Ordinary language philosophy and sociological theory; some issues in Wittgenstein’s later work and their implications for sociological theorising.

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"Ordinary Language Philosophy and Sociological Theorising"


This thesis examines the relation between ordinary language and sociological theorising in the light of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work on the problem of dualism. It examines the work of Peter Winch and D. Lawrence Wieder in their attempts to deal with, respectively, the role of convention and indexicality in the constitution of sense, and argues for an alternative view which ties these concepts together rather than giving either priority.

In an examination of theoricity, it looks at the work of Harold Garfinkel and Talcott Parsons, and finds that they exemplify twin aspects of a central problematic - how to reconcile naturalism, and the concepts of the everyday world, with the analytically formal structures which a scientific theorising requires. It argues for the mutual inter-dependence of these requirements.

In the analysis which it offers of the work of Alvin Gouldner and Alan Blum, it finds that their responses to Karl Mannheim's formulation of the problem of historicity founder on the difficulties contained in their conception of the possibilities for reflexive theorising. While Gouldner espouses the necessity of a radical commitment to emancipation as the fundamental value displayed by the historical development of thought, and Blum argues for the degeneracy of any attempt to locate such a value in the historical realm, this work argues that both theorists in fact offer versions of theorising which proceed from a classical epistemological position, leading to a fundamentally dualistic conception of language, and hence support an incoherent theory of certainty.

All of these analyses are set against the background of Wittgenstein's work on other minds and certainty. It proposes that Wittgenstein's criterial theory of sense-constitution, as outlined in the work of P. M. S. Hacker and
Gordon Baker, offers a fruitful alternative to the classical epistemological theories upon which much of the work discussed can be seen to rest. It proposes to find in this work a new way of approaching sociological theorising, and a new approach to work which has already been produced, notably that of Parson, Garfinkel and Mannheim.
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY:


THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION

UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM

LESLIE ROSS GOFTON

1979

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Most of the ideas have developed in the course of arguments with my fellow students, particularly Lawrence Hazell and David Nellist; they are not responsible for my inability to profit from their talents.

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I dedicate this work to Celia, Peter and Lauren, who gave me the reason for doing it at all.
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Introduction

This is an attempt to examine some pieces of sociological theorising in the light cast by some of Wittgenstein's work on the problem of language. Wittgenstein saw language as generating illusion within philosophy; it is my view that sociological theorising is bedevilled by confusion which it inherits from ordinary language, and as such, stands in need of the insight into its problems which Wittgenstein's remarks can provide. This study will aim to examine some of the work which has been produced by sociologists in the attempt to overcome the problems encountered when we, first of all, try to deal with the phenomena of the social world in terms which produce a 'scientifically' satisfactory account, and also an account which takes seriously the meaning which their action and speech has for them as members of that social world; that is to say, as members of society. The initial problem, then, is taken to be the discrepancy which has come to appear between the theoretical accounts produced by sociology under the rubric of science, (as an artificial language game) and the 'natural' language of everyday life. This will be seen to be the basic problem confronted by the subjects of this piece under a variety of guises. I introduce Wittgenstein's work in order to display some of the confusions arising from our assumptions about the way in which language operates.

I was interested, when I began this study, in some of the more recent approaches to the world of commonsense and its relation to theory which have developed in sociology. In particular, the theorists who have developed their work from analytical philosophy, (and also Wittgenstein's 'ordinary language' philosophy) and those from a phenomenologically-based tradition, mainly influenced by Husserl, directly or via the work of his disciple, Alfred Schutz. I have, therefore, joined together some of the work of Peter Winch, attempting to amalgamate sociology with epistemology, "ethnomethodologists" Harold Garfinkel and D. L. Wieder, some of the ideas discussed by Talcott Parsons in his seminal pre-war writing, some disparate approaches to the problematic of the Sociology of knowledge as it is expressed in the work of Karl Mannheim.
and also Alvin Gouldner; the work of the latter I discuss in tandem with that of Alan Blum, since, while Gouldner's work proceeds from a standard critique of 'hitherto existing' sociology, and that of Blum explicitly denies the efficacy of any such enterprise, they share interesting theoretical (as well as personal) background. Their respective enterprises, however, are distinctive, as I hope to show.

I have attempted to bring these elements together against the backdrop of Wittgenstein's work on intersubjectivity (the bulk of which is usually brought together under the heading of the 'Private Language' argument) and Certainty. I acknowledge at this stage, my inestimable debt to the exegetic work of P. M. S. Hacker and Gordon Baker. I have based my attempts to apply Wittgenstein's work firmly on the interpretation (1) which they have produced of the significance of 'criteria' in this work. Any misuses of their ideas, however, are entirely my own.

The first section is about the limits of commonsense accounts. Winch poses the question; since sociology must deal with the understandings which subjects have of actions, events and speeches which make up their experience of the world, how can we hope to arrive at such an understanding unless we use the concepts by means of which such understandings are arrived at by the subjects? Sociology, rather than being a (generalising, objectifying) science, should be concerned with 'grasping' what is going on, seeing in a social event an intelligible internal relationship in terms of the concepts employed by members of the social group who form the subjects of the investigation. However, it seems that, thereby, a concentration on the rules to which members orient in their language uses, in making the situation in which they find themselves intelligible and orderly, constrains accounts to conventions which can be ascertained about situations in general; it seems unable to deal with the problem of the innovative located interrelation between conventions and context (what has come to be called the problem of 'indexicality' (2)).
This is precisely the problem recognised by Wieder in his work on "convict codes" (3). Standard ethnographic uses of such codes treat them as maxims which can be used as the conventions by means of which understanding is achieved by members in situations in which they can be legitimately employed. Social action has sense (order, predictability) not, however, simply because of the 'rule' of convention, but because understanding themselves constitute the events of which they form the elements. Removed from context, he argues, concepts do not permit of unequivocal interpretation, but fit a number of possibilities; in fact, it is the possibilities which they permit which give to them their meaning-bestowing facility. The only way, then, to avoid speculative responses is to focus interpretative work on the order constructing process, to see the constitution of order by the investigator as a document exhibiting the features underlying sense assembly. Wieder thus retreats from the 'vagueness' of sense as a momentary accomplishment back to the incorrigibility of the process whereby this accomplishment is realised - that is to say, the (private?) experience of individual consciousness. If I own an experience, then surely I, among all, cannot fail to know what it is?

Both these positions suffer, in my contention, from a misconception of the nature of understanding; I argue that collective or individual ownership of experience does not constitute grounds for rejecting the possibility that others could share it; indeed, it is only possible for individuals or groups to understand in the way that they do because their understanding is based on accounts which can be spoken, since sense is derived from intersubjective experience. If thereby, we seem to have a new possibility of understanding the social world which is not limited (or ruled out of court) by the domination of group or individual (or everyday) usage, can we, then, produce scientific accounts of social regularities which are manifest in the order which we inhabit?

Talcott Parsons saw this as the central task of Sociology. For Parsons, the criteria of validity of knowledge is to be found in (Kantian) primal invariant categories. His strategy is founded on a correspondence theory of reality.
This relies on the demonstrable variety of perceptions of the external world (including the social), and presumptively, differences between such perceptions and the 'concrete' object as it exists independently of the act of perceiving it. The number of factual statements which can be made about such an object cannot, therefore, be exhausted; any body of theoretical work, if it aims to apprehend this concreteness must, then, be founded on a schema of categories which approximate this concreteness. In this view, the schema which approximates this most closely is that of logico-experimental (scientific) methods, since these are based on "universal and unchanging" primary categories of apprehension, giving to the properly qualified observer a view of the world of real objects which is independent of the historical conditions of the observer's circumstances.

Now this, it has been argued (4) ties the qualities of the real world to the (artificial, analytical) properties of formal logic. The understanding which is possible within this schema is limited to the conceivable relations of meaning which are warranted on logical grounds, and which:

"... can be projected into the sign syntax of a formalised language". (5)

As Apel comments:

"If it were true - as was assumed by the 'logical atomism' of Russell and the Young Wittgenstein - that there is only one logical form of language to describe the world, and accordingly, only one transcendental semantics for the language of science, the logical positivists could hope to solve the problem of linguistic understanding by constructing the semantical system for the language of unified science completely independent of the language-hermeneutical work in the understanding Geisteswissenschaften (including the hermeneutical history of science). But actually the Logical Positivists have long since given up that thought and now just demand that the object language be intersubjectively verifiable ... The sentences of the language of science do not describe facts 'just as they are', but rather facts of the behavioural environment of the scientists who interpret the sentences by using them. In the language of the Geisteswissenschaften we could say; the possibility that linguistic signs have meaning cannot be understood without presupposing a meaning intention which expresses itself in the signs. In other words, not even the facts of science are facts for the unchanging "subject as such" (of "the language as such") but they are constituted in a concrete and therefore historically determined
Thus, to return to the real world, the formal language of scientific accounting is tied not to the absolute categories of the transcendental logical realm, but to the conventions obtaining in concrete historical situations as they have evolved within a community of scientific practitioners. Parsons may well hope for 'aseptic space' in which to accomplish his analysis (7), but like Husserl, he is condemned to history. The greatness of Parsons lies, as Garfinkel realised, in the fact that he grasped this; for Parsons, the escape from the regime of commonsense necessarily involves idealisation. It is a price, so to say, which must be borne. The task of the social analyst lies in finding the way back from the 'way of seeing' of which sociological theory consists, to the factic intersubjectivity inhabited by the subjects of its study. Parsons' failure, like that of Husserl, takes nothing away from his achievements. Neither promised anything but great struggle, neither suffered from delusions as to what they had accomplished at any stage of their work.

Garfinkel sees the problems which Parsons faces; while accepting the historical reasoning of the logico-experimental (Neo-Positivist, Neo-Kantian) branch of human studies, he prefers to reformulate the epistemological problem in terms of the phenomenological approach. While Parsons sought phenomenological status for his framework on the basis of its (essentially Kantian) categorical imperatives, thus deriving from the 'means-end' schema (logico-experimental rationality) the necessary orderliness of the social, this is to proceed precisely from the point which the phenomenology of Husserl and Schutz would seek to reach. The correspondence between the world of objects and thought is, in this view a 'mystery' which can only be accepted within the Kantian tradition, Husserl sought to address its accomplishment.

Epistemologically, this approach adopts a congruence theory of reality. The perceived object of the 'outer' world, in terms of this theory, is the
concrete object. The two terms, "perceived object" and "concrete object" are synonymous and interchangeable. The world is just as it appears; there is nothing behind it. Rather than being the contents, sensory evidences are the conditions of perceptions.

Concreteness is only possible insofar as there is a standard in the non-perceptual order which remains invariant; it is thereby a property of the object constituted as a unity of meanings. An actual object, then, is a unified set of experiences, however these are founded. The question of the nature of the "objective" world is abandoned in favour of an acceptance of multiple realities, of varieties of objective knowledge.

Garfinkel, applying this to the social realm, proposes thereby that the world of commonsense, far from being explicable in terms of transcendental (primal, invariant) categories, is rather to be treated as an objective realm, accomplished by the varieties of commonsense rationalities employed by actors in the practices of which it is composed. Thereby, our apprehension of it in terms of the criteria of scientific language games violates the objectivity of actors' constitutions of reality in favour of ideal categories, removed from their incarnation in some concrete praxis.

Our response, he argues, should rather be to adopt a principle of indifference to reality outside that which is constituted in the actions and talk of our subjects, and to attempt to display the competences which enable any 'member' (carefully borrowing Parsons' technical usage of this term), to make sense of that reality.

He finds himself facing Husserl's problem, however. In the search for objective knowledge which does not depend on a set of (historical, formal) analytic categories he is back to uncritical acceptance of individual experience, (lead by the epoche) in the sense that, in accepting commonsense rationality
uncritically, but being indifferent to the reality which it constitutes, he is left only with the unformulable display of processes, of competences which are 'taken for granted', unspecifiable.

Now, this would seem similar to the position arrived at in Wittgenstein's work. As Specht puts it:

"There are, so to say, only objective objects of reality in the language game, with the corresponding linguistic signs 'objective object', 'reality', etc." (8)

However, while for Wittgenstein this formulation served to limit the extent to which philosophy could give metaphysical interpretations in those cases where problems cannot be solved along analytical lines, Garfinkel proposes to found a programme of empirical study on this basis. Specht describes this kind of aim in a characterisation of the projects of Kant and Husserl:

"Here, ontological knowledge of objects always amounts to grasping the structural system of appearances drawn up by the understanding or by consciousness. Language, however, remains outside of ontological (my emphasis) consideration. The appearances are admittedly constituted by people but this constitution is effected before language. Thus the fundamental ideas of the atomic model, according to which things exist before language, prevails in both Aristotles's realist ontology, and also in constitution theories. In both approaches, ontological knowledge refers to a non-linguistic objectivity, and for this reason, requires no justification or substantiation of an extra-linguistic nature". (9)

In contrasts, Specht argues, Wittgenstein's constitution theory sees ontological knowledge as an objectivity constituted by language;

"It has its methodological basis in the investigation into the structures of objects which are fixed by specific linguistic usage". (10)

However, Wittgenstein never considered a systematic study of language games and the objects constituted by them; it is conceivable that Garfinkel's project might be re-written as that considered possible by Specht, to wit:

"... as complete as possible investigation into and explanation of the individual language games in which the constitution of objects is effected." (11)
The problem with this kind of project, however, as Wittgenstein realised, was that it arrives, in Apel's terms, at

"... a kind of monadology of different cultural systems" (12)

A further consequence, he notes, is radical relativism; the kind of knowledge which might be arrived at would have no fixed parameters (since it must accept the infinite changeability of language games) no criteria of certainty (since it transforms Wittgenstein's analytic schema into an empirical realm without adopting the criteria which warrant statements within this language game).

The truly radical import of Wittgenstein's work in terms of the problems exemplified by Parsons and Garfinkel lies in the multivariate nature of understanding which his analyses bring out. The Antipathy between science and commonsense rationalities is not an insurmountable problem, and the achievement of these two theorists lies, I would argue, in providing an articulation between two of the most important dimensions of sociology. I argue that the relation between the work of these two theorists provides powerful illustration of the problems generated by the twin theories of epistemology sharing a common ontology, underlying most of sociology, and points towards the urgent necessity of finding an alternative way of conceptualising the material.

The problem of 'historicism' has been seen to be strongly linked to epistemological theories which relate 'certainty' to the constitution of meaning in the relation of the extra-linguistic reality outside of language, to the practices of communities or individuals. Karl Mannheim's account of the history of the 'Sociology of Knowledge' (13) shows that this can be tied to specific developments in the history of philosophy and science. Rather than simply a theoretical possibility, the self relativisation of knowledge becomes a practical possibility with the emergence of science as a bourgeois opposition to metaphysics and theology. It is an attack on a theoretical system rather than an individual; it arises, he argues, from a desire toward the
absolute which forms the basis of positivism and science, and the need to
grasp systemic totality on the part of the idealist historicist tradition.

Note, then, that Mannheim is pointing to the same conjunction (Aristotelianism,
Husserl and Kant) which has just been the subject of Specht's analysis.
Sharing, as they do, an atomic theory of meaning, whereby objects exist before
language, the historicisation of such meaning is a generic condition which
can only be moderated by an appeal to transcendental elements in a theoretical
schema. Seen as a development in the history of thought, the Sociology of
Knowledge, for Mannheim, only becomes a practical possibility with the rise
of science, flanked by positivism and the idealist-analytical schools of
philosophical thought. For classical philosophy, especially Plato and Socrates,
historicity was not an issue, however, but the issue. The very activity of
Philosophic thought was the attempt to escape from opinion, and ignorance,
into truth.

Heidegger sees the 'history of thought' between the modern age and the Greeks
as a denial of the originary project; thought has become "mathematised",
the power of representation has deluded western thinkers into the pursuit of
illusory goals of absolute, concrete, reality, a precise and logical struc-
turing of the world of 'real' objects and thought. (14). While Mannheim sees
relativism as an issue arising from the conflict of science with theology,
for Heidegger, relativism is a problem for science as a theology itself. The
desire of the mathematical thinker is to achieve complete certainty; to extend
his empirical empire over the totality of the world (15).

In Modern Sociology, we find the analogues of Mannheim and Heidegger in the
work of Alvin Gouldner and Alan Blum. For Gouldner, the historicisation of
sociological accounts is an endemic condition. The pursuit of 'value-freedom'
is to be abandoned in pursuit of a sociology which sees itself as committed
to the reflexive dialectic explication of its own grounds. Pace Mannheim,
he calls for the attempt to open up the awareness of the sociological community to the social conditions of the society in which accounts are produced. While, for Mannheim, this involves an analysis of the relations of production of whatever form which exist in the social milieu in which the account is produced, for Gouldner, this reflexivity grounds its analysis in a Marxism which applies its own criteria of criticism to its products (16). While Mannheim sought to establish, as an ultimate criterion of validity, that which:

"...points to the most comprehensive outcome of the discursive interaction of opposing perspectives, and ...repudiates any attempt (in the name of scientific or in the name of political authority) to abrogate this process." (17)

Gouldner divines in the historical movement towards emancipation the ultimate value toward which such a reflexive programme should move. For Gouldner, a reflexive sociology is radical or it is not reflexive, but apologetic, and hence ideological. For Mannheim, the criteria of a reflexive sociology derive from the problematic itself; they are part of the process of moving toward the ideal of a total view, on the way to a theoretical language which seeks to develop from contrasting views and the social contexts in which they are produced a synthesis of "conceptual contexts" (18).

Like Wittgenstein, Mannheim realised that conflicting accounts could not be reconciled without this process of comparison, but that this process of comparison violates the meaningfulness of the accounts unless it gives to them, where this is feasible, intelligibility in terms of the justifications which exist in the inter-related language games of which they are a part. For Gouldner, the commitment to radical political values, and the responsibility to take an active part in the historical movement towards emancipation, are essential prerequisites of the reflexive enterprise. The commitment to the goal of emancipation becomes the organising principle in his understanding of the sociological practices which form the objects of his critique.

In Blum's "darkly Heideggerian" work (19), we find the historicist critique of sociology worked out into a socratic detachment; the pursuit of standard
sociological themes is abandoned, in favour of an analysis which seeks to return to the 'medicinal' aims of the Greeks. Since discursive reason is all that modern thought can offer, then against this nihilism Blum seeks a return to the pursuit of Truth (and Being) as that which language cannot capture, with the ironic and iconic elements of speech established as the primary 'methodological' principles to which such a despair can only lead. Language, rather than concerning itself with the (concrete) accounting of the apparent, the conventional, the illusions of the mathematical world view, becomes instead the means by which the grounds which stand under understanding can be alluded to, if not seen, grasped or said.

Wittgenstein's silence in the "Tractatus" came about for similar reasons, but while the logical calculus to which this mysticism seemed to point turned out to be chimerical, for the later Wittgenstein, this formulation of a particular form of theoretic life served as an essential preliminary to his re-involvement in the problems of language and thought which had not been analysed away. Unlike Blum, and Heidegger however, the later Wittgenstein did not see the problems of language as leading to despair with its features. These are, for Wittgenstein, to be systematically dissolved; despair with the mathematical standards of certainty does not lead to a retreat from (discursive) reason, but to a rigorous re-discovering of the grounds upon which our form of representation is based, and the work of dispelling the illusions into which our grammar mis-leads us. If Blum's work does not convince us of the failure of sociology to provide us with worthwhile goals, as a form of theoretic activity, then its enterprise must be seen in this light - that its 'despair' is premature, and sociology may, after all be worth doing.

If my arguments serve to make at least this point, then I shall have succeeded.
CHAPTER I
ORDINARY LANGUAGE; CONVENTION AND CONTEXT

The Work of Peter Winch

"The Idea of a Social Science", Peter Winch's best known work, has not created a legion of followers for its author; there are few, if any Winchians for it seems generally agreed that the book does not lead us to a positive programme of work, but warns of the difficulties facing some of the programmes already in existence. Yet it had, and indeed continues to have an extraordinary effect on the teaching of Sociological theory. The issues which are raised in the book are important, and they must be faced by any programme of sociological accounting. I do not wish to claim that very much that is positive does emerge from this confrontation if we follow Winch's line, but I hope to show that there are some issues on which he moved in the wrong direction after raising them for the right reasons. (1)

The Place of Philosophy

In "The Idea of a Social Science", Winch sees himself as concerned with 2 main tasks; a criticism of one notion of the nature of philosophy, and a criticism of one notion of the nature of social science. For Winch, however, his critiques will be brought together by his unifying principle, that ....

"any worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with the nature of human society". (2)

He then goes on to attack the underlabourer conception of philosophy. Winch denies it all but the role of clearing away the rubbish that lies on the ground upon which science ('true' or 'new' knowledge) is to build. Philosophy is to be simply a conceptual handyman, keeping the tools of language in proper working order. This role is rejected as inadequate by Winch on the grounds that the central concerns of philosophy in metaphysics and epistemology exist autonomously of other disciplines, yet bear centrally upon
philosophical concerns within areas such as science, art, politics, religion and so on. Winch moves on to attack the Humean concept of experience; Hume's argument is that since all knowledge of relations between events in the world is arrived at through experience, philosophical investigation of the nature of reality relying as it does on a priori processes of thinking can never achieve what science can in this area. At the same time, if it admits this, then the very nature of its enterprise requires drastic re-interpretation. This Winch asserts is plainly based on fallacious reasoning; "The investigation of the nature of reality" involves distinctly different enterprises for science and philosophy. The question of man's relation to reality is not one which could be settled by scientific enquiry any more than the physical properties of reality could be unravelled by an a priori process of reasoning. Philosophy's concerns are conceptual. Moore's 'proof' of the existence of the external world by citing his own hands as examples serves not as a scientific or experimental proof but as an illustration of the way in which we do actually talk about 'externalities'. The issue here is not one of proof or otherwise, but of concepts.

Winch points out that a large part of philosophy's task is concerned with the elucidation of concepts, of correct and incorrect usage of linguistic expressions, insofar as these throw light on the intelligibility of reality. This intelligibility rests on the connection between thought and reality, and thought brings us to language. These are inseparably bound together, according to Winch. He discusses Wittgenstein's doctrine, both in the 'Tractatus' and 'Investigations' that .... "The concepts we have settle for us the form of experience we have of the world". (3) This summation expresses Winch's central idea; I shall argue that this leads to the problems which his critics have pointed out, and insofar as this is not the correct conclusion to draw from Wittgenstein's work, leads to incorrect conclusions about its value for social science.
"We cannot say, then (....) that the problems of Philosophy arise out of language rather than out of the world, because in discussing language, philosophically, we are in fact discussing what counts as belonging to the world. Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use. The concepts that we have settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world. It may be worth reminding ourselves of the truism that when we speak of the world, we are speaking of what we in fact mean by the expression "the world"; there is no way of getting outside the concepts in terms of which we think of the world (....) The world is for us what is presented through those concepts. That is not to say that our concepts may not change; but when they do, that means that our concept of the world has changed too". (4)

Winch is tying any investigation of the social world to investigation of the concepts which we use to describe that world. It is at this point that the problems which have been raised by critics of Winch, and Wittgenstein occur. Before detailing exactly how the formulation is erroneous (both in its claimed derivation from Wittgenstein, and in terms of its own logic), I propose to outline the consequences which Winch derives from this for the social sciences.

**Concepts and Enquiries: Winch's view of the Social Sciences**

First, Winch argues that philosophy is too keen to underestimate the extent to which what should be conceptual, a priori areas are in fact to be taken to be empirical enquiries based on experience. In this he says, philosophers are over-reacting to the claims of science that all statements about reality must be empirical. Arguing against Hume's analysis of causality, he maintains that the unwillingness to accept a priori legislation on the nature of future events on the basis of past experience - thus assuming alogically ordered and unchanging natural world - should not invalidate the ways in which we actually do use our conceptual apparatus - for without it, we are in no position to describe anything, or operate at all in everyday life. While philosophy is indeed concerned with the elucidation of the concepts which Hume is discussing, the continued existence of these concepts is of fundamental importance to the world in which they are used, and is no small matter.
Winch proposes, then, that rather than being empirical, matters depending upon the realities of the world - many fundamental scientific investigations, should be conceptual in nature. With regard to Social Science, (for instance) social behaviour is to be derived from an elucidation of the concept of social behaviour - how is it used, and what consequences do these uses have for Social Science?

"Elucidation" is the next concept on Winch's agenda, in fact; "to make something intelligible", he points out, acquires a systematically ambiguous sense as we study the variations which occur in the different contexts in which it is used. The objectives of different kinds of investigators may be very different yet they would all lay claim to being "after" intelligibility. Using Wittgenstein's notion of a language game, Winch points out that, likewise, these forms of games may have different objectives, yet only bear a family resemblance to each other in the form that they take.

Accordingly, the objectives, concerns, subject matter, methods, etc., of each game should be afforded its own philosophical enquiry; these will be mutually comparable, and indeed, overlapping, and such comparative studies would certainly lead to an increased understanding of the notion of intelligibility.

The fact that there are no immediate and obvious gross comparisons to be made does not however eliminate the subject of epistemology; rather than providing criteria for some master-concept of intelligibility, he argues that this should describe the conditions under which there can be any criteria of understanding.

Epistemological considerations bear centrally on the role of philosophy also; Burnett (5) had posed as his question; what difference will it make to the life of man if his mind can have contact with reality? The epistemologist Winch argues is concerned with the problem of why understanding, in the form
that it does take, is important in the societies in which it occurs - how is it possible? (in Kant's terms). This involves, he says, an analysis of the concept of social life, ultimately, for to show the central role played by the concept of understanding in the activities which characterise human society involves a discussion of the nature of the social life which is constituted by these activities.

Indeed, rather than simply saying that social relations are permeated with ideas about reality, Winch says "social relations are expressions of ideas about reality". (6)

Winch is here arguing that social life is the product of the specific context-bound ideas of those who constitute it and can only be understood in terms of the ideas which create it, as they are held by those concerned in this creation. This is a direct confrontation with many other social theorists, as he points out. Durkheim, for instance, held that social life should not be explained according to the notions of those who comprise the social group in question, but rather in the underlying causes "unperceived" by "consciousness" which dictate how these groups are constituted. (7)

Sociological investigation, for Winch, must involve analysis of the ideas of which these social relations are expressions.

For Winch, then, the central problem of sociology, "giving an account of the nature of social phenomena in general", is a philosophical-epistemological problem, and one which must be confronted in a consideration of the nature of language, rather than some "imaginary independent entity" such as "human relationships", or "group life", since these entities are not separable from the language which as concepts constitutes them. Discussing Weber's famous (8) definition of human action, he notes that meaningful behaviour, as behaviour which has some sense, motive or reason attached to it, can be so only because of the way it uses symbols, and not because of some activity internal to the
mind of its agent, (since, following the private language argument symbols have a social genesis, and life thereafter only in the social world). These formulations place emphasis on the centrality of language; note that he (Winch) removes from consideration "reality" apart from the concepts which describe it (objectivity, objects in themselves) and reality as the experience which the individual uses language to describe (subjectivity, states of mind). This would seem to be an attempt to get round the problem of dualism by taking as the object to be investigated what we have in the speech of actors as the action itself - that is to say, investigating the ways in which language is used to constitute meaningfulness in the social world. To paraphrase Schutz, (9) despite the problem of intersubjectivity, meaning is communicable, people make sense of each other. For Winch, this is possible because of the conventionality of speech acts, the fact that the uses of speech are instances of attention to rules, or instances of rule following.

He argues that the use of words does not consist of simply naming objects (10). Learning how to apply words cannot follow from simply relating sounds to objects. "Learning to mean something by making a noise" means to learn that this word can be used to signify this object, (as in pointing to, ostensive definition), but how this is successfully accomplished is not shown by the identity of this instance of naming with other instances of naming - or, we cannot infer from the "same" word being used in conjunction with the same physical object that the same meaning is intended. Rather than there being a simple correspondence between words and the world, what we have in fact is the ability to evaluate usage; i.e., to decide in terms of the context in which the words are used whether or not they make sense. In the case of the identity of usage what we have to have is a means of deciding that on different occasions, a word is used to "mean" the same thing. For Winch, this means of deciding is accountable (for) in terms of a rule, for "it is only in terms of a given rule that we can attach a specific sense to the words 'the same' ", (11)
An immediate difficulty, for Winch, is that all instances can be brought under the rule of some formula (think here of cases of insanity, and how, for instance, R. D. Laing deals with them, also, of course, Freud)\(^{12}\), even when we would say that we cannot discern the rule, or that the only rule that is being followed is to create a new one.

In fact, Wittgenstein answers this very neatly in a passage not cited by Winch \(^{13}\).

"What sort of supposition is this; we cannot have miscalculated in \(12 \times 12 = 144\)? It must surely be a proposition of logic - but now, is it not the same, or doesn't it come to the same as the statement (my e) \(12 \times 12 = 144\)?

If you demand a rule from which it follows that there can't have been a miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this through a rule but by learning to calculate. We got to know the nature of calculating by learning to calculate. But then, can't it be described how we satisfy ourselves of the reliability of a calculation? Oh yes! Yet no rule emerges when we do so - but the most important thing is; the rule is not needed. Nothing is lacking. We do calculate according to a rule and that is enough."

Thus "rule" only "makes sense" given that we possess the competence ("training") to recognise it as an instance of behaviour which is a "matter of course" - ie., relevant in this activity or "game". Rule does not appear as a prescription in its ultimate form.

No, for Winch, being able to account instances of rule following comes only "when it is possible for someone else to grasp what he is doing, by being brought to the pitch of himself going on in that way as a 'matter of course'".\(^{14}\)

Thus grasping when something is an instance of the following THIS rule is only possible for competent members, ie., speakers of the same language in the full sense (what Garfinkel calls a 'natural language') \(^{15}\). At the same time, this does not imply that we can capture the way in which sense is accomplished by prescribing a list of rules of human activity. As Wittgenstein in the example cited makes perfectly clear, the test of the application of a rule (ie., the meaningfulness of an activity) does not rest in the capacity to
formulate the rule, but whether there is a right and a wrong way to do what has been done - does it make sense to imagine things to be other than they are? That is the criterion (16) of competent performance; not the application of a criterion in itself, but a display of correct application. (17) Where this display is missing (in the Garfinkel student counselling experiments) (for example), to be sensible, the background to the "application of the criterion" must be filled in (what Someone 'must have' meant, thought etc.)

Rule is displayed in being able to 'go on' (18). That is, it shows itself where something concretely different exhibits analytically the same features (both are instances of rule). Here we might consider Wittgenstein's example of continuing a series of numbers. (19) If we wished to relate actions by imputing reasons or motives to an actor, we do so within "accepted standards of reasonable behaviour, current in the society in question". To identify instances of reasonable behaviour as subsumable under standards implies recognition of them as 'this or that kind of event' - that is, making a judgment of identity. As such, of course, this necessitates a recognition of an application of criterion, and thus, rule. Such applications of criterion (identifications of regularity) are discernible only within relevant modes of human behaviour, governed by their own rules. (20)

**Science as a form of life**

Learning to recognise competence (apply rules) then, comes from a social context of common activity which stands itself as a body of rules within which such competence has its own intelligibility. Thus preferred rules of play in a game only have intelligibility within the social context (body of rules) within which the game is intelligible, etc.

Winch claims that the aim of the social sciences should be to 'grasp the point' of what is going on in the social world. This cannot involve a process
of Verstehen, as Weber seems to call for it, since what is involved here is sense or meaning divorced from the social nexus; what is involved in Verstehen, for Weber, is grasping the ideas of the actor (his subjective state) by a sympathetic intuitive reconstruction ("nachbild") by methodological reconstituting the situation externally. (21) Winch claims that understanding is possible only as an internal relationship between elements in social interaction; such relations are conventional, and thus understanding any human activity depends upon grasping its conventions, - that is to say, the conventional usages in the speech and concepts which are used in, or as, or for the activity. As such, it involves grasping the application of rule and standards of competence in such applications (uses).

To sum up, for Winch;

(a) Understanding consists of grasping the point of what is going on.
(b) This consists in an internal relation between elements of the situation of interaction.
(c) Grasping the nature of this internal relation is seeing in it the application of criteria of intelligibility (rules).
(d) The nature of this internal relationship exists in the usage (conventions) which govern the use of language, however,
(e) displays of rule following in language cannot be reduced to a prescription of rule; the display shows the rule, but we cannot look for the ground which warrants the legitimacy of the usage, for speeches are part of the activities to which they supply sense; the sense that they supply derives in large part from their place in those activities; there is no external view of the role and nature of speech.
(f) The nature of usage (for instance, calculation) consists ultimately in the activity itself; it makes no sense to go beyond it except for specific practical reasons. I take usage here to mean rule governed practices.
(g) Representation or judgment of instances or identity, derives only and entirely from indifference to the nature of reality beyond this activity (nature). (22)

What then is Winch calling for? It is clear that he wishes to rule certain kinds of account (explanation) out of sociology, in so far as they make unwarranted claims for their exhaustiveness, completeness, superiority etc., - primarily the positivist-scientific model. In its place, he seems to be
calling for a serious consideration of cultural (linguistic-symbolic) resources, as activities with their own life; standards, intelligibility, ethics, rules of sensibility, competence.

Given his view of the properties of language, what could this be like, however? I shall talk a little about some aspects of Winch's social science which follow from the ideas he endorses.

Many of his critics have pointed out that certain kinds of activity are immediately indefensible, given his view of social scientific accounting - notably structural, historiographic, Marxist and empirical-statistical analyses. I do not propose to consider the truth of these claims, but my own feeling is that this misses Winch's point. Wittgenstein has been accused of similar aims, but he is very clear about his criticisms of these systems; he might be aiming to limit or reformulate their claims, but he cannot, except perhaps for himself, dismiss them.

"Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast, and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it." (23)

Wittgenstein certainly sees Social Science involving understanding by analysis of language uses. On Frazer's "The Golden Bough" he wrote,

"Our speech contains the precipitate of a complete mythology. We must plough through the complete language". (24)

His work is replete with appeals to see the sense in activities - and sense shows itself through the usages of language. What seem to emerge for me are 2 central problems, one of which I indicated earlier. Firstly, the power of conventionality (rule) to limit speech, and second the representational character of speech.
Conventionality and Representation

Winch cites Wittgenstein to the effect that rules do not always emerge, cannot be used to prescribe what meaning is in any particular instance; they show themselves in the way an activity or a speech usage is accepted as successful or warranted in the social world. Any attempt to accuse Winch of calling for formulae or recipes to account social behaviour would clearly be wrong. What he does call for however, apparently following Wittgenstein, is DESCRIPTION, a description of the conditions which must be satisfied if there are to be any criteria of understanding at all. (25)

Now a difficulty immediately presents itself; the difficulty of translation. I do not mean by this translation from one language into another - that exists apart from Winch's central thesis, and is, I would argue, not related to the point I have in mind. George Steiner expresses this very well when he says that the efficiency of Esperanto in translation is undisputed, but precisely because it abstracts "those imprecise and redundant energies which make possible the communication", it misses "the local mobile pluralism" which enables speech to perform its infinite, endlessly varied, endlessly unique role; .."only the more generalised inert, aspects of significance survive". (26) This is the fate of all universal or 'ideal' language.

What I do have in mind are precisely the conventions which Winch points to as the acknowledged commonality which gives speech its life. Wittgenstein gave the name "Form of Life" to the aggregate of activities (or language games) of which speaking a language consists. The problem (for Winch) would seem to consist of the fact that each use of language/application of rule creates meaning/has life in the context of its production, (language measures/rules the reality it represents, in the context in which it occurs). (This is the property of indexicality to which Garfinkel refers.) (27)

Given the fact, how are we to have access to its meaning in any other context?
If the life of a concept derives from its use, its meaning is then available to us only in use. There would not be a problem for Winch had he not called for a description of conditions in which intelligibility is possible. Such a description can only serve as a re-translation of the meaning. We cannot have, in a description of the conditions of intelligibility as they are concretely set out, any necessary constitutive framework within which meaning comes to be accomplished. It was precisely to avoid the problem of indexicality (creating as it does, an infinite regress situation in which meta-rules, meta-meta-rules etc., are needed) that Wittgenstein proposed the form of life as the ultimate activity. It is a display of actual performance which is to serve not simply as a concrete formulation of what we do, to exhibit it (although it does that) but also an occasion to confront the relationship between speech and the world. It does so through proposing that we find, in its concreteness, both an account of itself and a pointing to its nature (as a limit), as a pointing. Thus in the conventionality of language games within a form of life we are faced with ways of using language which do not only aim to represent reality, but call on us to see the essential inadequacy of representations in language of what they are not (what warrants them, grounds them).

Conventionality (Rule) gives the language game life, but it is only accessible to us when a formulation aims to display its partiality - against the claims of impartiality and indifference which concrete representations would aim to make - and to offer us the opportunity for analysis. Descriptions such as Winch seems to be calling for could not be representational; they would necessarily be possibilities, opportunities to speculate and theorize. The question arises - would they still be 'descriptions'? Are not descriptions essentially representational?

Bernard Williams makes a similar point when he writes in "Understanding Wittgenstein";
"For if our talk (about numbers - insert) has been determined by our decisions, then one result of our decisions is that it must be nonsense to say that anything (about concepts numbers systems) has been determined by our decisions. The dependence (of such phenomena) on our decisions in the only sense in which it obtains - for clearly there cannot be meant an empirical dependence on historical decisions - is something which shows itself in what we are and are not prepared to regard as sense and is not to be stated in remarks about decisions; and similarly in other cases.

The point comes out in the thought that the determinacy of reality comes from what we have decided or are prepared to count as determinate. (Zettel 351) "We have a colour system as we have a number system. Do the systems reside in our nature or in the nature of things. How are we to put it? Not in the nature of things."

The difference comes once more from a problem familiar in the Tractatus. How to put a supposed philosophical truth which, if it is uttered must be taken to mean an empirical falsehood, or worse. (28)

What I hope has emerged so far from this discussion of Winch's work is the fundamental importance which he attaches to language as a constitutive feature of social relations; he has argued the case for the central place of language in the understanding of social behaviour, which he sees as a system of internal relations framed in the context of rules which govern the usages of which this is made up.

What consequences would this have for Social Science? To begin with, Winch explicitly states that human activity cannot be summed up in a set of precepts; such formulae so obviously rely themselves on further precepts, and so on, that the regress problem generated deprives the initial formulation of any utility. We cannot thereby move on to argue that if we can find behaviour which is not formulated in accordance with a rule which the actor could formulate, this will count as non-reflective or habitual behaviour (29). The importance of rule, Winch argues resides in the fact that the learning how to apply criteria as to what is to count as correct in the performance of the activity. That is to say, the learning of activity involves rule-orientation rather than
rule-direction. Winch argues that the distinctively human feature of behaviour, however mechanical or habitual it may be, is the basis of reflection which its performance by human beings necessarily retains as their fundamental condition or possibility.

Now, he goes on to argue, against Oakeshott, (30) that changes in modes of behaviour can only be meaningfully said to occur in an environment which "contains within itself the means of assessing the significance of the behaviour which it prescribes" (31). Although habits may change, history involves more than simply a catalogue of such changes, and is also, more importantly, about the confrontation between the culturally significant ideas which persist or are transformed, or disappear, as men confront new social and environmental conditions.

Note, the claim is that grasp of what is going on in a changing society is only meaningful to those within the society in the real sense that only they understand what is going on; while a student of society will find it necessary to employ concepts which are not used nor would be understood in the society under investigation, these nevertheless presuppose a previous understanding of the concepts actually employed in the situation under investigation. (32) Winch argues that the concepts which social theorists employ are logically tied to the concepts which actually do enter into the activity under examination. Thus, while understanding is necessarily a real feature of everyday situations, the kind of understanding to which it is possible for the social scientist to aspire, must be tied to the conditions which govern such understanding in the everyday world, although it may aim to transcend the limits of this everyday world insofar as the concepts which it employs and the degree of reflectiveness is of a different order.

Nevertheless, there are real limitations involved; the aim of casual explanation, and prediction, often held to be central planks of the scientific enterprise, are ruled out for Winch. Science, he argues, applies its criteria as
to what is sensible, or intelligible, "unselfconsciously"; this is necessarily
the case, for to be self conscious is to be philosophical, rather than
scientific. In investigating human society, however, this is totally
inappropriate, for its very nature consists of "different and competing ways
of life, each offering a different account of the intelligibility of things".(33)

Crucially, then, we would seem to have no business evaluating (explicitly or
implicitly) the standards of rationality which occur in societies or groups
other than our own; what reality is like, or "objective" reality, has no foot­
hold in our actual use of language, but these are rather context bound or
context dependent. What is real or unreal shows itself in the particular
language used, and in the context of its use.

"The criteria of logic are not a direct gift of
God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible
in the context of ways of living or modes of
social life" (34)

This means that to apply (for instance) scientific criteria of rationality
when assessing, say, magical beliefs, is to commit a category mistake, for
criteria of intelligibility, and hence of rationality, are internal to the
mode of life involved, so that rationality can only be assessed in terms
of the practices involved in that mode of life. (35)

This, then, is the real significance of rules; it is not that the practice is
reducible to the framework which constitutes it, but that it is only and
entirely available AS that framework. To understand a practice is to grasp
the way of going on of which the practice consists. To describe the practice
so as to make it accessible to outsiders (i.e., to apply 'external' criteria
of intelligibility) violates the sense of the practice since on the one hand,
by its nature, its sense consists of the internal rules of which it is a
display, and on the other, it is in the context of its own criteria that it
expresses the social relations which should be the object of social investi­
gation.

There are, then, aside from purely formal or otherwise non-substantive
27.
criteria, no general criteria of rationality or intelligibility, these consist only of the actual practices of people in diverse cultures, or forms of life.

Critics, at this point, leap up and demand to know how, in that case, do we ever know that this argument is right? Surely it is only as we confront a common reality that we are able, for instance, to communicate with hitherto unknown tribes with strange languages, customs and practices. While we do not, perhaps, have to agree with the beliefs of the tribe in question, and can tolerate the untranslatability of perhaps major aspects of their culture, but there must be agreement as to what (for instance) it is to make a true or a false statement, and how to agree about what is empirically there or not there, or how to identify objects (etc.). (36) Since this does in fact happen, then it follows that we do share a common criterion of rationality, on this level at least. Lukes (37) also argues that all societies depend on a commonly shared reality (at least assumed) on the basis of which the predictions which form such a vital part of everyday life can be made.

Hollis (38) argues along somewhat similar lines that when we try to understand the utterances of a strange language, we must relate those utterances to the world; what we have, in the first place, are different classes of utterance related to each other in a way which is mysterious to the outsider. The only way we can have access to the relations between these classes of utterances is to isolate a class of utterances which correspond in some way with our own perceptions of what is there. Hollis argues that we must in the end rely on our perceptions of what is there and assume that these coincide, in general, with those of the subjects of our investigation. Communication between cultures is only possible, Hollis argues, if we assume both that we see more or less the same things as those we are trying to understand, and that we would say roughly the same things about them as our subjects would say.

Hollis and Lukes claim to have established a criterion of rationality which is
not context or culture dependent; such transcultural 'bridgeheads' depend for
their rationality on the verifiability of beliefs by direct appeal to empirical
criteria. (39) A belief is in correspondence with reality if it can be veri-
fied in accordance with certain mutually acceptable means; it is irrational
when it does not correspond to reality, since, while it purports to claim (so
and so) this is either falsified by empirical means or it is in principle
neither directly verifiable nor falsified by empirical means. (40) This seems
to be neither context bound nor optional, and inter-cultural communication
would seem to depend upon it.

Hollis and Lukes also argue that surely, there is another trans-cultural
criterion of rationality; a belief cannot be rational if it is either inconsis-
tent, self-contradictory, or consists of or relies on invalid inferences. At
the same time, the operable logical rules which would specify what is to count
as an inconsistency, self-contradiction or invalid inference, cannot be matters
of pure convention, since if we accept this, then the admission must be made
that a language could incorporate as part of its form of life, the possibility
that the laws of negation, identity and non-contradiction need not operate.
This would make such a language totally inaccessible to us, and hence we could
never know that this was the case.

This would seem a powerful argument against what is usually called the
"Relativist" position associated with Winch. However, I would argue, (following
Neilsen) (41) that there is no real disagreement between Winch and these critics;
winch's position is such that these objections do not touch his central argument.

Now Winch noted "the possibilities of our grasping forms of rationality
different from ours in an alien culture .... are limited by certain formal
requirements centring round the demand for consistency". (42) He goes on to
argue that this is all but useless, however, for separating rational beliefs
from irrational ones, for these 'formal requirements' tell 'us nothing about
what in particular is to count as consistency, just as the rules of the
propositional calculus limit, but do not themselves determine what are to be proper values of P, Q, etc." (43) Lukes sees this as simply a misleading way of saying that after all it is the content of propositions not the logical relations between them which is dependent on the social relations between men. (44)

As Neilsen points out, if we take the formal criterion of consistency alone, then it is not the case that it tells us nothing; although logical constants are all topic neutral, along with 'several', 'most', 'although', 'perhaps' and so on; these terms, even apart from their context, tell us a great deal about the formal relations between the elements which they are used to relate. (45)

However, most of our terms, and a great number of scientifically and philosophically interesting ones, are not topic neutral. They have their own "distinctive, informal, logical powers" which are only available through a grasp of their usage. Propositions can be negations, or contradictions but constructed from terms such that only a grasp of the logical powers of these topic non-neutral expressions will enable us to understand them; the content of the propositions is otherwise meaningless. It is precisely these powers which derive from the social relations between men, their forms of life, and their embedded language games. The argument here is between those who subscribe to Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language, of whom Winch is one, and those who reject this argument, following (among others) Ayer and Strawson, of whom Hollis is one. Lukes, however, makes the point that there may indeed be contextual criteria against which the reasons for action may be judged. In any event, the force of this particular aspect of the objections put forward by Lukes and Hollis depends upon their arguing against the possibility of a private language, and in the event, neither produces any significant arguments. The point is that it does not depend upon what they claim, that Winch is denying the need for field independent, formal requirements of consistency. This is simply not the case. (46)
The argument for a common conception of reality underlying cultural variability is certainly a more difficult problem. There is some uncertainty as to what Winch is in fact arguing for in his work. If he claims that criteria of rationality are completely context dependent, then there is surely a head on collision between himself, and Hollis and Lukes. This is, fairly clearly, not what he wants to claim, however. The final section of "Understanding a Primitive Society" consists of Winch arguing for Birth, Death and Procreation as precisely these significant areas of overlap between cultures. Thus, while he recognises the necessity for there to be these important areas to be comparable, he nonetheless maintains that they may well have distinct, diverse forms of life giving rise to individual and possibly incommensurable conceptions of reality. The question then becomes: can we then use such conceptions to show that a way of life is irrational?

We have already been presented with the argument that, if we are to have any cross-cultural understanding, we must share a range of everyday beliefs; we must also share a notion of how the truth of these as expressed in statements is to be verified. Hollis wants to move on from this to argue that, apart from everyday beliefs, most cultures have 'ritual beliefs' or 'metaphysical beliefs which inform everyday action'. (47) These, according to Hollis, do not have objectively specifiable truth conditions, unlike everyday beliefs, for they do not depend upon direct reference to empirical reality, but are rather dependent upon each other for criterial justification (a coherence theory of truth). Thus, he wants to argue, while these beliefs are unverifiable, they are nonetheless beliefs for which reasons can be given, in a very good and recognisable sense of rationality. Beliefs form 'clusters'; one belief depends upon another to supply its justification.

In this context, as a belief here corresponds to no identifiable reality, while rationality consists in the relation between beliefs, truth cannot be
a matter of correspondence. Rather, where we have rational connection between ritual beliefs, we may speak of 'metaphysical truths'.

Given, however, that Hollis and Lukes previously have argued the case, very convincingly, for the necessary existence of a bridgehead of empirical beliefs which make these concepts accessible to other cultural outsiders, at some point their circle of coherence must be broken out of and some of the beliefs in the metaphysical realm related to the empirical world. Now, it is clearly possible to read Winch so that he is taken as not denying the necessary existence of some universal (cultural) forms of life and their related language games, to do with accounting everyday objects in a 'commonsensical' fashion. Insofar as this seems to be necessarily the case if we are to have the possibility of inter-cultural communication, it would be difficult for Winch to sustain a position where he did not allow at least this minimum level of comparability.

This is not to say, however, that thereby, societies share a conception of reality for these shared conceptions seem to consist of only a small area where common criteria may be recognised by members of different cultures. It is also certainly true that, as Hollis has argued, there are different criteria of rationality in different contexts, the very nature of which makes them, except at any impossibly remote point of contact, incommensurable with those held in other cultures.

While we must accept that there are areas held in common by different cultures, and it is this which makes them comparable, there is no way we can decide that the common area is the sole reality, or even the most important one. As Humpty Dumpty says in "Through the Looking Glass", "The question is who is to be master, that is all". I have already referenced Steiner's comments on the problems of universal language and translation - 'only the more inert aspects of significance survive'. (48)
Many types of beliefs are simply incommensurable because we do not hold criteria in common which could be meaningfully used to assess them - for instance, ritual beliefs about heaven, or spirits. We could not meaningfully confirm or disconfirm such beliefs for the logical connections necessary to tie them to a common empirical world cannot exist. On the other hand, such beliefs will be internally connected (remember Wittgenstein's comments on 'ploughing through the whole language'), so as to support each other; so complex is the 'complete mythology' contained in the language that even a successful attack on certain peripheral beliefs cannot threaten the central features of the belief system.

Wittgenstein's remarks on the nature of certainty are highly relevant here; he believed that knowledge was only possible on the basis of grounds which could be said to be neither true nor false.

670 We might speak of the 'fundamental principles of human enquiry'.
671 I fly from here to a part of the world where the people have only indefinite information, or none at all, about the possibility of flying. I tell them I have just flown there from .... They ask me if I might be mistaken - they have obviously a false impression of how the thing happens. (If I were packed up in a box, it would be possible for me to be mistaken about the way I had travelled). If I simply tell them that I can't be mistaken, that won't perhaps convince them; but it will if I describe the actual procedure to them. Then they will certainly not bring the possibility of a mistake into the question. But for all that - even if they trust me - they might believe I had been dreaming or that magic had made me imagine it. (49)

There are certain of our own beliefs, Wittgenstein says, which we cannot be sensibly said to doubt, for we cannot imagine what disconfirmation here would look like. These would, in large part, form the kinds of knowledge on which the intercultural bridgeheads already discussed could be built. Claims to knowledge, he says, consist of circumstances in which one is prepared to give compelling grounds, to demonstrate the claim.
However, there are certain kinds of belief of which the grounds which might be given are no surer than the assertion - for instance, 'I have a body' or 'The world existed long before I was born'; he argues that it is impossible to imagine what the disconfirmation of such claims might be like. About such empirical propositions, no doubt can exist, if making judgments is to be possible at all. (50)

Continuing doubt about, for instance, the meaning of words, or the justification of inductive arguments, or the reality of material objects, or their persistence is not something which can be settled by producing incontrovertible evidence, but is something which ceases to be sensible in the context of the activities within which it might occur; these are questions which necessarily do not arise at all - at least in the usual contexts - which is not to say that such doubts might not serve some purpose within other language games, such as philosophy.

Here we seem to have an argument against the possibility of cross cultural analysis; while Winch has recently stated that he most certainly does not wish to claim that 'the ways in which we live never be criticised, nor that a way of living can never be characterised as in any sense irrational; still less do I argue that men who belong to one culture can never understand lives led in another culture' (51), it is difficult to see how this can be derived from what he actually writes. Stanley Stein (52) and Kai Neilsen (53) both maintain that Winch's denial of what seems to be the clear implications of his work is on the basis of its counter intuitive nature; it seems unexceptionable to us that we would want to be able to criticise, say, life amongst the Ik, or in the Third Reich or amongst the Dobuans. Stein has proposed that this intuitive conviction that we can criticise a way of life as a whole is necessarily tied to an incoherent metaphysical thesis; Neilsen objects that this has not
been established either by Stein or Winch, and 'on the face of it at least, the claim seems quite implausible' (54). What are the reasons, then, that Winch seems to find himself in such a counter intuitive position? I want to argue that this derives from certain of his methodological principles and that, further, these cannot be derived from what he claims is their source, the later work of Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein and Winch

You will recall that early in 'The Idea of a Social Science', Winch formulates his central principle as the idea that 'The concepts that we have settle for us the form of experience we have of the world'. (55) Further, he proposed that 'Social relations are expressions of ideas about reality' (56), and that 'each system of ideas, its component elements being interrelated internally, has to be understood in and for itself'. (57) I hope to have shown how this leads Winch to the position that he finds himself in, but the question now becomes - what is it about his operating precepts that leads him there?

To begin with, Winch argues that the understanding of the nature of Social phenomena in general, the elucidation of the concept 'form of life' belongs not to Sociology, but to Epistemology (58); at the very least, their relationship is much closer than is usually supposed. The central problem of sociology, that of giving an account of the nature of social phenomena in general, belongs to philosophy; sociology here is really a 'misbegotten epistemology' (59). The sociologist is faced with the problem that the rules which govern sociological investigation cannot provide criteria in terms of which he may identify what is going on in two or more situations, rather, it is the criteria which are applied by those whom he is investigating which will decide that. (60)

At this point, Winch is arguing that, rather than the sociologist understanding society in the way that a scientist or an engineer understands a machine, he is more likely to understand it in the way that he understands how his
colleagues are operating in the situation. Sociological understanding, for Winch, can only be based on the conventions governing action in the context in question. This is available in the language that is used, and 'speaking a language' in large part consists of knowing how to go on in particular situations.

The point should be made, and indeed, Wittgenstein makes the point very clearly, that this conventionalist account is not all there is to speaking a language. Hunter makes the point:

".... unlike most ordinary games, language games are intricately bound up with other aspects of life, with plans and fears and thoughts and activities, and cannot be understood in isolation from these" (61)

That is to say, rather than seeing the language speakers as understandable purely in terms of the conventions governing the language that they use to represent the world, we must recognise that every member of society is afforded, in the reflective (or reflexive) faculty which is a necessary feature of his (human) condition, the possibility of, in his actions and speech, attending to the relation between his speech or actions in the world, and creatively re-formulating that relation (62).

The difference may hinge on the interpretation given to the notion of a convention. Stanley Cavell expresses the point in the following way:

"That that should express boredom or anger or understanding is not necessary; someone may have to be said 'to understand suddenly', and then always fail to manifest the understanding five minutes later, just as someone may be bored by an earthquake, or by the death of his child, or the declaration of martial law, or may be angry at a pin, a cloud or a fish, just as someone may quietly (but comfortably?) sit on a chair of nails. That human beings on the whole do not respond in these ways, is, therefore, seriously referred to as conventional; but now we are thinking of convention not as the arrangements a particular culture has found convenient .... Here the array of conventions are not patterns of life which differentiate men from one another, but those exigencies of conduct which all men share." (63)
This makes reference to the rule-orientation of members of a society, to attend to rules is necessary if what we do is to 'come off' as a warranted performance. However, we should, at the same time recognise that conventions do not specify the meaning of the action for the performer; these may be accessible in context, but it is by no means clear at all that what is accessible is an exhaustive, clearly defined nor indeed clearly definable set of criterial conditions; even if this were the case, it is by no means established that the warrant, or the truth conditions of the utterances involved could provide the meaning or the significance of the speech for the speaker and others in the situation. Nor, I would argue, is this a consequence of Wittgenstein's arguments for the impossibility of private language.

Think, of necessarily ambiguous or vague meaning attached to action or speech in everyday situations; most marriages, are full of different 'atmospheres' where subtle nuances of emotion may be available only to the main participants because overlapping sets of conventions may be simultaneously in play; Harold Garfinkel demonstrated that when, for instance, we consciously rupture such intimate contexts, by, for example, being extra-polite in our own home, we create trouble, not because conventions are being violated, but because apart from the actor necessarily having to attend to the rules governing speech and action, the actor must also 'take responsibility' for the choices that he makes amongst those rules. (64) If our concepts did indeed settle for us the form of experience that we have of the world, and understanding consisted simply of grasping how to go on with those concepts, then such troubles could not arise, for we could simply impose the understanding that our competence as members of society gives us onto every occasion of interaction.

Of what could such competence consist, however? We must accept that language games, although they must serve as the standard against which speech or action is 'evaluated' (rather than de-coded), nonetheless change continually, according to the changes in the environment to which, in part they are a response, and
to the creative actions of those who play them. If this were not the case, then societies certainly would not have evolved, and could probably not exist.

Hilary Putnam makes the following point:

"Assume (as is plausible) that to understand a statement is to be explained as 'knowing its truth conditions'. If truth is correspondence to reality, it would seem as if of what the correspondence is is pre-supposed by knowledge that such and such a statement stands in the relation in question to anything or does not stand in the relation in question to anything. And if understanding the statement is equated with knowing what it is for, it seems to be the case that it stands or does not stand in the relation in question to appropriate entities, then knowledge of what the correspondence is, is pre-supposed in the understanding of every statement. But in what could this knowledge - which does not consist in the acceptance of statements, because it is prior to the understanding of all statements - consist? (65)

Putnam argues that the claim that we know what a statement means by virtue of the fact that we have a prior (extra linguistic) conception of its relation to the reality it purports to describe is incoherent; to learn a language one does not need to know that there is a correspondence between words and extra linguistic entities; that there is, in fact, such a correspondence accounts for the success of the language, but is not necessary for the language to operate in the way that it in fact does. The language rather, operated as a rational activity IN USE; we can (and do) talk about anything, once we have this faculty; we are constrained by the grammar of the language, rather than by the necessary relations between its statements and that to which it may refer.

Now this is not a claim that we cannot (empirically) have such knowledge; rather, if we take Wittgenstein's point, there is a confusion here between a conceptual investigation of the grammar of the language games involved, and an empirical account of the nature of human knowledge. The criteria which justify the sensible use of a statement are part of the grammar of the language game in which it is employed; this is not to say that criterial relations are
necessary relations between language and reality; rather, the criterial relation is a special relation, a priori, non-inductive conventional evidence which justifies the sentences employed in a language game. (66)

How do these arguments relate to Winch's problem, then? Recall my contention that this problem derives from the way in which he interprets the notion that our concepts settle for us the form of experience that we have of the world, and further, that these concepts have meaning only in the context of their employment, by virtue of the inter-subjectively available rules or conventions which members orient to in their employment. The problem arises for Winch when he is confronted with the fact that communication between cultures does, in fact, take place. He must concede that there are minimal areas within which comparison must be possible, given the constraints governing the nature (it would seem) of all human relationships to the material world. At the same time, he argues that these basic 'bridgeheads' between cultures cannot be used to justify comparisons between what constitutes the vast bulk of cultural belief systems, consisting as they do of a huge amount of statements which rely for their rationality upon the support of the internal 'mythology' of the language which they make up.

It would be helpful, here, if we could separate out the conceptual from the empirical areas, insofar as this is possible. Wittgenstein clearly considers this to be a key problem, and not one which can offer hope of a ready solution. Thus, he inquires, "Is it that rule and empirical proposition merge into one another?" (67)

Winch's account of understanding trades on the idea that language is inter-subjectively available because of the existence of rules, which enable sense to be made of its statements; these rules are conventional, and provide us with the concepts which we have about the reality which we inhabit - indeed, the concepts which we have constitute for us the reality which we inhabit. The
Form of Life consists in the relation between the world, and our formulation of it. These are indivisible, neither having sense apart from their relation to the other. As is well known, this is Wittgenstein's 'solution' to the problem of dualism.

To argue that our concepts settle the form of experience that we have seems to me to re-instate just such dualism, however, Winch clearly takes from this account of the relation of speech to the world the idea that, thereby, the only access we have to the meaning of the world inhabited is through speech. Now, if this were the case, then the problems which have been set out would indeed follow, since world-views would be incommensurable, and there would be no way of deciding between them. (68) As has been discussed, some contact with the empirical world is a necessary feature of any form of life if we are to even be able to communicate with each other, let alone people in other cultures. It would seem that we are faced with either taking the empirical world for granted (it must be the same for all peoples) or else assuming that the differences between the conceptual schemes which different cultures employ makes them incomprehensible to each other, except on a minimal level.

I would argue, however, that this only comes about if we accept the notion that our concepts determine our experience. We have seen what the consequences of this doctrine are for social science as Winch would have it; what is the warrant for this doctrine itself?

Our concepts have meaning for us only because we can interpret them according to rule. Following Wittgenstein's account of the essentially public nature of language and meaning, Winch argues that it is inconceivable that an individual should 'have' a private meaning for any experience; naming or accounting experience can only take place because we have learned a language within which it is sensible to ascribe this or that property to any event. Thought leads us to language, because only in terms of language is it possible to imagine thought. Sense is a public phenomenon because it is an ordered phenomenon;
our language permits us to make sense, and this consists in making statements, or having thoughts which we recognise in accordance with the conventions which obtain, regardless of our will, in the contexts, in the society of which we are members.

Imagine, for instance, that we went to the Amazon, and discovered a new species of fish, or animal. We could not sensibly decide to use any name which we might care to invent as the name of the creature without providing, beforehand, to those with whom we wanted to use the name, some details about what the animal was like, its size, colour, physical features, diet etc. Only then would it be sensible for us to begin to use a name. Here, the conventions governing the use of the name would require us to provide a warrant (in the form of the description of what one was like) before we could 'make sense' in using the name.

When such background knowledge is missing, then language can be used to provide the necessary warrant; sometimes this is 'expert knowledge', but in general, the meaning of a word need not include this kind of justification. As Wittgenstein says, language is a motley, and rather than there being one standard which fixes what the justification for using a word must be, there are rather, widely varying standards, appropriate in different types of context. It is definitely not the case that the rules which govern the warrantable use of a word can be reduced to one kind of evidential statement, for we do not only classify, verify or falsify when we use words, but also discuss. (69)

If Winch's claim that the world is settled for us in the concepts which we have of it is taken as literal, seems also to be a claim that such experience of the world is ours (we own it, as individual members of a community differentiated from other communities, which, likewise, own their different experiences of putatively the same world). It must be the case that Winch is indifferent to the nature of the extra linguistic world, for in terms of his own argument, this
is not a possible area of analysis. Now, this resembles, in some respects, the claim of the private ownership associated with Locke, which is the subject of Wittgenstein's attacks in his later work. (70) (It is not, of course, a private language in the sense which Locke intended, since this is a language based on the private experience of one individual.)

There are similarities, however; apart from the fact that Winch is arguing that only the members of one culture, rather than one individual can own an experience, the claims make by Winch are very similar. Within one culture, Winch is claiming, the experience of the world available to members of that culture is known by them in a way not available to members of an outside society; without the concepts available to the members of that culture, no outsider could have access to the world inhabited by its people, since their experience is only available to them through their ('private') concepts.

Now the difference exists for Winch in the idea that the conventions of the culture provide the warrant for the justifiable use of words in the language of the society. If Winch is indifferent to the nature of the extra linguistic world to which the concepts refer, then he is relying on the acquisition of competence by the members of the society in the justifications which they can provide for the usage that they employ. That is to say, becoming a member of a society must involve learning to apply language in accordance with a set of conventions internal to the language. If language is not primarily a matter of ostensive definition, which seems to be the consequence of Winch's exchanges with Hollis and Lukes, then the experience which its concepts provide for its members must be a product of the internal relationships between the sentences of which it consists. These must, furthermore, be such that the meaning of the concepts is available to members from the conventions governing their employment. These language games provide the ultimate point of reference; then meaning consists of 'going on in this way'; we must, at some point, simply say 'this is what we do'.
What seems to be missing from Winch's account, however, is the idea of language as an activity, or as part of an activity. As Austin points out (71), 'I do' as an utterance, is part of the activity of marrying someone; when we say 'I do', it is not just that the utterance 'makes sense' in the context in which it is employed, with our conventions about how it is to be employed in this context in the particular society in which we do live. To say 'I do' simply is marrying someone; it is a performative utterance.

The point to be made is that, while we can agree with Winch that our concepts will provide us with a good account of how to go on in this particular setting, is it also the case that this knowledge comes to an understanding of the meaning of the action for those involved? On the basis of a conventionalist account, we would have to say that if we can recognise the conventions to which the individuals involved can warrantably be said to be orienting, on the basis of their actions, then we understand the meaning of those actions for the individuals concerned.

Now this would be the case if those concerned were automata, for whom the actions could have only the recognisable conventional meaning; surely there must be, in all cases, more to the meaning of the actions for those concerned, however? As well as being an utterly conventional ceremony, marriage is also the setting for innumerable emotional experiences - apart from love, fear, shame, resentment, hostility, jealousy, remorse, humour, kindness and so on almost ad infinitum. Now, unless these are expressed in terms of the conventions involved, in the setting involved, there is no place for them in Winch's account.

This seems, then, to set limits to the kind of understanding that is possible given the conventionalist account. Now, it might be argued that this is an inescapable feature of human interaction; that people do have private thoughts, emotions, feelings which they 'keep hidden' and to which we cannot be privy.
Exactly so; however, this, I would argue, is a serious inconvenience to any account which is claiming to be able to explicate the meaning of utterances and actions, since surely it is to get round the notion of a private experience that Winch proposes language as the publicly available medium of sense. Surely the 'private' feelings of the actors involved are precisely what constitute the meaning of the experience for him or her?

Now, it is not the case that the feelings of the actors are incommunicable, for the point Wittgenstein makes is that, while these private experiences are nonetheless internal to the individuals concerned, they are in principle communicable; it is just that they could not entertain a private experience which they could not in principle communicate, for if they could not communicate it, how could they experience it? If these are not the kinds of meaning which Winch can claim to explicate from the public performances available to him, then what is the significance of his claim to have, in the concepts which members of a society hold, the experience that they have of the world? We must take care to distinguish the possibilities which any analysis can offer from the claims which an analysis such as that of Winch would seem to want to make. The point is not that since Winch cannot offer us the internal mental states of the individual members of a society, thereby his analysis is totally useless. As Wittgenstein makes clear, the search for the 'mental states' which correspond to how we act in the world is futile; all we have are the actions of men, physical and verbal. The real question is not - how can we make sense of the mysterious private existences of individuals? But rather - what kind of sense do we IN FACT make of the public world in which we LIVE?

It is precisely in claiming that the meaning of public life comes down to the conventions to which its actors attend that Winch's version of social science is unwarranted. Rather than the concepts that individuals have settling their experience of the world, it is the relation between those concepts and their employment in the lives of individuals which constitutes such experience. It
is not that concepts dictate what the meaning of the action will come to, but the experience of employing the concepts in relation to the extra linguistic world, in the ways that the individuals concerned actually do employ them, which constitutes the meaning. (72)

CODES, CONVENTIONS AND CONTEXT

Now, explanations of social behaviour which utilize the understandings of the subjects of the nature of the maxims, conventions, or rules which guide their behaviour are a standard part of sociology. Deviance is one area in which these have, for many years formed an integral part of attempts to account for the phenomena concerned. D. L. Wieder notes (73):

"The convict code is the classical or traditional explanation of those forms of deviant behaviour engaged in by inmates, convicts, or residents of re-habilitation establishments or organisations. In traditional analyses of deviant behaviour, some subversive or contracultural normative order is searched out by the analyst and utilized by him as an explanation for the behaviour patterns he has observed." (74)

Wieder goes on to describe the specifics of the code, which is the understanding of inmates and staff about forms of behaviour recognised by both as contrary to the 'proper' (in inmate terms) relationship between the two. It is behaviour which involves 'snitching', 'copping out', taking advantage of other residents, sharing what you have, helping other residents, 'not messing with other residents' interests', not trusting staff, and showing loyalty to the residents. Traditionally, the rules of the code have been treated as maxims of conduct which residents follow and enforce upon one another, and this is taken to be a sufficient explanation for the regular patterns of deviant behaviour found amongst the inmates. Patterns of behaviour among inmates are 'protected, supported and encouraged by the code, though they are not directly prescribed'. (75) The code, Wieder argues, provides the motivations to engage in patterns of deviant behaviour, to sanction those patterns positively, and not to interfere with those patterns even if it were in the
residents' own interest to do so. In this sense, an account of the code is an explanation for the patterns of behaviour it relates to. Staff also used the code, Wieder says, because it enabled them to:

"... identify or name individual acts and patterns of repetitive action and to collect the diverse actions under the rubric of a single motive and, in turn, to name them as the same kind of act. They rendered resident action sensible or rational by noting the ways in which resident action was rule governed and directed towards achieving goals that were specified by the code ... Residents' actions were reasonable in the sense that they had no choice but to behave in the fashion that they did." (76)

Staff were involved in using, explicitly or implicitly, a wide range of social scientific concepts in their use of the code to account inmates' behaviour; rule-governed action, goal directed action, intended and unintended outcomes of action, normatively required and normatively optional means of achieving a morally valued end, roles, role-bound behaviour and definition of the situation. The code thus structured staff's experience of the behaviour of inmates. It also made the 'environment' (relation with inmates) understandable trans-situationally, that is to say, understanding was non-situation specific.

Motives for inmate behaviour could be related to general features of the form of life of the inmate, rather than relating them to, say, direct personal feelings toward individual staff members.

So far, the account which we have seems to conform to the kind of explanation which Wieder would see as legitimate for social science; he would point out that these men share a culture which enables them to 'see the point' of actions in the contexts within which they occur. Wieder goes on to argue, however, that one could see the code, as it was employed by residents, as a means of providing, for outsiders and perhaps for themselves the 'social fact' character of their circumstances; that is to say, the code as a set of conventions accounts for compliance to a normative order, which is external and constraining. To see it as this, however, is to make it rather like a travelogue narrative, or a
Precisely like the narrative, Wieder argues, seeing the telling of the code in these terms is to deal with it as an account to be passively absorbed in isolation from the scenes within which, IN FACT, it is a continuous connected part manifested as an active consequential act within it.

Taking the talk that occurred within the scenes that invoked the code, referred to the code, or relied on the code for their intelligibility as merely a description of life, an account of the meaning of the actions for the actors concerned is to ignore the fact that, at the same time, this talk was part of the action involved in those scenes, indeed - part that was included within the scope of things over which the code had jurisdiction. That is to say, talk involving the code was 'reflexive within the setting of its occurrence'. (78)

Rather than being a disinterested report, the code, when it was being told, was invoked in response to matters which were critical to the hearer and listener, since it was a limit and a part of their joint action. Single utterances do many kinds of 'work' in the contexts within which they occur. They formulate the action, and have consequence for it, both as it occurs, and as that occurrence stands as part of the social organisation of the (sub) culture which is the rehabilitative establishment.

Wieder goes on to analyse the ways in which a single utterance could be rewritten by either naive or professional social scientist privy to the code as a multi faceted explication of the conventions governing the context within which it occurs, and also the practical exigencies involved in the real life relations between speaker and hearer(s). Further, he points out, individual utterances stand themselves as strategic moves which point to and subtly or directly modify the contingencies within the field of play of which the context of the utterance constitutes. Utterances where the code was told were always consequential; aside from its status as a description, the code
was also, when it was told, produced as a move in some other game - staff
who explained inmates' behaviour by citing the code would be justifying their
competence as staff, or defending their actions, or attacking some other
member of staff or the organisation, and so on.

The code, Wieder points out, is also necessarily flexible; any set of rules
in use as justifications for trans-situational evaluation or description must
retain an open character; by its very nature it does not consist of a fixed
set of maxims, nor did such maxims as might be invoked at a given time have a
definite scope of application. When the code was invoked, it was up the
hearer to identify (make sense of) the specific utterance as part of the code.
Since the code was not articulated in the 'finished' form already detailed,
any hearer would only have this kind of invocation on which to build up an
understanding of the conventions involved. Thus, at no time could there be
said to be one single proper or correct set of unequivocal maxims; it is
nonetheless true that not just any proposal would be acceptable, but how such
judgments might be reached is not open to any clear formulation, since the
very flexibility of the code necessarily leaves open the possibility of mani­
pulation and negotiation. Given the multi-formulative and multi-consequential
character of telling the code, Wieder recognises the probability that staff
were actively manipulated by residents when the code was told, one to the other,
with, probably as a necessary feature of the code's relation to its own
telling, one line for the inmates amongst themselves, and another for inmates
to staff.

Wieder goes on to argue that since telling the code creates the social reality
which the person involved orients to, a showing of how telling the code was
productive of a social world of real events requires not a (conventionalist)
account OF the code, but a description of how 'some participant .... went
about the task of understanding what he heard and saw as he was seeing or
hearing it'. (79) He argues that the multiple facets of the code, if we are
to understand them in the ways that they actually operate for the person hearing them, require a description of the 'ongoing course of direct experience'. That is to say, he argues, what we need is not a description of objects as they were experienced by the observer, but a description of the course of experiencing those occurrences (the objects which were experienced) as themselves objects.

He then goes on to give, not an account of 'the code' but of his collecting of the code; what emerges from his analysis is that, while he can produce, from inmate talk and action, a set of rules to plausibly account (or if you like, justify) members talk and action, while this organises and classifies specifics into classifiable types, this set of rules itself re-formulates and re-composes the perceived organisation of any scene to which it is applied. Disparate behaviours become seen as instances of 'the same thing'.

Now, Wieder points out, if we, in fact, attempt to explicate from any formulated rule specifics of inmate behaviour, we will find that the rule does not allow us to do so, except with a trivial degree of correspondence to actual behaviour. At the same time, he argues, many rules would seem to permit of directly opposite predictable behaviours. While rules may be experienced as predictive (in the settings in which they occur, they render behaviour both intelligible and, as it were, expectable or familiar), they are in fact operating as interpretative devices; their openness or flexibility permits a variety of possible interpretations, which may be subscribed to by participants or observers on the basis of any number of possible motivations.

Any production of rules to account convict behaviour would be a production open to justification on the basis of the actions of those whom it purportedly accounts. That is to say, it would have to be consistent with what is done and said by those who do and say it; but these rules, Wieder points out, cannot be an adequate explanation of patterns of action under the requirements of a
deductive theory, because in the instances where it does explain, situations, actions and rules cannot be INDEPENDENT elements. Thus we are brought back to Wittgenstein again. Not only is it the case that 'words only have life on the occasion of their utterance, but here we have a good example of 'rule' and 'empirical proposition' merging into one another. Is it also the case that 'at some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description?' (81)

As Wieder comments:

"Thus, telling the code, and any particular instance of formulating the code exhibits, rather than describes or explains, the order that members achieve through their practices of showing and telling each other than particular encountered features are typical, regular, orderly coherent motivated out of considerations of normative constraint and the like." (82)

Wieder argues that, rather than seeing (dualistically) the two events of 'the social action to be described' and 'the description of the social action', (along with its method) as two separate events, what we must do is to produce 'the accounting-of-social-action' as a single phenomenon; this exhibits via the occasion of constructing such an account, in the behaviours reported in it and the normative order behind it the observable and reportable instance of patterned, recurrent and connected motivated actions in their socially standardised situations. (83)

For Wieder, explanation must give way to description, but note, the descriptions which we give have that status not because they claim to be divorced from interests, but because they do not claim to be literal descriptions of social action, but are offered as one further instance of the product which results from the living practices which are the telling of the code, for instance. They have both the same logical status as the telling of the code has in the settings in which it occurs, and also the same phenomenal status, since their telling of the code may be read or treated as a source of advice or justification by persons in those settings, and may well be so used.

The line drawn between Wieder's inmates and staff, and the problems involved
are precisely the same. The incommensurability of belief systems comes to be
the problem that it is for Winch precisely because his view of understanding
leads him to expect that since the problem of understanding each other seems
to be solved within cultures, on the basis of his reading of Wittgenstein's
account of the public nature of meaning and thought, the difficulty which we
have with other cultures necessarily follows, since understanding is likewise
only an everyday matter for members of other cultures on the same basis. If,
however, we proceed not from the idea that our concepts settle for us the
form of experience that we have of the world, but rather, examine the way in
which the concepts (think of the code, and the difficulty of formulating a
clear and unequivocal set of rules) actually function in the settings in
which they are used, then a whole new set of possibilities emerge.

We cannot expect that our understanding of the meaning of social actions in
other cultures will be of a fundamentally different order than our under-
standing of social actions in our own culture, however that culture be defined.
Wieder's study argues very cogently the problems involved in gaining access
to the rules which operate in a social setting within the context of our own
society. Should we expect to have a superior understanding of the Azande
than we can have of members of our own society?

Note also the implications of thinking of concepts as 'ours'. Winch has
cited Wittgenstein to the effect that these are intersubjective phenomena, yet,
we are constantly led back to the idea that these constitute our experience.
Now, in Wieder's account, it is clearly brought out that the code is only
available to anyone as the specific and disparate actions and talk in which
participants indulge in the settings in which it may be invoked. As he makes
clear, while the code may be experienced as predictive, this is not how it
can, in fact, operate, since as a set of maxims, it does not permit of pre-
diction, but only offers the possibility of various interpretations. This is
precisely the point that Wittgenstein is making about the 'grammar' of language.
In the Investigations he says:

"Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think. What I mean is that understanding a sentence lies nearer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme, why is just this the pattern of variation in loudness and tempo? One would like to say "because I know what it's all about", but what is it all about? I should not be able to say. In order to 'explain' I could only compare it with something else which has the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern) (One says 'Don't you see, this is as if a conclusion were being drawn' or 'this is, as it were, a parenthesis' etc. How does one justify such comparisons? - There are very different kinds of justification here) .... We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same, but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other (any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another) .... Then has 'understanding' two different meanings here? I would rather say that these kinds of use of 'understanding' make up its meaning make up my concept of understanding. For I want to apply the word 'understanding to all this''. (85)

Wittgenstein goes on to say that the explanation of an expression, or the meaning of a poem is accomplished by 'leading' someone to hear it in this or that sense. Thus, within our own culture, our different understandings of the sense of utterances or actions, while based on conventions, is also a matter of being led to use these conventions in this or that way. It is not the case that we necessarily understand sentences or actions in this way or that, but rather that we can be brought to see them in these kinds of ways.

Similarly, with cross-cultural understanding, we can be brought to understanding of social behaviour, when we have 'learned the language', by being led to, or offered, the kinds of interpretations which members of that culture may be able to offer. Like Wieder's inmates, such inmates will not themselves be 'expert' in the total meaning of the conventions to which they attend in performing such actions, for the 'codes' involved will always have the fragmentary or unexplained character already discussed. It is part of the character of understanding that it will not have this kind of final complete or 'once-and-for-all' character. In Garfinkel's phrase, there is always an 'etcetera' clause involved, leaving the rules open to the exigencies of possible situations which may arise.
Winch's claim is that the understanding of members of a culture of the social institutions which constitute the culture is superior to that of those who are not members of the culture; now, it may be the case that we cannot claim to understand a culture unless we take into account the conventions to which members can justifiably be said to attend when they relate to each other, but this is precisely what members do in their relations with each other. Such relations can certainly be framed in terms of the conventions involved, but their understanding of how these conventions relate to their actions is an election, framed in accordance with the practical concerns involved, and potentially, formulable by anyone, including themselves in both inter and trans-cultural terms. George Steiner discusses this very well (in 'After Babel') in his account of 'language switching' in thinking. (86)

Understanding does not consist of one kind of thing, but, like language, it is a 'motley'. Thus, within our own culture, would we want to say that the understanding which inmates have of the convict code is superior to the understanding which, say, staff at the institutions involved may have? Or superior to the understanding which Wieder, or any other ethnographer may have? Would the ethnography produced by a social scientist who was also an inmate be superior or inferior? Would the understanding which all inmates have be of the same kind, or have the same status?

Here we come across an interesting set of arguments. Intuitively, we would want to say that, in the case of the convict code, the person who is able to explicate (whether or not he does so) the most complete formulation of the conventions of the code should be said to have the 'best' understanding of that code. Does this imply that those with a less complete knowledge of the code thereby have a less complete understanding of the meaning of their actions?

This seems unsatisfactory, for we would want to say that, nevertheless, when they do telling the code, they understand what they are about. However, Winch would seem to want to argue that, at one and the same time, because they are
members of the culture, this implies that their 'knowing how to go on' is precisely their participation in the publicly available conventions of the culture so that their understanding in each case is both the same (since it is based on the same conventions) and of equal status, if they are competent members. If we accept Winch's formulation that our concepts determine the experience which we have of the world, and if these concepts are only available to us through a shared language, then we must grant equal status to the understanding that each member of a culture has since these must potentially be the same in each case.

We have already discussed Wieder's account of how the convict code was available to anyone, so that, clearly, it functioned as a resource which offered very different possibilities for employment for different individuals who used it, both as staff and inmates and social scientists, both naive and professional. 'Understanding', 'justifying', 'explaining' were just some of the uses to which the code was put. It seems also clear that the status of those uses was a matter not just or even of the superior or inferior position in terms of knowledge or experience of the person using it, although this might be relevant in evaluating such usage, but was always more directly concerned with the practical exigencies of the occasion of usage. If the code was accepted as being competently invoked, then this would count as a display of competence by the members concerned. In this sense, the understanding of the code shared by all competent members could be said to be of equal value. But this is not to say that, on different occasions, for different practical purposes, the competences of different individuals in the uses of the code could accomplish the same things. Think here of differences between novices and old lags, staff and inmates, new staff and old hands. It is not the case that the understanding of one individual would necessarily be better than that of another, but that this would be decided on the basis of the knowledge and expertise which they could display to warrant the understanding for which they might argue.
The solution to the problem of understanding within cultures cannot specified simply as the possession, by members of those cultures, of the same set of inter-subjective resources. Rather, it is an accomplishment, by members, by the strategic deployment of those resources in accordance with 'grammar' which offers them the possibilities in the different purposes to which language is put. This conjoins both the conventionality which tradition hands down to the incumbent participant in a culture, and the creativity afforded by, on the one hand, the changing exigencies of practical circumstances, and the necessary openness and flexibility always present in conditions which necessitate ad hocing, since they offer no final and complete formulation.

Now, this seems to me to alter both the status of accounts which could be offered of the social phenomena in question, and the position of any investigator in relation to such phenomena. If the practical concerns of members bear directly on the uses to which they put the conventions which they share, and have clear implications for the sense in which we could talk of such uses as constituting their meaning, then precisely the same conditions apply to the uses to which such conventions might be put by any social investigator, either native or outsider. The status of any understanding argued by a social scientist would be decidable in terms of warrant which might be produced to reject, accept, qualify, modify (etc.,) any of the account by those competent to do so in terms of the rules of the game which they decide to invoke. That some understanding can be reached is a feature of the relation between all men of all cultures; it is the adequacy of the understanding which then becomes the problem, and it is to this end that subsequent exchanges between men might be directed. Between men from different cultures, it is a practical problem to succeed in conveying to each other the meaning which they give to different objects, actions, feelings etc. That they do so between themselves, as members of their own cultures, is surely precisely what being a member of a society is. Now, in his discussion of Augustine's account of the acquisition
of language, Wittgenstein objects that Augustine's account is not like that of someone initially acquiring language for the first time, but rather, like that of a person coming to a foreign land already in the possession of a language. (87) In learning language for the first time, it is not just the ostensive definitions (this name goes with this object or action) that we learn; rather, we learn a set of practices, that is language use has a point, it is a practical concern; we pick out some things, rather than others, to describe as 'food', we pay attention to snakes in this way, stones in that. Once we have learned what it is to go on as competent members of a society do, then we certainly can be said to have a certain stock of common understandings; are not our lives throughout, however, to a greater or lesser extent, a process of adding to, changing, modifying, dispensing with, such common understandings? (88) Inter-cultural contact is today a fairly common source of such experiences - think of the ways in which American culture influences the world. The point is, the question of our ability to incorporate such processes into our understanding does not arise.

We do not learn a foreign language in the same way that a baby learns to talk for the first time; but, note, this is also to say that when we learn a foreign language we do not do so in the same way that a baby learns to talk at all. That is to say, our learning of the language is in terms of the language which we already possess; would we want to say of someone who learns a second language that because he does not learn it in the same way as a native baby does that his understanding of the language or his speech, is thereby inferior to that of the baby, or deficient in some radical way? Surely we could not sensibly claim this, for many people do speak more than one language. But if our justifications for claiming to understand rest upon this competence, then surely we could not also claim that someone did not understand simply because he was not a member of the culture in question, rather than because he did not speak the language in question, since our own
claims, about our own practices rest ultimately on this claim (to speak 'English'), rather than on extra-linguistic knowledge. This is not to say that there do not exist practices which one could call 'the English way of life' which would automatically become available to someone who learned to speak English; think of jokes about foreigners or spies who make social gaffes, and so on. The point is that 'the English way of life' consists of practices within which language is the means by which they make sense. Now tea-time might mean something different if the conversation employed German rather than English words; think of cricket with a new set of signals, or the umpires' decisions shouted out in some foreign language (Urdu?). The point is, these are possibilities which exist as part of the practices; arguing that such violations of our conventions about how these practices should be carried on cannot involve saying they are incommensurable; one kind of practice relates to another in that they have a 'family resemblance'. Understanding one rather than another may involve incorporating different items to be considered significant, or may involve comparing one with another, but we should still be said to understand them. Our conception of the significance of the Japanese tea ceremony, surely, trades on our own conception of tea time; our understanding of Buddhism may involve comparison with western theology. If we want to argue that one cannot understand Buddhism unless one is a Buddhist, then how do we ever know what it is that we cannot understand, or indeed, in what sense is it possible for anyone to ever become a Buddhist (Christian, Marxist, etc?)

My argument is that it is precisely those processes which enable anyone to arrive at an understanding of a social institution which are a necessary feature of language use; that is to say, the variety of possible ways in which we can be said to understand, rather than the variety of understandings which we can be said to have. There is no way in which we can stipulate what it is for someone to understand correctly, apart from the ways in which such under-
standing is made (in Garfinkel's phrase) observable and reportable in the
practices of any language use in which such a claim is assessable; it is not
the case that we can reject as inadequate any account of social phenomena
produced except on the grounds that the claims of the account fail to conform
to criteria which we can produce such that these can then be seen as unjustified
in terms of recognised exigencies governing such practices.

My point is that any account, whether produced by an 'insider' or 'outsider'
terms which, in the differences are construed to exist between them, themselves
trade on, I would argue, a falsely dualistic conception of the role of language
as a practice within other kinds of practice, rather than recognising their
indivisibility from those practices) is always produced by someone for a purpose.
Its adequacy must, therefore, be conditional upon the exigencies of the situa­
tion in which it is produced. To be responsible for an account expresses the
requirements incumbent upon the author in his relation to those to whom the
account is addressed - that is, to produce an account which attends to its own
consequences, that is to say, expresses in the conventions to which it attends,
as warrantable instance of theorising (in this way), an awareness of its
practical nature, or rather, sees itself as a practice of seeing. An account
is, at one and the same time, a leading of the audience (see it in this way)
and also a being led (conventionality, or 'we must see seeing it in this way as
one among the ways that we can see at all'). It is both an election, and a
celebration or ceremony; it must, to make sense, be understandable in terms of
some conventions, but it must also accomplish the intentions of its author, and
to recognise it as doing so involves choosing amongst alternatives. What these
SHOULD be is not something which can be decided apart from the occasion of its
production; what its outcome will be depends upon the relation between the
reader and the text.

Now, in the case of social science, its accounts, I have argued, seem to be
faced with the dual requirements of (1) attending to the conventions which rule
the sense making practices of its subjects, and (2) transcending the contexts which provide it with its specific usages. We have had arguments, on the one hand, which maintain that the meaning of social behaviour is only to be found in the understanding ('standing-under') of the rules to which participants orient; and on the other, we have the argument that the contexts in which these usages have their life is so specific and multi-faceted that to attempt to understand, outside of the context is to violate the authority of participants (their author-ship).

But we have seen also, that understanding is not 'of a piece'; we say that we understand in a variety of different senses, and on the basis of many different kinds of justifications, arguments, 'intuitions', inspirations and so on, but not that our notion of understanding may, therefore, be broken down into different concepts. These different kinds of understanding are all part of our concept of what it is to understand.

Any understanding is not, however, as good as any other in the practical circumstances of everyday life; some can be justified, some rejected as false or flawed, some given credence, others regarded as fanciful, and so on. Neither is it the case that social scientific accounts are 'just talk' among other talk; they may be good or bad or indistinguishable from 'any other talk', but that is neither something which can be decided without an evaluation by some audience, nor is such an evaluation necessarily the same for all or most of that audience, although it may be, on some clearly common grounds (for instance, unintelligibility).

The key question has now become - what kind of language game is social science? And what are its conventions? Here we are faced again with the multi-consequential character of language, insofar as the practical concerns of social scientists and their consequent speech and action consist of the display of rule-oriented practices to accomplish such ends, these are, only and entirely, the corpus of social science; that it is done determines that it is, thereby, a
rule governed activity; what is done displays the rules and exigencies to which social scientists attend.

But it is not a game in which the players can decide, in one sense, to do what they like; it may be played in different ways (preferred rules of playing - think of Wittgenstein's example of 'how hard we hit a tennis ball'), but, to make sense as an activity, it must attend to the conventions governing what it is to be an instance of social science. It has, however, precisely the features of rule governed practices detailed above; while it is a public phenomenon - to count as sociology, a practice must be warranted as such - it is also concerned with concrete problems; that is to say, as a practice, it elects to proceed in the way that it does to some acknowledged and legitimate end.

Now, it is my contention that sociological accounts can and will be produced to accomplish various ends which can be incorporated within the rubric of a single concept of understanding. Rather than trying to decide what counts as understanding, since this is both a conventional and an occasioned phenomenon, we should recognise that our responsibility as social scientists consists rather of our relation to our audience. Any account must be produced not as a citation of rules which deny its status as a planful practical accomplishment in its own right, since this is an endemic feature of an account, as such; but rather, the author should respond to, and be responsible for the active involvement of the audience in his text. This is to recognise and acknowledge the status of this and all accounts as necessarily justified in terms of criterial (89) relations between itself and the community and tradition of social science.

This is to say that social scientific accounts should be responsible for 'relating' (telling) themselves and that-to-which-they-refer as one and the same accomplishment, but an accomplishment which, on each and every occasion that it is realised is only possible because of, on the one hand, the tradition to which it is heir, and on the other the community, or rule oriented elections which constitute, transform and transcend that tradition.
In more prosaic terms, I am arguing that social science can accomplish understanding of other cultures, and can judge other cultures precisely because this is what we do within our own culture. What this will come to or consist of, or the status of its evaluations, however, is likewise subject to the exigencies of the situation in which these accounts are produced and themselves evaluated. What can be or will be the criteria employed here cannot be a matter to be previously determined, any more or less than the extent to which we are subject to such determination from the past; insofar as we are, then to that extent, so shall future speakers and audiences be also.

That we will continue to combine within social science diverse forms of account (variations of preferred rules of play?) seems to me the endemic condition of any attempt to deal with the multiple dimensions of the social world. If rule and empirical proposition merge into each other (and I think we have seen that they do) then it follows that understanding of social phenomena will continue to be a variety of diverse practices, with different ends and different criteria to warrant their statements. While accounts will necessarily attend to different significances, they must also attend to the difference that they make, or their own consequence (worth, weight, value). That social accounts are reflexive on the occasion of their production is a necessary feature of their status as action undertaken to some end; it is the responsibility of the social scientist to provide for the reader recognising this in a display of his own recognition.

If this is an opaque requirement, perhaps we could illuminate it by talking about the point at which (as Wittgenstein says) 'description' takes the place of 'explanation'. Now, in view of what we have said about the nature of understanding, it would seem that the interpretive processes involved in electing to attend to this or that aspect of conventionality is itself a pre-decided 'explanation' or 'description' of the phenomena. However, we all acknowledge that, in everyday terms, a description or an explanation involves acting so as to make an event more accessible, or accessible in this or that
particular way. The point is that for some kinds of phenomena, explanation will require certain kinds of evidence which our practices dictate is appropriate; we empirically, count certain things (eggs) but not others (revolutionary consciousness). It is not that our certainty of some things is thereby assured (I have a body) but not others (he is in pain), but that certainty is itself a matter to be accomplished in particular cases in terms of the grammar of our language in using such terms. Description and explanation play different parts in different games, but these parts are determined by what we can be brought to accept as correct or appropriate usage of these practices.

Now description takes the place of explanation at just the point where it no longer makes sense to doubt; that is, explanation is the appropriate game to play when we can justifiably invoke evidence to show that, while x might be the case, in fact, z is the case because y conditions account for it. At a certain point, this is no longer an appropriate game to play because it does not make sense to propose any evidence for x being the case, because it does not make sense to imagine anything else; certainty only exists where there is the possibility of doubt, and those things which we cannot sensibly doubt are not subject either to proof, or disproof, since we cannot imagine what either would be like (the world existed before I was born). These can only be described.

Now, note, description takes just the form that it does on the basis of the conventional and practical exigencies which we have already discussed (90). That is to say, we are bound by the authority of our communal rules as to what it is that reality can reasonably be accounted as 'coming to', and within our language, we cannot doubt that it comes to this; nonetheless, this means that the objects of our descriptions here are at the same time not to be known in the same way as those which we can establish with evidence; they are constituted by and themselves constitute the language with which we describe.

Think, here, of the requirement that social scientists aim to bring about
explication of the subjects of their accounts. At one and the same time, their accounts formulate the scenes which they describe, and also display the conventions on which such a description relies (its ground). Doubt about the account qua account would make no sense to us, since we cannot sensibly imagine what it would be like for us to hear it as nothing (not one of a set of possibilities) rather than something; we could not decide not to make some kind of sense of it.

However, this transforms its sense, and how that makes sense, into something about which we could not have knowledge in the same way as we might have about other social phenomena. Yet as social investigators, it is precisely this set of conventions which is only made up of the actions and talk which is members behaviour - ie., it is an empirical object of investigation. So that at one and the same time, we have, incarnate in the concrete phenomenon, both the possible object of an empirical proposition, and an instance of rule, an analytic category. How are we, as is our avowed aim, to account for both?

The 'answer' of course, is that while the empirical proposition can be accounted quite properly in terms of what counts as a warranted statement, on the basis of evidence, simultaneously rule is displayed in the criterial relations between the sentences which express the meaning of the statement. To bring attention to this is the further task of the social analyst, and this may only be accomplished by being responsive to, and taking responsibility for, the multi-formulative character of any and all reading, writing, hearing, speaking, acting. This is a necessary feature of all accounting - that it has consequences on each and every occasion of its production, given that first and later productions (each occasion of reading) is elective as well as rule oriented. To take responsibility is to recognise, acknowledge and celebrate in the display of this feature its inevitability, and the consequent inevitability of ongoing creative re-formulation in every act of reading.

Winch's claim then, that we understand social behaviour on the basis of the
conventions to which participants are subject, fails to account for the understanding both of the subjects of social science, and of social scientists themselves, because it ignores differences in understanding as a practice, and instead treats this as a single concept determined by convention rather than seeing that understanding both exercises convention and as a practice, involving the ongoing negotiation of changing circumstances, constitutes those conventions, changes and re-formulates them as it uses them to deal with each moment of reality. The strong claim that I have made, that social science is both possible and necessary, proceeds from the conviction that because of cultural diversity, both within and between cultures, the aim of understanding is both a desirable accomplishment, as a self conscious practice, and also a basic human need. But it is this very diversity which gives understanding its place in human practices; Winch's work seems to me to lead to the conclusion that it is only homogeneity which permits understanding.

The question seems to remain, however, as to the difference between what I have proposed as a universal human capability or possibility, and a special claim to be able to do this 'better' on behalf of one group of practitioners. Indeed, this would seem to be the claim which was being rejected by Wieder's account of the convict code, while such a rejection was implicit in Winch's argument for conventionalism. Wieder notes that, in staff uses of the code, we could see the operation of specific social scientific concepts - staff and inmates used the code in just the same ways as social scientists to explain their behaviour, and to justify inferences about causes and motivations. Given the context bounded nature of such usages, we cannot hope for literal descriptions of such usages, nor could we hope to produce adequate explanations of patterns of actions which would satisfy the requirements of deductive theory, because in its explanatory uses, situations actions and rules are not independent elements (91). All we can have, on this view, is an account of how, for instance, telling the code was productive of a social world of real events, and a justification for hearing talk and action as hearable/seeable in this way.
In other words, what we must have is not an account of how the code explains social action, but rather, a description of the experience of the observer as he observed the social action of the way that he observed it.

I shall talk in greater detail about ethnomethodological work in my next chapter; however, this claim requires some comment at this point. Note, to begin with, the assumption that there is a hard distinction to be made between the description of objects experienced and the description of experiencing those objects. Wieder is, in fact arguing that, to explain how an object was seen as it was, we can turn to some other class of knowledge which we know in a different way from the experiencing of the object. He is trading on the reflective faculty, our ability to make our own judgments the objects of our speech/thought, to make the claim that, thereby when we require an account of how our concepts determine social reality, we must turn to our private experience, for 'there is no other place to go if we need access to the ongoing course of direct experience' (92). Now, note, these cannot be literal descriptions, since Wieder also argued that the code is always known only on the basis of previous experience in an implicit and indefinite fashion. Thus, the description of the ongoing course of direct experience becomes a concrete account of the reflection of the observer on his own experiences (which is partial and specific) but also a display of the competences or conventions which, presumably, anyone would operate with in producing such an account.

Presumably, however, for the account to make sense, Wieder is assuming that we can be brought to see the reasonableness (rationality) of the account on the basis of conventions which we already share with him; in another way, we can come to have knowledge of that about which Wieder is speaking because he can produce justifications (evidence) for the statements which he makes - we could doubt them, but Wieder gives us reasons for accepting what he says.

Now, if this is the case, then presumably what we cannot have knowledge of
(because we cannot sensibly doubt it) are the conventions on the basis of which we do make judgments in this case; these are what is displayed in Wieder's talk.

The claim was that we must turn to the observer's description of his experience of making sense of the inmate behaviour for a display of the processes by which reality was structured by the concepts used to describe it; in what sense can we say that our recognition of a display of conventions used to describe 'inner experience' is different from our recognition of such a display in the description of objects experienced as reality? Wittgenstein says that we may be led to seeing or understanding an object of experience in this or that way; Wieder is leading us to understand the process of understanding as an experience predicated upon reflection, but also predicated upon the differences between the reflections which individuals have. The fact that we can elect to construe the meaning of action, on the basis of indefinite sets of conventions, in this way or that, is taken by Wieder to have the consequence that all we have, given the differences between the practical exigencies of the contexts in which these conventions are employed, is the incorrigibility of our own experience of the process of experiencing.

Thus, while Winch was arguing for the incommensurability of different cultural experiences of reality on the basis that within a culture concepts structure the common reality which only members of that culture share, Wieder seems to be arguing that, within a culture, such are the contextual variations to which the employment of common understandings are subject, the experiences of different individuals of the meaning which these common understandings can be used to construe is not specifiable except in terms of the certain processes on which the individual can reflect as having attended to. Thus, while for Winch, public accountability explains the meanings which individuals attach to their speech and actions, for Wieder public accountability violates the contextuality of such meanings.
This account trades, however, on the notion that, in taking a private account of the experience of seeing as our object, we somehow have an account which is truer of the process of experiencing. I have already argued that the notion that truth is tied to certainty must face the fact that certainty is tied to the possibility of doubt, and that only certain kinds of proposition are open to doubt. To argue, as Wieder does, that the reflection on the process of experience is the only place we have to go if we seek an account of how concepts determine reality is to argue that this is because here, in our experience, we cannot be mistaken, for this is how things are with us. We seem, thereby, to be assured of a greater degree of certainty than if we simply say, this is how things seem to us in the outside world.

This position is founded however, on a radical doubt about anything outside the experience of which it claims certain knowledge; if we argue that our account of our experiences only has the sense that it has for us on the basis of this (naming a set of justifications), then this is the claim that, simultaneously, another participant could not have the same experience, since he would probably produce a different series of justifications for the meaning of the experience to him. Now, while it is certainly true that our experiences are ours, in the sense that we have them, it is by no means true that any experience is thereby ours in the sense that only we can have it - eg., toothache.

For Wieder to rely on his experience of his experience in order to claim that since he could not be mistaken about how he experienced his experience, therefore this displays the basis on which others arrive at their experience, he must claim that his reflections constitute evidence for the assumption. What does this claim come to, however? His account of his experience (of experiencing) makes sense only if we take for granted the reality which it justifies itself as describing; as a justification for experience, it must appeal to 'what it is reasonable for anyone to make of reality' rather than private experience as an object, to be pointed to. That is to say, the 'certainty' of his inner
experience rests not on HIS experiencing it, but upon the inter-subjectively agreed conventions within which it is possible for him to account it.

Think of saying 'I couldn't believe my eyes'; when we say this, we refer to the fact, in lots of cases, that we would have to, in an account of what we saw, describe a scene which could only be accepted by someone else seeing it; in terms of ordinary conventions, we could not account it, satisfactorily.

Thus, whilst Winch was indifferent to the reality outside of language because he saw this as uniformly constituted by the publicly accountable conventions of language use, Wieder trades on the uniformity of the underlying reality to justify the differences between individual experiences of reality in which, for him, the context embeddedness of experience results. Many ethnomethodologists claim that constructivist social science violates the incarnate nature of meaning by imposing onto it conceptual unity where it does not (cannot) match the meaning of the situation for participants. To claim this, however, they must reject the notion that reality is experienced as uniform in favour of the idea that any such actual orderliness is an accomplishment in context, a negotiation resolved from among the disparate meaning possibilities accessible to the individuals concerned. This is the consequence, for Wieder, of the partial and fragmentary corpus occasioned in actual usages of the code.

However, while individual experience makes of the code a partial, fragmented and open ended social order, the assumption with which individuals actually do operate, he insists, is of a unified and stable social order; telling the code involves asserting its facticity, its character as a 'real' social constraint. The code cannot predict behaviour, he argues, but it is experienced as doing so, although in fact its function is interpretive.

The whole model is inherently dualistic; while Wieder claims the conditionality of individual experience, his justifications for doing so rest upon the assumption of a unified reality. We cannot rescue meaning from its conditionality, but we can be shown how meaning is constructed. If reality is uniform,
and meaning is based on common understandings, however, why cannot we rescue meaning? The argument is based directly on the notion that private experience of meaning is too complex and transient to be recoverable 'from the operating table' (in Garfinkel's metaphor). (93)

This, however, is a view which trades on a notion of understanding which is, like that of Winch, highly specific and also uni-dimensional. It may be true that we cannot recover meaning in context, just as we cannot have another's pain, but it seems to me that this does not have the consequences for socio­logical theorising which Wieder outlines. Rather than being a prescription on possibility, it is simply to say that we are always involved in the present; it is one of the 'bounds of sense', where sense is taken to mean both perception and also rationality. It may seem obvious, when we are led to see the constitution of meaning in this way, that these practicalities, motivations, hopes, fears, depressions, etc., are gone, and we are here, now, so that any recall of them violates their incarnation as a moment of usage. But, seeing this in another way, we could argue that the significance of the moment and its meaning is not guaranteed thereby. This is to say that when we decide to account social reality as laymen or professionals, we do so in terms of criteria which we all share. It makes no sense to argue that we cannot do so, because its true meaning is unavailable to us now, because, if that were the case, we could never 'know' such a meaning in the way that we must claim, in fact that we do.

If true meaning is only available to the individual as he experiences it in the ongoing course of direct experience, it is thereby his private object, to which, by definition, others are excluded access. This is a form of solipsism, and is subject to the objections which Wittgenstein raised in the work of his later period.

For Wieder to claim that the ongoing course of his direct experience is all that we can have when we look for the processes which show how meaning is constituted in social experience is for him to claim that, for others to have the
same kind of experience is only a logical possibility if we accept that the verification of private experience involves different kinds of relations between the experience and the owner than does the claim that others have the experience; in the former case, if we take the experience as sense datum, then the verification does not require the identification of the owner, while, in the latter, while the identification of the owner enters into the justification of the utterances, the representation of the experience does not involve the concept of the experience as a sense datum in the same way, because it involves a different method of verification (94). We are here under the illusion that, in taking every individual as the mono centre of language, the special position of this language vis-a-vis its centre lies in its being compared directly with primary experience for its verification, and since this primary experience is unique and incomparable, and different languages differ only in their application, then all that can be expressed about them is their equivalence, and their uniqueness is inexpressible (think here of the importance of display in Wieder's account).

Now, this kind of bafflement, although it runs counter to common sense, is not refuted by it; rather, in the claim that within common sense we do not have the true picture of the way in which meaning operates, and that it cannot be trans­ferable in the way that we assume it to be, we have a claim for grammar being justified by reference to what it depicts, and the claim for the impossibility of representing this 'real' world in terms of the conventionally accepted grammar.

I shall not go through all of Wittgenstein's arguments against private language and solipsism; in the case of Wieder, it is sufficient to point out that his claim to know the processes on which his direct ongoing experience is based in a way that he cannot know that of others, cannot, thereby, produce a different account of his own experiences than he would produce of the experiences of others. Note, this is double edged; if the justifications for his account of
his own experience are the same as his justifications for sentences accounting the experience of others, relying as they do on the grammar of the language within which such experiences are represented for anyone, then the special status given to his experience over that of others is merely contingent; it is merely a formal uniqueness, geometrical rather than physical, since the unique self to which the experience is thereby connected does not enter into the scene which it sees. The display of the significances to which we attend when we assemble the sense of ongoing interaction is thereby available in any account, and not in some special way in an account which sees itself as focussing on itself. Precisely because of the context embeddedness of the ongoing experience of meaning, it is a formal property of consciousness that, while only the individual has the experiences which he has, these are only available to him through the grammar of the language available for him to use, and he cannot claim a special knowledge of his own experience which is not transferable in terms of such a language.

It does not follow, thereby, that all experience is recoverable in terms of the conventions which operate in such a language, for, as I have already argued, the nature of this conventionality is such that it is only and entirely available on its occasion. But neither does it follow from this that it is thereby a private experience, since, nevertheless, we can reflect on it only in terms of the grammar which our language gives us. The showing of how this grammar operates does not require special evidential status for such reflections, but is rather a possibility available to us in the accounting or re-formulation of any experience, since what is operating is not an 'empirical' process except in the sense that our utterances provide concrete data on which the work of analysis may proceed. Given Wieder's analysis of how the code operates, the claim that sociologists cannot produce adequate descriptions of how the code operates to constitute the reality which inmates inhabit proceeds directly from his view of the special status of individual experience; in terms of its own insistence on the accomplished nature of order in any particular setting,
however, Wieder must also recognise differences in the status of accounted uses of the code. If we could not come to know the individual uses to which the code was put because of the context embeddedness of those uses, then any use of the code would be as good as any other; as Wieder notes:

"The hearer was not in any position to make harsh judgments about the relevance of any specific telling to what he understood as a proper 'telling of the code'. This is not to suggest that any proposal whatsoever would have been acceptable but just how such judgments would have been rendered is, at the least, open to considerable manipulation, since the open flexible structure of the code precludes the possibility of comparing some present story with what is definitely known about what a telling of the code should consist of." (95)

The manipulation of the code by residents to thwart staff and observer is an ongoing possibility for Wieder precisely because he is concerned to give all instances of telling the code the same status; what the code comes to, for Wieder, is not just a set of rules, but a set of rules without criteria which enable us to distinguish correct from illicit moves. The conventional sociological usage of this set to account for inmate behaviour violates, he argues, the variety of ways in which the rules operate. In introducing this variety, however, Wieder obscures consideration of precisely which criteria exist for them to function as a set of rules at all.

What is missing from Wieder's account of the telling of the code is an account of how the code relates to the exigencies of convict life; it does not, except in a formal and uninteresting sense exist apart from its place within the social relations between the members of the community which is the institution. Wieder is right to argue that the code formulates and expresses those relationships, but in emphasising this, he excludes from consideration, by concentrating on the utterances within which the code is incarnated, precisely those significances which underlie utterance and determine what status the utterance will come to have in the context in which it is employed - for instance, the relation between staff and inmate. This explains why he must accept the possibility of manipulation, for any account which is produced self-consciously apart from the 'real' occasion cannot claim any special status over any other account, apart from
its self-consciousness. What it must do, however, is to rely on everyday conceptions of relations between speakers; for Wieder to make sense of the code as a telling trades on his and the reader's commonsense conceptions of the practical considerations to which members attend when they tell the code; what grounds Wieder's telling, according to his account, is the 'occasioned corpus of cultural elements' which he collects via 'the documentary method of interpretation', (96) whereby actual appearances are treated as the document of the pre-supposed underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences and elaborating that evidence. Wieder explains how this works by citing how he heard a question by an inmate ('Where can I find that meeting where I can get an overnight pass?') as expressing loyalty to residents because of the implications of the remark for him and the inmate on the occasion on which it was said. (97) He was able to see the sense of the remark in terms of the utterances he had heard up to that point and later, in terms of other utterances he was yet to hear. While, of course, it may be quite justifiable for Wieder to derive those implications from the remark, that he can do so derives not from the relation between actual appearance and pre-supposed underlying pattern; the justification for his hearing the remark in the way that he explicates it does not reside in an account of how it was possible for him to hear the remark, but this is rather, a description of recognising which trades on, or is logically parasitic on the recognising of the object as it is done. Learning to recognise the 'pre-supposed underlying pattern' involves learning to recognise the conditions under which one is justified in accounting instances of that pattern. To say 'I used that pattern here to make sense of this utterance' describes the recognition of those conditions, but cannot involve claiming to recognise the recognition of the appropriate conditions, since here, it makes no sense to ask 'how do you know', since this is both a manifestation of the mastery of the pattern, pre-supposing a knowledge of its criteria, and also a manifestation of the component concepts of the pattern contained within its descriptive use.

In short, Wieder relies, in his account of how the code is to be told, on making
a difference between reality and its pre-supposed underlying pattern so that he can claim to describe the recognition of the recognition of that reality. Rather, we should see the pre-supposed underlying pattern as constitutive of the conditions under which one is justified in accounting its instances, and simultaneously, itself constituted those instances (manifested in them) but that we cannot, because it does not make sense, aim to recognise the recognition of conditions.

Wieder's appeal to the observer's experience of ongoing reality depends upon making a difference between an account, and accounting of an account, rather than, as he claims, unifying the two in the notion of an 'accounting-of-social-action'. For what an account does, as well as specify an object, is to serve as a manifestation of the mastery of the criteria on which, to be sensible, it depends.

Resume

Now in my treatment of Winch and Wieder, I have walked a line which is very thin and tenuous. Both argue for aspects of the role of convention and context which are both important and also flawed. What I have tried to do is to show how these can be brought together to give us a basis for doing social science. Winch is right to stress that the conventions of language make meaning into a public, rather than a private phenomenon, but wrong to argue that public accountability has the consequence of cultural hermeticism. Precisely because the problem of understanding stands to be resolved in different ways in the diverse practices of all human society, given the universal nature of intersubjectivity, as detailed by Wieder, so cultures can and do become accessible to each other. (98) The question of their comparability depends, similarly, on an argument for the possibility of a social science. (99) Accounts come to be seen as not the same thing that the subject would say, but attend instead to the conventions of the language game of social science, which both warrants and assesses the accounts produced. It is not that social science warrants all accounts, but rather warrants them in terms of the justifications
available in the community and tradition of social science which they invoke.

While Wieder's account demonstrates the significance of context, it cannot produce social science which is warranted by the rules of such a game; indeed it aims to demarcate its project from those of conventional social science. One implication of this argument is that social science makes a false claim about the nature of the statements that it makes - that is to say, its 'explanations' violate the sense of the meanings it derives from subjects actions by being unable to account the multi-faceted ways in which their talk and action operates in its contexts. It makes this claim, however, on the justification of reasoned evidence for the multi-formulated and multi-consequential role of utterances, based on the capacity to reflect on those utterances. I argue, however, that this capacity to reflect does not provide for any different kind of account as a practice itself, but rather is a necessary feature of any account; that is to say, regress to the attempt to recognise a recognition does no useful work in theory, since it is always a feature of any reading.

Fundamentally, Wieder's account trades on, but has no place for the active role of theory; while it rejects conventional sociological theorising (at least implicitly) it stands itself as just such an instance of theorising, since it formulates a role for theorising which is anti theoretical.

For it proposes no differences between any man's social theories; insofar as everyday actors employ implicit sociological concepts in their accounting, for themselves and others, of social actions, and sociologists employ everyday usages in the same way as their subjects to account these actions, the only difference between them is their claims for this work; the same thing is done as practicality by the former and science by the latter. It is the nature and status of theorising which I shall address in my next chapter.

For Wieder, the notion of 'accounting-social-action' expresses the desire to
show how all members come to see (talk, action) in the same way, by explicating his seeing as it is being done. Now, at the same time, he emphasises, such seeing trades on his knowledge as a member in the same way that he presumes others seeing trades on their knowledge as members; this is what justifies the assumption that in accounting the accounting of social action, we display the methods of giving and receiving instructions for seeing and describing a social order, for 'the inter-personal existence of social orders and their availability to perception and description is the achievement of the various methods entailed in the accounting-of-social-action'. (100)

In another piece, Wieder states 'by focusing on how members actually use titles, names, categories and criteria in ongoing situations, the possibility of producing substantive transitiutional descriptions of such things as 'definition of the situation', 'life space', 'the actors orientation to his situation' and 'cognitive maps' is abandoned as the analysts task and becomes instead a further instance of the work that members do in making the orderly properties of the settings in which they act visible to each other', (101) and again, 'We do not take it that persons share the same meanings and definitions. Instead we attempt to show that members continuously rely on, and if pressed, insist upon, the capacities of others to find a presumptively shared sense in what they are saying'. (102)

Wieder's ethnomethodology, thereby, seeks above all to preserve the authority of ordinary usage; such analysis can, by its own admission, produce only instances of the capacity to do this which themselves rely on our capacity to read them as such. The argument is that, since seeings rely on a method, if the observer stipulates concretely how it is done, this exhibits the procedures which produce order for any members in the situation. His rules for seeing become concrete instances - think here of Husserl's famous statement 'We are the real empiricists'. Wieder does not claim that his rules, as concretely produced, are the rules which members attend to, nor can he. This work is
ongoing because it does not have an 'end in view', except for insisting on the variety of possibilities entailed in concrete formulations; it refuses the role of theory precisely insofar as it treats the variety of concrete formulations as 'all we can have', and thereby denies any differences between accounts which can be produced; that accounts can be produced serves merely, for Wieder, as a resource which is useful, rather than interesting, for, in spite of what he sees himself as doing, he is in fact producing a concrete normative order for creating sensible events in which only he (his perspective) is what is accomplished; in saying 'this is all we can have' Wieder denies both the interest in how his account is itself sensible, and the possibility of transforming the subject of his account into something other than what it concretely is.

This is not to argue for the illegitimacy of his activity so much as its essential irrelevancy; on its own terms, it has its possibility on the basis of the essentially perspectival basis of all accounting methods, and formulates itself as concerned with the instantiation of perspective, rather than its transformation. If we see this as all that it can do, then we can argue about whether this is interesting or not; and we must surely, see it in this way, for it disclaims the possibility of itself doing anything else. It is quite another thing, however, for it to claim that this is all anyone can do, and here ethnomethodologists seem to differ in their claims for the theoretical implications of the approach. For it to do that would be to claim that the election which it makes is the only election to be made, and here, it would have to produce reasons for doing so (grounds). What these might be, and the reasons which might be produced for rejecting them, I propose to consider next.
In the work of S-Sch and Wieder we find a concentration on the features of natural language which relates directly to the sociological work of relating such uses to accounts of social action. The commonsense world of everyday actors is the focus for their accounts; sociology has also, however, been concerned to explain the overarching framework which presents itself to the individual as society and its institutions. How are we to bring together this enterprise with the accounting of social action in terms of the meanings which everyday actors employ? — Indeed, can this be done?

Talcott Parsons has seen himself as concerned with just such a project; in his eyes, sociological theory at both societal and interpersonal levels displays an inherent, but unrealized, trend towards unity, which he has taken as his fundamental project. The success or failure of his project is not to be reviewed in the present work. What is of interest to me are the features which Parsons holds to be necessary for any sociological accounting to be done. I shall argue that these proceed directly from philosophical principles derived from Kant, and further, that principles of some sort do form the parameters for any cumulative work, that is to say, work which provides for any processes of comparison and evaluation. This is to say that sociological theorising, if it is to aim for any knowledge other than that available within commonsense, must be demarcated in terms of some such set of principles.

Garfinkel proceeds from this view of sociological accounting, but objects to what he takes to be its consequence; that it cannot, since it provides for itself in terms of an IDEAL rationality, deal with the ways in which language, in fact operates to accomplish meaning in the everyday world. While his project displays awareness of its theoretical grounds, I shall argue that the attempt to constitute grounds for an alternative project cannot succeed, and that the proposed alternative grounds cannot provide for a truly theoretical accounting of its phenomena without relying on the principles which it rejects.
The Problems of Theorising; Parsons and Garfinkel

"There has been of late a strong current of pessimism in the thought of students of the social sciences, especially those who call themselves sociologists. We are told that there are as many systems of sociological theory as there are sociologists, that there is no common basis, that all is arbitrary and subjective. To the present writer this current of sentiment has two equally unfortunate implications. On the one hand, it encourages the view that the only sound work in the social field is detailed factual study, without benefit of theory. On the other hand, for those who refuse to be satisfied with this, it encourages a dangerous irrationalism which lets go of scientific standards altogether. We are told sociology is an art, that what is valuable in it is to be measured by the standards of intuition and inspiration, that it is not subject to the canons of rigorous logic and empirical verification." (1)

Throughout his work, Parsons has maintained his commitment to the strategy of 'analytical realism' which he expounded in 'The Structure of Social Action'. This proceeds from an acceptance of the Kantian formulation of the basic problem of epistemology; it is a fact that we have valid empirical knowledge of the external world; how is this possible? In other words, the facticity of the intersubjective world is asserted, and the problem is posed by the way in which it is possible to address this objective realm (scientific theory) given the fact that men entertain 'philosophical' (i.e., non-scientific) ideas, in attaching subjective meaning (motives, feelings, ideas) to their (concretely and symbolically) manifested behaviour. The problem, for Parsons's analysis of human action, is to uncover the 'immanent process of the development of science itself' in the face of the given determinate and reciprocal relationship between the existential (non-scientific) and the imperative (rational) elements of this corpus of knowledge.

Reality must be ordered, he argues, by conceptual schemes which are, in Science, explicit, sophisticated and self-conscious, and in common sense, inherent in the structure of language. This ordering is in no sense a reflection of reality, but a selective structuring of a great mass of possible empirical observations, a description in terms of a frame of reference by means of which
a concrete phenomenon is characterised (conceptualised) in relation to a
particular direction (election) of scientific or commonsense interest. Con­ceptualisation is founded on a specific direction of interest, and concepts
have a reference only in terms of the frame of interest employed.

Now, for science, aiming at generalisation, explanation, measurement, etc.,
the concepts which it employs must, in an important sense, be arbitrary. They
are parts in theoretical systems, with organic relations of inter-dependence
preventing them from logically, being separable. The relations of the parts
determine the properties of the whole; when treated separately, either con­ceptually or factually, it is no longer the same, it becomes, so to speak, a
fiction. The process of empirical generalisation involves an arbitrary level
being fixed for units of analysis, from which 'general statements about the
possible or probable behaviour of such concretely existing (or hypothetical)
parts of concrete phenomena or various combinations of them, under given typical
circumstances' can be made. (2) An important mechanism in fixing the ultimate
level of the unit of analysis is the fact that, as phenomena are divided into
more and more elementary units of analysis (and logically there is no inherent
limit to the extent to which this is possible, "precisely insofar as the
phenomena are organic"), the more abstract or empty its concept becomes.

Parsons comments that the limit to this process seems to be determined by the
relationship between the unit, its level of abstractness, and the degree to
which it is 'organic'. The following definition is offered.

"I. A unit in a concrete system is the entity which
constitutes the common reference of a combination of
statements of fact made within a frame of reference
in such a way that the combination may, for purposes
of the theoretical system in question, be considered
an adequate description of any entity which, within
the frame of reference, conceivably exists independently.
The theoretical unit is the specific combination of

Logical universals in specific logical relationship
to each other into which these statements are fitted." (3)

This type of conceptualisation, using 'type-parts' to produce 'empirical gen­eralisations is, he argues, logically quite distinct from the use of 'analytical
concepts'. This has reference to a general property of a (concrete or conceptual) unit, while what we may observe is only its value (a logical universal - eg., Mass). Thus abstraction comes about, in this case, for quite a different reason than in the case of type parts; these come into being as the result of a conceivable concrete entity being analysed into 'convenient fictions', abstractions which cannot be observed existing concretely apart from their relationship to the whole. Analytical elements are defined as:

".... any universals (or combination of universals) of which the corresponding values (or combination of values) may be stated as facts which in part determine a class of concrete phenomena. 'Determine' here means that a change in these values within the framework of the same universals involves a corresponding change in the concrete phenomena in respects important to the theoretical system." (4)

That is to say, this is an abstraction because it refers to a general property, while we observe only its particular value.

Facts, for Parsons, exist only in relation to a conceptual scheme; he is dismissive of the varieties of empiricism which attempt to (1) reify general theoretical systems and claim either that the concrete phenomena to which the theory is applicable are exclusively understandable in terms of the categories of this system, or that all changes in such phenomena must be predictable from knowledge of the values of the variables of the system (positivistic empiricism) or (2) repudiate the validity of general theoretical concepts for any purpose in relation to the concrete phenomena in question, asserting either that only objective knowledge is possible of the details of concrete things and events (they can only be observed and described, and placed in temporal sequence, and not casually related in terms of general concepts) or that conceptual schemes can only formulate the unique individuality of a concrete phenomenon, and that this cannot then be further broken down or subsumed under general categories of any sort. At the same time, he holds that at least some of the concepts of science 'adequately grasp concrete aspects of the external objective world.'
He does not endorse the view that convenient fictions are the necessary outcome of the inherent processes of abstraction by which conceptual schemes are related to the real world.

Our experience, he notes (5) is of the particular, and so our knowledge of universals must, from a general critical point of view, be metaphysical, outside the range of experience. Such entities are real in the sense that it is a fact that men believe in them. These beliefs, and their interdependence with other social facts, is the basis of social orderliness; they are observed elements of the actor's social situation, and thus have the status of facts in any account of social action.

They are, at the same time, only analytically separable from other elements in concrete phenomena, and are not claimed either to correspond to concrete phenomena, or to describe completely, as elements or as logically coherent systems, any concrete thing or event. (6)

This, then, is analytical realism; it is founded on Parsons' commitment to the systematic nature of social organisation, and the possibility of having scientific knowledge of it, on a commitment to the fundamental importance of analytical conceptual schemes in formulating our knowledge of the world, and on a belief that we can uncover and develop a corpus of scientifically rigorous and logical knowledge about social action. Bershady (7) has noted how closely Parsons' logical strategy parallels that of Kant; each aims to establish categories necessary for knowledge; each claims that without a certain set of categories (Action framework, Space-Time framework) knowledge is not a possibility. This is so, Bershady notes, because each attempts to solve the general problem of epistemological scepticism and although it is never explicitly stated, Parsons' concern with developing the claim of sociology to scientific status as a restatement of Simmel's undertaking locates him firmly as an adherent to Kantian procedure. (8)
The main characteristics of realism, then can be made out; i.e., "no apparent epistemological priority of observation statements should lead us to deny the ontological status of entities referred to by terms in the theoretical language; rather than attempts to define theoretical terms in observational ones, observations should be seen as giving us the means of identifying the presence and nature of unobservable entities." (9) Correspondence rules, in positivist terms, can often be seen as causal relationships, rather than meaning rules, and the theoretical entity becomes the central feature of scientific accounts, rather than a theoretical problem. In the case of Parsons, this is clearly indicated in his reply to Wrong's "Over Socialised Conception of Man" (10) criticisms; his (Wrong's) biggest mistake .... "is the suggestion that when faced with the alternative of pursuing the technical problems of understanding a component of action process such as the internalization of values, or of immediately assessing its empirical significance in terms of the prime 'existential' problems of the human condition, the latter must always be chosen. This way lies the perpetuation of the regime of nonsense not the development of science." (11) Analytical realism thus aims at addressing the orderliness of the social world from a particular direction of scientific interest, seeing this as the only way possible for any kind of addressing to be done; thus, by the use of one particular logical strategy, a particularly defined concrete area becomes formulated as a system of related elements which structure human action. This emphasis on the analytical level involves an explicit disavowal of the ontological reference of its elements specifying that .... "It is never legitimate, except for the specific purposes of analytical abstraction, to think of an actor apart from a situation, and for almost all purposes of action theory, by far the most important objects in the situation are other actors, i.e., social objects. The 'system' with which we are dealing is therefore the system of relationships between actors and objects which, when social objects are involved is a system of social interaction". (12) In terms of a general theory, Parsons postulates levels of conceptualisa-
tion; his basic level, the 'general frame of reference concerns the basic characteristics of action as a category of phenomena, "without special reference to the nature and problems of the systems in which the relations of units of action to each other are organised". (13)

The task of sociology, according to Parsons, is strictly scientific - it aims to attain systematic theoretical understanding of empirical fact. For his theorising, however incomplete or preliminary, he sees a role in the cumulative development of such knowledge. For although the various levels of abstraction do not constitute external reality itself, nor are they direct or literal representations of it, any more than any theory can be. This does not, however, imply unreality .... "in the fictional sense .... they stand rather, in functional relation to is, such that for certain scientific purposes, they are adequate representations of it". (14) This is (according to Parsons) what Husserl would have called "phenomenological status", it .... "involves no concrete data that can be thought away, that are subject to change. It is not phenomenon in the empirical sense. It is the indispensable logical framework in which we describe and think about the phenomena of action". (15) This functions both as a framework and a description; while it claims phenomenological (universal) status, it also "takes on a different meaning" as an analytical framework, in that the values of its elements are concrete data, facts of observation or combinations of facts; they have causal significance, reconciling via the means and schema, "a real process in the mind of the actor, as well as external to it". (16)

Parsons' theorising, read in this way, can be said to say:

i. Facts only have reference in terms of some analytical scheme

ii. The concepts employed in analytical schemes necessarily involve abstraction from any number of possible empirical observations, because

iii. the apprehension of the most unique of events will require the conceptual use of at least one logical universal of some sort.

iv. It is the task of general theory to specify the elements which constitute
the framework of the social, developing systematic relations from a basic specification of the general, logically prior, analytically concrete properties of the unit act.

v. These must be rationally and systematically related in terms of a 'means-end' schema, because, although logically, ends may be conceived of as varying randomly, the fact of social orderliness means that they must be organised into an analytically discoverable system.

vi. This does not mean that concrete reality may be understood completely or even predominantly in such terms.

vii. The systematic relationship between universal categories and rules both a. constitute the event, and b. make knowledge of the event possible.

This reading of Parsons produces him for the purposes which I have in mind, if I were concerned to evaluate this conception, then I would have to produce arguments about how this analysis attended to the task which it set itself, whether the task was rightly conceived or not, how it succeeds or fails in accounting for the properties of reality, how true it is to the theoretical resources which it invokes, and so on. Such accounts of Parsons (17) have formed a great part of sociological theorising for the past thirty years. What I propose rather is to examine how Parsons is seen by one theorist, Garfinkel, who is both sympathetic to Parsons, and also, quite explicitly not concerned with doing the things that Parsons considers himself to be doing. I hope to show that the relation of Parsons to Garfinkel exemplifies what I consider the best relation between teacher and student, sociologist and sociology, both as community and tradition. That is to say, Garfinkel has used Parsons to "make a difference" to the way in which he speaks, as a sociologist; he takes what Parsons says seriously, which is to say that he trusts Parsons. This is not to say that he takes over Parsons' view of the world, but that, in trusting Parsons, he seeks to find, in Parsons' work, a way of reading it which gives it a reason
to be taken seriously.

Some parallels; Wittgenstein once remarked that there was no point in doing philosophy if it did not change your life (18); at the same time, when asked why he used Augustine's account of language acquisition as a resource when, on his own account, it was so deficient, he replied that it must be important, because it was held by such a great man. Now, how does Garfinkel show us how to take Parsons (or any theorist) seriously? I propose that this is by not saying what Parsons says, but by using it to say something different, but not just anything. Using Parsons to say something different from Parsons is a demonstration that we have understood, in a way that makes us responsible to the community within which our speech, and that of Parsons, is sensible (Sociological Theory), but also transforms, as it formulates, the rule-oriented practices of chat community. Rather than seeing the community as members unified in what they say, such a conception of community would see it as a resource which enables members to speak so as to show that they know, that is, to avoid saying (merely) what others say, but to show that they understand what others do. (19)

Taking Parsons Seriously; Garfinkel's Reading

My account of how Garfinkel uses Parsons relies on material, published and unpublished, in which his understanding of Parsons' work is expressed; my purpose is not to show that Garfinkel's work can be seen merely as reflecting the influence of Parsons, although such a task could be undertaken, in order to 'point to' one particular way of making the work of either understandable. This would be to trivialise the work of both, however. I propose, rather, that this characterisation of the relation between the two stands not as a judgment on the importance of one for the other (Parsons for Garfinkel), except insofar as the work of the 'student' transforms the work of the 'teacher' into some other practice, but does not supplant it. This, I would argue, makes Garfinkel responsible to Parsons, and the community of sociological theory, but does not
constrain him into only saying what they would accept, for such a responsibility is shown rather than needing to be asserted.

Garfinkel acknowledges the importance of Parsons in his published work unreservedly; his concept of membership, he notes, derives directly from that of Parsons (20). Both his and Parsons' work is centrally concerned with the problem of order; (21) his concept of the role of theory, likewise, acknowledges the importance of Parsons' work. (22)

Reading Parsons in this way, we must conceive his work in two main ways; first, a solution to the problem of social order, wherein real social structures consist of institutionalised patterns of normative culture, and the stable properties of real social structures are guaranteed by motivated compliance to a legitimate order. This proceeds from, and is itself to be considered in the light of Parsons' avowed claim that every theory of social organisation is a solution to the problem of social order; the direction of scientific interest, in this light, can be seen as treating the solution as the rules of theorising and inquiring procedures to which he attends. The concept 'Adequate structural analysis' derives, in the work that the theorist produces, from attending to these rules. Thus, in Parsons, that the rules of theorising and inquiring are equivalent to the concept of adequate structural analysis results in his taking empirical knowledge of social structures as both a necessary point of departure and a continual and actual source of control on its development.

If we see, analytically, theorising as sense transformation activity, then sociology is to be seen as concerned to transform available descriptions of life-in-society in accordance with the rules of sense transforming procedures found in the methods that sociologists actually employ, and to which they actually subscribe as correct ones. Descriptions of life-in-society are treated by societal members, as objects of their practical everyday concern; they are treated as what is real, for it is to these depictions with which they must
come to terms. From this practical level, these and any such descriptions become transformed into 'real social structure' by the methods of sociological theorising and inquiry. (23)

As Parsons says, structuring in this way depends on a definite set of procedures; that is to say, the theory exists in the relations between the elements of which it is composed, since it is a construction from possible accounts.

For Parsons (24) and for Garfinkel, then, sociological theorising consists of the idealisation of the ways in which society is known by its members in commonsense ways; this is the fate of any description of society whatsoever. while the warrant of commonsense knowledge derives from the rules which govern sense assembly in the contexts in which it is available, the rules governing the use, by sociologists, of any idealisation of the structure of the social world, as the basis of warranted inference in accordance with the aims of inquiry, make possible the empirical reference of such statements, in accordance with the accepted rules of sense transforming procedures. 'Real Social structure' then, comes down NOT to the contents of descriptions, but to descriptions controlled by the rules of procedure which are attended to by those who subscribe to them. Thus, Parsons' 'general theory of action', for Garfinkel, is not to be read as a substantive list, but seen instead as a set of rules for sense transformation, such that any account of the structures of society (how it is observable) can yield a possible description, delineated in terms of the meaning of 'possible' and 'essential' both in terms of the method, and also the programme, attitude, subject matter and accepted findings of sociology (as a set of rule governed practices, a community of practitioners).

This is to say that Parsons' approach substantively produces one real social structure, but that analytically it provides for the production of others; decisions between these substantive accounts will be in terms of the practical concerns of members as sociologists. Now, definitions do not consist of abstrac-
tions from 'reality' but are a set of rules of relevance in terms of which the subject matter is re-constructed as another set of possible events; we could not specify what it is that any definition selects from, since we cannot propose the entire set of things to which we could have attended. The concreteness to which substantive accounts refer does not justify the status accorded to the definitions of which it consists (think here of the argument in the last chapter on the nature of Certainty; see also Wittgenstein, "On Certainty"). All warranted statements are possibilities which have been accepted as in accordance with our way of seeing (empirical in that sense) rather than 'established' matters of fact (in the sense that they make reference to some 'unquestionable' externality).

For Parsons, as Garfinkel sees him, the problem of order is to be approached by taking as the real structure of the society those features which the sociologist idealises in accordance with specific rules of interpretation. It is not that the sociologist is to be seen as providing an external view of the social structure of the society, but that if we are to account for the fact of social order at all, our account will be of the environments of actors as they constitute that order in a way that provides for these environments to be seen as assembling that orderliness. It is possible for us to distinguish, in sociological accounts, between the sociologist's conception of the actor treating his environment which consists of the real social structures seen from within, and the sociologists' conception of the social structures as assembled products of actors treating the sociologists' society seen from within; that is to say, while we can distinguish between that set of phenomena which we call real social structure which consist of assemblies of concerted action, and that set of phenomena which we call real perceived social structure of the environment that the set of real concerted actions confront the members with, there is no sense in which we can say that there could possibly be confirming or disconfirming evidence produced which would constitute differences between what is pre-theoretically 'there' and what is 'there' in the theory, for what is really
'there' is an adequate description precisely insofar as it corresponds to demonstrable features of the actor's environment, which is precisely that feature to which sociological accounts attend in their rules of interpretation. Since the sociological description of real social structure is the idealisation of society known in the way that members know it, and can be nothing else, the 'reality' of social structure consists of that sociological description.

This is a necessary consequence of Garfinkel taking Parsons seriously; it is to apply those relevancies which Parsons' account provides to the account itself. Rather than seeing Parsons as the (conventional) product of what his words would mean if he were speaking the same as anyone else (as if he were not thinking), Garfinkel treats his speech seriously; he looks in what Parsons says for his reasons for saying it, rather than accuse him of saying these merely because it is what is always said, or (unthinkingly) because it is what another has said. Think here of conventional criticism of Parsons; his concepts cannot be 'operationalised', they 'do not explain anything, because they can be applied to everything, he is the product of his (ivory tower) environment, he is 'too abstract', he is 'too deterministic' (25). I am not saying that Parsons cannot be criticised, nor that these accusations do not have weight; what I am arguing is that criticism is unjustified if it does not read the work of a theorist in the way that it provides for itself to be read, and cannot be justified unless it accounts for its charges in terms of the criteria which provide the sense of the theory in the first place. Most critics of Parsons palpably fail to provide any such grounds for their charges, but proceed, very often, from a reading of Parsons which shows that they have not understood him in terms which he would provide for them to do so. (26)

Is any reading of Parsons as good as any other? What would a 'correct' reading of Parsons be like? We have already discussed the variety of understandings which we subsume
under the one concept. In terms of the present question, it would seem that we are faced with a number of possible alternatives. If we accept that Parsons can be said to make sense in terms of the criteria conventionally available to the community of sociological practitioners, then it would seem that there are a variety of possible interpretations which might be given to his work, for the rules to which practitioners attend in their sense assembling are by their nature, open ended and flexible, being only available as an occasioned corpus which must both fit the exigencies of the context and the previous experience of the members concerned. Thus, no understanding of Parsons has any necessary superiority over any other.

If on the other hand, we argue that some understandings of Parsons palpably are better than others (those acknowledged by his friends or his enemies to be justified as such), then we must decide between the competing criteria in terms of which such understandings make their claims. Here, we seem to be faced with simply a choice between competitive versions of what is justified in the real world and what is not. What Garfinkel has done is to take Parsons as producing a version of theorising which accords with his basic pre-theoretical assumptions; this is not simply a matter of limiting Parsons by saying because he addresses the question in this way his work has this form, but rather it is to seek the sensible justification for his statements in the issues to which he attends.

As has already been argued, these proceed from an acceptance of the Kantian framework to epistemology; this produces a theory of reality which claims a correspondence, between the perceived object of the 'outer' world and the manner in which it is apprehended, but a difference between the concrete object and the manner in which it is apprehended. Thereby, factual statements about reality can only ever be partial, although it is their function to approximate reality; according to Kant, this is possible because of the existence of primal, invariant categories of apprehension (Parsons' logical universals), which give
to the properly qualified observer, a view of the world of real objects which is independent of the historical conditions of the observers' circumstances. What cannot, therefore, be addressed, is the question of why the objects that are reproduced correspond in their logical character to the logical design of the real world.

This mystery is held by Platonist, or Realist, as the necessary framework which must be accepted for knowledge to be possible; Wittgenstein, however, showed in his work on mathematics that the correspondence between logic and the structure of the real world cannot be shown to proceed from the qualities of "external reality", but is rather a feature of OUR "inexorability", mathematics, and logic, are normative (social) systems, conventions or uses related to our practical requirements and responsive to changes in those requirements. While the rules which determine what it is to (warrantedly) accomplish something are a matter of convention, it is also the case that we can question the adequacy of those rules, when the practice fails to perform the task which we set. This is how the problem can be seen at all; rather than the social locatedness of practices making it impossible for one to make a mistake, or to see a problem in some other way, the very diversity of social practices makes it possible to criticise and modify the practices involved. Parsons may be correct in saying that these logical frameworks cannot be "thought away", but only assuming that we accept the framework within which they come into being. Thus, it is not a question of saying that Parsons is 'wrong' because we can conceive the problem in another way, for he is not saying that we cannot do so; rather, within the analytical framework which he proposes for conceiving of social action, we should have to discover elements of social action to which it does not attend. Hence, while we can criticise Parsons in terms of some other set of criteria within the language game of social science, we must always do so with the framework which he proposed for himself in mind, if we are to be responsible to his work, rather than a partial production. (28)
Garfinkel proceeds from Parsons by locating another epistemological question for himself; rather than asking 'why does logic have the inexorable force that we see?', he proposes that we see the possibility of asking 'how do we see the inexorable force that logic has?' If we leave aside the truth of the epistemological theory which proposes correspondence between the partial formulations of the external world and that external world, we are left with another possibility; that the perceived object of the external world is the concrete object. This congruence theory, derived in Garfinkel's work from Schutz and Husserl, proposes that the problem of the transcendental status of the invariant categories of understanding is not necessarily to be accepted as a mystery. While the Kantian question is interested in enquiring after the necessary framework within which any sense can be made of the external world, this question becomes itself the accomplished product of Husserl's project. Husserl argues that rationality, in the Kantian framework, becomes a methodologically necessary principle; what we can also do, he argues is to suspend judgment on these categories, what he calls a phenomenological 'epoche'; rather than seek an analytical framework, he argues that we should examine the uses which individuals make of their experience of the world, in making sense of the world, in order to construct a transcendental ground for all such experience; what Kolakowski has called Husserl's 'search for certitude'. (29) Now, to accept this project as legitimate is no part of Garfinkel's task; I will argue later that it does, in fact, have implications for the work that he produces. At the moment, however, we are concerned with how this enables him to proceed from Parsons' work. He could reformulate Parsons in terms of the concerns of this question by arguing that Parsons' work could be seen as producing an organisation of the possibilities of the observer's experience to present him with one out of a boundless class of possible objective worlds; rather than an attempt to approximate to reality, Parsons' theorising is a reconstitution of the world in accordance with the rules of scientific theorising and the procedures of the 'scientific method'.

To do so, however, would involve him in questioning Parsons' assumption of the phenomenological status of his primal invariant categories, since Parsons' work
(in Garfinkel's terms) proceeds from the acceptance of rationality as a methodologically necessary principle. Garfinkel chooses, instead, to suspend judgment on this, as he must; Parsons' work is not supplanted, but accepted within the terms of the pre-theoretical assumptions which form its base. Now, why must Garfinkel do this, for it is not simply a matter of choice or respect? To answer this, we turn to consider the work that Garfinkel himself has produced.

We can suspend judgment on primal invariant categories, as Garfinkel sees it, because as well as being an organizing principle in scientific discourse (as for Parsons), theorising, as the solution to the problem of the rational accounting of the world, is what is accomplished by everyday actors in their commonsense, mundane activities, it is seeable by them accountable by them, reportable by them, it is a discoverable faculty, as well as a collection of self-conscious methodological principles. Natural language, he notes:

"... serves persons doing sociology - whether they are laymen or professionals as circumstances, as topics, and as resources of their enquiries". (30)

and this furnishing itself provides for the "technology" of these enquiries and to their practical sociological reasoning its circumstances, its topics and its resources. Natural language, he argues, is encountered in the investigations of sociologists as an irremediably indexical phenomenon. That is to say, a description:

"... in the ways that it may be a constituent part of the circumstances it describes, in endless ways and unavoidably, elaborates these circumstances and is elaborated by them". (31)

Given the faculty of reflexivity, we can see that these characteristics of natural language assure to expressions the following properties; definiteness of sense resides in the consequences of expressions (how they are used); definitions collect definite considerations, but are not necessarily bounded; such bounds are provided in the possibilities available in the circumstances,
itself a condition prefigured by the indefiniteness of possible elaboration.

Indexicality is a necessary feature of all natural language, including sociology; for instance:

"the natural language formula 'the objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle' is heard by professionals according to occasion as a definition of association members' activities, as their slogan, their task, aim, achievement, brag, sales pitch, justification, discovery, social phenomenon, or research constraint. Like any other indexical expression, the transient circumstances of its use assure it a definiteness of sense as definition of task or whatever, to someone who knows how to hear it". (32)

Definiteness cannot be assured by anything other than the justifications which members may bring to it on the occasion of use. The actual expressions of sociology cannot be assured a definite sense by available mathematical or logical methods. All that sociologists can do is to transform these into idealised expressions, and then:

"structures are .... analysed as properties of the ideals, and the results are assigned to actual expressions as their properties, though with disclaimers of appropriate scientific modesty". (33)

In consequence, any practical sociological reasoning, (whether lay or professional?) seeks to remedy the indexical properties of practical discourse, in the interests of demonstrating the rational accountability of everyday activities, warranted by methodic observation and report of situated, socially organised particulars of everyday activities.

"The remedial practices of practical sociological reasoning are aimed at accomplishing a thoroughgoing distinction between objective and indexical expressions with which to make possible the substitution of objective for indexical expressions. At present that distinction and substitutability provides professional sociology its infinite task."

(Note; we mean by 'infinite task' that the difference and substitutability motivate inquiries whose results are recognised and treated by members as grounds for further inferences and inquiries. It is with respect to the difference and substitutability as aims of inquiry that 'infinite task' is understood by members to refer to
the open character of sociological fact, to the
"self cleansing" body of social scientific knowledge,
to the present state of the problem, to cumulative
results, to progress and the rest." (34)

This is taken by many of Garfinkel's followers to be an objection to the
practices of conventional sociology; I hope that it is clear from what I have
already argued that it should not be read in this way at all. As he quite
explicitly states (35) he is proposing an alternative to general theory
building but not, I would argue, aiming to deny its legitimacy. The key is to
be found in the careful distinction which he makes between practical sociolog­
ical reasoning and the practices of professional sociologists. For Garfinkel,
theorising is a feature of any accounting, whether lay or professional, and
subject to the same constraints. Thus, any practical sociological reasoning
attempts to remedy the indexicality of the expressions of natural language;
what he is pointing to is the sense in which sociologists (like Parsons) are
accepting the mystery of correspondence between the language with which we
describe the world and the reality which it is used to describe. This cannot
be a perjorative characterisation, given the terms of Garfinkel's own enterprise,
for he must also accept this mystery, while reserving the right to address the
processes which for him make it possible.

Now, how does he propose to do this? By in the first place, addressing the
practices of commonsense knowledge of social structures of everyday activities,
practical circumstances, practical activities, and practical sociological
reasoning. Garfinkel argues that the notion of member, derived from Parsons,
provides the key; this refers not to a person, but a faculty - the mastery of
a natural language. (36) The investigation which he sets for himself aims to
explore the ways in which the speaking of a natural language involves at one
and the same time, the objective production and objective display of commonsense
knowledge of everyday activities as observable and reportable phenomena; that
is to say, how is it that the mystery of correspondence is achieved? This is
also to draw attention to the key role played here by the attempt to transform indexical particulars into objectively substitutable expressions, not just in professional constructivist sociology, but in practical, everyday accounting of the real world. For Garfinkel, theorising is the transformation of the indexical character of formulations of experience into objective factual accountings of the real world, whether this is professional or lay sociology. Acceptance of the principle that the practices of sociological inquiry and theorising (lay or professional) the topics and findings of those practices, the methods proposed and so on are members' methods, he concludes that, for professional sociologist and for everyday actor, the investigation of:

"members' methods for assembling sets of alternatives, members' methods for assembling, testing and verifying the factual character of information, members' methods for giving an account of the circumstances of choice and choices, members' methods for assessing, producing, recognising, insuring, enforcing, consistency, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, planfulness and other rational properties of individual and concerted actions". (37)

is an investigation of how the objective (logically consistent) reality which is the subject of such accountings, comes to be assembled in the way it is. It is in natural language, he argues, that the objective particulars of the real world are somehow displayed. By addressing the practices of speaking a natural language, then, we should be able to discover, in the particulars of speaking, the exhibition of the phenomena which make this possible (in itself exhibited by the possibility of further description etc.) Rather than accept the limitations of constructivist sociology, Garfinkel proposes that ethnomethodological studies will aim to investigate and provide in detailed analyses, the practical basis for accountable phenomena; that is to say, in the investigation of the uses of natural language, the assemblage of the practices of speakers of situated particulars will provide a display of the work of the accomplishment of their speech meaning more than it can say in so many words.

Thus Garfinkel is pointing to the way in which his own working hypothesis limits what his accounting can do; the work must be ongoing because his account is
subject to the same conditions - that it can also, mean more than it can say in just so many words. This feature of the use of natural language, what Garfinkel calls 'Glossing', is the endless but particular and analysable practice and method for producing observable and reportable understanding. (38)

Garfinkel's work aims to recommend itself as providing an alternative to constructivist sociological theorising; to do so, it has proposed its topic in the way already outlined. It also aims to differentiate itself from constructivist sociology in other ways.

i. While sociology aims to idealise its production of the objective world, ethnomethodological studies will aim to avoid this by displaying structures rather than defining them.

ii. While both ethnomethodology and constructivist sociology aim to focus on the formal structures of everyday activities, the latter requires the mastery of a natural language as the sine qua non of adequate professional readership, and is accomplished via the mastery of such a language. While constructivist sociology claims for its production a different status than any other, for ethnomethodology, this production stands alongside any other production, as a phenomenon to be described; ethnomethodology is indifferent to the claims of such accounts for different status, and abstains from judgments of their adequacy, value, importance, necessity, practicality, success or consequentiality.

iii. Ethnomethodology does not aim to be a corrective to constructivist sociology.

iv. Ethnomethodological studies are free from the constraint of recognising the meaning of action and speech in terms of the conventions of particular institutional conventions whereas constructivist sociology is tied to such accounts. (39)

v. Constructive analysis is able to achieve its recommendation and understanding of its accounts' achievements and aims via their mastery of a natural language; that is to say constructivist analytical accounts of the formal structure of the social world is a practical achievement, since
it exists through the formulations of natural language. For ethnomethodologists, it is the formulation of such accounts, as a set of practices which comprise the phenomena of practical sociological reasoning. This differentiation itself displays the reading of Parsons; Parsons' main concern in developing the strategy of analytical realism was to avoid what he, following A. N. Whitehead called the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness; that is to say, he is careful to avoid reifying the analytical categories which he developed to describe the elements of social action. Garfinkel has already noted that in constructivist sociology, the only way in which the idealised concepts which describe the phenomena of the social world can be operationalised is to analyse structures as the properties of these ideals, and the results assigned to actual expressions as their properties - which is precisely, in Parsons' terms, to commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

To avoid this Garfinkel is relying on the principle that he refers to as 'ethnomethodological indifference'; while seeking to describe (members' accounts of formal structures wherever and by whomever they are done) at the same time, such description will abstain from all judgments (of their adequacy, value, importance, necessity, practicality, success or consequentiality). Here we have another echo of Wittgenstein - think of his famous dictum "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place". (40) Clearly, Garfinkel has the background to this in his account of the structures of practical actions; but he also attends to the role of such descriptions in accomplishing understanding. For Wittgenstein, description gets its light, its purpose, from philosophical problems; we can see that Garfinkel aims that his descriptions will similarly be directed towards the problems outlined by the project of practical sociological reasoning; that is to say, while Wittgenstein aims to arrange what we already know, what we have always known, in order to illuminate the problems consequent upon our bewitchment by language, Garfinkel similarly seeks to direct our attention to the commonsense mundane ways in which
we do manage the accomplishment of order in our language games to illuminate the processes which create such order.

While Wittgenstein, however, was concerned to illuminate the problems of one special language game (philosophy) by applying the corrective of ordinary language use, Garfinkel has quite specifically distinguished his project from that of constructivist sociology. Ethnomethodological studies, unlike Wittgenstein's analyses of ordinary language, do not aim to correct the 'mother discipline'; Garfinkel's project is rather, to recommend the rational accountability of everyday activities as a distinctive enterprise, marked off from constructivist sociology by 'irreconcilable interests'. The fact that constructivist theories can only (in his terms) be concerned with the repair of indexical expressions distinguishes, for ethnomethodological studies, a distinctive concern, in the task of a rational account of these ordered properties. What gives ethnomethodological studies that possibility is precisely the principle of its indifference, or the notion that its "descriptions" are to be read in terms of the suspension of judgment on the nature of the phenomena which it investigates.

Now, Husserl proposed a similar suspension in his philosophical project; in attacking the problems of scepticism and relativism, he sought to discover the source of absolute certitude. He proposed that this certitude can be gained if we no longer need to worry about the bridge between perceptions and things in themselves, where we cannot ask how we know that our acts reach the content as it really is. To accomplish knowledge of this level, he aimed at a 'transcendental reduction', where the world is meaning, things and other people are constituted phenomena. The world is not what is actually perceived, but is an infinite potentiality of consciousness; this consciousness is not a substance, but is actual only as directed toward something (intentionality). Rationality and certitude may be found only if subjectivity constitutes the objects of the world; only as it is dependent on the cognitive act is the object accessible.
in a way which makes doubt impossible. (41)

It is no part of my task to consider the foundations of Husserl's phenomenology; however, the implications of his proposed reduction are important in considering Garfinkel's work; Husserl proposed the reduction precisely to attain knowledge of a level of consciousness which was denied to science. The suspension of judgment in Garfinkel aims, similarly, at accomplishing knowledge of a level which is denied to social science. Description takes the place of explanation in Garfinkel because in explaining social phenomena, we necessarily idealise; our accounts substitute objective for indexical expressions, necessarily. The principle of indifference functions to locate the knowledge of the processes of practical reasoning at a level where it is not subject to such accusations, since it proposes as its topic the very process whereby the objective reality which individuals constitute in their practical reasoning is accomplished.

While Husserl claims to have found a consciousness which is not in the world (is not a part of it), but is entirely independent of empirical consciousness the empirical world, human psychology, biology and history, via the reduction, in Garfinkel's notion of indexical and objective expressions we find a similar nexus. Garfinkel must suspend judgment, or be indifferent to the status of his subjects' productions, precisely because in his theory, reality as it is constituted can only exist in the act of knowing it; any reflection on this is a mediation of the act of constitution which attempts to remedy the essential indexicality of the moment. For Husserl, the suspension of judgment afforded him access to ultimate certitude which could appear only in immanence, and was, since communication is always mediated by its symbols, incommunicable.

Now, Garfinkel is prepared to accept the consequences of his suspension of judgment; the programme of ethnomethodological studies is, indeed, founded upon the irremediability of indexicality. But the consequence of this acceptance is that the work that it produces proceeds from an absolute rejection of the possibility of doubting its productions, since, in terms of its own theory, what
cannot be doubted is the very possibility of re-writing any production. So that, while Garfinkel can posit the inevitable idealisation involved in any constructivist attempt to impute to indexical expressions the qualities of the structures analysed, he can only avoid this charge for his own findings by refusing to doubt them.

This is, of course, in keeping with Wittgenstein's arguments; since it is only possible to be certain about something which we could sensibly doubt, then it follows that that which we cannot doubt is something about which we cannot have certainty. In Garfinkel's case, the argument is reversed; since we cannot have certain knowledge of the sense of (indexical) expressions, then we cannot doubt them, but only suspend judgment, since we can neither confirm nor disconfirm them.

Garfinkel's findings, then, are not subject to the same processes of confirmation or disconfirmation as findings in constructivist sociology. In Wittgenstein's case, what must be accepted was the form of life - this is what could not be confirmed or disconfirmed, but was embodied in the grammar of the language. The notion of membership posits just such grammatical force to the competences embodied in the speaking of a natural language. We noted earlier, however, that, unlike Wittgenstein, Garfinkel was not interested in correcting sociology; for him, the investigation of practical sociological reasoning stands in its own right, and, as I have already argued, Garfinkel is not interested in correcting sociological (constructivist) theory.

Now, for Wittgenstein, the task of the analyst of ordinary language consisted in just such a corrective; he was concerned with 'assembling reminders', with 'showing the fly how to get out of the bottle' with "freeing the philosopher from the bewitchment of language". Ordinary language could be used in that way because it constrained the speaker to accept certain limitations; it could not be called upon to perform tasks to which, while we might be led by its indeterminacy and ambiguities to suppose it could offer us solutions, in fact it could
not, and this could be demonstrated by the process of examining it to see what we must accept. As Cavell notes:

"... There is virtually nothing in the investigations which we should ordinarily call reasoning; Wittgenstein asserts nothing which could be proved, for what he asserts is either obvious - whether true or false - or else concerned with what conviction, whether by proof or evidence or authority, would consist in. ... his writing is deeply negative and practical, the way Freud's is, and like Freud's therapy, it wishes to prevent understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change. Both of them are intent on unmasking the defeat of our real need in the face of self impositions which we have not assessed (PI 108) or fantasies ("pictures") which we cannot escape (PI 115) .... In asking for more than belief, such writing invites discipleship, which runs its own risks of dishonesty and hostility. But I do not see that the faults of explicit discipleship are more dangerous than the faults which come from subjection to modes of thought and sensibility whose origins are unseen or unremembered and which therefore create a different blindness inaccessible in other ways to cure. Between control by the dead and control by the living there is nothing to choose." (42)

For Garfinkel to produce, in his findings, a similar therapeutic change in sociologists might be a conceivable end for his work; quite explicitly, however, this is not the end he has in view. In denying this corrective function, however, what role does Garfinkel in fact envisage for ethnomethodological studies?

His distinction between ethnomethodological studies and constructivist sociology turns upon the differences between the scientific rationality which is the hallmark of the latter, and the rationalities which may be employed in the everyday management of social interaction. In "The Rational Properties of Scientific and Commonsense Activities" (43) he discusses the various ways in which rationality may be employed by persons doing sociology, and in everyday life. To begin with, he notes that commonly, sociological researchers decide a definition of rationality by selecting one or more features from among the properties of scientific activity as it is ideally understood and practised; this is then used to aid the researcher methodologically:
"in deciding the realistic, pathological, prejudiced, delusional, mythical, magical, ritual and similar features of everyday conduct, thinking and beliefs". (44)

This typically reveals, however, that there is a gap between lay and scientific knowledge and procedures, but that nonetheless, effective, stable and persistent actions and social structures occur. This has led many sociologists to abandon the empirically uninteresting rational properties which such definitions discriminated in favour of a study of the features and conditions of non-rationality in human conduct. Thus, Garfinkel seems to be saying that sociology has typically refused to accept the stability etc., of the social structures which it studies as evidence for a rationality other than the ideal scientific one which they attempt to impose on it.

Rationality, he argues, in fact designates many different ways of behaving; he produces Schutz's inventory of such uses as a point of departure. At the same time, he notes, we need not exercise the theorists' right to choose between them.

1. Categorising and comparing - refers to the ability to search experience for a similar situation.

2. "Tolerable error" - where theory and observation are fitted together, with greater or lesser correspondence, which may be related to the extent to which the choice of theory is "rational".

3. Search for Means - review of rules of procedure in past situations to produce effect.

4. Analysis of alternatives and consequences - weighing up the effects of action.

5. Strategy - anticipation of possible different courses of action prior to anticipated occasion.

6. Concern for timing - refers to the ability or choice exercised in taking up a position in expectation of specific possible ways in which an event can occur.

7. Predictability - refers to the person paying attention to the characteristics of a situation in order to be able to predict possible outcomes or reduce surprise.
9. Rules of procedure - the ways in which a person decides the correctness of his judgments, inferences, perceptions and characterisations.

Here, significantly, Garfinkel draws attention to two classes of rules for deciding the distinct ways in which a thing may be decided to be known; Cartesian and tribal rules.

"Cartesian rules propose that a decision is correct because the person followed the rules without respect for persons i.e., that the decider decided as any man would do when all matters of social affiliation were treated as specifically irrelevant. By contrast tribal rules provide that a decision is correct or not according to whether certain interpersonal solidarities are respected as conditions of the decision. The person counts his decision right or wrong in accordance with whom it is referentially important that he be in agreement." (45)

He argues that rationality is frequently used to refer to the application of Cartesian rules of decision, rather than others. Conventions may impose restraints on such decision making, the extent to which such constraints are suppressed or otherwise made ineffective may also be termed rationality.

9. Choice - both as an awareness of choosing as a possibility, and the fact of choosing.

10. Grounds of Choice - whether the 'appropriate' ones are cited, or whether any are cited at all - he discusses a number of different meanings of grounds.

11. Compatibility of means ends relationships with principles of formal logic - treating course of action as problem solving.

12. Semantic clarity and distinctness; - being clear about what is involved in the situation before accepting it.

13. Clarity and distinctness for its own sake - being clear about what is involved in the situation as its own end.

14. Compatibility of the definition of a situation with scientific knowledge - allowing what we normally treat as a "matter of fact" to be criticised in terms of its compatibility with scientific knowledge.
Garfinkel also notes that rationality may also refer to the person's feelings that accompany his conduct - e.g., "affective neutrality" (a joke, I think, by a keen student of Parsons,) "unemotional", "detached", "disinterested", and "impersonal"; while these may be features of the individual's experience of his environment, what Garfinkel is interested in is the way in which a person uses the feeling that he has about his environment to recommend the sensible character of the thing that he is talking about or the warrant of a finding. Only in ideally described scientific activities is a person who treats his feelings about a matter as irrelevant to its sense or warrant said to be acting more rationally than one who does not.

Garfinkel goes on to discuss the ways in which "these rationalities may be used to construct an image of a person as a type of behaviour"; this may be done with all the rationalities listed with four exceptions. (10-14) These four exceptions illustrate the distinction, for him, between the rationalities of everyday life, and those of the scientific attitude.

"Phrased as ideal maxims of conduct, these excepted rationalities state that the projected steps of in the solution of a problem or the accomplishment of a task i.e., the means-ends relationships be constructed in such a way (1) that they remain in full compatibility with the rules that define scientifically correct decisions of grammar and procedure (2) that all the elements be conceived of in full clearness and distinctness (1) that the clarification of both the body of knowledge as well as rules of investigation and interpretative procedure be treated as a first priority project: and (4) that the projected steps contain only scientifically verifiable assumptions that have to be in full compatibility with the whole of scientific knowledge." (46)

Garfinkel argues that scientific rationalities occur as stable properties of action and as "sanctionable ideals" only in the case of actions governed by an attitude of scientific theorising. "By contrast, actions governed by the attitude of daily life are marked by the specific absence of these rationalities either as stable properties or as sanctionable ideals". (47)

Where any attempt is made to impose the scientific rationality onto structures
subject to the rationalities of everyday life, this will result in a multiplication of the anomie features of interaction*. While the rationalities of everyday life may apply in the activity of scientific theorising, the reverse is not the case.

Now, this is, he says, "an empirical rather than a doctrinal matter", that is to say, the distinction between the scientific and everyday rationalities depends on the warrant that can be found for this statement. For the sociological theorist, he argues, this problem of rationality depends upon first clarifying the various meanings of rationality and allocating them to behavioural correlates in the individual's actions and the system's characteristics; which of the behavioural designations go together must be decided on the basis of experience rather than by the election of a theory. Further, the deciding of these behavioural designations must be allocated between definitional and empirically problematic status, and such decisions require grounds, and the justification of putative comparison with alternative sets of decisions. This is a further restatement of his conviction that sociological theorising is tied, in terms of its own ends, to necessary idealisation, since such an investigation could not succeed; the problem of everyday rationalities can only involve a suspension of judgment on those matters which constructivist sociology would require such judgment.

Garfinkel then goes on to discuss the differences between the presupposition governing the attitude of daily life and that of scientific theorising, using as his resource Schutz's studies of the constitutive phenomenology of commonsense situations. (48) These produce distinctions between the two in the following way:

1. In everyday situations, the orderliness of the world is achieved by the practical theorist, and he further attempts to sustain and justify this achievement. The world is taken to be what it appears to be, and any possibility that it might be otherwise construed may be entertained, but it is not acted upon. Such achievements are expected of others in more
or less identical fashion; matters of dispute are usually settled by mutual acceptance of conventional construals.

In scientific theorising, interpretation is conducted on the basis that the belief that objects of the world are as they appear will be held in abeyance; while commonsense rationality permits doubt, the practicalities of everyday life limit the extent to which this can be sustained. The scientific attitude is not limited by such constraints, since here, doubt is in principle unlimited.

2. The practical considerations of the everyday actor's involvement in the world form the second assumption of the everyday attitude. The accuracy of the actors' orderings is presupposed to be tested and testable without suspending the relevance of what he knows as "fact, supposition, conjecture, fantasy and the like, by virtue of his bodily and social positions in the real world."

"Events, their relationships, their causal texture, are not for him matters of theoretic interest. He does not sanction the notion that in dealing with them it is correct to address them with the interpretative rule that he knows nothing or that he can assume that he knows nothing just to see where it leads. In everyday situations, what he knows is an integral feature of his social competence. What he knows, in the way he knows it he assumes personifies himself as a social object to himself as well as to others as a bona fide member of the group. (49)

In contrast, science takes the sense and accuracy of the model to be a matter to be tested and decided while the relevance of what the theorizer knows by virtue of his "social and bodily positions in the real world" is a matter on which judgment must be suspended.

3. Time has a different place in both attitudes; in everyday life, a system of temporal relationships (assumed to be held in common with others) is used to break experience down into "slices", so that, for instance, conversation becomes not just what is experienced as it is experienced, but what it has just been, and what it is anticipated that it will come to be; sense is only realised here as a progression through a series of
realised meaning, each with retrospective and prospective significances. He assumes that the duration, pacing, phasing and termination of conversations is similarly co-ordinated by himself and others.

In the activities of scientific theorising, standard time is used as a device for constructing one out of alternative empirically possible worlds; while in the everyday world time would gear his interests to the conduct of others, in science it becomes merely a device for solving the problem of formulating, in relations of cause and effect, or something like it, the co-ordinated actions which are the subject of his investigation.

4. The everyday actor is informed as to the sense of events by a pre-supposed background of the 'natural facts of life'; "anyone would think the same in the circumstances." In science, the "anyone who would think the same" is not, as for the everyday actor, simply a member of the natural language community, but is a universalised anyone; rather than being rooted in the practicalities of a real world, the anyone of the scientific theoriser is "an ideal disembodied manual of proper procedures for deciding sensibility, warrant, and objectivity". (50) The scientific theoriser is not constrained by the obligations of "seeing the world in the way it is seen by any other real member" but is obliged only to give credence only to what he decides; it is his option to trust the findings of his colleagues, grounded in their common membership of some (scientific) community or other, but if he withholds this, he is permitted to justify this by invoking as grounds his impersonal subscription to a community of "competent investigators who are anonymous with respect to collectivity membership and whose actions conform to norms of the manual of procedures. By such actions he may risk criticism for unnecessary rigor. But such actions in daily life would risk a change in status to criminality, sickness or incompetence." (51)

5. For the everyday actor, private life forms the background to his differential relations to others according to the contexts in which they occur. Only what is relevant to the interaction in hand is presumed by those involved
to be grounds for behaviour in question; the matters that are assumed to
be known in common are informed in their sense by those matters which
are held in reserve.

For the scientific theoriser, no disparity exists between a public and a private
life so far as matters of warrant and sense are concerned; only matters that
are relevant to his depiction of a possible world have any place, and these
are both public and publicisable.

These two attitudes, he argues, produce "logically incompatible sets of events";
it is not the case that they shade into each other, or are merely different in
degree; they do not "describe different aspects of the same thing". Rather,
we must see that no necessary priority can be assigned to one production rather
than another on the basis of rationality; that is to say, the insistence of
scientific theorists on conceiving actions in terms of scientific rationality
creates for them the problems that they then find in fitting this rationality
to the choices exercised within the affairs governed in their sense by the
pre-suppositions of everyday life. Following Schutz, he argues that rationality
only exists in everyday life insofar as it is necessary for the practical
purposes of the actor in conceiving, for instance, the ends he has in mind,
their consequences, and the means at his disposal for realising them; this is
necessarily limited by the practical requirement of operating in the real world.(52)
so that, Schutz concludes, the exhaustive system which would be necessary if we
were to search for a notion of rational choice exists not at the everyday level,
but in the theoretical level of science; it is neither a peculiar feature of
everyday thought, nor should it constitute a methodological principle of scien-
tific sociological theorising.

Consequent upon this, Garfinkel recommends that, rather than the investigator
treating scientific rationality as a methodological rule, he should (if he is
investigating the affairs of everyday life) choose, instead of an idealised model
pace Parsons) to treat the properties of rationality only as empirically problematical data; "They would have the status only of data, and would have to be accounted for in the same way that the more familiar properties of conduct are accounted for" (53). This is the attempt to remove the rational properties of conduct from the domain of philosophical commentary and give them over to empirical research. In Garfinkel's view, this is possible because, unlike scientific theorising's definition of credible knowledge, the body of credible knowledge within activities of daily life is not subject to the rigid restriction of warrant in terms of an ideal - for instance, the sanction in science of not permitting two incompatible or contradictory propositions to be used as legitimate grounds for deducing the warrant of another proposition. If the definition of credible knowledge consists of the rules that govern the use of propositions as grounds of further inference and action, then while for science these rules must be clearly explicated (as the ideal to which it subscribes, its model) for the commonsense world, as has been argued, this is clearly not the case.

"Within the rules of relevance of everyday life, a correctly used proposition is one for whose use the user specifically expects to be socially supported and by the use of which he furnishes others evidence of bona fide collectivity status". (54)

Garfinkel is arguing that the justification for the empirical statement of the rational properties of everyday conduct consists in the sensible reporting of the activities as they are found, in terms of the rationalities into which they may be grouped; the grouping into forms of rationality is justified in the sense that the investigator may cite the conditions of the actors' make-up and to his characteristic relationships with others, but "without ironic comparison".

This has clear links to Wittgenstein's conception of the form of life as the 'bedrock' upon which investigation is founded, but which it cannot question; Garfinkel is similarly arguing that here description can take the place of explanation, and must; that is to say, the empirical investigation of the rational properties of everyday conduct cannot seek its justification in anything
other than its undoubtable nature. His reporting of these rational properties does not aim to explain them, for to do so would be to make them accountable for in terms of canons of justification which do not exist in the practical circumstances in which they occur. "Any factor that we take to be conditional of the properties of activities is a factor that is conditional of the rationalities". (55) In making the properties of rationality into data, he argues that we must account for them "in the same way that the more familiar properties of conduct are accounted for". How are the more familiar properties of conduct accounted for? Here, he turns in a circle, for while his argument here has so far been directed towards the aspirations of (constructivist) sociological theorising, he now turns back to such theorising; for it is only the requirements and claims of the model of "scientific" theorising which he aims to resist.

Given the choice between scientific and everyday rationalities, he argues, no necessity dictates that we must opt for the idealising procedures of science. The idealising procedures of scientific theorising themselves are not demanded by any ontological characteristics of the events they seek to describe. It is his argument that description has the character of accounting conduct if its statements are warranted by the criteria which we do employ in everyday life, rather than simply those criteria which are employed in the community of scientific theorising. Thereby, accounts of everyday rationalities depend for their warrant not upon the criteria of scientific rationality, but rather, upon the criteria which constitute the rationalities of everyday life.

Thus Garfinkel is trading upon the diversity of rationalities in the everyday world to warrant descriptions of the rationalities of that world; the empirical nature of his enterprise consists in the fact that the objectivity of the intersubjective world does not depend upon a set of master criteria in terms of which decisions about its reality may be warranted, but is rather a diverse set of practices, employed according to their relevance for the individuals concerned. The existence of this diversity assures members, among other things, of the
possibility of comparing or contrasting one set of practices, or one situation, with others. Similarly, Garfinkel can trade on this facility in his accounting; precisely those resources which everyday actors employ to reflect on the meaning of their own and others' actions and speech assure to Garfinkel the possibility of describing such actions and speeches, for these are warranted by the same set of inter-subjective resources.

His 'principle of indifference' then, can be seen to be a necessary feature of his project; ANY judgment would involve a stipulation which has no place in a description, for it would involve assigning definite meaning to the actions to which it is applied. Garfinkel cannot be concerned with this task, for in his taking rationality only as data, and not as a methodological principle, he is himself left without such a principle, save for the "principle of indifference". Precisely insofar as his work depends upon being indifferent to the "adequacy, value, importance, necessity, practicality, success or consequentiality" of its topic as account of the world, in order to make the rationality which warrants it into his topic, so Garfinkel is left without a principle in terms of which his accounts can be seen as adequate, valuable, important, necessary, practical, successful or consequential. Because they do not provide any criteria in terms of which we can judge their adequacy (etc.,) apart from those which they display in the description which they produce. They make no difference between the adequacy of constructivist sociology and practical sociological reasoning because in rejecting the scientific attitude (for their purposes), his accounts cease to be warranted in the same terms as those produced by the community of scientific theorists.

While aiming to be warranted by the rationalities of everyday life which they describe, it is nevertheless true that they are different from the accounts produced by everyday actors within this attitude, for while such actors produce theoretic accounts, they do so, in the overwhelming majority of cases, practical purposes. They do not suspend certainty in their accounts of the
everyday world, even though in their practices they necessarily retain the
capacity to suspend doubt. That is to say, doubts about the reality of the
realised world do have a place in the reflexive faculty, but only within very
special language games. Garfinkel may be indifferent to what the accounts
accomplish, but those who produce and assess the accounts cannot be, as he has
himself argued.

Wittgenstein:

"Let us say that the meaning of a piece is its role in a
game. Now let it be decided by lot which of the players
gets white before any game of chess begins. To this end,
one player holds a king in each closed fist while the
other chooses one of the two hands at random. Will it be
counted as part of the role of the kind in chess that it
is used to draw lots in this way?

So I am inclined to distinguish between the essential and
the in-essential in a game too. The game, one would like
to say, has not only rules but also a point."

But after all, a game is supposed to be defined by the rules!
So, if a rule of the game prescribes that kings are to be
used for drawing lots before a game of chess, then that is an
essential part of the game. What objection might one make to
this? That one does not see the point of this prescription.
Perhaps as one wouldn't see the point either of a rule by which
each piece had to be turned round three times before one moved
it. If we found this rule in a board game we should be
surprised and speculate perhaps about the purpose of the rule,
("Was this prescription meant to prevent one from moving
without due consideration?")

If I understand the character of the game aright - I might say -
then this isn't an essential part of it (Meaning is a physiognomy).

(56)

Garfinkel's descriptions aim to derive their sense from the criteria in terms
of which the rationalities which they take as their topic bestow sense in every-
day life; however, while these rationalities may be invoked by everyday actors
as the grounds for their practical actions in the everyday world, the rationality
of their invocation is precisely what is only available in terms of the point
(purpose) of their conduct. As Garfinkel argued (following Schutz) this is a
practically limited rationality, and does not fit a systematic form; however,
this limitation must also apply to Garfinkel, given that his description calls
into play the rationalities upon which it focusses, but at the same time, he must be indifferent to the accomplishment of the point to which the conduct is directed. That is to say, the point to which the behaviour is directed can have no significance for Garfinkel, save as a criterionless ascription not provided for by the self-imposed limits of his description; since the description is directed towards the rationalities upon which everyday conduct depends for its sense, rather than the accomplishments of that conduct, Garfinkel is not interested in the point of a language game, but only what rules the players attend to as they play.

Garfinkel's game has a point, of course, which has already been laid out; however, what is not clear about the point to Garfinkel's game is exactly what the rules of his game are; can we know when we break them? In terms of the outline just provided, it would seem that these rules consist in making descriptions of the operation of rationality as it occurs so that the warrant for these descriptions derives from the rationalities which they describe, rather than an idealised scientific rationality. Although this would be denied, much of Garfinkel's work comes down to what is usually called "naturalistic description", but with a specific "direction of interest". The Novelty of the work resides in the fact that it denies its status as a description as we usually understand the term, for while it describes courses of events, it is indifferent to their outcomes, so that the characterisation proposed as an account is itself what is "described", rather than referring to something 'behind' itself. Garfinkel sees this as empirical precisely insofar as the production displays the rationalities upon which it depends for its sense as an analytical transformation of its concrete nature. That is to say, it is the naturalness of naturalistic description which is the empirical object of his investigation. In this sense, Garfinkel's claim for the warrant of his analysis rests on an extremely ambivalent claim; while studies aim to display as they make use of the everyday rationalities upon which their studies depend for their sense, since there is
no remedy for the indexicality of such accounts, the possibility of deriving, say, a general theory of ways of speaking from such investigations is similarly subject to this constraint.

Think here, once again, of husserl's project; in talking about the meaning of other's conduct in this way, this talk is empirical precisely insofar as it is my production which is objective (concrete), that is to say, its objectivity resides in the fact that it displays the inter-subjective resources on which it depends for its sense, rather than stipulating them as features of reality external to the act of experience. In this talk, then, we have an avowedly uncritical view of the nature of reality which makes it impossible to be certain about any of its productions; the suspension of certainty is a natural consequence of this attitude. The question then becomes - what is the point of a game which suspends certainty in this way? If it aims to recommend uncritical description as all we can have of the practices of speaking, then it goes no further than wittgenstein's point that we must accept the form of life as the limit of our speech. It has also argued, however, for the diversity of justifications for the warrant of sensible speech; now, if sense making relies on such diversity, while it is surely the case that we must not be restricted by the scientific model of rationality in our evaluations of the speeches and actions of social actors, it is surely also the case that we must not be restricted by the authority of the mundane uses which actors employ; these are, as well as being the background to the facticity of the everyday world, surely also of different degrees of importance in the practices which actors follow in deciding upon the point of such speeches and actions. In his characterisation of chess, wittgenstein is pointing to the way in which different sets of rules may operate in the context of playing a language game, but that nevertheless, in understanding a game aright, we decide that some rules are more essential than others. The question becomes, for Garfinkel's project - how does it claim for its own project that it is more interesting, or more essential in an understanding of the constitution of meaning in everyday conduct?
Obviously, one of the ways in which it does this is to contrast its practices with those of constructivist sociology, in the characterisation of the regime of science to which it sees such sociology as necessarily subject; while 'we' take the attitude in terms of which everyday actions are sensible seriously, 'they' do not, and cannot. The claim is therefore advanced that the only way in which the phenomena of everyday conduct can be addressed which pays "serious" attention to its actual grounds is in terms of a programme of ethnomethodological studies. While 'we' cannot offer the same kinds of findings as constructivist sociology (that is to say, we cannot offer certain knowledge) the certainty toward which such sociology aims is illusory, in terms of our characterisation of the processes by which it produces its accounts; what is offered instead is the undoubtability of everyday rationalities, prefigured by the disclaimer of any attempt to decide their significance. If, here, meaning is a physiognomy, then it becomes the task of the theorist to grasp the significance of the face that is produced for the everyday world; (Wittgenstein was pointing out that we are led to seeing; how does ethnomethodology "lead" us?) Garfinkel has moved, then, from an acceptance of the necessity of categorial frameworks (and logical universals) in the constitution of social phenomena as objects to be accounted, pace Parsons, to the implication that if we are prepared to accept indifference to the significance of actions, we can therefore produce descriptions which exhibit the processes underlying any accounting. Parsons' account of sociological theorising is, thereby the ground of Garfinkel's project, in that sense; Parsons' account of the necessary features of sociological theorising provides for Garfinkel's differentiation of his project.

That Garfinkel can produce such accounts is provided for in the theoretical underpinning of his work; what remains to be decided is exactly what we should make of these accounts. I shall argue that Garfinkel fails to provide any compelling reasons for us to see the necessary demarcation of his project from sociological theorising, and that his conception of sociological theorising,
relying as it does on erecting irreconcilable barriers between the practices of scientific theorising and the practices of everyday rationalities, creates for itself no distinctive place as a theoretical project. What Garfinkel is arguing, essentially, is that unlike constructivist sociology, ethnomethodological studies will explain nothing, but will simply describe. The way in which everyday rationalities operate is not something which requires us to discover some new fact about it, but is rather a matter of seeing what we already know in a different way; (again, we are being led to 'see' in a certain way); explanation here means I think deductive-nomological accounting.

In a perfectly good sense, however, ethnomethodological descriptions do explain in leading us to see how we make sense, in a different light, in revealing how rationality is connected to the use of speech to accomplish meaning and order, we are grasping connections which illuminate processes, and this seems to be explanation in a perfectly recognisable sense. Such explanations are conceptual, rather than empirical however, for while it is true that the description produced is empirical, the problem which it addresses is not the adequacy (etc.,) of the account, but its relation to the rationality upon which it depends. The problem being addressed is that of how accounts are sensible for actors in the way that they are sensible. The description functions so as to illuminate an instance of the operation of commonsense rationality and cannot aim, in its own terms, at being an empirical description of the features of that rationality; such a description might only emerge on the basis of a huge amount of analysis, and could then only be an idealisation, since it depends itself on its topic to warrant its sensibility.

What, after all, is Garfinkel trying to do? He has said himself that his project is to "operate upon language and recover it from the table" (57). Like Wittgenstein's method of philosophy, the, ethnomethodology "leaves everything as it is" (or tries to); it is not concerned with correctives. But Garfinkel is also committed to the interest of his project as a means of investigation.
he is not, (like Wittgenstein), content to leave, as his project, the clearing up of confusions which arise in the practices of sociological or philosophical theorising, whether or not this is how his work could be seen. The investigative status of his work proceeds from his separation of the commonsense from the scientific attitudes, and their "irreconcilable" interests; that is to say for Garfinkel, the language games of science and everyday life are not only distinct from each other, but incommensurable; the criteria of one have no place in the understanding of the other. While Wittgenstein saw ordinary language usage as a constraint on the uses to which it could be put anywhere, since these often mislead, for Garfinkel science is not subject to the constraints of practical rationalities any more than practical rationalities operate as a constraint upon science, as an ideal practice. Thereby, the investigation of everyday rationalities involves practices which cannot bear upon science or scientific investigation except insofar as science itself can be seen as a social phenomenon, and thus taken as an object of investigation, and the scientific investigation of social phenomena cannot produce anything but idealisations of those phenomena which are warranted by the criteria which it employs, and thus do not have anything other than a limited sense in terms of the criteria employed in everyday rationalities.

Scientific sociology and ethnomethodological studies can thereby be said to produce irreconcilably different versions of the "same" phenomena; in terms of his own logic, Garfinkel cannot stipulate for one account over another. Choice between them must be made in terms of the investigative purposes of the theorist, but it is a choice which must be made, for it is not the case that they can be compared.

But, we would want to say, surely we do compare? In the case of science, we compare how the accounts which it produced of, say, physical phenomena, fit in with our everyday experience of those phenomena. Meteorologists refer to high or low pressure zones, and derive from this predictions about the weather, while
we do not search the skies for isobars, surely it is the case that we can be brought to see the connections between the two attitudes? This argument resembles that, discussed in the last chapter, by Winch (see below). Now, while Garfinkel may claim that the two enterprises can be brought under the auspices of distinctive sets of rules, to make such a hard distinction between those rules as to make their products incommensurable with each other is to impose onto the practices of natural language communities a rigidity which is surely not borne out by experience. Clearly, it is the case that members operate with different sets of rules of relevance in their uses of language, according to the context within which these are employed. For Garfinkel to claim that the scientific and the commonsense rationalities are incommensurable is like saying that the statements which they make "really" mean only what the rules to which members attend under the auspices of the (mutually exclusive) different attitudes can possibly intend them to mean. Given the principle of indexicality, the meaning of statements does not reside in pre-existing rules laid down for the actors before they enter into a situation but rather, such pre-existing conventions are the background against which the accomplishment of such meaning gets done.

Fundamentally, what we have here is a solution to the problem involved in reconciling conflicting descriptions; operating with the Kantian requirement for categorical frameworks to any description in mind, Garfinkel reformulates the problem of description so that, rather than holding individuals responsible to the requirements of scientific frameworks, we attempt to take seriously the actual frameworks which members employ as they categorise. Thus, the justification for the descriptions produced resides in our status as speakers of a natural language, or a variety of natural languages (the games of everyday life). The implicit assertion is that, when we produce accounts of how the structure of everyday conduct is sensible to us, while we must leave out of consideration the adequacy of its sense as a formulation, because this sense IS the objective order which
the conduct comes to, in the description we have a display of the grammatical resources upon which any sense depends, in this case. The criterial ascription of sense to our experience of the phenomena involved depends upon the possibility of other ascriptions being possible. Thus, Garfinkel is pointing to the fact that our practices of making sense enable us to have knowledge because it is conceivable for us to see the descriptions which we produce having sense other than that which we give to them, not because they could only make sense in the way that we propose. His characterisation depends upon the criteria which we employ to justify the descriptions which we produce of the conduct of others, not upon the subjective experience of others' conduct as a phenomenon of his experience. Thus, his descriptions, and any others, would be responsible to the grammatical structures which govern the justifiable ascription of meaning in the context in question, rather than being justified by the certainty of Garfinkel's (or any theorist's) subjective experience, since certainty (and knowledge) is only available of phenomena in terms of grounds, which can only be available inter-subjectively. The principle of indifference, then, locates such grounds in the grammatical structures of natural language games, so that knowledge of the objective features of the structures of practical actions is knowledge of the grounds (criteria) upon which the ascription of sense to such actions depends, and the certainty of such structures depends upon there being other possibilities for sense ascription in those grounds which are not, in fact, used, although we could conceive of them being employed. Certainty and knowledge here has, then, the same kind of warrant as that of any other account, no more or no less. That is to say, it is assessable in terms of the criteria which make it sensible, and only this supplies it with its warrant, and not its invocation of some other grounding (say, as an instance of 'science').

This involves Garfinkel, at the same time, in putting aside the possibility of comparison, for the purposes of something like a scientific project, as I hope we have seen, while Garfinkel's descriptions may be empirical (and hence
explanatory), as conceptual investigations, their justification rests upon the resources of the everyday rationalities in terms of which the 'empirical' objects of their investigation make sense. To develop cumulative knowledge of such a corpus, however, must involve reference to a rationality which is other than that which is employed in the language games of everyday life. Think here of the characterisations of rationality 10-14 below. In short, while Garfinkel can propose knowledge which is grounded in the rationalities of everyday life, rather than the scientific attitude, to develop a corpus of such knowledge depends upon grounds which are available within the scientific attitude, and not in terms of his definition, the everyday attitude. The distinctiveness of ethnomethodological studies from constructivist sociology resides in its indifference to the significance etc., of the talk and action which it investigates; that it cannot be indifferent to the significance etc., of its own talk is a requirement on any body of statements which aims to establish its claims to theoreticity. The claim to theoreticity in the case of ethnomethodology does not depend upon a different kind of practice from conventional (constructivist) sociology,

but depends upon such practices. Critically, Garfinkel has proposed, as his project, a description and empirical investigation of the structures upon which everyday conduct depends for its orderliness; now, while the description of experience as an orderliness certainly functions in much the same way as the description of an object, it is nonetheless not the same as the description of an object; rather, it is parasitic upon the description of the objects of which it is made up, logically, for it depends upon concepts of the objects of which it is taken to be a perception. Garfinkel is right to tie this to the rationalities upon which it depends for its sense, for its justification resides in the grammar of the natural language of the members concerned. A further consequence of this, however, is that while it can ask "How is the talk orderly (sensible) for members in the way that they take it to be?" it makes no sense for it to attempt to go beyond accounts which produce warrants from
manifested display of (competent) mastery of relevant natural language uses. As I hope I have shown, the structures which Garfinkel intends as the objects of his descriptions (or rather, which it is the objective of his descriptions to describe or show) are available only in the grammar of ordinary language games, (in Garfinkel's terms, the rationalities of the everyday attitude). Sense is justified by criteria which are its warrant, in the competent use of natural language.

The terms "rule" and "rationality" seem to do the same kind of work for Wittgenstein and Garfinkel respectively. In Wittgenstein's work, however, we find (albeit in a piecemeal form) a more drawn out account of exactly how rule functions - how rule "rules". This involves the notion of criteria, and of "criterial" relations of justification between elements of the inter-subjectively available rules of the language game (corpus of knowledge) available to a (competent) native language speaker (member).

Before we introduce this term into our account of the relation between language and the world, I propose to look at some of the ways in which Wittgenstein discussed its relevance.

Now, in Wittgenstein's terms, criteria consist in a variety of possible phenomena. On the one hand, he describes a phenomenon as the defining criterion of a thing (58). "All sorts of phenomena are used as criteria for his seeing that (59)"; "What is our criterion for blindness? A certain kind of behaviour (60). "One must examine what sort of facts we call criteria for a pain" (61) Those things which have criteria include phrases (62), words (63), expressions (64), concepts (65), states of affairs and propositions; facts, as well as being themselves criteria are also said to "have" them. (66)

Hacker suggests that we conceive of the criterial relation, in Wittgenstein's treatment, as resulting in entities specified in the material mode as being derivatively so specified, since the criterial relation is a grammatical or
logical relation, and so is to be thought of as holding between linguistic entities, as a matter of linguistic convention. However, while this permits one to speak of states, processes and events as having criteria, and of phenomena, kinds of behaviour, characteristics as being criteria in the material mode, this is merely equivalent to the formal way of speaking of words, phrases and expressions as having criteria, and of sentences, propositions, evidences or grounds as being criteria. (67) He goes on to argue that this kind of relation, while it is evidential, is to be distinguished from a necessary and sufficient condition; thus, while the criteria in terms of which the sense of an account would be justified may be satisfied, it must remain possible that other conceptions could be entertained.

We can see then, how Garfinkel's characterisation of his enterprise trades on this duality; while the relation is evidential (between Garfinkel's account and the justification of it in terms of everyday rationality), it is not the case that we can hold up this evidentiality as a necessary and sufficient condition, since it is perfectly possible for subject to pretend, or lie, or be deceived. The criterial relation is then, a conventional relation, in a strong sense, the truth of assertions couched in terms of criterial justifications, or the sense of accounts, is only partially specified by this relation. Nothing particularly objectionable in this.

However, Wittgenstein also goes on to distinguish criteria from the notion of a symptom; that is to say, rather than seeing the criterial relation as one of inductive evidence, Wittgenstein argues that when we cite, as evidence for our statements, that which is "coincided, in some way or another with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion" (69) (for instance, falling barometric pressure and rainfall), this involves adducing inductive evidence, whereas the criterial relation is a matter of linguistic force or convention. Thus, while "Nothing is commoner than for the meaning of an expression to oscillate, for a phenomenon
to be regarded sometimes as a symptom, sometimes as a criterion of a state of affairs" (Z para 438) (for instance, in science) the concommitant fluctuation in the sense of an expression, and the radical and natural indeterminacy of the sense of language do not prevent science from being possible, even though we might be led to say that science uses words which have no clear demarcation between what is symptom and what criterion. What is interesting in terms of Garfinkel's notion of science, however, is that, as he explicitly argues, while science involves constructing an account so that it remains in full accord with the rules governing scientifically correct decisions, with clear and distinct elements arranged so as to clarify both the body of knowledge of which science consists and the methodological procedures which accomplish this, so that what is produced is in full accord with the preceding body of scientific knowledge, in terms of the assumptions on which its steps are based, for Wittgenstein, while the practice of taking measurable phenomena as the defining criteria of an expression may often result in qualitative criteria becoming replaced by quantitative, where the shift of meaning is noticed, this merely generates the illusion of a discovery of the 'real meaning' of the term, since what is involved is not the discovery of 'real meaning', but a change in the sense of the terms involved; with the replacement of non-measurable phenomena by measurable ones as the criteria for the application of a term, the non-measurable phenomena may become symptom, with the consequence that the terms change their sense. While, for Garfinkel, science operates with a methodological self-consciousness which is excluded from the attitude of everyday life, for Wittgenstein what is excluded from science is the possibility of its terms having the kind of specificity which is much more readily available in the language games of everyday life, although this makes no difference to the practice of science, but is rather merely a necessary feature of the conditions under which it is conducted.

That is to say, rather than it being a problem for science to deal with the phenomena of everyday life, a problem which Garfinkel attributes to the
differences between the rationalities employed, for Wittgenstein, it is rather
that science is a problem for the language games of everyday life to deal with,
since it exemplifies in an extreme form, the endemic shifting of meaning embodied
in the fluctuation between symptom and criterion which is a feature of all natural
language practices. Criterial rules are tailored, Wittgenstein argues, for
natural conditions, but what those conditions are is always a matter to be
decided when they do or do not arise; while one may learn how to use an expression
under certain conditions, the description of those conditions is not equivalent
to a criterion of knowing what the expression means; in this sense, language is
naturally indeterminate. There is no single ideal of exactness or precision.
While we may make concepts more precise or refined for technical purposes, these
standards are relative to the purposes for which they are employed, so that
precision or imprecision may impair conceptual usages for different purposes.
There is never a final list of criteria, and the circumstances in which they may
be employed covers an indeterminate range.

To recap, then; Garfinkel argued for the distinctive place of ethnomethodological
studies on the basis of his formulation of the irreconcilable interests of the
scientific and the everyday attitudes, in the rationalities which justify their
practices. The phenomena of everyday conduct as the products of actors operating
within a distinctively different attitude to that of scientific theorising
could only become available as the product of systematic reconstitution of such
conduct on the basis of rationalities actually employed by members, including
the investigator, as speakers of natural language. Investigators accounts, then,
display the features of natural language which make the conduct available in the
way that it is ordered (warranted) by the talk in which speakers of the natural
language community concerned participate as competent members.

I have argued that, while Garfinkel can aim to produce such accounts, their status
as accounts is warranted only in terms of their place within some language game
themself. If their only warrant is to be the language games which they take as topic, then they can have sense only as a display of reflexivity within the language game concerned; as studies, they can have sense only if they abjure the distinction between criteria and symptom, so that the order which they investigate becomes objective (undoubtable) in exactly the way in which their initial precepts deny. I have further argued that Garfinkel's work depends upon sociology, although it claims to differentiate itself from sociology, and that the key principle in terms of which it differentiates itself is the principle of indifference. Proceeding from the principle that there is no necessary ideal embodied in the practices of science which would substantiate its claims to greater exactness or precision except for specific technical purposes, Garfinkel thereby concludes that indifference to such technical ends is a sufficient warrant for a practice which aims to investigate the conduct of everyday life, since this is how everyday actors proceed, and we are all subject to such constraints as are provided by natural language.

Wittgenstein discusses games in the following way:

"... such that whoever begins can always win by a particular simple trick. But this has not been realised - so it is a game. Now someone draws our attention to it - and it stops being a game. What turn can I give this, to make it clear to myself? For I want to say 'and it stops being a game', not: 'and now we see it wasn't a game'. That means, I want to say, it can also be taken like this; the other man did not draw our attention to anything; he taught us a different game in place of our own. But how can the new game have made the old one obsolete? We now see something different, and can no longer naively go on playing. On the one hand the game consisted in our actions (our play) on the board; and these actions I could perform as well now as before. But on the other hand it was essential to the game that I blindly tried to win; and now I can no longer do that." (70)

The essence of Garfinkel's claim for the distinctive place of ethnomethodology resides in his claim that, in showing us a new game, he is making the old practices obsolete; that is to say, we can no longer regard the phenomena of
everyday life as 'taken for granted', or rather as to be simply taken for
granted. It is a further consequence of Wittgenstein's argument, however,
that while the game stops being a game for those who have been shown the new
trick, it still remains as a game for those who have not. This is to say that
our ATTITUDE to the game is an essential part of its character. Now, while
Garfinkel can claim to remain faithful to the rationalities which ground every­
day conduct in the descriptions which he produces of how that conduct is orderly,
it is an essential point of the new game that it can no longer remain naive
about the purposes of such conduct. It is not a question of indifference, but
rather, what are the purposes to which such an attitude could be put?

At the beginning of this chapter, I included a section on Parsons' concept of
theorising, where he argued for the necessity of conceptual schemes in any
ordering of (social) phenomena. I have concluded that Garfinkel's project
involves attempting to remain indifferent to the purposes in terms of which
such schemes are employed in order to make their employment available as a
phenomenon in its own right. It is a consequence of Garfinkel's endorsement of
Parsons' characterisation of theorising that such a practice is possible, but
it is also consequential upon this endorsement that such practices cannot form
the data for any distinctively different form of theorising than sociology, for
it is subject to the same restraints in its attempts to build up concepts,
findings, models, theories etc. Science does not only aim to generalise, explain,
measure, etc., on the basis of a different language game than that of everyday
life, but rather, its language game proceeds from the same grounds as the
language games of everyday life, and develops possibilities within those lang­
uage games for specific technical purposes, but it both acts upon and is acted
upon by, the language games of everyday life. Ethnomethodological studies are
parasitic upon sociological language games in the same way; it is itself only
conceivable as a practice in the context of its place within the family of
games involving sociological theorising. The notion of a finding, in ethno-
methodology could only have any application in terms of a general rule about what such a finding could be for; for ethnomethodology to produce accounts assumes that these accounts would be produced for specific purposes.

Where, in Garfinkel's work, do we find a specification of such purposes? While the work is concerned to recommend itself, its task, as interesting for its own sake, and of no relevance for the practices of constructivist sociology, we might ask - for whom could the accounts have relevance, as productions aimed at an audience? As competent members of the same natural language community, it might be expected that the everyday actor, whom the investigator makes his topic, would be interested; however, what would be the purpose of directing such accounts at this audience? To make them self-conscious is to destroy the attitude which investigators are committed to preserve, ie., methodically unreflexive action. Conduct is within the everyday attitude precisely insofar as it operates without this self-conscious methodological reflection. Presumable the investigator is not producing the work simply for its own sake, for in that case, why should it be produced at all, since without an intended audience, it is a moving cog which does no work.

Rather, I want to argue, the only audience for which ethnomethodological studies could have any significance is precisely that which it proposes to be indifferent to - that of sociological theorising. The cost of this is that, for ethnomethodological studies to have any audience, it must surrender its claim to distinctive epistemological grounds.

Parsons and Garfinkel both take as their avowed aim the investigation of the structure which is a feature of social orderliness. For Parsons, this structure exists in the relations between the elements which form the framework of any analytic account, produced on the basis of empirical criteria, which adequately describes the phenomena in question. This is taken, by both Parsons and Garfinkel, as meaning that any sociological account of such structures necessarily idealises
what everyday members take to be the facts of the social world. While Parsons, however, strictly delimits the relation between the analytical elements of the structure so that they must be responsible to the empirical features of the world known in common to everyday actors (i.e., warranted by the rationalities to which such actors attend), he also makes clear that the theory exists in the relation between the elements, so that the meaning of the terms is not specifiable in terms of the criteria employed to warrant the everyday world which it describes.

For Garfinkel, structure in everyday conduct is the work manifested in the employment of what he calls, pace Mannheim, the documentary method of interpretation; while conventional sociology sees itself, often, as seeing through appearances, the subjects of sociological inquiry are concerned with:

"coming to terms with a situation in which factual knowledge of social structures - factual in the sense of warranted grounds for further inference and actions - must be assembled and made available for potential use despite the fact that the situations it purports to describe are, in any calculable sense, unknown; in their actual and intended logical structures are essentially vague; and are modified, elaborated, extended, if not indeed created, by the fact and manner of being addressed." (71)

Precisely those problems are involved, Garfinkel argues, in any sociological theorist deciding the reasonableness of his definitions and decisions about correspondences between observed appearances and intended events. There is no decisive difference, he argues, between the use of "reasonableness" in the warrant of sociological findings and its employment in the world of everyday actors; both call upon the use of their accounts to provide a context of interpretation, within which they are sensible. Sociological findings are facts only in the sense that they subscribe to a set of procedural rules that actually govern the use of sociology's recommended methods and asserted findings as grounds of further inference and inquiries; findings refers to:

"the set of sociological events that are possible when, under the assumption of the sociological and mathematical domains corresponding in their logical structures, socio-
logical events are interpreted in terms of the rules of statistical inference". (72)

Garfinkel recommends that the work of seeking the structure of everyday situations of choice lies between the rigorous description of physical and biological properties of social events (measurement) and using documentary work merely to attempt to reconstitute in commonsense terms, what the action has 'come to' (the "soft part") (73). Structure is thereby the work that subjects do to make the context available as an order. As an investigator's construct, such a structure is analytically available in its relation to the talk which gives it warrant.

Whereas for Parsons the meaning of its terms are recoverable only in terms of the empirical world (commonsense rationalities) since these are what the terms analytically correspond to, for Garfinkel, the meaning of his terms is directly recoverable from its corresponding reference in the material world. For Parsons, structure is a feature of analysis which is warranted by symptoms; for Garfinkel, structure is a feature of natural language which is warranted by criteria. The distinctiveness of ethnomethodology can be reduced, then, to the indifference to the analytic availability of structure, which could only be produced with specific purposes (see Parsons, above) in mind, and would hence be responsible to sociology as a theorising practice, in favour of a realist, naturalistic acceptance of the authority of the everyday world which is in its own terms, unable to provide any account of the meaning of its practices outside of an appeal to competence - "anyone would know it" or "I speak English".

Parsons is quite clear, however, that commonsense cannot provide any useful account of social phenomena, for it focusses on the practical tasks which are the everyday concern of people facing mundane reality; science on the other hand, because it operates on a level where meaning is radically indeterminate, struggles to locate its own grounds by being conscious of its methodological principles. The discovery of scientific knowledge can be said to proceed from
the radical indeterminacy of the meaning of scientific concepts, for the novel substitutions which science makes between criterial and symptomatic evidences for sense extend and transform our understanding of the world. It could be argued that the radical indeterminacy of the sense of scientific concepts is a necessary condition, given the critical role of indeterminacy in the practices of natural language games, and the peculiar place of science as a 'special' game. I cannot here explore the arguments for and against science as a means of accounting the social world; the more modest purpose of this work is to examine some of the issues raised by the practices involved in the speaking of natural languages for sociological theorising, and it seems to me a task that might require a searching examination of the extent to which science is peripheral to natural language.

Indeed, we might see Garfinkel's project as proposing the un-naturalness of scientific language as precisely that which prevents it from dealing with everyday conduct satisfactorily. I think that Wittgenstein shows that, while science is dealing with the world in ways which have an inherent tendency towards proposing themselves as transcendent, undoubtable, in fact this tendency proceeds from the practices of natural language games, so that science itself is to be seen as an extension of the practices of natural language, rather than a totally separate realm.

Now, although we cannot finally leave aside the place of science in the explanation of social phenomena, here the issue is rather can we simply describe the practices by which members make their conduct orderly and sensible if we leave aside judgments about its purposes? This seems to me to conflate a number of other questions; how is a description not an explanation? And how can we avoid judgment? For Garfinkel, a description does not involve any assumption about its faithfulness to presupposed patterns of interpretation; thus, his descriptions only function as descriptions if we do not impose on them the demand to be taken literally. The avoidance of judgment therefore refers not to the practices which have produced the account, but to how it is to be interpreted by its audience.
Ethnomethodological studies, in terms of their own requirements, then, can only seek to provide insight into the relations between the (concrete) practices which display the use of members' competences as speakers of natural language, and the (analytic) order which is the product of such practices in particular contexts. But this insight is only available in terms of a prior commitment to a particular vision of its phenomena as available analytically only in the way in which the theoretical framework from which the descriptions proceed stipulates; in Garfinkel's case, this framework is thoroughly sociological. Essentially, the framework proceeds from a vision of subject as member. His requirement is not that we should refuse to view the phenomena of social life sociologically, but that in the case of pre-constitutive phenomena, such a vision should not be tied to the logic of scientific inference. The status of his findings therefore hangs on the possibility of the logic of sociological theorising being different from that of science.

For Garfinkel, this possibility is provided for in the ongoing nature of ethnomethodological studies (74). Given the essentially sociological nature of its primary categorisation devices, however, it seems to me consequential in Garfinkel's work that the significance of his findings will not turn out to be assessable except in terms of its relation to a framework already available within sociological theorising. Like Wittgenstein's notion of the fluctuation between symptom and criterion in scientific language games, Garfinkel's descriptions cannot be specified as meaning exactly this or that, but what their use will be cannot wait upon some decisive criteria in terms of which such a meaning might be specified, for such criteria could never be available. It is not decisive one way or the other that we must rely on some criteria other than those of scientific theorising to make the phenomena of everyday conduct available as phenomena, for what the criteria of science might be is not something which can be finally decided, since these are subject to change in their relation to other language games.
The real question is rather what can the criteria of the sociological language game be found to be? Here, the promise of Parsons, and his gargantuan project displays the right spirit, but founders on epistemological problems (75). Now, the discovery of such criteria has been taken by some theorists as the project of making sociological knowledge into one kind of thing - that is, finding the essential features of sociological knowledge (not knowledge of society, but what it is to seek such knowledge). This, in a way, can be re-written as a search for the rules of the sociological language game. Parsons has proposed such rules on the basis of a Kantian solution to the problem of validity - the necessary existence of logical categories - and the analytic relation between explanatory schema and empirical reality. He is subject, however, to the accusations of conditionality to which any theory positing the social determination of knowledge leaves itself open. On a deep level, Garfinkel's account of the indexical nature of talk refers to the inherent process of conventionalisation which must be a condition for any communication to be possible, with the concommitant conditionality of any statements produced under this rubric. This has been responded to, typically, with the demand (either) that sociological analysis be reflexive, which is to say conscious of its locatedness, or else (in Garfinkel's case, for instance) abandon any claims to produce knowledge which is other than that which is grounded in particular frameworks of value relevance, whether these are explicated (Garfinkel) or not (constructivist sociology). Before turning to consider the problems of reflexivity and value, I propose to talk a little about the features of the Sociology of Knowledge objections to claim to truth. In the context of the present chapter, this will, I hope, illuminate my commitment to sociological theorising as a practice in which the principles which it displays cannot be reduced to a set of methodological rules, but comprises rather of a responsibility to a community of practitioners faced, like any other, with the practical problems of dealing with the problem of a trans-communal world, and the ideals in terms of which that world is to be considered.
The Sociology of Knowledge

Much of the discussion so far has concerned the problems facing those who set themselves to characterise sociology as necessarily proceeding from certain principled limitations; Winch has argued for the power of convention, Weider for the irremediability of indexicality in language uses, Garfinkel for particular uses of rationality in sense assembly, Parsons for the necessary employment of analytic frameworks employing logical universals. This section is concerned with the task of drawing out what, in a way, could be seen as an amalgamation of those issues, into a specification of theorising as always the product of particular purposes and specific value orientations such that any of its claim to knowledge must be remitted as partial, biased, located, historicised, distorted ideological and so on. This perspective, although it has classical antecedents, and has been a powerful influence throughout the history of western thought, is associated primarily with the work of Karl Mannheim in sociology. (76)

Mannheim proceeds from the position that it is possible to ask sociological questions about thought, it is a problem which confronts anyone dealing with history to account for the way in which the concepts which are employed, while having specific uses within the cultural practices of one period, become redundant, or transformed, in other times. In the face of this question, social scientists must relinquish their concern with epistemological problems to confront the problem of a:

"maximally radical structural analysis of the problems which may be raised in a given epoch, and analysis which not only informs outsiders about what is going on in research, but points out the ultimate choices faced by the cultural scientist in the course of his work, the tensions in which he lives and which influence his thinking consciously or unconsciously. Such an analysis of the work going on in the cultural sciences will give us the most fundamental characterisation of the intellectual situation prevailing in our time." (77)

Though is at once, he argues, self transcendent and self relativising. (78)

"Self transcendence and self relativisation of thought consist in the fact that individual thinkers, and still more the dominant outlook of a given epoch, far from
according primacy to thought, conceive of thought as something subordinate to other, more comprehensive factors - whether as their emanation, their expression, their concommitance or in general as something conditioned by something else."

"(Note)" What we mean by 'self relativisation' is by no means epistemological relativism, but merely the opposite of autonomy. One may very well assert that thought is 'relative to being', non autonomous, 'dependent on being' 'part of a whole reaching beyond it' without professing any relativism concerning the truth value of its findings. At this point, it is, so to speak, still open whether the existential relativisation of thought is to be combined epistemological relativism or not; ..... We definitely prefer a relativism which accentuates the difficulty of its task by calling attention to all those moments which tend to make the propositions actually discoverable at any given time, partial and situationally conditioned - we prefer such a relativism to an absolutism which loudly proclaims as a matter of principle, the absoluteness of its own position or of truth in itself, but is in fact no less partial than any of its adversaries - and still worse, is utterly incapable of tackling with its epistemological apparatus the problems of the temporal and situational determination of any concrete process of thought completely overlooking the way in which this situational conditioning enters into the structure and evolution of knowledge." (79)

The self relativisation of thought escapes from the vicious circle of self invalidation by conceiving thought as a mere partial phenomenon belonging to a more comprehensive factor within the totality of the world process. On the one hand, one may maintain that thought is merely the medium of expression rather than the ultimate cognitive constitution of objects; thus, beginning with the conviction that thought neither constitutes objects nor grasps ultimately real matters of fact, it can be seen as the expression of extra theoretically constituted and warranted beliefs (the realm of the Ideal, in Platonism). These ultimate philosophical principles transcend changes in the systems, since they are not subject to theoretical refutation.

From a sociological and historical standpoint, the relativisation of theoretical thought may involve relations between specific entities and the thought on which they are said to depend (mystical consciousness, religion, and empirical sphere such as the biological or social system).
"In all these cases, the factor on which thought is said to depend is contrasted with it as Being, and the contrast between Thought and Being is worked out philosophically following the model of Greek Philosophy. In most such systems Being appears as a whole, in contrast to thought as a mere part; and it is often assumed that in order to grasp Being one needs a supra-rational organ (i.e., intuition) or a higher form of cognition (i.e., dialectical as against reflective knowledge)." (80)

This is, he notes, decidedly not a modern phenomenon; Mannheim locates, however, the possibility of truly relativising knowledge with, rather than simply a theoretical possibility, "what is needed is a whole constellation of mental and practical tendencies" (81); with the shift from the dominance of the religious systematisation of ideas to the Enlightenment period, with its preparations for the coming Bourgeois revolution, the systematic as well as the sociological core of this oppositional science was formed around an opposition to theology and metaphysics. With the French revolution, we see a new way of depreciating ideas which was later to be reflectively expressed in the ideas of Marxism. This approach seeks to "disintegrate" ideas rather than simply refute, negate or call them in doubt.

This is the distinction between denying the truth of an idea and determining the function it exercises; the denial of truth still puts itself on the same footing as the idea; the theoretical basis for the idea is the same for the refutation. When the question of its truth or falsity is not even raised, however, then the extra theoretical purposes of the idea, its practical effectiveness is destroyed.

This unmasking is thereby not an attack on the moral existence of the persons concerned; while 'lie' refers to the relation between real existence and mental objects, 'error' is a theoretical category in this instance, referring rather to the relation between theoretical systems and their relation to reality. This is an attack rather on an impersonal socio-intellectual force, to bring to light an unconscious process, to destroy the social efficacy of ideas by unmasking the function they serve.

Mannheim's point here is that this is a modern phenomenon, coming about for specific historical reasons, with its roots in the desire to transcend immanent theoretical
meaning in practical existence. Now, the absolute towards which such a trend aspires, as he argues, an aspiration which requires to be understood against the background of, on the one hand, its formulation by anti-metaphysical positivism as a certain complex lifted out of the totality of the given and "like any other metaphysic", hypostatised as an ontological absolute, and on the other, formulated by the idealist-historicist tradition, the need to grasp ideas as mutually interdependent parts of a systemic totality, rather than in isolation, so that only now can the specific problematic of the sociology of knowledge, the confrontation of worlds with worlds, be developed.

While the contributions of positivism and a priori formalism (Kantianism) he takes to be in the constitution of the problem, the critical ongoing concern with this problem may be found to be between phenomenological and historicist approaches.

The phenomenological approach (which he discusses via the work of Max Scheler) sees as its basic problem the relation between theoretical and extra-theoretical factors; the need to distinguish between factual and essential, timeless and temporal, to seek to ascertain the timeless characteristics of the mind of man. This rejects the epistemological doctrines of positivism, and sees instead in metaphysical knowledge both "an eternal postulate of reason and a practical possibility". (82) This depends upon separation of sub-structure (composed of psychological drives) from superstructure (cultural products), in the relation of whole to part, such that in their inseparable unity, certain ideal configurations can only occur in conjunction with certain real configurations and vice versa. This approach cannot develop a historical theory because it seeks to explain timeless characteristics of man, and as such, can only posit the interaction of real and cultural factors on the basis of the exhibition of general principles of succession, rather than the concrete unique temporal phases which such a theory would require.

Here, we find Mannheim discussing the differences between the kinds of sociology which are possible; the need to develop laws, he argues continues the tradition of
natural science, regarding the historical individual as merely a complex of general, changelessly recurring properties, disregarding all that is not subsumed within their characterisation. The opposite tendency, which he traces back to the philosophy of history proceeds in the opposite direction. It considers historical individualities - both personality and any "historical constellation" - as the necessary object of investigation. Rather than seeing the individual as a combination of abstractly distilled, unchanging characteristics, the individual is to be determined by the characteristics and partial factors which are apprehended without mediation by general properties, in much the same way as a face is grasped by apprehending the "unique centre of an expression, and the eyes, mouth and other features characterised in the light of this central insight.

He notes;

"The school in question holds that this method, spontaneously employed in everyday life, has its application in science also, and has indeed been unconsciously used by scientists; it is high time, then, to fix the methodological character of this type of knowledge. For it is not the case that the 'centre of expression', the particular physiognomy of a situation, the unique evolutionary line exhibited by a sequence of events can be grasped only by intuition and cannot be objectified scientifically or communicated. All such insight into wholes can be translated into controllable scientific knowledge ...." (83)

In terms of general limits, then, the responses to the problem of conditionality can be seen as falling into 2 camps; if we accept the framework within which sociology comes into being as an oppositional science, it seems that the attempt to provide, in the tradition of natural science, general laws about the relations between concrete historical epochs founders upon the need to relate these to essential qualities of the mind of man; on the other hand, the grasping of how such uniqueness comes into being in the concrete situations within which meaning is realised is faced with the problem of relating any proposed supra-temporal unity of man in terms of on the one hand, the essentialist vision upon which this must be based, to the concrete multiplicity which the facts of human existence comprises. These are the very limits which Parsons and Garfinkel exemplify in their work;
Garfinkel can be seen as responding to the programme outlined by Mannheim above, while Parsons struggles with Scheler's problem in reconciling the need for formal frameworks with which to deal with laws and general principles, with the requirement to grasp the concreteness of the social worlds to which these laws and systems might putatively be applied. How, in Mannheim's terms, are these requirements to be reconciled?

Mannheim posits a new conception of the correlation between idea and reality; unlike the Platonist, who sees reality or realisation as secondary to the pre-existence of models and ideas, Mannheim posits reality as the condition under which the meaning of any such ideas can only be available; the separation of Being and Meaning which occurs as we seek to analyse the relation between them in the social genesis of ideas is only a "provisional device"; discomfort arises from the attempt to treat the products of such separation as faithful to the essential unity from which they proceed, either from a positivist or an idealist standpoint. Rather, if we abandon the search for phenomenological difference between real and ideal factors, and see this nexus as instead subordinate to the genetic unity of historic process, we begin to treat our existence as interpreting subjects seriously. That is to say, as existing human beings, we have immediate experience of our existence and it is here that real factors are converted into mental data. However, it is our experience which makes of the 'natural' world that which we treat within the mental realm; that is to say, the relationship is between 2 spheres of the mental rather than a radical disjunction between the mental and the natural (which we can only know through the mental); the substructure-superstructure relation can be said to exist between the 'milieu', those categories of meaning in which the human being lives with the greatest intensity, and his actions. Mannheim conceives of the Millieu as being primarily on the model of "the conditions of production, together with all concomitant social relationships". (84) Rather than accepting the immanent logic of meaning in the mental world, Mannheim proposes rather that the actually possible in the historical world be given precedence over the 'horizon of possibilities' inherent in the theoretic realm of ideas. Thus:
"It seems to be generally overlooked that the subject studying and understanding history can look at the latter from various standpoints, which make a considerable existential difference. Thus, it makes a great difference whether one surveys products of the mind retrospectively as finished products or rather tries to re-enact the process of their creation. In our opinion, however, it is a mistake to adopt the retrospective standpoint, and to try to account for the structure of genesis in terms of the actual as an accomplished fact, when dealing with problems of a metaphysic of the genetic process. (On the other hand, the problem of the standpoint of the subject in studying history is not the same as the problem of standpoints in the theory of historicism. All historicism teaches a determination of thinking by the standpoint of the thinker, but such historicist theories may have a conservative or progressive slant, depending on whether they are conceived from a retrospective or 'in statu nascendi' standpoint.)" (85)

"Only those who focus their attention exclusively upon the actual, upon the finished product cut off from all functional relationships within the genetic process, can have the impression that what happened was the realisation of something pre-existent, of a self-contained, absolute entity." (86)

While both what is accessible to us of the essential intuitions of past epochs, and how they become accessible to us, depends upon our standpoint, Mannheim proposes that there is a disjunction between scientific thought and philosophical thought, so that science completes just one and the same system during successive periods, but the latter starts from new centres of systematization in every epoch in trying to master the increasing multiplicity of the historical world. In science, meanings do not change, while in philosophy and the cultural sciences they do. (87) Thus the necessity for a dynamic approach is provided for in the necessity of regarding the products of distinctive historical epochs in the realm of philosophical and cultural ideas, as only available in their real being in the epoch in question, and as being controls on succeeding perspectival views of their meaning; at the same time, the fact that we accept such controls is taken by Mannheim as indicative of our subscription to some core conceptions of what it is for productions to exercise this control. Facts, for positivism came to have a carefree, unqualified, character; this was based on a naive metaphysical and epistemological position. However, Mannheim argues, while cultural and historical sciences can be more self conscious about their grounds,
this should not lead them to ignore what was important in positivist thought, and marked 'real progress'. This he takes to be the "metaphysical intention" of positivism that is to consider the ontological realm as 'this-worldly', immanent, rather than transcendent. Thus, we cannot conceive of any metaphysical entities which lie outside of an essential contact with that realm of experience which for us represents the ultimate reality of the world.

While metaphysics cannot be eliminated from our world conception, and metaphysical categories are indispensable for the interpretation of the historical and the intellectual world, it is not the case that factual knowledge and essential knowledge represent 2 separated different forms of knowledge. For Mannheim, essential knowledge "goes farther in the same direction than factual knowledge sets out." (88). We move from factual knowledge through to intuition of essences. The duality of fact and essence is parallel to that of historical science and the philosophy of history. What Mannheim is proposing is that the philosophy of history is subject to the guiding influence of the central elements of empirical science, such that:

"We are somehow guided by a 'plan', an 'intelligible framework' of history whenever we put the seemingly most isolated particular fact into a context." (89)

The assumption is thereby made that the orderliness of historical development is related to the stability of scientific systems of meaning. While these are different, qualitatively and hierarchically, they cannot be separated, for this makes knowledge merely a matter of revelation. It is precisely the relation between the empirical, scientific treatment of problems and the metaphysical, philosophical standpoint of the investigator which is in question. For Mannheim, such an investigation is only possible in the metaphysical assumption of the meaningfulness of the process of development; the relativisation of all accounts then becomes an acceptable condition, since it locates itself within the possibility of aspiring towards truth as part of the dynamic process of "attempts to account for the whole of reality" which is an inherent tendency of all human
thought. **Relativism is not to be overcome by a jump, by the proclamation of solution, but by accepting both the changes of history and the dynamic nature of our and all accounts within that history; "one's own standpoint, though relative, constitutes itself in the element of truth". (90)**

In terms of the present discussion, Mannheim's formulation of the problem of the sociology of knowledge draws out the parameters within which the work of the theorists under consideration is to be viewed. So far, we have seen that the twin requirements of constructing theoretical accounts of social behaviour, and remaining faithful to the properties of natural language as it is used to make the social world orderly and meaningful to subject and sociological investigator produced responses which confront contradictory requirements; so far it has seemed that the nature of the problems faced can only lead to reliance, on the one hand, on the technical exactitude but semantic indefiniteness of science, on the one hand, and on the interpretive competence but technical uselessness of natural language or commonsense on the other. Mannheim is right to point to the twin demands of faithfulness to "Being" and "Reality" as unrealisable, within an enterprise which sees itself as proposing 'solutions' to the problem of relativism, as set out below. Garfinkel's naturalism or extreme empiricism is the refusal to acknowledge the sovereignty of "Being", while Parsons' formalism proceeds directly from his commitment to the transcendence of a priori logic. Mannheim would seem to suggest the possibility of some other way of meeting the problem; the "dynamic" approach treats itself as an account located within the conditions of its historical epoch, and its commitment to truth as conditional upon the reflectiveness or reflexivity which it displays. Mannheim's formulation of the problem of the sociology of knowledge comes, for him, to the problem of what it is to provide a reflective account. To this problem I now turn, but not yet through a consideration of Mannheim. I propose rather to examine the work of 2 contemporary theorists who have produced related, but distinct, formulations of the problem of reflexivity; Alan Blum and Alvin Gouldner. It will be seen
that they confront the issues proposed by Mannheim and arrive at distinct resolutions of the problems involved in just the ways which he provided for in the formulation outlined. Against the background of Wittgenstein's philosophy, I will try to show, however, that these resolutions do not fail for the reasons outlined by Mannheim, but rather, Mannheim's requirements for success are themselves founded on principles which betray his analytical premises - i.e., the pre-supposed unity of science, and its separation from the processes of social determination.
CHAPTER 3
REFLEXIVITY HISTORY AND NOESIS

Blum
Blum's work, and that of his colleague Peter McHugh, is mysterious for most sociologists because it seems so different from what is recognisable as sociology in the writings of even the most diverse preceding theorists. What to make of Blum is the problem, and it must be said that his work offers no easy interpretations; by its nature, it is still changing, and any attempt at characterisation risks vulgarisation of what is essentially an ongoing exercise. His 'allegiances' are fairly easy to detect, but are not sufficient to enable us to detect direct relationships between his thought and that of those theorists we may claim as 'influences'. For a time, he was aligned with ethnomethodologists, and we can easily trace a concern with the same problems as Garfinkel; even then, however, his work acknowledged the use of Wittgenstein's concepts and approaches more than any of the others within this approach, save McHugh. With work produced after the "Theorising" paper, he takes up some of the issues raised by Martin Heidegger in his interpretation both of classical Greek philosophy, and his critique of science and of phenomenological-existentialist philosophy, with a reference particularly to Nietzsche and his work on ethics; his latest work revolves around the use of Greek philosophy to treat analysis of modern society. (1)

Now, while there is no easy way into this work, I think one or two clues about why it takes the form that it does are offered by looking at the work of Stanley Rosen. Before I offer an interpretation of Blum's theorising, therefore, I will try to prepare the way by looking at Rosen (2), since Rosen has been my key resource in making sense of Blum. Rosen's work is concerned, broadly, with the exegesis, on the one hand, of Greek philosophy and on the other, with an examination of moral, ethical and existential questions in the modern world. We can distinguish between his methodological strategy or decisions in the
interpretation of texts, and the consequences which this kind of scholarship has for philosophical issues which its analysis addresses.

His methodological principles are outlined in his introduction to his book on Plato's "Symposium" (3). The work, he wants to emphasise, is in dialogue form; while this is acknowledged by many contemporary scholars, nevertheless amongst those in the English speaking world:

"The emphasis upon epistemology, logic and linguistic analysis has directed attention away from standing dramatic form and towards the dissection of particular themes or arguments in relative independence from their context". (4)

Thus Plato's work is produced to illustrate, in the differences between his dialogues, evidence for the historical evolution of his thought, so that he appears either as a philosophically uninteresting thinker, or else concerned with the same issues as nominalist or linguistic thinkers of the twentieth century. Ironically, disinterested "conceptual analysis" aligns itself with nineteenth century historicism.

Now, Rosen argues, we cannot choose to disregard the centrality of the dramatic context to Plato's arguments, nor can we simply impose modern techniques and concerns onto a thinker of this antiquity.

This is based on a pure assumption of the superiority of our own techniques; Rosen cannot answer the question of their relative merits, but he aims to cast doubt on the assumption of superiority.

Now, the relevance of Rosen's approach to the problem of reading Plato derives from the attention which it gives to the problem of representing ideas in words. The work which I have discussed so far has brought out the difficulty of reconciling within a statement, the twin requirements of meaningfulness and exactitude. The problem seems to come with the seeming necessity that language cannot meet both of these requirements at one and the same time if we simply treat the content of statements as being what they speak about. Rosen argues that, in the case of Plato's dialogues, we should seek to read them not simply
as statements, using the same set of resources which we would bring to bear on a statement made to some end within any of our modern language games, but rather, seek to find in the work which the statements represent the rules of the language game within which they have some place, and thus find a way to use this work to make out both the language game, and the place of the statements within it. The work of reading Plato is thus always a re-construction of Plato (the author), but also a re-construction of the reader formulated by the author as the user of these rules to make sense of his work. This conception of the centrality of author-ity and reader-ship afford us keys to Blum's conceptions of the parameters of theorising.

To begin with, he argues, Plato wrote dialogues, so that he says nothing, in his writings, in his own name. Whatever is said, further, is relative to a particular dramatic situation. Even if Plato is taken as agreeing with the statements of his main protagonists, these say different things, at different times, to different audiences. Even Plato's explicit renunciation of all the views attributed to him cannot be viewed except in the light of the author's perennial practice of ironic dissimulation; how are we to take his own statements? Irony, Rosen argues, is the central feature or problem in the interpretation of Plato even if we take the (obvious) step of seeing the dialogues in their own words, independently of modern pre-suppositions (difficult enough) we still face the problem of the ironic element.

With this in mind, however, the dialogues can be seen as supplementing each other, rather than as contradictory; at the same time, while Plato argues that his most important teachings cannot be stated like any other form of knowledge, this is not to say that it cannot be stated in some form. Thus, while we must recognise that Plato's writings can be seen as an attempt to convey some \textit{esoteric} teachings, we must remain committed to seeing them also as concerned with conveying an explicit doctrine - that is, we must remain true to both the explicit statements of the work, and their implicit meanings, or intentions.
To do so is to seek to find in the dialogues "effective directions" both for the reconstruction of Plato's oral teachings (supplementary to his writing) and further, to the intentions behind this, which in Plato's teachings, argues that the intention of the dialogues is "to force the reader to engage in the act of interpretation, to fill in missing links, to revise accommodated arguments, to discern the import of hints, to understand the significance of jokes". (5)

Plato argues that the philosopher must discover the complete or more adequate formulation of the highest themes for himself - explicitly, that the teaching of the practice of Philosophy is impossible. Thus, for Rosen, regardless of whether an oral teaching exists, the unspoken dimension of the dialogues must be taken into account, and in methodological terms it is the most important dimension of the dialogues.

The purposes of philosophy are seen by Plato (via Rosen) as both medicinal and pedagogic; that is, philosophy must say different things to different readers so as to heal the disease of ignorance or thoughtlessness (as a doctor treats different patients in different ways) while at the same time, it must lead the young towards philosophy for their own sake rather than as a means of persuading them to one point of view, since truth here is the same as persuasion, and thus becomes a search for political power, rather than psychiatric (literally) purpose. Philosophy is a way of life rather than a set of true propositions.

In the dramatic presentation of men acting out the consequences of the disease of ignorance, Plato presents the consequences of the inevitable fate of all men, including the philosopher, in grappling with reason through opinion. Only scrupulous awareness of this condition enables men to escape from its dominion. An accurate reflection of the manner in which thought emerges, i.e., its context, is thus the first responsibility of those seeking to escape. The dialogue is thus an existential portrait; it brings together, in the form of a dramatic 'mimesis' of human existence, a representation of the "synoptic nature of Dialectic", so that the 'measuring practices' of mathematics and also poetry
are conjoined, but their product is reducible to neither one individually. The attempt is thus to imitate the wholeness of the form of life in which the production lived. Each 'technique' thus affords only a partial view, since it is directed toward specific ends; but nonetheless, each is a component. Dialectics, combined with the notion of medicinal rhetoric, lead us to see that every statement, as opinion, occurs within a dramatic context, so that agreement reached about the 'truth' of statements, while it does "collect" things, or "sort them out according to kind", is to be seen also as a methodic accommodation in terms of the practices and purposes of those concerned, including the 'teacher'.

For Rosen, being faithful to Plato's purposes poses enormous problems for modern scholarship;

"If, as is the case with Plato, one's aims include forcing men to think for themselves, to submit to the divine mania without publicly repudiating the divine nomos, to undergo a testing and purging of the psyche, and to protect philosophy from the rage of non-philosophers, then the procedures of irony make perfect sense .... The student of Plato should recognise frankly, without any naive repudiation of the need for accurate technical knowledge, that the metier of historical scholarship is by nature radically different from the exercise of divine madness .. (so that) .. obedience to standards derived from another and later tradition, violate Platonic accuracy". (7)

Thus, while 'speculation' has come to be a term of opprobrium in terms of such standards, for Platonic scholarship it is a necessary condition; each speculation is a test of the effectiveness of Plato's medicinal rhetoric in curing the disease of thoughtless interpretation.

The problem posed by Plato's work proceeds, in Rosen's view, from a modern commitment to the moral superiority of exoteric meaning in the medium of open and frank discussion over the political discretion which leads to secrecy or modified utterances; this commitment masks both the real restraints which politics imposes on the practices of philosophers, and also deprives interpreters of any possibility that work could be framed other than in accordance
with the very rigid principles - i.e., irony is ruled out. Rather, Rosen argues, should we not see that our pursuit of truth must remain faithful to the principles guiding the thought we seek to discuss? Plato is thus to be understood only in terms of the principles which he exhibits - that is, how he provides for himself to be understood. The issue then becomes - what is an attentive reader (of Plato or any text)? Rosen argues for the attention to the unity of form and content, so that in seeing the form, we also see the content, rather than allowing the content which is visible as form to conceal itself as content. In other words, the way in which an idea is communicated is external to the communication of the idea, but is nonetheless the 'esoteric' content of the form in which the idea is communicated. The attentive reader is thus obliged to think for himself in accordance with the instructions which he finds within the text; while he may criticise after he has done this, any other principles he may employ here are bounded by this previous requirement. In the case of 'mathematical' or 'epistemological' themes of modern philosophy, as applied to Platonic scholarship these must come after we have been faithful to Plato's concerns.

Rosen is thus arguing for attention to principles of interpretation in dealing with a text; he assumes philological and historical competence precedes such issues. This is to say, in the case of Plato, that historical studies should not be confused with philosophical ones; we should be wary of attempts to impute, for instance, philosophical significance to chronological ordering. We cannot reduce Plato to the product of the historical tradition of which he is a product, for:

"The fact that a philosopher is a citizen of his age does not prevent him from rational reflection upon the phenomena of his age ... but neither does it prevent him from engaging in reflections common to all ages". (8)

While the consideration of Plato's ideas continues to be dominated in modern thought by the assumption of evolution, through stages of thought (pace Comte),
Rosen argues against the metaphysic upon which this is based, that it prevents us from asking genuine theoretic questions internal to the work. Primacy is instead given to the development of ideas, rather than to their serious import. This, he argues, is the course we should follow only when we have exhausted all other approaches. To accept the principle on which it is based deprives us of the ability to think about the work in its own terms, since we are committed to an imposition of external hypotheses to order the work.

In terms of the problems of sociological theorising, the import of Rosen's analysis may not be immediately obvious; at the risk of overstating what may be nonetheless fairly obvious, perhaps I could point to some issues which seem germane.

First, for Rosen, theoretic questions have precedence over historical relations. Although responsible scholarship pre-supposes historical tact; that is to say, in dealing with the work of another scholar, theoretic issues are to be addressed first in terms of the principles provided for in the work of the scholar concerned.

Second, if we are to be attentive to the import of the work, we cannot neglect the unity of form and content; this is to say that form is to be regarded as the principle from which we derive the esoteric content which is exoterically expressed in the content of form communicating ideas.

Third, exoteric analysis alone is based on accepting the metaphysics of historical evolution of thought, and this is an unsubstantiated hypothesis (see the rejection of mathematical thinking in his "Nihilism"). Rather we proceed from the assumption that rational discussion is possible both within epochs about those epochs, and across epochs about trans-historical issues.

Fourth, work is not to be taken as necessarily committed to the value of the public discussion of all issues; the moral superiority of open discourse is not
to be assumed, nor should we assume this of the work of others, so that irony is an ever present possibility, both in our own work and in the teachings of others.

Fifth, any theoretic interpretation is a principled speculation; if we accept the possibility of both exoteric and esoteric teaching, then the purposes of the author are to be derived from the instructions which he gives for us to interpret his work. Any interpretation is to be weighed in the light of those purposes, so that work produced is to be seen as the product of a mind that thinks for itself, rather than as simply a conventional re-statement of what has already been said.

Sixth, escape from the realm of mere opinion is only possible by scrupulous awareness of this condition, and then only partially and momentarily. Truth (reason) appears only as an accurate reflection of the manner in which thought emerges.

Seventh, the value of mathematical and epistemological themes in modern thought is not pre-supposed, but in principle defined in their relation to the poetic concerns within which the purposes of philosophical work is also to be understood.

While these principles may seem opaque, in the work of Blum we find the attempt to realise a programme of theorising on social themes within their terms. My exegesis is open to the complaint of partiality on two main counts; first, I want to examine his work in relation to that of Wittgenstein, rather than thinking through it in its own terms; and second, I concentrate on particular pieces to serve my theoretical purposes, rather than seeking to preserve the integrity of the work as a whole. I hope to argue for this as a principled reconstitution provided for in the purposes of my analysis.

Alan Blum's Theorising (9)

As for Parsons and Garfinkel, any theorising for Blum is the embodiment of
one preferred method of seeing (sociologically). Implicit in this view is the idea that to use (any, sociological) language is at once to formulate sense, analytically, to formulate self, in that it is a display of "what we know", and to formulate the audience for our communication, since it is intended to be understood by those we direct it toward, and as such, it must attend to the rules of competent usage within the community of the theorist and audience. To use this language (or that) is to practise, to display one type of (language) game among others; this implies that it stands in a determinate relation to a preceding body of practices, necessarily; it is not a willful election, but is constrained by the corpus (of practices, which are rule governed) toward which it directs its speech. The notion of language here refers to natural language in the senses already outlined.

Sociology is, in the main, tied to the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation and Blum objects to that model on the grounds which have already been developed, implicitly, within Garfinkel's work, such that, when applied to the practices of actors in actually using language to make the world orderly and sensible, it glosses what should be explicated; it cannot grasp the normative character of language and action, since it is justified on the basis of an ideal rationality; it fails to grasp the contextuality of the subject; and so on (see preceding chapters). While this critique of the 'H.D.' model might be developed, Blum does not see why we should develop it, since such a critique would pre-suppose the problematic which that model sees itself as addressing. How are we to regard the H.D. model, then?

Holding it to our requirements is to treat it concretely; to see its failures as the occasion for corrective measures on our part is to fail to bring into question its own occasion, it is to fail to treat it as providing a means for us to make it sensible. That it does so describes the possibility of an analytic grasping of the method whereby the context within which it can talk,
becomes available within the terms of its language, rather than seeing it as merely talk amongst other talk, so that the occasion within which it occurs is not addressed.

An analytic grasping of such a method would try to see it WITHIN the terms of its language; it would ask; what kind of a natural language is it? and how is this a sensible language game to employ?

That he does reject the hypothetico-deductive model does not proceed from its failure to meet the requirements that this understanding of natural languages would impose onto it, but rather it comes about because this model "does not compel us". Its speech does not compel us to talk in the same way; this failure means that we are not silenced by its speech.

In other terms, this is simply to say that theorising is an election to live our life (if you will) in one way, it is an election insofar as we can reflect on the claims the success or failure, of one particular brand of theoretical activity to be a satisfying way of living; we can reject its claims by virtue of the fact that it claims that we cannot or should not, while in fact we do; for it claims to be what theorising CAN ONLY be, but it does not address what makes it possible to make this claim. "Deductive" theorising attempts, firstly, to be the only legitimate kind of theorising; it attempts to be a practice which claims greater (more secure) warrant for its statements, than for any others.

Now, in the "primordial grammar" of "theoria", the originary uses to which it was put in classical thought, science is to be seen as merely one kind of practice amongst others in attempts to escape from ignorance.

"Theorising .. (is) .. a more inclusive and powerful notion than science, and ... it encapsulates, as parameters, the ideas of spectator, search and self." (10)

Blum wants us to see theorising as a performative (11); that is, as a display
of what someone knows. It stands thus as an expression of self, accomplished by the actor. It is not thereby an account of self knowledge, but is rather to be seen as displaying the knowledge which grounds it. That is, it is a practical expression of self - a commitment, an action in the world which stands as a concrete re-presentation of the theorists' attempt at finding as his world (him-self) THE world, which stands outside.

This is in accord with Cavell's interpretation of Wittgenstein:

"If it is accepted that a language is what native speakers of a language speak, and that speaking a language is a matter of practical mastery (my emphasis) then such questions as 'what should we say if ..' or 'In what circumstances would we call ....,' asked of someone who has mastered the language (for example, oneself is a request for the person to say something about himself, describe what he does. So the different methods are methods for acquiring self knowledge." (12)

Now, it is to be noted that the objection to science is not on the grounds that it fails in its own terms (that there could be a better programme to be the kind of theorising that science wants to be), but rather that science, in failing to have the kind of mastery that it wants to claim, asks totally inappropriate questions of this kind of theorising. To ask of a 'display of self' "is it correct?" or "does it work?" is, as Blum points out, like arguing against how someone lives their life; degenerate theorising (which is to become an important idea in Blum's work) glosses the way in which science (and other kinds of knowledge) are possible only as games within a form of life. Possibility is the essential feature here - science (as a degenerate form of theorising, which it may be), wants to rule out other possibilities yet these are the very features of language which make IT possible.

Science (as a degenerate form of theorising) claims to re-present the world. Nominalist and Realist arguments both proceed from an acceptance of the premise that language is a medium by means of which 'reality' (which is not in question) is re-presented, or made present again, as if there were a prior sense in which it could be present before language did its work. In contrast, Blum wants to
argue that theorising cannot be restricted by science's attempts to rule what counts as knowledge; rather, what counts as knowledge is problematic because of the rule of science. In the originary grammar, theorising as a pursuit of knowledge was taken as a means to escape from ignorance. In trying to rule knowledge, science has tried to rule language; like humpty dumpty, words will mean just what science says they mean. The struggle here is political, and the rule of science is to proceed from its rule of grammar; just what words mean, what they can do, how important they are, how they are to be used. If science is to be master, it aims to be 'theological', (13). Its logic is to be the deity.

Blum has pointed out, then that science can deal only with one aspect of the pursuit of knowledge; that it is part of a form of life, rather than it-self a form of life, and is thus one language game amongst others; and that it tries, in trying to rule what we can see as valid knowledge, to gloss the very features which make it possible, as a way of speaking.

Now, one way of speaking would be to take, as its point, what that, as an occasion of someone speaking, does NOT say, but precisely what makes it possible; if it exists because of its place amongst other language games, what is its relation to those other language games, what IS its place? In Blum's terms, the question then becomes - what sort of things does this talk 'gloss' (cover over)? His answer is that what is covered over are precisely those aspects of the originary grammar of theorising which are present in its classical uses; ie., 'self', 'search' and 'wonder' (or audience/spectator). (14)

Note, this is not a critique, save of the degenerate tendencies which we can find in some of the usages of science. In pointing to some of the features of theorising which such degenerate usages would gloss, he would see himself as returning to that which gives science its possibility, rather than denying its validity. Thus, while the concrete forms of science would lead us away from the analytic concerns which ground them, he would lead us away from the rule
of form over the analytic, and toward the possibilities which ground such enterprises (as science, or mathematical thinking). His reading of theorising practices is thus to be taken as supplying us with a way to read them. If we are to say of theorising that it expresses the "Weltanschauung" of the theorist, then we must take this seriously. We can, of course, operate with this principle in what is, analytically, a trivial way, so that when we read, we re-interpret purely in terms of ascribed motivations, or interests; "Oh yes, he said this because he was a bourgeois intellectual/Marxist/car salesman etc." Bias is not, Blum argues, to serve merely as the determining feature of speech, for surely if we can recognise that all writing expresses Bias, then there must be a way of writing which attends to it as a necessary feature of all discourse (see here, for instance, Rosen's discussion of irony). Indeed, Blum argues that since it is a necessary feature of all writing, any claim that it could be otherwise is an absurd claim.

All speaking is the adoption of a perspective; to attempt to speak the truth about the world, therefore, must simultaneously be an attempt to come to terms with the necessary failure of any such enterprise. Speaking therefore becomes the attempt to display what makes it imperfect; that is, the attempt to make the audience think through what animates the speech. Reading is therefore a re-interpretation, in which the text is the occasion for what the theorist can make of the place of the speech within the language games (possibilities) which animate it.

Thus, there can be no 'definitive' meaning of a text, in the sense that any speech cannot (finally) be taken as only 'really' meaning this or that. Rather, the problem of interpretation arises from the endemic features of language, for which there are no solutions, no repairs to be made. Its imperfection is its nature, and the search for perfection is foolish (15). Speech must remain true to its nature (indexical, perspectival, flawed, imperfect); how then can we also accomplish knowledge, given these features?
Blum argues that we accomplish this by attending to those features of speech which are not representational, those features of speech which are not in speeches, but stand as the reasons why speech can be; the practices, methods, uses, which make up the foundation of being able to use a word to mean just what it does mean, or, more particularly, the background of practices of usage which make it possible for a word, as used, to have the possibilities that it does have as a resource in any activity of which it could be a part. While any speaking has a point in a language game (see the discussion of Garfinkel, last chapter, on the purposes of speech, and indifference), while seeing this point is one kind of activity in terms of what might be done with the speech, it is by no means all that might be done. Think of Austin, and the notion of performative utterances again.

If theorising about a text is a reformulation of one-self, reformulation is expression in another (an-other) form. Theorising is thus making speech what the audience must make of it, concretely; while what makes his speech possible (him-self) is what animates the speech, this becomes transformed into what anyone would have to know in order to understand the speech. In consequence, the speech as a display of self disappears in a concrete reading of the speech, and the author disappears for the audience; his author-ship, his author-lty (the common norms to which the speech attends) is unavailable to the audience precisely insofar as his speech depends on it not being possible for the audience to make what grounds his speech a topic for their speech, since, in a concrete reading, words mean what everyone knows that they mean. Thus, argument proceeds from the attempt of this view of theorising to rule the audience, to be what 'anyone' would understand. Its fruitlessness proceeds from the illusory nature of its final goal, which is perfect speech.

Rather than seeing argumentation surrounding the desirability of agreement as the necessary product of speech, Blum prefers to avoid this by seeing the task of theorising as rather to celebrate the ways in which each and every occasion
of theorising is also a display of the resources upon which the ability to theorise in fact depends. To this end, theorising then becomes the opportunity to celebrate bias, to find ways of reading which make reference to possibility as the resource upon which 'concrete' or 'stipulative' theorising in fact depends.

Argumentation proceeding from the goal of perfect speech is futile, for Blum, since it does not address what should be the true aim of theorising - it aims at producing agreement, rather than relieving the sickness of ignorance. Truth is equated with agreement. It does not recognise what its speech shows, but seeks to impose what its speech says. Thus:

"In my version of theorising, theorising is the methodic search for the collective that it presupposes (the form of life). From my perspective, any other conception of theorising is degenerate, concrete, and practical, since it locates its own justification in terms of the services it renders, its contribution to other concrete selves, its effects upon the audience; to formulate one's self as an achievement of theorising is to render one's common-sense audience irrelevant, it is to destroy the audience for one's theory". (16)

If we dispense with the necessity of agreement, then the audience becomes (analytically) irrelevant in the production of any theory, for the aim is not to persuade this audience to see the speech in terms of what it says, but rather to enable the audience to think through what the speech means for themselves. Thus, he is not saying that we should, in the concrete form of our speech, abdicate the inevitable function of communication (and hence the possible occasion for the agreement of other) but rather that we see the point of writing as an analytic occasion to explicate the grounds of our speech for ourselves, so that it stands, simultaneously, as both an occasion on which we can say something about ourselves, as we uncover the form of life which enables us to speak (in our understanding), and also an occasion on which we provide the means for others to find in the speech, more than it says as a speech (17). If the audience is to be irrelevant, analytically, then it is very much concretely relevant. Analytic ends for the theorist are contained in the notion
that, if the speech were to be taken as an occasion for the agreement of the audience, then a concrete reading would betray the possibilities of the speech as an analytic occasion for them. Refusing to take the audience seriously (in the sense that the speech does not aim for their agreement) recommends to the audience that they find in the occasion of the speech as theorising an opportunity to refuse to take the speech as a concrete speech seriously, to refuse to let it rule them. Thus, making the audience analytically irrelevant serves to open up the possibilities of the speech as an occasion for undressing language, for showing the way in which each and every occasion of speaking (theorising) presents the opportunity for finding in the reading a way to discover the conventions (grammar) which enables us to read, and the work that reading is, as reading. As a dramatic device, we might say, the need to make the audience irrelevant it ironic in that it focusses attention upon the active role of the audience in making of the text what it does in different ways, make of it, rather than, as in persuasive speech, denying this role by not allowing the audience to be anything but a passive receptacle for the speech.

The speech is thus to recommend that the audience think through the possibilities upon which sense making depends, rather than attempting to overcome the multiplicity by imposing the rule of one set of authoritative stipulations as to those possibilities. Rather than glossing the way in which speech concretely stipulates those possibilities, Blum proposes that we make one such attempt to rule into the topic of our speech, rather than relying on it as an unexplicated resource. In the explication of the conventions upon which its sense making depends, we are provided with, concretely, a speaking of the commonsense knowledge of the author, but at the same time, to address the usages which enable such a stipulation to make sense is to address simultaneously self and community, for the community is part of the self insofar as any user of language is simultaneously a follower of the public rules under which language is language (i.e., how it can mean what we want it to mean).
In terms of sociological theorising, Blum argues that the deductive model of theorising destroys, as it imposes concrete literalness onto occasions of usage, the possibilities of sociology as a form of life, since the "theoretic impulse in sociology is an achievement in explicating and showing a sociological conception of the world". In tying sociology to one version of theorising as a practice, the deductive model denies the possibility of sociological theorising serving as a means to pursue the originary aims of theorising, which are nonetheless patently relevant in terms of its historic theoretical discussion of its theoretical grounds (18). While theorising concretely produces methods for seeing the world in a particular way (sociologically), and "the possible society is a method for ... reconstituting a form of life as self", it is also the case that doing so SHOWS a sociological conception of the world. That is to say, in formulating possibilities into theories (as theories) we express our­selves in the medium which is the form of life (language); at the same time, the expression affords the analytic occasion for seeing what it is to conceive of the world sociologically. The possible society formulated by theorising in this case is a method for producing a theoretic ACTOR, since it is the grammar of this theoretic actor which imparts to this world its sociological character.

Each theoretic formulation produces a possible society; it is simultaneously, in it­self an expression of the actor who produces it (a display of his 'mind', or membership) and as such contains as its ground the grammar of sociologising, insofar as it is intelligible as sociology to a community of practitioners. In this way, potentially, the stipulations which it makes afford a method in that they are themselves possible topics for speech to explicate the form of life in which they make sense (literally) and this form of life is sociology.

For Blum, then, the responsibility of sociological theorising to be reflexive consists in the need to refer the reader of its theories to the possibilities which make it sensible. It must make reference to it­self in that the reader is directed toward the conventions which ground it as usage.
Blum is not denying the aims of standard (deductive) theorising, it supplies conditions under which it makes sense to read it as an explanation/description of the action to which it is directed, it is a transforming in the way that it is read of the object to which it is directed so that it is seen by the reader in this way. Now, Blum argues, all language does this, inevitably, in describing the world, we produce an implicit argument for our description as a way of seeing. However, to see one special formulation as distortion involves us in claiming something about the practical basis of common usage, rather than the veridical possibilities of all usage. Such attempts are to be resisted, and their claims denied, for the reasons already outlined, but we should recognise that this does not proceed from a denial of the practice, but rather from its imperialist (empir-ical) ambitions, to rule all discourse.

Rather, he wants to say, this kind of theorising, or any other, is an election, in that we make it as we claim for any stipulation or description, authority (our warrant as competent members) grounds other than those which attend to the conventionality of the grammar which grounds the usage. This is to say, the deductive model denies the possibilities of the phenomena as an occasion for alternative theorising; insofar as any concrete theorising relies on such a denial, in the way that it trades upon the conventions which enable it to make sense, argumentation proceeds from concrete reading.

Rather than seeing a phenomenon as an occasion on which to formulate a way of seeing the context, events, relationships between the elements, etc., (as, for instance, in the pursuit of general law, deduction, or explanation), Blum argues for each phenomenon as an occasion of interest, as an opportunity to re-call from the corpus of knowledge which we already possess the distinctiveness of the grammar which makes it possible for it to be that phenomenon or occasion of interest. Thus, sociological theorising is to be "a return to theorising apart from science", as the attempt to heal the disease of unthinking speech, speech which speaks without re-cognising what makes it possible for it
Again, this is taken to be in accord with Wittgenstein's attack on reductionism; each formulation of a possible society (action of theorising) is a bringing to mind of what is already in the corpus of knowledge of the theorist. It is not something new, to be empirically found to be there; rather, it is the task of theorising, for Blum, to re-call the methods which the possible society (in fact) IS, in order to see it AS a description grounded in the particular form of life. We have already discussed Mannheim's account of the problematic of the sociology of knowledge; in terms of that argument, we can see that, for Blum, the material conditions within which theorising takes place must be accepted, there is no sense in which he could be taken as arguing for possible transcendental concerns, or basic constitutive processes. (Again, in terms of Mannheim's account, it is interesting to locate Blum's account in terms of what Mannheim discusses as possible responses to the problem of conditionality.) (19)

The explication of the possibilities of the stipulations which make up the possible society ("state-ments") means a return to the communal resources which make up the activity (of formulating the possible society), possible. This does not require 'facts' of the kind most accounting does; the possible society as a method is to be seen as a redescription, rather than an explanation. That is to say, the features of the method are to be found in the formulation.

For conventional Sociology, then, this has the consequence that:

"For our purposes, then, whether or not some description of an event can be converted into premises containing lawlike statements, etc., is irrelevant, for it certainly can be accomplished. The point is, rather, why we as sociologists should elect to proceed in such a way. What compelling reasons could possibly be offered that could induce us to abandon our worlds and our history?" (20)

For Blum, then, theorising as a response to the problem of accounting the world involves a choice, since it involves a question about the existential
condition of the theorist. As conceived by conventional sociology, inheriting the concerns of mathematical and scientific world views, this is not apparent, since these world views are imperialist - they claim to rule the possibilities for legitimate/competent accounting. Thus, accounting does not proceed from a recognition of choice, but from appeals to arguments about which is the best way to live, which (concretely) is the best form of possible society (statement). Here we find the relevance of Rosen's comments on Plato's work as an 'existential portrait'.

Clearly, there are strong echoes of Wittgenstein here. The philosopher, for Wittgenstein, pursues the questions of metaphysics, ethics, and logic without considering the way in which his language contains in itself the very structures he is struggling with - he is like an alien, confronted with a strange tongue, when he finds that his language will not produce what he wants it to. In directing the philosopher back to the way in which language is used, Wittgenstein aims to free him from his "bewitchment".

It would seem that, for Blum, the sociologist shares in this bewitchment when he attempt to see in theorising one way of making the language of sociology capture the world. Theorising involves, rather, for Blum, the attempt to show the methods by which a theorist creates an idea. If it is to be reflexive, it must attend to the ways in which it is possible to create an idea (as methods, how the form of life in which it operates).

Sociological theorising, as a production of a possible society, shows what it is to produce statements which make sense in terms of sociology as a form of life. This is to say that sociological theorising provides for itself as a practice the ways in which the reader can competently warrant the account which it produces as an instance of the speech produced by members of the possible community of sociological theorists. A showing of the ways in which it is possible to be sociological means an attention to the way in which any formulation of a possibility (in conceiving of a social object) achieves the analytic
That is to say, in theorising we formulate what kind of language must be spoken - what the language of the audience is - in order that the speech be sensible. As an instance of rule-using activity, theorising is only able to construct a sensible edifice in terms of the rules and grammar of the projected audience, for, to stand as an instance of competent (real, serious) authoritative speaking, it relies on a display of recognised accomplishment in the gaze of its projected audience.

This, for Blum, is what reflexivity is about; an expansion of the possibilities of seeing, a grasp of the way in which concreteness limits the ways in which it is possible to be said to know. Reflexivity is an elected response of the theorist in the face of the possibilities offered by communities of language users - an alternative (freedom) to the imperialism of competing single ways of accounting.

While Blum is certainly not original in posing the problem of reflexivity as an issue of existential choice, there do seem to be significant differences between his version of the reflexive responsibility and those who have taken up the mantle outlined by Mannheim (see below). Before attempting to draw out some of the details of his proposed method of analysis, I would like to offer some thing more recognisable as the standard sociological response to this issue. I propose to look at the version of reflexivity produced by Alvin Gouldner, and popularised in his "The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology". 

Alvin Gouldner and the Problem of Reflexivity; Politics and Sociology

"The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology" (21) had a great deal of influence when it first appeared. It presented, among other things, a strong and clear attack on the bulk of what had been, for some years, the ruling paradigm in
sociology, Parsonian structural functionalism. Insofar as some of its criticisms were relevant, and were eagerly seized upon by opponents of passive scientism, the use to which they were put tended to avoid the serious critical scrutiny to which they ought to have been subject. I will not be concerned to produce an exhaustive critique of Gouldner’s work here, but will concentrate on his version of reflexivity.

"To be explicit, I believe that having spent so much time baring the assumptions in the work of others, I should now do the same in my own work ... Presumably I should now be able to dissect myself; ideally, and without defensiveness or self flagellation I should be able to outline my own major assumptions in some modestly coherent manner, if not evaluate them. But I also believe that such an effort is doomed to failure. For no man can be his own critic and in pretending that he can, he promises to deliver far more than he really wants. Still, some self knowledge is possible, and if I make the effort to disclose my operating principles, while warning of the distortion and incompleteness to which this is subject, I may render it easier for my critics to perform their own task". (22)

Gouldner carries on to say that it must be possible that his theory (characterising the convergence between functionalism and Marxism) is merely the projection of his own ambitions,

"... a fantasy fulfillment of my own wishes, a justification of my own values, and indeed of my own existence" (23)

but if we suppose this to be true, it does not follow that what has been said is necessarily a distortion of the truth about sociology. There is no way that men can approach truth or falsehood but by their socially shaped experiences of the world; but

"Whether or not any work presents us with reality or illusion cannot be determined by knowing his life that the thinker has led. In the end, this can be appraised only by looking at the work alone, and not the life; the work can be judged only in terms of the standards appropriate to it, and by seeing how well it bears up under criticism". (24)

He goes on to argue that what understanding the rooting of the work in the lives and time of those who produced it can do is enable us to see why it takes the form that it does take, why it is interested in that which it speaks
about. Truth value, for Gouldner, is thus not determined by social experience (the conditions of production) but it is tested (assessed) by the way in which the work stands up to the canons of criticism and argument embodied in the corpus of knowledge to which it is directed, the tradition within which it locates itself.

Gouldner believes that it is impossible to understand how social theory is actually made in terms of the assumptions which pre-judge what is an empirical question. This empirical question is (presumably) to be addressed by:

"... starting with the very primitive assumption that theory is made by the praxis of men in all their wholeness, and is shaped by the lives they lead and pursuing this into concrete empirical contexts". (25)

To do this is to grasp that "theorists are entrenched in their theories"; this 'entrenchment' is taken to consist of certain facts, derived from their personal experience, which are so rooted in their personal reality, that they are un-doubtable to those who hold them. He gives examples - the French Revolution, the rise of Socialism, the great Depression, advertising, salesmanship; these are 'taken for granted' unproblematic furniture on the consciousness of this, that or the other social theorist.

For Gouldner, what is at issue is not the determination of these 'facts', but how we are to order them; what is to be their significance for the accounts produced by those who subscribe to, and therefore, presumably, act on the basis of, their absolute reliability and unquestioned facticity.

"Social theorising ... is often a search for the meaning of the personally real, that which is already assumed to be known through personal experience". (26)

(Compare this with Cavell's comments on reminding ourselves of what we already know, or Rosen's comments on theorising as an existential portrait, or Blum's notion of theorising as "self formulation").

Gouldner wants to say that this search for the meaning of the personally real
is simultaneously an attempt to incorporate within that reality (as a normative order) social events or processes which he takes to be potentially threatening to the values which it embodies. This is a version of theorising as sense transformation; theorising here comes to be how reality must be seen in order for it to make sense, how the world is to be produced so as to correspond to the significances of the theorists life-world.

Theorising is thus always a selective ordering of the 'facts of experience', within normative frameworks determined by the 'personally real'. Theorists, since they cannot stand outside of this process, must seek to discover the conditions under which this process takes place. For Gouldner, this is achieved by arguing for the values of one way of seeing against others. This has become, then, an argument about the moral worth of ways of living.

Gouldner's famous article, "Anti-Minotaur; the myth of a value free sociology", expresses the concerns behind this formulation. What he objects to in such an attempt:

"... is not that the theorist fails to situate his social objects along a good-bad dimension, but only that this assignment, having been conventionally defined as irrelevant to his task, is now de-focalised and done covertly rather than being openly accomplished". (27)

Theorising involves, (he notes), in the way that it covertly manipulates its value basis the intrinsic possibility of ideologising the relations between the dimensions of any accounted social object; that is to say, in dealing with social events the "norm-alising process" covertly superimposes an ideological defence/apology on to reality, as reality exists over and above attempts at formulating theories to account for it.

The justification of this as an irremediable feature of all theorising is proposed to be the fact that:

"... it is extremely painful and threatening for a man to believe that what is powerful in society is not good."
This creates an unacceptable tension in the basic constitution of meaning in the world; it can be resolved either by re-aligning goodness with power or by concentrating on power while leaving aside the question of goodness". (28)

Obviously, all sociological theories can become accountable for in the way in which they deal with questions of goodness and potency, or in the way in which they leave them out of consideration. The question is framed so that theorising comes to be seen as a way of accounting these dimensions. Theorising made by "man in all his wholeness" in contrast, takes as its concern the way in which these issues are dealt with, and the consequences that this has, with the caveat:

"It is intended only as an example of the productivity of such a standpoint; it was not intended to assign any exceptional significance to the power-goodness dissonance in comparison with other forces, or to enumerate the variety of theory shaping forces mentioned (in the course of the work); and it was certainly not intended to present a systematic social theory about the extra-scientific forces at work in social theory. The presentation of that theory will have to wait for a later work". (29)

His work at this point is simply to constitute a 'case study', and the "theory of Social Theories" (which is to be constituted on the basis of such case studies) concerns itself with what sociologists want to do, and with what they actually do. This is not to be simply an empirical description of lives and times, but:

"... a transformation of the sociologist ... penetrating deeply into his daily life and work, enriching them with new sensibilities and raising the sociologists' self awareness to a new historical level". (30)

The sociologist is 'self-aware' (reflexive) only insofar as he is radical.

The question the sociologist must confront is how to live. We must develop:

"... the ingrained habit of viewing our own beliefs as we now view those of others". (31)

We must unite with our audience (whom we study as subjects, and write for) and no longer insist on the superiority of our systems of logic and belief.
This programme is to incorporate an empirical research project accompanied by a campaign of moral self awareness, the embodiment and advance of specific values, a pursuit of knowledge which deepens the self awareness of the theorist of who and what he is in a specific society at any given time, and how both his social role and his personal praxis affects his work as a sociologist; at the same time, this will be a search for both a technical means to achieve valid and reliable information about the world and a commitment to the value of openness in relation to the possibilities of revising his way of seeing in response to new facts, ideas and material conditions. The sociologists' self is to be transformed so that it recognises the way that its way of seeing is, or should be open to using information 'hostile' to it.

In short, the question of social research, is the question of Praxis. Gouldner calls for the sociologist to recognise the relation between role ('sociologist') and person (history). He calls for a re-unification of the moral standards of the man (the age) with those of the role. The sociologist must change as the praxis of intellectual work transforms the self of the historical man.

In Blumian terms, there is clearly a key difference here; for Blum, the authority of the deductive theorist depends on his self being interchangeable with any-one of his audience, his self disappears from his writing. Gouldner, in contrast, is calling for the self of the theorist to return to the doing of sociological theorising; unlike Blum, however, he sees this as desirable because of his belief in the value of accounts as expressions of self. Blum sees such accounts, responsible as they are to the canons of some community of theorists, as a refusal on the part of the theorist to question the nature of all grounds, and hence, a failure of analytical nerve.

Gouldner's Reflexive Sociology

"A reflexive sociology, for its part, recognises that there is an inevitable tendency for any social system to curtail the sociologist's autonomy in at least two ways; to transform him either into an ideologue of the status quo and an apologist for its policies, or into a technician acting instrumentally on behalf of its interests". (32)
Sociology's quest for knowledge, he points out, is distorted in the very act of setting up any resources for sociological investigation, since these must be controlled and any use of them must be accountable.

Sociology is thus distorted by i. the nature of its subject matter
ii. its methodologies
iii. its institutional setting.

"Every Social System is bent upon crippling the very sociology to which it gives birth". (33)

To be reflexive, Sociology must i. recognise that it is biased
ii. commit itself to values, which it makes explicit
iii. recognise its location in historical processes which may involve its knowledge becoming redundant at any time.

For Gouldner, a reflexive sociology (at this time) must be radical sociology. Reflexivity becomes available only in the commitment to radical values because of the concrete features of the institutional, political and social setting of sociology. To be other than radical is to become heir to the ills of society with its distortions and ideologisations. This (radicalism) is not only to be critical of the 'real' world but fundamentally of itself as a practice, in the way that it is done; it is a conception of how to live.

Again, this seems to conflict with how Blum conceives of theorising; for Gouldner, reflexive theorising depends upon arguing about how to live one's life, and this proceeds from a critical awareness of the parameters of self, and the knowledge which the self has. Blum sees such arguments as futile, attempts to make our speech rule what can be made of it by the audience; if we avoid such unproductive argument and conflict, we can try to address what lies behind our impulse (desire) to do this. The good of argument lies only in seeing what lies behind it, what is its beginning, what makes it a possibility.

Both conceptions of reflexive theorising turn, then, on the approach to values,
as the source of bias. For Gouldner, this is to be the subject of critical self-examination; for Blum, Bias is to be 'celebrated' (34). The first question seems to turn on the possibilities for self knowledge; Gouldner has said, effectively, no-one can be their own critic - but they must try; the good of self criticism comes from the attempt to know what we cannot, finally, know - to stand outside of ourself and see what it is that forms our knowledge of the world. The existential condition of the reflexive theorist, for Gouldner, then, is of mistrust or doubt, even of our own certainty; the reflexive theorist is a sceptic.

For Blum, the reflexive theorist seeks to live with bias; he seeks to accept the fate of human existence, while addressing what is behind how that fate works itself out in the individual case, Since this is what is behind the working of fate in all cases.

In the work of both theorists, we find a usage of the concept of grammar; I propose, through the examination of the work which they have both done on Marxist theory, to look at the way in which their respective approaches to reflexive theorising actually get done.

Gouldner and Marxism

The possibility of reflexive theorising depends, in Gouldner's work, on the possibility of self criticism. One version of self criticism involves seeing the contradictions in one's own value-related formulations. In a critique of Marxist theory (35) Gouldner tries to display this kind of activity.

Heformulates ideology as, in an attempt to change the (objective reality of the) world, a surmounting of the present in the acceptance of a re-ordering of the world - and acceptance of the authority of the formulation. Ideology's writing must come to be read in a particular way, if it is to be ideology. The authority of the idea over what it is about derives, he believes, from a particular form of social organisation which separates theory (in the concrete form of the intellectuals) from practice (in the concrete form of the social
world about which they theorist). Gouldner wants to say that Marx did not recognise, in this formulation, the different levels on which ideology operates. In seeking to re-unify theory and practice, Marx sought to reverse the objectification of ideas; he sought to formulate a theory which would tie theorising to the praxis of everyday life. This was to be achieved by joining a critique of idealist objectivism at the level of ideas.

To be a critique, it had itself to be objectivistic; it called, however, for a re-unification of theory and practice (intellectuals and masses) which would not be objectivistic.

In Marxist critiques of objectivism, then, lies the contradiction of formulating (in an objectivistic theory) a critique of theory which does not, as a praxis, itself involve re-unification for which it calls. The Marxist doctrine of praxis, then, conceals the contradictory role of the intellectuals who formulate it. It fails to discuss/criticise their dominance, and the way in which they form an elite stratum of the movement of socialism.

The Proletariat is thus created by a theoretical formulation of those outside of it; socialism is to be created by those who do not figure in it. The theory formulates the world (socialism) but the world has no place for the theorists (the vanguard). It needs, but cannot trust, or produce, theorists.

Marxism, as a theory, is thus its own enemy; its revolution must be perpetual since it is itself the incarnation of a world without systematisation into theories and practices, ideas and objects, elite and mass. Lenin, according to Gouldner, recognised this in his concept of the vanguard party, which is to bring socialism into being, but is not itself part of socialism. The vanguard party is evolutionary, rather than revolutionary; it brings socialism into being by instrumentalising theory (focussing on its necessary role) and by transforming theory into culture, creating a belief system and a shared language in a concrete "weltanschauung" as a practical political necessity.
"Marsism, then, lives on two levels, which is not in the least to suggest that it is two faced; nor again is it in the least to imply that it is in this respect one whit different from normal academic sociology. There is Marxism's manifest level as an extraordinary language, as a technical theory and philosophy, as a materialism on behalf of working class emancipation. Marxism also lives on a deeper level, an unconscious level not easily spoken in its own community, in which there is an abiding commitment to theory, to ideas, to generic ideology, and the dissonant authority of the intellectuals." (36)

Theorising, then, creates marxism as a practical political form; but its theory constitutes both a metaphorical ground (an originary grammar) and a concrete ideology. This dual identity is resolved, for Gouldner, in the possibility of radical reflexive theorising, which is critical insofar as it aims to display the contradiction inherent in its productions.

Its primary contradiction is that it is both objectivist and metaphorical. Its metaphoricality enables it to serve as a relevant theory to diverse concrete situations 'socialism' and 'the proletariat' are not concrete stipulations, at this level, and yet they plainly are at the level of ideology. Gouldner calls these two levels "Technical" and "Grammatical" (or "Paleo-symbolic"). The former is the level of ideology (the instrumental level at which theory becomes culture), the latter is the deep structure which generates rules or codes for theorising. (His formulation consciously mimics Chomsky's notion of deep and surface structure).

Theorising involves, as a reflexive enterprise, the re-discovery of the deep structure, consciousness of the metaphoricality of its concrete formulations. Reflexive theorising would imply, for socialists, something like a generative grammar, an attempt to uncover the rules of transformation which competent socialists employ when doing socialism, when their "knowledge" produces a surface structure, a concrete instance of that 'doing' (socialism) in operation.

"The reflexive theorists' task is to help make the actors' behaviour more fully visible to him as an object of his own decision, choice and responsibility, thus sharpening his rational capacities and confronting him as a subject, with his own dissonant objectivity". (37)
That is to say, Gouldner wants to bring about a re-cognition of this way of living (socialism) as rule-directed, the election of a conscious being (rather than the objectivistic alienation of the ideologue). His concern with grammar is as a means of producing a "new realism" with which to explore the rationality of socialism - i.e., to "understand Marxism's metaphoricality, we must grasp the paleo-symbolism underpinning and allowing continuity amid the vagaries of Marxist politics ... (these being) ... the shared norms of the concretely diversified community of Marxist speakers". (38)

Marx recognised, according to Gouldner, that philosophy (theorising) is in the service of history; it is the responsibility of the philosopher (theorist) to be reflexive as a means to pre-serve both the continuity of philosophical thought (Hegel and the movement toward the absolute and its metaphoricality, and the abiding leitmotif of emancipation, freedom from enslavement of material conditions, and ignorance) and the concrete historical processes (moving toward a material base which can actualise the re-union of theory and practice). The concrete basis of that process (the proletariat) is metaphorical as a practical necessity, as the idea preceding the change in conditions. It remains, in its metaphoricality, both a supremely adaptable concrete form, suited to varying conditions, and as an "analytic of the last resort", the base of a general theory of revolution.

The general metaphor of Marxism is one of emancipation from enslavement; as a metaphor, this is wholly in keeping with its philosophical antecedents (primarily Hegel and Feuerbach), involving as they do in their metaphoricality a recovery of the division into subject and object and the re-union of these in the absolute. To read them in this way is to differentiate their concrete concerns (as courses of practical reasoning) from their grammatical deep structure. Philosophy comes to be seen then as a continuous movement in history, in the service of history moving toward the end of mystification in a transformative critique of the subjective impulses to control/understand/objectify its objects (others).

To achieve this requires:
The problem of de-mystification becomes, then, the problem of grammar logic; a formal (theorising) rather than an empirical problem. It becomes a question of formulating transformations correctly, in critique; concomitantly, it becomes necessary to perceive the world strictly in terms of the subject-object distinction; this lies at the very root of the need for revolution - once the subject-object frame exists, then the movement from actual (is) to ideal (ought) becomes, as a general feature of the human condition, an imperative. In Marxism, this absolute becomes historicised.

Theorising as a reflexive enterprise comes to be a transformative process, then, in itself a means of emancipation, the reflexive theorist is constantly in the process of re-forming the concrete features of the (real) world as his election in the face of the (emancipatory) movement of history. For Gouldner, the theorist "in all his wholeness" cannot ignore the material conditions of the world; he must struggle constantly with the determining power which they exercise on his thought. Reflexive theorising comes to be, for Gouldner, a constant process of self criticism; an eternal struggle of consciousness against itself a perpetual process of movement towards an unattainable unity. For as consciousness struggles to incorporate both its own weltanschauung and the material conditions which ground it, the theorist struggles to fulfill his role in the emancipatory movement of history, as a member of a caucus which is apart from the metaphorical embodiment of the goal of history. The audience which is formulated by his theorising must be brought to a reading of his writing as part of the emancipatory process; his reflexivity consists in realising the relation between the concreteness of his role (in the objectification of the world) and his metaphoricality (analytically) as an agent of the revolution. This consciousness preserves the difference between his (authentic) self and its objectified presence as actor on the stage of history. Reflexivity is to
be the authentic role of the theorist in the service of history.

Knowledge and Criticism; the Search for the Self

What these theorists share is a concern for the corpus of knowledge which is the theorists' self. For Blum, this knowledge shows itself in what the theorist does with the application of the rules which govern the conventional usage; the search for the collective which underlies these rules and conventions which lie behind the practice and make it possible. Such an explication would involve reference to the concrete election of the author (that his writing will mean just this) but this is to say that this concrete election proceeds itself from its location as a practice in the body of practices which make up the natural language (culture) within which it is intelligible (as an instance of doing ... sociology, physics, crime and so on). Blum's reflexive theorising attempts to grasp the ways in which usage (of culture, the conventions of language) constitutes the normative dimensions of self in relation to community; to grasp how this comes about is to recognise the ways in which community (culture) itself provides an analytical method, in the achievement of the self of the theorist.

Blum's point, then, is that the self of the theorist is achieved in the formulation, and that a reflexive grasp of this recognises the variety of ways in which human lives are lived (that sense is made in a variety of ways, that the world is simultaneously what it is formulated as, and how it is formulated). What it is formulated as is available to us in convention, in the fact that 'we' know what a formulation means (the everyday solution to the problem of the inter-subjective world, in Schutz's sense). How this formulation comes to mean what it does mean is the problem of reflexivity - in other words, what are the sense making practices which enable the 'what' to be what it is? Since sense is made, there presumably are ways in which it is made. Blum's reflexivity promises to display these practices. To grasp these practices as a method is to confront what anyone would have to know (take to be a convention) to make sense, with the possibilities of any theorising (formulation, accounting) as an occasion
in which the resources of the community (culture) and the self simultaneously afford a method of seeing (sociologically) and a way of knowing (what it is to see in this way). Thus, self knowledge is grasping the communality of the common. It is not (cannot be) a question for argument for what is common is not what is private (a private language). Yet it is also not concrete (not stipulable), for each saying (as a concrete act of referring) relies on what is common to be a saying.

For Gouldner, the communality of theorising resides in the transformation of sense into normative frameworks; the minimal feature of theorising is objectification (that is to say, any theorising formulates the world, stipulates or refers to the world in its speaking). Simultaneously, however, it relies on a deeper grammar as the ground for this; the technical level is achieved by the rules of transformation (which speakers of the communal language use) from the paleosymbolic level; this level consists of the form of life (way of living) of the theorist as a normative frame unifying concrete diversity. Thus the essential process is subject creating object in terms of the metaphoricality of usage.

Now, the subject-object relation is simultaneously the way in which theory can exist, and the source of both the abiding existence of slavery (domination) and the historical imperative to remove it (ought implies can). Theorising is both generated by the historical condition, and in the service of the historical process whereby the problem is to be resolved. The community of theory is, therefore, in the relation of the historically specific normative frames which constitute its role in history to the analytic grounds which enable that to be a sensible existential condition. Self knowledge, in the reflexivity of the theorist, comes to a grasping of the conditions under which that is a sensible way to live, and the condition under which it is sensible (to be reflexive) is criticism; that is, to realise that any accounting displays the metaphoricality of its formulations is to realise the value bases which underlie theoretical
ways of living; as formulations of the world, these value bases constitute an accounting of history. It is the responsibility of the theorist to elect to align himself with the movement of history (towards emancipation, to realise that he is in the service of history) by making out of his subjective processes of theorising an object for theorising. Thus, at one and the same time, the theorist is part of the process of emancipation from the subject-object dichotomy, and displaying consciousness of the unity of philosophical thought in the service of history. For Gouldner, then, self criticism is possible because the value system of the theorist (his system, his corpus of knowledge) is the product of his speaking. Theorising, in objectifying the world, displays its metaphoricality in the face of the diversity of conventions; this metaphoricality is analytically available in that the speech of the theorist is subject to his control insofar as he can discriminate between examples of correct and incorrect speaking. Reflexive theorising can confront the rules of correct speaking with themselves as objectifications, thereby making them the subject for analytic evaluations, by the actor who produces them, (in terms of the deeper grounds of his reason). Gouldner refers to this as a realist approach to rationality; Skjervheim, (following Husserl) has called this 'objectivism' (40).

Clearly, knowledge of self means different things for these two theorists. Blum sees in the self knowledge which theorising involves, the search for a means to recover the form of life, to grasp the community of natural language speakers as a method in making sense. For Gouldner, the objects of criticism are the rules to which natural language speakers orient (whether they could formulate them or not) in discriminating instances of correct speech. Now, the difference may not be clear at this point; speaking is produced by the actor being able to discriminate between competent and incompetent speech. Chomsky has shown that we can (in principle, at least) generate rules of transformation to account for this process (41). Blum cannot but take as his point of departure, in a sense, the same 'object'; the speaking, the speech. However, Blum wants to bring out that speaking is not just an accounting of the world,
not just a transformation of sense in terms of the weltanschauung. Speaking
is a matter of bringing the world to being, it IS the world that it brings
into being. The rules of grammar, (of theorising, of socialism) which Gouldner
presents as the knowledge of the theorist do not constitute a description of
the practices by which theorising is done; they reveal the responsibility of
the theorist. That is to say, they display the orderliness of value judgments,
they show the reasonableness of reason in relation to the work to which it is
put.

Self knowledge is to be available, apparently, on two levels; it is to be what
emerges from critical reading of speech as metaphor (Gouldner) and what shows
itself in the speculative reformulation of possibility (Blum). From a stand-
point of sociological theory, both attempt to provide for these versions of ref-
lexivity as a necessary response to an endemic conditionality. What is not
considered is the locatedness of this conditionality itself, within the frame-
work of a particular set of practices which constitute the language game of
sociological theorising. If we accept that language games, although functioning
internally in very disparate ways, share certain features ('family resemblance'),
it would seem profitable to look at some of the basic features of sense making
which are not examined in these accounts. To this end, I shall explore some
of Wittgenstein's work on the problem of Private Language.

Reflexivity involves, for Blum and Gouldner, the attempt to grasp the relation
between the act of knowing (the world) and the formulation of that knowing.
The problem has come to be seen as - how are we to have knowledge of how we know?
Both theorists have appealed to the notion of the language in which formulation
is done being used in relation to a grammar which makes it sensible to a community
of language users, and have referred to the way in which a grasp of the rules
of this grammar will constitute the ground for any usage. Can we decide between
the methods which they offer for the search for these rules?
what has come to be known as the sociology of knowledge position (which Gouldner sees himself as carrying on) has said that any language use is evaluative, that any language used to produce an account of the social world is relative to the historical and social location of the speaker. That is to say, the products of theorising transform sense, and formulate self; the transformation of sense is concrete, and the formulation of self is analytic. Gouldner wants to confront this problem by making theorising into transformation of self in the process of formulating sense; that is, since value is the means to create (objectivise), value itself should be the object (the process of creation should be the object of theorising). Thereby, in the process of transforming the sense (of value) we transform the self of the theorist.

Value, in this language game, is the central term; that is to say, in ascribing values to a theorist, we make a claim about how he uses language, we assert something about how his language means what it does mean. In terms of accounts of the social world, we use value to mean that an account fails to transcend the conditions of its production. Value in the sociological language game refers to one of the limits of discourse. It means that all thought is socially determined; questions about value, then, become questions about the social conditions of the production of thought.

We could ask, at this point, about the grammar of sociology's discourse on the relation of thought to the world; this is to ask about the relation of subject to object. The relation of sociological object to sociologist as thinking subject becomes, then, an inquiry into the grammar of the sociological language game. Expressed differently, we might be seen to be asking; what does value accomplish as a means of ordering the world for the sociologist? How is value used to describe the relation between theory and the social conditions of its production?

Now, this is to confront the problem of dualism; that is to say, in asking for the way in which value (thought) reflects the social conditions of its production
(the world) we are asking for an account of how value is a description of that relationship - in what sense, that is, does the notion of value explain the relationship between thought and the social conditions of its production.

Intuitively, of course, we know what we mean by the notion of value judgment in this context; it is part of the way in which sociological thinking is done (43). I shall argue, however, that the notion of value, in the sociological way of thinking, systematically misrepresents the relation between theory and its objects.

My basic argument proceeds from Wittgenstein's attack on the notion of a private language. Wittgenstein was concerned, in discussing the ways in which the division of the world into sense-data and consciousness failed to account for the articulation between representation and its objects, to display the basic incoherence of dualism. It is a theme which occupied a great deal of his later work, and involved extensive discussion and argument. I shall abstract some of his main points in order to show how they are relevant to my concerns.

**Private Languages (44)**

The dualist claims concepts to be distinct from the world which they describe. The external world is experienced; this experience is the meaning of the world for the individual who experiences it. Concepts enable us to communicate this to others because of pre-existing agreement on the reference of these concepts.

Now, while language does rely on agreement and regularity in reference this does not mean that language is based on prior agreement in judgments. The Dualist makes agreement in concepts independent of agreement in judgment and thereby, truth is decided by human agreement - it is subject to the conditions of the social world in which it is formulated.

This is what Hacker (45) has called the 'separability thesis' and it is, he contends, both true and false at the same time. While our agreement in concepts enables us to measure the world (describe a state of affairs) insofar
as we can separate the judgment (using the language) from the world that it is used to describe; it must, it seems, either fit or it must not.

However, we identify our agreement in definition by means of our agreement in judgment. This is to say that unless our uses of concepts accomplish their task (measuring reality) regularly and consistently, we could not be using a language. Agreement over the uses of concepts implicitly relies on reference to agreement as to what "everyone" knows (what anyone would have to judge to be the case).

Logic is not thrown out here, however; our sentences do not determine the world, but only the possibilities that the world must satisfy. This is not to say that any language must be the result of social interaction, which would seem a pre-requisite to agreement, that we could not produce a language which is unshared, but rather that language, by its very nature, could not be something which is unsharable. The implications of this for dualism are:

a) that we cannot account for the way in which we have knowledge of other minds, and yet we act as if we do, and

b) only the sensations of our consciousness can have meaning, yet we cannot have knowledge of them.

To develop this devastating critique, Wittgenstein argues from the characterisation of language teaching, acquisition and purpose which is produced if we assume the dualism of language and the world. First, words "stand as ideas" in the mind of the user (developed, of course from Locke's famous discussion); that is to say, they refer to what is experienced. Experience describes itself in the concept which accounts it. Meaning comes from associating a term with a stored replica of one's own experience, with the 'exemplar' serving as the paradigm for the meaning of the term.

Thus, by 'ostension', word is fixed to experience and stored in memory like an almost infinite filing system. To communicate, then, it is necessary that the
same concepts be used for the same experiences. Now, the essential connections are indefinable; nevertheless, speaker and hearer manage to share the same subjects for ideas presented to their senses. Thus, in the dualist version of communicating, words can serve the primary function of enabling what are private experiences (or ideas) to be conveyed from one mind to another, because of the association between sound and referent, on which there is agreement between the minds concerned.

Now, this means that knowledge is acquired indirectly, since the associations which we are taught between idea and word, and word with referent must be assumed by us to be ours, and not those of the person teaching us.

"One man's mind cannot pass into another man's body .... (using a word is like) ... striking a note on the Keyboard of the imagination". (46)

Now, if we go from this separation of 'the world' and 'our experience of it', we come to three levels of skepticism. The first level leads us to assert that in this version of the world, only I can have knowledge of my inner states; others can only speculate on my inner states on the basis of my behaviour. Thus, here, certainty belongs only to me; outsiders can never experience my certainty. Thus, of course, we are led to the idea that I can only believe in the existence of anything outside of my experience; all that I can know are those things which are objects which I experience.

We thus have two distinct positions, formed on a common basis of conceptual relations. The second is merely less inclined to apply the term 'knowledge' to all but the incorrigible intuitions of private experience.

There is an even more extreme position, however; in solipsism, the privacy of knowledge and ownership of it is extended to language. If we accept that experience is private and non-transferable, and thereby that knowledge is privately (indirectly) arrived at, the meaning of language which is used to describe such knowledge is also private. When I refer to something, I mean by
that my experience of it, which is by definition, not anyone else's; so that words as used by different individuals mean something different to each one.

"The assumption would be possible - though unverifiable - that one section of humanity had one sensation of red, and another section another". (47)

Thus, we cannot, given this version of epistemology, understand what we are saying to each other; further, we cannot suppose that others are capable of having experiences, for the individual (the solipsist) is the locus, the centre of all experience. He is the mono-centre of the world and his language. We could never know that others have experience, for this is beyond all possible knowledge.

Wittgenstein rejects this on the basis of two objections to the idea of a private language. How, given the tenets of this viewpoint, can we account for the formation or the possession of a concept? Private language, as well as being unteachable, is also unintelligible to those who speak it. Furthermore, in terms of this theory, we cannot explain how sentences are constructed. Now, on both these counts, we plainly contradict what is actually done with language in the practices of every speech situation of everyday life.

He starts by looking at the way in which language is acquired. If we are to construct a concept, the association of word and sensation affords us no basis on which to do so, since this gives us no standard of lexical definition with which to evaluate future usage. Private ostension is a possibility only on the basis of existing language usages, which provide us with a concept of the object in question. It is the possession of a language which makes it possible to posit the process of ostensive definition. Ostensive definition can only be used to account for secondary language acquisition. It cannot account for learning that which it relies upon to give it sense as a process - i.e., possession of syntactical categories. For a word to mean an object it must already 'mean' it, for an object cannot give a sign its meaning.
In the private linguists' concept of mind, concepts are cards in a filing system, to be searched out as the justification for using words to refer to something not present. In the presence of objects or properties, we may use the subjective justification afforded by this system to deny that these are rightly called, or conjecture about presence, or remember a previous occasion on which the object/property was present. We cannot, however, justify referring to an object before us in this way. Wittgenstein sees this notion of justification as basically wrong. Justification must, he points out, appeal to something apart from that which needs justifying; one memory may certainly be checked against another, but there is no way that I can check whether the memory produces the correct correlation.

Also, given the privacy of the exemplar, there is, in principle, no way in which a correct exemplar may be distinguished from an incorrect. If, as the private linguist wants to say, it is only from their experiences that people can know what pain means, (and thus, each has his own exemplar, which is unavailable to anyone else), when communication does take place, the exemplar is irrelevant, it is a piece of 'idle machinery', in the process of communication, since reference to it only involves using the word in the appropriate situation, the naming relationship (as it is conceived in the private language account) has no part in the knowing of the meaning of a word or in meaning something by a word or knowing what someone means. If it did, communication would be impossible. (48) This is not to be taken to imply that private experience is nothing; it is not, he says, a 'something', but not a 'nothing' either (49). What the emphasis on private experience seems to do is to make possible the claim that intuition can yield knowledge without the intervention of concepts (and thereby, understanding). Objects can only be known in a way in which they make sense via the mediation of a concept; without understanding, there can be no knowledge which deserves to be so called. Appearance might be intuition without thought, but we cannot know it in this way. If we take the precepts of this account seriously, then, there can be no knowledge of the external world
which makes sense to the subject.

Similarly, given the arbitrariness of language, the fact that the correlation of sound and object is subject to the change and innovation of individuals or groups, the private language advocate would want to say that the essential relation of mind to world is in terms of images - that is, the exemplification of the world is in the form of a picturing of what the world is like, and any sign could be used to refer to this; however, while it is true that languages arbitrarily assign relations between sound and referent we cannot assume that this arbitrariness has no bearing on the way in which a sign becomes a symbol. It is only possible to mean something by making a sound in a language because of the complex structure of syntax in the language and this complex structure strictly defines the possibilities for its employment. Given the 'picture theory' of language we cannot account for the use of words to convey meaning, since the notion of a picture or an image cannot account for the semantic and syntactic principles which govern the possible roles of a word in different sentences.

To conceive of the role of language as bringing about a mental event in the mind of the hearer to achieve communication is radically mistaken. Wittgenstein says that ... "speaking a language is part of an activity, or a form of life" (50). The purely significatory characterisation of language proposed by the private language account leaves out the variety of ways in which language functions in our everyday life (e.g., the word pain in pleading, begging for mercy, asking for help, threatening, sympathising, pitying, praying, exclaiming, even joking). Seeking to find the constitutive features of mental states as the essences or sources of meaning is fundamentally misguided. Wittgenstein points to the behavioural indicators of thinking and understanding to deny the necessity or sufficiency of proposed internal states as criteria for asserting that these processes are taking place. Thinking (knowing, understanding) are not things that go on as the accompaniment to speaking, either internally or externally, rather:
"Language is the vehicle of thought". (51)

Note, he is not concerned to deny the possible existence of internal states; rather, he wishes to deny their efficacy in explaining that of which they are said to be the foundation. The epistemic privacy of experience would seem to deny the possibility of communication, knowledge and meaning; we can have no knowledge of any inner worlds, including our own.

Wittgenstein, with his reminders of the ways in which such knowledge is used in everyday life, claims that when we do ascribe such psychological terms to ourselves, we do so as of natural right, but without justificatory evidence; that this is a sensible thing to do derives from the self evidence which we find in the natural manifestation of such inner states. This is to say, while we have no criteria for ascribing these states to ourselves, we can nevertheless do so because of the existence of the natural expressions which constitute part of the evidence (criteria, justification) on the grounds of which others ascribe psychological predictates to us.

Doubt about the certainty of our knowledge of other minds (for instance, the possibility of others pretending) only makes sense in the context of possessing behavioural criteria to distinguish truth from pretence; it is not possible to imagine a situation in which pretending did not rest upon familiarity with forms of action which constitute the pretended action. Thus, we can know with certainty (of differing degrees) the contents of other minds; this certainty, he points out, does not depend on being subjective or objective for its reputability. Certainty does not differ psychologically if it is subjective or objective; the difference is logical, and the kind of certainty possible is given in the grammar of the kind of language game involved.

The criterion of certainty is laid down in the grammar which makes a sentence in a language game sensible. That is to say, what a sentence comes to, its sense, derives from the grammar, the rules for its use, the grounds of the sentence.
"These are, inter alia, the (non-inductive) evidence for the truth of the sentence in the absence of countervailing evidence". (52)

The grounds of a sentence, then, constitute the basis of justificatory certainty. Doubt can only rest on a background of such rules of evidence as we use in fixing the meaningfulness of what is to be doubted.

In the case of first person psychological statements (say, avowals of pain) it is not the immediacy of the subjective experience which excludes the possibility of doubt (as the sceptic would have it), but rather the grammar of knowing does not allow us to doubt that we are in pain, while at the same time, this excludes the possibility of being 'certain', in a sense, since it is only possible to use 'knowing' about oneself if the grammar of what one claims to know also permits one to 'believe', 'doubt' or 'suspect', which about personal subjective states, it does not allow. It is, Wittgenstein believes, nonsense to 'claim' to know that one is in pain; if one thereby claims greater psychological certainty than others can have, one is confusing the experience of being in pain with the possession of conditions which justify the claim to know (for instance, inductive proof or pain behaviour).

The way in which the private ownership thesis is formulated misleads us into the wrong conception of what 'experience' is; in the case of pain, to say that another person cannot have my pain makes pain out to be some thing which, because its location in a person permits us to individuate it, seems to be spatially located in the same way as a material object. Wittgenstein wants to say that this is misleading, and that while the phenomenal characteristics and location of a pain provide us with criteria of qualitative identity, the numerical identity of a pain is given by the pain behaviour of the sufferer. Experiences are 'identifiability' dependent on their owners, but criteria of identity in the case of experiences do not (except in a trivial sense) constitute uniquely private objects. A claim for the privacy of identifiability-dependent objects
neglects the fact that we can with great justification claim that such 'objects' are the same, on the basis of precisely the grounds which enable us to identify them at all; in a perfectly good sense, people can be said to have the same experiences, the same pains, the same knowledge. At the same time, Wittgenstein claims, to say that another person cannot have my pain is nonsense. The solipsist would be drawn into saying, given the doctrine of the privacy of knowledge, that "... only he can play chess". (53)

This is a confusion about the grammar of such usage equivalent to what such people do in fact say; 'only I can know my sensations - I cannot exhibit my experiences.' Wittgenstein points out that what looks like a metaphysical claim has, in fact, a good grammatical sense. To say that only I can know that I am in pain is to (quite correctly) claim that it makes no sense, in my own case, for me to doubt whether I am in pain, and thus says something about the meaning of 'pain' in this usage. What cannot be inferred from this knowledge is that doubt is logically excluded from such knowledge it is an a priori claim, and not an empirical one. First person psychological utterances in the present tense do not 'describe' the consciousness of the speaker, but are manifestations of inner states (avowals). In a limited sense, they can be taken as descriptions of my inner state, but they are criterionless; they do not depend on my:

"Observing my soul out of the corner of my eye". (54)

The impossibility of doubt implies the impossibility of knowledge - at least certain knowledge as this is given in the grammatical rules involved.

In the case of first person present tense psychological sentences the use of I as subject leads one to think that there is a peculiar sort of knowledge which is empirical, non-evidential and immediate. Yet there are no criteria which determine the use of I as subject, no identification of one object among others, no recognition of a particular person to whom the predicate is attributed. Thus there is no room for misidentification or misrecognition. This, he claims, means that 'I' is neither a demonstrative pronoun nor does it denote
a possessor when used to make avowals. Rather than constituting the basis from which appearances come to be discussed, the idea of subjective appearance is a relatively late stage in the acquisition of language (55). Language appears at first as a discourse of the objective: learning to call some thing by name (acquiring a concept) is the previous basis of the notion of subjective appearance. To learn how to describe how things seem to me (as if describing an object) is logically parasitic upon being able to describe an object. The concept of ascribing perceptions criterionlessly to the self depends on the concepts of the objects they are taken to describe; and it makes no sense to ask for the conditions under which we can justifiably describe the objective world as this or that. The use of language manifests the relevant mastery, but it is derived from nothing since, as language, it pre-supposes knowledge of its criteria to be sensible (56).

Wittgenstein says that justification must come to an end, and that end, (in a carefully limited sense) is with how things seem to be with the subject; however, the description of how things seem to be with the subject does not rest upon self evidence but upon conventions which give statements about the objective world their sense. The criterial relation which exists between statements and their sense supplies meaning to descriptions of the world, makes them justified as statements, but this justification is, although stronger than inductive evidence, much weaker than entailment. For a thing to seem to be does not imply that it IS so. (57)

If we follow Wittgenstein, then, we could argue that when we look for the justification for accounts, we should look for the criteria which make them sensible. Such criteria would consist of the grounds from which they derive or the grammar of the language game of which they are a part. How does this relate to the sociological concern with the value basis of accounts? Both Gouldner and Blum see themselves as concerned with accounting as an expression (manifestation, product etc.,) of existential basis; the corpus of knowledge of the theorist,
in some way, is held to 'contain', in some mysterious way, his values, which reflexive theorising would make available to us. How does their work set about accomplishing this task?
"The older notion of 'objectivity' in the social sciences, as crystallised in Max Weber's classical formulation of the value-free doctrine, stressed an epistemology that premissed a radical separation between the formal justification of assertions, on the one side and the origin genesis or 'mode of production' of these assertions, on the other. For my part, I do not believe that a radical distinction between genesis and justification is tenable. At the same time, I reject a relativistic and nihilistic solution. In order for us to have rational grounds for believing in the truth of specific assertions about the social world, we must suppose them to have been produced by certain kinds of people, 'normal' people, people having certain talents and training, working with a genuine commitment to certain justified criteria and certain methods, who accept these C and M, and who also, apply them with technical competence and moral sincerity". (58)

Gouldner takes this to mean that, in order to be rationally justified in believing in the truth of any account, we must have knowledge of the social system of scholarship from which it comes, and grounds for confidence that this social system is enforcing conformity with the methods which aim at the fulfillment of its criteria. In the modern world, however, there are no grounds for confidence in the scholars' conformity to the right method, since the world of scholarship is a social world in which membership depends upon initial and continuing displays of warrantable competence (agreed as such by other members of the community) which effectively distort judgment because of that world's own dependence upon a specific form of social and economic patronage for its own existence. To find the criteria of reliable speaking, in this account, would involve looking outside the specific context within which speech is produced (the community of social scientists) in order to "re-cognise" the relationship between the details of speaking and the vulnerability of its speech to external interests and desires. To seek to produce "objective" speech is to seek to isolate common virtues in the face of the diversity of interests. It is not, Gouldner notes, to be neutral, but to be ("literally") 'realistic', insofar as realism involves recognising that reason is continually
vulnerable to interest and desire. A claim to recognise, and be able to produce, objective speech, amounts to an exhibition of a lack of objectivity, in which case objectivity becomes ideology.

The reflexive social theorist, for Gouldner, "... stresses the connectedness of news and men's interests", helps people to maintain access to what their society is silent about, stresses insistently and one-sidedly the repressed and silent side of things. This is at once the task of knowing what is to be known, and persuading others of its value, in the interest of emancipation.

It is, according to Gouldner, to bring about a reconciliation between the technical language games of theorists, and the everyday language games of which they are transforms, insofar as we must recognise that technical language games, in his view, are not self grounded, but have their grounds in the mundane concerns of everyday life.

What is to be found in the everyday language game is value, as a system of priorities which structure production, whether of things or ideas. Value is thus the ground of both everyday and technical language games, by derivation. To speak reliably, in this event, then, is to invoke the emancipatory, that which questions, extends, opens up the value grounds of speech. Critical speech is radical, or it is not reflexive; that is to say, reflexive speech denies its own ability to produce, in its speaking, what grounds it, but is produced as a dialectical moment in an ongoing process. If it seeks to speak the good, rather than applying its own standards to it-self, then it becomes ideological, apologetic. Reflexive speech is dialectical, in Gouldner's view, in that it seeks to transform itself into what it is not (what it does not say, what grounds it). What grounds its speech is shown in the desire to apply critical standards to it-self, to take its place (as 'other' rather than 'first') as subject (rather than ruler) in the community of speaking, while seeking to
replace the (imperialist) desire for perfect speech with the (emancipatory) acceptance of the sovereignty of history, and historicity.

If value is the ground of the everyday language game, Gouldner argues, objectivity has, and can only have, a peculiar sense, in relation to social accounts. Correctness does not, then, imply truth, because of the rule of convention; for the same reason, partiality does not necessarily imply bias, since, given the priority of value, what does an accusation of bias now come to? Neither is 'reason', if it is to be conventional necessarily productive of 'Good', for who is to say what is good. To elect to be reflexive in terms of this argument, is to make an argument for a way to live, since it is to commit oneself to openness about what grounds one's inquiring. Thus, objectivity comes here to be the attempt to transform locatedness from the source to the topic of inquiry. To make value (as source) into topic, simultaneously employs it as re-source.

Gouldner is quite explicit when he formulates the analysis of the grammar of the technical (sociological) language game as depending on the justification of everyday language games. For him, to be reflexive must be to take emancipation as the primary value, to show this as the ground of your speaking as you analyse the sociological language game. The problem for reflexive social analysis, then, comes down to making the possibility of emancipation, as the good, what is to be shown by the analysis.

If value gives to social accounts the sense that Gouldner's critical reflexivity makes of them, then, for Gouldner, value-grounds are the criteria for sociological accounts. The grammar of the sociological language game, for Gouldner, consists in the criterial relations between its accounts and their value grounds. Criticism, then, of this grammatical relation, involves, he argues, a re-valuation of the relation between norms of inquiry (in sociology), methodologies and institutional settings, and the social system which game them birth, in terms of the political commitment to radical realism. The Theorising of which such a critique consists is at once ideological and metaphorical. As a concrete
statement of value, it is ideological, but its metaphoricality aims at transcending the particularity of its location to relate to a diversity of concrete situations. At the analytical level, then, its metaphoricality provides a deeper grammar which transforms its status, providing a dialectical moment in the process of transformation. Metaphoricality thus refers to the rules of usage (among reflexive theorists) which enable value commitments to justifiably constitute accounts of the social world.

The reflexive theorist, then, to make these rules of usage (this grammar) the topic of his inquiry is to make the way in which value is both conventional (and thus available) and metaphorical (and thus hidden) a problem. As a critical enterprise, this is to confront the resources of the community (culture) with the agency of history (the self); speech and ground, ought and is, subject and object - each is animated by the dialectical principle, the supreme confrontation between possibility and reality. In the grammar of reflexive theorising, as a metaphorical or 'paleosymbolic' ground, we find, as a 'form' of (theoretic) life, both the 'normative' frame of the theorist (convention) and the possibilities for reality which the way of life affords (its meaning-potentialities as metaphor).

Grammar, it should be noted, is not a theory 'produced' (or willed) by members of a cultural group about the nature of reality; it is the reality which they inhabit, for they are subject to its facticity; the laws of nature, for instance, may seem inexorable but this is our inexorability. Nevertheless, it IS inexorability, and we cannot 'choose' to have them otherwise. (60)

To posit the grammar of the language game as the ground of an account is to point to conventional justifications, in the sense that the reality which is accorded with is constituted by the language game, as part of the complex of such games which constitute the culture of a society. While Gouldner is (quite correctly) pointing out that technical language games (such as sociology) cannot be self grounded, in the sense that they supply their own criteria of justification,
it is quite another to separate language games out into 'technical' and 'everyday' in a way which gives priority to one over the other, for this is a separation of grounds. Gouldner is arguing that technical language games, since they have their genesis in the mode of their production (the social context within which they are created), are thereby parasitic on the everyday language games which (presumably) form this context of production.

Now, this argument is parallel to the private linguists' claim for 'subjective' speech; here, it will be recalled, we come ultimately to "how things seem to me" as the justification for speech; 'sense-data' form the limits of our world. Gouldner's argument is parallel to this claim in the sense that it assigns facticity of just the same order (as sense-data) to the world of everyday language games in relation to the 'second-order' productions of technical language games. How things seem to the everyday actor provide the yardstick against which the products of technical language games are to be measured.

Now, while Wittgenstein holds that the language game of taking subjective appearances as the object of speech is certainly a possible move, it is not the basis on which learning to describe the world is based, for it is parasitic on the practice of ostension - i.e., learning to call this object by this name. The notion of something appearing to me to be so depends on my having learned to say when it is so, spontaneously; that is, learning 'how to go on' in this or that language game by grasping the meaning of what it is to go on in this way or that way.

Language is 'given a new joint' when we learn to take how things seem to be to us as an object for discussion and appraisal; the subject here appears as the object. That this is possible neither implies that it is always done (of course), nor that the object that is addressed is the basis of actual inferences, since the 'object' in question is not an object at all. The kind of knowledge which we criterionlessly ascribe to ourselves depends upon the concepts which
we use to describe 'in the normal case'. While in this case (in assertions about
the 'objective world') our accounts are subject to verification by re-describing
the relevant perceptual observation (since to make an assertion means to learn
to recognise the conditions under which one is justified in making it), a
statement about how things seem to appear to me simply describes the recognition
of the conditions under which one is so justified, and is not subject to any
further process. We cannot recognise the recognition.

As Hacker puts it:

"It is the manifestation of our mastery of the relevant ..
concept, thus pre-supposing our knowledge of its criteria
and simultaneously a manifestation of our mastery of the
component concepts of the objective (world) .. contained
within the description." (61)

The notion of value in Gouldner's account of the relation between everyday and
technical language games (sociology, Marxism) is used to relate the accomplish­
ment of an account to its basis in everyday life (the mode of production, the
mundane). Value, for Gouldner, grounds the accounts of the everyday language
game, and thus, through them technical language games. Our accounts are sensible
if how things seem to be in the account is in accord with how things might
conceivably be, given the possibilities for justifiable assertion within the
everyday language game. The everyday language game, according to this line,
supplies the conditions under which the technical language game may make just­
ifiable assertions. A fundamental precept of Gouldner's reflexive sociology
involves the formulator of the account in the technical language game making the
values of the technical language game recognisable in terms of the conditions
for justifiable assertion of the everyday language game. As in Wittgenstein's
discussion above, it would seem that we can take how we formulate the social
world (the 'way of seeing' of the sociological language game) as an object for
inquiry in terms of the way in which the world is formulated in everyday lang­
uage games. We 'see' the differences; for instance, deviance may appear to be
bad, disgusting, irresponsible (etc.,) in the language games of the everyday
world, whereas in sociology (or psychology, or politics) it may be 're-written'
as rational, determined, expressive, creative, and so on. It would seem, then, that we should be able to make the 'values' which produce this vision responsive to the 'commonsense' view, from which, surely, it must derive since deviance as a phenomenon is a product of the everyday world in the first instance.

Gouldner argues that reflexive sociology must be an argument for a transcendent value basis, some common good which will transform the relationship between the grounds of the everyday language game and itself in a re-unification of 'pure' and 'practical' reason.

Now, this re-unification is to come about, according to Gouldner, with the reflexive recognition of the value grounds of sociology in the everyday world. This is to say that Value, as the justification on which world-referring assertions are ultimately grounded, is to be grasped in the recognition of the criteria on which mastery of the relevant conceptual usage (in sociology) depends. However, while for Gouldner, the justifications for usage in the technical language game can be derived from the everyday language game, Wittgenstein argues that the recognition of the conditions for justifiable assertion comes to an end with the manifestation of the mastery of the relevant concept, with the pre-supposed knowledge of its criteria.

For Gouldner to ground the concepts of sociology ultimately in the everyday language game involves a separation of the two levels and an assumption of the priority of everyday language games, so that the grounds of the sociological language game are available in everyday language. "Taking how things seem to us as sociologists" as an object of inquiry, in this account, depends on the everyday language game of "taking how things seem to us as everyday actors". If we accept this as a possible move, then the grammar of the everyday language game, since it supplies us with the ultimate justification for world-referring assertions, also supplies the criteria for the sensible attribution of value to sociological accounts, since these are responsible ultimately to the grammar of everyday language games.
However, to describe sociological accounts in terms of the values which ground them in the social context of production depends on our being able to justify the attribution of a criterial relation, that is to say, upon our making sociological accounts an object for the reflexive analysis. If they are to be taken as such an object (i.e., if they are to be grounded in values) then they must be taken as having one meaning, they must have a clear sense. We could not justifiably assert the relation between value and account unless we had not already interpreted what the account means.

Thus, for us to assert a relationship between value and account depends upon our already understanding the account to which we attribute this determining effect. That is to say, our understanding of the account is presumed to be analytically separable from our imputation of value.

To be critical of sociological accounts requires that we see sociological accounts as having a clearly delimitable meaning which we can treat as the one possible description; i.e., that we see in sociological accounts an instance of language operating as simultaneously (in Gordon Baker's phrase):

"a conjunction of possibilities and a possibility of conjunction" (62)

Proceeding from this separation off of justification from understanding, for the moment, we see that the understanding of the sentences of a sociological account comes about with the ascription of sense in terms of the criterial relations with the more basic sentences of the everyday language game. The claim that the statements of the sociological account were based on criteria which did not make them certain (i.e., that they are remitted, biased, value laden) would depend, in its turn, on the claim that these criteria, as justifications, in fact offered justification for believing in something else, with a presumptive ability to establish the truth of countervailing accounts, and a significant correlation between the countervailing accounts and the criterial justification appealed to in the everyday language game which afforded justification to both countervailing and original accounts.
The possibility of criticising the criterial justification appealed to the original account is therefore parasitic on the holding of other criterial relations between sentences in the sociological language game and the appeal to alternative possibilities putatively justified by the same sentences of the everyday language game. Thus, an accusation of value groundedness only has sense if we conjoin, on the one hand, the meaning of an account as highly determinate (a junction of possibility) and also highly indeterminate (a conjunction of possibilities). The notion of indexicality captures the paradox very well. On the one hand, the meaning of an utterance in context is highly specific, whereas if we remove it from context it offers an extremely wide variety of possible interpretations.

Continuing to maintain Gouldner's proposed relation between the sentences of the sociological language game and the language games of everyday life, we now find, however, that if we wish to claim that it is possible to discover instances of a breakdown between sentences of the technical language game and its everyday grounds, this can only follow if we maintain the general criterial relations between sentences of the two kinds. Mannheim's argument finds support here, for, we could not propose a general breakdown without depriving ourselves of any means to discover it. However, any criticism of the value bases of sociological accounts requires grounds; in the present case, since we must maintain the general principle of relations between sociological accounts and everyday language, these grounds must involve additional evidence which subverts the justifications appealed to give the original account sense. That is to say, the sense of sociological accounts can only be subverted by appealing to evidence which is different from the criteria appealed to in the first instance to give those accounts their sense.

Since the attribution of sense to an account depends on the criterial relations conventionally available to justify such an attribution as sensible, and the criticism of the value bases of sociology depends crucially on the sense
attributed to the object of criticism, it would seem to follow that to criticise an account must involve re-formulating the object which the conventional criterial relations would produce in terms of doubts grounded in additional evidential support.

However, Gouldner's attribution of value does not, and cannot produce additional evidential support from that already available, that which already justifies the usage. To criticise accounts then, in terms of the values which produce them, it would seem that we must (a) make the conventions which ground the attribution of sense into the 'objects' of criticism, and (b) offer additional evidential support, outside of the conventions which, for this 'object' ground its sensible employment, in order to offer a countervailing 'sense'.

what would this mean for sociological accounts? To begin with, it would mean that what sociological accounts come to, what the sense of its sentences is to be, can be precisely demarcated by examining the conventions of the sociological language game. If the sociological language game is to be, as a technical language game, itself grounded in the conventions of the everyday language game, then the conventions of the everyday language game would seem to afford an 'external view' of the sense of its 'sociological' sentences. However, these are, according to Wittgenstein's view of the constitution of sense, 'sociological' precisely insofar as they derive their sense from their relations to each other, as sentences in a specialised language game; the significance of the criterial account of sense making is precisely that no 'external' view of the sense of sentences is available. Consequently, if the sense of the sentences of the sociological language game depends on the criterial support of the sentences of the everyday language game depends on the criterial support of the sentences of the everyday language game, then the sentences of the everyday language game cannot be more basic than the sentences of the sociological language game; the criteria which justify the sociological language game would themselves require justification, and so on to an infinite regress of meta-statements, if that were the case.
Rather, what Wittgenstein's work suggests is that sentences which afford criterial support depend themselves for their sense on the sentences to which they are thereby criterially related in this action. This is to say, the sentences of the sociological language game themselves form the justification of the sense of the sentences of the 'everyday' language game which are criterially related to them; a statement of the value groundedness of sociological accounts depends for its sense on the criterial relation between itself and the account for which it claims to be the ground. The sense of the 'statement of value' depends on the sense of the account for which it claims to be the ground. It is a reciprocal relation. (63)

To claim that the sociological language game is grounded in the everyday language game, then, does not enable one to demarcate the meanings of the sentences of the sociological language game externally, for the sense of accounts in the sociological language game are involved in reciprocal criterial relationships with the sentences which form the justification of their sense. If value is to form the ground of an account, it cannot be formulated in terms of the sentences of the everyday language game, as if these were prior and unconnected. Whatever sentences are used could not provide a description of the practices involved in formulating a sociological account, for the justifications for the sentences produced in the practice of sociological theorising themselves form the 'meaning' of the sentences produced in the practice. There is no 'calculus' in language games; we cannot 'subtract' justification in order to isolate meaning; the meaning of theorising practices exists in the relation between sentences in an account and the justifications which make them sensible.

In sum, then, there is no external view of the meaning of sociological accounts outside of the criterial support afforded by the sentences which justify the usages which are embodied in it, and the sense of the sentences which afford such criterial support depends on what they are being used to attribute sense to, for their own sense.

Gouldner's formulation of value as a relation which assigns priority to the
sentences of the everyday language game is thus based on a 'classical' epistemological theory which Wittgenstein's work implicitly rejects. It makes no sense to formulate value as this kind of relationship, for this establishes a principle of doubt which would overturn any claim to certainty, since it rests itself on a view of certainty which is an 'illusion of grammar'.

We do, of course, speak of interest dictating the content and arguments of accounts (for instance, the social theories of Nazism), and intuitively, this seems a reasonable thing to do. This rests, however, on our ability to justify such critiques on the grounds of some overriding and unquestionable set of values (the sanctity of human life, the dignity of man, our version of the essential features of a just society, and so on). Gouldner's claim for the value of emancipation is just such a claim; what he also does, however, is to tie this moral critique to an argument that, since the accounts of social science exist as the formulation of possibilities in an interest-directed selection from the 'given and fixed realm' (the 'reality' of social conditions) it is therefore always possible to doubt their truth. He thus 'builds in' a possibility of scepticism which can be projected to any level. This enables him to justify the appeal to the moral realm (and the value of emancipation) by arguing from a possible particular breakdown (as in capitalist societies, or Nazi Germany) to a general breakdown, with no certainty (in this epistemology) available, with the concommitant necessity of an appeal to metaphoricality.

The notion of value, used in this way, necessarily becomes a causal factor in the genesis of social theories; there is no way out of the resulting infinite regress if we accept the thesis that, since justification is defeasible all social accounts are relative to the occasion of their production.

What Wittgenstein's work suggests is that, while any claim to justification is subject to the possibility of subversion, this does not necessarily involve the possibility of a general breakdown of criterial relations. As a general theory, the implications of Gouldner's scepticism would transform the possibility of
value-groundedness into a brute fact; what is to be remembered is that whether or not accounts are to be grounded in value is not to be decided prior to the construction of a general theory in which doubt and certainty have a role to play, for it is only in terms of such a theory that we could conceive of the proper role of value in relation to other possibilities (such as certainty, and doubt, and truth).

In terms of a theory which would see sense as being accomplished by the reciprocal criterial relations between sentences of a variety of language games, value has quite a different role to play than that which it takes in the relation between the fundamental sentences of the 'everyday' language game and the 'theoretical' sentences of technical language games such as sociology. In terms of the former, what is being doubted about the role of value is not the empirical fact of value directing theory, but the general premises which are adduced from this possibility.

According to Wittgenstein, the possibility of doubt does not undermine a claim to certainty based on criterial support. In sociological terms, only substantial grounds for doubt can undermine an account; that is to say, the possibility of doubting sociological statements does not undermine their claim to certainty in general, rather the claim to certainty which such accounts make is part of a language game in which (as in any language game) it only has sense to talk of certainty which does include the possibility of doubt.

In the language of sociology, it does not make sense to search for certainty which is unquestionable, any more than it does in any language game. It is precisely the questionability of social scientific accounts which makes it sensible to talk of them in terms of certainty at all.

Now, as Baker's argument has shown this is not simply the introduction of a new, weak sense of 'certain'; the point is that the kind of certainty involved
in the notion of value freedom (in the case of sociology) is based on a notion of knowledge which is, by virtue of how it is defined, both unattainable and unnecessary.

**Gouldner's Account of Value; a Summation**

For Gouldner, then, the consequence of the value embeddedness of any account of the social world is that objectivity only becomes possible with the analysis of what values in fact ground sociological accounts in the mundane concerns of everyday life. This rests on the separation of the grounds of everyday and technical language games; the latter are transforms of the former. To be reflexive is to search for value-grounds which display the interest of emancipation - i.e., the common good - in the objective transformation of the process of re-unification (of everyday language games and sociological theorising) brought about by self criticism. Making the technical level metaphorical enables Gouldner to claim that the conditions for the justification of its statements can be a matter of convention, or grammar. What is brought together in this formulation of the relation of value (convention) and account (metaphor) is the principle that the justification of statements, given that their sense is accomplished in the reciprocal criterial relation of themselves and their rules of usage, provides only and can only provide an irremediable indeterminacy to the sense of its sentences. The metaphoricality of the statements of the sociological language game provides for the principle of the indeterminacy of the sense of its sentences. However, this view rests, as has been argued, on the notion that some other possible view of the sense of its sentences is available to us. Taking Wittgenstein's view of the constitution of sense seriously, we can see that the sense of the sentences of the sociological language game is what is accomplished in the relation to its criterial justification - there is no other access to it. The claim to metaphoricality rests also on the ability to bring together concretely diverse phenomena as instances of 'the same thing'; this, it is held, demonstrates the existence of formulable 'rules of trans-
formation' which the theorist could, in principle, recognise, if not necessarily formulate. The paleo-symbolic level from which these rules transform, would presumably constitute a realm in which basic sentences (which are unformulable in principle) supply the sense of the sentences of the surface structure. While this claim cannot, by its nature, be refuted, the ability of sentences to justify concretely diverse phenomena as instances can be subsumed under a criteriological account of sense making because of the reciprocal relation of sentences and their justifications - i.e., the sense of the justification is at least partly determined by the sentence which it justifies.

The notion of being critical of the grammar of the sociological language game rests on a fundamental misconception of the possibilities for knowledge and certainty. It depends on reducing the sense of accounts in this context to grounds on a more basic level in the mundane language game. To specify sociological accounts as transforms of this more mundane level is to claim that the meaning of the concepts employed in sociological accounts is prior to the usage of those concepts in the assertions/statements of the account (e.g., Role, Structure, Action and so on). Under this account, we go wrong in sociology when we mis-apply the concept according to the grammar of the sociological language game as it is formulable in terms of the everyday language game. The rules of the sociological language game constitute what is to count as a correct or an incorrect application of a concept insofar as sociology is recognisable as having a specific end, which then stands as the arbiter of what will be intelligible within the activity. In a sense, then, the grammar of sociology is arbitrary; however, this end is itself only available in the correct application of its rules. The grammar of the sociological language game determines what is to constitute doing sociology in terms of what is to constitute good/true/accurate accounting of sociological phenomena but, what is to constitute the accounting of social phenomena is not defined by the rules of sociological grammar. Gouldner wants to claim that the language game of sociology is a transform of the language game of everyday life, and that therefore, its ends
(what gives it sense) are formulable in the mundane language game. But the grammar of the everyday language game is an alternate form of representation to the sociological language game. To account the ends of sociology in terms of the everyday language game is to change the sense. The language game of everyday life does not form the ground of the sociological language game. The statements of the sociological language game do not depend for their sense on a more basic set of sentences. Rather, the grammar of the sociological language game constitutes reality as the sociologist knows it. To argue for a more basic view is to move outside of the possibilities of knowledge.

To argue then for the relativity of sociological knowledge depends on the assumption of the possibility of a general breakdown of criterial justification for its statements; such a breakdown is explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein's constructivist account of sense making. The subversion of particular accounts necessarily remains as a possibility because the defeasibility of criterial justification is what makes possible the certainty that we can have. Thus, the possibility of the subversion of sociological accounts on the basis of their value ground is what supplies sociology with the form of certainty that is possible in any language game, but such a move involves grounds which are not themselves open to doubt, and therefore, cannot be known. The accusation of value groundedness is parasitic on the objective accounting which the sociological language game affords. The claim which reflexivity makes for a cognition of value grounds through self criticism is radically incoherent; the claim for a transformation of value grounds through self criticism may have some weight, but it cannot involve the kind of self knowledge which it claims, crucially, it does not involve the action of will. It is itself subject to the grounds possible in any community of language, which are in principle, open neither to doubt, nor knowledge, nor certainty; the transformation of a way of seeing can only occur within the logical possibilities of the evidential relationship between the sentences of what has already to be accepted, and the relationship between that which is the product of such a process, and the
process whereby it comes into being is not itself subject to doubt, knowledge or certainty.

The problem is essentially the status of the self as the object of subjective knowledge, the sense in which we know our own thoughts as objects in a field of cognition. Such knowledge only has sense in terms of the sentential criterial relations between the objects of which it is taken to be a description - i.e., knowing our knowledge as a way of knowing the world depends for its possibility on the relations between the sentences with which we describe the world, and how we justify them. The self which appears as subject in this move is irremediably conventional; the knowing of that self is the achievement of grammar, as it structures the relation between the self as subject and object.

Relexivity in sociology cannot take as its goal a critical speech on its own grounds; the object towards which such speech would be directed is not a possible object of knowledge. Critique is parasitic on the possibility of theorising. Any critique of the conventions of sociology pre-supposes a meta-sociology in which it is itself intelligible; the possibility of such a critique does not imply the relativisation of sociological accounts, but should rather itself form the ground under which such speech could be intelligible. The way of life under which critique is a possible move itself has a grammar, but this grammar must be accepted, it is not a matter for argument. This is not to say that it does not change, but rather that it only has life in each occasion of critique as the sense of critique and its object is accomplished in their reciprocal criterial relationship. Critique then comes to an argument for a way to live, but it is not reflexive, in the way that it claims to be, but rests on the acceptance of previously decided conventions of grammatical usage; the "objects" of the language game of critique are constituted in the grammar on which it rests.

The goal of reflexive sociology, then, is to be the grammar of the occasions in which sociological accounts accomplish sense.
Some Implications (ii) Blum and Self Knowledge

Self is the achievement of Grammar in the relation to the grounds which make it possible. That is to say, the self is accomplished by the relation between the communal resources upon which sensible speech (the speech of members) is founded and the occasions of speech which celebrate those resources in concrete possibilities. Speech re-collects the relation between itself and the world on the occasion of producing the world. Reflexive theorising, then, would be speech which attends not to this possible sociological world as a product, not to what is what is produced in its stipulations, assertions, predications, but rather how this product is a display of what makes it possible, how the self is a method for the production of speech. (64)

"Theorising is the attempt to bring the experience of thinging to speech. If thinking is a conversation within the soul" (cf., Wittgenstein, below), "what one speaks about ought to be exemplified as a moment in this conversation. One's predecessors re-present the unthought origins of one's own thought which this very thought seeks to surpass. Theorising begins with what men have in common, and since author reader and predecessor are men, inquiry begins with what they have in common as men. What they have in common is that they are all moved caused and summoned by that which moves causes and summons all things. Beneath the superficial commonality of their 'mutual orientations' to one another is a deeper unity - the oneness of Being in which all men participate .... The difference between the author, predecessor and reader is that he has listened to what they share. The Author knows that what they share needs re-thinking, and their deep unity consists not in the what of what they share but in the fact that what they share can be rethought. The most important matter to re-think is that what they share has not been thought ... The problem of the author is to induce the reader to join with him to hear what they share by constructing a relationship with the predecessor as the icon of the thinking experience as it-self an instance of the re-thinking to which author and reader are directed. Author and reader share their humanness - the capacity to re-think that which needs thought. The author's problem is to re-create an exemplary thinking experience for a reader whose horizons are controlled by the security of the unthought, the pleasurable and the common; to have the reader re-experience their human solidarity which the dispersive forces of the high sounding and impressive cover over.

To cite the falsity of predecessors, and their omissions, gaps and stupidities as failures is to compare their performances (performances which the author has himself created) with the standard of true speaking in terms of which they fall short. To use the standard resourcefully
for such citation while not exposing its committed and rational character as a standard that is achieved masks the possibility of re-experiencing the standard itself as that which emerges out of the Desire to surpass this self same arena of falsity and otherness. Because such usage concretizes the standard as a neutral object - present and apparent to the onlooker - it divests the standard of any moral weight as a good on the grounds that what is merely present is not worth saying”. The Book (65)

For Blum, then, the self-centredness which treats speech as simply the difference between author and predecessor cannot re-present the unity which grounds the author’s theorising as theorising; the assertion of this difference in the assumed agreement from which unthinking speaking begins masks the problem of how, in fact, necessary loyalty to this agreement (the moral grounds of speaking as a saying) is affirmed in the self. A saying of what ought to be shown itself shows what ’ought’ it aspires to, shows how it re-members its-self as a celebration of this agreement. Reflexive speech, then, recognises in the difference of what is shown to what is said the celebration of the moral grounds of speaking which unify author and predecessor, self and other, member and community. The knowing of this unity is the recovery of the self as a method for the accomplishment (in faithfulness to moral grounds of speaking) of membership which re-members the underlying community of language and that of which it speaks. To speak of sociology in this way is to mark off the subjects of which it speaks from the authoritative election which it makes concerning how the phenomena which it constitutes ought to be understood; it is to mark off the concrete subject (that of which it speaks) from the rule to which sociology subjects itself the rule which provides the auspices for sociological description. This rule is the Analytic subject of sociology; it is what enables sociology to produce a topic. The analytic subject of sociology, then, is the moral life of which, as itself an inquiry, it is an instance. Put in another way, sociological description displays its moral commitment not in conceptions of the material upon which it operates (as Gouldner and other ’reflexive’ sociologists would claim), but in the way in which any study displays in itself a normative commitment to how inquiry ought to be accomplished.
That is to say, it is intelligible only in terms of grounds which justify it as a display of competent membership (exemplifying the moral and rational code of the community of sociological language). To make the grounds of sociological accounting a topic, then, is to make the relation between the speech (what it constitutes) and its standard (how this is intelligible) the goal of speech. To speak truly would be to speak ideal rationality, but such perfect speech is impossible, for any reference to its own standard makes use of such a standard to constitute itself. The desire to make reference to the rational and moral grounds of speaking arises with the accomplishment of any practice of inquiry, for such accomplishment rounded on rational and moral standards which it must meet; in the accomplishment of inquiry there is immediately raised the possibility of 'that which the inquiry is for' (its moral/rational grounds) being the rational topic for the practice itself. The desire to address the grounds of sociological inquiry, then, amounts to a confrontation with the inaccessibility of the standards according to which sociological speech is intelligible.

The inaccessibility of the standard of intelligible sociological speech is not taken, thereby, as a recommendation for silences. Rather, definition, which stands as the accomplishment of intelligible speech, is to be seen as a metaphor in which the grounds are brought to speech; to make any such metaphorical appearance the occasion for inquiry into how it is arrived at is to display, in the workings of the reasons for the definition (the rationality) the moral grounds of the speech which the definition is — i.e., a notion of what justifies the sense of the definition (note here the criteriological account of sense making). To take a sociological account as a metaphor for its moral and rational grounds is to treat it as an icon, to take its occasion as the opportunity to show the desire the aspiration for a speech which grounds itself; the aspiration to the perfect speech shows in its failure (practicality, partiality) the limits on the possibilities of speech. The limits of possibility of speech which seeks to speak what justifies its speaking describes (shows) the conditions under which the Self achieves the rational and moral version which members recognise as the competent accounting of social reality.
Insofar as sociological speech is reflexive, then, it is speech which is responsible for the product which the speech is; that is, as the possible topic of rational speech, the product of reflexive speech must be itself subject to the rational methods whereby this responsibility can become clear and intelligible. This is not to make the speech subject to an idealised (planful, intelligible) standard constructed from just how (sociology, science, everyday thinking, etc.) gets done, but rather, it seeks to address the question behind the method - i.e., why it is worth doing, why it ought to be done. To understand the practice of sociology, then, does not imply that we accept the standards accepted as secure in order that sociology 'gets done'; sociology cannot achieve a practical understanding of itself, it cannot understand its practice in terms of the standards by which the practice is intelligible, it cannot make itself the topic for its standard. Yet, the aspiration to reflexivity displays the ground which is the reason for speaking, displays its rationality - the failure to speak the perfect speech displays the desire, the reason for aspiring to perfect speech.

Paradoxically, reflexive speech cannot achieve its aim (aspiration), for as a saying it cannot achieve practical understanding of why it speaks; to talk in such a way as to show that the failure is recognised, speaking in a way that shows that it remembers that the topic of reflexivity is what it does not say; that is, it understands itself as that reason for speaking (rationality) of which it cannot speak. It shows its rationality by not accepting the inadequacy of its own standard applied to itself (practical understanding as the ground), of what it can say of itself as a practice, as the limits of the self knowledge it can have. Rather, reflexive speech aims to recover what is shown, it aspires to recognise in the failure of speech to say its ground how this saying shows its moral and rational authority.

Reflexive speech is not, then, an accounting of that which enables it to be an account, but an account which shows that its product is justified by the internal relation between the standard in terms of which, as the product of a
practice, it is only intelligible, and the moral and rational grounds which this standard exemplifies (of which it is an icon). Now, this is to make reflexive speech the attempt to provide, in the reading of itself which it recommends (how its saying raises the question of itself as a topic), a way of undermining the rule in terms of which it is intelligible. The recommendation to treat the product of speech analytically is the recommendation to refuse to allow the subject of the speech to only be intelligible in terms of the standard which the practice provides; therefore, the only way of seeing which can resist the standard internal to the practice is metaphoric reading. Theorising which raises the question of itself as a practice recommends that its speech be read as a metaphor for that which is external to the practice (that which it cannot formulate, its moral and rational authority), so that any reading itself involves grasping through the rule of a practice the self which achieves the sense of the reading.

Reflexive speech, then, is speech which treats itself as if it were not providing an authoritative version of how it ought to be read; it is ironic, it treats words iconically, and refuses to take what they formulate (their concreteness, their meaning in terms of the standard of the practice which the speech is reflexive on) seriously (as the self evident justification of the moral and rational ground on which the practice stands).

For Blum, then, reflexivity is a way to self knowledge, but it is knowledge of the deepest grounds of self, the community of that self with the authority which (silently) sanctions all speaking. This authority is to be displayed, rather than described, for it is the authority which enables describing to describe. Crucially reflexive sociological speech would be speech which displays the authority of which its standard is (but) a metaphor. Reflexive sociological speech would be speech which recognises the irony of its formulations; for reflexivity (according to Blum) requires the denial of the standard of empirical adequacy, for this is itself a concretisation of the relation between description and its objects. All empirical description proceeds from
the subjection of the world to the rule of that which is the ground of the community of language users - that which is already available (cf., Wittgenstein, the sense of an object is not given by the object itself).

Reflexivity in sociology would be a theorising which rejects the ends of sociology as a form of life. It can only have as its ends (given Blum's account) the denial of the concerns of sociological accounting as serious concerns - it would seek to make the topics of sociology analytic, whereby they would lose their place as topics in the face of the greater topic (what grounds their existence as topics what is the moral and rational ground for their place as topics in sociology). Sociological accounts as descriptions become subverted, on this account of reflexivity, by their ironic relationship to the (unaddressed) moral and rational grounds of the way of life which they seek to preserve. Sociology exists only, then, as the decadent instrument of a way of life which refuses to take the Reason for its own being seriously. The aspiration to reflexive speaking would direct itself not at the adequacy of accounts (the criteria which give them sense in the language game) but at the possibilities of the language game in which they are sensibly employed. Reflexive speaking would seek to display the questions which ought to be the topics of inquiry which seriously raises the question of what grounds it (what is the reason for its speaking).

Sociology then is incapable of reflexive speaking, for reflexive speaking must take as its topic the way in which sociology, as a way of seeing, fails to address what authorises it. What, then, is reflexive speaking to consist of? Clearly, it has a view of what its practices should be, what election we ought to make if we are to confront the problem of what the grounds of our speaking ought to be. Many of these should be apparent from the discussion which has gone before. (66)

Firstly, it recommends that we treat any speech as an occasion, rather than a
stipulation. That is, what the speech is to mean should not be taken as self evident, rather, we should recognise that what it is to mean is accomplished in our reading; each reading is a new recovery, for the reflexive theorist, rather than a re-view of what has already been viewed. Of course, what the speech which is the reading will itself then be intelligible as must likewise, for the audience for which it is an occasion, be a matter for recovery. Reading is thus to be the display of the resources in terms of which the speech is intelligible, rather than the re-citation of the authority for its concrete meaning (what it means in terms of the standard of the practice within which it locates itself).

Speaking is therefore iconic and ironic; it is iconic in that its statement exemplifies the standard in terms of which it formulates the world (it is an instance of the rule which it is subject to); it is ironic in that it (inevitably) concretises that which ought to be its analytic topic (it-self, the moral and rational grounds which enable it to be what it is). Secondly, then, reading is to be metaphorical, rather than literal.

This makes theorising, as a practice, essentially non-cumulative; Blum is not interested in the idea of progress. Rather than moving towards more and more (essential, refined, profound, complex ... etc.,) knowledge, theorising is the re-cognition that what makes our knowing possible is the really serious topic and this is the first and most important question for any inquiry. Progress is (necessarily) founded on taking this question for granted, and taking it for granted means that it has not been asked.

Asking the question, then, is the business of reflexive theorising, but it is because of the accretion of the products of theorising which assume the answer to the first question that it is possible to ask it. For to ask the question is to involve one-self in a dialogue with the speech of which it is asked. What is made the topic for the speech upon another speech is the authority on which they both rest. Reflexive speech, thirdly, is dialogue-ic,
and Dialectic; it is speech which takes what it can make of another speech as its topic, but what it makes is itself recommended as merely a possible occasion for what another can make of it. Underlying what it makes of that which is its topic, and that which is made of it as a topic is the concern with how topic is sensibly made of any speech. Dialectically, it transforms itself from what it is as a saying to what it shows, from what it concretely is to what it analytically stands for, from an exemplification of a standard to the metaphor of the ground of which the standard is an icon.

A concern with reflexivity, then is a concern with the moral grounds which are covered over when the meaning of a speech is made to be that which must follow from the historicised instrumental purposes of its author, when his authority is derived from a concrete reading of the reason (rationalistic relevances) for his speaking. Thereby reflexivity becomes the concern with history as the process whereby speech, thought, action display how they are united with the ideal of rationality as they describe that which it illuminates (the good which makes it possible for us to recognise itself in what it does not describe). Theorising is essentially Socratic; it does not aim at arriving at (producing) statements, but is rather concerned with what it is to think in the right way so as to produce statements; the product is strictly subordinate to showing the thinking which produced it.

This conception of theorising depends crucially on a rejection of any attempt to specify the agreed meaning of a concept. The theory of the meaning of speech being in the usage is interpreted as leading to the impossibility of formulating the limits of its meaning, since it only has that meaning in the context in which it is employed.

"In theorising under the auspices of mathematical interests, men introduce standards of exactitude and parsimony into their discourse which are designed to stabilize the discourse as a common object of orientation for co-speakers. Yet,
exactitude can only be achieved when the diversity of actual employments is suppressed and forgotten; remembering such diversity makes the formulation of exact concepts impossible, because what is remembered are the inexhaustible conditions under which the formula is denied through the praxis of sociality". (67)

To read concretely is to accept the authority of what the speech can be read as saying on the basis of the unquestioned agreement (what anyone knows) as to what it must mean (Marx the economist, Marx the positivist). The only alternative an analytic reading, treats such agreement (the conventions of ordinary usage) as only the occasion for knowing through destroying the agreement, through interrogation of the conventions without stopping, without solving the problem. Any solution to the problem assumes an authority which is, by the nature of the problem, itself always open to question (any concretization is subject to analytic reading). The irremediable indeterminacy of the sense of speech, then, generates the problem of reflexivity; the gap between the historical situation of a corpus of work, and the action of interpreting creates the insoluble problem of encompassing the inexhaustible possibilities of its usage. Reflexivity can only afford partial and incomplete glimpses, through the investigation of such possibilities, of the encounter between Self, Convention and the transcendent unity of discourse which, as merely a catalogue of events, History is the concrete mask.

According to this account of theorising, meaning justified by reference to what criteria are available in the conventions of the community of language users merely hides the moral and rational grounds on which such a relationship in fact rests. To search for such moral and rational grounds is the ideal of a Socratic conception of inquiry. Further, such a search depends crucially on being in the form of a Dialogue. It is the attempt to educate, to show, to display what is going on when interpretation gets done. What other response is possible in the face of both the concreteness and the metaphoricality endemic to speech? We either submit ourselves to the authority of a standard, or refuse
The refusal to do so attempts to subvert the authority of the standard by focussing the action of inquiry onto itself, by making the process whereby the standard collects speech (which makes a thing out of the world) with the world (the thing which the world is), that is, it takes as its ideal that which is not a thing upon which that which is a thing depends (stands). This is the final irony, for the ground upon which the thingness of speech stands is no-thing. The no-thing (that which cannot be said) is not nothing, but neither is it some-thing. The goal of reflexive theorising cannot be said, but only shown. It consists in the concerted relation between speaker (speech) and hearer (interpretation) in an underlying principle which unifies them, the principle that the speech shows that which it does not say, that the word and the world are unified by what is other than them-selves. The aim of reflexive theorising is to find ways for this to affect the thinking which inquiry is, to find ways for it to be in thinking. Reflexive inquiry then, addresses the inner processes which are other than the public processes which speech, as the vehicle of thought, allows.

This account of the consequences of the indexicality of speech for theorising clearly attempts to transcend the limits of speech; interestingly, however, it depends itself upon a clear notion of what those limits are. This notion is contained in the version which it embraces of the constitution of meaning in speech. Fundamentally, it depends on embracing a doctrine of the irremediable indeterminacy of the sense of concepts. The argument is basically that:

"Such elementary human concern as the distinction between right and wrong assumes that man is able to raise himself above his historical conditioned-ness. When classical philosophy inquires into justice, and puts in the foreground the unconditional nature of this distinction, it is clearly right, and a radical historicism, which historically relativises all unconditional values, cannot be right. Thus one's arguments have to be tested in the light of classical philosophy." (68)

This does not rest on the fundamental contradiction implied in historicism, but upon the certainty that it can never be settled as to which perspective...
on the interpretation of speeches is the correct one. From this is derived the necessity of a retreat from progress and the necessity of inquiring into the relation between (historical) speeches and the originary concerns of the classical philosophy from which they have come.

Theorising which accepts the radical historicisation of value, the impossibility of talking about truth is Nihilistic; the consequence of accepting the conditionality of speech (its irremediable indeterminacy) is that "everything is permitted". The only attribution of value which is possible is by an act of arbitrary resolution, given the conditionality of speech, and such justification as we can produce for such an attribution is (of course) itself subject to the restraint of conditionality. According to the historicised concept of theorising that which is good is separate from that which is reasoned; given the Cartesian version of subjectivity, ego either independently perceives the order of the world as it presents itself to him, or else projects his created order onto the world as he masters and creates it. The question of the goodness of the order in either case becomes a problem inaccessible to metaphysics mathematised by the philosophy of history, while reason itself becomes historicised by the doctrine of the autonomous ego. What must be addressed are the consequences of this divorce between goodness and reason for the philosophies which it has produced. Essentially, such a conception of inquiry seeks to resist enslavement to history, wishing neither to revert to the past, nor plunge into the future, but rather to recognise that it is only possible to live (the good life) in the present. A Resistance of history comes down to a concern with the self (truth, being) which finds itself between past and future.

Now, any account of the constitution of sense, which attempts to replace the action of knowing (noesis), the 'conversation within the soul', with a "public, mediated, discursive" account of the setting within which this must take place is denying the prior intelligence of doing from which speech is derived; from this perspective, such an enterprise (as that of the later Wittgenstein) would
find itself arguing for the arbitrariness of reason, since it would have to deny that, as itself a human construction, there is any way to provide for the meaning or value of it. It is merely a contingent fact. The private language argument is taken to be implying that, since we must exclude the intuition of form noetically since there are no criteria by means of which one may decide whether or not the name given to the intuition is correct, we are thereby condemned to merely speaking without thinking, for a public speech itself depends on intuition and memory, and the ability to compare what is said against what it is that it is said about. Inner experience (noesis) is logically required if public speech is not to be either nonsense or silence. The argument that reason is discursive is nihilistic because it attempts to replace speech about the transcendent forms on which such intuition is based with speech about how ordinary language is used, and with this move, replace consideration of the value of usages with a denial of the validity of self predication on logical grounds, and a reflexive assertion of the correctness of their formulation by virtue of the silence which the theorising demands about anything which is not conventional. To be reasonable on this account, means to speak in the usual way. Any attempt to speak about why we should live the way of life within which such speech is the usual, cannot give any reasons, for to specify the way of life is to provide what such argument would come to; in the end, the decision to live such a life is a decision of principle, not subject to rational choice outside the way of life within which reason is possible. The inference of the value of the facts of the universe cannot, on the basis of a discursive account of reason, be a rational choice.

Wittgenstein's late philosophy, then, is absurdiste on this account. Such an account can have nothing to say, it cannot be theorising which is responsible for the moral and rational nature of the world of which it speaks. To read it in this way, however, clearly takes it as producing, from ordinary language, the only possible account of the nature of reason, being an account
which can say nothing of the reason for its nature. That is, the possibilities
for meaning which the reason of ordinary language provides are taken to be the
limits of any speech, its possibilities, as conventions, conflate what the
world can (only) be seen as with what the world is, with the result that, at
any time what the world can be seen as is subject to challenge on the grounds
that its possibility is itself only a convention which is open to doubt.

Now, Wittgenstein was concerned to replace the privacy of inner experience in
sense making with a public account of the shared nature of the rules by which
language, as the vehicle of thought, operates in this process. He denied not
the existence of inner experience, but only its use to account for this process.

As has already been argued (70), Wittgenstein did not deny the inner experience
which forms the object of subjective appearance; what he did deny was its
independence from language. He argued that the very possibility of taking
subjective appearance as an object was parasitic on essentially sharable
(rather than empirically shared) semantic and syntactic structures which form
the grammar of the 'lebensform'. The very essence of Wittgenstein's attack
on Cartesianism rests on the argument that it is precisely the condition of
the possibility of self knowledge which permits the speaker of the language
to claim knowledge of other minds, for, unless the assertions of utterances
about subjective states make reference to what is experienced (ie., have truth-
value) then no knowledge whatsoever is possible. The private linguist cannot
claim that while he can know that he experiences 'x', he cannot know that
others do for the ability to recognise that he experiences 'x' depends on his
ability to recognise that others do. The argument against the privacy of
experience is not an argument against noetic intuition per se; rather, it
argues against the possibility of intuition without the mediation of under-
standing.

Making sense, according to Wittgenstein, is essentially a public process;
any attribution of meaning is made in terms of what it is possible for a state-
ment to mean in the language from which it comes; that is to say, it is justifiable. The criterial relation (between sentence and justification) is determinate, defeasible, and distinct from both induction and entailment (71), while at the same time, it is the basis of what certainty is possible. To argue for a programme which proceeds from the fact of the accomplishment of sense is to argue that this fact is the fundamental resource in terms of which theories about how it comes about must be dealt with. Thus, an argument for the historical conditionality of accounts (as an argument for a transcendent world of truth) fails to deal with the facts of everyday experience. Wittgenstein's response to scepticism is not merely to make 'what the world is' a matter for negotiation and agreement; rather, he is concerned to make doubt about this something which must provide justification for itself in terms of the ways in which we do make sense, that is, in terms of the kinds of evidence which is acceptable for this kind of claim to make sense. That is to say, the conditionality of statements is not something which is to be assumed on the basis of their possible subversion, but rather, their subversion is only possible in particular instances because of the acceptance of general principles in terms of which it can be recognised as such. Blum's rejection of the ends of sociology, his denial of empirical adequacy as a criterion of certainty, his specification of the essential metaphoricality of accounts and his conception of dialogue and dialectic as the primary methods of reflexive theorising proceed from (i) the thesis of the irremediable indeterminacy of the sense of speech, and (ii) the notion of the transcendent unity masked by the failure of historically located accounts (Is), which underlies the reason (Ought) of all discourse. Essentially, his argument is for truth (Being) as the ultimate which speech cannot realise, but on which it depends. Certainty, for Blum, belongs only in the realm of metaphysics; we must proceed from a radical rejection of the standards of convention, with a trust only in the fact that we can speak, towards the originary reason why we do speak. Reflexive theorising must turn its back on what we can know, and turn towards how we can know,
In the 'Tractatus', this was, of course, precisely the problem that Wittgenstein confronted. He came to the conclusion that a perfect speech is impossible, that the ends of reason cannot themselves be certified as reasonable, that speech is merely a ladder which leads only to silence. The limit of speech (dianoia) is intuition (noesis), of which it must be silent. Blum would see this as nihilistic precisely because the good of speech, which Wittgenstein would (here) deny that it can speak, is precisely the thing which must be the goal of speech. He would accept the limit that Wittgenstein proposes for speech as a saying, but assert that this is merely a concrete mask, and that the metaphoricality of speech shows that of which it cannot speak. The implicit rejection of Wittgenstein's later philosophy proceeds from what is seen as Wittgenstein's identification of what is shown in speech as the merely conventional; for Blum, what is shown in speech transcends convention. The only certainty is the historical conditionality of the standards of convention.

For the later Wittgenstein, this was not the case. His later work was concerned to point out not only that the accomplishment of sense depends on the grammar of the conventions of language use, but that this grammar is itself the ground of certainty. This is not, as Blum's reflexive theorist would argue, to make reason only what is usually said, but it is rather to show us what it is to be certain of anything. Wittgenstein's achievement is precisely to demonstrate that certainty is the product, not of a conversation in the soul, but of the grammar in terms of which it is possible to make sense at all. That is to say, to be certain of anything rests not on the impossibility of doubting it to be the case (since all speech is historically located, can we doubt therefore that it is the product of the circumstances in which it was produced?) but on the logical possibility that things could be otherwise. Doubt, for Wittgenstein, cannot be based on the possibility that things could be otherwise than they are (think of interpreting historical accounts - of course, this is why the account is inadequate); Doubt must proceed from actual grounds, we must accept the
general principle that statements obtain their warrant from the criterial support that justifies them. Without this general principle, we could not have statements to doubt, for what gives them sense at all are the conventions within which it is possible to recognise them as statements. This is to say that certainty is not to be conflated with necessity; necessity follows from the production of incontrovertible evidence. To allow the possibility of improving the evidence (justification) for a statement is to allow the possibility that it is not necessarily true. The very identification of statement, however, requires that we have a conception of it not being the case - i.e., the possibility that evidence for it could be improved or overturned. Certainty, in contrast, derives from justification that cannot be improved upon. That is to say, certainty derives from justification which is actual rather than merely possible; to identify a statement as certain itself rests on the ability to recognise the logical possibility that it might not necessarily be the case. Being certain means being able to produce actual justification, and the recognition of what is justification depends on the possibility of doubting. Certainty is thus not something which cannot be doubted, but something which we do (actually) not doubt, but which we possibly could.

Crucially, then, the possibilities for knowledge are given relative to language, and are not independent of them. The noesis to which the dianoia of the Tractatus leads depends, after all, on language for its possibility. Truth is a quality which we recognise as being achieved by a statement which is supported by evidence which is in accord with the rules in terms of which we justify it. We can have no other access to knowledge; the possibility of doubting such evidence, far from undermining certainty, is precisely what makes it possible at all. The programme which Blum proposes for Reflexive Theorising can lead only to solipsistic incoherence. It arises from a misconception of what is involved in the constitution of sense, and what the possibilities for knowledge are. To provide (I hope) clarification of this charge, I propose to
examine a particular piece of his work to show how the application of his conception of theorising leads him, not towards truth and self knowledge but to the 'Ab-grund' of solipsism.

Blum's paper "Reading Marx" (72) defines its reason at the outset, by rejecting the idea of review as it is conventionally understood. It does not define itself as claiming to say what Marx meant, but to display the spirit of which it intends to depict Marx as the metaphorical embodiment. From the outset, it rejects the notion of producing an authoritative reading of Marx, and proposes instead that the reading which it produces is to serve simply as the occasion for inducing its reader to enter Marx's corpus 'playfully and experimentally' in order to "truly hear the resonances which his concrete speech covers over" (73). Marx's work, then, is to serve merely as an example for what lies beneath it; the problem of what Marx meant is thereby irrelevant for the purposes of this reading. Blum contends that the serious problem is to be why that should be a problem for the reader - that is, how does Marx's work serve as justification for so many possible readings? To respond to this, he argues, we must reject the conventions which allow Marx to mean something, and ask instead the question - How does Marx's speech NOT say what it means? That is, if we accept that Marx's speech as a concrete thing provides us with a reason for rejecting what it says (the historical conditionality of speech), that which it leaves unsaid must be the reason why it speaks at all.

"(Marx's speech)... speaks of men and machines, or organisations and machines, and what it leaves unsaid is everything; what it leaves unsaid is how it can intelligibly and forcefully speak of men and machines, organisations and activities, how it can speak of what is Good and Real and Rational through this talk". (74)

How does this speaking show us what it does not say? Blum proposes that Marx's speaking depends on an Ideal Rationality; the way in which his writing systematically undermines itself as a concrete formulation points to the metaphoricality of his speech; his descriptions of concrete states of affairs become metaphors as he undermines them with the caveat of historical conditionality.
Thereby, Marx formulates the Rational reader, for his speech becomes not what it is about, but raises the question of why it is spoken at all. The subjects of his speech then become not what he formulates them as, but the shadows of the ideal in terms of which they are cognisable at all.

The version of sense-making which Blum subscribes to holds that speech is incapable of making reference to what is real, in that what is real is precisely how speech can speak at all. If what it makes reference to is arrived at in accordance with the rules which determine how speech is sensible, then, as a picture of the world, it depends on the prior capacity to see reason as reasonable. Its form, then, is the illusion, and its mode of apprehension is what is real.

Analysis proceeds, then, from the decision to treat speech as if what it really comes to is not what it says. It excludes the question of what the speech 'really' means (whether it is right or wrong) in favour of a concern with how we make of it what we might make. Thus:

"Revisionism ... emerges through the understanding that Marx's speech has lost its power and this understanding is always grounded in the mathematical paradigm of the relation between speech and states-of-affairs. The speech has become obsolete (in need of repair) because it is no longer accurate, useful, or sophisticated; and yet, such a recognition only occurs when accuracy, utility and sophistication are seen as concrete features of the author's speech which are 'there for the looking' rather than as an aspiration which the speech evokes". (75)

Analysis thus turns us from the evaluation of speeches in terms of our version of what the real is towards the problem of how we can formulate the reality with which to compare the speech. The method to be applied to speeches, then, is - how is it metaphoric? How does it propose itself as a topic? Analysis has provided reasons for this decision, and has excluded itself from criticisms which might be levelled against it by clearly demarcating its province of concern; it is immune from criticism because it does not propose itself as being concerned with producing definitions, but only with initiating/responding
to ongoing dialogue. More correctly, 'criticism' is irrelevant, since, by its own account, the speech of analysis must be (concretely) partial, biased, transient (and so on), since it is to serve only as the occasion for metaphoric response. Analysis is immunised by its essentially inward, non-public nature. Crucially, it is not possible to doubt the process of education which analysis takes as its aim, because there are no specific grounds which could be produced to make this doubt sensible. Analysis justifies its decision to reject/systematically subvert the standards according to which speech is sensibly interpreted on the basis of ... "the despair resulting from the tension between the mathematical standard of certainty - the ideal of methodic knowledge - and the instability of the senses". (76) It thereby proposes that which cannot be doubted as the capacity to doubt itself. The ability to produce a metaphoric reading (a reading which subverts itself) is thereby to be the transcendent feature which unifies discourse. It is the un-doubtable capacity of all language speakers to hear, in their speech, more than they mean by it. The transcendent unity of discourse therefore, is located in the principle that speech is both concrete (re-ificatory) and analytic (metaphorical). In contrast to a tradition of reading which would take the concrete work as the source of the principles upon which certainty of its meaning must rest, analysis proposes a dialectical conception of reading, whereby that meaning is seen as emerging from the conversation of the speech in a matrix of convention, which is itself neither incorrigible nor indubitable. Thereby, what is to be addressed is the nature of the relation of the speech to convention, that is, to ask the question of the good of the instrumental purposes which are the auspices (norms, conventions) under which it is intelligible. A concern with this question, in attacking the conventions which would make the speech concretely meaningful, seeks to direct us to what ideal the degeneracy of concrete speech makes apparent. Marx no longer speaks 'facts' but shows us in his speaking what seeing so as to speak these facts must be. To take Marx seriously we must therefore not say what he says, but show that we have understood, that we are
not ruled by what he says, but can listen to what our response to Marx shows of how his work provides an occasion within which our method of making sense operates (that is, his work on the occasion of our making sense of it, is the method by which we make sense of it). In Wittgenstein's terms, language is the vehicle of thought; in thinking Marx's work, it is Marx's language which is the method for our assembling sense. Marx's work is only available for us in the sense which we can make of it - it justifies our interpretation. Analysis would show us that the conventionality of this relationship is the mask of the underlying unity (of Marx and the reader). The Ground of this relation is the reality of the moral and rational spirit (the Good) which is the true community of inquiry.

Now, Blum would have us aspire to knowledge of this transcendent Good. The desire to know is an icon, a partial and metaphorical glimpse of that which is un-knowable. Doubt is thereby the icon of that which cannot be doubted - what we can know merely metaphoricises what we cannot know.

Again, expressed in Wittgenstein's language, this is to point out that, "in the absence of metaphysical simples, correlated with linguistic simples by means of some mechanism constituting a connection between language and reality, the theory of the limits of thought and the logical structure of the world becomes radically conventionalist, and metaphysical truths become not simply inexpressible, but illusory reflections of grammatical conventions" (77). This quality of in-expressibility becomes, in Blum the principle of metaphoricality, the iconic nature of desire as the Good of reason. Reading Marx, then, is finding in Marx the source for our imagination; his work becomes allegorical, or poetic, a way of saying what cannot be said. The topic of our response to Marx is other than itself; it is that otherness which being itself pre-supposes.

The temptation here is to retreat from this position purely because of its implications for sociological work as it conceives of itself; it plainly is
not interested in accounting for the social world in terms of a criterion of adequacy, empirical or interpretive. In fact, quite plainly it is parasitic on such attempts for its own existence; knowledge arises from ignorance, the mistake (the problem) is the occasion on which education depends for its beginning. Analysis provides for its own existence, and insulates itself from attack, by delimiting its concern from the concerns of sociology, and at the same time, proposes the degeneracy of those concerns as the reason for its being. Analysis proposes the rationality of pre-reflectiveness (consciousness of the standard) as its topic.

Crucially, however, reflexivity is a problem for sociology; Blum's programme proposes that we separate the two. Sociology can never, for Blum, achieve understanding of itself as a practice; such understanding (as may be possible) comes only when we reject the standards of the discipline. Understanding (standing under) is thus outside of the usages within which it is practically accomplished (it is processual, inward, noetic). Why not, then, get on with the work, and leave this concern to itself?

If we accept the notion of understanding embodied in the practices of analysis (even though we do not elect to do this kind of work) we endorse a conception of the practice of sociology which is radically nihilistic - we do sociology even though we admit that it cannot understand itself. The seriousness of analysis is thereby the claim that it makes that sociology cannot understand itself, and this is the claim that must be answered.

How would sociologists propose to understand Marx? The charge of degeneracy arises from the claim that in producing a reading of Marx, sociologists endorse a concrete version of readership; that is, they propose that Marx's work means what we can make of it in terms of convention, that the reader is bound (ruled) by the conventions within which it is intelligible. This form of understanding is degenerate for Analysis, however, because it assumes Marx to be saying nothing - if the standard is conventional, it is always subject to revision,
and therefore, Marx is only intelligible in many different ways, all of which are justifiable in terms of some set of conventions. The real question then becomes - how does Marx's work provide in-sight into the principle which lies beneath the diversity (how is it an occasion for confronting the grounds which lie beneath the sense-making?)

Understanding, then, becomes a private rather than a public process (while, at the same time, the methodic accounting of understanding necessarily remains public and concrete, also metaphorical rather than literal). Concreteness and Analysis refer us to the consequences of writing; concrete writing accepts the rule of convention, analytic writing refers us to the methods of its accomplishment. Concrete writing accepts the silence which is outside of speech, analytic writing demands that we think the limits of speech.

Analysis depends, then, on the difference that it proposes between these forms of understanding - essentially, the difference is between literal and metaphorical conceptions of meaning. If reference is conventional, we cannot say what we mean, for words are not the things which they refer to, so that meaning invokes words as metaphors of things-in-themselves. We are analytic (we truly understand) when we grasp this metaphoricality, see the reason which it shows but cannot say.

Now, this distinction, I would argue, resurrects the problem of solipsism. It argues that truth is analytic; it ... "does not require a system, but the lived experience of wresting unconcealment from its hiddenness under the impetus of other-ness" (78). The consequences of this conviction have been set out below. That is so far unexamined are the practical possibilities involved in the version of duality proposed here.

Concrete reading is Analysis' version of mathematical thinking, or literalism. To read concretely is to accept the authority of speech as a picture of the world. Analysis takes as a fundamental principle the degeneracy of such a move. What does rejecting the authority of the picture involve however? First, it
proposes that each reading is an occasion of making sense; in other words, it makes the meaning of the speech an accomplishment of reading on each occasion. That is, what is the meaning of the speech is radically indeterminate, since each occasion is a new view rather than a re-view. What is real then, on each occasion of reading is the grasping of meaning on each occasion; the public accounting of this grasping remains concrete and inflexible, providing no account of how it is possible. The contrast invoked is therefore between speech as speaking, and speech as thinking; thinking is what speaking cannot say.

Now, Wittgenstein was concerned to deny precisely this kind of duality. Where he is misunderstood is in exactly what sense this would make thought conventional or conservative. The rejection of the atomic model (the picture theory) of meaning does not have the kind of exclusivity generally imputed to it; the thesis of the determinacy of meaning is not to be replaced by a logic of vagueness. To speak bluntly, the contrast between concreteness and analyticity is illicit, in terms of Wittgenstein’s account of the constitution of sense.

Understanding, in Wittgenstein’s terms, does not involve an independent object with or without ontological status. He argues that the meaning of a word is not independent of the rules of its usage, and that when asked for the meaning of a word, we often refer to the context in which it can be used, point to how it is used or what it ostensively refers to. He does not, however, identify meaning with the rules of usage. A word carries its meaning with it, but this is not accountable in the form of a list of rules. Meaning is defined, determined or constituted by the rules of usage, but it is not separable from them. Asked for the meaning of a word on this account, then, the (concrete) reader would produce justification in the usages conventional in his linguistic community. Now, this would be degenerate, in Blum’s terms, because it would limit the meaning of the word to those conventions — i.e., it would identify meaning with rules of use. Thereby, to gain understanding of the convention which
would warrant such a reading, he advocates a reading (response) which, although
it incorporates an immanent reflection of linguistic usage, rejects the con­
sequences of its conventionality for the purposes of understanding, and aims
instead to find in the work the desire to go beyond the limits which these
conventions set. An analytic reading, in Wittgenstein's terms then, proposes
to make the rules of usage (available through immanent reflection) point to
what makes them sensible. The meaning available in the rules of usage becomes
the problem for the analytic reader. Given the indeterminacy of the meaning
arrived at through reflection on the rules of usage, the analytic reader must,
of course, refuse to take it as an object, however; each concrete reading
(accomplishment of meaning) serves only an ironic purpose; to take its object
as given merely initiates a regress, in terms of this bifurcation. An anal­
ytic reading requires that it shall have no status as an account of meaning
other than as the analysts' metaphor for the internal grasping of the relation
between the speech, as an occasion, and the ideal which appears in the formul­
ation of the limits of the speech, in the analytic reading, on the basis of
how the speech as a metaphor can be re-constructed. Informed by the concept
of literalness speech comes to be seen not as a way of accounting for 'the
world' as a topic, but as a way of pointing to itself doing such an accounting;
speech (eternally) poses the question - how is it possible for speech to be
meaningful;

Analysis thus proposes meaning as merely the shadow cast by the sun of the
ideal (the real). Concrete reading identifies the shadow (meaning) with the
real (proposes the world as that which convention permits it to be). Under­
standing this shows the desire for knowledge which is the icon of the ideal
(Being, Truth).

To make this contrast, however, necessitates taking the reflection on the rules
of usage available to every competent member of the language community to have
a particular kind of (empirical, evidential) status; as Hare (79) has remarked,
the propositions about the rules of an activity which are available on reflection seem to have a peculiar similarity to synthetic a priori knowledge, and are in a sense analogous to Platonic 'anamnesis' (80). Indeed, if we take the notion of concrete reading seriously, we must be drawn into giving what is available on reflection the property of determining what is to count for us as the real world. The problem which, of course, seems to arise here, however, is why should we prefer any one set of rules of usage to any other set? If what is to be conventionally agreeable is what is to count as "the real", then we would, indeed seem to be bound by what everyone can be brought to agree to is an empirical fact. Concrete reading would then have all the disagreeable features which Blum brings out; it would indeed settle the meaning of the world by fiat.

However, it is precisely to undermine the notion that grammar determines meaning as a separate (special) object to which Wittgenstein's efforts are directed. The appeal to the justification of convention does not give the convention a special kind of evidential status; it is not an empirical matter at all, in the way in which Wittgenstein proposes that it be used. An appeal to use instead of meaning proposes that meaning as a special object, to be searched for, is an illusion generated by grammar. It is not the case that we can "find" meaning in the use, but that in the usages available to us, it is something that is achieved. The appeal to convention, therefore, serves only as the means to generate in particular cases, the study of the confusions resulting from the search for meaning as a special object; it is not in itself a programme of empirical research, but arises from the problems and confusions which beset those kinds of enterprise. (81)

The appeal to convention, then, aims to clarify confusion, to show how we do in fact achieve understanding on the basis of commonly available linguistic resources. The grammar of our language games warrants our use of language to mean what we can mean. To see this as a concretization, it is necessary to attribute to grammar an empirical quality which certainly Wittgenstein did
see it possessing. The justification afforded by grammar derives not from the unshakeable certainty of correspondence between language and the world, but from our determination to employ a form of representation; the hardness of logic derives from our commitment to a form of expression, and our refusal, or inability to depart from it. Thus essences, rather than being 'de re' necessities, are reflections of forms of representation, made by man rather than found.

To talk of the appeal to convention as a concretization of meaning is to appeal for knowledge of essences which is other than conventional; that is, we are directed to a form of knowledge which is other than linguistically available. For analysis to propose that the capacity to immanently reflect on rules of usage should serve as a special object, to be transcended as its conventionality is subverted, is to propose that we should renounce our commitment to the truth available in the logic of our form of representation. It is a call for a scepticism of the most radical kind. For, if truth, or certainty, is only analytically available, then the meaning of propositions about reality becomes irrelevant in the face of the question - what gives meaning its meaningfulness? By definition, this question is unanswerable. Knowledge becomes, then, a conversation in the soul.

Analytic reading, as the method for achieving this state, recommends the metaphorical, imaginative capacity of consciousness, as its icon. What is being pointed to is the self-grounding capacity of language as symbol, the capacity of language to say more than it wills of its place in a theoretic tradition. Blum speaks from a position which sees speech in its location within tradition, a position which sees the meaning of speech as not that permitted by convention, but by the ideal of which convention is but a metaphor. Truth indeed becomes the lived experience of otherness, for it requires scepticism even of the experience which we account to ourselves, as the product of convention. In the face of this radical doubt, our experience of knowing becomes itself the means to glimpse the transcendent unity of consciousness.
Grammatical propositions, according to Wittgenstein, however, are not themselves linguistic rules; while the latter cannot properly be said to be true, or necessary, the former can. While a grammatical proposition is to be understood as a proposition that makes an assertion about an object, that proposition depends exclusively for its truth value on the rules of usage of the linguistic sign which signifies the object. The rules of usage thus serve to express the a priori logical form underlying an assertion about objects, but as a grammatical proposition, this cannot be an assertion about a linguistic rule, nor can it take the form of a rule formulated in words.

Now, for Blumian analysis, the levels of concreteness and analyticity refer to correspondences between speech and the world; the degeneracy of concrete (literal) reading derives from our uncritical attitude towards our way of seeing - our acceptance of a conventional standard in terms of which we interpret meaning. A (concrete) reading of Marx would thus take his speech to be "a latent set of correlations for possible objects" (82), "relations of production", "mode of production", "foundation and superstructure", "social class" are identifications of objects of reference. In this reading, such identifications are taken to be incorrigible. Blum proposes that an analytic reading would make problematic this assumed correspondence.

If the identification between speech and object is incorrigible in a concrete reading, then it tells you nothing about the world (83). It could not be false; any speech, concretely read, is as good as any other. An analytic reading recommends, therefore, that any speech be treated as corrigible, conditional. However, this conditionality has the consequence that the information which it gives you about the world becomes irrelevant; the contrast invoked is between the conditionality and conventionality of meaningful speech, and the unspecifiable form of life within which the speech has meaning. Given the conditionality of the meaning conventionally available, propositions about
how that meaning is available become incorrigible, however. Talk of convention tells you nothing about the world, it simply is the case that this is how talk is meaningful. Blum takes this as a recommendation for a speculative response; that is, since conventions are incorrigible, they can only tell you something about their meaning if they themselves are taken to admit to the possibility of falsification (if we can doubt them), and the consequence of this doubt is the abandonment of faith in the logic of speech, and a commitment to the transcendent quality of imagination as the unifying ground of speeches.

Thus, Blum takes the incorrigibility of speculative (analytical) response to be the showing of the conditionality of convention; the incorrigibility of grammar is to serve as the object (occasion) for a display of imagination, resonnance, metaphoricality, a way of grasping the transcendent good of the human imagination.

To summarise, the conditionality of speech has the consequence that its meaning in terms of a standard (grammatical convention) makes the meaning radically indeterminate, to read concretely is to impose one version of authority onto the speech; an analytic reading makes the conventionality within which this indeterminacy might be resolved into the topic of speech, but this requires that its speech shall have purpose only in the way in which it rejects itself as an instance of an authoritative version. How are we then to read Marx?

A concrete reading, whereby the conventions of sense making are accepted, is degenerate, since in making sense-making a publicly accountable process, it cannot then examine the 'good' (the reason) of the conventions which make it possible. An analytic reading, refusing to take these conventions seriously, seeks to find, in the metaphoric possibilities of speech the deeper moral and rational grounds masked by the concreteness of convention. Here, however, the concrete (conventional) meaning of the speech must be irrelevant; the question arises, however, - what is the process involved in making sense of an analytic reading?
Blum wants to argue that 'thinking' here is different from 'making sense'; that we can have access to thought which is other than conventional. Analysis only has any point if we accept the notion that inner experience (noesis) can be separated, or occurs separately from the discursive processes of sense making. The degeneracy of concrete reading rests thereby in the fact that it sees no difference between thought and sense making. It is a discursive, public, intersubjective phenomenon. Only if we make a difference between thinking and sense making can we have access to the universal rational and moral grounds of all discourse. Seeing this difference is a 'conversation in the soul' - a radically private experience.

Think of refusing to take the standard seriously; to do so is to propose the metaphoric grammar of a speech as the standard within which it should be interpreted. A reading is produced which must, to be sensible be discursively formulated around the rules of the language game of "not-taking-the-conventions-seriously" of finding in the writing a structure other than that to which we conventionally attend. These rules are of course concrete and conventional just as much as any other sense making practices. Blum's claim is that, the self subversion written into such a reading, by the negation of convention in metaphor thereby produces, for the gaze of the inner (noetic) eye, the relation between sense making and the grounds on which it rests. Concrete reading, or the appeal to a "mathematical standard of certainty" rests, then, on the notion that states of affairs must be completely determinate; analysis responds to the limitations imposed on our knowledge of this determinacy by proposing the inherent instability of conventional forms of representation. Language fails us because it is the product of human action; Being (truth) itself is only available as that which is other than language. This is wholly in accord with the generally accepted laws of epistemology and semantics. Knowledge is independent of truth, what can be known to be true is separate from what is true; the thesis of the indeterminacy of sense proceeds from a generally accepted notion of transcendent, objective truth.
It was precisely to undermine such a notion that Wittgenstein's later philosophy was directed; taken seriously, his work would undermine the fundamental principles on which Blum's account of theorising rests, since they exemplify a standard epistemological position (the notion of a transcendent reality).

The separation between concrete and analytic reading rests on the notion that propositions about the world cannot capture the truth about the world; that is to say, the relation of statement to the world, to hypothesise is a relation of inductive support, linked to a priori probabilification. Thus, any statement, resting on the conventions of the standard available is subject to doubt which undermines the claim to certainty as the standard itself is always open to revision. Metaphor can therefore justifiably claim that its self reflection on the capacity to doubt, in subverting conventional sense making, opens the underlying grounds of discourse to view. The separation of thought and speech is implicit. Wittgenstein explicitly rejects this notion as incoherent; as has already been pointed out, the existence of private experiences is not, in his view, a contentious issue. The point made in his writings on private experience is that it has no place in our attempts to deal with the question of certainty and the justification of accounts.

We may, in reading Marx, or any text, derive meaning which we can justify on the basis of convention or some set of rules. Now, as Blum says, these readings often conflict and given the project, to author-ize a reading of Marx, necessarily so. It is one thing to argue that, therefore, such a project produces only chatter and dispute, and is thereby unmindful of the deeper grounds (the reasons) for Marx's speaking - which analysis would take as its subject - but it is quite another to claim that what is produced, because it depends on the conventions of discourse for its meaning, thereby involves a radical and irremediable division between its real meaning (truth) and its interpretation (opinion). Wittgenstein, in his writings on this issue, is pointing out that our certainty about anything is a product of the grammatical structures which
determine the firm (but not always immutable) relations between our form of representation and that which is represented, and that these are a communal, intersubjectively available resource; it is not the case that certainty proceeds from irrefutable evidence, but that it proceeds, in a given case from evidence which we cannot, sensibly, dispute. Certainty is thus conditional upon the possibility of doubt.

Blum's recourse to the "conversation in the soul" as the act of knowing truth may, indeed, (if we ignore its implicit critique and misconceptions about the nature of sense making) provide a metaphor for the internal processes which go on in the act of grasping an idea, or seeing a relationship. This does not help us, however, to account for the way in which, marvellously, our form of representation does work, and not only forms the way in which we do see the world, but provides an enduring basis, overlaid with subtle yet inexorable transformations, for speech to be sensible.

In the case of sociology then what are we to make of the demand for reflexivity? As I have tried to show, Wittgenstein's work provides us with the means to explore what I believe to be fundamental misconceptions as to what is both desirable and possible for sociological accounts. We must, in the attempt to interpret and explain the social, accept the condition under which this is a possibility, which is to say that our employment of language is subject to the grammatical structures which such employment involves. We must not be misled by the problems which such a structure seems to pose into rejecting the limitations of language in favour of a search for extra-theoretical knowledge, or undermining the products of theory in favour of an all embracing skepticism. Reflexivity has neither, in my opinion, of those features. Rather, a reflexive enterprise consists of working within the limitations of the grammar of the sociological language game while displaying the commitment to show those limitations, while at the same time (since the work of showing those limits is the work of producing valid knowledge) providing for the theoretical warrant of accounts in terms of recognisable display of theoretical awareness of the
intersubjectively available standards in terms of which sociological work is recognisable as such. This means that valid sociological knowledge will be available in terms of diverse standards of justification, rather than being simply one standard, but that knowledge nevertheless can be said to be available.
Conclusion

I have tried to show that Wittgenstein's ideas can be used to point out the limitations and illusions to which sociological theory is prone when it attempts to deal with the features of natural language. In large part, then, the enterprise is negative, in that what propositions do emerge are tentative and unexplained, and derive from the limits which I have set for the projects of the theorists I have discussed. The work of producing a positive programme falls, strictly speaking, outside the province of this present project. Hopefully, however, some suggestions about the possibilities for sociological analysis will have emerged. With the aim of drawing out some possible implications, I shall review the areas which I have covered. That this is a sociologist's postscript is, I hope, clear. As I believe I have maintained throughout, Wittgenstein was not concerned to produce, within philosophy any such programme; neither do I believe his work can serve such a purpose within sociology, since, finally, sociology is a programme of practical work, and is concerned with the problem of accounting for the world as it is found by men in society. This finding draws together the practices of science, philosophy, poetry and the multitude of diverse language games of which it consists so that understanding and explaining it becomes multidimensional, and cannot be finally limited to the practices of any one game, except insofar as that game itself acknowledges such multidimensionality. Valid sociological knowledge, then, is subject to the same limitations as valid knowledge in any other language game, no more or less; which is to say that knowledge depends on the possibility of doubt, but that doubt comes to an end. Where it comes to an end is precisely the condition which the ongoing practice of sociological theorising is constantly in the process of formulating and reformulating.

What will have emerged from the preceding chapters, I hope, is the conviction that much of sociology's theorising suffers from a persistent failure to deal with the complex of problems thrown up by the disjunction between the world as it is understood and lived in by the everyday man, and that inhabited by
specialists studying how that everyday man lives his life. Further, these problems are found by such specialists to be simply one kind of manifestation of a general epistemological problem (1), which is called the problem of 'other minds' or Cartesian dualism, among other things. The work discussed I take to exemplify the results of failing to solve what Kant referred to as 'a scandal of philosophy'. Now, a crucial part of my argument has been that 'technical' language games, such as sociology and philosophy, do not depend on justification from more primary sentences in the everyday language games from which they undoubtedly develop. I have used the criterial account of sense constitution to argue that, if we accept Wittgenstein's distinction between 'symptom' and 'criteria', and the different roles they play in the justification of the sense of sentences, then technical language games themselves stand in a criterial relation to the sentences of the everyday language game which offer the justification for their sense. This is to argue that the sense of the sentences of technical language games is not reducible to the sentences of ordinary language, but achieves a symptomatic semi-autonomy, so that the understanding which competent (technical) language users (members of the sociological community) arrive at is warranted because of their membership of that community. It is available in the reciprocal relationship between (technical) usage and (everyday) grounds, with neither having priority.

I am thus arguing that speakers of different technical language games (viz. sociologists and philosophers) retain, ultimately, their own interpretive domains; however, it is also my argument that these domains are not self grounded, and that making sense in sociology or philosophy is only possible at all because of their common relatedness to the language practices of the mundane world from which they spring, and to each other as members of the family of language games which form the cultural community which their traditions acknowledge. Insofar as Descartes is the common ancestor of (western) sociologist and philosopher alike, I take it that attempts in either camp to deal with his legacy will have profound implications for the other.
The attempts which I deal with here generate some severe problems for themselves. Peter Winch, attempting to remake sociology in a Wittgensteinian mould argues that since the uses of language in constituting meaning are rule directed, then the search by Sociologists for general laws to account social phenomena is pointless, since the nature of social phenomena requires understanding rather than explanation for any accounting. Consequently, sociology is a conceptual undertaking, rather than an empirical one, and as such, must assign priority to the conceptual understandings which men, in their social world, actually subscribe to and act upon. For Winch, then, the disjunction between the everyday world and the world of sociological theory is to be responded to by giving priority to the former. "Faithfulness to the phenomenon" is, it seems, the philosopher's response to the violation, by science, of the social world.

However, Winch's 'naturalism' also marks a retreat from progress. How, if the conventions or rules of everyday usage are to be assigned priority in the understanding of the social world, do we account for change? What are the relationships between different language games, both within natural language communities and without? Winch finds his social men to be, in terms of his concept of understanding, hermetically sealed into collectively exclusive enclaves, with communication depending upon, within the community, collective subscription to the conventions with which we find ourselves saddled at birth, and between communities, upon the primitive 'brute' certainties of the universal features of human societies - birth, copulation, and death.

In contrast, Wieder finds the world of the everyday actor infinitely subtle, and far more transient. The conventions of culture become, for Wieder, merely the tools of interaction; while Winch would see tennis as reducible to the conventions which govern how it is to be played, for Wieder, it is a strategic, emotional, playful, event. For Wieder, the social world is the achievement of actors engaged in constructing it out of the corpus of knowledge.
which their place in it affords them. To reduce the understandings which men have of their world to the conventions of it merely glosses the richness of their infinite inventiveness. If Winch seeks 'reality' in the concepts which men employ, Wieder seeks reality in the employment of the concepts. As such, it is always unavailable, for each moment is unique, each usage and meaning incarnate in the event. Yet we do "understand retrospectively". This is possible, Wieder, argues, by our ability to re-call the experience as a 'document' which exhibits the competences and relevancies in terms of which it constituted the meaning of the event of which it formed a part. The seeing of this recall as an exhibition of the everyday competencies which enable a corpus of cultural knowledge (such as a 'convict code') to constitute the (contextual) meaning of action both provides the formulation of a reflexive approach to the problem of relativism, and defines the consequences of this issue for sociology. Wieder (following Garfinkel and Mannheim, or so he feels) proposes ethnomethodological studies as providing a distinctive approach (to standard sociologies) which seeks to investigate phenomenologically the ongoing course of a participant's use of cultural competencies in structuring the meaning of social interaction. This is to involve the explication of the researchers use of his understandings as documents which exhibit such cultural competencies.

Wieder's position, in terms of the central problematic which I previously formulated can thus be seen as a despair of representation, and implicitly, an acceptance of the inevitability of idealisation and hence violation of incarnate meaning, and a retreat to the incorrigibility of private experience. The meaningfulness of the world is to be accounted for, rather than accounted as this or that; the epoche of this social phenomenology leaves aside the problem of competing accounts to turn inward toward how these accounts come to be possible at all.

While Mannheim saw the documentary method as a hermeneutic aid to the explication of the social context of production, and acknowledged the separateness
and equal validity of psychological accounts of meaning constitution, for Wieder this method serves only to provide the rationale underlying what comes to, finally, an account of meaning constitution as a private, intentional event. The documentary method provides, for Wieder, the intersubjective reference of sense making; it is his theory of meaning, that which justifies his experiences having relevance for others. If rules or conventions of language use are not omniscient (as Winch would have it) then Wieder's endorsement of indexicality must provide some means of giving concepts intersubjective comparability, and this is the role played by the documentary method. While Mannheim placed individual intentionality in phenomenological brackets, however, Wieder attempts to reconcile, within the notion of theorising as an "accounting-of-the-social-world", both the individual subjectively intending meaning and the intersubjective, objective context of meaning production, with its rules and conventions. While Mannheim recognised the problem as being how we can compare and contrast the productions of competing accounts, however, for Wieder, as for Husserl, the mystery of the accomplishment of intersubjectivity precludes any reflection on the differences between accounts, and, in its project of fundamentalist naturalist empiricism, is thereby left without critical standards, either for the world of its subjects, or for its own products - unsurprisingly, since these are ultimately reducible to the same thing, without criterial relations to the world of others.

The problem of other minds, then, has lead us to the question of the place of theory. The varieties of naturalism espoused by Winch and Wieder have been found to lead to unidimensional concepts of understanding which deny the basic project of making the world more intelligible, since they restrict the ways in which it is conceived of as possible to understand. For Talcott Parsons, the work of Sociology is the work of formulating a means to reconcile the objective realm of scientific thought with the subjective and intentional elements of human behaviour. Like Mannheim, he recognised in the positivist project of mastering the material realm of existence the true dynamic of
human aspiration, and its conflict with the irrational, emotional fate of 'imperfect' humankind. For Parsons, the central concern of any study of human action must be the resolution of the conflict between Reason and Existence, between science and emotion, between logic and irrationalism. The central problem is thus the problem of Order.

For Parsons, it appears, this was both the achievement of man, and the condition of men in society. The problem of order thus becomes - how are we to describe the orderliness which we find, and what order are we to attribute to the possible orders which we may choose to discern, in the intersubjective facticity which we all experience for ourselves? These choices Parsons finds to be limited by the nature of our society and the nature of our intellectual history; given the problem as he has defined it, in order to produce an account of the social realm, we must, first of all, find in the social world which we investigate those characteristics which make it that world for those who inhabit it, both scientists and laymen. The project must, then, characterise that world in terms of categories which, phenomenologically, order the world intersubjectively - that is to say, with Kant, the categorial imperatives. That these are to be the fundamentals of our account is thereby to locate this account as a rational, and (putatively) a scientific ordering, since it is an election produced as a result of one particular direction of interest. Parsons' solution to dualism, then, gives priority to the world of the specialist; all that is possible for Parsons, given his epistemological pre-suppositions, is to produce an analytic ordering, linked to the empirical realm by, he claims, the phenomenological status of its central concepts. Thus, the specialists analytical schema, as well as being a selective structuring of the empirical realm (and thus partial, and abstract) refers to the empirical world in the sense that it derives from and is the essential means by which rational sense can be made of, the concrete system which is the topic and product of actors' speech and actions.

For Parsons, then, the world of the everyday actor and that of the specialist
are the products of language games which are indivisible from each other; while he is committed to the development of rigorous science as the best way of accounting for the social world, he knows that science which ignores its grounding in the world of commonsense cannot hope to produce accounts which do justice to that world as a phenomenon, any more than 'naturalistic' avoidance of general categorial grounds could hope to produce an account which had application outside of the artful, intuitive, imaginative (etc.,) uses which might be found for it by whatever audience it might find.

What Parsons himself failed to provide was the means whereby this phenomenological analysis could find its way back into the empirical realm; he failed to recognise that by giving priority to the experts' world, he cuts the analyst off from his responsibility to precisely those 'irrational,' commonsense, intuitive, playful, and artistic dimensions which form the vital difference between the perfection of science and the brute facticity of the empirical.

The reference to the empirical realm in Parsons always struggles to penetrate the brackets into which his analysis, regretfully but inevitably, must consign it. As a masterful specialist, Parsons himself elected to develop his theory before the brackets could be taken off; that they never have been does not point to the futility of Parsons' endeavour, but provides a challenge for those who recognise his great achievement. Harold Garfinkel certainly saw this.

Herminio Martins has said (2) that, in some ways, Garfinkel's work is "... Parsons' project writ small". While Parsons addressed the role of the specialist in formulating accounts of the social world, Garfinkel addresses the role of the layman. For Garfinkel, 'lay' sociological accounts, although implicit and 'taken-for-granted' are recognisably sociological and have the same status towards the order which they address as those of conventional 'constructivist' sociology. The achievement of such constructivist accounts is to produce, in terms of scientific canons of enquiry, rigorous and sophisticated re-orderings of the social realm which point to the systematic and
logical interrelationships between 'social facts' as Durkheim conceived of them. Recall that, for Parsons, order was a two dimensional problem; where his enterprise founders is on the relationship between the analysts' construction of order, in terms of phenomenologically given categories, and the order which is accomplished by the phenomenology of the everyday actor 'tout court'. Parsons could not deal with commonsense in the consciousness of the subject.

To this task Garfinkel sees himself devoted. While Parsons emulates Kants' pre-supposition of the fact of (social) knowledge, Garfinkel pursues Husserl's alternative - he seeks to address the means by which this pre-supposed knowledge is arrived at. For Garfinkel, then, the language games of the everyday actor, since these exhibit the processes by means of which such order is accomplished, become the data and form the background against which his analyses are to be understandable. Parsons' commitment to science is what leads him into the blind alley of abstract analyticity, and Garfinkel seeks to avoid this by pointing to the necessary priority of commonsense rationality in making sense of the world of commonsense actors. Given Parsons' formulation of the essential tension between reason (and will) and existence (and fate), Garfinkel can be seen as accepting his fate; unlike Socrates, however, Garfinkel does not choose to make this acceptance an example. The principle of ethnomethodological indifference makes of Garfinkel's enterprise a detached, neutral, quietist formalism. The earnest empirical enquiry into how the 'whatness' of the world can be apprehended has no room for any attitude toward that whatness apart from its status as an object. That the products of Garfinkel's enterprise provide no criteria in terms of which they can be evaluated for 'truth' value is no surprise, given the initial bracketing of both the criteria of scientific language games and the criteria in terms of which the effectiveness, import, significance (etc.,) - that is to say, the concrete meaning of actions in terms of the particular intentions of the subjects - is to be evaluated. In cutting itself off from sociology, ethnomethodology becomes, necessarily a-historical. Indifference places the problem
of contextuality in brackets; with the provision of undoubtability, by this
move, however, Garfinkel also gives up the possibility of relevant or truthful
knowledge, and all his findings, lacking criteria by means of which their
sense can be decided apart from the morally nihilistic laboratories of its
practitioners, become irrelevancies for the historically engaged scientist
and layman.

That sense which ethnomethodological studies can have derives from the precise
separation of specialist and laymen which was the ground for ethnomethodology's
attack on formalist sociology; the criteria for ethnomethodological statements
to make sense has its communal grounding, not in the everyday world, but in
the community of ethnomethodologists. Garfinkel's alternative project can
have no relevance to the world, apart from those who find its pristine detach-
ment congenial, so long as these irreconcilable interests which mark it off
from sociology remain irreconcilable. The lack of values is as big a problem
for ethnomethodology as the grounding in value is for Sociology.

That this is a problem is testified in the work of Gouldner and Blum examined
below. For Parsons and Garfinkel, the struggle with theoreticity has led, or
so it seems, to phenomenological abstraction at the analytical and the concrete
level respectively. The struggle to reconcile these two with a theorising
relevant to the world of theorist and everyday actor is Gouldner's task. Like
Mannheim, he recognises the problem of reflexivity as the central one; unlike
Mannheim, he believes that the only possible response to this is a grounding
in the revealed fundamental value of the history of thought, emancipation.
In his argument, the division between specialist and layman can only be
resolved by making the value-groundings of the specialised domain responsible
to the reality of the social conditions from which it derives - the conditions
of production which determine intellectual and any other kind of work. This
is to make reflexivity essentially a critical activity (3).
For Mannheim, this was not so; his faith in the unity of science and scientific method resulted in a commitment to the pre-requisite of communication, comparison and appraisal of opposing contexts of meaning. To demand commitment to one set of values is to abrogate this principle; that Gouldner does so is perfectly compatible with explicit endorsement of the priority of everyday language games as the foundations which enable technical discourse to come into being. Indeed, for Gouldner, the malaise of modern sociology can only be repaired by reinstating the place of the values of the everyday world in the productions of its technical language games. Reflexive sociology, for Gouldner, can only be that which is mindful of, and critical of its genesis in the concrete value frameworks of the everyday world.

Gouldner thus argues that, in the struggle between competing accounts, the only viable response is to seek transcendental grounding in historical evolution; he discerns, in the relationship of preceding thinkers such as Hegel and Marx, a 'leitmotif' of emancipation, a desire for ought to become is which subtly modifies the thought of men in history and thus is transformed into social action. If speech is historically conditional, this argument seems to say, then all that can be done is to seek to align speech with history; this is to apply the standards which reveal themselves in history to the speech which is in history, to transcend the concrete conditions which would distort speech by displaying the emancipatory desire to reveal their power, and so, hopefully, turn it into a dialectical moment in the emancipatory movement towards the re-unification of speech with its grounds, as the reflexive criticism of the concrete conditions which distort accounts turns their power in upon themselves.

Gouldner's critical reflexivity, however, presumes to identify the process of historical development; this, of course, is a judgment which goes against the very core of Mannheim's teaching, and effectively pre-empts what would be the goal of his comparative, discursive project. Gouldner goes wrong when
he presumes to be able to criticise the value basis of specific accounts, in Mannheim's terms, for Mannheim insisted that his project was concerned to synthesise not opposing ideas but conceptual contexts. Given his discussion of the development of the sociology of knowledge and the key parts played in this development by positivist science and analytical and idealist philosophy, we can readily discern the difference, for Mannheim insisted that although ideas can conflict, they can also be compared, because they can be encompassed within the system of communication (the family of language games) which makes it possible for them to be understood at all. His concept of the 'total view' has been criticised as conservative pragmatist and utopian, but it can be seen to rest on carefully considered grounds viz., the patent ability of competing thinkers to explain themselves to others.

To seek historical grounds for the value of speech is to accept the sovereignty of history, in Gouldner's case. For Blum, history may be of class struggle, but, more importantly, it is the history of triumph for science and mathematical thinking, and, like Heidegger, he sees this triumph as being at the expense of thought. For Blum, the dominance of representational thinking in our age merely masks the failure to consider what the reason of this thinking comes to. For Blum, the problem of historical conditionality appears as a problem because of the desire of representational speech to capture the thingness of the world which lies behind it; this resistance to the universal condition of man masks the refusal to accept the ultimate groundlessness of any speaking which takes for granted the first question - what is the good of speaking? If, for Gouldner, history betrays the leitmotif of emancipation, for Blum history displays its futile pursuit of the illusion of progress. The only viable response to such futility is to respond to its images as ironic icons of the Good of which they are merely the shadows. The true role of the reflexive theorist, in his terms, is to display the commitment to theorising as medicinal, therapeutic and concerned not with rule in society but with change in man.
Blum's epistemology proceeds from the failure of language; he is concerned to re-make the role which language plays in thought. While Gouldner sees the conditions of the social world determining the products of theorising, Blum sees the very attempt by language to account the thingness of the world as a condition for its failure, for following Heidegger, Blum sees the grounds of language as nothing, or rather, that which is outside of language which is not-a-thing. The very attempt to capture that which grounds language shows the desire to find it in language, and, as such, fails to grasp the Reason why it can speak (4).

We find, in Blum, the most serious despair with the project of sociological theorising; in Blum's terms, such a project is incomprehensible in itself, for it implies a 'solution' to the problem of the good of speaking which, by its very presumptive existence, means that it has not been asked. In terms of our initial problematic, the theorising of Alan Blum rejects even the possibility of historical truth, for truth, in his terms, is not a possibility in discursive terms, but only reveals itself in the 'grasping', the 'struggle', the 'lived experience' by way of which the groundlessness of that which appears in being becomes apparent.

Like Heidegger, however, Blum's theorising makes of the first question-understanding—a superordinate task which precludes involvement in the concrete, historical issues which are the lived experience of man-in-history. Like the ethnomethodology of Garfinkel from which it springs, Blum's theorising is outside of history, and concerned with the pure, the crystalline quality of understanding, for Blum, in analytic, for Garfinkel in concrete (if formalised) terms.

The strong objections which I have raised to the positions adopted by these theorists have been based, very largely, on the work of Wittgenstein and some developments of it in the exegesis of Hacker and Baker. In the preceding pages, I have sketched in some of the relationships which appear to me to exist between
these positions in terms of a central problematic. The question arises, however, what other kind of approaches to the problematic might there be?

In the body of this work, I have alluded to Wittgenstein's work at various points to claim that this provides argument against the various positions which I have characterised. I should like to offer an account of Gordon Baker's attempt to apply these principles into a systematic alternative to what he calls the prevailing "Classical Epistemological Theories". If this argument has any relevance for sociology, then I should like to argue that this is because the theorists which I have dealt with below are all operating in terms of such epistemologies.

What has been called the general principles of a 'classical' semantical and epistemological theory have been expressed (5) as follows. First, the sense of a sentence is determined by stating its truth conditions, which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to establish that truth. Second, what is true is independent of what is known to be true. Thus, the truth that is intended in the specification of the sense of a sentence is independent of what can be known about what the sentence refers to by the human actors concerned in its interpretation. Third, sense is determinate, so that the sense of a sentence is definitely true or false in all possible worlds. With variations, these essential principles can be seen in most varieties of philosophical analysis of meaning, and concomitantly, have been imported tout court into sociological analysis. Epistemologically, these theories of truth and meaning have been placed alongside other arguments about the certainty of what we can know, so that there, it is proposed, first "the sense of epistemologically problematic sentences can be established independently of what counts as evidence for them, or whether they can be known to be true, and of how they can be known if they can be known" (6). Second, certainty is the impossibility of doubt; and third, only deduction can transmit certainty or knowledge (this is inseparable from the separation of knowledge from mere opinion by the necessity of the impossibility of doubt as a condition for certainty).
Fourth, all rational inferences are either deductive or inductive; evidence for probability is inductive where inference allows of some doubt, while in the case of (possible) certainty evidence is deductively related to proposition.

I hope it can be seen that the notions of truth and certainty which inform sociological theorising can be derived directly from such principles; the overriding problematic has been seen to be what it is that gives sociological accounts their warrant in the face of the historical conditionality (the mirror image of indexicality) of their production on the one hand, and the irremediable conventionality of their standards on the other. This, I would suggest, exhibits a conception of such standards which derives from the principles just outlined. Now, throughout this work I have used Wittgenstein to suggest ways in which we might see various sociological theories as illusory pursuits of some ideal; I want to suggest that this ideal derives from precisely the principles contained in classical semantic and epistemological theories. I propose to outline Wittgenstein's Constructivist theory of meaning as an alternative to these classical principles, in the hope that we may find some positive direction for sociological theorising by turning away from the illusions which these have generated.

Crucially, this theory depends upon creating new understandings of the notions of certainty and necessity. As we have seen, skepticism has been handled within the principles of classical theories by proceeding from a conflation of the notions of certainty and necessity; that is to say, for classical epistemological theories, certainty is linked with conclusive evidence, but it does not distinguish between evidence which it is not logically possible to overturn and that which it is not logically possible to improve. Its notion of certainty, then is either doomed to actual states of affairs where probability can always be improved, or else it must admit that its concept of certainty is impossible and incoherent, since, if no evidence could ever make it certain, then what kind of evidence could make it probable? Thus, if the claim is made that the evidence for a proposition could be improved, then it must also
be the case that it could be overturned, and if it can be overturned, then it can also be improved. Rather, Wittgenstein, suggests, should we not see necessity and certainty as separate; thus certainty resides in the possibilities given within a language game, so that conclusive evidence is rather that which cannot be improved upon or strengthened, and not 'incontrovertible' in the sense that it would necessarily entail that which it is evidence for in all possible worlds. Thus, the conditions for doubt in a constructivist theory would be curtailed. Rather than accepting the sceptics' account of the subversion of all possible accounts by tying them to the conjunction of possible illusion as a permanent possibility, Wittgenstein proposes that such a general principle is incoherent, in terms of his assertion of criterial relations between the sentences of accounts. If we separate out the notions of necessity and certainty which are conflated within the principles of classical epistemology, then while no instance of criterial support may not be subverted individually, criterial support does afford certainty in terms of a language game. What Wittgenstein's insistence on the separation of necessity and certainty does achieve within this theory is a limiting of the power of logical possibility; thus, while scepticism may remain as to the justification afforded by criterial support it is not to be allowed free rein; what power it may have is only to be decided in terms of the theory, rather than prior to its construction. This denies the logical possibility of a general breakdown of such a relationship, for in terms of constructivist theory, such a breakdown would not be possible, for the very possibility of subverting a criterial relation between sentences depends upon the general availability of this relationship; that is to say, on the one hand, the 'truth' which derives from the propositions of criterially supported sentences is not necessary truth, in the sense that generally, criterial relations give true conclusions from true premises, for this is not an empirical claim leading to this positive conclusion, but rather, is concerned with denying the use-
fulness of the search for such ends. The claim of constructivism is to exclude the possibility of a general collapse of such relations, which depends upon allowing for the necessary possibility of collapse in particular instances. Logical possibilities are not brute facts, and this, Wittgenstein argues, is how they are treated in terms of classical epistemologies. This is to say that, once again, Wittgenstein is warning against the illusions of an unexplained pervasive theory rather than proposing such a theory as an alternative.

For classical epistemology, mere possibility of doubt defeats any claims to certainty. For Constructivist theory, doubt is the necessary condition under which knowledge is possible. The argument is essentially that, since general breakdowns in criterial relations are not possible, then in particular instances, the mere possibility that such an instance may be subverted is not sufficient to deny its claim to certainty, since, if we allowed such a possibility this force, then we import a general principle, since we do not provide for such a subversion as a special or particular case; thus, only grounded doubt can defeat a criterial related claim to certainty. At the same time, what we understand as the criterial support for the certainty of a statement is what determines our understanding of the statement; only the introduction of additional evidence (substantial grounds) can then defeat this claim, since the criterial relation is not one of a priori evidence, but rather, a denial without additional evidence involves both changing the sense of the sentence which is doubted, and also assuming that this is the nature of the criterial relation.

Constructivism thus turns epistemology away from the search for necessary relations which determine the truth of sentences; rather than seeking to establish a systematic foundation which can realise the unrealiseable requirements of classical epistemology, Wittgenstein is directing our attention to the philosophical grammar in terms of which such ends can be assessed. Rather than proposing that his conceptions of necessity and certainty should respond to the programme of such an epistemology, Wittgenstein is arguing that the
explication of this grammar then makes classical epistemology responsible for the sense which it makes of necessity and certainty in terms of its principles. That is to say, he is arguing for certainty and knowledge which we logically can have, in terms of this theory, rather than what classical epistemology argues that we should have. Rather than accepting the 'good' of such a theory, should we not, rather, require this 'good' to justify its own 'goodness'?

In terms of a criterial account, any change in criterial relations involves a change in sense; this is to oppose, on the one hand, the view which emanates from classical epistemology that sense must be completely determinate, so that, if someone refuses to recognise the usual criteria for the sense of a sentence, he must be condemned on grounds which legislate for the 'real meaning' of the sentence. Rather, Wittgenstein argues, the fluctuation between symptoms and criteria as the justifications for the sense of sentences assures the possibility of a fluctuation of meaning which does not necessarily affect the truth value of a sentence (this is particularly common in science). It usually passes unnoticed.

This does not lead to a vagueness in the sense of sentences, however; from within the constructivist theory of semantics, the only sense which is available for the sentences of a language game is afforded by the criterial relations between its sentences; thus, there is no external view which could legislate for definitive meaning, but this is rather a concept which has no place in the theory. This is a reflection of constructivism's insistence on certainty as an achievement of our language games, rather than an ideal principle. In terms of such an ideal principle, definiteness of sense would seem to be a desirable quality which is missing in constructivist theory; but it is also a quality which is only to be seen as possible in terms of an external view of the process of sense making.

It is not the case that criteria are to be searched for as the 'undoubtable'
foundation of sense in any language game; if we assume that every sentence only has sense if we can assign criteria to it, and that all sentences with sense must have criterial support assigned to them, then this leads straight to an infinite regress, where in fact, no sentences can have sense, since we would always have to provide criterial support for the sentences which justify it, and so on. Rather than search for elementary sentences, which one could be tempted to do, it is preferable to see the criterial relation as reciprocal, so that sentences which criterially support other sentences are also sensible at least partly in terms of the sentences which they support.

This formulation of Wittgenstein's remarks into a systematic form is, Baker concedes, only the preliminary task to developing a full-blooded semantic and epistemological theory (7); it is no part of my task here to undertake this. What I hope this preliminary formulation will accomplish is to enable us to explore the ways in which this alternative formulation would affect the problems we have seen to arise in sociological theorising, and provide us with some way of seeing these problems in a different light. As has been argued, the implications of Wittgenstein's remarks can be used to develop a full blown theory, but this is a long way from accomplished, and it is certainly something which would, in some senses, go against Wittgenstein's expressed intention in his work. His work does have implications for the practice of sociological theorising, however, just as it does for philosophy, and it is the legacy of Wittgenstein that he provides for us a way of looking at theorising which may lead us to change our practices, but does not force us to do so; like Blum's conception of the Socratic theorist, it is no part of Wittgenstein's project to force us to speak what he speaks, but rather to allow us to see what it is that we do when we speak (8). This philosophy leaves everything as it is in the sense that it does not propose a lebensform which supplants what has gone before, but rather, forces us, if we can hear what it shows us in what it says, to be reflexive upon our practices, so that transformation comes from within
our practising, and is not imposed in terms of some superordinate principle which we bring to it. Constructivism as a theory, therefore, serves only as an instance of how theory operates, and seen in this way, allows us to consider how theory operates within our practices as that which we elect in the ends which we seek. At the same time, there are features of natural language and theorising which must be attended to because, it would seem of the internal logic of our attempt to make sense of the world as sociologists. It seems to me that constructivism, as an epistemological theory, allows us to attend to those features in ways which are a significant improvement on the ideals proposed by 'classical' epistemological theories. The working out of the full implications of constructivism is beyond the province of this present work, and would also depend on its articulation into a full blown theory. The crucial question would seem to be the nature of the sense which criteria bestow upon sentences; we have seen that constructivism would seem to either assert that criterial relations wholly determine sense because there are no relations of entailment (necessity) at all, or else that relations of entailment derive from criterial relations.

In Wittgenstein's insistence on the importance of normality conditions for understanding our form of representation, Hacker suggests that we find a 'thin analogue' of Kant's more protracted argument to establish the necessity of universal causal law as a general and fundamental condition of the possibility of conceptualised knowledge (9). For our concepts to have any purchase on the world, then they must reflect three general regular features; they must reflect the high degree of regularity in nature, they must display a high degree of rule governed connectedness, and they must manifest a general consensus between the individuals who employ them. While this depends upon their being a manifest agreement between the external world and our response to it, it is not the case that we could not imagine a general breakdown in this condition; the point is that we would not have any use for the present practices that we employ in accounting that world should such a breakdown occur; weighing, science, colour concepts, and so on, all depend on, at one
and the same time, a correspondence between the external world and our agreed ways of accounting this. This correspondence is not uniquely factic, however; language retains its autonomy, and thus practices can and do change. Only radical changes would rob our conventions of their use. But there is no sharp border line between such radical discontinuities (as we could imagine to be possible) and the normal conditions under which our concepts are employed. Where discontinuities do occur, we look for causes to account for them; if we cannot find them, then either the discontinuity is tolerated, or else the practice in which it occurs loses its usefulness. Usually, when we cannot, for instance, supply criteria which would legislate once and for all for the objective appearance of an object, we do not, thereby, say that the criteria which we do, in fact employ, thereby give no sense to the account of the object.

In classical theories, this case appears to depend upon the law of the excluded middle. Where we have cases in which criteria do not offer us a definitive method of seeing, then we are tempted to assert—surely such qualities must be either there or no? Wittgenstein remarks:

"Either it is raining or it isn't, one is inclined to say; how I know, how the information reached me, is another matter". (10)

In that the law of the excluded middle provides us with this kind of picture of objective reality, Wittgenstein seeks to emancipate us from its hold. The attractiveness of holding that reality is completely determinate lacks an application (11). Our practices do not provide us with any criteria for settling the objective existence; if we accept his arguments for multiple criteria in the application of expressions, criteria rather than truth conditions determining sense, and the notion that the criterial relation is that of necessarily good evidence and so weaker than entailment, that the list of criteria and their defeasibility conditions is indeterminate—all these lead us to see the law of the determinacy of objective reality (the law of the excluded middle) cannot be defended.
Justification comes to an end in social action; this is to say that, while our justifications for the world being as it is eventually come to what it (subjectively) appears to me to be, what it subjectively appears to me to come to is not an intuition, but the practice of a skill which is intersubjectively available; if we take the criterial relation seriously however, this does not provide us with a "firm foundation" for epistemology and language, but merely, enables us to see that the possibility of such a foundation is illusory, and that justification comes to an end where action must take its place.

Thus, judging is not learned on the basis of rule, in the sense that we do not learn 'once and for all' criteria which must be satisfied if our judgments are to be correct; we learn to accept the system within which judgment has a place. We do not learn to believe single propositions, but rather, propositions can only be believed as part of the totality within which they have sense, as a located nexus related to other propositions in mutually sense-dominating criterial relations. The search outside of such systems for the terms in which they are intelligible is based on the illusions which such systems generate of the nature of their foundations. In refusing to accept their inter-relatedness, in looking for more than we have as the basis for knowledge, we deny the role of grammar in fixing for us the limits of possible knowledge.

In terms of sociological theorising, we can see that the Constructivist epistemology which Wittgenstein's work would seem to suggest would provide us both with a means of assessing the possibilities of theoretical formulations of the nature of social phenomena, and also what limits are actually imposed on the search for knowledge of social phenomena. To begin with, it appears that the search for understanding in the concepts which actors employ to make their world sensible cannot proceed from the assumption that only in terms of an 'insiders' use of the lebensform is understanding to be accomplished, for this violates the view that criterial relations, in terms of which sentences have sense, are both multiple criteria, and also that the list of such criteria and
their defeasibility conditions is indeterminate, so that no such 'insiders'
view could ever be provided for except in terms of normalcy conditions which
stipulate for a precise demarcation internal to the society. As Wittgenstein
emphasises, there is no such sharp demarcation, but the very nature of the
practices involved depends upon diverse possibilities, and hence doubt, as a
preliminary to knowledge; such a condition, however, is limited by those
practices, so that doubt plays different parts in different language games,
in all of which, however, its possibility is prefigured by certainty which is
both undoubtable and also unknowable; that we can doubt proceeds from the
fact that, some things, we do not doubt.

The defeasibility of criteria, and the indeterminacy of their conditions does
not result in the indeterminacy of sense, however, except in terms of a
subscription to the principle of a possible external view of sense which
classical epistemology and semantics seem to regard as necessary. The index-
icality of the sense of sentences is not a limit on the interpretation of their
meaning unless we subscribe to the possibility of their being a 'once and for
all' definition of such meaning, and we are led into the acceptance of this
as a limiting possibility by the picture which classical epistemological theory
gives us of the nature of knowledge and certainty conflated with necessity.

Justification only comes to an end with subjective appearance in the sense
that in our criterionless ascriptions of sense to such appearance, we exercise
skills which we acquire within a community of natural language users, and our
ascription of sense to our subjective experience depends upon our previous
ability to account the sense of the external world. Thus, our description of
our experience has no greater evidential weight than our descriptions of the
external world; but further, its sense is to be weighed in terms of its place
within a set of practices; that is to say, the value of private accounts of
the meaning of experience is only assessable in terms of their place within
the system within which they have sense. The uniqueness of private experience
of meaning is a 'geometrical' illusion, since the meaning of any account is
what is available intersubjectively in the criterial relations between itself
and those sentences which form its justification, which are an indefinite set, rather than some special and uniquely definite set which are only available to the individual concerned. Thus, the orderliness of sense derives from the intersubjective availability of, simultaneously, an indeterminate set of criteria in terms of which sense is assignable, and also the conventions of 'normal conditions' under which these are to be used. Now, part of these 'normal conditions' involves assigning to actors ends in terms of which they are to be seen as operating; we cannot remain indifferent to these ends if we are to ascribe meaning to the sense of their utterances, whether or not we want to do so. If we choose to suspend judgment on these ends, then we are left without any means of deciding whether or not our accounts of the meaning of their actions are significant; we are producing naive uncritical descriptions which have no status in any theoretic account.

For to have status in a theoretical account, as Wittgenstein argues, there are at least three conditions which must be satisfied; first, we must accept that there is general agreement between individuals about how concepts refer to the regularities of nature, second, they must display a high degree of rule governed connectedness, and third, they must show the high degree of regularity in nature. The suspension of judgment on the conventions of 'normal conditions' involves calling into question the very nature of order; it must claim to operate on natural order, while, to be sensible, it simultaneously pre-supposes such order. Thus, ethnomethodological studies depend on a denial of their theoreticity to propose for themselves a distinctively different place than other sociological studies, but, to be sensible, their findings must rely on their place within a theoretic system.

At the same time, the operating premises of what Garfinkel calls 'constructivist' sociology explicitly propose the necessity of accepting such a framework as the prolegomenon to any social theorising. For Parsons, such a framework is to be taken over from science, as a self conscious methodological
set of principles. What this framework cannot deal with, in the terms that it sets for itself, is the disjunction between the "symptomatic" concepts of analytical schemes to account for the world, and the criteria of the everyday language games of actors who constitute its data; the only way that Parsons sees of dealing with this is in terms of 'primal invariant categories of apprehension' (pace Kant). This is to argue that, in terms of Wittgenstein's notions, the transcendent view of the natural order is to be found in master concepts, or some set of fundamental criterial relations which constitute the necessary order of the world; these cannot be 'thought away'. Insofar as science seems to express better than other frameworks the regularities in terms of which the world seems to present itself, Parsons, like Mannheim, takes this to be an indication of the primacy of positive, empirical thought in apprehending nature, but also of its necessary interrelationship with metaphysical developments on such thought. This view of theorising would assume that necessary relations are to be found, and that science provides us with a display of the grounds from which they must emanate. In terms of a constructivist epistemology, however, it is precisely the question of necessity which must be addressed; to assume that it must be solved, in the way that Parsons' constructivism does, is to appeal again to the picture of reality offered by classical epistemology, and in terms of Wittgenstein's account, this is to ignore the questions posed by the unquestionably social nature of our practices of apprehending the world. Theory may have to rely on grounds which turn out, after all, to be no more secure than an explication of its practices as social practices, but this is surely preferable to an unthinking assumption of necessity as a brute fact, rather than simply a possibility. This is to recommend, for social theorising, precisely the programme of explication which Garfinkel proposes for everyday life, but to be seen as a fundamental part of the family of practices of which such theorising is composed, rather than as an independent enterprise which has no repairs to offer to sociology. As I have suggested in the test, ethnomethodology is self conscious about the nature of language use in exactly the way that con-
structivist sociology is not; I further want to suggest that such self consciousness is a weakness in sociology which it is worth repairing, while, in ethnomethodology, this self consciousness tends to lead to indifference to theoretic community to which only integration into the body of sociological language games can offer use. Thus reflexive theorising, I want to argue, would be theorising within a community which encompasses the possibility, within a diversity of language games, of both accounting, describing, and explaining social phenomena in terms of some theoretical framework, which would be related to the ends of the investigator, and also explicating the justifications for its accounts in terms which would both secure them to the practices of the community of sociological investigators, and also investigate the relation between the special language game of sociological investigation, and the language games of everyday life to which it may not be reduced, but to which it is nevertheless ultimately responsible for its purposes.

The implications of Wittgenstein's constructivist theory of epistemology for Garfinkel, then, I take to be in the re-unification of ethnomethodological studies with the body of sociological theorising. With the surrender of the principle of indifference, which I would argue is the consequence of Wittgenstein's alternative view of the relation between the language games of science and commonsense, ethnomethodological studies may find that they can recognise the true community of their interests with sociological theorising, and redefine their project in terms of the common interest of combining understanding with the concrete historicity of the life-world. This is not to say that ethnomethodology cannot continue in its present condition, but rather, that Wittgenstein's work offers some possibility that the irreconcilability of its project with that of constructivist sociology may no longer seem so, since the necessity of its demarcation from sociology seems to me to proceed from the epistemological principles which it shares with sociology at the present time. The strong claim that it makes for the necessary idealisation of any
generalising theory, and hence the inability of such theory to deal satisfactorily with the sense assembling practices of men 'in situ' is vitiated by the terms of Wittgenstein's constructivism in the sense that this provides for the articulation of sentential relations of justification at this level with those at the second, theoretically abstract analytical level. Certainty is seen to be, in terms of this account, only ever available in the social, and hence historic, practices of members of language communities as they mutually act in and on the world, both constituting and transforming its meaning. Such constitution and transformation is only possible, in terms of Wittgenstein's theory of knowledge, if we see the inter-relatedness as well as the differences between the works formulated by the language games which constitute such communities.

The fundamental import of Wittgenstein for sociology lies, I believe, in his rescue of the notion of truth from the transcendental realm. For Wittgenstein, this is essentially an achievement of man in the social world, and given the view of language that he formulates, can be nothing else. To recognise this is at once to recognise how language functions in order to provide us with 'certain knowledge', and to see the task of drawing the parameters of such knowledge as involving a recognition of the illusions into which our forms of representation can lead us. I have argued that the role provided for value in certain types of sociological account proceeds from just such an illusion and further, that this notion loses its place when we analyse the grounds from which it derives. The pessimism to which Parsons alludes in "The Structure of Social Action" with the possibilities for sociological theorising(12) has long grown into a despair with the conventional means which sociology has developed to account society, and the theoretical asceticism of Garfinkel and Blum are the fruits of that tree, just as much as the politically based arguments of Gouldner, and, in another direction, the Critical theorists of Frankfurt, whom, regretfully, I have not considered.
In terms of the majority of these theorists, a belief in the spirit of Parsons, Mannheim and Wittgenstein betokens deep conservatism and an utopian faith in the possibilities for unified human knowledge. Hopefully, this work provides an argument against these charges; if not, my optimism about the future for sociology may be equally ill-starred.
Notes to Introduction


5. Ibid, p 32.


10. Ibid, p 186.


15. Ibid, p 59: (... "metaphysics is onto-theo-logic")


Notes on Chapter I: Ordinary Language: Convention and Context

1. In consideration of Peter Winch's work, I have concentrated on a limited number of the many issues raised by it; these are discussed, at length, in Bryan Wilson (ed) "Rationality" (1970) Oxford, Blackwell, and A. R. Louch "Explanation and Human Action" (1966) Oxford Basil Blackwell, as well as many articles, some of which are cited below.


10. Winch (1958) pp 26-7

11. Ibid, p 27.

12. See, for an interesting sociological discussion Jeff Coulter "Approaches to Insanity" (1973) Martin Robertson.


16. "Criterion" is discussed more fully in chapter 3 below: note here that "Criterion" is used in one particular way out of a number of possible ways. See also A. J. P. Kenny, "Criterion" in "The Encyclopaedia of
20. Winch, op cit p 84.
21. Weber, op cit chapter I
22. For Winch's "Indifference" to reality outside of speech see also his "Language, Belief and Relativism" in H. D. Lewis (ed) "Contemporary British Philosophy" (1976) George Allen & Unwin Ltd, pp 322-339.
25. Winch (1958) p 22; Note the particular sense of "criteria" here.
27. The problem of "context dependency" as we shall see, creates special difficulties for Winch. Note, however, that the main thrust of Winch's work aims towards an attack on the 'ambitions' of a "context-blind" generalising social science.
31. Winch, op cit p 64.
32. Ibid, p 89.
33. Ibid, p 103.
34. Ibid, p 100.
35. This debate is well represented in Wilson (1970).
43. Ibid, p 100.
45. Neilsen, op cit, p 320.
46. On private Language, and Wittgenstein's position, see Hacker (1972), chapters 8-10 and above chapter 3.
48. Steiner, op cit.
50. Ibid, para 308.
54. Ibid, p 331, N 54.
56. Ibid, p 23.
57. Ibid, p 133.
58. Ibid, p 42.
59. Ibid, p 43.
60. Ibid, pp 86-7.
64. Garfinkel (1967) pp 35-75.
66. See Hacker (1972) p 290-1, and passim.
68. To add fuel to the flames, see the somewhat ambiguous remarks reported by Rhees Etal in "Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief" (1966) Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
70. See J. Locke "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" ed A. L. Frazer (1894); republished by Dover, New York (1959) Books II and III and passim. Wittgenstein's reconstitution of the argument for a private language is distributed, and restated in a variety of forms, throughout his post-"Tractatus" work.
71. In J. L. Austin "Performative Utterances" in "Philosophical Papers" (1970) ed Urmson and Wornock (Oxford University Press) p 235, and passim. (This was originally delivered as an unscripted talk, for the BBC Third Programme in 1956). Austin's use of this example is not confined to this particular work; see for instance, his "Other Minds" (1946), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society re-printed in Austin (1970).
72. This is well illustrated in the "autonomous text" debate documented in Simonds (1978) pp 52-61, 64-5. The issues in the Private Language argument have interesting analogues here; for the relevance of this work, see above, chapter 2, on Mannheim.
74. Ibid, p 144.
75. Ibid, p 148.
76. Ibid, p 149.
77. Ibid, p 152.
78. Ibid, p 152.
79. Ibid, p 159.
83. Ibid, p 172.
84. See Wilson (1970) op cit, for some of the major contributions to this debate.
85. Wittgenstein (1968A) para 527-32.
86. Steiner (1975) pp 115-123.
89. By "Criterial" is intended the idea that the account which is produced is responsible for leading the audience to a recognition of its warrant; which is to say, rather than searching for unquestionable grounds towards which ideal speech would direct us, each account must locate itself as an instance of a specific language game, having sense within a community of language users (social scientists).
92. Ibid, p 159.


96. Following Mannheim's formulation in Mannheim (1952) op cit.


Notes for Chapter 2: Ordinary Language and Sociological Theorising

2. See ibid, p 33.
3. Ibid, p 35, note (1)
4. Ibid, p 35, note (1)
5. Ibid, p 287.
8. Ibid, p 72.
11. Parsons "Individual Autonomy and Social Pressure; Comment on Wrong", Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic review, Summer 1962.
15. Ibid, p 733.
17. As an undergraduate, my sociological theory courses seemed to consist, in large part, of dissections of the corpus of Parsonianism, scalpels being wielded by everyone from C. Wright Mills, and the Marxists, through conflict theorists like Lockwood and Giddens, to those like Gouldner who will use whatever is available, but seem quite willing to step into the warm shoes of General theory. This has proved a somewhat premature interment, however.

19. This form of relationship I derive from reading Alan Blum, although it is probably a weak version of that which he would intend.


21. I acknowledge here, the importance of Garfinkel's unpublished "Parsons Primer", Mimeograph in leading me to see the relationship between them in this way. It can, however, also be grounded in his "Studies in Ethnomethodology".


23. See the preceding section, notably the comments on "phenomenological status".

24. The following section is derived from Garfinkel's unpublished work on Parsons; Garfinkel is not, however, responsible for the use which I have made of it. See my "Concreteness and Analysis" (1972)(Mimeograph) University of Durham.


28. See Baker, op cit, and also the remarks on Criteria in the preceding chapter.

33. Ibid, p 339.
34. Ibid, p 339 note (1).
35. Ibid, p 341.
36. It is interesting here to compare Wittgenstein's use of the same sort of notion in his "Philosophical Investigations" (1968A), Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
38. This is discussed in an appendix to Garfinkel & Sacks (1970).
41. My approach to Husserl on the epoche has been heavily influenced by Kolakowski's sharp critique in "Kolakowski (1975)".
44. Ibid, p 262.
45. Ibid, p 266.
46. Ibid, pp 269-70.
47. Ibid, p 270.
52. See Schutz in Brodersen (ed) (1964) op cit, pp 142-3.


54. Ibid, p 281.

55. Ibid, p 282.


57. "Proceedings of the Purdue Symposium on Ethnomethodology" ed Crittenden and Hill,


62. Ibid pp 24, 55.


65. Ibid, paras 438-9, 571.

66. This section is largely derived from Hacker (1972) pp 286-7.


70. Wittgenstein (1964A) para 77.


73. Ibid, p 103.

74. See Dell Hymes' Introduction to Garfinkel "Remarks on Ethnomethodology" in Gumperz and Hymes (eds) "Directions in Sociolinguistics" (1972) Holt, Rinehart and Winstow, New York, p 306.
75. See Bershady's analysis of this in "Bershady (1975) Chapter 8.

76. Garfinkel, of course, utilises one of Mannheim's methodological responses to the problem of conditionality, the "documentary method of interpretation".


78. Ibid, p 137.

79. Ibid, p 137, note (1).

80. Ibid, p 139, see also chapter 4 of this work.


82. Ibid, p 156.

83. Ibid, p 158.

84. Ibid, p 163.

85. Ibid, p 165, note (1).

86. Ibid, pp 165-6.


88. Ibid, p 175.

89. Ibid, p 175.

90. Ibid, p 178.
Notes on Chapter 3: Reflexivity: History and Noesis

1. For some details of Blum's work, see the Bibliography: I shall mainly be concerned with the work up to and including "Theorising" (1974) Heinemann, London.

2. It is not the case that Rosen tell us why Blum writes as he does. There are, it seems to me, however, compelling grounds for finding in Rosen's explicit discussion of his principles of scholarship a good set of rules for reading Blum. Having said that, to seek such a set of procedures is undoubtedly to depart from the spirit of Blum's writing. See the frontispiece to Blum (1974) for a disclaimer.


4. Ibid, p (xi).

5. Ibid, p (xviii).

6. Ibid, p (xii).

7. Ibid p (xxv).

8. Ibid p (xxxii).

9. The first part of the following section is based, in large part on Blum's paper "Theorising" in Douglas (ed) (1970) pp 305-323.

10. Ibid, p 304.


15. See here Steiner (1975) on the search for a "Linguae Universalis".

16. Blum, op cit, p 308.

17. See the preceding discussion of Rosen's work.

18. See Mannheim (1952) cited above.


20. Blum, op cit, p 311.
21. Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology" (1971) 
22. Ibid, p 481.
23. Ibid, p 482.
24. Ibid, p 482.
26. Ibid, p 484.
27. Ibid, p 485.
29. Ibid, p 488.
30. Ibid, p 489.
33. Ibid, p 499.
34. Ibid, p 499.
35. See Blum, McHugh, Reffel and Foss "On the Beginnings of Social Inquiry"
40. See Hans Skjervheim "Objectivism and the Study of Man", Filosofiske
    Problemer Nr. 23 (1959) Oslo.
41. See his classic "Aspects of the Theory of Syntax" (1965) M.I.T. Press,
    Cambridge, Massachusetts.
42. What follows is an attempt to apply some of the ideas developed by
    Wittgenstein in his account of language uses by communities of competent
    speakers as a game-like activity - i.e., involving rule-directed/oriented/
    guided behaviour pursuing specific objectives, incorporating different
sets of rules to govern permitted 'moves', 'style of play', and so on. "Language-games" makes reference to these themes in Wittgenstein's work. I hope that the way in which these ideas are employed will obviate the need for any preliminary disclaimer of the objection that "game" denies to language use any serious point, or implies a planfulness or set of priorities which may or may not be justified.

43. I take it that "value" is a commonly used idea, and "value-relatedness" a commonly confronted problem within the community of sociological theorists - ie., competent speakers of sociological language. To forestall accusations of my erection of an artificial boundary for sociological language, it may be worthwhile to refer here to Wittgenstein's various discussions, of the analogy of language use to "tools" as well as "games". See particularly Wittgenstein (1968A) and (1969B). The point here is that Wittgenstein's discussion seeks to find useful ways in which these everyday ideas can be relevant to an understanding of how language functions, rather than tying us to a mechanistic imposition of the qualities of the everyday onto language.

44. In the following exegesis, I have relied heavily on P. M. S. Hacker's masterly discussion. He is, of course, in no way responsible to the uses to which I have put it.

46. Wittgenstein (1968A) para 16.
47. Ibid para 272.
48. Think here, of Wittgenstein's "beetle in a box" example, from Wittgenstein (1968A) para 293.
49. Wittgenstein (1968A) para 304.
50. Ibid, para 23.
51. Ibid, para 329.
54. Wittgenstein (2968A) para 188.
55. See Hacker (1972) p 309.
56. Ibid, pp 306-309.
60. See Winch, in Lewis (1976) for a detailed exposition of this idea.
63. The issues here are, of course, also found in the debate amongst literary analysts: see Jaques Derrida "Speech and Phenomena" (1973), North Western University Press, U.S.A.
64. See Blum in Douglas (1970), p 258.
65. Blum (1974) p 34. Unavoidably, I am afraid, much of the following discussion adopts some of Blum's Heideggerean style: I have found difficulty in finding a satisfactory alternative mode of expression. In keeping with the Wittgensteinian aims of this present work, however, I ask the reader to try to find the meaning in the use, and not to reject it because of strangeness or unfamiliarity.
66. Compare these with the principles set out by Rosen, and discussed at the beginning of this present chapter.
70. See the preceding exegesis of Wittgenstein's "Private Language" critique.


72. In (1974A) pp

73. Ibid, p 24.


75. Ibid, p 33.

76. Ibid, p 33.

77. Hacker (1972) p 179.


80. Ibid, p 745 f, p 749.

81. See also Friedrich Waissman "How I see Philosophy" (1968) ed. R. Harre Oxford University Press, Chapter I.


Notes to Conclusion

1. At a number of points in the argument that follows, I conflate what are separate issues into a unity which is, to say the least, highly suspect. I hope that this will be tolerated in the interest of trying to develop a general sketch of the interrelatedness of these particular problems, and some possible approaches to their solution.


3. In the arguments of Critical Theory against Mannheim we find a far more powerful formulation of this issue. However, the task of exploring the implications of this work is far beyond this present project. See, for some of the arguments, Theodore W. Adorno "Prisms" translated by Samuel and Shierry Weber (1967), Neville Spearman, London, p 38 and passim.


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This thesis was prepared for submission while I was in receipt of S.S.R.C. grant at the University of Durham in the period 1973–76, and no portion of it has been submitted for any other degree.
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