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LIFE IN THE SPIRIT:
A Study in the History of Interpretation
of Romans 8:12-17.

Abstract

This study is intended to be a contribution to current discussions centered around Biblical hermeneutics. In structure, it takes its lead from the series begun in 1955, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neutestamentlichen Exegese*, edited by Oscar Cullmann et al. The thesis attempts to present a description of the opinions of major Biblical interpreters on the passage contained in Paul's Epistle to the Romans 8:12-17. These six verses have been chosen because of their breadth of reference to central Pauline concepts, and because of their concern for the theme, 'Life in the Spirit'.

The interpreters of this passage are considered in the thesis in chronological order, beginning with Origen, the first theologian to write a commentary on Romans, and concluding with Continental and English-speaking theologians writing just before
the close of World War I. Because of the impossibility of reporting on every exegete who has written on this passage in Romans, a number of criteria are established in the Introduction, and with these criteria in mind, the selection of documents and interpreters has been carried out. Also to be found in the Introduction are twenty-two exegetical problems posed by the writer; insofar as possible, each of the documents examined is analyzed with these questions in mind.

The thesis attempts to point out major shifts both in conclusions relating to the problems posed in the Introduction, and in the hermeneutical principles governing exegetes writing at different stages in the Church's history. The major divisions of the paper are: Greek Patristic Exegesis, Latin Patristic Exegesis, The Middle Ages, The Age of the Reformation, The Post-Reformation Era, and The Modern Era.

A final brief chapter of concluding observations contains some insights on the history of interpretation as a whole, and attempts to summarize values which New Testament scholars can hope to gain from such an historical study.
LIFE IN THE SPIRIT:

A Study in the History of Interpretation
of Romans 8:12-17

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Theology
for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree,
The University of Durham

C.M. Kempton Hewitt

May, 1969

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**IV. BIBLIOGRAPHY**
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<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Corpus Reformatorum</td>
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<td>CSEL</td>
<td>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, H.J. Vogels, ed.</td>
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<td>PG</td>
<td>Patrologia Graeca, J.-P. Migne, ed.</td>
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<td>RSV</td>
<td>Revised Standard Version.</td>
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<td>ZTK</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION.

The purpose of this study is to present descriptively and as fully as possible - within certain limits - a history of interpretation of Romans 8:12-17, encompassing the period beginning with Origen (ca. 185-254), who wrote the earliest commentary on Romans that we possess, and closing in the early 20th century with the Great War (1918). But before the actual analysis of the history of exegesis can begin, it is necessary to consider a number of prefatory questions: the rationale for the study itself; the reason for choosing this particular passage; a detailed list of problems which the passage presents; and a statement of the limitations of the study.

In 1955 the first contribution to the series Beiträge zur Geschichte der neutestamentlichen Exegese appeared in Germany.¹ Edited primarily by Oscar Cullmann, in conjunction with Ernst Käsemann, Harald Riesenfeld, Paul Schubert and Ernst Wolf, this series has given expression to one dimension of the

¹ Lukas Vischer, Die Auslegungsgeschichte von 1. Kor. 6, 1-11. The series is published by J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen.
current debate concerning Biblical hermeneutics.¹ As Gerhard Ebeling's thesis - viz., that the history of the Church can be fruitfully viewed as the history of the interpretation of Scripture - suggests,² until the dawning of the critical era, interpretation of Scripture had been carried out first and foremost in the context of Church life. With the establishment of exegesis as a critical and historical discipline centered at the universities, there came also a divorce of critical exegesis (viewed as an objective, historical 'science') from the theological use of Scripture in the churches.³ The publication of Karl Barth's Der Römerbrief in 1919 was a protest not against the historical-critical method, but against the implicit suggestion that this method constituted the entire task of interpretation. In the Foreword of that first edition, Barth said,

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3. All of these facts refer primarily to the situation in Germany - a qualification which must be kept in mind when speaking of men such as Barth, Bultmann, Käsemann, Ebeling, Fuchs and Gadamer.
The comments which Barth's commentary on Romans set in motion intersect present interest in the history of interpretation at a number of points. Perhaps the most obvious is the implicit (and sometimes explicit) suggestion made by Barth that theologians of the past had been far more successful than those of his era in wrestling with the 'Arbeit des Verstehens selbst'.

Would it then not be helpful to review how our spiritual fathers made clear (or obscured !) to their listeners that Paul spoke as prophet and apostle of the Kingdom of God to all men of all ages ?

1. Karl Barth, Der Römerbrief (Unverändert Nachdruck der ersten Auflage von 1919), Zürich, 1963, p.v (emphasis is Barth's).

2. In his preface to the second edition of Der Römerbrief, for example, Barth compares the treatment of Paul at the hands of Calvin and Jülicher. The result is a discrediting of Jülicher and all like him.
More generally, the tangled hermeneutic debate which followed in the wake of Barth's commentary and which continues to the present day demands more historical data; precisely because there is no agreement as to what 'interpretation of the Bible' is or ought to be, all of the evidence deposited with us by past generations of interpreters ought to be taken into consideration.

All of what has been said above and more is relevant to research on specific and problematic passages of the New Testament. Agreement with Barth's claim for Biblical interpretation - that Paul must be allowed to speak to men of this age - does not release us from the necessity of discerning and taking account of the inheritance of past generations of exegetes. On the other hand, an important part of the debate about hermeneutics concerns the relationship between 'scientific' or critical theology and the pronouncement of the Gospel in the churches. Because Biblical interpretation is acknowledged to be a problem shared by the entire Church, it has become increasingly clear that the Church must attempt to understand its own checkered history of interpretation.

'Why?' it may be asked. There are at least three reasons. The first is that the Church and its scholars, both before and since the Reformation, have faced a number of crises concerned with the interpretation of Scripture. By carefully and objectively setting out the history of these crises (and the periods between them as well), it is perhaps possible to provide a context for understanding our contemporary situation. The second reason relates to the greatest crisis the Church in the West has ever faced - the Protestant Reformation. Here again the hope is that a review of the history of exegesis would provide a useful context within which Protestant-Catholic dialogue might be carried out. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a survey of exegesis on specific passages might be of help to modern commentators by pointing out neglected or little-known suggestions, patterns of relationship lying behind better-known exegetical ideas, and perhaps even interpretive 'blind alleys'.

Our purpose, then, for conducting this study is to provide a selected range of interpretive data in a descriptive

1. F.W. Farrar, in the preface to his Bampton Lectures (1885), said, 'A recognition of past errors can hardly fail to help us in disencumbering from fatal impediments the religious progress of the future'. History of Interpretation, Grand Rapids, Michigan (U.S.A.), reprinted 1961, p.lx. Cited below as 'Farrar, 1885'.
manner on a single passage of Paul's Epistle to the Romans.¹

These particular verses, Romans 8:12-17, have been chosen for a number of reasons. It is a passage which in its detail is extremely problematic, containing two or three classically moot questions, yet it touches broadly upon a number of important Pauline themes: the contrast of ἰδρυματικός and ἰδρυμα, sonship and adoption, Pauline anthropology, the role of the Spirit in the life of believers, the experience of suffering on the part of Christians, the Christian hope, and (depending upon one's interpretation) the ministry of the Spirit of God in prayer.² We have grouped these themes together under the title, 'Life in the Spirit'. Verses 14, 15 and 16 are clearly

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1. From the outset, the writer agrees with the principle of method laid down by M.F. Wiles in the introduction to his excellent study of Patristic interpretation of Paul, The Divine Apostle (Cambridge, 1967), in which he points out that an evaluative study of the early Church's interpretation of Paul, '... could only be made on the basis of an agreed understanding of St Paul which, within the range of such a book as this, would have to be assumed rather than argued' (p.2). Cited hereafter 'Wiles, 1967'.

2. A recent doctoral dissertation submitted to the Christkatholisch-theologischen Fakultät of the University of Bern takes Romans 8:1-17 as a basis for examining Paul's understanding of the role of the Spirit in sanctification. A slightly revised version of this dissertation, written by Kurt Stalder, has been published as Das Werk des Geistes in der Heiligung bei Paulus, Zürich, 1962. The final 100 pages (pp.387-487) are essentially an exegesis of Romans 8:1-17.
linked as well with various doctrinal controversies in the Church's history. The passage is not obscured by textual problems and yet contains enough problems of punctuation, translation, and variant readings to demonstrate a progressive awareness—especially in the West—of the value and necessity of scrutinising the Greek text.¹

The importance of chapter 8, when set against the Epistle as a whole, is illustrated by the amount of research which has been carried out in recent times. In addition to Kurt Stalder's study on the Pauline conception of the Spirit's role in sanctification (8:1-17), there have been two major historical studies on other isolated groups of verses in chapter 8. The first is that of H.K. Gieraths, *Knechtschaft und Freiheit der Schöpfung; Eine historisch-exegetische Untersuchung zu Röm. 8, 19-22.*²

The second is also an historical study, but with a narrower scope: W.C. Brownson, *Protestant Exegesis of Romans 8:26f: A History and Evaluation.*³

¹. This thesis is not, however, a study of the textual criticism of Romans 8:12-17, but rather a study of the interpretation of that passage.

². Doctoral dissertation, University of Bonn, 1950. This dissertation is written in two parts. The first is a survey of the various types of interpretation of ἡ ζωὴ τουτεσταυρωμένη and the second is an independent exegesis of the entire passage.

There are two more general works, both dealing with Patristic exegesis of Paul, which have been of great help to the writer. The first is Paulus Lehrer der Väter by K.H. Schelkle, and the second The Divine Apostle by M.F. Wiles. There is no complete history of exegesis, but there are a number of helpful guides. Perhaps the most useful of these in English is F.W. Farrar's Bampton Lectures of 1885, History of Interpretation. A more recent publication, The Cambridge History of the Bible ('The West from the Reformation to the Present Day'), edited by S.L. Greenslade, while not claiming to be a systematic history of Biblical scholarship, has much information which is helpful. Less detailed but also helpful is Robert M. Grant's A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible. During the 18th and 19th centuries, a number of histories of interpretation (or 'Hermeneutik')


2. Wiles, 1967. Wiles also wrote The Spiritual Gospel, an examination of the early commentaries on St. John.


were published on the Continent. One which has retained its usefulness is that of the French scholar, Eduard Reuss, Die Geschichte der heiligen Schriften Neuen Testaments, which contains a very full and descriptive historical survey of exegetes and other Biblical scholars. Brief surveys of the history of exegesis are contained in Karl Hermann Schelkle, Das Neue Testament, and in Kurt Frör, Biblische Hermeneutik. Virtually the only general survey of Biblical interpretation in English is Beryl Smalley's The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages.

This study has a number of inevitable as well as purposeful limitations; the most important has to do with the choice of documents. It is probably humanly impossible to take into account every extant commentary written on the Epistle to the Romans, even over such a limited number of verses. In the

1. A bibliography of these can be found in Farrar, 1885, p.479f, and in Robinson's article, 'Hermeneutic since Barth' (cited above).

2. Braunschweig, part I, 1842-1887. The latest edition is the 6th, which has been frequently reprinted.


Patristic era, one can be confident, but beginning with the Carolingian period there is such a steadily increasing proliferation of written opinion that it would be foolish to claim that one had surveyed even a majority of the commentaries. There does not exist even a complete bibliography of such commentaries, much less a descriptive history of exegesis - even of one verse - which could claim to be complete. At best, such a study as the present can only attempt to sample representative opinion throughout the Church's history.

What then are the criteria for selecting one's documents? In the Patristic period and in the Middle Ages selection is limited by the survival and publication of the documents themselves. In the case of the Middle Ages, Beryl Smalley speaks of those which have been published as a 'tiny proportion' of the total in manuscript.¹

¹ Smalley, 1964, p.xi. This is also true of certain Anabaptist books of sermons and Biblical expositions in the 16th and 17th centuries. See 'Hutterite Writings', Ch.V (pp.151-253), in Hutterite Studies, Harold S. Bender, ed., Goshen, Indiana (U.S.A.), 1961.
At the time of the Reformation and with the advent of printing, there was an explosion of written comment on the Pauline Epistles, but a great many of these commentaries are not generally available. The selection (or rather, non-selection) of documents is, of course, virtually involuntary. The task of choosing from extant and available commentaries seriously begins with writers of the 16th century and becomes increasingly problematic as one moves toward the present century. In this expanse of time the decision to include or exclude a commentary has been made after asking the following questions: Does the writer occupy a place of general importance in the history of the Church? If not, does his commentary represent a unique point of view or exegetical method? If this is also not the case, then does the writer represent or typify a theological or ecclesiastical movement or school of exegesis which is not better represented elsewhere? If the answer to all of these questions is in the negative in the case of any one commentary, that commentary has often been omitted.

An example of this process of elimination in operation can be seen in the relative merits of the commentaries on Romans written by two lesser-known scholars of the Reformation, Peter Martyr (Pietro Martire Vermigli) and Johann Bugenhagen. Although Peter Martyr was a distinguished scholar, he does not occupy
a place of great importance in the events of the 16th century; further, his very detailed exegesis is quite similar in method to that of Bucer. Bugenhagen, as Luther's lieutenant and chaplain, was responsible for carrying through the Reformation of the Church in Northern Germany and Denmark; what is more, his commentary is unique in two ways: it is unusually original and it is an exegesis of Romans carried out by a man who was first converted by humanism and then by Lutheranism. For good or ill, the difficult decision was made to exclude Peter Martyr and include Bugenhagen. Other decisions were even more difficult to make, admittedly subjective, and open to question.

The second most important limitation has been a fixing of a terminus date. At first it was hoped that all of the important commentaries up to the present might be included. However, it became increasingly obvious that this would expand the study beyond reasonable limits. Therefore, the cut-off date for this study is the Great War or perhaps it would be better to say the point immediately preceding the publication of Karl Barth's *Der Römerbrief*. This decision is not completely arbitrary, for the entire current practice of interpretation was put into question by the publication of Barth's commentary. Further, the present debate over hermeneutics is clear indication that more mature and capable
scholars than myself have not yet been able to evaluate fully the impact of that single commentary on Romans. It is then both out of necessity (for sheer lack of space and time) as well as respect for Barth's prophetic pronouncement that 1918 has been chosen as the point at which to conclude this survey of literature.

Other minor and more obvious limitations and considerations include the following:
The writer has attempted to stay within the bounds of the primary documents themselves, except where an explanation is necessary, in which case a secondary authority may be referred to. The material is arranged in chronological rather than topical order; conclusions are drawn and patterns of interpretation and contrasts and parallelisms are pointed out periodically. Conclusions arising out of the study as a whole as well as observations relating to the content of the passage are made in one brief, final chapter.

Commentaries written in ancient languages, when referred to, have been translated, but modern languages have not. Where a standard English translation has been available, it has been quoted in the body of the thesis. All references to the English text of the Bible, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the Revised Standard Version (RSV); those to the Greek New Testament are taken from the Nestle text (21st ed., 1962); those to the Latin text of the New Testament
from the Wordsworth edition of the Vulgate; and those from the Hebrew Old Testament from the Kittel edition of *Biblia Hebraica* (1962). The terms 'exegesis' and 'interpretation' are used synonymously throughout this thesis.

Perhaps the most helpful way of proceeding with the study itself is to pose a number of questions which might be put to each interpreter. The following questions are the result of a close scrutiny of the Greek text; they are, of course, not the only ones which might be asked but they do represent a fair list of the most important:

1. Is ἀρχα o[v] to be taken strictly in its inferential and transitional sense (with the stress of inference, thus emphasizing the dependence of v.12 upon what has previously been said) or more loosely, perhaps in a slightly weakened sense of transition (with the implication that v.12 is the beginning of a somewhat new type of material, not so organically connected with the preceding)? If the first is true, from what part of the preceding material does v.12 draw its inference (i.e., vv. 1-11 inclusive, vv. 10-11, or simply v.11)?

2. Is the phrase ὄντες ἀρχα μετὰ τῆς σημείας ἐκπροσώπησεν ἀρχα ἀρχα ἄρχα to be read without punctuation ('we are
not under obligation to the flesh ...') or with a pause or stop after ἄν

('we are under obligation, but not to the flesh ...' assuming that that to which or to whom we are obligated is being implied but not actually written)?

3. If an unspoken (positive) obligation is implied in this sentence (i.e., the latter choice in question 2, above), then to whom is the obligation (positive) and what is the source of the obligation?

4. Is the articular infinitive (τοῦ νῃνακοῦ) taken as:
   (a) epexegetical (an explanation is offered in order to make clear what is meant by not being under obligation to the flesh, 'that is to live according to the flesh') or
   (b) consecutive (the result of being under obligation to the flesh is demonstrated 'so as to live according to the flesh') or
   (c) final (the purpose of design of being under such an obligation to the flesh 'in order to live according to the flesh')? Does Paul leave anything unexpressed, which perhaps he goes on later to express in another way, e.g., the positive obligation to the Spirit?

5. In what sense is σαρῆ to be taken as it is used in v.12 (and v.13 if θήμα and not οὐδὲν is read)?
6. What sort of death is \(\text{μεθέλετε} \; \text{ἀποθνῄσκεῖν}\), and what kind of life is indicated in \(\text{ήσεσθε}\)?

7. Is v.13a to be taken as a warning, and if so, what is the sense of such an exhortation in the light of such 'indicative' statements in the preceding section, e.g., vv. 2, 4, 9, 10 and 11? Or: Are the \(\text{ές}\) of both clauses in v.13 denoting a condition viewed as unfulfilled?

8. What precisely is being asked for in the phrase \(\text{πνεῦματι} \; \text{τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανάτου}\)?

   In this connection,
   (a) What is the sense of the dative \(\text{πνεῦματι}\)?
   (b) Is \(\text{πνεῦματι}\) indicative of the human (that is, Christian) spirit or the Holy Spirit?
   (c) What are \(\text{τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος}\)?
   (d) Should \(\text{τοῦ σώματος}\) or \(\text{τῆς σαρκὸς}\) be read?

9. In v.14, is part a a proof or evidence of, or a condition for part b?

10. Is v.14 exclusive ('only those who ...') or inclusive ('all those who ...')?

11. What ought the order of words in v.14b be: \(\text{νιόλι εἰσίν Θεοῦ} / \text{νιόλι Θεοῦ εἰσίν} / \text{εἰσίν νιόλι Θεοῦ}\)?
12. How does the Spirit of God lead believers? Is the verb in the passive ("ἀγωνία") to be taken as simply 'are led' or as 'allow themselves to be led'?

13. What does this saying concerning sonship have to do (if it does at all) with the preceding two verses?

14. In v.15, what is the 'spirit of slavery' and what is the 'spirit of adoption', with special reference to the question of how Πνεῦμα, in both cases, is to be understood?

15. Is the Πάλιν to be taken closely with ἔλαβετε or with εἰς φόβον?

16. Is ἐν οὐ κράτοι μεν to be taken closely with what comes before or with what follows (v.16)? In either case, what is the thought which connects ἀββά ὁ Πατήρ with its context here?

17. Is ὁ Πατήρ an explanation of ἀββά or is the entire phrase the cry? Why does Paul use the word ἀββά in writing to the Church at Rome?

18. In v.16 how precisely does the Spirit bear witness with our spirit (with the question in mind: Does this refer to the Spirit's role in prayer or not)?
19. How are the two \( \Pi \nu \varepsilon \iota \mu \alpha \tau \nu \) (v.16) to be defined?

20. What significance can be found in the progression of terms used in v.17; children, heirs, joint-heirs?

21. In v.17, is \( \varepsilon \Lambda \varepsilon \rho \) used in the sense of 'provided that' or 'since, as is indeed the case', and in what sense is suffering a condition to glorification?

22. To what does the verb \( \sigma \upsilon \nu \delta \zeta \varepsilon \alpha \gamma \theta \omega \mu \nu \varepsilon \nu \) bear reference?

Because many of these questions arise directly out of a close scrutiny of the Greek text, we ought not to expect every interpreter to be aware of all of them. Indeed, the questions which interpreters pose as they approach our passage vary considerably from historical epoch to historical epoch; neither would it be possible to report fully on each exegete's answer to each of these questions.

Finally, it is only proper to speak about one's own personal limitations as well as the structural limitations of the study itself. As I have moved through the panorama of the Church's history, I have been awed by the magnitude of learning and the search for truth which one finds there, and thus by the magnitude of my task. I have again and again been aware how inadequate and unprepared I am to conduct such a study. It can only be hoped that my own weaknesses have not, by bad association, marred the discoveries and wrestlings of great men.
With these purposes, limitations and questions in mind, we turn to the study itself.
II. THE HISTORY OF INTERPRETATION

OF ROMANS 8:12-17.

A. Greek Patristic Exegesis.

Origen.

In Origen (ca. 185-254) we meet by far the most important member of the Alexandrian school and the most influential exegete in the early history of interpretation. His exegesis left its mark not only upon this early period, but upon countless generations of interpreters to follow. Origen's Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, consisting of 15 books, was probably one of his later writings, coming before the commentary on Matthew and after his monumental work on the Gospel of John.¹ This commentary on Romans, unfortunately, has been lost. We are thus limited to an abbreviated (10 books) and free

Latin translation by Rufinus.¹

In Rufinus’s translation of the commentary on vv. 12-13, Origen is certain that there is no sense in which Christians are debtors to the flesh.² He prefaces this by referring to Paul's teaching earlier in chapter 8: the Spirit of Christ dwells in us and the gifts of the Spirit have been conferred upon us. This can only mean, therefore, that we are debtors,³ debtors on account of those things which without doubt

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1. The fragments found in Toura only include a commentary to 3:1 - 5:10. The Greek fragments from the Catenae as edited by A. Ramsbotham (‘The Commentary of Origen on the Epistle to the Romans’, The Journal of Theological Studies, 13, 1912, pp.209-224, 357-368; 14, 1913, pp.10-22) extend only to vv.3-4; 7; 24-26 in chapter 8. A more ambitious attempt toward establishing a critical Greek text of this part of Origen's commentary is Jean Scherer's Le Commentaire D'Origène sur Rom. III. 5 - V. 7., Le Caire, 1957, in the series Institut Français D'Archéologie Orientale, edited by Jean Sainte Fare Garnot.

2. For the sake of convenience, we speak of Origen, but it is understood that where we have no Greek fragments to compare, we have no way of knowing how accurate, much less faithful, Rufinus is being to Origen’s original commentary.

3. Rufinus places debitores sumus in inverted commas, thus indicating that he takes the indebtedness of Christians first and foremost in the positive sense; we are debtors of those things which we have received, etc. Only then does he go on to say that we are not debtors of the flesh. Cf. Migne, PG, XIV, Col. 1101.
we have received from the Spirit of Christ.\textsuperscript{1} Precisely what 'those things' are Origen has made clear in the immediately preceding section: the Holy Spirit inflames the hearts of those listening to the word of God when it is faithfully spoken. This results in the doing of deeds, so that what is taught is fulfilled in deeds. Only this result of doing demonstrates that we have the Spirit of Christ. Then follows a list of virtues, the possession and cultivation of which prove that one has the Spirit of Christ:

Christ is wisdom; if anyone should be wise according to Christ and knows the things which are of Christ, he has in himself through wisdom the Spirit of Christ. Christ is justice; if anyone should have the justice of Christ in him, through justice he has in himself the Spirit of Christ. Christ is peace; if anyone should have in himself the peace of Christ, through the Spirit of peace he has in himself the Spirit of Christ. So also charity, so also holiness, so also each and everything which Christ is said to be, he who possesses these must be believed to have in himself the Spirit of Christ, and to hope that his mortal body shall be vivified on account of the Spirit of Christ dwelling in him.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} 'Consequenter ergo nunc addit quia "debitores sumus", eorum sine dubio quae a Spiritu Christi consecuti sumus'. \textit{PG}, XIV, 1101.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{PG}, XIV, 1101: 'Christus sapientia est: si sit quis sapient secundum Christum, et quae Christi sunt sapient, habet in se per sapientiam Spiritum Christi. Christus justitia est: si quis habeat in se justitiam Christi, per justitiam habet in se Spiritum Christi. Christus pax est: si quis habeat in se pacem Christi, per Spiritum pacis habet in se Spiritum Christi. Sic et charitatem, sic et sanctificationem, sic et singula quaeque, quae Christus esse dicitur qui habet, hic Spiritum Christi in se habere credendus est, et sperare quod mortale corpus suum vivificabitur propter inhabitantem in se Spiritum Christi'. 
We are, then, debtors of all we have received. We are not, however, debtors to the flesh. Our debt of service is to God who created us in his own image; that we should serve the flesh is contrary to the purpose of our creation. The objection which someone might raise - How are we not debtors of the flesh when we are forced by necessity of nature to provide food and clothing for it? - is simply answered as follows: the sin lies in transferring life to the flesh. It is this sort of service to the flesh, instead of to the God in whose image we were created, which constitutes living 'according to the flesh' (v.12). We live 'according to the flesh' when we indulge the desires of the flesh and as regards this, we are in no sense debtors of the flesh. This is not to say that we deny the flesh those things which are necessary, but the concupiscence of the flesh we do deny.

Origen takes the exhortative element of v.13 with complete seriousness; on the one hand, 'those things' in us which

1. PG, XIV, 1101: 'Sed fortasse dicat aliquis: Quomodo carnis non sumus debitores, cum et victum et indumentum providere naturae necessitate cogamur?'

2. PG, XIV, 1101-1102: 'Hoc est carnis desideriis indulgere'.

3. In his translation, Rufinus, in introducing the phrase to be discussed, uses the subjunctive: 'Si autem spiritu actus carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis'. PG, XIV, 1102.
are indicative of the Spirit of Christ (above) are continually in
danger of being lost or smothered, and, on the other hand, the
mortification of the acts of the flesh is a condition placed upon
the promise of life. Origen interprets v.13b in terms of virtues
defeating vices:

Charity is the fruit of the Spirit, hatred is the act of the flesh: hatred, therefore, is put to death and extinguished through charity. Similarly, joy is the fruit of the Spirit but the sadness of this world which marks death is the act of the flesh; so this is extinguished if the joy of the Spirit be in us. Peace is the fruit of the Spirit, dissension and discord is the act of the flesh; but it is certain that discord can be put to death by peace. Thus also the patience of the Spirit extinguishes the impatience of the flesh, and goodness destroys malice, weakness ferocity, continence intemperance and chastity kills impurity, and of such an order that he who through the Spirit should mortify the acts of the flesh shall live.¹

The promise of life in v.13 does not refer to this common life we
know, but to 'eternal' life. This eternal life shall come to all
who are perfect and '... should mortify by the Spirit the acts of

¹. PG, XIV, 1102: 'Fructus est Spiritus charitas, odium carnis
est actus: odium ergo per charitatem mortificatur et
eextinguitur. Gaudium similiter fructus est spiritus,
tristitia vero hujus saeculi, quae mortem operatur, carnis est
actus: haec ergo extinguitur, si sit in nobis gaudium spiritus.
Pax fructus est spiritus: dissensio et discordia carnis est
actus: sed certum est discordiam mortificari posse per pacem.
Sic et patientia spiritus, impatieniæ carnis exstinguat, et
bonitas malitiam perimit, et mansuetudo ferociam, et continencia
intemperantiam, et castitas impudicitiam necat, talique ordine
qui per spiritum actus carnis mortificaverit, vivet'.

the flesh'. In the same way, the death which is being threatened (v.13) is not that common one, but that death of sin. But this mortification of the flesh is not instantaneous; rather, it is a gradual process requiring patience. Yet when one begins to progress more ardently and is filled with a more abundant Spirit, the acts of the flesh begin to suffer and wither away. Thus, for Origen, faithfulness in executing the mortification of the flesh has its own built-in reward. Perfection, as the end goal of this process, is witnessed to in Christians when there is no indication of sin either in deed or in thought. Then it is possible to say that the deeds of the flesh have been totally mortified.2

At the very beginning of Book 7, Origen deals with the problem of how \( \text{IVeCMA} \) ought to be understood in vv.14-16.3

1. PG, XIV, 1102: '... ita et vitam non hanc communem, sed illam dicit aeternam, ad quam perveniet omnis qui secundum ea quae supra exposuimus, perfectus spiritu mortificaverit actus carnis'.

2. PG, XIV, 1102: '... ubi vero ad perfectum jam venerint, ita ut nulla in eis prorsus vel in facto, vel in dicto, vel in cogitatu peccati oriantur indica, tunc plane actus carnis mortificasse, et ad integrum morti tradidisse credendi sunt'.

3. PG, XIV, 1103.
Early on in the commentary to chapter 8, the problem of how law was to be understood occupied Origen in a similar way. Now he says that just as the one word - law - stands for many different laws in Paul's mind, so we find here many different spirits indicated with the one word - \( \text{Πνεῦμα} \). In v.14, \( \text{Πνεῦμα} \) means the very Spirit of God, but that is not the meaning in v.15a (where \( \text{Πνεῦμα Σοφίας} \) is spoken of). The meaning in vv.15b-16 (\( \text{αὐτὸ} \ \text{τὸ Πνεῦμα} \) etc.) is, again, that of the very Spirit of God, but the second use of \( \text{Πνεῦμα} \) in v.16 is something completely different from both the Spirit of God and the \( \text{Πνεῦμα Σοφίας} \).

Origen's conclusion is that, 'Therefore, it seems, all men are led by some spirit ....' 1

This conclusion serves also as a transition; directly following it appears an excursus on the scriptural uses of the word \( \text{Πνεῦμα} \), as Origen attempts to clarify the meaning. He makes these points:

- There are many spirits but among these the Holy Spirit holds the domination and principality. 2

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1. PG, XIV, 1103: 'Omnes ergo homines, ut videtur, aguntur aliquo spiritu ...'

2. PG, XIV, 1103: '... sed in his principatum et dominationem hunc Spiritum sanctum, qui et principalis appellatur, tenere'.

- Although there are many spirits, still there is only one who 'truly proceeds from God himself and gives to all others the grace of his name and holiness'.

- All these various spirits are, in function, ministering spirits, as is clearly shown in Hebrews 1:14.

- There are also evil spirits and angels; that is, we call them evil because their ministry is to carry out God's penalties.

- These ministering spirits are all what we might name 'rational' spirits, but there are also 'material' spirits.

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1. PG, XIV, 1103: '... ita et spiritus mult1 qu1dem sunt, sed unus est qui vere ex Ipso Deo procedit, et caeteris omnibus vocabuli ac sanctificationis suae gratiam donat'.

2. PG, XIV, 1103: 'Quod autem plures sint spiritus, declarat idem Apostolus ad Hebraeos scribens et dicens ...'

3. 'Are they not all ministering spirits sent forth to serve, for the sake of those who are to obtain salvation?' Hebrews 1:14.

4. PG, XIV, 1104. The passage begins: 'Appellantur praeterea spiritus mali and angeli mal ...' His conclusion is: 'Sic ergo etiam hi qui dicuntur mali spiritus, officium Deo erga poenarum exhibent ministeria'.

5. PG, XIV, 1104: 'Quae omnia dubium non est quin de rationabilibus spiritus dixerim'.

6. PG, XIV, 1104: 'Quos tamen ego materiales magis quam rationabiles spiritus dixerim'. Included are such spirits as those mentioned in Isaiah 4:4; Psalms 47:8 and 105:25.
Now turning again to the two occurrences of \( \textit{πνεύμα} \) in v.15, Origen finds two different spirits, each performing its own proper ministry: sonship of God occurs through the spirit of adoption, and the slavehood of God (!) occurs through the spirit of servitude.\(^1\) This spirit of servanthood corresponds to a period of servanthood under fear in the life of the Christian. This stage of a Christian's life is not represented here by Origen as punitive, but in other places it can be used in that way.\(^2\)

Beginning from Ecclesiasticus 1:14 ('The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord'),\(^3\) Origen points out that the beginning of serving

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1. *PG*, XIV, 1105: 'Certum est autem quod filius quis Dei per adoptionis spiritum fiat, servus autem Dei per spiritum servitutis'.

2. In the commentary to John 8:47 (XX, line 33), Origen makes a similar, but not identical point to that made here: Christians receive in baptism the power to become children of God, but this does not unconditionally find fulfilment. Those who do not strive to hear his words (and this means for Origen, do his word) remain at the first stage of the children of God; this is because they have only believed. In this place Origen uses Romans 8:15 to interpret the words, 'He who is of God hears the words of God ...' saying that those who do not strive to hear the words of God remain servants and thus have not attained the spirit of sonship.

3. Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 1:14 is parallel to the canonical Proverbs 9:10.
God is always filled with the spirit of fear, just as when one is still a small child; fear is the tutor of such children. Thus life in a state of the fear of the Lord is pervaded by a spirit of servanthood; this ministering spirit's task is to act as a custodian until such time as the immature Christian comes into maturity and is worthy to receive the Spirit of adoption of sons.\(^1\)

This, therefore, is what Paul teaches, that after we have died together with Christ and his Spirit has been established in us, we do not again receive the spirit of servitude in fear; that is, we are not again made little ones, having the beginnings, but as if it were once perfect now we receive the spirit of adoption, "in which" Spirit "we cry: Abba, Father".\(^2\)

It is clear that Origen takes Παλαβί closely with Ελαβεί, but the distinction is not, as in Irenaeus, between the old and new covenants. The 'again' refers to an earlier stage in the Christian's life.

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1. PG, XIV, 1105: 'Vides secundum concessam sibi a Deo sapientiam Paulus quomodo spiritus qui dantur in timore, hic tutores parvulorum ac procuratores appellaverit, qui unumqueque nostrum donec parvulus est, secundum interiorem hominem in timore custodiant, usquequo ad id aetatis veniat quo spiritum adoptionis filiorum mereatur accipere, et sit jam filius ac dominus omnium'.

2. PG, XIV, 1105: 'Hoc ergo est quod docet Paulus, quia posteaquam commortui sumus Christo, et Spiritus ejus factus est in nobis, non iterum spiritum servitutis accepiimus in timore, hoc est, non rursus parvuli et initia habentes effecti sumus, sed quasi perfecti semel jam accipimus spiritum adoptionis, "in quo" spiritu "clamamus: Abba Pater".'
It is also clear that for Origen, the Holy Spirit (which he sometimes equates with \( \text{TITUS} \)) is not received in baptism. The Holy Spirit is won as the Christian reaches maturity; maturity means a perfecting of the process of mortifying the flesh, or a total death to sin. Earlier in chapter 8 \(^1\) the possibility of initial impartation of the Holy Spirit was considered and rejected. The reason for this rejection is Origen's fear that untried Christians might lose the spirit \(^2\) through acquiescence to the flesh.

There is, then, a double condition; not only must one be worthy of the gift of the Spirit of adoption, but he must also persevere faithfully if he is to retain this Spirit:

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1. I.e., in the commentary on vv.10-11: PG, XIV, 1099-1100.

2. PG, XIV, 1100: '... utrumnam ex initio omnibus iste spiritus datur, et postmodum pessimis et a Deo alienis actibus effugatur, secundum illud quod scriptum est: "Non permanebit Spiritus meus in hominibus istis, quia caro sunt" ...'
   The alternative to utrumnam is: 'or by merit of life and on account of faith it is given afterwards ...' ('....' an vitae merito, et fidei gratia postmodum datur ...').
Wherefore it seems to me that both by merits this gift is acquired, and by innocence of life it is preserved, and to each one according to his progress in faith and grace it is increased; and the more pure the soul is rendered, so much the more the Spirit is infused into him.¹

Origen interprets vv.15c-17 as one piece; it is the spirit in which we cry, 'Abba, Father'. Only a son says 'Father', and thus only Christians who have attained the Spirit of adoption pray confidently enough to say 'Father'. The mature Christian's attitude in prayer compared with that of the immature Christian, is for Origen an indication of a chasm of quality between the lives of those who are under the spirit of servanthood and those under the Spirit of adoption. The latter do nothing on account of fear of punishment, but rather do all out of their love of the Father.³

1. PG, XIV, 1100: 'Unde mihi videtur quod et meritis conquiratur hoc donum, et vitae innocentia conservetur, et uniuque secundum profectum fidei augeatur et gratiae; et quanto purior anima redditur, tanto largior ei Spiritus infundatur'.


3. PG, XIV, 1106: '... cum jam nihil inest timoris, id est nihil propter metum poenae gerimus, sed propter amorem patris cuncta perficimus'.
The witness rendered to one's spirit is given by the same Spirit through whom one is adopted. This testimony is conditioned upon the fact of one's moving up from a state of fear under a spirit of servanthood to a state of sonship and the receiving of the Spirit of adoption. The testimony of the Spirit is, then, for Origen both the guarantee of sonship as well as evidence of the reward — inheritance — given to sons. To draw a distinction

1. Origen finds it significant that it is to the spirit and not to the soul that the Spirit bears witness, for the spirit is the better part of man ('Bene autem non animae, sed spiritui, qui melior in homine pars est ...' PG, XIV, 1106).

2. Origen will use this idea later in offering one of three possible explanations as to what the first-fruits of the Spirit in v.23 mean: 'Or shall we rather understand this, that in accordance with what we have discovered above, there are many ministering spirits, ministering in service on account of those who receive the inheritance of salvation, under whom each individual believer is instructed, as under tutors and governors, until the time previously limited by his father, that is, until he has arrived at the legal age of the perfection of the soul: when a person, having already got beyond the spirit of slavery, which he had received in fear, and by which he was kept in safety, as by an attendant, is made worthy to receive the Spirit of adoption, the first-fruits of the Spirit, through whom when adopted as a son he can also be associated with the church of the first-born, which is in heaven. And as there is much difference between being a son and being a slave, so does the Holy Spirit, the first-fruits of which Paul says that he and those like him possess, differ much from the ministering spirit'.

between these two groups of men is not unjust. Abraham (Genesis 25:5) had only one heir - Isaac - but many sons by wives and concubines; to the latter he did not give his inheritance, but gifts or rewards. In the same way, those who serve in fear under the ministering spirit of servanthood are not excluded from God's gifts. Still the heredity, through which those who have received the Spirit of adoption are glorified with Christ, is not theirs. This, in fact, says Origen, is just what Paul offers in a neat syllogism:

... If we receive the Spirit of adoption, we are therefore sons. But if we are sons, without doubt we are also heirs. For the slave expects a reward, the son hopes for the heredity.¹

There is nothing particularly startling about this analysis of the logic of these verses, but Origen's basic definition of ἐν νόμῳ, in which he makes a distinction between different kinds of Christians, is, in turn, predicated upon acts of obedience and merit. This theological supposition makes his interpretation essentially unusable to generations of 'orthodox'

¹. PG, XIV, 1106: "Si spiritum adoptionis accepimus, ergo filii sumus. Quod si filii sumus, sine dubio et haeredes. Mercedem namque servus exspectat, haereditatem filius sperat".

Origen interprets the Christian's co-heirship with Christ in terms of shared power. Jesus' request, 'Father, I will that where I am, these also may be with me' (John 17:25), includes a share in Christ's inheritance as judge. Thus the Son says to his co-heirs in Matthew 19:28: 'And you shall sit upon the 12 thrones judging the 12 tribes of Israel'. God gave the Son all judgement (John 5:22), and this he shares with the other sons.

'Provided we suffer with him in order that we may also be glorified with him' (v.11), Origen takes as being fully conditional; from his historical situation, he has no difficulty in accepting the reality of physical suffering. Fully expecting to follow Christ in his suffering, he expects other Christians also to suffer. (Yet Origen does see, as we might expect, the mystical aspect of suffering, i.e., the death of self and union with Christ and his crucifixion.)\footnote{He quotes Galatians 2:19-20 and II Timothy 2:11-12 with this interpretation implied.} The condition is a straightforward one; those
who imitate Christ in his suffering will be exalted in glory with Him by God (Phil. 2:8-9). Christ gave to Christians the example of the course they are to follow, a course which begins in humility, is carried out in suffering, endured in patience, and which finally leads to exaltation in glory:

For this is the way which Christ opened for his co-heirs, that they might be exalted not by strength nor by wisdom, but by humility, and that they might obtain the glory of the eternal heredity by the patience of tribulations. ¹

As we shall see later, it does not take long — relatively speaking — until this obvious, direct and literal interpretation of Paul's word becomes so incongruous with the facts of the Church's general experience as to make it unacceptable as it stands.

¹. PG, XIV, 1107: 'Haec namque via est, quam cohaeredibus suis Christus aperuit, ut neque ex fortitudine, neque ex sapientia, sed ex humilitate exaltentur, et ex tribulationum patientia aeternae haereditatis consequantur gloriam'.
The Antiochene School.

Theodore of Mopsuestia.

As the master of the Antiochene interpreters, Theodore's exegesis of our passage must be given careful consideration. Theodore, rather unlike other Antioch interpreters, does not always concern himself with the formal literary and historical questions of the text. This neglect is also partially true for Chrysostom. But, for Chrysostom it is his calling as a homilist and his evident pastoral concern which dictate the questions he feels pressed to answer. Theodore, on the other hand, seeks to understand Scripture theologically, and because he is a Biblical theologian, it is in Theodore's exegesis that we find the most definitive statement (although a distinctive statement) of the theological underpinnings of the Antiochene group of
In regard to Theodore's method of interpreting the Pauline epistles,

... we may say that Theodore draws his theology from the text, organizes it somewhat systematically, and then reimposes the more sophisticated system upon the text.

In his exegesis of chapter 8 of Romans we have abundant illustration of Theodore's tendency to reimpose his own elaborate theological system on the Biblical text.

1. Antiochene exegetics do not, as if by some pre-arranged agreement, share a totally homogeneous body of doctrine; but there are tendencies of viewpoint as it concerns philosophical indebtedness, especially as it concerned anthropology, immortality, the nature of Πνεύμαντος etc. This is, of course, especially the case in the degree to which each theologian had consciously or unconsciously rejected, accepted or modified the Platonism of the day. There is no way of knowing to what degree this process was deliberate but the end result is, in Theodore's writing, clearly evident. For it was Theodore's ability (a) to distinguish the implications of such philosophical problems; (b) to submit those implications to theological reflection; and, (c) to re-state a Biblical theology which was applied to the interpretation of the Scriptures, which made him such a brilliant figure in the history of theology. The interpreters reviewed in this thesis and generally recognized as belonging to the Antiochene School are: Diodore, presbyter of Antioch, bishop of Tarsus (died ca. 390); John Chrysostom, presbyter of Antioch, bishop of Constantinople (ca. 347-407); Severian, bishop of Gabala (flourished ca. 400); Theodore, presbyter of Antioch and bishop of Mopsuestia (ca. 350-428); Theodoret, student of Chrysostom and Theodore, bishop of Cyrrhus (ca. 393-458). Although he does not deal directly with our passage, I have been greatly helped by H.E.W. Turner's B.D. Thesis (Oxford, unpublished), Some Aspects of the Antiochene Exegesis of Holy Scripture up to the Council of Chalcedon, a copy of which Professor Turner graciously allowed me to use.

Theodore's interpretation of the entire 8th chapter of Romans is dominated by the doctrine of the Two Ages - Theodore's own particular view of redemption set in the context of time and history.1 Taken in its parts, his exegesis is repetitive and rather ambiguous, but seen in its broadest strokes it portrays, with considerable detail and perception, the situation of the believer caught between the Two Ages - living out a tension

1. It is fortunate that we have a fairly complete set of fragments from Theodore's commentary on chapter 8 of Romans, for this chapter gives him opportunity to discuss some of his most significant and distinctive views: man conceived as the Bond of Creation; the dissolution of that bond and the re-unification of creation in Christ (v.19); the nature of the adoption as children and sons (v.15); the relationship of sin to mortality (vv.3-4, 5-6, 9); the role of the Spirit in salvation (vv.9, 15); and his highly eschatological understanding of redemption as both 'already' and 'not yet', which in turn is based upon his doctrine of the Two Ages (vv.9, 15, 25-28). While all are important, the paragraphs commenting upon vv.15 and 19 of this chapter offer us definitive statements on important aspects of his theology. It is only to be regretted that we do not have his commentary to v.23, a verse suggesting themes so fundamental to Theodore's views that it would seem impossible for him not to have written at length upon it. The text of the commentary referred to here is contained in, Karl Staab, Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche, XV in Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen, Münster, 1933. Cited below as 'Staab, 1933'.
implicit in redemption and history:¹

Life as we know it in the Present Age (Romans 8:2) is characterized by (a) mortality and therefore subjection to the yoke of sin; and (b) participation in the Spirit, by whom we shall be transformed from mortality to immortality in the Resurrection. By interpreting 'the Spirit of life' as the Spirit which is able to bring about immortal life and by casting all of v. 2 in the future (as referring to what will come about at the dawning of the Second Age), Theodore clearly reveals one of his most basic convictions; any complete statement of redemption must begin with this scheme.

Salvation is to be understood in a dramatically historical context; thus any basis for a radical individualism is swept away.² As we

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1. The best summary of this important doctrine is given by Theodore himself in his commentary on Genesis. The relevant extract is translated in Greer, 1961, p. 72f and in R.A. Norris, Manhood and Christ, Oxford, 1963, p. 161. The latter is cited below as 'Norris, 1963'.

shall soon see, this is only a part of Theodore's understanding of redemption but it is a fundamental part. Two focal points in this scheme of the Two Ages are Baptism (present), by which men are given the gift of the vivifying Spirit, and the Resurrection (future), at which time the work of the Spirit is brought to full realization. But the emphasis is not always evenly distributed nor are tidy compartments of present and future kept apart in the course of Theodore's development. When Theodore wishes to stress the objective aspect of redemption in which God, at some future, eschatological time and with a single mighty sweep, accomplishes our salvation, he tends to cast redemption totally in the future:

The apostle says that by participation in the Spirit, the resurrection comes about; for, he says, "a natural body is sown, it is raised up a spiritual body" [Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44a] and thus when He prevails we shall live in incorruptibility and immutability ....
The Spirit, he says, which is given to us in order that we may hope for immortality - and faith in Christ has bestowed upon us the enjoyment of immortality already - has "liberated me" from death and sin. It is clear that Paul here shows what will be and what Christ has given us when he will make an end to these matters, for we will then receive freedom from death, we will not only be resurrected, but also receive immortal life. Then we are liberated from sin; then we have become immutable by
the grace of the Spirit and will not be liable to sinning: for it is obvious that during this life we are mortal and lie under the duress of sin.\footnote{1}

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1. Staab, 1933, p.133: Τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος μετουσίᾳ τῶν ἁμά- στάσεων γίνεσθαι ὁ ἀπόστολος φησίν: ὅτε λέγεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἔρεισθαι σῶμα πνευματικόν, ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ τότε κρατοῦν τόσο ἡμᾶς ἐν ἀφθορίᾳ, το καὶ ἀτρεπτεῖντε... το τοίχων πνεύμα, φησί τὸ εἰς ἐλπίς τῆς ἀθανασίας ἡμῶν δεδομένον, οὐ τίν πάσανυν ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν Χριστὸν πίστις παρέσχεθαι ἡμῖν, ἀπόδηλα εἶν με τοῦ τε θανάτου καὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας. διὸν δὲ ὅτι ἂπό τῶν μελλόντων πελεται τήν ἀπόδειξιν τῶν διὰ Χριστὸν παρασχεθεόνων ἡμῖν, ὅτε ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐκκλησίας λάβεται, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ τοῦ θανάτου ἐλευθερία τότε ἡμῖν προσ- γενόμεθα, οὐκ ἀνιστάμενοι μόνον, ἀλλὰ πάρ καὶ θανάτου ἑυστομοῦμεν. τότε δὲ καὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἀπαλαττό- ῥεθα, τότε ἀτρεπτόν ἐφονότος ἐπὶ τοῦ πνεύματος χαρίτι, ἁμαρτεῖν οὐκ ἐπιδεχόμεθα. κατὰ πάρ τοῦ τῶν παρόντα βέον πρόσηλον ὡς θεντοὶ τέ ἐσμεν καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐνόχλησιν κεῖμεθα.
Here Theodore has largely neglected the deliverance already obtained in baptism but has hinted at it in the phrase

\[ \text{οὐ τὴν ἀπολαύσειν ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν Χριστὸν πίστις παρέσχεκεν ἡμῖν} \]

the believer is not simply caught between the Two Ages - rather he participates in the Future Age even while bound over to this present life. Baptism can only pre-figure man's redemption because redemption can be nothing short of the removal of death. And yet, even that pre-figuring is so concrete and certain as to make the final goal a present fact. Living in the light of the present reality of the fact of redemption is referred to variously (in his commentary on vv.5-6) by Theodore as 'the thinking of the soul' (\( φρονήματι τῆς ψυχῆς \)), as opposed to the Biblical 'thinking of the flesh' (and replacing Paul's own contrast,

1. Precisely how this comes about in the believer is a highly complicated question and beyond the scope of this paper to develop in full. But of primary importance is Theodore's understanding of Christ as the 'Leader' or 'Pioneer' whose model of perfect ethical obedience - as Homo Assumptus - both makes possible and elicits our perfection of obedience before we cross over into immortality. Indeed, there is a strain of thought in Theodore which says that perfection of obedience is the path to immortality. It is this theme which is under-emphasised in Theodore's commentary to Romans 8. (Cf. Norris, 1963, p.191f). Also important for Theodore is participation in the Church's life and sacraments (Cf. Greer, 1961, Ch.4, 'Redemption, the Church and Sacraments and the Christian Life', pp.66-85).
'the thinking of the Spirit'); and, those who have reason (or, those who have 'a stronger mind' - \( \lambda \nu \iota \sigma \mu \omicron \omicron \varsigma \)), in contrast to the 'weaker ones' (\( \tau \omicron \omicron \nu \chi \epsilon \iota \rho \omicron \nu \omicron \nu \)).

Living in this manner is made possible precisely because Christians are established in the promise of immortality. This amounts to living on the exalted plane of immortality - by anticipation - even though we are still living under the burden of mortality and thus sin:\(^1\)

\[ \text{Romans 8:5-6} \ldots \text{he says that sinning follows mortal men throughout, but when we have become immortal we are liberated from sinning, so that in comparison that which Christ brings about appears to be much superior to the law, because the law could not take away death and thus} \]

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1. For Theodore, mortality is the cause of sin, which probably explains the reason he reverses Paul's order from 'sin and death' to 'death and sin'. Swete's remark (In Epistolæ B. Pauli Commentarii, I, Cambridge, 1880, p.LXXXVII), that for Theodore '... death is the sting of sin, rather than sin of death', catches the significance of this important variation in Theodore's theology, but reflects Swete's inadequate analysis of Theodore's weaknesses ('His errors are mainly due to an imperfect realization of the nature and extent of human sin'. p.LXXXVII). The difficulty of Theodore's theological system is that a seam of interconnected ambiguities runs throughout the entire fabric. Norris, 1963, clearly demonstrates that this series of inconsistencies runs throughout and accounts for the difficulty involved in any systematic study of Theodore. These inconsistencies and ambiguities are fully reflected at every important turn in his commentary on chapter 8 of Romans.
sin must reign in us even if the soul was educated a myriad times — as is indeed needful. But Christ removed death and with death he took off the duress of sin which was in us.¹

In his commentary on v.9, Theodore adds to this that we are established in the promise through baptism, for baptism is a symbol or type (τόμος) of the resurrection in which we are made immortal and immutable. And just as we are changed by participation in the Spirit,² so that same Spirit is bestowed upon us in baptism

1. Staab, 1933, p.134. Αἰπεντεθεν λοιπὸν διὰ πλεονίων λέγειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν θνητοῖς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν ἔπεται πάντως, ἄθανατοι δὲ, μετανοότες ἀπολλαγμέθα τοῦτον, ὑπὸ τοῦ κατὰ παράθεσιν φανερῶς τὰ κατὰ Χριστὸν πλεόστον ὑπέρεχοντα τοῦ νόμου ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀφελεῖν τὸν θανάτον οὐκ ἦσανατο, καὶ ἄναρχη πάσα ἡ κατατέιν ἐν ἕμιν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, καὶ μυριάκης ἐπάθεσεν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σέον· ὁ δὲ χριστός τὸν τῇ θανάτῳ ἀφεῖλε καὶ τὴν ἐνοχίαν ἕμιν τὴν ἁμαρτίας ἐνόχλησιν συνανείλε τῇ θανάτῳ.

2. ἢ τὴν ἀνάσθαιν τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος μετουσία γίνεσθαι...
and becomes a pledge (απραβίν) for the future.\(^1\) Paul's statement in v.9 ('... if the Spirit of God really dwells in you') ought not to raise doubts in the minds of Christian readers because the pledge of, and participation in, the Spirit assures us of the fact of our future transformation. Those who have been baptized and remain faithful do have the Spirit and the reality of his presence ought to be all the assurance anyone needs:

It is clear that the promise concerning the resurrection is true and it is hoped that participation in the Spirit will survive as the fruition of it. For it is impossible that those who have received the pledge will not also gain the rest.\(^2\)

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1. Wiles, 1967, writes: 'Baptism represents the moment of transference to this resurrection life, but it is a transference not in full reality but "at the level of prefigurative symbol" (κατὰ τóτεν). It is true that baptism does at the same time impart the first-fruits of the Spirit, but Theodore is insistent that the real evidence to justify Paul's theological assertions cannot be found in present experience but only in the future. It is the new status as something received κατὰ τóτεν in baptism and pointing forward to its future realization rather than the first-fruits of the Spirit as a present possession that is primary in the thought of Theodore'. (p.122).

2. Staab, 1933, p.135: διδόν ὡς ἀληθές ἑ περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐπαρρέλαια ἵν τὸν ἀπολαυσιν ἐν τοῦ πνεύματος μετοπίαν περιέσεθαι ὡμῖν ἐλπίζοντες οὐδὲ ἑ φαν εἰς τοὺς τῶν ἄρραβίνα ἔκλινων ὑποδεξαμένους μὴ καὶ τὸ οὔτων κομίσασθαι
In this passage, Theodore once again reveals his intensively eschatological understanding of redemption. He makes the same point in different ways, and one of his favourite forms of expression - adoption - is found in his next comment (v.15). After a rather typical Antiochene interpretation of v.15a, Theodore plainly states that we are not yet fully adopted and will not be until the dawning of the next age:

Well it is to say "Abba, Father" because it is common for little children to call their fathers "Abba". For those who were counted worthy of baptism were children, still, according to their present life, waiting for the perfect and true sonship of the coming age.3


2. Theodore explicitly states that Παλιω belongs to σουλειας and, like Chrysostom, begins from the assumption that the Holy Spirit was not directly revealed in the Old Testament.

Here the basic tension in all of Theodore's writings is evident: in baptism we have been made children in a special way, and partakers of the future age. But a part of our perfection consists in our participation in the perfect obedience of Christ, the culmination of which is our being raised as he was raised from death to a life immortal.\(^1\) Theodore's final words on v.15 summarize this tension:\(^2\)

The words "Abba, Father" he wrote not only to indicate the awaited perfection but also as a symbol of the present condition in which, like children, they did not receive complete enjoyment of participation in blessings,

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1. Chapters 14 and 15 of Norris, 1963, give an excellent summary of Theodore's understanding of man's predicament and his redemption through Christ.

2. The tension of the Christian caught between the Two Ages is reflected, as we have said, throughout Theodore's comments to this chapter. Of particular interest, however, is that of v.26, where the expectancy resulting from this tension has moved Theodore to understand prayer as longing after the goal of the future age. Thus, prayer is reshaped to mean essentially 'hope'. (The reversion to the theme of hope in Theodore's writings is, in fact, typical. Cf. Wiles, 1967, p.122).
but awaited the reception by them of these things as well in accordance with the present promises.  

In summary of Theodore's unusual handling of these relevant passages in chapter 8, we can say - however much an anomaly it may seem - that which God has promised to do for us and of which the water of baptism is the pledge, i.e., the transformation of our natures from mortal to immortal in the future age, we have been enabled by the pioneering effect of Christ's work and the anointing of the Spirit to bring about in this age by lives of perfect and free obedience to God.

Diodore.

Unfortunately we are left with mere fragments of Diodore's commentary to Romans, and even those fragments have come to light only in modern times. There is a short commentary on v.15, one on v.16, and a very helpful comment upon vv.17-18.

In the commentary to v.15, parallels to Chrysostom's interpretation - as we shall see later - are evident. In fact, it is easy to see how Chrysostom might have taken the basic, single idea from Diodore and expanded upon it in his usual pastoral manner,

1. Cf. J. Quasten, Patrology, III, Utrecht, 2nd ed., 1963, p.397. Diodore was condemned by a synod at Constantinople in 499 as the originator of Nestorianism. As is the case with so many early writers, this rush to judgement deprived later generations of documents of incalculable worth.

2. In order that we might better understand the influence of Diodore upon his student Chrysostom, we shall review Diodore's exegesis of v.16 at the same time we deal with that of Chrysostom, immediately following.

3. Diodore comments on the prayer (Abba, Father) under v.16, while under v.15 he considers only v.15a, i.e., the contrast between the spirit of servanthood and the spirit of adoption. The commentary to v.15 is found in Staab, 1933, p.92.
for Chrysostom bases his long list of differences (see section following) upon the distinctiveness of this dispensation (of which 'we' are partakers) from the former dispensation (of which 'they', the Jews, were partakers). In this development, Chrysostom repeatedly characterizes the difference between the two in terms of the quality of obedience seen in the two peoples, representing 'their' experience of God as an earthy, temporal and inferior one, and 'ours' as a spiritual, other-worldly one. All of these ideas are not explicit in Diodore's exegesis but, with a little imagination, all can be drawn fairly from it.

The contrast for Diodore is essentially between dispensations, i.e., law and Gospel. It is a sign of servitude (δουλείας σημεῖον τῷ ἑτέρῳ), says Diodore, when, after receiving commands from the law and neglecting those commands, one trembles in fear for the threatened punishment. For Diodore, then, it is existence in a state of servitude (i.e., the old covenant) as much as the neglect of the law's command which is at fault.¹

¹. Wiles, 1967, pp. 62ff, has accurately summarized the Antiochene School's view of the law in relation to faith. He makes it clear that the tendency of the Antiochene School is to stress the differing abilities of law and faith to achieve righteousness. This tendency is linked to the view that a righteousness achieved by the law would have been sufficient if only it had been possible, in opposition to other early writers who conceived of two kinds of righteousness (a greater and a less, law and Gospel) and that of the law being good and proper when seen in its right context.
The superiority of the Gospel in obtaining pragmatic results - righteousness - by going to the root of the problem - 'the weakness of human flesh' - lies behind Diodore's exegesis. This he has already made clear in his commentary to vv.3-4. There, to Paul's words, 'For that which was impossible to the law, in that it was weakened through the flesh...,' Diodore comments: Paul does not mean that the law commands impossible things, but that it is impossible for the flesh to fulfil the command of the law because of the hindrance of the evil one (διὰ τὸν ἐμποδίου ταῦτα πονηρόν), i.e., under the unmitigated condition in which man existed before Christ. Diodore sustains our interpretation of his words in v.15a (above) when he comments a few lines later to the words, '... in order that the just requirements of the law might be fulfilled' (v.4), that the meaning is that the law wanted to fulfil the command of righteousness (ὅτε βουλέτε μὲν πληρώσαι δικαιώμα τοῦ ρώμος) but was so weakened by its compromises to the weaknesses of man, that it found it impossible to do so. (The law, however, did perform a useful educative function).


2. With minor variations, it is safe to say that with the possible exception of Theodore this is essentially the view of the law which all the Antiochene writers took.
In summary of Diodore's exegesis of the first half of the contrast in v.15a, we can say that life under the \( \text{T\nu\varepsilon\S\nu\l e\i\acute{\i}\as} \) \( \Delta\nu\l e\i\acute{\i}\as \) in the old dispensation could result in nothing else but servitude - i.e., a condition in which one must live in a continual state of fear of punishment - for neither can man fulfill the law's command on account of rampant evil, nor can the law bring about the righteousness at which it aims.

Diodore sees the point of the contrast in terms of the practical results of the law on one side and the Gospel on the other. This is seen in his characterization of the second half of the contrast: '... but to be allowed to call God "Father" on account of our purity of life is in itself promise of the hope for adoption.'¹

Thus the contrast between expectation of punishment awaited in fear and living in the hope of adoption becomes a sub-theme, while the major theme (although not stated so explicitly) is that of the difference between dispensations and the 'just desserts of the two peoples'. In fact, Diodore ends his comment by saying that it is

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¹ Staab, 1933, p.92 : τὸ δὲ ἔπιγραμμαν πατέρα τὸν θεὸν ἀποκαλεῖν σιὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου καθαρότητα νίκθεσίας ἐλπίδας ἐπαφρεδδεταὶ.
the same Πνεύμα in both cases, varying its working
to what each people deserves (..., κατὰ τὴν ἀμφότερων ἀξίαν).\(^1\)

1. The statement must be seen in the light of Diodore's comment to v.2: 'He Paul said "Law of the Spirit" to distinguish it from the law of the scripture, instead of which there is now the enlivening grace of Christ'. (Staab, 1933, p.90:

Νόμον τοῦ Πνεύματος εἰτεν ἀντισταθεὶσαι πρὸς τὸν νόμον τοῦ γράμματος, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ χαρίς ἢ τευτονίσος.

Thus, what Diodore means is that the Spirit was not given in the old dispensation but the law was spiritual and in a distinctive way related to the work of the Spirit. Or, as Wiles summarizes Chrysostom's view: 'The Law is spiritual because it taught the way of virtue, of life in the Spirit, but it could not complete the task by actually giving the Spirit', (Wiles, 1967, pp.62-63). Diodore may seem to suggest in his ambiguity that the Holy Spirit is at work in both cases ('spirit of servanthood'... 'spirit of adoption'), but this could hardly be the case in the light of what he says in other places (above).
Diodore rejects all attempts to rationalize or in any other way soften the suffering of which Paul speaks in v.17. Specifically, he says that Συμπίπτω Χείλι cannot be understood in some abstract, metaphorical sense such as 'to sympathize' (Συνάψω Υφίστα) or 'to grieve along with'. (Συνάψω Ψυχόεικος) Christ in his death. This is preposterous if for no other reason than that Christ did not suffer anything against his will, nor was he weak in his suffering - a fact demonstrated by his trying to spare the sorrow of those gathered about him in his death. What then does suffering with Christ mean?

It means choosing to endure the same suffering as Christ, who represented truth, endured from the Jews. If we, being persecuted in the same manner, steadfastly endure and do not reproach when we are

1. Here we have a fine example of a major Antiochene exegetical principle in operation: any attempt to explain away the difficulty of the text by metaphorical interpretation is rejected; the historical meaning must be got at and maintained. This principle, however, is not without its own difficulties, as is well illustrated here, for Christians of Diodore's time could not normally be expected to die for their faith.
dishonoured, if we are prepared to suffer death for our own faith, thus suffering the same things as He suffered, we will also be glorified by becoming "children of God and joint-heirs of Christ". ¹

Then we come to a most intriguing comment: after establishing the meaning of the words (v.17, above), Diodore goes on to interpret the theology of the statement in the light of his understanding of Paul:

And inasmuch as he said that "to suffer with Christ" is the cause of our "being glorified" with Him, it seemed to him that this was the reward of woes and not a gift of grace even if, above all, the gift graciously bestows forgiveness.

¹ Staab, 1933, p. 93: ... τὸ τὰ αὕτα πάθη αἰρεότατα ὑπομένειν ἀπὸ Χριστὸς τινὸς ἀδημότειν πρεσβεύων πάσχειν ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων ἤνεσχέτο. ἕναν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διωκόμενοι καρτερῶμεν, ἀτιμάζομεν μιὰ συνφορῶμεν, ἕναν πρὸς θάνατον ἐτοίμας ἐχώμεν ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας ὡς αὐτῷ συμπαθῶντες, καὶ συνδεσμοθεωμέθα ἐν τῷ ἱερέσθεια τεκνὰ Θεοῦ καὶ συγκληρονόμοις Χριστοῦ.
for past sins. Having set this straight, he goes on, saying that God does not give us the fruit of citizenship in proportion to our sufferings, but rather it is multiplied and exceeded far and above what we have deserved by our toiling.¹

From this there are a number of interesting and necessary things to be said: Chrysostom is, almost without doubt, dependent upon Diodore's exegesis in almost every detail except the 'psychologizing' of the text which is so typical of Chrysostom. Specifically, the two major points Chrysostom makes are to be noted: (a) Paul wants to show that the gift of God is not of grace only, and (b) no matter how worthy our human efforts might be, God rewards us far out of proportion to our merits. These are precisely Diodore's points, although stated considerably more directly and clearly. Convinced as they were that Paul overemphasized grace, the Antiochenes found in v. 17 an excellent opportunity for Paul to set the record straight

¹ Staab, 1933, p. 93: καὶ ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν τὸ συμπᾶσχεν Χριστῶν ἡμῖν γίνεσθαι τὸ συνδιάθεντα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἔδωκεν τὸ τοιοῦτον καμάτων εἶναι μοσθὸς καὶ οὐ κατὰ χάριν δωρεά, εἴ καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον ἡ δωρεά τῶν θεασάντων ἀμαρτημάτων ἀμωβήτειν χάριτε σας. Τούτῳ διορθούμενος ἐπηγάγεν ὅτι οὐ πρὸς ἀναλογίαν τῶν καμάτων μετρεῖται ἡμῖν θεός τῆς πολιτείας ὁ καρπός, αλλὰ πολυπλοκίσκων καὶ ἐπερχαίνων πολλῶν ἐν ἀξίαν τῶν πεπονθήκην.
(cf. the τοῦτο στοιχεῖον 'amending this ...' above). Hence the Antiochene writers must, at minimum, be given credit for allowing the conditional idea of v.17 its fullest and most powerful effect. But even more interesting than this emphasis—which we ought to have expected—is reminder that God 'outdoes' all human effort. For in the Antiochenes's attempt to strike a balance on both sides of the divine-human relationship, the reminder must be given that whatever man does, God does more.¹

This piece of empirical data must be taken into account in any evaluation of early Patristic understanding of Paul's view of salvation and grace.

¹. This is so perhaps above all in passages where Paul speaks about suffering for one's faith. Wiles, 1967, p.107, notes that Chrysostom often explains Paul's neglect of the human side in suffering by saying that if Paul were to make too much of the merit of our suffering, we would be in danger of ignoring the divine side. This observation aptly fits the development of both Diodore's and Chrysostom's exegesis of v.17.
St. John Chrysostom.

The contents of the extant works of St. Chrysostom have withstood judgement throughout the Church's history perhaps better than any other early Greek Father. The extent of what has survived from this library is witness to the esteem in which Chrysostom has been held, for his writings come down to us more entirely preserved than any other Antiochene of this important period. This is, of course, partially because Chrysostom was more concerned with pastoral topics than prevailing theological controversies

1 (the theological content of his writings weathered the test of subsequent Church councils far better than any of his Antiochene peers), but more so because of his appealing and popular style. His *Exegetical Homilies* remain fresh, relevant, and surprising as such a claim may sound, at least partially usable right down to the present time.

Throughout the centuries of

1. It can safely be said that '...he was not involved in any of the great dogmatic controversies of the fourth century'. Quasten, 1963, p.474.

2. Hans von Campenhausen, *The Fathers of the Greek Church*, English translation, revised by L.A. Garrard, London, 1963, p.157, notes: 'The Homilies of Chrysostom are probably the only ones from the whole of Greek antiquity which at least in part are still readable today as Christian sermons. They reflect something of the authentic life of the New Testament, just because they are so ethical, so simple, and so clear-headed'. Cited hereafter as 'Campenhausen, 1963'.

Intervening Church history, no other interpreter of Scripture has been read with such confidence or has exerted such influence upon Biblical exegesis in general. Even in periods when the Greek language was in a state of near eclipse (as it was in the Middle Ages), Chrysostom's interpretations continued, in Latin translations, to press their claim.

In a passage such as ours,¹ Chrysostom is very much at home, for he sees the beginning of an exhortation in v.12, and exhortation — especially as it concerns itself with a high ethical demand — is Chrysostom's commanding interest. He demonstrates this propensity well in a long, preceding section over v.11. While most early interpreters utilize this verse along with vv.9 and 10 as proof-texts to support arguments in Trinitarian disputes, Chrysostom plunges immediately into moral instruction and thus avoids the central problems involved in the

moot issue of the Spirit's role in the resurrection of Christians.¹ He does not go into the question whether the participle is genitive or accusative case (he reads ἐνοικοῦν) but instructs his hearers how they are to go about guarding and preserving the 'quickening' of the Spirit until the time of resurrection. Thus the point of emphasis in this section is much the same as with Origen — those who have the Spirit can lose it and therefore must strain every effort not to lose it. Chrysostom promotes his moral instruction by means of a very artistic paradox: mortify the works of the body that the Spirit's 'making alive' (quickening) be maintained:

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¹ Chrysostom does not deduce from this verse that only those who have the Spirit will rise. This would put the idea of hell in jeopardy, for how, asks Chrysostom, can there be a judgement without a resurrection of the just and the wicked? Thus Chrysostom is led to assume that Paul is not speaking of the Spirit's role in the resurrection, but the quickening of the body, which is done by the Spirit, given first in baptism and referred to often by Chrysostom as the 'Gift'. This Gift is to be preserved by means of an upright, ethical and religious life: Διὰ τούτο οὐκ εἶπεν, Ἀναστάσεως, ἀλλὰ Ἰωσήφου τὸ πέπλων τῆς ἀναστάσεως ὑμῶν, καὶ τοὺς σίκαλος μονοῖς ἀσώρφαμεν. (PG, LIX, 519). ('This is why he did not say, shall raise up, but shall quicken. And this is a greater thing than resurrection, and is given to the just only') LNPF, XI, p.436).
Suffer not thy body then to live in this world, that it may live then! Make it die, that it die not. For if it keep living, it will not live: but if it die, then it shall live.\footnote{LNPF, XI, p.436; PG, LIX, 520: Μὴ τούων ἀφῆς γίνω τὸ σῶμα νῦν, ἐνα τὸτε ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸ ἄποθεανεῖν, ἐνα μὴ ἄποθανεν. Ἐὰν γὰρ μένῃ ἂν, ὦ Ἱσοταλ, ἡαν δὲ ἄποθανεν, τὸτε Ἱσοταλ.}

The motivation for this radical demand upon the lives of Christians is one favored by Chrysostom and one appealed to often in his writings:

And so if while here thou drive away the grace of the Spirit, and do not depart with it still safe, thou wilt assuredly perish, though thou dost rise again. For as He will not endure then, if he see His Spirit shining in thee, to give thee up to punishment, so neither will He allow them, if he see it quenched, to bring thee into the Bridechamber, even as He admitted not those virgins.\footnote{LNPF, XI, p.436; PG, LIX, 519-520: Ὡστε ἄν ἀπελάθης ἐναύσατα ὃν τὸν Πνεύματος τὴν χάριν, κἀγὼ σὺν αὐτῷ ἐξὼν ἀπελάθης, ἀποτέλοι πάντως, κἂν ἀναστῆς. Ὡστερ γὰρ οὐκ ἀνέχεται, τὸ Πνεῦμα αὐτὸν λαμίτων ὤρων ἐν σοι τότε, κολάσει σε παραδοναί, οὕτως, οὐ κακαβέται, ἐσεβεσμένον ἰδὼν, εἰς τὸν νυμφίαν ἐσαγαγεῖν, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰς παρθένους ἔκεινας.}
The idea of preserving or guarding the gift of the Spirit and the gifts which come with that gift is a commanding one with Chrysostom and not at all peculiar to his instruction on this passage. Rather, this theme is often pressed and usually in the immediate context of a reference to baptism; it is not surprising,

1. This is made abundantly clear in his *Baptismal Instructions*; in the Tenth Instruction, Chrysostom weaves a beautiful tapestry from New Testament texts showing that for both Jesus and Paul baptism is always and at the same time a cross, death, and resurrection. (See Paul W. Harkins, *St. John Chrysostom: Baptismal Instructions* in the series Ancient Christian Writers, XXXI, J. Quasten and J. C. Plumpe, eds., London, 1963). A perusal of the Instructions reveals just how central is the exhortation to 'preserve the gift of the Spirit given in Baptism' for Chrysostom. He never fails to use it as a basic appeal in sections where he reminds the baptizands or newly baptized of the uprightness and obedience expected of them. Among the clearest of such appeals is the following example (all references from Harkins, above):

'Do you, who are the new soldiers of Christ, who have this day been inscribed on the citizen lists of heaven, who have been invited to this spiritual banquet and are about to enjoy the benefits of the royal table, show a zeal which is worthy of the magnitude of His gifts, in order that you may win for yourselves even greater grace from on high. Our Master is kind; when He sees your gratitude for what He has already given, and that you are very careful to guard His great gifts, He bestows His grace upon you in abundance. Even if our contribution is small, He lavishes His great gifts upon us'. (Fourth Instruction, para. 6, p. 68).

Other places where this is clearly shown are:

a) Third Instruction, para. 29, p. 54.
b) Fourth Instruction, para. 22, p. 74.
c) Sixth Instruction, para. 23, p. 102.
d) Sixth Instruction, para. 25, p. 103.
e) Seventh Instruction, para. 24, p. 114.
f) Eighth Instruction, para. 25, p. 130.

Footnote continued:
then, a few lines later, that he supports the paradoxical demand to 'mortify the body that you might live' by a reference to death in baptism.

Chrysostom's strong view of baptism and the tendency of early Greek exegesis to accentuate the freedom of the human will go a long way toward explaining the radical demand for an 'unspotted' Christian life laid down in this passage. In baptism, Christians have been crucified, have died and have been raised. This is analogous to what happened to the body of Jesus. Since our bodies have died and been raised, we view the present life in an entirely different light than do the unregenerate. We go on mortifying the works of our bodies. Such a continual dying to sin is not fearful to us because we have already died to sin in baptism. This is in stark contrast to the man who lives as a slave to pleasures - he has no power to face the anxieties and dangers of life. In fact, he dies before death on account of his fear. But, because of the Spirit's continual presence, the Christian has no fear of any grief, danger, or change of

Continuation of footnote (1) from previous page:

... Paras. 15-18 of the Fifth Instruction, which the editor entitles, 'The Dangers of Relaxing Proved By The Conduct of the Jews' and paras. 19-23, entitled, 'The Example of Paul and the Lesson of Simon Magus', are heavily laced with this sort of exhortation. Examples are para.18, pp. 87-88; para.20, pp.88-89; para.22, pp.89-90; and para.23, p.90.
circumstance which he might meet. Thus it is, says Chrysostom, that 'He is most truly alive, who is dead to this life'.

Chrysostom then launches into a long illustration, using as his example the lives of two very different men: one is given up totally to pleasure, the other is dead to the deceits of this life. 'Let us see which of the two is actually more alive', says Chrysostom. Here we see Chrysostom the teacher, Chrysostom the shepherd of his people at his best. The word-picture he paints is vivid and totally believable as well as morally convincing. In this account (which demands more space to retell

1. PG, LIX, 520: ὅπων οὗτος μάλιστα ἐστιν ὃ νεκρωθεὶς τῷ βίῳ.

2. The negative half of the illustrations revolves upon a man who is caught up in the clutches of drunkenness, Chrysostom warms to this subject readily; indeed inebriation is a favorite topic (almost a hobby-horse) with him. His use of it is made more effective by reminding his hearers that metaphorically there are many kinds of drunkenness; here he mentions covetousness as another, worse kind of drunkenness. In other places, he uses the same human weakness metaphorically to mean rage and other passions. See Harkins, Fifth Instruction, paras. 1-18. Parallels to this are found in Homily 1, On the Statues (Homiliae 21 de statuis ad populum Antiochenum), in PG, XLIX, 22; Against Pagans and Jews (Contra Judaeos et Gentiles quod Christus sit Deus), in PG, XLVIII, 927-928; Against Drunkenness and Concerning the Resurrection (Contra ebriosos et de resurrectione), in PG, L, 434-435, the latter being an Easter sermon.
than can be afforded here) he contrasts the two ways of life so skillfully and in such black and white vividness so as to make it abundantly clear that the righteous life really is its own reward and therefore no sacrifice at all. He makes this point explicitly only in the first sentence of Homily XIV, after quoting vv.12 and 13.

Chrysostom sees a close and vital link between v.11 - as he interprets it - and the new section beginning with v.12; Paul has shown what an advantage the spiritual life is and how such a life of continual mortification is preparation for immortal life. Therefore, the way of virtue is made easy (τὴν ἔοδον τῆς ἁρετῆς εὐκολωτέραν ἐργάζεται). Now Paul joins to this an exhortation aimed at bringing his readers into line with the sort of upright, spiritual life he has described.

What Paul means to say is: 'we are debtors to the Spirit', for the actual words of the text - 'we are debtors not to the flesh' - imply this.1 Thus for Chrysostom, the point Paul

1. PG, LIX, 523: Οφειλέται ομοίως τῇ Πνευματικῇ τῷ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐν τῇ οὐκ ἐσμέν ὁφειλέται τῇ ὑπακοῖ, τούτῳ ἐσθάλωσε.
is making is primarily a positive one; he goes on to show that at every opportunity Paul is careful to say on one hand that what God has done for us is not out of indebtedness to us, but purely out of His grace; on the other hand, after we have received His grace, what we do is no longer a matter of free-will offering, but of debt.\footnote{\textit{PG, LIX, 523: ῥᾳ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῶν μετὰ ταύτα γινόμενα, οὐκέτι φίλοτιμίας, ἀλλ’ ὀφειλῆς.}} Therefore, the debt is to God and results directly from our confrontation with Christ. Paul makes this clear by saying the converse, but what he says (′we are debtors not to the flesh′) is also true. We are not to understand that Paul is here speaking against the nature of the flesh, says Chrysostom, and thus the Apostle adds the clarifying phrase ′to live after the flesh′.

For there are many things which we do owe it, as giving it food, warmth, and rest, medicine when out of health, clothing, and a thousand other attentions. To prevent your supposing then that it is this ministration he does

\footnote{For support, Chrysostom quotes I Cor. 7:23; 6:19; II Cor. 5:15.}
away with when he says "we are not debtors to the flesh", he explains it by saying "to live after the flesh".\(^1\)

From this it is clear how well Chrysostom's interpretation of the previous verse fits with that of v.12: the 'care of the flesh' which Paul wishes his readers to abolish is that which leads to sin. For Chrysostom, the difference between 'care of the flesh' and 'sin' is largely a matter of degree. He does not establish ascetic standards for his people (he fully approves for their use all of God's good gifts, including wine, used in moderation, but strongly disapproves all types of excess - including overeating). Chrysostom therefore solves one major grammatical problem in v.12 by taking the articular infinitive - ποτέ \(\dot{\iota} \eta \nu \) - as consecutive: Christians are not to be so solicitous of the body's normal and legitimate needs

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1. LNPF, XI, p.440; PG, LXI, 523-524: Καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ ὀφείλομεν, τὸ τρέφειν αὐτὴν, τὸ ἑαυτὴν, τὸ ἀναπαύειν, τὸ θεραπεύειν, νοσοῦσαι, τὸ πέριβαλλεῖν, καὶ μυρία ἑτερα ἀετουργεῖν. Ἡν, ο>xpath νομίσας, ὅτι ταύτην ἀναίρετην διακόνιαν, εἰπὼν. Οὐκ ἔθελεν ὀφειλεῖν τῷ σάρκι ἑρμηνεύειν αὐτῷ δέχεσθαι. Τὸ τὸ κατὰ σάρκι  \(\dot{\iota} \eta \nu \).
that they serve it slavishly: 'Let it have attention shown it indeed, for we do owe it this, yet let us not make it the mistress of our life...'\(^1\)

Chrysostom now skilfully builds the framework into which he will place the next several verses. Paul has said and proven we are debtors to the Spirit, interprets Chrysostom, and now he goes on to illustrate this by showing what are the future benefits (τὰς εὐεργεσίας) of our being debtors. Paul might have chosen to limit himself simply to the past, but instead he wisely chooses the things which are yet to come. For one is more motivated and challenged by the expectation of a benefit than by one already received.

The first of these motivations is the negative one in v.13a: 'For if you live according to the flesh you will die'.

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\(^1\) LNPF, XI, p.440; PG, LIX, 524: \ldots ὧτι ἕραπενεύησθω μὲν ὅφειλομεν ἄρα αὕτη τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι κατὰ σάρκα Ἰωμέν· τοῦτοτε, μὴ ποιῶμεν αὕτην κυρίαν τῆς λωτῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας.
But this is immediately followed by the second half of v.13:

'... but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body you will live'.\(^1\) By saying it in this manner Paul demonstrates to us that not only has the Spirit freed us from former sins, but 'renders us impregnable' against sins of the future.\(^2\)

Passing on to v.14, Chrysostom finds another, greater reward when Paul says, 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God'. It is in this passage

1. Although Chrysostom's text reads τοῦ θώματος and not τῆς σαρκός, his basic position is not shaken. He pauses to say once again that the essence of the body is not evil nor are all the deeds of the body evil. Paul would have us mortify the evil deeds. In his sober practicality, Chrysostom reminds his hearers: '... for seeing and hearing and speaking and walking are deeds of the body; and if we mortify these, we shall be so far from living, that we shall have to suffer the punishment of a manslayer'. (LNPF, XI, p.440).

2. PG, LIX, 525: Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο μόνον ἐστὶ, φυσικά, τὸ κατὸρθωμα τοῦ Πνεύματος, ἐὰν τῶν παρελθόντων ἀφίκειν ἡμᾶς ἄμαρτημάτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα ἀχειρώτως κατασκευάζει...
that Chrysostom elucidates most clearly the typical Antiochene view of the relation between spirit, soul and body. First he specifies that the verb is ἀγνοεῖν and not ἔγκειν - the gift of the Spirit imparted in baptism is not only that power which brings Christians safely into their eternal inheritance, but is also the authority and standard under which they are to live out their earthly lives in obedience.

That is, Paul wants

... to show that he would have Him [i.e., the Spirit] use such power over our life as a pilot does over a ship or a charioteer over a pair of horses.\(^1\)

Also distinctively Antiochene is Chrysostom's next point: not only is the body, but also the soul set under this authority:

\(^1\) LNPF, XI, p.440; PG, LIX, 525: ... δέλκυσις οταν οὗτῳ βούλεται αὐτῷ κύριον εἶναι τῆς ἡμετέρας ζωῆς, ὥς τὸν κυβερνήτην τοῦ πλοίου, καὶ τὸν ἴπποικὸν τοῦ ζεύγους τῶν ἵππων.
And it is not the body only, but the soul itself too, that he is for setting under reins of this sort. For he would not have even that independent, but place its authority also under the power of the Spirit.¹

Thus Chrysostom lays down a strong ethical line, reminding his readers that Paul gives no occasion for false confidence regarding the gift of the Spirit given in baptism. Carelessness after baptism and neglect of one's way of life can cause one to lose the Gift and the adoption along with it. It is the

1. LNPF, XI, p.440; PG, LIX, 525: Καὶ οὐχὶ τὸ σῶμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ βαλλει τὰς τοιαύτας ἕνιας Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνην βουλεταὶ αὐθεντεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνη τὴν ἐξουσίαν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος ἔθηκε συνάμελ.

NB: The Antiochenes tended to assume that man's nature is composed of body and soul and that Spirit is a distinctive element given to the believer. At times in their Pauline exegesis, however, it is difficult to tell whether this is the Holy Spirit inhabiting man or a Gift of the Spirit in the sense of a 'share' of the Spirit. See Wiles, 1967, ch.III, 'The Nature of Man', and especially pp.36f.
Christian's responsibility to live up to and conduct his life in accordance with the Gift of the Spirit. Clearly then, v.14 is not simply an indicative statement, but rather contains a strong imperative. The gift received at the baptismal font is not without its conditions and for Chrysostom the clearest and most serious condition is purity of life and conduct. That Paul places a condition upon being sons of God is necessary, for the Jews are also called — and rightly so — sons of God. But there is a significant difference between the people Paul is writing to and those of the old covenant — the name 'sons' may be the same, but the thing is not. In v.15, Paul shows what had been given them and what has been given us.

In analyzing v.15, Chrysostom sees a similar problem to that of v.12: Paul has actually spoken of only one side of the comparison, for the opposite of a Πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης would seem to be a Spirit of freedom (Πνεῦμα ἐλευθερίας). Instead he says Spirit of adoption, which is far greater than Spirit of freedom and, in fact, includes it. Chrysostom then leaves this second part of the comparison and goes on to what he considers a perplexing problem: we know that the Jews did not receive the Spirit. How, therefore, can Paul speak of a Πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης in the Old Testament? Chrysostom's
inevitable but rather disappointing answer is that God's gifts of revelation are what Paul has in mind when he uses the phrase Πνεύμα Σοφίας. Primarily this is the word of Scripture (τὰ γραμματά ὑμῶν ἐκάλεσεν) and at its center is the Law. Chrysostom freely acknowledges the validity of this revelation of God—it is above nature and therefore properly called 'spiritual'. If one takes a long-range view of God's economy (Πολιτεία), it will become immediately clear why the gifts of γραμματά were the gifts of bondage. For in the Old Testament the reward was close at hand, something like the daily sustenance given to household slaves; likewise, punishment for transgression was immediate. Again, in the same sort of concrete way, continues Chrysostom, what was expected of them by the Law concerned only those acts which were overt. With Christians it is totally other: our Lord commanded us not to murder, but not even to be angry; not only to shun adultery, but not even to look improperly. Perceptively warming to his subject, Chrysostom expands this basic tenet ('our' sonship in contrast with 'their' servanthood) with a list in which the sub-theme of corporeality or concreteness vs. spirituality or otherworldliness plays a major role. Some of the contrasts offered up in that list are:
we are not virtuous out of fear, but simply out of desire toward God (τῷ ποθεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν).

our promise is not an earthly one (such as a land flowing with milk and honey), but spiritual; i.e., he makes us a joint heir with the only-Begotten Son.

thus God causes us in all aspects of our lives to be drawn away from intercourse with things present, giving us gifts suiting those who have been made sons of God - nothing, that is, which is corporeal, but only that which is spiritual (ἀνθρωπῶν μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ σωματικῶν, πνευματικὰ δὲ ἄπαντα).

God spoke with them only through the mediation of others, but He speaks with us Himself and directly.

1. This point is actually made twice in Chrysostom's excursus. The second mention is clearer than the first: ἡλεινοὶ μὲν φόβῳ τιμωρίας πάντα ἐπραττόν ἀγρίμενοι, οἱ δὲ πνευματικοὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ πόθοι.

(PG, LIX, 526).
- the fact that they served in fear is demonstrated in that they were continually transgressing God's commandments - they acted as servants, continually grumbling, but we do everything to please the Father

- receiving good things, they blasphemed, but we are thankful for being placed in danger

- finally, even if we need be punished for our sins, still the difference is great, for we are not harshly treated by a priest doing us bodily harm; it is quite enough to be simply refused access to the table of Communion for a few days.

Then, noting that one might go on with such a list, Chrysostom quickly re-capitulates his thesis: the Jews, in fact, were not sons of God in reality, but only in name. In our case, this honor has become realized in the cleansing of baptism, the gift of the Spirit, and the providing of other good things.¹ With

¹ PG, LIX, 526: ... ὁ σιὰ βαπτισματός καθαρμὸς, ἡ τοῦ Πνεύματος δόσις, ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρα ἔνων ἱρονία.
those words, Chrysostom sealed what was destined to be the definitive interpretation of v.15a and b for centuries to come.

The Antiochene School's interpretation of the last words of v.15 and those of v.16 is, in general, insufficient and even confused, and although Chrysostom is not totally ambiguous when he begins to speak of Paul's understanding of πιτομα, he is, at best, unclear.

Interpreting the words ἀββά ὁ Πατήρ in the light of contrast pursued immediately preceding, Chrysostom points out that Jews do not pray in this kind of familiar language, whereas Christian men of all rank and calling are taught so to pray. In fact, these are the first words those newly initiated into baptism speak.¹ True to Antiochene exegesis of this passage, Chrysostom takes these words of v.15 closely with v.16; the believer speaking the words 'Abba, Father' is being prompted to do so by the Paraclete. The very utterance of that prayer is, therefore, a proof of adoption:

For it is not from the language [i.e., Abba, Father ...] alone, he says, that I make my assertion, but

¹. Chrysostom is referring here, of course, to the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the first liturgy of worship after baptismal initiation.
from the prompting out of which the language is born; since it is from the Spirit suggesting it that we so speak.\(^1\)

But there is a great ambiguity in Chrysostom's interpretation, for previous to this he has suggested - deducing, probably, from I Corinthians 12 - that just as there is a spirit of wisdom (\(\text{Πνεῦμα Σοφίας}\)) for teaching, a spirit of power (\(\text{Πν. Συναμέως}\)) for the raising of the dead, healing and exorcism, a spirit of tongues (\(\text{Πν. γλώσσων}\)) for speaking in tongues, and a spirit of prophecy (\(\text{Πνεῦμα Προφητείας}\)), so is there also a spirit of adoption (\(\text{Πν. Υἱοθεσίας}\)). The special ministry of those who possess this gift is simply, as moved by the Spirit, to call God 'Father' (\(\text{Πατέρα καλεῖ τὸν Θεόν}\)). Since the gift of the Spirit given in baptism for Chrysostom is, without doubt, universal for all Christians, it is clear that our exegete has here allowed conflicting interpretations to stand. Since

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1. LNPF, XI, p.442; PG, LIX, 527: \(\text{Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἔχωρίσαμα μόνον, φωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀφ’ ἧς ἡ φωνὴ τίκτεται. Τοῦ γὰρ Πνεῦματος ὑπαρχοῦντος, ταῦτα λέγομεν.}\)
Chrysostom is not usually so careless, we might well suspect a good reason, and this, in fact, is the case. For in alluding to a ministry utilizing a gift of the spirit of adoption, Chrysostom is following the example of his teacher, Diodore of Tarsus. Chrysostom, however, has altered Diodore's interpretation slightly, possibly because he did not fully understand or agree with what Diodore said. The text we have is not as clear as much of Diodore's exegesis. At v.16, Diodore interprets \( \piνεμα νιοθεσιάς \) as a special gift of prayer which fulfills the need referred to in v.26 of this same chapter in Romans: '... for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words'.

Thus it is, says Diodore, that in the times of the Apostles there was a gift of prayer given to different ones who would then pray, in the Spirit, for that which was useful,

1. Staab, 1933, p. 92f.
using as they prayed, 'sighs too deep for words'. 1 From the careful way in which Diodore established the *Sitz im Leben* (i.e., 'at the time of the Apostles' - ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων) for this practice, it is obvious that his interpretation grows out of concern to determine the literal meaning of the text, and does not necessarily reflect a ministry, contemporary with Diodore, of those who had the gift of the spirit of adoption or of prayer. He adds very little to help us, but does suggest that the subject of the clause Συμμετοχὴ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἡμῶν  i.e., αὐτὸ τὸ Πνεῦμα, is to be understood as the spirit of prayer (Πνεῦμα τῆς Προσευχῆς) praying through the one with the gift (cf. v.15c). As he prays the prayer of our Lord (Our Father, etc.), witness is borne to the spirits of believers. But this phrase - τῶ Πνεύματος ἡμῶν (v.16) - refers to the Spirit which is common to all Christians, not the human spirit but the indwelling Spirit of God, the Gift given in baptism.

1. Here Diodore quotes the words - ἵστανες ἀλαλητοῖς of v.26, but it is not clear if he is thinking of glossolalia and combining it with a more general gift of prayer or not. In any case, Chrysostom does not combine the two, as is evident when he lists the 'spirit of tongues' next to the 'spirit of adoption', without identifying one with the other.

2. Thus, the gift of prayer (Χάρισμα τῆς Προσευχῆς) which comes from the spirit of prayer (Πνεῦμα τῆς Προσευχῆς) is a specific gift, granted to certain individuals, while the spirit described in v.16 as τώ Πνεύματος ἡμῶν is that given to all baptized Christians.
The final sentence of Diodore's commentary is: '...
for the spirit - that is, the gift of prayer - cries Abba, Father'. ¹

This makes the verb third person (κραίζει) in place of the Biblical text's first person (κραίγομεν).² From this,


2. This piece of evidence must be balanced with three other observations: (a) The majority of the Antiochene exegetes understand v.16 to be speaking about the witness of the Holy Spirit borne to the 'Gift' of the Spirit (which has come to dwell in the baptized believer), causing him to say, 'Abba, Father', which is in itself an assurance or proof of the Christian's adoption as a child or son of God; this is the opinion of both of Diodore's pupils, Theodore of Mopsuestia and St. John Chrysostom. (b) The Greek fragment of Diodore's commentary as contained in the Catenae is nebulous and very probably does not contain all that Diodore had to say on this verse. (c) The fact that Diodore places this special gift of prayer in the time of the Apostles tends to make this interpretation - so long as it remained the only interpretation - rather irrelevant for his Christian contemporaries. Chrysostom - who is always first of all the preacher and only secondarily the exegete - evidently acknowledges the fact and in doing so, expands his interpretation so as to make it apply to his hearers. In doing so, it seems safest to assume that he is being faithful at least to the spirit of Diodore's exegesis; if not, in fact, to what he knew to be Diodore's opinion. It is this latter point which, if correct, explains the apparently contradictory interpretations reflected in Chrysostom's commentary to vv.15 and 16.
it can be seen that Diodore interprets the final words of v.15
(ἐν ὑμῖν καθιστομέν. ἄββα ὁ Πατήρ )
in the light of v.16, and assumes the one praying to be a
particular person who has received a gift of prayer.

Chrysostom revises this exegesis by substituting
a spirit of adoption for Diodore's more general spirit of prayer,
and also by evoking Galatians 4:6b ('... God has sent the
Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, "Abba, Father."') to
prove that v.16 captures the moment of prayer - Abba, Father -
in which the Paraclete is prompting the Gift of the Spirit to
speak its prayer. This, in effect, is the 'witness'. The
purpose of this witness, for Diodore, is to evoke feelings of
fear and piety in the faithful,¹ whereas for Chrysostom it is
to assure believers that they are indeed sons:

But when the Spirit bears witness, what sort of doubt
remains? For if it were a man, or angel, or
archangel, or any other such power that promised this
that might be some reason for doubt. But when it is

¹. Staab, 1933, p.92: ἕνα πρὸς εὐλαβείαν
καὶ φόβον πάντας ἐλκυσθείν.
the Highest Being that bestows this Gift and -
through the words which he prompted us to use in
prayer - bears witness, who can remain doubtful
concerning our standing?¹

Chrysostom next observes that Paul uses a
progression of ideas here: to say that one is an heir is more than
to say he is a child (the Jews were children but lost their
inheritance), and it is a still greater thing to say that we are
joint-heirs with Christ. But more interesting than Chrysostom's
theological interpretation of this verse is his analysis of Paul's
literary method in these five verses.

¹. LNPF, XI, p.442; PG, LIX, 527: Ὅταν δὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα
μαρτυρῇ, τοῖς λοιπῶν ἀμφιβολία; Ἔι μὲν
γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ἄγγελος, ἢ ἄρχαγγελος, ἢ
Ἀλλή τις τοιαύτῃ σύναιμος τοῦτο ὑπερηφανεῖτο,
καὶ ἀμφιβαλλὼν ἢν εἰκός τινας τῆς δὲ
ἀνωτάτων οὐσίας τῆς καὶ διαφορομενῆς τούτῳ,
καὶ δὲ ὦν ἑκέλευσεν εὐχεσθαι μαρτυροῦντας
ἡμῶν, τῆς ἀν ἀμφισβητήσας λοιπῶν περὶ
tῆς ἀξίας:
Chrysostom reckons that Paul begins with the difficult things he must say, in vv.12 and 13 telling his readers what will become of those who live after the flesh and so forth; but this distasteful part he compresses in as short a space as possible (τὰ πρὸς λυπηρὰ ρυστείλας) and goes on to the more pleasant (τῶν χρηστοτέρων) part. Here he expands his discourse, dwelling upon the great and numerous gifts and rewards which God has given to us. This climaxes in v.17a.

Chrysostom takes the relationship between vv.17b and 18 to be a complementary one: the rhythm of ideas from v.14 to v.18 is interrupted by something of a grace note in v.17b, for it is here, says Chrysostom, that Paul shows that God's gifts and rewards are not only a matter of grace. The conditional idea contained in v.17 gives the Christian who is ashamed at all he has received - without cost to himself - an opportunity to give in return. This opportunity also makes the promises of God's gifts, given in free grace, more credible in the eyes of the doubtful. Verse 18, then, returns to the major theme of the previous verses and accents it; anything which we might do in return for God's great gifts, says Chrysostom,
is outdone by the largeness of his rewards.¹ Thus Chrysostom understands ἐκτείνεται in v.17b as 'provided that'. It is evident from a listing of such sufferings² that actual, physical persecution is not far removed from the Church, for Chrysostom does not make a metaphor of 'suffering with Christ' or even reduce such suffering to the enduring of natural catastrophes. The words, in fact, come mostly out of a context reminiscent of persecution; believers are called upon to bear up under τὰς μάστιγας, τὸν λιμὸν, τὰς λεπταιας, τὰ σεσμὰ, τὰς ἀλύσεις, τὰς ἀπαγωγὰς.

1. It would be wrong to conclude hastily that Chrysostom sees God's grace as anything but completely free and unmerited. It is of course true that Chrysostom does here (v.17b) say that 'the gift is not of grace only' (ὢτι οὐ χάριτος μόνον ἐστίν ἢ δωρεά ...), but it would be dangerous to infer too much from this, especially since the text itself can be interpreted as suggesting an unfulfilled condition laid upon the inheritance (i.e., the cf. v.17b). In any case Chrysostom was not concerned with any of the issues of the Pelagian controversy.

2. This actually is found later, in Chrysostom's commentary on v.18, PG, LIX, 528.
Theodoret.

In spite of the completeness of Theodoret's commentary to Romans, he adds very little to what Diodore, Chrysostom and Theodore already have said concerning this passage. His commentary is not, however, redundant, nor is he especially

1. In his commentary on chapter 8, (PG, LXXXIV, 127-148) Theodoret gives a number of lucid statements on issues which are not so clearly stated by his three predecessors (above). The best of these are exemplified in his treatment of \( \tau \nu \epsilon \varphi \omicron \mu \alpha \) in its different occurrences in vv.10,11,15,16,23 and 27. Grouping together his treatment of \( \tau \nu \epsilon \varphi \omicron \mu \alpha \) in these places, one can extract a quite clear (although brief) statement concerning the Spirit: The Holy Spirit is divine and of one nature with the Father and the Son, not created, proceeds from the Father and is given to those who are worthy through Christ (v.11). Among the many pledges given to us, the grace of the Spirit is primary (v.23); this pledge of the Spirit living in the lives of believers is not the hypostasis of the Spirit, but the Grace or Gift (\( \chi \alpha \rho \iota \sigma \mu \alpha \)) given in baptism (vv.16,23,27). This Gift urges us to pray and assists us in doing so (vv.16,26,27). When Paul says that we have received the 'pledge' of the Spirit, he means that in the coming era we will receive the manifold grace of the Spirit, whereas we have now the 'firstfruit' or 'pledge' of the Spirit (v.23). The gifts of the Spirit are many and diverse - as Paul pointed out in I Cor.12:8f - but his gifts to believers in this dispensation are of a different quality ('spirit of adoption') than those of the past ('spirit of bondage') (v.15). This can be seen by the fact that although both Christians and Jews have been called 'sons', our sonship is by far superior, for the Jews are barren of the honor of the Holy Spirit, having no part in grace (v.14). All the same, the Spirit was at work in former times for the law was instituted by the Spirit (v.15).

Theodoret's treatment of the relevant passages, then, is typical of Antiochene tendencies: i.e.,

footnote continued:
dependent upon others' exegeses.

Theodore's interpretation of this passage (vv. 12-17)

continuation of footnote (1) from previous page:

... (a) Stress on the superiority of 'our' sonship in contrast to the inferiority of that of the Jews;

(b) Hesitance to identify \( \Pi \nu \varepsilon \nu \mu \alpha \) as an element natural to man and, when as in v.16, where a reference to \( \nu \) man cannot be avoided, time and space must be taken for a careful definition of terms. The product of this is the general Antiochene view that \( \Pi \nu \varepsilon \nu \mu \alpha \) in man is not a natural constituent of man's nature, but the gift of the grace of the Spirit in believers.

(c) An understanding of 'spirit of adoption' in the broad context of diverse gifts of the spirit, rather than the person of the Holy Spirit;

(d) Insistence that the Holy Spirit as such was not revealed or known in former times;

(e) Acceptance of the general view that the Holy Spirit as hypostasis does not dwell within the believer, but rather the 'Gift' or 'Grace' (\( \chi \alpha \rho \iota \sigma \mu \alpha \) ) of the Spirit guides and impels believers after baptism;

(f) A persistently ambiguous definition of Gift of the Spirit;

(g) A strong view of the role of the Spirit in the total redemptive process (always culminating in the Resurrection), with special emphasis on the fact of the Spirit's being the greatest pledge of final adoption, this assistance bridging the gap between this age and the next by promoting purity and uprightness of life, but also by prayer, which is brought to birth in the believer directly through the compulsion of the indwelling grace of the Spirit. This rather eschatological view of prayer in Antiochene exegesis of this chapter is an important and distinct contribution in the history of exegesis.
is somewhat distinct in that he places far more emphasis on the comparison of law and grace than do other Antioch exegetes. This is illustrated in his commentary to v.13, where he appends the observation to v.13b:

And this is what grace possesses in superiority to the law, that the latter teaches that which is to be done, but the former possesses the assisting grace of the Spirit.¹

This 'assisting grace of the Spirit' (ἐἴησεν οὐνεργοῦσαν τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος χάριν) is, for Theodoret as for all the Antiochenes, that which dwells within believers, and one of its major functions is to aid the believer to destroy the deeds of the flesh. The aspect of ethical obedience as preparation for life in the age to come is straightforward Antiochene thought, which Theodoret reflects in his exegesis of vv.12-17. 'Life', i.e., the gift of immortality and immutability, is quite simply the fruit of victorious living, as Paul exhorts in these verses.²

1. PG, LXXII, 133: ὁτὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν νόμον ἡ χάρις ἔχει, οτι ο μὲν τὸ δεῖν ἐδειδαξεν, ἢ δὲ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐξελ οὐνεργοῦσαν τὴν χάριν.

2. Theodoret's pithy summary can stand for all the Antiochene interpreters:

Καρπὸς γὰρ τῆς νίκης ζωῆ.
Theodoret's treatment of vv.14, 15 and 16 offers us no distinctive ideas, but his interpretation of v.17 deserves closer observation. In attempting to distinguish the ideas of 'heirs of God' and 'joint-heirs with Christ', Theodoret points out that not every son is an heir, and thus joining inheritance with the idea of adoption (which Paul has brought out previously), the Apostle has increased the honor given to us. The total picture is made even more complete (and God's benevolence made greater) when we are considered joint-heirs with Christ, for it is possible for a servant to be left an inheritance by his master, and still not be a partner with the son.

But as in Diodore, the most interesting comment is that to v.17b ('... provided we suffer with him in order that we may also be glorified with him'), for here Theodoret gives the conditional particle (ἵλπερ) its strongest possible meaning:

For not all having been deemed worthy of the salvation of baptism enjoy these

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1. Much of what Theodoret says in these verses is presented in footnote one of pages 85 and 86.
goods [i.e., above], but those who, in addition to this, also endure the fellowship of the sufferings of the Lord.  

He then goes on to put Paul's words in an historical setting, saying that these words were meant to be a comfort and exhortation to steadfast endurance to those who were suffering under persecution.

Thus Theodoret's interpretation is consistent with, and a summary of, the tendency of the Antiochene School on the subject of suffering in v.17b (and this applies to an extent also to their treatment of other passages in Paul concerning Christian suffering); they place the verse in the historical context of Christian persecution, whether or not such persecution is a reality for their readers. They also tend to emphasize the human

1. PG, LXXXII, 136: Οὐ γὰρ ἄπαντες οἱ τοῦ σωτηρίου βαπτίσματος ἀφειωθέντες τούτων ἀπολαύοντες τῶν ἁγαθῶν, ἀλλ' οἱ πρὸς τούτως καὶ τὴν κειμενίαν τῶν Δεσποτικῶν παθημάτων κατασχόμενοι.
side of responsibility in the total scheme of redemption.¹

Theodoret's exegesis of this passage illustrates how much at ease the Antiochene interpreters were in this section of Paul's letter. Paul's imperatives and exhortations fit well with their concern to show that not all is from grace, but rather that man, as aided by the gift of the Holy Spirit, has a role to play, no matter how much his effort is exceeded by God's good gifts, in obtaining the life of the Age to come.

¹ Theodoret lacks the refinement found in Chrysostom and Diodore, both of whom are careful to stress God's grace when Paul speaks of suffering for His name lest Christians become puffed up.
Gennadius.

Gennadius (d. 471) is a minor Antiochene figure in the same sense as the minor prophets are 'minor' figures in the Old Testament; he does not leave a great mark on the Eastern Church's history, nor are his surviving works extensive. He is much later (Patriarch of Constantinople from 458 to 471) than the four great exegetes already treated - Theodore, Diodore, Chrysostom, and Theodoret - and it is clear that he is heavily indebted to them. The additions he makes, however, are of considerable interest, and one can only regret that more of his work is not available.

1. Gennadius is not usually included in lists of Antiochene exegetes but he is directly influenced by that school, both in his method and conclusions. For this reason, as well as for convenience, he is included under the heading 'The Antiochene School'.

2. Staab, 1933, has managed to salvage enough fragments from the Catenae to reconstruct about three-quarters of Gennadius's original commentary on Romans. Other than the commentaries on Genesis, this is the largest piece of writing surviving from what must have been a sizable body of literature (cf. Quasten, 1963, pp. 525f).
Like Chrysostom, Gennadius observes a definite break between vv.11 and 12. The basis of this observation is a literary analysis; Gennadius suggests that Paul, having labored through all (the entire argument of his presentation), now summarizes what he has often said before and gives a clear admonition. Paul's argument has been that 'they' (i.e., Christian readers in Rome) no longer belong to Adam—which means a life of mortality under the law—but rather they now belong to Christ. The point of the admonition in vv.12ff is that they are not to give themselves up to the mutability of the flesh.¹

The value of this commentary on vv.12 and 13 is all the more enhanced by Gennadius's summary of v.13b. The implicit understanding of the Pauline imperative of this summary typifies Antiochene exegesis of our passage:

But if, he [Paul] says, you are eager to live according to the grace of the Spirit which is in you, maintaining inactivity in regard to the

¹ Staab, 1933, p.377.
practices of the body, you will be brought to immortality.¹

Gennadius is here essentially paraphrasing what he takes Paul to be saying in the second, positive half of v.13. In doing so, he understands ἰνσεοθε as 'being made immortal' (a condition accomplished first in the Resurrection) and the dative Πνεῦματι as a kind of living in harmony with the 'Gift' of the Spirit;² this is not far removed from Chrysostom's


2. Gennadius follows the general Antiochene principle of understanding that which indwells believers not precisely as the person of the Holy Spirit, but rather the 'Gift' or grace (Χάρισμα) of the Spirit.
continual emphasis on the necessity of preserving the 'Gift' of the Spirit, which is given in baptism. Gennadius's comment reminds us that not only do the Antiochene interpreters find themselves very much at home in this passage simply because Paul's imperatives seem to match their own ethical concerns, but also because the ministry of the Spirit — and the believers' response to the 'Gift' of the Spirit dwelling in them — is central in explaining the basis and motivation for ethical obedience in this age, which is invariably seen as preparation for the age to come. One outcome of this (as we have already noted in previous Antiochene writers) is a disregard for and vilification of the Law and all who live under its rule. The source of this attitude is not lack of respect for the Law (it was, all Antiochenes agree, instituted by God through the Spirit), but the pragmatic observation of the failure of the Law to gain its intended goal — to produce righteousness. Thus, much greater obedience is expected of Christians because of the superiority of the Gospel in this regard. The advent of the Spirit makes the Law, in fact, unnecessary.¹ The Spirit, then, is always

¹ Speaking of Chrysostom, Wiles, 1967, pp.62-63, writes: 'The law is spiritual because it taught the way of virtue, of life in the spirit, but it could not complete the task by actually giving the Spirit. The gift of the Spirit renders the law superfluous, because it deals with the root of the evil, where the law can only deal with the fruit'.
related to ethical obedience and ethical obedience is always exorted with a view to the future Resurrection and the gift of immortality. It is no accident that these exegetes made a good deal of the Spirit as a pledge of the 'final goods'.

This very historical view of God's revelation is even more concretely illustrated in Gennadius's commentary on v.15. Here he uses John 1:16 with a most ingenious twist, saying that the former grace (spirit of servanthood unto fear) is not at all like the present grace (spirit of adoption). God has given man one grace in place of another - the Gospel in place of the Law - and this is just what St. John meant in 1:16 (εἰς ἀντὶ εἷς ἀποκρίνεται). The present grace is greater because it is superior. The proof of superiority for Gennadius, using the words of the text, is that we have been delivered from the worst fear - that of death - for Christ has abolished death through his own death. The difference between the former and the present grace is analogous to the difference in

1. 'And from his fullness we have all received, grace upon grace'.

2. Gennadius does acknowledge, however, that the law which came through Moses was a gift of grace - a concession which is the one redeeming factor in Antiochene exegesis of this verse, an exegesis which otherwise depends heavily upon an invidious comparison between Jews and Christians.
attitude between a master toward a servant and a father toward a son. We are no longer servants of fear,¹ but rather we are sons who may truthfully (τὰ ψευδής) call God 'Father'.²

Gennadius's commentary on vv.16 and 17³ is surely one of the most enlightening and beautifully written among those we have reviewed of this entire school of exegesis. He begins by describing the spiritual gift in which we participate as the 'trustworthy pledge' (τό ἐνέχυρον ἄξιον τιστον), the means by which we participate in the hope of adoption and which confirms us in the expectation of that hope. He goes on to define carefully his terms: as in other Antiochene writers the first use of Πνεῦμα in v.16 refers to the ὁστασις of the Spirit, but the second refers to the 'Gift' which has been given to us by the former, i.e., the Holy Spirit proper. This is explained by way of a simple but effective analogy:

1. Gennadius anticipates what is to become a raging debate in later theology: the place and kind of fear allowable in man's relationship to God.


Just as the word "sun" denotes the body of the sun, so also the ray that comes from the sun is called "sun", the same as the whole. And we say of places that the one "has sun" and the other is "without sun", not that the house is placed outside the existence of the sun, but because its radiance comes upon some place while others are void of its radiance, and thus the Holy Scriptures call the grace of the Holy Spirit by the same name as that from which it originates.¹

This analogy, like most analogies, by no means satisfies all the questions we might like to put to the Antiochenes concerning the Holy Spirit. In fact, in many ways it

¹ Staab, 1933, p. 378: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡλιός μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τοῦ ήλίου τὸ σῶμα — λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἦς αὐτοῦ ἀκτίς ἡλίος ὁμονύμως τῶν ὅλων. φαμὲν ροῦν τῶν τῶν τῶν μὲν ἔχειν ἡλίον, τοὺς δὲ ἀναλίους ὑπάρχειν, οὗς ὡς τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ ἡλίου τῆς οἰκίας ἐξιστάμενας, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀπαγόρευμα πὴ μὲν τῶν χυρίων προσβάλλειν, πὴ δὲ προβόδοις τοῖς ἀποκλείσθαι — οὕτω καὶ τίν τοῦ ἄργου Πνεύματος χάριν ὁμονύμως τοῦ ἐξ ουπέρ ἐστίν ἡ Θεία λέγει γραφή.
raises more issues than it settles.¹ But we can regard this
analogy and the thesis which it supports as a classic
statement of the Antiochene position.² This solution to the
problem of how Πνεῦμα ought to be understood in ch. 8 of
Romans may seem inadequate, but as we shall see, it is by far
the most carefully worked out and consistent view for many
theological generations to come. If the Antiochene viewpoint is
subject to the criticism of ambiguity, then one need only reflect
on Origen's systematization of the problem to realize what an
improvement even this ambiguous interpretation really is.

1. One may ask if this view does not suggest a quasi-
Gnosticism. Why must man only experience the Holy Spirit
through the medium of his gifts and not directly? Perhaps Gennadius's choice of images is unfortunate in
this regard for, to use his words, our receiving the
'rays' of the sun immediately suggests a fragmentation
of the Spirit's Υπόδοσταέστης. The image of the
sun and its rays was, of course, familiar in early
Trinitarian speculation and necessarily carries with it here all of those associations.

2. Gennadius demonstrates the advantage of this view in this
same commentary. Quoting John 7:39b ('... for as yet the
Holy Σπíρτ had not been given, because Jesus was
not yet glorified'), he points out that Πνεῦμα Ἀγίου
(his reading, cf. Nestle, John 7:39 and apparatus) does
not refer to the Υπόδοσταέστης of the Spirit for
this forever was and is, but rather to the gift of the
Spirit which came at Pentecost.
Gennadius's comment on v.17a\(^1\) is short but well worth reviewing. He sees in the verse an opportunity of tying together the group of ideas 'adoption - heirs - joint-heirs - inheritance' and approaches this task logically, as follows:\(^2\)

If it is certain and not open to argument that we are children of God, then it must also be certain that we are heirs of our forefathers; by the first fact the second is necessarily demonstrated. Accordingly, we are called 'heirs of God' surely because (a) we are entitled to claim the same Father as does Christ,\(^3\) and (b) we are worthy to be called to the same

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1. In his commentary, Gennadius groups together vv. 16 and 17a, and vv. 17b and 18, thus implying that v. 17b is in content related to v. 18. This represents a rather significant insight, for many modern exegetes rightly observe that v. 17 is a skilful transition from vv. 12-17a to what follows.

2. Staab, 1933, p. 379.

3. Gennadius uses what would normally be a technical term in a non-technical context - ὑποτεθείμενος. A more literal translation than 'entitled' would be 'enrolled', since this term can be used to mean publically and legally registering oneself under a patron or guardian. There is no evidence in the papyri that this was tantamount to being adopted (and thus becoming a legal heir - a sequence of ideas which otherwise would ideally fit Gennadius's line of development), and thus Gennadius's use of the word here could be confusing. However, the attested use of 'claim as one's father' makes the appearance here much clearer (G.W.H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Fasc. 2, Oxford, 1962, pp. 519f). Lampe also indicates that the term is frequently used in Patristic literature of the Christian's relationship to God. Thus the technical use of the word is ...
adoption as he, and (c) we participate in the same adoption as he. ¹

Here we see the general Antiochene tendency to speak of the Christian's adoption in terms of Christ's adoption - a viewpoint quite unpopular with those who considered Theodore of Mopsuestia a heretic.

Gennadius offers us, in his exegesis of v.17, an analysis of Paul's words which, although written after the peak

footnote (1) from previous page:

... largely lost; nevertheless the use of it here in the immediate context of the words 'adoption' and 'heirs' is a pregnant one and it greatly strengthens Gennadius's pithy statement. Staab, 1933, p.379:

Кληρονόμοι μὲν θεοῦ, οὐκ οὖν ἐπιγραφώμενοι τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα Χριστοῦ καὶ εἰς νίκηθεςίαν αὐτῶν καθεδροῦς τὴν αὐτὴν καταξίωθεντο καὶ κληρονομίας αὐτῶν τῆς αὐτῆς συμπεθέσμεν.

¹. The rubrics ( (a), (b), etc.) are mine.
of the Antiochene School's prime, faithfully and even lucidly states the classical position.\textsuperscript{1} Our adoption, heirship and final inheritance (seen always in the context of being made immortal at the time of the Resurrection) are based on the model or example of Christ. His adoption, His inheritance, His glorification are the pioneering examples of things which are, and will be, ours.

\textsuperscript{1} Gennadius's exegesis of v.17a differs slightly from that of the Antiochene exegetes proper in that he does not emphasize the piling up of privileges (to be an heir is greater than being a son and to be a joint-heir with the Son is still greater), but rather the logicality of our heirship and our sharing with Christ the adoption and inheritance of sons.
Severian, Photius and Oecumenius.

In each of these three writers, we are left with only fragments of commentaries to the verses in our passage. Although all of them are men of no mean historical significance they are of only passing interest in the history of exegesis of our passage. Severian is, however, known primarily as an exegete and homilist and his commentary on the Pauline Epistles is of some considerable importance. While he was at swords' points ecclesiastically with John Chrysostom, yet in his exegesis he does not differ greatly from Chrysostom, and this is because he is influenced by the same teacher - Diodore of Tarsus.

Photius, on the other hand, is not known primarily as a Biblical exegete, but as a scholar devoted to other aspects

1. Logically, of course, these three writers do not belong together. Severian is the only one who can be identified with the Antiochene School in any strict, historical sense. Both Photius and Oecumenius are related to the historic Antiochene School by tradition. Because there are only mere fragments from each of the three which bear directly upon our passage, they are for the sake of convenience grouped together. The commentary written by Euthymius Zigabenus (12th century) will be reviewed in the section dealing with exegetes of the Middle Ages.
of theology and as an historian. He was the Patriarch of Constantinople and in time is far removed from the Antiochene School (born ca. 820-827). Like Euthymius Zigabenus (12th century), the importance of his exegetical writings lies in their dependence upon Antiochene exegesis. Strictly speaking, Oecumenius, Bishop of Tricca (not to be confused with the 6th century philosopher, Oecumenius, who was a contemporary of Severus of Antioch and from whose hand we have an important commentary on Revelation) does not belong to this section, being chronologically much later (10th century). Still, his exegesis, like Photius's, is so dependent upon that of his Antiochene predecessors as to make it almost obligatory to include him here. What is more, he is normally included in Catenae of the Greek Fathers.

Of the three men, Severian is the earliest and by far the most important. Of the vv.1-17, only a paragraph of his commentary on v.15 and a single line to v.9 survive.¹ The bulk of the scholion on v.15 is simply a rephrasing of Diodore's

¹. Staab, 1933, p.220.
exegesis to the same verse. There is, however, one line (the first) of extreme importance:

Some say that the spirit of servitude is the spirit of evil, but it is not so.\(^1\)

It is not clear whether Severian actually means the devil or some other minor evil spirit. In any case, it is the earliest reference we have to this distinctive interpretation, and the only mention of it in the Greek Fathers. As we shall see later, Augustine offers a similar, though fuller, interpretation.

In reference to our passage, we have only one short fragment to v.15 from Oecumenius:

Now perhaps, even though the Jews are called "gods" and "sons of God",\(^2\) just as everything with them was an archetype of what is ours, so is this also

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the case with adoption; for neither were they properly named "sons" but only typologically, nor did they receive the Spirit universally.\footnote{Staab, 1933, p.427: Τάχα δὲ, τι καὶ οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι Θεοὶ ἐκαλοῦντο καὶ νἱοὶ Θεοῦ, ὡσπερ τὰ \Piαρ' αὐτοῖς πάντα τοὺπος ἀὕ τῶν ἡμετέρων, οὕτω καὶ η νἱοθεσία. οὕτε \Piαρ κυρίως ἐκλήθησαν ἀλλὰ τοπικῶς νἱοὶ, οὕτε καθολικῶς \Piνεῦμα ἔλαβον.}

We have met a similar, although not so technical, interpretation elsewhere in Antiochene exegesis.\footnote{Cf. Chrysostom, above.} That it had become, even earlier, the almost inevitable thing to say is witnessed to in the very late commentary of Photius to this same verse. Photius's comment is, however, even more specifically
typological. He makes essentially the same point,\(^1\) adding that even if the Jews are called 'sons', still it is not given to them to call God 'Father', as it is to Christians. But he closes his commentary by suggesting that in other things there is a great difference between Jews and Christians (καὶ Πολλὴν ἡ ἄλλη διαφορά). These differences, we can only conclude, are typological in nature. This assumption is supported by Oecumenius's comment, that 'everything with them was an archetype of what is ours'.\(^2\)

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1. Staab, 1933, p. 510: οὐ δὲ γε Ἰουδαῖοι, εἰ καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο τέκνα Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ παμπόλλη κλίσεως ἐκατέρας καὶ νοσθεσίας ἡ διαφορά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τυπικῶς ὄνομαζόντο, ὡστερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸπον ἔτελεῖτο τῆς χάριτος, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὗ τυπικῶς ἀλλ' αὐτοτελῶς.

2. Staab, 1933, p. 427: ... τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς πάντα τῶν τῶν ἡμετέρων...
This final comment by Photius, taken together with the interpretation of both Photius and Oecumenius of v.15 (that while the Jews are typologically called sons, only Christians are sons in the fulfilled - \( \alphaυτοτελελυσσ\) - sense), is evidence of a definite drift away from the strictly historical or literal interpretation of the Antiochene School toward the easier and more speculative typological method.¹

The only other notable interpretation in Photius's commentary is the explicit statement (v.16) that we are adopted by God in baptism.²

1. It may also illustrate - since both Photius and Oecumenius are comparatively late - a tendency to use typology more freely as time goes on. Chrysostom, for example, on this same verse makes much the same kind of invidious comparison of the Jews' sonship and that of Christians, but he does not base his comparison on typology nor does he use the technical language we find in Photius and Oecumenius (e.g., \( \tauοτνσ \) and \( \alphaυτοτελελυσ \), but especially \( \tauοπλεκ\)).

2. Staab, 1933, p. 510: \( \οτε τεκνυν αυτοι εσμεν πο-\) θετηθεντες αυτω τω \( \betaαπτισματι. \)
Cyril of Alexandria.

Although known primarily for the central role he played in Christological disputes which raged in the first half of the 5th century, Cyril is also a significant figure in the history of interpretation. In fact, Cyril's exegetical works outnumber his dogmatic-polemical literary efforts; as Quasten points out, however, the latter are superior in quality. His commentary on John is equal in importance to those of Origen and Theodore of Mopsuestia on the same Gospel, and is much more extensive than either. Although the commentary on St. John is more purposefully polemical than either that of Origen or Theodore, it fully establishes Cyril as an independent exegete. Unfortunately, only fragments of Cyril's lost commentary on the Epistle to the Romans have been salvaged, and what remains of comments on our

1. Farrar, 1885, p.209, unfairly dismisses Cyril as an exegete in one or two curt sentences, saying that although different from Origen in some details, 'It is needless and impossible to speak separately of him ...' for, 'there is no new or original principle observable in his exegesis.' Farrar bases this judgement upon a comparison of the use of allegory in Cyril and Origen, and thus condemns Cyril because of his use of the allegorical method, particularly in the Old Testament. This is a dangerous selection of evidence, for a great deal of Cyril's New Testament exegesis does not depend so heavily upon allegory. For a far more balanced assessment of Cyril's abilities as an exegete, see Quasten, 1963, p.119.
passage is very minimal indeed - one short paragraph to v.14 and another to v.17b. ¹

Cyril's commentary on ch.8 significantly differs at points from both the Antiochene writers and Origen. In his comment on v.23, he makes a thinly veiled reference to Origen, and explicitly rejects his view. In discussing the nature of the awaited liberation, he takes the more conservative, orthodox line and denies that this means being delivered from the body we now have by its being resurrected in 'another spiritual form'...

¹ P.E. Pusey, Sancti Patris Nostri Cyrilli Archiepiscopi Alexandrini in D. Joannis Evangelium, III, Oxford, 1872, (cited below as 'Pusey, 1872'), pp. 210ff. The Migne text (PG, LXXIV) of these fragments (ch.8) is almost unusable; it lacks a number of fragments recovered in Pusey's text and within the material relevant to our passage adds commentary which cannot be attributed to Cyril: viz., col. 825, v.26, the portion beginning with the words Η μὲν φύσις ἡμῶν... and continuing to the end of the commentary (col.828) is lifted directly out of Gennadius. Also the last line ought to read ἡμῶν τὰς χρείας ..., and not ἡμῶν τὰς χειρας.
(ἐτερόν τῷ πνευματικῶν). Cyril departs from the Antiochene writers most significantly in his lack of emphasis on the central function of the Spirit in the believer's present life of hope and in the resurrection of the future. In the Antiochene School, as we have seen, it is the Spirit which mediates the grace of God's promises, bestows his gifts, is the present pledge of final adoption, and, finally, effects the Christian's transition into immortality.

Cyril, on the other hand, is careful to point out the close, almost subordinated connection of the Spirit to Christ, representing the Spirit as the Agent through whom Christ affects the lives of Christians. He interprets the 'law of the spirit of life' in v.2 not as the Holy Spirit but as the human spirit which has been enlivened by the Holy Spirit, i.e., the will which is

1. Cyril takes this line because he is anxious that no one deduce from the phrase ἄτενα ἡμᾶς τὴν ἑαυτῆς σῴζεις ἵμας ἀπολύτρωσιν (Cyril's arrangement of the text) that Christians ought to crave to get rid of their bodies. His way out of this demonstrates the debt he owes to the Alexandrian method of exegesis: we are to understand 'the liberation of our bodies' as adoption. Thus Cyril chooses to employ the allegorical method to relieve what he perceives as a difficulty rather than employing grammatical arguments, which would have been just as possible and more convincing.
spiritual, the mind which is inclined toward doing to good.\(^1\)
The genitive \(\tau\iota\nu\) is indication that the will of
the mind leads us to life.\(^2\) Quoting Romans 7:26, Cyril
demonstrates that this better, higher aspect of our nature has
always been with us, but through our weakness we were led to
resist the law of God and thus give way to the lustings of the
flesh. Through the Christ event, man has been empowered,
strengthened and liberated. Thus the 'law of the spirit of life'
has been set above the law of the flesh. Cyril cautiously points
out that the law of the spirit of life did not itself give the
freedom, but rather became for us the giver of the freedom which is
acquired through Christ.\(^3\) This analysis corresponds closely to

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1. Pusey, 1872, p.210. Cyril's actual words are: \(τὸ \̲θελήμα
tὸ \̲πνευματικὸν, \τοῦτεστὶ \τὴν \̲εἰς \̲τὸ \̲ἀραθὸν
τὴς \̲σκανώς \̲αποτίν.\)

2. Pusey, 1872, p.210: \(τοῦτεστὶ \̲τὸ \̲θελήμα \̲τοῦ \̲νου
τὸ \̲ἀποθέρων \̲εἰς \̲Ἰων.\)

3. Pusey, 1872, p.211: \(καὶ \̲οὐ \̲αὐτὸς \̲που \̲πάντως \̲τὴν
ἐλευθερίαν \̲διόυς, \̲μεροῖς \̲δε \̲μᾶλλον \̲ήμιν
ἐλευθερίας \̲πρὸ \̲ένος \̲τῆς \̲διὰ \̲Χριστοῦ.\)
Origen's general view of \( \text{Πνεῦμα} \) and \( \text{Πνευματικός} \):\(^1\) the \( \text{Πνεῦμα} \) in man is the higher, nobler part of man (sometimes referred to as \( \text{νοῦς} \)), it is good and thus in conflict with the flesh, but needs to be positively influenced and empowered by the Holy Spirit.\(^2\) Thus it is that at v.9, Cyril can say that by \( \text{Πνεῦμα} \) is meant human spirit and that as in the phrase 'spirit of life', it is the human spirit which has been made alive by the grace of the Holy Spirit.\(^3\) As in Origen, the idea of

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2. Cyril explicitly states this principle in his commentary to v.2: Κατεσφραγίσμεθα γὰρ δι’ αὐτοῦ τῷ Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι...

(Pusey, 1872, p.210). After saying this, Cyril appeals to Luke 24:49 and the words 'clothed with power from on high'.

3. Pusey, 1872, p.214: Πνεῦμα δὲ φανεν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἐν δὲ τῷ Τῷ Πνεῦμα ἓν, τῷ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνευματός ἐσο- ποιούμενον χάριτι...
the Holy Spirit dwelling within man is hereby considerably weakened.

One interesting ramification of this weakening is the way in which Paul's phrase 'you are in the Spirit' (v.8) is interpreted. Taking this phrase as a springboard, Cyril points out that 'If then someone is in the Spirit he will also be in righteousness and in life ...' That is, the newly empowered spirit of the Christian is in harmony with and lives up to the law of God. This is made even clearer in Cyril's comment on vv.6 and 7:

He says - quite rightly - that "the mind of the flesh" is death; but that "the mind of the spirit is life and peace". For the love of the flesh in truth imparts death; but to choose to live spiritually imparts eternal life and the goods of heaven. For if "the mind of the flesh is enmity towards God" because it does not obey the

1. Pusey, 1872, p. 214: Εἰ τὸς οὐν ἐστὶν ἐν Πνεύματι, οὗτος ἐστι ν καὶ ἐν σικαλοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν Ἰων...
divine laws, "indeed it cannot", for how can loathsome and profane lust please God? But the mind which is free from filth and mutability lives in peace with God, as far as that is possible for human nature.1

In other words, existence 'in the spirit' could just as well be described as living righteously and obediently. This very ethical interpretation of Paul's words is in stark contrast to Antiochene writers who emphasize the eschatological significance

of the believer's relationship to the Spirit - an eschatological emphasis that forms the basis for all ethical obedience. We ought not to be surprised then if the strong connecting link - the ministry of the spirit - between present ethical existence and future glorification is absent in Cyril's commentary.

Cyril is also anxious to establish - wherever the opportunity suggests itself - that the Spirit is not some independent power which acted upon Jesus and acts upon believers, but Jesus's own. This proposition is, in fact, the sum total of Cyril's interpretation of v.11; Cyril's commentary concerns itself only with v.11a. He says that Jesus was raised by the

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1. This point is relevant to the history of the conflict between Cyril and Nestorius. Cyril states, in the 9th proposition of the Twelve Anathemata, 'The Spirit is Jesus's own and not a foreign power by which he is glorified'.

2. As is true in all the early great Trinitarian disputes, this verse, together with vv.9 and 10, must have been of prime importance in Cyril's arsenal of proof-texts for all questions relating to the relationship of the Spirit to the Son.
Father through the Holy Spirit, which Spirit is His. The proof of this is John 2:19, where Jesus said: 'Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up'. He said this, asserts Cyril, because he himself was about to vivify his own temple (ὁτι γὰρ αὐτὸς τὸν ἵδιον ἐζωοίηκεν ναὸν). And thus, even though He is said to be raised by the Father, he Himself raised Himself through the Holy Spirit. Cyril then summarizes this in the best Nicene tradition, saying, 'all divine acts are effected by the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit'.

But for our purpose, the concluding sentence is the important one:

1. Pusey, 1872, pp. 214-215:
Ενηγερτάλ ο Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς ο Χριστός παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς, ἐνεργουμένης περὶ τὴν σάρκα αὐτοῦ ἐν σαρκί διὰ τοῦ Αʹ Άγιον Πνεύματος, ο ἐστὶν αὐτὸς.

2. Pusey, 1872, p. 215:
Πάντα γὰρ ἐνεργεῖται τὰ Θεοπρεπὴ παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς διὰ Υίου ἐν Πνεύματι.
'Thus Christ will also raise our bodies from the dead'.

Such an emphasis on the primacy of Christ in the lives of believers could hardly be more at odds with the view held by


2. This regulating principle under which Cyril conducted his exegesis also explains, in part, his interpretation of the phrase 'in the spirit' (cf. above) as well as his general tendency in the commentary on v.2 to understand τοῦ Πνεύματος (in the phrase 'the law of the spirit of life') not as the Holy Spirit but rather as the higher or nobler aspect of man's nature as aided by the Holy Spirit. Of special significance in this regard is Cyril's comment that the 'law of the Spirit of life' did not itself give the freedom envisioned in v.2, but rather became for Christians the 'patron' or 'giver' (Προέφένος) of that freedom which is acquired through Christ. (Cf. Pusey, 1872, p.211).

The Antiochenes certainly cannot be accused of replacing Christ with the Spirit as Redeemer, but they did tend to cast final redemption into the future; in this eschatological scheme the role of the Spirit was of utmost significance. Insofar as it regards this passage then, and for the sake of convenience, one can say that Cyril, and for that matter Origen as well, interprets redemption in moral and ethical categories while the Antiochenes emphasize the eschatological aspects of redemption which, in turn, forms the basis and motivation for moral and ethical obedience. This generalization must be balanced, however, by saying that for Antioch's most prestigious theologian, Theodore of Mopsuestia, there is a constant tension maintained: redemption depends on man's successful imitation of Christ's perfect obedience and, at the same time, only upon God's mighty acts of deliverance.
Antiochene theologians. They would have considered this not only poor theology, but an unwarranted meddling with the plain meaning of the text. From this instance alone, it is clear that the Antiochene writers, in contrast with the Alexandrian school of exegesis, consistently emphasized the Spirit's ministry in the Church between the time of Christ's ascension and the final Resurrection, which emphasis they felt to be in harmony with Paul's own views.

Although fragments of Cyril's commentary to vv.12 and 13 have not survived, it is almost possible to reconstruct what we might have expected him to say. In light of his commentary to vv.6 and 7, and 8 and 9 (cf. above), and in light of his definitions of what being 'in the flesh' and 'in the spirit' mean, it seems safe to conclude that he would not have taken occurrences of $\pi \nu \chi \epsilon \omega \mu \alpha$ in vv.12 and 13 to mean the Holy Spirit. Rather, he would have understood Paul's exhortation in these verses to refer to the Christian's responsibility to continue living 'spiritually', or in positive response to the higher part of his nature, which has been freed from the bondage of sin by Christ, empowered by God and strengthened by the Holy Spirit so that he might please God and thus live in peace with God. He
has already said that to live spiritually imparts eternal life (vv. 6 and 7), and this or something similar we might expect him to also say to v. 13b. What it means not to be a debtor to the flesh (v. 12) he has already rather fully explained in the commentary to v. 2.

At v. 14, he simply says:

Those who live in the spirit are "led by the Spirit" because of their being sealed by the Holy Spirit and their being liberated from servitude to the law and to the letter, and because they have entered into freedom and witness the Spirit of adoption, because they are the sons of God and in the spirit of adoption say "Abba, Father".

1. Pusey, 1872, p. 215: Οἱ δὲ Πνεῦματες, οὗτοι καὶ Πνεῦματες ἁγιωτάτες, διὰ τὸ κατέσφαγ··

καὶ Πνεῦματες ἁγιωτάτες ἐσθαι τῷ Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, καὶ ὑπότισαι δὲ μᾶλλον εἰς ἑλευθερίαν, καὶ μαρτυρεῖσθαι τῷ τῆς νεόθεσίας Πνεύματι, ὅτι τε εἶσιν ἦσος Θεοῦ, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς νεόθεσίας Πνεύματι διακεκράφασιν Ἀββᾶ ὁ πατὴρ.
In this brief comment, one or two details of our reconstruction (above) are confirmed, particularly the view that living in the spirit is the condition resulting from servitude to the law, and the general view that victorious Christian living is possible only when the human spirit is helped and strengthened by the Holy Spirit.

Cyril's interpretation of v.17 is essentially a contrasting of this present life with that of the future glory. He points out that the good is not established without toil, but that the toil of the saints is carried out in great hope. Their view, suggests Cyril, is not focused on earthly rewards but on the eternal glory; because of this contempt for earthly things, they are, therefore, worthy of eternal glory. Those who labor upon earth in fortitude and endurance will enjoy the victor's wreath in incomparable excellence. The labor for virtue, concludes Cyril, is small compared with the honors that come after.¹

Noticeably absent in Cyril's interpretation is a reference to actual, literal suffering under persecution for His

¹. Pusey, 1872, p.215.
name. Thus Cyril once again departs significantly from his Antiochene contemporaries.

This is a good point at which to conclude our review of Cyril's commentary. Throughout this section, we have tried to show how Cyril's interpretation varies from that of the Antioch School. Indeed this is perhaps the major significance of Cyril's exegetical writing, for in it we can plainly see that contemporary with and yet independent of the Antioch school of exegesis there flourished a rival method of interpretation in Alexandria which did not by any means cease with Origen. It is this method which was destined to triumph for succeeding generations.

But Cyril's methodological posture taken as an historical phenomenon is important from another, perhaps more significant facet which does not come to light in his exegetical writings, but rather in his dogmatic-polemical writings. Quasten has summarized it in this way:

*It is not only through his ideas that Cyril influenced the sacred sciences but also through his method. He is in fact the main representative of the scholastic procedure among the Greek Fathers. It seems that he consciously and purposely extended the long established practice of adducing "proofs from Scripture" to include*
also "proofs from the Fathers". ... It is certainly his merit that from now on Patristic testimony stands with Scriptural as authority in theological argumentation.¹

We see in Cyril the primary and earliest exponent of a theological method which will eventually also be adopted for the interpretation of Scripture - a method wherein interpretation means simply the assembling of authoritative (i.e., Patristic) opinion in an orderly fashion alongside the Biblical text. It has been remarked that Cyril's theological method meant that 'the creative age of the theology of the early Church had come to an end'.² If this is so, then certainly Cyril also marks the beginning of the end of the creative interpretation of Scripture. As the first to seriously espouse a new theological method, he makes himself a transition to another era in theology. But as the last of the Greek Fathers³ he also forms the transition to another, different kind of creative era in the history of interpretation - the Fathers and doctors of Latin Christianity.

³. 'In the Greek world he was the last of the Fathers of the Church because, strictly speaking, he no longer had any desire to be one'. Campenhausen, 1963, p.170.
B. Latin Patristic Exegesis.

Ambrosiaster.

Ambrosiaster's commentary to Paul's Epistles contains the earliest Latin commentary on Romans that we possess.\(^1\)

The identity of the writer remains until the present day shrouded in mystery.\(^2\) In spite of this anonymity, Ambrosiaster is perhaps the most important commentator of Paul (and certainly of

1. In all, there are five great Latin commentators on St. Paul who lived and wrote in the 4th century - Marius Victorinus, Ambrosiaster, Jerome, Augustine and Pelagius (Ambrose left behind no written work which systematically deals with Paul's Epistles). Of these five, only Ambrosiaster and Pelagius wrote complete commentaries on the Pauline Epistles (excluding Hebrews in both cases). Thus in this period we are limited to the commentaries on Romans of these two men and a very abbreviated exposition of certain selected verses in Romans by Augustine. For a discussion of these five writers see Wiles, 1967, pp. 10ff.

2. For a bibliography of literature concerning this question, see B. Altaner and A. Stuiber, Patrologie, Freiburg, 7th ed., 1966, p.390. Cited below as 'Altaner, 1966'.


Romans) in the 4th-century Latin Church.\(^1\) The exegetical writings attributed to Ambrosiaster show him to be an independent and influential interpreter in a theologically fluid period prior to Augustine and the Pelagian controversy. His exegesis is characterized by a crisp pithiness which, while it does not exclude the use of typology, often seeks to establish the historical sense of Paul's words. The depth of his thinking is often as difficult and far-reaching as that of Origen; indeed, he more closely resembles Origen - even to the extent of his conclusions on controversial theological problems - than any other Eastern theologian. However, his work stands in comparative isolation and does not provide the basis for, nor represent anything close to an epoch or school of exegesis. Still, he does offer us an excellent example of the West's understanding up to Augustine as well as a Latin text of the Pauline Epistles which predates that of Jerome.

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1. The critical text (texts actually, since two recensions are arranged on parallel pages) of the commentary to Romans 8:1ff is contained in Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, LXXXI, *Ambrosiasti Qui Dicitur Commentarius in Epistulas Paulinas. Pars I: In Epistulam ad Romanos*. Vienna, 1966, pp.248ff. (Cited below as 'CSEL, LXXXI'.) There is also a text of this commentary in PL, XVII, cols.116ff (chapter 8:1ff). This is, however, very untrustworthy and erroneously attributed to Ambrose. All quotations and references used are from the (gamma) recension of the CSEL text. With regard to Ambrosiaster as an interpreter of Paul, see Wilhelm Mundle, *Die Exegese der Paulinischen Briefe*, Marburg, 1919; especially ch.VI, 'Die Interpretation der paulinischen Theologie durch Ambrosiaster', pp.71-94.
Finally, not only does Ambrosiaster's commentary predate Augustine, but it has also almost certainly exerted an influence upon him. ¹

We turn now to a detailed consideration of this commentary.

In the section devoted to Romans 8:1-17, a number of important things are said concerning the Incarnation, the Virgin Birth of Christ, the doctrine of sin, the Atonement, the unity and discontinuity of the Law and the Gospel, the nature of faith and the believer's attitude toward worldly existence. In short, the breadth of theological interest - encompassed, as it is, in a piece of exegetical writing - is quite astounding. Of those exegetes already reviewed, only Theodore of Mopsuestia offers us anything like so theological an exegesis. Space does not permit even a summary of his interpretation of the eleven verses preceding our passage in ch. 8, but it will be necessary, from time to time, to refer to his earlier comments in order to understand fully some of his comments on vv. 12-17.

¹. It has been suggested to the writer by Dr. G. Bonner (Durham University), an authority on St. Augustine, that Ambrosiaster was accepted so readily by Augustine because he identified Ambrosiaster with St. Hilary of Poitiers.
To the first words of v.12 ('Igitur, fratres, debitores sumus non carn1, ut secundum carnem vivamus')\(^1\), Ambrosiaster makes much the same point as the Greek interpreters often make: we are debtors to the One who justified us - for we who were dirtied with carnal vices have been cleansed through the washing of the Spirit - and who made us sons of God.\(^2\) However, on the negative side of the assertion a more typically Western interpretation is offered: Ambrosiaster understands that to which Christians are no longer indebted as the inheritance of death left to us by Adam.\(^3\) Still, Ambrosiaster ought not be understood here as personifying death or as espousing a view similar to Theodore, in which man's present earthly condition is the definition of 'flesh' and thus the root of man's difficulty. Rather, it is the release of the body from sin and hence from enslavement to the Devil which marks Ambrosiaster's view of the

1. CSEL, LXXI, p.269.

2. CSEL, LXXXI, p.271: 'huic enim sumus debitores, qui nos carnalibus vitiiis sordidatos per lavacrum spiritus ablotos iustificavit et filios dei fecit ...'

3. CSEL, LXXXI, p.269: 'rectum et manifestum est non nos adinventioni Adae, qui carnaliter egit, obsecundare debere, qui prior pecoans mortem nobis hereditatis titulo (de) reliquit ...'
condition of death. This understanding is well summarized by Kelly when he says:

In Ambrosiaster's view man's body, as a result of the fatal legacy, is a prey to sin; Satan holds him captive, and can compel him to do his will. The reason is that ... Adam's sin corrupted the flesh, and the corruption is passed on by physical descent....¹

But Christians, having been released from sin by Christ, are no longer captive to Satan and thus cannot be considered debtors to the flesh:

.... For, before, having been placed in the flesh, we were living as subjects to sin by the example of Adam but now, liberated, we ought to render obedience to the Redeemer.²

This interpretation (i.e., that living in the flesh - following the course of adinventiôn Adae) is pursued

¹. J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, London, 4th ed., 1968, p.355. (Cited below as 'Kelly, 1968'). Also Wiles, 1967, p.40: 'Ambrosiaster asserts that it is the soul which was primarily responsible for Adam's sin, but that it is the body which is corrupted thereby and by which inherited sin is passed on ....'

². CSEL, LXXXI, p.271: '... prius enim in carne positi exemplo Adae vivebamus subiecti peccatis, nunc vero liberati reddere debemus obsequium redemptori'.

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in Ambrosiaster's exegesis of v.13a when he says, 'Nothing is more true: that if we should live according to Adam we will die'. The ground for saying this, as we have already noted and as Ambrosiaster now explicitly states himself, is that in sinning, Adam sold himself to sin and thus is delegated to flesh. That 'flesh' is here to be understood in a technical, pejorative sense is made clear in one concise statement: 'all sin is flesh'. Thus Ambrosiaster identifies flesh (when taken in the pejorative sense) as man when under the control and influence of sin, and not as the human condition of corporality itself. Still' there is a close connection between 'flesh' and the physical body, as we might well expect in a theologian who understands inherited sin to be physically transmitted. Thus it is that Ambrosiaster continues in his commentary on v.13a to say that since the body has been given over to the 'flesh', the source of vices is found in the five senses (id est de auditu, visu, tactu, odoratu vel gusto). In the first man sin was born externally and the danger of sin for us continues to be primarily the tendencies

1. CSEL, LXXXI, p.271: 'nihil verius, quia si secundum Adam vixerimus, moriemur'.
2. CSEL, LXXXI, p.271: 'omne ... peccatum caro est'.
of our 'exterior' senses.¹

This rather disappointing explanation of what it means to live 'according to the flesh' is matched, in the commentary on v.l3b,² with an equally disappointing interpretation of the phrase '... mortify the deeds of the flesh'. To mortify, says Ambrosiaster, is simply to repress. That is, the counsels and acts of the flesh ought to be repressed in such a way that they do not receive the power of acting. Thus Ambrosiaster's definition of mortification is unrealistically optimistic and simplistic: acts of the flesh are not so much to be caught just after they rise from the surface, but not be allowed to arise at all,

... for they are said to be mortified if they cease since, if they do not come about, they are not.³

1. Initially this may sound a great deal like Chrysostom's view on this passage (that the needs of the body are not sinful nor are the necessary attentions we pay to these needs, but rather that these external acts of the body become sinful precisely at that point at which they become the ruling concern of existence), but this is not the case. For Chrysostom it is the soul which must be looked to in attributing responsibility for sin. Ambrosiaster's view is much closer to that of Origen. See Wiles, 1967, p.40.

2. CSEL, LXXXI, p.271.

3. CSEL, LXXXI, p.271: '... mortificari enim dicuntur, si cessent, et quia si non fiant, non sunt'.
Ambrosiaster's interpretation of v.14 is more satisfying. Here he quotes I John 3:9a¹ and St. John 8:44a² in support of the fact that those in whose acts are seen the influence of worldly forces are not sons of God but sons of devils. On the other hand, those who are led by the Spirit of God are clearly recognizable as those 'in whose acts the counsels of the principalities and powers of the world are not seen'.³ Thus Ambrosiaster (a) takes v.14 closely with v.13, and (b) understands v.14a as proof or evidence of the fact stated in v.14b.

In his comment on v.15, Ambrosiaster more obviously gives away his kinship with the Alexandrian school of exegesis than in any other comment in our section.⁴ As we have seen in

1. 'No one born of God commits sin ....'

2. 'You are of your father the Devil ....'

3. CSEL, LXXXI, p.273: '... in quorum actibus consilia principum et potestatum huius mundi non videntur'.

4. For an excellent analysis and summary of the Fathers' interpretation of Paul's use of the word and idea of Law, see Wiles, 1967., ch.IV, 'The Law', pp.49-72.
Chrysostom's interpretation (which reflects general Antiochene thought), the tendency is to stress the historical progression of God's revelation; thus he is led to cast the comparison between Jews and Christians in terms of the inferiority of the Old Testament experience of God versus the superiority of the Christians' experience. This superiority is best seen in the practical working out of obedience, or, put another way, in the conquering of sin. In this scheme, the Spirit plays a strong, central role, for it displaces the law.1 Thus the contrast is a solid and historical one: Law and Spirit. In Alexandrian exegesis, however, the contrast is more one of the letter and the spirit of the law, with a strong dependence upon allegory and - at least on the surface - a stress upon the unity of law and Gospel. With this frame of reference, there is implicit a movement from that which is unreal ('letter') to that which is real ('spirit'); hence the historical importance of the advent of the Holy Spirit as a clear marking-off of one era and the beginning

1. Wiles, 1967, p. 62f, has characterized Chrysostom's view as follows: 'The law is spiritual because it taught the way of virtue, of life in the spirit, but it could not complete the task by actually giving the Spirit. The gift of the Spirit renders the law superfluous, because it deals with the root of evil, where the law can only deal with the fruit'.
of another is not nearly so central an issue as it was for the Antiochenes.

Ambrosiaster, as the first Latin commentator on Romans, is of great significance at this point, accepting, as he does, the Alexandrian point of view. His exegesis of v.15 is characterized by the following points:¹

(a) clear indication of the view that the believer in Christ is the equivalent to the man who perfectly obeys the law; and

(b) interpretation of 'the spirit of adoption' as the 'law of faith' and the 'law of security', and 'spirit of bondage' as 'spirit of fear'.

These two points are not, of course, equal - the first is really a conclusion based upon an analysis of the second, as well as upon an analysis of similar terms used elsewhere in Ambrosiaster's commentary on ch.8; for convenience, we can group the two points

¹ In addition to these two points, it is to be noted that Ambrosiaster does not explicitly mention a contrast between the Jews and Christians and that as a result of his exegesis the terms 'law' and 'spirit' are considerably weakened in ch.8; i.e., 'law' no longer always means the Mosaic Law, nor does 'spirit' always mean the Holy Spirit.
together in the detailed consideration which follows.

It would be unfair (in reference to b above) to suggest that Ambrosiaster sees no great difference between those under the law and Christians. He says quite plainly that the Law could never bring about 'life' because it could not remit sins.¹ Still, in support of the Alexandrian point of view, the Old Testament condition (Law of Moses) is contrasted with that of the new - the law of faith. Ambrosiaster has already written at length on this problem in his commentary on v.2. There he substitutes the phrase 'law of faith' for 'law of the spirit' and promotes the view that all those things then aimed at by the law, accrue now to believers by faith:

Let us see what difference it makes when the law is called spiritual and the law of the spirit. This is the point concerning which the law is called spiritual: because it gives precepts through which one might not sin, because he who does not sin is called spiritual, an imitator of heavenly things above. But the law of the spirit

¹. See the commentary to v.2, CSEL, LXXXI, p.251: 'nam et Moysi lex spiritalis est, quia prohibet peccari, non tamen vitae, quia res mortis peccata remittere non potest, ut vivificet mortuos'.


is so called because God, to whom faith pertains, is spirit. There, therefore, the words are present, here the reality; there what is of God, here God himself.¹

This clear statement is the conclusion to a careful working out of the negative implications of the 'foreshadowed-fulfilled' scheme of the Law. Earlier Ambrosiaster has posed the question that 'if faith furnishes the same things which also the law furnishes',² might it also be true that the law of faith can also be a 'law of death'? The answer, of course, is a resounding 'No!'.³

The important point to be drawn from this perusal of Ambrosiaster's commentary on v.2 is that the Law represents an

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1. CSEL, LXXI, p.253: 'videamus nunc quid intersit, cum dicitur lex spiritalis et lex spiritus. hoc interest, quia ideo dicitur lex spiritalis, quia praecpta dat, per quae non peccetur, quia qui non peccat, spiritalis vocatur, aemulus superiorum caelestium; lex autem spiritus "propter eα" vocatur, quia deus, cuius fides est, spiritus est. illic ergo verba sunt, hic res; illic quae dei sunt, hic deus ipse'.

2. CSEL, LXXI, p.253: '... si eadem praestat fides quae et lex ....'

3. Ambrosiaster's explanation is that the effect of faith is remission of those whom the law holds as transgressors; thus acting under faith they are freed from sin, whereas those remaining in bondage to the law stand condemned. The conclusion then can only be that those who do not obey faith are condemned not by faith but by the law.
ineffectual foreshadowing of a condition only fulfilled with the advent of the Gospel, and that this new condition can be characterized as the 'law of faith'. This is precisely the background necessary to understanding the points a and b above, which stand out in Ambrosiaster's interpretation of v.15.

1. This view is also reflected in Ambrosiaster's commentary on v.4 (CSEL, LXXXI, p.257f) where he says after quoting v.4, 'And so he calls sin condemned, that the righteousness of the law given by Moses might be fulfilled in us. For, having been removed from the condition of the law, we have become friends of the same. For the justified are friends of the law. But how is righteousness fulfilled in us except when the remission of all sin is granted, so that with sins having been taken away one appears justified, obeying with one's mind the Law of God? This is to walk not according to the flesh but according to the spirit, so that the devotion of the soul, which is the spirit, does not consent to the desire of sin ....' ('ideo damnatum dicit peccatum, ut inpliceretur in nobis iustificatio legis datae a Moyse. sublati enim de condicio one legis facti sumus amici eiusdem. iustificati enim amici legis sunt. quomodo autem inpliceretur in nobis iustificatio, nisi cum datur remissio omnium peccatorum ut sublatis peccatis iustificatus apparet mente serviens legi dei? hoc est non secundum carnem ambulare, sed secundum spiritum, ut desiderio animi, qui est spiritus, non consentiat desiderio peccati ....')

2. Further, the fact that he can invent terms such as 'the law of security' ('lex securitatis') in order to have a contrasting parallel for his 'spirit of fear' illustrates a reduction of the terms 'law' and 'spirit'.
In the text of the commentary itself, the following remains to be noted: Ambrosiaster transforms Paul's contrast completely: 'spirit of bondage unto fear' becomes 'spirit of fear', and 'spirit of adoption' is termed 'law of faith' or 'law of security'. This is a confusing inversion of terms and as such is not a good example of Ambrosiaster's writing, which is usually straightforward and clear-headed. Nevertheless, this rewording of Paul's word-picture brings v.15 within the limits of the basic definition of terms Ambrosiaster has already established in vv. 2 and 4. The point is simply that the law is the spirit of fear 'because it has brought men into a state of fear on account of sin'.¹ With believers, however, the case is completely reversed, for they have had their sins forgiven through faith and thus they live in complete security.²

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¹ CSEL, LXXXI, p.273: '... quia homines peccati causa in timore constituit'.

² This reconstruction of terms causes Ambrosiaster to minimize somewhat the role of the Holy Spirit in the second part of the contrast. Still, he does begin his comment with the statement, 'This means that, having accepted the Holy Spirit, we are delivered from all fear of evil acts....' (CSEL, LXXXI, p.273: 'hoc dicit, quia accepto spiritu sancto omni timore malorum actuum exutī sumus ....') K.H.Schelkle, Paulus Lehrer der Väter, Düsseldorf, 2nd ed., 1959, p.278 (cited hereafter as 'Schelkle, 1959'), offers this summary: 'Auch Ambrosiaster glaubt, dass Paulus Röm 8,13 vom Heiligen Geist spricht, mit dessen Hilfe wir die Taten und Pläne des Fleisches bezwingen müssen. Zu Röm 8,15 aber sagt Ambrosiaster als Geist der Furcht bezeichnet Paulus das Gesetz, das ja die Menschen um der Sünde willen in Furcht versetzt. Wir aber haben nunmehr den Geist der Annahme als Söhne empfangen'.

Therefore, 'law of faith' is the proper contrast to 'spirit of bondage' since it is by faith that the believer is made the true 'doer' of the law, no longer living in fear; on the contrary, he lives in security. In other words, the believer is here being evaluated in terms of his relationship to the law, rather than being placed in another subsequent era in which the law is no longer germane to the discussion. This is, of course, in general agreement with other Alexandrian writers and will be, from the time of Ambrosiaster forward, the accepted Western interpretation. The advantage, as we have already mentioned, is that it allows a more unitive view of the relationship between the Testaments. The disadvantage is that it tends to regard the law in its Old Testament manifestation as a rather shadowy reality which requires the advent of Christ, grace and faith before it comes into its proper reality.

Ambrosiaster's commentary on v.15b is not actually an interpretation of the phrase 'spirit of adoption as sons', but a moral exhortation based on the words, 'Abba, Father'. In this exhortation, Ambrosiaster points out that, 'If we exhibit a way of life disparate with this call in which we say "Abba, Father", we
do injury to God calling him Father'. The basis of this appeal is somewhat reminiscent of many of Chrysostom's exhortations: 'considering what we were', says Ambrosiaster, 'and what we have attained by the gift of God, let us order our lives with great care'. This exhortation is given an emotional valence by two perceived dangers: if we do not order our lives with great care, the name of God in us may suffer injury and we may also incur, as ingrates, all those things we have escaped by the grace of God. Thus the themes of preserving the present condition of grace (positive) and avoiding ingratitude (negative) are appealed to as motivations for Christian morality.

Two further points are of interest in this exhortation. Ambrosiaster pursues the contrast of fear-security (first voiced in the commentary to v.15a, above) by pointing out

1. CSEL, LXXXI, pp.273f: 'si enim huic voci, qua dicimus abba, pater, dissimilem conversationem exhibuerimus, injuriam deo facimus vocantes eum patrem'.

2. CSEL, LXXXI, p.273: '... ut considerantes quid eramus et quid dono dei sumus adepti, magna cura vitam nostram ordinemus ....'

3. Although each of these emphases could have been made by Chrysostom, he would be more likely to speak of the 'gift of God in us' than 'the name of God in us', as does Ambrosiaster.
that a lapse from grace is a perversion of security into timorousness. Accordingly, throughout the commentary on v.15, Ambrosiaster proposes security as a category for understanding the quality of man's relationship with God. Secondly, Ambrosiaster clearly believes that Christians are redeemed from sin and fear to a life of obedience. (This is a corollary of the point that the believer is identical with the doer of the law). He says that Christians are indebted to God on account of that which has been given to them. What is more, the first

1. CSEL, LXXXI, p.273: 'talem enim gratiam consecutī sumus, ut audeamus dicere deo: abba, hoc est pater. ideoque commonet, ne accepta fiducia in temeritatem vertatur'.

2. As we shall see, 'fear' becomes increasingly difficult to define and the extent to which believers ought to experience certain types of fear and be free of other types becomes a burning issue.

3. This is well summarized in the final sentence of his commentary on v.15: 'For on this account in His goodness He has granted this to us, which is above our nature, so that what we are unworthy of by substance we may merit by works'. (CSEL, LXXXI, p.275: 'idcirco enim bonitate sua hoc nobis indulsit, quod super naturam nostram est, ut quod substantia indigni sumus, operibus mereamur'.)

139.
point - that security and confidence characterize the Christian's life - is closely linked with this one. In a way of speaking, the security resulting from the believer's release from sin and thus from fear ought to equip him for an obedient life - freedom from fear is freedom to serve. Or, to put it in the words of Ambrosiaster's own vocabulary, the believer is made a perfectly obedient doer of the law through Christ by obeying the law of faith; all other acts of obedience are predicated upon this.

We have taken much time and space to review Ambrosiaster's exegesis of v.15 because of its importance historically, for this interpretation marks the acceptance of a basically Alexandrian viewpoint in the Western Church. It was destined to remain the standard interpretation (with minor additions and variations) for centuries to come, down to Luther and beyond.¹

While Ambrosiaster acknowledges the role of the Holy Spirit in the prayer life of Christians, as indicated in v.16,

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¹ One of the more important variations is that of Augustine. It is interesting to note that although Luther (in his Lectures on the Epistle to the Romans) felt constrained to cite Augustine's interpretation, he prefers that of Ambrosiaster.
this is not what he understands to be the primary significance of this verse. Rather, Ambrosiaster sees a continual tension at work in the Christian as he boldly names God 'Father': the confirmation of his boldness by the believer's good conduct (bene agentibus) and the confirmation of the Holy Spirit both of the believer's good conduct and legitimacy of naming God 'Father'.

The line of his exposition is as follows: we cry out from our soul 'Abba', i.e., Father, and the Spirit in turn witnesses to that word and to the soul (as the source of prayer) that our conduct is not inconsistent with the name of the Father. Thus two important facts emerge: the testimony of the Spirit is not so much to be connected with the general experience of prayer as with the moral and ethical life of the believer; the fact that the believer is so bold as to say 'Father' is in itself evidence of the Holy Spirit's presence within us.

Thus the point made by Ambrosiaster is simply the positive side of the exhortation in his comment on v.15: we can say 'Father' in all confidence because we 'exhibit a life worthy of

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1. Ambrosiaster does not make any observation on the significance of the two words ωπαται and σεπωνονταί standing side by side, as does Augustine; he considers the second word as simply a translation of the first.
his word'.  

Prayer, when taken in this sense, becomes a divine seal of approval on the lives of believers. This is precisely what Ambrosiaster says in an admirably clear and concise concluding sentence:

And this is the testimony of sons, if, in them, through the spirit the paternal seal is seen.  

Ambrosiaster's commentary on v.17 takes a logical approach in which he considers the ambiguities implicit in language about heirs and inheritances. First he sets out two 'givens', which, if applied to this verse, make nonsense of what Paul says: first, God the Father could in no way be said to be dead, but, secondly, it is true to say that Christ, in the course of his Incarnation, did die. 'What does it mean then', asks Ambrosiaster, 'that he who has died is always called the heir of the living, because are not heirs only such of the dead?' The question of a living Father and a dead Heir is, of course, absurd

1. CSEL, LXXXI, p.275: 'dignam enim vitam huic voci exhibemus'.
2. CSEL, LXXXI, p.275: 'et hoc est testimonium filiorum, si in eis per spiritum videatur signum paternum'.
3. CSEL, LXXXI, p.275: '... quid est, ut is qui mortuus est, semper viventis heres esse dicatur, cum heredes utique non nisi mortuorum sint?'
and Ambrosiaster says as much when he responds to his own question by saying that that which we call 'inheritance' is with God a gift, a gift which is transfused into obedient sons in such a way that death is not necessary.\(^1\) This solution is supported by a brilliant reference to the parable of the Prodigal Son, in which Ambrosiaster points out - with great pleasure - that in this parable the 'one living shared his substance with the living'.\(^2\)

There is one further unusual turn in Ambrosiaster's exegesis of v.17a: he remarks that in order to motivate us to obey God, the Father, a hope is held out - we are presently co-heirs with Christ but future heirs of God. Thus Ambrosiaster significantly departs from the more common observation that there is a building up of gifts, co-heirship with Christ being the climax (e.g., sons by adoption - heirs of God - co-heirs with Christ). As

\(^1\) CSEL, LXXXI, p.275: '... donum est patris in filios obaudientes transfusum, ut vivus viventis heres sit merito proprio, non necessitate defuncti'.

\(^2\) CSEL, LXXXI, p.275: '... ratione vivum viventibus substantiam ...'
we have said, the point of this future hope is supposed to be a motivation, which is to inspire us to despise any concern for mundane things.\(^1\)

Once again it is necessary to pause here to explain Ambrosiaster's use of what is for him an almost technical term: the description of flesh as *mundus*. Ambrosiaster's interpretation of v.8 is germane to this issue. There he says:

The wise of the world are in the flesh, because they are eager for the wisdom of the world, on account of which they are repugnant to the law of God. For whatever is against the law of God is carnal, because it is of the world. For the whole world is flesh; for all things visible are deputed to the flesh; for they are cognate with the flesh, no, indeed they are the elements of the flesh. Therefore he who serves mundane things is in the flesh.\(^2\)

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1. CSEL, LXXXI, p.275: 'ut ergo promptos nos ad obaudendum deo patri faceret, hac spe exhortatur dicens dei nos futuro heredes, coheredes autem Christi, ut quia magna spes praemii est, tanto magis in dei rebus propensiores esset, postponentes curam mundanorum'.

2. CSEL, LXXXI, p.265: 'sapientes mundi in carne sunt, quia sapientiae student, per quam legi dei repugnet, quidquid enim contra legem dei est, carnale est, quia ex mundo est. totus enim mundus caro est; omne enim visibile carnii deputatur; cognata enim sunt carnis, immo elementa carnis. ideoque qui mundanis rebus et causis obtemperat, in carne est'.
The suggestion that 'the whole world is flesh' (totus enim mundus caro est), when taken together with another, equally concise statement at v.13 that 'all sin is flesh' (omne ... peccatum caro est) makes of itself a definition of σαρκί (when taken in the pejorative sense) which is unique in the history of the exegesis of our passage up to now, but one with which Western exegesis from this time forward will be increasingly sympathetic.\(^1\) The plain implication is that to be 'worldly' is to be 'fleshly', and thus the Christian's task is to eliminate from his life all that pertains to the world around him. This also explains why, for Ambrosiaster, sin is so closely related to man's physical condition; all that pertains to the world (all that is 'exterior') is sin. Since it is through the five senses that man perceives and experiences the world around him, he is in continual danger of giving over to a 'worldly' point of view. Ambrosiaster is not limited to this one understanding of σάρκι, but it is a

\(^1\) There is, of course, Biblical support for this view in such passages as I John 2:15-17 ('Do not love the world or the things in the world. If any one loves the world, love for the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life, is not of the Father but is of the world. And the world passes away, and the lust of it; but he who does the will of God abides for ever').
distinctive view and one which is characteristic of him.¹

Finally, in the comment on v.17b we have another significant turn in the history of interpretation, for here Ambrosiaster spiritualizes the idea of suffering, making it mean mortification of the flesh and crucifixion of all that is worldly (see above).² Thus the inappropriateness of recommending a suffering similar to that suffered by Christ or even a suffering because of persecution is clearly acknowledged and a new meaning attached to Paul's words. Taken in the context of Ambrosiaster's exegesis of our passage, this solution is not only consistent but admirable insofar as it straightforwardly takes into account the reality of the present situation in which the Church finds itself. This is in direct contrast with the Antioch School, whose commitment to the literal and historical meaning of the text committed them to a view which was, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the contemporary situation of their readers and hearers. From


2. Schelkle, 1959, p.290, summarizes Ambrosiaster's view: 'Auf die innere Wesenheit hebt ab Ambrosiaster: Mit Christ leiden heisst ihm, die Begierden des Fleisches kreuzigen und die Welt verachten. Wer die Welt preisgibt, glaubt an das Künftige Leben, in dem er Miterbe mit Christus zu sein hofft'.


Ambrosiaster forward, however, some sort of figurative interpretation will be the rule rather than the exception.
Unfortunately, the epic controversy between Pelagius (and Pelagius's followers) and Augustine is not reflected in the commentaries on Romans from these two men; what purely exegetical writing on Romans we have from them was done before the controversy began. Still one can clearly see the seeds of the controversy in Pelagius's commentary. Our method, therefore, will be to review Pelagius's interpretation of vv.12-17 (as well as that of other relevant verses in chapter 8) with the issues of the later controversy in mind. Then it will be possible to see how Augustine uses the same verses in his arsenal of Scriptural proof arrayed against Pelagius and those who take up the Pelagian cause.

Pelagius's commentary is both concise and brief; often his comment is simply a paraphrase followed by a single

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1. The best text of Pelagius's commentary on Paul's Epistles (excluding Hebrews) is found in A. Souter, Pelagius's Expositions of the 13 Epistles of St. Paul, I, Cambridge, 1922 (cited hereafter as 'Souter, 1922'). Augustine never completed what would surely have been a massive commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, but did leave behind a short work which exposit very briefly certain select problematic verses in Romans (Expositio Quarundam Propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos). Fortunately, the one most interesting verse in our passage (v.15) is one of these 'propositionum'.
sentence of explanation. The style, then, is most often that of a continuous exposition in which the various phrases of a single verse are quoted and briefly explained. At times, however, Pelagius will pause to give a more detailed scholion. When he does this it is not so much an exegesis of the words themselves as a clarification of the background necessary to understanding the terms used in the text or the implicit ideas.¹

Pelagius's explanations of vv.12-13 are extremely short. To v.12 he simply says,

He says all this to show that the law is not necessary, which [law] has been given to those who are carnal.²

¹ An excellent example of this is found in Pelagius's comment on v.5 (Souter, 1922, p.62) where he discusses Biblical anthropology. In implicit agreement with Origen, he observes that, 'Man is constructed of spirit and flesh. Therefore when he does carnal things he is called as a whole, "flesh"; but when he does spiritual things he is called as a whole "spirit"'. (For a treatment of this idea - i.e., that Scripture can often use the part to indicate the whole - especially in Origen and Pelagius, cf. Wiles, 1967, p.29f, and p.30, note 4). A brief and convenient summary of Pelagius's key theological concerns is contained in Robert F. Evans, Pelagius: Inquiries and Reappraisals, London, 1968, ch.6, 'The Theology of Pelagius', pp.90-121.

² Souter, 1922, p.63: 'Hoc totum agit ut ostendat eis legem non esse necessariam, quae carnalibus data est'. 
At first glance, such a statement seems totally foreign to Pelagius's theological system; Augustine, after all, wrote an entire treatise (De spiritu et littera) to demonstrate that Pelagius was in error when he makes grace consist wholly of 'law and teaching'. Indeed, this has remained one of the classic criticisms of Pelagius's theology.¹ The problem has considerable light shed upon it in Pelagius's somewhat fuller treatment of v.7 in this same chapter. There he points out, in reference to the use of the word 'flesh', that contrary to the Manicheans' interpretation, we ought not understand Paul as saying that the flesh itself is an enemy to God, but rather that it is the 'carnal sense' (sensus carnalis) which stands in enmity to God. He then goes on to say,

For all which is not subject is inimical, and whoever should wish to vindicate himself never rises above the mode of the old law.²

He concludes this comment with the statement: 'He [Paul] said that it is impossible thus to call them back from the concupiscences of


². Souter, 1922, p.62: 'omne enim non subjectum inimicum est, et quicumque se voluerit vindicare, etiam veteris legis non numquam modum excedit'.
the flesh'. Thus here, as in the comment to v.12, Pelagius implicitly correlates those who are living in carnality with those living under the 'old law'. By the latter, Pelagius means here - as often elsewhere - the corrupted casuistic and/or ceremonial law and not the pure Mosaic law. In other words, wherever something seemingly depreciating is said about the law, Pelagius feels pressed to vindicate God's moral law. This distinction between laws - by no means peculiar to Pelagius - is fundamental to his defense of the Mosaic law. While it is true that God's gift of the law and the example of Christ take over the function assigned by Augustine to grace, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between different kinds of laws.

Pelagius's explanation of v.13a is closely dependent upon this same circle of ideas. He considers this abrupt fragment adequate:

According to the reason already explained, that carnal men cannot observe righteousness.

1. Souter, 1922, p.62: 'Impossibile dixit, ut vel sic eos a carnis concupiscentiis revocaret'.


3. Souter, 1922, p.64: 'Secundum rationem expositam, quod carnales homines justitiam custodire non possint'. 
In other words, those who live under the obscured and corrupted law are those who live according to the flesh and it is impossible for them to become righteous.

Pelagius's comment on v.13b is essentially a paraphrase ('If you should, through spiritual acts, conquer the works of the flesh'), followed by a short comment in which he points out that the works of the flesh and not the flesh itself ought to be condemned. Unfortunately, he does not explain

This line of interpretation (above) is enough to show us how weak and disappointing Pelagius's interpretation of Paul often is, especially when the issue at stake is central to Pauline theology. And it is in those rare instances when Pelagius is forced to speak of the role of the Spirit in the lives of believers that we see him at his weakest and worst, theologically speaking. This is clearly shown in his commentary on v.14. Here he paraphrases the first part of this verse as, 'Whoever merits to be guided by the Holy Spirit'.

1. Souter, 1922, p.64: 'spiritualibus actibus carnis opera subjeceritis'.

2. Souter, 1922, p.64: 'Quicumque meretur tur sancto spiritu gubernari ...'
so reminiscent of Origen — is even more distinctly expressed in Pelagius's comment to v.11:

If you should be so pure as to be worthy for the Holy Spirit to dwell in you, God will not suffer the temple of his Spirit to perish, but in that mode in which he raised Jesus from the dead, so also he shall restore your bodies.1

Thus not only is v.14a proof or evidence of 14b, but it is also radically exclusive: only those who deserve the Holy Spirit are led by him. This implies a condition of human responsibility from which even Origen would shrink. It is not difficult — granted the supposition of Pelagius's theology — to understand why Pelagius must weaken all statements which would suggest that man is divinely aided in his attempt to live a righteous life: the power (posse) of acting has already been granted by God, and the will (velle) and accomplishment (esse) of the act belong solely to man. There is no place in such an anatomy of action for the 'internal' assistance of the Spirit. Man cannot be pressured into acting, negatively or positively.

1. Souter, 1922, p.63: 'Si tam puri sitis ut in vobis spiritus sanctus habitare dignetur, non patietur Deus templum sui spiritus interire, sed quo modo Jesum a mortuis suscitavit, ita et vestra corpora restaurabit'.
What has been said above in regard to the Holy Spirit is not incongruous (in Pelagius's mind, at least) with the claim that grace is present in every action of man. But this grace, for Pelagius, consists essentially of the gift of free will itself, the so-called 'pure' Mosaic Law, and, of utmost importance for Pelagius, the example of Christ.¹

This inevitable weakening of the Spirit's role is strikingly illustrated in a number of Pelagius's comments on verses in chapter 8:

- At v.4 ('... in order that the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit'.) Pelagius makes no mention of the Spirit, but rather says that '... we, by the example of Christ, have mortified the flesh'.²

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1. As Kelly, 1968, p.359, has pointed out, the distinction to be made is between 'purely external aids' (i.e., the Law and example of Christ) and 'any special, interior action of God upon the soul' (the leading of the Holy Spirit). Hence Augustine's criticism that Pelagius's doctrine of grace consists entirely of 'law and teaching'.

2. Souter, 1922, p.62: '... qui exemplo Christi mortificavimus carnem' (emphasis is ours).
- Pelagius's explanation of the first sentence of v.9a ('But you are not in the flesh, you are in the Spirit') is simply, 'That is, engaged in spiritual affairs'.

- In the second sentence of v.9a ('if the Spirit of God really dwells in you'), he comments, 'The Spirit of God dwells in that person in whom his fruits appear, as he says to the Galatians: "But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy", etc.'

- In part b of the same verse, he defines 'the Spirit of Christ' as follows: 'The spirit of Christ is the spirit of humility, of patience and of all virtues ...'  

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2. Souter, 1922, p.63: 'In illo spiritus dei habitat, in quo eius apparat fructus, sicut ait ad Galatas: "fructus autem spiritus est caritas, gaudium", et cetera'.

3. Souter, 1922, p.63: 'Spiritus Christi spiritus humilitatis patientiae omniumque virtutum est ....' This comment is similar to that of Origen on the same verse.
- When Paul, in v.10, says, '...if Christ is in you', Pelagius interprets this to mean, 'If you imitate Christ'.

Added to these examples is the comment at v.5, mentioned above as an example of Pelagius's style of exegesis. There he essentially says that those who live 'according to the Spirit' are those who might be called spiritual.

In summary, we see this general tendency: when Paul speaks of either the Spirit or Christ living in believers, Pelagius tends to alter the imagery and suggests that it be understood simply as living 'spiritually', following the 'examples of Christ', demonstrating the virtues of Christ, etc. Further, when Pelagius is forced to admit a direct connection between the Spirit and the believer, he makes this connection dependent upon the merit of the believer.

1. Souter, 1922, p.63: 'Si Christum imitamini ....'
2. Wiles, 1967, p.116, comparing Origen, Victorinus and Pelagius on such Pauline themes as living by faith in the Son of God, being 'in Christ', etc., viewed in the context of the problem of faith and works, concludes that, 'Pelagius is content to reduce all such ideas to the concept of imitation. For him to have Christ in one is simply to imitate him'.
In this light, it is not surprising that Pelagius makes no mention of the Holy Spirit in his commentary to v.15. The contrast here, says Pelagius, is between slaves and sons, for fear pertains to slaves and love to sons. The Jews have received the spirit to force them by fear into slavery:

Those, therefore, who were not willing to be stimulated by a will of love are forced by the necessity of fear; but let us do everything voluntarily that we prove ourselves sons.1

Thus Pelagius adopts what is liable to become a very pedestrian interpretation of this verse - the contrast of acts motivated by fear and those motivated by love. But more distinctive is his equating 'the Spirit of sonship' with 'a will of love'. The logical connection of ideas is clear (sons act voluntarily out of love; therefore the 'spirit of sonship' is the posture or inner condition of love or, more simply, the spirit of love), but whether or not the theology is Paul's is open to question.

Pelagius's explanation of v.15b is on sounder ground, although it is by this time nothing new:

1. Souter, 1922, p.64: 'illī ergo qui operari caritatis voluntate nolebant, timoris necessitate coguntur: nos vero omnia voluntarie operemur, ut filius nos probemus'.

He who invokes the Father, professes himself to be a son: therefore he ought to be found like the Father in ways of acting lest he be subject to a greater penalty for his usurping a name in a void.  

The comment to v.16 in Pelagius's commentary is, once more, extremely brief. He simply says:

The witness of adoption is that we have the Spirit through whom we pray thus \[i.e., 'Abba, Father']\: for only sons could receive so great a pledge.

One is tempted to conclude from the phrase, 'through whom we pray', that Pelagius allowed for the enabling grace of the Holy Spirit in prayer. Such a conclusion, however, would be only partially correct. As Augustine pointed out in his criticism of Pelagius's doctrine of prayer (De gratia Christi, et de Peccato originali), this assistance is limited to an illumination or revelation of that which God would have us do:

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1. Souter, 1922, p.64: 'Quí vocat patrem, filiúm se esse profitetur; debet ergo patrī in moribus similis inveniīrī, ne pro nomine quoque in vacuum usurpato maiōrī poenae subjaceat.

2. Souter, 1922, p.64: 'Testimonium adoptionis est quod habemus spiritūm, per quem ita oramus; tantām \[enim\] arram accipere non poterant nisi filii.'
Thus our very prayers (as, indeed, he most plainly affirms in his writings) are of no other use, in his opinion, than to procure for us the explanation of the teaching by a divine revelation, not to procure help for the mind of man to perfect by love and action what it has learned should be done .... Moreover, the very help which he says assists our natural capacity, he places in the law and teaching. This teaching, he allows, is revealed or explained to us by the Holy Spirit, on which account it is that he concedes the necessity of prayer.¹

A brief perusal of Pelagius's commentary on v.26, which contains one of Paul's most important statements on the subject of prayer, substantiates Augustine's criticism. Twice in this commentary, Pelagius suggests that believers do not ask for 'terrestrial things', but rather only 'heavenly things'. That which constitutes such 'heavenly things' is only hinted at in one brief sentence: 'For our ability is weak if it be not helped by the illumination of the Holy Spirit'.² Further, at v.27b, Pelagius takes ἡ ἀφοσία not in reference to the Holy Spirit

2. Souter, 1922, p.67: 'infaller est enim nostra possibilitas, nisi inilluminatione sancti spiritus adiuetur'.
but to the human spirit; this ruse allows him to avoid any suggestion that the Holy Spirit aids believers by means of his intercession.²

Pelagius's continual biased favor of human merit causes him to make the heirship of v.17a totally conditional - an interpretation more daring than any we have yet confronted. He says, quite boldly, 'He who merits to be a son, merits to be made an heir of God and co-heir of the true Son'.³

Verse 17b is taken by Pelagius in its literal meaning. The condition of glorification is our willingness to suffer physically; he paraphrases this condition as follows:

If we suffer such things, when it should be necessary, for His name, as he bore for us — we shall be glorified with him'.⁴

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1. At the same verse, Palegus explains that the phrase 'the Spirit intercedes' really means that the Spirit causes us to intercede.


3. Souter, 1922, p.64: 'Qui meretur esse filius, meretur effici heres patris et veri filii coheres'.

4. Souter, 1922, p.65: 'Si talia pariamur cum necesse fuerit pro nomine eius, qualia pertulit ille pro nobis'.

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Augustine.

Our consideration of Augustine falls most naturally into two parts: (1) his use of certain verses in our passage (vv.12, 13 and especially 14) in anti-Pelagian and other polemic writings,¹ with special reference to the contrast between Augustine's use of these verses and that of Pelagius; and (2) Augustine's interpretation of v.15 in his *Expositio Quarumdam Propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*,² as well as his

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1. Those writings normally referred to as 'anti-Pelagian' are as follows: *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum* (412 A.D.); *De spiritu et littera* (412 A.D.); *De gratia Novi Testamenti* (Epistle 140, 412 A.D.); *De natura et gratia* (413-415 A.D.); *De perfectione justitiae hominis* (415-416 A.D.); *De gestis Pelagii* (417 A.D.); *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* (2 books; 418 A.D.); *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* (2 books; 419-421 A.D.); *De anima et ejus origine* (4 books; 420-421 A.D.); *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* (4 books; 421 A.D.); *Contra Julianum* (6 books; 422 A.D.); *Contra secundum Juliani responsionem imperfectum opus* (6 books; 429-430 A.D.). Two important writings which are not specifically anti-Pelagian in origin yet which address problems related to the Pelagian controversy are: *De gratia et libero arbitrio* and *De correptione et gratia* (both 426-427 A.D.). See Altaner, 1966, p.428, note 7.

interpretation of *Tívegnum soudias* in *De Consensu evangelistarum*.

As concerns our passage, Augustine and Pelagius confronted one another on such wide-ranging and central issues as how law, grace and the work of the Spirit in relation to the freedom of the will, ought to be understood. Turning specifically to the challenge which Pelagius had laid down, Augustine chose to attack the central tenets upon which Pelagius's theology rested. As the controversy developed and grew in intensity, Augustine came to rely more and more upon favorite themes and arguments. Consequently, a great deal of the polemic diverted against Pelagius and his followers is repetitive rather than systematic. A good many of these set ideas became inseparably attached to Scriptural references. Perhaps the best single example of this is Augustine's use of II Corinthians 3:6b. This half-verse became the theme of one of Augustine's most spirited replies to the Pelagian heresy, *De spiritu et littera* ('On the Spirit and the Letter'). Here Augustine demonstrates that Pelagius is wrong

1. '... for the letter killeth but the Spirit giveth life' (Authorised version).
when he suggests that the *velle* of man, taken together with God's gift of the law, make the *esse* of obedience possible. Augustine does this by pointing out that divine assistance is not in God's gift of the law, no matter how good and holy it might be, but in the grace of the Spirit. Will in itself, unassisted, can accomplish nothing good. Thus without the aid of the Spirit's grace, the law holds man guilty rather than justifying him. No other Scriptural text could have illustrated and supported this argument better than II Corinthians 3:6. In the course of addressing himself to the problems and issues of Pelagianism, Augustine developed and used a number of such standard interpretations (for want of a better term). The interpretation which came to be attached to Rom. 8:12-14 is one of the most important of these.

The most significant single phenomenon of this standard interpretation of vv.12-14 is the way in which Augustine takes these verses as a closely-knit unit. The emphasis, however, is always laid upon v.14, which is interpreted in the light of the preceding two verses. The point Augustine usually makes is this: that which is commanded by the Apostle (i.e., not to live 'according to the flesh' but, on the other hand, 'mortify the deeds of the flesh') as fulfilment of the condition of the promise
('... you will live'), is only possible through the assisting grace of the Holy Spirit (v.14). This exegesis made of itself an extremely useful and instant refutation of a major Pelagian conclusion, i.e., that 'all men are ruled by their own will'.

Augustine is to be credited for his shrewd perception of such a statement's implications, even if, as he points out, the second Palestinian council held at Diospolis in 415 A.D. was fooled by Pelagius's equivocation. Pelagius's statement was directly dependent upon his belief that while the posse is from God, the velle and esse belong to man, as we have already pointed out in our discussion of his writings. Augustine directly attacks this, by proving that the converse is true: willing and doing good is a result only of God's assisting man to


2. LNPF, V, p.183: 'His answers, indeed, they the council not without reason approved; because they had not to consider how he had in his writings stated the points which were objected against him, but what he had to say about them in his reply at the pending examination'. (Emphasis is ours).
do so. The development of Augustine's argument is, of course, much more subtle and complex than this summary implies, but the core of it lies in this issue: when man does good, are the _velle_ and _esse_ of that good of man or of God? And the corollary of that: if man does not do good, is it merely the absence of willing or doing in man, or is it because he is without God's help? The following are examples of Augustine's use of his standard interpretation of Romans 8:12-14 in proving his case against Pelagius and others involved in the Pelagian heresy.

Perhaps the best example of Augustine's use of these verses in the context of the _posse_, _velle_, _esse_ debate is contained in _De gratia Christi et de peccato originali_, XXV, written ca. 418 after Pelagius had been condemned by Pope Zosimus. Here he addresses himself directly to Pelagius's use of the terms _posse_, _velle_ and _esse_, saying that Pelagius must cease repeating

That we are able to do, say, think any good, is from Him who has given us this ability _[i.e., posse]_, and who also assists this ability; whereas that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds from our own selves.¹

¹. LNPF, V, p. 227.
Augustine's answer to this, supported by a quote from Paul, is simply that God has not only given man the ability (posse), and in any given situation aids this ability, but He also works in us to will and to do. In the arsenal of proof which Augustine then brings to bear, v.14 of our passage stands in an honored position:

Forasmuch as it is written, "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God", it follows that, in order that they may do that which is good, they must be led by Him who is good.

Another, even better example (better because it clearly shows how Augustine took vv.12 and 13 closely with 14) is contained in De gratia et libero arbitrio (ch.23). Here Augustine summarizes and attacks the Pelagian understanding of grace. They say 'that the Law is the grace of God by which we are helped not to sin ...'. But this is contrary to Paul's view of the Law, says Augustine, and repeats his standard interpretation of II Corinthians

1. Philippians 2:13: '... for God is at work in you both to will and to work for his good pleasure'.

2. LNPF, V, p.227.

3. LNPF, V, p.453.
3:6 above. Juxtaposed to this and used as additional support in his argument is the standard interpretation of Romans 8:12-14:

I have said this to deter your free will from evil, and to exhort it to good by apostolic words, but yet you must not therefore glory in man, — that is to say, in your own selves, — and not in the Lord, when you live not after the flesh, but through the Spirit mortify the deeds of the flesh. For in order that they to whom the apostle addressed this language might not exalt themselves, thinking that they were themselves able of their own spirit to do such good works as these, and not by the Spirit of God, after saying to them, "If ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the flesh, ye shall live", he at once added, "For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God". When, therefore, you by the Spirit mortify the deeds of the flesh, that you may have life, glorify Him, praise Him, give thanks to Him by whose Spirit you are so led as to be able to do such things as show you to be the children of God; "for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God". ¹ (Emphasis is ours).

Although it is true that Augustine often used this interpretation of Romans 8:12, 13 and/or 14 in his anti-Pelagian polemic, still it would be inaccurate to suggest that he was limited to one emphasis, i.e., that only through the grace of the Spirit can man do that which is good. This is, of course, the

¹. LNPF, V, p.453.
central, invariable interpretation given to these verses, but to this basic explanation are attached lesser, satellite emphases. Often, for example, the point is made that when men are enabled to do good by the leading of the Spirit, they ought to 'give thanks to Him by whom they act. For they are acted upon that they may act'. Yet another theological problem is discussed in the context of v.14. In the same passage (above, De correptione et gratia, ch. 4), Augustine discusses the paradox of grace and exhortation. In the introductory chapters of this work, Augustine has pointed out that without the grace of God, men cannot be delivered from evil, nor can they do good. Augustine then asks what purpose Paul could have in mind on occasions when he admonishes, exhorts, teaches and rebukes his readers. These things, answers Augustine, can be thought of as 'planting' and 'watering' (see I Cor. 3:7); they would be of no avail should God not give the 'increase'. It is no good, therefore, when certain heretics deceive themselves by facetiously asking, 'wherefore is it

1. LNPF, V, p.473, (De correptione et gratia, ch. 4). See also the quote (footnote 1, page 167): 'When, therefore, you by the Spirit mortify the deeds of the flesh, that you may have life, glorify Him, praise Him, give thanks to Him, etc'.
preached and prescribed to us that we should turn away from evil and do good, if it is not we that do this, but "God who worketh in us to will and to do" (see Phil. 2:13). The question and answer are both reminiscent of Romans 8:12-14 where Paul exhorts mortification of the flesh and then, in Augustine's view, suggests that this mortification is a result of the Spirit's action. Augustine's full answer to this skeptical question indicates just how important Romans 8:14 was to him:

But let them rather understand that if they are the children of God, they are led by the Spirit of God to do that which should be done; and when they have done it, let them give thanks to Him by whom they act. For they are acted upon that they may act, not that they may themselves do nothing....

A similar treatment of Romans 8:12-14 is found in De praedestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 22, where the complement to that immediately above is pointed out. Here Augustine expounds upon the principles inherent in that famous prayer which so angered Pelagius. To the Pelagian suggestion that in the proposition,

1. LNPF, V, p.473.
2. LNPF, V, p.473.
3. 'Grant what Thou commandest and command what Thou wilt' (Da quod jubes et jube quod vis); from Augustine's Confessions.
'If you believe, you shall be saved', there is on one hand a requirement which is in man's power to fulfil, and on the other hand a promise offered by God, Augustine responds:

Why are not both in God's power, as well what He commands and what He offers? For He is asked to give what He commands. Believers ask that their faith may be increased; they ask on behalf of those who do not believe, that faith may be given to them; therefore both in its increase and in its beginnings, faith is the gift of God.

The principle implied is this: in order that God's promises may remain in the power of God (and not in man's power), the fulfilment of the promises must rest with God. Similarly, in order that all may be of God and nothing of man, the will to act in obedience to the conditions must also be of God. Thus it is, says Augustine, that God requires of us and promises to us that which He pleases, and He supplies the means of fulfilling the conditions placed upon the promise. Romans 8:13b and 14 is a perfect example of this principle:

It is said, "If by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body you will live". Therefore, that we mortify the deeds of the flesh is required, but that we may live is offered. Is it,

1. LNPF, V, p.508. This is, of course, the later, more mellow Augustine speaking. Earlier he espoused a less inflexible view of faith and man's ability to perform it.
then, fitting for us to say, that to mortify the deeds of the flesh is not a gift of God, and not to confess it to be a gift of God, because we hear it required of us, with the offer of life as a reward if we shall do it? Away with this being approved by the partakers and champions of grace! This is the condemnable error of the Pelagians, whose mouths the apostle immediately slapped when he added, "For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God"; lest we should believe that we mortify the deeds of the flesh, not by God's Spirit, but by our own.¹

There are other examples of Augustine's use of Romans 8:12-14 (or v.14 alone) in anti-Pelagian and later polemic writings, but these are sufficient to demonstrate the centrality of the Spirit's leading in Augustine's understanding of grace and the operation of man's will. That Augustine should use verses in Romans 8 having to do with the ministry of the Spirit is not surprising, for Paul speaks of the Spirit more frequently in this chapter than in any other single place in his writings — and Augustine is, above all, a Pauline theologian. Further, in Augustine's scheme of things, the Spirit was closely bound up with effective grace. In fact, at times the Spirit in

¹ LNPF, V, p.508.
Augustine's writings becomes an operational definition of grace; the power of grace effecting its goals in man is the presence of the Holy Spirit.¹

This close relationship between the Spirit and grace is consistent with Augustine's understanding of grace. For Augustine, the idea of grace being a created entity, delivered by the Spirit to man, is totally excluded. Rather, grace is dynamic and unambiguous; above all, it is a creating reality. This is confirmed by Augustine's repeated insistence that any good deed man might do is the result of God's grace. What is more, Augustine finds it difficult to speak about this dynamic effect of grace without evoking the name of the Spirit at the same time.

In a letter from Augustine to Anastasius, probably written some time shortly after On the Spirit and the Letter, and summarizing a good deal of what is contained in that treatise, Augustine neatly sketches a précis of the relationship between the Law, grace, and the Spirit:

The Law, therefore, by teaching and commanding what cannot be fulfilled without grace, demonstrates to man his weakness, in order that

¹. See Kelly, 1968, p.366.
the weakness, thus proved, may resort to the Saviour, by whose healing the will may be able to do what it found impossible in its weakness. So, then, the law brings us to faith, faith obtains the Spirit in fuller measure, the Spirit sheds love abroad in us, and 
love fulfils the law.\textsuperscript{1}

Here it is obvious that the Spirit creating love in the believer (and thereby creating the condition necessary to fulfilment of the law) equals 'liberating grace'.\textsuperscript{2} The Holy Spirit at work in the believer, moving him toward obedience through love (Romans 8:13b, 14) is thus absolutely central to Augustine's theology of the Holy Spirit and, indeed, to his theology of grace.

Having considered Augustine's use of Romans 8:12-13 and especially v.14 in the anti-Pelagian writings, we now turn to his exegesis of vv.15 and 16 in \textit{Expositio Quarumdam Propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos} ('Exposition of Certain Statements from the Epistle to the Romans') and his very influential interpretation of

\textsuperscript{1} LNPF, V, xxvii (emphasis is ours).

\textsuperscript{2} Conversely, the third Person of the Trinity is often characterized by Augustine as 'Love' or 'Will'; the two are very close in his thinking since to move the will — for good — is love. In both cases it is the Spirit creating obedience in the believer which is emphasized.
the words, 'Abba, Father'.

Augustine's exposition of v.15 is a classic example of an independent theologian grappling with a moot exegetical problem. He obviously perceives the major difficulty as one of maintaining consistency: fundamental is his supposition that the differing eras of the two Testaments are reflected in the two \( \varepsilon \lambda \alpha \beta \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \) clauses of this verse. It is also clear for Augustine that the 'Spirit of adoption' must be the Holy Spirit. The problem, then, is how one ought to explain the \( \Pi \nu \varepsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \) in the first instance in order to maintain the parallelism of the two clauses. Anticipating a modern development in the exegesis of this verse, Augustine points out that if \( \Pi \nu \varepsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \) were to be understood in both cases as referring to the human spirit - which must be regarded as impossible - the entire problem could be neatly circumvented. Augustine's own final solution is not a particularly appealing one (it was later proven to be unpopular with the collectors and explicitly rejected by Luther), but is inventive. It is as follows: Those living under the Law do so out

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of fear; that which creates fear is the threat of death in the face of disobedience to the Law. For man, when he is not under grace, is unable to satisfy the precepts of the Law. The result is that those under the Law are given a 'spirit of slavery' which, in contrast to the Law, is not good and which by God's leave holds over them the power of death. This 'spirit of slavery' is not, as one might well be led to expect, the Holy Spirit acting in another, more alien capacity, but rather Satan.

Therefore, they are not yet under grace, and having been established under the law they are conquered by sins to obedience to carnal desires, and by a

1. Augustine is careful to cover himself from criticism by pointing out - in words similar to Romans 7:12 - that the Law itself is holy and good.

2. PL, XXXV, col.2074: 'Spiritus ergo servitutis in timore, ille est qui potestatem habet mortis ...'

3. Augustine's proof depends upon rather questionable use of two texts from Paul, I Corinthians 5:3b, 5a ('... I have already pronounced judgment ... you are to deliver this man to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit may be saved ...'), and I Timothy 1:20b ('... whom I have delivered to Satan that they may learn not to blaspheme').
violation of duty they increase the guilt of their crimes, they accept the spirit of slavery, that is, that spirit which has the power of death.1

Thus the 'spirit of slavery' is both a negative reward for disobedience and a punitive means of controlling - at least to some extent - man's cavalier sinning.

The contrast which Augustine here emphasizes, fear and love (rather than Law and Gospel), is entirely consistent with his later use of the love motif, i.e., love as 'shed abroad' in the hearts of believers as the means of fulfilling the law. It is easy to understand how, for Augustine, it would have been difficult to interpret both instances of **πνεῦμα** as the Holy Spirit, for the Spirit in Augustine is above all the Creator of love and thus the Liberator from fear. The only thing missing in this exposition is a positive statement concerning the Spirit's role in creating obedience in the believer. That this exposition predates the Pelagian controversy

1. PL, XXXV, 2074: 'Qui ergo nondum sub gratia sunt, et sub Lege constituti vincuntur peccatis ad obedientium desideriis carnalibus, et praeventatione augent reatum criminarum suorum, spiritum acceperunt servitutis, id est, spiritum ejus qui potestatem mortis habet'.
is pointed up by the fact that Augustine does not cast the contrast of v.15 in terms of 'the Law without the Spirit' versus 'the Law fulfilled through the Spirit'. Still, the roots of this later development can be seen.

Augustine's interpretation of the final words of v.15 ('... ἀββά ὁ πατήρ ') was destined to be considerably more popular and influential than that just reviewed. Perhaps the best statement of this exposition of the words 'Abba Father' is contained in his De consensu evangelistarum ('The Harmony of the Gospels') on Mark 14:36 and parallels.¹

Augustine begins by pondering why it is that Mark uses both words, Abba and Pater. The obvious answer, he observes, is that Pater is a translation of Abba. Still there is perhaps a deeper, symbolic significance to the reason our Lord used both words:

... intending to indicate thereby, that in sustaining this sorrow He bore the part of His body, which is the Church, of which He has been made the corner-stone ... partly out of the Hebrews, to whom He refers when he says "Abba ", and partly out of the Gentiles, to whom He refers when He says "Pater".²

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1. LNPF, VI, pp.184f
2. LNPF, VI, p.184.
Augustine then discusses Paul's use of 'Abba Pater'. We might have expected Augustine to say that these two forms of the address 'Father', one used by Jewish Christians and the other by Gentile Christians, are symbols of the Church's essential unity even in the face of its pluralistic composition. The point about unity is certainly present, but it is not emphasized. Rather, Augustine begins from the context of the prayer in Gethsemane and points out that Jesus, by using both words, enfolded both peoples—Jews and Gentiles—in His suffering. In the same way, Paul's use of both words ought to be understood in the context of suffering:

For it was meet that the good Master and true Saviour, by sharing in the sufferings of the more infirm, should in His own person illustrate the truth that His witnesses ought not to despair, although it might perchance happen that, through human frailty, sorrow might steal in upon their hearts at the time of suffering; seeing that they would overcome it, if mindful that God knows what is best for those whose well-being he regards, they gave His will the preference over their own.¹

This correlation of the address to God with suffering is surprisingly relevant to the verses following

¹ LNPF, VI, p.184.
Romans 8:15, i.e., 17b-18. We will see later, for example, in Peter Lombard, how this obvious connection between v.15 and vv.17b-18ff is neglected and Augustine's exposition of Mark 14:36 mechanically reproduced. The most significant contribution, however, is Augustine's suggestion that the use of 'Abba Pater' is a symbolic reference to the unity-in-diversity nature of the Church. It was so brilliant an insight as to be self-perpetuating and becomes, for the Western Church, the classic solution in explaining Paul's purpose for including both words.¹

It is interesting to note that Augustine here offers two interpretations of the words 'Abba Pater': one literal (Abba is Hebrew for Pater) and the other spiritual (by using both words, Jesus symbolized the composition of the catholic Church from two peoples, Jews and Gentiles, and incorporated both peoples in his suffering). This is typical of Augustine's preference for giving both a literal and a spiritual interpretation rather than contenting himself with the spiritual.

¹. There are really two standard comments to be made from Augustine's time forward: the first is simply to observe that 'Pater' is a translation of the Hebrew (or Syriac) word 'Abba'. Secondly, on the level of symbolic interpretation, some point is usually made about the church being a Unity of two diverse elements, elements symbolized by the Jews who say 'Abba' and Gentiles who say 'Pater'. Later the issue becomes complicated by the question as to whether or not both groups used the word 'Abba' or even the total phrase 'Abba Pater'.
In moving on from Augustine, we are forced to make a gigantic leap in time from the 4th century to the 9th. As surprising as it might seem, there is no significant contribution to the study of the Epistle to the Romans before the Carolingian Revival. The one towering figure bridging that gap to whom we would most naturally look - the Venerable Bede - did not write a commentary on this Epistle.

To an historian immediately concerned with this era, documents having to do with Biblical interpretation are immensely interesting and important, for they reflect the fact that the revival of learning stimulated by Charlemagne's reign was essentially a revival of academic interest in the Bible. But in terms of contributing to the advance of what we have seen up to now as a spirited debate - both in the east and the West - charged with an almost electric sense of inquiry, the commentaries on Romans from this period add almost nothing. This is amply illustrated by the small space required to review them.

Although we do not have a commentary from Bede, we see his influence in every commentary stemming from this period. This
influence was more by way of method than conclusions, for the
Carolingian scholars took as their curriculum the study of the Bible
and 'Bible study meant the study of the sacred text together with the
Fathers; the two kinds of authority were inseparable'. 1 Thus
Carolingian exegesis accepted as its primary task making available
the relevant comments from the Fathers on the Biblical text, as did
Bede. Commentaries coming from the hands of men with such an end in
view could only be exegetical anthologies. 2 These anthologies which went
under the name 'expositors', were extremely mechanical, clumsy, often
incongruous and not at all reliable in terms of the accuracy of the
text with which they quoted the Fathers. That they followed the
example of Bede does not mean they were superior to him; in fact Bede
was often more critical in his use of the Fathers than these. Their
sources are limited; these collections offer us no doorway to a wealth
of lost sources - Origen, Ambrosiaster, Augustine, Pelagius, with
emphasis on Augustine, are essentially the only Fathers they use. Some


2. For a very complete bibliography of early medieval commentaries
on every New and Old Testament book see Robert E. McNally, The
Bible in the Early Middle Ages, Westminster, Maryland (U.S.A.)
1959 (No.4 in the series Woodstock Papers; Occasional Essays for
Theology, edited by J.C.Murray and W.J.Burshardt).
Greek Fathers were also used in Latin translation, but these were not nearly so influential or important as Western writers.

Turning in detail now to the expositors on the Epistle to the Romans, we focus attention upon Rabanus Maurus (died 856). Of those with whom we are concerned, he stands closest to the source of the Carolingian Revival. Trained under Alcuin of York, he was master of the monastery at Fulda, the training ground for many influential scholars of this epoch (among others, Walafrid Strabo was his student). His collection on Romans is the most extensive of those here reviewed, running to 343 columns in Migne. This anthology was, without doubt, the most respectable and reliable available to Carolingian students. He shows a preference for Origen, often quoting him first and last on any one verse, and he also very skilfully utilizes Origen's own transitions from verse to verse. Even though Origen is often very verbose, Rabanus does not hesitate to quote him in entirety. Ambrosiaster is almost inevitably quoted in full, while, surprisingly, Augustine is limited to small excerpts. Of course, the difficulty with Augustine is obvious; with no real complete commentary on Romans, it required a great deal of work to sift through all of

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1. PL, CXI, cols.1273-1616. The commentary on Romans 8:12-17 is contained in cols.1446-1454.
Augustine's writings to find relevant comments for each sentence. (Still, the commitment to Augustine was so great that some even attempted this monumental task, as we shall see later). Only one lengthy section is lifted out of Augustine's writings and that is his explanation of vv.15 and 16 in _Expositio Quarumdam Propositionum ex Epistola Ad Romanos_. Gregory is also briefly quoted.

The difficulty of this kind of writing is clearly illustrated by the clumsiness of Rabanus's expositor. Because three major writers are utilized – Origen, Ambrosiaster and Augustine – and because all represent different styles of exegesis, it is almost impossible to weld together the extracts so smoothly that no seams show. To do this would require a critical, skilled writer who was not frightened of representing the essence of his sources rather than simply arranging them in order. This Rabanus was not prepared by the intellectual climate of his time to do; consequently he finds himself introducing for consideration the same verse on three or more separate occasions!

There is one notable exception to this straightforward listing of extracts, for on the third occasion when Rabanus introduces v.15a ('You have not received the spirit of servitude again to fear'), the question is asked, 'Why is it again?' ('Quid est iterum?'). The source for this question and the exposition
which follows has not been found by the writer. (It is possible, however, that the source for this exposition is to be found in a lost Latin translation or abstract of Chrysostom's Homilies). Rabanus Maurus's exegesis is similar to that found in Atto Vercelli and thus a comparison of the two is instructive.

The comment in Rabanus¹ is considerably more lengthy than that of Atto.² Both introduce the exposition with the explicit

1. PL, CXI, 1450: 'Quid est iterum? quomodo terrente molestissimo paedagogó. Quid est iterum? sicut in monte Sina accepsit spiritum servitutis. Dicet aliquis: Alius est spiritus servitutis, alius spiritus libertatis. Si alius esset, non diceret Apostolus iterum; idem ergo spiritus, sed in tabulis lapideis in timorem; in tabulis cordis in dilectionem. Audistis quomodo longe posita plebem voces, ignis, fumus, in monte terrebant; quomodo autem veniens Spiritus sanctus igneis linguis super unumquemque discipulorum inciderit. Jam ergo non in timore, sed in dilectione, ut non serví, sed fílìi simul. Quí enim adhuc ldeo bene ait, quia poenam timet, et Deum non amat, nondum est inter filios, utinam tamen vel poenam timeat. Timor servus est, charitas libera est. Fac vel timore poenae, si nondum potes amore justitiae. Veniet domina et servus abscedet, quia consummata charitas foras mittit timorem (I Joan. IV)'.

2. PL, CXXXIV, 202: 'Sed quid est quod ait iterum? id est, sicut in monte Sina, quod dicto ostendít eos fuisse sub lege. Dicit aliquid: alter fuit spiritus in Veteri Testamento datus populo Dei, et alter in Novo: quod si esset, nequaquam Apostolus iterum diceret, Idem ergo est spiritus servitutis et libertatis; sed spiritus timoris et servitutis in tabulis lapideis; spiritus amoris et libertatis in tabulis cordis'.

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¹ PL, CXI, 1450: 'Quid est iterum? quomodo terrente molestissimo paedagogó. Quid est iterum? sicut in monte Sina accepsit spiritum servitutis. Dicet aliquis: Alius est spiritus servitutis, alius spiritus libertatis. Si alius esset, non diceret Apostolus iterum; idem ergo spiritus, sed in tabulis lapideis in timorem; in tabulis cordis in dilectionem. Audistis quomodo longe posita plebem voces, ignis, fumus, in monte terrebant; quomodo autem veniens Spiritus sanctus igneis linguis super unumquemque discipulorum inciderit. Jam ergo non in timore, sed in dilectione, ut non serví, sed fílìi simul. Quí enim adhuc ldeo bene ait, quia poenam timet, et Deum non amat, nondum est inter filios, utinam tamen vel poenam timeat. Timor servus est, charitas libera est. Fac vel timore poenae, si nondum potes amore justitiae. Veniet domina et servus abscedet, quia consummata charitas foras mittit timorem (I Joan. IV)'.

² PL, CXXXIV, 202: 'Sed quid est quod ait iterum? id est, sicut in monte Sina, quod dicto ostendít eos fuisse sub lege. Dicit aliquid: alter fuit spiritus in Veteri Testamento datus populo Dei, et alter in Novo: quod si esset, nequaquam Apostolus iterum diceret, Idem ergo est spiritus servitutis et libertatis; sed spiritus timoris et servitutis in tabulis lapideis; spiritus amoris et libertatis in tabulis cordis'.
question, 'Quid est iterum ?' The answering expositions which follow have these features in common:

(a) both directly answer the question by pointing out that Paul means the same spirit in both parts of the contrast;

(b) both specifically name Sinai (i.e., the giving of the Law through Moses) as the place and point in time at which the 'spirit of bondage' was received;

(c) both set up the basic contrast in terms of spirit of servitude and spirit of liberty, rather than using Paul's image of 'spirit of adoption' in the second part;

(d) both make the 'one spirit' explanation turn on Paul's highly stylistic contrast in II Corinthians 3:3b '... written not with ink but with the spirit of the living God' not on tablets of

1. Rabanus actually introduces the question twice; immediately following the question when first posed is the introductory statement 'quomodo terrente molestissimo paedagogo'. The same question ('Quid est iterum ?') is then repeated. This confusion is perhaps evidence that Rabanus is repeating traditional material which has suffered in its transmission.
stone but on tablets of human hearts'. This is not directly quoted but woven together with point (c), above, and with the more usual contrast of fear and love.

This is a highly creative explanation. The primary difficulty with interpretations which understand the Holy Spirit in both parts of the contrast of v.15 is that of avoiding the suggestion that the role of the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament was a punitive one. By using Paul's turn of phrase in II Corinthians 3:3, this interpretation links the Holy Spirit with the giving of the Law and thus makes His role as positive as possible. Taken in its bare outline, this exposition falls broadly into that which suggests that the ministry of the Spirit is diverse and varied and that the function performed in the Old Testament is superseded by that related to the Gospel.

1. The relevant passages from Rabanus and Attonis set in parallel with II Corinthians 3:3:

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<th>II Cor. 3:3</th>
<th>Rabanus</th>
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<td>'... non in tabulis lapideis, sed in tabulis cordis carnalibus'</td>
<td>'... idem ergo spiritus, sed in tabulis lapideis in timorem; in tabulis cordis in dilectionem.'</td>
<td>'Idem ergo est spiritus servitutis et libertatis; sed spiritus timoris et servitutis in tabulis lapideis; spiritus amoris et libertatis in tabulis cordis.'</td>
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One further point ought to be made as to the source of this explanation: the very grammatical question and answer around which it centers is not typical either of this period or of Latin exegesis in general. Rather, it is characteristic of Chrysostom. The highly unusual contrast of 'spirit of bondage' and 'spirit of liberty' was first suggested by Chrysostom. What is more, the Antiochene writers agreed in general that the Law was the 'spirit of bondage', all the while holding that the Law was written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Western scholars did have Latin translations (some evidently of questionable reliability) of certain Greek Fathers. If the expositions we have reviewed above derive from Antiochene exegesis why are not at least parts of these expositions identifiable as direct, verbatim extracts? One part of the answer would seem to lie in the scarcity of written material in libraries of the monasteries of this period. We know, for example, that a good deal of material was inadequately transmitted and even, in part, orally (as in lectures). Apparently the Latin translations of Chrysostom and Theodore survived mainly in extracts of the compilations. Thus it is possible that what

1. See Smalley, 1964, pp.17f; also Farrer, 1885, p.250, who points out that in his prologue to the Gospel of St. Matthew, Rabanus Maurus specifically states that his commentary on the Epistle was compiled from eleven Latin and three Greek Fathers.
we have in Rabanus and Atto is an abstract of Chrysostom and Theodore
(it will be remembered that Theodore, in his commentary on v.15,
explicitly asks after the use of $\overline{\tau\alpha\lambda\upsilon}$). Because we know so
little about the medieval use of the Eastern Fathers, and because
Greek exegesis so little influenced the study of the Bible in the
Middle Ages, it is impossible to pass judgement on this specific case.

Sedulius Scotus (died ca. 858) accurately titles
his work on Romans Collectanea in Epistulam ad Romanos,¹ for this work
greatly resembles that of Rabanus. This compilation is primarily of
interest in that Sedulius bases his commentary upon that of Pelagius,
as well as Origen and Ambrosiaster, but he uses Augustine only
rarely.² His text of Origen and Ambrosiaster often does not agree
with our modern, more critical, texts. His commentary also includes a
long section which is evidently independent of the usual Latin Patristic
sources. In this excursus, Sedulius addresses himself to the phrase

1. PL, CIII, 73-75.

2. Souter points out, 'Of all authorities for the text of
Pelagius none would exceed in value the copy in the
possession of Sedulius Scottus ....'
A. Souter, The Earliest Latin Commentaries on the Epistles
of St. Paul, Oxford, 1927, p.212 (cited hereafter as
'Souter, 1927').
'cohaeredes vero Christi' in v.17. The problem prompting the discussion is one we have met before, most recently in Ambrosiaster: the appropriateness of Paul's analogy of heirs and inheritance when applied to God and Christ. Sedulius's approach to the question is, however, different from that of Ambrosiaster. Beginning with a quote from Hebrews 9:17 ('For a will takes effect only at death ...'), Sedulius goes on to develop a theme dwelling upon the sacrificial system of the Old Testament as a pre-figuring of the sacrifice of Christ: we are made heirs through the death of Christ, says Sedulius, and thus our inheritance is intimately connected with his death. He makes a great many other minor points, but adds nothing unique to the discussion of this problem.

Sedulius Scotus's collection is clear indication that the commentary on the Pauline Epistles written by Pelagius continued to make its influence felt far after the Pelagian controversy. Other than illustrating this point, Sedulius is of minor important in the history of exegesis.

Florus Diaconus (died ca. 860) is probably the most slavish and least critical of the collectors writing an exposition on the Epistle to the Romans. Consequently, we may dismiss him with only a

1. PL, CXIX, 279-318. The extracts relating to our passage, 8:12-17, are found in cols. 297-299.
brief introduction. He limits his sources entirely to the works of Augustine and proceeds simply by quoting the relevant (or irrelevant!) extracts — normally quite brief — together with the reference. This very mechanical exercise might well have been greatly useful to subsequent theologians if he had limited himself to places where Augustine actually discussed or even quoted specific verses in Romans. (We have seen earlier how helpful such a method can be when, for example, Augustine's use of Romans 8:14 in the anti-Pelagian writings is analyzed). But this is not the case with Florus Diaconus. We are left at the mercy of his own subjective judgement. His random selections, with only rare exception, are next to useless.

In this collection we see clearly the inadequacies of the method and mood which motivated Biblical scholars of the Carolingian epoch, who conceived of Bible study as simply arranging the often-conflicting opinions of the Fathers and doctors of the Church alongside the Biblical text. It was inevitable that some would perceive the inadequacy of this method, reflect upon it and launch out into a bolder, more critical approach.
It is in Haimo of Auxerre that we see most clearly the beginnings of a break with the tradition of mere compilation. It is to his commentary we now turn.

It has been said that Haimo's 'expositor' of our passage, Romans 8:12-17, is considerably different from others reviewed in this period; let us look at some of the general differences of interpretation and then lift a number of specific samples.

1. While it has been assumed by many (most influentially, Migne) that the Haimo who wrote the commentary to the Pauline Epistles is Haimo of Halberstadt, it is now almost certain that this Haimo is rather Haimo of Auxerre. The leading authority is E. Riggenbach, 'Historischen Studien zum Hebräerbrief', in Forschung zur Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons, VIII, T. Zahn, ed., Leipzig, 1907, p.41-201; cited in Smalley, 1964., p.39, note 3. Even so eminent a scholar as Lukas Vischer in his historical study of the exegesis of I Corinthians 6:1-11 accepts uncritically Migne's assumption that the author of this commentary is Haimo of Halberstadt (L. Vischer, Die Auslegungsgeschichte von I Kor. 6,1-11, Tübingen, p.46). Still, the precise identity of Haimo is of no ultimate importance to a history of exegesis. Viewed historically, Haimo of Auxerre (or even Haimo of Halberstadt, for that matter) is of relatively little importance; he does not even warrant an entry in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church nor in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Tübingen, 1st ed., 1909). Text from Haimo is found in PL, CXVII. Comments on our passage are found in cols.429-432.
from the text of the document itself. The most important single fact to be marked is Haimo's own evident dichotomy both in purpose and method: in part he still clings to the tradition which defines the theologian's task as that of compiling exegetical anthologies or collections. But there is also clear evidence that this stranglehold began to be shaken off in men like Haimo. As Beryl Smalley has said, 'Haimo stands on the line that divides the compiler of select extracts from the author of a commentary'. An example of this dividedness in Haimo is that he presents both a variety of explanations (which can be mutually contradictory) or simply the accepted (probably Augustinian) explanation, but also feels free to raise his own, independent questions and to suggest his own answers. Still, he is enough of a man of his age to be most confident in answering such questions when he has a clear idea of what the Patristic answer would have been.

Further, it can be confidently said that there is a quality about Haimo's work not found in the compilers. In fact, at moments there is an almost majestic dimension to his writings. These moments do not generally include brilliant exegetical insights, but rather consist of a helpful, devotional thought applied to the problem at hand.

Another, more minor antithetical tendency can be detected in this commentary: a strong preference for and influence by Augustine, and at times a painstaking attempt, through the very wording of his comments, to deny the interpretation given by Pelagius in his commentary on Romans.

Haimo's interpretation of v.12 is not at all exceptional. He observes that while we are not debtors to the flesh, we are debtors to God. (This, however, is a more generalized point than that made by some earlier Latin writers, i.e., that we are debtors

1. It ought to be remembered, however, that this painstaking attempt does not stem directly from Haimo, for where he seems to be subtly refuting traditional Pelagian interpretation, he is probably directly dependent upon the revision of Pelagius's commentary on Romans written by Cassiodorus (ca. 550). We know that Haimo used this commentary with great appreciation (cf. Souter, 1927, p.210). There are one or two rather outstanding examples of this in the commentary on our passage. In the example below, the texts of v.17 of the two commentaries (Pelagius and Haimo) are set in parallel columns:

Pelagius
'Qui meretur esse filius, meretur effici heres patris et veri filii coheres'.

Haimo
'Servus non meretur accipere haereditatem, filius accipit: et nos, si filii Dei sumus, haereditatem meredimus accipere'.

Haimo (and thus, Cassiodorus) does not attempt to overtly challenge Pelagius on specific points, or engage Pelagius in debate on the objectionable points of interpretation; rather, the words of the Pelagian commentary are subtly edited and rewritten so as to remove heresy from it.
to the Spirit). Once this rather normal interpretation has been given, Haimo enters the sort of question-and-answer type of exposition mentioned above. First he asks, 'What then have we received from Him that we should be debtors to Him?' The answer follows immediately: 'Anything which we possess which is of good'.\(^1\) This little piece of catechism is heavily indebted to Augustine, for I Corinthians 4:7b ('What have you that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if it were not a gift?') was a well-used proof-text in Augustine's polemic writings.\(^2\) Although Haimo does not use his paraphrase of I Corinthians 4:7 in precisely the same context as would have Augustine, the use is still faithful to Augustinian theology, viz., all good that we have is from God; all good which we do is from grace.

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1. PL, CXVII, 429: 'Quid ergo accepimus ab illo ut eis debitores essemus? Quidquid boni habemus'.

2. E.g., De Correptione et Gratia, LNPF, V, p.473: 'But when they do not act, whether by not doing at all or by not doing from love, let them pray that what as yet they have not, they may receive. For what shall they have which they shall not receive? Or what have they which they have not received?'
If this illustrates Haimo's dependence upon Augustine, the next question and answer illustrate Haimo's incessant refutation of the Pelagian commentary on Romans. To the question, 'How are we able to repay our debt to Him?', he answers: 'By serving His will, by conforming to His commands and by ascribing anything we possess of good not to our own merit but to His grace.' Such a careful statement can only be explained by a consuming interest on Haimo's part in avoiding any statement which might possibly give weight to Pelagian interpretation and, on the other hand, in using every opportunity available to strike a blow against the Pelagian commentary on Romans.

At v.13 Haimo defines the idea of death inherent in the phrase μὴ διετε ἀπὸ θεωρήσεως as eternal death (mors aeterna) and, conversely, that in the verb ἶνα θέσθαι as eternal life (vita aeterna). To live according to the flesh is to engage oneself in fighting against the normal list of vices (adultery, murder, theft, etc.); thus Haimo reduces the struggle suggested by v.13 to the level of restricting carnal appetites or restraining the concupiscences of the flesh. This is made plain in his discussion of

1. PL, CXVII, 429: 'Et quomodo possumus eī debitum reddere? Serviendo voluntati illius, obtemperando mandatis ejus, et quidquid boni habemus, non nostris meritis, sed illius gratiae imputando.'
the phrase πνεύματι τὰς πρᾶξεις τοῦ
cαυματος Θανάτου:

How then can we by the grace of the Holy Spirit mortify the works of the flesh? In this way, by grace of words: arrogance lives and reigns in us — receiving humility from the Holy Spirit, let us be humble and thereby we shall mortify arrogance; lust lives in us — receiving chastity from the Holy Spirit, let us be chaste and thereby it is possible for us to mortify lust.¹

The viewpoint of such an interpretation is, of course, monastic and moralistic.

Haimo's explanation of v,13 is also typical of this period. The line of interpretation which limits the meaning of vv,12 and 13 to a mortification of base, carnal excesses and the substitution of such evil habits by virtues will continue to be the accepted interpretation until well into the Reformation. The question which must be asked of this interpretation is this: can simply a catalogue of vices to be avoided and virtues to be fostered solve either

¹. PL, CXVII, 429: 'Quomodo ergo possumus mortificare per gratiam sancti Spiritus opera carnis? Hoc modo; verbi gratia: vivit in nobis et regnat superbia, accipientes a sancto Spiritu humilitatem, simus humiles, et sic mortificabimus superbiam; vivit in nobis libido, accipientes a Spiritu sancto castitatem, simus casti, et sic poterimus mortificare libidinem'.
the exegetical problem of what Paul means by the words *τὰς πράξεις τοῦ θείματος θανατήσετε* or the actual problem of man's human predicament?

In all fairness to Haímo, however, his suggestion that the dative idea of *τίνευμάτε* signifies the 'grace of words' is quite creative. Still this idea is not unique since the idea that the Holy Spirit is the Mediator of the grace of the 'words' which exemplify His gifts is related to the Augustinian understanding of the Holy Spirit.

The remainder of Haímo's interpretation on our passage is less interesting and can be briefly summarized: at v.14 Haímo points out that the sons of God are such not by nature but by adoption. In v.15, Haímo understands Paul to be speaking of the Jews who received from their fathers a *τίνευμα σωλήνας* in fear. This is, in fact, the Law which was dictated and written by the Holy Spirit. (Thus the Holy Spirit's role in the Old Testament is

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1. PL, CXVII, 429: 'hī filī Deī sunt, non per naturam, sed per adoptionem'. This was evidently something of a hobby with Haímo; he makes almost the same point at v.16 (PL, CXVII, 430): 'Si quando opera bona agimus Deo servientes, Spiritus sanctus, qui habitat in hóbis, perhibit nobis testimonium in corde per occultam inspirationem sine strepitu vocis, quia filī Deī sumus effecti in baptismate, non per naturam, sed per adoptionem ....' (emphasis is ours).
explained, much as in Rabanus and Atto). The source of fear is the
Law's threats, i.e., 'If you do this or that, you shall die the
death'.{1} is taken to mean that Christians ought not accept the Law as did the Jews, for the Spirit's role in the writing of the Law has been superseded by what He reveals to men in the Gospel. (Thus the contrast is one of Law and Gospel and not primarily fear and love as in Augustine). The implicit rejection of Augustine's suggestion that the 'spirit of servitude' is Satan by one who is so influenced by Augustinian theology is silent evidence of how unpopular this view must have been.

Haimo's interpretation of 'Abba Pater' follows precisely Augustine's classic explanation. In addition, he emphasizes the importance of the Spirit's aid in prayer. The reference Paul has in mind is to the Lord's Prayer.{2}

The inheritance spoken of in v.17 will be completely ours only after the general resurrection, when we shall be made immortal, incorruptible in body and immutable in soul. We are heirs with Christ insofar as we share in his sufferings. Further, the

1. PL, CXVII, 430: 'Si quis hoc vel illud fecerit, morte moriatur'.

2. PL, CXVII, 430: '... nisi enim Spiritum sanctum tempore baptismatis accepissesmus nequaquam auderamus Deum omnipotentem factorem nostrum Patrem clamare, dicentes in oratione Dominica: Pater Noster', etc.
condition of suffering is taken by Haimo as a real and actual suffering, and is not made to mean mortification of the flesh, a view which is inconsistent with the general tendency of the rest of his exegesis.
Latin Exegesis in the 11th and 12th Centuries.

Work on the Biblical text in the 11th and 12th centuries developed in many different directions and it has only recently been realized how complex and, in many ways, vigorous a time for Biblical scholarship this was. We are confronted with a puzzling array of selected extracts, independent expositions, glosses and books of 'Quaestiones'. The Pauline Epistles become the focal point for much of this vigorous activity and the material concentrating on the interpretation of Romans consequently proliferates. It will be our purpose to touch upon the better-known writers and generally available documents on our passage, and thus limit our study to a survey of the major types of exposition and their major conclusions.

Only a part of scholarly activity in this period was directed toward the same goal as that illustrated by the work of 9th-century writers such as Rabanus Maurus, Haimo of Auxerre, etc. No longer is independent exegesis held strictly
separate from the work of compiling the exegetical anthologies.¹
Anselm of Laon, for example, by his inspiration and work is not only responsible for the Glossa Ordinaria on the Pauline Epistles, but probably also wrote an independent, continuous (and undoubtedly sophisticated) exposition in which he reflected upon the more telling theological issues.²

Two outstanding Biblical scholars living and working in this changing period are Peter Abailard (1079-1142) and Peter Lombard (1100-1160). The latter entitles his work on Romans a 'collection', and it is, in fact, much closer to those collections of

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1. Smalley, 1964, p.51: 'The achievement of all these eleventh- and early twelfth-century scholars ... like that of their ninth-century predecessors, divides naturally into two: the production of text-books or aids to study in the form of "select extracts"; and independent exegesis. But now the two activities proceed together. We do not find, as we did in the Carolingian period, an older generation devoting itself entirely to the task of compilation'.

2. It is now generally recognized as certain that the marginal gloss of the Glossa Ordinaria was not written by Walafrid Strabo. Rather, it is now supposed that Anselm is responsible for the entire gloss on Paul, the Psalms, and possibly St. John's Gospel. Others of Anselm's school, including his brother, Ralph, were responsible for the majority of the remainder. Thus when we speak of the Glossa Ordinaria on our passage in Romans, we are speaking of Anselm. The evidence for a missing exposition of a completely different type authored by Anselm is presented in Smalley, 1964, pp.67ff. (NB: 'Continuous' as used here refers to a running exposition based on the Biblical text, as opposed to a marginal or interlinear glossing of the text).
the 9th century than most commentaries written in the early 12th century. To make it even more confusing, Peter Lombard wrote his collection in the form of a continuous exposition, but in reality he is essentially repeating and at the same time expounding the Glossa Ordinaria - a completely different kind of commentary. Peter Abailard, on the other hand, offers us an 'exposition' which, while dependent upon the wisdom of the Fathers, represents the growing mood of dialectic inquiry. Taken together, they represent the two aspects of scholarly study of the Bible mentioned earlier. We turn first to Abailard's exposition.

Abailard offers us a careful, phrase-by-phrase exposition encompassing far more than we will have space to review fully. We will limit ourselves to the highlights, stress the more interesting turns of his interpretation.

Abailard's interpretation of the words of v.12, 'we are not debtors to the flesh', is that 'we are not obliged to obey carnal desires'. This he illustrates by the situation of Christians

1. 'Expositio in Epist. Paul. ad Rom'. contained in PL, CLXXVIII. The exegesis of our passage is found in cols. 901-903.

2. PL, CLXXVIII, 901: ' ... desideriiis carnalibus obedire non debemus ...'
living under secular powers: there is no obedience owed to them should they command something which God has prohibited. In the same way, we are not obliged to obey carnal desires. Abailard is also careful to say that we are debtors to the substance of the flesh, inasmuch as indebtedness pertains to necessary care such as food and clothing.

Abailard suggests that we understand the threat extended in v.13 as the death of the soul (mors animae). He is fond of illustrating his exegesis, and his illustrations themselves are often insights into the exegetical mentality of the times. In v.13 he seeks to explain what Paul means when he urges Roman Christians to 'mortify the deeds of the flesh'. It is just as if, says Abailard, a baby still in the uterus is destroyed before it is born; even so we are to prevent evils conceived in the mind from progressing to the point of works. This illustration is then woven into a quotation from Psalm 137:9:

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Happy shall he be
who takes your little ones
And dashes them
against the rock!
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This, of course, is taken allegorically to mean that sins conceived by the mind ('your little ones') are to be killed by strangling and dissipating them ('dashes them', etc.) upon 'that stable foundation of
all good which is Christ' ('against the rock').

This is without doubt the most interesting allegory which we will encounter in the history of the exegesis of our passage, especially so since allegory as an interpretive device did not usually play an important role in expositing Paul. Allegory was used, of course, to wearying proportions in interpreting the Psalms, and it is Abailard's introduction of Psalm 137 which in all probability accounts for his unusual use of this literary technique.

Abailard's interpretation of v.14 is also unusual in that it depends for its exegesis upon ideas borrowed from both vv.13 and 15: those who live well mortify the deeds of the flesh (v.13) because they are led (aguntur) rather than forced (coguntur); that is, they are enticed by love rather than compelled by fear (v.15).

Throughout his exposition of our passage, Abailard repeatedly emphasizes the difference between servants and sons, fear and love, etc., and this is especially true of his interpretation of v.15:

1. PL, CLXXVIII, 901: 'vide quotes Psalm 137:9, id est concepta per aliquam suggestionem mente peccata adhuc quasi parvula sint mortificabit atque interficiet, allidendo ad petram, id est confringendo ea et dissipando ad illud bonorum omnium stabile fundamentum, quod Christus est ....'
We call God Father rather than Lord because we recognize ourselves to be sons rather than slaves. This in fact is what the Truth himself taught in the Gospel, for he often said that we ought to call God Father rather than Lord and by this use be exhorted to filial obedience.¹

This is also occasion for one of Abailard's illustrations, but in this case a delightful and quaint one: we do well, says Abailard, to call the abbots of monasteries Fathers, 'so that from the very name they are openly advised to be loved as fathers rather than feared as lords'.²

Abailard takes the conservative line on the interpretation of 'Abba, Father'. He quotes Augustine and his classic explanation and also Haimo, which gives us some indication of the latter's influence on subsequent exegetes.³

1. PL, CLXXVIII, 902: '... id est eum potius profitemur esse Patrem quam Dominum, ac per hoc nos potius filios quam servos recognoscimus. Sic enim et Veritas in Evangelio frequenter docuit nos scilicet Deum potius vocare Patrem quam Dominum, ut ex hoc quoque ad filiales nos hortaretur subjectionem'.

2. PL, CLXXVIII, 902: 'Unde bene abbates monasteriorum Patres dicimus, ut ex ipso nomine magis amari tanquam patres, quam timeri tanquam domini aperte admoveantur'.

3. There are many evidences in this section that Abailard had other expositions in front of him as he wrote, for he gives three different explanations for Paul's use of the words, 'Abba, Father'.
Abailard also repeats the standard interpretation of the day concerning the identity of the 'spirit of servitude'. Through the law, the Jews received the spirit of servile fear. This situation is to be contrasted with the advent of the Gospel.

One of the most interesting of Abailard's comments is made in his commentary on v.16. Having identified 'our spirit' with 'reason' (ratio) and pointing out that this verse leaves each individual to his own conclusion as to whether one is a servant and a son, he goes on to give an opinion as to Paul's literary purpose in writing as he does here: Paul is acting as a father to the Roman Christians, some of whom need to be strongly warned. Thus Paul here 'does not so much expound what kind of people they are as what kind of people they ought to be'.

In regard to the condition of suffering with Christ laid down in v.17, Abailard tries to have the best of both worlds. He gives the spiritual interpretation first: we must suffer for Christ since he who does not contend is not crowned (see II Timothy 2:5); the enemy against whom we contend is our vices. This line of explanation is, of course, the same as that which substitutes mortification of the

1. PL, CLXXVIII, 903: '... et non tam quales illi essent quam quales esse deberent exponere'.
desires of the flesh for actual suffering 'for His name'. But Abailard takes this interpretation into account by going on in a reference to Cyprian to point out that martyrdom does not constitute punishment, but on the contrary is a source of glorification. Thus Abailard leaves room for a literal interpretation of Paul's words. Still, says Abailard, we must face the fact that even though love prepares us for suffering, necessity may not bear out our readiness to suffer. Regardless of this, we must be prepared to suffer even though we lack a persecutor.

This is by far the fullest and most interesting interpretation of v.17 we have yet encountered. Abailard weaves into his commentary three different ways of understanding Paul's reference to suffering: the first is a rationalization or spiritualizing of the text (conquer lust), the second is concrete and physical (martyrdom), and the third is a pastoral explanation and exhortation based on the second (be ready to suffer even if the opportunity and means is absent).

Peter Lombard's work on Romans represents the more traditional collection of authorities and therefore considerably less inventive than that of Peter Abailard.1 At times, the Lombard

1. Peter Lombard's Collectanea on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans is contained in PL, CXCI. Comments on our passage are found in cols. 1438-1442.
appears to be almost overwhelmed by Augustine; so anxious is he to report Augustine's opinion on various questions that he sometimes includes material of very uneven quality and which is at times inadequately introduced. All of these characteristics reflect the Lombard's dependence upon the Glossa Ordinaria.

At v.12, the Lombard leaves no doubt as to how the syntax ought to be construed. 'Ergo fratres, debitores sumus spiritu non carnī, ut secundum carnem vivamus', he quotes, seeming to imply even that 'to the Spirit' is a part of the text! This is clear indication that by this time the standard interpretation of v.12 was quite fixed; Paul neglects to say it, but he means that while we are debtors to the Spirit, we are not debtors to the flesh. As did Abailard, the Lombard is careful to say that the creation belongs to God and therefore the flesh is not bad. Going on, he constructs a hierarchy of good: the Trinity, one God in three, is the highest good; the soul - created by God - is a great good. Compared to these the body is the smallest good. Thus the soul exists between the highest

1. The term 'standard interpretation' is justified in that the Lombard based his commentary upon Anselm's Glossa Ordinaria. By the time Peter Lombard's exposition gained circulation, the Glossa was well on the way toward general acceptance as the standard interpretation. As regards this specific opinion, we can see that Augustine's suggestion that the 'spirit of bondage' is Satan, having been dropped from the later collections, has been gradually replaced by the view which takes the 'spirit of bondage' as the Holy Spirit revealed in the Law given at Sinai.
and the least good - between God and the flesh. The soul, therefore, has the option of casting itself in either direction - toward either the smallest or the greatest good. The soul must realize that it is indebted to live according to God. The inner sources of vitality must be directed toward the highest good (God) and not toward the lowest good (the body).

The Lombard's exegesis of v.13 follows the traditional line. To 'mortify' the 'acts of the flesh' means not consenting to its concupiscence and even, if possible, diminishing those very concupiscences of the flesh themselves.

To interpret v.14, Peter Lombard uses a favorite Augustine play on words: it is more to be led than to be ruled (Plus est enim agi quam regi). This exegesis comes from a variation of Augustine's frequent interpretation of v.14 when he wishes to apply it as an argument against the Pelagian claim that 'all men are ruled by their own will'. Usually Augustine went on, in his use of v.14, to make the point that the one who is ruled still does something for himself; but Paul wants to say something more than this:

1. Cf. De gestis Pelagi, ch. 5.
Still, the Saviour's helpful grace is so much better than our own wills and desires that the Apostle does not hesitate to say: "For all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God". And our free will can do nothing better for us than to submit itself to be led by Him who can do nothing amiss ....

The point of Augustine's subtle distinction - i.e., Paul is so bold when speaking of grace that he uses the strongest possible word, indicating the maximum degree of influence - is repeated by the Lombard:

... he says they are led not ruled to demonstrate the great effect of grace. For it is more to be led than to be ruled. For we call one led as if one scarcely does anything; we say that one is ruled as if one does something. Therefore, he who is led is understood to do hardly anything; but he who is ruled does something and therefore he [the former] is led to act justly.

This is almost precisely the point made by Augustine (above) and no further comment is needed, except to remark upon the profound influence of Augustine upon Peter Lombard.

1. LNPF, V, p.185.

2. PL, CXCI, 1438-1439: '... aguntur dicit, non reguntur, ut magnum gratiae effectum ostendat. Plus est enim agi quam regi. Agi enim dicit, aliquem quasi vix aliquid agit; regi aliquem dicit, quasi aliquid agit. Qui enim agitur, agere vix aliquid intelligitur; qui autem regitur, aliquid agit, et ideo agitur ut recte agat'.
With regard to the problem as to how 'spirit of bondage' and 'spirit of adoption' ought to be understood, Peter Lombard takes the traditional (which is to say, Glossa Ordinaria's) line, which we have seen most recently in Atto and Rabanus Maurus. As in both of these exegetes, the argument is made to rest on the word iterum; thus the two occurrences of ΠΝΔΩΜΑ are not indicative of different spirits but of one (Holy) Spirit when seen in different manifestations. The Lombard introduces a new illustration: in the Exodus narrative (Exodus 14), the Spirit who divided the waters is a Spirit of wrath to the Egyptians but not a Spirit of wrath for the sons of Israel; the one group was brought to harm by the Spirit, the other group profited by the Spirit's action. In the same manner, the Spirit is here called the 'Spirit of fear' (sic) because it was the same Spirit who inspired the Law, and the Law was a source of fear to those who were convicted of their sins by the Law.

The Lombard accepts the Glossa Ordinaria's substitution of 'spirit of freedom' for 'spirit of adoption'. Thus

1. Evidently the Lombard finds the word 'spirit' (Spíritus) in some such place as Exodus 15:10a: 'Thou didst blow with thy wind, the sea covered them ....' (the verse begins in Hebrew). The Lombard is probably reading Spíritus for throughout this part of the Exodus narrative.
the circle of acceptance is closed and a reworked version of both Chrysostom's and Theodore's exegesis of v.15a comes to be the standard interpretation. But the Lombard goes on to weld this interpretation to the very Augustinian contrast of fear and love, in which he suggests that the love which the Holy Spirit has 'diffused' in our hearts is 'not that [love] by which he himself loves us,'¹ but rather by which we are made 'lovers' of God. The Lombard then demonstrates how this interpretation is illustrated by other genitive constructions which can be construed in the same way, i.e., the righteousness of God, by which we are righteous, and the faith of Christ, by which we are made faithful. This rather indecisive pairing of Eastern and Western interpretations on the important first part of v.15 is indication of the Glossa Ordinaria's tendency to mediate and compromise on difficult problems of exegesis. This tendency was, of course, an inheritance from the compilers.

It has been mentioned before that the definition of fear becomes increasingly complex as time goes on; here in the Lombard's exposition of v.15 we have the Glossa Ordinaria's attempt to

¹. PL, CXCI, 1439: '... non qua nos ipse diligit ....'
fully define fear in all its religious manifestations. Long before the Lombard's time it had been recognized that a simple contrasting of fear and love (in reference to v.15) was an over-simplification. Ought Christians not have a proper 'fear of the Lord'? it might be asked. The operative word is 'proper', and this is precisely where Scholasticism began. There are two general kinds of fear implied here, both of which are caused by one Spirit: \(^1\) chaste fear, which is in perfect love, and servile fear, which may result in acting rightly, but is still inadequate as a motivation. Parallel with this analysis, the Lombard interprets the two parts of v.15 as speaking of two kinds of servants:

For there is the servant who is also a son who fears the Lord and honors the Father. Whence through Malachi the Lord says: "If then I am a master, where is my fear? If I am a father, where is my honor?"\(^2\)
And there is the servant who fears punishment, but who does not love righteousness.\(^3\)

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1. PL, CXCI, 1439: 'Unus ergo spiritus est qui duos timores facit'.
2. Malachi 1:6b. The Lombard has inverted the original order. The entire verse reads: 'A son honors his father, and a servant his master. If then I am a father, where is my honor? And if I am a master, where is my fear? says the LORD of hosts to you, O priests, who despise my name, You say, "How have we despised thy name?"'.
3. PL, CXCI, 1439-1440: 'Est enim servus qui est et filius, qui timet dominum et honorat patrem. Unde per Malachiam Dominus ait: Si Dominus sum, ubi est timor meus? Si pater, ubi est amor meus? Et est servus qui timet poenam, sed non diligit justitiam'. 
Continuing in his report of Scholastic opinion, Lombard points out that not only are there these two aspects of the fear of God, but these two can be further broken down into four, all of which are above and beyond 'natural fear'; they are:

... (i) worldly fear which is evil, nor is it from God; and (ii) servile fear, which is good and from God, but not sufficient; and (iii) beginning fear, which is good and sufficient, and (iv) chaste fear, which is good and perfecting concerning which is here treated. For it itself chaste fear begets us as sons.¹

This exposition of v.15 is the most characteristically Scholastic we have yet seen.² All of the possible ways in which the fear of the Lord might be understood are reviewed and applied to an entire verse in which the word 'fear' is simply mentioned in a single part. That this exposition bears little relation to the issues at stake in the text does not seem to offend Scholastic scholars.

1. PL, CXCI, 1440: '... mundanum qui malus est, nec a Deo est; et servilem, qui bonus est et a Deo, sed non sufficiens; et initialem, qui bonus est et sufficiens; et castum, qui bonus est et perficiens, de quo hic agitur. Ipse enim generat nos filios'. (Rubrics are ours).

2. The definitive treatment of religious fear, developed from these basic definitions, was yet to be written by St. Thomas.
How inadequate an exegesis of v.15 this leads to is abundantly clear, for the result is to apply the category of fear not only to those who have received the 'spirit of bondage' but also to those receiving the 'spirit of sonship'—which would appear to be the contrary of what Paul clearly says!

We have here, then, an unusually good example of the influence the Scholastic mood was exerting upon Biblical exposition, even an exposition so traditionally conservative as Anselm's Gloss and Peter Lombard's Collectanea.

The remainder of Peter Lombard's exposition is extremely ordinary and very dependent upon Augustine and Ambrosiaster and we need not dwell at length upon it. Of greatest interest is the Lombard's synopsis of the traditional Augustinian view of the interrelationship of the three themes of the Holy Spirit, remission of sins, and the doctrine of the Church, as it applies to the interpretation of v.16. First, he draws heavily from Augustine's sermon on Matthew 12:32,¹ which is concerned with blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. He cites loosely a passage in which Augustine originally quoted Romans 8:15-16. The points which Augustine there made were, in turn,

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¹. Sermon LXXI, found in LNPF, VI, p.328.
fundamental to his doctrine of the Trinity and of the Church: remission of sins does not take place outside the Church and is only possible through the Holy Spirit; although remission of sins belongs to the entire Trinity, still we understand this work to belong especially to the Spirit; and, finally, it is through the same Holy Spirit that the unity of Christ's Body - the Church - is made possible. The Lombard then goes on to quote from Augustine's

1. PL, CXCI, 1440: '... id est recognoscere facit mente nostra, dum per eum facta remissione non agimus, de quo quod sumus filii Dei hoc facit cognoscere Spiritus sanctus, dum scilicet in Ecclesia fit remissio peccatorum in Spiritu sancto, quam remissionem cum Trinitas faciat, proprie tamen ad Spiritum sanctum intelligitur pertinere, quia Spiritus communis est Patri et Filio, amborumque unio, per quem fit societas et unitas, qua efficimur unum corpus unico Filii Dei'.

Although Peter Lombard does suggest that the Holy Spirit effects a recognition of the fact in the believer's mind, one can still discern the roots of the decision handed down later at the Council of Trent: the disapproval of any understanding of the Spirit's ministry which allowed for a direct witness of the Holy Spirit to the individual.

Tractatus on St. John's Gospel, where he speaks of the Spirit's function as the principle of charity within the Trinity and in the Church. What is above all significant about the Lombard's exposition is the rationale for the direction it takes: these themes are included simply because the ideas (above) are closely connected in Augustine's theology, and are only triggered by Paul's references to the place of the Spirit in the lives of believers.¹

¹ When one thinks of an author of the Lombard's stature and intellect signing his name to such a mechanical and repetitive commentary such as we have reviewed, one is struck by the inconsistency of such a creative mind accepting such a task. Such a great inconsistency must have an explanation, and indeed it does. Peter Lombard, like most of his contemporaries, did not consider himself above laboring on two, often distinct levels. This Collectanea in Romans represents his contribution to the first level of endeavor: glossing the text or writing a continuous exposition which was based upon the Glossa—both intended as aids or text-books in teaching Biblical studies on the lower levels. The more independent, continuous expositions, which were considerably more inventive and interesting, have been largely lost, but there is good evidence that Anselm of Laon wrote such a one on the Pauline Epistles in addition to his contribution to the Glossa Ordinaria. Besides his Collectanea in Romans, Peter Lombard is responsible for the Magna Glosatura, a major theological expansion of Anselm's Gloss on St. Paul and the Psalter. Thus it can be well understood how the Lombard might not have considered the task boring, but rather necessary and even demanded of him by his tradition. (A modern parallel to Peter Lombard's Collectanea would be the lectures of a renowned theologian to undergraduates). He was also capable of original theological inquiry as a means of interpretation. It ought also be said that by simply repeating the Glossa in the form of a continuous exposition (with only minor additions), the Lombard lent his not inconsiderable influence in favor of its acceptance as the standard interpretation. Viewed in this historical context, Peter Lombard's rather mundane exposition perhaps takes on new importance.
St. Bruno (ca. 1032-1101), founder of the Carthusian Order, is better known as a mystic than as an exegete, but very possibly deserves to be more celebrated as a Biblical scholar. Although he is most commonly thought of as a founder of a religious order, it may well be that his greatest influence (as regards subsequent generations of theologians) was as an exegete of the Psalms and of St. Paul's Epistles.

His commentary on our passage is traditional, well-edited (that is, he avoids wearisome repetition), and refreshingly brief. Still, there is very little startling or even new in his commentary and thus we limit ourselves to a summing up of the highlights:

In v.12, according to St. Bruno, Paul intended that we understand we are indebted to the Spirit. This is so, says Bruno, because it is 'by the Spirit that we live and shall be vivified'.

Bruno takes vv.13-14 in the classic Augustinian sense: v.14 is evidence

\[\text{1. PL, CLIII, cols.71-72.}\]

\[\text{2. PL, CLIII, 71: '... quia per spiritum vivimus, et adhuc vivificabimur'.}\]
that only through the agency of the Spirit is it possible to mortify the deeds of the flesh (v. 13). To be 'sons of God' is equivalent to possessing eternal life.

Verse 15 is construed to read, 'you have received a spirit, but not a spirit of servitude'. This 'spirit of servitude' is explained by that sequence of ideas which we have so commonly confronted: under the law men become fearful because of the threat of punishment on account of their disobedience. This condition (living in constant fear) is really the condition of servitude of which Paul speaks; thus, he who seeks to obey the law simply to avoid punishment or out of fear of punishment is enslaved by fear. This is the accepted interpretation, but Bruno states it far more clearly and concisely than do the more verbose expositors. He does not attempt, however, to define in both parts of v. 15. He accepts Augustine's classic exegesis of the words, 'Abba, Pater'.

1. PL, CLIII, 72: 'Vos quidem accepiste spiritum, sed non spiritum servitutis'. This means of exposition is quite popular with Bruno; he often explains the nuance of a phrase by quoting the verse and inserting explanatory material between the quoted words of the text.
St. Bruno gives more space to v.16 than any other in our passage. He is concerned with a rather philosophic issue: how can we say that we are now heirs of God but that He must experience death before our enjoyment of that inheritance is possible? It is the kind of inquiry which typifies the age, and we can see in it the sort of stylized form of exegesis made popular in the various commentaries known as *quaestiones*. Bruno's answer makes up in simple piety what it lacks in profundity; we say simply that the necessity of dying in relation to our future beatitude can only be explained in this way: 'For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face' (I Corinthians 13:12a).

In our consideration of 11th- and 12th-century interpretation of Romans 8:12-17, we have not been following a strict chronological order; rather, we have been considering commentaries utilizing different methods. Peter Lombard, for example, lived and worked a generation after Abelard, but both of them have left behind classic examples of the traditional 'expositor', compiled from the Fathers and Doctors of the Church. St. Bruno, approximately contemporary with St. Anselm of Canterbury, offers us much the same

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1. PL, CLIII, 72. Bruno's actual words are: 'si quaerimus quomodo sumus haeredes Dei, cum usus habeat haeredem esse morte decessoris ?'
type of commentary, but often adds an independent theological excursus.¹

The expositions of these three theologians closely resemble those of the Carolingian period, and it is for this reason we have presented them first in sequence. We now go back to the beginning of the era of Scholasticism and consider the roots of the Glossa Ordinaria - that document which towers above all others as the product of its age and of the age's greatest Biblical scholar, Anselm of Laon (died 1117).²


2. Authorship of such documents as the Glossa Ordinaria is extremely complicated, and solution of the various problems lies beyond the scope of this study. It is generally agreed, however, that at least two earlier assumptions are incorrect: that Hugh of St. Victor wrote the Quaestiones which appear in PL, CLXXV, under his name (and which we shall later review), and that the marginal gloss of the Glossa Ordinaria was written by Walafrid Strabo and the interlinear by Anselm of Laon. Without going into great detail, it is clear that in reference to the latter issue, the commanding role in the development of the Glossa is Anselm of Laon, and that he is most likely totally responsible for the Glossa on Paul. The older assumption concerning the joint authorship of Anselm and Walafrid Strabo, as well as the assumption concerning difference of function for the marginal and interlinear glosses, is difficult to scotch. Wilhelm Pauck, editor and translator of Luther's Lectures on Romans (in the series Library of Christian Classics, J. Baillie, et al., eds., Vol. XV, London, 1961) lends credence to both these assumptions (see p.xxvi). (Cited hereafter as 'Pauck, 1961'). Even so prestigious a reference work as The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church is obviously misled and unsure when it speaks of Anselm's role in the production of the Glossa Ordinaria (see p.59, 'Anselm of Laon'). Accurate and critical information on this issue is difficult to come by and the best, most reliable discussion is contained in Smalley, 1964, pp.46-66.
As an introduction to Anselm, however, we must briefly consider one of his teachers, Lanfranc, (ca. 1005-1089), Archbishop of Canterbury. Lanfranc's commentary on Paul in Migne follows the classic style of an interlinear and marginal gloss. (In other editions it is presented as a continuous gloss). This apparatus is only one of many early attempts at a standard, stylized apparatus, but in it we can see the inception of a final, authoritative gloss which was to make the process of further compilation unnecessary. There is little first-hand evidence to help in separating the layers which were added to these early glosses, but we do know that Lanfranc's gloss was successively overlaid with two additional glosses. This alone gives us some idea of the complex pattern that Biblical studies of this period follow. Not only did Lanfranc gloss the Pauline Epistles, but he also wrote a continuous exposition on the same books, which contained yet different material! In any case, Lanfranc's glosses on our passage form a perfect transition from the collections we have been dealing with to the Glossa Ordinaria.

Unfortunately, Lanfranc does not have much in detail to tell us about our passage. In the interlinear, he makes the

1. PL, CL. Romans 8:12-17 is contained in cols.131-132.
familiar point that we are debtors to the Spirit but not to the flesh. At v.15 he adds the words, 'as did the Jews at Mt. Sinai', after the words, 'For you have not received ...', thus accepting the current popular view that the 'spirit of bondage' was actually the Law as revealed by the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament. The third interlinear comment, on v.17, attempts to interpret what it is to suffer with Christ; it is that we are to endure opposition to Christ as if it were directed toward us. Thus the literal meaning is rationalized.

The marginal glosses to our passage are mainly collections from Augustine and other anonymous sources, but there is the original comment from Lanfranc on v.14, in which he interprets v.14 in the light of v.13:

They live approved because the acts of the flesh have been mortified. For they are sons of God for whom there is no doubt at all that they "live".

1. PL, CL, 131-132: 'Ergo, fratres, spiritui debitores sumus non carnī', etc.
2. PL, CL, 131-132: 'sicut Judaeī in monte Sinai'.
3. PL, CL, 131-132: 'id est, adversa in Christo sustineamus, sicut ipse pro nobis'.
4. PL, CL, 131 (marginal gloss no.10): 'Probatio quia facta carnī mortificantūs vivant. Filīī enim Deī sunt, quos vivere haud dubium est'.
This is, of course, the classic view: v.13b is a test imposed upon man, and v.14 is the pronouncement of approval based upon fulfilment of the condition. Lanfranc does not add Augustine's point that the fulfilment of the condition is through the grace of the Spirit's leading.

As can be seen from this brief resumé of all that is original in Lanfranc, the details of the commentary are not as interesting as the historical phenomenon of its existence. This is also true of the Glossa Ordinaria, to which we now turn.

As a document, the Glossa Ordinaria came to wield almost unequalled influence in the Western medieval curriculum, the Lombard's Sentences and St. Thomas's Summa Theologica being the only reasons for the qualification 'almost unequalled'. As its name implies, it eventually came to be the definitive and standard interpretation of Scripture.¹ Of course, acceptance of the Glossa Ordinaria as such was not immediate and for a time we know that it was one gloss among many (such as that of Lanfranc). However, when

¹. Smalley, 1964, p.65: 'From about the middle of the twelfth century, a glossed Bible normally contains the same set of prefaces and glosses, that is to say, the Gloss. There are variations from copy to copy in detail, but no large-scale changes or additions are made; the early printed editions are not very different from the manuscripts. From Paris the Gloss was spread throughout Latin Christendom and accepted as the standard work'.
it finally was accepted as the authoritative collection of opinions and interpretations, the science of compilation died a sudden death. Thus in the document now before us for consideration we have both the apex and the end (for all practical purposes) of the method and process begun by Bede and the later scholars of the Carolingian period.

As regards our passage, once again there is little new to add. Peter Lombard, whom we have already reviewed in detail, actually gives us a melioration or at least expansion upon the Glossa.¹ He does not, in fact, significantly alter the opinions on vv.14, 15 and 16. The Glossa does not comment on v.12, and on v.13 simply says to the word, 'If, by the Spirit' (Si autem Spiritu):

Either by the Holy Spirit or by our spirit, which, nevertheless, does not exist without the agency of the Holy Spirit.²

This rather studied ambiguity does not really add much to our understanding of v.13.

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¹ Smalley, 1964, p.64, points out that such expansions inform us as to the Gloss’s position of influence and acceptance in the mid-12th century.

² PL, CXIV, 495-496: 'Vel Spiritu sancto vel nostro; quod tamen non est, nisi agente Spiritu sancto'.
Looking back on our study of medieval exegesis up to now, one can see the emergence of a growing tendency: the discussion of theological issues which are often only remotely related to the text. The total picture of theological education during the period of activity of such men as Anselm of Laon seems to support the conclusion that the discussion of doctrinal issues probably took place in the context of the exposition of Scripture.¹ One result of this was a confusion between the disciplines of exegesis and theological inquiry. Another concrete result is the proliferation of *quaestiones*, or the posing of theological problems (suggested directly or indirectly by the text itself) followed by various solutions. Actually, very little is known in detail about the literary history of the various *quaestiones*, (for there exists a great number of them) but we do know that they formed an important part of all theological endeavour.

¹ Smalley, 1964, pp.66ff.
At first the **quaestio**, as a form of Biblical interpretation, simply interrupted the running exposition, but as time went on, this element grew and eventually became, at times, detached altogether from the exposition. Often these **quaestiones** became the building blocks for totally different kinds of documents; the Lombard's **Sentences**, for example, contain **quaestiones** transferred verbatim from his **Magna Glosatura**.

The **quaestiones** relevant to our passage really have very little to do with the history of exegesis, since they do not normally seek to interpret the text itself, but rather discuss theological issues which, through centuries of interpretation, have come to be accepted as the relevant issues. This, in fact, is an important characteristic of the **quaestiones**: for the most part (with certain exceptions) they assume that the reader is familiar with and accepts the traditional interpretation (i.e., the **Glossa Ordinaria**) of the text itself. It is only because the distinctions between theology and exegesis became blurred that these **quaestiones** came into our discussion at all.
Although the document here considered is anonymous, it is a good example of the various quaeestiones. The columns falling within our five verses comprise nine individual quaeestiones. By far the majority of these are concerned with various problems in v.15, and almost all of the latter treat of the tangled issue of fear. We will briefly review each of these nine items.

Quaestio CXCIII sets out to answer the question: Are the spirit of adoption and the 'spirit of fear' (sic) the same? The answer is much the same as given elsewhere; i.e., it is the same Spirit, but spoken of according to the diverse peoples which the Spirit has brought about. The general rule which here applies is that 'the obligation [or burden] and the originator

1. PL, CLXXV, cols.479-481. As Smalley notes, Migne wrongly ascribes this to Hugh of St.Victor. It is undoubtedly due to this traditional but false assumption that this book of quaeestiones came to be regarded as authoritative. The date of this document's writing is uncertain, but in style and scholarship it belongs to the period under consideration.

2. PL, CLXXV, 479-481; quaeestiones CXCIII to CXCVIII are concerned with v.15 and quaeestiones CXCIX to CCI with v.17.
of the obligation are called by the same name'. This would seem to mean, for example, that the 'spirit of fear' indicates the originator of the burden of serving in fear under the Law, as well as indicating the burden itself. It is interesting that the writer has slipped into using the phrase 'spirit of fear' which, of course, does not occur in the text. This usage derives from the tradition which tends to rephrase the contrast of v.15 as 'spirit of fear' and 'spirit of freedom'. At the same time this choice of terms is the source of considerable ambiguity; the ambiguity is hidden in the suggestion on one hand that while those in the Old Testament were placed under servile fear (in subjection to fear or punishment for transgressing the Law), those living under the mandate of the Gospel are liberated from fear, and in the implicit suggestion on the other hand, that at least some aspect of fear is still applicable to Christian men. As we shall see later, it is St. Thomas Aquinas who shrewdly perceives this ambiguity and attempts to restate and unify exegetical tradition in such a way as to lessen the harshness of the ambiguity.

1. PL, CLXXV, 479: 'Nota quod munus et auctor muneris eodem dicitur nomine'.
In *quaestio* CXCIV there is actually no formal question posed (an anomaly which apparently did not then bother scholars), but rather the simple observation that this saying (v,15) as a whole ought not to be understood to imply that at some previous time the Romans did receive a spirit of bondage (and thus might be in danger of receiving it again). The solution of the grammatical and theological problem is as follows:

"Again" does not designate a repeated fact in the same persons, but in diverse persons, as if he had said: "The spirit of servitude in fear has been given to the Jews in the gift of the Law, and again the spirit not of fear but of adoption has been given to us".  

This rather awkward explanation is more traditional than it may at first seem, for it suggests that the refers not to the giving of the same Spirit twice in the same manifestation to the same people, but twice, the second time in a different manifestation to a different people. This, then, is traditional because it maintains and utilizes as the key to interpreting v,15

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1. PL, CLXXV, 479: 'Iterum, non notat iterationem in eisdem personis factam, sed in diversis, quasi diceret: Judaeis quidem datus est in legis datione spiritus servitutis in timore, et iterum vobis est datus spiritus non timoris, sed adoptionis'.
the historical differentness of the Spirit's ministries and of the two peoples involved.

The above explanation and paraphrase is followed by a fourfold definition of fear which is virtually identical with that we have reported in the Glossa Ordinaria and in Peter Lombard.

Quaestio CXCV is far more speculative and raises the initial question: Is then fear a gift from the Holy Spirit? Although this is the direct question posed, it is not the issue about which the writer is primarily concerned. Rather, we must assume that 'yes' is the expected answer. Now the problem is a completely different one: assuming that fear is the gift of the Holy Spirit, we can only conclude that the gift of fear is good (for all gifts of the Spirit are good); why then is fear sometimes viewed as being evil? In his answer the writer reminds his readers that 'good' is having a good result; therefore, if fear (whether servile fear or initial fear) restrains men from doing evil works, it is good. Still, that in man which continues to permit evil is not the fault of the Spirit's gift, but comes

1. PL, CLXXV, 479.
from the vice of men themselves. 1 We are then offered a
discussion of the shades of differences between servile fear,
initial fear and filial fear. 2

Quaestio CXCVI 3 is far more interesting, for it poses
the fascinating question: Which of the various kinds of fear may
have been found in Christ? Characteristically, this major
question devolves into a series of sub-questions and answers. In
brief, however, the important answer is what we might have
expected: since worldly fear is always evil, this could not have

1. St. Thomas addressed the same problem with far better
results. See Article 4, Question 19 ('Whether Servile
Fear is Good'), pp. 315f. in Nature and Grace:
Selections from the Summa Theologica of Thomas
Aguinas, A.M. Fairweather, ed. and trans., London,
Classics, J. Baillie, et al., eds. (Cited below as
'Fairweather, 1954'). See also Article 9 ('Whether
Fear is a Gift of the Holy Spirit'), pp. 322ff.

2. This discussion is essentially a repetition of what
has been reviewed in earlier documents and need not
be here repeated.

3. PL, CLXXV, 479-480.
been found in Christ. And since servile and even initial fear are unable to be found in perfect love, neither could they have been experienced by Christ. Thus it was either filial fear or none which Christ experienced. But if we say that He knew filial fear, reports the writer, we have another problem, for we also say filial fear is that which fears to offend the other (and, thus, not the punishment); but is it not so that Christ did not fear to offend or to be separated? The solution of this problem is as follows: the filial fear which was in Christ was not the same as that in us in the present with respect to the effect it has. Rather it is like that in the angels or that which will be in the saints in the future, i.e., 'according to reverence' (secundum reverentiam), and this reverence can be defined as love mingled with subjection. It is this reverence of which the Apostle spoke in Hebrews 5:7:

'... and he \textit{Christ} was heard for his godly fear'.

1. It is interesting that the writer uses Hebrews 5:7 as an example of filial love in Christ, for the reference there is clearly to the Gethsemane experience (Mark 14:32ff) and yet in the next sentence the author refers directly to Gethsemane to prove that natural fear was also in Christ. Why then our writer chooses to speak of \textit{reverentia} in relation to Hebrews 5:7 is difficult to understand. Still, it must be admitted that the problem of how \textit{\epsilon\upsilon\lambda\alpha\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha} (in most Latin versions equalling \textit{reverentia}) is to be understood and translated in Hebrews 18, even up to now, not fully solved. While recent opinion tends to take this word in 5:7 as referring to Christ's natural and very human anxiety, the RSV mysteriously translates it 'godly fear', i.e., in almost the same sense the writer of the \textit{quaestio} under consideration wishes it to be understood. The answer to the anomaly in both cases would seem to be simply that tradition dies hard.
A further question is raised in the same quaestio concerning the evident anxiety expressed in Gethsemane by Christ. The answer is straightforward: yes, Christ did there experience ordinary or natural fear and in fact was moved to pray because of it. But natural fear is neither good nor evil and therefore this aspect of fear in Christ is not really relevant to the discussion.¹

The issues with which quaestio CXCVII concerns itself are of relatively little importance but the spirit and form in which it is presented are of immense interest, for in it one can perceive medieval theological education at work. In this quaestio a number of difficult problems are posed which require for their solution fine distinctions to be made. But what is significant is that no solutions to these problems are offered. Rather the writer simply says at the close of the quaestio:

¹ As with other opinions handed down, this straightforward answer is not the individual creation of our writer, but grows out of the Scholastic enterprise. St. Thomas says much the same in his full treatment of fear (Fairweather 1954, pp.311-312): 'But there is a kind of fear, namely natural fear, which is neither good nor evil. For it is found in devils, according to James 2:19: "the devils believe, and tremble", and also in Christ, who "began to be more amazed, and very heavy", according to Mark 14:33'.
I move these questions not that they be solved but that lecturers be inspired to seek the solutions with me.¹

Such a statement dramatically captures the spirit of the medieval classroom.

The questions within this *quaestio*, as has been said, are typically Scholastic in their intention and scope, and are by no means important to the history of the interpretation of our passage. For the sake of illustration, however, one of the many questions within *quaestio* CXCVII is here summarized:

First, by way of background, it is important to know that many of the distinctions and definitions of fear find their source in the interpretation given to Matthew 10:28:

> And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.

Briefly, part a of this verse is taken to refer to natural fear and part b primarily to servile fear, but also, when correctly

¹. PL, CLXXV, 480: 'Has quaestiones moveo, non ut solvam, sed ut lectorem ad quaerendum mecum excitem'.
understood, to initial fear (filial fear was considered to be something altogether different because the threat of punishment does not motivate filial fear). Now, our writer observes that servile fear was given in the Law. But, according to Augustine, servile fear is that by which hell is feared; therefore we can only conclude that the fear of hell is given by the Law. This conclusion, however, creates a problem, for hell confines not only the physical parts of the person (e.g., hands, manum), but also the soul (animum; cf. Mark 9:43) and this is plainly contrary to Scripture since the power of destruction of the body and soul (i.e., being committed to hell) belongs to God alone (Matthew 10:28). Thus the Law might be seen as a threat to God's omnipotence.

Rather shrewdly, our writer suggests by means of a question the direction in which the answer might be sought, and at the same time raises another question which might be pursued further in the classroom: Does not the Law have power only over man's physical entity and not over the soul ?

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1. PL, CLXXV, 480. The actual words are '... lex autem manum tantum, et non animum ?'
It is in theological exercises such as this that we see medieval education at work.

*Quaestio* CXCVIII\(^1\) is far more straightforward and simply asks whether servile fear makes one a servant of Christ or of the Devil. (The question is somewhat contrived, as the answer shows). Solution: Neither. Rather, one is made a servant of punishment, for servile fear, in a manner of speaking, removes freedom since those living under the threat of punishment are not permitted to do certain things.

*Quaestio* CXCIX\(^2\) is posed in reference to v.17. The question is not new: Is it possible to speak of Christ as an heir? If so, according to which nature? The writer points out that logically it is difficult to speak of an heir in terms of the divine nature of Christ, since in the normal use of the words, an heir is a successor who takes possession of the inheritance after someone has died. The Father has not died, nor has the Son succeeded him because both are eternal. How then can Christ be an heir? The solution is partially given away when, in the question, the writer asks according to which nature Christ was an heir: the

\(^{1}\) PL, CLXXV, 480.

\(^{2}\) PL, CLXXV, 480.
final solution is that Christ accepts the inheritance according to his humanity, and also that from the divine point of view it is not necessary with God for inheritance to be through natural succession.¹

Quaestio CC² is of great interest, for it assumes that Christ has received two distinct inheritances: one of eternal life and another made up of all of mankind. The problem, then, is to decide in precisely what sense Christians are co-heirs with Christ. (The assumption that Christ has been given the peoples as an inheritance is a direct deduction drawn from Psalm 2:8a: 'Ask of me, and I will make the nations your heritage ....') The answer, simply put, is that Christians do not participate in this latter inheritance and thus, in a sense, they are not co-heirs with Christ in all of his inheritance. Christians are co-heirs, however, in that they participate in the gift of eternal life.

¹ It is interesting to note that when this question arises from time to time in the history of exegesis, the answers are almost totally different from one another. As shall soon be seen, St. Thomas also asks this question with different results.

² PL, CLXXV, 480-481.
Quaestio CCl\(^1\) goes on to ask precisely in what manner Christians ought to suffer with Christ in the present, other than by having patience. This qualification indicates at least a partial dissatisfaction with the medieval monastic interpretation of this conditional clause (i.e., that we suffer with Christ in the present by seeking to mortify the concupiscences of the flesh in patience). The answers suggested are as follows: on the one hand, we can partake of Christ's sorrows which He bore for us. That is, we call to mind His sufferings in such a way as to empathize with Him. (This, of course, is the mystical solution). But, on the other hand, we can also suffer with Him by literally bearing tribulations as he did.

\(^1\) PL, CLXXV, 481.
Medieval Exegesis in the Eastern Church.

Euthymius Zigabenus.

Although we have been treating, up to now, Biblical exegesis in the West, a very significant commentary was written in this era (early 11th century) in the East. The writer is Euthymius Zigabenus, a Byzantine theologian and a monk who lived and worked at Constantinople. He was evidently something of a court theologian, for his monumental work \( \Pi \alpha \nu \rho \iota \aleph \alpha \lambda \iota \alpha \Delta \omicron \gamma \) was ordered by the Emperor Alexis Comnenus as a refutation of all the old heresies and of a neo-Manichaeism (the Bogomiles) which was running rampant at the time. He also wrote commentaries not only on all of the commonly accepted Pauline Epistles (and also Hebrews), but also the seven catholic epistles. It is evident that these commentaries were also polemically motivated, for Euthymius often mentions 'the dogs', by which he invariably means the Bogomiles. His commentary on Romans\(^1\) is primarily interesting for

\[\begin{align*}
\text{1. ΕΥΘΥΜΙΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΖΙΓΑΒΗΝΟΥ ΕΡΜΗΝΙΕΑ EΙΣ ΤΑΣ ΙΔΙΟΜΥΣΥΝΕΕ παίλου καὶ ΕΙΣ ΤΑΣ ΕΙΣ ΖΗΤΙΚΑ, ΚΑΘΩΛΙΚΑΣ, ΝΙΚΗΦΩΡΟΥ ΚΑΛΟΓΕΡΑ \text{ ed}^2\text{, ΤΟΜΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΣ, EN ΑΘΗΝΑΙΣ, 1887.}}
\end{align*}\]

The commentary on ch.8 of the Epistle to the Romans begins on p.84. Cited below as 'Kalogera, 1887'.
its faithfulness to Chrysostom's *Homilies* and to the literal method of exegesis - and this at a time when literal exegesis had long since declined. Nevertheless, it is a formidable commentary and in many ways vastly superior to anything produced in the Scholastic period. In the virtual absence of intellectual intercourse between the West and Constantinople, Euthymius's important commentary went unnoticed by scholars of the Roman Empire, and it is perhaps significant that Migne reproduces not Euthymius's commentaries, but only the *Πανοπλία* *Δομιτική* (with a parallel Latin translation). The text of Euthymius's commentaries became generally available to European scholars only in the late 19th century. It stands as a beacon in the midst of a long period of eclipse in the East.

Taken in isolation, Euthymius's commentary on our passage is most impressive, but when set alongside Chrysostom, there is but little new or different. In fact, it is this about Euthymius Zigabenus which is unique in our history of interpretation, for there is no other example of such an ancient viewpoint being so faithfully represented after a lapse of so many centuries. After a span of 700 years of relative silence in the East, a lone theologian confronted with the threat of heresy
adopts and elucidates, with a minimum of distortion, Chrysostom's Homilies; in doing so, he claims for the old Antiochene tradition of interpretation a new relevance. Still, as suggested above, the phenomenon of Euthymius's commentary on Romans is of greater importance than the detail of what he writes. His contribution to our passage can be quickly reviewed.

At v.12, Euthymius makes the usual point: we are debtors to the Spirit. But for the first time in our history, he suggests why this is the case. The logic is evidently as follows: throughout this chapter the flesh and the Spirit are repeatedly contrasted. Thus when Paul says in v.12 that we are not debtors to the flesh, he implies a flesh/Spirit contrast, i.e., that we are debtors to the Spirit. Whether Euthymius is dependent upon an ancient tradition for this explanation is by no means clear. It has the appearance of an explanation arrived at from intense study of older interpretation.

1. Kalogera, 1887, p.88: 'For this is how it ought to be understood, since the Spirit must be opposed to the flesh'.

τότε γὰρ συνεξήκουσταί· τὴν σαρκὶ
γὰρ τὸ πνεῦμα ἀντίκειται
Euthymius Zigabenus's text of v.13 is significantly different. He reads: Εἰ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ζήτε, μέλετε Πάλιν ἀποθενήσειν.

The addition of Πάλιν he justifies by his interpretation of this verse:

If you die bodily, you will also die an immortal death in your soul, which is the eternal chastisement.¹

But, Euthymius goes on, if you put to death the deeds of the flesh, through the Spirit '... you will live here i.e., in this earthly life spiritually, but there i.e., in the after-life forever.'²

1. Kalogera, 1887, p.88: Ἀποθενήσατε σωματικῶς, ἀποθανεῖτε καὶ ψυχικῶς θάνατον τὸν θάνατον, ὅσ ἐστιν ἡ αἰώνιος κολάσις.

2. Kalogera, 1887, p.89: Ἡσεσθε ἐν ταύτῃ μὲν πνευματικῷ, ἐκεῖ sc. αἰώνιῳ.
In attempting to construct a clever dual parallelism (die here, die later; live here, live later) for the interpretation of v.13, he finds himself saying something unnecessarily complicated— that when Paul says, 'For if you live according to the flesh ...', he somehow means 'dying bodily' before death itself. Further, he must invert Paul's statement in v.13b ('But if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body ...') to mean 'living spiritually'.

Reminiscent of Chrysostom (and in complete contrast to Western exegesis), Euthymius takes v.14 to be speaking about an aspect of Christian living, and not about how one becomes a child of God. Euthymius points out that after baptism, Christians are educated, piloted and driven by the Spirit of God.¹

Euthymius Zigabenus's interpretation of v.15 is essentially a comparison of Jews and Christians. 'Spirit of servitude' is the Mosaic Law, but ἱνενέμα here ought to be understood as an adjectival idea — the law was dictated by the

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¹. Euthymius uses three characteristic Greek words here:

- Παλαπαγομενταλ, educate a child;
- Κυβερνομενταλ, steer or pilot a ship;
- Νιοξομενταλ, drive a chariot.
Spirit of God and thus is 'spiritual'. The love is 'of servitude' because it imparts fear '... because it punishes immediately those who transgress against it'. Servitude in spiritual terms can be defined simply as avoiding evil for fear of punishment. 

Servitude is to be taken closely with ἐλαβεῖτε because if one is liberated from the law, one does not take it up again.

Euthymius Zigabenus repeats Chrysostom's observation that we might well have expected Paul to say 'spirit of freedom' instead of 'spirit of sonship'. Still, comments Euthymius, there is a good reason for Paul's saying what he does, for even though the Jews are referred to in Scripture as the 'sons of God', under the law they are treated as if they were slaves, 'frightening and punishing' (φοβῶν καὶ κολάζων) them. But Christians, having received the 'gift of adoption' in baptism,

1. Kalogera, 1887, p.89: ... διὰ τὸ Παρανύκτικα κολάζων τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας.

2. Kalogera, 1887, p.89: Χάρισμα υἱόθεσίας

- this ambiguous phrase is taken directly from Chrysostom's Homily on the same passage.
are created anew (ἀναγέννησάντι) by this grace. People such as these practice virtue because they are disposed toward virtue, not because they are threatened with punishment. (Thus the contrary of the 'spirit of servitude' really is the 'spirit of sonship').

That Euthymius Zigabenus construes the contrast of v.15 in this classic manner reflects the conviction that this verse is primarily concerned with the problem of the Law and the moral and ethical life of Christians, and not with regeneration ('adoption') itself. Actually this is also the emphasis of exegetes in the West from the Carolingian era onward. It will be remembered that earlier the problem of an unidentified line of interpretation of v.15a, beginning in Rabanus Maurus, was discussed. At that time we proposed the possibility of its being dependent upon Chrysostom and/or other early Greek exegetes. Here, in a medieval representation of Chrysostom, we can clearly see the points of connection: identification of the 'spirit of servitude' with the Mosaic Law; explanation of 'Spirit' in this phrase as a direct reference to the Spirit's having dictated Scripture; persistence in rephrasing 'spirit of sonship' as 'spirit
of liberty'; overriding interest in the function of fear in man's relationship to God; assumption that \( \pi \alpha \lambda \nu \) is to be taken closely with \( \varepsilon \lambda \beta \tau \tau \) and not \( \varepsilon \zeta \phi \omicron \rho \omicron \omicron \nu \) (and thus that it is the same Spirit being spoken of but in different circumstances); and finally, an emphasis on the qualitative, ethical differences which result from these two basic conditions of human existence.

These similarities still do not completely close the circle of proof. For this a Latin translation or abstract of Chrysostom's interpretation of the Epistle to the Romans would be necessary. Still, Euthymius Zigabenus has served the useful purpose of demonstrating how a medieval Eastern exegete, who is highly dependent upon Chrysostom, would interpret v.15. The parallel with his Western contemporaries on this verse is striking and encourages us to accept the earlier suggestion that the standard Western interpretation is, at times, just as dependent upon Chrysostom as is Euthymius himself.

Euthymius Zigabenus's interpretation of vv.16-17 is extremely close to that of Chrysostom. The ambiguity of the 'Paraclete' bearing witness with the 'Gift of Adoption' is repeated by Euthymius with no attempt to clarify how the 'Gift of
Adoption' is distinct from the Holy Spirit. He simply says that the cry, Abba, Father (v.15) 'is not the voice of the gift but of the Paraclete who gave the gift'. In v.17, says Euthymius we see how Paul gradually increases the gift promised us; not all children are heirs - but we are called heirs as well as children of God; not all heirs are great heirs - but we are called even heirs of God. Not all great heirs are joint-heirs of the only begotten, but we are joint-heirs with Christ. He feels that Paul adds the conditional statement of v.17 so that we do not become sluggish (ῥαθευμόλ), a viewpoint typical of Chrysostom. And when Euthymius says, in the same comment, that 'our labors are necessary', he is being faithful to Chrysostom's understanding.


2. Kalogera, 1887, p.91: ... δεῖ καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων τῶν.
of grace. This is especially the case since he is careful to balance such a statement with the observation that God 'outdoes' \( \land \kappa \widehat{A} \), literally 'conquers') anything we do by his own gifts. Such a carefully weighed series of statements can be attributed only to the influence of Chrysostom.
Latin Exegesis in the 13th and 14th Centuries.

St. Thomas Aquinas.

Although St. Thomas's Biblical commentaries are not as historically important as the phenomenon of the *Glossa Ordinaria*, they are an important part of the same tradition. This fact is underlined by the fact that St. Thomas's exegesis of our passage is not much different in its conclusions from those we have just reviewed in the section above. His commentary is precisely what we should expect from a brilliant, sophisticated intellect dealing constructively with an exegetical tradition such as St. Thomas inherited. For although he adds very little which could be described as completely new to earlier medieval exegesis, he does tidy earlier arguments and theological discussions considerably. Paul is treated

1. The text referred to throughout this section is found in volume 20 of *Doctoris Angelici divi Thomae Aquinatis ... Opera Omnia*, S.E. Frette, ed., Paris, 1876. This edition of St. Thomas's works is commonly referred to as the 'Vives' edition; accordingly, this volume will be referred to throughout as 'Vives, XX'. There is also an excellent German translation available: Helmut Fahsel, trans. and ed., *Des Heiligen Thomas von Aquin Kommentar zum Römerbrief*, Freiburg, 1927. The translation of the commentary on our passage is found on pp. 255-262.
as if he had written a tight scholastic document; thus St. Thomas follows closely and meticulously outlines each turn of phrase, each point in the argument, as if they were parts of syllogisms. As a result, the logical connections between verses and entire sections become, for the first time in Western exegesis, a vital step in understanding the Epistle.

Because St. Thomas's commentary is in many of its conclusions (if not format) similar to early medieval exegesis, and because his analysis is so detailed and lengthy, we should not be justified in repeating everything St. Thomas has to say. Rather, a few of his more instructive turns of interpretation will be reviewed in great detail, together with examples of his attempt to reduce Paul's sentences to syllogism.

As has been mentioned, it is perhaps above all significant that St. Thomas does not treat each individual verse as an isolated whole, but rather takes into account, as an interpretative factor, the connection between verses. Specifically, as regards our passage, it is interesting that St. Thomas interprets vv. 12ff in the light of v. 11, for St. Thomas sees vv. 12ff as a corollary to the proposition stated in v. 11. His argument in brief is as follows: the Apostle has said (in v. 11)
that the same 'spírit who raised Jesus from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spírit which dwells in you'. (St. Thomas interprets this to mean that believers' bodies will be made immortal.) Then Paul states the obvious corollary to this fact: 'So then, brethren, we are debtors not to the flesh', etc., and goes on to give the reason why we are not debtors to the flesh: 'For if you live according to the flesh, you will die'. Therefore it is clear that we are debtors to the Holy Spírit on account of all the good things given us by Him (e.g., v.11).

This analysis is especially interesting because while its conclusion is strictly traditional (that we are debtors to the Spírit, not to the flesh), its authority for the conclusion does not come from the opinions of the Fathers, but rather from the context of the verse. It was a brave and significant step.

1. Vives, XX, p.489: 'Non dícit mortua, sed mortalía: quia in resurrectione non solum a corporibus nostris auferetur quod sint mortua, idest necessitatem mortis habentía, sed etiam quod sint mortalía, idest potentía morí, quale fuit corpus Adam ante peccatum: nam post resurrectionem corpora nostra erunt penitus immortália'.
St. Thomas has his own interesting explanations of the terms *méllete ápò evniískelv* and *ίππες* in v.13; the death and life spoken of are both of two kinds, each having a present and a future manifestation. For there is a death of guilt (*mors culpae*) in the present and a death of damnation (*mors damnationis*) in the future; in contrast, there is a life of grace (*vita gratiae*) in the present and a life of glory (*vita gloriae*) in the future. It is the latter part of this parallelism which summarizes the major concern of our section, according to St. Thomas. This fact is illustrated by his introduction to a new section ('Lectio III') comprising vv.14-17. Here his first words are:

1. The 'deeds of the flesh' which believers are to 'put to death' in order that they might live are defined by St. Thomas as the works which '... proceed from the concupiscence of the flesh....' (Vives, XX, p.489: '... sequendo concupiscentias carnis ....')

2. Although St. Thomas divides our passage by introducing a new section with v.14, he still takes vv.12-17 as forming a connected unit, as our review of his commentary on these verses clearly shows.
Afterwards [i.e., vv.12 and 13] the Apostle has shown that through the Holy Spirit the glorious life shall be given to us, which excludes all mortality from our bodies, and here he brings to bear this proof: first he shows that through the Holy Spirit such a life of glory shall be given; second he shows the cause whereby it shall be given, "provided we suffer with him in order that we may also be glorified with him".

From this it can be seen that St. Thomas wishes to relate all of the sub-themes in our passage to that which he considers the major theme - inheritance of the future glorious life. This decision on St. Thomas's part, again, is based upon the dependence of vv.12-17 upon v.11: the Spirit's gift of immortal life bestowed upon believers' bodies (v.11) is precisely that glorification of which Paul speaks in v.17.

St. Thomas also interprets vv.14-15 in such a manner as to link them with the major theme of the future life of glory. An excellent illustration of this is found where he suggests that v.14 is the minor premise or proof to the proposition that such a life of glory will be given through the Holy Spirit. He says:

1. Vives, XX, pp.489-490: 'Postquam Apostolus ostendit quod per Spiritum sanctum dabitur nobis vita gloriosa, quae omnem mortalitatem a corporibus nostris excludet, hic probationem inducit: et primo ostendit quod per Spiritum sanctum hujusmodi gloriosa vita datur; secundo ostendit causam quare differtur, 1bi, Si tamen compatimur ut et glorificemur'.

All those who are sons of God attain the inheritance of the life of glory. But all they are sons of God who are governed by the Holy Spirit. Therefore all those who are ruled by the Holy Spirit attain the inheritance of the glorious life.\(^1\)

It is clear that St. Thomas attempts to base this piece of exegesis on a purely objective evaluation of the text. Although this development in method is of general importance in the history of exegesis, his syllogistic outline, in detail, seeks a logical completeness which may not always be present.\(^2\) Still, we

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1. Vives, XX, p.490: 'Quicumque sunt filii Dei, consequuntur hereditatem gloriosae vitae; sed quicumque reguntur Spiritu sancto, sunt filii Dei: ergo quicumque reguntur Spiritu sancto, consequenter hereditatem gloriosae vitae'.

2. Farrar, 1885, pp.271-272, pronounces a ringing criticism of St. Thomas's suggestion that all 14 Epistles 'treat of grace' and that Galatians is to be thought of as something of an appendix to the treatment of grace. His criticism might also be applied to St. Thomas's outline of our passage: 'It would be difficult to conceive anything more ingeniously misleading, more historically groundless, more essentially partial, inadequate, and mistaken, than this celebrated scheme of the Epistles in which every critical and historical consideration, as well as every human element in the origin of the Epistles is fatally ignored in order that they may be symmetrically arranged into an artificial diagram of abstract doctrine .... In Divinity, as Bacon says, there cannot be this perfection and completeness. We cannot have the form of a total when there is but matter for a part'. (Emphasis is ours).
see in St. Thomas a distinct attempt to reinstate a degree of objectivity in relation to the study of the Bible.¹

St. Thomas has a great deal more to say about v.14, much of it of interest. Because he is interested in establishing the literal meaning of the text, St. Thomas is the first exegete for a considerable length of time in our history of interpretation to attempt a positive definition of what it is to be 'led' by the Holy Spirit. Thus he clearly describes:

"... that is guided as by an instructor or leader; which indeed, the Spirit does in us, inasmuch as he enlightens us from within as to what we ought to do as it says in Psalm 143:10: "Let thy good spirit lead me on a level path!'"²

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1. For an excellent discussion of this, see Grant, 1965, pp. 92ff.

2. Vives, XX, p. 490: 'Quicumque Spiritu Dei aguntur, id est reguntur, sicut a quodam doctore et directore: quid quidem in nobis facit Spiritus, scilicet inquantum illuminat nos interius quod facere debeamus, Psalm. CXLII, 10: Spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam.'
He then goes on to give a syllogism and an illustration which is intended to make it absolutely certain how aguntur is to be taken and to ensure that no one misunderstand him to suggest that the Spirit's role is limited to 'internal illumination' (which was, as we have already seen, Pelagius's position):

But since he who is led is not moved from himself, and since the spiritual man is not only instructed by the Holy Spirit what he ought to do but also his heart is moved by the Holy Spirit; therefore all the more is to be understood in this when it is said: "all who are led by the Spirit of God". For those are said to be led who are moved by a higher impulse.  

The illustration follows this statement:

Wherefore we do not say of beasts that they act but rather that they are driven, because they are moved by nature to carry out their action and not by their own impulse. Similarly the spiritual man is

1. Vives, XX, p.490: 'Sed quia ille qui ducitur, ex seipso non operatur: homo autem spiritualis non tantum instruitur a Spiritu sancto quid agere debeat, sed etiam cor ejus a Spiritu sancto movetur; ideo plus intelligendum est in hoc quod dicitur: Quicumque Spiritu Dei aguntur. Illa enim agi dicuntur quae quodam superiori instinctu moventur ....'
moved not as if by his own will principally, but by the impulse of the Holy Spirit to do something.\footnote{Vives, XX, p.490: '... unde de brutis dicimus quod non agunt, sed aguntur, quia a natura moventur, et non ex proprio motu, ad suas actiones agendas. Similiter autem homo spiritualis non quasi ex motu propriae voluntatis principaliter, sed ex instinctu Spiritus sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum....'}

But a careful writer such as St. Thomas could not leave the issue there; rather, he neatly balanced what he had just said:

Nonetheless, through this it is not excluded that spiritual men are moved through the will and free choice, for the Holy Spirit causes in them the very movement of the will and free choice ....\footnote{Vives, XX, p.490: 'Non tamen per hoc excluditur quin viri spiritualis per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium operentur, quia ipsum motum voluntatis et liberi arbitrii Spiritus sanctus in eis causat....'}

If there were any doubt that this is basically the Augustine (albeit a more optimistic Augustine) in St. Thomas speaking, then all doubt is swept away in his concluding remarks on v.14, for here he chooses to explain the result of being led by the Spirit:

\footnotesize{1. Vives, XX, p.490: '... unde de brutis dicimus quod non agunt, sed aguntur, quia a natura moventur, et non ex proprio motu, ad suas actiones agendas. Similiter autem homo spiritualis non quasi ex motu propriae voluntatis principaliter, sed ex instinctu Spiritus sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum....'

2. Vives, XX, p.490: 'Non tamen per hoc excluditur quin viri spiritualis per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium operentur, quia ipsum motum voluntatis et liberi arbitrii Spiritus sanctus in eis causat....'}
Second is to consider how those, who are led by the Holy Spirit, are the sons of God. This is made clear from the similitude of carnal sons, who are begotten through the carnal seed of the human father. But the spiritual seed proceeding from the Father is the Holy Spirit; and therefore through this seed various men are begotten sons of God.¹

The interpretation of v.14 to mean that being a son of God is a result of the Spirit's leading is strictly Augustinian. While this somewhat traditional approach to the exegetical problems presented in v.14 is evidence that St. Thomas was not willing to free his exegesis from the conclusions of the Fathers and from theological considerations, it must at the same time be said that St. Thomas does not use his comment on v.14 as opportunity to discuss the obvious Augustinian implication, that all is of grace. And it must be remembered that St. Thomas was, among other things, a Patristic scholar; certainly he was well aware of the constant use Augustine made of v.14. Thus St. Thomas's hesitance to introduce the question of grace illustrates his general

¹. Vives, XX, p.490: 'Secundo considerandum est, quomodo illi qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, sunt filii Dei. Et hoc est manifestum ex similitudine filiorum carnalium, qui per semen carnale a Patre procedentes generantur. Semen autem spirituale a Patre procedens, est Spiritus sanctus: et ideo per hoc semen aliqui homines in filios Dei generantur'.
practice of avoiding overt discussion of unrelated doctrinal issues in the context of his exegesis.

We now turn to St. Thomas's exegesis of v.15, which is even more complex and detailed than that of v.14. Once again, St. Thomas connects this verse with the preceding and following in a most intriguing way: when Paul goes on to say (v.15), 'For you did not receive the Spirit of servitude', he is proving the proposition given in v.14: that by receiving the Holy Spirit men become sons of God. And Paul does this, says St. Thomas, by making three points:

a. the distinction of the gifts of the Holy Spirit;

b. our confession: 'in whom we cry, Abba, Father';

c. the testimony of the Spirit: 'For the Spirit himself bears witness with our spirit ....'

Thus, St. Thomas suggests that the content of vv.15-16 clearly demonstrates that believers have not 'received the Spirit of servitude', and this fact, in turn, proves the major thesis discussed above.

In contrast to much we have reviewed coming out of the Middle Ages, this is an analysis which must be taken seriously. For example, St. Thomas's suggestion that the actions implied in the final phrase of v.15 and in v.16 are evidence that believers have not
received a Πνεύμα ουδέκας (but rather some other, more benevolent manifestation of the Spirit) is, insightful.

It is in the details of his development of v.15 that St. Thomas partakes of many of the same ambiguities of later medieval exegetes. A representation of this ambiguity in the interpretation of v.15 might be as follows: as St. Paul says, believers have not received a Spirit of servitude (which St. Thomas takes to mean an inferior, servile kind of fear); but they have received a Spirit of fear (filial, or the highest and most acceptable kind of fear). This is precisely the implication of Scholastic interpretation. Such an understanding of v.15 fits best with a reduction of the inherent contrast to that of fear and love in man's relationship to God (filial fear being essentially a desire not to grieve God the Father; thus it is actually more a motive rising out of love than out of fear as the word is commonly understood). But this interpretation is also reconcilable with Chrysostom's exegesis, especially with its stress on the difference in dispensations (Law and Gospel) and the qualitative differences between the peoples of the two Testaments. ¹

¹. It will be remembered that the point of contact between medieval and Greek exegesis was the question after the function of Πνεύμα in v.15. The solution to this problem was usually to take Πνεύμα closely with ξανατάκτησις and suggest that two different gifts of the Spirit are referred to: the gift of the Law in the Old Testament, and the gift of liberty or freedom in the Gospel. This, in turn, was woven together with the more Augustinian tendency to contrast fear and love. This made possible the inclusion of a scholion on the four kinds of fear.
The ambiguity itself is, of course, reflected not only in the uniting of many diverse streams of interpretation, but in suggesting that Paul's words in the second half of the contrast in v.15 can be fitted into a _scholion_ on the different kinds of fear. It is precisely this ambiguity which St. Thomas perpetuates in his commentary, for by assuming that Paul is speaking about the diversification of the Spirit's gifts in v.15, St. Thomas concludes that some way must be found to make a place for an aspect of fear in believers' lives. This ambiguity is most clear when he says:

> Concerning the first _i.e._, distinguishing the gifts of the Spirit it must be considered that the Holy Spirit brings about two effects in us: one indeed of fear ... the other of love ....

This introductory statement is then followed by his thesis that '... fear makes servant but love does not'. He then goes on to relate the fourfold definition of fear and describes it more lucidly than the definitions we have had up to now.

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1. Vives, XX, p.490: 'Circa primum considerandum est, quod Spiritus sanctus duos effectus facit in nobis: unum quidem timoris ... alium amoris ....'

2. Vives, XX, p.490: 'Timor ... facit servos, non autem amor'.
A summary of this fourfold definition is as follows:

fear can have two objects - an evil of some sort which one perceives and flees from, and the source from which this evil emanates. (For example, a man is said to fear both death and the king, who is able to put to death). If someone flees an evil emanating from a temporal man (and thus turns away from God), then this would be human or worldly fear. This is not from the Holy Spirit and was in fact forbidden by our Lord (Matthew 10:28). But it also happens that sometimes a man turns to God because he fears the evil of punishment:

... and this fear is praiseworthy inasmuch as it at least fears God ... and accordingly is from the Holy Spirit. But insofar as such fear does not flee the evil which is opposed to spiritual good, namely, sin, but only punishment, it is not praiseworthy ....\(^1\)

Thus, although someone might well do good, still it is not because he does it willingly, but because he is coerced by fear of punishment - a mentality which is proper to slaves. Therefore, this fear is properly called servile, because it makes man behave as if he were a slave.

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1. Vives, XX, p.490: '... et hic timor est laudabilis quantum ad hoc saltem quod Deum timet ... et secundum hoc a Spiritu sancto est. Sed inquantum talis timor non refugit malum quod opponitur bono spirituali, scilicet peccatum, sed solum poenum, non est laudabilis ....'
The third fear is that which flees the evil (i.e., sin), which is opposed to that which is spiritual. That is, a person under such fears avoids the evil of sin both because he does not want to be separated from God and because he fears the punishment of such separation. Because this often is the case with men at the beginning of their conversion, it is called initial fear.

Finally, the fourth kind of fear has its eye only toward the spiritual reality; it fears nothing except the possibility of being separated from God. This fear is holy. Just as initial fear is caused by imperfect love, this fear is caused by perfect love (I John 4:18).¹

1. It must be remembered that St. Thomas is under the pressure of tradition to repeat the standard scholion on fear here at v.15. What is above all important to note is that he carefully shows the connection of this scholion with the exegetical problems of the verse - something which no one up to then had attempted. The fact that he goes to such great pains to show how this teaching on fear is relevant to the exegetical issues at hand clearly demonstrates St. Thomas's concern for method. Further, the scholion here summarized is really only a brief résumé when compared with St. Thomas's full theological treatment of fear in Question 19 ('The Gift of Fear') of the Treatise on the Theological Virtues (Fairweather, 1954, pp.310-329). It ought also be noted that in that discussion, as a part of Article 2, St. Thomas offers a definition of the four kinds of fear similar to that given here in his comments on v.15.
Here the application of the teaching on fear is made relevant to v.15. The old Law was given unto fear, says St. Thomas, referring to events in Exodus 19, which the thunder and other frightening phenomena (present at the time of the Law's being given to Moses) signified. 'Therefore the old Law, inducing obedience to the commandments of God by the infliction of punishments, has been given in the spirit of servitude ....'\(^1\) The second part of the contrast in v.15 is then skilfully placed in the context of this same scheme by means of a paraphrase and in such a way as to avoid actually mentioning the word 'fear'; rather, 'spirit of adoption' is taken to mean 'spirit of charity'. It is left to the reader to remember that the source of filial fear is charity:

Therefore Paul says: it is rightly said that "all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God: for you did not again" in the new law, as it was in the old law, "receive the spirit of servitude in fear" namely, of punishments, which fear the Holy Spirit brings about; "but you have received the

1. Vives, XX, p.491: 'Et ideo lex vetus per inflictionem poenarum, inducens ad mandata Dei servanda, data est in spiritu servitutis ....'
spirit" namely, of charity, which is "the spirit of adoption", that is, through whom we are adopted as sons of God .... ¹

Two final observations based on St. Thomas's summary statement ought to be made: as did the majority of earlier exegetes St. Thomas makes his interpretation turn on the correct understanding of \( \text{I} \text{f} \text{A} \text{L} \text{V} \) : two very different situations are characterized in the two parts of v.15's contrast. Since believers now live under the Gospel (or 'New Law', as St. Thomas chooses to say), they are not to return 'again' to live under the condition imposed by the Law (or 'Old Law'). Adjacent to this first observation, it is of interest that St. Thomas was far more successful than any of his predecessors in establishing the relevance of the traditional fourfold definition of fear for the understanding of the contrast in v.15; i.e., in the first part of the contrast 'servile' fear is pictured and in the second half 'filial' fear, and that it is proper to speak of filial fear since the contrast is really one of fear and love, and love is the cause of filial fear.²

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¹. Vives, XX, p.491: 'Et ideo hic dicit: Recte dictum est, quod qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi sunt filii Dei: non enim iterum in nova lege, sicut in vteri lege fuit, accepistis spiritum servitutis in timore, scilicet poenarum, quem timorem Spiritus sanctus faciebat; sed accepistis spiritum, scilicet caritatis, qui est adoptionis filiorum, id est per quem adoptamur in filios Dei....'

². It is also of interest that St. Thomas does not emphasize or even mention 'the spirit of liberty' (in contrast to 'the spirit of servitude'), a phrase taken from Chrysostom.
The second observation is that St. Thomas's solution as to the identity of the two occurrences of $\text{TV\textepsilon\textmu\textalpha}$ in v.15 is a definite modification of the traditional view. As we have seen, among those who understand v.15a as referring in some way to the operation of the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament, the difficulty has always been that of fitting such an operation into established doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit. Normally, in this regard the role of the Spirit in the giving of the Law has been pointed to; this is not the case with St. Thomas. Rather, as the last sentence of his commentary on v.15 indicates, he chooses to speak more generally of the diverse ministry of the Holy Spirit in effecting fear and love in men:

This is not said, however, as if there were different spirits, rather it is the same spirit, who brings about in some a servile, as it were, imperfect fear, and in others he brings about, as it were, a perfect love.\(^1\)

Thus St. Thomas comes down on the side of the view which identifies both uses of $\text{TV\textepsilon\textmu\textalpha}$ in v.15 with the work of the

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1. Vives, XX, p.491: 'Non autem hoc dicitur quasi sit alius et alius spiritus, sed quia idem est spiritus, scilicet qui in quibusdam facit timorem servilem quasi imperfectum, in aliis facit amorem quasi quoddam perfectum'. 
Holy Spirit, but, at the same time, somewhat weakens the historical
differentness of the two peoples involved - an emphasis so
characteristic of Antiochene exegesis. At this expense, however,
St. Thomas achieves a more consistent understanding of v.15 than the
rather undecided interpretation of other, earlier medieval exegetes.

St. Thomas had little to add to the understanding of
the words ἐν ὑπὲρ κρατομένει ἀπὸ δὲ ἡμᾶς Ἡγίασένιον
except the rather interesting insistence that this is not so much
the 'sound of the voice' (sonus vocis) as the 'intention of the
heart' (intentio cordis). This silent action of the heart can be
verbally described as κρατομένει, says St. Thomas, because
of its 'fervor' (magnitudo). St. Thomas's support for this
interpretation is based on a rather quaint piece of set exegesis:
in Exodus 19:15, God says to Moses, 'Why do you cry to me?' Since,
in the immediate context, there is no indication that Moses did
literally cry out to God (although the people do, in v.10!), it is
assumed that Moses has done so silently, in the inner thought of his
heart. But St. Thomas does successfully (and exegetically) connect
the final clause of v.15 with the rest of the verse:

But this fervor of exertion proceeds from the influence
of filial love which the Spirit brings about in us; and
therefore he says, "In whom", the Holy Spirit, "we cry Abba, Father".1

This, in turn, is supported by an extremely interesting appeal to Isaiah's Throne Room vision (Isaiah 6:1ff): on the basis of the fact that Seraphim (v.2) is literally translated 'burning ones' (ardentes), he suggests that when they cry out (v.3), it is, 'as it were, by the fire of the Holy Spirit'.2

Continuing with the general theme of inwardness of the Christian experience of the Holy Spirit, St. Thomas points out that the testimony of the Spirit (v.16) is not 'by an external voice to the ears of man'; rather, testimony is given through 'the efficacy of filial love which he [the Holy Spirit] brings about in us'.3 St. Thomas understands the function of the Holy Spirit's testimony to be a validation of the believers' confession. The Spirit brings about the effects of filial love, 'lest perchance anyone say that in our confession we are deceived'.4 The claim of sonship is objectivized in

1. Vives, XX, p.491: 'Sed ista magnitudo intentionis ex affectu filialis amoris procedit, quem in nobis Spiritus facit; et ideo dicit: In quo Spiritu sancto, Clamamus, Abba pater'.

2. Vives, XX, p.491: '.... quasi igne Spiritus sancti'.

3. Vives, XX, p.491: '.... exteriori voce ad aures hominum... per effectum amoris filialis, quem in nobis facit ....' .

4. Vives, XX, p.491: '.... ne forte aliquis dicit, quod in nostra confessione decipimus ....'
the attitude and acts of love and therefore certitude of sonship is not left solely to internal, subjective criteria.

On the question of heirs and inheritance (v.17), St. Thomas is most interesting when he asks a somewhat hackneyed question - a question which, in form, closely resembles those with which he opens his articles on fear in the *Summa Theologica*:

Now since the son does not receive the inheritance unless the father has died, it seems that man would not be able to be the heir of God since God never dies.1

St. Thomas's answer to this problem is of the 'with-God-it-is-otherwise' variety: while it is perfectly true that among men worldly goods cannot be possessed at one time by many (and thus it is necessary that one die so that the other might succeed), on the other hand, spiritual goods are able to be possessed at any one given time by many. Thus it is not necessary for the Father to die in order that the sons of God be his heirs.

Evidently, however, this answer did not completely satisfy St. Thomas, for he adds another, alternative solution to the

1. Vives, XX, p.492: 'Sed cum filius hereditatem non adipiscatur nisi patre defuncto, videtur quod homo non possit esse heres Dei qui nunquam decedit'.
'death of God' problem; in doing so, he uses a clever play on words:

Still, it can be said that God withdraws from us inasmuch as he is in us by faith .... 1

At v.17b, St. Thomas interprets the conditional clause literally: the life of glory comes only through suffering. He very skilfully connects the two ideas inherent in δυναμενον and δυναμενος by pointing out that Christ, the principal heir (principalis heres), came into the inheritance of glory through suffering. Therefore,

Now, we shall not come into the inheritance by an easier way, and so it also behooves us to arrive at the inheritance through suffering. As it is written in Acts 14:21; "through many tribulations we must enter the kingdom of God" .... 2

This resistance to mystical or metaphorical interpretation of suffering is but yet another instance of St. Thomas's concern for finding the literal meaning of the text.

1. Vives, XX, p.492: 'Potest tamen dic[i] quod Deus decedit nobis inquantum est in nobis per fidem ....'

2. Vives, XX, p.492: 'Non autem nos facilliori modo debemus hereditatem adipisc[i]; et ideo nos etiam oportet per passiones ad illam hereditatem pervenire. Act. XIV, 21: Per multas tribulationes oportet nos introire in regnum Dei ....'
We conclude our consideration of St. Thomas's commentary on our passage with a few observations on his place in the history of exegesis. Just as the Venerable Bede is better known popularly as an historian rather than a Biblical scholar, St. Thomas is more renowned as a theologian than as an exegete. And yet as an exegete he is of great historical importance. This is not only so because of his methodology (i.e., limiting exegesis to the task of achieving a fundamental understanding of the text), but also by the very fact of his considerable skill. This is not to say, however, that he approaches the text completely critically, for he does not. Nor does he apply the historical and philological tools which others often did. Indeed, the intriguing phenomenon of his exegesis is that he attempts to deal reflectively and analytically with the exegetical traditions which through the centuries of Christian interpretation had been imposed upon the text. And he deals with this tradition in such a way as to make it - insofar as possible - contribute rather than detract from a basic and literal understanding. In doing this St. Thomas
fulfilled an important historical function.¹

1. Concerning St. Thomas, Farrar (1885, pp. 260-270) says: 'Even Thomas of Aquino, with all his nobleness and greatness, profound as a thinker, incomparable as a theologian, is least successful in the interpretation of Scripture. Imbued with the fatal dream of the fourfold sense of Scripture, he is meagre in the explanation of the literal sense, but diffuse in speculative discussions and dialectic developments'. Such a statement is far too sweeping, narrow and even factually inaccurate. As we have seen, the issue of allegorical interpretation in Paul is not altogether relevant; furthermore, St. Thomas clearly states that the literal meaning of the text must be the basis of the other three. On this basis alone, Farrar's generalizations are inaccurate. The thrust of his criticism is valid only when one anachronistically imposes the historical-critical method upon St. Thomas. Rather, one must judge the work of St. Thomas on the basis of the task as he then conceived it. When viewed in this context, St. Thomas is successful as an exegete, for he was able to demonstrate the relevance of traditional interpretation for a basic understanding of the text.
Nicholas of Lyra.

In Nicholas of Lyra (ca. 1270-1340) we meet perhaps the most formidable exegete of the Middle Ages. He was formidable not only because of his learning (versed in Hebrew grammar and Jewish exegesis), but also because of the critical and scholarly spirit with which he approached the study of the Bible. The fact that his commentary on the Scriptures came near to replacing the Glossa Ordinaria is clear proof of his stature. Not only does Nicholas stand at the apex of medieval exegesis, thus providing a most satisfying conclusion to our study of the Middle Ages, but he is also a transitional figure, since his critical attitude and concern for the historical sense is like that of many Reformation exegetes.

1. Farrar, 1885, p.274, has nothing but good to say for Nicholas of Lyra. Referring to Nicholas as '... one green island among the tideless waves of exegetic commonplace', Farrar suggests that he ought to be thought of as the 'Jerome of the fourteenth century'. The reason for this rather untypical praise of a medieval exegete by Farrar is that he thinks of Nicholas as something of a prophet who stumbled upon the 'protestant' principle of going directly to the original text (which seems a bit far-fetched since Nicholas did not know Greek!) and who held out for the primacy of the literal meaning, thus pre-figuring Reformation exegesis. Above all, such a view ('one green island among the tideless waves of exegetic commonplace') neglects the mood of the times, which was running toward an emphasis of the literal sense. Specifically, it is because Farrar did not adequately understand St. Thomas that he presents Nicholas of Lyra as 'one green island'.

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Without detracting from his importance, it remains to be said that Nicholas made his greatest impact on the study of the Old Testament. It was for that task that he was best equipped and thus his exegesis of the New Testament is, at times, disappointing. His commentary on our passage is most notable for the way it cuts through

1. Perhaps the most impressive edition of Nicholas's commentary (and without doubt the most impressive document we will have occasion to review in the history of interpretation) is that printed by the Froben Press (Basel, Switzerland) in 1498. This edition runs to six folio volumes. In the center of each page appears the Latin text; surrounding this on one side (and between the lines of the text) is the Glossa Ordinaria, and on the other side is Nicholas's commentary. In all, no less than four sizes of type are used: the largest for the page heading, the next largest for the text itself, the next for the text of the two marginal glosses and for the alphabetical 'keys' arranged along the immediate margins of the Biblical text, and finally the smallest for the interlinear gloss and its key (which is arranged above the relevant words of the Biblical text). The text of the two commentaries is abbreviated in the precise style of late Latin manuscripts and because of this is often difficult to read. Nevertheless the accuracy with which the Froben Press was able to reproduce this difficult but space-saving style of print is evidence of the heights to which printing had risen at the hands of Johannes Froben in Basel. It was this edition which Luther had before him as he prepared his Lectures. Although there is another, later edition utilizing a similar arrangement of the Glossa and Nicholas's commentary (Biblia Sacra cum Glossa Ordinaria ... et Postilla Nicholas Lirani Franciscani; Antwerp, 1617, vol.6), it is far less accurate than that published by Froben; however, it is far easier to use since it does not use difficult manuscript abbreviations as does Froben. We have chosen to use primarily the Froben edition. Unfortunately, this edition includes neither title pages nor pagination; accordingly it is referred to throughout this paper simply as 'Froben, VI, 1498' together with a letter of the alphabet ('m-u' and, on another page 'a-f') which in turn refers to a key arranged alongside the printed Biblical text. This, of course, is standard practice with marginal glosses - the term, in fact, which most accurately describes Nicholas's commentary.
the accretions of tradition. This is not to suggest, however, that Nicholas concerns himself with only the literal meaning of the text's words. Indeed, those who suggest that this is the case would be surprised to see to what an extent Nicholas sought to convey a 'spiritual' meaning as well.¹

Because Nicholas's commentary on our passage is not particularly creative and by no means definitive in the history of exegesis, we shall limit the following discussion to the most interesting and salient points.

In contrast to the Glossa Ordinaria, Nicholas does make one short comment on v.12.² It is interesting, however, that Nicholas is more concerned with the literary purpose of v.12 than with the content. He understands Paul to be concluding the preceding section (vv.1-11) by clearly stating the thrust of what he had said directly above, thus emphasizing the inferential nature of


2. Froben, VI, 1498, 'm'.
the ἀποκριτικά, rather than the transitional sense. This thrust or purpose Nicholas takes to be '... that the faithful ought to obey the spirit and not the flesh'. Nicholas even adds a note to the effect that v.12 is so clear as to eliminate the need for detailed explanation, thus concurring with the unspoken decision of the Glossa. As we shall see later, the reformers generally agreed with this suggestion, limiting themselves to observations concerning the literary purpose and syntax of v.12.

In his comments to vv.13 and 14, we have ample proof

1. Froben, VI, 1498, 'm'. Nicholas's concise statement is simply "Ergo fratres", hoc concludit intentum scilicet ....' Because earlier medieval exegetes were not particularly concerned about the connection between sentences and paragraphs, the literary purpose of v.12, up to now, has not been an issue. By the very arrangement of his comments, as well as this sentence (above), it is clear that Nicholas takes v.12 more as a conclusion to the section immediately preceding. It was only later, in the Reformation, that the transitional nature of v.12 was emphasized. Still, even then vv.12-17 were not universally accepted as a pericope. It is interesting that Luther in his Lectures comments on the section vv.5-13 in one scholion but later in his sermons takes as the Epistle text for the 8th Sunday after Trinity Romans 8:12-17. The question of literary units, as we have seen earlier, has a much different cast to it in the Eastern Church.

2. Froben, VI, 1498, 'm'. '... quod fideles debent obedire spiritui et non carnī'.

3. Froben, VI, 1498, 'm'. '... patet ex dictis litera usque ....'

4. Froben, VI, 1498, 'n', 'o', 'p', and 'q'.

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of Nicholas's concern for the spiritual sense of the text: at v.13, for example, he points out that Paul means that appetites of the sense ought to be manfully restrained. Acknowledging that the verb *vivetis* \(\text{\textit{\LaTeX}}\) can refer to both present and future circumstances, he offers a two-fold definition: the life of grace (in the present) and the life of glory (in the future).

Nicholas's interpretation of v.14 is the most lengthy of this entire section. In the detail of its explanations is clear evidence again of how aware Nicholas was of the theological implications of the text. Comment 'p' is a careful theological analysis of the two distinct parts of v.14: in v.14 we see the fruit of cleaving to Christ, suggests Nicholas, insofar as this verse shows how great is the consequence of good. Nicholas sees part 'a' of the verse as an indication of the magnitude of this good and part 'b' as indicating its certainty. In illuminating the relationship of the latter idea to the 'consequence of good', he uses an earthy example: as surely as money is earned for services performed, those who are the recipients of this 'good' are sons of God. It is also interesting that Nicholas applies the 'then-now' formula to this verse, for he suggests that (in God's economy) part 'a' of v.14 speaks of the

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1. Froben, VI, 1498, 'o': 'vita gratiae et postea gloriae'. 
disposition of grace and part 'b' of the disposition of glory. This conclusion is drawn because of the parallelism of sons and heirs in v.17.

Up to now, this theological analysis has not offered us anything we could not find in Augustine or Thomas Aquinas, but at this point in the narrative, Nicholas turns to ask after the real meaning of the 'thing', thus conveniently illustrating for us his reputed concern for objectivity. Continuing with the same categories (v.14), he seeks a definition for *ago*. Here it is above all important to note that he implicitly rejects the tired and subtle play on the words *ago* and *rego* (which we first met in St. Augustine and found repeated by Peter Lombard). Rather, he attacks the problem head on and offers if not an original answer, at least a straightforward one. The following is a précis of Nicholas's answer: ¹ It ought to be remembered that there is given from God an 'influence' (*influxus*) by which dumb creatures are moved toward their physical perfection; now there is also a 'special influence' (*influxus specialis*) by which God moves rational creatures toward a supernatural good. This force the doctors called 'divine instinct' (*instinctus divinus*). This force

¹ Froben, VI, 1498, 'p'.
or instinct is God's way of preparing man for the consequent condition of grace. It is preparatory insofar as some follow and thus obey this divine instinct and receive grace, while others repel this force. In this context of definitions, therefore, we can assume that those spoken of in v.14a are those who are led by the Spirit of God in following (i.e., responding in positive obedience to) the aforementioned movement (the 'special influence' of God). Such as these are led by a principle superior to human reason.

In part 'b' of v.14, continues Nicholas, we see portrayed those who attain the condition of grace through which they are made adoptive sons of God. It is well said, Quicunque ...., since the 'divine instinct' is lacking in no one in this present life. Therefore,

1. Froben, VI, 1498, 'q'.

2. The place of human merit in attaining sonship is not an issue in Nicholas's commentary and thus ought not be imported into it. Still, the fact that he inherently rejects the time-honored interpretation placed upon this verse by Augustine, together with his suggestion that the 'divine instinct' exists in all men without distinction (the corollary being that if one does not attain the condition of grace it is his own fault), ought to be clear enough evidence that Nicholas of Lyra was no convinced Augustinian!
whoever does not attain the condition of grace can ascribe the fault only to himself, since the agreement to the said inspiration (v.14) is that which ultimately leads to the condition of grace.

In this admittedly theological analysis of v.14, we see reflected the growing interest on one hand in cutting loose from the ties of traditional, Augustinian categories of speech and, on the other hand, in applying rational criticism to the text. Nicholas's results may not be particularly profound, but the attempt is indicative of a refreshing and encouraging beginning.

There is but little of interest in Nicholas's exegesis of v.15. He speaks of the spirit of servitude being in the old law, which was the 'law of fear'. His interpretation of αβατα ὅτι ΤΑΙΤΙΡ is, however, of some significance since it departs from the traditional Augustinian line, for Nicholas suggests that the two words used for God designate the dual paternity of God! This is elucidated by means of the same kind of general-special formula he

1. Froben, VI, 1498, 'r', 'lex timoris'.

2. Froben, VI, 1498, 'u'.
used in v.14. One fatherhood of God is common to good and evil, whereby, for example, God is the Father of all creation; the other is special, whereby God is the Father of the just. Unfortunately and unexplicably (for it is not fully clear from the context), Nicholas does not specify which word applies to which fatherhood of God.

At v.16 Nicholas identifies Ipse ... Spiritus as the Holy Spirit, and interprets the verse to mean that while it is impossible for one through human means to understand oneself to be a son of God through the adoption of grace, one is able to do so through the revelation of the Holy Spirit. As evidence of this interpretation

1. From this and other examples, we can see that Nicholas is taken by the use of hermeneutic formulae. He tends to apply these rather woodenly and at times when they are not really encouraged, much less suggested, by the text. The fact that in the case of v.15 the reader is left unsure as to which name for God ought to be applied to the general and special fatherhood of God, is in itself an evident and even glaring criticism of this misuse of hermeneutic categories. As a development in the history of interpretation, however, his acceptance and use of this technique is of extreme interest and importance, for it marks the rejection of set theological answers and the subsequent search for a means by which the text might be analyzed.

2. Froben, VI, 1498, 'a'.

Nicholas refers to I Corinthians 2:12. Rather uncharacteristically, he offers an alternative interpretation: the Holy Spirit bears testimony by signs and miracles to the truth of the catholic faith and through this faith we are proven adoptive sons of God. This latter view, which we might term as the 'indirect testimony' of the Spirit interpretation, will, of course, later come into direct conflict with the first ('direct testimony') view; it is curious that Nicholas did not have enough confidence in the first interpretation to allow it to stand alone, but rather felt compelled to include also the more conservative, Augustinian explanation.

In regard to Christ's heirship and that of Christians (v.17), Nicholas simply says that inheritance carries with it the idea of stability; the consequence of the present condition of grace, for the believer, is a blessedness which is not divided but shared. Christ is a natural (as opposed to adopted) Son of God, and by participating in his inheritance we attain a glorification of soul and body just as he did.

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1. 'Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God'.
The suffering referred to in v.17 is interpreted as an appeal on Paul's part for Christians to tolerate the sufferings of the present life. However, Nicholas also goes on to suggest that Christians are to suffer what Christ suffered and just as he suffered. In support for this he quotes rather freely from Luke 24:26.

2. Froben, VI, 1498, 'f'.

3. Froben, VI, 1498, 'f': '... tolerando passiones vitæ præsentio sicut et ipse ....' (Emphasis is ours).

4. Nicholas says, '... it was necessary that the Christ would suffer these things and enter into his glory'. But the Biblical text has it a question, 'was it not necessary ... ?'
D. The Age of the Reformation.

The Biblical Humanists.

With Erasmus we come to a time when traditional
Scholastic theology was threatened with disrepute, and the
intellectual (which is to say, theological) world in the West was in
total confusion. Into the midst of this situation stepped Erasmus,
who by the sheer exertion of his classical learning and the
application of the critical method brought a breath of fresh air. The
impact of his demand for the critical and historical study of the
Bible - together with others like him - can hardly be overstated. His
place, however, in the history of interpretation can only be
described as that of a tributary in relation to the mainstream of the
revolution soon to take place in the form of the Reformation.¹ His most

¹ While it is true that Erasmus's method of interpretation as seen in
the Paraphrasis does not represent the mainstream of exegesis from
the Reformation onward, it is also true that a number of important
exegetes of the Reformation (mainly Swiss) were greatly influenced
by Erasmus. The benchmarks of style of the works of these exegetes
are a tendency to write annotations to, and paraphrases of, the
Biblical text rather than running commentaries; a dedication to
finding the grammatical sense by the use of the best linguistic tools
as well as textual criticism; and, finally, acceptance of Erasmus's
principle that theological conclusions must grow out of and be in
harmony with the grammatical sense. Among those who fit these criteria
are Beza, Bullinger, Oecolampadius and Bucer. We have works on Romans
from all of these except Bullinger and will later review them. See
Greenslade, 1963, pp.82ff.
characteristic contribution to our history is his *Paraphrasis* of the New Testament (excluding Revelation).\(^1\) It represents the results of a brilliant humanist who, having discarded the commentaries of the Scholastics, takes a fresh look at the New Testament.\(^2\)

His *Paraphrasis* incorporates spiritual insights arising out of a grammatical and textual analysis of the Greek text. Thus, although this document represented a negative reaction to the contorted logic of Scolastic *exegesis*, it by no means represented itself as being non-theological in nature. There is good evidence to support

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1. The text referred to throughout is that printed by the Froben Press in Basel, 1518. This edition of the paraphrase of Romans, in reality a fascicle of the final and complete *Paraphrasis* of the New Testament, is the earliest to appear. There is no proper title page, only 4 handwritten paragraphs listing the contents of the volume (the copy the writer used contains a random group of writings bound together). The index card in the University of Basel library reads: 'In epistolam Pauli apostoli ad Romanos paraphrasias, per Erasmum Roterdamum, ad reverendissimum cardinalem Grimanum'. This document will subsequently be referred to as 'Froben, 1518'. Earlier Erasmus had also published his *Annotationes* which, of course, included comments on our passage; we have chosen to review only his *Paraphrasis* because it is more interpretive - and thus more distinctive - than the *Annotationes* on our passage.

2. Another scholar who approached the study of the Bible in much the same spirit was John Colet (1466? - 1519), life-long friend of Erasmus and lecturer at Oxford. His comments on Romans are contained in: *Enarratio in Epistolam S.Pauli ad Romanos*; this was later edited and translated by J.H. Lupton in 1873 as *An Exposition on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*. 
the suggestion that Erasmus was unclear as to what profitable use could be made of the traditional Patristic interpretation; he was also sometimes inconsistent as to the proper place of allegory. Nevertheless, Erasmus does not here avoid the necessity of interpreting the spiritual meaning of the text. If this seems inconsistent, the tension of the time must be remembered, a tension which Erasmus personified: here was a man who sought to be obedient to the Church and her opinions, a man who (as is evident in his Paraphrasis) knew and loved the Fathers, but who, on the other hand, was committed both to the humanists' principles of critical inquiry and to a minority of opinion in the Church which aimed at putting the Bible and relevant interpretations of the Bible into the hands of the common man.¹

Essentially, however, this document illustrates dedication to the conviction that careful representation of the text's plain, grammatical sense will lead one directly to the most helpful and relevant spiritual sense. The result is a deceptively simple interpretation, an often

¹. It is a tribute to Erasmus's concern for relevance that a partial Swiss-German translation of Paraphrasis (containing Romans, I and II Corinthians and Galatians) was printed as early as 1522. (Paraphrases zu tutsch, Die Epistlen sancti Pauli, Zürich, 1522). There exists another edition printed in 1523 by the same translator (Leonem Iud) and publisher (Christ. Froschover) which contains all the Epistles of Paul, the Epistles of Peter and John, and Jude and James.
amazingly bold point of view and, although at times unreliable, still a usable guide to the New Testament.

Erasmus's view of v.12 is essentially a traditional one. The positive point which Paul neglects to spell out is fully brought out in the paraphrase: we are indebted to the Spirit, live according to him and ought to be obedient to him. We do not live, on the other hand, according to the flesh, since we have been mortified to the flesh. Nor are we indebted to the flesh after having been joined with Christ. Therefore, it is simply 'more fitting to serve the Spirit and be subjected to him'.

The exhortative element of v.13 is taken seriously by Erasmus and he sees Paul confronting Christians with a clear 'either-or':

You are called to life, but if it is after the flesh that you live, you will speedily go to death, but on the other hand if it is that through the strength of the Spirit you extinguish and mortify the concupiscences of the flesh, you shall live.

1. Froben, 1518, p.72: '... quae servire potius debet spiritui'.

2. Froben, 1518, p.72: 'In vitam vocati estis, Porro si juxta carnem vixeritis, ad mortem properatis, contra si vigore spiritus, carnis cupiditates extinxeritis mortuis illis vos vivetis'.
Unfortunately such a paraphrase does not give any clear definition of precisely what constitutes 'death' and 'life' - a major exegetical problem which we might well have expected Erasmus to have shed light upon from his study of Paul.

As we have seen, there had always been considerable room for speculation in the interpretation of v.14, and here Erasmus indulges himself, giving a paraphrase of over 70 Latin words for the Greek text's 9. What is more, he is concerned almost solely with v.14a, specifically how the Latin word ago ought to be understood. He begins by pointing out that the Spirit's rule is not harsh; he may summon to great things but this is lightened by the fact that he calls only the willing and desirous. Further, he instils love in those he calls and thus nothing is difficult for them, but rather pleasant. Erasmus then attempts to explain just how it is that the Spirit operates in the individual. To do this, he uses an analogy: the body draws its strength from the soul; thus if the soul is weak the whole body is torpid, but if the soul is strong the body is lively. In the same way the soul, in turn, draws its strength from the Spirit, and it is this strengthening of the soul by the Spirit about which Paul is speaking.

1. This is a reminder that while paraphrases of the Biblical text may often have purported to be an economical means of explaining the text, they very rarely were so.
Thus, for Erasmus, v.14 pictures the Christian enlivened and strengthened by the Spirit, ready and willing joyfully to perform all that which he knows will please the Father.

The paraphrase of v.15 illustrates that Erasmus was fully aware of Patristic interpretation, for here he takes a basically traditional line: because servants by their very nature are not related to their lord, they live in fear of punishment - such an attitude belongs to the Jews, who continue to live under the servitude of the law. Christians, however, once having been freed, ought not return again to the previous servitude which is constituted by fear on account of sins.

Here, of course, Erasmus is being inconsistent and his interpretation suggests that he may well have read the medieval exegetes' discussion on the function of \( \Pi\alpha\Lambda\nu \); he first says that v.15a refers to the condition of the Jews under the Law, but subsequently suggests that Paul is exhorting Christian readers not to return again to a previous servitude which, in turn, is redefined not in terms of historical eras, but by the imagery of man once bound by the fear of punishment for his sins.

The final clause of v.15 and all of v.16 Erasmus interprets by means of the theme of confidence: the Spirit gives us such confidence that we are, bold to cry out to God whenever the need
arises. To raise such a cry to God would not be possible if we did not have the confidence that we were the children of God (v.16). 'For he would not have imparted to us his Spirit, unless he had taken us as sons'.

Thus, says Erasmus, the Spirit is like a pledge or symbol of fatherly love which 'creates assurance in our spirit' ('fidem facit spiritui nostro') that we are the sons of Him who has given us the pledge.

Although the logic is somewhat circular, the exposition itself is quite attractive and tidy. The suggestion that the Spirit is a self-authenticating pledge of assurance (i.e., the very fact of the Spirit's having been given as a symbol of God's love ought give us confidence, but, at the same time, the Spirit creates assurance within the believer) somehow captures well the tone of Paul's words and, at the same time, unifies v.15b and v.16.

Attempting again to capture Paul's meaning when he speaks of believers being 'heirs of God' (v.17), Erasmus points out that it is God as the Source and Creator of all things, of whom Paul spoke. In explaining the phrase 'co-heirs with Christ', Erasmus suggests

1. Froben, 1518, p.73: 'Alloqui spiritum hunc suum non impartisset nobis, nisi pro filiis haboret'.
the imagery of being ingrafted into the body of Christ.\footnote{1} He has no startling insight as to what precisely is inherited, but simply says that it is through Christ that we have attained a common inheritance.\footnote{2}

Above all, the transition from discussion of inheritance (v.17a) to that of suffering (v.17b) is of interest, for here Erasmus connects the two by means of emphasizing the conditional particle, $\textit{et per hunc in ius communis haereditatis pervenimus ...}$, as follows: such a portion of the inheritance can not come into our possession unless we struggle along the same path by which Christ attained the inheritance. Thus, says Erasmus, the pattern of Christ is the one we are to follow:

Through the suffering of many evils Christ has attained possession of the benefits. Through obedience he has attained the kingdom, through disgrace honor and glory, through death he has attained immortality. And therefore we must suffer with him that we might share such benefits with Him. We must be obedient that we might

\begin{enumerate}
\item Froben, 1518, p.73. The actual words of the paraphrase are: 'Cohaeredes vero CHRISTI, cujus corpori insiti...'
\item Froben, 1518, p.73: '... et per hunc in ius communis haereditatis pervenimus ....'
\end{enumerate}
reign with Him, suffer indignity from the world that we be honored with Him, must die a time long with Him that we might live with Him eternally.¹

This highly literal interpretation is perhaps the best and most representative of Erasmus, for it is essentially a 'spiritual' interpretation of a grammatical usage (ἐγνωμονία, followed by the verb and a ἐγκακία clause). As we shall see later, this 'Erasmian' method of Biblical interpretation proved popular with certain of the reformers.

¹ Froben, 1518, pp.73-74: 'Ille ferendis malis, pervenit ad bonorum possessionem, Per obedientiam venit ad regnum, Per ignominiam venit ad gloriam, morte pervenit ad immortalitatem. Patiendum igitur nobis cum illo, ut cum eo bonorum contingat fructus, obedientium, ut cum illo regnumus, ferenda proba mundi, ut cum illo simul gloriosi, moriendum ad tempus cum illo, ut cum illo semper vivamus'.

Faber Stapulensis\textsuperscript{1} was contemporary with Erasmus and in many ways can be compared with him. Faber was a dedicated humanist scholar, deeply concerned for the renewal of the Church. He directed his efforts toward the spread of the Scripture in the common language, and was critical of certain aspects of the Reformation.\textsuperscript{2} As an individual (if we may risk a generalization), he was as a scholar inferior to Erasmus, but a more sympathetic figure than Erasmus. His exegesis of the New Testament was almost identical with that of Erasmus, for he

\begin{quote}
... tried to relate the study of the literal meaning of the text, by reference to the Greek original, with the spiritual meaning, that is, Christ himself speaking through the writings of the apostles.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} His real name was Jacques Le Fevre d'Etaples, but he will be referred to here by his Latinized name, Jacobus Faber Stapulensis, or simply Faber. \\
\textsuperscript{2} As a witness to the positive concerns of Faber, it ought to be recalled that in addition to his commentary on the Pauline Epistles (1513) and on the Gospels (1522), he also published the first French translation of the entire Bible (1528). Although he is an unfamiliar figure, especially to English-speaking theologians, he holds a place of considerable importance in the history of the translation and study of the Scripture, if for no other reason than the fact that the history of the French Bible begins essentially with him. See Greenslade 1963, pp.116f. \\
\textsuperscript{3} Greenslade, 1963, p.81.
\end{flushleft}
In his commentaries, his method was

... to give a paraphrased exposition, and then add to this brief notes showing by illustration the meaning of the Greek.¹

It is worthy of note that for the first time in Western exegesis, the Greek words of the Biblical text are quoted extensively, and critically compared with the Vulgate. This comparison is conducted at the end of the commentary on each chapter and is termed the 'examination' of the text. Faber's realization of the fundamental importance of the Greek text for any critical examination of the New Testament is reflected in the format of this 'examination': when he quotes the Latin text, he says, 'vulgata editio', followed by the quotation. But when he quotes the Greek text, he says, 'Paulus:', followed by the quotation! Such a suggestive contrast surely must have shaken his more conservative readers.

Faber's actual comment on our passage is direct and to the point.² It is a certain quality of refreshing decisiveness

¹ Greenslade, 1963, p.80.

² The commentary is contained in Iacobi Fabri Stapulensis in omneis D. Pauli epistolas commentariorum libri XIV, Cologne, 1531; hereafter cited as 'Faber, 1531'. Reference to this edition of Faber's commentary is complicated by the lack of pagination. However, each new section of the text commented upon is numbered consecutively throughout each book. The two paragraphs with which we are here concerned are 66 and 67, the first dealing with vv.12-16 and the latter with vv.17 and 18.
(similar to that found in Erasmus's *Paraphrasis*) which recommends Faber's commentary above all, for his exegetical conclusions are not particularly profound.

Although Faber comments on vv.12-16 as a whole, he by no means speaks systematically to every exegetical problem therein. Rather, he begins with a comment on the phrase $\text{ἀντιχωρίζω}$ (v.16) and then briefly - and seemingly at random - goes to the main themes of v.15. He does not comment upon vv.12-14. Because of this lack of scheme, it is perhaps easiest to give a summary of the paragraph.

The 'spirit' of whom Paul here speaks (v.16) is the Holy Spirit, who inspired the disciples and apostles, and this same Spirit gives us confidence to call upon God. 'They' accepted the spirit of freedom and of reverence; for sons (whether such by nature or adoption) are free and thus owe reverence and not servile fear to their parent. The Jews were not moved by the Spirit to call God 'Father' but rather 'Lord'. This is indication that they were slaves; they had accepted servitude in fear. When they thought of the Lord they thought of his sovereignty and power, and of the penalties inflicted upon those who did not fulfil the Law. Thus, out of an aversion of punishments the fear of God arose in them. This is servile fear and is not enjoined by the Spirit of Christ, nor has it been given to us.
Rather, Christ frees us from servitude and from the fear of servitude, and has transformed servitude to filial adoption and fear of punishment to reverence. 'Therefore' says Faber, 'let us fear God; but this fear proceeds from love'.

We pause here in our summary to point out that although Faber's interpretation of v.15, above, is completely traditional, he hesitates to use the traditional term 'filial love', virtually the only indication that he is not in sympathy with Scholastic definitions.

Faber then proceeds with a somewhat more general and theological discussion of the same material, ending with a transition to v.17. Here an appeal is made - based on a reminder of the benevolent and providential nature of God - for greater love to God in both good and evil times. This appeal, in turn, constitutes the transition to v.17.

Faber's exegesis of v.17 is far superior to that of vv.15 and 16, above. The key interpretational device is, as in Erasmus, the imitation of Christ. The following is an abstract of his exegesis:

1. Faber, 1531, para 66. 'Ergo deum timeamus, sed hic timor ex amore procedat....'

2. He does, however, use another technical term, 'servile fear' - an expression which he possibly considered more basically Biblical than 'filial love'. In any case, some such explanation is necessary for his reluctance to introduce the fourfold definition of fear, a definition with which his commentary proves him to be familiar.

3. Faber, 1531, para 67.
The adoptive sons are to imitate the True Son, who did not come to do his own will but the will of his Father, and who came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and who came not for the honors and pleasures of this world but for the contempt and indignities which had to be borne. This is even as it says in Isaiah of the Servant:

... he had no form or comeliness that we should look at him, and no beauty that we should desire him. He was despised and rejected by men; a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief....

But eternal glories follow those contempts, those sorrows, those infirmities. Our imitation, therefore, is of the Son, not of the Father, for we have been called not (first) to reign, not to be ministered unto, but on account of Him (Christ) to minister. Thus:

... let us be visited with joy if we are to bear scorn, grief and pressures of the world in imitation of Him. For a similar glory to that of the Son follows this short sojourn of earthly habitation.

1. Isaiah 53:2b-3a. Faber is evidently quoting from memory, for the Latin text he gives is inaccurate, even by the Vulgate's standards.

2. Faber, 1531, para 67. '...sed propter ipsum ministrare, si contemptus, dolores, et mundi pressuras, eius imitatione perferre gaudio afficiamur: hanc modicam terrenae habitacionis peregrinationem, consimilis cum filio consequetur gloria'.
It is interesting that as with Erasmus, Faber is most successful in dealing with those passages wherein the appeal of Christ for simple Christian discipleship is perceived to be clearly and directly evident. It is this understanding of the interpretation of the text's spiritual content which unifies the exegeses of Erasmus and Faber on v.17 and indeed, the explanation which accounts for the appeal of their interpretations of v.17.

1. Faber's interpretation of v.17b, however, partakes of the same ambiguity as that of Erasmus: the Christian is to imitate Christ in obedient service because this is the path to the final reward of inheritance. This, of course, neglects the fact that Christ's sonship is of a different order than that of God's adoptive sons.
The Reformers.

Martin Luther.

In terms of both theological importance and historical precedence, Martin Luther's Lectures on Romans must be the beginning point of any analysis of the Reformation's exegesis of any passage in the Epistle to the Romans. And yet, as important as these lectures are to understanding the theological currents which brought about the Lutheran Reformation as well as to understanding Luther himself, the Lectures, as a document, did not significantly influence the exegetes who succeeded Luther. These extensive lecture notes were neither printed nor widely circulated until early in the 20th century - and then only after the need

1. The Latin text quoted is taken from Johannes Ficker, Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief 1515/1516 ('Die Scholien' and 'Die Glosse'), Leipzig, 1908 (cited hereafter as 'Ficker, Die Scholien' or 'Die Glosse'). Unless stated otherwise, the English translation is that of Wilhelm Pauck, 1961. This translation has, at times, been compared with the German translation of Eduard Ellwein, Martin Luther: Vorlesung über den Römerbrief, Munich, 1927.

2. The only possible exception is Melanchthon, who may have had Luther's notes before him as he prepared for his own lectures given at Wittenberg and as he wrote his commentary on Romans.
for putting Luther's theological views in an historical perspective had come to be acknowledged. 1

1. There has been considerable confusion in the past as to what precisely these early lectures consisted of, and what Luther's classroom method was. The following comment, made by Farrar (pp. 324-325) in 1885, before the text of the Lectures was published, is demonstrative of how little was actually known of Luther's early academic career: 'For ten years... (1509-1517), though he lectured on the Bible at Wittenberg in a practical way, and had abandoned scholasticism, he was still partly content with the Vulgate, the Fathers, and the fourfold sense'. This confusion, so evident in a 19th-century writer such as Farrar, arose from the assumption that the Lectures on Romans was to be compared with either Luther's edited lectures on the Psalms or the even later edited and rewritten scholia of the lectures on Galatians. The confusion persists, however, until today, aided by the fact that the complete notes have never been entirely translated into German or English. This perhaps necessary omission tends to suggest that the lectures themselves consisted of one continuous, highly selective and rather theological commentary. In fact, quite the opposite was true: the majority of Luther's classroom time must have been taken up with the slow and laborious task of dictating the interlinear and marginal glosses - precisely those parts which often are not translated. The scholia did represent a more independent theological inquiry; however, it has been determined from the notebooks of students who attended these lectures that only certain, abbreviated parts of this were given extemporé to Luther's students. Thus Luther's lecture notes on Romans - and this fact is reflected in Ficker's edition of them - are in two distinct parts. Contingent to this simple observation are a number of important and even startling conclusions. The first is that Luther was still, in 1515-1517, committed to the method and even, to an extent, to the conclusions of medieval exegesis. One has only to read his interlinear and marginal glosses on a traditionally difficult passage such as ours to realize that Luther was heavily indebted to the findings of medieval exegesis for the material he was dictating in his classroom lectures. However, it is also clear that Luther was already beginning to chart a separate theological course. This is vividly illustrated by the way in which even Luther's marginal gloss is constantly and even abruptly invaded by theological observations. Further, the distinction of tasks implicit in Luther's gloss and the scholia is also consistent with medieval tradition in at least two ways:

/continued;
While our passage is not, as a whole, the most fortunate place in which to gauge the depth of Luther's exegetical footnote continued:

the first is illustrated by Anselm of Laon, who labored unstintingly on glossing the text - which was to be dictated to novice students - but who also probably offered students with the rank of 'master' lectures on the exegesis of certain set books which incorporated the lengthy discussion of theological matters. Secondly, it is out of this same tradition, i.e., the separation of exegesis (glossing the text) and theology (discussing the text), that the phenomenon of the various quæstiones arose. The spirit and purpose, if not the form, of Luther's scholia closely correspond with the quæstiones; that is, a companion to the Glossa Ordinaria which might treat of textual issues but more often pursued, at some considerable length and detail, the theological questions which the text directly or indirectly raised. In fact, it is entirely possible that at times, Luther, seeing the seeds of hated Scholasticism planted in the representative quæstiones, sets out in his scholia to give the proper theological interpretation of the issues at hand. For example, as we have seen in the anonymous quæstiones reviewed earlier, the theological implications of fear in man's relation to God are minutely examined in connection with Romans 8:15. Luther, in his scholia on the same verse, not only defines fear in a manner reminiscent of the Glossa Ordinaria, but also discusses the theological implications of fear as well as critically reviews Augustine's interpretation of v.15. Certainly, the precedents for this kind of critical excursus are not to be found in the tradition of glossing the text; and, while it is undoubtedly true that Luther's scholia represent his response to the currents of exegetical change represented by Erasmus and Faber (and thus signify a totally new development in exegesis), it is also highly likely that Luther found precedent for the scholia in medieval scholarship.
skills, one can see at work his basic theological interpretation of Paul on such themes as the nature of Christian existence, anthropology, the nature and extent of sin, and the place of faith in salvation. In terms of proportion, Luther follows medieval tradition, giving in the scholia by far the majority of his attention to v.15. There is only limited comment on vv.14, 16 and 17, and vv.12 and 13 are not commented upon at all. The gloss, on the other hand, is fairly even but again with an emphasis on v.15. We begin, then, with the marginal and interlinear gloss to vv.12 and 13.

Luther's interlinear gloss indicates a traditional interpretation of v.12: 'because the spirit of God dwells in you', inserts Luther, in his interlinear gloss, 'you are not debtors to the flesh'. 'Flesh' is defined as the prudence and concupiscence of the flesh. In his marginal gloss Luther points out that Paul's words in

1. In the scholia Luther grouped together the section Romans 8:5-13 for comment. Here he discusses at unusual length the term φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς (occurring first in v.6); it is likely that he felt this detailed treatment sufficed for the understanding of the terms used in vv.12 and 13.

2. Ficker, Die Glosse, p.72: '... quia spiritus Dei inhabitat in nobis'.

3. Luther's translation of φρόνημα as prudentia and not sapientia is significant as Pauck, 1961, p.224, note 16, points out. Luther's paraphrase of v.12 looks back upon the scholia (vv.5-13) for its basic definition of 'prudence of the flesh'.
Romans 6:18 ('and, having been set free from sin, have become slaves of righteousness') are applicable to this verse - a reference which surprisingly enough no exegete up to now has explicitly made. It is no accident that Luther made this connection, for, as we shall soon see, he perceived an important and interpretive connection between our passage and chapter 6.

At v.13 Luther defines κατὰ σάρκα as 'obeying the concupiscence of the flesh, as above in chapter 6', and μετέτειλεν θανάτου as dying 'spiritually and eternally', and adds 'because you now live' (i.e., in the flesh), creating a confusion similar to that which we have seen in Ambrosiaster.

1. Ficker, Die Glosse, p.72.
2. Ficker, Die Glosse, p.72: 'obediendo concupiscentias eius, ut supra 6 . . . .' 
3. Ficker, Die Glosse, p.72: 'spiritualiter et eternaliter'. 
4. Ficker, Die Glosse, p.72: 'quia jam vivitis'.
Further, in Luther's exegesis of v. 13, we meet a number of ideas which are really contingent on his interpretation of chapter 7. The first of these has to do with the dative \( \Pi\nu\varepsilon\varepsilon\mu\alpha\tau\varepsilon \) which Luther translates as \textit{per spiritum} and interprets as charity in the 'inner man' (\textit{interior homo}). This charity is the creation of the Holy Spirit, abides and is operative in the innermost depths of a man's hearts, and is the only possible means by which the acts and desires of the flesh might be mortified.¹ In Luther's own terms, it is this gift which constitutes the 'inner' or 'spiritual' man and this makes possible the struggle between the flesh and the spirit in the 'whole man'.²

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1. Here we see to what extent Luther was influenced by Augustine, for as we have seen, it was Augustine who first seized on Romans 5:5 as the solution for the problematic relation of man's ability and God's demand, suggesting that fulfilment of the Law is only possible through the grace of the Spirit, i.e., when the Spirit 'sheds love abroad in us'. Thus charity created by the Spirit is for both Augustine and Luther different from other virtues insofar as it is, above all virtues, purely the gracious gift of God (as opposed to other moral virtues acquired by 'habits'), and the single prerequisite for meeting God's moral and ethical demands.

2. Luther in his Lectures is always cautious to point out that 'spirit' and 'flesh' are not separate entities, but go together to make the whole man. It is precisely this understanding of Pauline anthropology which undergirds his vivid portrayal of Christian man in perpetual conflict. Thus with this interpretation of the classic problem, Luther stakes out one end of the continuum, the antithetical pole being represented by Origen, who, as we know, saw man as either 'flesh' or 'spirit' and, again in direct contrast to Luther, considered perfection an obtainable goal in this life.
Thus, when Luther here interprets \textit{Πνεῦμα} as the 'inner man' he implies the Holy Spirit only indirectly. Perhaps Luther's clearest definition of \textit{interior homo} is in his marginal gloss to Romans 8:6, where, in commenting on Galatians 5:19ff, he says:

We should note that "spirit" is here [\textit{i.e.}, Gal.5:22] taken to mean the inner man, as the contrast between flesh and spirit shows. And farther down we read "The Spirit is life because of righteousness". [\textit{Rom.8:10}]. But the spirit, \textit{i.e.}, the inner man, must have the Holy Spirit. One may therefore regard these fruits of the spirit as fruits of the Holy Spirit. Hence it is more appropriate to understand by "spirit" the inner man as if it were a good tree that brings forth good fruit and by "flesh" a corrupt tree that brings forth evil fruit. [\textit{Matt. 7:17}]. It is also more appropriate to say that the Holy Spirit creates the good tree rather than that it is a good tree by itself.\footnote{1}

It is almost a hermeneutical principle that Luther inserted this 'inner' or 'spiritual' man concept in those places where Paul used the terms νοῦς and τίνετομα in the context of spiritual conflict.¹

But Luther's interpretation of v.13 is dependent upon that of chapter 7 in yet another instance. In his marginal gloss, he explains the phrase τὰς Προμενίς τῆς Σαρκός Θανατοῦτε and in so doing, makes reference to a distinction which he has already carefully drawn in chapter 7: by facta Paul does not mean opera since such a word could not apply to spiritual men. Rather, he means the evil desires, such as are referred to in Romans 7:19b ('... the evil I do not want is what I do....'). This cross-reference to his interpretation of chapter 7 must, Luther realized, be clarified in order to avoid confusion. Thus he does in a word diagram: ³

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¹ See Luther's interlinear gloss on Romans 7:25 (Ficker, Die Glossa, p.68) where he explains mente as interiore homine. In this scheme of things, the carnal aspect of man's existence is called the 'external man'; thus in the same verse Luther takes the words of the Latin text carne autem as simply exteriore homine.

² Luther reads carnis, thus τῆς Σαρκός and not τοῦ Θαύματος

³ Ficker, Die Glossa, p.73:

de differentia inter (facere ita et iter (facta (perfecta,
the difference (to do) is the same (deeds)
between (to accomplish) as between (perfection).

This is intended to illustrate the importance of Paul's saying (Romans 7:19b) facio and not perficio. By way of background, it is necessary to know that earlier (scholia, Romans 7:18) Luther had argued that when Paul uses the words 'I will' and 'I hate', he is referring to the spiritual man or the 'spirit' (i.e., interior homo), but when he says 'I do' or 'I work', he means the carnal man and the flesh.

The original part of the distinction is, then, that the words 'to do' (facere) are indicative of the struggle - which exists only in the justified - between willing the good and realizing it; 'to accomplish' (perficere) means to realize perfectly what one wills and is not possible in this life.

There are, then, two ways in which Luther's interpretation of Romans 7:19b here applies: the first is to show that by 'the deeds of the flesh', Paul does not mean all the works of Christians, for spiritual men, while whole men, are still a mixed lot, doing good but not singlemindedly so, and even when they do good, they do so in the face of persistent evil desires. Thus the thrust of his
comment in this regard is that of pointing out that Paul has spiritual men, not carnal men, in mind. The argument is therefore parallel to that of chapter 7, wherein Luther saw pictured not a carnal man but a spiritual man struggling with his carnality.

Secondly - and this is the most important - Luther did not want to be understood as saying that the 'deeds of the flesh' mean even those good deeds which are performed by the man who is simul justus et peccator. To alleviate the embarrassment of this highly possible interpretation, he made 'deeds of the flesh' here mean 'evil desires', i.e., the fleshly aspect of Christian man's existence. Thus understood, Romans 7:19b fits perfectly with 8:13. To paraphrase it, Luther suggests that, 'The evil desires suggested by my flesh, which I do not will, must be mortified'.

It remains to be noted at v.13 that Luther, as we might well have expected, is pessimistic about the possibility of mortifying fleshly desire and acts; in his interlinear gloss, he adds after the word mortificaveritis, 'so that they no longer make progress'.

1. Ficker, Die Glosse, p.72: 'ut non proficiant',
Finally, he follows Patristic example by giving a dual meaning: 'you persevere in this life and live spiritually in eternity'.

Much as did Augustine in his anti-Pelagian writings, Luther interprets v.14 primarily in the light of v.13. To be led by the Spirit is to mortify the flesh, and to mortify the flesh is possible only through the Spirit.

"To be led by the Spirit of God" means freely, promptly, gladly to mortify the flesh, i.e., the old man in us, i.e., to despise and renounce all that is not God, even ourselves ... This is

1. Ficker, Die Glosse, p.72: 'permanebitis in ista vita spirituali in eternum'.

2. Worthy of note is Luther's neglect of the traditional points concerning the distinction between ago and rego, together with that distinction's theological implications (i.e., that v.14 shows how essentially basic is the grace of the Spirit in the Christian life). Certainly such a point would have been consistent with his exegesis of v.14.
not the achievement of nature but of the Spirit of God in us.\textsuperscript{1}

This, of course, necessarily implies the Spirit's gift of charity, as Luther's interlinear gloss shows.\textsuperscript{2}

Both in his scholia and marginal gloss, Luther seems at least to base his interpretation of v.15 on the traditional observation of an antithesis, at times almost quoting the Glossa Ordinaria. However, the contrast he draws is not so much that of the historical condition of the two peoples (although he does identify servitude with life as lived under the Law in the Old Testament), as that of the difference between the servant (who obeys only because he fears punishment) and the son (who obeys out of love). But Luther's interpretation is by no means consistent and straightforward; at one

\textsuperscript{1} Pauck, 1961, p.230. Ficker, \textit{Die Scholien}, p.194: "\textit{Spiritu Dei agi} est libere, prompte, hilariter carnem \textit{i.e.\textsuperscript{1}}

\textit{veterem hominem mortificare \textit{i.e.\textsuperscript{1}} omnia contemnere et abnegare, que Deus non est, etiam se ipsos .... Quod est non nature, sed spiritus Dei opus in nobis'.

\textsuperscript{2} Luther can even say 'charitate agunt contra facta carnis .' (Ficker, \textit{Die Glosse}, p.73).
point he appears to accept the traditional view of τίταγμα δουλείας (i.e., that this refers to the ministry of the Holy Spirit in some form or other) and at another point he interprets the τίταγμα in a completely ambiguous manner, as if it means 'state of mind' or 'disposition'. This ambiguity is almost certainly purposeful, for although he uses traditional language in speaking about fear (e.g., 'servile fear' and 'worldly fear'), the traditional Western interpretation could never have been accepted by Luther. As we have seen, the traditional view would call for interpreting τίταγμα στεφάνειας as the Holy Spirit, inspiring servile fear, and τίταγμα νίκηθεσίας as ministry of the Holy Spirit in bringing about filial or perfect love - the only condition under which man can rightly obey God. Nothing, however, could be more alien to Luther's theology. Accordingly, while incorporating as much as possible from the traditional interpretation, Luther shrinks from making what would have been the next logical point (after having pointed out that man, under the Law, serves the Law only out of servile fear) about 'filial' or perfect love, since this would have implied that man is able to serve God perfectly and singlemindedly.

1. See the section on St. Thomas Aquinas, above, who succeeds more than any other medieval exegete in correlating the fourfold theological definition of fear with the interpretation of v.15.
Luther's abrupt rejection of tradition is so important as to warrant quoting him at length:

Notice how profound the words of Scripture are: We are never or rarely without fear, because none of us is without concupiscence or the flesh or the old man in him. But coveting is never without the fear that one may lose what one covets. Thus, none of us is endowed with perfect love. Similarly, the saying: "Everyone that commits sin is the servant of sin", seems, at first glance, to express a judgement that does not apply to many, but if one looks more closely at it, one finds that it applies to all: for we all are the servants of

1. Of somewhat less importance is Luther's rejection of Augustine's interpretation of v.15—Expositio Quarumdam Propositionem ex Epistola ad Romanos (see above). In the section where Luther deals with Augustine's suggestion, Luther takes the line that when the Law makes its demands upon man, the 'prudence of the flesh' is stirred up and consequently man grows to loathe the Law and long for the freedom he had before he came to be under the Law. Thus spiritus is, again, understood as 'state of mind' or 'disposition' and not as the Holy Spirit. See Pauck, 1961, p.231.
sin, because we all commit sin, if not by deed, then surely by desire and inclination, as we have sufficiently explained before.¹

Equally interesting is Luther's treatment of ἤ̣ς in his marginal gloss. There he insists that Paul meant to say 'adoption' and not 'sonship';² this is important to Luther for a particular reason:

1. Pauck, 1961, pp.231-232 (emphasis is ours).
   Ficker, Die Schollen, p.195: 'Adverte, quam profunda sint verba Scripture. Quia nullus vel rarissimus sine isto timore est, quia nullus sine concupiscientia et carne seu vetere homine. Ubi autem est concupiscientia, necessario adest timor amissionis eius, quod concupiscitur. Ita nullus perfecta charitate preditus est. Item "Omnis, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati" facilis videtur sententia et in superficie multis non convenire, sed introspectata invenitur omnibus convenire. Quia omnes sunt servi peccati, quia omnes faciunt peccatum, si non opere, tamen concupiscientia et pronitate, ut supra satis dictum est'.

he did not want to say "sonship" but "adoption", in order to express the means by which we came into this sonship and in order to laud the grace of God. For they are not sons of God from nature, as only Christ is, nor from the seed or merit (as the Jews presume) but rather only from gracious adoption.¹

This is yet another subtle way of rejecting the traditional view, for by insisting that Paul is here speaking not of the condition of sonship, but of the means whereby men are made sons of God, Luther destroys the central assumption upon which the traditional view turned. For Luther felt that the Scholastics had been semi-Pelagian on this point, assuming, as they did, that man might somehow, of his own merit, (albeit with the aid of the Holy Spirit) perfectly love and obey God as a son (i.e., filial love). To use an anachronism, Luther saw that post-Augustine theologians, in their understanding of man's relationship to God, had leapfrogged his understanding of justification by faith. By removing the possibility of loving God perfectly as a son, without first having been graciously adopted to sonship, Luther neatly deflects the rush

¹ Ficker, Die Glosse, p.73: '... noluit dicere "filiationis", sed "adoptionis", ut modum exprimeret filiationis et commendaret gratiam Dei. Quia non ex natura ut Christus solus et semine neque ex meritis (ut Judei presumebant), sed ex gratia adoptionis filii Dei sunt.'
and weight of exegetical tradition. Taken together with the comment in the *scholia* (above), it was a hard-won, but masterful stroke.\(^1\)

Luther confirms this analysis of his interpretation of v.15, when later on in the *scholia* he comments on the words \(\tau\alpha\lambda\iota\upsilon\varepsilon\zeta\varsigma\ \phi\circ\beta\omicron\upsilon\). In his remarks on this phrase (*iterum in timore*) he says:

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\(^1\) This illustrates at one and the same time the intellectual struggle through which Luther passed prior to the events of the autumn of 1517 following, and also the necessity of having close to hand the various strands of the tradition with which he was struggling. Students who attended Luther's lectures, for example, could hardly have been aware of the break with tradition (since they did not know the tradition) which these lectures at times signified, much less have been aware of the crisis of authority which Luther's interpretation necessarily implied. The unfamiliarity of his listeners with the exegetical tradition may, in fact, go a long way toward explaining why Luther's lectures caused so little stir in and of themselves. Still, we ought not be too surprised, since divinity students then listened, in all likelihood, no better than those of today!
... in other words: formerly you were in the spirit of fear and under a taskmaster, namely, the law, that drove you on, but now that you are free you have not again received the spirit of fear but, rather, the spirit of sonship which is the spirit of trusting faith ....

Once again he has accepted and passed on to his students as much of the exegetical tradition as possible, but in doing so has significantly altered a pivotal idea in such a way as to challenge tradition. Specifically, the entire comment right down to (but

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1. Pauck, 1961, p.232. Ficker, Die Scholien, p.196: '... q.d. prius eratis in spiritu timoris et sub pedagogo pellente sc. lege. Non ergo denuo liberatī iterum eum accepístis, sed potius spirītum filiētātīs in fidučia ....' With regards to the last clause ('sed potius spirĭtum filiētātīs in fidučia') Pauck's translation is more a paraphrase than a translation. A better wording might be: '... but, rather, the spirit of sonship that you might trust'. The subsequent interpretation (v.15c) indicates that by fidučia Luther means 'confidence' more than 'faith' - although the two ideas were certainly related in Luther's own mind. The word 'trust' seems best suited to encompass both of these.
not including) the final clause is taken almost directly from Ambrosiaster. However, the final and decisive phrase ('sed potius spiritum filiætatiss in fiducia') refers directly to Luther's own particular understanding of man's proper relationship with God. While Luther sees the contrast as one of fear and confidence, such a confidence can ultimately rest only upon God's adoption (i.e., justification) of man. But fiducia here does not have reference only to trusting God initially, but also to the continual need for man to repent and be justified (semper peccator, semper penitens, semper justus). This somewhat suspended condition of Christian man - so fundamental to Luther's understanding of the Christian life - is not really tenuous, for abandoning trust in one's own righteousness and trusting rather in God's can only result in a great confidence. Thus Christian man, rather than despairing of his condition, turns to God again and again in repentance and faith. This 'dynamic quality' of Luther's doctrine of justification received by faith is inevitably involved when he here speaks of 'trust'.

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1. This term is used by Gordon Rupp (The Righteousness of God, London, 1953, p.184) in an essay on Luther's Lectures on Romans.
Luther comments at great length in the *scholia* on the last clause of v.15 and does so by skilfully carrying through the contrast of v.15. In summary, he says: those who have the spirit of fear see God as a tyrant, do not trust Him and imagine themselves able, of themselves, to fulfil all His demands. They are like those who offered Christ in His Passion vinegar or wine mixed with gall and hyssop to drink. Since they do not trust God, they cannot cry to God as Father; on the contrary, they regard Him as an enemy. Those who have turned to God in trust, on the other hand, have their hearts opened wide so that feelings and speech are released.

Here again is evidence of the complex nature of 'trust' for Luther; not only is trust a description of Christian man's present condition, but it is also intimately linked with initial fear and God's justification received by that faith. Even more important is the description of those who live in the spirit of fear: they regard God as a tyrant, says Luther, because they approach Him not in trust, but on the basis of their confidence of

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their ability to supply the righteousness which He demands. This description has a haunting vividness about it - and for a good reason, since it is a reflection of Luther's own religious experience. It is characteristic of Luther that he saw in Paul's words not just man at prayer, but man in his whole approach to God.

At v.16 in both the gloss and the scholia, Luther sets out the role of the Spirit in trust. What is above all interesting in this comment is a discussion of a distinctive aspect of Luther's understanding of justification received by faith: the positive role of good works in those who are led by the Spirit. While the scholia stress that the 'testimony' here spoken of is itself the trust created by the Spirit - the faith by which one is justified - Luther clearly states that this does not exhaust the meaning of Paul's words. Quoting at length - with a certain obvious degree of accommodation - from St. Bernard¹, Luther shows that in addition to the most obvious meaning of Paul's word (i.e., the Spirit enabling man to believe and, subsequently, assuring him

that his sins are forgiven), there are at least two further dimensions to the Spirit's testimony. The first and most historically important of these is the belief

... that the works you do are acceptable to God whatever they may turn out to be in the long run. And you have this faith that they are agreeable to God if you feel that you are nothing before God on account of these works even though they are good and done from obedience and because you do no evil works. When good works are done with this humility and with this feeling of compunction, they become acceptable in God's sight.¹

This rather unexpected development in his exegesis is clear indication of the depth of Luther's doctrine of the Holy Spirit's ministry and its importance for understanding his view of the Christian life: not only is it the Spirit who by 'shedding abroad the love of God' in the hearts of believers makes possible willing obedience to God's commands, but it is also the


testimony of the Spirit which makes possible a degree of confidence that such acts, when performed in love and humility, will stand the tests of time. This key insight into the Spirit's ministry was later to become Luther's first line of defense against charges of antinomianism. Of equal importance theologically, this tenet redeemed Luther's understanding of justification (and of semper peccator, semper justus) from becoming a doctrine of despair. Thus, within the bounds of the formula semper peccator, semper penitens, semper justus there is room for both progress and confidence in the Christian life.

It is with regard to confidence in the world to come that Luther makes his final point (taken from St. Bernard):

the testimony of the Spirit creates in man faith to accept the promise that he will share in the future glory.

Thus, in summary, the testimony of the Spirit is constituted by three aspects of faith. That Paul had all of these in mind, says Luther, is proven by what he says subsequently in the same chapter:

For he [Paul] says: "Who shall accuse against [sic] the elect of God?" (Romans 8:33). In other words: we are certain that our sins will not be laid to our charge. Likewise, he says of merits: "We know that to them that love God he [sic] will work together all
things for good". (Romans 8:28). Likewise, he says of eternal glory: "I am persuaded that neither things present nor things to come, etc., shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ". (Romans 8:38).

Luther's qualification of St. Bernard's original three points is by way of making all of them relate to the role of faith in the entire scope of the Christian's life. It is not simply that the Spirit

1. Pauck, 1961, p.235. Ficker, Die Scholien, p.198: 'Quia dicit: "Quis accusabit adversus electos Dei ?" q.d. certi sumus, quod pecata nulla nos accusabunt. Item de meritis: "Sciimus, quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia cooperatur in bonum". Item de gloria eterna: "Certus sum, quod nec instantia neque futura etc. poterit nos separare a charitate Dei, que est in Christo".

2. The method of Luther's accommodation of St. Bernard is itself interesting. The most difficult of the three was undoubtedly the second point of the threefold definition of the Spirit's testimony which concerned works. St. Bernard simply says that the Holy Spirit assures man that all his good works have their origin in God, as do the merits of such works in Christ. In other words, the Augustinian point about the primacy of grace is made. This point is not made with any reference to justification and, in fact, assumes that man can perform, by the grace of God and Christ, acts which are meritorious and acceptable. (This is unrelated to St. Bernard's view of the forgiveness of sins, wherein he did stress the place of personal faith - a view which probably initially recommended him to Luther. See Pauck, 1961, intro., p.1). All this is far too ambiguous for Luther's purposes and, accordingly, he interprets St. Bernard's words to mean that the Holy Spirit gives man confidence that good works performed as simul justus et peccator will stand. (See the discussion on Luther's exegesis of v.13, above). The two opinions did not, of course, exactly meet - primarily because Luther seemed to anachronistically assume that St. Bernard knew all about, and agreed with, his doctrine of justification. But to Luther's credit, he did not attempt to make Bernard's statements concerning meritorious works refer to

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bears testimony that these things are so, rather that one must appropriate the Spirit's testimony for oneself by faith. Further, there is expression of the theme which is so frequently present in Luther: that even this 'appropriating faith' is the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Thus for the first time in the history of exegesis, confidence is minutely defined and utilized as the medium of interpreting v.16. Finally, the tension (or 'dynamic quality') in

footnote (1) continued from previous page:

... works done in preparation of justification (see the scholia on Romans 3:21-22, in Pauck, 1961, pp.107ff). The observation that Luther accommodated St.Bernard to his own views does not imply that Luther did so dishonestly. On the one hand, it is known that Luther appreciated St.Bernard for his Augustinianism and his insight into the role of personal faith in obtaining forgiveness of sins. On the other hand, Luther has shown himself, throughout his Lectures on Romans, to be in intellectually painful dialogue with the full range of Western theological tradition. It would seem safe to assume that no man honest enough to grapple seriously with his intellectual inheritance would knowingly misuse his sources - especially a writer such as St. Bernard, with whom Luther believed himself to be in essential agreement.

2. In the scholia, Luther does not comment on v.17, and the interlinear and marginal gloss is very slender indeed. He notes that compati is usually taken as misereri and that this is because it is usually assumed that it is Christ who suffers and we who suffer together (pati simul) with Him. This would seem to suggest that Christians ought somehow participate mystically in the suffering of Christ, thus adding some evidence to the opinion that there was an undercurrent of mysticism in Luther's theology. In any case, the verse is not particularly important to him nor could he have accepted any suggestion of a condition (i.e., suffering) laid
Luther's doctrine of justification gives his exegesis of this verse a breadth which cannot be confined to any single experience or time in the course of the Christian's life. The testimony of the Holy Spirit consists not of one static condition, but of the faith by which one is justified, the faith that one is justified and the faith that one will be justified, all of which might be apprehended at any single moment but not confined to that moment.

Luther's sermons provide yet another important source for researching his interpretation of our passage. What is more, we are particularly fortunate in having not one but two entirely different sermons given by Luther and recorded by George Rörer.¹

footnote (1) continued from previous page:

... upon future glorification. Perhaps it is this which leads him to insist that the Greek word Εἰλημένος really means sì quidem and not sì tamen, which he goes so far as to put in brackets even though it is in the Vulgate text.

¹ George Rörer (1492-1557) was one of the unsung but faithful helpers and scribes of Luther. He had a great deal to do with the recording of Luther's sermons, lectures and Table Talks. His services as a proofreader of Luther's printed works, especially his translation and revisions of the Bible - in an age when printers often thought more of quantity than quality - is of particular historical importance.
One was given on the 8th Sunday after Trinity (the Epistle for this day being Romans 8:12-17) in 1535, and another on the same day in 1544.¹ For our purposes, the dates of these sermons are of more than passing interest; the first was preached ca. 20 years after Luther had lectured on Romans and the second only 2 years before his death. Here then is an opportunity to compare the early Luther with the mature Luther. For although it is obvious that the two (the Lectures and the Sermons) are differently conceived and are delivered in vastly different settings, it is also true that Luther was dedicated to the method of 'Biblical' preaching. Today we would term his sermons 'expository', for he generally follows the Biblical text closely, and the breaks in his sermons correspond to the verses or sentences of the text. Further, he often speaks about the Biblical writers' literary purpose and discusses the meaning of important and/or difficult words and phrases. Except for the fact that one is aware that they are given in a particular social and historical setting (e.g., when he speaks of current problems, he enters into polemic, or addresses his hearers as Ihr), the content and style of Luther's sermons compare

¹ 18 July 1535 and 3 August 1544, respectively.
favorably with a modern 'popular' or 'devotional' commentary written for laymen.¹

Luther's 1535 sermon is by far the most helpful and representative of the two.² He begins by acknowledging the

1. As documents, our modern (German) reconstructions of Luther's sermons command a far lesser degree of credulity than does Ficker's edition of the Lectures on Romans. This must, of course, be the case with any stenographic document, especially when that transcription was taken down in less than an ideal situation, in a mixed Latin and German script, and with no opportunity for the speaker himself to correct the notes. The Weimar Ausgabe of Luther's works, 1883ff, Vol.41, p.381, contains a critical edition of Römer's transcription of the 1535 sermon. Volume 22, pp.131ff contains an early attempt to reconstruct a German manuscript (incorporating idiosyncrasies of Luther's Saxon dialect) from those notes made by Römer. The same is done for the 1544 sermon in Vol.49, pp.525ff, of the Weimar Ausgabe; here the two parts (Römer's stenographic account and the German reconstruction) are more sensibly arranged one above the other on each page. However, neither the document salvaged from Römer's notes nor the German reconstruction of the Weimar lends itself to occasional quoting. Accordingly, the reconstructed German text used throughout is taken from Eduard Ellwein, Luthers Epistel Auslegung, 1. Band, 'Der Römerbrief', Göttingen, 1963. (Cited below as 'Ellwein, 1963').

2. It was also the sermon to find its way into the popular and influential Kirchen-Postille published innumerable times and found, along with Luther's translation of the Bible, in every devout Lutheran home. It was due to the influence of this collection of Luther's sermons that the very word Postille came to mean a collected body of homilies over the set lesson (either Gospel or Epistle), for each Sunday of the year. Prior to this the word simply indicated a gloss or exposition over a limited passage of Scripture. Both Luther's and others' Postilten came to be a mark of Lutheran life. However, because of a reserved attitude toward a set lectionary, this device was not used by Reformed churches - a fact which may partially explain why published collections of Calvin's sermons are so rare.
impossibility of expounding fully every theme Paul touches upon in the passage. Accordingly, while Luther does attempt to explain progressively the meaning of each sentence, he develops a theme which he believes to arise directly out of v.12, and which ties the whole homily together. This theme is announced in the opening sentences of the sermon:

Der Teufel tut dies: Wenn man von dem Evangelium von der Gnade predigt, wie Gott uns ohne unser Verdienst die Sünden vergibt und sich (die Vergebung) nicht mit Geld abkaufen lässt, sondern sie uns aus reiner Gnade schenkt, dann sagt der alte Adam: Wir brauchen nichts Gutes zu tun. Paulus antwortet: Das ist nicht die Meinung, wenn man von der Vergebung der Sünden predigt, dass man (getrost) sündigen dürfe. Denn die Sünde wird nicht dazu vergeben, dass sie (fürderhin) geschehe, sondern dass wir von ihr ablassen.

Luther was, of course, painfully aware of the potential danger inherent in his understanding of the dialectical relationship between Law and Gospel, and he was particularly sensitive to the charge that his doctrine of justification and hence, of Christian liberty, removed from man the obligation to live


righteously. He was even more sensitive to the charge that his doctrine was a license for sin. Inevitably, then, this passage wherein Paul raises the problem of obligation was critical for Luther, for it gave him opportunity to demonstrate unequivocally that he took seriously the necessity of moral exhortation to the end of piety, and moral and ethical improvement and, in this manner, to answer his critics' accusations.

Turning to the attack, he says, 'Nein, wir predigen nicht von der Erlaubnis zum Sündigen, sondern wir predigen von der Vergebung der Sünden'. This is followed by an analysis of Paul's words which is meant to support his claim:


To support his thesis, Luther repeats the central paradox of Christian freedom and appeals to Paul's threat for those who live after the flesh:

Wenn wir nicht durch unsere Werke die Sünden tilgen können, sondern Gott sie uns vergibt: Dann können wir also tun, was wir wollen? Nein. Wollt ihr das tun, so werdet ihr des ewigen Totes sterben.¹

This threat is coupled with the statement that the man who is truly a Christian ought ipso facto to alter his life.²

His listeners could have made no mistake as to what he meant, for, as always, Luther is boldly concrete and personal:


Thus, Luther argued that Christ did not die that the justified go on living as they always had lived or, to put it another way, that the true Christian man ought also be the morally changed man.

2. Ellwein, 1963, p.115. 'Wenn du ein wahrhaftiger Christenmensch bist, dann sollst du dich ändern'.
Other points of interest in Luther's sermon are as follows: 'flesh' at v.13 is defined - in agreement with the view expressed in his Lectures - not simple as base lust, but the original sin with which man is born and with which Christian man continues to struggle throughout life.¹

Verse 14 is again interpreted in the light of v.13; the leading of the Spirit is seen when the flesh is mortified, and, conversely, those who do not mortify the deeds of the flesh are not led by the Spirit. To this Luther adds a homiletic device: the Devil also leads some and his leading results in drunkenness, carousing, gambling, and thievery. The picture of those led by the Spirit is far different:

\begin{quote}
Die Kinder Gottes lassen sich leiten, dass sie sagen: Ich will's gern tun, will nicht ein Körnlein Unrecht tun. Ich will bei meinem Weib und meinen Kindern bleiben und meine Pflicht tun und beten.²
\end{quote}

¹. Ellwein, 1963, p.115: "'Fleisch' ist nicht allein die unflätige Lust, die Hureei usw., sondern alles, was von der Mutter geboren ist, nämlich nicht allein Haut und Haare, sondern auch die Seele. Ein Kind, das geboren ist, ist des Fleisches Frucht'.

Luther also speaks at length about the awesome privilege of being called 'children of God'. It is Luther at his delightful and earthy best when he suggests that man would do well enough to be a person of low estate, or one of God's little creatures, let alone his child:

Ich war's zufrieden, wenn Gott mich einen Bauer sein léesse und mir einen Garten gäbe, Zwetschgen zu essen, und sagte: "Sei mir eine Sau", oder wenn er mich das Elbwasser sein léesse mit den Fischen, oder sagte: "Sei mir ein Schaf". Aber hier nennt er uns nicht eine Sau, sondern seine Kinder'.

Something of the same approach is brought to bear at v,15, for here Luther simply describes the difficult life servants led in 'those days'.


Under such conditions man lived in constant fear, and so it was also under the Mosaic Law. In short, Luther compares

2. Ellwein, 1963, p,117. (Brackets are Ellwein's).
the 'belongingness' of sons with the tenuousness of servants. The interpretation has none of the subtlety seen in the Lectures. The problem of the Παλατίνα is not touched and Πνεύμα in both cases is solved by making δουλείας and νεοθεσίας adjectives (i.e., 'knechtischen Geist ... kindlichen Geist') - an interpretation which was carried through in his translation.¹

Luther's explanation of ᾧβα ὅ Πατὴρ is of interest only insofar as he suggests that the word 'Abba' is an imitation of a child's first attempt to say 'Father'. Theologically he takes the significance of this to be that Christians, as young heirs and without fear, say 'Abba'.²

Luther's 1544 sermon on Romans 8:12-17 is far less balanced and far more polemical than the previous sermon. More than half this later sermon is simply a catalogue of invectives -


2. Luther does not mention v.17 except in this reference. The sermon ends with a spirited exhortation which takes to task those who in time of the present plague ('Pestnot') cry out for the Church's ministry but who earlier neglected the Church.
more or less related to explanation of the text - arrayed against his Protestant and Catholic opponents. There are, however, two developments which are of interest: a broader, more theological definition of 'flesh' than that offered in the first sermon, and a more thoughtful and detailed statement concerning progress in the Christian life.

At the very beginning of his sermon, Luther observes that the effect of Paul's words in Romans 6:4 is much the same as that of 8:12ff: in both places Paul deals with the challenge of the antinomians and others who distort the doctrine of grace. This use of Romans 6:1-11 is of the utmost importance, for Luther, in explaining the need for moral and ethical vigilance, returns again and again to draw upon his interpretation of that passage.¹ The effect of this link with chapter 6 is to stress that there is a tension involved in the spiritual dying and rising with

¹. There are a number of Luther's sermons on this passage (Romans 6:1-11) which have survived. Ellwein's précis on the earliest of these (23 July 1525), p.53, is as follows: 'In der Taufe ist Christi Tod gegenwärtig und reisst alle, die getauft werden, in sich hinein und verschlingt alle Sünden. Wir fahren in Glauben hin, in seinen Tod, der unser Grob ist. Dass uns die Gnade geistlich ertüftet, ist nur ein Durchgang hinein in ein neues Leben, weil wir, wie in den Tod, so auch in die Auferstehung Christi hineingezogen werden. Freilich ist dieser unser Tod nicht vollendet, wie Christi Tod vollendet ist. Wir sterben täglich nach dem alten Adam und erstehen täglich zu einem neuen Leben. Erst wenn wir leiblich gestorben sind, werden wir frei von aller Sünde sein. Dieser Glaube, durch den wir mit Christus sterben und leben, ist nicht unser eigenes Werk, sondern das herrliche Werk der Macht Gottes. In Christi Tod eingepflanzt, werden wir am Jüngsten Tag wiederkommen wie die Engel'.
This tension is in the fact that while Christian man has already been buried and raised with Christ, that burial and resurrection is not yet perfected. Therefore, "Wir sterben täglich nach dem alten Adam und erstehen täglich zu einem neuen Leben". This is essentially the same - although more fully stated - theological rationale for a moral and ethical struggle as that offered in the previous sermon. Man is redeemed to live piously and uprightly, and thus the moment one has ceased to speak of the glories of resurrection one must begin to speak of works. This means that a distinction must be made between the terms forgiveness of sins, sanctification and vivification, for

Die Erlösung ist vollbracht, man bedarf keiner anderen mehr, keines (anderen) Todes und (keiner anderen) Auferstehung Christi mehr. Die sind vollkommen genug. Aber dass in uns der Sauerteig durch den ganzen Teig gehe und der ganze Mensch die Auferstehung erfahre, das ist ein ander Werk.

2. Ellwein, 1963, p.120.
This tension, or to use Luther's own Biblical image, this 'leavening of the lump', is resolved in the Christian now only by faith and in the future only by death. Therefore, in the day to day struggle with the 'flesh', the Christian man, while confident and full of hope, can never make the error of the antinomians, i.e., make man certain of his position and thus unauthentically resolve the tension. It is the 'flesh' in man which wants to be certain. But since we still carry the burden of 'flesh', we can never be certain. We must be content to live out daily the tension of burial and resurrection, to grapple with the flesh and allow the Holy Spirit to work his work of leavening. And if we are tempted to fool ourselves (along with the antinomians and Schwärmer), we ought to be reminded that Paul speaks in Romans 8:13 to Christians, not heathens. We can never escape the necessity of daily dying and rising with Christ.

This inevitable, and indeed necessary tension, when taken together with Luther's well-known doctrine of Christian

1. Ellwein, 1963, p.120: 'Was die Erlösung und Seligmachung angeht, hat sie Christus in vollkommener Weise vollbracht. Aber du hast sie noch nicht vollkommen empfangen. So stark der Glaube und die Zuversicht auf Christus ist, so weit ist der Tod getötet und die Heiligung geschehen'.
liberty, constitutes what Luther calls the 'royal middle course' ('kö niglichen Mittelweg'), avoiding extremes on either side. The ambiguity reflected in that term accurately reflects an unresolvable theological ambiguity which immediately becomes apparent wherever Luther speaks about the basis and content of the Christian's obligation: the motivation for, and the ethical quality of correct Christian behavior is to be found in the nature of man's redemption. The tension involved in a redemption which is to be had now by faith, but which looks to the future for its perfecting, is to be reflected in the daily moral and ethical struggle of the Christian to put to death the flesh. In this way he realizes daily the effect of his baptism; i.e., he is buried and rises with Christ. Therefore, there can be no straightforward claim upon the Christian except that which arises directly out of this relationship with God. That he is under obligation to live a life which is morally and ethically upright, that he is to be pious, that he is to do good works, every true Christian acknowledges and is revealed in the law; the source of that obligation is to be sought in what has happened to Christian man in the redemption which has begun in him and in the completion of the redemption which lies before him.

No other document from Luther's hand exceeds in lasting influence and importance, either theologically or
literally, his translation of the Bible. He labored at it incessantly and after the first complete German Bible was published (1534), he saw through eleven subsequent editions, many of which contained extensive revisions, the last of which (1546) was printed after his death. The first edition of the New Testament, however, was published in 1522. The following is a comparison of this first edition and last revision:  

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1. Taken from the Weimar Ausgabe, Vol. 7, pp. 52-53.
What is above all significant about Luther's translations of this passage is the indecisiveness with which \( \Pi \nu \epsilon \varepsilon \mu \alpha \nu \) is translated in v.15. As we have seen in consideration of his 1535 sermon, Luther at times took both \( \delta \omega \upsilon \delta \epsilon \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \) and \( \nu \iota \omicron \theta \epsilon \zeta \varsigma \iota \varsigma \) as adjectives and \( \Pi \nu \epsilon \varepsilon \mu \alpha \nu \) in both cases as 'state of mind' or 'attitude'. In the 1546 revision of his translation, he seems to vacillate and, by spelling 'Geist' with a large 'G', seems to indicate that the second use of \( \Pi \nu \epsilon \varepsilon \mu \alpha \nu \) refers to the Holy Spirit. However, while Luther is not always consistent on this point, the impact of his interpretation of v.15 is to reject the traditional view of the two contrasting uses of \( \Pi \nu \epsilon \varepsilon \mu \alpha \nu \). This is clearly reflected by Luther's translation wherein 'aber mal' is taken closely with 'fürchten müsstet' rather than 'empfangen'.

There are other minor points of translation which amount to interpretation. Among these are the following:

- the strongly passive interpretation of \( \alpha \rho \omicron \upsilon \tau \alpha \lambda \) as 'treibet'.
- the assumption that διανηρίσθη is a translation of αχαίadapted

- the weakening of the conditional particle εκλήθη

(discussed above in connection with Luther's Lectures on Romans) by the use of the conjunction 'doch' (1546 revision), which replaces the idiomatic phrase 'so wyr anders' (1522 revision).

Finally, while Luther's translation also contains an economic gloss (printed in the margin) there are no notes on our passage. The fact of this absence is of importance, for in subsequent generations it became popular for Biblical expositors to publish special editions of Luther's text which expanded Luther's gloss considerably, thereby not only associating the prestige of Luther's translation with their own views, but subtly (and sometimes even deceitfully) suggesting that their own marginal explanations reflected those of Luther. One or two examples of these annotated Bibles will be reviewed later.
Melanchthon.

Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560) contributed a greater wealth of writing on the Epistle to the Romans than any other reformer. Taking over from Luther, he lectured on the Epistle during the Wittenberg period of his life. During this time, he saw published a number of works which contributed to the eventual formulation of a very special hermeneutic for the interpretation of Romans.\(^1\) This search for Romans' own proper hermeneutic finds its roots in Melanchthon's commitment to the use of classical forms of literary criticism:

Melanchthon geht von dem fruchtbaren Grundsatz aus, dass man ein literarisches Werk allein dann richtig versteht, wenn man es nach denselben Gesichtspunkten interpretiert, mit deren Hilfe es erzeugt worden ist.\(^2\)

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1. These included the following: an edition of the Greek text of Romans with marginal notes (1520); annotations on both Romans and Corinthians (1522); and the Dispositio orationis in Epistola Pauli ad Romanos (1529). See Rolf Schäfer, 'Melanchthons Hermeneutik im Römerbrief Kommentar vor 1532', in ZTK, 1963, pp.216ff (hereafter cited as 'Schäfer, ZTK').

Briefly, the Gesichtspunkt from which Romans was written was, according to Melanchthon, that of classic rhetorical literary structure. Working from the traditional principles governing rhetoric, Melanchthon constructed an outline of Romans which reflected the literary structure of disputation and other adjacent forms. Schäfer summarizes the outline—which summarizes, in itself, Melanchthon's findings—as follows:

1. Melanchthon wavered in regard to the basic issue which this conclusion presupposes, i.e., whether or not Paul knowingly wrote the Epistle according to the rules of rhetoric or if, for that matter, Paul knew the rhetorical method. He concluded, 'Obgleich von Hause aus illitteratis, habe der Apostel doch nach gesundem Menschenverstand seinen Stoff so ausgebreitet, dass der "Hörer" nach einer gewissen Ordnung belehrt und dass nichts Sachfremdes mit der Sache selbst vermischt wird'. (Schäfer, ZTK, p.218). Later, however, Melanchthon altered this modest appraisal of Paul's knowledge and ascribed a higher degree of conscious method to his writing of Romans. Melanchthon's reluctance to content himself with the linguistic testing of his fundamental premise leads him to superimpose an essentially foreign and wooden structure on Paul's Epistle, instead of allowing the text to suggest its own structure. There is no doubt, however, that Melanchthon's beginning insight into the similarities between the form of formal Greek speech and certain parts of Paul's Epistles was a brilliant one. The degree to which Melanchthon was in advance of his times is rather strikingly illustrated when it is recalled that Rudolph Bultmann wrote his doctoral dissertation on precisely this issue (Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe, Göttingen, 1910).
Er gliedert den Brief in 4 Haupteile, die er sogar gelegentlich als "Bücher" bezeichnet. Das erste (Röm 1,8 bis 5,11) ist das wichtigste, denn es enthält die eigentlich disputatio. Das zweite (Röm 5,12 - 8,39) klärt in einer analysis oder methodus die drei Hauptbegriffe Sünde, Gesetz und Gnade, die im ersten vorkommen. Der dritte Teil (Röm 9-11) beantwortet einige Fragen und Einwände. Der Vierte endlich (Röm 12-15) enthält sittliche Weisungen.¹

The second main part (Rom. 5:12-8:39) does not follow the form of rhetoric, strictly speaking, but rather of dialectic.² Our passage, however, played only a minor role in Melanchthons outline, for it was not a part of the third major member of the 'analysis' (i.e., 'gratia', Romans 8:1-8), but rather found itself in the peroratio ('winding up') which consisted

¹. Schäffer, ZTK, p.220.

². That this section is, according to Melanchthon, a discussion of the three themes: sin, law and grace, and that Melanchthon's loci communes theologici were precisely the same is no accident. The fact of this correlation gives weight to those who would suggest that Melanchthon's commentary on Romans is an apology for the Reformation, designed to convince the Biblical humanists of the congruency of classical learning and Reformation doctrine. Or, put crassly, Melanchthon's commentary on Romans was Luther, dressed up in classical clothing and offered for sale to Erasmus.
of vv. 9-39. The outline of this section, insofar as vv. 12-17 are concerned, is as follows:

1. adhortatio 8, 9-16.
   paraskeue, apostrophe 8, 9f.
   propositio 8, 12

   1. ratio a poenis et praemius 8, 13.
   2. ratio a causa efficienti 8, 14f.
      maior 8, 14
      minor 8, 15

2. consolatio 8, 17-39
   a. gradatio 8, 17a.
   b. propositio 8, 17b ...

Melanchthon's work over the years on the structure of Romans found its fulfilment in a commentary (published in 1532)

1. Rolf Schäfer, ed., Römerbrief-Kommentar 1532, Vol. V, in Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl, Robert Stupperich, ed., Gütersloh, 1965. The outline is taken from 'Beilage I: Disposition', p. 376. Schäfer's edition of this text is the best and most critical available; it is from this edition that quotations in this paper are taken (hereafter referred to as 'Schäfer, 1965,' with the page number).
which interpreted the Epistle's theological content in a way consistent with that structure.\textsuperscript{1} It is to that commentary we now turn.

Throughout his commentary on chapter 8, it is clear that Melanchthon is greatly dependent upon Lutheran categories. On vv. 5 and 6, for example, he is careful to define flesh in such a way as to include what the terms καὶ ἐσμεν. The importance of this is, of course, the inclusion of 'reason' under the inheritance of sin. On the phrase τὸ ἀρχαίον ἔργα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος in v. 6, he says:

\[\text{1. While it is true that, as we have seen, St. Thomas also attempted to reduce Romans to a logically argued document, there is a decided difference between his method and that of Melanchthon; St. Thomas simply applied the Scholastic method to the Latin text. Melanchthon, on the other hand, attempted to deduce his breakdown of the Greek text on the basis of principles which the text itself (initially, at least) suggested. That is, he sought to find a hermeneutic which was consistent with the writer's original intention. Viewed in this light, Melanchthon's interpretation of Romans is, as much as anything, a concrete protest against Scholasticism's methods, for, 'Diese nämlich pflückt aus dem Zusammenhang der literarischen Einheit einzelne Sätze heraus, isoliert sie und vermag deshalb deren Sinn ebensowenig zu erschliessen, wie aus dem herumliegenden Trümmerwerk der Statue die Schönheit des unversehrten Kunstwerks beurteilt werden kann'. (Schäfer, ZTK, p. 218).}\]
"The mind of flesh is death" ought to be understood as concerning knowledge or the judgment of reason and of all effects which exist in human nature without the Holy Spirit. For Paul embraces, as I have said before, ἀνόητον καὶ ἐφαρμοστόν, reason, sense and appetite. And he means that neither the deliberation of reason nor any human impulse or emotion makes the heart alive before the wrath and judgement of God. Philosophy, public laws, and even the very law of God "is death". That is, does not enliven the heart before the wrath of God, since reason embraces, conceives, and forces these things to be done.¹

This definition is essentially Luther's earmarked by the dogged insistence that every human effort (especially reason) neither arising out of faith nor motivated by the Holy Spirit is declared 'flesh' by Paul.² But, if φρόνυμα τῆς σαρκός

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1. Schafer, 1965, p.233: "Sensus carnis mors est" intelligi debet de cognitione seu judicio rationis et de affectibus omnibus, quia in natura humana existunt sine spiritu sancto. Complectitur enim Paulus, ut antea dixi, ἀνόητον καὶ ἐφαρμοστόν, rationem, sensum et appetitum. Et significat, quod neque cogitatio rationis neque ullus humanus conatus aut affectus vivificet cor adversus iram et judicium Dei. Philosophia, leges publicae, immodipsa lex Dei "mors est", i.e. non vivificat cor adversus iram et judicium Dei, cum ratio haec tenet, cogitatur et conatur facere'.

2. For example, on v.6a, Melanchthon says: 'But Paul here ought to be understood as meaning those thoughts and movements which human nature has towards God without the Holy Spirit and without faith, (Verum Paulus hic intelligi debet de illis cognitionibus et motibus, quos natura humana habet erga Deum sine spiritu sancto et sine fide'). Schafer, 1965, p.233.
is all that which lies outside faith, then, on the positive side, 
*φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος* is '...faith, which the Holy Spirit effects in the heart, enlivens and consoles the heart in the judgement of God....'¹

While Melanchthon agrees completely with Luther as to the centrality of faith and that it is impossible to '... please God without faith and without the Holy Spirit'² and that, therefore, the definition of 'flesh' must necessarily be a wide one,³ his understanding of justification varies from that of Luther in terms of the goal of justification:

1. Schäfer, 1965, p.233: '...fides, quam in corde efficit spiritus sanctus, vivificat et consolatur cor in judicio Dei....'

2. Schäfer, 1965, p.234 (re: Romans 8:8): '...tamen non/ placent Deo sine fide et sine spiritu sancto'. (brackets are ours).

3. Schäfer, 1965, p.234: '... all who have not this spirit of God are in the flesh, therefore flesh is whatever being borne we bring with us, namely sense and reason. And because below he testifies that he is speaking of the spirit which men receive, he shows that the Holy Spirit is not a part of reason which is born with us'. ('*... omnes, qui non hunc spiritum Dei habent, in carne esse. Caro igitur est, quidquid nascentes nobiscum afferimus, sc. sensus et ratio. Et quia infra testatur se loqui de spiritu, quem accipiunt homines, ostendit spiritum sanctum non esse partem rationis, quae nobiscum nascitur*'). This comment, made in reference to v.9a, might well have been taken literally from Luther.
Ging es [i.e., the Zielpunkt of Justification] nach Luther letztlich um Gottes Ehre, so trat bei Melanchthon der Trost des geängsteten Gewissens ganz stark in den Vordergrund. Dass die terrores conscientiae beseitigt werden, Heilsglauben, ja Heilsgewissheit geschaffen wird, darauf fiel all der Ton. So sehr das an sich gut lutherisch ist, so unverkennbar ist doch, dass hier, verglichen mit Luther, eine leise anthropozentrische und zugleich eine leise eudemonistische Erweischung erfolgt.¹

This difference between Luther and Melanchthon has far-reaching ramifications which are, in turn, reflected in Melanchthon's interpretation of chapter 8. For example, it is of interest that Melanchthon considers vv.17-39 to be primarily concerned with consolation, i.e., the Trost des geängsteten Gewissens.²


2. Throughout his exegesis of Romans 8:17ff, Melanchthon, while fully acknowledging the reality of earthly and cosmic threats made upon Christians, tends to internalize all such threats in such a way as to make them impinge primarily upon the individual conscience. An example of this is his interpretation of the words τὴν γὰρ ἐλπίδα τὸ θεώμενον ••• (v.24a): 'The 4th argument is taken from formal cause, i.e., from the mode of salvation that, namely therefore we ought to tolerate afflictions because we have been saved, having accepted the promises through faith, nevertheless liberation and fulfilment of the promises is still awaited ... That is, although we still feel that we have sinned, and although we are still vexed by the terrors of sins of the world and of the devil, and although we are oppressed by death and other afflictions, nevertheless it
Again, his definition of 'mortification' (as he interprets the words ἐὰν δὲ Χριστός ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν in v.10) is indicative of the importance in Melanchthon's theology of the terrores conscientiae on one hand and the consolatio of the Holy Spirit on the other:

And "mortification" ought to be understood as concerning the succession of terrors and sorrows, to wit with respect to true penitence and true afflictions. But mortification ought not be called the diligence of coercing the flesh, which is made possible by reason, such as philosophers and monks perform ... This abstinence is not death because it is certainly a work of reason. But mortification is suffering torment and such affliction which would extinguish nature unless we behooves us to feel that we are pleasing to God through Christ and that we shall not perish on account of those evils'. ('Quartum argumentum sumptum est ex causa formalī, videlicet a modo salvationīs, quod sc. ideo tolerare afflictiones debeamus, quia ita solvi facti simus acceptis promissionibus per fīdem, ut tamen adhuc exspectetur liberatio et eventus promissionum .... H.e. etiamsi adhuc sentimus nos habere peccatum, etiamsi adhuc vexamus terroribus peccati, mundi et diaboli, etiamsi morte et aliis afflictionibus oppressi sumus, tamen sentire oportet, quod placeamus Deo propter Christum et quod propter illa mala non simus perīturī'. Schäfer, 1965, pp.239f). It is in a place such as this that Schmidt's criticism of anthropocentric and eudemonistic tendencies in Melanchthon's doctrine of justification can be documented.
were sustained by the consolation of the Holy
Spirit through the word of God. 

Therefore, mortification can find its source in
terrors induced by the Devil, principalities, powers (both earthly
and spiritual) or by God himself (in which case it is to be
considered a paternal chastisement imposed upon believers for their
own good). It is not surprising then, that Melanchthon interprets
the threats referred to in vv.17-39 in the context of 'mortification'.

Now that these definitions have been noted, we
move on to Melanchthon's extremely brief commentary on our
passage. 

Melanchthon's comments on vv.12-14 are not only
exceedingly brief but also lacking in any real profundity. As can be

seriis terroribus et doloribus, videlicet de vera poenitentia
et de veris afflictionibus. Nec mortificatio vocanda est
diligentia coercendi corpus, quam praestat ratio, sicut etiam
philosophi et monachi .... Sed haec abstinentia non est mors,
quae est certum opus rationis. At mortificatio est passio et
talis afflictio, quae naturam extingueret, nisi sustentaremur
consolatione spiritus sancti per verbum Dei'.

2. In Schäfer's edition, the comments to vv.12-17 extend to only
41 lines, and the format of this edition ('Studienausgabe') is
very small indeed.
seen from the outline (above), he clearly perceives the break at v.12 and the exhortative nature of the sentences which follow. He neglects to point out that believers are debtors to the Spirit, and simply emphasizes instead that the readers are to live according to the Spirit, not to the flesh. He does, however, see the central problem of the verse:

... the emphasis is on the word "debtors", for that signifies that it is requisite to act well.¹

Unfortunately, he does not explain what he means by this.

Verse 13 he understands as simply a support, drawn from 'penalties and rewards', for the statement in v.12. His analysis of the Christian's earthly predicament is surprisingly old-fashioned:

Here Paul confesses that there are, in the saints, actions of the flesh and evil impulses: but, still saints do not follow these impulses and hence it can be construed which sins are mortal and which venial.²

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He does not comment at all on v.14, but simply contents himself with a paraphrase of v.14 ('The sons of God are led by the Spirit of God') and of v.15 ('Having accepted the Holy Spirit you have become sons') and noting that, taken together, they form the major and minor premises in a proof taken from 'efficient causality' in support of v.12.

Having reviewed Luther's profound struggle with the problem of the ethical life of the Christian, we might well be puzzled at Melanchthon's aridity on these verses. There is, however, an obvious historical solution. We have seen that for Luther the source of ethical obligation can be pushed back no further than the new creation wrought in the individual believer at the point of his having been justified by faith. Thus, for Luther, justification and sanctification are present in the same moment. But Melanchthon's understanding of the doctrine of justification robbed Luther's original formulation of its unity, as the following concise analysis offered by Schmidt points out:


Melanchthon held like Luther, that with the forgiveness of the sins through God also always a heart-renewing activity of the Holy Spirit begins. But he put the justification of the comfort of the conscience purely in accordance with Anselm of Canterbury very strictly as forensic justice, as imputative justification ... On this was also already based against the Catholic doctrine of the real justification of man the main tone. From here the question of justification became much harder as it was not any more so organically linked with justification as at Luther; the "Christus in uns" Luthers went back. Justification should only follow the belief in the forgiveness of sin ... God promises to the believer also his Holy Spirit; but even so fallen justification and justification still chronologically and not any more logically together.

With this analysis in mind and returning to Melanchthon's exegesis of vv.12-14, we are immediately struck by the absence of detail concerning the 'inner man', the 'spirit' or the awful conflict in the 'whole man'. That the Holy Spirit is given those who are justified is, of course, assumed by Melanchthon; but whereas Luther repeatedly stressed that the gift of the spirit makes possible the conflict within the whole man, Melanchthon reduces the effect of the Spirit's presence in the believer largely to the

ministry of consolation. It is in these terms that he interprets the contrast of v.15: \( \pi\varepsilon\gamma\nu\alpha\varsigma \delta\omicron\upsilon\omicron\epsilon\iota\varsigma \) has reference to 'terrors' such as those experienced under the law, when the conscience is taught to fear. The new situation of the believer (suggested by the words \( \varepsilon\lambda\alpha\beta\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon \pi\nu\varepsilon\gamma\eta \nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\iota\omicron\epsilon\iota\varsigma \) ) is in the effect of the Gerechterklärung on the terrorized conscience:

Paul means, moreover, that a new word has been handed down which frees us from those terrors, because it remits sins and therefore with that word the Holy Spirit is given, who consoles and liberates hearts from terror.¹

No clearer example could be found of this distinctive element of Melanchthon's theology. While the contrast between the effect of the old Law and that of the new Word is, in itself, an insightful and tidy conceptualization, it fails to take into account the ministry of the Spirit to the Christian who is struggling with the forces which attempt to keep him from positive ethical action.

¹ Schöffler, 1965, p.236: 'Significat autem Paulus novum verbum traditum esse, quod liberat nos ab illis terroribus, quia remitti peccata. Ideoque cum illo verbo datur spiritus sanctus, qui consolatur et liberat corda a terroribus'.
Having come this far, it was perhaps inevitable that Melanchthon would interpret the 'testimony of the Spirit' (v.16) as the 'impulse' (motus) of the Holy Spirit by which Christians turn to God and invoke Him when their hearts are aroused in terror and danger. They then receive 'consolation and life'.

Melanchthon's treatment of the theme of consolation begins in earnest with v.17 and continues on throughout the remainder of the chapter; thus, it goes almost without saying that the suffering spoken of in v.17 is the terror so often referred to above. In contrast with the other exegetes of this era, Melanchthon's distinctive and detailed development of the terror/consolation motif allows him to bring a new understanding to Paul's words concerning 'suffering with Christ'. This new understanding is primarily a psychological one and, evaluated in psychological terms, it offers a profound insight, i.e., the believer must suffer, in his own inner and spiritual existence, the terrors of the Cross and the attendant threat of estrangement from God as did Christ. Thus, although v.17 is not taken precisely as literal, the necessity of suffering - in the unique sense in which Melanchthon defines it - is more strongly

1. Schäfer, 1965, p.236: 'Id autem fit, quando corda in terroribus et periculus erigunt se fide et recipiunt consolationem et vitam'.

and centrally stressed than in perhaps any exegete we have yet encountered. In fact, the categories drawn from v.17 invade the exegesis of the four verses preceding by way of making them refer to the suffering of a terrorized conscience.
Johann Bugenhagen was yet another contemporary and confederate of Luther. He was, however, closer to the affections of Luther than most of those who surrounded him. From 1523 until shortly after Luther's death, Bugenhagen was Stadtpfarrer of Wittenburg and personal chaplain (in an informal sense) to Luther. Not only did he assist Luther in his translation of the Bible, but he was an influential writer and exegete of Scripture in his own right. Further, he was no camp follower; his commitment to the study of the Bible and his interest in a reformation of the Church clearly antedate his acquaintance with Luther. In his early years he was influenced rather by Erasmus and the humanist ideals. Thus he had already rejected Scholasticism and had begun to lecture on Scripture well before reading Luther's tracts.

Perhaps Bugenhagen's greatest claim to an important place in the

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1. He is often referred to in the literature as 'Dr. Pomeranus' (or 'Pommer')—in reference to his place of birth (Pomerania).

2. A measure of Bugenhagen's place as friend and pastor to Luther is the fact that it was he who gave the eulogy at Luther's funeral.
history of the Reformation was his significant role as organizer of the Reformed Church in several states of northern Germany and, upon invitation from King Christian II, in all of Denmark, including a complete reorganization of Copenhagen University.

Although a formidable man and a reformer of significant historical importance, Bugenhagen's rather considerable body of writings has not attracted a great deal of modern interest. While there is evidence to suggest that his printed lectures, commentaries and tracts (many in the vernacular and obviously directed at a largely lay public) were read with great interest and exerted their share of local influence, the noticeable absence of interest in his writings in modern times is clear proof that Bugenhagen's place in history was not earned by the merit of his writings. Accordingly, the review of his commentary on our passage which follows, is merely a summary of certain parts, with primary emphasis on Bugenhagen's closeness to Luther.

1. Jo. Pomerani in D. Pauli ad Romanos Epistolam, The Hague, 1531 (referred to as 'Bugenhagen, 1531'). The portion of this commentary relevant to our passage is contained on pp. 84-91, but pagination appears only on one page (the right, as the book is open and facing the reader) of each opening.
As we shall see later, it became commonplace for Reformation exegetes who had also been influenced by humanistic principles of literary criticism to offer a more or less technical analysis of what they perceived to be a new kind of material beginning with v.12 of our passage. We have seen, for example, that Melanchthon labelled this section a peroratio. Bugenhagen uses what is virtually a synonym, saying that 'this all' is an Epilologus. Further, he suggests by allusion that this 'winding up' is directly related to Romans 6, as Luther consistently held both in his Lectures and in his sermons on this passage. Finally, Bugenhagen understands the words of vv.12ff to be set in the context of an exhortation. This group of observations became almost the standard thing for Reformation exegetes to say. (So much is this the case that throughout our subsequent view of exegetes during this period it will be necessary only to mention the fact).

1. Bugenhagen, 1531, p.84: 'Hic Epilologus est omnium....' He does not, however, indicate precisely where the Epilologus leaves off, but from the nature of the commentary which follows, it can safely be assumed that he meant vv.12-39 of chapter 8, as was also the case in Melanchthon's commentary.
In content, Bugenhagen's interpretation of v.12 is remarkably similar to that of Luther's two sermons (1535 and 1544) reviewed earlier. Verse 12 directly raises the issue of obligation, but because Paul leaves unspoken the positive obligation of Christians, there is a possibility of misunderstanding and Bugenhagen sets out to clearly elucidate the problem. It would be wrong, says Bugenhagen, to assume from this verse that because freedom of conscience has been proclaimed (in justification), we are not only free from Satan and impiety but also from God and righteousness.¹ This, of course, is a corrupted view of Christian liberty: freedom is not a license to sin; Christian liberty consists of freedom from sin and freedom to serve God.² This emphasis and interpretation is completely Lutheran. In fact, throughout his commentary Bugenhagen makes it clear that he is greatly indebted to Luther - whether directly or indirectly - for his interpretation.³

1. Bugenhagen, 1531, p.84. His precise words are: '...nam ubi audire praedicaret libertatem conscientiae, statim cogitabit se fore, non solum liberam a Sathana et impietate, sed etiam a Deo et justicia.'

2. Bugenhagen, 1531, pp.84f.

3. Precisely how Bugenhagen knew of Luther's interpretation on specific passages is unknown. It seems to the writer that Bugenhagen was likely to have access to Luther's private notes (which he prepared for the Lectures on Romans), but there is no compelling external or internal support for such a conclusion.
Bugenhagen's dependence upon Luther is again clearly shown in his exegesis of v.13. Here he defines the phrase κατὰ σαρκίνα ἑντε as living according to the carnis sapientiam, and expands the notion of 'flesh' to include human reason. Like Luther, he refuses to permit the reduction of 'flesh' simply to external sins (e.g., fornication and drunkenness). In purely Christian terms, the contrasting members of v.13 are to be understood as human prudence and the Word. The sin of the flesh is in living, thinking, and existing according to the prudence of the flesh rather than according to the Word of God.

Throughout his commentary, Bugenhagen gives away the fact that he is a preacher, for many of his comments are essentially homilies. Not unlike some medieval expositors, Bugenhagen uses the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden to elucidate his views on v.13. In particular, it is the word which reminds Bugenhagen of God's command (Genesis 3:3): 'You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree ... lest you die'. Bugenhagen's

1. As with Luther, Bugenhagen prefers the term 'prudence' (prudentia) to 'wisdom' (sapientia) in translating the phrase.
use of the story, however, is far richer than medieval usage: the
divine mandate is the Word of God and the first couple's
disobedience was caused by their following human prudence rather
than God's Word.¹ This kind of exposition is quite typical of
Bugenhagen's commentary.

Rather surprisingly, Bugenhagen takes \( \tau \nu \nu \mu \nu \lambda \tau \nu \) (v.13) as the spirit of Christ or of God, in contrast to Luther.
He follows Luther, however, by insisting that \( \pi \rho \alpha \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \tau \omicron \sigma \eta \omicron \mu \acute{\alpha} \tau \omicron \sigma \) (he reads \textit{facta corporis} but interprets it as \textit{carnis}) refers to
internal and not external concupiscence.

Bugenhagen's comment on v.14 is primarily of interest
for its repetition of Luther's view of Christian liberty: to be led
by the spirit of God is perfect freedom. When our hearts defer to
God's leading, we experience the most joyous course of life.²

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¹ Bugenhagen, 1531, pp. 85f.
² Bugenhagen, 1531, p.86. Bugenhagen's actual words are:
'\textit{Verum ne quis dicat: Si trahimur, ergo non est
libertas ? Recte. Haec tracto miro quodam sit gaudio,
et cordis dilatatione in Deo...}.'
Bugenhagen follows Luther (and thus Augustine) in interpreting v.14 essentially in the terms set out in vv.12 and 13. To be led by the Spirit is to mortify the works of the flesh and not to live according to the wisdom of the flesh. Further, and more importantly, it is the Spirit who makes possible the fundamental reconciliation between God and man:

Just as the Son is of one flesh with the father and the wife and husband are of one flesh, so the Spirit makes us and God one, that is, so that we are his sons, and he himself is in truth our Father.

As we shall see later, this Augustinian/Lutheran interpretation of v.14 (i.e., that part b of v.14 is the result of part a) becomes one of two major ways — among Reformation exegetes — of understanding the two parts of this sentence (v.14); the other is identical with Calvin, who saw the leading of the Spirit (part a of v.14) as proof or evidence of sonship (part b).

Bugenhagen's commentary on v.15 is extremely lengthy but incorporates very little of major importance. Most significant

1. Bugenhagen, 1531, p.86: 'Quemadmodum filius carnalis unam habet carnem cum patre, et uxor et maritus sunt una caro: Sic, Cumus spiritus nos et Deum unum facit, id est, ut nos simus filii eius, ipse vero pater noster'.
is the continuation of two tendencies which we also saw in Luther's interpretation of this verse. Those two tendencies are: (a) a degree of equivocation as to how the two occurrences of Πνεῦμα ought to be defined;¹ and (b) a movement away from the traditional interpretation of the two contrasting situations (i.e., that two historical eras and thus two distinct peoples are being spoken of in v.15). As a result of this de-historicization, one sees a movement toward making the contrast a paradigm of Christian man's own personal spiritual pilgrimage. (Put rather boldly, Luther saw his own legalistic attempt at self-justification as a monk as Πνεῦμα διαθέτεις and his Turnermühle as τὰ υἱόθεσίας.

The traditional view, which took ἡδὲ as a clue that Paul was here speaking about two, clearly defined historical dispensations is expanded to meet the specifications of Luther's familiar hermeneutics of 'Law and Gospel'. This expansion, however, destroyed the strict chronology of the traditional interpretation - as did also the medieval introduction of the category of fear at

¹. It ought to be noted that this holds true not just for v.15, but for the entire chapter. There is no other point at which Luther is so free as in his definitions of Πνεῦμα.
v.15. The important point, however, is that Luther's interpretation is most consistent when $\Pi\nu\varepsilon\tau\mu\alpha$ (v.15) is taken in the sense of 'state of mind' or 'attitude'.

Bugenhagen interprets v.15 entirely in these terms. In defining $\Pi\nu. \sigma\omicron\upsilon\lambda\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\varsigma$ and $\Pi\nu. \nu\iota\omicron\Theta\omicron\varepsilon\varsigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ he simply says: 'See, there is one spirit in servants and another in sons'. And as if to make it expressly clear what he means by 'spirit', he adds the only German phrase in his entire commentary on this passage: 'Eyn ander mut und synn' (mut here is used not in the sense of 'courage', but 'state of mind').

1. It was, of course, possible to understand $\Pi\nu. \nu\iota\omicron\Theta\omicron\varepsilon\varsigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ as the Holy Spirit since, as we have seen above in Bugenhagen's exegesis of v.14, it is the Holy Spirit who makes reconciliation between God and man possible. This is illustrated by Luther's translation, 'knechtlichen geist' and 'kindlichen Geist' (1546 revision). Even here, however, it is interesting that Luther spells the second 'Geist' with a large 'G' and the first with a small 'g' even though the two phrases are otherwise parallel.

2. Bugenhagen, 1531, p.86.

3. Bugenhagen, 1531, p.86.
Bugenhagen's picture of man living with a bad conscience is, up to a point, extremely traditional: man under the law lives perpetually with a bad conscience and, like a criminal, is constantly terrorized by the possibility of punishment for his sins. Under the Law man does not turn to God, but rather he flees from God's wrath, which is incurred by transgression of the Law. We see this perfectly illustrated in Adam, who hid from God after he had sinned. He then goes on to make the more Lutheran point: the real problem of life under the law is that the law cannot justify. We see this, he says, in the Church of Rome for all the statutes of the Pope, all the carnal practices of 'Romism', such as fasting, praying, chanting and the building of divine edifices for dedication to the saints, simply increase, rather than gain absolution from sin. In short, it is no more possible to be justified under the law which was given to the Jews than under the laws of Rome.

1. Bugenhagen, 1531, p.87.
2. Bugenhagen, 1531, p.87.
Bugenhagen offers a very full and lengthy interpretation of v.16; while he offers no specific insights which are compelling, it is of the utmost importance to mark the general care with which he treats definitions of terms used in this verse. It is characteristic of all the Reformation exegetes who were influenced by the humanists (and particularly by Erasmus) that they are highly interested in classical and neo-classical conceptions of anthropology. In particular, they are interested in the relationships of anthropological definitions to ethical motivation. Verse 16 then, where Paul speaks of auto to PNEUMA SUM—MARTYREL T. PNEUMATI HUMV is, precisely because the words are suggestive and are set in the context (vv.12-14) of exhortation to ethical obedience, a rare opportunity to attempt to correlate neo-classical conceptions of anthropology with the Christian idea of the Holy Spirit, especially as it relates to ethical motivation.

Bugenhagen's own individual attempt at this reconstruction is, as we have said, not particularly compelling but is highly interesting. He simply defines spirit ('... est excellenter hominis pars'), soul ('Anima vero est, ea vis omnis,
qua, vivificatur totum corpus ....'), and the body ("...totum illud externum est...."). But it is not these definitions which are critical, for they are commonplace. Rather, the relationship of the Holy Spirit to Πνεῦμα ἡμῶν is significant. Bugenhagen's answer to this problem supplies a philosophical basis for Luther's theological understanding of this passage (see above). Πνεῦμα ἡμῶν is that superior part of man, i.e., 'understanding', which is illuminated by the Holy Spirit, with whom the human spirit is made one, and apart from whom the souls of man are without 'understanding'.

There are three important implications to this suggestion: while Πνεῦμα is evidently native to human nature, there is considerable ambiguity in all attempts to distinguish soul and spirit in any manner other than function or degree; further, this human spirit, as understood now in terms of Reformation theology, is the result of a certain merging of two elements, i.e., the Holy Spirit and 'our spirit'; and thus the

1. Bugenhagen, 1531, p. 90.

2. Bugenhagen, 1531, p. 90. The wording of this crucial passage is: 'Spiritus, est excellenter hominis pars id est, intellectus, illuminatus Spiritu sancto, et cum eo unum factus, de quo animales homines nesciunt ....'
explicit suggestion is made that soul finds its completion in spirit. ¹

Further, this configuration of definitions offered by Bugenhagen is internally shaped by Luther's doctrine of the Word. Such an understanding leaves open the possibility of an insidious quasi-Gnosticism, in which the enlightening of Πνεῦμα effects salvation. As if to avoid the possibility of such an interpretation, Bugenhagen is swift to point out that rather than being the instrument of salvation, the enlightened Πνεῦμα becomes the domicile of faith and of God (domus fidei et Dei), because the Logos of God and the Holy Spirit have 'enabled' it. ² On the other hand, it is the dwelling

1. While Paul is not at all consistent in his use of Πνεῦμα when applying it to man, Eduard Schweizer is probably right in concluding that all of these ideas are foreign to Paul's understanding of anthropology. See Spirit of God, London, 1960, pp.84ff (Vol.IX in the series, Bible Key Words, A.E. Harvey, trans).

2. Bugenhagen, 1531, p.90: ' ... quia Verbo Dei, et spiritu sancto illustratur ......'
place of impiety if it lacks the Word of God. This, of course, is a humanist's way of expressing more precisely what Luther referred to as the 'inner man', the difference being that the \( \overline{\text{πνέομα}} \) is the object of what can only be termed an intellectual conversion. With his elucidation here of a doctrine which conceives of redemption in terms of the Logos invading the seat of reason (the intellect), Bugenhagen has robbed Paul's own understanding of redemption - which is always related to the whole man - of much of its impact.

Bugenhagen supports his analysis with an intriguing illustration:\(^1\) the Tabernacle which Moses was commanded to build had various parts; the visible, public and outward Tabernacle signifies, even by the name itself, the body. Here all is open, without mystery or secret. The 'Holy Place' and the fore-court signify the soul. Here the victims were sacrificed and the various ordinances for the expiation of sin performed. This is equivalent, in the soul, to the operation of human reason and the 'wisdom of the flesh'. But as one proceeds forward, a place is reached wherein there is no natural light, but only darkness and gloom.\(^2\) This is the

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Bugenhagen, 1531, pp.90-91.
\item[2.] Although he does not explicitly say so, Bugenhagen is here referring to the fact that the Holy Place was illumined by artificial light - an obvious symbol of human reason.
\end{itemize}
'Holy of Holies'. Here no human light or wisdom may preside, but only the Word. That is, God alone reigns. This is descriptive of man's spirit; it cannot be enlightened except by God's presence.

It does not take a great deal of imagination to see how this picture correlates with Luther's exegesis of our passage: the 'inner man' (which Luther also can refer to as 'the spirit') is brought into existence only by hearing and responding in faith to the Word of God. When this has come about, the Word can be said to indwell man. Further, this response in faith to the Word of God is in itself a rejection of human wisdom and reason or, better, a moving beyond human wisdom.

To summarize, we see illustrated in Bugenhagen's comment to v.16 the method and controlling principles which held sway with Reformation exegetes who attempted to deal with the Biblical text within the context of classical learning. This often produced individual interpretations widely divergent from the conclusions of traditional exegesis and which were destined by their very esoteric nature to subsequent obscurity.

1. Bugenhagen probably has in mind the tradition that the Ark contained the tables of the Law. Thus 'Word' (understood in the Lutheran sense) equals 'Ark' or 'Mercy Seat'.
Martin Bucer.

Martin Bucer (1491-1551), both by self-imposed mission and in the course of his life, bridged the gap between the Lutheran and Swiss Reformed camps. Although he was strongly influenced early on by Luther and brought Lutheranism to Alsace, he became the leader of the Reformed Church in Switzerland after the death of Zwingli.¹ Thus not only does he provide for us here a transition from Lutheran to Swiss Reformed exegetes, but the bulk of his active life as a reformer was spent in attempting a (largely unsuccessful) reconciliation between Zwinglians and Lutherans.

Bucer was also an early commentator on the Epistle to the Romans. In the dedication of his Romans commentary, Calvin speaks at some length of Bucer's commentary on Romans and with great praise. Calvin complains, however, that Bucer could not, once he had begun, stop writing, with the result that his commentary is far

¹ His influence was also felt to a degree in England, for he spent the final few months of his life at Cambridge, where he died and was buried. See C. Hopf, Martin Bucer and the English Reformation, (Oxford, 1946).
too lengthy, detailed and difficult for the average reader. Calvin might have gone further, for while Bucer seems in his commentary to be well aware of the major exegetical issues, he is prone to pursue at painful length doctrinal and moral topics which do not substantially contribute to the understanding of the text. In contrast to the reformer-exegetes who had been influenced by the humanists, Bucer is not particularly interested in philology or textual criticism. He quotes the Greek text only rarely (but Patristic commentaries frequently). His aim is obviously edification, mingled with erudition, not finality of grammatical exegesis. Unfortunately, his Latin commentary lacks the warmth and practicality of his earlier German writings.

1. Owen Chadwick (The Reformation, Middlesex, 1964, p.81; Vol.III in the series The Pelican History of the Church) rightly describes Bucer's Latin sentences as 'long and cloudy'.

2. Appearing on the title page of the edition cited below (following note) is the following partial description of the contents: 'Et ut Apostolus praeceps locus totius Theologiae tractavit quamexactissime et plenissime, ita maxima pars totius, non tam Paulinae, quam universae sacrae Philosophiae explicata est'. (Emphasis is ours). Concerning the goal of edification, see Greenslade, 1963, p.90.
Bucer's aim is reflected in the format of his commentary on Romans. He divides each chapter into sections of about eight verses. The treatment of these is in two parts; the first, by far the smaller, is called the 'Exposition' and the second the 'Interpretation'. For example, our passage falls within what Bucer calls section II of chapter 8, (vv.9-17). Bucer needs only two folio pages for the Exposition of these rather difficult verses, but Interpretation takes up six folio pages, two of which are solely concerned with v.15a. The two parts are quite independent in design: in the first part, Bucer seeks to explain the plain meaning of the words and sentences as directly and economically as possible; the Interpretation, on the other hand, is a full-blown theological discussion of the issues implied by the text. This discussion is, however, always linked with particular words and phrases of the text.

1. The first edition (1536) is not available to the writer; instead the following has been used: Metaphrasis et Enarratio in Epist.D. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos ... Basel, 1562. (Hereafter cited as 'Bucer, 1562').

2. As with many other attempts of this period to divide interpretation into separate tasks, Bucer is only partially successful in keeping the two parts actually separate; his Interpretation is often simply a discussion of a grammatical point which he refuses to discuss in grammatical terms. A good example of this is his interpretation of v.17b wherein he weighs the precise meaning of the conditional particle.
Considered purely in terms of magnitude (he was on page 373 of the folio edition used here by the time he came to chapter 8), Bucer's commentary is a major contribution to Reformation studies, but in terms of influence on subsequent generations (and even on contemporary readers, if Calvin's criticisms are indicative), it is of only minimal importance, even though Calvin must have read it with great affection, if not also with some impatience. As has so often been the case in our history, the fact of this commentary's being written is of more significance than its content.

The Exposition,\(^1\) practically in the style of a paraphrase, offers us nothing new or extraordinary. Verse 12 marks the beginning of an exhortation. The exhortation is organically related to the material in chapter 6: Paul's sentence ought to be understood as saying we are in no way indebted to the flesh, and therefore we ought not to bind over our potentiality to the service of the flesh. Rather, it is necessary that we bind over all our zeal and labor to the spirit, that by the spirit, all attachment be extinguished and thus we be totally consecrated to the spirit. As in Luther, 'flesh' is taken to imply human endeavor and reason as well as concupiscence.

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1. Bucer, 1562, pp.379-380, para. c and d.
Bucer accepts the Vulgate reading of *moriemini* for *μέλλετε ἀποστολή* with its implication that to live according to the flesh in the present is in itself a living death. To live according to the spirit is de facto to live in opposition to the flesh. The leading of the Spirit (v.14) is a test for sonship in the same way it was in Augustine and Luther: those who are led by the Spirit are those who destroy the works of the flesh by the spirit, and by this demonstrate themselves to be sons of God. As we shall see later, however, Bucer can no more than Luther be restricted to one interpretation of v.14, for he also can understand this verse as referring to the Holy Spirit's role in effecting justification.

Apart from casting the *πνεῦμα διακέιται* back into the Old Testament period, no particular observation is made at v.15. The *ἀπεσταλμένον* is passed over with the comment that this belongs in the area of private experience and thus need not be too closely analyzed. The remainder, concerned with vv.16 and 17, is simply undistinguished paraphrase.

Although the Interpretation of vv.12-17 is lengthy and detailed, we shall simply summarize the salient points, for

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Bucer's exegesis there is neither profound in detail nor illustrative in general of any distinctive stream (other than Lutheran) of his time.

Bucer's first comment is based upon the phrase εἰς Πνεύματα τὰς Πράξεις τοῦ Σώματος ἐγκατσωμένη in v.13b. For Πράξεις Bucer prefers studia rather than facta and further defines this as actiones and negotia. The idea of this Greek phrase is interpreted in terms of Colossians 3:5:

Put to death, therefore, what is earthly in you: immorality, impurity, passion, evil desire, and covetousness, which is idolatry.

Thus Bucer casts v.13b in terms of an exhortation which encourages an upright ethical life — this emphasis is slightly surprising in the light of his Lutheran orientation. We would have expected him rather to emphasize, or at least mention, the antithesis of human reason and spiritus. Rather more interesting is the fact that he accepts the reading corporis¹ and explains Paul's use here by the use of the phrase, from v.10, 'corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum',

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¹. For the text of v.13, Bucer reads, 'sś vēro spiritu studia carnis' but later speaks of 'actiones corporis'. This is an example of his disinterest in textual criticism.
the thought being that the death spoken of in v.13b is death to sin in the body. He is able to make this rather bewildering connection by suggesting that v.13b means putting to death the sin in the body which, in turn, makes the body dead.\footnote{Bucer, 1562, p.381: 'Porro quod actiones corporis hic dicit, satis declarat illud, corpus mortuum est propter peccatum, de corpore peccati, et mortem eius de peccati morte intelligendum esse ....'} Clearly he has simply seized upon similar wording.

Bucer's treatment of the leading of the Spirit (v.14) is quite similar to that we have seen in Bugenhagen. The basic Lutheran paradox of Christian freedom is repeated: where the spirit is, there is perfect freedom, but at the same time, Christian man is wholly 'led'.\footnote{Bucer, 1562, p.381. E.g., 'Vere itaque ubi spiritus, ibi libertas, et simul tamen agimus toti'.} Further, it is the Spirit which effects the adoption of man as son of God.\footnote{Bucer, 1562, p.381: 'Hic enim spiritus est, quo nobis sibi deus adoptat ....' We shall see later that this is an important idea in Bucer's earlier writings.} The Spirit seals the adoption which makes men sons of God, and is a 'pledge' or 'earnest' of their election. His leading necessarily implies active opposition to the 'flesh'.

1. Bucer, 1562, p.381: 'Porro quod actiones corporis hic dicit, satis declarat illud, corpus mortuum est propter peccatum, de corpore peccati, et mortem eius de peccati morte intelligendum esse ....'

2. Bucer, 1562, p.381. E.g., 'Vere itaque ubi spiritus, ibi libertas, et simul tamen agimus toti'.

3. Bucer, 1562, p.381: 'Hic enim spiritus est, quo nobis sibi deus adoptat ....' We shall see later that this is an important idea in Bucer's earlier writings.
The commentary to v.15 is by far the most lengthy, but by no means the most fruitful. Here the tendency to de-historicize, which we found to be so evident in Luther's exegesis, is also found: life under the two Ἰνακρίματα is generalized in order to describe the contrasting conditions under which contemporary men might live. This direction of interpretation is adopted, however, only after a more traditional analysis has been made. The 'old' people of God lived under a spiritus servitutis et timoris; obedience was wrested from them only with great effort, much as if it were the last farthing they possessed. In the precepts of the Law, they could make themselves acceptable, for observation of the Law meant life eternal, but transgression was eternal death. They did not will with a full desire to do that which they knew to be good, and to avoid that which they knew to be evil, neither could they because their souls were not yet enlivened by the Spirit. Nevertheless, to the extent that they were led by the Spirit, they were unable not to shrink back from offending God, and to try to render themselves acceptable to God. They were, in fact, from time to time able to do good and avoid evil; when this was the case, it was because they benefitted, at least to a degree, from the Spirit's ministry to them. They were

like little children who have not yet arrived at full discretion, relapsing from time to time, neglecting to obey parental instruction. They were motivated not out of love but fear.¹

This analogy of children and their capacity for discrimination marks a transition in Bucer's interpretation. From this point he enters into a discussion of the general spiritual meaning. It is important to know that Bucer bases his subsequent remarks on Hebrews 5:11ff (which he considers to be Pauline):²

About this we have much to say which is hard to explain, since you have become dull of hearing. For though by this time you ought to be teachers, you need someone to teach you again the first principles of God's word. You need milk, not solid food; for everyone who lives on milk is unskilled in the word of righteousness, for he is a child. But solid food is for the mature, for those who have their faculties trained by practice to distinguish good from evil.

1. Bucer, 1562, p.382. Calvin also made use of the same analogy; those who lived under the Law similis fuerunt pueros, and thus the revelation had to be suited to their mentality. The point made by Calvin does not, of course, concern the ability to discriminate.

2. This allusion is to be deduced from the context of Bucer's commentary; he never explicitly says he is paraphrasing Hebrews.
Bucer superimposes this contrast (child and mature person) on the contrast of v.15, creating a confusion not untypical of his writing, so that \textit{πνεῦμα υἱοθετήθη} becomes 'a childish spirit' \textit{(puerilis spiritus)}, and \textit{πνεῦμα ἁγιωθετηθή} becomes, somewhat inconsistently, 'that more mature spirit of Christ' \textit{(spiritus ille adultio Christi)}.\footnote{There is, of course, a twofold confusion; in the first part of his comment, Bucer has implied that \textit{πνεῦμα} in both cases refers to ministers of the Holy Spirit, while later he takes it (in the first case at least) as 'state of mind'. The second point of confusion is setting up a contrast between what is essentially a childish spirit and a spirit of adoption, or sonship.} In the course of elucidating this reconstructed contrast, he points out that while a 'childish spirit' (as a description of man's relation to God) is inferior to that found in Christians, it is still better than the condition which exists in the man who resists God's leading altogether. The latter is like an ill man who is advised to take a repulsive remedy but refuses, even though he knows it is what he needs. Those who have a 'childish spirit' accept advice and take their medicine obediently. This analogy has a dim, but confusing, relationship to the Hebrews analogy of milk and solid food (and also possibly to Augustine's \textit{Christus medicus} motif). The first are those wholly in Satan's power;
the second are like those who struggle under legalism - they do what they know is painful only because they realize that the consequences of not following advice (commandments) are more painful. The analogy does not really apply to those who have Пνεύμα υἱὸθεοῦاص because discretion has been fully established in them (i.e., a reference to the definition of the mature person in Hebrews 5:14, "... those who have their faculties trained by practice to distinguish good from evil").

It is above all interesting to know that Bucer intends this to be a remolding of medieval exegesis of v.15 (which was essentially an exegesis of fear, as we have already seen). The theme of a childish spirit is equivalent to initial or servile fear, while the discretion which is fully established in Christian men precisely equals filial love, which, in turn, is the Пν. υἱὸθεοῦاص. The man who has the mature spirit of Christ is able to fear God as a son and distinguish between good and evil.

We have followed Bucer's interpretation of v.15 rather closely in order to demonstrate how very complicated and confusing his exegesis often is. It is no wonder that Calvin was able to remark that he did not think his own commentary on the Epistle to the Romans was a duplication of that of Bucer, since 'Bucer is too verbose to
be read quickly by those who have other matters to deal with, and
too profound to be easily understood by less intelligent and
attentive readers.\(^1\)

While Bucer did comment further on vv.16-17, we need
here only mention the fact that at v.17 he struggled with the
problem of the Patristic tendency to interpret\(^2\) causally.\(^2\)
This, of course, created problems for Reformation exegetes, since the
inference could be made that glorification was merited by suffering.
We shall wait, however, to deal with this problem when we come to
Calvin's commentary, for it is there that the most definitive answer
to the problem is made. We move now to another source of Bucer's
use and interpretation of our passage.

After his excommunication while a pastor in
Weissenburg (1523), Bucer moved to Strassburg where he was given the
protection of the city. In the summer of the same year he began his
lectures (in Latin) on the New Testament. During this year and those
immediately following, he also wrote a large number of tracts,

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1. Calvin's Commentaries, D.W. and T.F. Torrance, series eds.,
The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Romans and to the
Referred to hereafter as 'Mackenzie, 1961'.

articles and private papers in the vernacular (Allemannic German). In these we capture a glimpse of Bucer in the full flush of the excitement which accompanied his discovery of the Reformation's central theological doctrines. Not surprisingly, his use of verses from our passage in this time and stratum of his writing is quite different from that we have already seen in his ponderous— and relatively late— commentary on Romans. That which follows is a brief sampling from his early (1520–1524) and somewhat later (1524–1528) vernacular writings.¹

Perhaps the most interesting of these references is contained in a manuscript written by Bucer for the purpose of advising the Strassburg Council, 'Das D. Luthers vnd seiner nachfolger lehre, wie die inn iven buchern verfasset ist, in den Hauptarticulen vnd puncten Christlich vnd gerecht ist ....'² In this Gutachten Bucer


2. Bucer, 1520–1524, p.310. This manuscript is dated (by archivists) October/November, 1523.
examines twelve main articles. It is the second of these which concerns us here: 'von der Rechtfertigung allein aus Glauben durch Christus'. Toward the close of his examination of this article, Bucer seizes upon the analogy of sons and servants to show that justification is on the basis of faith alone, and not merited by works:

Aber die weil Christus sagt: wer an mich glaubt, hat das ewig leben vnd die schrift nennt die gleubigen kinder vnd erben gotes, so ists ie clar, das wir vss gnad, so wir der glauben, selig werden vnd gar nit vss vnserm verdienst. Wie ein son, der nit mer arbeit dan ein knecht, offt fyl minder,1 noch so wurdet den son das ganz erb des vaters, den knecht richt man mit einm kleinen gelt vss, vnd das nit vmb seiner arbeit willen, sonder das er vom vater geporen ist; also wurdet die seligkeit den gleubigen, die dan wol arbeiten vnd guts thun, dan der glaub nit mag guter werck müssig ston, aber nit vmb irs arbeiten oder thuns willen, dan es als zu gering ist, sonder das sy zu kindern gottes vss gnaden angenumen sind, das do bezeuget der glaubig geist, so in vuss is vnd vss gutem vertruen darff zu got sprechen: Lieber vater, wie das Paulus schreibt zu Rom.8.2

1. Editor's note: 'minder' = weniger.

2. Bucer, 1520-1524, p.320.
Here then is the most Lutheran interpretation of vv.15 and 16 possible. (There are, however, a number of problems with this analogy, among them the suggestion that a son 'der nit mer arbeit dan ein knecht', which might have been taken as an antinomian suggestion). ¹ This interpretation of v.15, wherein精益 him is taken as indicative of those who are made righteous through faith and that精益 souls concerns those who do not exhibit this faith, is alluded to often in Bucer's writings. ²

Another exceptionally clear example of this interpretation is found in one of Bucer's most popular printed works, 'Das ym selbs ... niemand, sonder anderen leben soll, und wie der mensch dahyn kummen mög', written in August, 1523.

1. Bucer subsequently points out that such an interpretation would be wrong: 'Vss dem doch gar nit folgt, das wir nyt guts thun sollen, sonder das wir, durch disen glauben gerecht und gut gemacht, fil güter werck thuen ....' 1520-1524, p.320.

2. See Bucer, 1520-1524, p.90, and Bucer, 1524-1528, pp.107 and 119.
Seitenmal aber nun klar ist, das wir durch den glauben kinder gottes werden und den geist der kinder haben, welcher unsern geist auch versichert, das wir kinder gottes seind, uss welchem dann kummen müssen; wie wir gott durch disen geist als ein vatter erkennen und anruffen, das wir also alle menschen als unser bruder auch erkennen und ynen dyenen, wie das dem vatter auch sonderlich gefalt und uns darzu geschaffen und mit allem seinem gesatz und propheten dohyn gewysen hat. so folget nun ye gewisslich, das der glaub allein vermagent, uns von uns abzyehen und gott dem vatter als kinder zu übergeben. 1

Aside from Bucer’s allusion to vv.14-17 of our passage 2 in support of the main theme of this tract (that Christian men ought to live 'for others'), there is evidence of the Lutheran interpretation; it is only through faith that we are made children of God. The crucial sentence in this regard is: 'so folget nun ye gewisslich, das der glaub allein vermagent, uns von uns abzyehen und gott dem vatter als kinder zu übergeben'. 3


2. This fact is not completely clear from the selection quoted above, but rather from the immediate context of the paragraph, wherein Bucer quotes Galatians 3:16-17 and adds: 'Dergleichen schreibt er auch zun Romern' and in the following paragraph actually quotes Romans 8:16-17.

Oecolampadius.

John Oecolampadius (1482-1531), whose name is inextricably linked with Bucer, was the earliest of the Swiss reformers to write a commentary on Romans. This commentary reflects dependence upon Erasmian principles of exegesis, a characteristic of Swiss exegetes of this period which is often remarked upon by historians.\(^1\) There is great attention to grammatical details, consistent use of the original languages, and a noticeable absence of reference to the Fathers, with preference for classical writers.\(^2\) Oecolampadius's compact commentary was written at the height of his

\(^1\) Greenslade, 1963, pp.84f.

\(^2\) In his commentary on chapter 8, Oecolampadius refers to St. Jerome once, Erasmus once (v.15), and classical authors five times. Oecolampadius makes clear his preference for Erasmian principles of exegesis in this statement contained in his comment on vv.15-16: 'Thus I very much prefer a theologian to be a grammaticalis, as they say, than to be considered a subtle and seraphic moralizer as certain people think'. ('Imo sic malo grammaticalis (ut aiunt) esse theologus, quam cum quibusdam subtilis et seraphicus haberi moralisator').
influence in Basel, shortly after he was made Reader in the University.¹

Oecolampadius's exegesis of vv.12-13 (which he takes together) is only a repetition of that which we have already seen in others: the section beginning with v.12 is intimately related, in Paul's argument, to chapter 6. Specifically, Paul sets out once again what is essentially an answer to 6:1, 'Are we to continue in sin that grace may abound?' In the vv.12ff, Paul repeats his claim that Christian man is under obligation and, at the same time, at liberty to pursue an upright life. This Paul does by exhortation, writing in a hortatory style. He mixes encouragement with threat: on the one hand he holds out the promise of life, and on the other the threat of death.

¹. In Epistolam B. Pauli Apost. ad Rhomanos Adnotationes, Basel, 1526. Hereafter referred to as 'Oecolampadius, 1526'. Pagination of this quarto volume is on one side only, the right; the commentary begins on p.105.

Considerable information on this commentary is contained in Ernst Staehelin, Das theologische Lebenswerk Johannes Oekolampads, Leipzig, 1939 (Vol. XXI in the series Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte). See pp.213ff. Staehelin gives the date of the first edition as August, 1525.
Verse 14, in Oecolampadius's view, is not to be understood as proposing a test for sonship, but rather, suggesting a 'given' of one's status as a Christian: all Christians, says Oecolampadius, are sons of God, and therefore they live according to the Spirit and not according to the flesh.\(^1\) Thus Oecolampadius interprets v.14 in the light of vv.12 and 13, as do Augustine and Luther.\(^2\)

1. Oecolampadius, 1526, p.105: 'Omnes enim Christiani sunt filii dei .... ergo secundum spiritum non secundum carnem vivunt'.

2. Oecolampadius illustrates his point with an interesting example: people of noble birth are bred to a noble way of life and do not depart from the way of life to which they were born, lest they disgrace their nobility. In the same way, Christians have a good name and dignity, and neither would they contaminate their noble calling with impious living. The optimism which this interpretation reflects is illustrative both of the influence of the humanists upon such Swiss reformers as Oecolampadius, and of the wide gulf which separated the Zwinglians and those of Luther's camp. One cannot conceive of Luther suggesting that Christians will live upright lives simply because they are Christian.
As with almost all exegetes, Oecolampadius gives a more detailed exegesis of v.15 (and v.16, for he comments on them in one section) than any other in our passage; we need here, however, only pause to point out what is distinctive or of particular interest.

Turning first to v.16, Oecolampadius points out that those who would prove themselves sons of God (by the merits of their works) are here refuted: it is the Holy Spirit who assures us by bearing witness to our minds or consciences that we are sons of God. The contrast of v.15 Oecolampadius recasts in a way which is unique in our history thus far. The *πνεύμα* in both of its uses in v.15 is understood by Oecolampadius as 'state of mind' or 'attitude'. Oecolampadius completely abandons all attempt to interpret the contrast in terms of the old and new covenants. Rather, he seizes on the theme already used to interpret v.14: ignobility and nobility. Those who have a servile spirit (*servilis spiritus*) are those who are ill-bred, and are characterized by ignobility and intractability, being swayed by neither admonitions nor love of what is right and good. They respond only to terror and threats.¹

¹. Oecolampadius, 1526, p.105: 'Est autem servilis spiritus mens mala dura, et intractabilis quae non pudore vel monitis vel amore recti boni sed minus et terrore cohercetur'.

Thus a people who have a \( \Pi V. \, \text{Souleias} \) are like a nation of slaves; they are barbarians who must be forcibly induced to do what they ought.\(^1\) In contrast to those are those noble souls who are not driven (from without to obedience), but rather are motivated (from within to do good and shun evil).\(^2\) This contrast is then concluded with the following formula: 'The wicked will abhor sin out of fear of punishment'. And, 'The good will abhor sin from love of virtue'.\(^3\)

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1. Here Oecolampadius makes reference to a proverb concerning Phrygians and generalizes it to apply to servorum civitas: 'Est enim servorum genus illiberale et improbum Proverbios quoq; notatum, servorum civitas. De coetu enim improborum hominum, mendacium, furacium aut ignobilium dicebatur. Ita in barbaros serviliiq. Ingenio homines quadrabat Phrygem non nisi verberibus meliorem reddi'. (Oecolampadius, 1526, p.105). Oecolampadius evidently has in mind the proverb referred to in Cicero's Oratio pro L.Flacco 27,65: 'utrum igitur nostrum est an vestrum hoc proverbium Phrygem plagis fieri solere meliorem'. (quoted in Lewis and Short, LD, p.1372, entry Phryges).

2. Oecolampadius, 1526, p.105: 'Cum contra generosus animus (ut ait Seneca) rectius ducatur quam trahatur'. The reference to Seneca is unclear, but perhaps he has in mind the rather cynical proverb in Epistle 107, 'ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt'. (See Lewis and Short, LD, p.616, entry duco).

3. Oecolampadius, 1526, p.106: 'Oderunt peccare mali formidine poenae. Oderunt peccare bona virtutis amore'.
In such a statement, one can see a vague connection with traditional exegesis of this verse, which emphasized that under the law men were driven to obey because they feared the punishment of their disobedience. It is notable here, however, that there is no reference to the Law or to the conditions under which man lived in time of the old covenant. Oecolampadius's very humanist interpretation of these verses (14-15) is but a footnote to the history of their interpretation, but in his exegesis one can clearly perceive the reverberations of the intellectual climate which was generated by the Renaissance.

As if to avoid being understood literally when he speaks of nobility and good breeding, Oecolampadius concludes his treatment of the contrast by saying that sons, whether members of the family, i.e., filius familias, or sons who are not natural sons of God, but have succeeded to the place of sons only through adoption, all these sons are free, joyous and of their own free will do that which they sense to be pleasing to their father.¹ Thus Oecolampadius's rather philosophical interpretation is made Christian.

¹. Oecolampadius, 1526, p.106: 'Filii ergo vel familias vel qui natura filii non sunt, sed per adoptionem in locum filiorum successerunt, ingenui sunt, liberi et alaces, ultroq; faciunt quod parenti gratum esse sentiant'.

He then goes on to say that those who were initially God's sons of wrath (cf. Ephesians 2) have been redeemed through his natural son.¹

Commenting on the latter part of v.15, Oecolampadius notes that the word ἀββα is a translation for the Hebrew word יִשְׂרָאֵל or, what is more likely the Syriac (i.e., Aramaic) יִשְׂרָאֵל.² Further, as Erasmus says, the word is an imitation of a child's first attempt to say 'father'. (In German, says Oecolampadius, this word would be 'addy'). There are two ways to understand the addition of the words ὦ πατήρ: either this is simply the translation of a foreign word; or, in Hebrew fashion, a reduplication (Oecolampadius uses the technical term, κατ' ἀνάστις ἀποθέωσυ) for the purpose of emphasis (ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀποθέωσι). The latter is the more likely explanation.

¹. Oecolampadius, 1526, p.106: 'Nec caret mysterio quod adoptivi filii Dei dicimur. Nam natura sumus filii Irae. Ephes. 2. At Deus nostri misertus per naturalem sive proprium filium nos reddemit....'

². Oecolampadius had something of a reputation as an Hebraist and it was evidently this skill, as much as anything, which recommended him to Erasmus as a helper as he prepared his writings for the Froben Press in Basel. See Greenslade 1963, p.84.
for this doubling 'Father, father' indicates the intensity of the Christians breast.¹

Also of interest is his statement that Christians must not cry 'St. Martin! Pray for us, for we are sinners etc.', for as sons Christian men can approach God directly.

At v.17, Oecolampadius concerns himself primarily with an elucidation of Paul's words concerning suffering. His interpretation is very general: in quasi-Pauline language he speaks of the necessity of being proven in the heat of the battle. Christ is our example, the Antesignanus of the struggle in which we are engaged. We are heirs now of eternal life, but we ought to contend along this way (suffering) that we may see our Lord Himself. We must endure in order to obtain the promised inheritance of life.

1. Oecolampadius, 1526, p.106: 'Reliqui autem vocem Herbraeam quo significaret (ut Eras. ait) peculiare quiddam esse in ipso vocabulo quod et patres libenter audiant et pueri primum sonare discunt, atty. Quod autem praeterea addidit patris inquam vocabulum, vel ad interpretationem peregrini vocabuli adiectum, vel quod vero propius, ex more Herbraeo factum est. Iti enim easdem voces iterant emphasis vel gratia. Significat ergo conduplicatioe ista Pater pater ardorem pectoris Christiani'.

2. St. Martin is the patron saint of Switzerland.
Thus Oecolampadius keeps a wide-open view of Συμπτάσις χωμένειν: on the one hand he understands the idea of suffering to mean that Christians are called upon to surmount the manifold but general evils which man, in his human weakness, when unaided, is unable to bear. On the other hand, suffering is specified to mean the Christian's struggle with the lusts of the flesh. He makes reference to Galatians 5 and Hebrews 12, and indeed, when taken together, these two chapters seem to communicate his view. He notes no concern for the problem posed by a causal interpretation placed upon Ελίτω.

1. Oecolampadius, 1526, p.107: 'Superantur enim malorum magnitudine, cui impar est humana imbecillitas'.

2. Oecolampadius, 1526, p.107: 'Patimur autem dum carnem nostram crucifigimus'.

John Calvin (1509-1564) was undoubtedly the most formidable and influential exegete of the Reformation. He wrote commentaries on almost all of the books of the Bible, the first of which was that on the Epistle to the Romans.¹ Further, this commentary was the first complete commentary on any part of the Bible to be printed in English.²

Because Calvin's exegesis has been a major influence, the present study will concentrate on the definitive points of interpretation in Romans 8:12-17, contained in his commentary on the

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¹ The Reverend Dr. T.H.L. Parker, a recognized authority on Calvin's theology and New Testament studies in the 16th century, has suggested in a private letter to the writer that in his view, Calvin was writing his commentary on Romans during the years 1537-39. (The first edition was that of 1540).

² A Commentarie upon the Epistle of Saint Paul to the Romanes ... translated by Christopher Rosdell, London, 1577 and 1583. (Cited in Mackenzie, 1961). While this is the first complete commentary on Romans, an English translation of Beza's 'minor' annotations was contained in L.Thomson's revision of the Geneva Bible (New Testament only) published just a year previous (1576) to the first edition of the English translation of Calvin's commentary. The Latin text of Calvin's work, of course, has been subsequently translated into English a number of times. The translation used in this paper is from Mackenzie, 1961.
Epistle to the Romans. Unfortunately, no sermons preached by Calvin on our subject have survived, but references to these verses, and especially to v.15, in the second and subsequent editions of Calvin's *Institutes* are numerous. Insofar as these and others are relevant, they will be brought into the discussion.

1. Once again the writer is indebted to Dr. T.H.L. Parker for this piece of information.

2. The precise relation of Calvin's commentary on Romans to the *Institutes* - in terms of direction of influence - might be said to be problematic. The reason for this is as follows: a second and greatly expanded edition of the *Institutes* was published in 1539; the commentary on Romans was first published, as we have already mentioned, in 1540. At a number of points there are great similarities between the two. In his preface ('to the Reader') of the 1539-1559 editions of the *Institutes*, Calvin explicitly states his purpose in writing both the *Institutes* and any Biblical commentaries which might follow. From this statement, it is clear that he intended the former to supplement the latter insofar as it would not be necessary to indulge in long, doctrinal discussions (as he criticized Bucer for doing) in the commentaries, since he had already supplied the basic tool (the *Institutes*) for understanding Scripture as a whole. Further, in the preface to the editions 1539-1554, he specifically cites his Romans commentary as an example. However, it could be suggested that since he was writing the Romans commentary at the same time he was preparing the enlarged 1539 edition of the *Institutes*, the problem of direction of influence still remains. (See W. Sanday and A. Headlam, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, 5th ed., Edinburgh, 1902, pp.c111-c1iv; cited hereafter as 'Sanday and Headlam, 1902'.) While it is not in the province of the present study to suggest a final solution to the problem (or even to judge the merits of the problem's validity), there are one or two interesting relationships between Calvin's comments on v.15 and parts of his *Institutes* which bring relevant information to bear. These will be pointed out in the normal course of this analysis.
our review of Calvin's commentary on our passage is brief, it is because Calvin is, as always, straightforward, to the point, and concise.

Calvin's exegesis of the first verse of our passage contains most of the elements found in other Reformation expositors: v.12 is a conclusion to the preceding verses, but also an exhortation. Paul's sentence is defective, for he neglects to add the second part of the contrast; he means that we are debtors to the Spirit. Quoting Ephesians 4:30 and Galatians 5:25, he points out that Christians are dutifully bound to 'renounce carnal desires' and to devote themselves 'to the righteousness of God'.¹ This kind of language is, for Calvin, directly indicative of sanctification.² Thus

1. See Mackenzie, 1961, p.166, CR, LXXVII, cols.146,147: 'Id autem fit dum carnalibus concupiscentiis renuntiamus, ut nos justitiae Dei addicamus veluti in servitutem'.

2. Institutes, III.111.10: 'Thus, then, are the children of God freed through regeneration from bondage to sin. Yet they do not obtain full possession of freedom so as to feel no more annoyance from their flesh, but there still remains in them a continuing occasion for struggle whereby they may be exercised; and not only be exercised, but also better learn their own weakness. In this manner all writers of sounder judgement agree that there remains in a regenerate man a smoldering cinder of evil, from which desires continually leap forth to allure and spur him to commit sin'. (The English section title to III.111.10-15 is 'Believers experience sanctification, but not sinless perfection in this life'). English translation is taken from Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, F.W.Battles, trans., in The Library of Christian Classics, Vols.XX and XXI, London, 1961, p.602. This translation is hereafter referred to as 'Battles, 1961'.
even though Calvin does not explicitly connect the material of vv.12ff with that of chapter 6, it is clear that he intends the connection to be made.

Calvin not only makes the ordinary observation that v.13a is a warning intended to stir up the sluggish, but also makes use of this sentence to get off a bit of polemic: this warning can also be thought of as a refutation of 'those who boast of justification by faith without the Spirit of Christ'. Calvin, of course, has the Lutherans in mind, and the distinctions (i.e., justification/sanctification) he makes here must be set against the backdrop of his doctrine of salvation. As he has already stressed

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1. Mackenzie, 1961, p.166. CR, LXXVII, 147: '...qui justificationem fidei ictant sine Christi spiritu'.

2. Calvin thought of salvation as consisting of two dialectical parts (forgiveness and rebirth; justification and sanctification; reconciliation and regeneration, etc.) which can and ought to be discussed apart, but which are also inseparable (see the Institutes, III,x1.6; also Calvin's comment on 8:9 in his Romans commentary). These two parts of faith are reflected in the following extracts from the Institutes (III.x1.1; III.xiv.9):

Christ was given to us by God's generosity, to be grasped and possessed by us in faith. By partaking of him, we principally receive a double grace; namely, that being reconciled to God through Christ's blamelessness, we may have in heaven instead of a Judge a gracious Father; and secondly, that sanctified by Christ's spirit we may cultivate blamelessness and purity of life. (Battles, 1961, p.725).

/continued;
throughout his commentary on chapter 8, to understand the fullness of God's grace, one must keep both justification and sanctification in mind. Calvin reminds his readers that when sanctification is neglected, there is a lack of confidence in God. This is related to his conviction that while works can never be a basis for self-confidence, 'fruits of regeneration' do provide a source of encouragement and strength. Thus, where the 'spirit of regeneration' is not at work, there also confidence is absent.

footnote 2 continued from previous page:

... We confess that while through the intercession of Christ's righteousness God reconciles us to himself, and by free remission of sins accounts us righteous, his beneficence is at the same time joined with such a mercy that through his Holy Spirit he dwells in us and by his power the lusts of our flesh are each day more and more mortified; we are indeed sanctified that is, consecrated to the Lord in true purity of life, with our hearts formed to obedience to the Law. (Battles, 1961, p.776).

1. CR, LXXVII, 147: 'quia nulla in Deum fiducia, ubi non sit et amor justitiae'.

2. See the Institutes, III.xiv.19.
Calvin's interpretation of v.13b is essentially a summation of his understanding of sanctification. While the Christian is, throughout his earthly life, beset by his own infirmities and sin, he is to strive to mortify the flesh and grow in grace. Paul's reference to the promise of life is meant to be an encouragement.

Calvin begins his exegesis of v.14 with a formal observation: 'here we have the proof of what has immediately gone before'. It is a 'proof' in the sense that for Calvin, being 'led' (i.e., moved or governed) by the Spirit is the special privilege of the elect, those who have been regenerated through the Spirit. In this way, the Augustinian interpretation is pushed back yet another step: not only is the mortification demanded by Paul (v.13) made possible by the Spirit's leading, but the condition of sanctification

1. See the Institutes, III.111.10 (quoted above).
4. See the Institutes, II.111.10.
has been brought about in the elect by the spirit of regeneration. It is this work of grace which makes doing the right, albeit imperfectly, a possibility. When this point is fully appreciated, it is not difficult to see why Calvin saw v.14 a source of assurance for the Christian, since only the elect are led by the Spirit, the leading itself constitutes a reassurance.

Calvin's own syllogistic synthesis of v.14 is as follows:

... all who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God, all the sons of God are heirs of eternal life; and therefore all who are led by the Spirit of God ought to feel assured of eternal life.2

1. Later in the same comment to v.14, Calvin distinguishes between the universal action of the Spirit and actions which are peculiar to men (peculiares in hominibus); both of these, however, are distinct from the work of the Spirit spoken of in v.14. There (v.14) Paul means sanctification, an action of God which is limited to the elect. These fine lines of distinction are consistent throughout Calvin's writings and are based upon his understanding of how man comes to know God. Thus, what Calvin has to say here about the various actions of the Spirit is dependent upon the entire first two books of the Institutes.

Calvin acknowledges that the second premise is actually lacking in the text 'because it was axiomatic'.

This constant theme of assurance or confidence which in itself makes Calvin's exegesis of chapter 8 distinctive is carried into the section on vv.15-18. Verse 15 is a confirmation of the certitude of confidence of which Paul has just spoken:

He does so by mentioning the special effect produced by the Spirit. The Spirit has not been given to harass us with fear or torment us with anxiety, but rather to allay our disquiet, to bring our minds to a state of tranquility, and to stir us up to call on God with confidence and freedom.

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2. As did Luther, Calvin understood the struggle pictured in Romans 7 to be that of Christian man. This in turn is balanced by chapter 8: 'Having described the struggle which the godly continually have with their own flesh, he returns to the consolation which he had before mentioned, and which was very necessary for them - although they are beset by sin, yet they are free from the power of death, and from every curse, provided they live not in the flesh but in the Spirit'. (Calvin, on Romans 8:1, in Mackenzie, 1961, p.156).

More specifically, Paul here is treating of the 'fatherly indulgence of God' ('paterna Dei indulgentia') which manifests itself in His forgiveness of Christian man's human weakness and sins.

It is perhaps surprising that Calvin speaks of forgiveness in the context of an exegesis of v.15. Calvin himself offers his readers a key to understanding why this is so:

Our confidence in this forbearance of God, Paul teaches us, is made certain by the Spirit of adoption, who would not bid us to be bold in prayer without sealing to us free pardon.¹

Secondly, however, it is necessary to know that Calvin uses the phrase 'sealing to us free pardon' together with the noun 'adoption' or the verb 'adopt' in various combinations throughout the Institutes, but especially in Book III, as synonymous with regeneration.²

1. Mackenzie, 1961, p.168. CR, LXXVII, 148: 'Huius fidei nobis certam fieri docet a spiritu adoptionis, qui nobis fudiciam precandi non dictaret, nisi gratuitem veniam obtignando'. (This entire sentence is an addition to the first edition).

2. See the Institutes: II.v1.1; II.v11.15; II.x1.9; II.x11.2; III.1.3; III.11.22; III.111.9; III.x1.6; III.x1v.18; III.xv11.6; III.xv111.2; III.xx.36ff; III.xx1.7; III.xx11.4.
8:15 is not the only verse he has in mind when he does this; rather there appears to have arisen a configuration of such words and phrases as these which is drawn from a number of passages in Paul, but especially Romans 8:15, Ephesians 1:13-14 and II Corinthians 1:22. Typical of this use is Institutes, III.11.12:

... however deficient or weak faith may be in the elect, still, because the Spirit of God is for them the sure guarantee and seal of their adoption, the mark he has engraved can never be erased from their hearts; but on the wicked such light is shed as may afterward pass away.¹

Thus Calvin has adopted Paul's language for his own; the conception of the Spirit's sealing forgiveness (= adoption) becomes another way of speaking about the non-Pauline idea of regeneration, which in turn is used to interpret this passage in Paul.²

Continuing his exegesis, Calvin utilizes Hebrews 12:18ff to illustrate Paul's contrast of the two \[ \text{\textit{πνεῦμα τῆς οἰκονομίας}} \] : on the one hand there is the spirit of bondage which can be traced back to the law; and on the other hand is the spirit of adoption which

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¹. Battles, 1961, p.556.

². This is an excellent example of the problematic relationship between Calvin's commentary on Romans and the second edition of the Institutes.
comes from the Gospel. (In this stratum of Calvin's exegesis, he takes both occurrences of \( \text{πνε\u00fct\u00fcm\u00fca} \) as 'state of mind'). But such a seemingly harsh statement about the law is almost certain to be carefully qualified by Calvin. This is done by means of a clarification of the \( \text{πνα\u00fcv} \). This clarification is essentially a summation of his viewpoint on the Law, and the similarity and difference between the two Testaments (see the Institutes, II, vii-xi): Paul is comparing the Law and the Gospel, but this is different from comparing persons. The dispensation of the Gospel did imply a great change in God's dealing with man, but that is not to say that no one in the old covenant was given the \( \text{πνε\u00fct\u00fcm\u00fca \upsilon\iota\varepsilon\iota\iota\iota\iota\u00fcs} \); neither does it imply that the faith of the Old Testament Fathers was not greater than ours, for surely it was.\(^1\) The difference, then, is one of dispensations, and the effect of the dispensation of the Gospel is that believers are 'no longer bound by the servile conditions of the law' ('ne amplius servilis legis conditio nos constringat').\(^2\)

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1. See the Institutes, II.xi.8.
2. This in fact constituted Calvin's fourth 'difference' between the Testaments; see the Institutes, II.xi.9.
This servile condition was a direct result of the condemning function of the Law. Although the 'covenant of Grace' *(foedus gratiae)* is contained in the Law,¹ and although this condemning function was only accidental to the Law's true function,² Paul momentarily sets aside the covenant of grace in order to show the precise way in which the law differs from the Gospel.³ Calvin's summary of the solution to the problem of relationships between the covenants, as it concerns persons, is as follows:

When the law was published among the Jewish people, and also after it was published, the godly were enlightened by the same Spirit of faith. Thus the hope of eternal inheritance, of which the Spirit is the earnest and seal, was sealed on their hearts. The only difference is that the Spirit is more bountifully

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1. See the *Institutes*, II.x.1ff. '... all men adopted by God into the company of his people since the beginning of the world were covenanted to him by the same law and by the bond of the same doctrine as obtains among us'. Battles, 1961, p.428.

2. See the *Institutes*, II.vii.1ff, Romans commentary on chapter 7:10.

and abundantly poured out in the kingdom of Christ.¹

Calvin concludes his analysis of v.15 by explaining in traditional terms why men under the law were bound in fear: the law can only harass and torment the minds of men by the threat of death for transgression.

What is above all remarkable about the latter half of Calvin's exegesis of v.15 is that he reads \( \nu i v e \dot{\alpha} t i a s \) back into the Old Testament, calling it there the 'spirit of faith'. This can only mean that he understands the Holy Spirit to have exercised his adoptive ministry throughout both covenants. With this interpretation there is offered a viable alternative to taking \( \nu i v e \dot{\alpha} t i a s \) as a ministry of the Holy Spirit (which must

¹. Mackenzie, 1961, p.169: CR, LXXVII, 149: '... in populo Iudaico, quum lex promulgaretur, ac post eam quoque promulgatem eodem fidei spiritu illuminatos fuisse pios: ideoque obsignatam fuisse eorum cordibus spem aeternae haereditatis, cuius spiritus arrhabo est et sigillum. Hoc tantum interest, quod benignius et largiore manu effusus est spiritus in regno Christi'.

Calvin further qualifies this very positive statement by reminding his readers that salvation was first clearly revealed in Christ and that the revelation was obscure in the Old Testament when compared with the evangelii perspicuitas.
be limited to the giving of the Law if certain embarrassments are
to be circumvented) in the Old Testament. It is also noteworthy
that while his exegesis of \( \Pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\mu\alpha\varsigma \ \zeta\omega\upsilon\lambda\tau\epsilon\varsigma\alpha\varsigma \) is consistent
throughout the passage, he significantly varies his understanding
of \( \Pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\mu\alpha\ \nu\iota\varsigma\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma \) in the two parts of his
comment. Finally, his interpretation of v.15 implicitly suggests
that under the \( \Pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\mu\alpha\ \nu\iota\varsigma\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma \), the law is first truly
established in the elect.

Calvin's interpretation of the words \( \epsilon\nu \ \zeta\varsigma \ \kappa\rho\alpha\iota\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu \)
\( \dot{\alpha}\beta\beta\alpha \ \varepsilon \ \tau\alpha\varsigma\iota\varsigma\rho \) is by no means so distinctive: he repeats
Chrysostom's suggestion that the word \( \dot{\alpha}\beta\beta\alpha \) is an imitation of a
child's speech. The repetition is for the sake of amplification.
Augustine's interpretation, concerning the symbolic implication of
the two languages used, is accepted and enlarged upon. The word
\( \kappa\rho\alpha\iota\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu \) is used in order to express confidence. However, while
not mentioning his name, Calvin disagrees with Chrysostom: believers
in the Old Testament also called God 'Father'. Still, they did not
do so with such confidence as do we.

As he has done throughout this passage, Calvin
writes at length on the theme of confidence in his exegesis of v.16.
He rejects the Latin translation of \textit{contestatur} for \textit{\summa\varphi\tau\rho\epsilon\iota\varsigma}.
but also points out that the meaning is more than that the Spirit simply witnesses to our spirit. His comment, however, suggests a passive, rather than active, interpretation, there is participation of the Christian's spirit, but it is preceded by the witness of the Spirit:

Paul means that the Spirit of God affords us such a testimony that our spirit is assured of the adoption of God, when He is our Guide and Teacher. Our mind would not of its own accord convey this assurance to us, unless the testimony of the Spirit preceded it.¹

Calvin also relates v.16 to the latter words of v.15: the confidence which the Spirit pours (ingerit) into our hearts makes it possible to dare to call upon God as our Father. But Calvin's theology of faith and prayer is too subtle to leave it simply at that; he adds that it is by calling upon God that our faith is proved.

The exegesis of v.16 is closed with a polemical note:

The present passage is an excellent refutation of the shallow argument of the Sophists concerning moral conjecture, which is nothing but uncertainty and anxiety of mind, or rather, wavering and delusion.¹

As do many interpreters, Calvin perceives a culmination of ideas in v.17. What is distinctive, however, is his perception of the transitional nature of this verse. The logic is as follows:

The inheritance of God is ours, because we have been adopted by His grace as His sons. To remove any doubt, the possession of it has already been conferred on Christ, with whom we are made partakers. But Christ went to that inheritance by the cross. We therefore, must go to it in the same way.²

1. Mackenzie, 1961, p.170. CR, LXXVII, 150: 'Atque hic egregie refutantur nugae illae Sophistarum de morali conjectura; quae nihil aliquid est quam incertitudo et anima anxietas, imo potius vacillatio et hallucinatio'. This comment is similar in content to that in the Institutes, III.11.38,39.

2. Mackenzie, 1961, p.171. CR, LXXVII, 151: 'Dei haereditas ideo nostra est quia in filios eius gratia sumus adoptati; ac ne dubia sit, eius possessio iam Christo delata est, cuius facti sumus consortes; atqui eam Christus per crucem adiit: ergo et nobis eo modo adeunda est'.
This, of course, is said in order to obviate any possibility of interpreting \( \epsilon \) as causal, as Calvin himself explains. Suffering is exhorted by Paul here because it is another facet of the believer's obedience. Certainly Calvin's solution to the problem of the \( \epsilon \) is one of the most insightful we have met. Above all, it contains a positive affirmation rather than simply a doctrinaire denial. It neatly supplies a solution - in this one place - to a problem to which the reformers were very sensitive: self-justification by self-inflicted privation and suffering.

1. In this same comment, Calvin suggests that the following paraphrase gives the best sense of the \( \epsilon \): '.... nos Christi cohaeredes esse, modo ad cerendam haereditatem eadem, qua ipse via progressus est, ipsum sequamur'. (CR, LXXVII, 151; underlined material is that which has been added by Calvin in a subsequent edition).
Theodore Beza.

Theodore Beza (1519-1606), successor to Calvin in Geneva, is the last of the reformers to comment upon our passage. He is without doubt one of the most impressive Biblical scholars thus far reviewed. He has been called the first Protestant text critic, and indeed it is in his analysis of variant readings that Beza makes perhaps his greatest contribution to the history of exegesis. Beza's many editions of the Latin and Greek New Testament were invariably supplemented by one or more sets of annotations. In 1556 he published a new Latin translation of the Greek text which included brief marginal notes. His first edition of the Greek text was published in 1565. This edition also included his own Latin translation and the Vulgate (set in parallel columns with the Greek text), together with minor and major annotations. (The second edition of this Greek text, published in 1582, was revised in the light of 'Codex Bezae'). Further, in 1594, these major annotations were

published as a separate document (probably in Geneva by Henricus Stephanus II, but there remains some question as to place and printer).\footnote{These are not, however, identical to the major annotations contained in Beza's 1565 edition of the Greek text. Upon examination it becomes clear that Beza revised his earlier notations considerably; often he left whole paragraphs intact, and often he used the first few lines of a paragraph only to rewrite entirely the remainder. At other times he eliminated whole sets of comments altogether.}

Beza's work on the Greek text, as well as his annotations, exerted great influence on the translators of the Geneva Bible.\footnote{Greenslade, 1963, pp.155ff.} This was particularly so in the case of Laurence Tomson's revision of 1576 (New Testament only). Here Beza's minor annotations, and even parts of the major annotation, are translated and reproduced in their entirety, thus creating what is effectively the first complete set of explanatory notes on the entire New Testament in the English language. While not every verse is commented upon, this set of minor annotations goes far beyond an occasional footnote concerning particularly difficult words and phrases. As with other editions of the Geneva Bible, this revision was
reprinted almost annually (sometimes more than once in a single year), and thus it clearly exerted considerable influence in its time.

The following analysis is in two parts: a brief consideration of Beza's minor annotations as found in Tomson's revision of the Geneva New Testament (which are essentially those

1. Between 1576 (1st edition) and 1587, Tomson's revision of the New Testament was reprinted, sometimes with minor changes, approximately five times (there is some question about the year 1585). In 1587 this same New Testament was printed with the older version of the Geneva Bible's Old Testament. From 1587 until the first edition of the Authorised Version, this complete Bible and separate editions of Tomson's New Testament were reprinted at least 20 times. Although reprinting of the Geneva Bible in its various forms began to wane within a decade after the appearance of the Authorised Version, it maintained its popular appeal for a generation thereafter. The last printing of the Geneva Bible was in 1644. See Greenslade, 1963, p.159; and T.H.Darlow and H.F.Moule, eds., Historical Catalogue of the Printed Editions of Holy Scripture in the Library of the British and Foreign Bible Society, Vol.I (English), London, 1903, pp.83ff.

2. All references to this edition of the Geneva Bible are found in The New Testament of our Lord Jesus Christ, L.Tomson, trans., London, 1610 (but thought to be an error for 1601). This is referred to hereafter as 'Tomson 1601'. The Latin text of the minor annotations is taken from Iesu Christi Domini Nostrî Novum Testamentum, 1598 (place of publication not specified). This is hereafter referred to as 'Beza, 1598', (page numbers refer to part two).
contained in Beza's 1556 Latin translation of the Greek text), and a review of the most important points of exegesis contained in Beza's own revision of the major annotations (1594).

The note to v.12 in the Geneva Bible incorporates, in a surprisingly short compass, a number of points frequently made by Reformation exegetes:

An exhortation to oppress the flesh dayly more and more by the vertue of the Spirit of regeneration, because (saith he) you are debtors unto God, for so much as you have received so many benefits of him.¹

The term 'spirit of regeneration' is noteworthy: here Beza is looking forward to Paul's use of the phrase Πνεύμα ὑποτιθενόμενον, which Beza interprets as the Spirit's ministry of 'sealing' adoption, an idea taken directly from Calvin. In his major annotations, Beza shows his grammatical reasons for assuming, as he does here, that Paul neglected to go on to specify to whom we are indebted.

¹. Tomson, 1601, p.56. Beza, 1598, p.56: 'Adhortatio ad carnem vi Spiritus regenerationis in dies magis ad magis opprimédam. Quia, inquit, debito res estis Deo, tot acceptis ab eo beneficis'.
The notations to vv.13 and 14 are by no means definitive, but of interest for other reasons:

'\(\frac{13}{i}\) Another reason of \(\frac{i}{l} c., derived from\) the profit that ensueth: for such as strive and fight valiantly, shall have everlasting life. \(\frac{14}{i}\) A confirmation of this reason: for they be ye children of God, which are governed by his Spirit, therefore shall they have life everlasting'.

Both of these comments, considered in terms of methodology, reflect the twofold goal of Erasmian hermeneutic: the attempt to analyze the text grammatically (and, in the case of Paul especially, to set out the anatomy of the argument), and to edify the reader by elucidating the spiritual meaning. These two comments, above, are excellent examples of this principle; in both cases an observation about the logic of Paul's sentences is made, and then a theological insight is shared. While the two parts are organic, the 'spiritual' point is based on the grammatical. It is this

1. Tomson, 1601, p.56. Beza, 1598, p.56: '\(\frac{13}{i}\) Alia ratio ab utili, Quia fortiter pugnantes aeterna vita manet. \(\frac{14}{i}\) Confirmatio huius rationis, Quia filli sunt Dei qui ipsius, Spiritu reguntur, ergo vita aeterna eos manet'.
method which Beza uses over and again and with perhaps greater skill than any scholar up to his time.¹

Beza's next note, on vv.15 and 16, reads:

Hee declarreth and expoundeth by the way in these two verses, by what right this name, to be called the children of God, is given to the believers: because saith he, they have received the grace of the Gospel, wherein God sheweth himselfe, not (as before in the publishing of the Law) terrible and fearfull, but a most benigne and loving father in Christ, so that with great boldnesse we call him Father, the holy Ghost sealing this adoption in our hearts by faith.²

Once more, as in the two notes above on vv.13 and 14, the colon signifies a division of tasks; an observation is made concerning Paul's purpose (which is based upon a literary analysis of the text), and then the theological interpretation is given. Beza's understanding of v.15 here is not far different from that we have seen

¹ Greenslade, 1963, p.83.

² Tomson, 1601, p.56. Beza, 1598, p.57: 'Obiter explicat duobus ipsis versiculis quo jure Filiorum Dei appellatio credentibus tribuatque: quoniam, inquit, Evangelii Gratiam accipiant, in qua Deus sese non rursus formidabilem, sicut in Legis promulgatione, sed benignum Patrem in Christo praebet, adeo ut eum magna cum fiducia Patrem invocemus, Spiritu Sancto videlicet hanc adoptionem in animis nostris per fidem obsignante'.
in Bucer's early writings: by grace through faith we are made sons of God. There is, however, an important difference which comes out only in Beza's major annotation of 1565.¹ There he makes it quite clear that while the Christian is liberated through regeneration from the curse which follows violation of the Law, Christians are not exempt from obedience to the Law. In its moral and ethical demands the promulgated Law is compatible with the Gospel. In short, Beza upholds Calvin's position: rather than being abrogated by, or in opposition to, the Gospel, the (moral) Law is most truly established by it. Our position in relation to the Fathers who lived before Christ, therefore, is not one of spiritual superiority but simply the difference which resulted from the Advent of Christ.²

This statement is simply a substantiation of Calvin's very clear exegesis of v.15 and agrees with it in every detail.

1. The note to v.15a was one of those which was considerably shortened in Beza's 1594 edition of the major annotations. The particular point to which we refer above is not included in the 1594 version of the annotations.

2. See Beza, 1598, p.57.
As regards this interpretation of vv.14 and 15 by Calvin and Beza, there are two important points to be noted:

1) The leading of the Spirit (v.14) is understood as referring to the work of sanctification (as do vv.12 and 13), and vv.15ff are interpreted in terms of 'regeneration'.

2) The \( \text{Πνεύμα} \) \( \text{του Λου} \) \( \text{λαών} \), while taken as a description of man's condition under the Law, is not understood as the Law itself, as in some Patristic commentators. The effect of this, as pointed out above, is to deny any attempt at an unfavorable comparison between the Old Testament Patriarchs and Christians. The Spirit's ministry can be seen in the Law, but cannot be limited to the Law.

Still, Calvin and Beza were both ambiguous enough to leave in doubt the question whether the \( \text{Πνεύμα} \) in this phrase ought to be understood as (Holy) Spirit or 'frame of mind'; therefore this issue becomes a point for discussion among
1. This ambiguity exists even within the writings of one exegete. As we have already seen, Calvin's exegesis of v.15 leaves open the possibility of both interpretations. This is also true of Beza, as is indicated in the marginal notes of Tomson's revision of the Geneva New Testament. At v.15, and in addition to the note cited above, three special notes, set off by letters rather than numbers and printed in italics, are given. One of these notes (p) is in reference to v.15a, and surprisingly suggests that: 'By the Spirit (i.e., 'Spirit of Bondage') is meant the holy Ghost, whom we are said to receive, when he worketh in our minds' (Tomson, 1601, p.56). This is a translation of the first sentence of the note on Spiritum servitutis in Beza's 1594 revision of the major annotations (Annotationum Majorum in Novum Testamentum, part two, Geneva, 1594, p.95; hereafter referred to as 'Beza, 1594'): 'Spiritus vocat Spiritum sanctum: quem dicimus accipere quum in animis nostris est efficax'. This sentence does not occur in the 1565 version of Beza's major annotations. In that edition, all stress is laid upon the fear of punishment incurred by transgression of the Law. While closer identification of τοῦ υἱὸς τοῦ ἐλέησαι is not attempted, the tenor of Beza's long note would lead one to think that he had assumed the θέλειν λειτουργεῖν of this phrase meant 'state of mind'.

Insofar as I have been able to discover, no one has commented upon the fact that the marginal notes of Tomson's version were further revised after the publication of Beza's edited major annotations (1594) to include selected comments from that edition. It is for this reason that the writer has used an edition of Tomson's revision of the New Testament published subsequent to 1594. These are contained in notes which were set off, as remarked above, with letters of the alphabet and printed in italics. An examination of these has convinced the writer that certain (though not all) of these notes could come from no other source. Many of them, however, do not correspond to either edition of Beza's annotations (1556, 1565 and 1594). These are possibly taken from annotations of Tremellius and Junius, contemporaries of Beza.
Beza's minor annotations include two comments to v.17; both are translated in the margins of Tomson's version:

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{L17a} & \text{ A proofoe of the consequent of the confirmation:} \\
& \text{because that he which is the Sonne of God, doth enjoy God with Christ.} \\
\text{L17b} & \text{ Now Paul teacheth by what way the sonnes of God doe come to that felicite, to wit, by the crosse, as Christ himselfe did: and therewithall openeth unto them fountains of comfort: as first, that we have Christ a companion and fellow of our afflictions: secondly, that we shalbe also his fellowes in ye everlasting glory.} \end{align*} \]

Here we need only note the following: first the tendency, evident also in Calvin's commentary, to understand v.17b as a mapping out of the course of sanctification; next, the is carefully interpreted so as to avoid suggesting that our suffering is the cause of our glorification; finally, the suffering itself is spoken of in general terms, i.e., as indicative of the pains of the present life.

1. Tomson, 1601, p.56. Beza, 1598, p.57: 'Probatio consequentis confirmationis, quia qui filius Dei est, cum Christo, fruatur Deo'. And: 'Iam ducet Paulus, qua via Filii Dei ad illam felicitatem perveniente per crucem videlicet, sicut & ipse Christus. Simul autem aperit consolationis fontes, ac primum quidem, quod Christum ipsum habeamus affectionum socium: secundo quod illi quoque simus in alterna illa gloria socii futuri'.

2. Tomson's revision contains a note (s) to the word 'heires': 'Partakers of our fathers goods, and that freely, because we are children by adoption'. (Tomson, 1601, p.56). This is taken directly from Beza's 1594 edition of the major annotations, but does not appear in the 1565 edition: '...bonorum Patris participes, idque gratis, quia filii adoptivi' (Beza, 1594, p.95).
We turn now to Beza's 1594 edition of the major annotations in order to note points not yet touched upon. Our review will concentrate on Beza's use of grammatical tools in his exegesis of the text.

At v.12 Beza observes that something is wrong with the sentence; either the negative particle is to be transposed (see John 6:32 and 33), or, preferably, another opposing part ought to be supplied (see Galatians 4:8). Literally, Beza notes, one can see that there is a change in structure: Paul has now finished his argument concerning the justification and deliverance apprehended through faith in Christ, and proceeds with an important exhortation. There are two reasons for this exhortation. First of all out of pure honesty he realises that there is much that is shameful in his readers which is to be destroyed. Secondly, he gives this exhortation for sheer suitability's sake, for it is by this means (mortification of the flesh) that we receive personally our deliverance so freely given.¹

¹. Beza, 1594, p.95. The crucial part of this comment reads: 'Finita vero disputattonem de gratulta in Christo per fidem apprehenso justificatione ac proinde salute, antequam illam concludat, subjicit exhortationem gravissimam, partim ab honesto, quod turpe sit ei non sese totum consccrare a quo tantum beneficium, quod hac via salutem nobis gratuito dandam recipiamus'.
We see here again, this time in greater detail, how Beza's grammatical and literary analysis supplies him with a springboard to a rather profound theological insight. In our history, for example, both of these observations have often been made (i.e., that something must be supplied to complete the thought of v.12 and that Paul begins an exhortation at v.12), but few exegetes have gone on to draw out such insightful theological implications from these observations. It is evidence such as this which has created the general opinion among historians that Beza has too long been underestimated as an exegete.

At v.13 Beza suggests that mortificetis for 
\(\Theta α ν ν θ c \tilde{c} η \tilde{c} η\) is preferable to the Vulgate's mortificaveritis, for the present tense better communicates the struggle which is still flourishing.\(^1\)

A distinctive mark of Beza's annotations is his frequent reference to Hebrew grammar and forms in attempting to resolve ambiguities of the Greek text.\(^2\) This is illustrated in a

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1. Beza, 1594, p.95: 'Ego malui praesens tempus servare, quo significatur pugna adhuc vigere'.

2. It was, however, common for exegetes of this period to suggest that Paul's Greek was influenced by his familiarity with Hebrew.
wholly unique comment on the verb \( \epsilon \lambda \alpha ' \beta \epsilon \tau \epsilon \) (v.15). Here he says that Paul, consistent with Hebrew usage, often changes from first to second person. The implication is that no conclusion can be drawn from the person in which Paul chooses to address his readers.

Beza's interpretation of v.15 (which has already been discussed in some detail above) is essentially a comparison of the effect of the Spirit's ministry in the Law and in the Gospel. While he clearly identifies the \( \Pi \nu \epsilon \gamma \mu \alpha \) in the phrase \( \Pi \nu \epsilon \gamma \mu \alpha \ \delta \omega u \lambda \epsilon \iota \alpha \varsigma \) as the Holy Spirit, he attempts to minimize the harshness of such an interpretation by emphasizing that \( \delta \omega u \lambda \epsilon \iota \alpha \varsigma \) is best thought of as the result of the anxiety which is stirred up in us (in animis nostris) by the harsh and wholly impossible conditions of the Law. On the contrary, however,

1. Beza, 1594, p.95: 'Transit Hebreorum more a tertia persona ad secundam'.

2. Beza, 1594, p.95: 'Spiritus vocat Spiritum sanctum: quem dicimur accipere quem in animis nostris est efficax. Is igitur quia praedicatione Legis salutem quidem proponit, sed addita durissime & plane \( ' \alpha \delta \omega \upsilon \alpha \tau \varsigma \) conditione, nihil nisi timorem potest in animis nostris ciere, ut conscientia quasi serva iram domini magna cum anxietate expectet'.
Paul elegantly calls the Spirit - who was imparted to us under the Gospel - the Spirit of adoption because he sealed, in our hearts through faith, deliverance by free adoption in Christ and freedom from the curse of the Law ....

This is not, however, a rigidly historical interpretation, as both the absence of reference to the Jews and the use of the phrase in animis nostris make evident. Rather, Beza's comment reflects the general Protestant tendency to 'personalize' or 'spiritualize' the effect of the Πνεῦμα. Still, there is here a subtle difference between Luther and Beza: the implied danger for the Christian is for both Calvin and Beza not a return to the Law (as it was with Luther), but rather that of regressing to legalism, i.e., attempting to justify oneself through works of the Law.

1. Beza, 1594, p.95: 'Contra vero Paulus Spiritum in quo per Evangelium afflamur, quia gratuita in Christo adoptione salutem obsignat in animis credentium a Legis maledictione liberatis, eleganter vocat Spiritum adoptionis ...'

2. Beza, 1594, p.95: 'Ideo dicitur ab hoc effectu, spiritus servitutis ad metum, id est quasi in servilem conditionem nos redigens'. (Emphasis is ours). This sentence also indicates Beza's own ambiguity concerning the identity of Πνεῦμα σούλητας. If read out of context one could only deduce that here he has understood Πνεῦμα as 'state of mind'.
At v.15c Beza takes issue with the view that ὦ Παῦλος is simply a repetition of ἀββᾶ for the purpose of emphasis. If this is so, asks Beza, why did Paul not simply repeat ἀββᾶ or ὦ Παῦλος? Likewise, Augustine's suggestion that both languages are used to demonstrate that Christ belongs no less to the Greeks than to the Jews is also unacceptable, for in Mark the same words are attributed to Christ - but Christ did not speak Greek. Thus Augustine's interpretation is more ingenious than solidly based. The solution is simply this: ὦ Παῦλος is added for the sake of explaining the Syriac word transliterated as ἀββᾶ. Beza also notes that Paul uses the nominative case (ὦ Παῦλος) for the vocative.¹

Of interest at v.17b is Beza's discussion of Εἰτερὸς: he prefers the Latin translation of Si modo (which gives the same sense as the Vulgate Si tamen) above Erasmus's suggestion of Si quidem. The latter implies that suffering is the cause, rather than the condition of glorification with Christ. Thus,

¹. Beza, 1594, p.95.
as he himself points out, Beza is in agreement with Ambrosiaster, who thought that the 'condition of the cross' (conditionem crucis) is here being required in v.17b. The thought of the Apostle here is similar to that in II Timothy 3:12: 'Indeed all who desire to live a godly life in Christ Jesus will be persecuted . . .' Beza's solution, then, is precisely that of Calvin: suffering is the inevitable and natural course of the Christian life.
The Socinians.

It is perhaps above all regrettable for our study that Anabaptist movements generated so few published documents of faith. There is virtually no commentary on the Epistle to the Romans which is generally available to Western historians written by an Anabaptist theologian. There are, however, three commentaries on Romans, contained in a single monumental Socinian work, by Johannes Crell, Jonas Schlichting and Samuel Przypkowski. The Socinians represent an extreme left-wing manifestation of the Anabaptist view, and thus do not accurately reflect the views of more moderate Anabaptists such as Menno Simons, Jakob Hutter, Peter Riedemann, etc. It is, in fact, questionable whether the movement first centered at Rakow and associated with the name of Fausto Sozzini ought to be designated as 'Anabaptist', other than for the sake of convenience.

1. Novum Testamentum, Eleutheropolitâ, Freiburg, 1656 (4 vols), Samuel Przypkowski is not mentioned on the title page to this work because he was not an editor, but simply a contributor. His commentary on our passage is extremely brief; the most substantial comment is that on v.15.
More properly the Socinians belong to a long line of Unitarian movements.

While the three commentaries referred to above are not of major importance in the history of exegesis, they did, in their time, exert an influence on European Christianity out of proportion to the general impact of Socinianism. This is explained by the impressive list of scholars who were evidently attracted by both an intellectual climate which stressed humanistic learning and independence, and by a religious community based upon a high moral and ethical ideal.

Because the most distinctive mark of the Socinians was their rejection (on Biblical grounds) of the doctrine of the Trinity, our analysis will be limited to their interpretation of the various uses of \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) in our passage.

Socinian vocabulary, when concerned with such Biblical terms as \( \text{πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ} \) and \( \text{πνεῦμα Θεοῦ} \) (as found in Romans 8:9), is highly subtle. Socinian theologians are able not only to speak about a 'spirit of God', but also 'the Holy Spirit', and all the while not intend the Third Person of the Trinity as set forth in the classic creeds of the Church. This is possibly only by limiting definitions of such Biblical phrases to a functional description. The function of the 'spirit of God' or the
'divine Spirit', as described by the Socinians in their commentaries, is not far different from that in the commentary of Pelagius on the Pauline Epistles. The Spirit is essentially the enabler of the word of the Gospel; that is, the medium of enlightenment through which the word of the Gospel—seen most clearly in the teaching and example of Christ—is brought to bear on man. Further, there is, as in Pelagius, an obvious refusal to drive a wedge between the Law and the Gospel; while there is a difference between them, it is a difference of kind. This can be illustrated by Paul's contrast of the letter and the spirit; reinterpreted by the Socinians, the difference is that by the letter the Law was revealed to man in the Old Testament. In the New Testament the Gospel (the teaching and example of Christ) is made known to man by the Holy Spirit. Even as man was capable of fulfilling the spiritual

1. It is generally acknowledged that for their understanding of God's relationship to man, the Socinians are indirectly indebted (by way of the Nominalists) to Pelagius. See 'Socinianer', cols. 768ff.

2. Johann Crell, Opera Omnia Exegetica, I of Novum Testamentum, Eleutheropolis [Freiburg 2], 1656 (the commentary on ch.8 of Romans is found on pp.134ff; hereafter cited as 'Crell, 1656'), p.136: 'spiritus Dei habitat in vobis/ Per spiritum istum divinum qui in fidelibus hic habitare dicitur, primo & praecipue intelligendus est ille spiritus, per quem Evangelii doctrina hominibus innotuit; qualis inprimis erat ille spiritus, quem prius Evangeli praecones caelitus hauserunt, propter quem etiam factum est, ut Evangelium spiritum appellaret Apostolus, Legem autem literam, quod Lex literis primo fuerit incisa, & per literas hominibus revelata, Evangelium autem per Spiritum Sanctum hominibus innotuerit.' RGG, Vol.5, fasc.1, 1st ed., 1919.
Law of Moses, man is capable of following the example and teachings of Christ. The major difference between these two is that whereas the Law of Moses was simply proclaimed, the Word of the Gospel, by the divine spirit, became a very part of man's being. In fact, the two (the Word of the Gospel and the Spirit) are so intimately bound together that they are one. Thus, when Paul says 'spirit', he really means the Word of the Gospel, and when he says that the Spirit dwells in man, he means that the Word of the Gospel has come to abide with man.

1. Crell, 1656, p.136: "si vero quis spiritum Christi non habet non est eius. Cum antea vel dixerit, vel saltem innuerit, spiritum Dei in illis habitare; nunc loco spiritus Dei ponit spiritum Christi; ut ostendat, se non de quovis spiritu loqui, & qui etiam hominibus sub Lege constitutis inesse poterat; sed de eo Dei spiritu qualem Christus largitur, & qui Evangelicae doctrinae proprius est ac peculiaris, qui id praestare potest, ut alius sit in spiritu, id est, spiritualis plane ex carnali evadat homine'. See also Jonas Schlichting, Commentaria Posthuma, IV of Novum Testamentum, Irenopol/?, 1656 (hereafter referred to as 'Schlichting, 1656') p.228: 'Sed in spiritu./Intelligit autem spiritum nostrum naturalem, id est animum intelligentem cum Dei spiritu conjunctum ....'

2. Crell, 1656, p.136: "spiritus Dei habitat in vobis'. Hunc igitur Spiritum Sanctum cum illa Evangelicae doctrinae notitia conjunctum intelligit Apostolus'.

With this brief reconstruction in mind, we can turn to the exegesis of the relevant parts of our passage.

It is precisely this definition (above) which both Crell and Schlichting bring to bear on the phrase *εἰ δὲ Πνεῦμα τὰς Παράξεις τοῦ Σώματος Ἐνατοῦτε*:

the spirit of God, by whom we have received the Word of the Gospel, makes it possible to mortify the acts of the body. While the precise way in which this is true is cleverly left unsaid, it is clear from the definitions given elsewhere that the only 'grace' of the Spirit about which the Socinians can speak is that of illuminating or internalizing the teaching and example of Christ. When applied to the thought of v.13b, this makes a very tidy, consistent interpretation: it is through the moral example and teaching of Christ, which 'Word of the Gospel' has been made an integral part of our being by the Spirit of God, that mortification of the acts of the body is realized. The greatest possible emphasis is laid upon v.13 by the Socinians, for moral

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1. Crell, 1656, p.137: 'Nempe divino, qui in nobis habitat, quamadmodum ex sequenti versu appareat'. Schlichting 1656, p.232: 'Medium ostendit efficacissimum, per quod actiones corporis seu opera carnis perimenda, tollenda & abolenda sunt, per spiritum nimium Dei & Christi, qui in nobis habitat, si Dei & Christi sumus'.
and ethical obedience is the basis of justification.¹

Both Crell and Schlichting interpret v.14 in the light of this reconstructed Pelagian theology of the 'Word': part a of v.14 is the cause, part b is the result, and the verse taken as a whole is interpreted in the context of v.13. To be impelled or ruled by the Spirit of God (i.e., by the Word of the Gospel as internalized by the agency of the Spirit of God and conjoined with the human spirit) issues in the result of one being a son of God. It is because of this reign of the Word of God that man is able to put to death the actions of the flesh.²

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2. Crell, 1656, p.137: 'Causam affert cur illa sint victur1 qu1 perimunt actiones carnis. Est autem haec causa, quod spiritu Dei agantur, id est regantur & gubernentur. Qui autem tales sunt, hi sunt filii Dei, id est in statu & conditio filiorum Dei, & ab eo instar filiorum diliguntur: uno verbo, jus habent filiorum Dei adoptivorum, quod quale sit ex vers. 17 apparebit'.

Schlichting, 1656, p.232: 'Probat illos victuros esse, si spiritu actiones corporis mortificent Nam, inquit, qu1 Dei spiritu aguntur, hi sunt Dei Filii (v.14). Spiritu Dei agi, id est ferri, impellit, regit, & spiritu actiones corporis perimere, pro eodem accipit Apostolus. Hunc enim in finem quisque Dei spiritu agitur, ne usquam extent actiones corporis, sed unique sint actiones spiritus'.
The Socinian exegetes agree that the word \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) in v.15 necessitates understanding the \( \text{πνεῦμα σοφίας} \) as an indication of life as it was under the Law.\(^1\) The \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) in this phrase is to be taken as 'state of mind'; i.e., a 'spirit of servility' is an appropriate mentality for slaves.\(^2\) Since, however, such an interpretation might easily be construed as a critique of the

1. Crell, 1656, p.137: 'Cum vero ait denuo appare eos prius hunc spiritum accepiisse. Spiritus ergo iste erat, illas mentis qualitas, qua ex percepta Legis disciplina hominum mentes imbeubantur, qui servilis erat, qui servis plane conveniebat, servis erat proprius'. Schlichting, 1656, p.232: 'Iterum. Id est sicut prius factum fuit sub lege ....'

2. Schlichting, 1656, p.232: 'Non accepistis spiritum servitutis'. Id est spiritum servilem, spiritum qui servorum est seu servorum proprium; duo substantiva posuit pro substantiva & adjectivo, Hebraea phrasi, spiritum servitutis seu servili statui conventientem'. Also Samuel Przykpowski, Cogitationes Sacrae ad Initium Evangelii Matthæi et Omnes Epistolas Apostolicas, Eleutheropolii, 1692, p.49: 'Non igitur servitutis spiritum, qui nos heriti Dei severitate, sicut Judæi in lege terrebantur, terreet....'. See also Crell, above.
Law, the precise way in which the Law engendered a mentality of
servitude must be carefully stated. The solution lies in the
direction of the effect produced by the Law in the heart of man:
the phrase εἰς ψόβον gives us the definitive clue to this
problem, for the very harshness of the Law's demands creates fear in
the heart (anímus) of man— he who lives under the reign of fear is
not free but a servant.¹ That fear of punishment for transgression
of the Law produced a quality of mind which can be described as
'servitude', is an explanation we have often encountered in our study.
But the interpretation placed upon the contrast of πίν. σουλείας
and πνεῦμα θεοθείας is totally unique. The
spirit of mind produced by the Law's harshness is in contrast with
the reconstructed anímus, and the latter results from the conjoining of

¹ Schlichting, 1656, p.232: 'In timorem. Id est in solum
 timorem, vel praecipue in timorem ac metum. Finem ostendit
spiritus servilis, & hoc ipso rationem illius ac naturam.
 Spiritus servilis natura ac ratio simulque finis est ut metum
incutiat. Servorum enim est metu ac timore regi, qui, quia
 serví sunt, non liberi, frugi non sunt nisi metuant, proinde
 nisi severe tractentur. Hunc spiritum Legis disciplina
 severior, hominum animis indebat'. Crell, 1656, p.137: 'In
metum. Servorum enim proprium est metuere ac trepidare,
 servilíbus ingeníis convenit metus; metus, inquam, eiusmodi
qualis hic intelligitur, nempe ut severitatem ac supplicia eius
cui pares, tue cerviçì semper immíinentia cogites & expavescas.
 Ostendit Apostolus quid hic spiritus in animis eorum qui sub
Lege erant constituti, effacerit, nempe metum, timorem, &
trepdidationem, Vocatur autem ista qualitas animorum, ex Legis
disciplina severa ac rigidá excitata, spiritus....'
the 'spirit of the Gospel' and man's soul. The Word of the Gospel, which, as we have already seen, is inseparably bound up with the 'spirit of God', is made a living Word in the heart of man (as opposed to the written publication of the Law in the Old Testament); this, in turn, fills the heart (animal) of man to such an extent as to create a whole new reality. It is this internalizing of the Word which makes possible fulfilment of God's demand of obedience to the Law. In this unique way the Law is not only fulfilled in the teaching and example of Christ, but it is brought nearer than ever before by the 'spirit of the Gospel'. Thus the contrast is that of effect and mode, and not of the relative merits of Law and Gospel.

This attempt to minimize discontinuity between Law and Gospel is almost identical with that of Pelagius, according to whom,

1. Crell, 1656, pp.137-138: 'Vocatur autem ista qualitas animorum, ex Legis disciplina severa ac rigida excitata, spiritus, propter oppositum spiritum Evangelicum, qui non solum ex ipsa Evangelii doctrina, sed etiam ex caelo in nos manat, & animos nostros imbuist'. Schlichting, 1656, p.233: 'Sed accepistis spiritum adoptionis. Id est spiritum qui filiorum est, spiritum filialem, qualem habent Filli, vel qui pro Fillis adoptantur a Patre libero, spiritum nimium non tam timoris, quam ardentissimi erga Patrem amoris, & liberalis audaciae ac fiduciae, cum videant se etiam ardentissime a Patre amari, & liberaliter ac benigne haber1, quem spiritum Christi Evangelium de tanta & tam immensa Dei gratiae & erga nos amore, animas nostris indit & ingenerat'.
The Law of Moses was written on hard stone, and the Jews had in their possession only tablets inscribed in their absence; in the gospel the Lord himself was present among men and gave them his law in their hearing; this law his hearers took into their hearts ....

The Socinian view of the Spirit, was, of course, completely distinctive, and not identical with that of Pelagius. Nevertheless, the Socinian exegesis of Paul is primarily of interest because of its remarkable resemblance, in many parts, to that of Pelagius. It is fascinating to consider what use the Socinians would have made of Pelagius's commentary on the Pauline Epistles, had they known of its existence.

I. Evans, 1968, p.107 (emphasis is ours).
Roman Catholic Exegesis.

In his Bampton Lectures of 1885, to which we have often referred, Dean F.W. Farrar notes that he had not included 'the great Romanist commentators since the Reformation' because 'their writings produced no change in the dominant conceptions.'\(^1\) Essentially Farrar is right, although the picture of Catholic exegesis in the 16th and 17th centuries is not nearly so homogeneous as such a statement implies.

If there were no epoch-making events in the history of Catholic interpretation in the three centuries following the Reformation, there most certainly was a period of intense interest in fixing the authoritative (i.e., Patristic and traditional) interpretation of the text. Further, in the latter part of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century, there were a number of notable commentaries written by Catholic exegetes which easily equal in quality those written by some of the minor figures of the Reformation, for they used the same tools which had been given the majority of the reformers by the humanists. And if Catholic exegetes

\(^1\) Farrar, 1885, p.viii. See also Greenslade, 1963, p.533.
used comment upon the Biblical text as an opportunity to engage in polemics, they did so in self-defense against the same Protestant practice. In fact, one aspect of Catholic exegesis in this early period was a reaction to Protestant exegesis:

Catholic scholarship from the time of Cardinal Cajetan onward was faced by the twofold problem of how to avoid the appearance of accepting the Protestant appeal to the Hebrew and Greek texts of the Bible according to a different view of the analogy of faith, and how to discover a clear definition of what was meant by the requirements of the Council of Trent upon "the sense in which Holy Mother Church has held and holds the interpretation of Scripture" and "the unanimous consent of the Fathers".¹

These two problems represent two prevailing tendencies in Catholic interpretation: the first tendency (to use grammatical tools in the search for the literal meaning) is stronger in Catholic exegetes' writing before the Council of Trent and a generation thereafter, and the second tendency (sifting and collating Patristic opinion with the goal of finding the authoritative interpretation) is stronger in the exegetes writing toward the end of the 16th, the beginning of the 17th century and onward. Within 100 years after the Council of Trent, however, a great decline sets in; so much is this the case

¹ Greenslade, 1963, p.91.
that from the 'Great Commentary' of Cornelius a Lapide (1567-1637) until the revival of Biblical studies in the 20th century, there is virtual silence.¹

Viewed as a whole, and with regard to our passage, the following features appear in almost all of the Catholic commentaries:²

¹. There are one or two notable exceptions cited in Greenslade, 1963; Antoine Calmet, Commentaire littéral sur tous les livres de l'ancien et du nouveau Testament, 1707-16, and Rudolf Cornely, Cursus Scripturae Sacrae, 1896. Both of these are essentially anthologies of Patristic commentaries; in fact, Cornely's magnus opus comes very close to being a history of exegesis up to the Reformation.

². For example, those commentaries of Cardinal Cajetan (Thomas de Vio), Alfonso Salmeron, Commentaria in omnes ep. B. Pauli, etc., Cologne, 1604; Johannes Benedictus, In Quatuor Sacro Sancta Jesu Christi Evangelia, etc., Antwerp, 1559; Jacobus Nacchianti, Enarrationes in D. Pauli epistolas ad Ephesios and Romanos, etc., Venice, 1567; Wilhelm Estius (von Est), Absolutissima in omnes beati Pauli et septem catholicas apostolorum ep. commentaria, Cologne, 1631; and, Cornelius a Lapide (Cornelius Cornelissen van den Steen or Steyn), Commentaria in omnes divi Pauli ep., Antwerp, 1679.
Overall, there is a return to Scholastic vocabulary and conclusions. There is also a revival of many of the problems we have met at earlier stages in our history; e.g., the question of v.16, 'How can one speak of God's heirs when God is immortal?'

Other marks of Catholic exegesis relevant to our passage are the following:

(a) Frequent denial that part \(_a\) of v.14 is a test or proof of part \(_b\), and, on the positive side, an interpretation of this verse which stresses that all sons of God are led by the Holy Spirit.

(b) Adherence to more traditional views on the various occurrences of \(\text{Πνεῦμα}\), taken almost always as the Holy Spirit (with the obvious exception of \(\text{Πνεῦματι αὐτῷ μὴν } \), v.16, and \(\text{Πνεῦμα οὐδεὶς }\), v.15).

(c) A studied silence on the relation of vv.14 and 15 to the doctrine of justification and/or sanctification.

(d) Greatly expanded comments on v.16, obviously intended to limit carefully the extent and province of the Holy Spirit's witness to the individual.
(e) A clear interpretation of $\gamma$ (v.17) in a causal sense with the sometimes explicit purpose of disproving the cardinal Reformation principle of justification only by grace through faith.

It will not be necessary, nor would it be profitable, to analyze each commentary in detail, if only because many of them incorporate massive repetition of Patristic and medieval exegesis which has already been reviewed in this study. To trace each idea back to its source, whether in Carolingian anthologies or the Patristic commentaries upon which they draw, the medieval glosses and commentaries, the commentaries of St. Thomas and Nicholas of Lyra, etc., would be impossible. This is not to imply that all of these commentaries are made up only from antecedent works. Indeed, another important part of their make-up - particularly in some such as Cardinal Cajetan's - is a detailed discussion of the grammatical possibilities to be found in the Greek text - something which is not found in Patristic and medieval commentaries of the West. But the possibilities they raise are not usually different from those found in exeges of the Reformation. Rather, it is their conclusions which differ, and these are usually pointed in three general directions:
confirmation of the Vulgate's Latin text and of selected Patristic opinion, and a denial of characteristically Protestant interpretations.

An outstanding exception is Cardinal Cajetan, who often allowed the Greek text to lead him to a criticism of the Vulgate. However, such a thing was not possible after the Council of Trent, and, in this light, it is not surprising that Cajetan was later to be censured for many of his conclusions.

In the review which follows, we have chosen one problem, dealt with by Cajetan, to illustrate Catholic exegesis of this period: the interpretation of v.16.

Catholic opinion was particularly hostile to Protestant exegesis of this verse for a number of reasons, and the Council of Trent specifically denied the possibility of a direct, personalized witness of the Holy Spirit to the individual.

Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534), a Dominican and an early antagonist of Luther, went further than any other Catholic exegete in searching for the literal sense as a means of meeting the Protestant challenge.¹ His commentary on the Epistles of Paul is the only one of those reviewed here to be written before the Council of Trent.²

¹ Greenslade, 1963, pp.91-92.
² Epistolae Pauli et Aliorum Apostolorum ad Graecani Veritatem Castigatae. (Hereafter referred to as 'Cajetan, 1540'). Paris, 1540.
Cajetan's most distinctive and lengthiest comment is in fact on v.16. He begins by noting that the Greek text conveys a different sense from that of the Vulgate; whereas the Latin suggests that there is only one witness, the Greek clearly says there are two (the Holy Spirit and our spirit). Further, because Paul wrote Greek, we must accept as the literal meaning that both testify to us that we are sons of God. Cajetan then attempts to show how this literal sense ought to be interpreted: this 'internal' testimony which comes from both sources is concerned not with the possibility of sonship, but the fact of sonship; for that reason it must be

1. Cajetan, 1540, p.52: 'Ubi adverte quod in textu Graeco [sic] non est directe illemet sensus quem Latinus interpres sonat, quoniam Graecus [sic] sonat duos contestes (scilicet spiritumsanctum & spiritum nostrum) de eadem re: scilicet quod sumus filii dei. Latinus autem unum testem (scilicet spiritumsanctum) testificantem non nobis, sed spiritui nostro quod sumus filii dei'.

2. Cajetan, 1540, p.52: 'Et quanuis utrunque sit verum & in idem redeat: quia tamen Paulus Graec [sic] scripsit, ille est literalis sensus quem Grecus [sic] textus sonat: scilicet quod spiritussanctus contestis est spiritui nostro, ambobus testificantibus nobis quod sumus filii dei'.
considered a peculiar gift. The object or goal of this special gift Cajetan defines in quasi-Johannine language: the testimony is by no means that one might comprehend or perceive the proof of the condition of sonship itself, but to believe that one is a son of God, for to believe is to comprehend.

1. Cajetan, 1540, p. 52: 'Testimonium hoc quod spiritussanctus reddit simul cum spiritu nostro de hoc quod sumus filii dei, internum esse significatur ex eo quod ab utroque interno spiritu perhibetur non aliis sed nobisipsis. Et quam testimonium hoc non est de possibili, sed de facto (hoc est non est de hoc sumus quod possum "esse filii dei, sed est de hoc quod filii dei sum") ideo donum speciale est. Nam testimonium quod possimus esse filii dei, inter testimonia communia filii comprehenditur, testimonium autem quod ego sum filius dei, speciale donum est'.

2. See John 20:29: 'Jesus said to him, "Have you believed because you have seen me? Blessed are those who have not seen and yet believe".'

3. Cajetan, 1540, p. 52: 'Et quoniam nullius testimonii effectus est videre seu scire rem testificatam sed credere (non enim inducitur testimonium sed lumen aut ratio evidentiam faciens, ad hoc ut videatur aut sciatur res: sed testimonium inducitur, ad hoc ut credatur res testificata, ad hoc ut videatur esse credendum sic esse quod testificatur) ideo ex hoc testimonio spiritus-sancti & nostri quod sumus filii dei, non intelligas me videre aut scire, sed credere quod sum filius dei, sed videre esse mihi credendum quod sum filius dei'.
Although Cajetan's exegesis of this verse might seem to be in many ways not greatly different from that of some Protestant interpreters, it is essentially an apology for traditional exegesis. First of all, he is careful to distinguish this special gift of the Holy Spirit's testimony from His general ministry. This, in turn, is limited by means of applying the 'dual testimony', as he describes it, to the individual's struggle with doubt. In effect, Cajetan has said: 'That I am a son of God is a fact, to comprehend that fact, faith is needed and the testimony of the Holy Spirit and of my spirit is a corroboration of that faith'.

Thus faith for Cajetan is a means by which the unverifiable might be comprehended, i.e., an act of the will superior to reason, by which that which is rationally incomprehensible is made comprehensible. This highly subtle interpretation has, then, the effect of denying a central tenet of Reformation theology: faith conceived of as trust in Christ as a basis for justification. This inherent criticism of Luther (for Cajetan was almost certainly thinking of Luther as he offered his own definition of faith) mirrors Catholic opinion concerning the doctrine of justification by grace through faith: it was an
oversimplification, it elevated one theological virtue over others (hope and charity), and it neglected the fact that all those validly baptized were already sons of God.

Finally, Cajetan's interpretation of the Spirit's testimony as a gift is also an implicit criticism of the reformers' understanding of, and emphasis upon, grace. For this suggests that the relationship between sonship and the Spirit is simply one of a *χαρίσμα* (i.e., of the theological virtue of faith), whereas for the reformers, the Spirit is the one who effects sonship.¹ If Luther, in his Lectures on Romans, interpreted this verse to mean that the Holy Spirit enables one to believe, he used the verb *credo* in a vastly different sense (see above).

¹. For an historical study of this problem see Thomas F. Torrance, *The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers*, Edinburgh, 1948.
E. The Post-Reformation Era.

Protestant Orthodoxy.

As he prepared to survey the era of exegesis which now lies before us, Dean F.W. Farrar commented:

In spite of much theological labour and activity, the period at which we are about to glance in the history of exegesis is very cheerless. It was a period in which liberty was exchanged for bondage, universal principles for beggarly elements; truth for dogmatism, independence for tradition, religion for system.\(^1\)

The actual number of Biblical commentaries coming from Lutheran Orthodox and Reformed writers is small, for during this period Scripture was often used to buttress an increasingly complex and rigid body of doctrinal opinion and prejudice — a perhaps inevitable result of the \textit{loci} method of writing theology — but not often interpreted verse by verse. It is also a period when the most interesting exegesis comes from those who reject rigid orthodoxy, e.g., the Arminians, the exponents of \textit{Federaltheologie}, the pietists, and the rationalists.

Not only because it is a 'cheerless' era of exegesis, but because so little of interest or importance is said in it, this

\(^1\) Farrar, 1885, p.358.
study will confine itself to a very brief review of representative Lutheran and Reformed exegetes of the 17th and 18th centuries. This will be followed by an analysis of representative exegetes of the minority groups mentioned above.
Lutheran Orthodoxy.

Abraham Calov (1612-1686) is perhaps the most representative and the least sympathetic of the Lutheran dogmatists. His commentary on the entire New Testament is essentially a catalogue of hate directed against Hugo Grotius and others he considers to be "corrupt heretics." There is, however, an interesting incongruity in Calov's commentary, for he reproduced accurately Grotius's commentary almost in its entirety. To Grotius's exegesis he occasionally adds rebuttals, transitions and polemics. However, much of Grotius stands untouched, and the places in which he specifically takes Grotius to task for his mistaken and heretical interpretations are not frequent enough to explain the extensive reproduction of Grotius's commentary as a mere device of the polemicist.

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2. However, in defense of Calov it must be said that in the title of the commentary he clearly acknowledges his indebtedness to Grotius, for he not only says 'Grotianae depravationes & errores rectificantur...ex votis Eruditorum, Annotatis Grotii Universis...'. It is to Calov's credit that he clearly recognized the genius of Grotius even though he violently disagrees with his theology. In this regard, Farrar (1885, p.365) unfortunately presents a distorted picture of Calov's attitude toward Grotius. Oddly enough, Farrar overlooked mention of the fact that Calov quotes Grotius at length, often, it would seem, with complete agreement.
There is very little of interest among those comments which is original to Calov in our passage. Grotius's comments there are reproduced completely and Calov's exceptions to Grotius's comments are few and relatively minor. Examples of these are the following:

At v.14 Grotius had explained the relationship of the two parts of the sentence by welding together Luke 3:38 ('... the son of Adam, the son of God') with the Genesis 2 account of creation (especially v.7b, '... and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being') to suggest, by way of analogy, that it is by the insufflation of the Holy Spirit that we are made sons of God.\(^1\) Answering with what is almost a parody of Luther's understanding of justification, Calov responds that the cause of adoption is not insufflation by the Holy Spirit, but rather regeneration and faith. The gift of the Holy Spirit is the

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1. Calov, 1719, p.135: 'Nam si Adam dictus Dei filius, ut diximus ad Lucam III.38. quia Deus ei inflasset vitae terrestis spiritum, quanto magis ii, quibus inflavit Deus sanctitatis Spiritum ?'
consequence of regeneration and faith. ¹

Another, similar example is Calov's response to Grotius's comment on v.17b. Grotius interprets the final clause (ἐνα καὶ συνδοσθεώμεν) as offering the cause for the previous clause (εἴτε συμπτάσχομεν); i.e., the reason we are obligated to tolerate steadfastly those evils is the certain hope of the future glory.² To this Calov almost predictably responds that our sufferings are not the earning of merits, but simply the measure or proper succession of our adoption; these sufferings are permitted by God to those in whom he has established the eternal inheritance. The sole cause of the adoption is that act of establishment by God.³ He then goes on at


² Calov, 1719, p.137: 'Causem addit, cur tolerare mala illa constanter debeamus, spe certa scilicet futurae gloriae'.

³ Calov, 1719, p.137: 'Passiones non conditio sunt meritoria, sed modus vel ordo, quem Deus in hominibus ad aeternam haereditatem admittit, & observat. Causa enim unica constituta erat νικωθεσία, vel adoptio'.
some length to elaborate the manner in which this verse ought to be understood, but adds nothing to that we have already seen in other exegetes of the Reformation.

These two examples are representative of both the tenor of Calov's commentary and the content: he is above all concerned to prove the rightness of Luther's doctrine of justification and to disprove any possible suggestion that man is capable of offering to God any meritorious work of his own.
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, a popular form of commentary among Lutherans was that of a Luther Bible augmented by marginal glosses (including those written by Luther himself), summaries, prefaces, prayers, etc. These additions had the effect of expanding the original Luther Bible to mammoth proportions. An early example of this is the annotated Luther New Testament prepared by the Lutheran Orthodox theologian, Johann Christian Klemm (1688-1754).¹

Klemm's comments on our passage are far more moderate than those of Calov; they are nevertheless clearly intended to sustain the Lutheran Orthodox interpretation. Contrary to Calov, he is able to admit that more than one interpretation is sometimes possible. An example is Klemm's long marginal note to Luther's translation of πνεῦμα ἁγίας as 'knechtlichen Geist':

¹ Die Heilige Schriftt Neuen Testaments, Tübingen, 1729 (hereafter referred to as 'Klemm, 1729').

This outline of four possibilities is followed by Klemm's own reconstruction of the correct interpretation:

Ob nun wohl diese Erklärungen wohl bestehen können, und einander nicht entgegen sind, so verstehen wir doch hierdurch den knechtischen Geist vornemlich von derjenigen Mass des Geistes in dem A.T. welche zwar das Recht der geistlichen Kindschaft nicht ausschloss, aber doch den Schein einer Knechtschaft hatte, so dass zwischen diesen unter den Zucht-Meistern gehaltenen Kindern und den Knechten kein Unterscheid ware, und sie unter den äusserlichen Satzungen gefangen lagen, Gal.4, 1.2.3.²

There is the usual Lutheran ambiguity concerning the use of $\pi\alpha\lambda\nu\varsigma$, and the emphasis on that which is 'external' (äußerlichen Satzungen) is clearly taken over directly from Luther; finally, the position is maintained (in opposition to Reformed exegesis) that the relation of all men in the Old Testament under the law was inferior to that of those who stand under the Gospel. ¹

This ambiguity over the proper understanding of $\Pi\nu\epsilon\sigma\mu\alpha$ (v.15) is also evident in Klemm's marginal comment on Luther's translation of 'kindlichen Geist' for $\Pi\nu\nu\iota\sigma\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$:

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oder Geist der Kindschaft, welcher, Krafft des Gegensatzes, ist die reichere Mass der Kindschaft, da der heilige Geist den Glaubigen einen solchen Sinn schencket, welcher den Kindern gebühret, der ein kindliches Vertrauen erwecket, sie frey, willig und freudig zu Gott macht, seinen Vaters Willen in kindlichem Gehorsam zu thun und darnach zu leben, ihn als ihren Vater zu ehren und anzuruffen, und alle väterliche Wohlthaten von ihm zu erbeten. ²

¹. Klemm, 1729, p.355, comment on the words of Luther's translation 'abermal fürchten musset': 'abermals zur furcht, wie die, so unter dem Gesetze, dessen Schärffe, Zwang und in seinem Nothstall waren, wie die Väter des ersten Bundes, denn diese waren darunter nach dem äussern Menschen: die Werck-Heiligen aber mit Leib und Seele, als ledig von der Gnade des Evangelii in Christo'.

². Klemm, 1729, pp.355-356.
One might well ask how a writer could be so indecisive as to interpret the same use of Πνεῦμα in one sentence as 'the Holy Spirit' and as 'state of mind' in the next, as Klemm has done here. A clue perhaps is to be found in his definition of the words 'unserm Geist' in v.16:

unsere Seele, so fern sie durch den heiligen Geist geheiligt, und durch ihn mit Gott vereiniget ist.

We shall see a growing acceptance and refinement of this concept as we move on in our history. As we have already seen, the original source of this unitive idea (God's spirit and man's soul) is to be found in the Biblical humanist school of interpretation. However, Klemm's reference here to a spiritual Vereinigung probably comes from pietistic interpretation, which, as we shall later see, explains v.16 in terms of a mystical union of Christ and the believer.

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Other minor points of interest in Klemm's comments are:

(a) the recognition of at least two possible variations of interpretation of \( \Sigma \mu \mu \mu \mu \mu \mu \pi \tau \rho \epsilon \gamma \) (v.16);\(^1\) and

(b) a clear rejection of any implicit condition being implied in the clause \( \varepsilon \iota \iota \pi \epsilon \rho \ \Sigma \mu \mu \mu \mu \mu \mu \iota \alpha \iota \sigma \chi \omicron \omicron \omicron \nu \) (v.17).\(^2\)

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1. Klemm, 1729, p.356: '... der Heilige Geist gibt Zeugniss unserem Geist, oder so: der heilige Geist zeuget zugleich mit unserem Geist, es kommt aber beydes auf eines hinaus ...' (emphasis is Klemm's).

2. Klemm, 1729, p.356: 'Niemand verstehet hier eine wirckende Bedingniss, sondern eine wohlgefällige Ordnung Gottes ....'
Here also to be mentioned is Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus (1736-1792), longtime professor of Greek and Latin, and later of theology, at the University of Leipzig. Although a thoroughly Lutheran Orthodox theologian, Morus was mildly influenced by the Enlightenment and rejected the Protestant Scholastic dogmatic handling of Scripture. His exegesis is free from theological polemics and is perhaps best described as '18th-century grammatical-devotional'. His commentary on Romans, first published shortly after his death, was not originally written as a commentary, but rather is drawn from lectures given at Leipzig. For our purposes, it illustrates the aridity of Lutheran Orthodox scholarship in the closing decades of the 18th century. Morus's commentary corroborates other evidence of the failing vigor of a theologically rigid Lutheran Orthodoxy, a body of opinion almost totally sapped of its strength throughout the 17th and 18th centuries by minority movements within (e.g., Pietism and Rationalism).


2. Praelectiones, in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos, Leipzig, 1794 (hereafter referred to as 'Morus, 1794').
As evidence of a general mitigation of traditional Lutheran opinion, we shall limit ourselves to a survey of Morus's interpretation of the occurrences of \( \textit{Pneuma} \) in vv.14, 15 and 16.

For the first time, \( \textit{Pneuma} \) in no instance is taken to mean the Holy Spirit. Morus interprets the \( \textit{Pneuma} \) of v.14a as follows: 'Die sich selbst von dem neuen bessern Sinn leiten lassen ....' This same definition of \( \textit{Pneuma} \) as 'Sinn' is applied to the two \( \textit{Pneuma} \) in v.15. Specifically, he suggests that here the \( \textit{Pneuma} \) are used in a similar fashion to that of \( \textit{AN} \) in the Old Testament, where often the word is used to mean 'heart' (\textit{animus}) and

1. Morus does not comment on \( \textit{Pneuma} \) in v.13, but translates the verse as follows: 'Si enim ad normam vitiositatis vivatis, eritis miseris; sed si per novam indolem finem faciatis malefactis, eritis felices'. (Morus, 1794, p.104). Thus he clearly takes the \( \textit{Pneuma} \) there in the sense of 'state of mind'.

2. Morus, 1794, p.104. (Although the bulk of Morus's commentary is written in Latin, certain key phrases - most of which are paragraphs of the Greek text - are given in German).

3. Morus's translation of v.15 reads: 'Non enim accepistis indolem servilem denuo, ut metu adficiamini; sed accepistis indolem filiorum, ob quam Deum in precibus nominamus patrem'. (Morus, 1794, p.104).
then qualified by a word which tells something about the state of the mind or propensity.\(^1\) This can be seen in Psalm 51:14(12) where it says √Πνεύμα ('a willing spirit') where spíritus promtítudínis or williger Sinn is meant. Another example is Isaiah 29:10, where the Jews were said to be given √Πνεύμα ('a spirit of deep sleep'), i.e., spíritus somnolentíae or Hanx zur Trágheit.\(^2\)

These examples show precisely how Paul is using the Πνεύματα. In the first instance φόβος indicates the state of mind or propensity of the first Πνεύμα, i.e., 'propensio ad servilem metum' or 'innerer Hang', 'innere Neigung zu sclavischer Furcht'. The phrase Πνεύμα νιόθεσίας, on the other hand, indicates a different state of mind or propensity, i.e., 'propensio aními ad id, ad quod filíorum aními propendere solent', in short, 'filíorum sensus'. This simply means that Christians are motivated by a frame of mind, or an inclination of sonship. The effect of this is that they have a 'Sinn der Hoffnung,

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1. Morus, 1794, p.105: 'Jam autem Πνεύμα aut Πνεύμα aut Πνεύμα junctum qualitati alicuí aními indicat propensionem....'

The devotional value of this interpretation is in the thought that the Christian’s attitude toward God is not one of slavish fear, but of love and trust as a son.

While it is difficult to maintain such a definition in reference to the two Πνεύματα in v.16, Morus manages to do so. The result is a distinctive, though not particularly compelling, interpretation of v.16. He observes that although Συμμαρτυρείν is taken from the noun Συμμάρτυς (which he translates as 'Mitzeuge'), the meaning here is 'to confirm, to express approbation to another with proof'. The αὐτὸ τὸ Πνεῦμα spoken of is the same sensus ιόθεσίας Paul has already referred to in v.15. Finally, the definition of Πν. ἴμων is simply animus noster. Thus the sense of the verse is as follows: that frame of mind which is in me confirms my soul that I am a son of God. Or, put another way, in German, 'Ich

1. Morus, 1794, pp.105-106.
2. Morus, 1794, p.107: '... confirmare, documento aliquo probare'.
3. Morus, 1794, p.107: 'Ipse ille sensus ιόθεσίας ante descriptus Συμμαρτυρείν ...'
4. Morus, 1794, p.107: 'Sensus ergo ille qui in me est, confirmat animo meo, quidnam ? me esse τέκνον τοῦ θεοῦ ...'
habe ja den Sinn der Liebe zu ihm, das Vertrauen auf ihn, das Vertrauen auf ihn, die Hoffnung zu ihm, so wird er mich doch auch lieben'.

The commentary written by Johann David Michaelis (1717-1791) is reviewed here under Lutheran Orthodoxy only because it fits nowhere else. Michaelis, a professor of Oriental languages (as was his grandfather, Johann Heinrich Michaelis), was raised and educated in the nexus of Pietism at Halle, and at the same time was profoundly influenced by Rationalism. He recoiled from his father's Pietism and launched out to find his own individual understanding of Scripture. He went to Göttingen and became a celebrated and much sought-after lecturer. He represents second-generation Lutheran pietists who responded to the growing challenge of critical inquiry.¹ Michaelis's commentary² is distinctive not only because of its independence, but also in its method, for he was a pioneer of the critical method. As an outstanding scholar of his time, he was unusual insofar as he was concerned to make the right understanding (his understanding) of Scripture available to the laymen and not to limit himself to works of erudition. This concern


². Anmerkungen für Ungelehrte, Part III (annotations on the Epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians and Ephesians), Göttingen, 1791 (hereafter cited as 'Michaelis, 1791').
is conveyed not only in the title of his major work, but by the fact that he wrote in the vernacular rather than in Latin. He stands in the history of German theological inquiry as a towering figure at the dawn of the critical era; it is his pervading presence at Göttingen that, as much as anything, made the university there a center of critical studies in the latter half of the 18th century and for several decades into the 19th century.

1. Besides his Anmerkungen für Ungelehrte, based on his own translation of the New Testament, Michaelis also published a similar commentary over the entire Old Testament in 13 volumes. More technical works include his much-used and critical Einleitung in das NT (1750) and his best known work Mosiasches Recht (6 volumes, 1770-1775). A measure of his widespread influence is that both of the latter two works were later translated into English. (The English translator of Michaelis's Introduction to the New Testament was Herbert Marsh, a theologian of some importance who had studied under Michaelis in Göttingen. See Stephen Neill, The Interpretation of the New Testament, 1861-1961, London, 1966, p.4f). Finally, as an Orientalist, Michaelis made valuable contributions to the research of early Syriac versions of the Bible.

2. Another influential theologian at Göttingen in this era (but slightly later) was Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1753-1827); he did not, however, write a commentary on Romans.
It has been earlier remarked that Protestant exeges is tend less and less to read 'Holy Spirit' for ἁγιόν, ἁγιόν Χριστοῦ or ambiguous occurrences of ἁγιόν as we move towards the 19th century. Michaelis's exegesis of Romans 8 perfectly illustrates this tendency. In his explanation of ἁγιόν Θεοῦ (v.9) there appears a basic definition:

Gottes Geist Hier, wenigstens meiner Meinung nach, und so viel ich dritte Person in der Gottheit, von dem bisher gar nicht die Rede gewesen war, sondern wiederum was in der Platonischen Philosophie der Geist heisst, die vernünftige Seele, die obern Kräfte der Seele: der wird aber Gottes Geist gennant, weil er nach dem Bilde Gottes geschaffen, wie Gott ein Geist, ein denkend Wesen ist, ewig lebet u.s.f.¹

Michaelis applies precisely this definition to the phrase Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ θανάτω (v.14)² with the following interpretation:

Dieser Geist, Gottes Ebenbild, soll der herrschende und regierende Theil seyn: diejeniger, die sich von ihm regieren lassen, erkennen Gott für seine Kinder.³

1. Michaelis, 1791, pp.70-71 (emphasis is his).
2. Michaelis does not comment on v.12 and only briefly on v.13; he does not offer an explanation of the dative Πνεῦμα in v.13.
3. Michaelis, 1791, p.73.
The difficulty of reconciling this interpretation with traditional Lutheran exegesis of this passage (which explicitly ruled out all human Vernunft in questions concerned with salvation) is immediately apparent.\(^1\) Michaelis attempts to bridge this hiatus by attributing the possibility of sonship to Christ and to grace, and by disclaiming man's ability, when unaided, to be completely obedient to his enlightened soul.\(^2\) However, this rejoinder to possible criticism does not solve the problem; the mitigation of rigid Lutheran

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1. Michaelis had defined \( \text{Τυφλούς θεόν} \) (v.14) as: 'Dem Zusammenhang nach nicht, der Heilige Geist, die dritte Person in der Gottheit, sondern wiederum, der Geist, die Vernunft, die obern Kräfte der Seele....' (Michaelis, 1791, pp.72-73).

Orthodoxy has resulted in a breach with traditional interpretations and nowhere is this better illustrated than in the writings of Michaelis.

Michaelis's exegesis of v.15 affords us a glimpse into the excitement which accompanied the theologians' discovery of historical and philological criticism. Michaelis considers the ἔρματα of v.15 to be fundamentally different from the ἔρμα Θεοῦ in vv.9 and 14. He concedes that while it is possible to use the same word (ἔρμα) in rapid succession with completely different meanings, it is not according to the best convention of clear writing to do so. Thus we are justified, says Michaelis, in translating ἔρμα ποιεῖται as 'knechtischen Geist' and ἔρμα υἱοθετεῖται as 'kindlichen Geist', only because Paul does not follow this convention (above) here. When Paul uses the word ἔρμα in v.15 he means in both cases Gemuthsart, Affect or Gesinnung, and not 'die vernünftige Seele'. Thus, if one were to translate the phrase so as to bring out the meaning which Paul intended, one would say, 'ihr habt keine knechtische Gemuthsart, voller Furcht, sondern eine kindliche'. What Paul means by ἔρμα ποιεῖται is perhaps best expressed by the phrase Seele eines Knechtes. Michaelis

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1. Michaelis, 1791, p.73.
then adds this interesting observation:

Paulus schrieb, oder dictierte vielmehr, seine Briefe flüchtig und geschwind, und da ist es beynahe unvermeidlich, dass man nicht das eine, aus dem vorigen im Gedächtniss schwebende Wort, das mehrere Bedeutungen hat, bald darauf in einer andern setzt, weil es einem zuerst beyfällt.1

While in this instance not particularly profound, it is interesting that an historical insight of this order becomes a factor of control over interpretation. We shall see how the exegesis of our passage gradually changes throughout the 19th century, as critical factors are allowed more and more to exert control over the interpretation.

Michaelis's elucidation of the content of v.15 is couched in traditional terms: the Gospel inspires a 'kindliche Gesinnung' but the Law of the Old Testament a 'knechtische Gesinnung'. Being something of an expert on the Mosaic Law,2 Michaelis goes into some detail as to why those under the Law in the Old Testament had this 'knechtische Gesinnung' which was closely bound up with fear:

1. Michaelis, 1791, p.73.

2. See his Mosaisches Recht.
Das Gesetz verbot nicht nur ... die unvermeidlichste böse Lust ... sondern auch eigentliche Krankheiten, z.E. zum Exempel Aufsatz, machte es zur Unreinigkeit, die durch Opfer versöhnet werden musste. So gar, gutgemeinte Handlungen, die wider den Buchstaben des Gesetzes waren, wurden mit dem Tode bestraft, z.E. wenn einer, der kein Priester ist, die Lade des Bundes angreift, um sie zu halten, da sie in Gefahr ist vom Wagen zu fallen ....

There is, moreover, a serious theological reason why those under the Law have a 'knechtische Gesinnung'.

Das ganze Gesetz Mosis präget sehr viel mehr Furcht, als fröhliches kindliches Zutrauen zu Gott ein, sonderlich da es keine deutliche Versicherung der Vergebung der Sünde in jener Welt gibt, denn die Opfer bewirken sie nach Paulis Lehre nicht ....

It is difficult to judge whether Michaelis's pessimistic view of the Law is the result of his Lutheran inheritance.

1. Michaelis, 1791, p.74.

2. Michaelis, 1791, p.74. It is unfortunate that Michaelis chose to add another remark: '... wirklich gewissenhafte Juden findet man meistens sehr ängstlich'. This not only reveals a streak of anti-Semitism (which was then common), but also a serious weakness in theologians who were influenced by Rationalism - a tendency to apply what was considered to be common knowledge to the Biblical text with little regard for its relevance.
or his Rationalism, but it is interesting, as we shall see in the
section below which deals with rationalist theologians, that the two
often go together.

The comment on v.15c, is perhaps the most technical
and 'modern' we have met: Paul's words are in reference to the Lord's
prayer. But since Paul is writing before the publication of the
Gospels or any other definitive 'Lehrbcher' he must be depending upon
an oral tradition. That we call God 'Our Father' is a remarkable
difference from the practice of the old covenant; it is true that in
one place, Isaiah 64:7(8), God is called 'Father', but this does not
reflect everyday practice. The word ᾧβα is the quite normal
word used by Jewish children and also by Christ in prayer, as in Mark
14:36. It would seem that Christ used this word not only in Mark 14
but often in prayer. Otherwise there would be no explanation for the
occurrence of the Chaldaic word Abba in the midst of the Greek text
here and in Galatians 4:6.1 Michaelis then goes on to show the
relevance of his theory of Gospel transmission to this problem:

Aus dem Evangelio Marci, das viel später geschrieben
ist, als der Brief an die Römer, konnte man zwar
damals diesen kindlichen Ausdruck Jesu im Gebet

L. Michaelis, 1791, pp.74-75.
nicht borgen: aber von der Leidensgeschichte Jesu muss den ersten Christen mündlicher Unterricht gegeben seyn, und so viel wir wissen, hat ein Hauptstück des ersten mündlichen Unterrichts in der Geschichte Jesu bestanden, die nachher in den Evangelii verzeichnet ist.¹

To this rather impressive exegesis, Michaelis adds his theological interpretation:

Kurz, das ganze Evangelium, auch die Briefe der Apostel, prägen uns kindliche zuversichtliche Gesinnungen gegen Gott als unsern Vater ein, und machen uns den kindlichen Gesinnungen Christi gegen ihn ähnlich.²

Michaelis's resolution of the problem of the two Πνεῦματα in v.16 is similar to that of Morus: 'Eben diese kindliche Gesinnung, die wir gegen Gott als Vater fühlen, giebt unserer Seele Zeugnis, oder, ist ihr der sichere Beweis, dass wir Gottes Kinder sind'.³

1. Michaelis, 1791, p.75.
2. Michaelis, 1791, p.75.
3. Michaelis, 1791, p.75.
More interesting than his conclusion is Michaelis's reason for rejecting the traditional Protestant interpretation which understood Paul here to be speaking about the inner witness of the Holy Spirit.

Eine fürchterliche Lehre wäre das für den, der das Zeugnis nicht fühlte: wenn er noch so sehr bey der gewissenhaftesten Selbstprüfung fände, dass er bey Gott in Gnaden sei, und Vergebung der Sünden habe, würde er sich doch beym Mangel dieses Gefühls für einen von Gott verworfenen halten müssen.¹

Here is clear evidence of Michaelis's reaction against some of the abuses of the strict Pietism into which he was born.

¹. Michaelis, 1791, p. 75-76.
Reformed Orthodoxy.

In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, a number of weighty commentaries on Romans were written by theologians of the Reformed Orthodox camp. The situation among such exegetes was far different from that of Lutheran writers who, aside from Melanchthon's commentary on Romans, possessed no really definitive commentary upon which to rely. For Reformed theologians, however, there was a wealth of exegetical opinion from which they might draw: Bucer, Zwingli, Oecolampadius, Calvin and Beza. Without doubt, this tradition explains in part two historical phenomena: the number of Reformed commentaries written during this period, and the high degree of agreement between them on crucial exegetical problems. On the Epistle to the Romans alone we have commentaries from Caspar Olevian, 1 Johannes Piscator (Johann Fischer), 2 Robert Rollock, 3 David

1. In Epistolam D. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos notae, Geneva, 1579. Cited below as 'Olevian, 1579'.
2. Analysis Logica Evangelii Secundum Johannem, Herborn, 1591. (Although it is not indicated on the title page, this volume also contains a commentary on Romans). Cited below as 'Piscator, 1591'.
3. In Epistolam S. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos, Geneva, 1608. Cited below as 'Rollock, 1608'.
Pareus, Paul Tossanus, and others.

A detailed analysis of these commentaries will not be necessary, for most of them follow Calvin and/or Beza closely. If the conclusions of these writers do not greatly differ from those of their founding Fathers, the character and method of their commentaries differ considerably. Exegesis increasingly becomes opportunity for conducting extensive discussions of doctrinal issues

1. *In divinam ad Romanos S. Pauli Apostoli Epistolam Commentarius*, Heidelberg, 1613. Cited below as 'Pareus, 1613'.


3. Such as Hermann Witsius, whose major work is not really a commentary (*Exercitationes sacrae in symbolum quod apostolorum dicitur*, Amsterdam, 1697).

4. That is, they followed Calvin and Beza as they understood them. It becomes quite clear that in many details they really did not correctly understand them. In the case of our passage, for example, it would seem that none of the exegetes above (with the exception of Olevian) had a clear idea as to what Calvin meant when he spoke of a 'covenant of grace' at v.15. In this regard the comment written on v.15 by Cocceius (reported upon in the section immediately following) is above all interesting.
and an excuse for haranguing Protestant and Catholic heretics.
Whereas Calvin and Beza had attempted carefully but simply to
demonstrate the logical progression of Paul's argument, the Biblical
text is now put through impossible contortions by means of
delicately constructed syllogisms; the purpose of edifying the reader,
which had always been one primary aim in the commentaries of
Calvin and Beza, is now all but lost. The sole purpose of exegesis
becomes that of definitively proving the undeniable rightness of the
Orthodox Reformed position. In the section which follows we shall
attempt to demonstrate a number of these aspects of development.

The unanimity of these writers concerning solutions
to classic and crucial exegetical problems is perhaps best
illustrated in their interpretation of references to Πνεύμα
in vv.12, 14 and 15:

At v.12 they agree to a man that Paul has left
unstated the positive aspect of obligation which is that we are
debtors to the Spirit.¹ Further, all agree that the dative Πνεύματε
refers to the Holy Spirit (variously referred to as the Spirit of God,

¹ Olevian, 1579, p.339; Piscator, 1591, p.139; Rollock,
1608, p.159; Pareus, 1613, cols.701-702. Tossanus,
1665, p.183, is silent on the problem.
Spirit of Christ, or Spirit). ¹

Even more significantly, there is almost perfect agreement in their explanations of the difficult contrast of \( \text{πνευματα} \) in v.15. Tossanus, who is the latest of these writers (and who almost certainly consulted them as he prepared his annotated Luther Bible), summarizes in two notes the agreed-upon interpretations:

\[ \text{'einen knechtlichen Geist/ Od. 'er dem Geist der knechtschaft. Also nennet er die wérckung dess Geistes Gottes durch das gesetz/welches die hertzen der menschen durch die dréhungen wider die ubertreter darnider schlagt und erschrécket; dessen ein exempel sind die Israeliter/da Gott das gesetz der 10. gebotten vor ihnen von dem berg hat aussgesprochen/....'}² 

And:

\[ \text{'einen kindlichen Geist/ Od. 'er den Geist der kindschaft. Dadurch wird verstanden die gnédige wérckung dess heiligen Geistes durch die predig dess Evangeliums/welches die hertzen der glüubigen erquicket/und ihrer kindschaft versicheret....'}³ 

¹ Olevian, 1579, p.341; Piscator, 1591, pp.140-141; Rollock, 1608, p.159; Pareus, 1613, col.703; Tossanus, 1665, p.183.

² Tossanus, 1665, p.183.

³ Tossanus, 1665, p.183.
Others of the writers under consideration say more than this, but none say less. This, of course, is a significant development. Previously there had been some considerable ambiguity amongst Reformed exegetes as to whether both Πνεύματα referred to the Holy Spirit. That ambiguity is now resolved. What is more noteworthy than the conclusion is the evident need to agree upon solutions to such problems and then to canonize them as the only acceptable interpretation. When taken together, these early commentaries make of themselves a Protestant Reformed Glossa Ordinaria.

One of the most interesting developments in this group of commentaries with regard to our passage is the increased emphasis on v.14. This emphasis reflects a growing ethical rigorism in Reformed churches. In Holland, for example, the word 'Prazisismus' came to be associated with the influential theologian Gisbert Voet.


2. Calvin's cautious remarks concerning the 'covenant of grace', intended to soften the harshness of assigning a Πνεύματα to the Old Testament Fathers, are seldom referred to in the commentaries under consideration here. (But see Olevian, 1579, p.343: 'Ut hoc fiat, conferenda est conditio dispensationis gratiae Divinae sub veteri Testamento, cum ea quae est sub novo'). This fact becomes all the more significant in the light of Coccejus's Föderaltheologie.
According to this theologian, (negative) ethical standards were to be set out in concrete and specific lists of 'Thou shalt nots'.

The motivating idea was that the life of the Christian ought to be documented by visible ethical evidence. The relevance of this fact to Reformed exegesis of v.14 is exemplified in Pareus's interpretation of that verse. Above all, his reconstruction of the passages is significant:

- The sons of God live because they are heirs;
- You shall be the sons of God;
- If indeed you will obey the spirit.

Thus vv.13, 14 and 17 have an interlocking relationship; first, that to which the sons of God are heirs is the same as the promise in v.13b, i.e., life eternal; secondly, since it is assumed that Paul is


addressing those who have been adopted by God (the elect), one might also assume that the visible fruits of their adoption are seen in their obedience to the Spirit by whom they are led; finally, the result of that leading is precisely the mortification of the flesh referred to in v.13. This testing of election is by no means to be perceived as a threat but rather as an assurance:

Still, in spite of such careful drawing of distinction, this emphasis upon visible evidence of the Spirit's leading, which in turn is visible evidence of adoption, often gives the impression that the mortification of the flesh is a condition which must be fulfilled, as in this comment on v.14 by Olevian:

1. Rollock, 1608, p.159: 'Porro mortificare actiones corporis per Spiritum, est secundum Spiritum vivere'.

2. Tossanus, 1665, p.183. (Emphasis is ours).
He demonstrates the cause, why they only may have been given life who by the Spirit mortify the actions of the flesh. Because they are only sons and thus heirs of life who are led by the Spirit of God, compare Gal.4.1

When one allies such a statement with the fact that none of these commentators explicitly denies the causal sense of the conditional particle \( \epsilon \iota\tau\eta\epsilon\rho \) in v.17b (i.e., that suffering, defined as mortification of the flesh, can merit 'life'), it is perhaps not unfair to say that the ethical rigorism so evident in some churches of Reformed Protestantism led to a forced legalism which in turn led, in certain instances, to an interpretation of Scripture quite foreign to that of Calvin and Beza.

1. Olevian, 1579, p.342: 'Causam ostendit, cur ii tantum sint habituri vitam, qui Spiritu actiones carnis mortificant. Quia ii soli sunt filii & sic haeredes vitae, qui aguntur a Spiritu Dei, ad Gal.4.'
Reactions Against Protestant Orthodoxy.

We have considered representative exegetes of what has been termed Protestant Scholasticism; we now turn to a consideration of exegetes associated with four movements which reacted negatively toward the established method of conducting theological inquiry and/or the churchmanship of orthodox Protestant churches. The first two are centered in Holland and are essentially the result of individuals who are in conflict with one aspect of Calvinist theology, i.e., Federaltheologie and Arminianism. The third, Pietism, is a movement of vast proportions, but linked with the names of a long list of Lutheran theologians from Spener to Bengel; the fourth, Rationalism, is primarily an intellectual movement.

Johannes Coccejus.

The voice of Johannes Coccejus (1603-1669) was among the first to be raised against the rigid spirit of Reformed Orthodoxy and against the confessional-dogmatic use of Scripture. Specifically,

1. Farrar, 1885, p.360.
2. His German name was Johann Koch.
this meant rejection of the doctrine of predestination and of the
loci method of writing theology. The centrality of *foedus Dei
gratuitum* in his theology is relevant to this twofold rejection
(above) in that it replaces, as a key concept in understanding man's
relationship with God, the doctrine of predestination with the idea
of a personal covenant concluded between God and man; by conceiving
of the various covenants as being progressively concluded
throughout history (in a *Heilsgeschichte*), he effectively threw open
the entire Canon to theological inquiry, rather than restricting it
to isolated passages and uses, as did the loci method. Further, by
placing the Kingdom of God at the center of his theology, he
attempted to free the human conscience from the hegemony of the
Church.  

Coccejus's commentary on Romans is primarily of
interest to us for its interpretation of v.15 of our passage, and this
can be summarized.

1. For an analysis see A. Ritschl, *Geschichte des Pietismus*,
   I, Bonn, 1880-1884, pp.136ff. Cited below as 'Ritschl,
   1880-1884'.


   Cited below as 'Coccejus, 1668'. 
From what has been said in these introductory words, above, it is obvious that interpretation of the relations between the two covenants (Old and New Testaments) is fundamental to Coccejus's *Föderaltheologie*. Because Coccejus understands the two occurrences of Πνεύμα (v.15) to correspond to the two epochs of the old and new covenants in God's divine economy, his exegesis is remarkably similar to that of the Antiochene School, with the exception that Πνεύμα τὸ Θεοςίας is taken to refer directly to the Holy Spirit's ministry in the Old Testament and not just in the New Testament, as in Calvin's interpretation. In resumé, the major points of his exegesis are as follows:

The servitude here spoken of is not simply servitude to sin, but to the law which Moses imposed upon the people on account of their sin and to the 'elemental spirits of the universe' (Gal.4:3). Under the imposition and threats of the Mosaic Law, the people lived as servants rather than sons (cf. Gal.4:1-2). Under

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1. Coccejus, 1668, p.413: '...oeconomiae divinae didicisse videamur....'
such conditions it was not possible to find justification. Thus, while it is true that because of their situation, those people of the Old Testament received a 'spirit of servitude unto fear', to those who by faith perceived there the operation of the Holy Spirit, he is rightly named the 'Spirit of servitude'. Still, such a name for the Holy Spirit ought not to be misunderstood, for this term applies to one epoch of the Spirit's operation to distinguish it from its better operation in the New Testament. From this point forward, Coccejus launches into a carefully reasoned criticism of

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1. Coccejus, 1668, p.413: 'Quod fìliatio promissa, quae comitatur justitiam, quatenus est ex fide in Christum jam missum & consummatum, oppositur servitut, non tantum peccati; quae est hostium, Rom.8:7. (cuì oppositam fìliationem habuerunt etiam veteres, credentes in Deum, qui improbum justificat) sed etiam legis, quam Moses imposuit Israëlitis propter peccatum & ad ejus accusationem, sive elementorum mundi, Galat.4:3. Ea autem olim erat imposita etiam fidelibus; qui, quamvis essent filii, nihil statu differebant a servis. Galat.4:1,2'.

2. Coccejus, 1668, p.414: 'Quod sancti Veteris Testamenti pro ratione status sui acceperint spiritum servitutis ad metum, Hebr.2:15 ... Ubì est servitus a Deo imperata per præceptum carnale, & servitutis illius obtitio atque functio per fides, suadentem obtemperare tali præcepto; si eam fides operatur Spiritus sanctus, utique Spiritus sanctus recte appellatur Spiritus servitutis, non ut ista denomination signifiacet totum hoc, quod operatur (operatur enim fides Promissionis & spem benedictionis ac liberationis) sed ut operatio ejus in eo tempore per hanc denominationem distinguatur ab operatione ejus meliori in Novo Testamento'.

the many and diverse interpretations of v. 15. Among those he criticizes are Grotius, Chrysostom, Peter Martyr, David Pareus, Origen and Cappellus. Coccejus disagrees with those who take those men of the Old Testament in one piece; the servitude which Paul here alludes to is the service which man gives with regard to the ceremonial law\(^1\) (not simply abstaining from evil, as Grotius suggests), and we know that not all in the Old Testament were in such bondage. The emphasis of Coccejus's exegesis is almost precisely the same as that of Calvin: one cannot compare persons, only dispensations, and it is not possible to distinguish the sons of the New Testament from all the sons of the Old Testament.\(^2\) Paul speaks about a 'spirit of servitude'; who is the spirit, asks Coccejus, that brings about in them this servitude of hypocrisy? Certainly it is the Devil.\(^3\) This rather surprising

\(^1\) It was distinctive of Coccejus's theology that he considered the law of Moses a ceremonial (or positive) law which found its fulfilment in the moral law of the New Testament. See Ritschl, 1880, pp. 138f.

\(^2\) Coccejus, 1668, p. 415: '...non possunt distinguí filiú Noví Testamentí ab omnibus filiís Veterís Testamentí'.

\(^3\) Coccejus, 1668, p. 415: 'Quí est spiritus efficiéns illam servitutem hypocritarum? Certe Diabolus'.
suggestion - reminiscent of Augustine - finds its justification in the development which follows. Here Coccejus points out that *spiritus* in the contrasting clause (v.15a) signifies a state of mind (*affectus*), not a person, but that the author of this *spiritum adoptionis* is the Spirit(of God).¹ Thus the two parts (v.15a and b) are parallel: the Devil is the author of a state of mind characterized as hypocritical servitude, but the Holy Spirit is the author of disposition characterized as a *spirit of adoption*.

Finally, Coccejus is clear that the latter *spirit of adoption* was given to a remnant of the Old Testament Fathers; the only difference between them and us is that the Spirit had not been fully revealed in the Old Testament, as he was in the New Testament.²

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¹ Coccejus, 1668, p.415: *'An igitur eum spiritum acceperunt, h.e. donatum habuerunt , quemadmodum postea acceperunt & donatum habuerunt spiritum adoptionis ? Imo, inquit, affectum significat. An igitur eum affectum done acceperunt ?'*

² Coccejus, 1668, p.415: *'An igitur eum affectum dono acceperunt ? Et an Spiritus filiationis datus est reliquis Patribus, neque est inter eos, qui sub Veteri sperarunt, & inter eos, quo sub novo gratias agunt & laetantur, ulla distinctio: neque effusio Spiritus fuit reservata in ultimos dies ....'*
There is a great deal more which Coccejus has to say on v.15, but the above précis is sufficient to demonstrate how similar his exegesis is to that of Calvin in his commentary on the same verse. In this light, it is not difficult to understand the claim of those who suggest that Coccejus's Biblical theology was more faithful to Calvin than the theology of the early 'Calvinists'.
Hugo Grotius.

The most formidable scholar to espouse the theological cause of Jacob Arminius was Hugo Grotius (or Huig van de Groot; 1583-1645). Surely one of the greatest intellects of his age, his place in European history would have been assured as a jurist (he is sometimes referred to as the 'Father of International Law') even had he not turned his hand to theology. His Annotationes in Vetus et Novum Testamentum not only broke new ground in Biblical studies, but remained one of the most influential exegetical documents for several generations to follow. His Annotationes is among the most concisely written we have reviewed; his comments to each verse are, with rare exception, limited to relevant parallels (drawn from both Scripture and classical literature), definitions, brief explanations and, above all, philological observations. His comments on our passage can be reported upon in short compass.

1. Annotationes in Epistolas Apostolicas & Apocalypsin, part II, Vol.II of Opera omnia Theologica, Amsterdam, 1679. Cited below as 'Grotius, 1679'.

2. While Arminius did write a treatise on chapters 6 and 7 of Romans, there is no complete commentary on the Epistle from him. Another influential Arminian theologian, Philipp Limborch (1633-1712) wrote a commentary on Romans (Commentarius in Acta Apostolorum et in Epistolas ad Romanos et ad Hebraeos, Basel, 1740); he is highly dependent upon Grotius and adds relatively little to the latter's Annotationes.
At v.12, Grotius suggests adding the phrase \( \text{πνέματε τοῦ κατὰ πνέμα} \) (sed Spiritui ut secundum spiritum) in order to complete the thought of Paul's sentence. He defines (v.13) as facta; the entire phrase, 'deeds of the body', he defines as either \( \text{passiones et concupiscentias} \) or \( \text{τὸ φρονήμα τοῦ καρπού} \) (prudentiam carnis). He defines, 'to retain in a state of death' (in morte retinere). The verb \( \text{ἲνὴσοῦ} \) is taken as referring to eternal life.

Grotius's exegesis of v.15 is completely traditional: both occurrences of \( \text{πνέμα} \) are understood as 'state of mind' (affectus). An attitude of servility was engendered by fear of the pain of penalties imposed upon those who did not abstain from evil - a condition which describes the majority of Jews under the law of Moses. Under such conditions love did not reign, but rather fear. At v.15b, Grotius points out that Paul does not say

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2. Grotius, 1679, p.719. Grotius's treatment of v.14 has been discussed in connection with Calov's commentary on Romans.
4. Grotius, 1679, p.720: 'Merito autem servile hoc vocat: nam servi plerumque noxius abstinent, non domini amore, sed metu crucis aut pendentis habentae'.

'spirit of liberty' but 'spirit of adoption'; nevertheless, those who have been adopted, if they had been servants, are freed from servitude and made sons.\(^1\) He also points out that Paul's reference to adoption is drawn from Greek and Roman Law. He takes the repetitive phrase \(\alpha \beta \alpha \delta \ Pat\nu \rho\) as being an imitation of the delightful speech of children calling their fathers.\(^2\) He also notes that the article (\(\delta\)) has the effect of making a vocative of \(Pat\nu \rho\).

Grotius takes the compound verb \(\sum\nu\mu\alpha\rho\tau\iota\rho\varepsilon\iota\varepsilon\) (v.16) in the sense of the simple verb \(\mu\alpha\tau\iota\rho\varepsilon\iota\varepsilon\). The phrase \(\alpha\upsilon\tau\delta\tau\varepsilon\tau\iota\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\) refers to the spirit which is given by God (\(S\nu\iota\rupsilon\us\nu\varepsilon\\iota\le\nu\ \alpha\ \varepsilon\varepsilon\o\nu\varepsilon\\delta\ \nu\tau\iota\\nu\tau\iota\\nu\)) and \(\varepsilon\nu\tau\imath\nu\varepsilon\ \iota\mu\nu\nu\ \nu\) is 'our soul' (\(\alpha\nu\iota\mu\nu\nu\ \nu\tau\iota\nu\tau\iota\nu\)).

Befitting his interest in civil law, Grotius remarks at v.17a that Paul is speaking not only from Jewish law but also Gentile law; children, as sons, are heirs. There is, however, an improvement in Christianity (over Hebrew Law) since all Christians, without sexual discrimination, are sons and

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1. Grotius, 1679, p.720: 'Non satis habuit dicere \(S\nu\iota\rupsilon\us\nu\varepsilon\\iota\\nu\tau\iota\\nu\ \\alpha\ \varepsilon\varepsilon\o\nu\varepsilon\\delta\ \nu\tau\iota\\nu\tau\iota\\nu\)` sed dixit adoptionis: nam qui adoptantur, si servi sint, & liberi ex servis fiunt & filii'.

2. Grotius, 1679, p.720: 'Imitatur puerorum patribus blandientium voces ....'
The condition implied in the clause \( e^3 \text{'} \Pi \epsilon \rho \), etc. (v.17b) is well to be added, for as Cyprian said, the saving birth makes alive not by being merely received but by being guarded. The suffering implied in this verse is the patient toleration of all adversity, as if it were done to Christ.

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1. Grotius, 1679, p.720: 'Sententia est conveniens non tantum Israëlitico... sed etiam Gentium juris... Sed magis est ut jus Hebraeum respererit Paulus, idque \( \tau \epsilon \kappa \nu \alpha \) hic sint \( \psi \iota \circ \iota \) [fill1], non quod non utrique sexui Christianorum aptari possint quae dicit, sed quod jure Mosis filii necessario heredes, filiae non nisi filiis deficientibus'.

2. Grotius, 1679, p.720: 'Bene adjecit conditionem, quia \( \text{nativitas salutaris} \) non accepta, sed custodita vivificat, ut ait Cyprianus'.

3. Grotius, 1679, p.720: 'Si constanti patientia adversa omnia toleremus, sicut Christus fecit'.

heirs.
The Pietists.

No other movement of the 17th and 18th centuries left such a widely distributed deposit of Biblical comment to succeeding generations as did Lutheran Pietism. There are a number of clear historical reasons for this fact, for Lutheran Pietism was a 'back to the Bible' movement in at least two senses: first, the conviction arose that the material of theology ought to be ruthlessly reduced to fundamental Biblical doctrines; and, second, as a result of this, the Bible was no longer regarded - as it was in Orthodoxy - as a source for the documentation of confessional dogma, but as a 'dynamisch wirkende Quelle des Glaubens'.¹ Further, interpretation was placed largely on a subjective, inner-personal footing; the enlightenment of the individual by the inner testimony of the Spirit (Romans 8:16) became, to a large extent, the criterion of 'spiritual' exegesis. The result is highly practical exegesis intended to edify readers, with an almost constant emphasis on personal religious experience and upon the imperatives of ethical obedience.²


There are three or four major commentaries and a number of minor works which here concern us. Of those here reviewed, the works of Spener and Bengel are by far the most important. Both of these commentaries will be analyzed in detail and the others more briefly summarized.

Philipp Jakob Spener, (1635-1705), with whose name Lutheran Pietism is indivisibly linked, never wrote what might be properly termed a commentary on any Biblical book. However, we are fortunate in possessing a somewhat obscure collection of sermons (postille) delivered in Frankfurt in 1677 on the basis of the Gospel reading for Sundays. Together with this is bound what Spener modestly calls an 'einfältiger Erklärung' on the three Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians.

Spener divides vv.1-17 of chapter 8 into three main 'Lehrpunkten':

1. Die befreyung der glaubigen von der verdammuss.

1. *Dess thätigen Christenthums Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit*, Frankfurt a.M., 1687. (This is the 2nd printing of this collection). Cited below as 'Spener, 1687'.

2. Unfortunately, there is no critical edition of this collection and the authenticity of the text used here is problematic. Still, because Spener wrote the exegesis of these three Epistles as a forward to each of the sermons preached on the Gospel lesson, we can be more confident than, for example, in the case of Luther's sermons which were recorded by a stenographer.
2. Die ordnung unsers heyls. 3. Dess H. Geistes würckung'. The third begins at v. 5 and continues to v. 17; in the course of these verses he lists eight 'würckungen' of the Holy Spirit. This emphasis on the operation of the Spirit in the personal experience of the believer is not only characteristic of pietist theologians in general, but chapter 8 of Romans in particular was a keystone of Biblical evidence for their particular understanding of the Holy Spirit and of the 'spiritual man'. Spener's view of


2. Spener, 1687, pp.362ff. They are as follows: 1) 'Da ist nun die erste würckung/dass uns der Geist macht geistlich gesinnet seyn'. (v.5, p.362); 2) 'Die andere würckung oder vielmehr aller würckungen grund ist/dass der H. Geist in uns wohnet'. (v.9, p.363); 3) 'Jetzo folgt die dritte würckung. Es ist der H. Geist das leben in sich selbst/also/ wie er allen geschöpffen in der ersten schöpfung das leben gegeben hat/so gibt er auch in der andern schöpfung und widergeburt nochmahl das leben....' (v.10, p.364); 4) 'In-dessen so lang wir hie noch das fleisch/und also die sünde/an uns tragen/so arbeitet der H. Geist nicht nur an unserer lebendigmachung nach dem Geist/sondern wurcket auch in uns zum vierdten/die todung der geschöffte dess fleisches....' (v.12, p.365); 5) 'Die fünffte würckung ist nun der innerliche antrieb zu dem guten. Dann welche der Geist Gottes treibet/die sind Gottes kinder'. (v.14, p.366); 6) 'Die 6. würckung ist/dass er bey ihnen eine kindliche zuversicht würcket'. (v.15, p.366); 7) 'Auff diese folgt die siebende würckung/der trieb zum gebet. Wann es heisset/durch welchen wir ruffen/Abba lieber Vatter'. (v.15, p.366); 8) 'Die achte und letzte würckung ist endlich das innere zeugnuss dess H. Geistes'. (v.16, p.367).
Christian man was similar to that of Luther; i.e., Spener agrees that 'bestehet der mensch auss zweyen stucken',\(^1\) and that the 'inner man' is that which Paul often refers to as 'the Spirit'.\(^2\) Further, he agreed that man must struggle throughout his earthly life and until death with the 'alten natürlichen menschen',\(^3\) as the following comment on v.12 demonstrates:

> Also sind wir gleichwol schuldener/und daher nicht frey zu thun/was wir wollen; aber darum nicht dem fleisch; dann ob wir wol so fern daran gebunden seynd/dass wir hie in diesem leben dessen nicht gantz loss zu werden vermögen/so sind wir doch schuldig/nicht darnach zu leben. Und solches umb unsers eigenen bestens willen.\(^4\)

Those who would look for a major point of difference in this regard will be disappointed. There is, however, a difference of degree, for Spener was more optimistic than Luther about the outcome of this struggle. It is possible to be so

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2. Spener, 1687, p.364: 'Aber der Geist \(\sqrt[\text{v.10}]{\text{das jene geistliche/}}\text{was der H. Geist in uns gewurcket hat/der neue oder innere mensch...}^\) (Emphasis ours).


obedient as to starve the old Adam into a state of submerged (but not irretrievable) weakness:

\[v.13b\] Zwar das fleisch selbst konnen wir hie noch nicht so ganz tödten/dass es nicht noch kraftig seye/ uns zum bosen zu reitzen/und darnach zu gelüsten; so sollen wir also nur seine geschaffte tödten/wo dasselbe will in wêrckliche sünden aussbrechen. Wir müssen dem alten stamm dess alten Adams/den wir noch nicht mit der wurtzel auss der erden herauss bringen können/alle seine aussschläger/wo er bey uns bald diese bald jene sündliche lüste heraussen treiben/und fruchte bringen will/ sein ehe sie erstarchen/abbrachen und abreissen; damit dann dess alten stockes kraft selbst mehr und mehr schwach wird/und allgemach erstirbet. ¹

This confidence on Spener’s part is made possible primarily because of the emphasis and trust placed in the internal effective power of the ‘spirit’.² This motivating conception – which is fundamental to all Lutheran pietist theologians – is clearly reflected in Spener’s exegesis of v.14. In this comment he contrasts the essentially negative exhortation in v.13 with a positive:

¹. Spener, 1687, p.366.
Wir sind gesetzt nicht allein darzu/dass wir nicht sollen böses thun/ sondern auch darzu/dass wir sollen würtlich das gute vollbringen. Darzu treibet dann der H. Heist die glaubige/gibt ihnen krafft solches zu thun/und auch einen innerlichen antrieb.\textsuperscript{1}

The elucidation of this idea which follows is indicative of yet another manifestation of Pietism, encouragement of ruthless introspection. It is, in fact, a criticism of Pietism that the focus of attention is shifted from God to man because of the constant \textit{Heilungsprobe} or spiritual temperature-taking.\textsuperscript{2} The believer must constantly observe and measure his obedience in order to determine if he is in a state of grace:

...es gibt manchmahl auch gottlosen menschen der H. Geist gutes ein/wo er sie allgemach von der welt abziehen und zu Gott füren will/aber die sind darum nicht Gottes kinder/werdens auch nicht/wo sie nicht folgen/ja es ist ihnen eine ursach eines schwehrern gerichts. Sondern allein die sind/die sich treiben lassen und gehorsamen.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} Spener, 1687, p.366.

\textsuperscript{2} Schmidt, 1967, p.423: 'Spener meinte, dass der Glüubige die Gebote Gottes halten könne, wenn auch unter stetem Kampf. So machte er das Heil auch positiv von gewissen eintretenden Wirkungen der Rechtfertigung abhängig. Die unvermeidliche Folge ist, dass der Mensch sich beobachtet, ob er im Heil ist'.

\textsuperscript{3} Spener, 1687, p.366.
At v.15, Spener follows Luther's tendency to make the contrast impinge primarily upon the individual. The spiritual impact of the verse is, for Spener, that the Holy Spirit works 'eine kindliche zuversicht'\(^1\) in the believer. The 'kindlichen geist' is

Solchen geist/der uns ein vertrauen macht/dass wir uns zu Gott alles versehen/wessen sich kinder gegen ihre eltern versehen mögen.\(^2\)

Whether or not there ever was a divine person who might be called πνεῦμα σουλείας and what such a πνεῦμα might be is a question Spener does not attempt to deal with. In neither case, however, is the πνεῦμα in v.15 interpreted explicitly as the Holy Spirit; both νοθεσίας and σουλείας are translated, in agreement with Luther, as adjectives. Spener's definition of πνεῦμα νοθεσίας, given here, is significant:

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...einen kindlichen geist: in dem der H. Geist/der uns durch die gnade dess Evangelii geschencket ist/ von der grossen gnade zeugt/welche uns der Vatter in Christo geschencket habe/dass wir gleichwie ein kindlich vertrauen zu ihm haben/also auss sothaner kindlicher liebe/und solches geistes antrieb/ihm unsern gehorsam leisten.¹

To be fully understood, this definition must be placed in the context of Spener's key theological concept of the mystical union of Christ and the Christian.² In Spener's theology the spiritual life of the believer is that which flows out of a union with Christ himself. Thus Πνεῦμα, in the second part of the contrast in v.15, means for Spener the 'inner man' or 'spirit' created in those who are born again in a union with Christ.³ This controlling insight, which dominates so much of Spener's theology, is perhaps most clearly defined in a private letter to his opponent, Conrad Dilfeld, written in 1679:

1. Spener, 1687, p.366. (Emphasis is ours).
2. See Ritschl, II, 1880-1884, pp.97ff.
3. Still, as the above excerpt from Spener's comment on v.15 demonstrates, there is, as in Luther, an ambiguity: Πνεῦμα ισθεσίας might mean the gift of the Holy Spirit, and again it might mean 'spirit' (= 'the inner man'). For both Luther and Spener, there is no incongruity in implying both in the course of succeeding sentences.
Was den innern Menschen anlangt, weiss ich nicht, wie mein hochgeehrten Herr auf die Rede kommt, dass ich dadurch verstehe die sonderbare genaue Vereinigung eines Christen mit Christo. Welches war ganz ungereimt geredet zu sein deuchtet sic. Der innere Mensch ist der Geist aus Geist geboren und begreift also den Menschen, wie er nun in Kraft des Glaubens in der Wiedergeburt zu einem andern Menschen geworden ist in erleuchtetem Verstand, himmlisch gesinnten Willen und dergleichen.¹

Spener's interpretation of the contrast (v.15a) is directly applied to the closing words of v.15: it is only when we have this spirit of childlike trust in God that it is possible to call upon God.

So lang wir diesen Geist nicht haben/so dürfen wir Gott nicht anrufen/oder doch nicht anders als die knechte von ihrem Herrn etwas bitten/wo es nicht ohne furcht und schecken abgehet.²

¹. From Theologischen Bendenken und andere briefliche Antworten, Part 4, Halle, 1700-1702; quoted in A.Ritschl, II, 1880-1884, p.99. (Emphasis is in Ritschl's text). It is noteworthy that Ritschl, who was severely critical of this aspect of Spener's thinking, did not realize that Luther had said much the same thing about the 'inner man' in his Lectures on Romans. Of course, Spener's conception of the mystical union of the believer with Christ seen as the starting point of this 'new man' is foreign to Luther; he clearly states that the 'spirit' (= inner man) is created by the Holy Spirit.

². Spener, 1687, p.366.
This definition of \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) is not, however, applied to the phrase \( \tau\nu \text{πνε\vrmat\vrm} \ \eta\mu\vrm \omega\vrm \) in v.16; here \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) is referred to by Spener simply as 'herz und sinn'. As with all pietists, great emphasis is laid upon the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. The \( \text{Ziel} \) of the Spirit's witness is assurance of sonship. Even though from outward appearances it might not seem that we are children of God, the Spirit's witness assures us that such is the case. Thus it is a highly personal affair. What is distinctive about Spener's interpretation of v.16 is the way in which he proposes the Spirit's witness as something of an antidote to doubt over one's sonship. It might be suggested that this is simply symptomatic of problems generated by the close personal introspection encouraged by Pietism. In this light it is not difficult to appreciate Michaelis's criticism (above) of pietistic interpretation of v.16.

Spener does not comment on v.17.

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1. Spener, 1687, p.367: 'Dann es scheinet wol \( \text{Husserlich} \) nicht/und man sihets uns nicht an/dass wir solten Gottes kinder seyn; sonderlich wegen der noch anklebenden \( \text{sündlichen schwachheiten} \)/und wegen allerhand elendes und jammers/so wir in dem creuz in der welt aussstehen müssen. Das scheint dann gar der herrlichkeit der kinder Gottes nicht gemHss zu seyn. Aber so gibt gleichwol der H. Geist dem glaubigen in seinem hertzen das zeugnuss/dass er wahrhaftig ohnerachtet dessen/what ihm solches in dem \( \text{Husserlichen} \) scheinen möchte/oder sein hertz ihm sonstten die sache zweiffelhaftig machen wolle/gleichwol Gottes kind seye'.
Subsequent to Spener, there are three works written by pietist theologians which are relevant to our study. The earliest of these is the annotated translation of the New Testament written by Johann Reinhard Hedinger (1644-1704); following this is the commentary on Romans in the massive Licht und Recht series by the student and later colleague of A.H.Francke (1663-1727), Joachim Lange (1670-1744). Finally there is the individual commentary on Romans authored by Paul Anton (1661-1730), an early and influential member of the Halle Collegia biblica. We shall briefly trace the main outline of their exegeses of our passage.


2. Apostolisches Licht und Recht, Halle, 1729. Cited below as 'Lange, 1729'.

3. Anmerkungen Über die Epistel Pauli an die Römer. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1746. Cited below as 'Anton, 1746'.


Both Anton and Lange agree that there is an unexpressed positive obligation which must be read into the text at v.12.¹

That obligation is to God and to Christ.²

Both of these exegetes also see in the warning of v.13 a reflection of the necessity to keep constant vigilance over one's spiritual life - an attitude, as we have already seen, which was characteristic of pietists. Thus Anton says at v.13a:

So wird die Gewissheit von der Gnade eingesaltzen, dass sie nicht bey uns faule. Denn weil der Gnaden-Stand einem nicht absolut gebühret, so wird man durch solche Warnungen wider den Fall verwahret, wie auch schon im Stande der Unschuld der erste Mensch gewarnet ward, weil er doch fallen konne.³

Lange accomplishes the same thing by getting off a shot against the Calvinists:

¹ Anton, 1746, p.384, even suggests that Paul did not bother to complete his sentence since his readers knew what he intended to say: 'Wo ist denn nun das andere Stück, möchte man fragen, wem sind wir denn also Schuldner? Das nennet er hier nicht ausdrücklich, weil es nicht bey diesen Seelen nöthig war, und sie es schon wusten. conf. cap. 7,4. Wir sind erworben, gewonnen von Sünden, auf dass wir sein (Gottes und Christi) eigen seyn'.

² Anton, 1746, pp.383f; Lange, 1729, p.98.

³ Anton, 1746, pp.384-385.
Gott hat niemanden aus absoluten Rathschlusse zum ewigen Leben und zum ewigen Tode verordnet. Denn wäre dieses, so hätte Paulus sagen können: ν. 13/ ...
... als welche Worte dass zum Grunde haben, dass ein Mensch sein ihm wirklich erworbenes Heil verwahrlös en kann....

Spener's ambiguity concerning the definition of the various occurrences of ΠΙΓΟΜΑ in our passage is also reflected in these commentators. Anton, for example, is not quite certain how one ought interpret ΠΙΓΟΜΑ in ν.13b, on which word he says: '...nemlich durch den neugebornen Geist, doch aber auch durch den Geist Gottes ....'²

Comments on ν.14 contain little of interest, except a hint at a minor historical controversy.³

1. Lange, 1729, pp.98-99.
Concerning the interpretation of the contrast in v.15, there is no agreement between our commentators. There are, in fact, some rather odd mixtures and startling suggestions:

Hedinger's interpretation is the most traditional.

On v.15a he says:

Wie die so unter dem gesetz/dessen schärfe/zwang/und in seinem nothstall waren/wie die vater dess ersten bundes; denn diese waren darunter nach dem Hussern menschen: die werckheiligen aber mit leib und seele/als ledig von der gnade dess Evangelii in Christo.¹

What is most noteworthy in this comment is that Hedinger unknowingly uses Luther's phrase 'the outer man' to interpret \( \text{πνεύμα ουλείας} \).

Lange's explanation is similar, but he specifies the identity of both \( \text{πνεύματα} \) as follows:

Es ist nur ein Geist, und derselbe ist mit dem Vater und Sohne der Gesetz-geber und der Evangelist; wie denn so wol das Gesetz, als das Evangelium, von dem Dreyeinigen Gott promulgiret ist.²

¹. Hedinger, 1711, p.538.
². Lange, 1729, p.99.
The role of the Holy Spirit as Gesetzgeber is that of working in man an acknowledgement of sin and a knechtische Furcht before God. This aspect of the Spirit's ministry still happens now, in the struggle for repentance.\(^1\) This significant development in interpretation - which is really a re-emphasis of Luther - makes contemporary rather than placing in a totally different era, the Holy Spirit as πνεῦμα δούλειας. That the Law reveals sin and announces to man the wrath of God and thus drives him to repentance is, of course, straightforward Luther, but the explicit correlation of that idea with the first part of the contrast in v.15 is peculiar to Lange.

But if that point (above) is typically Lutheran, the following is reminiscent of the interpretation of Calvin and Coccejus on this verse:

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1. Lange, 1729, p.99: 'Er [...] the Spirit [...] wircket aber durch das Gesetz die Erkänniss der Sünden und also eine knechtische Furcht vor Gott. Ob nun wol diese Wirkung noch jetzo beständig bey allen in dem Buss-Kampfe geschiehet: so war sie doch fast empfindlicher unter dem alten Bunde'.
Und obgleich die Glaubigen der damaligen Zeiten auch zum Evangelium kamen: so war doch, wenn man die besonders Glaubens-Helden ausnimmt, die Evangelische Glaubens-Kraft und Lebens-Freudigkeit bey ihnen viel schwächer; und hingegen blieb das gesetzliche und fürchterliche Wesen bey ihnen in mehrer Empfindung.¹

Even though Lange did not use the phrase 'covenant of grace', he comes very close to doing so, and the point he makes above would certainly have been acceptable, as far as it went, to Calvin.

Anton's exegesis of v.15 is even more remarkable and must rank with that of Origen, Augustine, Calvin, and Coccejus in its originality. It is by far the most distinctive interpretation since the Reformation, although it bears some similarity to that of Lange (who comes later). The controlling observation is that Paul purposes to say that one must begin one's spiritual life with fear.²

This beginning in fear, however, is only a preparatory step in the experience of conversion.

Und in Absicht auf uns kan es nicht anders seyn, als dass sich im Anfange der Bekehrung gesetzliche Furcht findet, darunter aber der Heilige Geist sein Werck hat, ... dass er uns des Evangelischen Trostes recht fähig mache.³

1. Lange, 1729, p.99.

2. Anton, 1746, p.388: 'Es ist genug, will er sagen, dass man es mit Furcht anfangen müssen....'

3. Anton, 1746, p.388.
Therefore, the \( \Pi\alpha\lambda\nu \) is interpreted to mean that the born-again are not to return to that initial state of 'servile fear' experienced at the beginning of spiritual rebirth.¹ 'Da müssen wir nicht Demuth draus machen, und also wieder ins vorige zurücke kriechen',² says Anton, for whatever fear is remaining in us must be bit by bit driven out by love.³

Other exegetes, notably those writing in the era of Scholasticism, have suggested that the first part of the contrast (v.15) is indicative of a lower level of man's relation to God (e.g., that \( \Pi\nu\epsilon\delta\mu\alpha\ \delta\omega\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\alpha\varsigma\ ) ... \( \epsilon\iota\sigma\ \phi\omicron\beta\omicron\upsilon \) equals initial or servile fear), but Anton is the first exegete to integrate this view with an evangelical Protestant understanding of conversion and regeneration. If his interpretation appears syncretistic, it is probably only accidentally so. The tendency, present in at least one stratum of exegesis (Origen and Scholasticism)

1. Anton, 1746, p.388: 'Das soll nur voran und hernach vorbey gehen, dass es zu einem andern Stande komme... nicht wieder zur knechtischen Furcht'. (Emphasis is Anton's).
3. Anton, 1746, p.388: 'Dass Überbleibsel von solcher Furcht muss immer mehr durch die Liebe ausgetrieben werden'.
to view man's relation with and attitude toward God in terms of Stufen, ranging from lower to higher, is completely absent here.

Rather, as suggested above, the background for Anton's interpretation is to be found in Luther. That man must become a cowering servant of fear before the wrathful Lawgiver before he can be justified (and thereby be enabled to love the Law) is an understanding of Paul which could not possibly be more faithful Luther. 1

At v.16 both Anton and Lange agree that αὐτὸ τὸ Πνεῦμα is the Holy Spirit and that the second Πνεῦμα refers to the new spirit created in those who are born again. 2

1. Rupp, (The Righteousness of God, London, 1953, p.178), however, points out that Luther saw fear as fulfilling a continuing function in the believer.

2. Anton, 1746, p.390, 'Eben derselbe Geist Gottes stimmet mit unserm neuen Geiste im Zeugniss Überein. Unser neuer Geist, den wir in der Wiedergeburt empfangen, das neue göttliche Wesen des Evangelii, das der Heilige Geist in uns anrichtet ....' Also Lange, 1729, p.100: 'Derselbe Geist gibt Zeugniss unserm (wiedergebohrnen) Geist....' Anton and Lange do not agree about the correct exegesis of ἐνθρωπήθη. Anton says 'with our spirit', and Lange says 'to our spirit'.

Hedinger clearly objects to a causal interpretation of v.17b, while the others do not speak to the problem. Lange, however, has a great deal to say about the necessity of suffering with Christ. He discounts all natural or self-inflicted suffering, and limits Paul's words to suffering for the sake of Christ, which is, in turn, more specifically interpreted as '...um der Wahrheit und um des Gewissens willen....' This explanation is typical of pietist exegesis in its demand for dedication to the most difficult possible course of practical Christian living. This factor alone gives a partial explanation for the activism, social and missionary, which characterized Pietism as a whole.

1. Hedinger, 1711, p.538: 'Niemand verstehe hier eine wirckende bedingniss/sondern ein wohlgefällige ordnung Gottes....'

2. Lange, 1729, p.100: 'Man muss die Leiden, die man in der Gemeinschaft mit Christo über sich nimt, nicht mit den bloss natürlichen, in noch viel weniger mit dem selbst gemachten Leiden confundiren.....'

Not only was Johannes Albrecht Bengel (1687-1752) the most capable of all the pietist exegetes, but a giant among all Biblical scholars of his era. His succinct commentary on the New Testament, along with J.J. Wettstein's Libelli ad Crisín atque Interpretationem Novi Testamenti, John Lightfoot's Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae, and H. Grotius's Annotationes, is one of the few works of the 17th and 18th centuries which has retained its general usefulness. 2 Bengel is always brief and his comments on our passage take up a scant two columns of the original edition, even in that short space, there are a number of noteworthy points of interpretation.

Bengel sees a clear break in style at v.12, but does not feel it marks the beginning of a straightforward exhortation; rather, it is 'a kind of teaching, which borders on exhortation'. 3

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1. Gnomon Novi Testamenti, Tübingen, 1st ed., 1742. Cited below as 'Bengel, 1742'. The English translation is taken from A.R. Fausset, Gnomon of the New Testament, III, Edinburgh, 7th ed., 1873. (Cited below as 'Fausset, 1873'). This translation is often wooden and has been here often modified by the writer.

2. Bengel is one of the few exegetes who comes through Farrar's evaluation of post-Reformation exegesis relatively unscathed. See Farrar, 1885, p.392. He speaks of Bengel's Gnomon as a 'mine of priceless gems'.

3. Fausset, 1873, p.102: Bengel, 1742, p.576: 'Didascalis vergens ad horatationem.....'
The ἐστίν means that 'we acknowledge and consider ourselves to be'. Thus the teaching which follows assumes that those who are addressed receive the teaching with spontaneity. Paul has left the positive obligation unexpressed, and the reader must supply 'but to the spirit'.

At v.12 Bengel further points out that Paul does not say μέλλετε ἰννί, which indicates mere imminence (i.e., nacturi estis vitam, 'you will obtain life'), but ἰννίσθήσετε which implies continuing on in life, which Paul's readers already possess (i.e., manebitis in vita, 'you will remain in life').

Bengel then explains the meaning of the two parallel sentences in v.13 as follows:

1. Fausset, 1873, p.102: Bengel, 1742, p.576: 'sumus, nos ipsos agnoscimus & ducimus'.

2. Bengel, 1742, p.576: '...praesupponens homines spontaneos'.


4. As he does say in v.13a: μέλλετε ἀποθνῄσκειν

In the repentance of those over whom the flesh had dominion, and in the temptations of those over whom the spirit reigns, the flesh and the spirit are, so to speak, evenly balanced; grace has the upper hand (literally, 'prevents') in the former, sin in the latter. To whichever part a man turns himself, from it he receives his name.  

This is, of course, essentially the position of most Antiochene exegetes (i.e., that man is named after the element in him which dominates). But if Bengel takes his technical explanation from Greek exegesis, his theological interpretation is strictly that of a pietist. He does not admit the possibility that this balance or struggle is a continuing reality in the life of believers (contra Luther), but rather he ends his comment by observing that 'From this place forward Paul entirely dismisses the carnal state,' which he had begun to deal with at Romans 6:1, and he now goes on to describe the undefiled life of believers.

1. Fausset, 1873, p.102; Bengel, 1742, p.576: 'In poenitentia eorum, in quibus caro dominata erat, & in tentatione eorum, inquibus spiritus regnat, caro & spiritus quasi in aequilibrium veniunt; gratia illos, peccato hos praeveniente: utramcunque in partem homo se vertit, ab ea denominationem accipit'.

2. See Wiles, 1967, p.36.

3. Fausset, 1873, p.102; Bengel, 1742, p.576: 'Ab hoc loco Paulus plane missum facit carnalem statum, & pertexta ea parte, quam cap. VI.1. inceperat, purum statum vitalem fidelium describit'.

516.
Bengel sees v.14 as a kind of transitional pivot point of the material which he later summarizes with the verb ἐδόξασεν (glorificavit) in v.30. Throughout this passage, suggests Bengel, Paul is reminding his readers that this glory is not unmixed but a glory 'the taste of which is diluted with the cross'.

Bengel's interpretation of Πνεῦμα νικόθεοιάς is, unfortunately, ambiguous: Πνεῦμα is here taken specifically to mean a 'feeling' and 'sense' which carried something of a sense of bondage; the phrase also refers to the perception of the Holy Spirit's ministry in general as it was unfolded in believers in whom he dwelt (under the old covenant). Nevertheless, the Holy Spirit, even in the Old Testament, could not be described as 'a Spirit of Bondage'. This explanation is similar to those of Calvin and Cocceius: Πνεῦμα σουλειάς is not a description of the Holy Spirit in his Old Testament ministry.

1. Fausset, 1873, p.103; Bengel, 1742, p.576: 'Non autem meram descriptit gloriam, sed ut gustus ejus adhuc cruce diluitur'.

2. Fausset, 1873, p.103; Bengel, 1742, p.576: 'Spiritus sanctus ne in veteri quidem testamento fuit Spiritus servitutus; sed apud fideles, in quibus habitabat, ita suam vim explicavit, ut tamen subesset sensus & affectus, qui quidam ex servitute traheret, apud parvulos'.
but a description of the 'state of mind' of those believers in the old covenant. This attitude resulted from the inherent distortion of the revelation given to them. Here, then, is evidence in addition to that we have already seen in Lange and Anton that many pietist theologians were influenced by *Föderaltheologie*.

In explaining the function of the $\tau \alpha \lambda \nu$, Bengel takes a surprisingly advanced historical, rather than individualistic, view. He evidently assumes that the Roman church was made up of both Gentiles and Christian Jews, for he points out that those Christians who were heathens had an empty fear (they had had no experience of God previously, as did the Jews under the Law), and therefore they did not have a 'spirit of fear' to which they might return as the Jews did.  

Bengel takes a far more restrained line with regard to the definition of $\tau \nu \epsilon \varphi \mu a\tau l \varepsilon \mu \mu \omega \nu$ (v.16) than did his

1. Bengel, 1742, p.576: 'Habuerant Romani in gentilismo timorem vanum; sed non spiritum timoris, ut habuerant 11, in quorum locum venerant gentes'.

predecessors; it is simply the human spirit, along with which God's Spirit testifies.2

The comment on v.17 contains nothing of note. The phrase beginning with εἰπεῖ is primarily a transition to material which follows. Bengel does not comment on the εἰπέω συμπάσχωμεν as a condition of συνσοφασθώμεν.3

1. Perhaps the best comment on v.16 from Bengel is found in his well-known hymn, Du Wort des Vaters. The first strophe is as follows:

Du Wort des Vaters, rede du
und still mein Sinne;
Sag an, ich hör willig zu,
ja, lehre frei von innen!
So schweigt Vernunft mit ihrem Tand,
und du bekommst die Oberhand
nach deinem Recht und Willen.
Dir geb' ich all mein Innres ein,
das wolltest du, ja du allein
mit deinem Geist erfüllen.

Taken from Du Wort des Vaters, rede du, J.Roessle, ed., Württemburg, 1962, p.71; VI in the series, Zeugnisse der Schwabenväter.

2. Bengel, 1742, p.577: 'Spiritus Dei ipse unatestatur cum spiritu nostro'.

Count Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700-1760) was the colorful founder of the Herrnhuter or Brüdergemeine and prime mover in the modern era of Protestant missionary activity. Although a prolific writer, the only document bearing on our passage is Zinzendorf's 'experimental' translation of parts of the New Testament. His translation of our passage in its second, revised form is as follows:

1. This movement is variously referred to as The Moravian Brethren, The Moravian Church (or simply The Moravians), Unitas Fratrum, Evangelische Brüderkirche, and Brüder-Uniität.

2. Many of the writings of Count von Zinzendorf, including a great many sermons, are reprinted in Hauptschriften, 6 vols., edited by Erich Beyreuther and Gerhard Meyer. Hildesheim, 1963. A perusal of these volumes has revealed no sermon or tract directly concerned with our passage.

3. Eines Abermaligen Versuchs zur Übersetzung Der Historischen Bücher Neuen Testaments Unsers Herrn Jesu Christi aus dem Original Erste Probe, Bückingen, 2nd ed., 1744. This text is reproduced by photographic process in the above collection edited by Beyreuther and Meyer, Vol.VI, 'Verschiedene Schriften'. Cited below as 'Zinzendorf, 1944'. The first edition has not been available to the writer.
Und deswegen, lieben brüder! seyd ihr jetzo nicht an das fleisch gebunden, dass ihr nach fleischlicher weise dahin leben müsstet. Ja, wo ihr aber durch den geist des fleisches ausbrüche sterben macht, so werdet ihr leben; denn das sind Gottes kinder, die vom Geiste Gottes getrieben werden. Denn ihr habt keinen sclavischen geist bekommen, dass ihr euch wieder fürchten müsstet, sondern ihr habt den geist gekriegt, der sich vor angenommene kinder gehört, durch den wir rufen: Abba, d. i. vater; denn der geist selber hilfet unserem Geist bezeugen, dass wir kinder Gottes sind. Sind wir den kinder, so sind wir auch erben, und zwar Gottes erben, aber Christi mitberben, wo wir nemlich mit leyden, dass wir dann auch mit zu ehren werden.¹

At least two aspects of this translation are noteworthy:

Zinzendorf's interpretation of πρόμεσ τῆς σαρκός (for he is almost certainly reading σαρκός and not σώματος) by 'des fleisches ausbrüche' is reminiscent of Luther and is, possibly, milder than other pietists might have been satisfied with.²

Secondly, both occurrences of πνεῦμα in v.15 are interpreted as 'state of mind' or 'attitude'.

Here also to be mentioned is a massive exegetical anthology of largely - but not exclusively - pietist exegetes

1. Zinzendorf, 1744, p.89.

2. Zinzendorf's translation is particularly difficult to understand in the light of his strong line on sanctification, which amounts to perfectionism. See Schmidt, 1967, p.427.
prepared by Christoph Starke (1684-1745).¹ This work is completely uncritical in every way; a cross-check with some of the sources from which Starke quotes (often translated from Latin to German) proves him to be unreliable. He often cites passages loosely and is not adverse to including what appear to be his own, independent comments in material which purports to be from others. Further, he is uncritical in his choice of commentators, for he often arranges explanations from such incongruous writers as Coccejus, Lange and Wolff one after the other, with no apparent recognition of their incompatibility. Finally, his system of citing sources (symbols and abbreviations) is impossible to follow.

The Rationalists.

If Halle was the academic focal point of early Lutheran Pietism, it was also a center for modern German Rationalism. It was at Halle that Leibniz's student, Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and his disciples taught and worked. Among the latter's students was Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten (1706-1757), later a professor at Halle as well. While Wolff was a philosopher, Baumgarten was a theologian, and it was Baumgarten who demonstrated to the benefit of subsequent generations of scholars how Wolff's method might be applied to theology. His work forms a convenient transition from Pietism to Rationalism, for his religious heritage (which he never found reason to reject) was that of Pietism.

1. 'Rationalism' is used through this paper as a term of convenience. Historically, it refers to a minor theological movement which embraced a wide group of Continental theologians who were influenced in their method by the currents of philosophical developments of the Enlightenment. See Schmidt, 1967, pp.413ff; Greenslade, 1963, ch.VII, pp.238ff; RGG, IV, Fasc.2, 1st ed., 1919, 'Rationalism', cols.2038ff; and Farrar, 1885, Lecture VII, pp.397ff.

2. It has recently been suggested by Karl Barth, among others, that Pietism was an 'Übergangserscheinung zur Aufklärung'. Schmidt, 1967, p.430.
His commentary on Romans, outlined to the minutest detail, is a _magnus opus_ in itself, but contains little that is new in its conclusions. Rather, it is the task which Baumgarten set out for himself and the way in which he goes about accomplishing it which is distinctive. This task has two parts; the first is that of reducing Paul's argument to most minute detail. This is not done, however, with any view to extracting propositions as in St. Thomas, nor is the actual outline of structure based upon a preconceived system, as in Melanchthon's commentary on Romans. Rather, it is simply an attempt to follow _rationally_ the course of Paul's logic. The structure is based upon philological and grammatical analysis. In this analysis, the detail of Paul's sentences and paragraphs is more important than the broad lines of theological interpretation. While theological observations are not entirely lacking, they are decisively subjected to the goal of understanding the structure and the individual words used by Paul. This fact of Baumgarten's _exegesis_ is above all important, for it marks the beginning of a trend which continued into 20th-century _exegesis_ of Paul.

The second part of the task, as Baumgarten conceived it, was that of scrutinizing alternative possible interpretations of

1. Halle, 1749, ('Baumgarten, 1749').
difficult passages. As we have seen, it has at times been normal practice to discuss overtly a number of possible explanations. In Baumgarten's commentary, these possibilities are simply outlined objectively, often in great detail, and left to stand. On occasion Baumgarten makes it clear which he prefers, but this is not usual. Thus, while there is an undercurrent running through Baumgarten's exegesis which accepts the pietistic goal of edifying the general reader (which explains why the commentary was written in the vernacular), there is a new overall attempt at objectivity, and objectivity in the milieu in which Baumgarten wrote meant a rational explanation of the text using the tools (logic and grammar) relevant to that task. If, as Professor R.M. Grant has suggested, the Reformation resulted in a re-uniting of theology and exegesis, and if post-Reformation Protestant Scholasticism resulted in the subjection of exegesis to dogma, then in Baumgarten, Michaelis and others we see the beginning of fresh divorce of exegesis from theology as the price to be paid for independence and objectivity.

While Baumgarten's exegesis of our passage offers us no fresh insight, one or two examples from his commentary will illustrate what has been said concerning his method.

Baumgarten divides Romans 8 into three main parts: vv.1-13, the first section, "...enthält die Befreiung der Gläubigen
von allem Tode und Verdamnisse...¹ The second section, vv.14-27, '...enthält die Vorstellung der erlangten Kindschaft der Gläubigen bey Gott....'² Within the second section, vv.12-13 Baumgarten understands to be '...eine beigefügte Ermanung zum rechten und sorgfältigen Gebrauch dieser Wahrheit....'³ These two verses form the second part of a sub-section (vv.10-11 being the first part) which, in turn, relates to v.1. This analysis of vv.12-13 draws attention to the parallelism between the statement in v.12, ἀπ' οὖν, ἀδελφοί, ὀφειλέται ἐσμέν, οὐ τις ἄρκη.... and that of v.1, οὐδὲν ἀπ' νῦν κατάκριμα τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, μὴ κατὰ τάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα.


This also allows Baumgarten to observe that Paul implies a positive obligation:

...wir stehen unter einer Verbindlichkeit zu wissen notwendigen Handlungen, und zwar einiger uns erzeugten Wohltaten wegen, vermöge der notwendigen Pflicht der Dankbarkeit und Erkentlichkeit....

Baumgarten's rather lengthy but concise explanation of the entire v.12 demonstrates his concern to exhaust totally the meaning of Paul's words. In the comment which follows, Baumgarten is assuming that Paul had both a negative and a positive obligation in mind as he wrote; this can be broken down into three parts:

...1) wir sind durch diese und wiederfarne Wohlthat Gottes und Wirkung seines Geistes in einen solcher Zustand versetzt, dass das Fleisch oder natürliche Verderben der angebornen Sünde uns nicht ohne und wider unsern Willen gewaltsamer Weise bezwingen, beherschen und notigen kan demselben zu dienen, oder dass wir uns nicht mehr in einer Unvermeidlichkeit von demselben bestimmt zu werden befinden; 2) hingegen sind wir eben dadurch in eine neue Verbindlichkeit versetzt und aufs stärkste verpflichtet worden der Sünde nicht mehr zu dienen; 3) folglich sind wir vermöge des Gegensatzes zugleich und eben so stark verbunden dem Geist zu dienen....

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1. Baumgarten, 1749, pp.440-441. While Baumgarten acknowledges the textual problem, he chooses to allow the final clause to stand in the text.


Even from this, it can be seen that the format of Baumgarten's analysis promises more than it gives; Baumgarten is essentially dependent upon his theological inheritance of Lutheran Pietism for his interpretive ideas.

Baumgarten's interpretation of Paul's more ambiguous uses of ἔργα is typical of the period. At v.10 he notes that τὸ ἔργον

...bedeutet hier nicht den Geist Gottes um des Gegensatzes ἔργα willen; sondern die Seele, ihrer geistlichen Beschaffenheit wegen, sonderlich nach ihren obern Kräften, Verstand und Willen, und zunächst den neuen Menschen, die von Gott und seinem Geist errichtete und hervorgebrachte neue Fertigkeit zu rechtmässigen und auf die Vereinigung mit Gott abzielenden Veränderungen.¹

¹. Baumgarten, 1749, p.460. Elsewhere in his commentary on v.9 (p.456) Baumgarten similarly states that ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνδυνάμεως τοῦ Θεοῦ, '...bedeutet hier nicht sowol nach der sonst sehr gewöhnlichen Metonymie die vom Geist Gottes gewirkte, ihm gemäße und ähnliche, auf Gott gerichtete Gemütsfassung eines Menschen in Gegensatz des Fleisches; sondern die dritte Person im göttlicher Wesen....' The principle of metonymy, which we have often met in regard to definitions of ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνδυνάμεως and ἔργα, is simply that of substituting the name of one thing for another by reason of some relationship between the two objects. In this case the rationale of connection is both by reason of cause and result: the Holy Spirit creates in man the spirit and this to the end that he opposes and defeats that which is opposed to spirit, the flesh. See Lewis and Short, LD, 'denominatio', p.546.
It is essentially in this sense that the \( \text{πνευματε} \) is defined in v.13. Baumgarten raises no new possibilities for the understanding of the contrast in v.15. The difficulty of maintaining this definition, as we have already seen, is in applying it to \( \text{πνευματε} \ \text{ημων} \) of v.16. Baumgarten clearly sees the problem and surmounts it by grouping a number of definitions together under one explanation. The result is an uncontrollable chaos:

Da denn in diesem fruchtbaren Ausdrucke eigentlich zwey Sätze enthalten sind: a) unser eigener Geist bezeuget solches, das ist a) unsere Seele selbst, oder das Bewustseyn dessen, was in uns vorgehet, ist ein Versicherungsgrund dieser unserer Kindschaft Gottes; b) die göttliche Gemütsfassung und neue oder Üternaturliche Fertigkeit zum Guten, ist ein Beweis dieser Warheit, und versichert uns davon... b) der Geist Gottes hilft dazu, bestätigt und bekräftigt solch Zeugnis theils durch seine Leitung, Veranstaltung und Beforderung solcher Einsichten, theils durch die Hervorbringung solcher Wirkungen in den Gläubigen, die einen Beweis und Versicherungsgrund der Kindschaft Gottes bey ihren abgeben und ausmachen ....

Here it is evident that Baumgarten has attempted to unite a number of different interpretations of v.16 and in doing so has introduced a considerable degree of inconsistency.

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While Baumgarten marked the beginning of a critical approach to Scripture, his student, Johann Salmo Semler (1725-1791), took the case a great deal further. Semler belonged to the group of theologians then known as Neologen. In their approach to Scripture, these theologians not only attempted to determine the historical Sitz im Leben out of which the various strata of Scripture arose, but also to separate that which was relevant to the Sitz im Leben from what was essential to Christianity. The eventual result of this, as historians have observed, was a reduction of the Christian faith to practical moralistic categories.¹

Semler's commentary on Romans² is a paraphrase with occasional annotations appended:

Itaque fratres, ipsi perspicietis, oportere nos omnem operam dare, ut ne (qui christiani, Christi sectatores, dicimur) huic carnii nunc vitam nostram impendamus, aut ex corruptae naturae auctoritate vitam hanc agamus. Nam si (iterum) hanc vitam ex carnis pristina consuetudine agatis: in tristissimam moralem nunc, aeternamque olim, mortem non incidere non poteritis; si vero spiritus illa vi sic utamini jam in hac vita, ut corporis vitiosas consuetudines quasi morte magis magisque afficiatis:

2. Paraphrasis Epistolae ad Romanos, Halle, 1769, ('Semler, 1769').
vitam et nunc spiritualem augebitis in vobis, et illa aeterna olim (Deo multo similiores) potiémśni. Quot enim quique spiritu Dei duce se patiunter; hi omnes, Dei in similitudine ipse vivunt, et filii Dei sunt, (longe maiorí omíne quam Iudaí sibi eius nominis honorum tribuunt.) Neque enim (per Evangelium, et tam praeclara beneficia,) immísit vobis Deus spiritum servitutis et animi trepidationem, ut rursus metu vario (nisi studiosissíme servetis istas praeeceptiones de cibus, diebus festis etc.) carere non possitis; sed ímplevit Deus animum vestrum eo sensu, ut sciatis, iues et benefíciúm filiorum vobis competere; hoc nos spiritu et novo mentis motu laetabundí vel clamare audemus, Abba, (si Iudaí fúmus,) Pater, (si é gentíibus sumus.) Ipse (Dei) spiritus, (quo nos agi scimus,) testimonium perhibet (hac ratione) nostro spiritui, eius ministerio solemus nobis consíli esse nostrí status,: quod sumus filii Dei; (et ex eius divína fámília, quae divíno et certo iure in alias res utitur censeamur.) Si vero filii sumus, (facile et istud intelligitis,) filiorum etiam parte et forte nec nos carebimus; Deus enim regnum caeleste gloriarumque suam quasi dividet nobis; quæmadmodum Christus (ex morte resuscitatus,) eius factus est particeps; si modo ea in re etiam, Christo non sumus dissimíles, qui adversas res ante lubenter, ut Deus voluit pertulit, quam tantam gloriam consectus est'.

This paraphrase contains very little which is noteworthy or new. A rather surprisingly traditional view is taken at some points; he reads 'corrupt nature' for the use of οραφη at v.12, but as is true of all rationalist exegetes, his interpretation of the Πνεύματα is speculative: Πνεύμα ἀποθείας

has two meanings. On the one hand it is a 'heart of fear' (animi trepidationem) and on the other hand it has reference to a real condition of servitude under natural and supernatural powers such as those spoken of by Paul in Galatians 4:3 ('... έν ό ὅ τα
στοιχεία τοῦ κόσμου ήμεθα') or in Hebrews 2:5 ('Οὐ
γὰρ ἁγγέλους ἐπέταξεν τ. οὐκομένην τ. μ. .....'), or in I Corinthians 2:12 ('ἡμεῖς δὲ οὖ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ἐλάβωμεν .....'). Christians are free from all such subjection and superstitions.² Πνεῦμα νικὸθεσίας is 'our heart' when it is invaded by the sensus of God. Thus our spirit can be described as a 'new mind'.³

Another, less important exegete, also influenced by Rationalism, was Gotthilf Traugott Zachariae (1729-1777). His commentary is also essentially a paraphrase with prefatory notes.⁴ The following points of interpretation in this paraphrase are noteworthy:

2. Semler, 1769, note 195, pp.97-98: 'Non ἐλάβωμεν , christianae sententiae et notiones, quibus imbusbamur, ante baptismum non hoc secum tulerunt, ut ad nos quasi denuo sanciam acceperimus pristiam timendi superstitionem; igitur ıugo ıstius servitutus non ultro nos subiaciamus, Gal. 5,1'.
3. Semler, 1769, p.98.
4. Paraphrastische Erklärung der Briefe Pauli, Tübingen, 1781, ('Zachariae, 1781').
At v.12, the σὰρξ is spoken of as 'unsern sundlichen Lusten'. Our obligation is 'den heiligen Triebe des Geistes zu folgen'. In traditional terms he explains v.13a in his paraphrase as follows:

Wenn ihr aber durch die Triebe des Geistes die äusseren Werke, dazu die sundlichen Luste eure Glieder des Leibes missbrauchen, gleichsam ersticket, und ihnen ihr Leben nehmnet (folglich die Luste unterdrücket, und in keine Werke ausbrechen lasset): so werden sie auch euch den Tod nicht zuziehen, sondern das ewige Leben wird euch gewiss seyn'.

The πνεῦματε of v.14 is translated as Geist Gottes, but the πνεῦμα σουλείας as Gesinnung der Knechte and πνεῦμα νιοθεσίας as Gesinnung willig gehorsamer und getraulicher Kinder gegen ihren Vater. Finally, the πνεῦμα ημῶν (v.16) is simply translated as Hertzen and Gewissen.

There is little else of note in his paraphrase of our passage.

From even this short review it is clear that Zachariae's interpretation of ἐνέπνεομαι as used throughout our passage is more conservative than that found in other rationalist exegetes. He states that his reason for not explaining ambiguous occurrences of ἐνέπνεομαι as Vernunft is the inconsistency this would create in v.16 of our passage. In the Einleitung of this commentary, he states that from the progress of Paul's thought in chapter 8, it becomes clear,

Dass der Geist Gottes von dem Geiste des Menschen verschieden sey. Nicht allein der ganze biblische Gebrauch dieser Benennung bringet solches mit sich, sondern auch sonderlich v.16,26. Man verstehe durch den Geist Übrigens die Vernunft, so muss es auch hier die Vernunft seyn, und unsere Vernunft muss unserer Vernunft Zeugniss geben. ...1

1. Zachariae, 1781, p.XXX.
English Exegesis of the 17th and 18th Centuries.

In reviewing the accomplishments of English exegetes down to his time, Dean Farrar was forced to confess that,

The English Church, since the days of Bede and Alcuin, has rarely, perhaps never, been in the forefront of Scriptural studies.... She has had indeed Hammond, Whitby, Leighton, Patrick, Horsley; but is there a single English commentary before the last generation, except the Isaiah of Bishop Lowth, of which any one could say without extravagance that it struck out a new line or marked a new epoch ?

Farrar could well afford to ask such a devastating question, for exegesis in England was indeed in a decrepit state during the 17th and 18th centuries. There is virtually no exegete of the Epistle to the Romans who, by either his historical influence or written contribution, compels reporting here, with the possible exception of John Locke. There were a number of major (i.e., 'large') exegetical works written, as Farrar indicates. They were not normally exhaustive, detailed studies of single books, but, typically, English paraphrases of the entire Old and/or New Testaments to which were appended explanatory notes. Noteworthy examples of this type were Henry

1. Farrar, 1885, pp.420-421.
Hammond's *A Paraphrase and Annotations upon all the Books of the New Testament* (1653); John Locke's *A Paraphrase and Notes to the Epistle of St. Paul to the Galatians, the first and second Epistles to the Corinthians, and the Epistle to the Romans and Ephesians* (1705-1707); Daniel Whitby's *A Paraphrase and Commentary of the New Testament* (2 volumes, 1703); John Wesley's *Notes to the New Testament* (1755); Samuel Clark's *Paraphrases* (Matthew, 1701; Mark and Luke, 1702); and the works of Simon Patrick (all the books of the Old Testament to the Song of Solomon, 10 volumes; 1695-1710). There were also those of a more devotional nature such as Matthew Henry's *Exposition of the Old and New Testaments* (1708-1710) and Thomas Scott's *Commentary on the Bible* (1788-1792).

Of the above works, three are of relatively major importance: Hammond, because of his place as a pioneer in English exegesis; Locke, because of his exegetical independence and vast influence as a philosopher; and Wesley, because of his impact upon the English-speaking people of his age.

The annotated paraphrase written by Henry Hammond (1605-1660) is the earliest complete Biblical commentary written in English.¹ His work, however, is not all his own, for he borrows heavily from Hugo Grotius's Annotations, which he praises almost without limit. His only original significant comment on our passage is an extended discussion of the phrase ἐν ὑμνῷ κρατήρων: ἀββα δὲ πατὴρ (v.15). Hammond considers δὲ πατὴρ to be simply an explanation of ἀββα. There are different possible interpretations of the clause as a whole: it may simply be a form of petitioning God, as in the words of Christ in Gethsemane, reported by Mark 14:36. If understood in this sense, then the clause signifies the relation of children to their father, a relationship wherein the father is one who is good to his children. This, in turn, can be contrasted with the 'more servile affections of the Jews'. Or this crying out may not be a form of prayer at all, but a 'compellation' or address, '...wherein a son expresseth his confidence and dependence on his father's kindness and goodness to

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him.... There is yet another, less likely view which puts this cry in the context of Roman law concerning adoption and inheritance. In its use here the words 'Abba, Father' would be those expressed by an adopted son suing a rich man for his inheritance. This view is quite wrong for a number of reasons. It is refuted, first of all, because here, as in Galatians 4, they are already sons. Thus the whole conjecture is wrong since in both Roman and Jewish (!) custom the adopted son had the full rights of an heir.

John Locke.

John Locke's (1632-1704) annotated paraphrase is of a completely different order from that of Hammond. As an historical document, it is by far the most significant and interesting piece of scholarly Pauline research to come out of England in the 18th century.


Locke's method of interpreting Paul is set out in an appended lengthy preface entitled, 'An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles by Consulting St. Paul Himself'. In this essay, Locke steps off, with remarkable foresight and brilliance, the new ground which Pauline research must now claim and till. With ill-concealed disdain, he reviews the non-accomplishments of expositors before him. The practice of commenting on Scripture, said Locke, had now reached a point where the great body of exegetical opinion itself must be evaluated. This could only be done by first determining the original sense of Paul's words.

Locke's appeal, then, was for plain but thinking men who were free from doctrinal prejudice to approach Scripture armed only with historical and philological tools, in order that the original meaning of the text might be recaptured.

It would be difficult to over-emphasize the significance of Locke's influence upon critical exegesis. His Paraphrase and Essay were, within a short time, translated into German, and must have had fundamental influence on subsequent
generations of rationalist exegetes, along with his better-known works, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, and *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

The actual paraphrase of our passage contains but little of interest. Locke was more interested in the first eleven verses of chapter 8 and, unfortunately, he was less successful in the actual practice of exegesis than in proposing a methodology for exegesis.

Because Locke was concerned to reconstruct the unity of Paul's argument in each of his Epistles, his individual comments can be understood only when viewed from the perspective of his overall interpretation. Therefore, in order to put his paraphrase of our passage into context, we shall reproduce below his own summary of Romans 6, 7 and 8:

1. In his Bampton Lectures, Dean Farrar completely missed the significance of Locke's impact upon the development of critical exegesis; he mentions Locke only in passing and leaves him out of the list quoted above. Alan Richardson in his essay, 'The Criticism and Theological Use of the Bible, 1700-1950' (in Greenslade, 1963, pp.238-293), gives Locke his complete due, observing that it was the work of him and Pierre Bayle 'which laid the foundations of eighteenth-century rationalist criticism of the Scriptures'. (p.239). Bishop Richardson inexplicably neglects, however, to mention the *Paraphrase* and *Essay* reviewed here. This is but another evidence of the fact that this less-publicized work of Locke has been largely neglected. This neglect in undoubtedly due in part to the fact that Locke's *Paraphrase* and *Essay* are not generally available. Unlike his better-known works, they have never been reprinted in the past two centuries; it would be a great service to historians and exegetes alike if they were to be edited and reprinted.
St. Paul having, chapter 6 shewn that the Gentiles who were not under the Law, were saved only by Grace, which required that they should not indulge themselves in Sin, but steadily and sincerely endeavour after perfect Obedience: Having also, chapter 7 shewn that the Jews, who were under the Law, were also saved by Grace only, because the Law could not enable them wholly to avoid Sin, which by the Law was in every the least slip made Death; he in this Chapter /i.e., ch.8/ shews, that both Jews and Gentiles who are under Grace, i.e., Converts to Christianity, are free from Condemnation if they perform what is required of them; and thereupon he sets forth the Terms of the Covenant of Grace, and presses their Observance, viz not to live after the Flesh, but after the Spirit, mortifying the Deeds of the Body; forasmuch as those that do so are the Sons of God.  

From even this brief glimpse into Locke's exegesis, it becomes evident just how startling were many of his conclusions. His concern to find the historical Sitz im Leben of Paul's Epistles leads him to suggest that chapter 6 is addressed to Gentile converts, but chapter 7 to Jewish converts. The Roman Church was made up of both peoples: is it then not reasonable, asks Locke, that Paul addressed parts of his letter to one or the other of the two groups and the other parts to both? Chapter 8 is addressed to both groups because in it Paul points out that believers are now under grace, not the Law (as in chapter 7), but he also impresses upon his readers

1. Locke, 1707, p.78.
that they are called to a new obedience under the terms of a new
Covenant of Grace (as in chapter 6). Christian converts from both
backgrounds are obligated to 'sincerely endeavour' (Locke's
favorite phrase) to fulfill the conditions of this new Covenant.

Generally speaking, these 'Terms of the Covenant' dictate a clear
choice and endeavor to live 'after the Spirit'. Specifically,
this means fulfilling or conforming to the righteousness of the Law.
This does not mean a 'compleat exact obedience', to the old Mosaic
Law but rather 'an unblameable Life, by sincere Endeavours after
Righteousness' to such a degree as to demonstrate plainly that they
are faithful subjects of Christ.¹ This course, in fact, constitutes
living according to a new spiritual law, or, in Paul's words, living
'according to the Spirit'. Those spoken of (v.5) as being ἐκατὰ
Sophia are those who are under the fleshly dispensations
of the Law.² Thus, Locke's paraphrase of v.5 reads:

For as for those who are still under the Direction of
the Flesh and its sinful Appetites, who are under
Obedience to the Law in their Members, they have the
Thoughts and Bent of their Minds set upon the things

1. Locke, 1707, note 'w', p.81.
2. Locke, 1707, note 'd', pp.82-83.
of the Flesh, to obey it in the Lusts of it: But they who are under the spiritual law of their Minds, the Thoughts and Bent of their Hearts is to follow the Dictates of the Spirit in that Law.¹

This reflects what Locke perceives to be Paul's twin purpose in writing the Roman church: to persuade Jewish and Gentile converts from subjection to the old Mosaic Law, and on the other hand, to warn them against the anarchy resulting from not subjecting oneself to a new spiritual law. The two parts of this somewhat dialectical purpose reflect, in turn, the tendencies of the two peoples in the Roman church.

From here it is but a short step to say that there are Christians who are still living κατὰ τὰ σαρκία or under the dominion of 'the carnal or literal Dispensation of the Law'. Such persons are also under the dominion of their carnal lusts. They cannot please God because they have not the Spirit of God, for '... 'tis the Spirit of God alone that enlivens Men so as to enable them to cast off the Dominion of their Lusts'.²

¹. Locke, 1707, p.81.

². Locke, 1707, note 'c', p.82.
This complete chain of ideas is integral to understanding Locke's paraphrase of our passage, which is as follows:

Therefore Brethren, we are not under any Obligation to the Flesh to obey the Lusts of it. For if ye live after the Flesh, that mortal part shall lead you to Death irrecoverable; but if by the Spirit, whereby Christ totally suppressed and hindered Sin from having any Life in his Flesh, you mortify the Deeds of the Body, ye shall have Eternal Life. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the Sons of God, of an Immortal Race, and consequently like their Father immortal. For ye have not received the Spirit of Bondage again, to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of God, (which is given to those who having received Adoption are Sons) whereby we are all enabled to call God our Father. The Spirit of God himself beareth witness with our spirits, that we are the Children of God. And if children then Heirs of God, Joynheirs with Christ, if so be we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him.¹

From the foregoing and the notes which accompany his paraphrase, it is clear what interpretation Locke means to give the passage: both Gentile and Jewish converts are free from the domination of their carnal lusts (and are no longer under subjection to the literal Mosaic Law); therefore, there is no obligation to obey their lusts. They are called, on the other hand,

¹. Locke, 1707, pp.85-86.
to endeavor by the help of the Spirit to obey the spiritual law of God. The Πνεῦμα σωτείας is, of course, indicative of man's condition under the old Law; Πνεῦμα νικόθενίας is the Holy Spirit, the enlivener of men and given under the new covenant of grace, who enables Christians to cast off their lusts.

In summary, two aspects of Locke's exegesis are noteworthy: a controlling historical criticism and an overwhelming confidence in man's ability to lead a morally superior life.

Finally, his independence places him in a category by himself - an outstanding example of rational inquiry almost totally free from the pressure of exegetical tradition.

Here also to be mentioned in passing is the unique exegetical anthology (over the entire Bible) compiled by Jakob Brucker. This anthology is something of an oddity, for it is essentially an anthology of English exegetes translated into German, although Brucker adds, by means of a series of annotations, his own comments. This is but further evidence of the influence of Locke (who is given an honored place in Brucker's anthology) upon Continental Rationalism, for Brucker, while not particularly important in the history of exegesis, is a rationalist exegete in the line of Semler and Michaelis.

John Wesley.

There can be little doubt that John Wesley (1703-1791) was the most influential English theologian of the 18th century to comment publicly on the Bible. He was not, of course, an exegete, but rather a Biblical theologian and expositor. Like the pietists - by whom he was so profoundly influenced - Wesley and the movement he generated cannot be understood without first recognizing an inherent and compelling desire to depend upon Scripture for both the authority and content of Methodism's mission and message. In contrast to Pietism - which remained a movement within Lutheranism and thus was able to maintain a sphere of influence in German universities - Methodism, in its early years, produced no exegetes of note. Wesley himself was content in his Notes on the New Testament (1755) to reprint translated selections from Bengel's Gnomon and to add only minor notes of his own. However, in spite of the absence of scholarly concentration upon the problems of exegesis, there did grow up a body of opinion as to how particular parts of the Bible ought to be interpreted. Perhaps the most fruitful testing place of this opinion is in Wesley's Sermons. Fortunately, the Epistle to the Romans was a book of the Bible crucial to Wesley's theology. No fewer than eleven of Wesley's famous Sermons on Several Occasions are
based upon texts taken from Romans;\(^1\) of these eleven, three are based upon vv.15-16 of our passage.\(^2\)

The first sermon relevant to our passage is the ninth, 'The Spirit of Bondage and of Adoption',\(^3\) and it is based upon Romans 8:15. In this sermon, Wesley is primarily concerned with the contrast, which he interprets not primarily in the context of a divine economy, but contemporarily, as distinguishing various levels of man's relationship to God. As we shall see, Wesley's interpretation of \(\text{πνεῦμα θοικείας}\) bears a remarkable resemblance to that of some Lutheran pietists, notably Anton.

Wesley's sermon has three major divisions, corresponding to three kinds of men: the first is not directly mentioned in the text of v.15, but the remaining two are suggested by \(\text{πνεῦμα θοικείας εἰς φόβον}\) and \(\text{πνεῦμα οἰοθετίας}\):

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1. Sermons on Several Occasions, V, in The Works of John Wesley, ('First Series of Sermons 1 through 39 ....'), Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1771. Cited below as 'J. Wesley, 1771'.

2. The importance attached to these sermons by early Methodism is clearly witnessed to in a subtitle to the 1771 edition of these sermons. This subtitle reads as follows: 'and to which reference is made in the trust-deeds of the Methodist chapels, as constituting, with Mr. Wesley's Notes on the New Testament, the Standard Doctrines of the Methodist Connexion'.

3. J. Wesley, 1771, pp.98-111.
One who is in the first state of mind, without fear or love, is in Scripture termed a "natural man": One who is under the spirit of bondage and fear, is sometimes said to be "under the law": ... But one who has exchanged the spirit of fear for the Spirit of love, is properly said to be "under grace".¹

In brief, the natural man is he who is morally and spiritually asleep; he knows nothing of, and cares nothing for, God. This category, as Wesley applies it, is comprehensive enough to include a vast number of 'types': the agnostic who says 'there is no God'; the antinomian who imagines that the obligation to the law has ceased; men of learning who enshrine their own reason; the materially self-satisfied who give the appearance of being happy, etc. The unitive idea which binds all of these together in Wesley's mind is that of false freedom. Such men are not bound because they feel no condemnation; they live in a tenuous state of false security.² This condition is a prelude to the first condition described in v.15.

Wesley's description of the man who has received the ἰδίωμα is vivid:

\[\text{σοφεῖσις εἰς φόβον}\]

By some awful providence, or by his word applied with the demonstration of his Spirit, God touches the heart of him that lay asleep in darkness and in the shadow of death. He is terribly shaken out of his sleep, and awakes into a consciousness of his danger. Perhaps in a

¹. J. Wesley, 1771, pp.98-99.
moment, perhaps by degrees, the eyes of his understanding are opened, and now first ... discern the real state he is in. Horrid light breaks in upon his soul; such light, as may be conceived to gleam from the bottomless pit, from the lowest deep, from a lake of fire burning with brimstone.¹

Confronted by the breadth of God's commands, anxious and guilty over the penalty placed by God upon transgression of his commands, our awakened man determines to break with sin and to conquer it. There follows a fearsome struggle such as that in Romans 7:9ff,² where man 'under the law' is portrayed. Thus, those who have received the spirit of bondage into fear are those who are not yet regenerate and thus not under grace but under the law. Because sin can never be broken while in this state, those who are under the law are said to have received a spirit of bondage.

The third state, relating to πνεύμα νεοθεσίας is that of grace. Man comes to this state when he perceives the possibility of forgiveness of sins, calls upon Christ, and is reconciled to God.

¹. J.Wesley, 1771, pp.101-102.

He cannot fear any longer the wrath of God; for he knows it is now turned away from him, and looks upon Him no more as an angry Judge, but as a loving Father.¹

These three states, which Wesley terms 'the natural, the legal, and the evangelical',² can be summarized as follows:

The natural man neither conquers nor fights; the man under the law fights with sin, but cannot conquer; the man under grace fights and conquers, yea, is "more than conqueror, through him that loveth him".³

Wesley's sermon is essentially a call to conversion. While the 'natural' and 'legal' state apply universally to mankind (Jews, heathens and Christians), Wesley is appealing mainly to a generation of nomimal Christians. There is a recurring theme running throughout this sermon: those hearers who would call themselves Christians and yet cannot witness to a climactic experience of forgiveness are not yet Christians. In developing this theme, he often lapses into an ambiguity: there are 'Christians' who are still heathens (in a natural state), and Christians who are Jews

¹. J. Wesley, 1771, p.107.
². J. Wesley, 1771, p.108.
³. J. Wesley, 1771, p.108.
(in a legal state). Now, says Wesley, is the time to become a Christian **in fact** by entering into a state of grace. This interpretation is a degree removed from the stand of Pietist exegetes. It will be remembered that Anton said at this verse:

> Es ist genug, will er [i.e., Paul] sagen, dass man es mit Furcht anfangen müssen ....

And,

> Und in Absicht auf uns kann es nicht anders seyn, als dass sich im Anfange der Bekehrung gesetzliche Furcht findet ....

While Wesley might not have been willing to admit that a \( \Pi νέμα σοудείας \) was present in those taking the first faltering steps of conversion, he would probably have heartily agreed that such persons are experiencing conviction of their sins (repentance). Since in the theology of Pietism repentance is a necessary step in conversion, Wesley's interpretation of \( \Pi νέμα σουδείας \) as the aroused conscience is even closer to that of Anton. The idea of progression in the experience of conversion is clearly reflected in the following appeal:

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1. Anton, 1746, p.388.
Art thou fighting, but not conquering? striving for the mastery, but not able to attain? Then thou art not yet a believer in Christ; but follow on, and thou shalt know the Lord.¹

This interpretation of Wesley's sermon is further vindicated by his own suggestion that the 'evangelical state' is often mixed with the legal. Wesley is careful to add, however, that this is not a normal condition because, 'The wise and gracious God rarely suffers this....'² Still, it is significant that Wesley's sermon on v.15 bears many similarities to that of pietistic exegesis of the same verse.

Both the tenth and eleventh sermons³ are titled 'The Witness of the Spirit', and are based on v.16 of our passage. This duplication is explained by the fact that what Wesley had to say about the direct inner witness of the Spirit sparked off a vigorous debate among English divines. Charges were raised against

¹. J. Wesley, 1771, p.109.

². J. Wesley, 1771, p.110.

³. J. Wesley, 1771, pp.111-144.
Wesley accusing him of 'Enthusiasm'. During the 18th century in England, the debate about the doctrine of assurance was an important one. The first of these sermons is antecedent to this debate; in it Wesley carefully explains what he understands the testimony of the Spirit to be. The second sermon is written some 20 years later; nothing new is said in it, but Wesley defends what he has said earlier by elucidating his basic thesis and by answering the most frequently posed objections. From a perusal of these two works, it is evident that v.16 was for Wesley, as it was for Lutheran pietists, of monumental importance.

Wesley's basic interpretation of v.16, while unique, is quite simple and straightforward. Wesley fully acknowledged that the Greek of v.16 might be justifiably translated: 'The same Spirit

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1. The principle critic of Wesley's views on the inner witness of the Spirit was Bishop Joseph Butler of Durham. A record of the conversation between Wesley and Butler in which the accusation was made is contained in Jonathan Crowther, History of the Wesleyan Methodist, 1815. For this citation and for an historical sketch of the doctrine of Assurance in British Protestant theology of the 17th and 18th centuries see Howard Watkins-Jones, The Holy Spirit from Arminius to Wesley, London, 1929 (ch. XVI, 'The Witness of the Spirit', pp. 305ff). This chapter also contains a summary of Wesley's doctrine of the witness of the Spirit as contained in his sermons, journals, and other tracts.
beareth witness to our spirit, that we are the children of God'. But he contended that this was not the correct interpretation, for '...seeing so many other texts, with the experience of all real Christians, sufficiently evince, that there is in every believer, both the testimony of God's Spirit, and the testimony of his own, that he is a child of God'.

Thus, there are two testimonies and two witnesses. The first problem is the identity of 'our testimony'. Put simply, this is the human conscience affirming the believer that his life conforms to the marks set forth in Scripture (I John 2:3, 5, 29; 3:14, 19 etc.) and that he is reconciled to God:

A consciousness that we are inwardly conformed, by the Spirit of God, to the image of his Son, and that we walk before him in justice, mercy, and truth, doing the things which are pleasing in his sight.

Having defined the first testimony, Wesley turns to the testimony of the Spirit and offers this definition:

1. J. Wesley, 1771, p.113.

2. J. Wesley, 1771, p.115.
The testimony of the Spirit is an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God; that Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given himself for me; and that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God.\(^1\)

The keystone of Wesley's exposition of v.16 is that this testimony is antecedent to that of the believer's conscience:

We must be holy of heart, and holy in life, before we can be conscious that we are so; before we can have the testimony of our spirit, that we are inwardly and outwardly holy.\(^2\)

Here Wesley is leading up to saying that not only is the Spirit's testimony antecedent to, but also an intimate part of, that act whereby man is pardoned of his sin by Christ and reconciled to God. Man is not forgiven until the Spirit witnesses to him that he is forgiven:

Now we cannot love God, till we know he loves us.... And we cannot know his pardoning love to us, till his Spirit witnesses it to our spirit. Since,

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1. J. Wesley, 1771, p.115. Wesley is evidently oblivious of an inherent incongruity in his definition; earlier he was careful to point out that he did not construe the Greek of v.16 to mean that the Spirit witnesses to our spirit, but here he uses precisely that phrase.

2. J. Wesley, 1771, p.115.
therefore, this testimony of his Spirit must precede
the love of God and all holiness, of consequence it
must precede our inward consciousness thereof, or the
testimony of our spirit concerning them.¹

Thus the witness of Spirit means, for Wesley, nothing
less than that climactic act of trust which takes place in one's
conversion, and the assurance of pardon which is granted by the
Spirit in that experience. Indeed, Wesley's description of his own
conversion on May 24, 1738, might well be substituted as a
definition of 'the testimony of the Spirit':

I went very unwillingly to a society in Aldersgate
Street, where one was reading Luther's Preface to
the Epistle to the Romans. About a quarter before
nine, while he was describing the change which God
works in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt
my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in
Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was
given me, that he had taken away my sins, even
mine, and saved me from the law of sin and death'.²

Only when man is freed from 'the law of sin and death'
is it possible for him to love and serve God; only when man loves
and serves God does his conscience witness to the fact of his
obedience. While the priority of the Spirit's testimony (conversion)

¹. J. Wesley, 1771, pp.115-166.
². J. Wesley, 1771, p.510.
is of the utmost importance to Wesley's interpretation, the relationship of the two testimonies is to an extent reciprocal. The Spirit confirms the witness of our spirit, but without the fruit of the Spirit's testimony (love, joy, peace, etc.), the joint testimony could not continue.¹

In Wesley's interpretation of both vv.15 and 16, it is clear that religious experience has become a primary canon of Biblical hermeneutics. Wesley himself suggested that his interpretation is taken partly from the experience of like-minded Christians and partly from Scripture. When, as in the case of v.16, there is a clear grammatical choice to be made, he opts for the explanation which best fits his own religious experience. This tendency might not be viewed in isolation, rather it simply demonstrates his affinity with Lutheran Pietism, for subjectivism in Biblical interpretation was also a clear distinctive of their exegesis.

In the preface to his Notes on the New Testament, Wesley freely confessed his dependence upon Bengel's Gnomon, and was often satisfied simply to translate or paraphrase the substance of Bengel's notes. The respect with which Wesley treated Bengel is

¹. J. Wesley, 1771, p.124.
evidenced rather interestingly in Wesley's note on v.15. Here there are two comments on the phrase $\text{πνεῦμα σοφλείας}$; the first is a translation and partial summary of Bengel's comment. The second comment, however, is Wesley's own:

The Spirit of bondage means, those operations of the Holy Spirit, by which the soul, on its first conviction, feels itself in bondage to sin, to the world, to Satan, and to the wrath of God.¹

This explanation fits perfectly² with the interpretation Wesley gives v.15 in the sermon reviewed above. It is significant that Wesley feels compelled to reproduce Bengel's comment as well, even though he evidently felt Bengel had not given the verse quite the right theological interpretation.³

Wesley must have been gratified to learn that Bengel agreed with his reconstruction of v.16: there are two witnesses (our

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² There is a slight inconsistency in that in his sermon (above), Wesley interprets the first $\text{πνεῦμα}$ as 'state of mind', whereas here he takes it as the Holy Spirit.

³ It is interesting also that Bengel had not taken the same line on v.15 (i.e., a $\text{πνεῦμα σοφλείας}$ is present in believers in the early stages of their conversion) as had earlier Pietists.
spirit and the Spirit of God). The comment on v.16 in Wesley's Notes on the New Testament is, however, from Wesley himself and, once again, is consistent with what he has said in his sermon:

The same Spirit beareth witness with our spirit - with the spirit of every true believer, by a testimony distinct from that of his own spirit, or the testimony of a good conscience. Happy they who enjoy this, clear and constant.¹

¹. J. Wesley, 1755, p.377.
F. The Modern Era.

Continental Exegesis, 1800-1850.

By the turn of the century, Rationalism had made its indelible mark on the scholarly study of the Bible in Germany. In the first half of the century (1800-1850), German literary critics clearly dominate Old and New Testament interpretation. This is not to imply that all major German exegetes of this period are cut from the same bolt of cloth; some are theologically conservative (Tholuck, de Wette, Meyer), some are Roman Catholic academics (Klee, Maier), some are 'Biblical theologians' (Flatt, Olshausen), and others defy all but the most qualified classification (Küllner, Rückert, Fritzsche). The single factor which holds all of them together is an acceptance of literary and historical criticism, along

1. Only in the latter half of the century English-speaking scholars begin to respond wholeheartedly to the German challenge; in the first half, however, one can only speak of conservative reaction to German critical studies. Insofar as it relates to the Epistle to the Romans, this defensive reaction is best typified in the commentaries of two Calvinist exegetes, Robert Haldane (The Epistle to the Romans, first published in 1842; reprinted in offset lithography, London, 1966), and Charles Hodge (Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 1864 edition, reprinted in offset lithography, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1965).
with textual criticism, as at least one essential tool of interpretation. Acceptance of this principle, however, in no way indicates each exegete's attitude toward the theological aspect of interpretation. For example, many of the exegetes of this period, as if responding to the challenge laid down by Locke, utilize the results of their historico-critical exegesis to evaluate the more theological opinions of earlier exegetes (Chrysostom, Theodore, Augustine, Calvin and Grotius are most frequently cited). Others work toward a religious understanding of Paul with no reference to the history of exegesis, and still others refuse to admit the propriety of theological questions.

There is another significant development in the commentaries of the exegetes here considered: for the first time, a wide circle of scholars discusses - by means of published commentaries - the conclusions reached by their colleagues, proposes

1. During this period Lutheran Pietism was weakened to a point of virtual submission. There is no major pietist commentary written on Romans during the 19th century except that of Carl Heinrich Rieger (Betrachtungen über das Neue Testament, part one, Stuttgart, 2nd ed., 1883), who often repeats the opinions of 18th-century pietist exegetes, with no indication of a constructive response to critical studies. (Rieger's dates are 1726-1791, but his Betrachtungen were first published in 1828). The swift decline of pietist scholarship in the latter part of the 18th and early decades of the 19th centuries is perhaps one of the most interesting and remarkable facts in the history of Biblical interpretation in Europe.
new solutions, meets criticisms put to it by other exegetes, and attempts to find a synthesis of agreement. One result of this scholarly dialogue is a continual re-editing of commentaries. H.A.W. Meyer (who wrote the Romans commentary in the series founded by himself, Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament) saw five different editions of his commentary, from 1836 to 1872, through to the press, and worked virtually up to the day of his death.¹ F.A.G. Tholuck wrote no fewer than three different works to do with the Epistle to the Romans: an original commentary which took into account Patristic and Reformation opinion (subsequently reworked and published in a 2nd edition);² a technical analysis of the New Testament, utilizing literary criticism, to which is appended

1. See 'General Preface', pp.vff, in Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament, William P. Dickson, trans. and ed., Part IV, Vol. I, Edinburgh, 1881. This is cited below as 'Meyer, 1881'. This translation is made from the 5th and final edition (1872) of Meyer's Handbuch über den Brief des Paulus an die Römer. Citations from the German text are also taken from the 5th edition, published in Göttingen; this is cited below as 'Meyer, 1872'.


a response to Fritzsché's criticism of his Romans commentary;¹ and a second, completely new commentary on Romans.²

Thus we are faced not only with a great expansion of critical and historical detail within the commentaries,³ but also an expansion of the number of commentaries themselves. One must look back to the Reformation to find a period of productivity which in any way approximates that of the 19th century.

Because there is an essential unity of method in critical German exegetes of this period, it will be possible to consider them as a group, rather than individually. It will not be possible to review and analyze their treatment of every problem in our passage, but at least one major issue in each verse is covered in the section below. In addition to Friedrich August Gotttreu Tholuck (1799-1877), the commentaries of the following exegetes are also referred to: Johann Friederich von Flatt (1759-1821);⁴

1. Beiträge zur Spracherklärung des Neuen Testaments, Halle, 1832.

2. Kommentar zum Briefe Pauli an die Römer, Halle, 1842; cited below as 'Tholuck, 1842'.

3. In the commentary on Romans written by Reiche, for example, the section treating chapter 8 alone consists of 116 pages of fine print!

4. Vorlesungen über den Brief Pauli an die Römer, Tübingen, 1st ed., 1825, edited by his son, Christian Dan. Friedr. Hoffman, and published posthumously. This is cited below as 'Flatt, 1825'.
Heinrich Klee (1800-1840); 1 Johann Georg Reiche; 2 Eduard Külner (1806-1894); 3 Hermann Olshausen (1797-1839); 4 Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette (1780-1849); 5 Leopold Immanuel Ruckert (ca. 1845); 6 Karl August Friedrich Frötsche (1801-1846); 7 and Adalbert Maier. 8

1. Commentar über des Apostel Paulus Sendschreiben an die Römer, Mainz, 1st ed., 1830. Cited below as 'Klee, 1830'.
3. Commentar zu dem Briefe des Apostels Paulus an die Römer, Darmstadt, 1st ed., 1834. Cited below as 'Külner, 1834'.
8. Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Römer. Freiburg, 1st ed., 1847. Cited below as 'Maier, 1847'.

Some commentators attempt to demonstrate that the grammatical use of \( \mathcal{J} \) \( \alpha \rho \alpha \) \( \sum \nu \) \( (v.12) \) is to connect vv.12ff with preceding material. There is no general agreement, however, as to that to which v.12 relates, nor as to the kind of literary material contained in our passage. Flatt, the earliest of our commentators, suggests that, ' \( \mathcal{J} \) \( \alpha \rho \alpha \) \( \sum \nu \) muss mit v.6-ll. vgl. v. 13ff. verbunden werden....' The impact of this observation upon the interpretation of our passage (vv.12-14) is that '...den Neigungen zum Bösen folgen, ist Quelle von Unseligkeit; den Antrieben des göttlichen Geistes folgen, Quelle von Seligkeit, v.6'. Tholuck, however, agrees with Chrysostom that the \( \mathcal{J} \) \( \alpha \rho \alpha \) \( \sum \nu \) must be seen as grounded upon the great promise in v.11. Meyer essentially agrees, but points out that the \( \mathcal{J} \) \( \alpha \rho \alpha \) \( \sum \nu \) '...folgert nicht bloss aus v.11., sondern aus dem sachlich enge zusammengehörigen Inhalt von v.10.11'. Other exegetes simply note

1. Flatt, 1825, p.234.
2. Flatt, 1825, p.234.
4. Meyer, 1872, p.363. Fritzche, 1839, p.131 says, 'V.12. Argumentatur ap. e toto l., qui antecedit v.1-ll., non tantum e vs. 10. et ll. h. r.: itaque ergo h.r. quum igitur tot tantisque beneficiis nos Dei spiritus obstrimerit'.
the beginning of an exhortative or 'practical' application of the preceding theme, without emphasizing the inferential function of ἀρά οὖν. Typical of this interpretation is Köllner's comment:

Aus dem oben (v.6-11). angegebenen Verhältnisse der ἀρὰ und des Πνεύμα, das die ἀρὰ nur den Tod bringe und Gott nicht gefalle, das Πνεύμα aber Leben und Frieden erwarke, ja den ganzen Menschen veredle und vollende, zieht der Apostel nun die Folgerung, dass die Christen demnach nicht mehr nach der ἀρὰ, sondern nach dem leben mässsten.¹

This is also essentially the view of de Wette², Reiche³ and Maier.⁴ Rückert, who is also in general agreement, points out that vv.12ff are really not an exhortation but a practical application of what Paul has already said, because '... sein Zweck durchaus noch nicht

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2. de Wette, 1835, p.87.
3. Reiche, 1834, p.175.
4. Maier, 1847, pp.262-263.
Almost to a man, our exegetes agree that something must be added to complete Paul's contrast in v.12. Among the suggestions are:

\[ \delta \alpha \nu \lambda \alpha \tau \zeta \tau \varphi \nu \mu \alpha \tau \iota \lambda \] and \[ \delta \alpha \nu \lambda \alpha \tau \zeta \tau \varphi \nu \mu \alpha \tau \iota \tau \omega \kappa \alpha \tau \zeta \tau \varphi \nu \mu \alpha \tau \iota \lambda \] Among those who attempt the problem there is no agreement as to whether the phrase \[ \tau \omega \kappa \alpha \tau \zeta \tau \varphi \nu \mu \alpha \tau \iota \lambda \] is to be taken in a teleological relationship to \[ \varphi \varepsilon \iota \lambda \varepsilon \tau \zeta \zeta \] or as simply indicating that which one is obligated to do (as in the construction \[ \varphi \varepsilon \iota \lambda \varepsilon \tau \zeta \zeta \varepsilon \iota \mu \iota \tau \nu \iota \tau \nu \sigma \varsigma \]).

2. Flatt, 1825, p.234; Reiche, 1834, p.175.
3. Kühnler, 1834, p.283; Fritzche, 1839, p.132; Maier, 1872, p.262; de Wette, 1835, p.88; Rückert, 1839, p.424; Meyer, 1872, p.263.
4. The primary exponent of the latter view is Fritzche, 1839, p.132. Meyer, 1872, p.363, resists this explanation, preferring the phrase to be understood as 'der Zweck unseres Schuldverhältnisses zum Fleische, wenn dieses Verhältniss statt finde....' Tholuck, 1842, p.421, agrees with Meyer.
There is a variety of opinion as to how, precisely, "\( \text{mele} \) \text{te apotevnoiskelv} \) and \( \text{L} \text{yse} \text{se} \) (v.13) ought to be defined. Klee, a Catholic exegete, defines the first as '...geistig elend und unglückselig, und weil von dem Schicksale des Geistes jenes Leibes bedingt ist, auch in dieser Hinsicht höchst elend werden ....' and the latter as '...eines höchst glückseligen und herrlichen Lebens des Geistes, und durch eine natürliche Folge (v.10,11) eines unvergänglichen und ganz verklärten leiblichen Lebens leben'.\(^1\) Oldshausen makes the final point the center of his exegesis of v.13: life and death are here not to be thought of as bliss or 'unblessedness', but achievement or forfeit of the grace of bodily glorification. Thus the threat of death means, 'ihr werdet nicht die Auferstehung erlangen'.\(^2\) Rückert similarly suggests that the death referred to is the physical death, which, in the case of unbelievers, simply endures.\(^3\) Reiche's interpretation supports this view in general, while denying that death here applies simply to physical death:

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2. Oldshausen, 1835, p.286.
...das Wort [1.e., 'der Tod'] steht auch hier, wie fast immer im Briefe, in der bestimmten Bedeutung: der Tode, verbunden mit seinen unhöllen Folgen für den Bösen; Verlust seliger Unsterblichkeit des Geistes, und der Auferstehung des Leibes zur Herrlichkeit der Kinder Gottes.

This conclusion, held by the majority of our exegetes, gives an insight into the mood of critical studies on the period. Earlier exegetes, as we have seen, spoke easily about eternal death and life at v.13. This interpretation can no longer be admitted, claim many of our exegetes, because from a study of Paul himself, it has become clear that, 'Paulus glaube keine \( \alpha \nu \alpha \sigma \tau \alpha \sigma \iota \varsigma \) für die Ungläubigen', to use Rückert's words. 2

Throughout our passage, the exegetes in question concern themselves at length to identify the various uses of \( \Pi v e \sigma m a \). Those who take the \( \Pi v e \sigma m a t l \) of v.13 as the Holy Spirit or 'der göttliche Geist' are Flatt (undecided); 3 Tholuck; 4

1. Reiche, 1834, p.176.
Other suggestions put forward are those of Flatt: '...die durch das Evangelium bewirkte bessere Gesinnung...';4 Reiche: '...die höhere, geistig-sittliche Gesinnung des Christen...';5 and, most complicated, Küllner:

...\[ \text{durch den Geist, den die Christen selbst haben, der aber nun im Christentum erst, wenn...der Unwerth der Sünde erkannt ist, und nun Gottes Geist den Christen durch drungen und so das Geistige im Menschen gekräftigt und geheilt hat, ein Princip wird, mit Hülfe dessen der Mensch der Sünde ganz Herr wird. Es sind also wohl in der Geist des Menschen und der Geist Gottes, als Quell alles Geistigen, nicht getrennt gedacht.} \]

2. Maier, 1847, pp.262ff.
5. Reiche, 1834, p.177.
This suggestion, that \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) can sometimes mean a spiritual principle resulting from a uniting of man's spirit and the Spirit of God, is one frequently made by exegetes of this period.

The problem of the \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) arises again at v.14. Those who interpret \( \text{πνεῦμα \ Θεού} \) as 'Holy Spirit' or 'Spirit of God' are in the majority.\(^1\) Köllner again takes the phrase as referring to the 'geistige, göttliche Prinzip'.\(^2\) According to Reiche, \( \text{πνεῦμα \ Θεοῦ} \) ist hier die Gottheit nach ihrer Einwirkung auf die Christen, vermittelt der Erscheinung Christi, betrachtet'.\(^3\) Rückert, in agreement with Köllner, says that the \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) in v.14, '...das göttliche selbst, Prinzip des Lebens ist....'\(^4\) Tholuck, in his first commentary, seems also to accept this interpretation.

Calling \( \alpha\nu\gamma\omicron\omicron\upsilon\tau\alpha\lambda \) a 'mächtigen innern Antrieb', he goes on

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3. Reiche, 1834, p.177.
to describe Πνευματικό Θεοδοσία as follows: 'Sie bezeichnet schon das Lebendige, Kräftige in dem neuen durch die Wiedergeburt dem Menschen mitgetheilten Lebensprinzip....'¹ This explanation demonstrates that it is not impossible to synthesize the two viewpoints: Πνευματικό Θεοδοσία can be the Holy Spirit seen in his role as the 'Lebensprinzip' in believers. This is also Maier's solution: '...der hl. Geist auf den innern Menschen Einfluss gewinnt und thatsächlich das sittliche Lebensprinzip ist.....'²

Suggestions as to the precise nature of the influence implied in the verb ἀγοντιάλ continue to be speculative and rather subjective. Some writers suggest that the ἀγοντιάλ is 'middle' (i.e., 'allow themselves to be led'), thus attempting to preserve man's freedom.³ The majority, however, simply stress that the goal of this ἀγοντιάλ, which is not merely an external impulse, but rather an internal activity, is that of fulfilling the

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2. Maier, 1847, p.263.
3. See Flatt, 1825, p.235; Meyer, 1872, p.365; Reiche, 1834, p.177; Rückert, 1839, p.426 (with qualifications).
ethical demands which Paul has been speaking of earlier in this chapter. This emphasis, which is reminiscent of Augustine's interpretation of v.14 in his anti-Pelagian writings, is perhaps best summarised by Maier:

\[
\text{...der hl. Geist ist nur so lange mit dem Menschen verbunden, als er einen Einfluss auf das sittliche Leben hat, und wenn er diesen nicht findet, so hört seine Gemeinschaft auf...} \]

Perhaps most interesting of all at v.14 is the interest expressed in the term \( \nu\iota\omicron\omicron\sigma\; \Theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\nu \). In the comments of the majority of our exegetes, one can clearly discern the results of historical criticism and of the critical comparison of Biblical writers. Tholuck remarks:\( \gamma\iota\sigma\varsigma\; \Theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\nu \) von \( \tau\epsilon\kappa\nu\omicron\nu \)

\( \Theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\nu \) insofern verschieden, als es bestimmter das mündlich gewordene Kind bezeichnet...\( 3 \) Rückert notes that besides Paul, St. Luke and St. Matthew also use the term \( \nu\iota\omicron\omicron\sigma\; \Theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\nu \), while St. John uses \( \tau\epsilon\kappa\nu\alpha \). He concludes that while in fact there is no real difference, '...dass \( \tau\epsilon\kappa\nu\omicron\nu \) zärtlicher sey

1. So Klee, 1830, pp.527-528; Reiche, 1834, p.177; Olshausen, 1835, p.288.

2. Maier, 1847, p.264.

3. Tholuck, 1842, p.423.
Olshausen, however, feels that the difference lies in another direction: \( \Upsilon \zeta \Theta \epsilon \varsigma \) is a more definite pronouncement of the development of consciousness of sonship, while the \( \tau \epsilon \kappa \nu \omicron \omicron \) indicates the origin of one's sonship. In the following definition, it is clear that Meyer understands 'sons of God' to be a more complete idea than 'children of God':

'Die \( \Upsilon \zeta \Theta \epsilon \varsigma \) sind die durch der Glauben Gerechtfertigen, dadurch zur kindlichen Gemeinschaft mit dem versöhnten Vater von ihm rechtlich Angenommenen (v.15), von heil. Geiste, der ihnen gegeben ist ... Regierten, zur Würde des brüderlichen Verhältnisses zu Christo (v.29) erhoben und der ewigen Herrlichkeit (der Erbschaft) gewiss'.

Reiche's development of the term's background is the most thorough of all. He terms \( \Upsilon \zeta \Theta \epsilon \varsigma \) a symbolic formula, the content of which touches upon a mythical-anthropomorphic ground:

In the Old Testament, the expression, when not referring to the function or office of a single person such as the king (Exodus 21:6, Psalms 2:7), refers to the close relationship of the chosen people to God (Exodus 4:22, Deuteronomy 14:1). When used in the latter sense, it, '...schliesst die Begriffe vorzüglicher Liebe, Fürsorge und Wohltatenertheilung, insofern diese durch jenes nähere Verhältniss bedingt sind, in sich'.

In the New Testament it carries with it essentially the same meaning, only the idea of Υἱοθεσία is heightened and the evidence of the Father's love are greater and more glorious. In terms of meaning, the word corresponds entirely to the ἀγαπήν τοῦ Θεοῦ.

The point at which the greatest disagreement between these writers appears is in the interpretation of Paul's contrast of Πνεῦμα Σοφίας and Πνεῦμα Υἱοθεσίας.

1. Reiche, 1834, p.177.
2. Reiche, 1834, p.177.
3. Reiche, 1834, p.177.
in v.15. There is, however, in the midst of great diversity, one advance: the majority of our exegetes agree that \( \tau\alpha\lambda\upsilon \) is to be taken closely with \( \epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\phi\omicron\omicron\beta\omicron\upsilon \) and not \( \varepsilon\lambda\alpha\beta\epsilon\tau\epsilon \). This agreement in no way implies that all construe the verse in the same way, but it does mark a clear shift in the history of v.15's interpretation. The agreement concerning the \( \tau\alpha\lambda\upsilon \) is, in turn, based upon an insight into the literary nature of Paul's contrast. This insight is reflected in Tholuck's paraphrase of v.15:

Ihr habt, als ihr den Christlichen Geist empfinget, nicht einen Geist der Knechtschaft empfangen, so dass abermals Fürchten herrschen müsste, wie dies in der alttestamentlichen Oekonomie der Fall war; sondern der Gottesgeist, den ihr empfangen habt, ist ein solcher, in welchem sich das Kindesverhältniss offenbart. ²

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1. So Flatt, 1825, p.237; Tholuck, 1842, p.424-425; Reiche, 1834, p.179; Küllner, 1834, p.285; Olshausen, 1835, p.289; de Wette, 1835, p.88; Rückert, 1839, p.429; Fratze, 1839, p.135; Meyer, 1872, p.366; and Maier, 1847, p.265. Some exegetes, in order to show more precisely the way they are construing \( \tau\alpha\lambda\upsilon \; \epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\phi\omicron\omicron\beta\omicron\upsilon \), rephrase Paul's words as follows: \( \epsilon\iota\sigma\iota \; \tau\alpha\lambda\upsilon \; \phi\omicron\beta\epsilon\tau\epsilon\omicron\alpha\lambda \).

See for example, Rückert, 1839, p.429.

This paraphrase is actually a grammatical reconstruction, for it begins from one important assumption: one must start reading at the second \( \varepsilon \lambda \alpha \beta e \tau e \) and work back from there. In this way of viewing the verse, the repetition of \( \varepsilon \lambda \alpha \beta e \tau e \) is only a rhetorical device; what Paul means to affirm is contained in the second clause. The significance of taking the \( \Pi \alpha \lambda \nu \) closely with \( \varepsilon i \varsigma \phi \circ \beta o \nu \) now becomes clear; for only by releasing the \( \varepsilon \lambda \alpha \beta e \tau e \) from the grip of the \( \Pi \alpha \lambda \nu \) is it possible to arrive at the core of what Paul wants to affirm. Thus the majority of our exeges \( s \) would accept Fritzsch\( e \)'s reconstruction of the Greek text, even though it leaves the \( \Pi \alpha \lambda \nu \varepsilon i \varsigma \phi \circ \beta o \nu \) momentarily out of consideration:

\[ \tau \delta \varphi \rho \Pi \nu \varepsilon \omicron \mu \alpha , \delta \varepsilon \lambda \alpha \beta e \tau e , \]
\[ \omicron \varepsilon \Pi \nu \varepsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \sigma o u \delta e i \varsigma \varsigma \upsilon \zeta i \nu , \]
\[ \ddot{a} \ddot{a} \ddot{a} \Pi \nu \varepsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \nu i \sigma \theta e i \varsigma \varsigma . \]

1. Fritzsch\( e, 1839, p.136. \) (It is significant that Fritzsch\( e \) leaves the phrase \( \Pi \alpha \lambda \nu \varepsilon i \varsigma \phi \circ \beta o \nu \) out of consideration when attempting to deal with the problem of the two parallel clauses. This was indicative of the early 19th-century exeges\( t \)'s approach to v.15: the problem of the reference of the phrase \( \Pi \alpha \lambda \nu \varepsilon i \varsigma \phi \circ \beta o \nu \) was considered to be different from the problem of the point of reference of the \( \Pi \nu \varepsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \sigma o u \delta e i \varsigma \varsigma , \) even though not all exeges\( t \)s clearly separated the two).
But within a general acceptance of this point, there is still considerable difference of opinion as to the situation or condition to which Paul refers in the first clause, \( \text{où γάρ ἐλαβέτε πνεύμα σοῦ δὲ ἐὰς τὰδὶν εἰς φόβον} \).

Broadly speaking, there are two positions taken by the exegetes in question. The first part of Paul's contrast refers

a) to the Jews under the Law in the Old Testament;

b) to Jewish and/or Gentile converts in the Roman church.

The first of these is taken up, as we have seen, by Tholuck and also Klee,\(^1\) Köllner,\(^2\) Olshausen,\(^3\) de Wette,\(^4\) Maier,\(^5\) and Meyer.\(^6\) The second is proposed by Flatt, who says,

\[ \text{παύετε τὸ πνεῦμα σου δέ εἰς φόβον.} \]

\( \text{παύετε τὸ πνεῦμα σου δέ εἰς φόβον.} \)

\[ \text{scheint sich zunächst auf die Christen aus den Juden zu beziehen; da aber παύετε} \]

\[ \text{mit εἰς φόβον zu verbinden ist, so könnte es zum Theil auch auf Heiden-Christen bezogen werden.} \]

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1. Klee, 1830, pp.528f.
4. de Wette, 1835, p.88.
5. Maier, 1847, p.265.
Reiche, however, limits the relevance of this sentence to Jewish converts:

Der, mit dem Christentum vergangene, Zustand sklavischer Furcht ist der factische Zustand der Juden unter dem Gesetz... denn der Ap. redet hier noch vorzugsweise zu Judenchristen, und die Heiden haben ihre Götter nie sehr gefürchtet.¹

Rückert, in agreement with Flatt, thanks Paul is referring to both:

Es ist nicht Πνεύμα δουλείας d.h. nicht ein solches welches Knechtschaft wirke...; also auch die Empfänger nicht Knechte, nicht in einem solchen Verhätnisse zu Gott, das sie ihn bloss als ihren Herrn und Gebieter ansehn, der ihnen befehlt und droht, und vorkommenden Ungehorsam straf't. In einem solchen Verhältniss hatten Alle ehemem gestanden, die Juden zu Jehova, die Heiden zu ihren Göttern...²

Before moving on to the actual definitions of the Πνεύμα δουλείας in v.15, it is perhaps worth pausing to reflect upon the implications of the interpretation (with all of its variations) which we have just reviewed.

1. Reiche, 1834, p.179 (emphasis is Reiche's).

2. Rückert, 1839, p.428 (emphasis is ours).
With the advent of the literary-historical interpretation of v. 15, two main streams of exegesis are abandoned: first, the 'personalized' approach, seen best in Luther and in Lutheran Pietism, and secondly, the more prevailing tradition which attempts to read a \( \text{πνεῦμα σωτηρίας} \) (whatever the definition) back into the Old Testament. The turning of the tide resulted from a careful literary criticism of Paul's words. From this it was seen that the contrast in v. 15 was essentially a rhetorical one. While some exegetes continued to read a real condition, which existed either in the Old Testament or in the personal history of Jewish and/or heathen converts who made up the Roman church, exegetes were well on their way toward the suggestion that the contrast was totally rhetorical; thus \( \text{πνεῦμα σωτηρίας} \) represented no real condition at any time whatsoever. In any case, the necessity of having to explain the Holy Spirit as \( \text{πνεῦμα σωτηρίας} \) had vanished. With a single stroke, the Scholastics' wearisome definitions of 'fear', Luther's worried concern about the wrath of the Law, Calvin's and Coccejus's carefully constructed 'covenant of grace' and the Pietists' introspective accounts of repentance and conversion are, in the eyes of 19th century critical exegetes, put to swift and merciful death.
The variety of opinion amongst our exegetes concerning the definition of πνεῦμα σουλήκας ought not detract from the significance of their common discovery about the rhetorical nature of Paul's contrast in v.15 (i.e., that Paul was not speaking about a πνεῦμα or πνευμάτα - twice received by the readers of the Epistle). There remains, however, an inconsistency in this affirmation, for many of these writers do assume that Paul was referring in v.15a to some earlier fact.1

In the explanations which follow, there are two issues at stake: Does the πνεῦμα σουλήκας represent in Paul's mind an historical reality? And: How is the genitive to be construed? While this creates the possibility of numerous

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1. In all of our writers, there remains this element of imprecision mentioned above. Put briefly, this relates to the reality or non-reality of a πνεῦμα σουλήκας at some point in history. That is, did Paul think that there was, at some time past and/or present, a πνεῦμα σουλήκας? Or did he simply construct the imagery of a πνεῦμα σουλήκας purely for the purpose of contrast, while never for a moment thinking that it existed? In our next section, Johann C.K. von Hofmann (Die heilige Schrift neun Testaments, Part three, Nordsingen, 1st ed., 1868, pp.325-326) will suggest that the difference between the 'real' and 'unreal' interpretations might be expressed by the following translations: '...der Geist, den wir empfangen haben, sei nicht der Geist Knechtschaft', and 'der Geist, den wir empfangen haben, sei kein Geist der Knechtschaft'. (Cited as 'Hofmann, 1868'). In normal translation, this difference would hardly be great enough to suggest viable options, but the attempt to show the difference does serve to demonstrate a precision which is, on the whole, not present in the earlier exegetes here under construction.
combinations, there are, in our exegetes, three major options: to assume that Paul is speaking about (a) an unreal but objective 
πνεῦμα; (b) a real but subjective (i.e., 'state of mind') πνεῦμα; or (c) an unreal but objective πνεῦμα. The most common explanation given by earlier exegetes, that Paul is speaking about a real and objective πνεῦμα - the Holy Spirit - in the Old Testament, is almost universally rejected by the writers, as noted above.

Perhaps the most interesting exegesis among those who take part of v.15a (πάλιν εἰς φόβον) in reference to the Roman Urgemeinde is that of Reiche. He begins by refuting two possible explanations of the 'formula' (as he calls it), πνεῦμα 
σουλτέιας; it is not to be explained as 'die Knechtsgesinnung selbst' (as it is in II Timothy 1:7: σὺ γὰρ ἐσωκεν ὑμῶν ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμα σελίδιας ....), nor is πνεῦμα to be explained as the Spirit of God and σουλτέιας as a genitive of result. In this case the accurate translation would be, 'Ihr habt den Gottes Geist nicht als einer solcher empfangen, welcher Sklavensein wirkt, welcher zu Knechten macht'.¹ Such an idea would be quite un-Pauline, for where

¹. Reiche, 1834, p.178.
the Spirit of God (Christ) is, there is freedom (II Corinthians 3:18, 19; Galatians 4:1). What is more, such an interpretation must take the verb \( \varepsilon \lambda \alpha \beta \varepsilon t \) in close connection with the Genitiv affectiv, thus destroying the sense of the sentence: 'You have not received', namely 'von Gott durch das Eintreten in die Gemeinschaft Christ ....'¹ Further, the \( \Pi \alpha \lambda \iota \chi \upsilon \) does not belong to the Zeitwort, for, 'Diesss würde ein früheres Empfangen solchen Geistes voraussetzen; der frühere Sklavengeist unter dem Gesetz war aber kein Geist von Gott, indem der fromme Jude einen kindlichen Geist hatte ....'² Rather, \( \Pi \alpha \lambda \iota \chi \upsilon \) belongs to \( \varepsilon ^{3} \phi \omega \beta z \upsilon \) and the \( \varepsilon ^{3} \) demonstrates the result, i.e., '...so dass ihr euch in eurem neuen Verhältniss, als Christen, ebenfalls, also gleichsam zum zweitemale fürchtetet'.³ The situation of slavish fear, which passed away with the coming of Christianity, is precisely that condition of the Jews under the Law, '...dessen selbstverschuldete Übertretung sie... Strafe erwarten liess....'⁴

1. Reiche, 1834, p.178. Reiche does not assume the real existence of \( \Pi \nu \epsilon \upsilon \omega \mu a \delta \omega \lambda \epsilon e i a s \).
2. Reiche, 1834, pp.178, 179.
3. Reiche, 1834, p.179.
4. Reiche, 1834, p.179.
However, it is not probable that the Apostle Paul means to imply
that the cause of this great fear lies in the institution of the
Law itself, for in the Epistle to the Romans the contrast is
always between an earlier wickedness and culpability, and the ideal
of holiness of Christians, and thus not between Law and Gospel. The
implication of this general observation for v.15 is that,

This fact, that Paul never overtly suggests that there
is a fear/love discontinuity inherent in the Christian view of the
Heilsgeschichte, is overlooked by the majority of exegetes, says
Reiche, and causes them to make the error of explaining the
\( \Pi t e \varepsilon \mu a \ s o o d e i \alpha s \) in terms of motive, i.e., '...dass
die frühere Religion blos (unwirksame und unreine) Motive der Furcht
dem Menschen vorhalte, und dadurch nur einen Schatten von Tugend
erzwinge'. \(^2\) This generalization neglects two fundamental facts:

1. Reiche, 1834, p.179 (emphasis is Reiche's).
2. Reiche, 1834, p.179.
'Allein im Mosaismus fehlten Motive der Liebe und Dankbarkeit nicht, und auch der Christ soll mit Zittern und Zagen das Werk der Heiligung schaffen'.

We have reviewed Reiche's exegesis of v.15a at length for two reasons: first, his explanation is far more complete than that of the other exegetes in question. He recognised that if the rhetorical nature of Paul's contrast were to be taken seriously, it would not be necessary to speculate about the previous existence of a Πνεῦμα δουλειας. Taking the Πάλιν closely with εἰς φόβον in fact obviates regarding the Πνεῦμα δουλειας as anything more than a literary straw-man. If the distinction he draws with regard to the meaning of the phrase Πάλιν εἰς φόβον (= εἰς τὸ Πάλιν φοβεῖται) is a rather fine one (intent and result), he is at least consistent in applying only this phrase and not Πνεῦμα δουλειας to one part of the Roman Urgemeinde. Second, his exegesis is noteworthy for its critical constructiveness: he is able to apply his own analysis of Pauline theology to one particular and rather ambiguous idea, draw an appealing conclusion, and, at the same time, pass a

1. Reiche, 1834, p.179.
devastating criticism on what had been a standard exegesis of v.15. It was precisely this kind of careful, critical exercise that Locke appealed for some 130 years previous.

Others who attempt to apply v.15a to the Roman Urgemeinde are not so successful. Flatt, somewhat inconsistently, speculates as to what kind of \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) the Spirit of God would be as \( \text{πνεῦμα σουδείας} \) ('...nicht einen Geist, der Urheber eines knechtschen Sinnes ist, dass ihr euch wieder, wie vormals, ängstlich vor Gott fürchten müsstet...'), but goes on to apply the phrase \( \text{πάλιν εἰς φόβον} \) to both Jewish and pagan converts.

Rückert, who had the benefit of having Reiche's exegesis before him, is more consistent. He considers the genitive construction \( \text{πνεῦμα σουδείας} \) to be like that of \( \text{εἰς ζωὴν} \) (v.12), i.e., a genitive of result. The \( \text{πνεῦμα} \) which the readers have received is not '...eine solches welches Knechtschaft wirke...'; however, the same inconsistency is present: although he takes the \( \text{πάλιν} \) with \( \text{εἰς φόβον} \) and not \( \text{εἴλαβετε} \), he develops his explanation of the negated

1. Flatt, 1825, p.236.
2. Rückert, 1839, p.428.
in such a way as to suggest that this describes the earlier situation of Jewish and pagan converts.  

The earliest exegete who does not take part of v.15a as a direct reference to the Roman Urgemeinde is Tholuck. His earliest commentary is, however, inconclusive, as he simply notes that, '...der gesetzliche Mensch, im Bewusstseyn seines Zwiespaltes, Scheu, Angst vor Gott empfindet'. His 1842 commentary is more detailed. Here he interprets the genitive as showing affectus, i.e., 'als subjective Geistesrichtung aufgefasst....' Tholuck points out that if one wants to take v.15 as implying the Spirit's being twice received ('einem zweimaligen Empfangen des Geistes'), then one would also be inclined to the view that the majority of the Roman Urgemeinde was Jewish Christians and also inclined to interpret ἑυρισκόμενα ψυχικά as does Augustine (in Propos. ex ep. ad Rom). As already noted above, Tholuck relates the phrase ἀπὸ ἐν εἰς φόβον to the 'alttestamentlichen Ökonomie', and not to the former condition of the original readers, but he makes the following qualification:

1. See quoted material from Rückert, above.
2. Tholuck, 1828, p.298.
3. Tholuck, 1842, p.423.
4. Tholuck neglects the fact that Reiche was able to relate v.15a to Jewish Christians without agreeing to either of these assumptions.
Clearly then, Tholuck shares the ambiguity of many of his contemporaries, and is unable to confirm decisively or to deny the existence of a πνεῦμα σουλείας.

Klee’s definition of πνεῦμα σουλείας also attempts to strike a balance between the old and new covenants:

Köllner does not consider πνεῦμα σουλείας ever to have existed, but takes the genitive as showing result: 'Es sey nicht...ein solcher Geist, der die Christen wieder in ein knechtischen Verhältniss zu Gott setzen wolle'. Still, the phrase πάλιν εἰς φόβον does lend itself to an old/new covenant contrast:

Auf die herrliche Weise macht hier der Apostel auf den
grossen Unterschied zwischen der neuen Heilsanstalt und
der mosaischen Constitution aufmerksam. Im Mosaismus
war Gott der Herr, der Gottesdienst Furcht vor Strafe
bei Nichterfüllung seiner Gesetze, - nun ist Gott Vater
seiner Kinder, ihr Gehorsam - Liebe.1

Olshausen goes even further in denying that

\textit{Tπερίμα σουλείας} refers to the Holy Spirit in the Old
Testament. He points out, for example, that nowhere does the Old
Testament speak of a 'faktischen Geistesmittheilung'.2 de Wette's
explanation is similar, he interprets the \textit{Tπερίμα} in its
use as 'state of mind' and adds, 'Der Geist der Knechtschaft im
A.T., auf den hier zurückgeblickt wird, war kein empfangener'.3

Similarly, Fritzscbe points out that the \textit{Tπερίμα} which Paul's
readers had received was not a \textit{Tπερίμα σουλείας}.4
Maier explicitly states that Paul is speaking about a 'zweifachen

1. Köllner, 1834, p.285 (emphasis is Köllner's).
2. Olshausen, 1835, p.89.
3. de Wette, 1835, p.88.
4. Fritzscbe, 1839, p.136: 'Nam spiritum servitutis neque dari
posse a Deo ....'
Geistesverfassung' but takes both \textit{Souleias} and \textit{uκοθεσιάς} as genitive of 'Angehörigkeit oder der Ursprungs', and interprets these constructions as 'Geistesstimmung, Sinnesart, wie sie Sklaven und Kindern eigen ist'. Although the genitive in both cases is \textit{casus effectus}, \textit{Πνεῦμα} is to be understood as 'state of mind' and not 'Spirit of God'.\footnote{Maier, 1847, p.263.} Maier's application of these definitions to the meaning of v.15 illustrates again the general view of those who take \textit{Πάλιν εἰς φόβον} in close connection with \textit{ἐλάβετε Πνεῦμα Souleias} and with reference to conditions under the Law in the Old Testament:

\begin{quote}
Die Geistesstimmung des Sklaven ist Furcht, denn er steht einem Herrn gegenüber, der ihm mit Strafe droht; so würde also das \textit{Πνεῦμα}, wenn es die \textit{Soul}, wirkte, ein \textit{Πν. εἰς φόβον} sein, die Furcht in die Seele legen, wie dieses durch das alte Gesetz geschehen ist, in welchem sich Gott als strenger Herr offenbart und den Ungehorsamen gegen seine Gebote harte Strafe ankündigt.\footnote{Maier, 1847, p.263 (emphasis is Maier's).}
\end{quote}

Meyer also accepts the reality of a \textit{Πν. Souleias} and defines it as '...ein Geist, wie er im Zustand der Sklaverei die maassgebende Gewalt ist'.\footnote{Meyer, 1872, p.365.}
In summary, there are basically three lines of interpretation of v.15a: there is a group which takes the \( \text{Πνεύμα} \) as subjective ('state of mind') but which interprets the entire half-verse as being in reference to conditions under the old covenant. This group is perhaps best represented by Tholuck, Köllner and Maier. A second group takes the \( \text{Πνεύμα} \) as a (negated) reference to the Holy Spirit or Spirit of God; this is the view of Fritzsche, de Wette, Olshausen and Meyer. A third group, best represented by Reiche, takes the phrase \( \text{Πάντες εἰς φόβον} \) in reference to the Roman \text{Urgemeinde}. The last group tends to disconnect \( \text{ό̄ ή̄ρ̄ ᾱ τ̄έ̄ Ε̄ τ̄ Π̄ ν̄ ṃ̄ Ν̄} \) from \( \text{Πάντες εἰς φόβον} \) and understands this latter phrase to be expressing a separate, verbal idea (e.g., Rückert). Although there is no agreement about the kind of genitive \( \text{Soudeíás} \) is, all agree that \( \text{Πνεύμα Soudeíás} \) cannot be the Holy Spirit or Spirit of God at work in the Old Testament dispensation (although some think that it is a natural \( \text{Πνεύμα Soudeíás} \) present in those who live under the Law); and, as mentioned at the outset, all agree that \( \text{Πάντες} \) is not to be taken closely with \( \text{Ελάβετε} \) and that thus Paul does not mean to imply that his readers have previously received a \( \text{Πνεύμα Soudeíás} \).

Finally, it is noteworthy that all of these exegetes, with the exception of Reiche, utilize one part or another of v.15b to
draw a contrast between the Old and New Testaments, even though the conclusions of their grammatical analysis do not compel them to do so. Many are eager to minimize the contrast (Klee and Tholuck), but only Reiche explicitly denies that any such contrast is intended by Paul. The advent of critical studies, it is clear, did not totally eradicate the influence of exegetical tradition.

One of the by-products of the critical era was a vast increase in information about Oriental languages. It is not surprising that our exegetes' comments on the clause ἐν θεῷ καὶ ἐν κατατέλειον ἀββά διὰ πατήρ (v.15) and particularly the word ἀββά are more technical and detailed than those we have met earlier. No two writers approach the problem of ἀββά διὰ πατήρ in quite the same way, and therefore it is difficult to summarize the explanations offered. Most of our exegetes clearly see that there are two basic issues: the function of the διὰ πατήρ and the origin (both philological and historical) and significance of ἀββά. Some commentators take the διὰ πατήρ as simply a translation or explanation of ἀββά. Others consider the διὰ πατήρ to be an integral part of the address.

to God.\(^1\) Friztsche, who belongs to the latter group, points out that those who take the entire phrase as a repetition (either in imitation of a child's speech or for emphasis) neglect to realize that if it were simply repetition, we might have expected \(\delta\alpha\beta\beta\alpha'\) or \(\delta\,\Pi\alpha\tau\nu\rho\), \(\delta\,\Pi\alpha\tau\nu\rho\) (see Matthew 7:22).\(^2\) Meyer, the other major proponent of the latter view, refers to the three passages in Mark where \(\alpha\beta\beta\alpha'\) occurs: here there is no \(\delta\,\Pi\alpha\tau\nu\rho\) appended for the purpose of explanation. If Paul had intended \(\delta\,\Pi\alpha\tau\nu\rho\) to be a translation, then we might have expected the standard formula to precede it (\(\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota\varepsilon\varsigma\omicron\)\(^3\).

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2. Friztsche, 1839, p.140. While it might seem inconsistent to explain \(\delta\,\Pi\alpha\tau\nu\rho\) as a translation of \(\alpha\beta\beta\alpha'\) and at the same time, suggest that the repetitiveness of both together is in imitation of a child's first attempts at speech, this is precisely what a number of our exeges do.

The issue, however, is not decided with אֲבָבָא, but rather in the āḇḇā itself. A number of writers attempt to explain the word grammatically. Tholuck, for example, points out that āḇḇā is, in form, the emphatic state, but that the same form also expresses the first person suffix.¹ (This was, in fact, the common opinion of Semitic scholars of the time, and it is only recently that Joachim Jeremias has proved that this is not so).² Reche terms āḇḇā the Syriac-Chaldee form of the Hebrew אֲבָבָא.³ Rücker more accurately identifies the word as Aramaic.⁴ Olshausen, who wrote

1. Tholuck, 1828, p.298.

2. Joachim Jeremias, The Prayers of Jesus, No.6 in second series Studies in Biblical Theology, London, 1967, p.58: 'One constantly comes across the assertion in New Testament literature that abba, meaning "my father", is an emphatic state ("the father") which has secondarily taken over the function of the forms with the first person suffix ("my father" and "our father"). In reality, however, the development took place in exactly the opposite direction. The ā in abba was not originally an appended article, as in Aramaic the emphatic state is abba. In origin, abba is a pure exclamatory form, which is not inflected and which takes no positive suffixes; the ġemination is modelled on the way in which a child says ʾāmmā to its mother.... This form abba, deriving from children's speech, had made considerable headway in Palestinian Aramaic in the period before the New Testament'. Cited as 'Jeremais, 1967'.

3. Reche, 1834, p.179.

an early Hebrew grammar, also recognizes the word as Aramaic and
gives a surprisingly accurate definition of its origin:

'Abba, wie Papa, ist auch dem lallenden Kinde möglich
auszusprechen und characterisiert deshalb angemessen

Nicht kindliche Gesinnung und Weise'.

However, he wrongly assumes that Δββά is not used in
reference to Christ's prayer, but for its 'childlike' associations.
This interpretation is, of course, essentially a repetition of that
given by Antiochene exegetes.

Other exegetes, however, begin with Jesus's
use of the word and assume that through Him the same word came to be
a standard form of address throughout the early Church. This view is
accepted by a rather impressive list of exegetes: Reiche, de Wette, Frizsche, Maier, and Meyer. Meyer incorrectly thinks that

1. Olshausen, 1835, p.289. The verb and noun 'lallen' is an
   attempt in German to indicate the way a child speaks, but
   has come to mean 'stammer'; it is clear that Olshausen does
   not mean it in this sense, but rather in the sense of 'to
   babble as a small child'.
2. Reiche, 1834, 180f.
3. de Wette, 1835, p.88.
5. Maier, 1847, pp.263f.
the address to God \( \alpha \beta \beta \alpha \) came originally from the Jewish practice of prayer, but was transferred to Christian practice through Christ. In the transition, the word took on the nature of a proper name, but in its original form was a vocative. This in turn corresponds to the \( \xi \pi \acute{\alpha} \tau \nu \rho \) which is appellative in use, but nominative in form, and was used by Greek-speaking Christians in apposition to \( \alpha \beta \beta \alpha \). de Wette is less specific and simply says that the word \( \alpha \beta \beta \alpha \) was used by Paul here simply because it was used by himself and other Christians in prayer. Fritz sche's explanation is only slightly different from that of Meyer; the \( \xi \pi \acute{\alpha} \tau \nu \rho \) was originally an explanatory phrase, but through use it became an integral part of the address to God. Maier simply says that the entire phrase \( \alpha \beta \beta \alpha \xi \pi \acute{\alpha} \tau \nu \rho \), 'war wahrscheinlich eine in den christlichen

1. Jeremia s, 1967, p.57: 'We can say quite definitely that there is no analogy at all in the whole literature of Jewish prayer for God being addressed as Abba'. (Emphasis is Jeremia s's).


3. de Wette, 1835, p.88.

Gemeinden ausserhalb Palästinas in Gebeten übliche Formal; jenes wurde entweder als ein durch den Mund Christi geheiligtes Wort aufgenommen, oder wegen des kindlichen Klanges....¹

Maier's comment, '...entweder...oder...', points up a fascinating hiatus in the explanations of these writers: on one hand are those who accept the traditional Antiochene explanation of the derivation of \( \alpha\beta\beta\alpha \) (small children call their fathers this), and on the other, those who proceed from the Markan account of Jesus's address of God. In no case, however, do any of our exegetes attempt to unite the two ideas. This omission was almost surely due to the fact that theological point had become indivisibly welded to an historical fact, e.g., 'childlike utterances imply childlike trust', as in Olshausen, above. To have united these two explanations, it would have been necessary to have known that \( \alpha\beta\beta\alpha \), at the time of Jesus, was the normal address of a father and not limited to just small children.² There is virtually no advance toward a reconciliation of these views in the

1. Maier, 1847, pp.265-274.

2. See Jeremias, 1967, pp.57ff. It is interesting that Antiochene exegesis of Romans 8:15 plays an important role in the impressive array of evidence which Jeremias presents in support of the view that the form \( \alpha\beta\beta\alpha \) is derived from the speech of young children.
19th century.¹

The suggestions made by Augustine (accepted by Calvin) and Erasmus are particularly out of favor with 19th-century exegetes; none of our writers cites either explanation with approval. Further, not a single writer mentions the possibility of \( \dot{\alpha} \beta \beta \dot{a} \circ \pi \alpha \tau \eta \rho \) being an allusion to the Lord's Prayer. Finally, a new possibility of interpretation is referred to by Tholuck,² Klee,³ and Reiche,⁴ although none prefer it: in the Talmud (Gemara zu Berachoth fol.16.), mention is made of the fact that children of the master say to their fathers \( \chi \nu \tau \chi \nu \) while servants may only say \( \tau \chi \nu \). However, none of these exegetes knows quite how this piece of information is to be applied to v.15, other than to suggest that the believers' relationship to God, as their Father, is one of intimacy.

¹. Among those exegetes under consideration here, Reiche, 1834, p.180, comes the nearest to doing so: '...der Ap. Christi eigenes heiliges Wort im Gebete zum Vater Marc. 14,36. wiederhole, um anzudeuten, dass Christus auch in dieser Erweisung des kindlichen Geistes uns vorangegangen....'

². Tholuck, 1828, p.298-299.


At v.16, there is considerable disagreement as to how \( \alpha \upom \tau \varepsilon \tau \) \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \vartheta \mu \alpha \) is to be explained; opinions vary according to the precise way exegetes wish to define the \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \vartheta \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \upsilon \) in v.16 and how they have defined \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \vartheta \mu \alpha \) \( \nu \iota \omicron \delta \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \varepsilon \varsigma \) in v.16. Klee, for example, observes that if one interprets \( \alpha \upom \tau \varepsilon \tau \) \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \vartheta \mu \alpha \) as a reference to the Spirit of God (as he prefers to do), the problem of translation still remains, for,

> Versteht man auch v.15, den Geist Gottes, so heisst \( \alpha \upom \tau \varepsilon \tau \) \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \vartheta \mu \alpha \) : eben dieser Geist. Versteht man aber v.15, durch \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \vartheta \mu \alpha \) eine Gesinnung, so kann dennoch, wie im ersten Fall, \( \alpha \upom \tau \varepsilon \tau \) \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \vartheta \mu \alpha \) den Geist Gottes bezeichnen: "der Geist Gottes selbst".1

Flatt takes the verb (\( \sum \nu \mu \alpha \rho \tau \omicr \upsilon \varepsilon \tau \omicr \nu \)) as simple: 'Der göttliche Geist selbst trägt durch seine Wirkungen auf unser Inneres dazu bey, unsere Ueberzeugung von der väterlichen Liebe Gottes gegen uns zu befestigen und zu beleben, und gegen Zweifel und Schwierigkeiten sicher zu stellen, und bestätigt es auf diese Art unserem Geiste, dass wir Gottes Kinder seyen'.2

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1. Flatt, 1825, p.238.
Such a straightforward explanation is, however, not typical of our exegetes. Fritzsche¹ and Maier² understand \( \alpha \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \ \tau \omicron \ \Pi \nu \epsilon \omicron \omicron \alpha \) as the Spirit of God (and \( \Pi \nu \epsilon \omicron \omicron \alpha \ \eta \mu \omicron \omicron \nu \) as simply the human spirit or heart). Other explanations are more complicated. There is, for the first time, a detailed discussion of the asyndeton between vv.15 and 16. Flatt's reconstruction of the problem is not accepted by all as the proper way in which to analyze the connection of \( \alpha \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \ \tau \omicron \Pi \nu \epsilon \omicron \omicron \alpha \) with the foregoing. The majority of our exegetes prefer to take \( \alpha \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \) as \textit{ipse (der Geist selbst)} rather than as \textit{idem (eben derselbe Geist)}. Meyer, for example, asserts that \( \alpha \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \) is always in the \textit{casus rectus}, '... wobei sich die nähere Sinn-beziehung aus dem Contexte ergiebt ...'³ Those who agree are Tholuck⁴, Klee⁵, Köllner⁶, Olshausen⁷, de Wette⁸

¹ Fritzsche, 1839, pp.141ff.
² Maier, 1847, p.266.
³ Meyer, 1872, p.368.
⁴ Tholuck, 1842, p.428.
⁵ Klee, 1830, p.331.
⁶ Köllner, 1834, p.285.
⁷ Olshausen, 1835, p.289.
⁸ de Wette, 1835, p.88.
Rückert,¹ and Fritzschë.² But two important exegetes, Reiche and Maier, take the opposite view. Because they are in the minority, we shall analyze their explanations first.

Reiche's reason for translating auto to πνεῦμα as eben der Geist (i.e., idem) is that by translating it der Geist selbst, one assumes the introduction of a totally new subject, or at least that something unexpected was said. But this is not the case; '...das innere Zeugniss des Geistes war aber früher 5,5 und noch so eben ausführlich erwähnt v.14'. Thus, even as the lack of a conjunction shows, the Apostle 'einen im Vorigen liegenden Gedanken nur bestimmter ausspricht....'³

However, the first πνεῦμα of v.16 is not, according to Reiche, the Spirit of God, but 'der Geist des Christen, die durch das christliche Gottesbewusstsein bestimmte Gemüttsverfassung....'⁴

This 'Geist des Christen' is, of course, differentiated in Paul's mind from general human consciousness. πνεῦμα here

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1. Rückert, 1839, p.430.
2. Fritzschë, 1839, p.141.
cannot be the Spirit of God because, 'Allein τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ohne Θεοῦ, ist im ganzen Cap. der subjective Geist des Christen...wenn auch, wie immer, als erfüllt, gehoben, erleuchtet vom Gottesgeist gedacht'. The verb, says Reiche, must here be taken in its simple sense; the meaning thus is that 'unser Geist empfängt blos das Zeugniss, welches der christliche Geist, der Gottes Werk ist, giebt'.

Maier's explanation of v. 16 is captured in one succinct sentence: 'Das kindliche Vertrauen und die zutrauliche Liebe entspringt aus dem Bewusstsein, in die Liebe Gottes aufgenommen zu sein, wovon v. 16. der hl. Geist unserem Geiste Zeugniss gibt'. The verb must have the meaning of the simple, since, '...unser Geist kann ja aus sich selbst kein Zeugniss über die erlangte Kindschaft geben....' Further, '...wollte man unter τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ die kindliche Gesinnung, den durch den hl. Geist gewirkten Geisteszustand verstehen, so geht dies wegen der Entgegensetzung des τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ nicht an'.

3. Maier, 1847, p.266. 4. Maier, 1847, p.266.
5. Maier, 1847, p.266.
These two vastly different explanations have in common only the same solution of the asyndeton between vv.15 and 16; Paul is not introducing something completely new with the words \( \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \varphi \tau \omicron \eta \mu \alpha \) , but is speaking about the same \( \pi \nu \tau \eta \omicron \mu \alpha \) and witness as that in v.15b.¹

The explanations of v.15 given by those who read der Geist selbst for \( \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \varphi \tau \omicron \eta \mu \alpha \) (\( \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \varphi = \text{ipse} \)) have no factors common to themselves except for the tendency to take the verb in its compound use and, of course, an agreement that neither of the \( \pi \nu \tau \eta \omicron \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \) (v.16) refer to the Spirit of God or Holy Spirit.

Klee, the earliest Catholic exegete in our section, defines the \( \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \varphi \tau \omicron \eta \mu \alpha \) as der göttliche Geist; this is not precisely the \( \pi \nu \tau \eta \omicron \mu \alpha \Theta \epsilon \omicron \omicron \) , but '...der in unserm Innern waltende, dasselbe mit der heiligen Gnade, den göttlichen Tugendun, dem Drange zu Gott, dem Gebete, den unabsprechlichen Seufzern der Sehnsucht sie erfüllende Geist Gottes'.² Taking the verb as simple, he summarizes the meaning of the verse as follows: 'Unser Geist sagt uns, dass wir Kinder Gottes

¹. While both Reiche and Maier take the verb as simple, this agreement is somewhat accidental, although it does fit best with their solution of the asyndeton.

². Klee, 1830, p.331.
Thus, the prayer or cry *Abba, Vater* and the inner witness given by 'our spirit' are the result of the inner activity of the *Tüchermach* but are not identifiable as the Spirit itself. To a certain extent, Klee's hedging on this issue can be attributed to a desire to stay within the teaching handed down by the Council of Trent.


2. Klee is careful to add the following qualification to his exegesis: 'Ausser dem inneren Zeugnisse des Geistes muss, um dieses in desto grösserer Reinheit und Zuverlässigkeit kennen zu lernen, noch das Zeugniss desselben, welches er durch den Mund der Kirche gibt, vernommen werden. Denn wer weiss nicht, wie leicht ein böses Gaukelspiel unserer Phantasie, unseres innern Gefühles, und des in Gestalt eines Lichtengels erscheinenden Urteinds sich einmischen könne. Dann gäbe also Gott uns in zweifacher Weise Zeugniss? Allerdings; wie er uns sein Daseyn und Seyn in unserm Innern offenbart, und im Angesicht der Natur und im Leben der Weltgeschichte, und weiter noch im Husserlich zu uns gesprochenen articulirten Worte; so zeugt er in unserm Innern durch den Geist, durch das allerlieblichste Bewustseyn, dass wir Kinder Gottes sind, und dasselbe bezeugt er uns durch den Mund der Kirche, zu der, als seiner Repräsentantin, er uns hingewiesen hat*. (p.332, emphasis is ours). In spite of Klee's conservatism, one can clearly discern a foot being thrust into the door of post-Reformation Catholic exegesis. As individual exegetes, neither Klee nor Maier is particularly important, but as pioneers of Catholic critical study of the Bible, they portend something more significant.
Tholuck's exegesis of v.16, in both of his commentaries, is notably indecisive. The \( \alphaυτό \ τὸ \ Πνεῦμα \) he refers to as 'das göttliche Πνεῦμα', but he further defines this in terms of 1 John 5:10; that is, 'Wer an Gott glaubt, hat das Zeugniss in sich selber. Da nun jene Liebe, jenes Streben, des Herzens zu Gott hin im Gebete sich Hassert....'\(^1\)

Thus he finds himself in agreement with Ambrosiaster and others who, 'in dem Gebetsdrange selbst das Zeugniss des heiligen Geistes finden'.\(^2\) This explanation is consistent with his interpretation of Πνεῦμα ὑοθετικὰς in v.15: 'Da nun dort dem neuen göttlichen Πν. die eigentümliche Kraft zugeschrieben wird, unser Gemüt mit so kindlicher Liebe zu Gott zu erfüllen, dass wir uns vertrauensvoll an ihn wenden....'\(^3\)

(However, his definition of \( \alphaυτὸ \ τὸ \ Πνεῦμα \) as 'das neuen göttlichen Πνεῦμα' would not seem consistent with Ambrosiaster's exegesis which simply understands the Holy Spirit).

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1. Tholuck, 1828, p.299.
2. Tholuck, 1828, p.299.
3. Tholuck, 1828, p.299.
He notes that while the verb can have the meaning of the simple, as in Romans 2:15, 9:1, the actual meaning of the verb taken as compound is not unsuitable. Taking all these factors into account, the best meaning of the verse is that, 'Unser Geist schliesst, dass wir Gottes Kinder sind, Gottes Geist drückt das Siegel darauf'.

A number of these ambiguities are cleared up in Tholuck's 1842 commentary. There he opts, albeit somewhat indecisively, for the compound meaning of the verb; moreover, he suggests that the Latin translation, una testari, is the best, 'nach welcher die μαρτυρία des Geistes in dem vorherernähnten kindlichen Gebete gefunden wird, welches ja eben nach v.15. ein Ausfluss des heil. Geistes ist, und durch welches die Ueberzeugung unseres Geistes noch verstärkt wird, die uns schon der Glaube an das Wort Gottes in Betreff unserer Kindschaft geben...'

1. Tholuck, 1828, p.300.
2. Tholuck, 1842, pp.427f.
3. Tholuck, 1842, p.428. It ought to be noted, however, that Tholuck goes on to review what the meaning of v.16 would be if, with Erasmus and Luther, aυτο' were translated idem, and with Luther, Beza, Melanchthon, Calvin, Crell and Grotius, the verb be understood as simple. From this it is clear that Tholuck is not quite certain which explanation is the better.
Both Klee and Tholuck, then, take v.16 closely with v.15, assuming that the witness spoken of in v.16 is constituted, in part at least, by the cry, 'ἀψβά δὲ ταῦτα', but translating ἀυτὸ as ipse, not idem.

Köllner defines ἀυτὸ τὸ τεῦμα as 'der Geist Gottes, der dem Christen geworden ist, selbst', with no further explanation. The verb means, 'legt Zeugniss ab für, bezeugt', the compound is simply a strengthening of the verb.¹

The τεῦμα ματίκη μικρόν is 'die höhere geistige Natur, die der Mensch als solcher hat'.²

Olshausen takes the verb as compound in the full sense, and defines the two occurrences of τεῦμα as follows: 'In diesem Zustande der Kindschaft durchdringt sich nun das Zeugniss des eigen Geistes mit dem des göttlichen Geistes auf eigenthümliche Weise'.³ Olshausen also refers to I John 5:6 in pointing to a paradox: 'Das eigentlich Zeugnissgebende ist in diesem testimonium spiritus der göttliche Geist'.⁴

². Köllner, 1834, p.286.
³. Olshausen, 1835, p.289.
⁴. Olshausen, 1835, p.289.
is the human \( \nuos \) invaded by the \( \tau \nu \epsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \ \theta \varepsilon \omicron \omicron \); he offers an illustration to show how this can be so: Light needs no other witness to it than itself, but it does need an eye to receive it; in the same way the human \( \nuos \) receives the godly Spirit. Olshausen is careful to qualify this Verschmelzung of divine and human elements by pointing out that a difference between the \( \tau \nu \epsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \ \theta \varepsilon \omicron \omicron \) and the human \( \nuos \) remains, for '...er [the 'godly Spirit'] kann nur betrübt...oder verscheucht werden, aber als das absolute Princip der Heiligkeit ist er selbst unbefleckbar'.

Rückert refutes Olshausen's suggestion that Paul implies a '...doppele Zeugniss unsers und des göttlichen Geistes....' and poses the question, 'wer soll gedacht werden als Empfänger des Zeugniss des eignen Geistes und des göttlichen?' If this had been Paul's thought, he would have written: \( \sigma \upsilon \mu \mu \mu \mu \tau \upsilon \rho \omicron \varepsilon \epsilon \iota \mu \nu \iota \nu \ \mu \epsilon \tau \alpha \ \tau \omicron \tau \omicron \ \tau \omicron \ \nu \omicron \nu \omicron \ \omicron \omicron \ \\
Rückert's solution is to translate and explain v.16a as follows: 'er

2. Rückert, 1839, p.430.
giesbt unserm Geiste Zeugniss, und nehme an dass der Ap. irgendet Etwas
in seinem Innern, was ihm das lebendige Bewusstseyn der Kindschaft
verlief, als das Zeugniss anerkannt habe, welches der Geist Gottes
seinem Geiste gebe von der Untrüglichkeit des Gefühls Gottes Kind zu
seyn'.

Here then complete confusion reigns, and we
must wait until our next section for a better reconstruction of the
problem. The reasons for this confusion are perhaps noteworthy.
Both Tholuck and Meyer feel it necessary to append to their exegeses
of v.16 lengthy articles explaining the history of difficulties
between Catholics, Protestants and 'Schwärmer' arising out of this
verse. Others who avoid the problem are nevertheless affected by
the same historical consciousness. Further, the Enlightenment had
given all of our exegetes a new vocabulary of anthropology with
which to recast Paul's own set of ideas; nowhere is this more true than
with the word spirit. The confusion we see amongst our exegetes at
v.16 simply reflects a disillusionment with orthodox and pietist concern
about certitude on one hand, and an attempt to bring Pauline language

1. Rückert, 1839, p.480: Rückert defines the ἐν κυρίῳ ἐν πνεύμαtos as 'unser Geist, die höhere oder
höchste Natur in uns'.

2. This is especially true of Tholuck, Klee and Meyer.
up to date (philosophically) on the other. Those who do not take \( \text{αὐτὸ ἐὰν Πνεῦμα} \) as Holy Spirit have a common thread running through them: a great deal of talk about a higher, godly principle coming to enlighten and enliven the human spirit or \( \text{νοῦς} \). This, of course, is directly connected with German idealism of the 19th century. We shall see where this speculation leads to in the next section.

We shall limit ourselves at v.17 to a brief review of the various explanations of \( \text{ἐἰτηρ̃} \) and the clause following.

Out of all our exegetes, only Flatt\(^1\) emphasizes the transitional function of \( \text{ἐἰτηρ̃} \). The tendency is rather to emphasize \( \text{συμπάσχομεν} \) as a condition of \( \text{συνδοξάσθωμεν} \).\(^2\) Many writers point out that Paul

1. Flatt, 1825, p.239.

2. Some of these exegetes take the \( \text{ἐι̂α} \) as indicating the goal (Zweck) of the clause immediately preceding; so Meyer, Fritzsche, and de Wette. Tholuck, however, says that it would be better, \( \text{ἐι̂α} \) von \( \text{συμπάσχομοι} \) \( \text{ὅ} \) τοῦ \( \text{Χριστοῦ} \) abhängig zu denken...so dass die Bedingung des Nachdrucks halber vorangeschoben ist\(^1\) (Tholuck, 1842, p.431). The aim of taking \( \text{ἐι̂α} \) following, as an indication of the goal of the preceding clause, however, has much the same purpose, i.e., so that \( \text{ἐἰτηρ̃} \) etc., be not understood as the condition under which believers will merit glorification.
was writing in a time when Christians underwent considerable hardships, and even persecutions, on account of their faith.\(^1\)

There are a number of attempts, however, to interpret Paul's words concerning suffering in such a way as to make them relevant for contemporary Christians:

\[
\text{Wie Christus nach Leiden und durch Leiden in die Herrlichkeit einging, so werden auch unsere, den sehnigen ßhnliche...Leiden zu derselben Zeite uns fûhren.}^2
\]

\text{Kûllner simply paraphrases, ‘gleich ihm Mûhen und Leiden um des Guten willen ertragen’.}^3 \text{ Maier similarly says, ‘es ist aber nicht der Gedanke des Ap., dass der Christ nothwendig leiden müsse, um die himmlische Herrlichkeit zu erlangen, sondern dies wird zur Bedingung gesetzt, dass er die Leiden, wenn sie ihn treffen, mit einer Gesinnung und Geistesverfassung ertrage, welche derjenigen ßhnlich ist, mit welcher Christus die sehnigen erduldete’.}^4

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1. Tholuck, 1842, pp.430f; Rückert, 1839, p.431, Maier, 1847, p.276; Meyer, 1872, p.369.

2. Reiche, 1834, pp.182, 183.


Others take a more thoughtful approach.

Rückert, for example, feels that Paul does not mean 'mit gleicher Geduld oder überhaupt Gesinnung', but rather simply 'zugleich, in Gemeinschaft mit ihm leiden'. The condition of suffering with Christ must be taken seriously, even though 'liegt hierin, von unserm Standpunkte aus, etwas unrichtiges'; Paul's hard saying here can be explained by three facts:

...erstlich aus dem Zeitumständen, welche Leiden und Trübsal zur fast unvermeidlichen Begleiterin des Christenthums machten, so dass es leicht scheinen konnte, als ob es Bedingung der Theilnahme an Christo wäre; zweitens aus seiner [i.e., Paul's] Bereitwilligkeit Alles, auch das grösste Ungemach, um Christi willen zu erdulden; und drittens aus seinem brünstigen Verlangen, seinem Herrn in allen Dingen, so viel nur möglich, gleich zu werden, was ihm unmöglich scheinen mochte, wenn er nicht auch litte was Er gelitten hatte.

Thus the whole problem of interpreting the conditional sentence for contemporary Christians is obviated by placing it in its historical perspective.

1. Rückert, 1839, p.431.

2. Rückert, 1839, p.431.
Olshausen suggests what is perhaps the most destructive explanation. The suffering which precedes the glory is the struggle of the believer with sin within himself and in the Word, through which alone the new man grows to maturity.\textsuperscript{1} This particular interpretation is denied by Meyer, who points out that Olshausen has imported an element which is foreign, for \textsuperscript{1} Olshausen, 1835, p.391.

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{1}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{2}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{3}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{1}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{2}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{3}} \]

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{1}}\] Olshausen, 1835, p.391.
\[ \text{\textsuperscript{2}}\] Meyer, 1881, p.68.
\[ \text{\textsuperscript{3}}\] Meyer, 1881, p.68.

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{1}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{2}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{3}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{1}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{2}} \] \[ \text{\textsuperscript{3}} \]
Thus Meyer can afford to take the suffering spoken of quite literally; to suffer with Christ means that '...er hat thatsächlichen Antheil an dem von Christo geduldeten Leiden (I Peter 4, 13), trinkt denselben Kelch, welchen Er trank (Matth. 20, 22f.)'.

While Paul does understand this fellowship of suffering as a presupposition to the glory, it is not understood as *meritum* or *pretium vitae aeternae*, but as Melanchthon said, *obedientia propter ordinem a Deo sanctum*.

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Continental Exegesis, 1850-1918.

As one moves forward into the second half of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century, it becomes increasingly difficult to classify exegetes and their work into meaningful or even convincing categories. Rather than attempting such an arbitrary task, the following survey simply groups twelve different commentaries written by German, Swiss, and French exegetes. Taken separately, virtually every commentary represents a cross-section of some theological group or mood of the times. There is, for example, W.F. Besser (1816-1884), the conservative, almost reactionary Lutheran Biblical theologian, whose commentary for laymen could well have been written in the 16th century. ¹ There are Bernhard Weiss (1827-1918), ² and Theodor Zahn


(1838-1933), who carry on the tradition of dispassionate, critical and yet theologically conservative scholarship. There is the towering figure of Heinrich Georg August Ewald (1803-1875), Göttingen's brilliant Orientalist, pausing, as it were, to turn his attention for a few moments to Paul's Epistles. Here, too, are to be found men no longer well-known but whose names at one time were synonymous with important theological schools - men such as Johann Tobias Beck (1804-1878, 'Wittenberg Biblicism')


4. Cited previously; 'Hofmann, 1868'.]
the Erlanger Schule; and his theological enemy and representative of Repristinationstheologie, Friedrich Adolph Philippi (1809-1882), a converted Jew.

Biblical exegesis among Roman Catholic theologians throughout the period in question was steadily moving toward a full and official acceptance of all the critical tools and methods. The commentary written by M. - J. Lagrange (1855-1938), which was published within a year of our terminus date, is almost indistinguishable either in method or conclusions from Protestant commentaries of the same time. Lagrange's work as an exegete, in fact, is a significant benchmark in Catholic Biblical studies, and it is further symbolic that he was appointed, in 1902, to be a member of the Biblical Commission by Pope Leo XIII. Lagrange's commentary stands in distinct contrast to that of August Bispeng, a

1. Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Römer, Frankfurt, 3rd ed., 1866. Cited below as 'Philippi, 1866'.

2. Saint Paul Epître aux Romains, Paris, 1950. Cited below as 'Lagrange, 1950'. (The first edition of this commentary was 1916, unfortunately, this edition has not been available to the writer).


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617.
Roman Catholic exegete writing only a few decades earlier.¹

Other Continental exegetes of this period also to be considered are Frederic Louis Godet (1812-1900),² Richard Adelbert Lipsius (1830-1892),³ and Ernst Kühl (1861- ).⁴

In a final section subsequent to this one, consideration will be given to eight commentaries written by nine British theologians of approximately the same period.

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1. It is interesting that in the bibliography to his commentary on Romans (Der Brief an die Römer, in Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, Göttingen, 12th ed., 1963, p.XI), Otto Michel lists Bisping's commentary under Katholisch Kommentare, but Lagrange's commentary under Fremdsprachige Kommentare.

2. Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, II, A. Cusin, trans., VI in Clark's Foreign Theological Library, Edinburgh 1889. Cited below as 'Godet, 1889'. The first (French) edition (Commentaire sur l'Épitre aux Romains, Paris, 1879) has not been available to the writer.


4. Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer, Leipzig, 1st ed., 1913, Cited below as 'Kühl, 1913'.
The function which Paul intends the \( \alpha' \nu \rho \omicron \omicron \nu \) to perform continues to be a major issue in this period, especially so with the more detailed and critical exegetes:

Ewald's comments on the individual verses of our passage are extremely brief, but his attempt to sketch carefully the structure of vv.12ff is extremely valuable. He thinks he sees a structure in chapters 7 and 8 similar to that in chapter 6; in the latter, Paul proposes an objection (Einwand) and, after that objection is fully faced and answered, gives a corresponding exhortation (entsprechenden Ermahnung). This can best be seen in the two earlier cases of 6:12 and 19. Thus v.12 is the exhortation which corresponds to the objection raised and answered in 7:7-8:11.

There is, however, a difference in the material of vv.12ff:

\[ \ldots \text{weil wo alles bisher als das rechte beschriebene lebendig entriﬀt, da auch die göttliche verherrlichung als der lohn der gerechtigkeit nicht fehlt, so wendet sich die betrachtung bald allein diesem ihrem letzten \textcolor{red}{[sic]} gegenstande und damit der ewigen verklärrten hoffnung zu, um hier als am rechten orte auch dieses glied der ganzen grossen wahrheit in seinem lichten lichte leuchten zu lassen. Und diese wendung der rede vollzieht sich alsbald in den kürzesten aber drängendsten gedanken v.13-17.} \]

Besser simply takes a devotional line:

Brüder redet der Apostel die an, zu welchen er sich versieht, dass Gottes Geist in ihnen wohne, und indem er wir schreibt, stellt er sich selber mit ihnen in dieselbe Schuldnerschaft.¹

Philippi observes that the ἅπα συν. indicates that the material of v.12 'folgert aus v.1-11'. That is, 'Da also das Πνεύμα uns die ζωή bringt, so sind wir verpflichtet, nicht nach dem Fleische, sondern nach dem Geiste zu leben'.² This is in essential agreement with Lipsius, who feels that v.12 is not the beginning of a new section, but rather that vv.12ff contain the end result (das Endergebniss) of the preceding discussion. He further points out that the reason for Paul's conclusion in v.12 is that 'der Geist Gottes in uns wohnt und uns unsere künftige Auferstehung verbürgt'.³ Thus the ἅπα συν. reaches back essentially to vv.10-11 where Paul is speaking about both this present life in the Spirit and the future Resurrection. Those in agreement with Lipsius are Zahn,⁴ Weiss,⁵ and Bisping.⁶

². Philippi, 1866, p.337. ⁶. Bisping, 1870, p.244.
Not all, however, accept this reconstruction. Hofmann, for example, makes a definite division between vv.10-11 of chapter 8: from chapter 7:25-8:10 Paul 'die Freiheit von Sünde und Tod beschrieben hat, welche mit dem Geiste, der in Christo Jesu leben macht, gegeben ist und die Gegenwart des Christen bildet...', but in v.11 he moves on to speak about the bodily resurrection of Christians. Thus, the conclusion (i.e., ἐπίκαιρον, v.12) which he makes is not drawn out of vv.10-11, vv.6-11, or vv.1-11, but simply 'aus dem auf die Zukunft bezüglichen Sätze gezogen sein, mit dem er in einen neuen Gedankenzusammenhang eingetreten ist'. This rather distinctive viewpoint has a number of ramifications for the interpretation of the entire passage which follows. The first of these is that v.12 is not an exhortation but '...Ausdruck eines Sachverhalts, dessen Verkennung den Christen um die eben bennante Zukunft brächte'.

Taking precisely the opposite view is Beck, who takes the ἐπίκαιρον as growing out of v.10 in order to stress the ethical consequences of what is said there. Similar is Godet,

4. Beck, 1884, p.67: 'Hier leitet der Apostel aus v.10 die ethische Folgerung oder das Pflichtverhältniss ab'.
who paraphrases the reference contained in the \textit{άπα ποιεῖται} as follows: 'Since the Spirit has set you free from the law of sin and death, do not replace yourselves under curse'.

Kühl, while accepting vv.12 and 13 as being basically an exhortation, sees them as a proper conclusion to v.2:

Daher kommen v.12,13 in erster Linie als Abschluss der Hauptausführung des vorigen Abschnittes zu stehen, die dem Beweis der ebenfalls wesentlich negative gehaltenen These aus v.12 galten.

Perhaps the most interesting suggestion, which is remarkably like that of Ewald, is made by Lagrange, who sees v.12 as the culmination of Paul's answer to the objections raised in 6:1 and 15. Thus, v.12a is to be taken in a decidedly negative assertion:

Ces versets sont le corollaire de tout ce qui précède, depuis le ch.VI, et résolvent définitivement les objections de VI, 1,15. C'est même probablement pour cela que la tournure du v.12 est négative: non, nous ne devons pas servir la chair.

1. Godet, 1889, p.78.
Lipsius also makes reference to the relationship of vv.12ff and chapter 6, pointing out that 'Hiermit ist die Einwendung der Gegner 6 1,15 nach allen Seiten hin widerlegt'.

While disagreeing rather considerably about the details, the majority of these exegetes suggest that something must be added to v.12 in order to complete Paul's thought. Basically, there are two views, depending, in part, upon punctuation: (a) the emphasis lies in the negated thought (e.g., Ewald, 'Also denn, brüder, sind wir schuldner nicht dem fleische....'); or (b) the emphasis is upon the unspoken but implied positive indebtedness (e.g., Besser, after Luther, 'So sind wir nun, lieben Brüder, Schuldner, nicht dem Fleisch, dass wir nach dem Fleisch leben').

Those who take the first view are Hofmann, Bispling, and Lagrange.

Those who take the second are Philipp, Beck, Lipsius, Godet.

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Weiss,\(^1\) and Zahn.\(^2\) But most of these do agree that something like 

\(\text{ἀδέλλα τῷ πνεύματι} \) must be added to v.12 in order to complete Paul's thought.

There is a minor difference of opinion as to the nature of the unarticulated obligation to the Spirit in v.12. As we have seen, Beck and Godet stress the ethical obligation. Weiss, who thinks that the obligation is only indirectly owed to 'dem neuen Prinzip des \(πνεύμα\),\(^3\) thinks that the obligation is one of thanksgiving ('\(\text{wir...zu Dank verpflichtet sind}\)' ).\(^4\) Lipsius specifically denies this, saying the obligation is one of service (\(\text{Dienst}\)).\(^5\) Zahn hesitates, saying it is an obligation of Thanksgiving or, perhaps better, of service.\(^6\) Philippi solves the problem by suggesting the addition of the whole clause:

\(\text{ἀδέλλα τῷ πνεύματι, τοῦ κατὰ πνεύμα}\) \(\text{πρὸ}\) \(\text{v}.\)

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7. Philippi, 1866, p.338.
A more serious grammatical problem is raised by the articular infinitive (τοῦ ... Ἰηνύ); if one takes the construction τοῦ ... Ἰηνύ closely with the phrase immediately preceding οὐ ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ (as opposed to taking it closely with ὑπελατταὶ ἐσμέν), is the articular infinitive to be understood as epexegetical, consecutive or final? Only a few of our exegetes attempt this question. Philippi's definition of the problem is perhaps the most interesting: If it is taken as final (Genitiv der Absicht), the best translation of v.12 would be 'Wir sind Schuldner, nicht dem Fleische damit wir nach dem Fleische leben'.¹ The verse would then be taken to mean, 'stünden wir in einem Schuldverhältnisse zum Fleische, so wurde die Absicht dieses Verhältnisses sein, uns zum leben nach dem Fleische zu bewegen'.² But if the articular infinitive is taken as being consecutive (Genitiv des Erfolges), the best translation would be, 'Wir sind Schuldner, nicht dem Fleische, so dass wir nach dem Fleische leben', and the meaning would be, 'stünden wir in einem Schuldverhältnisse zum Fleische, so würde die Folge davon sein, dass wir nach dem Fleische lebten'.³

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¹ Philippi, 1866, p.338. ² Philippi, 1866, p.338. ³ Philippi, 1866, p.338.
Philippi also alludes to another view (put forward by Fritzscbe) which makes the phrase τοῦ κατὰ σάρκα Ἰνὲν dependent upon ὁφειλέται, as in the formula ὁφειλέτης εἰμί τοις τενοῖς. This would necessitate translating v.12 very awkwardly, e.g., 'Wir sind dem Fleische das nach dem Fleische Leben schuldig'.

This is precisely the view taken by Lagrange, who translates v.12, 'Ainsi donc, mes frères, nous ne sommes point redevables à la chair de vivre selon la chair', and comments, 'Dans τοῦ, le gén. n'indique pas la finalité; il dépend de ὁφειλέτης et marque ce à quoi l'on n'est pas obligé, c'est-à-dire de vivre au goût de la chair'. Similarly, Bisping, quoting Matt.18:24, where the amount of the debt is given in the genitive (... ὁφειλέτης μηρίων ταλαντῶν) makes the entire genitive construction dependent upon ὁφειλέται. This latter view may be loosely described as understanding an epexegetical use of τοῦ ...

Hofmann's reconstruction and exegesis of the grammar and meaning of v.12 is by far the most complicated. In his view,

1. Philippi, 1866, p.338. Fritzscbe's translation is: 'Sumus debitores non carni obligati, nempe debitores vitae ex carnis cupiditatibus instituendae'.


3. Bisping, 1870, p.244.
Paul has set out in v.12 to say that because the possession of the Spirit, on account of which (v.11, Ἰκα' with the accusative, τὸ εὐνόικον αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς) Jesus was raised from the dead and on account of which event we are placed in prospect of a future vivification (zukünftige Verlebendigung) even of the body, so the obligation of the Christian is of such a kind that he can do no less than make it the duty of his flesh to do his will. This obligation Paul expresses only by way of negation. This is not because he has suppressed something (the opposite to this negation) in the lively progress of his discourse; rather, Paul intentionally limits himself to the purpose of excluding the erroneous impression of natural men under which one considers himself to be indebted to that which serves his earthly well-being.\(^1\) In order to negate this delusion he joins ὀφείλεται εἰς μένει first with τὴν σαρκί and then with τὸν καὶ σ. Ἴνε. This must be the proper way to construe the sentence, since the genitive (τὸν ... ἵνε) is not an 'abhängigiger Folgesatz', dependent upon ὀφείλεται εἰς μένει τ.σαρκί, since the genitival infinitive clause expresses the objective (Zweck). However, it is also not simply a purpose clause (Zwecksatz) since 'to

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live according to the flesh' cannot be thought of as the objective in relation to the obligation toward the flesh, but rather only as the content (Inhalt) of such an obligation. Finally, this clause is not a 'Genitivus der Sache' (as Fritzsche, for example, suggested) by which that which one owes to the flesh is expressed.¹ The proper meaning of v.12 is, then, according to Hofmann as follows:

Zweifach, mit τῶν κατὰ σάρκα, einerseits, mit τοῦ κατὰ σάρκα, anderseits, bennent der Apostel die Verbindlichkeit, von der er sagt, dass sie die des Christen nicht sei, erstens als Verpflichtung gegen das Fleisch, dass man thun müsste, was ihm taugt, und zweitens als Verpflichtung zu einem Leben, welches im Sinne des Fleisches seines Namens werth ist. Da beide Benennungen wesentlich das Gleiche besagen, so kann der Apostel im Anschlusse an die letztere allein fortfahren, εἰ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ζῆνε...²

The major significance of this interpretation is that Hofmann recognised the possibility of interpreting the articular infinitive in a non-telic way, that is, as simply epexegetical. He is the only commentator in the 19th century to do so.

Weiss, on the other hand, in agreement with Meyer does take the articular infinitive as telic, that is τοῦ κατὰ σάρκα ζῆνε... 'bezeichnet den Zweck, welchen ein solches

¹. Hofmann, 1868, p.323.
². Hofmann, 1868, p.323.
Schuldverhältniss zum Fleische hätte, wenn dieses Verhältniss überhaupt statt fände'.

It is clear that he is reading the genitive construction as final (i.e., as Genitiv der Absicht).

It is perhaps worth pausing here to note two significant developments in the interpretation of v.12. The first is best reflected in the sentence, quoted above, from Weiss. He is above all anxious to make it crystal clear that in his view Paul's reference to an obligation is strictly rhetorical: this is what the obligation of relationship would be like, suggests Weiss, if indeed there ever had been such an historical reality, which, of course, is not the case. Traditional Western exegesis demands that the interpreter find in v.12 a reference to the doctrine of original sin, a demand which even the reformers accepted. But the results of critical exegesis demanded a denial of such a reference. It was only a comparatively conservative exegete such as Bispìng who at v.12 could say:

In der Wiedergeburt stirbt mit Christo die θαψε, die böse Begierlichkeit, wenigstens hört ihre Herrschaft auf, indem der Wille des Menschen durch den h. Geist

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The second development is more obvious, and is in fact the cause of the first: an overwhelming concern with grammatical detail as a means of determining as precisely as possible the original meaning of Paul's sentences. Ironically, it is the very freight of detail itself which at times almost obscures the text, a realization which first comes in the 20th century, after the publication of Karl Barth's Der Römerbrief in 1919.

In considering the various commentators' exegeses of v.13, we shall limit ourselves to the second part of the verse. Here there are at least four issues at stake: (a) what does Paul mean

when he suggests that the deeds of the body ought to be put to
death; (b) assuming that \textit{tou \textsc{su}mato\textsc{t}} (and not \textit{\textsc{tis} \textsc{kapko\textsc{s}}}) is accepted as the correct reading, how is this to be defined; (c) how is \textit{\textsc{pi}ve\textsc{im}m\textsc{a}t\textsc{a}} to be defined; and (d) to what is Paul referring in the promise \textit{\textsc{l\textsc{h}osee\textsc{t}}} ?

A further underlying question is the question of the condition (\textit{\textsc{el}}): does Paul conceive of it as fulfilled or unfulfilled and if the latter, does he consider the fulfilment of the condition a self-limiting condition placed upon the promise \textit{\textsc{l\textsc{h}osee\textsc{t}}} ? Of these questions, our exegetes, in the main, find two the most problematic: Paul's reason for using the word \textit{\textsc{su}m\textsc{a}} rather than \textit{\textsc{rap}\textsc{e}}, \textsuperscript{1} and the definition of \textit{\textsc{pi}ve\textsc{im}m\textsc{a}t\textsc{a}}. Our analysis will concentrate on these two questions.

Philippi is the earliest of our exegetes to comment critically on these problems. With regard to the \textit{\textsc{pi}ve\textsc{im}m\textsc{a}t\textsc{a}}, Philippi notes that 'Man kann hier \textit{\textsc{pi}ve\textsc{im}m\textsc{a}t\textsc{a}} auf den

\textsuperscript{1} Two exegetes, Besser and Bisping, can be eliminated from our discussion. Besser's exegesis is not technical, but it is clear that he reads \textit{\textsc{tis} \textsc{kapko\textsc{s}}} not \textit{\textsc{tou \textsc{su}mato\textsc{t}}}, and understands 'Holy Spirit' for \textit{\textsc{pi}ve\textsc{im}m\textsc{a}t\textsc{a}}. Bisping says that \textit{\textsc{pra}\textsc{e}\textsc{e}\textsc{i}s} \textit{\textsc{tou \textsc{su}mato\textsc{t}}} equals exactly \textit{\textsc{pra}\textsc{e}\textsc{e}\textsc{i}s \textsc{tis} \textsc{kapko\textsc{s}}} and defines the \textit{\textsc{pi}ve\textsc{im}m\textsc{a}t\textsc{a}} as 'der mit dem Geiste Gottes erfüllte Menschengeist'. 1870, p.244.
objektiven Gottesgeist beziehen, und instrumental fassen'.

If this meaning of τυγματε is accepted, then it is through the indwelling Spirit spoken of in v.11 that believers put the flesh to death. This is not, however, the interpretation Philippi prefers, for

Doch ist es wohl der Schriftanschauung gemäß, dass der Geist sich des Menschen, nicht aber, dass der Mensch sich des Geistes als des Werkzeuges oder Organes seiner Thätigkeit bedient.

Because of this, says Philippi, the meaning of τυγματε must be the same as that set out in vv.4,5,6,10. At v.4 Philippi had set out his basis for interpreting the various occurrences of τυγμα. There he remarked that,

Ursprünglich ist τó τυγμα der objektiv wirkliche, heilige Geist, der selbständige Gottesgeist, hingegen τυγμα ohne Artikel der Geist als ein dem Menschen enwohnendes, innerlich wirksames Princip, als subjektives Besitzthum.

However, the presence or absence of the article is no real formula, reported Philippi; since this τυγμα α'γκου came to be

regarded as almost a proper name, it can be taken to mean the 'objektiv selbstständige Gottesgeist' even when the article is lacking. On the other hand, it is also important to note that there is no good reason why, in certain connections, \( \Pi\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\) with the definite article could not be taken in the subjective sense:

So wird also doch die Entscheidung, ob im einzelnen Falle die objektive oder subjektive Bedeutung herrsche, nicht aus der Setzung oder Weglassung des Artikels mit Sicherheit gewonnen werden können.1

Thus, the \( \Pi\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron \) in v.13 is to be understood as 'die subjektive, pneumatische Geistesbeschaffenheit des Wiedergeborenen',2 and the dative is not to be interpreted so much 'durch den Geist' as 'im Geiste' in analogy to the thought \( \Pi\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\zeta\omicron\tau\omicron\pi\omicron\tau\omicron\tau\alpha\omicron\epsilon\omicron\nu \), \( \sigma\tau\omicron\chi\epsilon\omicron\nu \) in Gal.5:16,25. Further, the fact that the \( \Pi\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\zeta\omicron\tau\omicron\pi\omicron\tau\omicron\tau\alpha\omicron\epsilon\omicron\nu \) of v.13 poses no real problem to this interpretation, for '...der Mensch ist eben

1. Philippi, 1866, p.327.
selber Πνεῦμα oder ἐν Πνεύματι

insofern er vom Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ bewohnt und
getrieben wird'. 1 Finally, the fact that Paul puts Πνεῦμα
in contrast to Σῶμα in v.13, while referring only to
Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ in v.14, also supports the above
interpretation.

Philippi approaches the problem of the reading

Τοῦ Σώματος (which he accepts) through the word

Πραξεῖς : the latter are not identical with ἔργα

which are simply Handlungen or Thaten. Rather, Πραξεῖς

is either Betragen, Verhalten (Matt.16:27) or Geschäft, Verrichtung

(Rom.12:4) or sensu malo, 'ein improbum facinus, eine machinatio'

(Luke 23:51). 2 In the latter use especially the plural is customary

(see Acts 19:18), just as it is here and in the parallel passage in

Col.3:9 ('...seeing that you have put off the old nature with its

practices Πραξεῖς Σώματος'). Thus the meaning of

Πραξεῖς Τοῦ Σώματος is 'die sündlichen Bestrebungen' of

οἱ ῥήξ or the old nature (Παλαιὸς ἀνθρώπως).

Only these, not the ἔργα , can be put to death. Hereby,
says Philippi, is also confirmed our interpretation of the word

Σῶμα in this verse, for,

Here then is stated in considerable detail one major view shared by 19th-century exegetes: ἐνέργεια τοῦ σώματος refers to the sinful machinations of the 'old nature', but Paul uses the word ὁμόνοια for the purpose of contrasting the two opposing parts of Christian man. Philippi does admit another possible interpretation of ὁμόνοια ("das vollziehende Organ der Sünde") but totally rejects the traditional view, that the aspirations (Bestrebungen) of sin find their derivation in the body. The general rejection of this traditional view by 19th-century exegetes is yet another significant development in the history of the interpretation of our passage.

Hofmann opposes Philippi on virtually every point: the word ἐνέργεια does not in itself connote 'Uebelthathen oder Streiche oder Ränke';² rather it is a completely neutral word which can only be given this negative meaning when the context demands it;

1. Philippi, 1866, p.340. (Emphasis is ours).
here the context does not demand it. Further, "...müsst des Leibes eigene Thätigkeiten gemeint sein und nicht solche, deren Organ er nur ist, was er ja auch für das Gute wäre, das er Mensch thut". Why then does Paul use Σῶμα? "...weil es sich darum handelt, dass der Mensch gegen diese Seite seines Wesenbestandes hart sein muss, wenn er einst in einem Leben stehen will, in welchem er denselben Leib, der jetzt ein Leib des Todes ist, als einen wahrhaft lebendigen besitzt". Finally, Πνεύμα does not refer to 'his' spirit, but to spirit as used in the phrase Εστή εν Πνεύματι.

Beck takes up the other view alluded to by Philippi: while Σῶμα is not simply a substitution for Πνεύμα, the πραξίς of the Σῶμα are thought to be under the influence of Πνεύμα. In short, Σῶμα 'ist eben der Leib als Glieder-Gefüge'.

Godet, also a conservative exegete, accepts a view rejected by Philippi: the genitive (τοῦ Σώματος)

is not that of the instrument but of the author.\textsuperscript{1} The \textit{τήνομα} in \textsection{13} Godet takes simply as the Holy Spirit.

Lipsius takes a similar view in that \textit{τὰς πράξεις} etc. are 'die natürlichen Lebenshüsserungen dieses irdischen \textit{σώμα} \textsuperscript{2} Thus \textit{πράξεις} is not understood in a pejorative sense, and \textit{σώμα} is interpreted as the instrument of sin:

\begin{quote}
Unter dem \textit{σώμα} ist das \textit{σώμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας} (6,6), das von der \textit{ἀμαρτία} beherrschte \textit{σώμα} gemeint, welches in den Gläubigen ja principiell bereits todt ist (8,10). Mit seinen Gliedmaassen ist dieses \textit{σώμα} das Werkzeug, durch welches die sündigen Handlungen vollbracht werden.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Godet, 1889, p.79. To this construction, Godet adds the following comment: 'The acts of which the body is the simple instrument are not its own. Paul would suppress those of which it is the independent author, and wherein, consequently, it withdraws from the dominion of the Spirit. These should come to an end, because in the Christian the Spirit should direct and penetrate all, even his eating and drinking, according to the example quoted by the apostle, I Cor. X.31. In all these acts of life the body should not guide, but be guided'.
\item Lipsius, 1891, p.136.
\item Lipsius, 1891, p.136.
\end{enumerate}
Weiss is in essential agreement with Lipsius; it would be difficult to find any reason for interpreting \( \tau \alpha \varsigma \pi \rho \alpha \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) in other than the normal sense of *Handlungsweisen des Leibes*. The reason for Paul's using the expression \( \tau \omicron \upiota \omega \delta \mu \mu \alpha \tau \varsigma \) is that '...wenn der Leib sich von der Herrschaft des Geistes emanzipirt..., er nur solche Aktionen ausübt, zu welchen die im Fleische wohnende Sünde ihn veranlasst, und dadurch eben dem Tode verfällt, von dem er nach v.,ll errettet werden konnte'. The body is precisely that part of man in which sin repeatedly attempts to establish its mastery. In contrast to many other critical exegetes, Weiss interprets \( \tau \nu \varepsilon \sigma \mu \alpha \tau \varsigma \) as 'vermöge des heiligen Geistes'.

Zahn's interpretation of v.13b bears a marked resemblance to that of Lipsius and Weiss; the \( \tau \nu \varepsilon \sigma \mu \alpha \tau \varsigma \) referred to is the spirit of Christ, and \( \tau \alpha \varsigma \pi \rho \alpha \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) 2. \( \tau \omicron \upiota \omega \delta \mu \mu \alpha \tau \varsigma \).

is the earthly body and its deeds, but more specifically the 'body of sin' (Sündenleib) and its members (Romans 7:5,23). The Wollen und Handeln of the Sündenleib can be made ineffective. The involuntary acts of the body (breathing, the circulation of the blood, etc.) are certainly not meant here but rather the voluntary functions such as eating and sleeping. In the latter functions, a choice can be made, e.g., between speech and silence, sleep and activity, etc.¹

Kühl, on the other hand, observes that προεξεις τοῦ σώματος is essentially parallel with κατὰ σάρκα (v.12) and does not therefore develop any particular view of the use of σῶμα.² He is, however, one of the few to pose the question, 'Does the certainty of our participation in "life" and salvation finally depend upon our own decisions of the will and ethical uprightness?' He feels that the answer is to be found in the proper understanding of

Τρείματε:

Schon durch Τρείματε, das hier sicher nicht auf unser eigenes religiöses Innerleben, sondern auf den objektiven, in uns wirkenden Gottesgeist zu beziehen ist, deutet der Apostel an, das wir nicht auf uns selbst gestellt sind.³

Lagrange's comment is briefest of all: the πνεῦμα of v.13 is not the Holy Spirit but un principe de vie spirituelle. The meaning of the dative is εὐ πνεὐματι, i.e., 'dans l'esprit que vous avez reçu'. The word πρὸς Εἴης (in agreement with Philippi) is, as in Luke 23:51, to be taken in a pejorative sense, 'intrigues, menées'.¹ His interpretation of Σῶμα is essentially that of Lipsius and Zahn:

La loi du péché qui était dans les membres est vaincue; mais il reste des dispositions corporelles inquiétantes qu'il faut mettre à mort.²

Apart from a minor textual problem concerning the correct word order at the end of the verse (concerning which there is no general agreement),³ and in light of the fact that the majority

3. Only a few writers directly approach this textual problem: Hofmann (1868, p.325) thinks that the reading of Codex Sinaiticus (υἱὸὶ Ἑλὸς Ἕλαπ τῆς σαρκὸς) is the original. Philippi (1866, p.343) and Lipsius (1891, p.136) prefer the word order of BFG - υἱὸὶ Ἕλαπ τῆς σαρκὸς. Weiss (1899, p.354) agrees, as do Zahn (1910, p.393) and Lagrange (1950, p.201). Some of these exegetes take the word order to be highly significant. Lagrange, for example, feels that the order υἱὸὶ Ἕλαπ τῆς σαρκὸς is more meaningful because it brings into prominence the word Ἕλαπ, thus the meaning is 'ceux-là sont vraiment fils de Dieu', instead of simply, 'ceux-là sont fils de Dieu'. Similarly,
of exegetes that \( \text{πνεύμα Θεού} \) refers to the objective 'göttliche Geist' or Holy Spirit,\(^1\) the two major issues to which our exegetes address themselves at v.14 are (a) the precise relationship between the two parts of the verse and (b) whether the verb (\( \text{ἀγωνάω} \)) ought to be taken in the strictly passive sense ('are led') or the slightly modified passive sense of 'let themselves be led'. (Some even go to the extent of referring to the latter as the middle).

footnote (1) from previous page:

... Zahn feels that this word order brings out the emphasis, 'nicht weniger, nichts geringeres als Söhne Gottes sind diese'. Lipsius simply says that the emphasis is put upon \( \text{υκλικό} \) by such a word order. Weiss's comment begins with the same observation, but he goes on to make a more theological point: 'Durch die gesperrte Stellung empfängt \( \text{υκλικό} \) den vollen Ton, und dieser Ausdruck ist gewählt, um die spezifische Stellung der Söhne zum Vater, wonach sie der Liebe desselben und der endlich Theilnahme an all seinen Göttern gewiss sind, auszudrücken (vgl. zu 4,11)'.

Hofmann, who by accepting the reading \( \text{υκλικό Θεού εἰς κ' } \) is the odd man out, justifies his decision by observing that in neither part of v.14 does the emphasis fall upon \( \text{Θεού } \); rather in v.14a the emphasis is on \( \text{Πνεύματι } \) and in v.14b on \( \text{υκλικό } \). Beck (1884, p.68) reads \( \text{εἰς κ' Θεού } \) but does not give his reasons for doing so.

1. Virtually every exegete agrees with Lagrange, 1950, p.201: 'En qualifiant \( \text{Πνεύματι par Θεού } \), Paul ne laisse aucun doute sur la nature de l'Esprit; c'est l'Esprit de Dieu'.
The problem of the relationship between the two parts of v.14 is resolved in the commentaries under question into two issues: the first is the proper translation and emphasis of the correlative (οὐ τοῦ) and the demonstrative (ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ) pronominal adjectives; the second is whether v.14a is the proof, condition, or simply evidence of v.14b. We shall take the two in order.¹

A number of exegetes attempt to translate οὖ τοῦ in such a way as to make the entire statement in v.14b exclusive and thus dependent upon v.14a. Examples of this are as follows: Bisping, 'Denn Alle, welche von Geiste Gottes getrieben werden..., diese (und nur diese) sind Söhne Gottes'.² Besser: 'denn so viele der Geist Gottes triebt, die - und die allein sind Gottes Kinder'.³ Philipp: 'diese und keine Anderen'.⁴ Beck: 'Das εἰσίν ὦ λóλ Θεός setzt das αὐτός τοῦ θεοῦ voraus....'⁵ Lipsius:

¹. Not all of the commentaries are technical enough to supply an answer to these questions.

². Bisping, 1870, p.245.

³. Besser, 1861, p.598.

⁴. Philipp, 1866, p.341.

⁵. Beck, 1884, p.68.
'οὐτὸλ ... οὐτὸλ so viele...diese alle, aber auch nur diese'.

1. Weiss: 'Das οὐτὸλ hebt mit Nachdruck hervor, dass sie alle, aber auch keine Anderen....'

2. Zahn: 'Während durch οὐτὸλ jede Ausnahme ausgeschlossen wird, ergibt die nachdrückliche Hervorhebung des Subjects beider Sätze durch οὐτὸλ den Gedanken, dass nur von den um Vordersatz charakterisierten Christen die Aussage des Nachsatzes gilt'.

3. Lagrange: 'οὐτὸλ ... οὐτὸλ tous ceux-là, mais ceux-là seulement'.

Three exegetes disagree; Hofmann feels that the emphasis ought not be put upon οὐτὸλ so that it be read 'sie und keine Anderen'.

5. Godet rejects the exclusive sense 'they only', as does Kühl, who would paraphrase 'alle ohne Ausnahme, die

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5. Hofmann, 1868, p.325.
von Geiste Gottes getrieben werden'. Hofmann and Godet both explain why they reject the 'exclusive' interpretation of \( \textit{\text{O\text{\textregistered}T\text{\textregistered}L}} \).

Hofmann's reason is that '...der folgende Satz (l.e., v.14b) bestätigt nicht, dass man sich vom Geiste Gottes müsse treiben lassen, um Gottes Sohn zu sein, sondern dass der sich wirklich im Stande der Gottessohn befinde, dem Gottes Geist die sein Verhalten bestimmende Macht ist'.

Godet simply observes that Paul is no longer warning his readers, but is now proving the statement, 'ye shall live' (\( \textit{\text{N\text{\textregistered}E\text{\textregistered}E}} \), v.13). Thus, among those who reject a restrictive interpretation of \( \textit{\text{O\text{\textregistered}T\text{\textregistered}L}} \), there is no one generally agreed reason for doing so.

This, however, is also true of those who take \( \textit{\text{O\text{\textregistered}T\text{\textregistered}L}} \) as dependent upon some earlier condition implied in v.14a. What then is this principle of inclusion and exclusion? Besser links v.14a with 13b, i.e., 'Zum Tödten der Fleischgeschäfte, wovon der Apostel insonderheit geredet hat, treibt uns der Geist als Geist des Glaubens und der Liebe zumal'. Thus it is those who put to

3. Godet, 1889, pp.80f. The suggestion that Paul is giving content to his promise \( \textit{\text{N\text{\textregistered}E\text{\textregistered}E}} \) (v.13) in v.14 is also made by Philipp, 1866, p.340; Beck, 1884, p.68, Lipsius, 1891,p.136, and Weiss, 1899, p.353.
death the deeds of the flesh (and who do so by the Trieb des Geistes) to whom Paul refers in an exclusive sense in v.14b. This explanation, so reminiscent of Augustine's use of vv.13 and 14 in the anti-Pelagian writings, is essentially accepted by Philippi, Weiss, Zahn, and Lagrange.

It is in regard to our second question (above) that a number of our exegetes compare Paul's statement in v.14 with that of Galatians 4:6:

"ΟΙΛΙ ΜΕ ΕΓΝΕΤΕ ΥΙΟΙ, ΕΞΑΠΤΟΤΕΙΛΕΝ ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ΤΟ ΠΝΕΥΜΑ ΤΟΥ ΥΙΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΤΑΣ ΚΑΡΦΙΑΣ ΗΜῶΝ...."

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1. Besser, 1861, pp.598-599.
2. Philippi, 1866, pp.340f.
6. This verse in itself raises the issue: does Paul mean that the giving of the Spirit makes them sons or that the Spirit is given at some subsequent point to those who have been made sons? Those in favor of the latter view are Weiss, 1899, p.353; Godet, 1889, p.80; Lipsius, 1891, p.136; and Lagrange, 1950, p.201. Only Hofmann, 1868, p.325, prefers the former interpretation.
Does this not support the view, as Godet puts it, 'that living according to the Spirit is the proof that one possesses the rank of a child of God?'\(^1\) Precisely so say Weiss,\(^2\) Lipsius,\(^3\) Philippi,\(^4\) and Lagrange.\(^5\) Indeed not, says Godet, answering his own question; it is far better to paraphrase v.14: 'Ye have a right to the title of sons as soon as ye let yourselves be led by the Spirit'.\(^6\)

Understood in this way, Paul is speaking about a second level of experience in the Christian life, for,

Though one becomes a son by justification, he does not possess the filial state, he does not really enjoy adoption until he has become loyally submissive to the operation of the Spirit.\(^7\)

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1. Godet, 1889, p.80. (Emphasis is Godet's).
7. Godet, 1889, p.80. (Emphasis is Godet's). Weiss wholeheartedly disapproves of Godet's interpretation, saying that it destroys the very sinew of Paul's doctrine of grace; see Weiss, 1899, p.353, note.
Hofmann takes Paul at v. 14 to be referring to the fact that it is by receiving the Spirit that man becomes a son of God.¹ Bisping takes the same view of v. 14, saying that,

'Diese innere Lebensgemeinschaft mit Christo, die innere Neu- und Umgeburt, wird aber vermittelt durch den heil. Geist. Nur dann, wenn der heil. Geist wesentlich in uns wohnt, und die Liebe in unsern Herzen ausgesetzt, sind wir Brüder Christi und damit zugleich auch Söhne Gottes'.²

The issue of the interpretation of the verb ἐγέρσαι has already been touched upon in the paragraphs above, but a brief review of opinion on this issue is as follows. Those who clearly and decisively take ἐγέρσαι in its strictly passive sense are Besser,³ Philippi,⁴ Lipsius,⁵ Weiss,⁶ and Kühl.⁷ The only

1. See Hofmann's exegesis of v. 13, above.
4. Philippi, 1866, p. 341.
exegetes to state expressly a preference for the 'middle' sense are Zahn¹ and Godet.² In the case of the Godet, the sense of the verb is crucial to the interpretation he places upon the verse as a whole. Both Bisping³ and Lagrange,⁴ interestingly enough, make comments to the effect that although the verb be translated in its passive sense, man's freedom must be preserved. Bisping writes, 'Dass aber bei dem innern Treiben und Drängen des h. Geistes die menschliche Freiheit nicht aufgehoben werde, versteht sich von selbst'.⁵ Says Lagrange, 'ή θρονίζοντας έτοιμα δείχνει επίσημα ότι προκειται για την αυτογραφία του ότι τον άνθρωπον δεν έναν άλλο ζώον ή ένα όφελος'.⁶

2. Godet, 1899, pp.80f.
5. Bisping, 1870, p.245.
Exegesis of v.15 by these writers is largely a repetition of that in the first half of the 19th century, but with one or two interesting refinements. The great majority of exegetes agree that however Ἄνθρωπος ᾧθέται and Ἄνθρωπος νιόθεται are defined, the first ἐλαβετε clause is simply a negated, rhetorical statement of what the Ἄνθρωπος in the second ἐλαβετε clause is not. Again, there is almost universal agreement that Ἄνθρωπος is to be taken closely with εἰς φόβον and not ἐλαβετε; many writers suggest rephrasing this part of v.15 as εἰς τὸ Ἔμαστε in order to show the effect of this grammatical observation.¹

Finally, there is a degree of agreement that whatever v.15a refers to (in either an imagined or real sense), it is not a reference to the Holy Spirit's direct or indirect ministry in the Old Testament.

¹ E.g., Lipsius, 1891, p.137; Weiss, 1899, p.354; Philippi, 1866, p.344, and others.

² The outstanding exception is Besser, who says: 'Der Geist Gottes, welcher aus dem geistlichen Gesetz Mosis die Juden und aus dem Gewissensgesetze die Heiden ansprach, ward ihnen um der Sünde willen zu einem knechtlichen, knechtenden Geiste'. (1861, p.602).
Beyond these areas of agreement there are four disputed issues: the existence or non-existence at some historic point of a \( \text{Πνεῦμα σωφλείασ} \); the definition of \( \text{Πνεῦμα} \) in both its uses; the kind of genitives \( \text{Πν. σωφλείας} \) and \( \text{Πν. υεοθείας} \) are understood to be; and the historical meaning of \( \text{πάλιν εἰς φοβοῦ} \) (when taken to mean \( \text{εἰς τὸ πάλιν φοβεῖσθαι} \)).

As we have seen earlier, there is considerable ambiguity in 19th-century exegesis concerning the reality or unreality of \( \text{Πνεῦμα σωφλείας} \). In short, the problem is that most critical exegetes of this period consider the possibility of a historical \( \text{Πνεῦμα σωφλείας} \) to be dispensed with by simply affirming that the \( \text{πάλιν} \) belongs to \( \text{εἰς φοβοῦ} \) and not \( \text{ἐλαβέτε} \), and by observing that the first \( \text{ἐλαβέτε} \) clause is negated. Yet these exegetes often go on to discuss \( \text{ἐλαβέτε Πνεῦμα σωφλείας} \) as if it does, in fact, refer to a real situation in the past and/or present. Lagrange's initial comment on v.15 is a remarkable example of this ambiguity:

La partie négative ne signifie pas que les chrétiens ont reçu autrefois de Dieu l'esprit de servitude et qu'ils reçoivent maintenant in esprit d'adoption,
mais seulement que l'esprit qu'ils ont reçu n'est pas un esprit semblable à celui qu'ils avaient jadis.¹

Similar is Lipsius, who comments on v.15a:

...wie derselbe früher unter dem Gesetze die Leser erfüllte.... Unter dem Gesetze hatten sie Furcht, nämlich vor dem Κατακριμα, der Sohndachtsgeist aber setzt an die Stelle der Furcht kindliche Zuversicht....²

Bisping,³ Besser,⁴ and Kühl⁵ also imply that the entire clause of v.15a applies to a real, earlier condition; specifically the latter two exegetes suggest the Jewish and pagan experiences of the Roman Urgemeinde, and Bisping simply refers to man's condition under the Law. Typical of this group as well is Godet, who comments:

If we connect the verb Παλάυ, again, as we should do, not with the verb Ελαβας, ye received, but only with the regimen εις φόβον

¹. Lagrange, 1950, p.201.
². Lipsius, 1891, p.137.
⁴. Besser, 1861, pp.602f.
⁵. Kühl, 1913, p.287.
to fear, there is nothing in the expression obliging us to hold that Paul has in view an anterior divine communication; for the meaning is this: "The Spirit which ye have received of God is not a servile spirit throwing you back into the fear in which ye formerly lived."¹

But there is another group of exegetes who take έλαβετε πνεῦμα δουλειάς as a purely rhetorical device, set in parallel with the second έλαβετε clause, and not referring to any particular historical situation. Thie viewpoint is perhaps best represented by Weiss, who comments,

Das έλαβετε aber drückt nur aus, dass die Gesinnung, welche ein solcher Geist wirken würde, nur wieder dieselbe wäre, welche sie bereits früher gehabt haben.... Da darum der Geist ihnen nicht gegeben sein kann, damit sie auch abermals fürchten sollen, so kann er auch kein πνεῦμα δουλειάς sein.²

Hofmann³ and Zahn⁴ are essentially in agreement with Weiss's reconstruction of v.15a. Still, these three exegetes agree that πάλιν εἰς φόβον does refer to the former condition

1. Godet, 1889, p.81. (Emphasis is Godet's).
3. Hofmann, 1868, pp.325f.
of Paul's readers in Rome.\(^1\) Thus it is that Weiss can say immediately following his comment above, 'Die Furcht vor Gott ist vielmehr dem gesamten vorchristlichen Verhältniss zu Gott ebenso charakteristisch, wie dem Knechtverhältniss, weil man in jenem den heiligen Gott seiner Sünden wegen nur fürchten kann'.\(^2\)

Interpretations of \(\Pi\nu\epsilon\sigma\mu\alpha\) in the phrase \(\Pi\nu\epsilon\sigma\mu\alpha\,\delta\omega\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma\) as well as of the kind of genitive follow no precise pattern and raise no new possibilities. There is, however, an interpretation of the entire v.15, significantly unique for its time, suggested by Philippi. This is essentially a critique of his contemporaries' exegesis of the verse. He begins with a basic, ruling supposition: 'Der Gegensatz von \(\Pi\nu\epsilon\sigma\mu\alpha\,\delta\omega\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma\) und \(\Pi\nu\epsilon\sigma\mu\alpha\,\upsilon\iota\omicron\omicron\omicron\epsilon\omicron\omicron\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma\) erfordert, dass sowohl das Genitiv-

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1. Hofmann, 1868, p.326, takes the whole of v.15a as totally rhetorical, but still sees a reference to a previous condition of fear; '...der Beisatz \(\pi\alpha\lambda\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\,\phi\omicron\rho\omicron\nu\) bringt nicht mit sich, dass wir vorher den Geist der Furcht gehabt hatten, sondern sagt nur, dass wir, wenn der Geist, den wir jetzt empfangen haben, ein Geist der Knechtschaft wäre wieder eben so, wie vordem, in Furcht stehen müssten vor Gott, statt mit Kindesvertrauen zu ihm zu reden'.

Verhältniss, als auch der Begriff des \textit{Πνεῦμα} in beiden Ausdrücken entsprechender Weise gefasst werde'. He offers no evidence as to why this must be so. Proceeding with his argument, Philippi claims that \textit{Πνεῦμα ὄιοθεσίας} cannot be 'der Geist, welcher die Kindschaft wirkt', and that therefore it must be either 'der Geist, welcher von der Kindschaft ausgeht', or 'der Geist, welcher der Kindschaft eigentümlich zugehört'. The latter translation of the genitive construction makes the best comparison with the parallel contrast of \textit{Πνεῦμα Σωφρείας}, i.e., 'der Geist, welcher das Charakteristikum der Knechtschaft ist', or in Latin, 'spiritus, qualis est servorum' - an understanding of the genitive and the \textit{Πνεῦμα} reflected also in Luther's translation 'ein knechtischer Geist'.

But what \textit{Πνεῦμα}, Philippi then asks, is precisely meant here? \textit{Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ} or \textit{Πνεῦμα ἀνεφεῖν Πνοῦ; i.e., 'der objektive Gottesgeist selber, oder ein subjektiver, menschlicher, wenn auch

1. Philippi, 1866, p.343.
2. Philippi, 1866, p.343.
3. Philippi, 1866, p.343.
neither the inter-connection of Paul's argument nor Galatians 4:6 argues in favor of the first possibility. In the latter, the discourse is not about \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\upsilon\alpha\mu\alpha \nu \iota\sigma\varepsilon\sigma\iota\alpha \) but \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\upsilon \tau\omicron \iota\sigma \iota \iota\sigma \iota \theta\omicron\sigma\iota \) which follows the \( \nu \iota\sigma\varepsilon\sigma\iota\alpha \), '...und es konnte sehr wohl das \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\upsilon\alpha\mu\alpha \nu \iota\sigma\varepsilon\sigma\iota\alpha \) als Wirkung dieses göttlichen \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\upsilon\alpha\mu\alpha \theta\omicron\omicron\omicron \) gedacht werden'.

Neither is the connection with the \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\upsilon\alpha\mu\alpha \theta\omicron\omicron\omicron \) in v.14 evidence in favor of this view, for it may well be that a transition is made from the Spirit of God (v.14) to its effect in man ('der pneumatischen Wesenheit im Menschen') in v.15. Thus it is best to take the phrase as 'kindlichen Geiste des Menschen'. This, in fact, is imperative because of the parallel contrast of \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\upsilon\alpha\mu\alpha \delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \iota\sigma\iota\alpha \) : 'Denn der Geist Gottes selber kann doch nicht wohl ein \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\upsilon\alpha\mu\alpha \delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \iota\sigma\iota\alpha \) gennant werden, da er weder die Knechtschaft wirkt, noch von ihr ausgeht, oder ein characteristicisches Merkmal derselben ist, indem er nur den Kindern und Freien, nicht aber den Knechten gegeben wird'.

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1. Philippi, 1866, p.343.  
2. Philippi, 1866, p.343.  
3. Philippi, 1866, p.343.  
4. Philippi, 1866, p.344.
Thus far there is nothing particularly remarkable about Philipp's exegesis. It is true, however, that virtually no other exegete of those here analyzed takes the two genitive constructions in the same way. All, in fact, would disagree that both must necessarily be taken as the same simply because they are set in contrast. Further, while the majority of exegetes take Πνεῦμα in its objective sense, most, however, do agree that the genitive is that of effect. But Philipp's disagreement with his colleagues is far more fundamental that would be apparent in disagreement over the two occurrences of Πνεῦμα.

1. Following is a sampling of opinions on how Πνεῦμα is to be interpreted: Bisping (1870, p.216) takes it as the Holy Spirit, 'der uns zu Kindern Gottes macht ....'; Lipsius, (1891, p.136) feels that it is not a 'kindliche Gesinnung' but 'eine objektiv-göttliche Gabe...'; similarly Godet (1889, p.82), 'The Spirit of adoption is the Spirit of God, in so far as producing the spiritual state corresponding to sonship....' Weiss (1899, p.355), however, paraphrases, 'Ihr habt einen Geist empfangen, welcher dem Verhältniss der Sohnschaft angehört', and comments, 'Allerdings bezeichnet Πνεῦμα den Akt der Adoption, durch welchen einer zum Sohne angenommen wird'. Zahn (1910, p.394) stresses Gal. 4:1-7, which he interprets as meaning that men are made sons of God by receiving the Spirit of God (the latter taken in its objective sense, i.e., the Holy Spirit). Lagrange, (1950, pp.201-202) thinks it is not the Holy Spirit, rather, 'C'est donc encore une disposition d'esprit mais donnée par Dieu, donc surnaturelle, en relation avec l'Esprit-Saint....' The genitive he defines as follows: 'Le gén. est de qualité; l'esprit est celui qui convient aux adoptés vis-à-vis de leur père adoptif'. Kuhl (1913, p.286) simply notes that it is a genitive of possession.
Rather, the focal point is, once again, the Πνεῦμα

Philippi fully acknowledges that it has been rightly said time and again that Πνεῦμα σουλειάς does not indicate a Πνεῦμα which man really had, or experienced under the Law, but rather it only indicates negatively that which the spirit (which Christians have received) is not. Thus commentators encourage their readers to construe v. 15a and b: 'der Geist, welchen ihr empfangen habt, ist nicht etwa ein Geist der Knechtschaft, sondern ein Geist der Kindschaft'.¹ That is to say this Spirit of God is not possessed by slaves, but only by children of God. Further, we are often rightly told that the Πνεῦμα belongs with εἰς φοβοῦ, not ἐλπιστεῖ so that the meaning of the phrase is really that of a full clause: εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα φοβεροῦ.²

Does either of these quite correct grammatical observations solve the difficulty of v.15a? No! says Philippi. The Πνεῦμα σουλειάς can certainly only be also the spirit of fear. And when the half-verse is translated, 'the spirit which you have received is not a spirit of servitude, that you should,

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¹ Philippi, 1866, p.344.
² Philippi, 1866, p.344.
or must, once again fear', even so the thought inevitably completes itself, 'as it then happened... when you possessed the spirit of servitude, i.e., of fear'. The complement of this - 'as it came to pass under the Law, which worked wrath' - only seeks to disguise under another expression the identity of both these supplantations. The principle, then, which must be followed when interpreting v.15 is that:

Das πνεῦμα σοφίας muss also immer so gefasst werden, dass es als wirkliches Besitzthum des Menschen gedacht werden kann, also nicht als Spiritus Dei, sondern als spiritus servilis hominum.

Taking into account this principle, a correct paraphrase of v.15a and b would be: 'Ihr habt nicht einen knechtischen Geist empfangen, damit ihr euch abermals fürchten müsstet, wie damals, wo ihr diesen knechtischen Geist besasst, sondern ihr habt einen kindlichen Geist empfangen'.

1. Philippi, 1866, p.344.
2. Philippi, 1866, p.344.
3. Philippi, 1866, p.344.
4. Philippi, 1866, p.344.
There remain only two further points to complete Philipp's exegesis. The first is in v.15: ἐλάβετε is equivalent to ἐσώκεν ἡμῖν ὁ Θεός; this means that ἐλάβετε 'den objektiven Quell dieser Geistesstimmung bezeichne'. (This is possible in both cases of the ἐλάβετε clauses because the spiritus servilis hominum is not received, but only possessed). Thus the use of ἐλάβετε and the genitive construction πνεῦμα Σοφιᾶς is precisely parallel with Romans 11:8, II Timothy 1:7, II Corinthians 4:13, Galatians 6:1 and Ephesians 1:17. The second point is an affirmation of the fact that Σοφιᾶς and Φόβος were both the result of the revealed νόμος. This is not, however, to imply that the Roman church was made up primarily of Jewish Christians or that Paul here singled out the Jewish converts of the church:

Denn auch die Wirkung des natürlichen Gewissensgesetzes, welches die Heiden nach 2,14,15. besassen, ist eine analoge, und dass Paulus auch das Heidenthum als einen stand der Knechtschaft fasst, zeigt Gal.,4,8.9.

1. Philippi, 1866, p.344.
2. Philippi, 1866, p.344, 345.
Philippi's exegesis of v.15 is obviously of particular interest for two reasons: first, for his insight into the ambiguous results of his 19th-century contemporaries, who attempted to solve an historically debated passage by purely grammatical means; and, secondly, for his vindication of much of traditional exegesis. However, his conclusions are not simply reactionary; he would have disagreed, for instance, with Scholastic suggestions that servile fear is a gift of God (but he does agree that both σουλείας and φόβος describe the Πνεῦμα). Neither would he agree with Antiochene suggestions that ἦν σουλείας is an indirect reference to the Holy Spirit's inspiration of the Law. Still, he has provided a viable alternative to the main stream of critical exegesis which is both grammatically defensible and, in its broad outline, harmonious with traditional exegesis.

The possibilities suggested for the interpretation of the words ἀββά ὅ τὸντὴν (v.15) are essentially the same as those offered by exegetes in the first half of the 19th century. However, those who feel that ὅ τὸντὴν is simply an explanation or translation of ἀββά for the benefit of non-Jewish readers are in the minority.¹ Weiss² and Godet³

repeat Meyer's suggestion that the address \( \Upsilon \Sigma \Theta \Upsilon \) comes from the Jewish practice of prayer. Only Godet\(^1\) and Zahn\(^2\) find a reference to the opening address of the Lord's prayer. The suggestions that the phrase as a whole is repetitious so as to 
\( \tau \rho \sigma \alpha \) imitate the sound of children, or that itself is an imitation of children's speech, is out of fashion. A number of important exegesis agree that \( \tau \delta \beta \beta \nu \) was a term used in public Christian worship either taken over directly linguistically from Palestinian Aramaic and/or from Christ himself (Mark 14:36);\(^3\) a lesser number of exegesis agree that \( \varepsilon \tau \mu \tau \eta \rho \) is an essential part of the prayer itself.\(^4\)

As we have seen earlier, there are a number of problems in the exegesis of v.16. There is, first of all, an asyndeton between v.15 and v.16, the solution of which depends not only upon a decision concerning punctuation (full stop or simply a pause), but also, and more fundamentally, upon the precise relationship between vv.15 and 16; i.e., is v.16 speaking about something different from

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the Abbaruf in v.15c, or is it simply an explanation of one ramification of it? This, in turn, is related to the classic question of the correct translation of *αὐτὸ* : is it *ipse* (der Geist selbst) or is it *idem* (eben derselbe Geist)? Having answered the question, 'What or who is *αὗτος τὸ πνεῦμα* ?', the second, obvious question remains: 'What is the proper identification of the *πνεῦμα* in the phrase *ἐν πνεύματι ἦν πάντως* ?' Finally, the effect of the *συμμαρτυρεῖ* in the composite verb *συμμαρτυρεῖ* (whether as a simple strengthening of the simple verb or in its compound sense) must be found. Surprisingly, there is considerable agreement (although there is great variety in their comments as well) among our exegetes on most of these grammatical questions: virtually all agree that *ipse* is the correct translation of *αὐτὸ* (many realize that *idem* is impossible), that *τὸ πνεῦμα* is the objective Spirit of God, that v.16 is speaking of something different from (although perhaps related to) that in v.15c, and that the *συμμαρτυρεῖ* cannot be taken as the strengthened simple verb (*μαρτυρεῖ*). A more detailed analysis of various comments on v.16 follows.

At v.15, Besser had defined *πνεῦμα νεοθεσίας* as 'einen Geist, der in Kindschaft setzt und darin erhält'.

Consistently, he also took ἐν ἁπλῷ (v.15c) as a reference to the Holy Spirit, who makes possible the cry. It is surprising then that at v.16 he translates (in contrast to Luther !) ἀντί τὸ πνεῦμα as der Geist selbst (ipse), since he means the same Holy Spirit as seen in v.15b and c. Besser makes reference to 'unserm geheiligten Geiste' (as a possible translation of τὸ πνεῦμα ἡμῶν), but he does not explain what he means by this.

Philippi somewhat more predictably also translates der Geist selbst (ipse), and expands this by commenting, 'nämlich der Geist Gottes, in welchem und durch welchen wir das πνεῦμα ὑπὸ Θεοῦ v.15. haben'. The remainder of Philippi's exegesis pivots on his understanding of the verb ἀμαρτῆσαι: there is no example where the compound is identical with the simple, ἀμαρτῆσαι: here as in 2:15 and 9:1 it must be taken in the sense of una testari (zugleich Zeugniss ablegen). This is critical for both the

2. Besser, 1861, p.608.
5. Philippi, 1866, p.347.
understanding of v.15c and v.16; the words in v.15c are to be explained as follows: '...in dem kindlichen Geiste, in welchem der Abbaruf sich vollzieht, der Geist Gottes selber unserem Geiste Zeugniss von unserem Kindesstande ablege'.

This means that our spirit witnesses our \( \nu \gamma \epsilon \epsilon \theta \varepsilon \gamma \iota \alpha \) as a 'kindlicher Geist' through the Abba cry in v.15c, but it does so not alone, but rather 'mit ihm zugleich der Geist Gottes'. Thus vv.15 and 16 must be taken closely together even though they refer to two different things. The witness spoken of in v.16 is not only distinct from that in v.15c, but it precedes it:

\[
\text{Denn während die Schrift alle die, welche an Christum glauben, Gottes Kinder nennt, bezeugt der Geist dem einzelnen Gläubigen: Du bist Gottes Kind! Dieses Geisteszeugniss ist das erste, und zugleich der Grund des Abbarufes, welcher das zweite Zeugniss ist.}^{3}
\]

Philippi further notes that one would have expected something like \( \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicro...
Not untypically, Hofmann disagrees with all traditional and current solutions of the problem of translation: \( \text{αὐτὸ ὁ Πνεῦμα} \) is not 'der Geist selbst' nor 'eben derselbe Geist', but 'er, der Geist'. The \( \text{αὐτὸ} \) refers to a previously named subject which is subsequently named by the \( \text{ὁ Πνεῦμα} \). This \( \text{Πνεῦμα} \) is, then, the same as in v.15; i.e., '...der Geist der Ankündigung \( \varepsilonἰς\)\( \), den wir empfangen haben und vermöge dessen wir Gott als unsern Vater anrufen, uns innerlich der Gotteskindschaft versichert....'\(^3\) Thus vv.15c and 16 are to be taken closely together, as with Philippi (but Hofmann reads 'Spirit of God' for \( \text{Πνεῦμα νῷ Ὀλυμπίων} \)). Paul uses the verb \( \text{Συμμαρτυρεῖν} \) '...weil dieses Zeugniss des göttlichen Geistes Bestätigung dessen ist, wessen wir uns selbst bewusst sund und was wir und also selber sagen'.\(^4\) There are, therefore, two witnesses:

1. Philippi, 1866, p.347.  
Wir wissen, dass wir Gottes Kind sind, weil wir des neuen Lebens uns bewusst sind, in dem wir stehen. Aber wir wissen es nicht nur, sondern der Geist, welcher, uns dazu gemacht hat, sagt es uns auch. 1

Bisping's exegesis of v.16 is almost identical with that of Philippi. 2

Beck's interpretation of v.16 is the most unusual:

\[ \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \omicron \tau \omicron \nu \varepsilon \varphi \mu \alpha \ \text{is to be translated } \text{der Geist fur sich selbst, analogous to } \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \omicron \tau \omicron \nu \varepsilon \varphi \mu \alpha \ (\text{ich fur mich selbst) in 7:25. With the verb } \summa \theta \iota \rho \varepsilon \iota \nu \chi \nu \ \text{there is built a contrast with Paul's statement in 7:25: } \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \omicron \tau \omicron \nu \varepsilon \varphi \mu \alpha \ \varepsilon \tau \omega \mu \varepsilon \nu \ \text{voi'} \].

The theological implication is that, 'Das Produkt des inneren Geistes-Zeugnisses ist also das ewige Lebens-Bewusstsein statt nur ein zeitliches Lebens-Bewusstsein, das Gewissen der Seligkeit'. 4

Godet accepts the ipse translation of \( \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \omicron \). ('the Spirit Himself'), and interprets the thought of the verse in

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4. Beck, 1884, p.69, 70.
much the same way as Philippi. However, he does not think that
\( \tau \varepsilon \, \pi \nu \varepsilon \, \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \) refers back to the
witness which is constituted by v.15c. The experience there is an
indirect witness, but v.16 is referring to a direct witness given
to our spirit. Still, a bit of the thought of v.15c lingers in the
verb \( \sum m m a r t u p e l \nu \), in which the \( \sigma u v \) —
must retain its natural meaning ('bears witness conjointly with our
spirit').

Lipsius translates \( a u t \tau \, t \, \pi \nu \varepsilon \, \mu \alpha \nu \) as
der göttliche Geist selbst (ipse), and also takes the verb in the
sense of Mitzeugniss, so that \( \sum m m a r t u p e l \nu \) \( \tau \varepsilon \, \pi \nu \varepsilon \, \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \) means 'legt Mitzeugniss ab mit unserem Geiste'.

This Mitzeugniss, says Lipsius, is not to be differentiated as
something other than the \( k p a ' z e l \nu \) of v.15c; rather
our \( k p a ' z e l \nu \) is a \( k p a ' z e l \nu \, \varepsilon v \, \pi \nu \varepsilon \, \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \),
i.e., 'ein von dem über uns kommenden göttlichen \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \, \mu \alpha \nu \) uns eingegebenes'. Thus Lipsius's exegesis of v.16 is very close
to that of Philippi. Since, however, Lipsius interpreted
\( \pi \nu \varepsilon \, \mu \alpha \nu \, v i c \, \theta e s i a s \) (v.15) as 'eine objectiv-göttliche
Gabe', how could Lipsius and Philippi agree? The answer lies in a

1. Godet, 1889, p.84.
2. Lipsius, 1891, p.137.
presupposition supported by Lipsius: 'Voraussetzung ist aber
allerdings eine innere Erfahrung des subjectiv-menschlichen
πνευμα von dem in ihm wirksamen bzw. redenden
objectiv-göttlichen πνευμα'.

Although Weiss agrees with the ipse translation of
αυτ' το πνευμα and also agrees that the compound verb
is not simply a strengthened form of the simple verb ματυψεῖν
he disagrees with the bulk of opinion, above (Philippi, Hofmann,
Godet, and Lipsius, who differ in detail, but agree in broad outline).
Essentially, Weiss feels that other commentators make too much of a
supposed parallelism between v.15c and v.16, whereby the
κραύγειν (v.15c) is a subjective witness and v.16 is an
'überinstimmende Zeugniss des objektiven heiligen Geistes'.
The danger of this, says Weiss, is that the connection of v.16 with
v.14 is lost:

Vielmehr unterscheidet Paulus von der objektiven
Gottesmacht des Geistes in uns, die durch ihr άρεί ς
die Thatsächlichkeit unseres Kindschaft-Verhältnisses
(im metaphorischen Sinne) bezeugt, das neue durch den
Geist in uns gewirkte Geistesleben (vgl. v.10), in
welchem wir subjektiv (durch das Gefühl kindlichen
Vertrauens) unserer Kindesstellung zu Gott uns bewusst
werden und so ein Zeugniss für dieselbe haben.

1. Lipsius, 1891, p.137.
2. Weiss, 1899, pp.356-357.
What is noteworthy however, is that Weiss agrees that a different witnessing is spoken of in v.16 than that in v.15.¹

Only Kühl of all the critical exegetes here reviewed suggests that v.16 is simply a clarified repetition of v.15c: the asyndetische linking between vv.15 and 16 shows that a facet of the previous statement is being clarified. The Πνεῦμα in the phrase τῷ Πνεύματι ἡμῶν is, according to Kühl, 'das neue, religiöse Innen leben der Christen'.²

At v.17 we pause only to ask two questions: does the sentence beginning with εἰτέρ represent a condition already fulfilled or yet to be fulfilled? And what kind of Mit-Leiden is implied in the verb Συμπαθέωνεν?

In attempting to answer the first question, Bisping begins with the ζωά; since it is dependent upon Συγ-Κανπονομολ (and not Συμπαθέωνεν), we must take the clause which follows as final, 'in der Absicht, um die Verherrlichung dadurch zu erreichen'.³ No other exegete agrees with him. Most others take the εἰτέρ as an unfulfilled condition upon which the ζωά clause is directly

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dependent and which itself is to be understood as showing result, not purpose. Some, however, comment that ἁμαρτάχσετε, although a condition, is not meritorious.¹ Weiss takes εἰτὲρα in its weakest sense, noting that it 'soll so wenig wie v.9 die Gewissheit ihrer κανονομία zweifelhaft machen, sondern nur zur Selbstprüfung anregen....',² an interpretation which Kühl explicitly denies.³ Many, in fact, do take the εἰτὲρα clause in its literal sense; Philippi calls it the 'unerläßliche Voraussetzung',³ Lipsius simply a 'Voraussetzung',⁴ and Godet a 'condition to be satisfied'.⁵ Lagrange, however, rejects the translation of si tamen (for εἰτὲρα ) in favor of si quidem, with the implication that it is a condition already being fulfilled.⁶

Suggestions as to what kind of suffering Paul implies run in every direction. Most exegetes are extremely general, if not ambiguous, in their remarks. Ewald simply says 'die unvermeidlichen

2. Weiss, 1899, p.358.
4. Lipsius, 1891, p.137.
5. Godet, 1889, p.85.
leiden der Welt...,\textsuperscript{1} while Besser includes 'Elend, Verfolgung, Schande und Tod'.\textsuperscript{2} Some attempt to show the historical meaning of Paul's words and their possible meaning for contemporary readers:

Diese Leiden sind zwar eigentlich Bekenntnissleiden, wie sie namentlich \textit{sic} in besonderem Maasse die ersten Christen zu erdulden hatten; doch lässt sich der Begriff an sich verallgemeinern, und auch auf die Kampfesleiden in Beziehung auf die Sünde, das \textit{Evanatoû̃ta σπάζεις τοῦ θώμας}, in Anwendung bringen.\textsuperscript{3}

Others take the words in the strict sense of 'persecution' without any regard for the relevance of such an interpretation:

Als eine solche Teilnahme werden die Leiden bezeichnet, welche die Christen um ihres Glaubens willen erdulden, nicht als ob diese die Leiden Christi ergänzen müssten, sondern sofern die Gemeinschaft mit dem Gekreuzigten sich in der Leidensnachfolge beurkundet....\textsuperscript{4}

Perhaps the most balanced exegesis is that of Weiss, who can find meaning not only in Paul's words in an historical sense, but in a contemporary sense:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ewald, 1847, p.390.
\item Besser, 1861, p.614.
\item Philipp, 1866, p.348-349; Hofmann (1868, p.327) explicitly takes issue with Philipp for his interpretation, but Beck (1884, p.70) is essentially in agreement.
\item Lipsius, 1891, p.137.
\end{enumerate}
Die Überezeugung, dass in dieser Leidensgenossenschaft sich die Gemeinschaft mit Christo bewähren müsse, damit wir zur Vollendung derselben in der Teilnahme an der göttlichen Herrlichkeit (5:2) gelangen können, zu der Christus bereits gelangt ist ( Çalış Ka$ 

\[ \text{entwickelte sich, zumal unter dem äußeren Einflusse der verfolgungsreichen Zeitverhältnisse, notwendig aus der inneren Gewissheit, dass bei Jesu selbst sein gottgewolltes, im Gehorsam gegen den Vater übernommenes und getragenes Leiden der Weg zu seiner Herrlichkeit war (Phl. 2:6ff').} \]

English Exegesis, 1850-1918.

It has generally been acknowledged that Farrar's complaint about the dearth of solid, critical Biblical research in England was fully justified. The sudden explosion of commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans in the latter half of the 19th century is attributable to, among other things, a new responsiveness to developments in Germany. There are numerable evidences of this fact. Lengthy introductions to commentaries which discuss and criticize in detail F.C. Baur and the Tübingen school are common. There is a strong dependence upon German exegetes themselves, especially H.A.W. Meyer, whose name occurs far more frequently than any other. In that section of their introduction wherein Sanday and Headlam discuss other commentaries of the 'Modern Period', it is noteworthy that English exegetes are often evaluated in terms of their awareness of critical methods of interpretation developed in Germany. Commenting upon Dean Henry

Alford's *Greek Testament*, for example, they note that this work, '...was the first to import the results of German exegesis into many circles in England'. Finally, it is noteworthy that at least six commentaries on Romans from the hands of German and French theologians were translated into English during this period. This fact clearly has historical implications, for all ten select commentators reviewed here come in the second half of the 19th century and the majority of these sometime after 1860. It is no coincidence that these dates correspond to the publication of F.C. Baur's *application of Tendenzkritik* to the Pauline Epistles.

The English commentaries of this period, to be considered here in order of chronology of first editions, are those written by Henry Alford (1810-1871), Benjamin Jowett (1817-

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1. Sanday and Headlam, 1902, p.cvii.

2. I.e., Tholuck, Meyer, Weiss, Philippi, Godet, and Lipsius. The commentary written by Lipsius and translated into English by Williams and Northgate in 1883 was not that used in the section above, but rather Lipsius's earlier contribution to the *Protestanten-Bibel*. It ought also be noted that the English translation of Weiss's commentary is not a complete translation of his revision of Meyer's commentary.


5. The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, London, 2nd ed., 1886 (reprinted from The Speaker's Commentary, 1881). Cited below as 'Gifford, 1886'.


7. Sanday and Headlam, 1902.


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5. The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, London, 2nd ed., 1886 (reprinted from The Speaker's Commentary, 1881). Cited below as 'Gifford, 1886'.


7. Sanday and Headlam, 1902.


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5. The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, London, 2nd ed., 1886 (reprinted from The Speaker's Commentary, 1881). Cited below as 'Gifford, 1886'.


7. Sanday and Headlam, 1902.


In general, commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans written by English theologians of this era are less grammatically oriented and detailed than those of Continental origin. Even Sanday and Headlam's contribution to the International Critical Commentary appears to be the very soul of brevity when compared to the works of such men as Meyer, Reiche, Weiss, Philippi, Zahn, etc. Consequently, our analysis of these commentaries will also be less detailed.

The question of the relationship of vv.12ff to the material preceding (the function of ἀπά oὐν) is discussed by only four exegetes. Liddon takes ἀπά oὐν as implying inference based upon vv.10-11: 'It follows...from the relation of the Holy Spirit to our θυμόν τὰ ωματά, described in ver. 10,11 that: THESIS, Christians are debtors; but they do not owe any debt of obedience to the ἀπά with the view of leading carnal lives (ver.12'). Beet agrees and attempts to capture, in paraphrase, the nature of the inference: 'If Christ's presence in us be a proof that our spirit is alive, and if God will raise the bodies of those in whom His Spirit dwells, then are we

1. Liddon, 1893, p.131.
bound etc'. 1 He feels that v.12 is a 'practical application' and vv.13-17 'a proof' of the statement made in vv.10-11. 2 Sanday and Headlam are less precise, suggesting in agreement with Lipsius, that vv.12-13 are to be taken closely with 'the foregoing':

...no doubt it is true that these verses only contain the conclusion of the previous paragraph thrown into a hortatory form. 3

They go on to remark that v.12 begins a new paragraph since it is really a transition to an exhortation. Further, although a new idea is introduced at v.14 (heirship), 'that idea is only subordinate to the main argument, the assurance which the Spirit gives of future life'. 4

Denney is even more general: 'The blessed condition and hopes of Christians, as described in these last verses, lay them under obligations....' 5

1. Beet, 1902, p.223.
2. Beet, 1902, p.223.
5. Denney, 1900, p.647.
Many commentators agree that a positive but unspoken obligation is implied by Paul. Vaughan, for example, translates \( \delta\phi\varepsilon\iota\lambda\varepsilon\tau\alpha\lambda\varepsilon\sigma\mu\varepsilon\nu \), 'We are under an obligation to; it has a claim upon us'. He also notes that the position of the \( \delta\) suggests a clause which has been suppressed: \( \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha \tau\omega\Pi\nu\varepsilon\mu\nu\alpha\tau\lambda\iota \). In essential agreement are Moule, Liddon, and Beet.

None of these exegetes explicitly discusses other grammatical details, such as the articular infinitive of v.12. The single exception is Vaughan, who takes the clause \( \tau\omega\Pi\nu\varepsilon\mu\nu\alpha\tau\lambda\iota \) as denoting purpose.

The majority of our exegetes understand the \( \Pi\nu\varepsilon\mu\nu\alpha \) referred to in v.13 as the Holy Spirit. The only exceptions are Sanday and Headlam and Vaughan, who comments, 'The \( \Pi\nu\varepsilon\mu\nu\alpha \) is the soul as quickened and inhabited by the Holy Spirit...'.

(Earlier, at v.5, Vaughan had similarly commented that \( \tau \nu \varepsilon \sigma \mu a \) is used by Paul 'to denote the renewed soul, the immaterial part of man as quickened and elevated by receiving into it the Holy Spirit of God').\(^1\) Sanday and Headlam simply call it 'the human \( \tau \nu \varepsilon \sigma \mu a \), but it is the human \( \tau \nu \varepsilon \sigma \mu a \) in direct contrast with the Divine'.\(^2\)

Approaches to the problem of defining \( \tau \alpha \gamma \pi \rho \alpha \varepsilon \epsilon \varsigma \) are varied. Denney notes that while one might have expected \( \tau \alpha \gamma \sigma \alpha \rho \kappa \sigma \) instead, still '...in the absence of the spirit the body in all it does is only the tool of the flesh; the two are morally equivalent'.\(^3\) Liddon refers to 'the animal actions of the body'.\(^4\) Sanday and Headlam do not comment (!) on \( \tau o \delta \sigma \omicron \mu \mu \alpha \tau o \varsigma \) and its variant, and simply describe \( \tau \alpha \gamma \pi \rho \alpha \varepsilon \epsilon \varsigma \) as 'of wicked doings', referring to Luke 23:51, thus implying that it is to be

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2. Sanday and Headlam, 1902, p.202. A full discussion of Paul's use of \( \tau \nu \varepsilon \sigma \mu a \), when applied to man, is found in their comment on v.9, pp.196-197.
3. Denney, 1900, p.647.
understood here in a pejorative sense.\textsuperscript{1} Similar is Moule, who quotes Meyer with approval,\textsuperscript{2} Gifford,\textsuperscript{3} and Beet.\textsuperscript{4} Only Gore discusses the meaning of Θανατώτε. His description is traditional:

Mortification is absolutely necessary, and at every stage of the Christian life. It is the carrying into effect in detail of the fundamental law of our new life - the law which the baptismal ritual was intended to teach - life by means of death. For the body had gained the upper hand: it had come to control the weakened spirit. Therefore the reinvigorated spirit must react upon the body and its impulses. It must make its government felt, and the physical tendencies must be checked, pruned, cut back.\textsuperscript{5}

A number of exegetes observe that v.14 is a proof' or 'confirmation' ( γάρ ) of the verb ἱνασκες.\textsuperscript{6}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[1.] Sanday and Headlam, 1902, p.202.
  \item[2.] Moule, 1891, p.146.
  \item[3.] Gifford, 1886, p.152.
  \item[4.] Beet, 1902, p.224.
  \item[5.] Gore, 1900, p.290.
  \item[6.] So Alford, 1894, p.320; Vaughan, 1880, p.155; Beet, 1902, p.224; Gifford, 1886, p.152; Liddon, 1893, p.132; and Denney, 1900, p.647.
\end{itemize}
Moule, however, suggests that the \( \gamma\alpha\rho \) points back to \( \Pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\mu\alpha\iota \) (v.13).  

Questions concerning the precise functions of \( \kappa\omicron\sigma\omicron\omicron \ldots \omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\omicron \) are almost totally absent; virtually all of our exegetes take the \( \dot{\alpha}\rho\omicron\nu\omicron\tau\iota\alpha\omicron \) simply as passive.

Both Liddon and Sanday and Headlam qualify the passive interpretation by pointing out that the leading of the Spirit does not compromise man's free will. The most critical remark is that of Moule, who says, 'The emphasis in this ver. is about equal on each clause; on the condition, (spirituality of will, \( \text{\textit{\textcircled{\textsf{S}}}}\iota\omicron\gamma \) and on the privilege, (son-ship). Only the spiritual are children of God; and the spiritual are nothing less than children of God'.

Gore, in his comment, suggests that \( \kappa\omicron\sigma\omicron\omicron \) has a restrictive sense:

The New Testament language would have us regard all the baptized as regenerate and sons of God, but it will not let us mistake the meaning of this teaching. In any effective sense it is they, and only they, who are really controlled by the divine Spirit who can call themselves sons.

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1. Moule, 1891, p.146.
Our exegetes offer us no new startling interpretations of v.15. A number of these writers would agree with Moule's paraphrase, 'Ye received the Holy Spirit not as a Spirit of (connected with) slavery, but as a Spirit of (connected with) adoption.'¹ This assumes, of course, that the two ἐλάβετε clauses are set in rhetorical and not real contrast (the first being negated), that Πάλιν is to be read closely with εἰς φόβον, and that this latter phrase is to be applied to the former condition of Paul's Roman readers.

Because Moule thinks of the first ἐλάβετε as representing an unreal possibility, he can freely take Πνεῦμα throughout the verse as 'the Holy Spirit'. Vaughan and Denney would appear to support this view. Vaughan, for example, paraphrases, 'The spirit which you received (on becoming Christians) was one not of slaves, but of adopted sons'.² Denney, commenting on the first ἐλάβετε clause, says, 'The aorist refers to the time of their baptism, when they received the Spirit. It was not the Spirit proper to slaves, leading them again to shrink from God in fear as they had done when under the law of sin and death, but Πνεῦμα

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¹. Moule, 1891, p.147.
². Vaughan, 1880, pp.155-156.
υεθήσιας, a spirit proper to those who were being translated from the servile to the filial relation to God'.

Liddon similarly remarks that, 'What Christians have received is (a) not such a spirit as might rule a slave, so that they should now again, as under the law, live in terror; but (b) the τυείμα υεθήσιας, the Spirit that inspires and befits an adopted son'. Both Liddon and Denney take the τυείμα in the first clause in a subjective sense, while Moule and Vaughan take it as the objective Spirit of God; all, however, take the τυείμα in the second clause as the Holy Spirit. Beet is in agreement with Liddon and Denney, defining τυείμα σωσίλας as a 'characterizing genitive' (a spirit of bondage is a spirit 'such as animates slaves') and also considers Paul to be speaking about an unreal situation: 'This does not imply that any spirit of bondage actually exists, but merely denies that we have received such'. Beet is perhaps the most consistent of all theologians in this group as a whole, in that he also considers the phrase 'spirit of bondage' as referring to an unreal situation. He comments: 'For fear: tendency of the spirit

2. Liddon, 1893, p.132.
which animates slaves. If God gave us such, He would lead us back again to our former state'.

Sanday and Headlam's interpretation of v.15 is somewhat different. They very clearly define πνεῦμα δουλείας: there is a use of πνεῦμα in Scripture which is yet different from the meaning of 'the human spirit under the influence of the Divine Spirit', in which πνεῦμα comes to mean state of mind ('a particular state, habit, or temper of the human spirit'). Examples of this are πνεῦμα ἀνδρόσεως. Num.5:14,30 ἡ πνεύματα τῆς δουλείας; πν. ἀνδρόσεως Is.61:3 ἡ πνεύματα τῆς δούλωσις; and πνεῦμα πορνείας Hos.4:12 ἡ πνεύματα τῆς πορνείας. More often, however, this state of mind is due to 'supernatural influence, good or evil' (rather than self-derived). Examples of this are πνεῦμα γοφίας etc. Is. 11:2 ἡ πνεύματα τῆς γοφίας; πνεῦμα πλανήσεως Is. 19:14 ἡ πνεύματα τῆς κρίσεως; πνεῦμα κατανυγέως Is. 28:6 ἡ πνεύματα τῆς κατανυγέως; πνεῦμα κατανυγέως Is. 29:10 ἡ πνεύματα τῆς κατανυγέως (see Romans 9:8); πνεῦμα χάρτος καὶ οἴκτηρμον

Zech. 12:10 orefλη από τον θάνατον; and in the New Testament: πνεῦμα ἀσθενείας Luke 13:11; πνεῦμα δείλιας 2 Timothy 1:7; and ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς πλάνης John 4:6. Thus it is evident that here πνεῦμα σοφείας is 'such a spirit as accompanies a state of slavery, such a servile habit as the human πνεῦμα assumes among slaves'. Further, the slavery implied in v.15a is 'that of the Law'. Although πάλιν goes with εἰς φόβον, the meaning is closely connected with πνεῦμα σοφείας: 'The candidate for baptism did not emerge from the terrors of the Law only to be thrown back into them again'.

The mention of baptism is not unique to Sanday and Headlam; a number of exegetes take Paul to be referring to baptism in the positive ἐλάβετε clause (v.15b);

We who, like the first Christians, received baptism with the laying-on of hands, did then and there receive...a spirit proper not to slaves but to sons of God....


2. Sanday and Headlam, 1902, p.203.

Similar is Denney: 'The aorist refers to the time of their baptism, when they received the Spirit'. The difference, of course, is that Denney means the Holy Spirit whereas Sanday and Headlam and Gore mean something like 'state of mind proper to sons'.

Alford, the earliest exegete of those here considered, suggests an unusual interpretation of Πνεῦμα σου λείας. This phrase, says Alford, refers to man in his natural state, which is always a state of bondage. By negating the first clause, Paul is saying that the Πνεῦμα given to them and who was the agent of their birth into a new state, was not a spirit of bondage (i.e., 'a spirit to retain them or lead them back into their old state'). This, says Alford, eliminates the problem. Interestingly enough, Alford rejects de Wette's suggestion that Πνεῦμα be taken with εἰς φόβον. A number of commentators explain Paul's use of the word ἀββᾶ in a way similar to Beet:

Christ spoke frequently to God and of God as Father; and taught us to do the same. Hence the Aramaic word with which He approached God became sacred to His disciples, and passed unto the lips even of those who spoke other languages.

3. Beet, 1902, p. 225. See also Moule, 1891, p. 147; Liddon, 1893, p. 133; Sanday and Headlam, 1902, p. 203; Gore, 1900, pp. 292-293.
Alford feels that the entire phrase ἀλφάντα is a form of address,¹ as do Moule² and Gore.³ Moule accepts Meyer's interpretation in toto. Sanday and Headlam offer the most extended exegesis; strangely enough, they feel that the two languages side by side indicate that 'Christianity had its birth in a bilingual people'.⁴ There is an element of intensity in the repetition, but this is not enough to explain it. Neither is it correct to assume that Paul is explaining ἀλφάντα for his readers with the words ἀντίφαντα:

It seems better to suppose that our Lord Himself, using familiarly both languages, and concentrating into this word of all words such a depth of meaning, found Himself impelled spontaneously to repeat the word, and that some among His disciples caught and transmitted the same habit.⁵

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2. Moule, 1891, p.147.
5. Sanday and Headlam, 1902, p.203.
This is perhaps the strangest explanation, or combination of explanations, we have yet encountered.

At v.16, virtually all of these exegetes accept the ipse translation of αὐτὸ (the Spirit itself). Further, there is a decided opinion in favor of taking the testimony spoken of in v.16 as referring in part to the κραίζομεν of v.15. Thus many would agree with Denney, who feels that the end of v.15 ought not be punctuated with a full stop but a comma: 'In that we cry, Abba, Father, the Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, etc'. The meaning of v.16 then is as follows:

Our own spirit tells us we are God's children, but the voice with which it speaks is, as we know, prompted and inspired by the Divine Spirit itself.¹

But if one has understood Tυεγμα υιοθετίας (v.15) not as the Holy Spirit but in terms of subjective attitude or state of mind, then such an explanation is impossible. Beet, for example, comments:

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¹. Denney, 1900, p.648. See also Vaughan, 1880, p.156; Moule, 1891, p.137; Alford, 1894, p.392.
Our spirit cried (v.15) Abba, Father: and, just as a similar cry from a child is a testimony - though possibly a mistaken one - that he is a son of the man whom he calls Father, so the cry to God of our spirit, the highest part of our being bears-witness that we are children of God. That this cry was prompted by the Spirit of God, adds His infallible testimony to the testimony of our own spirit, and assures us that our confidence is no delusion.¹

Interpretations which do not take v.16 closely with v.15c are somewhat more speculative. Sanday and Headlam compare the verb used in v.16 (συμμάρτυρειν) with its use in 2:15 and 9:2 and comment:

There the "joint witness" was the subjective testimony of conscience, confirming the objective testimony of a man's words or actions; here consciousness is analyzed, and its data are referred partly to the man himself, partly to the Spirit of God moving and prompting him.²

Similarly, Jowett points out that man can be thought of as consisting of two spirits: a higher, which is the Holy Spirit, and a lower, which is his own.³ The implication is, as Liddon puts it, that, 'These concur, the first speaking from without through revelation and the second from within in the depths of consciousness...'.⁴

1. Beet, 1902, p.226 (Emphasis is Beet's).
2. Sanday and Headlam, 1902, p.203.
4. Liddon, 1893, p.133. See also Gifford, 1886, p.153.
It is noteworthy that in no case does an exegete take the compound verb \( \sum_{\text{\footnotesize\textit{ω}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{μ}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{α}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{τ}}} \) in the sense identical with the simple \( \mu\text{\footnotesize\textit{α}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{τ}} \).

Comments from our exegetes on the clause beginning \( \epsilon'\text{\footnotesize\textit{π}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{p}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{r}} \text{\footnotesize\textit{s}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{σ}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{h}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{o}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{m}} \) (v.17b) are not detailed enough to answer all of the questions we put to Continental writers. Beet, however, notes that the \( \epsilon'\text{\footnotesize\textit{π}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{p}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{r}} \) is to be taken as fulfilled (he translates, 'If, as I assume, etc.'),\(^1\) and Denney would also seem to make this assumption,\(^2\) as does Alford.\(^3\)

Sanday and Headlam at v.16 refer readers to an extended note on the use of \( \epsilon'\text{\footnotesize\textit{π}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{p}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{r}} \) in ch.3:30. There they discuss the etymological distinction between \( \epsilon'\text{\footnotesize\textit{π}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{p}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{r}} \) and \( \epsilon'\text{\footnotesize\textit{γ}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}} \) ('\( \epsilon'\text{\footnotesize\textit{π}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{p}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{r}} \) is used of a condition which is assumed without implying whether it is rightly or wrongly assumed, \( \epsilon'\text{\footnotesize\textit{γ}}\text{\footnotesize\textit{e}} \) of a condition which carries with it the assertion of its own reality');\(^4\) the discussion is rather academic.

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2. Denney, 1900, p.648: 'Paul was sure of it in his own case, and took it for granted in that of others'.
3. Alford, 1894, p.393.
however, since the distinction cannot hold for the New Testament. What is important is that both 'lay some stress on the condition, as a condition'. The idea of suffering with Christ Sanday and Headlam interpret in terms of the 'Biblical conception of Christ as the Way'. The implication of this is that, 'His life is' not merely an example for ours, but in its main lines presenting a fixed type or law to which the lives of Christians must conform.

There is a general reluctance to include in the idea of suffering with Christ the general notion of sorrow or pain common to human existence, but rather the tendency is to restrict suffering to that which is directly the result of one's faith. Beet is virtually the only exegete who suggests the persecution of early Christians as the historical basis for Paul's words.

1. Sanday and Headlam, 1902, p.96.
2. Sanday and Headlam, 1902, p.204. Gore in his interpretation of v.17b (1900, pp.296f) follows this suggestion of Sanday and Headlam.
III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

The purpose of this final section is to highlight the main features of the history of exegesis of the passage under consideration. Because trends and turning points, as they relate to the specific problems of each verse, have been noted throughout the paper, it should not be necessary to list or discuss each of these in detail. Rather we shall comment upon some of the most significant points of exegesis with regard to specific verses, and make a number of general observations concerning the history of interpretation at large. We shall also suggest what we consider to be problems which, in our opinion, are not particularly fruitful areas for research and those which deserve further investigation.

There are two general features of the interpretation of our passage which stand out. The first, and perhaps most remarkable of these features, is how early on in history the 'accepted' issues were determined. Within three to four centuries after Paul had written his Epistle to the Romans, the major problems with which exegetes for centuries to follow would struggle
had been determined, a fact which surely must have far-reaching implications for modern commentators. The second remarkable fact is really a natural consequence of the first: this is the sheer repetition of problems and suggested solutions. But perhaps the most significant general finding of our study is that often when the accepted problems and solutions of exegesis are broken out of and even rejected, the most interesting and creative developments occur. This is seen most vividly in our times by the publication of Karl Barth's *Der Römerbrief*. Further, it is of interest, although perhaps predictable, that these points of change occur in those places where a creative theological mind or movement is at work. (However, it doesn't always happen that where such a mind or movement is at work these things occur).

What are some examples of this, as they occur in the history of the interpretation of our passage?

The debate between the Antiochene and Alexandrian produced perhaps the most theologically rich Biblical commentaries ever to be written. It is remarkable that commentaries by Origen and Theodore of Mopsuestia, for example, remain sources of wonder to modern historians and exegetes. In particular, Theodore's commentaries on Paul's Epistles continue to challenge modern
Biblical theologians, a challenge which has not yet been fully met. There is some justification for suggesting that Theodore's highly eschatological interpretation of v.15 is more 'modern' than that of many later exegetes.

Both Origen and Augustine were Pauline scholars, and it was largely the implications of their debate concerning the correct interpretation of St. Paul with which the Church in the West concerned itself in the centuries following. Above all, Augustine's interpretation of vv.12-14, with its emphasis upon God's grace as the source for all victorious Christian living, set the tone for the interpretation of those verses.

It is also worthy of note how unpopular or unappealing interpretations dropped out. We have two outstanding examples of this in the first six centuries of Christian exegetical endeavor, and both concern v.15 (which, without doubt, has been considered the most problematic verse of our passage throughout the history of exegesis). Origen's suggestion that the first two parts of the verse are concerned with the distinction between immature and mature Christians was far too reminiscent of a kind of Gnosticism to be allowed to stand. Yet it does appear in a transformed version at least twice: in the medieval suggestion concerning the different kinds of fear, and in Pietistic (especially Wesleyan) suggestions about
conversion marking the changes between cultural Christians and truly-converted Christians, or between Christians at the beginning of their conversion and after maturity. Augustine’s suggestion that the 'spirit of bondage' was Satan was also too dangerous to permit ready acceptance.

Our study has suggested that the Middle Ages was a period of greater Biblical activity than has often been realized. Here it was not theological controversy which stimulated activity, but rather the burning desire to fix, once and for all, an 'authoritative' interpretation of Scripture. Here we have seen two kinds of endeavor: on the one hand a piling up of source materials, drawn from Patristic sources, into collections or anthologies (as we have chosen to call them) and the culling of these sources into something like a recognized or 'standard' expositor. This finally culminated in the Glossa Ordinaria. On the other hand, and on a higher level, there was a theologizing of the text itself. In our passage we have seen that this led to something of a misuse of Scripture, for verses such as 15, 16 and 17 became simply a springboard for theological reflection. This is illustrated by long excursions into the question of kinds of fear both in believers and in Christ (at v,15) and technical discussions about the precise way in which one can apply such human terms of reference as
'adoption' and 'inheritance' to God and his people (vv.16-17).

If St. Thomas, the most outstanding of all medieval and Scholastic scholars, is not well-known as a Biblical scholar, it was because he began from a body of theology and sought to find a Biblical basis for this, rather than building a theology from Biblical categories. Yet, in his concern to find the basic, literal meaning of the text, he and Nicholas of Lyra were a foreshadowing of the revival of learning so evident in Erasmus and the Biblical humanists. This revival of learning brought with it all of the advantages of linguistic science, but was not used to the same advantage by all: in Erasmus it led to the founding of a most attractive and sound hermeneutic (the so-called Erasmian method of exegesis), used by many of the reformers and post-Reformation exegetes with uneven results. The commentaries by Bugenhagen, Bucer and Oecolampadius, for example, are often seen by twentieth-century eyes as arcane and unhelpful in their use of illustrations from classical literature and philosophy. Even in these, however, there were developments of considerable, if not lasting, interest. Bucer's and Bugenhagen's exegeses of v.15 and Oecolampadius's exegesis of v.14 are some of the most inventive we have come upon in our history.
However, the Erasmian method, which itself was dependent upon the great advance in linguistic skills in his time, is perhaps best vindicated in a writer such as Beza, whose interpretation of our passage is surely one of the most balanced and helpful in the entire history we have surveyed, even though it is rather doctrinaire in its assumptions.

Perhaps one of the most creatively conceived commentaries of this general period is that of Melanchthon. It is in the design - if not results - of his commentary that we see the fruits of freeing oneself from one's inherited pre-conceptions and applying totally fresh categories to the text. In relation to our passage, one of the great improvements of exegesis came as a result of seeing Paul's words in their connectedness (a fact reflected so well in Melanchthon's commentary), i.e., the realization that vv.12-17 have a close connection with Romans 6.

Both Luther and Calvin, the figures which tower above all others in this era, clearly saw this connection, but drew different conclusions from it, each in accordance with his theological view of the Christian life. While Luther spoke of the continuing struggle of the 'inner man' with his sinfulness in his attempt to live obediently in the face of the evil which he had inherited, Calvin resolved vv.12-13 into an epigram of the doctrine of
sanctification, and Paul's words on 'adoption' into doctrinal language concerning the role of the Spirit in regeneration.

The difference between Calvin and Luther can also be seen in their interpretations of v.15. Luther's interpretation of this verse is a personalized one; those with a 'spirit of bondage' are those living (presently) in the fear of the wrath of God, incurred by transgression of the law, and in which those who have trusted Christ for their justification have a 'spirit of sonship'. In contrast to this is Calvin's interpretation, solidly based on his carefully worked-out doctrine of the 'Covenant of Grace' — which soon established itself as the viewpoint to be dealt with.

Two generalizations concerning Reformation and post-Reformation exegesis can be made: upon close comparison it becomes evident that the best of Reformation exegesis is highly congruous with the findings of 'modern' exegesis, and that the latter is often highly incongruous with the exegesis of subsequent 'Lutherans' and 'Calvinists'.

The opinions of the reformers soon evolved into a bitter and doctrinaire dispute between the two Protestant camps, each of which was more concerned to use the Bible as a weapon for polemic than to listen to it as the Word of God. In the centuries which followed, the most productive exegesis very often came from
those individuals and movements which opposed orthodoxy. Further, it is highly interesting that in some cases movements which opposed Protestant orthodoxy recovered and re-interpreted aspects of Reformers' thought. This can be illustrated in Coccejus's interpretation of v.15, which utilizes Calvin's 'Covenant of Grace' doctrine as restated in his *Föderal theologie*; and in pietistic exegesis of the same verse, which took up Luther's personalized interpretation and applied it to conversion. Two of these movements dominate our study from the 17th century to the 19th: Pietism and Rationalism. Because of their concern for life in the Spirit and for personal piety, such men as Spener and Anton make the most of what they recognize to be the major theme of our passage: a life of inner spirituality and ethical uprightness as brought about and assisted by the Spirit of God. The historical result of Rationalism was the unreserved application of critical disciplines, literary and historical, to Scripture. As is illustrated in our passage, the extremely detailed work which these exegetes applied to the text, primarily in the 19th century, performed a great service. In part this was in terms of pruning away a good deal of the dead wood which had accumulated throughout the centuries. Another result was a careful limiting of the grammatical and historical possibilities. This can be documented over and over again in our passage: for
example, the relation of v.12 to preceding material (although there is no general agreement on this issue) and a careful reconstruction of this rather problematic verse itself. But perhaps the most significant development was the suggestion, based on grammatical analysis, that v.15 does not necessarily imply the Spirit's ministry in the two dispensations. This freed exegetes from the necessity of discussing, as had been done from the time of the Antiochenes, all of the problems involved in throwing v.15a into the Old Testament.

Nevertheless, 19th-century exegesis, while performing a useful and even epoch-making achievement, brought with it its own problems. The most obvious of these was the creation of a vast bulk of detail on virtually every letter, phrase, and sentence of Scripture. This detail was so great as actually to obscure the words and meaning of the Bible. The other result was the introduction of a bewildering variety of possibilities and indecisive results. This is reflected, for example, in all of the varied opinions concerning the proper interpretation of the word 'spirit' in vv.12-16.

If one is looking for a consensus of agreement as to the problems such as those posed in the introduction of this thesis, then one will be disappointed. Two examples will suffice: it has been said over and over throughout the history of
interpretation that Paul implies an unspoken, positive obligation in v.12. But there is no agreement on the question to whom (God, the Father, Christ, or the Holy Spirit) believers are obligated. Neither is there agreement as to why we are obligated. Again, at v.17 where Paul clearly speaks of the necessity of suffering on the part of Christians, there is not a shred of agreement as to what the suffering consists of; neither is there agreement as to how the conditional clause in which Paul's words are found is to be construed.

Thus there are no 'results', other than negative, which can be set down as irreversible. There is, in other words, no single interpretation which is 'correct', and certainly there is no exegetical school or period which can be canonized as ideal; as Calvin said in another context, it is unfair to compare persons of different epochs. Rather such a study as ours can only point up, as we have intimated in the introduction, some known blind alleys of exegetical possibilities and uncover forgotten but helpful lines of interpretation. These functions, we hope, have been served in the body of this paper itself.

In looking back over the centuries of exegesis, two things become clear; no theological generation ought to be content with the hermeneutical principles of previous generations, a fact often denied by whole generations of exegetes, especially evident in
the Middle Ages and in 19th-century critical exegesis. And, the
corollary of this, that the times of greatest interest, Biblically
speaking, have been those in which men of commitment and
intelligence have, under God, turned to Scripture for guidance in
interpreting theologically for their own life and the lives of
those who live in their times the meaning of the Christian
revelation in relation to the Church, the world, and human and
cosmic destiny. It is a source of wonder and thanksgiving that the
Church, often in spite of herself, has never failed to give
birth from time to time to men who have done this. What is more,
she has often not recognized the prophet in her midst. Reflecting
upon the history through which we have come, one is moved to ask,
'When will we again see a great renewal of such a kind?' Or
perhaps, 'Have we just lived through such a renewal and not
recognized it?'

Earlier it was suggested that such a study as ours
might provide a meeting place for dialogue between confessions
within the Church. What would be a starting place in our passage?
Throughout history one can discern a continuing debate between those
who emphasize either the indicative or imperative (Sein/Sollen) of
the Christian life. That is, there has been perpetual disagreement
between theologians concerning the balance to be maintained between
Paul's mention of the 'givens' of the faith (i.e., the gift of the
Spirit in baptism, life, the future glory, etc.), and the extent
to which the outcome of the Christian life depends upon the moral
quality of the present life; or, put another way, what is the proper
balance to be kept between man's receiving of God's grace and his
response to God's gifts?

This issue has been near the surface in all of the
climactic theological debates of the Church: the controversy between
Antiochene and Alexandrian Christianity in the East, the Pelagian
controversy in the West, the Reformation, and, to an extent, the
challenge of Pietism in more recent centuries. It is notable that
virtually all Christian interpreters have clearly perceived Paul
in our passage to be speaking about the moral quality of the Christian
way of life, what his view of this way of life is, and what
relation the Holy Spirit has to that view. Because the answer to
this question changed with every major turning point in the Church's
history, such a question, when applied to virtually every verse in
our passage, can be used as a paradigm for understanding the
theological differences which presently divide the Church.

One's understanding of Paul's anthropology is
fundamental to the interpretation of our passage, and indeed to all
of Romans 8. Throughout the course of our study, we have often
confronted a number of exotic and even bizarre theories concerning Paul's use of words such as 'body', 'flesh', 'spirit', etc. A good many people have been led astray by such speculation. This uncontrolled philosophic speculation is surely a blind alley. For a number of centuries exegetes burdened themselves with a problem of the relation of the two peoples, Old Testament and New Testament, especially in relation to the Spirit's ministry. One of the benefits of 19th-century exegesis was the elimination of the need for this. Verse 15 is not the place to find answers to Paul's views on Israel. Other matters, such as the technical details in Paul's use of human terminology in God's relation to his people, such as 'adoption' and 'inheritance', are obvious in their inappropriateness. In a more general sense, it seems clear that all attempts at over-systematization of exegesis are doomed to failure, whether it is St. Thomas reading Romans as if it had been written as a tight, Scholastic document, or Melanchthon attempting to force it into a classical rhetorical discourse.

On the other hand, a number of possible lines of research and inquiry surely deserve further consideration. At v.12, for example, the question of the source of the positive, unspoken obligation has often been alluded to. Typically, earlier answers to this question were facile and very general in nature, e.g., we
are indebted to God because of all the good things he has given us (Haimo: 'Quid ergo accepimus ab illo ut ei debitores essemus? Quidquid boni habemus'). Later, when exegetes began looking back in Paul's argument for a source, answers became tied to specific verses, e.g., the entire section of Romans 8:1-11, vv.10-11, or v.11. This is contingent on a current pressing problem for New Testament scholars: the problem of determining Paul's rationale of the motivation for a superior ethical life on earth has certainly been addressed by theologians of the past, but there is a clear need in our age for re-thinking Paul's understanding of ethical motivation.

Although exegetes have always been fascinated by Paul's use of the word Abba, it was Joachim Jeremias who first pointed out how rich are the ideas imbedded in the early Church's use of this word. While the foundation work which needed to be done on this problem has been already accomplished by Jeremias, it is clear that the eighth chapter of Romans has much to tell us, from the viewpoint of the early Church's greatest theologian, about the worshipping congregation and the individual Christian at prayer, and the ministry of the Holy Spirit in the act of prayer.
There is need for an objective discussion of the
difference between the classic Protestant and post-Reformation
views of the witness of the Spirit (v.16) and the implications of
those interpretations not only for the life of believers but for
the study of the Bible itself.

Finally, it seems to the present writer that Paul's
clear statement concerning the necessity of suffering 'with Christ'
is an unmired idea worth considerable attention, especially so in
a time when Christian men exist in such a variety of conditions,
when the nature of suffering has been, for many parts of the world
community, vastly altered, and in a time in which modern man has
been made increasingly aware of the cosmic dimensions of his
existence. For this, of course, not only v.17b is necessary, but the
verses immediately following (which, incidentally, indicate that
Paul was, in his own way, fully aware of the cosmic dimension of
suffering), and, indeed, the entire section, vv.17b-39. There is
perhaps no other idea in our passage which better illustrates the
major conclusion of our study: that Scripture must be continually
and unceasingly re-interpreted.
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