Aristotle’s doctrine of the evolution of society, with special reference to the first book of the politics; together with a brief consideration of the relevance of this doctrine to recent developments of communities in certain parts of west Africa.

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Abstract

The study deals generally with Aristotle's ethical and political philosophy; the primary theme, however, is Aristotle's theory of the nature of society as expounded in the First Book of the Politics. The study, therefore, refrains from going into the details of the so-called primitive elements in Greek culture, and of questions like exogamy, endogamy, totemism etc., which bulk so largely in works like G. Thomson's "Studies in Ancient Greek Society".

The introduction deals with earlier conceptions of man and society as reflected in the conception of ἄνθρωπος, and gives some close attention to Protagoras' doctrine of the development of society as expressed in Plato's 'Protagoras'.

Chapter 2 examines Plato's conception of ἄνθρωπος and relates this to his theory of man and society.

Chapter 3 critically examines the various conceptions of ἄνθρωπος ascribed to Aristotle, especially in so far as those views imply judgements on Aristotle's doctrines in the Politics.

Chapter 4 examines Aristotle's conception of human nature, and of the relation of Ethics to Politics.

Chapter 5 examines the Greek Household, and Aristotle's conception of the nature of the Household.
Chapter 6 deals with Aristotle's theory of slavery.

Chapter 7 gives an account of the Greek village or clan-community; the development of the village-community is reviewed with reference to the emergence of the state and Aristotle's conception of the role of the village in the developed state. Attention is here drawn to the 'tribal' elements in Aristotle's political thought.

Chapter 8 examines Aristotle's conception of the nature of the city-state. Attention is drawn to both the merits and the inadequacies of Aristotle's conception of the state through a close examination of his conception of (a) political justice and (b) friendship or social sympathy.

Finally, though no special attempt has been made in the study to dig into the primitive past of Greek culture, it is argued that the society which Aristotle analysed has sufficient similarities to some West African societies to make his categories applicable to those societies. These similarities are more obvious in family and religious customs, but even, in more political terms, what Aristotle says of the clan-village contains lessons relevant to the study of any 'tribally' based society.
ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE FIRST BOOK OF THE POLITICS; TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF THE RELEVANCE OF THIS DOCTRINE TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF COMMUNITIES IN CERTAIN PARTS OF WEST AFRICA.

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. in the University of Durham.

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J. O. SODIPO

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September, 1964.
First of all, I would like to make one or two remarks in explanation of the title of this thesis. For, a grasp of its denotation is essential for a true understanding of its contents.

Modern anthropologists regard the myth that it is possible to construct universally valid genetic stages in the development of society, or culture, or that there is a universal law of growth from the simple to the complex form of society correlating with the uniform unfolding of what was potential in man, as exploded. The interest of the anthropologist, it is maintained, is not in constructing logical stages in the development of cultures but in examining how a culture operates i.e. how a social system works; in the language of anthropologists, the governing principle is 'functionalism'.

Now, Aristotle's doctrine of the evolution of society has been so intimately tied to the exploded myth that any mention of this doctrine recalls the myth and its associations. For, most of the eminent anthropologists and sociologists of the 19th century, Sir Henry Maine, esp. "Early History of Institutions" London (1875); "Early Law and Custom", London (1891); and "Ancient Law", London (1861)
E.B.Tylor*1, L.H. Morgan*2 more or less consciously took their point of departure from Aristotle. It was observed by these scholars that Aristotle has conceived natural change as continuous motion arising out of the thing changing, and has described it as a genetically connected series of stages leading to an internally determined direction; further, every natural kind of species undergoes the same process of change. Aristotle has also studied the state, i.e. the political organism, as a natural object in its growth or origin (τὰ κράτη τὸν φύσιν βλέπειν); he has thus studied the state from an analysis of man as a political animal who was endowed with certain needs and potentialities which 'naturally' under favourable circumstances produced the state. In doing this, he has stated the doctrine of the evolution of society.

He was of course studying the society he knew, i.e. Greek society, and in the very course of the sketch of his doctrine he notes that things might be different and indeed were different in different societies; the family, for instance, is a κοινωνίας λεγόμενον, the barbarian conceiving its nature differently from the

*2 L.H.Morgan, "Ancient Society; or Researches in the lines of human progress from savagery through barbarism to civilization". Chicago (1877).
Aristotle's doctrine of the evolution of society is, therefore, no more than the 'schema', with the necessary presuppositions, which he adopts for an evaluation of the institutions of Greek society. But because the 'schema' is enveloped in the aura of his usual scientific or metaphysical terms - the natural and the accidental, the good and the necessary - it has sometimes been taken as establishing the fundamental laws of social evolution.

Thus, Tylor, Morgan, McLennan and Herbert Spencer, in a way that echoes Aristotle's distinction of the natural and the accidental, each develop a theory of the evolution of society in terms of stages of development. Thus, Sir Henry Maine arguing against the 'Horde' Theory of the origin of society put forward by J.F. McLennan and L.H. Morgan draws most of his support from Aristotle and Plato, and declares in one place that "the greatest luminary of ancient science (i.e. Aristotle) invented or adopted the Patriarchal Theory", and "the greatest name in the science of our day (i.e. Darwin) is associated with it"; for "Mr. Darwin appears to me to have been conducted by his own observations and studies to a view which cannot be distinguished from this theory" (Maine, Early Law and Custom, p.206.). Also in his epoch-making work "Primitive
Marriage" McLennan accepted the Aristotelian account of the origin of society.

The reader of the title of our thesis may therefore naturally expect that it would be concerned with subjects with which the evolutionistic schemes of the 19th century anthropologists were concerned - questions like the 'Horde' or the Patriarchal Theory, 'promiscuity' and 'group marriage', Exogamy or Endogamy etc. Such a reader is, however, likely to be disappointed. For these are not our primary concern. This is, however, not to deny the relevance to our theme of some of the insights of these men, and from time to time we may have recourse to some of the results of their pioneering work to illuminate our theme. Our primary concern, however, is with Aristotle's conception of the nature of man and his evaluation of the various associations or societies which contribute to the realisation of that nature; and the term 'evolution' denotes no more than Aristotle's sense of the progress, both temporal and non-temporal, involved in evaluating those associations. Indeed, what little role the 'evolution' which appears in the title plays may be properly understood if it is known that an earlier title was "Aristotle's ethical and political doctrines, together with a brief discussion of their
relevance to social life in certain communities in West Africa", and the modification was only necessitated by the need to signify our special interest in Aristotle's conception of those societies like the Family, the Village and the Polis, which cater for human happiness.

The present study is therefore primarily a study of Aristotle's political philosophy and a study of Greek society too, at least in so far as Aristotle's doctrine reflects the conditions of the society he knew. This explains why the views of previous Greek thinkers on man and society are considered as constituting the appropriate background for an examination of Aristotle's theory of man and society.

The criticism however might be made that this approach necessarily involves a neglect of the so-called primitive survivals in Greece and thus misses exactly those aspects which are likely to make the discussion of Aristotle's doctrine in relation to societies in West Africa possible and relevant. That criticism would be answered in the appropriate place.

However, in view of the fact that the culture of the ancient Greeks, whatever be its drawbacks, satisfied many impulses some of which the larger communities of today find themselves incapable of satisfying, to examine the
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views of one of the greatest political thinkers that ever lived on the institutions of that society and see the implications of those views for parallel institutions, where such exist, in the so-called 'simpler' or 'primitive' societies is perhaps no less 'anthropological' than seeking for the primitive elements of that ancient culture.
# VII
## BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The following is a list of the main works consulted, but it is in no way a complete bibliography. Articles and special studies which I found useful are referred to in the main body of the thesis.

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The study seeks the key to a proper understanding of Aristotle's political philosophy in his conception of φυσικά, a brief inquiry into the antecedents of the term with special reference to its significance for ethical theory is therefore regarded as constituting the background.

Preface - pp. I - VI.
Bibliography - pp. VII - XI.

Chapter 1 pp.1 - 70 - The term φυσικά is examined, and its use is reviewed in relation to the ethical discussions of the middle of the fifth century in Athens when ultimate questions about man and society came to be vociferously raised. Some special attention is given to Protagoras and Socrates.

Chapter 2 pp.71 - 120 - Plato's conception of φυσικά is examined in relation to his theory of man and of the evolution of human institutions.

Chapter 3 pp.121 - 174 - Aristotle's conception of φυσικά. In this section there appears to be an anticipation of Aristotle's purely political doctrines; the justification for this is that the theme discussed - the principle underlying the doctrines of the Politics and Aristotle's general political outlook - touches closely on his conception of φυσικά.
Chapter 4
pp.175 - 206
- Aristotle's conception of human nature (φύσεως) conditions for the realisation of this nature, and the relation of Ethics to Politics.

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Chapter 9
pp.411 - 475
- The relevance of Aristotle's doctrines to some West African communities is examined.
The background to Aristotle's moral and political thought.

It would in a sense be true to say that the ethical and political ideas of the main previous thinkers and poets from Homer downwards and the general antecedent history of the Greek race, its customs and institutions, constitute the background of Aristotle's political thought. Perhaps of no other Greek political thinker is this as likely to be true as of Aristotle, who has, to a remarkable degree, a nose for the actual, and who, therefore, in his philosophy gives a considerable degree of validity to the tendency of things as they actually are or have been in the past, and attributes such a significant position to the ideas of his predecessors. Whoever attempts to depict such a background, therefore, would need not only to give an account of the general history of the race and of its institutions but also to examine the ideas of previous thinkers on man and society, extracting from the songs of the poets and the writings of the orators their moral and political implications. As there is no intention of doing this in this preliminary chapter a brief word of explanation seems necessary to clarify what is here conceived to constitute 'background'.
It is generally known that there came in the development of the Greek race a stage when society became sufficiently aware of itself to be able to look at its surroundings as it were 'ab extra', and to desire some rational explanation of the apparent mystery of its surroundings, of the way these surroundings came to be what they were, and of the powers active within them. The previous myths and fantasies - products, as it were, of childish imagination - began to give place to a rational inquiry into the nature and origin of the world. Thus early in the sixth century the era of philosophic thought was inaugurated, it is generally believed, by Thales who tried to give a basis for the understanding of the mystery of the universe by postulating water to be the 'matrix' from which all things develop.

We are here not strictly concerned with the history of Greek philosophy nor with the conditions of its rise. Still a few remarks are relevant. Firstly, the critical consciousness in society, was itself partly a consequence of material, economic and social developments. In the cities of the coast of Ionia where this consciousness first found expression - our first philosopher Thales, and two important figures among those immediately succeeding him, i.e. Anaximander and Anaximenes, all came from the coast of Ionia - a high level of economic growth and material prosperity had
already been attained in the sixth century B.C. This was fostered mainly by trade and colonising activities. Society had emerged from the tribal stage, and political development had reached a level sufficiently high to enable our first philosopher to make the rather sophisticated proposal for centralization of the Ionian League, if what Herodotus (Histories, I. 170 - 3) tells us is true. An innately inquisitive spirit like the Greeks', therefore, became alerted by contact with different peoples, and especially with the older civilisations of the East, their skills and techniques and astronomy. The result is the beginning of what we call scientific inquiry.

It must be noted, however, that though we call the inquiry scientific, it was in spirit much less concerned with the possible utilization of natural powers and resources for economic ends than with discovering the principles of human society, its institutions and environment. The story told of Thales, our first philosopher, makes him comparable to a modern scientific investigator who, on "striking oil" in the course of his research, with cool detachment abandons the field declaring that his interest was pure θέωρεία and that it was not for oil he sought. Instead of directing the inquiry to the possible development of machines to replace slaves the Greek inquired into the φυσική of the
slave. Thus while philosophy was certainly not so anthropocentric as to prejudice pure logical speculations as it later came to be with the Stoics and Epicureans it was as much concerned with the problem of \( \varepsilon \delta \alpha \iota \mu \omicron \nu \omicron \alpha \) as with the phenomena of the heavens and all other varied occurrences in the cosmos which constitute the human environment. Thus reason, born of curiosity, came to be regarded as the most efficient means of answering the question of human happiness and of solving the problems that confront man in social life. Secondly, we must note that according to references in the major fifth century writers, the word which these philosophers used to designate the nature of their enquiries was \( \varphi \omega \omicron \varsigma \).

In the fifth century, for reasons which will briefly be discussed later, the belief became prevalent among the foremost moral thinkers that the 'unum necessarium' was the winning of an adequate philosophical standpoint capable of serving as the basis for the theory and practice of the moral life in society. Both Plato, whose objective was rendered all the more practical by his sense of the inadequacy and decay of the traditional Greek morality during the late fifth century, and the more important of the sophists, whose theories Plato thought it was his main business to refute because those theories were offsprings of that degeneracy -
all of them - approached the problem of man and society with the assumption that an adequate grasp of what constitutes 'φύσις' for man would enable one to know the proper standard for the conduct of human affairs. The satisfaction of this 'φύσις', they believed, constitutes human happiness. A glance at the First Book of the Politics shows to what extent Aristotle considers the elucidation of what constitutes 'φύσις' for man a necessary preliminary for an adequate estimate of man, his happiness, and the institutions that minister to this happiness.

It is, therefore, an important assumption in this inquiry that the examination of the development of the term 'φύσις', and its use in moral and political theory by Aristotle's predecessors, constitute the background of Aristotle's political thought, and that an adequate examination of Aristotle's political theory, both in its ethical aspects, and in its purely political aspects, must depend to a large extent on an adequate grasp of the nature of his philosophic principle or his theoretical 'schema', which, it is believed, comes down to his conception of φύσις.

There are thus distinguishable in Greek moral and political thought two aspects or, in historical language, two eras. First, that aspect which reveals the pristine customs and the traditional social morals of the race. These
customs and social ethics form the main content of the songs of the early poets who sing of ἀρετὴ and ὁθη.

For, ἀρετὴ is the excellence of those men who, within the framework of ὁθη and νόμοι, use their natural capacities to the utmost and within the praise of their fellowmen.

And ὁθη is 'that which is done and is generally believed to do', in other words, it is the standard of conduct prescribed by custom, but by custom, supported by ὅμικος - 'that which is established', and by an incipient moral sense expressed by νέμοντας, ὁποιος, and ἀλογος - that self-judgement according to a standard supplied by others or by society. Thus it is the ὁθη of old men to bathe, eat and sleep, and that "of divine kings not to say or do anything out-of-order in public". (Homer, Odyssey IV, 691 cf. Hesiod, Works and Days 275 – 285).

A sense of 'normal' is therefore implicit in ὁθη.

But at this stage of ethical thought there is some vagueness about the ultimate moral sanction. Thus, while custom prescribes the standard of conduct, he who does that which is not done, i.e. drives out ὁθη, does not merely offend 'social propriety' but 'disregards the voice of the gods' (Homer, Iliad, XVI, 386 – 8). Thus the sons of Achaeans who carry a sceptre receive 'themistes' from Zeus when they do justice, and Zeus honours Hecatē above all.
others; for she makes famous whom she will among the clans and in ὀξη she sits besides kings who have self-respect; for, "she, being herself the author of ὀξη and fitness among things, the king who has her for his assessor cannot err in his judgement of what is done or the way things really happen". In Hesiod, also, ὀξη has Zeus for father, Themis for mother and Eunomia for sisters, (Hesiod, Theogony, 901 )

Therefore, while men do certain deeds and avoid others because their fathers had acted so and public opinion forbids them to do otherwise, the concepts of ὀξη and θέμις are in a way connected with religion, its sanctions and ideas. The just man, therefore, is the man who observes the established social forms but he observes them usually because they have been so established for a sufficiently long period and with sufficient firmness to have gained divine sanction; the 'just' man is thus also he who observes those practices which place him upon the best terms with the higher powers (cf. Homer, Odyssey, II, 282; III 52 - 53 and 133 - 134). Thus Odysseus asks, "To whose land have I come now? Are they violent and wild and unmindful of ὀξη, or are they those who cherish strangers and whose spirit is fearful of the gods?". With the gods in the background therefore, θέμις and ὀξη are both "right" and "Hereditary custom". These
"hereditary precedents of procedure" cover the whole of social existence in this era. And to this era belong, with various peculiarities, Homer, Hesiod, Simonides of Ceos, and probably Pindar.

Secondly, there is the aspect which reveals the preoccupation of several thinkers who, thanks both to social and political developments and the inquiries of the pre-Socratics, became dissatisfied with the acceptance of customs and institutions solely on the grounds that they were traditional and, realising the need for a philosophy of first principles, came to examine the basis of customs and the validity of the institutions of society. This is the era of analysis, and to it belong the Sophists, Democritus, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; and each in his own way, Sophocles, Euripides and Thucydides.

This division is, of course, mainly arbitrary, and, in a way, defective in so far as it gives the impression that all the writers of the first group were uncritical in their acceptance of traditional customs and institutions and were unaware of the need to cast a critical look into the basis of social and individual morals. A comparison of the different pictures that would emerge if one extracted the moral and political teachings implicit in the poems of Homer, Hesiod and Simonides would show that our division does not take account of the characteristic details of each poet's ideas.
Also the transition from poetry to analysis was not through a leap. When Hesiod complained of princes who administered crooked δίκη he shows his awareness that the Ἀθέσεις ἡμέρας or νόμοι which constitute the yardsticks of the princes' rule do not conform to the ordering of any divine δίκη. Solon gave no explicit theory of φύσις but he directed his remedies to establishing a just political order the existence of which was being jeopardised by the ambitions of powerful men; he thus reveals implicitly his conviction that the 'status quo' no longer had any divine sanctions, and there runs through the surviving fragments of his poems a controversy similar to that later on conducted as to the relations of justice and expediency.

All these men in so far as their efforts implied a recognition of the fact that the traditional does not gain validity just because it was traditional were direct contributors to the development of the philosophic approach in morals and politics. But what is more important, the moral and political ideas of the men of the first era are not so divorced from the analysis of the men of the second era; for it is into the basis of those very customs and institutions, more or less uncritically accepted by the poets, that the philosophic thinkers made it their main pre-occupation to probe. In some cases, as with Aristotle
in broad outline, and as with Plato in the *Laws*, political philosophy has its very basis on those very customs and traditions. Looking from another angle, one sees similar significance in the attention which Plato, the greatest of the philosophers, gave to the moral and political ideas implicit in the songs of Homer, the greatest of the poets, and his sense of the influence, actual and potential, of those ideas in his own time. This indeed shows to what extent 'analysis' was involved in poetry and customs, i.e. to what extent the effort to find a philosophic basis for morals and politics is involved in traditional social and individual morals, and proves that the old "propriety of conduct" was not abrogated in the era of analysis; for what the ethical inquiry of that era did was to use the abundant material of the former era for analysis and reconstruction, to place its 'customary' ethics on a firmer basis of knowledge, to systematize the ethical ideas stored up in poetry, to make the basis and obligation of morality clearer and to reconsider the claims of morality with the requirements of an adequate and fully consistent life.

Still, the distinction between an era of poetry and one of analysis enables us to concentrate on the theme common to those who directed their efforts towards finding a philosophic basis for morals and social institutions.
Therefore, though it is realised that 'analysis' needs for its elucidation some reference to traditional morals and institutions it is an important assumption in this work that the formulation of each philosopher's first principles is the key to an understanding of his evaluation of the institutions that cater for human happiness.

Now, the first attempts to formulate consciously a theory about man and society took among the Greeks, as hinted above, the form of postulating what is fundamental in human nature; ethical theory, when it is distinguishable from political theory, then takes the form of what kind of conduct conduces to the fulfilment of this 'nature' - the fundamental in man. Political theory, sometimes positive, at other times negative, takes the form of examining what social institutions contribute to the realisation of this 'nature'. The use of the word 'nature' and 'fundamental', however, needs some explanation; for the word which most of these thinkers used is 'φύσις' - the same word which, it is believed, the first philosophers used in their enquiries into the nature of the universe. A few words about the word 'φύσις' is therefore
considered not out of place. For the semasiological development of φύσις yields points by no means irrelevant to the development of Greek political theory. We are here however not launching on an extensive scale a semasiological inquiry into the development of φύσις; we would confine ourselves to a brief consideration of the development of the term from a purely descriptive one to a term used as a criterion in morals and politics, and examine its significance for Greek moral and political theory.

Although interpretations differ widely, most scholars who have given any attention to the semantics of connect it with φύω, φύομαι, φύειν - 'to bring forth, to beget, to produce, to put forth; and its passive φύεθαι - 'to be born, to be begotten, to be produced, to grow, to spring up or forth, to come into being. But there the agreement ends. Disagreement arises at the point of deciding how significant is the primary meaning in the developed uses of φύσις.

¹ In relation to the specific purpose of examining Aristotle's doctrine of the evolution of society, tracing the development of the word might seem an instance of the procedure which Horace advises us not to adopt - starting the story of the Trojan War with an account of the egg from which Helen grew. Ars Poetica 147 - 'nec gemino bellum Trojanum orditur ab ovo'. It is however hoped that our results here would justify the procedure.
One would probably find a discussion of the term \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) in any of Aristotle's major works, the first chapters of the De Caelo, the De Partibus Animalium, the Politics, for instance. The principal Aristotelian 'loci' for the interpretation of \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \), however, are Metaphysics D IV, 1014b 16 - 1015a 19 and Physics II 192b8 - 194a21; a close look at the discussion in the Metaphysics would, however, serve our purpose here.

It may, I hope, be safely assumed that the compedia Aristotle gives are based on his analysis of \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) as found in the literature and thought preceding him. In the discussion in Metaphysics D IV, Aristotle gives the impression that the word \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) has one real meaning; there is however little doubt that all the meanings he lists are meanings that the word \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) really does have from time to time, though Aristotle is right in saying that one of them is logically more fundamental than the others, which are derived from it by more or less natural extension or analogy. But first let us glance at the various meanings. \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) could have the following various meanings:

1. Origin or 'birth' - "a meaning which would occur to anyone", Aristotle says, "if he were to pronounce the 'u' in \( \varphi\varsigma\iota\varsigma \) long"

2. That out of which things grow, i.e., their seed.

3. The source from which the primary movement in every natural object is present therein in virtue of the object's own
essence.

(4) The primitive matter out of which things are made.
(5) The essence of natural objects.
(6) Essence in general.
(7) The essence of things which have a source of movement in themselves. This meaning Aristotle regards as the fundamental meaning of φύσις.

In view of our interest in the primary meaning of however, the first meaning in Aristotle's list is the most significant. Met. D 1046b 16 -

φύσις λέγεται ὅνα μὴν τρόπων ἢ τῶν φυσικῶν γένεσις, οὗν ἐν τις ἐκπεπτεῖσθαι λέγον πώς.

One or two remarks may be made directly at this point. First, it is generally agreed that Aristotle's etymology is here false - the 'u' in φύσις, unlike that in φῶς, φῦμαι is never long. This, however, need not necessarily affect the correctness of the meaning which Aristotle says φύσις sometimes has. Secondly, that though it is true that Aristotle quotes Frag. 8 of Empedocles (Diels) as exemplifying not the meaning of φύσις as γένεσις (meaning no. 5), too much can easily be made of this; it seems more likely that in fact φύσις means 'growing' or 'growth' or 'coming to be' in Empedocles Frag. 8., though we cannot here enter into the learned discussions
surrounding this fragment.

It is nevertheless relevant to ask whether the fact that 'the simple root \( \text{cu} \) is the equivalent of the Latin 'fu' and the English 'be' rules out the primary idea of 'growth' or 'coming to be' in \( \varphi \omega, \varphi \upsilon \omega \alpha \lambda \) and in \( \varphi \upsilon \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \). For, Greek '\( \text{cu} \) Latin 'fu', English 'be', are the equivalent of Sanskrit 'bheu - : bhū. And under this, Walde - Pokorny, Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Indogermanischen Sprachen, 2nd vol; vide p. 140 (cf. Pokorny, J. : Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch 1st vol. p. 146) record:

'bheu - : bhū ursprgl. (ursprünglich) wachsen (wohl = schwellen "... woran entslehen, werden, sein") , i.e., originally, 'grow' (possibly \( = \) 'swell, increase, grow bigger') ... hence, 'originate become, be'.

The original signification 'grow' is of course well observed in Greek usage (see Liddell & Scott sub \( \varphi \omega \omega \) cf. also Boissacq, E., Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Grecque Heidelberg - Paris, 1938, sub \( \varphi \omega \). The semantic development 'grow' \( \Rightarrow \) 'become, be' (cf. Skt. bhū, 'become, be'; Greek \( \kappa \varepsilon \varphi \upsilon \kappa \alpha \), \( \varsigma \varphi \nu \upsilon \), 'be, be by nature', etc) may therefore be a witness to a subsequent progressive conceptual fusion of the processes of 'becoming' (= originating) and 'growth' and the resultant
state of 'being', a process the nature of which is perhaps still traceable in the early philosophers' varied use of \(\varphi\sigma\tau\). The semasiological development would therefore be something like \(\delta\beta\mu=\text{grow} \rightarrow \text{become, be}\. This hypothesis is perhaps favoured by the existence of a firmly established Indo-European radical \(\delta\epsilon=\text{be}\), both in its substantive and in its copulative use (cf. Skt. as-ti, Gk. \(\epsilon\sigma-t\), Lat. es-t < \(\epsilon\epsilon-s-t\)), especially as there is no reason to suppose that for such a fundamental concept the IE speakers did tolerate a perfect synonym without the slightest semantic differentiation. It seems therefore inconclusive to say, as Burnet does, that 'the simple root '\(\varphi\nu\)' is the equivalent of the Latin '\(fu\)' and the English 'be', and need not have this derivative meaning' of growth. It may even be misleading to say that the meaning of 'growth' in \(\varphi\nu\varphi\mu\) is derived.

Lovejoy's\(^\text{1}\) suggestion therefore that from 'birth', \(\varphi\sigma\tau\) presumably came to mean 'innate quality', and later still came to mean 'characteristics in general', 'the derivation from 'birth'

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\(^1\) In the account here given of the development of \(\varphi\sigma\tau\) I am much indebted to A.O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, "Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity", Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, esp. the chapter on the 'Genesis of the Conception of 'Nature' as 'Norm'" and the conspectus given at the end of the book of 'some meanings of Nature'.
being then largely forgotten" seems, in the circumstances of our knowledge of the development in usage, the most plausible.

J.L. Myres\(^2\) believes that the significance for political theory of \(φύσις\) lies in its primary meaning of \(γένεσις\), 'the way things grow', or 'the process of becoming.' His view, however, has not gained wide acceptance, nor is it supported by the fact that most of the earliest usages of the word emphasise not this primary meaning of \(γένεσις\) but the descriptive signification of the term in the sense of 'general character' 'qualities', 'constitution'. The relevant aspect of this development for our purpose is the transition from \(φύσις\) as a general descriptive term to \(φύσις\) as 'norm'; we shall therefore devote a few paragraphs to examining this aspect.

There is the well-known instance of the word in Homer (Od. X.303). There the Slayer of Argos (Hermes) gives Odysseus the plant 'moly' which he has plucked from the ground, and shows him its nature - \(καὶ μοι φύσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐδείξε - \) 'it is black at the root, but the flower is like to milk'. Here certainly \(φύσις\) is used as a term signifying 'characteristics.'

\(^2\) "The Political Ideas of the Greeks", London, 1927, pp. 155-164. \(φύσις\) Myres argues, denotes 'the process or way of growing'. Thus, against the interpretation of \(φύσις\) in Od. X.303 as 'appearance' or 'physical characteristics', Myres believes that Hermes is drawing Odysseus' attention to the 'process of growth' of the 'moly' - 'black at the root' refers to 'the beginning' of the process of growth, and 'flower like to milk' refers to its completion. Myres interpretes the other instances of the word \(φύσις\) in the early writers on this principle. The interpretation seems to me often forced, and rather unconvincing.
The word φύσις occurs some five times in Aeschylus. In the 'Prometheus' 489 the chorus distinguished clearly "the flight of crook-taloned birds, which by nature are auspicious" - οὕτως τε δεξιοί φύσιν - and the details of "the birds' various modes of life, their mutual feuds and loves and their consortings" make clear the descriptive signification of φύσις. In Supp. 496 the emphasis is on external characteristics - μορφής δ' οὖν χημόστολος - "the nature of our aspect is unlike yours" for "Nile and Inachus," it is added, "rear a different race". In Choephoroe 281 it is possible to translate φύσις as 'constitution', but it is 'constitution' in the sense of 'general characteristics'; σαρκῶν ἐπαρµατήρας...λείχηνας ἐγέρθοντας ἄρχαίαν φύσιν - "Leprous ulcers...eating away the primal nature of the flesh". The meaning is the same in Persae 441, ἄκμαὶοι φύσιν seems to invite the sense of 'constitution' for φύσιν, but the added details - ψυχήν τ' ἀριστοὶ κτῆγενεῖαν ἐχῶρεσεῖς show that φύσιν draws our attention to external characteristics.

In Pindar in the two instances of the use of the word φύσις the signification in one is certainly descriptive - Melissus has not the φύσιν ὑπογείων because he is small of stature - Isthmian III.49. In Nemean VI.5., however, we have ἀλλὰ τι προσφέρομεν ἐμπαν ἦν μέγαν νῦν ἦτοι φύσιν ἀληντοῖς,
and here φύσις could refer to an intellectual as well as a physical quality.

The descriptive sense of the word φύσις is confirmed by the usage in Herodotus. In Herodotus *Histories* II.5, we have Αλγύπτον γὰρ φύσις τῆς χώρης ἐστὶ τοῦδε — and then follows an account of the general characteristics of the land. In II.19 we have τὸ ποταμὸς φύσις πέρι and in II.35 we have τῷ ποταμῷ φύσιν ἄλλοι πληθυνθεῖσθαι ἔτει ἄλλοι ποταμοὶ and in III.22 φύσις πυρᾶν. There are other similar instances of the word in Herodotus. But there are also in Herodotus some traces of development in usage. For, there are one or two instances where φύσις can without violence only be translated in the sense of 'the normal or usual qualities' of a thing. In V.118 we hear of the Carians being posted in battle ἵνα μὴ ἔχωσι τὸ κύρος φεύγειν... αὕτω τε μὲν εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαζομένην τῆς φύσιος; γενοῦτο ἐπὶ ἀμείνονες/ The usage is similar in IV.50 when the Danube is spoken of as ἄλγυφ μέζων τῆς ἐσωτερικῆς φύσιος, and in VIII.38 where two hoplites who appeared at Delphi are spoken of as μέζονας ἡ κατ' ἀνθρώπων φύσιν. As soon as φύσις acquires this sense of 'normal', it becomes easy to use φύσις to denote a 'norm' whether human nature, animal nature or even the nature of inanimates; and instances of this slightly further step in usage are found in Herodotus, e.g. III.65, 116.
In spite of this, however, the descriptive sense of φύσις is so strong in Herodotus that the development from a purely descriptive connotation to a normative one in the use of φύσις remains purely latent. Thus φύσις means much more the same thing as νόμος as it appears in for example, II.45 -

εις μεν νόν δοκέομι, τά τινα λέγοντας, της 'Αιγυπτίων φύσις καὶ τῶν νόμων καμίαν ἀπείρως ἐχεῖν οἷς ἐλληνες, or they are complementary terms as in II.35.

Αἱγυπτίοι δέμεν τῷ οὖδενφ τῷ κατὰ οὖδεν έφόρον καὶ τῷ ποταμῷ φύσιν ἀλλαχην παρεχομένῳ ὣς οἱ ἄλλοι ποταμοὶ, τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἐξακρινths τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἑστήσαντο ήθελαι τε καὶ .

On the whole, therefore, the Herodotean use of φύσις in the sense of 'norm' is very near to the usage in the Corpus Hippocraticum in the sense of the 'normal', the 'original', the 'natural' place or condition of a thing. Thus with the passages Herod. IV50, V.118, VIII.38 mentioned in the last but one paragraph above could be compared the passage in the Corpus Hippocraticum, Περὶ ἄρθρων 30, which speaks of a joint in dislocation as being placed παρὰ φύσιν and as returning to its φύσις when replaced. φύσις in this sense very nearly means τὸ εἰληθὸς with which it is indeed often associated, as in the Corpus Hippocraticum, Περὶ λεγῆς νόσου 14, and Προγνωστικὰν 2. (cf. Arist. Probl. 949a 31 and Thucy. 45.2).
In Sophocles the sense of φύσις is in many instances that of 'the character' the 'distinctive' quality of a thing, though often a man's general character is seen against his birth (Electra, 325, Ajax 1259, 1301). It is however, interesting to note that the sense of the 'normal' which we find latent in Herodotus comes more into the open in Sophocles. For in the latter we find φύσις being used for that which is a permanent and distinctive characteristic of a thing as opposed to its transitory and superficial features. In Philoctetes 902 we find Neoptolemus asserting his real nature as against the hardly noble one revealed by his trick on Philoctetes —

διπλαντα δυσχέρεια, τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν

διαν λιπῶν τις ὀρθ. τὰ μὴ προσεικότα,

"All is offensive when a man is false to his true self, and does unseemly things".

In Electra 1023, Electra draws a distinction between character as a distinctive and permanent quality of a person, and the accidental characteristics which sometimes accompany that quality. ἀλλ' ἥφισσον γε; τὸν ὑὲ νοῦν ἤσοσαν τότε

"My temper (or quality) was the same, my mind less ripe".

The foregoing account of the development in the use of φύσις has been necessarily sketchy, but I think it has drawn our attention to the fact, which for our purpose is the
important point, that though the primary meaning of φύσις may be 'growth' or 'birth', it very early lost this meaning and its commonest meaning in the earliest literature is 'general character', 'make-up', and that the normative meaning was a development from this descriptive connotation. In view of this fact, however, it seems likely that if in the late seventh century or in the sixth century somebody was told that a group of men wrote περὶ φύσεως his first reaction would be to want to know "on the nature of what?", and 'nature' would ordinarily, i.e. outside of any philosophical or scientific theory, mean 'general character'. That this would be a legitimate reaction even up to the beginning of the fifth century seems to be supported by the fact that even when the phrase had some to be used technically as the designation of the works of the early philosophers, the nature of what was their concern was quite often specified. Thus when Xenophon wanted to tell us that Socrates did not concern himself περὶ φύσεως, i.e. with the problem of the Nature of the Universe as it had come to be technically designated, he said that he did not teach περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ἤκερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι; he then goes on to amplify the connotation of πάντων in the phrase - the origin of the world, the laws by

Xenophon - Memorabilia 1.1, 11-15
which the heavenly bodies are governed; it is almost a paraphrase of the questions which Aristotle tells us in the Metaphysics aroused men's curiosity and gave rise to philosophy - "the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun, and about the stars and about the genesis of the universe". In Lysis 214b Plato, although grammatically using φύσεως as if it were equivalent to, or co-ordinate with, τὸ δῆλον leaves no doubt of the close connection between φύσεως and τὸ δῆλον in the inquiries of the pre-Socratics. What he writes is ὁ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τοῦ δῆλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες, but περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τοῦ δῆλου is a hendiadys for περὶ τῆς τοῦ δῆλου φύσεως (Cf. Soph. 249e). Even the phrase μετεωρολογίας φύσεως περὶ of the Phaedrus (269e) seems equivalent to περὶ τῆς τοῦ δῆλου φύσεως, especially in view of the close connection of the investigation concerning the universe with questions about the phenomena of the heavens (cf. Arist. Met. 982b 12 - 17 Plato, Tim. 47a, Rep. 530a - 531b). Further, the phrase is used on the work of Anaxagoras, one of the greatest of the inquirers περὶ φύσεως. Again in the Protagoras (315c) we find a crowd of students eagerly putting questions on astronomy, the heavens and the nature of the universe to Protagoras - διερώτησιν ὅσα περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικῶν ἐπετα διερωτήσιν.

Here τοῦ δῆλου would normally perform the function
of the details — 'heavens, astronomy' — in the sentence.

We should, however, not be surprised if in the fifth and fourth centuries we find the 'πάντων', 'τοῦ ὅλου' dropping out and the phrase περὶ φύσεως came to be technically used to designate the works of those who attempted to explain the Nature of the Universe. The earliest occurrence of the phrase περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία seems to be in the Corpus Hippocraticum περὶ ἱστορίας νοῦσου though Burnet suggests that its first occurrence is in Euripides. Even the usage in the Corpus Hippocraticum still suggests clearly that πάντων or τοῦ ὅλου was understood and was originally usually expressed with περὶ φύσεως when it refers to inquiries such as those undertaken by the pre-Socratics. The phrases περὶ φύσιος and ἀνθρώπου περὶ φύσιος ταιότου περὶ φύσιος γυναικείων which designate some of the enquiries of the Corpus Hippocraticum are parallel to περὶ φύσεως τοῦ ὅλου, of which the Latin "De Rerum Natura" is a fair translation.

Even when Plato uses the phrase περὶ φύσεως without the

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\[1\] Early Greek Philosophy (4th edition 1930) pp. 10 - 11. On Eur. Fr. inc. 910, Burnet says "This is the oldest and most trustworthy statement as to the name originally given to science. I lay no stress on the fact that the books of the early cosmologists are generally quoted under the title περὶ φύσεως as such titles are probably of later date."
addition of πάντων or τοῦ ὅλου in referring to the inquiries of the pre-Socratics there is often an amplification which shows that πάντων or τοῦ ὅλου is to be understood. Thus in the Phaedo (96a) περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία is explained as "the knowledge of the cause of each thing, why each thing came to be, why it ends and why it is; and in the Philebus (59a) the inquiry περὶ φύσεως is directed to finding out how the world came into being, the laws by which it operates and its modes of operation."

But the nature of the problem which these early thinkers raised made it almost inevitable that φύσις should acquire a new significance in their hands. As long as problems of scientific explanation were not raised, it was possible for φύσις to be confined to its essentially descriptive connotation; even the sense of 'normal' which it developed outside philosophic usage did not lift it much above the descriptive sense, as is shown clearly by Herodotean usage. Herodotus talks of the φύσις and νόμοι of Greeks, those of Egyptians, those of Indians, and those of Aethiopians. The νόμοι of these various peoples differ, in some respects totus caelo! The 'Father of History' however, seems content to note that these differences are results mainly of differing environments and circumstances and to advise, providential historian that he was, that all customs deserved reverent obedience. Greater knowledge of the ethnology and sociology of other peoples did not therefore raise
for him such acute problems as it did raise for some of the sophists. Whether this attitude was due to the temperament and the intellectual bent of the historian, or to the fact that the philosophic significance of ψυχή for social enquiry was still only latent by his time, or whether he realised the full scientific significance of ψυχή and was disposed towards the Protagorean view of society as some scholars suggest, it is impossible for us to consider here. We, however, know that Herodotus probably finished his histories about the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (c.432 B.C.), although there are references (e.g. Bk. VI, 121-140, VII, 133-7, 139-144 160-2, and Bk.IX 73-5) to events occurring between the years 431-429 B.C. which points towards the conclusion that there was some later revision.

Be that as it may, the pre-Socratics sought the ψυχή of the universe; and in doing so, they were not attempting to give a description of each of the particular things that collectively constitute the universe; they were rather seeking a principle by which it could be explained, its nature, the variety of its phenomena, the laws of its operation etc. Thus by the very nature of the problem they raised, the principle of explanation is a major aspect of the solution of the problem. To say this is to imply two things; first, that these early thinkers were mainly interested in explaining the universe and secondly, that the nature of the problem makes the issue of
a principle of explanation or dominant one. It may come to pass, however, that as the attempts to explain developed and analysis became intensified, emphasis might shift from the thing explained to the principle of explanation. This would by no means be a strange phenomenon in the field of thought; and there is evidence which points in the direction that something like this happened in this field of Greek thought. When Plato tells us, for example, in the Lysis (214\textsuperscript{b}) and in the Philebus (59a) that the pre-Socratics inquiring παρθησεως were concerned with the Nature of the Universe, its processes etc. he uses φύσις with emphasis on the thing explained, and in a sense which keeps φύσις to its common usage as the 'character', 'qualities' of something, a sense which usually needs a specifying genitive; when however, he tells us, as in the Laws (891b) and (892c) that the pre-Socratics conceived the material elements, air, water, earth and fire to be the φύσις of things, he uses φύσις in the sense of a principle of explanation. This is made clear in his own counter argument that any attempt to explain the nature of the universe must include purpose or a planning mind as φύσις. It is possible to detect both senses in Aristotle, but he naturally concentrates on φύσις as a principle of explanation. It is in this sense that φύσις is the essence of things which have in themselves a source of motion; and φύσις is more form than matter (cf. Met. 1015a 13ff.). It is also in this sense that Aristotle
explains the φύσις of most pre-Socratic philosophers to be in one way or another a material ἀρχή.

One of the most significant results of the inquiries of the pre-Socratics, therefore, was, in spite of the variety of the things which each philosopher made his first principle, the development of the use of φύσις to denote the first principle, the permanent that explains the variable, the complex and the multiform. For without the development which the word saw in the hands of the early philosophers φύσις was not on its own capable of being used as it came to be used as the touchstone by which to judge what is good and bad in morals and politics, and by which the permanent and essential could be distinguished from the transient and superficial.

*1 Since we are here mainly concerned with sketching the background of the use of φύσις as a criterion in morals and political life, we omit any discussion of the various interpretations given by scholars to φύσις as used in pre-Socratic philosophy, except when our exposition demands reference to a particular interpretation. The main ones are of course Burnet's which views the pre-Socratics as concerned with the 'primary substance', 'the fundamental element of things'; Heidel's Περὶ φύσεως - Proc. of Amer. Acad. of Arts and Sciences, Vol. XLV (1910) pp. 79-133 - which takes φύσις to mean (a) the process or growth of things, (b) the cause of the process or growth of things, and (c) the definition or 'chemical formula' of the constituent elements of things; and Cherniss who in his epochal work - Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic philosophy, esp. pp. 359ff. established beyond doubt that the pre-Socratics in their inquiries Περὶ φύσεως were as much interested in processes as in explanatory principles.
There is therefore a kernel of truth in Jaeger's statement that "the Greeks did not think of human nature as a theoretical problem until, by studying the external world... they had established an exact technique on which to begin a study of the inner nature of man" for "the Greek spirit trained to think of the external cosmos as governed by fixed laws searches for the inner laws that govern the soul, and at least discovers an objective view of the internal cosmos.*

But what is more important, however, some of these philosophers who inquired into the principles by which the universe and its phenomena could be explained believed that these same principles are applicable to the proper ordering of human conduct and of society. For, as I suggested earlier, these early thinkers did not conceive the nature of their inquiries as a modern physicist or chemical analyst conceives his own; they took a more synoptic view and believed that the cosmos and the microcosmos as governed by the same laws, that therefore an insight gained into the working of the cosmos provides a guiding principle to life. As Barker very well puts it, "these early theories were, to those who propounded them, solutions of the riddle of the universe. As such, they applied to the life of man as much as they did to the life of the earth. Conclusions with regard to the elements of physical nature and

*1 Jaeger - Paideia Vol. 1 p.150.
their mutual relations involved similar conclusions about the elements of man's moral nature and the connection of those elements - about the elements of the state, and the scheme by which they were united".*1

When Anaximander (fr.1) speaks of 'justice' as a principle of the cosmos, he seemed like applying a term borrowed from the social structure to the cosmos but he also probably believed that political justice has its basis in cosmic justice.

It is, of course, generally known that the Pythagoreans believed that knowledge of the nature of the cosmos is indispensable to a proper ordering of the microcosmos - man - and of society. They therefore believed that the principle of things which with them was number was applicable to morals and society. Scholars have seen Pythagorean influences in Plato, and even in Clisthenes of Athens and Hippodamus of Milostus; and as the author of the Magna Moralia tells us in a summary of previous ethical thought "The first to attempt a definition of justice was Pythagoras; but his method was faulty for he made virtue a number, justice a cube etc."

In Heraclitus ὁ θ'οῦς, it is true, κυριακότοι φθιέτ (Fr.B.10) but once succeed in grasping it, and you have the touchstone for the proper ordering of conduct and society. Whether it is called 'justice' or 'Ὄο οὐφον' or 'λογος' or 'the thunderbolt that steers the course of all things' or 'the ever-living fire' it

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*1 Barker - Greek Political Theory - Plato and his Predecessors, second edition, p.46.
is nevertheless the universal law. 'Fools may seek' to live in a private world of their own imagining, but the wise 'must hold fast to what is common to all (τῇ διανῇ πᾶντων) as a city holds fast to its law (νόμῳ) and even more strongly. "For all laws are fed by the one divine law"; true wisdom consists in understanding this matrix of law, the 'common' basis to all human actions whether public or private -

"σοφία διηθέτα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας (Fr. B.112)

Empedocles speaks of nature as an order of justice (Fr.B.135); in Parmenides, it is 'justice' that holds Being within the bonds of the measure "and does not loose her fetters and let anything come into being or pass away but holds it fast", though in the case of Parmenides it must be difficult to see how this kind of justice could help the proper ordering of society.

Even in the case of Democritus, Gregory Vlastos has shown*1 to what extent Democritean Ethics is in fact based on his Physics, even though Cyril Bailey in his study of the Atomists believes that "Democritus' ethic hardly amounts to a moral theory" and that "there is no effort to set the picture of the 'cheerful' man on a firm philosophic basis or to link it up in any way with the physical system. In fact, however, 'wisdom' for Democritus is insight into the order of nature, an insight which enables the soul to direct both external forces and its own inner motions of desire and hope"; for ἐσθαμονία τοῖς βοσκήμασιν οἶκειοι οὐδέν χρόνοι (fr.10) but ψυχὴ οἰκητηριῶν δαιμόνος (fr.11)

If, therefore, one sought in what respects these thinkers left, as a result of their inquiries, any legacy for subsequent moral and political thought, one would look in the direction of their attempts to grasp the explanatory principle of natural phenomena, i.e. its ultimate reality, and in the meaning they gave to φύσις in the process of these inquiries; also probably in the direction of the efforts of some of them to found a moral and political theory on the basis of their inquiries Ἡρός φύσεως. For their attempts to establish some connection between the cosmos and the microcosmos, between the world of nature and the world of man, even if philosophically unjustified, are evidence of the incipient awareness of the need to place human conduct on a philosophical basis and of the growing importance of questions about man and social life.

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About the middle of the fifth century B.C. in Athens intellectual interest becomes more centred on the microcosmos and less on the cosmos. Man, therefore, becomes the centre of investigation, or as Gomperz puts it "Cosmology in the widest sense of that term was superseded more and more by Anthropology in an equally comprehensive sense." The change was not, of course, a sudden one. For while the foregoing thinkers elaborated their theories on the universe, important changes, political and social were taking place in most parts of Greece but especially in Athens; even the degree of philosophical curiosity and intellectual emancipation manifested by the physical philosophers was partly
a concomitant of the emergence of society from tribal or feudal conditions to comparatively urban and commercial conditions. Colonization had led the people into parts of the world hitherto unknown to them; vision and experience had thus been widened; curiosity aroused and imagination stirred. Contact with the ancient civilizations of Lydia, Phoenicia and Egypt widened their outlook; it revealed opinions and beliefs different from the Greeks' and pointed to ideas and techniques hitherto unknown.

In most parts of Greece, the codifiers of the seventh century probably looked upon their codes as the formulation of an absolute pattern; and to judge by the stories told of their efforts to preserve the pristine integrity of their laws, either by sworn covenants or by provisions designed to prevent amendment or repeal, they believed that their work would suffice for all time to come - α ντημα δει. But by the sixth century when Solon administered his remedies for the political ills of Athens, ills that were obviously aggravated by the operation of economic forces, it had become fairly obvious that laws were so far from being divine, unchanging and eternal that there were times when society could neglect to change them only at the risk of self-destruction. Society, it appeared, had its own law of survival, independent of divine sanctions or supernatural supervision. A contemporary of Anaximander, Solon's thoughts were sufficiently imbued with the spirit of the natural philosophers to see that the political life of a community is
subject to definite laws. (See Solon esp. Fr. 10. and 12).

Athens had played an insignificant, if any, part in the enquiries of the sixth century, but in the fifth century great social and political changes took place; and in this period Athens grew to be the meeting-place of various philosophic and scientific views and a place of attraction for a variety of thinkers from the whole Greek world. After the glorious role Athens played in repelling the Persian onslaughts and freeing her Ionian kinsmen from the Persian yoke and menace, she was a growing and prosperous imperial state; and imperial functions provided a variety of employment for many citizens, in the courts, in the docks and in the ships. A new era was inaugurated in which it became possible to think that a man is what he makes himself; competition seemed unlimited, and the rights of the individual to attain his own ἄρετη was strenuously asserted. The acme was reached, of course, in the age of Pericles.

Side by side with these social and political developments went developments in the field of knowledge. Every department of human activity received attention. Treatises were being written of the arts of medicine, musical theory, dramatic technique and indeed on almost every subject that relates to man. Historical knowledge widened. Many might not have travelled as widely as Herodotus but his 'Histories' and the 'Round the world' sketch of Hecataeus were no doubt easily accessible.
Athenian drama reflects the shift in intellectual interest; theology was still of course a constant theme of the dramas but there was some 'bringing down of the gods from heaven to earth'; theology became less abstruse than it was in Aeschylus. It was not to be expected that a pious Sophocles, in whose house the sacred image of the cult of Asclepius was kept on the arrival of the god into Athens would abandon the background of the gods and religious dogma, but greater interest is centred in the conflict of human wills and the play of human emotions. In 'Antigone', for example, the workings out of divine justice form the background but a lot of the interest centres on the natural connexion of Creon's misfortune with his wilful character; in Antigone, on the other hand, he raised some ultimate questions of morality and justice. In this intellectual milieu, it is almost inevitable that the problem of what constitutes the ultimate basis of morals and of social life would be raised. This view would be entitled to some validity even if it were only a conjecture. For it would be difficult to believe that the same people who had earlier sought for the ultimate reality by which natural phenomena could be explained, who had applied similar methods in the field of medicine would fail to attempt the important truths necessary for the guidance of human conduct and social institutions at a time when their interest was centred mainly on human activities and when their knowledge of various
social customs and practices had considerably released them from the chains of custom and tradition. As it is we have sufficient evidence not only from the surviving fragments of Hippias, Prodicus, Antiphon the Sophist but also from the Platonic Socrates and in a way from Euripides and Thucydides that the problem was actually raised.

However, in asking how the problem was raised, it must be borne in mind that one of the most remarkable features of the period now under consideration is that the river of Greek thought is now a confluence of many streams and that it flows a bit turbidly; there is the stream of physical speculation, no doubt substantially reduced in volume but still flowing nevertheless; there is the stream of rhetoric and general cultural education, and even of pure eristic. In this by no means limpid general current, it is by no means easy to distinguish the stream in which we are particularly interested - that of the ideas of those men whose aim it was to place individual and social morals on a fundamental basis. For, a partial consequence of there being so many streams is that multiplicity of interests which seems to be such a notable characteristic of the men of this period. Gorgias, according to the tradition, showed interest in physical speculation, in eristics and in rhetoric; Protagoras taught general cultural education, showed interest in rhetoric and perhaps eristic (e.g. the 'antilogia') and in philosophic speculation (e.g. The 'Homo...
Mensura doctrine). Hippias seems exceptional but not really egregious in relation to the general class of the elder sophists; and even Socrates' declared ignorance of the doctrines of the physical philosophers could easily be exaggerated; for his acquaintance with the theories of the physical philosophers was probably no less than that of the elder sophists (pace. Plato Ap. 19c., but cf. 26d).

A phenomenon which seems a common point of discussion to all the men of this period, and by examining which we would probably find our way to that stream which is of particular interest to us is the φύσις - νόμος antithesis. For this seems to be at this period the solvent material at the confluence of the streams of Greek thought and flowing past which each stream takes on a common colouring. This fact even, I think, accounts for the various assessments by scholars of the significance of the φύσις - νόμος antithesis in the thought of the period; for, since one would find traces of the antithesis whichever field of thought and practice one inspects, one is likely to come out with an assessment of the significance of the antithesis corresponding to that aspect of thought or practice. This view is supported by as early an assessor as Aristotle. To judge by what he tells us of the use of the φύσις - νόμος antithesis in the Topica and the Sophistici Elenchi, one would think that the use of the antithesis was confined
to rhetorical or eristic purposes. In *Top.* 173a7 he cites Callicles of the 'Gorgias' as an example of a man who uses this antithesis for rhetorical purposes. It hardly needs pointing out, however, that for Callicles in the 'Gorgias' more was involved in the use of φύσις and νόμος than scoring rhetorical or eristic advantages; and indeed, not to mention Plato, the trouble Aristotle himself takes in the *Politics* to counter the arguments of those who, using the φύσις - νόμος antithesis, would undermine the basis of social life shows that the φύσις - νόμος antithesis was used in more fundamental debates, and that Aristotle himself realised this.

In view of this, it is hardly surprising that the estimates of the φύσις - νόμος antithesis should range from that which regards the antithesis as little more than a rhetorical device popular with the sophists to that which says that at first "natural philosophy distinguished between νόμος and φύσις and this distinction was transferred to ethical questions at a time when the decline of political morality had produced a general belief that only might is right".

Burnet in 'Law and Nature in Greek Ethics' saw some noteworthy significance of the antithesis for Greek ethical and political theory and sought its roots. His treatment of the problem is therefore given some rather detailed attention here.

Taking his point of departure from Aristotle's statement (*E.N.* 1094b14) "that things fair and things just are liable to
such variation and fluctuation that they are believed to exist by law only and not by nature", Burnet undertakes to show that tendency to use the antithesis to undermine the basis of laws, was the result of an error which the earlier cosmologists made and which some of the ethical theorists of the fifth century B.C. repeated - the error of seeking "the underlying reality of the world and that of conduct... in pari materia" with the thing explained. Stripped of historical details, Burnet's argument goes like this: (a) the cosmologists i.e. the pre-Socratic philosophers, observed the manifold phenomena of the world: they sought its φύσις, i.e. its explanatory principle, but they sought this principle 'in pari materia' with the phenomena explained, Thales' water etc., and because of this their inquiry resulted in banishing phenomena into the realm of the unreal. (b) the ethical theorists of the fifth century, unlike their 'tradition-accepting' ancestors to whom social traditions or customs ( νόμοι ) appeared regular and permanent, became curious about the diversity of the customs and the institutions of various peoples; they therefore sought the φύσις of customs and conduct but as they sought this φύσις 'in pari materia' with the phenomena explained, they banished customs and traditional laws into the realm of the unreal.

It is, as it is now generally recognised, of course an over-simplification to say that the pre-Socratics sought φύσις
'in pari materia' with the phenomena they sought to explain,* but what is more important, the physical philosophers did not banish phenomena into the realm of the unreal but rather laid emphasis on the ultimate principle which they believed would explain those phenomena; and that this principle of explanation should assume a more significant position than the phenomena explained seems unavoidable whatever principle one chooses. The pre-Socratics did not banish the phenomena they explained into the

* In this estimate of the ϕυσικ-νόμοντιθεσις, Burnet is no doubt influenced by his conception of the motives and interest of the enquiries of the pre-Socratics, which he believes were 'Concerning the Primary Substance' - for "the search for the primary substance really was the thing that interested the Ionian philosophers". Barker - Greek Political Theory - Plato and his Predecessors p.65 - adopting this view of ϕυσικ also accepts the Burnetian view of the root cause of the ϕυσικ-νόμος antithesis, and interpretes its significance in Greek political theory accordingly. But as far as 'materia' of which Burnet speaks is concerned, some of these philosophers like Anaximander did not select any particular 'materia', in which case it becomes difficult to speak of seeking ϕυσικ 'in pari materia' and banishing phenomena to the realm of the unreal. Even those who chose materials like water, air etc. did not conceive them exactly as we find them in ordinary experience; in a sense these materials were logical postulates like Aristotle's 'simple bodies'. The Eleatics cannot of course be used by Burnet; they indeed banished phenomena into the realm of the unreal but it was exactly because they were not interested in explaining phenomena, Parmenides 'Being', as it happens, being primarily designed to exclude the sense-world; it is impossible to speak of such a deductive system as attempting to explain phenomena through a principle taken 'in pari materia'. 
realm of the unreal in any greater degree than did Plato and Aristotle both of whom Burnet would agree, did not seek the of phenomena 'in pari materia' with the phenomena they sought to explain.

The second step of the second half of the analogy, however, contains what seems extremely paradoxical in view of the people Burnet has in mind here. For, it is tantamount to saying that the sophists, or those of them who showed interest in ethical theory and practice, sought the 'φύσις' of νόμοι and that because they sought this φύσις in νόμος they banished νόμοι into the realm of the unreal. But the whole basis of the sophistic argument was that they did not seek to justify or explain νόμοι nor was there really a necessity for them to do this. For they were in the first place enormously helped by the peculiarity of the Greek language which has the same word for (i) law, customary usage and (ii) the popular or common belief, 'popular' often having the sense of 'erroneous'. It is true that with the pre-Socratic philosophers the antithesis between φύσις and νόμος was more implicit than explicit; and that Heraclitus even uses νόμος for the underlying principle of order in Nature, thus making no distinction between φύσις and νόμος; for the true νόμος is that which conforms to the common law and φύσις and φύσις and νόμος have unity in the λόγος which is the source of all order. But Heraclitus also uses φύσις for the real nature of a thing in contradistinction to the popular but
erroneous views of ordinary men (Fr. 1, 112, 123). Xenophanes in his εἰκας νομίζεται opposes the common view to the true belief of the nature of the Deity. Empedocles thinks it is unfortunate when one has to use a word in the popular sense, i.e. νόμως. It is in Democritus, however, that we find a more clearly defined distinction between things that exist τὸ ὄντα or ἔτεινα or φύσει and things that exist νόμως.

But, however, implicit the antithesis might have been in the pre-Socratic inquirers, the very fact that they sometimes wished to distinguish their own, i.e. the more scientific, view of the nature of things from the more common or popular view facilitated the evolution of the antithesis; and the correspondence of 'νόμως' expressing the 'popular' and the 'erroneous' with 'νόμως' as law, almost did all the work for some of the sophists. Nor would the significance of this fact have been undermined even if the pre-Socratics had chosen as φύσις something more explicitly immaterial.

The phenomenon to which Burnet draws attention - the social changes of the fifth century which often led into changes in laws and constitutions, the wider contacts with other peoples and their laws, which revealed the mutability and arbitrariness

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*1 Empedocles, Fr. 9. (Diels)

wvou - was only an additional help. For, laws (νόμοι) because they are 'νόμοι' have had their arbitrariness established and it is superfluous to seek in them any norm other than their arbitrariness. No attempt therefore was made to seek the φύσις of νόμοι either in a νόμος or in any other thing 'in pari materia'. These arbitrary positive laws become standards of conduct and thus arbitrariness is turned into a 'norm' in human affairs. As we learn from Thrasyxochus in the Republic 'right is nothing more than the enactment of might; wherever might may reside in any given state, and whatever its enactment may be: if the weak make laws in their own interest or in accordance with their conceptions of their interest, these laws and the might they establish are just and right as soon as they cannot be enforced'.

It is, however, imaginable that if the Greek name for 'laws' had been a different one from 'νόμοι' say 'δικαιο' it would have been possible and perhaps necessary for the sophists being here considered to seek the φύσις of 'laws', even in spite of the variety in their manifestations among various peoples.

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*1 The element of positive enactment in νόμοι has been hinted at by the activities of legislators like Zaleucus of Locri, Charondas of Catana and Lycurgus of Sparta, and more clearly revealed by people like Draco and Solon. Colonizing activities also necessitated enacting laws and formulating a constitution 'ab initio' for communities which are sometimes formed of various peoples with various traditional legal and constitutional backgrounds - a procedure that inevitably showed that νόμοι were nothing but positive enactments.

To say this is, of course, to explain the implication of the φύσις-νόμος antithesis largely on linguistic grounds rather than on philosophical grounds as Burnet and, as we shall soon see, Plato explain it. The linguistic explanation, however, applies to only an aspect of the φύσις-νόμος antithesis and its significance in sophistic theory - it applies to only those who because of the very connotation of φύσις and νόμος straightaway decline to seek the validity of νόμοι because they are by their very name arbitrary. Burnet's explanation, however, has the advantage of applying to the whole ramification of the antithesis in sophistic ethical theory. It would, therefore, be necessary to give an explanation of those aspects which the linguistic explanation does not touch.

It is interesting to note Heinimann's result in his inquiry into the conception in sophistic literature. Heinimann finds that the sophistic conception of φύσις was influenced by the inquiries of the Ionian philosophers. For, the sophists used the word φύσις to denote the true essence of things, liberated from all accretions, especially those that are added by man and due to divergent cultural

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developments. But the source of the influence is to be sought not in what the Ionian philosophers specifically considered to be the essence of things, as Burnet implies, but in the fact that \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) was the ultimate principle, the principle of invariability and order, which determines the objectively valid. Thus a man of the sophistic age may believe that the principles of conduct observed in "primaeval society" are the objectively right, and that all such modes of behaviour, customs and moral ideas as are added later are departures from the norm of 'nature' but the source of this need not be the fact that the Ionian philosophers sought the \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) of things in a 'primitive matter'. Indeed since the advocate of any imagined ideal thinks that his ideal is based on the fundamental in individual and social life, it is easy for the terms 'by nature' and 'natural' to be applied to various ideals.

There is, however, no doubt that an interesting phenomenon accompanied the application by the Greeks of the criterion of \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) to ethical and political problems. On the precedent of the inquiries of the physical philosophers, political theory should have taken the form of finding that \( \varphi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) which should be the criterion of human conduct and the canon by
which to judge the value of institutions - a standard of judgment which would be more reliable than traditional opinions and popular sanctions; for, in a sense the problem of the impermanence and variability of \( \nu \delta \mu \omicron \omicron \) for ethical and political theory is similar to that of the variability of phenomena for physical philosophy. In a sense, all those who concerned themselves with ethical and political theory rejected the dogmatism of the physical philosophers; they wanted 'man' to be at the centre of the inquiry - a step by no means harmless to, and probably consonant with, the new enquiry as emphasis has now shifted to the study of man; and in any case with most of these thinkers the rejection of the physical approach was not a denial of the need of a standard or \( \psi \omicron \omicron \gamma \omicron \) by which human conduct should be judged. But beyond this point, disagreement seems to enter into the ranks of the new theorists.

Socrates finds the new standard (\( \psi \omicron \omicron \gamma \omicron \)) for morals in the soul of man; for him, therefore, the standard of human conduct and of happiness is the soul of man, in reference to which all \( \nu \delta \mu \omicron \omicron \) would be truly regulated. To men like Protagoras and probably Gorgias, however, it would seem that Socrates' certainty (in spite of his notorious uncertainty) about the criterion of the soul implied the substitution of
one dogma for another. Protagoras and men like him could say that they had not rejected one dogma only to substitute another; and the κατωτέρ στάντορν ζυγοδοκος doctrine was very probably formulated both against the 'cosmic' dogma of the physical scientists and against the new 'microcosmic' dogma implied in Socrates' teleology. Whether Protagoras' doctrine represented the ideology of the sophists in general is a moot point; it is, however, fairly certain that the doctrine did not necessarily imply the rejection of a standard or norm of conduct. Protagoras would, however, disagree with Socrates' assertion of the absoluteness of this norm; against Plato he would argue that the norms of human conduct and the prime realities and value do not exist outside phenomena; against both he would assert that as far as human conduct is concerned νόμοι are in a sense the criteria of rightness, though this does not imply a denial of the validity of questions as to which νόμοι are better; nevertheless, man formulates his norm through experience. By others φύσις is recognised as the norm of human conduct; but the emphasis is on the sense of the 'permanent', and 'inevitable' or the 'biologically natural' implied in φύσις. The doctrine of Callicles (Gorgias 483c) and the argument of the Athenian envoys (Thucyd. V 86 - 111)
is based on this principle — "a compulsion of nature (φύσις ἀναγκαία) we learn "drives both gods and men to seek to rule wherever they can". Thus φύσις becomes ἀναγκή in human affairs.

With this sense of φύσις it is not surprising to find some Callicles critically looking at men in a society which regards the exercise of political power as the essential expression of ἀρετή but which has traditionally limited the exercise of this power by considerations of the social good and personal well-being, i.e. by forms of restraint called justice, temperance etc., and observing that the really fundamental thing in human nature is the impulse to exercise unlimited power and satisfy all desires, that a man like Sardanapalus is the true man of ἀρετή that those social restraints are mere trappings, accretions, bonds designed to restrict the man who might be capable of exercising natural ἀρετή, or to find some Thucydides examining the development of states and the nature of inter-state relations and observing the truth that it is self-aggrandisement, the naked love of power, which makes states tick, though this motive might be shrouded in a variety of appearances, and party ideologies. Similarly, some Antiphon might draw a distinction between the necessary (τὰ ἀναγκαία) and the superficial (τὰ ἄποθετα) and build a social theory on the conception that man's nature
is to follow the dictates of the necessary and the dictates of nature — breathing, eating, sleeping, and especially the impulse to self-preservation and self-interest. A man for instance could without harm disregard the superficial and the dictates of the laws τὰ τῶν νόμων provided he is not caught by the custodians of the laws; but in regard to the dictates of nature one inevitably comes to harm ὅπερ άληθείαν βλάπτεται whether one is noticed by other men or not while breaking those laws. Thus the laws of the city could some times command things that are contrary to nature; but as far as the things of nature are concerned, there is no distinction between Greek and barbarian. Hippias expresses similar sentiments, but though he also based his sentiments on a conception of φύσις φύσις with him does not easily bear the sense of 'the necessary and inevitable', which it bears in Antiphon but rather the sense of the 'fundamental' with an implication of the 'least common denominator'. For though he does not make the philosophical grounds of the sentiment explicit, he regards the universal elements of human nature as alone the fundamental, and he puts down social institutions as mere trappings, stripped of which we find ourselves all 'kinsmen'; for "Law is a tyrant of mankind and often compels
us to do many things that are contrary to nature" (Plato's Protagoras, 337 c). Callicles, Antiphon, and Hippias, therefore, seem to have something in common, i.e. the great emphasis they put on the biological nature of man in their interpretation of φύσις. The stronger animal does what he likes with the weaker, and indeed every man wants to dominate, observes Callicles; we all eat and breathe, says Antiphon; in 'biological' nature we are all kinsmen, friends and fellow-citizens echoes Hippias.

Some Critias, however, looking beneath the surface of religious practices and those religious hopes and scruples which traditionally had acted as incentives to good conduct might observe how some clever politician introduced a theory of superhuman beings and encouraged a belief in them in order, mainly in his own interest, to promote order and discipline - (Critias fr.1 (Sisyphus) Nauck). And this he would consider the 'fundamental' aspect of religion. Euripides also often uses the concept of φύσις to probe beneath the surface and look past externals to the inner man; by the criterion of φύσις he sometimes finds it justifiable to put noble sentiments into the mouths of slaves; to inform us that a noble slave is no whit inferior to a freeman (Eur. Ion 854), that birth
is a matter of indifference, for a peasant with generous
feelings is nature's gentleman (Eur. Orestes. 920, and Fr. inc.
345); a bastard need not be ostracized from society (Fr. 378)
for the test of worth is nobleness of character; external
circumstances are nothing compared with this; they are
impermanent and transitory (Hercules Furens 511):

In most of these instances, φύσις is used in the sense
of the permanent and essential aspect of an object or an
institution, especially when stripped of its trappings and
secondary qualities. The men mentioned above therefore use
φύσις mainly to call in question long-established institutions
and sometimes to dissipate prejudice and superstition.
But though through this usage, they throw many interesting
and pregnant hints on the nature of man and society, their
observations lack a common point of reference, without which
it would be easy to see a variety of things as 'fundamental',
depending on what angle one looks from. This common point
of reference is human εύδαιμονία. A conception of 'nature'
without this point of reference would be very inadequate for
a true conception of the 'nature' of man. As Socrates attempts
to prove in the argument against Hippias, those laws are
natural which contribute to human happiness, whether they
are universal or not; the custom of respecting one's parents is
good for man and the society he lives in - that is the
criterion of its 'naturalness' not its universality (Xen.
Mem. iv. 4. 44ff.) In the same spirit with Socrates here,
the Anonymus Iamblichus has remarked that law and justice have
their basis in φύσις i.e. in human happiness. The argument
is, of course, similar to that with which Plato refutes
Callicles' doctrine in the Gorgias, and it is imaginable
that Socrates would have opposed to the necessity of the
impulse to self-aggrandisement on which the Athenian envoys
laid so much emphasis the goodness of the state. Implied in
this, of course, would be the opposition between τέλος and
ἀναγκή.

It is, however, a different thing to deduce from this
that most of the Sophists based their ethical theories, if
we can call these rather incoherent views 'theories', on the
pre-Socratic conception of φύσις and therefore conclude or
suggest as Plato does, that the sophistic conception of φύσις
is the counterpart in morals of the pre-Socratic conception of
φύσις in physical theory. That the activities of the pre-
Socratics influenced the connotation of the term φύσις there
can hardly be any doubt, and indeed we have earlier on given
some attention to proving this. All that is being suggested
here is that the sophists need not enter into the philosophical
significance of the term φύσις among the pre-Socratics in
order to use the criterion of \( \textit{φύσις} \) as they did. Indeed, in spite of a common basis traceable in those uses, the variety of ways in which we saw \( \textit{φύσις} \) used ranging from Callicles to Critias and from Euripides to Hippias makes it impossible to explain the use of \( \textit{φύσις} \) in the criticism of social institutions on the simple ground that it has taken the connotation of \( \textit{δύναμις} \) from the pre-Socratic use of \( \textit{φύσις} \) as \( \textit{δύναμις} \) in their explanation of the universe.

Also, given the need for the criterion of \( \textit{φύσις} \) in human conduct - which seems to be the main debt of the sophistic age to the physical philosophers - there is no reason why those who would argue against the sophistic conception of the human \( \textit{φύσις} \) should not do so purely on the grounds of what institutions and laws and which code of conduct in fact promotes human happiness - it being agreed by all that happiness is the condition of well-being of real human nature; the 'natural' man then would be the human being whose intelligence, spirit and appetites are functioning in harmony and concord, and those institutions and laws would be natural which promote this supremacy of intelligence, and this co-operation of spirit and appetite under the guidance of intelligence, and those laws and institutions and those codes of behaviour which hinder the attainment of this condition would be unnatural (\( \pi\alpha\rho\alpha\ \phiυ\sigmaι\nu\)) no matter what some Callicles might argue and what some
Athenian envoys might say about that ἄναγκαια φύσις which drives both gods and men to seek the exercise of masterful pressure. We, of course, know that Plato based most of the arguments in the Gorgias and the Republic on precisely these grounds. These arguments anybody who accepts human happiness as the standard by which to judge institutions would accept human happiness is thus a telos; but in this rather general sense the Socratic teleology is only a more absolute and definite one than say Protagoras'.

Plato, however, believed that not only was a criterion of φύσις necessary for a true theory of human conduct and social institutions, but, further, that this criterion must be grounded on the ultimate basis of metaphysics. He might well have felt that if that criterion stood by itself unsupported by any metaphysical foundation, it would be easy to approximate any criterion to Protagoras' dictum πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος; and for Protagoras to pervert e.g. Plato's dictum that δικαιοσύνη is a state of the soul to his own less definite criterion. To prevent this, the dictum that δικαιοσύνη is a state of the soul is ultimately justified by the Forms (Rep. 501 B); goodness becomes an eternal Form; in a similar vein the argument against Callicles is strongly supported by reasons drawn from the harmony of the cosmos; and in the Phaedo 96a-100b: Sophist 265c-266e: Philebus 28-30, Timaeus 46c-e, but especially Laws 889b - 890a, and 892a-c, the
ultimate justification for human codes of conduct is the cosmic 'Soul' or 'mind' which plans everything for the best. Thus Protagoras' pragmatic 'telos' becomes very inadequate and seems too little teleological; the criterion of human \( \phi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) is not enough, a concept of the human \( \phi\sigma\iota\varsigma \) must involve a definite envisagement of the universe; an eternal and super-sensible 'telos' must be substituted for a worldly \( \tau\epsilon\ell\omicron\varsigma \); only with such a 'telos' can a man really make the soul's goodness the ultimate criterion of his conduct. For this seems to be the lesson implied in Socrates' statement Gorgias (469b) that it is always worse to do harm than to suffer it; the criterion of judgement here is by no means the pragmatic and worldly one, but the ultimate one of the soul's goodness; for even if I could calculate the amount of injury I would avoid and that which I would inflict by injuring another it would still be wrong for me to injure another, however great may be the difference in the injury I avoid and that which I inflict. In this sense, goodness is an eternal form, the prime realities and value exist outside phenomena and life's wisdom is an other-worldly wisdom.

In these circumstances, it is perhaps natural that Plato should wish to make explicit the contrast between his own envisagement of the universe and that of those men who, perhaps worse than men like Protagoras and the Anonymus Iamblichii, regard
customs and social institutions as secondary and of little
importance. Plato's exposition of that contrast in the Laws
is well-known; it is a contrast between the view which regards
'mind' as primary and that which regards 'matter' as primary.
"Our modern young men of enlightenment" i.e. the sophists,
argues Plato, regard the products and activities of mind -
customs, social institutions, standards of moral approval
and disapproval as secondary because the earlier cosmogonists
had made a distinction between 'matter' and 'Mind' and had
regarded 'matter' as ultimate - "Fire and water, earth and air
- so they say - all owe their being to nature and chance, none
of them to art; they in turn, are the agents, and the
absolutely soulless agents, in the production of the bodies of
the next rank, the earth, sun, moon and stars. They drifted
casually, each in virtue of their several tendencies; as they
came together in certain fitting and convenient dispositions -
hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard and so on in all
the inevitable casual combinations which arise from blending
of contraries - thus and on this wise, they gave birth to the
whole heavens and all their contents, and in due course to all
animals and plants, when once all the seasons of the year had
been produced from those same courses; not so they say, by
the agency of mind, or any god or art, but as I tell you by
Plato's intention is to show that soul comes first - "that it is not fire, not air but soul whose origin is earliest" and thus prove that soul is eminently natural. This Plato proves by the nature of physical motion; the ultimate source of motion (ἁρχὴ κινήσεως) can alone be the self-moved mover; neither air nor water, neither earth nor fire can move without the autonomous activity of the self-moving mover, which causes motion by acting on these. The argument is similar to that familiar to us in the Phaedrus. The necessity of the self-mover proved, all the products of mind - codes of morals, religious institutions, and all the criteria of moral approval and disapproval - must be natural; nature is neither soulless and irrational, nor blind and purposeless - "and so judgement, wisdom, art and law, must be prior to hard and soft, heavy and light". This concept of nature which Plato believes, to be the true one would destroy, he also believes the foundation of the sophistic depreciation of the criteria of values and life.

It must be very attractive for Plato who sees the most remarkable thing in pre-Socratic philosophy as the absence of any teleological explanation to point out the similarity between pre-Socratic thought and the doctrines of the more superficial sophists. But though he here clearly sets forth a view of life and a conceptual schema for a theory of man and society diametrically opposed to his own, there is no
justification at all for believing that Plato's reasoning here is based on any historical evidence. Of the views of those among the sophists to whom the doctrine here expounded could possibly apply we have already spoken; and the view has been expressed that given the sense of the 'fundamental' and 'permanent' already acquired by φύσις among the pre-Socratics, a sense that would be acquired however 'inmaterial' had been their 'explanatory principle' or φύσις it was easy for the superficial critic to use φύσις via theory of conduct exactly as some of the sophists did without seizing on the inner significance of the so called materialistic physics of the Ionians*; it would be natural for a deep thinker like Plato, however, to seek a more fundamental reason for the error in thought. For our purpose, however, the exposition in the 'Laws' has another significance; for, apart from crystallising the difference in Plato's criterion of conduct and life and that of the 'materialists' it points also to the nature of the difference which, we hinted earlier, exists between the Platonic criterion and, say, the Protagorean

* Though it must be remarked here that Burnet's exposition of the φύσις-νόμος antithesis bears some support in the argument in the Laws, and indeed Burnet uses the argument in support of his view that φύσις among the pre-Socratics meant 'primary substance'. The support is however weak since Plato is here not primarily concerned with what φύσις meant among the pre-Socratics; and of the historicity of Plato's deduction there is no evidence.
criterion, not in the sense that the concept of ἀρχή which Plato here attributes to the sophists touches Protagoras (in spite of his notorious agnosticism it would be difficult to deduce from Protagoras' ethical and political theory a materialistic physics of the kind here spoken of) but in the sense that, given and accepting a 'telos' in ethical theory, this 'telos' could be sought within different conceptual frameworks. And as our interest in this preliminary is to sketch the main conceptual frameworks within which, or the philosophic principles on the basis of which, man and society was studied before Aristotle, it would be necessary to be a little more explicit on this difference. For, leaving aside the pre-Socratic synoptic views of the cosmos and the microcosmos, the rather incoherent views of those behind whose way of thinking Plato thinks he sees the materialistic physics of the Ionians, and the speculative anthropology of men like Democritus, Anonymus Iamblichi, and Antiphon the Sophist, there are really two main conceptual frameworks within which man and society was studied before Aristotle - (a) the Protagorean and (b) the Socratic-Platonic framework.
Protagoras

If it is true to say that Plato's purpose in the 'Gorgias' is to reveal the dangers to morals of a rhetoric not based on philosophy, even when its teachers and exponents believe that men "ought to use rhetoric fairly as they would use their athletic powers" (Gorgias, 457 B), it is also true to say that his purpose in the 'Protagoras' is to reveal the limitations of the principle on which the orthodox view of society and morals is based, even when the advocates of that principle make excellent speeches on behalf of the sense of social obligation, and the agencies by which it is inculcated. In the 'Gorgias' we see the progressive deterioration of the products of an 'unphilosophic' rhetoric from a Polus to a Callicles; in the 'Protagoras' we see the weakness of the traditional foundation of moral values and of the restraints by which those values are sustained in the social consciousness. For our purpose, however, the 'Protagoras' contains something of additional significance. For Plato seems to sum up, through the mouth of Protagoras, the moral values of that era which we have called the 'era of poetry', and to make Protagoras not only the eminent living representative of the poets who were the first spokesmen* and authority of that 'era' in morals and conduct but also the able exponent of the significance of the several past poetic presentations of the progress by which

* Protagoras 326a, 339a; Cf. Lysis 213e.
men came to live in civil society*. For though Plato indeed does, in dialogues later than the Protagoras, make the poetic or traditional conception of morals the starting point of his analysis (for instance Simonides' view of virtue in the 'Republic' (331e) and Tyrtaeus view on courage in the 'Laws' (629a 30) we seem to have in the Protagoras a full-scale confrontation between the values of the 'era of poetry' and those of the 'era of analysis' with special reference to the principles underlying them.

Of the poetic presentation and its significance we can say but little here. Its salient features however, are these:

(a) The lower animals have their weapons and properties for survival automatic from nature (321ff). They are equipped with the necessary bodily structure, instincts, habits which enable them to respond accurately even if blindly to their immediate environment. Plato would probably see some significance in the fact that the myth attributes the lower animals' equipment in the struggle for survival to Epimetheus. (Those who see the myth as essentially Plato's would take this to be a denial of purpose or design - it probably however did not have this implication for Protagoras).

* Professor E.A. Havelock - The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics chapters I - V has, I think, performed a valuable service in expounding the implications for ethical and political theory of most of these myths. I however find his interpretation of the Protagoras' myth rather unconvincing.
(b) Man differs from the lower animals in that he has to rely on his reason. (This seems to be the point of the forgetfulness of Epimetheus who left men 'unclad' and 'unarmed', and the statement that man relied on reason from the first - the dilemma of Prometheus may well represent man 'under the pressure of necessity'.) Reason therefore is what distinguishes man from the other animals (322a) and using this Reason he makes technical progress.

(c) Technical progress however is not enough; for with all the technical ability in the world, man would not survive the threats of wild beasts; for men would remain, with 'techne' alone to work with, 'homo homini lupus'. Something extra was needed.

(d) Under further pressure of necessity, therefore, man developed the sense of justice and social obligation, i.e. the political wisdom which is a 'sine qua non' of communal living - anybody who is incapable of acquiring it is not fit to live in society, but in actual fact every human being is capable of acquiring it; we all have an innate moral sense. We therefore all partake of the sense of Justice and, Modesty in some degree; it is this fact which justifies punishing social offenders; and this punishment implies that virtue can be taught. (The succession of gifts from the gods in the myth would mean no more than the successive improvements which man made under the pressure of necessity.
- nor is there necessarily any significance in the fact that the first gift was stolen from the gods).

(e) This sense of social obligation, justice and modesty is what we call virtue, and it continues to be inculcated in every civilized society by several agencies - teachers, poets, parents, customs, laws etc.

(f) The different degrees of virtue, as of excellence in any other art of accomplishment, are the result of natural gifts; but the worst specimens of civilized men are better than savages - still another proof that virtue can be taught. And finally, while all men are more or less able to teach virtue, teachers like Protagoras, are better able to do so than the generality of mankind.

As for the more immediate concern of the dialogue, the inquiry into the nature of virtue, an inquiry that brings us to principles, Professor Kerferd* has done a valuable service in clarifying Protagoras' position, in throwing light on the supposed inconsistencies in which Protagoras' answer is believed to abound, and in showing that Protagoras could consistently maintain both the thesis that virtue is teachable and the thesis that the principle of Athenian democracy is justifiable. I here only draw attention to the main principles of that explanation.

(1) That all men share in Aidos and Dike, though they do not do so by nature; strictly, this boils down to saying that though the capacity for virtue is natural, virtue is not natural; men do not possess it in the manner that sheep possess wool or lions claws.

(2) that though all men share in Aidos and Dike, they do not share equally in Aidos and Dike.

(3) that throughout Protagoras' argument, Aidos and Dike and Sophrosyne are totally identical with political virtue - a thesis which Plato himself would find difficult to contest since it is a cardinal point of the Socratic teaching that it is by virtue of qualities like Sophrosyne, Aidos etc. that a man becomes a good leader - (it is however a different question whether these are the qualities which those pupils who throng to Protagoras wish to acquire).

All this no doubt clarifies Protagoras' position, but it does not make the Platonic Socrates' point unnecessary - and that is that Protagoras must prove that the conduct thus inculcated is truly virtuous and secures ἕθισμον - the truly satisfactory condition of life, that, in other words, Protagoras' moral values must be referred to an ultimate criterion. This of course would require a definition of ἁρετή, and this Protagoras is unable to do; for stripped of its almost Aristophanic farce, this is what the second half of the dialogue proves. To give morality the solid foundation it needs, what is required, Plato
seems to be saying, is a working back to first principles, clarifying the basis of moral and social obligation and relating this to the nature of happiness; and the true avenue to knowledge or truth in morals is by no means through the poets, nor through eloquent harangues or minute verbal criticisms.

The absence of any definitive concept of ἀρετή, or ἐθῆσιμονία which Plato criticizes in Protagoras' ethical and political theory * is however now frequently used as the yardstick by which to judge and set apart in opposite camps those who among the Greek political thinkers are the liberals and those

* Plato gives us no explicit hints in the 'Protagoras' as to the relation of Protagoras' political philosophy to the famous doctrine of relativism attributed to him in the Theaetetus, except in so far as a hint could be extracted from the passage Prot. 334a-c. It might be as Vlastos suggests (Plato's Protagoras - Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1956. p.XVI) that the purpose of the 'Protagoras' as Plato conceived it demands that "ontological or epistemological doctrines should either be excluded or confirmed safely into the background"; or Plato might have believed that Protagoras did not work out the connection between his epistemological doctrine and his political philosophy, especially in view of the fact that we have little or no evidence for the unity of the aphorisms of the sophists. Professor Kerferd, however, tried, successfully I think, to show (Plato's Account of the Relativism of Protagoras - Durham University Journal New Series Vol. XI. 1949-50 pp. 20-26) that the "doctrine attributed to Protagoras in the 'Theaetetus" is "in perfect accord with what Plato ascribes to Protagoras in the 'Protagoras'".
who are the anti-democrats and totalitarians, or to distinguish those who are friends of the 'open society' from those who are its 'enemies'. It would seem as if any definitive concept of because it is definitive thereby precludes 'liberalism' and a non-definitive one is liberal by virtue of being non-definitive. It is not even asked whether the conceptual system of a definitive concept of could contain a 'liberal' political theory, even if in order that this might be so, some changes might be necessary in the system as a result of facts not already taken into consideration.

This attitude is at the basis of Professor Karl Popper's 'The Open Society and its Enemies', which sees the essential difference between Protagoras' and Plato's approach to political philosophy (the roots of Hegelian historicism are found in Aristotle's), in the insistence of the former on the fact that men create norms, that it is man who is the measure of all things' and in the belief of the latter in an objective norm. The difference between 'Platonism' and Protagoreanism is therefore seen as follows:

'(Platonism): There is inherent 'natural' order of justice in the world i.e. the original or first order in which nature was created. Thus the past is good and any development leading to new norms is bad.

(Protagoreanism): Man is the moral being in this world. Nature is neither moral nor immoral. Thus it is possible
for man to improve things..."*1 Plato therefore, because he believes that there is a 'natural' order of justice in the world' becomes the protagonist of 'absolutism' and 'an enemy' of the 'open society'; and Protagoras because he believes that 'norms are man-made' becomes the protagonist of 'critical conventionalism' and the friend of the 'open society'.

The sense in which Popper takes 'natural' here, however, shows that he misses Plato's point. Professor Popper distinguishes two kinds of 'natural' laws (a) Natural laws which deal with facts and are statements describing the regularities of physical phenomena e.g. the law of gravity and (b) 'normative laws or standards' which act as criteria of value for various codes of conduct and ways of behaviour. Professor Popper believes only laws of type (a) justify being called 'natural'; he would deny the title to laws of type (b), but in a sense that is not very clear he converts natural laws of type (b) to 'natural rights or standards, at the same time stressing that there is something 'arbitrary' about them'. He believes that Plato's mistake lies in confusing the two kinds of 'natural laws'. Thus on the basis of this distinction, Popper could use Socrates disclaimer in the Apology (19c-d) that he knows nothing about physical speculations as proof that Socrates believed in no 'natural' criterion of morals i.e. in no objective moral truth and could be set in opposition to Plato! (See Popper on cit. Note 45 and 56 to chp. 10).

*1 K.R. Popper - The Open Society and its Enemies Vol. 1, Chapter 5, Note 7, p. 205
Plato, it is true, sometimes argues as if the norms of conduct are derived from the regularities of physical phenomena \(^*1\) but there is scarcely any doubt that the ultimate basis of his conception of a 'natural' criterion of conduct is the belief that, from the moral point of view, there are certain principles which are self-justifying to any rational being with a sense of value and by reference to which the rightness of conventional moral views of a particular society can only be judged. This is the case for the need of an ultimate criterion, a criterion which can be called 'natural'.

And whatever 'critical conventionalism' may mean Professor Popper, notwithstanding the remark that conventional norms are not gratuitously arbitrary, does not refute Plato's case. Writes Professor Popper "By saying that some system of laws can be improved, that some laws may be better than others, I rather imply that we can compare the existing normative laws (or social institutions) with some standard norms which we have decided are worthy to be realised. But even these standards are of our own making in the sense that our decision in favour of them is our own decision, that we alone carry the responsibility for adopting them. The standards are not found in nature. Nature consists of facts and of regularities, and is in itself neither moral nor immoral." \(^*2\). Popper, it seems to me, here

makes a distinction without the recognition of which, as Plato argues, no theory of morals can do justice to the whole field of our moral experience i.e. the distinction between conventional moral rules and practices connected with established institutions of a particular society and moral standards which are more than conventions. Popper's qualifying statement 'these standards are of our making' only obscures the point. Conventional practices may be moral, and there is no doubt that they take shape through the decisions of generations belonging to a particular society. But they are moral not because they are 'of our own making' but because, as Popper seems to admit, they are in accordance with certain standard norms; and these standard norms are standards for the assessment of conventional moral practices not because they are 'of our making'. On the contrary, we decide in favour of them as ultimate courts of appeal in our moral judgements by recognising that they represent facts which are in some sense natural i.e. not conventional or arbitrary. Popper insists that these norms are not found in 'nature'; this is true enough if by 'nature' is meant the physical universe, but they are found in nature if the term includes 'the sense of values' of beings who are capable of reasoning and reflection.

Popper's other criticism of Plato, i.e. Plato's preference for an unchanging structure of society, cannot be touched here
nor is it very relevant to our theme. And in any case Professor Levinson*1 has proved a very able defender of Plato on this score. But I detect a basic error in Professor Popper's reasoning; for he seems to argue that a preference for an unchanging structure of society follows logically from the advocacy of 'natural' or objective norms of conduct. Since Plato advocates 'absolute' norms, he must also advocate an unchanging structure of society. Indeed, according to Popper, the raison d'etre of the doctrine of the unchanging, eternal forms is the political ideal of an unchanging, 'closed', 'tribal' society. Thus the essential difference between Heraclitus and Plato is the latter's belief "in the possibility of arresting all political change", and "accordingly this becomes the aim he strives for"......For, "political theory must have seemed to Plato in his Heraclitean period to be just as elusive, fluctuating, and unfathomable as political practice"x2. Taking a hint from Socrates, therefore, Plato developed the theory of Forms, and made the Form "the accountable representative of the sensible things" which "could be consulted in important questions concerning the world of flux". Among the things which the theory enabled Plato to do was to put forward a theory of an unchanging society, "For only the most divine things remain unchanged" says Plato. "A sensible thing if it is a good copy, may change only

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*2 K.R. Popper op. cit. p. 16 passim.
very little at first. But every change however small, must make it different from what it has been before, and must thus make it less perfect by reducing its resemblance to its Form".\(^1\)

If we were to define Plato's moral and political ideal, however, it would be as "the organisation of life in such a way that opportunities for the happiness of an individual in conformity with the happiness of all others are fully provided for", and it requires no argument to see that different kinds of institutional practices may be compatible with this ideal depending on the circumstances and the people concerned. The same practice may, however, assume different values under two different circumstances. Thus, if by 'arbitrary' we mean opposed to the 'natural' we may have two different codes or institutional practices neither of which is arbitrary, and the same code may be arbitrary in some situations and not in others. If on the other hand by 'arbitrary' all we mean is 'not fixed' or 'varying' then hence there is a sense in which Plato's 'natural' norms make allowance for some 'arbitrariness'; at least the conceptual system of a 'natural' criterion of conduct does not preclude 'arbitrariness' in this sense. The only important thing, however, is that this 'arbitrariness' is limited to within a framework. The 'natural' norms are second-order prescriptions which can properly define the limits within

\(^1\) op. cit. p. 30 passion.
which conventional practices i.e. first order activities may be conducted. The 'arbitrariness' of moral conduct, therefore is a feature of what can be called 'the morality of custom and convention' which includes institutional practices but not of general moral standards which stand for self-justifying moral values. Plato criticizes Protagoras for not going further than the former, i.e. the conventional, but it does not follow that because Plato lays all the emphasis on the latter, he precludes the former. *1

Professor E.A. Havelock, *2 perhaps less fundamentally seems to make the same assumption as Professor Popper, and he certainly adopts a similar attitude; for marking a school of

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*1 This is not to deny that there is a strong conservative tendency in Plato. Plato's conservatism shows itself in many passages in the Republic and the Laws (e.g. Rep. 380 E ff; Laws 797 C ff, 903 B ff etc.) some of which Popper cites; but all these combined cannot, it seems to me, prove the thesis that the ultimate basis of Plato's political ideals is "change is evil, rest divine" (Popper pp. 37 ff), and that the search for the objective truths of morals is identical with the desire to found an arrested, unchanging tribal society.

*2 E.A. Havelock - The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics. p. 123.
political thought which he calls 'liberal', "in contradistinction to the formal, the teleological, and the authoritarian theories of Plato, and Aristotle" he says*1 "For the liberals man is to be taken as you find him and therefore his present political institutions are to be taken as given also... Democritus and Protagoras and Gorgias, who constitute the first generation of political theorists, accordingly concentrate empirically and descriptively on this kind of political mechanism. But their empiricism under the influence of anthropology has historical depth. So they expect to understand the system by relating it to man's whole previous historical development. Since, moreover, in the eyes of descriptive science, it is the generic man not the hero, and the piece-meal historical process rather than the miraculous leadership, which is the secret of history, the liberals were drawn to explore the social and political processes whereby this generic man formed society and institutions and controlled them by decisions, the effective criterion of which was that they must be common decisions embodying a common interest of the human group". On the other hand "liberalism lay outside the thought-world common to Plato and Aristotle. These two philosophical geniuses had their own practical pre-occupations:

*1 op.cit. p.123
how to furnish that authoritarian support in morals and epistemology necessary to found and to enforce a Greek system of higher education". Put in this way, it sounds as if "those practical pre-occupations" were motivated by reasons other than those of eliciting the principles of society and human happiness. It is true that in giving their principles practical applications, Plato and Aristotle naturally revealed the limitations of the materials with which they worked - the materials offered by the circumstances of Greek society, and they sometimes put forward ideas that can have only very limited application and even some that are obviously misleading or wrong. But it seems to me mistaken to regard these defects as resulting from faulty principles, and to place Plato's and Aristotle's principles in opposition to those whose main merit is that they have none of those defects which are often the concomitants of the application of principles to particular circumstances, and these defects those principles lack merely because they are not practically applied to particular circumstances. It would be interesting to see, for instance, what Protagoras' 'liberalism' advocates in respect of slavery in Greek society.

It was Protagoras' thesis that men 'μόνον άλληλοις \\
διά οίκη ἐχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην' (esp. Prot. 322b, and generally 319a-325b). But he would probably have little reservation in accepting Plato's and Aristotle's thesis that
a true polis is a κοινωνία πληθους δύναμις αυτόκρατος προς εὐδαιμονίαν (Plato - Rep. 368e ff.; Laws 681a ff.; 715b ff and Aristotle Politics I. 1252b 28ff, & III. 1276b 1ff)

Or would Protagoras think αυτόκρατος προς εὐδαιμονίαν irrelevant and misleading': Scholars like Popper and Havelock, as we have noted, believe that he would; for with him, it is believed, if a political society must be defined at all, it must be defined as a κοινωνία πληθους δύναμις, the assumption being that society remains δύναμις because social life satisfies many human desires. Thus in the other phrase - αυτόκρατος προς εὐδαιμονίαν is seen the desire to postulate what constitutes εὐδαιμονία and to devise an unchanging social structure believed capable of bringing about the attainment of this εὐδαιμονία - characteristics which are seen as the essence of Platonic as well as Aristotelian political philosophy.
That the tendency to follow the dictates of reason was a characteristic common to Socrates and some of the sophists few would deny. Like the sophists, he was reluctant to accept anything unless fully weighed and criticized. But the criterion of reason was in Socrates' hands not an unrestricted armoury, because it was limited by the conception of the good for man. We have seen how he used this criterion against the rather unrestricted armoury of Hippias (Xen. Mem. IV.4). The truth of ethical freedom and emancipation expressed in the criticism of every external authority on the basis of φύσις demands a concrete limitation; to make the proper use of φύσις, Socrates seems to argue, you must know your own 'good', and you do that by clarifying your purpose; firmly believing in the superiority of the soul over the body and, in the ultimate identity of the good and the expedient, Socrates himself seems to have made it his life-work to demonstrate that virtue, social and individual, was to the good of the doer. His ethics was however a sort of lofty 'eudaemonism', and he would probably fail to understand the more modern efforts to divorce the concept of duty and moral obligation from the notion of happiness; this would still be true even if we refuse to place too much credence in the Xenopileonic evidence as being liable to contamination by the more prudential outlook of its author (Xen. Mem. 1.14; 1:1:11; 1.4.5-19). We have both in the Gorgias and the Phaedo a conception of duty similar to that expressed by the 'categorical imperative' but even here there is no divorce between the notions of duty and happiness. 'Eudaemonism' is therefore not hedonism as commonly understood. In respect of the historical Socrates, therefore, the two plausible explanations of the hedonism of the 'Protagoras' would seem to me to be either (a) that which suggests that in the 'Protagoras' Socrates did not conceive the good which is pleasure as immediate pleasure but that pleasure which is the final outcome of a longer view dictated by έκπληκτη - the art of measuring or estimating (μετρητική), i.e. a longer view which takes account of the higher faculties of the soul, and that therefore although the doctrine may be called 'hedonistic', it is 'hedonism' with a difference. This view finds eloquent expression in W.K.C. Guthrie - Plato, Protagoras & Nemo, 1956, p.22, or (b) that of J.P. Sullivan, Phronesis 6. 1961 pp.10-28 which believes that the hedonistic doctrine of the Protagoras is 'hedonism' in the conventional sense but that the Platonic Socrates deployed it partly to reveal the limitations of the conventional and sophistic conception of happiness and partly to prove that even on this short-sighted theory, virtue would still need to be knowledge (for Sullivan's objections to the former view, see op.cit. Note 6).
If, as most scholars believe, the minor or Socratic dialogues of Plato portray the historical Socrates, then we have in them Socrates' attempt, though his doctrine of concepts "to establish against the sophists the absolute worth of moral determinations" and by using 'happiness' as the criterion to take some of the specific virtues as popularly conceived and test them against this criterion and sometimes against what is generally believed to be true (right opinion); thus several hypotheses of the nature of virtue are rejected either because they do not satisfy the criterion of happiness or because ordinary right opinion reveals their inadequacies. Whoever, therefore, might be Socrates' interlocutor whether sophist or ordinary man, the basis of the argument is the common belief that the highest good is happiness (εὐδαιμονία); Socrates further believed that the strength and ability to attain this is virtue (ἀρετή). The Socratic paradox (ἀρετή ἐπιστήμη) is an identification of this strength and ability with knowledge. (For a recent review of the true significance of the Socratic dictum - ἀρετή ἐπιστήμη see Gould - The Development of Plato's Ethics, esp. chapters I & II. Taking up the distinction between 'knowledge how' and 'knowledge that', Gould argues, drawing support from the connotation of ἐπιστήμη in the earliest literature, that the traditional interpretation has over-emphasised the role of 'knowledge that' in the famous dictum. Gould could not however (I am not sure how far he intended to) dismiss the role of 'knowledge that' even in those practical capabilities "of potters, shoemakers and the like" which, he argues, Socrates had most in mind in putting forth his dictum. It would however seem that in redressing the balance of the old interpretation, Gould over-emphasises the role of 'knowledge how' in the Socratic dictum, though by doing this it must be admitted he reveals the over-simplification of criticisms such as Grote's that "both Socrates and Plato (in many of his dialogues) commit the error of...dwelling exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct..." G. Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates London, 1865, I.399; Aristotle's criticism of Socrates is of course similar to Grote's.) But Socrates never thought that this knowledge is derived from a transcendental entity.

Plato however sees Socrates' sustained attempt to make men seek the truth which underlay their superficial views as the preliminary stages of the search for the absolute idea of the good τὸ ἅγαθον, the knowledge of which constitutes the absolute criterion of virtue and a struggle to attain which embraces the sum of the duties of man; for as Sir Alexander Grant puts it 'the Idea of Good...is to be a principle influencing human action, and necessarily forming part of any system of Politics or Morals worthy of being called so.'

* A. Grant "The Ethics of Aristotle" Vol. 1, p.204
The ἀρετὴ ἐπιστήμη dictum thus seems to be not so much a more fundamental formulation of the popular maxim "Ἰνδῆι σαυτὸν" but a dictum implicit in which is the belief that there is a transcendental 'Form of Good', the knowledge of which furnishes the ultimate basis of virtue and the absolute standard of right and wrong.

As is well-known, Plato's explicitness about what constitutes this knowledge was accompanied by a political and ethical attitude which severely subordinates all earthly interests to the pursuit of this Ideal Knowledge. In the 'Meno' where we get the first clear glimpse that the knowledge for which in the earlier dialogues we have long been in search would likely turn out to be 'other-worldly' some value is still given to 'true opinion' (ἄληθής ὁ δὲ) (Meno. 96D ff. - cf. Gorgias 454D. ff.), and therefore probably to the virtue which rests on it. It is therefore admitted that there had been and probably were still good politicians at Athens (Meno 939 ff: cf. Gorgias 516 E ff.) If this is so, Protagoras' failure to provide an immutable foundation for his criterion of conduct may not be so disastrous after all. One however strongly suspects that the Platonic Socrates does not genuinely grant the merits attributed to statesmen in the 'Meno' but is merely underlining the basis of popular and sophistic concept of morals and politics, and that his assessment of the worth of popular virtue and popular statesman is founded on the same principle as his acceptance of Protagoras' view of ἀρετή in the first half of the 'Protagoras', and is similarly motivated - the prudential and empirical morality of the sophists is being implicitly contrasted with a morality based on full philosophic consciousness. Therefore we also learn in the 'Meno' that real virtue is communicated by inspiration from the gods; knowledge already possessed in a previous existence is revived through ἲδήμης; and this inspiration is a sort of god-given (θεία μοίρα) impulse to attain truth and virtue. And the essential difference between ἄληθής ὁ δὲ and ἐπιστήμη we learn, lies in the instability of the former and the steadfastness of the latter. (Meno 98 a7ff).

In the 'Lysis' we see the true object of all human endeavours identified with the πρῶτον φίλον; here, though we arrive at the generic notion of good, the good is not yet conceived as an intelligible, transcendental substance.

In the 'Phaedo' where the nature of this knowledge becomes still more explicit, the moral attitude is so severely critical of earthly things as to amount almost to a complete rejection of life, at least of life as popularly conceived;
it is a good thing if the material and sensual instincts are starved and obliterated; such intellectual ascetism, most would agree, is a moral consequence of that criterion of the good whose knowledge consists not in the interpretation of the evidence of the senses, but in the recall or recollection of the experiences of another life, a life that seems limited to the divine element in us. 

Thus the soul is set against the body; no bounds are set to man's capacity for good; men are good according to how they rise out of the groove of ordinary human existence (Aristotle preaches the same ideal (E<sub>n</sub>. 1177b 30ff) but we shall see with what difference), and there is almost an unceasing inclination to decry the body and its needs. In the 'Phaedrus' a man finds his true self when he is drawn out of himself: ἐκκλητοῦνται καὶ οὐκέθα ἀδένων γνωσται (Phaedrus 2, 30a) In the 'Theaetetus', the soul of the philosopher soars aloft, leaving the body behind - an inert, uninteresting piece of matter (Theaetetus 173e), and the ideal for man is a being made like to God (διόσκωτος θεός).

The 'Republic' is of particular importance to us however because in it we find Plato for the first time fully spelling out the implications of his philosophic principle for the theory of morals and politics.
CHAPTER 2

Plato's criterion of \( \phi \sigma \iota \varsigma \) and the evolution of society.

For our purpose it is irrelevant to enter into the details of the steps by which Plato converted Socrates' criterion of reason into the criterion of eternal Forms. It is however in the Republic that the criterion of \( \phi \sigma \iota \varsigma \) finds expression explicitly in a political theory. We shall here briefly examine the influence of that criterion in Plato's theory of the development of society.

From our examination of sophistic conception of \( \phi \sigma \iota \varsigma \) and Plato's reaction to it, it has become, I think, obvious that Plato bases his moral and political theory on \( \phi \sigma \iota \varsigma \), i.e. on the assumption that there is a criterion by which to judge the excellence of morals and politics, and that happiness is the actualisation of man's natural capacities. However, the dualism which we find expressed in the transcendency of the Ideas, in the opposition of Being to Becoming, of Reason to Necessity invites in Plato a peculiar attitude to the actual institutions of society.

Plato as is well-known views phenomena as mere shadows of reality (Rep. 515A) worthy at best to be used only as the starting-point of enquiry. (Rep. 511B, 508 A). Truth is established on the level of the Ideas and properly has little or no contact with phenomena (Rep. 511B, 532 A; Phileb. 58 A.) Even in the Philebus where there seems a new determination to
give the maximum possible value to the sensed world, and to come to terms, as it were, with the actual world, the ideal is still to reach 'what is purest' (τὸ καθαρότατον) in each thing (Phileb. 55c) and to arrive at the abstract (Phileb. 56. D - E), and there seems to be an uneasy tension between the notion of purity (καθαρότης) and mixture (μείγμα) with the cup of honour going to purity - 'for we find fixity, truth, purity and what we have called perfect clarity (ἐλειπρίνες) either in those things that are always unchanged, unaltered and free of all admixture (ἀμείκτότατα) or in what is most akin to them; everything else must be called inferior and of secondary importance' 59c 2ff. (Professor Hackforth's translation)

On the other hand, we must have least to do with sensible phenomena, their origin, affection, or in general with things involved in a process of change" (τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεννησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα Phileb. 59 A); although there seems to be a necessity pressing us to deal with the mixed existence of the world of change (μείκτη καὶ γεγενημένη οὐσία Phileb. 61 B). The implications of all these for ethics we have already noticed in the διαλογιςθή θέσ of the Theaetetus, the lofty ascetism of the 'Phaedo', the σῶμα σῶμα doctrine of the Gorgias, and the ideal of the truly philosophic life of the Republic.
Although made in connection with the use in physical explanation of the principle of teleology by Plato and Aristotle, G.S. Kirk's remarks are relevant to Plato's approach to the study of society. Says Kirk, "it remains broadly true that...Plato tended to go straight for ultimate 'a priori' causes like soul or the Form of Good and to ignore the detailed study of most physical events. Concomitant causes could still be studied in the light of exalted metaphysical principles....Aristotle's 'scala naturae' at least allowed mechanical causation to be studied empirically at the lower levels of the natural progression". A difference similar to that which Kirk sees in the respective teleologies of Plato and Aristotle in physics is discernable in their principles in ethics and politics; the relevant sentences are: for Plato, concomitant causes could still be studied in the light of exalted metaphysical principles, and for Aristotle: The Scala naturae at least allowed mechanical causation to be studied at the lower levels of the natural progression. There is implicit in those two statements some truth about the respective attitudes of our two philosophers whether in respect of physics, poetry, rhetoric or social theory. Plato therefore works almost solely with the criterion of Reason or the Idea.

in his account of change whether physical change or the institutional changes of society. Phenomena derives its value only according as it is controlled by reason or piloted according to a pattern discernible by reason - an attitude that invites in political theory an approach not too favourably disposed towards a faithful repetition of historical details and much more inclined to examine the significances of phenomena as revealed by the overmastering guidance of Reason.

It is perhaps considerations of this kind that also prompt Mr. R.G. Bury's statement¹ that "not being an historian but a philosopher largely concerned with political theory, Plato was not primarily interested in historical inquiry (ιστορία) for its own sake. His references to history or pre-history, when they occur are introduced for the purpose of illustrating some particular point of doctrine." The first half of the remark - that Plato is not primarily interested in history because he is a political philosopher - is of course true; but it is also true of most political philosophers. The second part of the remark needs some qualification; for while every political philosopher is in a sense not primarily interested in history but only in so far as history has significances for his theory, several different attitudes to history are possible within that general framework; and

¹ R.G. Bury - "Plato and History" - The Classical Quarterly. N.S. 1 (XLV) P.86.
therefore Plato's specific attitude to history can not be adequagate explained solely on the grounds that he is a political philosopher. Aristotle, too, is a political philosopher but his attitude to history and the phenomena of social institutions is different from Plato's; this difference, it is here suggested, has its basis on their different philosophic principles.

Our remarks on the quotation from Kirk ought to show that the statements that Plato is philosophically uninterested in phenomena needs to be qualified; for in respect to ethics and politics, it could easily lead to absurdity of thinking that Plato was not seriously concerned with the phenomena of social life. Plato was, of course, very seriously concerned with life and in some cases he takes account of phenomena no less seriously than Aristotle. In fact, his thoughts often reveal his greater concern with phenomena and practical affairs than Aristotle's. Whatever might be its metaphorical significance, the theory of the origin of society in the Republic is based on the need to satisfy man's varied wants, and the principle of specialisation of functions is developed in order that these varied wants might be satisfied. Again it is from Plato that we learn that a life deprived of any sensation of pleasure or pain would be a miserable life - a life of pure apathy, by no means worth wishing for; and that ideal knowledge is not
enough; for "he who wants to find his way home when he wants to" - *πέλλει τις ἡμέρας καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐκάστοτε δίκαιον καὶ ὅποιον (Phileb. 62a 7) - "would need to know not only the 'divine circle' but also comprehend 'those circles which are mankind's special concern' (οἱ ἀνθρώπινοι κύκλοι).

Knowledge of the sensible world is therefore necessary if man is to find his way upon earth. (see esp. Phileb. 21 D ff. 60 E ff. and 63 c ff). And finally it is Plato who in the 'Laws' develops a theory of man and society which pays so meticulous an attention to the facts of human nature and who, with an incomparable insight, reveals the most distinctive elements of the main Hellenic and especially Athenian social institutions - a phenomenon to which Professor Shorey calls our attention when he describes the 'Laws' as a "unique combination of an Aristotelian wealth of good sense, political wisdom, and discriminatory observation with a divinatory insight and a depth of Hellenic feeling that forever eludes the would-be exhaustive categories of that semi-alien encyclopaedist". Concerning Professor Shorey's statement it is perhaps only pertinent to remark that though Aristotle may be 'semi-alien' and his Hellenic feeling less deep, his buoyant and more generous attitude to the weaker aspects of human nature and to those institutions which cater for the satisfaction

of man's natural impulses sometimes make the observations of his insight more illuminating in respect to Greek society and more fundamental in respect of mankind generally, because based on the premise that most institutions are called into being by some fundamental human impulses and that therefore the 

φυσικά of most institutions are discernible in their history - a premise which no doubt sometimes leads Aristotle into errors but which nevertheless makes the philosophy he based on the given of Greek society in many respects more congenial than Plato's. While therefore Plato no less than Aristotle was interested in the world of phenomena, the degree of that interest and the form it takes has some relation to Plato's philosophic principle, and, the difference in his philosophic principle and Aristotle's may sometimes point to some basic dissimilarities even when there are great similarities in specific recommendations.

We have in Republic II, and Laws III Plato's theories of the development of the state from its primeval beginnings to its final stage. And in the Politicus 269c ff, in the Timaeus 20a ff, in the Critias and in the Laws IV we have myths through which Plato conveys his conception of the nature of the development of political society*.

* The doctrine of the evolution of society enunciated by Protagoras in the myth of that dialogue has already been given a very brief consideration; for I believe that the myth was designed to express in imaginative form Protagoras' political philosophy (pace Prof. E.A. Havelock), nor is it very important to inquire whether Plato constructed it on his own or adapted it from Protagoras' Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως.
There is a vast literature on the Republic - "the definitive poetic embodiment of the parallel and antithesis between the ethical and political ideal which is an object of seemingly vain quest in the minor dialogues and that of the Athenian democracy and the sophists and demagogues who exploited for their own ends." Shorey. Much has also been written on the key place it holds in Plato's political theory. We shall here confine our attention to Plato's doctrine of the evolution of society with a view to seeing later on what light it throws by contrast on Aristotle's theory of society.

Nobody believes that in the doctrine of Republic II we have a historical account of the development of society. As to whether the scheme is logical, psychological or metaphysical there is much disagreement. The presentation of the scheme is however clear enough. Glaucon and Adeimantus restate as powerfully as they can Thrasymachus' doctrine of justice and they challenge Socrates to give an incontrovertible proof that justice is preferable to injustice. It is therefore necessary to show that justice is intrinsically better than injustice. In response to this challenge Socrates suggests that an analogy should be drawn between the individual soul and the state; for it would be easier to discover the nature of justice and injustice if we watch the state in the course of its development and so have justice and injustice 'writ large' in the larger organism of the state - a procedure
that is justified ex-tempore on the grounds that justice is manifested both in communities and in individuals. On the face of it, therefore, the typical state is designated to show on a larger scale the features of justice and of injustice and the theory of the state is from the start meant to be subsidiary to the theory of the soul, i.e. to ethics - an impression supported by the fact that both at the very beginning of the book - the conversation with Cephalus - emphasis is on individual goodness and our attention is there drawn to the fact that happiness depends not on material circumstances but on character; and also that emphasis shifts back to the individual at the end of the book (Bk. X).

In the 'Republic' as we have it, however, Plato at least apparently pursues the political study beyond the specific requirements of the analogy and conducts the inquiry in a manner suggesting that the typical state designed primarily to illustrate the ethical ideal is identical with a truly ideal state - an unjustified step but a very easy one to take in view of the fact that the individual and the state are not really distinct entities; for, as Socrates rightly argues, the state is composed of individual men and the qualities manifested by the state are the qualities manifested by the individuals who compose it (435c ff). It is perhaps some consideration of this kind that makes Proclus
remark that it is a logomachy to argue as to whether the main question of the Republic is individual justice or political justice or whether it is the social structure that controls the psychology or vice versa. The fact still remains, however, that the individual is an autonomous unit even if within the state, and the analogy between the individual and the state need to be kept within limits; those arguments which Proclus thinks superfluous are therefore not obviously pointless.

Professor Cornford*, for example, asked whether the social structure was deduced from the psychology or the psychology from the social structure and he attempted to show that "whereas it is commonly asserted or taken for granted that Plato arrived first at the triple division of the soul, and then built up his state in three corresponding stages, it is more probable than he began with the social structure, and then being convinced that the microcosm of the soul must be reflected on a large scale in the 'natural' state adapted his tripartite psychology to the framework of society".

Professor Cornford then went on to show that it was Plato's observation of the classes which constitute society coupled with ancient assessments of the distinctive qualities of those classes, which led him to formulate the theory of the tripartite division of the soul - Plato in conformity with ancient custom.

and belief saw wisdom in the aged, bravery in youth and temperance in women and children. Another view similar to Cornford's is that Plato derives his threefold structure from the Pythagorean doctrine of the three types of life - the life of the trader who comes to the games for monetary ends, that of the athlete who comes to compete, and that of the philosopher who comes to watch and understand. On the other hand, on the grounds that Plato "presupposes a certain amount of psychology in constructing the state from which he proposes to illustrate the nature of the soul" Professor Barker accuses Plato of a 'petitio principii'.

On Cornford's view, Professor Barker's accusation of a 'petitio principii' would fall to the ground; for on the basis of the reasoning in that view, Plato would not be presupposing anything about the nature of the soul; he would on the contrary be using the data offered by social life to prove the nature of the soul. That view, however, does not seem to me a very plausible one because it attaches too much significance to those ancient observations and customary practices. But if one rejects that view, one necessarily gives some validity to Barker's charge of a 'petitio principii' for it would be difficult to maintain that the threefold division is introduced neither to illustrate a social theory.

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*1 cf. Professor J.B. Skemp - 'Plato's Statesman' p.37 and note 1; and E. Barker - Greek Political Theory - Plato and his Predecessors p.163.  
*2 E. Barker op.cit. p.163.
nor as a psychological problem. And it seems clear that Plato wishes to show something about the individual soul. Thus Barker's accusation has some justification. It is however easy to exaggerate this; for Plato is not really setting out to prove that the soul is tripartite; the tripartite psychology is one of what Professor Shorey calls Plato's "extemporised logical machinery for a given purpose", not "a crystallisation of absolute truth" - the purpose here being to portray justice in the soul, a purpose that does not require for its achievement the rigid accuracy of the "extemporised framework". This probably explains the obviously tentative nature of the exposition of the parts of the soul in Bk. IV, and the rather inconclusive accounts of the soul in Bk. X; a vagueness the explanation of which Plato is probably hinting at paradoxically enough in the Φοινίκικον ψευδος of Rep. 414 c.f4.

On the other hand, there is hardly any doubt that the tripartite division was even if extemporised, an important framework in Plato's conception of the individual soul; and

*1 Paul Shorey - What Plato Said - Chicago, 2nd imp. 1934, p.320 - cf. his notes on Rep. 435 B.C., "Here it is enough to observe that the question, or the logomachy, in what sense the soul has "parts" is still under debate, that Plato does not dogmatise about it but claims no more for his classification than that it is practically sufficient for his present purpose; that the classification cannot fairly be criticised by comparison with the categories of modern psychology; that there is little basis for speculations about the Pythagorean origin of the doctrine, and none at all for the alleged contradictions with the 'Phaedo' and other dialogues." cf. J. Moreaux - Rev. Et. Anciennes, 55, 1953, pp.249-257
whether these divisions of the soul are called 'parts' (μέρη) or 'kinds' (γένη) or even forms (εἶδόν) and whether they are regarded as "different manifestations or modes of a single force called the soul" or "as capacities or tendencies to act" Plato seems to have seen the soul's nature at least when incarnate as expressed in the three manifestations figured in the tripartite division. This seems confirmed by the views he expressed of the soul in the Phaedrus and the Timaeus.

The tripartite division of the soul would then be a framework adopted, not without reasons, by Plato for his portrayal of justice in the individual soul, and this would seem to be the primary design of the Republic. In spite, therefore, of Plato's attempt to go beyond the demands of the analogy, the Republic remains truly metaphorical. For us, the relevant point is that the metaphorical nature of the presentation controls the form which the theory of the origin of society takes; for psychology, not history, determines the stages of this typical state which we watch as it emerges.

Let us then observe justice 'writ large' by watching the state in the course of its evolution - ἐὰν γνωμένην πόλιν θεασάμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἵσοιμεν ἄν γινομένην καὶ τὴν δόξιαν (Rep. 369 A).

"Man is a creature of many wants; since he cannot meet them all himself he joins other men to form groups which co-operate to supply man's various needs; this coming to live
together is a city-state". There is also a complementary fact - "No two persons are exactly alike, but each differs from each in natural endowments, one being suited for one occupation and another for another". The various needs of sustenance, housing, clothing etc. are thus met by the principle of division of labour.

A large part of the subsequent history of social and political theory is an appreciation of the principle here laid down by Plato, just as the principle is in itself a form of reaction to much of antecedent social and political thought. But its significance can easily be exaggerated; thus we have statements like this: "it is made quite plain in the "Republic", that Socrates does not believe in any 'social contract' theory; and if he appears to dismiss summarily the myth that man once lived in a 'state of nature' it is because as he says, 'no one of us is sufficient for himself'. The view expressed by Adeimantus is countered by the bald fact that the individual cannot exist save in society; co-operation is essential. Thus the theory of Hobbes and Rousseau received its 'coup de grâce' two thousand years before they conceived it, and both history and anthropology have since confirmed the verdict. In fact, however, neither Adeimantus nor Hobbes nor Rousseau believed that men once historically lived in a 'state of nature'; their respective theories are various fictions intended to convey what they respectively conceived to be the basic truths under-
lining the relations between man and man in social life; and
Plato's way of conveying this truth expressed in the theory that
a number of craftsmen came together because of the helplessness
of the solitary man (no one of us is sufficient unto himself)
is also ultimately a fiction.

Taken literally, therefore, history and anthropology can
neither disprove nor confirm Plato's verdict on Adeimantus'
typeory. Indeed Plato shows both in the Crito (51 B ff) and in
the Laws (683 D ff) that the fiction of social contract can
convey the true nature of a man's moral relation to his fellow
men and to the state. The sophistic conception of the 'social
contract' (Rep. 358 e ff) against which Plato here implicitly
protests seems to him mistaken in that it identifies the violence
and unrestrained self-assertion of 'pre-political' men with his
personal 'good', thus making morality an external thing arising
from the 'natural' injustices of 'pre-political man'; it makes
the assumption that a man has in T.H. Green's words* "rights
against society irrespectively of his fulfilment of any duties
to society, that all powers that be are restraints upon his
natural freedom which he may rightly defy as far as he safely
can", and that he can do this without harming his own good -

In this section of the Republic, however, Plato is
primarily interested in laying the principle of specialisation
of functions, a principle which is of considerable importance for
the ethical theme.

*1 T.H. Green - Lectures on the Principles of Political Oblig-
ation. 1907, page 67.
For the αναγκαιοτάτη πόλις is designed to illustrate the lowest element of the soul. Professor Shorey*¹ apparently missing the 'purpose of the portrayal of the city of minimum needs speaks of the irregular steps by which Plato came to portray his ideal state. But if it is remembered that it is the ethical purpose which controls the analysis, the steps by which Plato came to delineate his ideal state ceases to be baffling or irregular. We are given what is meant to be regarded as a polis, but it is constituted wholly of artisans, carpenters shoemakers etc. Aristotle criticizes this conception of the polis. He thinks it absurd to call a society such as depicted in this section of the 'Republic' a polis. I quote the passage:

Φησὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔσχηδιος ἐκ τεττάρων τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων πόλιν αὐτοκτονεῖ, λέγει δὲ τοῦτον ὅθεν καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ σκυτοτόμων καὶ οἰκοδόμων· πάλιν δὲ προστέθησιν, δοὺς ἀδιάκριτων τούτων, χαλκέα καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοτές ἀναγκαῖος βασικήσαι, ἔτι ὁ ἐμπρόσθεν τα καὶ κάπηλον· καὶ τάστα πάντα γίνεται πλήρωμα τῆς πράξεως πόλεως, δε τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε χρώμαν πόλιν συνεστηκοῦν, ἀλλ' ὀς τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον, ἵσον τε ὀσμην σκυτέων τα καὶ γεωργίαν. τὸ δὲ προσπολέμον τοῦτον ἀποδέκωσι μέρος χρώματος ἀδυναμίης καὶ τῆς τῶν κλητῶν ἀποτελέσεως ἐλα πόλεος καταστάσεως, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρες καὶ τοῖς ἀποκατοικοῦν κοινωνοῖς ἀναγκαῖοι εἰναὶ τοῦ τῶν ἀποκάλυφτα καὶ χρησεῖα τὸ δίκαιον. εἴτε όρθοῦ καὶ ψυχῆν ἔν τις θετήτης ἔσων μέρος μᾶλλον ἡ σώμα, καὶ πόλεων τὸν τοιοῦτον μᾶλλον θετεῖν τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν χρήσιν συνειδήσεως, τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ μετέχου δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ βουλευόμενον, εἴτε θετὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον.

*¹ P. Shorey, op. cit. p.217.
Soldiers, judges and deliberators, Aristotle argues, must find a place in the πρώτη πόλις for if a society existed without all these functionaries, it would not be a polis at all, except the term polis is used very loosely. Aristotle makes another interesting criticism - Plato's sketch implies that shoemakers are as necessary to the polis as cultivators. Both of Aristotle's criticism would seem to find answer in the fact that Plato was in the ἀναγκαστική πόλις concerned mainly to lay down the principle of the specialization of functions, and also to reveal analogically the lowest element of the soul. The first part of the purpose demands that a carpenter should not undertake the work of a shoemaker; on the other hand, the second part of the purpose demands that all the artisans should be regarded as forming a class, some unit; it therefore becomes irrelevant to raise the question which Aristotle raised i.e. which of them is performing the more vital service; the same purpose explains the remark that it would not cause much harm if a carpenter started making
shoes and a shoemaker started carpentering; it also explains the absence of soldiers and judges in the ἡμέρας ἰσότητος. And the absence of soldiers and judges explains Socrates' hesitancy in the reply he gave to Adeimantus when the latter suggested that justice was to be found in the internal relations of this city.

'Αλλ' ἐκεῖς καλῶς λέγεις· καὶ σκέπτεσθεν γε καὶ ὁμοόποικησθέν, said Socrates (Rep. 372 A.5) but he does not follow up Adeimantus' suggestion.

Yet in a sense the 'first city' is ideal because it is healthy (372e); but it is healthy because it is so far untempted; its health is the health of the lowest element of the soul. The Platonic Socrates could therefore in abandoning the 'first city' say exactly what the Athenian Stranger says in the Laws (378B 1 ff ) about the change from the rustic simple life of the survivors of the flood to a civilized form of life - "Their simple life could
not furnish perfect types of virtue or of vice" - cf. Polit. 272 A ff. In a way therefore, the simple rustic 'untempted' life is ideally δ'ν βιωτός ἄνθρωπος; and the Platonic Socrates would no less vocally than Glaucon is made to do term the 'first city' 'a city of pigs'. The attitude is ambivalent. The first city is healthy, but it is inadequate for the purpose of delineating moral excellence, which is dependent on civilization and culture.

Since the simple rustic ὄγις πόλις can never truly depict the ideal nature of the soul and of justice, luxuries must be introduced, giving us "a state at fever-heat" - 'φλεγμα\'νοουσα πόλις' - to have which is perhaps not a bad thing; as Socrates says -

ισως οὖν οδὸς κακὸς ἔχειν σχολοῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαύτην ταχ' ἄν κατέδοιμεν τὴν τε ἀκαίροισθην καὶ ἀδικημαν διὰ ποτὲ ταῖς πόλειν ἐμφύονται - Rep. 372E.

The inflamed city has so numerous wants that it must go to war to secure some of these. To ask whether the pressure of these multifarious wants on the population can not be relieved by resettling some of the population is to miss the point entirely; which is that soldiers are needed. It may however be noted that they were called into existence so that the needs of the τρυφῶσα πόλις might be procured; in reality, however, the 'raison d'être' of their existence seems to be to 'purge' or
discipline the 'state on fever-heat'. Plato, in conformity with the ethical design of the dialogue, seems intent on showing that an essential 'capacity' of the soul is that exhibited in the struggle against difficulties and temptations to which 'the appetitive element' of the soul makes us liable. And in terms of personal ethics and the search for the knowledge which, according to Socrates, is virtue, the discipline which the situation of the ἱστορία πόλεως necessitates, a discipline inculcated through habit, practice and right opinion shows that the knowledge which is virtue is not a purely 'intellectual' knowledge; the discipline of this element of the soul, i.e. of the soldiers of the state, is an indispensable prerequisite of philosophic virtue. The excessive luxuries of the city therefore perform a function similar to that of the economic needs by which the 'moral' principle of the specialisation of functions was introduced. On a similar line the 'philosophical' element of the soul is introduced on the necessity to render the 'spirited' element representing the soldiers safe for the community (Rep. 375 A). Rendering this safe demands education, and since it is not to be expected that the 'spirited' class would know the nature of this education and be able to define its limits a higher class - the philosophical class which is the true ruling class - will be necessary.

Towards the end of Bk. IV when luxuries had been introduced into the city and when the inflamed city had been purged, Socrates
views the finished picture and "the dream completely realised", and looking back on the principle upon which the first city was based declares "the principle which at the very beginning of our foundation of the state we laid down is, it seems to me, a rudimentary type of justice, but in fact though justice involves something of the kind, it is not a matter of a man doing his own work outwardly, but inwardly truly dealing with himself and his own, not allowing the capacities in him to usurp each other's place and to interfere with each other, but settling rightly everything within him and taking command of himself, imposing harmony and order and organising the three capacities in him.

Murphy*¹, for instance, makes use of this passage to show that in spite of the specialisation of the shoemaker, carpenter etc., Plato saw the virtue of the citizen in a full and rounded personality. "Plato is here saying that the function of all the citizens is moral virtue, to do what their consciences prescribe to them", i.e. apart from the virtue special to their particular social functions. Professor Demos*² also uses it to support his theory of the distinction implicit in Plato's analysis between an "inner city" and an "outer city" i.e. between private life and the institutional fabric of society. Quoting 443c - 444a, Professor Demos adds "In the above, Plato is distinguishing true

*¹ N.R. Murphy - The Interpretation of Plato's Republic - 1951
*² R. Demos - 'Paradoxes in Plato's Doctrine of the Ideal State'
justice from its adumbration: the first is justice of the inner city, while the second is justice in social arrangements. In other words justice in one's external relations is inferior in reality and value to justice in one's inner life.\textsuperscript{*1}

While the view is not obviously implausible, it seems to me that Plato is not here drawing our attention to the inferiority of justice in one's external relations to 'justice in one's inner life' but to the inadequacy of the analogy of justice seen 'writ large' to express the true nature of justice. What Plato means can, I think, be paraphrased thus: We have now seen the features of justice in large letters: when we laid down the principle of specialisation of functions at the beginning I guessed we hit at something like the truth; the features of justice were seen 'in large letters' only externally, but true justice, i.e. the justice of the soul which we illustrate by an analogy, is something internal - it consists in the inner harmony of the capacities of the just man; it is a moral self-organisation; of which the principle of specialisation of functions offers an 'eidolon'. The theory of the origin of society helps to establish this principle and to crystallize the 'eidolon'.

Aristotle would regard most of Republic V - VII, concerned as those books are with the longer way (cf. Rep. 435 and 504D).

\textsuperscript{*1} R. Demos - op. cit. p. 170
- the metaphysics of the Forms, the allegory of the cave, the divided line and the education of the philosopher kings as irrelevant to the theory of the state*1 but it is here that Plato reveals the nature of that criterion of the good which has been 'the object of a seemingly vain quest in the minor dialogues'. To Plato the morality sketched in the first four Books of the Republic would, without this criterion, seem to rest on a basis hardly more solid than that on which, for example, Protagoras based his ethical and political theory. The sketch of the moral virtues in Bk. IV therefore remains only a διαγραφή, needing the fundamental basis of the Forms. (Rep. 428e - 429c). In the large letters of the state this would be mere social morality; and necessary though it is from the point of view of the individual soul; it is impossible to speak of true ἀμετάκλητος without the criterion of the forms, and this criterion τὸ λογιστικὸν apprehends.

The details of that exposition is irrelevant to our purpose. But one point relevant to the analogy must be made: that the 'philosophic' element in us (τὸ λογιστικὸν) which is alone capable of attaining the knowledge of the ultimate criterion of conduct is regarded as doing so when freed from the two lower elements (cf. Rep. 511B, 517c). The individual is

*1 See Aristotle Pol. II chapters 5 & 6, esp. 6 1264b 39ff., and cf. E.N. 1. IV 3 and I VI. 13.
released from his fetters, and the 'eye of the soul' (δυμα
ψυχής Ρεπ. 533D) which in reality is the true soul as a unit
'sees' the ultimate criterion of conduct; and between this
element of the soul (as soul is conceived in the Republic) and
the ideas there is the same affinity which is affirmed in the
Phaedo between the soul and the ideas (cf. Rep. 490 B:

αὐτοῦ δὲ ἔστιν ἐκατότου τῆς φύσεως διασθαί
ψυχής ἑφάκτεσθαι τοῦ τοιοῦτον, προσηκεὶ δὲ ἐγγενεῖ)

For, even if the time during which it remains so is very
short, it is as the 'divine element' in man that τὸ λογιστικὸν
apprehends the ultimate criterion of conduct, i.e. as 'pure'
soul. Archer-Hind*¹ and Adam*² seem to me right in their views
of the nature of the soul in the Republic. According to the
former, "The two lower εἰδη are consequent on the conjunction
of the soul with matter....The main division is dual: λογιστικὸν
expressing the action of the soul by herself, ἀλογὸν has action
through the body. The εἰδη belonging to the ἄλογον Plato
classifies under the heads of θυμοσιδές and ἑπιθυμησικὸν
and according to the latter "If wholly separated from material
accretions, the soul is probably μονοειδῆς, λογιστικὸν
alone remaining". The difference between the 'Phaedo' and the
'Republic' therefore is that while the former seems to view
man only 'sub specie aeternitatis' the Republic views both

*¹ Plato's Phaedo, London, 1955, p. 5
'man in this life' and man 'sub specie aeternitatis'. In truth the soul is not full of contradictory powers; it is simple in its own nature and cannot be composed of many elements. In Rep. IV & IX we see the soul as modified in its contact with phenomena.

Therefore though as Professor Skemp points out the attempt to see simultaneously 'man in this life and man 'sub specie aeternitatis' creates a tension in the conception of the ψυχή in the Republic, a tension manifest in the conception of the soul as both tripartite and in composite, there is no real contradiction. It is true that since man is not all intellect, not constituted wholly of the cognitive faculty, this divine, or philosophic element in him must soon find itself in the midst of the two lower elements - the spirited and the appetitive - which it must 'come down' to control. Nevertheless, as ruler, this element is divine; thus man in a sense is ruled by the godlike in him, and to return to the analogy the philosopher beings of the state are god-like beings.

To reduce the transcendental nature of this criterion by insisting on the fact that man is not pure intellect or to limit the Utopianism of the political analogy seems to me to miss the point entirely, which is that, as apprehending the ultimate criterion of the good, the cognitive faculty in the soul is pure soul, i.e. the discarnate soul of the Phaedo, and that the

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*Professor J.E. Skemp, Phronesis, Vol. 5, p. 38*
philosopher-kings in the analogy are, as rulers, god-like beings. The significance of this point we shall soon see.

It is generally recognised that Plato's theory of the deterioration of cities and the cycle of constitutional changes in Republic VIII and IX arises from the same principle as the theory of the evolution of society in Rep. II (368 D ff). In studying the decline of cities and showing their order of demerit Plato was tracing the gradual deterioration of the soul as exhibited in the large letters of the state, just as in the earlier parts of the dialogue we see the true nature of justice delineated in large letters of the state. But Aristotle remarks ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτεῖᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὥσπερ τοῦ ἄκρατος, οὐ μὲντοι λέγεται καλῶς. τῆς τε γὰρ ἀριστοτερὸς καὶ πρώτης οὖσας οὐ λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν λογίως. φησι γὰρ αἰτίων εἶναι τὸ μῆ μένειν μηθὲν ἄλλῳ ἕν τινι μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχὴν ὦ εἶναι τούτων "ὅν ἐπίστρεφος πυθμὴν περὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀρμονίας παρέχεται", Pol. V. Ch. 12, 1316a. 1 - 7

Aristotle's criticism here as earlier on misses the point.

It is a rather surprising criticism, as it could hardly have escaped Aristotle that Plato was not being historical here; especially in view of Aristotle's own doctrine of constitutional changes in Pol. III. ch. 15 (1286b).
Although Murphy*1 warns us to bear in mind the metaphorical nature of Plato's presentation, he too seems to fall victim to Plato's dialectical approach in one place. For he argues that Plato would be putting forward a theory more conformable to his principle "that the right of the ruler is based solely on his enlightenment and public-spiritedness and once these are absent there is no obligation on the ruled to obey the ruler" if he placed the democratic form of government higher than the oligarchic and the democratic when the principle of aristocracy was abandoned. The fact however is that Plato never allows the analysis to depart from the framework dictated by the ethical or psychological purpose; and since he has already identified the common people with the lowest element of the soul, he would be guilty of a graver contradiction if he tells us that the governments next in rank to the government of the best in us - aristocracy in the state, the rule: of τὸ

λογιστικόν in the soul is the government of the common people the rule of the lowest in us - τὸ ἕκθωμηκικόν -:

For, although democracy is conceived by Plato as a constitution in which no class dominates, it is in reality a constitution in which the lowest element in us has a preponderant influence because the restraining influence of the higher elements is absent. In the 'Politicus', however, where Plato appears to have

*1 N.R. Murphy op. cit. p. 82.
in mind actual states (not as analogies to the elements of the soul), although he still regards democracy as the worst of the lawful constitutions, he rightly sees that its perversion is the least harmful. For "it is best to live in a democracy if all constitutions are perverted". Pol. 303 b 1.

In the 'Republic' therefore, we see the weakly-founded and variable criterion of the sophists replaced by a reliable intractible but superempirical criterion, a criterion grasped by the νοῦς or τὸ λογιστικὸν. The relation between this criterion and man's ethical and social problem is then presented through an imaginative conception of the social good and illuminated by the picture of a society seen in the process of its development.

* Supplementary Note

A few remarks are perhaps necessary in explanation of the assumption on which the foregoing comments on the theory of the development of society in the Republic is based - the assumption that the ideal state is thoroughly metaphorical. First I hasten to say that the assumption was made not in order to explain the so-called paradoxes of the Republic (see R.G. Hoerber Note on the structure of the Republic, Phronesis 6, pp. 37-40), but because the approach based on that assumption best illuminates the contrast in Plato's and Aristotle's doctrine of the development of society. But that assumption does not lack its intrinsic justification. For it seems to me that no attempt to fully understand the meaning of the Republic can succeed without taking account of the metaphorical nature of the presentation. For example, in recent years there have been several attempts to explain the so-called paradoxes of the Republic - See esp. R. Demos - "Paradoxes in Plato's Doctrine of the Ideal State" - C.G. n.s. 7, pp. 164-174; R.W. Hall - "Justice and the Individual in the 'Republic'" - Phronesis Vol. 4, pp. 149-158; R.G. Hoerber - "More on Justice in the Republic" - Phronesis Vol. 5, pp. 32 - 34; J.B. Skemp - "Comment on Communal and Individual Justice in the Republic" - Phronesis
Vol. 5, pp. 35 - 38; and again R.G. Hoerber - "Note on the Structure of the Republic" [Phronesis] 6, pp. 37 - 40. Most of these attempts (the notable exception is Hoerber's second article) start from the assumption that the ideal state is not metaphorical, the complementary assumption being that to regard the ideal state as metaphorical would, as Professor Demos puts it, "eliminate altogether Plato's ideal state". These attempts themselves acknowledgements that there is a metaphor in the presentation. Professor Skemp's attempt seems to me more guarded and better balanced. By drawing our attention to the significance of Rep. 441 c 4ff, where we are told (what indeed we should have learnt from earlier statements that the state is brought in only to portray the individual soul in large letters) that every individual (εις ἔκαστος) "presents the same pattern of ψυχή as does the community. He is σοφός by that same faculty by which the community is σοφός namely τὸ λογιστικόν, so with ἄνδερετα, and therefore λογιστικόν and θυμός τοῦτος must be present in each individual", Professor Skemp reveals the weakness of Professor Demos' parallel virtues of the 'inner' and outer city, i.e. those of private life and those of the institutional fabric of society. I also take Professor Skemp's comments on Rep. 518 c 2ff (the ὅμια ψυχῆς passage) as implying that Plato is there drawing our attention to the inadequacy of a personal ethics not based on knowledge of the Forms, and not to the distinction between two types of virtue as Dr. Hoerber argues (op. cit. p.32 - 34). Professor Skemp, however, adopts an approach somewhat similar to Dr. Hoerber's and Professor Demos' when, taking the ideal state rather literally, he attempts through a linguistic route to derive some σοφία and ἄνδερετα and ἐπιθυμία for the craftsmen. It seems to me that our primary equation ψυχή = σοφία, ἄνδερετα and ἐπιθυμία renders that quest unnecessary, subordinate equations like craftsmen = desire being purely dictated by the analogy. The primary equation, however, does not preclude the fact which seems only too plain, that men have these elements in various degrees. Indeed as we learn in 590 D 3ff, though the ethical ideal is for everyone to be governed by the wise and divine element in us, and
The theory of the evolution of society in Laws III bears a striking resemblance to that of Politics I. Before embarking on tracing that resemblance, I intend to examine very briefly the steps by which Plato came to the doctrine of Laws III.

best if this element forms an integral part of our soul, there will be some people who would derive the guidance of this divine element externally in the laws and institutions of society - γνα ενιαν πάντας οικοι εμεν καὶ φιλοι, τῷ αὑτῷ κυβερνόμενοι - a statement that can only naturally be interpreted as referring to differences of degree not of kind in the qualities of various souls.

To take the ideal state as metaphorical does no therefore eliminate the significance of the political aspects of the 'Republic'. It however emphasises its ethical purpose, and makes its aim the same personal and individual ideal which was the primary object of the Socratic quest. It is, however, possible as has been variously suggested by several scholars that having pursued Socrates' ἀρετή ἐξιστημὶ dictum to its fundamental conclusion in the 'Republic', the realisation that only a few are capable of grasping the ultimate criterion of conduct led Plato, among other reasons like the collapse of Athenian society, to give greater emphasis than Socrates did to the political framework of the ethical ideal (cf. Alexander Sesonke, "Plato's Apology: Republic I.", 'Phronesis', Vol. 6 pp. 29 - 36).
That Plato moved towards a progressively higher evaluation of empirical studies is a common place in Platonic studies. Astronomy, rejected in the 'Republic' (529 B) as incapable of offering an ultimate criterion because it uses data derived from the sensible world and is therefore fit only for the limited province of the astronomer, becomes an inquiry of considerable value to the philosopher in the 'Laws' (821a-822c, 895b, 897c), and in the Timaeus (34a, 36d, 47b, 52d, and 90d), in spite of the qualifying καθὸς τὸς of the latter; for the divine and invisible νοῦς is made manifest in the visible cosmos and by studying the latter the philosopher would be able to attain a true criterion of conduct and happiness. In the 'Politicus' (285 D) in spite of the distinction between "real existents which are easy to understand and the highest and most important class of existents to which there are no corresponding visible resemblances" we learn that the practice based on data derived from the sensible world prepares us for the insight into the nature of the 'τιμωτὰ τῶν ὦντων'. And the comic poet Epicrates (Fr. 287 (Koch); cf. Speusippus' 'Similarities') brings the gaze of the philosopher

* Professor Skemp's translation.
down to as earthy an object as the pumpkin, to determine the
genus of which becomes a matter of philosophic interest. It
falls outside the field of our interest here to examine whether
this growing interest in the empirical world was accompanied
by or consequent on any changes in Plato's metaphysical doctrine.*
There is however, no doubt that the new outlook makes its marks
in Plato's ethical and political theory. The phases of the
changing outlook have been marked by several scholars and more
recently by John Gould*2, whose main thesis is that the
'Politicus', the 'Timaeus', the 'Philebus' and the 'Laws' show
evidences of a more 'realistic' philosophy - a readiness on
Plato's part to take account of the hard realities of life and
recognise the given facts of human nature. And it seems that
Gould's thesis has a fairly solid basis. For, however true it
may be that the Platonic envisagement of the world is essentially
ontological, not genetic, and that Platonic philosophy is
therefore not concerned to explain the genesis of the existent,
there is hardly any doubt that in the envisagement of the

*1 This is the main interest, for example, of J. Steine's
works translated into English with an introduction by
D.J. Allan as 'Plato's Method of Dialectic (Oxford) 1940)

*2 John Gould - The Development of Plato's Ethics - Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1955, see esp. chaps. V, VI, XIII, XIV & XV. Making the
personal and 'idealistic' ethics of Socrates the starting point
of his interpretation, Gould tries to show that Plato's more
'realistic' outlook was accompanied by 'Pessimism' and 'despair'
in contrast to the optimism and idealism of Socratic period.
However, leaving aside the cosmology and the metaphysics of the 'Politicus' and the 'Timaeus' we shall now attempt very summarily to extract what lessons are relevant to Plato's political theory in the 'Politicus' and the 'Timaeus', especially with a view to illuminating the 'criterion' for politics and morals adopted in the 'Laws'.

In the 'Politicus', Plato takes up the old problem of a royal or political art (Euthydemus 290 B ff) and the antithesis between this royal art and the false arts of the demagogue, the orator and the sophist; and he attempts to find the true statesman and define him by eliminating through 'Division' all pretenders to his function. We learn that the true statesman is ἐπιστήμων τις and he rules with τέχνη (Pol. 259b 1 ff). He ought not to be bound by laws; for as an expert (τεχνικός) he should be free to disregard customs and conventional rules whenever his knowledge tells him that a departure from precedent will serve his ends more effectively. In this sense the τέχνη of the true statesman is the very antithesis of νόμος - one of those popular enactments which almost invariably are products of the ignorance and selfishness of demagogues and rhetoricians. In another sense, however, νόμος

*1 For a comprehensive exposition of the purpose and content of the 'Politicus' see the Introduction to J.B. Skemp - 'Plato's Statesman' - (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1951) to which the following sketch is indebted, esp. for the passages translated.
is a serviceable maid in the hands of the true statesman; for
νόμος could be the product of the τέχνη of the statesman.
And no 'volte face' is involved in putting forth these two
different opinions about νόμοι. For, as Professor Skemp
rightly observes "It is at first sight confusing to find in
the midst of this denunciation of law, and indeed following the
Socratic passage just described, a praise of law... There is,
however, no contradiction, formal or real, in Plato's argument.
Laws are like a doctor's prescription at their best - at their
worst they are like the attempts of the non-medical to get as
close as possible to a prescription written with medical
knowledge... He (the Statesman) is not bound by his own laws
any more than a doctor is by his prescriptions". (op. cit. p. 48)

For our purpose, however, the important thing is the
true nature of this ideal ruler and his ἐπιστήμη; and
this the myth brings home. Here I think Gould clearly grasps
the significance of the myth, and I find his interpretation
that Plato is drawing our attention to the 'humanity' of the
ruler of our present era convincing. "There is emphasis
throughout on the fact that the change is due to nature (φύσεως)
writes Gould* "the reversal is an integral part of the nature
of the universe, so that when revolving in the opposite sense,
it can be said to be αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς αὐτοῦ κορσίας....

But however inevitable the rotation away from the divine, it is still 'the slightest possible deviation from its true motion'. And since the myth is introduced in order to illuminate the nature of the 'grand mistake' which we would have made if we identified the statesman of the present age with the divine shepherd (274 e ff), it is important that immediately after the myth we are told that the ruler of the present age

(οἱ ἑνθάδε νῦν ὑπερὶσ τοιτικοὶ - 275B 8)

is not a god, 'the divine shepherd' of a simple human flock, but a human being ruling over other human beings. For in terms of the myth which makes our humanity begin with the removal of the god's controlling hands from the universe (Pol. 269e) it would seem that as incarnate even the divine element in us cannot totally escape the bonds of the flesh. In the 'Republic', on the other hand, though the philosophers must return to the cave and though we learn that nothing human is permanent and unchanging, τὸ λογιστικὸν (ΤΗΣ ὄμως ψυχῆς ρατιογε - see Rep. 533 D) which grasps or sees the ultimate criterion escapes from the fetters of the body; consequently the philosopher guardians of the analogy seem more like 'divine shepherds of a simple human flock', representing the purely divine in us, they control the human flock represented by 'spirit' and 'appetite'.

I therefore cannot agree with Professor Skemp that "the
truly scientific ruler of the Politicus can be none other than he" i.e. the philosopher king of the 'Republic', and would think that Campbell, Grube and Taylor*1 are right in suggesting that Plato in the 'Politicus' rejects the ideal of the philosopher-king of the Republic as unattainable. In fact, the evidence from Laws IV (713b-714b) the significance of which Professor Skemp expounds with a view to clarifying the distinction in the ideal of the 'Politicus' and that of the 'Laws' seems more like supporting the identity of the two ideals; for the 'divine shepherd' which, we are warned, it would be a 'grand mistake' to identify with the ruler of our world seems to be none other than one of the 'daemones' which, the 'Laws' tells us, were set to rule over men during the reign of Kronos. In drawing the parallels with the 'Laws' Professor Skemp, it would seem, overemphasizes the significance of the fact that the Statesman of the 'Politicus' rules with τέχνη and he exaggerates its consequences. Professor Skemp believes that the 'Politicus' draws the utmost consequences of the view that government is a techne (op.cit p.49) but even in the 'Laws' government is still a 'techne', and there is no evidence that


*2 cf. Gould op. cit. p.211
Plato ever abandoned that view. It however seems that the myth of the 'Politicus' teaches us a new lesson about the nature of this 'techne' and how it must be practised.

Vlastos,*1 however, agrees with Professor Skemp's interpretation of the political outlook of the 'Politicus'. I do not however think he is right in making short shrift of the myth of the dialogue in his interpretation. He dismisses it in a note on the grounds that there is no warrant for "the supposition that the divine kings of the age of Cronus stand for Plato's philosopher-kings" since "the former are not philosophers and the latter are not likened to gods." This seems to take a view too literal for Platonic interpretation. I have already given my own view of the significance of the myth; and the weakness of Vlastos' interpretation is that it takes no account whatever of the myth.

After the myth, we are told (275c) that "whether our rulers 'are human' or superhuman creatures we are still as committed as we were - neither more so nor less - to the task of seeking to reveal their true nature". In pursuing this task we do indeed find that our true statesman must rule with ἑπιστημή and that if we could find a ruler like him his rule would be by far superior to any actual constitution (301 b 5). Taking it that the myth draws our attention to the human element

in the nature of our true statesman, one does not need to
agree with Gould that Plato despairs of ever finding 'the man
to rule as a true man with ἐπιστήμη'. In order to believe
that Plato is in the 'Politicus' rejecting the ideal of the
'Republic'. For even if one agrees with Vlastos that it is
not Plato but the Greek public' who are doubting the merits,
and the practicability of the ideal ruler hinted at in Pol.
3016 ff, one need not agree with Vlastos that the ideal of the
Republic is being exactly restated. For there is no evidence
that to show the only ideal constitution outside the makeshift
constitutions is the ideal of the Republic; on the contrary
the myth tells a less lofty ideal is now desirable. But the
myth is not intended to undermine the Platonic certainty that the
true ruler must rule with ἐπιστήμη. Thus we are told that
the makeshift constitutions give rise to many evils because
"they all rest on the sandy foundation of action according
to law and custom without real scientific insight" 301E 6 ff.
What then is the true nature of this ἐπιστήμην τις?
In order to make him look like the philosopher-king of the
'Republic' Vlastos emphasises the absolutism of his power; and
he argues that since Plato regards the "ordinary, unphilosophical
kingship" as the best of the law-abiding constitutions he must
believe that the "capacity to bear absolute power without
corruption is well within the bound of human nature"; for
argues Vlastos, "if even this poor, second-rate autocrat, this
king without the kingly science, can hold such power without degenerating, how much more so the philosopher king? We can, therefore, conclude with reasonable confidence that Plato's early faith in enlightened absolutism was still intact when he wrote the *Politicus*" op. cit. p.237.

The truth, however, is that Plato does not credit this second-rate autocrat with any absolute power. We are definitely told that unphilosophical kingship is the best of the bastard constitutions, but like the others it rests on written enactment and customary habits without scientific insight but once the king disregards these enactments and conventional rules he becomes exactly "that one man who rules but does not govern his actions either by laws or by ancient customs but claims falsely what only the truly wise ruler had a right to claim and says that the 'best' course must be taken in defiance of written codes" - he becomes a tyrant. (301c1ff). In this respect, at least, Plato does not give the 'unphilosophic' ruler a power which he denies him in the *Laws* as Vlastos suggests. The reasoning with which Plato explains the collapse of the kingdoms are Argos and Messene because of the absolute power exercised by their rulers (*Laws* 690 d ff) is implicit in the *Politicus*. It can, however, be argued that even if Plato denies absolute power to the unscientific ruler in the *Politicus* his remarks there tend to show that he is willing to give it to the scientific ruler, (\textit{δικαιοσύνη τις})
which is all Vlastos needs to prove. Here attention must be drawn to the fact that Plato lays emphasis throughout on the insight of the true ruler. Vlastos in his note 25 shows that he is aware that it is possible to speak of a scientific ruler superior to all others while still recognising his humanity, but he thinks this view is more appropriate to the *Laws*. What the *Politicus* demands is 'one who rules with real knowledge, but what the *Laws* demand is a "ruler who had both the knowledge and the required nature (such as to withstand the corruptions of power)". I believe that these two requirements are implicit in the *Politicus* but the attempt to draw a clear distinction between the true statesman and the pretenders often puts the second requirement into the background. It however seems that the myth sufficiently emphasises it.  

*1 It seems to me that Vlastos attaches too little significance to the myth of the *Politicus* and too much to Plato's visit to Sicily in 361 B.C. by putting the 'crash of Plato's faith in absolutism' "After Plato's final encounter with Dionysius the Younger when he saw the ugly face of autocratic power at closer and more painful quarters than at any time in his life". op. cit. p.237.
irretrievably unites Being with some aspects of phenomena, and that phenomena cannot be explained solely in terms of Being. So the fact that the statesman of the 'Politicus' is ἐπιστήμωνις and rules with τέχνη should not blind us to the new truth which Plato is hinting at in the Politicus through the myth of that dialogue. The statesman of the dialogue therefore represents in spite of terminology an ideal somewhat different from that of the philosopher king of the Republic. His 'techne' rests on a basis somewhat similar to that of the νομοφύλαις in the Laws. For the myth makes it clear that in the 'Politicus', as in the 'Laws' (874e) fixed rules become necessary in consequence of our human imperfection; and it seems clear that Plato is in the 'Politicus' not setting the figure of his philosophic ruler who governs without the limitations of law by virtue of his 'techne' in sharp contrast to government by law, even in spite of some strain especially when the rule of the true statesman is contrasted with the rule existing in the 'makeshift' constitutions. The new truth seems to be only made more explicit in the passage well-known in the 'Laws' (739 b).

The same outlook which takes considerable note of the recalcitrant elements of human nature is shown in the 'Timaeus'. In the beginning of the 'Timaeus' we have something like a brief summary of the lessons of the first four books of the
'Republic'. After this, it is suggested that it would be a good thing to see the state whose structure is set forth in the Republic 'exerting function in accordance with its structure' so that we would see in actual practice the citizens of the 'theoretical' state of the Republic. Socrates confesses his limitations as far as practical affairs are concerned - his special field is the field of theory. It is perhaps plausible to suggest this confession is not without some significance, in view of the fact the ideal of the Republic was put forth by him. However, just at the point where we should begin to see the citizens of the ideal state of the 'Republic' in action the myth of the 'Timaeus' is introduced significantly at the point where according to the exposition in the 'Republic' we should be given the philosopher-kings; and bearing in mind that in the 'Gorgias' though less elaborately, and in the 'Laws' especially, Plato had argued that the limitations of the ethical ideal of the sophists arise from, a mistaken view of the universe, and that in the 'Politicus' he has put forth lessons of considerable importance for political thought through a particular view of the universe, it is reasonable to suggest that the myth of the 'Timaeus' is designed to convey new insights into the nature of man, morals and society. As Professor Skemp remarks* "we tend to

* Skemp. op. cit. p.54.
think of the *Timaeus* as representing an independent essay on the nature of the physical universe - as 'Plato's cosmology' in fact. But this is mistaken, as the introductory conversation in the *Timaeus* itself makes clear. The physics is only a preliminary to political history: it sets the stage for the account of the past glories of Athens". Plato therefore very likely believes that a correct appreciation of the cosmology expounded in the myth would afford some insight into the nature of political and moral ideals.

This new insight would naturally be looked for in the emphasis given to the concept of ἄναγκη in the myth. The Δημιούργος himself, must take account of necessity ( ἄναγκη) the Lucretian 'caeca potestas' which, as the fragment of Simonides quoted in the *Protagoras* (345 D 5) tells us, even the gods cannot control - ἄναγκη ὧ ν δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μαχονται *. Ethical and Political theory therefore must take account of the recalcitrant elements of average and historically determined human nature, and any ruler, however wise, must give allowance to those elements of human nature which the prescriptions and enactments of even the best intentioned and all-powerful autocrat cannot uproot.

* See Cornford - Plato's Cosmology - p.176 - "Necessity cannot be wholly persuaded by Reason to bring out the best result conceivable. Reason must be content to sacrifice the less important advantage and achieve the best result attainable. This last instance illustrates the truth of Galen's observation that the Demiurge is not strictly omnipotent. In arranging the world he could not group physical qualities in such a way as to secure all the ends he desired". and note his remarks on the different view held for example by Prof. Taylor that Reason entirely subordinates the disorderly material to 'the ends of Reason'. 
For just as the δημοκράτις can never fully eliminate the 'caeca potestas' inherent in his working material but can only guide it so that most things in this world might be governed for the best (Tim. 46A 2), so man can only strive to control as best he can, by the use of his reason - the divine element in him - the 'necessity' and limitations inseparable from our bodily condition. It would seem, therefore, that in order to be practicable the Utopianism of the 'Republic' must be modified.

The unfinished state of the 'Critias' where the account of the 'Timaeus' is continued makes it impossible to draw any definite conclusions from its evidence; interpretations of its myth therefore naturally differ. It is perhaps significant however that both the Atlantis - the city of Poseidon, the god of wealth and commerce, and Antediluvian Athens, (we remember that its citizens now represent the men of the ideal state of the Republic, the city of Athena and Hephaestus, the goddess of wisdom and the god of 'techne', are destroyed in the final catastrophe. Is Plato here expressing in myth his conviction that the loftiness of the ideal of Antedeluvian Athens, i.e. the ideal of the Republic, makes it impracticable because too uncompromising, and that Atlantis perished because it concedes too much to the 'irrational'? At least we are told that the citizens of Atlantis remained for ages happily leagued together, wise and law-abiding (Critias 120 e 1) until at last 'the portion of
divinity within them became weak and faint through being
oftentimes blended with a large measure of mortality and they
became filled with lawless ambition and power," Critias 121 b 1 ff.
It is therefore not an impossible suggestion, and indeed
Professor Cornford thinks it a very plausible one. For drawing
a parallel between Aeschylus and Plato and their respective
trilogies Professor Cornford writes "The philosophic poet and
the poet philosopher are both consciously concerned with the
enthronement of wisdom and justice in human society. For each
there lies, beyond and beneath this problem, the antithesis of
cosmos and chaos, alike in the constitution of the world and
within the confines of the individual soul. On all these planes
they see a conflict of powers, whose unreconciled opposition
entails disaster. Apolló and the Furies between them can only
tear the soul of Orestes in pieces. The city of uncompromised
ideals, the prehistoric Athens of 'Critias' legend, in the death
grapple with the lawless violence of Atlantis, goes down in a
general destruction of mankind. The unwritten 'Hemocrates', we
conjectured, would have described the rebirth of civilized
city and the institution of a state in which the ideal would
condescend to compromise with the given facts of man's nature.
So humanity might find peace at last. And the way to peace, for
Plato as for Aeschylus, lies through reconcilement of the
rational and the irrational, of Zeus and Fate, of Reason and

Necessity, not by force but by persuasion".*

* Cornford op. cit. Epilogue - p. 363
This is not to say that we have in the 'Timaeus' and the 'Critias' a recantation of the ideal of the Republic; (the ideals of the 'Republic' are still proclaimed (σῶς) in the 'Laws', but there is no doubt a softening-down - a willing to arrive at a compromise between the good and the necessary.

Whatever the Hermocrates might have been, the 'Laws' reveals the new ideal at work - the ideal of the compromise between the good and the necessary (Aristotle is going to make the emergence of the good from the necessary the basis of his political theory.) In conformity with this more realistic temper, we find in the 'Laws' Reason making the survey of history a necessary preliminary for the proper delimitation of its field of exercise. Cardinal principles having been laid in the first two books, the third attempts to find the very basis of political society. And while it would be expecting too much from Plato to believe that we have a purely historical analysis of the development of society, there is little doubt that we have in 'Laws' III an attempt to base political doctrine on the 'realistic' foundation of historical developments, even if, as is usual with Plato, Reason seeks only the significances of these developments*.

* see 676a - ἀδελφαρ καὶ τὴν τῶν πόλεων ἐπίσκοπον εἰς ἀρετὴν μεταβαίνουσαν ὧμα καὶ καίλαν ἐκάστοτε θεατέον.
The point of departure is one of those periodic destructions of mankind reported in the ancient legends (οἱ παλαιοὶ λόγοι).

And since legends like these 'must be perfectly credible to any man', we are to imagine one of these destructions, this time in the form of a deluge and then start reconstructing civilization from the rustic survivors of this deluge on the mountain slopes - "mere scanty embers of humanity left unextinguished among their high peaks".

The first society of human beings formed by the survivors of the deluge is the family, at the head of which is the patriarch who rules by unwritten custom law - ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίοις νόμοις ἐκόμενοι ἔφθασι (680a6) - ὁ πάντες τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πολιτείαν ὑπαστείαν καλεῖν, ἢ καὶ νῦν ἐτί πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν ἕλλησι καὶ κατὰ βαρβάρους ἔστιν * Πτ. 2

Next households unite into villages - "For out of the single households and families, whom the dearth consequent on the cataclysms keeps in isolation, arise communities in which the eldest rule because the eldest inherit the authority from father or mother, and the people follow them, and are soon to be found forming one flock, like so many birds, ruled by paternal authority, the justest of all titles to royal rank". This is the κόμη and the fully developed patriarchy.

The next stage is a union of villages; to function smoothly
a society of this type requires laws because of the diversity of the custom laws of the uniting villages. At this stage therefore we have the emergence of lawgivers and the growth of constitutions, monarchic or aristocratic. The enactment of laws therefore come about from the necessity to choose for the united community the best out of the custom-laws of the various clan-units out of which the new community grew.

When such communities as these last mentioned extend into the plain we have the fully developed city. This type of community gives to its citizens the scope for various activities and offers facilities of intercourse with the outside world. "As a consequence, not only do the relations of classes in the city change, but even the city itself is entangled in conflicts with other cities - sometimes with disastrous results" - Laws 676a - 682a.

Such a city was Ilium. (681d - 682e). Ilium or Troy forms the connecting link between its own stage of political development and the stage where confederacies are formed. Plato is imprecise as to what name we should give to the latter form of society. οὐδὲ δὴ τετάρτη τῆς ἡμέρας αὐτήν κόλις is the phrase with which it is introduced, and we are next told that we may call it an 'ethnos' if we wish - εἰ δὲ βούλεονται, ἔθνος (683a + 6e). Be that as it may, this stage is historically exemplified in the three Dorian cities of the Peloponnesus - Sparta, Messene and Argos. We have thus in Plato's sketch of
the development of society four stages - the household, the village, the polis, and the 'ethnic' community.

We need not join Professor Morrow*1 in arguing that almost everything in Plato's construction here is historical; there is however little doubt that he is right when he remarks - "The picture that they (Plato & Aristotle) give of the polis as emerging comparatively late through a union of families, clans, tribes and villages, and retaining as vital parts in its later structure these elements of which it was put together - this we see is eminently correct, in the main for the Greek world in which they were most interested; and especially true of Athens the city we know best."  

In the 'Laws', therefore, political ideals are presented not by way of conveying in myth the pure envisagement of Reason but by way of Reason seriously taking account of Necessity and grappling with it with a view to ordering it for the best. The lower elements of human nature are, no less than they are in the Republic, regarded as necessities forced upon the highest element of our nature by the contact with phenomena. In the 'Laws' however, there is the realisation that the grip of necessity is so strong that the political philosopher had better take account of it. Ideals therefore must be sought by grappling with the data of historically determined human nature, even if in the form of Reason seeking the significance of these*1.

*1 G.R. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, pp. 63 - 73. & 119
The myth of *Laws* IV only supplements the lessons of history. And this lesson is similar to that taught by the *Politicus* and the *Timaeus*. As in the *Politicus* (271c, cf. 274d) the emphasis is on the distinction between the period when all things are governed by the divine intelligence of the Creator and the period when human beings are responsible for their own affairs.

For "according to the received tradition, in that age of bliss, all life needs was provided in abundance and unsought, and the reason, we are told, was this. Cronus was of course aware that...no human being is competent to wield an irresponsible control over mankind without becoming swollen with pride and unrighteousness. Being alive to this he gave our communities as their kings and magistrates, not men but spirits, beings of diviner and superior kind, just as we still do the same with our flocks of sheep and herds of other domesticated animals: we do not set oxen to manage oxen, or goats to manage goats; we, their betters in kind, act as their masters ourselves. Well, the god, in his kindness to man, did the same; he set over us this superior race of spirits who took charge of us with no less ease to themselves than convenience to us, providing us with peace and mercy, sound law and unscanted justice, and endowing the families of mankind with internal concord and happiness. So the story teaches us today, and teaches us, truly that when a community is ruled not by God but by man, its members have no refuge from evil and misery; we should do our utmost - this is the moral - to reproduce the life of the 'age of Cronus', and therefore should order our private households and our public societies alike in obedience to the immortal element within us, giving the name of law to the appointment of understanding". *Laws* IV. 713c² - 714a² - Taylor's translation.

Plato certainly dwells on the rustic simplicity of that ideal world, but it would, I think, be mistaken if this is taken as evidence for Plato's nostalgia for a rustic utopia. The meaning seems to me to be this: while in the world, 'demons' take care of us and by providing all life needs control the arts and
techniques which in our world we must use to provide our needs, thus keeping under control all distracting and corrupting influences, in temporal life we are on our own - and liable as we are to many distracting and corrupting influences, we must, in lieu of 'demons', rely on the apportionment of Reason - the divine element in us - to take care of these things. *

It only need to be added by way of final remarks that the analysis in the 'Republic' has been mainly logical or psychological and the ideal transcendental. In the 'Timaeus' and the 'Politicus' the categories of a somewhat modified ethical and political ideal have been put forth through myths. In the 'Laws' analysis and myth proclaim the same ideal. In terms of the concept of φύσις, the criterion by which ethical and political ideals are formulated, it could be said that Plato has drawn quite close to Aristotle's doctrine that man's ideals should, at least largely, be formulated by looking at man and human institutions. Plato, it can be argued, regrets that this has to be done; Aristotle, thinking that it is the only valid thing to do, does it more cheerfully. At this point where the Plato's political principles are closest to that of his pupil, we shall examine the foundation of the political theory of the pupil.

* There may well be some significance in the pun διανόησις - δαίμονες which Gould (op.cit.p.98 Note 6) notices.
We saw in the last chapter that Plato found the true norm of 'φυσις' in the world of transcendent forms; I also there suggested, without implying that Plato ever abandoned the two-world doctrine, that behind Plato's attempts to grapple seriously with phenomena in the 'Politicus' and the 'Laws', for example, lies a philosophic principle quite close to Aristotle's. In view of these earlier investigations which were undertaken in the belief that they would shed light on Aristotle's philosophic principle and ultimately on his doctrine of man and society, it is time we asked what Aristotle's conception of φυσις is. However, Aristotle more consciously than any of the thinkers mentioned in the foregoing distinguishes πρακτικὴ φιλοσοφία from θεωρητικὴ and obviously regards the former as the valid starting-point of moral and political theory and wants to be as independent as possible of 'metaphysics' in the sense of the nature of reality or of the universe in his ethical and political theory; it may therefore seem necessary to add by way of explanation that the relevance of the theory of φυσις to ethical and political theory lies in the method it invites and in the nature of the 'norm' it presupposes, and in this sense Aristotle's conception of φυσις is no less relevant to his ethical and political thought than Plato's.

What then is Aristotle's conception of φυσις? In terms of the explanation of reality this is easily summarised. According
to Aristotle, the Pre-Socratics explained the world and its
contents by its material cause which they called ϕύσις; in
doing this, they were only partially right; it was also late
before this conception of reality was overcome (cf. Metaphysics
I.5) Plato sought the explanation in the εἶδος; here too he
was only partially right: For the true explanation is that
though reality is the phenomenal thing, it includes the εἶδος
or idea which the pre-Socratics neglected, but this εἶδος
cannot be separated from the concrete object itself as Plato
thought. θεωρία or ϕύσις is the combination of these two
aspects of being in the dynamic process of entelechy in which
the substantial form of the idea manifests itself in the
particular as the actualisation of that thing's potentiality.
Thus Windelband*, for example, with some justification, sees in
Aristotle's conception of ϕύσις Aristotle's dissatisfaction
with something that he saw in the system of his great prede­
cessor - Plato, i.e. "the Eleatic assumption of absence of
relation - absence of relation between the general and the
particular, between ideas and phenomena, between conceptions
and perceptions. For while Plato had made two different worlds
out of the general which is known by the conception, and the
particular which is perceived, the entire effort of Aristotle is
directed towards removing again this division in the conception
of reality, and discovering that relation between Idea and

* An Introduction to Philosophy, translated by Joseph McCabe p.6
phenomenon which shall make conceptual knowledge able to explain what is perceived". It is common knowledge that this effort led Aristotle to contest with Plato the χρήσις of the Idea (see e.g. Phys. 193b).

This conception of ϕύσις we find in the Metaphysics, in the Physics and in De Partibus Animalium; we only here draw attention to that in Physics 192b 21-23. There Nature is defined as "a principle of motion and rest in those things which have implanted and inherent in them an impulse to motion and rest whether that motion be locomotion, increase, decay or alteration"; and by the side of this definition can usefully be seen the static analysis of the four causes. In this analysis we are given the four causes which need to be known before the 'nature', 'essence' or reality of a thing is understood. Thus taking the famous example of the statue we have (i) The material cause - the marble of which it is made, (ii) The formal cause - the pattern by having which in mind the sculptor directs the process, (iii) The efficient cause - the sculptor who initiates the process, (iv) The final cause - the end or purpose which determines the statue in its finished form.

The last three causes, however, often become one - ἢρχεται ὅ ἐὰν τὰ τρία εἰς ἑν πόλλακτις. Physics B. 198a 24-25; cf. de Part. An. 1.1.642a1 and Phys.B 199a 30. When this happens we have only two causes - the material cause and the one formed by
the coalition of the other three. This coincidence is very common in living things.

Thus the concept of φύσις as the essence of things which have a source of movement in themselves and of the natural as having a principle of growth, organisation and movement in its own right, and a tendency towards a characteristic end - an end which we have to seek by looking at how things generally happen but which lies above the immediate facts of experience because comprehensible κατὰ λόγον is given philosophic expression in Aristotle's doctrine of potentiality and actuality and of matter and form. Aristotle thereby attempted to close the gap between idea and phenomena; and by substituting potential and actual for Plato's non-existent and existent believes that the end must be studied, in close alliance with the means: for the former is nothing extrinsic and can only be grasped through close attention to the concrete and specific.

The method which this conception of φύσις invites in ethical and political theory would seem to be the truly Aristotelian one. And indeed scholars often see the effects of this Janus-like aspect of Aristotle's conception of φύσις in his ethical and political works, in fact in all his works; for they see in the fact that the end - telos - lies a jump above the immediate facts of experience the ideal aspect of Aristotle's
thought and its debt in one form or another to Platonic heritage, and in the fact that this end i.e. the ideal must be sought for by an examination of the facts of experience the empirical aspect of his thought.

A view to which Professor During gives expression when he says "In Aristotle's writings we can always expect to meet side by side the two dominant trends: Platonic abstraction and biological empiricism" and again from a slightly different point of view "Aristotle was struggling to become a Platonist and to reconcile his empirical and common sense approach to nature with Plato's idealism".

According to the theory of the development of Aristotle made famous by Jaeger, however, Aristotle's conception of was not always as 'sketched' above. This could of course be true without precluding us from using that conception of as the background of Aristotle's ethical and political theory. The genetic theory, however, puts forward the additional thesis that whenever we see those "two dominant trends - Platonic abstraction and biological empiricism" - in the same work - the idealist trend must be separated and put into a different chronological pigeon-hole. And when on the basis of this theory one finds Jaeger whom the great Aristotelian scholar Ross justifiably calls "the most brilliant Aristotelian of our time" arguing that Aristotle examined the actual constitutions of Politics II "in order to show that the best state does not occur

anywhere"\textsuperscript{1}, in open defiance of what Aristotle himself says at the beginning of the book, it becomes difficult to put the genetic theory into the limbo of discarded problems. Therefore though the genetic theory of Aristotle's development is obviously no longer a live issue but rather a matter of historical interest a brief attention will here be given to the theory with special reference to Jaeger's and Von Arnim's versions as these two scholars seem to have studied the Politics in detail against the background of what they conceived to be the nature of Aristotle's development.

As Sir David Ross points out \textsuperscript{2} it was Thomas Case who blazed the trail of the development theory. For in his article on Aristotle in the 'Encyclopaedia Britannica' of 1911 (also his article in 'Mind' 1925) he gave an outline of Aristotle's development in which he put forward the view that Aristotle's own characteristic views only emerged after he had emancipated himself from Plato. The cornerstone of Aristotle's philosophy, Case argues, is the eternity of the world, and this enables him to put forward the doctrine that essence can be eternal without being separable; for the substantial reality of the concrete object follows from the eternity of the world.

The application of the development theory in a detailed

\textsuperscript{1} Jaeger - 'Aristotle' p. 286

exposition of Aristotle's thought is, however, Jaeger's achievement. The outlines of Jaeger's method are evident in his earlier studies like "Studien zur Erscheinungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles" Berlin, Werdman 1912, and Das Pneuma in Lykeion" Hermes, 48 (1913) pp.29-74. It is however in his epoch-making work "Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung" of 1923, translated into English in 1934 by Richard Robinson under the title "Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development" that Jaeger applies the development theory to the main fields of Aristotle's thought - Metaphysics and Theology, Ethics and Politics.

The outlines of that thesis are well-known; from the Platonic idealism of his youth Aristotle progressed towards an empirical scientific outlook. In Metaphysics ἐωτα from being a supersensible entity becomes "just one of a whole series of meanings of being" (Jaeger - 'Aristotle' p.204).

In Metaphysics and theology the progress is traced through the De Philosophia, the De Caelo, the 'earlier' or 'original' Metaphysics, the Physics and the later Metaphysics. While in his earlier thought, Jaeger argues, references by Aristotle to physical objects like Mount Olympus and to the myths of Uranus etc. had for him religious and metaphysical significance, in his later thought Aristotle actually admits sensibles into the earlier metaphysical foundation of the unmoved mover; thus, taking note
of the theory of Callipus, he multiplies the unmoved mover by 47 or 55 and gives us in Met. A.8 a doctrine which contradicts almost all that went before. In ethics, the progress is through the Protrepticus, the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics; an idealistic theory of morals and social life gives place to a more prudential ethics. In the Protrepticus, for example, 
φρονησις is given a transcendental status and it very closely resembles philosophic knowledge in the full Platonic sense, in the Nicomachean Ethics, on the other hand, "φρονησις is deprived of much theoretical significance". Not only did Aristotle think progress in the manner sketched but even in his later works it is often necessary to distinguish traces of the earlier mode of thought. On this reasoning, the ideal of the contemplative life in the E.N. belongs to the Platonic phase, even though it is a 'watered-down' ideal as we have it in the E.N., and also since the doctrine of the 'active intellect' in the De Anima is tinged with idealism it must be Platonic and early! Though the remark could seem rather unfair to Jaeger, it is nevertheless true that the logical conclusion of Jaeger's method is found unfortunately in Paul Gohlke.

* Paul Gohlke - Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften d.Arist. Hermes, LIX. July 1928 by his article on the Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric in O.A.W. of 1944. Jaeger's efforts are of course more fruitful of results, and it is impossible to dismiss them with the summary 'wasted effort' with which Gigon dismisses Gohlke's labours in the Gnomon of 1952.
who puts forward the theory that in almost every treatise of Aristotle that has come down to us, we have two versions - an earlier version composed by Aristotle before he got hold of the 'potency' doctrine and a later post-'potency' version. For, argues Golke, the doctrine of potency marks the turning-point in Aristotle's thought, and after his return to Athens Aristotle revises, and in the process virtually repeats all his earlier works, thus giving us the Janus-like aspect in his works!

Nuyens in his 'L' Evolution de la psychologie d'Aristote' (Louvain 1943) takes up Jaeger's presuppositions and applies them to Aristotle's psychology. He thus develops a 'three-period' theory of Aristotle's psychology: the 'Eudemus' period when Aristotle was still a full adherent of Platonism; the soul then is, as expounded by Plato in the 'Phaedo', a prisoner of the body; this is the pure 'dualist' theory. There is next the view of the soul developed in the biological works (with the exception of the De Gen.Anim) and in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. This view culminates, Nuyens believes, in the De Part.Anim where though we learn that the soul is form of body P.A. Bk.I, Nuyens makes a distinction between this view of the soul and the latest view in the De Anima on the grounds that the soul is not form of body in all its parts (cf. however, 641a 28 - b4, b9-10, with De Anima 403a3-12; 413a 5-7; 413b 24-7). The view of the third period is the 'entelechy' or 'hylomorphic' one.
This is the view of the soul in the *De Anima*, *Met. Z,H,ON*, the *Parya Nat.*, *De Gen.* *De Sensu*, and *De Memoria*. According to Nuyens, since the *EN* adopts a theory of the soul appropriate to the second period, the *EN* must be earlier than the *De Anima*.

It is perhaps hardly necessary to remark that even when the theory was new, not every scholar was convinced or even impressed by the results which Jaeger's method yielded, though its originality (in spite of Thomas Case) was universally acclaimed. Von Arnim, for instance, immediately after Jaeger's publication wrote a series of articles in the Philosophisch-Historische Klasse and the Sitzungsberichte of the Vienna Academy mainly aimed at exposing the chinks in Jaeger's armour. In some studies in the Wiener Studien Arnim attempted to show that, contrary to Jaeger's thesis, *Met. B.* is later than *Met. K.*, and that the 'we' passages of *Met A.* do not support Jaeger's thesis.

In his own theory which he develops in the 'Gotteslehre des Aristoteles' B.A.W. 1931 he agrees with Jaeger that Aristotle was at first a Platonist; Aristotle was however initially not very interested in metaphysics and differed from Plato in details. On almost every other point however, Arnim disagrees with Jaeger. He contests vigorously for instance Jaeger's thesis that in the idealist - scientist progress Aristotle in the *De Caelo* still regards God as a transcendental unmoved mover; though Arnim to maintain his own position had to regard some evidences* as later

* for example the passage at *De Caelo* 288b5 and 292a19.
additions. Still according to Arnim the unmoved mover simply does not belong to the De Caelo doctrines. In fact, according to Arnim, the doctrine of the unmoved mover is late; for it was not until Aristotle had written the biological works and discovered the fact that another motion apart from self-motion could be detected in animals that he rejected 'the self-mover' as the source of motion. Thus the doctrine of the De Caelo lies on the same basis as that of Physics I - VI, the basis that φύσις is an ἀκήρατος κινητας. After rejecting the self-mover as the self-sufficient explanation of motion Aristotle developed the doctrine of the unmoved mover. Thus contrary to Jaeger's thesis Aristotle was not gradually, as he moved away from Plato, depriving the doctrine of the unmoved mover of its metaphysical significance; he was indeed progressing towards the doctrine of the unmoved mover. The weakness of Arnim's theory would seem to lie in the unbridgeable gap it creates between the Aristotelian conception of φύσις and the doctrine of the unmoved mover.

Different views of the De Philosophia, De Caelo, Metaphysics progress are of course held by other scholars, by Ross and Guthrie pre-eminently among English scholars.

We here briefly draw attention to the views of these two scholars. In his articles entitled 'The Development of Aristotle's Theology', Classical Quarterly, 27 (1933) and 28 (1934) Professor Guthrie argued that the doctrine of the unmoved mover is reconciliable with Aristotle's mature doctrine of φύσις and
that it was indeed a doctrine of Aristotle's mature years.
Concerning the relationship of the 'aether' of the De Caelo and
the doctrine of the unmoved mover, Professor Guthrie suggests
"the possibility that A's beliefs about the aether may have gone
through three stages: (i) he accepted the earlier and popular
belief that the aether was a true god with a mind of its own,
and that its circular motion therefore was due to 'the action
of its own will' (ii) when his own theory of nature was further
advanced and he thought of ἐνεργεία as the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως
of everything, he applied this to the aether as well and said
that not only motion up and down but also circular motion must
be natural (iii) he subordinated it to the Unmoved Mover" (C.Q.
27. p.166), and in the concluding remarks of that article observes
that "the introduction of an unmoved mover did not mean the
denial of the physical theory which posited a principle of
growth inherent in the thing". Professor Guthrie does not, as
far as I know, relate his view of the development of Aristotle's
theology to the development of Aristotle's ethics and politics;
it however seems justifiable to deduce from the foregoing remarks
that he would not think it justifiable to separate the so-called
empirical and idealist trends in Aristotle's thought to separate
chronological compartments.

Sir David Ross seems on the whole more sympathetic towards
Jaeger's theory of the development of Aristotle's metaphysics
and theology. Though, contrary to Jaeger, he thinks that the theology of the De Caelo neither proves nor disproves transcendence, _yet_ in his comments on these so-called empirical and idealistic aspects of Aristotle's thought he seems to me to have rightly utilized the insights contained in Professor Guthrie's article. Hence Ross remarks "While I accept his (Jaeger's) belief that Aristotle moved from a Platonic, other-worldly view to a more realistic view, for which the physical world mattered a great deal, the movement of his mind proceeded neither so far nor so fast as Jaeger describes it as having proceeded. The clearest evidence of this is Aristotle's retention of the prime unmoved mover as the mainspring of his system in the very last years of his life. But we have also seen that, while Aristotle's conception of the soul went through three distinct phases, in the last of which it has ceased to be for him an entity distinct from the body, the physical activities of living things remained for him a matter of greater interest. In ethics we find the same story. The _Nicomachean Ethics_, by general consent a late work, breathes as high an idealism as any of his works. The same is true of the _Politics_; the so-called idealistic parts of it, in their present form, at least, are in all probability, no less than its other parts to be dated near the end of his life". The position implied by the foregoing remarks by Ross is

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the position adopted in this study of Aristotle's political theory but before we sketch in some details that position it is necessary to examine that aspect of Jaeger's theory which is of more immediate relevance to the Ethics and the Politics.

This is the Protrepticus, Eudemian Ethics, Nicomachean Ethics line of development; and here Jaeger places the weight of his evidence on the Protrepticus. Beside other considerations, Jaeger finds much support for his thesis in the language of 'Protrepticus' Fr.13 (Walzer, Ross). For in that fragment we have the remarkable expression that 'just as in the simple crafts the best tools are derived from nature, as for instance in the building trade the plummet, the rule etc....in the same way the statesman must have certain landmarks taken from nature and truth itself by reference to which he will judge what is just, what is good, what is expedient'. The key phrases, however, are contained in the following pieces which I cite.

αὐτῶν γὰρ ἐκεῖ τῶν ὀργάνων ταύτα διαφέρει πάντων, οὕτω καὶ οὕτως καλλίστος ὁ μάλιστα κάτα φύσιν κατέμενος
and again -

τῇ δὲ φιλοσοφῷ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπ' ἄντων τῶν ἀκριβῶν ἢ μιμησις ἐστὶν· αὐτῶν γὰρ ἐστὶ θεατὶς, ἀλλ' οὗ μιμηματῶν
and finally -

μόνος γὰρ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀλέξων ἔτη καὶ κοῖς τὸ θεῖον καὶ καθόπερ νὰ κυβερνήσῃ τοὺς ἄγαθος ἔτη αὐτῶν καὶ μοντίων ἀναφα-

μενος τοῦ βίου τὰς ἀρχας ὁμοίως καὶ τῇ καθ' ἐαυτὸν.
For Professor Jaeger these phrases and terms are evidence that Aristotle is in the *Protrepticus* referring to Plato's theory of transcendent forms and as an adherent of that doctrine. He sees in the *Protrepticus* the ideal of mathematical exactness; the exact opposite of the ideal of *E.N.* and some parts of the *Politics*. He believes that it offers a very insufficient explanation "to say that Aristotle was only imitating Plato's style and that his own opinion lay hidden discreetly and cautiously beneath: for the words can only be readily understood by their organic connection with the philosophy of the *Protrepticus* and the latter necessitates the dualist metaphysics of the Forms as the theoretical basis of the doctrines of values expressed in that dialogue. To interpret those pieces of Platonic terminology with a view to accommodating them to the later trend of Aristotle's thought would be a desperate way out of the difficulties" op. cit.

Professor Jaeger sees therefore in the *Protrepticus* the transcendental status of *φρόνησις* and its very close resemblance to philosophic knowledge in the full Platonic sense. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, however, "*φρόνησις* is deprived of much theoretical significance, and has its sphere sharply distinguished from that of *σοφία* and *Νόος*". *φρόνησις* becomes a practical faculty 'concerned with the choice of the
ethically desirable and with the prudent satisfaction of one's own advantage; it is concerned not with the universal but with the fleeting details of life*.

* Jaeger's statement that φρόνησις in the E.N. 'is concerned not with the universal but with the fleeting details of life' is an exaggeration which tends to give the effect of radical changes in Aristotle's thought. For what Aristotle tells us (E.N. VI.1140b 16-20; 1142a 23-30 cf. 1143a 35-55) is that φρόνησις is concerned as much with the particular as with the universal but perhaps rather more with the particular. The φρόνησις is good at deliberation, in the decision that issues in action, and the practical syllogism with which Aristotle illustrates the deliberation-argument makes it obvious that the φρόνησις is concerned with the universal as well as with the particular: All heavy waters are bad for health; this is a heavy water; therefore this is bad for health. In fact for Aristotle's ethical theory, the φρόνησις in the major premiss of the practical syllogism actually formulates his ideal, and it is partly because his ideal is the true ideal that he is called φρόνησις; the major premiss is a general conception or principle καθόλου ὑπόληπτος or λόγος. But since the φρόνησις is concerned with action he is also very much concerned with the particular subject of the minor premiss, for the aim of the deliberation-argument (the practical syllogism) is a προσεχείς resulting in immediate action.

Here again therefore it is easy to see how, on the one hand, Aristotle could concentrate on the significance of φρόνησις in the Protrepticus, esp. if he was urging people who underrate the value of ideals or abstract processes of thought, and on the other hand come to modify his language in the E.N. when he comes to deal with the actual theory of ethics. There, the presence in the practical syllogism (the instrument of the φρόνησις) of the singular minor term and the singular minor premiss - both of which cannot really be known but only be apprehended by φρόνησις demarcates the sphere of φρόνησις from that of επιτομή or νοῦς the faculties of the demonstrative or scientific syllogism.
This lowering of the status of \( \phi\rho\nu\nu\nu\alpha\varsigma \), Jaeger believes, is a direct and inevitable consequence of the rejection of the theory of Forms and of a trend of thought moving in the direction of Aristotle's maturer conception of \( \varphi\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma \). For while the theory (the theory of Ideas) was held \( \phi\rho\nu\nu\nu\alpha\varsigma \) was not only the knowledge of true being but was also the knowledge of the pure Norms by reference to which man should order his life. By its rejection however, dialectic lost its direct significance for human life and hence the distinction between metaphysics and ethics became much sharper than before. But here surely the distinction between metaphysics and ethics can only become sharper on Jaeger's hypothesis that \( \phi\rho\nu\nu\nu\alpha\varsigma \) as used in the Protrepticus represents the Platonic ideal of transcendental Good. For if Aristotle used \( \phi\rho\nu\nu\nu\alpha\varsigma \) in his exposition of the ethical ideal in a protreptic work \( \phi\rho\nu\nu\nu\alpha\varsigma \) could have within that framework theoretical as well as practical significance, as indeed it does have in the fragments which Jaeger believes come from the Protrepticus. If when Aristotle turns to the more specific problems of ethics he defines his terms more 'technically' this needs not mean that he has changed his ethical ideals: it may just be that he is in the E.N. concerned with problems which need not be raised in a protreptic work. (Further if, as During suggests, Aristotle wrote the Protrepticus to defend the philosophic ideal of the

Platonic school against the School of Isocrates*2 which tended

*2 It is Professor During's thesis that the Protrepticus was designed as a defence against the attacks of the Isocratean school on abstract processes of thought in ethics.
to hold abstract theory in contempt, he could very well lay emphasis on the ethical significance of 'philosophy' without committing himself to accept the theory of Ideas. Indeed in the very last paragraph of the *E.N.* the spirit of which, Jaeger believes, is diametrically opposed to that of the Protrepticus it is interesting to note what part their lack of Oeos (a plays in the disqualification of the school if socrates and other Sophists and the practising 'statesman' for the office of the lawgiver.) Apart from this, even in the technical language of the *E.N.* the φρονιμος (cf. *E.N.* 1143a 35-b9) is sometimes identifiable with the νομιν εχων thus showing how close the relationship is between φρονησις and νομις. It is νομις to which Jaeger thinks φρονησις is identical in the Protrepticus. If one adds the further fact that Aristotle was not concerned with the precise language of ethics in the Protrepticus, that he was probably only arguing that though philosophy is theoretical it is nevertheless of the highest value for practical conduct, it becomes clear that Professor Jaeger has put on the Protrepticus an interpretation that it does not necessarily invite.

To those who are convinced by Dr. Rabinowitz* however, Professor Jaeger's theory would appear to have little or no basis in so far as that basis is grounded on the content and philosophy of the 'Protrepticus'. For on the grounds that 'little positive

evidence for an accurate reconstruction of the work is available", Dr. Rabinowitz would argue that we cannot know anything definite about the Protrepticus. Dr. Rabinowitz no doubt succeeds in shaking the apparently impregnable basis on which Jaeger builds his theory and creates some radical doubts. I also think that some of Dr. Rabinowitz's doubts like those based on Iamblichus ability 'to use a variety of sources in a wide variety of ways' and on the difficulty, partly consequent on this, of proving that the excerpts are taken directly from Aristotle, are more strongly based than acknowledged even by During - 'Aristotle's Protrepticus pp. 28-29).

However, even some of those scholars whose criticisms are not as fatal to Jaeger's thesis as Rabinowitz's, and who are willing to accept a considerable number of these fragments as genuine believe that Aristotle was in the 'Protrepticus' not expressing a purely Platonic metaphysics or ethics. Among this group of scholars are During, Stark, and rather surprisingly, Nuyens who seems to be the first to argue that we have in the Protrepticus Aristotle's mature conception of ϕύσις. All of these scholars believe that the doctrine of the significantly political fragments to which we have drawn attention is, in spite of the Platonic expressions and terminology of those fragments, close to that of Aristotle's school-works and need not be taken as proof that Aristotle was an orthodox Platonist when he wrote
them. The view of these scholars is identical with that put forward by Professors Von Fritz and Kapp in the Introduction to their edition of Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts (pp.32 ff). It is expanded by Professor During both in his earlier writings on the 'Protrepticus', the most comprehensive of which is under the title - "Aristotle on ultimate principles from 'nature and reality'" - in "Aristotle and Plato in mid-fourth Century (Proc. Symposium Aristotelium, Oxford 1957), Gothenburg, 1961 pp.35 ff; and in his commentary on Fr.13 in "Aristotle's Protrepticus - An attempt at Reconstruction" - Trag.46-51, commentary pp.215-226. I here only summarise the main points of that argument. The pre-Socratic use of ὑστεροι facilitates Aristotle's use of it in the manner seen in Fr.13(W) without his referring to the world of forms; for similar usages are found in Hippias, Thucydides, Democritus, the Corpus Hippocraticum. Therefore as Professors Von Fritz and Kapp suggested what we have in this fragment is a reflection in Aristotle of the "pre-Platonic beginnings of a theory of natural law". Secondly, Aristotle's own idea of nature realising its telos within itself makes it possible for him to refer to a para-deigmatic reality without implying that this 'norm' is transcendent or outside nature. And finally, since the norm of is used in a similar way in works that are generally accepted to be among the school-works (e.g. EN: De Anima; De Gen. Anim. De Motu Anim.) it is unwarranted to interprete this usage in the
'Protrepticus' as implying Aristotle's full adherence to Platonism when he wrote the 'Protrepticus'. Even if it cannot be said that During's thesis is proved beyond doubt, the evidence marshalled in support of the thesis convinces me that any idealistic trend in Aristotle's later thought need not be put down as mere vestiges of an earlier phase of thought.

Jaeger also believes that Aristotle's biological works belong to his second Athenian period when he was head of the Lyceum. It is however difficult to neglect the evidence first pointed out by D'Arcy Thompson*1 that the place-names in the biological works tend to show that those inquiries were conducted on or near Lesbos before Aristotle's return to Athens in 335. The D'Arcy Thompson's suggestion has recently been given support by the results of Mr. Lee's*2 investigation. The evidence supports the view that at least the materials for Aristotle's biological works were collected during Aristotle's middle period.

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According to Jaeger, the earliest and the ideal sections of the Politics were written in Aristotle’s middle period; also, according to Jaeger, the same outlook which gave birth to the biological works gave birth to the empirical aspects of Aristotle’s ethics and politics. In view of the evidence that the biological works were undertaken or at least conceived when those sections of the Politics which Jaeger regards as earliest (therefore ideal) were written, it becomes extremely difficult to draw a distinction on chronological grounds between those sections of the Ethics and Politics which reflect an idealistic outlook and those which show a more empirical approach. For even on Jaeger’s theory (provided of course he accepts the new evidence) it has been shown that Aristotle was capable of revealing both aspects at the same time. The ‘empirical’ or ‘scientific’ temper which Jaeger saw only in Aristotle’s last years had long been present in his philosophic outlook: and there is evidence to show that soon after Plato’s death or even before, Aristotle was already engaged in works of detailed historical research (Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά, δικαιώματα ..).

Of course, this is not to argue that political or historical works like the collection of constitutions etc. were undertaken in Aristotle’s middle period. It is however to argue that the time-factor on which Jaeger lays so much emphasis
is not so significant to the effort to understand Aristotle's political thought. Sir David Ross agrees with Jaeger that the 'συνηγμένων πολιτείων' of E.N. 1161b 17 refers to the collection of the constitutions of 158 states. But while Jaeger uses this as evidence to support his theory of an earlier and later sections of the Politics (the programme adumbrated at the end of the E.N. is, to Jaeger, a later addition by Aristotle in the 'scientific' period). Ross thinks, rightly it seems to me, that the programme is a programme for a Politics about to be written, not one already written, even partially, and concludes that the whole Politics is a work of Aristotle's second stay at Athens, the period between the years 335 - 322*.

* According to Jaeger there is in the Politics no reference to any event after 335 B.C. (the end of Aristotle's middle period). This view is consistent with the theory that some sections of the Politics were definitely written before 335 B.C. but it does not prove much, since Jaeger does not explain why there should be no references in the 'empirical' parts to events after 335 B.C. Newman and Barker see traces of references to events after 335 B.C. Barker dating Pol.VII 1330b 32ff to within the years 338 and 326. No evidence however precludes us from dating the whole of the Politics to Aristotle's last years 335-322 B.C.
Let us then round off this negative aspect of our study by seeing what insight the conception of ἐδοξάζει we attribute to Aristotle gives us into the structure of the Politics. As before, the inquiry would proceed by confrontation with Jaeger's and Arnim's thesis. But let us first distinguish the major components of the Politics as it has come down to us.

a) Bk.1. On the evolution of political society, and on the household.

b) Bk.2. On the model constitutions proposed by other theorists, and on the best among the forms of government actually established.

c) Bk.3. On the fundamental conceptions which need to be assumed for any political society, and on true constitutions and their perversions.

d) Bks.4 & 5. On the varieties of constitutions; factors prejudicial to their stability and the means of ensuring their stability.

e) Bk.6. On the stability of constitutions.

f) Bks.7 & 8. On the best constitution.

In connection with the Politics the main points of Jaeger's theory are these (a) that the concluding passage of the E.N. in which Aristotle sketched the plan for the Politics is a later addition from Aristotle's hands. It was added about the same time as the composition of Bks.4, 5, & 6 of the Politics.
i.e., when Aristotle was head of the Lyceum. (b) that Bks. 7 & 8 form the earliest section of the Politics; Bks. 2 & 3 also belong to this period. Bks. 2, 3, 7, 8 therefore present an 'ideal' politics. (c) that Bk. 1 was added last of all to the heterogenous portions that compose the Politics. Bk. 2 was the original introductory Book, but when Aristotle converted his political theory from that of the ideal state to a general theory of the state, Bk. 2 became 'useless as an introduction' and Bk. 1 had to be written. I now take these points in turn.

There is really no justification for supposing that the closing remarks of the E.N. are a later addition; and Jaeger offers little. However true it may be that the Politics present a Janus-face "gazing on the idealists as if it were a Platonic Utopia and on, the realists as if a sober and empirical science* while being both at once, there is no reason why both those 'faces' should not belong to the same head and nothing in the E.N. in which the remarks which announce this Janus-faced thing are made contradicts its principle. Indeed the remarks are a logical conclusion of the argument which starts from the observation about the weakness of average human nature and of the need for the man who is able to teach political theory. Earlier we learn that experience contributes not a little, else they (the practical politicians) could not have become politicians by familiarity with politics; so it seems that those who
aim at knowing the art of law-giving need experience as well" (E.N. 1181a 9-12). But neither these remarks nor those in which the plan of the E.N. are sketched show that Aristotle has become an empiricist pure and simple; nor is he in the Politics a pure empiricist even in the so-called empirical sections of the Politics. There is a 'schema' that controls the observation of facts. θεωρία is important, and it is specifically on the grounds that they lack θεωρία that Aristotle in that argument in the E.N. disqualifies both the practical politicians and the sophists as potential νομοθέται.

Jaeger believes that Aristotle's remarks in the concluding paragraph of the E.N. mark a turning-point in the development of Aristotle's Politics; for Aristotle "here abandons the purely constructive method that Plato and he himself had previously followed, and takes his stand on sober empirical study". According to Jaeger what Aristotle is really saying is this "up to now I have been using another method. I have made my ideal state by logical construction, without being sufficiently acquainted with the facts of experience. But now I have at my disposal the copious material of the 158 constitutions, and I am going to use it in order to give to the ideal state a positive foundation". From where Jaeger gets the sense of 'up to now I have been using another method' it is not clear, and he himself does not show. The curious thing is that

* Jaeger - "Aristotle" p.265
Jaeger also believes in his theory of an early and later ethics that Aristotle has already abandoned 'Plato's purely constructive method' in the E.N. In the theory of friendship, for instance, (a theory in the course of the analysis of which one gets glimpses of Aristotle's political principles) Aristotle converts, Jaeger argues, the Platonic theory of friendship with its basis on the contemplation of God into a theory of the principles of sociology, and in Aristotle's 'complex phenomenology of society we should be hard put to it to detect the close connexion between Aristotle's theory of friendship and Plato's theory of Ideas'. While therefore Aristotle in his theory of friendship in the E.N. retains the Platonic doctrine that the other kinds of friendship are not co-ordinate and can be called friendship only 'per accidens', nevertheless psychological and sociological analysis bulks large in it. One would think that this outlook or method makes the remarks at the end of the E.N. with its announcement of the relevance of sociological analysis to the construction of ideals, so natural and fitting to the E.N. But Jaeger needs the hypothesis that the end of the E.N. was a later addition as a launching pad for the enterprise of separating different sections of the Politics into chronological compartments; and he would be denied this if the remarks at the end of the E.N. are taken as revealing the spirit of Aristotle's political methodology when he wrote the E.N. Nor does Jaeger

* Jaeger - "Aristotle" - p.243
explain why the execution of the plan show some divergences from the plan if that plan was added after the several μέθοδοι of the Politics had been assembled.

Let us consider next Jaeger's arguments for the priority of Books 7 and 8. We shall postpone for the time being arguments from cross-references and the nature of the ending of each μέθοδος. Jaeger believes that it would be more natural for Aristotle, in view of the Platonic precedent, to make the construction of an ideal state the primary aim of his political philosophy. That argument is, of course, a priori and amounts to little if not supported by other reasons. And the question at issue is not whether Aristotle made the construction of the ideal state his primary aim or not, it is obvious that he is interested in constructing an ideal state; but whether that aim is consistent with his empiricism. (Jaeger uses a similar argument in his examination of the doctrines of the E.N. Aristotle recommended the contemplative ideal; the contemplative ideal Jaeger argues is the originally Platonic ideal to which Aristotle formerly adhered; in the E.N. however, the contemplative ideal is a watered-down version of an earlier more purely Platonic ideal; it is somewhat alien to the general body of doctrines in the E.N.

Jaeger also argues that the doctrines of Books 7 and 8 of the Politics bear close resemblance to those of the dialogues and
what he calls the original Ethics i.e. the Eudemian Ethics. In Bk. 7 the end of the state is identified with the ethical end of the individual. This is 'thoroughly Platonic', says Jaeger. In that sense, however, Aristotle was a Platonist through his life for there is no evidence that he ever denied the identity of the end of the state and the ethical end of the individual. In fact, in that sense most Greek political theorists were Platonists. Jaeger, however, goes on to say that the identification of the end of the state and the ethical end of the individual was more complete in the earlier dialogues.

Here it becomes clear that Jaeger is seeing more in this statement than is warranted. He sees in Aristotle's identification Aristotle's belief that "the ultimate source of the state is the evaluating soul of the individual" and he converts this into the belief "that the highest ethical conception to which the soul attains is the state" - a different thing entirely. Not even Plato who, Jaeger believes, is the fountain-head of this doctrine believed that the highest ethical conception to which the soul can attain is the state, though he too believed in the identity of the end of the state and that of the individual. Jaeger interprets the identity of the end of the state and that of the individual as meaning that it is man's highest faculty that determines the best form of the state. This would be true of course if all

Jaeger, "Aristotle", p.275
it means is that philosophical skill or insight is required for the rational justification of any view as to what the state is or what the best state is. Thus philosophy or reason could be said to determine the shape or structure of the state, and it would be difficult to maintain that Aristotle ever denied this. But what the statement means for Jaeger is that the form of the state is justified by a specific faculty - the contemplative faculty which is man's highest; and from this he thinks it follows that man attains his highest excellence by engaging in political activity. "His membership of the state exhausts his nature".

(b) the highest human excellence is attainable in political activity, that political activity exhausts human nature; And from here he argues that once you admit that the political norm is determinable by a faculty less than man's contemplative faculty, you deny the identity of the state and that of the individual.

In this manner, Jaeger believes, the 'Protrepticus' for example has maintained that identity. In Books 7 and 8 of the Politics, Aristotle was already slightly abandoning the original position; for the state depicted here is neither ruled by philosopher-kings nor even by philosophy. When therefore in Book VIII, 1323b 36ff, the second chapter of the Book, Aristotle having briefly discussed the question of the best life refers
us to another σχολὴ for full discussion, the fact, according to Jaeger, was that he was expecting opposition to his identification of the happiness of the state with that of the individual in a state not ruled by philosophers. Aristotle's words are: (Pol. VII, i, 1323b 36)

ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοοῦτον ἐστὶν κεφοριμισαμένα τῷ λόγῳ.
οὐτε γὰρ μὴ διηγαγόντων αὐτῶν ὑμνοτῶν, οὐτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξερεύνην ἐνδεχόμεται λόγους, ἔτερας γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα.

We cannot help touching on problems of the best life here, he says, but we cannot go through all the arguments, that is a matter for another study. Pol. VII. ii 1324α 13ff makes it clear what he means - "we are dealing with two questions, that of the best life and that of the best state, the discussion of the first we have only touched briefly," then in 132α21 Aristotle, having come to the discussion of the second question adds

ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προφράγματιν την σχετικὸν ἐκείνῳ μὲν παράγον ἄν ἔλθῃ, τούτῳ δὲ (ἡ ἄριστη διάδοσις πόλεως) ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

This is no sign of the expectation of opposition for which Jaeger believes that Aristotle refers the reader to another σχολὴ. For, "in the Platonic circle in which these lectures were written Aristotle expected opposition to his identification of the happiness of the state with that of the individual. It would not be difficult for a philosopher to merge himself in Plato's city of philosophers and serve its
ends, but Aristotle's new ideal state is not ruled by Platonic kings". (Jaeger, "Aristotle," p. 280). Here we have once more another instance of imputing to Aristotle an approach or principle for which this is no evidence, and using that principle to measure when he formulated this or that doctrine.

Jaeger also convinces himself that the very fact that Aristotle raises the question of the best life is by itself a sign of the date of this picture of the ideal state. For that question has been the main concern of Aristotle's dialogues like "Philebus" and the "Protrepticus" and even of the original Ethics i.e. the Eudemian Ethics. In the later Ethics, on the other hand, the question "constitutes the traditional framework within which Aristotle develops his realistic and psychological doctrine of character". Jaeger, fortunately, finds a reference to the exoteric discourses in Pol. VII 1323a22 –

νομίσαντας οὖν ἵκανος πολλά λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.

The discussion that immediately follows is the classification of the constituent elements of the best life into external goods, goods of the body and goods of the soul. While admitting that the division of the constituent elements of the good life into those three parts is found in the Eudemian Ethics and the E.N., Jaeger argues that the reference to the exoteric discourses proves that Aristotle "is basing himself on a particular work on the

*Jaeger, "Aristotle," p. 276
'best life' and this must be the *Protrepticus* op.cit.p.276.

Another argument which Jaeger uses to show that Aristotle was in referring to another ὀχλὴ expecting opposition is that although still following the Platonic tradition of identifying the end of the state with that of the individual Aristotle recognises in Books 7 and 8 of the politics only two types of life in discussing the best life; he fails to mention the 'life of reason (φρόνησις) says Jaeger'. What Aristotle says is:

Τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνιον, ἐτ' ἐν τῷ χάρατιν ἐστιν ἐτ' ἐν ὀρθῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰτ' ἐν ἀμφιθεῖν μὴ μᾶλλον ἥκρηκε οτοι τῷ ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ τὴν ὀίνοποιον κακοσμημένον ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴν, ἐπει δὲ τὴν ἐξω κτήσιν μετριάξουσιν, ὡς τοῖς ἐκεῖναι μὲν κακοσμημένοις πλὴρο τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐλλείπουσιν. *Pol.* VIII 1323b1

As for Aristotle's not mentioning the life of reason, it is clear that he includes the 'cultivating the character and the mind to the uttermost' the life of reason. And *Pol.* VII 1325b 16ff also shows this:

ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ σοφότα τὶν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὀίνοποιας εἶναι μόνας τούτοις πρακτικὰς, τὰς τῶν ἀποκατανότων χάριν γίγνομένα ἐκεῖτες συνῆν ἔνεκεν θεαρίας καὶ ὀίνοποιας.

But in fact Jaeger's interest is not really in finding out whether Aristotle included a life of reason or not, although he argues as if that were so. For the conclusion he draws from

— op.cit. p.280
Aristotle’s not mentioning the life of reason is one that need not follow at all. To Aristotle’s not mentioning the life of reason, "a Platonist", Jaeger argues, would have to reply "Then there is nothing for the philosopher but to withdraw entirely from political life", and this would be the consequence of Aristotle’s own view in the 'Protrepticus' where philosophy alone could determine the highest political norm". It is difficult to see the connection. What Jaeger criticizes or thinks Platonists would criticize Aristotle for is the omission of the life of reason in his ethical ideal (as I have shown that criticism has no basis); but he equates this with approximating the ideal state to reality and then asks what room is there in such a state "for the contemplative life of the philosophical individual". The difficulty of the logic of the procedure should convince one that the argument is being conducted in a way hardly corresponding to Aristotle’s procedure. To prove that Aristotle once held the principles which Jaeger here attributes to him, the latter needs to show that abandonment of the principle that only philosophy determines the political norm and structure causes Aristotle to reduce his ethical ideal. Jaeger thinks he sees this reduction of the ethical ideal in Aristotle’s omission of the life of reason.

Elsewhere (P.281 for instance) Jaeger argues as if Aristotle after all wanted to retain the ethical ideal of the life of reason but involves himself in difficulties in not making
philosophy the determinant of the highest political norm. Hence in chapters 2 and 3 of Pol VII we find Aristotle, "the author of the Protrepticus, who has now abandoned Plato's city of philosophers, working out the resulting inevitable conflict between his philosophical and his sociological conscience", and "the original undivided unity of the active forces in Plato's romantic myth of the state could no longer restrain the tendency of these factors more and more to separate and diverge". (op. cit. p.281).

In calling the contemplative life 'active', therefore, Aristotle, Jaeger believes, was trying to replace Plato's "shattered mythical synthesis of knowledge and life". One wonders what Plato himself who had no shattered synthesis to replace would have called the contemplative life. In trying to forge a resemblance of doctrinal principles between Plato and Aristotle Jaeger seems to me to be misinterpreting both of them. Surely Plato does not teach that the fact that the philosopher kings rule the state makes the state 'the highest ethical conception of which their souls could attain'. On the contrary it is only a sense of duty and obligation that compels them to descend into the dave again and take part in its labors and rewards they condescend to it from a higher and preferable life of their own - Rep. VII.517Dff.

Without interesting himself in the sort of problems Jaeger
Jaeger tries to attribute to him, Aristotle raises in chp. 2 and 3 of the Politics VII problems implicit in Plato's ethical and political ideals; with this difference that since with Plato it is the philosophers who alone are capable of determining the right pattern and structure of the state the problem of the relation of the active life and the contemplative life also raises for him a question of political obligation - those who are capable of the highest activity owe it as a duty both in the interests of themselves and of society generally to engage in the lower activity of politics. With Aristotle on the other hand, it would seem that a degree of ἂνδρικός in many members of the society and moral discipline among all the members would probably secure a good state in which the philosopher could engage in his contemplative activity for as long as humanly possible. There is no burden of political obligation on the philosopher, though as a man he would be subject to the laws and the moral atmosphere of the state and would sometimes take part in its affairs. The doctrine of Pol. VII Ch. 3 is in accord with this view. Political activity, says Aristotle, can be a relatively worthless thing - there is for instance nothing dignified in ruling a pack of slaves; on the other hand, political activity could serve as the medium for the expression of a distinctly human excellence - it may offer the opportunity of practising a large number of the highest and best activities. But one should not confine "well
doing" (στραγγίζει) to such activities along, 'for thoughts with no object beyond themselves', and Speculations and trains of reflections followed purely for their own sake are far more deserving of the name of active" - Pol. 1325b 16ff.

This is the justification for Jaeger's remark that Aristotle is here again 'opening up new roads, and making a new tie to replace Plato's shattered mythical synthesis of knowledge and life'. Seizing Aristotle's point that those who by their thoughts are 'the prime authors of outward acts abundantly qualifying to be called 'active', Jaeger thinks that Aristotle has converted the activity of the creative mind into building. "He has abandoned the lonely heights of the Protrepticus and now places himself in the midst of active life, and comes forward as an architect of thoughts (διαβοιατέοντα) to build a state in which this intellectual form of action may obtain recognition". op.cit. p.262. In view of what Aristotle said just before this there is nothing that implies that he is using the word 'active' to forge a relation between a "shattered synthesis".

Regarding the foregoing arguments as evidence showing that Pol. 7 and 8 hold a position between the Protrepticus and the E.N. Jaeger assigns the group to the period of the original Ethics and of the original Metaphysics.

Nor do Jaeger's attempts to prove that the references in Bks.
7 and 8 are more reasonably taken to refer to the original Ethics or to an earlier dialogue strengthen his arguments. (cf. Pol. VII 1332a8 'felicity as the energy and practice of goodness to a degree of perfection', Pol. VII 1331b 26 the ends and means of the good life, and Pol. VII 1332a 21 - the definition of the truly good man: - None of these references is decisive.

It only remains to mention that Jaeger's theory demands that Bk.I be regarded as late. Now in Bk. VII an early book, 1325a 28-30 we have an explicit reference to the First Book on the kinds of authority -

Also Bks. 4, 5, 6 were composed, according to Jaeger, after Bks. 7 and 8; but the discussion of magistrates and the location of their offices in Bk.VII seems to refer immediately backwards to the discussion of the procedure for the organisation of executive offices in Bk.VI, cf. Pol.VII 1331b 14ff with Pol.VI 1321b 28-30; the discussion towards the end of Bk.VI seems to prepare us for a discussion of certain magistrates which are irrelevant to the democracy of Bk.VI But which the ideal state of Bks. VII and VIII involves (cf. Pol.1322b 33ff, and the various programmes of Bk.VII ch.10 and 11 and Bk.VIII.)

The approach of the inquiry into the social structure of the
best state in Pol. VII (ch.6) 1326a 21ff is very similar to that followed in Pol. VI (ch.4) 1290b2 - 1291b 13, with the necessary modification to suit the fact that while the former deals with democracy. Indeed there is a remark in that section of Bk.VII which shows that it is the difference in social and perhaps intellectual conditions which creates the slight difference in the two procedures to which I referred. (See Pol. VII. 1326a39ff - 1326b1.)

δήλον δὲ τούτ', οἵτιν' τού γίγνεσθαι πάλαις εἶδος καὶ διαφοράς καὶ πολιτικὰς πλεῖον. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τούτω θερεύοντες τούς τε βίους ἄτερούς ποιούσι καὶ τὰς πολιτείας.

- A remark hardly reconcilable with the Aristotle which Jaeger sees in Bks. VII and VIII of the Politics.

Let us briefly examine why Jaeger separates Bks. II and III from the group formed by Bks. IV, V & VI and joins them to Bks. VII & VIII. He argues that Bks. II and III are not an introduction to a general theory of the state. We take the two books in turn. Bk. II, he argues, is a historical and critical introduction to a theory of the ideal state, and he tries to prove that Aristotle was in Bk. II really trying to show that "the best state does not occur anywhere in reality"*. For he has already denied in the 'Protrepticus' any actual state like Sparta or Crete "or any other such could serve as a norm". In view of this, and the mention of the departure to Crete of Phalaecus, Aristotle surely

* op.cit. p.286
collected the material for these studies before his stay in Assos and Mytilene, when Plato was working on the 'Laws' and Spartan and Cretan institutions were a favourite subject of discussion in the Academy'. Since Jaeger cannot risk believing that Aristotle was interested in the knowledge gained from such studies and its usefulness for the construction of his own ideals he says that Aristotle conducts the inquiry for that negative purpose of showing that the best state actually exists nowhere. One might ask whether Aristotle believed that Plato whose work he was imitating, composed the "Laws" which draws so heavily on the Hellenic experience to prove that "the best state does not occur anywhere in reality". However, according to Jaeger Aristotle was still applying the old notion of norm or
But Aristotle himself tells us why he conducts the inquiry in Bk. II. i.e. why he examines other people's theories and actual states that are reputed to be well-governed

(συνομοσυναι πολίτειαι). The reason is - Pol. II 1260b 32ff - ἐνα τῷ ὑφεκτέον ἐχόν ὅψῃ καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ἢτι, ἐδ' ἐκτεινί τι παρ' ἀυτῶς ἐκείνων ἂν ὅσοις πάντως εἶναι σοφίζοντο ἑυλομένων, ἀλλὰ ὁ ὕφεκτός ἐκεῖν ταύτας τὰς νόν ὑπαρχούσας διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην ὅσκήμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον - Aristotle intends to discover what is right and what is useful, and wishes to learn from the defects he finds in existing forms.

Others of Jaeger's arguments are based on the nature of Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's political ideals; Aristotle's
criticisms are brusque and inaccurate; Aristotle therefore most probably composed Pol.II before the 'Laws' appeared; also Aristotle criticised Plato for not paying sufficient attention to the problems of foreign policy. In Jaeger's opinion, it was not theoretical reflections that led Aristotle to make that criticism; it was personal contact with actual foreign politics; and nothing could have taught Aristotle this lesson better than contact with Hermias of Atarneus, 'for no Greek state of the period was more dependent on neighbouring countries than that of Hermias'. Bk.II was therefore composed in Assos or shortly afterwards. We are not told why it must be shortly afterwards, for even granting that it was experience of Hermias' politics that taught Aristotle this lesson, he could still have used it years after he learnt it.

Again, contrary to Jaeger's argument, the first sentence in Bk.III shows that Aristotle is addressing himself to an inquiry concerning all constitutions. Cf. Pol.III. 1274b 32ff ἀνέπαφος ἐπισκόπωντι, καὶ τὰς ἐκάστη καὶ κοία τίς, σχεδὸν πρώτη οἰκείη περὶ κόλεως, τε ποτέ ἐστιν ἢ κόλις.

It is true that Bk.III is many times referred to as πρῶτοι λόγοι but this neither shows that it was written before Bk.I nor that it belongs to a group chronologically prior to the group formed by Books VI, V, VI. For Bk.III specifically refers to Bk.I as πρῶτοι λόγοι - (cf. Pol.III 1278b 16 - εἶπεν ταῦτα δὴ κατὰ
Book VII refers to Bk.III as πρώτος λόγος (cf. Pol.VII.14. 1333a 3 with Pol.III, 6) but it also refers to Bk.I as πρώτος λόγος (cf. Pol.VII. 1325a 30.) Jaeger regards both the reference to Bk.I in Bk.III and that in Bk.VII as later additions; but there is really no justification for so regarding them.

Jaeger makes a lot of the fact that Bk.III ends in the middle of a sentence, the second half of which is found at the beginning of Bk.VII. But any reader of the Politics soon realises that arguments drawn solely from the endings of the Books amount to very little. For, of all the eight books it is the endings of Bk.VII and Bk.IV that raise no difficulties.

The apparently most valid of Jaeger's arguments is that based on the spirit of the inquiry in Bks. IV, V, VI in relation to the spirit of earlier and the later books. But the difference in spirit can easily be exaggerated. Jaeger for instance lays much emphasis on the fact that Bks. IV, V, VI gives much attention to discussing varieties of oligarchy and democracy. He believed that in Bk.III Aristotle was striving for precise conceptions. 'The classification of constitutions is a piece of thought-construction in which the state is based rigidly on its fundamental elements and conceptions' the spirit, he says, is derived from the 'Politicus'; but Jaeger cannot help admitting that Aristotle

* op.cit. p.291
emphasises the economic and social aspects of the various constitutions more than the purely formal ground of classification. But further than this, Aristotle distinguishes various types of kingship in Bk. III chapters 14-17. This no doubt lessens the novelty of the distinction of the various types of oligarchy and democracy in Books IV, V & VI: Jaeger would therefore have none of it, "therefore it is not probable that the development of the various forms of monarchy at the end of Bk. III belongs to the book in its earliest shape"*1.

In the same way, Jaeger also finds sections of Pol. II. which probably did not belong to the earliest version (Jaeger op. cit. p. 285) and had he not denied the priority of Bk. I he would no doubt have had cause to do the same for it. However, when one has to distinguish an early and a later even in the allegedly earlier sections of the Politics it is better to assume unity of composition for the whole treatise, even if there is some unevenness, and examine the relationship of its doctrines.

Indeed the same scientific spirit in which the inquiry in Bks. IV, V & VI is conducted is evinced in the other sections of the Politics. For instance the programme rather elaborately sketched at the beginning of Bk. IV is an enlargement of that of Pol. III. 1288a 6 cf. Pol. IV. 1288b 21ff. There are other instances which point forward to the scientific inquiry of Bks. IV, V, VI: (cf. Pol. I 1258 b9; I.1260b 32; III, 1275b 21; III 1279b 10ff with the introduction to Pol. IV, esp. 1288b 38ff. *1 op. cit. p. 291 note 1
I take the rather elaborate introduction at the beginning of Bk. IV to be no more than a statement of the propriety of treating the so-called 'perverted' constitutions in the same way in which Aristotle has started treating the normal constitutions esp. monarchy and the perverted ones in Bk. III. The introduction no more represents a change of outlook than the elaborate restatement of the nature of the end of all arts and sciences and of the nature of political justice in Bk. III Ch. XII represents a change of outlook in Aristotle's conception of political justice in the earlier chapters of the book. Bk. III ch. VII. The additional insight that warrants the elaborate introduction is that the unilateral use of the criterion of goodness, wealth, and freedom should each be recognised in the distribution of political offices, for they each contribute to the state's end. In the introduction to Bk. IV, the additional insight is not that there are several varieties of each constitutional type and that it is the business of the to know them (the beginning of Bk. III implies this, and it becomes more explicit in the discussion of the varieties of kingship) it is that it is necessary to do for the so-called perverted form what is done for the normal types.

To show that there is no departure from principles the same criterion for the classification of constitutions used in Bks. I - III continues to be used in Bks. IV, V, VI (Cf. Pol. V 1301a 25ff)
But since the social conditions of a community to a large extent determines the degree of \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \tau \eta \) attainable by the members of that society, there is really no abandonment of principles when in Bks. 4, 5, 6 less is said of \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \tau \eta \) and more about the \( \pi \omega \lambda \iota \tau \iota \kappa \omicron \) or \( \nu \omicron \rho \omicron \theta \varepsilon \tau \iota \eta \) making the best use of the material at his disposal. Aristotle's conception of \( \varepsilon \delta \sigma \iota \mu \omicron \nu \omicron \lambda \) might have made him reluctant to use \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \tau \eta \) to describe the life of the citizens of such ill-circumstanced societies; but the \( \nu \omicron \rho \omicron \theta \varepsilon \tau \iota \eta \) does not abandon the criterion of \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \tau \eta \).

It is true that in Bk. 4 Aristotle adds that the legislator should be able to advise how a tyrant could best maintain himself in power; but what this means we see in his discussion on tyranny and how to preserve it; the scientific object of the legislator or statesman is to maintain the tyranny for as long as possible, but this we learn he would do only by rendering the tyranny as tolerable to the citizens as possible. And since we already learn in Pol. III. 1278b 24 that "men come together, and form and maintain political associations, merely for the sake of life" and that there is perhaps some element of the good even in the simple act of living, so long as the evils do not preponderate too heavily" it is not surprising that the inquiry in Bks. 4, 5, 6 assumes that there is some virtue in the mere stability of a state. Furthermore, the discussion in Bk. 4 ch. 11 on the type of constitution which
which is most generally practicable shows that it is
considerations about the provision of an adequate material
resources for the state that pushed ἀρετή into the background
as a criterion in these sections.

Finally, we shall briefly examine Von Arnim's theory*
in order to show what contradictory conclusions could be arrived
at by following the so-called 'genetic' method with its
assumption that the 'Politics' was written over a long period
of time, at different places and under different influences,
instead of assuming unity of composition and examining the work
from the point of view of doctrine and philosophical method.
For while adopting a method of approach similar to Jaeger's,
Von Arnim arrives at the very different conclusion that Books
7 and 8 of the Politics belong not to the earlier but to the
later sections of the Politics.

Von Arnim agrees with Jaeger that the two groups Books
4, 5, 6 and Books 2, 7, 8 should be attributed to different stages
of Aristotle's thought and be regarded as independent of each
other; but he disagrees with him on almost every other point.
Against Jaeger's theory that Bks. 2, 3, 7, 8 consist an 'Utopolitik'
Arnim argues that these four books do not form a single unit
from point of view either of form or doctrine. Bk. 3 Arnim argues
is not a fitting introduction to the doctrines of Bks. 7 and 8;
and further, the plan sketched in Bk. 3 is not carried out in
Bks. 7 and 8. Arnim, however, places his major emphasis on the

* Von Arnim - Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der aristotelischen
Politik C.A.W. 1924
inconsistency in the doctrines of Bk.3 and of Bks. 7 and 8. The constitution implied in Bks. 7 and 8 is neither monarchy nor aristocracy nor polity; in other words it is not an ἕρως πολιτεία as that conception is defined in Bk.3. Also the ideal state of Bks. 7 and 8 is relatively democratic in character; its citizens are alike to rule and be ruled in turn (Pol. 1332b 26). The ideal of Bk.3, on the other hand, is aristocratic. If Von Arnim had paid greater attention to Bk.1 however, he would have seen that there is no inconsistency in the aristocratic ideal of Bk.3 and what he regards as the democratic ideal of Bks. 7 and 8; For in Bk.1 Aristotle argues at length that although 'monarchy' as the form rule of father over children is a natural form of dominion in the household, it is not so for the political association except in very exceptional circumstances. Both in Bk.1 and in Bk.3 we are told that the political association is an association of 'equal and like' members; and the politikos who handles its affairs should properly be only primus interpares. This is where he defers from the ruler of a kingdom, or of an ethnic community, or of a household, or of a body of slaves. The tendency of the political association is to equality while that of the household is to inequality - βούλεται δὲ γε ἡ πόλις ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ ὁμοιώματι μᾶλλον.
Pol. 3, ch. 17 1287b 16ff. where after two preceding chapters in which the arguments are heavily weighted against monarchy Aristotle comes apparently rather grudgingly to grant the rights of a single man to rule, provided he was so pre-eminently superior to the other citizens. It is however made to look like an unlikely accidental feature.

Von Arnim draws much support for his thesis by a detailed examination of Bk. 3; there are however, some difficulties which that thesis cannot escape. For instance in Bk. 3, chp. 5 Aristotle expresses the view that a full citizen is one who both rules and is ruled; and in chapter 11 we have the famous argument in defence of democracy - the combination of qualities in the people make their rule better than that of experts. These and other passages Von Arnim regards as later additions by Aristotle. He also finds reasons to believe that Bk. 3 was originally a much longer one, abbreviated to suit the new conditions of the Politics after the later insertions. In the original version of Bk. 3 aristocracy was fully discussed as a constitution.

On the basis of these arguments, Von Arnim concludes that Bk. 3 does not belong to the group formed by Bks. 2, 7, 8. It more fittingly belongs to the group formed by Bks. 4, 5, 6 because it maintains the same aristocratic ideal as these. On closer scrutiny, however, it becomes clear that Von Arnim has little
evidence to maintain this thesis; the only evidence he offers being that at the beginning of Bk.4 ch.2 (1289a 30ff) where, after recalling the three forms of government and their respective perversions, Aristotle says "of kingly rule and aristocracy we have already spoken, for the enquiry into the perfect state is the same with the discussion of the two forms thus named since both imply a principle of virtue provided with external means". All Aristotle says here is that the consideration of the principle of monarchy and of aristocracy belongs to the same inquiry as that of the ideal state. Though I am not implying that there is a notable difference in the outlook of Bk.3 and Bk.4, it is nevertheless true that Von Arnim has no evidence for saying that Bk.4 is in a special sense a more fitting sequence to Bk.3 than Bks. 7 and 8.

We thus get, according to Von Arnim, the two groups 2,7,8 and 3,4,5,6. Arnim makes short shrift of Bk.1. It probably belongs to the group 3,4,5,6 because the principle that man is a ζῷον πολιτικόν is used in it as well as in Bk.III. This of course, cannot on the argument of the proponents of the genetic theory, prove the priority of Bk.1, for Aristotle could have earlier used that principle in Bk.3 and repeat it in Bk.1. More importantly, Von Arnim argues that if the discussion of ηεμπορίας and χρηματιστική which occupies chapters 8 - 11 of Bk.1 is removed, the argument of Bk.1 forms a fitting introduction to
that of Bk.3, and points to the same aristocratic ideal of
government - for monarchy and aristocracy corresponding to the
relations of father and children, man and wife would emerge
as the natural forms of dominion. Again, one must note that
though the facts he uses are true, they do not invite Arnim's
conclusion. For the fact that monarchy and aristocracy are
discussed in Bk.I and an analogy is traced between them and the
relations within the household does not prove that Bk.3 is a
member of a group to which Bk.I must also belong and from which
Bks. 7 and 8 must be cut off.

The transition to Bk.2 at the end of Bk.I Von Arnim regards
as a late interpolation, not even from Aristotle's hand. Like
Bk.3, it is an abbreviated version of its original version which
included the programme outlined in the opening sentence of the
concluding paragraph of Bk.I as we now have it i.e. the relation
of husband-wife, parents-children. Bk.I therefore, according to
Arnim, is an introduction to the group formed by 1,3,5,6.

As to which of these two troupes is prior, Von Arnim
confidently argues (contra Jaeger) for the priority of
the group formed by 1,3,4,5,6; it advocates an aristocratic
ideal, which proves that it belongs to a period in which
Aristotle was almost an orthodox Platonist. The fact that Bks.
7 and 8 teaches a relatively democratic political theory must
show how far Aristotle was from Plato when he composed it. But
it is Plato who composed the 'Laws'; Von Arnim believes that the ideal put forward by an earlier Bks. 7 and 8 was aristocratic and followed the 'Laws' rather closely but he does not pause to ask how democratic or undemocratic is the political ideal of the 'Laws'. Aristotle himself calls the constitution proposed in the 'Laws' a Polity i.e. the πολιτεία technically so called. It is a combination of oligarchy and democracy (Pol.2, 1265b 27, 1266a 6) and the best on the average. It is unlikely then that Aristotle, if he followed this ideal as Arnim suggests, would have proposed a constitution too undemocratic, i.e. too purely aristocratic that Aristotle would be dissatisfied with it for being too undemocratic after composing Bks. 4, 5, 6 of the Politics as Arnim also suggests. Arnim is sure, however, that Bk. 3 is modelled after the doctrines of Plato's 'Politics' and Bks. 1 and 3 were certainly composed before Aristotle's return to Athens in 335/4 B.C.

Although Arnim has argued that Bk. 4 is a genuine continuation of Bk. 3, he also admits that the tone of the two books is different; he explains this by the supposition that there was a considerable interval of time between their composition. In this interval the collection of constitutions was made, and the difference in tone between Bk. 3 and Bk. 4 is due to the work done by Aristotle during this interval. Arnim therefore attributes 4, 5, 6 to the first five years of Aristotle's Lyceum period. By now one must find it indeed to know exactly what
early and late means since Bks. 4, 5, 6 supposed to be 'Platonic' aspects of the work are now put to the Lyceum period. However, Arnim continues, during or after the composition of Bks. 4, 5, 6 Aristotle became dissatisfied with his former conception of the best state and modifies the older ideal to suit his newer point of view. Thus arose the three books 2, 7, 8 about the year 330 or later.

Apart from the rather fantastic remedies which Von Arnim applies to make his theory plausible, there are difficulties even if one admits the need of his remedies and judges the theory as a theory. For instance, Arnim does not tell us why or how the same Bks. 4, 5, 6 could on the one hand be consistent with the aristocratic ideal of Bk. 3 and on the other hand lead Aristotle to be dissatisfied with a former ideal on the grounds that it was aristocratic. Here again is one of the contradictions which bedevil the genetic theory. It is perhaps worth while to note that Professor Barker was "at one time attracted to the view that the Politics contained different chronological strata" and argued (Classical Review Vol. XLV. pp. 162-172) that Bks. 7 and 8 were composed early because in them Aristotle follows Plato's 'Laws' closely and accurately while in Bk. 2 his critique of the 'Laws' is brusque and inadequate; that Bks. 1-3 were composed in Aristotle's 'Macedonian' period - the Pella stage - because of the discussions of monarchy, aristocracy and
slavery which those books contain; that lastly in the Lyceum
stage (335-322) the 'scientific' period, Aristotle composed
Bks. 4, 5, 6; at the time when Professor Barker put forward
that theory he believed that we should devote little attention
to the political theory of Aristotle's Politics as a coherent,
unified theory but rather to the political ideas of the 'Assos'
stage, those of the 'Pella' period, and those of the 'Lyceum'
period. In his introduction to the translation of "The Politics
of Aristotle" (Oxford, 1946) p.xiii however, he says "five
years spent in the constant company of the Politics during the
preparation of this translation have irresistibly compelled
him to change his views". And rightly so; for no historical
hypothesis is needed for an understanding of the doctrines of
the Politics. Aristotle certainly regarded Bk. I in which he
sketched the evolution of society as the introduction to the
purely political doctrines of the later books.

Our examination of Aristotle's conception of φυσικά shows that both the so-called idealistic and realistic sections
of the Politics are two aspects of the same thing. It is true
that things have in them an immanent tendency in the direction
of the good, but there are numerous circumstances which may
warp them to evil; and in morals and politics these latter
tendencies seem to be specially active. Indeed, even in favour-
able social circumstances a sense of the goal may be clouded
by all manner of confusions; here the philosophic inquirer could
help by pointing to the goal; but full knowledge is not enough; for communities which possess it may be prevented by some unavoidable peculiarity of their social structure and accidental characteristics of their territory from attaining the true end. It is therefore the business of the philosophic inquirer not only to point out to those who are free from lets and hindrances the ideal end and method of political and social organisation and thus assist the inherent tendency of things to go right but also where insuperable impediments exist to ascertain by a close and minute study of society as it is, what course is best under the circumstances. The analysis of the best state which proceeds from an assumption of the circumstances best suited to the realisation of the full potentialities of man must therefore be supplemented by an analysis of what is best under given circumstances; indeed in many communities the potentialities of man realizable fall short of the ideal potentialities of man. Still such communities should come within the purview of the philosophic inquirer. The two considerations, I believe, are implicit in Aristotle's philosophical method. These two considerations may lead to two different aspects being distinguishable in Aristotle's thought. I, however, believe that they bear no necessary chronological implications.

However, to avoid any further anticipations we shall turn now to the more positive aspect of this study i.e. Aristotle's conception of the nature of man and of those institutions which cater for its satisfaction.
CHAPTER 4

Ethical and political theory, the field of our interest, according to Aristotle's division of the sciences (theoretical, practical and productive) (Met. E. 1.1025b 18 and Ibid. E.2 1026 b4), falls within πρακτική φιλοσοφία which is clearly distinguished from θεωρητική. But before we proceed with ethical and political theory pure and simple, we shall cast a glance at a study which Aristotle regards as a branch of φυσική and is therefore theoretical, φυσική being one of the three branches of theoretical science (μαθηματική, φυσική θεολογική) — Met. E., 1.1026a 18-19. That study is the De Anima. For our intention in the following chapters is to see (a) what Aristotle conceived to be human 'natural' powers or potentialities, the actualisation of which constitutes human happiness (b) how those powers and potentialities are converted into the moral actions which are their realisation, in respect of those habituations which result from actions and which in turn determine actions, i.e. those habits which accord with rational rules to regulate human powers otherwise oriented indeterminably to actions, good or bad and (c) those institutions like the family, the village, and the state, which serve natural needs and purposes and thus cater for the satisfaction or realisation of human powers or potentialities. For the first objective it is to the De Anima we turn for a very brief glance. Although the De Anima is usually called the treatise on psychology, to Aristotle it is a biological or physical treatise. For
in it Aristotle is not concerned with, in Wallace's words, "the analysis of the facts of mind based on an examination of consciousness" but with the principle of life. But as we shall see Aristotle's conception of man as a biological animal is not wholly unrelated to his conception of man as an agent of moral choice.

Pointing out in De Anima, 403a 27-28, that the soul as faculties of the body belong to physics whether this be the whole soul or only parts thereof, Aristotle having refuted earlier definitions of the soul based on functions and properties and having criticized both the Pythagorean and Platonic views of the soul asserts that it is the συνολον of soul and body which underlies all affections, and not the one or the other alone. It is the whole soul which is form of body (De Anima 411a26-b5). Soul is not simply the power to move and the power to think. On the contrary it holds these functions together.

(cf. 412b 5ff. Soul then "is the earlier or first entelechy of a body potentially possessed of life", such potential life belonging to everything which is possessed of organs. The significance of the qualification 'earlier' or 'first' lies in the distinction Aristotle makes between the implicit and explicit realisation of a faculty; the later or
second entelechy being the active status of a power or faculty'.

And in Bk.II.4, Aristotle shows that the soul is the cause of the functions of body in three senses: formal, final and efficient.

It acts as formal cause because it is form and essence of an animal.

It acts as final cause because nature, like mind, works towards an end, and soul is the entelechy - τὸ οὖ.

It acts as moving cause because the origin of locomotion is food, the origin of feeding is life, i.e. the possession of the soul (415b 21-23). Thus Aristotle is able to establish the ζωή of the psychic principle.

Having done this, Aristotle proceeds to investigate in turn the nutritive, sensitive and intellectual powers by examining first the objects on which those powers are exercised, determining from the objects the acts directed to such objects, and finally from the acts the peculiarities of the powers exercised in such acts. Thus, after the basic theory of the soul, and after learning that the lower soul is included in the higher as with mathematical figures (414b 28-32) we come to learn the specific φύσις of man.

Since 'life' is realisation of all the powers or faculties of a living thing there are as many types of life as there are degrees of vital activities displayed in different organic bodies. Aristotle therefore sees stages of various types of
life, stages which culminate in man. Nature proceeds by steps from inanimate to animate forms of existence through the intermediate stage of beings which are living but are not animals (De Part. Anim. 681a 12 cf. Hist. Anim. 586 b4). Also in the lower animals we find traces of the moral and intellectual qualities which distinguish man (Hist. Anim. VIII 1. 588a 18).

In man the principle of life manifests itself in its simplest way in the discharge of the basic functions of nutrition, growth and reproduction - the different processes in fact by which good is assimilated and mere existence is maintained. This form of life is common to all living things. The distinction indeed between inanimate and animate lies in the ability or inability to perform these functions: this is the 'vegetal' principle and it is this alone which plants have. In animals, however, we have a more complex manifestation of the vital principle; for in addition to the power of nutrition, growth and reproduction, animals have the faculty of sense-perception - especially the sense of touch. Touch is peculiar to animals and it is this that parts the animal world from the vegetable or plant world. The lowest animals have the sense of touch only, but the higher members of the class gradually add the other senses to this until the final number of five senses is reached. The next degree of soul, i.e. the third, is ψυχή ὁμοιοτητῆς. This belongs to man and to beings above him. There is also another faculty in man of which Aristotle seems to make an exception
Thus as far as man is concerned the soul can be regarded from four points of view in respect of the manifestations of its activities, though in reality the soul is indivisible.

We thus have:

(a) the soul as manifested in the nutritive and vegetative life.

(b) the soul as manifested in the sensitive and perceptive powers (this involves the 'receptive' faculty)

(c) the soul as manifested in the faculty of practical intelligence (this also involves the 'receptive' faculty).

(d) the soul as manifested in the exercise of the intellect and understanding or pure reason.

A man, therefore, has the vegetative, the sensitive, the conative and the intellectual faculties of the soul. *De Anima*.

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* See Wallace Aristotle's Psychology p.111 - "Faculties to Aristotle are thus not different 'parts' into which soul is actually divided, but only different sides or aspects of mental action. In opposition to the Platonic psychology which had seemed to draw a fast line between the members of its division, Aristotle views the partition of the soul into faculties as merely a convenient application of abstraction. And thus his faculties are not separable in actual fact or actual locality... and the distinction, so far as it exists, is only a difference in the manner of the mind's activity in dealing with materials of knowledge". (Cf. *De Anima* II, 2, 413b 14 and III 9, 432a 22). Aristotle therefore speaks of the faculties sometimes as five (*De Anima* II.3.1), at other times as four (II.2.7) and at others still as three (cf. *De Anima* III.7, 431a 13).
In the *De Anima*, however, we see man analysed as a member of the world of φύσις, as one of "those natural things which do move continuously, in virtue of a principle inherent in them, towards a determined goal...if nothing interferes with the process" - *Physics* 199b 15ff.

Now, while a flower, for example, attains its φύσις, we would say 'automatically', in obedience to the law of its organisation, blooming and attaining its fullest development or perfection, if there is no external impediment, and while also the lion, for example, attains its φύσις by actualising its vegetative and sensitive faculties, a new factor enters into man's realisation of his faculties and powers. For while in growth, nutrition, sight etc. man like all other animals has ἄλογοι συνάμεις, the human φύσις is not realised essentially in these συνάμεις but in those acts which exhibit the moral and intellectual virtues. These acts, however, are the determinate forms of certain συνάμεις which have the potentiality of change or process in either of two contradictory directions - the συνάμεις τῶν ἱματήσιων.

Man can only realise his φύσις by performing his own proper functions (ἐν τῷ ἐργῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου).
and in accordance with the law of his proper nature, and its harmonious development (κατὰ τὴν οἰκεῖαν ἀρετὴν - E.N.I.7.1098a 15). The attainment of the good for man depends on his actions and his actions are influenced strongly by his moral faculties which are themselves developed out of actions. The laws of his development are therefore not the unalterable laws of nature which are independent of habit; man's moral faculties or the moral virtues are developed in him out of habits - "therefore the virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature, but on the one hand we have a natural capacity for receiving them and on the other hand we are only made perfect by habit'. E.N. II.1. 1103a 23.

Aristotle believed, with Socrates and Plato, that there are objective norms of conduct; he was in total agreement with Socrates and Plato in opposing the views of those who held that νόμων are adventitious because they are no more than measures agreed on by men to cope with transient problems and who believed that laws enslave men by compelling them to act against their true interests; he therefore believed, again in company with Socrates and Plato, that moral and political actions could not be reduced to arbitrary decisions which turn mainly on considerations of custom and calculations of power. Aristotle would, however, believe that he understood better than Socrates and Plato the relations of norms of conduct to
moral and political actions.

In Met. A VI.987b 1 (cf. Ibid. M. IV.1078b 17ff) and M. IX.1086b 2) Aristotle tells us that "Socrates who ignored the material world and looked for universals in the moral sphere began to build his system of ethics and for the first time directed man's attention to definition; Plato accepted his method and argued that definition is properly concerned with something other than sensibles...he describes these non-sensibles as 'Ideas' or 'Forms' ". Aristotle also often mentions the analogies which Socrates drew between the virtues and the arts; between the just, brave, temperate or wise man and the cobbler, shipbuilder, physician and general. He felt that the analogies are valid within certain limits - the virtues are similar to the arts in method and mode of acquisition, though not in nature and definition. E.N.II.1. 1103a 26..."For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts". cf. E.N. 1103b 7. "Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad players are produced" (cf. also 1104a 27; 1105a 10; 1106b 8). Another point of
similarity lies in the fact that both 'things done' (τὰ πρακτά) and 'things produced' (τὰ ποιητὰ) have their efficient cause (ἀρχὴ) outside them in an agent or producer (Ε.Ν.6.4. 1140a 12, cf. Μετ. Ε.1. 1025b 6.

It is, however, interesting to note that with the discussion of the Hippias Minor and of Republic I before him, Aristotle believes that neither Socrates nor Plato recognised the proper limits of the analogy between the virtues and the arts. Although Aristotle recognises the fact that knowledge has a causal influence both on the practical man's practical functioning and on the artist's artistic functioning, he thinks that Socrates' analogies between the virtues and the arts give too much importance to the role which knowledge plays in the acquisition of the virtues - Ε.Ν. VI.12. 1144b 28 "Socrates thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were all of them forms of scientific knowledge) while we think they involve a rational principle." cf. Ε.Ν. VI. 1144b 18 and Ε.Ν. iii 8.1116b 3. Aristotle's own conception of the slightly different role of knowledge in artistic excellence and in practical excellence he probably conveys by emphasising on the one hand the 'truth' of the λόγος in 'techne' and on the other, the 'truth' of the φιλοσοφία in practice - "Art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning" 1140a; practical wisdom is a true and
reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man". 1140b 4. And finally there are two statements which seem pure deductions from the argument of the Hippias Minor. Judgements of value in art are based solely on the products of the art (ἐργον) but the object of action is the doing of certain things in a certain way - that things done should be of certain determinate character - the character and intention of the agent being the more important; therefore knowledge which is of primary importance in the arts is of reflected importance in the virtues - (Ε.Ν.ΙΙ. 5. 1105a 30ff, cf. 1140a 33ff); the other remark is at 1140b 21 - "But further while there is such a thing as excellence in art, there is no such thing as excellence in prudence; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable, but in prudence as in the virtues he is the reverse".

Judging by Aristotle's criticisms, it would seem that these problems to which he very explicitly sought answers in the E.Ν. never occurred to both Socrates and Plato. Thus again in E.Ν. 1145b 23-28 he criticizes Socrates' view that when knowledge is present it rules action, on the ground that this would imply that incontinence (ἀχρασία) does not exist. But a man, Aristotle argues, who knows right from wrong can behave incontenently if he is not "using" his knowledge (1146b 31-35). A practical decision is a conclusion from more than one premise;
a man not attending to all of them will miss the right conclusion. Drunkenness, madness, or sleep can befuddle the mind and lead astray one who "knows" what is right. So too incontinence e.g. anger or sexual desire. All these conditions induce temporary ignorance (1147b 17); but not ignorance of the universal, rather only of the particular object. Socrates who had, to Aristotle, said simply that knowledge cannot be mastered and dragged about by the lower affections would seem to Aristotle unaware of this distinction between universal and particular premises. Socrates would seem to be denying incontinence.

The same criticism would of course be true of Plato, but he, it would seem to Aristotle, did something worse by identifying the 'Good' with 'Being'. Aristotle, as is well-known, denied that the 'Good' is a substance or principle or that it could, if so conceived, assist in the explanation or direction of action (cf. EN.1.6. 1096a & b; also Met. vi, i.993b 20)

"For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action (for even if they consider how things are, practical men do not study the cause in itself, but in some relation and at the same time" cf. Met. VI.1.1025b 19 and E.N. I.1.1094a 3ff.

In actual fact and in spite of Aristotle's criticisms Socrates and Plato were aware of the point to which Aristotle
is drawing attention in the emphasis he gives to the role of habit in the attainment of the good for man - the point that virtues, actions cannot be explained by things alone or by natures, as natural motions are explained in physics. Like physical changes, however, Aristotle conceives that moral actions must be understood from the potentialities they realise. These potentialities in the case of man we have sketched in our brief glance at the De Anima - This is the first level at which we encounter φύσις in relation to man - the level of the 'natural' powers and faculties of individual men. We are introduced into the second level on the basis of the need for habituation which so strongly determines the manifestations of those powers and faculties. This is the level to which we are introduced in the E.N.

But this second level is more than an account of the progress of habituation. For at this level there is indeed an anticipation of the institutions which are inaugurated to serve ends and purposes which human 'natural' capacities demand. The science which embraces comprehensively this end - the good for man - Aristotle calls πολιτική - the study of man as a member of an organised community of men. It is the science of the supreme end; the architectonic science that rules over all other sciences - ἂρ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνώσις αὕτη μεγάλην ἢ ἐκείνην ἢ δ’ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. (E.N. 1. ii. 1094a7) cf. Euthydemus 291C-D, where Plato calls πολιτική ἡ αἰτία τὸν ὀρθὸς πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει.
The language has Platonic associations and reminds one vividly of the conception of \( \text{πολιτική} \) in the *Buthydemus* (p.291B). But Aristotle is not here seeking after the transcendental good of Platonic ethics and metaphysics. \( \text{πολιτική} \) is the master science because it embraces all the factors which can be regarded as influential on man's realisation of his good; it embraces both ethics in the sense of moral actions considered in terms of the realisation of individual faculties and potentialities, and politics considered in the narrower sense as the influences exercised on man and the ends served by social institutions. All other arts are subordinate to \( \text{πολιτική} \) and are its instruments \(( \chiρωμένης \ v_i \ τάσσης ταζ λοιπαί)\) not in a sense recalling Hobbes' *Leviathan* but in the sense that all human endeavours, however dignified, aim at an end-happiness, 'the good' - and that \( \text{πολιτική} \) deals with this end. The assumption, of course, is that the 'best life' or the good for man is realisable only, or at least could best be realised, in the social and political conditions of the city-state.

Ethics and Politics are therefore not separate sciences treating of independent subject-matter, but are dialectically distinct approaches to common problems, and in each approach the effect of the other must be taken into consideration. The *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* are two parts of a single
inquiry or science: what is assumed as given in the one constitutes the problem to be solved, at least to some extent, in the other; what is 'natural' is found first in the individual man, then in the group; first in the passions and actions which because they are subject to regulation by habit are the natural basis of ethics, and then in the associations which satisfy various human needs, which, in other words, cater for the realisation of human impulses and which, as Aristotle would put it, are called into existence by these 'natural' human impulses.

Since man differs in the ways to which we have drawn attention, from other 'natural' objects, how does he realise the faculties of his 'vital principle'; how does he realise the four manifestations of the soul to which we referred in the De Anima? The first faculty - that of growth, nutrition and reproduction - Aristotle usually puts in the background (E.N. 1097b 34) because he concentrates on the more specifically human faculties. The mere act of growth, nutrition and reproduction is common to plants. The confinement to the background of this faculty, however, does not mean that Aristotle does not recognise its contribution to human ζωή. For these impulses are 'natural' and are therefore ineradicable parts of any human being 'qua' human being; and since the specifically human good is a life which caters for the satisfaction of human needs, it follows that these impulses must be taken into account.
and allotted some place in the characterisation of the specifically human good. Also, the manner of the satisfaction of some of these impulses falls within ethical inquiry - the field that takes account of a specifically human faculty. Not only then are the satisfaction of these impulses a necessary condition of the human good, but they enter into the ethical system.

The combination of the faculties of 'emotion' or 'sensation' with that of practical intelligence gives rise to moral conduct. Aristotle's formula for this right combination is the famous definition of virtue; and the part 'practical intelligence' plays in it he expounds in E.N. VI. When there is the right combination there results so much happiness as our "composite nature" is capable to realise, for man is as an animal compounded of appetites, passions and practical reason, (E.N. 1177b 26-29; 1178a 19-21). The purely rational or intellectual faculty of the soul gives us happiness in its highest and purest form; this faculty is capable of exercise independently of external circumstances, (E.N. 1177a 2ff). For man, therefore, the highest special excellence is the intellectual faculty by which he ascertains truth (All men desire to know)* in other words, knowledge satisfies man's noblest impulse and

* See Met. A. 982b 24.
wisdom is man's highest faculty. The lower faculty of \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \nu \omicron \varsigma \) is however equally important for man; for it is this, not wisdom, that determines the true point of action.

Aristotle's analytical approach of distinguishing the several faculties of the soul should not, however, lead us to forget what Aristotle patently recognises - that man is a compound being, with tendencies natural and acquired, passions, appetites and intellectual qualities, all acting and reacting on each other in such a way as to make it impossible for practical purposes to disentangle them. This we saw in the De Anima. For the whole spirit of Aristotle's thought (this is where his biological temperament comes into the open in his account of man as distinguished from that of Plato who sometimes tended to see the essence of man alone in the 'divine' element in him) shows clearly, in spite of the very prominent attention he gives to the higher human faculties, his recognition of the fact that \( \epsilon \omicron \delta \omicron \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \) is the realisation of all the various human potentialities without mutual suppression.

Human \( \epsilon \omicron \delta \omicron \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \) he explains through his favourite illustration, is like health; and like health it depends on a concensus of the various structures and organs of the system. The fact therefore, that Aristotle sees the supreme end of the individual in contemplative activity, precisely that activity exercisable by the individual most independently of his fellows
has not the implications which some scholars see in it. The ideal may indeed be 'for man to live not merely so far as his mortality allows but in so far as he has in him some spark of the divine', and it may be noble indeed that we should 'so far as in us lies strive to be immortal and to shape our every thought with the aim of living by the standard of the highest principle within us' E.N. 1177b 31. But Aristotle recognises the fact that the philosopher is nevertheless a man. He is not advocating a sequestered life, a life of poverty and ascetism or even a 'stoic' ideal. The life of contemplation requires the necessaries of existence in so far as its subject is a man; he needs the moral virtues for maintaining a proper state of mind, and a proper relations with his fellow men. (A man must be well! Aristotle tells us 'he must have proper food and whatever else is necessary to comfort, together with a moderate amount of external goods (E.N. 1178b 33). He can live the higher life if he is moderately furnished with what civilized man requires. It is this fact of man's indissoluble connection with the lower type of life (for he is a compound being E.N. 1177b 28) which distinguish him from the gods. The gods, because they are more than human, could do away with all external goods, with the moral virtues - no one supposes them to be just, to perform deeds of courage or to perform acts of generosity (to whom (i.e. among themselves) could they make presents?) - but man (qua' man must
sometimes at least live a life spent in the sphere of the contingent and in discharging the duties of society and public affairs. Man also has a number of 'natural' impulses, the satisfaction of which constitutes his happiness. It is such impulses that call into existence 'associations' such as those of the family, the village and the all important association of the polis.

In fact Aristotle's analysis in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of the moral virtues, friendship, pleasure, the intellectual virtues and of the ideal of the contemplative life add up to the view that happiness is the satisfaction of human impulses, the catering for human needs and the fulfilment of human desires. Calling these impulses 'natural' is his way of saying that they are inseparable or ineradicable parts of any human being qua human being. But there is a hierachy of these impulses; the satisfaction of any of them, it is true, is good and pleasurable, in so far as it does not harm other natural impulses; the satisfaction of the higher ones should however be valued higher; for the pleasure accompanying the satisfaction of an impulse does not exhaust its value, i.e. its goodness; the higher impulses are distinctive of human nature; the highest is indeed divine; for in the life of speculative thought man gives the fullest expression to the divine element in his nature. But while believing that actualising the higher faculties as much
as possible is to aspire to the divine he nevertheless recognises that man qua man needs to satisfy both the lower and the higher ones. This is why he who is fitted to live outside of the community of men by nature and not by accident is either a brute or a god. (Pol. 1. 1253a 2-4).

In the E,N. the discussion is conducted from the point of view of the individual - how each man fulfils the conditions of happiness - that condition of excellence in which man realises his powers and faculties as a whole. Man is therefore viewed as the subject of ἔδοξαμοιῶτα as exercising the various moral and intellectual faculties. The treatise is to that extent theoretical.

It is, however, theoretical in a way different from that in which the discussion of the Ἠχύαη in the De Anima was theoretical. For in the latter treatise we were not concerned with the positive conditions of the manifestations of the vital principle of man; we investigated those manifestations theoretically from the point of view of φυσις. In the Ethics, however, we are concerned more with the problem of securing their proper manifestations. The treatise is a political one and it is concerned with the production of virtue. Emphasis therefore is on habit and its formation. Thus as compared with the De Anima, we do not need in the Ethics to sound the depths of the science of the Ἠχύαη (E.N.I.13. 1102a 23-0). An empirical psychology would suffice. Thus a twofold division of the soul is adopted – the
rational (τὸ λόγον ἔχον), and the irrational (τὸ ἄλογον).

For, the important point is for the statesman to realise that there can and there often is moral conflict in the human soul and what is made of this phenomenon is of vital importance to goodness or badness. This fact the division in the E.N. drives home for the statesman. But further statements are made in the Ethics suggesting that practical though we have been in our discussion in the Ethics more practical measures are necessary for realising the goals suggested there.

It is the necessity of these practical measures which prompts the statement towards the end of the treatise (E.N. 1179a 35-62) that our object is not θεωρεία— we are inquiring not just in order to know what virtue is but in order to become good. This directly links with the further remark in E.N. 1180a 1-14 which confirms the necessity of the lawgiver on the grounds of the weakness of human nature. This passage and the succeeding paragraphs need a brief examination in view of the role it has played in the interpretations of Aristotle's conception of the relation between Ethics and Politics.

In that passage we are told that "most people are naturally apt to be swayed by fear rather than by argument, and to refrain from evil rather through punishment than through their sense of what is noble": habituation to virtue therefore is the business of suitable laws. At first sight, it appears that heads of households
would be qualified to perform this function. Indeed their performance of it has the advantage that ή μὲν δὴν πατρικὴ πρόστασις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἱσχυρόν οὗτος τὸ ἀναγκαῖον —
E.N. 1180a 19; also parents would be able to cater for such exceptions as individual peculiarities might warrant —

Εἰς ἰδιότητος καὶ ἰδιογενείν ἄν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἰδίαις τῆς ἐπιμελείᾳς γινομένης μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἑκάστος.
E.N. 1180b 11.

Legislation and education, however, on the 'national' level is better because it is more comprehensive, especially as we have been told earlier that right education for the young is not enough; that we need laws regulating the adults' life 'in general about the whole of life'. Practical statesmanship is the thing needed. And the much needed external influence can be applied by bringing the young and the adult under authority of a system of laws so framed as to embody what the most intelligent minds of the community conceive to be the best life. Thus the ethical necessity of laws is established.

Having thus established the necessity of νομοθετικοῦ the next thing is to find the means of becoming νομοθετικὸς.

From whom then do we learn the science of legislation? Hardly from the practical politicians; for though their experience makes them better (οὗτος γὰρ ἱγίνοντ' ἄν ὑμᾶς τῆς πολιτικῆς συν- θεσίας πολιτικοῦ) 1181a 10.
They cannot impart a knowledge of statesmanship since they acquired it not 'by any rational or scientific method but by experience only**1. Experience (ἐμπειρία) here is the irrational knack - the ἀλογος τερίβη of the Metaphysics (Met. A 981a 1 - b.10).

Certainly not from the 'sophists'**2 (esp. Isocrates and his school); for not only do they not base their theories on experience but they are so devoid of the knowledge of this science that they know neither its essence nor its nature.

Aristotle is however concerned with establishing his own claim; this he does, but not without some difficulty. This difficulty seems evident in the shifts in the role of ἐμπειρία

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**1 Aristotle's remarks here echo Plato's objection to the practising politicians of Athens as teachers of δοστή. See esp. Meno 91a - 100c and Protagoras 319d - 320b; they cannot impart the knowledge of their art even to their own sons.

**2 Though Aristotle speaks here in general about Sophists (ὀφισταῖ) it is generally agreed that his criticism is specially directed against Isocrates and his school. His remarks about those who think that all the would-be lawgiver need do is to choose from the vast number of available laws is a direct reference to, and almost a quotation of some passages in Isocrates' Antidosis. See SS.80 esp. SS.82...

...οὐκετὶ τῆς ἀντὶς διανοούσας ἐργοθέτιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς νόμοις τιθέναι προαιρομένοις προθύγον γέγονε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κειμένων, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὕτους ἐπηείν οἱ δὲ ἐτέρους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας πειραθήμια συναγαγεῖν, ὅρθως δὲ ὁτις ὑπὸν ὁμολόγει τις κοιήσει κ.τ.λ.
and σύνεσις or διάνοια in the formation of the practitioner of the art, and of the meaning of ἐμπειρία as used in this context in relation to ἐμπειρία and διάνοια.

The sophists, we note, do indeed collect laws and constitutions and they try to select the best out of them (a step similar to that which Aristotle here contemplates). The sophists however, lack (a) ἐμπειρία (b) σύνεσις or διάνοια. Practical politicians have ἐμπειρία but they lack σύνεσις or διάνοια.

Now for the νομοθετικός practical experience (ἐμπειρία) is necessary (this, it would seem, Aristotle himself has not got). "For one cannot rightly appreciate the merits of various laws without practical experience in politics", (i.e. without being ἐμπειρίας). This ought to mean that somebody like Aristotle who is not actually engaged in politics cannot be a νομοθετικός and therefore cannot teach political science. Aristotle would, however, think that his close study of the constitutions of 158 states has given him a kind of ἐμπειρία; he would therefore be disqualifying those sophists who try to select the best constitution on the grounds that they have no σύνεσις.

The significance of σύνεσις or διάνοια is established
throughout the context. But after the practical politicians have been disqualified on the grounds that they were merely ἐμπειροί, i.e. ἀνεπιστήμονες the term ἐμπειροῖ in the rest of the argument approximates to ἐπιστήμονες in its connotation. Even the rigidity of the demand for practical experience is softened by the casual hint that one might be able to be a good judge of pictures without being a painter. Next, in the medical analogy, two elements of the physicians are distinguished (a) actual prescriptions for the treatment of individual cases, (b) his classifications of conditions (ἐςχετικά) of the body. The next sentence opposes ἐμπειροῖ to ἀνεπιστήμονες and the analogy is then drawn between the medical art and the political art in which we are told that collections of laws and constitutions would be useful to the τοῦ ὀνυματοφύλακτος, θεωρήσαι καὶ κρίναι. The 'scientific' process involved in 'classification of conditions of the body' is utilised to emphasise the 'θεωρητικά' and the 'κριτικά' aspect of the physician. Thus, although we started the analogy with the importance and necessity for practical experience in the formation of right judgement the conclusion we arrived at in respect of the political art emphasizes the 'θεωρητικά' aspect, and minimises
the significance of the ἐμπειρία aspect. So that we did not conclude that collections of constitutions are useful to the 'experienced' but that they are useful to those who are able to 'θεωρήσαν'. When, therefore, Aristotle concludes that those who 'ἀνευ ἐκεῖνως' investigate other forms of government waste their energy entirely is far as their own legislative faculty is concerned, he had in mind it is true, the 'sophist' (i.e. Isocrates and his school), but the ground of his objection against them here lies not so much in the fact that they were not actually engaged in politics as in the fact that as he believed, they did not have the σύνεσις or ὀτάνοια by which to comprehend the principles of legislation. The point is what by now we should expect as the natural Aristotelian approach that θεωρία is as important as empirical facts in any πραγματεία. Thus both the practical politicians and the sophists are disqualified as ἀνεπιστήμωνες, though on rather different grounds. *

* Von Fritz and Kapp, "Aristotle's Constitution of Athens", pp.45-46, commenting on the final paragraphs, and esp. the last paragraph, of the E.N. remark 'it is clear that Aristotle is not talking of his way to mastership, but that he simply presupposes his own qualification to deal with the historical material as an expert; actually he is concerned with a prospectus for his
I have dealt at length with these last paragraphs because I believe that the sequence of the argument shows its rather polemic and 'controversial' nature. Having established the ethical necessity of the lawgiver, Aristotle proceeds in one long argument to assess the relative merits of those who could claim or do claim to be able to supply the science of legislation; the argument ends by establishing the qualification students, and what he promises is that if they have a certain preliminary acquaintance with this material and follow his own guidance, they 'shall perhaps be better able to discern ...'

Against this it may be said first, that the methodical care with which Aristotle eliminates all rivals shows that he does no simply 'presuppose his own qualification'; he seems more like actually 'talking of his way to mastership'; second, it is difficult to separate 'the way to mastership' from concern with giving a prospectus for students for the basis of the whole argument is that it is only the true νομοθέτηκος who can do this; the problem of assessing who is the master of political theory is the same as that of finding who can teach it, third the conclusion θεωρητών γνώριστων τοις τάξις ἀν μᾶλλον συνάδεσμον καὶ πολιτεία ἄρεστα can not without difficulty mean, as Von Fritz and Kapp would take it, that 'if (Aristotle's pupils) have a certain preliminary acquaintance with this material they (the pupils) would perhaps be better able to discern ...' the best state etc; it fairly obviously means that Aristotle, putting his θεωρία to work on the material afforded by the collection of constitutions thinks himself qualified both on grounds of σύνεσις or θεωρία and ἐμπειρία to be the true νομοθέτηκος.
of the Aristotelian school to supply it. The very final paragraph is designed to justify this newly established qualification. He shows how qualified he is by displaying his design for this aspect of political theory. But it is a design much influenced by the nature of the argument at this point. And it could only be a general design not meant to impose the order which the books of the Politics should take.

* I take the transitional link at the end of the E.M. to be 'extempore'. It should not perhaps be very surprising if the link forged to connect two subject-matters dealt with in two different lectures or two different sets of lectures bears clear traces of the topic treated proximately to that link; and nobody makes any serious objection if that link does not reveal the nature of the subject matters thus linked, or if the programme there sketched is not strictly adhered to in the actual exposition of the next subject-matter. Von Fritz & Kapp op.cit. pp.46-47 seek more serious reasons to explain why the link is such as we have it. They see some of these reasons in the fact that "in earlier phases of his development, he (Aristotle) had dealt with Ethics and Politics as strictly separate disciplines'; also, "the main subject of his ethical theory is the question of the happiness of the individual. According to his theory, this happiness culminates in pure contemplation. But this avowedly something that transgresses ordinary human nature..." on the other hand, a human being would not be a human being if he did not live with other human beings; this is necessary for him in order to live a human life. It is primarily this latter aspect of human life with which political science in its original sense is concerned". When Aristotle decided to unite the two sciences, he felt the need for a link, but, say Fritz & Kapp, there were difficulties; it was hardly feasible 'to engage in such a discussion on the
The certain thing about these sections seems to be that it shows that Aristotle believed that an empirical study of various constitutions is an important aspect of political theory and that it is helpful in building one's theory to examine what other theories there were before. To think otherwise is to think that Aristotle put the basis of his whole political theory solely or at least mainly on the need for a legislator.

The occasion of the transition from the first to the second part for that would have necessitated an anticipation of a large part of the whole toward which he made his transition, and also the final results of his ethical theory, as summed up in the chapters immediately preceding the transition, almost preclude an unpredicated approach to the theory of the state.

First, I am not convinced that Aristotle treated 'Ethics' more independently of 'Politics' in the Eudemian Ethics than in the E.N. the reference to Politics VII 1323b 39 where the question of the best life is said to be the business of another study - (ατέρας γὰρ κατὰ γογον ἑργουν σχολῆς) does not prove anything. There is no evidence that Aristotle ever conceived Ethics and Politics in the narrower sense as so inseparably united as Plato did; he nevertheless believed that they are two aspects of the same study, which is all that is asserted in the E.N. Fritz and Kapp use the argumentum ex silentio that Aristotle does not make the same assertion in the E.E. to prove that Aristotle conceived the relation of Ethics and Politics differently when he wrote the E.E. I do not think
Indeed at first sight the argument upon which the ethical necessity of the legislator is established does not directly touch the ethical ideal - the ideal of contemplative life; for the supervisory function of the legislator is restricted to the sphere of the moral virtues; if therefore the basis of politics is founded on the necessity of the legislator we would fail to see the direct dependence of the speculative thinker on the polis. In fact, however, the main assumption that there is any evidence in support of their view. The statement in the Politics that the purely ethical inquiry about the good life belongs to another σχολή does not contradict the position of the Ε.Ν; for there is no reason why there should not be more than one σχολή within the same subject matter. Incidentally, the use here in the Politics is the only one we have in Aristotle of σχολή in the sense of 'discussion' or 'study', it probably does not mean anything very different from λόγος, several of which could be found within the same πραγματεία. In the De Anima 15a 11 - 12, for instance, Aristotle says that the question of the theoretic soul' belongs to ἕτερος λόγος here λόγος seems to be doing the same thing as σχολή in the Politics. There is a further contradiction involved in Fritz & Kapp using the genetic argument that the early Aristotle was Platonic to prove that Aristotle held a non-Platonic view of the relation between Ethics and Politics at the point when he was still fairly Platonic. Aristotle could therefore have said what he said
throughout the analysis is that of the various forms of association through which the human good - the ethical ideal - is realised. The polis - the all embracing association which men join for the whole of their life - is the ἀφθαρσία, because it is in it or some form of it alone that man can realise his whole being, actualise his highest energies. But there are no doubt numerous subordinate ones, ranging from that of husband and wife which gives expression to one of the most fundamental instincts of man (E.N. VIII. 14, 1162a 17) to that of fellow-veyagers who come together for the purpose of trade and profit, to the fellowship of philosophers.

The analysis of justice in E.N.V, esp. 1134a 23-1136a 9, and that of friendship in E.N. VIII and IX show the role of various associations in the realisation of human σοφία. We shall have more to say about this later on. Even the ideal

here of the relation of Ethics and Politics at any time in his philosophic career certainly in his later years (but Fritz and Kapp regard Pol.VII as early). Also I do not believe that Aristotle would have regarded the ethical ideal - the contemplative life as prejudicial to the proper approach to the theory of the state. To believe this is to think that it could ever occur to Aristotle that ethical ideal was realisable outside of the association of human beings.
of contemplative life with which the analysis of human
 Ends does not neglect the role of association in
 human Ends, in spite of the fact that we have in this
 ideal one which is practicable when man is most independent
 of his fellows. For we are told that man to be human at
 all needs society. To doubt this for a moment is to think
 that man is a god. For whatever might be his potentiality
 for the highest human ideal—contemplative life—a human
 being cut off from birth from the society of men would develop
 not into a man but into a brutish beast. The real basis of
 politics is the nature of the associations which cater for
 the realisation of the human good. The Politics, as we have
 it, starts with the nature and the value of various associations
 in respect of their ends, and criticises Plato for conceiving
 certain associations as identical; the discussion soon leads
 to the all-embracing association of the polis and to the
 succinct remark that whoever lives outside society and does
 so not by some accident but by nature is either a god or a
 brute (Pol. I. 1253a 2-4.)

 Therefore, it would, on the one hand, be misguided to
 underrate the influence which Aristotle attaches to habituation
in the realisation of the ethical ideal. For, it is habituation (ἐθικομοδία) which converts our natural capacities (ἀναμίμησις) into (εὐσεία) and naturally in the Ethics where Aristotle views virtue as an internal phenomenon and where therefore the approach is more psychological than political. The importance of this conversion for man's attainment of his φύσις is emphasised. On the other hand, Aristotle does not see the link of Ethics and Politics as consisting essentially only in the necessity for habituation or in the need for the coercive function. The complementary aspect of his political philosophy lies in the needs and ends which transcend individual powers - needs and ends which because they are natural, call associations of various sorts into being. The attempts therefore of certain scholars, some of whose views we have examined, to regard the First Book as a form of appendix or an afterthought is to say the least misguided. The rest of this study will be devoted to examining what types of society Aristotle considers to serve these natural needs and purposes and how, as distinct societies, they differ from each other.
The account of the development of Society in *Pol*. I cannot, of course, claim to be fully historical. Aristotle is in that account interested neither in proving that the Household is chronologically the first form of society in which man lived nor in laying down a universally valid law of social evolution and forecasting the future of society. To some extent, Aristotle deduces the origin of political society from the existing constitution of society and from what he conceives to be the nature of man; and in so far as he does this, his account is probably not much more historical than Plato's theory of the evolution of society in *Rep*. II or the Social Contract Theory of Hobbes. Even if the account were purely logical, however, it would still be philosophically interesting to ask why he made the assumptions he made and whether there are any logical gaps in the theory - why for instance, he supposes that three types of society are required to serve adequately 'natural' needs and purposes and how do these natural needs and purposes so differ from each other as to make three distinct kinds of society necessary.

Aristotle, however, further believed that the past political history of the Greeks exemplifies a certain law of progress, not fully realised by all the Greek peoples, still less by the barbarians; nor, as I already pointed out, did he believe that there was something inevitable about this law of progress which
would ensure that it would be realised among these other peoples. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of 'association' (κοινωνία) has, like an organism, (though accident plays a very large part in the history of the political 'organism') its normal sequence or stages from its germinal to its fully developed form; and this sequence can best be understood in the light of its genesis and development. (PoI.1. 1252a 24). Where historical evidence is available to support this sequence, Aristotle utilizes it, as in the case of the κόμη; where not, the sequence becomes logical and is lifted to the plane of philosophic history, as in the case of the origin of the family. Aristotle follows the same procedure in the 'Poetics' in his account of the development of Poetry and Drama; and recently two American scholars - Day and Chambers* have argued that the same procedure is followed in the more historical treatise on the Athenian Constitution i.e. that the successive stages by which 'the present constitution' evolved and reached the telos were presented through constructive and destructive moments apparently indeed in strictly chronological sequence but in reality with a logical or philosophical presupposition which turns the chronicle into philosophic history.

For our purpose, however, the importance of the account of the evolution of society in Pol.I lies in the fact that Aristotle's enumeration of these typical successive phrases is at the same time an account of their motivation, the desires and needs from which they spring, and an appraisal of their relative value in terms of the degree to which they serve the 'natural' ends of human existence.

Society, we are told, (Pol.I, 2, 1252 & 26) begins in Necessity, and its earliest form is συνόντασμός, the union, in pairs, of human beings who are indispensable to each other; this primarily is the society of husband and wife. Its cause is the sexual and parental instinct common to man and other animals; the instinct of self-preservation creates another sort of society by drawing the slave to his master. This is the "union of those who are by nature rulers and those who are by nature destined to be ruled for the sake of security. For he who is able by his intelligence to exercise foresight is by nature ruler and master, and he who can only carry out by using his body what the foreseeing man plans is by nature a slave."

These two elementary associations constitute the Household, and the true form of the Household is reached when children issue from the first συνόντασμός and become members of the Household. This society exists for the sake of satisfying daily recurrent needs - Pol.I. 1252b 13ff. - ἢ μὲν οὖν οἷς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν ὁλχὸς ἔστιν.
The next society arises when, out of a number of households, Villages are formed, of which the 'most natural' kind is a consanguineous group of clan 'ruled by the eldest'. Thus the earliest form of Greek Kingship arose, which among many barbarian peoples still persists (Pol.I. 1252b 19). This type of society is already capable of satisfying more than daily recurrent needs— it exists χρήσως ἐνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου.

The final stage is reached when a "complete city-state which already possesses entire self-sufficiency" is formed through the union of several such villages. Thus although the stage (as arising out of the earlier forms of society) originates "in the bare needs of life", it continues in existence "for the sake of the good life"—Pol.I. 1252b 27-30, of which 'self-sufficiency' is the most excellent characteristic and the consummation (Pol. 1253a 1). The self-sufficiency of a state depends partly upon the number of its citizens and partly upon its territory. "A state when composed of too few is not self-sufficient (and self-sufficiency is what constitutes a state); when composed of too many, though self-sufficing in mere necessaries ἀνταρκτικής ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις (Pol. VII.4 1326b 4) it is not a state but only a mere aggregate of people of the same race (ἔθνος), a form of society which lacks the differentiation which marks the state (Pol.II.1261a 27).

Two main 'differentiae' therefore distinguish a 'state' from the prior and inferior forms of social organisation.
(a) A genuine state has a fixed constitution defining civil rights and the allocation of political powers, privileges and duties; it is a government of laws not of men (Pol. III. 1270b 10-11) (b) Laws, however, as definitions of rights are not enough: for the law is a covenant, or in the words of the Sophist Lycophron, a guarantee of men's just claims upon one another, but it does not as such make the citizens good and just (Pol. III. 1280b 10-12). Laws defining mutual rights are necessary even in 'alliances'; "thus it is clear that any state that is properly so called, and is not a state in name only must be concerned about virtue; for otherwise the association becomes merely an alliance". Pol. III. 1280b 6-9).

A society, then, when its normal development is not arrested, goes through a typical evolution which corresponds to, and results from, an increasing realisation by men of the originally latent potentialities and needs of human nature - a gradual discovery of what 'the good life' (τὸ ἔδεξα ζῆν) for man is. The earliest form of social organisation serves only the most rudimentary of human needs. The final form gives man abundant opportunity for the full realisation of his potentialities. Man is therefore 'by nature a political animal' in the sense that his specific nature can manifest itself fully only in the polis. In the following pages we shall give attention to discussing in some detail Aristotle's appraisal of the relative value of each of these associations, supporting the account with evidence drawn from the facts of Greek life.
Aristotle and the Greek Household

Aristotle establishes the naturalness of the Household, it would seem, beyond doubt. Man is indeed by nature more a pairing animal than a political animal we learn in the E.N. VIII, 1262a 16. The social impulse of just being together, and the stronger impulse of reproduction and self-preservation calls the Household into being. But once existing, the Household caters for the higher needs of the good life. In pursuit of this, the head of the Household maintains a special relationship with the inmates of the Household. He rules the wife not as an absolute despot, but as a constitutional adviser - the husband-wife relationship approximates most nearly to πολιτική δοξά; he rules the children not as a tyrant but as a king who looks to the good of his subjects; he is concerned with property he rules in full despotism; when exercised rightly, however, this despotism is not without advantages to the slave. The head of the household, therefore, is a source of virtue to the household; the wife obeys him in silence, the children hold him in awe and loving respect, and the slave has little or no dealing with him, though as the servant of a poor man, the slave improves in virtue. The household, therefore, though it exists primarily for physical needs does not wholly lack contribution to those moral and intellectual needs which the state pre-eminently serves.
Aristotle does not go into great details of the internal organisation of the family. He, however, recommends in the

* I have left out any detailed discussion of Aristotle's exposition on οἰκονομικὴ and χρηματιστική and their mutual relations; for its relevance to our theme is essentially confined to Aristotle's notion that the head of the household should see to it that only as much material goods as the interests of virtue and happiness dictate are provided for the household and no more; it is in this connection that Aristotle discusses to what extent οἰκονομικὴ is related to and controls χρηματιστική. As a pure theory of economics the discussion is not without intrinsic interest. Aristotle, approaching the problem with the keen analytical insight for which he is well-known poses the right and essential questions. He displays a grasp of the basic ideas of production and exchange. He sees clearly enough the distinction between value in use and value in exchange, and as in the E.N. he displays a very illuminating theory of the primary function of money.

But his conception of capital is faulty and misleading, and does not rise above the very primitive conception of interest as that 'of making barren metal breed'. This of course, like his notion that brigandage and slave-hunting are a natural mode of acquisition is due at least partly to the ambiguity inherent in his conception of nature (φύσις); nature being sometimes as at the beginning of the Politics a condition of perfect development - the natural, in this sense, being 'whatever contributes to that which is best for the given species' - in the case of man whatever contributes to the good life, and nature suggesting at other times the condition in which a thing exists at its genesis - the natural in this sense being 'the ancient, the primaevial - that which is given by nature herself' (Pol.I.8. 1256b 7), that which conforms to the primordial law of zoological sustenance which prescribes that sustenance is to be won from "the residue of the substance from which the creature springs" (Pol.I.10. 1256a 36). In this case the primaevial state of man must have been his normal and best state; in this sense, also, that which is not made by man, that which does not owe its genesis to man's contrivance is the most natural.

Thus in one place man is by nature a political animal because the state ensures fully developed humanity, in another place, brigandage, hunting, the pastoral life are natural because they are characteristic of the primitive condition of men; the taking of interest is, therefore, unnatural because
ideal state of books 7 and 8, the age of 18 as the ideal age for a woman to marry, and 37 as the ideal age for a man. This has two main advantages: it makes for a harmonious sex-life between husband and wife since it takes account of the fact that a man still retains his procreative powers till the age of 70 while those of women cease at 50. Also the gap of 38-40 years is a respectable one to maintain between the head of the household and his children; a smaller difference in age may mean less respect from the children to their father. Another advantage is that the father's old-age would coincide with the time when his children are most capable to help and support him. There are other not negligible reasons; marriage at an earlier date for a man might retard his physical growth, and for a woman might involve hazards at child-birth; and finally, a union between a woman of 18 and a man of 37 is likely to result in male issues! Although the Greeks never ignored these reasons of personal happiness, they saw the household as serving more than these personal interests - there were other motives behind the desire to maintain a household - motives perhaps less open.

*(cont. from previous page) ...apart from other reasons, it is not practised in primitive societies. It is also in this second sense of 'nature' that Aristotle distinguishes the five 'natural' forms of life in Pol.I - the life of the shepherd, the farmer, the pirate, the fisherman and the hunter. There, although Aristotle does not insist on the temporal succession of these forms of life or point to the evolutionary significance, he realises that they are all more or less primitive and that one form is more primitive than the other. In Pol.VII. 1329b 5ff. for instance, he mentions the development of "an Italian people from the pastoral to the agricultural stage." Their primitiveness makes all these forms of life 'natural.'
to philosophic analysis but to which nevertheless Plato appeals in the constitution of the 'Laws'. Aristotle appeals to these motives less explicitly, though it must be granted that some of his arguments in Pol. II, for example, the one that the human instinct prefers to be able to identify its own blood relations, are based on some of these motives.

The Greek household in classical times was different from that of the world depicted by Homer - the almost self-sufficient unit in and through which the whole social life operates, embracing as it did the prince, his territories, his children, his subordinates and the other interrelations which make it so self-sufficient a unit. A patriarchy of a sort, it is true, but a much wider unit than that envisaged in Aristotle's doctrine. Indeed the Homeric ōξος would seem to Aristotle to be a form of clan-village community headed by its eldest member. In Hesiod, however, we notice a change from the Homeric picture; for with him the ōξος is constituted of a house, a plough-ox and a wife. It is perhaps this change that makes the Hesiodic picture more appropriate and relevant to Aristotle's conception of it. In every period, however, we find similar motives governing the ōξος.

Odysseus, anxious about the future of his ōξος, asked his mother in the underworld urgent questions about his ōξος and his mother replies, "the fair honour that was thine no man yet possesses, but Telemachus hold thy demesne unharassed" - Od. XI 184.
It is a lamentable thing when there is no offspring to succeed to one's household and substance; and Eurykleia soothes Penelope with the thought that this would not happen to the house of Arkeisios - "And trouble not a troubled old man; for the race of the son of Arkeisios is not, methinks, utterly hated by the blessed gods, but there shall still be one, I ween. I hold the high-roofed halls and the rich fields far away." - Od. IV 754-7. Hector appeals to the same motive when to encourage his soldiers he said "Nay, fight ye at the ships in close throngs, and if so be any of you, smitten by dart or thrust, shall meet death or fate, let him lie in death. No unseemly thing is it for him to die while fighting for his country. Nay, but his wife is safe and his children after him, and his house and his portion of land are unharmed, if but the Achaeans be gone with their ships to their native land." Iliad XV 497. Marriage was therefore contracted largely 'liberorum causa' and the gods blessed a marriage by granting numerous children; Priam and Niobe were especially happy and proud while their children lived. The loss of children was a terrible affliction, as the sequels of this family show, and a curse that brought down childlessness was most cruel (Od. IV.12 etc. Iliad XXIV, 546, 602ff, IX 455ff). The wife attained her greatest dignity as mother, and there was a sort of passion
for offspring.

It would seem then that the average Greek felt it to be his duty to sacrifice all his personal feelings for the sake of the continuity of the Family. "Let not this seed of Pelops' line be blotted out" prays Electra at the tomb of Agamemnon, "for then in spite of death thou art not dead. For children are the voices of salvation to a man, though he be dead; like corks they buoy up the net, saving the flaxen cord from out the deep" - Aeschylus Choe. 504ff. (Loeb. translation). Even at Sparta where we would least expect much importance to be attached to the continuity of the Family, the procreation of children was held to be of such importance that if a wife had no children she admitted, with the full knowledge of her husband, some other citizen to her, and children born from such a union were reckoned as born to the continuation of her husband's family without any breach of the former relations of husband and wife. - Plut. Lycur. & Num. 4; Xen. Const. of Sparta 1. 7 - 9.

Isaeus says (Isaeus VII (On the Estate of Apollodorus) 30 - "All men, when they are near their end, take measures of precaution on their own behalf to prevent their familiies from becoming extinct and to secure that there shall be someone to perform sacrifices and carry out the customary rites over them. And so, even if they die without issue, they at any rate adopt children and leave them behind. And there is not merely a
personal feeling in favour of this course, but the state has taken public measures to secure that it shall be followed, since by law it entrusts the archon with the duty of preventing families from being extinguished. At Athens therefore, the Archon had the power and sometimes the duty to compel a reluctant heiress to marry, or order the next of kin to perform his duty in order to prevent any oμος from perishing for want of representatives (ἡ Plato: Laws 924e). The main conditions determining the fitness of such a match was nearness of kinship. The rules regulating this custom seem to have been strict; for although some allowance was made for the heiress who was unwilling to marry an obnoxious kinsman, and for the kinsman who felt that his own house had greater claims on him, Isaeus tells us (iii.64) that "it has indeed frequently happened that husbands have been thus deprived of their own wives owing to their wives becoming ἐξωτικὴς; for the law ordains that daughters who have been given in marriage by their father and are living with their husbands, shall, in spite of the fact that they are thus married, pass into the legal power of their next of kin, if their father dies without leaving them legitimate brothers"; the purpose being to prevent the extinction of their father's house.

* If the married heiress already had sons, however, she need not be divorced from her husband and marry the next of kin though she had the right to do so; one of her sons could perform the function of preventing her father's house from becoming desolate.
Isaeus (1.39) also informs us what the consequence of this law was for men; there the claimants say "If Polyarchus, the father of Cleonymus and our grandfather, were alive and lacked the necessities of life, or if Cleonymus had died leaving daughters unprovided for, we should have been obliged on grounds of affinity to support our grandfather, and either ourselves marry Cleonymus' daughters or else provide dowries and find other husbands for them - the claims of kinship, the laws, and public opinion in Athens would have forced us to do this or else become liable to heavy punishment and extreme disgrace." If, however, a man left more than one heiress, only one need be dealt with in respect of providing succession, though all shared in the property.

The levirate or marriage with deceased husband's brother seems to have had no place in Greek family custom. The practice that comes near it, but only just, is that which we saw in Sparta where a wife is allowed to bear children by another man into the family of her husband; though we seem to have traces of the true levirate in Deiphobos of legendary Troy and in Lycurgus of Sparta who declined to take his brother's wife.

The marriage connexion still recognised the wife as belonging to her father's family, it therefore did nothing to strengthen the kinship blood if the next of kin married the widow on taking the inheritance of his relative who was deceased
without issue.

Unlike in Roman Law, the wife in Greek Law could not inherit from her husband; and only when it became a question of finding an heir to her son, and failing all near paternal kinsmen could the inheritance pass through her, and then it was as the mother of her dead son, not as widow of her dead husband. Even then being a woman, she had no right of enjoyment, only of transmission. She could only inherit on behalf of her children, the inheritance would pass to her brothers and so on.*

The childless widow on the death of her husband had to return to her own family or whoever of her kinsmen was her guardian; if she wished she could be given again in marriage by him. In pseudo-Dem. Against Macartatus 1076 we learn of a widow who was allowed to remain in her deceased husband's house on plea of pregnancy and under the guardianship of the archon. There is evidence however that even the widow with children

"The dowry system, as practised at Athens, and very probably in Greece generally, evidently tended to maintain a connexion between the wife and her father's family; her entrance into her husband's house was not irrevocable, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus has good ground for the contrast which he draws (Ant. Rom. 2. 25) between Greek wedlock and wedlock as he describes it in the early days of Rome, when both dower and wife passed irrevocably to the husband, marriage being indissoluble, and the dower not reclaimable by action at law. The wife, in fact, in early Rome became once for all a member of her husband's family, 'a complete participant both in property and sacred rites' (κοινωνίας ἀδύνατον χρυσών τε καὶ ἱερῶν) and inherited from her husband just as a daughter would."
sometimes did return to her father's house; whether childless or not, however, the widow returned with her dower. But in case the widow with children stayed, her children are responsible for her livelihood. (Dem) (in Phaeipp. 1047).

The woman at Athens even after marriage always retained her guardian who was at once her protector and trustee. He was probably usually the head of the household to which she originally belonged and her next of kin, and had great power over her. In Isaeus V, 10 we see that Dicaeogenes III by coming into an inheritance from his first cousin Dicaeogenes II becomes the guardian of his three female first cousins, though all the three are married.

From Isaeus VII 11-12 we learn that marriage connexions are formed between first cousins both to reconcile old animosities between relatives and to prevent the dowry of the woman or whatever property might come to her from going outside the family. Now was marriage between the man and his half-sister (not born of the same mother) forbidden. Homer is of course full of such instances. Alcinous and Arete were uncle and niece and there are other similar instances (Iliad IV, 58ff; XIV, 296; Odyssey VIII, 267ff; X, 1 ff; VII, 63ff).

When a married heiress sets apart one of her sons to be heir to her father's house she must do this absolutely. Her son must entirely leave her husband's house and be enrolled into the
house of her father. If she did not do this with all the necessary ceremonies the house of her father would become extinct, an occurrence which would bring a lasting shame on her.

In Isaeus VII (On the Estate of Apollodorus); 31, Isaeus mentions the married sisters - the wife of Pronapes and her sister - who, having inherited the property of their brother, failed to meet the obligation of appointing one of their children to take the place of son in the house of their deceased brother (ἐξεινυ ὡ' ὀν ἔλοποιονοις ὁμ-τῶν αὐτατς παλων), thus securing the extinction of his house and leaving his house "shamefully and deplorably desolate". In the pseudo-Dem. against Macartatus 1077 a man who behaves as these sisters did to their brother is called δροιστής.

In Isaeus XI 49 we have the instance of a person who did the right thing. A wife inherits from her deceased brother a farm and persuades her husband to set apart their second son in order that he may carry on the family of her brother and take the property.

The idea of continuing the family was therefore the mother of the custom of adoption. Jebb has so well summarised the significance of this custom in its relation to the Greek conception of the Family that I quote him at some length. Referring

* Jebb - "Attic Orators" Vol.II "From Antiphon to Isaeus" p. 315
to Maine - (Ancient Law - chapter VI) on "The early History of Testamentary Succession" as having proved beyond reasonable doubt that the idea of a man's legal existence being prolonged in his heir or in a group of co-heirs sprang from the attribution to the individual of that perpetuity which is the characteristic of the family" Jebb continues - "The idea of continuing the family is that in which testament begins. How in primitive societies religious rites are the symbols and warrants of the family's continuity. The father of the Indo-European house was its priest as well as its master: the sacrifices which in life he offered at the hearth could after his death, be offered only by the son in whom his personality survived. These sacrifices were at once the most solemn obligations of his successor and the most sacred pledges of an inviolable succession. What, then, was to happen if there was no heir duly qualified by nearness of blood? To meet this case, primitive society invented Adoption, that is the authorised fiction of kinship...The Hindoo system of succession shows the primitive religious element completely predominant. When the childless Hindoo adopts a child, it is with a view to 'the funeral cake, the water, and the solemn sacrifice' (Maine loc. cit. p.192). The Roman testamentary law of Cicero's time, on the other hand, has broken free of religion...the obligation imposed by the Civil Law has become independent of the theol-
logical sanction. The Athenian system belongs essentially to the same stage as the Hindoo System. But in spirit the Athenian system may be regarded as intermediate between the Hindoo and the Roman. The Athenian exercise of adoptive power retains, indeed, as its nominal first principle, the religious continuity of the family. 'Succour him who is with the dead', cries the speaker to the jurors - 'do not allow him - I beseech you by the gods and the immortal spirits - to be treated with contumely by these men': 'think', he exclaims, 'for what you become responsible if you are persuaded by Cleon to give a different verdict:- first of all, you will send the worst enemies of Astyphilus to celebrate the rites at his grave'. It would be an utter mistake to suppose that these pathetic or stately commonplaces are altogether hollow. The sentiment is real enough. But at the same time.....the Athenian of the days of Isaeus adopted a son primarily because he wished to leave his property to a person who would not otherwise get it.'"}

However, the transfer of the adopted son from the Family of his father to that which he was chosen to represent was so real that he lost all claim to inheritance in his original family, and henceforth based his relationship and rights of kinship on his new position as son of his adoptive father. This absolutely insured the childless man that his successor would not merge the inheritance in that of another family, and
made it very unlikely that he would neglect his religious duties as they would henceforth be his own ancestral rites.

Just as Aristotle conceived it, the Greek Household was a patriarchy. While the man lived he was its head and the control over its inmates and of its property lie solely with him. The only exception is when a son feels that his father is no longer mentally capable of administering his property and he successfully proves this before a heliastic court (δίκη παρανοίας — cf. Aeschines, Against Ctesi, 251; Xen. Mem. I.2.49; Aristotle Α.Π. 56) Occasionally a father, through old age, may voluntarily pass on to his son during his life time some of his burden of responsibility by making him master of the estate (κύριος τῆς οίκου — Isaeus VII, 15 & 27). In this case the son would, of course, be responsible for the maintenance of his father.

After the death of the head of the family, the sons need not divide up; they could live on with joint ownership in the one household of their deceased father. The eldest son would probably take the hearth with the duties of the family altars which devolved upon him as the head of the family. An example of this joint ownership occurs in the speech of Demosthenes against Leochares (1083). The two sons of Exhumachos after his death gave their sister in marriage (no doubt with her proper portion)
and lived separately but without dividing their inheritance (τὴν ὀδοίαν ἄνεμητον). Even after one of the two brothers got married, they still left the property undivided, each living on his own share of the income, one resident at Athens, the other in Salamis.

It would, therefore, seem that the family, until final sub-division into separate households, drew its supplies from the common inheritance, and that the subdivision of the means of subsistence was contemporaneous and co-extensive with the differentiation of the various branches of the original household along the lines of the rising generations.

The speech pseudo-Demosthenes against Macartatus affords considerable information on this. In 1055 we have these words "Buselus, men of the jury, was a member of the deme Oeon, and to him were born five sons, Hagnias and Eubulides and Stratius and Habron and Cleocritus. And all these sons of Buselus grew up to manhood, and their father Buselus divided his property among themselves, each of them married a wife according to your laws, and sons and grandsons were born to them all, and there sprang up five households from the single one of Buselus; and they dwelt apart, each one having his own home and begetting his descendants."

This speech also shows us that a household of narrower limits was marked off from some further outreachings of the
family. The action which was the occasion of the speech, lay between the great-grandsons of two of the five founders of households — Statios and Hagnias, and had reference to the estate of the grandson of the latter (also called Hagnias) which had come into the hands of the great grandson of Stratius, One would have supposed that the descendants of Buselus with their common burial ground (against Mac. 1077) would rank as all in the same, if extended, Household under the title of Buseldai. It is however clear from this speech that too many generations had already passed to admit of Buselus being considered as still head of an unbroken but extended Household, and that his great-great-grandsons were already sub-divided into separate Households under the names of their respective great-grandfathers, Stratius, Hagnias etc. - "νομίζετε...
ὅπως μὴ ἐξερημωθησέται αὐτῶν ὁ ὀλίκος ὡς τῶν μικρῶν τούτων ἡμῖν, οἱ εἰσὶν ἐκ τοῦ ἔκτατου ὀλίκου, ἐν δὲ τῷ 'Ἀγνίου οἴκου ὁδὸσκωποῦ' ἔγενοντο. (1078-9)

This narrower limit embraces the Δυσπετείς; it is the Δυσπετεία; it governs inheritance, the main rules of which are these. (See Isaeus VII, 22 & XI, 1, and ps.Dem. against Mac. 1051).

i) On the death of a head of a family who left sons, the sons shared the inheritance equally.

ii) Failing sons and sons issue, daughters and daughters'
issue succeeded.

iii) A daughter, however, was strictly not an heiress in the modern sense but a person who went with the estate (ἐπίκληρος). The heir was either (a) her nearest kinsman who was bound to marry her, or (b) any person to whom the father had devised the property on condition of marrying his daughter; but further, either of these can properly be called an heir only if he was adopted by his father-in-law; if not, he only held the property in trust for his wife's sons.

iv) Failing lineal descendents, the succession passed to collateral kinsfolk on the paternal side as far down as children of first cousins - the limit of the ἄγγιστος - with a preference to males.

v) Failing these, it passed to the maternal side, with similar limit and preference.

We thus have this order of preference for collateral kinsfolk.

(a) Brothers, being sons of the same father as the deceased, taken per capita.

(b) Such brothers' children, taken per stirpes - males and females having an equal right.

(c) Sisters by the same father and their children, taken per stirpes.
(d) First cousins on the father's side, preference being given to males over females.

(e) Children of such first cousins - limit of the ἄνυξτεῖα (ὁλοκλήρωσι τῆς ἄνυξτείας ἀνεφικός πρὸς πατρὸς μεχρὶ ἀνεστικὸν πατρὸν).

Failing these, the succession reverts to the maternal side and the next lines are

(f) Brothers born of the same mother as the deceased, and so on in a similar order to the father's side.

Failing all these, however, the nearest kinsman on the father's side inherits.

It would therefore seem that the ἄνυξτεῖα demarcates the limit of succession and inheritance, and that the group of great-grandsons were considered to divide up their right to inherit once for all, and that having done so with respect to that inheritance they were considered to have begun a new succession. Thus, in the case of the death of one of these second cousins after the final division of their inheritance had taken place, the rest of the second cousins would have no right to share in his portion; an heir would have to be found within his nearer relations; these second cousins thus share responsibilities towards any of their relations within the group and higher up in their families, and also stand shoulder to shoulder in sharing such burdens as pollution and so on,
but are outside the immediate ἀγγλοστεία with respect to each other's succession. ps. Dem. against Macartatus shows this. For there (1053) we see the plaintiff who originally stands in the relationship of grandson of a first cousin to the deceased being adopted as the son of his grandfather (first cousin of the deceased) in order to come within the pale of the ἀγγλοστεία - the outer limit of which is ἄνεψιον παλές.

The younger members of the Household had a duty to maintain the older members. "The law enjoins us" says Isaeus (VIII.32) "to support our parents," meaning by 'parents' father, mother, grandfather, and grandmother, and their father and mother, if they are still alive; for they are the source of the family, and their property is transmitted to their descendents, and so the latter are bound to support them even if they have nothing to bequeath to them. (cf. Aristotle, E.N. 1165a 21 - parents are the greatest of benefactors, and have the first claim for maintenance even at the risk of one's own self-preservation). This duty was as important as the performance of the burial rites and the continued cult at the grave (see Deinarch II, 18 and Lys.XIII 45). This common debt towards living forbears must have aided in consolidating the group of descendents already bound together by common rights at the tombs of the dead. To Plato (Laws 931 A) honours paid to living parents come next after honours to ancestral deities, although Aeschylus (Supp. 707-709) places reverence for parents third among the
statutes of justice. Indeed at Athens any citizen might bring before the Archon any information concerning maltreatment of parents, women and orphan. This was the γραφὴ κακώσεως, a special form of which was the εἰςγγέλτα κακώσεως ὄρφανος of Isaeus XI. In such trials as these the prosecutor could address the court with no time limit - (Harp. S.V. κακώσεως· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄνευ δόδτος) and suffered no punishment if unsuccessful. The accused on the other hand, if proved guilty might suffer δύση (Xenophon, Memorabilia II, 2. 13; Diogenes Laertius 1, 155) or even death - (Lysias XIII 45) and in Isaeus XI, 14 Theompopus speaks of himself as κινώνεων ὕπερ τοῦ σώματος (cf. Isaeus VII 32). We learn from Aristotle (Α.Π. 55 3) that the candidates for the archonship were asked amongst other things whether they treated their parents properly, and from Aeschines (against Timarchus, 13) we learn that even when the father had through some crime lost the right of maintenance by his children, the son was still bound to bury him when he died and to perform all the customary rites at his tomb.

In every period of Greek history we find the Household intimately connected with the need to satisfy daily needs. Telemachus connects the household closely with its sustenance. The suitors by consuming its sustenance destroys the Household - (Od. IV. 318) ἔστεσεν μοι ὁ λόχος, ἐλώλες ὁ πόνα ἔργα.

Hesiod sees the energies of the Household mainly directed to wringing a living from the ἄληρος—Aristotle tells us
that the household exists to satisfy daily recurrent needs. Aristotle saw Hesiod's picture of the Household appropriate enough to illustrate his own conception of the Household. A householder, according to Hesiod, needs a house, a wife and a plough-ox - Aristotle only substitutes a slave for the plough-ox, - ὃ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' ὀλιγτοῦ τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν.

And the words used by Charondas - ὁ μοι-κασός (sharers in the mealbin) and by Epimenides of Crete (μοίκασοι) (sharers of the same plot of ground - connote this relationship of the Household to the κληρος. Pindar even uses the word δυσκλαροι to mean twins (Pindar Nem. IX.11).

But the κληρος was more than an article of property - a mere instrument for the satisfaction of the daily wants of the members of the Household. It is also closely connected with the sanctity of the hearth and desire to perpetuate the household. It was an ancestral holding. The members of the Household were bound together at their ancestral hearth by mutual ties of common maintenance, and even the sanctity of sharing the same loaf - the product of the κληρος extended also to guests whose relations to their hosts might last for generations, the famous example of this is of course, that of Glaucus of Lycia and Diomedes of Argos. (Iliad VI 145 ff).

Classical writers, however, often mention the custom which rendered the κληρος or ἄρχαλαι μοίραι inalienable. Aristotle
comments on the excellence of the ancient law at one time prevalent in many states, against the sale of the original κληρον, and the good purpose served by the custom of making everyone cultivate his own moderate-sized holding - (Pol. VI. 1319a 10).

In Isaeus we have a number of passages (Isaeus III, 42, 60; VI, 48; VII, 31; cf. Aesch. 1 30-31, 96) telling of the law which forbade anyone to alienate by will his landed estate from his lawful sons.

Plutarch and Heraclides mention a law against the sale of the κληρον which earlier, existed at Sparta. In the Life of Agis, Plutarch states*1 that the κληρον passed in succession ἀπολειποντος from father to son - ἐν διάδοχαις πάτρος καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν κληρον - until the Peloponnesian War. And in his 'Life of Lycurgus' XVI*2 he again tells us - "The offspring was not reared at the will of the father, but was taken and carried by him to a place called Lesche, where the elders of the tribes officially examined the infant, and if it was well-built and sturdy, they ordered the father to rear it, and assigned it one of the nine thousand lots of land - τρέφειν ἀκλειροῦν, κληρον ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνακαταλληλῶν προσνειμαντες. This ceremony did perhaps no more than mark the acceptance of the child into the tribe, an acceptance marked by the symbolic offer to the new born baby

*1 Plutarch - Lives - Agis and Cleomenes V.
*2 Plutarch - Lives - Lycurgus and Numa XVI.
of a ξανθος. Even here, however, the dependence of the Household upon the ξανθος is underscored, though the child is put in his early years under the direct supervision of the tribe.

The link that bound the cultivators to their land was so strong in early times at Athens that mortgages could apparently not be paid off by mere transfer of land itself; but the whole family of the debtor went with their mortgaged property and became enslaved to the creditor, having in future to work the land for the creditor at a fixed charge. As N.G.L. Hammond observes, "the inalienability of family land was (thus) more firmly rooted in the mainland states than in the colonies. Even so we find that in the colony of Leucas founded c.625, a law enforcing the inalienability of the old estates was operating after Solon's archonship and in a society which controlled political candidature by a system of property qualifications (Aristotle - Politics, 1266b 21). It is therefore 'a priori' probable that in seventh century Attica, an area less developed economically than Corinth, the mother state of Leucas, the original estates of the Athenian settlers were inalienable from the families....we know that in other states the famous lawgivers of the seventh century were concerned to maintain the tenure of the original estates."

Plutarch again mentions a law (Solon 21.3) which was in existence before Solon's reforms. "Before his (Solon's) time, no will could be made, but the entire estate of the deceased must remain in his family." This was the state of affairs which Solon determined to set right - "for he" says Plutarch, "by permitting a man who had no children to give his property to whom he wished, ranked friendship above kinship and favour above necessity, and made a man's possessions his own property."

Nevertheless, the sentiment that bound the family to the soil remained long after this time. Besides the prohibition to sell the family land which Aristotle speaks of as prevailing in Locris, the Hypoknemidian Locrians insisted on actual residence on that land in the case of their colony at Naupactus. Though unable apparently wholly to forbid the participation of the colonists in the ancestral rites of their kin in Locris, they took advantage of the prevailing sentiment with regard to the permanence of the family, and insisted that the continuance of the hearth of the colonist at Naupactos should at any rate be considered of equal importance.

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*C.R. Morrow - Plato's Cretan City - p.110 "Custom and ancestral morality, if not law, discouraged the alienation of the family land, even after mortgaging and sale had become legally possible"; and his note 43 "Aesh.I 30-31, 96; Isaeus VII,31...In the Athenian Cleruchies established in the fifth century it was expected that the cleruchs would live on his allotment, and 'a fortiori' he would hardly be allowed to sell it without permission (Guiraud, "La Propriete fonciere en Grece," Paris, 1890 II 448, Glotz, "Ancient Greece at Work," London, 1926, 152). An almost illegible decree of the late sixth century, as restored by Luria, contains a clause prohibiting any Cleruchs on Salamis from leasing their holdings except
At Athens, therefore, even in the fourth century B.C., when the owner of a χλῆρος died without having sold it, the inheritance could not be diverted from the legitimate children even by will (Isaeus, iii, 60 & 42; VI, 48); the only proviso being that the children must have gone through the ceremony of being accepted and enrolled by the phratria. If the descendant had missed this formality, and had failed to be recognised as a legal member of the clan, he or she lost all rights to the property, which went to the devisee or next of kin (Isaeus iii, 73 & 80). For the right to possess land was at Athens, as at Sparta, intimately connected with the tribal organisation; and the claim from the paternal estate could only be recognised, after full acknowledgement of necessary qualification had been granted by the larger society of the tribe. To go into the details of this, however, would be to anticipate the discussion of the next stage of the social development as Aristotle conceives it.

It is instructive to note that Plato preserves in the household of the constitution of the 'Laws' all the main principles by which we see the Greek Household to work.*2

*(cont. from previous page).....in a case of clearly established financial or physical incapacity, and we can infer that sale would also be prohibited (Tod.I. No.11)*

He appeals to the desire to perpetuate oneself and one's stock.

There is a sense in which mankind naturally partakes of immortality, a prize our nature makes desirable to all of us in its every form; for to win renown and not lie in our graves without a name is a desire of this. Thus the race of man is Time's equal twin and companion, bound up with him in a union never to be broken, and the manner of their immortality is in this wise; by succession of generations the race abides one and the same, and so partaking in immortality through procreation. Whence piety flatly forbids a man to deprive himself of the boon by his own act, as he wilfully deprives of himself who takes no thought of children and wife”. Laws 721 B (cf. Laws 923 C). Taylor's translation.

His measures for preserving the unity and continuity of the family are strikingly similar to those contained in the law of inheritance and of the ἰγχιστεῖα at Athens. (Laws 922a, 924a, 926-928d). "There are to be family shrines, in which the ancestral gods (αὐτρίφωι θεοῖ) are worshipped and service rendered to the dead members of the family. The lot holder, as head of the family, passes on his lot at death to the son whom he has chosen to succeed him, and this son is the minister (θεραπευτής) not merely of the gods of the city, but also of the gods of the family (γένος) and all its members, living and dead (740 bc, 923 a). The rules... regarding inheritance, bequest, adoption, the marriage of an heiress, and the attention paid to the guardianship of orphans (922 a, 924 a-c, 926 d - 928d) and to funeral rites and memorials (717 de) are all clearly intended (sometimes it is
explicitly said so) to assure the continuance of the family as an important part of the state...These ancestral customs, says the Athenian stranger, are the bonds of the whole constitution. If they are properly established they support all other legislation; but if not, like imperfect mortises in a carpenter's work, they give way and let the whole structure come tumbling down (793bc).*1

Plato also recognises the limit of the ἀγχιστεία, as shown in Laws 929 C. "To be legally repudiated, a man must be disowned not merely by his father, but by the whole kindred. Thus our law will in such cases provide some such process as this: if, with just cause or without it, unhappy passion assail a man with the desire to cast out of his kin the son of his own begetting and breeding, he shall have no licence to do the act incontinently, without due form. He shall first summon his own kin as far as his cousins, and his son's kin by the mother's side, and lay his charges before them, in proof that expulsion from the kindred is no more than the accused's desert at the hands of all." By extending the summons to cousins' children in other places where he refers to similar gatherings of the kin, Plato shows that he has the Athenian ἀγχιστεία in mind (of. Laws 925a). He makes provisions for the care of parents (Laws 932a) and for any citizen to bring accusation against an undutiful child (Laws 932d). He stipulates punishment for

*1 G.R. Morrow - op.cit. p.119
those who fail to give information, and believes that no punishment can be too great for the offending scapegrace (Laws 881d).

As the relationship between the ὀλχός and the κληρος, Plato also makes the κληρος inalienable. Buying and selling is desecration to the god-given κληρος (Laws 741a ff). "It is hard" as the inscription at Delphi says, "to know what you are yourselves. So I, speaking as legislator, pronounce that neither your own persons nor the estate are your own; both belong to your whole line (γένος) and future, and still more absolutely do both lineage and estate belong to the community. This is so surely so that I shall never, if I can help it, permit you, when shaken by age or infirmity, be cajoled into evil testamentary despositions by the insinuating arts of the flatterer". (Laws 923a). The land is a goddess herself - ὀσκοῦσα θεός - and the acceptance of the lot is confirmed by a solemn religious ceremony with threefold sacrifices and prayers (Laws 741 c).

Thus, Plato penetrated clearly into those principles of the household which made the Greek Household tick: and he made use of those principles in the ideal state of the 'Laws' because they make a very great contribution to the stability of the state - "Those ancient ancestral customs are the bonds
of the whole constitution". Aristotle does not go into these
details but there is hardly any doubt that had he done so,
those principles would have met only modification, not abol­
iton in his hands; for much more than Plato he gives
tradition a value in his conception of φόρος — tradition
arises from a natural instinct for what is true or what
contributes to the attainment of the human good. This
modification, of course, Plato gives these principles under
the guidance of his philosophic insight — as in the case of
dowry (Laws 742c, 774cd), disinheritance (Laws 929 a-c),
worship, festivals and religion (Laws 707ff, 740b and 955e ff).

As we would expect, however, both Plato and Aristotle put
the household under a fair amount of control by the state. The
most serious defect which Aristotle seems to have found in the
Greek household, a defect which perhaps showed the nature of
the progress of social development, was its 'Cyclopean' freedom
from the control of any superior society. Each household was
ruled by its eldest like a king — (βασιλεύεσχαι ), the position
of the eldest revealed traces of the primitive nature of the
household unit when the eldest was a sort of monarch (βασιλεύς)
of the independent unit of the family (cf. Aeschylus. Ag. 1300,
and Choe. 486 and 631); the household was allowed to administer
itself exactly as it liked and to bring up its young members in
its own way as if it did not matter how that was carried out
(E.N. 10.10 1160a 24 ff).
Aristotle makes it his major preoccupation in his ideal state that these defects are remedied. That it is only the state which can effectively carry out this function is one of the proofs that a society superior to the Household is needed for man to realise to the full his potentialities. Aristotle would also have felt that the average Greek household left the woman ill-equipped for the task of rearing the future citizens; attention, he adds, must be given to the education and the development of virtuous habits in women and children; for women are half the state and children are the potential citizens (Pol. 1, 13, 1260 b 15ff). He grants that much cannot be said of the Household as an organisation preceding the state; for when the State has come into being, it must, as the all-inclusive organisation, affect its constituent elements.
CHAPTER 6

Aristotle's Theory on Slavery

It is hardly possible to discuss the Greek household and Aristotle's conception of it without examining, however briefly, the institution of slavery in Greek society. For like most Greeks Aristotle regarded the slave as indispensable to a truly constituted oίκος.

There is probably some truth in the suggestion that the tie which in earlier days bound the slave to the family was religion and that the institution had no basis on the inherent personal qualities of the slave. As we learn from Clytemnestra (Aeschylus - Agamemnon, 1035ff) Heracles, the son of Alcumene in the days of old endured to be sold and eat the bread of slavery; and Clytemnestra also speaks of "the custom which makes the slave a partaker in the holy water of the house at the altar of the god who guides its wealth," though we also hear of "upstarts who might treat their slaves differently". In Demosthenes (in Stephanum 1. 74; and in Aristophanes (Plutus, 768) we find traces of the ancient ceremony by which the slave was enrolled into the family, a ceremony which seems analogous to that of marriage and adoption. There is therefore some truth in the following remarks of Maine on the nature of ancient slavery and the place of the slave in the family. "When we speak of the slave as anciently included in the family" says
"We intend to assert nothing as to the motives of those who brought him into it or kept him there; we merely imply that the tie which bound him to his master was regarded as one of the same general character with that which united every other member of the group to the chieftain. The family consisted primarily of those who belonged to it by consanguinity and next of those who had been engrafted on it by adoption; but there was still a third class of persons who were only joined to it by common subjection to its head, and these were the slaves. The born and adopted subjects of the chief were raised above the slave by the certainty that in the ordinary course of events they would be relieved from bondage and entitled to exercise powers of their own; but that the inferiority of the slave was not such as to place him outside the pale of the family or such as to degrade him to the footing of inanimate property is clearly proved, I think, by the main traces which remain of his ancient capacity for inheritance in the last resort." Ancient Law, ch.V, p.163.

Aristotle was, however, in his doctrine of the evolution of society concerned with eliciting the natural foundation of the various institutions of the society he knew and he sought that foundation in the nature of man as that nature was revealed in history esp. the history of the Greek race.

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*1 Ancient Law

*2 See G. Nussbaum, "Labour and Status in the Works and Days", C.Q. N.S.X, (LIV)
Holding, therefore, a conception of 'nature' which invited amendment rather than any radical reconstruction of any aspect of that history he felt the need, living as he did in the Greek world of the fourth century, to probe the basis of the institution of slavery. There is hardly any doubt, however, that he found the institution of slavery the most intractable of institutions to put on a 'natural' basis. His definition of the natural slave is, of course, notorious - "he who is distinct from all other men as body is from soul, or as animals are from men is natural slave". But, try hard as he may, Aristotle does not succeed in proving that there are any such human beings. Aristotle undertakes to employ a double approach in his enquiry into slavery - first τῷ λόγῳ θεωρήματι; a theoretical justification; and secondly ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθέων *1 - ascertaining the truth by a review of empirical evidence - and we should do well to follow his method.

In Pol.I 1252a 26 Aristotle put the genesis of the institution of slavery on a basis similar to that of the marital relationship: that basis is Necessity. Male and female came together because they could not do without each other*2. The master and the slave came together ὅλα τὴν σωτηρίαν.

For, the slave is only a ὅμοιον - mere brute force - and every human being needs for survival both body and reason; the reason which the slave lacks the master supplies; and in return for this the slave puts his body i.e. himself, since this is all he consists of, at the disposal of his master. This co-operation we are told is in the interest of both master and slave. Apparently, we are still concerned with two men and their common interest, but it is clear that in reality the interest of the master is being considered for we learn that ' ὅ μὲν ὑπερτότης τοῦ δούλου ὑπερτότης μόνον, ἔχειν τοῦ ὁμόν ἔστιν. ὅ δὲ δοῦλος οὔ μόνον ὑπερτότου δοῦλος ἔστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἔχειν τοῦ ὁμόν.

We thus have the abstraction of a body without soul, partly being considered a separate individual, partly, wholly as part of a master. And the naturalness of slavery would seem to come from his being necessary to his master.

Indeed Aristotle clears the point that the relationship between master and slave is not one of subordination or reciprocal dependence; the marital relationship is more like this but the slave is specially designed by nature for menial work - φύσει μὲν οὖν διάφωσται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθεν γὰρ ἡ φύσις κοιντὶς τοιούτων οἶνον οἱ χαλκοῦτοι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἐν.)

*1 Pol.I. 1254a 11ff.
It is only slaves who fail to distinguish the function of slaves from that of women. That barbarians use their women both as mates and as labour hands only further confirms that all barbarians are slaves. Pol.I. 1252b 6 - αὐτῶν δ' ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον σὺν ἐχοντι.

But there it seems to me that Aristotle is plunged into difficulties from the start. For if a slave is by definition a being who lacks the element which rules or the element by which one is master then both the Asiatic husband and wife between whom there is Aristotle admits a ruler-ruled relationship cannot both be slaves since a viable consortium of husband and wife is possible between them. Whatever barbarians are by nature, therefore, it seems that the fact that a consortium of husband and wife is possible among them shows that they are not identical with the pure οἰκουμένη of Aristotle's definition. Of whatever quality it is, τὸ βουλευτικὸν is present in them. Aristotle, like most Greeks, might of course argue that these people are nevertheless all slaves both men and women, and have a δεσποτικὴ in their βασιλεία; still the fact remains that the political sovereignty of the βασιλεία is a different thing from the masterful authority of the master-slave relationship, even when the former relationship is called 'despotic'.

We also learn in Pol.VI.8. 1323a 5 that even among the Greeks the poor man has to use his wife and children as followers
and attendants. In this case, however, it is apparently not due to natural character, but to accidental circumstances. Aristotle would perhaps argue that the wealthy barbarian would still use his wife as slave but again both can not be slaves, which is what Aristotle intends to prove. (cf. Plato 'Laws' (805E) where we are told that in Thrace women work in the fields exactly like slaves.)

It is however in connection with the discussion of the household and property that Aristotle seriously takes up the problem of slavery. Here it becomes clear that the basis of the justification is less the interest of the imaginary man who totally lacks τὸ βουλεύτικὸν than the needs and comfort of the household.

"Property", we are told, Pol.I. 1253b 23ff "is a part of the household; and the art of acquiring property is a part of household management; for without the provision of essentials it would be impossible to live, not to speak of living well."

"Household management, like any other art requires its specific tools to perform its functions; of tools, however, some are animate and some inanimate; For example a pilot uses a rudder and a look-out; in the one he has an inanimate instrument, in the other an animate instrument". (It must be noticed that

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*1 cf. Dem. 57, 45 - πολλὰ δουλικὰ καὶ τακείνα πρᾶγματα τοῦ ἐλευθέρου ἢ πεντὰ βιακεταί ποιεῖν.
though the look-out can in a manner of speaking be called the pilot's animate instrument, he need not be his personal property)

"Therefore an article of property is an instrument for living, and property in general includes a number of instruments; the slave is one of these instruments but an animate one. (Indeed subordinates and servants in general may be described as instruments which must be present before other instruments can be used)". This long exegesis in fact proves no more than that for the accomplishment of certain ends, some men act in subordinate capacities. Men perhaps would not need to act in these subordinate capacities if "shuttles would weave of themselves and a plectrum do its own harp-playing".

Aristotle seems therefore to derive the necessity of slavery from the inability of 'shuttles to weave of themselves'. But the fable of 'shuttles weaving of themselves' reveals to him the weakness of the basis on which he has founded slavery. He therefore shows that slaves are not mere instruments of production. The function of the slave is to serve the active life (προδευτικός) of his master, and his function would still remain even if every machine known at that time and every implement operates without attendants. The head of the household needs him προδευτικός ζωήν. And it is this need to put the slave at the beck and call of his master which justifies making him a
piece of personal property. A man in such a position can hardly lead a life of his own; for as we learn in Met. A. 2982b 25 - ὄνθερωκος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὑν αὕτου ἑνεχα καὶ μὴ ἄλλον ὕν.

Aristotle's argument here shows that in his inquiry into slavery, his attention was almost exclusively focussed on household slavery. It is true he recommends public slaves in his ideal state 1, but the two bases of his argument on slavery - its Necessity and the interest of the slave are weak when considered in relation to his conception of public slaves. For instance, the imagined situation of machines operating by themselves would render a large number of public slaves unnecessary 2, if we extend the analogy of a plectrum doing its harp-playing to shovels digging by themselves, and indeed if all instruments worked by themselves. As for the second basis, the personal supervision of a good master hardly extends to public slaves. Indeed, not only is it not argued that subjection to a master is in the interests of this class of slaves but it is recommended (Pol. VII. 10. 1330a 25 & ff) that it is wise to offer all slaves the eventual reward of emancipation - διότι βέλτιον καί τοῦ δουλοῦ τις ἔλον κροκείθαμεν οὕτερον ἐπούμεν.

The promise to give the reasons why is not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it but it is remarkable that according to

1 Pol. VII. 10. 1330a 25ff.
Aristotle's recommendation, 'κάντες οἱ δοῦλοι' who are here, contemplated for freedom would initially be mostly βάρβαροι. However one takes this, the supposition here contradicts that of the argument in Bk.I. For even if it is still argued that barbarians are slaves, the argument can hardly be based on 'nature' as it is in Bk.I; for the natural slave there, it would seem, can never be fit for freedom.

In 1260a 39ff, the difference between the slave and the βάναυσος is said to be that the slave is a partner in his master's life while the artisan is less closely attached to a master - ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος κοινωνίας ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρότερον (cf. Pol.III. 4. 1277a 37 & ff). The remarks that follow show Aristotle apparently giving a greater degree of ἀρετή to the household slave than to the βάναυσος. This becomes clear if one follows the steps of the argument. We first learn that since both slaves and artisans are liable to ἀκολούθου, they would each need some ἀρετή for the performance of their work. We next learn that the degree of goodness that attaches to the artisan is proportionate to the extent of the servitude to which he is subject. His is a limited type of servitude.

Though the discussion of reasons why it is wise to hold out the prospect of liberty as a reward for their services is not forthcoming in the Politics, we can take Aristotle's own will as in a way a fulfilment of that promise - for, he granted freedom to five out of his thirteen slaves - see Diog. Laert. V.1.9 - Aristotle's three successors at the Lyceum also granted freedom to a proportion of their slaves; the first to 5 out of 9, the second to 4 out of 6, the third to 11 out of 12.
One would think that this would give the artisan a greater degree of *δρετη* but in fact this does not appear to be so. The function of the artisan is restricted to some mechanical functions. The slave, however, as it has been argued all along performs more than mere physical duties (this is why it would still be necessary for slaves to exist even if shuttles weave of themselves). He therefore needs some goodness of the moral order. Hence the master must produce in the slave some moral goodness, and this he must do as a moral guardian 'not as a manager giving instructions about particular duties'.

'This is the reason why those are mistaken who would withhold reason from slaves and argue that only command should be employed' - *(Pol. I. 1260b 5. cf. Laws IX. 859a)*. It is, however, possible to argue that Aristotle's point is that the slave's virtue (because he is less than a full human being) is altogether servile virtue; the artisan on the other hand is a tool some of the time and needs a servile virtue to cover that part of his life which is servile but on the whole his 'virtue' is less limited than that of the slave; he therefore needs less servile 'virtue' than the slave and more of the 'virtue' of a freeman, being to a large extent a free man.

Still, if that is the nature of the slave we naturally ask
what is Aristotle's justification for public slavery. From the point of view of functions, the public slave holds the same position as that of the artisan and his ἄρετή would be about the same as the artisan's. Also if the justification for making the household slave a piece of personal property is that he is a partaker in the life of the household and that it is in his interest to be such, we miss any justification for public slaves; and if the need for mechanical operatives always exists there seems no warrant in nature, judging from what Aristotle says, to make them pieces of property; for the statement 'ὅ μὲν δοῦλος τῶν φύσεως, σχυτοτόμος ὃ' ὀθεσίς, ὃδε τῶν ἄλλων τεχνητῶν is a piece of mere assertion when Aristotle's justification of slavery is applied to public slaves; for public slaves are no more born into their situation than artisans, and there seems little warrant for saying that artisans restricted as they are to a limited slavery, are not thus fitted by nature while public slaves are designed for their peculiar position by nature, except on grounds of social convenience.

The more interesting aspect of Aristotle's doctrine of slavery is however his theoretical analysis of the nature of the slave. Here Aristotle is confronted with a considerable amount of difficulty, most of which arises, it seems to me from the fact he was explaining this Greek political practice seeking as is his wont, a validity on some ultimate biological or
anthropological foundations. For instance, as plain statements of explanation in regard to the institutions with which he was concerned many of his remarks make solid good sense, as revealing the assumptions on which those institutions were based. If his statement that the slave lacks τὸ βούλευτικόν and therefore ἀρετής is taken not as a statement of ultimate truth but in terms of the legal position of the slave in Greek society, it is largely true. The slave is legally the property of his master and at the disposal of his master's orders. always obeying orders, he can be said to make any choice of his own very rarely. Hence he lacks τὸ βούλευτικόν, the faculty of deliberation which is a prerequisite of ἀρετής (the exercise of deliberate choice). So also is his remark that the τὸ βούλευτικόν of the woman is ἄχυρον* the adjective Aristotle chooses is perhaps significant of his way of thinking for the adjective κύριος is derived from κυρίευειν "to be one's own master; to be master; to be fully responsible" It makes sense to say that the τὸ βούλευτικόν of the woman is ἄχυρον in view of the nature of the Greek household and Aristotle's conception of it. The final authority in the household rests with the husband who is really κύριος. In so far as the exercise of choice does not rest finally with the woman, her τὸ βούλευτικόν can hardly be κύριον.

* (negative of κύριος)
Aristotle’s remark that the βουλευτικόν of the child is ἀτελές needs no qualification. Man starts as an infant, the helpless subject of his parents but his τέλος is the fully developed manhood of the father (Pol.I. 1260a 17ff & 1260a 32)

Legal personality is however a different thing from human personality resting on biological foundations; and deprivation in law of the exercise of personal choice is not the same thing as a biological lack of the reasoning faculty. And Aristotle seems to undertake too much in seeking to justify the one by proving the other. To do this, he needed to prove that the slave is only σῶμα; but even to use the slave as a mere σῶμα Aristotle saw that the slave must retain some distinctly human characteristics; for to use a human being as an instrument involves using him as a human being, utilizing his distinctively human powers, his reason and his capacity for willing obedience. Hence we find Aristotle at one time saying that the slave is a κτήμα ἐμπρος (Pol.I. 1253b 32), at another time that the slave is ἄλογος lacking τὸ βουλευτικόν and προαίρεσις. Hence we also find Aristotle in the same sentence both granting the slave some element of reason and denying it to him. Pol.1254b 16ff ὡςοι μὲν ὅποι τοσσύτων διεστάσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπος ἔστι (διάκειναι τούτων τὸν τρόπον ὅσον ἦστιν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἢ τ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον). οὕτως μὲν οὖσι φύσει δοῦλοι...ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος...Ď κοινωνίᾳ λόγῳ τοσσύτων ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν. τὰ γὰρ ἀλλὰ ζόφα
οδ λόγῳ αλωθανόμενα ἀλλὰ παράμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ.

(cf. E.N. 1161a 34f - where we find the slave at the same time possessing no reason and participating in reason in his relationship with his master). The source of the contradiction lies in the fact that on Aristotle's psychology and theory of virtue in the E.N. even the minimum of moral virtue which Aristotle is forced to grant the slave for the sake of the proper performance of his servile functions is not realisable without the quality of προαγέος (and this needs the faculty of τὸ θελευτικόν ( ) which Aristotle seems inclined to deny the slave in order to distinguish him from the free man 'by nature'.

Since with Aristotle the great principle of classification of creatures is the definition according to functions, Aristotle has either to grant the slave τὸ θελευτικόν thus recognising him as belonging to the species 'man', or deny it to him and argue 'per errationem' as if two creatures of the same species belong to two different species. Aristotle's aim is no doubt to identify a servile species, doomed by nature to remain servile and to work for man, just as there are bovine and equine species, domesticated by man and quite distinct from the human species.

It is unnecessary to go into the details of the analogies by which Aristotle attempts to prove the naturalness of slavery;
for at best they only clarify Aristotle's intentions and they
by no means justify the extensions to slavery (cf. Pol. 1254a
34ff and Pol. III, IV, 1277a6 - ὡσπέρ ἔτι οὖν εἴθεις ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ
σώματος, καὶ ψυχὴ ἐκ λόγου καὶ δρέξεως καὶ δικία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ
γυναικὸς καὶ κτήσεως ἐκ δυσκότου καὶ δούλου...)
Aristotle still needs to prove whether there are men who stand
in relation to other men as body to soul, or even whether such
men can exist. Aristotle proves neither of these. And indeed
by granting as we saw the slave a degree of moral virtue he
admits that a relationship like that between body and soul cannot
exist between man and man. So the argument from the mental
incapacity of slaves is seriously weakened.

Aristotle attempts to draw arguments from physical difference
between the body of the freeman and that of the slave. But even
in respect of physical characteristics, Nature seems to have
failed in her aim to distinguish the body of the freeman from
that of the slave. But in view of the remarks in Pol. I. 1252b we
would expect Nature to take greater care in distinguishing the
bodies of slaves. Still we find that the opposite of Nature's
intention happens - 1254b 32 - τοὺς μὲν (ὡς τὸν δούλων) τὰ
σώματα ἔχειν ἔλευθερων τοὺς ὃς ἠλική.

At least in this respect, we have seen that
there is hardly any 'natural' distinction between the bodies of
freemen and those of slaves. This distinction which we find
difficult to trace is even more easily discernible than the mental distinction - ἀλλ' ὁδ' ὑμοίως ἡμιον ἴνειν τὸ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος, etc. etc.

In view of Aristotle's failure to show this, however, the confidence with which he states in the next sentence (Pol. 1255a1) that - 'It is thus clear that, just as some are by nature free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the condition of slavery is both beneficial and just - is to say the least surprising. In fact, Aristotle's usually penetrating analysis reveals the absurdity of the position he holds in respect to slavery; and he seems to admit his difficulty when he asks 'if slaves have a goodness of the higher sort, in what respect will they differ from freemen? If they have not, it is a surprising thing; they are human beings, with a share in reason (and we should naturally expect them to have the higher goodness of reasoning beings! Aristotle, as we already learn, solves the difficulty by granting to the slave some amount of reason 'inadequate for his own deliberation for making personal choices but sufficient to enable him to understand the rational character of his master's command'. It will however be true to say that here we have the spectacle of a great mind really struggling against himself as he reveals the logical assumptions of a practice which his conservative instincts make him
reluctant to condemn, though his admission in Pol.I.1255b 2 that it is possible for a Greek to be a natural slave and for a barbarian to be a natural free man seems to invalidate the practical application of the theory.

In the absence of any easily applicable theoretical criterion of the natural slave, however, the temptation must be strong to base the justification on the more pragmatic grounds of what sort of people we do in fact find to be slaves. And indeed in Pol.I. 1254b 21 the natural slave is identified with the actual slave - 'A man is a slave by nature if he is capable of becoming the property of another - and this is why he actually becomes the property of another - (ἐστι γὰρ φύσις ὁσίλος ὁ δυναμ-ενος ἄλλον εἶναι (ὅτι καὶ ἄλλον ἐστιν).

It is exactly this proposition that the opponents of slavery contests; and it is interesting to note Aristotle's answer to their objections.

In Pol. I. 1253b 20 we learn that there are some who impugn the justice of all slavery; these men regard the control of slaves by a master as contrary to nature. "The distinction between master and slave", they argue, "is due to law or convention; there is no natural difference between them; the relation of master and slave is based on force, and being so based has no warrant in justice."
In 1255a 5ff Aristotle attempts an answer to these people; for although he seems at the start to have in mind those who oppose a certain kind of slavery his conclusion might be taken as an answer to every form of objection to slavery. The argument is rather complicated, but its main points seem clear enough. If those who deny the existence of natural slavery confine themselves to conventional slavery, then they are in one sense correct. For there is a conventional slave as distinct from a natural one: the law which sanctions the practice that the conquered should become the property of the victors is for instance really a convention. It is the justice of this convention which is impugned by certain men learned in the law (οτ εν τοις νόμοις). These men argue that possession of superior force does not confer entitlement to rule.

In giving his own answer Aristotle lays down two propositions which he believes all the opposing groups would accept, the two major groups are, of course, the unconditional opponents of slavery and the unconditional defenders of slavery. First that it is excellence (ἀρετή) when in possession of means (χορήγεια) which can successfully exert forceful pressure. For masterful pressure always inheres in an excess of some good. Hence the view that the fact of masterful pressure always implies the presence of excellence - ἐστιν ἢ ἐξ ὧν κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθὸν τινος, ὥστε δοξεῖν μὴ ἢμεν ἄρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν -

*1 For a valuable contribution to the explanation of this passage see Newman. The Politics of Aristotle, Vol. II. pp. 150-152 to which this account is indebted.
second, that the better in excellence should rule and be master. The only point of difference, therefore, is the question of justice. One side holds that the justice of slavery lies in the goodwill which the master is able to evoke in his slave (true goodwill we already know from the E.N. arises on account of some ἀρετή). This side, in other words, argue that even if there is some ἀρετή in masterful pressure, this excellence is not the whole of that excellence which confers entitlement to rule and makes such rule just. The other side holds that justice is the rule of the superior i.e. the stronger; in other words, whoever successfully exerts forceful pressure displays ἀρετή and this ἀρετή is itself a justification for rule.

Aristotle believes that there is some truth in both contentions; but they each fall short of the whole truth. For if these two positions are placed in clear antithesis neither position is strong enough to confute the view that the better in excellence should rule and be master. The one side, Aristotle argues would have no basis for argument if 'goodwill' on which they lay so much emphasis is divorced from ἀρετή; and the other side, it would seem, takes a part of ἀρετή for the whole of ἀρετή. They forget that it is not virtue alone which enables a side to exert forceful pressure; χορηγία favourable external circumstances - plays a large part; this group therefore gives too much value to χορηγία or seem to forget that superiority
in ἐρωτῇ can lead to the superior in excellence being subdued by the inferior. The two sides whose arguments Aristotle places in opposition are clearly the advocates of might is right and those who argue that goodwill is essential to the master-slave relationship.

He, therefore, does not raise at all the case of those who hold that all slavery is contrary to nature (Pol. 1. 1253b 20); The position of these groups in respect to ἐννοεῖ is not that ἐννοεῖ should exist between themaster and the slave but that it is contrary to the spirit of ἐννοεῖ for one man, however highly placed, to treat another man as a piece of property. And Aristotle has little justification for making them accept his proposition that the better in excellence should rule and be master in the sense of ὀρθοτητς. Also Aristotle makes them accept the proposition that there is some ἀρετῆ in forceful pressure, whereas the whole basis of the argument of these people is that forceful pressure brings about the unnatural situation of one man having another man under his control.

Aristotle easily disposes of the argument of a third group who argue that the legal is just; for as he points out in a rather liberal spirit a law may sanction an unjust war; but the use Aristotle makes of this point is an interesting one. "Those who say that the legal is just," he tells us, "can hardly mean that a law which sanctions the enslavement of Greeks is just."
"For when they mention slaves they do not mean men of high spirit and reputation who happen to be captured in war or purchased, but barbarians, which automatically means that to avoid contradiction they are looking for the natural slave along the lines we have laid down above." For while Greeks are by nature free everywhere — πάντως ἄλλως σκονδαίοι — the freedom of barbarians is local but their natural position is slavery. It is with this reasoning that Aristotle justifies slave-raids against the barbarians. For when the slaves hunted are barbarians, the art of acquiring slaves is part of the art of war, or the art of hunting (Pol. I. 1255b 38 — ἢ ὁ κηνηκή (τε, τὸ κτισθαί τοὺς δούλους), οἶον ἢ δίκαιον, κολεμική τις ὁδὸν ἢ θηρευτική).

And in what seems to be a curious instance of the application of his teleological principle, Aristotle not only sees the of plants in their giving subsistence to animals, and of animals in turn to man but places the phenomenon of 'men hunting other men' in the same category as men hunting animals — Pol.I. 1256b 16ff - "Plants exist to give subsistence to animals and animals to give it to men....Accordingly as nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain (εἶ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μὴτε ἄπελες κοιεῖ μὴτε μάτην), all animals must have been made by nature for the sake of men. It also follows that the art of war is in some sense a natural mode of acquisition. Hunting is a part of that art;
and hunting ought to be practised - not only against wild animals but also against human beings who are intended by nature to be ruled by others and refuse to obey that intention - ὃς φύσει ἀνακαινὸν τούτον ὑπά τὸν κόλαμον.

Aristotle thereby almost enthrones the law of the jungle; we are therefore not surprised to learn in Pol. VII 1327b 27ff that what marks the free man from the slave is ἑθικός. For in that passage we learn that the peoples of Asia, whom we have by now come to recognise as natural slaves, 'are endowed with skill and intelligence, but are deficient in spirit, and this is why they continue to be subject peoples and slaves!' - τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν "Ἀσιαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅμως δὲ, διόπερ ἄρχομενα καὶ οὐκεδοντα διατελεῖ. The Greek race, however, possesses both ἑθικός and διάνοια (τὸ δὲ Ἐλλήνων γένος... ἐθνοῦμον καὶ διανοητικῶν ἑστὶν).

*1 (cf. Lester H. Rifkin - Aristotle on Equality - Journal of the History of Ideas - No. 14 (1953) pp.276-283 where the strange thesis is maintained that Aristotle, using a 'functional theory' (whatever that means), 'has blotted out Plato's sharp distinction between slaves and all other classes of society' and Aristotle is ranged together with the 'Cynics, Sophists and Euripides' against Plato, who it is argued based his theory of slavery on racial lines. In actual fact, however, there is very little difference between Plato's and Aristotle's theory of slavery, though Aristotle's seems to have taken greater trouble to examine the theoretical foundation of the institution. Plato on the other hand spells out in some details in the Laws the treatment, punishment etc. of slaves - See Glenn Morrow - Plato's Law of Slavery - University of Illinois Press 1939, and G. Vlastos - Slavery in Plato's Republic - The Philosophical Review 50 (1941) pp. 289-304.)
In Bk. I (cf. 1252a 31ff) what makes slavery natural to the barbarian is lack of δύναμις; in Bk. VII he is granted δύναμις but his lack of θύμος makes him a slave. Even in many of the arguments of Bk. I. however, we already have intimations that though theoretical justification of slavery is the 'natural' intellectual superiority of masters over slaves the ultimate justification is superior power, i.e. forceful pressure (τὸ χρᾶτος). It is surprising that the fact that slavery is the only one association, among those into whose basis he inquired, into which one party has to be compelled by force does not decidedly show Aristotle the 'unnaturalness' of the institution.

Aristotle, however, most probably exaggerated in his theory the extent to which in actual practice the slave was purely a living instrument; and he was being too doctrinaire in supposing that the supposition on which the Greeks or more specifically the Athenians based their relationship with their slaves was that the slaves were not fully human; but indeed as we saw in his remarks on the public slave and the artisan he sometimes reveals his awareness that the slave was in practice a normal human being, howbeit holding a low position in the social ladder. As Westermann rightly observes "There has seldom been in history ....any slave-holding community in which the theoretical slave - that is, a thing totally devoid of legal personality and without possessions of his own - has really existed in the
actual practice of that community. Only in the confinement of prisons can men be totally deprived of all their freedoms, and hence totally enslaved. This inability to coerce human beings into a situation of total slave subjection produces a fundamental contradiction inherent in the very structure of the institution of slavery." *1 What Aristotle makes of this contradiction in his theory of slavery we have already seen; in practice however, "institutionalized slavery has always been a limited slavery and in many cases, the slave was no more a means for the ends of another than the industrial worker".*2

The legal status of the slave might lay him more open than usual to assaults on his person, and his master might have the power of life and death over him but his own services very often


*2 cf. R. Schlaifer - Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle - Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 47, 1936, p.182 - "It is a mistake to insist too strongly on the analogy between the slave and the beast: while the relations of master and slave were practically those of owner and property, still this does not necessarily imply any similarity between the slave and other forms of property, a fact of which the average Greek never lost sight. The emphasis placed by various theorists on the mutual advantage of the relation shows this most clearly. It must be kept in mind that there is little difference in theory between the free foreigner and the slave; the only real difference is that the one is in point of fact under the physical control of a master".
were sufficient to guarantee against cruel treatment even at
the hands of his master who often in return for useful services
accorded him certain rights. It is true that Plato stipulated
only purificatory rites in the case of the death of a slave at
the hands of his master. But there are a number of evidence
showing that killing a slave was put on the same level as
killing a free man. Demosthenes mentions a law of Solon
which makes assault or any other wrong against a slave liable
by a popular court; this is the γράφη ὑβρεως - if the accused
is condemned the court has the power to fix the penalty immedi-
ately and we learn from the orator that many convicted of out-
raging slaves had been sentenced to death. And Antiphon
(V.47, 48) speaks of a law which forbade putting a slave to
death without a trial; Isocrates (Panath, 181) criticizing the

*1 Laws.VI.777d - Plato's recommendation reflects the actual
practice. When a slave was murdered by his master no political
right was perhaps infringed; but there was the religious sanction
of offence against the gods which needed cleansing. cf. Aeschin.
1.17; Dem. 21.46; the δίκη βλάσπης was usually available to
the master in protection of his own interests.
*3b Dem. XXI.49, cf. Dinarchus - Demosthenes 23 - the case of
Themistius
*3 Dem. XLVII 70; 72 - this is the δίκη φόνου it would seem
that a member of the family would need to prosecute as a
δίκη a private wrong.
arbitrary powers given to the ephors at Sparta tells us that the Greeks do not put even the most worthless slave to death without trial. Lycurgus* (Leo. 65), tells us that the ancient lawgivers did not allow a slave killer to get off with a fine. We learn from the pseudo-Xenophontic treatise - The Constitution of Athens - that the law of Athens encouraged haughtiness and even insolence of slaves to citizens; they, however, believed that it worked in the interest of free men themselves because there was no outward distinction between slave and free; for if slaves were to adopt a cringing attitude before free men these would be more likely to ill-treat them, and thus making the property of citizens to suffer. Though the conclusion hardly honours the dignity of the slave as a man, it throws some light on the actual position of the slave in respect of freedom. A condition like this must have facilitated the enrolment in the tribes of many foreigners and slave metics attributed to Clisthenes.

We know that a large part of the police force at Athens was formed of slaves - Scythian archers; that slaves performed important functions in the temples (cf. Euripides, Ion) and that the general body of public slaves, a definition of one of which is

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* (referring to the γράφῃ ἤβηθεν in which the case goes first to the Thesmophoroi for preliminary hearing, and is then passed on to one of the popular courts).

- Δημόσιος ὁ τῆς πόλεως δοῦλος ὁ ἄφησεν τοῖς δικαστὴροις καὶ τοῖς κοινοῖς ἔργοις
(cf. Athenaeus XIII p. 522c) enjoyed considerable independence; for though as state servants each had a Magistrate over him, they each had a completely independent private life (cf. Waszynki - Hermes vol. XXXIV, pp. 553ff).

There was another group of slaves - the χωρίς ὀικονύται who also enjoyed a considerable degree of independence. They are the μισθοφοροῦντα σώματα - wage earning slaves whose services were usually let out by their masters. They were legally the property of their masters and nothing prevented their master from taking from them whatever they earn by being sent out to work for others, or gained through being set up in business and living outside the master's household. But they were usually, if even on sufferance, allowed to keep part of what they had acquired, usually subject to the payment of a periodical sum. Thus though legally slaves, their 'de facto' status was hardly different from freemen, perhaps of the artisan class. Indeed, a slave of this class might become sufficiently prosperous and when managing a business might have slaves under him who look to him as their master.

*1 - Inscriptiones Graecae II.2.1 Nos. 1553-1578. (cf. Xen. De Vect. IV. 49-50)
*2 - See Is. VIII. 35. (See Westermann op. cit.)
By examining a large number of the Delphic manumission
documents Westermann *1 has, I think, successfully, shown that
the Greeks "saw freedom not as a single unit but as something
divisible; they saw freedom as consisting of four factors;
"its legal recognition; the unassailable quality which it
granted to the manumitted; the right of choice of action, or
activity; the right to move where one wished...Each of the three
remaining freedoms, once the legal status was fixed, could be
broken into or impinged upon". The Greek society therefore was
one in which a man could be part free and part slave. Slavery,
then, would appear to be in actual Greek practice not an
inflexibly rigid concept as Aristotle would make it, nor a
complete deprivation of rights, nor did the Greeks regard it as
having any foundation in some biological or anthropological
truth; it was a thing they took for granted and put on a purely
legal foundation.

The other part of Aristotle's theory - that the barbarians
are by nature slaves - is easily explained. It is a sentiment
which the history of the Greek race perhaps tended to encourage.
For almost simultaneously with the rise of pan-Hellenic nation-
alism and the economic expansion of the Greek world came into
the Greek world and especially Athens a steady stream of foreign

*1 Westermann - "Slavery and the Elements of Freedom in Ancient
Greece" - Quarterly Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts
and Sciences in America - Jan.1943) 1 - 16.
peoples - Thracians, Scythians, Cappadocians etc. - either captured in war or bought as slaves - to supply the labour force for most of the menial tasks of Greek society. And from the Greek disdain for menial work, a disdain that probably had its roots in an earlier phase of their history, grew a contempt for the people who performed these menial tasks.

Of course, it was not that slavery did not exist in earlier times; but it hardly lent itself to explanation on racial lines; if we could take Homer as evidence of the view of slavery in those earlier times, it would seem that slavery was taken for granted. It was bad luck to be enslaved, for as Homer tells us:

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The evidence points to the conclusion that according to the usage of war, the men were slain and only the women and children carried off into servitude. Also the slaves who were bought were mostly women and children, for they were most easily kidnapped; the men-slaves of Homer were therefore often persons who had been bought when young and trained for their later position by the master. Greek civilisation had not yet made a distinction between the labour of master and that of slave and the system, where master and slave threw their labours together. The slave of course had no rights, if by that is meant the rights to do what he wanted, regardless of the wish of his master; he therefore regarded his lot as an unhappy one though he made very few complaints. He adapted himself to conditions and made the best of them, often identifying himself thoroughly with his master's house and its interests. (Odyssey XIV 3 - 4; XVII, 594; XIX, 355; XX, 218-223). The slave in Homer seemed to have possessed a sort of peculium as well as his wife and house, at the will of the master. Eumaeus, the swineherd, had a slave which he himself had bought (Odyssey XXI 214-216; XIV 449-452). Slave-women are found offering a price for a piece of jewellery and in several places it is hinted that a good master would give his slave something now and then if he had been faithful (Odyssey, XIV. 62-67; XV. 376 - 379). Slave-marriages produced slave-children; but the children of a master and his concubines
followed closely the status of the father - (Od., XVIII, 223ff cf. Od. IV. 10ff). Female captives in war regularly became concubines; they were entirely at the disposal of their conquerors who might marry them if they chose. Women of princely descent drew water for their masters in a foreign land, for the noblest might at any time fall into servitude by chance of war (Od., 430-433; VII. 10-12; VII. 527-529; XI 421-422; II. 295ff; II. 226-228; IX. 658; XI,625).

Women slaves regularly spun and wove under the direction of the mistress, cleaned the house, ground the meal, washed the clothes, nursed the children and cooked the food. Men-slaves, often fallen nobles, tended the flocks and herds and sometimes assisted their masters in fight. (Od. 1.141; IX.10; XVII. 212ff; XX. 177ff; II. XI 696-697).

But however mild Homeric slavery was, the slave and the non-slave both felt it was unfortunate to be a slave. Euripides' attitude to slavery can be said to be Homeric; this sentiment he expresses in several places but specially forcibly in the Hec.442-479, in the course of which the 'chorus' says -

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Ποτ μὲ τὰν μελέαν πορεύεσθις;
Τὸ δουλόσωνος πρὸς δίκοιν
κτηθείτο τῇ δίκαιῳ ἀρκίᾳ
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(cf. Hec. lines 889-993, and Troades 186ff and 1060ff and 282ff)

War therefore could bring the noble prince and the modest citizen into slavery; and but for the odium of the name and the
indignity of bodily subjection a slave may be the equal of a freeman in mind and character.\*1

Nor was there in those early times any real contempt for agricultural or general manual work. Newman\*2 has suggested that the Dorian invasion must have marked a turning point. For the Dorians subdued the original population of the territories they settled in and forced them to perform all the necessary manual and menial duties so as to leave themselves free for military occupations "Thus the ruling class in possession of

\*1 (cf. - Zimmern - The Greek Commonwealth, (Oxford 1924 p.388)
"The literature of Greece, from Homer to Euripides and beyond him is full of the pathos of captivity - of the cry of the strong man who, by enslavement, has lost 'half his manhood' and of the women and children whom he is helpless to protect from shame and insult. The real horror in Greek warfare...was the life-long imprisonment that might await the unhappy survivors of the vanguished. Greek poets and teachers, who loved to dwell on the mutability of human things, never allowed this fear to grow dim in the minds of their public. The fifth-century Athenian with slaves about him to help in his daily business, listened with a thrill to the story of /I. Hecuba or Andromach\* or Iphigenia and returned home from the theatre, but yet critical or resentful of the institution of slavery, but resolved to be kinder and more patient with the uncouth young barbarians who, by some strange sport of heaven, now formed part of his own household."

wide domains and disposing freely of the labour of the subject populations and of the purchased slaves whose numbers begin from this time to increase, withdrew from all occupations connected with the supply of daily wants, and by leaving labour of this kind exclusively to the subject races stamped it as unworthy of a free man. Accordingly it is in the states which maintained in some degree intact the tradition of that epoch - in the Lacedaemonian state, and that of Thespiae, for instance, that we find these occupations forbidden to the citizen". There is evidence to show that the prejudice against manual work was slow to appear in those states in which there was not a ruling and exploiting class imposed on a subject people.*1 Euripides' line αὐτοργὸς - ὅπερ καὶ μόνοι σφίκουσι γῆν

*2 most probably reflects the Athenian attitude. Aristophanes often has words of phrase for the small farmer, and even Aristotle, though he recommends that the farming class of his best state should be servile nevertheless recognises that nothing affords a better basis for a democracy than a majority of ἄφτοργοι in the

*1 It is perhaps true, as Aymard argues, that in early Greece and to some extent in classical times, manual work as such was not despised, but it made all the difference whether one performed manual work as one's own independent agent or for the sake of another, or on another man's authority. A difference which Aristotle sees as the essential distinction between the free and the slave - Aymard - Rev. d'hist. de la philosophie et d'hist gen de la civilization XI.1943 p.130ff.

*2 Eurip. Orestes - 920
population. Nevertheless, the Lacedaemonian state and the states of Crete had set an example which the other states of would follow sooner or later: they often in various degrees followed that example; and at least in this respect both Plato and Aristotle thought that the Lacedaemonian example was a good one, though they both made it clear that the freedom of the higher classes should not be devoted to war, as at Sparta, but to philosophy and other intellectual pursuits.

With such contempt for manual labours, it was natural for the Greeks, esp. the Athenians, when they found themselves in the midst of non-Greek peoples doing most of their menial jobs, to conclude that those labourers were inferior peoples naturally fitted for ignoble functions. Coupled with this, of course, was the Greek consciousness of the superiority of their own political institutions. Hence the Greek consciousness of his own superiority and his contempt for the barbarian. It is needless to cite statements that reflect this superior attitude. Euripides (in whom also we find some of the first utterances against slavery) conveying the popular Hellenic view presents us with a Jason who believes that the fact that he brought Medea to Greece i.e. within the pale of civilization, is more than sufficient reward for all the benefits Medea conferred on him by their marriage, and Demosthenes reviles the Macedonians (who were scarcely outside the Hellenic pale) as barbarians, and in the Telephus of Euripides
we have the line -

ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΔΝΤΕΣ ΒΑΡΒΆΡΟΙΣ ΔΟΥΛΕΥΩΜΕΝ;

It is therefore likely that the average Greek would agree with Aristotle that the Greeks were naturally free and the barbarians naturally servile. Still, in this respect, Aristotle would seem to lag behind the more advanced opinion of his day. There were Greek thinkers who had made significant hints at the truth while Aristotle rest content with a cautious conservative attitude. Herodotus had made it his aim "to preserve from oblivion the great and wonderful deeds of the Greeks and barbarians; Lucian's prejudice would later turn that plainly expressed statement into "Greek victories and barbarian defeats", and Plutarch, more narrow-minded than the First Historian, would call him φιλοβάρβαρος. Xenophon, while expressing his belief that the Persians of his own day had declined from their pristine greatness nevertheless took Cyrus as his ideal king, thus paying tribute to the system which once made Persia a great imperial power. Later Eratosthenes was to condemn Aristotle's notorious but probably apocryphal advice to Alexander to treat the Greeks as a leader and the barbarians as a master (δεσπότης).

*2 Lucian - 54 - Plut. de mal. Herod. 12 & 53 (cf. Herod VII
*3 Plut. de Alex. fort. 6 - Strabo 66
Enough has been said elsewhere of those who oppose Aristotle's equation barbarians = slaves on theoretical grounds.

Aristotle's theory of slavery could not, if put into practice have worsened the condition of the actual slave; indeed it was more likely to better it, but his conception of the nature of the slave hardly does justice to the slave as a man; and the corollary of his theory that certain non-Greek peoples are fitted by nature for the servile condition has a rather sinister aspect, and unfortunately still tends to appear in modern guises.

Sir Henry Maine *1 spoke of the compunction which ancient communities almost unconsciously experienced in regard to slavery and believed that this experience of compunction "always resulted in the adoption of some imaginary principle upon which a defence or at least a rationale, of slavery could be founded." "Very early *2 in their history" says Maine, "The Greeks explained the


*2 - It is not clear how early is Mainé's 'very early' but even as late as the fifth century B.C. we have no evidence that the Greeks believed that slavery was good for the slave or that the slave was destined by nature to be a slave. The scepticism of the fourth century B.C. through its criticism of slavery and indeed of every institution evoked a defence. Aristotle formulated the most systematic defence of slavery. Most Greeks would probably feel sorry sometimes for slaves, without criticising the institution, must as, as Zimmern (op.cit. p.389) puts it, to day "with a labour system which is in some ways equally barbarous an employer who reduces his staff in bad times" and who sees that his labourers are "still largely paid in truck" does not criticize the industrial system".
institution as grounded on the intellectual inferiority of certain races and their consequent natural aptitude for the servile condition. The Romans, in a spirit equally characteristic, derived it from a supposed agreement between the victor and the vanquished, in which the first stipulated for the perpetual services of his foe, and the other gained in consideration the life which he had legitimately forfeited. It is perhaps pertinent to remark that while these two imaginary principles may be equally effective in satisfying the conscience of the master, and while the degradation the one deals on the slave is not necessarily worse than the other deals, the Roman imaginary principle does less injustice to the nature of the slave because based on the more pragmatic grounds of conquest in war; for even the most militarily successful people knows to what extent success in war depends on chance. It is also the less subtle principle, and could easily find itself embarassed if confronted with the problem of the justice of war. The Greek, or Aristotle’s, principle of making the servile condition the natural condition of some people makes it ‘ex hypothesi’ just to wage war on these so-called inferior peoples. It would also deprive the slave of his de facto rights.

Thomas Aquinas indeed later on laid down on Aristotelian lines the grounds of a just war; but it is in Sepulveda*1

an Aristotelian scholar of the 16th century that we find concrete evidence of the use to which Aristotle's theory of the natural slave can be put. A scholar of prodigious learning, he put his authority as one of the principal scholars in the recovery of the 'true' Aristotle and a translator into Latin of Aristotle's Politics - a translation "recognised for centuries as an indispensable work" - to justify a war of suppression against the Indians. The key points of his arguments are directly borrowed from Aristotle. Thus, like Aristotle, he asks 'Aren't all men born free, according to the doctrine of the jurists?' And like "the philosopher" he answers, No, the jurists refer to another kind of slavery which had its origin in the strength of men (we are reminded of Aristotle's \( \tau o \ k r a t o t v \)) in the law of nations, and at times in civil law. Natural slavery is a different thing. For philosophers use the term natural slaves to denote persons of both inborn rudeness and of inhuman and barbarous customs. Those who suffer from these defects are by nature slaves. Those who exceed them in prudence and talent, even though physically inferior are their natural lords...If inferior beings refuse this overlordship, they must be forced to obey by arms and may be warred against as justly as one would hunt down wild beasts"*1

Again on the fact that the Indians lived under some form of government, this fact by no means proved that they were equal to

*1 Hanke op. cit. p.44
Spaniards. It simply showed that they were not monkeys and did not entirely lack reason"*1 At one and the same time it is recommended that they should be hunted down like wild beasts and it is admitted that they are not monkeys. Here again we have the Aristotelian contradiction in the theory of the natural slave.

Las Casas, Sepulveda's opponent, seemed to have very capably assumed the roles of Antiphon, Alcidamas and others of the group when he said "all the peoples of the world are men"*2

At least in respect to the theory of slavery, it would seem that this latter group looked more deeply into the intentions of 'Nature' than Aristotle and Sepulveda.

*1 Hanke op.cit. p.48
*2 Hanke op.cit. p.112
Aristotle's conception of the Village - ἡμισχύματα.

Of the three phases which Aristotle saw in the social evolution, least is said specifically of the intermediate phase i.e. the Village. It is true, of course, that he does not give a thoroughly continuous or systematic statement even of the first phase i.e. the Household, but both in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Politics we get sufficiently clear glimpses of his views on the Household to enable us to trace without much difficulty their general tendency. In the Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics in the course of his discussion on Justice we are given a glimpse of the nature of Household Justice as compared with Political Justice and in the Eighth Book we learn something of the nature of Household Friendship. Again, in the First Book of the Politics we penetrate far enough to see the Household from various aspects e.g. the relationship of the head of the household to wife, child and slave, and the true constitution of the Household; and the analysis of the reasons that brought the household into existence gives much light on Aristotle's conception of it. In short, we can easily see that the Household, as Aristotle conceives it, holds a very real place in the Polis; it is not merely a "passing phase of the social evolution"; for it performs its own peculiar functions and retains its peculiar features even in the fully developed state. The fact that the household needs
to be adjusted to the constitution of the state shows that a real and important place it holds in the fully developed political society. (cf. Politics I, 13, 1260b 15; cf. V.9 1310a 12ff; VIII, 1 1337a 11ff).

To Aristotle, however, the Village seemed no less distinct a phase of the social evolution than the Household or the Polis and it exists just like the Household and the Polis by nature and is a permanent element in the State. This is clear from his remarks in the course of his criticism of Plato's political ideals in Pol.II. For instance in Pol.II.4. 1262a 12 Aristotle tells us that the clan (γένος) and the village (κώμη) aid in the maintenance of good feeling and good fellowship among the members of the community no less than the household does; and in 1264a ff. we learn that the clan, phratry and tribe are indispensable elements even in the fully developed polis. It is nevertheless true that we would like to know much more of the κώμη in the fully developed polis; we know, for instance, something of the οικιακόσύνη and φίλα of the Household and the Polis; but not of the κώμη.

Still it is possible to gain a fairly clear picture of Aristotle's conception of the κώμη by elucidating his few remarks in the Politics with his statements and theories in his other works and with the observations of other Greek writers.

The most significant passage in the Politics for a review
of the κώμη is that at Pol.I 1252b 15

First, then, the κώμη is formed of more households than one; secondly, it exists for the satisfaction of more than daily recurrent needs; thirdly, the village is in its most natural form only a larger family; it is an extension or offshoot of the family (ἀποικία οἰκίας) the tie of blood relationship is therefore still acknowledged in the Village and a Village community would seem to be a true and natural Village community, not when composed of individuals combined by chance, say for economic reasons or for self-defence, but when the family becomes enlarged into several families living on the same spot, or, having become enlarged, some leave its original home and settle in a new home. In either case, the members of the κώμη would still be διοικατότες. The basis of the κώμη therefore is blood relationship. And finally, the rule of the eldest which is a characteristic feature of the family is continued in the village and from the village it passes into the state. The
fact that the polis is formed of a combination of several villages and that the village is an off shoot of the household is used to account for the early prevalence of kingship in Greece (Pol.I. 1252b 21ff). The fully developed polis, however, is very rarely a kingship.

The inclusion of τὰ ἐθνῆ in the sentence - διὸ καὶ τὰ πρῶτον ἐξασκεῖσθαι ἀι πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἐτί τὰ ἐθνῆ shows that, whatever they are, τὰ ἐθνῆ are clearly regarded as preserving the traditions of the village. Now, the term 'τὰ ἐθνῆ' is sometimes used as a vague expression for the rather loose tribal structures of the non-Greek peoples; in this sense (τὰ ἐθνῆ) is more or less a synonym for ὁ βασιλαίος at other times however, as in Pol.II 1261a 26, the term is used to denote enlarged village communities like those of the Arcadians, the Aetolians and the Macedonians. An ἐθνὸς would thus seem to be an enlarged village community - a mere aggregate of men of the same race or a tribal population.

In Pol.I. 9 1257a 24 we are given another feature common to a village-community and the enlarged village communities (τὰ ἐθνῆ) of the more backward societies of Aristotle's time. Aristotle is there talking of exchange. "In the first form of association" he says "which is the Household, it is obvious that there is no purpose to be served by the art of exchange. Such a purpose only emerged when the scope of association had already
been extended until it issued in the village. The members of the Household had shared all things in common: the members of the Village separated from one another (in a number of different households) had at their disposal a number of different things, which they had to exchange with one another, as need arose by barter - much as many uncivilized tribes still do to this day - aeaepe nrnrt xoWh %oiel xal irSv pappaptxoSv tdviav

Pol.I.9 1257a 24).

Like villages, therefore, ta e[on] derive from families or households but having reached the village phase of the social evolution they failed to evolve a higher form of society: they grew in size but not in quality. While therefore they may provide for material needs they are incapable of providing opportunities for morality, art and literature all of which find the most favourable soil in the polis. (an e[ono] is only otnoe w[v]c e[v] toiv d[ne]a(kai)otc)

(Pol.VII. 1326b 4).

Aristotle's rather cryptic remarks in Pol.II 2 1261a 27*1 probably sheds light on his conception of the khym. There in the course of his criticism of Plato's conception of the polis, Aristotle attempts to set out the differential x of the polis, and in doing this he makes remarks that touch on the khym, the e[ono] and a smma[xa. "Not only is the polis composed of a number of men" says Aristotle "it is also composed of different kinds of men, for similars cannot bring it into existence. There

is a difference between a polis and a military alliance. A military alliance...possesses utility purely in virtue of its quantity, and a great alliance, even if there is no difference of kind among its members, is like a weight which depresses the scales more heavily in the balance. (A polis is essentially different: it necessarily requires a difference of capacities among its members, which enables them to serve as complements to one another, and to attain a higher and better life by the mutual exchange of services). In this respect a polis will also differ from a tribe: (that too, like a military alliance may be stronger merely by virtue of being larger), provided, however, that it does not allow its members to be scattered in separate villages, but unites them in a confederacy like that of Arcadia" - Barker's Translation. The key sentence however, is - ἀλλ' ὁδ' ὀκτὼ τῶν πόλεων ἐνὸς ὃταν μή κατὰ κόμιας ἢ συνεξωρισμένοι τῷ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' ὁδ' Ἀρκαδίας.

Two types of ἔθνος are distinguished:

(a) The organised one, of which the Arcadians are an example; this bears a similarity to an alliance; the more numerous its constituent villages become, the stronger it grows. The difference in the constituent members (in this case the villages) does not matter but this is not so in the polis. It is clear that Aristotle has in mind the Arcadian League (a confederacy of a sort) in depicting this type of 'Ethnos' (b) the uncompacted mass of villages
containing members of the same race. An addition of villages to this type of 'ethnos' brings no increased strength. We thus see the village in relation to (a) the polis (b) the organised 'ethnos' and (c) the unorganised 'ethnos'.

The type of 'ethnos' which Aristotle thinks characteristic of non-Hellenic peoples is not given a place in the above account. For Aristotle certainly does not conceive this type of 'ethnos' as similar to the Arcadian nor to the type to which the addition of villages would bring no new strength.

Dittenberger however, thought that the second type of 'ethnos' represents the non-Hellenic type of 'ethnos'. For he observes 'To this kind of ἐθνος (the Arcadian kind) however, conceived as analogous to a συμμαχία is opposed another which Aristotle excludes from this analogy by the addition of the words - ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κάμης ὡσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος - 'provided their population be not dispersed over a number of villages'. By the latter he means the ἐθνος which forms a political unity (usually with monarchical constitution), which is not divided into a number of city-states, nor centralized in a single city, but where the people live scattered all over the territory in detached villages or unwalled towns without political independence (κάμη). In other words it is the organisation with which the Greeks became acquainted in most of

*1 Dittenberger - Gott., gel. Anz. 1874 (p. 1832)
the neighbouring non-Greek nations; whereas tribal federations composed of separate city-states were a somewhat more Hellenic development.

The difficulty of this interpretation however lies in reconciling it with what seems to be Aristotle's point here - that the addition of more villages to the second type of 'ethnos' does not increase its strength. The difficulty becomes obvious when we place the point Aristotle is making by the side of Dittenberger's interpretation - an ethnos, like an alliance, may be stronger merely by virtue of being larger "provided", says Dittenberger, "that the ethnos is not distributed, like most barbarian nations, into non-independent villages, but like the Arcadian for instance, into a number of independent city-states" an argument that implies that the strength of an ἔθος lies in the independence of its constituent units whereas Aristotle seems to wish to show that in order to acquire strength the homogeneity of the units of the ethnos must be accompanied with a form of centralization, as happens among the Arcadians. Again, it is not at all obvious that Aristotle conceives of the first type of ἔθος as constituted of city-states. The fact that most of the towns which composed the ancient Arcadian League as well as those absorbed later on into Megalopolis/is not a very strong support for Dittenberger's view; for the term 'polis' was often used for townships or communes especially if they had at an earlier time been independent communes.
The distinction Aristotle is making is between the organised type of such communes and a group of such communes to which the only common thing is that they are occupied by members of the race. The non-Hellenic 'monarchical' type is neither the one nor the other. I therefore do not think that by the second type of Ἕδωνος Aristotle has in mind specially the non-Hellenic type of Ἕδωνος. Aristotle was there only concerned to differentiate the polis from an alliance and he illustrates this distinction by bringing in those two types of ethnic groups. In Pol. III 1276a 2 however, Babylon is regarded as a polis of a dubious nature because it has the dimensions of an Ἕδωνος.

We shall now, however, turn our attention more specially to the κώμη. In this account of the κώμη it is believed that Aristotle's healthy respect for facts and his customary adherence to the essential facts of Greek life makes it legitimate to try to interpret his conception in the light of Greek political development.

The backward parts of the Greek world were still organised on a village basis in the time of Thucydides; and there were certainly traces of this state of affairs even in Aristotle's time. It therefore seems probable that Aristotle's theory has some basis on his observation of the contemporary political development and the condition of the village community. Indeed, Aristotle is only one among many Greek philosophers and historians who believed that villages were the common unit of early Greek civilization.
Thucydides in his sketch of the evolution of Greek
society, gives us interesting facts about the village community.
Describing life in the backward parts of Greek (Thuc. I. 5.1;
II. 80.8; III 94, 4; IV 43, 1) he tells us that the village is
generally an unwalled town (ἄτειχόστος). Also in speaking of
piracy Thucydides tells us that its prevalence was due to the
ease with which unfortified villages could be plundered. "For in
ancient times both Hellenes and Barbarians, as well as the in-
habitants of the coast as of the islands when they began to find
their way to one another by sea had recourse to piracy...They
would fall upon the unwalled and straggling towns, or rather
villages, which they plundered, and maintained themselves by
the plunder of them".*1 Things changed however when village
communities here and there who had accumulated some surplus
(κερινοῦσακρηματῶν) resolved to stand fast and unite to
protect their own; this was the beginning of a general transition
from the unwalled and defenceless village community based on kin
to a 'political' society, with a unitary organisation and a
citizenship in which the bond of territorial contiguity and
common interest replaced the tie of birth. Self-preservation
therefore made men build a fortified place, to which flight
could be made by people in the surrounding countryside in case
of attack. This is the polis, and a village or several villages
might be situated below or around its walls. An example of such

*1 Thucy I.5 - Jowett's Translation
There was therefore a phase in the historical evolution of the polis in Greece when villages were the largest units and when no collective authority united these communities. This is shown in his description of the state of affairs in Attica before the time of Theseus - "The Athenians had always been accustomed to reside in the country. Such a life had been characteristic of them more than of any other Hellenic people from very early times. In the days of Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus, Attica was divided into communes, having their own town halls and magistrates. Except in case of alarm the whole people did not assemble in council under the king but administered their own affairs, and advised together in their several townships" Thucy. II. 15. Each little commune was, therefore, an independent unit with the loose title of polis. In applying the term polis to both types of settlement - the unfortified group of villages and the fortified town - Thucydides probably conveys the independence of the communes; for if he had used such an expression like κατὰ κώμας it might have led to confusion since in his time the word κώμη was not associated with independence but with dependence. In his time the distinction between κώμη usually associated with lower level of society and πόλις usually associated with civilization and culture had become clear-cut. Thus Strabo later on could write "Those who assert that there are more than one thousand
cities in Iberia seem to me to be led to do so by calling the big villages (μεγάλαι κώμαι) cities (πόλεις), for in the first place, the country is naturally not capable, on account of the poverty of its soil or else on account of the remoteness or wildness of it, of containing many cities, and secondly the modes of life and the activities of the inhabitants (apart from those who live on the Seaboard of our Sea) do not suggest anything of the kind. The majority of the Iberians are village dwellers (οἱ κατὰ κώμας οικοῦντες) and as such they are uncivilized (ἄγριοι) (Strabo III. 163 cf. IV.186, V. 218, 241, 250).

In other parts of Greece we find κώμαι as the underlying unit. This was the state of affairs in Aetolia (Thucy. III. 94.4; III, 97.1) as late as 314 B.C. when a sympolity was formed (cf. Diodorus XVIII.24 2; 25 1, and XIX 74 b.). Under the sympolity we find the population gradually concentrating into the cities in the middle although traces of the old village system remained. Thus, while the villages centring about a fortified city might maintain their autonomy for some time, an important step was taken when each of them surrounded its own local powers and helped to form a government in common with other villages settled about the fortress. The step was perhaps nothing as deliberate as a historical scheme would suggest and indeed in many cases the synoecism was effected by stages - first, the combination of villages into a town and then the combination of towns into a city.
As Strabo again tells us (VIII, 336-7) "What is now the city of Elis had not yet been founded in Homer's time; in fact, the people of the country lived only in villages. And the country was called Coele Elis from the fact that the most and best of it was "Coele". It was only relatively late, after the Persian Wars, that people came together from many communities into what is now the city of Elis. And I might almost say that, with only a few exceptions, the other Peloponnesian places named by the poet were also named by him, not as cities, but as countries, each country being composed of several communities from which in later times the well-known cities were settled. For instance, in Arcadia, Mantinea was settled by Argive colonists from five communities, and Tegea from nine and also Heraea from nine, either by Cleombrotus or by Cleonymus. And in the same way the city Aegium was made up of seven or eight communities, the city Patrae of seven, and the city Dyne of eight. And in this way the city Elis was also made up of the communities of the surrounding country." (cf. Strabo VIII 336).

This synoecism seems to have taken several forms. Sometimes several villages would form a voluntary combination. Part of the village population might transfer to the new city of their own free-will, and the rest might remain in the villages surrounding the city. This is the way in which those cities of which we have spoken - Mantinea, Tegea, Heraea - and other
Arcadian cities of which we hear in the fourth century B.C. were formed.

Another type of synoecism, however, resulted when a village, on becoming more powerful than the neighbouring villages, forced the other villages to become dependent upon it and thus develops into a city. In case of this sort, the people of the dependent villages might not be given a share in the political rights of the city. Although Thucydides tells us (1.10.2) that Sparta ever remained a group of villages "in the old-fashioned way of the Greeks" its relations to the perioecic towns which were for the most part unfortified was of this character. It was also not uncommon for a city to be deprived of its independence and to be made dependent upon another city and politically speaking, to be regarded as a village. Such seems to have been the fate of Mycenae which was made a village dependent upon Argos.*1 The fate of Æleusis seems to have been something like this with respect to Athens.

From the foregoing it is clear that once a number of have united to form a polis, each χώμη becomes a subordinate unit in a bigger whole, although the degree of this subordination varies with the various types of synoecism. Whatever be the form of the synoecism however, once a polis is formed the villages of necessity undergo some adjustment.

*1 W. Dittenberger - Sylloges Inscriptionum Graecarum 3rd ed. I-IV, 594; Swoboda, R.E. (Pauly-Wissowa S.V. θόμη) points out that with the introduction of democracy the inhabitants of such dependent villages achieved political equality with those living in the city.
What then are the characteristics of the independent ἴσδημα. W.W. Fowler\(^1\) drawing on the insights contained in Maine's "Early History of Institutions" gives a comprehensive account of these characteristics. The clan usually chooses the site to be occupied with regard to the nature of the soil, the accessibility of water and considerations of security. The village is therefore usually centred in a place with some natural advantages. The household of the chief or headman of the community obtains the best site: if this site is extensive enough to contain the whole clan, then the whole clan settles there, if not the headman or chief and his household settle on this site and the other households settle around it and regard it as a place to which flight could be made in time of danger. Within the village each household has its residence with a small field attached (the χλῆρος) and somewhere around the village or preferably in the front of the chief's house there would be an open space - the ancient agora, the modern counterpart of which is the village-green. In the middle of this open space would be the village-tree usually surrounded by a stone bench for the heads of the households in the clan. Here or in the house of the headman the heads of households often meet.

The chief is the head of the principal household and the representative of the clan - ancestor; his household and his hearth therefore is invested with a special sanctity, his hearth

\(^1\) W.W. Fowler \(\text{"The City State of the Greeks and Romans"}\), London 1895 ch.II, esp. pp.27-34. See also Professor Adcock on the development of the Greek polis in the "Cambridge Ancient History", Vol.III ch.XXIV.
being as it were the ancestral hearth of the clan. He has his estate divided off from the other land of the community - this was his 'temenos', but besides this, his people could set apart other pieces of land for him as tokens of honour.

Outside the immediate village site but within the territory of the clan would be the cultivated fields and beyond these the grazing land and waste. The arable and pastoral lands are controlled by the village assembly under the direction of the elders; but the arable land is divided into small holdings among the families while pastoral land is undivided. The fundamental characteristics of the village community therefore are: kinship of its members, government by a council composed of the heads of the households constituting the clan: community of property, especially landed property; and common worship.

There can be little doubt of the general truth of Fowler's view; though there might be some divergence due to particular circumstances and development in certain respects. For example, instead of a council of family heads in control of a village we may find a headman in almost absolute control. It is difficult to tell whether the headman or the council is the older institution; Aristotle however, tells us that the village is ruled by the headman, usually the eldest of the chief household, a form of ἀρχή derived from the family organisation. The evidence from Homer, however, is in favour of the view that the power of
the chief was closely connected with the council constituted by the heads of households, or the gerontes. Similarly, there might be a modification of the tradition that the members of the community are bound together by blood kinship. For, with time the members of the community may forget their common origin and outsiders not possessing a common heritage may be admitted. The unity of blood would in that case be supplanted by unity of interest which usually develops from a long possession of common land and common fortune. And finally, the traces of a worship peculiar to a village may often be effaced by the spread of a common religion over a wide area.

The picture that emerges from the foregoing of the life of the village-community would approximate to that of the world of Homer, allowing of course for modifications necessitated by the more heroic context in which life was lived in the latter. It must be admitted, however, that the Greek words ordinarily connected with a clan or tribal society have in Homer rather vague connotations. They mean a "body" (of men or things) – Iliad II, 469; XI, 595; XII, 330; XIII, 533; XIV, 361; XV, 54; Odyssey, VII, 206; VIII, 481; XIV, 73, 181. Only in a few cases do we find 'phylon' or 'phratre' used in a way which implies some organisation; in one case the army was arranged by 'phretrai' in battle, to find who of the leaders and men were cowardly and who were brave, for they would thus by
themselves (κατὰ σφέας γαρ μαχέονται)

In this way every man would fight as courageously as possible with the aim of bringing honour of glory to his family. There is also a case of murder "within the tribe" where the murderer had to flee for his life from the brothers and relations of the slain man. We also find the Rhodians divided into three divisions, divisions which corresponded with tribes - that of Lindos, that of Ialysos and that of Cameiros. And finally there is the fact that one who desired internal warfare was put beyond the boundary of tribal brotherhood, themistes and hearth; we find fire to be the symbol of brotherhood.

Most scholars consider Homer's 'phrētre' a society intermediate to the family and the state but there is difficulty in actually identifying it with Aristotle's clan-community (κώμη). Nevertheless the picture we get of Homeric society and his 'phrētre' is that of an extended patriarchy like the κώμη, and Aristotle, as Plato before him, illustrates his conception of the intermediate society with a quotation from Homer. We see in

*1 Iliad II, 360ff (cf. 802 - 806)
*2 Odyssey XV, 272ff.
*3 Iliad II, 655; 668
*4 Iliad IX, 63 - 64
Homer that the king or chief takes from the patriarchal organisation of the family the function of head-sacrificer into the wider society of the tribal state, carrying with him ever a sacrificial knife which marked him as the performer of public sacrifice. Though holding supreme power, however, government was not confined wholly to his will; for there is a popular assembly which is the means of taking the sense of public opinion; this assembly met in the agora. There is a council of 'gerontes' or heads of households; and they often sat around the 'polished stones' by the tree in the middle of the 'agora'.

Finally in regard to landed property the characteristics which H.J. Rose saw in Homeric very much resemble those which we have seen in the clan-community (μουν). I here quote Rose's remarks at some length. "If we look at the 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey' we find the land tenure to have been somewhat as follows. The people under their king or baron, lived in a polis, a word which later meant 'city' but in Homer is often a quite small place. Small or large, it was essentially a group of houses, generally surrounded by a wall, if not always, and normally in a position naturally strong. All around it lay fields and meadows, cultivated by the citizens or used for the pasture of their beasts. But if we look for the owners of these fields

*1 Iliad - III, 271-272
*2 H.J. Rose, Primitive culture in Greece, London 1925
*3 Rose, op.cit. p.179
we find that generally they have no individual owner. A case in point is the interview between Meleagros and the Kalydonian elders in the ninth book of the 'Iliad'. According to old Phoinix, who tells the story, the elders, wanting his help very badly, offered him 'his choice of a beautiful estate of fifty gyai...where the plain of lovely Kalydon is fattest, half of it vineyard and half of it cleared flat arable land'. This Phoinix calls a 'great gift', and clearly no small one would meet the case. It is likewise called a 'temenos', the same word which is used of the sacred land of a god. Such a 'temenos' never seems to belong to anyone but a king (Meleagros is a king's son), and may reasonably be supposed to be part of the 'honour like a god's' with which the Homeric king is treated. Elsewhere we have a description of a 'temenos' of this sort being harvested by the king's thralls; elsewhere again, a picture of the 'aroura' or ploughland being turned by many ploughmen...This time there is no king concerned; it is obviously common land, and the whole community has turned out to plough it or to help the ploughmen in one way or another. Yet the beginnings of private ownership are there; the 'kleros' which we found in Crete is already known to Homer, who describes a very poor man as 'one who has no 'kleros'. As the word means properly 'lot' (in the sense of casting lots), it would seem that some system existed by which strips of the land were assigned to various members of the community, not apparently as their property, but for them to
plough and reap, and presumably enjoy the fruits of, until a re-division took place...that the klerei were not permanent in Homer's day is indicated by his picture of two men with measuring ropes in their hands quarreling vigorously as to where one ends and another begins. Permanent estates have fixed boundaries and do not need all this re-measuring. Still the individual ownership of land was beginning, for a rich family, is described as 'men who had many klerei'. There are thus characteristics common to the society portrayed by Homer and the society represented by the χώμη in post-Homeric Greece.

The foregoing being the fundamental characteristics of the χώμη and the fate that was likely to befall a χώμη once it was merged with other χώμαι to form a polis being so various, it is perhaps surprising that Aristotle leaves the place of the χώμη in the polis so vaguely defined.

Now, in the Poetics (III, 1448a 36) Aristotle tells us that the χώμη and the ὁμιός are the same thing under different names; the Peloponnesians use χώμη and the Athenians use ὁμιός. It is perhaps worthwhile to point out that Aristotle's remark is not strictly correct for we find ὁμιός in the Peloponnese (for example in Elis) and τρίχωμοι and τετράχωμοι in Attica.*1

One need not however hold Aristotle down too strictly to his words here; for his remark may mean no more than that the

*1 See Pougès in Daremberg - Saglio s.v. kôme - pp. 854 ff. (cf. Strabo, 9. 2. 14.)
Peloponnesians more commonly use κόμη than δήμος while the tendency in Northern Greece and especially in Attica is to use δήμος rather than κόμη. The more fundamental question, however, is whether Aristotle conceives the Attic deme, which he seems specifically to have in mind in the remarks in the Poetics, as holding a place comparable to that which the κόμη of the beginning of the Politics would hold in the fully developed polis, and if not, why not. It is also possible that an "Attic δήμος was originally much more like the κόμη whose characteristics we have sketched and less like the Attic deme of the post-Cleisthenean age. If so, what are its consequences on Aristotle's remarks on the place of the intermediate association of the κόμη in the Politics. This is the question I attempt to answer in the following paragraphs.

One thing is certain - and that is that the author of the A.P. cannot have failed to see what a difference there was between the original κόμη which the Attic synoecism converted into the state of Athens and the Attic demes of his own age. And it might throw some insight into Aristotle's conception of the true place of the κόμη in the polis if we trace the transformation which the constituent parts of the state which we know best underwent and examine Aristotle's evaluation of that transformation. It is also possible that the fact that in doing this we have to draw most of our information from Aristotle himself may
help us to pose the problems as they appeared to Aristotle.

As the evidence already cited from Thucydides shows, the ancient inhabitants of Attica lived in separate village communities. The oldest of these several village communities would seem to be Pallene, Thoricus, Athmonia, Marathon, Cine, Phalerum Eleusis. Strabo tells us that Marathon, Cine, Probalinthos and Tricorythos at a very early date came together and formed a single unit which was called tetrapolis; next Piraeus and Phalerum and two other village communities which both worshipped Hercules as their hero-god formed another tetrapolis. The famous synoecism was the unification of all the village-communities of Attica into the one state of Athens - this united those agricultural communities around the Cecropia (the later Acropolis) which had Athena as its patron-goddess, those around Eleusis under the protection of Demeter, and the community of shepherds in the south under the protection of Pallas; All these communities now obeyed the same laws, a man who originally came from Thoricus, or from Marathon or from Eleusis considered himself an Athenian.

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*1 - Bury - History of Greece, p. 163
*2 - Strabo IX, p. 463.
*3 - Bury op. cit. p. 163.
After the unification, however, the units were grouped into the four ancient Ionian Ethnic groups — Geleontes, Argadeis, Aigicoreis, Hopletes, names which it is believed by some are derived from the four sons of Ion, but which is taken by others as reflecting division into social classes — Geleontes (nobles), Hopletes (warriors), Aigicoreis (shepherds) and Argadeis (farmers). This tribal grouping seemed to have continued in use till the time of Cleisthenes. Each tribe had three divisions called a Trittys or a Phratry. Strabo gives the name of the twelve village-communities which comprised Athens at this time as reported by Philochorus; Cecrops, Tetrapolis, Epacris, Decelea, Eleusis, Aphidna, Thoricus, Brauron, Cythera, Sphettus, Cephissus. Greenidge says that the twelfth which is missing is Phalerum, but Ferguson is probably correct in arguing that it is Agras. Aristotle believes that each village - community constitutes a Trittys or Phratry in the unity which is the State of Athens. Pollux whose authority is here most probably Aristotle supports this view. If this is true, then the original *ματα

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*1 Bates, '5 Post-Cleisthenean Tribes', p.1.
*3 Strabo IX p.397
*4 Greenidge, 'History of Greece', p.126
*6 Ferguson op.cit. p.177
would seem to retain a lot of their identity in the polis. Each tribe was next divided into 12 naucrables;*2 each
naucrary had a chairman called the Prytanis; this system seemed to have continued in use till the time of Solon; for Herodotus
tells us that the Prytaneis of the Naucreries suppressed the
conspiracy of Cylon.*3 Aristotle tells us that Solon retained
the ancient structure of society.*4 There were four tribes, and
four tribe-kings. Each tribe consisted of three Trittyes and
there were twelve Naucreries to each tribe. It would appear,
however, that by Solon's time the original village-communities
or communes had lost some of their identity. The whole of
Attica was divided into 48 parts, each division being called a
Naucrary, a division that seems based on the old tribal or clan
divisions.

Then after a period of tyranny and general confusion,
Cleisthenes became the leader of the people, in the year of the
Archonship of Isagoras, having suffered some defeats in the hands
of the political clubs (*επαινται). Cleisthenes now reconstit­
uted the whole state of Athens, abolishing the ancient division
of the state into four tribes, and distributing the whole
population into ten tribes. "With the aim" says Aristotle "of

*1 Jacoby disputes this conception of the relation of the trittys
to the original village communities - Jacoby F.Gr.H 3b Suppl.
1. 393-396 and 2. 290-293
*2 Bury op.cit. p.177
*3 Herod. V. 71 (cf. Thucydides 1, 126.8).
*4 Aristotle A.L. 8.3
mixing up the population so that a greater number would share in the administration of the state. Hence the proverbial saying: 'No tribe investigation', this was directed against those who wanted to check on family, phratric or tribal backgrounds of citizens; and the reason he did not distribute the people into twelve tribes was that he wished to avoid a division according to the already existing Trittyes: for the four tribes consisted of twelve Trittyes" - A.P. 21. Fritz & Kapp's Translation.

Cleisthenes also established new Trittyes and Demes. There were thirty Trittyes; as for the number of demes, there are various estimates. Herodotus*1 puts them at a hundred; but he almost certainly underestimated the number. Bury*2 puts it at about 200; there seems to be some 127 about which something is known for certain and the number continues to increase with research. Polemo*3 names 174.

Aristotle sees the main object of Cleisthenes' reform in his attempt to prevent the disfranchisement of those citizens enrolled after the overthrow of tyranny. And in Politics III 1275b 37, he tells us that Cleisthenes enrolled in the tribes a number of foreigners and a number of aliens belonging to the slave class. But there is hardly any doubt that the main object

*1 Herodotus V. 69
*3 Strabo IX, 575.
of Cleisthenes' reforms was to break the influence of the big old families and of the ἄτατοι, which was exercised through the old tribes, phratries and clans. However, Aristotle's remarks in Pol. VI 4. 1319b 19ff show that he sees the true significance of Cleisthenes' reforms.

It would seem, therefore, that until the time of Cleisthenes the kinship groups which were the original constituent elements of the polis survived and retained a lot of their pristine vigour in the polis. Each was more or less a close corporation with its religious rites, its own traditions and customs (cf. Pol. VI. 1319b 19ff. and Pol. V. 4 1304a 35). Cleisthenes attempted to prove that the tissue out of which the state had been created - the clan-village - was no longer essential to the state's vitality; it might survive but its place was henceforth to be supplied by a new purely administrative organisation - the demes. He thus fully accepted the territorial principle, with all its implications and dragged the concept of 'the people' (ὁ οἶκος) into the full light of day.

It is perhaps not wholly accidental that the author of the A.P. does not use the word ὁ οἶκος (the deme) at all in the Politics to denote the intermediate association which he sketched at the beginning of the Politics. We are told in Pol. I. 1252b 18 that the members of the ἄνδρας are ὁμογενεῖς 'suckled in the same milk'. In Pol. II 1264a 6 Aristotle combines γένος and ἄνδρας.
and the argument against Plato's abolition of the subordinate associations of the family and the clan and tribe is based on the principle that the affection of the members of the clan-village for one another is an extension of the family affection, and that like the family feeling it contributes to the welfare of the polis and the happiness of its members. In Pol.III 1280b 40 we are told that the polis is an association of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life — πόλις δὲ ἡ γένων καὶ κόμμαν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους.

A few lines earlier, (1280b 33) the polis is defined as a union of families and clans — ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῶν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους — and marriage connexions, kin-groups, religious gatherings are means to this end (φατρικαὶ καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγώγαι).

In Pol.VI.4 1319b 19 Aristotle tells us that the breaking up of genuine tribal and phratric groups and their replacement by artificial troupes is an effective measure in the hands of advocates of extreme democracy: "Old tribes and clans are replaced by new: private cults are reduced in number and religious gatherings are turned from private houses to common centres, and every contrivance is adopted to make all the citizens mix as much as possible and to break their old loyalties", Barker's Translation. A tyrant, Aristotle tells us, would be wise to adopt those measures too. As opposed to these measures which
promote extreme democracy, Aristotle comments on the excellence of the ancient law, at one time prevalent, in many cities, against the sale of the original κλήροι and the good results of making everyone cultivate his own moderate sized holding. Pol. VI. 1319a 10ff (and cf. Pol. II.166b ἀδοκίμασθαι δὲ λαοὺς νόμος ἐστι μὴ κωλεῖν...ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασφάζειν.)

In that passage in Pol. VI. one gets the impression that the rural demes perform one of the functions which a κώμη should perform in the fully developed polis.

Aristotle therefore wished the clan-village to retain its kinship basis in the fully developed polis. The function of the κώμη is not that of a purely administrative unit in the polis. Aristotle's remarks on the demes which resulted from Cleisthenes' reforms makes this clear; even after Cleisthenes, however, some rural demes might still have retained their gentile nature and continued to be inhabited by kinsmen, and these would approach Aristotle's conception of the κώμη. For the main point of his argument against artificial divisions such as Cleisthenes' is that it destroys the basis ofloyalties and feelings which are essential to a good state. In this respect, Aristotle's argument against reforms like those of Cleisthenes sound very much like that of Burke against the reforms of the leaders of the French Revolution. Intent on undermining the influence of the ancient traditional nobility, the leaders of the French Revolutio-
did away with the old division of the country into provinces, through which the aristocratic families exercised their influence and adopted a new division into a much larger number of departments, which would form the basis of the whole political system. 'We begin our public affections in our families' writes Burke. No cold relation is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our neighbourhoods and our habitual provincial connexions. These are inns and resting-places...The love of the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. Burke's 'habitual provincial connexions' is Aristotle's clan-village relations; and it would seem that both for Aristotle and for Burke a great deal of the value of those relations lie in their being habitual or as Aristotle would prefer to say 'natural'.

Indeed, in view of the frequency with which Aristotle connects associations of the tribe, clan or village with religious functions, it would seem legitimate to think that he sees the clan-village as performing essentially some religious functions. One even finds support for this view from Aristotle's remarks in the E.N. VIII 9. 1160a 9ff where he gives the purpose for which various associations came into being: "Sailors aim at what is advantageous on a voyage, with a view to making money or something of the kind, fellow-soldiers at what is advantageous

in war...members of tribes and demes act similarly, offering sacrifices and arranging gatherings for the purpose and assigning honours to the gods and providing relaxation for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem to take place after the harvest as a sort of first fruits".\(^1\) Ross's Translation.

It seems clear therefore that Aristotle conceives the \(\kappa\omega\mu\eta\) as a tribal or clan group; and he identifies it with the phratry or trittys in the fully developed state.\(^2\) There is however another unit or sub-group which Aristotle mentioned in the Politics, though not in the analysis of Pol. Bk. I. This is the \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\omega\zeta\). In Pol. I we have the \(\omicron\lambda\xi\sigma\varsigma\) the \(\kappa\omega\mu\eta\) and the \(\pi\omicron\lambda\varsigma\). In the rest of the Politics, however, we hear of the \(\omicron\lambda\xi\sigma\varsigma\) the \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\omega\zeta\), the \(\phi\rho\alpha\tau\rho\sigma\alpha\) and the \(\pi\omicron\lambda\varsigma\). With the identification of the \(\kappa\omega\mu\eta\) with the phratry, the \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\omega\zeta\) looks like an intermediate group between the \(\omicron\lambda\xi\sigma\varsigma\) and the \(\phi\rho\alpha\tau\rho\sigma\alpha\). What then is the place and function of the \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\omega\zeta\) in Aristotle's conception of the structure of society?

In the fragment from the lost chapters of the A.P. Aristotle tells us that the archaic Attic state consisted of

\(^1\) - Haussovlier (Vie Municipale en Attique p. 162ff) has shown that even in the fourth century B.C. the demes of Athens, or at least some of them, usually the country demes, still had their gatherings and religious celebrations, a relic perhaps of the more vigorous religious life of the ancient phratries.

\(^2\) cf. Jacoby op.cit. Supplement 1. 393-396 and 2. 290-293
four tribes, twelve phratries and 360 γένη; and in this he is followed by the lexicographers, Harpocration, Photius, Pollux and Suidas. (In view of the learned controversy on the nature and history of the Athenian γένη it is perhaps necessary to make clear here that our main interest in the γένος lies in so far as it illuminates Aristotle's political philosophy, and we only bring as much history as necessary for that purpose.

From the picture given in the fragment, the gene of the archaic Attic state was anything but aristocratic and exclusive; every citizen belonged to a tribe, a phratry and a genos. But this was clearly not the case in Aristotle's time. Why then did he give that picture of the archaic Athenian state? Costello \(^*1\) thinks it 'natural to suppose that Aristotle had evidence of a revolution in the Athenian kinship system of which no explicit mention has survived' and he attributes this revolution in the Athenian kinship system to Cleisthenes' period - 'a period recent enough for evidence of it to have survived till Aristotle's time'. Costello here suggests that the picture given by the fragment of the structure of Attic society is more or less true of the period just before Cleisthenes. This seems improbable and Costello hardly suggests why at the time of Cleisthenes the γένος should develop from an 'egalitarian' kinship unit into an exclusive, aristocratic one; and if it is

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argued that the process which started long in the past only culminated in a change in Cleisthenes' period, it would still seem that Aristotle did not draw his picture of the archaic state from recent evidence. Nor could Aristotle indeed have done so, judging from Costello's conception of the development of the γένος. For, having conceived the γένος as a distinct unit as old as and contemporaneous with the phratry itself, Costello saw divergences of wealth as resulting in the fragmentation of both phratry and 'genos' and in the disappearance of the old solidarity between their members. Having broken the phratry and the 'genos' the wealthy families unite into a closed aristocracy and formed ἕταιρείαι which became their characteristic organisation; "for now certain members of the 'genos' were included in the narrow circle of the ruling class, while others, the vast majority, were deprived all political rights", in other words, all three classes - Eupatrids, Zeugites and Thetes - existed within the framework of the 'genos'. If this was the state of affairs before Cleisthenes, it could hardly be said that Aristotle had evidence here for the picture he drew of the archaic structure of Athenian society, especially if, even by Solon's time, 'the old kinship-organisation had lost its meaning now that the same phratry, the same 'genos', might contain both privileged and virtually disenfranchised citizens'. (Even if one accepted this theory it would seem surprising that the ἕταιρείαι should appear to be such unified groups in the law of Philochorus which Costello ascribes to the time of Cleisthenes. Costello's difficulties arise because he attempts to maintain the
historical truth of Aristotle's scheme and to reconcile it with what we know of the 'gene' in historical times.

Wade-Gery maintains against a host of scholars - De Sanctis, Beloch, Francotte, Jacoby and others - that the 'gene' were not exclusive aristocratic organisations. Drawing evidence from Aristotle and Plutarch, he attributes the formation of the aristocracy of the Eupatrids to Theseus and of the 'gene' (as well as the phratries and tribes) to the earlier period of Ion. The synoecism, which is a theme relevant to the conception of the 'gene', Wade-Gery prefers to put even sometime prior to Ion. For Aristotle and Thucydides assume that the unity of the Attic nation existed in principle long before: all Theseus did was to put it into permanent practice by some sort of assembling in the capital, and organising of the local chieftains'. The state which Ion divided into tribes, phratries and 'gene' therefore was the unified Attic state (with the possible exception of Eleusis).

Wade-Gery believes that the local chieftains which Theseus summoned constituted the aristocracy - the 'Eupatridai' - (we are not here concerned with Wade-Gery's theory of the relationship of the Eupatrid order to the Areopagus Council nor with his thesis about the 'one Council-Chamber' mentioned in the summoning call). The relevant question for our purpose here is the exact and true relation of these aristocrats to
the γένη. Since Eupatrids were not new men from outside the state, the relationship could be one of two kinds: either they remained in the 'gene' to which they formerly belonged or they now formed one or more distinct 'gene' (if the remained in their old 'gene', one would like to know the nature of these γένη in their localities before the summoning). Since Wade-Gery denies any aristocratic trait to the γένη he finds it more difficult to identify these local aristocrats as distinct γένη; he therefore supposes that there would be some γένη which contained both Eupatrids and non-Eupatrids. For 'a Gennete's citizenship was conceived to be more ancient than the nobility of any Eupatrid, though (since I imagine every Eupatrid belonged to some 'Genos') not more ancient than the Eupatrid's citizenship. But Gennethood implies no nobility; it does not exclude the possibility that for any given 'Gennete' all the thirty generations (in the 1,000 years between Ion and Aristotle) might be small farmers, or even labourers or artisans'.

This conception of the γένη, however, created difficulties for Wade-Gery when he comes to treat the γένη of which we know something about. This becomes clear in this discussion of the 'Law' from Philochorus. Wade-Gery attributes this law to the period of Solon. But, though he had already argued that the original state was divided as a whole into γένη and
that a 'genos' of artisans could have maintained itself throughout the centuries until Aristotle's time he speaks, in respect of the law of Philochorus, of a situation in which some members of a Phratry (by some real or fictitious family consciousness) formed themselves into groups called γένη and in which the members of less powerful families have formed similar groups with no bond of kinship; (the phratry shows a tendency to discriminate in favour of the former and the state thereby forbids such discrimination). The question is 'what is the relationship of these new powerful γένη of which Wade-Gery speaks to the old γένη?' Indeed what Wade-Gery's statement means is that the γενναται are in control of the phratry, if so, his earlier assertion that the whole state was divided into γένη invites the absurd situation of implying that new γένη were created out of old 'gene'.

It is unnecessary to labour the historical point about the γένη; for both Ion and Theseus, it is generally agreed, are fictions. Wade-Gery, however, would not deny that those prerogatives and influence of birth, or at least what remained of them, which he attributes to the 'Eupatrids' in the archaic state were apparently the close preserve of the γένη that we know historically. Wade-Gery's interpretation of the Demontid decrees (I.G.ii. 1237) supports this view. Wade-Gery, therefore, seems to take Aristotle's picture of the archaic state too
seriously; for even if he had historical evidence for his other figures, it is not likely that Aristotle seriously meant that at the time of Ion there were 360 distinct units called gene, with 30 men to each ἀριστοκράτικος. He might mean no more than that the archaic state recognised, apart from the family and the phratry, some vaguer bonds of relationship less closely-knit than the family and less inclusive than the tribal group of the phratry.

Indeed that relations like that of the γένεια were vague and hardly recognised in the archaic state, and that the loyalty was to the all-inclusive tribal group, seem to be borne out by some of the ancient laws of the Attic state. For instance, in the inscription found at Athens belonging to the year 409/408 B.C. Tod. (GH1487) (an inscription believed to be a copy of a genuine law of Draco) responsibility for murder, and no doubt for the preservation of life and property, rests first with one's immediate relatives (οικείοι, ἄχιστοι) and next with the phratry. In cases of involuntary homicide it is the victim's immediate relatives - his father, brother and sons - who can on a unanimous vote decide to pardon the offender. Failing this, the responsibility falls on the victim's agnatic relatives to the degree of first cousin; still failing this, however, the responsibility falls on the phratry - οἱ φράτερες - who make their decision through ten men elected δρικούνδην. (cf. Dem.c. Makart 1070ff.)
The two main levels at which law operates are the level of immediate relatives and the level of the phratry.

The phratry then seems to be the original tribal group. With the expansion of the original group, however, sub-groups conscious of a more immediate kinship-bond may emerge and might stand to the original group as the 'genos' stands to the phratry in Aristotle's picture of the archaic structure of Attic society. These sub-groups might tend to weaken the force of the kinship bond of the larger unit though the symbols of that larger unit would be rather tenaciously held. Here Costello draws an illuminating comparison between the Greek and some primitive cultures, though I still think he is mistaken in making the sub-groups almost contemporaneous with the larger group - "the social organisation of the New Zealand Maoris", he writes, "presents affinities with the Greek: the largest unit is the tribe (iwi) claiming descent from one ancestor; it comprises several hapu; and these are divided either into sub-hapu or immediately into households (whanau) which may each contain several families".*1 Some of these sub-groups might come to acquire wealth and constitute themselves into aristocratic groups with a certain pride in their more immediate kinship; they might also come not only to establish their own private cults but acquire a preponderant influence in the phratry and

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*1 Costello, op. cit. p.174
in the management of its cults. The γένη of classical Athens seem to be groups like these; this explains why when the structure of the 'genos' became crystallized it should appear that only nobles belonged to γένος; an appearance that naturally encourages the identification of γεννήται with ἐξκατριδαί.

Even Wade-Gery who denies the identification of γεννήται with ἐξκατριδαί defines the Eupatrids "as scions of certain houses of heroic descent who inherited certain priestly functions and a certain religious competence",¹ and of the genos of the Demontids he says that 'the law of the Phratry perhaps still resides unwritten in their breasts; if not, it resides written in their keeping. The interpretation of the law, in the last instance, lies with them',² a remark that invites the conclusion that the Demontids were, like the Eupatrids, "scions of certain houses of heroic descent".

The fact then seems to be that, whether the archaic state before Theseus was divided into γένη or not, the Ὀλυνατοί of the local groups to whom Theseus gave religious and political functions were the leading families of these local groups (κατὰ δῆμον ἐξκατριδαί) and the ancestors of the γεννήται of whom we hear so much in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

¹ Wade-Gery - Essays in Greek History p.130.
² Wade-Gery op. cit. p.131.
They probably exercised most of their influence through the phratries, as evidenced by the Demontid Decrees in any interpretation. They might also have controlled entry to the phratries.

The 'genē' would therefore seem to be the repositories and upholders of the tribal traditions and the ancestral law of the patriarchal society; they are also certainly connected with priesthods. The difficulty about relating the γένος to Aristotle's political thought lies in reconciling his statements on the archaic structure of society with what we know historically of the γένη. For the question presents itself whether Aristotle thought it ideal that in each phratry every member should belong to a γένος and that each γένος should have its own private cult. Nor do the fragments which are likely to reflect Aristotle's view of much help.

1 cf. Pollux viii.iii. φυλοβασιλείς κ.τ.λ. and I.G.iii 267 and 1335 where there is a mention of eνηγήτης εξ οικογένειαις.

2 Professor Andrewes, "Philochoros on Phratries", J.H.S. Vol.31. pp.1 - 15 discusses the evidence more fully, but I cannot accept his view that the 'genē' were artificial institutions; in this view he finds support in W.S. Ferguson, "The Athenian Phratries", 'Classical Philology', Vol.5 pp. 257 - 234.
Hammond seeks a reconciliation by amending some of the fragments in such a way that it would be possible to retain Aristotle's view that everybody belonged to a γένος and also maintain the special nature of the γένη which we know something about, and which we call the true γένη in the phratry.

For instance, the passage in Lex. Patm. S.V. γεννηται, after giving the account of the division of the early state, reads as follows:— τούτων δὲ ἐκάστη συνεστήκει ἐκ τριάκοντα γένων καὶ γένος ἑκάστων ἄνδρας ἔχει τριάκοντα τοὺς εἰς τὴν γένη τις τεταγμένους οὕτως γεννηται ἐκαλούντο (ἐξ) δὲ καὶ ἑρωσθναι ἑκάστοις προσήκουσιν ἐκληροῦντο, οὗν Εδμολπίδαι καὶ χήρυκες καὶ Ἐκεσοβούταδαι μὲ ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναιῶν κοινάς Ἀριστοτέλης, τ.τ.λ.

Hammond puts the words from καὶ γένος to ἐκαλοῦντο in brackets and takes it as an aside; τριάκοντα γεννηται becomes the antecedent of δὲ (Hammond excises ἐξ) and ἑκάστοις refers to τριάκοντα γεννηται. The sense of the passage is therefore not that each γένος of which the Eumolpidae etc. are examples of its own ἑρωσθυνη but that each phratry.

i.e. each group of 30γένη had a special priestly clan of which the Eumolpidae etc. are examples. Thus members of the priestly families were allocated by lot to the phratry unit i.e. the group of 30γενε in order to hold the priesthoods appropriate to that group.

The interpretation also involves taking Εδυμολπίδαι κήρυκες, 'Ετεοβούταδαι as examples of ἱερωσύναι; they would be more correctly taken as γένη who have ἱερωσύναι, a slightly but crucially different thing. With this interpretation Aristotle might speak of the whole state being divided into gene without implying that every genos was similar to the Eumolpidae, the Ceryces and the Ετεοβούταδαι. Although this is not an impossible interpretation, it seems more likely that δὰν refers back to γεννηται (Hammond also seems to read more into the passage when he adds that the particular family holding the priesthood might not belong to the phratry unit which it served.

Whatever be Aristotle's conception of the place of the γένος in the phratry, however, there is no doubt that he connects the γένος with ἱερωσύναι; historically, however, it is those γένη which are actually concerned with ἱερωσύναι that came to be known properly as γένη and whose members are called γεννηται.
When Aristotle tells us (A. P. 21.6)

τὰ ὅντα γένη καὶ τὰς φρατρίας καὶ τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἕισαεν
(ὁ Κλεισθένης) ἕχειν ἑκατοντος κατὰ τὰ πατρία,

we again see the connection of phratries, clans, and cults but again the relationship of the cults to the clans and phratries is not specified. There is little doubt however that Aristotle recognised the conservative force exerted by the phratic cults whether they are in control of a few clans or not. The progress towards a true political association seems to have been accompanied by the weakening of the cults around which the powers of the clans revolved, either by making them state cults or by leaving them under gentile control while making them accept state supervision and their doors open to the people—a phenomenon which Aristotle observes (Pol. 1319b 19). Jacoby* sees in the 'Genesia' a cult which Solon saw fit, even while democracy was in its cradle to convert from a private cult into a public one "in order to weaken the strength of tribal ties and strengthen the sense of common feeling". And Feaver in his study of the

*1 Jacoby - 'Genesia' - A forgotten Festival of the Dead - Classical Quarterly 38, 1944, pp. 65 - 78.
"Historical Development in the Priesthoods of Athens"*1 shows to what extent the development towards democracy was in a way also the development of state cults. Among many cults which witnessed this transformation is the Eleusian cult; and Feaver's comment on this cult is instructive; having drawn attention to the gentile origin of the cult Feaver points out a number of public decrees about the cult in the fifth century and observes "the fact that all these decrees concerning the Eleusian cult are public shows us that while the gentile cult of Eleusis retained its great prestige during this period and had very special privileges confirmed to it....a great deal of jurisdiction over its affairs had been assumed by the Demos, so that it was tending to become a "public cult" in all respects except that of appoint to priesthoods, which still were private in the Aristotelian sense of being controlled by a genos. The period when this tendency might have begun is difficult to discover, but there is no doubt that it was accentuated during the rise of the democratic concept of government during the fifth century". Therefore "the curious duality of the sacerdotal systems in Athens was but a reflection of that dichotomy between aristocratic and democratic elements in the community as a whole which

played such a significant role in the course of events".\footnote{Feaver op. cit. p.158}

Thus the state cults were an effort to forge a sense of common belonging and unite the entire population of the nascent city-states; emerging out of earlier tribal worship, therefore, these cults expanded their sway as far as the boundaries of each local political unit.

In the foregoing pages I have tried to show that historically the Greek polis developed from tribal or clan groupings; that Aristotle is aware of this and that this is reflected in his conception of the ἱστορία as a phase of the social evolution. Nor is this really surprising for even in the 4th century Athens, the procedure of adoption which took place at the gathering of the phratores (Isaeus iii.14), and the introduction into the deme which took place at the age of eighteen at Athens, involving the enrolment in the ἀνάρχηκον γραμματεῖον during the feast of Apaturia reflect the tribal basis of Athenian society.

There is however no doubt that, historically, clan, tribal and all such groupings are bound to suffer a serious encroachment on the development of the polis; for in the fully formed polis tribal and clan organisations play but a subordinate part in the life of its members, and political and public functions occupy a much larger place than private loyalties and stand on a higher
plane of importance. In a sense, Aristotle says that this is as it should be. The polis, because it is responsible for the maintenance of the lives of all its members, was supreme over its constituent parts and overrode the citizens' obligation to any one of the less inclusive groups. Also while the polis makes these encroachments on the prerogatives of these hereditary groupings, the individual, recognising the security which the state affords him and the freedom of action which it enables him to exercise on his own personal account, began to see the possibility that he might work out his own economic salvation without being necessarily tied down to those traditional groupings; and the possibility he often finds attractive, especially as the corporate activity of the traditional groups is usually so closely restricted to the common holding of landed property which is used for the common not the individual advantage. Indeed in such societies it might be difficult to say whether the land more truly owns the group of men or the group of men own the land.\footnote{1} Such liberation, from the unwritten, traditional rules of tribal life we seem to see in Hesiod whose father, on abandoning his protected if restricted position in his tribal organisation migrated from Cyme to Boeotia. The liberation of course might involve economic stresses as it did in Hesiod's

\footnote{1} cf. Pol.II.1266b 21 and VI.1319a 11; and Plutarch - Solon 21.3 -
case, who, on seeing the weakness of the foundation of the economic life of the small independent farmer who has left the ancestral clan, recommends the expediency of having only one son (Works and Days 376-78). Nevertheless, in the fully developed polis, the time usually comes when the population grows larger than the land could support. This might give rise to industries and trade; whereupon the significance of kinship in the economic field becomes slight; for even where the activities of the citizens are necessarily co-operative, each citizen finds that he works under a system whose rules deny the relevance of kinship and where loyalty does not depend on kinship. The solidarity which obtains where relatives must rely on one another for the provision of their daily needs is absent and indeed irrelevant. One the whole, Aristotle, it would seem as pointed out earlier, regrets the weakening of the kinship bond and believes that every effort should be made to make every citizen maintain his tribal, phratric and clan connections; the so-called freedom of the merchant, sailor, artisan etc. from the tie of these hereditary groupings seem to him a bad thing. It results in the practice of 'living as you like' - τὸ ζῆν διὰ τῆς βούλησις - Pol. VI. 1319b 30.

Here we see Aristotle's moral conservatism at work. It would seem that Aristotle sees the clan-group as exerting some
of the conservative influences which nowadays are regarded, at least in advanced countries, as being exerted by the family. Large urban populations, Aristotle argues, (his points become explicit in his preference for an agricultural democracy*) take people out of their clan-groups; such people as mechanics, traders and labourers bound by no tribal loyalties or duties or indeed any responsibility become disconnected atoms drifting through the life of the community and seek only the satisfaction of the moment. Incapable sometimes even of self-maintenance, they come with the greatest ease to the assemblies and are very easily corrupted by foreigners. Aristotle deplores this, inevitable, it would seem to us, outcome of city life and regrets the instability of its citizens; this instability he believes would be restrained and tempered if citizens retained their membership of the intermediate association of the clan. Homer had suggested that men fought better if they fought by the side of their fellow tribesmen; Aristotle suggests that men are likely to be better behaved or at least less easily corrupted if they retained the sense of belonging to a clan or tribe.

Aristotle, of course, knew of the radical reconstructions in some Greek poleis of the traditional tribal groupings whose interests and loyalties, it was believed, directly conflicted with the interests of the citizen-body as a whole, or detracted

* Pol. VI. 1318b 6ff.
From the whole-hearted loyalty of each individual to the polis; he also knew of those measures which were promoted to assert the supremacy of the political association and the independence of the individual from the traditional group. In addition to those of Cleisthenes at Athens, which we have examined in some details, examples of such tribal reforms are found in Cleisthenes of Sicyon, and Demonax of Cyrene. Similar reconstructions seemed to have occurred in the Ionian communities of Asia Minor. For, before 700 B.C. these communities seemed to have had a tribal organisation which very much resembled the tribal structure of mainland Greece.* Miletus and Ephesus it would seem modified their original structures earlier than others to allow the growth of a more politically integrated community - a modification clearly necessitated by the pressures of urbanisation when Ionia changed from an agrarian to a mixed economy.

For different reasons, but from a similar argument that clan or tribal ties detract from loyalty to the polis Plato, Aristotle believes, if we judge by Pol.II, outlines the revolutionary scheme in the Republic in which traditional or hereditary ties should be abolished, clearly among the governing classes (though Aristotle says Plato leaves room for doubt) even to the tie of paternity and maternity. Aristotle's criticisms

of these measures are well-known. He himself, as we have seen, refuses to proceed to this extreme and eliminate inferior organisations in the interest of a theoretical unity of the state.

The principle on which he leaves unimpaired these minor associations is, however, subordinated to his main doctrine, that in the polis we have an association that is self-sufficient to cater for a good life, and which is supreme over its constituent parts, since its function is nothing less than the realisation of the supreme end of human life. In fulfilling this function, the polis has within it lesser organisations whose functions it is competent to supervise in pursuance of its own 'political' aim. But it is not itself engaged in satisfying every need; some needs are specifically within the province of some of the lesser organisations within it; it is to satisfy some of these needs that the Household and the clan-village exist as permanent entities in the Polis. If regarded as the highest association, therefore, the family as the patriarchate pure and simple, the Cyclopean unit in which each householder rules his own wives and children and paid no respect to others is a mark of a very low culture connected with cannibalism, lack of religion and arts and other savage characteristics; even the higher society of the Ἐἱκόν if regarded as the highest, can perform functions only a little higher than that of satisfying daily needs - the impulse to worship for
instance. When subordinated to the all-embracing association of the polis, however, these societies give opportunities for the realisation of many potentialities which they could not have done if left to themselves.

Aristotle would perhaps agree that the 'naturalness' of the Household seems on the whole more firmly established than that of the *κόσμος* but since (*Pol.* II 1264a 6) 'the foundation of any state will always involve the division and distribution of its members into classes - Aristotle believes that there is no reason for abolishing the clan-village groupings and that there are several reasons why they should be retained. Any division would probably serve if the main purpose is to secure administrative convenience or efficiency, but divisions like those of the clan-village are more of a natural but essential needs which artificial divisions would not satisfy. And in any case, as the remarks that precede the actual criticism tell us (*Pol.* II 1264a 1-5) 'There is another matter which must not be ignored - the teaching of actual experience. We are bound to pay some regard to the long past and the passage of the years, in which these things (advocated by Plato as new discoveries) would not have gone unnoticed if they had been really good. Almost everything has been discovered already; though some of the things discovered have not been co-ordinated and some though known, are not put into practice". It is a
classical statement of conservatism, and Plato was probably being conservative, in maintaining the system of phratries' (746a, 785a) and tribes (745e) in the Laws.

It is perhaps interesting to note that when Plato retains these subordinate associations - the family, the clan and the tribe, he makes their relations to political life clearer than Aristotle does in the discussion of his ideal state. The citizen body falls into 12 tribes; each tribe has cults devoted to Hestia, Zeus, Athena (Laws 745b) just as at Athens each phratry has the cults of Apollo, Patrous and Zeus Herkeios. Each tribe also has its private cults; to each tribe is allotted a twelfth part of the countryside: at the centre of each division there is a χώμη in each of which there are altars and sacred precincts (848d) dedicated to the local divinities. As the χώμη is a symbol of the life of members of each tribe, Plato calls the members of each tribe χωμήταλ. The city (i.e. the area around the acropolis) is also divided into twelve portions, a portion to each tribe.

Plato also speaks of other subdivisions of the state like phratries, demes; (746d); we have already seen the connection between the tribe and the χώμη; the relation of the 'phratry' to the tribe is not specified but in the only other reference to the phratry (785ab) it is suggested that citizens should register in their 'phratries'; and this would not preclude the
identification of the tribe with the 'phratry'. It is however probable that the references to phratries and demes are only reflections of Athenian institutions, the names of which Plato has adopted without taking the trouble to integrate those names into the over-all schema he is using, though the contents of that schema are very much influenced by Athenian institutions. It is perhaps possible to identify a deme with the twelfth part of a tribe of which Plato speaks in 771b, especially as he also prescribes that a citizen shall be designated by his patronymic, his tribe and his deme (753c). There are also tribal courts; for Plato prescribes three different courts for the trial of civil cases; there is first the court which the litigants appoint for themselves among their neighbours and friends. It is the court of arbitrators (this court it seems Plato thinks ideal for the settlement of civil cases - (as witnessed by his effort to reduce the volume of litigation and to confine them to settlement by one's immediate friends and neighbours, an effort manifest in the laws which make a man liable to a larger fine if he appeals and loses than that to which he would have been liable had he been content with the decision of the lower court). This argues for the presumption that by calling this court χυριώτατον δικαστήριον (767b) Plato means that it is ideal for civil cases. From this court appeal could be made to the tribal courts (Laws 768b) the members of which are chosen by lot, and who must give
their judgement as occasion arises (i.e. at once) and be inaccessible to entreaties". There is the final court composed of judges selected one from each of the several magistracies.

Glen Morrow however, denies that these courts are locally tribal courts; he believes that they are no more and no less tribal than the heliastic courts at Athens. But in this he can hardly be right. The first objection to his view that it demands the identification of these tribal courts with the common courts; however, the common courts look more like the final courts, and this interpretation seems more fitting in each instance where a case is referred to the common courts (762b; 846b, 847b).

Secondly, it involves referring the case of an offending magistrate (762b) (in this case an agronomos) to a court of arbitration for if we take the common court to which the case of the offending magistrate is referred as the tribal court, then the first court must be the court of friends and neighbours i.e. the court of arbitration, - an unlikely procedure to adopt for the trial of an offending magistrate. The court of villagers and neighbours (κωμὴται καὶ γείτονες) is here the tribal court (it is the κωμὴται καὶ φυλῆται of 956c, φυλητικάλ καὶ δικαίος of 766c.) As magistrates the only difference in their trial of the agronomoi and that of the select judges lies in the fact that as lesser magistrates and as being more immediately connected

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with the tribes, the tribal courts could settle the case of the agronomoi; but if for whatever reason the case is not settled then it is referred to the common courts which in this case seems very likely to be that constituted by the guardians (cf. 762d); a defendant select judge however, is tried directly before the court of guardians. The common courts, therefore, are the courts of final decision; they do not however have any static or specific composition. In some cases they would be the court of select judges (as in purely private suits); in others they might be the court constituted by the people with three of the highest magistrates as presidents (766c - 6); they might again be the court constituted specially for the trial of capital offences (a combined seating of the guardians of the laws and the court of select judges); they might also be the court set up for the trial of a 'euthynos' and, as in the case of a defendant select judge and of 'agronomoi', they might be the court of the guardians.

The objection as to how these locally tribal courts could adjudicate suits between two people from two different tribes is easily disposed of. The problem might not have occurred to Plato, and indeed from the way Plato talks of the court at first instance (friends, neighbours etc.) the same objection might be made against the court of first instance in the case of two people from two different tribes wishing to submit their case to this first court. This difficulty would not prove that
did not conceive this court to be essentially constituted of neighbours and friends.

Finally if one sees, as J.H. Oliver* does, the dependence of the twelve tribes of Plato's city in the Laws on the Old Attic Trittys, especially in connection with the role it played in the religious life of the Athenians even after Cleisthenes' reorganisation, then it becomes plain that in spite of the sophistication of their political thought both Plato and Aristotle never abandoned the traditions of a tribally based society.

Aristotle's conception of the essential nature of the polis.

The true basis of Aristotle's political philosophy, as we saw, lies in the necessity of various associations which serve those human needs and ends which transcend individual powers. Man's realisation of the end (τέλος) is the actualisation of his natural powers and potentialities. This is εὐδαιμονία - the condition of self-fulfilment. Actualisation is however a key word, for man's happiness lies not in the mere possession of certain powers and latent tendencies but in the manifestation of these powers in purposive action. The role which habituation plays in directing these powers (δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου) to the right end and eliminating those impulses which lead away from virtue and incline men to pursue false ends we have seen in our brief glance at the E.N.

By virtue of these human impulses which are the originating cause of various societies, the effort of human nature to realise itself has given birth to the Family and the Village. Those impulses, however, did not cease starting the development of new forms of society until that form of society is attained in which they could be fully satisfied. With the Family and the Village as preliminary stages such a stage is reached, Aristotle believes, in the polis. Thus, just as "Tragedy having passed through many changes (πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβάλονος) halted when it attained its true nature" (Poetics - 1449a 14-15) the social evolution inaugurated with the
Family halted when it attained its true nature in the polis. Man's moral progress towards the telos culminates in the polis - that social organisation which provides not only for the material needs of life but also for the good life. In the polis, then, man realises his immanent end; for the polis alone allows the unimpeded activity of the moral and intellectual faculties of the citizens; it secures the limit of "perfect self-sufficiency", the good life or happiness being that "which is by itself desirable and is lacking in nothing", E.N. I.7, 1097b 15.

A concomitant of εὐδαιμονία therefore is αὐτάρκεια; this is a difficult word to translate; it is generally translated 'self-sufficiency' in English, and that translation is accurate enough for most purposes. But it could be misleading in the Aristotelian context. For the significance of the concept of αὐτάρκεια in Aristotle's ethical and political theory lies not in the negative sense of not wanting, of independence of external material circumstances and of general indifference to all things external to the individual but rather in the positive sense of fulfilling one's powers and potentialities, in other words of self-fulfilment, of realising one's capacities and of attaining the specific objects of one's natural desires. The former is the Cynic ideal, the ideal of asceticism, of self-sufficiency attained by inuring oneself to hardship, of impregnability to the slings and arrows of fortune achieved by
the contempt for all objects of desire. It is also to some extent the Stoic ideal; for in spite of the more positive aspects of Zeno's ethical and political theory, the Stoic ideal still lays sufficient emphasis on the negative concept of endurance and internal independence to draw it close to the Cynic ideal.

Aristotle himself, however, seems drawn between two aspects of εὐδαιμονία - the internal and the external. Viewed internally, εὐδαιμονία we learn in Ε.Ν. I.7. 1097b 7ff, is ἀυτάρχης; for it is a condition in which no natural want of man is left unsatisfied; it is a condition in which a man fully realises himself ( ἄντως) and attains his telos. In this sense, self-sufficiency is a component of the good for man. In this sense also, God is eternally ἀυτάρχης. In the case of man however, circumstances outside him have some influence on his ἀὑτάρκεια and his happiness. The ἀὑτάρκεια of the εὐδαιμων therefore raises consideration of external factors. This aspect of Aristotle's thought is perhaps reflected in his statement - "I do not mean that he (the εὐδαιμων) should be self-sufficient to himself alone, but with parents, children and wife, friends and fellow-citizens, man being by nature a creature fitted for political society". From this point of view the concept of ἀὑτάρκεια is used mainly to denote the satis-

* Ε.Ν. I.Ε. 1097b 9.
faction of the demand of the conditionally necessary; these are the conditiones sine quibus non, the 'τὰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτῷ καὶ ἀνάγκαια mentioned in the Physics, the Metaphysics and the De Part An. They represent all the processes which must be gone through before an end is achieved. In respect of happiness, some of these conditions are material, others moral or spiritual. The material conditions Aristotle identifies as τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. Happiness, however, does not depend on these alone; for it is possible for a man to gain the whole world and still lose his own soul (E.N.I.10: cf. Plato's Gorgias 483 B - 484 B). Happiness therefore must be evaluated in terms both of material or economic goods and generally favourable external circumstances and of moral goods as well. A condition in which all these conditions are met can be described as αὐτάρκης, but the ultimate reference is the end to be achieved; and so closely allied is αὐτάρκεια to τέλος that it would be meaningless in most Aristotelean contexts to speak of the one without reference, explicit or implicit, to the other. Indeed the adjectives τέλειος and αὐτάρκης seem to be inseparable twins (e.g. Pol.I.1 1252b 28; Pol.III, 1280b 31).

Aristotle is therefore, not an advocate of αὐτάρκεια for its own sake - the comparatively more 'self-sufficient' condition of the stone is not the object of man's desire; and the reasoning by which the Cynics came to regard animals as
nearer to God because they needed much less than man and therefore enjoyed greater αὐτάρκεια is the very opposite of Aristotle's reasoning; and the value of the αὐτάρκεια of the contemplative life (E.N. 1177a 27ff) lies as much in its independence of external circumstances as in the fact that the exercise of that faculty is for man an act of self-fulfilment. There are probably a thousand and one things which man could do independently of society but except such things fulfill man's distinctive faculties they would be irrelevant to any characterization of the human good and to the concept of true αὐτάρκεια.

The polis is the κοινωνία αὐτάρκης because it secures for man this true αὐτάρκεια. It is therefore conceived as a society which is by nature not part of a higher society; for it is by itself capable of fulfilling its own end. The ethical ideal of αὐτάρκεια therefore demands that the polis should be self-sufficient even in respect of material goods; the ideal also demands that there should be a limit. On this basis, Aristotle recommends that the ideal state should be situated in a territory which ensures the maximum of self-sufficiency; for "since self-sufficiency consists in having everything and needing nothing such a territory must be one which produces all kinds of crops". Pol.VII. 1326b 29; it is on the same principle
that Aristotle approves of the 'self-contained' ideal of Sparta with all its characteristics of a society in the pastoral or agricultural stage of social development, especially in the days when she was most free from the taint of commercial exchange.

Aristotle's κοινωνία αὐτάρκης would therefore naturally be taken as that association which is independent of all external influences, material and spiritual. It would however be easy to exaggerate the resemblance between Aristotle's conception of the state and that of the 'Romantic school of philosophers of more modern times (the 18th and 19th centuries) for the resemblance is more apparent than real; unlike these later philosophers, Aristotle does not posit in the very existence of the state any prime reality and value nor does he dissolve individuals into the sources from which they are presumed to derive their moral being in the sense in which the philosophers of this school conceive of the 'reality' of the group. Aristotle indeed says that man in relation to the state is like a part in relation to the whole and he argues that the state precedes the individual both as the actual precedes the potential and as the whole precedes its parts; but in fact this is no more than a philosophical way of expressing the Greek commonplace that the citizen realises his end in the polis. Therefore in spite of Popper who sees a Hegelian historicism in

* The Open Society and its Enemies - Vol.II
Aristotle and the fact that the organic theory of the state as developed by Green and Bosanquet has support in many of Aristotle's remarks, Aristotle's 'antarchy' of the polis is different from the 'historical' 'Antarchy' of Hegel and the 'economic' one of the Comte de Saint-Simon. Where a modern political philosopher is more likely to differ from Aristotle with greater justification is on the strength with which he emphasises the 'naturalness' of the polis as if the end - the good for man - cannot be attained through different paths under different circumstances and his implicit denial, more apparent than real, that the state is only a means to the satisfaction of human needs; this denial is, however, obviously a reaction to the sophistic attempt to undermine the moral basis of the state, a reaction which sometimes leads Aristotle to argue in a way which encourages the false impression that he believed that the state was an end in itself and that Nature designed the polis as the only form of society in which human natural ends could be realized.

When, however, one asks why Aristotle closes the social evolution at the stage of the polis which he regards as the climax, one finds oneself looking for an answer in the nature of Aristotle's philosophical principles. We nowadays think of the 'nature' of something as stamped with the aspects of other things indeed an infinitude of other things which it reflects; in fact
a thing's nature is no more than its function in its contemporaneous environment, together with aspects inherited from its own past; and with each new environment there is an evolution of the old entities into new forms. To Aristotle, on the other hand, a denial of the eternity of the species would be tantamount to a denial of the possibility of knowledge. We nowadays believe, taking our starting-point from Aristotle's insight, that human impulses are the originating cause of new and ever-widening societies and that there is no pattern laid up in heaven on attaining which society has attained its final form and the social evolution must stop. To Aristotle, on the other hand, the tendency to modify political principles, founded on the experience of many generations, to suit every gust of political events would seem like a denial of the possibility of political science. The suggestion of radical alternatives, the tendency to analyse the possibilities of that which has not actually happened or to speculate on the merits of possible forms of societies are therefore alien to Aristotle's political principles. Here we perhaps find a partial explanation of Aristotle's alleged 'blindness' to the fact the days of autonomous republics were over, and his unawareness that he was standing on the threshold of crucial changes, changes pregnant with political developments hitherto unknown. In defence Aristotle would perhaps argue that if the empirical evidence
offered any reliable criterion to work with, large territorial organisations which Philip's activities bade fair to inaugurate in Greece offered no challenge to the superiority of the polis as a form of organisation best suited for man's pursuit of his end or good. In other words the achievements of Persia, Egypt and of Macedon itself did not demand an argument or justification for the assumed superiority of the polis even in face of the possibility that Greece itself might soon be organized on the model of these larger organised units. This assumption of the superiority of the polis influences Aristotle's analysis of those principles like those of justice and friendship which form the basis of society; for even when his analysis hints at the potentialities of these social forces, he often fails to explore these possibilities because his interest is confined to the narrow limits of the polis.

In the belief that Aristotle's view of these principles illuminate his conception of the essential nature of the polis, we shall give some attention in this closing chapter to examining some of them. In doing this, we must turn our attention once more to the E.N. for though, as seen earlier, the analysis in that treatise has been conducted much more from the psychological point of view, some of the phenomena there analysed encroach on the province of political theory. Of these, the two main ones are the discussions on justice and on friendship or social sympathy.
There are perhaps as many different conceptions of justice and social sympathy as there are political and ethical philosophies. Antiphon the Sophist, as we noticed, seeking the principles of human relations in the biological and physical foundation of truth (αληθεία) and nature (φύσις) makes the fact that all human beings perform similar biological functions the all-important factor in human relations. Thus he believes that the terms Greek and barbarian have no relevance to the nature of justice; for the criterion of the latter should be τὰ τὴν φύσιν ἔμφεροντα, and it should have reference to man qua man. The terms Greek and barbarian are conventional terms which could be restrictions on nature (νομοθετήματα φύσις). It is therefore wrong to base social distinction on one’s being or not being well-born. "For we all, Greeks and barbarians alike by nature have the same nature in every respect. This can be seen from the fact that the natural necessities (breathing, eating etc.) are the same (we all breathe by mouth and nose, and eat with our hands) and in none of these respects (i.e. neither as to our needs nor as to our ways of satisfying them) is there a difference between Greek and barbarian". Antiphon therefore founds an all-inclusive human equality on the physical similarity of all human beings. But what, we may suppose Aristotle asking Antiphon, is the significance of this physical equality to the realisation of the human good. Though a

* For a detailed examination of the political implications of Antiphon’s conception of φύσις see E.A. Havelock - "The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics" chap. X.
reasoned argument on this point is lacking in Antiphon's fragments, there is implied in many of his remarks his belief in the inherent rationality of man's natural instinctive drives and impulses. He believes that if these drives are allowed to function 'naturally' they would promote a natural consensus (δυόνοια) among men and that guided by such consensus (δυόνοια) man's emotional and rational objectives are realizable in harmony. Actual legal prescriptions hinder rather than promote the harmonious functioning of these impulses and good social relations. (Even to bear true witness in court involves injuring someone who has not injured one and is therefore unjust). Though with a rather different motivation, Antiphon would say with Diogenes that 'all external institutions are obstructions and all social interests are distractions'.

Aristotle would no doubt criticize this conception as based on a false view of the autonomy of the individual and as laying too much emphasis on those impulses in respect of which man most approximates to non-human creatures; it therefore does not provide for the realisation of the more distinctively human faculties; it neglects the more important aspect of human life - the moral aspect, and the faculty of reason. Man as a ζῷον has, it is true, some kinship with the lower animals, but his nature should be seen in his fullest development not in his
rudimentary or primitive quality - For Nature is more 'Form' than Matter. Man's highest development lies in the union between the spontaneous self-expression of the individual and his moral perception of his place in the community of his fellows. This, Aristotle would argue, can only be achieved in that common participation in an active life and the community of minds on which he lays so much emphasis; and he would certainly not grant Antiphon's assumption that our emotional and rational faculties 'naturally' function in harmony with one another if no hinderers. The whole hypothesis and spirit of the Ethics is against Antiphon's assumption.

If Aristotle could criticise Antiphon's conception of justice and social sympathy as being based on the least distinctive element of human nature, one wonders what his criticism would be of a conception like that of the Stoics. Here certainly Aristotle cannot make the same criticism as he could make of Antiphon's theory. For the Stoic theory is based on the doctrine that each one of us has a particle of the divine Reason in him; and this faculty Aristotle himself recognises as the distinctively human faculty. Thus the Stoics no doubt encouraged by the circumstances of their time - the decline of Greek city life and the foundation of large territorial states - preached a universalist or cosmopolitan doctrine of

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*1 see S.V.F. I fr. 262; II fr. 323.
*2 S.V.F. III. fr. 323
justice and friendship. Virtue, they believe, is the law of right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) which governs the universe; for man it consists in the obedience of the particle of reason which is in each one of us to the universal reason which is God; human laws come into existence when men recognise this obligation. This λόγος the Stoics believe, provides the true foundation of all human institutions; Thus it becomes directly identical in the last analysis with a moral principle. It also furnishes the ideal of a single organisation or society of all mankind. For all those who recognise this one valid universal law are by that very fact citizens of one state; they are also wise and virtuous; they are friends, even if they are personally not known to each other (this is as we shall see the exact opposite of what Aristotle argues).

It seems fairly obvious, however, that with the Stoics ethics was fast becoming a religion, that the concept of ἀνάρχεια was receiving a new non-political slant, that their theory, in spite of its philosophical foundation, conceals the attempt of men turning away from the problem of the good life considered in relation to the hard realities of life into an ideal world in which cruel empirical facts seem irrelevant. To Aristotle it would seem that their theories are mere theories, statements of ideals conceived "in abstracto", it neglects the nature of actual friendship and its contribution to the good life.
to posit an ideal friendship with people who may never be
known; it pays lip-service to the ideal of the brotherhood
of man while it lacks any institutional underpinning which makes
friendship or comradeship a reality in cultural life; and it
abandons or tends to abandon the concrete duties and respons­
ibilities of the concrete state for the citizenship of an ideal
world polis and even in some inexplicable way it believes,
if we may judge by Zeno*1, that the human impulses that give rise
to actual family life can find expression in an ideal family
in the world-state. In a word, the Stoic conception of friend­ship and justice would bear to Aristotle's conception a relation
not unlike that which the Cynic and Stoic conception of
\( \delta \nu \alpha \rho \alpha \varepsilon \nu \alpha \) bears to Aristotle's conception of the same. It is
once again an evidence of Aristotle's conservative political
philosophy that he does not see it fit to discuss the possibility such as later
of the institutional underpinning for the wider society/conceived
by the Stoics being supplied in his time or at any time.

In fact however, the Stoics did not totally neglect
empirical facts; the Stoic wiseman still needed to recognise
the society of which he is actually a member, and though Zeno
recommends in his 'Polity'*2 a society without family life,
without laws, coins etc. and in which all differences of
nationality would be merged in the common brotherhood of man,

*1 H.C. Baldry's article on 'Zeno's Ideal State' J.H.S. Vol.79
pp. 73-15 is here followed.

*2 see Baldry op.cit. pp.6-7
he nevertheless found it necessary to advise the wise man how to live in the society of which he is actually a member. It can therefore be said that even theorists whose principles are universalist recognise and heed in one way or the other Aristotle's remark that political and ethical principles cannot be treated like principles in geometry or metaphysics but must be modified to suit particular times and circumstances if they are to remain as principles which bear any relevance on the conduct of human affairs.

This modification would seem inevitable in most theories where the criterion is a general and universal one. For the generality and universality of the principles demand that these theorists either draw attention to the lowest common factor in human nature, as Hippias and, as we have just seen, Antiphon seem to have done, in which case, Aristotle, for instance would argue, their theories seem relatively irrelevant to the characterization and the realisation of the distinctively human good; or they are so lofty that they, in most cases, need some lowering in order to be of practical relevance. For, if the theories try to maintain their position as truly objective principles, valid under all conditions and categorical for all decisions, they must be expressed in formulas that are so abstract and imprecise as to be practically useless; if, on the other hand, they try to define in detail the ideal conditions that
they mean to realise and to embody themselves in exact norms and rules that will promote this realisation, then they become parochial and provincial rather than catholic in their relevance. We see, then, in Plato, an advocate of the most supremely transcendental criterion an example of this phenomenon. On the one hand, we find in his theory a criterion which by implication contains a doctrine no less universalist and cosmopolitan than that which the Stoics based on their doctrine of World-Reason or that implicit in the ἀνθρώπος λόγος of Heraclitus; on the other hand, we see this criterion so totally directed to the ordering of a particular state that the criterion tends to lose the potential universalism of its application and to give the appearance of extreme parochialism. For the boundless vista offered by the criterion gives such an obvious contrast to the parochialism of its field of application.

We might be told that the division of mankind into Greek and barbarian is false (Pol. 262D) but the customary Greek-barbarian antithesis and the division of peoples and races into types is explicitly accepted and seems to lie at the basis of much of the exposition, and if the more conventional interpretation of the metaphorical presentation in the Republic be accepted, Plato finds in the artisan no higher virtue than that of being temperate, in the warrior none higher than that of being brave and social and true individual fulfilment he finds only in the
guardian class. The result is to give the ideal a deep dye of parochialism. It is of course a different question whether as suggested by Cornford*1 Plato's total engrossment in the application of the criterion to the conditions of the contemporary Greek city life is due to his disillusionment with the Socratic effort to found the good society by starting first with the moral reformation of the individual and then imagining a society consisting of perfect individuals. There is little doubt that the transcendental nature of Plato's criterion makes the gap between ideal and practice so obvious.

Unlike Plato who gives in his philosophical principle small significance to particular circumstances, or current opinions but who in practice takes these rather seriously, and unlike the Stoics and other 'Natural Law' theorists like Locke who make a natural equality their ethical and political premise and sometimes modify the rigidity of the postulate according to the demands of circumstance, Aristotle in his very premise gives a place to that "virtue which may give a just precedence, to that excellency of parts and merits above the common level". Here again his concept of φύσις is at work, the theorist must not allow his theories to run away with him; rather theory must be based on the observation of actual facts. What is observed, therefore, customs, traditions, current opinions become

constituents of φύσις. This conception is at the basis of Aristotle's remarks on τὰ φαινόμενα and τὰ ὤντα in E.N. 1145b 2ff, remarks which have been excellently expounded by Stewart.1 Moral science is conceived as the formation of a system from the materials furnished by common opinions. It is also the conception with which the exposition starts in the E.N. on the problem of εὐδαιμονία.

This, however, does not mean that Aristotle derives his 'norms' directly from common opinion. In the opening section of Metaphysics A, for instance, Aristotle brings out the difference between opinion and definition. Opinion and definition differ in origin, subject-matter, form, and purpose. Opinion arises directly from sensible contact with the particular and indirectly from memory and tradition. Definition, on the other hand, arises from a systematic reflection upon opinion itself; it is always of the universal. In morals, it is true, experience seems in very little respect inferior to art, and indeed we observe that persons of experience are actually more successful than those who possess theory without experience. Nevertheless, definition reveals to what extent the relational judgements of opinion are well founded. It brings clarity while opinion brings content.

1 Stewart, "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics", Vol.II, p.123
In regard to ethical norms, therefore, while we must, of course, begin with what we know, we must realise that what we know is of two kinds; first, what we know by way of the opinion which belongs to us as members of a common society, and second, what is known absolutely, that is by way of the logical and other criteria which are, at least relative to the given opinion, axiomatic, self-evident and necessary. To arrive at 'norms of conduct', therefore, certain hypotheses which are drawn from opinion are tested by certain criteria which are self-justifying.

Thus, in respect of the good for man Aristotle examines three hypotheses which are drawn from common morality. For "to judge from the lives that men lead, most men ... seem (not without some ground) to identify the good or happiness with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment". (E.N. 1. 1095b14). For, there are three kinds of life that stand out prominently to view, that just mentioned, and public life, and thirdly, the life of contemplation.

The first hypothesis, i.e., that pleasure is the good may seem, at first sight, likely to pass the necessary tests, but really, while it may be said to be internal and intrinsic it fails to satisfy the test of completeness, that is, of
satisfying the highest ends of man. The second hypothesis, i.e., that the good lies in a life of honour, is first rejected on the ground that it is a good not internal to us since it is neither an emotion nor an ability. "The refined and active may conceive it to be honour; for this may be said to be the end of public life; yet it is plainly too superficial for the object of our search, because it is thought to depend on those who pay rather than on him who receives it, whereas the chief good, we feel instinctively, must be something which is our own, and not easily to be taken from us".

The third hypothesis is a synthesis of the first two and transcends their deficiencies. The chief good is "an activity in accordance with virtue and if there is more than one virtue in accordance with the highest in a complete life". It is the activity which unites the theoretical and practical life and brings pleasure into the definition as a necessary constituent. The criteria used by Aristotle to establish his norms of conduct are therefore similar to Plato's in the Philebus. The chief good must be intrinsic, internal and complete.

Now, it may be said that neither Plato nor Aristotle derives his 'norms' from what 'is'. However, Plato who conceives
of reality as a system of immaterial forms could, with a great deal of confidence, say that these principles or norms of conduct derive from the universal principle of the good; they are values which exist in their own right; human consciousness only recognise them as the end of moral action and the goals of human aspiration. Aristotle who refused to recognise this one 'good' would, it seems, have to confine himself to saying that they derive ultimately from the nature of man, though the Aristotelian postulate of a godhead, a perfection towards which human beings aspire, makes it difficult to say this with maximum certitude.

Kantian ethics indeed was later to assert that man's consciousness of ultimate ends sets him apart from the 'natural' world; for, when man recognises ethical ideals and shows a sense of moral obligation, as in the application of the term 'ought' to a man's conduct, he escapes the network of influences and antecedents that determine the rest of his nature, and he becomes a member of some higher order of reality. Ethical norms and moral values are members of this world, which exists and is real independently of ourselves, a world, the reality of which we apprehend by means of the 'practical' reason. By implication, too, Platonic and Aristotelian ethics would seem to Kant mistaken in their
attempts to derive 'norms' of conduct and the sense of 'duty' and 'right' from a clear conception of the good. For, according to Kant, we no more see the good than we see the truth, and just as we do not judge an assertion to be true or false by comparing it with a concept of truth, so we do no judge an action to be right or wrong by comparing it with a concept of good. We only know that we ought to act in a certain way in reference to certain situations, and we feel constrained so to act. We feel it would be right for us to act as we think we ought to act, and we feel that it would be wrong for us to act as we think we ought not to act. We do not even know that what we think is right really is right, we only know that we cannot for that reason plead excuse and plead that there our responsibility ends. Thus norms of conduct and concepts of moral obligation are not derived from any conception of the good; on the contrary, concepts of moral obligation determine the good. The 'right' of ethics is therefore completely transcendent to the 'right' of ordinary morality.

Plato's and Aristotle's ethics may thus be distinguished both from the theories of ethics which identify the 'right' of ethics with the 'right' of ordinary morality and from Kantian and other modern ethics of the same school. It is
possible that Aristotle's definition of the good in terms of individual perfection makes the egoist bias of his ethics more obvious, but the assumption of Aristotle's teleological ethics is that of all the major Greek ethical theorists. The end of man is the highest and most harmonious development of his faculties to a complete and unified whole. It is this ideal which dictates the norms of conduct.

This outlook, especially in the more political aspects of Aristotle's thought, sometimes results in the analysis being too restricted by the materials that lay to hand, i.e. the materials furnished by Greek customs and institutions, and in occasional failures to look beneath the materials furnished by circumstances for deeper significances. Hence, though the thesis may be put forward that man is a political animal in the sense that 'qua' man it is in the polis that he has the opportunity of realising his capacities, one need not deduce from this the ideal that everybody should be given the opportunity of realising his capacities. On the contrary, if there are in the polis human beings who are customarily used by others as instruments for the exercise of ἀρετή these men must be by nature so, just as people who have been living in a large ἄνω and under a king, like the Persians, without provoking any changes must be fit 'by
nature' to live in such a society; for otherwise their natural impulses ought to have created the necessity for changes, i.e. their 'nature' ought to have supplied an originating cause to start the process of change.

Two main principles therefore guide Aristotle's conception of justice and friendship or social sympathy; first, regard to the data of actual situations; second, ultimate reference to the ideal of individual self-fulfilment.

Aristotle places justice within the context of the moral virtues. But the word 'justice', he says, is equivocal. 'Justice' is virtue, the habit or state of individual character; but it is also 'complete virtue'. In this sense it is 'uprightness' or 'righteousness'; the state of the good or just man as expressed in his relations to others in the wider community of the polis. In E.N. 1130a 6, Aristotle makes the distinction between ἀρετή and true δίκαιοσύνη explicit - it is that between a state regarded as a state and the same state regarded in relation to others.

Justice in this wide sense Aristotle calls 'general justice' or 'universal justice' - ἡ ὅλη δίκαιοσύνη, ἡ καθόλου δίκαιοσύνη. This is the expression of complete moral virtue (1130a 9). It is also identical with the complete observance of the law (E.N. 1129b 12ff and 1130b 22). The just is therefore the lawful; Aristotle's reason for this remark being that "the law bids us
to practise any vice". (1130b 20). Now according to this reasoning, i.e. that the σκοποδαιος or δίκαιος is the νόμιμος there would be as many types of σκοποδαιος as there are different systems of laws. A modern ethical and political theorist would, of course, demarcate more distinctly the province of morals from that of politics. It is, however, unnecessary here to enter into considerations of the general Greek conception of the state as 'a way of life' and the ultimate source of morals which makes the assumption seem so natural to Aristotle and even modern theorists recognise the influence of the state on the morals of its members. Aristotle sees the implication of his identification of the δίκαιος as σκοποδαιος with the νόμιμος and in Ἐν. 1130b he raises the question of the man who is good without qualification - ἀκλως ἄνηρ ἀγαθός. For since the good citizen is a man who furthers the maintenance of a particular social system whatever be its intrinsic merits, the question καθ' ἣν ἀκλως ἄνηρ ἀγαθός ἐστι is of some importance. This is the question which Aristotle also raises in Pol. III. 1276b 28ff; and there Aristotle identifies the truly good man as the citizen of the best state, i.e. the aristocratic state delineated in Bks. 7 and 8. (cf. Pol. IV. 1293b 3ff and Pol. III 1283b 43ff. and Pol. VII. 1332a 32ff.) The merits of that best state and the principles which justify its being called the best state are
(i) the existence of that atmosphere which reinforces through education the moral character of its citizens and which makes it possible for them to use well τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά and (ii) the availability of those τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά. In fact the whole of chapters 13 of Bk.VII of the Politics defines the first of these two principles as belonging to the sphere of the Legislator and the second as that in which fortune is sovereign, and we are told that 'while a good man may handle well the evils of poverty, sickness and the other mishaps of life, the fact remains that felicity presupposes the opposite of these evils' i.e. you can only attain absolute goodness, and with it absolute felicity, if you have the requisite wealth, and the general 'requisite equipment of life. So 'the truly good and happy man, as we have stated elsewhere in our argument on ethics, is he who by the nature of his goodness has advantages at hand which are absolute advantages.' In other words, the truly good or just man is a citizen of that state where the two main conditions of εὐδαιμονία are fulfilled, where in other words ἀυτάρκεια is attained.

But justice is also a part of virtue (E.N. 1130a 14). In this sense justice is 'fairness' displayed in one's specific dealings with other men, and (τὸ ἴσον) is the principle of this form of justice. Aristotle tries to illuminate the nature of this type of justice through its opposite - πλεονεξία; the disposition to get more than one's fair share τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἑνεκα.
This is particular injustice, as distinct from general injustice which embraces all wrong actions (ἀδικήματα). For though many wrong actions belong to the general class of ἀδικήματα we assign each wrong to a specific vice, for instance flight in battle to ὀπλία, adultery to ἁκολασία, the vice from which actions arise in which a man takes unfair advantage for the sake of personal gain is the specific vice of ἀδικία.

Its opposite, the particular virtue in which a man shows fairness in his specific dealings is justice. This justice Aristotle calls particular justice (ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη).

Particular justice can be divided into two different species (i) Distributive (ii) Rectificatory. We are more concerned with the first here as it touches more closely on Aristotle's political philosophy.

In its distributive aspect, particular justice deals ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἡ χρημάτων ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ὀσα μέριστα τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (Ε.Ν. 1130b 31-33). It deals in other words, with the fair apportionment of τάγαθα κερί οὖσα εὐνυχία καὶ ἀνυχία ἄ' ἐστι μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ λαός, τινὶ δ' ὀθὲν ἀεὶ (Ε.Ν. 1129b 2). What then, are here the μέριστα τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας which include τιμή and χρήματα. Aristotle seems to be dealing with what could be called 'political justice'. Joachim*, however, would exclude from the distributions of which Aristotle speaks here 'the privileges, powers, places assigned

to the constituent members or estates of the 'political community' on the grounds that such a distribution would involve φρόνησις.

Says Joachim, 'if we remember that he (sc. Aristotle) is concerned with the moral virtue of justice, we shall at once dismiss an interpretation which has found favour with many commentators. They have supposed Aristotle to be thinking of the fundamental legislative acts by which the privileges, powers, places were assigned to the constituent members or estates of the political community. But such distribution would require φρόνησις (practical wisdom) which is an intellectual virtue, in its highest form, as the legislative genius of the architectonic statesman'. It seems Joachim was preparing us for this when in his introductory paragraph to the Fifth Book he says * "The just man, of whom we are here to treat - or at any rate so far as we are to consider him - exhibits the virtue of unthinking obedience to certain rules which he can not himself justify, perhaps not even formulate for himself". Whatever Joachim's qualifying statements may mean, I think his remarks could, with the same degree of truth or falsehood, be made of the other moral virtues, until in Bk. VI the relation of the moral virtues to φρόνησις is specified. It is true, both of the 'just' man and the 'virtuous' man qua exercising any of the other moral virtues that 'the rules to which he conforms are rules which 'thoughtful reflection would

* Joachim - op.cit. p.126
formulate for the guidance of the individual in a properly organised community for the furtherance of his own and his fellows' highest good; they are rules which he himself if (or when) his own power of thinking had matured would formulate and justify". Aristotle specifically mentions τιμή (honour) here as one of the μεριστά τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας of which we here speak. It is hardly to be expected that Aristotle believed such distribution would not involve φρόνησις even 'in its highest form'. And he does indeed in the course of the exposition of particular justice speak of the distribution of political offices under various constitutions. (cf. Λ.Μ. 1131a 26ff. and 1134a 24ff). Nor does Aristotle's attempt in 1133b 32ff to explain in which way particular justice differs as a μεσοτης from the other moral virtues reveal any difference in the relationship of justice to φρόνησις and that of the other moral virtues to φρόνησις. I think the significance of his remarks lies merely in the fact that while justice is like the other virtues a mean, it has both its extremes fall under the single vice of injustice while these extremes of the other moral virtues fall each under a separate vice.*

* Stewart (Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, Vol. I p. 473) sees a further point of distinction between justice and the other moral virtues in the fact that (particular) justice is a μέσος in two ways. All the moral virtues, including δικαιοσύνη areμεσοτητες "in the sense of being μετριότητες - phases of, man's adaptation to a difficult social environment; but δικαιοσύνη is a μεσοτής also in a more literal sense of the term, in as much as it realises itself in a definitely measurable external μέσος... and the choice of that which is objectively τόον...the just man is μέσος in a sense in which the σωφρόν e.g. is not μέσος i.e. he is μέσος και τόον". I doubt whether Aristotle
The really important point we wish to establish is that Aristotle's analysis of the distributive aspect of particular justice is firmly associated with the province of his purely political theory. In view of this, it is relevant to refer to Grant's view of particular justice as here expounded. Grant - Aristotle: Ethics, Vol.II. p.122 (ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης κτλ.) "Justice is a mean state or balance in a different sense from the other virtues. It is not a balance in the mind, but rather the will to comply with what society and circumstances pronounce to be fair (τοῦ μέσου ἑστιν). Justice, according to this view, is compliance with an external standard. While in courage, temperance, and the like, there is a blooming of the individual character, each man being a law to himself, in justice there is an abnegation of individuality, in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all. It must be remembered that the account of ἐπικεφαλὲα in this book supplements that of justice and takes off from its otherwise over-legal character". It is clear from his other remarks that Grant's motivation in passing these remarks is to draw our attention to the fact that the analysis of justice here is more appropriate to a political treatise than an ethical one because it adopts an attitude more external and less psychological than that adopted in the examination of the other moral virtues. But if it is remembered

*(cont. from previous page)* wished to draw this further distinction, though it must be admitted that he used the concept of τὸ ζῷον to distinguish particular justice from general justice.
what role Aristotle attaches to the proper ordering of one's immediate social circumstances and the availability and proper use of external χρημα it would be clear why justice though placed in the context of the moral virtues should be "defined according to the principles of Jurisprudence and Political Economy."

Now, in this apportionment of τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά we are told that the ideal formula is that of proportional equality - (τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον). This is, of course, to start with the assumption of inequalities. But Aristotle argues that in spite of appearances to the contrary the formula of proportional equality embraces considerations of fairness and equality. In E.N. 1131a 26ff. Aristotle argues that all men are agreed the formula of proportional equality is a good one; but men are not agreed as to 'what constitutes merit'. The premise of proportional equality is therefore not enough. The 'hypothesis' the standard of value by which proportion is assessed must be specified. Aristotle has no doubt that the justice of which he here speaks ought to be based on ἀρετή. To base a theory of justice on any other criterion is to misconceive the nature of the political association. Some people, like Lycophron, would reduce the laws of the state to articles of mere convenant, and the political association to an alliance (cf. Pol.iii.5.11). And democrats think that everyman is as good as his neighbour (Pol. VI.1.10)
cf. Rhetoric I. VIII, and Rep. viii.558c). However, this proposition of sharing (specifically political functions) 
τα ἑκτὸς 

κατ' ἀρετῆν needs a close examination.

First what can κατ' ἀρετῆν mean, and what, in view of Aristotle's conception of ἐυδαιμονία and the end of the State with regard to the individual does it mean to say that the law of distributive justice is that public honours, advantages or rights should be distributed among the citizens in proportion to their contribution to the end of the state. Now, in E.N. 1099b 18 in the course of the discussion on ἐυδαιμονία we are told that "virtue would be very generally shared for all who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain kind of study and care". This sounds democratic enough. If this is the nature of in what sense, then, could one share τιμή (honour), political offices, χρηματα (wealth) κατ' ἀρετῆν. It could be in the rather Protagorean sense that though anybody who is not maimed in respect of ἀρετή, is capable of ἀρετή, men do not in fact possess an equal amount of ἀρετή. But Aristotle is clearly not using ἀρετή in this sense. However, in the sense in which we have been using ἀρετή so far, it is one of the τὰ περὶ ὕποκατα of E.N. 1098b 12ff, and in this sense it is possible for every one to have as much ἀρετή as possible without committing the vice of χλεονεξία. The truth, however, is that while placing
ta peri ψυχην very high in the scale of the goods that contribute to human συναμοινη. Aristotle is far from arguing 'more Stoico' that they constitute happiness. His remarks in E.N. 1129b 5 reveal Aristotle's awareness that ta peri ψυχην could be shown by way of the 'quiet' moral virtues - the sense of duty, social obligation etc. - in relative poverty and obscurity but he also cannot forget the fact that complete virtue or happiness is displayed in the proper use of wealth and social advantages and therefore presupposes external goods (cf. Pol. 1332a 20-23).

Now, since happiness requires (i) moral discipline and (ii) external goods, and since happiness is not, as Aristotle himself argues, a conception like that of evenness in number which could be predicated of the whole number (say 12) without being predicated of its component parts (say 5 and 7) it would seem plausible to argue that in a state whose end is happiness it is part of political justice to aid every member in the pursuit of this end. Aristotelian justice, however, seems to demand that those who can display perfect arete because they have the necessary qualities and possessions should be encouraged to do so in the state; for they, unlike artisans, mechanics and similar classes, could act for the sake of the καλον instead of the άναγκαιον; and by so doing, Aristotle believes they contribute to the end of the state. The dictate of proportional justice
demands, in spite of E.N. 1099b 18, that mechanics should be barred from citizenship because they are incapable of true justice. In this sense Aristotle's justice does not question the justice of the society he was explaining.

In E.N. VI ch.VI 1134a 24-25 however, Aristotle draws a distinction between absolute or simple justice (τὸ ἀπλῶς ὀίκαιον). We have already seen what 'political justice' is. It finds expression in the political association and in relation to the constitution of the state; it is justice between men as citizens and observable only within a legal framework. It is indeed this fact which distinguishes political justice from familial justice, for although there is by analogy a justice in the husband-wife relationship, there can be no real justice or injustice between one and one's children (children being part of one's self, nor between a free man and slaves (slaves being chattels). But what is absolute or simple justice (τὸ ἀπλῶς ὀίκαιον). Although Aristotle does not define the sphere of absolute justice, there is little doubt that the relation between simple justice and political justice is like that we saw between the σπουδαῖος or δίκαιος ζυγούμιμος and the good man without qualification (ἀνὴρ ἄγαθός ἀπλῶς). There is therefore a presumption in favour of the supposition that just as the good man is the citizen of the best state (ἡ κατ' ἐυχήν, κατὰ φύσιν πολιτεία).
so simple justice is justice in that best state i.e. justice as expressed between citizens who are free and equal; who have been brought with the right moral discipline under the ideal moral atmosphere and are supplied with the necessary amount of external goods for the realisation of their ἀρεταί. τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον therefore coincides with τὸ ἀκλωγὸς δίκαιον only in the best state; and though political justice is found among any group of men who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency (πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἀυτάρκειαν) (with a view, that is, to fulfilling themselves) political justice finds its true expression among equals each of whom finds self-fulfilment in the political association. Simple or ideal justice is therefore between people who are free and equal, this equality however, is an aristocratic one, and must be distinguished from the arithmetical equality of democratic theory, which takes no cognisance of the true aim of the political association i.e. the realisation of ἀρετή by each of its citizens.

Aristotle does indeed recognise the fact that ἑλευθερία freedom from subjection to an external forceful restraint, and from subordination of one's life to the will of a master is the minimum condition requisite for the exercise of any human ἀρετή it is the minimum a man needs to start fulfilling himself or to create any values in the give and take of cultural life (cf. Ε.Ν. 1134a 27). But he does not argue from this to the ideal that
every man should at least possess this ἐλευθερία without which he cannot exercise his initiative.

All men above the level of the slave can be said to members of the political association; and through various uses of the correct formula of justice τὸ Ἰσον - either κατ' ἀναλογίαν or ἀφιεμόν, various constitutions are possible. A constitution is therefore, the application of one of the several possible forms of the τὸ Ἰσον principle. The best constitution is that which while using the principle τὸ Ἰσον κατ' ἀναλογίαν with ἀρετή as the hypothesis or the standard of value, still has its members arithmetically equal.

The criterion of individual self-fulfillment has, it seems, hitherto controlled Aristotle's analysis of what constitutes true justice, the truly good man, the best state etc. In E.N. 1134b 18ff. Aristotle seems to be raising the problem of 'humanity' as a principle worthy to be taken notice of in the formulation of a correct theory of justice. For there Aristotle makes the distinction between natural and conventional justice (τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον) and (τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον). The question here offers itself whether Aristotle is using the concept of the 'natural' to raise the question as to whether some things which are 'by nature' wrong could be regarded as right 'by convention', and whether he intends to use the concept of the 'natural' to establish the criterion of a higher law which could invalidate such
conventional laws, or of the justice in a society wider than the polis. The language he uses gives that impression at first. 'of political justice', (E.N. 1134b 18ff) we are told, 'part is natural, part legal - natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is no longer indifferent' - Ross's translation. Thus the second part of the passage by confining the conventional to the things which are in themselves neither right nor wrong makes it clear that Aristotle is not raising the type of problem we mentioned above. And indeed the whole of Aristotle's argument from 1134b 35 - 1135a 5 implies that all positive laws are in various degrees approximations to, or in perfect embodiments of, natural justice. For 'just as wine and corn-measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets, similarly the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions are also not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars" Ross's translation. Thus the problem of natural and conventional justice becomes assimilated to the question of the justice maintained under various constitutions; when we are therefore told that though constitutions are not everywhere the same, there is one
which everywhere by nature the best, the reference again is
to the best state κατ' ἔυχην or κατὰ φύσιν. But the question
about the natural justice which, we are told earlier 'everywhere
has the same force' is not pursued; for though we are told that
that state is 'by nature' everywhere the best, we are also told
that even the laws of nature are not invariable 'for the right
hand is "by nature" stronger than the left, yet some people are
left-handed and most people can become ambidexterous'. It seems
clear therefore, that Aristotle is not raising the question as
to whether there are certain principles which all positive laws,
in spite of the variability in their prescriptions must recognise
because they are commanded by the nature of men and societies
as such.

It must be noted that the question here raised is different
from that of equity which Aristotle discusses in E.N. 1137a 31 -
1138a 3. Equity (ἐπίσκεψις, τὸ ἐπισκέπτεις) is a correction of
legal justice (ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμων δικαίου - E.N. 1137b 12-
13); a correction which the generality and rigidity of laws makes
necessary, if particular cases are to be judged according to the
spirit rather than the letter of the law. Equity, therefore,
fills the gap between the letter of the law and its spirit
according to particular circumstances; it makes that adjustment
which the legislator himself would have made if he were judging
that particular case. Equity is therefore better than strict
legal justice (cf. E.N. 1137b 10-13), but it is important to note that it still builds on the law (E.N. 1137b 25). It therefore rests on the same moral base as the law itself; it is, it is true, a more accurate implementation of the moral assumptions of the law, but it corrects the law in its application rather than in its inception. We tried to see whether in his use of natural and conventional justice Aristotle intends to establish a criterion in the name of natural law, by which the assumptions of positive laws could be judged in their inception, and we saw that he either does not raise that problem or he obscures it with the assumption that positive laws deal only with the area of the morally indifferent.

Aristotle spells out the question of 'natural law' more fully in the Rhetoric, and it seems relevant to examine briefly what he says there. In Bk.I ch.X Aristotle makes a distinction between particular (ιδιώτικα) and universal (κοινωνικά) law. "Law may be either 'particular' or 'Universal'. I mean by 'particular' the written law which regulates the life of the citizens in any polity and by 'universal' the unwritten principles which may be said to be universally recognised. In Bk.I. chp. 13, Aristotle makes some finer distinctions; and the exposition is given in terms of (a) particular law (b) universal law (c) unwritten law and (d) equity. Particular law now embraces (i) 'written' law which are the legal prescriptions of any particular state and (ii) unwritten law which has its basis in ancestral customs,
rituals, social opinion, and which as recognised in a particular community gives rise to equitable considerations by which the written law is modified and adjusted (cf. Pol. 3. XVI. 1287b 5).

Particular law is therefore partly written and partly unwritten. The universal or unwritten law of ch. 10 becomes in ch. 13 the 'universal law' or the 'law of nature'. As law of nature, it is unwritten but everywhere recognised. "For there exists, as all men in some degree divine, a natural and universal principle of right and wrong, independent of any mutual intercourse or compact". An instances of the appeal from positive laws to this higher 'law of nature', Aristotle cites Antigone's defiance of the human 'positive' law in the name of 'The immutable unwritten laws of Heaven', Empedocles' 'law universal' which prohibits putting any living thing to death, and Alcidamas' declaration in his Messenian oration to the effect, according to the scholiast, that 'God has left all men free, and nature has made no man a slave'.

We thus have the particular law which is the law prescribed by a community for their own particular purposes, the unwritten law which is the unwritten part of 'particular' law through which equity is effected; and finally the 'unwritten' law which is that universal law of nature which common humanity prescribes.

In E.N. 1134b 18ff, we saw that though Aristotle speaks of
a natural or absolute justice, he leaves the sphere of that justice vaguely defined, and we noted that the concluding sentences of that section provide a presumption in favour of the interpretation that natural justice here is the justice prevalent in that aristocratic state which is the best state κατ' ἐν έννυ
or κατ' φθονίν. In the Rhetoric, however, there seems to be a more specific sphere assigned to 'natural' justice. But it is difficult to estimate how seriously Aristotle takes his 'theoretical' statements about a higher natural law which all positive laws ought to take cognizance of; especially so is this in view of the fact that Aristotle argues in Pol.I 3 the exact opposite of Alcidama's declaration in his Messenian ovation, if we rely on the scholiast.

Our doubts seem to be increased by Aristotle's remarks in Bk.I. ch.XV. There the theory of a natural law is discussed in relation to "the proper means of employing laws whether in exhortation and discussion and in accusation and defence". "It is clear that if the written law is unfavourable to our case, we must appeal to the universal law and to the principles of equity as expressing justice of a higher order". "We must argue" he continues, "that the juror's oath does not bind him rigidly to the letter of the law and urge that while equity and universal law, as being conformable to Nature, are perpetual and invariable, written laws are liable to frequent change. An instance of such a plea is Antigone's plea that in burying her brother she
violated Creon's law but not the unwritten law of Nature."

But we are also told that if the letter of the law is on our side we must use various arguments which insist on the letter of the law: "the juror's oath is not intended to permit him to give any arbitrary interpretation to the law but 'only to exonerate him from a charge of perjury, if he should fail to perceive the meaning of the law;' that a state may just as well enact no laws if they are not to be obeyed; that the aim of the law is not the absolute good but the good that is relative to, and takes account of, particular circumstances; that the laws are the product of an expert and even if the laws fall short of absolute correctness the mistake of an expert is less than that which ensues if the habit is formed of disregarding the expert's advice; and that indeed the greatest danger lies in the citizen's effort to be wiser than the laws. The arguments for abiding by the letter of the law seem overwhelming and if one connects this with what Aristotle says about laws in the Politics (e.g. Politics II. vii. 1269a 12ff., and Pol. III. xvi ss. 5 - 7, 1287a 23ff.), it seems clear that Aristotle would be reluctant to challenge the validity of positive laws on grounds of a higher natural law.

Aristotle's remarks give the impression that the dictum or slogan of natural justice is given a significant role in his analysis of political justice. In fact, however, Aristotle
is not very impressed by the sophistic slogan of natural justice and his analysis of justice does not abandon the limits of the polis, for in the two places where he uses the concept of natural justice, we find that the first most probably refers to justice as it would exist in the aristocratic state—this is the class who have the necessary moral, intellectual excellences and the sufficient material goods for social fulfilment, there is the formula of τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄριστον among these aristocratic equals; this is the 'natural' aristocracy, even though their material goods are produced by an economically depressed and politically disenfranchised class. In this sense, actual and obvious 'physical', moral and intellectual inequalities' are founded in the constitution of nature'. The second apparently implies an awareness of the minimum claims which common humanity demands in any social organisation, but there it sounds more like a mere theoretical statement.

On the other hand, Aristotle's analysis of justice is very concrete; it is immediately tied to his conception of συνιστατος, συνιστατος and of ἀναρχεία. Aristotle therefore, tends to use ἀκλώς or κατὰ φύσιν to describe the situation in which the conditions for the fulfilment of συνιστατος are met. But side by side with this ideal situation we have references to various other possible situations; the analysis implies that there are various types of συνιστατος, various types of justice, various

types of constitutions, and these various types are regarded as approximations to or imperfect embodiments of the ideal.

Thus while Aristotle establishes a solid groundwork in the concept of justice the superstructure fails to reach its maximum height. He realises that justice is a principle of criticism, but his conservatism prevents him from seeing that his own criticism of the society he is explaining does not go far enough. Thus while the polis is an association for maintaining a good life for its citizens, and while justice is the ordering of the political association - ἡ γὰρ δόξη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἔστιν (Politics I. 1253a 38) - the idea of association does not seem to have been pushed through even in Aristotle's theory.
Aristotle on friendship or social sympathy.

Perhaps more clearly than his analysis of justice, Aristotle's analysis of friendship or social sympathy (φιλία) reveals the strength as well as the weakness of his philosophic principles and of his concept of the evolution of society.

"While the structure of society depends primarily on justice the...internal creative force of society depends on civic friendship. Friendship brings about the agreement of wills, required by nature but freely undertaken, which lies at the origin of the social community...This was well known to Aristotle, who distinguished types of communities according to types of friendship". So writes Jacques Maritain in "The Rights of Man" (pp.22-3), and his remarks are very apposite in regard to Aristotle's conception of friendship or social sympathy. (Cf. E.N. 1155a 22-26 and 1159b 25-30).

For friendship (φιλία) as Aristotle conceives it, is like justice, an essential feature of every society. For the capacity for forming permanent associations is so essential for man's realisation of his good that the sentiment or feeling which arises when men associate for the pursuit of a common purpose and by which such associations are maintained must be natural. Early in the eighth book of the E.N. we learn that it is possible to trace the genesis of this feeling. In its
most rudimentary form, it is manifested in the mating instinct — this is a drive to satisfy some biological impulse, and it is common to man and animals. It exists 'by nature' and it is in this more primitive or lower sense of 'nature' that man is by nature more a pairing animal than a political animal. (E.N. 8.14. 1162a 17 - ἀνθρώπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικὸν, διὸ πρῶτον καὶ διαγκαλώτερον οἶκα κόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποίητα κοινότερον τοῖς ἔθεοις)

This impulse is Nature's provision for the perpetuation of the species, and it gives rise to a form of friendship among those whom it brings together. The family feeling (the familial friendship) is a development in a less intense form from the pairing instinct. It is this which unites parents and offspring, kinsmen and tribesmen. Also it is this feeling which induces animals to protect their young - E.N. 8.1. 1155a 16ff. - φύσει τ' ἐνπρεῖχεν ἐσθε πρὸς τὸ γεννημένον τῇ γεννησαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῇ γεννησαντι, ὥσ τὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἄλλα καὶ ἐν ἰδίνια καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τὰν ἔθεοι, καὶ τοῖς ὑμοίναις πρὸς ἀλληλα καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥσ τοὺς φιλανθράκους ἑπαρνοτέμεν

Aristotle also believes that the growth of the family instinct corresponds with the growth of ὕπονοις. For in the Gen.Anim. 753a 7ff. we learn that with the lowest animals this instinct tends to cease with the birth of their offspring, while animals
of higher intelligence than these watch over their young for longer periods because their intelligence tells them that this function embraces their own good, until finally in man \( \phi \nu \lambda \alpha \) becomes sufficiently wide in scope to be the basis for various social associations; for man's \( \varphi \rho \omicron \nu \eta \sigma \iota \zeta \) makes him realise that his own good depends on these wider associations.

Since there are various purposes other than that of reproduction for which men live together, a wider social sympathy is necessary; and man being \( \varphi \rho \omicron \nu \mu \omicron \omicron \theta \tau \alpha \tau \omicron \zeta \) is indeed capable of this wider social sympathy. It is by virtue of this that associations between persons not necessarily related by blood but who came together either by agreement or through circumstances are possible. Such associations are those of fellow-travellers, clubmen, and the more permanent type like the political association. Indeed, for reasons into which we shall enter later, \( \phi \nu \lambda \alpha \) finds its truest expression in the political association; and when it thus finds expression it even makes justice unnecessary; hence lawgivers seem to care more for it than for justice - \( \varepsilon \eta \nu \nu \nu \ 6. \ IX. \ 1160a \ 9ff. \) - "All forms of community are like parts of the political community; for men journey together with a view to some particular advantage, and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life; and it is for the sake of advantage that the political community
too seems both to have come together originally and to endure, for that is what legislators aim at, and they call just that which is to the common advantage" Ross's translation. cf. E.N. 8.1. 1155a 22ff. Thus sailors make a journey together for some common advantage, fellow-soldiers for victory in way, and members of tribes and demes (φυλήται καὶ ὄνυται) also live together for some common advantage, honouring the gods and providing relaxations for themselves (τιμῶς ἀποκειμένης τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀνακαύσεις πορίζωντες μεθ' Ἡ-θονῆς.) (E.N. 1160 a 24).

Man therefore recognises the common advantage which lies in his good-will towards other members of the species, and in joint pursuits. In fact, there seems implicit in Aristotle's remarks in the Gen.An., to which we have already referred, a belief that one of the characteristics that distinguish man from the lower animals is the scope which he is capable of giving to this feeling. It is the basis of the co-operation which creates and supports human society. This is perhaps the most fitting sense in which φιλία could be used as a political principle. Aristotle however, uses φιλία as a political principle in a sense rather different from this.

For while φιλία is ἀναγκαῖότατον ἐν τὸν βίον, Aristotle adds that it ought to exist for the sake of the good life. It is therefore not enough to seek the forms of friendship in their 'necessary' manifestations; there is the need to investigate what
form it must take if it is to constitute part of the good life. It is in this sense that φιλία is ἀρετὴ τῆς ἡ μετ' ἀρετῆς. Φιλία, therefore, οὐ μόνον ὅ' ἀναγχαίον ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλὸν (Ε.Ν.8.1 1155a 28.)

Aristotle, therefore, places φιλία like justice, in the context of the moral virtues. And, in conformity with the nature of the moral virtues, it is regarded as a ἔξεσθε as distinguished from a πάθος (feeling, emotion) or a δύναμις (capacity). Φιλία therefore becomes a state of character and must reflect the deliberate choice of the φίλος. Just as in the moral virtues, therefore, the personal character of the φίλος is involved in φιλία and the quality or character of φιλία is determined by those actions in which the φίλος gives expression to his φιλία (cf. E.N. 1157b 26ff). All the requirements which Aristotle stipulate for φιλία seem to follow from this fact - that φιλία is ἀρετὴ τῆς ἡ μετ' ἀρετῆς. Φιλία therefore requires (a) βουλήσεως ἐκείνης (i.e. τῷ φιλομένῳ) ἀγάθου; it must therefore be distinguished from what is more appropriately called the 'liking' for inanimate objects like wine (ordinary language, for example, uses φιλεῖν for wine but the feeling towards wine is strictly not φιλία but φιλίσεις) (b) ἀντιφιλήσεις which must be rendered ἐν ἀντιφιλήσεις and (c) τῷ μη λανθάνειν.

By stipulating the last requirement, Aristotle attempts to
refute the common notion of 'friendship' as reciprocity of goodwill between two persons or more. Reciprocity of goodwill, he adds, is not enough; those who are friends must be aware of each other's goodwill.

ἐὖνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιποιοῦν-θόσι φιλίαν εἶναι. η ἐπετείθεν μὴ λανθανούσαν;...οἵ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἄλλῳ καὶ βούλεσθαι τάγαθα μὴ ἄνα λαθανοντας οἷς ὑπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων.

(E.N. θ. IV. 1155b 33ff.)

Now, while we dealt with the 'friendship' which is at the basis of the associations of fellow-voyagers, of soldiers, of clubmen, of tribesmen and demesmen, it seemed that the significant thing was the generic instinct of goodwill, latent in all of us and therefore exercisable towards those whom we have never met, and the fact that a form of friendship exists wherever this feeling of goodwill is reciprocated. With this idea we regarded the sailors, the soldiers, the tribesmen, the demesmen as, in a sense, periōt because they associated together for a common purpose and because their reciprocal goodwill forms the basis and the main support for their co-operative effort. Indeed, the essential factor of human friendship seemed to lie in the fact that 'πολλοὶ εἶναι εὖνοι οἶς ὁμοί ἐναδράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνομεν οὕτω εἰκεικεῖς εἶναι ἡ χρησίμους'

It is this which makes it possible for men who are not necessarily related by blood to form and maintain associations. The value of eunóia, therefore, lies in its being generic, in the
fact that we are 'potentially' friends to one another. Its
generic nature of course implies some indefiniteness; for it
becomes truly operative when men reciprocate it in some joint
effort. This seems different from Aristotle’s notion of
friendship as involving conscious reciprocity. In the Arist­
otelian sense of true φίλεια it is only by analogy that one
can call fellow demesmen fellow tribesmen φίλοι.

When speaking in terms of the moral virtues, therefore
Aristotle apparently conceives εὐνοία as a πάθος. In 1156a 1
the verb used to denote the act of reciprocating εὐνοία is
παθεῖν – (τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἄλλο κἀν ἑκείνων τις πάθοι πρὸς τούτον.
And in E.H. 9.5 1166b 30ff, Aristotle becomes more explicit,
and his expressions there confirm our impression of his concep­
tion of εὐνοία. γίνεται εὐνοία καὶ πρὸς ἁγνωτὰς καὶ λανθάνουσα
φιλεῖ δ’ οὖν. οὐ γὰρ (εἰς εὐνοία) ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ’ ὅρεξιν... 
ἡ δ’ εὐνοία καὶ ἐκ προσκαίρου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τούτων ἁγνωτῶν συμβαί
νειε. ευνοί γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθάλουσι, συμπροσταίειν δ’
ἀν οὖδ’εν. ὅπερ γὰρ εὔπομεν, προσκαίρως εὐνοὶ γίνονται καὶ ἐπικολαθ
ไข่ στέργουσιν. ἐστιν ὅτι ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὢσκερ τοῦ ἑράν ἣ
ἡ διὰ τῆς ὁδεγός ὦν... οὕτω δὲ καὶ φιλοὺς οὐχ οἶον τ’ εἶναι μὴ
εὐνοὺς γενομένους, οἳ δ’ εὐνοὶ οὐδ’ δ’ ἑκείνων μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν. βουλοῦνται
γὰρ μονον τάγαθα σοὶ εἰς εὖν εὐνοὶ, συμπροσταίειν δ’ ἀν οὖδ’εν, οὐδ’ ὅχλητεν ὅπερ αὐτῶν... ὅτι μεταφέρων, φαίνει τις ἀν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι σφι
φιλίαν, χρονικομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι
φιλίαν.
Euvonia then is an inactive condition; it is, indeed, the beginning of friendship but it may not lead into any co-operative effort. (οἱ εὖνοι συμπάθητεν ὧδὲν οὐδὲν, ὅτε δὲ
διχθεῖσθε π ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν). Euvonia requires time to develop into the settled state which is friendship (οὐ γὰρ (εὖνοια)
ἐχει διάτασιν οὐδὲ δρεχθεῖν); time therefore gives euvonia the necessary διάτασις and turns it into a έξις, (χρονιζομένη
dὲ καὶ εἰς συνθείαν ἀφικνομένη γίνεσθαι φιλίαν)
cf. E.N. 1156b 25ff - ἐνὶ δὲ (φιλία) προσθεται χρὸνον
καὶ συνθείας κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰδήσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἀλας συναναλώσαι οὖδὲ ἀποδέξασθαι ὅτι προ-
tερον οὖδ' εἶναι φίλους πρὶν αὖ ἐκατερὸς ἐκατερῷ φανῇ φιλητῷ καὶ
χιστεῦθη.

Therefore until we already know what the friends expect from the friendship we cannot know what kind of friendship they maintain.

If, however, φιλία (friendship) requires all that
συνθείαν and 'διάτασιν' and if people cannot be friends until they know each other i.e. until they have 'eaten salt together' and if they can not take each other as friends until they have been found lovable and trusted by each other, then some name other than φιλία should be given to that 'internal creative force of society' which Aristotle calls φιλία at the opening of the treatise and which he tells us is mutually felt by members of the race (τοῖς ὄμοσθένεσι) - E.N. 1155a 20) for
this feeling, we are told E.H. 1155a 19ff; finds expression especially among men, which is the reason why we praise lovers of their fellow-men; it even finds expression among fellow-travellers -ιδοι δ' αν τις καὶ εν ταις πλαναις ὡς οἰκείον ἄκας ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. It is this feeling which legislators, in their desire to banish that worst enemy - faction, are most concerned to promote.

Though Aristotle calls this feeling φίλια in this opening section, it bears a close resemblance to εὐνοία as that concept is later defined; for it lacks the elements of conscious moral choice, the διάτασις, the συνήθεια which Aristotle later gives as the conditions of φίλια. If φίλια as conceived in the opening section of the E.H. is more truly εὐνοία it would be misleading to regard it as such an inactive state as Aristotle later defined it, even if it is true that it is a mere 'potency'. Indeed, it would be truer to regard it as the fundamental principle (ἀρχή) of communal life and of various social co-operative efforts than to regard it as the mere beginning (ἀρχή) of friendship. And it is a concept like it rather than that of intimate personal friendship which Aristotle need postulate as a sociological or political principle.

But as Stewart rightly observes Aristotle propounds two

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*1 Stewart - Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics Vol.II p.262
main questions concerning φιλία — that about its 'Natural History' and that about what use can be made of it in the interests of the good life. "As discussing the first of these questions" says Stewart "the treatise amounts to an inquiry concerning the 'Principles of Sociology'; as discussing the second question it is an 'Essay in the Metaphysic of Ethics'." It does, however, appear as if these two questions sometimes reveal two different perspectives and that the two questions are not so intimately related as Aristotle would have us believe. Thus, taken as a sociological force friendship must be given some emphasis in terms of utility and pleasure (cf. E.N. 8.9.3 1160a 15ff) and E.N. 8.12. 1162a 25). The basis is the urge to satisfy material needs and interests at various levels; the significance of friendship lies in its unifying effect on human beings who come together in pursuit of common material objectives. It is on this basis that two men are capable of full community and partnership inspired by social sympathy and expressive of basic justice and right, E.N. 1161b 1ff. In accordance with this conception of φιλία we are told in E.N. viii 2.4. 1155b 33ff that many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be good or useful. (πολλοὶ γὰρ εἶσιν ἐννοοῖ οἶς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐμπαθήδες, ὑπολαμβάνονται δὲ ἐπικείμενος εἶναι ἣν κρατάμουσι). In IX 5.3. 1167a 12, however, we are told that εὐνοία does not arise on terms of the friendship based on utility nor from that
based on pleasure (\ldots o\nu\ t\'h\nu\ d\'i\a\f\'\i\t\h\o\n\ o\h\w\i\\h\i\\i\h\i\m\o\n\ o\h\w\i\d\i\ t\h\i\n\ o\h\w\i\a\ t\o\ \h\o\n. o\h\w\i\d\i\ g\a\p\ e\u\nu\o\a\ e\p\i\ t\o\n\t\o\i\c\s\ g\i\ne\ta\i. )

What we have here is, however, not a contradiction resulting from the two different questions which Aristotle raises in the treatise but an instance of the data of social life being controlled or modified by the conditions demanded by the good life. For in spite of E.N. 1155b 33ff, and although we are told in E.N. 1156a 6ff that there are friendships on account of the useful and on account of the pleasant, Aristotle makes it clear (E.N. 1156b 7ff) that true friendship is the friendship \( \kappa \a\t\' \d\r\o\e\t\h\i\nu; \) the former two are inferior types of friendship or friendship by analogy - cf. E.N. 1157a 25ff. "For men apply the name of friends even to those whose motive is utility, in which sense states are said to be friendly (for the alliances of states seem to aim at advantage) and to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure...Therefore we too ought perhaps to call such people friends, and say that there are several kinds of friendship - firstly and in the proper sense that of good men qua good, and by analogy the other kinds". When therefore in E.N. 1167a 12 Aristotle confines \( e\u\nu\o\a \) exclusively to friendship on account of \( \d\r\o\e\t\h\i\nu \) he is only being explicit in the discussion of \( e\u\nu\o\a \) in terms of the good life. One may therefore speak of \( e\u\nu\o\a \) arising from friendships with utilitarian or hedonist motives, but these two types are inferior
types of εὐνοια the reasoning being that εὐνοια is by
definition the wish for someone's good, irrespective of
reciprocity, that therefore εὐνοια = altruism and that the
friendship in which altruism is the primary or sole motive
exhibits true εὐνοια and is therefore friendship par excellence, while on the other hand self-interest is primary
in the inferior friendships.

On broad sociological grounds, it is perhaps possible
to challenge Aristotle's distinction of three species of
friendship and three corresponding types of εὐνοια. Against
his theory, one might argue as Professor E.A. Havelock has
indeed agreed*1 that it is unnecessary to exclude utilitarian
or hedonist motives from true friendship, that while it is true
that if pleasure and utility are pursued in an egoistic spirit,
with too much rivalry and too little co-operation genuine
friendship is impossible, it does not follow from this that
motives of pleasure and utility ought to be excluded from
friendship, that there is genuine friendship where men create
pleasures and profit for each other and share the same with
each other; that life, in the widest sense, is biological, that
motives of pleasure, profit, amusement, mere survival bring men
together, that within this biological cycle, life is social, that
this participating in common in various life-activities is
friendship, that the sense of common wants and needs, of common

*1 E.A. Havelock - "The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics"
pp. 295 - 310.
humanity is the great potential for friendship. In all these points however, one would have made scarcely any observation which Aristotle does not himself in one way or the other make in the treatise on friendship. Having made all these points however, by way of comments on the 'Natural History' of Aristotle would argue that the value of friendship lies in its contribution to the good life. It is therefore in terms of the good life that Aristotle sees the significance of φιλία for the evolution of the state and its various institutions. It is also this fact that makes the treatise on friendship so revealing of many significant aspects of his political theory.

In terms of the good life, φιλία as conceived by Aristotle, rests on a principle not unlike that on which 'justice' as expounded in E.N. Bk.5 rests. Thus the doctrine of τὰ φιλητά in regard to φιλία teaches a lesson similar to that taught by the ὤρος or ἀξία of justice. For just as justice differs in different states according as their ὤρος differs, so the friendship between various peoples differs according as the ὤρος (here τὸ φιλητόν) differs.

(cf. E.N. 1156a 16ff, 1156b 7ff, 1157b 27ff, b 31ff. Thus just as a democracy might raise the subordinate criterion of freedom into an ultimate principle of justice, and an oligarchy might raise the subordinate criterion of wealth into an ultimate principle of justice, so friends could make either
pleasure (τὸ ἱδὺ) or profit (τὸ χρήσιμον) the ὁρος of their friendships. The true ὁρος of justice however, is ἀρετὴ and similarly true friendship is the friendship κατ᾽ ἀρετήν.

We saw that perfect or natural justice finds expression in that ideal state in which the citizens are not only free and equal but also have sufficient external goods available first to free themselves from the necessity of finding the means of catering to the lower wants and mainly to enable them to live the life of culture and political ἀρετὴ. Aristotle's remarks in Ε.Ν. IX. ch.9 show that the ἄκλως φίλοι the friends κατ᾽ ἀρετήν of his conception are equals who have no need to form friendships for the sake of pleasure, and who have no need to form friendships for the sake of profit because their material necessities are otherwise provided for; they engage themselves in exercising their ἀρετή through noble needs, generous acts and other political functions; friendship to them is a mirror reflecting their own excellence, and a means by which they externalise their own personal excellence. Some of these points however, touch on Aristotle's doctrine of φιλαντρία and the arguments by which that doctrine is supported; but although that doctrine is of considerable significance to Aristotle's political theory, especially in its connection with the ideal of the contemplative life, our emphasis in what follows would be on the light which Aristotle's conception of φιλαντρία throws.
on his conception of the various minor associations within the political association and of the various forms which the political association could take. And in this connection Aristotle makes the most illuminating remarks in his comments on the friendships among people who are unequal - (φιλίαι καθ' ὑπεροχήν — E.N. 1156b 12ff)

Aristotle has already developed the theme of τὸ ἀντικεῖον in E.N. V ch. 5 in connection with his analysis of commercial justice. Commercial justice seemed to have raised a question somewhat different from that of distributive justice; for although the ἀξία could be fixed differently in different societies, the main business of distributive justice is that of fixing an ἀξία and of effecting ἴσοτης by distributing honour, offices etc. proportionate to each man's desert. In commercial justice, however, one is concerned with the exchange (συνάλλαγμα) of goods which differ in value, and the ἴσοτης of commercial justice is effected when equivalent amounts of goods are exchanged. Aristotle works out the principle of commercial justice in terms of, for instance, the superiority of the farmer to the cobbler and of the need of finding a proportion or ratio in which the number of shoes which the cobbler exchanges for his food reflects the superiority of the farmer to the cobbler, i.e. the cobbler gives 'x' shoes for his food, (cf. E.N. V. 5 1133a 33ff — ἐστὶν ὁ ἀντικεῖον ὁταν ἴσαις, ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον τὸ ἐργὸν τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ).
The principle of this is τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς καὶ ἀναλογίαν. E.N. 1132b31. — ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς καὶ ἀναλογίαν.)

The principle, however, is applicable to spheres outside pure commercial exchange; it is applicable wherever diverse elements are brought together in a co-operative effort; in fact the principle of proportionate reciprocity is the bond of union that holds a city together E.N. 1132b 33ff

τῷ ἀντικοινῷ γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις....( οἱ κοιναὶ)

τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. οἷοὶ καὶ χαρίτων ίερὸν ἐμμοδῶν ποιοῦνται, ἵνα ἀντακόδοσις ἦ. τούτῳ γὰρ ἱδιοχαρίτος

and Pol.II 2.1261a 30 — διότι περὶ τὸ ἵνα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ὀφείλει τὰς πόλεις ὀφεὶν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἰρηταὶ πρῶτερον.

The principle rarely finds application between similars:

(οὐ γὰρ ἐκ οὐσίων ἡταρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία ἀλλ' ἐκ ἡταρῶν καὶ γεωγοῦ καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἒσων; E.N. 1133a 16)

It is a principle which finds application in Aristotle's friendships between unequals (φιλία καθ' ὑπεροχήν ) Although the ideal friendship is that between equals (E.N. 1156b 29ff) there are certain friendships in which the friends are not equals; these are friendships in a secondary sense (δευτέρως) and in such friendships viz. those implying inequality, the love should be proportional i.e. "the better should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly
in each of the other cases: for when love (ἡ φίλησις) is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then in a sense arises equality, which is certainly held to be characteristic of friendship. The friendships between father and son, between the elder and the younger in general, and between ruler and ruled, fall within this category". (E.N. 1158b 12ff).

The same idea is implied in Aristotle's remarks in E.N. 1167a 14 to the effect the inferior friend makes up the balance with a greater feeling of goodwill - ὃ μὲν εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὅν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὐνοίαν, τὰ δικαία δρῶν...οὕς ὁ ἐν εὐνοίᾳ δι᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειαν τινα γίνεται ὁταν τῷ φανῇ καλός τις ἡ ἀνδρείας ἡ τι τοιοῦτον.

But it is Aristotle's remarks on benefaction in E.N. 1167b 16 ff. which reveal the real nature of the friendships among unequals. Though, as we see in E.N. 1158b 24, the ὀφει of friendship demands that the ὑπερεχόμενος should render more love (φίλησις) in return for the benefits he receives, we learn in 1159a 25 that the true mark of friendship lies in active love, i.e. with the ὑπερέχων in conferring benefits etc. Thus while τὸν ἀμείνων (sc. δεῖ) μᾶλλον φιλεῖθαι ἡ φιλεῖν (φιλεῖν is here certainly the verbal derivative of φίλησις) nevertheless, true φιλία δοξεῖ δὲν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖ σθαι εἶναι (Ε.Ν. 1159a 27)
And in the sense of active love, it is the ὁ ἀμείνων, ὁ ὑπερεχων who is doing the loving.

Thus having dismissed the analogy between the benefactor and the object of benefaction and creditor and debtor as a poor one, Aristotle tells us that the reason why benefactors are friendly towards the objects of their benefaction is a more natural one. For "those who have done a service to others feel friendship and love for those they have served even if these are not of any use to them and never will be. "The position of benefactors is like that of poets who have an excessive love for their own poems, doting on them as if they were their children; and the reason is that "existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved" and "a man is really what he does! (ἐσμεν ὁ ἐνέργειᾳ). For the man who is fortunately placed therefore, acts of benefaction are expressions of his ἀρετή just as the handiwork of the craftsman is an expression of his ἀρετή for it expresses in activity what the craftsman is in potentiality. The ideal at the basis of this is the same as that behind Aristotle's doctrine of φιλανθία it is also the ideal represented by the μεγαλόψυχος in spite of some elements of caricature visible in him. Benefaction then, is not conceived as a political principle operating among
equal human beings; it is essentially operative in unequal relations, between the superior and the inferior, the benefactor and the object of his benefaction, and between rulers and ruled. This therefore is the implication of friendships among unequals for the personal ideal of friendship.

It is also in the context of friendships between unequals that Aristotle treats of the various constitutional types - monarchy, aristocracy and timocracy or polity, and their perverted forms, - tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. In E.N. 1160b 24ff Aristotle draws an analogy between these constitutional types, and the various relations within the household (a) The association between father and sons has a character like that of monarchy. The father takes care of his children as a king does his subjects; and this is why Homer calls Zeus, the king of the gods, by the name of 'Father' - kingship always tending to mean a paternal form of rule (b) The association of husband and wife appears to be of the nature of an aristocracy. The husband rules by virtue of merit, in matters where a husband should; and he leaves to his wife all other matters which suit her gifts (c) The association of brothers is parallel to 'timocracy'. "They are equal to one another, except in so far as they differ in age." In E.N. 1161a 10ff, the corresponding friendships are traced. (a) "The friendship between a king and his subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred...Such
too is the friendship of a father, though this exceeds the other in the greatness of the benefits conferred; for he is responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing. (b) The friendship of man and wife is the same that is found in an aristocracy; for it is in accordance with virtue - the better gets more of what is good, and each gets what befits him. (c) The friendship of brothers is like that of comrades, for they are equal and of like age, and such persons are for the most part alike in their feelings and character.

This exposition lays the foundation for the doctrine which Aristotle propounds at the beginning of the Politics that authority is not essentially the same in every relation between ruler and ruled (cf. Pol. 1 1252a 7-16). Also in the distinction he makes between συγγενικὴ φιλία, ἐταιρικὴ φιλία and πολιτικὴ φιλία he illuminates the true nature of some of the doctrines of the Politics.

In E.N. VII. 1160b 11ff Aristotle makes the distinction between various types of friendship.

"αφορέσεις δ' ἄν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν.
αἱ δὲ κοινωνικαὶ καὶ φιλετικαὶ συμπλοίκαι, καὶ δόσι τούτων ἀλλιώτω κοινωνικαῖς ἐκκαθιστήθη μᾶλλον. οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τίνα φαίνονται εἶναι.

Let us see, then, the friendship based on kinship. This we learn,
is the primitive $\phi \lambda \iota \omega$. It is this which unites parents and offspring, and especially those closely related by blood. It therefore embraces (a) the relation of parents and children, (b) that between brothers, (c) that between cousins and other kinsmen; $\varepsilon \tau \alpha \iota \rho \iota \kappa \iota \gamma \phi \lambda \iota \omega$ also seems to be a species of $\sigma \upsilon \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \nu \iota \kappa \iota \gamma \phi \lambda \iota \omega$ and indeed, if we judge by the picture of Homeric society, the solidarity which exists between 'comrades' ($\varepsilon \tau \alpha \iota \rho \iota \kappa$) is very similar to that of the family; a situation that must be at the back of Aristotle's mind when he almost identifies $\varepsilon \tau \alpha \iota \rho \iota \kappa \phi \lambda \iota \omega$ with $\sigma \upsilon \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \nu \iota \kappa \iota \gamma \phi \lambda \iota \omega$; for sworn to aid, succour or avenge one another, these comrades of war or adventure regarded themselves as being bound by obligations similar to those which bind members of the same family or 'genos'. Aristotle therefore justifiably identifies $\sigma \upsilon \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \nu \iota \kappa \iota \gamma \phi \lambda \iota \omega$ with $\phi \lambda \iota \omega$. Thus in *E.N.* 1159b 32 we learn: "now brothers and comrades have all things in common, but the others to whom we have referred have definite things in common"; and in *E.N.* 1162a 1 we are told that the friendship of brothers is akin to that of comrades.

But as society becomes less 'group-based' and as the more and more distantly akin are thrown together, i.e. as the Family grows into the Village, and Villages are organised into the City, the $\phi \lambda \iota \omega$ sustaining the society undergoes a transformation
friendship becomes less based on blood-relationship or group solidarity and the relations between the individuals composing the community become more contractual. In this wider community, therefore the bond of unity and the basis of φιλία is no longer blood-relationship but ὀμολογία (agreement). The friendship existing in such communities Aristotle calls κοινωνική φιλία. Therefore, though some form of friendship exists in every κοινωνία Aristotle distinguishes a more specific κοινωνική φιλία the basis of which is ὀμολογία.

Of κοινωνική φιλία itself, however, two sub-types are distinguishable (a) the type that exists between ξένοι - η ξενική φιλία. Here again notions of friendship drawn from the nature of Homeric society illuminate Aristotle's conception.

At the back of Aristotle's mind, we seem to see the Homeric institution of 'guest-friendship' by which the guest becomes assimilated to the family of the host by sharing the comfort of the home in food and drinks and the protection of the sacred hearth; he thus becomes bound to his host for the remainder of his life, guest and host being each bound at all times to render help to each other when necessary. Here however, Aristotle uses ξενική φιλία to cover a field wider than that of ξένοι only; it would include all relations in which there are co-operative efforts διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον but in which no permanent συνβίωσις (τὸ συζητή) is necessarily involved.
There may seem at first sight to be some contradiction between Aristotle's view of the basis of the political association here expressed and his arguments at the beginning of the Politics (cf. Pol. iii 1280a 30ff and 1280b 6ff). There, Aristotle challenges a view that sounds similar to that which he advocates here. The sophist Lycophron has said that the political association rests on a compact (συμβίωσις) and that it is a guarantor of men's rights (ἐγγυτήτης ἀλλήλοις τῶν οικαίων) Aristotle challenges this as a mistaken view of the nature of the political association. It is to regard the citizens as εὐνοι, fellow-merchants and the city as an alliance. There is no doubt some resemblance between Lycophron's view of the political association and Aristotle's as expressed in the E.N. But the resemblance is more superficial than real, for there is really no contradiction between Aristotle's view in the Ethics and that in the Politics. For, though both ἡγεμονικὴ φιλία and κοινωνικὴ φιλία depend ὀμολογία and so belong together to the specific field of κοινωνικὴ φιλία, the fact that the one involves no συμβίωσις while the other does is vital and makes a world of difference. For the ὀμολογία of the κοινωνικὴ x κοινωνία is more truly ὀμονοία (consensus or unanimity) than mere compact, the 'συνθήκη' of Lycophron's doctrine. For, as
we are indeed told in the same book of the Politics, φιλία
i.e. πολιτική φιλία is η τού συζήν προαιρέσις. (Pol. iii 1260b
That the ὀμολογία of the political association is really
ὀμονοία Aristotle makes clear in Ἑ.Ν. 1167a 24ff. It must
be distinguished from mere identity or congruence of opinion
(ὁμογνωμοσύνη) - τὰς κόλεις (i.e. τοὺς κόλεως κόλιτας) ὀμονοιίν
φαίνειν, ὥστε περὶ τῶν συνφερόντων ὁμογνωμοσύνη καὶ τὰ τέκτα προαιρέων-
tαι καὶ πράττοντι τὰ κοινῇ ὑστῆρι ὁδεγήσαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτά ὅτι ὁμονο-
ούσιν, καὶ τοῦτω περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγεθεὶ καὶ ἐνδεχομένων ἥμφοι ὑπάρχε-
eιν ἡ πᾶσιν.

It therefore involves προαιρέσις "it is concerned with actions,
and actions affecting two persons or everybody; it concerns
human interests and affairs connected with our lives περὶ τὰ
συμφερόντα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν βίων ἁνήχωντα.
Aristotle further adds his usual note that this 'consensus'
comes easily among good men - βούλονται τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφ.
ἐροντα τούτων καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίένται
but among inferior sort of men (οἱ φαύκοι) it is hard to come
by; for they aim at their own selfish ends (πλεονεξίας
ἐφείμενοι ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις)...συμβαίνει οὖν ἄντως στασιζέ
μεν ἐπαναγκάζοντας ἄντως ὁ ἐρωμένος τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

The 'raison d'etre' of the political association and of
is, of course, τὸ κοινὸν συμφερόν and in a sense all the requirements stipulated for φιλία at the beginning of the treatise on friendship are connected with the attempt to establish a theory of friendship by virtue of which the friendship among the individual members composing the political association works towards the common good τὸ κοινὸν συμφερόν and the friends aim at the true ἀγαθὸν and not merely at the τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν. The attempt, as we saw, however, seems to have led Aristotle into demanding in place of πολιτικὴ φίλια a personal intimate type of friendship; for friendship needs time and custom to become a settled state; it is consequently difficult to draw a line between Aristotle's conception of φιλία as a political principle and φιλία as intimate personal friendship. But, then, Aristotle would deny the need for a distinction since, in accordance with a basic principle of his political philosophy, the end or final cause of the feeling of friendship whose natural history is traceable in various associations within the state is the friendship between good men.

Nor do Aristotle's remarks when he comes to treat of the number of friends the happy man needs help us much to distinguish πολιτικὴ φίλια proper from intimate personal friendship. In 1170b 29, the number of good friends required is compared with the optimum size of a city - the standard for both is the same - τὸ καλὸν Ἰν; and later, 1171a 6ff though we are told that it would be difficult to rejoice and
in an intimate way with many people, nevertheless, one would still need as many friends as are enough for the purpose of living together - τοσούτους ὀσοὶ εἰς τὸ συζήτησις ἵκανοι - a standard still identical with that of deciding the optimum size of a city. The only place where a more explicit distinction tends to be made between personal friendship and political friendship is in 1171a 15ff where we are told that while people who have many friends and mix intimately with them are all thought to be no one's friends and regarded as obsequious there is an exception in political friendship; for politically one can be friends with many without being obsequious. But in fact this draws attention more to the fact that only a few can attain to the ideal friendship than it makes a distinction between political friendship and personal friendship. And it prepares us for a political ideal in which a few are truly friends and maintain a friendship based on 'virtue and the character of the friends themselves' while they maintain a form of friendship (vide, the exposition on τὸ ἀντίκεισθαι and ὁμόνοια and Ε.Ν. 1156a 10) towards those who are not truly ἰγαθότεοι.

Speaking in constitutional terms, it is not clear to what political category Aristotle would assign an aggregate composed of οἱ ἀπλῶς φίλοι - but the distinction Aristotle makes between συγγενική φιλία and πολιτική φιλία shows that
its friendship rests on the same basis as ὑπὸ βασιλεία, ἀριστοκρατία, τιμοκρατία. It rests on πολιτική φίλα. The analogy between the family and the state has revealed the nature of the relationship between the component members of those three constitutions; but while the friendship of this ideal κοινωνία is based on ἀρετή like βασιλεία and ἀριστοκρατία its members, i.e. its truly component members, are equals. The ἄλαζος φίλοι are indeed the ἄλαζος συνεδριαὶ of the ideal state of Ἑκ. 7 and 8 of the Politics (cf. Pol. 7 ch. 4).

To a very large extent, therefore, Aristotle's doctrines on φίλα support and are supported by the more purely political doctrines of the Politics, and reveal his political ideals. Again like the analysis on justice, the analysis on φίλα does not transcend the limits of the City-State.
Conclusion

We see in the distinction Aristotle makes between political and familial justice and between the various types of the social bond (the tie which keeps the members of a society together) his evaluation of the different forms of society which we have in the family, the village, and the state. For, while the bond of union is never simple or single (the motives that make men live and act together being so diverse) yet among the conditions which keep society and maintain its constitution in vigour certain leading forces may be distinguished and in different associations or forms of society one or the other of these is often so prominent as to dominate the remainder and give the association its character.

Thus the bond of kinship gives the family its character. Since kinship forms the bond of union among men, both primitive and civilized, and even among animals, it is the most natural or primary bond of union. Kinship is the bond of union even in the enlarged family or clan; for in societies of this type what authority there is fuses itself with the domestic authority of the elders: it also depends largely on the personal qualities of those elders; though it usually falls to a man by some rule of succession.

It is this absence of government or law in the sense of an impersonal system capable of over-riding the ties of kinship
which Aristotle sees as the distinguishing characteristic of the clan - village community, a characteristic which, among others, reveals its inferiority to the polis. The basis of the wider but much looser organisation called the tribe is still kinship and intermarriage. That these larger aggregations like Macedonia or Persia should fail to evolve a higher social form but should make kinship the basis of their union also is an evidence of their inferiority to the polis. Patriarchal authority is suited to the family but in the wider society of the tribe it is a form of despotism and those who submit perpetually to this form of rule are the barbarians who have by nature a slavish disposition. For in such communities authority does not rest with the people and there is no free criticism of established custom.

A type of social organisation in which government is conceived not as itself the source of unquestioned authority but as a function which certain individuals are delegated to perform as servants, "ministers", of the public as a whole is the polis. The structure of the laws, the acts of executive government, are not so many commands issued by a superior and obeyed by the people, but are customs and decisions expressing the character and depending on the resolves of the people themselves. The citizen has rights which are no less important than this duties; for it is a prime characteristic of the state that it establishes the rule of law (Pol. III 1280b27) and
subjects its own officers to this impersonal sovereign.

The state thus stands in strong contrast with the despotic empire or 'ethnos'! for its government rests not so much on the authority of a superior as on the consent of the bulk of its members. In the clan or tribe the individual has no legal position and hardly any existence apart from the body to which he belongs. The family, the clan, or the village, take responsibility for his safety and maintenance; his life is laid down by his place in them, his property is in the main a share in their property, his gods are their gods. He can not leave them, nor can he enter into obligations which will have the effect of binding him. His position in the group is, as it were, an exhaustive account of his existence, and he has little personal life apart from it.

The component members or units of the polis, however, are not groups but individuals. Thus with the emergence of the state we have in regard to the individual what Sir Henry Maine calls the change or progress from status to contract. For, the individual is now a responsible agent and as soon as he comes to mature years he is made fully responsible for his actions. Aristotle’s conception of moral responsibility in the Nicomachean Ethics Book III illuminates this point. The citizen and no one else is punished if he does wrong. He is free to alienate his property and to enter into contracts
with whom he will. The minor groups to which he belongs are either mere local bodies created afresh by the state which delegates to them some of its rights and duties, or they are voluntary associations which the citizen himself forms by agreement with others. Also, some of the responsibilities of the old "natural" groups are taken over by the state. Whether it is a feature of democracy or not it is difficult to say, but we see Aristotle having recourse to the clan when he thinks this freedom or full responsibility needs to be restrained.

The state is a community whose character depend on the good-will of the bulk of its members, and whose welfare rests accordingly on their loyalty and public feeling, while it is for them the guarantee of the free exercise of their rights as citizens. The two distinguishing features of the political community are therefore the individual responsibility of its citizens and a responsible government expressing the will of the whole society in law and administration. From these two features issues security under law and the power of the community to make and modify the law. The citizen is indeed a man who could rule and be ruled with a view to the good life (Pol. III, 1277b6). It is this which distinguishes the state from the family the clan, - village community or tribe; it is also this which distinguishes the Greek polis from the tribal or imperial despotisms which Aristotle calls
'ethne:

The good for each man lies in the realisation of what is in him, the development of his personality; and it is Aristotle's unshaken belief that the polis affords the greatest scope for the realisation of the human personality.

It is perhaps fitting to end by drawing attention to a number of different views on Aristotle's pre-occupation with the polis while Philip was proving that the end of the city-state had come.

Gomme*1 says: "Not only in the 'Constitution of Athens' but in the 'Politics' too he regards the small state as that best suited to his countrymen and superior to other forms; he is quite unconscious that, in our modern phrase, it did not work, just as he is that it was already moribund, if not dead. Yet there was Alexander's career, only too plain for all men's eyes. Why did he - the wisest man of his day, divorced from the passions of national politics, why did he not either welcome the advent of Macedon to end the 'kleinstaaterei' that was ruining Greece, or if he did not think it was ruining Greece, why did he not fear Macedon, and especially Alexander? Not surely just because Macedon respected autonomy, where it suited her, more than dominant Greek states had done; the example of her behaviour in Thessaly, Euboea, and Thebes (where it did not suit her) would have saved him from such a blunder. It was partly that no doubt, but the reason is more complex. ...For him (Aristotle) the question whether a political system 'worked' was not, primarily, a question whether it secured an efficient administration or even whether it would survive external attack, but did it fulfil its purpose? A man can be killed by a lion, or a good man by a bad one; but that does not show he was not, till the moment of death, fulfilling his proper purpose; and if a man, in order to survive, must spend all

*1 Gomme - "Essays in Greek History and Literature" (Oxford, 1937) p.229
his time hunting lions or on his guard against a bad man (and so behaving like the latter) he cannot fulfil his proper purpose. The business of the state is to provide conditions in which the best possible life is open to the citizens; and in his view, as in that of most Greeks, though himself apolis, public life, politics, was part of this best life for most citizens, not a few only. This was not obtainable under any constitutional system that he knew except the Greek - certainly no more in Macedon than in Persia or Egypt; and a political system that did in fact foster the activities not only of the politicians, but of a Sophocles, an Aristophanes and a Plato, cannot be said not to work." 

Gomme, I think, should have added, however, that the fact that most Greek states, sundered apart by "internecine" warfare, were constantly in a state of "hunting lions or on guard against bad men" in order to survive should have made Aristotle more willing to examine the values of the large territorial state; Aristotle might have felt, however, that this condition was not an inherent quality of the city-states, although he does remark that the Greeks would rule the world "if only they could once achieve political unity" - (Pol. VII. 1327b 35).

*1 Wolin says: "It has been alleged that the ideas of Plato and Aristotle were so closely bound to the fortunes of this tiny political entity that, when the polis gave way to the larger empires of Macedonia and Rome, the parochial assumptions of their ideas were exposed: assumptions about the racial homogeneity of the population, the optimum size of the political community.....There is no question that these beliefs made classical political thought appear hopelessly municipal in an era where the conditions of existence

were imperial. A comparable indictment was laid against Rousseau... Yet in the cases both of Rousseau and of Plato and Aristotle this kind of easy criticism misses the mark. The essential questions raised by these political thinkers were: how far could the boundaries of political space be extended, how much dilution by numbers could the notion of citizen-participant withstand... before the political association ceased to be political... The association that they had in mind was 'political' for several reasons. It served needs that no other association could; it was reflective of a part of the individuals life that he lived in common with other men... In short, the association was political because it dealt with subjects of common concern, and because all of the members were implicated in a common life. As Aristotle had remarked, it was quite possible to enclose the whole of the Peloponnese by a single wall, yet this would not create a polis*.

Kelsen*, however, neglecting or missing the point of Aristotle's doctrines in the Ethics and the Politics believes that Aristotle was actively fostering the Macedonian policy for a large territorial state, and that in the ideal of the contemplative life he was putting forward a philosophy which would render it easy for Athenians to accept Philip of Macedon as monarch. For when Aristotle wrote his Ethics and Politics, says Kelsen* "the polis had been finally brought under the control of the Macedonian monarchy. This monarchy claimed the right to establish itself over democracy, not indeed completely to abolish the latter but to strip it of its most important functions, which it arrogated to itself. Aristotle's doctrine of the state reflects most clearly this change. Only by keeping this change in view does the political significance of the Aristotelian conception of God and of the moral ideal of a purely contemplative life become comprehensible. Let it be sufficient here to

recall that the glorification of the contemplative life, which has renounced all activity and more especially all political activity, has at all times constituted a typical morality set up by the ideologies of absolute monarchy. For the essential tendency of this form of state consists in excluding the subjects from all share in public affairs".*1.

When again Aristotle says (Pol.III 1.277a 20) that the excellence of the good citizen, especially in the case of the ruler, is identical with that of the good man but that we should remember that subjects too are citizens, Kelsen's point from this is: "Thus the conception of citizen is no longer limited exclusively to the active political participation, but is extended to the passive condition of being ruled, and in this way adapted to the monarchial form of government. Kelsen forgets that the citizen is defined as he who rules and is ruled in turn. - Pol.III. 1277b 8.

Some of Kelsen's arguments may be relevant to the post-Aristotelian period and may describe with some truth the mood of Stoicism which, without any sense of compelling urgency, contemplated political life as if it was acted out amidst a setting as spacious as the universe itself. But as far as Aristotle is concerned Kelsen's study misses the mark and in some cases ascribes to Aristotle doctrines diametrically opposed to his philosophical principles; for in spite of the ideal of the contemplative life, Aristotle was, like Plato,

* 1 op. cit. p.15
totally absorbed with the ideals of the city-state. This absorption it has been suggested earlier has some basis in Aristotle's conception of 'nature'.

Classicists and anthropologists alike have seen in the history of the Greek city-states the force of 'separatism' - that resistance to wider integration in the sphere of organisation rather than of feeling. For, Greece, split into several small states, which neither Athens nor Sparta was ever able to make into a Hellenic nation furnishes the star example of 'separatism'; she also proves that advanced knowledge and economy and even common sentiments are not enough to weld millions of people into a nation. Aristotle has some justification for extolling the merits of the city-state but there is also some truth in Meyer's remarks to the effect that the Greek nation was condemned to utter impotence at the time when her culture had attained its peak and grown ripe for a world culture.
Aristotle's doctrine of the evolution of society in relation to some West African Communities.

Aristotle and West Africa, the Humanities and Anthropology! the combination seems at first sight improbable; and it raises the very obvious question - what relevance could the doctrines of Aristotle, one of the most eminent exponents of the ideals of the good life with all his emphasis on the potentialities and faculties most distinctive and characteristic of man as a creature of civilized society - have for the societies of West Africa.

Yet the majority of Greek thinkers and writers regarded their inquiries - inquiries which constitute the humane studies as co-extensive with anthropology - which literally is the study of man. They no doubt believed their culture was superior to the cultures of many of their neighbours but they nevertheless felt that their concern was with man 'qua' man and their interest truly anthropological. Herodotus is not without justification regarded as the Father both of History and Anthropology. For as Myres puts it "There is an anthropologist to whom we go for our facts: the painful accurate observer of data, the storehouse of infinite detail...And there is an anthropologist to whom we look for our light - His learning may be fragmentary, as some men count learning; his memory
faulty; his inaccuracy beyond dispute. But with shattered
and rickety instruments he attains results...he may not
know...but he has learnt to see and what he sees he says....
There have been anthropologists in our own time and before,
who have come near to combine both excellences and in none
perhaps are they wholly severed. Least of all do we expect
to find both wholly present or wholly absent, in one who
has in a sense fallen into anthropology by accident and
created one science, while he pursued another art. In the
Greek compiler who made this 'the plan of his researches,
to procure that human acts should not be obliterated by time,
and that great deeds, wrought some by the Greeks, some by men
of other speech, should not come to lose their fame' we cannot
but see a man who meant - with good or ill success - to be in
the best sense a mine of information. But it is the same
Herodotus who put it before him in his title-page 'to discover,
besides, the reason why they fought with one another'; and
that is why we hail him Father of Anthropology, no less than
the Father of History; for he not only hewed out a new avenue
of knowledge but spoke to an audience who themselves

*Aristotle is, if less obviously, an anthropologist in the

*1 J.L.Myres - "Herodotus and Anthropology" in 'Anthropology
and the Classics' p.124.
sense in which Herodotus is an anthropologist; he lacks, it
is true, the open and unprejudiced outlook of the 'Father
of History' and he concentrates on the essence of civilized
life, and thus centres his interest on those aspects that
are most distinctive of civilized man; he even sometimes
regards with contempt those whom he considered to be the lower
species of mankind. Nevertheless he compiled outlines of the
social and institutional development of 158 states, Greek and
non-Greek, and considered all these outlines as necessary
even if raw material for his great work on political science.
Thus he, like Herodotus, believed that researches into the
customs and social institutions of various peoples were a
worthy undertaking, his 'Barbarica Nomina' being the Aristotelian
version of Herodotus' and Hellanicus' "researches into non-
Greek customs".

Even those among the Greek thinkers who did not under-
take empirical researches in anthropology pondered on the
human condition in all its forms and in its various stages
of development. Aeschylus, Sophocles, Democritus, Diodorus,
Euripides and others are full of these reflections. To cite
an instance, Xenophanes' remark that all peoples depict their
gods as like themselves and "the Aethiopians say that their
gods are snub-nosed and black" contains more of anthropological
significance than appears at first sight; though to deduce from this as Sextus Empiricus (Diels, I. 133, Fr. 91) seems to have done that the Aethiopians prefer the blackest and the most snub-nosed woman is to raise a different issue! Mrs. Beardsley*1 points out that Negroes were known in the Greek world as early as Minoan times*2 and if Evans is correct were employed by Minoan commanders as auxiliaries*3. A Negro on a human mask was found at Cyprus*4. A Negro trumpeter appeared on the shield of a Homeric warrior. Eurybates, Odysseus' messenger, who came from Ithaca was probably of Negro extraction*5.


*3 Evans, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 755-757 and plate XIII.


*5 Homer, Odyssey, XIX, 246-248, describes Eurybates, as follows: "He was round-shouldered, dark-skinned, and wooly-haired".
And if we believe Quintus of Smyrna, the Greeks encountered Negroes in the army of Memnon at Troy. The mask of a Negro, discovered at Acragas along with the representations of Demeter and Persephone and their worshippers shows the usual Negro caricature—the flat nose, the thick, everted lips and the short wooly hair. Marconi believes that the portraiture is done with a fidelity to nature which suggests direct observation from life. Negro contingents are believed to have formed a part of Xerxes' army, and, according to some scholars, even fought at Marathon.

Some plays probably contained Negro characters. The Memnon or Aithiopes of Sophocles and possibly the Memnon of Aeschylus had an Ethiopian chorus. The Andromeda of Euripides, if the Andromeda crater in Berlin can be trusted, represented the country and people of Ethiopia by a Negro wearing a tight jersey and a short, richly patterned chiton.

* Quintus of Smyrna, 2, 100 - 101.
* Herodotus, Histories, VII, 69 – 70.
* Sophocles Frgs. 25 – 30 (Nauck)
* M. Bieber - "History of Greek and Roman Theatre", Princeton and London, 1939, p.54 and Fig. 62.
Scholars have regarded the scene on a fifth century depicting a Negro woman tortured by satyrs as reference to some satyr drama. One of two actors appearing on an early fourth-century vase is a bald, beardless Negro who wears a little skin fastened on the right shoulder, walks by the aid of a staff, and holds a flaming torch. Mrs. Beardsley argues that it is likely that Negroes appeared as actors not only in regular dramatic performances but also in myths danced in pantomime 1, and that a bronze statuette of a Negro usually interpreted as a dancer represents one of the wildest moments of a dance reminiscent of certain African tribal dances 2.

It is perhaps not irrelevant to note certain alleged traces of Minoan and Aegean influence in West Africa to which Talbot, and Froebenius long before him, drew our attention. There is a remarkable resemblance between the Snake-Goddess of the Ibiobio and the famous statue of the Minoan Snake-Goddess 3. Even at the present day there are still traces of the double-axe as a religious symbol among the Southern peoples of Nigeria such as the Ekoi, the Ibiobio, the Yoruba.

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1 Beardsley, op. cit. pp. 113 - 114.

2 Beardsley op. cit. No. 207 and Fig. 18; also Nos. 211 - 212.

and the Bini.*1 And judging from the report of Mr. Palmer,*2 it would not be too fanciful to suppose that Dan Baranda, the modern Hausa middle man is none other than (etymologically) Zeus Labarandeus, who like the Labrys or Double-Axe of Crete, called Barandami by the Hausas, faces both ways.

Of course, Froebenius many years ago developed the curious theory that he has found the 'Atlantis' of which Plato spoke long ago in West Africa in Yoruba culture.*3 Even if one dismisses Froebenius's thesis as appropriate to the world of romance, to which indeed the myth of 'Atlantis' belongs it may be noted that his theory is so thoroughly documented that even some of those scholars who find themselves unable to accept the theory still find it necessary to give the evidence which Froebenius marshalled a closer look. Thus Talbot*4 believes that a good deal of evidence can be adduced in support of the view that there are influences of an ancient Mediterranean civilisation in the Sudan and the West Coast of Africa. He, however, argues,

*2 Palmer - "The Bornu Sahara and Sudan" (1926) and cf. Mackenzie - "Myths of Crete and Pre-Hellenic Europe" (1917) p. 160 ff.
*3 Leo Froebenius - "The Voice of Africa" (Eng.Trans, 1913) vol. i, 224, 260 - 2; 319 - 349.
against Froebenius, that that influence was transmitted via the Sahara and not via the Atlantic route. Meek*1, also, disagreeing with Froebenius nevertheless notes that "the objects dug up in the Yoruba country by Froebenius have been dated by Egyptologists as belonging to the 6th century B.C."

Berthelot's*2 theory is the more interesting because it argues that the Greeks and Romans not only had some knowledge of Negro Africa (i.e. the Sudan) but had penetrated there themselves. Berthelot thus sees grounds for making Pliny's Nigeris our Niger, Ptolemy's Nigeir also our Niger. Pliny's Nigritae becomes real Negroes on the Niger; Ptolemy's Nigritae are a people on the left bank of that river in the region of the historic Songhai and his Geirioi are the modern Hausas. It is interesting to note that Delafosse*3 writing early this century, after making it perfectly clear that the etymology of the word Niger, Nigritae etc. "has nothing to do with the colour of the people living on the river banks, asserts, that "in reality the ancient Nigritae were 'Nigerians'."

*1 C.K. Meek - "The Northern Tribes of Nigeria" (O.U.P.1925) vol. i, p.58.

*2 Berthelot - "L'Afrique Saharienne et Soudanese" (Paris 1927) The references in the next two paragraphs are to (a) Berthelot op. cit. p.386-388 (b) Ptolemy IV 6,5-6,6 and (c) Mauny - "L'Quest African chez Ptoleme" p.747-748 except otherwise stated.

*3 Delafosse - "Haut - Senegal Niger" (1912)
including white Berbers as well as Negroes and 'Nigritia' is the absolute equivalent of the name 'Nigeria' given by the English to their riverain Niger colony"*1.

Mauny*2 hotly disputes Berthelot's identifications; but though some of the etymology on which Berthelot based his identifications may be precarious most of them are supported with evidence of considerable weight. For the same of their interest I add a few more of Berthelot's identifications, especially those in West Africa.

Berthelot finds that there are five real Negro peoples mentioned by Ptolemy; the Geirei, the Nigretae; the Daradae and Perorsi, at the mouth and on the upper waters of the Senegal respectively; the Munaces "in the fertile valleys of the mountains of the Baoutchi; the Noubae in Darfur; and the Derbiccae "west of the Bongo Mts; occupying the basin of the Chari".

Other identifications are:-

**Babir** - the Regucibat, a nomad tribe between Adrar of the Iforas and the Senegal.

**Adrangidae Aethiopes** - Wangara Mandigoes.

**Gongolae** - the name survives in R. Gongola (Gende) east - south east of the Baoutchi.

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*1 Delafosse op. cit. vol i. p. 53.
*2 Mauny - "L'Quest African chez Ptoleme" p. 747
Tarroultae and Climatitae in the Kong Country (Ivory Coast?)
Nanosbeis and Nabathrae: tribes south of the Gongola and Benue, extending as far as the Adamaïsa Massif (Mt. Aroualtes)
Ouchalicceis Aethiopes - in the region of the Oubangui (Ubangi)

There is finally the story told by Poseidonius and related by Strabo*¹ that one Eudoxus circumnavigated Africa, since he reached on both the east and the west coasts peoples who talked the same language, to do which he must have crossed what Seligman*² calls the "Bantu Line" i.e. Cameroons at least on the West Coast and Dar-es-Salam on the East Coast.

Herodotus makes remarks, some of which relate to Africa south of the Sahara. He, of course, divides Africa into four regions, and according to him the whole continent is inhabited by four races and no more. "Two of these", he says "are indigenous and two are not. The two indigenous are the Libyans, who dwell in the north of Libya, and the Aethiopians who dwell in the south; the Phoenicians and the Greeks are sojourners".*³

*¹ Strabo - Bk. II, 100.
*³ Herodotus - IV. 197.
Here, it seems, Herodotus makes a clear distinction between the Berbers of North Africa and the Negro and Negroids of the Sudan, thus including all the races inhabiting the southern part of the continent (as known to him) from Senegambia to Nubia under the general term "Aethiopian".

In Bk. VII ch. 69 Herodotus describes a Negro or Negroid people (African Aethiopians) serving in Xerxes' Army. "The Aethiopians who dwell above Egypt" says Herodotus "came to war wearing leopards' skins and lions' skins fastened about them, and they had bows made of the branch of a palm-tree, in length not less than four cubits, and short arrows of reed, and on the tip thereof instead of iron a pointed stone, which they also engrave seals withal. Also they had spears, and a sharpened roebuck's horn fixed upon the end thereof for a spearhead. They also had studded clubs; and when they went into battle they daubed half their body with chalk and half with ochre". J.E. Powell's translation.

Treiddler (Herod. 130-1) points out that spears tipped with antelope horn may still be seen among the modern Dinka and Seligman (Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan (1932) p.141) writes "The true Dinka weapons are a spear and wooden club, but the bow and arrow is used by the Agar and perhaps by other tribes of Bahr el-Chazal. There is reason to
believe that the practice is an innovation learnt from non-Dinka tribes". Pliny\(^1\) had much earlier said that "the Africans ("Afri") first fought with clubs against the Egyptians" but later used reeds (i.e. arrows); and concerning the staining of the body, he says that "the Hippodores smear themselves all over with red-clay" and further he says "at the present day even minium is in great esteem with the nations of Aethiopia, their nobles being in the habit of staining the body all over with it, and this being the colour appropriated to the statues of their gods". Budge\(^2\) thinks that modern parallels exist among the Shilluk, Manbattu, NiamNiam, Acholi, Bari, Nuer, Mbicho and the people of Malakumbi and Taveta.

The loss of Aristotle's (Nomima Barbarika) "Treatises on non-Greek customs" is unfortunate from our point of view, because it deprives us of first hand knowledge of his judgements on customs and institutions of non-Greek peoples which have parallels in Greek social and political institutions; we might also have had his full views on those tribes mentioned only cursorily in the Politics.

In *Politics* IV.4, 1290b 3 - 7, for instance, Aristotle tells us that "a government in which offices were given according to stature, as is said to be the case in Aethiopia,

\(^1\) Pliny - VI. 190.
\(^2\) Budge - "Osiris and the Egyptian Resurrection" (1911) vol.ii, pp. 257-8)
or according to beauty, would be an oligarchy; for the number of tall or good-looking men is small." The reference seems to be to the fabled Macrobiians. For, Aristotle's remarks bear a striking similarity to Herodotus' (Herodotus III.20) - "Now these Aethiopians to whom Cambyses sent them are said to be the tallest and most beautiful of men; and they say that among many other customs diverse from the rest of mankind, they also have this one touching the kingship, that they take for king whichever citizen they judge to be the tallest and to be as strong as he is tall". Powell's translation.

Scylax*¹ (112) makes similar remarks. These notices are considered mythical by a number of scholars but Keane*² has suggested that Herodotus from whom Scylax and the others got their notices had in mind some real tribe recognisable in its modern descendants like the Beja, who are remarkably handsome or others who are very tall. It has also been suggested that the term "Makrobios" was not originally a Greek word at all, but a Greek 'pun' on the tribal name (Makora, or Makoritae or Makoraba) of a people of the Upper Nile. It has also been suggested that the myth of long life arose because, like certain modern

*¹ See Muller - Geographici Graeci Minores fr. 112
*² Keane - Ethn. Egy. Sudan (1884) vol. II.
African tribes, the Aethiopians of Herodotus counted less than 12 months to the year (five months constituting their year) and thus were understood by the Greeks to live longer than the normal span. Hugh Last suggests that the word "Makrobios" meant long-bowed, a suggestion whose plausibility seemed increased by the emphasis which Herodotus places on the length of Aethiopian bow and the nature of its arrow. Hugh Last also draws support from "the evidence from the Egyptian side" having been assured by Griffith that 'Land of the Bow' in the earliest times is the name for the Nile country which began at the barrier of Gebel Silsileh and lay immediately to the south of Upper Egypt, and "later on Upper Egypt...together with Nubia beyond so far as it was known, still continued to be called the Land of the Bow".

W.R. Halliday however, argues with some cogency that "the tradition to which the Aethiopian Macrobii of Herodotus begins with Homer and runs right through classical antiquity. They are a species of the 'gentle savage', fortunate in the enjoyment of those primitive excellences,

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*1 Hugh Last - "The Classical Quarterly" - Vol.17 pp. 35-36.
*2 See Herod. III. 21, 22, and vii.69.
ethical, social and physical, which are alleged to be characteristic of 'natural man'. Of such, who were certainly difficult to find nearer at hand, it was believed that the dwellers upon the extreme fringes of the known world consisted." On the other hand, Hugh Last bases a fairly convincing argument on the nature of the bows of the Western Shangalla, which, intended for burial with their master, are stiffened in such a way that they can not be bent at all.

Aristotle, like those other Greek writers who showed some interest in anthropology, believed that racial characteristics were due almost solely to environment - (cf. Politics VII.7. 1327b 23 - "The peoples of cold countries generally, and particularly those of Europe, are full of spirit, but deficient in skill and intelligence; and this is why they continue to remain comparatively free, but attain no political development and show no capacity to govern others. The peoples of Asia are endowed with skill and intelligence, but are deficient in spirit; and this is why they continue to be peoples of subjects and slaves. The Greek stock, intermediate in geographical position, unites the qualities of both sets of peoples".

*1 Hugh Last op. cit. p. 36.
Hippocrates, the younger contemporary of Herodotus, had already said "you will generally find that human physique and character follow the nature of the country" and had explained the broad distinction between fair and dark races in terms of the influence of the sun. We also see the same principle at work in Aeschylus who in his play 'Prometheus' tells us that Prometheus will change his colour if parched by the sun, and we see that the Danaids, though originally of Argive descent, become Libyans or Egyptians or Indians through the effects of the heat of the sun in their new countries; and the Aethiopians are black because they dwell by the fountains of the sun. And Diodorus (III.33) concluding his astonishing tales about some tribes in Africa and Asia says "If anyone of our readers shall distrust our histories because of what is strange and astonishing in the different manners of life which we have described, when he has considered the climate of Scynthia and that of the Trogodyte country and has observed the differences between them, he will not distrust what has been here related". Environment, it seems, explains everything.

It would not be surprising if the limited criterion of environment sometimes leads to mistakes. Thus while

*1 Aeschylus - "Prometheus Bound" lines 22, 808; "Suppliants" lines 155, 179, 184.
Aristotle is right, and Herodotus whom he here corrects is wrong, in stating (De Gen. Anim. ii, 2, 736a 10) that the semen of the Aethiopians is white like that of other peoples, weakly basing his argument on the analogy of the teeth, he goes on to say that their nails are black like their whole skin (Hist. Anim. iii. 19, 517a 19), although their bones and teeth are white. Again using the same principle of explanation he tells us (Problem. XIV 4. 909a 27-31 and De Gen. Anim. V. 3. 782b) that the Aethiopians like the Egyptians are bandy-legged because "the bodies of living creatures become distorted by heat"; the heat of the sun being also responsible for the curly hair of the Aethiopians. It can not of course be said that Negroes or Negroids (Herodotus' Aethiopians) are racially bow-legged. In 'Politics' II. 3. 9. 1262a 16ff, in the course of his criticism of Plato's conception of the family (the community of women etc.) Aristotle says "The resemblance between children and parents must inevitably lead to their drawing conclusions about one another's identity; indeed some of the writers on 'the descriptive geography of the world' assert that this is actually the case; that there are tribes in the interior of Africa who have wives in common and assign the children that are born to different fathers by their likeness to them."
It is not certain which writer or which tribes Aristotle has in mind here. Herodotus (IV.180) speaks of the Auseans, living near Lake Tritonis west of the Lesser Syrtis - "They have the use of their women in common, not living in matrimony but lying with them after the manner of beasts. And when a woman's child is full grown, the men meet together and the child is held to be the son of whichever of the men he resembleth". Herodotus also ascribes community of women to the Scythian race of the Agathyrsi (Herodotus IV. 104) "who live exceedingly delicately and wear much gold; and who have the use of their women in common, that they may be kinsmen one of another, and being all one family may not envy or hate one another" - the last reason being the very reason for which Plato proposed that women should be had in common in his ideal state. However, the Agathyrsi are certainly not in Africa.

Diodorus also attributes community of women to certain tribes in Africa; of the Trogodytes, for instant, he says (III.32) "The Trogodytes are called Nomads by the Greeks, and living as they do a nomadic life off their flocks, each group of them has its tyrant, and their women like their children, they hold in common with the single exception of
the wife of the tyrant; but if any man goes in to this woman the ruler exacts of him a fine of a specified number of sheep". (cf. III 15.2 where we are told that "the Trogodytes go about entirely naked and have the women and children in common like their flocks and herds, and since they recognise only the physical perception of pleasure and pain they take no thought of things which are disgraceful and those which are honourable"). On the other hand, what Herodotus tells us about this tribe on the Red Sea Coast is that they are often pursued by the Garamantes, and that "they are the fleetest of all men whereof we have heard the report "that they feed on snakes and lizards and such-like creeping things, and use no tongue that is comparable to any other but screech like bats". This tribe has been identified with the modern Tibus or Teda, a very agile people living in Tibesti. Nothing however is said about community of women being practiced among them. Though Mela (i.44) places them "in the scorched parts of Africa, the habitat of the race is clearly on the Red Sea Coast.

From the notices in the Greek writers to peoples like the Auseans, the Trogloodytes, notices which as we saw Aristotle knew of, it is clear that when Aristotle made the

ultimate social unit the monogamous family from which other social forms are derived, he knew he was not stating a scientifically provable thesis. McLennan's effort*1 therefore to show the scientific error implied in Aristotle's assumption and Maine's acceptance of Aristotle's doctrine as the historical truth seem mistaken.

Nor is McLennan's reconstruction of the evolution of society from the 'Horde' to the 'Matriarchal' group and finally to the 'Patriarchal' group nowadays believed to illuminate the origin of society. He no doubt provides considerable evidence both linguistic and institutional in support of his thesis that the system of male kinship established in Greece in historical times has superseded an earlier system of female kinship and that the clans (gene) and 'brotherhoods' (phratriai) are the survivals of wider tribal associations, anterior to the rise of the family, in the modern sense of the term.

But even if he had succeeded in proving all this he would not have proved the primitive origin of society. For, recent anthropological studies have proved beyond doubt that the family has not evolved according to a single plan of development. Even if early man was promiscuous in the sense

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*1 McLennan - "Primitive Marriage", and "Studies in Ancient History".
in which McLennan ascribed promiscuity to the ' Horde', man nevertheless did not approach the present ideal of monogamous marriage through identical stages by a slow progressive development. To establish this, one needs to show that group marriage is practised in all the very simplest cultures extant. For, even if it is granted that development in these cultures is uneven it is unlikely that the unequivocally rudest peoples generally forged ahead to achieve the matrimonial conceptions of the most civilized. But so far is this from being proved that it has been shown, on the contrary, that some extremely primitive tribes are monogamous, that some fairly advanced or complex societies are polygynous, and that there is no certain criterion by which polyandry, for example, can be assigned to a particular stage.

However, since our interest is centred specially on Aristotle's political philosophy as reflected in his doctrine of the evolution of society the criticism which two eminent anthropologists - M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard - made of political philosophy considered in relation to anthropology or what they call "comparative politics" would seem relevant to our attempt here to see some significance for West African communities in Aristotle's political philosophy.
Say they:

we have not found that the theories of political philosophers have helped us to understand the societies we have studied and we consider them of little scientific value; for their conclusions are seldom formulated in terms of observed behaviour or capable of being tested by this criterion. Political philosophy has chiefly concerned itself with how men 'ought' to live and what form of government they 'ought' to have, rather than with what are their political habits and institutions.

In so far as political philosophers have attempted to understand existing institutions instead of trying to justify or undermine them, they have done so in terms of popular psychology or of history. They have generally had recourse to hypothesis about earlier stages of human society presumed to be devoid of political institutions or to display them in a very rudimentary form and have attempted to reconstruct the process by which the political institutions with which they were familiar in their own societies might have arisen out of these elementary forms of organisation. Political philosophers in modern times have often sought to substantiate their theories by appeal to the facts of primitive societies. They cannot be blamed if, in doing so, they have been led astray, for little anthropological research has been conducted into primitive political systems compared with research into other primitive institutions, customs, and beliefs, and still less have comparative studies of them been made. We do not consider that the origins of primitive institutions can be discovered and, therefore, we do not think that it is worth while seeking for them. We speak for all social anthropologists when we say that a scientific study of political institutions must be inductive and comparative and aim solely at establishing and explaining the uniformities found among them and their inter-dependences with other features of social organisation.

This criticism contains three main points which we shall now consider in relation to Aristotle. The first and to me the most significant point is that while the anthropologist confines or should confine himself to purely sociological forms of explanation, the political philosopher is essentially interested in passing value judgements. Aristotle is of course a true political philosopher and in this respect the criticism of these eminent anthropologists would be valid against him. But while his aim may affect the historical truth of the political philosopher's hypotheses or premises, I do not think it makes his theory irrelevant to the study of society. The second point that philosophers have recourse to hypotheses is indissolubly connected with the first. The third is about modern philosophers who "try to substantiate their theories by appeal to the facts of primitive societies". There are of course a number of ways in which these philosophers could substantiate their theories "by appeal to the facts of primitive societies". Aristotle for instance says that man is by nature primarily a pairing or mating animal rather than a political animal; he could if he wished have supported this theory by appeal to the historical fact that certain primitive societies, some of which he no doubt knew, at
least paired or had the institution of marriage in one form or the other but his theory would still not be based on the fact that the first society formed by man, chronologically, was the man-woman unit. The remark that these modern philosophers have been led astray because "little anthropological research has been conducted into primitive social systems" seems to show that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard take it that these philosophers believe that their hypotheses about the origins of society are historically exemplified in certain societies and that the foundation of their theories would be strengthened if they could show this. Thus Hobbes would be looking for a society in which the tag *homo homini lupus* is a true description of the state of affairs, and similarly Locke, Grotius and Rousseau.

As far as I know neither Hobbes or Rousseau nor indeed any one of those philosophers who built a political philosophy on the hypothetical origin of the state thought that their theories were built on a purely historical basis or that their theories could be refuted purely on the basis of historical accuracy, though their hypotheses were no doubt influenced by historical conditions. And Aristotle would be the first to admit that it is not worth while seeking for the origins of primitive institutions if by 'origins' is meant historical origins.
One would think that the fact that these philosophers were led astray because "little anthropological research has been conducted into primitive political systems" implies that more anthropological research would reveal the true nature of the historical origins of primitive society. But so far is this from being so that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard conclude that "we do not think that the origins of primitive institutions can be discovered and therefore do not think that it is worth while seeking for them". On this point, then, philosopher and anthropologist seem to be agreed. The distinction which Fortes and Evans-Pritchard make between the anthropologist and the philosopher in their relevance to the study of society, therefore, centres on the significance of 'explanation'.

There seems however a contradiction in the objections which Fortes and Evans-Pritchard raised against political philosophers. For, when they say that "Political philosophy has chiefly concerned itself with how men ought to live and what form of government they ought to have, rather than with what are their political habits and traditions" the notion is that 'explanation' is accurate description, and the objection to political philosophers is that they neglect the accurate description of actual societies in favour of constructing imaginary ideals. When,
however, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard say: "in so far as political philosophers have attempted to understand existing institutions instead of trying to justify or undermine them, they have done so in terms of popular psychology or of history", it seems clear, in spite of the difficulty of knowing what 'popular psychology' and 'history' stands for, that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard here criticise political philosophers because the latter speculate on inadequate historical and empirical data about the origin of the state out of a previous non-political condition of human societies i.e. from primitive political systems of which we have very little or no knowledge. Thus they blame political philosophers both for giving false descriptions of the origin of society and also for creating imaginary ideals. One would have thought that the latter stricture makes the former superfluous, if not contradictory; but Fortes and Evans-Pritchard apparently wish to maintain both objections. The more grounded criticism, however, of political philosophers seems to be that the political philosopher constructs imaginary ideals. It must however be noted that he does this because he is primarily interested in evaluating or criticising the actual by confronting it with imaginary ideals; it is not as if he had aimed at describing
If we take 'explanation' in the first sense, there is no doubt that the greatest contribution to the advance of the study of society has come from the field of the anthropologist who does his research living often rigorously among the peoples he wants to explain. But the anthropologist, almost inevitably I think, also uses the second type of explanation. For instance at p.20, (African Political Systems) Fortes and Evans-Pritchard say:

In a politically organized community a particular right, duty or sentiment exists only as an element in a whole body of common, reciprocal, and mutually-balancing rights, duties, and sentiments, the body of moral and legal norms. Upon the regularity and order with which this whole body of interwoven norms is maintained depends the stability and continuity of the structure of an African society. On the average, rights must be respected, duties performed, the sentiments binding the members together upheld, or else the social order would be so insecure that the material needs of existence could no longer be satisfied. Productive labour would come to a standstill and society would disintegrate. This is the greatest common interest in any African society, and it is this interest which the political system, viewed in its entirety, subserves.

Here obviously the explanation of "any African society" is not a mere description of the component elements of the system but involves terms of value like interest, sentiment, right, duty, in other words their account is not confined to showing that the system works but embarks, if imperceptibly, on showing why the system works. For, words like interest,
duty, sentiment tell more than that the people accept the system; they hint at the value judgements implied in the 'acceptance' of a system. Indeed in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard own words "items of social behaviour and therefore political relations have also a moral aspect; that is, they express rights and duties, privileges and obligations, political sentiments, social ties and cleavages". The anthropologist therefore does evaluate cultures or social systems. He, however, avoids terms like 'good' and 'bad', which he leaves to the philosopher, and he prefers terms like 'primitive' and 'advanced', 'simple' and 'complex' which he takes to be useful scientific expressions implying no reference to virtue or morality. At the basis of such evaluation is, of course, a relativism which takes all cultures to be equally good or, since the anthropologist seeks to avoid terms like 'good', which assumes that each culture must be valued in its own terms. The question it asks therefore is "does the culture satisfy the people themselves? Even if they are cannibals what satisfactions does eating human flesh supply in terms of their cultural values?". The political philosopher who evaluates social systems, imaginary or real, in terms of a moral ideal or an ethical good would therefore seem to most anthropologists to be applying a criterion of judgement which may not be a
product of the culture he is evaluating.

A criterion of evaluation that is culture-free is however seen in survival-value. It is therefore argued that the evaluation of cultural behaviour or institutions had better be made in relation to the viability of the culture i.e. in terms of the adequacy for continued existence rather than in terms of moral value. Thus, to refer briefly to Aristotle's scheme of social development, the anthropologist would say that the role of the clan-village diminished in Greek society because circumstances had changed with the appearance of statehood and because the clan was no longer adequate to fulfil certain social integrative needs which it fulfilled in the lower stage of social development. The clan would, in other words, be viewed as an instrumentality, pure and simple, and as discarded when other units assumed its former functions. The question which Aristotle raised as to the contribution of the clan-group per se to the attainment of an ethical ideal would seem irrelevant to the anthropologist.

Thus, to explain the changing attitude in certain African communities in the acceptance of the clan, for instance, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard would explain the symbols associated with it "sociologically translating them into terms of social function" especially as "Africans have no
objective knowledge of the forces determining their social organisation and actuating their social behaviour".
Whatever the last sentence may mean, it seems certain to me that whether we are thinking of the family, or the clan or the state, the political theorist who seeks explanation by examining possible motives of "acceptance" and referring these motives to an ethical ideal and the anthropologist who seeks explanation in terms of "materialistic needs" and "survival-value" each in his own way throws some light on the nature of society. Therefore while granting that the problems of comparative politics and not those of political philosophy one may nevertheless argue that political philosophy has its contribution to make to the study of society.

Nor indeed are the value judgements of the political philosopher so divorced from actual facts as it appears at first sight. Indeed man's actual experiences are the data of political philosophy. When Aristotle, for example, in his sketch of the origin of society says that the impulse of self-preservation brought the slave into the household i.e. into the care of the master and that the slave places his body at the disposal of someone who is able to supply the 'guidance of reason' he was using a criterion of value to explain the institution of slavery but he would not have put forward his hypothesis if slavery had not existed in
Greek society and if the slave were not in fact under the control of the master.

Therefore, even if the anthropologist reluctantly grants the relevance of value judgements to the explanation of society we, seeking the significance of Aristotle's categories for certain West African societies, need to show that those categories are formulated in conditions sufficiently similar to those prevailing in West Africa to make their application relevant and fruitful.

The fact that thought had become deliberate, systematic and critical in the society Aristotle knew while different conditions prevailed in West Africa until lately is of course not to be lightly dismissed. For, that fact is one of the main contributory factors to the glory and the achievements of the Hellenic culture. Its significance can, however, easily be exaggerated, as it often is even in most contemporary anthropology which usually lumps together all non-literate or pre-literate peoples under the term primitives and makes a distinction between 'primitives' and 'moderns' on the basis of literacy and illiteracy. Thus many well-developed and massive cultures in Africa and Asia are brought under the scope of anthropological inquiry and become undifferentiated from, say, the cultures of the Arunta and the Andaman Islanders.
Also, the Aztecs and the Incas are subjects of anthropological inquiry while the Greeks and Romans are outside its scope.

Bascom*1 in his short article has very brilliantly created a background which is most appropriate for our examination of the significance of Aristotle's doctrine, and the comparison of the two cultures which tracing that significance involves. For, drawing attention to the importance of recognizing the richness and complexity of some cultures in making generalizations about "primitive" peoples, Bascom says*2

Simplicity is commonly cited as a characteristic of "primitive" cultures. Social, political and economic structures which are simple or at least not highly institutionalized, and simple technologies are found among "primitive" peoples, as well as cultures with a restricted number of forms of expression in folklore, music, dancing, or the graphic and plastic arts, a small number of ceremonies, and religious concepts which are indefinite or perhaps only difficult to define because they have a wide and general application. The generalization that such a description fits all non-literate societies, however, is false; and the definition of "primitive" as "simple" is sometimes qualified by a postscript that the cultures of the Maya, the Inca and of certain tribes on the West Coast of Africa are remarkably complex. The term "primitive" is valid in these cases only if it is used technically to distinguish literate societies from those whose history and culture are transmitted orally.

The publications of Rathray, Danquah, and Sarbah on the Ashanti and Fanti (Akan), Field on the Ga, Spieth and Westermann on the Ewe, Herskovits on Dahomey, Johnson on the Yoruba, Meek and Thomas on the Ibo, and Talbot on a number of tribes in Southern Nigeria, to mention only a few

* 1 W.R. Bascom - "West Africa and the Complexity of Primitive Cultures" - 'American Anthropologist' Volume 50 pp.18-22.
* 2 Bascom op. cit. p.18.
of the sources, indicate the complex and highly formalized political, social and economic institutions, the variety of artistic expression, and the intricacies of theology and religious ritual that are found in the Guinea Coast area.

Although the lack of large-scale political units is one of the distinctive characteristics of the eastern Ibo, they cannot be regarded as simple in religion, economics, art or other aspects of culture. And while the empires of the Sudan area to the north are perhaps more widely known, there is little to choose between them and the Benin, Yoruba, Dahomey, and Ashanti kingdoms in the way of complexity of structure. Of all the groups the Yoruba are the most highly urbanized. Nine of the ten largest cities in Nigeria, according to the last census\(^1\), all of what are over forty-five thousand, are Yoruba, including Ibadan...the largest city in Negro Africa.

Kings of the Guinea Coast area held far-reaching authority. They ruled large populations through a series of subordinate chiefs responsible for districts, sub-districts, cities, and parts of cities within their empires. They were able to raise large armies to defend their kingdoms or to invade the territories of their neighbours, and occasionally to resist the penetration of the Colonial powers. Civil and criminal cases were tried before formally constituted courts of law, presided over by the chiefs.

A comparison between the structure of Greek society and that of some West African societies is therefore not such a bizarre undertaking as at first sight appears. For there are indeed interesting similarities between the institutions, customs and beliefs of Greek society and

\(^1\) Bascom, on a 1936 estimate quotes the population of Ibadan at 387,000; it is now estimated at very near a million.
and those of some west African societies.

"I conceive that land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living and countless numbers are still unborn"\(^1\) says a Nigerian chief expressing his and the traditional conception of the true relation of the family to the land, as reported by Meek.

Here we seem to have almost a direct quotation from Plato - "The land is a goddess herself...and the lot-holder, i.e. the owner of a plot of land, must pass his lot at death to his son, and this son is the minister not merely of the gods of the city but also of the gods of the family and all its members living and dead"\(^2\). The Greek 'aachisteia' is almost identical with the Yoruba 'extended family', the former embracing a group wider than that embraced by the family and not as inclusive as the clan, the Yoruba 'extended family' being a group of people connected by recognition of a common lineage head whom they regard as representing their interests within the wider society of the clan. Thus in both cases we have a society intermediate between the family and the clan.

Homer indeed offers all the characteristics of a tribal

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\(^1\) Meek - inside cover of "Land Law and Custom in the Colonies" (O.U.P. 1946)

\(^2\) Plato - "Laws" - (740 b.c., 741 c.cf. 923b)
society; and a Yoruba tribal chief with his plural wives would very likely find good company among the warrior chiefs of the Iliad; and until recently it would not be difficult to find among the singers or bards attached to the court of the chiefs some capable, by virtue of their art, of reciting tales about the origin, history and achievements of the chiefly house whose characteristics one could with profit compare with those of the tales of Homer. And the relationship between the tribal chief, the members of the community and the land among the Yorubas as described by Dr. Elias remarkably resembles that which we saw in Aristotle's clan-community 'kome' and in Homeric society if Dr. Elias' description is divested of purely legal terminology. For among the Yorubas the chief is everywhere regarded as the symbol of the residuary reversionary and ultimate ownership of all land held by a territorial community. He holds on behalf of the whole community in the capacity of a caretaker or trustee only but he allocates portions of land to family heads according to need and these in turn reallocate among their numbers.*1

G.B.A. Coker, a judge of the Nigerian High Court who has made an excellent study of the Yoruba family notes the

truth contained in the analogy Aristotle draws between household authority and the authority of the monarch or chief, and in drawing attention to the close relationship between the father and the chief in the Yoruba conception of both says "the average Yorubaman believes that these men (i.e. chiefs) placed over him have the divine authority to lead and govern him. It is therefore not difficult to appreciate the reason for the recognition of the chiefs by the Yorubas and the considerable authority attributed to them. Indeed, what Aristotle said is true of the Yoruba, that:

"Men say that the gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine not only the forms of the gods, but their ways of life, to be like their own" (Aristotle, Politics Bk. I chap.2, para 7, tr. Barker p.4. See also Maine, Early Law and Custom pp.86-90)\(^1\). Aristotle, of course, has other views about a society of which this is a permanent feature but those views we postpone till later.

And as regards the institution of slavery, the only point on which the head of the Yoruba family would disagree

with Aristotle's theory on the institution of slavery is the scientific or natural basis he gives to it. In fact, according to Coker, Aristotle and the Yoruba head of family would agree that it was "that later practice, introduced mainly from Europe" which prostituted "the true and the Aristotelian conception of slavery by introducing "the mercenary element" thus turning slavery "into one of the most outrageous acts of inhumanity the world has ever known". For, "in ancient times the slave was as much a necessary part of the household as the wife, and in the average Yoruba home...the slave was as much a member as anyone else in the home" - thus "a normal household among the early Yorubas consisted of the head of the family, the wife, the children and the slaves".¹

Aristotle would also think it worth his while to assess the merits of the conception of the soul among the peoples of Southern Nigeria as observed by P.A.Talbot. Says Talbot -

"There is a general belief that each person possesses four souls: first, an ethereal one, the double and inner frame of the physical form; secondly, the soul proper, the consciousness, the thinking or mental body: thirdly, the spiritual or minor Ego: and fourthly, the Over-Soul, or ēhi, the great spirit, which often includes several lesser Egos and always stays with God...The shadow is considered the sign, usually of the ethereal, but sometimes of the mental body...The ethereal one dissolves with

¹ Coker op. cit. p.38
the physical structure, while the greater part of the soul is relatively immortal, and the third and fourth perish. *1

This conception, however, does not imply the split of man’s nature into several incoherent elements or selves. The unity of man’s personality is presupposed; for all the selves or souls constitute a unity which often expresses itself according to the Yoruba conception, through the medium of the body (ara) and through the agency of the heart-soul (okan) the whole individuality being regarded as Spirit (Emi) or over-soul or the larger self which belongs and is skin to the Supreme Divine Spirit - Classicists would hear faint echoes of Aristotle’s νοῦς παθητικός and νοῦς κοινητικός.

Talbot *2 again makes interesting comparisons between the Greek, the Yoruba, the Ibiobio God of Thunder and his relation to Mother-Earth; comparisons which according to Talbot confirms Miss Jane Harrison’s statement that "as Euripides has it: it is in his Epiphany of Thunder and Lightning that Keraunos (Kronos) comes to keraunia, that the Sky God weds Semele, the Earth, the 'Bride of the Bladed Thunder' "*3 and "at the present day the Ibiobio

*2 Talbot - "Life in Southern Nigeria" (1923)
*3 Talbot op. cit. pp. 4 - 7.
God of Thunder (Ete Abassi (Father God), the husband of Eka Abassi has been superseded by Abassi Obumo, as was the Greek Chronos (Kronos) by Zeus, the Yoruba Shango by Awlawrun (Olorun), and the Ibo Chuku Abiama by Chineke, or has even become identified with him, as has Eka Abassi in some places with Isong, the earth." *1

Gilbert Murray not groundlessly sees "several West African parallels" to the cult of Dionysus, the Bundu of the Mende, for instance, and traces some similarity between Zeus Lykaios and the Human Leopards or Human Lions of West Africa*2. There is a striking similarity between the Greek 'Themis', especially as conceived by Hesiod, and the Yoruba 'Ela'. The former sits by the side of all-seeing Zeus, giving to man right (δικαίος) and earthly rewards if justice be observed. The latter is "The Prime Minister of Olodumare" - (The Supreme Deity of the Yoruba) and "one whose function is to set the world right, a deity to whom is credited the main functions of peace-making and of reconciliation where there is discord, and the restoration of order wherever there is chaos" and he "works on earth to create order, happiness and understanding among the inhabitants of the earth". *3

* 1 Talbot op. cit. p.13.
* 2 Gilbert Murray - "Anthropology in Greek Epic Tradition outside Homer" in *Anthropology and the Classics* p.70ff.
* 3 Dr.E.B.Idowu - "OLODUMARE - God in Yoruba Belief" Longmans 1962, pp.101 - 103.
The appearance of 'Themis' in the Greek conception of the gods has been ascribed by several scholars to a time when the Greeks became more conscious of the problems of morals and realised the issues involved in the relations between individuals and society; the divine forces thus becoming increasingly conceived as ethical forces with increasing social consciousness. Here, 'Ela' yields an interesting point of comparison with 'Themis' in the moral ideas it stands for. It is also interesting to note that Orunmila's relation to 'Ela' is not unlike that of 'Themis' to Apollo, that 'Orunmila' is like Apollo a god of divination and has in 'Esu' a colleague not unlike that which 'Apollo' has in 'Hermes'.

In the main body of this study I drew attention to Dr. Feaver's study of the "Historical Development in the Priesthoods of Athens". One only need to compare some of his remarks with those made by Dr. Idowu on Yoruba priesthood to see the very striking similarities. In both cases the priests never formed a caste. In both cases the cults are attached to clans; also in both cases, we see public cults developing from private, or, what Dr. Feaver calls, 'gentile' cults. Among the Athenians a territorial community formerly consisting of 12 tribal or clan units, there was at the head of each unit the 'basileus' (king or chief) who had both secular and religious functions, and
after the unification which brought the state of Athens into existence "the chief cults of the new community were incorporated into the religious life of the whole group either by instituting a pilgrimage to its old cult centre or by setting up a parallel sanctuary in Athens, near the Acropolis, or by both methods...When new sanctuaries were set up, new priesthoods were needed...and the same genos (clan) which had controlled the original cult may have supplied the priests for the new". Among the Yorubas worship "is undertaken by the supreme head of the extended family who is "father" or "grandfather" to the whole compound community. The whole community is the offspring of the ancestor as well as of the central tutelary divinity. This supreme head is entitled to his priestly function he is the senior of the blood relations in the extended family and therefore succeeds to the priestly function which used to belong to the common ancestor from whom the family descended". But when the family had enlarged into a compound community and several compound communities had formed a ward or clan and several clans had formed a town, "the cult of the divinity tends to remain with its original 'owners' and clans that came into fusion bring their own cults and they remain the sole repositories of the cultus....whatever

might be the relative status of the persons or clans with the community, they retain the guardianship of the cults of which they are the 'owners'. If such cults become communal property, the whole community still look up to those 'owners' for the conduct of their rituals, with the only modification that they now hold the custody and officiate on behalf of the town".  

We come finally to Aristotle's three stages of the social evolution - the family, the clan-village, and the state.

From the point of view of the survival of a people or the species as a whole, the family is not an indispensable element of human society. For, sociologically, the biological trinity of father, mother and children, could be merged in larger units. It is, however, the differential relationship between husband and wife, parent and child, as compared with relationships between an adult with other adults of opposite sex, and between an adult and his child as distinguished from those with other children which distinguish the family. Although the question whether there is a sufficient basic identity between most types of marriage and family life to justify the use of a common term of

description is not a pointless one, most anthropologists believe that the family is universal.

Aristotle says that the family or household lacks self-sufficiency because it is by itself not adequate to satisfy the demands of the good life; it could satisfy only daily recurring needs. Anthropology points out that no matter how important the family is, it cannot be self-sufficient for the simple reason that it is normally exogamous. A male can get his wife only by obtaining some other man's daughter or sister. The incest rule makes the offspring of any one elementary family dependent on some other elementary family.

The family or household of Aristotle's conception approximates closest to what Radcliffe-Brown calls the "elementary" form of the family, i.e. a single husband and wife with their child or children, including adoptive children. Radcliffe-Brown, however, would exclude from the 'elementary' family slaves and other unrelated members of the household whom Aristotle and his fellow-Greeks regarded as comprised in the household.

On the other hand, "the feature of African marriage which is perhaps most widely known to the general public is that polygny - the legal marriage of one man to two or
more women concurrently - is permitted" *1 "In fact" continues Mair "this rule is only one aspect of a system where co-operation in tilling the fields and herding the cattle is provided by a group of people bound by the obligations of kinship and marriage and not by the relationship of wage-earner to employer. The larger the co-operating group, the greater the possibilities of wealth and of defence against enemies, and the more children are born to any group, the greater its hopes of expansion in the future. Legitimate children are secured by marriage in due form, and the importance of securing legitimate descendants accounts for the characteristic features of African marriage law. Woman have their own share, an important one, in the division of labour, and both the wealth of the group and its hopes of progeny are greater in proportion to the number of wives.

Thus the polygynous joint family, consisting of a man, his wives, and their children, is the ideal of most Africans. But it is obvious that the normal distribution of the sexes in any population would make it impossible for every man to have even two wives, let alone a large number... As a generalization it may be safely asserted that many Africans

must always have been monogamous."

Thus Dr. Mair draws attention to two important facts that the collective solidarity of tribal life is at the basis of polygynous marriage while the individualism which Aristotle postulates for familial and political life is at the basis of monogamous marriage and that actually monogamy is the most prevalent form of marriage all over the world though it is obligatory only in a few societies.

There is no doubt that Aristotle would regard the polygynous family as a mark of barbarism: For Aristotle's ethical demands lead him often to despise the family which does not conform to his own ideal. Thus he contemptuously calls a union of the non-Greek man and woman a mere union of a man-slave and a woman-slave because the non-Greek uses his wife for manual labours.

Though one can hardly hope thereby to make Aristotle modify his judgement on polygyny it is nevertheless relevant to draw attention to the surprising support which polygynous marriage seems to have found in St. Augustine as reported by the Rev. Lyndon Harries, and to Ward's explanation of the nature of African polygynous marriage. *1

Lyndon Harries says:

St. Augustine did not consider polygamy an offence

against the moral law provided that its object was the multiplication of the race. It is immoral, (contra mores), he held, only if its purpose be mere sexual pleasure. It can become wrong on extrinsic grounds if it is prohibited by positive law or reprobated by public sentiment. He wrote:

'It is made a matter of grave reproach to Isaac's son Jacob that he had four wives, but a general consideration will clear him of all blame. When polygamy was a common custom, it was no crime; it ranks as a crime now because it is no longer customary. We must distinguish between offences against nature, offences against common custom, offences against positive law... If you enquire as to natural law, he took his wives not from fleshly lust, but in order that he might have offspring; if as to custom, it was a general practice at that time in those parts; if as to positive law, there was none that prohibited it'.

Ward's explanation *1 is on similar lines, but it is based on a close examination of the marriage customs and behaviour of the Yoruba. While not dismissing the sex motive in the acquisition of plural wives Ward rightly assigns to it a minor role. For there are several more potent motives. First is the desire for children. A man who is thought to be incapable of procreation is an object of contempt; hence the husband of a barren woman will frequently take another in order to demonstrate his virility. Children in large numbers also add to a man's standing and

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usually prove a source of great help. Taboo is perhaps a strong but not an inappropriate word to describe the sanction against sex relations with a woman within the three years immediately following the delivery of a child - such prolonged abstinence is thought suitably relieved by a second marriage if a man had the means of achieving it. Also, since the levirate is practised, a man may suddenly find himself inheriting a wife.

Another important motive is the direct economic utility of wives. For, Yoruba women are excellent traders and are well-known for their bargaining ability. As Dr. Mair says *1 "in Africa the wife's contribution to the family's subsistence is normally direct and indispensable, and where this is so her husband is as much dependent upon her as she is on him". Another important motive for plural wives is the craving for prestige. For an imposing array of wives no doubt increased a man's social standing.

More importantly, Ward is clearly right in stating that the psychology of polygyny has little to do with excessive masculine lust, that the practice is not as degrading to the wives as appears at first sight to an outside observer, and that, the relationship between co-wives is just like that between any human beings thrust into proximity and

* 1 Dr. L.P. Mair, op. cit. p. 7.
in a sense put into the position of rivals.

Although Ward's study is particularly of Yoruba marriage and family, most of his findings are true of most West African societies. There are, of course, minor peculiarities; the YakB of South-Eastern Nigeria, for example, neither associate prestige with the number of wives nor do they, like most other West African societies, ascribe any ascendancy to the head wife.

Dr. Coker's summary of the Yoruba family in relation to property would be true of most West African families and I here quote him at some length. He writes:

Family property as an institution of native law and custom is fundamental to all forms of property-holding in Yorubaland. This is so, not only because land constituted the most important source of wealth among the early Yorubas, but also because the traditional instinct of the average Yoruba manifests the consistent desire to acquire and retain land in the family... No question arises with respect to the classification of land, for instance, as immovable property, but as wives and slaves also partake of the element of immobility they are equally regarded as immovable properties of the family...

The death of the husband... does not determine the connection of the wife with the family, and the nexus could be, and almost invariably is, retained by the widow marrying another member of the family, usually the brother of her deceased husband. Evidently her marriage attaches her more to the family of her husband than to the husband himself; indeed, she is a peculiar member of the household. Yet she was never bound by native law and custom so to marry the brother; but she is so much an acknowledged part of the family property of her deceased husband that no one else outside that family
would readily agree to marry her. Whilst a wife she is entitled to take part in all the activities of the family in which women can take part, and she enjoys her share of respect and dignity. It has been suggested that under native law and custom the status of the wife differs little from that of the slave. It is submitted, however, that this is not a correct inference from the state of things, and any such conclusion could only be justified from a study of a particular family, and not from a general study of the lives of a whole people" (See Delano, op. cit. pp. 120 et seq; Meek, Law and Authority, etc., pp. 202-203; Rev. E. Ward, op. cit., p. 38; also pp. 230-233, ante)*1.

In most West African societies, therefore, the fundamental social unit is the family. A number of patrilineally related units of this type may form a coresidential group known as an 'extended' family. This usually embraces the males of a patrilineage plus their wives and the unmarried females begotten by the members; it therefore usually excludes its female members so far as they are married while it includes the wives who come from other lineages and perform important functions in the house-group. In his study of the Ibo, Green defines this house-group or extended family. Says Green*2

By a house-group is meant a collection of separate mud houses belonging to the individuals of an extended family. Sometimes two or more house groups are close together... By an extended family

*2 M.M. Green - "Land Tenure in an Ibo Village", 1941, pp. 2-3, see also 'Introduction to "Ibo Village Affairs", 1947.
is meant a group of closely related people, known by a common name and consisting usually of a man and his wives and children, his sons' wives and children, his brothers and half-brothers and their wives and children and possibly other near relations... All the people born in the village believe themselves to be descended ultimately from a common ancestor.

Green's definition would be true of most West African familial groups, with the obvious exception of certain matrilineal groups.

Except that the members embraced by the Greek 'anchisteia' did not necessarily live together, the Yoruba or the Ibo 'extended' family very closely corresponds to the Greek 'anchisteia'.

Among the Yorubas however, there is a larger aggregate formed by a number of extended families. This is known as 'agboile'. This may be called a clan-village. A number of 'agboile' may form a town. In such a town the 'agboile' is a unit enjoying considerable independence, and its administration is gerontocratic. The head of the 'agboile' who is also a lineage head is sometimes called 'bale', though this is a title more appropriate to the head of a clan-village which is not a component unit of a larger aggregate forming the town. The 'bale' decides all matters affecting the lineage members, consulting where necessary the heads of the extended families which compose the 'agboile' and their head wives. He may also punish offending members,
of the group. In serious cases, he might represent the interest of a member of his group before the town government.

The role of the village-head in this respect is even greater among the Ibo where the village head and some village elders perform important judicial activities and have important roles in matters of funeral and inheritance, trade, the punishment of theft and other crimes, and the external relations of the group. Indeed, according to the distinction Paula Brown makes, it is the fact that among the Ibo, the Mende, the Dahomey, the kin-group head acts as his group's "official representative to the community" that partly distinguishes these societies from those in which associations not based on birth or kinship, and the state play the major role.

When an 'agbole' increases in numbers a branch may settle in another part of the town or in a new village; in this case we have a genuine example of Aristotle's definition of the clan-village - "an offshoot of the family". In such a case the head of the new 'agbole' or village is usually regarded as subordinate to the head of the parent compound.

The 'agbole' therefore would correspond with Aristotle's 'komé'. If however the clan is defined, as it is often
defined, as a unilateral exogamous group neither the Yoruba 'agbole' nor the Greek 'kome' can strictly be defined as a clan-group. But sometimes the bond uniting the members of a group formed by people belonging to a number of lineages is regarded as a clan-tie by virtue of the sense, sometimes vague, of common origin felt by all the members of the group. In this sense the clan would be a large group based on the arbitrary and artificial extension of kinship sentiments, having economic and social functions, and often united by common ceremonies and by common religious and other symbols. It is in this sense that the Yoruba 'agbole' or the aggregate formed by a number of it, and the Greek 'kome' can be called a clan-group.

The true lineage among the Yoruba is called 'idile' and it plays an important social role. As P.C.Lloyd observes:

In all these (Yoruba) towns the majority, if not all, of the living male members of the lineage live together in the lineage compound. The head of the lineage is also head of the compound. This old man is responsible for discipline within the lineage and within the compound; his authority in the former case extends over scattered persons, since the adult women of the lineage live in their husband's compounds but return to their own for lineagemeetings; within the compound the lineage head exercises authority not only over the members of his own lineage but also over their wives and possibly strangers. All minor disputes are taken before him for settlement; certain more serious
offences, such as manslaughter or witchcraft, are dealt with by the chiefs from the beginning. Appeals against a lineage head or cases involving members of two lineages are heard by the ruler and his chiefs.

The lineage is the land-holding unit and most traditional craft industries were practised by members of one or two lineages. Cases involving land or the craft were thus discussed in lineage meetings.

The government of the towns was based largely on the lineage system...

The authority of the lineage head was mainly moral and he was usually senior in age to the other elders. Also, though his seniority gave him a control that was apparently nominal, the general belief that he was better fitted to approach the lineage ancestors and duties gave him a considerable amount of real authority.

Finally, we come to the third stage of Aristotle’s scheme – the state. Aristotle sees the state essentially as a political organisation where kinship ties are not used as a basic principle of organisation in the pattern of distribution or delegation of authority. His 'first' state is a monarchy because, directly deriving from the structure and organisation of the clan-village, it has a single hereditary head from which all authority stems. Monarchy, however, he believes is not the ideal organisation for a fully developed state because, according to him, it fetters the principle of participation by all members in the administration of the community.
In his epoch-making work on 'Ancient Law', Sir Henry Maine, once again basing part of his exposition on the insights contained in Aristotle's doctrine, says that in early societies kinship was "the sole possible ground of community in political functions" whereas "the idea that a number of persons should exercise political rights in common simply because they happen to live within the same topographical limits was utterly strange and monstrous to primitive antiquity." It seems obvious now from the findings of anthropology that Maine exaggerates the role which kinship plays in the social life of 'primitive' societies and is mistaken in his estimate of the role of the territorial tie.

Be that as it may, the existence of states in West Africa even in the fairly distant past is recognised by most anthropologists. Most of these states are, however, kingdoms; and the extent to which authority in them is based on inheritance of chieftainship in local dominant lineages would probably make Aristotle doubt whether the word 'state' is an appropriate term to apply to these social organisations. But since whoever resides within the territorial boundaries of the chief or king acknowledges and accepts his authority, whatever his kin-connexions, it would be difficult to deny these
Another point on which Aristotle seems mistaken is his idea that every monarchy (he here obviously based his assumption on the nature of what he conceived to be the nature of monarchies among non-Hellenic peoples) is a despotism. One hardly need mention modern constitutional monarchies which could be as democratic as Aristotle would approve, making allowance for modern conditions. But even at the less sophisticated levels, it is easily proved that monarchy is by no means necessarily identical with despotism (Aristotle, and indeed most Greek political theorists, of course, made a distinction between monarchy and despotism but they regarded either as an instance of one man rule, the difference between them lying only in the fact that the monarch rules in the interest of his subjects while the despot aims at his own selfish interests). For, when examined in relation to the role which associations play in social life, a chief or king may appear in a number of different situations. The king or chief may dominate the important associations in the community, thus strengthening his control with the aid of a closely knit organisation. Second, he may be a mere puppet in the hands of societies, secret or open. Third, there may be divided authority.

There would probably be at least one instance of each
situation in the kingdoms of West Africa. The Benin kingdom from the 15th to the 18th century may be cited as an example of the really autocratic kingdom. Among the Yorubas, though the independence and authority of the king is considerable, religious fraternities - the famous example is the 'Ogboni' society among the 'Egba' and the 'Osugbo' among the 'Ijebu'-greatly fetter the authority of the chief. For, these societies decide most important issues, perform judicial functions, sometimes turning over criminals over to satellite organisations for execution. And among the 'Mende', the grand master of the 'Poro' society often eclipses royal power. But even in what is a general description of Yoruba kingdoms one sees that chieftainship is usually not despotic. For, as Dr. Paula Brown remarks:*

Whether the authority of a Yoruba chief was legal, ritual, or both, he headed a loose confederacy within which most administration was local, but major disputes or offences could be brought to his court. This type of centralization was accompanied by some occupational specialization, urbanization, the appointment of agents of the central government in towns, compulsory military service, and the collection of tribute.

And J. Vansina in "A comparison of African kingdoms" distinguishes five forms:

(1) Kingdoms where the king controls the internal and external affairs of the provinces; (2) kingdoms where the king controls the internal and external affairs of the provinces through a system of overseers; (3) kingdoms where the king controls only external policies and where there is no permanent administration link between him and the chiefs of provinces; (4) kingdoms where the external policy is regulated by a council of chiefs headed by the king; and (5) kingdoms where the only authority of the king is to arbitrate in disputes between the chiefs, when asked to do so.

But he finds that, except in "states* of such a small size that there is no delegation of authority, so that the king is headman of a village but where nevertheless the formal structure of a kingdom is present", only a few states belong to class (1) i.e. the obviously autocratic state.

According to the famous comparative review of African Political systems edited by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, however, there are two main types of African Political systems. The one group which is called group 'A' has a centralized authority, administrative machinery and judicial institutions, this group is typified by the Zulu, the Bemba and the Kede; to this group would fall West African communities like the Yoruba, the Mende and the

Ashanti, the other group (B) typified by the Nuer and Tallensi is the segmentary. This lacks government in the sense in which group A is said to have a government i.e. there is no sharp division in rank, status or wealth, and the lineage structure is the framework of the political system. The Ibo of Nigeria falls into this group.

This distinction is of course a very broad one and there have been a number of attempts to make more precise distinctions. Thus Paula Brown*1 making a new classification by the use of the presence or absence of lineages, associations, and the state in the political structure reveals that Fortes' and Pritchard's classification ignores the role of lineages in the centralized political systems and ignores associations and other elements in discussing the segmentary political systems, while emphasising the role of lineage and kinship ties in them. From Paula Brown's analysis there emerge four types of political systems in West Africa (a) societies like the Tallensi whose political structure is based almost on lineage alone; (b) those with larger non-localized clans such as the 'Ibo' which have lineages and associations (c) those such as the Yoruba and Mende where lineages,

*1 Paula Brown -"Patterns of Authority in West Africa"- Africa No. 21 pp.261 - 277.
associations and the state have roles in the political structure, and (d) those like the Ashanti, Dahomey and Nupe where lineages and associations play a very minor role in the social structure.

When, however, it is realised that there are some differences in the political structures of even the various sub-tribes within a tribe, it will be clear how inadequate broad distinctions such as Fortes and Evans-Pritchard are for a classification of African political systems. Paula Brown's distinction however even though it may be inadequate when fine distinctions need to be made, serves our purpose here because it gives the broad outline of the social structure of most West African societies in terms of the lineage, associations, various forms of age-grade etc., and the state.*

In conclusion we may note that Aristotle sees that the true authority in the family unit is moral; this is clearly so in most West African societies, the authority of the father resting on the respect and love which most children feel towards their parents. I have earlier

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*1 In his article on "The Traditional Political System of the Yoruba" ('South-Western Journal of Anthropology', Vol.10, 1954 pp. 366 - 384.) P.C.Lloyd discusses in details the role of lineages in the governmental structure of the Yoruba. I am here indebted to his account.
remarked on the close connection which Aristotle sees between the authority of the elementary family and the authority exercised in the clan or village community; his observation is clearly true of most West African communities; for the elementary family, forming a part of the extended family usually has its authority merged with that of the clan head who is usually the senior by one or two generations to most members. Kingly or chiefly authority is therefore in spirit parental. The chief's authority is exercised in the localised clan - which corresponds with Aristotle's village (kome), but intermediate to the elementary family and the maximal lineage is Aristotle's genos which one can only translate again into clan in English.

It is with these intermediate groups that Aristotle connects the aristocratic cults whose activities gave trouble to the democrats in the course of the development of democracy in Athens. One can observe these intermediate groups in most West African societies; they are usually lineage segments, i.e., sections of the maximal lineage which is the village, and usually have cults established for the worship of the ancestors of the lineage. Green's analysis makes this clear in respect to the Ibo.*

* M.M. Green - "Ibo Village Affairs" and "Land Tenure in an Ibo Village".
but the same is true certainly of the Yorubas and I guess of other West African societies like the Tallensi, the Mende, and the Ashanti.

The more interesting aspect of Aristotle's doctrine is his conception of the relationship of the village or clan community to the state. For he states that the clan-village is no less distinct a phase of the social evolution than the Household or the State and that the clan-community exists by nature and should be a permanent element in the state. We learn for instance that the clan-group aids the maintenance of good feeling and good fellowship among the members of the state (Politics - II 4. 1261a 12) that the 'phratry' or tribe performs indispensable services in the fully developed state. Thus Aristotle, as I have shown in the examination of his conception of the village earlier on, regrets the weakening of the kinship bond and recommends that every effort should be made to make every citizen retain his tribal, phratic and clan connections; for the so-called freedom of the merchant, sailor, artisan etc. from the ties of these hereditary groupings seem to him a bad thing. It results in the practice of 'living as you like' (Politics VI 1319b 30). Hence his preference for
an agricultural democracy in which most of the citizens
would be able to retain their clan connections,
cultivating their ancestral holdings (Politics VI.
1318b 6ff). For when you take people out of their tribal
or clan groups what you have later on, so Aristotle's
arguments go, are the mechanics, traders, labourers, who,
bound by no tribal loyalties, become disconnected atoms
drifting through the life of the community.

We thus see that Aristotle conceives the relation
of the clan-village to the state in close connection with
the change from rural or tribal life to urban life.
It is therefore interesting to note the form which the
change from rural or tribal life has taken in some West
African communities. By and large, new social organisations
are formed when people come from different traditional
groups and mingle as a result of the shift from rural to
urban pursuits. Some of these new organisations take the
form, more or less, of pure associations but are partly
based on occupation and tribe, and assume responsibilities
for many of the duties traditionally performed by the
extended family and other kinship groups. Such are the
findings of Professor K.A. Busia in his 'Report on a Social
Survey of Takoradi-Sekondi', 1950. Also, there are other
associations more purely based on tribal affiliation, and
these also provide other forms of adjustment to the new circumstances of urban life. But, what is remarkable in view of Aristotle's doctrine, Professor Busia points out that it is these tribal associations rather than the town in which the urban dweller settles which serve as the real focus of his interests and activities. For while he may own property there and marry and have children he is always considered, and he considers himself a 'stranger'; the ties of kinship keep alive his attachment to his native town or village. And speaking of 'The Role of Tribal Associations in Nigeria', Coleman says that these associations "are the medium for re-integrating the individual employed in an impersonal urban city by permitting him to have the essential feeling of belonging". But as seems almost inevitable, the fact that most kinship groups are no longer economically self-sufficient impairs their solidarity for other social purposes; consequently occupation and other associations not established or tribal or kinship lines have taken over many of the activities previously performed by the extended family, the lineage and other traditional organisations. Thus once again, it is proved that where statehood enters, especially if under the conditions of industrial production, the clan and other groups based on kinship
become rather impotent social entities.

Aristotle is, no doubt, right in noting the sense of belonging which clan-ties could give in the fully developed state. The Greeks however neglected his conservative warnings. Aristotle himself has noted that the weakening of the institution of chiefship (the clan head originally) was a concomitant of social and political progress. He even spoke contemptuously of non-Greek societies who perpetually submit to chiefly authority. His fellow-Greeks seem to have added that the weakening of the tribal groupings and their replacement, after the citizen had freed himself from their loyalties and duties, by small groups in the forms of clubs and other societies is also a concomitant of the social evolution, especially at the appearance of an industrial society.

There is currently much debate on the breakdown of tribal patterns of African societies - the formerly wide circle of kinship is contracting and playing a decreasing part in the lives of the people. The child now does not grow up amidst a host of kinsmen in the village. The extended family formerly a compact, self-supporting unit within the larger society of the clan is giving place to
the family of an industrial society and there are, no doubt, symptoms of Aristotle's atomistic individuals who, bound by no loyalties, drift through the life of the community. It is not likely that these African communities in their search for new structures and new associations to replace the old ones would have recourse to Aristotle's recommendations; it is nevertheless interesting to note that over two thousand years ago somebody saw clearly into the roots of the present African social situation.