Philopoemen: a study in Hellenistic history

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"Philopoemen, a study in Hellenistic History" by R. M. ERRINGTON.

The basis of the work is an examination of the ancient source material, in particular Plutarch's 'Life of Philopoemen' and the fragments of Polybius' Historiae which deal with the Achaean League. An outline of the resultant interpretation of Philopoemen's career is as follows. Until 222 B.C. he took no part in Achaean politics, but was involved solely with Megalopolis. Between 222 and 211 Philopoemen was in Crete representing the interests of Philip V of Macedon, from 210 to 200 in Achaean where after attaining a military independence of Macedonia with Philip's encouragement, he used this to attempt to join Rome. Defeated on this issue in 200 he returned to Crete to help Sicyonians, Achaean allies. In his absence his friend Aristaenus carried his policy and joined Achaean to Rome.

On Philopoemen's return in 194 he first desired to cooperate with Flamininus; but when he discovered that Flamininus was merely using Achaean for Roman policy Philopoemen began to press the letter of the law of the Achaean Acadius with Rome at first misunderstanding, but finally exploiting Achaean clientels. He refused Rome any right of interference in Peloponnesian matters, although he himself was unable to find satisfactory solutions to many of the Achaeoans' problems, particularly those associated with exiles from Sparta and Messene. The Roman Senate, bound by its conventions could find
no way round the impasse until after Philopoemen’s death in 182, when his party lost most of its influence in Achaia. This interplay of policies and purposes of the Senate and Philopoemen is worked out in detail.

The concluding chapter traces the developing weakness of his party after his death and attempts to correct some modern interpretations of Polybius’ judgement of Philopoemen and his policies. Appendices deal with source problems, chronology - whereby some new solutions are proposed to problems in the Achaean strategos list - and other pertinent problems.
This work was begun in summer 1961 and ended in October 1965. In the course of its composition, many debts have been incurred which cannot all be acknowledged individually. The most outstanding are: to Professor E. Badian, who has undertaken the task of supervision with an energy and enthusiasm - despite constant ill-health - which has never ceased to stimulate and encourage; to Professor F. W. Walbank, who suggested the subject and read drafts of the early chapters; to Professor E. Birley and the staff of the Durham University Archaeology Department, for congenial working conditions and a stimulating environment; to Professor K. M. T. Atkinson and my colleagues in Belfast, for encouragement and discussion.

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R.M.E.

Belfast.

October 1965.
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All dates in this thesis are B.C. unless it is specifically stated otherwise.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

At the time of his death in May/June 182, Philopoemen was in his 70th year.¹ A calculation from this date gives June/July 252 as terminus post quem for the date of his birth. Unfortunately, this cannot be accepted as altogether conclusive, for it may conflict with evidence from Plutarch. The battle of Sellasia is now generally agreed to have been in 222.² In the autumn before the battle Cleomenes attacked and took Megalopolis. At this time Plutarch says that Philopoemen was 30 years of age.³ Imprecision lies in the fact that we do not know whether Plutarch's figure represents an inclusive or exclusive calculation. If exclusive, there is a direct conflict with the other Polybian evidence, for it implies a date of between autumn 254 and autumn 253. On the other hand, if Plutarch is simply recording Polybius' information, as is quite possible, it may represent an inclusive calculation - Polybius' usual method - and is then compatible with the other Polybian date: it gives us autumn 253 to autumn 252 as limits. This can then be combined with the terminus post quem of June/July 252 to produce a narrow limit for the birth of between June and October 252. This, while open to objection, has the virtue of accepting the certain Polybian date of June/July 252 as terminus post quem, and explaining Plutarch's figure as a compatible Polybian calculation.⁴

Philopoemen's father Craugis was one of the most distinguished citizens of Megalopolis. While he lived, he gave a home to Cleander of Mantinea, who had been exiled from his native city. Craugis did not
long survive the birth of his son, who was brought up after his death by Cleander. No doubt the tie of interest was added to the tie of sentiment in Cleander's case. The death of his Megalopolitan patron must have made his position as exile less secure in Megalopolis; and the assumption of the duties of guardian of Philopoemen would tend to predispose the Megalopolitans in his favour.\(^5\)

When Philopoemen became older, he was put under the training of Ecdemus and Megalophanes, who had helped Aratus free Sicyon. Both were Megalopolitans, both had studied with Arcesilaus of Pitane in the Academy while in exile. The two together had, perhaps in 252, been responsible for the assassination of the tyrant of Megalopolis, Aristodemus 'The Good', and as a result were enabled to return to Megalopolis.\(^6\) A further result of their participation in the two 'liberations' was that they acquired a reputation for being freedom-fighters; and their association with Arcesilaus gave their reputation, in the popular mind, a philosophical basis. As a result, Plutarch, in his idealised portrait of Philopoemen, suggests that Philopoemen's famous love of freedom stemmed directly from his early association with the two tyrant-assassins. This idea gives him a philosophical theory which provides a theme for the interpretation of Philopoemen's later political activities. We shall see that Philopoemen's later actions were based on far more realistic political considerations; and there is no hint of the philosophical motivation which was built into the legend and retailed by Plutarch.

The training of Ecdemus and Megalophanes cannot therefore be
considered to have been in any way responsible for the courses of action which Philopoemen took later. Polybius seems to have realised this, and describes the results of their training in very general terms. The emphasis, as he presents it, seems to have been laid on personal self-sufficiency and public morality. The results which Polybius attributes to this course of training are very practical: that Philopoemen 'soon came to excel all his contemporaries in endurance and courage both in hunting and in war'. These were clearly useful personal acquisitions for his future public military career; but bear little relation to the policies which circumstances caused him to form. Plutarch's myth-making, whereby he attributes much of the glory of the 'Last of the Greeks' to the teaching of Ecdemus and Megalophanes, can have no basis in reality.

The first 30 years of Philopoemen's life was a period of great change for Megalopolis. The city had been founded in 369 with the active support of Epaminondas as a concrete manifestation of Theban support for Arcadian independence, and a symbol of the destruction of Sparta's military hegemony in Peloponnese. After the eclipse of Thebes, Megalopolis looked to Macedon for support against Sparta; and this continued throughout the third century. Taking no part in the Chremonidean war, Aristodemus, the current tyrant, suffered invasion from Acrotatus, the son of the Spartan King Cleomenes II, whom he defeated and killed. He himself was assassinated by Ecdemus and Megalophanes - perhaps in 252 - and at some time before 243 was replaced by Lydiadas, son of Eudamus. This new tyranny probably
accorded with the wishes of Antigonus Gonatas, although it seems that
the Aetolians were instrumental in helping him to the tyranny; this
was perhaps as a result of making his reputation by the defeat of Agis
at Mantinea, where he and Leocydes had led the Megalopolitans. After
his accession to the tyranny he placated the Eleans, who were allies of
the Aetolians, with the gift of Alipheira - perhaps paying off a
personal debt in this way. Although Alipheira was a constituent city
of the Megalopolitan koinon, it seems to have maintained some municipal
independence. As its situation probably made it indefensible at this
time by Lydiadas, it was ceded to the Eleans to keep them quiet while
he was engaged on the Spartan front.

Lydiadas' assumption of the tyranny at Megalopolis coincided with
the rise of Aratus to influence in Achaea; and with this the pursuit
of an expansionist policy by the Achaean League. The Achaean League
had been reconstituted, probably in 281/0, with the union of Patrae,
Dymae, Pharae, and Tritaea; and the first federal magistrates assumed
their offices in the strategos-year 280/79. In 275/4 Aegium joined
the League, giving momentum to the federal movement, and was quickly
followed by Bura and Cerynea, after pressure had been brought to bear
on the Macedon-supported tyrants by Margus of Cerynea. The remaining
four cities in Achaea - Leontion, Aegira, Pellene and Olenus - soon
followed suit, again probably urged by Margus. In 255/4 the federal
administration was streamlined, and one annual strategos substituted
for the two, which had been the system until the present. As Margus
was the first man to occupy this new modified and more efficient
strategos, we are probably justified in concluding that he had led the agitation for the change. Up to this time, the League had made little impact on the Peloponnesian scene, except to underline the fact that Macedonian control was less powerful than it had been in the early part of the century. Nevertheless, tyrants, perhaps supported by Gonatas, still held Corinth, Sicyon and Argos; and the comparatively feeble Achaean League would be fully occupied in simply maintaining its independence as long as this situation continued.  

A change was suddenly brought about in 251/0. In that year Aratus of Sicyon overthrew Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon, with the help of Ecdemus, and enrolled Sicyon in the Achaean League. No doubt there were opponents within the League to this extra-ethnic expansion - although this was the practice in the First League - and the bargain was not as one-sided as our sources, based on Aratus' memoirs, maintain. But we can surely envisage Margus' supporting Aratus' claim to unite his city to the League; and if credit is to be given, he should probably have at least as much as Aratus - who dominates the tradition - for his foresight in persuading the Achaeans to accept the neighbouring non-Achaean city, and thus initiate the period of expansion which eventually made Achaea synonymous with Peloponnese. We hear little of Achaea for eight years, when Aratus, now strategos of the League for the second time, led a successful attack on Corinth in 243/2. With Corinth came Megara, Troezen and Epidaurus. It must have been clear by now that the League had passed beyond the point of being simply another ephemeral attempt of weak states to unite against a common
danger, but had become a solid community of interests.\textsuperscript{11}

At Megalopolis Lydiadas had already had experience of Aratus through his contact with him at the battle of Mantinea - if we are to accept as even part truth Pausanias' account of the battle. But there is no indication that at this time Lydiadas had any thoughts about resigning his tyranny. The threat from Achaea was not sufficiently urgent to make a decision pressing; and on the other hand Aratus seemed determined to pursue a policy directly opposite to traditional Megalopolitan policy. After the accessions to the League of 243/2, his open hostility to Macedon was confirmed by the regulation of his relations with Ptolemy Euergetes, and the League assigned honorary hegemony to Euergetes. In return for this Aratus received an annuity of 6 talents: from the Egyptian point of view this was a cheap way of maintaining a policy of hostility to Macedon.\textsuperscript{12}

In the next year, 242, an alliance with Sparta was in operation. Agis IV and Aratus with the Achaeans combined at Corinth to oppose Aetolian militancy, which had been aroused by Achaean successes and was encouraged by Gonatas. Although this alliance was quickly broken off when Aratus suspected that the influence of Agis' domestic policies was being extended to Achaea,\textsuperscript{13} it is clear that there was no possibility of co-operation between Aratus and Lydiadas, whose traditional and immediate Megalopolitan opposition to Sparta could not be compromised, and who maintained friendly relations with Aetolia. Aratus' rupture with Agis was followed in 239 by the death of Gonatas and the accession of Demetrius II to the Macedonian throne. At this,
a re-alignment of forces took place in Greece, and an alliance between Achaea and Aetolia was made against Macedon. In itself this did not make any closer the possibility of Megalopolitan rapprochement with the League. But as Elis was a traditional ally of Aetolia and enemy of Sparta, this Aetolian alliance, following close on Aratus' break with Agis, tended to bring the whole Achaeo/Aetolian alliance into opposition with Sparta.

Achaea now began to have the same basic foreign policy interests as Megalopolis vis-à-vis Sparta, and Aratus' expansionism was already beginning to bring pressure to bear on Lydiadas. Probably before 235, the League under Aratus and Dioetas had expanded to include large parts of the Arcadian hinterland of Megalopolis: in these years Heraea, Alea, Cleonae, Cleitor, Cynætha, Stymphalus and Thelphusa were brought into the League. It must have become increasingly clear to Lydiadas that he was in grave danger of being sandwiched between a hostile and expansionist Achaea to the north, and a traditionally hostile Sparta to the south, where Cleomenes III had just come to power on the death of Leonidas. Prospects could not have been much less favourable for the maintenance of an independent Megalopolis. Lydiadas must have been aware of Aratus' reputation as tyrant-hater; and that his associates Ecdemus and Megalophanes were now living in Megalopolis and mixing with many of the young Megalopolitans. It must have been clear to Lydiadas that he was soon going to be faced with a critical decision: if he anticipated the course of events and resigned his tyranny at Megalopolis, he could apply to join the League; but in this case his
city would suffer a serious diminution of national sovereignty. On
the other hand it would effectually remove the threat from the north;
and there would be a reasonable expectation of aid against Sparta.
If he did not take this course, he would be compelled to face the ever-
increasing hostility from both Sparta and Achaea, and even fifth-
column attempts from within Megalopolis itself. The decision was
unpleasant; but for a politician the Achaean rapprochement was
inevitable. He chose to anticipate the major threat, and secure safety
for himself and Megalopolis. In 235/4 he enrolled Megalopolis in the
Achaean League; and was rewarded by himself being elected to the
federal strategia for 234/3. The Megalopolitans became Achaean citizens;
and as a result, a much wider sphere for political activity was opened
up to the ambitious. There can have been few who disapproved of the
long-term considerations which had influenced Lydiadas' decision.

During the next few years until 230/29 Aratus and Lydiadas
alternated in holding the federal strategia. Friction was almost bound
to arise between the two outstanding personalities of the League; and
this was certainly increased by Lydiadas' emphasising as League policy
his natural Megalopolitan fear of Sparta. Aratus may have been
unwilling to recognise the seriousness of the threat from Sparta and
may have tended to attribute Lydiadas' fears to Megalopolitan tradition
rather than to political reality. Added to this was personal jealousy -
another motive which created hostility between the two leaders; and it
is this aspect which Plutarch emphasises.17 Aratus could see his
personal supremacy threatened by the newcomer whom he had supported,
and in 230/29 provoked a crisis.

Lydiadas was strategos; and in his official capacity opened negotiations with the tyrant of Argos, Aristomachus, with a view to taking Argos into the League. When Aristomachus formally applied for membership with the support of Lydiadas, he was successfully opposed by Aratus. It seems clear that Aratus was provoking a trial of strength with Lydiadas; and Aratus had won. Plutarch faithfully records Aratus' propagandist accusation of Lydiadas, of poaching patronage. This was clearly the issue on which Aratus was prepared to fight. It was far more than simply the matter of Argive membership which was at stake: it was the whole basis of Aratus' personal dominance within the League. Hence the attempt to suggest that Lydiadas was in some way acting illegitimately in supporting Aristomachus' application. In fact, in Lydiadas' strategia, Aratus had no business to take upon himself negotiations for new League members. It was Lydiadas' duty, and if Aratus persisted, a clash was clearly inevitable, with legitimacy on the side of Lydiadas. Aratus of course, was able to pass this over in his apologia, and lay the blame firmly on the shoulders of Lydiadas' φιλοτιμία.¹⁸

This defeat was fatal to Lydiadas' political career. He had failed to appreciate the fact that he was a novus homo, an Arcadian in Achaea; and on the other hand he had underestimated Aratus' personal following in Achaea and the personal bitterness which the clash had engendered. The crisis was engineered by Aratus; and his victory secured his personal prominence. When he was himself strategos in
229/8 Aristomachus was quietly enrolled in the League, under Aratus' patronage. During the years of Lydiadas' activity, Mantinea had joined the League, and possibly Orchomenus. But after the accession of Argos, when other tyrants saw the friendly reception which had ultimately been offered to Aristomachus, Aegina, Hermione, Phlius and perhaps Pheneus and Lasion, entered the League. Aratus was consolidating his own position; and ostentatiously supported Aristomachus' successful bid for the strategia of 228/7.

Signs of trouble were already apparent in Achaea. Before 229 Mantinea was lost to the Aetolians, and in 229 was taken from them by the militant Cleomenes. Although it was recovered by Aratus, in 227, it was almost immediately lost again in the succession of disasters of 226/5. Caphyae was taken in 228 by Aratus, but this was the last independent acquisition made by the League. For the future, any accessions were to be de facto subject to the permission of the dominant power, whether Macedon or Rome. In 226 and 225, under the strategoi Hyperbatus and Timoxenus, Achaea lost many of her recent acquisitions, and became subject to violent attack from Cleomenes. The loss of Heraea and Alea was rapidly followed by that of Mantinea, Caphyae, Pellene, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, Corinth, Pheneus, Lasion and Megara. One result of this desperate situation was that Megalopolis, although remaining for the moment intact, was cut off from the rest of Achaea; and as the federal authorities were fully occupied with Cleomenes in northern Achaea, Megalopolis could expect to be left to fend for itself - particularly after the death
of Lydiadas at Ladoceia in 227. 22

In the circumstances it is not surprising to find that Aratus, quite early in the series of disasters - in 227 after Ladoceia - made use of two Megalopolitans, Nicophanes and Cercidas, to make an exploratory approach to the new Macedonian King, Antigonus Doson, in an attempt to negotiate Macedonian aid for the League against Cleomenes. This was, for Aratus, a direct change of policy from the hostility to Macedon, on which he had come to power in Achaea. But he was now faced with a straight choice between defeat at the hands of Cleomenes and the acceptance of the tutelage of Doson. In the circumstances the latter was the lesser evil. In the case of the Megalopolitans, hostility to Sparta and support for Macedon was the traditional policy of their period of independence. It is interesting to note that the incorporation of southern Arcadia into the League, and the resultant confrontation with Sparta, had the effect of causing Achaea to adopt the Megalopolitan policy rather than continue the earlier Achaean. But Antigonus’ demand for Corinth could not be granted in 227 for both personal and public reasons of prestige. The result was that the negotiations hung fire until the revolt of the city in summer 225 and its capture by Cleomenes. This effectually removed the stumbling block of Achaean prestige - now already shattered. By this time too Achaea was so hard pressed by Cleomenes that the autumn synod of the League voted to accept Antigonus’ demands for Corinth in return for military aid. 23

Early in 224 Antigonus appeared in the Megarid. With the
support of Timoxenus (strategos 225/4), and Aratus (strategos 224/3), he quickly dislodged Cleomenes from his strongpoints of Corinth and Argos; and by the end of 224 Cleomenes was confined to the south of Argos. During 223 Antigonus advanced into Arcadia, took Tegea, Orchomenus, Mantinea, Heraea and Thelphusa from Cleomenes, and thus confined him further within the traditional boundaries of Laconia. This campaign successfully relieved Spartan pressure on Megalopolis and southern Arcadia.\textsuperscript{24}

It was during these years of unremitting Megalopolitan hostility to Sparta that Philopoemen reached maturity and gained his early political and military experience. He had seen Lydiadas lay down his tyranny in favour of participation in the larger political unit; and had realised that this did not mean a betrayal of local sectional interests which could, in the circumstances, be better defended by participation in the Achaean League; and these considerations were not necessarily invalidated by the incapacity of Achaea to be wholly successful in defending Megalopolis against Cleomenes. It must be to the continuous warfare of these years that Plutarch refers, when he says that Philopoemen 'accustomed himself to march first on the outward march and last on the return'.\textsuperscript{25} He probably took part in all the serious fighting of 227, and may well have been present when Lydiadas was killed at Ladoceia.\textsuperscript{26} But his youth must have prevented him from taking any active part in Megalopolitan politics at this time; and he could have had little to do with the appeal to Macedon. However, as a soldier, he must have realised the need for military reinforcement
against Cleomenes, which was clearly not forthcoming from Achaea alone; and therefore have supported the negotiations. There was, after all, no loss of prestige for the Megalopolitans in an appeal to Macedon. But if Philopoemen can have played little part in the political activity of these years, he must have taken an important part in the defence of Megalopolis until 223, when the city was relieved by the presence of Antigonus in Arcadia; for by then he was recognised as an important military figure by the Megalopolitans, although, as far as we know, he had as yet made no mark in federal military matters.

In 223 comes Philopoemen's first major recorded activity. During the summer Cleomenes had made an unsuccessful attack on Megalopolis, apart from which the year had gone to Antigonus. In the autumn, the Macedonian troops were allowed to go home instead of spending the winter uselessly in billets in Peloponnese. This was equally satisfactory from the point of view of the soldiers, who were able to return to their families, and the Achaeans, who thus avoided the expensive obligation of providing winter accommodation for the troops. The soldiers were therefore dispatched from Achaea while the roads to the north were still open. This meant taking the gamble that Cleomenes would not use what remained of the fine weather to attack Achaea; but it seemed justified, as Cleomenes must have appeared cowed as a result of the reverses he had sustained during the summer. Cleomenes however looked upon this rather differently. To him this was the gift of an opportunity for a successful surprise
attack on Megalopolis. He made his preparations rapidly, and in a
night attack on the inadequately defended city - it was too large for
its population even in normal times, and must have suffered severe
losses in the years of fighting - he gained possession. In the course
of the fighting some 1,000 Megalopolitans were killed or taken
prisoner; the remainder, including women and children, were led by
Philopoemen to the safety of friendly Messene. In fact, Messene was
not a member of the League, nor yet of Antigonus' symmachy of 224,\textsuperscript{29}
but the common hostility to Sparta, traditional in both cities, was
sufficient to make Messene a safe retreat for the refugees.\textsuperscript{30}

There are three accounts extant of events subsequent to the
capture of the city, all biassed to some extent. Plutarch, in his
Cleomenes (23 - 25), relies largely on Phylarchus, whose bias was in
favour of Cleomenes. In his Philopoemen (5), the source may have been
Polybius' Philopoemen, which perhaps extracted from Phylarchus' account
material which could be interpreted to the glorification of Philopoemen,
and maintained essentially unaltered the Polybian bias against
Cleomenes. It is possible that the material from Phylarchus was
included by Plutarch himself, but he probably reflects Polybius'
portrait. The third account is Polybius' Histories (2.55 & 61 - 63),
taken from Aratus' memoirs or Megalopolitan tradition, with the
addition of his polemical discussion of Phylarchus' account - which he
does not altogether succeed in contradicting. To these Pausanias adds
little of any value.\textsuperscript{31} As the longest and most detailed account is
that in Plutarch's Cleomenes, it will be most convenient to use that
as a basis for discussion of the Polybian variations and criticisms.

Of those who were captured in the attack on Megalopolis, Plutarch names Lysandridas and Thearidas, ἐνθρεκ ἐνθέξοι καὶ δυνατοὶ μάλιστα τῶν Μεγαλοπολίτων. They were brought before Cleomenes, and Lysandridas immediately began negotiations for the safety of the city, making the suggestion that the Megalopolitans would be willing to join Cleomenes in return for the safety of their homes. As a result, Cleomenes sent them both to Messene to present his conditions to the Megalopolitans who had escaped: that Megalopolis would be spared if the union with Achaea was abandoned and support for Sparta promised. Philopoemen's influence was decisive in persuading the Megalopolitans not to abandon Achaea, and drove out Thearidas and Lysandridas from Messene as traitors. Cleomenes then did his best to wreck and loot the abandoned city before leaving for Sparta.32

Polybius' account ignores the negotiations altogether because it suited Aratus and Polybius himself to paint as black a picture as possible of the destruction - Aratus to justify his application for Macedonian aid, and Polybius for patriotic Megalopolitan reasons. He goes on to explain Cleomenes' violence: τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσαε μοι δοκεῖ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τῶν κατάραν περιστάσεις παρὰ μόνοις Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ Στυμφαλίοις μηδέποτε δυνηθῆναι μή τ' αἰρετισθήν καὶ κοινωνῶν τῶν ἱδίων ἐλπίδων μήτε προδότην κατασχενάσασθαι. This motivation simply does not account for the facts. It had been one of the main aims of Spartan policy towards Arcadia from the time of the foundation of Megalopolis to destroy it. Cleomenes' violence needs no such personalised motivation.33
How then are we to judge the authenticity of the mission of Thearidas and Lysandridas? If we can accept the probability that chapter 5 of Plutarch's *Philopoemen* has Polybius - in some form - as its base, this offers us a check. In this passage Plutarch mentions the mission, and Philopoemen's part in rejecting it, without however, mentioning Thearidas and Lysandridas. He may have simply omitted the names himself; but it is possible that he simply did not find them in his Polybian source. Confirmation of this comes from Polybius' polemic against Phylarchus: he mentions this episode, again without names, and although he suggests that Phylarchus is whitewashing Cleomenes, it is not this which he specifically objects to, so much as the omission of τὸν ἑπανον καὶ τὴν ἐν ἄγαθῳ μνήμην τῶν ἔξολόγων προαίρεσιν. Again Polybius' patriotic bias shows through his polemic; and his failure in this place to specifically deny the existence of the negotiations seems conclusive for their being historical.  

Why then did Polybius attempt to conceal the existence of these negotiations, which he did know about, and the names of the collaborators? He was certainly influenced by his source's (Aratus') desire to paint as black a picture of Cleomenes as possible; and his own patriotic desire to praise noteworthy conduct of Megalopolitans made him naturally sympathetic to this view. However a more personal motive can perhaps be found. The name Thearidas is known to have been the name of Lycurtus' father, Polybius' paternal grandfather. There is no chronological difficulty in the way of accepting the
identification of the two Thearidas; and it seems too much of a coincidence for there to be two important and influential Megalopolitans at this time named Thearidas. If we accept this identification, it removes the difficulty of Polybius' omission of this rather discreditable episode in his family history, which his father Lycortas and Polybius himself - both confirmed federalists - must have preferred to forget. The clash with the family friend, Polybius' hero, could not be easily or consistently explained in the family history; and inconvenient as it was, could be simply eliminated by omission in his own work. However, he could not control the output of other writers; and this gave him an additional, and personal, motive for his violent attack on the credibility of Phylarchus - which in this detail, at least, is unconvincing.

We can therefore accept as historical the negotiations between the Megalopolitan refugees, led by Philopoemen, and Cleomenes, through the medium of Thearidas and Lysandridas. The conversations however, which Plutarch records from Phylarchus, cannot be historical and must be attributed to imaginative presentation. On the other hand, the considerations which they represent seem reasonable. The only reason why Cleomenes should enter negotiations at all was hope of political advantage: he would gain nothing in the long term by the destruction of Megalopolis; Philopoemen's competent rescue of the greater part of the civilian population had even made the financial prospects from the sack of the city meagre. If the Megalopolitans could be persuaded to renounce their friendship with Achaea,
Megalopolis would become a Spartan forward post against the inevitable Macedonian/Achaean aggression of the following year. The empty shell was valueless strategically, as it was far too large for Cleomenes to hold himself with the forces at his disposal. Even the goods and chattels of the devastated city could not be expected to yield much, as Polybius himself points out. It was therefore reasonable enough to open negotiations with the refugees: no Macedonian reinforcements could be expected, and he could deal adequately with whatever forces Achaea could muster.

While Thearidas and Lysandridas may have been willing to sacrifice long-term Achaean interest for their particularist desire to preserve their city intact - far more valuable, admittedly, to the Megalopolitans than to Cleomenes - Philopoemen was completely unwilling to compromise, although some of his fellow refugees had to be persuaded of the value of the course he advocated. For both personal and traditional reasons he viewed with distaste a rapprochement with Sparta - though this cannot have been his main reason for treating the negotiations with contempt and sacrificing the city. He must have realised, as an experienced soldier, that since the appearance of Antigonus in Peloponnese, Macedonian power had become the key factor in the situation. The present impotence was only temporary; and any immediate advantage gained by a Megalopolitan agreement with Cleomenes would last just as long as Antigonus was without troops. Both for traditional and for immediate reasons, therefore, the presence of Antigonus in Achaea, and his involvement in the war with
Cleomenes, forbade any consideration of short-term gains, which would inevitably prejudice the city's long-term welfare. Polybius might rant to his heart's content about the loyalty of the Megalopolitans to the League, the praiseworthy sacrifice of their 'land, tombs, temples, homes and possessions rather than break faith with their allies'. But he must have realised, had he not allowed his moralising rhetoric to carry him away, that the decision which involved these things was taken after a cool assessment of present political reality and the expected development of events in the near future. Had Philopoemen failed to persuade his citizens, there would probably have been no Polybius to tell the tale.  

In the circumstances, Cleomenes had to make the best of his disappointment. The empty city was useless to him. So that the expedition would not be wholly without result, he sacked it, and removed all valuables to Sparta. A sum of about 300 talents, Polybius estimates, was the total result. Phylarchus, in an attempt to make the affair a triumph for Cleomenes, exaggerated the figure to 6,000.  

Cleomenes had not yet finished taking advantage of Antigonus' temporary incapacity. In Spring 222, before the Macedonian troops had returned from their homes, he entered the territory of Argos where Antigonus was wintering with a very small force. He did not dare to march out against Cleomenes with the forces at his disposal; and the Argives had to watch their countryside being devastated while their protector was able to do nothing to prevent it. In this case Polybius
is forced to express his admiration at the coolness of Cleomenes' calculation, in the process again striking a blow against Phylarchus' tragical history in the persons of those 'who think this was a rash and hazardous act'.

In July of the same year, 222, Cleomenes was brought to battle with the forces of Antigonus' symmachy at Sellasia. A detailed account of the battle would be out of place here, but the part played by Philopoemen, which first brought him to notice outside his strictly Megalopolitan activities, must be examined. In Antigonus' army were 3,000 Achaean εἰπίλεχτοι πείγοι, 300 Achaean cavalry, and 1,000 Megalopolitans armed in Macedonian fashion, and led by Cercidas. The number of Achaean is small, particularly when Megalopolis was able to provide 1,000 men; but this may have been arranged by Antigonus: the Achaean would have to feed the army. The independent group of the Megalopolitans and their equipment can best be explained by the personal nature of the Megalopolitan grievance against Cleomenes, now aggravated by the sack of their city. The longstanding friendship between Megalopolis and Macedon, coupled with Antigonus' failure to prevent the sack of Megalopolis, is sufficient to explain the Macedonian provision of equipment for the destitute Megalopolitans. Cercidas himself had been one of the original Megalopolitan envoys to Antigonus in 227; and this established personal connection had probably been used again to secure the equipment for these troops. The presence of this independent Megalopolitan infantry suggests that the Achaean authorities had not insisted on Megalopolis' providing a
contingent for their federal force - the selective nature of the troops required, being nowhere near a full levy, made this possible. However, we know that Philopoemen served among the cavalry; and as there is no mention in any source of separate Megalopolitan cavalry, he must have been with the 300 Achaeans. It is unlikely that he was the only Megalopolitan cavalryman, which suggests that Antigonus had perhaps again offered help with equipment.

The whole of the allied cavalry was placed in the centre of Antigonus' line, in the valley of the Oenus, between the two hills Euas and Olympus. To their left on Olympus was the Macedonian phalanx with 5,000 mercenaries under Antigonus, facing that of Cleomenes who was fortified higher up the slope. On the right of the allied line were the Achaean and Megalopolitan, facing Euas on which the other Spartan king was in command with some 5,000 men; in the valley between right and left were 1,000 - 2,000 Spartan mercenaries shielding the Spartan cavalry. Hidden overnight in the tributary valley between the allied right and Euas were Illyrians and Acarnanians. Antigonus' plan was to attack Euas with these surprise troops, and outflanking the Spartan left, to take them at a disadvantage, while the Macedonian phalanx prevented Cleomenes' leaving Olympus to aid Eucleidas. The centre was probably to be held back until both wings were engaged.

The battle began at dawn with the Acarnanian attack on Euas. The Spartan light-armed mercenaries from the centre were at once despatched to take them in the rear, in the space between them and the allied centre. This move was clearly dangerous for the
Acarnanians, but perhaps not altogether unexpected by Antigonus. In any case he did not yet give the sign for his centre to join battle, as he wanted to give the outflanking Illyrians on the right of the ambush time to engage, and to involve the Spartan mercenaries on the less favourable ground of the hillside, where the Acarnanian hillmen would be at home. This does not mean that he was intending to make a sacrifice of the Acarnanians: only to take the utmost advantage from the engagement of the Spartan mercenaries before sending in his centre.

Philopoemen had no official position in the allied army, except perhaps as leader of the Megalopolitan cavalry - even this is not made clear in the sources - and did not see the plan of the battle in this way. What was apparent to him in his place in the centre, the closest point to the Spartan attack on the Acarnanians, was that the Acarnanians were threatened from the rear. His reaction was based on instinct rather than military discipline. He drew the attention of the Macedonian officers to the threat from the Spartan mercenaries, and suggested immediate action. Reasonably enough, as well-trained officers, they resisted this attempt from the ranks to teach them their responsibilities, and waited for the pre-arranged signal from Antigonus' headquarters. Before this came, Philopoemen broke ranks and led his Megalopolitans, followed by the rest of the cavalry, to relieve the Acarnanians by a charge against the Spartan cavalry, left exposed by the mercenaries' absence. The Spartan mercenaries were thus forced to retire to protect their cavalry, the pressure on the Acarnanians was relieved, and the allied cavalry could return to
their position. In the event, Philopoemen's self-willed intervention had been successful in allowing the Acarnanians a freer attack. But in the long run it made little difference to the success of the attack on Euas. For by this time, the Illyrians had come over the brow of the hill; and Eucleidas, instead of using the advantage which his superior position gave him for attack, allowed the Illyrians and Acarnanians time to reach close quarters. As a result of the subsequent fighting the whole of the Spartan left on Euas was beaten into retreat down the opposite slope and annihilated.

Philopoemen's effort therefore, in this part of the battle, was essentially a minor episode, which may have added to the comfort of the Acarnanians and saved some lives, but had little, if any, effect on the course of the battle as a whole. Polybius' account of this - perhaps influenced by information from Philopoemen himself - turns it into a major part of the fighting, to the greater glory of Philopoemen and Achaea. In fact he suggests that Philopoemen's initiative was mainly responsible for the success of the attack on Euas - which we have seen can scarcely have been the case. In fact, had Philopoemen been a Macedonian, and not a member of the Megalopolitan allied contingent, he may well have expected to suffer for his misplaced initiative. But in the final assessment Antigonus was generous with praise to Philopoemen, when he found him seriously wounded after the later main cavalry engagement - although Polybius' anecdote suggests that had Alexander, the Macedonian commander of the right, been responsible for the premature cavalry attack, he would
have expected to answer for his temerity.

However, there is little reason to doubt the authenticity of the compliment bestowed on Philopoemen by Antigonus, that he had acted like a general - although there is room for discussion about the spirit in which the compliment was offered. When the battle was over the wounded would appreciate the king's praise. There is also no reason to doubt that Antigonus suggested that Philopoemen should serve him in Macedon, a detail which must come originally from Philopoemen himself. If his tactical insight had been at fault, there could be no doubt of his personal courage and initiative in fighting on when his legs were transfixed by a javelin. Antigonus could no doubt find employment for such men.⁴⁹

After the success of the allied attack on Euas, Cleomenes on Olympus in desperation launched a phalanx attack on Antigonus. The fighting here was severe; but the weight of the Macedonian phalanx, now supported by the right, which had been freed as a result of the success of the attack on Euas, and the cavalry, was sufficient to win the day for the allies. The Spartans broke, and Cleomenes escaped to Gytheum from where he sailed to Egypt.⁵⁰ The war was over; the threat to Achaea from Sparta, for the moment at least, destroyed. The Megalopolitans could now thank Philopoemen's foresight for preventing their accepting Cleomenes' friendship.

II

Having to some extent made his reputation as a soldier in the war against Cleomenes, Philopoemen soon afterwards went to Crete,
where he stayed for ten years, fighting on behalf of the Gortynians. In this he was probably associated with the interests of Philip V of Macedon, who became king when Doson died in the course of the winter after Sellasia. We shall discuss Philopoemen's activities in Crete elsewhere. Here it will be convenient to examine briefly events in Greece between Sellasia and Philopoemen's first federal appointment, as hipparch in 210/09.

The members of Doson's symmachy surrounded and enclosed the territory of the Aetolian League, which had been strong enough to refuse to participate in the symmachy. Philip was only 16; and the Aetolians took advantage of his youth to attack Achaea, which now relied wholly on Macedon for protection. In 221 various raids against Achaea and elsewhere caused the symmachy to declare war on the Aetolians. The threat to Achaea from Sparta was also renewed when the Aetolians made an alliance in 219 with Lycurgus, who had emerged as the dominant figure at Sparta from the chaos following Cleomenes' death. Philip and his advisers saw the war as a whole, with the result that he spent 219 trying to open up the western route from Macedon to Peloponnese, and Achaea was virtually left to take care of herself. Philip's winter campaign against Elis and Triphylia did not significantly alter this state of affairs, and in 218 the Achaeans were so distraught that they agreed to pay Philip for time which he spent in defending specifically Achaean interests. Aratus had some influence over Philip, and tried to preserve some reality behind the facade of the symmachy, whereas Philip's chief Macedonian
adviser, Apelles, saw the symmachy simply as a weapon of Macedonian
aggrandizement - much as Doson had conceived it.\textsuperscript{53}

The effect of these two conflicting interests on Philip was
confused still more in 219, when he was joined by Demetrius of Pharos,
who had been driven out from his Illyrian kingdom as a result of his
misinterpreting Roman 'freedom'.\textsuperscript{54} Demetrius quickly gained influence
over Philip, and he was able to provide a new direction for Macedonian
foreign policy. His own aim was the recovery of his kingdom, and in
218 he persuaded Philip to build a fleet. Demetrius' influence
distracted Philip from Peloponnese and Achaean problems, and despite
the fact that Aratus had finally discredited Apelles, Achaea was for
the most part left to defend herself. This continued throughout 217,
although the Nemea brought Philip to Argos in July. While there, he
received news of the battle of Trasimene, which effectively replaced
his interest in the Aetolian war with a plan of invading Italy and
joining Hannibal against Rome. The war in Greece was therefore quickly
brought to an end in 217 at a conference at Naupactus. Peace was made,
and Agelaus of Naupactus recognised the danger of Philip's interest in
Italy when he warned the Greeks about the 'cloud in the west'.\textsuperscript{55}

But Philip was too much under the influence of Demetrius and his
own desire to play a world role to take any notice of Agelaus' warning.
A campaign against Scerdilaidas brought Philip a common border with
Rome's friends; and winter 217/6 was spent in the construction of
100 lembi. When this fleet put to sea, Scerdilaidas appealed to Rome.
The Senate detached 10 ships from its fleet at Lilybaeum to investigate
Serdilaidas' complaint, which Philip interpreted as the advance-guard of the whole Roman fleet. Thinking that his whole scheme was known he could only return to Macedon. But despite this failure, and the news of Cannae, which removed the greater part of Philip's bargaining power, he approached Hannibal. Although the negotiations were discovered by the Romans through the capture of Philip's messenger, a treaty was arranged in 215, in which Hannibal recognised Philip's potential diversionary value by acknowledging his interests in the Roman Illyrian 'Protectorate' to be legitimate.56

The Senate knew of this treaty in 215, but no action was taken until Philip's seriousness was expressed by attacks on Oricum and Apollonia in 214. M. Valerius Laevinus, the Roman fleet commander, immediately crossed the Adriatic, recovered Oricum, and forced Philip to burn his fleet at the mouth of the Aous. Philip's schemes had been spectacular only in their failure. Yet the Senate no longer could feel safe by simply trusting to bonds of amicitia with the existing dynasts and cities. A permanent naval establishment was required in Illyria to protect the straits of Otranto: once Laevinus had regained Roman Illyria, there he stayed. But protection of the straits was considered to be adequate safeguard, and no attempt to extend Roman influence was made until 212, despite Philip's drives against Illyria from the inland. In 212 approaches to the Aetolians resulted in the agreement of an alliance in 211; but the terms carefully emphasised Roman uninterest in permanent occupation of Greece. All towns should go to the Aetolians, all movable plunder -
including prisoners - to Rome. The Macedonian War was simply an
inconvenient distraction from the main war against Hannibal.57

With the end of the war against Aetolia, Philip expressed even
less interest in Achaea. His only purpose in southern Greece was to
keep Peloponnese quiet, so that he could concentrate on his western
plans. To this end he retained some of his strongholds in Peloponnese -
Corinth, Heraea, Orchomenus, Alipheira and Triphylia. In 215 these
proved to be insufficient to maintain peace in Peloponnese, when
factional trouble broke out at Messene. Achaeans interest was clearly
deeply involved, and Aratus travelled quickly to Messene. When he
arrived he found Ithome already occupied by Philip and Demetrius.
Demetrius urged that Macedonian interest demanded a permanent
Macedonian occupation of Ithome; Aratus argued that the goodwill of
the people was likely to be more effective. Philip was persuaded by
Aratus - although the concession cost him little. To make up for the
absence of a permanent garrison on Ithome, he ravaged Messenia in
214.58 Aratus had failed in his attempts to conceal the fact that
Achaea had become a Macedonian satellite. His claims to be able to
exert personal influence over Philip were finally shattered, privately
by the discovery that Philip had seduced Aratus' daughter-in-law,
publicly by the lack of interest which Philip at last showed in the
constitutional trappings of the symmachy. It had been formed as an
expression of Macedonian domination, and only briefly, while Philip
was finding his political orientation under Aratus' guidance, had it
been anything else. When Aratus died in 213/12 in his 16th strategia59
Achaea had become little more than a toy in the hands of the great powers. It will be the purpose of the following chapters to trace the way in which the next generation of Achaean politicians adapted themselves to the changing circumstances.
Philopoemen spent more than 15 years\(^1\) of his mature life in Crete, which the literary sources virtually ignore. This is partly due to the loss of Polybius' biography, where the events in which Philopoemen took part in Crete must have been described. But since the work was a panegyric account, which would contain little more than a list of the hero's achievements without the addition of any background or discussion of motives, we might not have had much more useful information had it survived. However, we have no means of judging the value of the material in the biography, since neither Plutarch nor Pausanias made any use of it for the Cretan years, and Polybius' \textit{Histories} ignored this part of Philopoemen's career. As far as the surviving literary sources are concerned, therefore, these two periods in Crete are a gap, which it is the purpose of the present chapter to attempt to fill.

The essential inadequacy lies in the sources. Philopoemen himself is not mentioned at all, Achaea only briefly, in the literary sources which have anything about Crete at this period; and apart from the War of Lyttus, to which Polybius devoted three chapters, the internal history of Crete is just as uncertain.\(^2\) Epigraphic evidence can fill, to some extent, the gaps in the literature; but as so often when inscriptions provide the bulk of the evidence, interpretations are disputed, and it is therefore only possible to offer a likely reconstruction of events in Crete during these years, and the
relationship of the island to the general Greek political movements of the age. The interpretation offered here is an attempt to use the available material to build up some kind of positive picture of the place of some of the Cretan cities in the history of this period; and to show the part played by Philopoemen in the events of the years of his absence from Achaea.

At some time soon after Sellasia (222) Philopoemen went to Crete. The real circumstances are concealed by Plutarch's version, that his activity at Sellasia had so attracted Boson's attention that he invited him to join his staff - an invitation which Philopoemen refused; but because he did not want to be under another man's orders, and yet wanted military activity, he went to Crete. Plutarch clearly knew little about the true reason for Philopoemen's departure; but it is perhaps significant that it was only Antigonus' offer of formal military service which was refused. There is no hint in Plutarch's account of Philopoemen's being indignant at the offer of the king, such as appears in Pausanias. The way was clearly left open for Philopoemen to accept a less formal type of service: to represent Macedonian interests while at the same time retaining his own freedom of action. And we shall argue that it was this type of informal representation of Macedon in Crete, which Philopoemen undertook for Antigonus' successor, in the honourable tradition of the upper-class condottieri.

We do not know exactly when he went to Crete. But it may be of some significance that in 220 Philip sent a force of the symmachy.
to Crete to help the Lyttians and their allies, among whom was the party of the neoteroi at Gortyn. Included in this force were some 200 Achaeans. The internal Gortynian quarrel between neoteroi and presbyteroi, which Polybius records, must have some external political, as well as internal social significance. Van Effenterre, accepting the obvious indications of the names neoteroi and presbyteroi, suggests that they represent democratic and oligarchic parties within Gortyn — democratic in the attenuated sense of the word forced upon the language by Hellenistic conditions: '... le terme s'oppose moins désormais à aristocratie ou oligarchie qu'aux diverses formes de pouvoir personnel favorisées souvent par les monarques dans les cités grecques.' The only real objection to this is the total lack of supporting evidence.

Willet's use of Forbes' examination of the institution of vēol led him to suggest that this stasis at Gortyn was 'a conflict between the older and younger citizens ... promoted by internal causes of which we are ignorant'. This less precise identification seems in itself safer, and therefore preferable, in the current state of our knowledge of Crete at this time. But the causes may perhaps be elucidated. The War of Lyttus started as a final phase in the attempt of Cnossos and Gortyn — the presbyteroi — to subdue the whole island to their joint hegemony. In the course of this war against Lyttus, other cities broke from the alliance with Cnossos and Gortyn; and the stasis broke out at Gortyn. It was only with Aetolian help that Cnossos and the Gortynian presbyteroi were enabled to come out on top. After this the war became more general and Lyttus was destroyed. At this point
Philip intervened with his contingent from the symmachy; and the war was soon decided in favour of the dissidents from the Gortyno/Cnossian dualism. At some time after this, Philip was appointed prostates of all Crete - clearly by the victorious party, whom he had supported; and this naturally included the neoteroi at Gortyn.9

Can we find in this series of events a reason for the stasis at Gortyn? We cannot be sure that the neoteroi were democrats (even in the hellenistic sense); but we can be sure that they opposed Cnossos and the dual hegemony, which was supported by the presbyteroi. After the success of the revolt from Cnossos and Gortyn, the koinon - whether founded then or earlier - seems to have been dominated by Gortyn; and this Gortynian domination lasted, though gradually fading out, into the mid-second century.10 This clearly means that the neoteroi had effectually managed to exert Gortynian hegemony over the federation after the war. It seems reasonable therefore to see the neoteroi as Gortynian nationalists and perhaps federalists, who were dissatisfied with the dual hegemony - and the internal power in Gortyn for the presbyteroi, which this implied. A revolution towards federation (or a more effectual koinon, if it already existed), and away from the dual hegemony, would result in power in Gortyn for the neoteroi; and in Crete as a whole, the koinon would be likely to look to the Gortynian neoteroi for leadership. For success in the revolt meant that Cnossos' pretensions to hegemony were destroyed, and the presbyteroi at Gortyn with them. From the point of view of the participants, this was clearly worth fighting for, worth civil war - both for the
neoteroi and for the Cretan cities, which were dissatisfied with the dual hegemony. And it is in this way that the stasis seems to make most sense, when set in its Cretan context.

The intervention of Philip in Crete is more easily explained. In Greece the Social War was declared in summer 220. Cnossos already had an alliance with the Aetolians, and this was naturally supported by the Gortynian presbyteroi. It is not known when this alliance had been established, but it fits conveniently into the well-established anti-Macedonian traditions of Cnossos, which had sent help to the Rhodians as long ago as Demetrius' siege in 305. 1,000 Aetolians were instrumental in driving the neoteroi out of Gortyn. This alignment of the presbyteroi with the anti-Macedonian parties offended the neoteroi personally and nationally; for there had been close relations between Gortyn and Macedon, as the extant treaty between Gortyn and Demetrius II shows clearly. This may have been made by the neoteroi during an earlier period of power, or by the presbyteroi at a time before the idea of the dual Gortyno/Cnossian hegemony became practicable. But during Doson's reign the Macedonian alliance must have been abandoned, and alliance made with Cnossos and her anti-Macedonian traditions.

When the neoteroi were driven out, they had a ready-made grievance to set before Philip. Macedonian interests were now threatened by the predominance of the presbyteroi in Gortyn; and now that war with Aetolia was common to Macedonian interests both in Greece and in Crete, the neoteroi had a strong argument. They seem to have gained Aratus'
support; and this will help to account both for Philip's undertaking to help those willing to support him in Crete, and for the 200 Achaeans in the contingent from the Symmachy.  

Philopoemen's position in this is not altogether clear. It may be that he was simply one of the 200 Achaeans; or he may have gone out with the support of Antigonus or Philip as an agent provocateur. If this latter were the case, the secrecy which Polybius seems to have observed over his visit to Crete would be more easily explained: there could be nothing disreputable about membership of an allied contingent - although, on the other hand, there was probably little spectacular about it, which would deserve special mention. Further supporting this view is the length of his stay in Crete - at least until 211 - in an island now dominated by Philip and Philip's friends. Philopoemen must therefore have fought on the right side in the War of Lyttus; for otherwise his position in Crete would have been intolerable after it. He must have supported the neoteroi, for his return to Crete in 200 is at the specific request of the Gortynians; he must have supported the growth of Philip's influence, for on his return to Achaea he was immediately elected to the federal hipparchy in a year when Cycliadas, the leader of the Macedonian party, was strategos. He probably therefore took some part in organising the appointment of Philip to his prostasia. A close personal connection with Macedonian interests explains satisfactorily Philopoemen's prolonged residence in Crete after the crisis of the War of Lyttus had passed. This had happened by 219, for it was then possible for the Polyrrhenians and
their allies to send help to Philip and the Achaeans in Greece.14
This recovery on the part of the federal faction in Crete suggests
that the force from the symmachy was able to be withdrawn, thus
throwing Philopoemen's solitary position into relief. All factors
seem to point to a close relationship between Philip and Philopoemen
during Philopoemen's first period in Crete.

Despite this close relationship, which we have demonstrated,
Plutarch wrote that Philopoemen refused co-operation with Antigonus
in 222. This does not mean that our analysis of Philopoemen's relation­
ship with Philip is necessarily wrong. Plutarch took what he found in
Polybius, and this can only have represented Philopoemen's public
statement. When Polybius wrote his Histories, he could not admit that
Philopoemen had ever favoured Macedon, for this would have seemed to
be simply confirming his anti-Roman reputation, which Polybius was at
pains to deny. Even in 222 Philopoemen cannot have desired - for
different reasons - to become known as a Macedonian hireling. If he
was to have any hopes of a political career in Achaea, he had to
maintain an appearance of independence from Macedon. Therefore his
public refusal to co-operate with Antigonus after Sellasia.

But this did not mean that he was de facto prohibited from
accepting Antigonus' offer. A public denial only meant the absence
of public co-operation: nothing prevented Philopoemen from representing
Macedonian interests in Crete unofficially and informally. In this
way he would preserve his political position in Achaea, while at the
same time he gained personal benefits discreetly from his de facto
acceptance of the offer. He was not abandoning Achaea, for Achaean interest was as closely involved as Macedonian in defeating Aetolian influence in Crete. His first period of Cretan activity could therefore be regarded as patriotic service, as long as the Macedonian influence was kept out of sight. This explanation of Philopoemen's public rejection of Antigonus' offer also suggests an explanation of the precise nature of the offer. We have argued that the rejection was only a public demonstration of Achaean solidarity, which did not affect the de facto collaboration. This suggests that the original offer was of what Philopoemen actually undertook - service in Crete. The difference between the plan and the result was that Antigonus had probably died before Philopoemen went out, and Philip was the executant of the scheme. It is reasonable to assume that Philip at first simply continued Dositheus' policy, as the Cretan plan fitted well with the development of Aetolian hostility to Macedon. This added more truth to Philopoemen's sophistical statement, recorded by Plutarch, that he had rejected Antigonus' offer. It was true, in a sense, because he had in fact rejected it publicly; it was true, in another sense, because it was, in the event, Philip who was served by Philopoemen.

II

When Nabis came to power in Sparta after the death of Machanidas in 207, he founded his position on mercenary help. In particular, this came from alliances with Cretan cities. The alliances became so close that Nabis came into control of some of the Cretan cities. In 204
he was strong enough to start attacks on Achaea, which continued for some years in a desultory fashion. In 200 Philopoemen held a successful *strategia*, during which he made some attempt to take the war to the enemy, and took the first steps to guide the Achaean League to the alliance with Rome. After this *strategia* Philopoemen suffered defeat at the elections and returned to Crete, where he stayed until 194. One reason for his leaving Achaea is clear: the election defeat spelled danger, and this is discussed in detail elsewhere. The reason for his prolonged absence, after his supporter Aristaenus gained power in Achaea, comparatively soon after his departure, is less clear. But it seems likely that it was a reason of policy which kept Philopoemen in Crete, although at the time of his departure he was simply making a virtue of necessity.

The first fact to consider is that Philopoemen went to Crete in 200 at the express wish and invitation of the Gortynians. From our analysis of his relations with Gortyn during the War of Lyttus, it is clear that this invitation must have been issued by the *neoteroi*, who had been in power at least since the establishment of Philip's *prostasia*. He must therefore have been involved in fighting against the enemies of the *neoteroi*. Nabis' position in Crete may be relevant to this. It is difficult to trace any certain relations between Sparta and any individual Cretan city at this time; but there are some significant indications. After 200—while Philopoemen was in Crete—a war was carried on between Gortyn and Cnossos. This is clearly, in some sense, a continuation of the Cnossian struggle for power in
Crete, which had resulted in the War of Lyttus. But in the new
conditions of the time, we should expect to find, if there is any
political significance in Philopoemen's presence, Nabis' power
centred on Cnossos or one of her allies. The Achaean hostility of
200 towards Sparta would then be mirrored in the Cretan alliances,
as was the Achaean/Macedonian hostility to Aetolia in 220; and
Philopoemen would provide the link.

The indications that this may in fact have happened are not,
at first sight, of great relevance. In 272 Areus II of Sparta served
in Crete under the Gortynians. It also seems likely that at the time
of the Chremonidean War the position was reversed, and Sparta was
helped by Gortyn. These items seem to point in the wrong direction;
but in 272 and later, the Gortynian party which had the friendship of
Sparta was probably that which, by the time of the War of Lyttus, was
known as the presbyteroi. At that time they were in close relations
with Cnossos, co-operating in the attempt to establish the dual
hegemony. After Philip's intervention, the neoteroi had become the
dominant party in Gortyn; and although there seems to have been
general peace in the island after the War of Lyttus, we have already
noted that the hostility between Gortyn (neoteroi), and Cnossos (and
presumably Gortynian presbyteroi in exile), broke out again at the
time of Philopoemen's visit to Crete in 200. Nabis was probably of
the royal Spartan blood; but in any case, as king of Sparta he
would take up traditional Spartan connections, which in the changed
circumstances involved an alliance with Cnossos. This is what we
should naturally expect of a Spartan ruler looking for support in Crete; and Homolle has independently attempted to demonstrate this connection.\(^{22}\) He suggests that the inscriptions IG XI 4, 716 (= Ditt. Syll., 584) and 719 should be read closely together. This then suggests a connection between Nabis and Cnossos at this time. It would be rash to be as sure as van Effenterre that Homolle's demonstration shows any certainty in this relationship - 'les Cnossiens sont sans doute parmi les amis de Nabis'\(^{23}\) - but it does suggest the same conclusion as the earlier evidence.

There are other indications, which suggest a close relationship between Achaea and Gortyn on the one hand, and between Nabis and Cnossos on the other. In the circumstances of the war which was going on in Crete between Cnossos and Gortyn until some time before 189,\(^{24}\) we should consider the Mycenaean proxeny decree for Protimus of Gortyn.\(^{25}\) This Protimus had been responsible for an attempt to save Mycenaean *epheboi* who had been taken to Sparta by Nabis - perhaps among the 2,000 Argives taken to Sparta by Nabis in 195,\(^{26}\) perhaps at some other time during the Spartan domination of the Argolid after 198. The decree must have been set up after the *epheboi* had returned - for it could hardly have been erected while Nabis was still in control of the town. The type of relationship enjoyed with Sparta during Nabis' comparatively brief period of control is illustrated by the decree in favour of Damocleidas the Spartan, which renews [τοῖς Λαχεδαίμονίοις τ]ἀν κοινανίαν ἄγ[όνων, ἄν] ἰ κώμα θετη. We can scarcely imagine this being passed voluntarily, when the Spartans were likely to take
all the *epheboi* they could lay their hands on, as Protimus' almost contemporary decree shows. The friendliness of a Gortynian to the *epheboi* of an Achaean town, and its recognition by honorary decree, suggest again the public friendship of Gortyn for Achaea, which included mutual assistance, and the hostility to Nabis which this implied. The form of the service which Protimus rendered is not clear; nor whether it was successful. But the demonstration of mutual goodwill is clear.

A later example of the same disposition on the part of Gortyn may be seen in the presence of Telemnastus of Gortyn with 500 'Cretans' as an important figure in Philopoemen's campaign of 192 against Nabis. The close personal connection of Philopoemen with Gortyn and the importance of the part Telemnastus played in this expedition strongly suggest a personal connection between Telemnastus and Philopoemen. They also imply a public connection between Achaea and Gortyn, for Polybius mentions that Telemnastus' exploits were remembered almost 40 years later, in 153, when his son was Cretan ambassador to Achaea. The friendly connections between Gortyn and Achaea seem demonstrated; but they also imply official Gortynian hostility to Nabis. This, in view of Nabis' known interests and interference in Crete, and in the light of the current hostility between Gortyn and Cnossos, indicates a friendship between Cnossos and Nabis, and supports what the other evidence has independently suggested.

In the light of this evidence, strongly suggesting friendly
relations between Gortyn and Achaea, and Nabis and Cnossos (and other Cretan cities connected with Cnossos), we can consider it to be of the greatest probability that Philopoemen's otherwise unnecessarily long period in Crete from 200 to 194 was directed against the position which Nabis had built up for himself in the island. His fighting in the war between Gortyn and Cnossos was directly parallel with the Achaean war effort in Peloponnese against Nabis.

Having established this with some certainty, we can turn to other evidence, which may fit into this pattern of relationships between the states of Crete and Greece. There is some evidence which points to Polyrrhenia's having close relations with Sparta. In the middle of the third century, the Polyrrhenians set up a stele to Areus II of Sparta. This indicates that they were anti-Macedonian at the time. As we have already noticed, Areus had a close connection with Gortyn, which Nabis seems to have taken up with the presbyteroi. Polyrrhenia gained the support of the Gortynian neoteroi when leading the revolt from the Gortyno/Cnossian dualism. With this naturally went the support of Philip; and the body of opinion which had led the revolt and had enjoyed the help of Philip's symmachy in 220 replied by taking the lead in organising the Cretan force which was sent to Greece in 219. This change from the earlier anti-Macedonian policy probably represents a change in the dominant political group in Polyrrhenia. But the change did not last long. By the time of the Kretikos Polemos, which began in 204, Polyrrhenia seems to have again changed sides. In the series of city decrees for the asylia of Teos,
the Macedonian Perdiccas does not appear in the decree of Polyrrhenia. Holleaux, in his illuminating interpretation of these decrees, has understood this to mean that the Polyrrhenians now sympathised with Rhodes in the war which she was fighting with Philip.32 If Holleaux is right in this, the Polyrrhenians would seem to be reverting to their mid-century attitude of anti-Macedonianism. At the earlier time, anti-Macedonianism was synonymous with friendship with Sparta. If the attitude was repeated - and it would no doubt receive adequate encouragement from Nabis - we may have identified a second ally for Nabis in Crete. However, this argument depends too much on the correctness of Holleaux’s persuasive, but uncertain, interpretation of the documents to insist on its validity.33

We have already mentioned the Kretikos Polemos, which started in 204: more must now be said. It has been discovered by scholars from two imprecise references in Polybius,34 one concerning a mission of ambassadors who were sent by Philip to Crete to stir up war against the Rhodians; the other concerning the increase of Nabis’ influence in Crete. In addition to this, undated epigraphic evidence exists, some of which was first referred to this war by Herzog, and all of which has been often worked over since.35 But despite the work of the scholars, the war, in course and origin, remains obscure. The epigraphic evidence can arguably be interpreted as referring to the war of 167 between Crete and Rhodes; and although Holleaux has put forward a very strong case for 204, which we accept here, this is not absolutely certain.
The passages of Polybius show us this much: that Philip was intending to pursue his antagonism towards the Rhodians in Crete at this time. We have already seen that some 10 years previously he had established a prostasia in Crete; and it seems likely that he had maintained an interest in the affairs of the koinon, and with this, in the Gortynian neoteroi. As far as Nabis is concerned, the reference in Polybius does not seem to indicate his undertaking a full-scale war: Polybius simply describes him as supporting the pirates. As we have already shown, Nabis' interests should have been on the side of Cnossos; and Philip's, we should expect to find on the side of Gortyn and the koinon. In any case, Philip's undertaking in Crete was only a diversionary move in his main struggle against Rhodes; that his intervention rapidly waned seems clear from the Gortynians' request to Philopoemen,36 at the time when Philip's occupation elsewhere must have left the koinon open to a split led by Cnossos; and of course, Philopoemen's interests were opposed to Nabis'. The issues involved in the Kratikos Polemos clearly cannot have been as clear-cut as to have united Philip, Nabis, and 'the Cretans' - whatever this may mean in this context - as Guarducci thinks.37

As we have already pointed out, an alliance between Philip and Nabis at this time would be surprising: it seems much more likely that there would be a conflict of interests in Crete between Nabis and Philip, rather than active co-operation. For we must also remember the situation in Peloponnesse. Philip was still an ally of
Achaea, and as late as 200 he offered, however insincerely, to help the Achaeans in putting an end to the trouble from Nabis, which Achaea had now been suffering for five years. Without solid evidence to the contrary, we should conclude that no friendly relations with Nabis had ever existed for Philip. The agreement reached in 198/7 over Argos cannot be used to show any community of interests as early as the Cretan war; for this was only a stop-gap arrangement to spite the Achaeans, when they had joined the Roman allies against him. But there is some evidence that Philip and Nabis were in fact opposed in the Cretan war; and this is connected with the Rhodian position in Crete. By tradition, Cnossos was friendly with Rhodes. She had sent help in 305, when the island was blockaded by Demetrius; in the War of Lyttus Rhodes had sent help to Cnossos; and at the time of the Kretikos Polemos friendly relations between Cnossos and Rhodes probably still subsisted. We have suggested that Cnossos was one of Nabis' sources of power in Crete: if therefore we take together this common friendship of Rhodes and Nabis for Cnossos at the time of the Kretikos Polemos, it is clear that there is no possibility of an alliance between Philip and Nabis for the Cretan war.

It seems clear therefore that it is incorrect to speak of 'The Cretans' at this time as if they acted as one body - this despite the existence of the koion. The island was split into at least two camps; and one of the factors which conditioned the split was the friendship of Nabis or Philip. This aspect of the otherwise
internal split was probably emphasised after the battle of Chios, when Philip's interest was forcibly shifted from the Aegean, and his ability to create a balance of power in Crete destroyed. It is scarcely surprising to find Cnossos renewing her anti-Macedonian policies as soon as Rhodian support was available, for Cnossos can only have been brought to recognise Philip's prostatus after the War of Lyttus unwillingly. The support offered by Rhodes and the eagerness of Nabis to gain influence in the island must have appeared a providential combination of circumstances, of which they took full advantage. Gortyn and the koinon on the other hand were less fortunate in the enthusiasm of their foreign champion. Philip's interest in the Aegean was soon cut short, and they had to look to Achaea and Philopoemen, who had served them adequately in his first period of Gortynian service.

A circumstance which may be connected with this invitation is the presence of Didascalondas the Cretan among the Achaean forces while Philopoemen was still strategos in 200. Didascalondas accompanied Philopoemen in his attack on Nabis' mercenaries at Pallene, and was important enough to be entrusted with the command of part of the Achaean levy. This seems to mark him out as being more than simply a mercenary captain - although there were Cretan mercenaries in Achaea in 200, as a dated inscription from Mantinea shows. It is unfortunate that the man's home city cannot be discovered; but we can conclude with some certainty that it was not Cnossos or one of the Cnossian allies. This leads to the
suggestion that he may have been from the koinon. The koinon was
controlled at this time by the Macedonian party, probably still led
by the Gortynian neoteroi, and had supported Philip as long as
Philip supported it. We have argued that it was threatened by a
secession movement supported by Sparta and Rhodes during the Kretikos
Polemos. It would therefore be entirely natural to find a representa-
tive of the koinon in Achaea, in the first instance helping the
Achaeans in their parallel struggle against Nabis; but really hoping
to secure some help for the Cretan sector of the war. It therefore
seems possible that Didascalondas was their representative; and that
the Cretan troops of the inscription were the koinon's token of good
faith to their Achaean allies. He may in fact have been a Gortynian
who already had a close link with Philopoemen; but we have no means
of showing this.

There is no other information which sheds any further light on
relations between Achaea and the cities of Crete; but some events
should be related in the light of what we have shown to be the
probable reconstruction of Cretan politics. In 197, shortly before
the campaign of Cynoscephalae, 500 Gortynians joined Flamininus under
the command of Cydas. It has been argued by De Sanctis that these
were simply part of the 600 Cretans who were handed over to Flamininus
by Nabis in the spring, after the negotiations at Mycenae. But
from what we have seen of relations between Peloponnese and Crete
at this time, it seems highly unlikely that Gortynians would seek
service with Nabis (implying willingness to serve against Achaea),
when Philopoemen was helping them to fight off the threat of Nabis' influence in Crete; and on the other hand, it is unlikely that Nabis would use mercenaries whose loyalty was necessarily in doubt. But, in fact, there is a much more compelling reason for thinking that these troops were not Nabis' ex-mercenaries. For Livy expressly states that these troops were handed over at once - datis; and we have every reason to believe that this must be taken literally, for these very troops were largely responsible for showing Philocles at Corinth that Nabis had already changed his allegiance. The 500 Gortynians who joined Flamininus in Phthiotis cannot therefore have been part of Nabis' 600 Cretans.

In this case the question must be asked: why did these Gortynians come to join the allied army? It is most unlikely that they were mercenaries hired by Flamininus. The answer may lie in Achaea. We shall see that there was no essential disagreement on policy between Philopoemen and Aristaenus at this time; and there is no reason to doubt that Philopoemen fully approved the Achaean agreement with Rome in 198. It is therefore open to suggestion that Gortyn - having turned anti-Macedonian after being abandoned by Philip - sent these troops on the advice of Philopoemen, who was acting in co-operation with Aristaenus and Nicostratus. It seems too much of a coincidence for the Gortynians independently to have decided to send these troops to join Rome, just at the time when Philopoemen might have been expected to urge this policy upon them, and when their main Greek allies, the Achaeans, had just pronounced their readiness to accept
a treaty of alliance with Rome. It may be going too far to suggest that they were meant as a substitute for the Achaean troops, which were not available to join the allied army in the north; but it does seem clear that there was some Achaean influence at work; and this can perhaps be narrowed down to Philopoemen.

We have already mentioned the presence of Telemnastus of Gortyn on Philopoemen's expedition of 192 against Nabis. This demonstrates clearly enough the continuance of the public and private connections between Philopoemen and Achaea on the one hand, and Gortyn on the other. But why did Philopoemen only return to Achaea in 194, when he had been absent in Crete during some of the most momentous events in Achaean history? The continuity of friendly relations forbids us to conclude that he left Crete while he was still needed. The implication is therefore that the war between the Gortynians and Cnossians, which he had gone to Crete to participate in, was no longer continuing. We know that it had certainly ended in 189, as the two cities joined forces in that year to fight Cydonia - and this suggests a priori that some time had elapsed since the cessation of active hostilities between the two cities. We should perhaps look for the answer in Sparta. If the Cnossians and allies had relied as much on Nabis as he on them, the termination of hostilities in Peloponnese and the virtual neutralisation of Nabis in 195 would have a severe effect on the war in Crete. In particular, the stipulation in the terms of the treaty with Flamininus that Nabis must give up all the cities he controlled in Crete, as well as his navy, would drastically alter the
balance of power in Crete in favour of Gortyn and the koinon. In these circumstances Cnossos may well have felt inclined to make peace before it was forced upon her. This would naturally be soon after Flamininus' settlement of Sparta, therefore late 195 or early 194 - perhaps winter 195/4. This gives Philopoemen sufficient time to have ended his commitment in Crete and returned to Achaea to spend a year or more recreating a position for himself, which he used to secure his election as strategos in autumn 193. We therefore suggest that the reason for Philopoemen's return from Crete in 194 was that the parallel war in Crete did not continue until 194, but reached a conclusion by negotiation as a direct result of the enforced withdrawal of Nabis' support from the Cnossian alliance.

The honeymoon period of co-operation between Gortyn and Cnossos which followed the peace and is illustrated by the joint war against Cydonia, did not last long. By 184 they were fighting each other again. This war does not seem to have been very prolonged, for an extant decree of the koinon dated to 183, records a treaty of alliance with Eumenes; and at the head of the subscribing cities appear both Gortyn and Cnossos. This implies that the differences which had given rise to the war had been settled, and support for the koinon re-established. Philopoemen retained his close connection with the koinon to the end of his life. During his last campaign he was accompanied by Cretans as well as Thracians and Achaean cavalry. We have no means of telling from which of the cities of Crete these troops came; but as Cnossos and Gortyn were enjoying one of their
periods of co-operation at this time, it seems possible that the troops were mercenaries from the koinon, and that the Cnossians too may have contributed men. This circumstance provides an additional plausibility to the arguments of Guarducci, who suggests that the epitaph of Tharsymachus, found at Cnossos, should be seen to refer to this war, rather than some internal struggle in Crete. In any case, from our point of view, the presence of the Cretans shows clearly enough that Philopoemen maintained his links with Crete during the intervening years; and still, as in his earlier campaigns, set considerable store by the aid of the Cretans.

We shall conclude this analysis with a summary of what we have argued was the probable course of events in the relationships between the cities of Crete and the Greek mainland from the time of Philopoemen's first visit. In 221 or 220, Philopoemen went to Crete, probably as a private individual with the support of Philip, after publicly rejecting Antigonus' offer of formal service, or perhaps as a member of the Achaean expeditionary force, sent as a result of Aratus' enthusiasm for the symmachy's interference in Crete. While in Crete, he fought with the cities opposed to the dual hegemony of Cnossos and Gortyn; and as a result came into contact with the Gortynian neoteroi. As a representative of Philip's interests in the island he remained after the temporary emergency of the War of Lyttus was over; and was present - perhaps even actively organising support for Macedon - when Philip was granted the position of prostates by the koinon. As a result of the success of the Macedonian camp in
the war, the neoteroi were restored to Gortyn; and under their leadership Gortyn became the dominant influence in the koinon. Philopoemen was present through all this, and must have been active in support of the Gortynians as well as Philip, as their later invitation to him suggests.

We hear nothing more about Crete until 204. In the meanwhile Philopoemen had been using the influence, which he had gained with Philip in Crete, to establish himself in Achaea. During the Kretikos Polemos of the years after 204, Rhodian influence in Cnossos on the one hand, and Philip's in Gortyn on the other, caused a split in the koinon, of which Nabis was able to take advantage. He had already established close links with some Cretan cities, probably including Cnossos; and Philip's war with the Rhodians seems to have given him an opportunity to confirm his hold. Philip soon began to lose interest in the Cretan war after his main effort in the Aegean had been frustrated by the Rhodians' success at Chios and the threat of their union with Attalus in an appeal to Rome. As a result, his attention was totally diverted from Crete, and Gortyn was faced with a secessionist movement in the koinon, being hard-pressed after losing even the moral support of Philip. Nabis, in a parallel effort to his undeclared war against Achaea in Peloponnese, continued his support for Cnossos. The Gortynians appealed for help to Philopoemen, the old friend of the neoteroi. He hesitated only as long as he was in power in Achaea: when the embarrassment of electoral defeat hung heavily on him, he accepted the Gortynian invitation. He spent the next five years,
even after his supporters had recovered their influence in Achaea, trying - not very successfully, it seems, from the effectiveness of Nabis' efforts in Peloponnese - to break the Cretan source of Nabis' power.

The Cretan war was only brought to a close as a result of the peace treaty between Nabis and Flamininus, one of the clauses of which was that Nabis should give up his possessions in Crete. The fighting had, in any case, been sporadic, for Gortyn, probably urged by Philopoemen, had been able to send 500 troops to join Flamininus' army in 197, as a demonstration of solidarity for the Achaean and Roman cause. After the indecisive conclusion of the war in Crete, Philopoemen returned to Achaea, from where he kept up his contacts with Gortyn, regularly employing Gortynians such as Telemnastus in the Achaean army; and even twelve years after his return from Crete, at the time of his last expedition in 182, Cretan troops played an important part in the composition of his army.
In 211/10 Philopoemen returned to Achaea from Crete and was immediately elected hipparch of the League for 210/09. His absence from Achaea had lasted for 10 years, and such sudden prominence - despite the fact that Achaea had benefited from his work - requires explanation. His colleague in office, the strategos, was Cycliadas. In 199/8 Cycliadas was expelled from Achaea for being leader of the pro-Macedonian faction. If he persisted in his pro-Macedonianism to the point where he allowed himself to be exiled for it, it seems more than likely that his association with Philip was of long standing, and that at the time of his strategia of 210/09 he was a solid supporter of the Achaean alliance with Macedon. Philopoemen's association in office with Cycliadas suggests that he was running on the same ticket - the two officials were elected at the same time - and that he therefore also represented a pro-Macedonian policy. It has already been demonstrated with some probability that Philopoemen had been working for Philip in Crete. His election, together with Cycliadas, suggests that this association continued after his return, and the rapidity of his election probably means that Philip's influence was actively at work in promoting the interests of his supporters. This support of Philip may allow us to discover why Philopoemen returned from Crete at this time.
Achaea had never been strong militarily. Aratus had managed to achieve a brief period of independence by taking advantage of the weakness of Macedon under Comatas and Demetrius II, but the threat from Sparta under the active Cleomenes demonstrated that this apparent independence was illusion. The invitation to Doson to save Achaea in return for the Acrocorinth set the Achaean military establishment in its correct perspective. Total dependence on Macedon was the only route to safety in the long term. The bitterness of this was partly disguised by Aratus by his claim to exercise some influence over the young Philip; but by the time of his death in 213/12 all illusions were shattered. Total dependence on Macedon was undisguised, and there seemed little alternative. For Aratus had made no attempt to keep up the efficiency of the Achaean army, and his fellow strategoi and hipparchs simply followed his lead in this. Polybius describes Euryleon, the strategos of 211/10 as οπτολομος και πολεμικης χρειας ἀλλότριος. In another place he castigates the Achaean strategoi of this time for being totally ignorant of military requirements. His opinion is the same about the hipparchs: whether through sheer incapacity, or blatant desire to be popular - with an eye on future elections - the training and efficiency of the cavalry had been almost wholly neglected. Polybius may be exaggerating these deficiencies in order to make Philopoemen's subsequent reorganisations contrast more sharply with them; but the recent history of the Achaean army - particularly in the Social War - goes far to support Polybius.
Thanks to Philip's activity, the Achaean incapacity had not yet proved disastrous. The Romans had been content to preserve their hold on the straits of Otranto without actively extending the war. But 211 saw a major development, with the formation of an alliance with Aetolia, Philip's main enemy in the Social War. This was quickly followed by alliances with Sparta, Elis and Messene, thus recreating the alignment of the Social War, with the additional hazard of Roman intervention. The seriousness of this latter was further emphasised by the replacement of Laevinus with P. Sulpicius Galba Maximus. Galba held the consulship as his first curule office in 211: he was clearly a man with influential support, and his appointment to Greece demonstrates the newly awakening interest in the Macedonian War of an important section of the Senate. These developments naturally affected Philip's view of the war. Looking at the situation as a whole, the parallel with the Social War alignment was embarrassingly close; and if developments occurred in the same way, he would find himself more and more confined to fighting in the north.

For Achaea the danger from the new situation was obvious. The combined hostility of Sparta, Elis, Messenia and Aetolia could not be faced with any confidence without Philip's continued help. Just at this critical moment Philopoemen and Cydias were elected to the highest federal offices. We have already shown their Macedonian connections, and suggested that Philip's influence must have helped them in the elections. This
examination of the circumstances of Achaea at this time does nothing but support our earlier conclusion. The crisis in which they were elected was essentially military. Yet even 10 years later Cycliadas had not managed to build himself a reputation as a military leader. His Macedonian connections are sufficient to explain his election. But the military crisis had to be met; and Philopoemen spent the year of his hipparchy reorganising the Achaeian cavalry, which took Achaea half-way to local self-sufficiency. This suggests that Philopoemen was intended, both by Philip and the Achaeans, to carry out this reorganisation. And we can go further: Philopoemen's return from Crete at this critical time is too convenient for Philip and Achaea for it to have been wholly coincidental. Therefore he must have been asked to come back to Achaea by Philip and the Achaeans, who both required Achaea to gain a new military efficiency in face of the new danger. The reason why the reorganisation was started with the cavalry is not altogether clear, but can be suggested. Had it been decided that the infantry should first receive attention, the organiser, Philopoemen, would have had to be strategos. For a man who had never held federal office and who had only recently returned to Achaea after a 10-year absence, the strategia was an invidiously high office; and Philip may well have hesitated before risking the loss of sympathy among his Achaeans which a strategia for Philopoemen in this year would involve. The hipparchy was less prestigious, and had the advantage for Philip of making it possible for him to test Philopoemen's loyalty and effectiveness with
the cavalry before he came to the infantry command; and on the other hand, Philopoemen would have an opportunity of finding his place in federal politics through the minor office.

It is easy enough to see why Philip and the Achaeans should support Philopoemen's election as hipparch. It is less easy to see why Philopoemen should accept the invitation to return to Achaea. He had been away for 10 years, was out of touch with federal politics - in which he had never played any part - and had no doubt made his mercenary service financially worthwhile, both for himself and probably for Achaea, in the tradition of upper class condottieri. This last point is important, for large quantities of money would be necessary if a wholesale re-equipment of the Achaean forces was going to be undertaken: the previous strategoi and hipparchs had reduced morale to the point where money would not be forthcoming from individual soldiers, who did not take their part-time soldiering sufficiently seriously.

Macedon was not in any position to finance Achaea, with a full-scale war on her hands, and there is no evidence that the Achaean federal treasury had money to spare from normal sources. If Philopoemen returned and undertook the task of re-organising the army, he must have expected to have to spend much of his earnings of his mercenary service on this - and Plutarch perhaps refers to this: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν στρατείων προσίστατα κατανάλισκεν εἰς Ἡπτονν καὶ ὡπλα καὶ λύσεις αἰχμαλώτων. . .

8 He must have anticipated substantial political rewards for this. Up to a point, political rewards could be promised in advance. He could be
promised Macedonian support, and that of the Macedonian party leader in Achaea, for the first stages of his federal career - the hipparchy and the strategia. But his continued political success would depend on his own efforts and popularity as a politician - once the immediate work was accomplished, his supporters could afford to abandon him, should this become desirable. It was, no doubt, pleasant to serve his home as leader in a crisis; and in his later career, Philopoemen showed that he had the interests of Achaea at heart. But this had not brought him back from Crete during the crises of the Social War.

The major difference between then and now was the absence of Aratus. Aratus had dominated Achaean politics with an autocratis all his own. And it is no accident that few of the other Achaean strategoi of his time appear as personalities during the period of his dominance. Philopoemen had not wanted to be dominated by the Sicyonian. But after Aratus' death, there was a power vacuum in Achaea. Aratus' presence had prevented any dominant personalities from emerging during his lifetime, and there was no one to take over after his death. The opportunity was open, if Philopoemen chose to take it, and was made easier by the promise of Macedonian support in the early years. He could clearly envisage himself acquiring, with this initial backing, an influence in his own generation comparable with Aratus' in his. Everything combined to make a return to Achaea highly attractive.

The danger to Achaea from the more active Roman commitment had
already been brought home to the Achaeans in 210 while Euryleon was still strategos, and underlined the importance of Philopoemen's task. Galba had attacked and occupied Aegina, which was handed over to the Aetolians in accordance with their agreement. The Aetolians did not want to keep the (for them) awkwardly situated island, and promptly sold it to Attalus of Pergamum for 30 talents. This brought another enemy to close quarters with Achaea, and also created a refugee problem for her. Nothing could be done to recover the island; the Aeginetan refugees who refused to accept Attalid rule had to take what solace they could from exercise of their Achaean citizenship in their place of exile in Peloponnese. 9 The danger from Achaea's impotence no longer needed the politicians to emphasise it. As a result, Philopoemen obtained full co-operation from the Achaean cavalrymen when he instituted his new training schedule as soon as he was elected in the autumn. He insisted on a formal training in individual and corporate manoeuvres; the quality of the horses was improved — this must have required disbursements from Philopoemen's earnings; a corps mentality was cultivated to replace the old individualistic tradition. Philopoemen's own active part in this training programme was to visit each city in the autumn and explain the manoeuvres to the assembled cavalrymen and the local commanders, who were expected to practice them during the winter and to have perfected them by the spring. He then revisited each town in order to check progress and provide solutions for any difficulties which might have arisen in the meanwhile. 10 In the
spring, the whole federal cavalry force was collected together for joint exercises and mass manoeuvres, once the individual contingents had become proficient in their sectional manoeuvres. The whole undertaking seems to have been supervised, as far as possible, by Philopoemen himself, and no personal effort was spared in the interests of efficiency. The very thoroughness and attention to detail mark out the professional soldier, who had earned his living by his military skills.

From the military point of view, Philip and his Achaean supporters had chosen their man well. But the cavalry organisation alone was not sufficient to assure military self-sufficiency. Philip cannot have expected this, particularly since Cycliadas was strategos. It will therefore have been no surprise when he received an anguished appeal from Cycliadas in spring 209. The Peloponnesian section of the war was warming up, and Achaea was menaced from two sides. Machanidas had finally emerged from the political chaos at Sparta - nominally perhaps as regent for Lycurgus' son Pelops - and followed traditional Spartan expansionist policy: attacks on southern Arcadia, of which Megalopolis would expect to bear the brunt. At the same time, the federal authorities were occupied in beating off an Aetolian attack, launched across the narrows of the Gulf. Livy does not mention any major Achaean disaster; but appeal to Macedon was a tradition founded by Aratus, and Cycliadas was not the man to break it. The attackers might be expected to withdraw at the threat of Macedonian opposition whereas Achaea's weakness was notorious.
But Philip's occupation with his own section of the war emphasised Achaean isolation. His operations near Lamia against a joint force of Aetolians, Romans, and Pergamenes had produced two successful encounters for him, with the result that his retirement to Phalara encouraged the Aegean commercial states to propose peace negotiations. As in the Social War, the renewed fighting was disrupting Aegean commerce, and the negotiations were undertaken by representatives of Egypt, Rhodes, Athens and Chios. On the Aetolian side, Amyntander of Athamania was chosen to negotiate. No conclusion could be reached on the spot, but a truce for 30 days was acceptable to both sides, and further discussion was postponed in concilium Achaecorum, for which the place and date were fixed. Philip then travelled to Argos, where he celebrated the Heraea, after which he went to Aegium ad indicium multo ante sociorum concilium. At this meeting there was discussion about ending the war with Aetolia and (too late) no cause ante Romanis aut Attalos intrandi Graeciam esse. It seems clear that this must be the meeting earlier described as concilium Achaecorum, since it was at this meeting that the ambassadors were received who had started the negotiations at Phalara. Any prospect of a successful outcome from these renewed negotiations was rapidly removed when the Aetolians announced that they would consider peace only on condition that Pylus be restored to Messene, Atintania to Rome, the Ardiaei to Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus of Illyria.

The Aetolians are the last people we would expect to find
insisting in this way on the rights of their allies. Livy follows Polybius' bias faithfully in giving the impression that the Aetolians were to blame for the continuation of the war; but the view is too naïf and Greco-centric. The chief contenders in the war were Rome and Philip. And while either of these wished to continue the fighting, there was no hope of ending the war. Rome was committed to neutralising Macedon for as long as Hannibal was a serious threat in Italy: the Macedonian war would not be ended solely by the course of events in Greece. The Greek commercial states might struggle as they would to get the parties to a conference; but until Rome wanted peace, their efforts would be futile. It is this background against which we should consider the Aetolians' demands at Aegium; and they are at once seen to be simply demands formulated by Rome to secure the continuation of the war by their certain rejection. The 30 days' truce had been a convenient way out of a temporarily embarrassing situation after the Lamia operations: its only effect was that Philip had squandered his success by misinterpreting the nature of the Roman commitment.

By the time of the concilium the threats to Achaea were becoming even greater. In addition to the serious attacks which had induced Cycliadas to call in Philip, the situation was complicated by Attalus' crossing to Aegina, and the Roman fleet's movement to Naupactus. It was clear that the break for negotiations was only an interlude, and that the war would continue as before. This meant that Achaea had to be protected, since all
forces were trained on the Gulf; and while Philip travelled to
Argos to celebrate the Nemea, he left 4,000 troops and 5 ships
as a guard for the north coast. But 5 ships could not transport
4,000 men, and the result was that these forces were only a
nominal protection against the operations of the mobile Roman
fleet. At the height of the Nemea Galba landed between Sicyon
and Corinth with the intention of plundering this rich Achaean
territory. Philip's garrison on the Acrocorinth did not act; and
the news of the Roman incursion was brought to Philip at Argos.
It was a rare opportunity of demonstrating to the Achaeans the
value of a quick and efficient army: he left the celebrations with
his cavalry, followed by the infantry, and hurried northwards. He
met the Romans wandering about in undisciplined fashion and drove
them back to their ships. There could be no doubt in Achaea as
to the value of the Macedonian support; no doubt what would be
the effect of its withdrawal. Philip's support for Philopoemen's
reorganisation would allow him to operate in the north without
sacrificing the loyalty of the Achaeans through his inability to
help them. The urgency of this was underlined by the threats of
this year.

A further demonstration of Achaean reliance on Philip's
support, and the potential danger from its withdrawal, came soon
after the Nemea. The Aetolian attacks on Achaea, started in the
spring, had had the effect of attracting an invitation from the
party in power in Elis for a permanent Aetolian garrison force.19
Cycliadas had made no attempt to deal with this threatening
development until Philip was in a position to support him. This was arranged after the Nemea. The allied forces advanced from their assembly-point at Dyne as far as the river Larissus, which was the boundary between Achaea and Elis. They were met there by the Elean and Aetolian cavalry which tried to stop the invasion. Philopoemen's newly organised cavalry met its first test, and came through with flying colours. The allied cavalry soundly defeated the Elean, and Philopoemen won a personal encounter with Damophon, the leader of the Elean cavalry. Philip must have taken encouragement from this demonstration of the effectiveness of the reorganised Achaean cavalry for his scheme to support Philopoemen.20

After the battle, the Eleans withdrew to their city. The invaders spent the next day inadvisedly in plundering the countryside which had been abandoned to them. During the night, Galba introduced 4,000 Romans into the town. The first thing the invaders knew of the presence of the Romans was on the following day, when they tried to provoke a battle with the Eleans. In the ensuing struggle, Philip was fortunate to escape with his life; but eventually a successful withdrawal was made to Dyne, collecting more plunder on the way. Strategically the expedition had been a failure, for the Aetolian garrison survived intact: the threat to Achaea remained. No major action had been taken against Machanidas, with the result that Achaea was still in a very dangerous situation. Soon afterwards, the need to
develop the Achaean army and to cease relying on Philip was further emphasised by the sudden withdrawal of Philip from operations in southern Greece. News of a new Dardanian invasion of Macedonia immediately took him to the north. The weakness of his resources is emphasised by the fact that he had only 2,500 omnis generis armatorum to leave as protection for Achaea. These were commanded by Menippus and Polyphantas, but were not likely to be much protection against Elis, Sparta and the fleets of Attalus and Rome based on Aegina. 21

Galba at once took advantage of the Achaean predicament. After Philip's withdrawal, the Roman troops were taken from Elis, and on the way to Aegina, where they were to spend the winter, took retaliation against Dyre, since it had been used as a base for the allied expedition against Elis. The town was attacked and destroyed; and although it was repaired and restored to the Dymeans on Philip's orders by Polyphantas and Menippus, it was a brutal lesson on the inadequacy of relying on Macedonian support. 22 Morale must have recovered a little when, towards the end of the year, Cycliadas won a battle near Messene against the Eleans and Aetolians, probably with the aid of the Macedonian troops. But it was cold comfort for the ease with which the Romans had swept aside opposition to destroy Dyre. The cavalry reorganisation was clearly only a first step in the right direction. It was not enough in itself to provide adequate defence. 23

Despite the threatening nature of the situation facing
Achaea, Philopoemen was not given the opportunity of turning his attention to the infantry section of the Achaean army in the next year. Philip's sudden departure had perhaps left his plans for Philopoemen unfulfilled; and Philopoemen had not himself yet acquired the personal prestige which could dominate the elections. In Philip's absence, therefore, Nicias was elected strategos. Events predictably followed the pattern of the previous year: the Aetolians, probably operating from Elis, were again active, and Machanidas took Tegea and attacked Argos. His success before Argos was so threatening that Nicias did not think of resisting alone: the traditional appeal was therefore made to Philip. Philip, as always, was ready to promise help on any appeal - and the Achaean was not the only appeal - but he was fully occupied in dealing with the more urgent threat from the operations of the Roman and Pergamene fleets in the Aegean. It was already full summer and near the time of the Olympic games when he found time to move into Peloponnesse. In the meanwhile Achaea had to do her best to defend herself.24

In July Machanidas turned his attention to Elis, which may reflect some success of Nicias' in repelling him from the Argolid. At the time, the Eleans were preparing for the celebration of the Olympic games; and as Machanidas was also a member of the Roman-Aetolian alliance, he was not suspected of being a danger. Machanidas seems to have been dissatisfied with the effect of the Aetolian attacks on Achaea from Elis, and to have considered that he could put the anti-Achaean potential of the base to better
effect. If he wanted to attack Achaea from the west, Elis was a convenient base: Machanidas therefore ignored his ties of friendship with Elis and took advantage of the Eleans' preparations for the games. Up to this point, Philip had not been in Peloponnese this year, but Machanidas had underestimated him. At the time of the attack on Elis, Philip was at Elatea discussing possibilities for peace. The threat to Elis affected him directly, for it threatened his own strongholds of Heraea, Alipheira and Triphylia. The negotiations were therefore broken off, and Philip hurried to Heraea. When he arrived he learnt that Machanidas had already been repulsed, and had returned to Sparta. As there was no further advantage to be gained from staying at Heraea, he travelled to Aegium, where he attended an Achaean synodos.

Philip's border castles had a dual purpose: to keep Achaea in place under the Macedonian hegemony, and to preserve the Achaean borders from external attack. The castles' safety depended basically on Philip's readiness to come to reinforce the garrisons, whenever danger threatened - a readiness which the conflict with Rome was making progressively more difficult. Philip had already recognised the vulnerability of Achaea when he had supported Philopoemen's cavalry reorganisation as a first step towards Achaean military self-sufficiency. The Aetolian garrison at Elis had clearly been a threat to the western border castles; Machanidas' attempt on Elis again emphasised their essential
isolation. Philip was becoming every year more deeply involved in the Roman war, and the number of troops committed to garrison duty was in the region of 20,000\(^2\) — clearly a number which he would benefit from reducing. The protective duty of his border castles could be replaced by encouraging Achaean self-defence; the hegemonial aspect of their duty could perhaps be served by maintaining only the strongest of the castles — Corinth and Orchomenus — provided that the safeguard was taken of having friendly strategoi elected in Achaea.

This was the scheme which Philip proposed to the Achaeans. The hegemonial aspect of the castles must have aroused resistance among patriotic Achaeans, and the defensive aspect had not been prominent in recent years. Philip therefore declared to the synodos that he intended to withdraw his garrisons from Heraea, Alipheira and Triphylia, and restore these places to the Achaeans.\(^2\) The offer was represented as a genuine attempt to give the Achaeans more control over their own affairs, and from the patriotic viewpoint was welcome. It was also an admission of weakness on Philip's part, but his maintenance of Corinth and Orchomenus would prevent Achaea from taking any great advantage. This first necessary safeguard against any anti-Macedonian reaction in Achaea was already in existence. The scheme was announced at the synodos, but no date was fixed for the withdrawal. Philip took advantage of his presence on the Gulf to borrow some ships from the Achaeans to carry out an attack against southern Aetolia. Nicias accompanied the expedition; and although it was not of any
strategic importance, substantial amounts of booty were collected, and the Achaeans could feel grateful to Philip for supporting them in retaliation against Aetolia.²⁹

The second safeguard for Philip's position in Achaea was achieved at the autumn synodos. Philopoemen was elected strategos³⁰ and immediately started on his major reform of the infantry. Given the association between Philip and Philopoemen in Philopoemen's period in Crete, the fact that Philip had supported Philopoemen's election to the hipparchy in 210, and Philip's proposals regarding the withdrawal of his garrisons, it seems clear that Philopoemen was again strongly supported by Philip in these elections. The previous connections are too solidly established, and the immediate activities of Philopoemen too convenient for Philip, for another conclusion to be tenable. Philip realised, as he had since at least 210, that Achaea must achieve a military self-sufficiency, for he could not guarantee her safety himself in the new circumstances. Even his garrisons were too isolated to be of much value - and in any case, he could no longer afford to squander troops and money unnecessarily. But if his withdrawal of support caused Achaea to suffer severely, she might join his opponents despite the garrisons' remaining at Corinth and Orchomenus. It was therefore vital that Achaea should become self-sufficient, and that this should be organised by a solidly pro-Macedonian man. Philopoemen had already demonstrated his efficiency, and nothing up to the present time had caused Philip to have any doubts about his loyalty. Philopoemen therefore
became strategos for 208/7 with Philip's full support and a mandate to complete the army reorganisation which he had started with the cavalry.

It did not take long for Philopoemen to make his intentions clear. At the very synodos at which he was elected, he addressed the assembly in a speech which deplored the current decadence of the Achaean army - many of the members of which must have been present - and urged reform. Polybius says that the result was an immediate change of heart among his audience. In itself, this need mean no more than that they expressed willingness to co-operate, which must already have been apparent from their willingness to elect him strategos. But the thoroughness with which he undertook the reform is impressive. It is clear from the rigorousness of the reform itself that he had managed to gain the full support of the classes which constituted the army. Beginning from fundamentals, he scrapped the old equipment - the light but clumsy thyreos and short javelin, which had forced the army to fight at long range - and substituted the more solid shield and long sarissa of the Macedonian phalanx. In addition to these - a complete innovation for the Achaean militia - he introduced phalangite helmets, breastplates, and greaves. This removed some of the basic weakness, and turned the ineffective light-armed militia into a potentially strong army, which could press home an attack without fear of excessive danger to individuals. A return to the earlier Achaean practice of hiring mercenaries was also made. It
is clear, from the frequency of appeals to Philip in recent years, that a mercenary corps had ceased to be a permanent part of the Achaean military establishment; this deficiency was now repaired by Philopoemen.32

The cost of these innovations must have been very heavy, and cannot have been wholly borne by individual phalangites. The cost of the mercenaries, in particular, was solely the responsibility of the federal treasury. Yet there is no sign of financial strain in Achaea. A certain amount of money must have come in from the Elean expedition of Cycliadas and the Aetolian expedition of Nicias, but this cannot have been wholly responsible for the influx of money. Philip cannot have provided any money: for had he been able to afford to supply the Achaean army, he must have been able to afford mercenaries for his garrisons in Achaea. As with the cavalry reorganisation, we must look to Philopoemen's public and private earnings as condottiere in Crete as a major source of the influx of wealth, probably referred to by Plutarch.33 This seems to be the only major source of adequate wealth available, and it is no accident, for this reason as much as the others, that Philopoemen was the man who was entrusted with the reorganisation of each section of the army.

The re-equipment of the troops and the hire of mercenaries was only one facet of Philopoemen's reorganisation. As with the cavalry, he had to teach the infantry to use their new weapons, and to combine together and with the newly hired mercenaries,
before they were ready for battle. Philopoemen spent eight months of his year on this training, visiting the individual cities, teaching and advising. In the spring, the whole army was collected together and put through exercises. When this was done, as well as securing increased efficiency, the morale of the troops was much higher, and Philopoemen considered that it was worth risking a battle with Machanidas. He was, this year, the sole problem for Achaea, since the Aetolians were fully occupied with Philip in the north. Philopoemen collected his army at Mantinea, and Machanidas, eager to accept the offer of a battle, which he had long been trying to provoke, advanced to Tegea. The ensuing battle, the military detail of which does not concern us, resulted in a major victory for Philopoemen and his newly trained army. Machanidas pursued the Achaeans too far when they broke in the early part of the engagement, and returned to find that the rest of his army had been overwhelmed in his absence. The culminating disaster for the tyrant was his inability to break back through the Achaean lines: in attempting this, he was personally opposed by Philopoemen and killed in a hand-to-hand struggle with the Achaean strategos.34

Philopoemen naturally exploited his success. Immediately after the battle, the Achaean army marched into Tegea, which Machanidas had taken the previous year. From Tegea, Philopoemen advanced into Lacconia and allowed his troops to ravage the countryside.35 The mercenaries expected this licence to supplement their pay, and the Achaeans would be glad to take revenge in kind
on Sparta. But there is no indication that Philopoemen had any intention of making Sparta a member of the League. His victory over Machanidas was immediately substantial, but not in the long term overwhelming. He did not, even immediately after the battle, consider himself strong enough to attack the city of Sparta and face Spartan desperation. And he was clearly right in this. The rapid emergence of Nabis with a power which maintained him as tyrant for 15 years indicates that there was still a formidable section of the Spartan population which considered itself to be undefeated and solidly anti-Achaean. Had Machanidas not been killed at Mantinea, the battle would have been little more than a tactical victory for Philopoemen. As it was, it gave him the opportunity of following it up by ravaging Laconia, but not of seeking any kind of permanent settlement, such as he later attempted in 192. In 207 he had no opportunity for anything other than the immediate enjoyment of his victory, and the creation of a personal reputation for having crushed the traditional enemy of Achaean. The immediate benefits were nevertheless substantial, for the success at Mantinea coincided with a lessening of Roman interest in the war in Greece. For 207 and 206 the Aetolians were left to bear the major part of the war effort, since no Roman reinforcements were sent to Greece for these two years. This meant that Achaean was freed from attack by the Aetolians at Elis; and although Nabis must have become tyrant very soon after the death of Machanidas, he was initially too much occupied with establishing his claim to power.
at Sparta to think of an immediate resumption of Machanidas' aggressive foreign policy.

Mantinea was an all-Achaean success. Philopoemen's reputation in Achaean was made; Philip's plans had been outstandingly successful. The most obvious immediate result of the battle was the safety of the Achaean border areas from Spartan attack. Sparta was temporarily weakened, and for the moment Achaean was the unquestioned primary power in Peloponnese. The army reform of Philopoemen had, at its first real test, achieved the defeat of the major threat to Achaean safety; Roman lack of interest in the Macedonian war had removed the Aetolian threat; Philip had promised to withdraw his border garrisons. It must have seemed to the Achaean that a new age of independence was dawning, in which Aratus' first anti-Macedonian strokes towards Achaean independence might be repeated. This new situation of Achaean naturally threw the position of Philip's garrisons into relief. Of their two duties, defence of Achaean from outside danger and oppression of Achaean from inside, only the latter now remained. The significance of this must have been as clear to Philip as to the Achaean: if his border castles were now evacuated, there was nothing but Corinth and Orchomenus to hold Achaean firmly to alliance with him; and while this might be sufficient for the purpose while Achaean was permanently weakened by a long-term border war, they could prove inadequate in the new conditions created by Mantinea, and therefore threaten the whole basis of Philip's power in Peloponnese.
It is known that the garrisons in question were not, in fact, withdrawn until 198, when Orchomenus was also included, but we do not have any specific information about why or when Philip changed his mind and decided to keep them. We have argued that, although Philip had supported Philopoemen in his army re-organisations, the effect of Mantinea was greater than he had anticipated, and instead of simply relieving the pressure on his inadequate resources, seemed likely to weaken the whole basis of his power in Peloponnesse. In the circumstances, it seems likely that it was at this point that Philip decided that he must retain his border castles, when Achaea first saw the possibility of independence after Mantinea, when the hegemonial aspect of the border castles was both more apparent to the Achaeans and at the same time more necessary for Philip. Philip's method of recouping his prestige over the withdrawal, by supporting Philopoemen and Achaean self-sufficiency, had rebounded by its embarrassing success: it was this latter which prevented his being able to carry out the withdrawal.

Mantinea was a major blow to Spartan power: 4,000 from the Spartan army had been killed, and when Nabis had established himself as tyrant, he carried out a radical social reform in order to compensate for this loss of man-power. The most noticeable features of this social re-organisation were a redistribution of wealth and the down-grading or exile of the traditional aristocracy. Polybius describes these innovations bitterly and abusively, and there can be little doubt that many of his
strictures are legitimate. On the other hand, Nabis' success, by whatever means, in resuscitating Sparta and holding it securely in his power for 15 years, deserves more appreciation than Polybius is prepared to give. Nabis was a tyrant, a complete autocrat; but if his success in his inevitable policy of hostility towards Achaea had not been so outstanding, Polybius' picture of his régime might have been rather different. It was in the propaganda of his opponents that Nabis' despotism became morally unacceptable, primarily because it was politically dangerous. It was politically dangerous in the first place because it was successfully established, and because it was a manifestation of the long-standing Spartan threat to Achaea, just as if Mantinea had not been. In the second place, the régime created exiles. This was morally objectionable on humanistic grounds, in that Greek democracies tended - except in times of stasis - to accommodate their opponents if they were willing to come to terms. Polybius' objection to Nabis is partly an expression of his humane dislike of this aspect of nakedly oligarchic or autocratic systems. But the exiles were also an immediate political problem, and this has sharpened Polybius' acrimony. For the problem of the settlement of the Spartan exiles was the major issue in Achaeon politics in the years following the death of Nabis and the incorporation of Sparta in the League. Nabis' régime, therefore, was doubly detestable. But we should assess Nabis' success without the flavour of Polybius' moral and political opposition, as a phenomenon of the time. As we are
concerned only with Nabis' political relationship with Achaea, and his part in Greek politics in general, the social character of his régime does not affect the issue.

In 206 Philip brought his war with the Aetolians, who had become weary of waiting for Roman support, to an end. Appian records the presence of Galba at the meeting of the Aetolians in 206, at which it was decided to make peace with Philip. He tried to oppose the motion accepting the peace, but was shouted down. There could be no doubt that the Aetolians were war-weary and felt let down by the recent inadequacy of Roman support. Philip grasped his opportunity of disrupting the ranks of his opponents by making peace with Aetolia. There is very little information in the sources about this peace, which the Romans opposed; but Philip's allies, including Achaea, must have participated in it, and also the Greek allies of the Aetolians. This had the effect of returning the war to the situation in which it had been before the Roman alliance with Aetolia in 211: the two protagonists, Philip and Rome, were still enemies and still at war, but Rome was now again without effective allies.

Even before the peace of 206 the Senate seems to have been impressed by Aetolian war-weariness, for it mounted a large expedition of 10,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 35 ships, which had already set out when the news that the Aetolians had made peace independently arrived at Rome. This renewed Roman activity
was clearly a tardy attempt to show that the neglect of the eastern theatre had not been the result of any essential lessening of Roman interest in the war. Philip was still the enemy, and the Senate could not easily acquiesce, for prestige reasons, in the war's simply petering out, without first making a demonstration of power. P. Sempronius Tuditanus arrived at Dyrrhachium at the end of 206 with the Roman forces. But events of the year offered no advantage to either side: the Romans were unwilling to carry on the war alone, and broke the deadlock by opening negotiations which led to the peace of Phoenice. This is not the place for a discussion of the signatories of the Peace. For our purpose, it is enough to notice the effect of this peace on the Peloponnesian situation: Achaea was adscripta on Philip's side - as we should expect - and on the Roman, Nabis, Elis and Messene. For Achaea this formally marked the end of the war with Rome, which had not, in fact, affected her greatly since 208. The aspects of the general conflict which had affected her most at the height of the war had already been removed before the final peace was made at Phoenice: the threat from Sparta had been temporarily destroyed by Philopoemen's victory at Mantinea; the threat from the Aetolian establishment at Elis had been removed by the war-wearyness which culminated in the peace of 206.

II

The second part of this chapter will attempt to show that after Mantinea Philopoemen adopted Achaean independence, which he
had been encouraged to achieve by Philip, as an active policy. This naturally brought him into conflict with Philip and eventually induced him to look to Rome as Achaea's most likely ally when the Second Macedonian War was on the point of breaking out. Before examining the detailed and chronological development of this change between 207 and 200, it is first necessary to demonstrate that this change in policy was real and did actually occur.

The first evidence is Philip's attempted murder of Philopoemen, alleged by Plutarch. The account is undated, but the context places it around 205: Φίλιππος μὲν γὰρ ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς οἶδενος, δὲν ἔκποθαν ὁ Φιλοποίμην γένηται, πάλιν ὑποτήξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ Ἀχαιοῦ, ἐπεμψεν εἰς Ἀργοὺς κρύφα τοὺς ἀναρίζοντας αὐτόν· ἐπιγνωσείης δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παντάπασιν ἤξεισθην καὶ διεβιβάζη πρὸς τοὺς Κόλπας. Pausanias has virtually the same account. Plutarch's interpretation of the attempt in this passage, that Philip wanted to curb Philopoemen's insistence on Achaean independence, suits our thesis ideally. If Philip was prepared to go to the length of organising a political assassination of Philopoemen, we must surely conclude with Plutarch that Philopoemen was following a policy, not only of Achaean self-sufficiency but also of anti-Macedonian independence. This conclusion is necessary if we believe that Plutarch's account represents an actual murder attempt by Philip. But the matter is more complicated: for although we cannot prove that this attempted murder is an
unsubstantiated allegation, some considerations lead to this conclusion.

In the first place, Philip showed little interest in Achaea between his decision to maintain his border garrisons in 207 and 200, when he was again threatened with Roman intervention. In itself, this is by no means conclusive, for source material is fragmentary for these years. But the fact remains that the major object of Philip's interest in these years was his attempt to expand in the Aegean and Anatolia, and to this aim Achaea was peripheral. The second objection - again not conclusive - is that Philip was frequently charged with murder: so much so that Flamininus joked about it when he conferred with Philip at Nicaea in 193. The joke was, no doubt, intended to refer to the habit, endemic in the Hellenistic monarchies, of judicial murder of embarrassing individuals. But rumours were also current of simple political assassinations. The records of these are uniformly preserved from hostile non-Macedonian sources, and in every case the evidence is such that it causes strong suspicions that the allegations are fabrications of hostile contemporaries. In the case of Philopoemen, the account is only of attempted assassination, and therefore gives rise to some suspicions. But suspicions do not constitute solid evidence, and do nothing to demonstrate their own validity. Our conclusion must therefore be that a final decision on the truth of Plutarch's account is not possible, despite the fact that such evidence as there is points towards its possible falsehood.
This indecisive conclusion does not provide us with much information about Philopoemen's policies at this time, but we must explore further the implications of the possible falsity of Plutarch's account. Whether true or false, Plutarch's account must come from Polybius, and therefore in the first instance from Philopoemen himself. If it is false, we must assume that it entered the tradition in one of three ways. It may have been Philopoemen's propaganda, a complete fabrication aimed solely at discrediting Philip. Strongly against this is the difficulty of making such an accusation stick without either evidence or witnesses. We can therefore have some confidence in assuming that there was some actual occurrence which was used as source for the original of Plutarch's account. This leads to the second and third possibilities for the way in which the account may have entered the tradition. An actual attempt on Philopoemen's life could be interpreted in two ways to produce the result we have: either as a conscious distortion for propagandist reasons, of an attempt in which Philip was not, in fact, implicated; or as the result of a sincere belief that Philip might attack him in this way. All of these three possible interpretations have a similar significance for our purpose, for all imply that a hostility between Philip and Philopoemen existed at this time. Although we can probably reject the first, it seems impossible to decide which of the other two alternatives is the more probable. The conclusion which is reached from this examination of the possible circumstances of the alleged murder attempt, is that whether true
or false, it certainly indicates that there was a strong hostility at this time between Philopoemen and Philip.

The second piece of evidence which demonstrates Philopoemen's anti-Macedonian position after Mantinea is his association with Aristaenus. Aristaenus in his strategia of 199/8 was responsible for exiling Cycliadas, the leader of the Macedonian party, and for breaking completely with the Macedonian alliance and joining Rome. There can be no doubt that Aristaenus was anti-Macedonian and pro-Roman at this time. It is his association with Philopoemen which is not usually demonstrated. The reason for the obscurity of the close relationship between the two men in this period is that later they were opposed to each other on points of principle connected with their interpretation of the Achaean foedus with Rome. This later opposition crystallised in the tradition - starting with a mis-interpretation of Polybius - and was reflected back into the earlier period. We therefore have the incomprehensible picture in Plutarch of Aristaenus helping Philopoemen - although, Plutarch says, he differed from him politically.

The circumstances of this vital episode are that when Philopoemen returned to Crete in 200, Megalopolis was bearing the brunt of the war with Nabis. The dominant Megalopolitan view of Philopoemen's absence was that he was deserting his native city just at the time when his help was most needed. It was therefore formally proposed that he should be exiled.
Plutarch continues: οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ διεκώλυσαν Ἀρίσταινον πέμψαντες εἰς Μεγάλην πόλιν στρατηγὸν, δὲ καὶ πὲρ ἐν διάφορος τῷ πολιορκοῖς πέρι τὴν πολιτείαν, οὐχ ἐξακε τελεσθῆναι τὴν καταδίκην. Aristaeus was strategos, and although he intervened with the support of a federal decree, it is inconceivable that he would have done so had he not wanted to; and he cannot have been prepared to take extravagant federal action to preserve Philopoemen's civil rights if he was opposed to him - Aristaeus was quite prepared to exile an illustrious opponent, such as Cycliadas. Philopoemen therefore would not merit such federal intervention on his behalf at this critical time unless he was a close associate of Aristaeus'. The conclusion seems inescapable.

It is also possible to demonstrate a possible earlier connection between Philopoemen and Aristaeus, and while this does not add anything to our knowledge of Philopoemen as pro-Roman or anti-Macedonian - it is before the possibility of such a change became apparent - it does emphasize again the falsehood of the unqualified assertion that Philopoemen and Aristaeus were opponents. In the dispositions for Mantinea in 207 Polybius gives the name of the Achaean hipparch as Ἀρισταῖνετος of Dyne. Niccolini has given a convincing demonstration that the manuscripts are likely to be in error at this place, and that the reading should probably be Ἀρίσταινος. In three of the places where Aristaeus' name occurs in Polybius, some manuscripts read Ἀρισταῖνετος, and in two passages of Plutarch the
same confusion occurs.\textsuperscript{55} It seems clear that in the midst of such confusion among the manuscripts we should not boldly maintain the correctness of Άρισταίνετος in Pol. 11.11.7, and should seriously entertain Niccolini's suggestion that the hipparch of 208/7 and the ἄστρωτος of 199/8 are one and the same man.\textsuperscript{56} One difficulty in this, however, is that Plutarch gives the name of Aristaemus' home city as Megalopolis.\textsuperscript{57}

Polybius, in the surviving fragments, nowhere gives the city, unless we accept Niccolini's conjecture at 11.11.17. This gives us a direct clash between the two authors. If the Polybian reading was certain, we could easily explain Plutarch's variant as a simple error. But the dilemma is resolvable: an inscription from Delphi records honours set up by the Achaeans to Άρισταίνον ὁμοιόν άρετάς ἐνεχεν καὶ ἐθνοίας τὰς εἰς τὸ έθνος καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀθλαντικά. As Niccolini points out, it would be strange to find such a fulsome inscription set up at Delphi for a man who shared the name, but not the birthplace of the well-known statesman, but of whom no other information in our comparatively wide knowledge of leading Achaean politicians is available.\textsuperscript{58} The best solution of the difficulties is therefore to accept that Plutarch has erred, that the manuscripts of Polybius should read Άρισταίνος at 11.11.7, and that the Delphic inscription refers to the same man, the well-known Aristaemus, the friend and contemporary of Philopoemen.

If we accept this identification as probable, it remains to
make the point that, since Philopoemen was *strategos* in 203/2 and Aristaenus hipparch, they will probably have shared the same political views, then as later. We have argued that the elections for 203/2 were dominated by the *auctoritas* of Philip, who wanted Philopoemen to reorganise the Achaean infantry. Our conclusion must therefore be that Aristaenus also shared the support of Philip in 208. We have thus shown that Philopoemen was not alone in his defection from Macedon between his success at Nantinea and the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, but was closely connected with Aristaenus throughout the period.

The third piece of evidence which demonstrates that Philopoemen was anti-Macedonian, and therefore pro-Roman, in 200, is his departure for Crete in 200/199. It has already been shown that Philopoemen's activity in Crete was part of the Achaean war against Nabis, but the events which caused his departure at this time must be elucidated here. The date and circumstances are discussed by Plutarch:

> Ὅδε Κρητῆ πολεμεῖν τημικαθία καὶ στρατηγὴν διοπόντιος ἐγκλήματα παρεῖχε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς ἑχθροῖς ὡς ἀποδιδράσων τὸν οίκον πόλεμον. Ἡραυ δὲ τινὲς οἱ λέγοντες, ἐπέρους τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἠρμηνέων ἔρχοντας, ἰδιώτην ἐντα τὸν θειοποίεμα χρῆσαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σχολὴν ἐφ᾽ ἱγμονίᾳ δημιουργοὶ τοῖς Ρωμαίοις. Ἡν γὰρ ἄλλοτρος σχολῆς, καθάπερ ἄλλο τι κτέμι τὴν στρατηγικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐχεῖν διὰ παντὸς ἐν χρῆσι καὶ τριβῇ βουλήμενος . . .

The accusation of his enemies is incredible: Philopoemen was a distinguished
mercenary soldier and engaged in fighting in Crete: he would not run away from military activity. The other reason which Plutarch gives is more fruitful, and can be substantiated. Its implication is that this was the version preferred by his friends as a counter to the local accusation of his abandoning Megalopolis. The point of the discussion in this case is concerned not with his political position in Achaea, but with his local position in Megalopolis: therefore it could be said, without losing face, that Philopoemen was simply using his involuntary leisure. The vague information about the events which caused this leisure - our primary interest - may therefore be trustworthy.

Philopoemen went to Crete because (or simply 'when') the Achaeans chose others as archontes. This statement is valuable both for the date and for the information it gives about the reasons for the departure. Philopoemen was strategos in 201/0, and was succeeded by Cycliadas (200/199) and Aristaenus (199/8). If we are to take a secure date from Plutarch's statement, the election of archontes must refer to Cycliadas' year or Aristaenus' or both. Aymard has already pointed out that archontes need not mean strategoi; and therefore that Philopoemen can have left Achaea in 200/199 without contradicting Plutarch. But in itself this is not proof that he did leave at this time. However, if we take it together with the fact, which we have already established, that Philopoemen and Aristaenus were close political associates, it becomes
conclusive. For the election of Aristaenus in autumn 199 must be regarded as a victory for Philopoemen's party and policy, and would certainly not have the effect of leaving him at leisure to leave Achaea for Crete. We can therefore be sure that Philopoemen's departure for Crete was during the strategia of Cycliadas.

If Aristaenus' political success would have prevented Philopoemen from leaving Achaea, the causal interpretation of Plutarch's genitive absolute - favoured by Pausanias - means that Cycliadas' election was itself the reason for Philopoemen's departure. Cycliadas was last mentioned in the sources in his strategia of 210/09 when Philopoemen was hipparch. In 200 he was equally a strong supporter of the Macedonian alliance, but our evidence about Philopoemen in 200 suggests that he was no longer an associate, but an opponent of Cycliadas. We have shown that Philopoemen was friendly with Aristaenus at this time: but in 199 Aristaenus caused the exile of Cycliadas. We are therefore justified in concluding that Philopoemen and Cycliadas were similarly opposed politically at this time. Opposition to Cycliadas meant opposition to Macedon; and in the circumstances of the time, this entailed friendliness towards Rome.

Philopoemen's departure for Crete, therefore, took place in 200/199, was motivated by the election of Cycliadas and the resulting fear for his position in Achaea, and again demonstrates conclusively that Philopoemen was no longer a supporter of the Achaean alliance with Macedon.
In the light of the change in Philopoemen's standpoint between his success at Mantinea and his departure for Crete in 200, which we have demonstrated, an interpretation of the events of this period can now be offered. Mantinea did more than simply destroy the threat from Machanidas: it also opened up the possibility of creating a new independent Achaean power in Peloponnese. Philip showed that he had realised the significance of the victory when he decided to keep the border castles, which he had previously offered to vacate. But this could not restore Achaean morale to its feeble pre-Mantinea state. He himself had begun the discussions about the castles, and the movement towards self-sufficiency in Achaean - which he had initially encouraged - must have reacted unfavourably to his decision not to evacuate them. From this point, it must have taken on some feelings of positive hostility towards Philip. By 205 this independence movement already had attracted substantial support. Philopoemen was stratēgos for the second time in 206/5, and at the Nemea of 205 he paraded his victorious Achaean troops to scenes of almost hysterical acclaim.

In order to appreciate the full significance of this Achaean hysteria, we must bear in mind that the Nemea was held at Argos. Here there was traditionally strong support for the Macedonian kings, and Philip in particular had cultivated this support by frequent attendance at the Nemea. Philopoemen's popular reception must have seemed to a Macedonian observer to be in the way of a usurpation of Philip's almost traditional honours at
the festival. And more: his ovation was shared by the Achaean troops, who had saved their country by acting without aid from abroad and had become the new efficiency-symbol of resurgent Achaean nationalism. This was a sharp contrast with the previous ineffective feebleness of the Achaean army, which had even made it necessary for Philip to leave the Nemea of 209 in order to repel the Romans. The popular encouragement shown by this ostentatiously patriotic reception - even if aroused by strategically placed cheer-leaders - could only serve to confirm Philopoemen in his embryo claim to Achaean independence from Macedon. Philip's offer to vacate the border castles in 208 in a moment of crisis had demonstrated to the Achaeans that Philip felt no sentimental attachments to Achaean. He had encouraged Achaean military efficiency and Philopoemen had taken him at his word. After Mantinea Philopoemen wanted to exploit the effectiveness of the Achaean army as a means of attaining a form of independence in Peloponnesse, whereas Philip wanted to put the clock back to the period of unquestioned Macedonian hegemony. But he could not have it both ways, and the damage had already been done: Philopoemen's success in his independent action at Mantinea was fully supported by large numbers of Achaeans, who greeted him at the Nemea of 205. Philip had shown quite bluntly that Macedonian interest alone ruled his relationship with Achaean: Philopoemen was now in a position in which he was prepared to show that Achaean interest, and Achaean interest alone, should rule Achaean's relationship with Macedon.
Probably in the same year, 205, Megara was reunited with the League. Discussion has centred on the date at which the reunion occurred, and conclusions vary between Philopoemen's strategic of 193/2, 201/0, and 206/5. But Aymard bases his arguments in favour of 206/5 on the order of events in Plutarch's narrative, and while they are not finally decisive, they show the strong probability of a date about this time. We can therefore tentatively accept that the return of Megara to the League occurred in Philopoemen's strategic of 206/5, which makes it possible to interpret it in the light of Philopoemen's nationalist desire for Achaean expansionism and independence. From this point of view, Megara was an important gain for Achaean, as it controlled the passage through the Isthmus. But it was also a useful propaganda gain, if Philopoemen wished to gain support for his independent policy by emphasising the desirability of reunifying the Achaean of the pre-Cleomenic War period. This was the period of Achaean independence and freedom from the shackles of the Macedonian hegemony: the emphasis placed by the accession of Megara on the conditions of this early period of the League must inevitably have had the effect of discrediting Philip's current disregard for Achaean feelings by continuing to maintain his hegemony over Achaean with his garrisons.

The independence at which Philopoemen aimed did not develop into a doctrinaire nationalism. There was a solid practical interest added to the nationalism, which gave practical application to the policy. Philip had encouraged Achaean to defend
herself against Sparta, and Kantinea had not permanently ended the threat from Sparta. While Philopoemen had been engaged in his activities in Achaea, which provided him with support for a less close relationship with Macedon, Nabis had been consolidating his position in Sparta. By 204 he possessed a mercenary army, recruited in Crete as a result of his close ties with Cnossos and other Cretan cities; and he felt strong enough at Sparta to begin to make use of it abroad. The first move for an expansionist Sparta was traditionally towards the north, and in particular against southern Arcadia. Nabis was no exception, and he now began to look for a casus belli with Achaea: in 204 he found it. Some Boeotian travellers had rested at Sparta, and before they left persuaded one of Nabis' grooms to defect and accompany them. He agreed and took with him the best horse from Nabis' stables. In itself, this did not have the makings of an international incident. But the sequel involved Achaea: the men had already reached Megalopolis before they were caught by the Spartan pursuit party. The Spartans naturally demanded that the alleged thieves be handed over, but were met with a point-blank refusal from the Megalopolitans. Megalopolis was naturally hostile towards a resurgent Sparta, and she was under no obligation to hand over the fugitives who had sought asylum there. Nabis did not need to take public offence at the Megalopolitan refusal unless he wanted to; and if he wanted to be provocative, a policy of appeasement by Megalopolis would not significantly delay the outbreak of hostilities. Nabis therefore
considered the refusal a sufficient pretext for an attack on
Megalopolitan territory, which consisted of a raid on an out-
lying farm. We do not know whether the pretext was engineered
by Nabis - if so, we should have expected Polybius to say so -
or whether he simply took advantage of the opportunity which was
offered. In any case, the slightness of the pretext makes it
quite clear that he intended to provoke a war with Achaea. The
period of freedom from attack from the south, won for Achaea by
Philopoemen's victory at Mantinea, was now over. The new tyrant
had established himself, and the dangerous pre-Mantinea situa-
tion was restored. Another opportunity for the continuing practical
application of Achaea's military self-sufficiency was easily
found.65

The war, still undeclared on the part of Achaea,66 continued
sporadically for the next two years, 203 and 202. We have no
information about its events, and as a result are probably justi-
ified in concluding that no significant advantage was won by
either side. Even Philopoemen, who was probably strategos for
either 204/3 or 203/2,67 must have failed to make any signif-
ificant impression. If both sides were content to occupy them-
selves with border raids - suggested by the Achaeans' failure to
declare war formally until 200 - there could, by the very nature
of the war, be little advantage gained. However, during the
course of Lysippus' strategia of 202/1 Nabis altered his
tactics. He determined to change the direction of the war by
striking out for a larger and firmer base of operations in
southern Peloponnese, from which he would more easily be able to attack Achaea. Following the example of Machanidas' attack on friendly Elis in 208, he launched an attack on Messene, probably with the support of an anti-Achaean party within the city. At first he met little resistance, as he was formally an ally from whom attack would be unexpected.

In his first approach he gained control of all the city except for Ithome. Philopoemen immediately understood the new danger to Achaea which was implicit in the Spartan possession of Messene: this would particularly affect Megalopolis, which must already have borne the brunt of the undeclared war. When Lysippus was urged by Philopoemen to send federal forces to prevent Nabis from occupying the whole of Messene, he was more concerned to reflect upon the fact that Messene had joined Aetolia in 211 and had remained a member of the hostile alliance until 205. Lysippus cannot have appreciated that the danger to Achaea as a whole from Spartan possession of Messene was substantial enough to make it worth his while giving the prestige of his office to an unsolicited and unapproved expedition to the aid of a recent enemy. In strict law, he had ample excuse for refusing Philopoemen's request: no source mentions that any faction of the Messenians formally appealed to Achaea, only that Philopoemen took the initiative in urging Achaean intervention. Philopoemen may well have anticipated some factional support in Messene for action against Nabis' attempted coup; but Lysippus as strategos could not legitimately interfere in the affairs of
another sovereign state without receiving an appeal from some faction. At the same time, Achaea was not formally at war with Nabis, therefore federal intervention was doubly illegitimate.

Philopoemen, however, decided to take private action. He had no federal office, therefore was not prevented from acting by any federal scruples. He could command no federal forces, but he did not have any difficulty in raising a force from Megalopolis, with which he marched to Messene. The threat to Achaea from Nabis' possession of Messene naturally appeared more real when viewed from Megalopolis than from Aegium: the proximity of the danger made action which the federal authorities considered unnecessary and illegitimate vital and equitable. This was not the first time that a sectional interest in Achaea had taken it into its own hands to protect itself, when it was clear that the federal authorities were unwilling; nor was it the first time that a close relationship between Messene and Megalopolis had proved mutually beneficial: the refuge which the Messenians had offered the Megalopolitans in 223, under a reversal of the present circumstances, would not be forgotten by Philopoemen. Nabis was surprised by the arrival of the Megalopolitans; the anti-Spartan Messenians rallied, and as Philopoemen entered one gate, Nabis escaped out of the opposite gate. There was little fighting, if we are to believe Polybius, who is behind Plutarch's account; and it may be that Nabis, who had clearly overestimated the strength of his support, did not want to risk his forces in an encounter in which he was likely to be beaten. The arrival of Philopoemen and his Megalopolitans had
prevented him from capitalising on his initial success. The success of Philopoemen's unofficial action against Nabis must have increased his popularity in Achaea, for he was elected *strategos* for 201/0. The critical issue was still Sparta; and since Philip was fully occupied elsewhere, Achaea could justly be grateful to Philopoemen. He was successful enough against Nabis for it to be unnecessary for him to insist on a formal declaration of war by a federal *syncleros*. But his Megalopolitan origins made him take care to prevent the continuation of Nabis' attacks. He, as well as Nabis, had his Cretan connections, and he made use of them against Nabis in 200. He had no scruples about striking back at Nabis without a formal declaration of war, and the success of a cutting-out expedition, in which his Cretans took part, against some of Nabis' mercenaries at Pellana was such that Nabis waited until Philopoemen had vacated the *strategia* before launching any further attacks on Achaea. Polybius gives a detailed description of the impressive way in which this expedition was assembled in secrecy before the attack, but his admiration does not reflect any major importance of the expedition itself; his admiration is directed solely towards the technical competence which Philopoemen displayed in carrying out the complicated arrangements. But apart from this technical interest, the expedition was simply a facet of Philopoemen's continuation of the war of local border raids. The only development was that the retaliation was now placed on a federal basis. Although it was not sufficiently important for it to be necessary to declare war, its success was startling in
keeping Nabis quiet for the remainder of the year. Nabis was no hothead, and his two recent experiences of Philopoemen's energy were sufficient for him to decide to wait until he had been replaced in the strategia before continuing his plundering raids on Megalopolis and southern Arcadia. In the long run, Philopoemen's successes in quietening Nabis had little effect on the course of the war, but only served to lull the Achaeans into a false sense of security.

It has already been noticed that Cycliadas was elected strategos in autumn 200, and that Philopoemen as a result left Achaea for Crete. He was a political associate of Aristaenus, shared his anti-Macedonianism and in 199 friendliness towards Rome, and was therefore in opposition to Cycliadas. Cycliadas' election, in fact, constituted a major defeat for Philopoemen and Aristaenus. The main problem remaining for us, about the election of Cycliadas, is to explain the circumstances in which it became politically possible. Philopoemen was strategos in 201/00, and had some success against Nabis, which should have been sufficient to secure the election of another of his group as strategos for 200/199 - Aristaenus, for instance, was available and eligible. We must, therefore, consider the other events of Philopoemen's strategia in the light of this problem.

In the spring of 200, the Roman propaganda mission, which was sent to Greece when the Senate decided on war with Philip, visited Aegium. The members were C. Claudius Nero, M. Aemilius Lepidus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus. Its main purpose was to attempt to seduce
Philip's Greek allies and to confirm the friendship of those states which had supported Rome in the previous war. On their way from Italy the ambassadors had already visited the Epirots, Amyntas, and the Aetolians. Before going on from Naupactus to Athens, where they were to meet Attalus, they crossed the Gulf to visit the Achaeans at Aegium. In each place they based their propaganda on the claim that Philip must μηδενι πολεμειν. The motif appeared mild enough: the Romans (unasked, except by Rhodes and Attalus) were announcing their Protectorate of the Hellenes. If Philip was willing to become a Roman client and to allow Greece to become a Roman Protectorate without fighting for his hegemony - conditions which were impossible for Philip to accept - war would be unnecessary. Essentially benevolent in tone to the Greeks, the mission and its message were generally well received by the states it visited.

In Achaia, Philopoemen was strategos when the ambassadors arrived at Aegium. Since Mantinea, he had been relying on the strength of the Achaean army to give reality to his attempts to persuade the Achaeans to adopt an attitude of independence from Philip, as far as the continued presence of the garrisons allowed. In these circumstances, the Roman propaganda motif was eminently suitable. When Philopoemen heard the ambassadors' message, that they were demanding that Philip should stop making war on the Greeks, his immediate reaction must have been sympathetic. For from Philopoemen's point of view, what were
the Macedonian garrisons other than one aspect of Philip's war on the Greeks? There could be no disguising Philopoemen's interest in the Roman proposal, for it suited his policy admirably. We have no evidence that his anti-Macedonianism - evidenced by the alleged murder attempt - had yet turned to pro-Romanism. Yet Aristaenus in 199/8 was fully committed to joining Rome in the war against Philip. The most economical interpretation of the available evidence is that Philopoemen's and Aristaenus' anti-Macedonianism first turned towards Rome when this Roman propaganda embassy called at Aegium in 200, for at this point the Romans and Philopoemenists discovered that they had a common anti-Macedonianism.

For the moment there could be no possibility of Achaean action against Philip, even with the promise of Roman support: the Macedonian garrisons held Achaea by the throat. And more than this: it was by no means certain that a majority of the Achaeans would support a move towards abandoning the Macedonian alliance, despite Philopoemen's personal influence. The positive aspect of Philopoemen's policy - the assertion of Achaean power in Peloponnesian against Sparta and the right of independent action - was recognised as patriotic and desirable, as his reception at the Nemea of 203 adequately shows. The negative aspect - the anti-Macedonian aspect, which was a natural growth from the other - was more revolutionary, more dangerous to put into practice, and therefore demonstrably less desirable for Achaea. The independence achieved up to this
point had been exercised within the limits imposed by the Macedonian hegemony: it was safe, and had, in the first instance, been encouraged by Philip. The step now envisaged was incomparably larger, and therefore could be expected to attract less support. Most Achaeans can have had little concept of the disparity between Roman and Macedonian power: even after most of the garrisons were removed and the Roman allies were blockading Corinth in 198, Aristaenus had difficulty in obtaining a majority for his proposal to abandon the Macedonian alliance and join Rome. But the formation of a mildly pro-Roman group in Achaea seems likely to have taken its origin from the appearance of the Roman propaganda mission at Aegium in 200. It was not a group of pro-Roman quislings; it was rather a group which was prepared at this stage to give a cautious welcome to Roman expressions of interest, which happened to have features in common with the policy which the group had independently evolved. Philopoemen's partial achievement of independence had naturally led to anti-Macedonianism; in this the interests of Rome coincided. It was therefore natural that an element of friendliness to Rome should, in the present circumstances, take its place in the policies of the independence party.  

If we are correct in taking the presence of this Roman mission at Aegium in 200 as the point of origin of the Achaean pro-Roman party, we have come close to explaining the circumstances of Cycliadas' election. If Philopoemen and Aristaenus
at this point formed a policy which envisaged the possibility of co-operation with Rome, the shape of their propaganda must have changed to suit this new development in their policy. They will not have simply kept quiet about their proposed entente with Rome. Cycliadas, on the other hand, was famous for only one thing: for being head of the pro-Macedonian party in Achaea. And we must assume that it was this dominant feature of his political character which caused his election. The conflict between the new Philopoemenist policy and Cycliadas' traditionalism is obvious, and we must conclude from Cycliadas' success that the new Philopoemenist policy was beaten conclusively in the elections - to the extent that Philopoemen could not face living in Achaea with the notoriety of his defeat and perhaps the threat of exile hanging over him. Aristaenus did stay in Achaea, and braved the defeat. He seems to have been more of a politician than Philopoemen, and more prepared to take political risks if future prospects were inviting. In any case he did not have a convenient invitation from the Gortynians waiting to be taken up, to provide himself with a patriotic excuse for voluntary exile. The absence of Philopoemen, however, did mean that Aristaenus was left as chief representative of the party which they had jointly formed - a position which he may have felt was worth the risk of exile at the hands of the reactionary Cycliadas.

One further event of autumn 200 tends to confirm that this interpretation of Cycliadas' election is correct. The wave of
reaction against Philopoemen and Aristaenus seems to have manifested itself again, perhaps already before the election. After the fall of Abydus to Philip - probably in September - Achaean ambassadors arrived at Rhodes, which was taking the lead with Pergamum in the reintroduction of the Romans. The Achaeans asked the Rhodians to try to reach agreement with Philip; but the Roman propaganda mission, which was just about to complete its journey to Antiochus and Ptolemy Epiphanes, intervened and urged the Rhodians not to make peace without Roman consent. The Rhodians were only too glad to be reassured of Roman support, and immediately agreed.

The Romans opposed this Achaean embassy of conciliation for obvious reasons: they did not want their potential allies to be neutralised in this way. As this embassy was so clearly contrary to Roman interests, it cannot have been sent with the consent of Philopoemen, but must represent the policy of Cycliadas and the pro-Macedonians. The actual date of the embassy and its chronological relation to the Achaean elections are not clear, and cannot be discovered. If it was before the election of Cycliadas, it suggests that the Philopoemenists had already lost the support of the synodos before the elections; if after the elections, it merely confirms that Cycliadas was willing to work in the interests of Philip. But from the point of view of parties and policies, this essentially anti-Roman mission to Rhodes confirms what we have already established, that the support which Philopoemen and Aristaenus had attracted
while their policy was based solely on patriotic independence, was lost by the end of Philopoemen's strategia of 201/0; and that the reason for this loss of support was the proposed entente with Rome.

The ten years of Philopoemen's political career in Achaea between his visits to Crete saw a major change in his policies. In Crete until 211, he had been working in Philip's interests, and he continued to co-operate after his return to Achaea. He gained his first federal offices, the hipparchy in 210/09 and the strategia in 208/7, with Philip's support. But the developing crisis in Philip's war with Rome made it impossible for him to continue to protect Achaea from Sparta. His encouragement of Philopoemen to undertake the remodelling of the Achaean army was too successful, and the death of Iachanidas at Mantinea created the possibility of an Achaean policy which aimed at achieving a local independence, which Philopoemen believed could be maintained by the new Achaean army. In this he was probably supported by Aristaenus. A solid barrier against achieving this aim was formed by the Macedonian garrisons; and it was natural that the result of this opposition should be the growth of an anti-Macedonian aspect in their policy of Achaean independence in Peloponnese. The next - and most far-reaching - development came in 200 with their realisation that their anti-Macedonianism was shared by Rome. This unity of interest caused them to express cautious willingness to co-operate with the Romans. But this association with Achaea's recent enemies caused a major political
reaction in Achaea, and a surge of new support for Cycliadas and his policy, probably stimulated by Philip's realisation of the danger implicit in any success for his opponents. The embassy to Rhodes and the election of Cycliadas mark substantial defeats for Philopoemen and Aristaenus. It seemed that, for the moment, they had lost the struggle. Philopoemen decided that the safest course for him was to return to Crete. Aristaenus took the risk of staying in Achaea as de facto leader of the party and representative of Philopoemen's interests in Achaea. They had taken up an extreme position, and had advanced beyond the point where their supporters would follow them. Electoral defeat was temporarily the reward for their seeing the future too clearly.

III

The years of Philopoemen's absence in Crete were epoch-making for Achaea and Greece; but since they are not central to the theme of this work, need only be surveyed briefly here. Cycliadas, whose election to the strategia was the main reason for Philopoemen's journey, was not strong enough to maintain his party in power after his strategia, and Aristaenus was elected strategos for 199/8. In the course of his year he established the Philopoemenist policy firmly: Cycliadas was exiled, the Macedonian alliance abandoned, and alliance formed with Rome. Aristaenus met some entrenched resistance from those in favour of maintaining the Macedonian alliance at the syncletos at Sicyon, which accepted Rome's friendship, but the threat from the
presence of the fleets of Rome and Attalus at Cenchreae made Aristaenus successful. Nabis too had no desire to appear to be on the wrong side in the war, and although Philip tried to use their mutual anti-Achaean feelings to bind Nabis to him by the gift of Argos, Nabis quickly joined Rome in spring 197. A truce for the duration of the Macedonian war temporarily ended the Spartan threat to Achaean.

In summer 197 Flamininus defeated Philip at Cynoscephalae. The Achaeans did not participate in the battle, but benefitted from the Roman success: until the battle Corinth had been retained in Macedonian hands; now it was freed from its Macedonian garrison. Philip was broken, and the Senate undertook the settlement of Greece by the despatch of 10 commissioners. Flamininus insisted that the freed towns should remain free and not pass into the imperial hands of the allies; in this way he annoyed the Aetolians, who had expected to benefit from the joint success. Achaean did not require very much: Philip's Peloponnesian garrisons - except for Corinth - had been evacuated in 199, and the Roman commissioners confirmed Achaean in control. Over the treatment of the other freed cities Flamininus disagreed with the members of the commission. The Senate was worried by reports of Antiochus III's successful progress through Asia Minor, and the commissioners, reflecting this disquiet, wanted to retain control of at least the 'fetters' - Acrocorinth, Chalcis and Demetrias. Flamininus was equally aware of the potential threat from Antiochus, but thought that
Roman precautions could best be taken by ensuring the friendship of the Greeks - by demonstrating the sincerity of the Roman claim to have 'freed the Greeks', rather than by military activity which would forfeit this.

Flamininus' success over the commissioners was reflected in his proclamation at the Isthmia of 196, that all the Greeks should be free. As an immediate gesture, the town of Corinth was reunited with Achaea. The 'fetters' were retained for the moment, although by his proclamation Flamininus had committed himself to their eventual evacuation. Antiochus, however, was still the great fear; and Nabis' association with Rome during the war was not considered to be sufficient evidence of continuing Spartan loyalty. The excuse that he refused to hand over Argos to the Achaeans was therefore given for a campaign to reduce Nabis. The Roman allies, led by Flamininus, invaded Laconia in 195 and stripped Nabis of his control of the perioic towns on the coast, which were given into Achaean guardianship - but they did not become members of the League. Nabis' Cretan possessions were also taken from him in the settlement. Argos was recovered by Achaea, but Nabis was allowed to retain Sparta: Flamininus was aiming at a balance of power in Peloponnese rather than a gratification of his allies' wishes.

The seriousness of a potential union of Nabis and Antiochus was now greatly diminished, and Flamininus had little
further excuse for staying in Greece with Roman troops, if the sincerity of his 'freedom of the Greeks' was to be believed. The struggle came in Rome at the distribution of the provinces for 194. Scipio Africanus had been elected consul for 194 through the general Roman fear of Antiochus, and he made it clear that he wanted Macedonia. Flamininus, on the other hand, was more than ever committed to the 'freedom of the Greeks', and the evacuation which this implied. In the event, the Senate adopted a waiting policy and accepted Flamininus' view: they determined to meet the threat from Antiochus with the primary weapon of Greek goodwill. It was therefore agreed that all Roman troops should be withdrawn from Greece. In spring 194 Flamininus called a general meeting of the Greek states at Corinth, and announced the withdrawal of the Roman troops. This was his final patronal beneficium; and it was balanced by a request for the clients' pium officium: the repatriation of all Roman citizens bought in the international slave markets during the Hannibalic war. The request was naturally granted, at a cost to Achaea alone of 100 talents in compensation to the owners.

Satisfied with his success, Flamininus passed through central Greece, withdrawing garrisons and establishing favourable governments. He continually emphasised the benevolence of Roman interest in Greece, the fact that Rome and Flamininus were the only sincere liberators whom the Greeks had known. The Aetolians were not convinced; and Achaea had the continued threat from
Nabis to temper her enthusiasm for the Roman evacuation. And these became major problems. But Flamininus had ended his mission. He left Greece, was greeted by the Senate meeting extra urbem, and celebrated a three-day triumph. But despite the pomp of the triumph, there was still apprehension at Rome about Antiochus; and it was this crisis which revealed the weakness in Flamininus' balance of power in Greece.
CHAPTER 4

PATRIOTISM AND CLIENTEELA

In the spring of 193, some time after the consuls had held levies and left for their provinces, Flamininus asked the Senate for the ratification of his settlement of Greece. At the time, envoys from the whole of the Greek world, Asia as well as Greece, were present, and were used by Flamininus to broadcast to the Greek world the resounding diplomatic defeat which the envoys of Antiochus suffered in interview with Flamininus and the ten commissioners.

It seems unlikely that the Aetolians were represented in Rome this spring, as Flamininus had probably, to some extent at least, engineered these embassies to demonstrate in Rome the breadth of his patronage, and the Aetolians would not find much welcome in such a gathering.

In Greece in the meanwhile, Philopoemen had returned to Achaea, probably in the autumn of 194, when the war between Gortyn and Cnossos, which had been supported by Nabis, had been brought to an end. It seems fairly clear that it is this period to which Plutarch refers, when he says that Philopoemen caused the secession of small constituent states of the Megalopolitan koimen, arguing that they did not belong to the city, and had not in the beginning. As a result of this he was able to create a supporting party for use in federal politics. It seems clear that the Megalopolitans had not forgiven Philopoemen for putting personal and federal interests before Megalopolitan in 200, when he had left Achaea to fight Nabis in Crete. Soon afterwards they had tried to exile him, and had only been prevented by federal intervention headed by Aristaenus.
Some of the towns which were now encouraged towards independence within the League by Philopoemen in 193 may be tentatively identified by their copper coinage issues, which show their independence within the League at some period. It has been suggested that cities which we know had been constituent parts of Megalopolis, and for which there are independent coinage issues of the Achaean League period, should be attributed to this time. These are: Alea, Aliphira, Asea, Callista, Gortys, Dipaea, Methydron, Pallantion, Teuthis, Theisoa. 6

But too much emphasis should not be placed on these coins. They are certainly coins of the League; but their date within the League period depends solely on historical criteria, not numismatic. It is therefore not possible to demonstrate independently of the historical argument that the coin issues in question are even contemporary. The most we can say is that they would agree well enough with the historical phenomena if they could be shown to have been issued subsequent to Philopoemen's return from Crete. We cannot therefore be certain that the towns from which coins are extant were the Megalopolitan towns which supported Philopoemen, still less that they were the only ones to do so. For even if the coins can by some means be proved to be significant in this context, this latter consideration is important, as we are completely dependent for information upon the accidental discovery of the League coins from the towns: there may well have been other towns which supported Philopoemen which either did not issue independent coinage at all, or from which examples have not been discovered. With or without the coinage towns, there
must have been a considerable body of support within the League apart from Megalopolis, on which Philopoemen could rely; and it must have been with this support, and not that of Megalopolis - the main source of his earlier influence - that he was elected federal strategos in the autumn of 193 for 193/2.  

On the international plane, the summer of 193 passed with no significant alteration in the cold war situation between Rome and Antiochus. After the collapse of the negotiations at Rome in the spring, a Roman embassy was despatched to Asia; but no concessions were extracted from Antiochus or his representatives - the king was unsettled as a result of the death of his eldest son Antiochus, and was not prepared to pay much attention to international affairs - and the embassy returned to Rome in the autumn. They reported simply that they had not discovered anything which could be construed as preparations for war.  

Although this was true enough as far as Antiochus himself was concerned, all was by no means settled in Aetolia; and matters came to a head at the autumn general meeting of the League, held as usual in connection with the Thermica. Opposition to Rome had been growing in Aetolia since the settlement after Cynoscephalae, and at this autumn assembly in 193 it was resolved to send propaganda missions to Nabis, Philip and Antiochus. It is the embassy to Nabis which concerns Achaea most deeply, and must be examined in detail here. Nabis had complied with the terms of the peace with Rome in all but one respect: he still had a company of Cretans in Sparta. It is
possible that these had been hired in the course of the intervening months: they first appear in 192 when Philopoemen made his attack on Sparta. But the report of the Roman legati of 193 indicates that danger to the Roman settlement of Greece was anticipated from Nabis; and it seems simplest to assume that the Cretans had simply not been dismissed in 193. Apart from this, Nabis had complied with the terms of the peace. No attempt had been made to regain his Peloponnesian power, or to encroach on the new Achaean protectorate of the periplus towns. The Aetolians might well be led to believe that the revolutionary fire, which they hoped to exploit, had been quenched at Sparta, and that Nabis, far from lending support to any rising against Rome which they might contemplate, would at best be neutral, and at worst on the Roman side.

For these reasons the embassy of Damocritus was necessary. He put his point strongly to Nabis: the Romans had left Greece, and would not return just because of Nabis, whatever he might do; he should therefore try to get back the coastal towns, and with them the basis of his earlier power. It is not likely that the Aetolians sincerely believed in the arguments which Damocritus was putting forward: at best they represented Aetolian wishful thinking. But they found an eager listener in Nabis, who was prepared to act as soon as he realised that there was moral support forthcoming from Aetolia. It is likely that he had already been encouraging his old supporters in the maritime towns - it is difficult otherwise to see how he could be ready to act so quickly. He was therefore able to
support or provoke _coup d'état_ in those towns where his support was strongest; in others direct assassination achieved the desired results.

By the end of October Achaea had formally protested to Nabis, reminding him of his treaty obligations. Other more concrete steps were also taken, behind which we can see the hand of Philopoemen, now _strategos_; a garrison was sent to Gytheum, the most important of the coastal towns, and an embassy to Rome. The establishment of an Achaean garrison at Gytheum was allowed under the treaty between Nabis and Rome as part of Achaean _tutela_; the embassy to Rome was merely a manifestation of diplomatic prudence. But it does indicate very clearly that Philopoemen's election in 193 was by no means 'malgracieux pour Rome', as Aymard suggests. There is simply no evidence which would suggest this at this time. Philopoemen was no blind chauvinist, as Polybius makes quite clear in his comparison between Aristaenus and Philopoemen. He fully realised the limitations of what was possible for Achaea, even at a later time when the formal _foedus_ was in operation between Rome and Achaea. In 193 when there was no formal alliance between the states, when there is no indication in any source that he expressed any desire other than for co-operation with Rome, as long as Roman and Achaean interests coincided - as they certainly did in this case - unfounded assertions, based on inadequate examination of the evidence, about a clash between the policies of Philopoemen and Rome, are the stuff from which myths are made, and should wholly disappear from our tradition.
When the Senate came to consider its foreign policy towards the east in spring 192, the legati who had been to Antiochus impressed the Senate with the lack of warlike preparations by Antiochus, and no direct action was taken. But the cold war was to go on; and the Achaean embassy bearing news of Nabis' recent hostility made some kind of action both desirable and diplomatically possible, both to prevent southern Peloponnese becoming a disaffected area under the renewed self-assertiveness of Nabis, and therefore possibly a base for Antiochus; and on the other hand, to reinforce Achaean solidarity by providing support on appeal in what appeared to be, at first sight, merely a local war. A. Atilius Serranus, who had been given Hispania Ulterior at the distribution of the praetorician provinces, had his appointment changed by a vote of the people, and was now given Macedonia and the fleet. Similarly, M. Baebius Tamphilus, who had originally been given Citerior, was transferred to Bruttium. Atilius was ordered to undertake the construction of 30 quinqueremes, and to select from the existing fleet any vessels which were still seaworthy; to man the fleet he was to enlist socii navales.¹⁴

These preliminaries took most of the summer; and although Atilius was ordered to go to Greece at once, it was the end of summer 192 before he had completed his preparations and appeared off Gytheum. By this time everything was almost settled and Nabis already dead. Aymard refuses to believe that Atilius had taken so long over his preparations; and assumes that he must have taken some
part in the events of the year. But this is contrary to the impression we get from reading Livy and, for what it is worth, the phrase of Zonaras, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπαξίαν — both of which have as ultimate source the full text of Polybius. And there is not even any compelling a priori reason for making such an assumption against the trend of the evidence. In addition to Atilius and the fleet, a propaganda mission was also sent to Greece with the purpose of attempting to cut the ground from under Antiochus' feet in advance, by counteracting the propaganda of the Aetolians and the use they were making of his reputation. The mission was headed by Flamininus and was composed of Cn. Octavius, Cn. Servilius Caepio and P. Villius Tappulus. This was an extremely prestigious mission, consisting as it did of three consuls (Flamininus, Servilius and Villius), and a distinguished praetorian. Of the consuls, Villius had had almost as much experience in Greece as Flamininus himself: he was his predecessor as consul in Macedonia in 199; in 197 he was appointed to his staff as senatorial legatus; he served as a member of the ten commissioners for the settlement of Greece; in 193 he was a member of Ser. Sulpicius Galba's embassy to Antiochus, from which he had just returned. The composition of this embassy shows clearly that the Senate attached great importance to this aspect of the cold war: Nabis might be used as an excuse, but Antiochus was behind it. They left Rome early in the year, and Flamininus was in Greece early enough to be able to play a part in the early stages of the war against Nabis.
As soon as the weather allowed military activity to take place, Nabis attacked Gytheum; and in an attempt to repay the Achaeans for putting a garrison in Gytheum - and to try to persuade them to withdraw it - ravaged some Achaean territory. Despite this, Philopoemen made no move until the ambassadors who had been sent to Rome returned. It seems quite clear that at this stage he wanted to preserve as close a relationship as possible between Achaea and Rome, even if this involved some trouble for outlying parts of Achaea - in particular, Megalopolis would be one of the first to suffer. As soon as the ambassadors did return, a syncletos was called at Sicyon; at the same time an embassy was sent to Flamininus, who had now arrived in Greece, but was still in the north. As a result of his distance from Achaea the reply of Flamininus, to the effect that the Achaeans should wait for the arrival of Atilius' fleet before embarking on open war with Nabis, did not arrive until the Achaean syncletos was already in session and likely to decide in favour of war. The delay can have been nobody's fault: the fact that Philopoemen sent the embassy to Flamininus at all, as soon as he heard he had arrived in Greece, shows that he was eager to co-operate. On the other hand, Flamininus can scarcely have calculated the travelling time of the envoys' return so exactly as to virtually ensure that his advice would be ignored. There was no calculated duplicity on his part over this matter. He intended his advice to be taken seriously, and there is room for an examination of his motives in giving it.
It must have been urged on him by the Achaean ambassadors that the matter of Nabis was urgent: all the facts, with their full charge of Achaean emotion, had been placed at his fingertips, and the only advice he could give was to wait for Atilius. Despite the Senate's instructions to Atilius to go to his province at once, Flamininus must have known that he was likely to be involved in building ships and recruiting crews for some time. This meant that if the Achaeeans took no immediate action, Gytheum would certainly be lost, and Achaea would be laid open to attack from Nabis on a larger scale than was already the case. Why did Flamininus want this? In the first place it must have been galling to him to be virtually powerless until Atilius arrived. Diplomacy without gunboats was an emasculated weapon to Flamininus. Yet his task was to counteract Aetolian influence. The method favoured by Flamininus was to acquire personal ties with the client states, and secure their loyalty as a result of their gratitude for beneficia conferred by him. In Achaea he was presented with a textbook situation: the Achaeeans were voluntarily humbling themselves by asking for a beneficium, yet Flamininus was prevented by force of circumstances from conferring it.

The situation was difficult; but Flamininus did not make the most of it. Instead of bowing to the necessity forced upon him by the urgency of the Achaeeans for a decision about action against Nabis, and the clear necessity that they should engage him alone for the safety of the Roman settlement and their own security, without waiting for physical Roman help to arrive, he tried to turn back the
tide of events. Instead of promising the full Roman moral support of his own authoritative presence for their militarily independent undertaking, he refused to compromise his chance of conferring a great *beneficium* by fighting the whole war for the Achaeans, and excluding them from playing a major part in their own defence. He therefore simply, and unrealistically, told them to wait for Atilius. If they did this, of course, he would take the war off their hands: he was simply - and clumsily - trying to create an opportunity of exercising patronage where none existed on the scale which he envisaged. As a result of his clumsiness in his treatment of this situation, he lost the chance of gaining the minor advantage for Rome of giving the Achaeans the backing of Roman prestige: when it came to the point, the Achaeans did not need Atilius to rescue them - as Flamininus may have suspected when he insisted on their waiting for him - and no *beneficium* was conferred.

From the Achaean point of view Flamininus' advice was totally unexpected. Not only did it mean that Roman hostility would be aroused by any independent Achaean action to preserve themselves and the Roman settlement, but it was also a personal affront to Philopoemen. He had scrupulously taken care to obtain Roman approval for every action he had contemplated against Nabis, and now found his independence of action incomprehensibly withheld - apparently against the Roman interest, and certainly against his view of the Achaean. His view of Roman aims must have immediately undergone a rapid change. His absence in Crete had prevented his previously experiencing
Flamininus' methods in person; and Aristaenus was too closely involved personally with the Spartan settlement to have done more than hint at dissatisfaction with Flamininus' methods. In any case, Achaea had so far come well enough out of the Roman settlement for it still to be possible to believe that Flamininus had some friendly interest in Achaea more than in other Greek states. But now the active Philopoemen had returned, and was presented with the situation through hearsay and Aristaenus' already compromised ideas. At first Philopoemen's willingness to follow Aristaenus' established line of conduct is manifest in the cautious embassies to Rome and Flamininus. But the crisis in his belief in Roman generosity to Achaea rapidly came with the arrival of Flamininus' letter and its delaying advice.

Militarily delay was inadvisable, but unlikely to prove disastrous: the arrival of Attilius' fleet would quickly have secured the recovery of places lost to Nabis, and there had in any case already been delay while the embassy was sent to Rome. Admittedly this was in the winter; but a wait of a few months more - or even weeks, had they decided to wait for Flamininus' presence - could not have had much effect on the situation. Flamininus' auctoritas alone might have been sufficient to end the war, even without the support of Roman troops, as he did in fact eventually intervene in the war himself and make a peace. But politically, the relationship between Flamininus and Achaea was radically altered by the arrival of Flamininus' letter: asked to endorse action, he had simply advised further delay. To him, Achaean desire for action was a new
phenomenon, and he naturally acted defensively. But it did demonstrate his essential Roman selfishness and lack of altruistic benevolent interest in Achaea, and its effect on Philopoemen was correspondingly disastrous. Ready to trust his experienced advisers until events proved them wrong, this point had now been reached. The 'freedom of the Greeks' did not affect Philopoemen in the same way as his fellow Achaean politicians — for even Aristaenus was politically compromised over this slogan — as he had not experienced the mass emotions of the Isthmia of 196, the Nemea of 195, and the evacuation scenes of 194. He seems to have correctly seen no essential difference between the freedom conferred by Rome and the freedom granted by Macedon. Earlier in his career he had had some success in breaking away from total military dependence on Macedon by his success at Mantinea. He had now been led to expect that the situation under Rome was different, that Rome would wholly co-operate with him; but his colleagues had been shown to be living in a fools' paradise, and their expectations had been shown to be wrong. It was therefore necessary to take immediate action in order to stake the Achaean claim to follow an independent policy in Peloponnese. It was quite clear to Philopoemen that Flamininus wanted to deprive Achaea of the prestige of a potential military success; with his view unprejudiced by close association, Rome was simply repeating the diplomacy of Philip's symmachy. Action was the way in which his experience advised him to claim political individualism.

His decision was made easier by the fact that the syncletos had
expected Flamininus' message simply to endorse Philopoemen's desire for action, had discussed the matter accordingly, and almost decided for war before the letter arrived. Further discussion was conditioned by the contents of the letter, and this was indecisive. The opinion of the strategos was therefore sought. Philopoemen took his opportunity, and tactfully said he was willing to undertake the consequences of any decision of the syncletes, which correctly interpreted this as an expression of his desire for war. The decision was carried by a large majority. Whatever decision the syncletes had taken would have meant compromising Achaean interests. To the mass of the syncletes the most immediate matter was the war with Nabis, to Philopoemen the necessity of staking a claim for the right to follow an independent policy in Peloponnese against the recently revealed macchiavellianism of Flamininus. The circumstances of the arrival of the letter simply made easier the decision, which was necessary from both points of view.

It was from this time that the hostility between Flamininus and Philopoemen began. The unique source of our information about this is Polybius; and as a result of Polybius' own personal association with Philopoemen we might anticipate some tendency to throw the blame onto Flamininus; and this is, in fact, what we find. The ill-feeling between the two men seems to have first become general knowledge towards the end of 192, when Philopoemen gained greater honours than Flamininus for his war against Nabis. The record is in Plutarch, comes from Polybius, and is represented as simple
jealousy on the part of Flamininus. The idea of this was certainly common knowledge in autumn 192, as Polybius makes it a reason for the Aetolian attempt to seduce Achaea from Rome: he spoils the effect of this by laying the hostility at the feet of Flamininus, and still making it an argument for the possibility of Achaean defection; but the same implication is there, that Philopoemen was hated by Flamininus. It is not made clear whether the hostility was mutual. The next evidence comes ten years later. Deinocrates of Messene hoped to get help from Flamininus as a result of his hostility to Philopoemen. Again the same implication is there, again coming from Polybius; and it is nowhere stated that Flamininus' hostility was either reciprocated or justified.

But there are considerations which must be made in each case. There was indeed, from Flamininus' point of view, some reason for him to be hostile towards Philopoemen. Philopoemen's action, in direct contradiction to his advice, was the first time he had experienced such failure to appreciate the moral obligations of \textit{clientela} in Achaea. He could regard his advice as completely acceptable to the Achaeans, \textit{if they wished to follow it}; the \textit{strategos} could easily stifle any opposition \textit{if he wanted to}. It was clear to Flamininus that Philopoemen was deliberately flouting the advice given in his letter. Polybius does not really clarify the situation when he apologises for Philopoemen's action, by explaining that Philopoemen really wanted to co-operate with Flamininus and wait for the fleet, but the danger to Gytheum and
the Achaean garrison was too great. Yet a fleet was necessary for a successful attack, and Achaea's was woefully feeble. In fact, if Philopoemen had been realistically assessing only the military situation, he would have waited for Atilius and not risked loss of men and prestige in contravening Flamininus' expressed wish. Flamininus clearly had sound reasons for believing that Philopoemen deliberately wanted to cross his plans.

This in itself was sufficient to create an initial hostility. But it implied more. It implied that Philopoemen had realised that Flamininus' own schemes were not aimed solely at the benefit of Achaea. If Philopoemen was abusing *clientela*, he had now good reason to believe that Flamininus was playing a double game with Achaea; and Flamininus could not like the idea that this was fully recognised by the *strategos*, whom he knew by reputation only. Philopoemen's action therefore represented both a breach of the client's obligations, and a tacit accusation that Flamininus was breaking his obligations as patron. We can now appreciate fully that even at this initial stage, before they had even met, the clash between the two self-willed and successful statesmen contained elements of great potential personal and political hostility.

If Philopoemen had no full realisation of what Rome required of a client state, he had nevertheless shown himself willing to accept the unspoken ideal as long as it was expedient. But he also had a sound recognition of what a Greek state required of its protector. This was the language he understood.
refused to endorse proposed Achaean action against Nabis, refusing even to give his name to be used in Achaean propaganda, in Philopoemen's eyes Flamininus was failing in his duty as protector. When Philip had failed in his duty as protector, Philopoemen had taken successful independent action. Flamininus was now failing; the same remedy was to be applied. So far the matter was simple, and in itself quite sufficient to arouse a personal hostility on Philopoemen's part, not so much because in this particular case Achaea would suffer disaster if Philopoemen complied with Flamininus' advice - although failure to act at once might prove politically inconvenient - but because it was a pointer to a general Roman policy. In case of a conflict over a serious danger, Flamininus, in Philopoemen's interpretation, had shown conclusively that what happened to Achaea did not concern him unless Roman safety or prestige were intimately involved. This was the more distressing as it was the truth. Yet Flamininus was attempting to salvage the present situation, not in order to help Achaea - or he would have given the weight of his prestige to immediate interference against Nabis - but simply to assert his own and Roman dominance over Achaea, and emphasise Achaean indebtedness to Rome. Philopoemen had not had time to develop the consciousness of Flamininus' prestige and the power of Rome, which other Achaean politicians may have felt, and therefore considered immediate action against Nabis both possible and desirable, for the very reason that he wanted to prevent Flamininus' taking undeserved advantage from
delay. If there was some confusion about the meaning of clientela - so far understood to Flamininus' satisfaction by Aristaenus - there was full understanding by both men of the personal issues involved: and it was from the conflict of personalities expressed in action that hostility between the two men arose. The issues were clear to both: the choice was Philopoemen's.

Polybius wrote with fuller understanding of Roman policy and its base in clientela than any of the contemporary politicians; and he seems to have felt that it was necessary to offer a defence of Philopoemen's collision course with Flamininus. In only one case does he imply that Philopoemen hated Flamininus, when the Aetolians sought Achaean help for this reason after misinterpreting its effect. He does insist upon the matter of the danger to Gytheum's being the cause of Philopoemen's action, which we have shown is inadequate. Similarly in the case of the Achaean navy. No acceptable reason for Philopoemen's use of the antique ships appears in Livy, and this must be because there was none in Polybius. Polybius' excuse, recorded by Livy, is the Homeric tag that Philopoemen was Arcas, mediterraneus homo - which is no explanation of the failure of the Achaean strategos in his professional duty. Polybius clearly felt a difficulty which he was unwilling - or unable - to clarify; and the only explanation can be that Philopoemen was in such a hurry to secure some success before Flamininus arrived in Achaea, so that he could present him with a fait accompli, that he was willing to take any risks.
Polybian apologetics cannot excuse Philopoemen for the part he played in creating the hostility between himself and Flamininus.

Philopoemen's first action in this new Achaean war against Nabis was an attempt to relieve Gytheum and its Achaean garrison by a naval attack. The town was already besieged by land by Nabis, and it was the complete inadequacy of the Achaean navy which had made help from the Romans the more desirable in the first place. But as this was not forthcoming, and political conditions made immediate action now essential, the best had to be made of the fleet at the disposal of the Achaeans. It was in this that Philopoemen made the gross mistake which ruined the expedition, as a result allowed Nabis time to take Gytheum, and demonstrated the probable ineffectiveness of Philopoemen's hasty and ill-prepared scheme to prevent Flamininus' taking advantage of the war. Too eager to make use of every ship which was available, he chose as flagship a quadrireme which had been in Achaean possession for 80 years, was completely unseaworthy, and incapable of withstanding any pressure in battle. Nabis on the other hand had built some new ships since the treaty with Rome, and it was against these that the Achaean fleet would have to fight. Setting out from Patrae, the regular base of the fleet, Philopoemen sailed to Gytheum where he was met by the new Spartan ships. The antique flagship was quickly sunk, and Philopoemen escaped on another small ship. The fleet returned discomfited to Patrae.²⁷

Before an expedition could reach Gytheum by land the town
was taken by Nabis. Such was the first result of Philopoemen's badly planned naval raid, undertaken solely for political reasons. All the responsibility was Philopoemen's. It is inconceivable that if the old ship was as unseaworthy as Livy's account from Polybius implies, he had not been warned by the admiral, Tison of Patrae - who had to take the same risk of shipwreck. If, on the other hand, advice had been given that the vessel would stand the test, Philopoemen, although ultimately responsible for the result, did have the excuse that he had been disappointed by his advisers. We have already noticed Livy's failure to record a satisfactory reason for the haste of the Achaean preparations and the total incompetence of Philopoemen. This can only be because Polybius' own apologetics have obscured the true reason for the haste, the decision taken by Philopoemen at the Sicyon synoikias to finish the war before Flamininus or Atilius could interfere. The item was discreditable; therefore, although it could not be omitted, it could be glossed over with an apposite literary quotation.

After this initial failure a land expedition was organised as rapidly as possible. The situation of the Achaean garrison in Gytheum had not changed, as nothing had been achieved by the naval expedition. In anticipation of an attack by land, Nabis had moved a third of his blockading force to Pleina, where he expected the attack to be launched. While a large-scale Achaean expedition was in preparation, a night raid on these Spartan troops succeeded in destroying their camp. Philopoemen followed up this success by
raiding Tripolis, the area of north Laconia near Megalopolis. Gytheum was still under siege; and when the main Achaean expedition finally entered Laconia, before it could make contact with the enemy, Gytheum succumbed to Nabis' persistence. As a result Nabis' troops were freed to meet the Achaean attack before Philopoemen realised this. He showed qualities of leadership in extricating his army from an attempted ambush close to Sparta, and went on to ravage Laconia, although he made no attempt on the strategic towns of Gytheum and Sparta, which remained strongly held by Nabis. Again very little of positive value had been achieved by Philopoemen, although the prestige of the successful raiding expedition must have done something to remove the ignominy of the naval débâcle. But Gytheum was now in Nabis' hands; and as the relief of Gytheum had been the main reason stated for the whole Achaean war effort, this could be considered to have failed.  

An interesting aspect of this expedition is the presence of a body of Cretans under the leadership of Telemnastus of Gortyn; and at the meeting at Tegea before the main campaign started, of Epirotarum et Acarnanum principes. The connection between the Gortynians and Philopoemen has been discussed elsewhere, and represents solid personal support for Philopoemen. The position of the Epirots and Acarnanians is more difficult to assess. At first sight it seems that they were simply sympathisers with Philopoemen's desire to take action against Nabis. They had probably participated in Flamininus' war, and were eager to check
the forces of social revolution which might be exploited by their
disaffected Aetolian neighbours. But this does not adequately
explain Livy's explicit mention of the Epirots and Acarnanians,
and their presence only at the concilium. It is clear that his
source must have had some more lengthy discussion of the presence
of these principes, which Livy has curtailed. A priori it would be
strange to find a client state, which Flamininus had probably
already visited, offering support to Philopoemen's independent
action, of which Flamininus disapproved. It therefore seems
possible that these principes had come as the unofficial representa­
tives of Flamininus, in a last attempt to urge Philopoemen to
abandon his private war and wait for Atilius. This would satisfact­
orily account for Livy's mention of them alone of the other socii at
the meeting at Tegea, his failure to mention them at all in the
actual war, for in this case only the principes would have travelled
to Achaea. If this explanation could be accepted, Philopoemen's
rejection of their representations would mark a further stage both
in his commitment to the war and in the mutual hostility between him
and Flamininus.

From the point of view of the immediate aims of Achaea and
Philopoemen the expedition had achieved little. From the point of
view of Flamininus, and Roman policy as represented by him, it was
less disastrous than might have been expected. On the one hand the
Achaeans had been too successful for him to allow them the luxury
of another expedition, and upset once and for all the precarious
balance of power in Peloponnese - they must have taken some encouragement from being able to deny the use of his country to Nabis. On the other hand, Nabis had had sufficient success in his immediate aims to give him some encouragement; and so far, as the Aetolians had forecast, there was no sign of a Roman army or navy: why otherwise had the Achaeans acted alone? Nabis could look forward to fighting Achaea alone for an expansion of his influence over the coastal towns, particularly if he could expect some Aetolian support.

By the end of the main Achaean expedition Flamininus had arrived in Peloponnese and decided to intervene. He would at least be able to claim some thanks among the Achaeans for putting an end to the war. And Nabis was in no position to refuse the demand for a truce which Flamininus made. He was still under treaty - even if it was somewhat strained by this time - and he had no intention of incurring more Roman interest than absolutely necessary. Flamininus therefore negotiated the truce with Nabis, so putting an end to hostilities. Any further activity in this field would be associated with the presence of the fleet of Atilius. For the moment the war was over.

Philopoemen had totally failed in his aim of gaining sufficient advantage from his independent action to restore a measure of equality to the relationship between Achaea and Rome. The truce was achieved by Flamininus alone; the peace was imposed on the Achaeans. All that had been achieved was the creation of personal animosity between the two men.31

Despite Philopoemen's failure in achieving the final aim of the
war, his raid on the camp of Nabis' troops and his successful extrication of his army from the ambush were the first military activities of any allied Greek state, undertaken without either the physical or moral support of Rome, since Philopoemen's departure for Crete in 200. They were not particularly glorious by comparison with the Roman achievement; but they were Greek. And as a result Philopoemen was ἄγαπήμενος καὶ τιμώμενος ἐξαπερατῶς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τοῖς θεάπροις. Plutarch does not make any attempt to clarify what he envisages by this. Aymard interprets it simply as an ovation at the Isthmia, which were again due in 192. The circumstances would certainly be sufficient to cause those with a taste for irony to enjoy the presence of Flamininus; and there is precedent enough for this type of ovation at games—in Philopoemen's own case, at the Nemea of 205. But despite the plausibility of the suggestion, there is difficulty in this interpretation, as it does not explain Plutarch's mention of the theatra. There must be some significance in the plural form, even if it only indicates the theatres of two or three individual Achaean towns. We can add to this, that Plutarch regards these honours to Philopoemen as a significant stage in the development of hostility between the two men, and he is surely reflecting Polybius in this. Philopoemen was being honoured equally with Flamininus, and Flamininus did not like it.

Although Flamininus' most spectacular single honour was the tremendous spontaneous reception he had received at the Isthmia of
196, this was by no means a permanent honour - although the memory of it might linger. It was merely the rejoicing of the day; and we must assume that individual cities would be prepared to show their appreciation of their benefactor in a more permanent way. Plutarch indicates this clearly when he says τῶν δὲ ἀχαιῶν αὑτῷ πολλὰ πρὸς τιμὴν ψηφισμένων. No civic honour was considered more precious than an honorary decree or statue set up in the civic theatre. Statues seem to have been, for the most part, reserved for poets, as in the case of Philippides, honoured at Athens c. 287/6; but for Philopoemen, after his death, it was voted σταφανάκι ὑπὸ καὶ αὐτῶν εἰχόσι χαλκέας τέσσαρις, καὶ στάσιν τῶν μὲν μίαν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ. Honorary decrees were also regularly set up in theatres; and grants of proedria were the commonest of all. It seems clear that something of this permanent kind must have been bestowed on Flamininus by a grateful people. This was the fullest expression of civic gratitude, and must have been recognised as such by Flamininus. Although always ready to take advantage of spectacular, if ephemeral, displays of public emotion, he would be certain to appreciate more fully the solid bonds of clientship demonstrated by these permanent forms of thanksgiving. It must therefore have been Philopoemen's association with him in this permanent type of offering, in the recognition that for all time Philopoemen, the ἀναστὼν Ἀρχάδα μικρῶν καὶ ὑμόρων πολέμων στρατηγόν was being held to be his equal which caused him to feel that his honour was threatened. No Greek could ever equal his Isthmian proclamation of 196; however much acclamation Philopoemen might receive at the same
festival in 192, it could not match the hysterical rejoicings in the name of Flamininus at the festival four years earlier. But in the civic honours, the plaques and statues set up in the theatres of the independent towns, his honoured status could be approached, and by being shared, lessened. And he had some justification for his distress; for Philopoemen was receiving these expensive honours for actions in a war in which, for the moment at least, he had failed, both in his political and military objectives; and if we can take Plutarch's *Ελλήνων at its face value, approval of Philopoemen's attempt to break Achaea's bonds of clientship was expressed further afield than simply in Achaea. Honours of this type to Philopoemen in these circumstances were an insult to Flamininus and the policy he represented. His mission to counteract Aetolian influence was having unexpected and undesirable personal results.

Nabis was not slow to make his next move. Using the time granted by the truce with Flamininus, he appealed to the Aetolians for help. It seems clear that he must have known that Flamininus had simply checked the Achaeans in order to wait for Atilius; and as he now considered himself to be too deeply committed to the anti-Roman camp - although his son Armenas and other influential Spartans were still hostages at Rome - to expect any favourable terms in a new permanent settlement, he determined to take what advantage he could of the respite granted him by the truce. On the other hand, he was now by no means as desirable an ally for the Aetolians as he
had appeared in the autumn. Militarily Sparta had been envisaged as a hostile power constantly occupying the Achaeans. While this was still possible, it had lost a great amount of its value since the neutralisation of Nabis' forces by Philopoemen. While there was still value from the Aetolian point of view in the fact that he still held Gytheum, the Achaeans had nevertheless prevented Nabis' becoming a major threat to their security. Unless there was a rapid change in the balance of power in Peloponnese, Nabis was effectively out of action.

Politically too the situation had changed since the autumn, matching Nabis' military weakness, there was the political effect of the rapprochement which he had entered with Flamininus to be considered: he could not expect the Aetolians to sympathise with his motives for accepting a truce which Flamininus did not have the power to enforce. An application for Aetolian aid after this could only attract the suspicion that he was trying to play a double game, and was therefore to be trusted by neither party. Yet the strategic arguments advanced for Aetolian possession of a friendly Sparta were still valid: Achaea should still be prevented from taking part in a general war by having her forces occupied in a permanent struggle in the south. The decision was therefore taken by the Aetolians to assassinate Nabis and take the city of Sparta directly under the control of the Aetolian League.

The first part of this mission was successfully accomplished; but as soon as Nabis was dead the forces which had been entrusted
with the operation started looting the town, and enough support was gained by those who undertook to rally the Spartans to drive out the looters. Many of them were killed, but some managed to escape to Tegea and Megalopolis, hoping to find there a friendly reception for the murderers of the tyrant; but as Aetolians they found no sympathy among the Achaeans, and were at once arrested and sold into slavery. Philopoemen learnt by this means of the death of Nabis, and determined to make an attempt to bring Sparta into the Achaean League before any one party could gain the support of Flamininus and fortify itself in power with the remnants of the tyranny. This he successfully accomplished just at the moment when Atilius' fleet arrived off Gytheum; but we must examine in detail the manner in which this union was achieved, as the Spartan problem, starting as it does for Achaea with the incorporation of the city in the League in 192, was the main stumbling block to a peaceful settlement of Peloponnese for the next 13 years. The idea of the union was at first sight sensible enough: the main threat to the safety of Achaea would be removed by the incorporation of Sparta in the League. Certainly the external threat disappeared. But Sparta's internal problems became Achaea's and had superimposed on them the traditional problems of relations between Sparta and Achaea, which as a result became even more confused and difficult to solve.

There are two accounts of the actual business of union. Livy simply mentions a council of principes, and says that it decided to join Achaea. He says nothing of the feelings and dispositions
of the *principes* involved. In the circumstances it can only be assumed that they were representatives of all factions, among which Livy did not trouble to distinguish. Plutarch, in describing the same scene, is more explicit: τεταραγμένης δὲ τῆς Ἱπάρχης ὁ

*Philopomous* ἀριστάς τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιπίπτει μετὰ δυνάμεως, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀχόντων, τοὺς δὲ συμπείσας προσηγάγετο καὶ μετεκόμισεν εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαίοὺς τὴν πόλιν... ἀνέλαμβαν δὲ καὶ Δαχεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς ἀρίστους, φιλαξά τῆς ἑλευθερίας ἐκείνου ἐλπίσαντας ἐξείν.⁴⁰ The party distinctions given here are extremely vague; and there is the possibility to be considered that Plutarch was merely writing such distinctions into his account as a rhetorical commonplace - although the account as a whole must depend on Polybius. Plutarch however does go on to explain who the *aristoi* were - among them Timolaus, Philopoemen's guest-friend.⁴¹ Of the two perhaps real groups distinguished in Plutarch's first sentence, these *aristoi* who gained Philopoemen's support can only be the latter group, those whom he persuaded to join the League: he clearly could not trust those who remained unconvinced. These latter must have had good reason for their unwillingness to be won over by Philopoemen; and it must be because they saw greater personal advantage from independence, or even actual danger from the union. We should therefore see in them the remainder of Nabis' supporters.

This makes it easier to identify the politics of the *aristoi*. They were clearly a group which had not been as dangerously close to Nabis as their opponents: to them the loss of state identity, by
the abolition of the Spartan kingship and the entry into the League, would not carry the same personal risks. It is true that even they had to be persuaded, but compromise for them was clearly practicable. On the other hand, they cannot have been actively hostile to Nabis or they would quickly have been forced into exile or annihilation. If they had any principles about the nationalist bogey of Spartan traditions, they had already compromised them by living under Nabis' régime; and they were ready to compromise them again. We do not hear of the exile of their opponents, and they cannot reasonably be identified with any of the later groups of exiles. It therefore seems likely that they were allowed to continue living in the city, although prevented from taking any active part in the government.

The political confusion in Sparta was, to some extent at least, resolved by Philopoemen's installation in power of those willing to support him and the union with Achaea. In the circumstances it was not unnatural that they should look to him for the security of the government. It is against this background that we should consider the offer to Philopoemen of the 120 talents raised by the sale of the house of Nabis. The accounts which we have of this show no significant variation; therefore Plutarch's, which is more detailed and precise, will be the basis of the discussion. It is clear that the Spartan aristoi, despite the support of Philopoemen, were not secure in power. Philopoemen's reply to their offer shows that opposition within the city was
agitating against their government, and this opposition must have provoked the circumstances in which the offer was made to Philopoemen, as an attempt to buy his support for the government. The fact that it was made by Timolaus, Philopoemen's guest-friend, indicates the importance which the government attached to the support of Philopoemen, and to this attempt to bribe him; and on the other hand suggests that they were not yet fully sure that they had his wholehearted support. But the refusal of the bribe by Philopoemen made it clear that he did not want to have his policies dictated to him in advance by personal ties based on this kind of financial gratitude. He preferred that they should meet the dictates of circumstances, and that he should be free to form them in that way without incurring the charge of disappointing legitimate expectations based on such devious ties of gratitude. He made it clear that he was a friend of Timolaus' group - meaning that for the moment at least, he saw Achaean interest intimately associated with their retention of power - but refused to accept unconditional advance obligations. By accepting the gift he would have associated himself too closely with one faction to make himself ever acceptable to the other; and he clearly envisaged some kind of compromise as the only practicable solution to the Spartan confusion. He wanted to leave the door open for himself to act as mediator. If Polybius' report of Philopoemen's advice to the Spartan government at this time is authentic - to bribe their enemies to silence rather than their friends - Philopoemen was already working
towards his goal of compromising differences between the Spartan factions in the Achaean interest. He must have clearly been afraid that Flamininus would enjoy fishing in the troubled waters of Spartan politics, and was eager to prevent this.

Soon after this the Achaean year came to an end with the autumn synod and the election of Diophanes as strategos. There seems to be no reason why we should not consider that Diophanes in autumn 192 was elected as a supporter of Philopoemen: he was a fellow Megalopolitan, and had served under him frequently in the various campaigns against Nabis. There is nothing to indicate that he had any serious difference of opinion with Philopoemen before the attempt to reorganise Sparta with the help of Flamininus in 191. Although this difference of opinion developed into open hostility, this is no argument for political opposition to Philopoemen at the time of the elections. It would, in any case, be extremely strange to find a political opponent of Philopoemen's elected to the strategia at the very time when Philopoemen's own glory, and therefore influence, was at its peak. 46

In the autumn of 192 Antiochus arrived at Demetrias; and after an abortive attempt to gain support at Chalcis, went into conference with the Aetolians at Demetrias. A decision was taken to try to gain support in Boeotia, Achaea and Athamania. As far as Achaea was concerned, the attempt was agreed upon as a result of rumours circulating about the increasing hostility between Philopoemen and Flamininus, as a result of Philopoemen's
independently undertaking the war against Nabis and the subsequent annexation of Sparta. They apparently had no reason to believe that the change of strategos in Achaea would make any difference to Achaean policy. But they had grossly misinterpreted the Achaean situation. Even at the time of the first difference of opinion between Philoepomen and Flamininus, Flamininus had had little doubt that Achaea was loyal to Rome on major issues, and directed the weight of his propaganda to other objects. He may not have been quite as sure by this time that Philoepomen's hostility was only the result of reaction to Flamininus' interference in Peloponnese; but in any case, it was no part of his task to take risks. He was therefore present at the syneltoi called at Aegium by Diophanes to hear the Aetolians.47

This syneltoi was a resounding success for Flamininus. The emissaries of the Aetolians and Antiochus were shown decisively that there was no sympathy for their cause in Achaea. There was no stage in the syneltoi when there was any likelihood of the Achaeans' being persuaded by the dissidents. They made this absolutely clear by going further than simply rejecting the suggestions of the ambassadors, with the declaration that they would have the same friends and enemies as the Romans. Had there been any doubt in Flamininus' mind about the essential loyalty of the Achaeans, it must have vanished now. At the same time, it is clear from this Achaean declaration that there was at this time no formal treaty of alliance between Rome and Achaea. The leading
spirit behind Achaean action at the syncletos must have been the strategos Diophanes. He was of the party of Philopoemen, and Philopoemen's support for his action was affirmed by Polybius in his own defence of Philopoemen before the Roman commissioners in 145. There can therefore be little doubt that Philopoemen fully supported the action of Diophanes over this declaration of war.48

Diophanes was willing to back up the Achaean decision at once with arms. 1,000 Achaean troops were mobilised, and 500 sent to both Piraeus and Chalcis as garrisons. This was done openly on the request of Flamininus, and although it was in general unusual for Achaean troops to serve abroad, it was not unknown in times of exceptional circumstances.49 The use which Flamininus was immediately ready to make of these troops indicates that he had probably exerted some behind-the-scenes pressure on the Achaean officials to propose the declaration of war, the ground for which was prepared at the syncletos itself by the speech of Flamininus. If this was so, Philopoemen must have known about it and approved, despite the split between himself and Flamininus.

At Piraeus the Achaean troops were successful in helping Flamininus expel Apollodorus, the leader of the party favouring Antiochus. At Chalcis they were less successful, and seem to have incurred some disgrace, at least in Philopoemen's eyes - who took no part in these military activities. They were forced to bargain for their release from the siege; and as Plutarch's record of his reactions to this shows, Philopoemen displayed the same type of
attitude towards the Syrians as Flamininus in his speech before the
syncletes - he would have cut them off in their taverns. If this
reaction is contemporary - it may be later reminiscence, perhaps to
Polybius himself - it already indicates a criticism of Diophanes'
leadership, and perhaps reflects his growing disapproval of the
closeness of Diophanes and Flamininus.50

In Elis, Achaea caused apprehension on two counts: on the one
hand, continued Achaean expansion within Peloponnesse must eventually
affect Elis. If Sparta could be simply annexed with little immediate
trouble, how was Elis going to be able to stand alone? On the other
hand, the traditional ties of friendship between Elis and Aetolia
still existed. In the past these had repeatedly brought Elis into
conflict with Achaea, and now that Aetolia and Achaea had again
chosen different sides in the approaching war, conflict could again
be anticipated. In winter 192/1 the only possible action for an
anti-Achaean state, which did not fully realize the nature of
Antiochus' commitment in Greece, was to enter negotiations with him.
This the Eleans did, hoping for protection from Achaea and from the
support which Rome might be expected to offer for her further
expansion. The Eleans were successful in this, and a force of 1,000
foot soldiers under a Cretan Euphanes - otherwise unknown - was sent
to protect them. As there is no record of any Achaean attack on
Elis during 191, it is reasonable to conclude that the force was
successful in its objectives until Thermopylae.51

One other event, which probably occurred during this winter, of
first importance for Achaea, was the grant by the Senate of a 
foedus aequum. The reasons for accepting this date are that the 
decision of the Achaeans to declare war on Antiochus in the autumn 
was of inestimable physical and propagandist value to the Romans; 
therefore the Senate would feel inclined to grant the foedus as a 
recognition of Roman gratitude for the Achaean action. This fits 
well too, as we shall see, with the increased expansionist activity 
of summer 191, when it was necessary for Flamininus to explain 
harshly - but not explicitly - that the situation had not been 
changed in its essentials by the grant of the foedus. 52

Roman policy towards the East does not seem to have created 
sufficient partisan feeling in Rome for it to become the basis of 
any major inter-party disputes. 53 The one feature which is in fact 
apparent is the remarkable lack of controversy over the major issues. 
Dispute such as there was, was concerned with methods rather than 
ends. For instance, in 196 Flamininus had had some difficulty in 
persuading the commissioners for Greece and the Senate to accept the 
full implications of the 'freedom of the Greeks', to which he was 
personally committed. But this issue was not factional, and did not 
become so. It was simply based on a different assessment of the 
necessary strategy to be employed towards Antiochus: the potential 
threat was agreed. 54 Flamininus was able to persuade the Senate to 
follow his view by showing that his was the best Roman policy - as 
far as we can tell, without any 'party' disputes. There was no 
fundamental disagreement on policy between Flamininus and those who
disagreed with his assessment of the position. Attempts to see a party issue in eastern policy, a conflict between the Scipios and Flaminini, do not seem to have any basis in the facts given by our sources, and are to a large extent illusory. Certainly Africanus and his friends took the danger from Antiochus seriously; so did the Roman people when they elected him consul for 194; but so equally did Flamininus when he saw Greek clientela as a major weapon for use against Antiochus. And the majority of the Senate relied on the calmer advice of their eastern experts, and did not create a consular province of Macedonia in 194, because they considered this the best policy.55

When there was again the threat of real danger from Antiochus in 192, Flamininus' propaganda mission of eastern experts was sent to Greece by the Senate. There is no possibility of seeing a party issue in this. Flamininus was no longer an evacuationist: the hope was that the beneficial results of the evacuation policy were now to be seen. The Senate's reaction was based solely on an assessment of the situation, and it sent the best men for the job. As events took a more serious turn, it became necessary to send a consular army to Greece in 191. It happened that M'. Acilius Glabrio was successful at the consular election for 191, probably helped by the prestige of the Scipios, and he was sent to Greece to deal with Antiochus. But it would be wrong to assume that opposition at the
elections was based on a different policy to be pursued towards Antiochus. Reports of the state of affairs in Greece came from Flamininus' mission, and the early elections for 191 must have been held as a result of the receipt of information from him. This shows clearly that Flamininus, as well as the Scipios, fully appreciated the need for a Roman army in Greece. His earlier policy of evacuation cannot now be attributed to him, as he continued his work in Greece in full co-operation with the consul. Again, there was no conflict of policies at the elections: only the usual conflict of persons. And this seems to have continued to be the case with regard to eastern policy throughout our period.56

In spring 191 the new consul M. Acilius Glabrio arrived in Greece with M. Porcius Cato on his staff. One of Cato's first tasks was to engage in a minor propaganda mission for Glabrio. From the base of the Romans at or near Corinth he made expeditions to that city, followed by Patrae and Aegium, before going on to Athens. The purpose of these visits was probably simply to announce the arrival of the new consul in Greece at the principal centres of population. It was a confirmation of the Roman commitment to help their allies against Antiochus, a physical demonstration that the war was not going to be wholly fought by allied arms and Flamininus' propaganda. The presence of the brash young Cato straight from Rome would be quite sufficient to show the cities he visited that his was a wholly Roman commitment. Cato visited the convenient coastal towns; perhaps another legate visited the southern Achaean cities.57
During the spring and early summer, events in the north developed and culminated in the defeat of Antiochus by Glabrio at Thermopylae, probably in May. After the capture of Chalcis the previous autumn by Antiochus, the Achaeans had played no part in the war. In Peloponnesian however, there was considerable activity this year. Early in the year Diophanes was faced with violent disaffection at Sparta. Plutarch’s account is straightforward: the Spartans εἰς πόλεμον κατιστάμενοι διετάρασσον τὴν Πελοπόννησον. Philopoemen tried to prevent Diophanes from interfering by calling his attention to the broader issues involved in connection with the presence of Antiochus in Greece; but Diophanes took no notice, invaded Laconia in company with Flamininus, and marched on Sparta. Philopoemen rushed to Sparta, organised the opposition to Diophanes and Flamininus, and successfully prevented them from entering Sparta. As a result τὰς ὀντιὰν τῇ πόλει ταραχὰς ἐπανε ταῖ κατέστησε τοὺς Λακεδαιμόνιον πάλιν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν, ἐκείπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔτοι. Plutarch makes no attempt to analyse either the party groupings at Sparta which led to this violence, or the motives of Diophanes, Flamininus, or Philopoemen for their actions; and Pausanias’ even briefer account is of no help in this. But it is necessary to attempt to elucidate these matters, as they are fundamental for any understanding of Achaean politics at this period.58

After Philopoemen’s settlement at Sparta the previous autumn, Timolaus and the aristoi had been confirmed in power with the support of Achaea and Philopoemen; but their position was by no means
secure, as their attempt to buy Philopoemen shows. Any political confusion, therefore, at Sparta must have been primarily a conflict between the aristoi and Nabis' party. When Plutarch says that the Spartans eic πόλειον κατοικούμενοι, this must be interpreted in the light of the party groupings. What it means, in fact, is war against the League, as is made quite clear by Plutarch's statement that Philopoemen rejoined the city to the League. This hostile activity therefore cannot be by Timolaus' group, whose interest was intimately connected with the League, but must indicate that they had been overthrown and replaced by the anti-League party.

The reactions of the League politicians to this news were varied. Philopoemen must have wanted to intervene on behalf of Timolaus and his own settlement, but he was no longer strategos. Diophanes must equally have wanted Sparta to remain in the League; but he cannot have been as eager as Philopoemen to save Philopoemen's prestige. There was also Flamininus to be considered; and Diophanes may have been unwilling to act at first without Flamininus' approval. Flamininus' position was difficult, as he was not a free agent, and had to take due consideration of the possible effect of any action on the war against Antiochus. For this reason, the general disturbance in southern Peloponnese was dangerous, and could not be allowed to continue. But there were also his personal feelings to be considered: he was tied to support the Spartan participation in the League, otherwise he would get no support from either Diophanes or Philopoemen; and his balance of power ideal had in any case only
been viable while Nabis was alive. On the other hand, he was by no means tied to the support of Philopoemen's friends in Sparta. His connections of clientela, from his defeat of Nabis, were with the tyrant party, and it was still his view of Roman interest to keep Achaea fairly weak. If this could no longer be done by maintaining another power to hold her in check, it could be achieved more subtly by causing internal trouble within the League. His aim therefore seems to have been to destroy Philopoemen's prestige and gain his new larger and weaker Achaea at the same time, by reuniting Sparta to the League under the government of the anti-League party.

Diophanes' reaction to this is demonstrated by his joint expedition with Flamininus to Sparta. His motives for co-operating with Flamininus against his old colleague Philopoemen may have been mixed. His dedication, seen by Pausanias, proclaimed that Diophanes was the first man to unite Peloponnese under Achaean control. He was clearly proud of this achievement, and this should probably be seen as the key to his policy in 191.60 He may sincerely have been convinced that his aim - in which he was directly competing with Philopoemen - could only be achieved in his year with the full co-operation of Flamininus, in this respect differing from Philopoemen. And it is possible that he had an informal agreement with Flamininus to this effect. This would immediately cause him to be willing to support Flamininus at Sparta, for as Sparta had now seceded from the League, Diophanes would be able to claim to have restored it; and at the same time himself become the League patron of the Spartan government, in this replacing Philopoemen.
It is in this context that we should interpret Philopoemen's violent objections to Diophanes' interfering in Laconia. He cannot have favoured total lack of Achaean action, as Plutarch suggests, for his friends had been ousted by the anti-Achaean party; but he did have violent feelings about the action which Diophanes was contemplating. This was both personal and public: personal, because of his connection with the settlement and Timolaus' government, public because, with his generally distrustful view of Flamininus' activities, he probably understood what Flamininus was trying to do.

While Timolaus' group was in power, Achaea did not have to exert pressure on the recognised government to keep Sparta within the League: any intervention could be represented as action on behalf of the government against dissident factions. With the elevation of an anti-Achaean group to power, with the limit artificially placed on their freedom that they would have to belong to the League, future relations between Achaea and Sparta would be confusion worse confounded - which Flamininus desired, as it would give him the opportunity of frequent intervention and the demonstration in Rome of the breadth of his patronage.

These considerations, added to a wish to prevent Flamininus and Diophanes from gaining undeserved prestige from a reversal of his own settlement, made Philopoemen decide to ignore any possible consequences of opposing the strategos and Flamininus at Sparta: his prestige - and therefore his political career - was at stake. If it came to justification he could represent his action as support
for the legitimate and recognised government against internal rebels, whom the powers of the League were supporting. He arrived at Sparta before Flamininus and Diophanes, and had time to organise his friends into resistance before they arrived. It seems unlikely that there was any actual fighting before the city: Philopoemen no doubt organised his Spartan government troops and propaganda sufficiently well to make this politically undesirable for Diophanes and Flamininus, who had no alternative but to withdraw, having suffered a major political defeat. The support which they had intended to offer to the tyrant party had failed to achieve its aim.

Philopoemen's action cannot be judged by the criterion of absolute legality, for legality had become a weapon of the political conflict. He had certainly opposed the strategos and Flamininus; but because he was successful, he did not suffer for this rashness. Diophanes and Flamininus had set out to restore Sparta to the League and prevent general trouble in Laconia. They could not in equity complain when Philopoemen, although acting unofficially, had achieved this result. Plutarch is quite precise on this point: Philopoemen calmed the city and restored it to the League. He had fulfilled his obligations to his friends, preserved his prestige by protecting his settlement, robbed Flamininus and Diophanes of their political spoils by achieving their ends without using their methods - on which they had placed at least equal importance. What is more, his solution was likely to be far more popular among the Achaean voters than the official solution favouring Nabis' ex-supporters. He was successful,
therefore he was not punished for his action. He was successful because he had the propaganda of legality on his side, and had managed to paint the official federal action as the destruction of the legitimate government. Flamininus was not prepared to resort to naked power politics; therefore had to concede defeat. Had Philopoemen failed, the full force of Achaean legalistic propaganda would have been turned against him, and his political career would have been at an end.

This action of Philopoemen could not improve his relations with Flamininus, which had already begun to deteriorate the previous year. It also marks the first break with Diophanes, which resulted in Diophaneas' joining Aristaenus - who had also had no major difference of opinion with Philopoemen before his return from Crete - in the opposition to Philopoemen which flourished in the next decade. But this incipient hostility to Philopoemen did not prevent Diophanes from continuing to pursue their joint policy of expansion. Just after Thermopylae the island of Zacynthus, which had been held for Amyntander of Athamania by Hierocles of Agrigentum, was bought by Diophanes from Hierocles for Achaean. At about this time too, the negotiations which had been going on with Messene broke down. At Elis a more favourable reply was received. The Eleans clearly had nowhere to turn for help against Achaean now that Antiochus was defeated, and the purchase of Zacynthus could not make them feel more secure. It was therefore a matter of expediency that they should be willing to allow negotiations to proceed on a more friendly basis.
For the moment, it seemed that Diophanes might have more success in gaining new adherents to Achaea by applying pressure to Messene. After Thermopylae, action against Messene seemed legitimate, as the Messenians were known to have favoured Antiochus, without actually having taken an active part in his support; and Diophanes may have felt that extreme measures were justified in treating this potential enemy. He led the Achaean army against Messene and made preparations to besiege the town. But he had made the mistake of failing to consult Flamininus. This may have been deliberate, as his flirtation with Flamininus' policies at Sparta had not had the success he desired, and he may have been disillusioned by this failure. He could always argue, if necessary, that the foedus granted Achaea the right to independent action. The Messenians however appreciated the importance of Flamininus' intervention in any Peloponnesian settlement, and appealed to him at Chalcis. They offered to open their gates to the Romans, but not the Achaeans. Flamininus hurried to Megalopolis and sent messengers ordering Diophanes to stop the fighting. Diophanes, despite his desire for expansion and the recent foedus, had not expected a demand in these naked power political terms, and felt obliged to acquiesce in Flamininus' demands. He played no part in the discussions for the final settlement of Messene, but simply accepted what Flamininus imposed. This was, in fact, on the whole favourable to Achaea: Messene was united with the League, and her exiles were to be taken back.

From the point of view of Achaea this settlement was acceptable,
although the exiles might prove troublesome, and Diophanes was deprived of the glory of having achieved it himself. Flamininus was placed in an awkward position by Diophanes' independent action, yet he managed to find both a suitable immediate compromise and a new general policy for the future. He had little alternative about granting Diophanes Messene. Diophanes was a useful man for Flamininus in Achaea, and he had to conciliate him after preventing his fighting against Messene; if Messene were left independent, Philopoemen would certainly have taken the city in his next strategia without asking Flamininus' permission, and Flamininus would have been robbed of all chance of extending his clientela both in Messene and in Achaea. This settlement of Messene marks an important new phase in Flamininus' policy of creating internal discord in a city which he joined to the League. At Sparta he had failed in his attempt to achieve this by changing the pro-Achaean government. At Messene for the first time, he tried to achieve this by insisting on the restoration of the exiles - who at Messene were already his clients\(^5\) - an equally potent cause of civil disturbance, with the additional propagandist benefit of having equity on its side. It was the lack of this which had contributed to his enforced acknowledgement of defeat by Philopoemen at Sparta. After Messene, 'the restoration of the exiles' becomes the key theme of Roman policy towards Achaea.

From the point of view of Flamininus' relations with Messene, this settlement was also satisfactory, although before this becomes apparent it is necessary to identify the Messenian political groups.
The only account which we have of the events of 191 is that of Livy, in which two groups of Messenians are distinguished, those holding the city, who offer *dedition* to Flamininus, and the *exules*, who are restored as a result of the settlement. The one Messenian politician whose name we know at this period is Deinocrates; and it is convenient to examine the party groupings as they affected him.

In 195 he had been leader of the Messenian contingent to the allied forces in Flamininus' war against Nabis. As a result of this he had become *client* with Flamininus. We can therefore conclude that the party represented by Deinocrates had been in power in Messene in 195. The next we hear of Deinocrates is in winter 184/3, when he appears in Rome, looking to Flamininus for support against Achaea for Messenian independence. The basis for this hope is his long-standing friendship with Flamininus, which had been formed in 195 and presumably continued unbroken until 184/3. This at least, is the impression which Polybius' account gives. Deinocrates assumes automatically that the bond of *clientela* will work in his favour. There is certainly no doubt in his mind that the 10-year long friendship had altered in any way, or that anything had intervened which would make the answer to his request seem at all doubtful to him. This later trust in the solidarity of the *clientela* is important in consideration of the groupings of 191. For if the group of Deinocrates were the holders of the city in 191, they must have felt that the foundations of the *clientela* existing between Flamininus and Deinocrates had been betrayed by Flamininus:
dedictio was offered, with the result that the worst fears of the party were realised - enforced membership of the Achaean League, which it was the very purpose of the dedictio to avoid, and the enforced restoration of the exiles, who must have been their political opponents. \(^68\) This was scarcely the way in which Deinocrates would expect clientela to work; and it did not augur well for future relations with Flamininus. Yet there is no hint in 184/3 that any such betrayal had taken place.

From this examination of the earlier and later relationship between Deinocrates and Flamininus, we would expect the benefit of any settlement to have accrued to Deinocrates' party. In the settlement itself, the group which certainly gained the greatest benefits was the exile group, not the city group. There are reasons connected with Flamininus' developing policies which made the restoration of the exiles at Messene desirable; but a personal link between Flamininus and the exiles should not be discounted on these grounds. If we discard the identification of Deinocrates with the government party and examine the alternative, the difficulties are much less. If Deinocrates is one of the exiles, there is no need to see Flamininus' action of 191 as being contradictory to the friendship with Deinocrates dating from 195; and it shows more clearly the solid basis for hope which Deinocrates showed in 184/3.

The main difficulty in this identification is that we know nothing of the change of circumstances, which turned Deinocrates
from leader of his countrymen in 195 to exile seeking restoration in 191. In itself the change is not wholly surprising; nor is the fact that we hear nothing of it, if we make due allowance for the state of our sources. Nevertheless, the difficulty does remain unless a change in general circumstances can be found to support the hypothesis - it is clear that neither the government group nor the exile group was in favour of union with Achaea, so that this cannot have been the issue over which they split.

The single most important issue facing the states of Greece between 195 and 191 was the attitude to be taken towards the Aetolians and Antiochus. This was a particularly vital issue in the case of Elis and Messene, which were old allies of Aetolia and Rome. Elis had quickly made her decision, and a Syrian-paid garrison was accepted into the city. Messene was not openly committed to the same extent, but this should not be taken to mean that the issue was not alive. It is not possible to envisage Deinocrates recommending any policy other than that of closer union with Rome. In autumn 192, before it was known how fully the Senate was committed to the war with Antiochus, at a time when Antiochus was already in Greece, this may well have appeared a dangerous course; when the Syrian garrison came to Elis it was impossible. Deinocrates must have seen great personal advantage in a close relationship with Rome; and he seems to have had a fuller understanding of Roman power than his opponents. At the time of the start of the negotiations by Diophanes, it was known that the government group was in
favour of Antiochus. It therefore seems very likely that Deinocrates had been forced into exile over this issue.

The presence of Deinocrates among the exiles made possible a settlement of the Messenian problem which would be a cause of satisfaction to Flamininus. We have already seen how the settlement suited his Achaean policies. Similar considerations were at work in his relations with Messene. It was again a compromise by the friends of Rome: Deinocrates was restored, but Messene was united with Achaea; the government party which had favoured Antiochus was weakened by the union with Achaea and the restoration of their opponents, without any compensating advantages. All advantages gained by the various interests in Achaea and Messene could be claimed by Flamininus as manifestations of Roman generosity and a heavy-handed demonstration of how clientela worked. All disadvantages and difficulties could be laid at the door of local party squabbles and the necessity for compromise. The settlement was a neat distribution of beneficia to those willing to compromise; but as so often in a compromise - as Flamininus no doubt realised - no one was satisfied, and Messene was a satisfactorily recurring problem for Achaea for the next 12 years.

After the settlement had been imposed on Messene, Flamininus made it known to Diophanes that he wanted him to call a syncretos. At this meeting, despite his recent acceptance of the accession of Messene into the League, he made it quite clear that Rome was not prepared to allow Achaean expansion to continue indefinitely:
within Peloponnese — a concession to Diophanes’ aims, and a bid for his support — it could be acceptable; outside the mainland was out of bounds. The matter which brought this to a head was that of Zacynthus, which had recently been bought by Diophanes. Flamininus used the simile of the tortoise’s vulnerability, once its head was out of its shell, to point out that Achaea must keep within Peloponnese. In any case there had been some sharp practice in the purchase of the island, which Flamininus could legitimately claim as Roman by right of the defeat of Amynander before it was bought by the Achaeans. There was clearly some truth in this claim, and Diophanes must have realised the possibility of the charge at the time. But at the synclétos he vainly insisted on the legitimacy of his action, against the arguments of Flamininus and of an unidentified group of quidam Achaeorum.⁷⁰

The problems arising from Livy’s narrative of the synclétos are the identification of these quidam Achaeorum, and the reasons for Diophanes' violent reaction to Flamininus' interference over Zacynthus, when we should expect him to be coming closer to Flamininus' policy for Achaea. We have seen that relations between Philopoemen and Diophanes must have been openly hostile after Sparta; and yet it is clear that they both believed in the possibility and desirability of annexing new territory. The growth of personal antipathy between the two men was no reason for Diophanes to change the policy in which he believed and to which he was politically committed: the Messenian affair shows this clearly, and
Zacynthus is this pattern. He had again tried to present Flamininus with a *fait accompli*; and now that this had failed, he had no alternative but to defend his purchase of the island, in which his personal prestige was deeply involved. He had lost little by complying with Flamininus' order over Messene, as it had arrived before any conclusion had been reached. With Zacynthus, the situation was different: an already existing Achaean settlement was to be overturned. However much Diophanes may have been willing to co-operate with Flamininus in general, he was already too much personally involved on the opposite side to be able to do anything but defend his position on this issue. If he did not have any hopes of winning, he could hope to take some advantage from demonstrating his patriotism.

The opposition to Diophanes, which Livy leaves anonymous, cannot be certainly identified. It seems fairly clear that since Livy does not give the spokesman, Polybius did not either. This should immediately arouse suspicion. The activity of the opposition at the *syncletes* was confined to attacking Diophanes in person, and in dissociating themselves from his action: *et initio cam se rem asernatos testabantur et tunc pertinaciam increpitabant praetoris.*71

There is no suggestion that there was any general sympathy for Flamininus; and it is made quite clear that it was this specific issue which was the object of their hostility - *cam rem*. It must be considered possible that Livy has recorded a piece of deliberate concealment by Polybius. Were the *uidem* Philopoemen and his supporters, using the Zacynthus issue, which was already lost, to
destroy Diophanes politically, just as Diophanes had attempted to destroy Philopoemen politically over Sparta? This would certainly make sound political sense. The difference of opinion cannot have been over the ideology of expansion, as this was apparently agreed by all groups. But it could well have been a personal matter of this nature; and Philopoemen may have attracted support on this issue from the more moderate Achaeans who were unwilling to act independently of Flamininus.  

If Diophanes hoped that his display of patriotism in a lost cause at the synclitom would make up for his earlier failure at Sparta, and create sufficient influence to prevent Philopoemen's election as strategos at the synod which followed soon after, he was badly disappointed. Philopoemen was elected, and at the very electoral synod came again into conflict with Flamininus. Diophanes, on the other hand, was not, as far as we know, ever again elected strategos; and was driven into a policy of close co-operation with Rome, in order to provide an alternative policy to the more openly independent action of Philopoemen's group, participation in which he had forfeited by his stab in the back at Sparta, when he deserted Philopoemen for Flamininus. He did however, despite his ultimate failure in federal politics, succeed in unifying Peloponnesian under Achaea; and his statue proclaimed this until imperial times. But as far as we know, his political unreliability disqualified him from playing any important part in administering his achievement.
A further attempt to assert Roman patronage on Achaea was made at the autumn synodos of the League, at which Philopoemen was re-elected strategos. Flamininus had convinced Glabrio of the value of his Peloponnesian policy, and both came to Aegium. Since the spring, Flamininus had discovered a new diplomatic weapon for harrying expansionist Achaea, in the numerous exiles in Peloponnesus, particularly from Sparta. The restoration of the exiles had been accomplished at Messene; now it was to be introduced at Sparta. There were large numbers of exiles from the various Spartan extremist régimes of the Spartan revolution: Flamininus did not distinguish between the various groups, but insisted on wholesale restoration. They had become clients at the time of the expedition against Nabis; but until his restoration of Deinocrates to Messene he had not formed any policy which involved their restoration. This was put forward for the first time at the synodos of autumn 191, and naturally met violent opposition from Philopoemen. His argument, recorded by Plutarch, was that he wanted the exiles to owe their gratitude for their restoration to Achaea and Philopoemen, not to the Romans. The issue is very clearly formulated, as it was clearly understood by Philopoemen: he knew well that Flamininus stood to gain from the restoration of the exiles what he had failed to achieve by his attempt to change the governing party. His own direct public and private interest was to prevent Flamininus from achieving this, to prevent his causing trouble to the League and increasing his own influence at the same time. If the Romans should
insist on a restoration, Philopoemen realised that he would have to submit; but he could manipulate the circumstances in such a way that Achaean and Philopoemen's patronage would achieve the result, not Roman and Flamininus'. But even this point had not yet been reached. The matter had just been broached, and there was yet time to see whether the Senate would endorse its representatives' demands. For the moment Philopoemen managed to have the issue shelved by the synodos.  

The other matter to be discussed, in which the Romans were interested, was the accession of Elis. The Eleans too had every reason to want to prevent the Romans from exercising their patronage. They had much to gain from this, for they had been openly on the side of Antiochus, and could therefore be regarded as defeated enemies. They considered that if they joined the League of their own accord, they might avoid Roman retaliation - the value of which was driven home to them by the fate of the Messenians, who had been in a similar situation. Flamininus' treatment of Messene, in particular his restoration of the exiles, could scarcely encourage other states to put themselves in his hands. The Eleans, since they had no alternative to joining the League, naturally wanted to do so on as favourable terms as possible. This meant, without Roman interference. They stated their position clearly; and the synodos recognised the coincidence of Achaean and Elean interests - perhaps again advised by Philopoemen's experience of Flamininus' patronage diplomacy - and accepted the Eleans' statement.
The Romans had been deprived of another chance to assert their patronage, again frustrated by Philopoemen, now aided by Elean suspicions. The continuation in useful diplomatic life of 'the freedom of the Greeks' depended on the absence of demands in terms of power politics; and the Romans had to accept their defeat.

The formalities of Elean union with Achaea were probably carried out at once, if we are to accept the whole truth of the claim on the base of Diophanes' statue, that Diophanes was the man who first unified the Peloponnese under the Achaean League. We have no reason for rejecting this claim; and as Diophanes' year must have ended at, or soon after, the synodos, the union was probably arranged and ratified at this synodos.\(^7\)

Opposition over Peloponnesian matters did not mean that Philopoemen considered that it was necessary to refuse all cooperation to the Romans. During the winter an Achaean force ravaged the southern coast of Aetolia. This seems to have had little effect on the general course of the war.\(^8\)

Flamininus' policy towards the Spartan exiles was re-emphasised, now by the Senate, during the winter 191/0. A Spartan government embassy went to Rome to ask about the possibility of the restoration of the five hostages, who had been taken by Flamininus in his war against Nabis, and the coastal towns which had been placed under Achaean tutela at the same time. The Roman reply was that they would give instructions about the coastal towns to envoys who were being sent to Greece; as far as the hostages were concerned, there would
have to be further consideration. They then asked why the 'old exiles' had not yet been restored, now that Sparta was free. The reply of the embassy is lost. 81

The first point for discussion is the date of the embassy. Aymard wants to place it in summer 191, on the grounds that there would be no value in sending it after the Achaean autumn synods, at which Philopoemen had refused to capitulate to the Romans on the exile question. This, his main objection to the traditional date accepted here, must be rejected when we remember that the policy which Flamininus pursued was, in the eyes of the Spartans, his own policy, not necessarily that of the Senate. An embassy to the Senate might well secure support which was simply not apparent on the spot. The Spartans must have been hoping for this. Again, Aymard dismisses too lightly the usual senatorial custom of receiving foreign embassies under the new consuls. Although it is true that this was not a fixed rule incapable of variation, the present case offers no exceptional circumstances which would suggest the necessity for a change in the customary procedure. 82

The main objection, however, to dating this embassy earlier than winter 191/0 is the Senate's rider to its reply, about the 'old exiles'. We have seen how the idea of using exiles was essentially Flamininus', and first appeared in summer 191 at Messene. First applied to Sparta in the autumn at the synods, it had been thwarted by Philopoemen. The relevance of this to dating the embassy is clear: the policy which Flamininus represented as Roman interest with regard
to Sparta could not be presented to the Senate until he himself returned to Rome, in the late autumn or winter 191/0. Therefore the senatorial reply, which Polybius records, cannot precede the synodos. The fragment of Polybius can stand in winter 191/0 where Büttnern-Wobst places it.

The appearance of this embassy in Rome is of great importance for understanding the state of the government at Sparta. It is clear that this is a Spartan government embassy: Polybius would not otherwise have called the ambassadors simply ἀλεξανδρόνιοι. But the requests which they make are very strange if Timolaus' group was still in power, and we must assume that they had been overthrown between Philopoemen's defence in spring 191 and this embassy of winter 191/0.

In the first place the embassy was contrary to the convention included in the Achaean foedus with Rome, which prevented a constituent state from petitioning the Senate. Timolaus' group would certainly have acted legally through their protector Philopoemen. Again, although Timolaus' group may have wanted the restoration of the coastal towns, it could have no interest in asking for the restoration of the hostages taken from Nabis: they included Armenas, Nabis' son, and must have been all five strong supporters of the tyrant party. This again points to a change of Spartan government.

Just as significant is the terminology of the Senate's reply. For the first time, the phrase ἀρχαῖοι φυγάδες is used in connection with the Spartan exiles. At the synodos it was only exules who were considered to need restoration. This refinement of terminology
must imply that there were at least two groups of exiles now, and of these, the Senate was not concerned with the 'new exiles'. As the distinction first appears between the Achaean autumn synodos and the winter audience at Rome, we must conclude that the creation of the 'new exiles' must have taken place in that period. Since the demands of the embassy in themselves suggest that there had been a change of government between the spring and the winter, it is an economical hypothesis to conclude that the 'new exiles' had been created by this change of government, and were therefore Timolaus' group.

It could, perhaps, be argued against this view that Livy's failure to specify 'old exiles' is not decisive for a change of Spartan government between the synodos and the winter. He could be simply using imprecise language. This objection, however, involves explaining the creation of the 'new exiles' before the synodos. The only occasions when there was trouble in Sparta between the death of Nabis - the terminus post quern for the creation of 'new exiles' - and the synodos of autumn 191, were at the time of Philopoemen's original settlement, and at the time of his interference in spring 191. On neither of these occasions were his opponents driven into exile. The original settlement involved 'persuading some, compelling others', but not exiling them, as is clear from the trouble which Timolaus' group had in maintaining themselves in power after the settlement. Similarly, at the time of Philopoemen's intervention there were no exiles created. If exiles were created then, they would have been
the anti-Achaean group, the party which was opposed to Timolaus and whom Flamininus was eager to have installed in power instead of Timolaus' group. In winter 191/0 this group was responsible for the request to the Senate for the restoration of the hostages. Therefore they must have been restored between Philopoemen's intervention and their winter appeal to Rome. The only occasion in this period when Spartan exiles are mentioned is at the Achaean autumn synodos, where Flamininus and Glabrio demanded the restoration of the exiles. If the anti-Timolaus group was exiled at Philopoemen's intervention, they must have been restored at this time to be able to send the embassy to Rome the subsequent winter. But Philopoemen refused to restore the exiles at the synodos. Therefore they cannot have been the tyrant group, who must accordingly have been at Sparta all along. We can therefore have confidence in Livy's statement that only unspecified exiles were involved in the discussions at the synodos, and in our conclusion from this that the distinction between Livy's exiles of the autumn and Polybius' ἄρχατοι φυγάδες in the winter is a genuine distinction. It must be due to the creation of 'new exiles' between the two events. These 'new exiles', we argue, were Timolaus' group.

The circumstances of the change cannot be certainly ascertained; but the fact that the embassy to Rome was so quickly despatched suggests that Flamininus had had a hand in it - on this occasion Philopoemen was unable to prevent the coup d'état. Equally suggestive of Flamininus' interference is the fact that the hostages - except for Armenas, who did not long survive - were in fact released soon
after the embassy had been received. The tyrant party was composed of his clients; and he was more than ever attached to them after being frustrated by Philopoemen in the spring. It seems quite likely that, without physical interference on his part — which could again be anticipated and frustrated by Philopoemen — he had continued throughout the year to encourage his friends, and had offered them diplomatic support and recognition by the Senate as the legitimate government. Hence their haste in sending the embassy to Rome before Philopoemen could interfere. But the question of the exiles created by the tyrants — now described _en bloc_ as 'old exiles' to distinguish them from Timolaus' group — was still a hare worth pursuing; and despite the change in government — enough in itself to cause Achaea infinite discomfort — the Senate seized upon the cause of the 'old exiles': it had the supreme advantage of being the cause of equity as well as convenience.

In spring 190 an embassy arrived in Achaea from Eumenes of Pergamum, seeking help and confirmation of his alliance. The Achaeans did not hesitate. A _syncletos_ confirmed the alliance and 1,000 Achaean infantry, matched by 100 cavalry, were sent to Eumenes under Diophanes. Diophanes must have been a political embarrassment to Philopoemen this year, but he knew Diophanes was a competent soldier; and therefore made use of Eumenes' claim on the alliance to remove the potential political trouble-maker, by sending him with the expeditionary force, which was still in Asia in the autumn and formed part of Eumenes' contingent at Magnesia.
No information is extant regarding Achaean activity for the remainder of 190; but in the spring of 189 Achaea continued her participation in the Roman war effort against Aetolia: she co-operated with Pleuratus of Illyria in an expedition to ravage the south coast of Aetolia. It seems to have had little success or effect on the course of the war. In the autumn, after the beginning of the siege of Same, Achaean funditores from Aegium, Patrae and Dyme were with Fulvius in Cephalenlia. Livy, from Polybius, is careful to point out that there was no political significance in the choice of these towns, but that they provided the best slingers because of the pebbly beaches. Apart from these two incidents of participation in the general war, we know nothing more of Achaea until autumn 189, when internal troubles again broke out at Sparta.86

The course of these troubles and their settlement are related by Livy, but his chronology is very confused, although the narrative material is from Polybius, and therefore trustworthy. This confusion has led to great differences in interpretation of the events related; and it was not until Holleaux applied himself to elucidate the chronology that it became clear. His fundamental study raises no disagreements about chronology, and a detailed repetition of his arguments seems unnecessary. However, a résumé of his results is necessary for a discussion of the events themselves as they affect Achaea.87

The siege of Same began about the beginning of October 189, and lasted four months - a round figure - ending towards the end of January 188. Fulvius left Same for Rome, once the siege was under
way, to conduct the elections: this was towards the end of October. After the elections he returned to Same, arriving in mid/late December; for the remainder of the siege he remained at Same. In Peloponnesian Philopoemen was elected *strategos* at about the time of the beginning of the siege; shortly after this 'the Spartans' attacked 'the exiles' at Las, 'the exiles' appealed to Achaea, and a *syncletos* demanded satisfaction from 'the Spartans' - the surrender of the ringleaders. A massacre of those 'Spartans' favouring compliance with the Achaeans' demand followed, together with a decree seceding from the League and an appeal to Fulvius, who by this time had left Same for the elections. Another Achaeans *syncletos* declared war on Sparta, and hostilities began on a small scale, but were prevented from becoming general by the approach of winter. At the same time Philopoemen let it be known that he intended to attempt to carry a law making the meeting place of the *synodos* variable: the people of Aegium felt their privilege threatened, and also appealed to Fulvius - still in his absence from Same.

After the return of Fulvius, the siege occupied him fully until its end. Meanwhile the Achaeans *demiourgoi* announced the normal first *synodos* of the year for February, as usual at Aegium. In order to have his proposal discussed before the *synodos* took place, Philopoemen summoned a *syncletos* to Argos. Fulvius, when he was able to attend to the accumulation of Peloponnesian affairs, came first to Aegium; but when he discovered that the regular *synodos* was being preceded by a *syncletos*, went on to Argos. He found
little opposition to support there, and Philopoemen's proposal was
successfully passed. 39 Another syncletos was then summoned to Elis
to discuss the Spartan question - by this time it must have been late
February - and at this syncletos Fulvius advised sending ambassadors
to the Senate. Lycortas and Diophanes represented the two facets of
Achaean policy, and had probably returned to Achaea by the end of
April with an ambiguous reply. In May, Philopoemen was joined by
large numbers of 'exiles' when he led the Achaean army against Sparta.
At Compasion, he met the leaders of the 'Spartans', and in a riot
some were killed; the next day others were judicially murdered. A
settlement of Sparta was then carried out.

This is the chronology which is accepted in the following
discussion. Two matters arise from these events which require
further discussion: the Achaean constitutional alteration, and the
Spartan question, which are discussed in that order.

Aegium had been virtually the capital city of the early Achaean
League. It was the centre of Old Achaea and easily accessible from
each of the original Achaean cities. For this reason synodoi had
always been held there, and the Aegienses had come to regard it as
their privilege. They no doubt found economic advantages in holding
the synodoi in their city; but in addition to this, there was the
prestige within the League, and the possibility, not to be discounted,
of exerting unofficial local influence on decisions taken in the
synodoi: it was not necessary to vote to be able to exercise influence.
As the League expanded, and the weight of population was increasingly
in Arcadia rather than Old Achaean, it became increasingly inconvenient to retain Aegium as the fixed meeting place of the regular business synodoi. This was the more important, as Megalopolis was providing a larger proportion of leading Achaean statesmen than any other single city — to our knowledge, Philopoemen, Lycortas and Diophanes.

There were also occasions which could be envisaged when it might be more efficient to hold a synodoc elsewhere than at Aegium; and this type of consideration seems to have been behind the reform of 188. It did also open the possibility of manipulation, in order to subject the members to excessive local influence in the case of specific local issues, as was already the case with the synicletoi — although there is no evidence that this occurred. Of the 17 recorded synodoi after the reform, 90 4 were held at Megalopolis, 3 at Corinth, 2 at Aegium, 1 at Sicyon, and 7 at places unknown. This scarcely suggests regular manipulation by dominant local interests — although it is not possible from such a small scattered sample of meetings to reach a definite conclusion. It is clear, however, that Aegium was not excluded. In addition to his natural desire to offer help on appeal, the support which Fulvius had given the Aegienses had been also soundly based on the greater convenience for the Romans of knowing that the synodoi would regularly take place only at one convenient coastal town — although in fact most Roman ambassadors were received at synicletoi — and the only two known synodoi after Philopoemen's law at which Romans were present were
the Aegium meetings. But again, the paucity of evidence makes it impossible to decide finally. Nevertheless, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it does seem indicated that efficiency and privilege-breaking were the keynotes to the reform, rather than the creation of the possibility of manipulation.

This seems indicated too by the fact that there was little opposition to Philopoemen's proposal when the syncletos met at Argos. There is no need to see corruption in the haste of his summoning the syncletos. In order to prevent the matter from being discussed at the synod - already announced - in the hostile atmosphere of Aegium, it was essential to have the syncletos both before the synod and at a distance from Aegium. Hence Argos and the haste. There was some opposition from the Aegienses; but it was not voluble enough to make Fulvius consider staking Roman prestige on what appeared to him to be a losing cause: and it was clearly a victory for the better cause.

The evidence of these chapters of Livy is the first indication we have of how matters were going at Sparta, since the embassy to Rome of winter 191/0. Flamininus' policy of the reintegration of the 'old exiles' had been heavily emphasised in 191. In 190 another Roman mission was sent to Greece which carried instructions about the coastal towns. We know nothing of the composition or detailed task of this embassy; but it seems likely, from the circumstances of its appointment, that the instructions would include a further emphasis on Roman insistence on the restoration of the exiles. Philopoemen must again have offered resistance to this statement of
Roman policy, as he had to Flamininus and Glabrio at the 191 synodos, for there is nothing which suggests that the 'old exiles' were restored before 188. At the same time, Philopoemen must have realised that, if the exile problem really reached crisis point, the Senate could insist on the restoration, and he would have to agree. He must, therefore, by this time, have been trying to find a face-saving formula. His action in 188 shows that by this time he thought the formula had been found.

The possibility of discovering the circumstances of this comes from a fragment of Polybius, in which he describes and moralises upon Philopoemen's action at Compasion: "καλὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ κατάγειν τοῖς ἀναμάλατοις φυγάδοις εἰς τὴν Ἑπάρτην, συμφέρον δὲ τὸ ταπεινώδει τὴν τῶν Λακεδαίμων πόλιν, ἐκατάφονεσαντ' αὐτῶς δεδορφοφορηκότας τῇ τῶν τῶν ἱστορικῶν ἀνακοινωνήν τὴν "The contrast between the 'captive exiles' and the 'strong-arm men of the tyrants' provides a valuable guide if we read Livy's account with Polybius' description in mind. It is clear that the 'captive exiles' - nowhere else mentioned - were at least part of those who were with Philopoemen, and who were eventually restored. The 'strong-arm men', on the other hand, must have been those whom Livy calls simply Lacedaemonii. Since they are explicitly described by Polybius as supporters of the tyrants, they must be the group which sent the embassy to Rome in winter 191/0, whom Polybius then dignified with the title Λακεδαίμονιοι - in fact, as Livy's unprejudiced account would suggest, the government in
power. Between autumn 191, therefore, when Timolaus' party was overwhelmed, and autumn 189, there had been no change in the holders of power at Sparta.

Polybius' description of those whom it was worthy of Philopoemen to restore as 'captives' does not allow a wholly satisfactory explanation. He uses the term to distinguish a particular group of exiles, but does not make it clear in this passage whether he means one group from among the 'old exiles', or a separate group in contrast to the whole mass of 'old exiles'. Polybius' own bias towards Achaea and Philopoemen suggests that he would approve most of all of the restoration of the exile group which favoured Achaea and Philopoemen - Timolaus' party. His ambiguity may be deliberate, for he certainly had a misleading statement which Livy translated: Philopoemen praetor iam inde ab initio exulum causae amicus. If this is referred to the 'old exiles' alone it is patently untrue; but if to simply 'exiles' - among whom were by now Timolaus' group of recent exiles - it can be ambiguously interpreted to include the 'old exiles', and save Philopoemen's reputation as a humanitarian for posterity (although it does not enhance Polybius' as honest historian). We may therefore tentatively prefer this explanation of 'captive exiles', and assume, from the terminology, that at first some members of Timolaus' group had been taken prisoner by the tyrant party before escaping to, among other places, Las. This would explain more easily the violence of the government's attack on the town: the issue of the 'old exiles' was certainly alive, as the
Senate had made quite clear; but not as alive as that of the comparatively recently expelled government party. The appeal of these exiles to Achaea after the attack also tends to show that they were not the 'old exiles', but the 'captive exiles': the 'old exiles' could not anticipate much support from Philopoemen, despite the fact that Las was still in Achaean tutela. On the other hand, the appeal of the government to Fulvius against Achaea, after slaughtering the remaining pro-Achaean elements, shows clearly that they had great trust in the protection of Rome, which had first been demonstrated by Flamininus, to the extent that Rome would support them against Achaea.96

We are now in a position to understand the nature of the face-saving situation in which Philopoemen was able, as a by-product of action in the support of Timolaus' group, which he had supported throughout at Sparta - iam inde ab initio exulum causae amicus - to restore the 'old exiles', in accordance with the policy of Flamininus, and steal the patronage of the restored exiles which Flamininus had hoped to gain for the Senate. This was a compromise, for Philopoemen could hardly desire to bring additional trouble on Achaea from the restoration; but on this Philopoemen ultimately had no choice, since the Senate chose to insist. He therefore attempted to gain as much advantage as was available by stealing the Senate's policy.97 The attack on Las in autumn 189 by the government of the tyrant party was primarily aimed at the annihilation of the remaining members of Timolaus' group. The appeal made to Philopoemen, which
first involved Achaea again in Spartan internal troubles, was by Timolaus' party; and Philopoemen responded, as expected, by demanding those of the tyrant group who were responsible. The result of this was a further anti-Achaean demonstration at Sparta, the murder of 30 Achaean supporters, secession from Achaea, and the appeal to Fulvius. Some fighting followed the subsequent Achaean declaration of war, but the winter froze the status quo.

The Achaean ambassadors to Rome, sent in the spring after the Elis syncretes on the suggestion of Fulvius, were Lycortas and Diophanes. Lycortas represented the well-established view of Philopoemen, that the Achaeans should be allowed to decide matters at Sparta in accordance with the agreement with which the city had entered the League, and their own laws. This represented the issue as an internal Achaean matter of neither interest nor importance to the Senate; and implied that the intervention of Flamininus, and the interest he had in the Spartan question, was illegitimate. Diophanes' position was that which he had first taken up in spring 191, and was now probably confirmed by the support of Aristaenus. He had then allowed that Flamininus might have an interest in Sparta, and committed himself to his support on this. The same point of view was expressed by him now, that the Senate should have the first and last words on the Spartan question. He recognised - as did Philopoemen - that in the last resort the Senate could insist irresistibly that its demands be carried out; he differed from Philopoemen in the same way as Aristaenus: by acceding to, and going
half-way to meet the inevitable, the inevitable might be less disastrous in its effect. 98

The result of this embassy was that the Senate decided novari nihil de Lacedaemoniis, although, according to Livy, magnae auctoritatis apud Romanos tum gens Achaeorum erat. To some extent this is true, although it did not mean that the Achaean dominant group could get what it wanted from the Senate. This is clear from the reply, which simply attempted to preserve the status quo. It means more precisely, that a large body of senators had been recently involved in Achaean affairs, and understood what the issues were; and the Senate as a whole had been grateful enough to the Achaeans for their declaration of war against Antiochus to grant them a foedus aequum. Since then, Achaea had supplied contingents of troops against the Aetolians, and helped Eumenes up to Magnesia. The auctoritas was based solidly on the Senate's recognition of the value of these officia. But despite this, the Senate expressed its view of the essentially peripheral nature of its involvement in Achaean affairs, now that Antiochus was finally defeated. As long as Peloponnesian remained comparatively quiet and played its part as Roman client, the Senate did not care unduly what action was taken at Sparta. The result was that both the Spartans and Philopoemen were able to argue that the ambiguous reply gave them the right to their own way: the only thing that was clear was that the Senate was not going to intervene openly as Diophanes had requested. 99

In May, after the receipt of the Senate's reply, Philopoemen
assembled the Achaean army, and accompanied by large numbers of exiles - certainly Timolaus' group, and at least some of the 'old exiles' too - made his way to Compasion in Spartan territory. Secession was a major federal offence, and he demanded the surrender of the leaders of the tyrant party who had been responsible. A conference was arranged, and 80 Spartans accepted Philopoemen's pledge of safety. As they approached the Achaean camp they were given a hostile reception by the groups of exiles, and although Achaean officials tried, at this stage, to honour Philopoemen's pledges, although this may be simply Polybian apologetics - 17 were stoned to death on the spot by the exiles, both groups of whom had great feelings of personal hostility to the leaders of the tyrant party. The next day the remaining 63 were given a summary trial and executed. Polybius later expresses the view that this was a beneficial action on the part of Philopoemen; but he does not, in that place, describe or express an opinion about the means by which it was accomplished. It would have been difficult to defend this breach of the pledge of safety at the time of the conference, international diplomatic procedure being sacrificed to temporary political advantage. The expediency of taking the advantage offered must have seemed to outweigh the moral aspects. The possibility must have seemed at hand of finally resolving the Spartan problem: the annihilation of the leaders of the tyrant party would make the restoration of Timolaus' group easy; and with them could go the 'old exiles', thus removing a source of Roman interest in Sparta; both groups in
Sparta would then be so closely attached to Achaea and Philopoemen by ties of gratitude that future serious trouble could not be expected.

With these considerations to the fore, it was easy enough for interested parties such as Polybius to condone the pseudo-judicial massacre. The only fragment of a non-Achaean account is that preserved in Plutarch, of the Spartan historian and antiquarian Aristocrates. Aristocrates' recorded version is that Philopoemen killed 350 Spartans, whereas Polybius gives only 80. Aristocrates' figure must be either exaggerated, or include figures which Polybius failed to record. There may have been a continuation of the massacre once Philopoemen gained control of the city, the casualties from which Polybius discreetly failed to include in his figure for Compasion. On the other hand, Aristocrates' figure may have been deliberately exaggerated in order to vilify Philopoemen - although in this case we would probably expect an even larger figure. The choice between the two figures must be largely a priori, in which case we must not allow Polybius' reputation for accuracy to overweight the issue in his favour: we have insufficient information to form any judgement about Aristocrates' historical tendencies. 103

Despite Polybius' sympathy with the aims and methods of Philopoemen, the solution imposed at Sparta after the massacre at Compasion was the source of future troubles for Achaea, for he sacrificed, to some extent, the goodwill of all parties by the violence of his settlement. He ordered the walls to be torn down,
mercenaries, who had supported the tyrants and their successors, and helots, who had been enfranchised by the tyrants, to be expelled. Neither the ordinary citizens nor the returning exiles would have much quarrel with this; although a source of future trouble might arise in the ex-helots: those who refused to leave Laconia, some 3,000, were sold as slaves in Achaea, and a portico built at Megalopolis with the money realised. The traditional Spartan institutions were abolished - including most significantly, the Agoge. This clearly was striking at the heart of the traditional Spartan state of the days of independence; and the substitution of the Achaean system could have been consolation to neither group of exiles, nor the remaining population of Sparta.¹⁰⁴

But the issue which affected the largest numbers of the remaining population and the exiles themselves, was the problem of reintegrating the 'old exiles'. There could have been nothing like the same problem with Timolaus' group, who had not been away from the city for anything like the same length of time. But Philopoemen made no attempt to solve this problem. The property of the murdered and dispossessed of the tyrant party was available; the money from the sale of the 3,000 helots would have gone far to settling the real physical problems associated with the restoration. Yet Philopoemen squandered this invidiously on a portico at Megalopolis, emphasising - if this was still necessary - the total submergence of all Spartan interests in those of Achaea.¹⁰⁵ He had lost his opportunity of solving the problem which was to vex Achaea for the next
nine years by his ill-considered display of victorious jubilation. The weakest point in his compromise with Roman policy had been that Achaea would be burdened with the exile problem: he had rashly thrown away his chance to eradicate this weakness. Although there can be little excuse for this major failure in statesmanship, we can perhaps discern the reason for it. In the fragmentary passage in which Polybius analyses Philopoemen's motives, he seems to provide Philopoemen's reasons for not using the money for the exiles. He realised that money was necessary to restore the monarchy: therefore he prevented money becoming easily available. This consideration is crucial; for it adequately provides the reason for Philopoemen's shortsightedness. His mind was fixed solely on the prevention of a restoration of the monarchy. Since Cleomenes, this had been the major problem for Achaea. It is easy enough in this context to understand his failure to realise that this problem had already been solved by his own massacre of the tyrant party, and replaced by the development of exile complaints, equally dangerous in the new conditions of the Senate's willingness to interfere. Philopoemen's lack of magnanimity in victory insulted his friends, and gave new point to immediate agitation for a further settlement of Sparta.
CHAPTER 5

CLIENTELE AND THE PAX ACHAICA

The solution of the Spartan problem, attempted by Philopoemen in the settlement after Corapasion, offended too many interests to have any chance of being uncompromisingly successful. As soon as the character of the settlement became clear, δυσαρεστηκατές τινες τὰς ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ τοῖς γεγονόσι καὶ νομίζοντες ἐπὶ τοῦ Φιλοποίμενος δίαι τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν προστασίαν καταλελυθαί τὴν Ῥωμαίων, went to Rome and appealed against Philopoemen's settlement, in the hope of the Senate's interfering to alter its terms. Who were these dissatisfied men, left surprisingly anonymous by Polybius, who were immediately ready to appeal to Rome against Achaea? The possibilities are, that they were either one of the exile groups, or the remains of the tyrant party. One would not expect either group of exiles to throw their gratitude at their restoration to the winds immediately after they were restored: the pro-Achaean group could not expect any benefit from an appeal to Rome, and the 'old exiles' might be expected, at least for the first six months of their restoration, to withhold their complaints until they saw more clearly what their position would be. And had the 'old exiles' turned ingraten rapidly, we should have expected Polybius to say so in ambiguous language. But he does not mention their dissatisfaction until 185/4.

The one aspect of the settlement which caused the greatest distress at Sparta, according to Livy, was the restoration of the exiles. Therefore, those who suffered most from the restoration of the exiles would feel the greatest and most immediate dissatisfaction
at the Achaean settlement. The remains of the tyrant group, which Philopoemen had overthrown and almost annihilated, would clearly feel the greatest loss. They also had been most closely attached to Rome: Flamininus had supported them in 191; the Senate had granted them the restoration of the hostages in 190, and had left them in power; when threatened by Philopoemen the previous autumn, they had been responsible for the offer of the city to Fulvius. It would clearly be natural for them - much more than for any other identifiable group - to appeal to Rome. Their position of power had been overthrown; and with it, they could claim, the Roman *prostasia*, which was given form most recently in the ambiguous reply of the Senate to the envoys from Achaea and Sparta in spring 188, which tried to preserve a stable situation in Peloponnese. They naturally interpreted this as a continuation of Roman patronage in their favour, and the confirmation of their right to rule Sparta. In these circumstances their overthrow was in itself sufficient provocation for an appeal to the Senate which, they argued, should feel as offended as they themselves. It therefore seems quite clear that this hasty appeal to the Senate was by those members of the tyrant group who survived the massacre at Compasion. That there was such a group, as late as 184/3 - then in exile - is clear from Polybius' description of Chaeron at Rome ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεθανατωμένων καὶ τῶν ἐκπεπτωκότων κατὰ τὰ τῶν Ἀχαίων δόματα.

As soon as Philopoemen learnt that a Spartan embassy had been sent to Rome, late in his *strategia*, he immediately sent Nicodemus
of Elis to represent the point of view of the Achaean government.\textsuperscript{4}

Our identification of the Spartan group which sent the embassy makes it easier to understand the urgency with which Philopoemen sent Nicodemus. For the Spartans would be sure to emphasise their own interpretation of the Senate's answer in the spring; and as the recent history of their relations with the Senate might lead the Achaeans to expect the Senate to show them favour in this case also, it was necessary to point out that, from the Achaean point of view, Philopoemen's interpretation of the ambiguous Senatus Consultum was just as reasonable: if the Senate had been prepared to accept the situation existing in the spring for the sake of stability - the declared policy of their reply - they should be equally prepared to accept the situation existing in the autumn, as this included the restoration of the 'old exiles', which had been continually emphasised since 191 as a chief aim of senatorial policy. Added to this, the Achaeans were, on their own interpretation of the foedus aequum, free and equal allies of the Romans, and should therefore attract more benevolent attention than the disreputable remains of the troublesome tyrant party.

From the Senate's point of view, the Achaeans were simply clients who, blinded by their apparent legal rights, did not recognise their extra-legal moral obligations. As a result, the Senate was for some years after the final defeat of Antiochus unable to form a positive policy, in the absence of immediate active interest, which made sufficiently clear what was expected of Roman clients. While
Flamininus was active in Greece, it had been possible for him to find solutions for matters arising among the clients of Rome, whom circumstances had also made his own personal clients; and latterly, the equitable demand for the restoration of the 'old exiles' had given direction to senatorial policy towards Achaea. The Senate had neither the need nor the desire to interfere physically in Greece; but the cause of the 'old exiles' had given it an opportunity of exercising patronage, and, as the senators thought, making it abundantly clear that the Achaeans were expected to obey. Opposition in Achaea had been unexpected; but the repetition of the policy had served to maintain in clear outline the expected relationship. When Flamininus left Greece in autumn 191, the connecting link, which had given a continuity to Roman policy towards Achaea, was broken; and the rapid change of circumstances at Sparta radically altered the situation. The Senate still wanted to emphasise the client-patron relationship; but Philopoemen had shattered the possibility of making this understandable to the Achaeans by his implementation of Roman policy in the restoration of the 'old exiles'. This effectively destroyed the comprehensible recent guiding light of senatorial policy.

While the problem of the 'old exiles' had remained unsolved, senatorial policy could appear consistent and purposeful — so much so that Philopoemen had found no alternative to stealing the Senate's thunder — although the real desires of the Senate, for stability on the one hand, and clientela on the other, were not fully comprehended by the Achaeans. Once this problem was solved, however inadequately,
the continual, but non-committal and ineffective partisan interference by the Senate and its representatives - the only way in which the desired relationship could now be asserted - eventually revealed to Philopoemen the limitations imposed on the Senate by its own code of conduct, and led him to exploit the situation. It took Callicrates, after years of confusion, to give direction again to senatorial policy.

It is this initial confusion in the minds of the Achaeans as to the real aims of senatorial policy, followed by understanding and exploitation, and on the other hand, the apparently directionless drift of the policy itself, resulting from an essential lack of interest in Achaea after the crises of the wars against Philip and Antiochus, which are the touchstones by which relations between the Senate and the Achaeans in the 180s should be interpreted. This first becomes clear in the senatorial reply to the envoys sent to Rome by Achaea and Sparta, with the encouragement of Fulvius, in spring 188. The Senate's answer to the problem was simply to preserve the existing situation: novari nihil de Lacedaemoniis placebat. Exactly the same attitude can be seen in the reply of winter 188/7 to Nicodemus: δυσαρεστούνται μὲν καὶ τῇ τῶν τείχων συντελεσθεὶ καὶ τῇ καταλύσει * * τῶν ἐν τῇ Κομασίᾳ διαφαρέντων, οὐ μὴν ἔχωρον τι ποιεῖν. The senators had to express disapproval: Philopoemen had acted violently and wilfully, although senatorial advice had been for inaction; the offended parties at Sparta were Rome's clients, and had appealed for support. The Senate had to pay lip-service to
this moral commitment. But the 'old exiles', also Roman clients, had been restored, and no disapproval could be expressed about this. The Senate therefore expressed formally its disapproval at the most obviously factional and violent - therefore controversial - aspects of Philopoemen's settlement; the destruction of the walls and the 'Icycuran' constitution, and the mass murder at Compasion. But it was satisfied with this paternal admonishment, and expressed no intentions for the future, to which it might be held morally committed. Peace, stability, and the due recognition of clientela were the aims; therefore the fathers would not do anything to alter the new established situation. Perhaps taken by surprise, and found without a positive reaction to this conflict of petty clients' claims, they could only repeat the disinterested negative of the previous year. The Spartan mission did not have much more success in eliciting positive support for their new situation. After a delay, they managed to obtain a letter addressed to the Achaeans from the consul M. Aemilius Lepidus; but he only repeated the Senate's non-committal attitude: oνι δρατὸς αὐτὸς χειρικέναι τὰ ἱκετά τοῖς Ἀχαῖοιαμονίοις. It is not surprising that when the Achaeans received their report from Nicodemus they simply let the matter pass without opposition or discussion. It must have seemed a clear victory for Philopoemen, now openly admitted by the Senate.

Probably during this same strategia of Philopoemen, trouble with Boeotia broke out, which reached serious dimensions. The Achaeans and the Aetolians had been urged by the Senate to act as dutiful
clients, and to press upon the Boeotians the necessity of their complying with senatorial policy and restoring Zeuxippus. The Achaeans had responded by sending an embassy which urged the Boeotians to do this; but they determined to make use of their rôle as Roman agents to gain the weight of Roman prestige for pressing a local issue also. There were several outstanding lawsuits to be settled in Boeotian courts between the Megarians - members of the Achaean League since 206/5 - and the Boeotians, which the Boeotians were reluctant to settle. As this was apparently a federal matter, the Achaeans, at the same time as they presented the Roman request about Zeuxippus, asked that these lawsuits should be settled by the Boeotians. When this was agreed, but the Boeotians did nothing, Philopoemen allowed the Megarians to lay hands on Boeotian property. The situation rapidly became critical. Polybius says that if the Senate had pressed the restoration of Zeuxippus at this point, there would have been war; and the situation was only eased on the Achaean side, by the Megarians' stopping their raids, and on the Boeotian side, by the settlement of the lawsuits. This easing of tension was the result of a compromise; but from the Achaeans' point of view, the outcome was satisfactory, for it was the Roman policy which had been the sufferer in the compromise. By tacking the matter of the Achaean lawsuits onto the Roman requests about Zeuxippus, Philopoemen had created a tension which made it impossible for Roman policy with regard to Zeuxippus to be fulfilled at this time. It seems fairly clear that Philopoemen, when he realised that he could not enforce both the Roman and the Achaean demands, must
have deliberately decided that the Roman policy of restoration was to be sacrificed in favour of the compromise which settled the Achaean lawsuits. This was simply a bargain between the Achaeans and the Boeotians for the better interest of both parties. The Boeotians had the same objections to the restoration of Zeuxippus as the Achaeans had to the restoration of the Spartan 'old exiles'. Philopoemen was only acting as agent for Rome in this matter, and must have seen Achaean interest in the first place in the settlement of the Megarian complaints, in the second place in maintaining generally good relations with Boeotia. Neither of the aims could be achieved by insisting on Zeuxippus' restoration; both were achieved by his neglect of it. The Roman policy, which had been the reason for opening the original negotiations, was lost in the diplomatic mêlée. As this policy was essentially Flamininus', it must have appeared in Rome that Achaean preoccupation with their own local problems, and failure to recognise the priorities expected of a client, were again frustrating his policies; and it was again Philopoemen who was responsible. The hostility between the two could not have been lessened as a result of this episode.

Again, probably in this strategia, Philopoemen clashed with the policy of Flamininus, this time over Messene. He is alleged to have interfered with the terms of Flamininus' diagramma, which was issued at the time of the Messenian settlement of 191. This was probably a comprehensive document regulating the whole settlement, the basis of which Livy gives when describing how Messene was
treated in his account of 191. The circumstances in which we learn about this διόρθωσις are these: the embassy headed by Q. Caecilius Metellus was entertained in Achaea in 185, and accusations of responsibility for the current discontent in Peloponnese were levelled at Philopoemen by Diophanes. Disputes had arisen, it was alleged, about the Messenian exiles, and in particular περὶ τὸ τοῦ Τίτου διάγραμμα καὶ τὴν τοῦ φιλοποίμενος διόρθωσιν. What had this διόρθωσις involved, that it should cause serious disputes? Roebuck rightly dismisses the view that the emendation was a constitutional move in a democratic direction, but fails to suggest an alternative. While this rejection of a trend to democracy is reasonable, some attempt at a more precise alternative explanation must be made. It seems fairly clear that sincere democracy was not a live issue in Achaea (or elsewhere in Greece) at this time, if for no other reason than that Nabis' propaganda must have made democracy a dirty word. If, then, we agree with Roebuck in rejecting a change to democracy, what was the effect of Philopoemen's emendation?

In the circumstances, the most likely action would have been an attempt at securing, in some way, greater Achaean control over Messenia. This was certainly desirable, for Messene was an unwilling member of the League. Neither the restored exiles, nor the party in power in 191, had wanted to be united with Achaea in the first place. The result, therefore, from the Achaean point of view, must have been unsatisfactory, although Diophanes, given no alternative, had accepted the terms. Added to this was the internal Messenian
problem of the re-integration of the exiles. As at Sparta, union with the League had made exile integration an Achaean problem, which the hostility of both parties to Achaean must have made both more difficult and more essential to solve. Two methods were feasible of gaining greater Achaean control: the establishment of a group in power in Messene which, for the sake of Achaean support in internal matters, was prepared to compromise its essential opposition to union with the League - as at Sparta in 192 and 188; or some enforced alteration in the terms of the agreement uniting the city as a whole to the League. This latter could only contravene the terms of the diagramma if the specific terms of the entry into the League had been detailed in it. In itself this was an intrusion into the League's affairs, although, from Flamininus' point of view, easily justifiable by the Messenian deditio and the necessity, after the conclusion of the Achaean foedus, of demonstrating the nature of Achaean clientela. But perhaps more likely, as the dispute in 185 was essentially about the exile problem, is that the diagramma had contained some specific political safeguards for the restored exiles - Flamininus' friend Deinocrates and his associates - within Messene. This was clearly not overstepping the bounds of equity or interfering excessively in Achaean affairs, as Messene had offered deditio, and all parties were Flamininus' clients.

But if Flamininus could interfere in this way on behalf of his friends, it was equally possible for Philopoemen, as strategos of the League, to argue his right of interference on behalf of his
interpretation of the constitutional rights of another section of
the community; and as Achaean interest was concerned, this was
equally justifiable. If Deinocrates had been established in power
by Flamininus' action, he could be disestablished by Philopoemen's.
This was particularly likely in the political atmosphere of Achaea
in 188, after the apparent solution of the Spartan problem. One
thing which seems to suggest that Philopoemen's action was aimed
specifically at Deinocrates, is the fact that Plutarch says explicitly
that there was a personal hostility between the two. This shows at
its most extreme, in the apparent reluctance of Deinocrates to use
Philopoemen as a bargaining counter in 182 after capturing him; and
on the other side, in the rumours freely circulating among the
Achaeans after Philopoemen's death, that he had been poisoned by
Deinocrates - recorded uniformly in all sources, which depend on
Polybius. There is no means of testing Polybius' evidence on this;
but true or false, it has the same significance for the present
purpose: the rumours were considered believable, and therefore illus-
trate that it was well known in Achaea that there was a violent
personal hostility between the two men. This becomes much clearer,
if we can interpret Philopoemen's διόρθωσις as a measure which removed
the safeguards which Deinocrates had enjoyed in Messene as a result
of the terms of Flamininus' diagramma.

If we accept this interpretation of Philopoemen's emendation
of the diagramma, it fits in well with the pattern of Philopoemen's
activity in this strategia. His aim was clearly to solve all
outstanding problems connected with Achaean predominance in Peloponnese, which might invite Roman intervention. He had been prevented from claiming to be the unifier of Peloponnese; for in that race Diophanes had already scrambled home in his strategia of 192/1 with the support of Flamininus, and removed the prize from the competition. But problems there were; and Philopoemen could stress the inadequacy of Diophanes' superficially glorious achievement by drawing attention to the problems left unsolved, and providing independent Achaean solutions to them. He could not oust Diophanes from his claim to fame; but he could prevent him from benefiting from his personal disloyalty. As far as Philopoemen was concerned, Diophanes was not going to be able to claim to be the only patriot. At Sparta therefore he had tried to solve the outstanding problems by the forcible restoration of those likely to support Achaea, the removal of the Roman claim to interference, and the weakening of the opposition. In Boeotia he had been prepared to provoke serious trouble in order to settle the Megarian lawsuits. It would not be at all surprising to find him interfering with the settlement of Flamininus at Messene in favour of a group more ready to co-operate with Achaea, thus reducing the prestige which had been built into Deinocrates' position by Flamininus.

Despite this independent activity throughout the year, usually in conflict with the spirit of declared senatorial policy and that of Flamininus, Philopoemen does not seem to have won great approval in Achaea. This was made quite clear at the time of the elections
when Aristaenus, who must have disapproved of the heavy-handedness of Philopoemen's non-compliance with Roman wishes, was elected strategos. He must have had large support for his more co-operative programme from those vested interests, more interested in stability than independence, which were afraid that Philopoemen was going too far in his interpretation of Achaean rights under the foedus, and prejudicing the stability which was essential for commercial activity. Despite the violence used at Sparta, it must have been already clear that Philopoemen's settlement had not created the general peace and stability which they needed, and that it was by no means going to be generally accepted as the last word on the problem by those most intimately concerned: if he claimed this, it could already be shown to be otherwise. He was therefore unable to have one of his close supporters elected strategos for 188/7, thus breaking for the first time the dominant position which he had held since his return from Crete.

The one event which we know occurred in Aristaenus' strategia of 188/7 was the synodos of late summer, held at Megalopolis. At this synodos several embassies from abroad were received, and Achaean ambassadors returning from missions abroad were heard. The first report was from Nicodemus of Elis, who brought the news that the Senate was dissatisfied at Philopoemen's action at Compasion, but did not intend to take any action. No decision or action seemed necessary from the Achaeans, and the matter was shelved. It seemed clear that Philopoemen had been successful with this fait
accompli; and Aristaenus was not the man to shrug off obvious Achaean advantage by making an issue of the reply for personal political reasons. It seemed wiser to accept the rebuke along with the declaration of Roman non-interference. Aristaenus, as much as Philopoemen wanted to give the Spartan settlement every chance of success. The fact was, that if it failed - as already seemed possible - no Achaean politician had an acceptable alternative to offer. Nicodemus' report therefore attracted no discussion.

After Nicodemus, envoys from Eumenes of Pergamum were received: they offered to renew the alliance, and gave details of an offer of 120 talents, which Eumenes was making to the Achaeans, which he intended should be invested and the interest used to provide a payment for the synodos. Polybius then continues to give details of the debate which followed the offer, which was met by considerable opposition from the Achaeans. Apollonidas of Sicyon argued that, although the amount of money was suitable to the dignity of the Achaeans, the purpose for which it was offered was disreputable, and even illegal. He cited an Achaean law which prevented individuals or officials from taking presents from any of the kings; and argued that, if Eumenes' gift were accepted, all would be openly admitting that they were being bribed. It was now Eumenes offering money: soon it would be Prusias and Seleucus, and the Achaeans would be equally bound by gratitude to each of them. The gift should therefore be refused. The second speaker was Cassander of Aegina. Aegina was still in Pergamene hands, and Cassander argued that to accept
Eumenes' offer now, would be to acquiesce in his continued possession of Aegina. The synodos then unanimously rejected the offer.¹⁵

Aegina had been in Pergamene hands now for more than 20 years; there was little prospect of its being returned to Achaea; yet it was still claimed as Achaean, still the exiled Aeginetans exercised their Achaean citizenship. Although we hear nothing about the effect of this issue on Achaeans policies until 187, it was clearly kept alive, in much the same way as contemporary claims of the same type are maintained as long-term policies. Achaea had not been rash enough to commit herself to the equivalent of a Hallstein doctrine, but tempered Aeginetan emotion with diplomatic good sense. Nevertheless, the Aeginetan lobby was clearly of some strength. And with reason; for the completeness of the control which the Pergamene governors exercised over Aegina must have found its emotional reaction in an Achaea which still affected political independence. Even if this was occasionally circumscribed, the pretension was there, and opposition to the conditions illustrated by the Cleon inscription must have been entrenched in Achaea.¹⁴

This maintained hostility on the local issue had not resulted in doctrinaire blindness on the broader. It had not prevented the formation of an alliance with Attalus, or action on it when requested by Eumenes. But political conditions had changed since the defeat of Antiochus, and the fulfilment of Roman wishes no longer directed Achaeans foreign policy. Eumenes had made good use of the Achaeans troops which had been sent to him in 190; and as a result of the
Roman victory over Antiochus - in which the Achaeans had played a part, together with Eumenes - he had received large territorial accessions in Asia Minor. Although there is no reason to assume that the Achaean troops had not been paid by Eumenes - perhaps through Attalus - it was clearly in his interest that the troops of the Achaeans should still be available for the future, perhaps to defend his new possessions, perhaps to gain more. The treaty with the Achaeans, which had already proved so unexpectedly useful, was therefore to be renewed; and as an attempt to commit Achaea to his support for the future, he offered the 120 talents to the synodos.

The Achaeans reacted to this in exactly the same way as Philopoemen had acted when Timolaus had tried to buy his support at Sparta. Aristaenus had no desire to compromise Achaean foreign policy in advance, and there is no reason for believing that Philopoemen would have acted differently. The reference to Prusias and Seleucus in Apollonidas' speech voices the fear that the Achaeans might find themselves intimately tied to the support of conflicting interests in Asia, once a precedent was set by the acceptance of Eumenes' offer. The new non-committal policy of the Senate could not be expected to help them decide on the correct course of action. If, therefore, freedom was to be maintained in policy-making, it was necessary that no excessive ties of gratitude should be contracted with foreign powers. Apollonidas did not make explicit the particular disfavour which an Achaean would feel for being bound to Eumenes in this way: he politely disguised this as an objection.
based on opposition to the trend which it would set. But he must have had in mind that Aegina had been bought by Attalus, with the notorious consequences. In these circumstances no free Greek, with any claim to freedom of action, could have allowed himself to act otherwise than in opposition to this flagrant example of Pergamene cheque-book diplomacy. He knew his advice was popular, and could support it with the moral appeal to the Achaean law and the recidvature of the synodos - which could no doubt have been quietly set aside, had interest lain in that direction. But this did not prevent him from concluding with a violent personal attack on Eumenes: diò μη μόνον ἄπειπάσθαι παρεκάλει τοὺς Ἀχαίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ μισεῖν τὸν Εὐμένην διὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῆς δόσεως. Cassander appropriately did not have the same hesitations as Apollonidas, but came straight to the point, stressing the fact that Aegina had been bought. In the circumstances it was not surprising that the synodos, swayed by these emotional appeals of their leaders - who in this case had hard-headed politics behind them - unanimously voted for the rejection of Eumenes' offer; and this probably meant the end of the alliance.

It is possible that there were also sound internal reasons for the synodos' rejection of Eumenes' offer. There was, at the time, no payment for attendance at the meetings of the synodos; therefore only those who could afford to finance themselves were able to play any large part in federal politics. This ensured that the administration of the League remained solidly middle and upper class. If this element of self-financing were removed by Eumenes' gift, it
might well open the way for lower class demagogues to play a serious part in federal politics, to the exclusion of some of the more respectable but less talented middle-class members. This prospect would immediately arouse opposition from the capitalist classes, whose money made it possible for them to participate in the business of the synodoi. We must therefore see these vested political interests also at play in the rejection of Eumenes' offer, making the emotional appeal about Aegina, and the strictly foreign-policy considerations coincide to a large extent with personal interest.  

The same synodoi immediately found another opportunity of emphasising the Achaean desire to maintain unimpaired the possibility of forming an independent foreign policy, unhindered by any moral commitments, such as Eumenes had tried to obtain. When Seleucus' envoys were received for the renewal of the treaty, they made an offer of ten warships, which would have been an important addition to the Achaean navy. The motive was quite clear, as it was obviously in the interest of the new Seleucid king to make an early attempt at securing the goodwill of one of the more important Roman clients in Greece; and from his point of view, the offer of the ships was in itself modest, and unlikely to create the invidious impression of an attempt at buying Achaean support. But Eumenes had already aroused Achaean suspicions of this kind of offer, and the same considerations had to be made by the Achaeans with regard to Seleucus' offer as with Eumenes'; and although the alliance was renewed - a token of friendship and safeguard for the future - the gift of the ships was
rejected. Aristaenus' cautiousness was again predominant.

Although the rejection of the gifts of Eumenes and Seleucus represented successes for Aristaenus, they were not controversial or factional successes, for there is no reason for believing that Philopoemen would have advised differently. But Aristaenus did have a major political success at the synodos, and this was gained at the expense of Philopoemen's group. Towards the end of Philopoemen's strategia of 189/8 he had sent Lycortas, accompanied by two Sicyonians, Theodoridas and Rhositeles, to Alexandria, in order to negotiate the renewal of the current Achaean alliance with the Ptolemies. Lycortas had returned in time to make his report at this synodos at Megalopolis, and was accompanied by Egyptians bringing gifts from Epiphanes, which consisted of 6,000 bronze peltast shields and 200 talents of coined bronze. The negotiations had been ostentatiously successful, and the alliance had been sworn. A new diplomatic triumph for Lycortas and Philopoemen's party had been gained, which only required the formality of ratification by the synodos. The gifts were offered in an essentially different spirit from those from Eumenes and Seleucus, for throughout a great part of the third century Achaean had been in receipt of subsidies from Egypt, for as long as Achaean and Ptolemaic policies coincided. Still in the second century the Ptolemies maintained a naval station in Achaean territory at Methana, and this must have been countenanced by the Achaean authorities, on the 'sovereign base' principle. We hear of no agitation to have the base removed - such as there was against
Eumenes' continued possession of Aegina - and must assume that it was generally accepted by the Achaeans without opposition: it no doubt brought some prosperity and employment to a remote part of the Argolid. It might therefore be expected that the Egyptian gifts would not be considered to have 'strings' attached, but were rather in the spirit of the third-century subsidies, and therefore, even in second-century conditions, were more acceptable.

When Lycortas had made his report, Aristaenus opened the discussion. He saw in these apparently successful negotiations of Lycortas and his colleagues an opportunity to blur the image of active efficiency which Philopoemen was trying to create for his group. On a point of information, he asked which of the many alliances which the Achaeans had had with the Ptolemies at various times, each containing widely differing terms, had been renewed by Lycortas. On the face of it, this request was reasonable enough, for Aristaenus as strategos clearly needed to know such information. But he must have suspected some irregularity when he was prepared to make an issue of it at the synodos. He must already have undertaken some research into the Achaean archives in order to discover the state of the alliances before Lycortas was sent to Egypt; and as a result of this research, he must have realised that Philopoemen had not made such a thorough examination, that he therefore had a great opportunity to shatter public confidence in Philopoemen's group.

He therefore asked his apparently ingenuous question. The result was highly satisfactory; for neither the Egyptian ambassadors nor
Lycortas was able to answer; attempts to make light of the matter by treating it with good-humoured levity were not successful in deceiving the synodos, some members of which must have been prepared for Aristaenus’ manoeuvre. Philopoemen, whose was the ultimate responsibility, was unable to clarify the issue. Aristaenus was in sight of a major political success. As strategos, he refused to allow the synodos to ratify the alliance, which was therefore shelved. Even Polybius records that Philopoemen’s party was generally considered to have failed to take sufficient care over public matters which were entrusted to them; Aristaenus acquired the reputation of alone knowing his business.

Aristaenus had scored a major success over Philopoemen, who was, at least temporarily, discredited. Yet we should not assume that Aristaenus was necessarily opposed to the continuation of friendly relations with Egypt: had this been so he could have organised a speaker to oppose the Ptolemaic possession of Methana. The fault which he had revealed was as much a fault of the Alexandrian chancellery as of the Achaean strategos; and his refusal to give carte blanche to the negotiators was only statesmanlike caution. He was simply using the issue - which was not of any great urgency - for immediate political advantage, without prejudice to the ultimate result. In fact, the alliance was not concluded in the immediate future, but had to wait for Lycortas, who successfully completed the negotiations, probably in his strategia of 185/4: he was quite as much committed to the alliance as Philopoemen, and would be likely
to settle the issue as soon as he got the chance. Aristaenus, on the other hand, had every interest to make political capital by postponing the negotiations, in order to emphasise that the inefficiency of Philopoemen's party was responsible for depriving Achaea of the security of the alliance and the enjoyment of the gifts. As far as the gifts were concerned, we have seen that they were essentially different in intent from those of Eumenes and Seleucus; and were therefore accepted when the negotiations on the alliance were finally successful.

Aristaenus had shown himself at the synodos eager, as far as possible, to preserve a non-aligned Achaea. Fulfilment of the terms of a general alliance depended, as always, on the circumstances of the moment, and the effect on the immediate policies of the states concerned. They were by no means as binding as the more strictly moral ties, which would have been contracted by the acceptance of a large donative from a king. Apollonidas was certainly correct when he argued that the Achaeans would feel that they had been bought—and moreover, the donor would expect them to feel this. As a result, the obligation stemming from this was felt to be more compulsive than that from a formal legal alliance. There could be no doubt that Aristaenus carried a majority of the synodos with him in this, and it is likely that this included Philopoemen. On the other hand, Philopoemen had suffered a major defeat in Aristaenus' demonstration of his reckless inefficiency over the Egyptian alliance; and other members of his group must have shared his discredit. On this ground
alone, therefore, it would be surprising to find Philopoemen or one of his party elected to the strategia for 187/6. In addition to the Egyptian business it might be expected that a further tactless strategia of Philopoemen would lead to a further deterioration in relations with Rome. If Philopoemen was the unknown strategos for 187/6, he did not long retain his ascendancy, as Aristaenus was re-elected as soon as was legally possible, in 186/5.

In 185, in the course of Aristaenus' 4th strategia, relations with Rome again assumed a preponderant importance for Achaea. Q. Caecilius Metellus came to Achaea after spending some time in Macedonia collecting complaints against Philip. It was July, and the time of the Nemea, when Metellus arrived in Achaea. The Achaean magistrates therefore assembled to meet him at Argos. Metellus had no official letters from the Senate; therefore, it seems likely that the visit to Achaea was no part of his original instructions from the Senate. The purpose of this unofficial visit seems to have been simply to impress the Achaean with his own importance, and to assert Roman patronage after a gap of two years. Aristaenus, as much as Philopoemen, had attached more importance to his interpretation of the Senate's declaration, in its reply to Nicodemus in 187, that it intended to take no action on the Spartan settlement, than to the phrase of the reply which deplored the Achaean violence. At the time, this had seemed less relevant, as no action was required. As a result, no action had been taken by the Achaean in the intervening period, except such as was necessary to continue the process of
Spartan integration into the League. But to a Roman, with Metellus' intention of interfering in Achaea for interference's sake, this gave a useful opportunity. It was legitimate, for his purposes, to ignore the more moderate and negative aspect of the original senatorial intention, and draw attention to the positive aspect, which the Achaeans had so far ignored. Metellus chose to restate the Senate's disapproval in his own terms.

It was with this that the conference opened. Metellus repeated the Senate's disapproval of the Achaean violence at Compassion; but went further than the Senate, which had required no action. Metellus parexále diá pлеiónov διορθώσασθαι τὴν προγεγευμένην δήμοιν. This demand took the Achaeans by surprise. Nothing had led them to think that the senatorial attitude had changed since 187; yet Metellus was recklessly demanding that they re-open the whole Spartan question, a demand which, if pressed into action, would destroy everything which had been achieved by the relative stability of the past two years. Aristaenus, the strategos, remained silent.

Polybius gives his own partisan interpretation of this: δῆλος ὅτι ἐκ αὐτῷ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος δυσαρεστεῖται τοῖς ἐκοινωμένοις καὶ συνενδέχεται τοῖς ἐπὶ Καισαρίαν λεγομένοις. This interpretation, in fact, is precisely the opposite to what we would expect Aristaenus' true motives to have been. Had he been so grossly dissatisfied with the Spartan settlement as to approve (even tacitly) of Metellus' demand for new action, he had himself held two strategiai since the settlement, in which he could have put into operation the means to
reverse it; and he would have been assured of senatorial approval
had he undertaken this. Yet he had accepted fully every implication
of Philopoemen's settlement by his failure to attempt to reverse it:
the presence and complaint of Metellus are sufficient proof that no
change had been contemplated. Had Aristaenus wished to express
satisfaction at Metellus' demands, his silence would not have been
the best way to show Metellus that he agreed with everything he
said; and in the circumstances, Aristaenus' silence shows clearly
that he considered himself to be tarred with the same brush as
Philopoemen over Sparta. As Metellus was not expecting open
opposition, Aristaenus thought it politic to keep quiet about his
real feelings, in the knowledge that he would only antagonise
Metellus by expressing them, and giving them the air of officialness.
Protestation of what the Achaeans thought the Senate had meant in
187 had no value, even as face-saving arguments, when confronted with
the text of the Senate's reply and Metellus' interpretation of it.
Silence was the only possible course for Aristaenus.

Diophanes, however, in sharp contrast to Aristaenus' reticence,
rushed in with personal charges against Philopoemen. Aristaenus had
accepted Philopoemen's settlement of Sparta; since 191 Diophanes
had not been allowed to gain any official position from which he
could commit himself, even to the wrong course; and this must have
angered him. But Diophanes had suffered more than this political
eclipse: in addition to being kept out of further office, he had
been personally offended by Philopoemen's interference with
Flamininus' settlement of Messene, in which he had played an important part. Diophanes therefore had adequate private reason for feeling aggrieved at Philopoemen, and he was prepared to give voice in support of whoever attacked Philopoemen. Metellus' reproaches were just what Diophanes needed: he was hurt, and did not consider the more distant effects of his self-defence. It is this kind of behaviour which Polybius had in mind when he described Diophanes, at this time, as an inadequate politician άνθρωπος στρατιωτικότερος και πολιτικότερος. Diophanes expressed full agreement with Metellus' condemnation of Philopoemen's action at Sparta, and added his private complaint about the handling of Messene. Personal rancour had broken the unified front which the Achaeans had so far presented to Metellus. Had Diophanes kept his personal complaints to himself, Metellus would have had the satisfaction of impressing himself on the Achaeans by administering his rebuke - which was all he had wanted in the first place; the Achaeans would have accepted this in silence, and continued their inaction. All honours would have been satisfied.

The possibility of this satisfactory outcome was removed now by Diophanes' indulging his personal interest in Messene and hostility towards Philopoemen. Metellus at once noticed the dissension, and seeing the possibility of making a greater personal effect, put on a show of anger at the fact that the Achaeans had not yet taken any action over Sparta. The calmness had been shattered; personal hostilities had been allowed to rule action; Metellus' new speech
provoked Philopoemen's party. Speeches by Philopoemen himself, Lycortas, and Archon made open defence of the Spartan settlement, and emphasised the supreme importance of allowing the stable conditions at Sparta to continue. Despite Diophanes' tirade, it became clear that the meeting as a whole approved the maintenance of the settlement, and Metellus realised this. He again showed anger at the frustration of his efforts - since his reliance on the split shown by Diophanes' speech, he was more than ever committed to compelling positive action from the Achaeans: he could not have immediately realised that Diophanes was in a minority of one - and demanded a syncletos to hear his point of view. He no doubt hoped that the larger meeting would be less mindful of the broader political implications for Achaea, and pay more serious attention to his bluster. The Achaean magistrates were equal to the occasion, and replied by demanding to see his written instructions from the Senate, in accordance with which he would have had the right to be considered an official ambassador, and quoted the Achaean law on the subject, which forbade the official reception by a syncletos of Roman envoys who were without written instructions from the Senate. Metellus had none, and saw himself beaten: frustrating indeed for the Roman, using his initiative and already exceeding his instructions, to find the internal laws of the client state interfering with his wishes, which he considered a higher legality. The exploitation of clientela was complete; and at the moment, Metellus was powerless to do anything about it. In an attempt at rescuing what remained of his dignity, he stormed out of the meeting before a formal answer to
his initial request had been given.

Aristaenus, as strategos, must have been more deeply involved in this rejection of Metellus' request than any other Achaean; yet he gets no credit for this from Polybius. But despite the unfavourable picture which Polybius records of Aristaenus at this meeting, it was not his own considered verdict. For this, we must look at the comparison which he makes between Aristaenus and Philopoemen. In that place, his conclusion is that Philopoemen's policy was ἀλή, Aristaenus' εὐκρήμων, and both ἀυθαλὲς. This judgement does not include any suspicion of traitorous behaviour, such as is implied in his account of the Argos meeting; and as the syncrisis represents Polybius' quietly considered opinion, we must explain the occurrence of the earlier account, which can only represent contemporary propaganda. The answer probably lies in Polybius himself and his political associates. At the time of the Argos meeting, Polybius cannot have been much more than 20 years old, an undiscriminating age, at which he would be ready to accept the versions of events and assessments of characters which Philopoemen and Lycortas found it convenient to propound. When he later came to write of the events, Polybius could not be sine ira et studio: he had been involved—even if only as a passive recipient of the adverse propaganda—and would tend to react towards the events in retrospect in the same way as he had at the time. In his comparison of Aristaenus and Philopoemen, he was judging policies in general terms, with a different point of reference. He was therefore able to reach a better balanced and less partisan conclusion.
Despite this independent view of Aristaenus' career, Polybius colours his picture with Lycortas' tints when he ends the synkrisis with φήμη δὲ τις ἐνετρεχὲν ὡς Ἀρισταῖνος ῶπαμαῖος εὐνοοστέρον μᾶλλον ἢ τιλοποίμενος ὑπάρχοντος. Although he seems to be trying to dissociate himself from the rumour, he had no reason to record it at all if he considered it to be wholly false. Even in this attempt at dispassionate comparison, his father's political opposition affected Polybius' judgement. The differences in policy were, in fact, differences of method rather than end, as Polybius' analysis shows clearly; but in this case, where the main difference had to be sought in the emphasis to be placed on a personal interpretation of τὸ καλὸν κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον, passions ran high, and control of the source of long-term propaganda - in this case Polybius - has been sufficient to achieve the permanent misrepresentation of a statesman, who was as loyal and patriotic as any of his contemporaries.25

Although Polybius was capable of discarding the contemporary propaganda, it is this which has most affected the portrait of Aristaenus in his account. In the propaganda of the Philopoemenists, Aristaenus was Philopoemen's opponent, therefore capable of no patriotic action. Yet if we reject Polybius' partisan interpretation of Aristaenus' action at Argos, we find nothing which suggests that Aristaenus was in any way inferior to Philopoemen in his patriotic desire to maintain intact the vital Spartan settlement. Aristaenus was not the only Achaean to keep quiet at Metellus'
initial demand; yet Aristaenus alone is branded as a sympathiser by the propaganda. When the magistrates spoke on the proposal, Aristaenus did not reply to Diophanes: but sufficient had already been said by Philopoemen, Lycortas, and Archon to make it unnecessary for the strategos to add anything, which would only have the effect of prejudicing Metellus further against him. In this, the significant fact is that Aristaenus could probably have refused to put the question to the vote, had he disapproved of the inevitable result. Yet the motion was carried. Again, Aristaenus as strategos must have been the man who cited the law to Metellus, which refused him the synclatos; yet Polybius passes over in silence the lead which he must ex officio have taken in this. In his account, the refusal was made by the sum total of the magistrates - a strange contrast with his account of the 187 synodes, where personalities are named explicitly on each issue. It seems clear that Polybius is simply retailing propaganda, in which Aristaenus' part was consciously concealed in favour of the party of Philopoemen, who were named individually, and Diophanes, with whom Aristaenus is unjustly associated.

Aristaenus was a serious political danger to Philopoemen because he was successful. He had gained two strategiai at the expense of Philopoemen's group, and his policy was close enough to Philopoemen's to make the latter appear simply the more dangerous version. It was necessary to discredit him if the Philopoemenists were to survive as an effective group, and they chose this meeting at Argos as the
crisis point. It is not altogether clear why they thought Aristaenus could be successfully misrepresented over this. The method is clear enough: to discredit him by bracketing him with Diophanes as an unpatriotic Romanophile, which Diophanes' convenient outburst at Argos made easier. Since his *strategia* of 192/1, Diophanes had moved into a position of severe opposition to the Philopoemenists, and seems to have begun to realise that, in the long run, only compliance with Roman requests and a non-partisan settlement of Sparta and Messene was a viable policy. But this policy only became effective in Achaea after the death of Philopoemen, when Callicrates adopted it. In 185 it was traitor-talk. It is not clear how the propaganda was able successfully to associate Aristaenus with this currently disreputable policy. Polybius says that 'the Achaeans' accused Aristaenus and Diophanes of having invited Metellus, and in 188 Fulvius. It seems clear that 'the Achaeans' in question are no other than Philopoemen's group. But it is one thing to raise a rumour, another to make it stick as a reputation. And Aristaenus must have been vehement in his counter-propaganda. It seems an insufficient explanation of Philopoemen's success to simply assume that the *strategos* failed to counteract this hostile propaganda adequately, although it was demonstrably untrue.

The suspicions of Diophanes may bear some relation to the facts, for Diophanes was a self-confessed Romanophile. But we cannot assume that Aristaenus courted disaster by inviting Metellus to make the disastrous appearance at the meeting of magistrates.
Nevertheless, the propaganda’s effectiveness and the fact that the Philopomists chose this issue for the struggle suggest that there may have been some awkwardness about Metellus’ visit, which prevented Aristaenus from defending himself effectively against the propaganda. The year was a Nemea year, and the crucial meeting took place at the time and place of the Nemea. This suggests at once that Metellus was in Argos primarily for the celebration of the festival. Aristaenus was strategos, and therefore must have been responsible for entertaining him. It seems unlikely that Metellus would simply appear at the festival - a visit to Achaea was not on his official itinerary - without a specific invitation. But there is no difficulty in this, for it is likely that, as the official Roman representative in Greece, he would be given an invitation as a matter of normal diplomatic courtesy. If so, the invitation must have been issued by the strategos Aristaenus.

If this reconstruction of the likely course of events is correct, we may have discovered the awkward situation which prevented Aristaenus from adequately countering the propaganda of the Philopomists. He could not deny that he had invited Metellus to Achaea, although the invitation was for a different purpose. He had not wanted him to speak to the magistrates; but once in Achaea, Metellus could be approached by any dissident parties - whether Diophanes or some Spartan group - and make a request for a meeting. In the circumstances, Aristaenus could not refuse. The innocent formal invitation to the Roman ambassador to attend the
Nemea celebrations was turned by the Philopoemenists' propaganda into a plot to overthrow the patriotic policy. Aristaenus was branded with Diophanes. The slander is manifest. Yet it succeeded in its purpose; the charges stuck; and the disreputable manoeuvre ended Aristaenus' political career. From this time he disappears from Achaean history, and the party of Philopoemen, now entrenched as the only patriotic group, remained in power until Philopoemen's death removed his auctoritas.

The visit of Metellus and the support given him by Diophanes gave an ideal opportunity to the Philopoemenist propaganda machine. When it set to work after Metellus' departure, it was not surprising to find that Lycortas was elected strategos for 185/4. The year saw various developments, both in the situation at Sparta and in relations with Rome, all of which stemmed from the rebuff of Metellus. The Achaeans realised that, although Metellus had not had any formal letters from the Senate authorising him to interfere in Achaea, and although the Achaeans were fully justified by their law in refusing him a hearing at a syncletos, it was likely that he would make bitter complaints about the lack of co-operation he had encountered when he visited Argos. In order that his misrepresentation should not pass unopposed, Apollonidas of Sicyon was dispatched to Rome to represent the Achaeans. It is not clear whether he was sent by Lycortas or Aristaenus; he had led the opposition to Eumenes' offer in 187, and may well have belonged to Aristaenus' group. But we have seen from the evidence of the meeting at Argos
that there was little serious disagreement in Achaea - except for Diophanes - on the issue of Sparta; and the defence made by Apollonidas in Rome would have been equally appropriate whichever strategos had sent him.\footnote{26}

There were two aspects of the Achaean reception of Metellus which were discussed by the Senate: the problem of Sparta, and the Achaean refusal to summon a synclétos for him. These were treated separately. Over the refusal of the synclétos, Apollonidas took as the basis of his defence the same argument as Aristaenus had used to foil Metellus at the actual meeting: the citation of the law which limited the synclétos to decisions about alliance, war, or letters from the Senate. Against this legal argument Metellus gave vent to a general accusation of Philopoemen and Lycortas, and the state of the Spartan question - Aristaenus must have been included in this tirade, although Polybius makes no mention of it. In contrast with the violence of Metellus' language, the Senate's reply was studiously moderate: it was impressed upon Apollonidas that fitting reception should always be given to Roman representatives. This simply emphasised the importance, for any diplomatic exchange, of the grant of reciprocal facilities. No attempt was made to come to terms with the Achaean law; this was a question which the Senate evaded. It was quite within its power to recommend that the law be altered, that special exceptions should be made in the case of Romans. Yet it did not make any such recommendations.
It seems clear that the Senate did not think that it was at all publicly involved in the rejection of Metellus' demand, which it had not authorised; and Metellus' private commitment was politely disowned by the Senate, with a mild attempt at saving face by the citation of general principles of diplomatic communication. The law could clearly be useful to the Fathers if they wanted to keep their legates strictly in check, if they wanted to preserve the possibility of rejecting inconvenient public involvement when private prestige had been unofficially and unnecessarily committed. A similar interpretation should be given to the Senatus Consultum brought to the attention of the Greeks by C. Popillius Laenas and Cn. Octavius in winter 170/69, which instructed the states of Greece not to provide troops to any Roman commander unless he was in possession of a Senatus Consultum explicitly authorising this. The usual interpretation has been that the Senate simply wanted to recover the goodwill of the Greeks before the war with Perseus;\textsuperscript{26a} but an additional - and equally important - consideration must have been the Senate's own insistence, in view of recent events, on the Senate oligarchy's corporate control of all foreign policy - the same consideration which led to their disowning Metellus in 185/3. In 184 the Achaean realises that the Senate was not prepared to take full responsibility for the private actions of its diplomats, which did not concern it, and the law probably remained on the Achaean statute book.

In the case of Sparta, however, the new commitment which
Metellus had undertaken could not be shrugged off so easily, for he had simply given new emphasis to already declared senatorial policy. The fact that he had re-introduced the matter, when the Senate would have preferred to let it lie dormant, was in this case irrelevant, for his private action in this sphere necessarily involved public commitment. It was also complicated by a new factor, for which Metellus was wholly responsible. His expression of interest in Sparta had roused Areus and Alcibiades, two of the 'old exiles', who were dissatisfied with their reception at Sparta, to go to Rome. Their names are significant of their Spartan royal background; and their aim was simply the re-establishment of a glorious and independent Sparta - in which the chief glory would fall to them. They were unwilling to be 'grateful' to the traditional enemies of their city for their restoration, for this would have meant acquiescing in Achaean control. But they had not taken any action until Metellus inadvisedly expressed renewed Roman dissatisfaction at Philopoemen's settlement. The glory-seekers leapt at the chance, and hastened to Rome, where they were received by the Senate and disputed with Apollonidas' legation. Apollonidas had had, as part of his mission, an attempt at improving Achaean relations with Rome over Sparta; and he conceived of this as a simple explanation that matters could not have been better managed than by Philopoemen. The presence of Areus and Alcibiades, and the policy they represented, was unfortunate for Apollonidas, for this open denial of the truth of his statement took a great deal of weight from his arguments. Faced
with two such diametrically opposed views, and the consideration that Metellus had already committed Rome to new activity on the Spartan question, the Senate had little alternative but to add Achaea to the terms of reference of the mission which was to investigate Macedonia again in 184, headed by App. Claudius Pulcher: there would be no doubt about Pulcher's having written instructions to visit Achaea. This prevented the Senate from committing itself to a course of action based on insufficient evidence, and admitting that it had no positive policy towards Achaea. On the other hand, it continued the non-committal apology for a policy, of asserting legitimate interest in client Achaea, which Metellus had embarrassingly again brought to light.

Areus and Alcibiades did not represent all the restored 'old exiles', but were an extremist breakaway group. Their complaints before the Senate concerned the power and status of their city which had been shattered in the settlement of Philopoemen. They argued their desire for a free Spartan state, free of all the limitations which the federal mechanism inevitably imposed on them - in particular, the necessity to act, both publicly and individually, like the other cities of the League, in accordance with the regulations laid down by federal magistrates, was felt to be irksome. When Apollonidas returned to Achaea and made it known that Pulcher had been given explicit instructions to deal with Achaea, and that Areus and Alcibiades had been received by the Senate, where they had apparently found favour, Lycortas decided that a synodos should
discuss all issues which might be raised by Pulcher when he addressed the synклетос, and decide as far as possible what line should be taken. The great issue was Sparta and the action the Achaeans should take over the sectional appeal of Areus and Alcibiades to the Senate. The ties of gratitude, with which Philopoemen had hoped to hold the support of the 'old exiles' after their restoration, had not proved as strong as expected; and the synодос fully shared his indignation that due gratitude owing to Achaea from this section of the 'old exiles' had not been shown. Passions became inflamed at the thought that Areus and Alcibiades, through their traditionalist independent view of Spartan policy, were calling in Roman intervention, which might easily result in the loss of Achaean freedom of action. Instead of quietly attempting to work out a solution to this new facet of the Spartan problem and its implications with regard to relations with Rome, the meeting allowed emotionalism to take the upper hand; and Areus and Alcibiades were condemned to death.29

There was little reason behind this. It must have been apparent that a solution could not be reached in this way which would satisfy the Senate; even if it remained essentially indifferent, Metellus' action and the appeal of Areus and Alcibiades had made it necessary to act in order to save face. Sparta was, in any case, the one issue in Achaea on which the Senate had continued - even if in a desultory manner - to assert its interest. The purpose of the meeting had been to form a policy - ideally, to find a means whereby a
satisfactory compromise could be reached, which would have allowed the Senate to extricate itself from its support of Areus and Alcibiades, without severely damaging the Spartan settlement. It had ended by destroying the possibility of a reasonable compromise policy being formed. Lycortas was now condemned to face Pulcher at the synoletos with the mandate to defend this extreme position to him.

But worse was to come. When Pulcher arrived at Cleitor, where the synoletos had been called for him, he was accompanied by Areus and Alcibiades. Pulcher began with the now almost traditional statement of policy, the condemnation of Philopoemen's settlement after Compasion. Reply was made by Lycortas on behalf of the Achaeans. The speech, as found in Livy, cannot be held to represent the actual words of Lycortas, and therefore a detailed examination is valueless for the present purpose; but Pausanias confirms that the spirit of the speech is correctly given by Livy. It was fully in the spirit of the most extreme members of Philopoemen's party, not at all suited to the delicate diplomacy which was required. Lycortas went as far as to suggest that the real responsibility for the present dissatisfaction was the ineffectiveness of Roman policy on the Spartan issue in 189, the already existing stasis in Sparta, and the ingratitude - this could never be forgotten by Philopoemen's group - of Areus and Alcibiades. Had Lycortas given up all hope of reaching a negotiated settlement, and determined merely to establish his reputation locally as a patriot, he could not have spoken less
relevantly. It was a speech which found its origins in frustration and despair.30

The reaction of the mildest Roman could not have been favourable to Achaea; Pulcher did not suffer from the lack of the usual Claudian consciousness of his dignitas. In fact, the only wise reaction on the part of the Achaeans would have been the silence which had initially greeted Metellus the previous year. No speech, however conciliatory, could have had any effect on the preconceptions which conditioned Roman requirements as expressed by Pulcher. However reasonable the defence might appear to be from the Achaean point of view, the very fact of Lycortas' daring to make it showed the Roman that the essential nature of the client-patron relationship between the two states was being flagrantly violated by the Achaeans. In the circumstances the speech was irrelevant; and worse, insolent and provocative. Roman policy could not take its arguments into consideration, and its content was duly ignored by Pulcher. His subsequent statement, expressed with the usual Claudian consciousness of dignity, was that, although it was in his power to treat the Achaeans however he wished - a more than usually naked statement of what clientela could mean to a Claudian - he would be happier if the Achaeans could be persuaded to act without compulsion, in accordance with the normal client's desire to perform officia. The threat frightened the synodos; faced with no alternative, it could only comply. The syncletes did not realise that the words themselves in Pulcher's reply to Lycortas
were the only reality: the threats they expressed were mere bluster. There was no likelihood of physical senatorial intervention to force a settlement at Sparta, as the magistrates at Argos had realised when confronting Metellus the previous year. The larger syncletos, however, could be stampeded by threats, as Metellus had hoped, and as the present case demonstrated: Pulcher was able to have his way. There was nothing the strategos could do, despite his more realistic appreciation of the extent of senatorial commitment. The syncletos gave Pulcher carte blanche over Sparta; but the only specific action taken was to rescind the recent condemnation of Areus and Alcibiades. Pulcher was satisfied to have impressed the Achaeans with their real status, and was careful to avoid involving the Senate in any complications relating to specific details of the Spartan settlement. 31

Pulcher drove home his message about Roman supremacy in the clientela relationship, by granting the Spartans dispensation from the terms of the convention which regulated the dispatch of embassies to Rome, and gave them permission to send envoys. 32 They were ready to take full advantage of this, and four separate groups of envoys, each representing different policies and interests, were dispatched to Rome and received by the Senate in winter 184/3. The readiness of the Spartans to act in this way suggests that there was general dissatisfaction in Sparta at the way in which Areus and Alcibiades had managed to obtain factional advantage, by having established close relations with important senators. But there is
no evidence which suggests that Pulcher allowed the Spartans to secede from the League.\textsuperscript{33} The fact that he gave them permission to send ambassadors to Rome clearly suggests that he was not prepared to take any decision on details, which would commit the Senate in advance to a new controversial settlement. Despite his emphasis on his general ability to take any action regarding Achaea unilaterally, he did not in fact do more than state this position. The federal authorities, representing Philopoemen's party, sent Xenarchus to negotiate the renewal of the foedus, and continue Achaean representation at the discussions on Sparta.\textsuperscript{34}

It is fortunate that Polybius' own account of these envoys and the policies they each represented, is extant, as Livy's is summary. It is therefore possible to define more accurately the course of Spartan history.\textsuperscript{35} The first group (in the order in which Polybius describes them) was headed by Lysis. They represented 'old exiles', and predictably wanted all their property back - δείν ἔχειν αὐτοῖς πᾶσαν τὰς κτήσεις, ἄφ' ἄν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐφύγουν.\textsuperscript{36} This was the traditional and expected demand of the restored exile, and Lysis must have represented the largest proportion of the 'old exiles'. There was also present the royalist splinter group, headed by Areus and Alcibiades. Instead of simply opposing Achaean restrictions on Spartan independence, their policy had now taken on the more positive form of the desire for the re-establishment of a large active citizen body. Their specific proposals were a compromise on the main 'old exile' demands, in favour of this positive policy:
that property to the value of a talent should be restored to the
'old exiles'; and the remainder of the money made available by the
redemption of the exiles' property should be used to enfranchise more
citizens. This seems very like a revival of Cleomenes' schemes for a
resurgent Sparta, although it is unlikely that Areus and Alcibiades
represented an actual body of exiles from that time. Their policy
was nationalist, and therefore was opposed by the other 'old exiles',
who were only interested in recovering their private property. This
sufficiently explains the existence of divided interests among the
'old exiles' and the creation of this 'royalist' splinter group.

The ideas of Areus and Alcibiades show strong anti-Achaean bias,
and a traditionalist desire for Spartan independence, which is in
sharp contrast to the narrowly personal motives of the other groups;
but it is so out of keeping with the reality of the changed circum­
stances, that this glimpse of Cleomenes' nationalism is all we see:
the demand of Areus and Alcibiades, in the form in which it was
stated, could not now be acceptable to the Senate, whose aim was to
solve problems, not create more, or find serious support there.
The methods by which they proposed to achieve their aim was also
traditional: the enfranchisement of those 'worthy of the franchise'.
Usually this had meant helots or perioeci; but in the circumstances
of the time, their source of support would be the ex-adscripti, who
had been enfranchised by Nabis and sold or exiled by Philopoemen.
This aspect of their claim too had its anti-Achaean roots. But it
was on this especially that Areus and Alcibiades must have based
their claim for senatorial support. For the sale and banishment of these new citizens had been one of the specific objections which they had originally raised to Philopoemen's settlement, in their first appearance at Rome the previous spring. The result had been the appointment of Pulcher to examine the Spartan question: clearly this must have seemed to be sympathy extended to their complaints. This policy was now more precisely formulated, and on it and the slogan of traditionalism, Areus and Alcibiades based their hopes of senatorial support.

The third group was headed by Serippus. This party was urging the continuation of the position which Sparta had held since it had become a constituent member of the League. This statement of policy suggests that Serippus was the current representative of the pro-Achaean group, which Timolaus had led, which had been established in power by Philopoemen in 192, had been expelled late in 191, and had been re-established after Compasion. This was the only party at Sparta which had ever shown any enthusiasm for Achaea, as they realised that their position within Sparta depended wholly on Achaeans support: independence of Achaea for them meant exile, as they had learnt between 191 and 188. Therefore now, as Timolaus had earlier, Serippus recommended the continuation of the union with the League, which would give him internal power at Sparta, and Achaeans support for it.

The fourth Spartan group was led by Chaeron. Polybius specifically describes them as ἀλλος δὲ τῶν τεθανατωμένων καὶ τῶν
This is clearly the remains of the tyrant party - the strong-arm men of the tyrants, who must have gone into exile if they escaped massacre at Compasion.

The purpose which Polybius attributes to Chaeron is simply the restoration of these 'new exiles', and the re-establishment of some specific constitution - the text contains a lacuna at this point; but it seems clear that it would be the 'free' constitution which they would want, such as had been in operation between the revolt from Achaea in autumn 189 and the Compasion massacre the following year. Their aim was anti-Achaean, as Polybius makes clear. Hopes of achieving their restoration must have centred on the fact that this party was likely to find favour at Rome, for it was the party which Flamininus had consistently supported against the Achaean supporters of Timolaus, in 192/1; and this support had continued after he left Greece, as the Spartan hostages were restored on request from this group. In 189 again, they had offered dedition to Fulvius; and it had seemed that the Senate's ambiguous reply of spring 188 had favoured their continuation in power at Sparta;37 on many occasions since Compasion, Philopoemen's treatment of their party had been specifically condemned by the Senate and its representatives. There was therefore every reason for Chaeron to consider that his group had a good chance on this, its first appeal to the Senate since 188/7.

These variously conflicting parties appeared before the Senate and argued among themselves, and with the Achaeans, until it was
impossible for the senators en masse to understand all the issues involved. A committee was therefore appointed, consisting of former legati to Greece, Flamininus, Metellus and Pulcher, who were expected to be well-informed on the complicated issues involved, in an attempt to gain agreement for a compromise solution. This committee eventually gained agreement, that Chaeron's exiles should be restored and union with Achaea continue—some pressure may have been exerted by Flamininus on these matters—but discussion was more heated, and no agreement was reached, over the property issue. Nevertheless, a schedule of points of agreement was drawn up, and Xenarchus—rather unwillingly, as he had taken no part in the negotiations—was constrained to put his name to it, together with the Spartan groups, giving it his seal of federal approval. The one point about which the Achaeans felt satisfied was the continuation of the city in the League. Pausanias adds that the walls of Sparta were rebuilt and that the traditional Greek method of settling violently disputed cases—reference to an international arbitration court—was to be employed with capital cases; all others were to be settled by federal judges. The reason for this is easy to see, and it was equitable enough: it removed from the federal jurisdiction the possibility of a repetition of the condemnation of the tyrant group at Compasion, and of Areus and Alcibiades at the synodos of 184—both parties who had suffered were present at the negotiations; from the local jurisdiction, it removed the risk of judgements on property—now expected to be the chief remaining cause of party dissension—being left in the hands of biased local officials. We do not hear
anything more about this issue, which probably indicates that the ruling worked well. 40

The two groups, which had gained at least part of what they had hoped for from the Senate, were Serippus' and Chaeron's; and it is not surprising to find that these two groups, rather than the divided exiles' groups with their unrealistic policies, were able to be dominant in Sparta until 178. The Senate had managed to avoid the admission that it had no ready-made positive policy towards Sparta and Achaea, by appointing the committee of ex-legati to clear up the incomprehensible confusion. The mild policy of limited disapproval of Achaeian action at Compasion had almost recoiled by the confusion which it had caused, when it was belatedly recognised by the Spartans that this could be turned to factional advantage. To demand the acknowledgement of clientela had proved to be no longer sufficient, and the 'eastern experts' were called in to resolve some of the confusion. In general, however, the vague purpose of Roman policy towards Achaea since the defeat of Antiochus continued. Another ambassador was appointed to visit Peloponnese after dealing with developments in Macedon. This time Q. Marcius Philippus was the man. 41 His task on this occasion perhaps was more specific - to examine progress towards the establishment of the agreed compromise at Sparta. In this he failed; and his presence had little effect when he tried to assert Roman influence in the matter of Messene, which also came to a head during his year in Greece.

At some time after the appointment of legati, in winter 184/3,
Deinocrates of Messene travelled to Rome. On his arrival he found that Flamininus had been appointed legatus to Prusias, which meant that he would have to pass through Greece on his journey. Deinocrates was naturally pleased with this; and as far as we know, made no attempt to have a formal interview with the Senate. His plans were for a Messenian movement towards independence from Achaea, and he hoped that his friendship with Flamininus would be sufficiently powerful to have his desire for secession imposed on the federal government with the full weight of Roman patronage. But despite his strong hopes from Flamininus, he did not neglect preparations for meeting the contingency in which Messene might unilaterally declare independence from Achaea. He spent the greater part of the summer making arrangements — no doubt, with the help of Flamininus — for war materials to be shipped to Messene from Italy. By the end of the summer all preparations were complete, and Flamininus, who had delayed his departure, was accompanied by Deinocrates when he left Rome. 42

In Achaea Philopoemen was elected strategos for the 8th time at the autumn synodos, thus maintaining the ascendancy which his group had asserted since the eclipse of Aristaenus after his strategia of 186/5. He soon heard that Flamininus had arrived in Greece; but as Xenarchus had been in Rome at the time of his appointment, it must have been known that Flamininus had no specific senatorial instructions to deal with Achaea. It must also have been known that Messene was disaffected, and that Deinocrates had left for Rome.
Philopoemen's knowledge of Flamininus' past relations with Deinocrates must already have led to suspicions that Deinocrates would try to enlist Flamininus' support for the Messenian cause; and Philopoemen's own personal distrust of Flamininus can only have encouraged the suspicion. Tactics, therefore, had to be considered before Flamininus arrived, in case these suspicions proved justified. It was fortunate that Flamininus' instructions were already known to the Achaeans, for it made it possible to refuse, with the full backing of Achaean law, any dangerous request which he might make for a *syncletos*. No preparations were therefore made for calling a *syncletos* to meet him. The same tactics were to be used as had been successful with Metellus: the full importance of this had been driven home by the success of Pulcher before the *syncletos* at Cleitor.

When Flamininus arrived at Naupactus, he wrote to the Achaean strategoi and damicourgoi as expected, telling them to call a *syncletos* for him. They replied with a request for details, citing, as to Metellus, Achaean law - in this case the law about the prior publication of matters for discussion at the *syncletos*. Flamininus, who was perhaps in a hurry to reach Bithynia before the winter finally set in, did not press his request, and Deinocrates' hopes, and those of the Spartan 'old exiles', now again driven out from Sparta, probably as a result of the success of Serippus and Chaeron before the Senate and the subsequent restoration of the tyrants' party, were disappointed. It is clear that Flamininus did not want to become involved in a battle with the entrenched Achaeans over
Messene, when he had no formal instructions from the Senate - and little personal inclination for lost causes - despite his friendship for Deinocrates and traditional support for the Spartan 'old exiles'. He had encouraged Deinocrates so far for the sake of *clientela*, without any senatorial guidance; but positive trouble-making, which might bring the Achaeans to heel, but which might backfire and leave the Senate to rescue its endangered prestige at the risk of making the Achaeans even less clear about their true status, was to be left to the Messenians themselves. The Senate could not, in the nature of the relationship which it was fumblingly trying to establish, openly interfere: Flamininus' hands were tied the more so, because the Senate's policy was basically his own in the first place.\(^{43}\)

Shortly after this the Messenian revolt broke out, and Philippus was present at an Achaean *synclētēs* at which the question of war with Messene was discussed. He attempted to assert Roman patronage by interfering in order to prevent a declaration of war; but the Achaeans considered action to be immediately necessary, and the Roman advice - as that of Flamininus over Sparta in 192 - given for personal political reasons, was ignored by the Achaeans.\(^{44}\) This Achaean disregard of Philippus' intervention was the more serious, as he had specific instructions from the Senate to investigate Achaea, and could not but produce a further deterioration in Achaean relations with Rome. Philopoemen had again shown that the Achaeans, under his leadership, were unwilling to comply with the requirements of the *clientela* relationship. But the Senate's frustration at this
apparently wilful disregard for client's obligations, in connection with matters in which it had only become interested through force of circumstances, showed itself at the annual reception of foreign ambassadors.

Philippus' official report of his mission was highly unfavourable to the Achaean: he stated bluntly that they showed no intention of referring decisions on any matter to the Senate, had ideas discordant with their status, and intended to resolve everything themselves. The Achaean ambassadors of the year were then introduced. They asked for help against Messene; if no positive Roman help was forthcoming, they asked that the Senate should at least prevent the Italian help for Messene which Deinocrates had arranged the previous year. The reply which they received showed clearly the Senate's justifiable frustration, for Philippus had tried to prevent the war's being declared at all and to reach a negotiated settlement: even if Sparta or Corinth or Argos should secede from the League, the Achaean should not wonder if the Senate thought it was of no relevance to itself. This flung back in Philopoemen's face his own ambiguous position: he refused to countenance unsolicited Roman intervention, which might have an effect on the formulation of Achaean policies, and therefore compromise Achaean independence; on the other hand, Rome was an ally, and as such open to be called upon for aid in any emergency. He could scarcely expect the Senate to accept the implications of this tactless sophistry, and it came to a confrontation over Messene. Philippus' intervention at the synelatos had been
specifically aimed at the prevention of further trouble in Peloponnesse; and he no doubt had hopes that Messene could secure a negotiated settlement, as Sparta had the previous year. This possibility had been rejected outright by the Achaeans, following the first precept of Philopoemen's policy, and not relishing another imposed solution to one of their internal problems. But the necessity of invoking the second - the appeal for Roman help - came immediately; and there is no sign of Achaean embarrassment at their application of double standards. But the Senate naturally felt angry at this insult to its efforts at negotiation, which had simply resulted in an unnecessary complication of Peloponnesian politics.  

Polybius adds that the Senate's reply was given full publicity, and was virtually an invitation to any state to secede from the League with Roman blessing. But despite this anti-senatorial interpretation - coming from Lycortas - this was not true, and the Senate did not wholly yield to its frustration. The envoys, who had received this reply, were not allowed to leave Rome and thus broadcast the news of the Senate's attitude, as Polybius implies - although knowledge of it may have become current unofficially. They were retained until such time as news of the course of the war should reach Rome. The Senate could not take the risk of seeming, even ambiguously, to support the wrong side. When it was learnt that the result of the war was favourable to Achaea, the envoys were again summoned before the Senate, and told that supplies would be prevented from reaching Messene, as they had requested earlier. There was now
no danger that this would alter the course of the war. Polybius interprets this more realistically than the earlier Senatus Consultum: 'This made it clear to everyone that, so far from shuffling off and neglecting less important items of foreign affairs, they were, on the contrary, displeased if everything was not referred to them, and done in accordance with their decision'. It was this point which the Senate had been trying to make since 188, with progressively less success, until frustration had driven them to anger. Polybius says that it was now clear to all: but at least until 179/8, when Callicrates became powerful, there does not seem to be any greater desire among the Achaeans to accept the obligations of their clientela. It was an advantage to understand the Senate's wishes; but the Achaeans did not immediately show that they were prepared to act in compliance with these wishes. In this particular case, the change of opinion on the part of the Senate was simple. The Fathers had waited to see the result of the war, in order to avoid committing their prestige to the support of the losing side.

In the same winter, 183/2, there were two Spartan embassies at Rome. The first represented the 'old exiles', who had been again driven out of the city after the restoration of Chaerone's party. They had looked to Flamininus' presence at Naupactus in autumn 183 to retrieve their position; but had been disappointed, along with Deinocrates' Messenians, when he refused to press the Achaeans. In the first place their embassy had been headed by Arcesilaus and Agesipolis - who had been king of Sparta 'when a young man', perhaps
after the death of Cleomenes - but they had been captured by pirates *en route* and killed. We do not know which section of the 'old exiles' they represented: their connexion with the old royal houses suggests that they might have been attached to the group of Areus and Alcibiades. But as neither Areus and Alcibiades nor Lysis, who led the other section of the 'old exiles' at Rome, are again mentioned in our sources, it is not possible to decide firmly. If they were attached to Areus' and Alcibiades' group, their presence may suggest that Areus and Alcibiades had themselves been eliminated at the time of their re-exile. The remainder of the members of the embassy managed to escape the pirates, and continued their journey to Rome. We do not know what reply was given them by the Senate; but it cannot have been particularly favourable, as far as positive action was concerned. They had been exiled as a direct result of the implementation of the settlement, which had been agreed in the presence of the senatorial committee of ex-*legati*. Any new interference by the Senate involved the admission that the negotiated settlement was unsatisfactory - the exiles would, no doubt, say that it had broken down completely; and in the circumstances of the newly strained relations with Achaea over Messene, it was important that Roman policy towards Peloponnese should maintain the appearance of consistency. 48

The other embassy, from the anti-exile coalition of Seriphus and Chaeron, who held the city, was headed by Seriphus. It is not altogether clear what Seriphus hoped to gain from this journey to
Rome, as Polybius does not make this explicit. But it seems likely that he had two purposes. On the one hand, he represented the Spartan government, the coalition with Chaeron; and in this capacity he had to represent the government's point of view of the new expulsion of the 'old exiles'. On the other hand, he represented his own section of the coalition government, whose key policy was the maintenance of the union with Achaea; in this he differed from Chaeron. It was therefore necessary, in the new circumstances created by the expulsion of the 'old exiles', to reaffirm his sectional commitment to the continuation of the union with Achaea. The Senate was committed to this as a result of the agreement of the previous year; but Chaeron had powerful friends at Rome as a result of his association with Nabis' party. Serippus, therefore, had to attempt to gain a renewed senatorial commitment to support the union with Achaea. This he failed to do. Peloponnesian politics were annually becoming more confused; and the Senate refused to increase its commitment over Sparta: 'They had done all they could, and for the moment did not think the matter concerned them'. But as with the Achaeans, they did not allow Serippus to leave Rome until the summer. The Senate was non-committal, but it did not want knowledge of this non-committal attitude to reach Peloponnesian until some clear line of development in events at Messene could be seen, and a more positive attitude taken. When news of the Achaean success at Messene reached Rome, Serippus was allowed to leave; and he reached Peloponnesian when it was already summer, to find his position at Sparta seriously weakened by
Chaeron's declaration of secession from the League.

After the winter, the war with Messene, the declaration of which Philippus had failed to prevent, started again in Peloponnese. By about the middle of April, the Achaean levy had been assembled in order to make the conventional raids on Messene. Philopoemen, who should have been leading it as strategos, was suffering from a fever at Argos; and Lycortas, who was hipparch, took over the command of the army until Philopoemen should have recovered. The war was urgent, as Deinocrates was supported by supplies from Italy, and could not wait for the strategos. Failure to attack at the first convenient moment would be interpreted as federal acquiescence in the secession, and a success for Deinocrates. In the event, Lycortas' expedition did not achieve very much: no battle was fought, no important position taken, no concession gained from the Messenians. It seems, in fact, that it was the usual type of border-raiding expedition, which served only to announce that the federal government considered itself to be seriously at war. Before Lycortas returned, however, news reached Argos that Deinocrates was attacking Corone. It seems clear that news of this had by-passed Lycortas; and Philopoemen, who was by this time convalescent, was the only man who could take any action to retain Corone for Achaea. He therefore left Argos, and rode to Megalopolis in a day, a distance of some 50-60 miles, through the mountains - no small achievement for a 70-year-old convalescent, which duly became a feature of the Philopoemen legend when related by Polybius. There he collected some Thracians and Cretans and 60
young Achaean horsemen - probably those too young to serve in the
mass levy which Lycortas led - and set out for Corone.

The direct route from Megalopolis to Corone passes close to
Messene; and before Philopoemen was able to reach Corone, he was
ambushed by Deinocrates at the head of 500 Messenians. In the mêlée
which followed, Philopoemen was captured when his horse stumbled and
fell on top of him. Livy, reflecting Polybian panegyric, suggests
that he could even now have escaped with the help of the Thracians
and Cretans, had he not wanted to occupy the Messenians until the
young Megalopolitans made their escape. As it was, he failed to
take advantage of his opportunity, and fell into the hands of
Deinocrates. His capture obviously was a triumph to the Messenians,
but they were not sure how to take full advantage of their success.
To one section, who, according to Polybius, had large popular support,
it seemed that an invaluable bargaining counter had been given them;
Deinocrates - who did not have the advantage of Polybius' sympathy -
had not made up his mind as to the most beneficial use of Philopoemen's
capture. But all factions agreed that no risk of escape should be
taken while policy was being formulated, and they locked Philopoemen
up in a cave-like prison, where he was soon found dead. Polybius' story is that Deinocrates had had poison brought to him, thus
indulging his personal hatred and desire to strike a mortal blow at
Achaea by getting rid of Philopoemen. But there can be no
certainty of this. Polybius' account, in some form, is the basis
of all of our accounts; and all information he was able to acquire
must have been subject to interpretation by his personal emotional and political bias. In addition to this, the growth of the Philopoemen legend cast an aura of greatness over the Achaean hero's death. In the accounts we have, it survives in the alleged death-cell conversation with the slave who brought his poison, according to which he expressed his altruistic patriotic anxiety for Lycortas and his countrymen - which Livy carefully introduces with *ferunt*, although Plutarch gives a straight narrative.  

The problem of the account of Philopoemen's death is therefore essentially a source problem. The Achaean legend needed its hero, and some embroidery was inevitable. The death-cell conversation is clearly part of this growth. But information about the intentions of the various Messenian groups vis-à-vis Philopoemen can only have come, in the first instance, from a Messenian source. It is clear from the picture which emerges of Deinocrates' part in the events that his account was not the origin - in any case, it would not be accepted by the Achaeans, or therefore appear in Polybius. But there is a sharp contrast made in the sources between the masses, who were kindly disposed towards Philopoemen, and at the most wanted to use him to extricate themselves from Achaean hostility - *multitudo quidem integra, memor pristinorum eius in civitatem meritorum, parcendum ac per eum remedia quaerenda esse praesentium malorum censebant* - and the *auctores defectionis, quorum in manu res publica exat*. This strongly suggests a major effort at political apologetics to the Achaeans after Messene had
capitulated. It was then in the interest of every Messenian, who had not been too closely associated with Deinocrates, to lay the blame for the result - and the resulting major offence to the Achaeans of the death of Philopoemen - firmly on his shoulders. We know that there was such a split between the leaders of the revolt and a more moderate party, who were finally responsible for capitulating to Lycortas and handing over Deinocrates' party to Achaea. It must therefore, be from this group that the account of the disposition of the Messenian parties at the time of Philopoemen's death, which we find in our Polybian sources, comes. 58

The fact that this account was accepted by the Achaean tradition does not shed light on its inherent reliability, for the circumstances of this group after Messenian capitulation made it necessary for them to present a tale of unwilling complicity in the defection. Anything disreputable told about Deinocrates would be immediately accepted by the Achaeans, perhaps even believed by the masses. The Achaean strategos had died in captivity; the Achaeans could not be expected to accept that his death was natural. A scapegoat had to be found; and Deinocrates was the obvious choice, made even easier by his recent suicide. It had to be said that Philopoemen was murdered: popular heroes do not otherwise die sudden deaths in enemy hands. The heroic tradition added the necessary drama - perhaps in the first instance, Polybius himself in his Life. But in the circumstances, a natural death would not be unexpected. Philopoemen was 70 years old; he
had been ill just before leaving Argos; he must have been
exhausted as a result of his journeys and the fighting; he may
well have suffered internal injuries as a result of his horse's
falling on top of him. In addition, the place where they kept
him - the state treasury - was underground, therefore airless and
perhaps cold and damp. In these circumstances, death, as a cumul­
ative result of all these factors, would not be at all surprising.
As we have seen, Polybius' poison story seems very like the trad­
tional explanation of sudden death in enemy hands. There is,
therefore, serious ground for doubting the genuineness of this
elaborate account of the circumstances in which it occurred.

The first steps in the creation of the Philopoemen legend
were taken by the organisers of the funeral - Lycortas and his
group. When Messene fell to Lycortas' subsequent campaign,
Philopoemen's body was recovered and burnt. As if to
demonstrate that theatrical shows of emotion were not the sole
preserve of Flamininus, the urn holding the ashes was dressed with
funeral ribbons and wreaths, and carried to Megalopolis by
Polybius, escorted by the whole of the Achaean army in full armour.
The procession, says Plutarch, was a mixture of triumph and
funeral, for the captives taken in the Messenian war were paraded
in the procession. Public mourning extended beyond Megalopolis
itself into the surrounding countryside, and the procession was
joined by people from the villages and towns as it travelled from
Messenae to Megalopolis.
As a climax to the pageantry, the urn was buried in his native city, and in a primitive ceremony of retribution, captive Messenians were stoned to death at his tomb. The expiation was complete: Messene had paid for her destruction of a hero by creating a legend from her defeat. Posthumous honours for Philopoemen were naturally widespread in Achaea: for the most part, they took the form of expensive statues and paintings, which by 146 had acquired such decorative significance in the cities of Peloponnese, that they excited the greed of the Roman legionaries: Polybius felt it his duty to intervene on their behalf, and made his defence of Philopoemen which saved the honours. The statues were allowed to remain.  
Outside of Achaea, Philopoemen was also honoured: at Delphi an equestrian statue was erected by the Achaeans, which Plutarch saw there and which Pottow has tried to reconstruct. But the most fulsome honours were naturally granted by his native city. Diodorus is fully supported by a fragmentary inscription in his account: 'In addition to the decrees in his honour voted by the Achaeans jointly, his native city set up an altar, instituted an annual sacrifice to him, and appointed hymns and praises of his exploits to be sung by the young men of the city'. It would not be the fault of Lycortas and the Megalopolitans if the legend did not take root.
Deinocrates, as fact and expediency suggested, was held in Achaea to be responsible for Philopoemen's death. For the moment, there was no strategos; but in accordance with the law, Philopoemen's predecessor took over until the next synodos. This was rapidly proclaimed to be held at Megalopolis, which was a convenient meeting-place for the immediate pursuit of the war. The army too was present, ready to march straight against Messene as soon as the synodos decided who should be the next strategos. There could not be much doubt as to the result of the election in the highly emotional atmosphere, and Lycortas was chosen. The Messenians were quickly reduced in the war, now that a serious Achaean campaign was launched against them; and by July they had been brought to the position of asking for terms. Deinocrates had soon lost his support when it became clear that the death of Philopoemen had committed the Achaeans more than ever to complete success in the war. He therefore committed suicide before he fell into Achaean hands. The remainder of his party, whom the Achaeans made scapegoats for the death of Philopoemen, were also given orders to commit suicide when the settlement and the re-incorporation of Messene within the League were arranged at the second synodos of the year, again meeting at Megalopolis, 'by the generosity of Lycortas and the Achaeans'. This generosity was also responsible for the dependent Messenian towns of Abia, Thuria and Pharae being separated from Messene.
and given independent membership of the League. It was fortunate for Lycortas that it was his son who interpreted his generosity for the world, for his solution to the Messenian defection had two essential features in common with the Spartan settlement of Philopoemen after Compasion. The anti-Achaean party, which led the defection, was physically eliminated, in order to prevent its becoming another threatening exile group; presumably the party which had negotiated the settlement was confirmed in power. But as with Sparta at Compasion, it was a new weaker Messene which was restored to the League: Lycortas clearly did not wholly trust his new 'pro-Achaean' supporters.\(^2\)

When Serrippus returned to Sparta from his embassy to Rome in summer 182, he found that Chaeron had taken advantage of his absence to declare Spartan secession from the League. We hear of no Achaean military activity against Sparta this year, and must therefore assume that Philopoemen and Lycortas had been too fully occupied with the Messenian revolt to take any action against Sparta. But Serrippus' return altered the political balance at Sparta in Achaea's favour. With or without Achaean support, he was able to gain enough influence quickly in Sparta to be able to approach Lycortas with proposals for the reintegration of the city into the League.\(^3\)

The syncretos, which was called for this new discussion of Sparta, was held at Sicyon after the settlement at Messene. Lycortas, with an unashamed appeal to Achaean self-interest, urged that, since the Senate had declared itself uninterested in Spartan problems, Sparta should be taken back into the League, in order to preserve faith with those who
had been faithful to Achaea (clearly Serippus' group); and on the other hand, to keep out the 'old exiles' — whom they had not been responsible for driving out — and pay them back for their ingratitude (Areus and Alcibiades' group).

Philopoemen's death had removed from his party the personal prestige which he had used to promote his policy. Whereas there had previously been no serious doubts expressed that Spartan participation in the League was wholly desirable, at this juncture opposition to Lycortas' continuation of the same policy was expressed by Diophanes. It seems clear that he thought that Philopoemen's death removed the Achaean commitment to unconditional Spartan participation in the League, that there was now room for a final settlement which would remove the disastrous disputes from Achaean politics, and restore some security and stability to Peloponnes. And he had some support when he opposed Lycortas' openly partisan arguments, and suggested that any settlement reached with Sparta should include provision for the restoration of the exiles. The unexpressed implication of this was if this provision were not forthcoming, the Spartan application should be rejected. It seems clear that this opposition must represent a continuation of the factional struggle in Achaea between Diophanes and the Philopoemenists. But by 182 Diophanes had hopes of greater success. Now that Philopoemen was dead, his policy might be overthrown, with favourable consequences for Diophanes. In the first place, many had suffered from the loss of life and destruction of property which Philopoemen's policy entailed. This continual political chaos might be ended by a less
partisan interpretation of Achaean obligations towards Sparta, which might achieve at the same time a substantial benefit in internal stability and a less pretentious relationship with Rome. As far as Diophanes' own position was concerned, he would clearly benefit politically from both of these results. He had formed a close relationship with Flamininus in 191, and Flamininus had again shown interest in Sparta in 183. Diophanes might well hope for Roman support for himself in Achaea. In addition, many may have only supported Philopoemen's policy because of his personal reputation. When this ceased to be a political reality with his death, they would appreciate the benefits conferred by the renewed peace and stability in Peloponnesse. Diophanes therefore stood on the side of the exiles, who had been immorally and illegally expelled from their country.

It was this policy which, in a more logical and developed form, Callicrates explained to the Senate in 179/8. For the moment the ghost of Philopoemen still walked in Achaea, and Diophanes only gained a partial success. But even this was a sign of the crumbling control of the Philopoemenist group. Diophanes had reminded the syncletos that exiles would continue to be a major problem if action were not taken; and a compromise was arranged whereby Sparta entered the League, and those of the 'old exiles', who had not offended the League with their ingratitude, were to be restored. Bippus of Argos was then sent to the Senate to report on the events of the year. At Sparta the compromise was by no means satisfactory to all groups; but the restoration of some, and continued hostility to the remaining exiles, seem to have
made Serippus and Chaeron newly conscious of their common interests, and the coalition must have been patched up, for Chaeron was sent to Rome as representative of the Spartan government. Those exiles who were not to be restored — probably the group originally led by Areus and Alcibiades — could now only hope for restoration as a solution imposed on Achaea by the Senate. They therefore sent Cletis and Diactorius to Rome.⁶

By the time these envoys came before the Senate, the Roman frustration of the previous year, caused by the uncontrollable confusion, had disappeared with the emergence of a comprehensible power structure in Peloponnesus. After the Senate had heard the news of the Achaean success against Messene, they had immediately altered their first reply. Now the non-committal cautious attempt at affecting the course of Achaean independent policy was resumed. The Spartans came before the Senate first. The exiles obtained the promise of a letter to the Achaean s about their restoration, but nothing was said in condemnation of the Spartan government's action in expelling them. This could not have altered the present state of affairs; and the previous policy of the condemnation of Achaean action at Compasion had been exploited by the various factional interests in Peloponnesus to the point of severe disaffection in the Achaean League, and civil war in the constituent states, neither of which the Senate had been able to control. The Senate, in fact, had burned its fingers, and was willing to learn from its failure.⁷

When the Achaean were introduced, some days later, the Senate
expressed no dissatisfaction at their settlement of the Messenian war of secession, and received them in a friendly manner. The contrast with the previous year could not have been greater. In addition to the new conditions in Peloponnese, which in themselves produced a more tolerant attitude on the part of the Senate, it must have been realised in Rome that the ineffectiveness of Roman policy in the past year had been fully exploited by the Achaeans for their own advantage. There could be no objection to the Achaean success in itself; but the fact that it had been achieved through the failure of the Senate's attempt at controlling the course of events in Peloponnese had shattered the use of this kind of petulant non-intervention, which had temporarily been the form of senatorial policy the previous year. The purpose of policy was now the same as ever: the conduct of diplomatic relations with the client state in accordance with a general acceptance of the mutual obligations of clientela. The simple proud assertion of patronage had failed, because it had been deliberately misinterpreted, and had resulted in confusion. It was now necessary to be more careful: in order to preserve its prestige, the Senate must support the successful factions.

From the Achaean point of view nothing had changed. The significance of the Senate's changed attitude escaped them, in the same way as the real significance of the Senate's earlier attitude had escaped them. Under the Philopoemenists, Achaea was no more ready to comply with apparent generosity than with open dominance, if the recommended action did not suit Achaean policies. The Spartan exiles were the
first to return to Peloponnese, and immediately presented their letter from the Senate to the Achaeans, who decided to wait for Bippus' return before taking any decision. At this time, the agreement with Messene was completed, and three years' exemption from federal taxes granted, to make up for the serious long-term damage caused by the war to the Messenian countryside. When Bippus returned he displayed the traditional Philopoemenist attitude to the new aspect of Roman policy. He reported that the Senate's letter had been written ὅ ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς συνάξεως σπουδῆς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν φυγάδων φιλοτιμίαν, and as a result the Achaeans decided to take no action. Bippus must have been misinterpreting the Senate over this, in the light of his own friendly reception. Polybius himself gives no hint of exile φιλοτιμία in his brief but adequate account of the reception of the Spartans; and he had every interest to do so, had it been possible. In 188/7 he implies clearly enough that the Spartans acquired their letter from Lepidus by their importunity. There is nothing of this in 181 until the return of Bippus. This can only imply deliberate Achaean misinterpretation of the Senate's attitude, conditioned by the Achaean attitude to the 'ungrateful' exiles. The eagerness with which they decided they could safely ignore the letter strongly suggests this. They were, in fact, acting in exactly the same way as they had under the influence of Philopoemen since 188, willing to yield only where circumstances were manipulated to compel them by demands in terms of pure power politics. The trouble and confusion over the exiles was again being perpetuated by the Senate's failure to react positively to the Achaean treatment of clientela, and accordingly to indicate its
policy clearly in terms of unambiguous orders, rather than simple advice which merely created controversy. As long as this state of affairs continued, the Peloponnese would remain under the illusion of independence - a hang-over from Flamininus' propaganda of the war period - and therefore in confusion.

It seems likely that the exiles appealed to Rome again the following winter, as we find in summer 180 Hyperbatus, the strategos, holding a synodos which again discussed the matter of the Spartan exiles. Previous to this, Chaeron had been beginning to act autocratically at Sparta, and had been suppressed by the strategos. It must have seemed that another Spartan secession was at hand; and this, coupled with the intransigent attitude of the Achaeans to the letter of 181, would be sufficient to send the exiles to Rome again. The election of Hyperbatus to the strategia already marks a break in the succession of Philopoemenist strategai in autumn 181 and, following the compromise which Diophanes had extracted for the Spartan exiles in 182, must indicate that the opinion represented by Lycortas had suffered a considerable weakening of support since Philopoemen's death. Lycortas wanted to exploit clientela, the newly dominant party to operate within it. At this synodos action on the new letter about the Spartan exiles was the occasion of a confrontation of the two policies.

Lycortas' view was that on which Philopoemenist policy had always been based: the active assertion of the right to follow an independent policy, with appeal to the foedus as a last resort. He now stated his conviction that the Senate would respect Achaean law if the necessity of
this were expressed forcibly enough. If it were pointed out that
the fulfilment of the Roman written request would involve the whole-
sale contravention of Achaean law, the legal fabric from which the
state was constituted, Lycortas argued that the Senate would be
reasonable and would not insist. This right of the client state to
allow its laws to block Roman policy was denied by Hyperbatus and
Callicrates. They argued that they should act in complete accordance
with the Roman request, καὶ μὴ νόμον μὴν στήλην μητ' ἄλο μηρέν
tοῦτον νομίζειν ἄρθραλτερον. At last a party in Achaea felt
itself powerful enough to openly challenge the Philopoemenists, and
give formulation to the relationship which the Senate had been trying
to establish. Lycortas could not command the auctoritas which had
been Philopoemen's alone. He had been elected into the vacant
strategia in 182 on the emotional wave aroused by Philopoemen's death.
But his position had been gradually weakened since then: first by the
partial success of Diophanes in 182 over the Spartan exiles; secondly
by the election of Hyperbatus in autumn 181. It was in these circum-
cstances that Callicrates was able to develop Diophanes' policy;
formulate it in his own way, and introduce it to the Achaeans, with
the full support of the strategos in 180. Philopoemen's death marked
the fatal weakening of his party. But Callicrates' introduction of
his own policy at the synodos was only the first stage in its fulfil-
ment, for the Philopoemenists were still strong enough to cause violent
dissension; and it was only decided to send ambassadors to Rome.

Polybius did not have any sympathy for Callicrates. He was the
political opponent of Polybius himself, his father Lycortas, and the
policy of independence formulated by Philopoemen. To Polybius, Callicrates was a traitor, pursuing a policy of sycophantic acquiescence to senatorial wishes, while the independence party followed the noble ideal of the free alliance, in which co-operation could be refused. As we have only Polybius' account of Callicrates' first major success before the Senate, we must attempt to penetrate the hostile web of bias and innuendo, and examine Callicrates' activities and successes without Polybius' prejudices. The synodos, before which the hostile parties expressed their fundamental differences, sent to Rome Callicrates, Lydiadas of Megalopolis and Aratus of Sicyon, not a mention in these terms of reference of the major difference of opinion, although Polybius states explicitly that it was this which caused the embassy to be sent. The very presence of Callicrates suggests that either the Achaean foolishly hoped that he would represent the view of Lycortas - in which case, why had Lycortas himself not been sent? he had no official position - or that Polybius is guilty of suggestio falsi in his detail of the terms of reference of the envoys: given Polybius' general attitude to Callicrates, the latter seems by far the more likely. The significance of the presence of Lydiadas and Aratus, both members of the old Achaean aristocracy, cannot be certainly discovered. Aratus had been appointed along with Lycortas and Polybius to visit Egypt in 180, but the embassy had not travelled when news of Epiphanes' death arrived. The party significance of Aratus' presence even then is not clear, for he was sent διὰ τὰς προγόνας συνοπάσεις ήρας τὴν βασιλείαν. Lydiadas is not elsewhere mentioned.
If these two aristocratic nonentities were the delegates chosen to represent Lycortas, they were a bad choice, for they were totally outmanoeuvred by Callicrates. When the envoys came before the Senate, Polybius again indulges his disapproval of Callicrates. He says that he exceeded his instructions, and even dared to lecture the Senate. If Polybius took this positive approach amiss, the Senate by no means did so. When Callicrates had finished his speech, which advised the Senate openly to take sides, and to make absolutely clear what they wanted in Greece, to ignore the inevitable unpopularity which would result, in favour of putting an end to the general uncertainty which was making clientela unworkable, another Spartan envoy representing the exiles emphasised Callicrates' message. The Senate's favourable reaction was to write an open letter about the Spartan exiles to the Achaean. This was circulated to the Aetolians, Epirots, Athenians, Boeotians and Acarnanians - who may have been sheltering some of the Spartan exiles. These states were thus involved, by virtue of their status as Roman clients, in the necessity for the exiles' restoration to Sparta. In the official reply to the Achaean, praise was lavishly bestowed on Callicrates. This success in itself sufficiently explains Polybius' subsequent tirade against the man who was patriot enough to see that stability in Peloponnese depended less on the establishment of a relationship of freedom and independence of Rome and an inefficient and partisan internal party dominance, than on making the true Achaean position in relation to Rome clear both to the Achaean and to the Senate. It is not necessary to follow Polybius when he shows his emotional party bias in describing Callicrates as μεγάλων καλῶν.
The implication is that before Callicrates, everything in Achaea had been stable and smooth-running. Only a highly partisan interpreter could ignore all the recent troubles within Achaea over Sparta and Messene, and the conspicuous failure of the Philopoemenist party, with their emphasis on independence, to find any solution.

The reappearance of an active Roman policy Polybius blames squarely on Callicrates, again ignoring all the unsatisfactory aspects of the earlier ambiguous relationship. No doubt it had been possible prior to Callicrates to appear *καλὰ ποσὸν ἰσολογίαν ἐχειν πρὸς Ἀχαιοὺς.* But this was only as a result of Achaean exploitation of clientela which obscured the real relationship between the two states, and Roman unwillingness or inability to react unambiguously to this.

In a world ruled by power politics, Callicrates' perceptiveness exposed as the ludicrous pretence it was the Philopoemenists' claim to be following a free and independent policy. But the Senate was as much to blame as the Achaean politicians for this pretence, through its failure to break out clearly from the terms of the war-time propaganda. It knew the relationship it required, but was hamstrung by the emotional legacy of the war. No single opportunity appeared, until Callicrates' visit to Rome, of making clear the formulation of the essential post-war relationship. If prosperity and security should be the first aims of a patriotic statesman, Callicrates gained an increased measure of both for the Achaean by his clarification of the Achaean clientela. Polybius' traditions and emotionalism failed to
consider this grossly unsatisfactory aspect of the 'free and independent' policy of Philopoemen, in which the safety and prosperity of the individual were sacrificed to the national dignity of the state - which in turn suffered from the partisan bickering of political vested interests. The circle was complete. Callicrates certainly precipitated the crisis which broke this vicious circle; but it was bound to come, and was less painful if originated from the clients' side. But Callicrates was nothing if not a realist, and forecast his own unpopularity in precipitating it. The real basis for Polybius' criticism of Callicrates is the political commitment of Lycortas' family tradition. Even his assessment of the Roman character, upon which he bases his judgement of Callicrates' action, reflects Lycortas' partisan argument at the synod. There it was meant to oppose the arguments of Hyperbatus and Callicrates; Polybius has added little of his own. It was, in fact, as much the internal victory of Callicrates as the diplomatic, which affected Polybius' emotions and judgement, for it effectively rendered the policy to which he was committed unrealistic and unworkable.

Callicrates used his success at Rome and the Senate's commendation to stand for the strategia of 179/8, which he secured with ease, and which he used to restore the remaining Spartan exiles and those Messenians who had been rejected by the last Achaean settlement - the remains of Deinocrates' group, who had not accepted Lycortas' invitation to commit suicide. We have no means of checking Polybius' accusations of bribery and other corruption - coming from a political opponent, they
must a priori be suspect - but the fact remains that the restoration of
the exiles by Callicrates was the final stage in the solution of the
Spartan and Messenian problems, which had dragged on for more than a
decade, in which time they had come little nearer to a final solution.
The political stability which this secured, as a result of the general
recognition that Callicrates had the full support of the Roman Senate
for his action, must have been of great advantage to individual and
commercial, as well as strictly political, interests in Peloponnese.
It seems probable that the majority of the apolitical mass of the people
would be far better satisfied with this stability through dependence
than with the former independent insecurity. Callicrates could
deservedly take general thanks for this success in improving living
conditions, which Philopoemen's party, by excessive participation in
local quarrels and indulgence of political vested interests, had
signally failed to achieve. Callicrates' acceptance of the benefits of
the embryo pax Romana showed him to be more far-seeing than any of his
traditionalist contemporaries. Polybius' partisan account should not
blind us to this fact.

II

Lycortas

Despite the overwhelming prestige with which Callicrates took his
place in Achaean politics after his return from Rome, Lycortas' group
maintained its policy of insisting on the legalistic interpretation of
Achaean relations with Rome, which had been the keystone of
Philopoemen's most recent policy. This was maintained in opposition to
Callicrates, and succeeded in gaining some strategai for the party. Xenarchus, the brother of Archon of Aegira, was elected strategos for 175/4. A staunch Philopoemenist, he had been the Achaean representative at Rome in 184/3. Yet despite possession of the strategia Lycortas' party was unable to have its policy accepted at the synodoi which Livy records for this strategia. The immediate issue was of Achaean relations with Macedon: at some time previously a law had been passed which prevented Macedonians from setting foot in Achaea. The matter now came to a head over some Achaean slaves who had escaped to Macedon, and because of the existence of this law, proved irrecoverable. Callicrates was conscious of the Roman interest in Macedon at this time, and urged that the recovery of a few slaves should not be allowed to prejudice future relations with Rome, on which Achaean security depended. This was the point on which Callicrates had made his stand at Rome in 180/79: he had built his position in Achaea on fear of Roman intervention and the necessity of complying with the spirit and requirements of senatorial wishes to the finest detail. Lycortas' group had already been compelled to yield in some aspects of Philopoemen's doctrinaire non-compliance with Roman requests. They had come to accept that the will of Rome was the most important single factor in any situation; and argument had to take the form that vital Roman interests would not be damaged by their proposed action. This was the sole remnant of Lycortas' earlier appeal to the essential reasonableness of the Romans - itself a development from Philopoemen's
extravagant misinterpretation of Achaean freedom. They were still
the party of independence, although it seems to have become accepted
that only spheres in which Rome could have little interest were
legitimate for the exercise of this independence, and these spheres
were now argued, whereas Philopoemen had simply assumed their exist-
ence. The party's stand was now on reasonableness rather than
right.

In 175/4 their spokesman was Xenarchus' brother Archon. He
had to argue from a position of weakness, but he was supported by
the vested interests of the slave-owners. He argued that the polit-
ical consequences of resuming a normal diplomatic and social
relationship with Macedon were by no means as desperate as
Callicrates claimed, and that this essentially reasonable step would
have the added advantage of regaining the escaped slaves. It did
not mean that essential loyalty to Rome was being betrayed, that in
case of conflict between Rome and Perseus the Achaeans would have
any doubts about which side to support. An attempt at gaining this
present advantage could do no harm to Achaean relations with Rome.

This argument, an application of the post-Philopoemen indepen-
dence party's policy, carried some weight with the members of the
synodos, many of whom may have been interested parties in the rec-
owery of the slaves; and Callicrates had to emphasise the indig-
nity of Perseus' method of raising the matter - he had sent a letter
rather than ambassadors - before he was able to have it shelved.
This was a narrow escape for Callicrates and his conception of
Achaean interests. Annulment in 174 of the anti-Macedonian law might easily be interpreted by the Senate as significant of a fundamental change of heart. It had been shown clearly enough in the past that a point of view which appeared reasonable in Achaea might have an entirely different appearance in Rome. Callicrates recognised this. His method of maintaining good relations with Rome was the simple avoidance of any potential conflict. This policy might involve prejudicing other Achaean interests, but the supreme solace was in the fact that the relationship with Rome was maintained intact.

Perseus had nevertheless been encouraged by the reception of his initial proposal, and sent envoys to Achaea for the same purpose. A synodos was conveniently in session at Megalopolis when they arrived. They therefore asked permission to present their proposals. This time Callicrates had no difficulty in carrying his policy: so complete was his dominance that he even persuaded the synodos to refuse the envoys a hearing. On this occasion Livy does not detail the arguments used; but as he describes Callicrates' group as qui ofensionem apud Romanos timebant, it seems likely that Polybius had a fuller account, in which this 'unpatriotic' aspect of Callicrates' policy was emphasised. Callicrates' whole position depended on the openly-admitted fear of senatorial recriminations. He felt no shame in upholding his view of the interests of his country in this way; and he had probably made ample use of the interval between the two synodoi to re-emphasise his point of view.4
The next year, 173, M. Claudius Marcellus visited Achaea; and at a *syncletos* expressed his pleasure at the Achaeans' maintenance of the law against the Macedonians. Callicrates' persistence in the Roman cause was thus rewarded. At the same time, Marcellus was clearly attempting to gain sufficient support for Callicrates in Achaea, which would remove any fears of Achaean disloyalty should a conflict with Perseus break out. In spring 172 Eumenes also drew the attention of the Senate to the potential threat from Achaea. Callicrates' success over the anti-Macedonian law and Marcellus' praise of him had not prevented Lycortas' party from maintaining its challenge. Archon gained the *strategia* for 172/1, in which he tried to confirm in practice the precepts of his speech of 174. When P. and Ser. Cornelius Lentulus travelled through Peloponnese and indiscriminately urged the cities of the League to support Rome, the Achaeans - no doubt in the person of Archon - protested that they should not all be treated as potential enemies equally with the Eleans and Messenians who had supported Antiochus. Archon clearly felt that the tacit accusation was as dangerous as it was unjust; and tried to prove his point later in the year. When A. Atilius Serranus and Q. Marcius Philippus were received at a *syncletos* at Argos and asked for 1,000 Achaean troops to garrison Chalcis against Perseus, Archon had no hesitation in complying. No Achaean of either party, as the Roman war with Perseus drew closer, could afford any suspicion that his group showed any favour to anti-Roman elements in Greece. This was particularly important for the 'independence' party. But Archon's action was
not sufficient to remove the traditional image of his party fostered in the Roman mind by Philopoemen and the recent continued opposition to Callocrates. Despite this help offered to Rome, increased in 171 to 1,500 infantry, Achaeonian loyalty was not considered to be proven, and in winter 170/69 Nanninus sent C. Popillius Laenas and Cn. Octavius to Achaea, in a further attempt at confirming support against Perseus. An advance 'leakage' of information made it known that Popillius' first intention had been to call a synclates at which he intended to accuse Lycortas, Archon and Polybius of being time-servers, and in essentials opposed to Rome. He had no evidence for this - a fact which Polybius naturally emphasises - but the alleged Roman fear of the effects of this party was sufficient to make Popillius' 'leakage' fully effective. When the ambassadors actually arrived, there was no mention made of the synclates. The boule was called at Aegium and addressed in friendly terms - as the circumstances in the north demanded - before the ambassadors departed for Aetolia. In this way any potential threat from Achaea was curbed, without any specific accusations having been brought against the independence party.12

The presence of Popillius and Octavius in Peloponnese had the effect they had desired, and caused some re-thinking in Lycortas' party. Soon afterwards, a meeting of the party tried to decide on the policy to be followed in the struggle between Perseus and Rome.13 Lycortas' own position was the most extreme view expressed: he advocated neutrality. In this view there still remained a fragment of
the group's original ideas: help to either side was disadvantageous when the might of the victor's power was considered, yet opposition to Rome was impossible in the light of their established reputation for opposition. Lycortas must have known that conditions had changed; yet he unrealistically put forward this traditional view, that some independent action was still possible. He did not find any support in his own party, for even Philopoemen had not hesitated to support Rome in a major conflict. Archon carried the meeting with him when he suggested that they should adapt their policies to the changed circumstances, and give their political enemies no chance of gaining an advantage on this issue. He was formulating a principle based on his action in his last *strategia*. Full compliance with Roman requests by the independence party might not rescue its reputation with a biassed Senate; but any other course of action could only be disastrous. Archon's virtue was in recognising this. They could not obliterate all memory of the embarrassing past; but they must do as much as possible to adapt their outdated policy to the present circumstances. Archon was almost suggesting that they should try to beat Callicrates at his own game. Lycortas' position was untenable, and Polybius was wise enough to agree with Archon. Lycortas had apparently forgotten that Philopoemen had co-operated with Rome on the major issue of the war against Antiochus, and was applying his local policy to the new major issue. His party would not follow him. This speech of Lycortas is the last time we find expressed the possibility of an independent Achaean policy.
Lycortas' defeat marks the end of an era. The party continued to offer opposition to Callicrates, and to try to combine this with obedience to Rome. But the show of independence was tempered by its essential unreality.

The party did retain sufficient support in Achaea to secure it the magistracies of 170/69: Archon was elected strategos and Polybius hipparch. Towards Rome Archon's policy was, as he realised was necessary, compliant. He carried a vote in a synedros which offered the whole Achaean levy to Marcius Philippus in Thessaly. This unsolicited offer - stealing the thunder of Callicrates - was not accepted by the consul; but, Polybius adds, he was glad that it had been made. It meant that there was no threat to the Roman cause from Achaea. However, during the subsequent winter, when an embassy came to Achaea from Egypt asking for help in the war against Antiochus IV Epiphanes, discussion was heated. Lycortas' party saw no vital Roman interests at stake, and wanted to send the help. Callicrates knew that any military action in the eastern Mediterranean must arouse Roman interest, and therefore counselled caution. Further discussion was accordingly postponed to a synedros at Sicyon. Again there was heated discussion; and according to Polybius, extensive support for the Egyptian proposal. But before the synedros had reached a final decision, Roman envoys arrived who urged the Achaeans to follow Roman policy and help negotiate a settlement. Polybius, who had been leading the opposition to Callicrates, withdrew his opposition, and ambassadors were appointed.
This was the final defeat for the independence party. The Roman intervention made it clear that any benefit which had been achieved by the party's adopting an ostentatiously pro-Roman policy had been undone by this further attempt at operating an independent policy. Callicrates knew that this was impossible. In the summer following these Achaean discussions Aemilius Paullus defeated Perseus at Pydna, and in the settlement, some 1,000 Achaeans of Lycortas' party were removed to Rome, leaving free operation for Callicrates. It was, no doubt, a more violent solution than was strictly necessary; but the Senate was weary of having its policies deliberately misunderstood and exploited by a few influential Achaeans, who possessed a large traditional support. Callicrates, on the other hand, was willing to adapt his policies to suit senatorial policy. Rome had supported him from the beginning for this reason, and this had forced the independence party to weaken its principles. But the possibility of an opposition had remained. During the Macedonian War it had been expedient to keep the Achaeans quiet: their troops were not required, but their peacefulness was. Yet possibilities of future conflict still existed. The Achaeans, if left to control their own foreign policies, could affect issues in which Rome was involved. This was clear from the support shown to Egypt in 169/8. The mass removal of this party, of which the Senate would never feel certain, was only the logical outcome of the victory at Pydna and the behaviour of the Achaeans over the past 30 years. Achaea was not the only state to suffer in this way: the Senate took its victory to its logical extreme wherever it
had met opposition. The relationship between Rome and the Greek
states was now openly based on power politics.

In Achaea Callicrates remained supreme until his death in
149/8. The strangest feature of the first phase of his predominance,
between his strategia of 179/8 and Pydna, is that he exercised it
without either himself or any member of his party holding another
strategia. In this period, we know of only four strategoi, and it
is possible that the unknown strategoi were members of Callicrates' 
party: on the other hand, all four were members of the independence 
party, and even if the unknown strategoi were Callicrates' men, the 
surviving electoral strength of the Philopoemenists needs explain­
ing. No strategoi at all are known between Pydna and 151/0, but
the accident of survival of information will account for this gap, 
in which Callicrates was supreme, and in which his party must have
held the strategias. But in the early period, the strategoi which
are known are all his opponents. Yet despite this failure of
Callicrates to hold office, he had little difficulty in making his
policy work, and it was this which was the dominant feature of the
period. It seems clear that in elections, Callicrates could not
rely upon as much support as when a policy crisis occurred, and at
the elections, his opponents' traditional sources of power were
effective.

But this electoral failure of Callicrates cannot be wholly
accidental: he could, after all, have fought the elections by
emphasising the permanent crisis of the relationship between Rome
and Achaea, and in this way have secured his party's election at
the expense of the Philopoemenists: if the synodos was prepared to
support his policy during the year, it would also have supported
his party in the elections. It therefore seems that Callicrates
may have been satisfied with the control of policy - which he cert-
ainly possessed - without caring excessively about office, and was
prepared to let the Philopoemenists have their fair share of
strategiai, in which they could demonstrate their split over the
attitude to be taken towards Rome. This would eventually discredit
them in Achaea; they were already discredited in Rome. Callicrates
seems to have been happy to leave them in office, to share the
responsibility for the policy which was his alone, and for which,
he alone would get credit from the Senate. In Achaea, this method
gave the Philopoemenists rope with which to hang themselves, while
Callicrates avoided the double odium of holding regular strategiai
and following an 'unpatriotic' policy.

During the years after Pydna, the only activities of the
remaining sympathisers with the independence party were concerned
with the restoration of the deportees. Embassy after embassy
travelled fruitlessly to Rome, until Polybius' influence with
Scipio Aemilianus secured the release of the 300 survivors in 151.18
The Senate considered that the hostages were now practically harm-
less, yet the return of the hostages created a situation where the
Senate no longer had any important bargaining counter, and this may
have contributed to the subsequent outbreak of the Achaean War.
For the most part, it was a new generation of independent Achaean politicians which was responsible for the final inglorious phase of Achaean League history, although they may have found inspiration for their grossly unrealistic attempt at a complete breakaway from Rome in the earlier policies of Philopoemen and his followers.

Polybius, however, was too realistic to have any illusions about the potential success of the rebels, and roundly condemns the unrealistic attitude shown by their desperate resistance to Rome. Neither he nor Stratius of Tritaea - both leading members of the old independence party, and both restored hostages - had any thoughts of supporting these latter-day patriots. Whether or not others of the 300 restored hostages had learnt a similar lesson from their period in Rome, is not clear. It may be more than coincidence that the events leading to the final trouble began in 151/0, the year of the return of the hostages, but no connection between the rebels and any of the restored hostages can certainly be traced. We know that no care was taken at Rome to ensure the trouble-free reintegration of the hostages, and this may have caused dissatisfaction. But the new generation of politicians seems to have been mainly responsible. When Callicrates died in 149/8 while on an embassy to Rome, his restraining influence was removed from the control of Achaean policies. Callicrates had been so successful since Pydna that the peace which he brought had ceased to have an obvious purpose, to a generation which could not remember the troubles during the period of Philopoemen's dominance. And it may
be this attitude which Polybius describes: αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει
φιλόκαινον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰχανόν ἐστι πρὸς πάσαν μεταβολήν.\textsuperscript{21}

This new generation, when freed from restrictions on their actions by the restoration of the hostages and the death of Callicrates, defied Rome to fight. The war could only have one result.

The Achaeans had finally shown themselves incapable of undertaking their responsibilities and obligations as clients: the difference in Roman attitude after Pydna had been cushioned to a great extent by Callicrates' political adeptness in his long period of dominance. But in the long run, it was not sufficient simply for the leading politicians to be willing to follow a policy which suited the Senate, if their willingness was not wholly shared by the people they led. The popular support which the rebels attracted again demonstrates the unsatisfactory nature of Achaean clientela.

In the settlement after the war, the Senate dissolved the League. The states of the League which had been most deeply involved in the fighting were united with the province of Macedonia; the remainder existed in varying degrees of 'independence'. A measure of formal Roman supervision was at last established; at last the Achaeans were forced to live within the relationship which the Senate had expected to come automatically into existence at the beginning.\textsuperscript{22}

III

'THE LAST OF THE GREEKS'

Plutarch records the opinion of a certain Roman, that
Philopoemen was 'the last of the Greeks', and he interprets this phrase as meaning, quite generally, that 'Greece produced no great man after him, nor one worthy of her'. The real point of the description Plutarch clearly did not understand, therefore he preferred to interpret the phrase in vague terms, in the light of emotions about 'the glory that was Greece'. Modern writers equally have found difficulty in understanding the meaning of the description. Benecke, for instance, looks upon it as a purely military description: '... with him ended the line of Hellenic generals who added a touch of genius to their virtuosity in the art of war'.

De Sanctis, on the other hand, refuses him the right to the description at all: '... l'uomo che a torto fu detto l'ultimo dei Greci'. His grounds for this denial are clearly influenced by nineteenth-century ideals of national unification: Philopoemen had no sense of supreme 'national' Greek interests, but was tied narrowly to his Achaean and Megalopolitan loyalties. He therefore failed to build a nation which could realistically resist Rome.

Benecke's interpretation can be ruled out on grounds of inadequacy: no Roman would be likely to take notice of Philopoemen's military activities - the man who appeared to Flamininus as the ἀνδρωπον Ἀρκάδα, μικρῶν και ὑμέρων πολέμων στρατηγῶν. De Sanctis' attitude is equally unrealistic, and takes no account of what 'Greece' could mean as a 'national' idea after 150 years of Macedonian domination. Isocrates' fourth-century panhellenism had not found much encouragement in the minds of the 'free Greeks', but
was adopted and forced upon the independent states by a Macedon whose imperialism found the panhellenic idea both convenient and congenial. More than a century later the key to the foreign policy of the individual Greek states lay in achieving sufficient local independence to be able to control affairs locally without interference from the dominant power; and one stage further than this - rarely achieved - was to become sufficiently independent to be able to choose the protector. It was because these two degrees of independence were briefly achieved by Aratus and Philopoemen for Achaea that they were exceptionally honoured by their fellow-citizens; and because of this last achievement of local independence by Philopoemen in one of the states of Greece, he was called - on one occasion, according to Plutarch: this was not a general familiar term - 'the last of the Greeks'.

In this narrow political sense, the description is realistic; for despite De Sanctis' nationalistic wish for the creation of a 'Greek nation', this was not a concept which had ever played a major part in the politics of the 'free Greeks' of any period. Greek politics had always been local, had always aimed, in the first instance, at the local independence of each city-state, and in the second the control of others. Nationalism in Greece had always meant local nationalism. It is necessary to make this point emphatically because De Sanctis' interpretation of Philopoemen's career obscures the issue. In fact, Philopoemen fits well into the ranks of Greek politicians, the men who always put the interests of
their home area first, who claimed for it the right of forming independent policies. In Philopoemen's case, the local loyalty was confused - or broadened, depending on the point of view - by the incorporation of Megalopolis in the Achaean League in 235. But the federal movement was not a movement towards the consciousness of a 'Greek nationalism': it was simply the extension of the local unit, which remained as conscious of the desire for local independence as any city-state. If we make allowance for the Hellenistic conditions in which Philopoemen was forced to operate, the local patriotism - in the sense of willingness to seek personal advantage through the advancement of the general interests of the home area - was wholly Greek; and as Philopoemen was the last politician with this type of policy who achieved any kind of success in Greece, there is some justification for his appellation by a cynical Roman, 'the last of the Greeks'.

If it is misleading to judge a politician of Hellenistic Greece by the ideals of 19th-century Europe, it is nevertheless historically informative. This is not as true of the 'psychological' interpretation conveniently formulated by Hoffmann: 'Seine Politik ist zu verstehen vom Soldatischen her . . . '6 This is used as a key to explain Philopoemen's violent actions and lack of consideration of the effects of his action, but it is singularly uninformative as a historical explanation, for it does not explain the formation of his policies in their historical setting. The blame for this comparatively uninformative guide to Philopoemen's
activities may be laid at the feet of the interpreters of our principal sources, Polybius and Plutarch, both of whom judge Philopoemen by the comparative method. Plutarch's comparison between Philopoemen and Flamininus deals with only two aspects of their careers: their military life and the benefits granted to the Greeks. From Plutarch's point of view, these were easy issues on which to collect information, and on which to write a discussion - he did not understand and was not interested in the political judgements which directed his protagonists' actions - and on which he could reach a neatly balanced conclusion: he allows to Philopoemen the crown ἐμπειρίας πολεμικῆς καὶ στρατηγίας, to Flamininus that δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἄρειοτητος. From Plutarch's point of view this was a satisfactory conclusion. He had pointed his moral and achieved a satisfying compositional balance. But from the point of view of the modern historian, the emphasis which he lays on the military aspect may prove misleading.

In the case of Polybius' syncrisis of Philopoemen with Aristaeus, misunderstanding and consequent misinterpretation are both more likely and more important: more likely, because a close examination of the text is necessary, more important, because Polybius' reputation as an 'authority' can lead to uncritical acceptance of what he seems to say. A close examination of the text shows, in fact, that Polybius does not attribute Philopoemen's policy to his militaristic attitude. The fragment starts with a distinction drawn between two aspects of the two
men: • • • συνέβης οὖν τὴν φύσιν ὁμοίαν σχεῖν οὖν τὴν αἱρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας. The φύσις and αἱρεσίς τῆς πολιτείας are clearly distinguished, and are treated separately in the subsequent discussion. Polybius makes them two distinct and separate issues, and one should not confuse them. Polybius first deals with the φύσεις: ἦν γὰρ ὁ μὲν Φιλοποιμήν εὖ πειθόμενος πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρεῖας καὶ κατὰ τὸ σώμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὁ δὲ ἑτερος πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ τῶν διαβουλίων. So much for their φύσεις. Polybius does not suggest that this had any effect on their policies. He is simply stating facts: Philopoemen liked fighting, and put his heart and soul into it; Aristaenus was more the stay-at-home politician, with neither the inclination nor constitution for an active military life. These were the facts of their natures, and Polybius describes the point of contrast objectively, as Plutarch describes his points of contrast with Flamininus. Polybius does not suggest that this difference in temperament caused the difference in policies, which he continues by discussing.

He introduces the political difference simply as another objective difference between the two men. It was interesting that there was more than one contrast between them, but he does not link the contrasts causally. He therefore introduces the political contrast with a simple δὲ: τῇ δ’ αἱρέσει κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν τούτῳ διέφερον ἀλλήλων, which he follows with a detailed description of his view of the salient points of their policies. In this part of his comparison, Polybius makes no mention of Philopoemen's
military career. The conclusion to be drawn is clearly that he thought it was simply irrelevant, that the policies which both men followed were based on their own analyses of the situations with which they were faced, and these analyses were expressed in political terms. Polybius does not say or imply that Philopoemen was more a soldier than a statesman: he says he was more soldier than Aristaenus - a completely different matter. We cannot therefore accept as either Polybian or meaningful the elegantly facile formulation by Benecke of the 'military hypothesis': 'He was more of a soldier than a statesman, at a time when Achaea needed a statesman rather than a soldier'.

The only way in which Philopoemen's policies can be understood, and therefore become historically informative, is by examining their relationship to the problems they were intended to solve. It has already been demonstrated that the phrase 'the last of the Greeks' should be understood to refer to Philopoemen's political aim of local independence, which gave him room for personal political advancement through local patriotism. And it is this aspect of his policy which Plutarch describes when he says that Philopoemen made the Achaeans strong enough to be able to stop relying on foreign protectors. But the issue could only be expressed in these simple terms before the Roman alliance, and it will be convenient to distinguish three phases of this policy. The first is apparent between his two visits to Crete. It is in this period that Plutarch's claim for Philopoemen is most easily seen to have some truth, for the
Achaean political scene was not yet complicated by the problem of relations with Rome. When Philopoemen returned from Crete in 211, and was at first supported by Philip's prestige in Achaean politics, his position was exactly that of Aratus after Doson's repossession of Corinth in 225/4. The Achaean army was too feeble to protect Achaea, and there was no alternative to Macedonian domination. It was when Philip found Achaean's troubles more than he could cope with that he encouraged Philopoemen to prepare Achaea to stand alone against Sparta. The achievement of the ideal of local independence was facilitated by Macedonian co-operation.

Philopoemen's success against Machanidas in 207 may have been more than Philip had anticipated; but he showed little interest in Achaea during the years between the wars with Rome. Philopoemen's army reforms had allowed Achaea to break free of Macedon, to reach the point of being able to choose her protector. Aratus had reached this point in 243 when the capture of Corinth expelled Macedonian interest from Peloponnese, which was replaced by nominal Ptolemaic hegemony; but Macedonian domination had been complete since 225. The choice facing Philopoemen in 200, when the Roman mission tried first to wean Achaea away from her traditional relationship with Macedon, was an innovation. Yet a choice had to be made. Achaea was independent enough to be able to choose between the protagonists, but was not strong enough to be able to remain neutral. Philopoemen chose, and was initially defeated by Cyliidas' traditionalists.

There was no alternative but to serve Achaea abroad, in the parallel
The second phase of Philopoemen's policy is that of the \( \text{Φιλοποιητικοὶ καὶ Αντιοχικοὶ χαιρόι} \), the period between his return from Crete in 194 and the expulsion of Antiochus from Greece in 191. The crucial problem of this period, given that the chief aim of Philopoemen's policy was to assert local independence as a free ally of Rome, was to achieve a satisfactory compromise, as a result of which the policy of co-operation with Rome on the major issues - now the war with Antiochus - which had been followed by Aristaenus since 198, could be made consistent with the policy of local independence. As far as Philopoemen was concerned, refusal to accept interference in Peloponnese did not alter his general willingness to co-operate in the major war. But the issue became confused as a result of the clash of personalities between Philopoemen and Flamininus in 192. The first sign that Flamininus wanted to interfere in Peloponnese against Philopoemen's view of Achaean interest came in the spring 192 when he recommended delay in acting at Sparta. Philopoemen's reaction was immediate, and aimed at denying all Roman right of interference in Peloponnese. The clash of personalities and policies culminated in the political battle over Sparta, in which Philopoemen was initially successful. The city joined Achaean; Philopoemen gained the glory. But Flamininus could soothe his wounds by destroying Philopoemen's settlement at Sparta and his reputation in Rome. The chief result of Philopoemen's local policy in this phase of his career was to build,
in his hostility to Flamininus, his reputation of being hostile to Rome.

Yet from Philopoemen's point of view, the reputation was not solidly based. Denial of Roman right of intervention in Peloponnese was one thing, denial of co-operation in the war against Antiochus was another and a wholly different thing. By the end of the Achaean war in 146 Philopoemen's reputation for being anti-Roman had crystallised and caused a threat to his statues and honours, at which Polybius felt compelled to protest. His defence was simple: the demonstration of Philopoemen's true attitude to Rome was to be found in his activities κατὰ τοῦς Φιλιππικοὺς καὶ κατὰ τοῦς Αντιοχικοὺς. For then he played a major part in securing the Achaean declaration of war against Antiochus and the Aetolians four months before the Romans crossed into Greece. This argument convinced the commissioners (although the fact that Polybius himself voiced the arguments was no doubt a major advantage). As far as Philopoemen's policy is concerned, the issue is clear: support of Rome on the major issue was in the interest of Achaea; denial of any Roman right of intervention - after the grant of the foedus in winter 192/1 there was legal justification for this attitude - in Achaea, which was interpreted as meaning the whole of Peloponnese, was equally in the Achaean interest. Polybius' defense was the truth, but it was only part of the truth. The real justification for the continuance of Philopoemen's reputation as anti-Roman comes in the third and final phase of his career, between the final defeat
of Antiochus and Philopoemen's death - which Polybius' defence did not mention.

This third phase is crucial, for it was the first time that Philopoemen's policy of local independence had been virtually the sole major issue in Achaean politics since Rome became an important consideration. The broader issues on which he admitted the legitimacy of Roman interest had passed away. The opportunity of achieving total independence of action seemed present, with the blessing of the Roman wartime propaganda of liberation, the permanence of which seemed guaranteed by the foedus. The policy was begun by misunderstanding clientela as expressed by Roman propaganda and the foedus, and continued by exploiting it. From the point of view of the Senate, peaceful clientela was required. There was no open desire to interfere in Achaean internal affairs until this was made necessary by the appeals of the Spartan exiles. Philopoemen seized the opportunity offered by the Senate's protestations of lack of interest: Compasion was followed by his party's becoming politically entrenched behind the lines of this settlement. Deliberate refusal to accept that the Senate's messages meant more than their face value indicated, a complete exploitation of clientela, was based on doctrinaire claims of local independence.

It was this deliberate misinterpretation of clientela, which had developed from an original genuine misunderstanding at the time when Philopoemen was willing to co-operate with Rome against the Kings, which destroyed Philopoemen's reputation in Rome. Polybius
seems to have realised this, for his defence of Philopoemen in 146
deals only with the time of the war. The source of the rumour
which he was trying to scotch he admits only in the most general
terms and adds extenuating circumstances: 

διαφέροιτο μὲν πρὸς 'Ρώμην πολλάκις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιταττομένων,
διαφέροιτο δὲ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὡσον διδάσκειν καὶ πείσειν ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀμφισβητομένων, οὔτε τοῦτο ποιεῖν εἰκῇ. 17 Similarly in his

synechēs with Aristaenus, he makes no specific mention of issues
on which Philopoemen tried to use persuasion before yielding under
protest; and again the time chosen for the contrast is xατὰ...

τοῖς Φιλιππικοῖς καὶ τοῖς Ἀντιοχικοῖς καιροῖς. 18 For it was only
at this time that it was true that Aristaenus was prepared to yield
to, and even anticipate, the Roman orders; to appear to keep the
laws while complying with Roman orders, but willing to break the laws
if necessary. 19 Polybius makes this a point of contrast with
Philopoemen; but the only occasion on which Philopoemen was faced
with a major decision, such as faced Aristaenus in the years after
198, was in 192 when he encouraged the Achaean declaration of war
on Antiochus and the Aetolians: he acted in exactly the same way as
Aristaeus had earlier in similar circumstances. As far as
actually breaking Achaean laws is concerned, Aristaenus can only be
accused of this at the Sicyon syncretos of 198, when he failed to
have the law maintaining the alliance with Philip annulled before
proposing the Roman alliance. 20 This single instance cannot be
legitimately developed as a general principle. It seems clear that
in this aspect of legality Polybius was stretching the facts in order to make a contrast which did not, in reality, exist.

The aspect of Philopoemen's policy in which he was prepared to oppose the Romans as far as possible was the issue of local independence and Roman interference. It was on this throughout that Philopoemen insisted, and the citation of Achaean laws in order to prevent interference was a regular method. We have only one example of his party's giving way under protest: in 184 at the Cleitor syncletos Lycortas' appeal to the legality of Achaean action ended with the syncletos' capitulation to Pulcher. But in the same way as Philopoemen did not differ from Aristaenus on the major war issues, so Aristaenus seems not to have differed essentially from Philopoemen on the issue of local independence after the wars. The only example which we have of Aristaenus' activity in this sphere is his treatment of Metellus in 185: there he insisted, as much as the other magistrates, on the sanctity of Achaean law and the undesirability of illegitimate Roman interference in internal Achaean affairs. The contrast therefore which Polybius makes between the essential policies of the two men is largely illusory, for it takes no account of changes in the direction of the policies, or the differing circumstances in which they were operative.

If there is a real contrast to be made, it should not be so much between the actual working of the policies, as in the philosophies which directed them. This appears clearly from the discussion between Philopoemen and Aristaenus which Polybius records
in some detail; from Plutarch and Pausanias we can accept that it took place at the autumn synodos of 191, at which Philopoemen refused Flamininus and Glabrio the right of interference on behalf of the Spartan exiles. This gives a precise point to the arguments of Aristaenus: ἐφ' ὑπὸ σιγῆς ἔνας ἐνυπάρτην καὶ ἕκατον καὶ τὸ κηρύχειον Ἰμαμα προτεινομένους συνέχειν τὴν πρὸς Ῠ飔μαίους φιλίαν. This first formulation of the difference between Aristaenus and Philopoemen has a precise reference to the events of the past two years: Philopoemen had opposed Flamininus over the Spartan war (τὸ δόρον), on the other hand he had supported the Achaean declaration of war on Antiochus and the Aetolians (τὸ κηρύχειον). Now again he was opposing Flamininus over the Spartan exiles, as he had opposed him at Sparta earlier in the year. This is the point of Aristaenus' complaint: Philopoemen was not consistent. Aristaenus seems to admit - the text is corrupt - that Achaea should stand up for her rights if this was possible; if not (and Philopoemen would agree that in the last resort resistance was impossible), διὰ τὰ ἀνυπάρτην ὅραθήμενοι τὰ ἄνυπα ταρίμενεν; he expands this by explaining that he sees two goals for a state's policy, τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον: when τὸ καλὸν cannot be achieved (independence on Philopoemen's principles) it is foolish to neglect τὸ συμφέρον (friendly relations with Rome, which Philopoemen's ambiguous policy was prejudicing). Some Thucydidean influence may be traced in this speech; but it may not be correct to attribute it to Polybius himself: the stock political
cliché of τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ σωμάτερον would not be out of place in this kind of debate at an Achaean synodes, and Aristaenus would certainly have been familiar with it.

Philoopoemen's reply was expressed in emotional terms. He recognised the difference in power between Rome and Achaea, but based his policy on appeals to equity and justice: by pointing out any illegalities in Roman conduct, this would make the burden of Roman domination lighter. Up to now the Romans had shown due regard for legality; the Achaeans should make use of this. It was only natural that in making this kind of reply he should misrepresent Aristaenus' policy: ἐκεῖνον μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζειν ἔς τάχιστα τὸ κρεάν ἱδεῖν γενόμενον καὶ συνεργεῖν τοῦτον κατὰ δύναμιν· αὕτω δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο ἄντερείδειν καὶ διωτείσθαι, καὶ οὕσω ἐστὶ δυνατός. From Philopoemen's point of view, in 191 Aristaenus may have seemed to be resisting Rome too little: in fact, Aristaenus had simply taken a more serious view of the Roman commitment against Antiochus, in which Peloponnesian affairs were seen as part of the main war—a view shared by Flamininus. Philopoemen's refusal to allow this had led to the clashes with Flamininus and with Aristaenus. In these circumstances it could not equally be maintained that Aristaenus was eager to see complete Roman domination of Achaea; this was simply Philopoemen's highly partisan and controversial viewpoint.

The difficulty for Aristaenus was that Philopoemen's group was successful in gaining strategiai until 188/7, in which time they were able to establish their policy. When we reach 186/5, and the
meeting of the magistrates at the time of the Nemea, although Aristaeus was as 'patriotic' as any of his fellow politicians his reputation gained at the time of the wars - a time when Philopoemen too would have found it essential to co-operate fully - was maintained and developed by his opponents. For this reason he disappears from Achaean politics after 135, leaving the Philopoemenists in control. Polybius nowhere makes a judgment on Philopoemen's and Aristaeus' policies during the post-war period. The wartime was noteworthy for two reasons: it was a critical time for Achaea on any judgement, and Philopoemen's policy at that time was defensible to the Romans. Therefore he can conclude his *synopsis* with this judgement, to which he adds the partisan rumour that Aristaeus was more favourable to Rome than Philopoemen: Polybius regarded Philopoemen's aim as a noble ideal, Philopoemen as a patriot. This view was shared widely by those who supported Philopoemen, who honoured him, and who continued to support Lycortas after his death. But the essential inadequacy of the policy was sufficiently demonstrated when it was first
seriously and successfully attacked after his death by Diophanes and Callicrates. It had been maintained by the personal prestige of Philopoemen, gained through years of successful military action and personal image-building, and could not stand without him. Independence was temporarily feasible under Philip; but as soon as Rome seriously intervened, it was a mistake to persist in it. The initial misunderstanding of clientela developed, with the recognition of the Senate's inability to act in accordance with its code, into wholesale exploitation. This drove Philopoemen further than necessary in his treatment of Sparta. In 192 he had committed himself to maintaining Sparta in the League. The resultant political chaos, and destruction of lives and property, were the responsibility of Philopoemen and his noble ideal. His commitment to Spartan participation in the League was immovable: it had been achieved despite Flamininus' opposition, and had become the key issue in the Achaean relationship with Rome. Capitulation meant loss of face before the Senate, Flamininus and the Achaeans. Philopoemen failed to find an acceptable solution, and the instability and suffering of Sparta and Messene were the price of his stubborness in the cause of a doctrinaire patriotism.
APPENDIX 1 - SOURCES.
APPENDIX 2 - STRATEGOI 211/10 - 179/8.
APPENDIX 3 - SOME ACHAEN COINS.
APPENDIX 4 - EUMENES AND ACHAEA.
APPENDIX 5 - AN ACHAEN LAW.
APPENDIX 6 - POLYBIUS 21.32c. 3-4.
APPENDIX 7 - SPARTAN PARTIES, 183-178.
The ultimate source of almost all our information about the life of Philopoemen and Achaean political activity during his lifetime is Polybius. Polybius was born at an uncertain date towards the end of the 3rd century. He was a Megalopolitan, and in addition to being a fellow-citizen of Philopoemen, was the son of his closest friend and supporter, Lycortas. The main part of Polybius' extant work, his *Histories*, covers the period from 220 to 146 B.C., and has as its theme the demonstration of 'how the Romans conquered the world in less than 53 years'. His original intention was to go only as far as 168, and he only later decided to continue the work to 146. The work included a detailed account of Roman relations with Greece; but as the books dealing with this survive only as fragments, we have not his full account of the policies and activities of Philopoemen during his period of political maturity.

Polybius himself is eager that his readers should know his historical methods, and he describes them in some detail. The historian must first of all have had active political experience, without which it is not possible to understand political history; similarly military experience is necessary for the understanding of military history. With this necessary preparation, he can proceed to 'the study and collation of written sources, and acquaintance with relevant sites'. But to Polybius, the most important source of information to the writer of contemporary history was the results of
questioning as many as possible of those who had participated in the actual events. It was partly for this reason that Polybius did not start the main part of his *Histories* until 220, for there were few survivors whom he could consult about earlier events. In addition to these materials, official archives were available for consultation, and also inscriptions.\(^5\)

How, then, do these methods affect the way in which Polybius wrote about Greek affairs during the period of Philopoemen's lifetime? As far as previous written historical sources are concerned, these were strictly limited. For the earlier history of Greece, which he wrote as part of the introduction to his main *Histories*, books 1 and 2, he used the *Memoirs* of Aratus, and the *Histories* of Phylarchus.\(^6\) But these could not be used for the later period - which involved Philopoemen more deeply - as they both ended before then. There may have been contemporary local Histories, on specific local topics - though if so they have vanished without trace; but it seems that, for the most part, Polybius must have constructed the parts of his *Histories* which dealt with these years on the basis of information gained from questioning contemporaries, and by personal experience. As an Achaean statesman he would have ready access to the federal records and archives; and similarly, as a Megalopolitan and member of the family of a close associate of Philopoemen, the more personal and local aspects of Philopoemen's activities would be well known to him. This personal information was probably used in the first place for the composition of his *Life of Philopoemen*, and
quarried from there when he came to need it for his *Histories*. But it also required a wider interpretation in the *Histories*, if it was to appear relevant to its context. The *Histories* had to be *xoyvov xai ypou*, which meant the inclusion in detail of any unpleasant facts which might have been simply omitted, or glossed over, in the *Life*.

This did not mean that Polybius was able to break clear completely from his own personal and political standpoint in the *Histories*. Despite the fact that Philopoemen had been dead for perhaps 30 years when Polybius was writing his *Histories*, he seems to have reacted to the original situations in much the same way as he did at the time. For instance, it is entirely due to Polybius' treatment of Aristaenus that he has been accused of being a traitor to his country: Polybius does not say as much; but it is all too clearly implied. The same type of bias is much more obvious later in his treatment of Callicrates. Here Polybius is even less the cool and dispassionate purveyor of facts: *xoyvov xai ypou* could apparently be liberally interpreted. A more general, but equally effective, bias is clear in the whole of Polybius' treatment of the Aetolian League. This was local patriotism and personal loyalty in action. It did not affect seriously the treatment of his general theme of the expansion of Rome; but from the point of view of the present study, concerned as it is with the same local issues with which Polybius took liberties in his interpretation, it is a bias which can lead to serious distortion in interpretation - although probably not in
matters of fact. We have no reason to dispute Polybius' claim to relate the facts accurately.9

The reason for this bias in favour of Philopoemen and his policies is clear enough. Lycortas was Philopoemen's successor as party leader; and Polybius - though not above disagreement with Lycortas in practice10 - could not be expected to write otherwise than favourably of the policy which they both represented. He was too much personally concerned with Philopoemen, myth and man, to do other than support him with his writing. And this did not stop at simply writing about him favourably. After the Achaean war, it was Polybius who prevented the destruction of Philopoemen's statues in Peloponnese at the hands of the Romans, and he had a personal interest in doing so. He could not represent his father's friend Philopoemen as the enemy of Rome, but he could not deny that there was some basis for the tradition, and he set out to correct this. His defence was tendentious, and ignored the part of Philopoemen's career which had caused his anti-Roman reputation; this also had the effect of misinterpreting the policy of Philopoemen's and his own opponents.11

As far as the date of composition of the Histories is concerned, this is not the place to discuss it in detail. A full account (up to 1956) of the attempts to fix a date with any precision is given by Walbank, and a summary of his conclusions will be sufficient here. It seems probable that publication was extended over many years, beginning at about 150 and going on until his death at some
time after 118. Although it is not possible to be certain, the books which contain Philopoemen's collision-course with Rome seem likely to have been published after the destruction of Corinth in 146.12

Much material from Polybius' Histories, which has not survived in the extant fragments, is preserved in the form in which it was incorporated in the Roman History of Livy. In the books which cover the period of Philopoemen's political activity, Livy devotes considerable space to descriptions of Greek affairs. Nissen has shown conclusively that these Greek parts of Livy depend for their source on the Histories of Polybius. Livy however, does not simply translate Polybius. He was only interested in Greece in as far as it affected Rome, and the purely internal affairs of Greece were of little concern to him. He therefore had to be selective, and abbreviate Polybius to suit his own scheme. However, in the parts which do depend directly upon Polybius, he is usually faithful to his source, and records his information with tolerable accuracy. The occasions when he leaves his source are when he takes his Roman readers into account, and omits explanations of features of Roman life which Polybius, writing for a Greek audience, had included. Similarly, although Polybius did not find it necessary to explain to his Greek readers familiar aspects and institutions of the Greek world, Livy must add an explanation for his Roman readers; and in the process, sometimes misinterprets Polybius in his attempts to expand him. Further slight changes in Polybius'
emphasis, or imprecisions, Nissen explains as concessions to Roman patriotism on Livy's part. But these may in fact be better explained by taking into account Livy's Rome-centered point of view, and absorption in the affairs of Rome, rather than conscious alterations. The speeches comprise the most unreliable part of his work. His penchant for rhetoric led him to expand the speeches he found in Polybius - which may themselves have borne little relation to the original which they were supposed to represent, although Polybius did claim to be attempting speeches of a Thucydidean nature, representing as accurately as possible the speaker's words. Livy however, is not so much interested in accuracy as in rhetoric for its own sake, and for the contribution it makes to the dramatisation of any given situation. We must therefore suspect the content of Livy's speeches - even where they are clearly based on Polybian originals. Factual detail incorporated in them may be accurate; but the nuances and forms of expression are likely to be Livy's own contribution.

Important historical cruces are also created by Livy when he fails to combine his sources correctly. This affects most seriously his chronology; for Livy's generally reliable list of Roman magistrates, taken from Roman annalists, is the most valuable general guide to the chronology of our period. On occasion, he fails to relate the Greek events dated by Olympiads in Polybius under the correct consuls, and as the later books of Polybius' Histories are fragmentary, we can get little help from Polybius in
correcting Livy's mistakes. Occasionally he realises that his account is muddled, and adds further explanation of his own - which can have the effect of simply adding to the confusion. On the whole however, these places are obvious enough; and apart from these various lapses on the part of Livy, he can be accepted as providing, in the main, trustworthy information for the history of Greece during the greater part of Philopoemen's career.

A second work of Polybius of importance for the study of the lifetime of Philopoemen, was his Life of Philopoemen. The work itself is wholly lost; but we know of its existence from Polybius' own mention of it in an extant part of his Histories. Plutarch and Pausanias may have used it as a source for their writings about Philopoemen. Polybius' own description of his work has been analysed by Pédech, in an attempt to discover its content more precisely; but his conclusions are vitiated by his attempt to extract more from Polybius' description than Polybius himself put into it. However, we must examine his arguments in detail.

He starts from Polybius' statement that the Life was written in three βιβλία; and attempts to fit the description of the work which Polybius gives to this schema. This seems to be rendered futile at the outset, for Polybius promptly proceeds to divide his material into only two parts, after the initial mention of the three βιβλία; these are the παιδική ηγεμονία and the επιφανέσταται πράξεις. The clear and obvious meanings of these two phrases are the actions of his youth and training, on the one hand, and the
deeds of his maturity on the other. Polybius continues to say that, as far as the *Histories* are concerned, it is best to omit any account τῆς μὲν νεωτερικῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ τῶν νεωτερικῶν ἔτην — that is, in expanded form, the παιδική ἀγωγή. He explains that he does this in order τὸις οὗ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἁμήν αὐτοῦ κεφαλαίων ἐκεῖ δεδηλωμένοις ἐργοις προσεῖναι καὶ κατὰ μέρος. By this he clearly means that the account which he gave in the *Life* of the ἐπιφανέστατοι πράξεις (here called τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἁμήν) was κεφαλαίῳ. As this is used as a term which is compatible with ἀβέβησι τῶν πράξεων, it indicates that the relevant background material was omitted, in order to make Philopoemen's achievements appear exaggerated — μετ' ἀβέβησι. The essential difference between the κεφαλαίῳ ἀπολογισμὸς of the *Life* and the treatment in the *Histories*, is that the *Life* was ἐγκώμιοικός, the *Histories* κοινὸς ἐπαίνου καὶ ψόγου; the *Life* he describes as κεφαλαίῳ καὶ μετ' ἀβεβησι, the *Histories* ἀληθὴ καὶ . . . μετ' ἀποδεῖξι. This means, in fact, that Polybius was simply writing the whole work from the point of view of the hero, as was natural in an ἐγκώμιον. This analysis shows clearly that Polybius made no attempt here to give a "contents table" of the three *byblia* of the *Life*. His division is essentially bipartite. As he summarises very briefly Philopoemen's background before the hipparchy, we can say that this was probably included in the παιδική ἀγωγή; and his fuller, circumstantial account of the ἐπιφανέστατοι πράξεις starts with the hipparchy, where Polybius himself specifically
Pédech's treatment of this material is unconvincing. He finds, easily enough, and with some a priori likelihood, material for the first of the three byblia in the παιδική ἀγωγή, and Polybius' own definition of this - τις ἦν καὶ τίνων καὶ τίσιν ἀγωγαῖς ἐχρήσατο νέος Ὀλυμπίας (though he badly misunderstands τίνων) - which Polybius describes again further on as νεωτερική ἀγωγή and νεωτερικοὶ ξῆλοι. This is reasonable; and some confirmation comes from Plutarch's similar treatment. But there is no certainty about it. Much more serious difficulty occurs in his attempt to define the scope of the second and third byblia. Pédech associates, rightly enough, the νεωτερική ἀγωγή with the παιδική ἀγωγή, but ignores Polybius' indication that the νεωτερικοὶ ξῆλοι are to be equally considered part of the παιδική ἀγωγή, and confuses them with the ἐπιφανέστατοι πράξεις. In each case he makes the double phrase a correspondence, suggesting that Polybius was using the phrases as synonyms. Pédech seems to realise that this is not possible, but prefers to ignore the difficulty. L'expression τὰς ἐπιφανέστατας πράξεις paraît plus éloignée de τῶν νεωτερικῶν ξήλων, forme sur laquelle elle est reprise. En réalité ces deux titres pouvaient convenir à ce deuxième livre. L'auteur y étudiait les goûts de son héros et racontait ses exploits jusqu'au moment où il devint hipparche. He offers no further discussion; a reference to Plutarch, who treats of Philopoemen's reading material and career up to the hipparchy in
this order is strictly irrelevant, for we know that Polybius did not describe these essentially minor events as ἐπιφανεσταται πράξεις. For him, the hipparchy is the ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων. There is no basis for Pédech's assumption of a correspondence between ἐπιφανεσταται πράξεις and νεωτερικοί χόλοι; nor for forcing them together into the second byblion. He has assumed his conclusion, and used it to prove itself. The facts simply will not fit his analysis.23

It is equally impossible to say precisely what Polybius included in the third byblion. Pédech has already disposed of the ἐπιφανεσταται πράξεις in the second byblion, and must look for something else. This must be an account of the later life—the most significant historically, as Pédech willingly admits. And we have Polybius' word for it that he did treat this period—even if κεφαλαίως (in the sense already described). Pédech correctly finds that the phrase τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν αἵτω refers to the period of Philopoemen's maturity; but he does not see that a thought-connection exists in Polybius' text with ἐπιφανεσταται πράξεις: they are essentially the same thing. It would be a priori likely that they would be treated in the third byblion; but it is not possible to prove that they were treated in the third byblion alone, which Pédech desires.

Pédech's analysis has in fact added nothing to what we already knew about the Life from Polybius himself. The training and youth of Philopoemen, as well as his own character and family
background (τίς ἡν καὶ τίνων καὶ τίσιν ἀγωγαίς) were treated at greater length than in the Histories, to which they were not strictly relevant. The political career was treated in a personified way, unrelated to the background of the time; and therefore perhaps at rather shorter length, than was suitable to the Histories. This was suitable to the biographical genre, but not to the Histories; and in the Histories Polybius promises to relate the man to his time. In addition, the three byblia suggest three parts - but on what system the material was divided between the byblia we have no means of telling. This is as much as we can tell about the Life: there are simply not sufficient facts for further speculation.

The date at which the biography was written is disputed. Polybius' own indications are that the Life was written before book 10 of the Histories, and therefore before 146. It is possible that the reference in book 10 to the Life may be a later addition, but there are no grounds for upholding this. This seems to rule out the suggestion of Lucas, that the Life was written after 146 as part of Polybius' scheme to rehabilitate Philopoemen's memory, in the same spirit as his defense of him before the commissioners. Other dates suggested are soon after 182 (the death of Philopoemen must be the terminus post quem), supported by Walbank and Ziegler, and soon after 160, argued by Pédech. The arguments in favour of both of these dates are weak. Soon after 182 is argued by Ziegler thus: 'Alle
Wahrscheinlichkeit spricht dafür, dass diese enkomiastische Biographie Philopoimes der literarische Erstling P.'s gewesen ist, ins Auge gefasst von ihm als Jungling, vielleicht noch zu Lebzeiten des bewunderten Helden, dessen Urne er von Messene nach Megalopolis trug, fertig gestellt etwa um 180 oder wenig später. The argument is virtually non-existent; and Walbank, who accepts the date, adds nothing. There is nothing in this to urge ready acceptance; but at the same time, little objection can be brought against it: the emphasis on the early years seems to require explanation, which it does not get satisfactorily if we accept the Ziegler/Walbank date of soon after 182. But this cannot be pressed.

The same is true of Pėdech's date. The purpose, he suggests, was to provide reading material for the education of Scipio Aemilianus, on the lines of Xenophon's Cyropaedia. None of his arguments proves this, though the suggestion does have the value that it explains away with no difficulty, the emphasis which Polybius laid on the early years. It can withstand with little difficulty such criticism as has been brought against it: it can be argued that Philopoemen, the anti-Roman (of the Roman tradition), would not be chosen as the hero of a work written to educate Aemilianus. The answer to this lies in the author: Polybius was not heir to the Roman tradition, and in his opinion, Philopoemen's policies were not anti-Roman in the strict sense. The whole point of choosing him as a hero was that he was a patriot, and as far as educative value was concerned, it made no difference whether he
wrote about a Roman, an Achaean, or a Persian, as long as the point of the exercise was made clear to the reader. If he had this purpose in mind, there would be nothing strange in his choosing Philopoemen.

The other objection is based on the fact that Cicero twice states that Aemilianus could scarcely keep his hands off Xenophon's Cyropaedia. Ziegler argues that it would have been ungrateful of him to prefer this work, had his friend Polybius written a Life of Philopoemen especially for him. It is idle to speculate on the reason for Aemilianus' preference for the Cyropaedia. Whether Polybius wrote his Life for Aemilianus or not, we can scarcely be expected to understand from Cicero's light-hearted remarks that Aemilianus read nothing but the Cyropaedia. It hardly needs saying that the Cyropaedia could be his 'favourite reading matter' - which is all Cicero is really saying - while he still paid due attention to other works, including, if necessary, Polybius' Life. We have therefore no reason for rejecting out of hand this date suggested by Pédech. At the same time, convenient though it is, he has provided no solid argument which makes it more likely than the date preferred by Ziegler and Walbank.

It has been suggested by Nissen, who is followed by Hoffman, that Polybius' Life of Philopoemen was used by Plutarch as the main source for his own Life of Philopoemen. The basis of this argument is that since Plutarch gives detail from Philopoemen's early life, which can only have come from Polybius' Life, he must have
used it as a basis for the whole. It should therefore be seen as the source of everything which could come from it. Ziegler, however, can find no reason for assuming that Plutarch has used Polybius' Life as a basis for his own work. The appearance of personal details - clearly taken from the Life - in the early chapters of Plutarch's work, he explains by the assumption that Plutarch had only glanced at the early chapters of the monograph, and after this used the Histories. In favour of this view is the fact that Plutarch certainly knew the Histories, as he includes in his Life Polybius' own defence of Philopoemen before the Roman commissioners in 146/5 - an event which occurred long after the date at which Polybius wrote his Life. Also, the Greek sections of the Flamininus depend on Polybius. Another fact which adds strength to Ziegler's suggestion, is that Plutarch has no information about Philopoemen's activities in Crete: these were irrelevant to Polybius' Histories, but the Life cannot have wholly ignored 15 of Philopoemen's most active years. These arguments of Ziegler suggest that Nissen's conclusion is likely to be incorrect; but a final decision on which of the two irrecoverable Polybian accounts Plutarch used cannot be reached.

In addition to the Polybian material, Plutarch seems to have made use of at least two other sources. The first is Aristocrates of Sparta. Plutarch names him specifically when he quotes his (higher) alternative figure to Polybius' for those killed at Compasion. He seems to have known his work well, as he cites him
also in the Lycurgus. But the Compasion incident seems to be the only certain attribution to him in the Philopoemen. Aristocrates wrote Iaconica, at an uncertain date - although there are grounds for thinking that he was later than Polybius. It seems clear that in this case he was used directly by Plutarch.\(^\text{37}\) The remaining sources must be left vague. To them must be attributed all parts which cannot be assigned to the named sources. They may be, as Nissen prefers, a collection of anecdotes; they may be simply 'tradition', or recollection of Plutarch's own from his memory of his extensive reading. It is impossible to name them specifically, but it is clear that Polybius and Aristocrates of Sparta do not adequately account for the whole of Plutarch's source material.\(^\text{38}\)

Plutarch's Flamininus is also directly relevant to the history of Philopoemen's Achaea. Nissen's analysis of the sources has here survived fundamentally as it left his pen.\(^\text{39}\) The main source for Greek affairs is Polybius' *Histories*: 'Hauptquelle ist Polybios, in zweiter Linie ein Annalist, dann eine Reihe von Bemerkungen und Anekdoten aus seinem umfassenden Excerptenschatz'. An attempt was made by Klotz to show that the annalist in question was Valerius Antias; but his arguments have been shown to be inadequate by Smith; and the position is now much as Nissen left it.\(^\text{40}\) In any case, this dispute does not affect the Greek sections, for which Nissen indisputably established Polybius as the main source.

Two other sources which have some quantity of material about
Philopoemen remain. Suidas' article presents no problems - and no independent information - as it consists merely of two transcripts, one from Polybius' *Histories*, the other from Pausanias' treatment of Philopoemen in his *Arcadia*. Pausanias' account, however, is of more interest, and presents more source problems. He has treated his sources unhistorically - for which he should not altogether be blamed - but not unintelligently; and the relevant chapters contain scraps of information which seem to go back to Pausanias' own fund of general knowledge. The problem is to see how far this type of individualist treatment is responsible for the variations which his account shows as compared with our other extant sources. Nissen believed that he had simply made use of Plutarch, with some other scraps of information from an unidentified source, and concluded, "... ist diese ganze Übersicht des Pausanias vom Leben Philopoimens für die Kenntnis der Tatsachen wertlos". In this judgement Hoffmann and Ziegler are prepared to follow him. On the other hand Mühl has argued that Pausanias' main source was Polybius' *Life*, and that any similarities between his account and Plutarch's result from the fact that they were using the same source. Neither case is without its weakness; but at the same time there are important factors which support either. The conclusion to which we are inevitably led - if we do not a priori postulate Einquellenprinzip for Pausanias - is that Pausanias must have used both Plutarch's *Life* and one of Polybius' works in his compilation. In addition, there are phrases the origin of which cannot be traced: they may be additions or embroideries of
Pausanias himself, or simply his mistakes. It seems futile to re-examine all the inconclusive evidence which has been cited in favour of either view. This examination will be confined to citation of the strongest evidence which shows, with some certainty, the use of both Polybius and Plutarch.

Nissen had the mass of probability on his side in deciding for Plutarch. Pausanias does follow his order of arrangement, even where this is not chronological. This could be explained by a common source, but it seems unlikely that both would independently choose to abbreviate the (probably) much longer Polybian narrative in exactly the same details. It is nevertheless difficult to decide exactly what must come from Plutarch because it was not in Polybius. We are finally restricted to the accounts of Compasion. Both are confused; and Nissen refused to use them to support his argument. It is clear, however, that Pausanias' figure for the dead, 300, is not Polybian (Polybius gave 80). Plutarch records Aristocrates' variant of 350, without actually expressing his own opinion; and Pausanias' figure is clearly more in line with this than with Polybius'. It is possible that Pausanias had looked at Aristocrates and miscopied, or 'adapted' him in some way, in the light of Polybius. But it seems on the whole more likely that he misused Plutarch's information in this way: there is no evidence that he knew Aristocrates' work otherwise. This is as much as we can certainly say in favour of Pausanias' use of Plutarch: Nissen's other arguments are all inconclusive. But a reading of both texts
does leave the impression that the general correspondence in the form of the material in the two accounts is too great to be accidental; and although this cannot be irrefutably demonstrated, it seems likely.

It is much easier to show that Pausanias knew and used Polybius. The clearest, and therefore most important, addition in Pausanias is in 8.51.5-6, where he details the part which Lycortas played in the Messenian war before Philopoemen's death. Plutarch has nothing of this, and it is not possible that Pausanias simply made it up; it seems wholly Polybian, and is repeated in (or from) 4.29.12. Nissen does not attempt to identify this source, although he must have suspected that this writer supremely interested in the activities of Lycortas was Polybius. There is also clear confirmation of Polybius' having been used in Pausanias' account of Philopoemen's force. Plutarch simply says that he took cavalry with him; Pausanias knows, clearly from Polybius, that he had light-armed with him as well (though he muddles the numbers). The remainder of Hühl's arguments are not so strong. He may be right that Pausanias' different account of the evacuation of Megalopolis in 223, three times repeated, comes from Polybius' Life: Plutarch says simply, τοις δὲ πολῖτας τρόπον τινὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐξέλευε, whereas Pausanias specifies that more than two thirds of the population, with women and children, were led to Messene by Philopoemen; which finds confirmation in Plut. Cleomenes 24. The authority for this was probably Phylarchus, who may have been
used by Polybius in his Life as he was for the Histories. However, there are too many variables in this argument for it to stand as a proof that Pausanias had used Polybius.

There are two other points which Nilhl does not make, which have a bearing on this question. The two statements regarding Philopoemen's appearance conflict. Plutarch counters an opinion he has met — ἄκ ἐνὶοι νομίζοντο — that Philopoemen was ugly, by reference to his statue at Delphi which he himself had seen. Pausanias takes no account of this, and simply repeats the opinion. We can probably define this 'opinion' to represent Polybius — who had, after all, seen the man in the flesh —; Pausanias may therefore have been using Polybius here — and choosing his source well. He was not misled by Plutarch's easy acceptance of the sculptor's heroic vision.

The second additional point is the very close resemblance between Polybius' description of Cleander having ἐνὶα παρική with the house of Craugis, and Pausanias' similar statement. Plutarch does not have any mention of this. Both of these items strongly suggest that Pausanias knew and used Polybius.

None of the other passages used in the debate certainly add anything to this. Final conclusion therefore about the total of Pausanias' sources must remain vague. It can however, be regarded as certain that at least in his account of the last campaign he made use of a Polybian source; and there is evidence which strongly suggests that he may have used this for other parts of his
narrative. On the other hand, the general character of the
chapters on Philopoemen and the possible citation of Aristocrates,
suggest equally strongly that Flutarch's Philopoemen was used as
a general scheme.

Apart from these main sources for the life of Philopoemen,
there is little other source material. Occasional passages of
Appian, Diodorus, Justin and Strabo usually add little to the
picture gained from the other sources; and inscriptive material
is only present in large enough quantity to be an important aid in
elucidating events in Crete. The content of these minor sources
will be discussed more conveniently at the points where they are
used.
The establishment of a strategos list is essential for a detailed historical study of Achaea. It is made more difficult by the fragmentary nature of the material; and when all is done, some gaps inevitably remain unfilled. Nevertheless, the results which are achieved are fundamental to the political reconstruction.

The strategoi of the early years of the League are not the subject of this appendix. They have been discussed in detail by Walbank, and little of relevance to the present study is to be gained by repeating his arguments. The results of the whole period of Philopoemen's political activity have been discussed in detail by Niccolini; 202/1 onwards by Aymard, with always illuminating, if not always acceptable, results; 201/0 onwards by De Sanctis. A parallel table of these lists, together with earlier treatments, is included at the end of the thesis for the sake of comparison with the results of the present study. In addition to these comprehensive studies, the contributions to the Realencyclopädie on individual strategoi occasionally offer new discussion, and will be cited where relevant.

The first years from 211/10 offer little scope for disagreement. The strategos for 211/10 was Euryleon. Polybius mentions him at the beginning of his formal introduction of Philopoemen into his History, which suggests that Euryleon was strategos at the time of Philopoemen's return from Crete. As we know that Philopoemen was
hipparch under Cyciadas, whom we shall show to have been strategos 210/09, and was elected immediately after his return from Crete, the mention of Euryleon is only relevant if he was strategos 211/10. Cicciadas is shown to be strategos 210/09 - Livy says pene sum summa imperii erat - by the date of the battle at the river Larissus.

Plutarch says that Philopoemen was hipparch then, and the battle is dated by Livy's mention of the Nemea, which took place in 'odd' years: therefore 209. Livy adds some confusion by recording these events under the consuls of 208, M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quinctius Crispinus. This however must simply be a mistake in collating his sources - Polybius for the Greek events and an annalist for the Roman. It does not indicate any unreliability in the Greek information he provides, which is soundly Polybian. Livy also provides the name of Cicciadas' successor, Nicias. He is securely dated by the Olympia of 208, Elean preparations for which were disturbed by Machanidas shortly before the expedition to Aetolia in which Nicias took part. Nicias was therefore strategos 209/8.

In 208/7, following Nicias, Philopoemen held his first strategia. The evidence for the date comes from the position in Polybius' text of the fragment recording the battle of Mantinea; and the fact that Philopoemen was strategos for the second time at the Nemea of 205. This necessitates a first strategia in 208/7, to avoid the illegality of successive strategiai. The date of the battle of Mantinea also makes it clear that by this time the entry-time to office of the Achaean strategoi must have been in the autumn. Before the battle
Philopoemen had trained the Achaean army ὀβεῖ ὄλως ὀκτὼ μῆνες (Pol. 11. 10. 9). This means that if the strategos at this time entered office at the beginning of May, as earlier (περὶ τὴν τῆς Πλειάδος ἐπιτολὴν Pol. 4. 37. 2), the battle would have occurred in the latter part of December. This would be so unusual that we would expect Polybius, in the very detailed account which he gives of the battle (11. 11-18) to have given some indication that the season was abnormal. It seems clear therefore that at some time between Aratus' strategia of 217/6 (Pol. 5. 30. 7: ἱσπεῖας ἐναρχομένης), and the present strategia of Philopoemen (208/7), the time of entry into office had been altered; and the official strategos-year now started in the autumn, as did the Aetolian year. Larsen says the change occurred in 217, for which date he claims the support of Pol. 5. 106. 1. It is possible that the change occurred at this time, but no weight can be placed on Pol. 5. 106. 1, which simply records a return to peacetime activities: the election of Timoxenus is not precisely dated to autumn 217. Aymard is rightly more cautious, and leaves the date imprecise; and Walbank agrees with this caution. A further possibility is that the change was made when Aratus died in office in his strategia of 214/3. It must have been then necessary to elect a stop-gap; and if the idea was current at the time that a change in the entry-date would be beneficial, use might have been made of the necessity of electing a strategos in the autumn to have the entry date permanently changed to that time of year.

The strategos of 207/6 is unknown; but in 206/5 Philopoemen was
again in office. This is dated by the Nemea after Mantinea, which
must be that of 205. His successor we do not know; but it seems
very likely that in one of the years 204/3 or 203/2 Philopoemen held
the strategia. He was in his 8th strategia when he died, and we
shall see that it is very unlikely that he was strategos in 187/6.
The only years which are then vacant, in order to complete his 8
strategiai, are 204/3 and 203/2, either of which Philopoemen may
have occupied. If a choice is to be made, 203/2 seems preferable,
as Nabis had by that time fully revealed himself to be as great a
threat to Achaean safety as Machanidas had been. This cannot have
been apparent to the same extent in 204. But events of both years
are so inadequately known that final decision is not possible.

The strategos of 202/1 was Lysippus. His strategia is dated by
Nabis' attack on Messene, which Polybius places at about the time
of Philip's battle off Chios. This Walbank rightly dates to 201,
which makes Lysippus strategos 202/1. In his account of events
of 200 - autumno fere exacto - Livy mentions that the strategia had
passed from Philopoemen to Cycliadas. This means that Philopoemen
must have succeeded Lysippus, and therefore been strategos 201/0;
and that Cycliadas was strategos 200/199. He was followed in
office by Aristaenus (199/8) who was followed by Nicostratus
(198/7). The next known strategos is again Aristaenus, leading
the Achaean section of the allied army during Flamininus' war
against Nabis in 195; therefore Aristaenus was strategos for
196/5. A gap of two years, for which there is no information, is
followed by Philopoemen's 5th *strategia* (193/2) after his second return from Crete: this is dated by the Roman magistrates for 192, coss. L. Quinctius Flamininus and Cn. Domitian Ahenobarbus, during whose year the propaganda commission to Greece, headed by T. Quinctius Flamininus, was operating. Philopoemen was followed by Diophanes (192/1), dated by the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio and the continued presence of Flamininus in Greece. The identification of the *strategos* for 191/0 is disputed. Before Aymard's discussion of the *strategos*, it had been accepted that Philopoemen was *strategos* illegally in two successive years, 190/89 and 189/8. The evidence for this seemed cut and dried in the statement of Livy, *Philopoemen continuatur magistratus*. Aymard's attempt to argue Philopoemen into a legal succession of *strategoi*, 191/0 followed by 189/8, met little favour; but he reaffirmed his belief in the correctness of his earlier conclusions, without adding any further discussion, in *Les Premiers Rapports*. There matters have rested. It must be admitted that Aymard's presentation of his arguments suggests that he is arguing a weak case: the fact that he does not tackle the Livy passage - which is the crux of the whole problem - until after the presentation of his other arguments, none of which is in itself decisive, and then only in a perfunctory manner, is unfortunate, as his date for this 6th *strategia* of Philopoemen deserves serious consideration.

In his discussion of the Livy passage, Aymard fails to provide a sufficiently decisive explanation to support his case.
the publication of his article, Holleaux has re-examined the chronology of the whole Polybian section of Livy in which this passage occurs; and has shown conclusively how confused Livy himself was about the chronology of 189/8. One of Aymard's suggestions, that Livy was adding to the Polybian narrative his own explanation to his readers of Philopoemen's undoubted appearance as *strategos* both in autumn 189 and spring 188 (i.e. using *continuare* without any reference to iteration) is a useful lead. We cannot accept that Livy was using *continuatur magistratus* in any but the normal technical Roman sense of iteration of magistracy. But Aymard's basic point, that 'Philopoemni continuatur magistratus' is non-Polybian in origin, is useful. We can accept from Holleaux' demonstration that Livy himself did not understand the exact chronological relationship between the beginning of the siege of Same, the outbreak of hostilities in Peloponnese, the election of Philopoemen, and the visit of Fulvius to Rome to conduct the Roman elections; and this brings us closer to understanding the confusion which led to 'Philopoemni continuatur magistratus'.

This seems, in fact, to be just another case of Livy's interpreting what he failed to understand. We can regard it as certain that he meant iteration, and intended iteration to be understood by the phrase: he was not torturing Roman official terminology in order to point out to his Roman readers the detail of a situation which was perfectly clear to him. He was rather trying to rationalise the results of his own misunderstanding and confused
abbreviation. It may well be that he thought the Achaean year began at the same time as the Roman. If so, 'logic' demanded iteration as an explanation of Philopoemen's exercise of the strategia both in the autumn and in the following spring. But the fundamental point, which must be emphasised, is that the confusion, as in the whole of the passage in which this phrase occurs, is Livy's own. Aymard has shown conclusively that there was no need for iteration on military grounds at the time of the Achaean elections;\textsuperscript{24} This together with the general chronological confusion regarding the order of events in Peloponnese, which Holleaux has demonstrated, seems to allow us to reject the apparently certain evidence of this passage.

We have as yet assembled no positive evidence with regard to the identity of the strategos of 191/0. Aymard dismisses unreasonably, and without evidence or argument, the possibility of a fourth strategia before Philopoemen's second visit to Crete; the inscription which mentions Philopoemen's fourth strategia could as well refer to 201/0 as 193/2, in both of which years he made an expedition against Sparta in which Cretans played a part; and we prefer the earlier dating.\textsuperscript{25} Plutarch's phrase, \textit{στρατηγὸς ἐἰς τοὺς ἄρτος κατάγαγε τὸ de φυγάδας}, can refer only to the year of Compasion; and \textit{στρατηγὸς ἐἰς τοὺς ἄρτον—when strategos the next year} (Aymard) (Compasion, we know from Livy, was 188) - prima\textsuperscript{facie suggests that Plutarch has simply made a mistake, or misunderstood his source. Aymard's dissection of this sentence, using
στρατηγὸς εἰς τοῦμὶν in favour of 191/0 while accepting that the remainder of the sentence refers to 189/8 is an abuse of language which can find no acceptance. 26

If στρατηγὸς εἰς τοῦμὶν is to be legitimately pressed for chronological information, it must be with reference to the Polybian mixture of strategos-years and Olympiad years, which Plutarch may have telescoped in this section. 27 By this argument, we must consider the autumn συνοδὸς of 191 to be in the strategos-year 191/0 (i.e. the συνοδὸς marks the beginning of the year); we then have the following equivalents:

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<th>Strategos-Year</th>
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<td>191/0</td>
<td>01. 147.2/3</td>
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<td>190/89</td>
<td>01. 147.3/4</td>
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<tr>
<td>189/8</td>
<td>01. 147.4/148.1</td>
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In this way it is possible to regard εἰς τοῦμὶν in 01. 147.3 (191/0) as referring to 01. 147.4 (189/8). Plutarch’s accuracy in taking his evidence from Polybius is thus to some extent (but tortuously) vindicated. The system is ingenious; but argument must be brought against it on the following grounds. Can εἰς τοῦμὶν even meaning ‘in the next year’, in such a heterogeneous passage of Plutarch really be pressed to give this type of logical chronological consistency of detail? Did Plutarch in fact know the dates of the events which, it is argued, he is defining so accurately? Is this not rather just another of Plutarch’s attempts to pay lip-service to chronology, using it in the main to provide some kind of reality through relativity for the events he describes? The system
implies that he has consciously or unconsciously preserved the accuracy of his Polybian original, despite the fact that he has himself grossly telescoped the events. This seems to me highly unlikely, and leads us to the second objection.

There must always be some doubt as to Plutarch's source(s) for this chapter; but for the whole of this Life, he seems to have made some use of Polybius' Life of Philopoemen, although he knew the Histories and incorporated a large amount of detail from them. In the Life, there would not be the stricter chronological accuracy which Polybius observed in the Histories; and if Plutarch was using the Life at this point - which we cannot demonstrate, although the anecdotal character of the chapter suggests this - he had no accurate chronological source to follow. He therefore could not preserve its chronological accuracy. The fact that Plutarch wrote that the exiles were restored in the year after the synodos at which Philopoemen admitted his interest in them, indicates at most that Polybius wanted to give this impression. Polybius would probably not go as far as straight falsification of facts; but a phrase such as ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ στρατηγίᾳ would have the desired effect, and could easily be misinterpreted by Plutarch - who was, in any case, not really interested in dates - and generalised into εἰς τοῦτον. A further objection to taking literally εἰς τοῦτον to mean 'in the next year', and using it as a sound basis for chronological argument, is the way that Plutarch used the sources which were available to him. He did not sit down to write
with all his sources in front of him, and simply extract portions which were relevant to the scheme which he had drawn up for his work. To suggest this, as those who argue in favour of the tortuous accuracy of εἰς τοβριόν do, seems to be to misunderstand the way the writer works - and Plutarch was, above all, a competent writer. The continuity of the narrative depended upon Plutarch's memory of his sources to fill out the framework of the chapters which he had drawn up. Constant checking of detail, where accuracy in minutiae was unnecessary for his purpose, was not his method; and in these circumstances, the possibility of relying with security on εἰς τοβριόν for argument about the detail of chronology seems remote.\(^{28}\)

In addition, and of more immediate relevance to the present purpose, this system provides no information about the strategos of 191/0. There is one piece of evidence, virtually ignored by Aymard, which suggests that Philopoemen was in fact strategos for 191/0. Plutarch's account of the autumn synodos, and the part played by Philopoemen in leading the objections to Glabrio and Flamininus, gives the impression that Philopoemen was in a leading position. He wanted the exiles restored, 'through himself and the Achaeans'. This in itself is no solid proof that he was strategos at the time of the synodos; but if the motivation, taken from Polybius, is correct, it must mean that it was generally known that he was able, if not willing, to carry out - clearly by virtue of his official position - the restoration which the Senate's representatives were beginning to insist upon; and for this reason was
leader of the opposition at the synodos. This would suggest that, if he was not actually strategos at the synodos, he must at least have been already elected: the body which was prepared to elect him would naturally support his opposition to Glabrio and Flamininus. The argument is not absolutely decisive for a strategia of Philopoemen in 191/0, for it is possible to argue that the Polybian motivation is simply apologetic—in which case no conclusion can be drawn at all. Such an extreme situation, however, seems unlikely, and the balance is heavily weighted in favour of a strategia of Philopoemen in 191/0.

The strategos of 190/89 is not known. It is possible that it was Archon of Aegira. Polybius records an undated conversation between Philopoemen and Archon at which he himself had been present; but he would be very young in 190/89, and this is an objection to the date. However, although a priory a later date would be preferable, we cannot rule out Archon for this year for this reason alone, as our knowledge of Polybius' date of birth is so imperfect. 29 The order of the fragments in the Vatican palimpsest is also against this, although this need not be decisive: the passage may not have been included in the Histories at the point at which the conversation occurred, or its position may have suffered alteration at the hands of the excerptor. However, although no certainty is possible in this case, it does seem likely that if Archon was not strategos, the post was occupied by another of Philopoemen's supporters: he had remained in the forefront of Achaean politics.
since his return from Crete; he himself had been strategos twice, and Diophanes had been elected as his supporter; he was again strategos himself in 189/8. It is inconceivable that this pattern should have been broken in 190/9.

After general agreement about Philopoemen's strategia of 189/8, the year of Compasion and the Spartan settlement, which is dated by Livy, disagreement starts again. Aymard, with De Sanctis, leaves the strategia of 188/7 with no name, suggests Philopoemen VII for 187/6 and Aristaenus III for 186/5. Niccolini, following Mittern-Wobst, places Aristaenus III in 188/7, followed by Lycortas 187/6; but to do this he ignores the date of the successive embassies of Q. Caecilius Metellus (185), App. Claudius Pulcher (184), and Q. Marcius Philippus (183). These embassies recorded by Livy, though dependent on the accuracy of the recording techniques of the Annalists, must have senatorial records at their base; and must be accepted as the most accurate indication we have. Aymard's system preserves the necessary relationship between the Achaean strategoi and the Roman embassies; but he does not account adequately for the reason which caused Niccolini to ignore Livy. This is the passage of Polybius in which he records an embassy to Rome by δυσαρεστησαντές τινες τῶν ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι τοῖς γεγονόσι and dates this μετὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ Κομμασίῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπαναλειπούν. After spending some time in Rome they managed to extract a letter from the consul of 187, M. Aemilius Lepidus, in which he said that he disapproved of the Achaean treatment of Sparta. Philopoemen
countered this embassy σὺν πρεσβευόντων εἰδέως... πρεσβευτῶς καταστήσας τοὺς περὶ Νικόδημον τὸν Ἡλείου ἐξέπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Ρώμην. 32 To be able to do this it is clear that Philopoemen was strategos. Nicodemus returned and made his report to a synodos when Aristaenus was strategos. 33 It is agreed that Nicodemus could not have taken two years over his urgent mission; hence Aristaenus appears to have been strategos in 188/7. This is the reason why Böttner-Wobst and Niccolini preferred to ignore Livy's dates for the Roman embassies, in order to preserve faith in Polybius. Aymard recognised that this is illegitimate, and accepted the secure dates offered by Livy. He then set out to resolve the dilemma raised by the date of the embassy of Nicodemus; and we must examine his arguments closely in this.

The main part of his proof is his attempt to show that Pol. 22.3 can be used to show that the embassy of Nicodemus set out in the (hypothetical) 7th strategia of Philopoemen, 187/6, and arrived back in Achaea after a suitable interval to fit in with the strategia of Aristaenus in which Metellus was entertained at Argos in 185 (Pol. 22. 7-10). His arguments about this passage are highly tendentious, and extreme sympathy with his views would be necessary before any possibility of accepting them appeared. The fragment of Polybius 22.3 gives a perfectly clear and consistent picture of what actually happened; and there is no need to dissect it to fit a preconceived theory.

In order to support his case, Aymard has to argue that the
Spartan ambassadors went secretly to Rome, unknown to Philopoemen, and stayed there several months without his finding out that they had even gone. He argues that they must have got their letter from Lepidus just before he left for his province, returned to Achaea and presented it to the Achaeans. When Philopoemen was elected in autumn 187 - several months after the return of the Spartans - he sent Nicodemus. Polybius describes the same set of events much more comprehensibly: Philopoemen sent Nicodemus ὅν πρεσβευόντας εἰσελθόντας. Later he describes the time of the embassy of Nicodemus as ἔτες ἔτη ἀρματικοῦ ἐφικτόντος (22.7.1), showing clearly that it left late in the strategia of Philopoemen, not early, as Aymard's argument for 187/6 requires. This last phrase Aymard does not discuss; the first he virtually ignores: he claims to be interpreting the phrase, whereas in fact he is making nonsense of Polybius' language. According to him ὅν πρεσβευόντας εἰσελθόντας must mean, 'some months after the Spartan envoys had completed their embassy and brought back a letter from Lepidus'. This he claims is 'nullement en contradiction avec les textes'.

He also provides various supporting arguments for his central thesis, and we must examine them. 'Si ... tous les événements racontés par Polybe dans les fragments 22.3 et 4, montrent Philopoemen exerçant sa sixième, et non sa septième stratégie (by his reckoning this would be 187/6: cf. table), s'ils doivent par conséquent se placer avant l'automne 188, Polybe n'en parlerait très probablement pas dans la 148 olympiade, comme il le fait'.
The reason for this argument is that Polybius tends to protract his Olympiad years to coincide with the Achaean strategos year; in this case the excerptor's introduction to the previous fragment in *Exam. de legat. gent. ad Rom.* dates it to the 148th Olympiad.\textsuperscript{37} If the order of the fragments is to be preserved, Aymard argues, 22.3 was also dated to the 148th Olympiad by Polybius. Therefore the Spartan embassy was after the end of Philopoemen's strategia.

Another principle in dating the fragments of Polybius, which must be used to supplement and emend the order of the fragments in the Constantinian collections - which must have been liable to alteration, even if only by accident - is the internal evidence provided by each individual fragment. This was not subject to displacement by the excerptors; and where it exists is a much sounder basis for calculation than the order of the fragments in the excerpts, as it certainly goes back to Polybius himself. In this case we have it specified in Polybius' own words that the Spartan embassy was despatched μετὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ Κομπασίᾳ τῶν ἄμφων ἐπαναίρεσιν, and οὗ πρεσβευόντων ἐβέθα, dates the action of Philopoemen in despatching Nicodemus - which cannot, as we have shown, bear the interpretation which Aymard requires. The whole point in Polybius' dating the Spartan embassy by the reference to Compasion is that it was closely subsequent to it. As the massacre at Compasion took place in June 188 at the latest, and was quickly followed by the ratification of the settlement at the Tegea synkleitos, this discontent could well have come to a head by
August, and caused the embassy to be sent to Rome - there is no need, with Aymard, to assume that every detail of the settlement had to be completely put into operation before discontent could take this physical form.

The internal evidence of 22.3 decisively confirms that the actions recorded took place in the same strategos-year as the Compassion massacre, and therefore (by Aymard's system of reckoning) in the 6th, rather than the 7th strategia of Philopoemen. There is still, however, the order of the fragments. The principle has already been stated that certain internal evidence should take precedence over the Constantinian order of the fragments in case of conflict. In this case there is more reason than usual for rejecting Aymard's reliance on the apparent evidence from 22.1. For 22.1 and 2 are simply a table of contents for book 22, which contains the bulk of the 148th Olympiad. In this, the events detailed in 22.3 are not even summarised; and although Aymard tries to make light of this, it could only be if they were certainly attributed to 01.148 in the fragment of introduction 22.1 by the excerptors, that we could be sure that this was so; and therefore be prepared to seek an alternative explanation of the obvious date of events mentioned in 22.3. It is clear then, that the attribution of the events mentioned in 22.1 and 2 to 01.148 - which we have no reason to dispute in itself - does not affect in any way the dating of events recorded in 22.3, which is an independently collected fragment, and has sufficient internal
chronological evidence to refute Aymard's objection.

Aymard's second objection had already been dealt with — that all the terms of the settlement would have to be fulfilled before it was thought worth while appealing to Rome. He says — without really showing why — that the embassy could not have arrived in Rome much before November. It has already been suggested that as early as August matters at Sparta would be clear enough in outline to justify an embassy from the humiliated party; and Aymard raises no fundamental issue which would cause us to doubt this.

His third objection to the more reasonable interpretation of 22.3 is that, 'très probablement, Philopoimen n'envoie Nikodémos à Rome qu'après avoir connu la lettre de Lépide'. In this place he simply ignores the evidence of ήν προσεβότεν ἐθέτεις: 'On pense en effet qu'il constitue cette ambassade dès qu'il apprend le départ des Lacédémoniens. C'est supposer que ce départ n'est pas tenu secret; mais rien ne le prouve'. The reason why we conclude that Philopoemen sent the embassy when he heard of the Spartan, is because Polybius says so — not as a result of any a priori argumentation such as Aymard tries to use to discredit Polybius' statement. There is no need to follow him through the intricacies of his fundamentally faulty argument, and show disagreements at each stage: once the keystone is removed, the whole edifice falls.

After disposing in this way of Aymard's attempt to postdate the embassy of Nikodemus, we are reduced to the original dilemma, which made Aymard set out on his precarious course, of fitting
together the return of Nicodemus in the strategia of Aristaenus and
the reception of Q. Caecilius Metellus by the Achaeans, also in the
strategia of Aristaenus. This Livy dates to 185, making Aristaenus
certainly strategos 186/5. Aymard's arguments for a strategia of
Philopoemen in 187/6 depend on his dating the embassy of Nicodemus
to this year; and since this is not possible, the identity of the
strategos must remain in doubt. The dilemma arises from the
admitted impossibility of allowing more than two years for the
embassy of Nicodemus, on which all writers are agreed, and in which
we concur.

The resolution of the difficulty seems to lie in the examin-
ation of the fragment of Polybius in which the return of the
embassy of Nicodemus is reported as well as the return of Lycortas
from Egypt, who had also been sent by Philopoemen the previous
year. Two meetings are recorded: one a synodos when Aristaenus was
strategos; this was the meeting which heard the reports of the
embassies, and received those from Eumenes and Seleucus IV. The
second is the meeting of the magistrates (ἀρχαί) at Argos, τὰ
πανηγύρεως ἀνακοίνωσις, also summoned by the strategos Aristaenus,
to receive Metellus. This is dated quite vaguely as μετὰ δὲ
ταῦτα. All previous writers have assumed gratuitously that both
of these meetings were in the same year; and that there is there-
fore conflict between Livy's date for the mission of Metellus, and
the return of the embassies from Rome and Egypt. There is in fact
no reason for assuming that both the meetings were in the same year:
the second meeting is simply μετὰ δὲ τὰ ῥῆτα— which in a fragment such as we have can mean virtually any length of time. As we know certainly from Livy that Metellus was in Greece in 185, it is clear that the meeting of the magistrates was in 185, that the festival is the Nemea of 185, and that Aristaenus was strategos 186/5. This must be beyond dispute, and Aymard was right to emphasise it.

The dispute comes over the earlier meeting. Aymard simply assumes that it was earlier in 185, and his arguments, as we have seen, become very involved in his attempt to prove this. But there is, in fact, no reason why the synodos should not be in 187—the natural date at which one would expect the Achaean embassies to return. Aymard argues against 187, as he thinks this involves pre-dating the embassy of Metellus; and most of his arguments depend on this. But there is one further point which he raises against 187 which may be raised against it still, despite the fact that it is recognised that Metellus' embassy need not be in the same year as the synodos. This is the matter of the presence of ambassadors from Seleucus IV at the synodos in order to renew the existing alliance. Antiochus III did not die until 3rd or 4th June 187; therefore Seleucus could not send out ambassadors before this date. This precision for the date of the death of Antiochus, which creates a terminus post quem for Seleucus' despatch of the embassy, depends on evidence which was not available when Aymard was writing. Nevertheless, he would have found it sufficiently conclusive for his purposes, as he thought the synodos must be earlier
in the year than the Nemea (July), which, we are arguing, was two years later. Without this objection, the synodos can well be in the late summer of 187. If the embassy to Achaea was sent out quickly, it could be in Greece by September, in plenty of time to be received by the strategos Aristaenus before the end of his year. Thus the appearance of the ambassadors from Seleucus at the synodos need be no objection to a strategia of Aristaenus in 188/7 as well as 186/5.44

We can now give secure dates to the events recorded in the fragments of Polybius, which Aymard has called into question. 22.3 refers, as seems obvious, to 188; 22.7-9 deals with the synodos of late summer 187, in the third strategia of Aristaenus (188/7); 22.10, in agreement with Livy 39.24.13, refers to 185, in the fourth strategia of Aristaenus, (186/5). We have thus resolved the apparent conflict between Livy and Polybius; and in the process have revealed another certain strategia for Aristaenus.

With Aristaenus securely fixed in 188/7 and 186/5, we must consider 187/6. Aymard, as a result of his misunderstanding the dates of the two meetings, and his resultant post-dating of the mission of Nicodemus, fills in the gap with the strategia VII of Philopoemen. The evidence for this disappears with the collapse of his system for the strategiai of Aristaenus, and the gap remains. Wittner-Wobst and Niccolini, who do not attempt to reconcile the evidence of Polybius and Livy, are of no help in completing the list at 187/6. In fact there is no evidence pointing to the name of the
strategos for this year; and it is accordingly impossible to fix it with any certainty. The argument in favour of Philopoemen is that he was in his 8th strategia when he died,\textsuperscript{45} and we have so far accounted with certainty for 6 others. In fact, it is quite possible, and indeed likely, that he had held another unknown strategia before his second visit to Crete - a possibility which has already been considered.\textsuperscript{46} On the other hand, as Aymard prefers, he may have been re-elected in 187. Heavily against this (and therefore heavily in favour of the earlier unknown strategia) is the gross incompetence which he had been shown to have exercised over the renewal of the treaty with Ptolemy. This, as we have seen, was in late summer 187, only a short time before the elections. It was a major triumph for Aristaenus, and it makes it seem extremely doubtful whether Philopoemen would have been re-elected so soon after this demonstration of his incompetence.

Another possibility for 187/6 is Archon. The evidence for a strategia of Archon in 187/6 is the same as that used to suggest the possibility that he might have been strategos 190/89.\textsuperscript{47} The date Büttner-Wobst and Niccolini fix for Archon is 185/4; Aymard prefers 184/3, as he rightly has Lycortas in 185/4 at the time of the embassy of App. Claudius Pulcher. This date for Archon depends on the position in Polybius' text of the fragment from the Vatican palimpsest, which Büttner-Wobst arranges as 22.19. There is in this case no precise internal evidence regarding the date of the fragment. The previous fragment of Vaticanus is specifically attributed
to book 22, but this is the only indication. It is therefore possible that Archon was *strategos* in 187/6: there is not, to the same extent, the objection, which was raised against 190/89, about the age of Polybius. But in neither case is it possible to be sure; and in the circumstances, it is perhaps best to leave the year without a name, while acknowledging the possibilities.

For 186/5 we have Aristaenus secure. 185/4 is equally securely fixed for Lycortas by the embassy of App. Claudius Pulcher, who was appointed on the return of Metellus, in Spring 184. With 184/3 the problem of the date of the death of Philopoemen first requires solution before any attempt can be made to name the *strategos*.

Attempts at fixing a generally agreed date for the death of Philopoemen have been notoriously unsuccessful. Opinion has generally been divided into two groups, one favouring 183 and the other 182, depending on whether it was considered that Livy in 39.49-50 had brought forward his account by one year, or not. The two most recent attempts at the problem each suggest a new approach; but reach the same diversity of result. Aymard comes down in favour of 182, and Hoffmann criticises Aymard's methods and accepts 183. The arguments of Aymard cannot be said to have yet firmly established the case for 182. His fundamental weakness, as Hoffmann is quick to point out, is the excessive reliance which he places on the order of the Polybian fragments in the excerpts, in order to fix the *strategia* of Archon in 184/3, thus forcing the acceptance of Philopoemen for 183/2, and as a result, his death in May/June 182.
Hoffmann's arguments, depending as they do on a different approach to the problem of the date, shed a great deal of new light on the issue; and although we find his conclusion unacceptable, the application of his methods gives us the possibility of a new argument for 182. We must examine his position in detail.

Much labour has been expended on the issue of the synchronism of the deaths of Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, and Philopoemen. The question at issue has been whether Polybius meant Roman consul-year, Olympiad year, or Achaean strategos-year. Hoffmann's discussion of this issue is admirable, concluding as he does that Polybius simply meant a 12-month period, and that it is not possible to press the matter beyond this. Although the scheme proposed here would fit into an Olympiad year, this is not an important part of the demonstration.

Hoffmann uses as the basis of his argument for 183 the chronological relationship between the embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus to Macedon and Peloponnese and the Messenian war, in the course of which Philopoemen died. This is suggested by Livy 39.48.5f., and must be taken into account. Other evidence which Hoffmann uses is the reference in the speech of Callicrates — almost certainly accurate: neither Callicrates nor Polybius had reason to falsify the facts — to the fact that, 'at the time of the Messenian war, Q. Marcius Philippus acted vigorously to prevent the Achaenians from deliberating about the Messenians without the prior consultation
of the Senate, but they did not listen to him, and voted for war.\textsuperscript{51}
The obvious conclusion to be gathered from this is that the war had not been declared when Philippus met the Achaeans, but was either at that time or shortly afterwards; also that there was a state existing in which war might be considered necessary at any time.

Further to this is the report of Philippus in winter 183/2, to the effect that the Achaeans did not want Roman consultation, but would come to heel when the Spartans joined the Messenians. This simply implies that he knew that war had been declared by the Achaeans at the time he was making his report.\textsuperscript{52}

From these pieces of evidence, the passage in Livy, and the account in Plutarch which suggests that Philopoemen's last expedition was a hasty undertaking,\textsuperscript{53} Hoffmann concludes that:

Philopoemen had died on the outbreak of war early in 183 (\textit{περὶ ἀκμῆν σῖτου})\textsuperscript{54} which was the war of Deinocrates, before the formal war decree had been passed; Philippus tried to prevent this when he arrived in Achaea, but failed; and the war then dragged on until it was brought to an end early in 182. The war must continue into 182 as we have records of two separate Achaean embassies to Rome, one in winter 183/2, which simply asked the Senate for help in preventing the shipment of strategic material to Messene from Italy; the second after the conclusion of the war, when Bippus of Argos reported to the Senate what had been accomplished by the Achaeans. This must have been the following winter, 182/1, as the Achaean settlement with Messene was not arranged until the second \textit{synodos} (perhaps July).\textsuperscript{55}
There are considerable objections to telescoping in this way all the events we know into 183, and then extending the war after the death of Philopoemen for another whole year. Firstly the declaration of war. Hoffmann claims the support of the second sentence of Livy 39.48.5 for his dating the existence of the war in summer 183. But he had failed to analyse the passage adequately. If any reliance is to be placed on this at all, it must be taken closely in context with the first sentence of 48.5 - the appointment of Philippus. The implication then is clear that he was appointed because of the already existing Messenian trouble. This means that the trouble must have broken out in autumn 184 for news of it to have reached Rome in time for consideration; it is thus not possible to press the argument from Plut. Ph. 18 about Philopoemen expecting an easy year, as Hoffmann wants to do in favour of 184/3 against 183/2. For Philopoemen must have known about the impending war at the time, even if Messene had not actually seceded at the time of the elections. So in this respect Hoffmann is no better off with 183 than 182.

If the war had been continuing during the spring and summer of 183 before Philippus arrived in Achaea, and if Philopoemen had been killed also before his arrival, it would be extremely strange to find the declaration of war put off for so long so that Philippus - whose main task was, after all, with Macedonia - could still play a part in the discussions. Hoffmann argues in favour of this that the expedition of Philopoemen was an 'improvisiertes Unternehmen'.
But he ignores the evidence of Pausanias that Lycortas had already been despatched ἐν τῷ στρατευτῷ, when Philopoemen ἰπείγετο μετασχέειν Λυκόρτα τοῦ ἐργον. This second phrase is unmotivated, but if we supply the background from Plutarch and Livy - the sudden attack on Corone - a sound reason for Philopoemen's second thoughts about joining the expedition becomes apparent. The war seems to have been, in fact, on a large scale, with the Achaean army in large numbers, therefore necessitating a prior declaration of war. If Philippus had tried to prevent this, it must have been before this expedition, and therefore before the death of Philopoemen. This is possible, though it makes it necessary for Philippus to appear in Peloponneso early in the year.

There is however more objection than this. To suit the records which we have of Achaean ambassadors to Rome, the war must drag on for a year, ending in 182. This is not at all the impression which the sources give: Plutarch, Livy and Pausanias are agreed (all take their accounts in some way from Polybius), that the retributive expedition of Lycortas was not long after the death of Philopoemen; and Polybius himself implies unequivocally that the war was over by the second συνάδος (perhaps July). It is contrary to all the indications of the sources that this should be the second συνάδος of the year after the death of Philopoemen. It must be the same year; and if Hoffmann insists on 183 for the death, the end of the war must be 183 too. This of course, leaves us with the problem of the Achaean embassies to Rome. If we
accept 183 for the death of Philopoemen and the end of the war, these two different embassies must have appeared at Rome in the same winter. It is clear that they did not: the first would be rendered futile by the presence of the second, and we know that the Senate replied to both. 183 therefore cannot be accepted.

One last objection which must be raised against 183 is the mission of Deinocrates to Rome, and his relations with Flamininus. At some time early in 183 Deinocrates appeared at Rome; this was probably after the usual time for senatorial receptions, as Flamininus had already been appointed legatus to Prusias; in any case, Deinocrates does not seem to have been officially received by the Senate. If the passage of the Suda included by Büttner-Wobst as Pol. 23.5.4-13 is correctly placed - as is clear from Livy's date for the embassy of Flamininus - even if we make due allowance for tendentiousness where an enemy is concerned, the indications are that Deinocrates spent a considerable time in Rome in the social delights of diplomatic society; no doubt too he made arrangements at this time for the supplies to be shipped to Messene, which worried the Achaeans so much later in the year. In fact, it seems quite likely that he stayed at least up to the Peloponnesian harvest time - the time of year of the death of Philopoemen - as these arrangements may well have taken some time to complete. The point of this objection is that if Deinocrates was in Rome in spring 183, he could not at the same time be in Messene fomenting revolution against Achaea. We know that he
hoped, even until the time of Flamininus' abortive request to the Achaeans for a *syncleres*, that his influence with Flamininus would be sufficient to get him what he wanted for Messene. It can only have been when this failed that he had to put his secondary plan into operation — which must even then have taken some time — of open war. There just was not enough time for all this before the Peloponnesian harvest-time of 183; and therefore another scheme for the chronology of these events, which takes account of all the evidence, must be preferred in place of Hoffmann's unsatisfactory, though illuminating, scheme.

In order to achieve this, we must first reject the implications of Livy 39.48.5, that the war started in autumn 184 — as would Hoffmann — as a confusion of the usual junction-passage type. At the same time, of course, Livy has brought forward by one year the Polybian chapters 49 and 50, which, despite this, are internally reliable. With this said, the reconstruction can be attempted.

In spring 183 — sometime after senatorial appointments had been made — Deinocrates arrived in Rome, made contact with Flamininus and other persons who might be able to supply what he wanted for the contemplated Messenian revolt, and arranged for the shipment of this material. This took the greater part of the summer; and when Deinocrates, travelling with Flamininus, arrived at Naupactus, it was already autumn and Philopoemen had taken office as strategos. There is no difficulty in placing Flamininus' departure so late in
the year, as he does not appear in Rome again until 181.61
Philopoemen refused to call a syncletes for Flamininus. It must have been already well known in Achaea that Deinocrates was well on the path to revolution when his hopes in the efficacy of Flamininus' intervention were dashed. A discussion therefore on the matter of war or peace with Messene must have followed fairly quickly on the return of Deinocrates; and Philippus, returning from Macedonia, was ineffective in his attempt to get the matter referred to Rome. However, an embassy was sent to the Senate asking them to prevent material from being shipped to Messene.

Over the winter Philippus reported to the Senate; and the Achaean envoy received an unsatisfactory reply. When spring came, Achaea was at war with Messene, and Philopoemen was killed in the course of it. After his death it took Lycortas some two months to finish off the war before the second synodos; and in the autumn Bippus of Argos was sent to Rome to tell the Senate the result of the war.

This scheme for the events of 183/2 explains all the source problems and creates no more. Livy's mistake is common enough in his work to arouse no serious objection. The synchronism is easily explained, either on the Olympiad reckoning, or Hoffmann's 12-month period system. Scipio's death can be put as late as August 18362 (though there is no need for the sake of the present argument for it to be placed at its chronological limit); Hannibal's, as Hoffmann says, can be spring or early summer 182 - while Flamininus
was in the east, in any case, to account for his traditional association with Hannibal's death; and Philopoemen's at harvest-time — May or June — 182.

We can now return to the Achaean strategos list. As we have established that Philopoemen met his death in 182, in his 8th strategia, he must have been strategos 183/2. This leaves us a gap unfilled, 184/3. Aymard argues at length from the order of the Polybian fragments in Vaticanus that Archon was strategos in this year. But we have already shown that Archon's strategia cannot be fixed exactly by this method, as there is no internal evidence in the fragment itself which gives us any certain indication of the precise date. The most we can say is that 184/3 is a possibility for Archon, in the same way as 187/6 is a possibility. The a priori argument from the age of Polybius which we used against 190/89 cannot be applied at all against 184/3; but this is no positive argument in favour of the year being the strategia of Archon. However, we can conclude with some certainty that if Archon was not strategos in 184/3, the office must have been held by some other supporter of Philopoemen, thus maintaining unbroken the succession of Philopoemenist strategiis.

After Philopoemen's death, Lycortas, with the intermediacy of his predecessor in office, (perhaps Archon), took over the vacant office for the remainder of the year. The strategos for 182/1 again is extremely uncertain. It is suggested, both by Bittner-Wobst/Niccolini and Aymard, that it was Lycortas; and De Sanctis
accepts this with a query. Reasons for this are not very compul- 
sive. As Aymard points out, it is not possible to show that the 
Sicyon synclites - at which the reincorporation of Sparta within 
the League was discussed - was after the beginning of the strategos-
year 182/1. His own argument, stemming from the proposed embassy 
of Lycortas, Polybius and Aratus to Ptolemy Epiphanes (which did 
not actually set out, as Epiphanes died in the meanwhile), is 
suggested by the order of the fragments of Polybius, and cannot be 
regarded as conclusive. 65 His rejection of the possibility of the 
ratification of the treaty with Ptolemy during Lycortas' strategia 
of 185/4, which he bolsters up with his faulty dating of the 
Megalopolis synodos of 187, equally cannot serve as proof. There 
is no reason why we should not allow the possibility of a ratifi-
cation in 185/4. 66

This admission destroys Aymard's arguments for a more certain 
strategia of Lycortas in 182/1. On the other hand it does nothing 
to remove the a priori likelihood of this. Lycortas was now head 
of Philopoemen's party; and his course in his stop-gap strategia 
of 182 was conspicuously successful. One could easily conceive 
the possibility of his being re-elected in the autumn - there was 
probably no room for the non-iteration rule here, as the stop-gap 
strategia was irregular. The Achaean unwillingness to act on the 
letter supplied by the Senate to the Spartan exiles, and the 
eagerness to shelve the matter as soon as Bippus made his report 
also suggest this, but do not add anything to make Lycortas more 
certainly strategos.
The strategos of 181/0 was Hyperbatus. During his strategia the abortive embassy to Epiphanes was planned; and a meeting at which the Spartan question was discussed was held. The order of the fragments - in this case the only chronological indication we have - suggests that the mission to Ptolemy was planned and frustrated before the meeting at which the exiles were discussed took place, and the embassy of Callocrates, Lydiades and Aratus was sent to Rome. Since Aratus was a member both of the abortive mission to Epiphanes and the mission to Rome, the embassies cannot have been contemplated at the same time. Since the order of the fragments suggests that the mission to Rome was second, we must define as closely as possible the date of the abandonment of the Egyptian mission. As the news that Epiphanes had died prevented the mission setting out, it cannot have been planned long before his death. The last known document from the reign of Epiphanes is dated to Pharmuthi 16, year 25 = 20 May 180. This means that the Achaean embassy cannot have been abandoned before this date - and in fact, probably somewhat later.

Given this dating for the Egyptian mission, we must put the meeting at which the Spartan exiles were discussed after this. This suggests that the matter was perhaps brought up by the return of another (otherwise unknown) letter from the Senate, brought by the Spartan exiles, rather than raised spontaneously by Hyperbatus, as Aymard suggests. For this to be the case, we would expect it to be brought up as soon as Hyperbatus gained office, in autumn 181.
and the date of the Egyptian mission shows clearly that this was not so. There was plenty of time before the date of this sýnodos (after May 20th) for a Spartan embassy to have returned from Rome with a more forthright letter. The Achaean embassy would then be despatched, and it is unlikely that they would be received by the Senate before the winter 180/79, as they could scarcely arrive before the autumn. This means that Callicrates could not be elected strategos in autumn 180, as he was on this mission at the time. He cannot therefore have directly succeeded Hyperbatus, as Aymard, De Sanctis and Niccolini agree he did, and be strategos 180/79. The return of the embassy, if received by the Senate at the usual time, would be in spring 179; and as Polybius is at pains to point out that Callicrates used the prestige and influence which he had gained on this embassy to secure the strategia for the next year, he must be strategos 179/8.

This leaves a gap in 180/79 which it is not possible to fill. It is just possible that the mission had been quickly accomplished during the summer, and that Callicrates was elected for 180/79; but this involves leaving little gap between each stage of the course of events known during the year, and making the Senate meet in high summer to receive the Achaean embassy - which by this time must have been regarded as an annual occurrence, and of little significance. It seems altogether more likely that the embassy was received at the usual time under the new consuls of 179.
Coinage of the Achaean League is notoriously difficult to date, or even to assign to mints. As this is the task of the professional numismatist, no attempt is being made here to offer a comprehensive examination of the extant coins. One silver series, however, seems to offer some evidence for the continuation in active existence of the Arcadian League, after Arcadia had been incorporated in the Achaean League. This issue has occurred regularly in every hoard. The coins are: obverse, head of Zeus (the regular obverse both of the Arcadian and Achaean Leagues); reverse, naked seated Pan with the monogram either ME or AP (instead of the regular Achaean wreathed monogram).  

The condition of these coins in two hoards, probably buried in the second century, has led the numismatists publishing these hoards to suggest that they must have been struck comparatively soon before they were buried, therefore certainly during the period of Achaean League dominance in Arcadia.  

The question arises as to why the city or cities striking these coins were allowed to perpetuate this vestige of Arcadian separatism, instead of participating in the federal coinage.

It seems clear that the coins with ME represent Megalopolis, and it is possible that (some of) the others with AP instead of ME as monogram also originated in Megalopolis. Miss Grace, in publishing her hoard, tentatively attributed the coins to Megalopolis or Mantinea, and suggested that they were "a manifestation of
national consciousness". This may, she suggests, have taken the form of a brief revival early in the second century of the Arcadian League, under the leadership of one or other of the two cities to which she attributes the coins. The real objection to this - which she herself recognises - is simply that there is no shred of evidence for such a movement; and general political conditions are strongly against the hypothesis. The one case of disenchantment in Arcadia leading to a secession, was the case of the towns which Philopoemen caused to separate from Megalopolis in 193; but these were an addition to the League. M. Thompson, in publishing her hoard, suggests that her coins of this type were struck by Megalopolis purely as local issues, intended for local circulation only, and for this reason did not come into conflict with federal coinage policy. If this were the case, we should not expect these purely local coins to have survived to the quantity of approximately 11% in these hoards of mainly federal silver. In any case, it seems unlikely that coins intended for purely local circulation would be of silver.

However, this suggestion, implying that the continuance of apparently independent Arcadian coinage need not indicate any nationalistic conflict or secessionist movement among the Arcadian members of the Achaean League, may provide the means to a solution of the problem. The Arcadian League might be politically defunct by the end of the third century, as other evidence suggests, but it certainly would not be religiously defunct. In this religious
sense, it might be true to speak of a 'national consciousness' -
without any of the political overtones which the phrase seems to
imply; for there is no evidence of mass Arcadian dissatisfaction at
their membership of the Achaean League.

Continuance of the Arcadian koinon on a religious basis after
234 - the year of Megalopolis' entry into the Achaean League, and
therefore critical for our purpose - is suggested by two inscriptions
as well as the coins. The first, from Magnesia on Maeander,
records a decree, probably of Megalopolis, in favour of recognising
asylia for the cult of Artemis Leucophryene. It concludes ἄξολοθρως
δὲ ἐκδόθης ψηλισσωναι καὶ τοῖς άλλοις Ἀρχάιοις, followed by a list of
18 cities, which include the non-Arcadian cities of Pellene, Tritaea
and Cerynea. A reasonable explanation of the presence in the list
of these cities is that the Magnesian mason or official responsible
simply did not distinguish the Arcadians from non-Arcadians: to him
it was convenient to describe all relatively obscure Peloponnesians
as Arcadians. The date of the inscription is not known exactly.
It is one of a series of asylia decrees for Artemis Leucophryene
which Dittenberger, following Kern, places in 207/6. For our
purpose the exact date is not important, as it is agreed that it is
certainly after 234. There is nothing in this case which suggests
that this list of Arcadians represents a secessionist movement;
and as they are involved in a purely religious function, the natural
interpretation is that the reason why they retained their 'national
consciousness' was for this religious purpose.
The other inscription yields the same result. It is a mutilated decree recording the posthumous heroic honours to be paid to Philopoemen. Again the purpose is essentially religious, and although the relevant section is too fragmentary to provide more than the general outline of the sense, the words 'Αρχάοι ἄξιοι are preserved (1.34). The context of the decree makes it sufficiently clear that the emphasis is laid on the religious aspect of Arcadia, that the heroic honours for Philopoemen recall the traditional religious and nationalistic background of Arcadia, without expressing any sentiments as to the present political orientation of the area.

This continuation of an Arcadian 'national consciousness' in the religious sphere offers an acceptable explanation of the AP and ME coins. We must accept that there was no secessionist significance in their issue, and there is little difficulty in envisaging a special Achaean dispensation to Megalopolis in 234 to continue minting her coins in the old style: Megalopolis was an important acquisition for the League, quite important enough to be able to extract this type of concession in the early stages of her membership. Suggestive of the correctness of the explanation is a comparison of the weights of the different issues. The weights of the ME and AP coins of the League period in the Herwerden coin room of the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford compare favourably with those of the League coins, which were clearly struck on the same standard. In comparison with these, the earlier Arcadian coins are uniformly heavier, and suggest a different standard, although the coin types
are the same. Therefore there was a change to the League standard in or soon after 234. The coins, on this interpretation, offer an illustration of the political importance of Arcadia within the Achaean League - which is clear enough already from the literary sources - but do not add anything to our knowledge of political movements.
The view adopted in the text (ch. 4, § 22), that an alliance with Pergamum was first formed with Attalus in 198, in 190 was confirmed by the Achaeans who then sent help to Eumenes, is based on that of Aymard (PR, 374 & n. 9). There is however, the difficulty that it was already seven years after the death of Attalus when Eumenes appeared to be applying for a renewal of the alliance (Pol. 21.3b). For this reason we prefer to consider the application in 190 as being not for a formal renewal, which was no doubt carried out soon after the death of Attalus, but for a strictly unnecessary (but tactful) enquiry as to whether the Achaeans were prepared to stand by the terms of the alliance and send help. This would explain Polybius’ use of επικυρευτη instead of ανακαταστατι which puzzles Aymard (ib. n. 9). But there is a textual problem connected with the original alliance. At Liv. 32.23.1 Weissenborn-Müller, print: societatem cum Attalo ac Rhodiis prae senti decreto confirmant. Attalo is a conjecture by editores veteres, who often emend from the context. The MSS however read: cum Romanis ac Rhodiis (B), or simply cum Rhodiis. The reading of B can be defended by assuming a temporary treaty with Rome for the duration of the war; otherwise it is contradicted by the following sentence dealing with relations with Rome. But Attalus is nowhere mentioned in the MSS.3

There is therefore no MSS authority for an alliance with Attalus in 198; and Pol. 21.3b, as we have suggested, need not
refer to a renewal (it does not prima facie). We must, however, also consider the later application of the alliance. In 187 Eumenes sent ambassadors to Achaea who τὴν συμμαχίαν τὴν πατρικήν ἀνενέσσαντο, (Pol. 22.7.3). Two points here tend to support our interpretation of Pol. 21.3b. First, the use of πατρική to describe the alliance. It could be argued that the word is simply used emotively to describe an alliance which was in fact only formed as recently as 190; but it is far simpler to allow the word its full meaning, and assume an alliance with Attalus. Secondly, the fact that ten years had already passed since the death of Attalus and the renewal of the alliance which had been formed with him in 198, only three since 190. This is by no means conclusive evidence, but alliances for ten years were far more common than alliances for four years. The evidence as a whole, therefore, supports the conjecture of the editores veteres at Liv. 32.23.1 in adding Attalo to our text.

* I am grateful to Dr. A. H. McDonald for this information about Livy's text.
APPENDIX 5

AN ACHAEEAN LAW

In 191 Cato visited Corinth, Patrae and Aegium as representative of the new consul Clabrio (Plut. Cato Maior, 12). The legality of these visits in Achaean law has been questioned by Aymard (PR, 330), who concludes that they were, if not formally illegal, at least contrary to the spirit of the law which regulated embassies sent by the independent states of the League (cf. Aymard, Assemblées, 166 n. 3). The example usually cited as an illustration of this law is that of the Megalopolitans to Macedon in 229/8 (Pol. 2.48. 6-7); but in this case it is not made clear by Polybius that the Megalopolitans were legally obliged to consult the Achaeans. The whole point of this consultation was that Aratus had organised the willing Megalopolitans to open negotiations on behalf of the League. It is clear that this required federal endorsement. But it is not relevant to a discussion of the legal obligations of the member states who wished to negotiate on their own behalf.

In fact, the only restriction of this kind for which we have evidence is on sending embassies to the Senate. Evidence for this comes from Pausanias (7.9.4; 12.5), based on Polybius, and shows that it had been the subject of a convention agreed between Rome and Achaea - clearly included as one of the terms of the foedus. It is obvious that this was to the advantage of the Senate, as it was of the Achaean federal government, that all Achaean matters arising on any one occasion should be presented by one set of
ambassadors. That this convention was often broken, or ignored, especially by the Spartans, who were in many cases encouraged by the Senate's agreeing to receive them, is not in dispute. But it is clear that the convention was a matter of mutual convenience, which the Senate could set aside if it suited it, and which the federal government found difficult to enforce. An agreement of this kind clearly was not concerned with the regulation of the reception of Roman missions in Achaea, whether by the federal government or by the constituent states. There is therefore no evidence which suggests that Cato's action was in any way illegal or irregular, whether in contravention of an Achaean law, or of the convention between Rome and Achaea.
This fragment of Polybius, which is vital for an understanding of the reasons for Philopoemen's settlement of Sparta after Compasion, is desperately corrupt in the most crucial passage. Buttner-Wobst makes sense of the early corruptions (ll. 1-4, p.69 of his text) with acceptable emendations, but does not attempt to fill the lacuna (1.5), assessed by Boissevain at 17 letter-spaces. Of the emendations which he records in his apparatus (none of which, in fact, reach Boissevain's 17 letter-spaces), there is a remarkable agreement as to the general sense of the passage, variation occurring only in detail. The emendation of Hultsch has therefore been accepted as the basis of the interpretation offered in the text (ch. 4, 181), which makes the passage read: γεωργὸν δ' ὑπὶ πάσης βασιλείας ἐπανορθοεῖσθαι τὰ χρήματα (γέγονεν, ὥστε φόβοι μονοεικῆς ὥν καὶ στρατηγικὸς, περιέβλεπεν ίνα μὴ ποτε) γένοιτο χομιδῆ πάν ἔξω (πορί)χομένων χρημάτων.

This is, however, the counsel of desperation, and certainty on the problem is not possible. In an attempt to illuminate the problem, Professor E. Badian was kind enough to examine the MS (Vaticanus gr. 73) in the Vatican, but was unable to read anything in the crucial place, even with the aid of ultra-violet rays. We must therefore continue to rely wholly on what earlier scholars read - or claimed to read: a glance at Buttner-Wobst's apparatus will show that there is not even total agreement on this.
However, as philological scholars have been able to agree on the general sense, it seems legitimate to use this as the basis for political interpretation.
Close attention to the chronology of the various references to Spartan parties at this period can make a comprehensible picture of the apparently contradictory evidence. We take as starting point Polybius' definition of the parties at Rome in winter 184/3. Four groups were present, of which two represented factions composed of 'old exiles', one the Achaean party (led by Serippus), and one the ex-tyrant party, essentially anti-Achaean, led by Chaeron. The agreement which was reached with the Roman senatorial committee, and which Xenarchus, representing the Achaeans, was induced to endorse, contained two points relevant to the present discussion: it was agreed that Chaeron's group, in exile since Gompasion, should be restored; and that Sparta should continue to belong to the Achaean League.¹

By autumn 183² when Flamininus unsuccessfully asked the Achaeans for a syncletos, the 'old exiles' were again in exile; and their hopes, along with Deinocrates', were disappointed by Flamininus' failure: αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀναξιοχράτους ἐλπίδες καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων λεγόμενων φυγάδων, τότε δὲ προσφύγοις ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος ἑκαπενθότοις, καὶ συλλήφθην ἡ τῶν Πίτου παρουσία καὶ προσδοχία τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διέσεσαν.³ The exiles clearly hoped for restoration; but as there had been no problem about their restoration to be discussed at Rome the previous winter, they must have been exiled in the period
between the return of the embassies and the appearance of Flamininus at Naupactus in the autumn.

The next evidence is from the following winter: two Spartan embassies were present at Rome, one representing the exiles (that originally led by Arcesilaus and Agesipolis), the other led by Serippus. The exiles clearly wanted their restoration; Serippus' demand is not made clear, but it is unlikely that he had changed from his previous support of Achaean. The Senate's answer to him was non-commital: ἑοὐσαι τὴν πόλιν, διότι πάντα.

The Senate's reply to Serippus became known in Achaean in the late summer of 182, after the death of Philopoemen and the settlement of Messene. Lycortas called a συνέλευσις at Sicyon: 

ἐπὶ τῇ ἡπάρτῃ ἔς τὴν συμπολιτείαν, φάσιν τῶν Ῥωμαίων μὲν ἀποτρίβεσθαι τῇ πρῶτῃ ἄκτις δοκεσθαν ἐπίτροπην ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ταύτης. ὁποιεστὶς γὰρ ἄκτις οὐν μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ Ἀλκεδαίμονα πραγμάτων πρὸς ἄκτις· τῶν δὲ κυριεύοντας τῆς ἡπάρτης κατὰ τὸ παρὸν βούλεσθαι ὁμοίως μετέχειν τῆς συμπολιτείας. διὸ παρεχάλει προσδέχεσθαι τὴν πόλιν. From this, it is clear that by late summer 182 Sparta was no longer a member of the League; yet the party in power at that time was in favour of reunion. Lycortas continues by describing this party as 

τοῖς διαστήμησαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἔννοι 
πίστιν, and contrasts them with the 'old exiles' who had failed to show due gratitude for their original restoration. Lycortas
implies that their present exile is nothing less than they deserve.\(^5\)

The gaps in the information which we have from Polybius are considerable; yet they do not present wholly unsurmountable difficulties. The terminus ante quem for the expulsion of the 'old exiles' is autumn 183 (Flamininus at Naupactus); that for Spartan secession summer 182 (Achaean syncletos at Sicyon). The occasion of the expulsion of the exiles coming so rapidly after the return of the embassies from Rome in spring 183 seems likely to have been closely associated with the restoration of Chaeron's party - the party which, in its various earlier guises, had created the original 'old exiles'. In this new expulsion, we have no reason to deny the complicity of Serippus' group, or even of the Achaean federal government. Philopoemen had not really wanted to restore the 'old exiles' in 182; and the ingratitude of Areus and Alcibiades since then must have made him regret his earlier decision. It seems possible therefore, that this expulsion was carried out by a coalition of all anti-exile elements. This means that in Sparta, Chaeron and Serippus must have co-operated. They were clearly united in their hostility to the 'old exiles'; yet there was a major difference of opinion: Serippus' main policy was co-operation with Achaea; Chaeron, whose group was formed of those exiled by Achaea in 183, must have been fundamentally opposed to the League, and at the Roman conference, only accepted this as a means of ensuring his group's restoration. The coalition was therefore fundamentally unstable.
Polybius does not specify the reason for Serippus' visit to Rome in winter 183/2, and the Senate's reply does not give us more information than that it was concerned with the status of the city on which the Senate suspended judgement. He cannot have been urging a restoration of the city to Achaea, for the secession had not yet taken place: the Senatus Consultum which contained the Senate's reply to the Achaeans clearly implies this:

If Sparta had already seceded, it was not known at Rome; therefore Serippus cannot have been contending for restoration. On the other hand, the Senate's settlement of Sparta had already been upset by the expulsion of the 'old exiles'; and it might be considered that the whole would require negotiation anew. In this case, Serippus would need to justify the treatment of the 'old exiles' on behalf of the government as a whole; and on behalf of his own group, he had to make his sectional position clear: he would attempt to obtain a Senatus Consultum confirming that, even in the new conditions, the Senate would ensure that Sparta remained Achaean. This was the more important as his partners in the coalition had the opposite intention.

Serippus cannot have been responsible for the secession; and it is unlikely that Chaerion would be able to command sufficient support to declare Spartan secession once Serippus had returned from Rome. This rules out action in accordance with the Senatus
Consultum proclaiming Roman lack of interest, for Serippus brought it with him. If Chaeron was eager to secede, the best time was while his coalition partners, who would oppose the secession, were away from Sparta, while their influence could not be brought to bear on the matter, and while the winter prevented Achaean military activity. Yet although the secession had taken place by the summer, after the return of Serippus it was possible for Lycortas, in recommending the acceptance of Sparta into the League, to say that those in power at Sparta ἀπὸ τὸ παρὸν wanted to rejoin the League, and these were the people who had preserved faith with Achaea. In these circumstances, the only possible meaning this can have, is that Serippus had carried out a coup on his return, and was, ἀπὸ τὸ παρὸν at least, in power and strong enough to be able to enforce his policy. There was no question of either of the groups of exiles having changed sides vis-à-vis Achaea, for they were only selectively restored after Sparta was reunited to the League.

There was no further question of Spartan secession; but despite the restoration of the less offensive 'old exiles' - those who had not abused Achaean friendship - the problem of the die-hard loyalists of the 'old exiles' remained. In winter 182/1 Chaeron was in Rome, and disputed before the Senate with envoys from the exiles, Cletis and Diactorius. It seems clear that Chaeron was acting on behalf of the Spartan government - Polybius says: Ἀκεδαίμονει τοὺς περὶ Χαῖρωνα κατέστησεν - and we must assume that the coalition had been patched up after Serippus' coup and the reunion with
Achaea. They must still have been united against the activist exiles, and Chaeron could clearly be a useful representative for the Spartan government, with his old connections with the Senate from his association with Nabis' party. Serippus clearly could not afford to leave Sparta again himself, and take the risk of a repetition of the events of the previous year.

The result of these embassies was that the Senate sent a letter to the Achaeans, which was duly ignored. Probably the next winter, 181/0, the exiles were again represented at Rome, and another letter was sent to the Achaeans. In 180 Chaeron had managed to gain a dominant position in Sparta; Polybius says nothing about the political aspect of this, but mentions only the personal; but the threat was considered serious enough for Chaeron to be suppressed by federal intervention. This interference must mean that Chaeron was thought to be planning another secession; and Hyperbatus, learning from the last period of Chaeron's dominance in 182, stepped in before the secession became a fact. Achaean ambassadors were again sent to Rome - Callicrates, Lydiadas and Aratus - during winter 180/79: the result was Callicrates' triumph, which included, in its final working out, the final restoration of the remaining Spartan exiles, and the ending of another phase of Spartan confusion.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Pol. 23.12.1; Liv. 39.49; Plut. Ph. 18.1; Paus. 8.51.5.
   For the date of death, cf. discussion in app. 2, p. 414f.


3. Plut. Ph. 5.1: Ἐδήδε αὐτῷ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονότος.

4. Hoffmann, RE XX 1, 76f. 'Philopoimen', wrongly bases his calculations on a death date of June 183, and as a result finds 253 as the year of his birth from the Polybian evidence.

5. Pol. 10.22.1; Plut. Ph. 1.1-2; Paus. 8.49.1-2.


7. Pol. 10.22.4.

8. Cf. Hiller, RE XV 1, 'Megala Polis', 128; 134f. On the battle at Mantinea, Paus. 8.10.6-9, cf. Walbank, Aratos, 36, n. 1; Beloch, IV 2, 521; 609. Paus., 8.27.12, dates the accession of Lydiadas 2 γενεαί after the death of Aristodemus. This cannot be correct: at the most the time is 10 years. cf. Schoch, RE XIII 2, 2202 'Lydiadas'.


10. Pol. 2.41.1; 41.12 (reunion); 41.13-15 (Aegium, Bura, Cerynea); 43.1-2 (administrative change). On the chronology
of the early development of Achaea, cf. Walbank, *Comm.* I, 233ff., and writers cited there. W.'s system does explain all the data, although it is necessary to employ exclusive calculation, whereas Pol. seems to have preferred inclusive elsewhere.

11. Pol. 2.43.3; Plut. *Ar.* 5-9 (Sicyon); Pol. 2.43.4; Plut. *Ar.* 16.2-24.1 (Corinth); Pol. 43.5; Plut. *Ar.* 24.3; Paus. 2.8.5; 7.7.2 (Megara, Troezen, Epidaurus). On extra-ethnic expansion in the First Achaean League, 02 Larsen, *Robinson Studies*, 807ff.

12. Plut. *Ar.* 24.4; 41.3; Cl. 19.4; Paus. 2.8.5. cf. Walbank, *Aratos*, 45-49.


14. Pol. 2.44.1; Plut. *Ar.* 33.1.

15. Polyaeus (2.36) records the accession of Heraea under Dioetas. It is probably best placed at this time of Achaean expansion in Arcadia; and the strategos-list (cf. Walbank, *Aratos*, 167ff.) allows 238/7 or 236/5 as the most probable years. If the incorporation of Heraea is seen as a result of an attack on Sparta, as Walbank (*Aratos*, 58), it is best to place it in 236/5. With Heraea went Cleitor and Thelphusa (*Beloch* IV 1, 632). Alea may also have been taken with Heraea: in 227 Cleomenes takes Heraea and Alea (Plut. *Cl.* 7.3), and they were perhaps taken together in 236; but in any case Alea was Achaean before 227. (MSS of Plut. *Cl.* 7.3 read Ἀλεαίαν, which is unknown. Suggested emendations are Ἀλεάω and Ἀλέαω. Asea was a small village belonging to Megalopolis (Strabo 8.343);
and seems unlikely to have been mentioned in Plutarch's source along with Heraea. Alea was of greater importance, and therefore more likely. Cf. Walbank, Aratos, 85). Cleoneae was added to Achaea probably in 235 - a Nemec year (Plut. Ar. 28.3). Perhaps at this time too Gynaetha and Stymphalus were annexed (cf. Niccolini, La Conf. Ach. 28-9).

16. Pol. 2.44.5; Plut. Ar. 30.2; cf. Walbank, Aratos, 62-3.

17. Plut. Ar. 30.3: φιλοτιμοφάνειος δ' εθνης ἐπεραλείπτην τὸν Ἀρατοῦν. It is clear that Aratus, whom Plut. is using as source here, had the sole intention of developing his own point of view: in Plut. the faults are all Lydiadas'. cf. Plut. Ar. 35.3; for more evidence of Aratus' interpretation of Lydiadas' φιλοτιμία.

18. Plut. Ar. 35.1-3; Pol. 2.44.6.

19. Mantinea: Aetolian in 229 (Pol. 2.46.2); Achaean before this (Pol. 2.51.1). Orchomenus: probably at this time. In 223 after Antigonus had captured the town from Cleomenes, obx ἀποκατέστησε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς (Pol. 4.6.5). This implies that O. had been Achaean before 223; but in 229 it was Aetolian (Pol. 2.46.2), so that c.234/3, the time of Achaean expansion into Arcadia, seems the necessary date; and Dittenberger attributed Syll. 490 - the accession terms for O. - to 234/3. On the other hand, Foucart, the original publisher of the inscription (Rev. Arch. 32, 1896), followed by Niese, OGIS III, 35 n.3, prefers to take it with Liv. 32.5.4 (199 B.C.), where it is described how Philip evacuated Orchomenus and gave it to Achaea. It is possible that this is correct, notwithstanding
Pol.'s use of ἰμοκαλίστημι in 4.6.5. Cf. Pol. 30.9.8, where the word means only 'hand over' (although this is the only example of this usage cited by Mauersberger, Polybios-Lexikon, and therefore tells against the interpretation).

20. Pol. 2.44.6 - Hermione and Phlius; Plut. Ar. 34.5 - Aegina and ἡ πλείστη τῆς Ἀρχαίας: in this phrase may be included at least Pheneus and Lasion: in 225 they were among towns taken by Cleomenes, and 229 seems to be the most likely time for them to join Achaea. Pol. 2.52.2; Plut. Cl. 14 - in this passage MSS. read Ἀγγαυνι otherwise unknown. Manso suggested ἁσιώνι, accepted with reservations by Walbank, Aratos, 81; Plut. Ar. 35.3 - strategia of Aristomachus).

21. Pol. 2.46.2 (Aetolian, taken by Cleomenes); Pol. 2.57.2 (recovered in 227); Pol. 2.58.4; Plut. Ar. 39.1 (loss in 226/5).

22. Plut. Cl. 4.4 (accession of Caphyae); 7.3 (loss of Heraea and Alea); Pol. 2.58.4; Plut. Ar. 39 (Mantinea, Pheneus, Pellene, Phlius); Plut. Cl. 14.2 (Lasion); Pol. 20.6.8 (Megara); 2.52.2 (others). On events of these years cf. Walbank, Aratos, 89f.

23. Pol. 2.47.5-51.1 (preliminary negotiations); 52.3-4 (loss of Corinth and final agreement with Antigonus). On the date of the first negotiations (227/6), cf. Walbank, Philip, 13-14; Porter, Plutarch's Aratos, p. lxii.

Pol. 2.54.5-14; Plut. Ar. 45; Cl. 23 (events of 223).


26. At Sellasia Philopoemen was a cavalryman (Plut. Ph. 6), which suggests that he had been in the habit of serving with the cavalry. As Achaean cavalry fought under Lydiadas at Ladoceia (Plut. Ar. 37), Philopoemen may have been among them.

27. Pol. 2.55.5.


29. Pol. 2.54.4-5; Plut. Ar. 45; cf. Freeman, History of Federal Government, 382-3; Beloch, IV 1, 712-13; Walbank, Philip, 15-16 (& bibliography); Comm. I, 256. It is surprising that the large amount of detailed study of the working of the symmachy has blinded scholars to the primary truth, so clearly (but emotionally) observed by Freeman, that the symmachy was simply a façade to disguise the regularisation of Macedonian domination - in this respect no different from Alexander's Corinthian League, or the League of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Even Walbank, when confronted with Antigonus' hegemony of the Achaean League (Plut. Ar. 38.6), and the law enjoining Achaean magistrates to summon an assembly whenever the hegemom wished (Pol. 5.1.6), can write: '... so long as the king of Macedon was prepared to abide by its terms, the domination which it offered him was largely illusory'. (Comm. I, 256). It is not necessary for the dominant military power to break the terms of an agreement in order to dominate.

30. Pol. 2.55; 61-63; Plut. Ph. 5; Cl. 23-25; Paus. 4.29.7,
states that Messene was a member of the League at this time; but he seems to be making the inference from the friendly reception of the Megalopolitans. We know that as late as 221 the alliance with the Aetolians was still officially in force (Pol. 4.3.9), and in 220 the Messenians had to appeal to the League as friends, but not members, for help (Pol. 4.7.2-5).

That they were not members of the symmachy either seems clear from Pol. 4.5.8 - although again friendly relations are implied. Cf. Walbank, Philip, 24; Comm. I, 453, against Fine, AJP, 1940, 156-7.

31. Paus. 2.9.2; 4.29.7-8; 8.49.4. Paus. seems to have as his source here the same material as Plutarch, but indulges in some melodramatisation: for instance, Plut.'s ἔγκλημα εἰς τὸν φανερον (2.9.2); and ἔλεγεν . . . ἐν σπουδαίς (4.29.7) - which even Polybius could not say. But cf. app. 1, 1 ικτ.

32. Plut. Ch. 24.5.
33. Pol. 2.55.
34. Pol. 2.61.4-6.
36. The suggestion (ad. Syll. 626) that Lycortas married a daughter of Philopoemen, thus making him Polybius' maternal grandfather, is unlikely in the absence of mention by Polybius himself. However, this does not mean that the suggestion need be wholly false: if Philopoemen's daughter was Lycortas' second wife,
from whom Thearidas II was born; he would be Polybius' half-brother. This would explain, perhaps better than Ziegler (NE XXI 2, 1445 - out of respect for Philopoemen's glory), the continuance of the name 'Philopoemen' in the stemma; and at the same time it explains the absence of mention by Polybius.

38. Plut. Ph. 5.
39. Pol. 2.61.9-10.
41. Pol. 2.64.
42. Pol. 2.65-9; Plut. Cl. 28; Ph. 6; cf. Kromayer, Antike Schlachtfelder I, 199ff; comprehensive discussion of date and aspects of Pol.'s account in Walbank, Comm. I, 272f.
43. Pol. 2.65.3.
44. Plut. Ph. 6.
47. τούς δαντοὺς πολίτας (Pol. 2.67.5; cf. Plut. Ph., 6.3). These were almost certainly the cavalry, not the infantry, who were also at hand: Philopoemen, himself a cavalryman, would not lead an infantry attack on the Spartan cavalry.
48. Pol. 2.67.8. Plut.'s account (Ph. 6), is in the manner of an ἀριστεία, and is accordingly confused in detail.
49. Plut. Ph. 6.7 - 7.1; Pol. 2.68.1-2.
50. Pol. 2.69; Plut. Cl. 28-29.
51. Cf. ch. 2.
52. Pol. 4.25. Cf. in general, Fine, AJP, 1940; Walbank, Philip, 24f.
Pol. 5.104 (Agelaus' speech): the historicity of this speech has been questioned (without argument), by Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos, 54 n.1; but Roman influence in Illyria had been close enough for 12 years to make the speech entirely plausible. We rather agree with Walbank, Philip, 66: 'For all its tactful phrasing, the speech was fundamentally a request to Philip not to hurl himself thoughtlessly into a war with Rome'.
58. Pol. 7.12; Plut. Ar. 50; cf. Niese, GGM II, 469-71; Walbank, Aratos, 156; Philip, 72-5.
59. Pol. 8.12; Plut. Ar. 5.3; cf. Walbank, Aratos, 157.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. c. 220-210 and 200-c.194.

2. Pol. 4.53-55. As far as Philopoemen is concerned, Plutarch simply records that on each occasion he returned λαμπρός—little more than conventionally 'successful'. (Ph. 7 & 14).


4. Paus. 8.49.7: τὸ δὲ Ἀντιγόνου μὲν ὀλίγου μελήσαν ἐμέλλε.

5. Pol. 4.55.2.

6. Van Effenterre, La Crète et le monde grec de Platon à Polybe, 165f.

7. ib., 167.


9. Pol. 4.53-55 (events of war and Gortynian stasis); Pol. 7.11.9 (Philip's proastasia).

10. The date of the foundation of the koinon is disputed.

Guarducci ( Riv. Fil., 78, 1950) suggests that it was founded after the War of Lyttus, and that Philip's proastasia was a result of the part he had taken in founding it. Van Effenterre, on the other hand (op. cit., 132f.), considers it to be earlier in the third century: 'la fondation du koinon peut en somme être rapportée au troisième quart du IIIe siècle' (ib. 138). The date of the foundation is not strictly relevant to the present study; but the effect of the war and the intervention of Philip mark an important change in the
Cretan balance of power, which van Effenterre notes. We need not re-examine all his epigraphic evidence, but his conclusion is a useful statement of the position: 'Ce n'est sûrement pas dû au seul hasard des trouvailles si nous avons aux IIIe et IIe siècles tant de traités où Gortyne figure et semble même souvent jouer un rôle déterminant'. (op. cit. 154). Whatever the facts about the date of the koinon's foundation, the intervention of Philip is, as Guarducci and van Effenterre would agree, a vitally important event in internal Cretan affairs.

13. Polyrrhenia and Lappa, the leaders of the Cretan war effort, appealed both to the Achaeans and Philip for help (Pol. 4.55.1); the influence of Aratus is implied by Pol. 7.14.4 and Plut. Ar. 48.
14. Pol. 4.55.5.
15. Pol. 13.8.2; cf. Liv. 34.35.9.
17. Cf. Dubois, Les Liges Étolienne et Achaïenne, 74 n. 5. Also below ch. 3, 196.
18. Plut. Ph. 13; Paus. 8.50.6.
19. Paus. 8.50.6; cf. Inscr. Cret. IV, 176; i, viii, 9 (which Guarducci dates to this time).


24. By 189 Gortyn and Cnossos were co-operating in a war against Cydonia (Liv. 37.60).


27. SEG, 3, 312. Boethius, in his discussion of the historical setting of both of these inscriptions, is inclined to place them both after the peace of 195 (BSA 25, 425). His argument is that only after the peace and the restoration of 'friendly' relations between Achaea and Sparta would the Mycenaeans be willing to pass a pro-Spartan decree. This view seems excessively naif. The two decrees seem incompatible, and therefore incapable of having been passed under the same political circumstances. Protimus' decree must be after the loss of the Argolid by Nabis, therefore after 195; it would have been far too dangerous to pass it before then. Damocleidas' decree, demanding as it does entirely different political circumstances, must surely be dated to the period of Nabis' control of the Argolid i.e. between 198 and 195; and the indications are that it would be early in this period, for once Nabis had control, the Mycenaeans would be eager to
accommodate him as far as possible and as quickly as possible. There is no difficulty in this: a community did not have to be free to pass decrees honouring its masters. Cf. (for instance) OGIS, 329 (Aegina).

28. Liv. 35.29.1. At about this time, a Telemaestus of Gortyn, son of Antiphates, was honoured at Epidauros (IG IV², 244); it seems likely that this was the same man. The statue was erected in the Asclepieion by Cretan soldiers to honour this συμμαχός ὑπὸ ἔξοχον ἀγεμόνα.

29. Pol. 33.16.6.

30. Inscr. Cret. II, xxiii, 12A.

31. Pol. 4.53.6-7; 55.5.

32. Holleaux, Études 4, 189f.

33. Cnossos was also one of the cities which did not receive Perdiccas, as was Lappa, which had been closely associated with Polyrrhenia in the War of Lyttus (Pol. 4.53-55); Cnossos, we have argued, was one of Nabis' cities; and in this case, anti-Macedonian too. Polyrrhenia and Lappa (if we accept Holleaux' demonstration of their anti-Macedonian standpoint), should also have enjoyed the support of Nabis. In the cases of the other two cities, Rhaucus and Cydonia, which certainly did not receive Perdiccas, no other connection with Sparta can be traced, apart from this association with Cnossos.

34. Pol. 13.4.2: εἶς δὲ τὴν Κρήτην προσβεντὰς ἐξαποστέλλει τοὺς ἔρευντας καὶ παρομήνοντας ἐπὶ τὸν κατὰ Ροδίων πόλεμον. Pol. 13.6.2: ἐξουσίωνε μὲν γὰρ τοῖς Κρητῖκα τῶν κατὰ Σάλακταν
ληστείων. cf. 18.54.8-12; Diod. 28.1

35. Herzog, Klio 2, 1901-2; Cardinali, Riv. Fil., 35, 1907;
Holleaux, Études 4, 163f; 178f; Segre, Riv. Fil., 61, 1933;
Guarducci, Epigraphica 2, 1940; Walbank, Philip, 109f.

36. Plut. Ph. 13; Paus. 8.50.6.

Walbank, Philip, 110, also suggests that Nabis may have been
working with Dicaearchus. The general imprecision involved in
talking about 'the Cretans' should be avoided. If this means
the koînôn, it should be stated clearly. The Kretikos Polemos
is sufficient to show that there was little unanimity at this
time (as we would in fact expect).

38. Liv. 31.25.4-7.


40. Diod. 20.88.9 (305); Pol. 4.53.1-2 (221); Ditt. Syll. 581,
cf. van Effenterre, 214.

41. Pol. 16.37.3.

42. Ditt. Syll. 600 - in accordance with our dating the fourth
strategia of Philopoemen to 201/0 (cf. app. 2) this inscription
must be redated to this year.

43. Liv. 33.3.10. Cydas is a common enough name at Gortyn (cf.
index to Inscr. Cret. IV); and further identification is
hazardous. But a Cretan Cydas is used by Eumenes in 169 to
carry on his negotiations with Perseus (Pol. 29.6.2; 7.8;
Liv. 44.13; 24.10). It may be that he is the same as our
Cydas, as contact could have been made with Eumenes as a result of his participation in the Cynoscephalae campaign. The period of 30 years separating the two events is long, but need not wholly rule out the identification. Cf. Niese GWS III, 323 n.1; Schoch, RE Supp. 4, 1123; he may have been Cosmos at Gortyn in 184 (Pol. 22.15). Against this, cf. van Effenterre, 264, n.3; ib., 298.

44. De Sanctis, Storia IV 1, 78 and n. 159, accepted by Walbank, Philip, 167 n.4; Aymard, PR, 147, n.52—well discussed by van Effenterre, op. cit., 206.

45. Liv. 32.40.4.

46. Liv. 37.60.

47. Liv. 34.35.9.

48. Pol. 22.15.


50. Liv. 39.49.2; Paus. 8.51.5.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Plut. Ph. 7; Paus. 8.49.7; (Philopoemen); Liv. 27.31.10
(Cyclades) Cf. app. 2, 3, and strategos-list.

2. Liv. 32.19.2.

3. Cf. ch. 2, passim.

4. Pol. 10.21.1 (Euryleon); 11.8.1-3 (strategoi); 10.22.8-10
(hipparchs).

5. Liv. 26.24.1-4 (Aetolia); Pol. 9.29-39 (speeches at Sparta);
30.6 (Elis and Messene). On the treaty, cf. Klaffenbach,
SDAW 1954, no. 1; SBB 13, 1956 no. 382. On the date (211) cf.
Badian, Latomus, 1958.

6. Refs. in Broughton, MBP I, 272; cf. Scullard, Roman Politics,
65.

7. Liv. 31.25.3.

8. Plut. Ph. 4.3.

9. Pol. 9.42.5-8; 11.5.8 (capture); 22.11.9-10, cf. Ditt.
OGIS 281 (sale to Attalus). Cf. Miese, GMS II, 484; De
Sanctis, III 2, 420-1; Placelire, Les Aitoliens à Delphes,
300 n.2.

10. Plut. Ph. 7.3-5; Pol. 10.25. Philopoemen's explanation was
made τοῖς τε πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀποτελείοις (9). The
ἀποτελείοι were the local commanders of the local detachments
of the federal army (cf. Ditt. Syll. 600). It must be
assumed that οἱ πολλοὶ in this case were the local cavalry-
men, to whom alone Philopoemen's information was relevant.
Cf. Aymard, Assemblées, 102 n.1.

12. Liv. 27.29.9. Hachanidas is called tyrannus Lacedaemoniorum; but Pelops was still alive, for he was killed by Nabis (Diod. 27.1), and it seems likely that he was nominally king. Cf. Liv. 34.32.1.

13. Liv. 27.30; cf. Walbank, Philip, 89-91. The technical form of the concilium is discussed by Larsen, Rep. Gov., 170: 'Probably it was, so to speak, a combination of an extraordinary meeting of an Achaean assembly and of the synedrion of the Hellenic League'. Philip was fully entitled to call such a meeting, but may not have paid as much attention to constitutional form as modern scholars: in the present circumstances he had no need to worry excessively about Achaean constitutional niceties when his supporters were in office and needed his help.

14. Liv. 27.30.

15. Cf. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos, 56: 'man sprach vom Frieden, ohne ihm zu wollen, und schob die Schuld am Misslingen der Verhandlungen dem Gegner zu'.

16. Liv. 27.30.11.

17. Liv. 27.30.15; 17.

18. Liv. 27.31.1-3.

20. Liv. 27.31.9-11; Plut. Ph. 7.
21. Liv. 27.32.1f. (Romans in Elis etc.); 32.10 (Menippus and Polyphantas).
22. The attack on Dyne is only known through later allusions.
   It has usually been placed in 208 (De Sanctis, III 2, 427 n. 75; Walbank, Philip, 98),
   but the autumn of 209 is supported by Pausanias, 7.17.5: ταύτην δίλιππος ὁ Ἀμιρρίδος πολέμων
   μόνην τῶν Ἀχαίων ἔσχεν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ταύτῃ
   Σουλπίκιος ἥγεμων καὶ οὗτος Ῥωμαίων ἐπέτρεψε τῇ στρατιᾷ
   διαρράπασι τὴν Δόμην. If we can accept this statement as even
   part truth, it suggests that there was a close connection
   between Philip's use of the town and Galba's sacking, and
   does not conflict with the evidence that Dyne was still in
   Achaean hands and habitable at the time of Philip's expedi-
   tion. The only difficulty is in finding a time when Philip
   could restore the town: he left Achaea after the Elean
   expedition, and did not return until July 208 (Liv. 28.7.14f).
   Livy (32.22.10) implies that the restoration followed rapidly
   on the destruction (captis nuper direptisque). The probable
   explanation is that Menippus and Polyphantas were responsible
   for the restoration on Philip's orders: Philip would still
   get the credit from the grateful Dymeans.
23. Liv. 27.33.5.
24. Liv. 28.5.5. Nothing is known of Tegea between its capture
   by Antigonus in 223 (Pol. 2.54.6-8) and 207, when it was
Spartan (Pol. 11.18.8). This attack of Machanidas on Argos seems the best time for the Spartan capture of Tegea, rather than the autumn. Cf. Walbank, *Philip*, 98 & n.2. The argument of De Sanctis, III 2, 427 n. 75, that it cannot have been before summer 208 because Philip did not help Achaea recover it, is not persuasive. It is unlikely to have been Spartan as early as 210 (Miese, *GGH* II, 483).

25. *Liv.* 28.7.14. Walbank, *Philip*, 96 & 304 n.5, suggests that Achaea had gained control of Olympia by this time, and had taken over the preparations for the games: Machanidas was therefore attacking on behalf of his allies, the Eleans. There is no support in *Livy* for this, in a Polybian passage: *Machanidas Olympiorum sollemne ludicrum parantes Eleos adgredi statuisse.* If Walbank were correct, Polybius would have been sure to emphasise that the Achaean right to superintend the games was threatened by Machanidas, and this must have been reflected in *Livy*. Miese's correction of the text (*GGH* II, 492 n.1) *Achaes for Eleos* - which Walbank's suggestion entails - is unnecessary. Machanidas' attack on his friends is quite comprehensible, and should not be explained away: there is probably some party significance - which we cannot find clearly - and the parallel with Nabis' attack on friendly Messene in 201 is close, cf. below, p.93f.


27. List of garrisons and figure (20,000 to 30,000) in Miese,
GGMS II, 600 n.2. Griffith, Mercenaries, 71-2, estimates at least 15,000.

28. Liv. 28.8.1-6. There is a difficulty in this interpretation, for Livy simply says, redidit... Achaecia (6). However, the cities, with Orchomenus, were not in fact handed over until 198 (Liv. 32.5.5). It seems unlikely that they were handed over in 208, recovered by Philip at some time later, and handed over again in 198. It is better to see the 208 'restoration' as an unfulfilled promise. Cf. Niese, GGMS II, 492 n.3; Walbank, Philip, 96-7; Aymard, RR, 59 n.53.

29. Liv. 28.8.7-10.


32. Plut. Ph. 9.1-7; Paus. 8.50.1; cf. Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegführung, 131-2; Niese, GGMS II, 495-8.

33. Plut. Ph. 4.3 (quoted above, p. 5f).

34. Pol. 11.11-18; Plut. Ph. 10; Paus. 8.50.2. The battle is discussed in detail in, Kromayer, Antike Schlachtfelder I, 281-314; Roloff, Probleme aus der griechischen Kriegsgeschichte, 116-141; Delbruck, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, I3, 252-6.

35. Pol. 11.11.8-10.

36. Liv. 29.12.1: neglectae eo biennio res in Graecia erant.

Balsdon, JES 1954, points out that this cannot mean that Galba was withdrawn, as his successor was not appointed until
late 206 (Liv. 29.12.2. Cf. MRR, promagistrates ad 207 and 206.).

37. Pol. 13.6.1 (204): ἔτος ἡδη τρίτον ἐχον τὴν ἀρχήν. This means that he had established himself by mid-206 at the latest. Cf. Ehrenberg, RE XVI 2, 1471 (207); Niese, GGMS II, 463-5.

38. There is no evidence for De Sanctis' improbable assertion (III 2, 428) that Philopoemen had been supported by Macedonian troops.


40. Cf. n. 28, above.

41. Pol. 11.18.10. The number is perhaps exaggerated, and certainly includes mercenaries and helots; but the loss was still heavy.


43. Cf. chs. 4, 5 & 6.

44. Liv. 29.12.1; App. Nuc. 3; cf. Walbank, Philip, 99-101; De Sanctis, III 2, 431-2; Niese, GGMS II, 500-1.


46. Plut. Ph. 12.2; Faus. 8.50.4 (who rationalises, and puts the attempt at Megalopolis, Philopoemen's home town); cf. Justin, 29.4.11.

48. Pol. 18.7.6 (Flamininus). A list of the alleged murder victims of Philip has been collected by Walbank, *CG* 1943, 4 n.3.

49. Walbank, *CG*, l.c.; Philip 124 n.6, notes rightly that the source of the tradition must be contemporary, and calls it untrustworthy; but he does not argue the point.

50. Liv. 32.19.2.

51. Cf. Pol. 24.11.3: this refers only to the time of the wars with Philip and Antiochus, i.e. after Philopomen had left for Crete in 200 and after his return; cf. ch. 6, p. 244f.


53. Pol. 11.11.7.

54. Niccolini, *Studi. stor. per l'ant. class.*, 1913, 1941.


56. Accepted by De Sanctis, *IV* 1, 57 n. 113; Aymard, *PR*, 68 n. 93.


58. *Delphica* II, 52. Text also in *Ditt. Syll.* ad 702;
Niccolini, op. cit., 194f.

59. Cf. ch. 2, 31; Dubois, Ligues Italiennes et Achaiennes, 74;
       Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 122 n.1 - but this was not the
       only reason.


61. Cf. strategos-list.

62. Aymard, FR, 45f & n.79 (and bibliography).

63. Plut. Ph. 11.

64. Plut. Ph. 12; cf. Paus. 8.50.5; Pol. 20.6. It is not, in
       fact, certain that Philopoemen was strategos: we are only
       told that the Boeotians thought he was. Cf. Niccolini, La
       Conf. Ach., 106; Aymard, FR, 14 n.7; Walbank, Philip, 165
       (206/5); Niese, GGHS II, 567 n.2 (201/0); Beloch, GG, IV 2,
       434; Meyer, NE XV, 196 'Megara' (193/2). Also possible is
       Philopoemen's (uncertain) strategia of 204/3 or 203/2 (cf.
       strategos-list) - not ruled out by Aymard's argument. As
       this is uncertain, 206/5 is accepted in the text, but the
       interpretation would be essentially unchanged if 204/3 or 203/2
       were the year.

64a. A further factor may have been federal considerations. Since
       the re-accession of Megara, Achaea shared a frontier with
       Boeotia. It was therefore in her interest to preserve as
       friendly as possible relations with Boeotia.

65. Pol. 13.8. Polybius' comment (?) that Nabis had been looking
       for an excuse to attack Achaea for some time is entirely
       convincing.
66. The formal war motion was carried at a synedrion at the end of 200 (Liv. 31.25.3-4).


68. In 219 Dyme, Pharae and Tritaea decided to look after their own interests - Pol. 4.60.


70. Didascalondas the Cretan (and probably others): Pol. 16.37.3.

71. Pol. 16.36.7; cf. Niese, CGHS II, 566.

72. Cf. Broughton, MRR I, 321 and 322 n.4, for refs.


74. Aymard, Pr., 47 n. 79, suggests that Philopoemen was aiming at a policy of neutralism. (Cf. Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 119; Hoffmann, RE XX 1, 85). He is led to this by his failure to reach the correct conclusion from the closeness of Aristaenus
and Philopoemen. He therefore denies that Philopoemen can have contemplated an entente with Rome. Yet we have shown that this is the only satisfactory conclusion from both his association with Aristaenus and his virtual exile in Crete. Justin (29.4.11) may preserve the remains of an original Polybian statement to this effect.

75. The order of events is that established by Walbank, \textit{Philip}, 313-317.


78. For a detailed account of these years, see all standard works, and esp. Walbank, \textit{Philip}, 138f.; Badian, \textit{For. Cl.}, 69f.; Stier, \textit{Roms Aufstieg}, 119f.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. Liv. 34.57.1.

2. Liv. 34.57-59; Diod. 28.15; App. Syr. 6; cf. De Sanctis, IV 1, 131; Badian, Studies, 126-7.

3. Cf. Liv. 34.57.3: beneigne omnibus responsum.


5. Flut. Ph. 13.5.


7. Cf. strategos-list and app. 2, § 311.

8. Liv. 34.59.3; 35.22.1; Badian, Studies, 128.


11. Liv. 35.29.2; 22.2.


13. Pol. 24.11-13 (comparison of Aristaenus and Philopoemen); cf. Aymard, PR, 304, followed by Castellani, Contributi, 78. The most probable date for the foedus, accepted here, is that of Badian, JRS 1952, 76f., of winter 192/1. Cf. also, Castellani, Contributi, 84-6.

14. Liv. 35.10.11 (elections); 35.20.8f. (provinces). There is some confusion in Livy on this point: he has mixed up the appointments of Baebius and Atilius, but it is quite clear that the naval preparations should go with the fleet, and therefore are Atilius'.
15. Liv. 35.37.3 (arrival of Atilius at Gytheum); Zon. 9.19; cf. Aymard, PR, 309 n.13; 310 (effectiveness of Atilius); Liv. 35.23.5 (appointment of propaganda mission).

16. For refs. cf. MRR. I, ad annum.

17. Liv. 35.25.2-3; cf. Aymard, PR, 301f.

18. Liv. 35.25.4-5: in concilio omnium ad bellum extemplo capessendum inclinatae sententiae erant. This suggests that Flamininus' letter did not arrive until at least the second day of the synclétos, when there had already been considerable discussion. Cf. Aymard, PR, 304f. On the nature of the meeting, cf. Aymard, Assemblées, 313; Larsen, Rep. Gov., 172.

19. Plut. Ph. 15.2; Paus. 8.50.10.

20. Liv. 35.25.6-10; cf. Miese, GGMS II, 683; Aymard, PR, 305-6.


22. Liv. 35.47.4.

23. Winter 184/3: Pol. 23.5.2.

24. Liv. 35.25.11-12 (P).

25. Liv. 35.47.4 (Aetolians); 35.25.11-12 (Gytheum).


27. Liv. 35.25.12-26.10; Plut. Ph. 14. The fact that Patrae was the regular base of the Achaean fleet seems fairly clear from Liv. 38.7.2-3, and the fact that the ships returned to Patrae after the expedition; it is also worth noting that the admiral, Tison, was from Patrae. It therefore seems likely that the fleet had set out initially from Patrae (the fact that the ancient quadrireme had been stationed at Aegium is of
little significance in this respect: it was a famous ship, therefore on view traditionally in the capital). The reading Patras (26.9) has been questioned by Mühl, (Neue Jahrb. für Phil., 1883), who suggested Prasiae (on the grounds that Prasiae was closer to Sparta for the subsequent expedition). This was accepted by Meischke, Symbolae, 59, and De Sanctis, IV 1, 134. Aymard, PR, 306 n.2 cannot decide between the established text and the conjecture. But the sound judgment of Niese, GGMS II, 683 n.1, followed by Mundt, Nabis, 13, is supported by Dr. A. H. McDonald, who has kindly confirmed that Patras has full MSS authority.

28. Liv. 35.27.1-10; cf. Plut. Ph. 14.4; Paus. 8.50.8 (night raid); Liv. 35.27.11-30.13 (main expedition). Cf. Niese, GGMS II, 683 n.12; De Sanctis, IV 1, 134-5; Aymard, PR, 306f. On the topography, see Loring, JHS, 1895.

29. Liv. 35.29.1 (Telemmastus) cf. ch. 2, 441; 27.11 (Epirots and Acarnanians). It is also suggested that Eumenes was present at some stage in the operations of this year against Nabis (cf. Aymard, PR, 309 n.12, & works cited there; also now McShane, Attalida, 139). It is clear that later in the year Eumenes was in Greece (at Chalcis and Athens: Liv. 35. 39.1f.), but he is nowhere mentioned in Livy's Polybian account of the war with Nabis. An inscription from Pergamum however (Ditt. Syll., 605A) records a dedication of spoils by those μετὰ βασιλέως Εὐμένου πλεύσαντες τὸ δεύτερον εἰς
Dittenberger's explanation, accepted by Aymard (l.c.), is that the reference is to a hypothetical expedition against Nabis in 192 and that (certainly established) against Antiochus in 191. An equally possible explanation, which also accounts for the absence of mention by Livy of Eumenes in Philopoemen's expedition, is that the soldiers making the dedication regarded the expedition of 195 against Nabis and that of 191 against Antiochus as two phases of the same war.

Cf. Walbank, _Philip_, 195n.3.


31. The circumstances in which this truce was negotiated are not clear, for Livy does not mention it and we must rely on Plut. _Ph._ 15 and Paus. 8.50.10, who do not give the circumstances. It is attractive (with Aymard, _PR_, 312) to assume that Flamininus openly intervened while the Achaean army was actually in the field, but the sources do not allow certainty for this. It may be safer to conclude, as in the text, that Philopoemen had already ended his expedition unsuccessfully, and Flamininus simply wanted to prevent another attempt on Sparta.


34. Plut. _Fl._ 13.3. One of these honours, set up by Aristaeus,
has been identified by Bousquet, ECH, 1964, 607f.

35. *Ditt. Syll.* 374 1. 64 (Philippides); *ib.* 624 1. 10 (Philopoemen); *ib.* 289 1. 39 (decree - Athens); *ib.* 374 1. 66; 1003 1. 15; 912 1. 24 (proedria). Cf. Gundel, RE XXIV, 'T. Quinctius Flamininus' 1075-6.


37. Liv. 34.35.11; Pol. 21.1.

38. Liv. 35.34.4-5; 35.1f. Cf. Badian, Studies, 131-2.


42. Aymard's discussion (PR, 318f.), of Sparta within Achaea is vitiated by two major faults in interpretation: (i) failure to distinguish between the various Spartan interests (ii) willingness to assume a static policy for Philopoemen, and a static political situation in Sparta until 188.

43. Pol. 20.12; Plut. *Ph.* 15.4-6; Paus. 8.51.2. Paus. places the offer after Philopoemen's defense of Sparta against Flamininus and Diophanes; Plut. makes it clear that it is a direct result of the initial establishment in power of Timolaus' group. Paus. also makes the offer of the actual household, not the money from its sale, and rounds off the figure to 'more than 100 talents'. None of the variants are
more than inaccuracies stemming from abbreviation.

44. Plut. Ph. 15. 5-6. The Philopoemen legend was probably responsible for the growth of the tradition about Timolaus' conventional three visits.

45. Pol. 20.12.6-7; cf. Plut. Ph. 15.6.

46. Pol. 21.9; Liv. 37.20.2. These two passages, and the general consideration of Philopoemen's influence, seem decisive against the view of De Sanctis, IV 1, 169, that Diophanes was 'avversario politico di Filopemene', and of Aymard, PR, 323 & n.40, 'intermédiaire entre les deux politiques opposées d'Aristainos et de Philopoimen', followed by Castellani, Contributi, 79. The fault is in the assumption of static conditions and policies.

47. Liv. 35.47.2-3 (Aetolian estimate of Philopoemen); 31.2 (Flamininus' trust in Achaia); 48.1 (Flamininus at Aegium).


49. Liv. 35.50.3-4 (garrisons); for other Achaean service abroad: e.g. Liv. 33.18 (Rhodian Peraea); Liv. 37. 20-21 (Pergamum in 190) cf. below, p. 168ff.

50. Liv. 35.50.3-4; Plut. Ph. 17.1.

51. Pol. 20.3; Liv. 36.5.2-3.

52. Cf. Badian, JRS, 1952 (& bibliography, to which add Castellani, Contributi, 84f.).

53. Despite the attempts of scholars to see this. Cf. Scullard,
Roman Politics, 110f.

54. Cf. ch. 3, 164f.

55. Liv. 34.43.1 (election of Africamus); 4f. (provinces); cf. Badian, Studies, 122f.

56. Liv. 34.23.5 (Flamininus' commission); 24.1-3 (early elections); 24.5 (election of Glabrio).

57. Plut. Cato Maj. 12. The order of the towns in the text is that given by Plutarch. Aymard (PR, 329 n.25), unnecessarily wishes to alter this to fit the route of a traveller from Italy. Plut. does not say that Cato was en route from Italy. On the legal aspect of these visits, cf. app. 5.


59. Aymard, PR, 334 n.12, has doubts (strangely) about Plut.'s specific statement that Sparta was out of the League.

60. Paus. 8.30.5. Aymard, PR, 335 n.15, rejects Schorn's interpretation (Geschichte Griechenlands, 289), that Diophanes wanted to equal Philopoemen's glory - an obvious personal motive - in favour of his application of Polybius' biased judgement of Diophanes at another time as πολιτηκότερος (22.10.4). In fact, everything we know of Diophanes, supported by his inscription, suggests that Schorn was exact in his understanding. On Pol. 22.10.4, cf. ch. 5, p. 188.
61. Cf. Pol. 22.10.4f.; Liv. 38.32.6-7.
62. Liv. 36.32.1 (purchase of Zacynthus); 31.1-4 (Elis and Messene).
63. Liv. 36.31.2: cum Aetolis sentiebant.
64. Liv. 36.31.5-9.
65. See below, 67f.
66. Pol. 23.5.2 – the λαχώνικος πόλεμος can only be that against Nabis in 195: the expedition of 191 with Diophanes was not a joint allied venture, and scarcely even a πόλεμος. The fact that Deinocrates was the official representative of Messene in 195 seems clear from the concessions granted to Messene in the settlement, Liv. 34.35.6; cf. Seeliger, Messenien, 18.
67. Pol. 23.5.
68. Roebuck, Messenia, 92 & n. 117, thinks that the offer of deditio was not accepted: "The sequel of Livy's account shows that Flamininus himself made final arrangements for Messene's entrance into the League; had he accepted the surrender on behalf of Rome he could scarcely have done this, although a Roman commander who accepted deditio had wide powers..." This misunderstands the nature of deditio, which was essentially an agreement between the Roman commander and those giving the surrender. Cf. Heuss, Völk. Grund., 60 – a work which Roebuck cites!
69. Well seen by Seeliger, Messenien, 19, but denied by Aymard,
PR, 341 n. 14, on the grounds that this would have interested Livy; therefore he would have been bound to include it. But Livy has already sufficiently indicated that Messene was an Aetolian sympathiser; in any case, it may not have been in Polybius' interest to make this wholly clear: Deinocrates was no friend of Achaea. Aymard prefers to refurbish the oligarch/democrat division at Messene, for which the only evidence is Pausanias' description of Deinocrates as δυνατός χρήματι (8.51.7). This view was apparently founded by Freeman, History of Federal Government, 505, and became standard when accepted by Colin, Rome et la Grèce, 227 and Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 157. Cf. Roebuck, Messenia, 95 n. 126. It should now be abandoned.

70. Liv. 36.31.10-32.9; cf. Aymard, PR, 350-1.
71. Liv. 36.32.4.
72. Among them may have been included Aristaenus (as Aymard, PR, 350-1), who in any case was closer to Philopoemen than has often been thought. Cf. above, ch. 3, p. 331.
73. It seems likely that by this time it was about September, the time of the autumn συνόδος, therefore the time of the elections. Cf. Aymard, PR, 352 n. 2; Larsen, Reg. Gov., 173; cf. app. 2, p. 316.
74. Paus. 8.30.5.
75. Liv. 36.35.7: de exulibus Lacedaemoniorum restituendis actum est.
76. Liv. 34.26.12-14.
77. Plut. Ph. 17.4.

78. Aymard argues that this policy must have been passed down to Flamininus by the Senate, without offering any conclusive argument: it was usual for the man-on-the-spot to formulate a policy in good faith, which was then adopted by the Senate, and it seems likely that this was done in this case. His attempt (PR, 356f. n.1), to prove this by arguing that Pol. 21.1 refers to summer 191 is not convincing, see below.

79. Liv. 36.35.7; cf. Aymard, PR, 353f. Another matter in which Diophanes perhaps concerned himself was the negotiation with Glabrio for the resettlement of the Elateans, who had been made homeless on the destruction of their city, probably by the Aetolians, and had taken refuge at Stymphalus. The matter is recorded in an inscription from Stymphalus (SEG 11, 1107), the interpretation accepted here that of Passerini, Ath. 1948; but cf. Mitsos, RHR, 1946/7; Accame, Riv. Fil., 1949 (both argue unconvincingly that Elatea was destroyed by the Romans). It is not clear whether the Diophanes mentioned (1.12) as envoy to Glabrio is in fact the strategos. Against this is the fact that he was sent by the Achaean outside of Peloponnese as an ambassador on a relatively unimportant matter, which the strategos would not normally undertake in person. However, it may be that this mission was after his strategia, but before Glabrio left Greece.

80. Liv. 37.4.6.

82. Aymard, *PR*, 356ff., n.l. Examples of embassies introduced otherwise than by consuls are comparatively rare: *Liv.* 34, 57.3; 37.46.9; *Diod.* 31.5.1 cf. *Pol.* 30.4; *Ditt.* *Syll.* 612.

83. The distinction was appreciated by Niese, *CGMS* II, 716 n. 3, although not elaborated, but surprisingly denied by Aymard, *PR*, 359 n. 9.

84. *Pol.* 21.3.4.


86. *Liv.* 38.7.2-3 (operation with Pleuratus); 38.39.3f. (Cephalenia).


94. *Pol.* 21.32c.2; cf. appendix 6, n. 349.
95. Liv. 38.31.1: the failure to interpret this phrase in its context has led to total failure to understand Philopoemen's attitude towards the exile problem. Cf. Niese, GGNS II, 715; Aymard, PR, 321; 338.

96. Liv. 38.30.9 (appeal of exiles to Achaea); 31.5-6 (appeal of government group to Rome).

97. Two passages make it clear that the 'old exiles' were in fact restored in 188: Pol. 22.11.7: οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν τῶν ἀρχαίων φυγάδων τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀχαίαν κατημένων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. Cf. Liv. 39.36.14 (Areus and Alcibiades); Pol. 23.4.2-3, in which the dispute of the 'old exiles' is not that they demanded restoration, but that their settlement after restoration was unsatisfactory.

98. Liv. 38.32.6-10 (Achaeans at Rome); cf. Pol. 24.12-13 (comparison of Philopoemen and Aristaenus); 22.10.14 (Unanimity of Aristaenus and Diophanes). In the foedus to which Lycortas refers (Liv. 38.32.8) it seems preferable to understand the agreement between Sparta and Achaea rather than the foedus with Rome, as Lycortas' whole emphasis is on the fact that this is an Achaean internal matter. Cf. Niese, GGNS, III, 44.


100. Liv. 38.33.4-5. The 'captive exiles' were restored, therefore must have been present at Compasion (Pol. 21.32c.3). At least Areus and Alcibiades of the 'old exiles' were present (Liv. 39.36.14-16).
The fragments and testimonia do not allow us to echo Aymard's judgement of Aristocrates as 'auteur d'assez faible valeur' (PR, 330 n.1; cf. Stier, *Rosa Aufstiegs*, 174 n. 396: 'Der spartanische Tendenzhistoriker ...'). We must be careful to take Polybius' natural bias into consideration. For there was later a group of Spartans which Pol., 23.4.5, describes as ἄριστο ἂν τῶν ἡμίτονων καὶ τῶν ἐξεπέμπτωτων κατὰ τὰ τῶν Ἀχαϊῶν δόματα. This suggests that further judicial proceedings were in fact carried out after Compassion, with the result that the actual number condemned in the whole of the settlement of Sparta was far higher than Polybius' 80, which only recorded the deaths of the two days. We cannot therefore simply ignore Aristocrates (as, e.g. Niese, *GGHS*, III, 45). Pausanias' account (3.51.3) is briefer than Plutarch's, and contains some variations: he does not mention any deaths at all, says 300 were 'expelled from Peloponnese', agrees that 300 helots were sold. Where Paus.' figure for expellees comes from is obscure: perhaps a confused attempt to combine Aristocrates' and Polybius' figures from Plutarch?

105. Liv. 36.34.7.

106. Pol. 21.32c.4; cf. app. 6, p. 344.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5.


2. Pol. 22.11.7.

3. Pol. 23.4.5.


5. Liv. 38.32.9 (138); cf. ch. 4, 118; Pol. 22.7.6 (Nicodemus). The text is corrupt, but sufficient remains to make the policy clear.

5a. The lacuna in Pol. 22.7.6 must have contained some mention of the constitutional alteration (as B-W.'s conjecture).

6. Pol. 22.3.2. The actual time when the letter was written was probably not long before Lepidus' departure for his province. He clearly did not want to commit himself until he knew the attitude of the Senate as a whole, which he simply echoes. Cf. Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 150.

Castellani, Contributi, 90, by following Aymard’s faulty chronology (Cf. app. 2, 318) makes Lepidus' letter precede the Senate’s reply to Nicodemus by nearly a year. No satisfactory explanation is therefore available for this delay, but it must become simply 'altro segno del disinteresse dei Romani'.


8. Liv. 36.31.9 (original settlement); Pol. 22.10.1-6 (Philopoemen's amendment). On the general nature of this

9. Roebuck, *Messenia*, 95 n. 126. Aymard, *PR*, 365 n. 26, does not speculate about the nature of the amendment, but suggests: 'en 191/0 cette intervention est à sa date logique et normale'. However, he does not cite any evidence to support this. Philopoemen's 5th *strategia* is also supported by Seeliger, *Messenien*, 19-20 (although he dates this to 190/39). This cannot be correct. Diophanes was in Rome in spring 188 opposing Lycortas and Philopoemen (Liv. 38.32. 6-7); and although the main point at issue was Sparta (as it was in 185), Diophanes would have been certain (as in 185) to have raised the matter of Messene if Philopoemen's emendation had already taken place at this time. As he did not, we are justified in placing Philopoemen's intervention after spring 188. Aymard and Seeliger are right in agreeing that Philopoemen must have been *strategos* at the time; and as we have no evidence for a *strategia* between 189/8 and 183/2, it seems best to put this intervention in his 'reform year', 189/8.

10. Cf. ch. 4, 14, 15.

11. Plut. *Ph*. 18.3 (personal hostility); Liv. 39.50.7-8; Paus. 8.51.7; Plut. *Ph*. 20; Pol. 23.12.3 (poisoning), cf. below, 329.

12. Pol. 22.7.5-7.


16. Despite Pol.'s ἀνευσώραυτο (22.7.8). Cf. De Sanctis, IV 1, 238; McShane, Attalids, 164 & n.51. There is no need with De Sanctis, IV 1, 238, and Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 151, to interpret this as an anti-Roman move: the Achaeans had sufficient cause of grievance against Eumenes simply in his capacity of King of Pergamum and Lord of Aegina.


18. Larsen, 'Roman Greece', in Frank, Economic Survey, IV 366-7, suggests that this influx of money would have the effect of depressing interest rates, thus causing the commercial classes to oppose the offer. But in the total absence of background information about the Achaean commercial scene, this must remain speculation.

19. Pol. 22.3.6 (despatch of embassy); 9.1-12 (return and discussion).

20. Plut. Ar. 14.1; 24.4; 41.3.


25. Pol. 24.11-13 (syncrisis); cf. ch. 6, 114ff. The most recent estimate of Aristaenus is also the most unperceptive of Pol.'s bias - Castellani, Contributi, 92-3; cf. De
Sanctis, IV 1, 240.


26. Pol. 22.11.6; 12.1; 12.5-10.

26a. Pol. 28.3; 16.2; Liv. 43.17.2. Cf. Meloni, Perseo, 270-1 (bibliography).

27. Achaean reaction was based wholly on this failure to show due gratitude. Pol. 22.11.8; Liv. 39.35.6-8.

28. Pol. 22.11.7; 12.1-4.

29. Liv. 39.35.5-8; cf. Pol. 22.11.8.

30. Liv. 39.36.1-2 (Areus and Alcibiades); 3-4 (Pulcher's disapproval); 36.6 - 37.17; cf. Paus. 7.9.4 (speech of Lycortas).


32. Paus. 7.9.4. Cf. app. 5, q.34.

33. As Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 154; De Sanctis, IV 1, 241.

34. Pol. 23.4.11.


36. B-W conjectures Κλήτης for MSS Δηςικνατι at Pol. 23.4.2, because Cletis is mentioned at 23.18.5. This is unnecessary, when we consider the rapid turnover of Spartan politicians at this period. Cf. app. 7. B. Shimron (in a private letter) suggests that Lysis' group represented the descendants of the 'old oligarch' opponents of Cleomenes. This is possible, but it seems dangerous to be so specific: there must also have been numbers of exiles created by the factional
struggles after Cleomenes' death, and by the régime of Machanidas (now all considered 'old exiles', along with the exiles from Nabis' time), which would tend to blur precise distinctions after more than 40 years. The total restoration of property was the regular demand of the restored exile, and cannot be taken to describe any particular group. Cf. Ditt. OGIS 2 (Mytilene); Ditt. Syll. 306 (Tegea); Michel, 417 (Calymna).

37. Cf. ch. 4, p. 147.
38. Pol. 23.4.7. Pulcher's name must be added from Paus. 7.9.5.
39. Paus. 7.9.5. Nothing suggests that the 'laws of Lycurgus' were now restored, (as Castellani, Contributi, 99).
40. Discussion of these embassies in: Miese, GGMS III, 49-50; Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 156-7; De Sanctis IV I, 241-2; Castellani, Contributi, 98-9.
41. For refs., cf. MIN I, 379.
42. Pol. 23.5. On the chronology cf. app. 2, p. 333.
43. Pol. 23.5.14-15 (Flamininus at Naupactus); cf. Liv. 31.25.9 (Achaean law).
44. Pol. 24.9.12 (not in Larsen's list of assemblies); cf. Castellani, Contributi, 100.
45. Pol. 23.9.8-10 (report of Philippus); 12-14 (reception of Achaeans and answer of the Senate).
46. Pol. 23.17. 3-4.
47. Pol. 23.5.18 (expulsion) cf. app. 7 for discussion of circumstances.

48. Pol. 23.9.1 (two embassies); 6.1-3 (Arcesilaus and Agesipolis).

49. Pol. 23.9.11.

50. Pol. 23.9.11. Although Seriphus is not explicitly mentioned as having been retained at Rome, this must be inferred from the fact that his return was around the time of the final Achaean settlement at Messene (Pol. 23.17.5).


52. Paus. 4.29.11. This is the only mention of Lycortas' expedition, but may be accurate, as the other sources are wholly concerned with Philopoemen at this point. Philopoemen's alleged death-cell inquiry about the safety of Lycortas (Liv. 39.50.7; Plut. Ph. 20.2) supports Paus. in this point.

53. Liv. 39.49.1; Plut. Ph. 18.3 gives the name of the threatened town, in the accusative case, as Kolonides. The two towns are in the same direction from Megalopolis and about 30 km. apart; in the absence of Polybius' own account we cannot recover the truth of this detail. Corone was more important, and nearer Messene; it is therefore accepted here. Seeliger, Messeniens, 21-2, misreads Plutarch and invents an otherwise unknown settlement Colonis, which he places in northern Messenia. He envisages Philopoemen's capture in northern Messenia, and
argues that Philopoemen's attempt on Corone would not be frustrated in the north. This is more faulty than a simple misreading of Plut., for no source states that the battle was near the threatened town: only that Deinocrates laid his ambush in the mountains near Messene. The direct route from Megalopolis to Corone (and Colonides) passes close by Messene. There were clearly numerous opportunities for ambush. Cf. Miese, GGRS III, 52 n.6.

54. Liv. 39.49.2. Plut. does not mention the Thracians and Cretans, but Livy's statement is conclusive for their having been in one of Pol.'s accounts. The presence of this solid professional support made Philopoemen's undertaking less hazardous than the account of Plutarch, centred on Philopoemen, suggests, for it mentions only the young cavalrymen.

55. Recorded in all sources: Pol. 23.12.3; Liv. 39.50.7-8; Plut. Ph. 20; Paus. 8.51.7. Uniformly accepted by all modern writers with no expression of uncertainty: Neumeyer, Philopoemen, 54; Seeliger, Messenien, 22; Miese, GGRS III, 53-4; Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 160; De Sanctis, IV 1, 243; Benecke, CAH 8, 298; Hoffmann, RE XX 1, 92-3; 'Philopoemen'; Castellani, Contributi, 102.

56. Liv. 39.50.7-8; Plut. Ph. 20.2-3.


58. Pol. 23.16.2f.

59. Plut. Ph. 21.2; Paus. 8.51.8.
60. Plut. Ph. 21.2-4.
61. Plut. Ph. 21.5-6; Pol. 39.3.3-11.
62. Plut. Ph. 2; Ditt. Syll. 625; Pomtow, Klio 9,160.
63. Diod. 29.18 (Loeb tr.); Ditt. Syll. 624; cf. Liv. 39.50.9.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6.

I

1. Plut. Ph. 21.1. This explanation follows Larsen, Rep. Gov., 178. The law regarding the assumption of office by the predecessor on the death of the strategos is only known from 146 (Pol. 36.15.1), but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that it was operative in 182.

2. Pol. 23.16-17.2 (end of war and settlement); Plut. Ph. 21.2; Paus. 8.51.8 (death of Deinocrates). Cf. Niese, GGMS III, 54-5.

3. Pol. 23.17.5f. Cf. app. 7 on Spartan parties.

4. Pol. 23.17.7-11.

5. Pol. 23.17.12.

6. Pol. 23.18.1-2 (decision of syncretos); 18.3-5 (embassies to Rome). Cf. app. 7 on Spartan parties.

7. Pol. 24.1.1; 1.4-5; Liv. 40.20.2.

8. Pol. 24.1.6-7; Liv. 40.20.2.

9. Pol. 24.21-2 (return of Spartans); 2-3 (Messenian settlement); cf. 23.15 (damage to Messene).

10. Pol. 24.2.4-5. Cf. 22.3.2 (187).


13. Pol. 's opinion of Callicrates has usually been accepted as the basis of modern interpretations: cf. Niese, GGMS III, 59, 'Er war ein ehrgeiziger, gewissenloser Politiker, in
erster Linie Parteimann, nicht Patriot'. Less violent, but still seeing the issue in terms of 'servitū' against 'libertā', De Sanctis, IV 1, 247-8. Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 167, made a brief objection to this uncritical trend, but did not expose Polybius' bias at length. Cary, Greek World, 198, is again too brief to have made an impression on the tradition. Badian, For. Cl., 90-93, is the first real attempt to come to terms with the Polybian assessment; yet even this penetrating analysis is not accepted by Castellani, Contributi 107, who, although recognising Pol.'s bias, accepts the traditional picture.

16. Pol. 24.8.9-9.15 (speech of Callicrates); 10. 6-7 (senatorial reaction).
17. Pol. 24.10.8.
19. Pol. 24.10.11-12 (Polybius); 8.2-4 (Lycortas).

II

1. Liv. 41.23.4; 24.1 (strategia); Pol. 23.4.11 (in Rome); Castellani, Contributi 109, fails to see the significance
of Xenarchus' connection with the Philopoemenists, and sees him simply as 'un esponente . . . di un risorto partito filomacedone'.

2. Liv. 41.23.2; 6-7; 42.6.2. There is no indication as to when the law had been promulgated. De Sanctis, IV 1, 106 n. 217, suggests that it dated from the time of Aratus' struggle against Macedon and was resuscitated in 198. Aymard, PR, 112 n. 4 prefers to place it in 198, and he is followed in this by Castellani, Contributi, 71. Against this are the Macedonian troops which participated in Flamininus' war against Nabis in 195 (Liv. 34.26.10). Dubois' suggestion (Ligues étolienne et achaïenne, 82-3) that in 174 it had been passed recently, is attractive, and not wholly ruled out by the reference to it in 172 as vetus decretum, (Liv. 42.6.2). It could well have been passed by Callicrates' group, whose rise to power in Achaea coincided with the deterioration in relations between Rome and Macedon. The fact that it only became an issue in 174 and Callicrates' eager defence of it (Liv. 41.23.5-8), suggest that its enforcement, at least, was only recent, and that Callicrates had been involved.


5. Liv. 42.6.1-2. Cf. Castellani, Contributi, 113. Broughton, MRR I, 410 n.3, accepts the opinion of Weissenborn that this N. Claudius Marcellus was cos. 183.


7. Pol. 27.2.11. It is also suggested, from Paus. 7.10.9, that Xenon of Patrae, another of Lycortas' party, held a strategia at about this time. Aymard, EEA 1928, 61-2 and Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., 311, offer either 174/3 or 173/2. De Sanctis, IV 1, 406, with reservations, prefers 173/2. In fact we cannot build on this evidence: the only conclusion to be drawn from Paus. 7.10.9 is that Xenon was strategos before 167.

8. Liv. 42.37.7-9. The text at 8 is corrupt; and as printed by Weissenborn-Müller makes the Achaeans claim that Elis and Messene had supported Philip. If the restored text is correct, this accusation is wrong - although this does not mean that it was not made.

9. Pol. 27.2.11-12; Liv. 42.44.7-8.

10. At some time a Spartan, Leonidas, who was in touch with Perseus, was condemned by the Achaeans for his activities. He later led a contingent of troops for Perseus (Liv. 42.51.8). We do not know when, or in whose strategia the condemnation took place; but it is easily explicable whichever party was responsible. It is not therefore significant for information about the parties. Cf. Castellani, Contributi, 114.
11. Liv. 42.35.10.

12. Pol. 28.3.3-10; Liv. 43.17.2-4; cf. Badian, For Cl., 96; Castellani, Contributi, 117-8. A decree of Argos in honour of Octavius has been found: cf. Charneux, BCH 1937, 181f.


15. Pol. 28.12-13. The dispatch of the troops fits well enough with the declared policy of Archon for us to consider it to have been a serious offer, with Scullard, Roman Politics, 204; Briscoe, JHS 1964, 70; Against this view: De Sanctis, IV 1, 300; Meloni, Perseo, 313; Castellani, Contributi, 120-1.


19. Pol. 38.10.8-13 (Polybius); 17.4 (Stratius).

20. Pol. 35.6.3-4.

21. Pol. 36.13.3.

(political aspects of Achaean War).

III

1. Plut. Ph. 1.4; cf. Ar. 24.2. Paus., 8.52.1, has a variant of the phrase, which seems to be simply his own interpretation: Philopoemen was the last επτάντας of Greece; as Miltiades was the first.

2. CAH 8, 299.

3. De Sanctis, IV 1, 243-4.


5. As Hoffmann, RE XX 1, 'Philopoimen' 95; cf. Stier, Roms Aufstieg, 172f.

6. Hoffmann, RE XX 1, 94.


11. Pol. 24.11.3.

12. CAH 8, 299. Cf. also Stier, Roms Aufstieg, 172, '... vor allem Soldat'; Gelzer, Kleine Schriften III, 149. This is not a Polybian judgement.

13. Plut. Ph. 8.3.


15. On this in detail, cf. ch. 4, passim.

16. Pol. 39.3.3 = Plut. Ph. 21.5-6; Pol. 39.3.4-8.

17. Pol. 39.3.5.
18. Pol. 24.11.3; cf. 13.9.
19. Pol. 24.11.5.
20. Liv. 32.22.3f.
NOTES TO APPENDIX 1


2. Hiller von Gaertringen (ad Ditt. *Syll.*, 626) suggested that Polybius was related to Philopoemen. Walbank, *Comm. I*, 228, objects that Polybius would have been sure to mention it. Cf. Ziegler, *Polybios* (i), 1445; also ch. 1, n. 36.

3. Pol. 1.1.5; 3.1. Since the Achaean sections of the Histories appear to be outside this declared purpose, Gelzer has developed the view that these were either written separately and included when the main work was begun ('Die hellenische Προοιματική im zweiten Buche des Polybios' = *Klein Schriften*, III, 111f.), or included, separately from the main purpose, as an attempt to open the eyes of the Achaean to the fact that the glorious development of the League had been betrayed by Callicrates ('Die Achaea im Geschichtswerk des Polybios' = *Klein Schriften*, III, 123f.). Cf. also, 'Über die Arbeitsweise des Polybios', = *Klein Schriften*, III, 161f.

4. Philopoemen first appears (in the main part of the Histories) in 10.21; his death is recorded in 23.12, and a summary of his policies and achievements in 24.11-13.

5. Pol. 12.25e; 4.2.2-3. From 16.15.8 it is clear that he made use of Rhodian documentary sources, but whether directly or through Zeno is not clear; from 3.26.1 it is

9-10. There is nowhere explicit mention of the use of Achaean records, but it is unreasonable to assume that they were not consulted. For his use of epigraphic material, cf. 3.33.17-18; 56.4 (the Lacinian bronze). For full discussion of P.'s sources, cf. Walbank, Comm. I, 26f. On P.'s 'pragmatic' history, cf. Gelzer, 'Die pragmatische Geschichtsschreibung des Polybios', in Kl. Schr. III, 155f.


9. Pol. 16.14.6 (patriotic bias); 2.46.3; 4.3.1; 9.38.6 (Aetolia). On Aristaenus and Callicrates cf. ch., 5 & 6, Ko., 244, 249.


10. Pol. 28.6; cf. ch. 6, 143.

11. Pol. 39.3; 24.11-13; cf. ch. 6, 144.


13. From book 24 onwards, Livy's interest increases in Greek affairs in proportion to the Roman involvement. He records the death of Philopoemen in 39.50.


pp. 81-2.

16. E. g. 37.33; 21.12.10 (the Salii); cf. Nissen, 27.


18. Cf. Walbank, Comm. I, 13-14; see now in Miscellanea di
studii alessandrini in memoria di Augusto Rostagni, 211-213.

rhetorical alterations do not only occur in the speeches;
but it is here that they are most apparent.

20. E. g. Liv. 39.49-50 (death of Philopoemen, 182, related under
183: cf. app. 2, 320f ); 38.30-34: on the confusion here,
cf. Holleaux, Études 5, 263f.


22. REG 64, 1951, 82f.

23. Pol. 10.21.6; Pédech, op. cit., 83.


26. Pol. 10.21.5; Pédech, op. cit., 84 - ἀναγάζεται must not be


28. In this connection, it is as well to point out that
μετασχηματισμοὶ πόλεων (Plut. Ph. 7) does not indicate
'reformes dans l'armée crétoise' (Pédech, op. cit., 88).

29. Pol. 10.21.6. At 15.30.10. P mentions Carthage as still
existing, and therefore had written up to this point before

30. Lucas: Über des Polybios Darstellung des Ìtolischen
31. Walbank, Comm. I, p.2 & n.2; Ziegler RE 'Polybios' 1472.  


33. Cic. Tusc. II 62; Ad Q.f.i. 1.23; Ziegler ib., 1475 n.1.

34. Missen, op. cit., 280-7; Hoffmann, RE XXI 1, col. 77.

35. RE, 'Polybios', col. 1472.

36. Flut. Ph. 21; Pol. 39.3.

37. Cf. Schwartz, RE 'Aristocrates' no. 25; Jacoby, FGH III B, no. 591. We scarcely need to attribute the whole of Flut. Ph. 16 to Aristocrates, as Missen op. cit., 284, simply because it deals with Sparta; it is seen essentially from an Achaean viewpoint.


41. Suidas, 'Philopoemen' = Pol. 10.22; Paus. 8.49 (with minor differences and omissions).

42. Paus. 8.49-52.


45. Flut. Ph. 16; Paus. 8.51.3. I cannot understand how Mühl (p.43) can claim that the figure 300 comes from Polybius.
46. Plut. Ph. 18.7; Paus. 8.51.5; cf. Liv. 39.49.2.

47. Paus. 8.49.4; 8.29.8; cf. Plut. Ph. 5.

48. Plut. Ph. 2; Paus. 8.49.3.

49. Pol. 10.22.1; Paus. 8.49.2; cf. Plut. Ph. 1.

50. Cf. ch. 2, passim.
NOTES TO APPENDIX 2.


5. Liv. 28.8.10 (Nicias); 7.14 (Olympia).


Kalender, 43, to 207.

9. Plut. Ph. 13.1; Paus. 8.31.5.


12. Liv. 32.19.2; 20.3; 31.1 (Apistaenus); 39.7 (Nicostratus).

13. Liv. 34.24.1; 25.3; 30.7.

14. Liv. 35.25.7; 26.3f.; for Roman magistrates, cf. MRW ad 192.

15. Liv. 36.31; 32.1-2.


17. Liv. 38.33.1.

18. FR, 365 n.26 (cites criticism of earlier work, to which add: Hoffmann, RE XX 1, 'Philopoimen', 87.

19. By Aymard's reckoning (Cf. table), this is Philopoemen's fifth strategia, and it is discussed as such in his article.


22. Aymard gives no examples of this suggested non-technical usage, and there are none cited in TLL, 'continuare'.


25. Ditt. Syll., 600 (dated by Dittenberger to 193/2): ερι
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26. Plut. Ph. 17.4: Μανίων δὲ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ὑπότου μενικηρότος μὲν Ἀντίσχον, αἰτομένου δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαίων ἕπως ἐάν γε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων φυγάδας κατελθεῖν, καὶ Τίτων τάβτὸ τῷ Μανίῳ περὶ τῶν φυγάδων ἁξιούντος, διεκώλυσεν ὁ διόποιμην οὖ γο τοῖς φυγάσι πολεμῶν, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενος δι’ αἰτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἀχαίων, ἀλλὰ μὴ Τίτων μηδὲ Ῥωμαίων χάριτι τοῦτο πρακτήναι, καὶ στρατηγῶν εἰς τοπικόν αὐτοὺς καθίγαγε τοὺς φυγάδας.

οὕτως εἰχὲ τι πρὸς τὰς ἐξοντικὰς ἐπὶ φρονήματος δύσερι καὶ φιλόνειχον. The meeting with Glabrio was the autumn synodos of 191: Liv. 36.35.7. For Compasion, cf. Liv. 38.33-34; cf. Aymard, op. cit., 8f. For the purpose of the argument I use Aymard's translation of εἰς τοπικόν (= 'in the next year'). However, it seems probable that the phrase should bear the much vaguer meaning, simply 'in the future', (distance unspecified). This use is found from Thucydides (4.61.5; 5.9.8) to Lucian (Hist. Conscr., 13; Ver. Hist., 2.27), and seems better fitted to the imprecise and anecdotal character of chs. 16 and 17. This usage cannot be proved, however, for this instance, and it seems best to meet Aymard's arguments as they are presented. But if we accept the vague interpretation, the arguments used in the text to discredit Aymard are unnecessary.

27. I am grateful to Dr. A. H. McDonald for this interesting
suggestion.


30. Liv. 38.30-34.

31. Cf. table. On the Roman embassies, see NR ad locc.

32. Pol. 22.3.

33. Pol. 22.7.2 (stratēgia of Aristaeus); 5-7 (report of Nicodemus).

34. Aymard seems to accept this too, op. cit., 32-3, though his own system, as he admits, necessitates an 18-month absence for Nicodemus.

35. Pol. 22.7.1; Aymard, op. cit., 30-34.


37. Pol. 28.1.1.


40. Pol. 22.7.9 (synodos); 10 (magistrates).

41. Even in a non-fragmented part of his work μετά δὲ ταύτα can introduce a period of up to 30 years (2.39.3).


43. New Babylonian evidence is published by Sachs and Wiseman, Iraq, 1954, 202f., who adduce a date of 3 or 4 July, 187. However, Aymard, REA 1955, 108, has shown conclusively from
the same evidence that this is one month late, and that the true date is 3 or 4 June, 187.

Some doubt is possible as to the likelihood of such a rapid announcement in Greece of the accession of Seleucus IV; but in fact two considerations strongly suggest that it would be in the interest of the new king to have the announcement made as rapidly as possible. (i) Seleucus was bound to be reminded at his accession of the situation at the beginning of the reign of Antiochus III, when Antiochus was faced with the potential opposition of Achaea (Pol. 4.48.10). This suggests that Seleucus would be eager to broadcast the news of his accession as rapidly as possible in order to prevent the possibility of a repetition of Antiochus III's initial insecurity. (ii) Achaea would be particularly likely to be early on the list for the despatch of envoys by a new Seleucid monarch, as a result of the friendly relations Achaea was reputed to have with Rome (Cf. Liv. 38.32.9.), and the importance for the Seleucids of maintaining good relations with the friends of Rome after Magnesia. These considerations make it fairly clear that the general announcement of the accession of Seleucus could be expected very soon after the death of Antiochus; and that, as a result, the envoys from Seleucus to Achaea to renew the treaty could be in Achaea before the end of Aristaenus' strategos-year, 188/7. Any difficulty about the timing of this embassy is
not in the actual time spent travelling (1-2 weeks would be quite sufficient for even a slow ship from Phoenicia - and 3 months are allowable in our scheme), but the time taken for the court to announce the changeover and send the envoys. This seems likely to have been done as quickly as possible.

(I am grateful to Professor K. M. T. Atkinson for discussion of this problem).

45. Plut. Ph. 18.1; Paus. 8.51.5.
46. Cf. above, p. 319.
47. Pol. 22.19.
48. Liv. 39.33.3-5.
49. Paus. 4.29.11; Aymard, RMA 1928, 43-53; Hoffmann, Hermes, 1938, 244-8.
51. Liv. 39.48.5; Legatus in Macedoniam Q. Marcius est missus, iussus idem in Peloponneso sociorum res aspicere. nam ibi quaque et ex veteris discordiis residui motus erant, et Messene descinerat a concilio Achaico. Pol. 24.9.12-13:

"πρῶτην μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μεσσηνίαξις πολλὰ ποιήσαντος Κοιντοῦ Μαρκίου πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ 'Αχαϊός βουλεύσασθαι περὶ Μεσσηνίων ἀνεν τῆς Ῥωμαιῶν προαίρεσεως, παραχώσαντας καὶ ψηφιομενοὺς αὕτοις τῶν πόλεμον. . ."

52. Pol. 23.9.8-10: perὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον ὅ Ἱλίκιος τοιατὴν ἐπεποίησε τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν διότι, τῶν Ἀχαίων ὁ βουλομένων ἀναφέρεται ὁδὲν ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκλητον, ἄλλα
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πάντα δι’ ἐαυτῶν πράττειν ἐπιβαλλόμενων, ἢ ἐν παραχωβοῖς μόνον αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ παρόν καὶ βραχεῖαν ἐμφασίν ποιήσασιν ὑπαρροστήσασιν, ταχέως ἡ λαχεδαίμον τῇ Μεσσήνῃ συμφωνήσασι. τούτοις δὲ γενομένου μετὰ μεγάλης χάριτος ἦσαν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐφη: καταπεφευγότας ἐπὶ Ῥωμαίους.

53. Plut. Ph. 18.3: δὲ φιλοποίημα ἐτυχεῖ μὲν ἐν Ἀργεῖ πυρέσσων, πυθόμενος δὲ τούτα συνέτεινεν εἰς Μεγάλην πόλιν ἡμέρῃ μιᾷ σταδίους πλείονας ἡ τετρακοσίως. κάθετεν εἰς δὲ ἔρχεται τοῖς ἑπετεῖς ἀναλαβόν... Cf. Liv. 39.49.1f.;

Paus. 8.51.5.

54. Paus. 4.29.11.

55. Fol. 23.9.12 (1st embassy); 18.3 (2nd embassy); cf. Aymard, Assemblées, 275 (2nd synodos in July).


Plut. Ph. 18.1: ἔταξεν οὐ μόνον ἑκείνην τὴν ἄρχην ἀπολέως διάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ βίου τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτῶ μετ’ ἱππικίας καταβιβάζαι τὰ πράγματα παρέξειν.

57. Hoffmann, op. cit., 247; Paus. 8.51.5; Plut. Ph. 18; Liv. 39.49.1.

καὶ γὰρ ἠπερ ἐπίτηδες συνέβαινε τότε πάλιν συνάγεον
tοῦς Ἀχαϊοὺς εἰς Μεγάλην πόλιν ἐπὶ τὴν δευτέραν σύνοδον...
Cf. Aymard, Assemblées, 275 (2nd synodes).

59. Pol. 23.5; Liv. 39.51.1.

60. Pol. 23.5.18: αἱ μὲν τοῦ δεισικράτους ἐκπίθευα...καὶ

συνλήψιν ἔ του Τίτου παρούσα καὶ προσδοχία τοῦτον τὸν

τρόπον διέπεσεν.

61. Cf. Gundel, RE XXIV 1, 1093, 'T. Quinctius Flamininus'.


65. Pol. 24.6 (Egyptian embassy); Aymard, RMA 1928, 53f.

66. This is argued in ch. 5, above,23-4; Cf. De Sanctis, IV

1, 246 n.20.

67. Pol. 24.6 (Egyptian embassy); 8. 1-8 (meeting).

68. Skeat, Reigns of the Ptolemies, 32. But cf. Samuel,
Ptolemaic Chronology, 139: 'The ostrakon is from Hermoutis,
and since this is quite a distance up river, it is entirely
possible that Epiphanes was dead before 20 May 180. To be
safe, we should allow three months for the news of his death
to reach Hermoutis, and that would mean we might say that
Epiphanes was alive on 20 February 180, but possibly also he
was still alive when the ostrakon was written. At any rate,
it is hardly likely that he was dead before 20 February 180,
and so it is between that date and 6 October 180, the end of
the 25th year, that we place his death'.
69. Cf. Aymard, op. cit., 58f.; Larsen, Rep. Gov., 180-1, considers the meeting a *synclétos*: 'Since there seems to have been no *synodoς* in the autumn after the elections, the meeting must have been a *synclétos*. With the necessary dating of this meeting to summer 130, the necessity for considering it a *synclétos* disappears.

NOTES TO APPENDIX 2.

1. On League coinage in general, see: Clerk, A Catalogue of the coins of the Achaean League; Weil, Z. für Num., 1882; Gardner, BMC Peloponnesus, Achaia; Lübbeke, Z. für Num., 1908; Crosby and Grace, Numismatic Notes and Monographs, 1936; Thompson, Hesperia, 1939; Head, Historia Numorum, 417.

2. Crosby and Grace, op. cit., Thompson, op. cit.

3. Thompson, op. cit., 142 goes as far as to say: 'That Megalopolis minted these issues of the seated Pan with the Zeus obverse seems beyond question. The identical type with the letters ME$T, significant of the city name, is well known, and there is no reason for supposing that the League coins originated from anywhere else but the same city'.


5. Cf. Tarn, CR, 1925 — though his criterion of the use of the ethnic 'Αρκάς to indicate the continuance of the Arcadian League as a political entity must be rendered doubtful by the suggestion advanced here.


9. I am grateful to the staff of the Herwerden coin room for showing me their Achaean coins and drawing my attention to the significant weight differences vis-à-vis the earlier Arcadian coins.
NOTES TO APPENDIX 7.

1. Pol. 23.4; Paus. 7.9.5. cf. ch. 5, 124k.

2. On the date, cf. app. 2, 133k.

3. Pol. 23.5.18.

4. Pol. 23.6 (Arcesilaus and Agesipolis); 9.1 (both embassies); 9.11 (reply to Serippus). Cf. ch. 5, 136k.

5. Pol. 23.17.5f.


7. Pol. 23.17.5.

8. Pol. 23.18.2.


10. Pol. 24.1.5; 2.4.

11. The Achaeans discussed a letter from the Senate in summer 180 (Pol. 24.8.1f. On the date cf. app. 2, 398b) and it seems likely that this would only result from a request by the representatives of the Spartan exiles.


It seems unnecessary to give a list of editions of texts. Oxford and Teubner texts have been used for the most part, except in the case of certain authors, who are cited by standard editions (but Diodorus by reference to Loeb edition, vol. 11). This should cause no difficulty.

(ii) Modern Works

This bibliography collects works cited in the notes in an abbreviated form, except for standard works of reference (e.g., CAH and RE), and some works cited only once, for which necessary bibliographical material is given where they appear. References to Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, are to the third edition unless otherwise indicated.


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" " See MCDONALD, A.H. and WALBANK, F.W.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autumn 192</td>
<td>Sparta united with Achaean League by Philopoemen; Timolaus' group - the aristoi - installed in power; tyrant party not exiled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 191</td>
<td>Factional trouble at Sparta; tyrant group on top, secession from League. Philopoemen intervenes to restore Timolaus to power and Sparta to League; prevents Flamininus from supporting tyrant group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring onwards</td>
<td>Flamininus continues to support tyrant group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn 191</td>
<td>Achaean synodos; Glabrio and Flamininus start Roman agitation about restoring Spartan exiles of tyrant period; Philopoemen accepts desirability, but refuses to act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Later autumn</td>
<td>Timolaus' group expelled from Sparta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter 191/0</td>
<td>Spartans (Tyrant party) ask Senate for restoration of hostages given by Nabis in 195. S.C. describes exiles from tyrant period as 'old exiles' for first time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring/summer 190</td>
<td>Hostages, except for Armenas, restored to Sparta; no action on exiles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Autumn 189

tyrant party - the government - attacks
exiles - Timolaus' group? - at Las; appeal
of exiles to Achaea. Secession from League
by Spartans; first stages of war; Spartan
appeal to Fulvius.

Spring 188

Compasion: judicial murder of 70 of tyrant
party. Restoration of 'captive exiles' -
Timolaus' group? - and 'old exiles' by
Philopsonien. Some of tyrant party exiled.

Winter 188/7

Some discontented Spartans at Rome comp­
aining about Compasion - probably tyrant
party sympathisers.

Spring 187

Letter of Lepidus deploring Compasion.

July 185

Metellus complains about Compasion to
Achaean magistrates.

Winter 185/4

Areus and Alcibiades ('royalist' 'old
exiles') at Rome; dispute with Apollonidas
about the merits of the Compasion settle­
ment.

Spring/Summer 184

Areus and Alcibiades condemned to death by
the Achaeans.

Summer 184

App. Claudius Pulcher at Cleitor synclētos
with Areus and Alcibiades; death sentence
on Areus and Alcibiades removed. Pulcher
Summer 184 (cont.)
gives general permission to Spartans to
send envoys to Rome.

Winter 184/3
Four Spartan embassies in Rome: Serippus,
Areus and Alcibiades, Lysis, Chaeron.

Before autumn 183
Coalition of Serippus and Chaeron expels
'old exiles'.

Winter 183/2
Serippus in Rome. In his absence, Chaeron
carries out Spartan secession from Achaea.

Summer 182
Serippus returns; regains control in
Sparta.

About August 182
Achaean synoletos at Sicyon; Sparta rejoins
League.

Later 182
Selective restoration of exiles; coalition
between Serippus and Chaeron patched up.

Winter 182/1
Chaeron, and Cletis and Diactorius, dispute
before the Senate.

Spring 181
Letter from Senate about exiles reaches
Achaea; no action taken.

Winter 181/0
Envoys from remaining exiles in Rome.

Spring 180
Chaeron's newly acquired dominance crushed
by Achaean federal intervention under the
strategos Hyperbatus. New letter from
Senate about exiles.

Winter 180/79
Callicrates, Lydiadas, Aratus in Rome;
Winter 180/79 (cont.) envoys of Spartan exiles in Rome also.

Autumn 179 - Autumn 178 Strategia of Callicrates; restoration of remaining Spartan exiles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>AMBARD</th>
<th>DE SANTIUS</th>
<th>NICCOLINI</th>
<th>BETTMANN-WOBST</th>
<th>NISSEN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>211/10</td>
<td>Euryleon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Euryleon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>210/9</td>
<td>Cycliadas</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>209/8</td>
<td>Mecias</td>
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<tr>
<td>208/7</td>
<td>Philopoemen I</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Philopoemen I</td>
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<tr>
<td>207/6</td>
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<tr>
<td>206/9</td>
<td>Philopoemen II</td>
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<td>Philopoemen II</td>
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<tr>
<td>205/4</td>
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<tr>
<td>204/3</td>
<td>Philopoemen III??</td>
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<td>Philopoemen III??</td>
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<tr>
<td>203/2</td>
<td>Philopoemen III??</td>
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<td>Philopoemen III??</td>
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<tr>
<td>202/1</td>
<td>Lysippus</td>
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<tr>
<td>202/0</td>
<td>Philopoemen IV (III)??</td>
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<td>Philopoemen IV (III)??</td>
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<td>199/8</td>
<td>Aristaenus I</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Micostratus</td>
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<tr>
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<td>190/89</td>
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<td>189/8</td>
<td>Philopoemen VII (VI)??</td>
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<td>188/7</td>
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<tr>
<td>187/6</td>
<td>Archon?? (or Philopoemen VII ??)??</td>
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<td>Archon?? (or Philopoemen VII ??)??</td>
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<td>186/5</td>
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<td>Lycortas I</td>
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<td>184/3</td>
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<td>183/2</td>
<td>Philopoemen VIII; Lycortas II??</td>
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<td>Philopoemen VIII; Lycortas II??</td>
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<tr>
<td>182/1</td>
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<td>Lycortas III??</td>
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<tr>
<td>180/79</td>
<td>Callicrates</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Callicrates</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. La Confederazione Achea pp. 267-311.
4. Beiträge zu Polybios (Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Gymnasiums zum heiligen Kreuz zu Dresden 1901.
5. Rh. Mus. 1871: 'Die Ökonomie der Geschichte des Polybios'.
6. In n.1, p. 240, N. recognizes that Euryleon may stand for 211/10, but does not include him in his printed list.
7. Philopoemen was most likely strategos III in 204/3 or 203/2.
8. The bracketed number indicates the number of Philopoemen's strategiai if the strategiai of Philopoemen were unaccounted for were 187/6.
9. Archon was strategos for one of the years 190/89, 187/6, 184/3.
10. B.-W makes no attempt to use Livy's magistrate lists as a chronological guide; hence his mistake in placing the Aristaenus/Lycortas series in 188/7 and 187/6. Niccolini follows him in this mistake.
11. B.-W and Niccolini have Lycortas here in order to comply with the Achaean law regarding the succession to a dead strategos; this is not necessary.
12. Lycortas was elected on the death of Philopoemen to serve the rest of the term.
13. Nissen does not include Callicrates' strategia in his list.