Aspects of patterning in the vocabulary of Chaucer with particular reference to his courtly terminology

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Aspects of Patterning in the Vocabulary of Chaucer, with Particular Reference to his Courtly Terminology.

The present study analyses the senses and sense-relations of approximately fifty words of two major groups signifying benevolence and malevolence within courtly contexts in the works of Chaucer. The analysis is carried out not with individual words alone, but also in such a manner as to indicate how these words enter into patterned relationships of various types and origins, and some of these are described. Though the ultimate contribution of the thesis is conceived to be in terms of a more precise understanding of the conceptual background and stylistic resources of Chaucer's art, thereby furnishing the equipment for a surer and closer criticism of late mediaeval English literature in general, some account is also taken of recent linguistic thought on the structure of the vocabulary and meaning.

The problems of analysis and representation of the meaning of vocabulary items and their inter-relationships are considered as a preliminary: structural semantics, conceptual fields, collocations, idiom-formation and context of situation are discussed, and the contribution of linguistic theory to the method of analysis is indicated at some length. The limitations of the ordinary, synchronic model of linguistic description for the study of the lexis and diction of a mediaeval language are demonstrated, and the reconciliation of synchronic with diachronic methods is urged as a corrective. The notion of a fully extensive semantic field in this area of the vocabulary is rejected in favour of the inter-relation of numerous lesser systems, and the importance of diachronic and extralinguistic factors in the study of vocabulary is then illustrated by their role in explaining the origin and development of the lexical, lexico-grammatical and semantic patterns originally isolated by synchronic analysis. By these means a literary critical procedure is envisaged which would combine the insights of literary and intellectual history with the critical objectivity of descriptive linguistics.
J. D. BURNLEY

ASPECTS OF PATTERNING IN THE VOCABULARY OF CHAUCER
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO HIS COURTLY TERMINOLOGY

VOL. I

Ph.D. Thesis

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University of Durham 1971
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The years of the preparation of this thesis have been spent on the move so that my debts, which I acknowledge happily, are scattered throughout the country.

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Introduction

0.1. The aim of the present study is to examine the senses and illuminate the uses of a number of words from a particular area of the vocabulary of Chaucer, indicating, where appropriate, any patterns into which the words enter. But this is not the totality of its aims: the way in which it performs this task is equally important. The information which this study derives must be presented in a form which renders it easily re-applicable to the literature from which it is drawn, whether at the stylistic level or that of the background of ideas. The purpose of this study is not to elicit a theory of semantics, with Chaucer's language for exemplification, but to employ such theoretical considerations as may be useful in the analysis of Chaucer's usage, with the intention of increasing the assurance with which close, textually-based, literary criticism can approach his work. Its representation and discussion of linguistic meaning must therefore be somewhat informal and, with this in mind, I have adopted an eclectic and sometimes flexible attitude to linguistic theory which requires some comment.

0.2. The debt of modern linguistics to the Geneva scholar, De Saussure, is acknowledged to be heavy, and it is nowhere heavier than in its exploitation of the notion that systematic relations are to be found in the vocabulary of a language. This overall system of the vocabulary exists only in the synchronic plane and is a feature of 'langue' rather than 'parole'. It is exemplified by Saussure's famous image of the chess-board, which is paralleled by Ipsean's image of the mosaic. Unfortunately, the compilers of Saussure's book were wont to express his views as axioms, thus (p.83): "The opposition between the two viewpoints, the synchronic and the diachronic, is absolute.

\[ A \text{ Course in General Linguistics, tr. Vada Baskin, London (1960), pp.88-89.} \]
\[ Ipsean's \text{ first use of the mosaic image is in: } "\text{Der alte Orient und die Indogermanen}" \text{ in \textit{Studien und Aufgaben der Sprachwissenschaft, Festschrift für Streitberg, Heidelberg (1924)}, p. 225.} \]
and allows no compromise." and, speaking of the internal and external aspects of language: "In any case, separation of the two viewpoints is mandatory, and the more rigidly they are kept apart, the better it will be." ¹ Such rigidity may, however, militate against the supply of information of extreme value to literary understanding. In a synchronic and internal study of a language, Saussure goes so far as to say that loan-words may be entirely satisfactorily treated as members of the language system, regardless of their derivation. Such wilful blindness is, of course, undesirable in a study related to literary criticism and, indeed, in the study of a Middle English writer such as Chaucer, an axiomatic statement of this sort obfuscates questions of prime importance. Chaucer's language is the English of a man who could express himself equally readily in French, and the recent linguistic history of England was such that we might expect to find elements from at least two language systems in his writing. The extent to which these two linguistic systems and their associated stylistic traditions had coalesced is in itself a pertinent question for any structural study of his language. Can we, in any case, speak of synchrony in relation to these problems, when Chaucer's poetic life extended over thirty-five years, and clear traces of the evolution of his vocabulary are apparent in it? ² Furthermore, the greatest proportion of the corpus is poetic; much of it fictional and in verse. Chaucer's wide experience enables him to lend verisimilitude or verbal irony, by employing, correctly or incorrectly, terms from a bewildering range of linguistic registers: his interests include medicine and the law, astronomy and astrology, protocol and the wine-trade. In The Reeve's Tale, he is capable of employing some of the characteristics of Northern Middle English sufficiently well for

¹op.cit., p.22. By "internal and external", Saussure means the systematic relations within the language structure, and the relations which language contracts with culture, institutions, political history in the external world.

²In translating Le Roman de la Rose, Chaucer used the word 'kynge' as a courtly equivalent of 'king'. To taken over the vocabulary and style of courtly love,
Professor Tolkien to refer to him as a fellow philologist. ¹

The fact that so much of the corpus is in verse is significant, not only in respect of the more formal organisation of the language, but also with relation to Chaucer's work as part of the medieval verse tradition. Much of the diction of Chaucer's poetry is the heritage of earlier writers, borrowed by imitation from English writers or by loan-translation from the French. Thus, many rhymes, verbal formulae and collocations are products, not so much of the synchronic system of the language, as of the diachronic tradition of poetic composition. They form patterns in that E. Coeseriu has called the 'architecture' of the language as opposed to its structure. Such patterned usages cannot be economically or elegantly accommodated in the synchronic system of the language and can be better explained diachronically or by extra-linguistic reference; norms of explanation which should supplement the synchronic one. ²

Considerations of this kind encourage the investigator of a medieval text to take a less doctrinaire view of synchrony and the propositions dependent upon it than theoretical purity demands. As a result, it is clear that we should expect to find no fully extensive and integrated system in the collection of linguistic usages constituting the Chaucer canon; the more so since our approach is necessarily at the level of 'parole' rather than 'langue' and we can only abstract towards the latter with difficulty.

Diversity and variety at the level of usage form as much a part of Chaucer's

¹ 'Chaucer as a Philologist,' APS (1934), pp.108ff.

² The protests of scholars at the peremptory distinction made between synchronic and diachronic approaches have been heard from Jespersen’s review of the Course (1916) onwards.


Boech notes the licence of the poet to ignore many of the 'unities' set up by linguistic constructs such as register, dialect and synchrony.
language as his art. Hence, such rigidity as Saussure's theoretical statements presuppose is not only unnecessary, but may prove injurious to the kind of study here undertaken. Nevertheless, though we may not be discussing a single, unified system of language, minor systematic relations must exist, and there remains a compulsion to define, clarify and pursue consistently whatever approach is adopted, and to work explicitly any deviations from it. We shall commence by the discussion of some theoretical standpoints on the composition of linguistic meaning, hoping to derive from them some stimulus for the creation of a method of investigation.
Section I

Preliminary Discussion
I.1 Meaning and Form

I.1.1 At an early stage in any lexical investigation the problem of the representation of lexical items must be faced. Any assumption may be subject to later modification, but it is essential to decide the approximate extent of the syntagmatic string with which we are to deal and to assume a relationship to the abstraction 'lexical item.'

I.1.2 Traditional language study identifies the 'word' as the unit both of grammar and lexicon: modern linguistics allows the reality of the item 'word' as a unit of language, but finds difficulty in defining it, according to the means of analysis it has developed, in such a way that the definitions are mutually consistent.

Thus, Lyons speaks of words, differentiated from each other according to the means of analysis applied to the seen stretch of utterance, as 'phonological', 'orthographical' and 'grammatical' words. He reserves a fourth category for those forms classifiable together to represent a lexical item.

Halliday considers the word to be one of the units of grammar, filling a place on the scale of rank between the morpheme and the group, but he considers lexicon to be an entirely separate level in linguistic analysis.

and comments:


and the remark of H.A. Gleason, An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics, New York (1955), p. 110:

'The word is one of the most difficult concepts in English morphology to define.'


Interesting comments on the difficulties of defining the word are to be found in A. Martinet, 'Le mot' in Problèmes du Langage (Collection Diogène) 1966.

The variant spellings in Sir Gawain byn sumt; by sumt (2464; 2467) may represent uncertainty concerning the extent of the phonological words. Chaucer's orthographical word lent may represent two grammatical words: 3rd pers. sing. of listen and the noun lust.
the lexical item is not necessarily coextensive on either axis (paradigmatic or syntagmatic) with the item, or rather with any of the items, identified and accounted for in the grammar. 1

The significance of this is borne out by examples like the following, where inflectional variants and similar forms from different word classes may or may not have semantic implications: grace: graces - are: ares.

kynde(n): kynde(adj): kyndenesses.

- benjane: benevolently: benignites.

pecience: pacient (used attributively)

and pacient (used substantively).

Formally similar phrases (have putes(on): have putese) may have quite different significance. On the syntagmatic plane, the lexical item may or may not be represented by a continuous syntactical units thus, where we should like to elicit a lexical item represented by the phrase "have putes of", we may find a discontinuous sequence: have bad of her pyte.

Halliday's conclusion is that:

On the syntagmatic axis, it may be useful to recognize a lexical item which has no defined status in the grammar and is not identified as morpheme, word or group.

I.I.3 The notion of an abstract 'word', consisting of all the inflectional variants of a particular form, is familiar to traditional language studies: the abstract word is realised in a number of different forms according to its system of accidence. This notion seems to be what underlies Lyons' conception of the 'lexeme'; the unit which he takes to be the formal representative of a lexical item. 2 There seems to be little point in

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2 Structural Semantics, Publications of the Philological Society XX, Oxford (1963), p.12. As numbers of allomorphs are classed together as a single morpheme, so the variant forms of the same lexical word are classed together as a lexeme. This lexeme differs from the usage of C.F. Hockett (A Course in Modern Linguistics, p.170) and others, including Martinet (see below, n8).
distinguishing between inflexional variants of the same word in the process of lexical investigation, though, as noted in the previous paragraph, the investigator cannot simply assume that similarity of form implies similarity of sense. To class a number of inflexional variants as representatives of the same 'lexeme', it is required that they also have the same lexical reference. The investigator who uses the abstraction of 'lexeme' as his basic unit must be aware of the possibility of variety in sense implied by small differences such as those of occurrence.

I.I.4 Sinclair, employing a method of lexical investigation based upon collocation, suggests that for speedy results the best method is the use of the word; he seems to have a definition of word in mind which would correspond with Lyons' lexeme. He is, however, aware that the distinction in inflexional ending may be important to the sense (danger; dangers) and is forced to recommend a procedure at the level of the morpheme to obviate such mistakes. Unfortunately, at this level of analysis, his method will furnish a task which is 'beyond the capacity of the most dedicated human drudge', though it might fall within the abilities of a 'very large computer'.

Further complexities are admitted by the recognition of the need to identify polymorphemic lexical items and to distinguish more than one item of the same form. Presumably, within this procedure, grace would represent a lexical item of single morpheme form, whilst graces would represent a different lexical item realised by the combination of two morphemes. It must of course be noticed that, according to context, the single morpheme grace may have a large number of different lexical references.

1 'Beginning the Study of Lexis' in In Memory of J.R. Firth (op. cit.), pp. 419-20.

2 By form Sinclair simply means a stretch of language which has not yet been given lexical status. Traditional language studies would consider polymorphemic items to be idioms incapable of resolution by ordinary grammatical rules. The second problem, that of polysemy, is one which has occupied much attention in more traditional works (cf. H. Kosiol, Grundzüge der Englischen Semantik, Vienna and Stuttgart (1967), pp.24ff.
Sinclair does not concern himself in this discussion with the theoretical problems of the determination of morphemes or their division into sub-types, though there is no unity among linguists on these points. If we assume that the morpheme is a form/meaning composite, as Sinclair appears to do, we are left with the necessity of the division of morphemes into lexical morphemes (those with which we would be primarily concerned) and functional morphemes (which lack lexical meaning but are capable of the formal or semantic modification of lexical morphemes). Although we are primarily interested in the first type, we cannot ignore the second when they are in combination with morphemes of the first type.

There are obvious advantages in detail and precision in basing an enquiry upon the morpheme, yet it shares many of the disadvantages of the selection of any grammatical unit as the representative of lexical reference. Yet more pressing than theoretical objections are the practical ones of the labour required in differentiating morphemes and detecting polymorphemic units.

I.I.5 If we return to the desirable, voiced by Halliday, of separating lexical and grammatical items, Lyons' abstract lexeme seems a possible starting point. An alternative approach is offered by the Saussurian semiotic assumptions of Martinet's syntactic theory. He is unable to find sufficient linguistic criteria for a confident and mutually consistent definition of the word and suggests instead the notion of a syntactic unit consisting of a significans and significatum: this minimal sign, he calls a moneme. For Martinet, each moneme represents the exercise of a deliberate

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1 This division is made by J. Fisich, Morphemic Structure of Chaucer's English, Alabama U.P. (1965), pp.15-28.

choice in the string of utterance from a set of items possible at that point. According to the extent of the set from which the choice is made, the monemes are subdivided into lexemes and morphemes. The former are selected from an infinite or very large set, the latter from a more strictly limited one; thus, in the sentence 'John saw the dog', John, saw and dog would be lexemes whereas the, which is selected from a set of two (a, the), is a morpheme.

The combination of two or more monemes which, within the structure of the sentence, have more intimate ties than with other items in the sentence, Martinet calls a syntagma.¹

Thus, inflected forms are considered to be syntagmas consisting of the juxtaposition or amalgamation of lexemes and morphemes. Formally similar word-class variants (nice, pitiful, pitously) are regarded as derivatives composed of a lexeme and one or more monemes of rather ill-defined status.²

1.6 As the syntactic theory underlying a semantic investigation, Martinet's ideas have certain features which recommend them. Firstly, it is a syntactic theory overtly based upon a form/meaning relationship; its units are defined by the relationship between form and meaning, thus obviating

¹ Martinet ("Le Mat" in Problèmes du Langage, Collection Diogène, Paris (1966), pp.39-53) gives the following example, in which three syntagmas are marked: 'un énorme rocher/surplombait/la voie ferrée.' He points out that the phrase au/par et a mesure, though analysable into five traditional words, represents a single moneme since the sequence of items in it is predetermined allowing no choice after the choice at/is made.

² Martinet seems to consider affixes as a rather unity unit, a special variety of lexeme, sharing some features with morphemes. (Elements of General Linguistics, pp.127-29). To Lyons, they represent a reason why analysis at the level of morphemes is unsatisfactory (Structural Semantics, p.78). He gives the following examples in which morphemic analysis would spuriously suggest a similar semantic relation: ignorance

perserverance

perseverance

He suggests that the remedy is to treat these at the level of the lexeme, in which case the first pair would represent two lexemes and the second variants of a single lexeme. According to Martinet's theory, the first pair would consist of syntagmas composed of two different lexemes and two different morphemes and the second pair would consist of two syntagmas, in each of which the same lexeme was combined with different morphemes. It is obvious that from the point of view of semantic analysis, Lyons' conception of the lexeme, although arrived at by a different method than Martinet's, will coincide with Martinet's conception of that term.
the difficulties of polysemy. The meaning of lexemes in this theory is essentially their sense in context. Items consisting of more than one word or more than one morpheme (in the sense used by Sinclair, above) will automatically be accommodated when the criterion of significantum is applied.

Secondly, clear practical procedures are suggested by the theory in the comparison of more and more similar utterances until the minimum distinctive sign (the moneme) is isolated. Concentrating upon the significantum, the theory allows the identification of discontinuous significantia in the moneme or syntagma, and the notion of the syntagma allows great flexibility in the relation of linguistic form to lexical reference.

Since the theory will accommodate such variety of syntagmatic 'length' and discontinuity with relation to single lexical reference, a practical method suggests itself which will consist of gathering lengths of text, including the orthographic word (or Lyons' lexeme) we are investigating. The length of the piece must be great enough to ensure that we have included all the significantia of the moneme we are seeking; this means at least clause length, and preferably sentence length. The paradigmatic comparison of a number of occurrences will swiftly reveal the syntagmas which concern us and a further such analysis should reveal the monemes and, in particular, the lexemes we wish to identify. The essential feature of the analysis is that it proceeds from larger stretches of text to smaller and does not try to extrapolate the representatives of lexical units at a given size of grammatical unit all in one step.

The effect of this will be of a kind of filter in which the syntagmas or monemes of high frequency and great syntagmatic length at the formal level will be set aside early in the analysis. Hence, the two sentences:

John gave bread
John gave alms

may be assumed to have the same structure, but a comparison of the occurrences of alms and bread would soon reveal a greater affinity between this verb and
The phrase give away might be treated as a syntagm and we could look out for related phrases. More indivisible idioms would also be separated from ordinary phrases at an early stage. Martinet's theory, with its extraordinary flexibility, proves a fertile and stimulating starting-point for semantic analysis.

1 The flexibility of Martinet's approach is exemplified in the following (Problèmes du Langage, p.53):

.... deux ou plus de deux monèmes qui sont entre eux deux ses rapports plus intimes que ceux qui les rattachent au reste de l'énoncé forment un syntagme. Tout, dans ce sens, n'est pas syntagme dans un énoncé dans Jean part demain, il n'y a pas de syntagme mais trois monèmes qui épuisent l'énoncé. ....... on n'a aucun intérêt à poser, entre le monème et l'énoncé complet minimum qui est la phrase, une unité contraignante, de celles dont fait nécessairement partie tout segment de l'énoncé. Libre au linguiste de délimiter des syntagmes là où son exposé y gagnera en clarté. Libre aussi à lui d'opérer avec des mots partout où la structure de la langue à l'étude paraît réclamer qu'on mette l'accent sur la cohérence sémantique et formelle de certaines syntagmes.

In view of Halliday's views (quoted above) about the relation of grammar to lexis and the declaration of Lyons (Structural Semantics, p.29) that morpheme, lexeme or a higher unit may be the unit of semantic analysis, the attractions of such flexibility are obvious.
I.II. Meaning and Situation

I.II.1 It is well-known that there exists no indissoluble bond between a formal unit of language and its significance, such that this one-to-one relationship is never disrupted. A linguistic form has a given significance, not through any inherent determination, but as a result of the custom of a single speech-community to understand a given utterance in a like way in specified circumstances. This contract, lacking codification, may be broken at any time. Such disruption, and the establishment of new bonds, have been the concern of those who investigate types and causes of semantic change.\(^1\) Change may be brought about by linguistic processes, such as morpho-phonological re-analysis (pinta / pint of), ellipsis (general / general officer), or word-formation according to the rules inherent in the language (throughput / put through),\(^2\) or, more commonly, as a result of external factors such as psychological, cultural or social modifications in the society using a language. It is obvious from this that, since the significance of linguistic utterance can be affected by extra-linguistic phenomena, we must assume that a portion of the 'meaning' of any linguistic form is to be found in the circumstances of its use. This fact was recognized by traditional semanticians and Stern (p.60) speaks of a kind of central cognitive meaning surrounded by an aura of peripheral meanings composed of other senses and affective associations which might be of first importance in other contexts.

This kind of mentalistic notion of relation between form and significance puts difficulties in the way of semantic analysis. Assuming its existence,

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2. This example was collected from The Sunday Times Business News, 5 March, 1967. Speaking of Jet Petrolaum, the writer stated that they were seeking a higher 'throughput' per station. The word was still being used in the same context in the same paper in 1970.
how can one isolate the core meaning from a number of occurrences of a linguistic form? The complexity of the problem is increased when we recall that we can find no warrant for selecting any single formal unit as the representative of the lexical item and, even if we could, we should be faced by the problems of multiple meaning and synonymy. The imprecision of the meaning relation is doubly aggravated by the difficulty of both isolating the formal item with specific significance and the relationship between the contextual sense and central cognitive meaning. Considerations of this nature have made linguists reluctant to deal with the occurrence of individual formal units in isolation. Emphasis has been placed not only upon use in a wide variety of interpretations of the term 'context', but also upon the problems of the combination of linguistic signs to form higher meaningful units. In this latter case logical consistency is of prime importance and the senses of individual words are of less concern than their combinative properties.

I.II.2. The association of the words 'meaning' and 'use' is most familiarly ascribed to Wittgenstein, though one may commence by quoting the neat formula of Stuart Chase (The Tyranny of Words, London (1938), p.7): 'The true meaning of a word is to be found by observing what a man does with it, not what he says about it.' Wittgenstein's conviction, that the only empirical data which we can assemble on the meaning of an utterance is that gained by describing the conditions of its use, is similarly quotable:

For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. 1

Wittgenstein does not, however, make clear enough for linguistic analysis exactly what is meant by use. His interest in linguistic meaning was largely centred in the fact that the structure of derived sentences does not always reflect the underlying logical structure very precisely. This point is

taken up in a paper by R. Wolls in which he demonstrates discrepancies between grammatical construction and logical inferences in utterances of similar structure. He closes his discussion by demonstrating how some adjectives are much more susceptible than others to contextual effects; psychological factors, relativity, vagueness, and point in time may affect the understanding of some assertions containing words like numerous and future. Uso, then, is admitted to be more than the relation of grammatical structure and formal items to each other and to logical assertion; in a number of cases it includes also features which we might have considered extra-linguistic.

I.III.3 An attitude in some ways similar to that of Wittgenstein to the meaning of a linguistic utterance is to be found in the theories of J.R. Firth and his followers. Firth, influenced by his own work in the field in Africa and India, and also by the work of anthropologists, notably Malinowskii, saw the meaning of utterances as part of an all-embracing theory of meaning by which units at each level of linguistic analysis drew their meaning from syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations as part of an enveloping context of situation. Within this theory, meaning becomes explicitly a matter of relations to a context. The sweeping extent of Firth's concept of meaning is exemplified in the following early statement:

As we know so little about mind and as our study is essentially social, I shall cease to respect the duality of mind and body, thought and word, and be satisfied with the whole man, thinking and acting as a whole, in association with his fellows. I do not therefore follow Ogden and Richards in regarding meaning as relations in a hidden mental process, but chiefly as situational relations in a context of situation and in that kind of language which disturbs the air and other people's ears, as modes of behaviour in relation to the other elements in the context of situation. A thoroughgoing contextual technique does not emphasize the relation between the terms of an historical process or of a mental process, but the interrelations of the terms of the actual observable context itself. In so far as introspection may be relied on, ... (utterances) ... may be considered also in their relations within my context of experience. What may be called memory-contexts or causal contexts are then linked up with the observable situation.

Like all those we have reviewed, I propose to split up meaning or function into a series of component functions. Each function will be defined as the use of some language form or element in relation to some context. Meaning, that is to say, is to be regarded as a complex of contextual relations, and phonetics, grammar, lexicography, and semantics each handles its own components of the complex in its appropriate context.

In a later paper, the same views are further developed. Firth makes clear that he regards the text itself as part of the total context of situation and that this context includes both verbal and non-verbal elements. He dissociates himself from Malinowski's view that the situation merely forms a behaviour matrix within which a linguistic utterance has meaning, and he stresses that the verbal and non-verbal aspects are interdependent constituents of the context of situation. Pursuing the analysis no further than the level of lexis, Firth seems to consider that the sense of a word is dependent upon its commutability in the systems of the paradigmatic plane, its collocations, and its relations as the exponent of an element of syntactic structure on the syntagmatic plane, and its interaction with the larger verbal and non-verbal contexts. He illustrates grammatical meaning, separated from any but the most generalised context, by the composition of anomalous sentences such as: "She slowly rushed upstairs to the cellar and turned the kettle out to boil two fires."

In this later paper, too, Firth tries to set up more precise schemes.


3 By the collocations of words Firth means: 'the mere word accompaniment, the other word-material in which they are most commonly or most characteristically embedded.' (ibid p.180). See also below.

4 A further syntagmatic relation which Firth recognised was the structural one of colligation. This applies not the relations between lexical items but between the abstract grammatical classes. (ibid pp.181-83).
to delineate the non-verbal context in a way acceptable to linguistic theory. Although mentioning the 'quotation situation' he no longer speaks of 'memory contexts' or 'causal contexts' and in one statement seems to imply a considerable restriction of the original notions: "The context of situation in the present theory is a schematic construct for application especially to typical 'repetitive events' in the social process."

The implication of a simple, easily delineated situation is realised in Firth's suggested analysis of the situational context as follows:

1. The participants: persons, personalities and relevant features of those.
   a) The verbal action of the participants.
   b) The non-verbal action of the participants.
2. The relevant objects and non-verbal and non-personal events.
3. The effect of the verbal action.

This is evidently a fairly simple behaviouristic situation, but there are a number of imponderable abstractions included; the sense of relevant begs almost as many questions as that of personality. The exterior relations of the constituents of the context of situation may present even greater difficulties. Suggested manoeuvres are analyses of the more general frameworks to which a particular context of situation belongs, such as:

a) The economic, religious or social structures of the society involved.
   b) Type of linguistic discourse to which the text belongs (narrative, monologue, explanations etc.)
   c) Details of age, sex, number of participants in situation.
   d) Types of speech function within social relations.

It is fairly obvious that all of these factors may have an influence on the sense and use of a word, but they are too arbitrary and imprecise to serve as the framework of analytic investigation.

I.II.4 Certain of Firth's followers have attempted to develop and clarify his notion of the context of situation. These efforts may be divided into those aiming to elaborate the theory and those endeavouring to derive from it a practical analytic method. Of the first type is the contribution by
Joffroy Ellis to the volume of memorial essays dedicated to Firth. Ellis's opening sentence adequately represents the view of the theoretical linguist upon Firth's works: "It is generally recognised that one of Firth's decisive contributions to linguistic theory was the concept of 'context of situation'. It is also widely recognised that he left this concept in many ways unelaborated." In Ellis's elaboration verbal context is an interlevel between the non-linguistic situation and the formal level of language (consisting of grammar and lexis). A distinction is made between the instant contextual meaning of a formal item (that actually occurring in a given instance) and potential contextual meaning (which is the range of possible meanings of a given item when considered outside any specific context or situation). Within this theory, the utterance can be defined as the relation of a unit of form to situation and, from these actualizations of contextual meaning, the categories (the potential meaning) of context may be derived. Thus, the minimum unit of form related to context (that is potential and outside specific situation) is the sentence.

The component of the theory termed situation can not, of course, remain unreduced, and Ellis endeavours to set up a schema for its reduction; the part of his paper which concerns us most at present. Situation is compounded of a number of categories which are of varying importance according to specific instance and which, in contrast to the theoretical relationships outlined above, are not ordered according to any necessary principles of interdependence.

a) Immediate situation includes everything relevant at the place and time of the speech-event (except items included under other headings).

b) Under situation includes anything relevant in the universe at any time.

1 'On Contextual Meaning' op. cit., pp.79-95. In a footnote, Mr. Ellis makes a distinction between context and situation. This sub-categorisation, probably necessary for a workable theory, seems to be the first departure he makes from Firth's original formulation. He does, however, recognize (p.81) that this is a theoretical expedient rather than a necessary and desirable division.
On stating these categories, Ellis attempts to vitiate the obvious objection concerning relevance by defining it as (a) what distinguishes one situation and its utterances from another, and (b) what is specific to a given culture and its language. This formulation still promises formidable difficulties in practice, most especially in an unfamiliar culture; yet it is unreasonable to demand extreme rigour in the categorisation of situation. Category (a), too, falls below a high standard of precision since the number and type of other headings cannot be fixed with certainty, and will certainly have to be varied according to the type of text under examination.

Participants includes all relevant features of anyone in the immediate situation who actively determines the utterance or is affected by it.

There then follows a series of sub-categories involving register, the total register-range of the idiolect of a speaker and his place in the range of register in the language, the register-choice, which involves the assignment to specific registers of specific linguistic utterances. These classifications are essentially linguistic but have a relation to the general cultural situation.

By the sub-category of thesis is meant the event, action or state of affairs which the utterance signifies. Its relation to the immediate situation is complex and variable and the notion of thesis, or some development of it, must be of prime importance in the application of this theory to literary texts. The inclusion of thesis introduces into the basic Firthian theory a notion of reference distinct from the immediate situation in which an utterance takes place. With relation to this referential component, Ellis mentions the sub-category of context of mention, which has connections with the formal division of the sentence into given and new, and is therefore related to the formal notions of topic and cohesion.

Finally, tone includes those elements of contextual meaning which are non-referential: as tone, feeling, intention.¹

¹ Register, context of mention and non-referential components of meaning are not accepted as part of the competence of semantics by the more formal semanticists. Leech, Towards a Semantic Description of English (pp.83-85) assigns them to a subsidiary study which he terms 'General Stylistics'.
It is fairly clear from this that, despite the highly technical vocabulary and formal presentation of those ideas, they do not form a theory with universal application to any speech act, except at a level of very high abstraction. For example, the notion of 'register' as part of a methodology for the description of an utterance, is extremely imprecise. Ideally, analytic processes must consist of a finite set of mutually exclusive categories; this is patently not the case with the divisions of register. Register is at least partly dependent upon the random nature of circumstance so that, even to derive a set of categories which we can never claim to be exhaustive, would require a considerable programme of research. The notion of register will always be a weak analytic instrument, and so it is with situation. Thus the power of description of the various elements of Ellis's theory is very diverse; in fact, despite the theoretical formulation, his ideas are really, like Firth's, still only a set of suggestions on how to approach the analysis of language in situation.

I.II.5 Certain of Ellis's suggestions have been taken up in the same collection of papers by B.B. Kachru in a study of Indian English. This is a study of the use of English in the writings of bilingual individuals for whom English is a second language. The paper is at first concerned with the relationship between the two languages at the formal level, but quickly demonstrates the necessity of the analysis of context. The 'wider' and 'immediate situations' of Ellis are accepted and methods of procedure are discussed in theoretical terms, but these are of the utmost abstraction, since the actual categories of context are in fact extrapolated from the text itself. The lesson seems to be that one may theorise only in the most general terms about contextual features, but when the necessity for the analysis of a specific text in a specific situation occurs, the details of the procedure must be settled on an ad hoc basis. The 'parameters' which

1 Ibid. pp. 255-287.
Kachru finds relevant to his study are the following:

A. General Cultural Factors ('wider situation'):
   1. Social status of the individual in the group. Expressed in terms of:
      (a) Position in the hierarchy of castes.
      (b) Political status and economic position.
   2. Religion. (In the Indian setting it is important to know whether a participant is a Hindu, Muslim, etc.)
   3. Speaker/addressee relationships: wife/husband, children/parents, teacher/pupil (this may have decisive effects upon the choice of language, as in the use of honorifics).

B. Individual or Personal Factors ('immediate situation'):
   1. Sex of the participants.
   2. Age of the participants.
   3. Educational background of the participants.
   4. Characteristics which localise persons:
      (a) Linguistic: Accent and other language traits.
      (b) Non-linguistic: Food habits, dress, etc.

Kachru notes that this categorisation is not mutually exclusive since religious differences may intersect the linguistic differences dependent upon geographical origin. He also notes the further necessity of taking account of contextually delimited sub-languages within the language as a whole. A 'restricted language' is one which cuts across idiolectal and dialectal differences and may be used for specific purposes by all the speakers of the language. Such would be the languages of law or administration in India. Register, he takes to be simply a further step in delicacy in a similar sub-categorisation, so that one might expect to find a difference between, legal reporting, sports page and editorial English within the restricted language of newspaper English. A third category might be found within the restricted language of social exchange; this Kachru delineates as speech-function. It would include such easily demarcated functions as abuse and curses, flattery and persuasion, greetings, etc.
This organisation subdivides, though perhaps not very rigorously, that area of contextually linked linguistic usages left unreduced by Ellis under the heading 'register'. Obvious difficulties will arise in assigning language to any one of divisions of this type and, although he does not explicitly say so in this case, it soon becomes obvious that Kachru's division is in fact an ad hoc one. Of course, as a suggestion for analysis, it is none the worse for that, but it must be remembered that it is merely a procedural suggestion rather than a part of an integrated theory. As such it enables Kachru to make interesting observations on certain restricted usages in Indian English.

I.II.6 An attempt to apply somewhat similar ideas, though in a less rigorous way, to certain aspects of simulated spoken language in certain of Shakespeare's plays is made by Vivian Salmon in Leeds Studies in English, 1967. Mr. Salmon makes three important general points before citing her evidence, two of which bear closely upon the analysis of situations: firstly, that spoken language arises in a situation and, secondly, that such a situation involves more than one participant, whose language will be influenced by their attitudes to one another. These two facts characterise the colloquial speech with which she is dealing in a number of ways. Since speech arises in a situation:

(a) ritual formulae will arise for those situations which frequently occur;

(b) speech within a situation need not be so explicit as written language separate from an immediate situation; therefore elliptical forms may occur more frequently.

1 'Elizabethan Colloquial English in the Falstaff Plays', pp. 37-70.
2 This point was made by Firth in the original formulation of his ideas concerning 'context of situation'. One example he gives is the phrase 'Say whan', used when pouring alcohol. *The Tongues of Men*, p. 110.
3 Cf. Martinet, *Towards a Functional View of Language*, Oxford (1962), pp. 58-59. Martinet's concern with self-sufficient communication as the only proper study of linguistics leads him to exclude situation-dependent utterances. This same concentration upon communication in linguistic terms as the sole motive factor in linguistic change ('linguistic evolution is entirely determined by the communicative needs of man': ibid. p. 21) tends to vitiate Martinet's ideas on diachronic linguistics.
(c) various linguistic devices will reflect the fact that this is an interchange between two or more participants.

(d) sometimes language chosen in such a situation will reflect attitudes or relationships to each other which are permanent, such as those between servant and master, parent and child; sometimes temporary attitudes will be expressed such as dislike or politeness.

These factors (a), (b), (c) are then illustrated from the text by a series of quotations and some of the ritual formulae are subsequently grouped according to the attitude or relationship between the participants in the situation.

The results, though not contributing very greatly to theoretical work on context of situation, represent useful additions to our information on situational usage in early Modern English. The theory behind these results is informally stated and applied, but again acts as a series of procedural suggestions subject to ad hoc modifications. The success of the results is in no small measure due to this.

I.11.7 A locus classicus of situational studies, freely and rightly quoted by most later workers on these lines is the field study conducted in Cyrenaica by T.F. Mitchell. He spends some time on delimiting the scope of his enquiry with as much precision as possible, and the success of his whole paper is perhaps largely dependent upon his choice of a situation which easily admits such treatment. The reciprocal situation of buying and selling allows an easy reduction to an abstract situation of few participants and the ritualised nature of the linguistic exchanges contributes to a simple statement of the data.

Among the observations which Mitchell makes on his method, the following may be quoted. Firstly, he establishes the relation between texts and environment in terms of four main classifications, most of which are by now

1. Spatio-temporal situations of persons in context (participants).
2. Activities of participants.
3. Attitudes of participants (exemplified by boasting, cursing, flattering or blaming etc.)
4. Their 'personalities' (including such factors as trade or profession, class or geographical origin, educational standard).

'Personality' is an abstraction within the abstraction 'situation'. It excludes any bystanders and includes only those directly involved in the business of buying and selling. Furthermore, there is no necessary synonymy between the technical term 'personality' and the persons who may be in the vicinity. A 'personality' within a situation may in fact represent a number of persons: a seller may be a group.

Mitchell emphasises that such classifications are not to be regarded as rigorous and definitive. He contends that, in any given statement classification must be ad hoc, so that other categories of classification of the relationship between text and situation may recommend themselves; furthermore, not all texts will permit statement to be made under all four categories which he gives. He points out that no very precise definition of the categories 'Activities' and 'Attitudes' is possible outside their use with reference to a specific situation.

The ascription of any utterance to the class of language proper to a given situation must be broached with caution. Even with pieces of text which may properly be ascribed to the situation of buying and selling, one may expect to find numerous overlaps with other contexts of situation (p.39). Thus a greeting may belong to the 'language of greetings', but if the text is large enough, we may find that it is also part of the ritual exchanges of the buying and selling situation. (It is perhaps needless to add that only the utterances of the 'personalities' involved in the transaction would be considered as part of this language in the first place.) Though most utterances may be usable in a number of situations in addition to that
under examination, there will certainly be a minority which are limited to that particular situation; those may in fact be in the form of the distant collocation of elements which, singly, may be used in a number of situations. Such pieces of text are regarded as technical words proper to that situation. 1

Certain further narrow correlations between text and situation may be suggested in terms of the limitations set upon language by the precise 'personality' and by more specific features such as the object for sale, the locale (in a shop or market-place), method of sale (auction or otherwise).

It is notable that in his approach Mitchell is deliberately flexible; he eschews formal and definite assertions of theory and shows a willingness to adapt method to the task in hand. His classifications are no more than an empirical guide which is flexible enough to be further specified to accommodate the particular circumstances. He avoids the trap, which rigorous theory might require, of attempting to set up mutually exclusive contexts of situation or ascribing any but a few expressions 2 exclusively to a single situation. In the true Firthian tradition, he acknowledges the difficulty of separating the levels of collocation and of situation and comments on the way in which a familiar situation may presuppose certain stereotyped collocations, giving a predictivo element to certain forms in certain situations. To a large extent the separation of collocational and situational levels in this kind of study may simply be a matter of point of view. Although his study is aimed primarily at the buyer-seller situation, 'lexicographical or stylistic statement might envisage collecting the collocations of riksig or hjalpel and stating correlations for them with several situational categories.' (p.54).

1 In direct contrast to such 'technical' language, Mitchell reminds the investigator that he must not, in his study of the language in which an activity is conducted, disregard the language in which it is explained or discussed (pp.34-35). This helps to relate his main interest to the general cultural matrix.

2 I use the term 'expression' rather than 'word' here since it would seem that, in English at least, such situationally restricted utterances are more often common collocations of two or more words than a single orthographical word.
The notion of 'context of situation' as promulgated by Firth and developed by his followers is an important one for lexical analysis. It must not, however, be mistaken for a rigid theoretical statement. An examination of the literature on the subject reveals that, though theory may be useful in suggesting modes of procedure, a detailed and specific theory is impossible and attempts to evolve one tend to be micropresentative. The most valuable practical work employs general ideas related more to empiric observation than formal theory and it is always ready to evolve ad hoc classifications to deal with each area of study. The sole requirement upon the investigator is to maintain the consistency of the classifications he sets up to deal with the area with which he is concerned.

The value of previous situational studies to lexical research is not, then, in the presentation of an integrated and rigorous theory, so much as in the endorsement of a number of fertile suggestions for enquiry, which may be adopted or rejected according to their explicatory value when applied to the particular data under examination. General suggestions which we may expect to be of value in any investigation of language in situation are the following:

a) Situation is, at least in part, an abstraction composed of a number of components which are not easily delineated in general terms.

b) Participants are one important component. They may be stated as 'personalities' which is an abstraction in terms of the situation since, within a situation (e.g. buying and selling), a 'personality' may be represented by a group of individuals.

c) Delineation of 'personalities' is largely a matter of convenience, but the following divisions may be useful: age, sex, number of participants, educational background, geographical origin.

d) Their activity in the situation is important.

e) Their attitudes to one another may also be important. Such attitudes may be transient (annoyance, curses, praise) or may be dictated by unchanging
certain institutionalised and repetitive situations occur which are
accompanied by stereotyped phrasing. This gives an element of predictabi-
li ty to the language in such situations and enables elliptical forms to be
used.

g) The investigator must have recourse to related factors outside the
immediate situation: to his knowledge of the wider situation, to the type
of text over a larger context (involving such factors as speech-function,
register, and restricted languages) and also to explicatory language which
throws light on the situation under study.

h) Within the situation, especially in literary texts, the thesis of
the utterance may also be of importance: behind the immediate situation
there may be, contained in the language of the utterance, reference to
another situation.

i) Finally it may be noted that situations are not mutually exclusive
categories, nor can any utterance be exclusively ascribed to any particular
situation.

1.11.9 For comparison with these approaches to the language of situation,
drawn from the neo-Firthian school, we may elicit the study of the lexical
field of laughing and smiling in Modern English made by Madeleine Schnee-
berger. Her approach to situation is by way of the theory of Group
Dynamics, but in her analysis of situation, we find importance accorded to
many of the same factors as in the Firthian approaches. The participants
in the situation may be analysed according to the following criteria (pp.7-8).

c) Number (the laughing and others present)

b) Sex (the laughing and others present)

c) Age

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1 See Ellis's theory above.

d) Class or Rank - which is divisible into:

i) objective rank (bestowed upon a person from without and universally accepted, e.g. social position, military rank etc.)

ii) subjective rank (which a man accredits to himself independent of external factors).

In practice Miss Schnoebelger finds such a classification inadequate. In her chosen field the parameter of Sex is relatively unimportant. Furthermore, she is compelled to sub-categorise and to introduce new classifications to increase the specificity of her analysis. Thus she introduces such criteria as whether or not social contact is made by the smile, grin or chuckle, or whether it is the result of such contact. Details of attitude and sub-divisions of some of the above categories are also included.

It is immediately obvious that, although Miss Schneebelerger's categories do not coincide precisely with any of those in the neo-Firthian analyses, there is very considerable overlap between them. Her treatment of rank differs slightly, though it is mostly covered by the Firthian 'attitude' or 'speaker-addressee' relationship, and her introduction of the teleological aspects of the utterance within the situation is not so tightly drawn in the Firthian theories. The importance ascribed to it in Miss Schneebelerger's thesis is obviously ascribable in large part to the subject of her study.

I.II.10 A number of precepts important to an analytical procedure have emerged from these situational studies. Firstly, while dividing the situational context from the verbal context for ease of analysis, we should not imply any hard and fast division in fact, and we should always be ready to re-establish the link in our statement of the evidence. More important still, in adopting the ideas of others for situational research, we must only use the most general theoretical approach, specifying this empirically for each new task. For example, there is quite plainly no justification for using Kachru's category of Religion for a study of any area of the
vocabulary of fourteenth century England, unless perhaps we are interested
in texts which might be related to the Polagian heresy. Other situational
studies have much to offer in the form of general guidance as to procedure,
but detailed methods must be freshly evolved to accommodate the general
situation in fourteenth century England and the type of language and
situation under examination.
I.III Meaning and Context

I.III.1 The desire for 'context' when we are asked to explain the sense of an unfamiliar word is usually satisfied, not by a description of the situation in which it was heard, but by positioning it in a verbal string. Only if there is still mystification or ambiguity is the non-verbal situation described. It is clear from this fact that the verbal context of a linguistic item plays an important part in establishing its sense to the hearer. The way in which this is accomplished is much less clear. Occasionally it may be that the verbal context offered relates to our general experience of the non-verbal world so that the word bull is adequately disambiguated by the contextual frame 'the black —— stamped and bellowed'. The fact that, given the linguistic form in isolation, we should probably understand it in this way rather than as a Papal document, is probably a function of its relative frequency in this sense, and does not alter the importance of context in establishing this sense.

The way in which the utterance refers to the non-verbal world is inscrutable in the present state of semantic knowledge. All we can do is to describe the situation, often with the use of ad hoc descriptions, as mentioned above, and state something of the utterance in which the item under examination occurs. The extent of the utterance which it is necessary to take into account is likewise imprecise, but with Ellis, we may assume that an extent corresponding to that of the grammatical sentence is appropriate.

In certain cases the verbal contexts may not relate to anything of our personal experience in the non-verbal world. Given the word polo, two possible clarifications are suggested by the following contextual frames.

In England, the earth's magnetic —— lies to the west of true North.

Federowski was a ——.

1 See above.
The interpretation of these sentences, and of the linguistic form pole in each, lies, not merely in their reference to the phenomenological world, but through our competence in interpreting those sentences in relation to a number of other sentences which we have experienced. They allude, not to recognisable situations, but to other linguistic utterances. At some point, we may expect this circularity to break down into reference to the non-linguistic world, but this point would seem to have little to do with our understanding of these sentences.

Such sentences are an extreme example of the way in which the serial nature of language ensures that distantly removed items in the verbal context may affect the significance of sentences and the senses of lexical items. Although one may take the sentence as the unit with reference to an immediate situation, the senses of items within it are constantly subject to influence by the developing verbal context over an indeterminable distance. This fact presents insurmountable difficulties to rigorous analysis and leads Lyons to posit the notion of 'restricted context'. Here the utterance is independent of previous utterances and can be understood in relation to the 'restricted context' of a shared language and culture. Further details of context and sense must be adduced and represented according to expediency in the particular example treated. But even this judicious approach to context presents difficulties to the investigator of medieval languages who can at best only partially share the culture associated with the language he is investigating.

I.III.2 Since the sense of a word is to some extent dependent upon its verbal context, we may expect that occurrence in a wide variety of different contexts will result in considerable polysemy. Since frequency of occurrence implies, at least in the case of non-grammatical words, the ability to

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2 Theoretical Linguistics, p.419.
appear in a wide variety of contexts, we might expect a distinct correlation between high frequency and extensive polymy. Statistical research has borne out this link between context and sense.¹

I.III.3 If we re-formulate the notion of 'frequency of occurrence' as 'probability of occurrence' in a range of contexts we arrive at a slightly different perspective which may be of more methodological value to us. The significance of a sentence derives not only from the lexical items of which it is composed but also from underlying syntactical relations holding between them. Thus Lyons can suggest, as a test of synonymy, the ability of a lexical item to be substituted for by another in the same contextual frame without any resulting change in the significance of the sentence. Such a procedure is commonly used where a native speaker is available to arbitrate on the effects of substitution; in the case of a medieval language this method can only be approximated where a piece of discourse is closely repeated in something like the same situation. Nevertheless, the principle that immediate context has a close link with sense is important to the empirical investigation of texts, for we can cite syntagmatic contexts, even though our knowledge of paradigmatic sense relations may be doubtful.

The fact that syntagmatic criteria determine sense may easily be demonstrated by examples, though the manner in which this occurs is less easy to state in formal terms. In the frame 'John kicked the ___' a number of lexical items might be substituted. If the context is extended the sense of the blank space is specified by the relations which it contracts with the rest of the utterance: 'John kicked the ___ which slunk off miaowing'. Clearly the blank can now have the sense only of cat. It cannot be said, however, that it is the extension of the context alone which results in this specification. Certain items play a much more important part than others and it is the form 'miaowing' that clinches the sense here. Similarly,

given the frame 'addled ———', we know that only brain or egg could be fitted into the gap. In usages like this not only the sense of the item to be understood but also the form of the item itself is suggested; thus we expect 'addled brain' rather than 'addled mind', although the contextual sense would be identical.

I.III.4 The restricting function of the frames mentioned works strictly in accord with the grammatical relations exhibited in those frames: in the case of 'addled ———' a Modifier/Head structure and, in the case of the other example, through the use of a relative pronoun and a qualifier. From this we might assume that the determination of sense is necessarily related to fixed grammatical structures and that if these are altered a sense alteration might follow or, vice-versa, that sense will not be altered so long as grammatical relations are undisturbed. The falsity of this latter assumption is easily demonstrated by modern English adverbs. Adverbs are normally considered to be verbal modifiers or qualifiers, as in the following sentence:

'The man suddenly took off his hat'
yet in some sentences they seem rather to modify the subject of the sentence:

'The man reluctantly resigned his post'.

Part of the reason for this difference may lie in the obvious derivation of these adverbs from adjectives,\(^1\) when we can say:

'The reluctant man'

but not

'The sudden man'.

It would seem that the function of these lexical items in word-classes whose divisions are not clearly marked can influence the significance of sentences. This being so, other factors of syntagmatic organisation apart

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from syntactical relations may influence sense. If we look at the adverb *cruelly*, we find that word order may determine the way in which the significance of the sentence is understood, though the grammatical structure remains unchanged. When the adverb is placed close to the subject in the following sentence, it tells us something of the nature of the man:

"The man cruelly killed the cat."

but placed finally, it qualifies the action, becoming an ordinary adverb of manner:

"The man killed the cat cruelly."

It is perhaps unnecessary to remark that both 'the cruel man' and 'the cruel killing' are possible forms.

I.III.5 If we return to the example 'addled egg' for a moment, another perspective which may be of value in sense analysis, can be considered. In a phrase such as that mentioned, the word *egg* is almost completely predictable given the modifier *addled*. In terms of information theory, *egg* is here redundant since, following *addled* in this syntagm, the set of possible choices is only two, *egg* or *brain*. According to the principles of information theory, meaning implies choice. At each point in the syntagmatic string, new information is added only when a deliberate choice of a new item is made. The larger the paradigmatic set from which the choice can be made, the more information content plus the choice, the smaller the set, the less information is offered. When the set is reduced to a single member, that item cannot be said to have any meaning at all distinct from its immediate verbal context; taken with its immediate verbal context, the resultant phrase may have some meaning in relation to a situational context. Thus the second *do* in 'How do you do?' cannot be said to have any meaning distinct from the phrase, but the phrase has a situational application.

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1 Martinet's linguistic theory (see above, p.8) is stimulated by information theory.
deriving from the paradigmatic opposition it contracts with phrases like 'Pleased to meet you' or with silence.

This viewpoint will be of little value in cases where a large set of choices is available, but it serves as a useful warning against seeking too persistently for the cognitive meaning of certain words which are completely predictable in certain verbal contexts and situations, and it may be possible to establish paradigmatic sets of words which occur in relation to particular syntagmas in particular situations, and thereby establish some similarity in sense between the utterances. Thus:

Have route on
Have mercy on
Have pitee on in the courtly love situation.

It should of course be noted that probability cannot be assessed in any single case without a collection of all occurrences of a single form in the corpus, when probability can be assessed by a paradigmatic comparison of the occurrences of a form in its immediate context.

Although such a comparison will reveal certain predetermined syntagmas, determination may exist which is not easily revealed by such methods. A great many extra-linguistic features exert their influence on syntagmatic patterning. The situation and previous context may lead to the omission of certain items or to the occurrence of otherwise unrecorded syntagmas.

One may expect that a modifier applied to a head, with no apparent and direct relevance to the immediate situation, would represent a distinct and deliberate choice and would therefore be meaningful. This is not unfortunately always the case. Chaucer can refer to flores Outrago or flores More using flores after the manner of a 'fixed epithet'. The determination here is by the general cultural milieu and there is not sufficient evidence of

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1 These will include a range of types distinguished by literary criticism as idioms, cliches, 'fixed' epithets, formulas and so on.
occurrence to suggest any predetermination. The phrase *fiore Polyphemus* is likewise predetermined, but this time by the fact of its adoption from a French translation of the Latin original *furia Polyphemus*. The same may be said of certain items of traditional poetic diction which may not be sufficiently frequently represented to be provable as determinate syntagmas.

I.III.6 In traditional studies of semantics a common distinction is made between 'logical', 'cognitive' or 'denotational' meaning and 'affective', 'emotive' or 'connotational' meaning. By the former is meant some kind of central, primary or essential meaning of a lexical item, while the latter refers to the possible aura of emotion or association which surrounds the central meaning. While it is clearly true that in most contexts liberty and freedom will have a similar cognitive sense, yet may differ in their emotional associations, it is equally obvious that, in view of the way in which sense is dependent upon context, a statement of the relation of cognitive and affective elements in the general 'meaning' of liberty would be hopelessly imprecise and inadequate. Some account of individual contexts must be given and, in doing this, emotive and affective elements may become separately and individually explicable. A second member of the revolutionary triad will serve to illustrate this better. We may concede that fraternal and brotherly are cognitively synonymous, yet a study of their use will reveal sharp distinctions in context which correspond to emotive differences. Thus, fraternal is frequently used in the general context of politics — and more specifically left wing politics; a use largely dependent upon the historical chance of its employment in a

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revolutionary slogan in 1789 - whilst brotherly is more frequently found in Christian contexts, where it owes its currency at least in part to the monastic ideal and the concept that all mankind is descended from a single father. The collocation with love results in a phrase indisputably connected with this general context. Although there may be analogies between the brotherhood of men in Christian theology and that in Marxist idealism, the use of each particular linguistic form is associated with each particular context and inspires in the hearer the emotions which he personally finds appropriate to each. These emotions will, of course, be conditioned by experiences and memories of other contextual occurrences and they belong, not to linguistics so much as the individual psychology.

It is obviously more desirable in any objective study to state the connotational differences between fraternal and brotherly in terms of their uses in different contexts rather than by vague references to associations. In this way the extent of their synonymy and their differentiation in senses can be accurately stated.

I.III.7 A short illustration of how the study of contextual senses bypasses the difficulties envisaged in the division of meaning into 'cognitive' and 'emotive' may be given from Chaucer's use of colour terminology.

We fancy that we know fairly precisely what the denotational meaning of grene is, but a great number of uses (TC.I.157; PF.130; ST.V.54; RR.690; RR.1425; LGW(0)225) also occur in contexts which might enable us to say that this use of grene has also connotations of springtime, natural growth, vigour, luxuriance of nature and joy at these things. Within this type of context grene is a key term in the poetic theme of the reveryria. Any use in this type of context will lead to recognition of the familiar poetic manoeuvre, setting up certain expectations within the literary tradition.

1 Stern (op. cit., p. 56) and Lyons (op. cit., p.450) both anticipate the difficulty of separating cognitive and emotive meaning and resolve to limit their enquiries, as far as possible, to the former.
Those will not normally be stirred in other contexts, with other collocations. Yet certain uses of grene outside the descriptive context of the raverdie depend upon this traditional use of the word, and it will appear in contexts in which the sense is shifted, so that the primary emphasis is upon what were once contextual associations. Thus one finds phrases like:

CT.IV.120. And thogh youro grene youthe floure as yit.

The association between grene and youthe is a traditional one, as Boethius shows, and is an obvious analogy to be made in any culture living in a climate with clearly marked seasons of new growth. The word is also used in contexts where this transferred sense is not obvious, yet the ordinary colour sense is out of the question and the reader is forced to assume a sense somehow similar to the connotational meanings in the familiar raverdie context:

CT.IV.1173. I val with lusty herte, fressh and grene, Sayn you a song to glade you, I wene;

In a passage from the Merchant's Tale the shifted senses of colour terms are used by Chaucer in a clever piece of word-play. He employs a tension between the denotational colour sense of grene and the contextual senses associated with raverdie, and an antithesis with hoore, which has developed a contextual sense of 'old' through its restriction in Chaucer to old men and its formulaic collocation with old. (cf. IV.IV.1400):

CT.IV.1465. I feelo me nochero hoore but on myn heed; 
Myn herte and alle my lymes been as grene 
As laurer thurgh the yeer is for to sene.

The first line here employs the ordinary colour denotation, selected by the context in the second half of the line, while the first half favours the contextual sense of 'old and feeble'. The second line exploits two finely differentiated contextual senses of grene (heart - 'joyful and vivacious');

Boethius I.m.i. 11. 
Gloria foliciis olim viridisque inventae.
limbu - 'vigorous and youthful'). Finally, the explicit comparison with the laurel draws the sense back to colour denotation, but the more gently since the laurel is presented as an evergreen tree which retains its springtime youth throughout the year. Such a tour-de-force of sense-manipulation is possible only because this colour adjective has been central to a particular situation repeatedly worked over by poets, and has therefore developed a range of possible senses, any of which can be selected by judicious choice of context. From this it will be seen that I have the strongest reservations about remarks such as Ullman's: "Many terms of praise and reprobation become saturated with moods and feelings attaching to them in innumerable contexts." This is far too imprecise a formulation, implying too sharp a differentiation between emotive and cognitive meaning, and the primacy and monolithic contrality of the latter. It would be more just to say that a particular linguistic form has a particular range of possible senses, some of which may be realised in emotive contexts or situations. The emotional value of a linguistic form is not something proper to it, but is drawn from memories of its use in emotive circumstances and by deliberate stylistic exploitation. The emotive elements or the so-called connotational senses of a form are only realised when the present context, in the widest sense of the term, including situation, recalls earlier contexts with emotional overtones. We might well expect that, for these contextual senses to develop, repeated use in them is necessary.

It would seem, therefore, that the most satisfactory compromise between the necessity of treating affective and connotational meanings in a study aimed at providing useful insight for literary criticism, and the demand for objective method made upon the investigator of language, is to treat as far as possible those aspects of meaning as contextual senses, where necessary providing historical, comparative and stylistic data to explain them and

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their relations.

Reasons of economy will, of course, preclude the statement of each occurrence of a word in context, so that at some point classification of occurrences into senses must be made. This will no doubt furnish difficulties, but in any classification a compromise has to be made between precision and economy, and the decision as to which are the most valuable distinctions between senses will have to be made with regard to the aim of the enquiry and the total body of evidence available.
I.IV  Collocation

I.IV.1  In paragraph II.3 (above) it was mentioned that certain items of context appear to have a more significant part than others in specifying the sense of a particular lexical item. In the example offered ('John kicked the cat which slunk off miaowing') it is clear that miaowing has a closer conceptual affinity with cat than slunk off has; it is therefore more important in directing us to the sense of cat, so long as we know what miaowing implies. This habitual co-occurrence of words, associated simply by relative proximity in the syntagmatic string, and not necessarily by very immediate grammatical relations, Firth developed into a technical term for a procedure of analysis. This habitual co-occurrence of lexical items, he called collocation. Since the term was introduced as a level of analysis, there has been some confusion as to its precise sense, so that some discussion of its sense must precede an assessment of its usefulness as an analytical tool.

I.IV.2  Firth introduced the idea of collocation as an instrument of analysis in a paper of 1951, 'Modes of Meaning'. He illustrates his idea by claiming that part of the meaning of ass is its relation to such adjectives as silly, obstinate, stupid, awful and he points out that the relation is mutual: 'One of the meanings of night is its collocability with dark, and of dark, of course, collocation with night.' The peculiar use of the word 'meaning' is noticeable here and also the fact that all the examples given are in a fixed grammatical relation to one another; that of modifier to head. In the following analysis of some of Swinburne's verse, however, Firth desorts the grammatical frame when discussing collocations. This is the attitude he eventually takes to collocation in the most extensive

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statement of his theory, where he considers collocation to be a syntagmatic co-occurrence at the lexical level only, while colligation represents relations on the separate syntactical level.\(^1\)

Despite the unambiguous statement of his position in the later theoretical paper, the imprecision of the introduction of the idea seems to have led to considerable confusion among followers of Firth, at least in general introductory books on linguistics, if not in more extended works on collocation. Thus, R.H. Robins states quite plainly that collocations are independent of grammatical relationships,\(^2\) yet gives Firth’s example of dark night, and supports it with more examples of a similar grammatical structure. Indeed all Robins’ discussion of the question revolves around lexico-grammatical structures rather than purely lexical relations. Similarly Halliday, McIntosh and Strevens,\(^3\) in explaining the notion of ‘lexical set’, deal with collocation in a way that is not so clear as might be wished. They maintain a comparison between lexical choice and grammatical choice: ‘Whereas in grammar we can say: “at this place in structure, these terms are possible, and all others are impossible”, in lexis we can never say: “only these items are possible”’. The words chair, seat and settle belong to the same lexical set because they have a number of probable collocations in common; the examples given are of terms which will normally be in direct grammatical relationship with these words: comfortable and sit. Another lexical set given on the same page: table, desk, bench -- certainly would not share these grammatically-linked collocations, and we may wonder indeed what collocations they would share, though we would certainly admit the likelihood of them occurring together simply through the co-occurrence of the objects


\(^3\) The Linguistic Sciences and Language Teaching, London (1964), pp. 33-35.
In both these books interesting observations are made on the phenomenon of habitual collocation but, no doubt partly through the compression of the treatment, clarity falls below the ideal. In each, although the autonomy of lexical relations is urged, the selection of examples of collocations reveals that the authors are guided in their choice primarily by simple grammatical relationships. This of course allows them to offer examples of collocations which the reader immediately accepts as probable, but at the same time, it suggests that collocation is in fact a lexico-grammatical feature. Such an assumption is supported by the impression given that the selection of a lexical item, constituting a collocant, is made at a point in the syntagmatic string from a set of possible choices, which must be conditioned by other items in the string and their syntactical relations. The set therefore appears analogous with the system of grammar and is a paradigmatic relationship. In lexis, not only are there more items to choose from at any given point, compared with the items or classes one is choosing from in grammar; also there is no line to be drawn between those that can and those that cannot be chosen.  

A further factor tending to confuse the issue of the purely lexical or lexico-grammatical nature of collocation must be Firth's original claim that collocations are 'part of the meaning' of each other. Such a remark is often true with regard to cognitive meaning in simple grammatical structures such as modification; as in Firth's example dark night. It has been stated by linguists that collocational similarity bears no necessary relationship to conceptual or referential similarity, yet there lingers a vague assumption that some affinity between cognitive meaning and collocation may exist. Such an affinity would only exist with any certainty in the

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1 Ibid., p.34.
2 Ibid., p.33; and Sinclair in In Memory of J.R. Firth, pp.410-11.
case of grammatically related items; the identification of other items that may have a conceptual affinity would be most difficult and would require very large samples of text.

I.IV.3 More extended works dealing with lexis show that linguists — sometimes the same linguists as previously mentioned — are aware of these problems. Halliday, in his theoretical work, abstemiously excludes grammatical criteria from collocation, which he says is simply the statistical probability that certain items will occur at certain number of removes from a given lexical item. The lexical set is the paradigmatic structure set up from the collocants occurring in a large number of uses.

In an article devoted to the explanation of the necessity of illustrating patterning on the linguistic level separately from grammar, Halliday closes with the recommendation that the study of collocation on the lexical level alone should not constitute the whole of the enquiry. 'It is not known how far collocational patterns are dependent on the structural relations into which the items enter.' It is therefore necessary to supplement the purely lexical collocational analysis by a lexico-grammatical analysis; an analysis of the grammatical structures in which the collocating lexical items are found.

I.IV.4 The case made by Halliday for an autonomous study of the co-occurrence of lexical items (collocation) is taken up, with the emphasis on procedural methodology, in the same volume, by Sinclair. In his discussion of the problems Sinclair assumes the autonomy of lexis. His attitude is emphasised by his denial that lexical items are chosen, one against the other, in the way that grammatical choices are made; he prefers

2 'Lexis as a Linguistic Level' in In Memory of J.R. Firth, p.159.
3 'Beginning the Study of Lexis', pp.410-429.
to consider the occurrence of lexical items, like Halliday, simply as a matter of greater or lesser statistical probability. The investigation of the lexis which he proposes also advances, at least to some extent, by statistical methods. Certain problems in collocational analysis are faced and decisions for procedure are made. For example, since this is to be a purely lexical analysis, the problem of syntagmatic distance of significant collocates presents itself; no guidance should be expected from grammar if the autonomy of lexis is to be maintained. This is solved by the necessary expedient of fixing an arbitrary span of a given number of places at each side of the item under examination; the optimum breadth of this span may be determined by later experience. The identification of items which are significant collocations is to be related to the probability of the collocation, and a formula is suggested for assessing this, which works in terms of the frequencies of the item under investigation, the collocate, the span of places on either side of the item investigated, all in relation to the total number of occurrences of items in the text. The relative proximity of items within the span to the item investigated is not considered important since some obviously important collocates are always at some remove from each other whilst others are always directly succeeding one another in the syntagma. It would appear that to take note of this kind of ordering would be to confuse grammatical with lexical features and such an analysis must wait until later in the investigation. The problems of lexical items composed of several grammatical units and of distinguishing lexical items with the same form (from the formal point of view: polysemantic items) are raised. It is suggested that, with the expenditure of much labour, the former problem can be solved by the test of examining the collocates of the units separately and then determining whether there is any considerable coincidence between the sum of these collocates and the collocates of the

\[ e.g. \text{spick and span; brotherly love; to buy ... cheap.} \]
suspected multi-unit lexical item. If there is no similarity then the items are distinct. An example given by Sinclair is that of cold feet as an idiom and as an ordinary modifier/head construction.

The second problem is really not so different from the first, since in the traditional sense, both problems involve a kind of polysemy. Yet the fact that single formal items might have different collocates presents some considerable difficulties; obviously any simple collection of the collocates of any formal unit will not distinguish between those units which represent different lexical items. Sinclair's suggested answer to this problem is that the collocates of each distinct lexical item will tend to collocate themselves, so that hand will collocate with marriage, daughter, engagement, chill, yummy, ace, flush. But if we examine the collocations of each of these in turn, we will find that they will tend to collocate with each other, setting up two distinct groups or ranges. This process will provide the basic data for establishing the structure of the lexis in terms of lexical sets.

The solutions offered to these two problems requires some comment. Although Sinclair formulates the problems as

'(i) detecting multi-morpheme items;
(ii) detecting more than one item with the same form.'

he in fact offers no means of detecting multi-morphemic items; what he offers is a means of verifying that certain stretches of language, which we suspect might be single lexical items, but which resemble the co-occurrence of two or more lexical items, are in fact single and distinct from the two separate lexical items. This is not a means of discovery, but of giving validity within the method to something we already suspect. Furthermore the method of verification would seem to be superfluous in view of the fact that the method suggested for the distinguishing of items with more than one form would work equally well for the first problem. In practical terms, however, the objection against this second method is the labour which
it would involve. In a study of fifty words, this might involve the
collection of two hundred collocates for each word, followed by the col-
lection and study of two hundred collocates for each of these, before any
inkling of the collocational range can be ascertained. It is clear that
the amount of effort involved would be very considerable and, depending on
the collocational span, the length of the text chosen, and the nature of
words examined, the number of collocates might well be considerably greater
than two hundred. Sinclair himself found that this work could be attempted
only with the aid of a computer. A final difficulty is mentioned towards
the end of his paper but dismissed on the assumption that the text for
examination would be sufficiently homogeneous to be untroubled by such
factors. It is quite clear that certain collocations are found only in
specific varieties or registers of a language: thus hand and horse in
the context of equitation. One is free to wonder whether homogeneity can
be found in a text long enough for the rest of Sinclair's method to work.
Certainly such homogeneity is not to be found in the works of Chaucer.

I. IV. 5 The view that the study of collocation is to be conducted entirely
and separately upon the lexical level is not shared by all linguists. Thus
Joos claims that collocation within specified grammatical structures can
act as an index of cognitive meaning and illustrates this by the example of
the word code. The enquiry is restricted to those senses of code which
connot 'legality' rather than 'a symbol system'. The senses are first
arranged subjectively and this subjective arrangement is claimed to be
validated by collocational criteria. According to Joos, 'semological
collocations are always grammatically linked pairs or sets of grammatically
identified words', but he does not admit all such combinations as

1 'Semology: a linguistic theory of meaning', Studies in Linguistics 13
(1958), pp. 53-70.
2 Ibid., p.64.
significant. Certain collocations occur with every sense of the word examined and therefore cannot be claimed to help in distinguishing senses; these Joos does not recognize as collocations in his 'semological' sense. Since no indication is given as to how collocations can be distinguished from these non-collocations without first knowing and arranging the cognitive meanings relative to one another, it is clear that Joos's work cannot form the basis of an analytic investigation.

I.IV.6 A much more sophisticated view of collocation in relation to grammar is that offered by Professor McIntosh. His interest in collocation is also explicitly connected with cognitive meaning; he draws an analogy between the syntagmatic relations and phonetic reference of the orthography and the meaning relations of language as a whole, and comments:

My main reason for such an exploration is this: that the problems connected with meaning in the ordinary sense are notoriously complicated and it seems to me that in this (graphological) realm we have a somewhat similar system operating in a much simpler fashion. 1

In discussing the relationship between graphological and linguistic meaning, McIntosh makes the distinction between 'potential' and 'actual' meaning (a distinction developed by Ellis — above, p. 17). 2 The former is to be understood as equivalent, in the lexical sphere, to lexical meaning, whilst the latter corresponds to contextual meaning. 'Potential' meaning involves both grammatical and collocational features and may be considered to be defined by the limited appropriateness of an item to a certain number of places in the verbal context within certain situational contexts. As such, it is a rather ill-defined composition of all the contextual senses of the item. The 'actual' meanings are the senses, occurrence by occurrence, of a particular item taken in its verbal and situational contexts. An extreme

2 Ibid., pp.103-105.
view might claim that a linguistic form has as many actual meanings as it has occurrences, but it is clear that the necessity of communication precludes this extreme viewpoint in the everyday use of language. There would therefore seem to be little justification for a linguist to adopt this view in his description of language; he must classify actual meanings into clusters, each of which will represent a single 'use'. This is the principle followed by the compilers of large dictionaries. McIntosh is not here concerned with the compilation of dictionaries and does not discuss the problems of this classification and the degree of objectivity with which it can be carried out.

The relation of grammar and collocation is, however, treated more extensively in the same volume in an article 'Patterns and Ranges', first published in the same year as 'Graphology and Meaning'.1 Here McIntosh illustrates how the acceptability of a sentence depends not solely on its grammaticality but equally on the collocability of its lexical items. He attempts to set up a system of collocability, the collocational range. The proof that collocability is a necessary requirement separate from grammar is offered by the example of the distinction between sentences which are anomalous but which can be considered to have an application in some situation (the flaming waste-paper basket snored violently) and those for which no possible situation can be envisaged (the molten postage feather scored a weather). In both cases the grammar is well-formed, but since one sentence is perhaps acceptable, whilst the other is not, evidently the anomaly is at the lexical level. One must, however, make the reservation that the anomaly occurs, not merely through the coincidence of these lexical items, but through their collocations within certain syntactic relationships. Professor McIntosh comments:

but, in discussion of this matter of collocation, he prefers to treat the
more general case where it is left to the subjective impression of the reader
to decide upon the probability of a situation of application. Furthermore,
in deciding the eligibility of collocations, he states as a means of procedure,
that which has been the implication of the examples he has given; that, for
clarity, he will limit himself to collocations occurring within defined syn-
tactical units in particular grammatical structures. Such a decision is
obviously a radical departure from the Firthian conception of collocations
as lexical co-occurrences independent of grammar. To McIntosh, a collocational
range is that set of lexical items which occurs at a particular point in
the syntagmatic string of language, and this is conditioned not only by the
lexical items in the vicinity, but also by the grammatical structure in
which they appear:

The assessment of a collocation in the last resort involves in
one way or another all other lexical items in the context, and there
is scarcely a limit to the remove at which these may affect our
interpretation of the word we happen to be specially preoccupied with.
Furthermore various circumstances in the situational context are
likely to be relevant. (p.191).

Despite this theoretical statement, McIntosh is compelled by necessity, for
simplicity, to discuss only examples in the most limited grammatical
structures such as the modifier/head relationship. He mentions the aspect
of linguistic competence which enables the fluent speaker to select the item
died rather than passed away within a Subject/Predicate construction of
which the rhododendron bush forms the subject. We may never have had cause
to use this sentence before, nor even have heard it before, yet we unhesitat-
ingly choose one verb rather than the other. We may state this fact
formally by saying that passed away and rhododendron bush each have colloc-
tational ranges which do not include the other term. The decision of the
speaker to include rhododendron bush in the collocational range of died
rather than present any idea from his knowledge of features of the use of each and every word, he can frequently leave the reader in collocation
with other plant names, but not the latter. Thus the range is assumed to
be extended by analogy; rhododendron bush is known to be a plant name and
is so classed, in usage, with other plant names.

It is clear from this that cognitive meaning is involved in the setting-
up of collocations of this type, and Mcintosh is fully aware of this. He
says of the collocation molten feather that a full account of the set of
nouns capable of occurring instead of feather (a full account of the colloc-
utional range of molten in a modification/word construction) "gives a long way
towards constituting the meaning of molten" (p.129). The same point is
made (p.194) when he assumes that:

the meanings a given word has (however we may define
meaning) are in some direct way associated with our experience of
that word in a variety of contexts, our association of that word
with other words which have, in our experience, a somewhat similar
range, and our association of the word with other words of similar
shape, often but not always etymologically related. (p.194)

This is, in effect, a restatement of the idea of 'potential meaning' made
in 'Grammar and meaning'.

The claim that collocational sense has a definite relation to cognitive
meaning, which seems to be made in 'Gedachtnis' article, is one which cannot
be taken for the ordinary further notion of collocation. It is a claim
worth investigation since, if it proves to be true, it will provide a
powerful instrument for the objective analysis of the senses of lexical
items in unfamiliar texts.

I. IV. 7 In the following discussion, I intend principally to consider a
single modification/word structure, and only in passing to touch upon more
extended verbal context. It will, however, prove necessary to consider
due a particular context of situation might influence on this type of grammat-
ically ordered collocation, and to observe its implications for the
relation to cognitive meaning.
At the close of his article Harris comments, but does not develop, the idea that certain peculiarities of collocating pairs might be explicable in terms of their grammatical structure and their informational value: this latter to be understood in terms of the relative restriction of the range from which the collocate is chosen. A basic premise of information theory is that the ability to convey information implies choice and, as a corollary to this, that the limiting of choice, the increase in the probability of the occurrence of a particular item, reduces the informational value of that item.  

It may be seen from this that each choice of a collocate from a large collocational range, where there is considerable freedom of choice, might contribute more information than a choice from a more restricted range. Though this may hold true in signal systems, certain qualifications have to be made to this assumption when we are discussing lexical collocations, and these are best illustrated by examples.

Firstly, in dealing with collocational ranges, we can not assume that each member is of equal informational value. If we are concerned to establish the meaning of the word *leaf*, we may discover a wide range of items acting as modifier: *dead, green, ivy, shrivelled*, and so on. We should find a higher probability of the occurrence of *green leaf* than *marigold leaf*, so that, although the former may tell us more about leaves in general, the latter, which is less probable, tells us more about a leaf in a specific context and carries greater informational value. Hence simple breadth of range, without more detailed specification, is inadequate as an index of the informational value of any collocate.

Secondly, peculiarities of the organisation of language complicate the situation. If we take Firth's example *dark night*, we may assume with some justice that it is a frequent collocation. If this is so, recalling the dogma that collocation is a bi-partite relationship, we might imagine that,

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Given the occurrence of one of the items, the co-occurrence of the other is to some extent probable. It then follows that one collocate must carry some information in common with the other, since the latter is of partially depleted informational value through its predictability. But if we examine this collocation in the ordinary way of information theory, working from left to right, we can not say that, given the form dark, the form night in an especially probable successor. On the other hand, speaking in syntactical terms, if asked to find a modifier for night, dark seems quite a likely choice. In this structure the word night seems to include much of the information given by dark, but even taking grammatical structure into account, the reverse is not true. The relationship is articulated by grammatical relations and is neither the simple sequence envisaged by information theory nor the equal bi-partite relationship of collocational theory. If we wish to discuss it in terms of information theory we have to envisage the sequence as channelled by grammatical structure working here from head to modifier.

Apart from grammatical factors, certain semantic features influence collocation in unpredictable ways. Of the two collocations yellow leaf and withered leaf neither has an inherently greater probability than the other. Yet, subjectively, the latter seems more specific, seems to carry a greater semantic load than the former; we may therefore be tempted to regard it as less probable. This illusion that the latter has greater informational value in this way, is in fact nothing to do with the actual frequency of either modifier within this collocation. It has to do with the fact that yellow, to the competent speaker, is perceived to belong to a clearly defined lexical set of colour words, some members of which (e.g. brown, green) are extremely common collocates of leaf. The peculiarity of withered is that it

1 This kind of organisation by a semantically related set is analogous to the point made by McIntosh concerning rhododendron bush and its collocation with died.
belongs to no such defined set and therefore seems to represent in this
collocation a much more deliberate and distinct choice than the colour word.
Thus, in saying something of value about the relative informational content
of collocations, we must not only take into account the general frequency
(including the collocational ranges) of both collocates, but we should also
be aware that probability might be affected by certain conceptual groupings
within the collocational range.

With this warning, we may consider for a moment the problem which
suggested to McIntosh the use of informational criteria. He points out that,
in any unusual collocation, what faces us is not an unusual use of any one
lexical item, but rather the rare collocation of two items. Nevertheless our
attention is almost always focussed upon the peculiarity of a single word;
one collocate seems fixed, while we feel compelled to adjust the sense of the
other to account for the collocation. Some indication of grammatical and
lexical features which might be involved has already been given; we might now
consider further the relationship of semantic and informational features.
In informational terms predetermination is equivalent to a lack of any value.
Thus the sense 'egg' is implicit in addled since the collocational range of
addled in the modifier/head is limited to egg and perhaps brain. But is
our feeling for the specific collocate to be changed in sense directly related
to probability alone? If we suggest the collocation *addled car* it is the
former item which seems strange and has to be understood in another way; yet
if we add extra context ('You haven't eaten that addled car, have you?'),
the other collocate becomes the dubious one. The examples *asphalt egg*
and *fierce egg*, although the probability of their occurrence is equally small,
and each has a fairly large collocational range, elicit the subjective reaction
that different halves of the collocation require to be changed. It is
inconceivable to the competent speaker that an egg should be made from asphalt,
whilst the associations of fierce make it possible that it is a deviant use
with the sense 'strong'. One must doubt whether
the informational value. If we take the example "addled book" the expectation that the modifier will seem odd and will need to be adjusted is not necessarily fulfilled; it is possible to explain this collocation in terms of the transferred sense of book. *Addled* normally collocates with brain, hence the implication of the collocation may be that the views of the author of the volume are being called in question. In the case of *asphalt* the possibility is that it belongs to a set of the names of substances from which things are made; again semantic considerations are the answer to a problem rather than statistical ones.

If we were to accept, as is probably the case in some but not all instances, that certain collocates contain part of the sense of the other collocate, would this be valid at any level of lexical meaning above that of the individual contextual sense? To what extent would it contribute to a statement of the more abstract meaning, McIntosh's 'potential' meaning? Since probability is a function of frequency, which in turn related to the total number of occurrences in a text, we may say that this decision on meaning takes into account all the contexts of an item which correspond with the grammatical frame with which we have chosen to work. As a result these individual statements of meaning relations should have a validity with regard to the overall 'potential' meaning. Unfortunately however the system of language does not seem to function in this neat way, for, apart from the limiting factors already mentioned, new ones are constantly to be found. Thus the term *white noise*, from the restricted language of accoustical engincering, seems superficially not very different from expressions like *green leaf* or *dark night*, but it is hard to see how either of the collocates overlap in sense with each other. Here the lexeme *white* is used by an analogy with optics, where white light contains all wave-lengths of the visible spectrum, just as *white noise* contains all wave-lengths of the audible spectrum. Similarly *wet night* is a fairly frequent collocation so that *wet* may be considered a probable modifier of *night*; yet one can hardly
accept that it is a part of the meaning of night. The problem is raised of what degree of probability ensures the apparent overlap in sense in some collocations, and to what extent do common, but non-semantically criterial, situational features affect collocations?

I.IV.8 From the analytical point of view, any kind of transferred meaning will tend to disrupt the possible link between collocations and cognitive meaning, whether it be metonymy of the kind found in added book or anthropomorphomorph metaphors as in the decision to call the birch tree the 'queen of the woods'. If we are examining the collocations of book or queen these collocations in such a use will differ considerably from the ordinary uses. If, as we must initially, we limit ourselves to the formal level of analysis, certain grammatical features will also prove disruptive. Thus the occurrence of pronouns as collocates will be common so that, at best, these will be of small informational value and, at worst, as when they refer to a noun used in a transferred sense, they will be distinctly misleading. Equally confusing will be those uses which occur with negation. If any coincidence between collocation and cognitive meaning is to be maintained, the negation must be taken into account: as, for example, in the following sentence where we are attempting to determine the sense of the word succulent by examining collocates in a modifier-head construction: 'Most succulents are not spiny as are cacti ...'

Returning to the second half of the question posed at the end of the last paragraph, some indication of the extent to which extra-linguistic features can affect the kinds of collocations to be found in a text may be exemplified from the Chaucerian corpus. If cognitive meaning is assumed to be related to the collocational ranges of lexical items, each collocation, as part of such a range, will influence our judgement of that meaning. A few examples from Chaucer's usage will illustrate some of the ways in which random elements in the context of situation can predetermine collocations,
affect their frequency, and thus upset any easy assumptions as to the relative probability of collocations and their consequent value in assessing cognitive meaning.

Firstly we may cite the lack of homogeneity in Chaucer's language and add that this is a language used in close contact with at least two others, French and Latin. Hence, not only is the culture of fourteenth century England dominated by concepts first formulated in these two languages but, as a result, the English language is often patterned according to patterns originally proper to these languages. This is equally true of the lexical as of the grammatical level. Throughout the works of Chaucer we find numerous lexico-grammatical calques on French phrases: to have despit of; to take leve of; to catch a pite. Based on Latin phrases, though perhaps by way of French, are places delitables and paytate (Franklin's Tale V. 899, 907, locus amoenus and pingere in the rhetorical manuals). The influence of a foreign language may be more immediate in the sense that it is a direct translation with an identifiable source; thus the collocation fyerce Poliphemus (Bo.IV m.vii) is simply a rendering of the Latin ferus ... Polyphemus whilst the puzzling outward grace in the Clerk's Tale IV.424 is based upon the Latin of Petrarch (extra ... cum gratia hominum, vivebat) and the French of the Livre Criseldis (vivoit ... on grant grace dehors).

The influence of tradition or authority may also affect the lexico-grammatical patterns of a language through deliberate quotation or through the echoing of sentiment. In Chaucer's language collocations such as grene youthe and grene herte are referable to a literary tradition associating the springtime rebirth of nature with the youthful vigour of mankind. This tradition is to be found in Late Classical literature and is maintained in

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1 D.R. Howard, The Three Temptations, Princeton (1966), p.296, comments perceptively that 'the French renaissance of the twelfth century comes to fruition in England in the age of Chaucer almost exactly as much later as the Italian Renaissance of the fourteenth century was to bear fruit in the age of Shakespeare.'
Old French as part of the theme of reverdic. Deliberate quotation is to be found in the use of proverbs and sententiae as well as in excerpts from important works of literature or instruction. Thus the modern English idiom 'to screw up one's courage' seems to be based upon a reminiscence of Shakespeare's imagery in Macbeth.

Certain collocations occur in contexts of didactic or philosophical debate which are deliberately unexpected and even oxymoronic. Thus the collocation good ire in the Parson's Tale is used to shock the reader to attention to the didactic passage which will explain the validity of such modification of ire. Without this accompanying passage, taken as an isolated collocation, this might tend to give a totally erroneous impression of the normal evaluative elements in the meaning of ire. A similarly antithetical collocation, though this time afforded by the peculiarities of situation, is that between white and crow in the Nun's Tale. Within a limited corpus, such exceptional cases may prove troublesome in the analysis of collocations, though they may be negligible in the context of Halliday's 'twenty million running words'.

Finally peculiarities of the sense of one or other of the collocates has been recognised as a cause of peculiar collocations; any transferred or figurative sense may disrupt the pattern we hope to establish and a new pattern may or may not begin to emerge. One such new pattern in Chaucer's usage is that connected with the figurative use of the words grace, mercy, pitee where each is spoken of in the imagery of running water; pitee renneth soone; welle of grace; welle of mercy and many others. The analogy between emotions and water suddenly welling up from a spring is so widespread that we might be able to allow for this in treating these collocations, but we should be sacrificing the hoped-for objectivity of our method. We should also be distorting the Chaucerian usage since certainly in the case

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1 'Lexis as a Linguistic Level', op.cit., p.159.
of grace and mercy the analogy is between water and the theological con-
ception of grace and this derives from Biblical authority and exegetical
commentary.¹

I. IV. 9 The examination of verbal context and a number of theories about
its connection with the meaning of individual lexical items has provided
us with a range of suggestions which might help to establish methodological
principles. Firstly it is clear that, although verbal context is of
extreme importance in the analysis of meaning, it is not sufficient when
taken alone, even if each occurrence of a lexical item is studied. A
number of features of both general and situational context must be taken
into account in establishing each sense. Although the general cultural
context can be assumed to be stable throughout the life of a poet, distinct
features of it may be brought into prominence by particular uses of a word,
and these will require comment in delineating the sense of that occurrence.
Thus, in establishing a sense, we should expect to have to draw evidence
from the verbal and situational context of the actual utterance, but also,
in a way which cannot be formalised, from aspects of the general cultural
milieu; which may include evidence from cognate foreign languages.

The study of collocations, in the Firthian sense of lexical co-occurrence,
has doubtful links with cognitive meaning, yet it will offer useful evidence
concerning habitual uses of some words. In many cases it will reflect the
cocurrence of objects in the referential domain; in the case of material
objects this may or may not be of interest, telling us more about the
organisation of the real world than the meanings of the words (e.g. table,
desk, seat, ruler, pencil), but in the case of abstractions, co-occurrence
¹ Variations of the opposition between water and grace are repeated by all
four evangelists and twice in the Acts of the Apostles (e.g. I have
baptised you with water; he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit. Mark
1:8) Exegetes considered the water at Cana and that drawn by the
Samaritan to contrast with the 'living water' or grace which Christ offers.
may be much more genuine to meaning. If we are studying emotions or social attitude, the fact that they are considered together or that they occur together with relation to a single situation, suggests that they are articulated pieces of human behaviour, and such evidence is of prime importance in assessing their meaning.

Lexico-grammatical collocations can act as a useful index of cognitive meaning since they represent a portion of the syntactically ordered verbal context. Inevitably, they lack precision and may be a very fallible guide indeed to cognitive meaning for reasons which have been demonstrated; nevertheless they can act as a useful general guide if not too rigidly applied to the exclusion of valuable extra-linguistic evidence. This type of study is of first rate value in determining lexical items which consist of traditional formulae, idioms or proverbial elements. One might suggest that within the syntactically ordered framework of these collocations it might be possible to set up a scale of idiomaticity according to which a high probability of collocation suggests an idiom with a single lexical reference whilst low probability presupposes two or more distinct items.

Finally, the very flexibility of the use of language, the uncertain link in language between form and meaning and its variable dependence upon situation, should warn us against the danger of adopting too generalised and rigid a method of the analysis of meaning.¹

¹ An interesting schematisation of context is offered by Sture Allin in "Semitische Strukturen" Studia Philologorger, 2 (1960), p. 377 who believes that the close linguistic context is formalisable whilst context of situation and general context, which also bear upon the sense of an item, must remain unformalised.
I.V. Patterning

I.V.1 It is advisable at this point in the discussion to consider briefly what the notion of 'pattern' implies, and perhaps to look forward to some kinds of pattern which we might hope to find in a lexical study of an area of the vocabulary of Chaucer. We may begin by drawing a distinction between patterns and sets; a procedure which will also involve the notion of structure. Sets are simply collections of items, established by their conformity to one or more criteria, which may be externally or internally applicable. Table, chair and stool enter a set which may be designated as that of common domestic furniture; a set from which throne would be excluded. Yet throne would be a member of a set of items which are customarily used for sitting on, whilst table would be excluded from this new set. The first of these sets, we might consider to be externally established by virtue of the co-occurrence of these items in a single location; the second is established internally by the fact that its members all share a particular function.

Similarly, lexical sets may be established by the external criterion of the collocation of each of its members with some specific item, or an orthographical set may be ordered by the internal consideration that all its members have the same initial letter. The common conditions of polysemy and synonymy can be simply portrayed in terms of sets ordered by the fact that they share the same formal item. Polysemy is the condition which occurs when a set of senses are assigned to a single formal item; synonymy, when the sets of senses of two formal items intersect.¹ Seen from this

¹ If we have two formal items, X and Y, with the senses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 respectively, the condition of synonymy and polysemy may be simply represented by a diagram of intersecting sets. No internal articulation is implied by the sequence of numbers.
simplified point of view, polysemy and synonymy are not structural sense relations since there appears to be no internal ordering involved, but the sets are grouped by an external criterion; the separate occurrence of the members as senses of a single formal item. In truth, however, this is rarely the case. The various contextual senses which are realised in the uses of a single formal item are usually inter-related and are therefore internally, or structurally, ordered. They will all belong to a larger set defined by a particular number of criteria. This will be subdivisible and resolvable into mutually exclusive sub-sets, and eventually to the level of the individual sense, by the addition of new criteria. If these sets have a number of criteria in common in this way, and are therefore members of a more generalised set, their relationship to one another and to the higher level set will be a structural one.

Structure implies internal interdependencies between the items entering into it. Ordinarily, when we speak of structure in language we have in mind the syntactic relationships into which the string of discourse enters, but what we imply in talking of the structure of the vocabulary is the interdependence and mutually defining nature of the senses of lexical items. It is plain that if we intend to discover structural relationships of this sort, a preliminary will be the organisation of the items into simple sets.

Pattern is a less easily defined concept in relation to language, but an initial requirement in identifying pattern is that there should be some element of repetition. This may not be precise and exact repetition, for we should include symmetry within the definition of pattern, and here the repetition of the pattern is in some way reversed. The fact that pattern is dependent upon repetition implies that it is a systemic or paradigmatic organisation; thus, by the comparison of repeated syntagmatic features we isolate a paradigmatic pattern in language.

The relation of the larger sets and smaller sets would be analogous to McIntosh's notion of potential and actual meaning (see above, p. 87).
Finally, we may sum up by noting that sets may or may not be internally structured and that, while we should expect structures to correspond to a more general pattern, patterns need not have a narrowly structural form. Some patterns will hold between two distinct levels of language in a way structures do not. Pattern may be found operating simultaneously in both the syntagmatic and paradigmatic planes; thus, in an attempt to discover pattern, we must take into account both system and structure, both set relations and structural ones.

I.V.2 When our primary interest is in lexis we should expect to find patterns of at least three major types. Firstly we shall find patterning in the formal level, the expression system of the language. These patterns will take the form of lexico-grammatical structures which are repeated whole or in part throughout the corpus. They will comprise idioms, proverbial elements, formulaic expressions of one sort or another, calqued phrases and so forth.

A second type of patterning we may expect to find is semantic patterning. This may be of the structural kind suggested by Trier's theories of the linguistic field, but may be more objectively demonstrated by simpler structural relations such as antonymy or hyponymy. This latter term denotes the condition where a more general term includes the senses of more specific terms and could therefore be substituted for them in certain contexts, though the reverse would not necessarily be true (e.g. the relationship holding between fish and shark, herring, salmon, and carp). We should here take up a point made earlier about synonymy and polysemy. Hyponymy would represent the condition in which, when \( X \) is the formal item FISH and \( d \) is the sense 'carp', FISH can be used in certain contexts where it has the sense 'carp', or, alternatively, a form CARP (\( X \)) exists with this sense and can be so used instead. The form CARP, however, cannot be used in certain...

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1 A term introduced by J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, p.69.
contexts where the form FISH can be used with the more general sense 'fish'. A more complex version of our diagram may help to elucidate these patterns of sense and form.

Formal items: X | Y | (X) | (Y)

'potential' meaning: \( H_1 \) | \( H_2 \) | \( H_3 \) | \( H_4 \)

contextual or 'actual' senses: \( a,b,c,d,e,f,g \) | \( u,v,w \) | \( m,n,o \)

The above diagram now represents two formal items, X and Y, which are polysemic at the level of contextual meaning. At this level they have one sense, d, in common and so are synonymous in one context. Out of context, the more general set of criteria shared by all the contextual senses which constitute the 'potential' meaning of each formal item, \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \), are different enough for there to be no question of synonymy at the level of potential meaning. The relation between \( H_1 \) and the set of related senses \( (a,b,c,d) \) and \( H_2 \) \( (d,e,f,g) \) is a structural one of hierarchical formation.

Now, if two sets of senses, \( (u,v,w) \) and \( (m,n,o) \) are also found to be possible for X and Y respectively and these are related internally, but not to any of the other senses, we shall then have to set up new sets of potential meaning, \( H_3 \) and \( H_4 \), and X and Y will now seem polysemic outside context. Hyponymy, in Lyons sense, is found when a number of the contextual senses, a, b or c, can be realised by the use of other formal items H, I, J. In that contextual sense, H, I, J are hyponyms of X. It is not necessarily the fact that H, I and J will in every context have the senses a, b and c, so that they may not always be hyponyms of X, yet cases do exist where contextual variation in sense is slight, so that hyponymy appears to be a neat and stable pattern. It is equally obvious that the senses a, b, c are not hyponymic with relation to X when it has the potential meaning \( H_3 \). This being so, there are obvious inaccuracies and confusions in stating what is essentially a relation of senses in terms of formal units with which they lack a one to one relationship. It becomes necessary to append to the formal item a key which will refer to a previously delineated potential.
1 The model is still an oversimplified one. It could be improved by bringing a set of norms between the potential meanings and the contextual senses. 

2 Compare the etymologies of: gentle, sober, idle, idle, idle, idle and slide, slide, slide, slide, slide, slide. Note that the slide development, which only works of it, the norm (gentle, sober, idle) has directly access to it.

Certain lexical patterns may be intimately connected with situation as, for example, when different lexical items are selected to express the same cognitive meaning in different applications or registers (horses sweat, men perspire, but ladies merely glow) or when a single situation is viewed from different perspectives and the choice of lexical item reflects this difference (buy, sell; offer, accept). A slight extension of the time span may add other associated words (have, ask, give, receive). This relationship is called converseness by Lyons.  

Other types of pattern will no doubt present themselves in the course of analysis, and a thorough lexical study will not only seek to identify those patterns but will move outside the language in order to suggest influences which are responsible for creating them. A full lexical investigation ought to establish the senses of words, give details of their use, including any patterning, syntactic or semantic, into which they enter, and offer something of their history, internal and external, to account for the patterning. All this information may be of use in the application of the results of investigation by literary criticism for a fuller understanding of the text and its background.

1 Theoretical Linguistics, p.467. Lyons definition is slightly different from that given here, since he does not consider situation of importance but rather 'oppositeness' of meaning, so that husband and wife are also examples of converseness.
I.VI The Method

I.VI.1 What is being sought is a method or framework by which to state the facts - in this case the meaning or functioning of words - and the test of any method is the degree to which it enables the facts to be exhaustively, usefully and, as far as may be, simply stated, classified and handled. Any abstractions from the totality of the subject-matter, in this case the functioning of words in speech, that prove useful are justified, and precisely to the extent that they prove useful.¹

Robins' words on methodological approach are a salutary reminder: abstraction is valuable but clarity is worth more. For the sake of clarity one must, in analytical work, be prepared to sacrifice the apparent conceptual neatness of formal and abstract statement. Yet such an attitude does not confer upon the investigator the freedom to wander haphazardly down each by-road he encounters. A broad consistency of approach is required or clarity becomes the victim of the opposing tendency to atomism and eccentricity. The lesson taught by our introductory discussion of linguists' attitudes to the analysis of meaning is this very lesson: clarity and descriptive value lies in the middle way between formal theory and arbitrary practice; 'vertu is the men'.

The method adopted, then, draws inspiration from a number of the theoretical and practical approaches discussed above, but inevitably it re-fashions the instruments somewhat to its own purposes. The initial treatment of each lexeme may be of a formal nature, but it is hoped that this justifies itself in the more flexible discussion by which it is supplemented.

I.VI.2 It has been found in practice that it is necessary to treat each lexeme separately in the initial stages of analysis. An attempt to suggest lexical patterning simply by the study of collocations, as Joos suggests might be possible,² failed for reasons which have been mentioned in the

² loc.cit. pp.62ff. The method does in fact appear to work in the case of a few words (e.g. the relations in sense between merciful, pitiful and despicable), but it has no more general validity.
discussion of collocation above.

The first task of the investigator, then, is to collect all the occurrences of a particular lexeme. This has been done with the help of the Chaucer Concordance in the case of each lexeme studied. Each occurrence must be accompanied by a sufficient indication of its context; normally to the extent of the sentence in which it occurs, and this may be supplemented by notes on the more general context. A complete reading of the corpus is of course necessary in order to contextualise occurrences more fully.¹ For present purposes this corpus was assumed to be all those works which are indisputably Chaucerian in origin; thus doubtful poems such as Against Women Unconstant and fragments B and C of the Romaut of the Rose and the Equatorie of the Planetes have been excluded from the initial investigation, though evidence offered by them may be brought in more general discussion.

The total number of occurrences of each lexeme is stated since this is of importance, both in assessing the value of the evidence relating to it, and in establishing its status in relation to other items in Chaucer's lexis. The formal scatter of the item has similar importance, and obviously has a direct bearing upon its total frequency, so that the realisation of the lexeme in different word classes should also be stated in quantitative terms. Some sub-division and qualification may be necessary at this point. It might be useful here, for example, to state such differences as that between the use of mercy as a noun and the sub-category where it is used as a sentence substitute in an appeal for mercy.

I.VI.3 From the collection of citations for each occurrence, an account of the situations of use is possible. By these situations we need not imply a situation in which the word is part of an utterance embedded in a coincidence of circumstances of the phenomenal world. The word which

¹ Naturally, fuller contextualisation by wider reading in contemporary literature is of great value.
we are at present concerned with may in fact be part of the narrative which
establishes the immediate situation. So that in a sentence like "she granted
him grace, the word we are studying refers directly to a narrative situation
identified by the sentence of which it is a part. It is clear, therefore,
that situation analysis, since not all sentences are narrative in this way,¹
will not be applicable to all occurrences of a particular lexeme. We shall
in practice make a distinction between the use of a word in a narrative
sentence of this sort and as an utterance within a situation, yet there
proves to be little necessity to analyse the situations of each separately.

The analysis of situation of use requires a fairly high degree of
generality; the machinery of analysing the situation of each occurrence
separately and presenting the results individually would be prohibitively
extensive and lend little to clarity. The method of applying each occur-
rence separately to a more generalised framework and offering an account of
the general features of the use of each grammatical representative is
clearly preferable. The result, working at the level of the totality of
contexts of each grammatical form, will tell us something of the general
situational probability of each form. It is a level of abstraction
analogous to McIntosh's 'potential' meaning. Since the situational frame
used for categorising usage is of such a general nature nothing will be
gained by stating the results from it at a level more delicate than that of
the particular grammatical realisation of the lexeme. Delicacy of state-
ment relating to peculiarities of individual situational uses — the kind of
analysis that may be useful in separating nearly synonymic terms — can more
easily be achieved on an ad hoc basis as the investigation continues.

The following schema, adapted from Schneeberger, Mitchell and Kachru,
has proved adequate for this rather gross categorisation of the situational

¹ This is especially true among the sententious utterances found among the
parts of the corpus devoted to moral philosophy; e.g. 'Somtyme it cometh
of Ire or prive hate, that noriseth rancour in herte, as afterward I shal
declare.' (CT.X.509).
uses of the Chaucerian terms studied.

A. Does the situation involve individuals or groups?

In general, non-situational uses this question will be unanswerable.

B. Is the relationship between the participants benevolent or malevolent?

C. Does difference of sex play a part in the use?

D. Does the prerogative of action in the situation to which the word applies belong to people who are externally superior or inferior?

The sense of externally here refers to superiority according to some generally accepted criteria (e.g. social criteria) outside the situation in which the confrontation of the participants takes place.

E. What does the external superiority consist in?

This may include such factors as divinity (pagan or Christian), ascendancy in the social hierarchy (vassal/lord; man/wife) or perhaps moral ascendancy. Although theologically indefensible, the treatment of the Virgin Mary as divine as opposed to mortal seems justified by usage in the text.

F. Does the above prerogative belong to the participant who is superior or inferior within the situation?

G. What does this internal superiority consist in?

It may include physical force, previously agreed rights, particular effect of a recognised code of behaviour or any of a range of circumstantial factors.

I.VI.4 After the occurrences of lexemes have been divided into word-classes, the analysis of verbal context commences with the collection of the lexico-grammatical collocations proper to each word-class. In order to maintain comparability between each lexeme at this stage of the analysis, it is divided so that the collocations proper to each grammatical structure are stated separately. Thus a lexeme is first divided into its realisations as noun, adjective and adverb and then the structures into which

These correspond approximately to Martinet's syntags. They are of sufficient syntagmatic length to include phrases of a single lexical reference.
the noun enters - subject + predicator; predicator + object etc. - are examined separately, the realisation of the predicator being stated for each actual occurrence. It is clear that, although I have called the starting point of this investigation a lexeme, such an appellation is justified in only a very loose way. The progress of the study will reveal to what extent the form has the same lexical reference. At the beginning of the investigation all we know is that there is formal and etymological similarity between the items we are examining.

The examination of these lexico-grammatical features, when taken with the analysis of situation, begins to delimit a broad area of cognitive meaning and the repetition of particular phrasal devices suggests formulae and idioms. Furthermore, similarity in situational use and a considerable coincidence of lexico-grammatical collocational range will suggest some degree of synonymy between lexemes, the extent of which can later be determined at the level of the contextual sense, or the slightly more generalised level of use.

The second part of the formal analysis of verbal context is that devoted to purely lexical collocation of the type theoretically suggested by Firth and practically studied by Sinclair. The stretch of context involved in the collection of these lexical collocations is, in the primary instance, the sentence in which the word studied occurs. Nevertheless, since this part of the study is lexical and related more directly to situation or associative contexts than to grammar, one must be prepared to retrieve lexical collocations from outside the sentence limits if this retrieval seems to be sanctioned by the bulk of the evidence from within sentence limits. Lexical collocations are considered significant largely on account of their frequency, and here stylistic factors are perhaps of more import than the relation of the words to the actual situation. Conventionalism in description is part of the nature of mediaeval poetry, so that we find the same epithets co-occurring on repeated occasions. The mere listing of
the collocates will reveal little in such cases and may even lead to false assumptions. It is therefore worth attempting to classify the collocates in a way not purely lexical nor yet grammatical but, rather, with reference to their stylistic employment. Such a classification will also have some value in assessing aspects of the cognitive meaning of the word under study. Within the same major classification of structure (e.g. modifier) a number of items may appear; these may be simply listed (he was she gay, fresh, ne jolyf, RR.435) or, as is very commonly found, paired (Largesse, that sette al hir entente / For to be honourable and free. RR.1151). Certain other relationships can be suggested, but these are either less frequent (such as occurrences at the same point in deliberately parallel structures, metrical balance within the line) or less easily delineated. Of this latter type, is what I shall call in the analysis, the linked relationship between a word studied and a frequent collocate. By this is meant certain more distant grammatical relationships, such as those set up between the modifier of a relative pronoun and the modifier of the noun to which the relative refers, or, perhaps, with reference to the situation, certain causal links represented in the sentence. Linking is a relationship between frequently occurring collocates which is dependent more upon a general understanding of the significance of the sentence than upon narrowly definable features of style. Finally, it may be added that the value of this kind of lexical collocation, further ordered by the above stylistic considerations, is equally great in suggesting related words for the expansion of the study as in the stylistic information it offers.

I.VI.5 This formal method may serve to indicate certain sense relations and establish the meaning of terms with a fairly high generality, yet it will fail to reveal individual senses or uses. Much must be assigned arbitrarily and many minor aspects of usage will not be revealed. This can be corrected only by a commentary upon the formal analysis which will help
to fill out its inadequacies in the presentation of the precise details of usage, stylistic and situational, of each word.

From the evidence collected and arranged in this way, and from a reconsideration of the citations originally gathered, an attempt can be made to classify the contextual senses of each formal item into 'uses'. For this task, it is allowable to use evidence from outside the corpus and, if necessary outside the language, so long as the details of this use of evidence are given. Indeed in the case of the Chaucerian corpus evidence from French and Latin originals may be of great importance at this point in the analysis. When this stylistic syntactical and semantic evidence has been collected we shall be in a position to discuss the evidence of patterning within the lexis of Chaucer.

1 A statement of this evidence is offered in the Appendix.
Section II

The Senses of the Words
Easily the most frequent collocations of grace are mercy, pitee, and love. Translation is frequently a matter of borrowing from the original, thus grace is almost exclusively gratia in Boethius and grace in Holibe. Some indication of the semantic breadth of the term in Chaucer is afforded by the considerable, though sporadic, use for translating other forms. A few examples are given below.

RR.1255 God yeve hir right good grace ; la seue merci.
RR.1169 ... she stod in love and grace / Of rich and pover;
ele a devise / L'amour des povros e des richos.
CT.VII.1207 grace; amour
CT.IV.102 grace; grace; carum.
CT.XV.395 hath such favour sent hiro of his grace;
tantum divinis favoris affulserat;
Disu ... envois tant grace.
RR.1428 was of such a grace; estoit de tel aire.
CT.VII.1764 by the grace of oure Lord God; se Dieu plait.
CT.IV.613 knave child .... Ful gracious and fair;
filium elegantissimum.

The Nouns
Grace
1. Use as an exclamation.
Use as a complement: ask $G$.
do a $G$.

Grace here represents a kindly feeling, a benevolent attitude, in a superior person which will lead to material benefit (beneficium) to a petitioner. Occasionally there is some confusion between the action itself and the feeling which inspires it, so that grace then refers exclusively to the action.
This stress upon the concrete is encapsulated in the syntactic structure of phrases of the type do...<br> For whose yevoth a yifte, or dooth a grace, do it by tyme, his thank ye wel the more.<br><br>We may further refine our general characterisation of the senses here involved by noting the use of these syntagmas in two sharply defined situations: those of the pleading of the courtly lover and that of the judgement by a lord of evil-doers.<br><br>In the first of these, the narrower sense of compliance with the request for love develops. This undergoes a certain concreteisation in syntagmas of the type illustrated above:<br><br>... though that she did hym as thanne a grace, and also by its collocation with verbs such as challenge and deserve. This process is hastened when, in a lower social register, where the petitioner is equal or even superior to the potential grantor, the word takes on an ironic, euphemistic sense when compared with its more decorous situations of use:<br><br>For after this I hope ther cometh moore. Leman, thy grace, and sweete bryd, thyn oore! The specificity of grace here is suggested by the fact that Alisoun has just agreed to let Absolon kiss her; he hopes, expects, and appeals for moore.<br><br>The second situation, that of the judgement of a lord, is found clearly when grace acts as the complement of a verb. Here the petitioner is frequently a guilty man and grace takes on a specific sense close to the modern sense of 'mercy', 'clemency' or 'pardon':<br><br>But that the queense and othere ladyses mo So longe preyeden the kyng of grace, Til he his lyf hym graunted in the place,<br><br>Have ye nat seyn sometyrae a pale face, Among a press, of hym that hath be lad Toward his dooth, wher as hym gat no grace,<br><br>It is especially in this situation that syntagmatic links with mercy are found in Chaucer:
And hym of lordship and of mercy prayde,
And he hem graunteoth grace, and thus he seydes

As in the previous situation, this sense of grace can be concretised, so
that grace can be evaluated and made to apply in a comparative way to various
acts of clemency:

When Theseus hath doon so faire a grace?
This last quotation is an assessment of the act expressed in the quotation
immediately preceding it.

2. Use as a Complement: stande in g.

Tho syntagmatic structures grouped under the above heading express the
concept of GRACE in a way different from those examined above: the criteria
of Petitioner, Grantor, Recipient, which can be perceived in many of those
uses, are here much less apparent. The interaction between the person who
is in grace and his patron is not marked and, indeed, external forces alone
may bring about this state. Nor is there a direct and necessary benefit
to be derived from being in grace, for in some cases the prerogative belongs
to an inferior. Boethius, for example, despises the grace of the multitude
(Bo. III, p. vi, 29). Evidently here the sense is one of a gratuitous
benevolence, and syntagmatic links with love are important. In these
syntagma, grace is love and favour and implies no more than an attitude.

Tho phrases in this group are commonly used in the courtly love
situation, and a new syntagma is formed for this application:

Me knyght in amies to doon a hardy dede,
To stonden in grace of his lady deere,

This sense of the lexeme GRACE is also frequently specified in a use implying
popularity:

Another stant so in peples grace
For hire sadnesse and hire bonyganyee
That of the peplo grettest voys hath she;

The notion of the esteem of the populaco is repeated several times with some
variation in wording (CT.I.1077; RR.1169; LG.I.1014). Such uses contrast
with the more patrician contexts where mercy and clemency are important senses.
3. Use as a Complement: fynde g. to.

In uses with this group of syntagms the subject of the verb is often a divinity, the receipt of whose grace enables the recipient to achieve a desired aim. Thus grace is not here confused with an act by a grantor; it is that favour which bestows upon a man the power to act on his own behalf. When the grantor is a divinity, grace is a supernatural power. It may even have domain over the functioning of the conscience, emotions or intellect:

| CT.IV.1666 | And elles, God forbede but he sante
|            | A wedded man hym grace to repente
|            | Wel ofte rather than a sengle man |

Divine grace may prove the agent of salvation:

| PP.84     | Then shul they come into this blysful place,
|           | To which to comen God the sendo his grace. |

When the subject of the sentence is human, these senses of a supernatural enabling power are manifestly impossible. Instead, grace develops the sense of 'permission':

| LG.2258   | For Philomene, with salte teres eko,
|           | Gan of hire fador grace to beseko
|           | To sen hire syster, that she loveth so; |

4. Use as a Complement: fynde that g. that

This structure illustrates further developments in sense. With application to a clear situation and a human grantor, the sense is often similar to the senses of those syntagms grouped with ask g., and the consecutive clause merely illustrates the concrete acts called grace:

| CT.VII.2331 | That ther nas kyng ne prynce in al that lond
|            | That he nas glad, if he that grace fond,
|            | That she ne woldo upon his lond werreyo. |

Even in this example, however, there is the possibility that the grantor of the specific grace is not the lady in question, but some unnamed agency such as Fortune or God. A second example will illustrate a development of this

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1 The grace of gyle in Floris Flouman (c-text) VII, 213, provides a useful example of the sense of the donation of an enabling power.
when the grantor is evidently supernatural and grace is qualified and stated to be of such a kind as to achieve a certain state of affairs;

CT.VIII.354 And after this, Tiburce got such grace
That every day he sought, in time and space,
The angel of God;

There is here the possibility of understanding the events outlined by the sentence to mean that Tiburce acquired the ability to see angels by no external help, but through a quality inherent in him. Such a reading is openly invited by a third example, and is inevitable in a fourth:

CT.III.1683 'Now, sire,' quod he, 'has frires such a grace
That noon of hem shal com to this place?'

HH.1099 And yet the stone had such a grace
That he was siker in every place,
All thilke day, nat blynd to ben,
That fastynge myghte that stone seen.

Here the grantor is at last totally absent, and grace is simply a supernatural quality possessed by the stone and specified in the succeeding clause.

In uses of the syntagm lynde a. to; do a. a. lynde that a. that there is a similar tendency to particularise the reference of the word grace, reducing the importance of the grantor, and resulting in a modification of the point of view in understanding the sentence. As the source of grace becomes less important, so emphasis is concentrated upon the actual deed or its effect, either of which may be called a grace. Modifiers may be introduced into the syntagm, evaluating particular examples of grace and, when these coincide with a verb such as gat or han, there is rarely any need to understand the existence of a grantor at all. The simple situation is disrupted and a new sense appears. This sense, of an endowed quality, is explicit when applied to an inanimate object, and it is a small step from here to see the quality as proper to the object rather than endowed.¹

¹ Compare the usage of the Floure and the Leaf (ed. Pearsall) line 557:
(levos) Whose lusty green Hay may not appared be,
But eie keping their beauty fresh and greene
For thore nis stone that may hem deface,
Haile nor snow, wind nor frosts kene;
Wherfore they have this propertie and grace.
Ambiguity, however, remains when this type of syntagm relates to human beings. The sense of an inherent quality is found, with a slightly different syntactical construction in:

\[ TH.1428 \]

That th'orthe was of such a grace
That it of floures hath plente,
That both in somer and ynter be.

Both the quotations from the Romant of the Rose are direct translations of similar French expressions \( (avoir un tal eur; estoit de tal eire) \) which are normally taken to refer to fate or fortune.

5. Certain uses in Chaucer seem to be ambiguous between the senses of 'property', 'endowed quality' and 'fortune':

\[ CT.IX.980 \]

And longe tyme dwelled she in that place,
In hooly werkes evore, as was hir grace.

Sometimes, however, certain beneficient circumstances may be explicitly the gift of Fortune:

\[ CT.I.1861 \]

Thanne shal I yve Emelya to wyve
To whom that Fortune yveth so faie a grace.

and, with a modified point of view which concentrates attention solely on the recipients, we find:

\[ CT.VI.783 \]

Wy! Goddes precious dignitee! who wondo
Today that we sholde han so faire a grace?

Finally, use with an impersonal verb gives the sense of an entirely fortuitous event, lacking any external direction:

\[ TC.I.907 \]

For by my trouthe, in love I dorste have sworn
The sholde nevore hen tid thus fayr a grace.

From this sense of a lucky event, a generalised, abstract sense of 'luck' is readily derived:

\[ TC.IV.1233 \]

"Than if I nedde spoken, as grace was,
Yo wolde han slayn yourselyf anon?" quod she.

The imprecations or good wishes expressed by such exclamations as With harde grace, with sory grace, goods grace are also referable to this sense.
6. That Chaucer's correspondence closely used the word grace as a synonym of the modern word 'luck' is undeniable, but when he wished to lend extra significance to some event, or feels it necessary to use language with philosophical exactitude, Chaucer himself has recourse to the more rigidly defined sense of grace as a divine beneficence and to the situation in which God in Creator and mankind recipient. In this careful use of grace, the distinction between an unmotivated chance and a grace is made by connecting it with 'hap' or aventurne. In each case the sense of grace is closer to the Christian conception of Providence than the vague notion of 'luck':

29.89

Shall I clepe byt hap other grace
That brought me there?

Pandareus, too, stresses the vital difference between two kinds of apparently random events:

29.1.896

... for nought but good it is
To love well, and in a worthy place,
This ought not to clepe it hap, but grace.

This habitual contrast between hap or aventure (Par., 60) and grace is one in which Chaucer stresses, in conventional expression, the philosophical problem of free will and predestination which forms an important theme in his more extensive works. The collocation of grace with hap or aventure ensures an allusion to this body of philosophical debate and, hence, ensures that the sense of grace is taken to be that defined sense which it is given in that literature.

Although Chaucer, in more serious philosophical works, or as a technique of rhetorical persuasion, distinguishes between hap and grace in a way corresponding to the philosophical distinction between chance and providence, on a more relaxed level of composition, he fails to do so and it is very improbable that the distinction in serious was maintained in ordinary usage of the period. The author of the Hawke Lyric Algyroid uses the word hap in a context which is proper to the defined sense of grace:

An hende hap ich abbbe yheate,
Icnot from heane it is we sent.
In Chaucer's more colloquial tone, also, we find:

\( \text{OP.} \, 573 \)  
Now is nat that of God a ful fair grace  
That swich a lewed mannes wit shal pace  
The wisdom of an heep of lerned men?

Here, a balance between the sense of God's providence, favour or pure chance, pivots upon the irony of its disreputable manifestation.

In certain contexts, where grace is not paralleled closely by any specific event, but is firmly attached to a person, as in the sense 'quality', it may come to signify 'destiny'. The hand of God is seen in the shaping of destiny, but there may be a certain ambiguity in the respect that the word may refer to an endowment of character:

\( \text{CT.} \, \text{III.} \, 553 \)  
... what viste I wher my grace  
Was shapen for to be, or in what place?

7. Noun, adverbial and adjectival phrases correlate closely in sense with uses already discussed, but the noun phrases in particular represent grace as an abstraction, as do the adjectival phrases, so that such phrases as ful of grace, in the absence of any exemplar of the function of grace, become no more than commendatory formulae. The collocation of fair and ful of grace (CT.VIII.67) suggests how the modern sense of physical commendation may have arisen. That the Chaucerian usage could be understood in this way remains doubtful. The temptation to understand a passage in the Clerk's Tale as referring to an overt personal quality, perhaps physical excellence, is modified when the quotation is paralleled by its sources:

\( \text{CT.} \, \text{IV.} \, 424 \)  
In Goddes pees lyveth ful esily  
At hoom, and outward grace ynogh had he;

Petrarch  
Sic Valterius ... summa domi in pace, extra vero summa cum gratia hominum, vivebat;

Le Livre Grisoldia  
Et ainsi le marquis, ... vivot en bonne paix  
en sa maison et en grant grace dehors;

It is clear from this that in the sources Walter is envisaged as living in the peuples grace, but Chaucer's translation has introduced the possibility
of re-analysing his sentence and understanding outward grace as a particular quality possessed by Walter.

8. The senses delineated above have been derived from the examination of the interaction between certain syntagms and situations. It may now be interesting to examine in detail the uses and sense-developments of grace in a specific situation (that of the judgement of an evil-doer) and, separately, the permutations of a single common syntagm: have ... grace.

We have already noted the sense of 'clemency' found in the situation of judgement with syntagms of the type ask g. A man who got no grace is soon on the way to execution, and grace received in this situation can be particularised and categorised according to the benevolence of the judgement (so faire a g, etc.). This particularised sense, within the strictly delimited situation, may be expressed in a more impersonal way:

_Lov.1947_ Not senden his owene sone, Theseus, Sith that the lot is fallen hym upon, To ben devoured, for grace is thore non.

The emphasis here is not so much upon a judgement as upon a penalty exacted, from which there is no escape. The sense of grace in uses like this approaches that of the phrase is ther no remedye? (_CT.VI.236_), though the use of the form grace also recalls its senses of 'mercy' or 'chance':

_Tu.IV.952_ To doon hym sone out of this world to pace;
For wel he thoughte ther was non other grace.

The special situation with which we are dealing is instrumental in forming a specialised sense which we have not noted earlier:

_CT.VI.240_ For, pardae, Jepte yaf his daughter grace
For to compleyne, er he hir slow, alast!

Here the fact that the situation is one which encourages a sense of 'mercy' tends to obscure the sense of 'permission' which we would normally ascribe to this usage. The sense of temporary acquittal or stay of execution, which is reinforced by the insertion of the purposive for before the

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1 The sense 'permission' is acknowledged by the _M.E.D._ in _Cursor Lundi_ and _Piers Plowman_ (A text) but is not quoted for Chaucer.
infinitive, is not recorded by the L.E.D., nor by the O.E.D., until 1711.

Turning to the syntagm have grace we find that, depending upon the immediate context, it is capable of two interpretations. When the context makes the presence of a grantor clear, then have grace can be interpreted as related to ask grace and means something like being in receipt of grace. When no grantor is posited, the syntagm is attributive and refers to a quality possessed without reference to its origin. There are, however, numerous ambiguous examples:

CT.III.928 And, em, iwis, fayn volde I don the best,
If that ich hadde grace to do so.

Problems are raised, too, by the interpretation of the following, where power is collocated with grace in a sentence where both will require different interpretations of the verb have!

CT.VI.383 Swich folk shal have no power ne no grace
To offron to my relikas in this place.

Taken with power, have must be understood in the sense of 'possession' without implication of a grantor; with grace, and taking cognizance of the adversative no, have seems to imply receipt from a grantor. This dual possibility of the interpretation of the structure with have is also surely an important factor in the development of the senses of 'quality' and 'chance' which grace exhibits. The distinction drawn syntagmatically between inherent power and granted grace (permission) parallels the distinction made in other contexts between being and grace.

9. The plural form of the noun (graces) is used in Chaucer exclusively to signify 'thanks'.
The Adjectives. Gracious; graceless

The senses of the adjectives graceful and graceless are closely related to those of the noun grace. The former is used with both subjective and objective reference. With subjective reference, it may apply to a person in power who is likely to show grace to another (CT.VII.1821, where merciful pitee is attributed to a gracious lord); with objective reference, it applies to the weaker party and suggests that he is in receipt of grace, that he is pleasing to the superior, as in Absolon's approach to his lady:

CT.I.3695 Under his tongue a true-love he beare,  
For thorby wende he to han gracious.

The adjective may also be applied in a more general sense of 'pleasing to behold,' as in the following:

CT.IV.613 A knave child she bar by this Walter,  
Ful gracious and fair for to biholde.

The fact that this renders the Latin elegantissimum encourages us in the assumption that graceful is beginning to develop connotations of aesthetic pleasure. Such an assumption is supported by the nonce occurrence of a noun formed upon this adjective, where the reference is to the deceptive fairness, treacherous pleasure, of the words of a false lover:

LGV.1675 Why lykede me thy youthe and thy fayrenesse,  
And of thy tonge, the infynyt gracionsnesse?

Graceless occurs only twice (CT.I.781; CT.VIII.1078) and has a sense directly contrary to that of graceful in the first passage quoted above. In its use in The Canon's Yeoman's Tale, it seems to have the sense of lacking grace as an enabling power, a power granting salvation from the wiles of an enemy.
This lexeme is used once only in the entire works of Chaucer. Its antecedent form in Old English appears to be in the process of being superseded by the French borrowing grace, with which it is synonymous. Its use in Chaucer, in the Miller's Tale, seems to be precipitated by its frequency in the popular lyric, from which it is chosen, together with bendo, as part of the burlesque of courtly ideals which is found in this tale.\(^1\)

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Collections of importance are诗诗, 等等 and so on.

In politics, money translate woman piggery where on not occasions are, once, (31.VII, 1664) assignee. In passing, it translate piggery rendered right by John de Lona.

Sir John

Perry

I. The situation of use of the leaves of CXXI is often very similar to the situation in which they is used, containing a petitioner, greater and perhaps a recipient. CXXII is shown towards a petitioner who is usually in some distress: distress which is often the result of a relationship between the persons involved in the situation but which is, itself, outside the relationship denoted by "Stjx/5. In practice, these might mean gentleness and kindness shown by a lady to a distraught lover, or it might mean clemency shown by a lord to a penitent and miserable vassal who has previously transgressed against him.

Within the situation of courtly love, the previous affront may be acknowledged.

Mr. (F) 155 and says that hand does unfitnessness... no with the tydye, for new-fangledness... doth gentle mercy of air transgownse, On other occasions, there is no affront, but money seems to presuppose self-abasement (24.11.1635). In a lower social register, the self-attainment of a penitent petitioner is replaced by a presumption, born of self-assurance, in asking for the mercy of a lady:

21.I.3208 This Nicholas gave money for to eye, and wrote so fine, and prayed him so faith, that she new love be granted unto her.
This behavior might well be compared with the curious conduct of Lear's
squire of Shrewsbury (II. 1. 98-151), who very willingly procured, in ex.
it in so at with the sexual behavior of the petitioners for pay. 1 That it
suggests a precision in cause that under the use of law, a considerable
such an enthusiasm is closely associated in the view of .

The examples will surely illustrate the use of these in the situation
of judgment. The conditions are the petitioned history and guilt of the
petitioner and his humble acknowledgment of it.

(3) 404
And it so be he my ken not cause,
Yet of the heart, with a more<ul>ful heart,
And profess it him, might in his bare chests,
To be right yet at your own judgment.

(3) 301
En, if rash dare such then we know a deed
And one more, / bitches, that hates
The base situation in which these contexts are used is obviously a
very able and precise one; nevertheless it may be disturbed and, with
the disturbance, there occurs a modification in cause. With emphasis on
the idea of imminent violence, in the execution of revenge justice, we quickly
arrive at situations where violence is threatened outside the application
of strict justice, yet the same power is still used: the threatened person
may exclaim 'Mercy!' Thus, we find the context used in situations of
single oppression and, in a similar way, when the oppressor is not clearly
stated, or even when the cause of misery is something external and remote
from the possible creator of misery. The plea in this situation is not a plea
to refrain from an action of oppression, but as sometimes in the courtly love
situation, it is a plea for positive aid. The only context to appear in such
a situation is Heinpruyt, which suggests that there:

(2) 1. 916 
Hat ye with us your eloic and your favor,
Yet we blacken mercy and ourselves.

(11) 1. 926 
In his language money the hirer gets
She fly out of his body for to flyning,
Yet to deliverance of we that she was true.

1) Compare the Roxton's characterization of Lear (III. 5. 952ef.) is men that
beast transported to a love, and cause for to our empty and taken his record;
and not the dead men by the law, men charge between him and the place, and
not lasting on some for as to have understanding of money.

Ex.
2. There is, in the uses of mercy, a very common syntagma, have mercy, which further examination reveals must be sub-divided with regard to its sense in relation to the basic situation of use. In one use, it forms part of the group to which the syntagmas lynde and receyven also belong, and here it signifies the receipt by the petitioner of mercy:

**ABC.120**

Thanne needeth us no wepen us for to save,
But only ther us dide not, as us oughte,
Doo penitence, and merci axe and have.

In the second use, the grantor is envisaged as exhibiting mercy (having mercy) towards another:

**BN.367**

Hir eyen seemd monon she walde
Have mercy; foolen wonden soo;
But hyt was never the rather doo.

The above quotation forms part of a eulogistic description of a dead lady. The sense of mercy required is that narrowed by use in the situation of courtly love; thus it is a marked virtue to be tardy in showing mercy to sudden petitioners. Clearly, in a situation where the grantor is said to have mercy, this phrase must be understood in a sense different from its use in a situation where the recipient is subject of the phrase.

The syntagma have mercy reveals a similar sense range to syntagmas already discussed. It is especially common, and frequently collocated with pity, in the situation mentioned above, where suffering is caused by some external agency. It is used as an appeal by the distressed, and by the narrator as a simple statement. Ambiguity between the two senses of have mercy is rare since both are of rare occurrence and since one of them is simply an elliptical form of the much commoner and longer syntagma have mercy on/of. On their rare occurrences, however, a distinction has to be drawn between them from the larger context, since in the smaller context their uses may be identical.

The ambiguity of this elliptical form of the syntagma can be easily explained in historical terms, which will also illustrate the different relationships of the two uses of an apparently identical formal marker.
The ordinary Old English way of expressing the sense of the phrase have mercy on/of was by the two common verbs miltisan and urian; this phrase is therefore a calque upon the French phrase avoir mercre d. As such, it replaces, in Chaucer's language, the common Old English expressions. The calque, however, which should be understood as a single unit of sense equivalent to the single Old English word form, is composed, at least partially, by words of native derivation and can be interpreted in a less idiomatic way. The common Old English sense of habban, still current in Middle English, was 'to have, to possess'; and a secondary sense 'to get' was not unusual. Thus, on occasions when the object of the calque phrase is obvious, so that its linguistic representation can be omitted together with the particle of/on, the remaining syntagma (have mercy) can be interpreted in two ways: either as a portion of the total calque phrase, or according to the ordinary native sense of have in this grammatical structure. The differentiation of the possible significances of have mercy is possible only by the analysis of its linguistic and situational context of use.

3. The senses of MERCY are fairly easily defined by their uses in relation to particular events and situations, but it may be useful to note something of the use of the concept of MERCY as argued by Chaucer as a conscious moral philosopher. This is particularly well illustrated in structures where mercy is the subject of a verb. Here the extent of MERCY is of prime interest to Chaucer: the idea that the extent of MERCY is greater than the transgression of those to whom it is offered is found; MERCY extends beyond strict justice. Christ and the Virgin are very frequently the epitomes of such MERCY, but lords who are willing to extend MERCY to the undeserving may also be the object of Chaucer's approbation. A similar notion is also

1 Thus in Aelfric's homily on the Assumption of St. John:
   and gif man odrum miltisād, hu micelc svīdor vile God miltisan
   and acrum mennum his handgewerce!
The Alfredian Boethius twice translates by the use of the verb miltisād ideas which Chaucer was later to translate by the use of the phrase have pite on (IV.p.iv.257; IV. m. iv. 18).
invoked in the courtly love situations:

CT.I.3089  
It must be considered, lovest me;  
For gentil mercy oweth to passen right. 1

4. The senses of the adjectives merciful and merciabie present no problems. In every occurrence they mean 'ready or likely to show mercy' and are applied to social attitudes (piety) as well as to the portions of people conventionally expected to indicate attitudes (sighes) and to persons (in particular the Virgin and the Christian divinity). 2 Merciabio is most commonly used in a situation of repentant guilt (LG.410; CT.VI.1866; 1823) but is also applied to a more general situation of the reaction to any kind of unspecified misery. In CT.V.1036 it is the modifier of sighes and collocates with benigynes and pitee and in ABC I it refers to the Virgin Mary and collocates with accour. LG.410 represents the consequences of being merciabile as eschewing ira and becoming tretable.

5. The phrase grant mercy is an idiom of thanks borrowed from French usage:

CT.II.239 'Iwis, myn uncle,' quod she, 'grant mercy.

1 Those uses, in which mercy is assumed to be capable of surpassing reason, have the air of pleasing a cause. An ancient tradition considered mercy to be regulated by reason as distinct from the emotional reaction of pity. See below, p. 419; and compare the same idea in Piers Plowman (c-text) VIII, 62 where the lexeme CRACHE is used.

2 In addition to the obvious association of merciabile with the name of the Virgin in Chaucer, the sole occurrence of merciful is in collocation with mayde, with the same reference. Compare the allegorical representation of mercy in Piers Plowman, B text, XVIII, 115-16:

merciful holy day mayde: a make kyngge with vnis,  
A ful bonyngs buirde: and boxome of speche.
The Nouns: Pitee; pitee

The most important collocations are: mercy, compassion, routhe, gentillesse, the verb yapen, and the noun herte. Collocation with a small set of verbs of perception is also important. Translation evidence of two distinct senses is offered by Boethius since Chaucer uses the same form to translate both the adjectives miser and puis and their derivatives. His translations from French offer no valuable evidence since he normally borrows the French word-form.

1. The point must firstly be made that the differences in form of the noun, illustrated above, do not consistently correspond to sharply distinct senses in Chaucer's usage, modelled upon the distinction between Latin miser and puis. There is, on the contrary, evidence which should deter us from establishing two distinct lexemes in Chaucer's usage, and assume the existence of a single one, which covers a broad area in terms of contextual senses, and includes the senses of both of these Latin words.

2. One of the commonest uses of the noun pitee is in the syntagma have pitee on/of which, like the similar phrase employing mercy, is a calque on French usage. Certain situational differences distinguish the use of the two phrases in many, though not all, occurrences. When one 'has pitee' there is no necessary suggestion of superiority with respect to the person pitied, nor need there be any suggestion of any previous relationship between the participants; hence there is no suggestion of guilt or repentance in most uses of pitee. Pitee may therefore be used in situations which are very similar to those where mercy might be used, though close analysis will sometimes reveal distinctions. In the following example guilt is declared, but the superiority of one of the participants and the waiving of the threat
of judgement is not clear:

Another is to han pite of defaute of his neighbores;

In the courtly love situation, the use of PITIE is more restricted than the use of GRACE or MERCY, though sometimes the uses may be precisely parallel, and pite may be paired with mercy (TC.II.655). The judicial situation provides an interesting occurrence where pite may seem to be used identically to mercy. The reference is to the account of the trial of Boethius where the gloss has been added: 'it ne onclyned som juge to have pite or compassion'. At first this seems to be typical of the situation in which mercy is used, when the guilty man is accused and his accuser has power of execution. There is, however, the crucial difference here that Boethius has repeatedly assured us of his innocence. Perhaps pite was therefore felt to be more appropriate than mercy, for Chaucer uses it when, in a lawsuit, the injured party, not himself guilty, asks the judge for pite rather than mercy;

for thei enforcen hem to commowe the juges to han pite of hem

The Latin original of the above uses the form miserationem, which implies the emotional reaction towards which the rhetorical skills of the advocates would be directed.

3. A further distinction of importance between the senses of mercy and pite is in the far greater emotional significance of the latter. Pite is very frequently an emotional reaction to distress or misery, as is implied by the high frequency of its collocations with verbs signifying weeping; mercy is far less emotional:

In world nys wight so hard of herte
That hadde sen her sorowes smerte,
That noldo have had of her pyte.

Social standing in this relationship is of no importance in most uses, yet suffering in the just and worthy is often assumed to inspire pite more
intensely. Medieval popular philosophy considered the heart to be the seat of the emotions, equating it in general usage with the 'sensitive' portion of the soul. It is therefore not surprising to find the word herte frequently used to designate the place where pitee is felt as the result of the perception of the woe of others:

Anon hire herte hath pite of his wo,
And with that pite love come in also;
And thus, for pite and for gentilloses,
Refreshed moste he been of his distresse.

The collocation of pitee, herte and GENTILLESSE is three times repeated in Chaucer's works in a phrase which is reminiscent of proverbial usage:

Til at the laste aslaked was his mood,
For pitee renneth soone in gentil herte.

The heart of one who aspires to gentilloses is frequently considered to be sensitive to emotion and susceptible to external stimuli, whether the song of the birds in spring-time or the sufferings of one's fellow-creature. It is arguable that the sorrow of the gentil herte at the suffering of another is analogous to the wretchedness of the sufferer; that, in fact, in certain uses, pitee may signify 'sympathy':

That pitee renneth soone in gentil herte,
Feelynge his similitude in peynes smerte,
Is proved alday, as men may it see,
As wel by werk as by auctoriteei

I take this quotation to mean that pitee is the feeling (sympathy) felt by the sensitive heart at perceiving the sorrow felt in a heart similar to itself.

1 This, or a similar idea, seems to have had wide currency in European courtly society. Compare Dante, Inferno, V, 100: 'Amor, ch'al cor gentil ratto s'apprende,' which is itself an echo of Guinizzolli's: 'Foco d'amore in gentil cor s'apprende.'

2 For the sense of his similitude, see CT.I.3228. This interpretation of pitee is strongly supported by the usage of Lydgate, Temple of Glas, 841ff:

That evenlich and with pe same fire
She mai be bet, as I now brewe and melt,
So pat hir hert be flamed bi desiere,
That sho mai knowe bi feruance how I swelt.
For of pite pleinli if she felt
The self hete pat dop myn hert embrace,
I hope of roups she would do me grace.

The Book of Vices and Virtues gives this assumption patristic authority.
This sense of PITEE, implying the sensitivity of the person showing pitee and their sympathetic nature, is that with which the adjective and adjectival phrases are included in a set of moral attributes of the courtly man or woman:

_1255_  
O sely wemen, ful of innocence,  
Ful of pite, of trouthe, and conscience,  
The Prioress's attempts to counterfeit the behaviour of the court are chiefly marked by an extreme Jane Austen-like sensibility, which is carried to sentimental extremes, leading her to weep at the sight of a mouse in suffering.

4. After the syntagm have p. of/on, the commonest use of pitee is in the construction with the verb 'to be'. We may sub-divide the occurrences of this structure into three types according to the extent to which the context evokes the presence of a participant who feels pitee, or whether this feeling is left entirely to the reader.

In the first type, pitee is followed by the infinitive of a verb of perception which suggests the presence of a perceiver who has pity in the sense set out in paragraph 1:

_1577_  
Compleyned ek Eleyne of his siknosse  
So feythfully, that pite was to heere,

_Footnote 2 (continued from previous page)._  
Church  
It is associated with St. Paul's figure of the human race as members of the same body (p.146; 203) and (203.32): 'seyn Gregori seip pas moare parfiyt pat a man is, be moare be feleb opere sorwe.'  
Gower's story of Constantine and Sylvester (CH. II.3187ff) which illustrates the action of pitee allied to Christian charity, mentions the equality of all men at birth and before fortune and counsels that one should deal with another as he would wish to be dealt with. Pitee is then reciprocal, both on earth and in terms of final judgement:

3339. 'O Constantin, for thou hast served  
Pite, thou hast pite deserved:  
Forthi thou shalt such pite have  
That god thurgh pite woll thee save.  
At VII, 3107ff, he goes so far as to consider pitee as the cause, through Christ's incarnation, of human salvation.
Secondly, especially in relation to events communicated, the inter-personal nature of pitee as a relation becomes obscured, and it becomes possible to regard it as parallel to the event. The narrator shares the reaction of pitee with the reader rather than suggests it in a participant in a fictional situation:

**CT.V.1428**

O Cedasus, it is ful great pitee
To reden how thy doughtren deyde, alasc!

Finally, when the special class of verbs of perception or communication are replaced by a verb from outside this class, pitee is totally impersonalised. The reference is directly to the event and comes to signify 'a sorrowful thing' or 'a matter for regret':

**CT.III.2015**

It is great harm and certes great pitee
To sette an irous man in heigh degree.

**BD.1266**

And pitee were I shulde sterwe,
Syth that I wilned noon harm, ywis.

As mentioned above, so in the use of this syntagm, the suffering of a person of social or moral worth is more readily considered to be a pitee than the suffering of the less eminent. The worthy may be good peple, seintes, nobles and true lovers or a king's son, Theseus:

**LGW.1976**

A kynges sone to ben in swich prysoun,
And ben devoured, thoughte hem gret pite.

5. The association of weeping with PITEE is evident in a great number of uses, but nowhere more markedly than in the uses of pitee in adverbial phrases. The verbs modified by for pitee signify weeping very frequently and, to a lesser extent, helping the afflicted. In the following quotation, where pitee at the plight of the oppressed leads to weeping, the phrase is modelled upon the calque have p. on:

**CT.VIII.371**

Hem hente, and whan he forth the seintes ladde,
Hymself he weep for pitee that he hadde.

If we compare this kind of usage with that of the previous type (BD.107 And wepte, that pitte was to heere), we can visualise a situation in which a person in misery weeps, inspires pitee in the observer (hearer) who, because
of his piteous, also weeps. By this means a real illustration of the developing
sense of 'sympathy' can be made. The susceptibility, the piteous, in the
observer is an essential quality of the angelic heart.

As an alternative to weeping, the piteous of the observer may, if he is
in a position of sufficient power, incite him to help the distressed. In
such situations, piteous may refer to emotional sensitivity or, by their
continuity, to the action resulting from the emotion. In these situations
piteous is frequently found in collocation with grace and mercy, and the
precise sense of each is lost in their combined application to imprecise
aspects of the same situation. Discussion of such use is deferred to a
later discussion of synonymy.

The Adjective: piteous; pitiful.
1. As with the noun, the two main forms of the adjective do not clearly
correspond to distinctions in sense. The two major divisions of the sense
of piteous are its use with subjective and with objective reference: that is
'emotionally sensitive, likely to feel piteous' and 'distressful, likely to
evoke piteous.' It is, however, noteworthy that the spelling pitiful occurs
only with subjective reference, or in ambiguous uses, and never with objective
reference.

2. Applied to characters, piteous may be one of a set of virtuous attributes
conventionally ascribed to courtly people:

Gentil esse, 9 This firste stok was ful of rightwisnesse,
Trowe of his word, sobere, pitous, and free,
Clene of his gost ...

The use of piteous, with its etymological connection with pite, may be
significant in this poem where courtliness and religious faith coalesce.

In the judge, the attribute piteous implies the tempering of harsh justice
by emotional sensitivity to suffering; advocates should be debonair and
pitiful (Lp. IV, p. iv, 263-4), and the ideal king is:
'pitous and just alwey yliche;' (CT.V.20).

3. When applied to events, inanimate objects and actions, *pitous* normally implies that some aspect of them will inspire pitee in the heart of an observer:

`CT.II.509` That in a grave yfere we moten lye,
Sith love hath brought us to this pitous ende,

`CT.II.509` And whan that he this pitous lettre say,
Ful ofte he seyde, "Alas! and woylayay!"

4. Thus, most of the occurrences of *pitous* may be easily referred to senses of *pity*, yet a number present difficulties. The broadest sense of *pitous*, as a strong tendency for emotional reaction or great sensitivity, together with its etymology and its affinity for moral contexts, seems sometimes to be narrowed into a religious application, as suggested in paragraph 2, and come to mean 'pious'. Such possible occurrences are usually ambiguous, as in the description of Hypocrisy (Poop-Holiness) in the *Romeunt of the Rose*:

`RR.420` With pale visage and pitous,
And semeth a simple creature.

The pale face gives us an external reference which an observer might find evoked his pity; hence the sense of *pitous* is here ambiguous. One of the very few unambiguous uses is to be found in the Parson's Tale:

`CT.X.1039` orisouns or pryeres is for to seyn a pitous wyl of herte.

A number of occurrences as modifier of the word *herte* also lead to ambiguity. In the following examples, Troilus is no doubt suffering, but the suggestion that *pitous* is applied to *herte*, because the suffering heart may inspire pity in Criseyde is untenable. It would be possible to relate these uses of *pitous* to the syntagma *it is pitee* and suggest that they simply mean 'sorrowful', yet we feel that in this context *pitous* is more closely related to the senses essential to the courtly ideal. There may even be, as well as the implication of strong feeling, some of the moral sense of 'piety', 'sincerity', 'integrity' derived from the Latin *piius*.
For which, with humble, true, and pitous herte,
A thousand tymes mercy I you preye;
So rueth on wyn aspre peynes smerte,

For ever in oon his herte piétous
Ful bisely Crisyede, his lady, soughte.

Certain uses of *piétous* to modify emotions also present difficulties of interpretation. When he considers his imminent departure from Crisyede, with the coming of day, Troilus is distressed:

... for piétous distresse,
The blody teris from his herto melto,

The fact that what causes such sudden misery out of joy, is simply the prospect of temporarily losing the pleasure of Crisyeide's company, also suggests that *piétous* is here intended to have reference to the extreme sensitivity of the hero and, hence, the intensity of the distress.

On three separate occasions *piétous* is collocated with *joie*. On two of these, Chaucer is merely adopting the usage of his source so that, in *CT.* II.1114 For pitous joie, 'renders Boccacio's 'tutte pieno/ Di piétosa allegrezza', and 'piétouses joyes' in the *Roman de Troiyle et de Criside*. In the *Clerk's Tale* (IV.1080), 'asroune doun she falleth/ For pitous joye' renders Petrarch's Latin 'illa ... pene gaudio examinis et piétato amens.' The third example is an addition to the source, which refers only to 'joie', by Chaucer:

It is tempting to explain all these uses as simply referring to the strength of feeling of the persons concerned, but there is some evidence to suggest that the senses associated with Latin *miser* also have some part here. Just as in the collocation with *distresse*, *piétous* is used when there is a sudden reversal of emotion from joy to dread, so the phrase *piétous joye* seems especially to be associated with a reversal of emotion from misery to joy. In the *Clerk's Tale* and in Chaucer's original use in the *Man of Law's Tale*, this occurs at the joyful denouement; in the *Troilus* the ladies who are filled with *piétous joye* are so affected because they are pleased that...
Crisseyde may rejoin her father, though they are sorry that she is leaving them. All three occasions are occasions for highly wrought emotions and tears, following evident emotional reserve. A similar use of this particular collocation is also found in Old French poetry when pathos and joy are found at the relief of emotional restraint under suffering. A similar coalition of joy and pitie is found in the description of the song of the birds in the *Romeant of the Rose*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RH.89</th>
<th>The smale briddes syngen clere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(cf. 497)</td>
<td>Her blissful suete song pitouso.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here the birds sing a song celebrating their escape into Springtime from the rigours of winter which had robbed them of their song (71ff.). The song of such birds is notorious for its effect upon the sensitive heart of the courtly listener. Here the sense of *pitous*, borrowed directly from the French, seems to be that of the power of the song to move the heart of a listener; its pathetic power.

The Adverb: *pitously.*

1. The uses of the adverb correspond in sense closely to those of the adjective and furnish no further problems.

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1 Cf. the Old French chanson *Amis et Amiles*, 185-6; 3233-5; and the Anglo-Norman version, lines 489-90.

2 The French original *Roman de la Rose* ties bird-song and the effect on the heart much more closely than Chaucer:

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81-83. Liout a dur cuer qui en mai n'aime,
Quant il ot chanter sor la raine
As oiseus les douz chanz pitieux.
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-end compare Hue do Rotlande's *Ipoméda*:

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8905-96. Kar chant d'oisel e astrumont
E d'amur un angusement;
```
The only collocation of importance is pitee.

Translation evidence is scanty, but routhet translates pitee and pitieas (CT. IV. 579) and for routhet and for pitee translates illacrimans.

The Noun: Routhet

1. The use of the syntagm have routhet of/on is extremely common in the courtly love situation where its sense is close to that of the similar uses of merc and pitiee. Synonymy with contextual uses of the latter two is common and, like pitiee, ROUTHET is felt at the suffering of the guiltless:

CT.V.1319 Ye sle me giltelees for verray Payne.
But of my deeth thogh that ye have no routhet,

Although the courtly love situation produces analogies of this type with the judicial situation, there appears to be no euphemistic sense of ROUTHET in this situation parallel to the use of GRACE and MERCY. Nevertheless the use of modifiers like som, other, swich, generou routhet suggest degrees of ROUTHET which can only be referred to actions stemming from the emotion.

ROUTHET as a distinct emotional quality is found in uses where its place in the human constitution is indicated:

LGV.1063 And in hire herte she hadde routhet and wo
That ewer swich a noble man as he
Shal ben disherited in swich degré;

Occurrences may also be found in which the person to whom ROUTHET is directed is not clearly stated. In such uses the reltional sense ('pity') is subordinated to an absolute emotional one ('sadness'). The lexeme ROUTHET can therefore mean 'to be sad' as well as 'to be sorry for...':

LGV.1345 ... of which I may nat wryte,
So gret a routhet I have it for t'endite —
2. The syntagm with the verb 'to be' occurs in two distinct forms: followed by the infinitive of a verb of perception or communication, and standing alone. The former type, preserving the notion of an observer who is affected by the suffering of others, is identical in sense to the similar use of PITEE. The latter type is used without reference to relationship in a situation and, like the similar use of PITEE, is used with application to events. As an emotional assessment of events, ROUTHE is frequently collocated with such words as synne, harme, wo and, as with PITEE, the downfall of a worthy person is most likely to provoke this usage:

CT.IV.1908 "He is a gentil squier, by my trouthe! If that he deyde, it were harm and routhe.

The single use with an impersonal verb results in an ambiguity of sense between application to a regrettable event and the evocation of a generalised, depersonalised emotional reaction:

HF.383 But wol-away! the harm, the routhe, That hath betyd for such untrouthe,

3. The association between PITEE and help or weeping is also maintained in the usage of ROUTHE. It is best exemplified in the uses of the adverbial for routhe:

CT.II.529 The constable hath of hire so greet pitee, And eek his wyf, that they wepen for routhe.

Even more extreme than weeping, the sensitive heart may feel such affliction at the sorrow of another that death is threatened:

CT.V.438 Wel neigh for the routhe almoost she deyde

The interpolation of the definite article into the adverbial above, presents a problem of interpretation. It is not now clear whether the routhe referred to is the emotion of Canacee or the pleynite of the falcon whom she pities. That routhe, in certain linguistic environments, can mean pleynite is illustrated by its use to render the French phrase faire plante. ROUTHE does not, however, presuppose articulate lament:

LGW.669 This woful Cleopatre hath mad swich routhe
The verb *Rewe (on, upon)*

The uses of the verb fall into three main types:

**transitive:** *rewa on/upon* (misery; miserable person)

**intransitive:** *(s'one) rewe.*

**impersonal:** *it (s'one) rewe.*

1. The first of these is used overwhelmingly in the courtly love situation and is there equivalent to the phrase *have routhe.* *Contillosesse* is concerned with the disposition to *rewa upon* misery (CT.II.853) and there is an association with weeping (TC.V.260).

2. The intransitive use destroys the sense of ROUTHE as a relation and the sense is now 'to be sorry' rather than 'to be sorry for s'one'. The distinction may not be very clear in certain uses:

   TC.III.114 Therwith his manly sorwe to biholde
   It myghte han mad an herte of stoon to rewe;

Regret at earlier folly is a common sense:

   CT.I.3530 'Werk al by conseil, and thou shalt nat rewe.'

3. The impersonal use also often has the sense of regret at previous actions:

   CT.IV.2432 Me reweth soore I am unto hire teyd
   as well as colloquially expressed sorrows

   CT.VII.3097 God woot, it reweth me; and have good day!
   and 'pity' within the burlesque courtly love situation:

   CT.I.3462 But yet, by seint Thomas,
   lie reweth soore of hende Nicholas

The Adjectives. *Routhelees; Rewful*

1. The adjective *Routhelees* is applied only to human beings and is used

   (a) to represent a permanent trait of character in the courtly situation.

   (b) as a reaction in a particular situation and implying obliviousness to suffering.
1. In a heightened sense which means something like 'cruel', since it implies the infliction of suffering, as well as failure to be affected by it.

2. Revealing is applied to persons and to events with objective reference only. It implies a condition likely to evoke COME, and never the state of mind of a person likely to show COME.
The lexeme COMPASSION is of extremely limited use, since it is restricted to a nominal use in a single calqued phrase, have compassion on. To have compassion of a person in distress or of their weeping is an attitude opposed to taking it e-game (Mars, 276). The gentil herte is particularly susceptible to compassion at the distress of others and this may result in sympathetic weeping:

CT.II.659  This Alla kyng hath swich compassion,  
As gentil herte is fulfild of pitee,  
That from his eyen ran the water doun.

When a person of power is similarly affected, this may result in an act beneficial to the sufferer:

CT.VII.2221  And thanne hadde God of hym compassion,  
And hym restored his regne and his figure.

A distinction may be drawn between PITIE, ROUTHE and COMPASSION in that the last, seen over the totality of its uses, seems to have a more elevated tone than the two former. This, it derives from its frequent use in passages of moral exhortation or moral philosophy. Outside such passages it is also frequently the prerogative of socially elevated characters. COMPASSION may also be used outside the particular situation, where it is part of a desirable attitude in a fixed moral or social order. In the Legend of Good Women the ideal attitude for a lord is set out:

LGW(F)390  Yit mot he doon bothe ryght, to poore and ryche,  
Al be that hire estaat be nat ylike,  
And han of poore folk compassyoun.

and in the Pars on's Tale (X.810) we are enjoined to have pitee and compassion on our fellow-sinners. In a general situation such as this, where no particular relation exists between the pitied and the pitying, and inferiority of the former is either unclear or externally determined, the sense of the word must be in an area where the concepts of charity and largesse are not far distant.
The Noun: Favour

Collocations: Favour is collocated with grace, gentillesse and with less elevated concepts, envy, meede.

Translation evidence is unimportant, though in Boethius Chaucer twice prefers a direct Latin borrowing (favor) to the French of Jean de Meun (grace).

1. From the point of view of situational analysis there is a strong correlation between the use of the word favour and the granting of the desire of a weaker person by a stronger. It is natural that Fortune should be regarded as a source of favour. The kindly feeling of women is dependent upon the favour of Fortune (CT.I.2682); the lack of her favour casts men into misery (Fortune, 5); and the possession of it places him in an enviable position (CT.IV.69); but Fortune is notoriously fickle in her favour (CT.VII.2724). This use of favour as an aspect of Fortune - a way of discussing good and bad luck - together with its use in the syntagm favour of people, tends, in the context of Boece, to make for a pejorative sense of the word. Favour tends to be seen as unstable, undeserved, administered without justice and equally unjustly lost. This pejorative development of favour is also clear enough in moral passages outside Boece. The Parson gives a list of some of the motives for perjury and includes favour among them:

CT.X.595 Rek thow shalt nat swere for envye, ne for favour, ne for meede, but for rightwisnesse,

The infamy of certain acts motivated by the desire for favour may also taint the concept:

CT.VII.2691 ... a fals traitour, His head of smoot, to wynnen hym favour Of Julius, ...

and in the Troilus, favour is posited as a possible enemy of truth:
"And loketh now if this be resonable, 
And letteth nought, for favour ne for slouthe, 
To sayn a sooth..."

Though, in *Piers Plowman*, Lady Beede is a morally ambivalent personification, and we can find uses in Chaucer without overt pejorative overtones, this portrayal of *favour* as the motivation behind unworthy deeds, its grouping with familiar vices, and its treatment in *Boece*, lead to it having in every use a distinct potential of pejorative connotation.

2. *Favour*, like *grace*, can mean 'kindly feeling', that good disposition which culminates in an act also called *favour*. It is used thus with Fortune, and apparently also referring to God's benivolence:

*CT.IV.395*  
I see that to this newe markysesse  
God hath swich favour sent hire of his grace,  
That it ne semed nat by liklynosse  
That she was born and fed in rudenesse,

We may perhaps make a distinction here between God's *favour* and his *grace*. Of his *grace* (kindly feeling) God has sent Griselda a particular gift so that her appearance has been changed: this is not the *grace* to empower her to do anything, but merely an act which makes her appear different to others.

3. Also, like *grace*, *favour* may apply to various beneficial acts in particular situations:

*PF.626*  
Thanne wol I don hire this favour, that she  
Shal han right hyrn on whom hire herte is set,

*HF.1788*  
... if I hit graunte  
Or do you favour, yow to avaunte!

4. A peculiar use of the noun is to be found in the Proem of Book II of the *House of Fame* where Chaucer asks for inspiration from the Love Goddess and the Muses:

*HF.519*  
How faire blissfull, O Cipris,  
So be my favour at this tyme!  
And ye, me to endite and ryme  
Helpeth, that on Parnaso duelle,

The sense seems to imply that Cipris is being asked to show *favour*, yet the syntax is more appropriate to similar uses of the words *sccour* and *help*. 
The Adjective: Favorable

1. The rare adjective is used with subjective reference only. Its sense is 'showing favour' and, one one of its two occurrences, it has strong pejorative connotations:

HF. 1479

One sayde that Ouer ende lyse,

Feynyng ge in hye poetrie,

And was to the Grekes favourable.
The noun: misericorde

1. The corpus includes few occurrences of the noun misericorde, and these are individually unrevealing. Little can be discerned of individual senses from context, but there is a long passage in the Parson's Tale which purports to explain the function of misericorde as an element of a theory of behaviour which includes such concepts as pitee, compassion, mercy, charity. The fact that the French word misericorde in sources is often rendered by Chaucer as mercy and the associations with the Virgin which it shares with the latter word indicate the general area of its senses. misericorde is entirely limited, but for a single occurrence, to the religious situation: devotional texts or the speech of ecclesiastics, which we may assume has been conditioned by such texts. The single exception is that of the exclamatory use in Troilus and Criseyde, where love relationships echo those of theology:

TC.III.1177 He any wrong, I wol no more trespace.
Doth what you list, I am al in youre grace."

And she answerde, "Of gilt misericorde!
That is to seyn, that I forgyve al this."

A few lines earlier Troilus begs for mercy. In this use of misericorde, with its stress on the guilt of the penitent, the situation is precisely similar to that in many uses of mercy. Similar criteria are found in the use in the religious situation in ABC.35.

At CT.X.804, the Parson gives a long account of the function of misericorde as a remedy against avarice. The former is made equivalent to pitee as a cure for this vice, so that, together, they are efficacious in the relief of one's fellow man and turn the mind from the delight in wealth. There follows a tentative differentiation of misericorde and pitee.
in which the former is seen as the first stirrings of sympathy whilst the latter leads directly to action:

"Thenne is misericorde, as seith the philosophre, a vertu by which the corage of a man is stired by the mysesc of hym that is myssed. Upon which misericorde folweth pitee in parfournynge of charitable werkes of misericorde./"

It is observed that Christ allowed the crucifixion to take place as a result of his misericorde for mankind, then examples of misericorde in human actions are given. These actions of misericorde include the experience of pitee:

"The speces of misericorde been, as for to lene and for to yeve, and to forysven and relese, and for to han pitee in herte and compassioun of the meschief of his evene Cristene, and eek to chastise, there as need is."

Thus misericorde is seen to represent two aspects: actions, or an emotive predisposition to actions, stemming from concern for the welfare, according to Christian principles, of one's fellow man. As well as the relief of misery and the extension of mercy, it may connote a more metaphysical aim, which may not be obvious to the recipient: it aims to help against the spiritual distress of sin, even against the wishes of the recipient, and this may lead to secular punishment. Thus the ecclesiastical use of misericorde, with its spiritual associations, might conceivably result in uses antonymic to the common secular uses of mercy.

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1 We may recall the assertion of Gower that pitee was the emotion which stimulated Christian salvation (above p.93, n.2).
The noun: charitee; charitee.

1. The two forms of the noun represent two distinct borrowings into Old French from the Latin accusative participle. The form charitee is a Gallo-Roman borrowing which has undergone a series of phonological modifications within the spoken language. In Central French, the phoneme /k/ is palatalized before /a/, developing by the thirteenth century, to /ʃ/. Concurrently, /a/ is raised to /e/ and subsequently diphthongized, giving the falling diphthong /ie/. The concentration of stress in Gallo-Roman upon the penultimate syllable results in the shortening of the antepenultimate syllable in this word, and the consequent syncope of /i/. The form charitee attests the restoration of /i/, together with the root vowel proper to Latin pronunciation, under the influence of the literary Latin renovation of the twelfth century. It will be of interest to determine whether the formal distinction, in view of the different histories of the forms, indicates any semantic differentiation.

The form charitee is rare, and two out of three of its occurrences are in a phrase clearly based upon French usage:

CT.III.396  Yet titled I his parte, for that he
Wende that I hadde of hym so great charitee.

CT.V.881  Toune sereed it ye hadde a greet charitee
Toward unkynde; but how thonne say it be
That ye swiche wenees make it to destroyen.

The sense of these examples seems not far removed from the French sense of the word: 'love and esteem.' This general sense of love and kindly feeling is also found in the exclamatory use of charitee, as a title for the God of Love in Troilus and Criseyde. Fortune, as one of a series of antithetical titles designed to demonstrate her instability, is called th'envyous
charite (B.642). Here the sense is less specific than that of sexual love found in Troilus and Criseyde.

2. The prevalence of the word charitee in theological and moral contexts reveals its most typical sense to be one conditioned by Christian thought. The significance of the fact that the form charitee is most frequently used
in this context is to some extent vitiated by the overall preponderance of this form; yet it is reasonable to consider the form charitee as having a largely secular application in Chaucer's works. The adverbials in charitee and out of charitee refer to the state of the soul in its attitude to fellow men rather as the phrase in grace refers to the relationship to a superior, perhaps God. In some situations the relation to other persons is clear:

CT.1.519 and in dole thou shalt love hym in swich wise that thou shalt doon to hym in charitee as thou woldest that it were doon to thyne owene persone.

In other occurrences, the phrases are used as semi-mystical moral or religious phrases without any particular application, but implying holiness; a state of the individual soul:

GP.522 A trewe eynder and a good vs his,
Lyvyng in pees and parfit charitee.

In more colloquial passages, the syntagm has a rather flippant secular sense, implying simply good or ill-feeling between ordinary people; this use is entirely devoid of moral seriousness:

TC.I.49 To prey for hem that loves servaunts be,
And write hire wo, and lyve in charitee,

And for to have of hem compassion,
As though I were hire owre brother dere.

The above example derives irony from comparison with Christian moral teaching, with which the diction is in close correspondence. The irony of the next quotation resides, not so much in the total expression, but in relating this colloquial use of the phrase to the circumstances of its use, whilst recalling its proper religious employment. It relates the life of Bath's attitude as a result of being preceded by other women of the parish; an occurrence which she takes to be a snub to her dignity when carrying out religious observances:

GP.4152 And if thor did, certeyn no worth was she,
That she was out of alle charitee.

The irony is explicit in the contrast between the Wife's behaviour and the Parson's earnest warning that, when they are about to pray the water roster,
the congregation should 'be ful war that thow ne be nat out of charitee.'

3. The syntagms for *seint charitee* and *par charitee* are used only as reinforcements to requests; they are suggested motives for complying with such requests. The semantic content ascribable to them varies from use to use: sometimes they are little more than a tag; on other occasions they may be firmly applied to a situation and conditions of action. In one such occurrence *charitee* is posited as a motive for granting a request to a totally impotent petitioner. There is an evident correspondence in sense here with such phrases as *for your grace* and *for youre curtesye*. This relation will be studied later:

CT.I.1721 And as thou art a rightful lord and juge,
Ne yif us neither mercy ne refuge,
But sle me first, for seinte charitee!

4. In common with many of the words studied, *charitee* as a motive for action beneficial to fellow-men, and the action itself, become confused. In the Christian sense, the Parson speaks of *werkes of charitee* among men, and in a corresponding secular sense, *charitee* is a designation applied to the act of a lord giving advancement to a humble, but worthy, retainer:

CT.I.1433 They seyden that it were a charitee
That Theseus wolde enhauencen his degree,
And putten hym in worshipful servyse,
Ther as he myghte his vertu exercise.

There is the suggestion here that Theseus has done a charitable act not simply in respect of his appointee, but to the whole of his court by his choice of a worthy young man. *A charitee* is a deed generally judged to be a good one, rather than a simple act of favour conferred upon one man in a way which might be ethically ambivalent. This is true also of the other use of *charitee* in this sense (PF.508).

5. That use of *charitee* in some syntagms which seems to imply a vague state of holiness, a kind of spiritual power, is reinforced by one of its uses as
a subject. It is clear that in this use the primary sense of charitee is not that of beneficial acts, nor simply of good disposition towards one's fellow-men; rather it seems to imply a force like that of prayer, acting at the spiritual level. This seems to be a derived sense: something like 'blessedness' or 'spiritual fortitude' resulting from love of and good works toward one's fellow-men:

C2. III. 865 For now the grote charitee and prayeres,
Of lymytours and others hooly freres
... maketh that ther ben no sayeryes.
Translation evidence is available from the *Romaunt of the Rose.*

There may nothing ben his socour: No puet avoir garant ne mire

The lexeme is frequently collocated with the lexemes GRACE, PITRY, and MERCY.

1. A quotation from the *Knight's Tale* will illustrate the coincidence of the use of socour with uses of mercy and pitee:

CHI. 918. Mat growth us youre glorie and youre honour,
But we biseken mercy and socour.
Have mercy on oure vo and oure distresse!
Som drope of pitee, thugh thy gentillesse,

The situation of the use of these phrases is that of the encounter of the victorious Theseus with a group of distressed ladies who seek his sympathy and aid. This is the kind of situation in which the use of PITEE might be expected, rather than the use of the lexeme MERCY, since the distress which the lord observes is the result of causes external to the present relationship. In any case, the desire for PITEE and MERCY in this situation is clearly correlated with the desire for SOOCOUR.

The use of SOOCOUR in this kind of situation, in syntagms of the type biseken/ do socour, is further specified in four uses in the *Legend of Good Women* (1053; 1476; 2432; 2440). Here the petitioners are shipwrecked sailors cast ashore in an unknown land: they ask the ruler of that land for socour. A fifth uses an impersonal construction:

LOU. 1489  If they were broken, or ought wo begon,
Or hadden nede of lodman or vitayle;
For of socour they sholde nothyng feylo.

Clearly, in examples such as this, SOOCOUR, which the petitioner craves, is a particular kind of aid; he is asking for particular acts to alleviate his distress, and he is asking them from someone previously unknown. In these

The Noun: Socour; socours
uses, then, socour implies specific practical help. In the courtly love situation, socour comes from a third party and, instead of material help, means aid to achieve a desired goal. At the same time, however, the conceit of the 'lover's malady' enables the word to be understood in this situation as direct physical help:

The lady in question is the Goddess of Love.

Socour may also refer to unspecified help in situations of danger or misery connected with emotional rather than physical well-being. Thus Calkas asks for socour from the Greek lords after prophesying the fall of Troy:

This rather unspecific, non-physical sense of socour is also found with application to the Virgin Mary as grantor. Just as the direct concrete form of socour is reinforcement to the body and material estate, so in this context, if any precision is given to the kind of help offered, it is reinforcement to the spiritual part in order to overcome sin:

Socour, then, involves actual help in various situations. It may be collocated with GRACE, MERCY and PITY, but unlike them, is incapable of designating a human relationship, emotion or attitude. Were it possible to analyse the relationship of SOCOUR to the other three lexemes in their application to a situation, we should find that the emotions or attitudes signified by the latter three serve as the stimulus of the action signified by socour. In many uses, however, this theoretical distinction is not maintained, since words denoting agentive emotions are frequently uncritically applied to the actions they provoke. The emotion and the action are
linguistically represented by a single designation which may be used to
denote either the action or the emotion or a complex of the two.

2. As with the lexemes GOD and FUGUE, socour can be used without appli-
cation to a situation in which two participants, one granting the other
receiving socour, appear. Here the implication of socour is merely that
an escape from present ills, without suggestion of the kind
nor source of this help:

CT.V.1357 That unwar wrapped has me in thy cheyne,
Fro which t'escape woot I no socour,
Have onlay doeth or elles dishonour;

A similar, rather imprecise sense of socour is to be found in uses with the
verb 'to be;' here the subject is frequently the Virgin, who is a help for
mankind against the ever-present threats of his fallen state, and acts as
an intercessor with God. This general, vague sense may also include ideas
of 'protection' against the common ills of Fortune or even enchantment:

RR.1606 For whose loketh in that mirrour,
There may nothyng ben his socour
That he ne shall there sen somthing
That shal hym lede into lovyng.
1. The lexeme HELP, in most of its uses cannot be claimed to belong to the sense area with which we are concerned. In a few uses with the syntagma ask h., bleisen h., seken h., take h. there is a similarity in sense to related syntagms using the form grace. There is, however, no orientation with regard to social eminence.

2. Collocations of help with nede are common both in the syntagma have nede of and with the impersonal verb nede. At its most general, help is merely the answer to a particular need, and may come from anyone, bidden or unbidden. In the Tale of Helibee (VII.1306) and Troilus and Cresside (V.1027) it is made clear that help is most useful from a friend. Boethius inveighs against foroyn help ('help fro without') III,p.xii) and contrasts this need with suffissance. This thought associates neatly with the use of socour in the resolution of the poem Fortune:

    My suffissance shal be my socour;
    For synally, Fortune, I thee defye!

3. Help and grace may be situationally synonymous and they are juxtaposed in an exclamation in Troilus and Cresside (IV.103). In The Merchant's Tale (IV.2334) help is used as an exclamation by the wife, May, who claims that she will die if she cannot have some green pears. The situation in both these cases is that of the urgent desire for the granting of a petition, but in both cases also a particular aim, a specific action is desired, rather than merely a favourable attitude.

4. Help and grace are again collocated in the single occurrence of the adverbial phrase withouten help:

    CT.I.2400 And, wol I woot, withouten help or grace
    Of thee, ne may my strengthe noght availle.
The sense of grace here is that found when a divinity is the subject of
the phrase grace to infin. : 'an enabling gift from the divine'. The
distinction between help and grace here may be that the former implies the
direct intervention of God. The Parson sees the help of God as a direct
reinforcement of personal fortitude.

CT.X.1075 and sae he shal han strenthe of the helpe of God, end of hooily chirohs,
In the case of the lexeme DEBONAIRES there seems to be little point in endeavouring to discover the sense of each word class separately, since the noun, at least, is inadequately represented and the uses of the words do not seem to suggest any great divergences of sense corresponding to grammatical function. Nevertheless the fact that the noun is used predominantly in moral psychological exposition is a warning that vigilance must be maintained with regard to semantic differences between word classes.

The most important collocations of DEBONAIRES are: patience, pitous, goodness, good, goodly, faire, make, patience, and ire.

In translations the lexeme is used exclusively to render the identical French word. Predicated of enemies Chaucer uses a pairing debonaire and meke to translate simply debonnaire in the original. The range of Latin words in Boethius which are rendered by DEBONAIRES is very large: mitis (of a tame tiger and Sephyrus); prospera and blanda (of Fortuna); propitious (of judges); benigme (of force); plus (of people in general). It is clear, however, that Chaucer simply adopted the French of Jean de Meun in all these cases. Etymologically, the earliest form of the word is the adjective, which is in turn derived from an Old French adjectival phrase de bon aire, which has an original sense of 'belonging to a noble lineage'. In common with many such words, there is an early confusion between nobility of birth and nobility of behaviour, so that the lexeme need not imply noble birth in Chaucer's time.

1. A most striking fact about Chaucer's usage of the adjective debonaire and its derivatives is the frequency of its occurrence outside a courtly context as a term of moral philosophy, one of the contending elements of the psyche. The Parson (CT.X.65ff.) gives a detailed analysis of it as...
a remedium contra pecatum Ire, and his deliberations offer a useful opportunity of determining what the abstract ideal, derived from the imprecise adjective, might mean.

The Parson begins by equating debonairotee with mansuetudo, and allies it with patience, which he equates with sufferance, as antithetical to ire. He explains the psychological functions by stating that debonairotee is a virtue which suppresses sudden emotional outbursts, in particular those aimed against others. Debonairetee is the active virtue parallel to the passive one of patient acceptance; the former prevents aggression and the latter too fierce a defence against external attack. Debonairetee is visualised as a quality inherent in man, or as a part of God's grace, but it is evidently not taught as a social accomplishment.

Since the disposition of the powerful is of more direct importance than that of others, the moral import of debonairetee is especially interesting in regard to lords, and hence judges. The Parson and Prudence, echoing the Latin tradition of Seneca, both agree that debonairetee is desirable in the judicial lord:

CT.X.467

"Ther is no thing moore convenable to a man of heigh estaat then debonairetee and pitee.

CT.VII.1861

'Ther is no thyng so comendable in a greet lord/ as when he is debonaire and meeke, and appeseth him lightly.'

The lord who shows debonairetee will restrain his desire for harsh revenge justice against the guilty and will be beneigne to his deserving inferiors. Thus, according to the Parson, Christ acts debonairotee in sparing sinful man (CT.X.315), and in Boece IV p.iv 263 it is recommended that judges should be 'nat wroothe but pytous and debonayre' and, instead of harsh justice, should seek to rehabilitate criminals. The antagonists of Velibeus submit to him because they are assured that he is debonaire (VII.1820) and 'debonaire and meeko, large, courteys' (VII.1760). Debonairetee, although it evidently implies gentleness, kindness and magnanimity to follow men, does not preclude
the possibility of anger; a sweetness and stillness of spirit it may be, but in an important passage the Parson envisages a kind of Ire which embodies debonnairetee. 'Good Ire,' he says, 'is with debonnairetee, and it is wrooth withouten bitternesse; nat wrooth agryns the man, but wrooth with the mysdede of the man.' Here there is evidence that, in the sense of the word which the Parson intends, debonnairetee is not merely a simple tranquillity of nature, but a genuine concern for one's fellow Christian. To what extent the Parson is recasting the senses of the words for doctrinal purposes is hard to say, but the uses of the noun in these moral philosophical passages would all admit of this interpretation, and there is additional evidence in the oxymoronic phrases hispitaue debonnaire (BD.626) to refer to Fortune, and debonayre force of God (Bo.III.pxi 135) which destroyed the giants. This last phrase evidently bears some sense of the modification of violence, being channelled to beneficent ends: the Latin original has benipaia fortitudo (Jean de Meun: la debonnaire force).

2. That debonnairetee of whatever kind is regarded as an attribute of character and not an accomplishment nor a momentary emotion, is suggested by its frequent use as a general descriptive term for the characters of people separate from any situation, and also by such noun phrases as 'herte of misericorde, debonnairetee, suffraunce...' (CT.X.1054), together with the description of persons whose clothes belie the impression given by their faces of their inner constitution:

CT.X.430 God woot that though the visages of somme of hem seme ful chaast and debonnaire, yet notifie they in hire array of styr likerousnesse and pride.

Here the antithetical arrangement of the sentence seems to imply a sense of 'humble' or 'meek' for debonnaire.

3. Debonaire and its derivatives are also used in courtly contexts. The noun is so used only once, and as an abstract quality of character, it seems much more a part of moral philosophy. In some contexts the sense of
debosairly in the courtly situation seems to be equivalent to that understood by the Parson. Compare the sense in the following quotation with those in which lords or Christ show concern and judge mildly those who trespass against them:

In the courtly situation, too, debosairry is used to represent an attribute of character and is especially applied to courtly women. The allegorical figures Fraunchise (BU.1220) and Curtesie (BU.797) are both called debosairry, as are Criseyde (I.181), Blanche the Duchess (BU.860), Alceste (LU.1.179), Pertelote (CT.VII.287) and Emelye (CT.I.2282). In all of these, the term is one of general description used of a courtly lady: Emelye and Fraunchise have debosairry hearts; Blanche and Criseyde have debosairry eyes and shere respectively. The latter application occurs in a more graphic situation than the others, which may help to throw some light on the sense of debosairry in a courtly lady:

The picture is of a lady who, while not overcome by awkward embarrassment, is less than forceful and strident; she is diametrically opposed to the Wife of Bath, who must always go first. This restraint in her behaviour is again seen when she stands beside her father after her return from Troy; here her submissiveness is called mansuete.

This sense of gentleness, of moderation, predominates over that of benevolence in some courtly contexts, though the component of concern for others can rarely be discounted in the sense:

Here the overt sense is one of moderation and gentleness, but this tone is
adopted, and the words chosen, from concern for the suffering man in Black.

In courtly relations between man and woman, the look is often of great importance. Blanche is portrayed as looking debonairly upon all, but Chaucer takes great pains to stress that, although she looks kindly and gently on all, it is with moderation and no pejorative implication can be made:

[22.351] Leughe and playe so womanly, 
But looks so debonairly, 
So goodly speke and so frendly.

Crisayde, too, shows kindness in her look on Troilus, but it is tempered with the same moderation:

[23.156] With that she gan hire even on his caste 
Ful easily and ful debonairly, 
Ayving hire, and hied nought to faste 
With never a word.

In Boethius (II, p.viii, 12-13) Fortune, personified as a great lady, is twice called debonaire, glossing two distinct Latin words, prosperam and blandae. The former use, he contrasts with contrariwise fortune, and in following Jean de Meun's choice of debonaire to translate both Latin terms, Chaucer obscures a distinction made in the Latin between an impersonal application (prosperam) meaning simply 'favourable' and a personal one (blandae) meaning (perhaps dissimulatingly) 'kind'.

4. A number of minor uses remain to be examined. In the Parson's Tale, we find him insisting on the necessity of tranquility to the spiritual life:

[23.k.560] (iro) bynymeth from man his wit and his reason, 
And al his debonaire life spirituell that shold keepen his soule.

while a second use in Boethius implies that Chaucer considers that calm gentleness of spirit is the desired behaviour of a Christian, for he translates Boethius' pius as debonaire:

[Bo.III, mix, 45] (God thou art cleernessse, thou art mostable 
Rostte to debonaire folk

1 This use of debonaire in a context of Christian morality is paralleled in the roughly contemporary Book of Vices and Virtues, ed. H. H. Francis, B.E.T.S. (O.S.2177), 1942, p.94. Boetititudes, 33.34. Blessed be he debonere, for pei schulle be lordes of pe erpe. The word debonaire here was added by Jean de Meun. Chaucer chooses this rather than pitite.
The sense of gentleness and mild disposition is also implied by the description of the metamorphosis of one of Ulysses' companions in the house of Circe (Bo.IV.m.iii, 15): he becomes a tame tiger and 'goth debonayrely in the hows'.

The features of the gentle breeze, Zephyrus, warm and life-giving, restoring the leaves to the trees in the annual reviving, account for the use of debonaire in the following translations:

Bo.I,m.v,22 Zephyrus, the debonere wynd, bryngeth ayan ... the leaves (rochesthat wites Zephyrus frondes).

A problematic substantival use of the adjective in Troilus and Cressida I, 214 should be mentioned. The use has a proverbial ring, describing the power of love to ensnare all, and this has been commented upon by editors:

'For kaught is proud, and kaught is debonaire.'

Robinson, following Hoot, seems to assume that debonaire is equivalent to proud in this sentence. In view of the senses of debonaire established in Chaucer's usage by this investigation, it seems more probable that this is an inclusive expression of the type riche and poore or young and old.

5. Finally, although a distinction was made in introductory remarks on the senses of RACIST CM and DJ:301TAXP between passivity and activity, there occur a number of uses of the latter with undeniable passive implication:

CT.VII.1064 Whanne dame Prudence, ful debonairly and with greet pacience, hadde herd al that hir housbonde liked for to seye ...  

HF.2013 Such routhe hath he of thy distresse,  
That thou sustreft debonairly -  

AA.127 And al this tok she so debonerly,  
That all his wil, her thoughtes hit skilful thing;  

From such uses we may assume that debonairly is substituted for paciently with some verbs, and synonymy results. This extension seems to be limited to actual contextual uses in certain combinations of linguistic and situational

1 A not dissimilar transformation is wrought in the taming of King Cyrus from ire to become debonaire and meke in Gower, CA.VII.1887ff. Gower also refers to the south wind as debonaire (CA.VI.363).
circumstances. In dealing with the lexeme **PACIENCE**, we are dealing with a word which comes within the sphere of Christian moral psychology, so that the defined sense of the word may, at times, differ slightly from actual contextual uses. Thus the Parson uses a similar linguistic context to the examples above when he defines PACIENCE as the ability to suffer dobonairely; but, here, dobonairely means simply 'mildly, tranquilly':

CT.X.660 The philosopher seith that pacience is thilke vertu that suffreth dobonairely all the outrages of adversitee and every wikked word.
The commonest collocations of *bene* are: *honest, faith(ful), honorable, stable, discreet, sad.*

Chaucer seems to have a predilection for the word *benign* which encourages him to use it even when unprompted by the text he is translating. Translation evidence is, in fact, sparse and unrevealing. The adjective *benign*, and the adverb *benevolently*, are direct borrowings from the French in the *Tale of Melibee* (*benigne* and *benigneement*), but both here and in the *Clark's Tale*, Chaucer uses the lexeme as an unprompted addition. At CT.IV.1053 he translates *bono fide et vraye humilité* by *faith and benignity*. According to the Boethius Concordance, *benigna* occurs twice in Boethius' works: on one occasion, prompted by Jean de Meun, Chaucer renders this *debonnaire*, on the other (Bo.III,m.ix,41) he merely adopts the Latin word, ignoring the French translation.

1. *BENIGNITY* is clearly an essential trait of character and a trait which works to the benefit of others. It is listed with a host of womanly virtues in the description of Griselda:

CT.IV.929 Hure goost was evere in pleyn humylite;
   No tendre mouth, noon herte delicat,
   No pompe, no semblant of roialtee,
   But ful of pacient benyngnytee,
   Discreet and pridalees, cy honourable,
   And to hire houbondes evere meke and stable.

and its uses with a possessive emphasise its part as a component of person-

alitie. Griselda's husband puts her *BENIGHTNESS* to the test:

CT.IV.1053  I have thy feith and thy benyngnytee,
   As wel as evere woman was, assayed,

The Parson analyses the endowments of mankind into 'goodes' of *nature, fortune and Grace*. The heritage of nature (i.e. by virtue of birth), he divides into two: 'goodes of body' (*heale of body, strength, deliverences, beaute, rectrice, franchise*) and 'goodes of soule' (*good wit, sharp
understandyng, subtil engyn, vertu naturel, good memorie). Health, advancement and popularity are in the gift of fortune, whilst BRAGGARTICE, together with a number of spiritual virtues, is a gift from God, of which it is foolish to boast (GU. X. 450ff).

Such examples as these reveal BRAGGARTICE to be a trait of human personality closely connected to Christian ideals and dependent upon the grace of God. The moral-evaluative implications of most of its more important collocations may have prepared us for this finding.

2. The above uses suggest that BRAGGARTICE is purely a passive virtue. Its occurrence in association with HUMBLNESS and humblesse in a number of uses, together with the disproportionately large number of occurrences in the Clerk's Tale, and elsewhere, applied to suffering women, increase this awareness of connotations of sweet submissiveness. The Parson sums up the situation quite well:

GU. X. 109  
Penitence destroyeth a man to accepte benygnely every payne that hym is enjoyned;

and Prudence asks her husband to listen patiently to the unwelcome things which she intends to tell him:

GU. VII. 1238  
and soothe, I hope that your benyngayte vol taken it in pacience

BRAGGARTICE in these examples, indicates the spiritual condition which will predispose one to accept hardship without complaint; but not only without complaint or animosity, rather with a positive sweetness of spirit, a distinct mildness towards the source of what might otherwise be irritation. This is clearly suggested by the following description of an ideal priest:

GU. 483  
Bonyghe he was, and wonder diligent,  
and in adversitie ful pacient,

Here BRAGGARTICE is the condition of being loving to others and, at once, maintaining tranquility in one's own hardships. The first element of this, kindliness to others, is explicit in a second reference to the Parson:

GU. 518  
He was to synful men nat despitosus,  
He of his speche daungerous he digne,  
But in his techyng discreet and benyngae.
The use of the lexeme 'benigne' in contexts such as those quoted has given it strong moralistic connotations which are closely connected with Christian ideals. Nonetheless, it is used as a descriptive term in the presentation of the characteristics of great courtly ladies. Indeed, despite numerous applications to men, the sense of submissiveness and its echoes in most uses of 'benigne', tend to make it especially associated with the description of women. As well as applying to submissive, oppressed women, the term may apply to women of some power and prestige. Thus we find the princess Canacee showing compassion for a distressed bird:

*CT.V.486*  
I so wel that ye han of my distress  
Compassion, my faire Canacee,  
Of verray womanly benigne  
That Nature in youre principles hath set.

The queen who accompanies the terrifying God of Love in the prologue to the Legend of Good Women (f) 243 is similarly described:

So womanly, so benigne, and so meke,

This 'benigne' is evident in the face and the voice as well as in the behaviour of some great ladies. Blanche, the duchess, is thus described:

*BB.918*  
He sholde have founde to discryve  
Yn al hir face a wikked sygna;  
For hit was sad, symple, and benigne.

It would seem from such examples as these that 'benigne' is applied to great ladies, not in any attempt to emphasise their social elevation or physical beauty, but rather the perfection of their souls, especially in humility and kindliness. Note that Chaucer, in the first of these three quotations, contradicts what he claims above about 'benigne' being a *God of grace*.

In the Complaint of Mars (178), amidst a list of conventional virtues of a lady, we find that of *benigne humbless*, and the allegorised Pity in the complaint of the same name (58) is called *humblest of herte* ...

*Benigne flour*.

However, in some contexts, humility and submission do not seem to be important criteria in the sense. Thus the penitents in the Tale of Meliboe...
approach Prudence with the words:

(1743) And therefore, deere and benigne lady, we preien yow and biseken yow as meekely as we kanne.

Evidently they consider that the character of the lady will preuioupone her to help them, and indeed it does, bringing about poace by careful counsell and magnanimity, so that the tale is closed as one of Prudence 'and hire benignytee' (CT.VII.1890). The Virgin Mary is also a benigne lady in a position of power:

CT.VIII.54 But often tyme, of thy benignytee,
Ful frely, or that men thyn help biseke,
Thou goost bifom, and art hir lyves leche.

Thus benignytee may have quite an active sense when applied to ladies; more than lacking animosity, it can have a positive sense of being well-disposed to some-one and ready to help them. Many of the adverbial clauses become simply formulae in the situation where a petitioner calls upon the great for help and invokes an aspect of their character which might be connected with the will to help:

CT.III.39 Now, lady bryght, for thi benignyee,
At reverence of hem that serven the,
Whos clerke I am, so techeth me devyse.

CT.II.532 Thou be my shold, for thi benignyee.

There is no doubt that adverbial phrases, such as these, arc situationally inspired tags adding politeness to a request of a greater person. There is no distinction in sense between these and for thi grace or any others of these formulae, but if we do assume that the word has sense within the phrase, the sense must be an active one.

4. In its application to men, BENIGNyTE is generally active, an exception being the Clerk of Oxenford who admirabley demonstrates the passive sense:

CT.IV.21 This worthy clerk benignly answerdes
"Hooste," quod he, "I ar under youre yerde;
Ye hen of us as now the governaunce.

1 Cf. the almost identical idea in The Priorsse's Prologue, VIII. 478.
Some typical of the application to men is the following, in which the
Parson claims that it is a sign of true benignity for a lord 'to be
benigne to his good subiects' (CT.I.457). BENIGNITY in men is often
shown by their actions towards the less fortunate. Troilus, blessed by
the love of Cressida, becomes a paragon of virtues:

CT.III.1802 And though that he be come of blood royal,
Benigne he was to all in general,
For which he got hym thanks in every place.

Alcesto (Ld. I. 361) says that a lord ought to 'Sheweth his peple pleny
benignity'; Troilus appeals to the God of love 'so benigne to me benigne';
(CT.I.431); the Parson intimates that it is a sin when a man 'herkeneth
not benigne the complaint of the poore' (PT.X.373); Aurelius appeals to
Lord Phoebus for help in his hopeless love, assuming that, as in Ganacee
(see above), BENIGNITY is related to ITINAE (CT.V.1039); Lyulbee raises
his penitent vassals from the ground ful benignely (CT.VII.1827), and
Griselda tells her children that their benign prince has tenderly
protected them (CT.IV.1097). In Parson's Tale 582, the narrator indicates
that the mercie of God will be extended even to the worst sinners because
He is so benigne.

Thus BENIGNITY is associated with acts of beneficence and magnanimity
towards people in general, pity for the distressed, and forbearance and
forgiveness towards the guilty. A benigne judge encourages the submission
of the criminal:

CT.VII.1821 But yet, for the grote goodness and debonnairetou
that all the world witnesseth of youre personne, we
submitted us to the excellence and benignitez of youre
greatie lordshipes,

Any differentiation in sense between the key terms of the above quotation
would be hard to make. At the end of the Troilus, Chaucer addresses it
to Lower and strode, asking them to correct it 'Of youre benignitez andzales
goode' (CT.V.1859); he submits his work to assessors whom he expects to
balance conscientious fervour against forbearance in their judgment of it.

On a considerable number of occasions, BENIGNITY is used without any clear act of benevolence towards a human being, and in such uses it becomes one of the list of courtly moral epithets; its sense is very vague and must be inferred from uses where it is a trait of character inspiring beneficence. The king in the Squire's Tale (21) is, among other things, 'pitous and just, alway yliche;/ Sooth of his word, benigne and honorable,'. The formal eagle of Pp.375 is 'the moste benigne and the goodlieste' among birds, and Githerea (Venus) is called benigne (CT.I.2215).

The association of the Goddess of Love with benigne is scarcely surprising, taking into account the fact that the term involves being well-disposed to mankind. We may also remember that love made Troilus benigne, and this function is supported by the explicit claim (VC.III.26) that Venus makes lovers cortye, freshe and benigne. The personification Love is awarded the same epithet (VC.III.1261) and in the Merchant's Tale (IV.2093) may loves Janyan so benigne, that she will die if she may not have him. The context suggests a sense directly opposed to that of gentle philosophical submissiveness with which we started: something like 'violently' or 'forcefully' could be substituted. This intensification is the result of the use of the adverb semi-tautologously. Other emotions or acts of benevolence which are reinforced in this way are curtaiyn (CT.I.179) and the grace of God (CT.X.1091).

5. As well as benevolence towards mankind, harshness may ideally be tempered by BENIGHTEN, as we may guess by Chaucer's dedication to Strode and Gower. Thus, the restrictions put upon mankind by adherence to the code of religion are for his own benefit, and are called (Bo.III.m.ix.41) 'thi benigne lawe'.

The Parson is at pains to emphasize the value of mildness and benevolence in reproving evil-doers. One must be careful to avoid anger or one might 'slee thym, which that he myghte chastise with benigne', (CT.X.628). See also CT.X.510.
6. Most uses of beneignite involve human relations and attitudes, yet one use is to be found where the adjective is applied to the weather \((\text{C}, \text{V}, \text{X})\) of a kind which makes the birds sing. It is obviously spring weather, weather which is kindly and benevolent to the birds, gentle but yet joyful (lusty) and invigorating. In short, from the point of view of the birds, the weather is fine and favorable.
This lexeme represents the adoption, perhaps via French, of the Latin mansuetaudo. It is used by the Parson, where it is described as the remedy for IRE, and glossed for the ignorant as debonairtee. Its significance is clearly the same sweet tranquility of spirit as the latter lexeme signifies in these moral treatises. In its only occurrence outside moral treatises, it is applied to Griseyde as she stands obediently by her father after her return from Troy. Here it collocates with muvot and milde, contributing to a totally passive and submissive picture of a dutiful daughter:

VC.V.194 She scyde ek, she was feyn with hym to mete,  
And stood forth muvot, milde, and mansuete.
Translation evidence is limited, though the lexeme seems to be used to render French debonnaire. In Middle English, paired adjectives debonnaire and mekely are used to render the French simplex debonnaire on three separate occasions, and mekely and bonelgly renders benignement once. The fact that mekeneuse renders clementin once in Boece is probably due to the use of Jean de Meun's translation where it is rendered debonairete (IV, p. iv, 152). Meke is also used to render French humblement / humilité and Latin humilitas.

Collocation evidence is plentiful since, like the adjective kynde, meke is frequently used in paired constructions. The most important collocations are debonnaire, kynde, humble/humilité, pacient, and benigno, but a great many more occur: large, fre, faire, young, fresche, curtesy, stille, stable, buxom, hooly, womanly, and, antithetically, fierce.

1. The collocation womanly directs us to a significant feature of the use of meke in that it is very frequently predicated of women; as wives within the marriage relationship, as the object of courtly affection, or in the person of the Virgin. Typically, the Life of Bath reverses the common usage here in her desire for: 'Housbondes meke, young, and fresch abedde,' (Ct. III. 1259). This association with women, and more especially with the Virgin, is perhaps referable to the identification made between mekenesse and one of the special 'privileges' which the fourteenth century cult of the Virgin considered were specially granted to Mary. This association is also suggested by the repeated comparison of mekenesse with that of a wyde (Ct. 69; Ct. I. 3202). The lexeme is also applied to the mild jud.ke, where it is paired with debonnaire, and to Christ. This last application is supported

1 Middle English Sermons, ed. J. O. Ross, Bess 205, 251-19. Meke is here the gloss of humilité.
by the association of the lexeme with the word *lamb*.

2. The use of the lexeme _lamb_ implies gentleness, humility and submission, consequent imperviousness to violent emotion and, hence, tranquility of spirit. In Chaucer's usage it is contrasted with *Philips*:

_Ca.VII.597_ And ever on Cristes moorder meske and kynde
_Thee cripe,_

Within the situation of courtly love, this active sense can imply readiness to grant grace. The application to Christ is arranged as a deliberate contrast to the danger and turbulence of earthly loves:

_Ta.V.1847_ And syn he best to love is, and most make,
What reeth fyncke looves for to seke?

Within the courtly situation, but with passive application, the lexeme seems chiefly to imply submissiveness and humility:

_Ta.V.739_ But atte laste she, for his worthynesse,
And namely for his meke obeyeance,
Hath swich a pitee caught of his peneunce.

This is also the sense found in the marriage relationship and in more general situations:

_Ta.IV.538_ Grisildis moot al suffre and al consente;
And as a lamb she sitteth meke and stille,
And leet this cruel sergeant doon his wille.

1 _Ibid._, 20.79. The same is true of *The Person's Tale*, X. 475.
2 A rare verbal use (Ca.VII.1684) renders *'jo me sille humilier.'* The verbal use also occurs with similar sense in Gower, Ca.I.366 and _Piers Plowman_ (c-text) V.90.
4. In Chaucer's later work, in common with a number of other morally evaluative terms, meekness seems to be used in senses which must be considered ironic, when viewed against the ideal of moralistic writing. Thus the meekness of hondo Nicholas is tainted with the suggestion of self-interest; it is certainly torn from the established framework of its position as the first branch in the tree of virtues:

CT.I.3202

This clerk was called hondo Nicholas.
Of deorne love he koude and of solas;
And therto he was sleigh and ful privee;
And lyk a mayden make for to see.

1 Compare CT.IV.1745; CT.III.434 and perhaps CT.V.739. For the status of mekenes in the hierarchy of virtues, see The Book of Vices and Virtues p. 126ff.
MILDE

Strangely, this is a very rare word in Chaucer: the adjective alone is found, and then only in one occurrence. This is when Calkas, in Book V of Troilus and Criseyde, welcomes his daughter after her issue from Troy:

TC.V.194 And twenty tyme he kiste his daughter sweete,
And seyde, "O deere daughter myn, welcome!"
She seyde ek, she was fayn with hym to mete,
And stond forth mwyet, milde, and mansuete.

The vocabulary of the line in which this occurs is noteworthy, for mansuete also is a nonce occurrence, and mwyet is uncommon. The sense of milde here is 'quiet and gentle.'
G. S. Lewis has shown (Studies in Jords, pp. 26ff.) the large range of senses of the word *kynde*, most of which are outside the area laid down as being of interest in the present study; yet, since they are senses subsumed under the same formal unit of language as those senses which concern us, they should receive some mention. This is the more necessary since the formal resemblance also suggests some semantic relation either diachronic or, possibly, synchronic.

1. The O.E. antecedent *cynnde* is related to the word *cyn*, which gives us the modern 'kin', and referred to race or lineage. This sense is used in Chaucer:

   **CT. VIII. 121**  This mayden bright Cecillie, as hir lif seith,  
   Was comen of Romeyns, and of noble kynde,

   **CT. XII. 119**  'comen of so lough a kynde,'

2. A second well-recognised sense is that of nature as a semi-deity and the vicar of God, glossing Latin *natura*:

   **WP. 312**  and right as Alyn, in the *naynt* of Kynde,  
   Devyret the nature of aray and face,

   **WP. 312**  Thogh Jun, that men clepe god of kynde,

3. *Kynde* may also refer to the individual nature of a person, persons or things. Here it identifies and refers to traits characteristic of those things or persons:

   **CT. IV. 668**  The kynde of menes has to folys.  
   In thing that strenghe is,

   **CT. IV. 2451**  men Iovon of propre kynde newefangelnesse,

   **CT. I. 2451**  Saturne anon, to stynten strif and drede,  
   Al be it that it is cynn his kynde,  
   Of al this strif he gon remadyn kynde.
4. *Kynge* may also refer to that class of objects or persons which display certain characteristic traits enabling them to be grouped. They are classified according to their nature and the class formed may be called by the same word. *Kynge* here glosses the Latin *genus* in *Lucianus*:

*Bo.IV,p.iii,76* (that is to say, wilikide the ... which that is the utteresto and the worste kynde of schrewednose)

*Bo.IV,p.1,57* and thou schalt wel knowe anye thinges of this kynge, ...

*Bo.III,p.ix,31* "Suffisance and power ben thankes of a kynder!"

The third of these may easily be understood with sense 4, but in fact translates *nature*, whilst the second translates *genus*.

5. A more consciously classifying sense is used by the Canon's Yeoman:

*CT.VIII.789* Though I by ordre hem nat rehearse ken, By cause that I am a lewed man, Yet wol I tolle hem as they come to aymde, Though I ne ken nat sette hem in hir kynde:

A number of phrases give idiomatic extension to the sense above.

6. *By (way of) K.*

a) This is related to the sense of nature (characteristic traits) and also to the group of things which fall within a class marked by certain traits. There is a sense of normality; the ordinary course of events, what is natural or normal?

*CT.VII.650* "My throte is but unto my nekke boon,"
Seyde this child, "and, as by wey of kynde, I sholde have dyed,

b) It can also refer to certain inborn characteristics, as opposed to those taught, and hence has the sense 'instinct':

*CT.VII.1596* And knew by kynde, and by noon oother loore, That it was pryme, and crew with blisful stevene.

7. *Love of K.* This phrase is opposed to celestial love. It is the antithesis of natural creation and also the ordinary species of love; carnal love:

*Te.I.979* That was unapt to suffer loves hate, Celestial, or elles love of kynde;
8. When actions are grouped according to particular facets of them, the use of *kynde* extends into the territory of modern *way* or *manner*:

TC.III.334

I shal thi proces set in swych a kynde,
And God toforn, that it shal the suffise,

9. Finally the following from the Parson's section on Lechery:

CT.X.965

For if the chirche be halwed, and man or womman spille his kynde inwith that place, by wey of synne or by wikked temptacioun, the chirche is entredited til it be reconsiled by the bysshop.

The adverb formed on the noun *kynde* (*kyndely*) and the adjective of identical form have senses related to those mentioned above. Thus, speaking of his service to love, the Man in Black of the *Book of the Duchess*, 777 says his ability to serve came from instinct:

I trowe hit cam me kyndely

A few lines earlier he speaks of *kyndely understandyng*, meaning perhaps that intellect is a characteristic trait in the nature of mankind or that he had a natural, instinctual understanding of the *game* of love.

When the Wife of Bath says (III.402):

Deceite, wepyng, spynnynge God hath yive
To wommen kyndely,

she is not referring to God's beneficence, but to a trait of the nature of women.

Genitive apposition (cf. Mustanoja p.85) accounts for phrases such as *his kynde noriture* (TC.IV.768) and the following, where the sense may equally imply a place reserved for a particular class or for objects of a particular nature:

HF.836

That kyndely the mansioun
Of every speche, of every soun,
Be hyt eyther foul or fair,
Hath hys kynde place in ayr.
And syn that every thyng that is
Out of hys kynde place, ywys
Moveth thidder for to goo,

In some uses a different sense might be understood, as in the following,
which records the beneficent effect of the sun on flowers:

TC.II.970 But right as floures, thorugh the cold of nyght
Iclosed, stoupen on hire stalke lowe,
Redressen hem ayein the sonne bright,
And spreden on hire kynde cours by rowe,

A use such as this brings us to those senses which will engage our prime
attention.

B. No translation evidence exists for these uses of the lexeme. The
evidence of collocation shows collocations with TREWE (inc. trouthe) to
be easily the most important, with GENTIL next and, following and of equal
importance, meke; parfit; sadde. The collocation with beste might be
mentioned as semantically related to parfit. The only head words which
are twice modified by the adjective are: herte, man, and references to
the character of Griselda; though the collocation is actually with a pronoun
in one occurrence. As mentioned above, only quyte (with) occurs twice
governing the object kyndenesse.

1. The commonest single situation for the use of KYNDE in the senses which
concern us is the situation of love and marriage. Here either partner
may be said to be Kynde, but along with TROUTHE, it is generally presumed
to be a trait more typical of women. The essential relational nature of
the word in this situation is repeated:

TC.IV.1417 And treweliche, as writen wel I fynde,
That al this thyng was seyd of good entente;
And that hire herte trewe was and kynde
Towards hym,

The mutual bond of TROUTHE and KYNDESSE is exemplified in the claim of
the Wife of Bath:

CT.III.823 After that day we hadden never debaat.
God helpe me so, I was to him as kynde
As any wyf from Denmark unto Ynde,
And also trewe, and so was he to me.

Thus Kyndenesse in marriage consists of avoiding acrimonious exchanges. In
a general sense it can simply mean being pleasant to people, doing something for their benefit; thus Chaucer asks lovers to repay the good deeds of Venus with similar **Kyndenesse**:

**Mars 298**

Compleyneth thilke ensample of al honour,  
That never dide but al gentilesse;  
Kytheth therafore on her sum kyndenesse.

The constant juxtaposition in the love situation of *trewe* and *kynde* makes the borders of the concepts ill-defined. A lover who is one is also the other: one of the ways in which a lover may be good to his love is to be constant. Constancy is often assumed to be a characteristic trait of ladies:

**Mars 281**

And ye, my ladyes, that ben true and stable,  
Be wey of kynde,

But, though ladies are constant by nature, men often *loven novelrie*:

**LGV.921**

For it is deynte to us men to fynde  
A man that can in love been trewe and kynde.

The borders of the concepts become so ill-defined, the phrase becomes so attached to a situation, developing a single sense for both terms in concert, that either component may be used as an elliptical variant with the same sense as the total phrase:

**LGV.665**

But herkeneth, ye that speken of kyndenesse,  
Ye men that falsly sweren many an oth  
That ye wol deye, if that youre love be wroth,  
Here may ye sen of wemen which a trouthe!

Here the term *kyndenesse* is understood to include *trouthe*. At the end of *Troilus and Criseyde*, the fact of his love's inconstancy is realised by the hero. In the following sentence the word *kynde* seems to be equivalent to *trewe*:

**TC.V.1643**

... Troilus wel understod that she  
Nas nought so kynde as that hire oughte be.

Finally, we might note a transferred use where *kynde* directly modifies *love*:

**TC.V.920**

"And thenketh wel, ye shall in Grekis fynde  
A moore parfit love, or it be nyght,  
Than any Trojan is, and more kynde,  
And bet to serven yow wol don his myght."
2. As well as *kyndeness* in love—which does not seem to undergo the pejorative development of *Grace* or *Mercy* in this use—the word may be applied, chiefly to women, outside the love situation and having overtones of moral worth or nobility. Christ's mother is called *meek* and *kynde* (*CT.VII.597*); Griselda is *pациent* and *kynde* and *sad* and *kynde* (*CT.IV.1187, 602*); Griselda says that Walter seemed *gentil* ... and *kynde* (*CT.IV.852*). Here the collocation is with ideals of moral philosophy and these collocations seem to specify the vague sense of good disposition of *kynde*.

The worth of the folk of Troy is summed up in a few words covering their learning, accomplishment and benevolence:

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TC.V.970
... but certeyn, men shal fynde
As worthi folk withinne Troie toun,
As konnyng, and as parfit, and as kynde,
As ben bitwixen Orkades and Inde.
```

In reference to Alceste the word seems to have a sense almost exclusively of nobility of character rather than benevolence to another; though this forms part of her excellence. The benevolence and faith which she shows to her husband is of so elevated an order that the sense of *kynde*, approaching that of *trewe* (as above), and also the good disposition mentioned here, mounts to heights of moral implication above either:

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TC.V.1527
"As wel thow myghtest lien on Alceste,
That was of creatures, but men lye,
That evere weren, kyndest and the beste!
For whan hire housbonde was in jupertye
To dye hymself, but if she wolde dye,
She ches for hym to dye and gon to helle,
And starf anon.
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3. The vague sense of benevolence towards others, also, is used on the level of everyday good turns. The first example is evidently an adverb formed on the adjective which in turn is a special development of the noun *kynde*. It is the only occurrence of this form with this kind of sense; the adjective and adverb *kyndely* normally refer to natural traits or classifications:

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CT.VII.353
And if that I were riche, as have I blisse,
Of twenty thousand sheeld sholde ye nat mysse,
For ye so kyndely this oother day
Lent me gold;
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Pandarus' good turn in wooing Criseyde on Troilus' behalf is acknowledged in a transferred use:

TC.III.1610 That thanked be the heighe worthynesse Of Love, and ek thi kynde bysynesse.

"Thus hastow me no litel thing yyive,
Custance begs her father to thank her husband for his kyndenesse in his treatment of her (CT.II.1113).

Finally a pejorative use might be noted in which kynde and gentil are ironically applied to one of the worst villains of the pilgrimage to Canterbury:

GP.647 He was a gentil harlot and a kynde; A bettre felawe sholde men noght fynde.

This is the only use of kynde in a deliberately ironic context, though gentil is so used in the Wife's Prologue. The fact that the rather vague concepts of KYNDESSE and GENTILLESSE are normally treated with such respect increases the irony immensely.

4. A final sense which seems well-removed from the others is worth mention. Criseyde weeps bitterly when she must leave Troy and her lover, but those around her think she is weeping because she is leaving their company, and they weep in sympathy. Those around her consider that it is kyndenesse which makes her so distressed, thus kyndenesse is seen as a softness of temperament akin to pitee, and Criseyde a moment later (731) is called ful of sorweful pite.

TC.IV.720 And they that hadde shown hire of yore Seigh hire so wepe, and thought it kyndenesse, And ech of hem wepte ske for hire destresse.
BUXOMNESSE

BUXOMNESSE is a rare lexeme in Chaucer, lacking translation evidence and having no particularly important collocational relations.

1. The most striking single fact about the use of BUXOMNESSE is its frequent application to the relationship between man and wife. In particular, it seems to be a virtue required of a wife in relation to her husband. A wife who is called buxom is also trewe, vertuous and ententyf to her husband's welfare:

CT.IV.1287 Wel may his herte in joy and blisse habounde, For who kan be so buxom as a wyf? Who is so trewe, and eek so ententyf To kepe hym, syk and hoole, as is his make?

Hence, since the wife of the man is his help and is so buxom (ibid.1333) they must needs live in concord.

The sense of buxom, in relation to wifely virtue, seems to imply not only obedience and submission, but deference and solicitude for the spouse. This sense is apparent in the uses in the Shipman's Tale. The husband, departing on a journey to Flanders, asks his wife to manage his affairs during his absence:

CT.VII.242 For which, my deere wyf, I thee biseke, As be to every wight buxom and meke, And for to kepe oure good be curious, And honestly governe wel oure hous.

The departing merchant would hardly ask his wife to be compliant to everyone; in fact he is asking her to be mild-mannered, deferential and eager to please his business colleagues. This also must be the sense of the following:

CT.VII.177 They wolde that hir housbondes sholde be Hardy, and wise, and riche, and therto free, And buxom unto his wyf, and freseh abedde.

1 The use of BUXOMNESSE in relation to the state of marriage occurs, though rarely, in Gower (e.g. CA.V.2807).
Here all other virtues are active and the sense 'submissive' would clash with them; nothing more passive than 'deferential' or 'solicitous' seems to be implied.

The collocation with heart in the situation of courtly love, in which a lover outlines the extent of his submission to his implacable lady, may suggest a sense of 'submission' plainly and simply, but the larger context is one of straining to find some grounds on which to please the lady, even agreeing to die to do so:

Lady 119

But I, my lyf and deeth, to yow obeye,
And with right buxom herte hooly I praye,
As is your moste plesure, so doth by me;
Wel lever is me liken yow and daye
Than for to anythyng or thinke or seye
That yow myghte offende in any tyme.

Thus, the sense of buxom, though loosely including the senses 'obedient' and 'submissive,' also has the associations in Chaucer of 'eager to please' and 'solicitous'.

2. Buxomly seems to have little active sense; its only use seems to be connected with humility and submission rather than the specific desire to please:

CT.IV.186

He graunted hem a day, swich as hym leste,
On which he wolde be wedded sikerly,
And seyde he did al this at hir requeste.
And they, with humble entente, buxomly,
Knelynge upon hir knees ful reverently,
Hym thonken alle;

3. Buxomnesse has a perfectly passive sense; it is used once in a counsel of passive acceptance, submission to, fate:

Truth 15

That thee is sent, receyve in buxomnesse;
The wrestling for this world axeth a fal.

The only trace of activity expected of the recipient of the worldly lot is evidently contentment with it. Buxomnesse, then, must mean cheerful submission rather than merely submission.

1 The notion of suffering buxomly the pains of love is also found in Gower, CA.I.1370.
Translation evidence from Boethius is of limited value. Pacience translates the Latin patientia. Translations of phrases are perhaps more interesting, though two of these have their phrasing prompted by the French translation: thus lost p. is rendering of 'dederit impatientiae manus' and suffre in p. is the translation of 'patienter(que) tolerasset' and is gratuitously added in translating 'aequo animo toleres'.

A wide range of collocations are found but the only ones occurring more than once are with individual forms of the lexemes: BENIGNE, ATTEMPIRAUNCE, MEKE, and, perhaps, DEBOKAIRE.

There are no interestingly frequent modifications of head words by the adjective, but the adverb repeatedly modifies suffre and take. This fact encourages the mention of other symmetries in usage. It might be noted that the only nouns which the adjective modifies, other than those referring to human beings, are the abstractions suffraunce and benyngnytee.

The frequency of suffre and take as the head words modified by the adverb phrase in p. is worthy of mention. The equational sentences with Pacience as the subject all have the word vertu as object; this is reflected by the noun phrase vertu of p. and a collocation with vertu in the adverbial phrasal use of the noun.

1. The association with vertu which is demonstrable in context corresponds to the place of PACIENCE in the scheme of ideas of penitential theology. Thus it is the remedie agayns Ire of the Parson's Tale. This virtue, contrary to the vice of Ire, is also called suffrance (CT.X.654). This complements the internal associations with SUFFRE drawn from context.

The definition offered by the Parson is: 'a vertu that suffreth swetely every mannnes goodnesse, and is nat wrooth for noon harm that is doon to hym....
thilke vertu that suffreth debonairement alle the outrages of adversitese and every wikked word.'

In both the Tale of Melibee and that of the Parson, Pacience is treated as a philosophical or theological precept of behaviour, a virtue which enables one to suffer ill words, deeds or fortune with fortitude and mildness:¹

And the same Salomon seith, 'The angry and wrathful man maketh noyse, and the pacient man atempreth hem and stilleth.' He seith also, 'It is moore worth to be pacient than for to be right strong;

And therefore seye I that it is good as now that ye suffre and be pacient.

One of the virtues of the Parson of the General Prologue is his pacience, which seems to be a function of Benignites:

Benygne he was, and wonder diligent, And in adversitee ful pacient.

Pacience, in its broadest theological sense, is the willing sufferance of all kinds of hardship and affliction (CT.X.1056). According to the Parson the first of these:

The first grevance is of wikkedede wordes. Thilke suffrede Jhesu Crist withouten grucchyng, ful paciently, when the Jewes despised and reproved hym ful ofte./ Suffre thou therefore paciently;

Thus we have the collocation herkne paciently (CT.III.1996).

2. The Parson mentions of women that they lack the ability to show pacience in the suffering of insults:

Also, certes, God ne made nat womman of the foot of Adam, for she ne sholde nat been holden to lowe; for she kan nat paciently suffre.

Such a claim may be expected to have its opposition and this is well represented in a series of uses where Pacience is used to refer to the tribulations in mariage and the suffering of it. Thus Griselda is the flour

¹ Pacience is, of course, the virtue of the philosopher who is not disturbed by troubling emotion. Gower (CA.III.639ff.) uses the traditional example of Socrates.
of wyfly pacience (CT.IV.919), she is humble and ful of pacient benyngnyte.

Griselda is unjustly provoked, but shows nothing but meekness:

CT.IV.623 O nedelees was she tempted in assay!
      But wedded men ne knowe no mesure,
      Whan that they fynde a pacient creature.

The Man of Law observes, with more specific reference, and perhaps with legal sanctions in mind:

CT.II.710 For thogh that wyves be ful hooly thynges,
      They moste take in pacience at nyght
      Swiche manere necessaries as been plesynges
      To folk that han ywedded hem with rynges,

In her typical way, the Wife of Bath reverses the roles of the sexes when cajoling her husband to be al pacient and meke (CT.III.434). Both the Merchant and the Host envy those husbands whose wives are pacient:

CT.VII.1895 That Goodelief, my wyf, hadde herd this tale!
      For she nys no thynge of swich pacience
      As was this Melibecus wyf Prudence.

CT.IV.1224 Ther is a long and large difference
      Bitwix Gridis grete pacience
      And of my wyf the passyng crueltee.

Thus Pacience in marriage refers to the submission of the one partner to the will of the other in much the same way as the use of the word Buxom. The former is also used in reference to the attitude of the lover to the sufferings of his frustration, which may colloquially be called 'luck':

Mars 21 Yst at the leste renoveleth your servyse;
      Confermeth hyt perpetuely to dure,
      And paciently taketh your aventure.

The Clerk neatly draws together Pacience in its theological use, relating to the hazards of fortune or providence, and its restricted use in the relations of men and women:

CT.IV.1149 For, sith a womman was so pacient
      Unto a mortal man, wel moore us oghte
      Receyven al in gree that God us sent;

The Parson notes that submission and obedience are a part of Pacience:

CT.X.675 Of pacience comth obedience, thurgh which a man is obedient to Crist...
3. It is obvious that the adverb *paciently* generally refers to passive states, and acceptances of events, rather than to deliberate acts. When referring to verbs like *take* and *suffer* the equivalence of the phrase *in p.* and the adverb has been noted. However the phrase is occasionally used with other verbal compounds. Thus we have:

CT.VII.2826 Syn thilke day that she was last a wyf,  
In pacience ladde a ful symple lyf,  
For litel was her catel and hir rente

This use and the phrase *answer in p.* suggest a slight distinction in sense where the emphasis is upon the sweetness of character of the person and their habitual behaviour rather than on their reaction to a particular affliction. It is a slightly more active sense of the word; *pacience* is a virtue in dealings with others as well as in the reception given to others dealing with oneself. Thus, the adverb too is occasionally used in this more active way:

CT.X.861  
Man sholde loven hys wyf by discrecioun, paciently and atemprely; and thanne is is she as though it were his suater.

Here *paciently* is in direct opposition to 'violently' and it implies understanding and regard for the wife and sweetness of attitude to her. Moderation and gentleness are the essential elements decreed.

4. As with other abstract attitudes or emotions, *pacience* is used in the syntagmatic frame *have ...* to indicate possession of it as a quality of character. A distinction is made between *have p.* and *have p. in*; the former represents a general attitude of character, whilst the latter may have two distinct senses. Firstly, and commonly, it refers to the reaction of *pacience* in response to, or amid, tribulation. Thus:

CT.VII.1493  
I seye that ther be ful manye thynges that shul restreyne yow of vengeance-takynge, / and make yow for to enclyne to suffre, and for to han pacience in the wronges that han been doon to yow.

With which may be compared:
CT.IV.2369
And she answerde, "Sire, what eyleth yow?
Have pacience and resoun in your mynde!

Here the same linguistic structure has two different semantic implications: in one, emphasis is upon the character who has to show pacience, and the assumed seat of the attitude is gratuitously added; in the other, the occasion of the necessity of pacience is of concern. This latter type is common enough and consistent enough to be regarded as an idiom which may be represented in a number of ways:

grete pacience which the seintes ... han had in tribulaciouns
us oghte, ... in the deeth of oure children ... have pacience.
to han pacience in the wronges ...
There are four occurrences of the adjective *treable* in the work of Chaucer; two of which occur in the phrase *treable to* "good(ness)." The significance of this seems to be that of tending towards goodness, a sense which is perhaps clearer in view of the etymology of the word from French *tendre*.

1. Used of human attitudes, its sense is that of easy approachability, of gentleness.

2.4.658

"A man is a quicke thynge, by nature dobonose and
treable to gooynesse;"

2.633

"Loke haw goodly spak thyght, as hit had ha other wyght;
No wayt notheow tyngz no wyght,
And I say that, and gest me aynyght
With hyse, and fende hyse so treble,
Hyght words: shylful and zonnable,
As we thought, for al hym belo."

---

1 Codex Fry nr. 1143 treable.
Translation evidence is offered by the *Roman de la Rose*, where *hende folk and wys and free* renders *Franches genz e bien enseignies*, whilst *hende and wis* renders *bien apris*.

The only important collocations are: *wis, curteys, free, joly*.

1. In deciding the senses of *hende*, it is necessary to divide its uses into two: those in which it is a fixed epithet applied ironically to clerks, and the two uses in the translation of the *Romant*. In the latter two uses, *hende* is clearly associated with nurture, with accomplishment in the skills of proper behaviour. Its association with the art of courtly manners is clear in a third example:

CT.III.1286  Oure Hoost tho spak, "A! sire, ye sholde be hende
And curteys, as a man of youre estaat;
In compaignye we wol have no debaat."

2. The ironic application to clerks perhaps derives from this strain in the meaning of the term, where its application deliberately recalls the skill of clerks, proverbial in the fabliaux, in the art of *deerne love*. 
The most important collocations of CURTEISIE are: vilanye, honour, benigne and faire.

Translation evidence is lacking, since the word is normally a direct adoption from the French original. Exceptions to this rule are the following:

CT.IV.74 ful of honour and of curteisye moult noble de lignaige et plus assez en bonnes meurs nec minus moribus quam sanguine nobilis

RR.538 A mayden curteys ... qui estoit assez gente et bele:

RR.640 A fair and joly companye Fulfilled of alle curtesie." ... bele est tele compagnie et cortoise et bien enseigne.

The etymology of CURTEISIE indicates that it is connected with the word court; it is nevertheless used with reference to all levels of society. It is used of social behaviour and is intimately connected with verbal communication; both the forms of behaviour and of speech thus designated are often of an elaborate or ceremonious kind. In some situations, the use of CURTEISIE seems to be connected with self-denial in the person to whom it is applied: usually the denial of a right for the benefit of another.

1. In its widest sense, CURTEISIE can simply connote behaviour proper to court society: the Prioresse has exquisite table manners and it is said that she 'peyned hire to countrefete cheere/ Of court, and to been estatlich of manere,' (GP.139-40). This is the sort of behaviour which she hopes would be acceptable at a major court. The court of a great lord, when in
session, was a complex hierarchy of relations between men who were alert to the slightest infringement of the order, the smallest affront to honour: it was the business of the seneschal (steward) to be aware of the structure of court society and to arrange protocol accordingly. Such an awareness of curteisie is revealed in the utterance of the strange knight in the Squire's Tale:

CT.V.95

Saleweth kyng and queene and lordez alle,
By ordre, as they seten in the halle,
With so heigh reverence and obeisaunce,
As vel in speche as in his contenaunce,
That Gawayn, with his olde curteisye,
Though he were comen ayeyn out of Fairye,
Ne koude hym nat amende with a word.

He greets the court with due regard for its hierarchy and speaks and conducts himself with ceremonious respect and self-restraint towards it. The excellence of his speech is especially remarked. In the court of Love in the Legend of Good Women (G. 231) the lords and ladies sit 'As they were of degre, ful curteysly;'. A less hallowed courtly custom evidently justifies the use of curteisie to describe Troilus riding to his farewell to Criseyde. The reference here is to the pomp of a ceremonious excursion:

TC.V.64

This Troilus, in wise of curteysie,
With hauk on honde, and with an huge route
Of knyghtes, rood and did hire companye,

The same band, when riding to war, might inspire the use of the term chivalrie, yet when we are told that Chaucer's Knyght always loved both chivalrie and curteisie we are unwilling to accept that they are merely different sides of the same coin. The first may imply feats of arms, but placed beside concepts like trouthe and honour, the second seems to indicate something more than the complementary arts of peace, the ceremony of courtly order. Like the

1 The hero of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight shows great concern for the forms of his speech: lines 360 and 1295.

2 In the Anglo-Norman version of Iromedon (2620ff.) an elaborate, mounted procession is associated with curteisie and the hero is credited with the invention of this elaborate, formal progress. W.O. Evans, Mediaeval Studies 29 (1967), p.145, prefers to interpret this as referring to the conventions of curteisie, seen as kindly behaviour.
curteisie taught to Nero which, paired with moralitee, staved off his incipient tyranny for many years, the curteisie loved by the Knyght seems to connote an ethic, an ideal of conduct. ¹

2. There is, however, no need to move away from the society of the court to discover ideals of behaviour. The noblest heroes valued both sapientia and fortitudo, the former was thought of in terms of wise counsel in the hall. Wisdom gains expression in speech and in familiarity with courtly custom. The heroes of English romance are frequently wis and war and honde; those of French romance are bien parlé e enseigné and de bel afeitement. The strange knight of the Squire's Tale accords well with these formulae: he appreciates the hierarchy of the court, but the stress is upon the excellence of his speech, both in its ceremonious correctness and in its content. The faire speche of Curteisie is fair both in expression and content (RR.1251). This content exhibits the concern of the speaker for the comfort of his interlocutor; speeches are calculated so that their content embodies this concern and their subtlety of construction acts as a compliment. At RR.799, the allegorical Curteisie decorously invites the shy onlooker to join the dance; the Canon's Yeoman, who is ful of curteisye (CT.VIII.587) addresses the pilgrims with deference; most striking of all, is the delicacy of the bluff Host's request for the Prioresse to tell a tale, with its subtle rhythms, its respect for the lady, and its gentle qualifications of the direct request:

CT.VII.445

... and with that word he sayde,
"As curteisly as it had been a mayde,
"My lady Prioresse, by youre leve,
So that I wiste I sholde yow nat greve, I wolde demen that ye tellen sholde
A tale next, if so were that ye wolde. Now wol ye vouche sauf, my lady deere?"

¹ Curteisie to Gawain is likewise more than dalliance, though the lady and the inhabitants of Bercilak's castle think of it as 'luf-talkyng'; and an accomplishment which can be learned superficially: 'Is pe lei layk of luf, pe lettrure of armes;' (1513).
In a speech of this kind, where language is used as a social instrument within a code of courtly behaviour, the elevated style of the utterance is as important as the ideals contained by it; they both serve to reassure and compliment the addressee. This is indeed a faire speche.

By contrast, the revellers of The Pardoner's Tale lack curteisie in that they address the old man whom they meet with something less than solicitude for his welfare:

CT.VI.717

... "What, carl, with sory grace!
Why artow al forwrapped save thy face?
Why lyvestow so longe in so greet age?"

The old man, having thus been myssed (RR.1260), replies that:

... it is no curteisye
To spoken to an old man vileynye,
But he trespasse in word, or elles in dede.

From these examples, it appears that the ideal of curteisie includes the decorous expression of consideration for the feelings of others; although the old man of The Pardoner's Tale implies that it may be forgotten if one has actually suffered harm from one's interlocutor. In fact, other examples prove that this is not the case; the old man's words serve merely to emphasise the enormity of the behaviour of the revellers. The rough and ready reply which he suggests may be justified by an insult perhaps represents common practice, but is far from the ideal of curteisie. It is no curteisie to give a dusty answer any more than it is curteisie to initiate insults. The allegorical figure of RR.1251 is: 'Of fair speche, and of fair answere;' and she bears no malice. Thus, the drunken Miller (CT.I.3123) acknowledges respect for neither God nor man and rants blasphemously, disregarding curteisie; Proserpyne, in contention with her husband in The Merchant's Tale, cries that she will not, for the sake of curteisie, refrain from retaliation against those who speak ill of women:

CT.IV.2309

As evere hool I moote brouke my tresses,
I shal nat spare, for no curteisye,
To speke hym harm that wolde us vileynye."

Cf. CT.III.1207ff.
Where there is no curteisie on either side, a quarrel is likely. Thus, at CT.III.1287, the Host is forced to remind the Friar that he should be hende/ And curteys, since they desire no debaat between him and the Summoner, and at the latter's reply, he appeals for Pees.

Thus the ideal of curteisie as a relation between persons is one of solicitude for the welfare of others, which is often expressed in ceremonious speech, and which is carried to the lengths of foregoing the right to reply in kind to insults.

3. The denial of rights over another person which curteisie often implies is obvious in the Host's request to the Prioresse (quoted above). At the beginning of the Pilgrimage, the Host had been granted charge of the organisation of story-telling and vested with the sanction against disobedience of making the offender pay for the whole expedition. His deference in asking the Prioresse whether she is willing to tell a tale is in some measure a voluntary renunciation of this right. His curteisie, like that of Nero in his early days, prevents him from exercising his right tyrannically. This criterion of the sense of curteisie is especially common among those uses where the word forms part of an adverbial phrase. Both the Summoner and the Manciple ask the Host or the company to waive their right to order the telling of tales of ... curteiaye and to allow them to tell a tale when they, themselves, desire to do so (CT.III.1669; CT.IX.28). His curteisie is given as the reason why Absolon, the clerk, will accept no offering from ladies, and when hende Nicholas seizes Alisoun she calls him to decorum on the same account. A situation such as this (CT.I.3287) burlesques those situations where at a more elevated level curteisie involves the renunciation of self-interest for the sake of another.

With this aspect of its sense in mind, curteisie enters frequently into the same situation as mercy or grace. In a judicial situation, the judge may renounce his power of immediate condemnation in order to hear the plea
of the victim. The God of Love is urged to do this by Alceste in the Prologue of the Legend of Good Women, 342, and Chaucer, aware that his audience has the right to be critical and judge him by his writings, begs them not to ascribe to his person the awkwardness and roughness of the language of his characters:

GP.725

But first I praye yow, of youre curteisye,
That ye n'arette it nat ray vileynye,
Thogh that I pleynly speke in this mateere,
To telle yow hir wordes and hir cheere,
Ne thogh I speke hir wordes proprely.

When a judgement is made, if it is done curteisly, the prisoner receives 'moore esy sentences and juggements' (CT.VII.1855).

The actions which exhibit curteisie are not always speech or the renunciation of personal interest for the sake of another. Sometimes a right may be enforced, but in a manner which acknowledges the inviolability of the personality of another. As in the example of marital harmony envisaged by the Merchant and quoted above, curteisie is reciprocated by favorable behaviour on the part of the person to whom it is shown: "he that moost curteisly comandeth, to hym men moost obeyen." (CT.VII.1856).

Finally, as noted above, when speaking of adverbial phrases, curteisie is sometimes applied simply to acts on behalf of others which work to their benefit and which are not demanded by any form of compulsion upon their agent; as, for example, when Deiphebus takes the trouble to go personally to invite Criseyde to dinner.

4. The social affiliations of the ideal of CURTEISIE are not obvious from the situational analysis, though etymology would suggest that it was restricted to the higher echelons. An examination of its occurrences shows that CURTEISIE is not the monopoly of the upper classes by any means, but supports the view that it is an ideal proper to them, and adopted by others. The most serious uses of the term are to refer to aristocratic persons, and when it is used as a general epithet of description, it applies to the gently born Walter:
Wherewith he was to speak as of lineage,
The gentillesse yborne of Lumbardye, 
A fair persona, and strong, and yon, of age, 
And ful of honour and of curteisye;

The Parson lists curteisie as one of the marks of the special form of gentillesse which he envisages (3.x.46); a gentillesse not so much of lineage as of spirit. In endeavouring to still the incipient quarrel of the Squire and the Friar, the Host claims that curteisie is to be expected of a man of the latter rank. To this evidence of the assumption that curteisie is the inevitable possession of the higher levels of society, must be added the evidence of the general sense noted earlier of familiarity with various aspects of the customs of the court. Nevertheless, it is not felt to be anomalous to say that a yeoman may show curteisie in such uses it is clear that such people are endeavouring to follow the most creditable courtly ideal; a manner of behaviour or expression which demonstrates a desire to acknowledge the value of another.

The social position of the person exercising curteisie naturally has an effect upon how it manifests itself. If a lowly person shows curteisie to a more elevated one, this is exhibited in deference. The Squire (2.29), is lovely, and servysable whilst the Friar, who would only have dealings with the well-to-do, was curteis and lovely of servysse (2.230).

As has already been noted, the exercise of curteisie in persons of elevated rank consists in the limitation of their power to do harm to those beneath them, or their deliberate attempts to do good when this is not necessitated by circumstances. Curteisie is therefore celebrated as a desirable quality in the mighty. The moral senses of curteisie as a relation between persons are qualities desirable in anybody and may appear in anybody; but they are a matter of general concern only in the powerful, whose character and mode of behaviour have wide repercussions. The most important part of the curteisie, which Chaucer considered that Seneca taught Nero, was not the protocol of court, nor the art of complimentary speech, but
the moral attitude (morality) which excluded the consideration of other
people preparatory to any action and which acted as a counter to his natural
tendencies to evil and tyranny.

5. A number of problematical uses of the lexeme curtosis occur which suggest
meanings somewhat outside those sketched above:

51.3957 for which this miller did both hole and corn
an hundred times more than before;
for the before he stole but certainly,
but now he was a thief outrageously.

In the above example we are told that, on hearing that the manciple lay ill,
the miller redoubled his thefts of grain brought to him to be ground. When
challenged, he boldly denied it. The key to the sense of the expression
here lies in its opposition to outrageously, a word which is normally
opposed to some derivative form of securit. Securit (moderation in externals
and self-restraint in behaviour and emotions) is a necessary companion virtue
of curtosis; indeed, in many situations, it makes it possible, one virtue
being impossible without the other. The collocation of securit or of words
indicating self-control with curtosis is not uncommon 51.333.2300; 51.333.2871; 51.344.65. The allegorical picture of curtosis (111.231) stresses
the fact that she was neither nice nor outrageous. These facts, taken
together with the sense of curtosis as related to the ordered procedures
of the court, give us some idea to what extent Chaucer stretches the sense
of curtosis here. Previously, the miller stole with deliberate restraint,
with decent moderation; after the illness of the manciple he steals with
neither order nor restraint. The natural phrase for Chaucer to use might
have been by securit, but his choice of curtosis, in collocation with
stal, discovers in the situation a marvellous air of paradox and irony
which pervades the medieval social norm that millers were sneak-thieves of
their customers' grain; a custom, indeed, almost as hallowed by usage as
the protocols of the court.
The adjective curtesie is applied by the Baron to the Lord Allan Swift (I, i, 245) when discussing the latter's desire to see each good deed count towards salvation. The allusion here seems to be to Christ's mercy, His benevolent disposition towards all men. The modern association between CURTESIE and love which is enshrined in the phrase 'courtly love' is borne out to a remarkably small extent in the works of Chaucer. It is occasionally accepted that one may become certain by love as well as by instruction:

\[ TC.III.26 \]

Yet do how cortesie be, from thee and benigne; yet an association between love and CURTESIE is much rarer than we might expect. There is no suggestion that a lady described as certain is especially likely to show mercy to one who claims to be distressed by the suffering of love.

Finally, a peculiar use of curtesie must be noticed:

\[ IV.550 \]

"...yet is not in renown so deep
No certesly, but help thiself soon.
Yet is that others then thiselven hope,

This use is divergent from the pattern of usage which we have established thus far: it can be reconciled with it only by unconvincing ad hoc explanation. We have to assume that Pandarus is using the adverb in an unprecedentedly broad sense, taking it from context and intending it to refer to a general ideal of CURTESIE. He is attempting to persuade Troilus to act outrageously, rejecting the ordered moderation of CURTESIE and selfishly renouncing the solicitude for others which is also a part of its meaning. Such an interpretation appears strained.\[ 2 \]

1 Manuscript evidence reveals that the earliest


2 Thus, however, is the explanation offered by Evans, "'Cortesie' in Middle English," loc. cit., p. 149. His interpretation is that Pandarus is advising Troilus 'to ignore convention and about Grisyele' and, though (rightly) denying the association of 'cortesie' and courtly love in Middle English, he suggests that, in fact, here the word is applied to a prime characteristic of courtly love since, according to him, 'It is in concern for Grisyele's honour, since the love must be kept secret, that Troilus would be acting certainly.'
(alpha) manuscripts all read precisely at this point. Although the adverb with the sense 'fastidiously' is not recorded until the nineteenth century, an adjective with this sense is twice recorded in Chaucer (ST. XXI.140; ST. IV.1562). Caxton's printed edition, which is a beta text, has piously, a reading which Robinson notes may be supported by the Italian sctitilmente. In view of the disarray of the manuscript evidence here, and the peculiarity of this use of certainly, it seems wise to disregard it as primary evidence of a sense of CURWILLABLE in Chaucer's language.
THANK

Collocational evidence is sparse: the only repeated collocation is pris. Translation evidence is equally inconclusive. In Boece thank glosses laudibus (French: ces loenges) once, and once bene mereatur (French: bonnes graces). The phrase yeldynge graces and thankynges renders en rendant graces in the French source of The Tale of Melibee.

1. In the use of thank it is noteworthy that, although there are syntagma have and get thank, and some with moral implications (deserve and win thank), there is no occurrence of yeve or ask thank. The situation is linguistically realised solely from the point of view of the recipient or possessor of thank. The syntagm have thank is never used with subjective reference in the manner of an idiom derived from French syntax, like have pitee on, but is always used objectively, like have grace.

2. In determining the senses of thank, a first point of importance is that it is generally in the nature of a reciprocal action, a reaction to a particular action in a situation in which the participants and the actions are well specified. Thus it is said of the Reeve that:

GP.612
His lord wel koude he plesen subtilly,
To yeve and lene hym of his owene good,
And have a thank, and yet a cote and a hood.

A thank is here distinguished from a material reward for pleasing the lord. The sense of thank is similar when May (CT.IV.2308) complains that vilification is the only thank she gets for her kindly deed to her husband. The syntagm deserve thank is also used in specific circumstances, as when Troilus hints that, if he lives, he will reward Pandarus:

TC.I.1015
"Now blisful Venus helpe, er that I sterve,
Of the, Pandare, I mowe som thank deserve."
In uses such as these, specific persons perform or intimate beneficent actions, and are recipients of the gratitude of the beneficiary in a way identical to the modern usage of the word.

3. The syntagm deserve thank, apart from the use quoted above, is employed in a very consistent way; in four out of five occurrences of the syntagm, all in Troilus and Criseyde, deserve rhymes with serve, and in three of these four, a lover is to serve a lady in order to deserve her thank:

TC.III.441  And for the more part, the long nyght  
He lay and thoughte how that he myghte serve  
His lady best, hire thonk for to deserve.

The service in which a knight might engage for his lady's sake is often far removed from any action which might be directly beneficial to her; the use of the syntagm wynne thank illustrates this:

TC.III.1777  And this encrees of hardynesse and myght  
Com hym of love, his ladies thank to wynne,  
That altered his spirit so withinne.

In this type of use, the lady's thank is not in response to any direct action on her behalf by the lover; the latter has simply performed some deed or perfected his character as a compliment to her. The modern sense of 'thanks' is inapposite here. Etymology would suggest that the sense of the word is related to 'thought' and must mean something like 'favourable thought' or 'good opinion'. Such a translation is perhaps close to Chaucer's meaning, and in most of the uses, there seems to be a close approach to synonymy with certain uses of grace. Any distinction lies in the amount of deliberate activity we allow to the lady in each use. The syntagm wynne ladies thank is particularly reminiscent of some uses of grace, though it does not precisely correspond with any of them.

4. The syntagm get thank seems generally to be used in less well-marked situations. An example from Boece exhibits the sense 'good opinion' very clearly:
And yif that folk han geten hem thonk or preysynge by here dissertes, what thynge hath thilke pris echid or encresed to the conscience of vri.se folk ...

There is no precise Latin phrase to correspond, though Chaucer seems to be expressing the Latin laudibus. The same sense is implicit in the following where good behaviour results in good opinion:

**Then ek how wel and wisely that he kan**
*Governe hymself, that he no thynge foryeteth,*
*That where he cometh, he pris and thank hym geteth;*

The distinction between good opinion and open praise is again one of passivity and activity. Chaucer's attitude to lovers in the Proem of *Troilus and Criseyde* is rather more active, perhaps signifying 'good wishes' rather than merely 'good opinion'. Chaucer asserts his benevolence to lovers:

**But nathales, if this may don gladnesse**
*To any lovero, and his cause availle,*
*Have he my thonk, and myn be this travaille!*

Later Chaucer seems to use the word with a much more active sense even than this:

**Wherefore I nyl have neither thank ne blame**
*Of al this werk, but pray yow mekely,*
*Disblameth me, if any word be lame,*
*For as myn auctour seyde, so sey I.*

A translation 'good opinion' would be appropriate here, but the stronger expression 'praise' would be more natural.

Just what is the sense of Pandarus' words to Troilus, in persuading him not to allow himself to die with his love undeclared, is not so clear. Everyone would think that he died of fear for the Greeks and:

**Lord, which a thonk than shaltow han of this!**
*Thus wol she seyn, and al the torn attones,*
'*The wrecche is ded, the devel have his bones!*'

Here the thank seems to be ironically related to the courtly love situation. Troilus' action, instead of service to his lady, is death; her reaction instead of a good opinion, or an act of grace, is a derogatory speech. Instead of praise there is depreciation. None of the modern periphrases would do to translate this, for its ironic usage excludes some of them and it holds elements of all of them: a translation as 'esteem' or 'thanks'
would be equally justifiable.

In a similar use, we find the syntagm thank ye; one who does a grace or gives a gift without delay has the greater thank because of his alacrity (LOW (F) 452). Either the sense 'thanks' or the sense 'esteem' (in the estimation of the recipient) are satisfactory.¹

The syntagm thank be to has plainly the sense 'praise':

CT.IX.101  O thou Bacus, yblessed be thy name,
That so kanst turnen earnest into game!
Worshipe and thank be to thy deitee!
Of that mateere ye gete namoore of me.

The adverbial phrases from the Parson's Tale plainly have the sense 'good opinion':

CT.X.1035  But nathelesse, if thow mayst nat doon it privelie, thow shalt nat forbere to doon almesse though men seen it, so that it be nat doon for thank of the world, but onely for thank of Jhesu Crist.

The adverbial phrase from the Merchant's Tale:

CT.IV.1801  For which departed is this lusty route
Fro Januarie, with thank on every syde.
Hoom to hir houses lustily they ryde,

presumably refers to thanks - in the modern sense - given to a host. The other possibility, attractive since thank applies all round, is that the revellers go home with a good opinion of each other, a jovial esteem for all members of the party.

Thankynge/Thankes

The syntagm faille yow my th. obviously has the sense of modern 'thanks' but there is also the implication of something more material; more material too, perhaps, than good opinion:

ST.VII.188  Daun John, I seye, lene me thi hundred frankes.
Pardee, I wol nat faille yow my thankes,
If that yow list to doon that I yow preye.

¹ The sense of open praise or esteem is evident in Gower's description of a Roman triumph which is held for a victorious general: 'In thonk of his chivalerie
And for non other flaterie.' (CA.VII.2379).
Thankynes certainly has the sense of modern thanks:

CT.VII.1804 ... and answereden ful mekely and benignely, / yeldynge
graces and thankynges to hir lord Melibee...

The very consistent usage willen + possessive + thankes + infinitive
contains an inflected genitive, and is an idiom in which it is difficult to
isolate the sense of THANK. It may be related to the sense of good opinion,
and its sense in this usage is 'willingly' or 'eagerly'. Bo.III,p.xi,86 is
a rendering of the Latin: 'et ad interitum sponte festinent'. The version
of Jean de Meun reads: 'de leur gré', and Chaucer: 'or that wole, his
thankes, hasten hym to dyen.'
This lexeme perhaps does not fall inside the area to be studied; nevertheless an account of some uses showing an affinity with Curteis may be noted.

The noun is used commonly whilst the adjective is quite rare. Senses of the noun are generally specific versions of a general concept of 'an act or acts done for the benefit of another'. There is the fairly institutionalised sense in which the lover or the man may enter into the service of a lady or a lord, theoretically directing his acts to the benefit of that person. Such service may be for a salary (CT.I.1803) or according to feudal dependence, and may be of a high or low estimate in the eyes of society (CT.I.1415; 1435). The service of God, as well as continuing day to day, is ritualised in the church, just as the service of a lord may be ceremonialised in the hall. A slight shift in meaning makes the term apply to the liturgy itself (GP.122).

1. The attribution to Griselda exemplifies the simplest sense closest to the basic concept of the noun. It has the sense 'useful in service; willing in service', with perhaps some overtone of humility:

CT.IV.979 Preyynge the chambereres, for Goddes sake,
To hasten hem, and faste swepe and shake;
And she, the mooste servysable of alle,
Hath every chambré arrayed and his halle.

The application to the Squire of the General Prologue, and another squire, is significant, for it was the duty of the squire to serve the knight. In the famous use in the General Prologue an example of the kind of task given to the Squire is found:

GP.99 Curteis he was, lowely, and servysable,
And carf biforn his fader at the table.

Elsewhere (CT.IV.1911) servysable is one of a series of virtues of a squire, but no acts justifying its application are given. Here it is necessary to
mention an adjective phrase formed from the noun and to compare it with the
description above of the Squire:

**GP.250**

And over al, ther as profit sholde arise,
Curteis he was and lowely of servyse.
Ther nas no man nowher so vertuous.

The sense is the same as that in describing the Squire - implying lack of
arrogance, pleasant disposition to others and eagerness to do some deed on
their behalf - but the irony of the context has often been noticed.

Finally the use in the tale of the Canon's Yeoman also debases the
currency of the term:

**CT.VIII.1014**

In Londoun was a preest, an annueleer,
That therinne dwelled hadde many a yeer,
Which was so plesaunt and so servysable
Unto the wyf, where he was at table,
That she wolde suffre hym no thyng for to payne
For bord ne clothyng,
1. The commonest sense is one of mortification, annoyance and grief, the emotion resultant upon the frustration of favoured plans; so in Troilus, IV. 529 and in:

CT.VIII.1403  
Lol swich a lucre is in this lusty game,  
A mannes myrthe it wol turne unto grame,  
And empten also grete and hevye purses,

2. As a word with reference to a relationship, it refers to an act or acts, which might result in the bitterness and anger of the first sense:

AA.276  
And putte yow in sclaunder now and blame,  
And do to me adversite and grame,  
That love you most -

It may also refer to bitterness directed towards a person, and be close in sense to 'hate':

TC.III.1028  
'Ye, jalousie is love!'  
And wolde a busshel venym al excusen,  
For that o greyn of love is on it shove,  
But that woot heighe God that sit above,  
If it be likkere love, or hate, or grame  
And after that, it oughte bere his name.
STIF

Stif, stifly

Collocations are not repeated, though the word is paired with bold and toght.

Translation evidence is limited to two occurrences in RR where stif and bold translates grant e roide or fort e roide (of a stream) and a phrase styf in stour is applied in place of genz.

1. There is a major dichotomy in the senses of stif. Firstly in collocation with bely, the word has much the same sense (hard and inflexible) as the modern term:

CT.III.2267 Thanne shal this cherl, with bely stif and toght
As any tabour, hyder been ybroght;

This is the only use with this physical sense; the rest of the uses of stif are in stereotypes or intensifying.

2. A knight is stif in stour (RR.1270), which is part of a stereotyped epithet replacing an equally formulaic use in French (biaus e genz); a stream descends 'ful stif and bold' (RR 115), a phrase corresponding to one of the French versions: grant e roide, fort e r. or possibly, celere e r. The content of these phrases certainly involves elements of violence and, perhaps, boldness:

3. GP.673 This Somonour bar to hym a stif burdoun;
Was never trompe of half so greet a soun.

The significance here seems to be that the Summoner is a larger than life character with a voice as powerful as his personality.

The Wife states:

CT.III.380 Lordynges, right thus, as ye have understonde,
Baar I stifly myne olde housbondes on honde
That thus they seyden in hir dronkenesse;
This is the Wife's reply to the charge that women destroy their husbands; a charge made by the man she tyrannises. In this situation, violence and power become harshness and cruelty. If the Wife does not intend to abrogate to herself the negative moral judgement implied by the word 'cruelty', then she intends to be understood in terms of firmness, strictness and implacability.
STIBOURN

The lexeme is exceedingly rare; only two occurrences are found, both in the Wife’s Prologue and used to describe herself:

\[\text{CT.III.456} \quad \text{And I was yong and ful of ragerye,}
\]
\[\quad \text{Stibourn and strong, and joly as a pye.} \]

\[\text{CT.III.637} \quad \text{Stibourn I was as is a leonesse,}
\]
\[\quad \text{And of my tongue a verray janglersesse,} \]

The first quotation celebrates the wildness and vigour of her youth, the second her unwillingness to submit to her husband’s will. Stibourn seems to imply something like ‘forceful and strong-willed’.
The only important collocations are: cruel and stout.

Translation evidence is offered by the Clerk's Tale:

With stierne face and with ful trouble cheere,

aussy comme tout courrouciez et troublez
turbida fronte

and Boethius: rigidus. (Jean de Meun: li roidez)

1. The association with male persons and attributes is especially noticeable. It is further associated with violent acts and men who are notable for their ability in battle. Application to these people may extend beyond their actual deeds, and may seem to refer to traits or attitudes of character, as in the Boethian reference to Cato.

2. The association with arms is found in a large proportion of the uses. Mars (CT.I.2441) is called the stierne god armypotente, and the Romans besieging a city are similarly described:

LGW.1695 Whan Ardea beseged was aboute

With Romeyns, that ful sterne were and stoute,

and in the Knight's Tale stern-ness is established as a quality of the emotional attitude of fighting men:

CT.I.2154 An hundred lordes hadde he in his route,

Armed ful wel, with hertes stierne and stoute.

Stern, when applied to men, either when they are actually indulging in warfare or when the major concern is their ability in battle, is a commendatory epithet relating to their intent of doing harm to an enemy. They are harsh, cruel, bent on violent mischief.

Such traits of character may exist in a man outside the precise situation in which they are exhibited and the attitude of a man's disposition may be determined from attributes such as his voice (Diomedes: TC.VII.801) or
his \textit{face}, as in the \textit{Clerk's Tale}, when Walter is about to announce the first of his acts of cruelty to his long-suffering wife:

\begin{quote}
\textit{CT.IV.465} For which this markys wroghte in this manere:
He cam allone a-nyght, ther as she lay,
With stierne face and with ful trouble cheere,
And seyde thus:
\end{quote}

The use of the epithet here is hardly laudatory of Walter's character, but the sense of determination to do harm is unchanged. The adverb is used to describe the implacability of the God of Love on meeting Chaucer at the beginning of the \textit{Legend}:

\begin{quote}
\textit{LGW(F)239} For sternely on me he gan byholde,
So that his looking dooth myn herte colde.
\end{quote}

3. Outside the field of battle, and in circumstances where the emphasis is not on the power of the man named to do direct harm (often violent physical harm) to anyone, \textit{stern} seems to develop a weaker sense, implying not so much a determination to do harm, as a failure to do expected good or a refusal to be swayed to leniency or mildness.

Applied to Cato (\textit{Bo.II,m.vii,19}), this is a commendatory epithet (Latin \textit{rigidus}), as it is when applied to a judge (in this case the judge of sinners):

\begin{quote}
\textit{PT.X.170} there shal the stierne and wrothe juge sitte above,
and under hym the horrible pit of helle open to destroyen hym that moot biknownen his synnes,
\end{quote}

It must be admitted, however, that the harsh judge is also balanced by the clement judge in medieval ideals.

Calkas, for his cruelty in leaving his daughter in the doomed city of Troy, considers himself in an ill light, and as a father both \textit{stern} and \textit{cruel}. The modern sense of the word in this collocation - something like \textit{strict}, implying an attitude to the child's behaviour - is missing. He is simply harsh in his failure to care for the welfare of his only daughter.

4. \textit{Stern}, in its sense of violence and hostility, can be applied, with an element of personification, to meteorological phenomena; thus, in \textit{Troilus}, it is applied both to wind and rain. The emphasis seems in both to be on
the violence rather than the hostility of the elements; at least it must be through this criterion of sense that the transferred collocation takes place, since this is not a true personification:

TC.III.743  The sterne wynd so loude gan to route
That no wight oother noise myghte heere;

TCII. 677  And evere mo so sternaliche it ron,
And blew therwith so wonderliche loude,
That wel neigh no man heren other loude,

This last quotation is an impersonal construction, denying any sense as a trait of character, and concentrating instead on the violence and insistence of the rain.

Finally, two problematic uses remain: the first, from The Knight's Tale, occurs in the description of a battle:

CT.I.2610  The helmes they tohewen and toshrede;
Out brest the blood with stierne stremes rede;

The precise sense of stierne here is difficult to isolate. It is employed in an amplifying adverbial phrase, describing the way in which the blood burst forth, increasing the violence and vividness of the picture. Perhaps the best way of interpreting this is as the conflation of the adverb with an adverbial: 'in red streams.' On so doing, the sense of stierne seems to be essentially concerned with the violence and force of the issue of blood. There is, however, an inevitable association between the senses where malevolence is an important criterion, and the fact that these are wounds inflicted by an enemy who might also be called stern.

The second use is even more confusing:

HF.1498  Thoo saugh I on a piler by,
Of yren wroght ful sternely,
The grete poete, daun Lucan.

Here confusion is again caused by the transfer of use between adverb and adjective, and the pilar and the poet: an adverb is used in an adjectival phrase, and the phrase must be understood as a unit. No good sense can be assumed for sternely if it is assumed to modify only its past participle. The pillar, then, is of
the adjective would be stretched by this. There can be no reference to hostile intent nor any direct one to violence. The only justification for the application of this adjective here is because of the association of iron with weapons and battle and because of the nature of the poetry of Lucan. The application of *stern* to Cato supports the view that it might apply to men as a result of the determinedly serious and moral tone of their literary works.
STOUT

No translation evidence is available from the work which is generally accepted as Chaucer's own.

The most important collocations are: sterne; cruel; (harde) and strong; byg; grete; brode; rounde and longe.

1. It is clear from these applications and collocations that STOUT is concerned with notions of size, strength and the capacity for violent action. In special circumstances this violent action is submitted to that moral judgement which distinguishes cruelty.

2. With purely physical application, we have the collocations with browes, tuskes, carl; but each is set in a context which presupposes the destructive power of the thing or person described. Thus, from the introductory impression of the Miller, we pass on to his wrestling prowess and his ability to break doors from their hinges:

GP.545 The MILLERE was a stout carl for the nones; Ful byg he was of brawn, and eek of bones.

The description of Lygurge (CT.I.2134) follows the reference to his browes with mention of his bravmes harde and stronge. In the reference to browes, the implication must be of knotty thickness, which is evoked in the description of the Miller as: 'short-sholdred, brood, a thikke knarre;'.

The tusks of the boar, of which Trojanus dreams, carry an implicit sense of menace in their very strength; there is no other justification for their existence:

TC.V.1454 And hire bisoughte assoilen hym the doute Of the stronge boor with tuskes stoute;
3. Applied to the physique as a whole, **stout** seems to imply a bulky solidity, acceptable in a churl, but lacking the blend of grace with strength which is desirable in a nobleman. Thus the following cannot be taken to have an exclusively physical reference:

TC.V.1493

She tolde ek how Hemonydes asterte,
Whan Tideus slough fifty knyghtes stoute.

The assumption must be that, in making this collocation, the emphasis is upon the sense of destructive ability which is immanent in the previous uses. **Stout**, therefore, seems to be a term of approbation of knights in their function as agents of destruction. The fact that they themselves are destroyed may suggest that this is a stereotyped epithet or may simply be a stylistic device to emphasise the achievement of Tideus.

4. The collocation with **hertes** can hardly be taken physically and, in any case, the term is paired with the word **stierne**, which bestows overtones of mental or emotional attitude:

CT.I.2154

An hundred lordes hadde he in his route,
Armed ful wel, with hertes stierne and stoute.

The phrase **stierne and stoute** seems to imply that these men are determined upon violence, upon wreaking havoc upon the enemy. Such a sense is also probably intended in the applications to Romeyns:

LGW.627

Octovyan, that wod was of this dede,
Shop hym an ost on Antony to lede
Al uterly for his destruccioun.
With stoute Romeyns, crewel as lyoun,
To ship they wente,

LGW.1695

Whan Ardea beseged was aboute
With Romeyns, that ful sterne were and stoute,
Pul longe lay the sege, and lytel wroughten,

In all these occurrences, violence is still at the stage of intention. The implication is that there is a mental resolve to do destruction. The formulaic phrase **sterne ... and stoute** can hardly be broken into two complementary senses; both seem to imply firmness of mind in a resolve to do
violence. In one of the quoted uses, stern is replaced by cruel, though
this seems to be a sense of cruel which lacks moral obloquy, and concentrates
on the power to do violence. In this kind of use stout comes close to the
sense of (physical) bravery in its sense of 'resolution'; hence, perhaps,
the later development of the phrase 'stout-hearted'. The doubtfully
Chaucerian sections of the Romaunt reveal collocations with proud. Given
suitable situations, stout could probably have the senses 'proud' and 'cruel'. 
STRONG

The most important collocations with head words are: kyng, god, peynes. The most important collocations with other modifiers are: sharpe; yong; fressh. It collocates twice with each. Note the special circumstances of the last two, which are used as approbatory epithets.

Translation evidence is offered by the Romaunt:

eisel strong : lessu fort
cold so strong is not exactly paralleled but
fort tens d'iver occurs in the next line.

and The Tale of Melibee

strong paas : fors pas.

The Parson, talking of inner strength, says:

PT.X.728

Agayns this horrible synne of Accidie, and the branches of the same, ther is a vertu that is called fortitudo or strengthe, that is an affeccioun thurgh which a man despiseth anoyouse thinges./

1. STRONG has a similar spread of sense to the modern English lexeme. It can refer to the physical strength of an individual or of an animal like the horse (CT.V.192). Hercules is regarded as the epitome of Strengthe in this sense:

CT.VII.2116 And every reawme wente he for to see.
He was so strong that no man myghte hym lette.

In ideal descriptions, physical strength is often accompanied by boldness (CT.VII.2030): 'To speke of strengthe, and therwith of hardynesse;'. It may also be balanced with moral attributes, or others recognised as courtly, as in the conventional sequence with fressh and yong mentioned above.

2. STRONG may also refer to the resistance of an inanimate object.

CT.VII.865 And over that a fyn hauberk,
Was al ywroght of Jewes werk,
Ful strong it was of plate;
or the inner resistance of a human being to sin, as we saw in the excerpt from the Parson's exposition.

3. A thing may be judged strong by the efficacy of its functioning in any respect: this includes the functioning of things which have no physical strength or even animation:

*RR.72*

The byrdes that han left her song,
While thei suffride cold so strong,
In wedres gryl and derk to sighte.

The sense of intensity, judged by results, also underlies the application to poison (*CT.VI.367*) and perhaps eisel (*RR.217*).

4. The modern sense of powerful is that of the Chaucerian application to the abstraction God's purveiunce (*CT.I.1665*), and this indirect sense of strength is also that of the collocations with goode folk and the phrase stronge of freendes.

5. The application to witnesse is the result of figurative usage. Ideas of the way in which testimony may prove unshakeable, when tested against the known facts of a case, perhaps underlie it. The sense is of unassailability:

*CT.IX.284*

0 every man, be war of rakelnesse!
Ne trowe no thyng withouten strong witnesse.

6. In certain of the collocations already mentioned, a possibility exists of the recognition of a criterion of harmfulness (e.g. in collocation with poison). This criterion of harm and hostility is evident in a number of collocations and situations where STRONG is used in relation to martial concerns, where strength is directed exclusively to the harm of another. Thus this possibility invades the ordinary interpretation of the phrase strong kyng in the following:

*CT.I.2638*

The stronge kyng Emetreus gan hente
This Palamon, as he fought with Arcite,
And made his sword deep in his flesh to byte;

In the picture of the boar, its strength is essentially its capability for destruction.
And hire bisoughte assoilen hym the doute
Of the stronge boor with tuskes stoute;

The application to speres (CT.I.1653) is gratuitous if taken in its ordinary sense, but the fact that it is collocated with sharpe suggests this sense of strength in doing harm. Mars is referred to as the stronge god (CT.I.2373) and, though the use of the word may imply no more than physical strength, there is an unavoidable association of his function as fomenter of discord. This is emphasised when Chaucer speaks of the skills of Mars:

Thy sovereyn temple wol I moost honouren
Of any place, and alwey moost labouren
In thy plesaunce and in thy craftes stronge.

In this example of metonymic transfer, the sense is certainly close to that of violence, harshness, and cruelty.

7. The term is also collocated with feelings and afflictions: thus 'throws sharpe and wonder stronge' (TC.V.1201) may refer to the intensity of the pain, yet the collocation with sharpe suggests the sense 'harsh' or 'cruel'. The situation is similar with regard to the repeated collocation with peynes:

Allas, the wo! allas, the peynes stronge,
That I for you have suffred, and so longe!

8. Strength may lead to oppression, and oppression through closeness of keeping and resistance to escape is certainly an association of the following use:

In darknesse and horrible and strong prisoun
Thise seven yeer hath seten Palamoun
Forpyned, what for wo and for distresse.

9. Finally, a number of uses far removed from any ideas of physical strength, moral strength, intensity or resistance must be noted. The cuckolded husband of the Merchant's Tale cries out:

"Out! help; allas! harrow!" he gan to crye,
"O stronge lady stoure, what dostow?"

1 In legal usage, this collocation has a technical reference to the rigorous and coercive confinement intended by a statute of Edward I (1275) to persuade notorious malefactors to submit to trial by jury: 'seient remis en la prison forte et dure.' F. Pollock and F.J. Maitland, The History of English Law before the time of Edward I, 2nd ed., Cambridge (1898), II, 651n.5.
Clearly neither physical nor moral strength is involved; what she is doing is extreme, outrageous and also cruel.

Similarly the revellers of the Pardoner's sermon are apprehensive lest they be taken for theves stronge (CT.VI.789). The word contains the sense of outrage to ordinary people, and the harm done by thieves.

Two further examples in which the sense of harshness is uppermost are:

CT.VII.1445 I bithenke me now and take heede how Fortune hath norisssed me fro my childhede, and hath holpen me to passe many a stroong paas.

CT.IV.1139 This world is nat so strong, it is no nay, As it hath been in olde tymes yoore,

10. Note. Most of the uses (all except two) with deviant senses are attributive.
1. **Sturdy** is used of persons who oppress others; as of the masters who beat the lions in their keeping:

Bo.III.m.ii,11  
Al be it so that the lyouns of the contre of Pene benen  
the fayre chaynes, and taken metes of the handes of folk  
that yeven it hem, and dreeden hir sturdy maistres of whiche  
thei ben wont to suffre betynges;

(Latin:  
... metuantque trucem  
Soliti uerbera ferre magistrum,)

(French:  
leur felon maistre).

In this sense of 'harsh and cruel' it is twice applied to Walter in The Clerk's Tale (IV.698, 1049). In the latter, it occurs when Walter has a change of heart and begins to **reven upon** his wife.

Finally, the word is used by the Wife of Bath to describe an aspect of her character:

CT.III.612  
For certes, I am al Venerien  
In feelynge, and myn herte is Harcien.  
Venus me yaf my lust, my likerousnesse,  
And Mars yaf me my sturdy hardynesse;

Here the sense of **sturdy** can scarcely be taken to be simply harsh or cruel; there is an unmistakable sense of forcefulness, of vigour here. Here the criterion of violence is uppermost.

2. This association with violence and forcefulness is present in three uses where the lexeme describes the manner of motion of a man possessed by strong feeling. These account for one of the uses of the adverb and one use of the adjective in an adverbial phrase:

CT.III.2162  
He looked as it were a wilde boor;  
He grynte with his teeth, so was he wrooth.  
A sturdy paas doun to the court he gooth,  
Wher as ther woned a man of greet honour.  
...  
This frere cam as he were in a rage,
When we take into account the parallelism of *sturdely* and *hastely* in describing the passage of Phoebus on his way to catch Mars and Venus together (Mars 82), it might seem that the main point in the sense of both these uses is speed, vigorous motion, though there is certainly a malevolence which is the occasion of the haste. In the *Miller's Tale* the violence is there, but no trace of cruelty or malevolence. The emphasis is upon speed and urgency resulting from the carpenter's concern for Nicholas' health:

CT.I.3434 "Go up," quod he unto his knave anoon,

This knave gooth hym up ful sturdily
And at the chambre dore while that he stood,
He crieth and knocked as that he were wood,

The final phrase emphasises the frenetic nature of the activity. Here, *sturdily* seems to have a sense suggesting little more than speed, an intensifying use.

3. Finally, *sturdy* is used of an inanimate object, an oak tree, and of a man outside any suggested relationship with another. There is no question of harshness or oppression nor of vigorous action; rather the word is applied to signify static strength and vigour.

CT.II.1380 "Thenk here-ayeins: whan that the stordy ook,
On which men hakketh ofte, for the nones,
Receyved hath the happy fallyng strook,

In application to the man, the word may have some pejorative sense derived from its senses of harshness and cruelty and from its collocation with *harlot*.

CT.III.1754 A sturdy harlot wente ay hem bihynde,
That was hir hostes man, and bar a sak,
And wha men yaf hem, leyde it on his bak.

Although the *O.E.D.* gives this occurrence as an example of the physical sense, pejorative senses of both *sturdy* and *harlot* are common, both separately and in the collocation of words in the same area of sense as *harlot* (beggars etc.) S.v. *sturdy* 5c and *harlot* 1.
FIERS

Important head words modified by the adjective are: Mars, Arcite, courage and leoun; another collocation of importance is: despitous.

Translation evidence is limited to the rendering of Latin ferus ... Polyphemus, where the French translation cruéis is ignored, and Old French 'Pleins de dessein e de fierte' by fiers and daungerous.

Fiers, fiersly

1. The great majority of the attributive uses of fiers are applied in destructive and violent references; thus Mars, the pagan god of battle, is three times called fiers; the dangerous and destructive lion is called fiers once and Arcite is also likened to a lion in his ferocity. Furthermore, the fact that a fiers leoun is paralleled by a meke lomb suggests that both epithets are proverbial of the particular animals. Achilles and Arcite are called fiers in the moment when they are bent on armed destruction, and Polyphemus receives the same distinction together with the information that he has eaten Ulysses' companions. Such uses leave little doubt as to the sense of fiers. Its primary meaning seems to be 'violent and destructive to human life:'

CT.VIII.198 "For thilke spouse that she took but now Ful lyk a fiers leoun, she sendeth heere, As meke as evere was any lomb, to yow!"

CT.I.1598 This Arcite, with ful despitous herte, Whan he hym knew, and hadde his tale herd, As fiers as leon pulled out his swerd,

TC.VI.1806 Despitously hym slough the fierse Achille.

There is an interesting correlation between FIEHS-ness in a man and behaviour which is called despitous.

2. As well as applying to a person and his attitude in the moment of destruction, FIEHS may also apply to the heart; it may be an emotional
attitude and, as such, extend beyond martial or physical destruction to other harsh or violent, but only moderately harmful, action such as Sir Thopas spurring his horse because of the FIERSnness of his spirit:

CT.VII.780 Sire Thopas eek so wery was
For prikyng on the softe gras,
So fiers was his corage,
That doun he leyde him in that plas
To make his steede som solas,

It is also possible to talk of the sea and its waves which 'fiersly ... grown/
To drenchen erthe ...' (TC.III.1760).

3. There exist, however, one or two uses in which little or no active harm is done to another, and the application of FIERs seems peculiar, especially in the case where the reason for this FIERSnness is given:

RR.1482 But natheles, for his beaute,
So feirs and daungerous was he,
That he nolde graunten hir askyng,

Fortunately the French version of this exists:

RR.1449 Mais cil fu, por sa grant biaute,
Pleins de desdein e de fierti,
Si ne la li vost otreier,

In O.F. the word Fiers could mean either 'proud' or 'fierce'; the latter evidently related to a sense 'proud in martial skills'.

The collocation of fiers with knyght, in which it is coupled with proude (TC.I.225), may seem to correspond better with this sense, but the context reveals that the sense must be similar to that in which it is applied to Narcissus in the Romance. In the Troilus, it refers to the hero, who will have no dealings in love. The sequence of events in the stories mentioned and the collocations, together with translation evidence, leave no doubt that the sense of FIERs, here, is one approaching pride or arrogance. What is probably implied is a species of pride which is offensive to others, pride which is aggressive, pride which prevents a man from showing kindness in love. If we envisage pride as self-obsession resulting in the despising of others, this is the sort of attitude implied.
4. One final collocation presents a difficulty:

CT.II.300  Thy crowdyng set the hevene in swich array
            At the bigynnyng of this fiers viage,
            That cruel Mars hath slayn the mariage.

The enterprise on which Custance is embarking is one which is not dear to
her and it will prove disastrous; at the same time it may be assumed to
be one carried out with some pomp, since it is to her marriage. This
transferred use, then, may have the sense of 'proud' or of 'destructive'.
Since there is more description of woe than ceremony, it is safest to assume
that this is a unique application of FIERS to an abstract, non-human event,
and that it has the sense 'intensely harmful', or 'cruel'.

The lexeme is rare in Chaucer. It is collocated twice with leoun and is used in the *Romaunt of the Rose* to gloss O.F. *hisdosement* (grymly).

Grim, grymly, grymnesse.

1. Of the two uses which are clearly accompanied by actions, *grymnesse* is associated with the power to inflict harm:

   And with hys *grymme* pawes stronge,
   Withyn hys sharp nayles longe,
   Me, fleynge, in a swap he hente,

   The danger and the destructive power of the eagle's talons are evoked, but there is no question of the parts described having an independent attitude to their unfortunate victim. In the following, there is a strong probability that devils possess not only the power to harm, but also the necessary malice to desire to do so:

   ther as they shul han the fyr and the wormes that evere shul lasten, and wepyng and wallynge, sharp hunger and thurst, and grymnesse of develes, that shullen al totrede hem without respit and withouten ende.

   Here, *grymnesse* refers to the deliberate acts of sentient beings, and presumes an attitude of harshness and cruelty.

2. The application to lions, to the statue of Mars, and to the knight, are without any such action or relationship as justifies the use of the word in the above example. They represent instead a simple assumption by an observer as to character, perceived from appearance, looks or repute. Thus the statue of Mars looks *grim* (*CT.I.2042*) and the crowd speculating on the merits of Palamon and Arcite consider that one looks *grim* and is therefore likely to be an effective combatant (*CT.I.2519*). The cock, Chauntecleer, in the *Nun's Priest's Tale*, when daylight comes, to compensate for his timidity in the face of dreams, imitates the demeanour of a lion:
CT.VII.3179 He looketh as it were a grym leoun,
   And on his toos he rometh up and doun;

The two collocations of grim with lion in such a limited use of the
word suggest that grimness is a quality especially appropriate to lions;
and the fact that it is to efface timidity suggests that, what is meant, is
ferocity. Thus grimness is an expected and necessary quality of warriors
and lions: the power and desire to do destruction.

3. The use of the adverb is to describe the way in which the head of the
allegorical figure of Hate in the opening of the Romaut of the Rose has her
head bound up with a large cloth:

RR.161 Hir heed ywrighten was, ywis,
   Ful grymly with a greet towayle.

(French 148) E si estoit entortillie
   Histoirement d'une toaille.

Here there is no hint of threat or power to do harm in the sense of grymly.
The French suggests only that this is an unpleasant, perhaps frightening,
sight. The word here can mean little more than ugly and unpleasant.
Cruel, crueltee, cruelly

The lexeme CRUELTEE does not enter into any repeated idiomatic constructions, unless the common adverbial-forming procedure of prefixing the noun with for or through be considered such. Even these phrases are uncommon. The adverb is also applied on a total of three occasions to the idioms wreken ... ire and aboughte ... ire. The adjective is applied more than once to a number of head words: Fortune, pagan gods (especially Mars), tigre, herte, are most common. There is a distinct tendency to occurrence with peyne, wo or torment, where the modification of one seems to stimulate the occurrence of the others.

Significant collocations of CRUELTEE are: jelosye (2); tyrannye (2); peyne (4); malice (3); wood (2); wo (2); torment (2); sterne (2); dispitouse (2); felle (2); felonious (1).

The Latin equivalents are as follows, according to the evidence of Boethius. Most of these are rendered cruel by Jean de Meun.

Crueltee: severitas; saevitia; crudelitas.

Cruel: saevus (easily commonest); ferus; torvus; ferox; atroc (of about equal occurrence); and infames.

The phrase cruel harmes occurs as a translation of strages.

1. The commonest use of CRUELTEE is with a sense close to the modern meaning. It can refer to a deed (a crueltee) of violent hostility against another, the abstract state of mind, or character of persons gratuitously committing such acts (crueltee):

CT.VII.2413 In which tour in prisoun put was he, And with hym been his litel children thre; The eldeste scarce fyf yer was of age. Alas, Fortune! it was greet crueltee Swiche briddes for to putte in swich a cage!
The action which is called a crueltee, or betrays the abstract character trait in a person, may be parallel to the term. Thus may be seen:

**CT.II.72**

The crueltee of the queene Medea,
Thy litel children hangynge by the hals,
For thy Jason, that was of love so fals!

Normally, acts of unnecessary violence against the innocent are regarded as immoral, thus we have their contrast with 'virtue':

**Bo.II,p.vi,67**

So that the tormentz that this tyraunt wende to han makede matere of cruelte, this wise man maked it matere of vertu.

Crueltee frequently means the torment of the weak, powerless or acquiescent:

**TC.I.9**

To the clepe I, thow goddesse of torment,
Thow cruel Furie, sorwynge evere yn peyne,

**CT.IV.539**

Grisildis moot al suffre and al consente;
And as a lamb she sitteth meke and stille,
And leet this cruel sergent doon his wille.

In the Complaint to Pity, Crueltee is directly opposed as a personification to Pitee, and the lover is represented as complaining to Pitee of the harsh oppression of Love:

**Pity 6**

My purpos was to Pitee to compleyne
Upon the crueltee and tirannye
Of Love, that for my trouthe doth me dye.

Two important uses of CRUELTEE are united in this example and these will be further exemplified; they are: CRUELTEE allied to oppression by wickedness conjoined with power, CRUELTEE within the courtly love situation. The latter may be deferred while examples of the former are given below.

2. CRUELTEE, along with some others of the words studied, takes its place among those terms appropriate for the discussion of the duties and behaviour of a lord with temporal power:

**Bo.III,m.vi,35**

Allas! it is gresvous fortune as ofte as wikkid sweerd is joinde to cruel venym (that is so seyn, venymous cruelte to lordschipe)."

This sentiment is repeated in substantially the same form in the monk's comment upon Nero (VII.:2493) as the murderer of his mother. Alcoeste puts the Boethian and feudal commonplace:
For he that kyng ye lord ys naturel,
Hym oghte nat be tiraunt ne crewel,
As is a fermour, to doon the harm he kan.
He moste thinks yt is his lige man,

A number of the ways in which a lord may be cruel to those dependent upon him are given in the Parson's Tale:

"Leon rokyngye and bere hongry been like to the cruel lordshipes in withholdynge or abreggyng of the shepe (or the hyre), or of the wages of servaunyt, or else in usure, or in withdrawynge of the almesse of povre folk."

Crueltie, then, is not necessarily synonymous with violence in acts against an individual; it is rather to be judged as such by its deleterious effects. It would also be objectively judged to be an evil or unjustified act. The word is also used in reference to the lord's function as judge, so when Melibee decides to disinherit and exile his rebellious enemies:

"Cartes," quod dame Prudence, "this were a cruel sentence and muchel agayn resoun.

There is a clue here to the attitude that crueltee is unreasoning, an attitude which re-appears from time to time. Boethius complains that his judges showed him no Pitee:

Bo.I,p.iv,229 But now thow mayst wel seen to what eende I am comen for myn innocence; I receyve payne of fals felonye for guerdon of verrai vertu. And what open confessioun of felonye hadde evere juges so accordaunt in cruelte ....

As the term is used of the harshness of earthly lords, so it may be used of that of the pagan deities:

TC.IV.1192 Than seyde he thus, fulfild of heigh desdayn: "O cruel Jove, and thow, Fortune adverse,
This al and som, that falsly have ye slayn Criseyde,

The pagan god most often called cruel is Mars, though a slight shift in sense is indicated in most of these uses. There is an emphasis on the harshness and violence of Mars as the god of war and destruction. Treatment of this sense will be deferred.

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1 In contradiction to the Senecan definition of crudelitas as justifiable harshness (see below, p.416).
3. Closely allied to the concept of justice is that of revenge. There is no sense here of moral evil in the application of the term; rather the stress is upon the effectiveness and violence of the act. Vengeance, like righteous ire, is ethically respectable enough to be ascribed to the Christian God; the wreck of God hym smoot so cruelly
That thurgh his body wikked wormes crepte,
And therwithal he stank horribly

but it is also the property of men and pagan gods:

That Manes, which that goddes ben of peyne,
Shal ben agast that Grekes wol hem shende.
And men shul drede, unto the worldes ende,
From hennesforth to ravysshen any queene,
So cruel shal our wreche on hem be seene.

It might also be noted that vengeance may be unjust when it is visited for no other cause than the spleen or imagination of the avenger (wreken his-ire - CT.VII.2597).

4. Close to this sense, but where the emphasis is upon the criterion of violence and harshness rather than upon criteria of evil, lack of reason or effect on the person acted upon, is a further division of sense. The frequent collocations with the pagan god Mars fall within this sense areas:

Of Trace was he lord, and kyn to Marte,
The cruel god that stant with blody darte;

There are few occurrences where the stress is on violence alone; other collocations with Mars are coupled with words such as despitouse, which indicate a morally reprehensible attitude to others. In describing the fighting propensities of the Amazon queen, Chaucer says:

.... and with her propre hond
Agayn hir foos she fought so cruelly
That ther nas kyng ne prynce in al that lond
That he nas glad, if he that grace fond,
That she ne wold upon his lond werreye.

The ferocity and lack of human feeling of the Romans in battle is compared to that of a lion:

With stoute Romeyns, crewel as lyoun,
To ship they wente, and thus I lat hem sayle.
The violence and hostility of a warrior is paralleled by that of a wild beast: both lack the sense of deliberation and consequent moral obloquy found in the same behaviour, or similar deeds, of a man in peace-time. Thus we find the word collocated with the idea of vengeance again, and vengeance divorced from reason, not entirely without disapproval:

CT.VII.1009  
And by the manere of his speche it semed that in herto he baar a cruel ire, redy to doon vengeaunce upon his foes, and sodeynly desired that the werre sholde bigynne;

This sense of violence and hostility without deliberation is that applied to animals. In a substantial proportion of these collocations, the animal is a man-eater:

LGW.1929  
This Mynos hadde a monstre, a wiked best,  
That was so crewel that, without arest,  
Whan that a man was brought in his presence,  
He wolde hym ete, ther helpeth nodefence.

Such uses as this preserve the basic situation of harshness or violence to another individual. When applied to more orthodox creatures, the sense is purely of their ferocity, their potential danger rather than their actual deeds against humankind:

CT.I.2628  
Ther nas no tygre in the vale of Galgopheye,  
Whan that hir whelp is stole whan it is lite,  
So cruel on the hunte as is Arcite  
For jelous herte upon this Palamon.

5. Here mention might be made of the common figurative applications of cruel. Thus, by metonymy, we have cruel mowth (Bo.IV,m.ii,6), in talking of the menacing of oppressive kings; thought crewel (Bo.IV,p.iv,8), when describing the attitude of the wicked in encompassing the downfall of the virtuous. By personification, we find cruel firmament, referring to the oppressive tendency of the prime mover to reverse the natural west to east motion of the other spheres (CT.II.295), and the cruel whiel of Fortune is so called because of its function in promoting the harm of men (TC.I.839). Similarly, the trumpets of war, Boethius' classica saeua, are translated cruele clariouns (Bo.II,m.v,24), the epithet being applied through their
association with the battle, where the adjective might seem more proper. Criseyde (TC.IV.772) cannot contemplate suicide by the sword, for the crueltee of the weapon.

6. Somewhat similar in sense to the foregoing are the uses of CRUELTEE with relation to abstractions such as emotions or other indefinite phenomena. In these uses the sense is of harshness and violence:

CT.I.1382 What sholde I al day of his wo endite?
When he endured hadde a yeer or two
This cruel torment and this peyne and wo.

The emphasis upon the criteria of harshness and violence is revealed also in two similar uses:

TC.IV.844 "Whoso me seeth, he seeth sorwe al atonys,
Peyne, torment, pleynte, wo, distresse!
Out of my woful body harm ther noon is,
As angwissh, langour, cruel bittrenesse,
Anoy, smert, drede, fury, and ek siknesse.
I trowe, ywis, from heavene teeris reyne
For pite of myn aspre and cruel peyne."

HF.36 Or that the cruel lyf unsofte
Which these ilke lovers leden
That hopen over-muche or dreden.

In uses like these CRUELTEE might be replaced by PITTEE were it not for the fact that the emphasis is here upon the violence and harshness itself, whilst, if PITTEE were substituted, the emphasis would be upon the reaction of an observer.

This use also accounts for an interesting transferred sense of cruelly. Normally we might expect the adverb to modify the action of a person actively inflicting harm on another; however, it can also apply to the harms inflicted:

CT.I.2303 As keene me fro thy vengernace and thyn ire,
That Attheon aboughte cruelly.

In the following, the source of the discomfort is not a real agent either, therefore crueltee cannot be ascribed to it as a deliberate act. The judgement of the harm and its violence is purely from the point of view of the recipient of events:
"The soth is this: the twymbnyng of us tweyne
Wol us diseese and cruelich anoye;
But hym byhoveth sometyme han a peyne,
That serveth Love, if that he wol have joye.

Finally, an example from Boethius might help to reinforce the point. Here the stress is upon violence and harmfulness:

But the anguysschous love of havyng brenneth in folk more cruely than the fyer of the mountaigne of Ethna that ay brenneth.

7. It was noted earlier that, in the courtly context, crueltee is opposed to pitee when speaking of love petitions. A number of occurrences may be found in which CRUELTEE has little emphasis on violence, on evil and malicious destruction, or harm to others. The sense seems to be a much weakened one of failure to react to the suffering of others with pitee:

And with hir beek hirselven so she prighte,
That ther nys tygre, ne so cruel beest,
That dwelleth outhere in wode or in forest,
That nolde han wept, if that he wepe koude,
For sorwe of hire,

A single occurrence such as this is valueless, since it is a fair assumption that a fierce and destructive animal like the tiger would not be considered to be soft-hearted, and the sense of cruel could be that above, when applied to a tiger. Compare, however:

In al this world ther nys so cruel herte
That hire hadde herd compleynen in hire sorwe,
That nolde han wepen for hir peynes smerte,
So tendrely she wepte, bothe eve and morwe.

Here, there is no object of crueltee, it is quite inactive; the state of a heart observing the distress of another; the implication is that a cruel herte would not be moved by ordinary distress. Similarly, Griselda is content to submit to the will of Walter and to allow her child to be taken from her; she is inactive, but her crueltee is raised as a possibility.

He wolde have wend that of som subtiltee,
And of malice, or for cruel corage,
That she hadde suffred this with sad visage.
Galcas considers himself a sterne and cruel father (TC.IV.94) because he failed to save his daughter from the doomed city of Troy. Troilus' heart becomes cruel (TC.V.1534) after he is enraged by Cassandra's prophesy, though there is no immediate outlet for this except in his brusqueness to the prophetess.

Earlier in the poem, the refining influence of love had had its effect upon Troilus, so that one of the vices which had been suppressed was crueltee. There is no evidence that his crueltee extended any further than disdain of lovers, but this is replaced by friendliness and magnanimity:

TC.I.1083 For he bicom the frendliest wight, The gentilest, and ek the moost fre, The thriftiest and oon the beste knyght, That in his tyme was or myghte be. Dede were his japes and his cruelte, His heighe port and his manere estraunge, And eech of the gan for a vertu chaunce.

The transformation is similar to that wrought in Mars by Venus (Mars.37), when jelosye, cruelte, host and tyramye are forbidden him.

Magnanimity to other humans and the lack of it have special significance in the relationship of courtly love or of friendship. Thus, Pandarus considers it a crueltee not to confide in him as a friend (TC.I.586), while the crueltee of the noble lady is in caring nothing for the suffering and death of her lovers; in short, lacking pitee:

TC.II.337 "If it be so that ye so cruel be, That of his deth yow liste nought to recche, That is so trewe and worthi, as ye se, Namoore than of a japer or a wrecche, -

8. Finally, CRUEL may be used with a distinct social relevance to refer to those who do not behave to each other as do people aware of the exigencies of the courtly code:

RR.265 For, trustith wel, she goth nygh wod When any chaunce happith god. Envi is of such cruelte That feith ne trouthe holdith she To freend ne felawe, bad or good.

Chaucer is here closely following the French (cruauté).
The necessity of good behaviour to others and the resultant good reputation is stressed again in *Tale of Helibee*:

**CT.VII.1647**

And he that trusteth hym so muchel in his goode conscience/ that he displeaseth, and settleth at nocht his goode name or loos, and rekkes nocht though he kope nat his goode name, nys but a cruel cherel./

The collocation with the socially inferior *cherel*, together with the depreciatory *but*, and the abstraction and distancing of any act of hostility to others, helps to give this use purely social application.1 *Cruel* here, referring to the social advancement of a churl, and that he has no conception of the proper code of behaviour, is nearly equivalent in sense to *vileyn*.

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1 This sense of the adjective *cruel* is supported by the French source of the *Tale of Helibee*: 'il negligé sa bonne renommee et ne fait force de lui garder, il est cruel et vilain.' (Bryan and Dempster, p. 604). No doubt this shift in sense, which is recognised by none of the standard dictionaries of either language, is dependent upon the assumption that churls are lacking in the sensitivity which is proper to the courtly person (cf. paragraph 7). The social misdemeanour of Tristram and Isolde is called *cruauté* in Béroul's *Tristan*, line 616. Ewert glosses this 'wickedness'.

WOODNESSE

Wood, woodnesse, woodly

The lexeme WOODNESSE enters into a number of consistent idiomatic constructions, most of these involving the predicative adjective. Only one typical construction with the noun emerges (falle in woodnesse). The adjective modifies a wide variety of head words, of which leoun, and pronouns referring to all sorts and conditions of men and women, are notable. Less notable is the modification of tyrant (2 occurrences, but also a number of applications to pagan gods and others whose behaviour is tyrannical).

On grounds of frequency, the most significant collocations are: ire, cruel, dronke (lews)(nesse).

The word is used as a translation of Boethian:

wood: saeuens; furiosus; saeuus (w. + felenous); rabidus furibundus
woodnesse: ira; furor; rabies
wax w.: saeuire

It also translates the French of the Romance of the Rose.

wood: forsenee

go/be w.: enrager and Jean de Meun renders the variety of the Latin by the same two lexemes.

1. The Boethian evidence suggests the presence of a criterion of violence and destructiveness in the sense of WOOD. This is supported by the use of Woodnesse as a personification; here a sense of unreason is joined by other, more violent personifications, and the evocation of violent death:

CT.I.2011 Yet saugh I Woodnesse, laughynge in his rage,
Armed Complaint, Outhees, and fiers Outrage;
The careyne in the bush, with throte ycorve;

2. The common gloss for WOODNESSE would be, however, madness, mad, and also
angry or enraged. The noun woodnesse can mean an act of folly or unreason;

CT.VII.1481 Forthermore, ye knowen wel that after the comune sawe, 'it is a woodnesse a man to stryve with a strenger ...

and it can also mean a fit of unreasoning behaviour, a fit of madness:

TC.III.794 "And he is come in swich peyne and distresse
That, but he be al fully wood by this,
He sodeynly mot falle into wodnesse,

A man who is mad loses all faculty of reasoning and shows disregard for his situation; so does the drunken man and the lover, and both these parallels are drawn:

CT.VII.496 ... a man that is out of his mynde
And a man which that is dronkelewe,
But that woodnesse, yfallen in a shrewe,
Persevereth lenger than doth dronkenesse.

TC.III.1382 Tho besy wrecches, ful of wo and drede!
Thai callen love a woodnesse or a folie,
But it shall falle hem as I shal yow rede;

The phrases w. out of his mynde/wit illustrate the commonplace nature of this concept, which has spawned a number of consistent idioms (see below p. 315)

There are less emphatic uses, such as that in which Pandarus suggests an arrangement of terms in this field, by putting WOODNESSE at one end of his scale and progressing to LEWED:

TC.III.398 I am nought wood, al if I lewed be!

Pandarus makes a distinction between the unlearned and the intellectually defective.

The sense of the word may be narrowed by context to mean the rash foolishness of presumption:

Lady, 84 And lat me serve yow forth; lo, this is al!
For I am not so hardy, ne so wood,
For to desire that ye shulde love me;

the advanced stage of the state of being daswed by reading (HF.658):

OP.184 What sholde he studie and make hymselven wood,
Upon a book in cloystre alwey to poure,

or (cf. the reference to Nero in paragraph 9 below) to the foolish irresponsibility of a spendthrift:
To make hym lyve by his propre good
In honour desteeles (but if he were wood),

3. The connection of WOODNESSE with the violence of IRE is made by a number of occurrences in which they are juxtaposed. There is deliberate parallelism to make a didactic point in:

CT.III.2087 'Ne be no felawe to an irous man,
Ne with no wood man walke by the weye,
Lest thee repente;'

Extreme IRE and woodnesse are not far separate:

CT.III.2121 This sike man wax wel ny wood for ire;
He wolde that the frere had been on-fire,
With his false dissymulacioun.

Ire and Woodnesse together combine in destructive hostility.

4. WOODNESSE is also used to describe the ferocity and hostility of the warrior or the wild beast; a violence distinct from that of the man in peacetime because, although unreasoning, it is justifiable as the nature of the animal or man and may be valuable in the profession of the latter as a warrior:

Mars 123 Now wol I speke of Mars, furious and wod.

The animal called Wood is par excellence the lion, and the collocation appears to be a proverbial one. It occurs on five separate occasions in similar linguistic environments. Two of them are nearly identical for a considerable span of units:

CT.III.2152 The frere up stirte as dooth a wood leoun,
CT.III.794 And he up stirte as dooth a wood leoun,
And with his fest he smoot me on the heed,

Variations on the basic simile are possible as the following

CT.I.2631 Ne in Belmarye ther nys so fel leon,
That hunted is, or for his hunger wood,
Ne of his praye desireth so the blood,
As Palamon to sleen his foo Arcite.

This example combines another common use of Wood; that in which the cause of Woodnesse is given; the syntagm w. for ... .
5. WOODNESSE is used too of the oppressive violence of persons in elevated positions; a violence which may be intentional and deliberate. Thus, beside the WOODNESSE of Mars, which may be morally excused as a necessity of the God of War, we have the vengeful WOODNESSE of the goddess Juno:

But I must been in prison through Sature, and eek through Juno, jalous and eek wood, That hath destroyed wel ny al the blood Of Thebes ....

In Boethius II.m.vi.28, WOODNESSE is identified explicitly with wickedness in the shape of Nero, but is a translation of the Latin rabies. There is evidently no equivocation between wickedness and madness; if a mad man does evil deeds they are nonetheless wicked and he must be considered evil himself, since he is the author of them. The modern humanistic view of diminished responsibility is not so common in the Middle Ages. Thus, a cruel tyrant can be called wood from the point of view of good folk, even when his actions are deliberate, as in the torture of a worthy man:

But this freman boot of his owene tonge, and caste it in the visage of thilke wode tyrant.

Earlier, WOODNESSE is used with a word of undoubted moral implications, the two combining ideas of madness, cruelty, wickedness and violence:

Wharto thanne, o wrecches, drede ye tiraunz that ben wode and felenous withouten ony strengthe?

6. The sense of furious hostility is present in applications to abstractions or attitudes of mind:

Therwith the wikched spirit, God us blesse, Which that men clepeth the woode jalousie, Gan in hym crepe, in al this hevynesse;

It may also be applied in a sense reminiscent of a similar use of CHUELTEE in which the reason for its application is to be judged from its effects. The emphasis is upon violence and deleterious effect:

1 Foolishness, lack of judgement, is sometimes distinguished from deliberate transgression, however, as in Chaucer's defence to the God of Love in the Prologue to the Legend of Good Women or the words of Criseyde in TC.III.326.
And Pandarus, that sey his woode peyne,
Wex wel neigh dod for routhe, ....

Sometimes the sense may include the criterion of 'unreasonable' but the
stress may be upon the gratuitous hostility of the agent so that the
application closely parallels similar uses of CHUELTEE: 

"Yowre princes erren, as youre nobleye dooth."
Quod tho Cecile, "and with a wood sentence
Ye make us gilty, and it is nat sooth.

7. The sense of violence is emphasised when the word is applied to inanimate
objects, particularly those which seem to have an activity of their own.

Woodnesses is coupled with Ires to describe the turbulence of the air
(aetheris iras) (Bo.II,m.iv,18) and in the Miller's Tales:

That now a Monday next, at quarter nyght,
Shall falle a reyn, and that so wilde and wood,
That half so greet was nevere Hoes flood.

Again in Boethius I,p.iii,77, we find the phrase tumolte and wood noyse
(furiosi tumultus), where there is certainly some disdain for the follies
of the world, but the criterion of violent action is also present. The
adverb is also used with the stress upon the criterion of violence as is,
on two occasions, the semi-substantivised use of the adjective for wood: 

And caughte to this lady swich desyr
That in his herte brende as any fyr
So woodyl that his wit was al forgotten.

The se, by nyghte, as any torche it brende
For wod, and possith hym now up, now doun,

Uses like this of WOODNESSE, simply to refer to violence, almost certainly
derive from the idiomatic use of the adjective wood in phrases comparing
some violent action to that of a mad man:

The cartere smoot, and cryde as he were wood,
The popular assumption seems to be that madness is accompanied by violent
action and shouting:

But swich a nede was to preye hym themne
As for to bidde a wood man for to renne.

1 See T.F. Mustanoja, op.cit., p.381.
Thus the idiom *to do s'thing as he were wood* is as much as to say 'to do something violently and unheedingly.'

This idiom, logically appropriate only to the actions of persons, is extended to inanimate objects which may seem to have their own activity:

CT.I.2950 And coppes fulle of wyn, and milk, and blood, Into the fyr, that brente as it were wood;

From here it is a short step to the application of the adjective to some inanimate objects in the sense of violence illustrated above.

8. The syntagms *be w... make w. and wexen w.*, and also one attributive use, are sometimes used with a sense which appears to be more or less idiomatic, varying from fury or violence towards another, to such violent hostility as is deserved by the other's actions - the modern *anger*.

The least idiomatic uses are those translated from *Boethius*, such as:

Bo.I,p.iv,12 And scheweth it nat ynoth by hymselfe the scharpnesse of Fortune, that waxeth wood ayens me? (caeculentis: not a close translation).

When some reason for furious hostility is evident, a sense change occurs, be it ever so slight:

Bo.IV,m.vii,22 But natheles Poliphemus, wood for his blynde visage, ... (furibundus)

Thus, the following has a sense very close to modern 'angry', though the sense of the violence of the anger is still felt:

LGW.624 Octovyan, that wod was of this dede, Shop hym an ost on Antony to lede Al utterly for his destruccioun.

The violence is also felt in the more colloquial atmosphere of the *Summoner's Tale*:

CT.III.1666 This Sumonour in his styropes hys stood; Upon this Frere his harte was so wood That lyk an aspen leef he quook for ire.

Finally three truly colloquial uses may be mentioned. There is no explicit violence though there is an indication that the anger is intense. The use is equivalent to the modern colloquial 'mad' to mean 'angry':
For though that Absolon be wood or wrooth,  
By cause that he for was from hire sight,  
This nye Nicholas stood in his light.

I wole han twelf pens, though that she be wood,  
Or I wol sompne hire unto oure office;

There are four uses of the syntagm though ... be w. (see p. 528); two have a negative in the main clause and all are colloquial in tone and have the sense of anger:

This made hym with me wood al outrely;

In this environment care must be taken not to confuse with in this example (a construction dating from O.E. times. Cf. wrath with ... - iustanoja, 419) and ayens in an example above. The latter has the sense of 'hostility towards'. Perhaps, however, the distinction in Chaucer is more stylistic than semantic.

9. A number of other, rare, uses are to be found. The first is with a sense where the emphasis is essentially on lack of reason and not at all upon violence; its sense is similar to a stronger version of modern 'foolish':

Al be it so that the proude Nero, with al his wode luxurie, kembde hym and apparyled hym with faire purpres of Tyrie ...(sauientis).

In the application to Muse (Bo.I,p.v,65) the sense is something like 'crazed':

For coveitise is evere wod  
To gripen other folckis god.  

(que toz jorz enrage/ Covoitise de l'autrui prendre)

The sense here is madly, furiously eager (cf. Mars 239). In RR.276, the adjective is used substantivally, evidently to translate French duel (Que par un poi de duel ne font)

And hath such (wo) whan folk doth good,  
That nygh she meltith for pure wood.

Here the sense seems to be one of violence but violent discomfiture. The moral criterion is important since we are here discussing the emblematic figure of Envie. The sense of French duel is one of sorrow and anger in their most extravagant forms.
Finally, it is worthy of note that, although WOODNESSE has uses both in ordinary colloquial speech and in philosophical discourse (the noun form being proportionately far more important in Boethius), it is never used in courtly situations. The nearest approach, when it becomes a respectable term for literary composition, is in appreciatively describing the ferocity of lions, warriors and warrior-gods.
HARDNESSE

Hardnesse, hard, harde

The collocations in reducing order of importance are: sharp, greevous, perilous, daungerous, depe, sore, pennaunce, payne, myghtily, spitously, pitee, gentilesse, dehonairetee.

Translation evidence is of little importance.

Boece: Hard (adj.): dura. (Jean de Meun: dure/durtéz)

Hardnesses (n.): dura.

Romance de la Rose: Hard (adj.): dur(s).

1. In examining the senses of this lexeme, some note must be taken of the repeated collocation of various exponents of the lexeme with the word herte. The collocation is an ancient, stereotyped part of poetic diction; perhaps its conceptual origins are in a simile like the following, where the heart and soul are confused as the sensitive recipient of impressions from without, and the seat of emotion. Lack of susceptibility, concretised, leads to the application of the adjective HARD:1

CT.IV.1900 Som tyrant is, as ther be many oon, That hath an herte as hard as any stoon, Which wolde han lat hym sterven in the place.

A similar image is used by Pandarus of Troilus' attempts to influence Criseyde:

TC.II.1241 "But ye han played the tirant neigh to longe, And harde was it youre herte for to grave.

De Lorris sees hardness of heart as insensitivity to the spring and its concomitants:

RR.85 Hard is the hert that loveth nought In May, whan al this mirth is wrought,

Slff. Mout a dur cuer qui en mai n'aime, Quant il ot chanter sor la raime As oisiaus les douz chanz piteus.

1 The image, by which the sensitive part of the soul is likened to wax, ready to take sense-impressions, is common in Classical philosophy and is found in the transmitters of this philosophy to the Middle Ages. Boethius himself expands on this notion in Book Five, metre vi.
Various grammatical arrangements of the basic collocation are noted below; for example, the composite adjective **hardhearted**. This condition is of concern to the Persoun because it hampers the action of charity and prevents contrition. Too hard a heart is considered sinful in *Melibee* (VII.1696) and the Persoun identifies it with Augustinian *malitia*:

**CT.X.486**

Now hath malice two species; that is to seyn, hardnesse of herte in wikkednesse; ...  

Here the sense of fixity of intentions is implied. The Friar excuses extortion by the similar notion that people whose hearts are insensible to remorse cannot reveal it by weeping, and can therefore compound in cash:

**CT.229**

For many a man so hard is of his herte,  
He may nat wepe, althogh hym soore smerte.

2. The simple concrete sense of the adjective **hard** is well exemplified by the following:

**CT.IV.228**

And whan she homward cam, she wolde brynge Wortes or othere herbes tymes ofte,  
The whiche she shredde and seeth for hir lyvynge,  
And made hir bed ful hard and nothyng softe;

3. As an adverb, **hard** is used to modify verbs of violent action; here it acts as an intensifier:

**CT.I.3476**

And hente hym by the sholdres myghtily,  
And shook hym harde, and cride spitously,

4. The adjective, particularly in idioms with the verb 'to be', has the sense 'difficult':

**PF.534**

"Ful hard were it to preve by resoun  
Who loveth best this gentil formel heere;

**CT.IV.1164**

It were ful harde to fynde now-a-dayes  
In al a toun Grisildis thre or two;

Often the use of the word has a less clear-cut sense of 'difficult'. Chaucer notes that: 'hard language and hard materie/ Ys encombrous for to here/ Attones;' Difficulty causes distress in the hearer, so that the subject and its presentation may be said to be 'hard' in another sense; that of
being harsh and unpleasant to the hearer. The Parson acknowledges the coincidence of the two senses:

CT.X.732 This vertu maketh folk to undertake harde thynges and grevous thynges, by hir owene wil, wisely and reasonably.

Here the parallelism with grevous underlines the coincidence of difficulty and distress suggested by this use of harde. Again, the balanced antithesis of the following, and the variable sense of the word hard, increase the oxymoronic effect of the line:

PF.2 The lyf so short, the craft so long to lerne, Th'assay so hard, so sharp the conquerynge,

5. Hardness of heart, mentioned earlier, implies a failure to react to the misery of others, an emotional insensitivity which may be intensified into active cruelty to others. The hard-hearted may be so inflexible and careless of external good that hard-heartedness is considered by the Parson to be equivalent to Malice. The Romaunt, however, sees it as mere insensitivity:

RR.333 In world nys wight so hard of herte That hadde sen her sorowes smerte, That nolde have had of her pyte,

325ff Nus tant fust durs ne la veist (N. t. d. coeurs n.) A cui grant pitié n'en preist

Insensitivity to others may, however, soon lead to the deliberation of cruelty: a tyrant may let a man die, through his hardness of heart (CT.IV.1990), a father may do injury to his child, despite its innocence (CT.II.857), and Calkas laments his cruelty in leaving his daughter to perish in the city of Troy:

TC.IV.95 O starne, O cruel fader that I was! How myghte I have in that so hard an herte?

Fortune is represented as taking positive delight in the suffering of others:

Bo.II,m.i,12 No sche neither heereth, ne rekketh of wrecchide wepynges; and she is so hard that sche laugheth and scorneth the wepynges of hom, the whiche sche hath maked wepe with hir free wille.

1 Cf. Troilus and Criseyde, IV, 1140.
This reminds us of the moral orientation of hardness and pity which is
evident in the Parson's identification with malice and his derivation of
severity and tyranny in lords from the sin of Covetise (CT.X.755). The
'bailiff' of the Friar's Tale complains of the severity of his lord:

CT.III.1427  My wages been ful streite and ful smale.
My lord is hard to me and daungerous,
And myn office is ful laborous,

The adjective hard, as might be expected from the above collocation, is often
used of the attitude of the courtly lady who refuses to respond to professions
of love: her insensitivity works her lover payne and may therefore be seen
as cruelty.

At TC.II.1271, having routhe is opposed to having been hard and, in
Complaint to his Lady, the same opposition is expressed:

Lady 100  But the more that I love yow, goodly free,
The lasse fynde I that ye loven me;
Alas! whan shal that harde wit amende?
Wher is now al your wommanly pitee,
Your gentilesse and your debonairtee?

Pandarue makes the only use of the adjective hard in a substantival use when
he says that Criseyde has been won of hard in a sentence where hard
might be replaced by daunger. Elsewhere he implies the synonymy of
hardnesse and daunger in the love situation:

TC.II.1245  Al wolde ye the forme of daunger save,
But hasteth yow to doon hym joye have;
For trusteth wel, to longe ydoon hardnesse
Causeth despit ful often for destresse."

6. The adverb harde is used in the courtly love situation in a use where it
seems to have more sense content than a mere intensifier:

TC.III.1531  So harde hym wrong of sharp desir the payne,
For to ben oft there he was in pleasaunce,
That it may neere out of his remembraunce.

This use seems to stand between the intensifier and concentration on the
suffering of another, which enables words like cruel, which have a primary
application to a person and his acts, to be applied to unmotivated events or
purely to suffering as a result of the acts. This type of use is not uncommon with hard. It is represented in the common expression with harde grace!; Alas! the harde stounde (AA.238); hard mischaunce, (Venus 47); and

CT.VIII.873 Swich supposyng and hope is sharp and hard; I warne yow wel, it is to seken evere.

The common syntagm To Be - hard + infin. can, as well as 'difficult', be used in the way mentioned above. The passive infinitive exemplifies the particular mischaunce referred to:

Bukton 32 God graunteth yow your lyf frely to lede
In fredoms. for ful hard is to be bonde.

The noun hardnesse is used with the modern sense 'hardship' (CT.X.688; Bo.IV,p.v,35). Finally, concentrating solely on the recipient, the adverb is used in a framework common with cruelly, the concentration being upon violence, though there are overtones of pathos, as in the use of CRUELTEE:

LOW.2483 And that hath she so harde and sore abought,
Alas! that, as the storyes us rescorde,
She was hire owene deth ryght with a corde.

7. Something should be said here about the French derived form Hardy, Hardely, Hardynesse (Hardiment).

Firstly it may be noticed that the adverb here is formed by an alternative process to the formation of the adverb from the O.E. hard; here an ly suffix is added rather than the e.

Secondly, the French adjective, hardy, is exceptionally rare (1 occasion). The only form in which confusion between the lexemes is at all probable is the substantive, which is formed in the same way, though the French preserves the original i or y. It seems as though there has been an attempt to avoid homonymic clash in the adoption and re-formation of the French term.

Hardely. This is fairly rarely used with its etymological sense of 'boldly' (translating Boethius' audacter):
CT.IV.2273  Al hadde man seyn a thyng with bothe his yen,
Yit shul we wommen visage it hardily,
And wepe, and swere, and chyde subtilly,
So that ye men shul been as lewed as gees.

The more common sense is derived from its use in colloquial language as an asseveration inserted into bold statements. In uses like this it may be glossed as 'indeed'; 'no doubt'; 'certainly' 'surely' etc:

HF.359  'Loo, ryght as she hath don, now she Wol doo eft-sones, hardely;'
BD.1043  "Byoure Lord," quod I, "y trowe yow wel!
Hardely, your love was wel beset;

In certain uses there is, however, the possibility of confusion with the adverb formed from O.E. heard:

Lady 112  And this I wol beseche yow hertely,
That, ther ever ye fynde, whyl ye lyve,
A trewer servant to yow than am I,
Leveth thanne, and sleeth me hardely,

The translation here is in doubt; 'make sure you slay me', 'slay me hershly' or 'slay me boldly'?

Hardynesse. This word has the clear French sense of 'boldness' which is found in the adopted Hardyme at TC.IV.533. It usually implies boldness in undertaking some direct action - physical courage involving strength or violence. As a corollary, the compound Foolhardynes is also found (PF.227). It is often collocated with strengthe or myght, and, unlike hardnesse, is almost always considered a virtue:

CT.II.939  Who yaf Judith corage or hardynesse
To sleen hym Olofernus in his tente,

CT.VII.2020  Was nevere swich another as was hee,
To speke of strengthe, and therwith hardynesse;

(Samson)

LGW.611  He was, of persone and of gentillesse,
And of discreetiuon and hardynesse,
Worthi to any wyght that liven may;

The other side of this adulation of Hardiness as a virtue is given by the Parson:
strength of body and worldly hardynesse causeth ful ofte many a man to peril and meschaunce.

Sometimes this worldly hardynesse may coincide with hardnesse

and namely whan that meyne is felonous and damageous to the peple by hardynesse of heigh lordshipe or by wey of offices.

The familiar-seeming phrase hardynesse of his herte (CT.VII.2508) is distinguished from the commoner phrase by its context.
DAUNGER

Daunger, daungerous

Neither collocational nor translation evidence offer valuable information.

1. The modern sense of something which threatens safety is represented by a single plural occurrence from the General Prologue's description of the Shipman:

GP.402  But of his craft to rekene wel his tydes, 
         His stremes, and his daungers hym bisides, 
         His herberwe, and his moone, his lodemenage, 
         There nas noon swich ......

2. Daunger and daungerous are familiar words in the context of courtly love. At a more prosaic level, one partner in a marriage may be daungerous with regard to his love for another:

CT.III.514  That thogh he hadde me bete on every bon, 
            He koude wynne agayn my love anon. 
            I trowe I loved hym best, for that he 
            Was of his love daungerous to me.

A loved one who is daungerous does not accede to the other's desire for affection:

TC.II.1376  Seyth Daunger, 'Nay, thow shalt me nevere wynne!'

Such an attitude of restraint in love, bordering on scorn for the lover, is associated with pride:

RR.1432    But natheles, for his beaute, 
           So feirs and daungerous was he, 
           That he nolde graunten hir askyng,

The French original has here, for the second line:

Pleins de desdein e de fierté 

a collocation represented in Chaucer's work by the juxtaposing of the personifications Disdany and Daunger in PF.136.

In LGW(F)160 Daunger is opposed to Curtesye, and Criseyde is said to
have played the tirant and will continue to retain the form of daunger (TC. II.1243). Restraint and lack of response may be, or may be represented by the sufferer as, active cruelty which is likely to bring about his death:

TC.II.384 But alwey, goode nece, to stynte his woo,
So lat youre daunger sucred ben a lite,
That of his deth ye be naught for to wite."

This active and destructive concept of daunger seems to be limited to the high style and the pretensions of courtly society where the sensitivity of the rejected lover is assumed to be greater and the threat to his emotional balance is more intense. A simple transfer portrays this as the result of more active malice on the part of the beloved:

AA.186 His newe lady holdeth him so narowe
Up by the bridil, at the staves ende,
That every word he dreadeth as an arowe;
Her daunger made him bothe bowe and bende,
And as her liste, made him turne or wende;
For she ne graunted him in her lyvynge
No grace, whi that he hath lust to singe,

Here, the opposition between Grace and Daunger in the courtly situation is neatly exemplified.

In the situation of more ordinary love, daunger may simply mean 'restraint,' perhaps with overtones of scorn, as though for an inferior. The knight of the Wife's tale believes the hag he has been compelled to marry is inferior to him and he shows simple restraint:

CT.III.1090 "O deere housbonde, benedicitee!
Fareth every knyght thus with his wyf as ye?
Is this the lawe of kyng Arthures hous?
Is every knyght of his so dangerous?

Finally, at the simplest and most grotesque level, the Wife can use the term simply with reference to restraint in sexual matters, and the irony by comparison with its higher style uses is evident:

CT.III.151 In wyfhod I wol use myn instrument
As frely as my Makere hath it sent.
If I be dauengerous, God yeve me sorwe.

This irony is reinforced by the covert image of sex as a gift of God, a prerogative of action freely bestowed by God, like Grace, which is a common collocation with the phrase "God sende."
3. The associations of restraint, superiority and oppressive behaviour, which are noticeable in the courtly love situation, are also found, with varying degrees of emphasis, in other contexts. One of the Wife's scabrous images bridges the gulf between the marriage bed and the market place in respect of the first of these associations:

CT.III.521 With daunger oute we al oure chauffare;
Greet prees at the market maketh deere ware,
And to greet cheep is holde at litel prys:

The same sense is evident in the description of the generosity of the personified Richesse:

RR. 1147. And hym alwey sich plente sende
Of golde and silver for to spende
Withoute lakking or daunger,
As it were poured in a garner.

As well as the sense of restraint in the bestowal of goods, daunger can also refer to restriction placed by a lord upon the action of others:

CT.I. 1849 My wyl is this, ..... 
That everich of you shal goon where hym leste
Frely, withouten raunson or daunger;

4. The thread of sense represented by restriction, control, domination and oppression is also to be found outside the courtly situation. Thus the image of love as a tyrannous lord is used to represent the plight of Narcissus:

RR. 1470 Narcisus was a bacheler,
That Love had caught in his danger,
And in his net gan hym so strayne,

All the world is under the domination of Richesse (RR. 1049). Chaucer's irony is again evident in his observation that the Summoner had the power over young people of the diocese, perhaps because he knew all their schemes and handed them advice:

GP. 663 In daunger hadde he at his owene gise
The yonge girles of the diocese,
And knew hir conseil, and was al hir reed.

Domination and control stray easily into oppression as the 'bailiff' of the Friar's Tale claims:
GT.III.1427  My wages been ful streite and ful smale.  
My lord is hard to me and daungerous,  
And myn office is ful laborous.

5. The thread of sense involving superiority, arrogance and disdain is found in general situations; thus the garden, described so fulsomely in the Romance of the Rose, is not too superior and disdainful to harbour small birds:

RR.490  The gardeyn was not daungerous  
To herberwe briddes many oon.

(A French variant reading is: M'estoit ne desdesigneus ne chiches).

One may be disdainful and superior in addressing another, and it is a notable virtue of the lady Ydelnesse (RR.591) that her response to a civil question is neither unmeke nor daungerous. Though the Persoun is evidently a superior person, he is neither harsh nor scornful of his moral inferiors and his tone, unlike that of Absolon (CT.I.3338), is neither superior and high-sounding, nor harsh and oppressive:

CP.517  And though he hooly were and vertuous,  
He was to synful men nat despitous,  
Ne of his speche daungerous ne digne,  
But in his techyng discreet and benygne.

The Persoun's lack of arrogance is especially praiseworthy in a man of such perfection, and contributes to that perfection.

Finally, Chauoer proposes to tell his prose tale and insists that the other pilgrims will like it if they are not daungerous:

CT.VII.939  I wol telle a litel thyng in prose  
That oghte liken yow, as I suppose,  
Or elles, certes, ye been to daungerous.

The sense is obviously one of superiority, arrogance which disposes an audience to judge itself beyond pleasing by any simple little tale.
1. It is clear from the collocations that hauteyn is connected with nobility and its behaviour. It is used in this way as an appreciative term. The falcon fit to hunt the heron was one of the finest of its race (LGW. 1120), and there is no trace of pejorative sense in the application to Richesse:

And in a priye corner in disport
Fond I Venus and hire porter Richesse,
That was ful noble and hautayn of hyre port.

2. The other two uses have some pejorative sense. To the ecclesiast, the significant trait of elegant behaviour was the way in which it was prone to the sin of Pride:

For sothe, Salomon seith that "flaterie is wors than detraccioun." For somtyme detraccioun maketh an hauteyn man be the moore humble, for he dredeth detraccioun;

3. The Pardoner uses a manner of speech which he hopes will impress his audience. Here the sense of hauteyn seems to imply, not only an elegant manner of pronunciation, but a style of delivery packed with high-sounding but probably meaningless phrases. The Pardoner cultivates pomposity of expression:

"Lordynges," quod he, "in chirches whan I preche,
I peyne me to han an hauteyn speche,
And rynge it out as round as gooth a belle,
For I kan al by rote that I telle.

The aspect of the behaviour of the nobility, which springs from arrogance and results in cruelty to people they scorn, is not covered by the word hauteyn in Chaucer, but in the disputed section of the Romance of the Rose (6101) hauteyn is coupled with cruel in just this sense.
DESPIT

Despit, despitous, despitously

Translation evidence is found in the Romaunt and Malibee alone and the usage is very close to the Chaucerian: 'E le tint a si grant despit/Que' is rendered 'And took it in so gret dispit/That'. The use of the French verb tenir is interesting in the light of the English idiom halt ... d. of.

Collocation evidence reveals the most important collocations to be: vilanye, hate, tirannye, sorwe, furie.

1. Examining the syntagms evidently modelled upon French phrasing which are arranged in the left hand column in the syntactical treatment (Appendix, p.549), we find that despit here clearly refers to an emotion or attitude of mind. This attitude is plainly scorn or contempt for an act, situation or person regarded as unworthy. The various syntagms are derived from the common French expression aveir despit ... and from a similar French expression al despit de. As well as the simple calqued expression we may find analogical developments of it: take in d. and be in d.

Friars claim to contemn the delights of the world:

CT.III.1876    We han this worldes lust al in despit.
The virtuous courtly lover holds all wickedness in contemn:

TC.III.1787    And moost of love and vertu was his speche,
And in despit hadde alle wrecchednesse;

(cf. TC.IV.1675)

One may feel contempt to commit a particular act or simply to allow oneself to suffer an insult:

CT.V.1395     How sith that maydens hadden swich despit
To been defouled with mannes foul delit,
   Wal oghte a wyf rather hirselven slee
   Than be defouled,

The disinterest of a lady may at length cause her lover to hold her in
contempt, perhaps even hate her:

TC.II.711 If I wolde outrelche his sighte flee, 
Perauenter he myghte have me in dispit, 
Thorough which I myght stonde in worse plit. 
Now were I wis, me hate to purchase, 
Withouten nede, ther I may stonde in grace?

(cf. TC.II.1246)

Two of these syntagms, however, have senses for which the ideas of scorn or contempt would be inadequate. The suggestion of something other than scorn is evident above; in the following, it is even clearer:

RR.1487 And whanne she herde hym werne her soo, 
She hadde in herte so gret woo, 
And took it in so gret dispit, 
That she, withoute more respit, 
Was deed anoon.

CT.III.481 I seye, I hadde in herte gret despit 
That he of any oother had delit.

Both these examples, at their very different levels, refer to the frustrations and vexations of love. Both ladies have been treated with contempt by their lovers and their reaction is of intense emotion compounded with annoyance and chagrin. We find this same sense of 'bitterness' with the adverb and adjective:

TC.V.199 ... this woful Troilus, 
In sorwe aboven alle sorwes smerte, 
With feloun look and face dispitous.

CT.I.1124 This Palamon, whan he tho wordes herde, 
Dispitously he looked and answerde,

In the Wife's Prologue, one may even commit suicide through bitterness of heart:

CT.III.761 ... a tree 
On which he seyde how that his wyves thre 
Hanged hemself for herte despitus.

Troilus's reaction to the troubling dream of Criseyde and the boar is sorrow and despit in this sense:

TC.V.1243 For sorwe of which, whan he it gan byholde, 
And for despit, out of his slep he breyde,
2. The column of syntagms on the right hand side of page 549 in the Appendix, some of which have despit preceded by the indefinite article, use the word in a sense which suggests an action rather than an attitude or emotion. What seems to be implied is the carrying on into action of the emotion or attitude. This is an action which reveals contempt for the position or the feelings of the person against whom it is carried out: it is a slight, an affront or an insult:

CT.II.699
She wolde noght hir sone had do so; 
Hir thoughte a despit that he sholde take 
So strange a creature unto his make.

A despit in this sense requires vengeance as Absolon testifies:

CT.I.3752
"My soule bitake I unto Sathanas, 
But me were levere than al this toun," quod he, 
"Of this despit awroken for to be."

and the unfortunate Friar of the Summoner's creation complains:

CT.III.2176
"I have," quod he, "had a despit this day,

3. The adverbial phrase in d. of has on most occasions a stronger sense than its modern equivalent, which has the sense 'notwithstanding'. In Chaucer it means 'in contempt for' the opinions of people and often has the sense of 'as an insult to' as well. This sense of injury is evident in Troilus' cry:

TC.III.1705
**** Pirous and tho swifte steedes thre, 
Which that drawen forth the sonnes char, 
Han gon som bi-path in dispit of me; 
That maketh it so soone day to be;

This intention to insult and demean is even more clear in the following:

LGW(F)134
In his dispit hem thoughe yt did hem good 
To synge of hym, and in hir song despise 
The foule cherl ***

Here Chaucer is picturing the triumph of small birds in Spring and their delight in pillorying in song the bird-catcher who tyrannised them during the winter months.

The sense 'in contempt for' rather than that of injury is represented by:
that foule partie shewe they to the peple prowldly in despit of honestitee,

The syntagm in d. seems to be able to refer to an act done in anger with the intention of insulting (Lowe. 1938) or to have a purposive sense (like the French phrase) i.e. 'in order to shame':

And wol nat suffren hem, by noon assent, Neither to been yburyed nor ybrent, But maketh houndes ete hem in despit."

The adverbial for d. may also have this purposive use:

Right for despit were peynted hem bisyde, Pyes, on hem for to crie and chyde.

Other uses cover the senses of adverbial phrases of manner: for annoyance or vexation:

and forasmuche as they dar nat openly withseye the commaundements of hir sovereynes, yet wol they seyn harm, and grueche,-and-murmure prively for verray despit; /

Other senses are 'to show contempt' (CT.III.2061) or simply 'because of contempt' and perhaps even 'because of a desire to injure'.

Contempt for one's fellow man may indicate pride in one's demeanour, so that despitous is frequently associated with pride:

Upon a lord that wol have no mercy, But been a leon, bothe in word and dede, To hem that been in repentaunce and drede, As wel as to a proud despitous man That wol mayntene that he first bigan.

Despitous is he that hath desdeyn of his neighebor ... or hath despit to doon that hym oghte to do.

Contempt may not be far removed from cruelty and violence, and this sense shift is no doubt hastened by the analogy of despitous with the sense of the adjective pitous. Thus, when the day interrupts lovers, it is cruel as well as contemptuous:

Alias I what have thise loveris the agylt, Dispitous day?

Mars is also cruel and dispitous (CT.II.435) as an essential trait of his
character as god of war. Hence, when Troilus falls to Achilles, only the occurrence independently of the adjective fierse discourages us from understanding despitously as 'fiercely, cruelly' and compels us to understand it as meaning 'contemptuously':

TC.V.1806  
Despitously hym slough the fierse Achille.

In less heroic combat, the sense of violence seems primary:

CT.I.4274  
And by the throte-bolle he caughte Alayn,  
And he hente hym despitously agayn,  
And on the nose he smoot hym with his fest.

Furious violence is certainly indicated when the aphetic form is applied to shouting:

CT.I.3476  
This carpenter wende he were in despeir,  
And hente hym by the sholdres myghtily,  
And shook hym harde, and cride spitously,  
"What! Nicolay! what, how!"

That connotations of lack of sympathy, roughness or contempt are present in these uses, where the primary sense is concerned with physical violence, is indicated by a use in the Clerk's Tale, where the French source is available to us:

CT.IV.534  
... but out the child he hente  
Despitously, and gan a cheere make  
As though he wolde han slayn it er he wente.

The French original concentrates on the roughness, the lack of courtesy of the servant, who carries off the child: 'prist l'enfant par rude et lourde maniere.'
DESDAYN

1. The senses of Desdayn plainly spring from the inequality between two or more people in some situation, or the self-esteem of one in regard to a particular act. These two facts are well-represented in the Verb/Object and related idioms. The Virgin is said to have so ennobled mankind that God no longer had desdayn of it:

CT.VIII.41 Thow nobledest so ferforth our nature,
That no desdayn the Makere hadde of kynde
His Sone in blood and flessh to clothe and wynde.

The word nature has the possible polysemy of 'birth and hereditary in the social sense' or simply 'inherent characteristics'.

The Parson repeatedly equates sinfulness to servitude and gives this as a reason why sins should be shunned:

CT.X.143 Certes, wel oghte a man have desdayn of synne, and withdrawe hym from that thraldom and vileynye./

(cf. ibid. 148, 152).

At line 150, the Persoun assumes that desdayn is natural when a servant sins, and argues that such desdayn should extend to a sinful master also. From the Persoun's attitude, it is possible to see that desdayn is essentially a social feeling, an attitude of the superior to his inferior; the Persoun is endeavouring to give it moral significance.

2. As with other words denoting social relationships, desdayn is also used to refer to the air of superiority adopted by the courtly lady, which makes her reject her lover:

TC.II.1217 She went allone, and gan hire herte unfettre
Out of desdaynes prison but a lite,
And sette hire down, and gan a lettre write,

In the lettering over the gate of the park of Love in the Parliament of Fowls (136), Disdayn is coupled with Daunger.
3. The idioms have s'one in d. and taak it .. in d. appear to have a slightly different sense from those mentioned above. There seems to be no question here of superiority of one person over another, nor of self-esteem preventing an act unworthy of a person. If any sense of scorn is involved, it is scorn of the ideas set forth by one man in a situation:

GP.789 "Lordynges," quod he, "now herkineth for the beste; But taak it nought, I prey yow, in desdeyn.

The Host is here introducing his idea of telling tales on the road to Canterbury. The second use is when the same host interrupts the Franklin's words in praise of the gentilless of the Squire, and reminds him of his promise to tell a tale to the order of the Host:

CT.V.700 "That knowe I wel, sire," quod the Frankeleyn. "I prey yow, haveth me nat in desdeyn, Though to this man I speke a word or two"

The reminder of the agreement is rather peremptory and the Franklin may well be referring to this lack of ceremony which would be appropriate in addressing a person worthy of disdain.

4. Two more occurrences require examination. Desdoyyn normally implies an action, some direct connection with a situation or person, scorning to act in a particular way or scorning a person. In Troilus, the hero, thinking Crisseyde is dead, prepares to kill himself and desdoyyn is the strong emotion which calls forth his exclamatio:

TC.IV.1191 Than seyde he thus, fulfuld of heigh desdoyyn: "O cruel Jove, and thow, Fortune adverse,

Here, desdoyyn seems to be the desire to dissociate himself from the life of men and specifically from his own worldly lot:

Bo.III,p.iv,9 And therof cometh it that Y have right gret disdoyyn that dignytes ben yyven ofte to wikkide men.

Here Chaucer is adopting, almost without modification, Jean de Meun's translation of quo fit ut indignemur .... If scorn is involved, it is scorn felt at the whole moral climate of the world and the injustice of human life.
only the occurrence of the word in question.

From the reference to "that which shall not pass," we see that there is an unchangeable battle space form in which

? that can be immediately made formless without solving, or

through any extreme condition.

Thus, the formation of the idea is "impossible."

It could mean that the object has been transformed to water, or life, or...and so on to the abilities of invisible or the forces of the millenniums to form and become, so that it is influenced by the adoration with the

Where can...
March 12, 1863

I am here in the valley of the shadow of death, (the valley of Baca.)
No triumph over me.

I.e. The word occurs in an old, and is the proper word here as a genuine example of a word which went out of use during the course of

Edward'skjold. Here... is... to revisit here again. This work...
Translation evidence offered by positition. These that MALICE be a fully broad application. Thus, as an explanation, it is the translation of "malice". Then the subversion of human nature is described, it is applied, and policy or repenting is the translation of "repentance".

The reason we disagree here that the same orthographic form is used in Amos.

There seem to be no habitual expressions into which, perhaps extent, earth, only, it repeated as a casual explanation of the link in the person's psychology, possibly the repeated thing, a. m. represents, with any kind of idea. The repeated adversative phrases are merely idiomatic ways of forming adverbs with any number.

The most important collocations are. "in a, adding a, based on structural considerations rather than frequency, implicitly existence, magnificent, wife.

1. The person deals shortly with MALICE at the beginning of his section on REBUS. He implies an opposition with EMBRACE and says that MALICE is drawn from MALICE, which makes it a sin against the holy thought. So then goes on to describe two kinds of MALICE, obedience, in sin or refusal to recognize that it is sin (as. 3 OF), and persecution of truth or God's gifts to another. MALICE in a person is seen in their vices and it is destructive of virtue and innocence of the soul.

32,11,363 O feared woman, all that may confound Virtue and innocence, though thy Malice, Is bred in thee, as most of every vice!

In justifying the subversion of human nature when it becomes malicious, reflected in the shape of man turned to beasts.

33,7,34,11,27 Therefore, when that man perverted and turned into Malice, content, whence have that form to the nature of man, etc.
2. The defined sense of *malice* as the desire and love of doing harm is supported by a number of ordinary uses in non-explicatory contexts. The following gives *malice* as the reason for an unjust accusation:

Bo.I,p.iv,272 But O malice! For they that accusen me ....

*Malice* seems to include not only the inclination to do harm but also implies the ability to do it:

LGe.2590 The rede Mars was that tyme of the yeere
So feble that his malyce is hym raft;
Repressed hath Venus his crewel craft,
............... venim is adoun,

This sense of the activity of the desire to do harm is also found in the collocation with *tirannye,* in which the ordinary senses of both are influenced by the other; *malice* - 'evil' *tirannye* - 'oppressive power' coalesce in a sense of delight in the power to do harm:

CT.II.779 O Donegild, I ne have noon Englishh digne
Unto thy malice and thy tirannye!

3. In a more passive sense, where active harm is not found, *malice* can have a sense merely of ill-feeling. Thus we can compare the following references to the same events in the Clerk's account of Griselda's suffering and Walter's cruelty. *Malice* may apply to the active wickedness of Walter in his persecution of his children and wife:

CT.IV.1074 "And folk that ootherways han seyd of me,
I warne hem wel that I have doon this deede
For no malice, ne for no crueltee,
But for t'assaye in the thy wommanhede,

It may also apply to the possibility that Griselda is so hardened in evil that she passively suffers the persecution of her children:

CT.IV.692 .... and if that he
Ne hadde soothly knownen therbifoore
That parfitly hir children loved she,
He wolde have wend that of som subtilete,
And of malice, or for cruel corage,
That she hadde suffred this with sad visage.

This passive use is reinforced by the contrast with *pacience* in line 1045. It is notable that *Crueltee* appears in both active and passive uses with *malice.*
4. The passive 'malice... observed mention on the only thing approaching an idea. The word has the same 'suspect's.

This noble act set by little sudden side

and by one with the bright eye.

and by some through the upthrust shield

Of the eye, and to the so long brought;

and through her, as she, as he, as thought like.

The first of these refers to Lucania seeing Hecuba, and the second to

denial extracting his sisters to France. In both the poss., the last

name of evil or evil intention may be equally well be replaced by the

name 'harm' if taken from the point of view of the result to the person

conspiring, or to another (i.e. if the reference is to the person who came

out but at this point in time, 'male' must mean 'evil' or 'evil intention;

because if the explicit in upon the coming victim, 'male' simply means 'harm')

The sense of male as evil intent, passive ill-wishing, is reinforced

by the parallel with hate in the following:

and thus thine foulest, void of all male, how run, and lusty vein

of hate, and equal will of our power,

5. An important consideration when male results in active harm is whether

or not it is intended. Taken from the point of view of the harm done,

intention seems to be an important criterion for omission to male. If

it is not intended this leads to the collocations with feilus.

Thus it is argued that Shakespeare could be foolhardy enough to do harm,

without intending to, through his habit of translation or adaptation of

other authors:

and she, per accident, for this man ye see,

do not the deed, save, save, no damage;

but for this vast thing, you to make

her simple heart of this writing, the tale.

In familiar culture, consider that foolhardiness is or was a source of

harm as malice.
TO.III.326 "I saye nought this for no mistrust of yow,
Ne for no wise men, but for folke nyce,
And for the harm that in the werld is now,
As wel for folke ofte as for malice;"

(cf. also TO.III.880)

The use of the adjective is in a passage referring to those critics of
the House of Fame who would judge it according to unfair criteria:

HF.93 And sende hem al that may hem plesse,
That take hit wel and skorne hyt noght,
Ne hyt mysdemen in her thoght
Thorgh malicious entencion.

This use can well be compared with some uses of Envye in a similar situation.
Translation evidence: the French corresponding to Chaucer's use of *envie* is repeatedly envi†e or avios. The phrase *full of envi†e* may represent the French plain *tén‡i†e*, but the phrase had ... rich lust and envi†e, ... is used to render *regnant avio* (22.1611). More unusual is the rendering for a somewhat sophisticated of the French *en fendoi† di‡re* a *envi†* (257) nothing offers a little Latin evidence. Here envy, *envius* and *uvius*, *envius covens* both rendered *envi†e* by Jean de Syston.

The most important collocations are greatly influenced by the moral doctrines of the seven sins. Thus the most important is the one which precedes it in the usual order: *Pride* and of considerable importance too is the one following, *jus‡ avius* too is important from the point of view of collocation. The other important collocations are: *jalousy, cruel,

It may be of interest that *envy* is regarded by the fourteenth century *Book of Vice and Virtue* as a branch of *Pride*. If we examine the branches there mentioned we find that the collocations are inductably influenced by the sort of moral theological thinking found in such works, thus the subdivisions of *Pride* are: (untroubled) false, traitor, treason, vilany, deceit; presumption; covetous, of Inc. wrath; hate; content.

1. The sin of *envy*, as described by works on the seven chief sins, is defined on numerous occasions in Chaucer's works. It is regarded with a seriousness which is not present in today's use of the term and it may be listed together with such grave misdeeds as murder (Plutarch, I.6, 52). The Parson opens his discussion of it by characterising it as "force of other manner propitious"; and after the word of boar Angustyn, it is *force of other manner slole, and joye of others manner harm" (304,481). Such a
Hat thought that had they predicted where Terah
that loved warm, saved from a great wall,
that old, as of another ancient tale,
and that in of his home and his people
(who doctor thought this description).

Ezra makes implicit irony of the stock definition by ascribing it to his
physically original linguistic person. The lemma also points out the
obvious connection between lovers and...
Again, in referring to Satan, reason is given why he should desire something of man's state, a reference is made to past joy when the stress is on present danger. Here the emphasis is more upon Satan's malice and destructive potential than upon his desire for his old heritage:

**CT.II.365**

O Satan, envious syn thilke day
That thou were chased from oure heritage,
Wol knowestow to wommen the olde way!

Malice and harm is obviously paramount in the following:

**LGW.902**

And now, ye wrechede jelos fadres oure,
We that whilom were children youre,
We preyen yow, withouten more envye,
That in o grave yfere we moten lye,

Similarly, the reason for bearing false witness is malice and the desire to do harm rather than coveting any good of the victim's:

**CT.X.796**

... when thou for ire, or for meede, or for envye, berest false witnesse, ...

Compare also **LGW.1899 et al.**, where stress is rather upon malice than desire.

3. A few uses make a clear distinction between the modern sense of envy and the implications of malice and hatred which are usually found in the Chaucerian use of the word. In one use *envye* is explicitly a mutual relation and not the attitude of one person to the good of another:

**HF.1476**

But yet I gan ful wel espie,
Betwex hem was a litil envye.
Oon seyde that Omer made lyes,

Here *envye* is preceded by the indefinite article and seems to have the sense of contention, dispute, and malice in the detraction of one poet's work by another. Similarly, mentioning the tale of the Calydonian boar, Chaucer recalls the disagreement and strife which arose from Meleager presenting the head of the boar to Atlanta. His uncles felt they had been slighted:

**TC.V.1479**

"Of which, as olde bokes tellen us,
Ther ros a contek and a greet envye;"

Here *envye* refers to the malice and hatred felt mutually and is somewhat abstracted to the sense 'strife'.

Compare the use in the **Knight's Tale** where Theseus endeavours to prevent hostile feelings developing into open strife:
... the sense is not of a gift or of author...

6. a nature of urs, however, have strength on the hostility of parent involvement upon the good fortune or achievement of one and the conviction of one as a constant and familiar and implied desire to achieve a similar form.

7. By which this follows hence great envy, explanation that Jason might be differential to the title.

have all in her collected my that anyway there...

and therefore, returning, in triumph and encountering a group of loving women, pass forward the text book education of JTV.

21.1.367 Good then, my dear...

Here is here, however, implicit opposition in the use of envy to the sun and this triumph. It is possible that the luster as sun in this account.

Similarly, Jason foresees people eager to reconstrue his story of the
theft of a she (21) which and equally he notices the fictional desire to write
something as well. In the epigraph he says that the work is a more
adaptable and not the product of his own ingenuity, finishing?

Act 1, Scene 54 and with this word shall I close envy.

Here, the envy that he has in him is clearly the distraction of a malicious
critics which may be stimulated by a resentment of his ability. In almost
every use of the word envy there is alongside the govennment of another's
achievement or good fortune this trace of resentment at it and consequent
hostility to the person; the difference in men, it primarily, in the manner
given to this hostility. Even then the ability is stressed; hostility in
close, presents...

20.5.72...
One use is found, however, which Chaucer translated from the French, in which
the sense of malice, resentment or hostility is entirely absent. It
describes the attitude of a single man without any reference to relations
with another:

**RR.1653**

Tho hadde I sich lust and envie,
That for Parys ne for Pavie
Nolde I have left to goon and see
There grootist hep of roses be.

This is a translation of *E lors m'en prist si grant envie,* and we should
note the different syntactic structure (followed by *that*) and the fact that
the word *lust* is imported into the translation to reinforce the sense of
'desire'. The English translation of this French sense (cf. mod. French
*avoir envie de*) requires the specifying function of *lust*; it is translated
by a phrase because the Middle English sense of *envye* is almost exclusively
pejorative and has implications of its neighbouring deadly sins. This
sense of desire is approached by the verb *envien* (*HF.1231*) as are senses
of 'compete' (*BD.406*) and 'compete with the aim of detraction' (*TC.V.1789*).

5. The conventions of courtly love required that those who were in love
should be considered to be greater blessed than those excluded; hence they
were constantly the possible targets of the *envye*. Therefore, although
the profit or advantage of lovers may not be obvious and the malice of
detractors may be overt, this kind of malice is always modified by the
assumption that they covet the estate of the lovers.

This is least noticeable in the ascription of *envye* to a wall by
Pyramus and Thisbe (*LGW.757*). The impression is that the word is habitually
applied to all those obstructive to lovers and the wall qualifies for this
broad classification, thus, too, is *day* classified, in the traditional *aube*
situation:

**TC.III.1700**

And day they gonnen to despise al newe,
Callyng it traitour, envyous, and worse,
And bitterly the dayes light thei corse.

The text book of courtly love in northern France, the *Roman de la Rose*, makes
Felonye, felonous, feloun

Comparatively few of the occurrences of the lexeme are found outside Boethius, and this is in part the result of Jean de Meun's predilection for it.

Translation evidence is of course plentiful. Partly as a result of the use of the French translation, the grammatical categories of the original are not always identical with those of Chaucer's work. Thus the noun 
improbitas is translated 'felonous wikkidnesse' and nefas, 'felonous synne'.

The main glosses of Felonye are: scelus (sceleratus); nefas; nequitia; iniquitas; facinus.

The first two are easily the commonest.

For Felonous: sceleratus (scelus); nefarius (nefas); improbus (improbitas); perniciosus, and once each, toruus; saeuis (applied to tyrants) and ferox.

The first two are again more common.

For Feloun scelus; facinus.

The Roman de la Rose also gives us the French word felonie.

The most important head words are: those representing types of people - man, folk, citezeens, tirantz - in a general way, and there are collocations with different words which are more or less semantically equivalent: do; performen; apparaileen and wikkidnesse; curesynnesse; synne.

The most important collocations are: wikkide (wikke); synne;

and with negative implication: vertu; innocentz;
also despitous/spitous; and one occurrence each of the semantically related yvel, schrewednesse, mysdedes.

1. It is already clear from the evidence above that FELONYE has, as its commonest sense, something to do with the commission of evil acts. Its sense
seems; occasionally, suggest the name of violence and society evident in shaded red such a possibility in more in which by private collectors.

Clearly, a delusion may be characterized as in not which in morally evil

But for the reason of good and belongs as well not be referring to good.

shades of a reporter: mention of the culpable which was the can be.

and for good and: this is native to the violence and evil conflict of good.

But at least it has involved that delusion falls that

and the death of site, one man. The final, concrete example above is repeated on the abstract level of involving various virtues:

In which way some must accept subduing, that I argue only that offended falls incorporate delusion against

It is also stated in terms of the guilty in conflict with the innocent (29.l, p.v.197).

Emphasis refer to the violent and one situation, also to the abstract principle of guilt and evil opposed to virtue and innocence.

Naturally, moral guilt also involves legal guilt so that there is some direction of the punishment forever by 436.LXIII

age that usually virtues, land, and those other elements of lawful gazette has neither used to delusion at all in

which delusion opposes the gazette has established that for good folk.

sum, 436.LXIII enters the same range of 'original', and in other idea. year, also has its references at 'lawfulness'.

I propose page of falls deluge the prosecution of several virtues, and that when content form of deluges been sworn

as according in example. ... (cf. also 49.lv, p.v.22).

2. 49.lv. then, including those which are both original and illegal, and
their gravity varies considerably. They may include all those acts of which the Furies were traditionally the avengers (Bo.III,m.xii,34); murder is also included (CT.VII.3040; and CT.II.643). But, besides this more emotional use of *felonye* to refer to serious crimes, it can be used for apparently less serious misdemeanours. It is used, for example, of the plottings of Boethius' adversaries:

Bo.I,p.iv,52 And of the felonyes and fraudes of thyn accusours ...

and in the Parson's Tale 438 a meyne is called *felonous* which is *damagous* to other people. Other things worthy of the appelation are the desire to do vengeance, and the tendency to anger (CT.X.543; Bo.IV,p.iii,107). The equivalence of a *felonye* and a *symne* is suggested by the translation in Boethius I,p.iv,154:

> For shal I clepe it thanne a felonye—or a symne—thatis I have desired the savacioun of the ordre of the senat?

The syntax of the English might suggest a distinction between the two terms, but this cannot be maintained along the lines of legality/morality in other contexts, nor is it supported by the Latin where the single word *nefas* is used. The present phrase is the product of a dilemma in the French translation.

3. *FELONYE* is used of illegality according to the laws of the state and of immorality according to the laws of society; it is also used of sins against man or God in religious estimation. The Parson speaks of the sin of Despair, pointing out that it is the origin of all varieties of wrongdoing, probably judged from the religious viewpoint:

CT.X.696 This horrible synne is so perilous that he that is despeired, ther nys no felonye ne no symne that he douteth for to do;

In speaking of sins against God, *felonous* can have the sense 'blasphemous'

Bo.V,p.iii,125 But not onely to trewe that God is disseyved, but for to speke it with mouth, it is a felonous symne.

To think that God is not sovereign good is called a *felonous cursydnesse*
The first thing that needs to be done is to ...
In speaking of Ire, the Parson distinguished a reprehensible kind which leads to premeditated desire for vengeance; the source of this is *felonie of herte* (CT.X.543). In a similar sense, *felonye* is one of a list of vices given in *Boethius IV*, prosa iii. These include avarice, ire, timidity, sloth, inconstancy, lechery, and treachery (*insidiator occultus*):

and if he be felonous and withoute reste, and exercise his tonge to chidynges, thow schalt likne hym to the hound.

(Perox atque inquiss lingumam litigiiis exercet?)

Here *felonous* is certainly evil to others, in the sense of quarrelsome, malicious and perhaps *Envyous*.

In the *Romance*, the arrow in the quiver of Swete-Lokyng which is called Vylanye is said to be poisoned with *felonye* and *spitous blame*. Again the sense seems to be one of harmfulness to the lover, one of malice. Earlier in the poem (165) the image of Felonie is set between those of Hate and Vilanye.

The collocation *felonous talenz* (*Bo.V*, p.ii.36) is slightly ambiguous in significance, since it may mean the desires and affections of an evil man, or it may mean affections which are destructive to that man. The latter sense squares best with the Latin (*perniciosis ... affectibus*).

5. The form *Feloun* as a substantive simply means one who is *felonous* or commits *felonyes*. It occurs in the same kind of contexts as these two words: virtue receives the punishments suitable to *felouns* (*Bo.IV*, p.1,31) and;

so that anoyous Payne, that scholde duweliche punysche felons, punysscheth innocents?

The adjectival use is more difficult to account for:

To Troie is come this woful Troilus,
In sorwe aboven alle sorwes smerte,
With feloun look and face dispitous.

The clue to the sense of this must be given by the considerations given in the preceding paragraph. Here, the term must signify a look of malice to all mankind, related to the sense of *FELONYE* in the *Romance of the Rose*. We may compare it with a second usage in the same poem: *Ses felons cuers* (*RR.265*).
Ylenger, yleng, ylengerly, ylengenent.

In common collocations, e.g., in deriduing name of kneuaut, koon\^, al\^, al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^, al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^, al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^, al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^ al\^.

Notice also the number of the seven shee and their branches which are collolated with ylenger, yleng, etc. etc., etc.

There are also a number of collocations which represent the lesser station of society: ylengdon, ylengoed, etc.

The Romance offers little useful translation evidence, though ylengersly in Chaucer’s translation of ylengent.

Nothing offers the following glosses with leur v. c non contenteun.

(\*French ylenger

how Conte v. c non contenteun.

(\*French Hector

1. Some of the collocations of YL\^G\^TH, together with the translation from Latin dederam and French ylenger, suggest a reference to the social hierarchy, which in the primary use of the loanes in the earlier Old French texts. The substantive ylenger, referring to a member of the lower social orders, occurs only in the doubtfully Chaucerian parts of the text. Earlier in the account, however, this sense is preserved in Chaucer’s usage, social baseness being measured by lack of knowledge of the custom and manners of the more elevated members of society.

Chaucer considers that the baseness of the personification of ylenger consists in her lack of training to treat anyone with honour. The French original adds the conception of worthiness of honour.
165ff. Qu'el sembloit bien chose vilaine;  
Bien sembloit estre d'afiz pleine  
E fame qui petit selst  
D'enorer ce qu'ele deust.

Roughness of speech and expression may be considered indicative of social baseness, as Chaucer was aware when he defended verisimilitude of speech at the commencement of the *Canterbury Tales*:

**GP.726** But first I pray yow, of youre curteisye,  
That ye n'arette it nat my vileynye,  
Thogh that I pleynly speke in this mateere,  
To tell yow hir wordes and hir cheere,

A man may be considered to exhibit *VYLAYNYE* in his speech according to two criteria; those of the form of his speech and of its content. Chaucer adds to the above:

**GP.740** Crist spak hymself ful brode in hooly writ,  
And wel ye woot no vileynye is it.

When speaking of *vylyyne* as a speech-act, the usual implication is that it refers to the content of what is said. The person of refinement was, unlike the personification of *Vylynye*, supposed to esteem his fellow highly; hence, if he detracted from them, he fell below this ideal and behaved in a manner more fitted to the level of churl:

**GP.70** He nevere yet no vileynye ne sayde  
In al his lyf unto no maner wight.  
He was a verray, parfit gentil knyght.

One who speaks ill of another may find himself accused of *VYLAYNYE*:

**TC.IV.21** Allas! that they sholde evers cause fynde  
To speke hire harm, and if they on hire lye,  
Iwis, hemself sholde han the vilanye.

An antonymy with *Curteisie* is suggested in the following and reinforced by

**CT.IV.2303:**

**CT.VI.740** But, sires, to yow it is no curteisye  
To spoken to an old man vileynye,  
But he trespasse in word, or elles dede.

Within the ethos of courtly manners, *VYLAYNYE* may refer to acts wider than a mode of address: thus Pandarus dissuades Troilus from leaving the house of Sarpedoun at an earlier time than expected in case this is construed as *VYLAYNYE*:
The essential criterion of success, summed from the ethical social reference, is also more morally both in the social morality of childhood and the spiritual morality of the church.

The translation from a reference to social because to one of moral because is explained or qualifying such as the site of land.

And the translation is not always believe that a village or any other place can always be a village.

2. One may commit an act which, in isolation, is judged to be a bad one, but when viewed in context as an action or action in the light of the fact, such acts are usually helpful to another and often imply a decrease in their value or a deduction from them. Thus, a principality in the current, in our anger not to come to complete tax losses:

But the high holy site known to buổi; his thought it allow a village.

Conversely, the unhappiest of men is considered as a hero since the proper behavior of the hero and called a "hero" (Jes. 35:1) and another famous that he brings nothing to dedicate that can track back an (Jes. 8:6, 10:33). This means of TV plan as it becomes a form that can not from social practice it also are cut in the reference to "enlightenment" in
She took hir children alle, and skipte adoun
Into the fyr, and chees rather to dye
Than any Romayn dide hir vileynye.

Creon's treatment of the dead bodies of his enemies (CT.I.942) is regarded
as an act of Vylayne; a reduction of the esteem in which they should be
held, a gross insult. VYLAYNE is also one of the possible reasons for
unfair critics detracting from the House of Fame:

And whose thorgh presumpcion,
Or hate, or skorn, or thorgh envye,
Dispit, or jape, or vilanye,
Hysdeme hyt,

And words described as Vileyne may not simply be poorly formed but may have
a content which detracts from the person to whom they are addresseed:

for he dide nevere synne, ne nevere cam ther a vileyne
word out of his mouth./ Whan men cursed hym, he cursed hem
noght;

Frequently, VYLAYNE seems to apply to an act close to betrayal, in
which a person who should by the established order of things respect and
be loyal to another, does them harm:

0 Januaria, dronken in plesaunce
In mariage, se how thy Damyan,
Thyn owene squier and thy borne man,
Entendeth for to do thee vileynye.

(With this type should be compared the Vylayne of false lovers).

Wives, in their adultery, do vylayne to their husbands (CT.IV.2261), and
also in betraying their secrets (CT.III.962).

Also VYLAYNE is used simply to refer to an act done to the detriment
of another with overtones neither of betrayal nor of deliberate detraction:

So lat me nevere out of this hous departe,
If I mente harm or any vilanye!

3° As mentioned above, the baseness of sin may be implied by the use of
VYLAYNE - especially in a religious context, but also in the colloquial
language (CT.III.962), where both are used with less strict application.
In the usage of the Latin and other ecclesiastical languages, there is

frequently associated with one or another of the words "in" or "adsque"; hence

adjunction (II, XIII, 69) and "latter" (XII, 61) are particularly indicated for

conjunction with "latter". In this connection there is a reference to

"in" (another) and a certain distinction and in the

choice to qualify words, such as "inhabitant" the villager becomes an

inhabitand (II, XIII, 70), "have in villaggio" (XII, XIII, 70), "within the

villaggio" (XII, XIII, 70) and the following opposition to "salute":

XII, XIII, 70: No matter right that one has with its "

so as not the other to respect and hate the villaggio".

XII, XIII, 71: in these points with "latter".

XII, XIII, 72: The "latter" is for to an "corn" knowledge and villaggio,

but at once point identified with the "in villaggio" (XII, XIII, 71). In

a broader sense of the i. e. general, a man may have villaggio thoughts, speak

villaggio words, and have a villaggio heart;

XII, XIII, 77: and certainly villaggio may not only but out of a villaggio

heart.

This idea should be compared with the idea of words of attraction mentioned

above.

Let at its moment be characterized in the same way;

XII, XIII, 80: for which every villaggio name, that was born in another

places may be called "villaggio;"

The devil tries to draw people into his villaggio (XII, XIII, 81)

4. The adverb villaggiarily has a very limited use (2 uses) and is restricted
to the modification of past participles, used passively, in two of these.

The exception illustrates the sense with overtones of betrayal, as well as

behaviour unaccustomed to social position, and is contrasted with the behaviour

of the person just quoted;

XII, XIII, 84: ... and to him for the death with his hose-

blood; that they are unkindly, canon his gentleness,

given him no villaggiarily to show him of his own nature.

The passive uses place the word in a position which facilitates interpretation.
in a new sense. It is in fact a form referred wholly and solely back to the
actor, but now modified by a preposition which in turn modifies the action
upon. The attention is directed to the person mentioned and a new sense
of spite, spite in general.

42 3 A 96 Then should the facts in every passage
have altered from whatever action,
that has no vital unity forward.

The logical situation is much clearer in the French.

42 3 4 Je pourroit savoir a entendre
that used and in itself want
not l'en routine but vibrant.

Here there is a notion towards symmetry with 624422.
Accumulation evidence is no way to the conclusion of the wind that

1.

The conclusion was later supported by John Dobson.

18, 1911, a little after the All of 1920 and All of the original

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Kate seems like a creator of discord and has an attitude of heart called fel,
and the Harpies are called cruel brydder felle (Ch.VII.2100):

\[\text{Ch.I.2630} \quad \text{Ther nas no tyre .......}
\]
\[\text{so cruel on the hunte as is arcite}
\]
\[\text{Per jecous herte upon this Palamon.}
\]
\[\text{He in Belmarye ther nys so fel leon,}
\]
\[\text{That hunte it, or for his hunger wood,}
\]

Cruelty evidently implies no moral judgement, but simply harshness, cruelty, violence, ferocity. The destructive ferocity of Mars and Juno is expressed in the only direct application to a human referent; though immortal, rather than human, and above moral judgement:

\[\text{Ch.I.1559} \quad \text{Allas, thou felle Mars! allas, Juno!}
\]
\[\text{Thus hath youre ire ore lynage al fordo,}
\]

2. The Old French use of fel regularly applied to human beings and had a range of sense from 'wicked' through 'cruel' to 'traitor'. It would seem, therefore, that the English senses are all transferred senses of the original. There is, however, a use in Troilus and Criseyde which closely approaches these other French uses:

\[\text{Ch.V.70} \quad \text{But wha he holde don so fel a dede,}
\]
\[\text{That shal I seyn, and whi hym list it spares:}
\]

The deed mentioned is the projected slaying of Diomedo and the carrying off of Criseyde. Troilus rejects the idea lest Criseyde be injured. Although the deed is one of violence and harshness, the stress is not upon the cruelty of Troilus; the fact that this is a human act, which is debated, invites moral judgement. Thus, perhaps, fel has some of its French sense of 'evil' or even 'mad' or 'desperate' which may be justified in view of the gloss of Latin insanum (see above + compare WOOD).

Again, this moral sense is invoked when Troilus is searching for some justification for Criseyde's desertion:

\[\text{Ch.V.1257} \quad \text{What wraoth of juste cause have ye to me?}
\]
\[\text{What gilts of me, what fel experience,}
\]
\[\text{Hath fro me raft, allas! thyn advertence?} \]
Jalousy

No translation evidence is offered by either Boethius or the Romance.

The most common associations by collocation are, in decreasing order of frequency: strif; love; wood; cruelty; envious; hate; novelrie. Some of these occur in simple lists while others recur in syntactically patterned positions; of the latter, strif, envious, wood and love are important.

Other words of similar sense occurring in syntactically patterned positions are: debat, treason, tore, encre, wrothe.

1. The lexeme JALOUSIE is easily the most common in relation to the situations of lovers or of husbands and wives. A husband or a lover may be jalous without the threat of a third party, and this is demonstrated by his deeds which, however, presuppose the possibility of a rival.

The longest explication of JALOUSIE is given by Criseyde's musings on the behaviour of Troilus, who has fallen into miserable speculation on her supposed infidelity:

TC. III. 1023ff. "Ey al my wo is this, that folk now usen To seyn right thus, 'Ye, jalousie is love!' and wolde a busheal venym al excusan, For that o greyn of love is on it shine, But that woot heigh God that sit above, If it be likkere love, or hate, or grame; And after that, it oughte bore his name."

Criseyde goes on to say that some kinds of jalousye are excusable, as for example when it is repressed by Piete, so that the sufferer does not do or say amiss; this pentelesse makes jalousye excusable. By comparison, she says, there is also jalousye, full of furie and despit, which overcomes all efforts to repress it. She finally admits that Troilus succeeds in the repression of his jalousye and this makes for his discomfort.
2. In the *jalousye* exhibited by husbands or accepted lovers, an important criterion of the sense is that of possessiveness, and the desire to retain the prize; this desire often necessitating repression of the wife or beloved.

In the case of wives this may extend to the threat of death:

**CT.IV.2073** And therswithal the fyr of jalousie,
Lest that his wyf sholde falle in some follye,
To brente his herte that he wolde sayn
That som man bothe hirr and hym had slayn.

There may be no immediate threat and *jalousye* may be an habitual attitude resulting in restriction and oppression of the one who is possessed:

**CT.I.3224** Jalous he was, and heeld hire narwe in cage,
For she was wyde and yong; and he was old,
And dened hymself been lik a cokewold.

In the following, *jalousye* is coupled with *kepyng,* which demonstrates the primacy of this idea in this sense and situation:

**CT.I.3651** Thus asved was this carpenteris wyf,
For all his kopyng and his jalousye;

In this primary sense, then, is the reaction of lovers or husbands at the contemplation of their partner entering a sexual liaison with another. Within this broad terminology a further situation may be included; the reaction of fathers of daughters to a similar threat to their children:

**LO.900** And now, ye wrechede jelos fadres oure,
We that whilom were children youre,
We preyen you, withouten more enuye,
That in a grave shere we moten ly;
Sith love hath brought us to this pitous ende.

Piramus and Thisbe are the speakers.

The lexeme is also used in this kind of situation with a good deal of vagueness as to who shows the emotion:

**LO.722** For in that contre yit, withouten doute,
Haydene been ykept, for jalousye,
Ful stryte, lest they diden som follye.

The lover who is *jalous* may sometimes be in no position to restrain his beloved by force so that the most he can do, short of unacceptable violence, is to speak bitter words to her; thus, by metonymy, we have: *jalous wordes* (*TV.* III.907), and in describing the perfect marriage:
Cf. I.1105

... and no man loveth so tenderly,
And he his serveth so gently,
That never was ther no word haw bitwene
Of jalousie or any oother teene.

Cf. too 22.V.74C.

Thus, within the field of marriage and sexual relations generally, jalousie indicates primarily a kind of possessiveness with overtones of unreasonableness, and an inevitable contiguity in the situation with oppression and violence. 1

2. JALOUSYE also has the criterion of suspiciousness:

Verc. 33

Jalousie be hangen be a cable!
She wolde al knowe through her espay-
That ther doth no wyght nothing to reasonable;
That al nyce harming in her imaginyn.

The personification of Jalousie is considered an ever vigilant for harm and transcending reason in her alertness. This attitude, implying distrust of one's beloved (22.IXX.837), is of course anathema to courtly love, and is considered one of the mortal vices in that situation:

24.498

"I can coyn, if she me wynde sake,
Unkynde, janglere, or rebel any wyse;
Or jalous, do me hanzen by the hel!"

3. A number of uses of JALOUSYN in the Knight's Tale deserve special mention, since their sense seem to be affected by the special situation there, where intense rivalry exists between two equals in the estimation of a single lady. The lady does not care passionately for either. Since neither has possession of the lady and the rivalry is open, allowing no suspicion, neither of these criteria are stressed. The emphasis seems to be on the strength of feeling and the anxiety felt by each lest the other should be successful. This leads to violent hostility between

---

1 Both jalousye and avarice are considered traditionally typical of the old, and both included this element of hemynge. Gower comments upon the affinity between the two:

"... and wel maketh a litel unhede
Between him which is avariouse
Of golde and him that is jalous
Of love".


them and the sense of the lexeme, through the comparative lack of involvement of the lexem, and the suppression of the other criteria, moves towards that of hatred:

2.1.2785 I have here with my count Palamon
had strif and rancour many a day ago
for love of you, and for my jalousye.

Earlier in the poem, the pairing of strif and jalousye seen to invite understanding as similar, in referring to the relationship of Palamon and Arcite, which is seen to be an inimical one:

2.1.1034 I spake as for my suster Luysye,
for whom ye have this strif and jalousye.

This impression is strengthened by a similar pairing a few lines later:

2.1.1840 That is to say, she may not now have both,
Al be ye never so jalousse as to mothe.

Theseus is preparing to arbitrate between Palamon and Arcite. In their final battle we hear that Arcite is cruel and fierce to Palamon for Jalous.

The impression is strengthened by a similar pairing a few lines later:

2.1.2634 The jalous stroke on hir helme byto;
Out rennete blood on botho hir sydes rede.

From this context we would be almost justified in reading jalous as synonymous with 'hostile' or, avoiding figurative language, simply 'violent'.

4. A number of uses occur also which seem to be closely similar in sense to some of the senses of envyoun. The persons who are likely to be jalous are not clearly specified and seem to have a very tenuous connection with those against whom their malevolence is directed. They seem to occupy the place of the loscngiers of French courtly poetry who are always ready to defend courtly lovers:

2.1.(g)331 For in youre court is many a loscngour,
And many a quoynte toteler accusour,
That taboure in youre ere many a thynge
For hate, or for jalous yngynge.

Chaucer is here talking of the court of Love, but there is no hint of competition between the accusers and accused, and the stress seems to be more
upon gratuitous malice than strongly emotional motives. For the barefulness of the accusations, compare the phrasing of Venus 33 (above). Again, in The Squire's Tale, V, 206, the strategems of lovers against the perception of vague jealous men are mentioned, and in Venus, 62, the adjective is used substantively to suggest the unspecified persons who might prove a threat to the lover's resolution. Finally, in Here, 7, the light of the sun is seen as the candle which reveals lovers' secrets to the jealous and enables their slanderous tongues to wag:

Here 7

But ye lovers, that lye in any noose,
Fleeth, lest wikked tongues yow espye! Lo! sond the rumor; the candle of jealous:

This is an adaptation of the classical aube and it has its loco diere in attendance; people who are not personally involved, but who are malicious, though less than immediately desirous of being in the position of the lovers.

5. The sense of violent enmity mentioned above is to be found more explicitly in the following. Here there is no suggestion of possessiveness, nor even a vague desire for the position of the person against whom the malice is directed. The emphasis is purely upon unreasoning malice and violence:

UT, I. 1329

But I moot been in prisoyn thurgh Saturne, And eek thurgh Juno, jealous and eek wood, That hath destroyed wol ny al the blood Of Thebes,

This uniquely clear example of jealous in the sense 'malicious' is also its only application to a female.

6. Also unique is its application to an animal, the swan. This comes in a list of birds in which distinctive features are given:

Pr. 342

There was the douve with hire yen make; The jealous swan, ayens his deth that syngeth;

The precise contextual sense here is difficult to establish, but Professor J. A. W. Bennett remarks that JALOUSYB was traditionally ascribed to swans.  

1 The Parlement of Foules, p. 150, where he quotes this association in Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy.
7. Finally a peculiar use in the *Parson's Tale* may be noted:

CT. X. 539  

The good ire is by jalousie of goodnesse, thurgh which a man is wrothe with wikkednesse and agayns wikkednesse;

This sense is evidently not very different from senses in paragraphs 1 to 3, and seems to imply a fervent desire to possess.
Tirannye, tiraunt

Translation evidence of Boethius shows that tiraunt is used only to gloss tyrannus, though the sentence may be arranged so that tirannye glosses tyrannus.

Collocation evidence: the most important collocations are: cruel/cruelttee (easily most important), wode, felonous. There is also a reciprocal relation between the antithetical relation of vertuous and the positive one of vice. It might be added that the names of the following vices are found among the collocants: ira, pride, envy, avarice (the last 3 in a single passage).

1. Viciousness and oppression are obviously components of the sense of TIRANNYS from the collocations mentioned above. The Latin tyrannus is derived from the Greek and is generally taken to mean 'absolute ruler' but it is clear that the association with cruelty had been made in the Late Latin of Boethius. There are occasional uses in Chaucer where the wickedness of the man of power called a tiraunt is not stressed:

De.III,p.v,23 A tiraunt, that was kyng of Synile, that hadde assayed the peril of his estat, schewed by similitude the dредes of remes by jastnesse of a sword that heng over the hed.

In the Franklin's Tale, Chaucer speaks of tirauntz in the Greek sense, but the more modern sense is also applicable for they are ful of cursednesse (V.1368) and involved in deeds of violent oppression (CT.V.1387).

Elsewhere, tiraunt refers to a man of power who is also wicked and oppressive, and tirannye always has the emphasis on evil and cruelty. Tiraunts are false (CT.VII.2537); felonous and wode (De.I,iv,13; IV,m.i,42); cruel (CT.VII.2103). Tirannye is listed with other violently harmful abstractions in CT.I.2015 and is, with other vices, notable by its absence from the ideal Former Age 54. Pursuing a conception of recurrent interest
to Chaucer, it is regarded as undesirable in the man of power. It is his particular vice:

\[ \text{CT.VI.2508} \]

"Lire," wolde he seyn, "an emperour moot nede be vertuous and hate tirannye -"

(see also \[\text{ibid. I.2502}\]).

The essential wickedness of the tyrant is clearly stated in the following:

\[ \text{CT.IX.223} \]

"Right so bitwise a titleless tyrant and an outlawe, or a thief errant, The same I say, there is no difference. To Alexander was told this sentence, That, for the tyrant is of greater might, By force of mayne, for to slay downright,"

In this definition, the word \text{titleless} is important, since it implies a distinction between wrongful oppression and rightful severity. In general use this distinction is subject to blurring. The peculiar use where \text{tyrant} seems to be used adjectivally is an example of such blurring; the fermour has the right to be severe in administration of his tenure, but the line between oppression and justifiable and expected severity is a subjective one:

\[ \text{Id.(F)377} \]

"For he that kyng or lord ye naturall, iljia to be tyrant ne cruel, As is a fermour, to doon the harm he kan."

It is assumed that one who has no ties, inherited by birth, with his liegemen, will be oppressive.

2. The cruelty and oppression of persons in power may be referred to in abstract terms, as in adverbial phrases of manner. In such uses \text{tirannye} seems to become a quality of the mind like \text{cruelty}:

\[ \text{CT.I.941} \]

"Fullfild of ire and of iniquitee, he, for despit and for his tirannye, To do the dade bodyes vilenye Of alle our lordes whiche that been ylawe, Hath alle the bodyes on an heap ydrawe,"

and again:

\[ \text{AI.66} \]

"And whan the old Croon gan espie How that the blood roial was brought a-doun, he held the cite by his tyrannye," with emphasis rather upon cruelty and violence than upon regal power, the
torn tyrant is used figuratively to apply to the squire.1

Ex. 314

Ther was the tyrant with his feathers done
And grey, I wene the squuir, that doth yyne
To bryddes for his outrageous ravyne.

3. As is often the case, tyrannye is used both in the discussion of political and social behaviour and also, by figurative transfer, in the discussion of courtly love. Thus Crisycde, with reference to her reluctance to accede to Troilus's desire, is accused of playing the tyrant (Ex. I:II.1240). The thinking which allows the application of the term to a reluctant mistress is set out in the following:

67.1189

Som tyrant is, as ther be many con,
That hath an herte so hard as any stoon,
Which wolde ha him let hym intervein in the place
Ne rather than ha granted hym hire grace;
And haes rejoyssn in hire cruel Pryde,
And reketh nat to been an homicide.

When Love is personified, tyrannye may be used as a quality of its 'character'; likewise it may be referred to the behaviour of the personified Cruelte (Pity 6; 67). The first is stated in a favourite antithesis of deserts and treatment received. (cf. Ex. 1:07):

Pity 6

My purpose was to pite to compleyne
Upon the cruelte and tyrannye
Of Love, that for my trouthe doth me dye.

Here, tyrannye can hardly be considered a part of character, but is rather judged as a result of effects on another; it is oppression by a hypothetical entity which can be defined only by its harsh results.

4. Finally a number of uses exist outside the courtly love situation and which have little emphasis on violent power. They seem to be primarily moral uses. This accounts for the use in the description of Custance, though the contract with humility suggests that tyrannye here, though primarily moral, implies haughtiness and superior attitude:

1. Jennett, The Parlament of Fowles, p. 150, says that Chaucer is here following Alain of Lille and that the word had a special association with birds of prey.
C.1.II.155 Ambulance hath sloun in hire al tirranye.
The is mirour of allz curticey;
Hir berto is verray chamber of boul, boun, boun;
Hir hand, ministre of fredam for almece."

Such a sense is probably present in the purging of a courtly lover:

Laxo 37 For she forbad hia jolymge at el,
and cruelte, and bost, and tirranye;

But the sense may sometimes suggest no tendency to set oneself above others
and may simply imply evil and violence to others:

C.1.II.779 O Donegild, I ne have noon English dizne
Into thy milice and thy tirranye!

And the same lady said to be ful of tirranye (696).

The lady in love can complain of the tirranye done by men, where the
word means no more than the wicked and cruel deeds done to the undeserving:

LXX.I.1883 And as of men, loke ye which tirranye
They doon oldy; every hem whose lyte,
The trewest ys ful brotel for to triste,

5. The Use of Tirrunt as an Adjective

The use in appositive function of the noun, as in the tirrunt Arisc-egl ey (C.1.V.1387), is fairly common. Such uses call for no comment other
than that, if an adjective of identical form exists, it would be impossible
in such uses to distinguish the attributive adjective and the noun. This
is equally true in predicative constructions:

Lax.(F)377 For he that kyng or lord ye naturel,
Ryn oghte nat be tirrunt ne crouel,

This unique use closely parallels a common predicative use of adjectives in
which two adjectives are paired by the use of a conjunction. This fact of
use, however, encourages the interpretation of this particular use of tirrunt as an
adjectival one.
Ire, irous

Translation evidence is restricted, since the form of the word is frequently adopted directly from Latin or French.

From Old French: for his wrath, yre, and onde — de corvo et d'astine
he that is irous and wrooth — qui est courroucio
stirch...to wrse and to irs — a courrouia et a yre
he baer a cruel ire — il estoit mout courroicie

In these examples, selected from outside those uses where Chaucer merely adopts the word ire from his source, it is most striking how consistently he pairs ire with wrooth in translating the French lexeme COIRON. This seems to be a specifying or clarifying technique akin to the glossator's pairing of terms.

From Latin: In Boethius Chaucer's use represents the ira of Latin and the ire of Jean de Join.

Collocational evidence is, as might be expected, affected by the presence of IRE as one of the chief sins. It collocates frequently with other sins and their branches (lechery, envy, pride, covetise, hate, falncensc et al.).

It commonly collocates also with words signifying sorrow or misery. Its other most important collocates are: CRULETALS, FOOLNESSE, MATHE, ANGER, VENGANCE.

Before endeavouring to ascertain the senses and sense-relations of IRE from its uses, it might be instructive to look at the terms in which it is defined in didactic contexts expounding the seven capital sins. The Parson has a long section on IRE and the means to combat it. The theological attitude may, however, be introduced by the Summoner:

CT.III.2005 Ire is a synne, son of the se of sevones,\nAbhominable unto God of hevenes;\nAnd to hymself it is destruction.
This every lewed viker or person\nCan seye, how ire engendreth homycide.\nIre is, in sooth, executour of pryde.
Surely enough, the Parson opens his section on _ire_ by pointing out its origins in _pride_ and _envy_:

**CT.X.534** for soothly, he that is proud or envious is lightly wrooth.

he goes on: 'This synne of _ire_, after the discovering of _Saint Augustine_, is wicked will to been avenged by word or by deed.

There follows a pseudo-scientific description of the perturbation of the blood in the heart, causing a man to wish harm to those he hates, and resulting in the clouding of his reason. The Parson then divides _ire_ into two: good _ire_, which is _ire_ against evil deeds, and wicked _ire_, which can itself be divided. The first of these divisions is _sodeyn_ or _hastif_ _ire_ which springs without premeditation; the second, and the graver, is that species of _ire_ which is a determination to do vengeance and is premeditated as such. This form is mortal sin.

The results of _ire_ are that a man is robbed of his spiritual tranquility; he is subject to hatred and discord, liable to strife and murder. There is no need to follow the subtleties of the operations of _ire_ which might face the parish priest in his pastoral duties; the Parson ends by counselling _DÉBOJAIREFTE_ and _PACIENCE_ as antidotes to _ire_.

Amongst this multiple definition of _ire_, offered by two of the Churchmen on the Pilgrimage, we have encountered a number of the criteria of sense which emerge in use.

1. Firstly, _ire_ is a sin and is forbidden by God (**CT.III.1834**), as the Parson says; it finds offence in others and leads to vengeance:

**CT.I.1765** And although that his _ire_ hir girt accused, Yet in his resoun he hem bothe excused,

_Theseus_ is a just lord who is able to overrule _ire_ by his intellect. Otherwise, he might have taken vengeance for a real or imagined insult:

**CT.IX.279**  
O rakel hand, to doon so foule anys!  
O trouble wit, o _ire_ reccheles,  That unavysed smyteth giltes!  

The group of syntagms with _ire_ as subject or complement, and implying the exaction of vengeance, reflect _Augustinian_ and earlier definitions of
the term. Outside this group the usage in Troilus V.1464 illustrates the association:

"Diane, which that wroth was and in ire
For Grekis holde don hire sacrifice,
**** **** ****
Wrek hire in a wonder cruel wise;

Apart from vengeance, IRE is listed as one of those causes of general evil-doing and speech:

CT.V.781 Ire, siknesse, or constellacioun,
Wyn, wo, or chaungynge of complexioun
Causeth ful ofte to doon anys or spoken.

IRE, alone, might be the immediate motivation of murder:

CT.II.265 'is bowe he bente, and sette therinne a flo,
and in his ire his wyf thanne hath he slayn.

2. The Parson has listed all these aspects of IRE, but another important concept associated with it does not fall within his parish; this is the effect of IRE as affecting a man of power and prestige. The setting forth of this problem falls within the sphere of interest of the Tale of Melibee, and the concern there expressed is voiced elsewhere in the Canterbury Tales:

CT.VII.1125 And secondely, he that is irous and wrooth, he may nat wel deme;

Prudence then goes on to advise her husband to put aside certain attitudes in taking counsel about his course of action with regard to repentent vassals. Shortly afterwards she finds cause to rebuke him:

CT.VII.1246 .. ye have erred, for ye han broght with yow to youre conseil ire, coxeitise, and hastifnesse/ the whiche thre thinges been contrarious to every conseil honest and profitable;

The final judgement is made by the Summoners:

CT.III.2014 And therfore preye I God, bothe day and nyght,
an irous man, God sende hym litel nyght!
It is greet harm and certes greet pitee
To sette an irous man in heigh degree.

Joethius advises the sufferer on how to weather the onslaught of the irous man of power, concluding:
Bo.I,iv,16  Tharto thanne, o wrecches, drede ye tirauntz that ben wode and felenous withouten any strongthe? Hope aftir no thynge, no drede nat; and so schaltow desarmen the ire of thilke unwighty tiraunt.

Both the Parson and the Summoner in the passage quoted make the point that IRE is dangerous not only to others but to the one who experiences it. This is taken up elsewhere; in the Ipen of Law's Tale, the joyful state of one whose heart is not stirred by IRE is contemplated:

CT.II.1137  Who lyved evere in swich delit o day
That hym ne mooved outher conscience,
Or ire, or talent, or som kynners affray,
Shyne, or pride, or passion, or offence?

Boethius (I,p.v,69 and IV,iv,10) imagines a man tortured by his own IRE:

Bo.IV,iv,10  For lecherye tormenteth hem on that o side with grevy venymes; and troublable ire, that areseth in hem the floodes of troublynges, tormenteth upon that othir side hir thought;

The same idea is repeated in the Squire's Tale V 455 and in Troilus and Criseyde V 1223:

So he was lene, and therto pale and wan,
And fable, that he walketh by potente;
And with his ire he thus hymselfe chante.

3. In many of its uses, then, IRE is sufficiently well-defined by the Parson as a persistent attitude of mind which makes a man ready to take violent action against those around him; it is the theological deadly sin, a condition of the spirit. The adjective irous, and the noun used in adjectival phrases, most frequently have this sense, unless they are applied in respect of some particular situation which reveals the ire to be sudden and temporary. Thus examples like the following sum up the character of individuals:

CT.III.2017 Whilom ther was an irous potestat,
As seith Senek, ...

The man who is suffering from the sin of IRE is not a worthy companion for any friend, for no one is safe from his outbursts any more than if he were mad:
The adjective... not only a man who is temporarily enraged, nor a man permanently incensed against a particular object, but also a man subject to the sin of Ili, and therefore a double danger to the human race in his suddenaudacious outbursts, and in his capacity for maintaining implacable hatred, perhaps without cause. Such a sense in evil, the complement one of the adjective. Sometimes any sense of major connected with a deal of oppression may be missing: the deed, like that of Sama in Ely, the son of a critic, is a premeditated deal of cruelty with little provocation, and committed while in considerable control of one's faculties (19.III.264.376). In such situations anger has much of the impact of guilt.

This sense of implacability, cruelty and persistent considered hatred, in that appropriate to the use of Ili in the portrait of Hase given in...
If it is treated with some sentimentalism in the description of the falls in
between Islands and streams, where it heightens the intention to lead to death
the antipathetic, which is valuable in bread to find Righting.

They might not have that hill Johnson
in his Righting were a good lean,
and so a cruel time was wasted
in which boats were left to rote,
that brother rest as beam for the wood.

Such wood in these are especially constant conditioned wood of the name
of Ili as a sudden and limited amount of hostility against another.

5. The sense of Ili as a burst of rage (The reasons why oral aim) is sound
enough and in the state represented by worth like rogue, and soiling, and
and in the following:

But it were only, Oswald the more.
be cause he was of a woeful shape,
a little less is in his heart's place;
he can be church, and blame it all.

Although this kind of Ili in a limited action, its intensity are, be
very great.

Idle life and very ill by wood any lies;
the constant collection with quick opposite the joint.

The use of the word figuratively, in giving to action to the sudden
imbalance of the weather (II.479-480) connected with the iron of the boy
is closely allied to this case.

6. The association of Ili with mending is available to the claim by
combinations that Ili can harmful to the one afflicted by it. The emblematic
sense of the amount of the man is twice said to be distinguished by, how silly
she refused any intervention to amaze her misery, as does Ilius then first
raised by the name of lover.

But some mice, and the counsel homes,
and for their love and polished mine, to
for contrast, fallen of thine constant mouse.

Ilius enters a similar state of despair after his betrayal (II.1423). In
and into the...It seems...to signify the implacability of...there is no amount of...this is an enduring state in which...Congress might himself...to misery and know more comfort, conduced with leisure...for all and for the situation in which...Shall we a
number of collocation...between the word used in this case...
The most frequent collections of D.C.1., in Chaucer, are:

I. 2349, 2305,2291, 1349, 1193, 1109, 1298.

The forms in v..t.."..."... with D.C.1., to render the
French terms s.d.m. and, more rarely, D.C.1. The phrase gentilijn ...
worship in Lord ... the confessor ... the noblest' which is ...
turns related to Petrarch's Latin, ' investor ... circulo'.

The Latin evidence of Chaucer shows the forms used to early Latin,
and also appears as the forms using French renderings, whilst the
advenrent renders generalisations.

1. The sense of D.C.1. seems to admit of a major division into those which
indicate a relation between the or more people and those which imply an
isolated notion of ownership, Richardson or charge. It is in this latter
sense of ownership that it is contracted with the old word heaume.

[84,66] In wrath we turned to defence
while in the cause, and variation at the turn of events, the incomparable
complexity of circumstances

[83,127] Only to say that we could not find neither
be we never so jalousie as so wrath.

2. The cause of variation may more often be the activity of another person
constituting an insult or injury which results in a reaction of D.C.1.
The notion of offence seems to be an important part of the meaning of the
lexeme. In pursuit of justice heathen did not shrink from giving offence
to powerful men and uttering their D.C.1.

[83,115,160] the wratheth of more mightye folk hath aluey ben
depited of us for oveshe of right.

The Latin here is potentional ... effecto ... within the feudal organisation,
the lord against whom a personal right was brought was also the judge, hence some
difference in seeking legal reconciliation might be found?

22.2.11.1/1.48 - out prescription he hath with heaviness and which
wrath to a cause, by cause of our offence, that he
may enjoy us with a pain we were not bare no
utterance.

For the AMEN which results from an offence leads to a desire for vengeance
as in the weak attitude to Troy:

22.7.560 - "That were's wrath with heath enmity we're,
If that they might, I move it well, inye.

The justification for AMEN and the desire for vengeance is important in
the judicial as in other situations. Is the offence a genuine one or is
it imagined? Is the execution of justice real or merely the wreaking of
unjustifiable revenge? In the face of lincehood's cruelty, similar reviews
whether he has given her cause for hostility:

22.9.126 - That wrath's of just cause have ye to no;
What gift of me, what ill experience,
Hath she no merit, all the thine adventure?

She just AMEN of the offence and wrath's just,
Has condemned all mankind
for original sin:

22.1.339 - And therefore do we all born cause of wrath and of
damnable perdition.

It may happen, however, that AMEN has no just cause and springs only
from the disordered spirit of sinful man:

22.2.3 - For which, whose hath envy upon his neighbour, even
he will commonly synod hym a nature of wrath, in word or in
delo, aye him to whom he hath envy.

and 'be that is proud or envious is lightly wrath.' Thus ladies who
enjoy a prime position in the parish become enraged when their primacy is
challenged:

22.4.51 - In all the parish the wif she are, her nose
That to the offynge before hire chold be soon;
and if they did, certesyn no wrath was thee,
That she was out of alle charities.

It may be that AMEN is justifiable, but in excessive, and such emotion
is to be avoided, for it clouds the reason, and impair judgment:

22.7.1699 - the, that been wroth hiten nat wel what they doon,
no what they say.
3. The terms hortus and faut, as we have seen, an important one in the judicial situation. It also, by a common figurative transfer, becomes important in the courtly love and religious situations. But in the case the hortus and faut both, as we have seen in a similar role, are the means of the lover's service being cast in terms of the laudas ALLOIDS, together with its feudal connotations of vengeance. Such a usage becomes of almost idiomatic frequency in the allegory, where the hero even attempts to commit suicide in order to assuage a possible insult to his lady. He will administer justice to himself.

**Picture 1.10**

that shall I make upon you even bite
night hence I crave and do your herte an ese,
I wish, both your methe I may space.

In mitigating circumstances, the lady may carefully distinguish between her sorrow at the imperfect service of her lover, and SORROW. She raises well-disposed towards him.

**Picture 1.10**

"Of which I am right sore, but ought not more;"

The phrase in hortus and faut is used frequently in every-day situations to indicate vengeance with reason. It has an idiomatic flavour in uses like the following:

**Picture 1.10**

"By soe," quod he, "I am a little smooth
with, or, or, or, or,

**Picture 1.10**

But lest that precious fell be with no smooth,

5. The phrase in hortus and faut is often to be a more elliptical version of the preceding phrase, but occasionally, has a somewhat different implication:

**Picture 1.10**

"By soe," quod he, "to be no longer worse,

Here we have the reconciliation of a quarrel and it seems to be implied that both sides had been smooth with each other. Here, rather than a one-sided relationship of major and hostility or an insult, we need to have an equal

[1] The association between hortus and vengeance in application to the Christian end is to be found in Horts Flos (c. 1225).
evidence at [2.3.437]. The setting of the scene of Troy and Antigone, and the fortune of the Greeks and Trojans "while that they were wroth" (1.1.6) also illustrates this sense. It is a sense which has a number of figurative derivations and can be used, as well as its primary sense of "to be in conflict" to a number of incompatibility or incongruity.

[2.1.438] Revel and trouble, as in a love degree, They been full wroth al day, as men may see.

[2.5.52] Blythe, by lawsuit, be as bleethe, For all wolde and I be wroth.

The Person associates WROTH with continued contention.

[2.5.61] If a man be wroth with another, whom soe be T h e m e n a s o n g h e h y m n h i s q u e r e s ,

and he quest ordaining WROTH with hatred (2.502).

5. The offence which frequently causes JUICE may be mitigated by the claim that it is intended only in jest and the Host repeatedly uses this protection from the WROTH of other pilgrims:

[2.1.434] But yet I pray thee, be not wroth for none;
A man may rage ful sooth to none the wo.";

The protection which is offered to the victim of insults from moderate WROTH in the virtue of patience: a man who has patience, 'is not wroth for noon harm that is done to hym.' (2.5.579).

6. Finally, a connotative which was suggested at the outset must be reinforced. whilst in the judicial situation, and most other uses, WROTH is contracted with the tranquility of PEACE, DESCRAMBLING (2.4.34, 4.4, 263) and PEACE, the distinct association with sorrow and chagrin is sometimes emphasised by a contrast drawn with words connoting happiness and prosperity. An attitude of WROTH is opposed twice to being blythe in the Parliament of Fouls (3.4, 322), and the rhetorical satirical lists of The book of the Duchesse present similar oppositions between joyous happiness and WROTH:

[3.9.5.0] Joye be thow, and evermore
In wealhowe ye turned by pleasaunce
Had my colt inty another.
E2.1292

... yliche they unfered theo
Go bysce, and she ou come to theo
Yliche they were bothe glad and moother.

Vocation at the turn of events, indistinguishably, intertwined with sorrow,
in a possible sense of SHAKESPEARE.
The most important collocations, in order of diminishing frequency, are:

- Jalousie, malicious, malvolent, angered, old, bitterly.

ANGER translates the French lexeme COMBRA and it may be paired with LUXEB in the English translation. ANGER seems to be used with peculiar consistency to translate COMBRA as in demonstrated by the following doublets:

- souvenez et a ye : to angre and to ire.
- souvenez d'entre avec de souvenez : semblant of atant ne angre.
- de malvolent et de courroux : for angre and for malvolent.

There is no translation evidence from Latin.

1. The Parson makes clear the close association in sense between ANGER and the sin of ILE. He conceives it as a sudden fit of pique as when 'a man is sharply corrected in his drift to forsake his course, / there were set he be madly, and answer suddenly and angrily, and dofenden or exousen his synne ...' (x.586). He considers that LUXEB is the cause of such behaviour (x.655). Such a conception of ANGER evidently underlies Prudencius' psychology in his approach to Prouus, hoping to make him forget sorrow in ANGER. Here the noun anger simply means a fit of anger:

x.x loser

These words sayde he for the noble alle,
That with such thing he ought hym angry maken,
And with an anger doth his vo to falle,

Exactly this sequence of events is portrayed as happening spontaneously later in the story (v.1535).

2. As is common with emotions in medieval psychology, little distinction is made between the sudden emotion and the overall tendency of character as in the use of the lexeme ILE, we find that ANGER can connote a trait of character. It is applied as an epithet of the Parson, the angry Parson (x.7.1), and the personification Hate in the poem is called in angry wrath (133). ANGER, like all violent emotion, disturbs the reason so
that ia an evil and taken his counsel or felt evil, as of angry evil, as of proved evil" (PsAm.640).

3.liketh like EV and EVIL, is associated with the desire for vengeance:

and on his lipos he pon for anger byte,
and to himself he says, "I shall thee yet!" (PsAm.1299)

It is also specifically associated in Shakespearian usage with evil age. It is
listed with grumblings, liry, and annoyance as the besetting sins of those
advanced in years (PsAm.1309), and the wife renounces this association with a
swoon:

and evil and angry annoyance of annoyance,
and unfore had some variety portliness!

4. ANGER, in the case of certain evil husbands, may be a corrective and
self-destructive emotion, cliarmin at their inability to rein in too spirited
young wives. The wife has used it as a weapon in domestic trouble:

that in his brave face I may lay hands
For revenge, and for variety jealousy.

the wife's practical demonstration of the self-destructive nature of ANGER
is matched by the diagnostic ability of the husband's caricature of a fairy
offering pastoral advice:

Sigh sown teeth that ill to some unforte -

5. In addition to this innate, turbulent emotion, ANGER can be used in
such the same way as HATE to connote a relationship of hostility and
annoyance between two people. This use is, however, relatively inelegant:

My enter angry with my tale now?

6. As with HATE, there is the opposition to jovial and humor evident
in what appears to have the air of a well-worn platitudes.

"and if so be that poor horse after time,
An alley happeneth after major gone."

PSALM 130
Section III

The Occurrence and Application of the Words
III.1 In any full account of the use of a lexeme in the language, attention must be paid to the frequency of its use and to its applications. Clearly, the former is a function of the latter, since overall frequency will be related to the opportunities for use; if a lexeme has a very restricted application, and the circumstances of that application are rare, the frequency of occurrence of the word, even in a long corpus, will obviously be low. Similarly the grammatical scatter of a lexeme may influence the frequency of occurrence. If a particular lexeme occurs only as a noun, its opportunities for use in the string of syntax will be reduced, as compared with a lexeme with a scatter including a noun, adjective and adverb. There is therefore a relationship between frequency of occurrence and possible varieties of use; a statement which might be re-worded by saying that there exists a relationship between frequency of occurrence and variety in sense, since we have decided that sense is to some extent dependent upon situational and verbal contexts. The repeated occurrence of familiar topics and the establishment of invariable idioms tends, however, to work against this simple relationship between frequency of occurrence and variety of sense, so that the effect in natural language is not so marked as we might theoretically predict. ¹ This matter of favourite topics, idioms, and variety in the register of language tends to make information of frequency of occurrence far more a stylistic statement, when restricted to a single author, than a linguistic one.

¹ See Zipf, op. cit., p. 21. Zipf sees this in terms of a balance between speaker's and auditor's economy. The first moves towards idiomaticity, while the latter requires a one to one correspondence between formal and semantic items. Zipf's tendency to reason by analogy, and his mathematical exactitude, based upon the inexactitude of dictionary entries, do much to vitiate his work, though the general principles cannot be disregarded.
III.2 The following tables show the grammatical scatter and the frequency of the lexemes examined. It will be noticed that most of the lexemes which exhibit a distinct form for nominal function also employ that form in idioms allowing adverbial and verbal uses. The commonest way of constructing a verbal idiom is by the use of the verbs have and do, on the model of French idiom.
## Table 1: Grammatical Scatter

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<th>Noun</th>
<th>Advb.</th>
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x  A distinct form is found fulfilling the marked function.

An idiom is formed with the noun to create an adverbial or verbal phrase.

1. Kyndo; kyndeness. The nominal kynde has a distinct lexical reference from the same form acting as modifier.
2. The form pacient occurs both as adjective and noun.
3. The verb routhe occurs beside the idiom have routhe on.
5. Strength has a distinct lexical reference from the adjective.
6. Vilaynue occurs beside a quasi-nominal vilaynue.
7. Two adjectival forms are found: merciable and merciful.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adj.</th>
<th>Noun</th>
<th>Advb.</th>
<th>Verb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malice</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envye</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felonye¹</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirannya²</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaloucie</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Ire</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Daunger</td>
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<td>Fiore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stern</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desayn</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Untrotablo</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Tretablo</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stibourn</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milla</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Mansuate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hende</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compassioun</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>⨿</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socour</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thank³</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grame</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Onde</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misericorde</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>⨿</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The form folon occurs both in nominal and adjectival function; the chart merely refers to felonye.

2. The form tirant occurs in nominal and adjectival function; the chart refers to the scatter of tirannya alone.

3. The noun has the formal and semantic variants thankynge and thanks.
Table 2: Frequency of Occurrence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-4 occurrences</th>
<th>5-9 occurrences</th>
<th>10-19 occurrences</th>
<th>20-39 occurrences</th>
<th>40-59 occurrences</th>
<th>60-79 occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>graces</td>
<td>merciful</td>
<td>reweful</td>
<td>favorable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graciousness</td>
<td>milde</td>
<td>rewefully</td>
<td>mancusoeto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>graceless</td>
<td>tretable</td>
<td>buxomnesse</td>
<td>untretable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core</td>
<td>grimness</td>
<td>stif</td>
<td>thankyngees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>servysable</td>
<td>grimly</td>
<td>stifly</td>
<td>stibourn</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>fierly</td>
<td>woody</td>
<td>onto</td>
<td>sternly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>hauteyn</td>
<td>sturdinesso</td>
<td>wrathly</td>
<td>malicous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vylayns</td>
<td>sturdily</td>
<td>wrathful</td>
<td>felonnesse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>vylaysly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>angrily</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Includes only adjectival use.
2. Includes only adjectival use.
80-100 occurrences

cruel      wood            routhe       ire

More than 120 occurrences

pitee

More than 150 occurrences

mercy

More than 250 occurrences

grace

It is worth noting how, in relation to particular topics, frequency may or may not be related to grammatical scatter. In the case of PITEE, the three distinct forms are all of common occurrence, whilst the GRACE and MERCY owe their common occurrence essentially to a single common nominal form.

Because of the difficulties of deciding which uses to include in the reckoning, no figures are given for STRONG and HARD. The latter has, however, about eighty occurrences in the works of Chaucer, of which somewhat less than half fall within the semantic area of this study.

Function and form are not always inseparable in grammatical semantics, any more than in lexical semantics, so that a number of forms normally used as adjectives are used occasionally as nouns. Among these are: debonair; envious; jealous; remorseful; graceless; wood. This converted use does not, however, disturb Table 1, since all those lexemes also exhibit forms proper to nominal function. Nevertheless, the reminder of the separability of form and function which this entails prompts us to examine the variety of form ('formal scatter') which can be associated with a single grammatical function. Such variety of form may serve stylistic ends and, indeed, may provide the basis for sense development. Thus, as a noun, the lexeme GRACE may be represented by the forms:

Grace; graces; graciousness.

1 Here there are distinctions in sense, see above, p. 82.
and similarly: Thank; thankes; thankynge.
Help; helpynge.
Kynde; kyndenesse.
Charitee; chiertee.
Felonye; felon.
Tirannye; tirant.

Variant forms occurring in adjectival function are:
Gracious; graceles.
Merciable; merciful.
Pawful; pawtheles.
Vylaneus; vyleyne.

As Verbs: have routhe on; rewe on.

Examination of the senses of these forms may encourage us to treat graces as a different lexeme from the other members of its group, but there would perhaps be less justification for regarding thankes and thankynge as separate from thank. We may have to descend to a fairly delicate level of analysis to separate a sense of thank, which is synonymic with thankes and thankynge, and graces, from a sense which is synonymic with the grace of a lord. Kynde, as an adjective, belongs to the same lexeme as kyndenesse, but as a noun, their senses are distinctly different. Felon and tirant differ from felonye and tirannye in a parallel way; each referring to an act and its agent.¹ The difference is perhaps sufficient to demand statement as distinct lexemes, though such a distinction is of a fairly arbitrary nature. The distinction in form between the unique vylaneus and vyleyne is not paralleled by any distinction in sense so that, synchronically, we would class them as representatives of the same lexeme but, diachronically, it is necessary to add to this description the information that both derive from distinct adjectival forms in French and that the latter seems, in some

¹ Felon is also used attributively as an adjective on one occasion.
contexts, to be understood as exhibiting the inflexion of the possessive genitive of nouns in Middle English. This seems to be the case despite the fact that no other inflected forms of a noun "vileyn" occur in Chaucer's works. The distinction between "charitee" and "obierte", representing a formal distinction in French, preserved by Latin influence, is not consistently maintained in use with relation to any distinction of sense or application. Nevertheless, the former is more common in contexts with a religious application, whilst the latter form tends to have a secular application.

III.3 The syntax of the adjective is of some interest in discussions of occurrence, and its substantival use has already been mentioned. As a modifier, the adjective is normally used either attributively or predicatively and, after collecting occurrences of all adjectives, it is discovered that most adjectives are used in both ways. There are, however, two or three notable exceptions. The word dangerous is used exclusively as a predicative adjective in a highly consistent syntagm (see p.320 below). This is, in fact, the only adjective of those examined which is limited to predicative use. By contrast, the words vileyn and sturdy are restricted to attributive use. The restriction of the former is perhaps related to its similarity to an inflected noun, as explained above. The lack of symmetry in the use of the latter is unrelated to any specific features of its usage, and may be purely a matter of chance, since the adjective occurs only seven times in the corpus.

III.4 The syntax of the noun is similar in most of those examined. Almost all are found as the direct or indirect object of a transitive verb. If we exclude certain uses of the verbs 'have', 'do' and 'to be', on the grounds that they are part of an established idiom, only the following fail to appear in the structure: sturdiness, felmanse, buxumness, misericorde, grymnesse,

1 This interpretation is supported by the limitation of vileyn to attributive use whilst vylaneus is limited to predicative use.
charitee, compassion, desdayn. The first five of these are so rare that it is impossible to draw any conclusions from the peculiarity of their occurrence; the last three are restricted to peculiarly consistent usages with the verb 'have' in the case of the latter two, and with the verbs 'have' and 'to be' in the case of charitee.

If we exclude obviously personifying uses and uses with the verb 'to be' (equative uses), a high proportion of the nouns studied do not occur as the subject of a verb. Those which do occur in this position are the following: grace; pitee; mercy; routhe; charitee; benignitee; woodnesse; daunger; malice; envie; jalousie; tyrannie; tirant; ire; vrathe; anger; debonairctee; grame. The last two occur only as the subjects of passive verbs. A number occur only very rarely as a subject, whilst envie, ire, tirant, jalousie are common as subject. Certain patterns of usage which emerge in the subject function are deferred for discussion under syntagmatic patterning in the next chapter.

III.5 Some details of application are also valuable in determining and distinguishing senses; indeed, in certain familiar situational uses, a fairly precise description of application may be all that is required. Such would be the case in the use of a single word as an exclamatory plea. A number of the words are used in this way and they are all lexemes which bear some relation to the general, petitioner-grantor situation: grace; core; help; mercy. A very few other words are used as exclamations, although outside this situation, thus O malice! is used as an exclamation of indignation to express the Latin of Boethius I,p.iv,272, O nefas! With these may be compared similar exclamations, O ire reccheles (CT.IX.279), O charite (TC.III.1254) and O greceles (CT.VIII.1078).

Certain of the nouns undergo a comparable stylistic specialisation of use when they are explicitly and deliberately used as personifications. The distinction between a stylistic and a semantic process is made deliberately here, for it is frequently the case that anthropomorphistic elements in language,
and in some cases simply metonymic features (e.g. 'his ire hir gilt accused,' (CT.I.1765), credit abstractions or inanimate objects with purely human acts. By stylistic personification, is meant deliberate anthropomorphism consciously sustained by the extended verbal context, of the type which modern editors recognize typographically by the use of a capital. This kind of personification allegory is typical of courtly poetry which, drawing its sophistication in this sphere from moral and pastoral treatises, employs it to study the psychology of fine amour. The words used thus as personifications are central to the complex of courtly and moral psychology: Curteisie; Pitee; Mercy; Danger; Cruelte; Reutheliees; Woodnesse; Jalousye; Envye; Desdayn; Vylanys; Felonie; Ire. The Book of Vices and Virtues treats Vylanys and Woodnesse as branches of untrewe, which is itself a branch of Pride. Felonie and Ire are considered equivalent and are related to Woodnesse. Pitee and Mercy are considered to be gifts of the Holy Ghost.

III.6 Discussion of the application of the adjective will almost certainly tend to overlap with discussion of its syntagmatic patterning and its senses, so that much discussion must be deferred until later. Nevertheless syntagmatic pattern, concerned as it is primarily with the formal level of language and its intersection with semantics, is not the place to treat certain general points which might be made in terms of application. Certain adjectives exhibit a conceptual restriction of their uses, which may be stated here. Thus the following charts some peculiarities of the uses of the adjectives studied. In the case of rare occurrences the total number is stated afterwards in parenthesis.

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1 H.W. Bloomfield endeavours to distinguish personification allegory from simple animate metaphor, emblems etc. by the criterion of their predicates when they act as subject of a sentence. Predicates which bring about personification are not easily distinguished from simple animate metaphors such as the example he gives from the General Prologue: 'Aprill .../ The droghte of March hath perced ...' 'A Grammatical Approach to Personification Allegory', in Essays and Explorations, Camb., Mass. (1970), pp.243-260.
a  Applied only to males
    irons; stern; stoute; stif (5); sturdy; graceless (2);
wraught (1); hende (and one mixed group, see below).

b  Applied only to females
    mansuete; milde (1); vylanous (1); stibourn (2)².

c  Applied to animals as well as humans
    meke; hauteyn (4); strong; jalous; cruel; wood; grim (7);
    fiere; fel.³

d  Applied to weather or meteorological phenomena as well as humans
    benigne; debonaire; strong; stern; fel; wood.

e  Applied to concrete objects and to humans
    stoute; hard; strong; grim (7); stif (5); sturdy; cruel; fel.

f  Applied to divinities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian or the Virgin</th>
<th>Pagan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>merciable</td>
<td>merciable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debonaire</td>
<td>debonaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benigne</td>
<td>benigne</td>
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<tr>
<td>strong</td>
<td>strong</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>fel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>wood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Both milde and mansuete applied on a single occasion to Criseyde.
² Both occurrences are applied to the Wife of Bath.
³ A number of these applications to animals are conventional, illustrating fancied anthropomorphic attributes of the animals. (see below, p. 315).
Certain of these adjectives have uses which are restricted in a way beyond the ability of the chart to demonstrate. There is little doubt in some cases that Chaucer employs this restriction as a stylistic device. The narrow application of *hende* to amorous clerks has been recognised in the *Miller's Tale* as an example of Chaucerian irony - but the relationship of this usage to the corpus as a whole has not been recognised. The narrow domestic application of *buxom* (see below, p.310) should be noted, as should the special application of *meke* to Christ, the Virgin and, in the 'Marriage Group'

1 Two substantive occurrences are also found.
of the *Canterbury Tales*, to husbands and wives in respect of the matter of sovereignty. The lexeme MERCY also seems to have a special association with the Virgin and the Christian God, as does the lexeme SOOCOUR; the latter particularly noticeable in the short poem *An ABC*. There is a similar association between the lexeme FAVOUR and Fortune, whilst the Wife of Bath, and no-one else, is called stibourn. The normally masculine sturdy is also used with application to her character. Servysable has a special association with squires, analogous to that of hende with clerks, whilst curteis is used, in religious contexts, of Jesus Christ, though not of the rest of the Trinity. This last usage is not an uncommon one in Middle English verse and may have some link with the image of the Christ knight.¹

III.7 In the everyday use of language, words acquire certain connotations; a term which was defined above as composed of memories and associations of earlier contexts and uses. An awareness of the connotational import of words forms the basis of the Classical theory of the three levels of style which, in the Middle Ages, became firmly associated with three levels of social estate. Since Chaucer is a literary writer, well acquainted with the theory of his craft, he might be expected to employ words with an overt awareness of the three levels of style, low, middle or high, so that we may expect to be able to assign much of his diction to one of these three categories. In practice this proves extremely difficult and, I believe, inadvisable. There is, for example, no warrant for assigning synonyms such as herte and corage, visage, face and chiere to any particular stylistic level. In any case the manuals considered the mark of stylus gravis to be the employment of certain 'difficult' tropes, with a consequent increase in emotional vehemence, rather than the use of a specially restricted vocabulary.

¹ A useful summary of the Christ-knight exemplum is to be found in, W. Gaffney, 'The Allegory of the Christ-knight in *Piers Plowman*', *PNLA*, XLVI (1931), pp.155-69.
Chaucer speaks of *heigh style* as the language in which it is suitable to write to kings (CT.IV.18), and a glance at the letters exchanged between the citizenry of London and Henry V, campaigning in France, will give us an inept version of what he perhaps had in mind. The letters are constructed in lengthy periodic sentences, almost entirely from formulaic and Latinate phrases, so that their informational content is reduced to a fraction of their elaborate lexical embellishment. Although we can be fairly sure that Chaucer, a few lines later in the Clerk's introduction to his tale, does not praise Petrarch for this kind of writing, we must admit that the notion of 'enlumining' by high style might include this kind of lexical embellishment as well as the use of difficult tropes. It was for his lexical skill that the fifteenth century revered him. Yet, though we might with confidence assign certain outlandish Latinate coinages to high style, such confidence would falter when we consider our area of the vocabulary, just as when we examine a lengthy passage of Chaucer's work. If we may phrase it thus, Chaucer seems to exhibit a constant tendency to work towards a colloquial mean, a middle, or, more properly mixed, style of narration (*stylus mixtus*). This tendency is evident in the opening of the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, as it is in the Proem of Book II of the Troilus, and as it will be seen to be in the more general use of the vocabulary. Certain words may be used in courtly, religious or philosophical contexts in a decidedly solemn style, but these will also appear elsewhere in a more relaxed colloquial style without any sense of strangeness.

If we examine the social associations of his language, we will discover a few words which seem to be restricted to particular social strata, though this is rare within our area of prime interest. Chaucer reveals himself to

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3 See below, pp.292ff.
be aware of the conditioning of words by social register and speaks of tyrants as differing from bandits only in their power in the social situation, and of unchaste women he says:

CT.IX.212-20  Ther nys no difference, trewely, 
    Bitwixe a wyf that is of heigh degree,
If of hir body dishonest she bee,
And a povre wenche, oother than this -
If it so be they werke both says -
But that the gentile, in estaat above,
She shal be cleped his lady, as in love;
And for that oother is a povre woman,
She shal be cleped his wenche or his lemman.

The word and the deed must be in accord, he says, and so prefers, just as the Parson delights in speaking of the thralls of sin, to couple moral turpitude to social baseness.¹ This ironic weapon of style is forged, not through the correspondence of the lexical items to any artificial levels, but through their habitual use in relation to certain social levels. The habitual use of words in relation to a particular situation equips them with the connotations of that situation; if the situation is arranged into a stratified relationship with other situations, then we have some justification for talking of levels of style. Otherwise, certain words merely have certain connotations and certain proper applications.

That Chaucer is aware of decorum in the use of words outside the stratified notion of propriety is argued by Pandarus's advice to Troilus on the construction of a love-letter:

TC.II.1037-43  "Me jompre ek no discordant thyng yfeere,
    As thus, to usen termes of phisik
In loves termes; hold of thi materre
The forme alwey, and do that it be lik;
For if a peyntour wolde peynte a pyk
With asses feet, and hede it as an ape,
It cordeth naught, so nere it but a jape."

Thus, misapplication and resultant incongruity on the lexical level are literary techniques known and, as examination would show, used by Chaucer. They may produce comic effects or ironical ones, and everywhere produce

¹ Compare also the helle hæfton (captivus inferni) of Beowulf, 788.
stylistic variety. In so doing, of course, they present a possible source for any attempt at objective analysis. Instead of the severe restriction of lexical items to particular applications and hence, in some cases, to particular levels, we find them scattered in a great number of applications. Assignment to a 'proper' application will become a matter of frequency and probability rather than of absolute decision.

The area of vocabulary with which we are concerned is not much illuminated by the association of levels of style with social levels, and indeed an analysis of its stylistic applications is not profitably made in terms of levels at all, except insofar as levels are implied by the distinction between ordinary everyday usage and courtly and literary vocabulary. A certain proportion of the words in this area belong to a restricted technical language of moral philosophy, which in turn is essentially theologically-based; yet it is rare that a sharp distinction can be made between the secular interest in morals and manners implied in the courtly tradition and the pastoral interest which inspires theological tradition in this area. Similarly the language of feudalism is shared by the discussion of theology and courtly civilisation. Certain words, however, seem to belong more particularly to the technical language of the moral/theological vocabulary, and among these, certain/pre-eminently. Thus the following lexemes might be classed as typical of serious Christian moral discussion:

PACIENCE; FELONYE; ENVYE; MALICE; IRE; MISERICORDE; CHARITEE; REKE; MANUSUITE.

Some others are extremely common in this kind of use but are also frequent in other spheres:

DESDAYN; COMPASSION; BENIGNITEE; BUXOMNESSE; STRENGTH;

(this last in a different sense from that which primarily concerns us, signifying spiritual fortitude and glossing Latin fortitudo).

FELONYE is further determinable as primarily a Boethian word glossing a fairly wide range of Latin forms. See below, p. 418.
Certain words are common here but also equally common in courtly or
feudal situations and sometimes in the ordinary usage of everyday situations.
Among these are:

DEBONAIRETE; VILAYNYE; JALOUSYE; GRACE; MERCY; PITEE; DESPIT.
A few words are particularly associated with the courtly situation, though all are found in reference to a feudal relationship:

DAUNGER; SERVYSE; THANK; KYNDNESSE; CRUELTEE; FAVOUR; HELP; TRETABLE;
UNTRETABLE; HAUTEYN; SOCOUR.
The lexeme CURTEISIE is also frequently used in religious contexts, whilst ROUTHE tends to be of ordinary, everyday use and is also used in the burlesque courtly love situation of The Miller's Tale. A large group of words of English origin we may take as being of ordinary use, but most of these may occasionally be found in courtly or theological contexts: STURDY; STOUT;
STERN; STIF; HARDNESSE; GRIM; WOODNESSE.

III.8 The development of Chaucer's linguistic and stylistic resources necessarily brought about changes in even this tentative arrangement of his lexis. He uses a number of words in his early works in serious contexts which are used only with ironical intent, or not at all, in his later works. The case of hende, used in a serious courtly context in The Romaunt of the Rose, has already been mentioned. Except in the early Anelida and Arcite, grame is used exclusively in colloquial passages, as is stif, again with the exception of the Romaunt, where the sole occurrence of onde is also to be found. Buxom is used in serious, unironical passages only in the earlier poems and the shorter poems written before 1390.

We might assume that Chaucer was deliberately expunging certain ordinary, native-derived words from his diction; but that this is a defective assumption is suggested by his unique uses of the words stibourn, in the Wife's Prologue, and of oore, in The Miller's Tale. Similarly grim and stoute are used in serious passages only in the later Canterbury Tales.
The truth of the matter seems to be a little more complicated than our initial assumption. Although Chaucer abandons the serious use of one or two hackneyed terms of English poetic diction, he is equally ready to use some evidently colloquial words for the first time. Furthermore, certain words, often of French derivation like gentil, which have become devalued by use, are re-assessed in the later work. Thus, in the General Prologue description of the Prioress, the word pitous is given ironic overtones, just as curteisly acquires them in the description of the Miller's dishonesty in The Reeve's Tale I 3997, and grace in the situation of Absolon's appeal in The Miller's Tale I 3726. Daungerous is used with swinging irony in the marriage situation of the Wife of Bath:

CT.III.151  In wyfhod I wol use myn instrument
As frely as my Hakere hath it sent.
If I be dangerous, God yeve me sorwe.

CT.III.521  With daunger oute we al oure chaffares;
Greet prees at the market maketh deere ware,
And to greet cheep is holde at litel prys;

The irony, which is evident in the use of some of these words in Chaucer's later work, derives largely from a growing awareness in the poet of appropriateness of diction and its corollary, incongruity. The settings of The Canterbury Tales are far more various than those of the early courtly poetry and on a number of occasions Chaucer asserts the necessity of suitting the language to the matter; the word must be cosyn to the dade. But words such as pitous, grace and daunger are essentially part of a structure of ideal concepts, related to well-discussed precepts of behaviour, and possessing its own specific vocabulary. When these words are torn from this setting and placed in a new, unaristocratic, unidealised situation, collocating with such distinctly colloquial words as lemanent, as grace does in The Miller's Tale, the effect is one of incongruity and, when we juxtapose the applications proper to the words, of irony.

While we should accept that peculiarities of occurrence and application in the case of some of these words are sometimes due to the increasing stylistic
subtlety of the mature poet, we should exercise caution in claiming that this is a conscious revival of Horatian poetic principles by the greatest poet of the English Middle Ages, and purely an individual stylistic innovation. The fact that Gower uses *buxom* to refer to the marriage relationship, and that Langland uses *curteisly* ironically, indicates that the inclusion of *buxom* in the marriage service, and the removal of esteemed concepts from their proper contexts, were represented by a broader feature of usage. What Chaucer is doing, indeed, in many of these kind of uses, is borrowing from everyday language, sharpening the incongruities and pointing the irony. It is unnecessary to stress again how this consummate skill of the developed Chaucerian style, exploiting connotational meaning to the full and alluding covertly to other situations, complicates, if not confounds, any attempt to order Chaucer's vocabulary into neat categories of application and finally of sense.

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1 CA.V.2807. *Piers Plowman* (C-text) III, 164.