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LANDLORDS, LINEAGES AND LAND REFORM IN AN IRAQI VILLAGE

By

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of Durham.

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ABSTRACT

The main theme of the thesis is to analyse the social and political

consequences of central government involvement and recent Land Reform in a

village in central Iraq.

In the first place, it examines the historical background to con-

temporary political change. Over the past fifty years, there has been

considerable political and economic change at both the national and local level.

After the registration of the tribal lands in the names of the shaikhs

and important landlords, which took place in the 1930's, the political

policies of various governments during the period of the Monarchy (1921-1958)

became explicitly pro-landlord, thus establishing a form of indirect rule

in the countryside.

However, after the Revolution of 1958 and the assumption of power by

the Ba'thists, some ten years later, there occurred a marked shift in the

power structure. These post-Revolutionary governments initiated new policies

of direct intervention in the rural areas, through Land Reform programmes and

increased political and economic control. Since 1968, the Ba'th Party has

assumed a major role in encouraging and controlling various forms of peasant

participation in both the political and economic life of the village.

The thesis analyses the processes by which the village chosen for

detailed study became more integrated into the wider political structure.

The study shows how the shaikhs and landlords, who once constituted the

political and economic elite, have, in the course of increased external control

and the introduction of new economic incentives, begun to lose their basis

of prestige and socio-political status. These changes led to the emergence

of a much more open field of competition between the new peasant and Party-

based leaders and the older pillars of village society. They also reinforced

the fragmentation of tribal and lineage organisation leading to the development

of smaller kinship groups and to new forms of political alliance and ideology.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The material for this thesis was collected in the course of fieldwork in Da'udia Village, Diyala Province, central Iraq, between September 1974 and September 1975, followed by another brief visit in the summer of 1976. During my stay in Da'udia I received warm hospitality from the people of the village, who accepted me into their homes and patiently answered my questions. I am deeply grateful to them all for this experience, and I should particularly like to thank Shaikh Rashid of Albu 'Amir, Hajj Hasan of Dulaim, Jawir, and Abu Hisham, chief local government official in Da'udia.

In Durham, my greatest debt is to Dr. Norman Long, for his enthusiastic and patient assistance, his generosity of spirit, and unfailing sense of humour. His detailed advice and perceptive comments have been of inestimable value in shaping my work into its present form.

My thanks are also due to Dr. Peter Sluglett, who helped me in every possible way during my study in Durham, both my wife and I will never forget his generosity and sympathy. I should also like to thank Mr. David Brooks for his encouragement in the early stages of my work. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the kindness of the secretaries and library staff at the Department of Anthropology and the School of Oriental Studies, especially Mrs. Robinson, Mrs. Elvin and Mrs. McBain, and Miss Judith Willis for typing a barely legible manuscript with speed, accuracy and cheerfulness.

For financial assistance I acknowledge with gratitude the Gulbenkian Foundation, which awarded me a two year fellowship in 1973. This was supplemented for a further year by a scholarship from the Iraq Government. Most of all in this connection I should like to thank my Father and Mother, for supporting me financially for the last two years, and for enabling me to complete the thesis after my scholarship had been terminated. More importantly I should like to express my deepest gratitude to them for their

unfailing encouragement and support through all the stages of my education.

Above all, I should like to thank my wife, Amal, who shared my fieldwork with me, and who enabled me to gain access to much of the information on which this study is based, especially from women in the village. Her patient understanding and her lively and informed interest have enormously enriched my work over the last five years.

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INTRODUCTION

The research problem

There is little doubt that the rural population of Iraq, as in other parts of the Middle East, is being profoundly affected by recent processes of economic and political change. Judging by the evidence of the last few decades, it seems reasonable to assume that sooner or later all rural societies in the Middle East will undergo fundamental re-structuring in order to adjust to their rapidly changing physical and social environments. Yet what is of interest is not the inevitability of change, but rather the nature of the modes of articulation and accommodation between the rural population and the larger structures of which they are a part.

A useful perspective for viewing the interplay of local and national level processes is that provided by F. G. Bailey, who has examined the relationships between national political structures and "small-scale relatively undifferentiated tribal or village structures". Bailey emphasizes that "almost without exception today these (local level) structures exist within larger encapsulating political structures ... These larger structures are, of course, much more specialized and command much greater political resources than the structures which they enclose".[1] According to Bailey, there are at least three possible ways in which these two types of structure interact:

> "At one extreme is the situation in which the encapsulation is merely nominal, merely, one might say a matter of geography. The leaders of (the encapsulating structures) either cannot or choose not to interfere with (the encapsulated structure) ... The second possible posture for the leaders of (the encapsulating structure) is the predatory one: they do not concern themselves with what goes on inside (the encapsulated structure) as long as the people who live under it pay the revenue ... The final posture is that in which the ruling power has taken the

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[1] F. G. Bailey, Strategems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics, Oxford, 1969, p. 146.

decision that (the encapsulated structure) must be
integrated: which, in practice, means radical change,
if not abolition ... This posture is adopted by
virtually all the developing nations: they seek, with
varying degrees of determination and success, to put an
end to casteism or communalism or tribalism or region-
alism and to make a united nation." 1)

A basic aim of the present thesis is to analyse the consequences of
this process of encapsulation as it occurred in the context of a village in
central Iraq. It combines an historical account of socio-political change
with an analysis of the contemporary dynamics of political processes at
village level. A major part of the thesis is devoted to a detailed
discussion of the nature and social consequences of the two Land Reform
programmes initiated by the post-Revolutionary governments.

Before the Revolution of 1958, the rural political system in Iraq was
characterized by a relatively high degree of local autonomy. Political
activity in the countryside was controlled by small groups of wealthy
absentee landlords or by rurally-based leaders of large and powerful kinship
organisations. These leaders controlled the main links between the rural
communities and the urban centres. The policies of all pre-Revolutionary
governments (1921-1958) were essentially those of indirect rule, thus
conforming to Bailey's second type of encapsulation. These governments
relied heavily on local tribal shaikhs for the maintenance of order, and the
latter were rewarded by being given increasingly independent control over
local productive resources. Their tribesmen were gradually transformed
into sharecroppers, or tenants working under their supervision. This
system gave the larger landlords economic and political leverage and made
them virtually part of the state apparatus.

With the collapse of the Monarchy after the Revolution of 1958,

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1)   Ibid., pp. 149-151.

a new type of political structure was inaugurated which emphasised the

necessity of transforming the rural areas so that the whole of the rural

population might be fully integrated into the state. From this time onwards

the character of the Iraqi state fits more closely the third alternative

described by Bailey, although during the first decade there was a period of

policy indecision, and considerable political and economic uncertainty.

However, with the coming to power of the Ba'thists in 1968, a clearer

path towards rural transformation was established. A system of party

organisation was instituted to replace the former political and bureaucratic

structures. The new arrangement was intended to create a framework to

transcend existing lineage and kinship organisations and to put an end to

persisting power struggles between kin-based factions. The Party cell

system was established to consolidate local Party leadership so that

individuals would be able to participate more fully in such organisations

as cooperatives, land reform institutions and community associations.

The Ba'thists attempted to introduce fundamental changes in Iraqi society,

with the object of destroying the remnants of the old political order once

and for all. This was to be achieved by means of a "socialist revolution"

to be effected in the rural areas by the implementation of a second Land

Reform programme and by the encouragement of increased peasant participation

in local and national politics. The new leaders believed that it was not

enough simply to introduce new forms of administration and land tenure; it was

also necessary to raise political consciousness among the peasants and to

encourage their involvement in the Party. The new policy depended therefore

upon the building of a strong political organisation at grass roots level

which would serve to create new political links between the 'revolutionary

vanguard' and the masses in rural and urban areas.

Over the last twenty years, then, rural Iraq has become increasingly

incorporated into the national political framework. This thesis examines

the impact of changing economic and political processes on Da'udia, an

agricultural community located some 40 miles north of Baghdad. After a

review of historical developments since the end of the Ottoman Empire and

the British Occupation in the course of the First World War, the analysis

will focus on the repercussions on village social and political behaviour

of rural development programmes implemented since 1958.

Da'udia village seemed particularly suitable for study, since it has

directly witnessed various forms of government involvement since Ottoman

times. In 1974, when the study began, the village consisted mainly of the

remnants of large estates and land expropriated under the Land Reforms of

1958 and 1970. After the advent to power of the present government in 1968,

the peasant beneficiaries of the Land Reform came to participate in national

political processes for the first time in their lives. Wide ranging

social and organisational changes have occurred since the implementation

of the second Land Reform of 1970, because this involved an elaborate re-

settlement scheme, the establishment of a block system of cultivation and

the formation of new cooperatives and peasant associations.

At the time of these socio-political changes, Da'udia was composed of

two rival kinship groups,[1] Albu 'Amir who are Shi'i, and Dulaim, who are

Sunni Muslims. The heads of these two kinship groups had been engaged in

continuous competition for control of local political and economic resources

since Albu 'Amir's arrival in the village in the latter part of the nineteenth

century. Before 1968 the political organisation of Da'udia was controlled

and manipulated by the family of the shaikh of Albu 'Amir, who were the

dominant local landlords and had developed strong political connections with

the government in Baghdad. After 1968 Albu 'Amir's power base became

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1)   I use the term 'kinship group' generally to refer to groups based on
      a core of agnatic kin, real or putative, at whatever level of
      organisation (maximal or major lineages, sub-lineages, or sets of
      households).

seriously eroded and village politics became the focus of struggles between several smaller peasant groups attempting to capture new positions of political influence. During the first two years after 1968, one group of the leaders of Dulaim managed to concentrate power in their own hands through their control over the local Party leadership and thus became important brokers between the local community and the wider political system. Later, with the implementation of the Land Reform of 1970, major rifts took place among the leaders of the two main factions over the distribution of their affiliated peasant households within the new settlements established by the government. This breach drove various sub-groupings to ally themselves across kinship boundaries for the first time. Concomitantly, the Ba'th Party began to mobilise support in the village, which led to the emergence of a number of new local leaders, who started to exploit both the antagonism and social separation between the leaders of the two main factions, and access to Party and government agencies in the village.

Given this context, the thesis aims to examine recent political events and processes within the village, taking account of various ecological and economic dimensions. These changes and continuities derive in part from policy decisions adopted by central government, but are also substantially affected by the legacy of the past. Hence any attempt to discuss socio-political processes at village level necessitates developing an approach which takes account of diachronic factors and of the relations between micro and macro levels.

Analytical approach

In order to develop the analysis it becomes necessary to make explicit the underlying theoretical assumptions and concepts employed. In the first place the thesis adopts what Turner has called a "processual analysis". Thus he writes: "explanations for both constancy and change can, in my opinion, only be found by systematic analysis of processual units and temporal

structures".[1]

The methodological and theoretical assumptions of such an analysis were first worked out in relation to the study of local level politics by Swartz, Turner and Tuden. Writing in 1966, they point out that:

> "from the perspective of politics, processes such as
> marshalling support, undermining rivals, attaining goals,
> and achieving settlements are the prime _foci_ of interest.
> The groups within which these processes occur are important
> because they constitute the field of political activity, but
> ... the political field can expand and contract ... The
> important point here is that ... a political study follows
> the development of conflicts for power (or for acquiring support
> for proposed goals) into whatever groups the processes lead ...
> (and this) may require an examination of the roots of (a local)
> struggle (for leadership) in the national context." [2]

Such a perspective, then, emphasises the importance of focussing upon political activity in terms of the strategies adopted by particular actors and groups who, within defined political fields, draw upon a range of resources, relationships and values, some of which may derive from outside the immediate social context. As Mitchell has argued, such an approach to the understanding of social organisation is especially valuable when we are dealing with social systems which contain alternative value frameworks and which therefore present the actors with a considerable range of choice.[3] The notion of "social field" allows for the coexistence of these disparate types of structure. Also, as Long points out:

> "the idea of a _field_ of activity is wider than what we would
> normally mean by ... a political _structure_ for it refers
> not only to those institutional arrangements specifically
> designed to attain certain ... political ends, but also
> takes into account other kinds of relationships and values
> that may be utilised for the same purpose. The heuristic
> advantage of such a concept is that it ... (enables one to
> handle) what Firth has called the 'organisational elements' -
> the processes by which individuals choose between

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1)   Turner, V. W., _Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors_. Ithaca 1974, p. 43.

2)   Swartz, M. J., Turner, V. W., and Tuden, A. (eds.) _Political Anthropology_. Chicago and New York, 1966, pp. 7-8.

3)   See Mitchell, J. C., _Tribalism and Plural Society_. London, 1960, p. 19.

alternative courses of action and manipulate various norms and values in order to justify them." 1)

A further important element is stressed by Swartz, Turner and Tuden. Political fields have their own spatial and temporal dimensions. Hence political struggles may be confined to a segment of the village involving only close kinsmen and neighbours, whilst other types of conflict may spread to include unrelated participants from outside the village. Likewise, certain types of political process may endure over varying periods of historical time. Thus, for example, certain types of structural conflict may persist over generations, whereas others may be relatively short lived. Hence an adequate analysis of political processes requires taking into account events over both long and short time scales. It also necessitates an analysis of the ways in which political fields may expand or contract. Attention to these various dimensions is brought out in the presentation of data in this thesis.

In the earlier part of the study we shall be concerned with identifying the determinants of political change at national and village level in order to establish the historical and environmental context within which the political struggles between the two main factions took place. Implicit in the interpretation is the fact that one is dealing with shifts in the political field in terms of both external resources and the build-up of internal social and ecological pressures. A major change occurred in the nature of the political field relevant to village politics after the Revolution of 1958, which had the effect of integrating the village more closely with the wider political system, thus making available to contestants a new range of political resources and alternative modes of legitimation. This is shown

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1) Long, N., Social Change and the Individual. Manchester 1968, p. 9. See also Bailey, F. G., Tribe, Casts and Nation. Manchester 1960, pp. 10-11 ; Epstein, A. L., Politics in an Urban African Community. Manchester 1958, p. 232 ; Kapferer, B., Strategy and Transaction in an African Factory. Manchester 1972, p.

most strikingly in the case of some Dulaim leaders who were able to tap a

wider range of relationships as a result of their early contacts with the

Ba'th Party.

The analysis is followed through in subsequent chapters by an

examination of the changes that accompanied the 1970 Land Reform, which once

again expanded the field of political activity and intensified the competition

for resources, many of which derive directly from the State. As a result of

this change in the nature of the political field, new leadership styles and

strategies emerged, in which peasant leaders became prominent in the

village for the first time. Their success must be attributed primarily to

external rather than internal factors, although the structural opposition

between the two traditional factions undoubtedly contributed as well.

In attempting an analysis of political change using the notion of

political field it is useful to focus on the points of articulation of the

local society with the wider system of social and political relationships.

Actor-oriented types of analysis have suggested that certain categories

of individuals, or even groups, frequently perform brokerage roles, thus

controlling crucial sets of relationships that link the local system with

the larger whole.[1] Thus Adams has conceptualized the role of the power

broker as follows:

> "His actual control over either sphere depends upon his success
> in dealing with the other; his control in one level of
> articulation provides a basis for controls in another ... He
> controls one domain by virtue of having access to derivative
> power from a larger domain." [2]

This interpretation is relevant to a consideration of the ways in which the

different political leaders operated in Da'udha. Under the Mandate and Monarchy

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[1]   See Long, N., _Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development_.
        London 1978, pp. 119-128 for a general review of literature on
        brokerage; see also Boissevain, J., _Friends of Friends_. Oxford 1974,
        pp. 147-169.

[2]   Adams, R., Brokers and Career Mobility Systems in the Structure of
        Complex Societies, in _Southwestern Journal of Anthropology_, Vol. 26,
        No. 4, 1970, pp. 320-321.

the shaikh and the landlords controlled the links with the State and derived

support and legitimacy for their actions from the national government.

This clearly facilitated their ability to manipulate less powerful groups

in the village, and left them free to use traditional lineage values to

provide a justification for their status, which was reinforced by their

monopoly of the use of force. In contrast, in the more recent past there

has been a proliferation in the number of brokerage positions, none of which

commands a monopoly over political resources. The new power brokers operate

under different constraints; if they occupy a Party or administrative position

they clearly have the backing of influential outsiders, but their sources

of support and legitimacy[1] in the village are more fragile. They do not

control the same level of economic resources as the landlords, nor can they

so easily appeal for local support on the basis of kinship affiliation:

indeed, several Party officials come from outside the village. On the other

hand, Party members from within the village must necessarily seek support

from segments wider than their own sub-lineages. In addition, the new

positions do not carry the same kinds of economic rewards. This situation,

which is illustrated in the account of dispute settlement in Chapter IX,

contains elements of both legitimacy deriving from customary relationships and

values and from that associated with the new ideology and organisation of the

Ba'th Party.

The development and significance of factionalism

Political conflict in the village must also be examined not only from

the point of view of individual brokers or political entrepreneurs but also

[1] As Swartz, Turner and Tuden suggest it is useful to distinguish between support and legitimacy: "we understand 'support' to mean anything that contributes to the formulation and/or implementation of political ends" (including force) ... "legitimacy" is a type of support that derives not from force or its threat but from the values held by the individuals formulating, influencing, and being affected by political ends." (Political Anthropology, op. cit., p. 10).

in terms of the social groups involved in the contest. These groups,
although often based on kinship and lineage ties, acquire their basic form
from the links that exist between leaders and followers, that is, leaders
recruit followers when engaging in political manoeuvres, and although
recruitment may take place along kinship lines, their raison d'être is the
network of transactions between the members, and the opposition they display
towards other similar groups. Nicholas suggests that such groups may be
called "factions". He states that factions emerge during organised conflicts
concerning the uses of public power: they are basically impermanent,
although they may last for long periods. They are built around the activity
of a leader, who recruits followers on the basis of single or multiple
criteria. [1]

Thus, as many writers have emphasised, a principal element in a faction
is the leader-follower relationship, and the specific transactions that occur
between the two. This holds whatever the idiom of solidarity or whatever the
rationalisation of the links between leaders and followers. For example,
agnatic kinship may be used as an explanation for the development of a certain
type of factionalism but this is no guarantee that the group gains its
coherence because they are agnatic kin. Many of the groups in Da'udia explain
their allegiances by references to their being members of the same lineage,
or by being descendants of a common agnatic ancestor, but closer examination
shows that the fundamental ties binding a group together are overlapping

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1)   Nicholas, R. W., Factions - A Comparative Analysis, in M. Banton, Ed.,
      Political Systems and the Distribution of Power, London, 1965, pp.
      27-29. For further discussion of factionalism see Beals, A. R., and
      Siegel, B. J., Pervasive Factionalism, in American Anthropologist,
      Vol. 62, 1960, and the same authors' Divisiveness and Social Conflict,
      Stanford 1966; Bailey, F. G., Strategems and Spoils, Oxford, 1969,
      pp. 51-55; and Alavi, H., Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties,
      in The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1973, pp. 23-62.
      Boissevain's discussion of factions (op. cit., p. 192, and note 27
      p. 249) covers similar points but he emphasizes multiple criteria of
      recruitment, although apparently contradicting himself in a footnote
      when he refers to Indian examples where kinship forms "the most
      important recruitment principle".

political and economic objectives and interests, and not kinship _per se_. Indeed in many of the cases analysed in the body of the thesis, parts of lineages align with parts of other lineages, and alliances between various sub-lineages fluctuate according to different situations. Unlike the balanced opposition of segments in a segmentary lineage model,[1] the lineages and sub-lineages involved here are usually unequal in numbers, economic resources and political influence. Their main foci of organisation are their respective leaders, who engage in contests for control over scarce resources and for access to superior sources of power.[2] This phenomenon is especially significant in situations of rapid social change, when new and more desirable prizes and rewards are created. Nicholas sees the leaders of factions as the prime movers in organising factional groupings, since they are motivated by their quest for personal power and influence.

Given the fact that factions are essentially built around the leader-follower relationship, they are not equivalent to the development of political organisations like political parties that claim to represent the interests of particular social strata. Moreover, factions are essentially made up of unequal relations of power and control between the leader or leaders and the followers. This is brought out in the material analysed here in that many of the followers of the landlord factions are subordinate and dependent peasant sharecroppers. The same situation pertains for the new peasant factions, since the majority of followers look to their leaders for favours and political rewards. It is for this reason that these two

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1) For an account of the classic segmentary model in relation to Iraqi tribal groups, see Fernea, R., Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority Among the El Shabana of Southern Iraq, Cambridge, Mass., 1970, pp. 77-104. See also Peters, E., The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 90 (1960), pp. 29-53.

2) The whole question of the importance of external superior sources of power is discussed by Adams, R. N., in Energy and Structure; A Theory of Social Power, Austin and London 1975, pp. 68-93, where he analyses power domains and levels.

contrasting patterns are structurally similar. In this context kinship

has reinforced these unequal relationships between landlords and peasants.

The same indeed is true of relations justified by party ideology. Bailey

emphasises the need to view factions from the point of view of their

emergence:-

> "If one looks at the circumstances in which factional alignments
> appear, the process is not at all frivolous. It is, as I
> said, like adolescence: a rejection of past allegiances and
> a fumbling, haphazard and - to an outsider- desperately
> selfish searching for new ways of arranging social inter-
> actions. Factions may arise when the environment provides
> some new kind of political resource which existing groups
> cannot exploit." 1)

This observation is useful in considering the material on Da'udia since

factional struggles emerge precisely at points of transition, when the

political field is being reshaped in response to changes in the overall

political environment. One of the difficulties of factional conflict is

that it can never be satisfactorily resolved or regulated, since by definition

it interferes with the achievement of overall goals. Over time factions which

may be based initially on a series of social transactions between the leaders

and followers (e.g. economic or status rewards) develop an element of moral

consensus, and engaging in conflict with structurally similar groups increases

solidarity. Thus, although factions may be disintegrative for the social

order, they often lead to a certain internal cohesion and to the formulation

of particular group goals and ideologies, at which point they may become more

permanent entities. This process is seen in relation to the struggles between

Albu 'Amir and Dulaim in the pre-Revolutionary period, but is also illustrated

by the smaller political groupings which have emerged in the recent situation

and which to a certain extent justify their actions with reference to

Ba'thist ideology.

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1)   Bailey, F. G., op. cit., p. 52.

Parallel observations: Harik and the egyptian case

Although there are few works that analyse in detail the local impact of

planned rural development schemes and land reform in the Middle East, one

notable exception is that of I. F. Harik[1] who examines political change

in the context of a single village in the Nile Delta in the late 1960's.

Using a somewhat similar actor-oriented approach, he shows how local political

structures were shaped by the introduction of the 1952 Land Reform programme

and the establishment of new government-sponsored organisations.

A central point in his analysis is the notion that all change deriving

from outside agencies must necessarily be interpreted by the local actors:

> "... ideological messages emanating from the capital
> were localised to a marked extent as villagers under-
> stood them in a selective manner relevant to their own
> conditions, not necessarily as they were propagated by
> the literati." (p. 264).

Extending this perspective, one can further argue that in the same way the

new organisational apparatus itself is utilised by local groups and individuals

for the achievement of goals which may not necessarily be compatible with

those intended by central government. As has been suggested, this applies

particularly to the way in which the 'traditional' political leaders have

been able to adapt to new circumstances, infiltrating government institutions

and making strategic use of them in order to consolidate and protect their

positions.

A second point is that incorporation of the Egyptian village into the

wider political field, coupled with a programme of social reform, leads to

a "pluralistic structure" of power:

> "Under such conditions, power tends to become diffuse in
> a vast network of relations rather than highly dichotomised
> between leaders and followers ... Leaders try to accommodate
> each other in order to reduce the extent of dependency on
> their constituencies ... Thus different political blocs

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1)   Harik, I. F., The Political Mobilization of Peasants: A Study of an
      Egyptian Community. Bloomington and London, 1974.

seek to contain each other and prevent the emergence of
a hegemony by one leader or group ... During brief,
alternate periods, (one of the landowning families and the
new mayor) achieved relatively dominant positions in the
community, but they could not hold on to their hegemony
because of changing conditions and intense competition." 1)

These observations suggest a process by which factional groups multiply.

A similar conclusion is reached from the analysis of data on Da'udia, where

the shift from a pattern of dual opposition to the proliferation of smaller

factional groupings took place as a result of changes in the external

environment and from various internal pressures relating principally to

access to cultivable land and water. Hence the contemporary situation is

characterised, like the Egyptian example, by a system of "several competing

and internally cohesive groups" that from time to time are rearranged to

form new alliances.[2] Because of the dispersed nature of resources and the

legacy of political divisions stemming from the nineteenth century, it

becomes difficult for any one group, however well organised, to monopolise

village politics.

Chapter Outline

The study is divided into three parts. Chapters I and II provide

an account of the general historical background; Chapters III and IV describe

the village setting and the framework of kinship organisation; and Chapters

V to IX analyse in detail recent social and political developments, with

special emphasis on the consequences of the Land Reform programmes.

Chapter I is concerned with the historical context of the 'feudal'

system in central Iraq and its political and economic implications. This

chapter describes the circumstances surrounding the decline of the tribal

system and delineates some of the historical dimensions relevant to an

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1)   Harik, I. F., Ibid., p. 283.

2)   Ibid., p. 126

understanding of contemporary processes of social fragmentation and
conflict within rural society. Chapter II outlines recent political changes
in Iraq and describes the two Land Reform programmes enacted since the
Revolution of 1958. It also gives an account of Ba'thist organisation and
ideology.

In Chapter III the physical setting of the village is described and
details of its social and economic structure are given, stressing particularly
the importance of the ecological dimension and the diverse social origins
of the population. Chapter IV, which discusses the patterns of kinship
organisation within the village, provides an essential background for an
understanding of the political competition and factionalism which are
analysed in later chapters.

In the third part of the thesis the processes of political competition
and factionalism are elaborated. In Chapters V and VI it is shown that the
village was, and to some extent still is, divided into two rival political
groupings based on membership of the two main tribal groups, Albu 'Amir
and Dulaim, with their respective lineages. While in the earlier phase the
dominance of Albu 'Amir was more or less unchallenged, changing political
circumstances permitted the emergence of Dulaim as a serious contender for
power. Chapter VI documents this and subsequent developments which
facilitated the growth of the Bá'th Party as a major political factor in the
village. In Chapter VII the rise to political power of the heads of the
smaller sub-lineages is analysed, especially in the context of the new
settlement scheme, and the factional struggles that occurred among them as a
result of these developments are discussed. Thus these three chapters consider
the main strategies adopted by the various kinship groups in aligning and
realigning themselves in response to changing economic and political circum-
stances inside and outside the local community.

Chapter VIII explores the workings of two new local organisations

introduced by central government - the Peasant Bureau and the cooperative
societies - and analyses the ways in which these have become arenas for
political struggle, and have given new dimensions to the pattern of factional
rivalry.

Chapter IX provides a detailed exposition of a number of case studies
of dispute settlement [1] and attempts to identify the factors which determine
the choice between using 'traditional' or State-regulated forms of mediation
and arbitration. In the final chapter, the historical and contemporary
socio-political scene is reviewed and, extrapolating from the case of Da'udia,
a number of general comments are made concerning the characteristics, trends
and possible outcomes of recent rural development policy in Iraq.

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[1]   In this and certain other chapters, I present case studies, using the
       method of situational analysis. See van Velsen, J., Situational
       Analysis and the Extended-Case Method in Epstein, A. L., (ed.),
       The Craft of Social Anthropology, London 1967; also Turner, V. W.,
       Schism and Continuity in an African Society, Manchester 1957. For a
       discussion of the significance of case study method for an analysis
       of problems of social change, see Bailey, F. G., Tribe, Caste and
       Nation, Manchester 1960, pp. 15-16, and Long, N., Social Change and
       the Individual, Manchester 1968, pp. 7-11.

CHAPTER I

Social and Political Organisation in Iraq and the Development of Land

Tenure: An Historical Background

Iraq is a predominantly agricultural country, where some 56% of

the population continue to derive their income directly from agriculture

and animal husbandry. This, combined with a relatively small population,

means that agriculture will be a key factor in all plans for economic

expansion both now and in the future. Iraq probably depends more on land

and irrigation than any other country in the Middle East except Egypt.

In consequence, political and social change has invariably been closely

connected with changes in the system of land ownership, with the result

that "land tenure, as an independent variable, makes its influence felt

throughout the entire set of social institutions and social structure of

which an agricultural society is composed".[1)] Furthermore, the fact

that the area has been politically divided throughout all but the

relatively recent past, either between centralised governments or under

a number of local dynasties, has facilitated the spread of different

practices and customs of land tenure in the different parts of the area

that now forms the modern state. A brief review of socio-political

developments in the area until the revolution of 1958 will serve to set

the land system in its historical context.

Historical Developments, 1258-1958

In 1258, after a long siege, Baghdad fell to the Mongols, and the

Abbasid caliphate, which had been founded in 750, came to an end. For

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1)   Harris, B., *Iraq: its People, its Society, its Culture.* (New
       Haven, 1961), p. 194.

began an ambitious programme of sweeping social, economic and political

reforms.

Social and economic developments

Throughout the whole of the period reviewed above, agriculture and

pastoralism provided a livelihood for the vast majority of the inhabitants

of the area. In this context, the extent of the power of the state

could be measured by its ability, or its inability, to collect taxation

on agricultural produce. For the greater part of the Ottoman period at

least, the powers of the state barely extended outside the towns in which

its garrisons were quartered.[1] The population was divided, as it still

is, into three main groups: the Sunni Arabs, who live to the north and

west of Baghdad, and dominate the towns of Baghdad and Mosul; the Shi'i

Arabs, who form the largest single element in the population as a whole,

and account for most of the rural population of the south of the country,

and the Kurds, (also Sunni Muslims, but from a different ethnic and

linguistic background from the Sunni Arabs), who form a fairly homogeneous

block in the north and north-east of Iraq. Since Sunni Islam was the

"official" religion of the Ottoman Empire, Sunni Arabs have always pre-

dominated in public life and politics in Iraq, though it should be stressed

that the distinction between Sunni and Shi'i no longer carries the same

connotations today as it did in the period which has just been reviewed.[2]

Until the first quarter of this century, most of the population of

the area were nomads, either cattle herders or pastoralists. By the latter

half of the 19th century, however, a significant tendency towards

sedentarisation is discernible. A variety of factors, among them greater

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1)   Sluglett, P., p. 1.

2)   See page 124 below.

the next two centuries Iraq[1] was nominally a part of the Mongol empire,

ruled somewhat sporadically from Tabriz. After the death of Timur Leng

in 1405, control over west Persia and Iraq passed first to two Turcoman

confederacies, the Kara Koyunlu and the Ak Koyunlu, and then to the

Safavid dynasty, which came to power at the end of the 15th century. At

this time, the Ottoman empire was gaining new strength and confidence

under the energetic rule of Selim the Grim (1512-1520) and the Safavids

were decisively defeated at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514. Egypt and

Syria were captured from their Mamluk rulers in 1516 and 1517, and in

the reign of Sulaiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), generally taken as the

zenith of Ottoman power, an Ottoman force captured Baghdad and Tabriz, and

by the early 1550s, the whole area, including Basra, was brought under

Ottoman rule.

It is important to stress that the actual extent of Ottoman control

varied considerably throughout the long period during which Iraq was

nominally under the authority of Istanbul. In the first place, the

Ottomans were frequently challenged by Persia, especially in the 17th

and 18th centuries, and, more generally and continuously, by the nomadic

tribes inhabiting the west and south of the area, whom the Turkish governors

were rarely sufficiently powerful to control. Iraq was added to the

Empire in the period of its heyday, and from the end of Sulaiman's reign

in 1566 to the latter part of the 18th century there was a period of

sporadic but unmistakable decline, in which the influence of the centre

over the provinces gradually decreased.[2]

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1)   "Iraq" is used in this context to denote the area comprising the
      modern state, though it must be understood that this did not exist,
      as a political unit, until its creation in the period immediately
      after World War I.

2)   The preceding paragraphs are based on Holt, P. M., _Egypt and the
      Fertile Crescent 1516-1922._ (London, 1966), pp. 1-61.

In Iraq, local forces were in charge of the country by the beginning of the 17th century, and for a short while Baghdad fell to the Safavids once more during the reign of Shah Abbas, until its recapture in 1639. Local forces once more asserted themselves, and from the middle of the 18th century to the early 19th century Ottoman control was lost to a Mamluk elite who had come to acquire "an impregnable position in the administration of Baghdad".[1] Finally, the Mamluks were themselves removed in 1831, when 'Ali Ridha Pasha entered Baghdad, with an army from Istanbul and the attempted reintegration of the Iraqi provinces into the Ottoman Empire began. In Jwaideh's words:-

> "Thereafter the governor was sent directly from Istanbul, and was granted his office in return for the payment of an agreed amount to the Treasury as a substitute (badal) for the revenue he was expected to raise from the province. But most of the governors' extortions were held in check by the power of the leaders of the tribal confederations in the tribal areas. Every attempt to extend direct Turkish control beyond the towns met with the solid resistance of the tribes." [2]

By the second half of the 19th century, however, Ottoman policies had undergone important organisational changes through the inauguration of a series of reforming edicts known collectively as the Tanzimat. These had begun with the disbanding of the traditional militia, the Janissaries, in 1826, and their replacement by modern armed forces, trained and equipped on European lines. Although the difference between intention and reality must once more be emphasised, and also viewed in the context of the considerable distance of the Iraqi provinces from the capital of the Empire, the general effect of the Tanzimat reforms was by no means negligible. It is also significant that these reforms took place partly

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1) Holt, P. M., p. 147.

2) Jwaideh, A., Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq. In, St. Antony's Papers, Vol. XVI, (London, 1963), p. 112.

parallel to and partly in response to various economic developments

which were to be of great significance for the area:-

> "With the opening of the Suez canal, and the growth of
> river communications, the Tigris and Euphrates valleys were
> more accessible to the outside world, and as a result the
> growing of cereal crops for sale or barter became possible,
> and gradually also more attractive than rearing stock for
> subsistence. The closed economy was greatly modified,
> and surplus produce was sold to outsiders who resold either
> to the towns or to India and the Gulf. The desire for the
> greater security needed to achieve steady agricultural
> production broke down some of the resistance to the
> Ottomans' attempts to pacify the country, and enabled them
> to bring more of the area under their control." [1]

Thus it is in this period that the Iraqi provinces first came into

major contact with the outside world. Of the imperial powers, Britain's

interests were paramount in the area, since it occupied a strategic

position on the route to India. In 1906 and 1914 Britain's share of

"Mesopotamian and Gulf trade" was over 75% of the total.[2] In the

early part of the 20th century another factor emerged, that of the

potential wealth of the oilfields of south-west Persia, and the inferences

to be drawn from the very similar geological formations to be found on

the Ottoman side of the Persian/Ottoman border in central Iraq. Securing

the free flow of the oil from Abadan, and checking Turkish intrigue at

the head of the Gulf, were the two chief objectives of Indian Expeditionary

Force "D", which landed at Fao in October 1914, following the Turkish

decision to side with the Central Powers on the outbreak of war.

Although it began as a holding operation, the Mesopotamia campaign

gradually changed into a war of conquest. Inspite of severe reversals,

and an appalling casualty rate, British troops entered Baghdad in March

(1917) and captured Mosul city a few days after the Armistice with Turkey

was signed at the end of October, 1918. The course both of the Mesopotamia

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1) Sluglett, P., <u>Britain in Iraq 1914-1932.</u> (London, 1976), pp. 1-2.

2) Sluglett, P., pp. 55-56.

campaign[1] and of the events leading to the establishment of the Iraqi

state have been amply documented elsewhere.[2] A unified state was

created, with an imported constitution and an imported monarch, Faisal,

son of King Husain of the Hijaz, who was to rule, in a somewhat limited

sense, until his death in 1933. An Arab facade was erected, covering

the reality of British control, exercised. until 1932, by British civilian

"advisers", whose advice had to be taken, by a British High Commissioner

responsible to the Colonial Office in London, and by units of the Royal

Air Force. In 1932, Iraq became nominally independent; the mandate regime,

which had begun formally in 1920, was terminated, and Iraq became a member

of the League of Nations. However, the R.A.F. maintained a strong

presence in the country, and the oil of Iraq was entirely in the hands of

a British dominated company, the Iraq Petroleum Company. In the 1930s a

series of coalitions and personal alliances dominated political life until

the entry of the army on to the political stage, in the first coup d'etat

in the Middle East, in 1936. Thereafter the army ruled until 1941, when

Iraq briefly attempted to join the Axis powers; the attempt failed, and

a second British occupation began. After the war, and especially during

the cold war period, all form of opposition to the monarchy and the state

was rigorously suppressed, and a state of inertia on the surface

accompanied by vigorous clandestine activity underneath it came to an end

in the revolution of 14th July 1958, when another military movement, the

Free Officers, assassinated the King and members of his entourage, notably

the hated Nuri al-Sa'id, and set up a revolutionary government which

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1) See Barker, A. J., The Neglected War. (London, 1967).

2) e.g. in Ireland, P. W., Iraq, a Study in Political Development.
   (London, 1937): Longrigg, S. H., Iraq, 1900-1950. (London,
   1953): Sluglett, P. J., Britain in Iraq 1914-1932. (London,
   1976).

security, and the widening of Ottoman control, which was aided by such inventions as the steamship and the telegraph, made agriculture seem both possible and profitable, though progress in this direction was by no means uniform. This fundamental shift in the mode of production was accompanied by the gradual realisation that land ownership, leases, and boundaries, were matters of far greater importance than they had been under the more elastic conditions of a nomadic or pastoral regime. We should note two other parallel developments at this time: first, the decline in the power of the tribal shaikhs, and secondly, the interest of the Ottoman authorities, as part of the centralising attempts of the Tanzimat reforms, in "rationalising" the collection of agricultural taxes, which formed the mainstay of the revenues of the State.

With the gradual spread of settled agriculture, the shaikh's role as the leader of a band of armed retainers to defend the tribal area became less and less important. Sub-shaikhs, or sirkals, gradually became independent of their tribal superiors, and towards the end of the 19th century began to pay taxes direct to government rather than through the intermediary of the paramount shaikh. This process was encouraged by the Ottoman authorities who were anxious to break the powers of the leaders of the great confederations, and to introduce the Tanzimat reforms into Iraq. The section of these reforms which is of particular relevance in this connection is the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, first introduced under the governorship of Midhat Pasha between 1869 and 1872. Before discussing this, however, it is necessary to consider the traditional arrangements in force in the Iraqi countryside before the arrival of Midhat and the 1858 Code.

The traditional system of land tenure in the irrigation zone of Iraq [1]

Throughout most of the Ottoman period, the basis of "land-holding"

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[1] Since the village of Da'udia lies in the irrigation zone, I shall not discuss tenurial arrangements in the rainfall zone to the north.

was the tribal <u>dira</u>, a large area not limited to land actually tilled, but also including non-cultivated and even submerged marsh land, over which a tribe exercised customary rights of occupation. The tribal system, as it then existed, had no formal legal basis, and no protection from the state. In law, the tribal lands were regarded as state lands, and the tribal occupants were merely tenants at will.

Under this system, cultivation, where it existed, was partly communal, and partly individual. The method of farming necessitated some communal organisation, since a single household could not undertake the clearing of land, the building of dams and the strengthening of the river banks. The <u>sirkal</u>, or sub-shaikh, acted as a kind of foreman, managing these functions on behalf of the tribe, organising canal clearance and irrigation, allocating seed, and performing other necessary duties. In the 18th and early 19th century the area actually cultivated within the <u>dira</u> was small, and shifted as canals silted up and the land became impoverished through salination. The area cultivated by each individual shifted in consequence, and though individual prescriptive rights to land, called <u>lazma</u>, did exist in some areas, they were generally fairly rare. The tribal shaikh collected an amount varying between $\frac{1}{3}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ of the amount produced from the tribesmen, in kind. Hence under this system the tribesmen were neither individual owners nor labourers, but occasional cultivators of land which was communally owned.[1]

On top, as it were, of the traditional system, the Ottoman state collected taxes where it could. The legal basis of this activity was the theory that ultimate ownership of agricultural land, called <u>raqaba</u>, was vested in the state. The "cultivators", whether great shaikhs or notables

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1)   Though authorities differ here; e.g. Fernea, R. A., <u>Shaikh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority among the El-Shabana of Southern Iraq</u>. (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), p. 97.

or their tribesmen were only entitled to usufruct, _tasarruf_, of the
state, or _miri_, land. In Iraq, as almost everywhere else in the Middle
East, private freehold property in agricultural land, called _mulk_, was
virtually unknown.[1] However, although there were no _formal_ private
property rights, the weakness of the state facilitated the existence of
de facto rights, which operated through the agency of the _iltizam_ or
tax-farming system, particularly, for our purposes, in the period from
c.1800 to c.1869. This system, itself a development of the former system
of military vassalage (_iqta'iyya_), was a device through which the central
authority recognised the reality of its dependence upon local shaikhs
and urban notables for the actual collection of revenues. The taxation
of a particular province or sub-province was auctioned to the highest
bidder, who would in turn farm out smaller units to others on a local
level. In this fashion, individuals, where they were in a position to
exert authority, became de facto landlords, because they had won entitle-
ment to tax collection. Such a system was clearly open to enormous abuse,
most clearly from the point of view of the actual cultivators, but also
from the point of view of the state, which, although it often had little
choice in the matter, was not at all anxious to sustain a group of
powerful middlemen which could and frequently did challenge its authority.
It is significant, therefore, that several efforts were made to abolish
the _iltizam_ or tax-farming system in the period in which the Tanzimat
reforms began to gather momentum, after 1840. The Ottoman Land Code of

1) See Harik, I., _The Impact of the Domestic Market on Rural-Urban
   Relations in the Middle East_. In, _Rural Politics and Social
   Change in the Middle East_, Ed. Antoun, Richard and Harik, I.,
   (Bloomington: Indiana University press, 1972), pp. 338-339.
   For a thorough discussion of the land categories, see Haider, S.,
   Land Problems of Iraq. (London University, unpublished Ph.D.
   thesis, 1942).

1858 was a major milestone in this process although its eventual effects

on Iraqi rural economy and society were to be quite other than those

intended by the framers of the legislation.

The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 and its Application in Iraq

Fundamentally, the Code was totally unsuited to actual agrarian

conditions in Iraq. It claimed to be no more than the assertion of the

state's traditional ownership rights over miri land, (raqaba), and the

restriction of the powers of the tax-farmers, or multazimin, to that

of tasarruf, or usufruct. But it also offered an important new security,

the provision of title deeds (tapu sanads) to land, which were to be

given to those who could prove ownership. Sluglett has noted:-

> "Naturally, the code was far from being an act of dis-
> interested benevolence on the part of the Ottoman author-
> ities. As well as enabling Government to assert its
> control over the provinces, the growing tendency towards
> sedentarisation and the increasing cereal production which
> resulted had probably acted as a spur to a more vigorous
> revenue policy ... Primarily the code was designed for
> conditions in Anatolia, where, by creating a body of lease-
> hold tenants, the fragmentation of large estates would result
> in the breaking of the power of the so-called "lords of the
> valleys". It was felt that the possessors of sanads, in
> Sir Ernest Dowson's words "a body of industrious peasant
> proprietors and tax-payers" would be more ready to pay taxes
> to a Government which had confirmed them in the possession
> of their lands. In Iraq, however, these conditions did not
> apply. The Code could not fit around the kind of corporate
> communal ownership which existed, and the difficulties which
> followed Midhat Pasha's attempts to introduce it to the
> area after 1869 largely derive from the incompatibility of
> the two systems. Neither Islamic nor Ottoman Law recognised
> the existence of corporate legal entities, which meant that
> leases could only be given to individuals, rather than to
> the 'X' or 'Y' tribe. Thus in Iraq the Code was used to
> restore or in some cases even to create the authority of
> tribal leaders by giving individuals rights over lands which
> had formerly been held in common by the leaders and their
> followers together." 1)

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1)   Sluglett, P., p. 236. See also Dowson, E. M., An Enquiry into Land
       Tenure and Related Questions. (Letchworth, 1932). and Warriner,
       D., The Real Meaning of the Ottoman Land Code. In, Issawi, C., (ed),
       The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914. (Chicago, 1966),
       pp. 72-78.

disputes between landlords and peasants over land.[1]

Conclusion

Agriculture provides the livelihood of the majority of the Iraqi population. The greater part of this population are tribes which settled during the later period of Ottoman rule on land that had been out of cultivation for five centuries or more, after its devastation by the great Mongol invasion. In the transition from a nomadic/pastoral to an agricultural economy, the tribes retained their identities as social, economic and, to some extent, political units.

Their hereditary shaikhs continued to bear responsibility as leaders of their people in an existence which derived its security from an immemorial tradition of mutual dependence. The economy was at first one of almost pure subsistence; the lands were held by the tribe without title deeds or fixed boundaries. A subsistence economy offers little inducements to the complex, costly and possibly dangerous process of turning customary and collective land occupancy into private ownership as recognised by law in the modern state.

The Ottoman land code of 1858 facilitated land registration in the names of tribal chiefs. At about the same time the development of river communications, linking up with scheduled steamship lines enhanced the value of stockbreeding and agriculture as cash-producing activities. This evolution at first made slow progress, but was immensely accelerated after World War I. Opportunities for an agricultural market economy increased, while the British, in contrast to the Ottoman authorities, followed a policy of supporting the tribal chiefs and identifying their interests with those of the new regime.

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1)   Baali, F., p. 51.

Similarly, the process of granting title deeds was not straightforward, and occasioned much misgiving and corruption. "What happened in many cases was that the tribal leaders would register the lands in their own names, thus making the whole _dira_ to all intents and purposes the personal property of the _sanad_ holder."[1] Thus _sanads_ were sometimes issued for lands which overlapped, sometimes duplicated in respect of identical properties, and sometimes issued for great areas of land for which the government had neither the right nor the intention to grant tenancies. This resulted in considerable loss of revenue and was contrary to the government's expressed policy that land should be assigned to the actual cultivators.

The hesitation and reluctance of the tribesmen to obtain _sanads_ - they were also, it should be noted, regarded as facilitating the system of conscription for life then in force - left the way open for high administrators, urban notables, and the astuter shaikhs, to purchase land and _sanads_. Hence a new class of absentee landlords grew up at the end of the 19th century, with legal title to their estates. They began to demand _mallakiyah_, or landlord taxes for their land, which was still cultivated by tribesmen whose social status had suddenly taken a turn for the worse. In many cases, the latter bluntly refused to recognise the rights of the absentee landlords, or to pay the _mallakiyah_. This change in the social relations of production generated two different attitudes. The absentee landlords and the _sanad_ holders felt that the government was their main ally against the peasants. Since they had become incapable of collecting _mallakiyah_ by themselves from the tribesmen, they turned to the government to carry out collection on their behalf. On the other hand the tribesmen naturally found themselves in opposition to the government,

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1)   Sluglett, P., p. 237.

who supported their enemies against them.

In practice, the tribesmen generally disregarded the titles which were granted, and continued to farm in various semi-tribal ways. Thus complete confusion resulted, since there arose one situation established by law under which certain owners held legal titles to land, and another situation existing in fact, in which the persons cultivating the land had claims recognised by custom or prescriptive right, which were enforceable at law to a somewhat uncertain extent. In fact, the policies initiated by Midhat lasted for a period of less than twelve years, at the end of which less than one fifth of the land area then under cultivation was registered in tapu. The tapu offices were closed, and no more alienations of this kind were accepted. But these developments were important not so much at the time but in the precedent which they set for the future, especially during the period of the British occupation and mandate from 1914 to 1932, when these practices were substantially reintroduced.

The Ottoman governors after Midhat considered that allocation of lands to tribal shaikhs would deprive them (the Ottomans) of much of the control which they were able to exercise over the tribes. Proceeding from this assumption, they lost no opportunities of exploiting the principles of state land ownership by appointing loyal shaikhs as lessees, and withholding such privileges from those who had shown tendencies towards disobedience or independence. Midhat's successors also took lands forcibly away from some tribes, and granted them out to others. This policy took little account of the long-term possible consequences for both the cultivators and the government, and in the period between the middle 1880s and 1914 the tribes fought a series of bloody wars which were entirely rooted in the land problem. "Each time land was taken from one of the tribes and given to another there followed a period of wars and

recrimination between the tribes concerned, the ejected tribe trying

desperately to take back its former lands and the new possessors seeking

no less tenaciously to retain their hold over it."[1]

In many parts of Iraq the wars over land had weakened the tribal

confederations, and resulted in the creation of hostile groups, and mass

migrations of tribal sections from one area to another. Among some tribes,

the tribal organisation stayed firm, and the power of the shaikhs appears

to have grown stronger as the influence of the shaikhs of great confederations

(the paramount shaikhs, shuyukh al-mashayikh) declined.

In matters affecting land tenure and the collection of revenue, the

British authorities consistently claimed that they were not innovating,

but continuing existing arrangements. However, the system "which was in

fact produced was a selection of those practices which facilitated the

simplest and most effective method of administrative control combined with

the collection of as much revenue as possible. The most important result

of this policy was to create a small number of large property owners,

either through direct land grants to individuals or through measures designed

to bolster the powers of tribal shaikhs and landlords."[2]

In the latter connection, the British authorities enacted the Tribal

Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation in 1916, to be applied in all cases

of dispute in which one or both the parties were tribesmen. "The

regulation ... enhanced the shaikh's position by giving him absolute jural

authority over his tribe, while other courts, with codes based on Indian

civil and penal systems, were set up for the rest of the population. Thus

the selected shaikh was confirmed in his office, became the accredited

agent of the central administration and had official power to ask for aid

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1) Jwaideh, A., pp.128-29.

2) Sluglett, P., p. 238.

in civil and criminal matters."[1] Furthermore, the British authorities

claimed that the settlement of title to land could not be properly regulated

until a complete cadastral survey was undertaken. It is noticeable, however,

that no large scale attempt to make such a survey was made during the

period of the mandate, and Baali remarks that the British made no serious

effort to settle the land question throughout their period of both direct

and indirect rule in Iraq.[2]

In the course of the period which began in 1915 and continued through

the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, processes were set in motion whereby the

economic and political powers of shaikhs and landlords over the cultivators

were immensely increased. The status of the tribesmen declined from that

of free cultivators or nomads, to that of virtual serfs, tied to the soil

by a series of enactments, notably the Law Governing the Rights and Duties

of Cultivators of 1933. As Doreen Warriner noted:-

> "In the new state, where the large landowners were powerful,
> strong pressure to introduce a system of land registration
> came from the shaikhs and landholders who were installing
> pump irrigation on the banks of the two rivers. Whereas
> in the past the tribal authorities had resisted the central
> government in its efforts to register land in individual
> holdings in the names of the cultivators, they now demanded
> settlement of title as a means of ousting tribesmen whose
> prescriptive rights to graze and cultivate prevented the
> pump owners from securing the land supplied by the pump as
> his own property. It was now the wealthy who wished to use
> the state against the cultivators, not the state which aimed
> at securing the rights of the cultivators against the
> wealthy." [3]

Thus tribal land was alienated, in what were in effect freehold tenures,

to shaikhs, urban notables, politicians, and other supporters of the regime.[4]

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1) Sluglett, P. p. 240.

2) Baali, F., The Relation of the People to the Land in Southern Iraq.
   University of Florida Press, Florida, 1966, p. 13.

3) Warriner, D., Land and Poverty in the Middle East. London, 1948.
   pp. 144-145.

4) For an indication of politicians' activities in this connection, see
   Sluglett, P., p. 101.

Registration of title was carried out under the Land Settlement Law of

1932, which gave the Government the right to settle title and establish

registration procedures. In this context it should be noted that much of

the land assigned in this way was "new", in the sense that it had not

been previously cultivated, and the number of mechanical pumps, increased

from 143 in 1921 to 2,500 in 1939 and 2,900 in 1949, with proportional

increases in the irrigated area.[1] Hence, "because in Ottoman times the

cultivators on tribal lands had no legal title to the land which they

occupied, the landlords were able, during the period of the mandate, to

use their political power, and British sympathy, to secure legal title to

land which was by custom and tradition the property of the tribe."[2]

The most striking feature of the ownership and control of land in

'Independent Iraq' (i.e. before the revolution of 1958) was the concentration

of large agricultural holdings in a few hands. Thus Table 1 shows that

of the cultivated lands of Iraq in 1958-1959 there were 3418 holdings of

1,000 donums or more, and that these, although constituting only 1.9% of

all the holdings, included 68% of all cultivated land. This concentration

of ownership and the control of agricultural and pastoral land by a few

individuals, together with the nature of the relationship between land-

lords and peasants, have led writers to describe Iraq as having a "feudal"

or "semi-feudal" system.[3]

These developments naturally had a profound effect on the structure

of the tribal system, which broke down gradually over the pre-revolutionary

period as one of the results of the factors which have been enumerated above.

These various social and economic changes were consolidated by the settlement

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1)   Gabbay, R., _Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq_.   London, 1978,
      p. 25 and footnote 12.

2)   Warriner, D., _Land and Poverty in the Middle East_. (London, 1948).
      p. 107.

3)   e.g. Baali, F., pp.28-29. However, see Gabbay, R., p. 78, for a
      useful discussion of the terms "feudal", "feudalism" in the Iraqi
      context.

<center>Table 1</center>

Size, number and area in donums[1] of cultivated holdings in Iraq[2]

Size	Number	% age	Area	% age	Average
Less than 1	22,801	13.5	8,524	*1	0.4
1-4	35,157	20.9	64,531	0.3	1.8
4-20	45,539	27.1	429,910	1.8	9.4
20-100	41,305	24.5	1,943,987	8.3	51.1
100-600	18,616	11.0	3,868,001	16.6	296.2
600-1,000	1,510	0.9	1,156,735	5.0	766.0
1,000-4,000	2,461	1.4	5,011,683	21.5	2128.1
4,000-10,000	682	0.4	4,078,593	17.5	5980.3
10,000-50,000	251	0.1	4,554,280	19.5	21786.0
50,000-100,000	19	*1	1,334,102	5.7	70215.9
Over 100,000	5	*1	876,913	3.8	175382.6
All holdings	168,346	100.0	23,327,259	100.0	138.6

1)   1 donum (or mashara) = 0.62 acres or 2,500 sq. metres

2)   Computed from Agricultural and livestock census of Iraq, 1958-1959.

of title to land, carried out in the period after 1933. The shaikhs thus

became the legal owners of the dira, the sirkals the managers and agents,

and the tribesmen share-cropping fellahin, with no rights or status whatever.[1]

Although the landholder was not legally permitted to charge interest

on any advances given to cultivators, his share of the crop when he provided

the seed increased out of all proportion to its cost. When the land was

pump-irrigated the fellah's share was generally only two or three sevenths

of the crop. (In date or fruit groves, where the landholder had to make an

investment and the value of the output was high, the fellah might receive

only between one fifth and one eighth of the crop.) The fellah's share

of summer crops which could only be grown with water furnished by the land-

holder might range from one half to two-thirds. In the latter case, he

supplied his own seed and implements.

1)   Warriner, D., Land Reform and Development in the Middle East.
      London, 1957, p. 136.

The size of the area cultivated by each fellah and his family

varied widely according to the quality of the land, the means of irrigation,

the availability of water, the type of crops, their yields, and the season.

The fellah planted an average of about 20 <u>masharas</u>[1] of winter crops, but

owing to the shortage of water, could plant only about 15% of this area in

summer crops. In rice areas he generally had only about four or five

<u>masharas</u>, and in date or fruit groves an equal amount. In each of these

latter cases, however, the output per <u>mashara</u> was more valuable. Lack of

sufficient draft animals and implements, low yields and the necessity of

turning over a larger share of the crop to the landowner all combined to

depress the economic status of the cultivator.[2]

On the whole, the relationship of the peasants to their previous

tribal leaders was transformed into one of serfdom and exploitation, and

in consequence, many peasants from all over the rural south deserted the

land. In these circumstances, as Fernea has noted, tribal organisation was

often reduced to a collection of named groups with little or no corporate

function or separate existence. Even where land registration procedures

allowed peasants to retain ownership of a certain amount of land, they

were often obliged to abandon full-scale cultivation because of soil

salination, and the point where crop returns had ceased to support the

investment of seed and effort had been reached in many places in the Shamiya

area, where Fernea conducted his fieldwork, in the late 1950s. Thus·-

> "The progressive deterioration of the soil has resulted in
> a general decline in agricultural activity. Informants
> (1957) report that thirty years ago twice as many men were
> farming in the Daghghara region as there are today. Many
> men who did not permanently migrate left the region in the
> summer to work in Baghdad, or find seasonal employment as

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1) Or <u>donum</u> : a unit of measurement corresponding to 2,500 sq metres.

2) For an account of the organisation of agriculture in a typical
village in this period, see the <u>Appendix</u> to this chapter.

agricultural labourers ... Among the El-Shabana cultivators, both small property owners and tenant farmers took part in the seasonal labour migration to Baghdad. In 1957, tribal leaders estimated that more than 80% of the men went to Baghdad to work during the summer months, largely in the construction industry." [1]

The movement of the rural population to the cities, a notable feature of the period between 1945 and 1958, was not so much due to the employment opportunities offered to the migrants as to the appalling conditions which prevailed in the countryside. The system of landownership was one of the main causes of this migration, which was further accelerated by the catastrophic flooding of large parts of the rural south in 1954. In many areas throughout the south, a great number of peasants, accompanied by their families, and often by their entire lineages, left their villages for Baghdad or Basra. In Daghghara, peasants who did not migrate sometimes found jobs with the local administration in the area; yet, as one tribesman expressed it, "if we don't persuade the farmers to come back and farm the land, the muwazzafin (administrators) will soon have no-one to serve but each other." [2]

Because of their poverty, and their common background the migrants tended to concentrate in certain areas of the cities, notably the al-Thawra area of Baghdad. They tended to live in small mud or reed huts called sarifahs. These were single rooms averaging 27 square feet in size, where some six persons would live, sleep and cook. In 1956 there were 16,413 of these huts in Baghdad, with 92,000 inhabitants, and it was estimated that there were nearly 120,000 rural migrants in the city as a whole. About 25% of these came from 'Amara, one of the poorest provinces of the rural south, which was characterised by huge landholdings and almost continuous

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1)   Fernea, R., pp. 38-39, 50.

2)   Fernea, R., p. 23.

New Tribal Dispute Regulations transposed the jurisdiction of the tribal chief over his followers onto the statute book of the state. The Cultivators Law of 1933 prohibited share croppers and labourers from leaving the land when in debt to the landowner, as they almost invariably were, and gave the landowner the right to take punitive action against the families of fugitives. New land settlement laws permitted increasingly larger tracts of land to be registered virtually as the property of the shaikhs and urban capitalists.

While the shaikhs were thus secured by legal processes in their new position as large-scale landowners, they were alienated from their traditional functions of leadership. Consequently, by the time of the 1958 revolution, 67.1% of the registered area of Iraq was in the hands of landlords holding estates of over 1,000 donums, while only 15.7% remained in the hands of peasant owners with up to 100 donums. The burden of the agricultural economy rested on the dispossessed sharecroppers and labourers who made up the bulk of the rural population.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

P. E. Naylor[1] carried out field research in rural Iraq just before

the 1958 revolution. His study is a very useful illustration of the land

system and the conditions of various aspects of rural life which prevailed

during this period in Iraq. The description given below refers to the

period up to the middle of the summer of 1958. The village I have chosen

to refer to from among his studies in Iraqi villages is extremely similar

to the one in which I carried out my own field research.

"The village lies very close to the River Tigris and stretches away

from it in a wide arc. All water is pumped from the river. The gross

area of the holding is 3,400 acres, all under one owner who lives in a

great house on the river, but the cultivators came from a village about

two miles distant. During the last years of the feudal system before the

1958 Revolution, there were considerable changes in the organisation of

holdings. Between 1950 and 1958 the number of cultivators dropped from

100 to 21. This was partly attributable to disastrous floods in 1954

but it also reflects, in part, a similar change in other areas; increasing

opportunities for urban employment have been drawing the rural population

off the land and into the towns all over the country. The owner has

reacted to this depopulation in the only way open to him, by mechanising

his production. He has not responded by lowering the proportion of the

crop which he takes from his cultivators, a reaction which might equally

well have been expected, because these proportions are more a matter of

local custom than individual convenience and not readily changeable by

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1)   Naylor, P. E., Farming organisation in central Iraq. Empire Journal
      of Experimental Agriculture. Vol. 29, No. 113, 1961. pp.30-31.

a single owner in isolation.

Part of the area is run as a mechanised farm by the owner. The sequence of operations on the winter crops is to plough by tractor, broadcast the seed by hand, and cover the seed with disc harrows. The crop is harvested by combine harvester. Labour requirements are thus very low; merely broadcasting the seed, about three or four irrigations and occasional supervision. The owner employs monthly paid labour from the villages at about £5 per month. The remainder of the land is divided up between the share cropping cultivators. The landowner ploughs the land for them by tractor, gratis. The seed, provided by the owner (but reclaimed by him at harvest out of the cultivator's share) is broadcast on the ploughed land and may be covered by ploughing by horse and wooden plough or else disc-harrowed by tractor, for which he charges about 50p per acre. The cultivators prefer to cover the seed with a horse plough as it is cheaper. Harvesting is sometimes by combine harvester but the cultivators prefer to cut by hand as they are charged 15% of their share of the crop for the use of the combine. The procedure for the cultivation of summer crops is similar.

The crop rotation followed is identical to that described in connection with other villages, the holding is divided into two approximately equal parts by the main road and these are taken as the basic divisions of the fallow system. The part in the north is cropped in one year and that to the south the next year. That to the north was cropped in 1956-7 and again in 1958-9, that to the south in 1957-8.

The 1957-8 cropping distribution is given below:

	Winter Crops			Summer Crops	
		Acres			Acres
Wheat		780	Rice		162
Barley		296	Cotton		56
Linseed		74	Summer Fallow		2127
Winter Fallow		1195			
	Total	2345		Total	2345
			Orchards		46
			Unused, waste, ditches		1009
				Total Area	3400

The proportions of winter crops, summer crops and waste area are approximately similar to those found in other villages, but the area of winter crop farmed per worker is more than twice as large: $57\frac{1}{2}$ acres of winter crop as against 20 acres, entirely as a result of mechanisation. The area of summer crop is similar since these cultivators only crop the cotton. The rice is cultivated by a completely different set of share croppers whom the owner has recently settled on his holding. They have migrated from the poorer rice-growing areas farther south and cultivate no winter crops at all.

This illustrates the changes that were occurring in Iraqi agriculture prior to land reform: (1) the area farmed per worker was increasing through the mechanisation of production, itself the response to rural migration; (2) the beginnings of an alternative to the share cropping system were emerging, the landowner farming part of his holding on his own account and employing wage-paid labour instead of share croppers; (3) some specialisation of production was occurring, instanced in this case by the group of cultivators growing only rice, indicating another step along the road from subsistence to commercial farming."

CHAPTER II

Recent Political and Social Developments

Introduction

In this chapter I intend to discuss recent political developments in Iraqi history, especially in the context of the various Land Reform policies inaugurated by successive governments since 1958. I shall then refer in detail to the Land Reform of 1970, implemented by the present government which has been in office since 1968. I will also deal with the organisation and ideology of the Ba'th Party, in order to explain both the method and the effectiveness of the implementation of current Land Reform programmes.

Political developments, 1958-1974

This period, which is both turbulent and extremely complicated, falls naturally into three sub-periods. The first begins in July 1958 with the destruction of the ancien regime and the seizure of power by the Free Officers under Qasim, and ends with the latter's overthrow in February 1963; the second begins with the Nationalist/Ba'thist coup of February 1963, and continues with the ousting of the Ba'thists in November of the same year, and the Nationalist governments of the 'Arif brothers, until July 1968, while the third, which is in fact still continuing, begins with the return to power of the Ba'thists in July 1968.

As has been explained in the previous chapter, pre-revolutionary Iraq was ruled by a small oligarchy, dominated by Crown Prince 'Abd al-Ilah and Nrui al-Sa'id, which was closely dependent upon British support. All pretence of political freedom - there had been a Chamber of Deputies, and political parties, both largely for display purposes, in existence since 1921 - was ended in 1952, when parties were dissolved and Nuri took over

personal control. In 1955 Iraq joined the Baghdad pact; its foreign

policy lay close to Britain and the West; the regime served the interests

of feudal absentee landlords and merchants; there was almost no industry,

and very little had been accomplished with the oil revenues.

On the political front there were three major political parties in the

1950s, all of which were of course illegal, the National Democratic Party,

the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Ba'th Party, to which should be added

a looser grouping whom we can call the "Nationalists", who supported the

policies inaugurated by Nasser in Egypt, but who lacked a formal political

organisation. The three parties combined in 1956 to form the clandestine

United National Front, whose broad goals included a number of social reforms,

and more particularly, real political independence from Britain. In spite

of a considerable degree of political activity, and of political awareness,

it should be stressed that the Revolution of 1958, which destroyed many of

the most important features of the ancien regime, as well as its most

hated members, was engineered by groups within the army who were not formally

linked to any of the political parties.[1]

However, although the Revolution of July 1958[2] was not organised

by the parties, it was eagerly welcomed and supported by all of them,

although differences soon arose between the various groups over the

precise nature of the policies which the new regime should follow. The

main split, which emerged after a matter of weeks, was symbolised by the

immediate rift between the leader of the Free Officers, General 'Abd

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1) See Dann, U., Iraq under Qassem; a Political History 1958-1963
   London 1969, pp. 19-33, and Farouk-Sluglett, M., Republican Iraq,
   Some Recent Writing Reconsidered, in Review of Middle Eastern
   Studies III (1978, in press).

2) The events of July 1958 amount to a Revolution (thawra) in so far as
   they mark the complete and so far unreversed overthrowal of the
   social and political structures in existence at that time. The
   political upheavals after 1958 are more in the nature of a
   succession of coups d'etat by either right or left wing groups.

al-Karim Qasim, and his second in command, 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif. Qasim's

political notions were extremely limited, and may be summarised as anti-

imperialist and simple reformist. He thought in terms of introducing

socialised medicine and housing, distributing land to the landless without

any serious expropriation, a Bandoeng type of neutralist foreign policy,

and informal ties of friendship with Egypt, then linked with Syria in the

United Arab Republic under Nasser's presidency.

'Arif, on the other hand, had more positive intentions, and was a

fervent supporter of Nasser and Nasserism. Only a few days after July

14th, 'Arif was in Damascus discussing with Nasser the possibility of Iraq's

entry into the UAR. In the context of the political situation in Iraq, this

suggestion was anathema to the Iraqi Communist Party, since they had no

wish to see Nasserist political and economic doctrines applied in Iraq, or

to be the victims of Nasser's virulent anti-Communism. Hence the Ba'thists

and Nasserists supported 'Arif, against the Communists. In this struggle

Qasim aligned himself with the Communists, not out of any particular

conviction, but more fundamentally because he wished to be 'Sole Leader'

(al-za'im al-awhad) and had no desire to defer to Nasser. Hence a power

struggle developed within Iraq, in which the UAR intervened actively, with

material and moral assistance; the attempted coup against Qasim staged

at Mosul in 1959 was planned with Egyptian arms and money, and Sawt al-'Arab

radio station denigrated Qasim and the Communists until the end of Qasim's

rule.

In the course of these struggles, 'Arif tried to assassinate

Qasim, but failed, and was captured and imprisoned. The Communists gained

some influence in government, but this has been largely exaggerated, since

the highest official posts they held were those of Director of Broadcasting

and Minister of Municipalities. However, the Communists were active in the

mass organisations which they had been instrumental in organising before

the revolution, such as the teachers', students', and lawyers' unions.
The ICP's main platform was that of demands for representation in government,
a new constitution, and free elections.

By the end of 1959, Qasim began to become concerned about the isolation
from other political groups, and from the rest of the Arab and Western world,
into which his association with and dependence upon, the Communists had led
him. The Kirkuk incident of July 1959[1] had led to widespread political
unrest, and Qasim sought a change of direction by declaring that he was
above political parties (nahna fawq al-muyul) and began to dissociate himself
from the Communists. In concrete terms, this took the form of dismissing
all Communists or sympathisers from the civil service, and perhaps more
crucially, from the army. Here, however, Qasim miscalculated, for he
had effectively cut off his own power base, since the Ba'thists and
Nationalists were by no means won over by these tactics and continued to be
pro-'Arif and anti-Qasim.

Domestically, Qasim's government introduced a number of reform measures,
most notably the Land Reform of 25th September 1958. It was based on the
Egyptian land legislation of 1952,[2] and was of a largely redistributive
nature. It was designed to enhance the appeal of the regime in the short
term, and to maximise the long term productivity of the economy. Fairly
generous maximum holdings were laid down, and land in excess was to be
expropriated and redistributed to peasants in parcels of 60 donums of
irrigated and 120 donums of non-irrigated land (1 donum = .62 acre); landlords
were to be compensated for the expropriation.[3] Using a fascinating quotation

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1) See Dann, U., pp. 223-226.

2) See Mabro, R. E., The Egyptian Economy 1952-1972 London 1974,
pp. 56-82.

3) Gabbay, R., Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq, London 1978
pp. 108-120. A full description of the Law (No. 30 of 1958) appears
on pp. 109-112 of the same work.

from Muhammad Hadid, Qasim's first Minister of Finance, Gabbay provides

a valuable commentary on the 1958 Law:

> "Progressive governments can best compete with the Communists
> in rural areas by offering land reform programmes that are
> genuinely beneficial to the peasantry. These programmes
> should help create a large class of small owner-farmers with
> secure occupancy rights and should help assure the _fallahin_
> of rising incomes. Under such circumstances, the Communists
> will lose a large number of farmers as their target of appeal,
> while the government will win strong allies in defence of
> the reformed land-tenure system." 1)

Whatever the intentions of the reformers, it soon became clear that

the problems which confronted them were far too deep-rooted and complex to

be adequately solved by the 1958 Law. Conflicting political aims, technical

obstacles, illiteracy and malnutrition in the countryside, and the general

lack of experience of the bureaucracy in tackling a task of such magnitude

all combined to make the execution of the law either inefficient or

inoperative. Furthermore, the random posting and assignment of officials

greatly increased the confusion, experts and officials who had been employed

by the _ancien regime_ were retired or transferred, and the three coups and

sixteen cabinet changes which took place between 1958 and 1965 had obvious

effects on the confidence of both the administrative and technical civil

service. As the following table shows, the actual redistribution of

expropriated land was extremely slow:-

Land expropriated and redistributed, September 1958-September 1963

Land subject to expropriation	15,000,000 donums
Land expropriated	11,200,000 "
Land redistributed	1,800,000 "
Land under temporary administration	9,400,000 "
Families receiving land	60,000 "

Another reason for the ensuing chaos was the fact that land was

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1) Hadid, M., _Dirasa Ijtima'iya li Mashakil al-'Iraq al-Iqtisadiya_,
    Baghdad 1959, p. 111, quoted in Gabbay, p. 113.

distributed to individuals who had previously been sharecroppers, and who had no experience or knowledge of the organisation of cultivation. In addition, distribution was made without taking differences in the quality of agricultural land into account as far as its type or productivity was concerned. No funds were made available to the beneficiaries, and it was several years before cooperatives were established to provide agricultural and social services.[1] Thus in the mid-1960's, the "abolition of feudalism" had been accomplished as a political act, but in the anti-landlord rather than the pro-peasant sense. One of the most obvious results of the Land Reform in its early stages was a fall in agricultural production to some 40% of pre-revolutionary levels,[2] and the country was forced to import rather than export food.

Hence with regard to the social structure, the first stage of the Revolution did not effect a massive change. The landowners and the grande bourgeoisie lost their political power but, except for certain local instances, were allowed to retain their properties and businesses. And although they suffered occasional harassment and intimidation, they were not totally uprooted as a social class.

As a result, just after the 1958 Revolution, many cultivators deserted their holdings following their landlord's disappearance. The landlord, either personally or through his representatives had normally provided essential managerial services, with the result that during the months which followed the Revolution, it became clear that the mere absence of the

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1) Mawaqif jadida fi'l-islah al-zira'i wa al-ta' wuniat al-zira'ia fi 'l-iraq. (New attitudes towards Land Reform and agricultural cooperatives in Iraq). Ministry of Land Reform Baghdad, 1972, p. 8.

2) Warriner, D., Land Reform in principle and practice, London, 1969, p. 78. See also Simmons, J. L., Agricultural development in Iraq: Planning and Management Failures. Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, Spring 1965, pp. 131-32.

landlords was not enough to solve the cultivators' problems: who was now
to supply the seeds, repair the pumps, organize the canal work, settle
disputes between cultivators, and run the irrigation system? To alleviate
rural sufferings and discourage urban migration during the first winter
of the Revolution, Qasim authorised ID 30 million to be distributed in
'loans' of ID 10 to ID 20. More than 250,000 farms received these loans
which were never repaid. "In fact, some of the loans were probably spent
on bus fares to Baghdad, for while on the one hand Qasim paid the peasants
to remain in the countryside, on the other hand political announcements
that 'the Government of the Revolution has taken upon itself to give all
citizens palaces and cars' encouraged many peasants to flock to the cities
to collect their rewards. The resulting migration had the effect of
overcrowding Baghdad and Basrah as well as removing much needed agricultural
labour,"[1] a situation which induced the government to use temporary relief
loans, never repaid, to discourage migration.

Naturally, the tensions and uncertainties at this level were only
reflections of the situation in the wider political arena. After the purges
initiated by Qasim between 1959 and 1960, the whole machinery of government
was greatly weakened, and a series of follies and blunders ensued. In
June 1961 Qasim threatened to invade Kuwait, to which he laid claim as an
integral part of Iraq. Later in the same year the Kurds under Mulla Mustafa
Barzani became finally disenchanted with the regime's failure to provide
any concrete evidence of autonomy for Kurdistan, and a long and fruitless
war in the north and north-east of the country began. By early 1963 the
regime was isolated in every way, since Qasim had either alienated, neutralised
or persecuted all the factions and groups which had been prepared to support

1)   Simmons, John L., Agricultural development in Iraq· planning and
      management failures. op. cit., pp. 131-32.

him. However he could only be removed by military force, and the Ba'thists had been infiltrating the armed forces since 1960. Early in 1963, a group of officers led by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr raised a rebellion at Abu Ghuraib outside Baghdad, and moved military units into the capital. Qasim was beseiged with a few supporters in the Ministry of Defence, but was hunted down and shot on 9th February. 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif was immediately raised to the Presidency, and a Nasserist/Ba'thist military junta took over with Bakr as Prime Minister. The Communists were persecuted, imprisoned and executed, and there was a mass exodus of left-wingers and intellectuals.

The period between 1963 and 1968 is equally chaotic, though in a sense less complicated. After some nine months, the Ba'thists fell out with 'Arif and the Nasserists and left the government following a coup in November 1963. The governments which followed were of a generally rightist complexion and occupied themselves mainly in persecuting the left and fighting a totally unfruitful war in Kurdistan. During these five years governments were far too insecure to devote any real attention to land reform and other social issues. Local leadership, which had begun to pass away from the shaikhs and landlords in the rural areas after 1958, was gradually recaptured by this group, who thus dominated social and economic relations in the countryside until 1968. However, between 1963 and 1967, 1.1 million donums were distributed between 28,383 beneficiaries, quantities roughly comparable with those of 1959-62.[1] On the whole, the five years formed a period of political and economic stagnation in which Iraq became increasingly isolated from her neighbours and power circulated among a succession of military regimes notable only for their brutality and political ineptitude.

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1)   Gabbay, R., p. 116.

The Revolution of July 1968

On 17th July 1968 another coup d'etat took place, but one of rather greater significance than those which had preceded it over the previous ten years. In July 1968, the present government was brought to power by the intervention of Ba'thist officers in the army, and a new phase of political and economic change began. After a period of attempted coups and counter-coups, the regime seems to have consolidated itself sufficiently by 1970 to begin several important programmes. By March 1970 a Kurdish peace plan was formulated, which forms the basis of the present arrangements for Kurdistan; in October 1970 the State of Emergency, which had been in force since 1958, was lifted, and a programme of close economic association with the USSR was also inaugurated.

Following two major trade agreements in 1969, Iraqi-Soviet relations had begun to improve. Real strengthening of economic and political ties only took place after Nasser's death in 1971, but the groundwork had been laid in the two previous years. One obvious problem was that of the Ba'thists' repressive attitudes to both the Iraqi Communist Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party. However, with mediation from the USSR and other socialist countries, a National Progressive Front was set up in 1971, and has lasted, if rather uneasily, until the present time. This alliance of Ba'thists, Kurds, and Communists has enabled the regime to proceed on the basis of a considerable measure of internal solidarity. With this alliance behind them, and strengthened by a 15 year treaty with the USSR signed in 1972, the government undertook the almost total nationalisation of the country's oil industry in the summer of that year. Immediate marketing problems had been solved by barter deals with the USSR and Eastern Europe, and France had been given a contract for nearly a quarter of the annual production of the Kirkuk oilfields. By the end of the year, Iraq was maintaining sales, and by the middle of 1973 a satisfactory compensation

arrangement had been worked out with the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC),

the former owners. After the October War in 1973, of course, marketing

problems have been pushed permanently into the background.

Social and economic developments

Since the nationalisation of the oil in early 1972, the national

income rose from ID 896 m in 1969 to ID 4013 m in 1976, while the per

capita income increased from ID 100 in 1969 to ID 349 in 1976 - at 1975

prices. This year's budget allocation amounted to ID 5300 m. In the two

decades preceding the present government's assumption of power (1951-1969) only

ID 189 m had been allotted to industry, compared to ID 709 m allocated in

1976 alone. The official allocation for agriculture in 1976 alone (ID 268 m)

by far exceeded total allocations for the period 1951-69 which amounted to

only ID 179 m. [1]

The Ba'thist government's programme is based upon nationalisation,

Land Reform and extensive economic planning. "The economic programme for

Iraq covers the whole economy. The plans determine the division of

productive national resources between capital and consumption goals, prescribe

wage and price levels, and determine credit and currency policies. [2]

In addition, social and cultural goals are described extensively. The

plans are so massive that it will be impossible totally to implement them in

short order. However, stating them is obviously meant to provide an

aspiration to the masses as well as goals for government officials."

The Land Reform of 1970

For our purposes, the most important feature of the present government's

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1)   Iraq Today, Ministry of Information, Baghdad, No. 44, Vol. II, July
      1977.

2)   (New attitudes towards land reform and agricultural cooperatives in
      Iraq) op. cit., p. 10.

programmes is the Land Reform of 1970. In that year the Regional Leadership

of the Party reviewed agrarian conditions in the country before and after

1958 and prior to the 17th July 1968 Revolution and came to the conclusion

that the 1958 Law had had the effect of serving the interests of the

landlords rather than putting an end to their exploitation of land and

peasants.

In Gabbay's words:-

"The new law incorporated many of the provisions of the old
law of 1958, and in many respects went further. A new ceiling
on holdings was established which took into consideration
the fertility of the land, the availability of water, cropping
patterns and marketing facilities. The new ceilings ranged
from 1,000 to 2,000 donums for rain-fed land, and from 40 to
600 donums of irrigated land; maximum extent of holding could
be reduced by as much as half in relation to the proximity of
these lands from marketing centres. The owners of orchards
which exceeded the established limit were permitted to keep
the whole orchard, but the actual cultivator of the orchard, if
he were a different individual, was entitled to a half share
in the land as well as the trees. All the expropriated land
was to be registered as government (miri) land, ... land in
excess of the allowable holding was to be considered leased
from the Government until it was expropriated." 1)

In contradistinction to the 1958 provisions, no compensation was to be paid,

and the landlord could no longer choose which part of his holding he was

allowed to retain. Collective and cooperative farms were to be set up and

agricultural contracts were to be regulated by law.

It was not the government's intention to limit land reform to dis-

tribution alone, since this was not considered to be a progressive step,

placing too heavy a burden upon the peasants. A case in point was the issue

of cereal grains to new landowners who, instead of planting the seeds, either

ate or sold them. The Ba'thists therefore maintained that a socio-psychological

change of attitude on the part of the peasants was needed. What was

advocated was a change in planning and programming whereby public institutions

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1)   Gabbay, R., p. 119.

would take over the land as soon as it was nationalized and should educate the peasants in the process of modernization. This method was not interpreted by the Ba'thists as complete public ownership of the land with the government having full control of the administration of agriculture, but a flexible policy which can take into consideration the diversities of land, weather, products and the present capacities of the peasants. Moreover, the Land Reform of 1970 has authorized the establishment of cooperative and collective farms, and in the long term, state farms are to be established. The land of individual members in the cooperatives cannot be sold, rented, leased, donated or used as collateral for loans.

In 1968 the number of cooperatives in the country was only 443, comprising 6,037 members but in 1976 it reached 1,721 cooperatives of various types comprising 267,720 farmers working the cultivable area in Iraq which is 18.3 million donums.[1] The present government has adopted two kinds of Land Reform policy. The first system, which is found in some parts of the country, is the system of large state farms with centralized administration covering all or most of the land reform sector. In other parts, the government has adopted the joint distribution of land based on the block system, which is intended to lead to joint cultivation by the peasants. This latter system operates in the village which I have studied. Most of the expropriated land has to be administered directly by the peasants themselves under the auspices of the Party and government experts. During the first Land Reform of 1958 extensive subdivision of the expropriated large estates proved impossible for political, technical and ecological reasons. However, such measures have now been adopted for stimulating more intensive and proper use of land in the reformed sector and to make it possible to absorb more

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[1] New attitudes towards Land Reform. op. cit., p. 13.

workers, provided that the technology is planned rationally.

The Land Reform programme of 1970 has been accompanied by the establishment of new settlements for peasants in the Land Reform areas. Over the last nine years the Land Reform peasants have been moved to new settlements. This was done in an effort to give different types of technical and material assistance and to encourage collective cultivation.

At the present, there are no real collective or state farms in Iraq in the Soviet sense, but when the plans are implemented, such farms will exist and will be supervised by officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. Collective farms in Iraq will then be exactly like the Kolkhoz in the Soviet Union, while the state farms will be fashioned after the Soviet Union's Soukhoz.

The main aim of the new Land Reform programme, as stated by the government, is to achieve socialist transformation in the rural areas by eradicating all the legacies of the past and establishing a new basis for this sector. The Land Reform is designed to introduce radical change into Iraqi society, especially in the villages, through the political education of the peasants. The organization of the Ba'th Party has penetrated the countryside. Branches have been established in almost every village. After the Revolution of 1968 the peasants were organized into unions created and directed by the Party.[1]

The Ba'th Party believes that change cannot be produced simply by changing physical and environmental conditions, but also and most importantly by changing the minds of people, on the assumption that the main factor in change is ideological. For this reason the Party and its branches had

---

1) The new rural institutions created by the Ba'th Party, especially the Peasants' Union and the Peasant Bureaux are discussed below (p. 39).

started to lecture audiences on different issues all over the country on
a wide variety of topics, long before it came to power in 1968. As the
Party has a rigid formal structure, it is useful to examine its ideology
and organisation before studying the impact of the Land Reform and the
activities of the Party on recent developments in Iraqi rural society.

Ba'thist ideology and organisational structure

The ideology of the Ba'th Party, which was formulated in the mid-1950's
in its constitution and in the writingsof its principal thinkers is
essentially a nationalist doctrine[1] that views Arabs as "a single eternal
nation". Ba'thists believe that the Arabs have always formed one nation
and their reunification in a single state is the Party's main goal. This
unity can only be achieved as a result of a social and spiritual revolution,
which will liquidate the forces of (internal) feudalism and (external)
imperialism and prepare the popular forces for their role in the future Arab
state.

This state will have a democratic Parliamentary regime which will
guarantee freedom (hurriyya) and carry out policies of social justice and
economic reform which are summarised as "Arab socialism". This socialism is
moderate: rights of inheritance and of limited non-exploitative ownership
are recognised, and it is "spiritual", as opposed to "materialist".[2]
It is called "Arab socialism" since the founders believe that the social
political and economic circumstances of the Arab world are unique.

The main development in Ba'thist ideology took place during the VIth

---

1) Arab nationalism is defined by the Ba'th on a secular basis, but the
special role of Islam in Arab history is recognised. Islam is
acknowledged as the basis of the most glorious phase of Arab history.

2) Aflaq, Michel Dirasat fi al-ishtirakiya (Studies in Socialism)
Beirut, Dar al-Tali'a 1960.

National Congress in Syria in 1966. The ideological outcome of the conflict

between leftist and rightist factions which broke out on that occasion was

outlined in the treatise al-Muntalaqat al-Nadhariyya (The Basic Theories),

which is outlined below:

> "1. The reaffirmation of the principles that the purpose
> of socialism is to create a free society where opportunities
> are equally available to all, and where exploitation is abolished.
> In Under-developed countries, this abolition includes all types
> of foreign and domestic exploitation and getting rid of the
> decadent aspects of the past.
>
> 2. The repudiation of the sanctity of private ownership,
> since this is a bourgeois fabrication. Scientific socialism
> accepts only human work as the source of value for man.
> Therefore, any private property which exceeds the personal needs
> of an individual must be exploitative no matter how small it is.
>
> 3. The national liberation struggle in under-developed
> countries is a natural reaction to the feudalist-bourgeois system.
> Local capitalism and financial concerns are not concerned with
> rapid industrial development ...
>
> 4. The conclusion, therefore, is that class struggle and
> socialism became a necessity in order that the exploited masses
> may enter a new historical stage. These masses are the workers,
> peasants, ideological army, revolutionary intelligentsia and the
> petite bourgeoisie in the commercial, industrial, agrarian, and
> service sectors." 1)

These revised theories were accepted by the Ba'th VIIth National Congress and

gradually adopted into the policies and programmes of the Ba'th Party in Iraq.

Economists were employed to draw up new guidelines for economic

development. The following guidelines were set out:-

1. The incorporation into the public sector of the major productive units,

financial institutions, transport system, large real estate property, foreign

trade, and major domestic enterprises.

2. The systematic incorporation of the petite bourgeoisie into the socialist

sector.

3. The by-passing of the stage of state capitalism, while bureacracy is

kept under constant surveillance and democratic administration is substituted

---

1) al-Muntalaqat al-Nadhariyya (The Basic Theories), Damascus Ministry
   of Information, 1966, p. 6.

for private, autocratic control in the industrial sector.

4.   The completion of the Land Reform programme, and the establishment of

socialist relations of production on the land.

5.   The use of planning for socialist transformation with due consideration

to planning on a pre-Arab level.

The organisational structure of the Ba'th Party

The Ba'th Party structure is cellular and thus exclusive as opposed to

inclusive, a fact which derives from the hostile circumstances in which it

developed. 'Aflaq has defined the Party's purpose as "to perform a

mission, to put a programme into action, and to capture power and use it".[1]

The fulfilment of this purpose requires a highly disciplined hierarchical

organisation.

The cell structure of the Ba'th Party is not unique, since it can also

be found in most or perhaps all Communist parties. This similarity does

not of course mean that the Ba'th is a Communist Party. It is true the

Ba'th claims to be the champion of the same class as the Communist Party

does (i.e. proletarians and peasants and/or intellectuals), but the Ba'thists

have not articulated or developed a theory of world-wide revolution.[2]

It is useful to make a brief sketch of the organisation and structure of

the Party, surveying its various levels.

One	National Secretary
One or More States	National Command
Entire Country or State	Region
At Least Two Divisions	Branch
Two or More Companies	Division
Three to Seven Cells	Company
Three to Seven Members	Cell

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
1)   Aflaq, M., al-Tandhim al-Dhakili li'l-Hizb (The internal organisation of
        the Party), Damascus: Ba'th Party Publication, 1963, p. 14.

2)   ibid, p. 14.

At the top of the pyramid is the National Secretary, selected by the segment

that rests immediately below him in the pyramid. This next level of the

pyramid is the National Committee (i.e. of the "Arab Nation"), consisting

of thirteen members. Below the National Committee in the Ba'th Pyramid

and the various Regional organisations; each Region is an Arab country

or state or, in the case of the Gulf, group of small States. Below the

Regions are the various Branches. Each Branch contains a minimum of two

Divisions, the next lower level on the Ba'th pyramid. Each Division is made

up of two or more Companies which form the next layer. Each Company consists

of a minimum of three and a maximum of seven Cells. These Cells form the

base of the pyramid. The development of relatively small and parallel

units has allowed the Party to maintain secrecy and control.

The Cell is the primary unit of Party structure. The membership of

the Cell is kept to a majority of seven and a minimum of three.[1] There are three

different types of Cells, each with different purposes. First, there is

the Area Cell which consists of a collection of several Ba'th Party members

in a given place or area.[2] There is no effort to unite people with similar

jobs or training in the Area Cell. Next, there is a so-called Work Cell[3]

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1) Abu Jaber, K., _The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party_ syracuse: syracuse
University Press, 1966, p. 159.

2) ibid, p. 140.

3) In the countryside the work cell is the Peasant Bureau (al-maktab
al-fallahi), whose main function is to coordinate agricultural
affairs at village level, and to attempt to integrate village
society into the wider political and socio-economic activities of
the Party and the government. It is also the main channel of
communication between the peasants and the local government, in
the sense that it is supposed to be resorted to initially in any
dispute or conflict which may eventually find its way to the
appropriate local government department. See Chapter VIII,

which is made up of members who share a common background or vocation.[1]

It is, therefore possible and in fact probable, that an individual Party

member will be a member of both an Area Cell and a Work Cell. Such an

arrangement provides many advantages, such as cross-reference, security,

and mobility. These cells will generally meet in the home of one of

their members. The third type of cell is called <u>Halaqat al-Ansar</u>

("Sympathiser" Cells). These cells consist of individuals who are simply

sympathetic to the goals and ideals of the Ba'th, and they far outnumber

actual members. This group serves a double purpose as it keeps the Party

itself small, while providing a broad base of support. The "Sympathiser"

Cells also serve as a training ground for prospective Party members.[2]

The leadership of these cells is provided by a secretary who is a member

of the Party and is appointed by the Company Commander.

The Company is the next unit in the structure, and it is made up of

three to seven cells ("Sympathisers" are excluded). All members of the cells

comprising a Company meet, vote, and select its leadership. This leadership

then selects the cell secretaries. The Ba'th points to this selection of

the Company leadership as an indication of the democratic process at work.

```
                    ┌─────────────┐
                    │   Company   │
                    └─────────────┘
                           │
        ┌──────────────┬───┴──────┬──────────────┐
    ┌────────┐    ┌────────┐  ┌────────┐    ┌────────┐
    │  Cell  │    │  Cell  │  │  Cell  │    │  Cell  │
    └────────┘    └────────┘  └────────┘    └────────┘
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
The <u>amin al-sirr</u> ("Keeper of the Secret"), or Secretary, is appointed by the

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1)   Abu Jaber, K., <u>The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party</u>. p. 140.

2)   ibid., p. 140.

leadership of the next highest organisation, the Division. A Company may
include an area equivalent to a small town, village, or a section of a city.

The next level is the Division, which consists of two or more
Companies. The leadership is elected by a conference of the lower organisations,
and the Division Secretary is appointed by the Branch leadership. The
leadership and the Secretary at this level share the duties of receiving
and carrying out the instructions of the superior or higher organisation,
the Branch, and consider applications for membership and submit them to
higher authorities. They also examine and evaluate complaints from the
lower organisations and members and submit monthly reports on operations.
The Division Secretary represents the Division at Party conferences and is
the only one to communicate with the higher organisations.[1] Hence the
organisation may be represented as follows:-

```
                          ┌──────────┐
                          │ Division │
                          └────┬─────┘
              ┌────────────────┴────────────────┐
         ┌────┴─────┐                       ┌────┴─────┐
         │ Company  │                       │ Company  │
         └────┬─────┘                       └────┬─────┘
       ┌──────┼──────┐                   ┌───────┼───────┐
    ┌──┴─┐ ┌──┴─┐ ┌──┴─┐             ┌───┴┐  ┌───┴┐  ┌───┴┐
    │Cell│ │Cell│ │Cell│             │Cell│  │Cell│  │Cell│
    └────┘ └────┘ └────┘             └────┘  └────┘  └────┘
```

The highest policy-making and policy-implementing organisation within
the Party is the National Command. Its authority must be submitted to by all
leaders, members, and organisations. If necessary it may assume direction
of any Division, Region, or lower organisation at its own discretion. It
also assumes the responsibility for cooperation or non-cooperation with any
other political Party or government.[2] The National Command has disciplinary

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1)   ibid., pp. 140-141.

2)   Aflaq, M., The internal organisation of the Party. pp. 24-25.

powers over the Regional Command; it prepares the agenda for and convenes the National Convention and also controls organisational, political, cultural, and financial affairs. The National Command has seven offices (organisation, Party education, peasants, labour, propaganda and information, culture, and finance), and has created a "school to educate and graduate prospective leaders of the Ba'th Party".[1]

It is immediately apparent that true power in the Ba'th Party is held by the secretaries at each level, largely because communication is and must be vertical and is through the secretaries. There can be no horizontal communication or contact between any of the organisational levels. The Ba'thists have thus developed a Party which follows the principle of "Democratic Centralism" in which members are not allowed to criticize the Party or the leadership after the programme or decision has been carried out. Within the Ba'th Party, the minority is overruled by the majority, and the lower organisations are subjected to the higher ones.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the political and socio-economic history of Iraq from 1958 to the present day. The Revolution of July 1958 was followed by a long period of very considerable instability, which lasted until the assumption of power by the present government in 1968.

This political instability caused previous governments to adopt policies in the rural areas which were frequently contradictory. Moreover, the first Iraqi Land Reform did not greatly help to solve the problems facing poorer peasants. The method of land distribution then adopted resulted in a deterioration both in the fertility of the soil and in the economic condition

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1)   ibid., p. 25.

of the peasants. The measures taken in 1970 have attempted to establish

land reform on a scientific basis, with the adoption of the block system

and collective cultivation. This was aimed at avoiding both further

deterioration in the soil and the mistakes of the first land reform. In

order to avoid the excessive bureaucratic supervision which contributed

to the failure of the first reform, and to allow peasants to participate

more fully in the processes of economic and political change, the government

has created a new system of communication and political mobilization through

the Party organisation.

CHAPTER III

The village - A brief background and recent developments

In this chapter I give a general account of the physical and socio-

historical setting of the village, and delineate the main features of the

changing economy and political system. The description is organized

in two parts: the first deals with ecology, tribal and social origins,

settlement patterns and the organization of the village economy; and

the second discusses administrative, political and social structural

aspects. These various dimensions provide essential background for the

later analysis of the impact of the 1970 Land Reform programme as it

affected a single Iraqi village.

The Location

Da'udia is a village of Sunni and Shi'i Muslims of approximately

2,500 people according to official estimates. It lies 40 miles north of

Baghdad and it is bounded on the east by the Tigris, and on the north

and west by the boundary of Diyala province.

To reach the village from Baghdad one proceeds north along the road

to Ba'quba (the capital of Diyala province). Da'udia is located about

35 miles from Ba'quba and about 20 miles from Khalis town (see map 1).

The village is located near the southern border of the Lower Khalis Project.[1]

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1) The Lower Khalis Project is part of the larger Diyala irrigation
project and has been selected for special development as a high
national and regional priority. Agricultural development in Iraq
is of major national, economic and social importance. Under the
present National Development Plan, production from agriculture is
planned to be increased to ensure incomes for the predominantly
agricultural population and to provide food and raw materials for
the industrial and service sectors. The lower Khalis area was
selected as being the most promising for special development, with
the intention of becoming a key project in developing the agricultural
economy of Iraq. The projects will serve 61,600 hectares, of which
52,000 will be irrigated by gravity from the Diyala and 9,600 by the
existing pumps from the Tigris. Development of the whole project has
been phased over a period of six years.

Map I LOCATION OF UPPER AND LOWER KHALIS

0   Km   200

N

UPPER
KHALIS

R Diyala

I R A N

Khalis

Da'udia   Baquba

LOWER
KHALIS

BAGHDAD

Ramadi   Abu Ghraib

R TIGRIS

I   R   A   Q

R EUPHRATES

KUWAIT

S A U D I

A R A B I A

The Lower Khalis Project area overlaps the boundary of two provinces (muhafadhas), Diyala and Baghdad, with the greatest area in Diyala.

The Lower Khalis area is part of the large alluvial plain of central Iraq, intersected by a number of large rivers. It covers about 90,059 sq kms between the rivers Tigris and Diyala. The land is monotonously flat without undulation and with a minimal overall slope from N.E. to S.W. Even local slopes of alluvial development are less than 0.2%.

The major visual interest in the area is provided by the palm gardens. These are mainly located along the Tigris riverain strip, and in the north around Khalis town. Some new planting is being attempted in one area by the Baghdad-Ba'quba road, but many more trees are needed to break up the huge treeless vistas over the greater part of the Project area. The village lies directly on the busy main road between Baghdad and Ba'quba which connects the capital of Iraq with the north and north-east of the country.

The existing asphalt roads in the area link Baghdad to Khalis, Baghdad to Ba'quba and Khalis, and provide one link in the north joining these two roads, and another to serve the villages along the Tigris bund from Baghdad to Da'udia and beyond.

One railway line passes through the Project area in the east from Baghdad to Ba'quba and continues to Kirkuk. This is a single narrow gauge track and is planned to be widened. There are stations at Khan Bani Sa'd, twenty miles from the village, and at Ba'quba.

Many of the larger villages, especially those along the main roads, have telephones. The expansion of this service has provided an important service especially in emergency situations.

Public transport is provided by both public and private sectors. The public service only operates along the asphalted roads. Private mini-bus services are flexible and operate where needed. These services

are quite extensive and serve villages off the main roads. Two mini-buses,

which are being purchased by wealthy villagers, are based in Da'udia.

These mini-buses make an average of four or five trips to Ba'quba and

Baghdad every day. Villagers can also use the public bus which runs

from Baghdad to Ba'quba via the village, several times a day up to 9.00 p.m.

The inhabitants of Da'udia do not consider their village a world

of its own. Many persons from the outside visit or pass through the

settlement; and since the implementation of the Land Reform programme of

1970 there has been increased government involvement in rural affairs.

Of the villages scattered throughout the area, Da'udia is the one most

connected to the outside world, both because of its location and because

it has been the area most affected by Land Reform policies since 1958.

It is also connected with the outside world economically and socially in

a way which tends to distinguish it from its neighbours.

The majority of the population surrounding the village area is

scattered in small settlements. The district is heavily populated: within

a radius of fifteen miles from the village there are more than fourteen

settlements, none of which is more than a mile or two from its nearest

neighbour. Most are small, about ten have a population of less than

300 while the rest have about 500 each. The only sizable settlements are

Khan Bani Sa'd and Husainiya which depend economically on the nearby

brickworks and to a lesser extent on agriculture. Khalis town is the

largest and nearest urban centre to the north of the village, with an

estimated population of 15,000.

Khalis town serves as the location of the headquarters of the Lower

Khalis Project administration. Throughout the year communications between

the village and Khalis town are continuous. Many officials from the

Khalis Project are in continuous contact with the local government

officials, especially with the Agricultural Office and the heads of the

co-operative societies. Many villagers travel occasionally to Khalis town,

usually to the headquarters of the Lower Khalis Project, where some

business is carried out. But the villagers' main connection is with

Baghdad where many of their kin live. There is a considerable amount of

intermarriage between the people of the village and their migrant kin

in Baghdad, and the people of the village probably feel a closer affinity

with Baghdad than with any of the other villages or towns in the area, in

spite of the fact that both Khalis town and Ba'quba are closer. On the

other hand, because of the improved roads and the bus services to Baghdad,

neither Khalis town or any other community in the area is to any great

extent the market town for the village people. Villagers take the public

bus or the mini-bus to Baghdad for major shopping expeditions, and some men

go to Baghdad as often as once a week to shop or carry on other business.

The Ecology

Although the history of Iraq as an independent country is very short,

the history of settlement in the area is very long. Over 700 years ago,

the Mongols entered the country, massacred the population and destroyed

many of the cities, villages and irrigation canals. Except for the last

few decades, the whole area has been ruled by foreigners since that

time. Prolonged misuse of land during this period, and neglect of adequate

cultivation methods has caused much deterioration of the soil.[1]

Over the centuries, salinity has gradually spread throughout the

Mesopotamian plain, until now about 80 per cent of the land is affected

to some degree. Today, cultivators throughout the plain are struggling to

make most of the salinated land fit for agriculture.[2] Moreover, the process

---

1) See Adams, R. McC., The Land Behind Baghdad. Chicago, 1965, for an
account of the development of land use in the Diyala region.

2) Van Aart, R., Drainage and land reclamation in the lower Mesopotamian
plain, in Nature and Resources, Vol. X, No. 2, April-June 1974, pp.
11-12.

Map 2   THE NATURE OF THE SOIL IN DA'UDIA

NORTHERN BADA

Canal

Settlement no 2

Settlement no I

Shaikh's Estate

Khalis — Baghdad   road

intensively farmed
arable land

Canal

Dulaim's leaders Agricultural Land

Waqf's

road on flood
protection
bund

Land

River   Tigris

Settlement
no. 4

N

Settlement no 5

0   km   5

Settlement no 3

intensively farmed
arable land

SOUTHERN BADA

orchards

fertile land

less fertile land

salinated land

of soil formation varies throughout the country as a consequence of

differences in climate and vegetation.

The soils of Da'udia are a good example of the wide variation found

over a comparatively small area. Even over short distances, potentially

good and poor soils occur together in an intricate pattern.[1]

In a river basin such as that in which Da'udia is located salinization

is a normal process in all soils which are, or have been, irrigated and

cultivated. Almost all soils have, or have had, an artificially high

ground water table, and soils which are dark brown in colour and have a

high content of deliquescent salts become more extensive towards the

centre of the basin. Shok and camel's horn are the most common weeds in

these parts. Both are perennial leguminous plants, deep rooting, and

important for grazing and fuel.

Sabkha soils occur in irregular patterns, generally in silty or

loamy textured material in areas where the surface is still in contact

with ground water through capillary action for most of the year. They are

common in the silty irrigation deposits along old and present-day irrigation

canals and ditches, particularly on uncultivated land.

Salts in some parts of the village can easily be elutriated from

the surface during the first irrigation if some extra irrigation water

is applied. In this way most cultivators and especially beneficiaries of

the Land Reform try to remove the salts from the surface of the soils.

Natural fertility in these parts of the village is too low for intensive

farming, although this can be surmounted by the application of chemical

fertilizers. However, even with such fertilizers, many soils produce

only low yields because of poor physical soil conditions, (such as

---

1)   See map no. 2.

consistency, porosity, density, permeability).

On the other hand, the soil of the river levels in the village
consists of relatively coarse-textured layers, the texture becoming
lighter with increasing depth. In relation to the river and basin, this
part of the village is higher up; the ground water table is deep. It
fluctuates with the water level in the river and is almost non-saline with
an extremely high lime content. Moreover, soils are well drained, as
excess water can flow into the river or the basin, except when the river
is at an unusually high level.

Due to these characteristics, the physical conditions of this soil
are excellent or good and are suitable for many crops. Capillary water
does not reach the surface if the soil is continuously covered by crops.
Hence this soil is used for date and fruit gardens, sometimes in combination
with vegetables or alfalfa.

The social and tribal composition of the village; A brief historical survey

Da'udia village is occupied by four main groups. The two largest
are Albu 'Amir, who are Shi'i Muslims, and Dulaim, who are Sunni Muslims.
There are also a further two smaller groups, the Shurughis and the so-called
"new-comers". Before they came to the Bad'a area of Da'udia, Albu 'Amir
were a Bedouin tribe wandering in the Jazira, the area between the
northern parts of the Tigris and Euphrates. The 19th century was a time of
political chaos and social dislocation, and wandering Arab confederations,
such as the Shammar to the north of Baghdad and the Muntafiq to the south,
came more and more to dominate the hinterland and subdued other less power-
ful tribes who either paid tribute or were forced out of the region.

The Albu 'Amir tribe were small in comparison with the major con-
federation, the Shammar whom they could not hope to resist, although they
refused to pay tribute to them. Hence, after a series of raids they fled
al-Jazira and marched southwards to the Shi'i holy city of Karbala', where

Map 3 IRRIGATION CANALS

KHALIS

BA'QŪBA'

Uthmaniya
Canal

Khalis al
Sharqi
Canal

River Diyala

River Tigris

Moshiriya Canal
Muhammed
Sakran Canal

KHAN BANI SAAD

DA'UDIA

Bad'a Canal

N

0   mls   5

BAGHDAD

they settled for some time before finally moving to Bad'a, their present

location. Bad'a had been granted to Albu 'Amir as <u>lazma</u>[1] by the Turkish

authorities and when Albu 'Amir arrived in Da'udia they occupied most of

the land there.

Bad'a is also the name of a canal excavated by the Albu 'Amir when

they settled down in Da'udia around the beginning of the 19th century.

It carries water from the Muhammad Sakran canal behind the northern part

of Bad'a.[2] In the whole area there are many canals which were excavated

by Albu 'Amir, such as 'Auda al-Hamad and 'Auda al-Hasan, to water the

land before the introduction of pump irrigation on the Tigris.

Between the time of the excavation and completion of the Bad'a feeder

canal, Albu 'Amir changed their location many times. This was the result

either of attacks from neighbouring tribes attempting to occupy the land,

or of attempts by these tribes to change the direction of the water course.

Both the neighbouring 'Azza and 'Ubaid tribes were numerically stronger

than Albu 'Amir. Only when the Turkish authorities in Baghdad were strong

enough to control the area were the tribes forced to live in peace.

Otherwise they were constantly at war.

Today the Albu 'Amir are divided into agnatic lineages (<u>fakhd</u>), of

approximately eleven generations, each of which contains a number of sub-

lineages (<u>bayt</u>), consisting of about four to five generations. These

lineages all claim descent from 'Amir, the founder of the tribe. In the

course of their wanderings in Iraq they had established themselves in a

number of localities before settling down in Bad'a. Members of some

lineages seem to have been incorporated by the Zabu, a tribe in the village

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1)   A form of customary land tenure: see p. 8   above.

2)   See map 3.

of Abu Ghraib.[1] As a result of the Turkish system of land tenure, most of the arable land in the village came to be controlled by Albu 'Amir under a form of common ownership. By 1932 most of the land previously owned by the group as a whole had come to be held "illegally" by the Shaikh's family, and as a result many members of Albu 'Amir left the village. In the early 1950s the shaikh's family began to cultivate rice,[2] recruiting specialist cultivators to replace the tribesmen who had left.

Dulaim originate from the area around Ramadi, where many members of the tribe still live. They left the area as a result of conflict with the more powerful Shammar confederation, but it is not clear exactly when they arrived in Da'udia. However, it can be said with certainty that they arrived before Albu 'Amir. During the Ottoman period Dulaim worked mainly as sharecroppers for Turkish absentee landlords. At the same time they rented some waqf[3] land in the area, which was granted out in small individual plots. The collapse of Turkish rule in 1917 which was accompanied by widespread national tribal unrest all over Iraq, forced most of the absentee landlords to sell or desert the land, which was then controlled or bought by members of Dulaim. When the Ottomans finally left Iraq these individuals gradually took over the land they had cultivated and managed to have it registered in their own names in the course of the 1920's and 1930's. Like Albu 'Amir, Dulaim are organised in lineages and sub-lineages, claiming putative descent from some unnamed agnatic ancestor. Members of Dulaim live mostly along the bank of the Tigris, mainly concentrated in a single large settlement.

The Shurughis (a term indicating inferior social status) were rice cultivators who had left their homeland in 'Amara as a result of a process

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1) See map 1.

2) Now prohibited because of salinisation.

3) A form of mortmain.

of land monopolisation by a few powerful families. At the time of their
arrival, several families of Albu 'Amir had migrated to Baghdad and other
large cities in search of employment. These families no longer show any
permanent attachment to the village.

Other "newcomers" arrived in the village at the time of the
implementation of the Land Reform of 1970. Most of them are from the
al-Misarra lineage of Albu 'Amir, which had become separated from the other
parts of the tribe in the course of the migrations during the 19th century.
In 1970 the government began to encourage urban-dwelling migrants from
the rural areas to return to their "homelands". Both Dulaim and members
of the al-Misarra lineage already residing in the village encouraged
these families to come to Da'udia.

From the above account it is clear that the population composition
of the village has never remained constant, but has fluctuated as a result
of continuous migrations in response to social and political changes in
the wider society. Table 1 below illustrates the population composition
of the village in 1970, immediately after the implementation of the Land
Reform. Table 2 shows the amount of land received under the Land Reform
by the various lineages and groups.

Table 1

Name of lineage/ social group	Name of tribal group	No. of peasant households	Households of leading families
Albu Khamis	Albu 'Amir	91	19
al-Misarra	Albu 'Amir	70	-
The "newcomers"	Albu 'Amir	200	-
Albu Hajj Hasan	Dulaim	57	3
Albu Musluh	Dulaim	26	4
Albu 'Uqash	Dulaim	20	4
Shurughis	-	30	-
Totals		494	30
Resident households not related to above groups. (e.g. government employees)		17	-

Table 2

Name of lineage/ social group	Name of its tribal group	No. of peasant household beneficiaries	Size of landholdings
1. Albu Khamis	Albu 'Amir	65	1178 donums
2. Al-Misarra	Albu 'Amir	60	1080 donums
3. The "newcomers"	Albu 'Amir	200[1]	3600 donums
4. Albu Hajj Hasan	Dulaim	50	900 donums
5. Albu Musluh	Dulaim	20	360 donums
6. Albu 'Uqash	Dulaim	-	-
7. Shurughis	-	-	-
		395	7110 donums

Village settlement pattern

The village is divided into four parts. Two of these combine to form the area called Bad'a, which lies in a semi-circle around the centre. The third part is located on the Tigris behind the centre of the village, and is connected to Bad'a at the north-east and south-east. The fourth part lies on the other side of the Tigris.[2]

Bad'a is divided into two parts for administrative purposes. These parts are referred to nowadays by numbers, rather than by ethnic composition, largely for the benefit of government officials working in the area. Local people however have referred to them as Bad'a al-Shamalia (northern) and Bad'a al-Junubia (southern) since the construction of the asphalt road linking the centre of Da'udia to the main road between Baghdad and Ba'quba.

Before the Land Reform of 1970, the pattern of residence in the village was based on the geographical division of the land among the landlords. Before the implementation of the Land Reform the village families lived in clusters of kinship groups ('urban) in these three areas. The term 'urban is derived from the root 'arab, which means locally 'the

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1) By 1974-75 only 50 of these households remained in the village. For details on why they left see Chapter VIII, pp. 203-8.
2) See map overleaf.

population of the rural areas'. The 'urban consisted mainly of a number

of bayts or sub-lineages of different major lineages which had been dis-

tributed throughout the area following the great concentration of land-

holding which took place in the 1930's. These sub-lineages were dis-

tributed among the leading family of Albu 'Amir who became the proprietors,

and divided the land among themselves. Before the creation of large

estates, each major lineage controlled its own residential area. After

the implementation of the Land Reform of 1970-71, and the construction

of new settlements (aslaf) by the government, the pattern of residence

has been dramatically changed once again. For the present it is based

on concentrated settlements which include peasants from both Albu 'Amir

and Dulaim. Residence is thus no longer based on scattered farmsteads as

before.

As a result of these changes, those villagers still working for private

landlords now tend to live in concentrated settlements near the landlords'

houses. These settlements, like those established by the government, are

also principally composed of patrilineages, and have now become located rather

far apart, whereas they were fairly close together in the past. The

distance between the new settlements (aslaf) established by the government

varies from place to place, but all five of them are located in North

Bad'a and South Bad'a. The two new settlements in North Bad'a are about

three miles apart, and they are about four miles from the three new

settlements in South Bad'a. The South Bad'a settlements are about one and

a half miles from each other. The village population, which is about

2,500, is distributed over an area of about 10 square miles.

The centre of the village is a wide empty area crossed by a paved

road which links the village to the main road to Baghdad and Ba'quba

Map 54 DA'UDIA SETTLEMENT STRUCTURE

NORTHERN BADA

orchards

The present Shaikh of Albu 'Amir and his brothers houses

Shurughis houses

Canal

Settlement no I

Settlement no 2

The Dulaim peasants houses

orchards

The Dulaim's leaders houses

Canal

Baghdad — Khalis road

The Dulaim peasants houses

orchards

River Tigris

The Dulaim peasants' houses

Settlement no 4

N

0   km   5

Da'udia Centre
public buildings and shops local
government, petrol, cafe, veterinary
and dispensary

Settlement no 5

Settlement no 3

The present Shaikh of Albu 'Amir's cousins houses

SOUTHERN BADA

Settlement no I includes
A Albu Khamis lineage

Settlement no 2 includes
A Albu Hajj Hasan lineage
B A Sub lineage of Albu Musluh of Dulaim

Settlement no 3 includes
A Albu Ayyada Sub-lineage
B Albu Dirrij Sub-lineage
C Al-Arafna

Settlement no 4 includes
A The newcomers
B Albu-'Inad Sub-lineage
C Albu Hammudi Sub-lineage

Settlement no 5 includes
A Albu Rizayyiq Sub-lineage
B A number of newcomer families
C A Sub-lineage of Albu Musluh of Dulaim

respectively. Most of the government buildings are located on either side of this road. This area serves as a market place for the people and forms the centre of many other village activities. The centre of the village occupies an area of about four donums. It includes the government building or Sarai, the headquarters of the local Party, the agricultural office, the school, the veterinary unit and the Co-operative Societies' building.

Most of the middle part of Da'udia is occupied by people who are not members of Albu 'Amir. The majority of them are from Dulaim, living along the bank of the river. Some civil servants including the chief administrative director (mudir), and the head of the primary school, live in government-supplied houses; other officials, like the policeman, live in mud houses at the back of the settlement. Other officials commute to the village, particularly the school-teachers. Those who live in Baghdad or Ba'quba use the bus service to Da'udia.

All village houses are built in close proximity to one another, originally for defence, but also to facilitate social contact. The spatial distribution of houses falls roughly into sub-lineage (bayt) quarters, joint family groups within a sub-lineage tending to live next door to each other or to share a joint dwelling, each family possessing its own separate entrance and room or rooms.

The houses of the village are of two styles, indicating the differences in economic status of their owners. The most common type of house has mud walls with long rafters on which smaller branches or poles are laid covered with a layer of mud. Inside the house the roof is supported on wooden pillars. There is a door at the front, and generally a small window. There is usually a small hearth where cooking is done, a pen for animals at the back, and a small front yard which can be used for cooking, and where many other everyday activities are carried out. The house is

normally built to contain two rooms, to which other rooms may be added, for instance when sons marry.

The new dwellings, which constitute the second type of housing in Da'udia are modern one-family houses, constructed of either oven-baked bricks or of reinforced concrete and steel. In structure and design they resemble urban dwellings in Baghdad with their flat roofs, glass windows, cement floors, electricity, indoor bathrooms and kitchen. The wealthier people of the village live in this kind of modern house on the river bank and own private cars. Along the river bank near the centre of the village, stand the opulent modern residences (qusur, or palaces as the peasants call them), of the big landlords. These are located close to their owners' orchards, and are surrounded by a few mud houses belonging to share-croppers and tenants, who also perform various services for their landlords.

The village mosque is an old style brick building with three arches at the entrance and a courtyeard with a fountain for ablutions. The mosque serves as a gathering place for the men especially before and after prayers.

When I started my field work, the market place contained only five small shops run on a part-time basis by peasants wanting to supplement their income. Most of the people travelled to Baghdad or Ba'quba for main shopping. In general Iraqi villagers are averse to running grocery businesses and refer to shopkeepers with disdain, since shopkeeping is considered a low status occupation. By the time of my most recent visit in the summer of 1976, many people had opened grocery and other retail shops, selling goods at fixed prices.[1]

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1) The government has established fixed prices for many basic commodities such as meat, flour, sugar and tea and prosecutes anyone who sells above these prices. Despite this fact, exploitation of consumers, especially long-time residents of the village, is not an uncommon practice. Shopkeepers are less prone to overcharging strangers and newcomers since they may be government officials still lacking any

Village economy and land use

The bulk of the village population are peasants who depend entirely
on agriculture.[1] Pump irrigation is the cornerstone of the agricultural
economy, since summer rainfall is neglible and the average total annual
rainfall of 156 mms falls in the winter between November and April.
Rainfall at the proper time is of immense importance to agriculture.
Although the cultivators depend upon pump irrigation and are thus generally
immune from the effects of drought, they run the risk of losing their
herds in very dry periods, since the animals normally graze on the fields
after the harvest. The most critical period comes when the summer cultivation
begins, when water for irrigation becomes a major problem, and quarrels
tend to arise over trivial issues.

The constant need for irrigation for summer crops often forces
peasants to walk their fields at night so as to ensure that the channels
carrying water to their own canals have not been blocked by some hostile
or selfish neighbour.

The irrigation system, which is an integral part of the rural
economy and which the various parties are obliged to maintain, depends
entirely on mechanical pumps, since precipitation is insufficient. Droughts,
prolonged or short, occur frequently throughout the country, especially
in the central and southern parts of Iraq. It is also important to point
out that the majority of pumps in the village are privately owned: only
two out of the total of twenty pumps belong to Land Reform co-operatives.
A vital agricultural resource has thus continued to remain largely in private
hands. The share of the crop taken by the pump owners amounts to 24% of

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close ties with shop eepers in the village. Goods are sold and
services rendered on both cash and credit terms, customers in the
latter case, paying their accounts on either a monthly or a weekly
basis. In addition, a number of peddlars tour the village from time
to time, carrying their merchandise on donkeys. They sell a wide
variety of goods, including cloth, cosmetics and sweets, occasionally
on credit.

1) See Table 3 , overleaf for an occupational breakdown.

Table 3

Principal Occupations of Resident Adult Population in 1974-75[1]

Occupations	Working in Da'udia[2]	Working Outside	Totals
Professional/ **Administrative**			
Teachers	6	9	15
Police Officer	1	-	1
Government Employees	10	-	10
Health Clinic Employees	1	-	1
Policemen	6	-	6
Commercial/Transport			
Shopkeepers	12	-	12
Lorry and Bus drivers	6	11	17
Unskilled Wage Labourers			
Non-agricultural wage labourer	30	30	60
Agricultural wage labourers 3)	60	-	60
Peasants			
Peasants who are dependent only on Land Reform plots	85	-	85
Sharecroppers	49	-	49
Peasants who combine Land Reform plots with sharecropping	160	-	160
Peasants who work waqf land	20	-	20
Landlords	30	-	30
TOTALS	476(90.5)	50(9.5)	52(100)

Percentages in brackets

1) The table excludes housewives, and retired or disabled persons.

2) There are additionally some persons who work in Da'udia but who maintain households outside. They are mostly government employees who commute to the village each day.

3) The majority of these persons are Shurughis who work in the orchards of Albu 'Amir and Dulaim.

4) As I explained on page 54, by this date only 50 of the original 200 "newcomer" households remained in the village. This accounts for the reduced number of Land Reform peasants in this table as compared with the figure for 1970 (See Table 2, p. 54).

gross production under a contract between the owner and the <u>mudir</u> or
head of local government. With the notable exception of the pump owned
by the leading family of Albu 'Amir, most of the pumps are of low
capacity.

The pattern of agriculture in the village as a whole is of winter
and summer crops. Winter crops (<u>shitwi</u>) consist of wheat and barley which
are grown partly for subsistence and partly for sale, and winter vegetables
such as beans, broad beans and spinach which are also produced for sale.
Summer, or <u>saifi</u>, cultivation consists mainly of tomatoes, cucumber, okra,
water and honeydew melons. Summer crops are the main source of cash income
for the villagers, and certain areas, which change from year to year, are
left fallow for manuring by animals in the winter in order to be as
productive as possible in the summer. Apart from this, areas planted
with beans in the winter are also favoured for summer cropping.

Before 1968 a high proportion of the cultivated area was devoted to
rice and peasants produced sufficient vegetables, wheat and barley to meet
their household needs. Nowadays, peasants have to purchase rice which
is considered something of a luxury. After government prohibition of rice
cultivation,[1] wheat and barley have become the main winter products, while
vegetables are the chief summer crop.

Ploughing is normally done by tractors, which can be hired through
one of the co-operative societies. Those who are unable to hire ploughs
from the co-operative society, because of high demand at certain periods,
can usually hire them from well-to-do families who charge higher rates.
After the ploughing of the land the seeds are sown by the cultivators and
their wives and children.

Whereas males usually undertake the main tasks of ploughing and
harvesting, sowing and weeding are most frequently left to the women. In
peak periods, households usually recruit additional labour from their kin.

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1)   (As a result of salinisation.)

On the whole, winter cultivation is less profitable, since summer crops are cultivated exclusively for cash. Advance credit is provided by the government agency handling vegetables and other summer products. When the individual's turn for irrigation water comes round, there is an acute demand for labour. The monetary returns on the summer crops are high, although market prices are subject to sharp fluctuations, and crops are frequently subject to damage from pests and wind storms. In the areas near the river where irrigation water is more readily available, vegetable cultivation is less risky.

Summer vegetables take two months to mature and require attention throughout that period. If the young crop is left without water for a few days it will deteriorate very quickly, and may be ruined altogether. In contrast, cereal crops require little labour, normally only ploughing and sowing. After that and until the harvest in June, the cultivators are free from agricultural duties.

The village is well known for its fruit from the orchards on the Tigris where the land still retains its fertility because of the natural drainage into the river. Most of the fruit is bought by wholesalers at least a year before the harvest. These traders maintain credit relations with the owners of the orchards and regular trade connections, involving further complex credit relations, in the large cities, especially Baghdad. Most of the orchards are owned by large landowners from both Albu 'Amir and Dulaim.

Cereal products are also grown on land near the Tigris and on other fertile tracts all over the village. Many of these plots are owned by the same large landowners, who sell their products for cash in urban-based markets. Agricultural labour on the large estates depends both on share-cropping and on wage labour. On these estates agricultural activities are more advanced in terms of production and cultivation. Large landowners

adopted more advanced methods of cultivation using facilities provided by the agricultural office. This, coupled with their experience, maintains a good cropping regime and land fertility, and their control of the more fertile lands on the river bank enhances their economic position.

The soils near the river bank are suitable for the cultivation of many kinds of crops all the year round. This multi-cropping pattern, coupled with more organized and advanced methods of cultivation, is generally adopted by the private sector. Cereal production in the parts of the village away from the area which enjoys natural drainage into the river has shown a decline in the quality of yield. Sizeable quantities of cereals, mainly wheat and barley, produced in this area, are consumed locally as a main diet. All production from both Land Reform and private land is sold through the local co-operative societies.

Land use and the organisation of agriculture on private land

The Land Reform co-operatives usually give their own members priority for the use of the machinery which they control, but the economic situation of the major landowners generally enables them to hire machinery from outside the village at times of shortage. In fact, most of the larger landowners have at least a plough at their disposal, and at peak periods they work in teams to plough their land.

On private land, the landlord organises all agricultural production, determines which crops should be grown in which fields, allocates the land to the cultivators, owns the irrigation pumps and pays for their maintenance, taking in return a half share of all crops grown. The actual process of allocating land follows the same pattern as on other holdings in the area. Each field is devoted to a particular crop and is sub-divided among the cultivators in strips or mukhtat. Sometimes each cultivator has only a single strip in each field, and sometimes the field is split up into blocks and each cultivator has one strip in each block.

The same system has been applied in the Land Reform areas in the village

and in other regions. In the village this system appears to have reached

an extreme situation. The fields are divided up into blocks of approximately

$1\frac{1}{2}$ acres in size and each block is sub-divided into three strips.

The unit of measurement is the local long-handled digging shovel

(misha), some 6-8 ft long, the width of the block corresponding to

approximately 20 handle lengths. The object of this elaborate sub-division

is to ensure that each person gets an equal share of good and bad land.

The size of the area allotted to each nuclear family depends on two main

factors; primarily the working capacity of the family, and secondly, its

needs. The number of strips into which the total area is divided and their

size depends upon the importance put upon ensuring a fair distribution of

good and bad land between families.

Outside the Land Reform area in the village the relationship of

cultivators to large landowners is still within the framework previously

described as feudal.[1]

The large landowners usually employ a <u>sirkal</u> or bailiff who supervises

cultivation, as well as land allocation and water distribution. These

<u>sirkals</u> are normally close relatives who report to the landlord on the

progress of cultivation and on any requirements and problems. During

the evening gatherings at the guesthouse, the <u>sirkal</u> reports to the shaikh

and discusses various problems with him in the presence of the cultivators.

The latter receive instructions for the following day, which may include

recommendations to concentrate on specific crops, particularly vegetables,

normally in short supply and likely to rise in price.

<u>Land use and organisation on Land Reform territory</u>

In principle it was intended that peasants should be settled on the

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1) See Chapter II.

new Land Reform (1970) settlements on the basis of joint cultivation.

The Government felt that it was impossible to provide them with health

and educational services and co-operative facilities if they remained

scattered all over the area, and it was also considered important to

avoid fragmentation of holdings which had prevailed in the past.

Ecological conditions in the village had resulted in high salinity on these

formerly fragmented holdings and for this reason also, attempts were made

to abandon individual cultivation in favour of the joint cultivation of

larger plots. The five settlements have been organized on the basis of

block land use which has been developed since 1970, together with the

establishment of co-operative societies. The entire area of any one

settlement belonging to a single co-operative society is divided into a

number of blocks according to the size of the area and the number of

cultivators. These blocks are almost always approximately equal in size

and managed under a system of crop rotation. Each head of household within

the settlement has approximately 18 donums, and he is required to follow

the rotation system prescribed by the local Land Reform office. The same

crop is cultivated throughout each individual block in order to facilitate

irrigation and harvesting and the application of fertilizers and pesticides.

The block system has largely succeeded in overcoming many of the problems

associated with fragmentation by combining the land within particular

settlements into units of efficient management size. But although peasants

should in theory cultivate jointly, they in fact tend to divide the land

among themselves within the block. Hence each peasant cultivates his

'own' piece of land and takes its produce for himself, although this is

usually marketed through the co-operative society. On the other hand in

spite of the tendency towards individualism, a certain amount of co-operation

is already apparent, such as joint cleaning of canals and joint renting of

agricultural machinery. This has become possible through the appointment

by the government of a 'president' (<u>ra'is</u>) in each settlement, who takes the initiative for organizing the cleaning of the canals before each crop season.

The settlement president is the medium through whom the peasants approach the local agricultural and irrigation authorities, and he is frequently a member of the co-operative board. This has helped to strengthen contacts between the administration and the new settlements in the village, although the peasants sometimes prefer to approach the local authorities independently without going through the settlement president.

The five settlements in the village are served by two co-operative societies. The first two settlements, in North Bad'a, (see map no. 4), which contain 125 households, are served by one co-operative, while the other three settlements in South Bad'a, containing 270 households, is served by the other. Most of the members of the administrative boards of the co-operatives are drawn from among the cultivators, particularly from the presidents of the settlements. In spite of any disputes which may occur between the presidents and the members of the settlement, the president will normally inform the co-operative of the various requirements of the settlement which he represents. His duties include the organization of the distribution of water both within his own settlement and in association with other settlement presidents. All the settlements, it should be noted, are composed of unrelated kinship groups, as will be explained in greater detail later.

Agricultural co-operation within the new settlements

Social life among the unrelated kinship groups in the Land Reform settlements is based on co-operation in agricultural activities, which require different forms of association. The nature of the climate requires continuous co-operation to operate the mechanised irrigation system.

The irrigation system cannot be operated by an individual or an

individual family alone. The establishment and excavation of the canals, cleaning out the silt, and the digging of feeder canals all require large scale joint activity at settlement level. Without such co-operation it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the system.

The division of land is based on a number of factors, such as proximity to the settlement and soil fertility, which results in an individual's holdings being scattered all over the area. Because of this, and because the village irrigation system cannot provide separate canals for each holding, many separately worked parcels must lie next to a single canal, so that the co-operation of all the peasants within the settlement is required. Furthermore, co-operation is occasionally necessary between two settlements sharing a single canal. For this reason the irrigation system within any one settlement is often not simply an internal concern affecting that settlement alone. Even an independently irrigated settlement may experience the intervention of the head of the local co-operative, acting on behalf of one of the parties to a dispute.

Co-operation in irrigation and cultivation and the common life of the settlement encourages another kind of co-operation at marriages and funerals. On these occasions members of a single settlement participate as a whole, although the obligation of one villager to another depends largely upon his kinship relationship. These occasions of co-operation, coupled with occasional conflicts over irrigation and boundaries, give settlement members a sense of joint territory. Settlements are small, and the social relations of members therefore include all their fellow members, as well as extending outside to include other members of the local community, largely through kinship relationships, since the kinship group has been scattered throughout the area. Thus friendship and common residence as well as more traditional kinship links have become important factors in the conduct of social relationships. Members of the settlement and the village as a whole

are linked by a common background. The individual knows details of his

family history and background, as well as being aware of his fellow

villagers' situations. These relationships play a significant role in

harmonising and solving conflicts, especially among the newly settled

Land Reform peasants.

The new organization established by the government, together with the

local party organization, has begun to play a crucial role in settlement

life: each settlement has a Peasant Bureau [1] which tries to encourage the

cultivators to work together in agricultural and irrigation activities,

and which attempts to settle conflicts as they arise at settlement or

village level. Thus the cultivators' social relationships have been

extended to include people outside their kinship group, in contrast to the

situation in the past, when the village was divided into two major groups

which were segregated socially by tribal and religious affiliations.

Since the establishment of these new organizations the village as

a whole and the new settlements are by no means isolated and closed

worlds. Also, the breaking down of the barriers between members of the

local community, and living together in settlements regardless of sectarian

division have generated conflicts between unrelated kinship groups,

although these disputes are in some senses the heritage of the past.

The importance of the household

In spite of Land Reform, and attempts at co-operativisation, the

household remains the basic economic unit. Such a household, generally made

up of a nuclear family, typically occupies its own house (kharaba =

literally, ruin), and lives next door to its close relatives. The change

brought about by the Land Reform is reflected mainly in the individual's

control over a tract of land registered in his name. The peasant who was

previously a member of an extended family, is now, for all practical purposes,

the master of his own plot of land, although he is still tied to his father,

1)   See Chapter II, p.

brothers and relatives by obligations or support in disputes arising with others within or outside the settlement.

The ordinary household in the village usually consists of a man, his wife and their four or five children. The man is normally considered the head of the family and he decides upon the internal and external affairs of his own unit. Types of extended family are not common in the village[1] and only occur when a number of brothers decide to live together and manage their joint resources, including land, under their father's supervision. Where couples form part of a large household, their behaviour towards each other is governed by the fact that they are both still subject to its head. The wife works together with her husband's brothers' wives under the immediate authority of their husbands' mother.

The division of labour within these households depends primarily on sex. The woman usually concerns herself with domestic affairs, and arduous work such as weeding and sowing, especially when her children are still young and she cannot rely on them for assistance. Consequently, young girls are trained in domestic duties, while boys are trained in agriculture by their fathers. Boys begin work by grazing animals and laying out their fodder. Poor agricultural yields make animal husbandry an important extra source of income.

Livestock and the domestic economy

Each household owns at least one cow. Its milk is sold to a government dairy in Baghdad. Some peasants share cows, especially those who cannot afford the necessary fodder. Under this arrangement one partner gets the milk, while the other has the benefit of any offspring. In drought periods, the herd owner has to face the dilemma either of buying expensive

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1) For example, in a sample survey of Settlement 3, there were only
    2 extended families but 34 nuclear families.

fodder which most cannot afford, or of selling the animal at a lower price.
Families who are unable to maintain their cows due to fodder shortage
often give them to a fellow peasant to look after. The partner then becomes
a 'bone sharer', which means that he gets an equal share in the offspring.
Sheep and goats are the concern of the women and are shepherded by boys
and young girls. They are reared mainly for sale. Numbers vary from
season to season and are sold in the spring.

Alfalfa is one of the most important crops in the area, both for
domestic animals and for sale to sheep herders who camp near the village
at the beginning of the spring and who stay there for about four months.
City dwellers, especially surburban inhabitants of migrant origin in
Baghdad, are the main dealers in alfalfa. The majority of these immigrants
maintain their kinship relations with people in the village and especially
with the large landowners, in order to monopolize large quantities of
alfalfa either for their own animals, which are kept in their yards or
for sale in the suburban markets in Baghdad.

Animals raised in the village are an important priority since they
supply milk which forms, with bread, the standard diet for daily consumption.
The great importance of fodder in rural life is clearly illustrated by
the fact that some cultivators refuse to harvest their crops mechanically
because they claim that this damages the fodder. Consequently, many
peasants continue with traditional ways of harvesting in order to preserve
the fodder which is stored in heaps covered with a layer of compressed
earth.

Other sources of income

Because of their economic circumstances, many Land Reform peasants
attach themselves to large landowners as sharecroppers in order to supplement
their income from their own plots. These families usually exploit their
kinship relations with the landowners in order to work with them. Some

of them hire a tract of land from a larger landowner to cultivate alfalfa,

usually in groups of about five or six. They pay the rent jointly to the

landowners and production is distributed among them equally. For both

sharecroppers and those who rent a tract of land, the landlord's

responsibility is to plough the land and to provide irrigation water.

The cultivators are responsible for the provision of seeds and labour and

for tending the crops.

Since the Revolution of 1968 and the nationalisation of oil in 1972

there have been increasing signs of wage-workers going outside the village,

to work on new government projects. Many peasants, especially the younger

generation, as the shaikh of Albu 'Amir remarked to me, no longer consider

farming a desirable career, and the transport facilities connecting the

village to Baghdad and other nearby cities and the higher wages in the urban

areas encourage many people to work there. They usually consider the

village where their families and relatives live as a place to return at

night or during the holidays.

Greater mobility has also been encouraged by agricultural mechanisation,

which allows the cultivator to take on additional non-agricultural work.

Although it may be argued that Land Reform has partially halted migration

to the cities, it has not yet succeeded in stopping it to any appreciable

extent. Young people seek more attractive government employment in the

cities and have begun to despise agricultural labour. The presence of

more schools in rural areas has tended to accentuate this trend in spite

of efforts on the part of the government to keep young people on the land

by establishing local agricultural education centres. This problem has

begun to be most acutely felt on landlord estates, and the landlords

complain that they are short of labour despite the fact that the Shurughis

have not benefited at all from the Land Reform.

Although Da'udia is primarily an agricultural settlement, there

are many men who work away from the village. Some of these men live outside

Da'udia, but still consider it their home. They return for religious

festivals and funerals.

Women and young girls of Shurughi origin also engage in work outside

the village to supplement the family income. They also pick oranges and

lemons in the village orchards. Neither Albu 'Amir nor Dulaim allow

their women and girls to work for wages, since both groups feel that it

is shameful for their women to do so.

Relations between Dulaim and Albu 'Amir before 1970

Before the Revolution of 1958, the leading family of Albu 'Amir

acted as a dictorial authority, usually surrounded by members of its own

lineage acting as bodyguards, who ruthlessly kept the peasants down.

Supported by these armed forces, as well as by police and the government

machinery, the leading family was able to control the peasants and the

population as a whole. No-one dared to complain or could refuse to work

on the family's land. The punishment would have been torture or exile,

as many peasants confirmed.

The present (1977) shaikh of Albu 'Amir was a Member of Parliament

under the Monarchy and managed to control the best land on the Tigris and

pushed Dulaim further and further towards the river bank.

During this period Dulaim occupied a very secondary place in the

economic, political and social life of the village, and this state of

affairs lasted substantially until 1968. During that time the leading

family of Albu 'Amir managed to establish links with the central power in

Baghdad and also to establish affinal and thus political alliances with some

of the tribes in the surrounding areas, at a time of constant tribal fighting,

mostly over access to water. However, the leading family and Albu 'Amir

as a whole were the main protectors of Dulaim, who did not participate

in the fighting, since they were too weak to form an independent political
leadership or to recruit their tribesmen to defend the village. Dulaim
were thus generally outside the orbit of these wars and feuds since they
were not involved directly in hostile relations with any parties either
inside or outside the village. Thus Dulaim depended heavily on the
leading family of Albu 'Amir for their protection, and were able to continue
to cultivate their small plots of land without interference. This
relative stability helped them to develop cash crop cultivation and thus
to enhance their economic position: several of their leaders transformed
their plots into orchards, which have prospered over the last fifteen
years due to the improved market conditions which have come into being
after the construction of the new road.

In Da'udia, because the implementation of the first Land Reform
was somewhat hesitant and slow, the shaikh of Albu 'Amir managed to claim
exemptions, and thus largely retained his power. Hence the stipulations
of the Land Reform were not in fact rigorously applied for the first
ten years, between 1958 and 1968. Peasants from Dulaim and Albu 'Amir
who did obtain plots of land under the Reform could not actually exploit
them because they did not have the necessary funds, seed, irrigation, or
machinery at their disposal. Thus they often simply returned their
lands to their previous owners, and were even forced off the land under
various pretexts. In contrast, under the present Land Reform programme,
the leading family of Albu 'Amir has lost more than 10,000 donums, both
inside and outside the village.[1] Within the village about 7,470 donums
were expropriated from them, and distributed among 400 peasants from both

---

1) After the registration of the Bad'a in the names of the leading
   family after 1932, they had purchased more land outside the village,
   which was previously worked by sharecroppers. Under the Land
   Reform of 1970, the whole holding of an individual was counted as
   a unit irrespective of its location.

Albu 'Amir and Dulaim who now live in five settlements or <u>aslaf</u> all over

the village. As will be shown, this has already begun to have important

social and political consequences.

The present administrative structure

With the advent of Land Reform, the role of local government has

sharply increased. With the shift away from large private estates to

fixed shares of communal land, and with the distribution of irrigation

water being partly taken over by the local government, the local shaikh's

official responsibilities have greatly diminished. Shaikhs are no longer

recognized by the central government as an integral part of the local

administration as was previously the case.

The lower Khalis area, which includes Da'udia contains parts of

two provinces (<u>muhafadha</u>) Diyala and Baghdad, with the greatest area lying

in Diyala. Within the area there are four districts (<u>qadha</u>) which split

into subdivisions (<u>nahia</u>). Da'udia is the headquarters of a <u>nahia</u>, which

is part of Khalis <u>qadha</u> in Diyala <u>muhafadha</u>.

The headquarters of the <u>nahia</u> are located in the centre of the

village. Administrative affairs are run by the chief director or <u>mudir</u>

<u>al-nahia</u>. The government buildings contain a number of offices, belonging

to various ministries.[1] At all administrative levels the chief local

official of the Ministry of the Interior is the highest ranking government

official in a territory. Internal organization is specified by regulations

from Baghdad, but implementation is left almost exclusively to the dis-

cretion of the <u>mudir</u>, and the actual mode of operation in a unit is power-

fully influenced by the inter-personal relations among the civil servants.

However, authority within a unit, while concentrated in the person

of the senior local official, is in fact greatly circumscribed, since

most decisions are taken in Baghdad. Criticism is limited to questioning

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1)   See chart no. 1.

CHART. I ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

```
                          THE MUDIR
                             │
                        DEPUTY OF
                          MUDIR
                             │
        ┌──────────┬─────────┼─────────┬──────────┐
        │          │         │         │          │
   HEAD OF     POLICE        │     SUPPLIES    FINANCIAL
   CENSUS      OFFICER    HEAD OF    DEPT      INSPECTOR
   DEPT                  PERSONNEL
        │          │      DEPT      │              │
  OFFICIALS    DEPUTY      │    PURCHASING    FINANCIAL
  OF CENSUS    POLICE  INFORMATION SECTION    OFFICIALS
  DEPT         OFFICER  SECTION      │              │
        │          │         │    STORES      ACCOUNTANCY
                POLICEMAN  ARCHIVES SECTION      DEPT
                          SECTION
```

7-5

whether the details of programmes and policy are locally applicable,

and criticism is not fed back to the centre through the chains of command.

The main duty of the mudir is to handle day-to-day administrative problems,

and the duties of the officials such as the police are limited to carrying

out his orders. Other officials are responsible to him for matters

falling within their own technical competence.

The village is connected to other ministries and provinces through

the application of the Land Reform. The Land Reform authorities established

their own administrative structure throughout the country based on

agricultural projects located in villages, whereas agricultural affairs

were previously under the direct control of the mudir. As an agricultural

area Da'udia forms a sub-division within the Khalis project whose head-

quarters are located in the town of Khalis, twenty miles north of the

village. The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, which directs

the Khalis project has stated that it will cover almost all aspects of

agriculture, including raising rural living standards through a rational

organisation of agricultural holdings, supplying adequate public services,

introducing intensive cultivation methods, expanding mechanized

agriculture and developing land reclamation to reduce the excessive

salinity of the soil.

The project has several departments for managing various agricultural

tasks and all the local agricultural offices in Diyala province are

directly related to it,[1] under a single Director-General. The Director-

General and the heads of the various departments form its executive board

or majlis al-idara. The project employs a number of agricultural

engineers and agronomists specialising in field crops, horticulture,

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1)   See chart no. 2.

Chart II Administrative Structure of the Khalis Project

```
                                    ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD
                                             |
        Administrative Board's Secretary ----+---- Administrative Board's Bureau
                                             |
                           General Director -----+----- General Director's Bureau
                                             |
                                   Deputy of General Director
                                             |
  +--------+--------+--------+--------+-------+--------+--------+--------+
  |        |        |        |        |       |        |        |
```

Director of Legal Department
1 Contracts Section
2 Affairs Section
3 Research Section

Director of Personnel Department
1 Salaried Personnel Section
2 Training Section
3 Wage Labourer Section

Director of Soil Department
1 Survey Section
2 Drawings Section

Director of Finance Department
1 Accounts & Estimates Section
2 Weights & Measures Section
3 Accounts Section

Director of Economic Affairs
1 Studies Section
2 Projects Section

Director of Irrigation Department
1 Excavation Section
2 Pump Irrigation Section

Director of Technical Department
1 Agronomist Section
2 Animal Husbandry Section
3 Crop Disease & Protection Section

Director of Cooperatives Department
1 Local Cooperatives Section
2 Marketing Section
3 Transport Section
4 Relations Section

animal husbandry, mechanical and irrigation engineering, as well as several supervisors, co-operative officers, drivers, mechanics and administrators. The arable land of the whole project area is cultivated according to a plan involving crop rotation, the introduction of cash crops and canal reclamation.

Thus the Agricultural Office is not related or officially subordinate to the mudir al-nahia, and co-operation between the heads of the two offices is governed more by an informal arrangement than by official directives, and relations between the two heads were often strained. The main task of the Agricultural Office is to deal with peasants settled on Land Reform land, as well as with the agricultural affairs of the whole area. Thus the relationship between the Agricultural Office and the peasants it has to supervise is not simply an administrative one.

Local government officials are appointed by the Central Government. They are almost all townsfolk, usually educated at least to secondary school level, while the mudir is usually a university law graduate. Promotion depends on length of service and on ability. For the most part civil servants are seeking to achieve rank and status in an urban rather than in a rural setting, in which smart clothes, wealth and a proper disdain for peasants are highly esteemed. Their lifestyle thus differs both from that of their own seniors and from the peasants around them. They consider their service in the village only as a temporary stage and they do not bother to build up strong relationships with the local people. Their attitudes towards village life and its affairs, are generally characterized by indifference and ignorance. The find village life lacking in civilized amenities, and they tend to resent the lack of facilities, and are not interested in rural traditions, to which they pay little attention. Their contact with the local people in most cases is confined to their official duties. In contrast, the attitudes and behaviour of the

people of the village, especially the landlords, towards the officials, are

affected by the desire to establish channels of influence (<u>wasta</u>).

Relationships among the families of the officials who come from

outside the village, reflect the governmental and social stratification

already existing in Iraqi society. The families of the <u>mudir</u>, the head

of the primary school, and some of the large landlords who are high up

in the social scale usually make contact with those of a similar way

of life and standard of living. The families of those who are lower in

the government hierarchy normally make contact with peasant families

whose way of life and standard of living, and even education, are similar.

In general opportunities for families of senior and junior government

representatives to meet and interact are occasional and limited.

The political arena

Political authority in Da'udia is now in the hands of a new group of

participants and the peasants have been more closely drawn into the running

of their own affairs. After the Revolution of 1968, the Ba'th Party

attempted to construct a new political system. They set out to convince

the peasants that kinship factions had no class basis, and that the peasants'

best interests lay in mutual co-operation in the context of village and

class unity. The Party leadership and its organs also warned peasants

that the shaikhs and landlords had simply used kinship bonds to exploit

members of their lineages. Most of the early Party members happened to

come from a single group, Dulaim, so efforts were made to recruit young

people from all groups, using these recruits to establish wider channels

of communication and influence.

The head of the Party organization today is a young village teacher

who does not belong to one of the local kinship groups, having originally

come from outside the village, while the President of the Co-operative

Society is a local peasant. A third important factor is the <u>mudir</u>, who

is a Party member and who plays an important role in the village by

co-ordinating activities between the local government and the local Party.

However, it is important to stress that although Party authority is the

strongest in village affairs, the fact that the wealth and social status

of the local landlords has remained largely intact has permitted them to

retain a substantial measure of political influence in the village,

sufficient, in fact to amount to a rival power system. However, the two

landlord groups are Shi'i and Sunni Muslim respectively, and there is

considerable conflict between them over the manipulation of political

processes in the village. Many of the older generation still retain

political and emotional ties with landlords of their own faith, while the

younger peasants who have been recruited into the Party complain that their

elders are not orientated to Socialist and modern ideas because the latter

believe that Allah made the world with rich and poor and that man must be

content with his lot. In contrast, of course, the Party claims that

misery has nothing to do with Allah, but derives from the behaviour of

men and stresses that peasants can improve their lot through education and

work.

The Party claims that landlords complain to the lineage elders about

the transfer of power to younger villagers in order to create dissatisfaction.

The young, the landlords suggest, are not capable or responsible, and

leadership should remain with the experienced. They also invoke kinship

rivalries, pointing out that the new leadership comes from a single group

to the detriment of others. Moreover, when any of the new local institutions,

- such as the co-operative society, fail to function properly, the landlords

are quick to take advantage of the opportunity to criticise them. The

Co-operative Board has held frequent public meetings to counter such rumours

and to raise the level of political consciousness.

In the village, the Peasants' Bureau and the Party hold weekly

meetings to ensure that the provisions of the Land Reform are being
implemented, and to explain the benefits of higher productivity and
the logic of larger agricultural units. Small holdings, it is
stressed, can be consolidated to take advantage of mechanization if
peasants are organised into specialised teams on collective land and
the advantages of a modern division of labour can help increase yields
on apparently unproductive soils. In general, these changes have gone
some way towards removing many peasants from the influence of the land-
lords and from the misery of the former agricultural system.

Some aspects of village social life

In spite of the changes which have taken place since the implementation
of the 1970 Land Reform, the village has still preserved many of its
institutions and traditions. Villagers can immediately be distinguished
from government officials since they wear the traditional dishdasha all
the year round. The dishdasha is a long shirt covering the whole body,
made of wool or cotton.

Most villagers spend their leisure time together in one of the
houses of their senior kinsmen after sunset, having finished their work
early in the afternoon. It is considered shameful to spend time with one's
wife and children, and most men do in fact spend little time with their
women. In general, men look for companionship with men and women with
women.

In their evening gatherings men usually talk about various issues
of their daily life. Most of the work for the next day is agreed upon
during these meetings which usually last until 9 o'clock at night. At
other times of day, the cafe or qahwa, located near the government
buildings, is the social centre, especially during the mornings. The
people gather to drink tea and chat over various problems, and the cafe
is the centre for the exchange of news, gossip, discussion and village
affairs.

Members of any group in Da'udia are linked on a number of different levels, such as kinship and marriage, age group and friendship. Kinship is the dominant principle of intra-group relations, and kinship and marriage ties also link men and women in the village with a wider circle of members of their own group living in surrounding areas or outside the village.

The majority of the peasants are still tied to their land and to rural tradition, where the fact of blood relationship is still of immense importance. Proverbs graphically illustrate the great importance of kinship structures, the details of which are familiar to all villagers. Enquiries about a fellow villager are usually answered with reference to the lineage, fakhd or sublineage, bayt, to which the person belongs. Individuals depend on their kinsmen in various ways, presumably because many aspects of their social life are considered the affair of the group and not of the individual alone, and because the kinship system is still the basis of social organization. Peasants say that their kinship organization has lost many of the functions that it used to have, and that the tribe or lineage of today cannot possibly do for its members what earlier forms of the kinsip system did for their fellows. The new Land Reform policy which has grouped them in joint settlements has bridged some of the gaps which divided them, and although it has resulted in various conflicts, it has nevertheless created a number of common interests.

It is in the new settlements or aslaf which consist of a number of different unrelated kinship groups, that the cultivators have become aware of common interests which, in many situations, have already begun to transcend ethnic cleavages. They have become more aware of their role in society and have gradually developed some understanding of the role of the state. The great majority of peasants now seem convinced that the government wants to help them rather than exploit them as was the case in

the past. In their evening conversations they often discuss the Party and the government. They have only a vague comprehension of ideas such as "progress" and "socialism", but they are well able to understand the realities of the Land Reform and the co-operative movement.

Religious festivals

The most important religious festival in the village is the commemoration of Muharram, celebrated only by the Shi'i and thus by the Albu 'Amir in Da'udia. The two other festivals are celebrated by both major groups; the 'id al-fitr at the end of Ramadhan, and the 'id al-adha at the climax of the pilgrimage ceremonies in the month of Dhu'l-Hijja. On the first day of each festival, men go to the mosque very early for morning prayer (salat al-subh), and they proceed to their own guest house, where holiday greetings are exchanged and children, both boys and girls, kiss the hands of their elders, hoping to be given some money. Then the men assemble in small groups, generally sub-lineage based, though not necessarily so, and make the rounds of friends' houses in the village. Most peasants normally go first to the headquarters of the local Party where they greet the Party officials and the mudir. Several of the important men of the village, like landlords and respected lineage elders, stay at home for the first part of the morning to greet visitors. Coffee or tea, and tobacco are offered. Visiting continues on a diminishing scale for three days, with friends and relatives from other areas also coming for the occasion. It is the duty of everyone from the village who is working or living outside to return for the festivals and to make the ritual visits and greetings.

Participation in the ceremonies and observances has relevance for local and national politics and also for conflict resolution within the village, since it is considered a duty for everyone to be at peace with everyone else at the time of the festivals, when disputes are supposed to be

healed and forgotten.

During these festivals both Shi'i and Sunni express tolerance towards each other. The Sunni know that the Shi'i venerate 'Ali more than they do themselves, but they say that the difference between the two sects are not important. Several Sunni have Shi'i friends and visits are exchanged between them.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have given the physical, historical, socio-economic and political background of the village, and have referred briefly to some of the social changes and new forces operating both inside and outside village society.

The village was and is an agricultural settlement. But, since the implementation of the Land Reform of 1970 the economic status of the peasants has shifted from that of sharecroppers and tenants to landowners, and in consequence many peasants have started to cultivate cash crops. The Land Reform has wrought radical changes in the socio-political structure of the village. This has increased government involvement in the rural areas through investments in local co-operative societies and the establishment of new agricultural projects. Government involvement, mainly carried out and supervised by the local Party, has penetrated rural society throughout Iraq. The impact of these new developments on rural social organization will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters. But first it is necessary to provide an analysis of the system of kinship and marriage system in order to delineate one of the main features of village social structure.

CHAPTER IV

Kinship and Marriage

Introduction

      This chapter discusses the main components of the system of kinship and marriage in the village. I shall first describe the declining importance of tribal organization in the face of the major political and economic changes documented in Chapters I and II. This is followed by a discussion of the system of agnatic lineages, kinship terminology and patterns of family-household organization and marriage.

The decline of tribal organization

      The previous chapters have referred, in broad terms, to the changes which have been taking place in the tribal organization, particularly that of Albu 'Amir, from 1930 onwards. With the registration of the land in the names of the leading family and its subsequent distribution under the latest Land Reform programme, the pattern of tribal control and ownership by Albu 'Amir has undergone a series of major changes _per se_.

      Changes in tribal structure and the kinship relationships upon which it is based have been closely connected with changes in land holding. Hence the decline of tribal organization goes hand in hand with the alienation of land, first into the name of one family or individual, and then its distribution among the various other groups. In general, in these situations, as Fernea has noted, "tribal organization has been reduced to a collection of named groupings with little or no contemporary function or corporate existence".[1]

      This process has been accompanied over time by the establishment of

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1)   Fernea, R. _Shaykh and Effendi_, op. cit., p. 12.

local bureaucratic government, first by the British in 1917 and then by
successive national governments from 1921 onwards. The activities of the
various governments which came to power in Iraq have gradually deprived
"the tribal organisation of most of its historic purpose",[1] and reduced
its functions and status in the rural areas.

As has been described in Chapter I, the different tribal organisations
in central Iraq gradually lost their political independence during the
later Ottoman period, and the arrival of the British in 1917 resulted in
further decline. This loss of political autonomy occurred for two main
reasons. First, the geographical location of Albu 'Amir and other groups
near the capital made it difficult for them to strengthen their tribal
organisation in the face of government forces so that they did not develop
tribal confederations such as those in southern Iraq. This was a result
also of their diversity in terms of religious difference as Shi'i and
Sunni Muslims and their heterogeneity in terms of descent and loyalty.

Secondly, most of the tribal shaikhs in this area were recruited into
the machinery of government by the British authorities and were used
subsequently against their fellow tribesmen by both the Mandate and Monarchy
governments. A British administrative report in 1930 stated:

> "The tribal organisation is not so pronounced in this liwa
> (province) as in some other parts of Iraq, and, were it not
> for the recognition afforded to him by the government, the
> shaikh or ra'is would find it difficult to maintain any
> semblance of authority over his tribesmen ... here, as
> elsewhere, we are following the policy of recruiting the
> tribal organisation where it has lapsed by supporting the
> leading shaikhs and making them responsible for the
> behaviour of the tribesmen. This process of consolidation
> bore good results in the Basra wilayat. All experience goes
> to prove that the chaotic state of rural Mesopotamia in the

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1)   Ibid., p. 13.

1920s was largely due to the fact that the Turks feared and tried to weaken the power of the shaikhs instead of turning it to their service." 1)

The leading family of Albu 'Amir had in fact attached themselves to the Turkish authorities since the introduction of the Tapu system in 1872. [2] Under these regulations the Albu 'Amir shaikhs rather than their tribesmen benefitted, and the land passed into their private ownership. After the downfall of the Turks in 1917, Albu 'Amir attached themselves to the British authorities and the national government. During that period the present shaikh's father was very well known in Baghdad political circles a fact which greatly assisted his son, the present shaikh, to become an M.P. under the Monarchy. During that period the leading family of Albu 'Amir were able to control both the peasants of their own group and the area as a whole.

Under the Mandate and the Monarchy the leading family of Albu 'Amir managed to acquire and control most of the village agricultural land, as well as to deprive their own tribal group of their holdings. In this connection, Fernea has noted:

> "The emergence of a dominant lineage group, a group having proportionally greater control of resources and ultimately greater power within a tribal group than any other segments, runs counter to the cultural model of the tribal system present in the Daghara region as well as to the classic model of the segmentary system. Yet the development of a dominant lineage is understandable within the framework of a segmentary model, for it is, in a sense, the end result of conditions undermining those checks and balances which keep structurally equivalent segments equal in politico-economic terms. It is difficult to see how any segmentary system can persist under conditions which permit a single segment or alliance of segments to achieve a monopoly over sources of wealth." 3)

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1) Report of the Administrative Inspector, Diyala Liwa, Confidential No. C.101 A-1, pp. 3, 36 (National Archives, Baghdad).

2) See pages 10-11.

3) Fernea, R., op. cit., p. 105.

Hence, when the land became officially registered in the name of its leading family, the original segmentary organization of Albu 'Amir, based essentially on a form of balanced egalitarianism, was gradually eroded. Furthermore the Land Reform legislation has added a new dimension to this process, although the struggles for land between rival groups continue to be fought out in terms of kinship loyalties. This has resulted in a strengthening of sub-lineage solidarity and greater concentration of social and political functions at this level. The chapters that follow take up this theme, analysing the struggles between kin groups or sub-lineages in the face of new internal or external pressures.

Patrilineality and patrilineage

The patrilineage is the most important kinship group in the life of the individual in the village. The individual's primary relationship in the village is through his membership of a specific agnatic lineage. There are four main lineages (fakhd) in the village, each divided into a number of sub-lineages (bayt).

Patrilineage

Patrilineage is a consanguineal kinship group composed of males and females tracing their relationship to each other through descent from a common male ancestor of approximately eleven generations depth. There are four main lineages in the village, Albu Khamis and Al-Misarra in Albu 'Amir and Albu Hasan and Albu Musluh in Dulaim. These four include a total of 24 sub-lineages, whose members can trace their exact genealogical relationship with each other for at least three generations, and who are also known collectively by the name of a particular ancestor. The largest lineage is the Albu Khamis to which the present shaikh of Albu 'Amir belongs. This is composed of 11 sub-lineages while the Albu Hasan of Dulaim is composed of 6, Albu Musluh of 4, and al-Misarra of 3. The

"Newcomers", those peasants who came to the village after the implementation of the Land Reform of 1970 and who claim to be "Misarri" do not constitute either a lineage or sub-lineage, but are rather an aggregation of extended and nuclear families. In general the "Newcomers" are unable to trace any exact genealogical relationship among themselves, but claim that they are each others' aqarib (relations), and that they have known each other over a long period.

Typically the lineage (fakhd) is a corporate group which exercises a common responsibility for the actions of its members. The lineage is in theory united politically, in the event of disputes between it or its members and other kinship groups in the village. The lineage however is not corporate in the sense of having joint property, since property is individually controlled by fathers until their death, when it is divided among the male members of the household. In most cases the father divides the property among his sons before his death, although he retains real control during his own lifetime.

This supposed corporate solidarity among members of a lineage, as well as the relationships between members of nuclear families, underwent important changes from the time of the Revolution of 1958 until the implementation of the Land Reform of 1970, especially after the establishment of new settlements for Land Reform peasants. This brought about substantial changes in economic and political relations among and between the lineages, and led to the emergence of a new political element which has begun to compete with traditional sources of power and authority. Most people in the village describe tracts of land as belonging to sub-lineages rather than to lineages. The lineage no longer controls property jointly, but it has formal joint activities which make it appear to be a united group vis a vis other similar groups, particularly in cases of conflict or on the occasion of death and marriage.

The heads of lineages

The word used to describe the chief of the lineage is "ra'is", president, in recognition of his ability to preside over the kinship group and represent it externally. He has both external and internal functions, each interdependent in the sense that the internal recognition which he receives is the main criterion qualifying him to stand on an equal footing with other heads of lineages and to live up to his group's expectations in cases of dispute and conflict.

The inability of the lineage head to fulfil such expectations will normally signal his group's abandoning him in favour of another figure in the same kinship group. One of the most important qualities of the ra'is is the possession of influential connections with other heads of lineages which can be utilised in conflict situations. He must also be respected and have a guest house in which the members of his group can meet and be given suitable hospitality. He must also be able to grant requests and favours which in their turn will assist in the building up of his following. The head of the lineage can thus be considered as the spokesman rather than the commander of his group, and he need not necessarily be the oldest member. Under the new political and economic circumstances which now prevail many of the lineage heads have retained their posts, but their role and function has dramatically changed.

The use of the terms 'bayt' and lineage segmentation

The literal meaning of the word bayt is house. In the village the word is used to designate a whole range of social groups from the nuclear family upwards, through the extended family to the aggregation of extended families which composes a sub-lineage. Hence the term bayt is used to describe various different levels of patrilineal kinship groups and is often extended to include affines and co-residents. Nevertheless, villagers point out that the word bayt should strictly be applied only to those

relatives who can trace their descent back at least three or four generations to a known common ancestor.

It is clear that most of the bayts in the village consist of co-residential extended families, in the sense of married sons with their wives and children residing in the vicinity of the husband's paternal kin. Economic co-operation within the extended family or sub-lineage is normally determined by land ownership, which is in fact largely based on the nuclear family. The word 'a'ila, which means 'family', is used in the village either to refer to the nuclear family or to a single co-resident extended family. The word 'ashira, tribe, is very rarely used in the village, and informants say that the word has lost its former meaning in their daily political and economic life. Individuals are referred to in terms of their kinship affiliation, that is by the lineage (fakhd) to which they belong (e.g. al-Misarra, Albu Khamis). Hence the villagers use the words 'a'ila and bayt to distinguish various subdivisions or segments in the structure of the lineage. It is thus possible to make an analytical distinction between the various segmentary levels of the lineage structure. A three-generation level extended family which has remained together after the death of the paternal founder may be considered a minimal lineage in anthropological terms. Such an extended family is a corporate group sometimes united by joint control of property and common responsibilities towards each other on occasions of conflict and economic hardship. The term bayt is also used to designate a larger aggregation of agnatically related extended families who can trace descent to a common ancestor over at least three generations. Hence "bayt" may describe a major lineage of intermediate size whose members also belong to a maximal lineage, fakhd, where the relationship between ego and the common ancestor cannot always be precisely defined. Most maximal lineage members tend to live in proximity to each other in the village but this grouping

no longer forms a corporate economic unit in the new political and economic situation, although this should not be taken to mean that it has entirely ceased to constitute a political unit vis a vis other similar groups.[1]

A typology of patrilineages in the village

In this section a typology of the patrilineal kinship groups will be given. Their features are relevant in any discussion of the conflicts and politics in the village. The kinship groups in this typology are the largest lineal groups; that is if the major lineage belongs to a maximal lineage, the maximal lineage will be the unit of the typology rather than the component major lineages. This may be justified on the grounds that the largest groups are the most important in political and conflict situations.

The typology is based on three criteria. The size of the lineage, in the sense of the number of male members, is the first of these, since numerical strength is still regarded as a matter of extreme importance. In recent times lineage numbers have played a vital role in the acquisition of land under the Land Reform, particularly among the Albu Hajj Hasan lineage of Dulaim and among the Albu 'Amir. This has affected their ability to penetrate the local co-operatives and the local Party and thereby to influence political processes in the area. The second criterion is the extent to which the group has managed to concentrate its settlement under the Land Reform in a single area or in its traditional area.[2] A group's ability to do so is normally conditioned by the first criterion, and also

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1) Fernea's analysis (pp. 81-83) cannot be used in this part of Iraq. The terms sillif, shabba, and hamula are not used in Da'udia or in most of central and northern Iraq.

2) The redistribution of land under the Land Reform had an adverse political effect on the smaller-sized lineages who were not strong enough to prevent themselves being dispersed within the new settlements.

by the third, which is the extent to which the group is politically united,
in the sense of presenting a front with a strong and recognised leadership
in both the traditional and the new political and economic circumstances.
Political unity is a function of a number of factors, as will be seen in
the discussion of disputes and conflicts between lineages. The large
lineage which is politically united behind a strong leadership contains
all the preferred features of such a group. Hence one can categorise in
the following manner:

large	-	small
concentrated	-	dispersed
politically united	-	politically disunited

According to this typology, the following types may be found in the village.
The first type is represented by the large, concentrated, and politically
united Albu Khamis and Albu Hajj Hasan. The background of the latter
lineage is that the original Hajj Hasan came to the village from Ramadi
with a few followers at some point late in the nineteenth century. The other
Dulaim groups, Albu 'Uqash and Albu Musluh were founded in the same manner,
although no-one knows the precise genealogical relationship between the
groups. Hajj Hasan, the present head of the Albu Hajj Hasan, which has
60 adult male members, rose to power in the comparatively recent past
through his political connections and his considerable wealth. The Albu
Khamis, the lineage of the present shaikh of Albu 'Amir, shares the same
features as regards numbers and political unity. It is the largest
lineage in the village, with 110 adult male members, who live together on
a piece of Land Reform land adjacent to the estate of the shaikh and
his brothers.

The second type of lineage is represented by al-Misarra, the "Newcomers"
and the lineage of Hajj Musluh of Dulaim. Although the latter lineage has
a wealthy and respected leader he is not active politically, and has

tended to take no part in conflicts between Albu Khamis and Albu Hajj Hasan.
When the Land Reform was implemented in the village, most of the members
of this lineage were distributed among two settlements, ten in Settlement 2
and the other ten in Settlement 5. Both groups of al-Misarra, from the
original village and from the "Newcomers", are well known for the sharp
divisions which exist among them. In spite of their considerable numbers,
they have no generally recognised single leader, although they were
politically united for a short period before the implementation of the Land
Reform programme around the person of Jawir, one of the "Newcomers" who was
a Party member.[1] This man brought al-Misarra into an alliance with Albu
Hajj Hasan against the Albu Khamis lineage, but the alliance broke down
when the members of al-Misarra were distributed among Settlements 3, 4 and 5
during the course of the Land Reform. Most of the newcomers were settled
in Settlement 4, while the original al-Misarra were distributed in three
settlements, Albu Hammudi sub-lineage in Settlement 4, Albu 'Ayyada in
Settlement 3 and Albu Razayyiq sub-lineage in Settlement 5.

The third type is quite different from the other two. Albu 'Uqash is
very small (20 male members), but it is closely united behind its leader.
Its small size and the absence of acute conflicts between its members has
prevented structural segmentation, and there are no minor and major lineages.
The lineage did not take part in the conflict arising out of the various
Land Reforms since 1958 as it had always controlled _waqf_ land, which put it
in a special category apart from the others. The lineage is politically
united because its leader, Tariq, is a young man who occupies a high position
in the Ba'th Party in Baghdad.

There are thus four types of lineage in the village:-

1.	Large, concentrated, united	Albu Khamis, Albu Hajj Hasan
2.	Large, concentrated, disunited	al-Misarra
3.	Small, dispersed, disunited	Albu Hajj Musluh
4.	Small, dispersed, united	Albu 'Uqash

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[1] Jawir was a friend of the Albu 'Uqash lineage head, Tariq. When the
latter was a student in Baghdad (prior to 1958) he became friendly with
Jawir, and recruited him into the Ba'th Party. Jawir first came into
contact with Da'udia when he worked as a sheep trader.

A number of observations arising from this typology may be made. The politically strongest lineages are not necessarily the largest (cf. Albu 'Uqash). Secondly, political power in the village depends on the influence of the leadership of the lineages, (which now depends upon their urban political affiliations). Thirdly, the unity of the lineage is more important than its size. Fourthly, it may be concluded that there is a relationship between three factors; unity, political leadership, and urban political affiliation. Hence large lineages are only important if they have power bases both inside and outside the village. The strength of the lineage in terms of membership is of little relevance in the face of the military and police powers of the state, but still has meaning within the village in terms of its effect on political events and processes, especially when correlated with the three factors mentioned above.

Kinship organization and terminology

Given the agnatic system of descent, the kinship terminology used for reference and address is organized in terms of two kinds of relatives, agnatic and matrilateral. Members of the first of these categories play a crucial role in the life of the individual, since most social institutions in the village revolve around patrilineal descent. Membership of a family and a lineage is defined by patrilineal descent, and property rights and social status are similarly allocated.

On this basis the kinship and descent systems in the village are based on patrilineal consanguinity. Thus the father, his sons and grandsons are considered agnatic to each other, together with the daughter. However, the daughter's sons are not considered to be members of _her_ father's group, but of _their_ father's group. The difference between the agnatic group and matrilateral groups is expressed in a village proverb, "The son of your son is your son, but the son of your daughter is not".

The pattern of residence in the village is also determined by the patrilineal descent system and is thus patrilocal. Genealogy plays a vital part in everyday life since it determines many social roles and functions. Social norms by which social status is determined are based on descent from a specific lineage or kinship group. Village households still emphasise their internal solidarity and their relations with other kin groups on this basis, particularly through endogamy. Endogamy stresses the solidarity and unity of the group and increases its numbers, thus developing its political and economic power. Personal influence within the village is largely based on the strength of ego's kinship group, which can always be relied upon in critical situations.

The importance of patrilineal descent is clearly visible from the status occupied by males. Sons alone can inherit their father's status and authority. The eldest surviving son inherits his father's position and responsibilities, and on the former's death these are passed on to his younger brothers. If ego dies with no sons, his responsibilities pass to his brother ('amm - father's brother).

Similarly, the father's sister ('amma) has great authority over her brother's sons. During his lifetime she may supervise their marriage arrangements, and in the event of his death with no surviving brothers, it is her duty to look after them. The mother's sister, on the other hand, has no such authority. In the same way, sons have strong links with their paternal grandparents. In general, the superiority of patrikin is obvious from the high status of men and the inferior status of women. This inferior status makes village women ineligible to inherit their father's land, and sometimes even forces them to renounce the half-share prescribed for women under both Islamic and modern Iraqi law. This law prescribes that daughters should inherit a half of the share of a son in their father's estate, but village women are frequently passed over by their brothers.

The most important feature of the system of kinship terminology is
that it groups ego's numerous different relatives into broad but precisely
differentiated categories. The relationship between two persons of a single
kinship group is reflected in particular patterns of rights, obligation
and behaviour which derive from this relationship. Hence the importance
of the kinship terminology, which defines the various kinship groups to
which ego belongs. The kinship terminology used in the village is
classificatory, apart from the specific terminology used within the
elementary family, like father ab, mother umm, brother akh and sister
akht.

The principal feature of the classificatory terminology is that the
same term used for closely related kin is also used to designate collaterals.
Hence a single term designates all members of a single generation, regardless
of their biological relationship to ego. The kinship universe is thus
divided into two categories of relatives. Those on the father's side are
generally called 'ammam or father's brothers, while those on the mother's
side are called khawwal or mother's brothers. Kinship terminology also
distinguishes an individual's relationship to his paternal relatives from
that connecting him with his maternal relatives, and distinguishes his first
cousins from those more distantly related. For example, when a man refers
to his first paternal cousin, he uses the term ibn-'ammi (any father's
brother's son), whereas when he refers to his second paternal cousin, he
uses the term 'ammam (father's brothers) in the plural. Similarly, when
a man refers to his first maternal cousin, he uses the term ibn khali
(my mother's brother's son), whereas when he refers to his second maternal
cousin, he uses the term khawwal in the plural as shown in diagram I.

Thus the word 'ammam, father's brothers, is used for father's
brothers of second and third degree. Similarly, ego refers to all members
of this group (including father's sisters), as awlad 'ammam or father's

DIAGRAM I

Ego refers to:

A	Jiddi – my (paternal) grandfather
B	Jiddati – my (paternal) grandmother
C	Ammi – my father's brother
D	Mart ammi – my father's brother's wife
E	Bint ammi – my father's brother's daughter
F	Ibn ammi – my father's brother's son
G	Mart ibn ammi – my father's brother's son's wife
H	Bint ibn ammi – my father's brother's son's daughter
J	Ibn ibn ammi – my father's brother's son's son
K	Ammati – my father's sister
L	Rajul ammati – my father's sister's husband
M	Bint ammati – my father's sister's daughter
N	Ibn ammati – my father's sister's son
P	Amm abuya – my father's father's brother

Ego refers to:

1	Ummi – my mother
2	Abuya – my father
3	Marti – my wife
4	Ibni – my son
5	Binti – my daughter
6	Akhuya – my brother
7	Mart akhuya – my brother's wife
8	Ibn akhuya – my brother's son
9	Bint akhuya – my brother's daughter
10	Ukhti – my sister
11	Rajul ukhti – my sister's husband
12	Ibn ukhti – my sister's son
13	Bint ukhti – my sister's daughter
14	Jiddi – my (maternal) grandfather
15	Jiddati – my (maternal) grandmother
16	Khalti – my mother's sister
17	Rajul khalti – my mother's sister's husband
18	Ibn khalti – my mother's sister's son
19	Bint khalti – my mother's sister's daughter
20	Khali – my mother's brother
21	Mart khali – my mother's brother's wife
22	Ibn khali – my mother's brother's son
23	Bint khali – my mother's brother's daughter
24	Khal ummi – my mother's mother's brother

Ego refers to descendants of (P) as ammam or awlad/banat ammam (father's brother's sons and father's brother's daughters)

Ego refers to descendants of no. 24 as khawwal or awlad/banat khawwal (mother's brother's sons and mother's brother's daughters)

brother's sons, and banat 'ammam, father's brother's daughters.

The word khal designates the mother's brother, while ibn and bint khal refer to all male and female descendants of the mother's brothers, while the word khawwal (pl. of khal) refers to all relatives on the mother's side of the second and third degree. Thus the father's brother and the mother's brother are categorised differently both legally and socially. The father's brother ('amm) is considered a closer relative than the mother's brother (khal), which results in the existence of separate sets of rights, obligations and duties.

Thus, the classificatory system of kinship incorporates horizontal, vertical and collateral relations into a single system which permits the use of a very limited terminology to refer to large categories of kin. This increases the solidarity of the group to a considerable extent, by stressing the broad outlines of relationships between individuals.

The nuclear family

The nuclear family forms the basis of family life in village society and the kinship groups within it. Most agricultural and related activities are based on co-operation between the members of this small unit. Each member of this unit has duties according to sex, which forms the basis of the division of labour. The basic relationship between the members of the nuclear family is that between husband and wife and their unmarried children, who normally live together in a single dwelling. In most cases, some relative from either the husband's or the wife's family lives with the nuclear family, such as a widowed sister of the husband, or his unmarried brother. In general the nuclear family as a whole is considered more important than its individual members, and individual behaviour is judged in the context of membership of a specific nuclear family, belonging to a specific kin group. The individual's reputation and social status is

reflected in the family's reputation and status. Hence the nuclear family is both the sum of the internal relationships of its members and also a unit within the context of the community. The family, however, is a continuous entity within an agnatic kin group such as the extended family and the lineage. Although the household as a social entity is related to larger kin groups a distinction is made between the authority of the lineage elders over the members of the household/nuclear family and the authority of the father. Within the household itself it is sometimes difficult to separate these two patterns of authority, but generally the father's role is more decisive in the affairs of his dependants, in that he controls their property relations and their relations with other households. The relationship between fathers and sons is always one of loyalty and respect, which continues after the son has left the parental home and established his own household. Disobedience to the father is tantamount to disobedience to the whole family. This relationship, which is based on the father's total control, and on extreme obedience on the part of the son, is very evident among landlord families. Relationships between fathers and sons where the fathers have more than one wife are characterised by competition among the sons for their father's favour, since this will determine inheritance arrangements between often hostile half-brothers. On the other hand, in peasant families, in which a man has only one wife, father-son relationships seem generally to be more relaxed and less formal.

The father of the family normally has the last word in matters affecting his wife and children. He has the decisive voice in the arrangement of the marriages of his sons and daughters, particularly his daughters, since they have no right to choose their partners without his consent. Village men consider that women are unable to take decisions independently and that they are a constant threat to the family's honour. For this

reason the family takes the first possible opportunity to arrange its daughters' marriages, a fact which further underlines the inferior and fluctuating status of women, in spite of significant recent social changes in the life of the village. Village families no longer give their women as compensation (fasl) in blood feuds as was previously the case. The decline of tribalism has been responsible for the rising importance of the nuclear family in the village over the last decade, during which the state has begun to play an increasingly important role in rural social affairs.

In spite of these developments, the rural individual still considers women simply to be the "garden of the seed of the genealogy", and the symbol of his family's honour. His choice of a marriage partner is based on the honour and reputation of his wife's family, since it is widely believed that characteristics of the wife's family will be passed on to the children. Hence the village proverb, "Two thirds of the son comes from his mother's brother".

In general a woman's status improves considerably after marriage, and even more so after the birth of her children, especially sons, since it is widely believed that the woman determines the sex of her children. The more sons she has to contribute to the economic and political strength of her family, the more her status will rise in the eyes of her family and of her hsuband, although her relationship with her husband is still based on his superiority in all matters affecting the family.

In many households in the village the mother plays the role of go-between between the father and his sons, harmonising relations between members of the family. This is especially common in landlord families, where the role of the second wife is crucial in many conflict situations between the father and his sons. Here the second wife usually dominates her husband, who becomes, in a common idiom "like a lamb in her hands".

She is normally more favourably treated than the first wife, which leads to the development of conflict in such families. In all cases, however, the father still occupies the dominant position in the internal affairs of the family and in its relations with other families or kinship groups, in the same residential area, or in the village as a whole.

When the father dies, his eldest son, or his older brother, will inherit his position. The eldest son may have older sisters, but he enjoys the same status as his father. Hence fathers assign greater responsibilities to their eldest sons than to the younger ones, and they tend to accompany the eldest sons on their visits to other families on important social occasions. In village society, the father is usually referred to by the name of his eldest son (e.g. Abu Ahmad, father of Ahmad). The eldest son will inherit his father's position after his death, and will be responsible for arranging the marriages of his sisters and younger brothers. He will take responsibility for the management of the family's affairs. Most married brothers tend to continue to live together for varying lengths of time after their father's death, although this is becoming more infrequent since the implementation of the Land Reform programme, which has helped them to establish independent households of their own. In such cases the married brothers will normally leave their house and its furniture for their elder brother, who will remain responsible for supporting his mother and his unmarried siblings. The Land Reform programme has contributed to the breakdown of the extended family, and the distribution of land among peasants has helped individual heads of households to establish themselves independently. The same measures have led to similar results among landlord families, because such families, in order to avoid confiscation, have divided their holdings between individual members.

However, the decline of the extended family should not be exaggerated, because in spite of the pressures already described, several of its important

features still function in village society. Following the decline of lineages and tribal organisation, greater emphasis has been laid on the relationships between members of an extended family; new forms of social organisation introduced by the state have not yet totally undermined traditional social relationships.

Moreover, in spite of the considerable development of the Iraqi economy after the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1972, and the vast increase in oil revenues over recent years, together with the State's initiatives in many fields of development, the economy has not by any means solved the problem of rural unemployment and underemployment. Hence it seems likely that the extended family will persist, particularly in areas where agricultural productivity remains low.

Relationships connecting the individual with the world outside the nuclear family

The pattern of behaviour among members of nuclear families, characterised by loyalty and respect on the part of the younger towards the older members is extended to include close agnatic relatives such as father's brothers ('amm) and father's father (jidd). Relations between the father and members of the nuclear family are generally kindly and tolerant, in contrast to those with the father's brothers, who sometimes enjoy more authority than the father himself over his sons, but the relations between members of the father's brother's family are the strongest of all in the local community. The strength of this relationship is clearly revealed in conflict situations involving other kinship groups living in the same settlement or outside it. In such cases father's brother's sons (awlad 'amm) form a common front against outsiders. Because of agnatic bonds, the individual is forced to defend his own kinship group. Instances of dissociation, either on the part of the individual or of the group, are viewed with contempt by the whole local community, and status is lost.

Connections between the members of a single agnatic group are extended
to include the women even after exogamous marriage. Thus if married
women misbehave, this will damage the reputation of their natal agnatic
kinship group, especially if they are married to non-relatives who will
return them to their own group, who must then avenge their honour. The
domination imposed by bayt on its own members sometimes leads to situations
of conflict, either because of the misuse of authority, or because of
a straight conflict of interest between members. Since the bayt always
resides in the same part of the village, there is permanent potential for
conflict, which leads to the proverb "Relatives are like scorpions",(which
is also a pun· al-aqarib k'al-'aqarib). Thus the conflict aspect of
relationships is often stronger than the support and help aspect. But
whatever the degree of conflict or competition, the unity of the agnatic
kinship group towards the rest of the world remains important in the life
of the individual and the agnatic group to which he belongs, as a form of
insurance for his life and his economic resources, as will be explained
in detail below.

The relationship of the individual with his matrikin, however, is
frequently characterised by support and affection, mainly because the latter
are not involved in conflict situations like those of the agnatic group.
Moreover, they tend to live in a different part of the settlement. In cases
of dispute and conflict among agnatic kinsmen, ego normally asks the help
of his mother's brother's relatives. Maternal cousins usually find them-
selves obliged to help their sister's sons in times of crisis and difficulty
such as trying to pacify contenders in a dispute, since their mediation
is the most likely to be acceptable to both parties.

In general, the relationship between ego and his maternal cousins is
affectionate and supportive. The individual's behaviour and attitudes
towards them is less formal, and this is generally true for all relatives

on the mother's side, such as mother's brothers and mother's sisters and her agnatic relatives. These people will normally show affection towards ego's sons and daughters when they visit each other. When an individual marries one of his mother's relatives, his relationship with them will strengthen. The individual is normally encouraged by his mother to marry within her agnatic kin group, while his father will tend to push him in the opposite direction. Thus, relationships with maternal cousins and their agnatic relatives are characterised by affection and support.

Marriage and affinity

The range of permitted marriage partners within the village is defined by Islamic law. The individual may not marry his sisters, his father's sisters, his mother's sisters, his wetnurse, his brother's daughters, his sister's daughters or his wetnurse's daughters. The individual may marry up to four wives at a time. Incest, adultery and extra-marital sexual relationships are condemned by the villagers, who will often completely ostracise male offenders. Incidents of this kind are in fact fairly rare in the village, although two did occur in the course of my fieldwork.

In the first case, involving members of Dulaim, the wife of ego, who was a soldier stationed near Baghdad, was having a sexual relationship with both ego's father and ego's brother. Rumours of the affair reached ego, who returned to the village and killed his wife. Both his father and his brother were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, but no action was taken against ego.

In the second incident, a pre-marital sexual relationship was discovered between two paternal cousins from Albu 'Amir. The boy had promised to marry the girl, but when it became clear that he did not intend to do so, her brother killed her. Sensing that this was to happen the girl begged her brother to bind her wrists so that she should not be able

to struggle or kill him in the process. Since the local authorities were
not informed in this case, no legal action was taken against either the
cousin or the brother.

In general, it is quite normal for a woman to be killed by her
family if she has a sexual relationship outside marriage. Villagers are
reluctant to marry into families whose honour has been compromised in this
way. They also hesitate to marry the daughters of weavers, shopkeepers,
vegetable sellers and vegetable cultivators, although such scruples are
gradually becoming less important. The main reason for the undesirability
of such marriages is that weavers are considered cowardly, spending all
their time with their wives and daughters at home and not mixing with other
men; shopkeepers have lost the traditional attributes of honesty and
straight dealing after mixing with merchants in the city, and have begun
to cheat their relatives and customers. Similarly, the cultivation of
vegetables _for sale_ is considered a dishonourable departure from traditional
values: crop cultivation for _subsistence_ is not so regarded.

Marriage in the village marks a transition between two distinct
social statutes. When a man marries, villagers say that he has fulfilled
the other half of his religious duties, because the true Muslim, according
to them, should marry. When an individual marries, he will be considered
a man, and will be able to go to the guest houses (_mudhif_) in the village
and sit with other men as their equal, because he has a woman, and thus
has two sets of relatives, like the others. This relationship, which the
marriage has helped to establish, will increase the circle of the
individual's relatives both horizontally and vertically; when his daughters
are married, he will increase his affines and his sons' marriages will
increase his agnatic relatives. After such a series of marriages, a man
will be the pivot of a number of relationships which will all serve to
increase his political and economic importance, both within and outside

the kinship group. These relationships will be increased in both breadth and depth through repeated marriages. The average age of marriage among the peasants is 18-25 for males and 16-20 for females.[1] Most villagers consider that early marriage is advantageous, since it is likely to produce male assistants for agricultural tasks as early as possible, as well as a guarantee of support in old age. A proverb illustrates this attitude: "when a girl reaches 15, she should either be in the embrace of her husband or the embrace of the earth". If a girl reaches 20 without marrying, people will tease and criticise her, and she will go to holy men and sacred shrines to seek divine assistance to "open the doors of marriage" for her.

Those men who have "missed the train of marriage" (in the language of the urban dwellers) are condemned by the people as unnatural and unmanly. For this reason, most of the peasants marry early on in their lives, although the age of marriage in recent years has tended to become later because of increased costs, which are borne by the man's family. As has been mentioned, polygyny is socially desirable, since it implies more sons and more affines and more political and social power which may be deployed in critical situations: people say "take as many girls as possible and defeat your enemies" (khudh al-nisa' wa kid al-'ada'). Although women represent economic power, their main function is to strengthen relations between members of the group. In spite of the occurrence of polygyny in landlord families, it has begun to decline among peasants because it has become increasingly expensive and hence beyond their reach.

The ideal marriage partner is ego's father's brother's daughter, or bint 'amm. Frequently ego's father will have chosen one of his brother's daughters when still a child as his son's marriage partner, largely because

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1) Evidence from my random sample of 100 couples.

of the strong kinship relationship between the two families. This also

results in the lowering of the bride-price, which in such cases is not

more than ID 100 (about £ 150).[1] In an exchange marriage the bride-

price is even lower, and this arrangement is very common in the village.

In this case the man's family pays no bride-price when the marriage

contract is drawn up. though he must make restitution if divorce takes

place in the future, which is very rare. The preferred marriage of ego's

father's brother's daughter takes place because both parties normally live

close to one another and are familiar to each other. Most village families

prefer this kind of marriage and the girl's father describes his brother's

sons as his 'back belt' (hizam dhahari) or strong supporters. The boy's

father considers his brother's daughter to be more loyal to him than a

girl from an unrelated family, who may encourage her husband to set up

a separate household. The brother's daughter will frequently stay with her

'amm in the same house after marriage, and her father's brothers will

be considered fathers to her. She too prefers such a marriage, because

of the relationship between her family and her husband's family. Her

father's brother will protect her, especially after marriage, when her

husband may insult her, hit her or try to humiliate her.

People associate marriage to unrelated girls with the idea of separation

from family and relatives, although such marriages do increase the circle

of relatives through affinity. Moreover the marriage of bint al-'amm (father's

brother's daughter) is more secure, and the incidence of divorce is very

rare. Even when husband-wife relations in such a marriage are not good,

the couple hesitate to divorce, because of the complications which would be

created within the kinship group. In popular opinion, divorce is always

associated with moral causes, normally the misbehaviour of the wife or her

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1) In contract marriages with a distant relative many involve a bride-
price of as much as £400.

disloyalty to her husband's father. This tends to prevent the husband from resorting to such a serious step as divorce because of its connotations. In extreme cases the husband may ignore his wife but will stop short of divorcing her.

Although the aim of marriage in the village is to create a family, it also has the function of reasserting already existing economic and political relationships among agnatic kin. This clearly emerges from the pattern of preferred marriage, and it is clear that marriage is a crucial factor in the structure of these groups, which makes it a family, rather than an individual, affair. The individual does not have the freedom to choose his wife as he wishes, although the present more educated generation is moving in this direction. Equally, neither the girl nor her father has the right to choose her partner. Furthermore, if the father is approached by a non-agnatic relative asking for the girl, he is first obliged to ask his brothers whether they wish to marry his daughter to one of their sons. If they decline, he is further obliged to consult his agnatic relatives of the second and third degree. In the same way, the father of a son wishing to marry outside the agnatic kinship group must send respected emissaries to the girl's family, especially to her father's brothers (awlad 'amm), for only the latter have the right to prohibit (nahwa) such a marriage.

There are defined rules and regulations surrounding the prohibition of marriage in such cases. First, the 'prohibitor' (al-nahi) must be a patrilineal relative of the girl: her mother's sister's son, for instance, does not have this right. Secondly, either the 'prohibitor' himself, or one of his agnatic relatives must be prepared to marry the girl. The right of prohibition is exercized only once if the purpose is simply to prevent a marriage alliance with a particular non-agnatic group: the awlad 'amm do not generally prohibit marriage with a second non-agnatic group. Respected or rich families tend to send emissaries to the awlad 'amm to

persuade them to consent to the marriage before rumours begin to circulate in the village.

As has been mentioned, most families prefer father's brother's daughter marriages because they strengthen agnatic relationships. Marriage between affines has the effect of further binding the families and their relatives on both sides, and the affinal relationship includes respect and affection. Marriages of brothers of one agnatic group to sisters of another further strengthen affinal relationships, especially with the passage of time, when the children of these marriages will also marry among themselves. In the diagram (diagram 2) both E and F are in fact agnatic relatives because

Diagram 2

they are <u>awlad 'amm</u> from A and B: at the same time they are related matrilineally, since they are also <u>awlad khala</u>, mother's sister's sons, from C and D. Both parallel cousin and cross cousin marriages are preferred in the village since they reinforce existing kinship and affinal relationships, and are considered one of the most important factors in the structure and continuity of the kinship group. Affinity created by these marriages will in time be converted into agnatic kinship through the multiplicity of marriages between the two groups of affines.

Residence in a single settlement reinforces relationships between kinship groups, who depend on each other for the performance of basic

agricultural tasks which necessitate co-operation on a fairly large scale.
This requirement means that it is impossible for groups of kin to become
isolated from each other,   and   survive economically, especially where
there is economic and social differentiation between the groups.   In such
cases the weaker group becomes dependent upon the stronger.

Concluding comments

As we have seen, patrilineal descent is the main factor in the
formation of kinship groups, and this is strengthened by parallel cousin
marriage within patrilineal kinship group. These latter groups are
collections of persons who trace their descent back to a common ancestor
of three to four generations' depth and who recognise their genealogical
interrelationships. Such a group is known as a _bayt_, or sub-lineage, and
has taken on increasing importance with the decline of tribal organisation
and of the major lineages. For this reason, most marriages take place within
this group. Although marriage might serve to increase the circle of relatives,
the resulting relationship is not as important as the agnatic relationship,
since it may weaken over time, whereas the agnatic relationship will be
maintained through generations. On the other hand, affinal relationships
may disappear after the divorce or death of the person or persons who
created them. The decline of a relationship created by affinity is more
likely in the case of marriage to a group living outside the village, since
there is no day-to-day contact or mutual assistance. However, most groups
within the village are concerned to establish such relations within the
framework of the village. In general, affinal relationships tend to be
affectionate because of daily contact and assistance. Such relationships
live on in popular memory even after the death of the person or persons
who created them, and the wife-givers will be referred to as _khawwal_,
mother's brothers, by the husband's group.

Although the affinal relationship is limited by its nature, the husband and wife who are joined together by it may enhance co-operation between their two families. In emergency or critical situations affines will stand by each other, and this assistance may be extended to include support to overcome an economic or political crisis.

Affinal relationships are extremely important, although they do not lead directly to the formation of major corporate groups. For this reason agnatic relationships take priority in many aspects of life; hence on the occasion of death or marriage agnatic relations take precedence, while affines only participate marginally.

Affinal relationships involve the wife-givers in several important relationships with their daughter's husband and her sons, which extend to include a number of obligations such as economic support in times of crisis and political support in the paying of compensation for blood feuds.

Especially among the landlords, affinity serves to establish political and economic alliances. This has become particularly important after the implementation of the Land Reform programme when some groups, fearing a loss of political status, began to make marriage alliances to protect themselves. The shaikh of Albu 'Amir himself has adapted to the new situation since the end of the monarchy in 1958 by connecting himself and his family through such relationships. These horizontal connections have begun to assume a greater importance than vertical ones in the context of the political and social upheavals which have affected rural Iraq over the last twenty years.

CHAPTER V

Landlords versus Landlords : Political Conflict up to 1970

Introduction

In the two chapters that follow I analyse the development and persistence of factionalism between and within lineages at village level and assess its significance for the understanding of local political process. In the present chapter, I outline the historical background to this factionalism and identify the important political actors and groups, showing how changes in external and internal circumstances have led to alterations in the balance of power between the various kin groups.

The next chapter (Chapter VI) examines how the implementation of the Land Reform programme and the composition of the new settlements have been affected by factional struggles; and discusses the role of the political party.

The leading family of Albu 'Amir

The leading family of the present shaikh's bayt (sub-lineage) consider themselves the "heart of Albu 'Amir". They justify this claim on the grounds that they represent the original group of leaders who controlled the Bad'a area. Moreover, they see themselves as ranked first among the other segments on the basis of their direct descent from 'Amir, the founder of the tribe.

Under the leadership of Ahmad the present shaikh's grandfather (IA1), the leading family of Albu 'Amir first acquired the land under lazma regulations from the Turkish government in Iraq before 1917, and then under the tapu system during the years which followed the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921. The registration of the land in the name of the

leading family effectively deprived the other members of the tribe of the

rights which they had previously enjoyed.

The strategy adopted by Shaikh Ahmad (IA1), before 1914 when the

Ottoman government's influence was weak in the rural areas, was to marry

two women belonging to two lineages of the tribe, Albu Khamis, to which

he himself belonged, and Albu Ghuzlan. He also married into a neighbouring

tribe which supported Albu 'Amir against other tribes when the British

authorities took over the area. During these difficult years (1917-1919),

hostile tribes from time to time cut off the Bad'a water supply, which

came from the Diyala along the Khalis canal which runs to the edge of the

village. In face of these external threats the leading family acted as

a group under the leadership of their grandfather.

However, the unity of the leading family, which consists of five

brothers, did not long survive the death of Shaikh Ahmad in 1918. He had

been able to maintain the unity of the tribe by marriage alliances and

personal influence, in spite of the weakness of the Ottomans and the

constantly changing political situation. After his death, the shaikhship

went to his eldest son 'Ali (IB6), who divided the land between himself

and his other brothers. After the pacification of the area and the arrival

of British administration, the shaikhly sub-lineage realized that it was no

longer dependent on a group of armed followers, and was thus able to dispense

with the active support of the rest of the tribe.

It is very important to reiterate that the tribes of central Iraq

found it impossible to maintain their organization, being so close to the

administrative centre of Baghdad. In contrast, tribes in the south and

north of the country were able to retain their traditional organization,

even after the establishment of the Iraq Government in 1921. Moreover,

the tribes on the Tigris, including Albu 'Amir, came from a variety of

origins before their migration from the Arabian peninsula, and had wandered

extensively within Iraq itself before settling in the area. In the course

of these migrations they became members of both Sunni and Shi'i sects,

which accounts for the sectarian heterogeneity of the region.

As I described earlier, all these factors contributed to the decline

of tribal organization in the area, and to the lack of large confederations

such as those found in southern Iraq (e.g. the Muntafiq). The last straw

for the maintenance of tribal unity was the shaikh's registration of the

land in his own name in the latter part of the Ottoman period, and the

subsequent disputes which developed between members of the shaikh's family

after the withdrawal of the Ottomans and the arrival of the British. Here

it is important to recognise that, although disputes between the members

of the leading family begun immediately after the death of Shaikh Ahmad, the

troubled political circumstances which had prevailed between 1914 and

the establishment of the Iraq government in 1921 acted to preserve family

unity. But when the national political situation had stabilised, the

leading family divided the land into three parts, after having excluded

a brother who was the son of a Baghdadi mother. The remaining brothers

were the sons of three mothers: Sharif (IB9) and Muhammad (IB12) who were

full brothers, took one share; another share went to 'Umar (IB4) and 'Ali

(IB6) who were also full brothers. Salih (IB2), who was from the third

mother, received the third share. 'Ali (IB 6) who was shaikh at that time,

and who had initiated the division, took the part on the river bank

farthest from his brothers Sharif and Muhammad (IB9 and IB12). 'Ali's

decision to do this was based on two considerations; first, the riverside

area was difficult to irrigate because of the height of the banks - there

was as yet no mechanised irrigation - and second, it was liable to flooding,

which in fact occurred more than ten times between 1918 and 1954.[1]

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1)   Since the establishment of the Tharthar dam near Samarra' in 1954
       there have been no floods in this area.

The division of the land in this manner was the source of a long conflict between the brothers. Shaikh Sharif and his brother Muhammad played no part in village politics until the death of their brother 'Ali, who was shaikh for only a short time. On 'Ali's death in 1921 the shaikhship passed to Sharif, although it had been expected that it would pass to 'Umar (IB4) since he was older than both Muhammad and Sharif. However, because the mother of Sharif and Muhammad was descended from the main lineage, Albu Khamis, Sharif challenged 'Umar (IB4), and recruited all the members of Albu Khamis to stand by him, and thus he became shaikh. Both Sharif (IB9) and Muhammad (IB12) married women from Albu Khamis, whereas 'Ali (IB6) and 'Umar (IB4) were married to women from a tribal group outside Albu 'Amir. These marriages have ensured that Albu Khamis continued to support the brothers Sharif and Muhammad. Later, when the Shurughis arrived to work on rice cultivation, Sharif and his full brother assigned to the Albu Khamis a tract of land, previously used as an orchard, for wheat and barley cultivation. In contrast, 'Umar and 'Ali's son 'Abid (IC12) told the rest of the Albu Khamis lineage and some peasants from Albu 'Amir to leave their land, and simply replaced them by Shurughis.

During his shaikhship, which extended from 1921 to 1956, Sharif was able to consolidate his leadership both inside and outside the village. First, he married two women, one from Albu Khamis (IB8) and the other (IB10) from Albu Ghazal lineage of the same tribe. Secondly he married his son, Rashid, the present shaikh (IC28) and his brother (IC27) to the daughters of his brother (IB12), and thus succeeded in consolidating his position amongst his family, and in excluding his half-brother's sons from participation in village affairs. Shaikh Sharif's position was further strengthened when his half-brother's sons (IC5,6,7), married his daughters (IC21,22,23). Sharif's (IB9) half brother's sons had no choice but to marry from their own sub-lineage since there was no other sub-lineage of equivalent

rank into which they might marry. Thus through these various marriages

Shaikh Sharif was able to acquire allies from among Albu Khamis and his

own sub-lineage. Although his half-brother's sons remained internal

rivals, their marriages to their father's brother's daughters affirmed

Shaikh Sharif's position and converted them into his supporters in external

matters.

Throughout the shaikhship of Sharif, the shaikh's family played an

extremely important role in village life. It began to buy adjoining

landholdings from weaker landowners such as Dulaim, forcing them to

abandon their lands. The political success of Shaikh Sharif did not derive

from his position within the tribal structure, but resulted rather from

his relationship with the centre of power in Baghdad. He became well-known

in social circles outside the village during the Monarchy, and this fame

eventually helped his son, the present shaikh, to take his father's place.

The present shaikh's relationship with his own family

During the long period between 1921 and 1956 Shaikh Sharif and his

brother Muhammad were dependent upon Rashid (IC28), the present shaikh,

whom they used to take with them to solve disputes both inside and outside

the village. Rashid had established important friendships with people

in high positions in the central administration:[1] his relationships extended

beyond the village to include the most respected Shi'i 'ulama' (religious

authorities) in both Karbala' and Najaf (important Shi'i centres in southern

Iraq) as well as several influential administrators in Baghdad.

However, this period did not pass without conflict within the family.

Rashid, the present shaikh, encountered serious opposition from his parallel

cousin Hadi (IC34), who started to provoke his own father (IB12) to divide

up the land between himself and his brother (IB9), and thus to establish

separate households. There was continual conflict in this period between

1) These ties were largely developed by his father, Shaikh Sharif who,
   during his shaikhship, was well known in political circles in Baghdad
   and had close connections with members of the elite families. This
   network was critical for Rashid when he was 'promoted' as a Member of
   Parliament.

Rashid and Hadi, who is still (1974) described by the peasants as a hard and arrogant man. Both Rashid and Hadi quarrelled, even in matters which actually necessitated mutual cooperation. At the same time, Hadi was also in conflict with his two half-brothers Jamil and Salam (IC31 and IC33). Their mother (IB11) came from Albu Khamis, to which the leading family belonged, and she was also the sister of the wife of Shaikh Sharif (IB8). Hadi wanted to take control of the land to prevent the lion's share going to Jamil and Salam.

In 1955 this led to Hadi's killing Salam and then accusing one of the peasants of having committed the crime. Most of the villagers were convinced that Hadi had murdered his half brother at the instigation of Rashid who wished to foment difficulties between them, and had hinted to Hadi that Salam was having an affair with Hadi's wife. The police were called in and Hadi was tried and subsequently imprisoned. However, on leaving prison in 1960, Hadi was murdered by Rashid and his brothers. The latter were never brought to trial, and the case was never even investigated, which illustrates the strong ties the shaikh maintained with the authorities in the early Republican period. The case also illustrates the way in which an individual can become isolated from his agnatic group: Hadi's mother and wife were both outsiders, and he could not resist the determined efforts of Rashid and his brothers to maintain their dominance over the land and the affairs of the village.

The present shaikh's regime

Many external and internal factors, at both village and sub-lineage level, assisted Rashid to obtain the leadership. The same factors probably contributed to the downfall of his ibn 'amm, Hadi. In the sub-lineage to which he belongs, Rashid, the present shaikh, occupies a crucially important position because of his network of kin relationships. He is

related to his <u>awlad 'amm</u> through three marriages. His three sisters

IC21, 22, 23 are married to the three sons (IC6,7,8) of his <u>'amm</u> 'Umar

(IB4). He himself is married to two women, IC2 and IC29, who are the

daughters of his <u>'ammam</u> Salih (IB2) and Muhammad (IB12). These kin

relationships linking him to his <u>'ammam</u> have greatly strengthened his

position within his close agnatic circle, while in contrast his <u>ibn 'amm</u>

Hadi never enjoyed relationships which could have made him a contender

for the leadership.

These circumstances, together with his being the son of the previous

shaikh, enabled Rashid to overcome many obstacles standing in the way of

the succession. Moreover, his strong personality helped him to take

many initiatives, even during the lifetime of his father and his <u>'amm Muhammad</u>

(IB12). His contacts offered him a wide range of opportunities for political

manoeuvre, and he was able to use his position as a mediator for the

resolution of disputes. His connections in high places stood him in good

stead in the village itself, and he has been able to control local

government in the area for most of the last twenty years, even during the

lifetime of his own father, Shaikh Sharif, and his <u>'amm</u> Muhammad, who became

shaikh after Sharif's death. During Muhammad's lifetime Rashid became

more and more powerful, especially during Muhammad's illness, when Rashid

was asked to deputise for him.

During the period which followed his father Sharif's death, Rashid

depended mainly on his eight brothers, four full brothers and four half

brothers.[1] After his father's death, the land was divided between Shaikh

Rashid and his <u>'amm</u> Shaikh Muhammad. Shaikh Rashid took considerable pains

to improve the productivity of the land. In particular, he planted an orange

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1) In fact Rashid had 12 brothers, but the other four were pushed out
of the village after Sharif's death, probably because their mother
did not belong to any of the major kinship groups.

grove which now yields him enormous returns, and is one of the most valuable in the area. Its productivity has been aided by Shaikh Rashid's ability to persuade his own lineage to remain in the village as cultivators, especially after the introduction of rice, which, as we have noted, led to large scale departures by members of other lineages of Albu 'Amir, who had had no previous experience of rice cultivation. The exception was the shaikh's lineage, Albu Khamis, who stayed with him. The emigration of the rest of Albu 'Amir led to the shaikh's cousins(IC3-9) being virtually deprived of political support. Another small lineage, al-Misarra, whose members also stayed behind to work with the ruling family, were hated by Albu Khamis, but nevertheless stayed on as share-croppers.

Before the revolution of 1958, the leading family were the people with most political weight in the village. Their position depended on their vast estates and their relations with the authorities in Baghdad. As has already been mentioned, Rashid, the present shaikh was a Member of Parliament under the Monarchy, but after his father's death, conflict broke out for the control of the shaikhship, particularly between the two segments of the shaikh's family descended from the two wives of Shaikh Ahmad (IA1). In the end the sons of 'Umar (IB4) failed to gain control of the shaikhship because they were unable to secure much support from kinship groups in the village. Their mother was an outsider and their own lineage was already opposed to them from the time that many of its members were ousted from the land. Externally both segments of the family aligned themselves with somewhat different political groups in Baghdad[1] in an attempt to strengthen their position vis a vis each other, although this does not appear to have affected the outcome. They ceased to celebrate Muharram together, employing different _sayyids_ (holy men) for the celebrations. Internally, the conflict affected marriage relations

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[1] At this time there were several competing factions in national politics, each pursuing different foreign policies and committed to different imperial powers.

in that there have been no marriages between the groups since the death
of Shaikh Sherif: each group has exercised the right of prohibition
(nahwa) against the other in order to prevent the exchange of women which
would facilitate alliances.

Shaikh 'Ali's family (IB6) provides a good example of the prohibition.
Only one son survived Shaikh 'Ali, and this son, 'Abid (IC12), the
oldest living member of the leading family, was married to the daughter
of his 'amm 'Umar (IB4). 'Abid has four sons and two daughters, none of
whom are married. Although his father left him 800 donums and a fair
amount of money, 'Abid has never been able to exploit much of the land
due to his having few peasant-clients, and the money is now exhausted.
Most of his sons and daughters continue to live with him in the same house,
although his eldest son is aged 55, and the two daughters are about the
same age. When I asked him the reasons why his children had stayed
unmarried, 'Abid told me that his sons and daughters were the victims of
the conflict between "awlad 'ammi", and his relationship with them was that
of 'the weak to the strong". He had tried to obtain Rashid's sister (IC16)
as a wife for his eldest son, but that was, he explained, a tactical error;
his awlad 'amm (IC3-9) threatened to kill him if the marriage took place,
and 'Umar's family have subsequently forbidden him to give his daughters in
marriage, or to marry off his sons. In 'Abid's opinion, the whole sub-
lineage is waiting for his death so that they can seize his land.

The rise in the status of Dulaim

While the leading family of Albu 'Amir were facing internal problems,
the prominent figures of Dulaim were gradually developing their own
political leadership. In order to obtain a precise picture of the present-
day situation it is necessary to refer to the historical background of the
relations between these two kinship groups and especially between their
heads during the period after the revolution of 1958. In fact, the various

changes of policy between 1958 and 1968 have been crucial in this respect.

In spite of the internal rivalries within the leading family of
Albu 'Amir an important political group was being formed at this period
in the history of the village. The leading family were a small, internally
united group of five brothers and their families, whose genealogies regulated
their marriages and reinforced their solidarity, while the Dulaim leaders
were and still are unable to trace their exact genealogical connections.
The factor which united Dulaim was their claim that they belonged to a
single tribe from which they had been separated many generations ago. Most
of their lineages continue to be independent from other lineages in the
conduct of their internal affairs and in the payment of fines in cases of
inter-tribal dispute or injury. This contrasts with Albu 'Amir who, in
such circumstances, once acted as a unified political group.

A crucial factor contributing to the sense of unity amongst Dulaim
was the fact that they lived together in a particular part of the village
on the edge of the Tigris, where they were not exposed to the migrations
which took place among Albu 'Amir due to the land registration of the 1930s.
The secondary political and social status of Dulaim continued until 1968,
when drastic economic and political changes occurred in the country, which
had their repercussions on local relationships. We shall now investigate
how it was that Dulaim came to achieve a dominant position in the political
and social hierarchy of the village, and describe the nature of their
relationship to the leading family of Albu 'Amir, and how this affected
political and kinship relationships in the village.

As we have already seen, the leading family of Albu 'Amir were politically
dominant in the life of the village when Dulaim's role was only marginal.
From their history and from stories told by informants, it is clear that,
before 1958, the leaders of Dulaim had very little influence on political
processes and events in the village. There were two reasons for this.

First, there was already a strong political group in the village which controlled village affairs. Here many villagers emphasised that most internal disputes within Dulaim were referred to the ruling shaikh of Albu 'Amir. Second, their leaders were extremely weak economically and were not in a position to set up their own guest house, which was the main symbol of political power during that period.

The economic status of Dulaim began to improve in the early 1950s, when most of their prominent figures began to take advantage of the relative peace prevailing in the countryside to cultivate their fruit gardens and the land surrounding them, which they planted with wheat and barley. This step led to increased income and also provided employment for Dulaim cultivators. At the same time, the leading family of Albu 'Amir began to cultivate rice, which greatly enriched the family itself but also caused major migrations among the rest of the tribe, since the family imported Shurughis, because of their known expertise in rice cultivation. Both these actions, taken more or less simultaneously by the leaders of both Dulaim and Albu 'Amir, had a different impact on their followers. The cultivation of rice resulted in weakening the relationship between Albu 'Amir peasants and their leaders, at a time when political rivalries within the leadership were rife. On the other hand the economic development of Dulaim in the early 1950s provided the first indication of their emergence as a political significant group, as was witnessed by the construction of their first guesthouse in 1954 by the head of the Albu Hajj Hasan lineage, (IIB11). This was followed later by the building of two other guesthouses by the heads of the Albu 'Uqash and Albu Musluh lineages.

It should be emphasised, however, that the guesthouses did not play a particularly important role in the external relations of Dulaim, that is with Albu 'Amir. For example, in 1955 some animals belonging to Dulaim damaged crops belonging to Albu 'Amir. The leading family

confiscated the animals and distributed them among their own peasants,
which necessitated the mediation of the most senior member of Dulaim,
Shaikh 'Ali Sulaiman,[1] who met the ruling shaikh in his guesthouse in
the village, and arranged for the release of the animals. This incident
is still talked about by Albu 'Amir peasants in the village to stress
the subordinate position of Dulaim in the village at that time.

As a small group of lesser social and political importance, Dulaim
were completely overshadowed by the leading family of Albu 'Amir, and
they also had no distinctive leadership. The leaders of Albu 'Amir could
point to their military achievements in the past and to their political
connections with the central administration, after the establishment of
the Iraqi state in 1921. From 1958 onwards the status of shaikhs
declined generally and the leaders of Dulaim began to acquire even greater
political and social weight than that formerly possessed by the leading
family of Albu 'Amir; and their guesthouses became recognised by other
kinship groups in the village. By 1968 the political and social functions
of the Dulaim guesthouses competed effectively with those of the leading
family of Albu 'Amir, especially after the implementation of the Land
Reform of 1970, since they became places where most village groups
met either to discuss land allocation or to settle disputes, as will be
explained below. The political position which Dulaim acquired, through
the penetration of the local party by their sons and their subsequent
control of local government, has facilitated their role in dispute
settlement and in the provision of favours for various kinship groups.
However, the prominent figures of Dulaim have experienced their own internal

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1) 'Ali Sulaiman had been paramount shaikh of Dulaim since 1920, and
in 1955 was still based at Ramadi, the original centre of the
Dulaim dira.

disputes of the same kind outlined for Albu 'Amir, where different sub-groups struggled for supremacy against each other. Most of these disputes began to come to the surface after 1968, and had a considerable effect both on Dulaim themselves and on their relations with other kinship groups in the village. But before discussing this topic, we need to analyse the internal kinship structure of Dulaim.

Kinship organization within Dulaim

Dulaim is composed of three distinct kinship groups or lineages. As has previously been mentioned, Dulaim are unable to trace their genealogical relationships precisely, but they claim membership of the same tribe which came originally from the area round Ramadi, from which they split off at some point in the nineteenth century. On being asked to explain the precise genealogical relationships between the three lineages of the Dulaim one of the leaders answered, "We are from the same group and have the same attitudes towards other groups in the village". This indicates that Dulaim define their kinship affiliation mainly by reference to their social relationship with Albu 'Amir, and especially in relation to its leading family. The discrimination and humiliation which they suffered at the hands of Albu 'Amir has given their own internal relationships something of the status of kinship bonds, although they cannot trace their exact connections, despite their belonging to the same tribe. This sense of kinship, together with their hostility towards the leading family of Albu 'Amir, has strengthened over time and shaped their attitudes to both the internal and external world. Their residential isolation in a separate part of the village over a long period of time, as well as their belonging to the Sunni sect, when the majority of the inhabitants are Shi'is, [1]

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1) It should be emphasised, however, that the sectarian factor, although certainly of crucial importance in the recent past, no longer plays the same role in Iraqi politics as a whole. See here Sluglett, P. and Farouk-Sluglett, M., Notes on the present state of Sunni/Shi'i relations in Iraq, BRISMES Journal, Summer 1978.

has intensified this feeling of brotherhood.

Furthermore, their social isolation from the rest of the village has led to the creation of a number of close affinal bonds between numbers of the three Dulaim lineages, although not to the same extent as has occurred amongst the leaders themselves. The practice of parallel cousin marriage which occurs between close agnatic kin within the lineages is therefore matched by a number of marriage links between these Dulaim sub-groups. This pattern results in the strengthening of internal relationships, allowing each group to assert its independence, while also consolidating ties with other Dulaim lineages. The proportion of intra-as against inter-lineage marriages between the three lineage groups is shown in Table 1. This suggests that parallel cousin marriage has long been a feature of Dulaim lineage organisation.

Table 1

Marriages among the Dulaim lineages

Name of lineage	Total no. of marriages	No. of marriages within lineage	No. of marriages with other Dulaim lineages
Albu Hajj Hasan	50(100)	34(68)	16(32)
Albu Musluh	22(100)	14(64)	8(36)
Albu 'Uqash	18(100)	10(56)	8(44)

Percentages in brackets

During the period between 1958 and 1968, the ruling group of Dulaim was composed of three family groups as shown in Genealogy II, whose heads represented Dulaim in their external political relationships in the village. The importance of these three groups in the life of Dulaim began to increase following the rise in the group's fortunes in the early 1950s. The first appearance of their increased political authority was seen in Hajj Hasan's (IIB11) building of a guesthouse in 1954, which enabled him to gain political support from other members of Dulaim. In spite of this development, however, members of the three families continued to exercise relatively independent political control over their own groups, although in the wider arena Hajj Hasan (IIB11) and his brother (IIB13) were the most influential political figures. Their influence derived from their seniority and relative wealth.[1] In addition, their wives came from Albu Musluh and from Albu 'Uqash respectively (see Genealogy II). These marriages made the two brothers the main points of articulation in the political and kinship relationships within Dulaim, which had previously not existed. This enabled Hajj Hasan to play a key role among Dulaim in the course of the upheavals which followed the revolution of 1958, and particularly after the Ba'th party's rise to power in 1968, which greatly enhanced the status of Dulaim in the political life of the village.

Political developments within Dulaim since 1958

The economic and political developments in the life of Dulaim are associated with more general trends in the history of the country between 1952 and 1958. After the Egyptian revolution of 1952 the whole of the Arab Middle East became involved in ideological struggles between the supporters of the new regime and the reactionary governments which surrounded it. The rise of Nasser had particular effect on nationalist parties in the area, which began to respond to the ideas of Arab unity and which were encouraged to try to overthrow their own pro-Western governments. After

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1) Particularly after their purchases of land on the west bank of the Tigris after 1954. See Map, p. 2.

1952, the nationalist parties in Iraq became more active. Their secret

activities were largely concentrated in the major cities, but their

influence spread to the countryside through students from rural areas

who were studying at schools and institutions in the larger urban centres.[1]

In Da'udia, it was the younger members of Dulaim who were the first

recruits to the nationalist political parties, since, owing to their

recent rise in prosperity, Dulaim were the first group to send their

sons to study in the towns. At this time (1952-59) there was only one

school in the village, with a single teacher,[2] who only taught the sons

of the leading family of Albu 'Amir. Dulaim children were not able to

attend the school because of constant hostility on the part of the Albu

'Amir children. The long absence of the Dulaim boys in the towns turned

some of them into pioneer members of the various political parties on a

national rather than just on a village level. The principles put forward

by these parties found an emotional and material response among such

individuals and on their return to the village during the holidays they

would begin to propagate their views amongst their friends and relatives.

These principles found fertile ground among the older, as well as the

younger generation, because they symbolised their deep-seated opposition

to the leading family of Albu 'Amir, who were closely identified with the

regime of Nuri al-Sa'id and the Monarchy.

The most important figure in this process of recruitment was Tariq

(IIC1), who was recruited by the Ba'th Party. Tariq recruited a large

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1) Similar observations have been made by Bujra, A.S., (The Politics
   of Stratification: A Study of Political Change in a South Arabian
   Town, Oxford 1971) and Epstein, A.L., (Politics in an Urban African
   Community, Manchester 1958).

2) This teacher remained in the village for 15 years and also acted as
   accountant for the leading family of Albu 'Amir. I am most grate-
   ful to this individual for several very informative interviews.

number of his kinsmen, particularly the sons of Hajj Hasan, Shakir (IIB21) and Talib (IIB20), and his awlad 'amm IIB4-9. In the period before 1958, Dulaim considered themselves the progressive forces in the village in contrast to the reactionary leading family of Albu 'Amir. Most people confirm that the first secret leaflets against the Monarchy to appear in the village were distributed by Tariq, and Dulaim were the first group in the village to declare their support for the new republican regime in July 1958. On 14th July, 1958 Dulaim organised the first public demonstration in support of the new government. This celebration was presided over by Hajj Hasan, and rifles were fired into the air as a sign of general rejoicing. Hajj Hasan also organised the despatch of a con- gratulatory telegram to the Free Officers, in the name of Dulaim, signed by himself as head of Dulaim in the village. [1] This support on the part of Dulaim became even stronger when the Land Reform of 1958 was inaugurated, and, when its application to the village was announced, Dulaim peasants were the first to present their petitions to acquire tracts of land. In addition, they began to encourage some of the kinship groups of Albu 'Amir, such as the al-Misarra, to ally with them against the leading family.

How was Dulaim able to take such a bold stand against the leading family of Albu 'Amir? The reason for this was that during the first few months of the revolution the village suddenly became part of a new political structure. With the disappearance of outside support from which their power had derived, the indirect rule of the local shaikhs and landlords underwent a temporary collapse. Great shifts of power had indeed taken place on the national level and the revolutionary government began to

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1)   Hajj Hasan has kept a copy of this telegram which he shows to
      visitors in any discussion of the early days of the revolution of
      1958 to illustrate the attitude of his group towards progressive
      forces in the country.

delegate its power to new agents throughout the administrative system.[1]

In Da'udia a new head of local government was appointed, the leading

family of Albu 'Amir losing its power and authority. During the period

of the implementation of the Land Reform programme of 1958, access to

power and to the administration was confined to those who supported the

new republican regime. In Da'udia, Dulaim and their supporters were the

natural allies for the new regime, and consequently had special access

to the local bureaucracy. However, unfortunately, for Dulaim, this

state of affairs was short-lived. After some months the Free Officers fell

out amongst themselves, with the political parties siding with the various

different factions which emerged. The Nationalists and Communists, who

had formed a united political front before the revolution gradually became

divided against each other. General Qasim, who had been the prime mover

behind the coup d'etat which brought the Free Officers to power, and who

had become chief of state, veered from initial support of the Communists

to bitter hostility towards them.[2]

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1)   See Chapter II.

2)   Outwardly, the split appeared to centre round the question of unity
      with Egypt; the nationalists supported this, while the Communists,
      who feared the application to Iraq of Nasserist political and
      economic doctrines in a period when Nasser was violently anti-
      Communist, opposed it. At the same time, Qasim wished to be 'Sole
      Leader' and had no desire to defer to Nasser, which meant that,
      initially, but for entirely different reasons, the Communists were
      his natural allies. As a result Qasim became identified, quite
      erroneously, with the Communists, and every social reform which he
      introduced was considered socialist or Communist. His way out of
      this situation was to declare himself above all political attach-
      ments - "Nahna fawq al-muvul" - which threw him into the arms of
      the Right without giving him the benefit of their support. See
      Farouk-Sluglett, M., Contemporary Iraq: Some Recent Writing
      Reconsidered, Review of Middle East Studies, No. 3 (1978); and
      Chapter II of this thesis.

The leading family of Albu 'Amir returns to power

After Qasim's dissolution of all political parties, the machinery of government fell into the hands of opportunist and reactionary elements. The Land Reform of 1958 began to suffer grave setbacks, and in Da'udia the leading family of Albu 'Amir regained their power and their control over local government. As most informants emphasised, Albu 'Amir asserted themselves in this role more vigorously than before, especially towards Dulaim. Their return to power clearly emphasised the continuation of their traditional political position. Undoubtedly, their status and their social and political relations with the society outside the village were vital factors in determining their return to power. As a long-standing elite group, they had emerged to form a substantial network of personal relationships with the elite of the wider society. During the period between 1960 and 1968 the shaikh's family once more acquired political power within the village as well as influence outside it. In 1965 the Minister of Land Reform was of 'Amiri origin, so the leading family not only regained their land, but established their guesthouse as one of the most important centres in Iraq for those landlords and shaikhs who were angling for the return of their properties.

During this period, the leading family became reunited as a group in spite of conflicts among its members. The status and personality of Rashid, the present shaikh of Albu 'Amir continued to be strong. His dominant personality was revealed after the implementation of the first Land Reform programme of 1958, when his <u>awlad 'amm</u> (IC3-9) united under his leadership to drive out those peasants who had taken over land. The shaikh's cousins demonstrated their loyalty by visiting his guesthouse as a group from time to time.

On the village level, the leading family expelled most of the Land Reform peasants, especially those from al-Misarra and they began to harass

the Dulaim peasants by cutting off their water supplies. There are two

petitions in the local government archives presented by Dulaim peasants

to the <u>mudir</u> in which the petitioners ask for the protection of the

government as follows:-

> "We, the signatories to this document, peasants of Da'udia,
> beg you to take proceedings against Husain al-Jasim (a member
> of Albu Khamis, to which the leading family belonged) and
> his relatives, who have begun to exploit the land given to
> us in the village, and against Husain al-'Inad and his
> relatives who struck one of the peasants of al-Misarra and
> prevented him from cultivating the land given to him
> under the Land Reform. These acts carried out against
> us by peasants from Albu Khamis have begun to represent
> the character of a conspiracy against the revolution and
> its achievements on the part of the supporters of the
> ancien regime and of the orphans of Nuri al-Sa'id. We
> beg you to take the firmest possible action against these
> criminal hands."

(10th December, 1961.)

> "We, the signatories to this document, peasants of Da'udia,
> beg you to take proceedings against the criminal hands who
> damaged our crops and cut off our irrigation water. We make
> open reference to the peasants of Albu Khamis who are
> encouraged by the feudalists to force us to leave the land.
> In this respect we should like to draw your attention to the
> fact that it has become impossible for us to cultivate the
> land given to us by the government, and we have decided to
> abandon it since we no longer have guarantees for the security
> of our own lives. Furthermore, the president of the
> cooperative society has become an open supporter of the
> feudalists in the village, and has made over to them the
> machinery which was supposed to be for our use. Instead of
> the cooperative working for the peasants it has become a
> refuge for the feudalists and their supporters, and a
> hatchery of conspiracies against the revolution and its
> instruments." 1)

(9th August, 1962.)

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1) In the village both al-Misarra and Dulaim called the Land Reform
peasants of Albu Khamis "the supporters of the feudalists" ('Awan
al-iqta'iyyin). In fact Albu Khamis were the group on whom the
present shaikh and his brothers had long depended. During the
years following the 1958 Land Reform programme, they were the
group who controlled much of the land and prevented rival groups from
making use of the opportunities it offered. Moreover, they also
controlled the cooperative society and directed its benefits
towards the leading family.

As is clear from these two petitions, Dulaim began to make open objections to the actions of the leading family. Thus, although the latter had regained its power in the village, it no longer exercised the same control as before over Dulaim. In addition, Dulaim began to employ a new weapon to bring pressure to bear on the leading family and on local administration: a new language which referred to the "principles of the revolution" and its "enemies". This expressed Dulaim's objections to the new political circumstances and implied a threat to the supporters of these changes.

During this period, the political power exercised by the leading family of Albu 'Amir derived mainly from the new political order which had emerged, whereas before it had been based on both their relationship to the Monarchy and on the legitimization of their dominance over the other village groups. After 1961, village society began to be divided into two factions, when previously it had been clearly dominated by the leading family of Albu 'Amir. Dulaim now became far more cohesive and powerful than before, despite the fact that they were composed of three distinct lineages. The families of Hajj Hasan and Albu 'Uqash emerged as the two groups that were most concerned with Dulaim affairs, and who were prepared to challenge the leading family of Albu 'Amir. The third group, Albu Musluh, were more independent in their internal affairs and they themselves decided their policy towards other groups in the village. Nevertheless, like the other lineages, they were deeply concerned about the political and social problems faced by Dulaim as a whole. Hence the disagreements between the leaders of Dulaim were not in any way as serious as those which divided the leading family of Albu 'Amir. Also the disputes that arose between Dulaim leaders and peasants were not so acute as those between Albu 'Amir leaders and peasants. Moreover, since Dulaim shared a common history and were clearly differentiated from Albu 'Amir, an attack on any one of them was normally treated as an attack on the group as a whole.

The feelings of solidarity and community which existed among them did

not arise simply because they <u>were</u> Dulaim but from their long history of

struggle against the leading family of Albu 'Amir.

Although during this period the leading family of Albu 'Amir con-

trolled access to political power, its legitimacy was gradually challenged

as a result of its highly unpopular efforts to regain land which had

been distributed as part of the earlier Land Reform, a factor which at the

same time enhanced the prestige and status of Dulaim. The peasants of

Dulaim and al-Misarra became particularly conscious of the political

struggle being waged between the two rival groups. Furthermore, the Land

Reform peasants became hostile to government policy in the rural areas,

and it is no surprise to discover that at this time some of them joined

various illegal political parties. Thus, as a result of recent experiences,

most of the peasants gradually became in favour of creating a new political

situation in the country, and, like any other oppressed group, they began

to regard the leading family of Albu 'Amir with increasing resentment.

These events and processes were local reflections of various political

movements taking place all over Iraq. Between 1958 and 1968 political

forces which had previously had virtually no power began to establish

themselves more forcefully in the country. The Ba'th Party, for example,

began to grow on a scale unmatched in any other Arab country. In the

village, many peasants from Dulaim and al-Misarra were recruited into

the Party, especially after prominent members of Dulaim began to offer

jobs to members of al-Misarra who had been expelled from their Land Reform

holdings. Dulaim's hostility to the leading family of Albu 'Amir began to

crystallise; their adoption of the peasant cause proved a useful weapon

which they could exploit against Albu 'Amir, and which could be used to

gain support from outside their own group. During this period, Dulaim

was in an economically stronger position and exhibited more political

cohesion.

Dulaim's return to power and political domination

Before discussing Dulaim's return to power in 1968, it is useful

to examine the effects of the long struggle on the leadership of both the

Albu 'Amir and Dulaim groups. We have already seen how Shaikh Rashid

re-established his leadership among Albu 'Amir. During the period between

1958 and 1968, changes in the social structure of Iraq as a whole, and

especially the rural areas, were in fact more superficial than real. Hence

the incumbent shaikh was well able to exploit the various contradictions

between the military government, the political parties, and the entrenched

interests of the civil service and bureaucracy. His awlad 'amm returned

to recognising his leadership and began to act as a united front against

other rival groups, with the result that the shaikh was able to regain

most of the power that he had lost in the early years of the revolution

of 1958. At the same time, although other political groups in the village

began to challenge the authority of the leading family of Albu 'Amir,

this challenge was not sufficient to resolve the internal problems which

divided Albu 'Amir itself, since the roots of these conflicts extended

far back into the past. Thus the truce which was organized among them was

only tactical and shortlived. Once the threatening political winds ceased

to endanger the leading family of Albu 'Amir, internal conflicts broke out

among them once again, and many such incidents occurred after their

return to power.

The leaders of Dulaim, on the other hand, acted as a united group

in the face of the attempts at political and economic manipulation by Albu

'Amir. During the decade 1958 to 1968, the leaders of Dulaim began

carefully to cultivate a number of important individuals and political

figures outside the village, notably government ministers and senior civil

servants. Thus such relationships were no longer confined to the leading

family, and Dulaim's activities in this respect were eventually to enable

them to establish themselves as an independent political entity within

the village. It is important to add that these contacts also extended

beyond figures actually in power at the time to members of illegal

organisations which were to play a vital role in the Iraq of the future.

Hence Dulaim managed to have its feet in many camps at the same time, in

contrast to Albu 'Amir, who maintained more or less exclusive contacts

with essentially reactionary forces. Thus, on the eve of the events of

1968, Dulaim were ready to take over the formal political structures

of the village.

When July 1968 came many of their sons were high up in the ranks of

the Ba'th Party, at both local and national levels. Hajj Hasan led the

group within the village, while his nephew Tariq (IIC1) was politically

active in Baghdad. Hajj Hasan and his brother (IIB13) were mainly concerned

with the internal affairs of Dulaim within the village. The development

of their political careers had been facilitated by their great wealth,

derived from two large citrus groves, fruit orchards, and wheat and barley

fields. Their total joint income was estimated at about ID 90,000 per annum

(approximately £180,000) and most of their profits in the years between

1958 and 1968 were reinvested in agricultural improvements. The brothers

also owned substantial flocks of sheep, which were tended by members

of Dulaim, as well as shops and houses in Baghdad. Some of their great wealth

was used to give employment to members of Dulaim and al-Misarra, whose labour

was used especially after 1961 to construct various houses and other

properties in Baghdad owned by Hajj Hasan, in preference to using Baghdadi

labourers. Both Hajj Hasan and his brother were economically and politically

superior to the families of Albu 'Uqash and Albu Musluh. The main economic

resources of Albu Musluh are its citrus plantation and small wheat, barley

and vegetable fields, while that of the Albu 'Uqash lies in their control over waqf lands. Hence the seniority of Hajj Hasan and his brothers, together with their wealth and their political connections, ranked them first among the leaders of Dulaim.

After 1961, the political activities of Hajj Hasan could not be successfully blocked by the leading family of Albu 'Amir, although they did manage to block access to the formal political structures of the village. Hajj Hasan was mainly active in the wider political arena. After the over-throw of the Ba'th Party, following their first brief rule from February to October 1963, Hajj Hasan was able to secure Tariq's release from jail after a couple of months, although he was supposed to appear before a military court. Between 1963 and 1968 the part of the village occupied by Dulaim became extremely active in the struggle against the military nationalist rulers who took over in October 1963, and Hajj Hasan's house became the headquarters of Tariq and his group who held clandestine meetings there. During this period, Tariq became a senior member of the Ba'th Party, and his residence in the village protected him from the watchful eyes of the police who were mainly concentrated in the urban areas. In order to avoid difficulties and imprisonment for its members, the Ba'th Party chose the village of Da'udia as one of its major centres of operations. The selection of his house for this purpose, and his role as host, brought Hajj Hasan into contact with many new persons who were later to rise to prominence after the Revolution of 1968. The guesthouse contains numerous photographs of Hajj Hasan showing him with many of the political leaders who emerged after July 1968. During my visits he frequently alluded to his friendships with these individuals and his visits and telephone calls to them.

Hajj Hasan in power

When the Ba'th Party took over in Iraq in 1968 their most immediate

concern was to maintain themselves in power. On the basis of their

previous experience in 1963, their attitude towards other parties may be

summed up in the phrase 'here we are - and here we shall stay'. Hence

they immediately occupied themselves with a number of internal and external

problems. Indeed during the first two years there were many attempted

coups against them, as well as disputes with Iran and revolts in Kurdistan.

Hence the Party was forced to leave the management of local affairs largely

in the hands of local Party branches and sympathisers. An intensive

campaign of propaganda through the media was carried out against the

enemies of the regime. These enemies were described as the local allies

of imperialism, consisting of dissident elements in the army, feudalists

and other reactionary elements who had previously combined successfully

to overthrow the Party in October 1963. The campaign in the media was

further intensified each time a new plot against the regime was uncovered,

and the population was exhorted to be on their guard against such enemies

of the regime and to report anything suspicious to government officials

and members of local Party organisations.

As far as the village was concerned, Dulaim were firmly in control,

and Hajj Hasan and his brother emerged as the leaders of the village.

The shaikh of Albu 'Amir and his brothers were imprisoned in Baghdad for

a year, as a security measure. Moreover, the Albu 'Amir family, including

the shaikh, were successfully prosecuted in the courts for their illegal

exploitation of Land Reform land during the ten years between 1958 and

1968.[1]

Those peasants of Dulaim and al-Misarra who had been expelled from

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1)   Under present Land Reform laws the leading family of Albu 'Amir has
       lost 7110 donums, while before 1970 they only had to give up 3500
       donums.

their land were encouraged by Dulaim to repossess it, and there were
many clashes between the shaikh's lineage, Albu Khamis, and Dulaim and
al-Misarra. During this troubled period, Hajj Hasan, as one peasant
pointed out to me, was "the Party and the government", through his two
sons Shakir and Talib, amin al-sirr and deputy amin al-sirr of the local
Party, and through his relatives, who formed the majority of the rank
and file of the Party in the area. At this time, there was no other group
able to challenge the combined power and authority of Dulaim and al-Misarra.
In the same way as had been true for the shaikh of Albu 'Amir, the house
of Hajj Hasan became the focal point for visiting members of the local
administration and the local Party, who were almost invariably asked to eat
there.

Hajj Hasan had emerged as the strongest personality in Dulaim, and
their effective leader; there was no one else among them of such standing
and experience. Furthermore, Hajj Hasan rapidly became known outside the
village for his activities, through his friendships with important figures
in the Party and in government. In order to enhance his prestige in the
village, he demolished his house and built a new one on the bank of the
Tigris. The new house, called al-qasr, "the palace", by the villagers,
is in fact composed of three adjoining houses, two of which house his two
married sons. The new guesthouse within this complex consists of a large
room designed to accommodate over a hundred people, furnished with modern
furniture from Kuwait. There Hajj Hasan would receive his visitors,
seated at a table with two telephones, one for himself and the other for
the use of local Party officials, who would meet in his guesthouse before
their own new building was constructed.

In the first instance, only Albu 'Uqash supported Hajj Hasan and
his sons, but later his political power was further increased when al-Misarra
and "the newcomers" allied themselves to his leadership. During the two

years before the implementation of the 1970 Land Reform programme, Hajj

Hasan secured many jobs for the sons of the "newcomers" in local admin-

istration and on the Khalis Project which was then in its initial stages.

Furthermore, through the Party positions occupied by his two sons, he

began to assign tracts of Land Reform land to those who had been expelled

from their plots by the shaikh of Albu 'Amir during the period between 1963

and 1968. It was for this reason that al-Misarra became the main supporters

of Dulaim at a time when the village became divided into two opposing and

rival camps. Tariq's absence in Baghdad, where he was appointed editor of

'Sawt al-Fallah' (The Voice of the Peasants) left a vacuum in the village

arena for Hajj Hasan to exploit. Thus Hajj Hasan became the main channel of

communication between the village community and the wider society.

Conclusion

As we have seen, changes in the wider political system in Iraq have

had a fundamental impact at village level. The collapse of the Monarchy in

1958, and the recurring coups d'etat in the country over the next ten years,

were mirrored at the village level by the changes that took place in the

political relationships of the kinship groups, and in the ways in which

they articulated with the wider political system. The take-over by the

Ba'th Party in 1968 was immediately followed by and, indeed, was responsible

for, the rise of the leaders of Dulaim, who acquired influence both inside

and outside the village. Concomitant with this was the decline in

importance of the leading family of Albu 'Amir.

This struggle for power between the heads of the two rival groups

had its repercussions on the alignments of peasant groups and leaders and

on the development of factionalism which emerged between vertically-organised

kinship groups. Also, although the struggle between the landlords of the

two main lineages appeared primarily political, in that it was a struggle

for power in the village, it was based also upon economic and kinship

differences. In the next chapter, I will pursue this discussion in order to see how far these struggles affected the implementation of the Land Reform, and in order to clarify the nature of the various socio-political divisions existing in the village.

CHAPTER VI

Political Alliances and Struggles during the Implementation of the Settlement Programme of 1970

Introduction

In this chapter I shall analyse the events and the political processes that accompanied the Land Reform programme, concentrating especially on the establishment of the new settlements and the distribution of peasant families within them. This process of reform must be seen first against the background of the social structure of the village, which is composed of two rival factions competing with each other for political control, and secondly, against the background of the policy adopted by the Ba'th Party[1] with regard to the rural areas.

Before the distribution of peasants within the new settlements there was great anxiety that the programme would mean the scattering of hitherto closely-knit kinship groups over the new areas, which would undermine existing relationships and perhaps also lead to hostilities between co-resident, but unrelated, groups. My aim in this chapter is to focus on the development of the factionalism and changing political relationships that in fact emerged among local groups, and to examine the roles of the political Party and 'traditional' leaders.

The Party and its relations to the local people

The function of the Party has been greatly expanded and diversified since it came to power in 1968 and by 1970 most ministerial offices and administrative positions had been taken over by Party members. Although these various ministers, officials and mayors are, from the official

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1) See Chapter II for an account of the ideology and organization of the Ba'th Party.

point of view, government officers, and although much of their work is
purely routine government business, nevertheless in matters of general
policy they are closely guided by the Party, which in consequence, is
permeating the country at all levels. Furthermore, in the implementation
of general policy, ministers look for guidance to regional Party leaders,
and officials, like mayors and local mudirs, look similarly to the local
Party officials in their areas. Most of the administrative offices
in the country in fact are dominated by the Party, from the highest levels
down to the smallest local unit, the nahia.

On the village level, the Party supervises most of the important
functions of local government carried out by the mudir. In Da'udia
the mudir was closely connected with the local Party, both as a member
and also by virtue of his role as a government official. Instructions
received through the administrative hierarchy of government tended to
harmonise with the general policy passed on to him by the Party machinery,
because the source of both kinds of authority was ultimately the same,
the Ba'th Party. The continuance in post of officials, such as mayors
and mudirs, no matter what rearrangements occur at higher government or
Party levels, is chiefly dependent on the success and assiduity with
which they carry out Party policy, and on the close co-operation they
maintain with the local Party. Political power, then, is no longer, as
it was in the past, dependent simply upon administrative rank, but rather
upon an individual's standing within the Party and upon the success with
which he implements Party policy.

In Da'udia, the mudir occupied the relatively low rank of nasir
within the Party hierarchy, and as a result his political power was small.
He could do little towards resolving problems in the village without
first having recourse to local Party leaders, and especially to the
amin al-sirr , the   most important political figure in the village.

Social and political rank in fact tends to correlate with whether or not
one is a full member of the Party and for how long.

Many of the inhabitants of the village occupy the same low rank in the
Party as the mudir, so that when they have a problem which ought really to
be taken to him, they prefer nowadays to circumvent him by going directly
to his political superior, the amin al-sirr, who will sign their petition
as an indication to the mudir that he must do what he is asked to do.
This suggests that the Party is now the dominant source of power, both at
the level of national government agencies and at local village level. The
Party controls most of the political institutions established since 1968,
such as the Peasant Unions and Co-operative Societies in the rural areas,
and the Trade Unions and Student Unions in the urban areas.

One of the most important features of the new political organisation
is that the new group in power excludes members of the traditional elite
who now have virtually no political influence, except in those cases where
they retain some kind of friendship or kinship relationship with the new
leaders. It is now well known in Iraq that access to political power in
the country has become dependent upon membership of the Party and on one's
rank within it. Furthermore, the greatest political power lies in the hands
of those who were full Party members before 1968, before it became obviously
and generally advantageous to be a Party member. Most of these old members,
and especially those living within the same neighbourhood, have known each
other as friends for many years. These networks of friends form structures
existing somewhat independently of· the formal Party organization, so that,
whatever the difference in formal Party rank between two old members, they
will tend to be loyal to and help each other.

What, then, is the significance of this new pattern of political
Party organization for kinship groups in Da'udia? And what advantage does
it bring them? As we saw earlier, the younger generation of Dulaim were

the first in the village to be recruited into the Party, achieving full membership rank before 1968. Shakir and Talib, the two sons of Hajj Hasan, became the most important of the four local Party leaders; Shakir (IIC21) was appointed the 'Keeper of the Secret' (amin al-sirr), and his younger brother Talib (IIC20) his deputy. Furthermore, their cousin Tariq, (IIC1) the editor of the Baghdad newspaper 'Voice of the Peasants', was a member of the Party for the Baghdad area, in which the village was included.

After 1968, however, the political power of Dulaim was not simply confined to the local Party. In addition, they began to dominate the Peasant Bureau, an organization set up by the Party to deal with peasant problems. The head of the Bureau in Da'udia was Shakir, Hajj Hasan's eldest son, who was amin al-sirr. The three other members were Jawir, the leader of the "newcomers", the mudir, and the head of the Agricultural Office, all of whom occupied the rank of nasir. Thus Dulaim were in a position to exercise political influence through various institutions of the Party and local government, and they also had some kind of access to other institutions outside the village. As I have explained, old Party members linked by long established friendship networks were particularly well placed to acquire influence or benefit from the new regime. Dulaim are a good example of this, and Hajj Hasan a particularly striking case, with his extraordinarily extensive network of friends and colleagues at all levels in the Party, both inside and outside the village.

The situation with regard to the political standing of the other kinship group, al-Misarra, was different. Although some members of this group, like Jawir and others, belonged to the Party before 1968, they were still only of nasir rank after 1968, and therefore their political power in the village, such as it was, really derived from the fact that they had allied themselves with Dulaim against the leading family of Albu 'Amir. The latter family had no Party members.

The redistribution of land, and the resettlement of the peasants, which began in 1970, was controlled by Dulaim, or more precisely by Hajj Hasan and his sons. This process obviously entailed a great deal of intrigue and negotiation between the various parties involved. In the next part of this chapter, I intend to examine how Dulaim exercised its power in the village in respect of the resettlement process, and analyse the emergence of internal factional struggles.

Abuses of power

The idea of resettling peasants on the newly acquired lands disturbed not only Albu Khamis lineage and the members of the leading family but was also a matter of serious concern for other kinship groups in the village. The dispersal of kin members over the new land posed a real threat to their political strength, especially in the case of the 'original' al-Misarra,[1] who saw in resettlement the possibility that hostile action might be taken against them. This suspicion was confirmed when rumours in the village suggested that resettlement would take place in four separate areas, and that in three of these areas members of Albu Khamis, al-Misarra, and Albu Musluh of Dulaim, would be grouped together, while the Hajj Hasan lineage would have their own independent settlement in the fourth area. Albu Khamis peasants heard that Hajj Hasan and his sons were seizing this opportunity to scatter them in small units in different localities, and so the shaikh and his brothers actively fomented opposition to this plan, arguing instead that they should be given their own independent settlement. Furthermore, the shaikh promised that, even if they were unable to secure a single holding from the authorities in the process of resettlement, the members

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1)   It should be remembered that there are two groups of al-Misarra in the village. The first (the 'original' al-Misarra) were already living in the village before the Land Reform, while the second (the 'newcomers') arrived only after 1970.

would be able to settle together on the shaikh's own lands, and work for him. The shaikh campaigned intensively throughout his own lineage because he knew that other groups wanted to have their own individual resettlement areas, and that his own lineage was to be resettled together with al-Misarra in two separate settlements, while the Hajj Hasan lineage would be grouped together in one.

The strategy of Hajj Hasan and his sons during this period had three principal objectives: (i) to keep their own lineage as a separate unit in one settlement, (ii) to prevent any mixing between their own lineage and that of the shaikh, (iii) to amalgamate the shaikh's lineage (Albu Khamis) with that of al-Misarra. The shaikh's lineage and al-Misarra were of the same tribal origin but had long since been at bitter odds with each other. Thus Hajj Hasan's strategy was to put these two antagonistic groups together, so that they would use up their energies quarrelling with each other. He aimed to give a semblance of impartiality to his plans by permitting the mixing together in one settlement of the "newcomers" of al-Misarra and some members of the lineage of Hajj Musluh of Dulaim.

This plan was objected to not only by the shaikh and his group, but also by members of "the original" al-Misarra, who criticised the idea claiming that old quarrels would break out again if they were put together with the shaikh and his group, and that they too aspired to have their own independent settlement. Then, when the "original" al-Misarra discovered that the decision about their resettlement had not yet been officially taken by the Peasant Bureau, they started to put pressure on Jawir, the leader of the "newcomers", who was a member of the Bureau, arguing that both the "original" al-Misarra and the "newcomers" should be allocated separate and independent areas. They also made it clear to Jawir that, if the original policy of settling them with the shaikh's group was pursued, they would take no part in the new cultivation scheme, and would migrate from the

village. Finally, therefore, Jawir put these arguments before the Peasant

Bureau and attempted to persuade Hajj Hasan to put pressure on his sons

in the Bureau so that the plans might be suitably modified.

The wishes of al-Misarra could not, of course, be completely ignored,

since they were the main allies of Hajj Hasan and his sons. Hence Jawir

found himself in an extremely difficult situation, because he needed the

favour of both Hajj Hasan and the "original" al-Misarra to perform his political duties

satisfactorily. Jawir explained to me that he was in fact trying to persuade

Hajj Hasan and the Peasant Bureau to accept al-Misarra's point of view,

when the "original" al-Misarra began to circulate rumours in the village

that he was giving in to Hajj Hasan and the Bureau. Jawir also told me that

when at last the whole issue was put before the Peasant Bureau, he alone

objected to the plan to put the "original" al-Misarra and the shaikh's group

together, which was favoured by Hajj Hasan's sons, the _mudir_, and the Head

of the Agricultural Office.

The recommendation of the Peasant Bureau, then, was to resettle the

kinship groups in the following four new settlements:-

1. Settlement no. 1 in Bad'a al-Shamalia (North Bad'a) to include:
     (a) the peasants of Albu Hajj Hasan lineage
     (b) some peasants of Albu Hajj Musluh lineage

2. Settlement no. 2 in Bad'a al-Shamalia (North Bad'a) to include:
     (a) some peasants of Albu Khamis lineage
     (b) some peasants from the "newcomers"
     (c) some peasants of the "original" al-Misarra

3. Settlement no. 3 in Bad'a al-Janubia (South Bad'a) to include:
     (a) some peasants of Albu Khamis lineage
     (b) some peasants of the "newcomers" (most of them)
     (c) some peasants of the "original" al-Misarra

4. Settlement no. 4 in Bad'a al-Janubia (South Bad'a) to include:
     (a) some peasants of Albu Musluh lineage
     (b) some peasants of the "newcomers"
     (c) some peasants of the "original" al-Misarra

When these decisions were made known to the people of the village, the

"original" al-Misarra were the first to declare that they would never accept

it, and they accused Jawir of favouring Hajj Hasan and his sons. They

stated that they would neither join the settlement nor help the other

kinship groups to construct the new settlements. Albu Khamis lineage also

refused to accept the decision or to have anything to do with these new

settlements.

In the face of these disputes the local Party found itself in great

difficulties. Hajj Hasan and his sons started to put more pressure on

Albu Khamis and the "original" al-Misarra to accept the recommendation,

but this resulted in the boycotting of Hajj Hasan's guesthouse by al-Misarra,

and precipitated open hostility between Hajj Hasan's group and Albu Khamis.

The latter two parties started to talk openly against each other in the

village, and to recruit allies.

One day, a peasant of Hajj Hasan's lineage went to work in gardens

adjacent to the Albu Khamis area. Whilst he tried to work, a number of

Albu Khamis peasants taunted him and threw insults at his group. The two

parties were gradually joined by reinforcements and this led to a scuffle

between them. A number of men on both sides were wounded before the police

could restore order. The incident was then immediately reported by

telephone to Tariq in Baghdad. He travelled to the village at once and

ordered the release from jail of the peasants of both sides. Afterwards

he accompanied the Albu Khamis peasants, who had been released, back to

their settlement and stayed overnight with them. This gave the Albu Khamis

lineage the opportunity to tell Tariq that Hajj Hasan was discriminating

against them in the policy adopted by the Peasant Bureau. This long meeting

between Tariq and the Albu Khamis leaders angered Hajj Hasan, and exacerbated

the differences between Tariq and his followers on the one hand and Hajj

Hasan and his sons on the other, which had arisen since Hajj Hasan's rise

to power in the village in 1968.

Conflict among Dulaim

From the time of the first quarrel between the Hajj Hasan and Albu

Khamis lineages, which occurred shortly after the change of government in 1968, the latter began to suffer harsh treatment and several of its members were imprisoned on the orders of the _mudir_, who was himself acting at the behest of Hajj Hasan and his sons. The recurrent clashes and imprisonings did not please Albu 'Uqash, who started to criticise Hajj Hasan on the grounds that Albu Khamis were after all their neighbours, and part of the village too, and should not be treated in this way. They expressed their discontentment with the part played by Hajj Hasan and his sons in the village, and with the policy in general. They complained that Hajj Hasan and his sons often took decisions behind their backs, without having even the courtesy to consult them. Hajj Hasan and his sons, on the other hand argued that Tariq's uncles (IIB3 and IIB5) often acted against Hajj Hasan by putting pressure on the _mudir_ to make decisions favourable to other groups in the village. The various activities of Tariq's cousins caused great dissatisfaction among the Hajj Hasan lineage, who started to try to persuade the Hajj Musluh lineage to side with them, in the hope of putting a stop to these activities, which they regarded as aiming at reducing their influence in village society.

The conflict which took place between Hajj Hasan and Tariq was not confined to the two parties, but also spread to include Hajj Hasan's sons (IIC20,21) and Tariq's cousins (IIC3-9). Both groups were in the Party, although Hajj Hasan's sons held higher rank. Despite their lower rank, however, Tariq's cousins had the advantage of close kinship with him, and he would intervene from time to time with both local government and outside authorities in favour of this or that group, without having to establish formal alliances with any particular faction. In addition, as Ba'thists, they considered it their duty to recruit peasants into the Party irrespective of any kinship bonds. Their major effort at recruitment was directed at the younger generation of villagers from both al-Misarra and Albu

Khamis lineages, who had not until then been recruited into the Party, and who were potentially an effective power base for Tariq's cousins. The political effort of Tariq's cousins was directed at spreading disenchantment with Hajj Hasan and his sons, suggesting that they played a major part in the Party out of self interest as a means of achieving political dominance in the village. They claimed, too, that the complaints which they had made to the political authorities of the district had not been passed on from local Party level, as a result of political interference. They were very critical of Hajj Hasan's sons, who, it was said obstructed their promotion to higher levels of responsibility within the Party. Tariq's cousins did not only concentrate their efforts at the level of the local Party; they also made constant reports of their dissatisfaction with Hajj Hasan and his sons direct to Tariq himself, describing how the Hajj Hasan group was intriguing and manoeuvring against other groups in the village.

As a result of these incidents, the social status of Hajj Hasan and his sons began to deteriorate from the time of the open breach between them and Tariq's cousins. Moreover, after the decision about peasant resettlement was made public, al-Misarra began to ally itself with Tariq's 'ammam (paternal uncles) in order to undermine and circumvent Hajj Hasan and his sons. In these circumstances, the latter found themselves critically in need of the support of the Hajj Musluh lineage in opposing Tariq's 'ammam, but their attempts failed. Hajj Musluh, the leader of the lineage, was not greatly interested in the political manoeuvrings going on in the village, but was naturally concerned with preserving the unity of Dulaim, and was in consequence dissatisfied with the decision to disperse his lineage among the various resettlement areas, especially since it had been taken without consulting him. The relationship between Hajj Hasan and Hajj Musluh was not secure enough to encourage Hajj Hasan to place

any reliance upon him. The differences between the two men dated back to their respective fathers' time; it was well known among Dulaim that Hajj Hasan's father and Hajj Musluh's father disliked each other intensely. The dispute between the two fathers seems to have concerned a small tract of land controlled by Hajj Hasan's father, and it had carried over to affect the sons as well, whose relations were further damaged by the fact that Hajj Hasan had married Hajj Musluh's sister but had later treated her badly when he married for a second time.

Tariq's absence from the village during this period left a power vacuum which the various kinship groups began to struggle to fill, each one attempting to rally support for itself and destroy the support built up for the other parties. The conflict came to a head when the resettlement plan was announced, since it led to major hostility between Hajj Hasan and Tariq's cousins. Tariq's intervention to release the peasants who were jailed following the affray was clearly the action of a man who felt the political ground shaking beneath his feet. He apparently realised that the troubles attending the processes of peasant resettlement were in large measure the result of mistakes and failings on the part of his own kinship group, and that this fact threatened his own position of seniority and even his political influence within the Party. On the second day of his stay in the village, he announced that the resettlement plans had been withdrawn, and he invited the Land Reform peasants to an open meeting in the village three days later to discuss plans for a re-distribution.

At this public meeting Tariq explained that the Revolution was for the benefit of all peasants, irrespective of kinship or tribal status, and that while no adverse notice would be taken by the Party of recent actions, such quarrels and intrigues would be severely dealt with in the future. The Party had examined the issues involved in the village re-settlement programme, and it was opposed to putting any plan into effect

against the peasants' wishes. They had now decided, he said, to establish

five settlements instead of four, and to distribute peasant families as

follows:

1. Settlement no. 1 in Bad'a al-Shamalia:
   (a) the peasants of Albu Khamis lineage

2. Settlement no. 2 in Bad'a al-Shamalia:
   (a) the peasants of Albu Hajj Hasan lineage
   (b) some peasants of Albu Hajj Musluh of Dulaim

3. Settlement no. 3 in Bad'a al-Janubia:
   (a) the peasants of Albu 'Ayyada sub-lineage of al-Misarra
   (b) some peasants of "the newcomers" called Al-'Arafina

4. Settlement no. 4 in Bad'a al-Janubia:
   (a) the majority of the "newcomers"
   (b) the peasants of Albu Hammudi sub-lineage of al-Misarra
   (c) the peasants of Albu 'Inad sub-lineage of Albu Khamis

5. Settlement no. 5 in Bad'a al-Janubia:
   (a) the peasants of Albu Razayyiq sub-lineage of al-Misarra
   (b) some peasants of Albu Hajj Musluh of Dulaim
   (c) some peasants of the "newcomers"

The peasants voted to accept the proposals, and at the end of the

meeting most of them pressed for a change in the composition of the Peasant

Bureau. Tariq agreed to this, but left it to the local Party to make the

necessary arrangements after the peasants had been settled on their new

holdings. The next day Tariq also tightened his hold on the local Party

organization by appointing a friend of his as amin al-sirr. This man was

a teacher living in the village who had previously been one of the four local

Party leaders. Both of Hajj Hasan's sons were soon transferred to Party

work in another village.

Tariq's aim was not simply to calm the troubled situation and to

restore peace between the various kinship groups in the village. He also

wished to destroy Hajj Hasan's position, because his group had begun to

act as a "Party within the Party" in the village and to undermine the role

of the real local Party in village affairs.

The village meeting and the attendant changes in local Party leadership

gave Tariq considerable popular support in Da'udia, and reduced Hajj Hasan's

influence almost to vanishing point. Acting through the Party organization

and the Peasant Union, Tariq was thus able to bring together an over-
whelming degree of support for himself and for the new arrangements. He
thus demonstrated that, whatever the title or influence of village leaders,
it was he, due to his higher political position, who held the real key
to power. [1]

It may thus be said in conclusion that the political power of kinship
groups depends closely upon the extent of their relationships (or lack of
them) with the centreof power in Baghdad, and on their influence within
the local Party. Once the link with outside sources of power is lost, as
is illustrated by the Hajj Hasan case, and by the loss of the shaikh's
authority in an earlier example, local political power is destroyed. In
spite of his wide ranging personal relationships, Hajj Hasan lost his
local position once his _political_ link with the outside world was destroyed
by the removal of his sons and by the loss of Tariq's support. Following
the decline of his power in the village, new patterns of alliance began to
appear; the "original" al-Misarra and the "newcomers" began to drift away
from Hajj Hasan towards Tariq's group, who now represented the main channel
of political influence.

The removal of Hajj Hasan's influence did not bring an end to political
manoeuvres between the various kinship groups. The factionalism so evident
in village life did not disappear, and will not do so, as long as the head of each
kinship group feels a first loyalty to his own lineage. In fact, faction-
alism emerged once again through the activities of the re-constituted
Peasant Bureau after the resettlement. However, before examining this,
let us first analyse the new pattern of relationships between the heads of
various kinship groups or lineages, and describe the internal relations
between leaders and their kin under the new settlement arrangements.

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1) Tariq was made Minister of Agrarian Reform in the autumn of 1977.

The impact of Land Reform and resettlement upon kinship groups

Under the Land Reform programme the "original" al-Misarra lineage was widely dispersed over the area of the village. In fact, this dispersal had begun long before the Land Reform, since from the time of the registration of the village land in the name of the leading family of Albu 'Amir until the present. al-Misarra have lacked powerful and effective leadership. Prior to 1958, they were subordinate to and humilated by the shaikh of Albu 'Amir and his family, and the very name "Misarra" came to connote low status within Albu 'Amir. Before 1970, al-Misarra worked as tenants for the shaikh and his cousins.

We have already noted that Albu Hajj Hasan and Albu Khamis have been the most influential lineages in the village for many years, due largely to their size and solidarity, and to their superior economic position.[1] The peasants of these two lineages were able to obtain their own independent settlements with corporate land holdings, which were of both material and symbolic value. For many years the leaders of each of these groups had built up close ties with other members of their lineages, as well as forging strong links with the world outside. The influence of al-Misarra was far smaller, probably because of their size (they number only 400, including women and children) and their restricted socio-political influence. When the land was first expropriated from the leading family of Albu 'Amir, al-Misarra began by acting as a single group. However, internal factionalism soon emerged, reflecting a lack of agreement over many basic issues, especially over the distribution of families among the various settlements.

The three main sub-lineages (bayts) of the "original" al-Misarra are Albu 'Ayyada, Albu Hammudi and Albu Razayyiq. In 1970 all three sub-lineages

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1)   See pp. 50-52, 72-74.

were moved and incorporated into different settlements. Albu 'Ayyada
and Albu Hammudi accused Albu Razayyiq of a plot against them when the
latter allied with the "newcomers", (who were originally brought into
the village by the government). The first two groups claimed that Albu
Razayyiq had helped the "newcomers" to play a leading role in the village
when the former chose a "newcomer" as their settlement head.

With the establishment of the cooperative societies these three
sub-lineages, as I shall explain in Chapter VIII, divided further. This
conflict within the cooperative, to which all three belonged, had social
and political implications beyond the cooperative itself for al-Misarra,
for their lineage relationships were seriously undermined. Lineage
elders lost influence over their members, and over village affairs in
which their group was concerned. Endogamy was not enforced; as one man
put it, "Nowadays even respectable families have begun to take wives from
among those Shurughis".

In contrast, the shaikh's lineage, Albu Khamis, acted as a single
group in spite of the dispersal of some of its sub-lineages. The majority
of the sub-lineages (five out of seven) were located in the same area,
adjacent to the estate belonging to the shaikh and his brothers in Bad'a
al-Shamalia (North Bad'a) (see Map 4·). Albu Khamis claim to be descendants
of 'Amir, the founder of the tribe, and as such their descent status is
considered to be the highest in the system of lineages, and they are proud
that the leading family of the Albu 'Amir belongs to the Albu Khamis.
Besides being the strongest and wealthiest group of Albu 'Amir, the leading
family remains a crucial factor in their internal and external organization
which has persisted over time. Thus the members of Albu Khamis place high
premiums on preserving their close kinship affiliation with the leading
family, as it helps to maintain their political position within the village.

During my fieldwork in 1974-1975, the overall picture was that most

members of Albu Khamis realised the importance of their group in the village context. In the first place, they are pre-eminent in terms of numbers since they now total about 600 individuals. Moreover, they control about 4178 donums, including the shaikh's land, of about 3000 donums, and this land, which is now mainly located in a single area, serves to enhance their prestige and authority. During the first stages of the implementation of the 1970 Land Reform, they acted as a unified group in order to obtain land concentrated in a single area adjacent to the land owned by the shaikh. Within the lineage, the shaikh's power is extensive. In cases of major dispute, Albu Khamis refer their problems to him for settlement.

The commonest occasion on which the unity and solidarity of the Albu Khamis receives public expression is at the funeral of one of their members. In such cases the shaikh presides with his brothers over the mourning council (fatiha). A big tent, originally belonging to the present shaikh's grandfather, is pitched in front of the deceased man's house, wherever it is located in the village. Most of the members of Albu Khamis will attend the fatiha and contribute to its costs, although the main contribution comes from the shaikh himself. The fatiha continues for seven days, starting early in the morning and lasting until late at night. All those attending are served with food; and huge quantities of rice and a number of sheep are usually provided by the shaikh and his brothers. The shaikh attends the fatiha early in the morning and takes his seat in the middle of the tent. On his right sits the sayyid, (the holy man) who normally accompanies the shaikh on such occasions. In addition, other groups in the village will attend the fatiha to express their sympathy, including the mudir and the leaders of Dulaim. Thus the fatiha functions as an occasion for various groups to show their solidarity and test their relative esteem, rather than being simply a mourning ritual.

The procedure among Dulaim is more dramatized and publicized. During my last period in the village, one of their leaders was killed in a car accident. The deceased was escorted to his final resting place by both Albu Khamis and Dulaim, to the accompaniment of heavy gun salutes which lasted for more than an hour. On this occasion Albu Khamis appeared as a distinct group, most of them joining the funeral parade along with the shaikh and his brothers. This was an impressive display of numbers. Later the shaikh's son commented, "On this occasion Dulaim lost themselves among us".

During Muharram, Albu Khamis appear a more cohesive group than others in the district, with the majority of their members participating in the various religious ceremonies. This month is of course of special significance to all Shi'i Muslims, and Husain's martyrdom is commemorated each year in daily recitations and processions. In Da'udia the whole ceremony is organised from the shaikh's guesthouse, where the sayyid is housed for the duration of the feast. On the last night of the month, the ceremonies reach their climax, with a mass gathering outside the guesthouse. When the shaikh appears with the sayyid in front of the door after the evening prayers, the various kinship groups start to move round the fence of the guesthouse in a funeral-like procession. As it sets off, the procession chants a sad dirge, the men striking their shoulders vigorously as they move, group by group, carrying blood-stained black flags. During the procession Albu Khamis act as a single group, thus expressing their sympathy and loyalty to their relatives "in faith and blood". In this way the celebration provides an opportunity for Albu Khamis to display their solidarity.

An element of challenge may also be seen here in that the celebrations serve to express latent opposition towards participating kin groups, although the religious idiom implies identity with a society wider than

that of the individual's immediate kin network. This latter aspect has

in fact been given additional emphasis in recent years by the involvement

of government officials, whose presence at the ceremonies has widened the

universe of the participants.

The shaikh's new relationship with his awlad 'amm

After the introduction of the present Land Reform programme, the

relationship between the members of the leading family gradually became

transformed into one of competition. The reconciliation achieved prior

to 1968 proved temporary, for, in 1970, the conflict broke out into the

open once again. The present shaikh's cousins (awlad 'amm) (IC3-9) had

kept their land registered in the name of their eldest brother and hence

had most of it expropriated under the Land Reform. In contrast, the shaikh

himself skillfully avoided this problem by registering all his land in

the names of his brothers. In addition to this, the shaikh's awlad 'amm

could not retain the rest of their land as a unified estate in one spot,

as the shaikh had done. All this led to the shaikh being accused of using

his awlad 'amm as a scape-goat and of plotting to eliminate them entirely

from the village. The shaikh was also accused of having refused to allow

other members of Albu Khamis to approach the government for access to

the family land held by 'Umar (IB4); they had of course hoped that these

(Albu Khamis) people would simply continue to cultivate as share-croppers,

with themselves as landlords, just as before. The shaikh, who was obviously

not averse to seeing this part of the family decline, naturally withheld

his permission. It was for this reason then that his awlad 'amm put about

rumours in the village that the Land Reform programme was not being applied

to any part of the shaikh's land. They also argued that Settlement no. 1

was entirely composed of Albu Khamis, and that this land was being

cultivated under the old share-cropping system, which was not in fact the

case.

The present shaikh succeeded in maintaining his estate intact

through his friendships with Tariq's cousins and with Hajj Musluh, which

began to blossom at the time of Hajj Hasan's dispute with the two latter

figures. Hajj Hasan's strategy was to attempt to divide into small plots

the land which remained in the shaikh's possession after the Land Reform.

However, the shaikh quickly realised that Hajj Hasan's purpose was to

fragment his land and thus to undermine his material base in the village.

Hence, following the Land Reform, relationships within the leading

family became somewhat strained. This was perhaps most spectacularly

visible in the summer of 1975, when the shaikh and his cousins were walking

in the funeral procession of one of the Dulaim leaders. On such occasions

it is customary for volleys to be fired into the air, and seizing the

opportunity thus presented, one of the sons of 'Umar (IB4) took aim and

actually fired at the shaikh. But he missed. A pitched battle would

certainly have broken out at this point had it not been for the intervention

of Tariq's cousins, who, together with the local police, managed to prevent

a serious affray. This incident illustrates how the political position of

the shaikh of Albu 'Amir had changed; had he remained tribal leader in

the sense that he had been in the past, such an incident would have been

unthinkable. The case also shows the improved position of Tariq's cousins;

not only did they act as mediators between the members of the leading

family involved, they also managed to talk the police out of making any

arrests.

The shaikh's new relationship with Dulaim

In response to these changed circumstances, the present shaikh has

started to arrange his network of social relationships according to a new

strategy. This is based partly on accepting greater dependence on the

Albu Khamis peasants, and partly on setting up a new set of marriage

alliances and affinal bonds with other groups. First, he married his elder son to one of Hajj Musluh's daughters, (IIC11) thus reducing the threat of Hajj Hasan and his sons. Secondly, he connected his family through the marriages of two of his brothers (IC19 and 20) to a well-known landlord in southern Iraq of similar standing to his own, and through another brother's (IC18) marriage made good relations with a religious family in Karbala'. These marriage ties have enabled him to establish important affinal bonds both inside and outside the village.

His son's marriage to Hajj Musluh's daughter has had its repercussions not only on the relations of the shaikh with Dulaim but on Dulaim themselves. When the shaikh began to negotiate the marriage, Hajj Hasan and his son tried to prevent it on the basis of nahwa.[1] But Hajj Musluh refused to submit to their wishes, alleging that they could not act like this because they were not true agnatic kin. Hajj Hasan also tried to exploit this occasion to improve his relationship with Tariq's cousins and to encourage them to stand by him in this matter. However, the latter refused to intervene on the grounds that Hajj Musluh was not a child (tufl) but an experienced man who was quite capable of managing his own affairs. Since these incidents, the relationship between Hajj Musluh and Hajj Hasan has further deteriorated, while Hajj Hasan has improved his contacts with the awlad 'amm of the shaikh.

These conflicts among Dulaim have had their repercussions on the functioning of their cooperative society. In Da'udia there are three so-called 'private sector' cooperatives, associated with the three groups of landlords and wealthier families; the shaikh's family, that of his cousins, and that of Dulaim. Each group has established its own independent

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1) For a discussion of nahwa, see p. 108 .

cooperative society. The main aim behind this is to involve the better-off

farmers in the government's agricultural plan, whose primary objective

is to increase agricultural productivity and provide improved facilities

such as agricultural machinery, fertilisers and hybrid seeds. However,

the decision to set up three cooperatives instead of just one was clearly

related to the existing social divisions within the village.[1]

Each of these three cooperative societies is administered by an

administrative board (majlis al-idara). Members of the board and the

presidents (ra'is) are elected from the members of the group without the

intervention of local government or political party. Their relationship

to local government operates mainly through a supervisor who is appointed

by government and who passes on their demands to higher authorities through

the Agricultural Office in the village, and who instructs them on the

agricultural plan they are expected to follow. Throughout my fieldwork

there was little activity on the part of these societies, and their

meetings, which were usually not attended by all board members, were rather

infrequent. The supervisors often complained of the difficulty of adhering

to the agreed agricultural schedules. Moreover, a series of disputes

among the leaders of Dulaim had made it difficult for them to organise

cooperative society meetings to discuss business, and the supervisor was

often forced to take credit petitions to each individual household for

signature.

A similar pattern manifested itself in the cooperative organized by

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1) The names given to the three private cooperative societies in the
village which have been set up since 1970 reflect the hostility
and rivalry between Dulaim and the leading family of Albu 'Amir.
During the Hajj Hasan period, Dulaim named their cooperative
"Risalat Khalida" (eternal message), (a well-known Ba'thist phrase),
while they called the cooperative belonging to the shaikh and his
brothers "al-Julan" (i.e. the Golan Heights) and that of the shaikh's
awlad 'amm "al-Quds" (Jerusalem), meaning that the two latter were
were still in enemy hands!

the shaikh's cousins. As their supervisor explained to me, "The shaikh's cousins do not cooperate with each other but compete to get the lion's share whenever there is anything of common interest". As in the other cooperative, credit petitions require the agreement of members of the Board, but in practice it was often difficult to persuade them to endorse other members' petitions. Quarrels and shouting broke out frequently at the meetings I attended during the course of my fieldwork.

In contrast to the two other cooperatives, the society run by the shaikh and his brothers exhibited fewer decision-making problems. Decisions were arrived at by consensus rather than by majority vote - a strategy designed to show the group's internal cohesion.

The shaikh and the local government: New bases of power

The shaikh now has no formal relations with local government agencies because the officials, particularly the mudir, have deliberately decided to ignore him in order to improve their image with the rest of the village. The mudir is not personally friendly either with the shaikh or his brothers, and there is on the contrary a certain amount of hostility between them because of conflicts over irrigation water, as many of the new settlements still depend on pumps controlled by the shaikh's family.[1]

In general, the nature of the relationship with the local government officials can be observed from the fact that the shaikh and his brothers do not normally visit the mudir in his office, unlike Dulaim, who do so regularly. Dulaim are welcomed with tea and cigarettes, amid much joking and gossip. But if the shaikh himself has to go to the local administrative headquarters, one of his brothers or sons usually goes instead. He depends very heavily on these kinsmen to look after many aspects of his life in

1) See Chapter IX for a detailed analysis of the importance of the control of irrigation pumps for political ends.

the village, and he tends to discuss local affairs with them in private.
During my fieldwork the mudir, who was in charge of the compulsory women's
literacy programme in the village, jailed 20 Albu Khamis peasants whose
wives were not attending the classes. This punishment, which only lasted
for a single day, naturally caused great ill-feeling among Albu Khamis,
who immediately informed the shaikh. He ordered his brother to approach
the mudir, but the latter refused to set them free. Subsequently, the
shaikh approached one of Tariq's cousins, who then contacted the mudir,
telling him that the shaikh was on his way to see him. As a result, the
mudir immediately released the peasants.

Thus, in spite of the bad relations between the shaikh and local
government, the shaikh has managed to retain a power base in the village
through his connections with some of Dulaim. Furthermore, the Albu Khamis lineage
has become more closely attached to him because of the conflicts it has
experienced with various other kinship groups, particularly with Hajj Hasan's
lineage. Lineages such as Albu Khamis and Albu Hajj Hasan have emerged
as political entities that act through the co-ordination of their leaders
and not with the political party or local government.

The relationship of Albu Khamis with the shaikh and his brothers is
characterized by mutual help and respect. The shaikh and his family, who
are still the wealthiest group in the village, are indispensable for the
Albu Khamis peasants' livelihood, particularly because they are still in
control of the most fertile land. The new Land Reform beneficiaries in the
village receive only 18 Donums, a part of which is generally left uncultivated
because of salination. Hence most peasants, after settling on their land,
need   extra employment because the plots are not large enough to support
their families. Because of these difficulties, most Albu Khamis peasants
and their families continue to work for the shaikh as sharecroppers, and
the same relationship exists between Hajj Hasan and members of his lineage.

Hence, in both cases economic dependency and political alliance go hand in hand.[1]

Although the shaikh and Hajj Hasan are now excluded from participation as leaders in either local government or the Party, this does not mean that they no longer play any role: they do, at the lineage level, which is still crucial, because of the prevalence of conflict amongst the various kinship groups. Kinship affiliation in these situations has become a mechanism through which individual peasants have begun to organize themselves for effective participation in village politics. Under these processes of change, the differences within and between the sub-lineages of Albu Khamis and Hajj Hasan have been narrowed and this development has made it possible for the present shaikh and Hajj Hasan to mobilise their own peasants on both a lineage and an economic basis.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion indicates that there is in the village a type of dual opposition or factionalism. For a long period, the cores of the two factions have been the present shaikh of Albu 'Amir (the Albu Khamis lineage) and his brothers, and Hajj Hasan of Dulaim and his sons. Other lineages in the village have shifting alliances with one faction or the other, depending on particular circumstances.

The heads of the two factions (the present shaikh and Hajj Hasan) constitute the two main contending elite leaders of the village. Each of them is connected to his own group of peasants through close economic and kinship bonds, and these bonds serve to mobilise their factions against each other. Both the shaikh and Hajj Hasan also maintain important external relationships with influential figures at national level, who may

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1) For details of the economic position of these groups, see Chapter VIII.

intervene in their favour from time to time.

These factional struggles have not only affected the relationship of the heads of the two core factions, but have also reinforced the divisions between their peasant followers. This situation fed into the Land Reform programme and made it difficult for the Ba'th Party to implement its policies. This is most clearly brought out by the problems that arose over the distribution of peasant families on the new settlements, since each kinship group insisted upon having its own separate settlement. Later, further difficulties developed because for many families their land allocation was insufficient for their needs, and they were obliged to continue as sharecroppers of the shaikh or Hajj Hasan.

CHAPTER VII

The Role of the Sub-lineages in the Land Reform Settlements

Introduction

In this chapter I will assess the impact of the 1970 Land Reform,

and the factionalism which it engendered, on the smaller kinship groups

in the new settlements, focussing mainly on Settlements nos. 3, 4 and 5.

All three of these settlements are occupied by several different kinship

groups or sub-lineages belonging either to Albu 'Amir or to Dulaim.

In the concluding part of the chapter I show how the sub-division

of the estate of the shaikh of Albu 'Amir, which was used as a strategy

to avoid land expropriation under the Land Reform, led to the development

of antagonism and rivalry between the shaikh and his brothers. This,

I suggest, parallels the types of structural conflicts that are generated

among the sub-lineages living in the new settlements.

The development of sub-lineage solidarity

In the context of the distribution of these sub-lineages in the new

settlements, as well as the conflicts which have arisen between them following

the implementation of the Land Reform, the sub-lineages have begun to

assume much greater importance in village organization. The sub-lineage

or __bayt__ is the basic socio-political unit whose members are loyal to each

other and who live together in a particular part of a settlement. The

importance of this kinship group is clearly shown by the close relationships

maintained among its members and by the role played by its elders in socio-

political affairs, especially in disputes with other kinship groups.

It is important to note that, as a kinship group, the sub-lineage

survived the "feudal" period, despite the decline of the tribes and maximal

lineages. In fact the sub-lineage has begun to take on some of the

characteristics of the tribe. This is largely due to the fact that the sub-lineage is an agnatic group whose members refer to each other as awlad 'amm (see pages 97-98).Throughout the feudal period, the members of such groups frequently worked as sharecroppers for landlord families. The rise of landlordism, which accompanied the pacification of the rural areas in the 1920's, and which contributed to the decline of the tribe, did not give rise to the same disintegration on the level of the sub-lineage. This unit survived as a social and economic entity due mainly to the strong kinship relationships between its members, which imposed multiple obligations on each individual. This kinship solidarity was particularly manifest when peasants were ousted from their lands on the arrival of the Shurughis. This movement of kin groups took place at the level of the sub-lineage, which generally moved as a group to become share-croppers with another landlord family.

Some of the members of these sub-lineages emphasised to me that they had been forced to change their place of work and residence many times because of bad treatment on the part of the landlords. As one peasant put it, "We were obliged to leave together because it would have been impossible for the rest of us to have stayed on with a family who had maltreated one of our members". Later, after the implementation of the 1970 Land Reform, such kinship groups moved as a whole to join the new settlements.

All three Land Reform settlements then are based on two or more sub-lineages whose members live in close proximity - the stronger the kin relationship, the closer the dwellings are to each other. This is mainly due to the system of marriage, which requires the son to live with his family after marriage, and to the habit of marrying the father's brother's daughter, or a girl from the same sub-lineage. This results in the consolidation and differentiation of each agnatic kinship group. Hence it is possible to measure the degree of intensity of relationships within each kinship

group by the concentration of its houses. Members of a single sub-lineage

are very keen to live in the same part of the settlement: for example,

when Settlement no. 4 was established, the <u>ra'is al-salaf</u>, Jawir,[1]

suggested that residence should be mixed and heterogeneous instead of

organized by kinship group, but members of the Albu 'Inad of Albu Khamis

and Albu Hammudi of the "original" al-Misarra refused, because of already

existing conflicts between them.

Albu 'Inad were the first to refuse to mix with other kinship groups

in Settlement no. 4, which was mainly dominated by al-Misarra "newcomers".

The head of Albu 'Inad explained to me that when this settlement had first

been established, the head of the "newcomers" had suggested to the local

government that it should disperse Albu 'Inad houses amongst them, arguing

that the Land Reform committee should not give them a separate tract of

land because they were "supporters of the feudalists". Albu Khamis as a whole,

including Albu 'Inad, have always been unwilling to mix with non-kin in a

single settlement.[2] Their negative ideas about these settlements were

associated with notions of moral decline, and they referred to such incidents

as assaults on girls there. The same phenomenon occurred in Settlements 3

and 5. Settlement no. 3 was composed of Albu 'Ayyada of the "original"

al-Misarra, and al-'Arafna, a part of the "newcomers". Settlement no. 5

was composed of three groups: Albu Razayyiq of the "original" al-Misarra,

a sub-lineage of Albu Hajj Musluh of Dulaim, and a number of "newcomer"

families. Members of each of these sub-lineages claim that they are of one

"flesh" (<u>lahma</u>) and prefer to live together, isolated from strangers.

In general, then, most of the peasants in these settlements prefer

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1)   For further details on his political career see Chapter VIII; also
      pp. 94, 144, 147.

2)   As we have seen in the previous chapter, they were successful in
      establishing their settlement in North Bad'a.

to live with their close agnatic kin, since they are the people with whom they have the strongest bonds which extend over most aspects of daily life. Thus most peasants living in the new settlements have moved there as kinship groups or sub-lineages whose members claim to be awlad 'amm (father's brother's sons) to each other.

The internal organization of the sub-lineage

Interaction among the members of any one sub-lineage in the same settlement is much more frequent than among those who only share membership of the settlement. It is this small group, normally a cluster of two adjacent blocks, which collectively maintains rights to a section of the settlement and to a tract of cultivable land. Most of the new settlements consist of four or more blocks, each inhabited by the members of different sub-lineages. All these blocks are known to their inhabitants and to outsiders by the names of the founders of the respective sub-lineages. The boundary between the dwelling areas of two unrelated sub-lineages is often marked by a pathway, and the adjacent houses of the two groups are built back to back on either side of the boundary, thus emphasizing, by their orientation, the separateness of the sub-lineages.[1]

In spite of the intervention of the local administration and the local Party in cases of disputes and conflicts over agricultural and irrigation matters, the sub-lineages are in most cases anxious to preserve their internal organization. This is partly to maintain their autonomy and partly to prevent the local administration and Party from interfering in their affairs. The only exceptions occur in cases of open conflict which sometimes take place between sub-lineages, although these are now comparatively rare. Many kinds of conflict necessitate this type of internal political cohesion, which provides a framework of relationships through which they may operate as political and social entities.[2]

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1) See map overleaf

2) See Chapter IX.

Plan of Settlement No 3

IV E 7,10	mudhif of Abu 'Ayyada		mudhif of al-'Arafna
IV F 15-18			
IV E 5,6			
IV F 7-9			
IV F 10,13	T	T	F
IV F 11,12			
IV E 3,4	R	R	I
IV E 1,2			
IV F 1,2			
IV F 3,6	E	E	E
IV F 4,5			
IV F 26,23	E	E	L
IV F 15,14			
IV F 24,25	S	S	D
IV F 11,12			
IV F 22			
IV F 8,9			3
IV F 20,14			

The settlement is divided into two housing blocks, separated by a
pathway lined with trees. The cultivated area lies to the right of the
diagram. The block of houses on the left of the diagram is occupied
by members of Abu 'Ayyada (see Genealogy IV), and that on the right
by nuclear families of al-'Arafna (al-nsarra 'newcomers')

The distribution of lineage segments among the various new settlements, accompanied by conflicts between them, has compelled the sub-lineages to intensify social cohesion among their members, especially after the collapse of the tribe and the maximal lineages. This may clearly be seen from the refusal of members of sub-lineages to be fully incorporated into the settlements with members of other groups. They insist on having their own area and thus maintain their unity and solidarity. Furthermore, rights over tracts of land are vested in these sub-lineages. For this reason, if one member of a sub-lineage should fail to make use of the land allotted to him by the Land Reform authorities, his descent group will normally request the Agricultural Office to re-allocate it to another member of the sub-lineage who has no land registered in his name. Land within any settlement controlled by a sub-lineage is thus continually being circulated and re-allocated within the same group.

Theoretically, land for cultivation can be claimed by any individual peasant, but it is in fact almost impossible for anyone to obtain a tract of land without being a member of a descent group. During the period of my fieldwork some peasants had given up the tracts of land allocated to them under the Land Reform, either because they were outsiders, or because they were given land near non-kinsmen. In such cases, these individuals often found they could not obtain enough water because the time allocated was too short, or because their water allocation period came late at night. The problem was exacerbated by quarrels over water and by their exclusion from the sub-lineage with whom they were supposed to cultivate the land jointly.

The division of the land

When the new settlements were composed of unrelated and rival sub-lineages, these groups often proved difficult to organize in teams for joint cultivation. In theory, collective distribution and joint cultivation were

the main principles guiding the establishment of the settlements. However,
what in fact happened was that each sub-lineage had its own land which was
worked in individual plots.

Settlement no. 3 is an example of one of the new sub-lineage based
settlements, and of the way in which land has been divided among various
kin groups. This settlement is located on the outskirts of the village
in Bad'a al-Janubia (southern Bad'a) behind the road running between
Baghdad and Ba'quba. It is mainly occupied by two unrelated kin groups,
Albu 'Ayyada sub-lineage of the "original" al-Misarra and al-'Arafna,
who belong to the "newcomers". This settlement has 44 heads of households
and extends over an area of 854 donums. The Land Reform authorities in
the village decided that these two groups should settle in a single
settlement and cultivate the land jointly. The decision to accommodate
them in a single settlement was based on the assumption that both claimed
to be kin by virtue of their membership of Albu 'Amir. Hence there seemed
to be a strong possibility of their cooperating in cultivating the land
jointly. After they settled, however, they began to compete for the more
fertile land. And after the allocation committee had left the area, the
peasants redistributed the land among themselves, each group and peasant
household within the groups having an equal share in terms of size and
fertility of plot, many of which were saline or barren. First of all, they
excluded the highly saline areas and then divided up the rest on both
sides of the six canals into basins (ahwadh). There was one basin on each
side of every canal. These basins were in turn redivided in half, one
half for each kin group. Each half contained a number of donums belonging
to 11 or 12 households, each of which had two donums in both parts of
the cultivation area. The land was allocated by lot. Hence any individual's
total land holding was parcelled out over several tracts scattered throughout
the area. In this way, kin-owned tracts came to be situated next to non-
kin tracts and were cultivated individually. Thus, although the block

system introduced by the government has been superficially retained,

its underlying idea and purpose has effectively been undermined.

Households, marriages and the sub-lineage

As I have shown in Chapter IV, the nuclear family, in its capacity

as a household, forms a basic unit of the kinship system. Each family

occupies its own homestead or kharaba ('ruin'), as it is sometimes called,

which is situated next to the houses of kin who belong to the same sub-

lineage. In such households the authority of the father extends even to

married adults still living under the same roof, who may well have tracts

of land registered in their own names. The recent development of individual

landholding has weakened the economic interdependence of the members of the

family, although, on the face of it, it has not greatly affected the

loyalty and respect shown to elders.

The tendency towards setting up an independent household has been

strengthened among those young couples who have received tracts of land

registered in their names. A considerable number of peasants in the newly

established settlements have set up separate independent households.

This happens when they settle down and begin to earn their cash income

independently, and become unwilling to pool it. A further reason for this

has been the establishment of the cooperative societies, which provide

machines for ploughing and harvesting. Mechanization has released children

from agricultural labour and enabled them to go to school. Most of the

members of Settlements nos. 3, 4 and 5 have established their own households,

and this is gradually becoming normal practice in the village as a whole

and especially among the landlords.

In spite of this new trend, the nuclear family is still considered

less important than the sub-lineage in many aspects of the life of the

individual. In some sub-lineages, the kinship groups are composed of two

sections of 'ammam who trace their descent from a common ancestor, as shown

in Genealogy no. III, which shows Albu 'Inad sub-lineage of Albu Khamis

in Settlement no. 4. This sub-lineage has 55 members and contains two

groups (X and Y). Group X is composed of the families of 5 brothers, one

of whom is dead, and has 17 male members. The second, Group Y, is composed

of three brothers, with 11 male members. The two groups together control

152 donums, but only 8 men actually have land registered in their own names

under the Land Reform programme while the other 22, who have no land, work

as sharecroppers on the land of the shaikh of Albu 'Amir and his brothers.

In this sub-lineage, Group X is connected by affinity to Group Y

and considered awlad 'amm. The most prominent figure among Albu 'Inad in

Genealogy III is 'Abdullah (D4), who owns the guesthouse. 'Abdullah's

importance derives largely from his seniority (he is 52) and his relations

with his brothers D3 and D5. 'Abdullah and his two brothers are married

to three sisters and their daughters and sons are married to each other,

as can be seen in the Genealogy. 'Abdullah is the man who normally represents

both Groups X and Y in their external affairs and in irrigation matters,

as well as in the celebrations and festivals of other groups in the village,

assisted by his brother D3. But 'Abdullah is more active in Albu 'Inad's

relationship with other groups because he is younger than D3, who is now 70.

The same phenomenon can be observed among Albu 'Ayyada in Settlement

no. 3. The leadership of Groups V and W (see Genealogy IV) lies in the

hands of Jasim (IV E7), who has a guesthouse adjacent to his own house

(kharaba). All male members of the group gather regularly in the guesthouse,

particularly when there is a marriage or dispute to be discussed. Jasim's

leadership derives from the fact that all his married sons still live

with him and they control, as a group, the largest cultivation unit in the

settlement, which is 90 donums, each individual being registered with 18

donums. Jasim's position as leader is also basically dependent upon his

sons' marriage relations, which connect him more closely with other members

of the group. Because of this network of relationships, male members of the

group ask his advice on a variety of matters especially marriage.

The same types of relationship can be observed in the structures of sub-lineages living side by side with unrelated kinship groups, as is the case in Settlement no. 3, which is occupied by al-'Arafna and Albu 'Ayyada sub-lineage, which is itself composed of two distinct awlad 'amm groups. Here it is important to note that resettlement has not resulted in the isolation of related kinship groups. In fact the tendency is for kinship groups to unite with their awlad 'amm and other close relatives wherever possible. This is considered of great importance because of the small size of the individual sub-lineage, and the consequent limitations on the possibilities of endogamous marriage. Co-residence in fact results in the development of political alliances between sub-lineages based largely on marriage links. This can be illustrated by Settlement no. 3.

During its first year of establishment, only Albu 'Ayyada and al-'Arafna were in residence in Settlement no. 3. The settlement extends over 854 donums and was at first only worked by these two groups. Because of the large size of the settlement, Albu 'Ayyada asked their awlad 'amm, Albu Dirrij, to persuade the Agricultural Office to assign part of it to them. This was in fact the result of quarrels between Albu 'Ayyada and al-'Arafna over irrigation water and boundaries. Relations deteriorated further when Albu Dirrij arrived, since the two related groups now outnumbered al-'Arafna which consisted of only 23 families, and the former controlled much more of the land in the settlement.

Albu 'Ayyada and Albu Dirrij, which are known collectively as Albu 'Ayyada, consist of two groups, as will be clear from Genealogy IV. The first, Group V, consists of 4 brothers and has a total of 42 individuals, and the second, Group W, consists of 3 brothers and has a total of 22 individuals. The relationship between the two groups is based on the fact that they are each other's awlad 'amm. Also Hamid and Jasim (IV E9 and

IV E7) have married each other's sisters (IV E10 and IV E8). This type
of marriage has recurred in the next generation in the cases of F17 to
F21, and F20 to F14, and has resulted in a series of strong political ties.
In addition each sub-lineage contains a number of internal marriages
which have strengthened the kinship relations between the awlad 'amm.

In Settlement no. 1, a contrasting pattern has emerged,[1] since Albu
Khamis sub-lineages show a high rate of patrilateral and matrilateral
intermarriage. This is probably because Albu Khamis sub-lineages have
maintained a certain degree of stability due to their connections with the
shaikh's family. Recent resettlement in the village has not affected them,
as was mentioned earlier[2] and they now mostly live in North Bad'a where
the land which they have acquired under the Land Reform is adjacent to that
of the shaikh and his brothers. In this settlement, there are 57 male members
of Albu Khamis and they control an area of 1026 donums between them. In
addition, most of them continue to work as sharecroppers for the shaikh
and his brothers. The area is divided into two units a mile apart. There
are six sub-lineages in the first unit, including 37 male Land Reform
peasants. The second unit contains two sub-lineages, made up of 20 males.
Interaction between the members of these sub-lineages is more frequent than
their interaction with other peasants in the area, and they also have close
relations with those members of Albu Khamis who have continued to work
for the shaikh and his brothers. They claim that they are all "one flesh",
(lahma wahida).

As a result of this great number of marriage relationships, the
behaviour of members of Albu Khamis towards each other is less formal and

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1) Identical to that in Settlement no. 2, which is entirely composed
   of members of the Albu Hajj Hasan of Dulaim.

2) See page 152.

more flexible than among unrelated kinship groups in other settlements.
For this reason they compare their relationships with each other to
the overlapping roots of grass, and tend generally to work together as a
social unit in many of their internal affairs.

If a marriage relationship exists between any two sub-lineages, they
consider themselves to be ahl (people of a single house). It is the
relationship through marriage which defines the notion of ahl between any
two individuals or groups. This can be observed from the constant visiting
between groups or individuals connected by marriage, which is what is
expected of such relationships. In this case, the notion of ahl means mutual
support and cooperation, which occurs frequently and which embodies
solidarity, created by the women who are the articulating element of the
whole kinship system, connecting individuals to each other and providing
avenues for economic and political exchange.

The role of sub-lineage elders

In sub-lineage-based settlements, the elders exercise effective control
over their members and play a crucial role in settlement affairs. The
traditional view is that age brings wisdom, and the longer one lives, the
more experience one gains, and the greater one's title to wisdom.

The house of the senior man of each sub-lineage usually contains a
detached room which serves as guesthouse or rab'a for male relatives and visitors
The construction of these mud guesthouses is carried out by all male
members of the group, and their maintenance are usually undertaken by them,
although the participants in this process are less numerous than in the
initial construction. The workmen contribute jointly to the meal at
middays when the work is in progress, and the owner usually slaughters an
animal when the job has been completed and invites all the group to share
in the meal.

The guesthouse or rab'a is normally built behind the house of the sub-

lineage elder who enjoys the greatest status among his peers and who is financially strongest, since he must receive visitors. As well as his financial standing, the owner of the guesthouse must have close connections with the other members of the sub-lineage. The guesthouse normally acts as the focus of the kinship group both in the village and in the new settlements, largely because the members gather there to discuss disputes and marriage arrangements.

Since the Land Reform, the sub-lineage guesthouses have begun to take on many functions which were formerly confined to the guesthouses of shaikhs and landlords. The kinship group has thus begun to acquire a political role, and the shaikh himself no longer plays so major a role in peasants' lives. Here the most important factor is the relative economic independence of the various sub-lineages from the shaikh and the other landlords. In addition, the intervention of the Party and local government in the affairs of the village through the new settlement scheme, far from undermining the political significance of the sub-lineages, has in fact enhanced their role. This may help us to understand why these sub-lineages continue to function as important socio-political groups vis-a-vis other similar units in the daily life of the settlements.

The number of guesthouses generally depends on the number of sub-lineages occupying a settlement. The guesthouses are considered gathering places for the individual sub-lineages, and are very rarely visited by members of other groups in the settlement. The exception is when there is a matter of common interest or a dispute between two sub-lineages over, for instance, the distribution of water. In these cases, elders are chosen from among the sub-lineages to represent their groups in discussions that take place in one or other rab'a.

These new guesthouses can be seen as one aspect of the crystallisation of sub-lineages into social and political entities, in the sense that they

have become the centres where sub-lineage members gather to decide upon their internal and external affairs. In most of these settlements the senior members, especially the owner of the guesthouse (<u>sahib al-rab'a</u>), play an important role in the life of the group. These senior members enjoy the respect of their kinsmen because of their accumulated experience which qualifies them to act as representatives of the group, especially in cases of conflict or of marriage, which is considered a cornerstone of the structure of these groups.

In general, the importance of sub-lineage elders derives from both their kinship positions, and their roles as owners of the guesthouses. Most of the items necessary for festivals and funerals, such as utensils for tea and coffee and large plates for rice dishes eaten on special occasions, must be borrowed from the guesthouse, especially for the festival of Muharram, which is invariably celebrated there. The special chair (<u>minassa</u>) on which the Qur'an reciter sits during the Muharram celebrations is kept permanently in the guesthouse, even when it is not in use, in order to impress visitors. During Muharram, the solidarity and cohesion of the group becomes especially pronounced, since each household must contribute to the cost of the festival, which lasts for the whole month, and includes many collective meals and the <u>sayyid's</u> fees.

During this month, the <u>sayyid</u> resides in the guesthouse of the sub-lineage head, and most of sub-lineage members compete with each other to invite him to their houses for meals and to make charms (<u>hajab</u>) for the women. Previously, the <u>sayyid</u> would have resided only in the shaikh's guesthouse, since no-one would have dared to employ his own <u>sayyid</u> and in many cases could not have afforded it.

In such situations the settlement presidents (<u>ra'is salif</u>) appointed by the government find difficulty in fulfilling their functions, since sub-lineages other than their own tend to refuse to recognise their authority. Most members of kinship groups in the new settlements insist on

dealing with other groups in the same settlement through their group

heads or elders whenever there is a conflict or dispute which the elders

are in a position to solve.

However it is important to stress that the political organisation

of sub-lineages is generally latent, aiming chiefly to co-ordinate the

activities of its members vis-a-vis other groups in situations of conflict.

The most important factor characterising such groups is their recognition

of their descent from a common ancestor from whom they have taken their

name. Even where related sub-lineages are grouped together within a single

settlement, the individual sub-lineages continue to preserve their unity

and identity by their members working together during harvest and

cultivation periods. Furthermore, members of the sub-lineage hire machinery

and equipment for harvesting from the cooperative, and pay the charges jointly.

They also act as a group at weddings and funerals. In general the relation-

ship between closely related sub-lineages is not mechanical, since each

of them has the freedom to decide on its own internal affairs. This is

particularly clear over marriages with other kinship groups. During my

fieldwork, Albu Razayyiq sub-lineage in Settlement no. 5 wanted girl IV F8

from Albu 'Ayyada in Settlement no. 3 for one of their sons. The go-between,

Hamid (IV E9) was chosen by Albu Razayyiq. Group V, Albu 'Ayyada, refused

the offer because of their bad relationship with Albu Razayyiq in spite

of the pressure put on Jasim by Hamid. The head of Albu 'Ayyada, Jasim,

told Hamid in discussing the proposal that "the girl is our bint (daughter)

and we have the right to decide her future".

The control of each group over its daughters can be seen from another

example. In Genealogy IV, (Albu 'Ayyada), E3 gave his daughter (F6) to

his ibn akh (brother's son) F3, and then wanted to give his second daughter

(F5) to his sister's son and not to his ibn akh (F4), because his first

daughter was badly treated by his brother's family. However, E3 was

prevented from giving his daughter to his sister's son, and he complained

to me that this was because he has no sons. His brother (E5) married his

son (F9) to his sister's daughter, and gave his daughter (F8) to his wife's

brother's son. At the same time, the other brothers prevented E3 from

giving his daughter in marriage, mainly because Jasim, the oldest brother,

who was in overall control of the marriage affairs of the whole group,

argued that E3 was not the son of the same mother as himself, E5 and E1,

and that E3's wife was a stranger.

This analysis of the pattern of relations within and between sub-

lineages in the new settlements brings out the increasing political role

played by these small kinship groups in the village, which had previously

been dominated by the landlord families. It also, however, indicates the

potential for internal fragmentation as households seek greater independence

from their kin and as rivalries develop between sub-lineage elders. These

latter processes are as yet in their infancy but might be expected to

assume greater significance with the passage of time as economic and

demographic pressures increase. Hence the present stage of consolidating

their positions vis-a-vis other groups will probably be superseded by a

heightening of economic and political struggles within the sub-lineages

themselves. This process has occurred in other sub-lineage or extended

family groupings, even among the leading landlord families, as is illustrated

in the following case.[1]

Struggles within the shaikh of Albu 'Amir's family

As I previously mentioned, the shaikh of Albu 'Amir depends on his

brothers and sons in village affairs during his absences from the village.

This unity between the shaikh and his brothers has in part been reinforced

by recent political and economic developments. However, at the same time

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1)   See also my discussion of social fragmentation among the leading
       family of Albu 'Amir in Chapter V.

processes have brought about the division of land between the brothers,
and the setting up of separate households. This may be seen as a stage
towards the achievement of complete independence by the brothers in the
management of their affairs, especially in the light of the marriages
which they have made or proposed for themselves, which indicate new
divisions among them, and which will almost inevitably result in the
emergence of political cliques.

The establishment of separate households by the brothers has been
accompanied by the establishment of their own guesthouses, although these
are still of secondary importance to that of the shaikh, their elder
brother. The shaikh's <u>mudhif</u> is the place where friends of the family
are received, and where family and public ceremonies are held. Most of
the marriages of members of the family are arranged in the shaikh's guest-
house, although most of the brothers would normally have discussed these
arrangements in their own guesthouses before coming to the shaikh's. The
shaikh continues to play an important part in conducting these arrangements,
which are carried on in an atmosphere of the greatest secrecy, to such
an extent that information about them can only be obtained by women.
Women   dispute   and   quarrel amongst themselves over marriage
arrangements. In such circumstances, women will tell their husbands about
the point of view of the other party in the course of the negotiations,
and in this way a network of conspiracies develops. Thus divisions within
extended families begin to develop which are carefully concealed from out-
siders, although occasionally they explode into the open, to the amazement
of those outside the immediate family circle.

The only entry to the hidden world of the affairs of the shaikh of
Albu 'Amir's family is through its women.[1] This reveals deep divisions

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1) It would have been impossible for me to obtain this information with-
out the assistance of my wife, who formed friendships with the
women of the shaikh's family during our stay in the village.

and conflicts which are beginning to threaten the authority of the
shaikh over his brothers. The main cause of conflict is the second marriage
of Dir'a (IC26),[1] who is a full brother of the shaikh. His second wife
is Fatin (ID25) the daughter of Hadi (IC34), who was killed by the shaikh
and his brothers, including Dir'a. The shaikh himself was not pleased
by this marriage but Dir'a was determined to proceed with it, especially
when one of her matrilateral relatives approached her family, asking for
her in marriage. At this point, Dir'a (who is patrilineally related to
Fatin) decided that he would marry her himself. Fatin was famous for her
beauty, and Dir'a insisted on marrying her as his bint 'amm. Consequently,
according to the shaikh's first wife (the daughter of IB12), the relationship
between the shaikh and Dir'a deteriorated. Fatin began to provoke her
husband against the shaikh to take revenge for her father's death. She also
encouraged her brother, Wafiq (ID27), to try to marry one of the daughters
of Jamil (IC31) whom the shaikh had selected for one of his own sons.
It should be pointed out that Wafiq and the daughters of Jamil are awlad 'amm,
while the shaikh's sons and Jamil's daughters are awlad khala, this giving
Wafiq priority in terms of the village marriage system. Jamil's wife (IC32)
insisted that Wafiq should not be allowed to marry her daughter, and
alleged that the main cause of the problem was Wafiq's mother, who encouraged
her daughter (Fatin) and her son to arrange the marriage with Jamil's daughter.
Jamil's wife describes Wafiq's mother as the 'mother of calamity' (umm al-balawa),
presumably hinting at Wafiq's mother's relationship with her previous husband
(IC33). She further asserted that Wafiq and her daughter were brother and
sister through the same father (the late IC33),[2] and therefore could not

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1) See Genealogy I.

2) In fact Wafiq is not considered the brother of Jamil's wife's
   daughter, even if we suppose that he is the offspring of the relation-
   ship between the wife of Hadi (IC34) and IC33 because the wife of
   IC33 married Jamil after the death of her first husband, and he is
   thus not considered the father of Jamil's children.

marry in any case.

During the period in which these discussions were taking place, one of the daughters of Hadi (IC34) (a sister of Wafiq) was living with her 'amm (Jamil), and had been doing so since childhood. The rest of her family left the village after her father's death and went to live in Baghdad, but her 'amm, Jamil, insisted that she should stay with his family and did not allow her to go to Baghdad. Meanwhile she fell in love with her ibn 'amm, ID22, the son of the late IC33. This relationship developed while they were living in the same household, and is a frequent occurrence between awlad and banat 'amm in the village. Hadi's daughter knew that only a miracle would enable the marriage to take place, since ID22's mother disliked her and her family in general. For this reason, she tried to make spells and charms to soften the mother's heart. Her last attempt to do this took place at the time of the marriage negotiations which have just been discussed. A peasant girl informed ID22's mother of what was happening and so the mother immediately asked Hadi's daughter to leave the family, saying that she was a spy in the house who reported to her family and to her sister, Dir'a's wife. ID22's mother immediately began to negotiate a marriage for her son with one of the shaikh's daughters, much to the irritation of his brother (IC27), who wanted the girl for his own son. This brother's son and the shaikh's daughter are first cousins, whereas ID22 and the shaikh's daughter are second cousins.

None of these projected marriages took place during my stay in the village. But it is clear from these examples that the shaikh's position is in considerable jeopardy, since he is constantly forced to make precise calculations to maintain his interests and relationships with his brothers. Any wrong move on his part is liable to cause a major rift in the family. During these secret manoeuvres through the women, Dir'a began to invite the shaikh's four half-brothers, now living in Baghdad and deprived of

their inheritance, to visit him, and there were rumours that he was encouraging them to approach the local government in order to regain their rightful shares of the land, now under the direct control of the shaikh himself. Although the land is registered in their names, the shaikh does not permit them to cultivate it.

When I returned briefly to the village in the summer of 1976, I found that ID22 was now married to one of the shaikh's sisters, while ID27's son was married to one of the shaikh's daughters. Thus the shaikh had consolidated the bond with ID27 his ibn 'amm Jamil, and with ID22's family, who will now stand by him in the event of any hostility on the part of Dir'a. Moreover, IC16 and IC17 had also become his allies, since ID22's wife, although only the shaikh's half sister, is full sister to them.

The position of the shaikh within his family is thus beset with many problems, which may cause further conflicts and divisions between them in the future. At the moment, however, the shaikh's position is still somewhat stronger than that of any of his brothers because of the controlling influence he has over the network of kinship and affinal bonds in the family. Furthermore, he has married one of his sons to a Dulaim girl, thus strengthening his position outside the family as well. In addition, most of the members of Albu Khamis lineage still work for him, while the majority of his brothers' peasant-workers are Shurughis who have no power base within the village. As I pointed out in Chapter V, Albu Khamis peasants are the weight in the balance of power between the shaikh and his brothers.

In general, then, the political position of the shaikh's family has declined, although it still retains considerable economic resources. However, as the sons of the family grow up and seek their independence, they will probably divide up the land amongst themselves and/or look to new outside investments.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the sub-divisions and rivalries within and between sub-lineages in the new Land Reform settlements. As we have seen, these settlements are mainly composed of various rival kinship groups whose joint residence has exacerbated their socio-political relationships. Hence rivalry and competition occur not only between the main factions (Dulaim and Albu 'Amir lineages) but also extends to affect the smaller sub-lineage groups. In fact relationships within the new settlements must in part be interpreted in terms of pre-existing ties and conflicts of interest, although co-residence has made hostility between the competing groups more open and frequent. The political loyalty and cohesion of each sub-lineage is reinforced by its struggles and conflict with other groups.

This has given rise to the development of new groups of leaders associated with these smaller sub-lineages, which has indirectly resulted in the weakening of the role and authority of the settlement head (ra'is) appointed by local government. In most instances, these sub-lineage heads act as the main channels of communication with the administrative and political authorities in the village. The latter's role and influence are discussed more fully in the following chapter which deals with new organisations, such as the Party and the newly-established cooperative societies.

CHAPTER VIII

New Political Organisations : The Cooperatives and the Peasant Bureau

Introduction

This chapter analyses the political processes and events which accompanied the formation of the Peasant Bureau and the cooperative societies in the village. This is discussed with reference to the question of factionalism and to the part played by the officials of the Ba'th Party.

The foundation of the cooperative societies was one of the most important features of the Land Reform programme, since, through these, credit facilities and mechanization services were made available in an attempt to solve some of the problems facing peasants otherwise too poor to avail themselves of such services. The cooperatives are also important in the planning and consolidation of the new agrarian structure, as they act as a buffer between the peasants and the government itself. Through the cooperatives and the Peasant Bureaux, the government has tried to achieve political control over the countryside by undermining 'traditional' local powerholders who nowadays only function outside the formal political system.

Through the cooperative societies and the Peasant Bureaux,[1] which constitute the link with the national Party, the government is in a position to offer economic independence from landlords. However, the government and Party are not only interested in achieving economic ends but also in recruiting political support and loyalty, and thus in breaking the ties between peasants and landlords.

This political change is intended to replace the older medium of communication between local and national levels with a new structure. The

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1) See page 39

analysis which follows examines how far the government has succeeded in

building such a new political organization and in making its voice and

policies dominant in the affairs of the community. In this chapter I

shall explain how these new organizations have been drawn into an

arena of struggle involving conflicts between various kinship groups,

and how certain attitudes to the reforms have been influenced by factionalism

and consequently have hampered the implementation of government policy.

I will first describe the aims of the cooperative societies and their

administrative structure. This will be followed by an account of the

conflicts that occurred within them and within the Peasant Bureau.

The aims of the cooperative societies

The creation of cooperative societies after 1968 by the Ba'th Party

was designed both to replace the old system of dependence on landlord

and city merchants and to encourage higher levels of agricultural production.

The cooperative societies aimed to achieve the following ends:

(1) To coordinate the various stages of agricultural production;

(2) To assist members to follow the cropping programme drawn up by
agronomists and other specialists;

(3) To supply cooperative members with the requisite equipment and technical
know-how necessary for improved methods of cultivation;

(4) To encourage the use of fertilizers and insecticides and undertake
land reclamation wherever necessary;

(5) To help cooperatives to purchase or hire agricultural machinery;

(6) To organize the marketing of produce, its processing and transportation;

(7) To make efforts to raise the social, educational cultural and health
standards of the rural areas, thus reducing the urban/rural differ-
ential;

(8) To offer credit to members so that they might realize these objectives;

(9) To carry out any other services in the interest of cooperative members.

Between the first Land Reform of 1958 until 1970, only one cooperative

society had been founded in Da'udia, serving 200 members. Its activities

were limited to giving loans and rendering small-scale services. The major

development of cooperative forms of organization occurred after the 1970

Land Reform, when, through its new agricultural projects, the Ministry

of Land Reform made available the kinds of technical and material assistance

outlined above. Loans were offered at an annual rate of interest not

exceeding three per cent for periods of ten years or more (well below the

usual rates of moneylenders); improved seeds and pedigree livestock were

sold at low prices; and cooperatives received preferential rates for the

transport and sale of produce.

In order to avail themselves of these facilities, the cooperative

societies must now follow the forms of organization set up by the State

for the production and marketing of crops and for the provision of services.

Cooperatives cannot be run other than under State supervision, especially

during the initial period of their establishment. However, at the local

level, the cooperative societies face many challenges that threaten the

success of the cooperative movement. On the one hand, peasants have not yet

become an economic power to rival that of the 'traditional' landlords, and

thus sometimes look to the latter, rather than the cooperatives, for the

solution of their economic difficulties (e.g. they become or remain their

sharecroppers or turn to them for financial help). This clearly can affect

the commitment that peasants show towards the cooperatives. On the other

hand, the intervention of the government and Party in the running of the

cooperatives, which is partly designed to protect the cooperatives from the

negative effects of competition between kinship groups, often has the

unintended consequence of reinforcing these very processes. This obviously

generates a number of internal organizational problems.

The organization and administration of the cooperatives

There are now five cooperative societies in Da'udia. Two of these

are for the peasants of the Land Reform settlements, and have a total

of 245 members, serving an area of 7110 donums. The other three cooperatives

are for the so-called private sector, outside the Land Reform area. They

have a total of 92 members and an area of 6500 donums. As previously

mentioned, each of the private sector cooperatives is controlled by

landlord families (the present shaikh and his brothers, the shaikh's cousins,

and the Dulaim leaders). The reasoning behind the establishment of two

cooperative societies for the Land Reform peasants was that the number

of households to be served by a single cooperative was considered too large,

the general rule being to keep membership down to about 150 per cooperative.

All members of both kinds of cooperative society come from Da'udia village

and have been recruited from 'Albu 'Amir, Dulaim, and the "newcomers".

The two Land Reform cooperatives include peasants from all three groups,

and membership is not based on traditional lineage or kinship affiliation.

Membership of an agricultural cooperative is obligatory for all

Land Reform peasants. Individual peasants cannot refuse to join since

this would mean their being denied access to all the services provided.

Land Reform policies, including credit, marketing and technical assistance,

have of course provided real incentives for membership. Each cooperative

society has an administrative board or majlis al-idara composed of five

members who supervise its day-to-day activities. The board, which serves

for three years, is appointed by the local officials of the Party and

consists of the president (ra'is al-jam'ia al-ta'wunia), a secretary, an

accountant and two other ordinary members. However, the ultimate power

of decision concerning the policy and affairs of the society rests

theoretically with the general assembly which is composed of all members.

Before making the decision to appoint people to the administrative

board, the Party usually examines the records of those who are up for

nomination. The most important criterion for appointment is whether the

individual can work well with Land Reform peasants and promote cooperative

attitudes among them. Appointment generally depends heavily on the

individual person's degree of political commitment, for he will be required

to play a significant leadership role in raising political consciousness

among peasants and in creating a "peasants' front" (jabha fallahia).

The election of the administrative board, majlis al-idara, usually

takes place in the presence of the Land Reform peasants, who are

informed at least a week in advance, and are invited by the Peasant Bureau

to attend the installation which takes place in the cooperative building.

In the evening of the appointed day, when most of the peasants are free

from work, they gather in groups before the arrival of the organizing

committee. The latter is composed of members of the Peasant Bureau. On

these occasions, the committee is usually accompanied by the General Director

and the staff of the Cooperative Department of the Khalis Project, and the

mudir, the head of the local administration.

Before the process of appointment begins, a member of the Peasant

Bureau will open the meeting with a short speech on the benefits of the

cooperative movement. He reminds peasants of their duty to build an organized

rural society, and generally makes a brief statement about government policy

and about the cooperative movement in general. When the speech-making has

come to an end, peasants are asked to raise any questions or complaints

in order that they may be answered by the committee. Peasants generally

take the opportunity to state their opinions about the obstacles to efficient

cultivation and other matters, especially those relating to actions taken

by local government and the Agricultural Office. At the same time they

discuss the problems that their cooperative society has faced during the

period of the previous Committee. When the discussion on all these matters

is completed, another member of the Peasant Bureau reads the names of

the appointed members and the titles of their posts within the cooperative

and asks participants to raise their hands to approve each name, which
is normally done unanimously.

The post of President of the cooperative society (<u>ra'is al-jami'a</u>
<u>al-ta'wunia</u>) is considered the most important, as he is supposed to represent
the society both inside and outside the village. In the village he
provides the contact with local government officials whenever a peasant
or group of peasants wish to raise some matter with them. Also he escorts
government personnel when they have to deal with disputes which develop
between peasants over such issues as land boundaries or access to irrigation
water. Internally, the <u>ra'is</u> has the duty of presiding over the regular
meetings of the cooperative, discussing the minutes with the board and taking
decisions. In his absence, the Secretary, or any other member of the board
so authorized, takes the chair. All cheques and documents involving
undertakings on the part of the cooperative society are signed by the <u>ra'is</u>,
the cooperative supervisor appointed by government and the accountant, who
handles the difficult job of keeping the financial records and account books
straight. Most peasants appointed to the latter post have been reluctant
and hesitant to undertake it - presumably because it involves a complicated
process of accounting which few of them are qualified to tackle. The other
two members of the board assist the <u>ra'is</u> or the other officials with
various jobs when required.

Generally speaking, the <u>majlis al-idara</u> is empowered to handle all
cooperative matters and to take decisions on various aspects of day-to day
management. But each cooperative society also has a supervisor who is
supposed to help them on technical matters. The appointment of the supervisor
is usually made by the Agricultural Office in coordination with the Peasant
Bureau. The <u>majlis</u> holds a regular meeting once a fortnight in the cooperative
building, and extra meetings when the need arises. The main duty of the
cooperative supervisor is to discuss the implementation of national

agricultural policy at the local level: these discussions, and the

decisions agreed upon, are usually reported by him to the Agricultural

Office.

The private sector cooperatives have the same internal organization,

but their *majlis* is elected by the members themselves without the inter-

vention of the local government or the local Party organization. A

supervisor is normally appointed to each of these cooperatives by the

Agricultural Office; his main duty resembles that of the supervisors

for the Land Reform cooperatives.

There is another cooperative society in the village, which was

established as recently as 1975, called the 'Joint Cooperative Society'.

It includes the two Land Reform cooperatives which have been joined together

to enable their members to acquire services, such as agricultural

mechanization and larger loans from the Cooperative Bank in Baghdad, which

they could not obtain individually. The Joint Cooperative Society consists

of selected members from the *majlis al-idara* of the two smaller cooperatives.

Agricultural cooperative societies, and joint societies where they exist,

are members of a cooperative union on a provincial level. At the national

level, these unions form the General Union of Agricultural Cooperatives,

(Ittihad al-Jam'iat al-Fallahia). The supervision of the cooperatives is

carried out principally on a provincial basis, each province being divided

into local districts or villages, in each of which one main agricultural

cooperative society is situated. Village societies communicate officially

with the government Cooperative Department in the province through the

local Agricultural Office. Local cooperative societies are represented

by their presidents in the cooperative union at provincial level. Both

the representative of this union and the Provincial Directorate of the

Cooperative Department play a part in supervising societies situated in

their province. These organizations hold joint meetings to coordinate

their activity with their branches. One of the aims of these meetings
is to review the general policy and to receive reports on different issues
from the representatives of the local cooperative societies. A broader
objective is to help in the implementation of the agricultural policy
formulated by the Ministry of Land Reform and the General Union of
Agricultural Cooperatives.

These joint meetings, which are usually held twice a year, are
normally attended by senior provincial officials of the Ministry, and by
representatives of related ministries. Their purpose is to discuss the
production plan of either the winter or summer season. The proposed plan
is discussed in detail by officials of the Cooperative Department,
Agricultural Office staff from all over the province, the leaders of the
Cooperative Union and the Presidents of the village cooperative societies,
drawing upon available information, statistics and maps relating to each
society. After introducing the required amendments to the production plan
for the coming season, its implementation becomes binding upon the relevant
directorates and societies.

All this shows that in spite of having their own union organization,
local cooperative societies are closely tied to various government
departments. These connections serve the main purpose of supervising
the functioning of the cooperatives and also facilitate the flow of government
aid to the rural sector.

The Land Reform cooperatives in Da'udia

As I have said earlier, there are two cooperative societies in the
village for Land Reform peasants. The first, which comprises Settlements
no. 1 and 2, is called Fatah (after the name of the principal group in the
Palestine Liberation Organization) which literally means "break through",
and consists of members of both Albu Khamis and Albu Hajj Hasan of the
Dulaim. The second, which comprises Settlements no. 3, 4 and 5, is called

al-Intilaq al-Thawri, "The Revolutionary Explosion", and consists of various kinship groups including al-Misarra, Dulaim, the "newcomers" and Albu 'Inad of Albu Khamis.

The division of the Land Reform peasants into two cooperative societies has largely followed the geographical division of the village. Both Settlements, no. 1 and no. 2, are located in Bad'a Shamalia (North Bad'a) of the village, whilst the other three settlements are located in Bad'a al-Janubia (South Bad'a). Each of these two societies is run by a separate majlis al-idara consisting of peasants living within the area under its management. This division of the Land Reform area in the village into two cooperative societies was essential in order to keep membership down to a manageable size and to provide various services for peasants who were spatially dispersed.

Whilst this division into two societies may have helped organizationally to concentrate efforts by creating smaller units, this should not imply that they have escaped from the more general problems associated with the Land Reform programme. Nor have they been able to overcome the ecological difficulties which severely limit production in certain parts of the district. As we have seen in Chapter V, the soils in the areas of the Land Reform settlements are often highly saline and there have also been problems of water shortages. These ecological factors have undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of conflicts between kinship groups in the running of the cooperative societies and in the Peasant Bureau.

In order to understand the nature and consequences of these struggles it is first necessary to review the problems that arose during the reconstitution of the Peasant Bureau. Later I shall examine conflict within the cooperative societies themselves.

The members of the first Peasant Bureau

After the peasants had settled in their newly allotted lands, the

reconstitution of the Peasant Bureau became an urgent issue for two

reasons. First, there was, as we noted in Chapter VI, a general desire

for change in the membership of the Bureau and secondly it was necessary

to reflect the changes occurring in the patterns of relationships between

residents in the new settlements. The old Peasant Bureau which had

supervised the establishment of the new areas for settlement and the

settling of the peasants was composed of Shakir (IIC21), the amin al-sirr,

the mudir, the Head of the Agricultural Office, and Jawir, the leader of

the "newcomers".

There was a lapse of about eighteen months between the completion

of the new settlement programme and the reconstitution of the Peasant

Bureau. During this period the old Peasant Bureau members represented

the new settlements as follows: the mudir represented Settlement no. 5;

the Head of the Agricultural Office, Settlement no. 1; the amin al-sirr,

Settlement no. 2; and Jawir, Settlement no. 4. There was no official

representative for Settlement no. 3 whose peasants had to go directly

to the mudir or the amin al-sirr with their problems.

The main problem facing the Party in reviewing the membership of the

Peasant Bureau was that most peasants in fact had become accustomed to go

straight to the amin al-sirr or to the mudir, and especially the latter,

for the solution of their problems, no matter what settlement they came from,

and no matter who was officially their representative on the Peasant

Bureau. Peasants went to the mudir not because he was a member of the

Peasant Bureau but because he was the head of the local government. The

local branch of the Party concluded, therefore, that if local matters were

left to be dealt with by local government officials, the Party would become

isolated and these officials, not the Party, would once again become the

means of communication between the village and the outside. This was one

reason why the local branch showed keen interest in the reorganization of

the Peasant Bureau. A further reason was that the relationship between

the peasants and certain members of the Bureau was beginning to deteriorate

badly, as was the case of Jawir and the members of Settlement no. 4. As I

explained earlier,[1] the relationship of Jawir to both Albu 'Inad of

Albu Khamis and Albu Hammudi of the "original" al-Misarra was tense: the

former because Jawir had aligned himself politically with Hajj Hasan

against the shaikh of Albu 'Amir who came from Albu Khamis lineage; and

the latter because of Jawir's handling of the distribution of peasants

amongst the new settlements which led to the dispersal of the "original"

al-Misarra. These difficulties between Jawir and members of his settlement

meant that the latter frequently circumvented him and went directly to the

mudir with their problems. They complained that when they consulted Jawir

he would not put their own point of view to the Bureau but only his own.

The appointment of the new members

The reconstitution of the Peasant Bureau was set in hand by the amin

al-sirr, who summoned a meeting to discuss the problem. At this meeting,

according to Jawir, the amin al-sirr explained that in order to give the

peasants the feeling that they could come to the Bureau with confidence

and that they were properly represented, new members would have to be appointed

by the Party. He also said that if the Peasant Bureau remained as it was,

the Party would lose its hold over political processes in the village,

would become unable to preside over the development of the new settlements

in the way it would wish, and would be unable to build up a strong political

organization in the village. After a short discussion of amin al-sirr's

assessment of the situation, nominations were called for representatives

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1)   See Chapter VI, pp. 144-148.

for Settlements no. 1, 2 and 3. It was decided that Settlement no. 4 would continue to be represented by Jawir since he was a peasant and a Party member, and that Settlement no. 5 would be the responsibility of the mudir who lived close to this settlement and maintained good relations with its peasants. This was also a satisfactory solution to the question of developing close liaison between the Party and local government.

The discussion then moved on to consider who should be chosen for the other three settlements. The mudir spoke first. His main point was that they should be very careful in choosing representatives for Settlements no. 1 and 2 since they were occupied by two kinship groups from the major factions of the village, and that discussions in the Bureau, though confidential, would immediately be reported to the leaders of both factions. He suggested that candidates for these two posts should be chosen from among Party members who were sons of the peasants in these settlements, that is, from among the younger generation, whose loyalty to the Party was stronger. Jawir agreed with the mudir, while the Head of the Agricultural Office abstained.[1)]

The result of the vote to accept the mudir's suggestion displeased the amin al-sirr. He insisted that representatives of the peasants should be peasants and not as he put it, 'effendis', educated people. In making this reference to effendis he was attacking not only the sons of the peasants (most of whom were at secondary school) but also the mudir himself. Commenting on the mudir's opinion that unless great care was taken, Party loyalty would be overtaken by group loyalty and confidentiality breached, the amin al-sirr said that such thinking demonstrated a lack of trust in

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1)   The main reason for his abstention was that, having lost his place
      on the Peasant Bureau, he suspected Jawir and the mudir of having
      conspired against him.

the peasants, who were the very instruments of the political revolution which had taken place. He then suggested three names for the representatives of Settlements 1, 2 and 3: the Head of the Cooperative Society, his deputy, and a member of Albu 'Ayyada in Settlement no. 3.[1] The amin al-sirr also argued that the disagreement should be minuted, and the matter handed over to the District Party authorities in Khalis for resolution. The reply, received a week later, in fact accepted the need for the reorganization of the Peasant Bureau, and endorsed the views of the amin al-sirr.

Subsequently, the names of the new representatives were announced at a public meeting of the Land Reform peasants. On this occasion the amin al-sirr made it clear that in choosing these persons the Party had taken all the problems affecting the settlement in question into account. He explained that the aim of the local Party was to establish better communication between itself and the peasants, but that it was impossible to appoint representatives of each family and sub-lineage grouping in the village, because the aim of the Party was gradually to replace local personalistic loyalty by a broader loyalty to the Party. The main goals of the new settlement programme were to develop the block system of joint cultivation and to improve the material and social conditions of peasant life. It would be the task of the new representatives to report problems immediately to the Peasant Bureau, for speedy resolution.

Conflicts within the Peasant Bureau

Following the reconstitution of the Peasant Bureau, Jawir realised that there would be real problems between himself and the three new members,

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1)   In Settlement no. 3 there were two kinship groups, one from Albu
      'Ayyada, and the other from al-'Arafna. The former were from the
      "original" al-Misarra, who were hostile to Jawir, while the latter
      who were "newcomers" were friendly towards him. (See Chapter VI.)

since although the representatives of Settlements no. 1 and 2 were Ba'thists,

they were also closely connected with both Hajj Hasan and the shaikh. The

broad support for these two new representatives of Settlements no. 1 and

2 would not have been possible without the support of both these figures.

In fact during my fieldwork, I discovered that these two representatives

were agnatic kin of Hajj Hasan and the shaikh respectively, and fulfilled

some of the functions of <u>sirkals</u>, or bailiffs. In addition, both were

very active in village politics, and during the implementation of the Land

Reform and the establishment of the new settlements, they were in constant

touch both with their respective kin groups and with the local administration

and local Party. In spite of the fact that the two men were hostile to

each other, they managed to achieve more or less equivalent positions of

power in the village during the resettlement process, and succeeded in

becoming respectively Head and deputy Head of the Fatah Cooperative Society.

Thus, although these two new men <u>formally</u> represented Settlements no. 1 and

2, <u>in reality</u> they represented the rival interests of Hajj Hasan and the

shaikh of Albu 'Amir.

As will now have become clear, the appointment of these two men to

the Peasant Bureau was a great blow to Jawir, whose own relations with

Hajj Hasan and the shaikh had deteriorated. The only alliances left to

him were with the <u>amin al-sirr</u> and the <u>mudir</u>. Both men were close friends

of his, and they were attempting to make him a peasant leader at village

level. However, the problems and difficulties which began to beset Jawir

both in his own settlement and at the wider village level became such as to

be beyond the powers of the <u>amin al-sirr</u> and the <u>mudir</u> to assist him. In

order to strengthen his position inside his own settlement Jawir began to

pay attention to particular peasant problems; and devoted more effort and

time to such matters than he had in the past, but this did not have the

desired effect of consolidating his position. Rival groups like Albu 'Inad

of Albu Khamis and Albu Hammudi of the "original" al-Misarra sank their differences and made common cause against Jawir, and began putting pressure on the Peasant Bureau to have him removed.

In order to bring these two groups under his control and to weaken their opposition, Jawir approached their leaders independently. He asked them to work together in the future, and to try to make a fresh start on a better mutual relationship. His first meeting was with the head of Albu 'Inad, who was the most prominent of the peasant leaders in the settlement. Jawir tried to convince him that he (Jawir) and his group had not come to the village in order to displace Albu Khamis and he attempted to persuade him to become his deputy in the cooperative society of al-Intilaq al-Thawri (of which he was president). The leader of Albu 'Inad refused, and so too did Albu Hammudi. They claimed that the poor quality land on which they had been settled had been given to them as a result of Jawir's mistaken policies. These policies had also, they argued, resulted in the dispersal of al-Misarra over all three settlements.

The pretext for Jawir's decision to contact these two groups was provided by the literacy courses the Party had decided to initiate in the village. The representatives of the Peasant Bureau had been delegated responsibility for running them. In his enthusiasm for the literacy courses Jawir had built a room onto his house to accommodate them. This room was also designed to serve as a guesthouse in the settlement, to remedy the fact that the settlement had no common meeting place, and to provide a room which could be used for various purposes. As soon as it became clear to members of the settlement that the room built for the literacy courses was also to be used as a settlement guesthouse, many people began to boycott the courses, since they suspected that Jawir was attempting to establish himself in a position of influence over them, to become, as it were, their shaikh. Both Albu Hammudi and Albu 'Inad openly opposed Jawir and his group,

and suggested that separate literacy courses should be organised for each group.

This was not the only difficulty which Jawir had to face in his settlement. Both Albu Hammudi and Albu 'Inad sub-lineages ceased to consult him and went instead directly to the mudir or Head of the Agricultural Office. As might have been expected, from the time when hostilities began between the Head of the Agricultural Office and Jawir, the former started to behave in a very friendly manner towards Albu Hammudi and Albu 'Inad, and encouraged them to come directly to him for advice. Conversely, when he was approached by Jawir himself about various settlement problems, the Head of the Agricultural Office was extremely unhelpful and uncooperative.

On the level of the Peasant Bureau, Jawir's situation became rather difficult, particularly with the new members. During the weekly meetings of the Bureau, he had very little to contribute, since most peasants had discussed their problems with other members and not with him. Moreover, the three new members began to suspect that when he argued cases in the Peasant Bureau, he did this solely in his own interest. In many instances the new members had information to hand which Jawir did not have. This state of affairs, both at Peasant Bureau and at settlement level, was well known to Hajj Hasan and the shaikh, who were kept informed by the representatives of Settlements no. 1 and 2. During this period, irrigation problems became severe, but since the water was supplied by the shaikh's pumps, Jawir was unable to do anything, since he was not on good terms with the shaikh.

In these circumstances, Jawir not only found himself isolated at the level of his own settlement, but found that his own kinship group was beginning to become disaffected. The irrigation problems from which they suffered and the relatively poor land that had been allocated to them were blamed on Jawir. These difficulties led eventually to Jawir resigning from the Peasant

Bureau, so that he might devote himself more fully to his task as
Head of the cooperative society.

In conclusion, the appointment of the three new members of the
Peasant Bureau and their difficult relationship with Jawir made the Peasant
Bureau an object of rivalry and competition. From the time when Jawir
started to try to reduce his dependence upon Hajj Hasan, the members of
the latter's lineage began to circulate rumours against him. Besides the
difficulties these rumours created, his relationship with Albu Khamis
added to the problem. His position in the reconstituted Peasant Bureau
was thus difficult. This was not only due to problems with the new members,
but because there was much opposition within his own settlement to his re-
appointment. Thus while the appointment of the representatives of both
Settlements no. 1 and 2 greatly strengthened the position of the kinship
groups of these settlements in the Peasant Bureau, the re-appointment of
Jawir had the opposite effect. Moreover, the growing dissatisfaction with
his behaviour also weakened his position in the cooperative society of al-
Intilaq al-Thawri.

The cooperative of al-Intilaq al-Thawri

The ecological circumstances of the whole area of this cooperative
compare rather unfavourably with the area occupied by Settlements no. 1 and
2, which form the Fatah Cooperative Society. The outlying parts of al-Intilaq
al-Thawri, along the Baghdad-Ba'quba road contain heavily saline tracts
which are either completely abandoned or very sparsely cultivated. These
ecological circumstances and the consequent poor economic conditions were
compounded by bad management by the majlis al-idara of al-Intilaq al-Thawri
cooperative, and by the apparent inefficiency of the supervisor. The
government's plan was to let government technicians play a major role in
the administration of the cooperatives during their early years, after which

they would gradually become more autonomous and independent. However, members of the cooperative boards have tended to show little enthusiasm for this.

In practice, the management of the cooperative societies is carried out by the supervisor, who is theoretically better trained and more experienced than the members of the majlis al-idara. The supervisor plays a crucial role in the cooperative's activities in the village, though he has less power than the Head and members of the majlis. He is normally in charge of the accounts and receives members' fees and their payments for seeds and fertilizers.

During the early years of the cooperative movement in Da'udia, the peasants were occupied mainly in attempting to dominate the cooperative societies and in excluding rival or unfriendly groups. Each group, independently or in conjunction with others, tried to remove other groups and replace them. These conflicts caused considerable difficulties to the peasants of al-Intilaq al-Thawri, whose economic conditions were poor. This was especially so in Settlement no. 4, which was originally occupied by 200 peasants, the majority of whom came from outside the village. Their economic position was particularly bad, because they had no access to alternative sources of income, unlike the original villagers, who supplemented theirs by working as sharecroppers for the landlords. Moreover, the outsiders had no relatives in the village to help them during the first year when they established themselves there. Hence during the first and second years most of the peasants of this cooperative were faced with problems and setbacks, except the peasants of Settlement no. 5, where the land was fertile because of its proximity to the river bank.

Unfortunately, the land did not produce good yields, in the first year, and this was repeated the following year. During these two years the cooperative society provided the peasants with seeds, fertilizers and

harvesters. The machinery was hired from a government depot outside the village, and paid for by the cooperative, and in consequence most of the peasants fell deeply into debt.

Failure in two successive years had made a demoralising impact upon the peasants and the local officials. In the village, it was said that the failure of this cooperative occurred largely because its members did not collaborate effectively. This is partly correct, because they came from various unrelated kinship groups and did not work effectively as a team. But the main cause of the failure lay elsewhere, in saline soils and the poor management.

The majlis al-idara of the cooperative society encountered a number of obstacles due to bureaucratic inefficiency both inside and outside the village. One member of the majlis al-idara told me: "Time and again we reported our grievances about the condition of the land, but no-one responded in time". Moreover, three out of the five members of the majlis al-idara formed an independent poultry breeding business, and neglected the society, as will be explained later.

The day-to-day administration of the society was left to the supervisor, who apparently made little effort to make it work. For nearly two years he was left alone to cope with its problems. During this time it was difficult for the books to be kept and written up by the supervisor alone, and the outcome was complete chaos and confusion, with the accounts becoming completely mal-administered. Debts or loans were not correctly entered under individuals' names, and a large number of peasants claimed that they had been asked to pay an extra charge for hire of a harvester which had never in fact worked on their lands, or to pay for fertilizers and seeds they had not received.

During my fieldwork there was much criticism of the cooperative society's services, levelled mainly against certain members of the Board, who had

allegedly taken the chance to get rich. These were Jawir, the leader

of the "newcomers", who was the head of the cooperative, the head of the

Albu Razayyiq, of the "original" al-Misarra and thirdly a peasant

representative of Albu Musluh of Dulaim in Settlement no. 5. These three

members were very active and hard-working immediately after the expropriation

from the landlords; they claimed proudly that neither the peasants nor the

Party would have been able to obtain land from the landlords if they had

not taken action against the threats circulated by the leading family of

Albu 'Amir and their supporters among Albu Khamis. When the cooperative

society was founded the three were appointed by the Party as members of

al-Intilaq al-Thawri cooperative board on the grounds of their integrity,

and their potential and actual leadership qualities.

When the cooperative was founded, it was also planned to establish

a livestock project, and projects for stall-feeding calves and poultry-

breeding. The Cooperative Bank in Baghdad responded favourably to the plan

and provided the credits required for construction, and for the purchase of

animals, fodder and equipment. The credits were to be recovered by small

annual instalments, and land was made available for buildings at the same

time. All these arrangements were made in the name of the cooperative society.

When the work started, most of the peasants did not respond adequately,

and refused to work in teams according to a timetable or to look after the

poultry. Their unwillingness was due to the fact that poultry breeding

and husbandry were considered women's tasks, and that it was dishonourable

for men to look after chickens. When I asked one peasant why he did not

cooperate in the project he said, "I cannot risk my family's reputation and

my own, otherwise the people of the village (ahl al-qaria) will never

respect us nor give us women or take women from us; and they will call me

'Abu'l-Dajjaj'[1]' - which indicates an inferior social status.

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1)   Abu'l-Dajjaj means "the person who looks after chickens". In rural
        Iraq, where masculinity is extremely important, males are supposed
        not to engage in tasks which are mainly those of women: otherwise
        local people will look on them with contempt and consider them impotent
        and effeminate.

Eventually the poultry breeding project was taken over by three members of the cooperative board, who started to run it independently, each with four partners. When the Cooperative Department of the Khalis Project decided to abandon the poultry-breeding project it was on condition that the three members should select partners from the members of the cooperative. These partners were in fact chosen from their own agnatic relatives, and the whole project gradually became a private enterprise. Its connection with the cooperative society became limited solely to marketing, for which the cooperative charged a commission of 3%, and to repaying the original costs of the project to the Cooperative Bank by periodic instalments through the cooperative society.

All this resulted in considerable financial difficulties for the cooperative especially since the three members and their partners frequently failed to pay the instalments on time, which resulted in the Cooperative Bank withholding any further assistance.

The problems of the cooperative society came to a head in 1974, when a government agency approached the cooperatives in the area, including al-Intilaq al-Thawri, to persuade them to market wool for the agency's spinning mill. The same three members immediately agreed to this, and a sum of ID 14,000 (equivalent to £22,000) was advanced to them. They also persuaded the other two members of the majlis al-idara to commence buying wool, without any prior consultation with the general assembly. However, after three months, the project had incurred serious losses.

Meanwhile, rumours were circulating in the village about the behaviour of the three members of the Board. These rumours were intensified by peasants of both Albu 'Ayyada and Albu Hammudi,[1] who criticised them for their gambling and excessive drinking, both strongly disapproved of by village

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1) For the relationship of Albu 'Ayyada and Albu Hammudi with Albu Razayyiq and the "newcomers" see Chapter VI.

people. The three members were also publicly denounced for corruption: the evidence suggested that they had prospered by diverting the resources of the cooperative for their own personal use.

After this, the majlis attempted to urge the village officials, especially the mudir, to spread the cooperative debt equally among all the members of the cooperative, arguing that if the wool business had been profitable the benefits could have been claimed by all members. However, most peasants opposed this plan, claiming that if the deal had in fact proved profitable no one would have gained any benefits, and that therefore the three members themselves should repay the debt. Finally the General Director of the Khalis Project intervened and, on instructions from the Cooperative Department and Union, dismissed the three men and fined them for embezzlement. Yet, despite the apparently conclusive evidence of misconduct, the affair continued to create difficulties within the settlement as Albu Razayyiq and some of the "newcomers" accused both Albu 'Ayyada and Albu Hammudi of inflaming the issue in order to dissolve the board.

In order to alleviate the crisis, the Cooperative Department of the Khalis Project agreed to make available to the fifty remaining "newcomer" households on Settlement no. 4, fertilizers and seeds on credit, even though the cooperative still had outstanding debts. Although there had originally been some 200 members of this settlement, three-quarters had left over the three years since the founding of the cooperative. It was also decided to distribute a block of unallocated fertile land among the remaining peasants, and the cooperative was given the chance to pay off its debts over a longer period of time.

The general attitude of members of the cooperative to the problems which they had faced was that the society had not worked because control had passed into the hands of one particular board. According to one group of peasants, "they (the board) had disappointed the government which had trusted them and consequently had harmed our reputation in the village and

in local government circles". "The government", they argued "would have liked to help us; we have no doubt about that, but the mistake was, that we believed the board to be a reliable group. Even al-Hizb (the Party - the Ba'th Party), when it discovered their unreliability, dismissed them from its sufuf (organization)."

The reshuffling of the members of the majlis al-idara of al-Intilaq al-Thawri, which took place immediately after the dismissal of the board, did not solve the problem, in spite of the local government's and the Party's efforts to calm down the situation. The new majlis al-idara which came to power was presided over by a "neutral" peasant belonging to the small but respected kinship group of al-Huwatim.[1] The post of secretary was occupied by a peasant from Albu Hammudi, while the post of accountant went to a peasant of the Albu 'Ayyada. The other two members were from Dulaim and Albu 'Inad of Albu Khamis. The new set-up therefore excluded Albu Razayyiq and the "newcomers", who began to feel bitter and uncomfortable about the new composition of the majlis al-idara. This was reflected directly in their attitudes towards the new members; in most cases they preferred to contact the supervisor for their requirements of seeds, fertilizers and agricultural machinery, rather than any of the members. They had no prejudice against the ra'is himself but they refrained from meeting him in his room in the cooperative building where the other unfriendly members would also be sitting.

In brief, the soil conditions of the area, especially in the southern part, coupled with mismanagement, and hostility between kinship groups made it difficult for the cooperative to function for the benefit of its

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1)   al-Huwatim are believed to be the original inhabitants of the village, because they were living there before the Albu 'Amir and the Dulaim came in the nineteenth century. Most of this kinship group have left the village over the years. The remaining group consists of only twenty-five persons.

members, whose economic conditions during the first two years were appalling.
In this situation it was relatively easy for Albu 'Ayyada and Albu Hammudi
sub-lineages to expose various irregularities in the running of the cooperative
and to manipulate their kinship loyalties against their rivals in order
to bring down the members of the majlis al-idara.

The Fatah Cooperative Society

The second cooperative society, Fatah, functioned well in terms of service
provision. Its success was achieved despite the rivalry between its two
main kinship groups, from Albu Khamis of Albu 'Amir in Settlement no. 1, and
their counterparts, of Albu Hajj Hasan of Dulaim, in Settlement no. 2. These
groups competed for access to various facilities such as fertilizers and
pesticides and for the use of farm machinery particularly during peak
harvesting and ploughing periods. But despite this competition amongst its
members, the Fatah Cooperative Society has achieved considerable success
in the general provision of services to its members.

The cooperative is smaller than al-Intilaq al-Thawri; its membership
numbers only 150 (while other cooperatives started with more than 250),
and its lands are relatively fertile. Furthermore, its supervisor was
experienced and efficient and would help with members' problems and
implement the cooperative's plan efficiently.

During my fieldwork, meetings of the majlis al-idara of Fatah were
very rare. The ra'is and his deputy were antagonistic towards each other
and could not cooperate;[1] and many allegations were made against them. One
of these was that the ra'is had exploited an undistributed tract of land
adjacent to his own field without notifying the Agricultural Office. His
deputy was accused of providing farm machinery to Hajj Hasan and his sons.

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1)   The Head and deputy are the same two officials of the Peasant Bureau
      discussed on page 195-199.

During my last three months in the village both of them were dismissed

from the Peasant Bureau, on the grounds that both of them had been unfaithful

to the Party and its cause. Coincidentally, it happened that the board

of the Fatah Cooperative was also dissolved. This board had been in power

for three years, which is the maximum period allowed by law.

The new majlis al-idara was presided over by a peasant of the Dulaim

group from Settlement no. 2. The secretary came from the same group, while

the post of accountant was given to a peasant from Albu Khamis in Settlement

no. 1. The other two members came from Dulaim and Albu Khamis respectively.

In the eyes of the peasants, the post of ra'is is of a high status, and

reflects the political weight of the kinship group from which the candidate

is chosen. The various benefits and facilities that the associated kinship

group stands to gain are also extremely important. It is for this reason

that there is often fierce competition for this post.

Hence the Fatah Cooperative Society exhibits the same pattern of

competition between kinship groups as in the first example, but the administrative

and economic effects are less serious. The basic reasons for this are that

its members were fortunate in having better quality land, could supplement

their incomes by working as sharecroppers for the two most important

landlord families, and were lucky to have a highly conscientious and efficient

supervisor, who had the added advantage of being a Christian outsider and

therefore not directly involved in local lineage or village disputes.

Conflict between public and private sector cooperatives and the role of the Party

In addition to the various ecological, economic, administrative and

socio-political factors considered above, we need to discuss the roles played

by the 'private-sector' cooperatives and by the Party, since these constitute

significant dimensions which also affect the performance and success of the

Land Reform cooperatives. This section explores these aspects.

As I mentioned earlier, the private-sector cooperatives are associated

with the three rival landlord families: the shaikh's family, that of

his cousins, and that of the Dulaim leaders. In the eyes of their members,

the main function of these cooperatives is simply to supply credit for

fertilizers, seeds and other agricultural inputs. The government, on the

other hand, sees the private sector cooperatives as a way of allowing it

to monitor and control private enterprise, in order to bring it within the

overall framework of agricultural planning and development.

As Table 3 on p.218 show, the members of each cooperative have recently

received a considerable number of agricultural loans, although not all this

capital has been invested in agriculture; some of it has been used

to finance the purchase of urban land and property. Nevertheless,

availability of credit through the cooperatives has undoubtedly contributed

to the high levels of production achieved by the landlord families as is

shown in Table 1 overleaf :-[1]

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1) These figures should be compared with Table 2 giving similar
   data for the Land Reform cooperatives. See p. 217 of this chapter.
   The landlord families are also, as I have pointed out, in
   possession of the more fertile tracts of land along the river bank.

Table 1

Agricultural Production Among Landlord Families

Name of family	Crop type	Cultivated area in donums		Gross production in tons		Amount marketed in tons	
		1974-75	1975-76	1974-75	1975-76	1974-75	1975-76
Shaikh's family (IC15-35, ID10-26; plus IC1-2)	wheat	1500	1500	300	300	278	270
	barley	300	500	120	123	70	80
	cotton	50	50	40	40	40	40
	vegetables	300	800	?	?	?	?
	citrus	210	210	?	?	?	?
	alfalfa	?	?	?	?	?	?
Shaikh's cousins (IC3-13: ID1-9)	wheat	500	500	80	95	77	77
	barley	300	300	150	154	140	140
	vegetables	700	700	?	?	?	?
	alfalfa	?	?	?	?	?	?
Dulaim leaders (IIB1-13: IIC1-21)	wheat	883	883	353	360	353	360
	cotton	30	30	15	17	15	17
	dates	-	-	74	80	74	80
	vegetables	1000	1000	?	?	?	?
	citrus	?	?	?	?	?	?
	alfalfa	?	?	?	?	?	?

In the rare meetings of the private cooperatives most of the time was spent on listing members' requests for agricultural equipment and fertilizers. These meetings became more regular at the peaks of the agricultural season, when the need for various services was urgent. There was no coordination or joint meetings between the three societies. Each majlis al-idara worked completely independently of the others, and their demands were usually dealt with separately by the Agricultural Office.

When I commenced field research, a major complaint of the Land Reform peasants was that these private-sector cooperatives had absorbed most of the services provided by the Agricultural Office, and also that they had managed to commandeer the agricultural machinery supplied to the village by the mechanisation agency in Khalis Town for vital periods during the harvesting and ploughing seasons. Many peasants were unable to hire this equipment and blamed their majlis for missing the opportunity and for allowing the landlords to monopolise it through their own cooperatives. Peasant bitterness and disappointment increased further when they found they had to revert to traditional methods of harvesting by hand and ploughing with donkeys and oxen, since few of them had enough cash available to hire tractors.

During the last three months of my fieldwork these circumstances led to the direct intervention of the Party in agricultural affairs, as a result of which the two boards of the Land Reform cooperatives were disbanded, as has been explained above (see pp. 203-211). After this, the Agricultural Office was reorganized under the supervision of the Party and more agronomists were charged with the task of supervising the Land Reform areas in the village according to a strict timetable. These events coincided with a conference for local Land Reform cooperatives held at provincial level in Khalis Town. The conference was presided over by members from the head-quarters of the Party in the province, the General Director of the Khalis

Project and a representative of the Cooperative Union of the peasants of the province.

Most of the Land Reform cooperative boards attended, together with delegations from local Party branches. The main theme of the discussions was the causes of the failureof the agricultural plan of the previous year (1974-75). The Cooperative Union of the province blamed the local cooperative societies which, it was claimed, were not sufficiently active in furthering the cooperative way of life among their members. Moreover, the Land Reform cooperative boards were not applying the agricultural plan consistently. During the first hour of the conference most of the blame was directed towards the local cooperative societies. Later, the local delegations were given a chance to discuss the topics raised by the organizers. The village delegation seized this opportunity to deny the allegations against them, arguing that they could accept only partial responsibility for the failure of the agricultural plan. Instead they blamed the Khalis Project officials. The Head of al-Intilaq al-Thawri cooperative said that the officials of the Khalis Project who had drawn up the agricultural plan had failed to make proper arrangements for their agronomists to instruct the peasants on correct cultivation methods, particularly for beetroot and maize which they had never cultivated before. He went on to suggest that the ploughing and harvesting machinery posed another problem for them because they found themselves competing for its hire with the private sector cooperatives. This competition, he argued, had intensified when the Revolutionary Command Council decided to reduce the daily rental rates by fifty per cent in order to help the poorer peasants of the Land Reform. This encouraged members of private-sector cooperatives to approach the mechanical depots directly and to obtain the machinery without letting the Agricultural Office hire it for the Land Reform cooperatives.

The village delegation claimed that the officials of the Khalis Project did not make all the pre-requisites for the execution of the agricultural

plan available to them, and the machinery and equipment did not arrive in good time. Moreover, even when the peasants cultivated whatever had been decided upon, shortage of transport caused great damage to their crops. At the end of the conference, which lasted two days, two decisions were taken, which emphasised the importance attached to helping the newly established Land Reform cooperatives.

The first of these was that farm machinery should not be made available to cooperatives individually, but collectively, at village level, under the supervision of the local representatives of the Land Reform agencies and of Party members. Secondly, it was decided to establish joint cooperative societies at village level all over the province with their own mechanical depots wherever possible. During harvest time the allocation of the machinery would be organised by a committee composed of the mudir, the heads of the two Land Reform cooperatives, and the Head of the Agricultural Office.

In the distribution of harvesting machinery, priority was to be given to the Land Reform peasants. At the same time, each private sector cooperative received two items of machinery, irrespective of the area of land it cultivated or the amount of wheat and barley to be harvested. This arrangement was felt to be discriminatory by the shaikh's family, insofar as their area of wheat and barley was larger than that belonging to the leaders of Dulaim. This did in fact later cause substantial damage to the shaikh's family's crops as harvesting was considerably delayed. The family accused the mudir of deliberate prejudice against them, which he denied, stressing that they could well afford to hire harvesting machinery outside the village, which they eventually did. Dulaim, on the other hand, did not suffer, in spite of the fact that their financial resources were almost as great as those of the shaikh's family, because the orchards which they owned did not require the use of machinery.

In general, the result of this has been that considerable benefit
has accrued to the Land Reform peasants, who can now carry out their
harvesting without difficulty. During my last visit to the village in the
summer of 1976 I found that most of the peasants of al-Intilaq al-Thawri
cooperative had paid off their debts, and there had been a noticeable
improvement in their economic conditions. As a result of the reforms,
peasant productivity in the village has begun to increase, farmers'
incentives have heightened, and they have become gradually more involved
in the marketing process as can be deduced from Table 2 :-

Table 2
Agricultural Production among Land Reform Peasants

Crop Type	Cultivated area in donums		Number of peasant households		Gross production in tons		Number of households involved in marketing	
	1974 - 75	1975 - 76	1974 - 75	1975 - 76	1974 - 75	1975 - 76	1974 - 75	1975 - 76
Wheat	2000	2900	245	245	295	350	200	245
Barley	1000	1000	245	245	270	400	95	245
Vegetables	280	475	?	?	150	?	245	almost all
Alfalfa	350	450	?	?	?	?	?	?

It is thus clear that an increasing number of peasant households are in-
volved in the marketing process. As a result of massive government expenditure
in the agricultural sector the agricultural area has increased, especially
those areas cultivated with vegetables. Improvements in yield and the
development of a new type of agriculture have been accompanied by the
provision of more facilities via the cooperatives, as can be seen from the
Tables overleaf :-

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Table 3

THE PRIVATE SECTOR COOPERATIVES

al-Julan Cooperative
(The Shaikh of Albu 'Amir and his brothers and sons)

A. 1. Number of members : 32

2. Credits given to the society between 1974-1975:-

The Shaikh		ID8000
The Shaikh's brother	a)	ID6000
" "	b)	ID3000
" "	c)	ID3000
" "	d)	ID3000
" "	e)	ID3000
" "	f)	ID1500
" "	g)	ID1500
" "	h)	ID3000
" "	i)	ID3000
" "	j)	ID2000
" "	k)	ID5000
" "	l)	ID2000
The Shaikh's son	i)	ID3000
" "	ii)	ID2000
	Total	ID54,000

B. Area of land = 3000 donums, including 4 orchards

C. Number of petrol driven pumps: 7

D. Number of cows: 200

E. Number of sheep: 600

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al-Quds Cooperative
(The Shaikh of Albu 'Amir's awlad 'amm)

A. 1. Number of members including women : 40

2. Credits given to the society in 1974/75

The present Shaikh's ibn 'amm	a)	ID3000
" "	b)	ID3000
" "	c)	ID3000
" "	d)	ID3000
" "	e)	ID4000
" "	f)	ID2500
" "	g)	ID3000
" " bint 'amm	h)	ID2500
" "	i)	ID2500
" " ibn 'amm	j)	ID5030
to establish poultry farm		
The present Shaikh's ibn 'amm	k)	ID9040
to buy sheep		
	Total	ID40,070

B. Area of land = 1,500 donums including 3 newly cultivated orchards

C. Number of petrol driven pumps: 5

D. Number of cows: 180

E. Number of sheep: 600

F. Number of ploughing machines: 3

Risala Khalida Cooperative (Dulaim leaders)

A. 1. Number of members : 20

2. Credits given to the society between 1974-75

Hajj Hasan	a)	ID5000
Hajj Hasan's son	b)	ID3000
Hajj Hasan's son	c)	ID4000
Hajj Musluh	d)	ID4000
Hajj Musluh's son	e)	ID3000
Hajj Musluh's son	f)	ID4000
Hajj Musluh's son	g)	ID5030
(to establish poultry farm)		
	Total	ID28,030

B. Area of land = 2,000 donums including 4 large orchards

C. Number of petrol driven pumps: 8

D. Number of cows: 250

E. Number of sheep: 650

F. Number of ploughing machines: 2

G. Number of pick-up trucks: 7

Table 4

Year	Electric pumps	Petrol-driven pumps	Mechanical harvesters	Ploughs
1974-75	1	1	-	-
1975-76	4	2	10	10

This shows that there has been an immense and rapid increase in the provision of agricultural machinery. By 1976, both the Land Reform cooperatives had in fact recovered well and appeared to be more effective and better organised. These developments were accompanied by the establishment of the Joint Cooperative Society.

The Joint Cooperative has opened a shop in which prices are fixed by the government. It is one of the government's main principles of policy to subsidize and control market prices nationally. The Joint Cooperative has also bought two pick-up trucks to deliver produce to local markets, and also twenty ploughs and harvesters which can be hired by peasants via the cooperative. The Joint Cooperative even considers requests from the private sector cooperatives for the hire of this agricultural equipment. The price charged for the harvester is ID 0.5 per day, and for the plough ID 1 per day. The peasants pay half the cost for the harvester in cash in advance, and the other half is deducted from the return on the crops marketed by the cooperative. A repair shop with spare parts was also opened when the Joint Cooperative was established.

The board of the Joint Cooperative is composed of members of the boards of both the two Land Reform cooperatives and is presided over by the ra'is of al-Intilaq al-Thawri cooperative. Since the establishment of the Joint Cooperative the present ra'is has taken on a number of important political functions. Throughout my last visit to the village he was extremely busy either coping with his members' demands or settling local disputes. He

would intervene on behalf of peasants of both cooperatives, either with

government officials or with the representatives of the Party, to

settle disputes on the spot. Since his appointment, the present ra'is

has been available either in the cooperative building or in the agricultural

office, where peasants have brought him their problems.

Hence the new leadership in the cooperatives now really does consist

of representatives of the local people. They are still affected by kinship

considerations, which will not of course disappear overnight, but they are

clearly quite different in status and connections from the old landlords.

Furthermore, most of the members of the cooperatives have been made to enrol

on cooperative courses held in Khalis Town, to teach them the principles

and aims of the cooperative movement. Most of the peasants from the two

cooperatives were organised into teams by the Party and a timetable was

drawn up for their attendance on the courses. The educational aspect of

these courses was very considerable, as peasants from different areas of the

province were brought into contact with each other for the first time. They

no longer felt isolated, and experienced a sense of unity and strength.

The teachers on most of these courses were Iraqis trained either in Iraq

or in socialist countries, together with a number of teachers and technicians

from the German Democratic Republic under an agreement between the two

countries.

Perhaps one of the most interesting results of these latest developments

has been the very high level of solidarity and cohesion created among the

peasants. This has developed in spite of the bitterness felt by the "new-

comers" and Albu Razayyiq after the dismissal of their leaders from the

cooperative board. During my last visit I found that the two groups were

quite satisfied with the facilities and services provided by the cooperative,

and that even their attitudes towards the majlis al-idara had greatly changed.

In general these developments have cut across the 'lines' of kinship.

But the most crucial problem which faces the development of the cooperative movement in the village is that agricultural production activities have traditionally been based on the individual household. There is no tradition of cooperation in planting and harvesting, beyond that of exchange   labour in privately-owned fields. In this context it is significant that the range of activities organised by the new cooperatives is still very limited, and rarely includes joint cultivation. It would even be true to say that there has been a decline in the extent to which members of the new settlements cooperate for farming pruposes, due to the difficulties of establishing lines of communication and collaboration between rival sub-lineages.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the function of the Peasant Bureau and the Cooperative Societies in the village, and the impact of factionalism and rivalry among the peasants on these new organizations. Both of these organizations were designed primarily to enhance the economic position of Land Reform peasants, and also to be the main links between the rural areas and the central government. The peasants have certainly been encouraged to participate in local politics and to express their views about the new forces impinging on their own society. But many of their views and attitudes continue to be governed by their kinship affiliation and local political alliances. These recent reforms have brought the government into direct contact with the peasants for the first time in the modern history of Iraq. This political participation and various economic achievements have given some legitimacy for the Party to act as a regulator of formal political structures in the village.

The penetration of the Party organization among the peasants is a considerable step in terms of communication between the government and the rural population. Through these new organizations the government has begun

to play a prominent part in local affairs, which was previously the sole

preserve of the landlords, who nevertheless still enjoy a great deal of

power and authority in the village due to the fragmentation of groups and

the rivalries between them which have tended to discourage loyalty to the

new agencies. Furthermore, the Land Reform policy has not immediately

achieved radical improvements in the economic life of the peasants, many

of whom still work for and depend economically upon the landlords. The

landlords are still an important group in the village, and they use their

economic power to enhance their political position. Moreover, the private

sector cooperatives have maintained the landlords' economic advantages, while

the Land Reform cooperatives initially suffered considerable set-backs.

The latter were initially rather badly administered, and became the centres

of struggles between rival groups. Thus, in the earlier period particularly,

the landlords were able to impose their power on village society, since the

economic relationship between the peasants and themselves had not radically

changed. The peasants have certainly benefited from Land Reform since then,

but it has not completely eliminated their economic and political dependence

on the landlords. As a result the Party finds it difficult to establish a

sound political organization in the village.

The problem is not only that of setting up a new medium of communication,

but also that of taking local factors into account, since these affect the

local implementation of national policies. Although the Party has succeeded

in recruiting the peasants into its organization, they are often

motivated by a desire to strengthen their position vis a vis other kinship

groups. The local branch of the Party and particularly the Peasant Bureau

have provided new opportunities for competition among various kinship groups

in the same way as the cooperative societies. The present government and

the Party officials are aware of these problems, which they usually interpret

simply in terms of kinship loyalties, without any fundamental understanding

on their part of the way in which membership of different kinship or lineage groups continues to be associated with differential access to economic resources, and to political power or influence. The government also somewhat naively expects that the drive towards increased economic growth and political stability will solve many of these problems of development at the local level.

CHAPTER IX

The Role of Government Agencies and Local Leaders in Dispute Settlement

Introduction

In this chapter I shall focus on the problems arising from various intra-village conflicts and disputes and I shall also examine in detail a number of cases in order to determine the nature of the authority and power exercised by different groups. In this way I intend to illustrate the roles played in dispute settlement by the local government, the "traditional" heads of Albu 'Amir and Dulaim and the peasant leaders of sub-lineages who, under the present regime, have acquired new positions of power.

The intervention of these three groups - the local government, the "traditional" leaders and the leaders of the smaller kinship groups - in cases of dispute is influenced first of all by the nature of the conflict, since not all of these are the exclusive concern of one of the groups. Local government and the new Party-sponsored organisations try whenever possible, however, to dominate the field and to prevent the leaders of Albu 'Amir and Dulaim from intervening. In general, changes in local organisation have tended to weaken the effectiveness of, and the part played by, these "traditional" leaders in many aspects of village life. Increasingly the local government and the representatives of the newly-emerging power groups have begun to play a crucial role in these conflicts.

It is important to emphasize that the scope and organisation of the political field has been substantially affected by the land reform legislation and by the fact that the present government is greatly concerned to develop the rural areas and to change existing patterns of power relations. Before the implementation of the Land Reform of 1970, the village was divided into two separate parts controlled by the heads of Albu 'Amir and Dulaim, the two main lineage groups (see Chapter III). This division only rarely

resulted in open hostility arising between the two groups. Even when conflicts occurred over theft, or damage to one party's crops by another's animals, it was the responsibility of the heads of the two groups to settle the conflict through negotiations between them according to customary law ('urf). They also adjudicated on internal disputes.

This type of dispute settlement predominated during the Ottoman period in Iraq, when the local shaikhs were in conflict with the central power. Under British Occupation administration from 1914 to 1921, and after the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921, local shaikhs and heads of kinship groups were officially recognised in their positions, and given political and jural authority in the rural areas. Government policy at that time was to give local shaikhs a free hand in local affairs as long as this did not jeopardise the wider interests of the state.[1]

As a result of the weakening of the traditional system which followed the political changes after 1958, the landlords began to lose much of the coercive power which had been vested in them by the previous administration. This gradual breakdown of their authority intensified with the passage of time, in spite of the political instability throughout the country which lasted for several years after the 1958 Revolution and which enabled some local shaikhs to regain their power and authority temporarily.

The advent to power of the present government in 1968 was the major determinant in the loss of power and authority on the part of the local shaikhs

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1) The Tribal Criminal and Civil Dispute Regulation was enacted by the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force in 1916, on the lines of similar measures in force in India, to cover disputes in which "either or both of the parties (was) a tribesman". This was incorporated into Iraqi legislation in the early 1920's, and remained on the statute book until 1958. The Regulation created two sorts of legislation, one for tribesmen and one for 'others', and gave legal status to what the British authorities and their Iraqi successors alleged was customary tribal law. It will be clear that this was all part of the process of enhancing the powers of local leaders which took place in the course of the 'pacification' of the country between 1915 and the late 1930's. For further details see Sluglett, P., pp. 239-252, and pages 13-14 above.

and the changes in their social status. The present government has taken radical measures against landlords especially since the implementation of the 1970 Land Reform programme, which was accompanied by the establishment of new peasant settlements. These measures are especially important, because, for the first time, events in the wider political field have had important effects on the resolution of disputes and conflicts both between and within kinship groups. In the eyes of the government, conflict is aggravated by the existence of rival landlord families who still own vast amounts of land in the village, and have sought to build up alliances with peasants.

As has been shown, post-revolutionary policy, especially that pursued after 1968, has been to intervene directly in local affairs through the Party and the cooperative societies. This intervention is aimed mainly at completing the transfer of political power and authority previously held by the landlords to the State and the local peasants, and uses the Land Reform legislation to solve cases of conflict and dispute between peasants, so that the landlords are not in a position to exploit them.

This increasing assertion of centralised power has meant that the State claims the right to determine all disputes between individuals, even if it does not always do so. Successive post-Revolutionary governments have attempted to create conditions in which local issues, especially those directly connected with the Land Reform programme can be settled either by the people themselves or by local government, without reference to the landlords.

A central theme of this chapter is the contest between the so-called "traditional" and the new political authorities, which takes place largely in the context of the settlement of disputes between individual peasants and rival kinship groups. The individual peasant now has the choice of recourse to one or other of these authority structures, and his choice

confers legitimacy on the one he has chosen. In the section which follows

I shall examine cases of disputes and conflict to illustrate the factors

determining how choices between the two structures are made.[1]

Traditional methods of conflict resolution

The most acceptable method of solving conflicts (whether over politics,

women, land, irrigation rights or assault) is through mediation or arbitration

(wasta) by local leaders.[2] To approach government officials over a dispute

indicates a weaker position on the part of the individual or group who

does so - an implication which the person concerned and his group are anxious

to avoid. Moreover, even if the local government agrees to intervene and

actually settles the case formally, the need for mediation remains, because

the reconciliation of the parties is necessary for them to be able to re-

establish harmonious relations. Thus appeal to government does not eliminate

the need for mediation procedures, and it may in fact sometimes make their

success more difficult. Hence it is not surprising that there is considerable

resistance on the part of all social groups to going to formal litigation

in the government courts.

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1) "The analogy would hold, for example, where an Eskimo Shaman and a
   university-trained physician were actively soliciting patients in the
   same village; for it is unlikely in this case that they would be
   unaware of each other's success and failures. The critical decision
   facing the villager is whether to have his illness treated by the
   shaman (who represents the traditional structure) or by the physician
   (who represents the modern structure). The Zero-Game analogy is
   appropriate in this context because what one structure gains (i.e.
   the support of a patient), the other loses." (Clark, C. C. "Social
   Change and the Communication of Legitimacy: The Case of Dispute
   Settlement", in, The Journal of Developing Areas, 5 July 1971, p. 578).

2) In this discussion I use, following Gluckman and others, the terms
   'mediation' and 'arbitration' to distinguish between different
   degrees of authoritativeness and powers of enforcement in settling
   disputes. Thus, 'mediation' involves reconciliation of the parties
   concerned without recourse to strictly legal sanctions, whether under
   national or customary law ('urf), while 'arbitration' entails
   authoritative judgment and enforcement. For a fuller discussion of
   these dimensions see M. Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal
   Society, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965, pp. 183-9.

Due to the recent introduction of joint residence in the newly-established settlements there have been several conflicts between unrelated kinship groups. In fact, conflicts between these groups had already occurred long before they came to live jointly in a single location or settlement. Day to day contact, which contains elements of both cooperation and competition, has not yet developed into established and predictable types of relationships between groups, and this has sometimes led to open hostilities. Such conflicts range from trivial matters, such as quarrels between children, to serious ones such as assaults on women. In all these cases, the local administration does not interfere unless it is approached by the people themselves. When it does intervene, it will normally attempt to act as a mediator between the parties concerned. Pressures to settle differences as quickly and harmoniously as possible are very strong, since prolonged conflict makes daily life intolerable. In cases of dispute which may require some compensation, but which are not serious enough to necessitate the direct involvement of local government officials, the latter will try to persuade the parties to seek reparation through informal means. Here it is interesting to note that these officials never make direct reference to customary law or to the role of local arbitrators or councils, but clearly they prefer whenever possible to see matters dealt with in this way.

On the other hand, the villagers themselves also generally prefer to settle their disputes by approaching either agnatic or matrilateral kinsmen who can act as their mediators, or, if required, by recruiting an arbitrator. The process of dispute settlement that follows from this is handled according to unwritten pre-Islamic customary law ('urf) which is accepted unofficially by the civil authorities.

The reconciliation council or majlis al-tardhia

Whenever a conflict arises the older men usually intervene to 'freeze' hostilities by suggesting that it should be settled by mediation or arbitration.

Go-betweens (wusata') are chosen by both parties concerned and discussions take place about reconciliation. The go-betweens are usually selected because of some close personal tie between them (i.e. they are either kinsmen or friends). If it is decided to proceed further to hear the case before an arbitrator, who ideally should be unaffiliated to either party (a 'neutral' person), then the injured party is asked to choose a place for the hearing. This place must also be acceptable to the offender. In the case of disagreement, the appointed arbitrator, who is chosen for his wisdom, knowledge of custom and impartiality, will step in and invite them to his guesthouse or to that of some other neutral person. The decision by the offending party to present himself at the guesthouse of the plaintiff is generally interpreted as a sign of his guilt and of his readiness to confess and settle the case.

After the location of the hearing has been agreed upon, the arbitrator determines the amount of the farsha. This is the money handed over to the owner of the guesthouse, and the amount varies according to the nature of the case and the number of people invited to observe the proceedings and to serve as witnesses. The farsha is expected to cover all the expenses of food and entertainment incurred by the host. Both parties to the conflict give farsha to their host before the hearing takes place, except when the offender publicly confesses his wrong-doing in advance. In such cases, the farsha is paid by him alone.

The arbitrator together with a number of men chosen to represent the two parties make up the 'reconciliation council' (majlis al-tardhia). The size of the council and the mode of selection vary somewhat according to the nature of the dispute. Normally both parties will choose members of the majlis by selecting an equal number from two lists of nominees drawn up by themselves and discussed with the arbitrator. Throughout the proceedings that follow, the arbitrator acts as the chairman of the majlis.

On the day appointed for the hearing decided by the arbitrator, members of the majlis meet with the leaders of the sub-lineages or kinship groups of the disputants and with any other guests who are invited by the respective parties. After both the accuser and the accused have sworn on the Qur'an that they will tell the truth, their testimony is heard and the members of the majlis cross-examine them to clarify certain points. The majlis then withdraw to an adjacent room to reach its verdict; and, if the offender is found guilty, a decision is made to the amount of his fine.

Before the arbitrator announces the verdict publicly, the majlis transmits its decision to the heads of both disputants' kinship group. If a fine is imposed, the amount announced publicly by the arbitrator is almost always reduced, because the guests at the hearing generally prevail upon the injured party's family to do so - in honour of the members of the majlis, and of any other respected figures attending the proceedings. The majlis normally assigns a kafil or guarantor to each of the disputants to make certain that the verdict is carried out. The persons performing this role are prominent figures who have been nominated and selected by both parties. The verdict is usually unanimous, and should any members of either disputant's family or lineage challenge it, he would be publicly ostracised by his group and would no longer be given support or protection.

At the completion of the hearing, the offender and the offended kiss each others forehead, shake hands and declare that the quarrel is at an end. Members of the majlis, the guests and other persons invited to observe the case all join together to share the meal prepared by their host. In Islamic tradition, the judges constituting the majlis will be rewarded by God for their participation. They also achieve high status and respect in the village for their part in restoring harmonious relations between individuals and families.

Grounds for conflict or dispute

Conflicts arise between persons and groups in the local settlements
or neighbourhoods for a number of overt reasons. These conflicts may or may
not escalate to village level; also, if the arbitrators fail to arrive at
a satisfactory solution, mutual hostility will persist between the two groups.
The decline in the importance of major kinship groupings such as the tribe
and the major lineages, and the fact that Dulaim and Albu 'Amir have been
dispersed among the new settlements, have complicated the functioning of
the arbitration process in recent times.

The traditional objects of conflict have been of two types, the first
being issues of "face" or honour, usually connected with the chastity of women.
Quarrels of this type frequently have serious consequences for all the
members of the kinship group involved. The second, and more fundamentally
important type, is that of conflicts arising over boundaries and the
distribution of irrigation water, since land and water are the main
productive resources of the village.

Conflict over the location of the boundaries usually involves the
disputants and the local government alone, whereas conflicts over irrigation
necessarily also involve the shaikh's family, since the latter is still in
control of most of the mechanical pumps which provide water for the new
Land Reform settlements.

The struggle over irrigation takes place mainly between the local
government and the shaikh's family, each of which tries to impose his will
upon the other. The irrigation system which the contending parties are
obliged to maintain is an integral part of the village economy and depends
entirely upon the utilisation of mechanical pumps. This is because
precipitation is always insufficient for adequate irrigation, and also because
most of the land lies fairly high above the level of the river. The majority
of the pumps are privately owned· twelve by the shaikh's family and that
of his cousins, and eight by the Dulaim leaders, thus leaving only two in

the control of the Land Reform cooperatives.

With the notable exception of the pumps owned by the shaikh of Albu
'Amir and his cousins, most of the private pumps (those owned by Dulaim)
are of low capacity and are used to irrigate their owners' orchards along
the banks of the Tigris. The share received by the owners of a private
pump amounts to 25% of gross production, under a contract drawn up by the
mudir. The contract between the pump-owners and the peasants gives the
mudir the right to intervene on behalf of the latter, who are supposed to
take their grievances to him. Most disputes arise during times of severe
water-shortage, and are caused either by deliberate interruptions of the
water supply or by delays in repairing broken pumps.

State intervention in the control of the irrigation system must be
viewed in the context of the present government's policy of transforming
the whole foundations on which the rural power structure was established
and maintained. Without irrigation, settled life and cultivation are
impossible, as the region would become a desert. Strong government involvement
is necessary to exercise proper social, economic and technical control of
irrigation, especially in a situation where the irrigation pumps are
owned and controlled mainly by groups hostile to the Land Reform programme.
Increased government involvement in the rural areas has resulted in inevitable
clashes of interests between the various parties involved in this process.

The struggle for power between the different groups, especially
between the local government, as represented by the mudir, and the family
of the shaikh of Albu 'Amir, is caused by a deep-rooted and long-standing
mutual mistrust between the government and the shaikhs. This is the
product of a series of attempts on the part of successive governments to extend
their sovereignty over the country, ever since the creation of the independent
state of Iraq in 1921.

Previously, the irrigation system and supply of water was controlled

almost exclusively by the shaikh's family. This monopoly no longer exists,
in that the <u>mudir</u> now plays an important role in decisions about irrigation.
As a result, the local government finds itself concerned with irrigation
disputes all the year round, especially during the summer cultivation
period. These disputes either take place among the peasants themselves,
or between the peasants and the pump-owners, who often deliberately provoke
both the government and the peasants. Although many of the disputes over
water are still resolved directly with the pump-owners - which apparently
limits the government's effective role in village affairs - this should not
imply that the family of the shaikh of Albu 'Amir has completely succeeded
in maintaining its power <u>vis-a-vis</u> the local government.

To explain the interplay between the different parties, I shall begin
by examining the irrigation system in the Land Reform settlements. Here I
shall focus on problems which relate to the recent establishment of State
bureaucratic agencies in the village. I shall also discuss the administration's
attempts to deprive the shaikh's family further of the powers which it had
already begun to lose and will outline the ways in which the family
retaliated.

Conflict at settlement level

As has been explained earlier in Chapter IV, the basic structural unit
in each settlement is the <u>bayt</u>, or sub-lineage, three to four generations
in depth and containing usually not more than fifteen to twenty males, with
their wives and children. Matrilateral relatives also reside in the
settlement, but rarely predominate numerically. Membership of agnatic groups
gives individuals the right to a share in the land and the right to expect
mutual aid.

Members of a descent-group or <u>bayt</u> who function as a separate social
and economic unit have several kinship ties with similar named groups on
adjacent and jointly-held land within the settlement. Parallel-cousin

marriage and co-residence in the same block in the settlement make the

kinship group the most important unit in the life of the individual.

In practice, each bayt functions as a political group; and genealogies become

charters of political allegiance. Ideally, as the Arabic proverb proclaims:

"Myself against my brother, my brother and I against my cousin, my cousin

and I against the world."

One of the most important functions of the bayt is to settle, through

the elders, quarrels that arise between members. Not only are the members

anxious to keep their disputes away from the other groups in the same

settlement and from the local government, but the local government and

other groups are usually themselves reluctant to intervene. When a dispute

breaks out between two men - say, rivalry over women or trespass on farmland -

each will call his close male relatives to his assistance. Thus, if the

disputants belong respectively to groups A and B, as in the diagram below,

all members of A will combine to face those of B. Ultimately, a settlement

is reached because the two sections are closely connected through kinship,

and neither can, in practice, coerce the other. The values of the society

strongly urge a peaceful settlement between closely related groups. In

achieving the settlement, however, a major role is played by the elders.

Each bayt, through its elders, can act as an extended family made up

of several households, on one hand and as a political group vis-a-vis other

kinship groups on the other. As it compels a cohesive unity both internally

and externally, so its members have both an obligation to settle disputes,

and the means to hand of finding peaceful solutions.

In situations of conflict between two unrelated kinship groups sharing

a single settlement, whose relations are often characterised by mutual

distrust and suspicion, the case is different, though here again the elders

play a crucial role in preventing the dispute from escalating to settlement

level. Before discussing this matter in depth, it is useful to look at

the problems that arise within one particular settlement (salaf): although

this limits the perspective, it sheds light on some of the causes of conflict

in the village as a whole.

Conflict arises over a variety of issues and involves different groups.

The most important issue in Da'udia during my fieldwork was the allocation

of water, but the theft of water or complaints of insufficient water were

not in fact the main causes of these quarrels. A far more significant

factor was the political leverage which each group sought to exercise over

the others in order either to expel them from the land or to outstrip them,

by getting more land for themselves or their close relatives. As I shall

show later in the chapter, these were precisely the tactics used by the

leading family of Albu 'Amir towards its rivals when it attempted in various

ways to deny them water from the irrigation pumps which it controlled.

Case study: Water disputes in Settlement no. 3

al-Intinsar or "Victory" Settlement, Settlement no. 3, was occupied

by two groups each containing twenty-three households living in two separate

blocks. Although they belonged to the same lineage, Albu 'Amir, they no longer

considered each other as relatives. One group, Albu 'Ayyada sub-lineage,

was indigenous to the area, while the second group - al-'Arafna or the

al-Misarra "newcomers" were outsiders who had been recently moved into the

area by the government.[1] The two were frequently in conflict. A brief

description of the operation of the irrigation system will be useful here,

in order to understand the dispute which follows.

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1) For further discussion of the relationship between the two groups of
   al-Misarra, see Chapter VI.

The cultivated land of al-Intisar salaf is irrigated by six small canals (nahr) which draw their water from a main canal running along the northern border of the salaf which belongs to the present shaikh's cousins (IC3-9), who also control the nearby irrigation pumps.

The irrigation system in the salaf depends on the allocation of a specified number of waqts, or periods, during each agricultural season, each waqt being equal to the period from sunrise to sunset. The two groups received water as follows:

1. Albu 'Ayyada   :   6 waqts of water per week

2. Al-'Arafna   :   6 waqts of water per week

One 24-hour day therefore consists of two waqts. The irrigation system powered by the pumps operates six days a week, since the pumps do not function on Fridays. During the winter each group has six periods, that is, three consecutive days, of water every week. However, a different system prevails during the summer, when the rate of evaporation is high; each group then has water for 24 hours every other day. Both groups meet to discuss the arrangements for each season. The allotment of times is then recorded in the Agricultural Office, as a "contract" which can be referred to if either party breaks the agreement.

The ra'is salaf is in charge of the irrigation in his settlement, and he also arranges water distribution with other aslaf, via the Agricultural Office. The Agricultural Office also fixes the dates for cleaning (hashur) the canals and advises the presidents of the aslaf to inform their members. The canals are usually cleaned twice a year, before the winter cultivation and during the period of preparation for summer cultivation. The ra'is salaf of a multi-bayt settlement usually advises the heads of the bayts individually to organise their members to report for work. On the appointed day the peasants assemble in groups at the end of the canal behind the salaf and the ra'is salaf assigns a portion of the canal to each group. The

length of each tract is measured according to a <u>rabud</u> or the length of a
shovel handle.

Other irrigation tasks are carried out independently by both groups
in al-Intisar <u>salaf</u>. Each household is allocated a certain period of water
time within the time granted to his group. Disputes over water among
the peasants within a group are normally solved locally by the head of
the group. Disputes between groups require a third party to arbitrate.

In al-Intisar settlement the Albu 'Ayyada group consisted of fourteen
landholding peasant households, as against some twenty-three for al-'Arafna.
The original settlers of Albu 'Ayyada, however, were a smaller group. It
was only later when they invited some of their agnatic kinsmen who had been
working for the shaikh as sharecroppers that they reached a comparable size
to that of al-'Arafna. But, in order to settle these landless relatives
who came somewhat later, it was necessary to occupy unallocated land which
at the time was being exploited illegally by al-'Arafna. This unallocated
land consisted of seven plots, totalling some 126 donums, on which about 22
individuals were settled.

Not surprisingly al-'Arafna objected to the take-over, and since then
relations between the two groups have deteriorated considerably. Although
they sometimes carry out joint work, such as cleaning the canals, they refuse
to talk to each other and usually keep social distance. These problems
were further exacerbated in the summer of 1975 by a woman from Albu 'Ayyada
who diverted water away from the plot of a peasant from al-'Arafna. The
peasant immediately insulted and beat her. The girl returned crying to the
settlement where her group was living, and told them about the incident.
Such an action is considered a particularly grave offence, especially when
directed against a woman.

The reaction of Albu 'Ayyada to this insult was twofold. First, they
instantly informed the <u>mudir</u> who arrested the peasant, and second, they

showed their discontent by refusing to attend the literacy classes in
the company of the other group, [1] unless compensation was paid to them.
Hence arbitration was required to solve the problem according to customary
law or 'urf. Two days later, pressure was exerted on al-'Arafna by their
Misarri friends and relatives in Settlement no. 4, as well as by the mudir
and Party officials, to settle the matter peacefully.

Following this, a delegation made up of representatives of both al-
'Arafna and Albu 'Ayyada approached Jawir, the leader of the al-Misarra
"newcomers", who had considerable influence with al-'Arafna, to ask him
to arbitrate. The members of al-'Arafna argued that the problem could be
settled peacefully if Albu 'Ayyada promised not to take the case to court,
and if the mudir arranged for the immediate release of the peasant who had
been arrested. These demands were agreed to by Albu 'Ayyada and, as a token
of good will, they also promised to attend the literacy classes once the
settlement was finally reached. Five days later, the two groups gathered
in the guesthouse of Albu 'Ayyada and, under the arbitration of Jawir, begun
to discuss the case. The meeting was attended by the leaders of both
disputants.

Jawir opened the meeting by attempting to calm the atmosphere by
talking about the importance of maintaining brotherly and friendly relation-
ships under both Islamic and Arab tradition. He also reviewed the differences
which had arisen in the village in the past, and suggested that both the
groups should behave wisely and sensibly. Jawir's aim was to create a good
atmosphere and to encourage the participants to be magnaminous and moderate.
Immediately after this, the settlement procedures took place as described
above.

After the discussions between the representatives of both groups with

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1) The literacy courses established by the government were supposed to
   be attended by all - one course for men, one for women.

the arbitrator, al'Arafna brought in the offending peasant who confessed

his error in front of all of them and apologised by kissing the heads of

the Albu 'Ayyada elders, especially the father and brothers of the girl.

Al-'Arafna declared its readiness to pay the fasl (or compensation) of

£50, the sum agreed to by the arbitrator and the parties concerned.

Discussion

Irrespective of the nature of a dispute and the level on which it

occurs, local mediation and arbitration are almost always sought and implemented

for two main reasons. First, there is the realisation that a resolution

will allow the parties to restore peaceful relations. The second is the

desire to localise the scope of the conflict. The peasants choose not to

seek direct government intervention, and the government prefers not to be

asked to intervene in local quarrels unless matters get out of hand. This

unwillingness stems from the fact that, unless a group manages to impose

its will upon another by force, there is no need for the local government

to intervene. Moreover the local Party and the Peasant Bureau are often

able to infiltrate local groups, persuading them to solve their problems by

themselves rather than having recourse to the landlords. In the case

described above, we find that the disputing parties approach Jawir, a

member of the Peasant Bureau, who brings in the mudir, a Party-appointed

official; but Jawir's involvement arises primarily from the fact that he is

a member of the al-Misarra lineage to which both the parties belong, rather

than in his capacity as a Party member holding an official position in the

Peasant Bureau, although indirectly the Party is thus fully informed of

the case. At the time, the disputing groups were both facing difficult

relations with the leading families of Albu 'Amir and Hajj Hasan and could

not have approached them easily even if they had wished to do so.

The recruitment of peasants into the Party has profoundly affected

intra-salaf relationships and the village as a whole, although peasant rank
and file Party members are still aligned by kinship groupings. The sub-
lineages have encouraged their adult male members to participate in the
Peasant Bureau and each kinship group competes with each other, aiming to
increase its sphere of action and be more effective on salaf and village
level, especially in local government affairs. The Party, too, has every
interest in encouraging this process. Peasants regularly visit Party
Headquarters in groups to consult the secretary or his deputy on a wide
variety of problems. When I asked these peasants why they were there, a
common reply was:- "If the Party does not help us, who will?"[1]

It is of course difficult to predict how effective this process
will be, but there has certainly been a development of new channels of
communication, generating new loyalties which may well in the long run
replace old ones. To contact "outsiders", such as the Party, is becoming
less of a sign of shame or an indication of weakness. On the other hand,
Party members are keen that peasant problems should be solved in accordance
with Party principles. In general, however, the success of the government
and the Party in these situations depends on the difficult task of carefully
considering a number of factors operating within village society, in order
to win the confidence of the local people. Hence Party members and the
mudir are reluctant to involve themselves directly, and prefer to wait
until approached, except in serious situations.

Conflicts between settlements

Conflicts within a settlement, as we have seen, can be resolved by
various means. But what about disputes which involve two or more settlements
sharing a single water resource? Here the situation is more complex

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1) "Idha al-hizb ma yasa'duna, minu yasa'duna?"

because of variations in the social and ecological circumstances. In these cases, the role of the mudir assumes greater importance, especially when the irrigation water comes from a pump controlled by the local cooperative societies.

As I indicated earlier, regulation of the use of canal water which is allocated to a single settlement is a matter for purely internal arrangement, whereas when more than one settlement is involved the system is more complicated. Although each settlement is allocated water at a particular time, no one settlement can be completely independent and self-sufficient. Neighbouring settlements must collaborate for irrigation purposes, building and maintaining dams together. Moreover, it must be emphasised that the cultivators, as in the case noted by Fernea for Daghara Village, do not establish a new canal system and redistribute their water every year. Once a system of field canals has been dug, it commonly remains unaltered season after season, and the allocation of water distribution between themselves is unimportant compared with their joint concern with having an adequate allocation of water from the government."[1] A comparable situation prevails among the peasants in the case-study that follows. Most of the conflict that occurred between the settlements sharing a single pump and canal was over the water periods allocated to each of them and over persistent attempts to steal the water by closing down the sluice gates during the night, especially on the part of those whose plots were farthest away from the water source.

Case Study: Dispute over water allocation

The case of Albu 'Inad sub-lineage of Albu Khamis (see Genealogy III) which occupy part of Settlement no. 4, provides a pertinent example of struggles over water distribution.

After Albu 'Inad succeeded in establishing their own block in Settlement

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1)   R. Fernea, Shaykh and Effendi, 1970, p. 127.

no. 4,[1] they joined with Settlement no. 5 for irrigation purposes. This
was done with government help after the head of Albu 'Inad had complained
that it was impossible to share the water for irrigation with the other
people in Settlement no. 4 because of the antagonism that had developed
between them.

Settlement no. 5 was composed of three groups which were considered
to be unfriendly toward Albu 'Inad. These three groups were Albu Razayyiq
of the "original" al-Misarra, some of the "newcomers", and some members
of Albu Musluh of Dulaim. The four groups shared a pump belonging
to the same cooperative society. All of them participated equally in the
operating costs of the pump (e.g. the purchase of the oil and the salary
paid to the driver), regardless of the periods assigned to them for
irrigation. Moreover, the four groups shared one major canal which ran the
whole length of the area which they occupied. The responsibility for
cleaning this canal lay with each group of peasants according to the tracts
of land they controlled.

Generally, disputes over water allocation or theft are reported
immediately to the mudir, if the heads of the groups have failed to settle
their grievances. The most frequent complaints during 1974-75 came from
the peasants of Albu 'Inad who occupied the land at the far end of the area
controlled by the original three groups (see Table overleaf). Albu 'Inad's land
was higher than the land of the other three groups, and they therefore
required a longer irrigation period.

A conflict among the four groups developed when the head of Albu 'Inad
approached the other three to increase the periods assigned to his salaf
to compensate for the slower flow of water. After a hot debate, the heads
of the three groups refused to change the timetable previously agreed on,

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1) See Chapter VII, for details.

and claimed that the Albu 'Inad sub-lineage wanted to change the system in order to cultivate additional land given to them by the shaikh's cousins. Then the head of Albu 'Inad (III, D4) immediately petitioned the mudir for a more equal distribution of the water among the four groups. Following this, the mudir investigated the allegation of unequal access to water but in the end concluded that it was groundless.

In the light of advice provided by the Agricultural Office, who examined the land elevation for each of the four groups, the mudir finally ruled that the periods, waqts, assigned to each of them should be as follows:

Name of kinship group	No. of peasant households	Former waqts	New waqts
"newcomers" (al-Misarra)	10	3	2
Albu 'Inad	8	2	4
Albu Razayyiq	13	3	2
Dulaim	10	3	2

(Albu 'Amir brackets Albu 'Inad and Albu Razayyiq)

Moreover, the leaders of the Albu Razayyiq and the "newcomers" assumed an obligation to safeguard the pledge they made before the mudir, who threatened them that they would be arrested in the event of a breakdown of the agreement.

Before discussing the significance of this case, it is useful to consider a second, more serious dispute which arose between Settlements no. 3 and no. 4 over an alleged attempt at seduction.

Case Study: A question of love and honour

During the summer of 1975 an incident occurred involving a young man (IV FI) from Albu 'Ayyada in Settlement no. 3 and a girl (III E8) from Albu 'Inad in Settlement no. 4. The girl was a member of Albu Khamis lineage, while the young man belonged to the al-Misarra lineage of the same group of Albu 'Amir. Rumour had it that the young man had tried to seduce the girl in a field separating the two settlements. The girl screamed and her mother arrived on the scene: the young man fled, and later sought refuge in Baghdad in the house of an agnatic kinsman.

Albu 'Ayyada immediately contacted the <u>mudir</u> to inform him that they planned to bring the young man back from Baghdad. At the same time, relatives of the girl from Settlement no. 1 started to gather with their rifles at the guesthouse of Albu 'Inad. The <u>mudir</u> responded by posting police around the area of Settlements no. 3 and 4 to prevent any further escalation of the incident. However, the man's relatives managed to find him in Baghdad and he was brought back to the village to be held in custody until the <u>majlis</u> hearing.

After three days, Albu 'Ayyada sent a friend to Albu 'Inad to settle the problem in the customary (<u>'urfi</u>) way, and suggested solving it with the help of the shaikh's cousins (IC3-9) who would act as arbitrators. Albu 'Inad accepted this offer of solving the problem by customary method but insisted that the shaikh, who was at that time in Mecca, should judge the matter. During the time between the actual occurrence of the event and the return of the shaikh to the village some six weeks later, the shaikh's cousins were active in inciting the Albu 'Ayyada to reject any suggestion of the shaikh taking a major part, telling them that the shaikh would take revenge on them, by exploiting the case for what they had done in the past.[1] However, Albu 'Inad steadfastly insisted on solving the problem through the arbitration of the shaikh, and eventually both parties agreed to this.

In order to impress the shaikh with their respect and loyalty, Albu 'Ayyada went as a group to visit him at his guesthouse on his return from Mecca. After they had congratulated him on his trip, the head of Albu 'Ayyada sub-lineage (IV E7) requested that he might speak with the shaikh alone. During this brief conversation he explained from their point of view the

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1)   Albu 'Ayyada of al-Misarra lineage were the group who, together with Dulaim incited the peasants to take control of the land expropriated from the shaikh's family after 1968.

whole incident with Albu 'Inad. At the same time he gave the shaikh ID 100

as a farsha, which was in turn given by the shaikh to the head of Albu 'Inad

(III D4), so that he might prepare for the meal which would be eaten after

the settlement of the dispute. Under the chairmanship of the shaikh and

the heads of both the groups involved, the majlis sat in the guesthouse

of Albu 'Inad. In this way the composition of the majlis was a deviation

from the customary procedure which required that it should also include

neutral members. In this case, the heads of the two groups in dispute were

members of the majlis. As the Albu 'Ayyada group explained after the

problem was settled, the reason why it happened this way was because the

shaikh had told them that there was no need to involve ghuraba' (strangers)

in the case because they were ahl, "people of one house and relatives", [1]

and so should solve their problems among themselves.

On the appointed date, the hearing was held under the chairmanship

of the shaikh. After heated discussion between the members of the two groups,

which sometimes had to be calmed down by the shaikh and his brothers who

attended the hearing with him, the young man was summoned. The shaikh

questioned the man, who, as a result of pressure exerted on the mudir

by his group, had been released from prison on bail. He said that he was

in love with the girl and had been talking with her about marriage and

enquiring whether she thought that her father and 'ammam would agree to it,

when her mother saw them and screamed. He denied that he was attempting to

seduce the girl and blamed her mother for the incident, since he knew she

was not in favour of the proposed marriage. He added that the girl had told

her mother a long time before about his intentions, but she had ignored

her time and again. When the young man had completed his evidence, the

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1)   Both Albu 'Inad and Albu 'Ayyada belong to Albu 'Amir to which the
       shaikh himself belongs.

shaikh reproached him and said that if he had wanted to marry the girl he should not have consulted her or even contacted her. The man, the shaikh stressed, should consult the men, not the women, about such affairs. He then accused the boy of damaging the honour of the girl's family and her kinship group. Following this, the shaikh and the heads of the groups involved withdrew to discuss the matter in private.

Later the shaikh returned to give judgment. The girl's family was awarded the equivalent of £500 in compensation, but this was reduced to £300 after appeals were made by the aggrieved party in honour of the dignatories attending. The girl's family agreed not to take the case to the government court, but, even so, the sum paid represented the whole of the life savings of the young man's father.[1] The next day, the father was found dead in his bed and people speculated whether this was not due to the fact that he was unable to face the decision having gone against him and his family. They accused the shaikh of having favoured his own lineage, Albu 'Inad, and of having demanded so excessively large a sum in compensation. This whole situation of antagonism against the shaikh and his family was, of course, eagerly exploited by the local branch of the Party in an attempt to discredit them.

Discussion

The central role played by the mudir in the first case concerning the dispute over water allocation was made possible primarily by the fact that he was at one and the same time the head of local government, a Party member and also the representative of Settlement no. 5 in the Peasant Bureau.[2]

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1) Attempted seduction, together with adultery and elopement, is considered a 'black crime' (al-sawda) in Iraqi rural society. The culprit and his nuclear family are expected to bear the full responsibility for paying the compensation, although, as Salim comments for the marsh dwellers of the Euphrates delta, this may not always work out in practice as the group of brothers (khawwal) may offer contributions. See S. M. Salim, (Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta, University of London, The Athlone Press, 1962), pp. 51-2. In the case reported above, it was the father who paid the full amount.

2) See Chapter VIII.

This combination of roles meant that the peasants from Settlement no. 5 could hardly ignore or resist his recommendations. If they did, they might find it difficult later to approach him for other favours. His success might also be attributed to the following factors: first, the dwindling importance of the landlords and shaikhs in cases of dispute involving unrelated kinship groups, and second, the increasingly insignificant role played by religious leaders (sayyids) who claim descent from the Prophet and who, in the past, had acted as mediators in village affairs.

These holy men (sayyids), whether Shi'i or Sunni, were persons respected by their followers for their knowledge of religious and ethical matters. They devoted much of their time and effort to the service of the community, and participated in the social and religious affairs of their groups. They also performed the roles of mediators and arbitrators in intra-village disputes, although it was the shaikhs and the elders of the lineages and kinship groups who implemented their judgments.

The declining importance of the shaikhs and sayyids must be seen in relation to the mixed composition of Settlements 4 and 5 where we find both Shi'i (Albu 'Amir) and Sunni (Dulaim) Muslims.[1] In these circumstances, mediation by sayyids (or shaikhs) would have been rather difficult and probably impossible.

When I asked the head of Albu 'Inad what he was likely to do in case of continuing problems of water theft on the part of one or the other three kinship groups, his immediate reply was that he would go straight to the mudir to ask him to take charge of the keys to the sluice gate instead of allowing them to be in the control of those living closest to it, as is the normal practice. Albu 'Inad's reply clearly illustrates the growing role that

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1) The main division was between Albu 'Inad of Settlement no. 4 who were aligned with the shaikh of Albu 'Amir, and the three groups (Albu Razayyiq; Al-Misarra "newcomers"; and Dulaim) who supported Hajj Hasan of Dulaim. For details see Chapter V and VI.

local government can play in such situations.

The selection of mediators/arbitrators is generally based on the relations that exist between the disputants as well as on the nature of the dispute. In this case, a series of divisions based in part on genealogical and religious differences but complicated by political alliance made it impossible for the four groups to agree on the appointment of local mediators, whether sayyids, shaikhs or lineage elders. It is for this reason that the mudir assumed a major role in the arbitration process. There was no way in which the dispute could be settled easily otherwise. Indeed the problems had in the first place been generated because of the re-organisation of land and settlement patterns,which had radical implications for the structure and functioning of the lineage system.

Nevertheless, in spite of the changes consequent upon increasing government involvement in local affairs, shaikhs and landlords still continue to receive the respect and regard of many. This is illustrated in the second case study which indicates the areas of social life in which the local landlords and shaikhs are still of importance. In this incident Albu 'Ayyada had no alternative but to surrender to the pressures from Albu 'Inad,who insisted that they solve the problem of the attempted seduction through the arbitration of the shaikh. Both parties in this case wished to keep the quarrel within a small circle and thus to avoid the possibility of a public scandal developing if the mudir should refer the case to the court in Baghdad.[1]

As a matter of principle, the local administration and Party are anxious to break the power of shaikhs and landlords whenever possible. However, when disputes occur over matters of honour, especially those involving women, the officials are inclined to step aside to avoid embarrassment. In such cases

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1) It is common practice for cases of al-sawda to be handled outside the formal legal system. This even applies to middle-class groups in Baghdad.

the shaikh or the Dulaim elders[1] are normally called upon to act as mediators

by the parties concerned. The Party is anxious to avoid involvement in

such matters, since it is well aware that whatever the outcome, there

is always one dissatisfied group.

Conflict between the local government and the shaikh's family

Although the power of the shaikh's family has been substantially under-

mined by the new Land Reform legislation and by changes in national politics,

the shaikh continues to exercise an important influence on peasant economic

and political behaviour by virtue of his control of the mechanical pumps

which supply a large part of the village irrigation system. This has led to

major confrontations between the shaikh's family and local government

officials. Moreover, the shaikh remains in possession of considerable land-

holdings (totalling 3000 donums), which are worked on a sharecropping basis

by peasants whose own plots of land are too small or too unproductive to meet

their basic subsistence needs. This creates a dual loyalty on the part of

the peasants who both support the new Land Reform measures, and look at the

same time towards the shaikh for work and economic assistance. This situation

produces a pattern of cross-cutting interests which allows the shaikh consider-

able political manoeuvre vis-a-vis the local government officials. These

aspects are explored in the case that follows.

Case Study: Access to pumps - a critical resource

During the summer of 1975, the government took over land in Bad'a al-

Janubia (South Bad'a) belonging to eleven al-Misarra "newcomers" in Settlement

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1) The involvement of both the shaikh and the Dulaim elders in dispute
   settlement depends on the parties' kinship relationships to them.
   Thus if there is a dispute involving peasants from Dulaim and Albu
   'Amir, and the parties insist on solving it tribally, they usually
   call in both the shaikh and a Dulaim leader.

no. 4 and granted them other plots in Umm Rahayyil in al-Bad'a al-Shamalia

(North Bad'a), which is in close proximity to the shaikh's estate (see

Map 4). According to an estimate by the Agricultural Office, the new area

consisting of 360 donums was adequate to serve some twenty peasant households.

Umm Rahayyil was one of the most fertile tracts of land expropriated from the

shaikh's family under the Land Reform, but it had been allowed to remain

uncultivated and unirrigated.[1] Before the application of the Land Reform,

the shaikh had installed an auxiliary pump, safariyya or rahhala, there,

to lift the water drawn up by the main pump from the Tigris to the required

level, as the tract lay slightly higher than the surrounding land. Using

this device he was able to cultivate the land, planting various crops.

Immediately after it became known in the village that part of Umm

Rahayyil had been allocated to the eleven al-Misarra "newcomer" families,

a further nine peasants who were sharecroppers of the shaikh, and two others

from the lineage of Hajj Hasan of Dulaim, presented petitions to the mudir

asking that the rest of Umm Rahayyil should be distributed amongst them

because of their poor economic circumstances. These petitions were sent by

the mudir to the Peasant Bureau for a final decision. The meeting of the

Bureau decided that the land should be shared out amongst the peasants of Hajj

Hasan's lineage, although the mudir himself expressed concern, realising

that there might be difficulties over access to irrigation water.

Meanwhile, the leader of the eleven al-Misarra peasants had approached

the shaikh privately to request that he provide them with water by reinstalling

his auxiliary pump in Umm Rahayyil. This was accepted by the shaikh on

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1) When I questioned the people of the village why such a good plot of
    land should remain abandoned after the Land Reform, I was told that it
    was haunted by the spirits of Turkish and British soldiers killed in
    battle during the First World War. This story, however, did not
    prevent the shaikh from cultivating the land prior to the imple-
    mentation of the Land Reform, nor did it greatly affect the proposal
    to settle various peasant households there in 1975 when pressure of
    population on land was increasingly becoming a major problem.

condition that the rest of Umm Rahayyil be given to his sharecroppers and members of his lineage. Following this, the al-Misarra peasants begun a campaign to persuade the different parties, including the _mudir_ and the Peasant Bureau, to support the petition of the shaikh's sharecroppers. This they argued on the grounds that (a) Umm Rahayyil could not be cultivated unless the shaikh provided it with irrigation water, and (b) it would be difficult for topographical and political reasons for the shaikh's cousins to offer an alternative supply i.e. it would be necessary to excavate a canal through the shaikh's estate. As a result, the _mudir_ promised that he would try his best to convince the Peasant Bureau of the logic of this argument.

However, when the Bureau discovered that private discussions had taken place between the shaikh and the al-Misarra peasants, they ordered the _mudir_ to investigate the matter and the role played by the shaikh. This placed the _mudir_ in a somewhat contradictory position. But in the end, the affair came to nothing as the shaikh promptly denied having talked with the al-Misarra peasants. He also explained that he had sold his auxiliary pump a long time ago and that his present pumps were only sufficient to irrigate his own estate and the plots that he was already supplying. Since that time Umm Rahayyil has remained uncultivated due to lack of irrigation.

Discussion

Although theoretically the _mudir_ is supposed to supervise the irrigation in the village, in practice, as the above case shows, he is often not in a position to enforce his decisions or those taken by the Peasant Bureau. This arises fundamentally from the fact that the shaikh and other prominent landlords control all but two of the mechanical pumps necessary for irrigation. It is also partly explained by the structurally ambivalent position of many of the peasant groups who are thoroughly in favour of the Land Reform programme but are also afraid of antagonising the landlords and risking the chance of losing the supply of irrigation water to their plots.

In most cases, problems of water shortage are handled by negotiating with the pump owners through the supervisors of the cooperative societies, and not through the mudir. Peasants are fully aware of the opposition of interests existing between the shaikh and the local government officials and thus prefer to work through minor officials whose role is advisory. The cooperative supervisor is able to discuss the matter directly with the pump owners and, only in cases of continuous water shortage and deliberate sabotage by the pump owners, will he report the case to the mudir himself. If the mudir is called in then he is expected to extract an agreement from the pump owners that they will not disrupt the flow of water in future, although frequently the latter argue that the problems had been caused by mechanical failures or misunderstandings on the part of the pump operator.

Peasants, then, are reluctant to complain openly to local government of breaches of contract on the part of pump owners. If they do wish themselves to pursue the matter beyond the cooperative supervisor, they will tend to appeal through the Peasant Bureau, which enables them to conceal their individual identities, although there is no guarantee that the case will be dealt with swiftly and satisfactorily. Generally, in such cases, the issues are doubly complicated by the fact that different kinship groups within and between settlements are thrown into fierce competition for access to limited supplies of water. Furthermore, the existing kinship organisation of the village no longer provides any overall framework within which such disputes might be resolved. As I have demonstrated in earlier chapters, the main lineage and tribal groupings have lost many of their socio-political functions and authority.

The duality of power between, on the one hand, the shaikh and major landlords who control important economic resources and, on the other, the government with its formal legal and political authority - results in an inherent conflict of interest among the peasants. This is most pronounced

in the new settlements, as those living outside them are fully committed to
the landlords for whom they work as sharecroppers. The crucial change that
occurred for Land Reform peasants was that a number of alternative channels
of access to centres of power have been opened up, although, as we have seen,
the landlords are still able to exert some pressure on both government
and peasants. A further implication of this is that the peasants themselves
will, in certain situations, choose to deal directly with the landlords,
thus avoiding becoming too dependent upon the new political organisations.
Moreover, the political instability and continuous struggle for power between
different political groups at national level and between local groups in
the rural areas, that have characterised Iraqi politics over the past twenty
years, have made it unwise for peasants to risk their interests by committing
themselves totally to one side against the other.

This situation has developed, in part, because of the fluctuations in
policy towards landlords adopted by successive governments in Iraq. The
present government has recently taken radical measures against the landlords,
because of the subtle ways in which they have attempted to undermine the
Land Reform programme, and has invested heavily in agriculture and the rural
sector. During my last visit to the village in the summer of 1976, I found that
there had been considerable changes in the operation of the irrigation system.
The government had supplied all the settlements with mechanical pumps and
had thus severed the dependence, based on control of the flow of water,
which was a central element in the relationship of peasants to landlords.
In addition, the government had initiated a drainage system and land
reclamation programme designed to increase the cultivable area available to
the village. This was a remarkable achievement which, if successful, will,
in time, substantially limit the influence which landlords have over both
peasants and the government itself. During this last visit, one peasant
commented to me: "No more do the shaikh or his cousins create problems for

us" (<u>yasawun mashakil il-na</u>), and he went on to say that "no difficulties

have arisen with our fellow peasants since the installation of the pumps,

because the water is sufficient to drown us all" (<u>al-mayy kafi li-gharaqna</u>).

These observations indicate that peasants are becoming more

independent in their life style and aspirations. Many of them, it seems,

are less dependent on the landlords for their livelihoods than before

and have started to assume a more independent role politically. Village

politics no longer tend to be chiefly a matter of attaining an 'unequal'

compromise between the interests of powerful landlords and peasants.

Peasants have become more conscious of the political changes that have swept

through the country and now attempt to express their opinions more openly

through their relationships with the Party and at the meetings held in the

village attended by important Party members from Baghdad. Peasant problems

and obstacles to development are now openly discussed and peasants themselves

may deal directly with officials from the capital.

However, for the present, Da'udia, like many other rural communities

in Iraq, represents the co-existence of both traditionally-based and new

institutional forms. These institutions function side by side and are

differentially relevant depending on the social situation, although in some

contexts they come into direct conflict with each other.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have given an account of a series of cases of intra-

village conflict among various kinship groups, and have documented the ways

in which these disputes were settled. Some of them were solved within the

particular kinship groups, while others required the mediation of local

government officials or the heads of other kinship groups. Both 'outside'

bodies - local government and the heads of kinship groups - were nonetheless

connected to the disputing parties through genealogical affiliations,

economic ties and political commitments.

A salient feature of dispute settlement in Da'udia is the choice
between two contrasting means of resolution. The ordinary peasant has access
to two separate political structures, the new system based on Party control
and the old one centring on the landlords. Thus the Party attempts to
develop its communication networks among peasants and to involve them in its
programme of political reform, while the landlords try to reinforce their
power through offering to mediate or arbitrate in cases of conflict. Neither
the Party nor the landlords have succeeded in excluding the other from
the village arena; neither therefore acts as the sole dominant force in the
community. The choices made by peasants in the settlement of disputes depend
primarily on three interconnected factors: the nature of the conflict, the
relations of the parties involved, and the ties that they maintain with key
figures in the two rival political structures.

CHAPTER X

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters I have provided an account of Iraqi rural
society before and after the implementation of the 1970 Land Reform
programme. The analysis was developed through a detailed ethnographic study
of Da'udia village in Diyala Province.

A central issue throughout the discussion has been the question of
control over land - a crucial element in the history of the rural
population, since agriculture and animal husbandry have always constituted
its main source of livelihood. During the period before 1914, the history
of Iraq was to a great extent the history of shaikhs and tribes. All
areas outside the towns were tribal, each tribe having its own loosely
demarcated area. Within and between these tribes there were endemic feuds,
at the root of which was competition for scarce resources and political
control. The turning point in the history of the Iraqi tribes came with the
registration of land in the names of the shaikhs and urban-based landlords
in the 1930's and the "pacification" of the countryside. With this, the
pattern of political alliance shifted away from the tribe and tribal con-
federations towards the new urban centres of political power. Under this
system, certain tribal shaikhs became agents and active supporters of the
Monarchy, and, in return, they were allowed considerable freedom of action
at local level.

The registration of land in the names of shaikhs and absentee landlords
modified considerably the pattern of social organisation. It led to basic
changes in the relationship of shaikhs to their tribesmen, since the latter
were reduced to the status of sharecroppers or tenants. In spite of their
residence in the village, the new landlords became involved in affairs far
removed from the immediate needs of their peasants. They took a keen

interest in national politics and began to make investments in urban
property. During the period 1921-1958 the majority of seats in Parliament
were held either by them or their nominees.

During this period many rural people left their villages in search
of urban employment. In several instances they were expelled from their
homelands to make way for immigrants from other rural areas who were skilled
in the cultivation of new cash crops. An example of this is the movement
of the Shurughis from southern Iraq to Da'udia which was specifically
arranged so that they could introduce rice cultivation into the area.
Such population movements led to the intermixing of tribal groups and
contributed to the decline in the importance of tribal forms of organisation,
which were already in a state of partial disintegration.

Peasant discontent and unrest, expressed in part by migration and
occasional rural uprisings, gradually built up, especially during the
period after the Second World War. The political situation in Iraq was both
repressive and highly unstable, and events in the countryside contributed
importantly to the mobilization of forces opposed to the Monarchy which
culminated in the Revolution of July 14th 1958. On assuming office the
new government embarked on an interventionist policy towards the rural
areas. It became increasingly involved at local level, implementing a Land
Reform programme and attempting to undermine the authority and power of
shaikhs and landlords. However, as we have shown in Chapter II, the 1958
Land Reform was ineffective and produced chaos in the rural sector:
agricultural production levels dropped sharply and in many cases the precarious
economic situation simply re-affirmed the power of the shaikhs and landlords.
Hence the initial promises of radical changes and re-structuring for the
rural areas produced little positive result. Indeed after a short period
of political upheavals and economic difficulty, the government was forced
to give up trying to implement its Land Reform programme, and allowed the

wealthier, more powerful rural families to regain control over expropriated land. This process is illustrated in Chapter V by the struggles that occurred between the Albu 'Amir and Dulaim leaders and peasants, resulting in the expulsion of some peasant households from their recently allocated Land Reform holdings which were once again incorporated into the shaikh's estate. The illegality of this action was only later exposed in 1968 when the Ba'thists came to power.

On assuming control, the present government set about rectifying what it saw as the economic and political failures of the previous regimes. Once again, policy hinged on transforming rural social and political structures so as to destroy the power-base of shaikhs and landlords. The main vehicle for achieving this objective was a much revised and more thorough-going Land Reform policy which was closely integrated with a country-wide programme of political mobilization. The new Land Reform legislation of 1970 stemmed fundamentally from a political ideology derived from socialist principles. It aimed to initiate radical economic and social change and was to be accompanied by the establishment of new organisations such as local branches of the Party, peasant unions and restructured rural cooperatives. Another important dimension was the ideological commitment to the gradual collectivization of agriculture, which entailed the building of new peasant settlements (aslaf) and the use of a block system of cultivation with peasants working together under the supervision of technicians and Party and local government officials. In this way it was hoped (a) to create a solid "peasant front" which would be closely integrated into the national political structure, (b) to enhance agricultural productivity and levels of production, and (c) to overcome the ecological difficulties associated with land fragmentation, water shortage and soil salination. A major part of the present thesis has been devoted to examining the intended and unintended consequences of this programme of rural development, focusing

especially on the internal political processes and events in Da'udia village.

What, then, are the main outcomes of this programme? How far has it succeeded in changing existing patterns of economic and political power at village level? And what are the main obstacles to a structural trans-formation of Iraqi rural society?

It is of course difficult to give a satisfactory answer to these questions because of the complex issues involved. It would also be problematic to attempt an overall assessment of a programme of Land Reform which has been in existence for only a relatively short period. However radical the programme, it will still take many years for its full effects to be adequately appreciated and evaluated. There is also the difficulty of isolating the changes specifically produced by the Land Reform programme from other longer-term historical processes such as, in this case, the changing political role of the shaikh under different governments from the Ottoman period to the present day.

Considering the socio-political dimensions of these processes of change and adaptation, it is clear that recent developments have led to an increased level of political awareness and the beginnings of class consciousness among poorer peasants, who now display a growing degree of confidence in the ability of the Government and the Party to take steps towards the improvement of their socio-economic circumstances. The recruitment into and participation of peasants in the Party and cooperatives has strengthened this new alliance between themselves and the Government, which seems to be opening a new chapter in the history of rural Iraq. Membership of these new organisations enables peasants to protect themselves from the attempts of the landlords to exercise economic and political control in the village, and also integrates them into the wider field of political action. The improvement in their economic conditions, particularly in relation to land holding, has substantially altered the balance of power at village level, and many peasants are now able

to function independently of landlords for the first time.

The increasing economic and political independence of peasant groups has simultaneously resulted in an erosion of the authority and influence of landlords. The latter have suffered land expropriation, and exclusion from local government processes, and now play a greatly reduced role in dispute settlement. Most recently, as I have shown in Chapter IX, the shaikh of Albu 'Amir and his family have also lost their most important monopoly, the control of the mechanical irrigation pumps. Furthermore, the availability of agricultural machinery for members of the Land Reform cooperatives has also reinforced the economic independence of the peasants vis a vis the shaikh. The new settlement scheme, under which various lineages and kinship groups are scattered on a number of different blocks throughout the village, has also led to a decline in the control exercised by leading families over peasants of the same lineage, and an absolute reduction in the number of sharecroppers.

These developments have led not only to a decline in the landlords' control over their peasants, but have also generated increasing tensions within landlord families. This is particularly the case in the family of the shaikh of Albu 'Amir, where brothers and cousins have separated into rival groups, and in Dulaim, where Hajj Hasan has quarrelled with Hajj Musluh and the whole of Albu 'Uqash, and Hajj Musluh has actually sought to make new alliances with the family of the shaikh of Albu 'Amir. Furthermore, the strategy pursued earlier by the shaikh's family in an attempt to evade the expropriation legislation, namely the division of registration of his estate in the names of his brothers and sons, has itself had disastrous repercussions for the unity of the shaikhly family. It has accelerated the trend towards autonomy on the part of these individuals and their households, with the result that the estate can no longer function as a unifying common interest. Thus, while the Land Reform has led to increasing solidarity among peasant groups, it has

had precisely the reverse effect among the landlord families.

The loss of power by the leading families has been complemented by the rise of new social groups. Although these are generally based on the 3-4 generation sub-lineage or _bayt_, a crucial element in their advent to power is their connection with the Party. This has been illustrated particularly in the discussion of the political emergence of peasant sub-lineages in Chapters VI and VII, and in the analysis of the political rise and fall of Hajj Hasan. In both contexts, links with the Party at local and national levels rather than traditional lineage ties were of central importance. The Party also plays an increasingly significant role in the settlement of disputes, especially those involving unrelated kinship groups on the new settlements. Here the _mudir_, generally acting on instructions from the Party, has assumed some of the functions of mediation and arbitration formerly exercised by the _sayyids_ and landlords. The _mudir_ and the _amin al-sirr_, who both live in the village, are in continuous contact with the peasants, who regularly consult them at administrative or Party headquarters. Some come to complain over irrigation matters while others attend courses on political education. This reflects an important development of channels of communication between the government, the Party and the peasants.

The new settlements and the cooperatives have encouraged the development of relationships between unrelated kinship groups, and created new situations of mutual interaction and cooperation. These changes have been facilitated by the improved economic opportunities now available to peasants through access to wider markets, credits, technical assistance and better social and educational services.

Much of the discussion so far has concentrated on what may be character-ised as the _intended_ consequences of the Land Reform programme. However, as has been briefly indicated in the cases of the family of the shaikh of Albu 'Amir and the Dulaim landlords, rural development policies have

inevitably been accompanied by a number of largely unanticipated and

<u>unintended</u> consequences, due mainly to local and historical circumstances.

Furthermore, it is also significant that the Land Reform has not yet been

fully and effectively implemented according to the actual provisions of the

legislation, in the sense that the shaikh has managed to retain control

of the more productive parts of his former estates, instead of being

subjected to the confiscation of the most fertile tracts as the law requires.[1]

The conjuncture of these two sets of factors has resulted in the coexistence

of a series of contradictory tendencies: on the one hand it has encouraged

the persistence of conflict and rivalry based on lineage affiliation, which,

in certain circumstances has served to reinforce the position of 'traditional'

landlords, while on the other it has generated new patterns of competition

which have created new political goals and rewards. These two tendencies

manifest themselves most strikingly, as has been demonstrated, in relation to

situations in which kinship and family loyalties are tested.

In the earlier chapters of the thesis it was argued that there has been

a gradual decline in the significance of the tribe as a political unit since

the latter part of the nineteenth century, and that this was accompanied by

a reduction in the function of the major lineages. For most of the Occupation,

Mandate and Monarchy periods the policy of indirect rule introduced by the

British authorities in the course of the First World War had the effect of

shoring up the powers of shaikhs and landlords and at the same time enabling

them to enrich themselves through the acquisition of new rural and urban

properties, as their reward for supporting the colonial and semi-colonial

regimes. Nevertheless at village level, these developments effectively

transformed kin-based relationships set within a framework of segmentary agnatic

lineage organisation into relationships of economic dependence. This

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1)   See Chapter II, page 33.

resulted in the pauperisation of the mass of the rural population of

southern Iraq, and led to the emergence of the <u>bayt</u> or sub-lineage as the

basic political and economic unit, strengthened by the increased occurrence

of intra-<u>bayt</u> parallel cousin marriages. This applied equally to both

peasant and landlord families.

In the period after the Revolution of 1958 the weakening of

organisation at the lineage and tribal levels has continued. The failure

of the first Land Reform had the effect of partially reinstating the economic

power of the landlords, but this benefitted the landlords' <u>bayts</u> rather than

their lineages. At the same time the fierce competition between various

lineages for the land provisionally made available under the first Land Reform

programme had the effect of causing major realignments. For example, the

treatment suffered by al-Misarra, who were expelled from their Land Reform

plots by the shaikh in favour of members of Albu Khamis, his own lineage,

caused them to ally themselves with Hajj Hasan of Dulaim, a political

combination which would have been inconceivable in a "traditional" tribal

context. Since this time alliances have almost invariably been formed at

<u>bayt</u> rather than lineage level, and very largely determined by economic

factors. They have often been consolidated by exchange marriages, as occurred

between Albu 'Ayyada and Albu Dirrij. The same strategy was used by the

shaikh of Albu 'Amir in the marriage arranged between his own son and the

daughter of Hajj Musluh of Dulaim, as a form of insurance for his political

future.

The dual processes of lineage fragmentation and <u>bayt</u> consolidation have

accelerated since 1970. The lineages have now been dispersed among the five

new settlements in <u>bayt</u> units, each settlement containing two or more <u>bayts</u>,

each occupying its own designated housing. The rehousing of these unrelated

and often rival kinship groups has strengthened their internal unity and

encouraged the emergence of <u>bayt</u> leadership groups. In these circumstances

the inevitable conflicts over scarce resources and the competition for new

offices have adversely affected the principle of joint cultivation on which

the cooperative movement was supposed to be based. The allocation of tracts

of land of kin and non-kin side by side in a single block on the new

settlements, which was designed to implement this principle, broke down once

the Land Reform officials had done their work, in the sense that the

beneficiaries simply re-allocated the plots according to bayt membership.

Similar problems arose in relation to the cooperatives, which were established

on an inter-settlement basis: here fierce compeition took place between

rival bayts for control of the offices and over privileged access to credit

and agricultural equipment. Many of these struggles also took place at the

level of the Peasant Bureau between representatives of different bayts

wishing to acquire and maintain their positions as brokers linking the local

with the wider political arena.

In Chapters V and VI struggles between kinship groups have been analysed

in terms of persisting factionalism. It is, however, important to note that

although the structural form of these struggles has remained constant -

i.e. dualistic and based on agnatic kinship - the content, balance of power

and level of organisation have shifted significantly. From the early

1930's until 1958, political competition took place exclusively between the two

rival landlord families of Albu 'Amir and Dulaim, the former being much

the stronger economically and politically, and deriving its strength largely

from its links with the national government. Immediately after 1958, when

Albu 'Amir's allies in Baghdad had been eclipsed, the leaders of Dulaim

stepped easily, if briefly, into the power vacuum left in the village through

their connections with the new political forces which rose to power in the

capital. This state of affairs, however, did not survive the confusion and

upheavals in Iraqi politics over the next few years, in the course of which,

as has been shown in Chapter V, Albu 'Amir regained much of the ground which

they had lost. It was not until after the Revolution of 1968 that the Dulaim faction came to prominence once more through their connections with the Ba'th Party.

Thus after the failure of the 1958 Land Reform there was a realignment of factions on the basis of common economic interests. In the course of this al-Misarra 'deserted' Albu 'Amir for an alliance with Dulaim in response to the actions taken by the shaikh against them. Likewise, after 1970, Hajj Musluh of Dulaim 'deserted' Hajj Hasan and allied with the shaikh of Albu 'Amir: in this case both Hajj Musluh and the shaikh could form a common front against Hajj Hasan's attempts to disperse their lineage members and their sharecroppers over the Land Reform settlements.

It is significant that over time the participating units in these factional struggles gradually became smaller and there was a proliferation of leadership groups.[1] Contrary to the expectations of the Ba'th Party, this tended to encourage vertical divisions rather than the development of horizontal ties among peasants. Indeed, in certain situations, groups of peasants allied with particular landlords in opposition to other landlord-peasant groups. Also landlords managed to retain some degree of political and moral authority in their capacity as mediators and arbitrators. Moreover, the basic deficiencies of the Land Reform still force many peasants to remain part-time sharecroppers in order to make ends meet.

In this situation the Party became identified with certain kinship groups, since its early supporters were drawn entirely from Dulaim. Although it has began to recruit followers on a wider basis, it continues to suffer from being more closely tied to particular kinship factions than others and still attempts to mobilise peasants through kin and personal ties. Concurrently the fragmentation of the larger lineages drove peasants to seek new forms of political association that would further their interests vis-a-vis rival kinship groups. The Party provided this framework but in the

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1) This and other empirical conclusions offers independent evidence for some of Harik's propositions concerning local level political changes under conditions of rural transformation in an Egyptian village in the late 1960s. See my Introduction, pp. xiii-xiv.

process made it possible for sectional interests to flourish, a development

which works ultimately to the detriment of its own wider interests. It also

created a series of new political prizes in the form of administrative

positions and Party offices which were eagerly sought by the new peasant

leaders. As has been shown in Chapter VII, these new political entrepreneurs

were able to develop their own network of external links with economic and

political groups in Baghdad. Through the building of bayt-based guesthouses,

these leaders staked a claim to local political status and gathered

followers around them. Adopting a modified 'landlord' model, they set them-

selves up as representatives of their kin groups in the new village instit-

utions and participated in village politics on this basis. They also began

to take an active role in dispute settlement, here again reproducing the

landlord model. In response to this, the 'traditional' landlords have sought

ways of circumventing formal political structures and government control

through the establishment of direct personal and affinal ties with

influential persons in Baghdad, and also through the highly profitable private

sector cooperatives, which in fact function as government-supported capitalist

enterprises.

A notable response to these difficulties in recent years has been the

more explicit adoption by the government of policies of more direct inter-

vention and control. This was first manifested in the way in which the Land

Reform cooperatives were closely supervised by technical supervisors

appointed by the government, who could call on the support of the staff of

the local Agricultural Office. As has been described in Chapter VIII, the

supervisor's duties are extensive and cover the planning of the cropping

system, the organisation of credits, the running of the management board,

and the keeping of accounts. These functions have recently been further

extended to include strict control of the irrigation system, and access to

agricultural machinery. All these developments point to the centralising

tendency of present government policy.

This increased involvement by central government agencies derives partly from Ba'thist ideology, but is in fact largely due to the inherent political and ecological problems outlined earlier, coupled with the problem of developing an "efficient" local administration. As in many similar cases of rural transformation in third world countries, Iraq faces the dilemma of combining "efficiency" with all the problems of grass roots participation, and also suffers from the consequences of over-hasty and inadequately prepared attempts to implement complex agricultural policies.

The initial attempts to involve peasants directly in the running of local socio-political institutions, in order to enable them to improve their standard of living and to protect themselves against the exploitative strategies of the landlords, encountered a number of setbacks. Perhaps the most important of these is the tendency for peasant households to look for security and support from their closest agnatic kin, thus developing forms of mutual aid and political support at bayt level, rather than through the new forms of association. This was originally an historical product of the breakdown of the major tribal lineages, but it has survived as an adaptive response to the fluctuations and uncertainties of the political and economic environment since the early 1930s. The narrowing of the kinship group to a set of interrelated households of this type whose members share common economic and political interests has not been confined to the poorer peasant categories; it has also become significant for the landlord families. This pattern of organisation presents special problems to a government wishing to implement uniform social and economic reforms, since inevitably the coherence of any development scheme will be affected by the existing fragmented and competitive social structure.

In view of this, the government has almost no choice but to resort to increased centralisation, through the direct control and supervision of

development schemes and local political institutions. For a short while

after their accession to power in 1968 the Ba'thists clearly believed that

they could achieve their goals simply by recruiting people into the party

and developing grass roots organisation. What they failed to understand

was that, as Balandier puts it:-

> "the introduction (of national political parties) into a
> peasant environment (obliged) them to make concessions to
> the older order." 1)

In Da'udia this took two forms; on the one hand the Party had to come to

terms with the landlords, and in fact tended to recruit its first members

from one of their families, and on the other, it was forced to come to

terms with the aspirations and expectations of peasants and their leaders,

which involved the Party in giving legitimacy to the existing kinship

organisation. This created many of the problems and contradictions which

have been isolated in earlier chapters.

It is doubtful whether the more centralised policies now being

implemented will be able to overcome these difficulties. In the first place,

the real significance of the historical background to the present situation

has apparently been only imperfectly grasped by the government, and

secondly, even if a keener perception could be brought to bear, the sheer

magnitude of the difficulties would probably defeat the most informed attempts

to resolve them. To some extent, the monopoly control of the landlords has

certainly been seriously undermined, and some peasants have been given access

to important productive resources. However, this process is clearly still

incomplete, since landlords, together with their new rivals among the

peasant leadership, do retain power, status and influence through their

ability to manipulate both formal and informal structures and social groups

in the village. The present situation is thus essentially ambivalent: the

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1)   Balandier, G., _Political Anthropology_, London 1970, p. 182.

current Land Reform programme is more thorough-going and systematic than its predecessor, but at the same time it allows considerable scope for manoeuvre on the part of various kinship groups and individuals. This has led to the emergence of different levels and degrees of political entre- preneurship which may well in the long term prove a serious obstacle to the effectiveness of the new policies.

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION

1. Transliteration has been kept as simple and consistent as possible. No diacritical marks have been used.

2. When an Arabic word has a form which has been commonly accepted in English, it has been used without underlining (e.g. shaikh, fellahin). More specialised words (e.g. mudir, amin al-sirr) have been underlined. All words used more than once appear in the glossary.

3. Both 'ain and hamza have been indicated by '.

GENEALOGY IV ALBU'AYYAD A SUB LINEAGE IN SETTLEMENT 3

GENEALOGY I THE FAMILY OF THE SHAIKH OF ALBU 'AMIR
(Skeleton Genealogy covering main agnatic kin)

△ Men Deceased   △ Men

● Women Deceased   ○ Women

Ahmad

Umar

'Abid

Sharif

Jamil

Salam

Muhammad

Hadi

Marriages

GENEALOGY II THE DULAIM LEADERS

Legend:

- △¹ ○² Tariq
- ▲ Men Deceased
- ● Women Deceased
- △ Men
- ○ Women
- △ ○ Marriages

Albu Uqash

Albu Musluh

Albu Haji Hasan

Haji Musluh

Haji Hasan

Haji Hasan's Brother

Talib Deputy of Amin Al Sir

Shakir Local Party Amin Al-Sirr

A

B

C

GENEALOGY III   ALBU-'INAD SUB-LINEAGE IN SETTLEMENT 4

Men Deceased
Women Deceased
Men
Women

Marriages

GLOSSARY

The Glossary contains only words that are repeated more than once. All words are translated or explained when first used.

amin al-sirr : lit. Keeper of the Secret; (Ba'th) Party Secretary.

'ashira : tribe.

aslaf (pl. of salaf) : settlement.

bayt : three to four generation-depth sub-lineage.

dira : area customarily "occupied" by a tribe for grazing or cultivation.

donum or mashara : a unit of square measurement corresponding to 0.62 acres.

farsha : sum of money paid 'into court' by disputants in cases settled by customary ('urf) procedures; used for payment of expenses.

fasl : compensation, especially in cases involving honour.

hizb : political party; normally the Ba'th Party.

fellah, pl. fellahin : peasant.

al-jam'ia al-ta'wunia : cooperative society.

lazma : a form of customary land tenure.

liwa, now muhafadha : province.

majlis al-idara : administrative council or committee.

mallakiyah : the difference between what the landlord collects from the cultivators and what he hands over to the State as taxation.

mashara or donum : a unit of square measurement corresponding to 0.62 acres.

miri : land which in theory belongs (originally to the Ottoman) State.

mudhif : shaikh or senior lineage member's guesthouse.

mudir : director; used throughout to refer to the chief local government official in Da'udia.

Muharram : mourning ceremonies conducted by Shi'i Muslims in the month of Muharram commemorating the death of Husain at Karbala' in 680 AD.

muwazzafin : civil servants, government employees.

nahi, nahwa : prohibitor, prohibition, in the context of marriage; right occasionally exercised by paternal uncles with respect to their neices.

nahia : sub-division of a qadha, q.v. (Da'udia is the headquarters of a nahia).

nazir : (Ba'th Party) sympathiser, i.e. of low rank in Party hierarchy.

qadha : an administrative unit corresponding to a sub-province.

qasr pl. qusur : palace.

ra'is : president, chairman.

ra'is al-salaf : president or chairman of (land reform) settlement.

rab'a : guesthouse of sub-lineage.

sanad or tapu sanad : title to miri land.

sarifa : mud hut, built mostly round the outskirts of Baghdad by poor rural migrants.

sayyid : descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.

Shurughi : rice cultivators from 'Amara, brought to Da'udia in the 1950s by the shaikh of Albu 'Amir.

sirkal : sub-shaikh, sub-lineage head, often acting as bailiff for a more senior kinsman.

tapu sanad : title deed for miri land. Introduced into Iraq by Midhat Pasha in the 1870s, and revived by the British Mandate administration in the 1920s.

'urf : pre-Islamic customary law.

wasta : 'influence' or 'connections'; also mediation.

wilayat : former Ottoman province (i.e. Baghdad, Basra and Mosul until 1917).

wusata' : mediators/arbitrators in disputes.

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