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A GEOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

by

CARL E.R. GRUNDY - WARR.

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An M.A. Dissertation submitted to the University
of Durham for the Degree of Master of Arts.

December 1984.

24 MAR 2003
Figures 0:1 and 0:2 show Turkish mosques in the Greek Cypriot quarter of the old walled city of central Nicosia. Figure 0:2 illustrates the two main religions of Cyprus - a small mosque and Christian church located around 8 October Square only fifty metres from the Green Line. Before the inter-communal troubles of December 1963 - August 1964 the two communities lived side-by-side in many parts of the island. There are numerous physical reminders of this in southern Cyprus where it is not unusual to find a Turkish mosque in close proximity to a Greek Orthodox church.
ABSTRACT.

The main aim of this study is to examine the role of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in relation to fundamental changes to the human and political geography of the island. The political background to these changes is given some analysis but the major focus of the study is on the spatial aspects of intercommunal conflict, and the problems created for civilian life by artificial ethnic barriers, barbed wire-fences, sentry-posts, roadblocks, and other physical lines symbolizing the separation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

After a brief description of the situation prior to Independence, the centrifugal forces dividing the two communities and resulting in the formation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves are discussed. In the light of these major changes U.N.F.I.CYP. had to cope with many complicated practical difficulties on the ground relating to the separate de facto territorial control of certain parts of the Republic of Cyprus by the Turkish Cypriots. This study stresses the economic and humanitarian duties of what is basically a military peacekeeping force. In carrying out these duties there are many linkages between the non-military tasks of U.N.F.I.CYP. and the human geography of the island.

Finally, the period since the forming of the de facto partition line between the two communities is considered in detail, and particular attention is given to U.N.F.I.CYP.'s activities between the two Forward Defence Lines of the National Guard and Turkish Army, i.e. in the U.N.-controlled Buffer Zone.

The study then attempts to draw some conclusions regarding the likely future role of U.N.F.I.CYP., and to highlight the problems posed by the political deadlock between the two communities. There is also a short conclusion on the geography of peacekeeping, which is based entirely on this detailed case study.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

I would like to express my gratitude to the following people for their help in my preparation of this work.

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To all members of U.N.F.I.CYP. who generously cooperated with me during field research in April 1984. Special thanks to Mr Stephen Whitehouse, U.N.F.I.CYP. Spokesman; Mr Gary S. Brown, Station Commander, Australian Federal Police (Aust.civ.pol.); Lt. Colonel Ferdinand Pelzer, Chief Humanitarian Officer (U.N.F.I.CYP.); Sgt. Major Jones, Second Battalion, The Royal Anglian Regiment; and David Baylis, Operations Officer, British Contingent, Sector Two:

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To Antonis Y. Antoniadis and his family for their kindness and warmth, making my visit to Cyprus both memorable and enjoyable.

To Richard N. Schofield, Jon Mitchell, Rosemary Stone, Klaus Dieter-Kreher, and Chng Kin Noi for their help in various ways during the latter stages of the dissertation and for their friendly encouragement.

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This work is dedicated to the memory of
Ernest Joseph Woodhouse - my grandfather
CHAPTER ONE

AIMS, APPROACH, AND INTRODUCTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.

This introduction is divided into two sections. The first deals with the main aims and approach adopted in this study. The second gives details of the complexity of the Cyprus Problem as necessary background to the rest of the dissertation.

Section One.

The principal aim of the dissertation is to emphasize the "geographical aspects" of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cyprus. The fact that Cyprus is an island of only 9,251 sq. km. with a population of only 650 - 700,000 makes the island a manageable size for a detailed study of this type. The compact, easily defined heterogenous space of the island provides a valuable "testing ground" for analysis of the spatial dimensions of intercommunal conflict and "the interpositionary role" of an international peacekeeping force between the protagonists.

There have been other detailed studies of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (U.N.F.I.CYP.) operations, but none have focused on the spatial aspects of peacekeeping in relation to the peculiar political geography of Cyprus. For instance, Charles C. Moskos, 1976, carried out a study of the military sociology of peacekeeping, analysing "whether the imperatives of noncoercion and impartiality require a reformulation of conventional military sociolization and a restructuring of standard military organization." (1) Brigadier Michael Harbottle, 1970, examines the organisation and deployment of U.N.F.I.CYP. and provides insights into particular incidents from the standpoint of a former chief-of-staff of the Force, 1966-68. Another comprehensive and critical account of U.N.F.I.CYP. in its first decade is provided by James A. Stagenga, who questions whether or not the U.N. Force helped to "freeze and perpetuate" an anomalous and dangerous patchwork partition between the communities. (2) Other studies have concentrated on the international dimension of United
Nations peacekeeping and the intricacies of U.N.P.I.CYP.'s mandate, comparing it to other United Nations peacekeeping ventures. (3)

Little attempt is made in this dissertation to make comparisons with or generalizations about international peacekeeping as a means of regulating civil war or intercommunal conflict situations. U.N.P.I.CYP. is not being used as a 'model' for future peacekeeping ventures, although some useful lessons have already been learnt from the Cyprus operation regarding such critical factors as mounting and forming an international peacekeeping force, financing it, its administrative arrangements and logistical support machinery. As Stagenga points out:

"U.N.P.I.CYP. was tailored to cope with Cyprus crisis rather than to conform to any standard pattern or doctrine derived from U.N.E.F. or O.N.U.C.," two earlier peacekeeping forces. (4) In so far as there may be similarities between the situation in Cyprus and other states torn by inter-ethnic, religious, or tribal antagonisms combined with regional forces acting centrifugally to splinter the states, U.N.P.I.CYP.'s experiences may provide valuable information as to the effectiveness of international third party intervention in conflict situations. Such lessons may be particularly applicable to third world countries where the negative anticolonial aspects of nationalism are weaker than "the multitude of particularist tendencies." (5)

Cyprus is shared by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, yet due to a variety of internal and external centrifugal factors they perceived their shared space differently and mutually exclusive geopolitical goals. The combination of these goals and external political/military initiatives helped to fundamentally alter the political and human geography of Cyprus. The most dramatic manifestation of this took place in 1974 with the complete separation of the two communities into mono-ethnic areas divided by a \textit{de facto} boundary.

The spatial aspects of intercommunal conflict and resulting changes to an understanding of U.N.P.I.CYP. deployment, operations, achievements, and the constraints working against "a return to normal conditions" as
envisaged by either community and by U.N.F.I.CYP., all of whom had different perceptions of the situation and of why the Force was created. Richard Patrick's research on the geographical aspects of intercommunal conflict, i.e. "the locational aspects of each incident, where it occurred and why, how the location affected each incident and vice versa, where refugees went, the locational consequences of both evacuation and reception villages and their economies", (6) highlighted the significance of the spatial environments of each community. For instance, the Turkish Cypriots created their own space by forming protected enclaves and quarters in various parts of the island, which left the map of Cyprus dotted with "islands" of Turkish Cypriot-control for over a decade, December 1963 to July 1974. In this way the Turkish Cypriots altered their spatial environments, became increasingly cut-off from the Greek Cypriots, and introverted in their socio-economically confined strongholds which their leaders were determined to hold onto rather than let them fall under the influence of the Cyprus Government. On the other hand the Greek Cypriots maintained control of over ninety per cent of the territory of Cyprus, remained relatively comfortable in their economic prosperity, and were unable or unwilling to enter Turkish Cypriot areas, all of which produced a dangerous complacency about the plight of Turkish Cypriots and the political deadlock. The "isolated state" of the Turkish Cypriot community tended to enhance the psychological barriers and phobias separating the two communities.

From the above comments it can be inferred that the "buffer" activities of U.N.F.I.CYP. in maintaining physical barriers and cease-fire lines, the accepted status quo on the island split by intercommunal strife, helped to consolidate a de facto separation of the two main Cypriot communities. In this context much of this dissertation is devoted to:

1) U.N.F.I.CYP.'s role as a "buffer force" between the belligerents.
2) Its efforts to break down the barriers separating Greek from Turkish Cypriot by attempting to "normalize" socio-economic conditions in the island.
(3) An analysis of the forces behind the formation of distinct community-defined behavioural environments in order to determine other centrifugal and centripetal tendencies other than those emanating from U.N.F.I.CYP.'s activities.

(4) An examination of the numerous distributional inequalities arising not from the heterogenous space of the island but from "man-created space", and U.N.F.I.CYP.'s response to these problems.

Twice in the last two decades Cyprus has undergone major changes in its political geography, creating massive socio-economic, demographic and political upheavals. This study will focus on the geographical problems caused by arbitrary ethnic dividing lines drawn across the landscape of Cyprus, such as truncated communications, disrupted freedom of movement, divided agricultural resources and the disruption of land-use, misallocation of economic resources, welfare facilities, movement of goods and people, constraints on human and political interaction/cooperation. As Richard Patrick observed:

"The processes of conflict alter the phenomenal environment in which and upon which they act. Geographers have traditionally been interested in such results as boundary changes, population migrations, resource redistribution, shifts of locations, alterations to spheres of influence — generally speaking our focus has been on how conflict affects the spatial pattern of phenomena which, for various reasons, we view as significant." (7)

Two broad periods will be covered in detail, 1964 to July 1974 and July 1974 to 1984. For the first decade of U.N.F.I.CYP. peacekeeping I will question the extent to which the Force may have helped to protect a separatist movement in Cyprus by carrying out its diverse activities as (i) an interpositionary force, and (ii) a communication bridge between the two communities at a time of little or no progress in intercommunal negotiations towards a settlement of the Cyprus Problem. The second period deals specifically with the consequences of and peacekeeping problems created by an enforced artificial division of a small island. Particular
attention will be given to the peculiar geographical problems of the
United Nations Buffer Zone, utilizing recent fieldwork observations
and interviews with U.N.F.I.CYP. personnel. Finally, the current
political and spatial stalemate will be discussed in relation to the
continuing presence of a U.N. Force in Cyprus.

Section Two: The Cyprus Problem.

"Cyprus was the concluding chapter in a long Turko-Greek
struggle and disentanglement, and the Turkish government's
attitude to it was concerned with security fears as much
as with the Turkish minority: fears dating from previous
Turko-Greek encounters...as well as the nightmare of being
encircled by a coalition of pan-Hellenism and Great Powers
such as Britain, France or Russia." (8)

"The Cyprus Problem(s) must not be viewed simply as
'a problem of Greeks and Turks'. Nor is it true to say
'that but for the influence of Britain and later the
U.S.A. the Greek and Turkish Cypriots would to this day
be living together in harmony'" (9)

"Clearly, both communities were under the control of
outside factors over which they had very little influence;
there is every indication that, divorced from the wider
political argument, harmony could have prevailed." (10)

These three quotations, seemingly contradictory, are taken from
three experts on different aspects of the Cyprus Problem, and they
illustrate the complexity of this multifaceted issue. Indeed it is
useful to look at the Cyprus Problem from various levels and
perspectives.

(i) Intercommunal Coexistence and Conflict.

The island of Cyprus is shared by two major communities — the Greek
and Turkish Cypriots, forming about 80 and 18 per cent of the population
respectively. There are also small numbers of Maronites, Armenians, and
more recently, Lebanese. To a large extent this bipartisan population is
the Cyprus Problem. Greek and Turkish Cypriots have different cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds which helped to foster diverse nationalisms, a polarization of community politics and a spatial separation of the communities. Stressing these differences between the two 'Cypriot' communities has led some authorities to the conclusion that "the Turks and the Greeks cannot get on together". (11) If the past twenty years or so are considered in isolation many observers would probably agree with such a statement. But as Christopher Hitchens, 1984, puts it: -

"In order to criticize this trite and cynical view, which is the psychological counterpart of partition, one has to wage a battle against amnesia." (12)

This means taking a wider view of Cyprus' history and the development of intercommunal conflict in Cyprus.

Prior to the Independence Constitution the two communities were distinguished along religious rather than racial differences. (3) A "Greek" was simply an adherer to Orthodox Christianity and a "Turk" an upholder of Islam. Bicommunal definitions were officially enshrined in Article Two of the 1960 Constitution which states: -

"...the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who are members of the Greek Orthodox Church; the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Muslims; Citizens of the Republic who do not come within (these) provisions...shall, within three months...opt to belong to either the Greek or Turkish community." (14)

These constitutional provisions encouraged ethnic polarization and the development of community consciousness as opposed to a Cypriot national consciousness. The provisions effectively institutionalized political divisions that were taking place as a result of the Independence Movement. For instance, the Greek Cypriots had forged their anticolonial sentiments with demands for Enosis (Union with Greece). Enosis was
more than an expression of Pan-Hellenism to Greek Cypriots, as Peter Loizos explains, "it was some kind of search for allies, roots, and dignity by claiming a connection to a more prestigious culture, that of mainland Greece". (15) With the growth of the Enosis struggle the Turkish Cypriots became increasingly concerned that should the island become another distant province of Greece they would be either expelled from Cyprus, or become an under-privileged and downtrodden minority within Greater Greece. Turkish Cypriots became more aware of their ethnic identity, vulnerable minority status in Cyprus, and more vociferous in pushing for their rights in Cypriot affairs. Britain actively encouraged this politicization of communal differences and used the Turkish minority to prop up the colonial administration. (16) Turkish Cypriots were even used as auxiliary policemen in the battle against E.O.K.A. ( Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - National Organization of Freedom Fighters ) in the late-'Fifties, which caused intercommunal bloodshed. As Michael Attalides points out :-

"The real intercommunal bitterness only extended to the grass roots level when killing started." (17)

Before the outbreak of intercommunal violence in the late-1950s there had been a high degree of interdependence in economic and certain ritual relations in Cyprus. (18) If one goes back to the Ottoman period before the development of Greek nationalism there were few signs of widespread communal animosity. On the contrary, distinctions between "Greeks" and "Turks" were often blurred by instances of intermarriage, and a substantial number of conversions from Christianity to Islam. There were even whole villages of Greek-speaking Muslims. Many Cypriots bore the nickname of Linobambaki ( Linen Cotton ), signifying their "mixed" origins. There also several mixed peasant revolts in opposition to higher taxes imposed by the Church or Ottoman Governor. (19)

Until recent times there was much cooperation in socio-economic life, the ordinary people never finding it difficult to live together, to share the island, places of work, villages, suburbs, coffeeshops, and wedding
festivities. Working-class members of both communities joined the communist-led Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation (P.E.O.), which had 4,000 Turkish members before the Turks formed "separatist" trade unions in response to intercommunal conflict.

Professor Coufoudakis, 1976, tried to analyse "the dynamics of political partition and division in Cyprus". He highlighted some important internal and external factors leading to the spatial separation of the communities. One of the internal factors during Ottoman rule was the revitalisation of the Orthodox Church under the Millet system, transforming the Archbishop into "the unchallenged spokesman in political, social, educational and religious affairs of the Greek Cypriot community." (20) During the anti-colonial movement the call for Enosis was "spearheaded by Orthodox churchmen, passionately right-wing, and lacking insight into Turkish Cypriot thinking." (21) Another source of division was the segregated educational system, which strengthened community ties to their respective "mother lands", and fostered the perpetuation of ethnic differences. As Patrick observed:–

"This system of education has not only produced strong Greek and Turkish patriotism rather than any sense of Cypriot identification, but it has also maintained and emphasized the villainous roles into which Greeks and Turks have historically cast each other." (22)

Economic disparities between the two communities were another potential source of communal separation. At Independence Turkish Cypriots had an average per capita income some twenty per cent below that of Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, most of the island's lucrative businesses were in Greek hands. These disparities were mainly due to social and cultural differences as opposed to any policy of "exploitation" by Greek Cypriots. (23) Unfortunately these economic differences were to be "used" by the leaders of both communities in order to achieve their separate political goals after December 1963.

Hitherto external causes of the separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots
have only been hinted at, but they will now be given more weight, for as one commentator has put it—

"At almost every stage in the drama...the weaknesses or errors of Cypriots were exploited or compounded by external intervention." (24)

Others also stress the manipulation of and interference in Cypriot affairs by interested outside powers as being the principal factor in "the gradual movement toward political partition on the island". (25) Greek and Turkish Cypriot phobias about each other have not only been intensified by internal political rivalries but by the complex interrelationships of internal and external power politics.

(ii) The Geopolitical Dimension of the Cyprus Problem.

Cyprus has an advantageous position at the easternmost end of the Mediterranean, near the troubled Levant, a valuable position for "all forms of advance, economic, military and cultural." (26) The strategic position of the island is largely the cause of outside interference in Cypriot affairs. The linkages between Cyprus and vested external interests are at various levels.

Intra-Regional Level: Graeco-Turkish Rivalry.

By defining the chief protagonists in Cyprus as the Greek Nation and the Turkish Nation the Cyprus Problem becomes one element of the intra-regional rivalry between Greece and Turkey. In this context "Nation" is defined as a group of people who feel themselves linked by a common cultural heritage (hence the Enosis Movement). As Richard Patrick explains:-

"If Turkey and Greece are included within the community boundaries of the protagonists, the Cyprus Problem could be viewed as only one of several connected conflict systems overlapping the Greek and Turkish National boundaries." (27)

For three hundred years (from 1571 to 1878) Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire, although the majority of its population were Greek settlers. Nevertheless, from the time of the first influx of Turkish
Muslims from the mainland the seeds of "Cyprus's continuing conflict between a Greek Christian majority and a Turkish Muslim minority" were sown. (n. 27) In 1821, the mainland Greeks rose against their Turkish overlords, motivated by the "Megali Idea" or Great Idea of Hellenism, i.e. the liberation of all Greeks everywhere and, ultimately, the recovery of Constantinople as the capital of a unified and resurgent Byzantine Empire. Following a Russo-Turkish war in 1877 the Turks handed Cyprus over to Britain in return for a defence agreement. On the day British rule began, July 8, 1878, the new British High Commissioner was welcomed by the Bishop of Citium, who expressed hope that Cyprus would soon be reunited with "Mother Greece". In 1915 Britain offered Cyprus to Greece as an inducement to that country to enter war on the side of the Allies against Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey. Athens refused the offer, deciding to remain neutral.

After the rise of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, there was the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, which led to a redrawing of the Greco-Turkish boundary and an exchange of populations, creating "a linear interface between two states in the form of a boundary which promised to be stable because it was agreed by both parties and was mostly drawn through sea, and because minorities were largely cleared from the territories which it separated." (28)

As Brian Beeley, 1977, points out, this Treaty merely shifted the location of a potentially hostile interface to the Aegean and to Cyprus, which officially became a "Crown Colony" in 1925. The drawing of the boundary in Thrace and the eastern Aegean achieved the spatial separation of Greeks and Turks considered vital to stability at the political interface. (29)

Within Cyprus the two communities developed polarized political positions pulled by their respective "mother lands". Turkish Cypriot demands for Taksim (i.e. Partition) were strengthened by the political and military superiority over Greece in the eastern Mediterranean and by its close proximity to Cyprus. To the larger powers, Greece and Turkey, Cyprus
became an important territorial/strategic issue connected with an increasingly significant resource-cum-boundary dispute in the Aegean Sea. Since 1923 this sea has virtually been a "Greek Lake", a process completed in 1947 with the annexation to Greece of the Dodecanese Islands only a few kilometres from the Turkish coastline. The rivalry over the Aegean has multiplied with the discovery of oil and gas deposits in the seabed. In 1973/74 Turkey made unilateral delimitations of a continental shelf boundary in the Aegean by granting exploration concessions to the Turkish Petroleum Company — an action which brought Greece and Turkey close to war in 1976. Ankara would like a Median Line established in the Aegean to allow Turkish exploration of the eastern half of it, but the Greeks are unwilling to lose access to large parts of the seabed or to allow Greek Islands to be turned into "enclaves" within a Turkish zone. (30)

In the summer of 1974 Turkey intervened in Cyprus following a Greek coup against Makarios, and consequently the island was divided. Turkish propaganda expresses her fears:-

"Turkey was being encircled; Greece was trying to make the Aegean a Greek Lake. Union of Cyprus with Greece would complete the circle...the Turkish population of Cyprus would be forced out..." (31)

Since that partition many Greek Cypriots are well aware of their "minority status" in the eastern Mediterranean region and are worried that one day the Turks will attempt to annex the whole island. (32) In many respects the Cyprus Problem thus represents a "double minority problem". Turkish Cypriots have been worried about their minority position within Cyprus and domination by the Greeks, whereas with the weight of Turkey at their backs the Greek Cypriots are a "strategic minority". Unfortunately, the past history of Graeco-Turkish rivalry has proved that the readjustment or creation of de facto political boundaries or ethnic interfaces has merely shifted the arena of conflict rather than solved it, and the existence of such a physical partition in Cyprus has not erased the
possibility of a Graeco-Turkish war over the island.

The Super-Power Level: Cyprus and N.A.T.O.

Cyprus, like Lebanon, has suffered from its geopolitical position. Throughout the course of the intercommunal conflict, one of Washington's concerns has been to maintain stability in the eastern flank of N.A.T.O., overriding any concern for Cypriot independence or Cypriot aspirations. As Adalbert Weinstein puts it:

"How does it happen that this economically meaningless and militarily non-existent small Cyprus with its 650,000 inhabitants have such an influence on the world scene? The answer is simple. Geographically it is a securely anchored aircraft carrier at the intersection point of the lines of tension of the great nuclear powers." (33)

The British Sovereign Base Areas, Dhekelia and Akrotiri, no longer serve their original function — that of safeguarding British control over Suez, Jordan, and Iraq, but they are key bases controlled by an important member of N.A.T.O., although not directly under N.A.T.O. command. United States strategists view Cyprus as a base for early-warning installations and for aerial surveillance of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Prior to the 1974 coup d'état against President Makarios Washington were concerned about the island's independent, non-aligned status, particularly in view of the fact that the largest political party in Cyprus was A.K.E.L., the Cypriot communist party, which was totally against any solution binding Cyprus to N.A.T.O. Given the United States has several military bases, plus the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean area, Cyprus under Makarios was seen as a potential "Cuba in the Mediterranean". (34) Such a standpoint has led numerous academic observers to the conclusion that the United States played on intra-regional rivalries and intercommunal conflict in order to produce a situation more favourable to the N.A.T.O. Alliance. Cyprus became a "tactical pawn" rather than an independent "country with a complex individuality." (35) As Polivios Polyviou, 1980, points out, once the Turks had landed substantial military forces in Cyprus in July
1974, "American policy tilted decisively and consciously in favour of Turkey as it was thought that only in this way could losses within N.A.T.O. be minimized and American strategic interests safeguarded." (36)

Some commentators have gone even further to suggest that the United States directed the tragic events of 1974, supporting the Junta-backed rebellion in Cyprus and the Turkish military intervention forming a partition of the island, with its northern part under the influence of a key member of N.A.T.O. Some Washington strategists may have viewed this result as being in the best interests of the Western defensive system in the region. (37)

Colonial Level: Britain's Strategic Interests and 'Divide and Rule'.

Cyprus' strategic importance to Britain reached its peak during the anticolonial movement in Cyprus during the 1950s. Following the evacuation of Suez, in July 1954, the island became Britain's Middle East military headquarters, and a base to protect vital oil supplies. These strategic concerns provoked Anthony Eden to "internationalize" the Cyprus Question by encouraging Turkey's involvement, which was a move designed to counter the rising tide of Enotist sentiment amongst Greek Cypriots.

Throughout the colonial period, 1878 - 1960, 'divide and rule' policies helped to prop up the colonial administration. Greek Cypriots were effectively neutralized by a coalition of British and Turkish representatives in the Legislative Council. Britain also underestimated the strength of the Greek Cypriot nationalist sentiments and the pro-Enosis movement. This was demonstrated by political repression after pro-Enosis riots in 1931. (38) Little was done to promote Cypriot national consciousness. In fact, the two communities were treated as "a natural extension of Greece and the Ottoman Turks respectively...the horizontal bonds that developed between the two communities under the Ottoman Empire" were broken. (39)

Crisis point was reached in the 1950s when the agitation for self-determination and for Enosis reached a climax under two charismatic leaders, Archbishop Makarios and Colonel George Grivas. In April 1955, E.O.K.A.
Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, National Organisation of Freedom Fighters) started its campaign of sabotage against the British. In 1956 Makarios was deported, supposedly for complicity with E.O.K.A. At the end of 1956 Britain attempted a settlement drawn up by Lord Radcliffe. He proposed that foreign affairs, defence, internal security should remain with the Governor, whereas in other matters Cypriots should be granted maximum self-government immediately. In actual fact the Greek Cypriots were offered more power than ever before, but they rejected the proposals since no mention was made of self-determination. In the House of Commons, the Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd, made the first public reference to partition, arguing that the Turkish Cypriots would choose to join Turkey if given self-determination. Meanwhile the Turkish Cypriots adopted Taksim (Partition) as a counter-slogan to Enosis. On a visit to Turkey in 1957 Dr Küçük, Turkish Cypriot leader, commented that Ankara would claim northern Cyprus.

The murder of a Turkish Cypriot auxiliary policeman in 1957 triggered off a series of serious intercommunal clashes, causing some Turkish Cypriots to evacuate homes and villages. In response to E.O.K.A. attacks the Turkish Cypriots formed their own defence organisation called T.M.T. (i.e. Türk Mudafa Teşkilat), a paramilitary force assisted by Ankara. Apart from provoking intercommunal enmity E.O.K.A. had forced Britain to rethink its Cyprus strategy. As Robert Stephens put it:

"With 28,000 British troops tied down chasing two or three hundred E.O.K.A. terrorists, Cyprus had become a military liability." (47)

In mid-1958 Archbishop Makarios indicated for the first time that he was prepared to forgo Enosis and settle for independence. He was concerned that partition would either be imposed by Britain or won by the Turks in a civil war should Britain leave before a guaranteed settlement was reached. At the same time Britain decided that sovereignty over little Cyprus was no longer crucial to her strategic requirements.
Furthermore, there was concern over the growing rift within N.A.T.O. between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. All these factors led to tripartite talks between Britain, Greece and Turkey culminating in the Zurich-London Agreements of February 1959. Although Archbishop Makarios and a large delegation from Cyprus were present at these talks the provisions were imposed from outside Cyprus by the three interested powers. Thus the Cypriot leaders were presented with a fait accompli, a settlement they were obliged to accept. Unfortunately for Cypriot unity neither Enosis nor Taksim were dead, both policies reemerged after Independence.

For a more thorough understanding of the various levels of the Cyprus Problem the reader should consult the bibliography at the back. The preceding section is only intended as a summary of some of the major strands of the Problem and not a definitive account.
Footnotes and References.


(4) Stagenga, *op. cit.*, refer to ch. 4.


(7) ibid., p. 411.


(16) Other colonial powers in the region have used minority groups in this way. For instance, the French used the Druzes and the Alawi in Syria, the Berbers in the Maghreb, and the Christians in the Lebanon.
The British had previously used the Assyrians in Iraq. Refer to: Attalides, M. 1976, 'Relations between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots in Perspective', in International Symposium on Political Geography, Proceedings (Cyprus Geographical Association, 27 - 29 Feb., Nicosia), p. 58.

(17) ibid., p. 59.
(18) ibid., p. 56.


He argues that the intercommunal "symbiosis" was "the most valuable victim of the violent reaction of Turkish chauvinism to the Greek Cypriots' anti-colonial struggle." p. 150.


(22) Patrick, op. cit., p. 13.
(23) ibid., p. 15.
(24) Hitchens, C. op. cit., p. 159.


(29) ibid., p. 351.


(31) This quotation is from a booklet entitled 'The Facts on the Turkish Intervention in Cyprus', prepared by a private group of Turkish Cypriots in 1974.


He quotes from the *Washington Post*, 3 March 1964,

"...the comparison of Makarios to Castro goes beyond the fact that they both wear beards. Heedless of consequences each has flouted the interest of others, and each has appeared to be the prisoner of more extreme factions."

(35) Hitchens, op. cit., p. 163.


(37) One notable recent example is the book by Christopher Hitchens, 1984, *op. cit.*, in which he argues "that there was collusion between unevenly matched and differently motivated forces, who for varying reasons disliked an independent Cyprus", pp. 164 - 165.


CHAPTER TWO

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOPTS.

On 14 March 1971, President Makarios stated in a public broadcast:—

"Cyprus is a Greek Island. It was Greek from the dawn of history and it shall remain Greek forever. We have taken it over as a wholly Greek Island and we shall preserve it as an undivided Greek Island, until we hand it over to Mother Greece." (1)

At a press conference on 22 February 1972, Rauf Denktas, the Turkish Cypriot leader, bluntly commented:—

"...nothing short of geographical separation will save this community (Turkish Cypriot) from future harassment." (2)

Both statements reveal the opposite views each community adopted (3), and how little both sides had moved towards political reconciliation during the turbulent decade of the 'Sixties. This Chapter concentrates on (i) the collapse of the Independence Constitution, and (ii) different geographical criteria in order to see just how intermixed Cyprus was before the de facto separation of Turkish from Greek Cypriots, and questions whether or not there was any geographical basis for a "geographical separation" of the two communities.

(1) The Independence Constitution.

The reasons for the collapse of the first Cypriot Republic are well documented elsewhere so this is only a skeleton outline. The Zurich-London Accords laid the basic framework of the Constitution and drew up three international treaties:—

(1) The Treaty of Establishment, enabling Britain to retain absolute sovereignty over two military bases, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, totalling 99 square miles.

(2) Under the Treaty of Guarantee, Britain, Greece, or Turkey could intervene to uphold the independence of Cyprus with the proviso that Enosis and Taksim were prohibited, and to restore the 1960 Constitution.
(3) The Treaty of Alliance provided that Greece could station 950 troops and Turkey 650 troops on Cyprus.

Independence was gained on 16 August 1960, but the Republic's first three years suffered a constitutional crisis and virtual governmental paralysis. The complex system of checks and balances written into the Constitution to preserve bicomunalism and safeguard Turkish Cypriot rights proved to be a major centrifugal force polarizing the two community leaderships. Greek Cypriots claimed that the Turkish Cypriot "minority" was granted powers out of all proportion to their numbers. The Constitution gave "ethnic balance" a higher priority than "majority rule". (4) The Greek Cypriots argued that the ethnic ratios were unfair, for instance, Turkish Cypriots were entitled to thirty per cent of all civil service posts; forty per cent of army posts; moreover, the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President had veto powers over all legislation relating to foreign affairs, defence, or internal security. Bicomunalism was thus institutionalized in a Constitution which did nothing to enhance intercommunal cooperation at the political level. Another example were the legitimized separate municipalities organized along bicomunal lines, "thereby becoming the only organ of the constitution based on the idea of territorial separation". (5) President Makarios argued that the Constitution was imposed on the Cypriot people without consultation with them and should be subject to revision. Therefore he wrote to Vice-President Küçük proposing thirteen amendments to the Constitution. (6) If implemented the suggested alterations would have transformed the Republic into a state ruled by majority principles, which was unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots who wanted to be treated as "co-founders" of the Republic rather than as a minority group. Ankara hastily rejected Makarios' proposals, setting the scene for the intercommunal clashes of Christmas week 1963 and for the Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from Government.

Turkish Cypriot leaders have subsequently drawn attention to the activities
of the Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Yorgadis, who clandestinely circulated the Akritas Plan. This plan lays down a series of steps whereby the Greeks would make adjustments to the Constitution and use the concept of self-determination to achieve Enosis. It also suggested that if Turkish Cypriots resisted they were to be subdued by force. (7)

On 27 December intercommunal violence broke out. A "secret army" of ex-E.O.K.A. men took over from the politicians by organizing attacks on Turkish Cypriots who were themselves preparing for such an occurrence.

According to Peter Loizos:

"...the most serious Turkish Cypriot mistake was to form armed groups for protection in the event of intercommunal hostilities...This gave fuel to Greek extremists' claims that the Turkish Cypriots were going to provoke partition. It led directly to intercommunal violence..." (8)

It seems more accurate to argue that both communities built up paramilitary groups in anticipation of constitutional deadlock, an outbreak of violence, and owing to the survival of their mutually exclusive political goals.

(ii) Was there any geographical basis for bicommunalism and partition?

Cyprus has been described as...

"an ethnographical fruit-cake in which the Greek and Turkish currants were mixed up in every town and village and often in every street." (9)

At Independence there were 114 "mixed" villages (refer to Table 2.1), all urban centres had mixed populations, and in no one region did the Turkish Cypriots form a majority of the population. It is interesting to record that there was a dramatic decline in the number of mixed villages even prior to December 1963. Michael Drury found in the Paphos District only seven per cent (25,000) of the total rural population inhabited villages in which the ethnic ratio fell below 2:1.

"In 1960, it was thus 'normal' to inhabit a village which was essentially monoglot and mono-religious." (10)

In five of the six district towns the ethnic quarters were clearly defined
# Table 2.1: The Decline of Mixed Communities in Cyprus, 1891-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total Villages</th>
<th>Greek Cypriot</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot</th>
<th>Mixed Villages</th>
<th>Mixed as percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: M.R.G. Report, 1976, No.30, Cyprus, p.28. Patrick, R. 1976, p.12. [See Fig. 2:1]
A centre was considered to be mixed if ten or more people of a second ethnic group were residents. If the centre's total population was less than 100, the minority ethnic group had to comprise at least 10% of that total.

**FIG. 2.1 PROGRESSIVE SEGREGATION OF THE CYPRiot ETHNIC COMMUNITIES, 1891–1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Years</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek-Cypriot</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk-Cypriot</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* based on field research)

PATRICK '76
though boundary-less. Villages also had high levels of ethnic segregation and duplication of functions. As Drury, 1977, argues:

"the reality of the situation at independence was one of increasing ethnic polarisation at all levels of contact." (11)

The Geographical Distribution of the Communities.

Prior to Independence the idea of partition was mooted in Parliament and turned into a geopolitical goal by the Turkish Cypriots with the backing of Ankara, but was partition geographically justifiable or feasible?

In an article entitled — 'Partitioning Cyprus : A class exercise in Applied Political Geography', Alexander Melamid discussed the boundary definitions of the proposed partition lines suggested by the Turkish Cypriots and British (Refer to Map 2.1.). He concluded:

"Owing to the island's population distribution" definition of the boundary following the British suggestion will involve a population exchange of about 60,000 Greeks from Turkish territory against about the same number of Turks from Greek territory. Definition of the boundary according to the Turkish suggestion will involve a population exchange of 200,000 Greeks (half of the Greek population of Cyprus) from Turkish territory and against about 40,000 Turks (half the Turkish population) from Greek territory." (12)

The latter figures are extremely close to the actual numbers of displaced people in the "population exchange" following the Turkish intervention in 1974. (Refer to Chapter Six) In 1965 Dr Fazil Küçük presented a memorandum to Señor Galo Plaza, the United Nations Mediator, on 22 February. It argued for a geographical separation of the two communities and a "voluntary exchange" of people under United Nations supervision. Initially the Turks had proposed a dividing line from the village of Yalia on the north western coast through the 'Green Line' of Nicosia, and to Famagusta in the east. They claimed the zone north of this line, some 1,084 square miles or 38 per cent of the total area of the Republic. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to reduce the area
originally claimed to about 750 square miles or about 20 per cent of the Republic. (13) The transfer of the Greek Cypriot population from the Turkish zone would, it was estimated take a decade. In practice, when the policy of partition was brutally enforced by Turkish military action in August 1974, Greek Cypriot refugees moved en masse, and all but a minority remained in the North by December 1975. (see Chapter Six)

Taksim had developed into the political goal of the Turkish Cypriots for several reasons: -

i) Physical safety against Greek Cypriot terrorists;

ii) Mainland Turkey strongly opposed Enosis, insisting that "any settlement firstly must maintain an equilibrium of territorial interests in the eastern Mediterranean." (14)

iii) It could also be argued that politically the Turkish Cypriot leaders had much to gain from partition, which would effectively give them charge of a mini-state.

Political motives rather than geographical sense lie behind most physical divisions of two peoples sharing a common territory. Indeed an analysis of Tables 2.1 to 2.6 will show that on the basis of population size and distribution; land ownership; and settlement patterns there was not even a basis for the formation of artificial cantons let alone two de facto mono-ethnic zones. (15) According to District distributions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Paphos District had the largest percentage of Turkish Cypriots. Michael Drury, 1977, reveals that 37.4% of the population of Paphos town (Ktima), and 23.1% of the population of the remaining district were classified as Turkish Cypriot, these being the highest urban and rural percentages for any part of the island with the exception of Nicosia old town.

During the first three years of the Independent Republic approximately 38% of the island's settlements were either Turkish or mixed. These were dispersed throughout the countryside, and in no district did the Turkish Cypriot settlements form a majority. Only in small parts of each district
### TABLE 2.2  THE GROWTH OF GREEK ORTHODOX AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census of</th>
<th>Greek Orthodox</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>158,585</td>
<td>47,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>182,739</td>
<td>51,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>244,887</td>
<td>61,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>276,572</td>
<td>64,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>361,199</td>
<td>80,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>442,363</td>
<td>104,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*1973</td>
<td>482,000 (approximate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>480-488,000 (approx.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>145,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Notes: (1) The Census data from 1891-1960, gave "above-average quality data", whereas the figures for 1973 and 1976 are less reliable, few questions were asked in the enumerations. As for the 1978 population estimate of the Turkish Cypriot community, St.John-Johns questions its accuracy. He argues that "the total of 145,000 was not only perfectly feasible on demographic grounds but could have been much higher if some immigration is assumed".

(2) On the foundation of the Independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960 the categories of population change from "Greek Orthodox" and Muslim to "Greek Cypriot" and "Turkish Cypriot", thus the Greek Cypriot category may be inflated due to the inclusion of Maronites and other groups under the terms of Community definition written into the Constitution.
### TABLE 2.3 DISTRIBUTION OF GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIO TS BY DISTRICT IN 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Greeks</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>230,278</td>
<td>184,441</td>
<td>80.09</td>
<td>45,837</td>
<td>19.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>33,400</td>
<td>28,828</td>
<td>86.31</td>
<td>4,572</td>
<td>13.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>127,135</td>
<td>106,112</td>
<td>83.46</td>
<td>21,023</td>
<td>16.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>61,821</td>
<td>48,568</td>
<td>78.56</td>
<td>13,253</td>
<td>21.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limassol</td>
<td>118,600</td>
<td>103,725</td>
<td>87.46</td>
<td>14,875</td>
<td>12.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paphos</td>
<td>63,420</td>
<td>48,020</td>
<td>75.72</td>
<td>15,400</td>
<td>24.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>634,654</td>
<td>519,694</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>114,960</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Karozis, G. 1976, p.16.

### Table 2.4 Distribution of Greek and Turkish Cypriot Land Ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Groups</th>
<th>Area (in donums)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>4,123,711</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>852,455</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians, Maronites and others</td>
<td>91,406</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State owned</td>
<td>1,847,820</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,915,392</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Lands and Surveys Department, 'Whose is What? The true facts of land ownership' in Cyprus, Cyprus To-day, Vol. XII, No. 6.

N.B. Excluding state land ownership, the percentages read as follows:-

- Greeks 81.37%
- Turks 16.82%
- Armenians, Maronites and others 1.81%
- Total 100.00%
### TABLE 2.5  GREEK AND TURKISH HOLDINGS, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Area (in donums)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>2,502,441</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>652,486</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>42,821</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,197,748</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 2.6  DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS BY DISTRICT, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Turk</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>20,107</td>
<td>17,302</td>
<td>2,727</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>4,988</td>
<td>3,966</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>14,533</td>
<td>12,242</td>
<td>2,286</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>6,570</td>
<td>5,057</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limassol</td>
<td>12,874</td>
<td>11,627</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paphos</td>
<td>11,054</td>
<td>8,712</td>
<td>2,338</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>70,124</td>
<td>58,906</td>
<td>10,756</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: As Above.
were there any concentrations of Turkish Cypriot and mixed centres, such as in the southern foothills of the Pentadaktylos range, with the Turkish settlements of Ayios Andronikos, Ayios Iacovos, Artemis, Kalivakia, Platini, Photta, Ayios Ermolaos spread across this area. Such concentrations formed the basis of northern Turkish Cypriot enclaves, for example in the area south of St. Hilarion Castle.

( refer to Map 3:2)

Mixed population centres were declining before December 1963, falling from 36% to 18% of the total number of settlements from 1931 to 1960. This decline is explained by a combination of factors: -

i) During the colonial period there was a reduction in the number of marginal villages in a British attempt to separate landuse in certain areas. (16)

ii) Earth movements, dam construction, water supply problems have also caused abandonment or resettlement of some villages.

iii) Rural-urban migration increased after World War II as a result of socio-economic changes and urbanisation. (17)

iv) E.O.K.A. violence against Turkish Cypriots and revenge killings persuaded many Turks to evacuate villages in 1957-58. They wholly or partly evacuated 27 villages. These refugees returned to all but six of the abandoned villages once intercommunal relations had calmed down, only to re-evacuate them in the 1963-'64 crisis. As Pierre Oberling writes:- "The exodus of Turkish Cypriots from mixed and isolated villages which began at that time was ultimately to lead to the physical separation of the Turkish Cypriot community from the Greek Cypriot community." (18)

Often villagers evacuated certain settlements because they "felt" isolated and vulnerable to attack. These "feelings" reached new heights in the intercommunal violence of 1963-'64, and in many cases were justified. It was during that period that intercommunal tensions emerged as "the dominant influence in affecting the pattern of settlement." (19) Chapter Three will highlight some of the major changes in
the political geography of Cyprus resulting from such population move­ments, which according to Russell King "formed the geographical stepping stone to the new state", i.e. the Turkish-controlled micro-state in northern Cyprus. (20)

In George Karouzis' detailed study of various geographical criteria in an attempt to find a rational solution to the Cyprus Problem based on knowledge of population distribution, settlement patterns, and land ownership, he discovered that the Turkish Cypriot population living in 117 purely Turkish villages in 1960 was concentrated in 54 areas. (21) Out of these 54 areas, 33 were in groupings of just one village, 17 in groupings of two to five villages, and just four others in groups of over five villages. He then added mixed villages of both Greek and Turkish majorities in order to discover the existence of "Turkish Regions" with boundaries corresponding to the administrative borders of village groups. He finally decided on seven strangely shaped regions (see Map 24). It will be useful to consider this map when examining what actually has happened to the map of Cyprus over the last two decades, and to compare it with the maps showing Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Given the dispersed nature of many of the Turkish settlements and small size of most of the village groupings, the formation of "pockets" of Turkish Cypriot control completely transformed the landscape of the island in political and human terms.
Footnotes and References.

(1) Refer to bibliographical references and to Chapter Five for more details on Makarios' ambiguous stand on Enosis.

(2) Quoted in Attalides, M. 1979, Cyprus, (Q Press Ltd., Edinburgh), p.156.

(3) Although it should be noted that Archbishop Makarios made several ambiguous and contradictory statements regarding Enosis, particularly after 1967 when a military Junta was in power in Athens and he was under pressure from extremists within his own community.


(5) ibid.

(6) Makarios' proposed amendments to the Constitution included the removal of Presidential and Vice-Presidential veto powers; the establishment of unified municipal councils; the revision of the communal ratios in the civil service and security forces to coincide with the actual population ratio of four Greeks to every one Turkish Cypriot.


(11) ibid.


(13) U.N. Mediator's Report to the Secretary-General, 26 March 1964, para. 109.

(14) ibid., para. 110.


(16) Some examples are given from Western Cyprus by Michael Drury, 1977, op. cit.


(18) Oberling, op. cit., p.61.


(20) King, R. August 1980, 'Cyprus since 1974: Economic and Demographic Change', a paper presented to the Geography Section, Fifth Mediterranean Conference, Bar-Ilan University,
Tel Aviv, 5 - 7 August 1980.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SPATIAL ASPECTS OF INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT AND FORMATION OF TURKISH CYPRiot ENCLAVES IN CYPRUS.

In a report submitted to the Secretary-General on 26 March 1965, Senior Galo Plaza, U.N. Mediator in Cyprus, stated:

"All through this period (Dec. '63 to March '65) there were two kinds of "green line" on Cyprus, and few people dared to cross either kind. There were firstly the physical barriers, constructed out of road-blocks, strong-points, fortified houses, sandbagged walls and trenches...
The second kind of "green line" was the psychological kind." (1)

With the formation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves the two communities maintained "a psychological distance between each other as members of different groups. Such distancing can be conceptualized as the raising of an invisible wall. Wherever actual dangers arose on Cyprus from the proximity of Greeks and Turks, concrete walls were built. Invested with emotion as these were, they also represented psychological walls impossible to break down." (2)

The above quotations refer to the meeting of "Invisible" and "Visible" walls separating the two communities as a result of de facto changes in the political geography of Cyprus, December 1963 to August 1964. Unfortunately, the decade 1964 to '74 "saw a continuing process of cleavage between the two communities." (3)

Section One: The Outbreak of Intercommunal Violence.

Once the Constitution had collapsed the initiative fell into the hands of community paramilitaries and terrorists. Many former E.O.K.A. members had never handed over their weapons to the Cyprus Police, which enabled several dissident armed gangs to exist independent of central government direction. Simultaneously, Turkish Cypriots had made some preparations under the guidance of T.M.T. to seal off Turkish Cypriot quarters and fortify their villages in the event of Greek Cypriot assaults.
The last occasion when Turkish Cypriots could walk the streets of the Greek sector of Nicosia without harassment or fear of harassment was on 21 December 1963. At 2-15 a.m. on that day a group of Turkish Cypriots were stopped in Hermes Street, the boundary of the old Greek/Turkish quarters of central Nicosia, by a patrol of Greek Cypriot police wishing to see their identity cards. An angry crowd gathered, firing broke out, and a Turkish Cypriot couple were shot dead. News of this incident sparked off indiscriminate fighting in other parts of the capital. Appeals for an immediate cease-fire were ignored by Greek Cypriots who attacked Turkish areas of the mixed northern suburbs of Omorphita and Trakhonas. Many were killed, wounded or taken hostage. After three Turkish jets buzzed over Nicosia in what the Turkish Prime Minister described as "warning flights" and several appeals by the three Guarantor Powers for an end to fighting, President Makarios accepted a cease-fire on Christmas Day. The Government, by now comprising only Greek Cypriot leaders after a Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from all governmental and civil service positions, agreed to a tripartite peace-keeping operation. This was to be carried out by the national contingents of Greece, Turkey, and Britain, under the command of Major-General Peter Young, who was in charge of the British Army Units in Cyprus. In no time, total cease-fire responsibilities fell into British hands, for the other contingents had taken sides with their Cypriot compatriots. The Greeks eventually moved back to their permanent camp, whereas the Turkish National Contingent remained encamped around Kermia, Orta Keuy, and Geunyeli along the strategic Nicosia-Kyrenia road. (refer to map 3-1)

While the British mounted their peacekeeping operation which was to lay the foundations for U.N.P.I.CYP., intercommunal fighting continued. Following the Christmas week troubles in Nicosia, violence spread to other areas of the island. From December 1963 to end-August 1964, 72 mixed villages were evacuated by Turkish Cypriots, and 24 wholly Turkish Cypriot villages were abandoned. United Nations figures estimated about
25,000 refugees, of whom about 21,000 were given homes in larger Turkish Cypriot communities, while the remainder found temporary shelter in refugee camps. (4) Others have argued that between 25,000-30,000 Turks became refugees. (5) According to Richard Patrick, probably less than 200 Greek Cypriots from six mixed villages became refugees because of fighting or intercommunal tension after December '63. (6)

By mid-1964 a de facto patchwork partition had transformed the political geography of Cyprus from a unitary Republic into a Republic "riddled with holes". (7) Superficially it had a single administration, but in fact it was politically divided between the Greek Cypriot central administration and the "breakaway" Turkish Cypriot leadership, who controlled about 1.6% of the island's territory. (8) Based on field-research in 1970-'71, Richard Patrick revealed that 57 formerly "mixed" villages were then purely Greek, 19 Turkish Cypriot villages remained completely deserted, and some areas of each district town were either partially or wholly evacuated. (9) Furthermore, approximately 115 villages and quarters inhabited by Turkish Cypriots were under the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration (so named in December 1967). In contrast only 42 villages and quarters with Turkish residents were controlled by the Cyprus Government, accounting for only ten per cent of the entire Turkish Cypriot population. Even these villages were only partially integrated into the Government's administrative structure, and except for tax payment were left to their own devices.

U.N.F.I.CYP. was thrown into this peculiar and confusing political geography to restore peace and tranquility to the island. In order to appreciate the extent of the problems facing U.N.F.I.CYP., it is crucial to have a better understanding of the spatial dynamics of Cypriot intercommunal conflict and territorial control in the period December '63 to August '64. In reality U.N.F.I.CYP. arrived as the Turkish Cypriots were effectively creating the basis for a rudimentary, fragmented "state
within a state. (10) One of the primary obstacles facing the United Nations Force was that Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkish military commanders could not allow their people to conform absolutely to the United Nations' conception of normality in the island, because that conception included a recognition of the existing (Greek) Cypriot Government as the legitimate administration for the whole island. (11) The map of Cyprus was even more complicated than indicated by Map 3.3., for it was not always clear who had effective control where. There were numerous "contested areas" that could not definitely be allotted to either the Cyprus Government or Turkish Cypriot administration. (12) Many potential trouble spots were located at ethnic interfaces where there were no precise demarcations indicating geopolitical boundaries. Thus U.N.F.I.CYP. commanders had to be constantly aware of such "sensitive areas" of ambiguous territorial and political status, as well as of various local understandings or agreements regarding freedom of movement through or Greek Cypriot activity around Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. These parochial understandings/agreements were between local representatives of both communities, often under United Nations auspices, producing compromises where conflicts may have arisen. (13) A typical case would be an "agreement" concerning Greek Cypriot rights to use certain roads passing through Turkish Cypriot-controlled land, or their rights to farm land immediately adjacent to a Turkish Cypriot settlement.

In some areas the limits of control exercised by either community were marked by two concentric rings of fortified posts separated by a "contested zone" patrolled by U.N.F.I.CYP. personnel. In other areas "confrontation lines" existed between National Guard positions and Turkish Cypriot Fighters, the most obvious being the "Green Line" in Nicosia. All these areas of potential or actual conflict were closely observed by members of U.N.F.I.CYP. Both the Cyprus Government and Turkish Cypriot Leadership wished to extend their territorial control
or to test each others control of certain "strategic areas" by "creating incidents" deliberately aggravating intercommunal tensions. (14) By helping to reduce tension or to prevent incidents from occurring U.N.F.I.CYP. maintained a spatial status quo. This is why it is so important to understand the evolution of the political map of Cyprus and locational aspects of intercommunal conflict at the time when U.N.F.I.CYP. took over from a beleaguered British peace-keeping operation. The following sections will therefore examine the formation and shapes of the enclaves under TurkishCypriot-control.

Section Two: "Confrontation Lines" and Enclaves.

1) The "Green Line"

During the E.O.K.A. campaigns of the late 1950s the Greek/Turkish quarters of the capital were divided by a wire fence established to keep both communities apart in order to prevent intercommunal bloodshed. This line roughly followed the course of Paphos and Hermes streets (refer to Map 3.1). During the first three relatively calm years of independence there was no real necessity for a physical separation of the communities, but peaceful, mixed coexistence ended with the first gunfire on 21 December '63. On the night of 28-29 December a green pencil line was drawn across a map of Nicosia by General Young under the auspices of representatives of both communities. (15) The "Green Line" was never intended to be anything other than a temporary cordon sanitaire between the antagonists, patrolled by "neutral" troops to ensure that the ceasefire was maintained and the tactical positions of opposing fighter groups remained stationary. Unfortunately, the Green Line became a symbol of ethnic segregation and a division of international geopolitical significance. As Michael Harbottle points out: -

"Little did anyone at that table that night, least of all General Young, think that the green ribbon of chinagraph would become a dividing line between Turk- and Greek Cypriot for four years, an unremitting obstacle to progress towards normalization between the two communities." (16)
NICOSIA: ROUTE OF GREEN LINE THROUGH OLD CITY

The dividing line in Nicosia became a means to political ends, and like many other lines of demarcation and fortified ethnic interfaces, it represented a physical barrier blocking the way to a political settlement based on unity and cooperation rather than ethnic segregation. The bifurcation of the capital, moreover, created numerous infrastructural and administrative problems, including the division of communications, water and electrical supplies, all of which will be dealt with in Chapter Five.

ii) Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave.

During the Christmas '63 fighting many Turkish Cypriots fled to the safety of the developing stronghold extending from the Turkish "old quarter" of Nicosia northwards via the Kyrenia Road protected by the Turkish National Contingent. The first wave of refugees accounted for an estimated 8,000 people or sixteen per cent of all villages evacuated during 1963-'64. Probably 7,000 refugees were from Nicosia and its immediate environs, particularly the suburbs of Omorphita (5,126 refugees), Trakhonas (912), Strovolos and Eylenja (316). (17) It should be stressed that there were also some Greek Cypriot refugees from these mixed suburbs. Many other refugees who entered the Nicosia Enclave and the area under Turkish Cypriot de facto control extending northwards through Geunyeli, Krini, and Aghirda, came from mixed rural villages in later population movements when violence spread into the countryside. Turkish Cypriots abandoned twelve villages neighbouring the Geunyeli-Aghirda Enclave, such as Akaki, Aredhiou, Argaki, Dhenia, and Skylloura, all abandoned villages formerly with mixed ethnic populations. Thus an influx of refugees from scattered rural settlements helped the Turkish Leadership to consolidate territorial control from the capital to a point overlooking the Kyrenia coastline. (refer to Map 3.2)

The Kyrenia Pass and St. Hilarion Castle.

The northern section of this important Turkish enclave centred around Aghirda, which was part of the Nicosia Regional Administrative structure
MAP 3:2 GEUNYELI - AGHIRDA ENCLAVE

Showing initial strategic positions of Turkish military forces - 22 July 1974

Turkish military positions - 22/07/74
Fault
Height contours
Roads

Purely Turkish Cypriot before invasion
Area where Turks held majority of property
Greek Cypriot villages
Turkish Cypriot villages
Mixed villages
St. Hilarion Castle

25 0 25 km
but had a separate military command. (see Table 3.2 for details of Turkish Cypriot administrative control of villages in the Pentadaktylos)

Turkish National Contingent soldiers and Turkish Cypriot Fighters were stationed in positions near to the Kyrenia Road. The concentration of Turkish Cypriots in the Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave served several advantages, although the Kyrenia coastline was still firmly under Greek Cypriot control. For instance, the Turks had control of the mountain on which St. Hilarion Castle stands, overlooking the coast to the north and Nicosia to the south. It is a strategically and symbolically significant point, only ten miles from the outskirts of Nicosia, and the only peak in the Pentadaktylos under Turkish Cypriot control. According to Professor Volkan:

"...the mountaintop had become a symbol of Turkish omnipotence. A huge Turkish flag was hung from the peak of St. Hilarion to another mountaintop nearby. It was so enormous that it could be seen as a red spot from many miles away." (18) (also see Fig.3:1)

Turkish Cypriots were able to gain control of this strategically important area largely owing to the pre-existence of several mixed and purely Turkish settlements in the central and southern Pentadaktylos, especially in locations near the Kyrenia Road and to the south-west of Kyrenia town. (see Map 3.2 and Table 3.1 for details) The enclave developed around a cluster of five Turkish Cypriot centres: - Aghirda, Keumurju, Pileri, Krini, and Photta. If consideration is given to the surrounding region there were only four towns/villages under the control of the Cyprus Government that had Turkish quarters; only one, Ayia Irini, had a Turkish Cypriot majority. Most other purely Turkish Cypriot villages had been emptied of their inhabitants (e.g. Trapeza) or were absorbed by the protective ring of Turkish Cypriot Fighters and de facto control. Ayia Irini is an isolated village west of Myrtou, near Morphou Bay, so it was completely cut-off, but its Turkish inhabitants decided to stay while the village was too far away from other predominantly Turkish Cypriot villages to be included in a village "grouping" under
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agro-Physiographic Region</th>
<th>Greek Cypriot Population Percentage</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot Population Percentage</th>
<th>Number of villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Central Pentadaktylos</td>
<td>66.95</td>
<td>33.05</td>
<td>8 7 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Southern foothills of the Pentadaktylos</td>
<td>67.97</td>
<td>32.03</td>
<td>4 6 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Northern foothills of the Pentadaktylos</td>
<td>88.71</td>
<td>11.29</td>
<td>9 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Kyrenia Plain</td>
<td>88.64</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>8 0 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Key to villages
1 (Greek); 2 (Turkish); 3 (Mixed);

Source: Karouzis (1976) Proposals for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem.
( Cosmos Press, Nicosia, pp 24 and 49 )

See also Cyprus Population Distribution Map (1960).
TABLE 3:2  
DETAILS OF TURKISH CYPRIOI AND MIXED VILLAGES  
IN THE KYRENIA PLAIN AND PENTADAKTYLOS.

Under control of the Turkish Cypriot Leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Name</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot Name</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot Population</th>
<th>Greek Cypriot Population</th>
<th>Resident Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ayios Andronikos</td>
<td>Topcuköy</td>
<td>375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keumurju</td>
<td>Kömürçü</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aghirda</td>
<td>Agirdag</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krini</td>
<td>Pinarbasi</td>
<td>545</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pileri</td>
<td>Göceri</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photts</td>
<td>Dagyolu</td>
<td>785</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temblos</td>
<td>Zeytinlik</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalyvakia</td>
<td>Hisarköy</td>
<td>335</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kornokipos</td>
<td>Gornec</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayios</td>
<td>Ergenekon</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khariton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayios</td>
<td>Altinova</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iakovos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melounda</td>
<td>Mallidag</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Settlements abandoned by Turkish Cypriots.

| | | | | |
| Liveras | Liveras | 150 | 29 |
| Dhioros | Yorgos | 600 | |
| Ayios | Ayirnola | 467 | |
| Ermolaos | | | |
| Vasilia | Vasilya | 1,300 | |
| Lapithos | Lapta | 4,000 | |
| Trapeza | Teknecik | | |
| Ayios | Ayyorgi | 250 | |
| Yeoryios | | | |

Mixed settlements under the control of the Cyprus Government.

| | | | |
| Kyrenia | Girne | 800 | |
| Kazaphani | Ozanköy | 405 | |
| Ayia Irini | Akdeniz | 465 | |
| Klepini | Arapköy | 18 | |

N.B. Figures in brackets represent the numbers of refugees who left the villages.  
source: Patrick 1976 pp 278 – 323
Turkish Cypriot control. Dhioros, a mixed village close to Myrtou, was completely evacuated by its Turkish residents, most of whom fled to the Guenyeli - Aghirda Enclave. (refer to Map 6:8, for village locations)

On April 25, 1964, Greek Cypriots attempted to knock-out Turkish positions near to the Kyrenia Pass, but failed to gain ground. On 29 April, U.N.F.I.CYP. intervened to arrange a cease-fire. Eventually cease-fire lines were drawn by United Nations personnel by marking the front-line positions of both sides. U.N.F.I.CYP. occupied "disputed positions" wherever possible. These cease-fire lines posed numerous problems for Cypriots living on either side of them. For example, Temblos, situated at the northern extension of the Aghirda Enclave, was literally hemmed-in on three sides and had U.N.F.I.CYP. troops all around it to prevent National Guard and uniformed Turkish Fighters from entering the village as part of local cease-fire arrangements. As a result of these arbitrary lines Temblos villagers could only get to Nicosia via the Kyrenia Road, despite attempts to improve the mountain track to St.Hilarion. (refer to Chapter Five, Part One, p.117) To get to the Kyrenia Road they were subjected to Government restrictions and searches.

Until 26 October 1964 no Greek Cypriot was permitted to travel along the Kyrenia Road, running from Nicosia via Geunyeli to the north coast. So one of the first steps U.N.F.I.CYP. made to "normalize" conditions in Cyprus was to reopen the road to Greek Cypriot civilians, who were only allowed to move through the Turkish-controlled area if they were in the daily U.N.F.I.CYP. Nicosia-Kyrenia convoys, otherwise they had to take long detours around the perimeter of the Enclave. (20)

The Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave was clearly demarcated from the "Green Line" within old Nicosia to its northern extremity at Temblos. Confined within three lines of soldiery, their own Fighters, U.N.F.I.CYP. "blue berets", and Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen, the Turkish Cypriot Leadership and military commanders had tight control over this strategic
enclave, the most important solid block of Turkish Cypriot territorial control in the island. (refer to Map 3.3) This enclave played a very significant part in the Turkish invasion of 1974. (see Map 3.2)

iii) Refugee Movements and Enclave Formation in Other Districts:

According to Richard Patrick, 1976,

"...the majority - minority status is more accurately defined by taking a broader view than one confined to the ethnic composition of each village in isolation. Invariably, a Turkish Cypriot majority in a given village gives way to a minority status if the regional situation is considered." (21)

In a detailed study of ethnic population, settlement, and land ownership distribution in Cyprus, George Karouzis, 1976, came to the same conclusion using various geographical definitions of region. (22: refer also to Chapter Two) The detailed example of the Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave reveals the extent to which Turkish Cypriot control depended on the pre-existing distribution of Greek, Mixed, and purely Turkish settlements. Areas with a relatively high local density of Turkish Cypriots or high proportion of Turkish/Mixed villages (according to the 1960 Census), were often the foundation or "core" of Turkish Cypriot enclaves. For example, the Xeros - Karavostassi area had several Turkish and Mixed centres, including Elia, Kazivera, Limnitis and Ambelikou. Surrounding the Greek Cypriot settlement of Athienou were ten purely Turkish or Mixed villages, such as Ayia, Lourounjina, Potamia, Armos, and Melousha. (23)

The most widespread refugee movements took place in January 1964 after the lifting of road-blocks by the Cyprus Government. Fifty-one per cent of all villages eventually evacuated by end-August 1964 were evacuated in this month, a total of 6,443 people. (24) February accounted for 2,785 people and eighteen per cent of the total number of villages deserted by Turkish Cypriots. Five villages (973 people) were evacuated in the months of March and May, and finally, six villages and 837 people evacuated in early August.
MAP - 3:3 Turkish-Cypriot Controlled Areas 1964-July 1974

Turkish Cypriot centres
- Under the territorial control of the Cyprus Government
+ Under the control of the Turkish Cypriot Leadership

Enclaves

Location of lines of close armed confrontation

British Sovereign Base Area

Kokkina
Limnitis
Nicosa
Limassol
Paphos
Kyrenia
Famagusta
Larnaca

( Source: Patrick, 1978, p. 464)

[Compare with Maps 3.4 & 3.6]
Map by French geographer, E. Kolodny, showing Turkish enclaves.
MAP-3:5 PAPHOS DISTRICT: TURKISH CYPRiot ENCLAVES

- Map showing populated Turkish areas 1964 to '74/5
- Main roads
- Towns

Legend:
- Populated Turkish - and refugee centres;
- Some villages deserted by Turkish Cypriots in 1963-'64;
- Greek Cypriot villages;
- Inhabited mixed villages under Greek control:

Adapted from maps by Drury [1977]
It seems that most refugee movements were spontaneous, corresponding to outbreaks of intercommunal violence and intimidation, such as occurred in the Paphos District in February and Tylliria in August. A detailed study of "population upheaval" in Western Cyprus reveals some interesting points about the geography of refugee movements in the island as a whole. (25) Paphos District had the highest District ratio of Turks to Greeks, about 1:3. Michael Drury, 1977, found that thirty-two per cent of all inhabited villages in the District had a Turkish Cypriot majority, and that with the exception of the Dhiarezos Valley group and a small group near Lyso, they formed few obvious clusters. (refer to Map 3.5) Most of these villages had a small population, an average size of 365 inhabitants, and had scattered locations. Whereas many of the Greek Cypriot settlements were larger and were not surrounded by Turkish Cypriot settlements, although there were exceptions such as Lyso caught behind the villages of Meladhia and Melandra. This settlement pattern added to Turkish Cypriot feelings of geographical insecurity once intercommunal hostilities flared up.

In Paphos District the refugee movement pattern shows that Turkish Cypriots often moved to new locations either because of their central position within a particular group of Turkish/Mixed villages, or because the villages were tangential to main lines of communication and so ran less risk of interference. As Drury revealed, the resulting formation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves in Paphos District avoided most main roads, a pattern not repeated in other parts of Cyprus where enclave formation created major problems for road communications. (refer to Chapter Five - Section on Freedom of Movement) Another point to make concerning the overall pattern of enclaves in Cyprus is that where there was rugged, hilly topography, poor communications between villages, and a scattered inter-mixture of Greek and Turkish Cypriot settlements, it was only possible to form tiny "pockets" of Turkish Cypriot-control surrounded by Greek Cypriot-controlled territory.
The largest movements of refugees in Western Cyprus occurred during February and March following battles in Paphos town itself. Villagers from neighbouring Lemba and Yeroskipos moved to the over-crowded Turkish quarter of Paphos. Fighting in other areas led Turkish Cypriots from Khoulou, Kourtaka and Pitargou to seek refuge in Axylou. Once Turkish Cypriots in Polis were besieged, refugee movements began in north-western parts of the District and in remote areas, where villages evacuated included Phasli, Kritou Terra, Mamoundali, Asproyia, Loukrounou, and Galataria. In the countryside the major 'recipient' centres were Androkikou, Mandria, Stavrokono, and Anadhiou, which received the villagers of Lapithiou "taken" by the Greek Cypriots in March 1964. (26)

Once intercommunal fighting in Cyprus had calmed down there were only four mixed villages remaining. Of these, Ayia Varvara and Akoursos were both under Government control, whilst Kouklia and Timi, both with large Greek Cypriot populations, maintained their Turkish quarters under guard by armed Fighters. (refer to Map 3:5)

In Paphos and other districts there appears to have been little or no centralized coordination of the refugee movements, although no doubt some were encouraged by T.M.T. Patrick found it "...more typical for villagers to move on their own initiative leaving most of their clothing, furniture and food behind." (27) Turkish Cypriot leaders denied any contingency plan for population redistribution and consolidations in certain strategic areas, although they did offer assistance to villagers in transport provision and refugee housing. But as Michael Drury stresses,

"The identification of minority consciousness with specific and clearly demarcated territory was of crucial psychological importance...the Turkish Cypriots...felt that the legal recognition of the two communities was inadequate, at least for the less numerous one, unless a spatial dimension was added." (28)

Territorial separation certainly became an important political bargaining to the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, and concern for the physical safety
of their community was used as a justification for segregation.

iv) The Turkish Quarters of Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos.

The Turkish Cypriot municipality of Famagusta comprised the walled city; the suburbs of Baikal, Karaolis, and Sakarya. U.N.F.I.CYP. maintained several look-out points along the walls and at the entrances of the other quarters. There was also a demilitarized zone around the Turkish Cypriot quarters preventing the development of close armed confrontation. In contrast, Larnaca was similar to Nicosia in that it remained a centre of tension throughout December '63 to August '64, and a cease-fire line was established along the western boundary of Scala, the Turkish Cypriot quarter, marked by Artemis Avenue which separated Turkish Cypriot Fighters from National Guardsmen. U.N.F.I.CYP. kept this "confrontation line" under continual surveillance.

Paphos also had its ethnic interface marked by a cease-fire line. Bitter intercommunal fighting began on 7 March '64 when hundreds of Greek Cypriots were taken hostage, prompting retaliatory hostage taking and an attempt to overrun the Turkish quarter of town. About twenty percent of its 3,500 population were made refugees as most of the quarter was evacuated, leaving a Turkish Cypriot controlled area of only a few hundred square yards. British troops intervened to establish a cease-fire zone around the quarter, which was later patrolled by U.N.F.I.CYP. The quarter was entrenched on and behind a bluff from the town centre westwards, leaving a swathe of derelict urban no-man's-land running through the town centre. (29)

Limassol's Turkish Cypriot quarter was not demarcated by fortifications, and there was more contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots than in other District towns. Under local agreements, uniformed Fighters were not permitted to parade or to carry weapons in parts of the quarter adjacent to the Greek Cypriot sector.

It should be stressed that smaller towns and villages also had ethnic divisions and quarters. For example, Polis, in the north-west of Paphos
v) The Battle for Tylliria and the Kokkina Enclave.

The last refugee movements took place in early August 1964 in north-west Cyprus, Tylliria region. They followed a Greek Cypriot offensive under the auspices of General Grivas, who was effectively commanding the National Guard. (refer to Footnote 3↑) The Turkish Cypriots were in control of the only main road through the region. (refer to Map5:3) On 4 April armed elements of both communities fought to gain control of a hill dominating a section of the highway. U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. intervened to arrange a cease-fire four days later, and U.N. observation posts were established between the two rival camps. Although the coastal road was reopened to civilian traffic the Turkish Cypriots soon placed road-blocks along it. (32)

Apart from the concern about Greek freedom of movement along the north-west coast, the Cyprus Government was worried about the possibility that the Turks could smuggle-in large numbers of weapons via Kokkina. To combat this 2,000 National Guard troops were deployed in the area facing 500 Turkish Cypriot Fighters within the enclave. On 6 August, Government forces attacked Turkish Cypriot villages around Kokkina, forcing their inhabitants to retreat into a narrow beachhead.

Refugees moved into Kokkina from purely Turkish Cypriot centres such as Mansoura, Sellain T'Appi, Ayios Theodhoros, and Alevga. To prevent the Turkish Cypriots of Kokkina from being overrun Turkish Air Force jets invaded Cyprus air-space to knock-out National Guard positions over-looking
the enclave. On 9 August, the United Nations Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire. This enabled U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. to establish "neutral positions" around Kokkina and Limnitis. Thus the boundaries of these enclaves were clearly demarcated, patrolled by U.N. soldiers, and made known to the military commanders of both sides. Greek Cypriots were prohibited from entering Kokkina, and were only allowed to use the coastal road through Limnitis during daylight hours only. Hence local Greek Cypriots were often obliged to take very long detours through or around the edge of the Troodos Mountains to avoid Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Other tiny Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas in this region centred around Lefka/Ambelikou and Elea, Angolemi, Ghaziveran. Both enclaves were under close U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. scrutiny.

For Turkish Cypriots, Kokkina remains an important symbol epitomizing their determination to resist Greek Cypriot domination, and as such it held a garrison for Turkish regulars out of all proportion to its size or population. For Greek Cypriots, Kokkina emphasized the military support Ankara was willing to give to the strategically vulnerable Turkish Cypriot held pieces of territory in Cyprus. Furthermore, the Tylliria fighting had revealed how weak peace-soldiers are when opposing communities take up arms to achieve their goals. There was very little United Nations troops could do against the stronger National Guard, particularly when they were only mandated to use "force" in self-defence rather than to prevent shooting. U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. proved to be much more effective as a "constabulary force" once cease-fires had been arranged. (33)

Section Three: The Extent of Turkish Cypriot Territorial Control, and the Arrival of U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.

By March the bulk of refugees had moved (about ten per cent of the Turkish Cypriot population). Many never to return to their homes, and the Turkish Cypriot Leadership and military commanders consolidated their de facto control over their scattered territory. In fact some Fighter
commanders resorted to armed threats, and even in a few cases to murder, to prevent some refugees from moving into Cyprus Government-controlled territory. The Greek Cypriots were prepared to encourage the return of Turkish refugees to old homes but not if they were in "sensitive, strategic areas" adjacent to enclaves or National Guard positions. They wanted to prevent more land falling into Turkish Cypriot hands and "accused the British troops of fostering partition of the island by putting themselves between the combatants and escorting fleeing refugees from mixed villages to Turkish-held communities." (34) James Stagenga, 1968, points out that many Greek Cypriots remembered their struggle against the British Army during the "Emergency Period" of colonial rule from 1955 to 1959.

"Moreover, by establishing "Green Line" neutral zones to separate the two communities in Nicosia, Larnaca, and elsewhere, the British were tacitly partitioning parts of the country." (35) It has been suggested that Archbishop Makarios used British then United Nations peacekeeping forces to parry the threat of unilateral Turkish intervention, enabling Greek Cypriots to continue their attacks (military and economic) on Turkish Cypriot enclaves. (36) The point being that the presence of "neutral" peace soldiers, particularly under the protective umbrella of the United Nations, would deter Ankara from sending troops.

On 4 March 1964, U.N.F.I.CYP. was authorized.

"Both Cypriot communities were aware that once this force was deployed the then existing patterns of coercive control throughout the island would be 'frozen'. Both sides therefore were intent on consolidating or extending their control before U.N.F.I.CYP. could intervene." (37) As one commentator put it, the U.N. Force was introduced "to see that the spatial distribution of these two environments did not alter". (38) At its peak strength in June 1964, U.N.F.I.CYP. comprised 6,400 men. Such limited manpower had to be carefully deployed at the island's major trouble-spots and ethnic-interfaces, and like the hamstrung British force, it could not be everywhere at once, which meant that the Greek
Cypriot guerrillas and National Guard "could choose their objectives at will." (39)

U.N.P.I.CYP.'s day-to-day operations in Cyprus had to cope with the numerous problems arising from the fragmented pattern of intercommunal conflict and territorial control. In 1964 the United Nations estimated that "areas administered by the Turkish Cypriot community...and defended by Turkish Cypriot Fighters" covered "approximately 54 square miles; or 1/2 per cent of the total area of the country, with a population of about 59,000, including 13,600 refugees." (40) U.N.F.I.CYP. gave de facto rather than "official" recognition to these enclaves, and it recognized the major areas under Turkish Cypriot control, such as the old Turkish quarter of Nicosia; the Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave (often referred to in U.N. Reports and other sources as the "Nicosia enclave"); the Turkish quarters of Larnaca and Famagusta; the town of Louroujina; an enclave comprising Lefka, another around Kalyvakia, and the two beachheads at Kokkina and Limnitis. (refer to Map 3.3) The areas given "enclave status" by U.N.P.I.CYP. were those where close "confrontation lines" existed or where intercommunal hostility was more likely to occur, therefore security was tight, with opposing fighters maintaining positions separated by United Nations observation posts and/or patrols. Richard Patrick's estimates made in 1970-'71 include all areas under the de facto control of the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, then called the "Provisional Administration", which contained approximately 105,000 inhabitants, including 20,000 refugees. In 1971 there were still some 8,000 Turkish Cypriots living in territory under Greek Cypriot control. In total, about twenty per cent of the Turkish Cypriot population had abandoned homes in December '63 - August '64, whilst the majority of Turkish Cypriots already lived in locations where Greeks were either unable or unwilling to penetrate.

It is interesting to compare different attempts to delineate Turkish Cypriot areas. Map 3.6 is an American one based on Turkish Cypriot
American map showing Turkish enclaves.
sources. It indicates Turkish village groupings, together with the most important mixed villages of Cyprus, either with a Greek or Turkish Cypriot majority, plus areas of Turkish control. Karouzis, 1976, argues that "...in fact this is not the case because apart from certain isolated cases, no control was exercised in all the areas shown". (41)

Map 3.4 is by Professor Emile Kolodny (42) and is purported to show the distribution of the Turkish Cypriot community in 1970, Turkish Cypriot enclaves, purely Turkish and mixed villages/towns. It is useful therefore to compare the map with the one produced by Richard Patrick (Map 3.3) which shows "Turkish Cypriot Controlled Areas in 1970". Karouzis had the following criticisms to make regarding Kolodny's map:

(a) The enclaves shown on the map were not all areas to which Greek Cypriots could have no access.
(b) The Turkish Cypriot enclaves number 44, or if the Turkish Cypriot quarters of Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos are counted, 48.
(c) The number of villages shown as abandoned is not accurate.
(d) Some purely Turkish or mixed villages have been omitted.
(e) There is a significant similarity between the borders of Turkish Cypriot areas in the Kolodny map and those used in the American map.

In contrast, Patrick's map shows 40 enclaves, 44 if the four towns are included. As Karouzis attempted to show, these enclaves were not necessarily areas of purely Turkish villages, population or land ownership, and did not include all such areas within their borders.

Not only did the patchwork partition of the island pose problems for U.N.F.I.CYP. in its efforts to keep the peace, it also posed administrative problems for the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, which had only loose control over its dispersed enclaves. Until the removal of restrictions on Turkish freedom of movement in March 1968, it was extremely difficult for the Leadership to maintain anything but distant contact with the various enclaves and quarters under its de facto control. In practice, local Fighter commanders and Turkish officers from the mainland or village mukhtars (leaders) remained in control of their respective local areas,
particularly in areas some distance from Nicosia and the Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave. Over the 1964 to 1974 period the Turkish Cypriots developed a complicated hierarchy of territorial administrative control. There were seven de facto local government regions, each with a District Officer based in the largest local municipality, who dealt with village leaders and town mayors over civil matters. At the top of the administrative ladder was the General Committee (Provisional Administration from December 1967 onwards) which sat in Turkish Nicosia, headed by former Vice-President Küçük, and was in charge of island-wide Turkish Cypriot policy. When civilian and military considerations overlapped there was close liaison between the General Committee and senior military officers. As will be shown in Chapter Five some mainland Turkish officers had great influence over local events and were responsible for a number of violent incidents. At the lower levels of the hierarchy the influence of the Leadership in Nicosia broke down. Richard Patrick produced a detailed study and map of Turkish Cypriot local government organisation as it existed in 1970. (see Map 3.7) 'Groupings' of Turkish Cypriot villages found in close proximity usually had a military and/or police headquarters in the most central or important village of the group. It was in the more isolated village groups under Turkish Cypriot control that local affairs were run by Fighter leaders, mukhtars, and police chiefs. (43)

Section Four: U.N.F.I.CYP. and the Political Geography of Cyprus, 1964-'74.

The United Nations Force in Cyprus was confronted with numerous difficult tasks as soon as it became operational on 27 March 1964. Firstly, it had to see that cease-fire arrangements were observed by both sides, a difficult task when there was always a likelihood that General Grivas would act independently of directives from central government. Secondly, U.N. personnel had to cope with Government restrictions on goods moving into Turkish Cypriot areas. After the failure of the attack on Kokkina President Makarios decided to pursue political goals
by applying economic pressure on the Turkish Cypriots rather than by force of arms. As part of this policy the Cyprus Government put an economic blockade on Turkish Cypriot administered enclaves, stopping the movement of "strategic materials" into those areas. (see Chapter Five) Thirdly, there were restrictions on Greek Cypriot mobility through Turkish enclaves. Fourthly, the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were badly overcrowded and had a refugee problem, which meant that there were large numbers of homeless people lacking basic amenities. At first U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. had great difficulty in getting much needed medical and other aid into Kokkina, and it was not until mid-September 1964 that these supplies were delivered.

Throughout its first decade of operations in Cyprus, U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. refused to give the Turkish Cypriot Leadership any international recognition, dealing with the purely Greek Cypriot administration as the Government of the whole Republic. At the same time, U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. did recognize the gravity of the ethnic-cum-political partition. As the Secretary-General reported on 11 March 1965:

"The Turkish Cypriot policy of self-isolation has led the community in the opposite direction from normality. The community leadership discourages the Turkish Cypriot population from engaging in personal, commercial, or other contact with their Greek Cypriot compatriots, from applying to Government offices in administrative matters or from resettling in their homes if they are refugees." (44)

U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. were faced with an island criss-crossed by physical barriers, "confrontation lines", and the problems of hardening "psychological barriers" between the two communities. As Galo Plaza recognized,

"The physical impediments to normal relations between the communities were serious enough, hardly less so was the psychological impediment caused by the suppression of the healthy movement of ideas, for which were substituted slogans and counter-slogans shouted by propaganda machines across the dividing lines in uncompromising, provocative or hostile tones." (45)
It is difficult to fully appreciate the extent of the hardships suffered by the enclaved Turkish Cypriots. Their isolation behind "visible walls" tended to create more "invisible walls" between the two sides. As Drury puts it: "The two communities' separation, as the decade advanced, became increasingly entrenched, physically, emotionally, and materially." (46)

Professor Volkan, 1979, likened the Turkish Cypriots to caged birds...

"They had become prisoners, in spite of the fact that their "prisons" lay within the neighbourhoods of their own people in which it was possible to conduct some semblance of normal life." (47)

Under these abnormal circumstances U.N.F.I.CYP. acted as the only communication bridge between ordinary Cypriots on either side of the de facto dividing lines, trying to breakdown the problems of physical and psychological detachment, the psychological "green lines" separating them. Frequently young U.N.F.I.CYP. officers were engaged in delicate discussions between village mukhtars, farmers, policemen, and businessmen of both sides in attempts to settle parochial disputes and reach local compromises. Such "corrective and preventive" mediation, as Harbottle describes it, "determines their success as peacekeepers, not the authority of the self-loading rifles that they may hold in their hands." (48)

Very often intercommunal disputes or incidents arose as a direct result of the peculiar political geography in a given area. For example, Greek Cypriot farmers sometimes tried to enter a Turkish Cypriot area without the prior permission of local Turkish Cypriot authorities. In such circumstances U.N.F.I.CYP. would intervene to prevent any hostile reactions. United Nations escorts would then be arranged to protect farmers entering Turkish areas provided they had permission from local Turkish Cypriot police or mukhtars. Such local "agreements" or "understandings" were not always easy to arrange in the absence of clear demarcation lines between the disputants. Very often the boundary between territory under Greek or
Turkish Cypriot control was ambiguous. As Richard Patrick explains, the boundary "more nearly resembles a frontier zone in the unguarded fields about the village. Such zones are ill-defined, and their irregular shapes depend on local patterns of ethnic settlement, land ownership, communication, transportation, and intercommunal hostility." (49)

U.N.F.I.CYP. were preoccupied with clearly defined "confrontation lines" around the enclaves of Kokkina, Aghirda - Guenyeli, and those dividing the ethnic quarters of towns like Nicosia and Larnaca. The Force also deployed men at points near to or within "contested areas" between the communities where changes in the local status quo or breaches of the peace were always a possibility. The only areas where U.N.F.I.CYP. could relax its observations and activities were those without any Turkish Cypriots, such as parts of the central Troodos, and around remote and strategically insignificant villages where the local people of either community adopted a "live and let live" attitude.

Chapter Five considers the first decade of U.N.F.I.CYP. activities in depth. These operations reveal many interlinkages between the island's physical, human, and political geography and practical peace-keeping tasks. Two main categories of operations will be examined. In United Nations phraseology these are:

(i) Activities toward preventing a recurrence of fighting and contributing to the restoration of law and order, and
(ii) Activities toward a return to normal conditions.

The first group of activities were part of a wider process of "pacification" or "de-confrontation". U.N.F.I.CYP. interpositioned its troops in actual or potential trouble spots, arranged cease-fires, manned and demarcated "neutral" zones, negotiated for the removal of fortifications, roadblocks, and other evidences of confrontation. The second category of U.N. Force duties included many non-martial socio-economic and humanitarian responsibilities affecting the daily lives of both Cypriot communities. U.N.F.I.CYP. were, according to Stagenga, "helping to foster such intangibles as intercommunal trust and mutual confidence." (50)
The U.N. Force had a military branch called Operations Economics involved in a wide variety of problems affecting the lives and livelihoods of the Turkish community in their homes and villages and along demarcation lines. Details of their activities such as arbitrating water rights, escorting farmers in strategic areas, and settling disputes over local resources are given in Chapter Five. Five headings are concentrated on under U.N.F.I.CYP.'s "normalization" activities. These are:

i) Freedom of movement;
ii) Civilian services;
iii) Agriculture;
iv) Industry and other economic activities;
v) Relief operations:

Chapter Four examines some definitions of "peacekeeping" relating to U.N.F.I.CYP., and the limitations of its mandate. Government and Turkish Cypriot restrictions on its freedom of movement are also considered. Finally, one section is devoted specifically to the practical problems of deploying men in a small compact island with a complex political geography and changing patterns of intercommunal conflict.
Footnotes and References.

(1) Report by the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, 26 March 1965, paras. 50 - 51.


(3) Minority Group Report, No.30, 1976, Cyprus, Part One, p.3.


(5) Volkan, op. cit., argues that there were between 25 - 30,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees.


(9) These statistics are based on a comparison of Patrick's fieldwork with the 1960 Census of Population.

(10) Minority Rights Group, 1976, op. cit.

(11) U.N. Doc. S/6102, 12 December 1964, section regarding 'Activities towards a return to normal conditions'.

(12) Patrick, op. cit., ch.3.

(13) ibid.

(14) ibid., Appendices 1 & 2.


(16) ibid., p.67.


(20) ibid., para.14.


(22) Karouzis, G. 1976, Proposals for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, (Cosmos Press, Nicosia).

(23) ibid., p.37.

(24) Oberling, P., op. cit., Appendices.

(26) Patrick, op. cit., p.274.
(31) Following the 1955-'59 E.O.K.A. campaign, many Greek Cypriot fighters still gave their allegiance to the exiled commander, General Grivas, rather than to Archbishop Makarios. During the intercommunal violence of December 1963 and early 1964, several armed gangs acted without central direction from the Government. By June it looked as though Turkey was prepared to invade Cyprus. To counter this President Makarios appealed to mainland Greece for troops to defend the island. 5,000 troops were sent under the command of General Grivas, who returned to Cyprus on 14 June, 1964. Furthermore, the imminent invasion threat prompted the Government to introduce conscription, increasing the National Guard by 15,000 men. Even before the resignation of General Karayannis as National Guard Commander on 15 August, Grivas was gaining control of all Greek Cypriot military operations in Cyprus. When "officially" in charge of the National Guard he took several actions without prior consultation with the Cyprus Government, a few against Makarios' wishes, and was a continual pain in the side of U.N.F.I.CYP. attempting to restore order in the troubled island.
Refer to: Grivas, G. 1965, The Memoires of General Grivas, (Edited by Charles Foley) (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, Washington, D.C.);
Harbottle, 1970, op. cit., also has one chapter devoted to Grivas' activities in relation to certain incidents and U.N.F.I.CYP.
Also refer to: Special News Bulletin (Nicosia), nos. 100-102.
Purcell, H.D. 1969, Cyprus, (Ernest Benn Ltd.), p.344.
(34) Oberling, F., op. cit., p.111.
(36) This view is expressed by Pierre Oberling, 1982, op. cit. He argues that "the Greek Cypriots quickly acquired the same contempt for it (U.N.F.I.CYP.) that they had had for the similarly hamstrung British force and there was no let-up in their efforts to break the back of Turkish Cypriot resistance." (page 111)

(37) Patrick, op. cit., p.60.
(39) Oberling, op. cit., p.111.
(41) Karouzis, 1976, op. cit., p.103.
(43) Patrick, op. cit., Appendix II and pp.80 - 88.
(44) Refer also to the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council on December 1964, U.N. Doc. S/6102, in which he points out that the Turkish Cypriot policy of self-segregation was a way of protecting themselves from Greek Cypriot aggression or harassment.
(46) Drury, Jan.1977, op. cit.,
(47) Volkan, op. cit., ch.4.
(49) Patrick, op. cit., pp.87 - 88.
CHAPTER FOUR

PEACEKEEPING IN PERSPECTIVE.

"U.N.F.I.CYP.'s was the third mission attempted by a world peace force, and the most complex. Unlike Gaza or the Congo, which offered distinct ethnic divisions, Cyprus was a land of inextricably mixed communities. The fighting had now consolidated scores of embattled Turkish enclaves among a sea of Greeks, each of which required U.N. protection." (1)

"...the Turks thought U.N.F.I.CYP. was there to save them from the Greeks; the Greeks thought it was there to help the Government suppress Turkish rebels." (2)

"It is permissible to wonder whether, ultimately, the main political result of the presence of a United Nations Force is not to make the split between communities an international affair. The natural slope of evolution would be that which can already be glimpsed; demarcation line, then frontiers, then partition. Turkey would have therefore achieved an unhoped for success, for which Greece and the Greek Cypriots would doubtless never pardon her." (3)

Section One: What is Peacekeeping and What is a Peacekeeping Force?

Some Definitions and the case of U.N.F.I.CYP.

A useful working definition of a peacekeeping force is provided by Charles Moskos, Jnr., 1976, in his sociological study of U.N.F.I.CYP. A peacekeeping force should comprise components from various nations, operating under the command of an impartial world organisation, and should seek to reduce or prevent armed hostilities with the absolute minimum use of armed force itself. (4) It should also be as neutral as possible in a given civil war situation, and should not allow itself to become "a 'third force' in a conflict." (5) As Brigadier Harbottle, 1970, points out,

U.N.F.I.CYP. was established at "the specific request of the
Government of the territory concerned, to provide a stabilizing influence and presence for the maintenance of peace. It is not there to take sides nor to use strong-arm tactics to effect this purpose." (6)

The difference between most military operations and a peacekeeping one lies in "the imperatives of impartiality and noncoercion." (7) Normally a military force is engaged in assisting a recognized civil authority to prevent terrorism, revolution, or an attempt to overthrow the government. Under such circumstances the military is put in a partial position where the use of force is a recognized method of dealing with the problem. In contrast, a peacekeeping force is often placed in an interpositionary role to halt or reduce a conflict already initiated. (8) Referring to the British Army, Michael Harbottle argues "that their whole projection and inclination as soldiers had been towards meeting force with force, and, where necessary, fighting to achieve their tactical objectives. They had never before been placed in this 'in-between' position where weapons were the last things to be used and none of them liked it." (9)

As Moskos argues, peacekeeping requires a reformulation of conventional military sociolization and a restructuring of standard military organization.

The United Nations Organisation has become associated with peacekeeping operations as an "impartial" international body with the facilities to set up such operations. Inspite of U.N.P.I.C.Y.P.'s international make-up it was and is comprised mostly of "countries having close ties with Britain, the West and Western Alliances", with no contingents from Afro-Asian or Latin American countries. (70)

1) Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, or Peacebuilding?

Using Moskos' definition a peacekeeping force is:

an "inter-nationally legitimated constabulary...charged with a prophylactic role — the containment and retardation of conflict."

It is designed as an interim measure to forestall the globalization of
a local conflict until a political settlement can be devised and accepted. (11) This is crucial to a full understanding of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s operations, for it has never been granted a "therapeutic role" of finding a solution to intercommunal conflict in Cyprus. This latter task was the preserve of the U.N. Mediator. (12), whose job it was to use diplomacy and mediation as a way of reconciling diverse political and strategic attitudes in the Cyprus Problem. (13) As Professor Coufoudakis puts it: -

"By providing for the appointment of a mediator, the Council for the first time acknowledged that peacekeeping is neither identical nor necessarily conducive to peacemaking. The Council's peacekeeping and mediation proposals provided both the preventive and the therapeutic function. Resolution 186 therefore tacitly recognized the dissatisfaction expressed by many states about U.N.E.F., that without an active mediation effort U.N.E.F. had contributed to the pacific perpetuation of the dispute." (14)

Harbottle has gone further to stress the interlinkages between the various levels of third party intervention in conflict resolution, i.e. between the peacemaking, Mediator level, and the peacekeeping, U.N.F.I.CYP. level. It is up to third party "to facilitate rather than to impose a settlement", by carrying out its responsibilities at all levels. (15)

During the first phase of its operations in Cyprus, 1964 - 1968, U.N.F.I.CYP. was quite successful in its "pacification role". But the period 1968 - 1974, when intercommunal negotiations had resumed, represented a "second phase" for U.N.F.I.CYP., when its military duties "lapsed into routine observation, patrolling, and liaison." (16) During this "dead period" for the United Nations Force, Harbottle argues more could have been done on the ground to bring the disputants closer together, whilst the leaderships of each side discussed a settlement. For instance, U.N.F.I.CYP.'s mandate (see Section Two, Chapter Four) could have been extended to enable wider "peacebuilding initiatives", i.e. the promotion of peaceful social change through socio-economic
reconstruction and development, or what Stagenga termed as "civic action projects." (T7) Alternatively, the structure of U.N.F.I.CYP. could have been altered to allow for an enlargement of its Operations Economics branch in the military, or a larger civilian police contingent. In other words, to allow for an enlarged humanitarian and economic role facilitating the promotion of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s conception of "normality" in Cyprus. Indeed other specialized agencies of the United Nations could work in tandem with U.N.F.I.CYP. to promote greater socio-economic stability in Cyprus as they have done in several troubled areas of the Third World.

Michael Harbottle (18) argued for:

"a combined operation in which different types of agencies are needed for the peaceful containment of conflict, the re-establishment of stability, and the rehabilitation of community life."

Others have pointed out that in the late-Sixties and early-Seventies Cyprus "represented the most concentrated field of United Nations development aid in the world." (T9) The United Nations Development Programme in Cyprus (U.N.D.P.) was distinct from U.N.F.I.CYP., and its aid was not designed to support the Force's mandate. In the light of United Nations recognition of the Government of Cyprus, U.N.D.P. was unable to accede to the Turkish Provisional Administration's call for a share of U.N.D.P. aid, accredited to the Greek Cypriot administration. In spite of this limitation, there was ...

"...much unofficial liaison between the officers of U.N.D.P. and U.N.F.I.CYP., and pressure by U.N.D.P. experts to integrate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot in its various projects to support U.N.F.I.CYP.'s efforts to achieve a return to normalcy."(20)

An example of U.N.D.P. and U.N.F.I.CYP. cooperation leading to inter-communal cooperation was over the completion of the spillway of the Kanli Keuy Dam, located in the Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave. (21) (refer to Chapter Five) Unfortunately, such examples of an integration of United Nations agencies in closing the gap between the conflicting communities are very rare in the case of Cyprus. Furthermore, U.N.F.I.CYP.'s
mandate was left unaltered, and the size and scope of the Force were reduced rather than extended (refer to Table 4.1.), whilst civilian peacebuilding initiatives were not made by the Security Council to bring the two communities together at grass roots level. (refer to Chapter Five, which discusses many of these points in more detail.)

In sum, the definition of peacekeeping and the responsibilities of a peacekeeping force are in themselves restrictions, for they allow the Force scope only to preserve a status quo rather than to work for a solution to the underlying fears, mistrust, and "psychological green lines" between the conflicting parties. A peacekeeper's major function is to keep the two sides apart in order to prevent a recurrence of fighting. On the whole, U.N.F.I.CYP. did an admirable job, but as will be shown in later chapters, more could have been done to promote higher levels of intercommunal cooperation inspite of the political rift between community leaders. In the following sections some important features of a peacekeeping operation should be kept in mind:—

(a) Its international composition and command;
(b) The principle of impartiality;
(c) The principle of non-coercion:

Section Two: U.N.F.I.CYP.'s Mandate.

In its resolution 186 of 4 March, 1964, the Security Council recommended, "that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

Such an ambiguous mandate leaves plenty of room for differing interpretations of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s responsibilities in Cyprus. In practice, the Secretary-General is delegated substantial authority by the Security Council to clarify and interpret the U.N. resolution for the practical purposes of U.N.F.I.CYP.
Differing Interpretations.

1) The Greek Cypriot Viewpoint:

Each leadership saw U.N.F.I.CYP.'s tasks in terms of their own mutually exclusive political goals. President Makarios wanted to extend his regime's effective territorial control over the whole Republic, including those forty or so areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots. As the internationally recognized administration for the whole island it argued that the U.N. Force should help it to eliminate the Turkish Cypriots' "rebellion" in order that peace, law and order could be restored. As Interior Minister Georgadjis put it,

"The United Nations troops should be neutral, but that does not mean they should treat both sides on an equal footing in the conflict...You cannot equate a majority with a minority, the legal government with the leaders of a group." (22)

The Greek Cypriot Leadership wanted U.N.F.I.CYP. to extinguish what they saw as a "separatist movement". References were frequently made to O.N.U.C.'s part in crushing the Katanga secession in the Congo to justify a similar role for U.N.F.I.CYP. In one sense the Force conformed to the Cyprus Government's conception of its duties as far as they entailed the removal of fortifications and physical blockades between the communities, as well as measures promoting intercommunal economic integration. (23) U Thant, Secretary General, did continually insist that U.N.F.I.CYP. was not an adjunct to the Makarios Administration. Its initial aim was to keep the protagonists apart. These "buffer" duties were criticized by some Greek Cypriots as a deliberate attempt to protect Turkish Cypriots in their "separatist" cause.

Whatever Makarios' long-term political goals were, i.e. Enosis or a sovereign, independent, non-aligned and unitary state, his Government's control over ninety per cent of Cypriot territory was partly aided by United Nations recognition. In the Secretary General's March 1965 Report, U Thant argues that the Greek Cypriots saw the Force's main
function to be assisting them to restore normality —
"conceived by them...as an orderly submission of the
Turkish Cypriot community to the authority and
legislation of the Government." (24)

ii) The Turkish Cypriot Viewpoint:

A pro-Turkish Cypriot viewpoint is expressed by Pierre Oberling, 1982, who writes, "the 1963-1964 crisis was a most unusual phenomenon: it was not a revolution by a downtrodden minority against an arrogant, oppressive majority, but a revolution by an arrogant, oppressive majority against a downtrodden minority."(25)

In a memorandum submitted to Senior Galo Plaza, U.N. Mediator, on 22 February 1965, Vice President Küçük spelled out the viewpoint of the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, arguing that the Greek Cypriots wanted to subjugate and destroy the Turkish Cypriot community. He suggested physical separation of the communities as a solution, a suggestion supported by Ankara. (26) The Turkish Cypriots saw U.N.F.I.CYP.'s role to protect them from Greek Cypriot aggression and to preserve their scattered territorial control within the Republic. Subsequent chapters will examine the extent to which U.N.F.I.CYP. protected this de facto partition.

iii) U Thant's Interpretation of the Mandate.

Given the diametrically opposite positions of the two leaderships concerning the position of U.N.F.I.CYP., it was given awkward tasks to fulfil by a vaguely worded mandate. As Charles Moskos, 1976, argues,

"the mandate of U.N.F.I.CYP. was vague enough to allow the disputants to read their own self-serving interpretations into it...Though this ambiguity in U.N.F.I.CYP.'s mandate could and did lead to problems in the field, it helped to make the U.N. Force acceptable to the concerned parties." (27)

Sometimes the Force was accused of bias by either side in the pursuance of its responsibilities, but this was unavoidable for U.N.F.I.CYP. did not conform to either community's political goals. Although the United Nations recognized "the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and the
authority of the Government" it did not operate "as an arm of the Government". (28) U Thant realized that without a political settlement the best U.N.F.I.CYP. could do was maintain an "uneasy equilibrium" and try to create "an atmosphere more favourable to the efforts to achieve a long-term settlement." (29) He set the guidelines for the Force's operations with the limitations imposed by the fundamental "mistrust between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership" very much in mind. (30)

Obviously U.N.F.I.CYP.'s main task was to act "in the interest of preserving international peace and security". The Force proved successful in preventing an escalation of civil war in Cyprus into a Greco-Turkish war prior to 1974, although diplomatic intervention by the superpowers also helped forestall a Turkish military intervention in both August '64 and November '67. (31)

Secondly, U.N.F.I.CYP. had "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting" by interpositioning its troops between the belligerents wherever possible, and by using its good offices to reduce tensions and confrontations. (see Chapter Five)

Thirdly, U.N.F.I.CYP. had "to contribute to the maintenance of law and order", which was not defined in legalistic terminology but in terms of stability and providing protection, i.e. protecting the life and property of either community from any source of attack by the other community.

"The maintenance of law and order is normally the function of governments, and as the relationship between the Cyprus government and U.N.F.I.CYP. has never been clearly defined, and has been subject to considerable fluctuations in goodwill, it is difficult to judge the extent of the U.N. contribution in this area." (32)

Harbottle, 1974, in The Thin Blue Line, comments on the words "contribute to" in the mandate. He argues that such wording is indicative of two things, "the desire on the part of the Security Council to leave provisions of the mandate as flexible as possible, dictating
no rigid guidelines nor prescribing any fixed objectives, and the adherence to the accepted principle of U.N. peace-keeping intervention as one of assisting rather than enforcement." (33)

Finally, U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. was asked to contribute to "a return to normal conditions". It has often been asked what precisely was meant by "normal conditions"? U Thant carefully avoided a political interpretation of the phrase, applying his conception of normality to day-to-day socio-economic life in Cyprus. U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. rendered assistance...

"in the amelioration of day-to-day administrative, economic, social or judicial difficulties arising from the division of the communities." (34)


In his April, 1964, aid memoire, the Secretary General stated that "the use of force is permissible only in self-defence". (35) Nevertheless, "a rather generous definition of self-defence" was intended (36), which covered:

(i) The defence of United Nations' posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack, and
(ii) The support of other personnel in U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. under armed attack. (37)

U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. could not use force to impose peace, and "its use of the medium of negotiation" is "its chief weapon for settling a problem". (38) It had to be ready to step in to part the disputants as soon as they showed inclination to renew fighting. Only when mediation, gentle persuasion, and negotiation failed, were "measured amounts of fire power" permissible "to protect the United Nations operation...and uphold previously negotiated settlements." (39)

Section Three: U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s Composition and Deployment.

(refer to Table 4.1)

As James A. Stagenga points out:

"During U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s first tense year there were over

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total U.N.F.I.CYP.</th>
<th>Military Personnel</th>
<th>Civilian Personnel</th>
<th>U.K. Contingent (contribution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>30 April 1964</td>
<td>6,369</td>
<td>6,347</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 August 1964</td>
<td>6,211</td>
<td>6,037</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June 1966</td>
<td>4,861</td>
<td>4,687</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June 1967</td>
<td>4,622</td>
<td>4,449</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December 1967</td>
<td>4,737</td>
<td>4,563</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March '68</td>
<td>4,745</td>
<td>4,570</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Dec. '68</td>
<td>3,708</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1,090</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Dec. '69</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>3,475</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1,068</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 May '72</td>
<td>3,096</td>
<td>2,922</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1,055</td>
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<td>4,183</td>
<td>152</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>809</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Nov. '82</td>
<td>2,348</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Dec. '83</td>
<td>2,348</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May '84</td>
<td>2,347</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are taken respectively from U.N. Documents: -
Other Forces 19600

- National Guardsmen 50%
- Armed Police 5%
- Greek Army Officers 5%
- Turkish Army Officers 4%

Turkish Fighters 36%

British Forces (sovereign bases) 28%

10%

Cyprus Total Forces 31750 approx.

Unficyp 3160 (June 1972)

- UK 34%
- Ireland 14%
- Denmark 9%
- Finland 9%
- Canada 18%
- Sweden 9%
- Civilian Police 5%
- Austria 2%

Fig. 4:1
40,000 other well-fed and fairly well-trained armed men on the island at any given time, with more men easily available for speedy mobilisation. U.N.F.I.CYP. was outmanned by each side; simple statistics militated against the Force's taking any rash punitive actions." (40)

The Force comprises distinct national contingents which for the most part function as such (41), and a small civilian element of civil servants and civilian police (U.N.CIV.POL.) Heading the military element is the Force Commander, while the political element is headed by the Secretary General's Special Representative. The various batteries, brigades, regiments, squadrons, and other units are commanded by their national commanders, who received directives from the Force Commander. The national contingents comprised some regular soldiers (e.g. U.K. and Canada) and some volunteers (e.g. Scandinavian countries). Most of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s contributors — Ireland, the Scandinavian states, and Canada — had taken part in the two previous instances of U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Congo and Suez. (42)

Physical Geography and Force Deployment.

One of the most fundamental problems posed by geography for any military force is that of spatial deployment of limited manpower over large areas of territory, often characterized by a variety of physical features from location to location. U.N.F.I.CYP.'s relative functional efficiency compared to other U.N. Forces is partly due to the fact that it has operated in a small, compact island roughly the combined size of Norfolk and Suffolk. U.N.F.I.CYP.'s logistical problems were, therefore, not nearly so complex as those existing for the much larger Congo Force, O.N.U.C. (43) Cyprus also had the advantages of well developed infrastructure and logistical support for U.N.F.I.CYP. from the Sovereign Base Areas.

In spite of such advantages, a knowledge of the basic topography of Cyprus is crucial for an understanding of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s deployment in
the 1964-'74 period. (refer to map 4.4) For example, in Lefka District, the rugged, northern foothills of the Troodos meant that isolated, static observations posts (O.P.s) were preferred to one mobile U.N.F.I.CYP. unit. The reasons for this are obvious. In this area the "confrontation lines", represented by National Guard and Fighter positions, followed a helter-skelter course along mountain tops and edges often only a hundred or less yards apart. Irish Contingent O.P.s were linked by a rough, narrow track, suitable only for jeeps and goats, and were supplied by U.N. R.A.F. aircraft, stationed at Nicosia. In the winter the jeep tracks were often impassable, thus O.P.s were by far the best way of maintaining United Nations surveillance in this region. Each Observation Post detachment did not have the ability to intervene in conflict situations themselves, but could quickly report shooting incidents via radio so that the platoon or company commander could at once meet local Greek or Turkish commanders to begin cease-fire negotiations. (44)

Political Geography and Force Deployment. (refer to Map 4.1)

1) Contingent Level Deployment:

The basis of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s deployment was to match as far as possible the island's District boundaries, to facilitate the essential relationship that would exist between United Nations contingent commanders and District Officers and their senior officials, together with local representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community. Five operational zones were initially chosen (see Map 4.1) The peculiar pattern of intercommunal conflict and varying individual strengths of each contingent did not allow for one contingent per District, but U.N.F.I.CYP. was deployed in such a way as to ensure that Districts were covered according to the intensity of armed confrontation. Thus, Nicosia and its immediate environment had two contingents; the troubled Districts of Kyrenia and Lefka had one each; the remaining two contingents covered the relatively quiet four Districts of Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol, and Paphos.
MAP - 4:1
Initial UNFICYP operational boundaries and deployment of contingents in Cyprus. (The boundaries for UNFICYP's Limassol, Famagusta, and Larnaca Districts coincide with the Cyprus administrative districts of the same names, whereas UNFICYP's Paphos and Nicosia Zones include three Cypriot administrative districts: Paphos, Nicosia, and Kyrenia.) (Adapted from UN Doc. S/5679, May 2, 1964, attached map.)

Source: Stagenga (1968) p98

Scale in Miles

0  10  20  30
ii) Cease-Fire Lines:

The map of Cyprus was complicated by cease-fire lines around Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Along these U.N.F.I.CYP. manned permanent posts and regular patrols. The enclaves of Guneyeli - Aghirda; Limnitis and Kokkina, all had boundaries delimited as a result of cease-fire agreements accepted by community leaders on both sides and U.N.F.I.CYP. Static O.P.s were maintained by "blue berrets" between the Forward Defence Lines of either side. It was up to U.N.F.I.CYP. to ensure that neither side encroached on the U.N.-controlled "neutral" territory separating them. Such cease-fire lines were initially devised as a temporary measure to keep the antagonistic communities apart until a political settlement erased or redrew these lines. But as Richard Patrick points out, "As the conflict dragged on, with no political solution in sight, the cease-fire lines assumed more significance... Ambiguities which had at first been accepted were no longer tolerated. Both sides sought pretexts to manouvre their armed posts forward..." (45)

For much of the time U.N.F.I.CYP. succeeded in persuading offending parties to withdraw to old positions, to fill in trenches, remove extended fortifications, but in certain circumstances new front-lines emerged, or new posts forward of established defence lines. (refer to Chapter Five)

The best example of permanent U.N.F.I.CYP. deployment since its arrival in Cyprus was along Nicosia's "Green Line".

"Within the walls of Nicosia...U.N.F.I.CYP. inherited a cease-fire agreement that did not accurately record the exact width of the "Green Line" demilitarization zone..." (46) As a result there were frequent violations of the Green Line Agreement by both Greek- and Turkish Cypriots. One of the major tasks of U.N.F.I.CYP. was to prevent the armed occupation of buildings overlooking the "Green Line" or any "clandestine infiltration into vacant properties on both sides of the streets making the line itself". (47) This was a
difficult task for along Hermes and Paphos streets, Turks and Greeks lived in close proximity, there was a Greek Cypriot shopping area, and Greek bazaar traders continued to carry out their businesses there. The slightest incident could moreover spark off a chain reaction, e.g. a shouted abuse across the street; a youth throwing a stone; or the accidental discharge of a rifle. Along this line of close armed confrontation U.N.F.I.CYP. needed endless patience and vigilance. O.P.s were placed at regular intervals along the whole length of the Green Line with frequent patrols between them.

On one occasion U.N.F.I.CYP. discovered Turkish Cypriot Fighters had set up clandestine positions in houses along the Green Line, mostly by making "mouse-holes" through rear walls and shuttered shops on the north side of the streets. (48) U.N.F.I.CYP. was not prepared to let an Agreement: it was not party to obstruct the fulfilment of its objectives. Ideally it would have preferred the complete elimination of the Green Line, which was a barrier to "normality", a symbol of segregation, as well as a traffic hazard. Instead U.N.F.I.CYP. did what it could to foster a "return to normal conditions" within Nicosia by reopening shops and businesses on both sides of the dividing line. Any erosion of the demilitarized area controlled by U.N.F.I.CYP. would tend to create a large "no-man's-land" area in and around the streets of central Nicosia, preventing any economic activity from taking place there. To ease tension U.N.F.I.CYP. arranged for the removal of all Turkish fortified posts and armed men, plus the blocking of "mouse-holes" in properties along the Green Line.

The United Nations Force was unfortunately saddled with the Green Line, and as Brigadier Harbottle explains:

"There was nothing we could do about it, so long as both sides insisted upon its continued existence. But from the military point of view, it was a waste of manpower —-manpower which could have been used more effectively in a less static role."(49)
Similar problems existed in other towns with "green lines", such as Larnaca, Famagusta, and Paphos.

iii) Deployment in areas away from close confrontation lines:

As mentioned in Chapter Three, U.N.F.I.CYP. was not just a "buffer force" but was also a "law and order" force. Thus it not only had an interpositionary role to play, manning static posts between the front-lines of opposing fighters, but it also had to maintain a high degree of mobility, so that it could send units rapidly to trouble-spots wherever and whenever they arose. In this way U.N.F.I.CYP. contrasted sharply with U.N.E.F., stationed on the Israeli-Egyptian border from 1956 to 1967, and other border-patrol forces. (50) Prior to July 1974 U.N.F.I.CYP.'s troops could be seen almost everywhere, "patrolling streets and the countryside, stationed in Nicosia's stores, even standing around hotel swimming pools." (51)

Redeployment of contingents was sometimes necessary to secure a more efficient use of available personnel in relation to terrain and military requirements. Indeed broad operational zones were altered according to the Force's size and capabilities. ( refer to Map 4.2 ) For instance, when the initial deployment of the Force was decided upon, BRIT.CON. (i.e. the British Contingent) was allocated the southern zone around Limassol, adjacent to two Sovereign Bases, Episkopi and Dhekelia, both important for their logistical support. Later it was decided to extend the contingent's boundary, first westwards to include Paphos and Polis, then eastwards to include the village of Kophinou at the junction of the Limassol - Nicosia and the Limassol - Larnaca roads. This enlarged BRIT. CON. zone was over 1,000 square miles, the largest of all U.N.F.I.CYP. contingent areas. A permanent British Infantry Battalion camp was located at Polemidhia, just north of Limassol town. Supporting this was a mobile squadron of armoured vehicles stationed at Zyyi, sixteen miles to the east of Limassol. The squadron's task was to patrol all roads and tracks
MAP - 4:2


Source: Stagenga [1968] p98

Scale in Miles

0 10 20 30
away from permanent U.N. posts and regular patrols, to make "morale booster" visits to far-flung villages where a permanent U.N. presence was impossible. (52) In order to cover most of the inhabited area of Cyprus other contingents had similar mobile units operating everywhere there could not be a more permanent U.N.P.I.CYP. presence.


While U.N.P.I.CYP. was trying to remove obstructions to the free movement of civilians, its own mobility was restricted. (53) On 10 November, 1964, the Force Commander reached an agreement with the Cyprus Government, which allowed U.N.P.I.CYP. "to enjoy full freedom of movement throughout the territory of Cyprus" but for certain stipulated areas. (54) These areas were as follows:

i) Twenty-three areas, mostly around the coast, which could be visited only after consultation with General Grivas. These covered 45 square miles (or 1.25%) of the total area of the country.

ii) Sixty-three areas, scattered throughout the island, which could be interpreted as strategic National Guard areas, and could be inspected by U.N.P.I.CYP. Zone or District Commanders—not below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and only if prior notice was given to local National Guard commanders. These areas covered 15 square miles (i.e. 0.4%) of the total area of Cyprus.

Maps were distributed to indicate these National Guard "restricted areas" precisely for the benefit of all concerned. Despite this precaution U.N. Force movements were still interfered with by the National Guard and Greek forces beyond the agreed restricted areas. General Grivas, as the Supreme Commander of the Greek and Greek Cypriot armed forces, considered it his right to restrict the movement of U.N.P.I.CYP. whenever he thought fit. Indeed he added several new restricted areas to the original list without prior consultation or warning to the U.N.P.I.CYP. Headquarters. (55)

Another inhibiting factor on U.N.P.I.CYP.'s mobility was the fact that U.N. patrols were open to obstruction or harassment whenever they approached or moved through areas under the authority of Turkish Fighters. Questionably, the only areas where the U.N. Force had full freedom of
mobility were in areas of "neutral ground" between Forward Defence Lines of each side. Any attempts to move into U.N.-controlled territory had to be prevented if possible, although the Force was not always successful in this respect. U.N.F.I.CYP. patrols were occasionally impeded even along recognized and legitimate patrol tracks well away from armed posts or fortifications of either community. As will be illustrated in Chapter Five, in practice, like the different politically-motivated interpretations of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s mandate, "freedom of movement" meant different things to different people.
Footnotes and References.


(7) Harbottle, M. op. cit., p. 46.

(8) Moskos, op. cit., argues that:
"The paradoxical qualities of the emergent constabulary role are succinctly captured in what has become the unofficial motto of the United Nations soldier: "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."" p. 139.


(10) Stagenga, op. cit., pp. 84 – 86.

(11) Moskos, op. cit., pp. 20 – 40. On this also refer to:

(12) Refer to: Report of the U.N. Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, 26 March 1965, pp. 1-2 on his Functions and Activities.


(20) ibid., p.168.


(23) In spite of U.N.F.I.CYP. efforts to remove fortifications and barriers between the communities, Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, stated during March 1965 in a Security Council debate —
"I strongly believe that the United Nations cannot afford to have its name associated again with division and partition, especially after its gallant and successful effort to avoid that during the last phase of the Congo operation."


(26) Refer to: U.N. Mediator's Report to the Secretary-General, 26 March 1965, para. 78.


(33) Harbottle, M. 1974, in The thin blue line, op. cit., p.100.


(38) ibid., p.45.


(40) ibid., p.83.

(41) Although on occasions, units from different contingents would cooperate in order to prevent serious incidents from occurring and to increase U.N.F.I.CYP.'s strength in certain strategic positions.

(42) Refer to: Stagenga, 1968, op. cit., pp.88 - 89:

(43) As James Stagenga, 1968, points out :-
"The 6,000 men of U.N.F.I.CYP. would naturally get absorbed
by this small island as O.N.U.C.'s 15,000 were by the vast reaches of the Congo's 905,063 square miles, where "the initial troops were swallowed up by the size of the country, and units sometimes lost touch with the central command post in Leopoldville for as much as a week at a time."


(44) It should be noted that the Troodos Mountains posed problems for the British forces in the late 1950s, for they were used as a hideout for E.O.K.A. guerrillas.

Refer to: Polie & Scobie, 1975, op. cit., ch.8 — 'The Mountain Guerillas'.

(45) Patrick, op. cit., p.127.


(47) ibid.

(48) ibid., para.64.

(49) Harbottle, 1970, op. cit., p.78.

(50) For comparison of U.N.F.I.CYP. and other types of peacekeeping operations refer to:- Rikhye, Harbottle, & Egge, op. cit., and Luard, 1972, op. cit.


(52) The activities of these mobile units were even more important when U.N.F.I.CYP.'s size was reduced to about 3,000 men in the early 1970s.


(54) U.N. Doc. S/6426, paras.18 - 21;


and U.N. Doc. S/6426, paras.18 - 21;

CHAPTER FIVE.

PEACEKEEPING IN PRACTICE: U.N.F.I.CYP.'S FIRST DECADE.

"...ultimate responsibility for a return to normal conditions in Cyprus must, obviously, rest primarily with the authorities and people of Cyprus themselves, since normality can come along only as a result of a determination by the communities...to lay down their arms and seek to live again in peace." (1)

U.N.F.I.CYP.'s presence contributed "to the relative pacification of Cyprus, it also froze the situation so that the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and lines of division in the cities remained intact for a decade." (2)

"It would be unfortunate, to say the least, if the present effectiveness of U.N.F.I.CYP. should become the pretext for failure to find a solution to the fundamental problem of Cyprus." (3)

The decade August 1964 to July 1974 will be divided into two distinct periods for U.N.F.I.CYP. The first, August 1964- November '67, began and ended with major intercommunal clashes which nearly triggered off full-scale war between Greece and Turkey. The second period, November '67 to July '74, is one of less intercommunal tension, renewed intercommunal negotiations, and serious intra-communal splits in the Greek Cypriot community.

Section One: Political Background, August '64 to November '67.

There is no room here for a full analysis of intercommunal politics in this period, and the reader is asked to refer to the Bibliography for references dealing with the issues mentioned here in greater depth.

This period was marked by the failure of any suggestions for a settle-
ment and the total lack of negotiations between the respective community
leaderships. The Acheson Plan (4) was rejected by George Papandreou of
Greece as "partition masquerading in the rhetoric of Enosis" owing to
the opposition of Makarios. Senor Glao Plaza's recommendations in his
report of 26 March 1965 were immediately rejected by Ankara. (5) Oberling
(1982) argues that the U.N. Mediator's analysis "displayed a callous
disregard for the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots". Meanwhile Archbishop
Makarios lobbied for an independent sovereign state abroad and
simultaneously assured his community that he was still dedicated to the
goal of Enosis. (6)

On 18 December 1965, a U.N. General Assembly resolution (2077(xx))
supported the Cyprus Government's claim for unfettered independence and
it effectively discounted Turkey's claim to the right of intervention
based on the Zurich-London Treaties of 1959. With the support of most
of the international community behind him (7) Archbishop Makarios "could
proceed from a position of strength in institutionalizing the new
conditions in Cyprus", i.e. a Republic based on majority rule. (8)

In April 1967 events took a turn for the worse when 'the colonels'
seized power in Athens. Suddenly Makarios found himself ideologically
out-of-step with the right-wing Junta, for as Oberling points out, the
authoritarian, anti-communist Greek Junta "vehemently disliked"
Makarios' "Leftist sympathies and independent mindedness". (9) Within
Cyprus Makarios was plagued by the aggressiveness and insubordination
of General Grivas, who still believed Enosis would be won by force of
arms. Furthermore, many Greek officers and men had clandestinely
infiltrated the National Guard. (10) Indeed U.N.F.I.CYP. increasingly
identified the National Guard with the Greek Army. (11) Although Makarios
tried to weaken Grivas' position by reducing the National Guard's
budgetry allocations and by strengthening the Cyprus Police Force, this
did not prevent Grivas from launching the largest offensive against the
Turkish Cypriots since Kokkina 1964. In mid-November 1967 the National
Guard attacked the villages of Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros, killing twenty-one Turkish Cypriots, an operation which led the two community leaderships to reevaluate the political situation.


Given the vested interests of outside powers, N.A.T.O. considerations, the polarisation of ethnic politics in Cyprus and the activities of the National Guard, there was little U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. could do other than...

"remain as neutral as possible in the political fray while promoting a calm atmosphere and buying the necessary time to enable the parties and the Mediator to work out a durable and honourable settlement together." (12)

U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s major task was to preserve a peaceful status quo between the communities whilst higher level political initiatives were being sought. As Harbottle explains:

"Cyprus provides a patchwork of scenarios involving differing degrees and types of third party action ranging from the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General to the conciliatory initiatives at the grass roots level of a subordinate of low profile character." (13)

By rendering assistance in the amelioration of day-to-day administrative, socio-economic and humanitarian problems U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. was helping to nurture those positive elements of intercommunal life in Cyprus, acting as a bridge as well as a buffer between the two communities. The following sections deal with U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s efforts to promote 'peace', 'stability' and 'normality' in this troubled island.

i) Pacification Efforts.

Perhaps the most important initial task of U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. was that of interpositioning its troops inbetween the fighters of both sides. This was followed by various cease-fire arrangements, often between local National Guard commanders, Turkish Fighter commanders, and U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. officers on-the-spot. At the highest level "de-confrontation" negotiations were carried out by the Force Commander and the
Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus.

Examples of U.N.P.I.CYP. efforts to arrange bi- or unilateral defortification agreements.

U.N.P.I.CYP. made strong stands against attempts by either side to extend their barricades, front-lines, or erect new ones. General Grivas was determined to extend Greek fortifications throughout the island, using money allocated to the budget for defence and the armed forces. Such a policy led to counter Turkish Cypriot moves to improve their own defences. For instance, the National Guard constructed a new defensive bunker on Patsala Hill on the south shore of the Salt Lake of Larnaca, facing the Turkish suburb of Scala. In response Turkish Cypriots dug slit trenches near the road and west of Scala between the road and the sea. U.N.P.I.CYP. intervened, and after talks between the local Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr Orkan Muderrisoglu, the Turkish trenches were filled in and Fighters withdrawn. Unfortunately U.N.P.I.CYP. failed to persuade the National Guard to unman Patsala Hill. (14)

Larnaca was one of several coastal sites where the Greek Cypriots erected anti-invasion barricades adjacent to Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory. Similar coastal defences were at Kokkina, Temblos, Ghaziveran-Lefka, and Famagusta. Extensions to these defences often led to outbreaks of intercommunal fighting. When seaward defences at Famagusta were constructed the Turkish Cypriots constructed parallel barricades. In turn the National Guard took up additional positions around Turkish Cypriot quarters, which eventually led to shooting incidents. There followed a National Guard siege on the main Turkish Cypriot quarter in Famagusta. After the relaxing of the Greek Cypriot blockade, on 6 December 1965, both sides agreed to dismantle all fortified positions surrounding the perimeter of the Turkish quarter except for harbour defences. (15)

Another example of National Guard positioning creating intercommunal
tension was in the Lefka - Ambelikou area. Guardsmen were placed on hills to each side of Lefka, i.e. on Limekiln Hill and Peristeronari Hill. (16) The Government contended that these positions were essential for the defence of the Morphou Bay coastline. Nevertheless these new posts dominating Peristeronari village and the Ambelikou limekilns were obviously provocative and Turkish Cypriots were worried that they would be used in a Greek offensive. This made it very difficult for U.N.P.I.CYP. to guarantee against a recurrence of fighting. (17)

U.N.P.I.CYP. never managed to get both sides to agree on a "defortification programme". While the Greeks provocatively erected new positions, the Turkish Cypriots consolidated theirs, for they were outnumbered and out-gunned by the National Guard. The Turkish Cypriots argued that U.N.P.I.CYP. was not strong enough to defend them if they withdrew existing Fighter positions, and that such a move would leave Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory vulnerable to Greek occupation. As U Thant pointed out: "There is no peace on the Island, but a tense and fragile truce. This situation moreover is likely to continue as long as...the territory of the Republic is cut up by front-lines and fortifications whose presence contributes to maintaining tension at a high pitch." (18)

**Violations of cease-fire agreements and specific incidents requiring U.N.P.I.CYP. intervention.**

Initially cease-fire lines were drawn as temporary measures when local tactical situations were unclear. As the conflict dragged on these cease-fire lines assumed greater significance. Both sides wanted the lines delimited according to criteria which suited them, and both sides sought pretexts to manoeuvre their armed positions forward of existing lines. It was often difficult for U.N.P.I.CYP. to prevent encroachments into U.N. controlled "neutral areas" or demilitarized zones between the forward lines of both sides. The majority of cease-fire violations occurred where Turkish enclave boundaries had been delimited as a result of cease-
fire agreements accepted by U.N.P.I.CYP., the Cyprus Government, and Turkish Cypriot leadership, i.e. Guenyeli-Aghirda; Limnitis; Kokkina; and around the "green lines" of Nicosia, Larnaca, and Paphos (Ktima). A typical example occurred at Pileri on the western edge of the main Guenyeli-Aghirda Enclave (refer to Map 3.1). In September 1965 Turkish Cypriot fighters constructed and occupied a new post 2,000 metres west of the village of Pileri and 1,000 metres west or forward of their established Forward Defence Line. This advance had no tactical advantage but was located in what had previously been a neutral area. Some National Guard mortars were exploded near to this new Turkish position. (19) On January 22, 1966, the National Guard wounded three Turkish Cypriots who were cutting wood forward of their lines in the Karmi Forest area of the Pentadaktylos. In February a Greek Cypriot was ambushed and injured near to Pileri by two Turkish Cypriots. (20)

Other "confrontation lines" existed where National Guard and Cyprus Police detachments were established in close proximity to armed Turkish Cypriot quarters and villages. These confrontation lines were not necessarily clearly demarcated and as mentioned in Chapter Three; there were several "grey areas" of control. Very often military or violent intercommunal incidents in these areas were sparked off by a variety of factors, such as restrictions on freedom of movement, attempts by either side to assert control in an area of disputed territorial control, off-beat or irregular Cyprus Police patrols, and attempts to score decisive military victories. (21)

In the northern part of the Mesaoria Plain a group of villages formed an ill-defined Turkish Cypriot enclave. (These villages were: Kalyvakia; Kornokipos, Petra tou Dhiyeni; Kourou Monastir; Bey Keuy; Epikho; Ayios Khariton) Greek Cypriots avoided travelling through this area, and the Cyprus Government was concerned lest the Turkish Cypriots attempted to fortify their enclave and block all roads running through it. During September 1965, the Kythrea-Lefkonico road (refer to Map 5.1) was
blocked by Fighters at Bey Keuy and Pailatos, and the Trypimeni-Vitsadha road was blocked at Knodhara. In response U.N.F.I.CYP. increased its patrols in the area—a scout-car group (Canadian) was based at Bey Keuy, in addition to a Finnish infantry platoon, plus two SWED.CON. (Swedish Contingent) observation posts between the Turkish village of Chatos and the Greek one of Trypimeni. (22) In April 1966 the Government began improving a track linking Trypimeni and Vitsadha in order to by-pass Knodhara. Turkish Cypriots argued that the Government was trying to divide a Turkish-controlled area with the aim of overrunning it. Thus Turkish Cypriots placed armed men along the route. Greeks complained that this was a further restriction on their freedom of movement and increased National Guard and Cyprus Police presence in the region until "the entire enclave was encircled by a government cordon". (23) General Grivas was quickly at the scene, threatening punitive action unless the Turks withdrew from their trenches near Trypimeni. Turkish Cypriots insisted that if Greek Cypriots were to use roads through their area of control they should be subject to searches by Turkish Cypriot police. U.N.F.I.CYP. wanted the Trypimeni-Knodhara-Ayios Khariton area to become a demilitarized zone wholly under U.N. surveillance. Unfortunately this plan proved unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the area remained a potential trouble-spot. (24)

Further to the south there was trouble at Melousha and Mora. Communications between these two villages and those villages surrounding Chatos and Kalyvakia were difficult for they were separated by territory under Greek Cypriot control. The events at Trypimeni made the National Guard and CY.POL. (Cyprus Police) more determined than ever to prevent further restrictions on Greek Cypriot freedom of movement in the area.

In July 1966, a National Guard manoeuvre was made against Mora, where allegedly new Fighter positions were erected. U.N.F.I.CYP. quickly inter-positioned men between opposing fighter elements. A U.N. post was set up in the village and intercommunal trouble was averted.
The village of Melousha lies on the road linking Athienou with the mixed villages of Tremethousha and Arsos to the east. It was accepted practice for a Cyprus Police sergeant from Athienou to pass through the village on routine rounds of other villages. On 23 July 1966 an armed CY.POL. patrol from Larnaca drove through the village shouting abuse at its inhabitants, and then established a road-block on Melousha's eastern side. Turkish Cypriot Fighters soon occupied positions around the village to prevent any attempt by CY.POL. to re-enter it. Anticipating a strong Greek Cypriot reaction, U.N.F.I.CYP. placed men at the western edge of Melousha. U.N.F.I.CYP. actually used a "threat of force" to prevent Grivas from mounting an attack on Melousha. This "threat" was backed up by the presence of "blue berrets", armoured vehicles and mortars, and did prevent a recurrence of fighting. (25)

U.N.F.I.CYP. and the Paphos Vendettas:

During July and August 1967 a series of murders and abductions in Paphos District threatened to paralyse life in the area. For a time all movement between neighbouring villages and these villages and Paphos town ceased. In some areas villagers would not even venture outside the built-up areas of their villages to cultivate their fields and orchards. U.N.F.I.CYP. escorted trucks carrying essential commodities to areas where supplies were getting low, or escorted a doctor on his rounds. The major villages affected were Mandria, Stavrokono, Kourtaka, Inia, and others in various parts of Paphos District.

Brigadier Harbottle, 1970, explains how he had to tour the affected villages in his capacity as U.N.F.I.CYP. Chief of Staff. He spoke to local mukhtars and village elders "in an endeavour to discover what exactly were their fears and how U.N.F.I.CYP. could possibly help them." Harbottle describes this procedure as "a kind of pacification hustings". Eventually with the permission of both leaderships in Nicosia, local Greek and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars were brought together in a series of meetings in various parts of the District.
The main aims of these village meetings were:

(a) to seek assurances from both Greek and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars regarding freedom of movement through their villages;
(b) to ensure that Greek and Turkish Cypriot farmers could work in their fields without friction or interference; and
(c) to provide a forum for the discussion of possible solutions to intercommunal problems. (26)

After years of prejudice, Harbottle found that village leaders of both communities were willing to discuss their problems freely under the auspices of U.N.F.I.CYP. He describes the outcome of these meetings:

"...it was possibly the most successful passive achievement of the whole U.N.F.I.CYP. operation; for it not only brought normal life back to many villages, but it pricked the bubble once and for all of those who perpetually cried in the market places...that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together". (27)

The Paphos example illustrates how third party mediation can lead to reconciliation, and according to Harbottle it demonstrated the full range of third party action — peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace-making. (28) To solve this potentially explosive parochial issue U.N. Force officers had to get to the grass roots of the problem, listening to mukhtars and ordinary villagers of both sides. The results were so encouraging that the Secretary-General wrote:

"U.N.F.I.CYP. has been encouraged by the results of the mukhtars' meetings and it is its intention to extend them, if possible, at a suitable time, to other Zones and Districts as well as repeating them in Paphos District with a view to breaking down the remaining barriers and prejudices..." (29)

By fostering intercommunal contacts, U.N.F.I.CYP. was helping to remove some of the "invisible psychological walls" separating the two communities. Unfortunately U.N.F.I.CYP. efforts were hindered by the intransigent attitudes of both community leaderships, as well as by the activities of local military leaders aggravating intercommunal tension. The latter was certainly prominent in the Kophinou incident of November 1967.
Kophinou, November 1967.

The events at Kophinou and the immediate consequences have been well documented by others. (30) The intention here is merely to highlight some significant factors relating to this incident. Firstly, there was the important issue of freedom of movement in the area. Kophinou village is strategically situated where the Larnaca - Limassol road intersects with the Limassol - Nicosia road. The Cyprus Government was concerned about a Turkish Cypriot police station located close to the road junction and the danger of road-blocks. Secondly, the local situation deteriorated with the appointment in November 1966 of a new Fighter commander of the Ayios Theodhoros region, who used the nom de guerre 'Mehmet'. Under his local command the Turkish Cypriots of the Ayios Theodhoros region refused to recognize Cyprus Government authority there; fraternization with Greek Cypriots was punished; Greek and English road signs were replaced by ones written exclusively in Turkish; and new Fighter positions were established. (31) Turkish Fighters set up road-blocks which forced the Government to suspend Cyprus Police movements into Ayios Theodhoros. Even after the removal of Mehmet from the scene, CY.POL. patrols were blocked. Soon this parochial freedom of movement dispute developed into one which, according to Richard Patrick, symbolized "the essence of the entire intercommunal conflict: i.e. the government's determination to enforce its authority throughout the island, the Turkish Cypriot community's intention to protect itself by controlling Greek Cypriot access into Turkish Cypriot centres". (32)

Thirdly, General Grivas decided to mount a major assault in order to secure a Greek Cypriot victory against Turkish Cypriot resistance. The National Guard attacked Ayios Theodhoros in battalion strength after Turkish Fighters had been provoked into firing at a heavily armed Cyprus Police patrol which was sent through the Turkish quarter of the village.
Fighters from Kophinou tried to help their neighbours but only succeeded in turning the National Guard on them, which led almost to the destruction of the entire village. In retrospect there is no doubt that U.N.F.I.CYP. was taken by surprise and if wiser to the event it could have mounted a contingency operation, deploying a force of approximately battalion strength around the two villages in advance of the first Cyprus Police patrols. (33) The violence at Kophinou and Ayios Theodhoros reveals a number of important issues relating to U.N.F.I.CYP. operations. It illustrates how important it was for the U.N. Force to keep abreast of local intercommunal relations away from the obvious lines of confrontation. It also shows how seemingly trivial disputes over freedom of communications and Cyprus Police access to Turkish Cypriot quarters could escalate into major intercommunal incidents, particularly under the direction of aggressive local commanders. Finally, it revealed weaknesses in U.N.F.I.CYP. deployment, although its continued observation of and presence during the fighting probably "acted as a deterrent to those bent on more extreme measures". (34)

ii) Normalization Activities:

U.N.F.I.CYP. has been described as "a prime communication channel for the normalization of Cypriot life". (35) The Paphos example above shows that U.N.F.I.CYP. was certainly able to promote greater intercommunal contact and cooperation through its mediation with both communities at the grass roots level. It also shows the subtle interrelationships between pacification and so-called normalization operations. U.N.F.I.CYP. made every effort to negotiate for the removal of such obstacles to intercommunal contacts as armed fortifications, road-blocks, and government economic restrictions. The Force only had limited success in its de-fortification plans for it was continually frustrated by the National Guard. (36) General Grivas' "determination not to give a military inch" hindered and "delayed the longed-for normalization". (37) U.N.F.I.CYP. was also handicapped by a basic divergence of opinion between the two...
leaderships as to what was meant by 'normality'. Thus when Makarios announced a number of "measures for the normalization of the situation" on 2 September 1967 (38) the Turkish Cypriots remained sceptical because the Cyprus Government's attitude remained the same regarding Turkish Cypriot constitutional rights. At all times it is important to remember that:- "U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s achievements are sharply constrained by the degree of reasonableness and good will displayed by the two leaderships." (39)

In order to understand the opposite positions of the two leaderships and immense obstacles to a return to normal conditions in Cypriot life it is necessary to understand the economic conditions prevailing in Cyprus during the period.

Economic Conditions of the two communities, 1964-'68.

De facto partition due to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves meant:-

(i) Non-participation of Turkish Cypriots in the Greek Cypriot economy;
(ii) Government restrictions on Turkish enclaves and quarters in an effort to "deny all benefits of Government services to "Turkish terrorists" and sympathizers who rejected Government authority."

(40)

(iii) As a result of (i) and (ii) there was a growing dichotomy in economic fortunes. The Greek Cypriot economy prospered whilst the introverted enclave economies of the Turkish Cypriots stagnated. (41)

"...for ten years during which the Cypriot economy boomed and standards of living rose visibly on all Greek sides, the Turkish element was left to stew in its own juice." (42)

(iv) Aggravating the economic deficiencies of the Turkish enclaves were the problems of overcrowding in homeless refugees.

The majority of Turkish Cypriot enclaves were simply too small to be economically viable units and it is difficult to appreciate the immense difficulties their confined populations faced.

The economic expansion in the Greek sector after the traumatic changes of December 1963-August 1964 is quite remarkable. In the three years prior to 1964, gross domestic product (G.D.P) increased at an annual
average rate of over seven per cent. In 1964 it declined twelve per cent. Thereafter G.D.P. increased to pre-1963 levels. In 1961, G.D.P. was £114 million, by 1966 it had increased to £157 million, while income per head rose from £199 in 1961 to £260 in 1966. (43) In 1963, Panagides points out: -

"the Greeks with 77.1% of the population, had 80.2% of the income, while the Turks, with 18.2% of the population, had a low 12.6% of the income." (44)

Patchwork partition reinforced the economic gap between them. As U Thant observed, there was a striking contrast between the Government-controlled areas and the widespread poverty, fall in living standards, and virtual cessation of economic activities except agriculture and small retail business in Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory. (45)

In some senses the economic hardships of Turkish Cypriots were self-inflicted because of their leaderships discouragement of any activity which would expose Turkish Cypriots to the authority of a central government it regarded as unconstitutional. This is not to underestimate the effects of the Government's economic squeeze on Turkish enclaves.

**Economic Blockade.**

The Cyprus Government drew up a list of prohibited materials, which were:

1) Goods of direct military use;
2) "and those which, whilst they could indirectly be regarded as having military significance, affect primarily the return to economic normality." (46)

The list included essential items such as petrol and diesel oil; vehicle spare parts, tyres and batteries; woollen clothing; cement, and other building materials. Denial of these materials led to a rapid deterioration of Turkish Cypriot housing, infrastructure and means of production. (47) Professor Volkan describes this visible decay observed during a visit to Nicosia in the Summer of 1968:

"The contrast between one side of the green line and the other was impressive. The Turkish side looked as though it were in
ruins; the streets were pitted, and poverty was evident everywhere. I learned that the delivery of building material to the Turkish sector had been forbidden for a long time lest the Turks use it to fortify their enclaves, so nothing had been repaired." (48)

U.N.P.I.CYP. managed to persuade Makarios to lift certain restrictions. For instance, woollen materials, raincoats, steel wool, imported coal, sulphur, ammonium nitrate, fuel in large quantities, and tyres were all gradually allowed into enclaves. (49) During the whole period, August 1964 - March 1968, a strict blockade was kept on Kokkina, although on 10 June 1965, restrictions on imported "non-strategic" materials were raised. The Government's economic squeeze not only isolated Turkish Cypriots from the island's economic growth, in some regards it was counter-productive, aggravating intercommunal enmity, uniting Turkish Cypriot factions through common experiences of confinement and deprivation. Partly in realization of this the Government introduced some "normalization measures" in late 1967, and lifted restrictions completely in 1968. Other reasons for this were:-

a) U.N.P.I.CYP. pressure;
b) Following Kophinou the Government was even more worried about provoking a violent reaction by Turkey;
c) Makarios was probably influenced by the argument that an extension of Government control would follow from encouraging Turkish Cypriots to fraternize with Greeks, thus increasing Turkish Cypriot dependence on the Greek Cypriot economy.

Panagides argues that the Turkish Cypriots tried to create separate economic units, which led to an undue duplication of production facilities, "misallocations and non-optimal factor relations." (50) Greater economic interaction and interdependence would contribute to "the minimization of the inequality coefficient, which in turn is ... conducive to social stability." In contrast Turkish Cypriot leaders argued that they would be actively discriminated against and economic inequalities between the two communities would continue. They remained committed to a policy of "geographical separation". (51) Years of economic isolation had not led
to any change in Turkish Cypriot policy. Moreover, Government policy
during those years lessened the inconvenience caused by "pockets" of
territory outside its control. This meant, as Michael Drury suggests,
"Time did not in this case heal wounds; rather, as the
stalemate continued, so the environment of the enclave
produced symptoms of claustrophobia, whilst the environment
of economic boom convinced many Greek Cypriots that there was
no longer a problem to be solved." (53)

It now remains to look at some more specific problems created by these
Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and U.N.F.I.CYP.'s efforts to restore socio­
economic normality.

Freedom of movement:

From 1964 to 1974 the island was criss-crossed and honeycombed with
physical barriers to mobility. Greek Cypriots had to pick their routes
carefully to avoid areas under Turkish Cypriot control, whilst the Turks,
like Macbeth were 'cabin'd, cribb'd, confined, bound in to saucy doubts
and fears'. (54) U Thant described full freedom of movement as "the
first prerequisite for a return to normal conditions" (55), vital for
reintegrating the Cypriot economy. He also described freedom of movement
as "a convenient yardstick of political conditions in the island". (56)

(a) Restrictions on Turkish Cypriot movement.

Cyprus Police check-points and road-blocks existed on many main roads
and at the entry points to Turkish enclaves and quarters. Identity
checks, body searches, plus the fear of arrest and detention, discouraged
Turkish Cypriots from entering areas under Government control. The
Government did remove Cyprus Police check-points in the Districts of
Larnaca, Paphos, and Limassol. (57) Furthermore, a number of National
Guard positions were removed near to the "green lines" of Paphos and
Larnaca, although in Paphos, two armed and fortified Cyprus Police posts
still dominated the Turkish quarter. In September 1967, a government
"normalization programme" was started. Permanent road-blocks on trunk
roads connecting towns in northern and eastern Cyprus were abolished,
including those along the Famagusta - Salamis road; one at Astromeritis; and at Kyrenia, on the road leading to the Turkish Cypriot village of Temblos. Conditions also improved at the Famagusta Gate in Nicosia, where at one time delays of three to four hours were common for vehicles entering the Turkish quarter, but after the introduction of "normalization measures" delays and searches were reduced to three or four minutes. Traffic through the Gate increased from 350-400 vehicles per day to an average of 600-700 per day. (58)

The Turkish Cypriot leadership did not reciprocate government "normalization measures", instead strict control was maintained on the movement of Turkish Cypriots wishing to visit areas under Greek Cypriot control. Permits had to be obtained by Turkish Cypriots wishing to travel from their quarter beyond the walled city of Nicosia (59) and sometimes "strong-arm tactics" were used to prevent such movements. Fines could be imposed on any Turk who entered the Greek sector "for promenade, for friendly association with Greek Cypriots, or for amusement". (60) Turkish Cypriot leaders justified this "self-segregation" in terms of consideration for the security of their community, but others saw it as a deliberate "institutionalization and enforcement of separation". (61)

Normal communications between the scattered areas of Turkish Cypriot control were impossible in the period 1964 to 1968. U.N.F.I.CYP. helicopters provided a monthly escort for a number of local Turkish Cypriot leaders in order to facilitate regular meetings with their community leaders in Nicosia. U.N.F.I.CYP. escorts were also arranged for Turkish Cypriot children from the villages of Limnitis, Ghaziveran, Angolemi, Elea, Kalakhorio, and Ambelikou to the secondary school in Lefka enclave. These children were denied this from December 1963 to November 1964. Seriously ill Turkish Cypriots were given U.N.F.I.CYP. escorts to the Turkish hospital in Nicosia, whilst other escorts were provided for judges, farmers, and merchants, enabling them to continue their business.
One specific example of restrictions on Turkish Cypriot movement was at Temblos, a village on the northern extension of the Geunyeli-Aghirda Enclave, hemmed in by barbed wire fences and National Guard posts. (62) If the villagers wished to go to Nicosia they had to travel via checkpoints in Kyrenia. An alternative route was via a steep track up to St. Hilarion castle (refer to Map 3.2), from there a road led to the Nicosia-Kyrenia road. The Cyprus Government was extremely sensitive about improvements to the track up the seaward slope of the Kyrenia range, which, it felt, might enable the Turkish Fighters to threaten the rear of the National Guard coastal defence positions west of Kyrenia. In April 1965, villagers at Temblos began to improve the track to St. Hilarion. Given the possible strategic significance of this track, U.N.F.I.CYP. increased its positions astride it to ensure its use only for peaceful traffic, and more "blue berets" were placed inbetween Temblos and nearby National Guard posts. Furthermore, U.N.F.I.CYP. made a ruling that only hand-tools, rather than mechanical equipment, could be used to improve the track. (63)

(b) Restrictions on Greek Cypriot movement:

Greek Cypriots were denied access to most Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory and could only travel through others under U.N.F.I.CYP. escort, otherwise long detours were necessary. Kokkina was totally prohibited. The coastal road through Limnitis was open to Greek Cypriot civilian traffic during daylight hours. At night Greeks were only allowed to use the road in cases of medical emergency and providing there was an U.N.F.I.CYP. escort. (64) Fighters and Turkish Cypriot police manned roadblocks at Lefka, Ambelikou, and Kalokhorio, where Greek Cypriot civilians were subject to identity checks, and they were not allowed to stop within Turkish-held territory. Travel through the Guenyeli - Aghirda Enclave was restricted to the Nicosia - Kyrenia road under U.N.F.I.CYP. escorts, which ran twice daily convoys, often escorting up to 4,000 vehicles per month.
Greek movements were prevented across the "green lines" of Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos. Even in Limassol where no "green line" existed, no Greek entered the Turkish quarter at night, and few during the day. As mentioned in Section One of this chapter, there were several restrictions on Greek Cypriot mobility in the Chatos - Kalyvakia area. Moreover, any Turkish Cypriot attempts to control the Prastio-Nicosia; Lysi-Athienou-Nicosia; or Lysi-Asha-Nicosia routes would have precipitated armed confrontation. In Paphos District the Turkish Cypriot villages were scattered in small "clusters" of Turkish control. For instance, there was a cluster around Anadhiou (refer to Map 3.5). These villages were relatively isolated, away from main roads, and of no strategic value to either the Government or National Guard. In other areas U.N.F.I.CYP. had to arrange for Greek Cypriots to pass through certain Turkish villages. For example, a local agreement enabled Greek Cypriots from Lyso to travel through Pelathousa, otherwise Lyso was trapped behind Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory. Another local anomaly existed at Polis, where the Turkish quarter was reduced to a narrow, congested strip of land, only a few hundred metres square, astride the Polis - Paphos highway. This road was under U.N. Force observation and was kept open to all traffic, although Greeks were prevented from stopping within the Turkish quarter.

Thus Greek Cypriots had to be constantly aware of various local "understandings" or "agreements" regarding their rights to move from place to place, particularly when they had to travel across ethnic interfaces, check-points and road-blocks. As time passed these restrictions on Greek freedom of movement were of diminishing importance owing to the fact that the Government built new roads around the enclaves.

Civilian Services:

The Government also directed electricity supply lines and water distribution systems around Turkish Cypriot enclaves and quarters. In fact the Government had effectively renounced responsibility towards the provisioning of Turkish Cypriot public services in areas outside
its de facto control. Drury made a study of the provision of basic services in Greek and Turkish areas in Western Cyprus. (66) He found that Turkish Cypriot villages were under-privileged in the provision of tarmac roads, electricity, telephone services, tapped water supply, and postal services, compared to Greek Cypriot villages. These material discrepancies aggravated intercommunal bad feeling, especially in cases where Turkish Cypriots were not only being denied certain services but had had previously existing services withdrawn, such as postal services, telephone lines, and even water supply in certain cases.

U.N.F.I.CYP. negotiated with the Cyprus Government in order to get services restored to Turkish Cypriot areas, and in some cases it was successful. For instance, normal telephone and electric facilities were restored to the Turkish quarter of Paphos in June 1964. (67) In the Summer of '64, U.N.F.I.CYP. representatives met with Greek and Turkish members of the E.A.C. (Electricity Authority of Cyprus) to assist in arranging for the restoration of normal E.A.C. functioning in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. (68) U.N.F.I.CYP. tried to improve basic water supply to Turkish areas and tried to find ways for the settlement of bills for future water consumption. In 1965 an auxiliary water supply system was installed at Kokkina under U.N. Force supervision. (69) Wherever there were complaints of deliberate interference of water supplies U.N. Force teams investigated the problems and endeavoured to eliminate the causes of any water shortages. They investigated the acute but sporadic shortages of fresh water to the Turkish quarter of Larnaca, Scala, where the inhabitants claimed that Greek Cypriots, who were responsible for the flow of water through to Scala, were to blame. Officials of the Larnaca Water Board denied any interference with the water supply of Scala, blaming the old, inefficient water system of the quarter instead. U.N.F.I.CYP. technicians promptly installed water meters on the supply mains where they entered the quarter in order to establish how much water was being allowed into Scala. (70) During dry
summer months U.N.F.I.CYP. liaised with the Turkish Cypriot Leadership at the request of the Cyprus Government to arrange a coordinated island-wide reduction of water consumption. (71)

The Kanli Keuy Dam, located within the Guenylei - Aghirda Enclave, was completed with the cooperation of the United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.) and U.N.F.I.CYP. The dam was virtually complete at the outbreak of intercommunal conflict in December 1963 except for the spillway. For the following three years, materials for its maintenance and completion were not permitted into the Enclave. During a period of heavy rainfall in February 1967 the dam was in danger of flooding over. Emergency repairs were necessary to prevent disaster. Thus the Cyprus Government released the required materials to U.N.D.P. and U.N.F.I.CYP., who organized the Turkish Cypriots working on the project. (72)

As regards postal services, U.N.F.I.CYP. failed in attempts to persuade the Government to restore full facilities to Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory, although letter deliveries were resumed for the Turkish quarters of Larnaca, Nicosia, and Lefka. (73) The opposite political views of the two community leaderships made it impossible for U.N.F.I.CYP. to restore normality to such matters as the payment of social insurance benefits to Turkish Cypriots and public revenue to the Government out of Turkish Cypriot coffers. The Government argued that any benefits to the Turkish Cypriots would be used for "insurrectional purposes". (74) Similarly, U.N.F.I.CYP. made little progress in using its good offices to reestablish an integrated judicial system for both communities functioning throughout the island. (75)

Agriculture:

One obvious spatial problem resulting from the de facto changes of the political geography of Cyprus concerned land ownership. According to Turkish propaganda:

"As a result of the forced dislocation of Turks from their homes, 300,000 donums of Turkish owned land have been cultivated
for seven years by the Greeks without rent or compensation."(76)

Turkish Cypriots had abandoned some rich farmland, or left other areas uncultivated adjacent to National Guard or Fighter positions. As U Thant pointed out:- "By far the biggest problem in agriculture is the question of unauthorized cultivation. Large areas of agricultural land in Cyprus are being cultivated by persons who are neither the owners of the land nor tenants in the normal sense of the word." (77)

Responding to U.N.F.I.CYP. pressure the Government made it a punishable offence for Greek Cypriot farmers to cultivate Turkish owned land without the authority of absentee owners. In practice, however, Turkish Cypriots often had little choice but to lease their abandoned fields at uneconomic rents. Any complaints regarding rents could lead to land being damaged or left completely uncultivated, thus giving no return. In 1966, about fifty per cent of Turkish Cypriot abandoned land was being leased by Greek Cypriot farmers. (78) U.N.CIV.POL. prevented as far as possible any unlawful harvesting around abandoned Turkish villages. (79)

Greek Cypriot farmers were unable to gain access to land they owned within Turkish Cypriot enclaves. In the Guenyeli - Aghirda Enclave the Government claimed that 2,700 donums (i.e. about 9,000 acres) of Greek Cypriot land was either under Turkish Cypriot control or too close to Turkish Fighter positions for it to be cultivated by Greeks. (80) Little progress was made over Turkish Cypriot payment of compensation for cultivating Greek land, particularly in the area west of Dhikomo. In other districts U.N.F.I.CYP. escorted Greek Cypriot farmers to sensitive areas close to confrontation lines and to fields adjacent to Turkish Cypriot villages. In the Mesaoria both communities owned land around the indistinct boundary of the Chatos - Kalyvakia enclave. Intercommunal tensions rose around sowing and harvesting times. Local Greek Cypriot cultivators were allowed to enter the enclave provided they had submitted a request to the Turkish Cypriot police station at Chatos. At Mathiati and Peristerona in Nicosia District, informal meetings were arranged
by U.N.P.I.CYP., but the Force failed in its "attempts to arrange ad hoc meetings...on a larger scale to deal with broader aspects of unauthorized cultivation." (81)

U.N.F.I.CYP. helped save many citrus orchards in abandoned and sensitive areas, and it saw that these orchards were properly irrigated, even collecting irrigation fees from the owners and paying the irrigators. (82) The U.N. Force acted as an intermediary between Turkish Cypriot farmers and the Grain Commission. It proved successful in selling a high proportion of the Turkish Cypriot wheat and barley crops through the Grain Commission in 1965 and in 1967. (83) U.N.F.I.CYP. also used its good offices to remove restrictions on gas oil and lubricants for tractors; fuel for water pumps; and on sulphur and nitrate fertilizers (84), although most agricultural machinery remained difficult to obtain for most Turkish Cypriot centres. (85) In doing so U.N.F.I.CYP. ensured that Turkish producers could get their surpluses on to export markets, for without U.N. assistance cultivation would have been difficult.

Industry and other economic activity:

Owing to the political situation in Cyprus many industrial plants were closed or stood idle because their owners were separated from them by artificial ethnic boundaries or 'confrontation lines'. For example, three valuable Greek enterprises stood idle within Turkish enclaves — a limekiln and quarry; a flour mill; and a textile plant. (86) Turkish Cypriot owned enterprises were closed because they were denied basic raw materials by the economic blockade, others were located in strategic areas where Turks did not consider it safe to enter. Thus the Cypro-Steelwool Company remained closed owing to restrictions on steel wire and fuel, and the Turkish limekilns of Ambelikou were idle due to the proximity of National Guard positions on hills overlooking the limekilns. (87) U.N.F.I.CYP. efforts to reactivate a variety of industrial and commercial enterprises met with opposition from both leaderships. (88)
U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. measures to assist refugees:

Attempts to solve the refugee problem were hampered by the political stances adopted by the community leaderships. On 23 September 1965, President Makarios stated that the Government was prepared to provide:

(i) Assistance to repair or totally reconstruct Turkish homes in abandoned villages;
(ii) Financial assistance for the rehabilitation of all those Turkish Cypriots "forced" to abandon their villages by the Turkish Cypriot Leadership;
(iii) Financial assistance to any Turkish Cypriot unable to find employment within the Greek Cypriot sector;
(iv) Measures for Turkish Cypriot safety and protection. (89)

In support of this policy Turkish Cypriot enclaves were refused building materials for the construction of permanent structures to house refugees. This policy failed to entice many refugees back to old homes. Under these circumstances the most U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. could do was to try to alleviate some of the hardships and deprivations of Turkish Cypriot "displaced persons".

Virtually all the Turkish enclaves were overcrowded and lacking proper infrastructure. Furthermore, these tiny areas of land lacked the basic resources to provide employment for more than a small proportion of their working populations. Kokkina was a prime example. Since the Tylliria fighting in August 1964 the Kokkina enclave was a restricted zone where freedom of movement of people and goods did not apply. Approximately 800 refugees were living in caves or holes in the hillside. They were dependent on fortnightly Red Crescent supplies from central warehouses in Nicosia, firewood shipments from Limnitis; plus an occasional supply of fresh fruit and vegetables from neighbouring villages delivered under U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. escort. (90) In spite of U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. success in persuading the release of building materials to Kokkina to build a communal bakery (91), the enclave remained "the most unsatisfactory of all refugee centres."

"For almost four years this small area of infertile and uneven coastal land has sheltered a refugee population so
overcrowded as to leave no room for any significant exploitation of the soil." (91)

Even after the departure of 425 Turkish Cypriot students to Turkey in January 1966, the remaining 1,200 refugees continued to live "an uncomfortable, unhealthy and meaningless existence". (92) Other refugee centres had similar problems. Hamid Mandres, north of Nicosia in the main enclave, was one of the largest refugee centres. Initially there were 3,000 persons living in tented accommodation until mud-brick dwellings were built under a self-help scheme. (93)

The Turkish Cypriot Leadership discouraged the return of Turkish Cypriots to old homes in areas controlled by the Cyprus Government. The Turkish Government helped to finance a Turkish Cypriot rehousing scheme within areas under their control. Meanwhile the Cyprus Government tried to attract Turkish Cypriots back to areas in order to harvest certain valuable crops. Mallia, in Limassol District, was one of the richest vineyard villages in Cyprus. In December 1960 its population included 600 Turks and 80 Greeks. In 1963 the number of Turkish residents was 900, all of whom left after intercommunal fighting in early 1964. Considerable efforts were made by District authorities and U.N.F.I.CYP. to persuade Turkish Cypriots to return for the grape harvest in 1964. By mid-September about 120 families had returned. After the harvest the Turkish population of Mallia fluctuated according to seasonal work. The Government continued its efforts to keep Turkish Cypriots there, spending £6,719 repairing 103 Turkish Cypriot homes in the village. In spite of these efforts Mallia's 1970-'71 population contained only 400 Turkish Cypriots, over 600 Turkish Cypriots stayed in the safety of enclaves. (94)

U.N.F.I.CYP.'s efforts to normalize conditions by encouraging both sides to cooperate in the safe return of Turkish Cypriots to their abandoned homes in Government-controlled territory, like all other normalization activities, were frustrated by the underlying mistrust and unwillingness
to compromise between the leaderships of each community.

Section Three: Political Background, November '67 to July '74.

The bloodshed at Kophinou provoked a Turkish threat of war against Greece and led to a number of agreements between the two countries. President Makarios was willing to comply with some of these externally imposed agreements. For example, 6 - 12,000 Greek soldiers returned to Athens, but a number of Greek officers still remained in charge of the National Guard. Makarios also refused to increase the scale and powers of U.N.F.I.CYP. in accordance with the agreements. Had he permitted this, the Security Council could have acted accordingly. President Makarios also reformulated basic political goals, arguing that, "A solution, by necessity, must be sought within the limits of what is feasible, which does not always coincide with the limits of what is desirable." The "feasible" solution was an independent, united Republic, although Makarios continued to pay "lip service" to "Enosis as a distant goal". Enosis with a military Junta in Athens was no longer a desirable option, especially when the Greek Cypriots derived certain economic benefits from the island's independent status, which would disappear if the island became "yet another of Greece's neglected provinces". In spite of the modification of political direction Makarios had a landslide victory in the Presidential elections of 25 February 1968, securing 95 per cent of the votes, crushing the newly formed "Enosis Front" opposition.

In December 1967 the Turkish Cypriots renamed their leadership the "Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration", which replaced the old General Committee. Moreover, with the removal of restrictions on Turkish freedom of movement in March 1968, the leadership, based in Nicosia, was able to improve its control of the scattered Turkish Cypriot community. The formation of the "Provisional Administration" was "flagrantly unlawful" according to Makarios, for as Oberling points out, it made the Archbishop's
"chances of ever again presiding over a unified, bicommmunal government ... much more remote." (100)

On 13 April 1968, Rauf Denktas returned to Cyprus and was nominated spokesman of the Turkish Cypriot community. Mr Glafkos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives, was spokesman for the Greek Cypriots in the intercommunal negotiations which began on 2-5 June 1968. Denktas argued for some kind of 'functional federation', whereas the Greek Cypriots were willing to grant the Turks wider local autonomy organized on a conventional geographical basis. The intercommunal talks were not only handicapped by the different viewpoints of Denktas and Clerides, but by the activities of Greek Cypriot extremists and outside powers.

Drawing on a quotation from Laurence Stern, Michael Attalides argued,

"Sihanouk of Cambodia is now deposed and Makarios of Cyprus dead, but together these two Heads of State have been accurately described as "survival acrobats struggling to maintain national sovereignty in the shadows of the great power triangle." " (101)

Both the Greek Junta and the Nixon Administration accused Makarios of flirting with the Soviet Union. (102) Washington was primarily concerned about Western regional alliances in the eastern Mediterranean; the changing strategic balance among the superpowers; the effects of the Arab - Israeli crisis in the region and on superpower relations; and the non-aligned tendencies of Makarios in a country with a strong communist party, A.K.E.L. Washington appeared to favour a solution along the lines of plans finalized at the N.A.T.O. Foreign Ministers Conference in Lisbon in June 1971, which granted substantial regional/communal autonomy to Turkish Cypriots. The activities of the Greek Junta in Cyprus were influenced by U.S. efforts to "tidy up" the eastern Mediterranean. (103) As Coufoudakis argues,

"the objective of the overt and covert initiatives undertaken by the United States, Greece and Turkey since the
collapse of the First Cypriot Republic was to bring about the political division of the island." (104)

Within Cyprus Makarios was faced with growing opposition from pro-Enosis terrorist groups, led by 'E.O.K.A.-B' under General Grivas who secretly reentered Cyprus in September 1971. In 1972, relations between Makarios and the Junta deteriorated further after a consignment of weapons from Czechoslovakia were discovered at the Presidential Palace in Nicosia. (105) This was followed by an abortive "ecclesiastical coup" against Makarios by the bishops of Kition, Kyrenia, and Paphos. In the Summer of '73, the Archbishop sponsored an anti-Junta newspaper — 'Eleftheros Laos' (Free People), which called upon King Constantine and former Premier, Karamanlis, to establish a Greek government-in-exile in Nicosia. Meanwhile in Athens another military coup had brought the Chief of Military Police, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, into power, although the actual Head of State was General Phaedon Gizikis. In a cutting analysis of this takeover Hitchens, 1984, bluntly remarks:—

"If Papadopoulos was a Fascist in the Mussolini mould, Ioannides was more like an authentic Nazi..." (106)

The domestic political situation was very unstable in the early 1970s, which militated against reconciliation at the conference table during the second round of intercommunal talks, which began on 8 June 1972. Makarios had failed to clamp down on "the pro-Enosis diehards" and to lead his community towards the Turkish Cypriots. Any criticism of U.N.F.I.CYP. during this period must take account of the political constraints working against U.N.F.I.CYP.'s efforts to normalize conditions within the island, particularly the complex interrelationships between internal and external power politics.

Section Four: U.N.F.I.CYP.'s Second Phase, November '67 to July '74.

The U.N. Force entered its second phase of operations in Cyprus without any extension of its scale or powers. Before discussing its operations
during this period, it is crucial to consider whether or not ordinary
Greek and Turkish Cypriots still had the good will to coexist despite
de facto segregation. U.N.F.I.CYP. had some success in fostering
cooperation between mukhtars of both communities following the Paphos
vendettas in 1967. (see Section Two) Michael Harbottle noted that —
even "at the height of the international crisis in December
it was reported that members of both communities in Ayios
Theodhoros were sitting together in the same coffee house,
not only exchanging conversation but also Christmas gifts —
a sign that whatever the rest of the world was doing, they
at least were determined to get relationships back to normal
and live in quiet accord with their neighbours." (107)

It seems fair to argue that the overwhelming majority of ordinary people
in Cyprus wished to live in peace and security with one another. As
Harbottle argued in another article, there are plenty of examples
"where human relations and standards of civilized behaviour have
triumphed over ethnic differences". (108) It was one of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s
tasks to foster the spontaneous "reintegrating trend" in Greek and
Turkish Cypriot relations, a difficult task given all the polarizing
political forces at work in Cyprus. (109) In the years prior to 1968
U.N.F.I.CYP. had lessened the hardships of Turkish Cypriots living in
enclaves, and by so doing helped to preserve apartheid in Cyprus. The
presence of this Force may have reduced the urgency for a political
settlement by...

"providing the all-important face-saving excuse for
peaceful coexistence rather than the reason for it." (110)

Certainly by 1968 U.N.F.I.CYP. had become an important element in Cypriot
life, its "presence became addictive for all the islanders who had grown
psychologically dependent on this externally administered painkilling
operation". (111) In the six years up to July 1974 the United Nations
Force suffered a reduction in its numbers and kept the same mandate, never-
theless, "U.N.F.I.CYP. was able to play a more direct role in the
restoration of normal conditions...away from the political
battlefront in the social and economic fields." (112)

1) Pacification Activities:

Throughout this period there was less intercommunal violence than in the previous four years. Even so, U.N.P.I.CYP. failed to negotiate an island-wide demilitarization programme. 1968 to July 1974 was a period of "negative stability", superficially quiet, but with underlying tension, "strained, abnormal and fraught with the serious danger inherent in the continuing close confrontation of well armed and trained forces." (113) Under such circumstances both communities viewed with anxiety any reductions in U.N.F.I.CYP.'s strength, for as the Secretary-General puts it, "U.N.F.I.CYP. was considered "as a guarantee of tranquility and security, even in areas where there have been no disturbances for a long time." (114)

Confrontation areas:

(a) Nicosia.

The "Green Line" continued to be an area of close armed confrontation, a potential flashpoint where serious incidents could occur at any time. Successive U.N. Force attempts to arrange a mutual deconfrontation programme were unsuccessful. (115) Another trouble spot was the suburb of Omorphita, which had been the scene of bitter intercommunal fighting in December 1963. Since then, with the area being held by the National Guard, many Turkish homes which had been seriously damaged in fighting were left to decay. The suburb was on and in the vicinity of the Green Line and so much of it was patrolled by U.N. troops.

On 26 January 1968, the Council of Ministers decided to extend the municipal boundaries of Nicosia to include the suburbs of Pallouriotissa, Kaimakli, and Omorphita. Turkish Cypriots argued that this was a deliberate attempt to limit the power of the Turkish Municipality as provided for in the constitution prior to the troubles. (116) The Government rejected Turkish proposals that Omorphita should be placed
under the exclusive control of U.N.F.I.CYP. Tensions increased when Cyprus Police patrols made frequent visits to Green Line areas within the walled city, along Ayios Demetrios Street, and in Omorphita.

Turkish Cypriots refused to move from their forward advance lines between the Green Line and Naousis Street unless —

i) The suburbs were placed under U.N.F.I.CYP. control;

ii) National Guard posts in advance of the Green Line near the Ledra Palace Hotel, and between Omorphita and Hamid Mandres, were dismantled;

iii) All Cyprus Police patrols of streets on or within 100 metres of the Green Line were stopped.

Unfortunately, U.N.F.I.CYP. could do little to resolve these problems. The Government continued to restrict the return of Turkish refugees to their homes in Omorphita and Neapolis, as long as Greek Cypriots were prevented from entering the parts of these suburbs under Turkish Cypriot control. (117)

(b) Other Areas.

As in the capital no defortification was achieved along the "green line" of Larnaca. National Guard posts remained on Patsalo Hill and Hala Sultan Tekke, whilst Turkish Cypriots maintained their front-line along Artemis Avenue. In return for the "normalization measures" introduced by the Government in March 1968, the Cyprus Government called for a withdrawal of Turkish positions and a return of freedom of movement along Artemis Avenue. Turkish leaders argued that this would expose Scala to attack. Furthermore the continued occupation of their Muslim shrine of Hala Sultan Tekke was sacrilege, an affront to the Turkish Cypriot community. (118) Turkish requests for a reopening of the Turkish school within the Government-controlled part of town on the margins of Scala were turned down for strategic reasons. (119)

Limassol did not remain quiet throughout this period. Turkish Cypriots constructed a rattan fence across Lycourgos Street, adjacent to a Fighter compound, which they refused to remove. There was also some anxiety
regarding the use of the Greek Orthodox Church of Ayios Antonios, which was situated in a sensitive quarter of Limassol inhabited by Turkish Cypriots. (120)

Reductions in U.N.F.I.CYP. strength. (see Map 5:2 for 1968 deployment)

At the start of its second phase U.N.F.I.CYP. was over 4,700 men strong, but by May 1972 it was little more than 3,000 strong. These sizeable reductions led to redeployments and reductions in the number of manned observation posts. A new Larnaca Zone was created with approximately the same boundaries of those of the civil administration. One of the main reasons for these changes was the huge cost of financing the peacekeeping operation. In 1969, the Secretary-General requested a Secretariat Survey Team to look thoroughly into the financial situation of U.N.F.I.CYP. The Team concluded that —

"While the basic problems of Cyprus remain unsolved, it would seem highly unwise to make a reduction in the strength and effectiveness of U.N.F.I.CYP. on the basis of the present degree of quiet, which is in large measure the result of its presence on the island." (121)

ii) Normalization Activities:

Until 8 March 1968 "the Turkish Cypriots were in touch with the outside world only through the personnel of the United Nations." (122) On 8 March the Government lifted its economic blockade and all static roadblocks were withdrawn. Unfortunately the so-called "normalization measures" failed to reverse a definite "trend towards separate economic development". (123) The Turkish Cypriot Leadership held onto its control of scattered enclaves by continuing a policy of non-cooperation with and non-recognition of the Cyprus Government.

Separate economic development.

In 1971, a U.N. economist estimated that the average per capita income of Turkish Cypriots was half that of Greek Cypriots. (124) The Provisional Administration sought to promote separate processing and manufacturing
industries inside Turkish Cypriot territory, utilizing finance from
Turkey. As the Secretary-General commented in his report of 2 December
1970 — "Despite undoubted progress in intercommunal relations in
such areas as employment, training and commerce, no
rapprochement...has been made on such basic issues as
investment and economic policy." (125)

The Provisional Administration received an annual grant from Ankara of
£8 million, which covered the costs of communal welfare and development
programmes, as well as Fighter and civil servant salaries. Some critics
of the Leadership argued that more funds should have been channelled
into development projects to alleviate the chronic under- and unemployment
within Turkish areas. Economic conditions could have been improved by
a reduction of Fighter strength, by inducing refugees to return to
abandoned villages, and by closer cooperation with the Cyprus Government,
both to gain more U.N.D.P. aid and to reduce unnecessary duplication
of certain civilian services. (126)

One of the critical problems hindering the progress of the Government's
Second Five Year Development Plan (1967-'71) was shortage of labour.
Despite Turkish Cypriot unemployment the Provisional Administration was
reluctant to permit 'cheap' Turkish labour enter into the Greek Cypriot
economy. There was a slow trickle of Turkish Cypriot labour into
Government controlled territory, as the figures below indicate.

TURKISH CYPRiot EMPLOYMENT IN 1970.
( Figures out of a total Turkish Cypriot labour force of 45,000 )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greek Cypriot Enterprises and Others.</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot Enterprises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time labourers</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal labourers</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken from: Patrick, 1976, p.167 and
Attalides, 1979, p.94. (127)
The Provisional Administration argued that the figure of 13,000 Turkish Cypriots "cooperating" with the Greek Cypriot community was overexaggerated. These figures included employment for foreign-owned mining corporations and in the British Sovereign Base Areas.

**Freedom of movement:**

"The opening of the enclaves' "gates" into the Greek sectors began a second phase of life there." (128)

The removal of restrictions on Turkish Cypriot mobility throughout the island put an end to their solitary confinement, but there were no moves by the Provisional Administration to end restrictions on Greek movement. According to the Provisional Administration, a Turkish Cypriot who entered Government-controlled territory to live and work was effectively bowing down to the Cyprus Government. Rauf Denktash argued:

"The freedom of movement which the Archbishop appeared to have so generously granted the Turks was, in effect, an extension of his unconstitutional control over them." (129)

The Cyprus Government made a list of 123 public roads, the use of which were wholly or partly denied to Greeks. Prior to the outbreak of disturbances, forty-six of these roads were normally used by farmers to gain access to their fields. (130) Some of the major roads concerned were:

1. Nicosia - Kyrenia, under U.N.P.I.CYP. convoys;
2. Famagusta - Chatos - Nicosia;
3. Trypimeni - Knodhara - Nicosia/Famagusta;
4. Xeros - Limnitis - Pyrgos - Kokkina - Polis;
5. Paphos - Stavrokonnou - Kelokedhara; (131) Turkish Cypriot restrictions meant considerable delays or detours. For instance, the journey from Pomo, on the north-west coast of Cyprus, to Nicosia, usually took only one and a half hours, but owing to the Kokkina enclave a detour of over three hours was required. The main road through Kato Pyrgos was barred in the westerly direction by Turkish Cypriots in Kokkina, while in the easterly direction it was closed at night by Turkish Cypriots in Limnitis. Eventually, a U.N.P.I.CYP. post was reestablished near Kato Pyrgos with
a view to facilitating civilian Greek traffic through Limnitis during hours of darkness. (132) (refer to: Map 5:3)

In October 1970, a Fighter prevented a Cyprus Police patrol from passing through Ayios Evastathios. Up to that time the status quo had been that such patrols occasionally passed but did not enter the village while travelling along a track between Koni Kebir and Ayios Theodhoros. Turkish Cypriots interpreted this change as an attempt by the Cyprus Government to assert its authority in Ayios Evastathios. U.N.F.I.CYP. intervened in the dispute and arranged a compromise. Cyprus Police patrols would be permitted to pass by the village up to six times per year, provided that the patrol was accompanied by a U.N.F.I.CYP. escort and did not stop in the village. (133)

Civilian Services.

For the Cyprus Government to undertake to provide most public services to villages two basic conditions had to be fulfilled:

a) The village did not owe money to the Government. The Provisional Administration's non-recognition of the Government meant withholding money owed to it.

b) Half the cost of public facilities had to be paid for by the village itself. Most village authorities were reluctant to tax fellow villagers. District officers failed to persuade Turkish Cypriots to do this. (134)

Despite such obstacles there were significant improvements on the preceding period in such matters as laying new water pipelines, repairing dams, and cleaning springs in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. U.N.F.I.CYP. continued to solve a variety of disputes over intercommunal water supply. Turkish Cypriots could also apply for inclusion in Government water development projects and for public facilities for this purpose. There was an extension of electricity supply to several Turkish Cypriot villages. U.N.P.I.CYP. also took part in discussions pertaining to the proposed construction of a sewerage system for the whole of Nicosia to be funded
by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (135)
Unfortunately, owing to the leaderships mutual non-recognition of each other and Turkish Cypriot resistance to any extension of Government authority in their areas, the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were still not fully integrated into the electrification, water supply, road, and public service systems of the Cyprus Republic in July 1974.

Agriculture:

U.N.P.I.CYP. continued to carry out a variety of duties outlined earlier, such as escorting farmers to and through sensitive areas. The Force encouraged cultivation in certain "militarily restricted areas", including those of Mansoura, Ayios Theodhoros, and Selemani (near Kokkina), and it even supervised the growing of winter crops within twenty metres of National Guard positions at Gaziveran (Lefka District). Greek Cypriot farmers of Lefkoniko (Famagusta District) were allowed to till their fields in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled area of Psilatos. (136)

U.N.CIV.POL. continued to investigate local disputes arising from the confusing and often poor demarcations between areas of Turkish- and Greek Cypriot control. Many of these disputes concerned illegal encroachments onto private land, unauthorized grazing and cultivation.

During this period the Turkish Cypriot areas felt the benefit of several United Nations schemes. For instance, from irrigation development projects sponsored by the Government and United Nations Development Programme, as well as the soil conservation project of U.N.D.P. and World Food Programme (W.F.P.). At the end of April 1971, U.N.F.I.CYP. estimated that out of 1,476 participants in an important mixed farming scheme, sponsored by the Government and W.F.P., 245 were Turkish Cypriots. (137) In the soil conservation project there were 1,069 Turkish Cypriots out of an estimated 10,000 for the period October 1970 - July 1971.

Other encouraging signs of increased cooperation between the communities were the Government's extension of its drought relief scheme to Turkish Cypriot areas. U.N.F.I.CYP.'s good offices were also used to establish
cooperation in a malaria control programme in the vicinity of Nicosia. In spite of all these improvements it should be stressed that only a small percentage of Turkish Cypriots were actually involved in Government, United Nations, and W.F.P. sponsored agricultural schemes. (138)

Industry and other economic activity:

The revival of small industries within Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas was assisted by U.N.F.I.C.Y.P., but there was little reactivation of Greek enterprises in Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The return of these enterprises to full production would have provided many jobs to Turkish Cypriots, but the Provisional Administration considered them to be an extension of Greek control in Turkish Cypriot territory. One Turkish limekiln was reactivated at Ambelikou and two Greek Cypriot factories (limekilns) were reactivated in north Nicosia, one in the main Turkish enclave and the other in 'no-man's-land' between the front-lines of the National Guard and Turkish Fighters. (139)

Another anomalous situation arising from the island's peculiar political geography was at the village of Zyyi. This village was under the de facto control of the Provisional Administration, but had no Turkish Cypriot Fighter unit. Greek Cypriots had free access to Zyyi, and both Turkish and Cyprus police patrolled there, whilst an U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. camp was established on the village's outskirts. Zyyi had four carob-processing factories, three of which were owned by Greek Cypriots, so foremen and managers commuted to the village from Government-controlled territory. There was little attempt by either side to alter the the status quo for Zyyi was not located in a strategically sensitive area.

The refugee problem, 1968-'74:

U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. continued its efforts to assist refugees within Turkish enclaves by supervising the delivery of Red Crescent relief shipments arriving at Famagusta to Turkish distribution centres. U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.
estimated that about 1.6% of the territory of Cyprus was included within areas under the de facto control of the Turkish Cypriots in 1964. As pointed out in Chapter Three this figure does not include all Turkish Cypriot quarters and villages, some of which were only nominally under the control of the Cyprus Government. Patrick estimated that of the 135 Turkish Cypriot centres that were partially or fully occupied in August 1964, 20 were under government control and accounted for approximately 8,000 Turkish Cypriots. (T40) Other Turkish or mixed centres within Government territory had been completely abandoned by their Turkish Cypriot populations. During the period December 1963 to August 1964 Turkish Cypriots completely evacuated their quarters in 72 mixed villages and abandoned 24 Turkish Cypriot villages. Professor Volkan, 1979, states that "by the end of 1964 the Greeks occupied 97 per cent of the land". (141) This figure fails to take account of the three per cent of land included within the British Sovereign Base Areas, although it does assume about three per cent of Cypriot territory under Turkish Cypriot control which seems a reasonable assumption given the fact that even some Turkish Cypriot centres outside recognized enclaves refused to demonstrate allegiance to the Republic.

Territorial control was important to the political positions of both sides. A flood of Turkish Cypriots back into areas under the authority of the Cyprus Government would have weakened the position of the Provisional Administration, which explains why the latter did not encourage such "return migration". The Provisional Administration provided assistance to displaced persons by means of hardship allowances and long-term loans at low rates of interest, and it also had its own rehabilitation scheme, ironically helped by the Government's "normalization measures" which allowed building materials back into Turkish areas. Thus there was only a small trickle of Turkish Cypriots back into Greek Cypriot-controlled territory. By 1971 about 2,000 refugees had returned to twenty-two
settlements under government control. (142) These included those of Peristerona, Ayios Sozemos, Mallia, Yerovasa, Potamia, and other mixed villages. According to U.N.P.I.CYP., since June 1968, some fifty Turkish Cypriot families returned to the suburb of Omorphita. (143) Two Cyprus Police stations were immediately established in the vicinity "TO PROTECT thousands of Greeks from 100 Turks (mostly women and children) who had returned to their homes on the Greek side of the Green Line". (144) The Provisional Administration accused the Government of not doing enough to encourage a return of Turkish Cypriots, whilst the Government countered with the argument that the Provisional Administration actively discouraged any return to 'normality'. There was an element of truth in both views, which largely explains why so few Turkish Cypriots had returned to old homes and villages by 1974. U.N.P.I.CYP. did what it could under the circumstances, but its activities were yet again restricted by the attitudes of the two leaderships.


In Section One, Chapter Four it was argued that perhaps U.N.P.I.CYP. could have done more to promote contacts and cooperation between the two communities in the militarily "dead period" from 1968 to July 1974. It was also suggested that coordinated action involving a variety of U.N. agencies could have helped bridge the gap between the communities. Regarding the first point, U.N.P.I.CYP. did achieve some successes in socio-economic life, but owing to the political stalemate it was often difficult for the Force, with its limited mandate, to do anything more than maintain an uneasy status quo between the two sides.

Between 1968 and 1974 there were several United Nations programmes in Cyprus, distinct from the peacekeeping operation. The major constraint was that these schemes were not able to directly involve the Turkish Cypriot community, for the Cyprus Government was the internationally recognized administration for the whole island. Nevertheless, Turkish
Cypriots did participate in a number of U.N. sponsored schemes. Such as the Higher Technical Institute, assisted by U.N.D.P. and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (U.N.E.S.C.O.); mixed farming projects, soil conservation schemes, and the hospital and school feeding project, all sponsored by U.N.D.P. and World Food Programme. These projects were all under the administration of the Greek Cypriot administration, and so unfortunately, they only attracted a small proportion of Turkish Cypriots.

Michael Harbottle advocated a broadly based "multi-level third party process" to tackle the Cyprus Problem on all fronts, linking the diplomatic endeavours of the Secretary-General to the ground level activities of the peacekeeping force. He argues —

"...in 1968 U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. had fulfilled the role for which it had been created...a new approach was needed, one aimed at establishing a new confidence and trust between the two communities and at assisting in the development of a new social and economic relationship which would encourage improved intercommunal cooperation and peaceful coexistence... Had a civilian peacebuilding 'operation' been mounted in 1968 the events of 1974 might never have taken place." (145)

The Security Council did not adapt to the altered circumstances in Cyprus, so it kept a "redundant" military peacekeeping operation going. Once the military situation in the island was relatively stable, most of the U.N. Force's resources were directed towards alleviating the problems created by a large Turkish Cypriot refugee population, by unequal control of the islands resources, by a breakdown in intercommunal contacts, and a whole range of associated issues. These were primarily non-military activities aimed at breaking down physical and psychological "green lines", which suggests that what was actually needed was an expansion of U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s civilian component and Operations Economics staff. The scope of U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. was limited. It could not implement such initiatives as the Cyprus Resettlement Project, established by a small group of
Quakers and members of the Shanti Sena (the Gandhi Peace Movement) facilitating the return of refugees to a few specially selected villages.

(146) This would have required modification to U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s mandate, for the Force already had the organisational ability and personnel to attempt more ambitious "civic action projects". Unfortunately, Makarios was against any extension in the size and scope of U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.

In many respects the ordinary people of Cyprus have been polarized by the interrelated internal and external political forces, centrifugal forces too powerful for a small peacekeeping force to put right. The bicommunal character of the island has become an excuse for political partition, but in fact the reality is not so simple. As one commentator describes, "...animosity between Greeks and Turks" is a myth "perpetuated by those who seek to convince their fellows and world opinion that the two communities cannot live together..." (147)

In 1974, U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. was powerless to prevent the physical partition of Cyprus between the two main ethnic groups. From 1964 to 1974 the U.N. Force had preserved an "unstable peace" or "negative stability" in Cyprus. (148) Had the Security Council extended its original mandate U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. could probably have done more to enhance a trend towards reintegration amongst ordinary Cypriots, playing an active role rather than a passive role in intercommunal relations. The events of Summer '74 were tragic for the majority of Cypriots who, regardless of ethnic identification, wanted or preferred a return to peaceful coexistence.
Footnotes and references.

(3) U.N. Doc. S/6102, 12 December 1964, para.239.
(4) Dean Acheson, a former U.S. Secretary of State, attempted to resolve the problem by a political deal between Greece and Turkey. Cyprus would have the choice of independence or union with Greece, in exchange for a sovereign Turkish base in the Karpass peninsula and the cession to Turkey of the Greek island of Kastellorizon. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots would have two or three areas of "local self-administration".
(5) United Nations Mediator's report to the Secretary-General, 26 March 1965. (S/6253) This report ruled out both Enosis and Taksim, and argued for a united independent and demilitarized Cyprus with generous provision for minority rights. Galo Plaza also argued against the validity of treaties imposed on the Cypriot people, particularly the Treaty of Guarantee, giving external powers to restore the 1960 Constitution.
(6) In a public address on 26 May 1965 at Rizokarpasso Archbishop Makarios stated —

"Either the whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece or (it will) become a holocaust...The road to the fulfilment of national aspirations may be full of difficulties, but we shall reach the goal — which is Enosis — alive or dead."
(7) By late 1965 the Soviet Union indicated it would not support a government dedicated to Enosis, which would expand N.A.T.O.'s influence in the eastern Mediterranean. By June 1966, seven of the states which had initially voted for Resolution 2077 (XX) stressed that their votes should in no way be construed as an endorsement of Enosis. (refer to Oberling, P. 1982, The Road to Bellapais, (Columbia University Press), p.125.)
(9) Oberling, P. op. cit.
(10) According to the New York Times, November 19, 1967, as many as 20,000 Greek troops had illegally entered Cyprus. In addition the Greek officered National Guard numbered 10,000 active soldiers and 20,000 reservists.
State University Press), pp.150-151.


(21) For an in depth study of causes of intercommunal conflict and violent incidents in the period 1963-67, refer to Patrick, op.cit., ch. 4.


(23) Patrick, op.cit., p. 129.


Also Harbottle, op. cit., p. 119.

(27) Harbottle, op. cit., p. 120.

Also Patrick, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

(28) Harbottle, 1980, International Journal, op. cit., p. 120.


(30) Refer to: Harbottle, 1970, op. cit., who devotes a whole chapter to the Kophinou incident and its aftermath.


(31) Patrick, op. cit., p. 133.

(32) ibid., p. 134.


(34) ibid.,


(38) U.N. Doc. S/8286, Appendix 1, para.91.
(41) U.N. Documents : - S/7001, paras.100 - 105; S/6426, paras.102 - 107; S/8286, paras.90 - 100.
(47) Patrick, op.cit., p.108.
(48) Volkan,V. 1980, Cyprus - War and Adaption, ( The University of Virginia Press ), p.82.
(49) Refer to: U.N. Documents : - S/6228, para.135-137 ; S/6426, paras. 118 - 120; S/7001, paras.121 - 125.
(51) ibid., p.137.
(54) From MACBETH, Act III, Scene IV.
(61) Attalides,M. 1979, Cyprus, ( Q Press Ltd. of Edinburgh ), p.91.
(65) Refer to U.N. Documents S/7969, para.100; S/7350, paras. 49-54.
(68) Ibid., para.74.
(79) U.N. Doc. S/5950, 10 September 1964, para.163,
Also U.N. Doc. S/6102, para.82.
(80) Patrick, op. cit., p.287.
(82) Refer to: U.N. Documents S/5950, paras. 160 - 162; S/6102, para.82; S/5950, 10 Sept. 1964, para.164.
(84) U.N. Doc. S/6426, 10 June 1965, para.129.
(86) Ibid., para.115.
(89) Cyprus Turkish Information Centre, August 1970, op. cit., p.23.
(90) Refer to: U.N. Documents :- S/6102, paras.31-55; S/6426, paras. 144-151; and S/7001, paras.152 - 153.
(92) Ibid.,
(94) Patrick, op. cit., pp. 306 - 308.
(95) These agreements were :-
   i) Withdrawal of all Greek troops from Cyprus in excess of those permitted by the Treaty of Alliance;
   ii) An end to Turkey's preparations for war;
iii) The dissolution of the National Guard;
iv) Compensation for the Turkish Cypriots of Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou;
V) Expansion in the size and powers of U.N.F.I.CYP.

(96) Harbottle, 1970, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.165 - 166;

(97) Cyprus Mail, 13/01/68, p.1.
(99) \textit{ibid.}, an argument also advanced by Hitchens, 1984, \textit{op.cit.}, p.65.
(100) Oberling, 1982, \textit{op.cit.}, p.145.
(102) Christopher Hitchens, 1984, \textit{op.cit.}, argues that American – Greek relations under Nixon became "warm, rotten and corrupt". pp.74-75.
Attalides, 1979, \textit{op.cit.}, p.129, argues that the Greek colonels, trained in Cold War politics by U.S. agencies, viewed "Cypriot independence...as a mere preliminary to a Soviet Cyprus".
(103) Polie and Scobie, 1975, show that the Junta placed mercenaries in Cyprus to ensure "that the influence of Athens was felt in the proper places." (\textit{The Struggle for Cyprus}, p.169)
(108) Harbottle, M. 'Why Cyprus is doomed to become a political volcano', in \textit{The Times}, 17/10/74.
(122) Volkan, op.cit., p.90.
(123) U.N. Doc. S/10005, paras.72-75.
(128) Volkan, op.cit., p.102.
(133) ibid., paras.59 - 62.
(137) U.N. Doc. S/9521, 3 December 1969, para.44.
(140) Patrick, op.cit., p.80.
(141) Volkan, op.cit., p.20.
(142) Patrick, op.cit., p.80.
(144) The Cyprus Turkish Information Office, op.cit., p.27.
(146) ibid.,
Daubed on the walls on the Turkish Cypriot side of the Green Line are mainland Turkish military propaganda designs and slogans like the one shown in Fig. 6:1. It was through Turkish military intervention that a de facto Turkish Cypriot state was created.

LET MY BLOOD FLOW,
LET IT COLOUR MY SHROUD,
LET MY SCARLET SHROUD BECOME MY FLAG.
CHAPTER SIX

THE THIN BLUE LINE AND THE "ATILLA LINE"

"It is in conversation with Cypriots themselves, however, that the even more serious wounds inflicted on Cyprus become apparent. The most casual inquiry — such as, 'Where do you come from?' or 'Do you have a family?' — can be enough to induce a torrent of grievance or of grief." (1)

"You try to forget, but the dreams of a refugee are merciless. They take you to places that you knew and give the delusion that everything there continues to be as it was before. Then comes the painful awakening." (2)

"Our relationship with the Greeks was always like a cracked glass. It was shattered in 1974 and it cannot be glued back together again." (3)

Section One: The Demographic and Economic Consequences of Partition.

July - August 1974 will long live in the memories of many Cypriots. How can they forget? There is a permanent reminder of the losses, the bloodshed and atrocities, of years of intercommunal strife, a permanent scar etched across the landscape of the island, separating Greek from Turkish Cypriot.

The events of the Summer of '74 can not be easily forgotten or dismissed. Approximately one third of the Cypriot population of 650,000 became refugees, uprooted from their land and property with no immediate hope of a return. Villages were bombarded, destroyed, looted, families slaughtered, forests were burnt, the whole life of the island was disrupted. To catalogue such losses is not the point of this section, but before discussing some important demographic and economic consequences of the partition it is necessary to briefly describe how Cyprus came to be divided into two de facto micro-states.
The Turkish 'Peacekeeping Operation or 'Invasion'.

Relations between Makarios and the Athens Junta went from bad to worse in the first half of 1974. In July the Archbishop publicly condemned the Junta's support and direction of E.O.K.A.-B. He asked for a withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers staffing the National Guard. In reply, Athens ordered the go-ahead of a coup d'état against Makarios on 15 July 1974. The Greek officer led National Guard overthrew the Government, announced Makarios dead, and installed Nicos Sampson, a former E.O.K.A. anti-Turk terrorist as the leader of the 'new regime of national salvation'.

In an emotional diary of events in Kyrenia, Rita Catselli wrote a few days after the coup —

"The minority which carried out the coup has been seized with national masochism... Only the other day I read an historical article about the "Attempts to de-Hellenize Cyprus through the centuries". I think the most serious one took place just three days ago."  

On 18 July, Ankara sent Athens an ultimatum calling for the resignation of Sampson, a withdrawal of Greek officers in Cyprus, and firm pledges of Cyprus' independence. The Junta foolishly believed America would, as before in 1964 and 1967, prevent the Turks from invading and sent an equivocal answer. But both Washington and London lacked the political will to restore Makarios, leaving the way clear for a Turkish intervention. (5) Turkish troops landed in Cyprus on 20 July and their first "push" lasted until 22 July, securing a bridgehead around Kyrenia and the Guenyeli - Aghirda Enclave. ( refer to Map 6.1 ) The Turks opened a strategic passage west of Kyrenia running to Temblos - St.Hilarion - Nicosia. On 23 July 1974, Rita Catselli wrote:—

"Now I and my family are refugees, victims, and we have come to Limassol with almost nothing. In Kyrenia the Turkish flag flies and most of the Greek Cypriots who have not left the town are penned up in the big (Dome) Hotel."  

(6)
Outside the main Guenyeli – Aghirda stronghold the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were vulnerable to Greek Cypriot reprisals and occupation. U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. had to redeploy men rapidly in order to form protective buffers around enclaves and quarters to protect Turkish Cypriots wherever possible from "...highly excitable young men of the National Guard and 'E.O.K.A.-B' who regarded the enclaves as Trojan horses."(7) U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. concentrated on arranging local cease-fires in areas outside the narrow corridor occupied by Turkish troops. From 27 July onwards the "blue berrets" were helping to evacuate foreign nationals to the Dhekelia S.B.A., whilst patrols and manned observation posts were increased in sensitive areas. (8) At the Secretary General's request the total strength of the Force was increased by 2,078 to a total of 4,444 between 24 July and 14 August. (9) In a major redeployment U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. created two new operational districts on either side of the Turkish bridgehead in a futile attempt to contain the Turkish advance.

Meanwhile in Athens Brigadier Ioannides wanted to attack Turkey on all fronts, but he was dissuaded by his fellow officers in the Junta. "The colonels" handed over power to Constantine Karamanlis, who proclaimed the 1968 Constitution null and void. A wave of relief swept over Greece with the end of the dictatorship, but

"...the nightmare was not over, only shifted to Cyprus." (10) Turkish reinforcements continued to arrive in Cyprus, more Greek Cypriot villages were occupied with their inhabitants either taken hostage or forced out. The Turkish Cypriots were now in a position to reiterate demands for "a geographical federation of two autonomous zones". (11) Greek Cypriots were suddenly conscious of their "small and defenceless minority" status in the eastern Mediterranean, while Turkey was leaning protectively over their Cypriot brethren. At the second Geneva Conference in August, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Professor Turan Güneş, put forward a plan proposing that the Turkish federal zone be divided
between six cantons in different parts of the island, adding up to
34% of the land area. (refer to Map 6.2) The alternative proposal
was for two autonomous zones, of which the Turks would gain 34% of
northern Cyprus. Acting President Glafkos Clerides asked for 36 to
48 hours to consult with Athens and Makarios in London, but the Turks
were not prepared to wait. Immediately after the Conference broke down
the "second push" began. Between 14 and 16 August the Turkish troops
secured 36 to 37% of the island, brutally transforming the situation —
"from an argument over how the intermingling of two
different populations was to be regulated — by minority
rights, by power-sharing, or by devolution — into a
different kind of argument, one about what sort of federal
link could be built between territorially separate
communities." (12)

Christopher Hitchens argues that between the "first" major advance and
the "second" in August, "the Greek irredentist forces had fallen from
power in both Athens and Nicosia", Karamanlis replaced Ioannides,
Clerides replaced Sampson, and so "the pretext for the original invasion
had ceased to exist". (13)

Demographic Consequences and UNFICYP's Position after the
16 August Cease-Fire.

When an island-wide cease-fire was declared at 1600 hours on 16 August
1974 the political and human geography of Cyprus had been arbitrarily
and violently rearranged. An artificial line cut through the island
like a cheese-wire, extending to a length of approximately 180 kilometres
from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos in the north-west to the east
coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The single long
confrontation line, with the anomalous exception of Kokkina, effectively
forms a political-cum-ethnic boundary between the two Cypriot communities.
Turkey and Greece had directly influenced events leading to the
bifurcation of Cyprus. (14) According to Beeley, 1978, the spatial
separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1974 was merely an extension
of the political interface between their "motherlands", extending from Western Thrace through the Aegean near the Turkish coast to Cyprus. He argues that the only reason that Cyprus did not experience the sort of population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923 was "because the island was then under British rule." (15)

If reference is made to Chapter Two it was argued that there was no geographical basis for partition or even the formation of "artificial cantons". (16) Prior to the division of Cyprus Turkish Cypriots owned just 12.3% of the total land area, 16.8% of private land, and they formed only 18% of the total population. (17) Following the Turkish advance and partition there was a massive exchange of populations. Between July '74 and December '75 about 182,000 Greek Cypriots moved southwards and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots moved northwards. (18) The "transfer" of populations was piecemeal and largely uncoordinated, especially for the Greek Cypriots. Humanitarian relief operations were high on U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s priorities in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.), all providing relief for the "displaced persons" of Cyprus.

When the cease-fire line was drawn on 18 August, and after a general exchange of prisoners had been agreed on the 20 September, there were still many thousands of Greeks and Turks on either side of the division. The number of Greek refugees declined from about 203,000 on 1 September to 179,000 on 21 November, as some 24,000 returned to their homes in Nicosia or close to the southern side of the so-called "Attila Line". There remained about 15,000 Greek Cypriots in the north, many of whom were concentrated in the Karpass peninsula, the 'pan handle' of Cyprus by-passed in the Turkish Army's dash to split the country across the middle. Numerous Greek Cypriot refugees from Famagusta found sanctuary in Dhekelia Base, which remained safe from Turkish attack. Within the
Cyprus: the 1974 de facto partition and subsequent population movements.
### TABLE 6.1
**HYPOTHETICAL EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS BASED ON THE PRESENT SEPARATION LINE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Greek-Cypriot Population in the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus</th>
<th>Turkish-Cypriot Population in the Southern part of the Republic of Cyprus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Affected Greek Villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limassol</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paphos</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken from: M.R.G. Report No.30, 1976, p.27.
Based on official Greek sources,
Government of Cyprus, Nicosia.
Sovereign Base Area boundary the Greek Cypriot villages of Xylotymbou and Ormidhia took in many refugees. (†9)

U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. was able to provide some protection for the isolated Turkish Cypriots in the south but was unable to do this for Greeks in the Turkish-occupied north. U.N. convoys supplied food and emergency accommodation wherever they could for refugees. (20) U.N.C.I.V.P.O.L.'s Missing Persons Bureau had an extremely difficult job of trying to locate over 3,000 reported "missing persons", many of whom were not found and are presumed dead. Although U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s access to large parts of northern Cyprus was restricted it did make some U.N.H.C.R. deliveries to stranded Greeks in the Krenia Dome Hotel and to the villagers of Bellapais. (21)

For months after the cease-fire, refugee movements continued following "agreements" concerning the evacuation of certain Greek and Turkish Cypriot villages. U.N. troops escorted refugees across the "Attila Line". In southern Cyprus U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. proved unable to prevent some E.O.K.A.-B terrorist attacks on remote Turkish enclaves, such as Ayios Ioannis and the Turkish quarter of Paphos. As Hitchens remarks — "This was, perhaps, the last favour that E.O.K.A.-B and its junta allies were to do for the cause of partition". (22) A point reinforced by Pierre Oberling's comments:—

"The massacres had the effect of strengthening the resolve of the 42,000 Turkish Cypriots, scattered in southern Cyprus, to move to the Turkish-controlled north. But the Greek ( Cypriot ) government strenuously opposed the exodus, fearing that if the entire Turkish Cypriot population would move to the north it might tempt Turkey to establish a permanent protectorate there..." (23)

Paphos District contained many Turkish Cypriots, many had crowded into Akrotiri S.B.A., whilst the rest entrenched themselves into their most defensible enclaves. In January 1975 refugees at Akrotiri were safely
transferred. (24) On the 13 February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots announced northern Cyprus as the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" (Kibris Türk Federe Devleti). Within this de facto micro-state remained some fifty-three villages still with Greek Cypriot inhabitants. U.N.F.I.CYP. convoys were allowed to visit them with a Turkish military escort. By June 1975 there were approximately 10,700 Turkish Cypriots in the south, of whom 7,250 were provided with food and allowances by Government authorities. In the T.F.S.C. the 10,500 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Maronites remaining were supplied with food and allowances from the south delivered by U.N.F.I.CYP. (25)

Following an agreement on population exchange in Vienna on 2 August 1975, 8,033 Turkish Cypriots transferred to the north between 2 August and 7 September. (26) This left only 130 Turkish Cypriots, scattered in twenty-two localities in southern Cyprus. By December 1975 there were still 9,000 Greeks and 1,000 Maronites in the north, whilst another 25,000 Greek Cypriots were living in tents or temporary shacks, and over 200,000 Cypriots in all parts of the island were dependent on public assistance and relief supplies. (27)

Over the next few years there was a steady trickle of Greeks to southern Cyprus. For instance, in 1976 5,828 Greeks left the T.F.S.C. As Oberling puts it: "As they came to realize that the stalemate in Cyprus might be long-lasting, that the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was probably here to stay and that they constituted a very small Christian minority in a Muslim nation, most of them decided to leave." (28)

In spite of this there is evidence to suggest that Turkish coercion was behind the so-called "voluntary" transfers of Greeks to the south. (29) Certainly life in the T.F.S.C. was uncomfortable for the enclaved Greek Cypriots, for they were denied full freedom of movement, lacked proper educational facilities, medical care, and full religious freedom. By 1980, only 1,500 Greeks remained, concentrated in the sprawling, tobacco-growing village of Dipkarpaz (formerly Rizokarpaso) at the tip of the
Karpass peninsula. (30)

The table given below illustrates the number of refugees who left each of the six administrative Districts of Cyprus as a result of the tragic events of July - August 1974 and the period immediately afterwards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>GREEKS</th>
<th>TURKS</th>
<th>ARMENIANS &amp; MARONITES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Famagusta</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Kyrenia</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Larnaca</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>17,600</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Limassol</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Nicosia</td>
<td>60,300</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Paphos</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>182,000</td>
<td>45,400</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Comparison should be made with Table 6.7. Both tables give slightly different statistics for numbers of refugees from different Districts, but they do illustrate the broad spread of refugee movements in Cyprus, which affected about 290 villages, that is half the total number of villages in Cyprus.

---
### TABLE 6.2  AREA OCCUPIED BY THE TURKS BEFORE AND AFTER THE TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of land</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Greek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before (in donums)</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before (in donums)</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private land</td>
<td>852,455</td>
<td>12.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,215,117</td>
<td>61.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forests, lakes and State lands</td>
<td>286,794</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,424,273</td>
<td>20.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal, village commission, roads &amp; rivers and public corporation lands</td>
<td>23,248</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>113,505</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,162,497</td>
<td>16.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,752,895</td>
<td>83.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 6.3 DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE LAND BY DISTRICT AFTER THE TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Turkish occupied lands (in donums)</th>
<th>Free areas (in donums)</th>
<th>Total area (in donums)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nicosia</td>
<td>546,412</td>
<td>927,725</td>
<td>1,474,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kyrenia</td>
<td>368,957</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>368,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Famagusta</td>
<td>965,168</td>
<td>142,778</td>
<td>1,107,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Larnaca</td>
<td>49,047</td>
<td>548,367</td>
<td>597,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Limassol</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>810,780</td>
<td>810,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Paphos</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>708,338</td>
<td>708,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,929,584</td>
<td>3,137,988</td>
<td>5,067,572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use</th>
<th>Before the invasion</th>
<th>After the invasion</th>
<th>Increase or decrease %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigated</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivable land</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>496.6</td>
<td>552.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>201.5</td>
<td>201.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legumes</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial crops</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable - melons</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fodder crops</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cultivable land and</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>100.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land under fallow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vines</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchards</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almonds, nuts, etc.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other trees (olives and</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carobs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncultivable land</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>432.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>558.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken from: Karouzis, G. 1977, p.123.
Sources: PLANNING BUREAU, 1975, The Economic Consequences of the Turkish Invasion and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Nicosia.
Economic Consequences of the 16 August cease-fire line.

The Turkish Cypriots emerged from the partition with a disproportionate share of the island's resources. They held roughly 37% of Cyprus, although estimates range from 36.5% to 40% depending on whether or not the U.N. Buffer Zone or "dead zone", as Karouzis, 1976, termed it, is taken into account. A cursory glance at Tables 6.2,6.3, and 6.4 reveal that Turkish Cypriots increased the area of valuable agricultural and private land under their control. The Turkish North included all the tobacco plantations of the Karpass; 79% of the total citrus fruit production; 68% of the cereal producing area of the Mesaoria Plain; 86% of carrot production; 32% of other vegetables; 65% of green fodders; and 30% of carob production. (31) According to Greek Cypriot sources, "the invasion" meant that 80% of the island's citrus production was lost due to lack of irrigation during the troubles, and full recovery of these orchards would take ten or twelve years. (32) Table 6.4 shows a 173% increase in cultivable land held by the Turkish Cypriots compared to land held prior to the Turkish military intervention. Their greatest gains were in irrigated citrus fruit orchards and in industrial crops, particularly tobacco.

Water Resources:

The August '74 cease-fire line effectively divided morphological, agro-physiographic and hydrological regions. Three very important headsprings lie in the Turkish-controlled north — (a) Kythrea, (b) Lapithos, and (c) Karavas, each with an average daily output of 15,000, 5,000 and 4,000 cubic metres respectively. The "Attila Line" also cut across the courses of all the major northward flowing rivers from the Troodos Massif, which begin in the Government-controlled territory and end in Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory. This is the case with the Pyrgos, Limnitis, Kambos, Xeros, Setrakhos, Karyotis, Atasas, as well as the north-west flowing streams from the eastern Troodos — Elea, Peristerona, Akaki, and Merika.
Two important river systems are mostly contained in Turkish Cyprus — these are the Pedhieos and Yialias.

George Karouzis, 1977, argues "that of the total irrigated area 46.5% lies in the occupied areas and includes the richest in water and other natural resources areas of Morphou, Kyrenia coastline, Famagusta and Kythrea." (33) If yields per donum of irrigated land are 10 - 12 times greater in irrigated areas than non-irrigated areas, then the loss to Greek Cypriot agricultural production was enormous. Since 1974 the Greeks have been trying to make up for some of the loss by various irrigation and land consolidation schemes. (see below) They lost several important dam and water development projects in the Morphou - Tylliria and Pentadaktylos - Kyrenia coast areas. Indeed until the partition the water development policy followed an integrated inter-regional pattern aimed at conveying water from surplus to deficit areas, while taking into account land availability, domestic, industrial and tourist needs. (34)

Since the partition, it has not been possible to integrate water development schemes on an island-wide basis, although cooperation over water supply has taken place under U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. auspices. As in the preceding decade, water supply considerations are subject to the problems of political division between the two leaderships. During the 1964-'74 period the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were vulnerable to water supply shortages, owing to either Government restrictions, or to overuse of/diversion of streams and underground water resources shared by or running into both communities' territory. As Michael Drury, 1977, points out:–

Turkish Cypriots "resented the way in which new wells were deliberately sunk adjacent to their own territory, thereby lowering their own water table to untappable depths..." (35)

The de facto partition has solved some of the Turkish Cypriot community's water supply worries, but the north could still be deprived of water from the south during dry summer months should the Greeks decide this is
necessary either for their own needs or as a political weapon.

Communications.

With the exception of U.N.F.I.CYP. convoys and "population exchanges", on 16 August 1974 all north-south movement stopped. Main roads linking Kyrenia and Famagusta to Nicosia remained open to Turkish Cypriots but closed to Greek Cypriots. All freedom of mobility for ordinary Cypriots ends at the U.N. Buffer Zone or the two cease-fire lines crossing Cyprus. The creation of a narrow neck of Turkish Cypriot land to take in the town of Louroujina necessitated a diversion of Greek Cypriot traffic on the Larnaca-Nicosia route, a detour via Kalokhorio or Lymbia and Perakhorio. The old main road linking the two towns is no longer fully in use due to the fact that about three miles of it pass through Turkish Cyprus. (refer to Map 6.5)

Before discussing U.N.F.I.CYP.'s activities since August 1974, it is useful to understand some of the fundamental changes in the human geography of both sides of the partition over the period under review.

1) The Greek Cypriot South.

In a report on Cyprus by The Guardian in April 1984 it was argued that economic recovery has been rapid and...

"the 180,000 Greeks who came from the north are almost fully absorbed in the economic bloodstream. Unemployment is down to 3.5%..." (36)

Given the relative prosperity of the south today it is easy to overlook the huge obstacles Greek Cypriots faced after the partition. It is almost impossible to make accurate estimates of total Greek Cypriot land and property losses, but undoubtedly the greatest problem for the Government has been the dislocation created by large numbers of refugees, many from close-knit villages with strong kinship ties and attachments to the land. These refugees moved into plywood and chipboard shacks or specially built low-cost housing estates. Others built their own homes,
utilizing a self-help programme giving grants and loans, while some 40,000 refugees moved "provisionally" into vacated Turkish Cypriot homes, which they are not allowed to own. The Government holds the abandoned Turkish Cypriot property in trust for them. All "Cypriots", according to law, have the right to return to their former homes. One multiplier effect the massive influx of refugees did have was to trigger off a construction boom in the south absorbing much refugee labour, particularly in the construction of refugee housing and in new urban developments at Limassol and to a lesser extent other towns.

In 1974 G.D.P. fell 44% over the previous year. By December '74 unemployment in the Greek sector was nearly 30%. Economic recovery was helped by the First Emergency Action Plan 1975 - '77. At the end of 1978 Greek Cypriot unemployment was at a rate of two per cent and G.D.P. for the years 1976 - '78 was growing at eleven per cent per year.

Since 1974 the Greek Cypriots have turned their geographical position in the eastern Mediterranean near to the war-torn Middle East to their economic advantage. Joint ventures between Cypriots and foreigners have mushroomed. Over 2,000 off-shore companies have registered their offices in Cyprus, including many Arab ventures. During the recent troubles in the Lebanon, many Lebanese have sought temporary refuge in Cyprus. In 1976 78,000 Lebanese temporarily moved to the island. (37) With the continuing destruction of Beirut, many international business headquarters have transferred to Cyprus, and Lebanese are investing in property there.

"If the Beirutis cannot continue money making at home, then Cyprus has been an answer; and several of them have been permitted to operate their banks on the island." (38)

Above all, the south has had the advantages of its international recognition enabling the Government to foster trade links with the E.E.C. and Middle Eastern states. International aid has also flowed into the south. In June 1983 European foreign ministers agreed to grant Cyprus
44 million European currency units (€ 40 millions) in loans and grants. A second Cyprus - E.E.C. protocol of December 1983, allocated credits to the Cyprus Government for projects of potential benefit to the whole island. (39)

Dam and irrigation projects, such as the Yermasoyia Dam near Limassol, and increased irrigation along the coastal strip of Paphos, have made up for some losses of agricultural land to the Turks. (40) Raw farm products still represent 22 - 25% of the total exports of Greek Cyprus, while manufactured goods, including processed farm products, account for about 70%, with minerals making up the rest. Although agriculture's share of G.D.P. is falling it will continue to be an important foreign exchange earner and by 1986 agricultural exports are expected to bring in £ 108 millions against £ 64.5 millions in 1981. (41) Land consolidation schemes have helped to raise agricultural productivity since the partition. (42)

The Turkish Cypriot exodus created problems of rural depopulation in certain parts of the south, which has never been completely replaced. For instance, Paphos District lost a rural Turkish Cypriot population, and since 1974 attempts have been made to rationalize this disrupted agricultural system by land consolidation measures. It should be noted that owing to the formation of artificial enclaves there was "strategic over-population" in some rural areas prior to 1974. Large areas of Turkish Cypriot land are either farmed by Greek Cypriot refugees or by adjacent Greek Cypriot villages through a system of cooperatives. (43)

Another result of de facto partition was that the Turks increased the area of coastline they held from 10.5% to 51.5% (see Figure 6:2). This not only had strategic implications for the Greek Cypriots lost most of their tourist accommodation (about 65%) including the two main resorts of Famagusta and Kyrenia. To compensate, the Greek Cypriots have developed resorts at Paphos, Larnaca, and Ayia Napa, and in
FIG. 6:2 The coastlines of Cyprus before and after the invasion.
December 1983 a new international airport was opened at Paphos to complement the existing one at Larnaca. In 1982, the south had 550,000 tourists, whereas the north had only 87,000 visitors, of whom 65,000 were from Turkey. (44) Tourism is a big foreign currency earner for the Greek Cypriots, but the north earns very little because most of its tourists are spending Turkish lira, the dominant currency of Turkish Cyprus. Indeed many of the north's visitors are there either to visit relatives amongst the troops stationed there or to buy western consumer goods unavailable back home in mainland Turkey.

Southern Cyprus has enhanced its position in international trade since 1974, and new port facilities have been developed at Limassol and Larnaca in order to replace those lost at Famagusta, as well as to attract a Middle Eastern and Mediterranean transit trade. As a result of Greek Cypriot enterprise and international recognition of the Greek Administration in the south the economic dichotomy between the two communities is as pronounced as it was before Summer '74. In 1981 the average per capita income of a Greek Cypriot was four times that of a Turkish Cypriot, i.e. £4,400 per annum compared to £1,100 p.a. (45)

Unfortunately the economic gap between the two communities will probably remain a factor in their continued spatial segregation. Turkish Cypriots will be mindful of the dangers in allowing Greek Cypriots back into the territory they now hold for they do not want to be swamped by Greek Cypriot prosperity. The south has benefitted moreover from international aid, much of which "is related to the division of the island" and so "vested interests might develop to preserve that division". (46)

ii) The Turkish Cypriot North.

While the south has prospered the north has suffered from its de facto rather than de jure status. Non-recognition of the legitimacy of the Denktas administration by the international community has hindered economic development in northern Cyprus. On 15 November 1983 Rauf Denktas
declared independence for his de facto micro-state, renaming it the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (T.R.N.C.). "U.D.I." was for all practical "a declaration of dependence on Turkey and a declaration of secession from the Republic". (47) In spite of the camouflage of self-proclaimed independence, the economic and physical viability of the north is built on economic, military and political assistance from Ankara. Northern Cyprus has undergone a "Turkification policy" designed to create new "facts on the ground", making the prospects for a full reunification of the island increasingly remote with the passage of time. (48)

There are numerous physical reminders of Turkey's protection and close proximity to the T.R.N.C. As Russell King describes:-

"The Turkish flag flies on all public buildings and statues of Ataturk are prominent. The military presence, with an estimated 20 - 30,000 soldiers...is also marked. Many villages, which are bases for the military, and tracts of countryside, which are used as training grounds, are out of bounds to both local inhabitants and visitors. Turkish symbols and slogans are carved into hillsides. At the 1974 landing point, west of Kyrenia, an extraordinary concrete monument shows a Turkish cliff leaning protectively over little Cyprus." (49)

Mainland Turkish settlers and Turkish Cypriot refugees have now been settled in places which could have been made negotiable in territorial bargaining with Greek Cypriots. As Denktas puts it:-

"You can't deal with people on a percentage basis, as if the farms and villages were vacant. As people get more settled in the North the flexibility to adjust the zones is decreasing." (50)

One significant obstacle to an eventual solution is the fact that Turkish Cypriots are entitled by their de facto administration to own Greek Cypriot-owned but vacated property. Thus if the island is ever reunited there will be numerous disputes as to who owns what piece of land or house in large parts of Northern Cyprus.
Since 1974 some 30–40,000 settlers from the mainland—"Turkiyeli"—have entered the north. Officially they were described as seasonal workers but many continue to stay in Cyprus on a more permanent basis, settling in either Nicosia or Famagusta, or in three rural concentrations: the Karpass peninsula, the Mesaoria, and north Morphou. Hitchens, 1984, argues that this is a deliberate colonization policy "to alter the demographic basis of the island." (51) Many of these Turkiyeli come from backward parts of Anatolia and the Black Sea coast, have different modes of dress, are less 'European' in their behaviour, and adhere more fervently to traditional Muslim rights than do Turkish Cypriots. Such differences have tended to be a cause of friction between the "islanders" and mainland settlers. (52) Even Dr Küşük, the veteran Turkish Cypriot leader, showed concern over the unplanned "piling of people on the island" establishing "Oriental Sultinates" in northern Cypriot villages. (53) Furthermore, any member of the Turkish armed forces who have served in Cyprus or their families, is eligible for citizenship rights in Northern Cyprus.

The division of spoils in Turkish Cyprus has also been uneven.

"Clearly, since the economy of the 'state' is a function of Turkey...it is businessmen connected with the motherland who stand the best chance." (54)

This is understandable given that the T.R.N.C. has limited commercial links with other states except via Turkey. The 'Northern Republic' lacks access to many international financial institutions such as the World Bank. It lacks contacts with the E.E.C. and is without bilateral credit facilities. Turkey continues moreover to pay two-thirds of the budget of Northern Cyprus. As M.E.E.D. put it:—

"Politics apart, the Turkish Cypriot community is aware of one major handicap which may continue as long as it is divided from the South: its inability to gain access to the sources of aid granted to the Cyprus Government. While the World Bank provides funds for the Paphos irrigation scheme in the South, the citrus
orchards of Morphou in the North are threatened by drought." (55)

Despite the handicap of its non-recognition and ambiguous international status Northern Cyprus continues to trade with some European countries, particularly Britain. The Government of Cyprus has been unsuccessful in its attempts to persuade the E.E.C. to bar produce from the T.R.N.C. from benefits under an existing agreement, which would render exports from Turkish Cyprus so uncompetitive as to be unsellable on European markets. Exports from Turkish Cyprus increased from about £ 16 million in 1979 to £ 41 million in 1980. (56)

Citrus fruit exports are crucial to the fragile economy of the north, and every effort is being made to rehabilitate farming based on fruit, early vegetables and livestock. 11,000 hectares of rich orange and lemon groves in Morphou, virtually all Greek Cypriot owned, are now worked by Turkish Cypriot grape-farmers from Paphos. Unfortunately much land adjacent to the Turkish cease-fire line has lacked proper irrigation, which has led to the dessication of some citrus groves. (57)

A revitalisation of the tourist industry in Northern Cyprus is made more difficult by the Greek-ownership of numerous large hotels and the fact that only Turkish Airlines can use Ercan (formerly Tymbou) Airport, thus ruling out cheap flights from Western Europe. (58)

The physical separation of the two communities into distinct geographical areas, one internationally ratified, the other with a de facto existence only, has served to widen the gulf between them. Both sides function as separate states, duplicate economic functions, whilst ordinary Greek and Turkish Cypriots remain remote from each other. The political partition has fundamentally altered the human geography of Cyprus, an island with two mono-ethnic zones. As King describes:

"Northern Cyprus has been purged of its Greekness. Gone are the tall-hatted, bushy-beared Orthodox priests; the monasteries and churches are forlornly empty...Apart from a few faded slogans proclaiming Makarios and Enosis,
North Cyprus has been linguistically whitewashed." (58)

Turkish is the language of the T.R.N.C. and accordingly Nicosia has become Lefkosa; Famagusta is Gazi Magosa; Kyrenia is Girne; Morphou is Güzelyurt: These may only be names on Turkish maps or on signposts in Northern Cyprus, but they represent physical impediments to the reunification of the island.

Section Two: U.N.F.I.CYP. after the partition in August 1974.

The partition of the island by one line of close armed confrontation led to sudden, dramatic change in U.N.F.I.CYP. deployment. 130 observation posts were established in southern Cyprus and 36 in the north, where Turkish troops restricted the Force's mobility. (59) Even after the cease-fire on 16 August, there were some Turkish military manoeuvres, and U.N.F.I.CYP. failed to obtain a withdrawal of troops after minor Turkish advances in the Pyroi - Louroujina area, near Gallini, near Dhennia, and in Yerolakkas area west of Nicosia. Cross-firing continued for some considerable time in all these areas. (60) Permanent U.N.CIV.POL. stations were established in villages such as Dhali in August '74 and in Athienou in October '74, to afford greater protection for villagers in an area of particularly close armed confrontation. Meanwhile both sides consolidated their defensive positions, laid unmarked mines, and erected fortifications. U.N.F.I.CYP. recorded the Forward Defence Lines (F.D.L.s) of both sides and acted as a neutral border patrol force.

As time elapsed U.N.F.I.CYP.'s buffer duties became less complicated, and following the transfer of virtually all Turkish Cypriots to Northern Cyprus the Force was able to reduce its contingent strength. Instead of deployment on an island-wide basis in operational zones and districts, it deployed men in contingent sectors along "the general line of confrontation". (refer to Map 6.5) Six operational sectors were formed along the southern extension of the "Attila Line". U.N.F.I.CYP. manned observation posts and patrolled along tracks observing the F.D.L.s
of both sides. Helicopters were used whenever ground patrols were hampered by the danger of minefields or difficult terrain. (61)

Initially ground patrols were not allowed full freedom of movement in the Buffer Zone owing to interference by Turkish soldiers on the pretext that patrols approached to close to the Turkish F.D.L.

Operations in Northern Cyprus were curtailed to humanitarian assistance tasks for Greek and Maronite communities there. U.N.F.I.CYP. set up four liaison posts in the Karpass and three around Kyrenia, but it was permitted access to only a few main roads. U.N.F.I.CYP. continued its relief escorts between Limnitis and Kokkina enclave, where there were 1,500 inhabitants. (62)

During the eighteen months "transitional period" for U.N.F.I.CYP. immediately after the partition its main tasks can be summarized as :-

(a) Maintenance of the cease-fire and F.D.L.s;
(b) Interpositioning troops between the two sides to create an effective demilitarized zone under U.N. control.
(c) To discharge functions with regard to the security and welfare of Greeks living in the north and Turks still in the south.
(d) To support the relief operations coordinated by U.N.H.C.R. and other United Nations organisations / programmes and I.C.R.C. (63)


In order to understand U.N.F.I.CYP.'s operations in this period it is necessary to describe the Buffer Zone separating Greek from Turkish Cypriots. This U.N.-controlled corridor of land extends for the full length of the Turkish cease-fire line, 180 kilometres, and it varies in width from seven kilometres to just twenty metres inside the city walls of Nicosia. The zone takes up a total of about three per cent of the land area of Cyprus, approximately ten per cent of the agricultural land, although only a small proportion of the irrigated area (i.e. near Morphou).

U.N.F.I.CYP.'s main military duty is to supervise the cease-fire lines. Buffer Zone surveillance has improved considerably over the last decade.
In December 1982 U.N.F.I.CYP. had 137 observation posts, 66 permanently manned. By June 1984 there were 144 O.P.s, 71 permanently manned. Between these O.P.s, regular U.N. Force patrols cover the length of each contingent sector. Within the capital "the thin blue line" has strengthened its presence by deploying more junior commanders and troops. U.N.F.I.CYP. continues in attempts to persuade both sides to effect a "mutual unmanning" of key positions along the Green Line, particularly where incidents have frequently occurred. (64)

In recent years the Force has moved more U.N.F.I.CYP. accommodation into the Buffer Zone. Observation capabilities have improved with the aid of night vision devices, whilst mobility has been enhanced by improving the patrol tracks between the cease-fire lines. All these factors have enabled U.N.F.I.CYP. to reduce the number of serious incidents; and attempts by either side to move forward of established F.D.L.s., in order to restore the status quo ante. By delineating and keeping the opposing cease-fire lines in position U.N.F.I.CYP. has helped to harden the ethnic interface.

There are some examples of subtle changes in the status quo in areas within or adjacent to the Buffer Zone. For instance, during August 1983-June 1984, it was observed that there had been adjustments to the perimeter fence of Varosha, the southern suburb of Famagusta. Moreover, some houses had been inhabited in Varosha, and in spite of U.N.F.I.CYP. efforts to restore the old situation in Varosha, the Turkish Cypriots have done nothing to reverse these changes. (65) Another example is within the old walls of Nicosia. In April 1984 the Greek residents of Ayios Kassianos, in the eastern part of the walled city, protested against a U.N.F.I.CYP. decision to place a number of barrels blocking Athina Avenue, where Greek Cypriot families live. After representations made by National Guard officers the barrels were removed temporarily. According to the residents, the U.N. decision followed the recent advance of Turkish troops into the Buffer Zone to occupy the deserted old elementary school of Ayios
Kassianos. Such small encroachments into the Buffer Zone are an ever present danger, especially sensitive in areas where the two sides are separated only by a matter of twenty or so metres as in central Nicosia. (refer to Map 6.7) The incident in Ayios Kassianos highlights the problems U.N.F.I.CYP. has in trying to keep F.D.L.s static. (66)

Another important activity undertaken by U.N.F.I.CYP. is the monitoring of flights across the Buffer Zone, particularly of military aircraft crossing the Turkish cease-fire line from the north and light civil aircraft crossing the National Guard cease-fire line from the south. In response to the problem of frequent overflights of the Louroujina salient by civilian aircraft, the Cyprus Civil Aviation Authority have recently decided to reposition the light aircraft flight corridor between Larnaca and Lakatokia further to the south. (67)

To the north of the Buffer Zone U.N.F.I.CYP. activities continue to be hindered by tight restrictions on its freedom of movement. In December 1979, the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued the U.N. Force with a number of guidelines (68), which limited the hours per day U.N.F.I.CYP. posts could be used in the north as well as the number of roads open to the Force. In the period 1982 - '84 U.N.F.I.CYP. succeeded in removing Turkish restrictions on the following routes — Famagusta - Rizokarpasso; Xeros - Skouriotissa; Limnitis - Xeros; Nicosia - Famagusta. The latter had strict guidelines as to the number of U.N.F.I.CYP. vehicles allowed to use it. (69)


These activities cover the following :-
(a) To contribute to the restoration of normal conditions. (U.N. Resolution 186 / 1964)
(b) To contribute to the humanitarian relief programme in close cooperation with U.N.H.C.R. and World Food Programme (W.F.P.) (U.N. Resolution 359 / 1974)
(c) To carry out such Red Cross functions as may be required from time
to time by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

( Secretary General Report, U.N. S/12463 )

With regard to (b) and (c) U.N.F.I.CYP. has continued to carry out
humanitarian relief operations since the events of Summer '74. It
discharges functions handed over to it by the I.C.R.C. at the time of
the latter's withdrawal in June 1977. (70) With the advancing age of
those Greeks and Maronites still located in the north, these functions
have increased, especially with regard to medical and welfare services.
(71) An emergency medical supply service is provided, as well as medical
evacuation by U.N.F.I.CYP. helicopter should a member of a "minority"
on either side of the partition require urgent treatment on the other
side. (72)

U.N. troops have helped in delivering agricultural, educational and
medical equipment under the United Nations Humanitarian Relief Programme,
which provided $ U.S. 5 million to finance seventeen projects. This
programme, coordinated by the Cyprus Red Cross Society, involves
participation in the construction of a general hospital, the overseas
procurement of equipment and supplies for the health, education and
agricultural sectors, and professional training. (73)

U.N.F.I.CYP. continues to ensure that all transfers of Greek Cypriots
from north to south are voluntary. In 1984 there were 844 Greek Cypriots
residing in the T.R.N.C. The number of permanent transfers in the two
year period from 1 June 1982 to 1 June 1984 was 158. (74) For Greeks
residing in the north life has been subject to many restrictions. They
are dependent on the Turkish Cypriots for medical and hospital facilities.
Greek Cypriot educational facilities in the north amount to two primary
schools, one at Rizokarpasso has 51 pupils and one at Ayia Trias has 27.
(75) Children of secondary school age have to move south if they want
a Greek Cypriot education. Since April 1979, it has not been possible
for U.N.F.I.CYP. to arrange visits by children attending schools in the
south to their parents or grandparents in the north. (76)

Between June '82 - June '84, twenty-one Turkish Cypriots chose to move from south to north Cyprus on a permanent basis, and forty-seven Maronites decided to transfer from north to south. There are three Maronite villages in the north — Asomatos, Karpasha, and Kormakiti — which have maintained contacts with Maronites living in southern Cyprus via visits under U.N.F.I.CYP. auspices. The Force has also arranged frequent reunions of separated Turkish Cypriot families at the Ledra Palace Hotel on an ad hoc basis. (77)

The Promotion of Economic Activity in the Buffer Zone:

The Buffer Zone cuts across valuable agricultural land in the Morphou Basin and Mesaoria, divides the capital, truncates pre-August '74 route-ways, and runs over important river basins, streams, and underground water resources. Without U.N.F.I.CYP.'s presence the three per cent of Cypriot territory within the Buffer Zone would be a military waste-ground or an unproductive no-man's-land. U.N.F.I.CYP. has helped reactivate economic activity "between the lines". It has turned minefields into valuable farmland, and safeguarded civilians working under the noses of opposing soldiers.

For the two years after the troubles of 1974 there was little economic activity or movement near the front-lines of either the Turkish Army or National Guard. (78) U.N.F.I.CYP. has increased escorts for farmers working in sensitive newly opened fields in the Buffer Zone. A Farming Security Line (F.S.L.) has been carefully drawn and demarcated by U.N.F.I.CYP. for the mutual safety of civilians working on either side. (refer to Map 6.8) This F.S.L. roughly cuts through the middle of the Buffer Zone, alongside U.N. Force patrol tracks. Permission to cultivate land within the Buffer Zone is granted by U.N.F.I.CYP. after consultation with both sides.

The U.N. Force allows cultivation to take place "without prejudice to
any eventual political settlement" using two principal guidelines —
(i) Security and (ii) Ownership. On the one hand, cultivation
should not be a threat to the legitimate security interests of either
side. On the other, U.N.F.I.CYP. has tried to ensure that the land is
cultivated by actual owners or their employees. Proof of ownership must
be handed to U.N.F.I.CYP. before a farmer is allowed to cultivate his
land in the Buffer Zone.

Minefield clearance has been necessary in certain parts of the Buffer
Zone before any cultivation was possible, and U.N.F.I.CYP. has clearly
marked other known or suspected minefields. Every effort has also been
made to demarcate the Farming Security Line with white metal drums and
painted boulders so that its position is obvious to both sides, lessening
the likelihood of shooting incidents. Frequent U.N.CIV.POL. and U.N.
Force troop patrols carefully monitor agricultural activity within the
whole of the Buffer Zone.

WITHIN THE BUFFER ZONE.

- Turkish Force O.P. ———— Turkish cease-fire line or F.D.L.
- Greek Cypriot O.P. ———— Greek Cypriot cease-fire line
  ( National Guard ) or F.D.L.
  O.P.

N.B. O.P.'s are observation posts, and F.D.L. stands for Forward
Defence Line.

It is interesting to note that the Buffer Zone is the one area in the
island where Greek and Turkish Cypriots could live and work together.
At present the F.S.L. within the Buffer Zone forms an effective ethnic interface (see above diagram), but should U.N.F.I.CYP. gain permission from both sides to push Greek Cypriot cultivation northwards and Turkish cultivation southwards the Buffer Zone could become an intercommunal frontier zone. The Greeks own much land north of the F.S.L. within the Buffer Zone but are as yet unable to cultivate it, and there is some pre-1974 Turkish Cypriot land to the south. Unfortunately the Turkish Cypriot community is less interested in farming on their side of the F.S.L. owing to a relative abundance of land per head in Northern Cyprus compared to that of the Greek Cypriots.

Cyprus is susceptible to long dry Mediterranean summers and acute water shortages. The Buffer Zone has a peculiar hydropolitics with U.N.F.I.CYP. in charge of its water supply. Before a farmer can drill for water he must have proof of land ownership to obtain a drilling licence, then get U.N.F.I.CYP. permission. Negotiations with both communities takes place before a water bore-hole can be used. U.N.F.I.CYP.'s economic staff have spent considerable time ensuring that broken and damaged pumps, pipelines and electronic apparatus for the collection and distribution of water are maintained at an efficient level. Joint meetings between the water authorities of both communities are arranged by U.N.F.I.CYP. Such meetings are necessary to resolve mutual problems of water supply in Nicosia and appropriate regulatory measures during dry summer months. (80) U.N.F.I.CYP. has also made frequent visits to and inspections of supply tanks and reservoirs. It tries to ensure that the water distribution system of both sides is fairly and efficiently operated for the benefit of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. (81)

Other U.N.F.I.CYP. activities helping both communities include its annual anti-mosquito spraying programme in the Buffer Zone. (82) The U.N. Force delivers mail and Red Cross messages across the cease-fire lines as well as transferring government pensions and social security benefits to eligible Turkish Cypriots in the north. It has also
facilitated the replacement of older homes that became uninhabitable in villages within the Buffer Zone, and helped private owners take their movable property from the area.

U.N.CIV.POL. : Maintenance of Law and Order.

There is estimated to be over 9,000 residents in the Buffer Zone. The largest village is Athienou. (refer to Map 6.5) U.N.CIV.POL.'s major task is to see that the civilians and property within the Buffer Zone are protected. It maintains close contacts with the Cyprus Police and Turkish Cypriot police, and frequently visits village mukhtars and ordinary civilians on both sides of the United Nations-controlled zone. The civilian police assist the military element of U.N.F.I.CYP. in controlling movements within or encroachments into the Buffer Zone, and in escorting "authorized" movements across the neutral area.

Australian civilian policemen working for U.N.F.I.CYP. have their headquarters in Sector Two, and they "look after" the area extending westwards of Nicosia towards Kato Pyrgos and Kokkina. The Swedish civilian police headquarters is located in the mixed Buffer Zone village of Pyla, near to Dhekelia S.B.A., and their operational area extends eastwards from Nicosia to southern Famagusta. It should be stressed that all the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Pyla evacuated after the partition of the island.

U.N.CIV.POL. personnel act in many ways as an intermediary force, investigating into complaints of criminal activities having intercommunal implications and in various routine activities in conjunction with the military element of U.N.F.I.CYP. Regular patrols are made up and down the Buffer Zone to ensure that no civilians cross into areas on the "wrong" side of the Farming Security Line. A continual problem is posed by shepherds grazing their flocks dangerously close to the F.S.L.

It is important to stress that in the absence of direct cooperation and contact between ordinary people on opposite sides of the Buffer Zone
both the military and civilian components of U.N.F.I.CYP. act as the only communication channel between them.

Section Three: Case Study — U.N.F.I.CYP. Sector Two ; BRIT, CON.

Sector Two of the United Nations Buffer Zone lies on the western boundary of Sector Four, Nicosia Zone, and extends westwards of the Peristerona, Astromeritis — Morphou Road. It includes U.N.F.I.CYP. Headquarters located at the former international airport of Nicosia, as well as H.Q. CAN, CON. (Canadian Contingent); H.Q. BRIT, CON. (British Contingent); and H.Q. AUST. CIV. POL. (Australian civilian police), all situated near to the old airport. The Headquarters of Sector Two is at Kokkina Trimithia, just south of the National Guard P.D.L.

In 1975 most of the Buffer Zone was parched wasteland, a dangerous area of close armed confrontation, large tracts of it mined with un­marked anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. It represented a more for­bidding barrier than the high peaks of the Pentadactylos, a frustrating division for those Cypriots who can still see their old homes and fields across it. Within central Nicosia the cease-fire lines almost coalesce, but even in the countryside where the Buffer Zone is up to seven miles wide the "other side" is always tantalizingly close. The refugees now living in Peristerona "...have been evicted from their homes and orchards, but at midday they can still see the outlines of their old dwellings against the sky, and there is some comfort, as well as some pain, in the proximity. The invisible but still palpable line of division runs here, too. There is no village or town, however far from that line, which does not pay an indemnity to it with impoverished refugee housing, and with memories." (83)

Many Greek Cypriot farmers now living in the villages of Akaki, Peristerona or Astromeritis lost land to the Turks, north of Sector Two. Within this part of the Buffer Zone there are just two inhabited villages, Mammari and Dhenia, now both Greek Cypriot, although Dhenia used to be mixed.
The following details are largely taken from field observations in April 1984 and they should be used with Map 6.8.

Most of the land extending from the old Nicosia airport and U.N.F.I.CYP. H.Q. to the village of Dhenia is very poor, with little irrigation and few cultivated fields. South of the Farming Security Line, U.N.F.I.CYP. has helped extend cultivation from the National Guard Forward Defence Line northwards close to the F.S.L.; but north of the F.S.L. there was little evidence of any farming other than rough grazing land for goats. Turkish Cypriots own less land in this part of the Buffer Zone and also have less need to cultivate within this area. Moving westwards upto Dhenia the F.S.L. follows a course south of the U.N. Force patrol track, which in turn runs a distance of twenty to fifty metres south of the River Ovgos. U.N.F.I.CYP. was planning to move the F.S.L. upto the Ovgos in order to extend the area of possible Greek Cypriot cultivation south of the F.S.L. Thus making a tiny section of the Ovgos a natural boundary between Greek and Turkish Cypriots within the Buffer Zone.

Opening fields on the Greek side of the F.S.L. has been a piecemeal process. In some areas mines have been cleared, but there were still parts of the Buffer Zone fenced off owing to suspected minefields. Much of the land under cultivation in the "neutral zone" is either farmed by old owners of leased to new tenant farmers. Refugees from the north have been given Government grants to buy land. Some of these refugees were tempted into leasing land adjacent to or within the Buffer Zone. Plots of land within Sector Two vary in size from 5 to 20 acres. An averaged sized plot of 10 to 13 acres costs about C£ 2,000 per annum to farm.

West of Dhenia there were improvements in the area of land visibly under cultivation, although north of the F.S.L. scrubland and dead citrus trees were visible. The F.S.L. gets very close to the Turkish cease-fire line near Avlona and westwards to the end of Sector Two. In this area there were many well-tended citrus orchards and less dry cultivation.
Arbitration of water usage and supervision of water bore-holes are crucial roles for U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. in Sector Two where underground water supplies are needed by both sides. U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. has allowed the residents of Avlona, behind the cease-fire line within the Turkish sector, to use a water bore-hole within the Buffer Zone so that the village has a ready water supply. U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s Economics Branch in Sector Two was trying to work a compromise between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots over the use of two more water bore-holes and the rights of Greeks to cultivate land just to the west of the Akaki Riverbed, close to the F.S.L., Turkish Army observation posts, and Avlona village. In other words U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. has to negotiate with both sides before water bore-holes can be used and before fields in strategic areas can be opened for cultivation.

The overall impression of Sector Two was of an area of land, much of it neglected since the partition in August '74, slowly coming back to life under U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. auspices. North of the Farming Security Line U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. has tried to encourage greater Turkish participation, although large tracts of the Buffer Zone adjacent to the Turkish F.D.L. belongs to Greek Cypriots and therefore can not be farmed by the Turks. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriots once owned land south of the F.S.L. in some parts of the Buffer Zone. Thus the U.N. Force-controlled area represents an artificial geographical strip of land where intercommunal activity could eventually take place with U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. assistance and mediation, although each side will require considerable guarantees / compromises from the other if it is to allow the Buffer Zone to become an area of intercommunal existence. In the meantime U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. continues to ensure the safety of Greek Cypriot farmers working within one hundred yards of Turkish rifles in areas such as Avlona, where the the F.S.L. passes close to the village. Some semblance of normality is thus returning to an important strip of land that would otherwise be wasted "no-man's-land".
MAP 6:9
HYDROLOGICAL SURVEY AREAS SINCE 1974

Source: Greek Cypriot Dept. of Water Development

Survey Area
Main Roads
Buffer Zone

30 km
Section Four: Some Conclusions concerning U.N.F.I.CYP.'s Second Decade.

In June 1984 the deficit of the United Nations Force in Cyprus Account was estimated to be $117.7 million. In spite of this huge deficit the Secretary General concluded that:

"...the continuing presence of U.N.F.I.CYP. remains indispensable in helping to maintain calm in the island and in creating the conditions in which the difficult search for a peaceful settlement can be pursued." (84)

Although the British and Canadians and to a limited extent several other states have been willing to pay the costs of maintaining their contingents, the major share of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s financing has been the voluntary contributions the Secretary General was able to elicit, particularly from the United States. Nevertheless the U.N. Force has built up a chronic deficit since 1964 when U Thant complained that "the method of financing the Force in Cyprus as defined by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, is most unsatisfactory." (85) It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss alternative methods of financing, or indeed to give an elaborate appraisal of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s costs, but as Adams and Cottrell, 1968, argued "U.N.F.I.CYP. cannot go on indefinitely." (86) They added that "it can end successfully-only-when-a permanent political settlement for Cyprus is somehow achieved."

Apart from the status quo the options appear to be:

(i) Withdrawal of U.N.F.I.CYP. before a settlement;
(ii) Reduction in strength of the Force.

Given the current political stalemate in Cyprus the former choice would probably aggravate the situation by reactivating intercommunal violence. As for the latter point, U.N.F.I.CYP.'s strength in June 1984 was 2,348 considerably less than its earlier days in Cyprus. A token presence of a few hundred "blue berrets" would reduce its effectiveness and credibility as a peacekeeping force. Either option, complete withdrawal or a further scaling down of operations, could be interpreted as an admission by the Security Council of the intractability of the Cyprus
Problem. The Turkish Cypriots would see a U.N.F.I.CYP. withdrawal almost as international recognition of the de facto partition and the micro-state they have created with the assistance of Turkey. The least one can say about the significance of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s continued stay in Cyprus is that it is a visible reminder of international intermediary efforts by the Secretary General to bring the two sides together around the negotiating table. More significantly, U.N.F.I.CYP. acts as a communication channel between the communities, providing not only a sense of security but a ray of hope that one day the de facto boundary separating them will bridged.

This chapter has dealt with the dislocations and socio-economic upheavals created by the partition of Cyprus, subsequent changes in human geography on both sides of the dividing line, and the activities of U.N.F.I.CYP. in relation to these new facts on the ground. Chapter Seven examines in greater detail the Kyprianou - Denktas impasse; recent proposals for a settlement and/or concessions offered by either side; and the possible future role of U.N.F.I.CYP. given that it is likely to remain in Cyprus for some considerable time. U.N.F.I.CYP. itself plays a passive role in the politics of the Cyprus Problem, unable to influence the main actors responsible for the division. But its activities in the Buffer Zone have helped to bring valuable agricultural land back into cultivation. One positive contribution to a "return to normality" in future could be restoration of intercommunal activity within that neutral zone. U.N.F.I.CYP. escorts are still the only means by which there is any movement of Cypriots across the partition lines. Finally, U.N.F.I.CYP. has injected substantial amounts of money into the local economy in the form of demand for locally produced goods. As Greek Cypriots occasionally remark the "blue berrets" are "the best tourists in Cyprus".
Footnotes and References.

(4) Catselli, *op. cit.*, p.18
(5) For a more comprehensive and knowledgable account of the events of July - August 1974 refer to the relevant works cited in the Bibliography.
(6) Catselli, *op. cit.*, p.38
(12) *ibid*.
(14) Several commentators argue that the United States was the major external power behind events, by its support of the Greek Junta, the coup against Makarios, its "tilt" towards Turkey and passive acquiescence and diplomatic blundering over the military intervention. Refer to Bibliography.
(ii) Demographic Report for the Year 1970, Department of Statistics and Research, Nicosia.

(20) U.N. Doc. S/11568, 6 Dec.'74, para.33 & 43.
(21) U.N. Doc. S/11433, Interim Report by the Secretary General to the
Security Council, 10 August 1974, para. 17.

(22) Hitchens, op. cit., p.106.
(23) Oberling, op. cit., p.186.
(25) ibid., paras. 23 & 35.
(27) ibid., paras. 34 - 35.

(31) Statistics from the Planning Bureau, 1975, The Economic Consequences of the Turkish Invasion and the Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy. (Government Printing Office, Nicosia).


(33) Karouzis, G. 1977, Land Ownership in Cyprus, (Cosmos Press, Nicosia), p.120.


(39) ibid., p.79.


(45) Minority Rights Group Report, op. cit., p.16.
(47) Hitchens, op. cit., p.112.
(48) The Guardian, 16/12/79, Report by John Torode, 'Turkish Institutions begin to take root in Cyprus'.
(49) King, 1980, *op. cit.*, p.4.
(50) M.E.E.D., 14/03/80, Rauf Denktas in an interview with David Shirreff.
(54) *ibid.*, p.118.
(55) M.E.E.D., 22/04/77, p.116, an article by David Shirreff, 'Northern Cyprus: Ambiguous status hinders development'.
(58) *ibid*.
(60) *ibid.*, para. 26.
(62) *ibid.*, para. 29.
(63) *ibid.*, para. 45.
(66) *Cyprus Mail*, 18/04/84, p.3.
(73) *ibid.*, para. 44.
(74) U.N. Docs. :- S/15502, para.26; S/15812, para. 27; S/16192, para. 30; and S/16596, para. 30:
(80) U.N. Doc. S/15812, para. 34.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION.

POLITICAL IMPASSE AND U.N.P.I.CYP. TWENTY YEARS ON.

"Phobias will have to be overcome on both sides... time is running out... as years pass and new generations grow up fewer people will have any personal experience of living with members of the other Cypriot community..." (1)

"The weight of the past is indicated by symbols, such as flags and beliefs about history, and the present is circumscribed by dividing lines, leaders and the institutions they impose on followers, barbed wire and military organisation... relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is the dual one, of history and power politics." (2)

"Generations of children will grow up in mutual ignorance of, and antipathy towards, the other side. At present, amongst large sections of the ordinary population and educated classes, there is still some goodwill. This goodwill may be played down by the Turks who see things from a partitionist viewpoint, and exaggerated by the Greeks, who hanker after an unrepeatable utopian view of a perfectly integrated society, but it exists." (3)

Many geopolitical lessons have been learnt by the Greek Cypriot community. Enosis is dead. The Turkish Cypriots hold the upper hand in the political arena owing to the existence of the so-called "Attila factor". (4) They have their own de facto micro-state, economically weak and dependent on Turkey for its survival, but a state protected by a brutally effective boundary, which has stood for over a decade as an unratified political interface between Greeks and Turks. Greek Cypriots can not escape this physical and political reality. Whilst President Kyprianou continues to keep the Cyprus Problem alive in the international sphere, backed up by reiterated United Nations resolutions, the Turkish Cypriots are slowly
putting their "pseudo state" on the map. (5) As the years pass by the legitimacy of this Turkish Cypriot state will seem less equivocal and the likelihood of a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem diminishes.

In some respects U.N.F.I.CYP.'s presence is contributing to a pacific perpetuation of partition, but equally its position as a "buffer force" seems assured for as long as the Secretary-General continues his efforts to keep both leaderships negotiating. Before discussing the attitude of community leaders towards U.N.P.I.CYP. since the declaration of an independent Republic by the Turkish Cypriots on 15 November 1983, some discussion of proposed concessions and/or settlements is required.

Since August 1974, most intercommunal political debate has been over three fundamental issues :-

(a) Turkish Cypriot territorial concessions;
(b) The type of bicommmunal federal state to emerge from a settlement;
(c) The problem of refugees, particularly those from northern Cyprus:

In February 1977 Makarios - Denktas talks led to a number of Greek Cypriot compromises. Makarios agreed with the idea of an independent, non-aligned and bicommmunal Federal Republic. He also agreed to proportions of territory to be under the administration of each community, the proportions to be agreed in terms of economic viability or productivity and land-ownership. As the 1984 Minority Rights Group Report on Cyprus pointed out, federation is not an easy form of government anywhere, least of all on a small island of approximately 700,000 people, "only two units, disputed territories and disproportionate numbers". (6)

It is beyond the scope of this study to examine federal solutions in detail and to apply them to Cyprus, but it is well to be aware of some outstanding questions which would need to be answered. For example, how integrated would the state be? Would there be full freedom of movement for Cypriots all over the island? Would refugees be allowed to return to old homes and property? There are numerous others.
An alternative solution to bicommunal federation in two geographical zones has been suggested by George Karouzis (1976), who calculated a multi-regional federal system based on seven Turkish Cypriot "regions". (7) (refer to Map.2.4) These "regions" were worked out from a detailed study of pre-1974 village, village boundary, land ownership and population distribution patterns for both communities. Although Karouzis notes the existence of Turkish Cypriot enclaves from December 1963 to July-August 1974, his "Turkish regions" are based largely on the 1960 Census of Population and Agriculture. He argues:-

"...as it has been proved, there exists no geographical basis in Cyprus for the creation of Turkish Cypriot regions", whatever criterion is used- "physioagricultural, morphological, hydrological, economic, town planning". He compares his "Turkish region" to the Swiss cantons, "which also extend into geographical areas of other regions and often include enclaves situated in other cantons." (8) Karouzis favours a loose form of federation with full freedom of movement and strong central government, but he admits the need for "protection and security" of Turkish Cypriots "under a system of broad local autonomy". Such a multi-regional solution or cantonal system would require an end to fundamental intercommunal phobias and the development of some sense of "national unity". As Professor Pechoux argues, the Swiss developed "a Swiss national feeling" over and above linguistic, religious, and cultural factionalism.

"There certainly lies the main difference with Cyprus where the Cypriot national feeling, if it has even existed, was always subordinate to distinct Greek or Turkish nationalism." (9) The events of the Summer of '74 has led many Greek Cypriots to change their minds about the desirability of Enosis, as one report points out:-

"It is a paradox that a genuine sense of Cypriotness seemed to emerge on the Greek Cypriot side after the disastrous coup engineered by the Fascist junta in Athens. Not until they were faced with de facto partition and exclusion from their traditional villages in the North of the island did Greek Cypriots value their Cypriotness above their Greekness..." (10)
This geopolitical change of heart on the Greek side of the partition has not made the Turkish Cypriots more willing to compromise. Even though Enosis is no longer heard...

"...the Turkish Cypriots are so isolated from contact with Greeks that they find this very difficult to accept." (11)

Nevertheless, under a bizonal federal system the Turkish Cypriots would probably have to make generous territorial concessions to the Greek Cypriots.

In 1978 - '79, Kyprianou and Denktas discussed possible territorial concessions. A Greek map of a bizonal Cyprus was produced (see Map 7.1). This envisaged a Turkish Cypriot zone covering about twenty per cent of the island instead of the thirty-seven per cent now held. Such a settlement would enable a substantial number of Greek Cypriot refugees to return to former homes and property. Turkish Cypriots would be left with a small part of the Mesaoria, the Pentadaktylos, and Kyrenia coastline. According to Rauf Denktas, this was a Greek Cypriot attempt to confine "Turkish Cypriots on a dry rocky stretch of mountain where even goats can't live." (12)

A Turkish map of proposed territorial readjustments was presented for negotiation in August 1981. Six specific territorial concessions were offered (refer to Map 7.2), an area covering about three per cent of the total land surface of Cyprus. These six areas were:

i) Varosha, the southern suburb of Famagusta, plus Derinia.

ii) A large area of land north of the British Sovereign Base at Dhekelia. This area includes the villages of Kouklia, Kalopsidha, Kandea, Lysi, Makrasyka and Athna, which were primarily Greek Cypriot with the exception of Kouklia before 1974.

iii) The Louroujina salient, including the villages of Louroujina and Pyroi, as well as the segment of the Nicosia - Larnaca road which passes through it.

iv) The village of Avlona and vicinity.

v) The Limnitis region, west of Lefka, including various small villages up to and including Ambelikou - Karovostasi.

vi) Kokkina enclave, with its aging Turkish Cypriot population, ironically
MAP 7:2 Turkish Proposed Territorial Concessions in 1981

Turkish-Cypriot Held

Greek-Cypriot Held

a piece of land that has been purely Turkish territory for longer than two decades.

Since 1981 there have been no breakthroughs in intercommunal negotiations. Turkish Cypriot leaders have pushed for the reopening of Nicosia Airport, which since 1974 has been used as a United Nations parade ground. The Greeks interpret the Denktaş demands as 50:50 use of the airport with separate approaches from each side and separate customs arrangements, therefore the proposal is unacceptable to them. (13) On several occasions the Turks have offered to reopen Varosha to Greek Cypriots under the aegis of the United Nations. This once wealthy Greek suburb was sealed off by the Turkish Army in 1974. Its 35,000 Greek Cypriot occupants evacuated, leaving behind an uninhabited ghost resort, with a barren stretch of beach fronted by empty hotels, all guarded by high fences and Turkish soldiers. In 1978 plans to reopen Varosha were rejected by the Cyprus Government on the grounds that the Greek Cypriot returnees would effectively be confined to a narrow enclave along the coast. In effect the Greek Cypriot owners and staff would run the hotels for the economic and political advantage of the Turkish Cypriot zone. Since 1978, parts of Varosha have been opened for Turkish Cypriot occupation, and in early 1984 a number of adjustments were made to the suburb's perimeter fence and ten to twenty houses were reported to be inhabited by Turkish Cypriots. (14)

As is the case with Varosha, Turkish Cypriot settlement policy is tending to militate against a settlement. Greek Cypriot leaders remain sceptical about accepting Turkish concessions in the belief that by doing so they would be somehow recognizing the legitimacy of the rest of Turkish Cypriot-held territory, thus moving a step closer to a de jure bizonal solution between two distinct states.

Another worry for the Greek Cypriot administration is the massive refugee problem. As Karouzis correctly points out:

"It would not be realistic...to think that the refugees of the
North will, in due course, stifle their grief, their anger, their bitterness and their disappointment and will be forced to capitulate by accepting to live in small villages or towns away from the place where they were born, where they grew up, where they built their houses and properties, often with much toil and moil." (15)

At present it seems highly unlikely that the Turkish Cypriots will accept anything other than a bicomunal, bizonal federal solution with power invested in the two federal powers rather than a strong central federal government. They are not keen to open up the de facto border between the two Cypriot communities and have carried out policies militating against a reunification of the island even under some type of federation. For instance, some Greek Cypriot property has been bought by Turkish Cypriots in the north, even though this is illegal according to the Cyprus Government in the south. Furthermore, the presence of mainland Turkish settlers in the north has created another obstacle to an eventual solution. Turkish Cypriots have also settled in some areas offered as territorial concessions to the Greeks. As mentioned in Chapter Six, Turkish Cypriots are also worried that if the 'border' is opened up they will be swamped numerically and commercially by Greek Cypriots.

In August 1983, Señor Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General, attempted to initiate new forward moves in intercommunal discussions by suggesting a set of 'indicators' or options to be considered as a framework for negotiations by both sides. These indicators were :-

(i) Would both sides accept that the Turks should keep a minimum of 23 % of the island and a maximum of 30 %?

(ii) There should be a constitution with links between the federal government and two provincial governments. Perez de Cuellar advocated a full presidential system, the President being in charge of the southern (Greek Cypriot) province leaving the Vice-President to be the northern provincial president (i.e. Turkish Cypriot), in which case the members of the Council of Ministers would be in a 6:4 ratio.
Alternatively there could be a Presidential-cum-Prime Minister system, these two top executive posts should be rotated between the presidents of the two provinces, with a 7:3 ratio on the federal executive in favour of the Greek Cypriots. (16)

Unfortunately Mr Spyros Kyprianou only gave these proposals a luke-warm reception, while Rauf Denktas prepared for U.D.I., thus killing "another United Nations plan for Cyprus at birth." (17)

On 15 November 1983 Rauf Denktas and the Turkish Cypriot Assembly proclaimed the independence of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". In a summary of the declaration concerning the establishment of the T.R.N.C. it was stated :-

"All that is being done today is the confirmation and declaration of an existing reality and the renaming of our state."

Rauf Denktas made himself non-party President of the new Republic.

The Times reported the following day :-

"...there is no doubt that the proclamation of independence is an event of great symbolic and emotional significance... and undoubtedly does reflect the desire of the Turkish Cypriot community as a whole to have its separate identity recognized and be treated on an equal footing with the Greeks." (18)

This action has consolidated a decade of de facto partition and two decades of separation from the Republic of Cyprus. Or as Denktas prefers to put it :- "We have not seceded from the Republic of Cyprus, we have been thrown out of it and we have had to put the roof of statehood over our Heads." (19)

Some Greek Cypriot leaders argue that Denktas has never wanted a federal solution but just presidency over his 'Lilliputian State', and they fear that 'U.D.I.' is a permanent appropriation by the Turks. In contrast, Denktas argues that "U.D.I. does not preclude federation 'on a fair basis'." (20)

Following the announcement of an independent Northern Republic the Greek Cypriots went to the United Nations which declared the T.R.N.C. as
Greek Cypriot cartoon depicting Rauf Denktas, the self-proclaimed President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, cutting off Northern Cyprus from the rest of the island.
"illegal". In spite of this international condemnation of Turkish Cypriot independence President Kyprianou was unable to persuade the international community to impose economic sanctions on Northern Cyprus. (21) Only Turkey recognized the T.R.N.C., but time is on the side of the Turkish Cypriots.

"We have de facto support, de facto sympathy from many countries we expected to give us recognition... Recognition may have to wait a little longer." (22)

In April 1984, United Nations special Cyprus envoy Hugo Gobbi met the leaders of both communities in an attempt to defuse the tension that had built up over Turkish Cypriot moves to 'solidify' their breakaway state. Earlier, Turkey and the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot state formally cemented diplomatic relations by exchanging Ambassadors in Ankara and Nicosia. Unfortunately Hugo Gobbi was unable to move either side closer together or to prevent Denktas from his plans to establish a Constitution in the north and to hold elections. (23)


The Cyprus Problem should not only be viewed at the parochial level of intercommunal politics. (refer to Chapter One) The interaction between ordinary Greek and Turkish Cypriots has never been free from outside interference or influence. Since U.D.I. relations between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus have hardened. Ozal's first speech as Prime Minister of Turkey in November 1983 mentioned Cyprus as "a dagger pointed at the belly of Turkey". Greece has also threatened to send more mainland troops to southern Cyprus to strengthen the Greek Cypriots' bargaining position. (24) Thus U.N.F.I.C.Y.P.'s position on Cyprus as an international peacekeeping force is as important as ever.

The declaration of independence by Denktas has reinforced "psychological green lines" to progress. Many Greek Cypriots believe that Turkey is intrinsically an expansionist country and they are conscious of Ankara's support of the Denktas regime. On the other hand, many
Turkish Cypriots now feel a sense of security they did not feel prior to the Turkish military intervention, although some of them may be disillusioned by their 'pseudo-state's' continued dependence on Turkey. As Hitchens admits the Turkish Cypriot community "will not...voluntarily revert to the position they occupied before 1974." (25) Continued separation of the two Cypriot communities militates against any meeting of minds and a perpetuation of intercommunal "phobias" about each other. Greek Cypriots are worried that one day all or part of the island will be annexed by Turkey, whilst Turkish Cypriots still believe that Greek Cypriots want Enosis. Pierre Oberling, 1982, argues that the two sides can never coexist in a unified or loosely federated state, so the only way forward is for Greek Cypriot leaders to recognize the north, to exchange freedom of trade for territorial concessions. (26)

Given the political deadlock U.N.F.I.CYP. can do little more than maintain the status quo, expand its economic and humanitarian activities within the Buffer Zone, and continue its visits to "ethnic minorities" in the "Turkified" north. Unfortunately its mobility in Cyprus may be curtailed even further by Turkish Cypriot policy. As Rauf Denktash stresses,

"...we shall have to review the presence of U.N. troops. We don't want a direct conflict with the United Nations or any of its organs, but we don't want the U.N. to continue to misinform itself on Cyprus..." (27)

U.N.F.I.CYP. carries out its essential monitoring in Northern Cyprus as "guests" of the Denktash regime. If the Security Council continues its non-recognition of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' U.N.F.I.CYP. could find its operations in future restricted to the Greek side of the partition. With 20 - 30,000 Turkish troops in the T.R.N.C., Greek Cypriots feel that U.N.F.I.CYP.'s presence acts as a deterrent to another Turkish military push southwards. Even in a unified Cyprus there would need to be international guarantees of demilitarization. The complete demilitarization of the island, starting with a complete withdrawal of Turkish troops followed by the disbandment of the National Guard, would
require the supervision of a 'neutral' peacekeeping force.

Cyprus holds a coveted strategic position in an international struggle for influence in the eastern Mediterranean between two N.A.T.O. powers, and at a higher level, the island is viewed as an important base for the defence of western interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East. As such, ordinary Cypriots remain pawns in a situation entirely beyond their control, whilst U.N.F.I.CYP. acts as an interim force helping to preserve a spatial status quo not only within Cyprus, but given the vested interests of outside powers, in the eastern Mediterranean region.

It is still difficult to disagree with one of Stagenga's (1968) conclusions in spite of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s interim status:

"U.N.F.I.CYP. has consequently become indispensable to continued calm and has perhaps earned a place as a permanent part of the Cyprus landscape." (28)

Conclusion: The Geography of Peacekeeping.

U.N.F.I.CYP. has not only become a feature of the Cyprus landscape for it has also tried to alter abnormalities in that landscape resulting from the artificial physical separation of the two communities. Its presence has helped to maintain the status quo, i.e. the geographical separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but its humanitarian and economic duties helping to break down psychological barriers between them should not be overlooked.

As mentioned in Chapter One, the main aim of this dissertation is to stress the "geographical aspects" of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s operations in Cyprus. Many of the United Nations Force's responsibilities were/are related to physical ethnic interfaces separating the two communities. As such it was necessary to examine the numerous changes in the political geography of the island since its independence in August 1960 to the present.
Wherever lines of close confrontation were formed U.N. troops were placed in-between the Forward Defence Lines of the opposing armed elements. Before the de facto partition of Cyprus into two mono-ethnic units U.N.F.I.CYP.'s interpositionary role was complicated by the confusing pattern of Turkish Cypriot territorial control scattered over different parts of the island. U.N. troops protected these enclaves from the more numerous National Guard and Greek forces in the island, but they also attempted to remove fortifications and other physical evidences of intercommunal conflict, and to prevent new confrontation lines from emerging. Unfortunately, an island-wide defortification programme was never initiated owing to the policies and mutual mistrust displayed by the leaders of both communities.

From 1968 to July 1974, the removal of Government economic restrictions on Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas made U.N.F.I.CYP.'s "normalization" duties easier and some progress was made towards greater intercommunal cooperation over the use of the island's resources and in various economic activities. At the village level there were numerous interlinkages between peacekeeping operations and geography, both political and human. For example, wherever an artificial territorial "boundary" or defence line crossed over a main road or divided a stream, U.N.F.I.CYP. often had to negotiate with local authorities of each side in order to prevent serious incidents from occurring. In this way U.N.F.I.CYP. settled many disputes concerning the use of resources and movement of people/supplies in areas bisected by confrontation lines or within "grey areas" of disputed territorial control. U.N.F.I.CYP.'s presence helped to break down some "invisible walls" separating the Greek and Turkish Cypriot people. Nevertheless, the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration was determined to maintain its de facto authority over parts of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots were not permitted to enter the Turkish enclaves. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots remained cautious of moving freely outside their own
strongholds. Given the problems of political deadlock and posed by the persistence of pro-Enosis terrorist groups in Cyprus, U.N.F.I.CYP. could do little more than maintain an unusual pattern of ethnic separation on the island. The "visible" and "invisible" walls between the two communities remained, which made it necessary to keep a third force in Cyprus to contain the armed forces of the two communities.

Following the Turkish military manoeuvres of July - August 1974, the geography of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s operations was completely altered. Instead of deploying men near to ethnic interfaces in various parts of the island U.N.F.I.CYP. placed virtually all its observation points and patrols along the southern side of the Turkish cease-fire line of 16 August 1974. Its activities in the Turkish-controlled part of the island are restricted to humanitarian visits to a tiny minority of Greeks still in Northern Cyprus and to a small community of Maronites. U.N. Force operations are concentrated within the Buffer Zone (refer to Chapter Six) between the Forward Defence Lines of both sides. Within this United Nations-controlled strip of land U.N.F.I.CYP. arbitrates between the two communities over the use of land and water resources there, in addition it has helped bring this zone back into cultivation.

Without U.N.F.I.CYP., bloody civil war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots would probably have led to a similar de facto partition of the island. U.N.F.I.CYP. has helped to restrict the activities of extremists and the armed elements of both communities. Its endeavours to 'normalize' conditions in areas located near to confrontation lines has returned life to areas which would otherwise have remained barren, and many resource disputes or potential disputes have been settled by U.N.F.I.CYP. mediation.
Footnotes and References.

(4) Term used by Russell King, 1980, op.cit.
(5) The Guardian, 14/06/84, p.19 - Report by John Torode - 'The Island that lives by divide and rule'.
(7) Karouzis, G. 1976, Proposals for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, Cosmos Press, Nicosia.
(8) Karouzis, op.cit., pp.123 - 144.
(17) Financial Times, 14/10/83, p.2.
(18) The Times, 16/11/83, article entitled 'Cyprus put Asunder'.
(21) Financial Times, 23/11/83, p.3. Article entitled 'E.E.C. wary of harming settlement prospects. Turkish Cypriot sanctions ruled out'.
(22) South, January 1984, p.21. Interview with Rauf Denktas.
(23) Cyprus Mail, 10/04/84, vol. 129, no.12948, 'Time has run-out says President', p.1.


(24) A Papandreou - Kyprianou meeting in April 1984 discussed sending a division of 15,000 Greek troops to Cyprus, The Sunday Times, 29 April 1984, p.4.


(29) Not entirely "mono-ethnic" zones for some Greek Cypriots and Maronites still live in Northern Cyprus and there are still some Turkish Cypriots resident in the south. (refer to Chapter Six)
Some notes on primary sources.


(b) Other primary sources used in preparing the dissertation are those published by the Cyprus Public Information Office and Republic of Cyprus, which are included in the Bibliography.

(c) Turkish Cypriot Administration pamphlets and reports, published by the Cyprus Turkish Information Centre are also mentioned in the Bibliography.

(d) Personal Interviews: Refer to Acknowledgements.

It should be stressed that I have been unable to use all the information received and that I am completely responsible for any errors in the text.

(e) Maps:

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N.B. The above bibliography is not a comprehensive list of all the literature relating to the Cyprus Problem, but it is intended as a source of reference on many issues which could only be dealt with briefly in this dissertation. For a more detailed bibliography the reader should refer to:
