God in trinity, love in creation

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GOD IN TRINITY, LOVE IN CREATION

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to display vital connections between themes not generally connected. On the one hand, it considers the notion of love and relation in connection with God and the idea of Trinity. On the other, it endeavours to show how the notion of a Triune God of Love may be used to safeguard an idea of human beings in which their dependence upon love and relationship is stressed. Fundamental to this is the demand of freedom in terms of choice. This is shown to be a direct consequence of the nature of love, and to necessitate considerable revision of conventional doctrines of grace and providence. Throughout the thesis, great stress is laid on an eclectic use of sources to demonstrate the argument.

The thesis comprises two chapters of ontology, and three chapters of human concern. In the first two, the nature of Trinity and Creation are examined from a standpoint of the philosophy of loving relation. Three negative forces are identified in the shape of Cartesian Solipsism, the Platonic philosophy of Love, with its lack of relation and its abstract view of the Good, and thirdly Nygren's theology of agape, which it is held destroys man's integrity. Coupled with his non-use of the Trinity, it also reduces God to an abstract monad.

Positive thought is taken from Vanstone's Love's Endeavour Love's Expense, which develops a doctrine of God from a theology of Love, and this is taken into the third chapter which considers the consequences for grace and providence.
A revised portrait of providence coupled to a God who is neither impassible nor omniscient is provided. The remaining two chapters examine the consequences of such theology for man's own expectations concerning self-fulfillment and his obligations to others.
GOD IN TRINITY, LOVE IN CREATION

Being a thesis presented for an
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by

Robert N. Forsythe

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DEDICATION

To Ann, Meg and Sheridan: thank you for coping with my appalling English and these peculiar ideas.

Thank you too, to Edward, and to all in D.U.G.I.A.
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CONCERNING THE NOTES

The footnotes are found at the end of the thesis. The first time an author is cited, name and title are given; full details of publication are to be found in the Bibliography, which contains details of all books used in the preparation of the thesis, whether quoted or not.

Occasionally in the main text, the initials RNF appear: this indicates a comment by myself, generally within another's quotation.

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GOD IN TRINITY, LOVE IN CREATION

INTRODUCTION

The Introduction to this thesis has been written after completion of the overall text. It may thus serve as a review of the work as a whole. This thesis has been written chiefly with the exposition of an idea in mind. That idea was stimulated in the author when, as an undergraduate at Durham University, he read Canon W.H. Vanstone's Love's Endeavour, Love's Expense. To date, no other theological book has made such a singular impression on my mind. Although my thesis deals with many more authors than just Vanstone, I regard my work as a broad exposition of the ideas of his book coupled with some possible criticisms. In particular, I regard what I have written as an attempt to place Vanstone's material in a wider theological/philosophical context. Vanstone regards his work as derived from his parish experience and I respect his wariness for theology, and hence have deliberately refused to brand his work with the name of any "school". Nonetheless, it has been a fascinating exercise and one which in a theological context is, I am sure, worthwhile, to discern links between Vanstone's ideas and those of other theological movements. In particular I have endeavoured to show that parallels exist within a very ecumenical theological spectrum.

The idea which is central to Vanstone is that the nature of love is the nature of God, and that from the nature of love
a doctrine of God is discernible which can cope with the
classic problems of providence and theodicy, and show that an
evolving universe is in accord with the very nature of God.

It was the breadth of this achievement which first impressed
me in reading Vanstone's book. In my own work, I have
assessed these issues and also developed some others.

I have endeavoured to give great attention to what I
believe to be the ontology behind the Vanstonian position.
This is that the idea of love depends on the idea of relation.
Further, it is fundamental that this idea is taken into the
Godhead, hence the importance of the Trinity. Vanstone himself
recognises this. Nevertheless, the exposition of Trinity and
the requirement of relation for being is not the core of his
work and I have found it useful to develop this more fully.

In a situation where the two sides of relation need to be
accounted for, I have also felt it justifiable to attend to
the issue of self-giving and self-fulfillment in relation to
Jesus' own enigmatic pronouncement that one should "Love thy
neighbour as thyself".

When put together, one finds that the use of love in
producing a doctrine of God also produces a doctrine of Man
in which great weight is laid upon his free choice with
regard to response to God. Traditionally man's freedom is
often seen as prejudiced by God's Sovereignty. Thus it is
illuminating to study a presentation which preserves the
sovereignty of God whilst portraying his providence in such
a manner that it becomes the guarantor of the integrity of
man's freedom, and indeed of the integrity of nature to develop
within its own bounds.

Clearly this is a very broad based study, and since,
for personal reasons, it has only been pursued to M.A. level, of necessity some issues have had to be skimmed over. Indeed the work serves very much as an exposition of Vanstone within a broad theological spectrum and not as a critique. Reading Vanstone does raise very many questions, few of which, aside from the issue of theodicy, are dealt with here. Positively speaking, great possibilities exist for a theology of community and hence of the Church built around an acceptance of the portrayal of love and relation. The notion of interdependence coupled with the great responsibility for corporate fulfilment laid at the door of the individual in his response to God by Vanstone ought to have great applicability to the notion of corporate obligations. Negatively, some very tricky questions are raised if the questions of the Vanstonian nature of omniscience is pressed. If God is aware of all that is but not of all that will be, how exactly does this affect his providential guidance?

It would be necessary to develop a very complicated argument regarding the action of God within time, but this has not been attempted here. Even so, this thesis will, I think, still be found to be a very "full" work. And if it serves to stimulate academic debate about Vanstone's work and a renewed appreciation of the positive possibilities stemming from the idea of Trinity and love in relation to providence and the human self, then I shall be satisfied.
The object of this chapter is not primarily to examine what has proved ever since the Patristic period to be the major issue in Trinitarian study; the numerical problem of how one can at the same time be three. Indeed the chapter will not confront the doctrine directly and so will not endeavour to provide an *apologia* devoted to its rational coherence. Rather, following the method used throughout the chapters, the argument moves from human experience towards the divine nature by analogy. This is not intended to demonstrate the logicality of the particular doctrine but attempts to show the practical use of adopting the doctrine, that is the help it gives in understanding the human and more enigmatically the divine experience. The role of relation within human life has first to be established. It cannot be taken for granted in the light of what may be called Cartesian solipsism. Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* sometimes used as a base text for human experience is greatly misleading in the context of relation for it does not predicate relation. Instead relation appears to be secondary to individual self-consciousness. Likewise in theistic thought the Jewish and more especially the Greek philosophical inheritance is primarily monadic. This chapter will endeavour to reverse both influences.
Cogito ergo sum has its point, but only the most convinced pedant could ignore the situation that the speaker of these words was himself the product of the physical intercourse of two people. Further in the mental aspect as will now be developed, Descartes could not have reached such a conclusion without the use of a category of relation. Strictly speaking for Descartes' saying to be correct in itself, a baby totally isolated from all human contact would, if nourished mechanically, be able, upon maturity to reach his conclusions. The absurdity is evident; relation is a necessity for human life to develop, certainly in the bodily sense and arguably in the mental sense. Mary Midgley has recently devoted a paper to this line of thought.\(^1\) Although Descartes is not mentioned, her whole tenor is to establish that rationality is not an individual but corporate attribute, and that excessive individualism is irrational. Her particular target is G.E. Moore and the Humean empiricist tradition. Her argument is simple, that language, the foundation of reasoning, is social. To use a particular language is to be de facto a member of a given culture and a particular society. Speaking to oneself (or Descartes' Cogito ergo sum) is secondary; initially speech is speaking to an object. Reflection and reasoning as solitary is strictly secondary to reflection and reasoning as corporate, wherein men learnt those abilities.\(^2\) Midgley is thus enabled to accuse ethical egoism as facing not just 'emotional solitude' but 'conceptual solitude', leading to 'the collapse of thought'.\(^3\) Her conclusion is that rationality is dependent upon an acceptance of community, 'so no community, no reasoning'.\(^4\) Or, 'only a social being
could have a language ... man needs fellows to find his own identity', and as an echo of our next source, 'Through the Thou a man becomes I'.

Without doubt a seminal recent work in this field has been Buber's *I and Thou*. This is a philosophical work devoted to establishing the necessity of the relational principle. Buber advocates a relational stance which starts from the I-it relation. This is where men relate to others or to things from a point of view of knowledge. It is the business relation in which possession is for personal advantage. Beyond this, Buber advocates respect for others including things as objects in themselves. This is Kant's advocation, at least for people, of treating another 'never ... as a means but always as an end in himself'. Herein is Buber's I-thou relationship, in which the other is encountered in its very being and not as a means for some end of I. Buber then extends this principle into the Godhead. He advocates a form of mysticism by which men participate not only in the being of others but also in the being of God and of material things. In the latter instance Buber cites the example of a tree. All knowledge of the tree is in the I-it category, but in simply encountering a tree and letting its being affect the I in its entirety, it becomes a you.

Three spheres in the world of relation are portrayed. There is life with nature, in which I-thou has to remain below language, matter is not evidently self conscious. Secondly there is life with men. The realm of language and self conscious being having been entered, the Thou can be mutual. Finally there is life in the Spirit, this is within
the eternal Thou, in which relation is without words - a mystical element. Buber's quasi-mysticism may cause problems both with reference to the Godhead and to things, but the key issue is established as the requirement for relation in life and for treating our 'objects' as ends like our own selves. Buber's language for 'end' is 'thou' and this relationship is his formulation of the Golden Rule.

Walter Kaufman in his prologue to Buber's *I and Thou* elaborates on the consequences of this work by showing the variety of relations whereby I-Thou is denied. He cites five abuses of the I-Thou relation. There is the I-I relation in which individuals are totally dominated by their own ego. Another group think more of others than themselves, but only in the way of knowledge, they 'take an interest', to the extent that the It within a Thou fascinates them - I-It. There are the 'enthusiasts' as a third category, who take such an extreme interest in the It, that they destroy their I; for the sake of objectivity subjectivity is destroyed. In the domination of the object they kill themselves, It-It. Some entirely lose their individuality for the group mentality, We-We. While others in order to reassure themselves in a threatening world develop an us and them crusade mentality. Here are five ways of relation (and there are many more) with no 'You' in Buber's sense. However in all, there is relation excepting the first, the Cartesian I-I relation. Thus even if solipsism is shown to be ridiculous and relation to be the mode of being, not all relations are appropriate. Many relations abuse either the other or even oneself. Thus beyond establishing the necessity of relation for man's being, the question of the proper form of relation
has to be established. In theological terms this will become 
the question of the interrelation between self-love, other 
love and God love to which separate chapters will be devoted. 
It may be noted though that Buber's work is itself an attempt 
to resolve the issue in which the I-Thou relationship 
represents a fundamental harmonising of the three. On the 
other hand Buber does not use a concept of relationship 
within the Godhead, the concern of this chapter. 

The proper relation between I and Thou can be analysed 
in terms of mutual need. Need whether applied to persons or 
more specifically to God is often seen as problematic. Of 
persons, need is often held to be, indeed often it is the case, 
that it reflects self-centredness. Whereas with God, the 
inheritance of the Greek doctrine of divine self-sufficiency 
rules all considerations of need within the Godhead to be 
entirely inappropriate. For the Greek Philosophers, need 
was a sign of incompleteness, men/needs because they were 
incomplete. However, as with the discussion of love, it is 
essential to distinguish between proper and false needs and 
proper and false love, if a role is to be given to self 
fulfillment in men. Again in the Greek scheme God could not 
love because love reflected lack. Love for the Greeks is a 
form of need while God neither needed nor lacked anything. 
This leads directly to the monadic schemes of thought which 
render the Trinity unintelligible.

Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros which is discussed in 
detail elsewhere may create many problems. Nonetheless, it 
is not his interpretation of the Greek belief of Eros which
is normally held to be in error. His analysis of Greek Eros makes clear the problem concerning need and God that has been outlined. Plato speaks of love for the divine, but here love is only the expression of man's lack, 'Man loves and desires that which he lacks and has not got'. The Supreme Being however has all and needs nothing, and thus his only relation to love is to be the object of love. The essence of this view is that 'The beauty of the Divine Self sets all things in movement towards it, but the Divine itself is unmoved, it is absolute rest'. In Plato's words, 'A God needs not any converse with men'. This thought is the origin of what is held to be problematic in the Greek view, the lifelessness of the Greek God. It is as if activity and life were all signs of restlessness and lack and that utter immutability is the goal of existence. The question remains to what extent does the Greek God live? Is the future for mankind promised by this scheme, a form of contemplation similar to the Buddhist Nirvana in which the key to bliss is the loss of self-consciousness?

The simple answer to the problem is to respond by condemning the Greek view altogether. Instead one could argue that if there is a God and granted the existence of creation, then the creation is simply the expression of God's need. This though is to destroy 'God', since our existence becomes the condition of his existence. This the Greeks correctly perceived was impossible, for if there was a God who was not a demiurge, his absolute separation from the world in the sense of contingency had to be safeguarded. This the Greek view of Eros and impassibility safeguarded, thus their
aim by comparison with other contemporary religious systems was laudable. However, in dealing with one problem they created another, that is how is relationship to God to be conceived if he is static and motionless? It is against this view that the success of the doctrine of the Trinity must be judged. For not only does it introduce the peculiar category of human existence, that of the personal, into the Godhead, but in so doing it deals with the problem of need. This is because within the Godhead itself, relation, need, and fulfillment exist in fruition - three persons living in the fullness of the communion of one nature.

The rest of this chapter will be devoted to the development of this theme. Initially this will be done by citing theologians who have felt confident to develop 'need theology' in the context of their discussion of God. The astonishing feature that will become evident is the ecumenical nature of this tradition with Anglican, Catholic and Protestant representatives being cited. A start will be made however with a Jew, by returning to Buber. Incidentally, Buber has provided a Trinity of relations, the I-it, the I-you of persons, and in the third part of his book the I-Thou of the eternal person. Buber notes how the relationship of men to God has been characterised as one of dependence (Schleiermacher) or creature feeling (Otto), while this is correct he feels it to be onesided. While the pure relationship is one of utter dependence, it is also the altogether free and creative one. From this assumption Buber writes:

That you need God more than anything, you know at all times in your heart. But don't you know also that
God needs you - in the fullness of his eternity, you? How would man exist if God did not need him, and how would you exist? You need God in order to be, and God needs you - for that which is the meaning of your life. 15

Echoing the tragic theme to be analysed in Vanstone, he writes, 'The world is not divine play, it is divine fate'. 16

Buber of course does not use the language of Trinity and so to the charge that in using such language he is making God dependent on man he lacks a forceful answer. He does, however, offer the comment, 'How would man exist if God did not need him?' The very fact that men are, means that if God is, then unless the creation is a mere whim, need must enter. Noticeably, the Greeks did not portray creation in such terms as God's active role in creating man, for had they done so, to some extent they would have admitted a degree of need in God. Need though may vary in degree from a sense of strict necessity to simple good pleasure, a sense of shared request.

Christians are presumably happy to say that God requests our response to his initiative and equally well at all times intend to deny any sense of strict necessity. Nonetheless, the degree to which God needs us is generally glossed over and it is this that is being examined here.

Thus far men have been held to be relational. If created, this also testifies to a relational desire within God. The Trinity has been introduced in order to safeguard the relationship between men and God from any necessity on God's part. A balance has to be struck between God's involvement and genuine concern in creation and his independence in being - it is an article of faith that God was before the world was.
It is possible that a deeper appreciation of 'need theology' will come not just from a consideration of creation but from the acceptance of the divine nature as love. The characterisation of the divine human relationship as one of need in love is clearly seen in the sermons of Cardinal Hume. 17

Significantly, and in tune with the method of these papers, Hume starts from the analogy of human relationship. It is the nature of love that for two people 'there is in each of them, a wanting of the other, a needing of the other'. 18

This is true Hume holds of both marriage and friendship.

From this Hume goes on to write:

There is surely deep in the heart of each one of us a wanting and a needing of God, and that wanting and needing of God in us is only there because he himself wants and needs us. We could never begin to love God . . . if he had not first loved us. Why God should want and need us is a mystery. But it is true: otherwise he would not have created us and life ultimately would have no meaning for us. 19

In the succeeding sentences Hume ties this purpose of God to his nature as love, being one of utter trustworthiness and constancy of good intent. Hume thus regards it as acceptable to introduce need between God and man, but he does this not from ontological necessity but out of the nature of love. He accepts he cannot offer an explanation but that it is so, the sheer existence of creation testifies. Hume has not used the Trinity here, and had he done so, albeit it may be inappropriate in this setting of a sermon, he could perhaps have given more of an explanation and warded off possible criticism. By adopting the Trinity he could have held that the Godhead, being a community of three persons in one loving nature, lacking nothing and indeed living in the very fullness
of being, which out of this fullness and not from necessity, created for the sheer joy of sharing joy itself. Having though embarked on this road of creation, once started there can be no abandoning of the work of love. While there was no object of love outside the Trinity there was no need outside the Trinity, but having once created an object of love outside the divine being, having once created another, love cannot abandon the beloved and need thus immediately finds its place.

The words of Bonhoeffer concerning Christ in Gethsemane reveal this in a dramatic way. He wrote, 'as Jesus asked in Gethsemane, Could you not watch with me one hour? That is a reversal of what the religious man expects from God. Man is summoned to share in God's sufferings at the hands of a Godless world'.

God's nature being love and as such having entered the creative process, it is love's nature that it cannot be a passive onlooker. So God desires or needs a response from man for the full fruition of his work. From the simple consideration that man's nature is relational, this when applied to God has opened up a range of deliberations to be considered throughout this work. These include the nature of love and relation both within man and God. This leads into the nature of creation, how God on the basis of love and relation works in it. Thus the question of Grace and Providence needs to be attended to, with great stress on man's freedom consequent upon the nature of love. Finally the discussion will have to involve Creation's end, the purpose for which God intends this communion. This leads
naturally into consideration of the role of self-fulfillment or self-love and conversely the role of love for others, the paradoxical consideration that Christianity commands love.

The present chapter is devoted to laying the groundwork, by safeguarding the concept of a relational loving God wanting communion with his creatures, and allowing himself to be dependent on our free response. Its importance can be illustrated by an analysis of Canon Vanstone's work. Consideration of Vanstone's work occurs throughout this thesis. Here his use is as the fourth, Anglican, author, mentioned earlier who has developed 'need theology'. Unlike the other three authors mentioned previously, his 'need' theology is explicitly safeguarded by a doctrine of relations within God, though it may be assumed that it is so with Hume too. Vanstone's book may be said to be representative of 'need theology'. His analysis of God is developed directly from an analysis of love which stresses the need for response for love's fruition and the necessity of that response being free to be genuine.

From this is developed a whole theology of creation in order to safeguard these demands. This involves acceptance of evolution - there is to be no 'God of the Gaps', instead there is a portrayal of God not as cosmic director, but as cosmic artist working in conjunction with his material. Out of these two factors appears the notion of the triumphant or tragic outcome to God's plans dependent upon man's response. The only safeguard is God's limitless ability to love in kenosis. (This will be developed in detail elsewhere in this thesis, particularly in the chapter 'Freedom, Grace and
Providence'.) What has been said is sufficient to indicate that of the theologians so far cited who have stressed the importance of our response upon the being of God, it is Vanstone's work that is the most systematically developed. Here too the Trinity is introduced specifically to complement need theology, 'Trinitarian theology asserts that God's love for his creation is not the love that is born of "emptiness"'.21 The Trinity is used to safeguard the prior and complete being of God. In this attempt to account for these theologies of love, it can thus be appreciated why a start is being made with the Trinity.

An eclectic method is being followed in order to derive from the historical tradition material which demonstrates the anthropological value of an adoption of the notion of Trinity. Ours is not so much an historical study of a certain trend but a free ranging excavation into authors, from the Biblical period to date, in order to establish the significance of the Trinity for safeguarding the concept of human relations.

Four theologians have been seen so far, whose writing is of contemporary interest as is considered elsewhere but with three authors whose work starts out on a slightly uneven note, open to the criticism of making God dependent upon man. It is thus opportune to note some other theologians who have appreciated the problem of making God dependent upon man and a start will be made with a Catholic, Geach.22 He starts by noting the problem inherited from the Greeks of a God who cannot love because love represents change and need, and God is changeless and needs nothing. This is seen according to Geach in Spinoza's comment to the effect that he who loves
God cannot desire that God should love him in return. This is because after the Greek pattern, Spinoza thinks of love in terms of an access to joy for the lover from thinking of the beloved. Thus, while one who loves God will have great joy in thinking of God, the unchangeable God cannot be supposed to have great joy in thinking of the one who loves him. Geach notes how Spinoza holds that God's true lover could not wish otherwise, since to do so would be to wish change in God and thus God would no longer be God. Geach further holds that this is the view of Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas. Against this school, Geach notes the contrary doctrine, which would hold that God needs creatures in order to love. This is the danger to which our earlier quartet have exposed themselves. It is at this point that Geach introduces the notion of the Trinity, and significantly for comparison with the other theologians he ties this doctrine into the notion of charity—the theological virtue of love.

By placing Trinity at the heart of Charity, Geach is able to make the relation of love viable within God and so avoid, either a loveless God or still worse a God who with a desperate need for an outlet of love has to use men as a vessel for the return of his own love—the charge of cosmic solipsism that will be made of Nygren's work. Instead, God becomes a fullness of corporate communion, who lacks nothing and only out of this fullness does God create. Geach develops his discussion by reference to McTaggart's Some Dogmas of Religion. In this McTaggart raised the question of whether a freely creative God can be a person, since prior to creation, outside himself there is nothing and
therefore no other to relate to and so God cannot be personal. This is exactly the problem strict monotheism faces and also the problem for Greek philosophy committed to a unitary concept of the Good, that solitary being cannot be relational and therefore cannot love. Indeed can it live? Geach in response to McTaggart grants that he is right, relation is essential to being, others are necessary, but that McTaggart is wrong to exclude God from this category because in so doing he has ignored the essence of Trinitarian doctrine. Within the Trinity the full life of love can exist without the necessity for other beings. The Godhead's being complete in itself is safeguarded by the Trinity, for without the possibility of genuine relation within God, he would become a lifeless monad. The Trinity becomes the supreme testimony to the basis of being in relation in love. The effect of this commitment is that the Trinity has to be seen not as an also-ran tacked uncomfortably onto conventional doctrines of God. Rather the Trinity exposes the deeply problematic nature of conventional monotheism. Our assumptions need revision, in the light of the requirement for relation, life and love, it is monadic theology that has to be questioned not Trinitarian.

Geach is thus able to write 'if God is in fact three persons whose life is mutual love, then this is not the way God happens to be . . . it is the way God eternally and necessarily is, even if to our minds the necessity is in this life obscure'.24 To contemporaries the Trinity is often seen as an embarrassing addition to the simple gospel
consequent upon the addition of Greek Philosophy. Nothing could be further from the truth. For the Fathers the Trinity was the supreme discovery of the process of Revelation initiated in the Incarnation. Only the Trinity exposed the depths of the rationale of Incarnational theology, that the Godhead is himself relation in love and that this is the highest category of being. The immense effort expended by the Fathers in the development of the Trinity was in order to come to terms with the experience of Revelation and was not the consequence of the adoption of Greek Philosophy, to which the Trinity would be the most unintelligible of Christian doctrines. In Geach's eyes the problems that have come to be associated with the Trinity derive from a radical confusion around the word 'one' as an expression of a divine attribute. The problem is that two senses to the word 'one' may be discerned. This is the distinction between quality and quantity. There is unity in nature — qualitative, and unity in number — quantititative. The problems with the Trinity only arise when the stress is laid on the latter and not the former. The latter is inimical to the Fathers' formulation, who stressed the qualitative element of nature, yet it is invariably this latter that is the object of criticism.

It is noted by Geach how this error may be seen in Descartes' Meditations, from whom he quotes that the 'unity, simplicity and inseparability of God's attributes are one of the chief perfections I conceive him to have'. For Geach, it is monadic philosophical presuppositions
concerning the nature of God, particularly the demand for oneness in number, which creates the problems McTaggart is concerned with, and not Christian doctrine. In terms of nature, character and quality there is only one God, but this oneness, unity of character, is in three persons shared in its entirety. Thus, as Geach stresses, God is love because the three persons eternally love each other.\textsuperscript{26} From this material Geach believes he can present a rational argument to the effect that a monistic God could not be love, which may well be an effective answer to the question why the Greek philosophers could not allow their God to love. If it is granted as he has argued, that love is relational, then a monistic God could not be love. It is not logically possible for a unitary being to be relational except in a form of divine solipsism which could hardly be described as love. The position being adopted is that love prizes the existence of another even before it is love of the Good, (in oneself or another) which it assuredly is. Furthermore as Geach notes, the Christian would contend that Revelation's message is that God is not such a solitary self-lover. It is an even greater falsity to suppose that God need create beings to fill his need for love. Such an error can only occur where the Trinity is neglected and it is akin to the situation in which lonely human beings take to loving dogs, that is the projection of one's own need upon a lower level of being.

From this standpoint of the priority of the Trinity demanded by the loving nature of the Christian God, Geach
goes on to note how it was to Israel that God was revealed as love, and he then treats of the question of love and self-fulfilment in God and man, the question of the role of self-love which is dealt with elsewhere in this study. Geach has thus put himself into the position of contending that love as a cosmic force, if it is to be more than individual affection, has to be the nature of God. Only thus conceived can love be intelligible and this will involve multiplicity of being within the Godhead. In exactly the same position stands the Roman Catholic moralist, Bernard Haring.27 The link that Geach made between the Trinity and the nature of God as love is preserved. Haring's analysis starts from the viewpoint that since God the Father and the Son at root are a communion of love, so human communion with them is about love. The New Testament inspiration for this would be derived from the wealth of Johannine material. John's gospel is well known for its commencement with Logos doctrine, which commentators have promptly related to Greek philosophy.

Just as the Logos theme ought not to be ignored, nor should John's Love theme. Seen throughout the gospel the theme is prominent in the farewell discourses and especially in the analogy of the vine.28 The message is that the disciples have to abide in Jesus' love as branches of a vine tended by the vinedresser in the shape of the Father. The key verses expressing the theme of mutual communion in love are, 'As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you, abide in my love. If you keep my commandments you will
abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father's commandments and abide in his love'. That John was aware of the embryonic 'Trinitarian' character of this material was indicated in the previous chapter where Jesus says, 'If you love me, you will keep my commandments. And I will pray the Father and he will give you another counsellor to be with you for ever, even the Spirit of Truth'.

This theme of 'abiding with' in John, or in the Synoptic presentation of 'being with' Jesus, forms the basis of the Christian belief of the believer's communion with the communion within the Godhead of Love. It leads to a radical change in the perceived status of man before God. Thus immediately after the analogy of the vineyard comes the presentation of the new commandment to 'love one another as I have loved you'. The consequence of the believer's obedience results in Christ's saying 'No longer do I call you servants; ... but I have called you friends; for all that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you'.

Goergen's study of friendship in John makes clear that this devotion must involve joy and sorrow for both parties and that between the disciples and Jesus and between each other there must be total self giving, 'Greater love ... '. As a result of obedience in love, the sovereignty of God in power over men that categorises them as servants is changed into friendship, the sharing of being in respect. The moral status of God is thus different when seen as sovereign power or loving creator and this distinction will be expanded upon later. The citation of this New Testament material here does at least give some backing to the thought of the
theologians that are being considered, it shows that the question of being as relation in love and consequentially of multiplicity in the Godhead does have a New Testament foundation.

This then is the thought that Häring will be drawing upon. He notes these trends to the effect that it is love, self giving, measureless and sacrificial that impelled the Son of God to become brother, friend and master, and that the disciples can only be such by participation in that style of love. He writes 'Only love for Christ Himself makes us his disciples and imparts to our faith and hope the fullness of power unto salvation.' The importance of the introduction of the priority of love and obedience to Christ will be seen throughout this work, for it is the safeguard in the consideration of the role of self. To the charge that Christianity is just 'heavenly selfishness', the Christian can respond that whatever he receives is by way of joyous gift and not earned merit. Whatever role he receives, is as gift from Creator to creature and thus love of Christ is prior to all else as the proper response of the creature to the gift towards him of the Creator's Son. Häring himself notes how Jesus used the friendship theme and quotes John 15:15. It is in commentary upon the Johannine material that Häring introduces the Trinity, 'the profound communication of love in the Holy Spirit.'

The weight that Häring gives to the Trinitarian theme can be seen from the provision of a heading entitled 'Participation in the Triune Love of God'. Three linked
themes are apparent, Christocentricity, Trinity and Love. This is shown in his writing, 'To be in Christ and in the covenant of his love means to be incorporated in the life of the Triune God. Only in Christ do we have access to the mystery of the life and love of the holy Trinity'. This is taken as the springboard for a discussion on the nature of love and its relation to the Greek Eros which is properly discussed elsewhere in our work. Also, since Häring's work is primarily ethical there is no ontological development presented in his use of the Trinity, rather it is simply utilised as a kind of sheet anchor. This is not surprising, what is important to note is that the Trinity—the life and love within God, is taken as the root for his discussion.

Of all the theologies which place a Trinity centered around love at their heart, arguably the most famous is that of Augustine. It is also noteworthy in that the centrepiece of the argument stems from the analogy of human love. Bearing in mind what has been said concerning the Greek philosophy of Eros and its implacability to the notion of love within the Godhead, it can be seen how radical in its context Augustine's thought is, despite the problems subsequent generations have encountered with it. Augustine does what the Greeks had proved unable to do, to construct the life of love within the Godhead and credit must be given for his intent regardless of opinions concerning his method. The problem with the latter is debatable but in commentators' eyes generally taken to inadequate pneumatology, that is,
the manner in which the Spirit becomes a function of the personality of the other two persons of the Trinity, this again becoming apparent in his use of the human analogy. That his intention is to provide three persons in the Trinity is definite.\(^{39}\) He writes explicitly, 'Thus we speak of three persons, ... nor is any one Person of the three in any respect less than the Trinity itself'.\(^{40}\)

The problem is that on the one hand Augustine knows he is speaking entirely of a mystery, in which the introduction of a divine 'person' in a human sense is problematic: 'Just as by means of our voices, which produce a physical sound, the names, 'Father', 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' can only be uttered in separation, divided by the intervals of time occupied by each name. As they exist in their own substance the three are a unity.'\(^{41}\) On the other hand he is adamant that what is needed for life is relation, multiplicity in unity - hence his commitment to the Trinity, yet he realises the experience of the Godhead must not be read directly out of human life. With the Holy Spirit, in which linguistically the apparent connection to a person is nowhere near so evident as with the Father and the Son, Augustine is clearly uneasy as he writes 'It is no easy question whether the Father is the source of the Holy Spirit', an unease that is apparent elsewhere in the same passage.\(^{42}\)

Hence the importance of Augustine's use of the human analogy, for it is the third category of love between the lover and the beloved, which while in the human experience could not be called a person is such in the divine according to Augustine. This 'Holy Spirit is the inexpressible communion
as it were of Father and Son'. While in man this quality of communion is not a person in itself, it becomes so in the sheer harmony of the Divine in Augustine's opinion.

The use of the human analogy is limited because an image of the Trinity is being sought in one man, whereas the Trinity is oneness in three persons. So he writes:

while a Trinity of men could not be called one man, in the case of that Trinity it is called one God. Nor again is the Trinity, a trinity in the way in which man, that image of God has three elements but is one person. In that image of the Trinity the three elements are of the man, they are not the man, whereas in the supreme Trinity itself of which this is the image, the three are not of one God but there is one God, and they are three Persons not one.

The problem is always that of perceiving the personal in the third element of the image of the Trinity within man, that is the experience of love between the lover and the beloved, or to use Augustine's other images there is found in one man, mind, love, and knowledge and memory, understanding and will. None the less using this image Augustine has presented a strong portrayal of the Trinity to which men can identify.

Certainly the love of which Augustine speaks would be alien to the popular meaning attached to love today, for him it is attachment or commitment to the Good and not just isolated individual affection, 'What is this charity . . . but the love of Good?' However, the commendation of relation as the root of being in a commitment to a supreme value is inescapable. Of love he writes, 'And what is love then, but a kind of life which links, or seeks to link some two things, the lover and the loved'. This is the basis
for ascribing personality to the Holy Spirit. However inadequately it appears in a human life, the love itself between the lover and the beloved has the vestiges of a personal life and Augustine's thesis is that in the Godhead this becomes a personal link in all its fullness.

As has been remarked before it is not the purpose of this study to tackle the ontological problem of the Trinity although an idea of the problems Augustine might raise has been mentioned. Indeed the altogether larger questions might be posited why three? It certainly is not proposed to answer this although Augustine would have pointed to his analysis of love as threefold and the witness of Revelation. What is established though is that the Fathers of the early Church, (Augustine's is only the best known of many presentations) saw that in relation to Greek thought the apologetic need was to explain the possibility of relation in the Godhead and that the impetus for doing this was their experience of the New Covenant. The sheer revolution inherent in this undertaking is difficult to appreciate to those brought up in Trinitarian liturgy and theological Trinitarian debate, but for their contemporaries the Patristic development of the Trinity was the most radical development in theistic ontology since the appearance of monotheism. The need of today is to appreciate once again the freshness of Patristic thought, that in their formulation of being within the Godhead, in the creation of the concept of the life of the Trinity something utterly new was being provided, this stress on relation as the root of being.
Furthermore although the various Fathers used a galaxy of terms in which to ground this relationship, whether in *logos* or *phusis*, etc., love is also portrayed as the core of this relationship and in Augustine is used as the central image. Augustine's is the radical development in using a term so much at odds with the inheritance of Greek Philosophy in relation to the Godhead, but one in which the threefoldness and life are readily apparent. Gregory Nazianzen by contrast lays the stress on causality, on begetter, begotten and begetting, although in this one may posit a link to the creativeness of love.\(^4^8\) It has to be appreciated that the Patristic development of this doctrine has to be experimental and that the immediate adoption of the concept of love is not to be expected, for this concept would only cause greater problems in relating the Trinity apologetically to Greek thought. In this context it has to be remembered that Augustine is one of the later fathers. From a different period of church history a doctrine of the Trinity founded in the nature of God in love can be provided whose indebtedness at the same time to the Fathers is evident. Reference is being made to the seventeenth century Anglican divine, Thomas Traherne.

Traherne's *Four Centuries* are a form of mystical theology, mystical in that the end that is constantly being invoked is one of beatitude in love between man and God. In addition love is constantly invoked by Traherne as the way to perceive the world.\(^4^9\) Theological in that a treatise *en route* is provided of the doctrines of the church and also of matters of practical ethics such as the question of neighbour love.
Once again as in Augustine, although there are differences from him, it must be emphasised that Traherne's identification of God and love is not an identification with vacuous sentiment. God as love is supreme and inexhaustible good. He is supremely dedicated to the glory of His creature and hence of Himself. Traherne writes 'For if God is love, and love be so restless a principle in exalting its object: and so secure that it always promoteth and glorifieth and exalteth itself thereby, where will there be any bounds in our exaltation?' The notion of God as love is being used to guarantee the end of the one who is created; God cannot abandon his creature because this would be to abandon the nature of himself - love. Traherne's love theology is very close to Vanstone's in the sense of love's self-giving to the creature and too in the use of artist imagery. For Vanstone the imagery of God as artist is greatly developed, For Traherne 'God is the greatest and divinest Artist', whose expression is in creation, 'In making bodies, love could not express itself, or art unless . . .' According to Traherne, love is God's creative activity directed to the good of the creature, and it perfectly expresses His own nature. God's love makes the creature joyous in discovering his own created glory and the glory of God, 'That you are a man should fill you with joys, and make you to overflow with praises'. From God being love, springs a creation ethic in which Beatitude is a for 'The object of love is infinitely exalted. Love is infinitely
delightful to its object, God . . . manifests himself to be love and you being the end . . . are evidently its object.\textsuperscript{55} (This very positive assessment of creatureliness and of the world will be expanded in our next chapter, "Creation Ethics".)

To be noted here is the perception of love's relational nature, - man is the object, the beloved of God's purposes. Traherne then gives a consideration of sin, righteousness and justice, an analysis of the Fall's consequences after an analysis of creation's intent. From this he provides a consideration of Christ's work and this leads to the matter of especial concern, Trinity.

The model that is taken by Traherne for the Trinity has clear reference to the three-fold image of Augustine and it can be read as a developed exposition of the Saint's writing solely from the standpoint of a mystical love theology. That this is the case is put clearly in the sentences with which Traherne's consideration starts:

\textit{God by loving begot his Son.} For God is love, and by loving, He begot His love. He is of himself, and by loving He is what He is, INFINITE LOVE. God is not a mixed and compounded Being, so that His love is one thing and Himself another. \textsuperscript{56}

God's nature is for Traherne supremely only one thing - love. For him that is the interpretative category from which all other attributes must be derived and related. The nature of love is active and not passive, 'Being therefore God is all Act'.\textsuperscript{57} This as the Greeks themselves perceived was utterly at variance with the nature of their God. The Greeks saw love's activity as the expression of lack, and
that fulfillment simply leads to rest. Love was seen by Plato as a functional virtue servicing the higher category of the Forms, truth, beauty, goodness, etc. Thus 'love is always the love of something we lack', it is a middle virtue by which men can love truth and beauty, but not love love. From this in the Symposium, Plato gives what has been regarded as his highest expression of religious consciousness - the vision of beauty. Although this is a glorious appreciation of the triumph of goodness it remains prejudiced when compared to the work of Traherne being studied. This is because the personal is strictly secondary to the idea and seems to be subsumed in it. Traherne's love, which is certainly a living category together with the personal, is not a feature of the Platonic presentation, since the notion of life, that is change, within the Godhead is inimicable to the Platonic notion of perfection. This is the problem that the Christian Trinity tackles, that of providing life within the Godhead without prejudicing God, change without loss of immutability. Traherne interprets this category of being within the Godhead solely in terms of love - something utterly unacceptable to any of the Greeks for whom love had to be parasitic and secondary.

Hence in the Traherne passage now being considered, God's being love is primary and this love far from servicing the Platonic forms is the summation of them. Thus Traherne writes, 'But by loving He is infinitely righteous to Himself,
and to all' and 'Had He not loved, He had not been what He now is, The God of Love'. Love's being primary is manifest in its lively nature and hence the Trinity. Thus, the heading of Second Century 39, 'God by loving begot His Son', leads to the heading of the next, 'In all Love there is a love begetting, a love begotten, and a love proceeding'.

This is the Augustinian model, stressing the liveliness within the Godhead, 'Which though they are one in essence subsist nevertheless in three several manners.' Traherne accepts this human analogy by noting 'So that in all Love, the Trinity is clear'. That the mystical rather than the philosophical mind finds the Trinity easier to comprehend, possibly because the nature of love is experimental and not analytical, is seen in 'Where Love is the Lover, Love streaming from the Lover is the Lover; the Lover streaming from himself, and existing in another Person', followed by 'This person is the Son of God'.

The message is repeated that the Trinity, that is, the specific threeness of the relation within the Godhead, is derived from the nature of love, which is the nature of God:

In all Love there is some Producer, some Means, and some End: all these being internal in the thing itself. Love loving is the Producer, and that is the Father: Love produced is the Means, and that is the Son: For Love is the means by which a lover loveth. The End of these Means is Love: for it is love by loving: and that is the Holy Ghost.

Traherne presents the classic three persons in the one nature stance, but where he goes further than many is in tying this one nature entirely into the nature of love.
is making the link at the very deepest level between love and being:

For by loving Love attaineth itself and being ... That Love is the end of itself, and that God loveth that He might be Love, is as evident to him that considers spiritual things, as the Sun. Because it is impossible there should be a higher end, or a better proposed ... what further can be proposed then the most blessed and perfect life? ... by being Love God receiveth, and is the End of all.

There follow several passages devoted to the sheer joy of love, in which the relational and lively aspect of love is tied to Beatitude. Here can be read such comments as, 'For Love is the most delightful of all employments, All the objects of Love are delightful to it, and Love is delightful to all its objects'; and, 'Love is so divine and perfect a thing, that it is worthy to be the very end and being of the Deity'. All life stems utterly from love and what is not love dies, 'By Loving a Soul does propagate and beget itself; and 'God is present by Love alone ... By Love alone He liveth and feeleth in other persons ... by Love alone attain another self'. There is no escaping the great vitality and warmth of Traherne's presentation, which accounts too for the accompanying positive evaluation of the world, 'So that whosoever loveth all mankind, he enjoyeth all the goodness of God to the whole world: ... with all whom He is present by Love, which is the best manner of presence that is possible'.

The critic may perhaps still ask 'Why' and Traherne may disappoint him in not providing a "proof". There is
much here that is presented rather in the line of statement than argument. It has to be made clear that for every Christian who has taken love as his final category there are others who have taken the *logos* whether as 'the word' or as 'reason', and still others who have opted for justice and righteousness as their all embracing category. In this work it is not intended to enter these ontological debates as to whether love is actually primary or whether God is actually Trinity, rather it is intended to assess some of the issues that are raised if a Trinitarian God of love is assumed. This chapter is preparatory in that it does instance the very considerable body of opinion reaching into the roots of the biblical tradition that does support such a position. It shows too that the adoption of such a position is consonant with a commitment to a relational view of life, the stress on persons as ends that is not so readily visible in Greek philosophy. The adoption of a Trinitarian God of love, it is held, gives strength in a manner not otherwise available to those who hold to the supreme importance of the personal and to the role of love in the fulfillment of the person, by holding that this itself is the supreme character of being.

From this viewpoint the issues are raised of how men respond to this love and its activity in the world. Since this is an ethical study this leads to the issue of self-love, as selfishness or as a justified desire for self-fulfillment, and to the role of universal or neighbour love, for clearly our adoption of this stance is to say love is more than mere sexual preference for individuals that
Stendahl makes it out to be. This is the question of love as Commandment. On God's side by contrast the question has to be faced of how does a God relate to his creatures, - do many of the models hitherto used stressing God's Will and power, his omnipotence, omniscience and impassibility in fact accord with the nature of love? Thus the adoption of love as the fundamental explicative category of being may well lead to a reassessment of conventional doctrines of God and thus the issues of the chapter Freedom, Grace and Providence. Prior to this, consideration must be given to the actual intent of creation, the end a loving God desires, Creation Ethics.

As a foretaste of the issues to be tackled, it is appropriate to consider Traherne's own consideration of the balance between universal and self-love since this is an assessment directly consequential upon the adoption of a world view in which relation, Trinity and the supreme value of love are assumed. As will be seen in the chapter on Self-love, the adoption of love theology in relation to the Trinity leads to an ideal balance between self and other concern. That is, love being by its nature other concern, it also gives joy and fulfillment to the other, and entitles him to consider himself. For the beloved will wish the lover's own joy to be complete, as the lover too, desires the beloved to be joyful. This is precisely Traherne's own position, 'By loving others you live in others to receive it'. The 'it' being the end of Beatitude, when all will
be fulfilled in love, 'For according to the measure of your love to others will you be happy in them ... The more you love men, the more delightful you will be to God, and the more delight you will take in God, and the more you will enjoy Him.' Proper self-love is thus extolled as the creature's proper end in enjoying the blessings of the created world, 'A man should prize the blessings which he knoweth.' Self-love is proper as the creature's response to God in his world, while

It is true that self love is dishonorable, but then it is when it is alone. And self-endedness is mercenary, but then it is when it endeth in oneself. It is more glorious to love others, and more desirable, but by natural means to be attained. (That is via a proper estimation of self RNF). That pool (Self-love RNF) must first be filled, that shall be made to overflow.

It is absurd in Traherne's eyes not to love oneself for that is the stimulus to love others, when self and other are all seen in God, for 'God by rational methods enabled us to love others better than ourselves, (but) ... Had we not loved ourselves at all, we could never have been obliged to love any thing. So that self-love is the basis of all love.' Self-love is thus proper when seen as a gift of God to the creature and enables a proper estimate of life to occur 'So that God by satisfying my self-love, hath enabled and engaged me to love others.' This will all be developed in detail later but here it enables the practical consequences of Traherne's commitment to this ontology of love to be estimated. In that it centres around relation and the question of the fulfillment of ends for persons, it clearly relates to the pattern of life within the Trinity, whereby
the members thereof are both devoted to one another yet perfectly self fulfilled - 'because He is Love, nothing is more glorious than His self-love.' 79 This relates back to the discussion already had on the question of need and mutuality in relationships, both in God and man. That is the viewpoint that the nature of love is such that it is impossible to speak of a monadic God of Love. Outka in his review of agape - God's love, tackles this question of the role of mutuality, is it essential to God's love and if so is he dependent upon men? 80 Outka notes how agape is generally characterised as a love independent of the subject's particular feelings, possessing constancy and being unalterable. It is thus a regard for a human being, whether by God or man, by virtue of his existing - the theme of men as ends in themselves. On the positive side this means that the offer of agape is not wholly dependent upon the other's reaction, God does and men ought to love one another regardless of response. On the negative side the danger of this type of argument is that if the love is given regardless of response, what account of the reality of the other is being offered? If the response of the other does not affect agape, he is loved nonetheless, does this not prejudice the integrity of the other? This question Outka addresses.

However, first an excursus intended to illustrate this problem of agape in practice, and to posit the possibility that such a problem only arises where the doctrine of the Trinity has not been used. The subject taken, who will be
encountered at several places in this study, is Anders Nygren, in his greatly influential work *Agape and Eros*. Nygren stresses that *agape* is 'spontaneous' and 'uncaused'. He warns that this is not to say it is arbitrary, on the contrary it is God's nature, rather it means it has absolutely no reliance on human merit. But to say (as all would agree) that *agape* is not dependent on human legal merit is not to say that human beings have no value in themselves. Yet Nygren considers that the only ground for human value might be works of merit. These are rejected by Nygren and no other ground for 'causing' God's *agape* is then allowed. In other words, nothing whatsoever on creation, Outka's *agape* as love for a being *qua* existent is replaced by Nygren's *agape* as God's simply loving. Thus he is enabled to write, 'Agape is the direct opposite of that love which is called out by the worthiness of its object . . . The man whom God loves has not any value in himself. His value consists simply in the fact that God loves him.' This may be right in the narrowest sense of contingency, in that man does not have existence independent from God's sustaining grace, but in Nygren's use the possibility of the harmonisation of sustaining grace with the notion of value inherent in human beings, by virtue of their creation by God, is not allowed.

Nygren denies this option in writing, 'that the idea of the infinite value of the human soul is not a basic Christian idea at all.' Is not such language fundamentally misleading both to the nature of Trinity and Creation, even
if in the narrowest sense a meaning can be allowed? In such a light read,'It is not that God loves that which is in itself worthy to be loved, but, on the contrary, *that which is in itself without value acquires value by the fact that it is the object of God's love*. This it is contended takes no account of creation. While men were not, clearly they had no value, but once they were (created), then it becomes impossible to write 'that which is in itself without value'. It seems to be a contradiction in terms for Nygren to posit a created being being in existence without value. Indeed it might be said to be a form of radical dualism, a form of Gnosticism, something which Nygren would be at pains to deny to be sure. The argument is simple. It is being said, to say 'it is' of created beings is to give them value and this Nygren is denying.

Clearly a certain theology of the Fall is influential for Nygren, thus 'When man has fallen away from God, he is wholly lost, and of no value at all.' However, in addition it is argued that the non use of the Trinity accentuates the disaster. *Agape* is not seen by Nygren as relational. Since there is no use of the Trinity, the essential nature of response and reciprocity of love mentioned in Vanstone is not apparent in Nygren. Hence *Agape* becomes simply a one way force outward from God which does not encounter the human as a real individual, - he is simply a vessel for God's love. Indeed a portrait of a divine Narcissus appears who uses men to love himself since he lacks relation in himself. Nygren would no doubt regard this as perjorative. However, he is at great pains to emphasize the utter independence of
God's agape from man's own love. Thus 'Man's self giving to God is no more than a response; . . . it is but a reflection of God's own love'; or, 'He has nothing of his own to give; the love which he shows his neighbour is God's agape in him.'

How precarious a position Nygren's is, becomes apparent when he considers the New Testament material which itself comes closest to the message of the Trinity. Thus in considering John, who on the one hand presents agape as the relation between the Father and the Son and on the other extols agape as the love between the brethren, Nygren is most unhappy. He concludes that the 'Johannine conception may be said to mark . . . the transition . . . in which the Christian idea of love is determined, not by pure agape, but by eros and agape.' As Nygren himself asks: 'If the love of the Father for the Son is the pattern of all agape, it is impossible to avoid the question: How can agape retain its nature as essentially 'uncaused'? . . . 'The Father himself loveth you, because you have loved me and have believed'. In result, the Johannine conception of Agape begins to take a somewhat hesitating attitude, between 'caused' and 'uncaused' love.'

Herein is the nub of the debate. Nygren complains that John's perception that reciprocity and relation is the nature of love within the Godhead prejudices Nygren's conception of God's uncaused love. He is right, it does, but rather than admit the problem for himself, there is his condemnation of John as a fatal mix of eros and agape. Thus where the New Testament reaches the point where the role of
relation in love both within God and consequently in the relation to man, is highlighted, here Nygren condemns it by his demand for 'uncausedness'. Nygren has no role for relation to play in his concept of God's uncaused love, thus the Trinity far from revealing the real nature of being in love is a problematic enigma. Consequently the opportunity Nygren has for establishing a conception of agape's proper relation to men as real beings is never developed; instead their own independent existence is prejudiced. The free response that is usually held to be vital in any relation of love is of no importance to Nygren, 'Man's' love to God, in the Christian sense, must be a purely theocentric love, in which all human choice is excluded. because God's 'uncaused' love has overpowered him and constrained him, so that he can do nothing else than love God.91 In the analysis of love which this chapter adopts this view of Nygren's must be condemned as not being love at all. Using the analysis of Vanstone and Oman seen elsewhere in this work, founded upon a relational and hence Trinitarian view of love, the role of a genuine and free response of man to God is vital to the nature of agape.

This is the moment to return to Outka whose discussion on mutuality is on just this point. Outka notes how the lack of a role for response and reciprocity is evident in other writers and he cites Reinhold Niebuhr.92 There is a link here between those who stress self-sacrifice as all and self-love as fatal and those to whom response is unimportant, this it is contended is to destroy the self (for which see chapter four). Outka notes how the critics
have responded with the stress on mutuality, he cites D.D. Williams whom we consider in the self-love chapter. Outka sees that for these critics, ideally, mutuality is more than the calculation of reciprocal advantage. Kierkegaard and Niebuhr may tend to regard self-love as using the other as a means of self-aggrandisement but excessive self-sacrifice is paradoxically doing just the same. In loving relationships, the other will be best served by a proper estimation of oneself and indeed the other will desire in love the lover's own happiness. This is the message of Thaer, which stemmed from a belief in a God who in himself perfectly exemplifies the balance between sacrificial and self-love united in joy, hence the importance of the self-love issue to this study. A dilemma is thus evident: love demands free response, yet if posited of God, this makes him dependent on man. As will be evident elsewhere in this work, it is held that this dilemma, the tragic element of creation is the gamble that God as love risks in creation. This is particularly the point of the Vanstonian analysis. Nonetheless a distinction can be used which helps to ease the dilemma, although it also points to the poignant element of the tragedy.

This distinction is that between availability and mutuality and its purpose is designed both to preserve the freedom of the lovers, while in God's case freeing him from being contingent upon the creation. Hence the necessary prior condition for love's existence is availability. God always seeks to love his creation, He is always available.
However, response is not always offered, mutuality is not always present, but this is not to say God is not loving. Love to be love is not dependent upon response though to be fully fulfilled it is. Love is a complex which can be seen on at least these two levels of reciprocated and unreciprocated love. The latter is certainly love, in God's case it is still a complete concern for the fate of the other. However it becomes tragic. Love that is unreciprocated will still be love, that is concern, but tragic in that it lacks the overwhelming joy of fulfillment in the response of the other. Thus in offering a relation of love, whether between men themselves or men and God, the lover offers the beloved a certain power over the lover. This is the essence of the 'need' theology of Hume, Buber and Bonhoeffer. It is developed at length in Vanstone. It is clear to him that the love of God as much as of men must conform to this requirement. Thus God has bestowed a power over himself to Creation - this would be utterly inimical to Nygren's *agape*, that it should be in any manner dependent upon man's response. Vanstone writes of 'the power over itself which love gives to its object may be . . . the power to make angry (the Wrath of God - RNF\textsuperscript{94}) or to make glad . . . the power of affecting the one who loves. It creates a new vulnerability in the one who loves . . . Where there is no such surrender or gift of power the falsity of love is exposed.'\textsuperscript{95}

The power of a love ethic and theology is founded both in philosophical reflection, such as Vanstone provides upon
the nature of love, and in theological reflection upon the Christian source material seen in Augustine, Traherne and Häring. The philosophy leads to the adoption of personal and communal categories for life linked by love. The theology sees this as the pattern of absolute being itself - the Trinity. The traditions that have been invoked are both old and new. It is certainly not a 'new trend'. It is significant in this respect that it has been felt possible not to mention Fletcher and Situation Ethics. This certainly does see itself as a 'contemporary' ethical and theological expression of the love ethic, indeed it sees itself as the ethic of love. There is no intention of discussing Fletcher in depth. This is because he presents his work as a 'take it or leave it' option. His book cannot enter into dialogue with others and love is turned into such a totally all embracing category that the impression is given that to deny Situation Ethics is to deny love in Fletcher's judgement. Thus he is surprisingly polemical.

Here there is no wish to make love so precariously dependent upon one particular method. Instead an effort has been made to link twin themes of relation and Trinity within love through as wide a variety of sources as possible. Where this study does take a contentious stand is in the affirmation that the distinctiveness of Christian theology and ethics lies in its placing love at the root of being, thus emphasizing personal and relational nature.

It is contended that love as the root of being forms the heart of the revelation in Christ and leads to the radical doctrine of the Trinity. Although contentious,
such a stand is hardly novel. Jacques Maritain, a classic representative of Catholicism, makes this clear. He speaks not of love but of charity, which term preserves God's love from association with sentimentality. He happily adopts a view wherein Beatitude, another very traditional term, is seen as the end of man, that is the loving relation between God and man. Here perhaps one may identify the key as to why historically speaking it is the Catholics who have veered to a metaphysic of love while Protestantism has veered to a metaphysic of reason, for Maritain links such a metaphysic of love closely into the experience of worship, devotion and prayer. Thus he claims for Christianity that grace enables man to live the life of God and that the mystical tradition witnesses to this apparent extravagance.

Beatitude is thus mutual love and it is certainly not Nygren's unidirectional agape. It respects the genuine integrity of the individual human person as created, 'because God thus wished it, (and) needed our love as the friend needs the love of his friend, who is another self.'

Maritain sees this as manifest in the Old Testament, 'I love those who love me,' and fully manifest in those Johannine passages previously cited, 'He who loves me will be loved by my father . . . .' In Christianity, Maritain holds that the whole moral life is hung upon this charity with the double precept to love God and neighbour. This stress on charity was a scandal to ancient philosophy yet it is fundamental, because in Maritain's eyes it speaks to the whole man and not just to the intellect in the manner of the rational ethics of Aristotle, the Stoics.
and the Epicureans. Maritain presents the claim that the Christian love theology alone appeals to the highest part of the whole man. He cites Aquinas as perceiving this difference in his comment that the new law carries the precept of God into the heart. Conversely the recent Protestant author Newlands' on the subject reveals the difference in stress.

Despite the title of the book, it treats only half of the subject. It is a worthwhile study of love in action, and becomes a review of Christ's work, but it has very little consideration of the ontology of love, its passivity. Thus compared with the Catholic provision of a beginning in the Trinity and an end in Beatitude, there is only a middle, Christ's redeeming work for men. A lot of strength is thereby lost, in that Trinity is but briefly covered, and Beatitude not at all. The focal point of Christian theology is said to be the Gospel of God and men's appropriation thereof. What is actually said concerning the action of God is acceptable but in what is missing fundamental issues are ignored. It is those issues of the nature of men and of God, and of their communion with one another which are the consideration of this study. Stemming from this has been a consideration of the basic structures of being provided by this chapter. In what follows specific consideration will be given to the nature of actual creation, man and the end intended for him, and the relationship between this end and his present state, of his evolution and also stories of the Fall.
CHAPTER TWO
CREATION ETHICS

It will probably be clear to the reader that this author is not committed to autonomous ethics, in the sense that ethics can be derived from itself without any reference to other categories. Rather, it is held that particular ethical stances are controlled by adherence to particular world views. Even the supporters of ethical autonomy are conditioned by this, it is just that their world view is fitted around the demand for ethical autonomy. In the Christian sense it has been argued that the doctrine of Trinity and of God as love has a definite effect upon ethical views. The same must be said of the doctrine of creation and this can be seen at several levels. At the simplest, it is reasonable that one's beliefs concerning how the world is, its nature, are reflected in one's ethical standpoint. Note the introduction of 'beliefs', the actual facts of nature are not the subject per se but man's perception of those facts. The world view that conditions an ethical stance is not itself necessarily 'fact' but is a particular compendium of perceptions concerning the world itself (how), and ideals concerning one's understanding of that world (why). Thus doctrines of creation are complexes composed of 'how' and 'why' components and in this conceptual mix have their effect on ethics. In this manner positive and negative
assessments of man's nature lead to differing ethical stances. This is the question of the Fall which exercises very considerable control over theological ethics. Differing perceptions of the nature of this matter lead to very different ethical stances.

Doctrines of the Fall have traditionally been varied. However, in the last 150 years a new factor having a very dramatic affect on Creation Ethics has had a particular influence upon the doctrine of the Fall. This is the rise in evolutionary theory. Without wanting to adopt any particular viewpoint concerning the scientific 'facts' of evolution, the broad principle will be adopted without argument that in no straightforward sense can the Genesis story be regarded as factual. It may contain significant truths for man's self understanding but as historic fact, for instance that there were once only two people, Adam and Eve, it will not be accepted. Instead the ethical consequences of the adoption of a theology of creation which embraces the basic principles of evolution will be examined. That is a commitment to man's being part of a wider whole, the world, which is not itself a static system but a dynamic organism. Consideration of the issue will thus occur on two fronts: the acceptance of man as an evolving organism, and the effect of that acceptance on the ethical consequences of creation; and the consideration of how this can be tied into the theological understanding of man's end, his purpose. This will involve study of the concept of Beatitude.

A start will be made by a presentation of what will
be taken as a base text on the subject. Already studied in
the previous chapter this will be the recent work of Canon
Vanstone, the particular merit of which is to present a
developed study of Creation Ethics built around the basic
premise that God is love. In so doing Vanstone tackles
both the theological and evolutionary issues. Vanstone
effects a remarkable harmonisation between an acceptance
of evolutionary theory and the consequential development
of a particular theology of creation. Vanstone had been
brought up in the conviction that the church existed 'to
the glory of God.'

This notion stems from the tradition
encompassing Beatitude. In adopting this notion as the end
of man, Vanstone is allying himself to the particular tradi-
tion that man's end is the glory of God. Further exponents
of this tradition will be considered in due course, for it
is a tradition of great antiquity. Despite his commitment
to such a demonstrable tradition, Vanstone discovered in
his own ministry that he was finding it increasingly
difficult to interpret often mundane and trivial work as
servicing the 'glory of God!'. Vanstone had been brought up
in an atmosphere in which, firstly, the visible Church was

closely identified to the idea of the glory of God. Secondly,
he had in his own perception, in his upbringing, been able
to live up to this ideal. Two factors though broke this
spell for him. On the one hand the appearance of the welfare
state had removed what Vanstone had seen in his father's
ministry as the church's pioneering role in caring. Allied
to this on the other hand came the growth of religionless
Christianity associated with Bonhoeffer and Tillich, which seemed to disassociate the glory of God from the work of the institution.

For Vanstone, this discovery that he could no longer identify the grand concept of the glory of God with much church work provoked a crisis which led to a reevaluation of the doctrine of creation. In short, he was led to see God's creative activity in the whole of human experience and this had for him a profound effect on the nature of creation and of God's acts. Thus:

While I could believe that God is glorified in some sublime expression of human creativity, I found it less easy to believe that He is glorified in a freshly painted wall. It was at this humble and even trivial level of creativity that the new Church lived.

Vanstone also saw that the distinction in activity between church and secular work was proving hard to maintain. Hence 'The typical chorister in the Church was a person already interested in music.' If God was glorified by his creation it had to be in much more than the church activities Vanstone witnessed, for in his experience he could not see a worthwhile contrast between the church and the environment it served. The escape from this dilemma Vanstone found in accepting the continuity between sacred and secular and by re-evaluating the secular. This re-evaluation of the church's relation to the secular in Vanstone's own experience led directly to the re-evaluation of the doctrine of creation. Vanstone writes, 'This truth could be expressed in religious terms by saying that,
whatever else the church was, it was certainly a part of the creation; and therefore that it must share whatever importance might belong to created things in general.'

At the time Vanstone began to see this positive link between church and creation, there was in the outside world an increasing concern for nature and ecology. Vanstone began to see in his own work a parallel to the work of the conservationists - he felt them to be 'kindred spirits'.

Although not developed at length in his book in the philosophical sense, it certainly is in the theological, by the realisation that man is only a part of nature. It stems from the Biblical injunctions of stewardship, and Paul's theme of creation's renewal. After generations in which man has tended to distance himself from creation, thus allowing unbridled exploitation, the realisation is growing that not only does man depend on it for his existence and that if abused it recoils on man, but that this wholeness is part of God's order. In philosophical terms the old position was represented by Kant's assessment of men as intelligents, being the only ends in themselves and the rest of creation ranking as means; 'even those externals whereof the existence rests not on our will but depends on nature have as irrationals, a relative value only and are used as means and instruments for our behoof, and are therefore called things, whereas an intelligent is called a person.' This may seem to give carte blanche to the unscrupulous for abuse. Against this may be pitted the current writings of such as Midgley, in which man is tied
much more firmly into nature. A return will be made in
detail to Midgley for she provides a philosophical comple-
ment to the ideas of Vanstone. These trends can be seen
to illustrate the tussle between the Greek Platonist
intellectual heritage in which man is fundamentally an
alien, marooned in a hostile world, and the Biblical tradition
of creation.

Vanstone thus faced by the disproportion between the
trivial and the sublime being all of God, perceived that the
first step had to be an identification between church and
creation in order to give meaning to sometimes trivial
church activities. There then occurred an incident which
suggested to Vanstone the mechanism by which God could work
in creation. From this was to spring the inspiration for
a doctrine of God reconciled to evolution, suffering and
the demand for human freedom. Vanstone had been asked by
two children to suggest an activity for them. He suggested
that they made a landscape model. This they took up
without much enthusiasm but soon they became totally
absorbed in their work. In watching the development of
their absorption in their task, Vanstone saw an analogy to
the creative process in God. In the growth of this 'creation',
the end could not be precisely foreseen, there was only the
inspiration of a vision. Progress had to be step by step
in which each new construction was full of possibilities.
Each step involved a risk of failure or dissatisfaction,
there was no guarantee of success. The further the creative
act went the more precarious and tense it became. Thus, 'As
the model grew and became of greater value, each step in its
creation became of greater moment and was taken with greater intensity of care. Each item that was placed seemed to possess greater power to make or to mar.\(^1\)

Three themes can be discerned here which are central to an understanding of Vanstone's creation doctrine. There is the notion that creation involves risk, it cannot be rigorously predetermined. This is clearly allied to an acceptance of evolution as is the notion of the ever-increasing value of the growing complexity of the creation. Secondly, as it becomes more valuable, it becomes still more risky in its tragic possibilities. The third theme inherent in and to be seen throughout Vanstone's work is the idea that creation involves rendering the creator vulnerable to what has been created - giving the creation a 'power' over the creator. The rationale for this comes from two sources for Vanstone: the nature of artistry and the nature of love. The image of these children's creation is the image of an artist or a craftsman as Vanstone makes explicit in writing that:

-One could say that the activity of creating included the passivity of waiting - of waiting upon one's workmanship to see what emerged from it . . . in such activity, the creator gave to, or built into, his workmanship a certain power over himself.

Since he at once creates it, yet like all artists does not predetermine it but works with the nature of the material, that material has its own power in relation to him. If the artist who works with matter is in this situation, the God who works with living beings is still more so, since his relationship is one of love, and fundamental to love is the
respect of the freedom and rights of the other. This theme
Vanstone makes evident in the next chapter where he writes
that 'Where love is authentic, the lover gives to the object
of his love a certain power over himself - a power which
would not otherwise be there'.
Vanstone sees in the
evolution of creation, its risk and uncertainty, its waste,
the inevitable expression of the nature of love. Hence
'love proceeds by no assured programme', neither a parent
bringing a child up to independence, nor a God and his
creation.

It may be said that Vanstone happily identifies three
themes. The true nature of love in his presentation is
identified with the true nature of artistic creation and
the two are combined in the nature of God's creative
ability, which is thus enabled to come to terms with
evolutionary science because it is in the nature of the
artist to respect and work with the nature of the subject
matter. Love is also harmonised with the adoption of the
love theme to the demand of men's freedom. Thus art
safeguards matter, and love man's moral autonomy. God,
man and creation exist together by shared participation
and not domination. Suffering is explained as the inevitable
consequence of respecting the individuality of creation.
Suffering is an integral part of both love and art. Thus,
'The precariousness of love's activity appears equally
clearly in the field of artistic creation'. 'Precarious-
ness' here is Vanstone's term for the aspect of God which
allows uncertainty to occur for the sake of the other's
integrity, and is willing to run the risk of being hurt itself. Thus for Vanstone the essence of the artist and of God is that he is 'always stretching his powers beyond their known limits'.

The artist to be creative cannot work within his limits, if he does he is merely a manufacturer. He has always to stretch himself to go beyond his limit, and in this 'his work is precariously poised between success and failure, between triumph and tragedy'.

The only safeguard for creation lies in the sheer ability of God, for 'we see the greatness of the artist precisely in his power to win back control, to use that which had gone astray as an element within a new and larger whole'.

Vanstone explicitly makes the artist his model of creation under his consideration of the kenotic character of God. *Kenosis* - self-giving, is the very nature of love and of creative art. Thus the nature of creation, its development and its pain are explained by Vanstone in his identification of God and the artist. He specifically constructs theodicy around the notion of the artist giving independence to his creation which involves a genuine and intentional ignorance on the creator's part. This posits the possibility of evil, security lying only in the artist's ability to recreate from misfortune, but

the principle does not imply that evil is willed by the Creator, either for its own sake or as a means to a greater good. The artist does not will the moment of lost control, nor intend it as a means to the completion and the greatness of his work. He does not will the demand which that moment makes upon him - the demand to redeem it and to save his work... his will is to overcome the problem.
From the viewpoint of God this provides an explanation of God and of his actions compatible with a universe which is perceived to follow no predetermined course, in which genuine randomness and creativity appear along with prodigious waste, yet one in which an upward pattern of progress is discernible.

Vanstone's picture of God readily fits scientific conceptions of the evolving world. From man's viewpoint matters are not so satisfactory. Although Vanstone safeguards man's independence, to the extent that man may hurt his own creator, and although the demands of the nature of a loving relationship are made pre-eminent, in terms of theodicy man is simply urged to 'believe its all for the best'. Vanstone endeavours to disassociate himself from Ivan Karamazov's suggestion that God wills suffering for greater good. He accepts that if God did, it would be immoral. He allows only that God grants the possibility of evil as a consequence of the nature of love and art in creation. However Vanstone still writes that for the children of Aberfan the final triumph will be when 'the children themselves understand and are glad to have so feared and wept and died'. What is changed from Ivan's scenario is that this God now suffers all the pain himself yet even so would Ivan have been satisfied with the last quotation?

Ivan's position is that it is intolerable for one innocent to suffer for a greater good. Vanstone's answer
is that God has not willed this suffering, that creation could not be otherwise if the freedom of matter and men is to be respected and that all will be justified by the result. Can Ivan be satisfied by the claim that God did not specifically will evil, that its existence is a possibility, consideration of which is inevitable given the demand of freedom for creation's members, and that the nature of Vanstone's kenotic God is considerably different from that contemporary to Dostoyevsky? Vanstone's work in our estimation is a remarkable attempt to cope with the issues of love, creation, freedom and evil. Nonetheless some space will be devoted here to its problems, which might be summed up by saying, 'what right has love involuntarily to place the beloved in this highly fraught situation?'

If God's being love is stressed by Vanstone, particularly love's respect for the freedom of men, there remains the problem that men have no choice in their creation. Men are born whether they like it or not into what can be a frighteningly horrific world. Is volunteering men for death and pain an act of a loving God concerned for their freedom, even one so totally involved in their pain as Vanstone's God? At another more conventional level, Vanstone's portrayal has ignored the classic doctrine of the Fall which explained evil in terms of man's culpability. Many may be entirely happy that Vanstone chose to ignore the Genesis stories of man's culpability, but in so doing, Vanstone becomes very weak on the whole idea of sin and man's responsibility. Sin becomes lack of response in sharing with God's creative work, 'evil is the moment of
control jeopardised and lost', evil and sin are not depicted as the wilful wrongdoing of many Christian characterisations.

From Dostoyevsky's Ivan, criticism can be developed on two fronts. Firstly, from the viewpoint of the chapter headed 'Rebellion' there is the critique of the presence of innocent suffering in God's world. What right has God got to involuntarily/inflict this world upon us? Secondly from the viewpoint of the chapter headed the 'Grand Inquisitor', Dostoyevsky raises an issue which only becomes the more pertinent when read in conjunction with Vanstone. That is the question of whether man can cope with the Vanstonian concept of freedom? For to the Inquisitor it is precisely this gift of freedom that is intolerable. For the purposes of Vanstonian criticism the second major question of the 'Grand Inquisitor', that of creation for damnation, takes on a new light. While Vanstone would doubtless agree that classic theologies of creation for damnation are abhorrent, it might be argued that in his acceptance of evolutionary creation with its prodigious waste, he accepts a new form of the old argument. Vanstone portrays a God so heavily involved in his creation that from men an equally involved response is demanded. Ivan's question must be whether man can really cope with such an intensity of love and commitment? For the Inquisitor has perceived that ordinarily, men cannot cope with freedom let alone freedom with the divine, 'for nothing has ever been
more unendurable to man and to human society than freedom!"\(^{26}\)

The Inquisitor reacts against the elite, 'And why are the rest, the weak ones, to blame if they were not able to endure all that the mighty ones endured? Why is the weak soul to blame for being unable to receive gifts so terrible?\(^{27}\)

That Dostoyevsky feels this awful dilemma is graphically portrayed in reading 'that it was no great moral felicity to attain complete control over his will and at the same time achieve the conviction that millions of other God's creatures had been created as a mockery, that they would never be able to cope with their freedom'.\(^{28}\)

Ivan's thoughts are not presented to destroy Vanstone's argument. So far as we are concerned with the issue of theodicy as fundamentally one of belief in a good God, one must move beyond the realm of strict logic into that of mystery and faith. Logic alone cannot answer this question. Thus it is possible to side with Vanstone while still wishing to own up to the enigma of freedom developed in Ivan. This is to say one will believe in such and such while still seeing great problems inherent in that position.

Our position is simply to avoid adopting any one viewpoint 'enthusiastically'. Vanstone's is a uniquely powerful viewpoint facing evolution and suffering with the concepts of love and freedom, but in so doing a demand is made in terms of human response to God's self giving act that many would find extreme, to perceive the loving God at the heart of every Aberfan. Ours is no wish to deny this but to simply drive home the fact that it is a dilemma of extreme
proportions. Within Dostoyevsky himself this equivocalness is evident. For he speaks not only in Ivan but in Alyosha too. Hence in the chapter 'Rebellion', Alyosha does give an answer to Ivan's objections, 'you said just now, is there a being in the whole world who could or had the right to forgive? But there is such a being, and he can forgive everything . . . because he gave his innocent blood for all and for everything.' 29 Such a remark is all the more significant when read in the light of Vanstone where the note of the suffering of the innocent forgiver is made a permanent mark of love.

In the 'Grand Inquisitor', Christ patiently and silently endures the tirades of the Inquisitor who berates him for this paradoxical notion of freedom. The paradox is apparent too, in Alyosha's reaction to Ivan's story of the 'Grand Inquisitor'. He says to Ivan, 'this is absurd! Your poem is in praise of Jesus and not in his disparagement'. 30 It is apparent also in the conclusion to the story, in which Christ's only response to the tirade of the Inquisitor is to kiss him, whereupon, he is released by the old man, of whom Ivan comments, 'the kiss glows in his heart, but the old man sticks to his idea'. 31 'It is as well to read Dostoyevsky with this sense of ambiguity, that he writes after all from the standpoint of a believer and simply to set this against Vanstone, not as an argument against Vanstone's arguments, but as a reminder that the freedom and the vision of the Suffering God of which Vanstone speaks, are not 'easy' answers to the problem. They are to be received not so
much intellectually as experimentally. Indeed this is the whole drift of Vanstone's writing, that his conclusions have been reached at the end of a life in the parish and not the university. Hence his examples are derived from actual experience, 'Through the example of human love, I have argued that the love of God must be infinitely more costly, more precarious and more exposed than it is commonly represented to be'. The book's radical character derives directly from it's appropriation of human analogy. As H.A. Williams commented in the introduction, it is 'theology ... written in blood' and perhaps it cannot be fully assessed outside that.

Acceptance of evolution in general terms but tied to theology was Vanstone's purpose. Mary Midgley was mentioned earlier as providing a philosophical commentary on this theme. Her writing is interesting in that although written from a humanist stance there is much of consequence to the Christian doctrine of the Fall which was found to be lacking in Vanstone. She gives great attention to the pertinent problem of the great wilfullness of men's wrongdoing. Thus despite her acceptance of evolution, man's wrong doing is not inadequacy in development, but it is something he is responsible for. Her point is that in a work devoted to restoring man to his place amidst the wholeness of the material world, the wrong-doing that man perpetrates is on an entirely different level from the suffering perpetrated by other animals. She wishes to revise the generally accepted notion
that man is advanced and civilised, whereas the animals are primitive and 'bestial', where these terms are no longer scientific terms for states of intellectual capacity but terms of moral judgement. As she notes towards the end of her book on this theme, there is confusion between technical ability and morals: 'What is supposed to be that good about cleverness? Being clever is not obviously so much more important than being kind, brave, friendly ... .' 34

Regarding the animals she notes how 'bestial', originally simply an adjective - pertaining to beasts, is now a term of strong moral condemnation. She notes how wolves were flayed alive in medieval France, for they were regarded as cruel beasts and she asks the question, do wolves flay men alive? The immense difference she perceives between the animal kingdom and our own is that the animals in general only kill out of necessity to eat, and that the idea of murder, that is killing your own for no necessity is peculiarly human. 35 She notes a television documentary's comment on sharks, that 'these are the world's most vicious killers', - this in spite of the fact that sharks only kill in hunger and self defence, and that men kill far more sharks than sharks men. In her eyes it is man who is the mindless murderer, vicious and sadistic, revealed only too well in the enthusiasm for bloodsports. She is led to the conclusion that animals are more rational than men in a particular though more restricted manner, in that our rationality may have a broader range but it has a capacity for extreme capriciousness and arbitrariness. 37
Midgley then enters into a discussion of Edward Wilson's *Sociobiology* and the problem of the 'selfish' gene. This reveals a further interesting reversal of generally accepted notions, that is that the problem of selfishness is a peculiarly human one. Thus the egoist position can in fact only be posited of man, and not of animals in general, so it seems incumbent upon man to justify his egoistical stance if he can. According to Midgley in *Sociobiology* the scheme is that of an enormous cost benefit analysis in which non-paying actions are ultimately stagnant for the progress of the species. Wilson himself asks the question, can a species survive if it indulges in non-paying activities? However with Midgley while the human world may struggle to justify altruism, the animal world in fact depends on it, to the extent that within each species a far greater degree of mutual care is evident than in the human race. It might be labelled an egoism of each species, nonetheless compared with human behaviour the behaviour of animals is still far more ordered and within each species dedicated to the preservation of the whole. For the purposes of this chapter what can be learnt from Midgley the humanist is that it is possible to use the notion of evolution, firstly, to place man wholly within the creation, and then secondly, to show that the radical difference between man and the other animals is that his intelligence does not obviously better him morally. Indeed Midgley is raising the problem of the 'Fall'. Hers, a study taking evolution into account, accepts the problem why and where did man acquire a capriciousness and
horrible brutality, a pleasure in inflicting pain, that is lacking in the other animals?

It was suggested that a weakness in Vanstone's otherwise powerful portrait of a theology allied to evolution was his lack of a sense of fall and human responsibility. Both Karamazov and Midgley make this question real, Vanstone faces a question needing an answer, that is whether man is not far more horrible than Vanstone allows, and how responsible is he for the horribleness? Vanstone's root text for an answer to the question of evil was treated as an example of physical evil—Aberfan. He does not endeavour to tackle an example of acute moral evil which is what Karamazov does. Despite this Vanstone holds that using Aberfan he is answering Ivan. In so far as the victims are both innocent sufferers this is the case, but Ivan's own example, being a case of acute moral evil, raises the larger question of responsibility and forgiveness. Ivan faces God with the problems of creatures in his own image being mindless torturers. In the face of such horrific agony, Ivan holds that the perpetrators of such suffering are unforgiveable:

And finally I do not want a mother to embrace the torturer who had her child torn to pieces by his dogs! She has no right to forgive him, she can forgive him for herself... but she has no right to forgive him for the sufferings of her tortured child.

Albeit Dostoyevsky gives an 'answer' through Alyosha to the effect that Christ alone has this power of forgiveness, our point must be that Vanstone whilst citing Karamazov does not fully encounter the problem Ivan raises. Vanstone
tackles innocent suffering at the level of physical evil alone, whereas Ivan is more concerned with innocent suffering in relation to appalling moral evil. Midgley shows that equally from the viewpoint of the humanist philosopher accepting evolution just as Vanstone does, the problem is as acute, that senseless human evil has to be accounted for in men, and this Vanstone leaves unanswered.

The great problem that is being faced and to which at present there is certainly no wholly satisfactory answer, is to reinterpret the Fall in accordance with the theory of evolution. Traditionally the Fall has gained its strength in making man responsible for his wrongdoing, by its literal acceptance of the Genesis story. The genius of this was man's consciousness of pre-mortal bliss and his deliberate rejection thereof. Genesis is simplicity itself, man knew what was at stake in his rejection. However to do justice to evolution such a simple picture has to be removed. There never was a moment when man clearly knew all the issues involved in the rejection of God, when he knew what he was doing and did it in the rejection of the Almighty. Man's self-consciousness has been aeons in the making and it is not easy to know when to start positing moral responsibility of man. It can at least be said that even if the start is unknown the very fact that man is aware of moral categories now is significant enough for man to be responsible. Evolution makes it difficult to identify the sources of man's responsibility and Vanstone is just one author who would seem to have fallen at this fence in his non-discussion
of moral evil.

The hints of an answer may be provided by Midgley and others. Midgley it will be remembered accepts both evolution and the issue of man's moral responsibility. Her first move was to show how despite the fact that men and animals are part of the same evolutionary process, man in his development has developed a capacity for extreme nastiness. An illogical element has entered into mankind's existence. She is no more successful than others in identifying the moment when this happened but she does illustrate some factors involved in its development. Her analysis, as that of two other authors to be cited, involves an element crucial to the line of thought in this work, that of the question of the role of relation and intelligence vis à vis factors such as love. Philosophical Egoism together with the practical problem of selfishness are attacked in Beast and Man with the comment already quoted contrasting cleverness with kindness and friendship. This is further developed in her paper 'The Limits of Individualism'. Here she argues that the Social Darwinist's form of evolution which accepts competitiveness and self-centredness as natural is a twisting of the facts to suit their own demand.42

There is nothing new in this, as we noted in chapter one, Descartes could be blamed for encouraging conceptual solitude. Read in context Cogito Ergo Sum is set forth in order to 'discover the distinction between the mind and the body or between a thinking and corporeal thing'.43 Descartes' opposition to the body and his inheritance of
the tradition that saw man as an unfortunate trapped by matter is clear, and seen in remarks such as, 'But what is a man? Shall I say a rational animal? Assuredly not...' Or, 'it is plain I am not the assemblage of members called the human body.' He is happy to exalt the mind and the 'I' over the whole person and the community, without which either could not exist. In her paper 'The Objection to Systematic Humbug,' this is a theme Midgley develops at length, that to stress the intelligence and the individual leads to egoism and unconcern for others. This, in theological terms, is sin, although such language is not employed by Midgley herself.

No particular moment is identified, but what is suggested by reading Midgley is that in man's developing self-consciousness, just as this bestowed on him great capacity for advancement via thought, so in enabling him just to see himself, it created the possibility of selfishness. The scientific progress of self-consciousness developed the moral issue of selfishness. The issue was compounded by the stress on the one issue, the factor of intelligence which in its development made self-consciousness possible, while in itself not being a positive moral factor. Thus self-consciousness coupled with intelligence gave man the free choice to exercise the easy option, to consider just himself rather than his role in the world and the species of which he is a dependent part. Evolution's bestowal upon man of self-consciousness and free choice in intelligence gives him the option lacking to the other animals, of
considering only himself as one ego. Other species although lacking human intelligence nonetheless do have a 'programmed' altruism towards members of their own species, of which and do not indulge in the horrific cruelty men have proved capable. That man finds himself in this position is testified to by man's being aware that better possibilities exist. His sense of inadequacy stems from his awareness that he has not done as well as he would have liked. In outline form this is offered as an account of a 'Fall' reconciled with an evolutionary world view, but which still enables man to be held morally responsible, and which could usefully have been appropriated in a work like Vanstone's.

Buber in I and Thou suggests a similar divide between an I-it and an I-thou relationship. It will be remembered that the first is the relationship of use, while the second treats the you as an existent in itself. Buber regards 'primitive man (as speaking) the basic word I-you in a natural, as it were still unformed manner, not yet having recognised himself as an I', since 'even in the primitive function of cognition one cannot find any cogitans ergo sum of even the most naive kind.' Only as man evolves, (again no one moment can be identified), does self consciousness develop:

once the I of the relation has emerged and has become existent in its detachment, it somehow otherrealizes and functionalizes itself .. . once the sentence "I see the tree" has been pronounced in such a way that it no longer relates a relation between a human I and a tree You but the perception of the tree object by the human consciousness, it has erected the crucial barrier between subject and object; the basic word I-it, the word of separation, has been spoken.
Thus a process occurred in primitive man by which the It relation appeared and it formed a sort of Fall:

Then you believe after all in some paradise in the primal age of humanity? - Even if it was a Heil ... unreal it was not. Primal man's experiences of encounter were scarcely a matter of tame delight; but even violence against a being one really confronts is better than ghostly solicitude for faceless digits! From the former a path leads to God, from the latter only to nothingness. 49

Buber accepts a process in evolution by which men lapsed. The opportunity for the 'Thou' relation was lost and replaced by the poorer I-it relation in which the I uses the 'it' rather than respects it as 'you'. The same process is repeated in each one of us according to Buber in our infant life, for 'the prenatal life of the child is a pure natural association', the child possesses a basic drive for relation yet still it falls into ceasing to regard 'you' but creating 'it' in its development. 50 Intelligence thus enables man in Buber and Midgley to exercise a choice to take the easier though more disastrous option of regarding 'you' as 'it'.

Exactly the same theme it may be contended is seen in a third author, the novelist D.H. Lawrence, in Lady Chatterley's Lover. Here it is held, a major theme is the destruction of the human personality that comes through the exaltation of mind, and the forgetting of relation and of the wholeness of man. Hoggart's 'Introduction' goes to some length to make this point. He notes Lawrence's commitment to marriage and fidelity, on wholeness in man's life, against which intelligence seen in industrialisation is the great threat. He writes that, 'here Lawrence is insisting that if we regard man as a mechanical unit in a mechanical
society...then we cut off some of the springs of life—and so make relationships of integrity and wholeness even harder to arrive at'. Lawrence's theme is exactly that of Buber and Midgley that 'life is only bearable when the mind and the body are in harmony...obscenity only comes in when the mind despises and rears the body'. Clifford (whether maimed or not) and his friends share a view in which 'sex was merely an accident or an adjunct, one of the curious obsolete, organic processes which persisted in its own clumsiness but was not really necessary'. In Lawrencian terms intelligence misused makes men regard their wholeness, their sexual aspect much as Adam regarded his nakedness. Selfishness, a purely mental view of life and the lack of a 'thou' relation, are linked with ceasing to regard oneself as a whole being in community.

Accordingly the result is that, 'Hammond...with a wife and two children, but much more closely connected with a typewriter,' believed in 'the life of the mind...all hinges on the instinct for success. That is the pivot on which all things turn'. The succeeding pages show Lawrence delivering a relentless attack on the 'Bolshevism' of the mind. The character Dukes says, 'there's something wrong with the mental life, radically. It's rooted in spite and envy, envy and spite.' 'Real knowledge comes out of the whole corpus of the consciousness, out of your belly and your penis as much as out of your brain and mind. The mind can only analyse and rationalise...to criticise and make a deadness'.
The last three authors of whom only Buber is a theist, show how it is possible in accepting evolution as fact and rejecting literal interpretations still to possess a view of the world in which a concept of the Fall, whether termed such or not is tenable. All three share a belief that in the employment of intelligence man has made a fundamental mistake. It is not that intelligence itself is wrong, but that in the growth of self consciousness men become aware of the possibilities of short cuts, of taking apparently easy options, of regarding 'I' only and to hell with the rest. Intelligence as Midgley noted, instead of serving moral categories becomes the category in itself and exalts the 'I' in itself — Cogito ergo sum. Lawrence's message was exactly the same, that the supreme elements in life, compassion, tender loving care for another are ignored: 'All the great words it seemed to Connie were cancelled for her generation: love, joy, happiness ... All that remained was a stubborn stoicism', the only exception being the desire for money, 'Money, success, the bitch goddess ... that was a permanent necessity'.

Both the humanists Lawrence and Midgley perceive that a recovery of the value of love, notwithstanding differences in their perception of it, was fundamental to the recovery of human wholeness. As has been noted, Vanstone's analysis revolves around God as love. This from an ethical standpoint is the subject matter of our work. Thus in order to perceive what from the Christian sense the value of love
might mean in a human context, it is important to consider amongst the other issues of self and neighbour love the end for which a loving God creates man. To have an inkling of what man is intended for may help in the understanding of how man conducts himself now. Two comments from Midgley may serve to direct the way. The first must be read with Vanstone's strictures concerning love's essential demand for the preservation of human freedom in mind. It might seem a throw-away comment in its context but it contains much of significance for the position adopted in this work, that evolution is to be reconciled to the notion of God's creating free beings. Midgley postulates a revision of Genesis to the effect that 'the Lord wanted free servants and therefore so devised evolution that it was bound to produce them'.59 There may well be much more truth in this comment than Midgley may wish to allow, for in outline this is the doctrine of Vanstone. It thus needs to be held in the background of a discussion of man's end, and of the means to that end. This sense of God being concerned for men out of love for them as ends, out of a wider scenario than pure mental life is developed in the second of Midgley's comments. She has been attacking the exaltation of purely mental life, and thus the Platonist view of God as 'pure mind. She grants that Christianity has perceived the necessity for a wider portrait to safeguard man's wholeness. Hence it is an achievement of Christianity to define God as love. Interestingly she then quotes Traherne as perceiving this, and its effect upon man being that,
'God did infinitely for us when he made us want like Gods, that like Gods we might be satisfied . . . He wanted the communication of his divine essence and persons to enjoy it.'

It is Traherne's consideration of the end of man that shall now be examined. This is noteworthy in his development of this theme from a commitment to the notion that God is love, and consequently from an acceptance of the goodness of the material world: 'The end for which you were created, is that by prizing all that God hath done, you may enjoy yourself and Him in Blessedness'.

His use of Trinitarian doctrine in his theology of love has already been noted. Traherne's message although repeated in many different manners in the Centuries is at its root very simple. Love is such that it simply has to be in its nature the essence of God. If it is his nature, then so it ought to be in his creatures. Thus their end is to live the life of love in its fullness. Traherne writes that, 'Love is so divine and perfect a thing, that it is worthy to be the very end and being of the Deity', and in the same breath he speaks of the created soul: 'By loving a Soul does propagate and beget itself . . . above all by Loving it does attain itself . . . Till they love they are desolate.' From the same passage it is interesting to note an aspect of Traherne that might seem odd in relation to the assumption made about the passivity of mystical theology, which is certainly how Traherne is to be classified. It is also significant in being allied with a positive appreciation
of the world, it is his identification of love and act. Thus in the passage considered the final line ran, 'Till we become therefore all Act as God is, we can never rest, nor ever be satisfied'. Traherne's concept of Act refers to a lively sense of adoration and worship to judge from the biblical quotations he cites in support.64

The main theme of Traherne in the context of this chapter must be his link between a positive theology of the end of man and of the role of creation consequent upon the adoption of a love theology. The world as God's creation guarantees that since all in it must be honoured as God's, this safeguards the self's own role. 'The world does serve you, not only as it is the place and receptable of all your joys, but as it is a great obligation laid upon all mankind, and upon every person in all ages to love you as himself.'65 Despite living in an age much harsher than today, Traherne celebrates the joys of the material world throughout his writings: 'As the world serves you by shewing the greatness of God's love to you, so doth it serve you as a fuel to foment and increase your praises'.66 Favourite phrases to be found in connection with creation in Traherne are 'their creator's joy' and 'the greatness of his bounty', and so can be read 'The heavens and the earth serve you ... in shewing Unto you your Father's Glory'.67 Acceptance of the world's joys is enjoined, for 'Objective treasures are always delightful: and though we travail endlessly, to see them all our own is infinitely pleasant'.68 Yet in the same breath Traherne is careful to link gift and giving.
He accepts specifically our 'desire to have all alone in our private possession, coupled with 'the communicative humour that is in us'. This enables him, as has already been discussed, to resolve the conflict between the self and the other from his understanding of the nature of creation, its essential goodness in the hands of God.

In this the key to perceiving the world aright is to understand the nature of love in reference to God. One cannot avoid re quoting. 'Love is the true means by which the world is enjoyed ... There are many glorious excellencies in the material World, but without Love they are all abortive ... Love in the end is the glory of the world and the Soul of Joy'. Traherne is explicit concerning the end to which this love leads, for, 'To sit in the Throne of God is the most supreme estate that can befall a creature. It is promised in the Revelations. But few understand what is promised there and but few believe it'. There is an essential link between this future state and the present world which echoes Paul's Romans 8; Traherne writes that 'To sit in the Throne of God is to inhabit Eternity. To reign there is to be pleased with all things in Heaven and Earth from everlasting to everlasting, as if we had the sovereign disposal of them'. The Throne of God is defined as, 'The Omnipresence therefore, and the Eternity of God are our Throne, wherein we are to reign for evermore. His infinite and eternal Love are the borders of it'. Traherne's mystical hope is that human life will be fulfilled as it was intended to be by participation in the
life of God which itself embraces the totality of heaven and earth. The hope is sustained by the overwhelming conviction of the essential goodness of the world as an expression of love's creative activity, which allows for a positive assessment of the possibilities of such matters as self love which in other analyses are often problematic.

The theology of love Traherne adopts is thus the control for his analysis of the world, with its stress on the dignity of man as a creature, and the importance of our response. Hence he can write of 'The Supreme Architect and our Everlasting Father, having made the world, this most glorious house and magnificent Temple of His divinity'; and then of 'that for infinite reasons it was best that he (man) should be in a changeable estate and have power to choose what he himself listed: For he may so choose as to become one Spirit with God Almighty', and 'By choosing a man may be turned and converted into love'. Such thoughts relate to two of the other authors considered in this study. Positively they relate to Vanstone, the link to God as artist already having been commented on in the previous chapter. At this point the link can be seen in their sharing of the position that love demands choice and therefore of the supreme necessity to safeguard choice and freedom. It should be obvious how Traherne, with his high regard for the material world complements Vanstone. It is argued that this is due to their sharing a common theology of love which makes creation valuable, and of their desire to see love as a genuine communication of being in which respect by the
Creator for his own creation's integrity is fundamental. Negatively the consequences of an adoption of a different theology of love upon creation can be examined by a study of Anders Nygren's work.

Comparisons with Nygren have already been made, with respect to the consequences of his theology of love upon the doctrine of the Trinity. It has been argued that the non-use of the Trinity reflected a theology of love which did not stress relation and the need for individual integrity, whereas a positive demand for the integrity of the creature is at the heart of Vanstone and Traherne. They believe this to be the case because God's work would be lost if the creature's integrity was prejudiced. In their doctrine of love the control is the integrity of the lover's self. With Nygren the consequences of the adoption of a different control in his theology of love upon the doctrine of creation are evident. In Nygren's case his control is the Protestant conception of the sovereignty of God, and the doctrines of sin and fall. Nygren makes the nature of Agape centre around the comment of Jesus', 'I came not to call the righteous but sinners'. 76

The idea of 'sinners' is fundamental but Nygren develops it in such a manner through the notion of fall that men cannot have the independent reality Traherne and Vanstone value. Nygren's exegesis is tailored to fit the argument. Thus he takes Mark 2:17 at face value and accepts that 'the righteous go empty away', 77 this though is in
order to allow God's sovereignty to dominate. Since God takes the initiative in pouring his love out on sinners, man in his righteousness may not play a role in salvation. The problem here is that Jesus' comment was ironic, - the righteous were in fact sinners identical to every one else. In other words sin as a universal condition, so the necessity for all to be of grace, which can be interpreted in a very different manner to Nygren's. Nygren presumably knows of the ironic nature of Jesus' comment, but his purpose is to destroy the claim of independence that the idea of righteousness suggests and to reinforce his opinion of humans as sinners, who are entitled to nothing, rather than as creatures given an independent dignity.

The theme is made clear under Nygren's heading 'Agape is Creative'. A lengthy quotation is worthwhile to illustrate the difference between Nygren and the position of Traherne and Vanstone. He writes:

It is not that God loves that which is in itself worthy to be loved, but on the contrary, that which in itself is without value acquires value by the fact that it is the object of God's love. Agape is the direct opposite of that love which is called out by the worthiness of its object and so may be said to be a recognition of the value and attractiveness of its object. The man whom God loves has not any value in himself. His value consists simply in the fact that God loves him.

In one sense this could be interpreted alongside Vanstone to mean that the creature is wholly contingent every moment upon God the Saviour, his value is a gift, man is not an eternal existent, he is creature. However this is not how Nygren applies this, and herein is the significance of
'that which in itself is without value acquires value.'

Vanstone could not have written this because in existing the being has value as a creature. Nygren has the notion of the being's existing without value as a sinner and then being given value by Agape. The result is that Nygren in not ascribing any value to creation, and opting instead for a view of the sinner's existence as wholly without value and fallen, reintroduces the problem of dualism. This Vanstone/in his acceptance of the creature's value by virtue of his existing as a creature.

Thus for Nygren man is a being with no independence or rights, he has no freedom he is simply a being for God to act upon.\textsuperscript{50} 'Agape starts from the conviction of man's own worthlessness. When man has fallen away from God, he is wholly lost, and of no value at all.'\textsuperscript{79} Nygren's conception of creation, sin and fall is wholly different from the Vanstonian/Traherneian position. It creates a new dualism in which the sinner remains in existence, independent of God's grace and thus worthless. Man's integrity is thus destroyed and a sheep and goats mentality created. This position results from a refusal to consider any alternative between his own view and that of the Greeks he opposes which opts for 'the idea of the infinite value of the human soul'.\textsuperscript{80} Taken in its own terms it is agreed with Nygren that the latter is not a Christian idea but then it is certainly not Traherne's or Vanstone's either.

They stand for an option regarding Creation which makes the independence and integrity of even sinful man of vital
importance to the proper fulfillment of God's Creation. Men's value is wholly derived from God as creator, but by virtue of being in existence, even as sinners they must as objects of love destined for loving communion with God, retain genuine freedom of choice. In a creation, to exist must be to be of value, for Nygren to have valueless existence in creation is a conceptual contradiction. They appreciate, as Nygren does not, that the condition of freedom is the essential God-given component of humanity:

"O Adam . . . All other things have a nature bounded within certain laws: thou only art loose from all and according to thy own council in the hand of which I have put thee, mayst choose and prescribe what nature thou wilt to thyself . . . We have made thee neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal, that being the honoured former and framer of thyself, thou mayst shape thyself into what nature thyself pleasest". 81

D.D. Williams specifically condemns Nygren for his attitude concerning God's love and human freedom. He cannot accept Nygren's stress on love's 'uncaused' nature, that is that it does not relate to the value of the beloved. He writes of Nygren that 'love is meaningless without causality'. 82 Williams' position is drawn both from an appreciation of the value in creation and from the scientific perception of cause and effect. He is concerned that love should maintain a freedom that is compatible with a degree of causality, so spontaneity as freshness rather than arbitrariness is acceptable alongside causality. This
position accepts that man is a complex composite creature, who is acted upon by external forces, but who nonetheless has an innovative capacity to alter circumstances. For Williams the future is not fixed, man has to create it in conjunction with natural forces and the Spirit of God, and this returns us to Vanstone's ideas on Providence which are to be studied presently.

Behind the positive thought of Vanstone, Traherne and Williams lies imago dei theology. This is an ancient tradition built around Genesis 1:26 and of particular importance in the Orthodox tradition. However it is explicitly used by both Traherne and Williams. The idea of being in God's image is associated generally with the notion of choice. Man, like God, is capable of free choice, hence its appearance in these authors and its disfavour with those who distrust freedom. Traherne writes that 'the image of God was not seated in the features of your face but in the lineaments of your Soul. In the knowledge of your Powers, Inclinations, and Principles the knowledge of yourself chiefly consisteth'. Williams devotes a heading to the issue. He holds that the idea of man made in God's image is wholly Biblical and grants that the crucial question is what happens to the image in face of sin. He notes the Catholic answer to the question using the distinction of Irenaeus between tselem and āemuth within the text of Genesis 1. Tselem stands for the image, that is the endowment of men with reason and dominion, their
likeness to God in respect of being able to choose, being rational. These faculties although warped remain substantially intact such that natural man can recognise his predicament and chose to turn to God and be saved. Demuth stands for the similitude, that is the graces of faith, hope and love, for in the Fall these are held to be lost entirely. This schema forms the ground plan for the Catholic position of grace completing nature. Man to be saved required God's act. The independence he has, cannot in itself save him, but it can allow him to perceive his situation and to choose whether he will accept God's aid to redeem him.

Such a position is clearly helpful to a theology like Vanstone's which stresses the freedom of man while wishing to retain the role of grace. It also has its application to the Augustinian/Pelagian controversy in reconciling both elements, which should be remembered in reading the next chapter. As Williams notes, this position was inimical to the Protestant Reformers, the consequences of which have already been seen in the remarks concerning Nygren. For the Reformers, according to Williams, not only was the similitude lost but the whole image of God was left in ruins. The Reformers feared the Catholic confidence in human reason and determined that grace must be over all and so erected what this present study must regard as the false opposition between grace and man's free will. In their view the image of God was the 'original righteousness' with which God had endowed Adam and this original right relationship has been lost in its entirety in the Fall. Williams makes the
interesting point that both systems lose man's relation to love. In the Catholic, the loss of the similitude leads to the loss of the three theological virtues including that of love. Granted this problem, the Catholic scheme does preserve man's freedom in a manner the Protestant does not. Williams himself develops a new sense for the \textit{imago dei}. He does not wish to regard it as a special quality (the nature) but by his application of process theology, the \textit{imago dei} is to stand for the relation in which man is created with his neighbour before God. It is to stress man's personal qualities including love, and it thus refers not to a static concept of human nature but to a dynamic personal view of life in which love is the key. \textit{Imago dei} is the form of creation for a life fulfilled in love, and sin becomes the failure to realise the life of love.

It would be impossible to discuss Process Theology in detail here, but by quoting Williams it is possible to see how important traditional themes are, even if modified. Williams thoughts on the \textit{imago dei} together with the classical formulations of it are of importance for Vanstone's theology of love together with its stress on men's freedom. Likewise as will be seen Williams stands akin to Vanstone in his doctrine of God. Indeed comparing the two raises the interesting question, as to what extent does Vanstone, who eschews particular positions, write as a process theologian? A theme of equal traditional importance to the \textit{imago dei}, and which like it has undergone current
rewriting and is also of importance to a theology of love, is that of Beatitude. In this case it is Traherne who has provided the link between a commitment to love on the part of God towards man, and man's final end in a life of bliss. In Jacques Maritain, a Catholic author, the stress on Beatitude as the life of love has been examined to illuminate Jesus' saying that 'today thou shalt be with me in paradise'. With such a rich concept of the afterlife the problem of regard and of self-centered ethics appears, hence Maritain will be examined in more detail in the chapter on 'self love'. Likewise Moltmann (developed elsewhere) shows a renewed Protestant commitment to the joyfulness of man's end in its relation to God's glory.

Under the broad heading of Creation Ethics, this chapter has examined three headings in connection with the criterion that God is love. Those headings have been the idea of God as an artist in creation, the problem of the Fall and the question of man's end. The three are related since their reconciliation is required if an ordered view of creation is to be achieved which takes science and particularly evolution into account. The image of God as an artist in Vanstone's portrait enabled an identification to be made between God's activity and a creation with a degree of order, that is not one of sheer randomness but one of scientific causality, yet a creation that is not to be determined either scientifically or theologically. The image of God as artist was also seen to be compatible with
the idea of God as love, in that it allows the lover to respect the integrity of the beloved, God with his creation. Such an evolving image also allowed the hope of Beatitude, the thought that the end of man is not in utter disjunction from this world's experience.

This world is thus of great consequence for the hereafter. This thought was linked to Biblical tradition particularly in Paul, to Vanstone, and especially to Traherne's very positive use of the world which he celebrates throughout the *Centuries*. Such assessments were shown to be very different from those of Protestants such as Nygren using a very pessimistic doctrine of sin. The question of sin and the fall has been noted as the major problem in considering the creation. It was noted as a problem that Vanstone did not face squarely. Equally the Nygrenesque answer is totally unsatisfactory, for it revives the problem of Dualism and is not consonant with the nature of love and its stress upon the necessity of free response.

Thus an attempt was made to begin to develop a notion of fall consonant with evolution which does leave man responsible for sin. Consideration of the Creation in relation to the notion of God as love is thus seen to be important both from the manner of perceiving God's creative activity and thus the revelation of his nature, and from considering the problem that our experience of the creation is not all we would want it to be. There is both the question of our wrongdoing and also of the physical nature of the universe. The latter returns us to the notion of the necessity of
some form of evolution for the free development of matter for our own human freedom to exist. Such issues form the meat of following chapters, i.e., freedom in the next chapter, and further consideration of man's end in the chapter 'self-may love' - what/man expect for himself?

By studying the ontological question of the nature of relation and being, with the thought that 'God is love', positive consequences for the nature of man have been drawn. The importance of the Trinity in safeguarding the necessity of relation for the fulfillment of being has a vital role to play in safeguarding the being of men. Unless God is himself relational, the importance of relation for men cannot be deduced by the theist. Yet as many humanists appreciate, as we saw in Midgley, relation is fundamental to human being. These two chapters of ontology lay the groundwork for the following chapters in which the practical consequences of the Trinitarian God of love are examined. Chiefly attention must be given to the providential action of a God of love seeking to respect his creatures' integrity. The creatures' integrity is directly consequential from the nature of love which demands free relation and this requires 'space' for its development. So God's grace and providence, if they be of a God of love, dedicated to the freedom of His creature's response may well take on an unfamiliar form.
CHAPTER THREE
FREEDOM, GRACE, AND PROVIDENCE

The object of this chapter will be to consider how these three interrelated issues may be portrayed in harmony with the work of earlier chapters. The three are not to be considered in isolation. Elsewhere in this work the view has been developed of a God, who in Trinity forms a community of being complete in itself, through love. This God from the overwhelming fullness of love desires to create a world and beings to share this divine communion. Since this God is taken to be the God of love and it is axiomatic that love can only be offered out of a free willingness to God, the faculty of freedom is integral to man. Thus a concept of God built around the notion of love and of creation as outlined, requires conceptions of grace and providence which do not prejudice the freedom of man held to be vital to him. Traditionally it is these two concepts which often seem to prejudice freedom. Likewise the classic, 'if God knows of evil, He must be able to remove it, He does not therefore He is not' argument has depended on views of grace and providence which ascribe 'total' power to God. It will be attempted in what follows
to show how the concept of God which has been used throughout this work both serves to guarantee our human freedom, and also in some measure to reconcile a God of grace to the continued existence of evil and suffering in this world.

In our estimation it is the recent work of Hubert Vanstone which shows very clearly the link between the doctrine of God as love and the consequences which follow for the conceptions of the nature of men's freedom and the doctrines of grace and providence. An analysis will thus be given of Vanstone's work. Parallels to his work in other theologians will also be noted as will be the consequent problems, within the structure of 'Vanstonian' providence.

Vanstone prepares the way for his analysis of grace and providence by formulating his conception of God. He creates his picture of the God of love via an analogy from human love. He regards this as justifiable since he holds that the word love cannot meaningfully be used without first appreciating our ordinary human experience thereof. Secondly he uses a via negativa. That is, he defines three 'marks' which deny love in the human sense and from this holds that God must exemplify the converse. The first mark is that of limitation. Love never withholds itself, unless there is good reason for the sake of the beloved. When men test love, they can only by trials establish love's falsity, its authenticity can never be 'proven'. A totality of self giving is essential; by loving, the self makes itself available. If this can be said of the best of human love, it
should also be said of the divine. The characteristic expression of the limitlessness of divine love is in the notion of Christ's endless forgiveness. The second negative mark is that of control. In human love, if the lover is in control of the beloved then love fails. Love is activity for the sake of the other and not self aggrandisement. If the beloved is under the control of the lover, the beloved is no longer other and so no longer beloved, but merely an extension of one's own ego. Vanstone gives as an example, the son living at home with his mother who has got him 'where he is'. Love is always distorted by possession and control that is one sided. Conversely where the beloved is really other, the activity of love is always precarious. True human love has no certainty of completion because true love relies on mutuality and therefore in this world's setting is precarious and vulnerable. With human beings, true love is always open to disappointment. For example, Vanstone quotes the problems of children's upbringing. Wanting the children to discover for themselves is balanced by the temptation never to expose them to any danger. In Vanstone's eyes control of one party by another is very different from tender mutual concern and is fatal to love, which ought always to be marked by vulnerability and precariousness.

It should by now be clear what sort of influence Vanstone's portrayal of these 'marks' is going to have on the doctrines of freedom, grace and providence. With the first mark, that of limitlessness, one can imagine the
majority of Christians feeling no unease whatsoever. However when the second mark is translated to God, many Christians might feel that the doctrine of Providence was under threat. Is not the essence of man's security precisely that he is under the control of God? The understanding of God being in control over his children has been fundamental to Christian theology, whether in extremis such that men are merely machines, or in more moderate 'popularist' views that 'God will make it come right in the end', the view that whatever happens was all really for the best. Fatalism in a weak form is very comforting, one no longer has to excuse one's failures. Vanstone however has virtually overturned this theology. 'Virtually' is stressed, for it is vital to note that Vanstone will display a means by which God remains Lord.

Certainly his intention under this heading is to give to human beings a remarkably radical form of freedom. Thus if what is said of men under this heading is referred to God, it would seem that God is voluntarily relinquishing aspects of his potential control over human beings, to which he might be entitled by virtue of his sovereignty. From the orthodox viewpoint, what is most questionable is the suggestion of God's precariousness and vulnerability, as if anything that mere mortals might do could effect the Almighty God. It is as if it is being suggested that God is hurt when men take no notice of him, angry he might be but not hurt (irony). What Vanstone suggests must be very threatening to many but it does seem to be a theology which
is giving the ability to determine the fate of the universe into the hands of men as a gift of God. This would seem a providence much more acceptable to today's scientific world view. Parallels are clearly visible with the 'evolutionary' theology of Teilhard de Chardin by which man's obstinacy is able to impair evolutionary progress. Man's acceptance or not of love determines for Teilhard whether he reaches his God-given end or not.

This challenging of traditional portrayals is completed by Vanstone's analysis of the third mark, that of detachment. It must be remembered that in the Greek view of God which Christianity has in large measure inherited, detachment, God's self-sufficiency and invulnerability are key features of God's being God. In some forms of monastic spirituality too, it has been axiomatic to strive for detachment, for 'separation unto God' from all attachments to the world and other persons. In human terms Vanstone portrays the negative mark of detachment as a self-sufficiency which is unaffected and unimpaired by the one whom it professes to love. If love is described as a self-giving it ought, according to Vanstone, to give a power over oneself to the other. In loving another we are giving to the other a certain power over oneself. Detachment for Vanstone is greatly to be feared because it destroys vulnerability. It removes the power to make the other and/or oneself angry, glad, sorrowful and joyful. Ironically it is the idol of the modern era with its desire 'to have no ties', where self-sufficiency and independence are held up as ideals. Vanstone allows
detachment as he allowed control, only if it is exercised to foster the development of the beloved. Thus a parent may have to become detached from a child in order to let it mature.

In contrast to much theological writing either on the doctrine of self-sufficiency or upon spirituality Vanstone emphasizes attachment and vulnerability between God and man. He thus raises the question of man's contingency - does God need us? This was tackled under 'Trinity and Relation'. Now Vanstone's portrait of God, rendered vulnerable to the decisions of men, who has endowed them with very great freedom, and who wishes to be a partner with men in mutuality and not control, is accepted and connected to the three doctrines under consideration. It can be noted, however, that the American theologian Donald Goergen provides a broadly similar analysis of detachment at the human level. He uses the terms dependence and independence and notes how: 'Too often we identify dependence as a negative trait and independence as a positive one'. His ideal term is that of interdependence. His book, however, is an analysis of human relations particularly in the realm of celibate spirituality and does not make a central issue of linking human-human ideals of relation to the divine-human relation in Vanstone's manner. However, like Vanstone, he does accept the propriety of applying an analogy drawn from human experience to the divine. He does this by noting how the church has often used the Song of Solomon as a
spiritual metaphor of the relation between Christ and the Church. So Goergen is able to state, 'Even interpreted allegorically, it tells us something about sexuality in that the relationship between the two lovers is used as an appropriate way to symbolize the mystical union'.

Even in Paul he finds the use of human love as a symbol of Christ's love. Sexual union is thus sacramental, at its best a sign of divine love. For Goergen the significance of sexuality is that it reveals that we are not created self-subsistent being against all the tendencies to stress monadism whether in man or more dangerously in God.

If then with Vanstone, the validity of the human metaphor of love is accepted, it has been seen that this portrayal of love as vulnerable, attached and giving a degree of control to the beloved will have considerable effect on Freedom, Grace and Providence. This is made abundantly clear in the following chapter where the human analogy is applied to Christ's redeeming work. He uses the category of *kenosis* not simply as a description of how Christ became man, but as being in harmony with the three marks of the analogy of love. *Kenosis* becomes a summary of the whole divine relation to the created order, 'the God Who is revealed is the very God who 'empties Himself' - whose whole and total activity is the activity of self-emptying, or *kenosis*'.

God becomes a kenotic God. The objection that if God empties himself he becomes less than his fullness is answered by retorting that his fullness is fulfilled in his very nature of self giving. *Kenosis* in
Christ is not just a means of God becoming man in order to redeem us - a technical feat - but the natural expression of God's being who will not withhold anything of himself for his creatures. *Kenosis* thus affects the notions of grace and providence not just in the divine action in Christ but in the doctrine of creation. Creation is the result of God's kenotic activity as is its sustenance and its redemption in Christ.

The creation of the world is thus a totally kenotic act on the part of God which must reflect the three marks of love. There can be no limit in God's own self giving. The whole of God is expended in the creative and sustaining act according to Vanstone: 'Nothing must be withheld from the self giving which is Creation: no unexpended reserve of divine power or potentiality: no "glory of God" or "majesty of God"'.

It is not as if having created man, a part of the divine nature carries on as before unaltered by what has happened. God did not have to create, but once embarked on the course, it would be against the nature of God, according to Vanstone to hold back anything of his being. All this activity of God takes place in an evolutionary world, and the example Vanstone develops is the evolution of artistic talent. The artist who having the crude material, by his ability shapes it to the desired end, and is able if talented to turn mistakes into beauty. The power, absolute and supreme which God exercises in creation is that of love. It is therefore a limitless
capacity for self giving, and not a naked power, it is power to cope creatively with any situation but it is not power to behave arbitrarily. God's nature is loving and therefore trustworthy, his power serves love and not vice versa.

The kenotic God of love who creates cannot do so by an assured programme. Creation cannot be the exercise of naked power, rather it is the spending of his own being in order to create beings who can freely respond to communion with God. For that free response, and to do justice to the evolving world, the activity of God cannot abuse the mark of control. If God controlled men they would no longer be able to love him freely. God's activity in creation and therefore providence must be precarious:

Its progress, like every progress of love, must be an angular progress - in which each step is a precarious step into the unknown; in which each triumph contains a new potential of tragedy, and each tragedy may be redeemed into a wider triumph. 15 i.e.

Thus although the end is in view, the Kingdom, God's being God gives him the power to cope with whatever evolution and man's freedom may present en route without prejudicing the course of either. Vanstone's argument is that the nature of love, even divine love, must demand a creation much as it is; there is no fall from a primaeval glory. Rather he adheres to the twin demands of humanism, that the natural order is not to be miraculously interfered with, and that man's independence is not prejudiced by God. Instead a powerful portrait of divinity built around the
concept of love is so presented as to require evolution and human freedom in order to conform to the experimental nature of love. God creates for the end of voluntary communion, creator and creature, and to this end God has to work within the natural processes.

Vanstone is quite blunt that because God is love even he does not fully know the precise shape of the end of Creation, however he is capable of coping with whatever is produced. A lengthy quotation well illustrates this:

If the creation is the work of love, then its shape cannot be predetermined by the Creator, nor its triumph foreknown; it is the realisation of vision, but of vision which is discovered only through its own realisation: and faith in its triumph is neither more nor less than faith in the Creator Himself - faith that He will not cease from His handiwork nor abandon the object of His love. The creation is "safe" not because it moves by programme towards a predetermined goal but because the same loving creativity is ever exercised upon it. 16

The influence of Vanstone's use of love upon the concept of God is now seen to be clearly evident in Providence. He produces a picture which many Christians would find frankly frightening. The precise shape of the end of creation is simply not known to God, for the sake of evolution's own unfettered development, and man's own freedom to respond. Faith in God by man, is not faith in the certainty that God will lead him to a fixed end, but that faith in God's action leads to an as yet unknown but highly appropriate end. Again a parallel can be seen in Teilhard de Chardin's thought where evolution's final fulfillment depends on man's voluntary co-operation with God.17 Vanstone has
pushed the analogy between God and artistic creation very far indeed. His picture will certainly be more readily reconcilable with an evolutionary world view, but for traditional theology God has been stripped of attributes normally applied to him such as omniscience, omnipotence and his impassibility.

The classic problem of Providence is that of innocent suffering and Vanstone offers an explanation of this to fit in with his concept of artistic creation in love. Again it seems to fit in with an evolutionary world view but to be at odds with earlier Christian concepts. Vanstone ascribes physical evil to what he terms the precariousness of creation — which is in scientific eyes, the random and causal elements, creation is not sensitive to man's wishes. Physical evil is not for him due to maliciousness on the part of Creation, a view which Christians starting with the Genesis texts have sometimes veered to. Vanstone emphasizes that this is no radical dualism, but is simply the nature of creative love. Since that which is created has to be 'other', it has to be free to be allowed its own possibilities. These cannot be 'foreknown but must be discovered; (and) that its possibility must be "worked out" in the creative process itself; and that the working out must include the correction of the step which has proved a false step.\textsuperscript{19} Genesis even with God resting on the seventh day makes creation seem effortless. Vanstone notes this, holding that the language used 'conveys an impression of easy control and limited endeavour, of resources held in reserve and power unused.'\textsuperscript{20}
It is against this image, popular in devotion, and for the sake of accepting the evidence of great wastage and loss in the physical process that Vanstone develops his alternative. 'Evil as evolutionary fallout' is the phrase used by Sproxton in his discussion of de Chardin's conception of evil, and it may also serve to describe Vanstone's view.21 This evil which is a consequence of the physical progress does not exist deliberately as a means to a greater good. All along it is only a 'possibility' consequent upon the allowance by God of freedom both to matter and people's own development - both are free to develop within their own boundaries. This does make sense if Vanstone's God is sovereign. His God is sovereign yet has not predestined evolution, so matter is freedom from the direct control of God in the same manner in which men's own freedom is more normally conceived. Freedom here is not 'a free for all' but a freedom to develop in conformity with its own laws or volition, under the sustaining but not directing providence of God. Evil then is the problematical moment unforeseen and unforeseeable.22 Vanstone cites the specific example of Aberfan.23 God here is firmly placed as allowing himself to be subject to the physical creation. He writes that, 'at the moment when the mountain of Aberfan slipped, "something went wrong"; the step of creative risk was the step of disaster: the creative process passed out of control.' God is portrayed not as looking on from above, permitting the disaster for 'His own inscrutable reasons', 
but as a God 'Who received, at the foot of the mountain, its appalling impact.'

Vanstone fits God into the naturalistic scenario. Nature is nature as science sees it, and God decided to risk its being such in his creation, secure only in the knowledge that he has the capability to cope. Of the classic doctrines of omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and impassibility, only omnipotence and omnipresence are left. Omniscience and impassibility have clearly been removed, albeit by God's own choice and for the sake of the freedom of his creatures as a consequence of the nature of love. 'Miraculous' interference is thus removed. The only difference between a Christian and a non-Christian judgement of creation is in the significance of the purpose that they attach to the material and not in their estimation of the physical processes. For Vanstone, the Christian's distinctive position is to see in the scientific processes a God at work ushering in through these, at great cost to himself, a Kingdom in which love will be all in all.

The problem of the lack of moral evil in this picture was discussed in the previous chapter. What needs to be emphasized here is just how radical a rewriting of the doctrine of God has occurred in Vanstone's work. Through his analysis of love, the doctrine of providence has been rewritten to harmonise with the natural sciences. The nature of God has been utterly changed from the accepted notions of impassibility, omniscience etc. Instead God does not 'know' very much about the precise future course
of creation; his distinctiveness is not in his 'knowledge' but in his creative power to love, which can cope with and redeem whatever is presented. This revelation of the kenotic nature of God is seen as the essence of the Incarnation. Immanence is being stressed rather than transcendence. God as outside the world has been firmly placed inside the creation, not as a cog or component, but as its creator who, unlike the clockmaker, does not sit back to watch having wound it up. God is the artist permanently and traumatically involved in his creation.

God is so involved in love for the creation and thus so concerned for its free response that in a final radical step, Vanstone holds out the possibility of our frustrating God's end. Since God is love and therefore vulnerable to the response of the other then:

the issue of His love as triumph or tragedy depends upon His creation. There is given to the creation the power to determine the love of God as either triumphant or tragic love. This power may be called "power of response": upon the response of the creation the love of God depends for its triumph or tragedy.

Man's freedom is so important that the possibility of failure due to our non-response has to be allowed for. This notion that men can frustrate God's purpose in a final sense is utterly at variance with prior Christian thought.

Here is theology at the limit. On the one hand Vanstone maintains that God's love can cope with all, and on the other, the possibility of our frustrating God is allowed in order to preserve our freedom and to stress our responsibility - there is an element of paradox present. Certainly
the sheer existence of sin and evil testifies to the existence of some degree of a frustration factor. Further, such a view of triumph or tragedy does harmonise with a creation in which scientists cannot discern any certain purpose - rather it is our choice to create it in harmony with God. It is not self-evident nor will it be miraculously imposed.

Vanstone's writing is recent - 1977. Also within the book he is not very forthcoming on the sources of his thought. This is deliberate, for both within the book and in correspondence, Vanstone makes clear that the inspiration for his work was principally derived from parish life. The rest of this chapter then will be an attempt to provide parallels and sources for the development of this radical doctrine of God and Providence. It will be seen from what a variety of traditions parallels can be drawn. This is important since Vanstone himself seems very reluctant to join any particular school. He certainly ought not to be simply labelled as a process theologian despite some affinities with that school of thought. One theologian whom he specifically quotes is Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Already, in the autobiographical chapter, he had been quoted as being a substantial influence in Vanstone's early ministry. The quotation that is used is from one of Bonhoeffer's poems - 'Christians and Pagans'. It is set in the context of a discussion of the vulnerability of God, the suffering he voluntarily undergoes at the hands of creation. Vanstone quotes only 'poor and scorned, without shelter
or bread, whelmed under weight of the wicked, the weak and dead' speaking of a God who is the subject of these lines. It must be said of what follows about Bonhoeffer, that there is the problem that all the material from the prison period is what might be termed experimental. It was all written in a period of great crisis and so was never fully developed. Thus the radical doctrine of God that has been discovered in Bonhoeffer's wartime writings is not a feature of the earlier Cost of Discipleship. It is witnessed to in this later work only by tempting snippets.

'Christians and Pagans' is a poem designed to stress the difference between the generally accepted concept of God - the pagan view, and what Bonhoeffer sees as the case - the Christian view. The ironic picture of the poem is that men go to God out of need, 'Men go to God when they are sore bestead', and instead find that they are going 'to a God when he is sore bestead, (and so) find him poor and scorned'. The Christian finds as in Vanstone that the crux of response is to 'stand by God in his hour of grieving', God indeed 'goes to every man when sore bestead'. The concept of God and thus of providence has been changed to portray God suffering at the hands of his creatures. This suffering God is the exact opposite of what much theology expects of God and accordingly changes the concept of providence. This is clearly seen in the other classic Bonhoeffer text on the matter. His comments on the incident in the Garden of Gethsemane start from a line of Christians and Pagans:
"Christians stand by God in his hour of grieving"; that is what distinguishes Christians from pagans. Jesus asked in Gethsemane, "Could you not watch with me one hour?" That is a reversal of what the religious man expects from God. Man is summoned to share in God's sufferings at the hands of a Godless world.

Subsequently these sentences have earned the title 'religionless Christianity'. What is evident is that if they are accepted, then the sort of portrayal of providence Vanstone adopts will follow. God has for the sake of his creatures abdicated certain of His powers such that He is the sufferer. As Bonhoeffer notes in the preceding letter, 'Man's religiosity makes him look in his distress to the power of God in the world. God is the deus ex machina. The Bible directs man to God's powerlessness and suffering; only the suffering God can help'.

To be sure there will be problems concerning Bonhoeffer's exegesis of the Biblical material. For our purposes though it is sufficient to demonstrate the consequences of adopting the language for this chapter's three doctrines. Clearly a God who suffers at the hands of a godless world, who is not the deus ex machina will operate a different sort of providence. One it is suggested, close to that provided by Vanstone. It is the latter who, it might be held, provides the developed picture of 'religionless Christianity' that Bonhoeffer was prevented from creating. The essence of this thought is not to turn away from this world, to seek to find God in another altogether more secure world, but to see the world itself with all its
pain as the stage of God's action, to participate in the pain of the world as God's pain. The radical separation generally used between the pain of persons and the being of God must be completely overcome if either Bonhoeffer's or Vanstone's words are taken seriously. God has been seen as attractive by many people in pain, as helping by virtue of his not suffering. Thus in the middle of pain, the painless serenity of God provides a pole to clutch. Bonhoeffer and Vanstone attack precisely this serene God. From the same Germanic tradition Buber provides a quotation concerning Christ in which the parallel to Bonhoeffer and Vanstone is plain. In *I and Thou* he writes of 'the equality of all lovers ... whose life is circumscribed by the life of one beloved human being to him that is nailed his life long to the cross of the world, capable of what is immense and bold enough to risk it: to love man'. Here are the same themes of the dominance of the interpretative category of love, the consequent stress not on naked power but on the inexhaustibility of love, and of the sense of 'continuing crucifixion', seen in Bonhoeffer and Vanstone. 

An even earlier parallel to Vanstone taking into account the scientific world view - Bonhoeffer's 'Man come of age', is provided by John Oman's work of 1917, *Grace and Personality*. Just as Vanstone by defining his concept of God around that of the human experience of love was enabled to rewrite the three doctrines, Oman too follows the same method. His analysis does not specifically revolve around the nature of love, - rather, he considers the demand of what he terms
'moral personality'. Since God has created persons, he cannot operate such a system of grace and providence as to destroy the conditions of freedom under which they were created to realise their personhood. Oman starts by noting how the tension has developed from the Enlightenment which made man aware of his independence, over against the 'religious' man's view of an external infallible authority; in the eyes of many the plainest inference from God's nature and man's need.

Oman proposes to challenge the whole notion of 'the might of omnipotence directed in an unswerving line of omniscience'. He holds that 'His omnipotence is an assumption based on the mere naked idea of absolute force and in no way concerned with the notion of God as Father'. Oman's argument is that the notion of God's providence tied up with infallibility and omnipotence has grown up not from moral theology but from a more primitive power theology based on the sovereignty of God. Crudely speaking this is the notion that since God created us and is Lord in terms of power, He can *de facto* do whatsoever He pleases without question from us. This is the doctrine of Calvin and of Paul in Romans, 'Will what is moulded say to the potter, "Why have you moulded me thus?" Has the potter no right over the clay to make out of the same lump one vessel for beauty and another for menial use?' Such writing is to be utterly rejected. Historically speaking the growth of such thought can be understood. God was initially feared and treated simply as power, however as moral
sensitivity has developed it is very clear that the naked exercise of power is morally dubious.

Concerning the moral ambiguity of sheer power both Vanstone and Oman use remarkably similar language. Vanstone too is identical to Oman in his disavowal of power theology and its effect on providence. Oman writes 'there is little to show that either truth or righteousness ever came by way of irresistible might', and, 'Would such irresistible might as would save us from all error and compel us into right action be in accord either with God's personality or with ours?'. Oman condemns 'All infallibilities (as presupposing) an idea of grace mechanically irresistible. But a direct force controlling persons as things is no personal relation between God and man'. The 'infallibilities' of omnipotence, omniscience etc. owe more to the thought of God as power, derived from the doctrine of sovereignty than from moral considerations. Likewise Vanstone writes that 'the imagery of popular devotion suggests a divine supremacy over the universe'. However the idea of supremacy is more appropriate to that of a tyrant - hence the atheistic reaction such language can precipitate. Thus, 'supremacy is not the relationship of the artist to the work of art, nor of the lover to the object of his love'. It is precisely the images of the lover and of the artist around which Vanstone revolves his portrait of God, and in the case of the lover this is an image also at the heart of Christian spirituality and is
a strand in Old Testament prophetic writing. Vanstone's own condemnation of the influence of power theology upon the three doctrines could hardly be more severe: 'That God should be superior in every or in any respect, to an inferior universe is a quite illegitimate deduction from the doctrine of creation'.

Too much stress on man's conscious rebellion against God stemming from an over literalistic interpretation of Genesis leads theologians to forget that controlling all reflection ought to be the notion of the end for which man is created, to share in the 'glory of God'. Jürgen Moltmann, whose theology also tends away from the thought of God's naked power, towards that of a God involved in the pain of this world and allowing himself to be subject to the natural forces, has also re-used the notion of the 'glory of God' as a controlling factor in our conception of ourselves and our purpose in partnership with God. In Theology and Joy he is at pains to stress that the end of man is enjoyment of and with God. The joy of play - not childishness but childlikeness in trust-has to be recovered. This is the thought of 'whosoever shall not receive the Kingdom of Heaven like a little child shall not enter it.' Moltmann recognises that categories like joy and the 'glory of God' have been eclipsed by power theology. He accepts that the 'dominion of God' is important to Biblical thought but holds that it is complemented to an equal degree by the 'Glory of God' which is 'God's display of splendour, his beauty and his kindness or loveliness'. In the same paragraph prominence is given to love, 'a love which does
not merely manifest itself ethically in love to the neighbour but also aesthetically in festive play before God, speaking of man's response, which is thus not simply obedience. Unfortunately the 'one-sided emphasis on the dominion of God in the Western church, especially in Protestantism, has subjected Christian existence to judicial and moral categories'. Here is a Calvinist theologian who has seen that naked power is unacceptable to Christian theology. He has seen that a consideration of our end as joy and love in the glory of God is necessary, and as his wider theology has shown, this has altered the concept of God and of his involvement in the world. (cf. *The Crucified God*).

The whole power argument could hardly be made simpler than Vanstone's own pithy comment that 'Respect on the part of an inferior may be dictated by prudence; but it can hardly be justified by moral sensitivity. Superiority as such confers no moral right to respect: in particular, superiority of power confers no such right'. Meanwhile, Oman having made clear his stance on the power issue: that of implacable opposition to any notion that God wishes to control men outside their being as persons, moves on to develop what personhood may mean. In so doing he provides a discussion on the classic debate between Augustine and Pelagius concerning the free will of man and the Providence of God. Oman is problematical here however. This is through because through the centuries the two sides have become so
polarised that it is difficult to be certain whether what is being said of one party was actually being said by that party. Pelagius does not necessarily fulfil the role Oman gives him. Oman's argument is that grace over all, i.e. Augustine's position, is appropriate if it means that God is ultimately responsible for all that is - the doctrine of contingency. He writes 'The religious man always has ascribed, and found his whole confidence in ascribing, all things to God'.

The good such a man does he is enabled to do by the grace of God and he should not claim it for himself. By contrast for Oman, 'Pelagianism, instead of affording calm trust and patience, causes men to seek security in their own doings'.

Referring to what Pelagius actually said, it should be noted that he has a concept of all-sustaining grace, as a necessity for salvation at every moment. It is in this context of all sustaining grace, (in this paper understood as creating the gracious possibility of free will) that Pelagius asserts 'free will without denying our perpetual need of the help of God'. That man can exercise the will to good is wholly gift for Pelagius. All this we should hold is fundamental to the portrayal of grace this chapter supports. Where Pelagius does become questionable is in his assertion of the possibility of men's being without sin and his denial of any sort of congenital evil. Pelagius ought perhaps to be separated from 'Pelagianism', and distinctions ought to be made within his own thought between the profitable and unprofitable elements in the
same manner as is done with Augustine. What Oman sought was a grace that is over all to stress men's contingency, but in such a manner as not to threaten men's freedom. Despite the quotations above, he does not see Pelagius as providing this nor does he think Augustine wholly satisfactory. In the history of the Church Oman sees Catholicism as a compromise 'of an Augustinian church with Pelagian members'. In reading Oman one cannot fail to note how the two are discussed without reference to themselves but in comments about the subsequent party positions.

Recently a useful and eirenic discussion of what Pelagius and Augustine stood for has been provided by J.R. Lucas. His starting point is the tension within Christianity concerning freedom. It is for the freedom of men in order to stress their moral responsibility, and against men's freedom in so far as it might prejudice the role of God as sole and sufficient cause. Lucas responds by asserting that moral responsibility necessitates a concept of freedom. With or without the existence of God a concept of freedom is required for moral accountability, and if the latter simply does not exist, and men are deemed to be causally determined, society would face grave problems. Like Oman, he notes how Augustine and Pelagius provided the prototype for the theological debate. Unlike Oman and the majority of Christendom, he does not opt to side with one or other of the protagonists. Rather Lucas sees errors in both, and these errors stem from an
inadequate analysis of the notion of causality. Lucas is in practice concerned with reconciling Vanstone's second negative mark of love—control, with the thought that often enough God is seen to be in control, yet men to be moral need to be free. Thus both from the point of love—Vanstone, and morals—Lucas, man's freedom is an essential component of his relation to God. However, Vanstone, in tying the issue to love, is able to make the issue spring from the essential character of God prior to the demands of humanity.

Lucas distinguishes two senses of cause. There is 'cause', as the single ideal and 'complete cause' embracing all other factors; and there is 'cause' as the single most significant factor in any act. Such a distinction enables Lucas to commend Augustine for giving the glory for his conversion to God. Yet Pelagius is right to say that if Augustine is taken literally, the manhood of God's children is denied. Lucas characterizes the two as making, the one, of God a thing; the other, of man a thing. Augustine was right to give the credit to God and not himself, yet he was wrong to say he had no involvement in the matter; whereas Pelagius was right to stress men's freedom but wrong to turn autonomy into autarky. This is all related back to the distinctions about causality. Causality is highly complex and it is unusual for one single cause to be identifiable. To give a complete causal account of a moral decision would involve many sources, thus of necessity one 'primary' cause
is often selected. Strike a match on sandpaper and it will light, provided the antecedent sufficient condition is fulfilled - the presence of oxygen. A selection of different causes is possible without conflict but what cannot change is the full specification of the minimum antecedent sufficient causes even if they may not all be fully identifiable. In the case of a drowning, Lucas cites four 'causes', all different but real.53

When this is translated into the discussion on Augustine and Pelagius, Augustine is seen as using 'cause' in the narrow sense, in attributing all directly to God. A sense of inevitability appears in Augustine concerning events, which is particularly evident in the *Confessions*.54 It is easy in retrospect to see events especially in one's own life as more inevitable than they really are, since once an event has occurred, the other options are quickly forgotten. This is illusory, yet it is the impression to be derived from reading Augustine in his stress on the initiative of God. However, it might be more acceptable to say that God gives the ability to exploit to the best a given situation which has arisen in the natural course of events. Thus Augustine seems to credit God directly with the trivial matter of making people move house 'coincidentally' in order to build up Christian fellowship.55 Vanstone and Lucas would prefer to credit God's providence firstly, with establishing a creation in which such possibilities develop; and secondly, enabling his creatures to exploit opportunities, which naturally occur, to the services of God.
This is not a concept of God directing events, but of Him providing an interpretative and creative faculty which if exploited enables the same event to become a matter of grace or not. An event's becoming a matter of grace, its becoming graciously significant for the believer creates further opportunities in following events, each requiring further free acts of affirmation by the believer. A providence then that is firstly, though indirectly, constituted through natural created processes - our contingency, and secondly, in each individual event evaluatively creative. A distinction/between 'how' and 'why'. Man has little choice concerning his physical status - the 'how'. Here Augustine would attribute this directly to God, while Vanstone and Lucas would have God becoming voluntarily subject to his own created natural processes. Concerning what he makes of his physical status - the 'why', man is free to choose a wide variety of options, in some of which he can choose to align himself to God and in so doing precipitate further gracious possibilities, each requiring individual affirmation.56

It is the link between the 'how' and the 'why', or the constitutive and evaluative which becomes problematic. Augustine turns freedom of choice into the choice to do evil alone, and his positive sense of freedom becomes liberty, that is being freed by God from sin. Freedom as the choice to adopt God or not is fundamentally denied because, the 'Lord did not only say, "Without me you can do
nothing." He added, "You did not choose me; I chose you." Of the "free" will he adds, 'it is either "free from righteousness", and then it is bad; or else "free from sin, because it is a slave of righteousness." Either way it is practically in bondage. To Augustine, choice and liberty are two very different senses of freedom and he cares only for the latter. He is not concerned here with the moral issue of responsibility. The post-Enlightenment concern for the independence of the individual man is not an issue for him. However, his disinterest here and his ready acceptance of predestination create mammoth problems.

For if it is correct to see Augustine ascribing to God a very direct role in the constitutive sense, that is, that God directly orders and foreordains events; it is hard to see any role for man's freedom in the evaluative and thus moral sense. For the latter to be free, so the former must be clear from the direct control of God. If God has fixed an event so that it is 'loaded' for a person to make a certain decision, not only is God threatening men's freedom as choice, he is also liable to the accusation of injustice. In such a situation God may be questioned on the twin grounds of the abuse of freedom and the moral anomaly of creating some men destined for damnation. By contrast an inner link is demonstrable between the Vanstonian analysis of God's role in creation subject to the natural order, and the preservation of men's freedom. Provided scientific determinism is avoided, man's freedom is actually
safeguarded more by those theologies embracing evolution than by theological determinism denying it.

Lucas' preference for allying God to a sense of cause as only 'the most important member of that set of conditions that are conjointly sufficient' is thus to be preferred.59 Even here God ought not to be conceived as a separate member vying for a place of influence amongst other forces. This is the virtue of Vanstone's providence in not presenting God as a separate figure; either beside, or above and in direct control, of natural processes. Rather, God allows himself to be the subject of these processes and he makes his progress by relying on the creature's free response to God as it perceives him within. Vanstone's exegesis of love, the notion of its angular progress and the parallel of the artist, are used to link God into a scenario in which God himself works with possibilities and options, albeit towards a given end - the Kingdom. God's power lies not in his precise plan overruling natural forces but in his ability to work out his plans within his own self-imposed limits of conforming to his created natural order. Vanstone's ideal is thus in complete contrast to those who endeavour to link God's providence to a 'straight line' conception in which God has one fixed route towards his end, all deviation i.e. from which is either impossible /a strict theological determinism, or if possible sinful.

As Lucas holds, however much Augustine may have felt that his conversion to God took place at an appointed time
and was irresistible, nonetheless it is essential that man is able to say 'no' to God. Ahab felt that God was searching for him and yet he did not repent. 60 Vanstone, too, in his passages on tragedy regards it as an essential component of God's nature of love that man must have the ability to say 'no'. 61 For Augustine, the mystery is that despite men's freedom all that occurs is in God's plan. 62 For Vanstone, the mystery is that the possibility of a tragic end to love's endeavour has to be reckoned with. Behind these differences lies two different estimates of the morality and nature of freedom. Vanstone sees man even in his fallen state as free: indeed, his dignity and grandeur consists in this faculty of being able to make God's endeavour tragic or triumphant by his response. Augustine conceives freedom in relation to a serious view of the fall. Freedom for him is not so much freedom of choice as liberation by God from the death of sin. Thus immediately after his conversion he portrays his own free will as being the force of his rebellion against God and that all God 'asked of me was to deny my own will and accept yours'. 63 For Augustine, man's free will is inescapably tied up with sin and rebellion, it cannot be a partner with God. Augustine does not desire to give it creative autonomy in partnership, which is Vanstone's ideal. Free will in Augustine is synonymous with sinful rebellion, but in Vanstone it symbolises the creature's dignity in the imago dei.

Lucas like Vanstone regards it as vital that man is free as regards the power of response, and it is in man's ability to say 'no' that he creates an actual providence
similar to Vanstone's. They start from different places: Vanstone's radical providence is presented as a good thing in itself, consequent upon his doctrine of love and creation. With Lucas there is the suspicion that his radical doctrine is something of a necessary evil consequent upon men's saying 'no'. Vanstone revels in a myriad of options, whereas Lucas seems to have some sympathy for Augustine's association of choice with rebellion. For him, choice becomes a somewhat simplistic either/or, - 'It is always possible to say No, as if the only alternative was Yes.' Vanstone's scenario accepts a world in which many decisions are morally uncertain, in which we just cannot be sure of God's will. Lucas seems to associate choice very closely with a crisis of obedience, as in 'if we are determined to have our own way, at whatever cost, rather than his, we can'. By using such language, the question is posed as to what extent is Lucas revealing a preference for a 'straight line' view of providence where men's will permits? Rarely, though, can the possibilities of discerning God's will be so clear cut as to be linked to simple obedience and disobedience. It is not just that 'I disobey You', but the nexus of relationships both material and personal are so complex as to make much moral decision-making ambiguous. Decisions must still be made, in the hope of working through to answers, and it is this picture of God's working in an area of complex growth that Vanstone portrays so well. However, Lucas and his commendation of
Pelagius are to be applauded for safeguarding man's responsibility for his decisions and thus his moral freedom.

The question then arises, if the decision is men's, has too much been said. For 'If we insist on the agent's being in effective control of his actions, then must not he alone be described as the cause' Vanstone would opt for man's being in effective control but only as the gift of God which is voluntarily harmonisable with the will of God - a gracious gift towards the end of man. Lucas reaches the same answer but via further analysis of causality. The agent's decision, although a necessary condition for an act's performance, is not a sufficient condition unless external circumstances are also favourable. This is true with or without God. Simply because a person wills an act does not make it physically possible in itself. Similarly it may be held that although the decision is the free act of a man, the ability to perform an act is the result of God's grace. Furthermore the ability to take a free decision is also an antecedent gift of God. So to say that an agent has a role / control of his actions is not to say that the agent is the sole cause.

Lucas notes how language oversimplifies reality, for he has now reached the position where he will hold that it is true to say that both Augustine and God were responsible for Augustine's conversion. God, though, must bear the primary responsibility in generating and sustaining the creation, complete with all its possibilities, including free will.
and also, his responsibility in sustaining it. Belief in God must necessitate this ascription of primary responsibility, even if it is then held that God has discharged voluntarily the responsibility for certain functions to men: 'The choice is ours, Pelagius is right. Only, it is not thanks to us the choice is ours, but thanks to God.'

The root error in the discussion on freedom and grace is believed by Lucas to be the linguistic error in focussing on one cause as explaining action. It is the inability to relate together a variety of causal responsibilities that creates the problem.

Lucas provides a chapter specifically entitled 'Providence'. In this, more detail emerges on differences between his own and Vanstone's position. He attempts to reconcile God's providence and men's freedom, encountering the thought that the latter may frustrate God's plans.

The two authors are at variance because with Lucas the problem of the divergence of the divine and human wills is not inherent in nature's growth as it is with Vanstone. For Lucas, the disparity is a consequence of men's decisions, which 'frustrate what, so far as we had been able to make it out, had been God's intended plans.' Granted that in certain situations a man may consciously choose to frustrate what he regards as God's will, in many situations it can be argued against Lucas, that it is impossible to identify with certainty what is God's will, as if there was only one ideal option for every situation. Vanstone's creative providence
does not tie God to preferring one route at each juncture, but allows for a creative variety in which numbers of options are possible. It becomes necessary to identify without any certainty more or less satisfactory answers, in which God is creatively inspiring the will in a general direction rather than on a particular path. Oddly enough, Lucas seems to fall into his own trap. Having warned against the dangers of reading the inevitability of providence into past events ('We read into events a pattern that is not there', 72), he then postulates a future providence around an ideal fixed plan, 'my belief that God has a plan for me'. 73

Nonetheless in his consideration of how God actually works Lucas becomes very similar to Vanstone. Since man can and does say 'he' to God, God allows himself to be 'the victim of every bloodyminded man'. 74 This is because 'It is the corollary of caring, that one should be vulnerable, and a God who cares infinitely will be infinitely vulnerable', 75 - a striking parallel with Vanstone's language. Thus God is vulnerable and suffers at the hands of man's own God - given freedom: his is a 'continuing crucifixion'. 76 The concept of God is changed in the manner Vanstone's was, in order to safeguard the freedom of men, and Lucas has also now tied this to the nature of love. Vanstone's God is the artist with the creative ability to use the material while not knowing the precise route, while Lucas' is the planner who allows man to frustrate his plans but always has the ability to present a plan for the new situation. He writes:
'One plan may fail, but there are always others. As fast as we torpedo his best designs for us, he produces out of his agonised reappraisal a second best.' 77 In the sense that God allows man to affect his designs and yet always has the ability to cope with whatever we may do, this is very close to Vanstone.

Dissatisfaction may be felt with 'best design' and 'second best', for with such language Lucas seems in the throes of the tension between old and new conceptions of providence. He certainly seems aware of the dangers inherent in a conception of a fixed plan towards which the world is necessarily aimed, so he says, 'It is an error to talk about God's blueprint for the world'. 78 Such a fixed blueprint 'must be Procrustean'. Instead Lucas argues, we must 'either understand by design only the barest outline', which understand would not be affected by any man's non-cooperation, or / 'that an infinite God has an infinite set of blueprints, so that whatever situation emerges . . . there is a definite course of action that God would have us take'. This latter is Lucas' preference. 79 However if God has an infinite set of blueprints, of what is God really ignorant? Does man's free choice stand for anything?

The possession of blueprints implies that fore-knowledge which seems to insulate God from the traumatic uncertainties of man's existence, even if it is that God is unaware until the last moment which plan is in fact
to be executed. Lucas has the image of the planner and Vanstone the artist. It is contended that the latter is more appropriate to the placing of God within the human context of uncertainty. The value of Lucas is that he clearly wishes men's freedom to be safeguarded and he is prepared for a consequent change in the nature of God. He does stand against the 'common notion of providence (being) ... in large measure a notion of God's getting his own way in spite of our own wishes to the contrary'.

Sproxton in his biography of Teilhard also presents a similar tension without apparently noticing it. He writes of Teilhard holding that the world is bound for a destination, it has a beginning and an end. But must the latter be fixed in the manner suggested by Teilhard's 'Point Omega'? Christians may hope for a certain end, but as Vanstone suggests in his words on triumph and tragedy, our experience of the world is such that belief in God should not be treated as a quasi-legal guarantee. This latter sense then seems to be picked up in Sproxton's conclusion which would seem very close to Vanstone and to a lesser degree, Lucas. The truth is 'that we are evolution with its awful consequences. Man is now free'. The stage of man's self-consciousness has now been reached where we may be saved neither 'by natural intervention ... nor ... by supernatural intervention for supernature is in him'.

This suggests an immanent presence of God within man, coupled with great scope in his freedom of choice to
determine the triumph or tragedy of God's creative act.

The innovation that needs to be grasped is that God's being sovereign may become the means by which man's freedom is created and not the means by which it is destroyed, notwithstanding past performance. Nonetheless it was understood by Oman over sixty years ago. He sees God's creation of the moral personality as being the guarantee of men's ultimate freedom and of their preservation from being merely physical organisms. Autonomy and Augustinianism are both problematic for Oman. Concerning God's authority it needs to be understood that 'When we insist that God's power, being absolute, can have no limitation, human responsibility vanishes'. 83 However, if God is entirely becomes divorced from morals, man's will / 'the only element in moral decision', 84 then the question is raised, how can man fulfil what is demanded of him? Oman is thus happy for conceptions of God to be generated not to fulfil the philosophy of the absolute but to fit the bill of man's need. 85 Man's need is for grace, that is, the ability to grow in moral behaviour. From the Christian point of view this is contingency / yet he also needs freedom to be deemed to be morally responsible. The resolution of this dilemma requires grace to become linked both to power, as ability, and to the maintenance of man's free will.

Thus the need is 'not to theorise about the operation of omnipotence, but to ask ourselves, What is a moral personality, and, how is it succoured?'. 86 The moral demand puts
the philosophy of power and of God's omnipotence behind its own demands because in God's own nature this order is followed. The sense of this is seen as follows:

If instead of a God circumscribed on every hand by considerations of His own dignity, we have One manifesting His wise care in the most trivial events and common relationships, a God primarily concerned with our need and not with His own schemes or His own honour.

Wherein the two latter issues will in a new manner be safeguarded by the former.

Oman then in parallel with Vanstone and Lucas seeks his view that God's relation to us which is of love' requires that, 'If grace is determined by love, not merely as specious sentiment, but as this practical regard, the first question cannot be, How would it seek to display its dignity? but must be, How would it serve its children?'

The principle of analogy from the need and context of human experience used by Vanstone is adopted by Oman, for since 'that service takes place upon earth, our experience upon earth alone can be the means of understanding its character.'

Oman's method is thus strikingly close to Vanstone, in that by analysis of that love which is of God, the discussion is enabled to centre upon man's need but only by prior reference to the nature of God's love. This is evidenced in Oman's comment that:

If grace, therefore, be the operation of love, the essence of which is to have its eyes directed away from its own dignity . . . and towards the object of its care, an inquiry into its nature must be in vain which does not start by considering the human
nature it would succour.

So the question, 'what is the nature of God's grace?' is answered by 'what is the nature of a moral person?'

In stressing the priority of the latter question, a clever link is established between the work of God's grace and man's moral autonomy. If, as Oman holds, the nature of the moral person embraces moral autonomy, in the sense of responsibility, then the grace which created this moral person clearly sustains and succours this very moral autonomy. As with Vanstone and the loving personality, so Oman and the moral personality, by allowing man's genuine freedom itself to be an expression of grace, overcomes the disjunction between grace and freedom. Man's moral faculty for decisions is freely his as gracious gift, while the power to execute decisions is also due to the grace of God, already necessary changes have been made to the previous conceptions of God's grace and omnipotence. Hence to return to Augustine and Pelagius, Oman is enabled to condemn both, because both make a false divide between 'grace as a gift merely given and on works as human resolves merely carried through'. Oman believes both to have an impersonal account of God's providence, thus making grace mechanical. The personal account that he has given he holds enables man and God to become freely consenting partners, rather than separate agencies with clearly defined spheres of operation. Thus, 'In a right relation of persons, especially of father and child, the help of the one does not end where the effort
of the other begins'.

Such a personal relation, as in Vanstone, has its consequences for theodicy. This is because the key for grace's fruition in this analysis is the free response of the beloved. A 'gracious relation cannot provide the flawless world to be expected from grace as overriding omniscience guided by omnipotence, because a personal relation can only work as it meets response'. This response depends on our free and genuine perception of the goodness of God's will. His will is not to be judged by its power, (God is stronger than I, therefore obey) but in our recognition of its goodness: 'In short, we can only accept God's will as, by insight, we discover it to be our own'. Providence for the believer becomes not the conviction that everything was really planned for the best anyway, but rather the end point of faith. It becomes a belief in the supreme triumph of Good despite the great pain and waste of the world. 'A true belief in Providence is the goal and not the starting point of religion, a prophetic victory over evil and not a metaphysical optimism about the balance of good'. Providence is not an insurance from pain, but a means of seeing purpose in the world despite all indications to the contrary. It provides a tool for using the experience of pain. It is the stress in Oman on the personal nature of the question that conditions the outcome.
This enables man not to forget that a personal relation has two sides, which require us to find God's world also our world . . . by our own insight and devotion, and that the essence of a personal system is not to manufacture us good, but to help us win our freedom and the right use of it together. In that case God cannot relieve us of our responsibilities even when calamitous. Without it we might be the clay and He the potter but we should not be children and He our Father. 96

The close parallels between Vanstone and Oman are thus evident, with a great stress on human freedom as a gift of God, by which God, for our sake limits himself. The key to all three, Lucas, Vanstone and Oman, has been a version of the free will defence of God, in which men's free will is used to explain the great pain and suffering experienced, it being the inevitable concomitant to genuine freedom of response. However, this does only deal with moral evil, the prior physical evil of the world is not affected. This is a general weakness of presentations of this argument, their unhappiness in accounting for physical evil; as a result it is generally skirted over. Both Lucas and Oman have tended this way, to consider the issue just from the viewpoint of man's wrongdoing and consequent suffering. This is perhaps a legacy of the biblical portrayal of the priority of the moral over the physical 'fall' in Genesis. The concept of a golden age is no longer tenable, some account has to be taken of evolution. In this Vanstone proves more satisfactory despite his inappropriate use of Karamazov discussed previously. 97 Indeed he reverses the situation and deals with physical and not moral evil. He has not
placed man's ignorance of God just in relation to the human response but in relation to the whole physical dimension. Often the implication seems to be that God knew exactly how he would create the world and men, he then implanted into this physical system free will, and from thence the problems arose. Vanstone goes one step further in holding that the precise course of the whole of the created system is a mystery even to God, the Creator who gives it the energy to maintain it in being. All that is secure is that God is working towards an end through natural processes, which though set in being by him are themselves given a genuine independence in development. In this situation the supreme period of crisis has been reached, in this tiny era of humankind, the era when creatures capable of free response to divinity have reached being.

The means by which grace can remain God's action and yet still genuinely relate to man's own free act has been shown to be the crucial issue. Certain distinctions can be noted concerning the differing presentations of the modes of grace's action. An author whose work in this area is of considerable interest is Gene Outka. His discussion starts from noting the standard dilemma, that it is morally essential for humans to be responsible, but how then can a role for grace be found? He notes four distinctive methods by which Christians have endeavoured to resolve this conflict. It may be resolved by seeing human virtue as the instrument of invading grace, as infused by grace, as acquired irrespective of grace, and as elicited by grace.
The first option is classically Protestant and has been well stated in Nygren's *Agape and Eros*. The specific object here is to stress God's act in man against his own inadequate sinful and fallen resources. Man's free will and moral autonomy are not worth stressing because of the helpless state of man. The theology of the Fall is thus an influence at work in evaluating God's grace and its role in mankind. The completely different viewpoint of Vanstone for whom nothing could be so abhorrent as irresistible grace, likewise stems from a very different view of the Fall. Nygren's real error is in destroying this ability to respond that Vanstone holds so dear. The Catholic D'Arcy also regards this as a serious error on Nygren's part. Using Nygren's own language he writes, 'God is *Agape* and we should naturally expect someone to be the beneficiary of that love and as beneficiary to respond. But if the theory is taken literally (Nygren's) there is no one to respond . . . In this elimination of *Eros* man has been eliminated'.

Of the second - infused grace, Outka notes its traditional identification with Roman Catholic theology. Thus Outka notes how a Roman Catholic representative like Gillemann can speak of it as a sanctifying grace which elevates the whole man. To Protestant eyes such as Outka's it has unfavourable connotations with the supernatural and the miraculous. Outka associates the third, acquired grace, with the moral 'I ought therefore I can' argument. It
reflects a universal capability but stresses one's own efforts, whereas infusion stresses God's. The problems of infusion are that it is mechanical and of acquired, that it is Pelagian.

The fourth option, grace elicited, is provided by Outka as an attempt to resolve problems inherent in the others. It attempts to preserve a distinction, noted at other points in this thesis, between the freedom of the will to respond as decision and the power to execute good deeds as grace. Grace's object is to elicit a response: the agent must actively respond to the gift offered in deciding to accept it, rather than passively receive it.

Perhaps another way to express Outka's point is to say the agent actively seeks in order passively to receive the gift, and this is to be preferred for the element of dialectic it suggests. This is appropriate to an issue which the direct application of language cannot resolve, in that an element of linguistic tension is inevitable between grace as the entire gift of God and man's own free will and responsibility - the issue of causality already discussed via Lucas.

Outka regards elicitation as preserving the genuineness of the human response to grace, in order that nothing fundamentally non-human is introduced, which is the suggestion with infusion. Distinctions are required between supernatural and natural, and their relation to human nature. Thus infused grace reflects a clear understanding of the boundaries of natural man and of the essential role of the
supernatural in bringing him to fulfillment. Elicitation reflects a view in which man must find fulfillment in the natural, though here the natural may become so charged as to become in Sproston's word, 'Supernature'. The flavour of Vanstone is such that the natural is to be preserved in the sense of the integrity of natural processes and of man's independence, yet these become the very tools of the future Kingdom. Elicitation is thus distinct in Outka's analysis from infusion in that it requires man's decision and will. It differs from acquired grace in that virtue is evoked and sustained from without and is not simply self-activated and self-directed. The key to elicitation is that the agent decides to do what in himself he cannot do, the position being that a man can decide to follow God but cannot by himself actually follow God. The moral stress on the freedom of man is thus on the decision, while the power or ability rests with God.

To a degree it has to be granted that if grace is real in some sense it is irresistible. Certainly any resistance that is possible is due to God's own self-limitation as in Vanstone. Even so, the grace of creation remains irresistible. I had no choice over my birth. Man is not consulted over whether he wishes to participate in the venture of existence, he simply has to. Within this framework, once existing he may choose to resist. Continued sustenance in life is itself a grace which has simply to be accepted, unless, once again, the radical God-given freedom of choice is used in suicide. Freedom then is functioning within a fixed
physical realm.

Ooutka's use of elicitation is thus presented as a useful understanding of the operation of grace which can complement the pictures seen in Vanstone, Lucas and Oman. From these authors and from the other sources quoted, it can be seen that a substantial body of opinion has grown up this century, which has not been afraid to develop a new doctrine of God, in order to counter problems felt with traditional presentations of Grace and Providence, and at the same time to try to provide a providence more consonant with belief in evolutionary theory and the scientific world view. The overall outcome is an emphasis on man's responsibility for the end of the world, with or without God. Man is in the position of exercising great power, sufficient as is only too clear in this age to determine the fate of his own kind. With God, man is placed in the position of taking God to the limit. The mystery of today is not how it is that all is really planned by God for the best, but to what extent will the triumph and tragedy theme of Vanstone be taken to its final end - has man really the ability to say 'finis' to God in a nuclear holocaust? Stanley Hauerwas in remarks to Durham students averred that the crucifixion was more tragic than nuclear armageddon, and that it had been followed by Resurrection. Perhaps true, but nothing ought to be said that lightens the load on man in this day.

Of the various authors, it is held that it is Vanstone
who provides the most thorough reworking of the doctrine of God to reflect the demands of man's personal autonomy. He does this through his analysis of God as love, and in a book so radical, the surprising and satisfying element is the priority and role that is accorded to God as living and active. Men are not emancipated from God despite all the radical thought, rather genuine created partnership is achieved.
CHAPTER FOUR

SELF-LOVE

One of the most enigmatic texts in the gospels forms the root of perhaps the single most contentious issue in theological ethics - the role of self-concern. Jesus' texts of self-denial are unequivocal, 'let him deny himself and follow me'.¹ When Jesus said in answer to one of the most fundamental question put to him concerning his beliefs, 'Master which is the great commandment?', stressing in his reply, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself', he apparently introduced a radical discontinuity into his teaching.² Despite the critics the two can be reconciled. Indeed it might be hoped that Jesus did so himself. Here attention ought to be drawn to another of his cardinal texts, 'If any man would be first, he shall be last of all'.³ Often taken as a classic text of denial yet it springs out of self-concern. It has even received criticism for being a 'spiritual insurance policy' - suffer now for joy later. Thus while Christians portray their religion as one of self-sacrifice and service of others, quoting the example and words of the master, their detractors also quoting Jesus hold that it is a religion for the underdog, promising an
unlimited heavenly return for earthly poverty. 4

As will be seen, Christians are by no means consistent in their approach to the role of the self, due to varying assessments of the New Testament material. Such assessments themselves are being controlled by authors' wider preconceptions concerning other doctrines, especially those of the Creation and of the Fall. A further influence on Christian reflection has been the conclusions of other philosophies, for there are a myriad of views concerning self-concern ranging from the Greek philosophers to the latest in psychoanalysis, such ideas as Maslow's self-actualising man. Since Christian ethics developed in relation to prevailing Greek ethical attitudes, study will commence with the intellectual air Christ's opinions entered.

Aristotle's *Ethics* presents a consistent treatise on friendship, central to which is the role of self. 5 A friend is one 'who desire(s) the good of their friends for the friend's sake . . . because each loves the other for what he is, and not for any incidental quality'. 6 Such a passage might seem to harmonize well with Jesus' teaching. However it reflects an entirely different, and philosophical, setting producing a very different result from the theology of the New Testament. This is clear from the context of the previous citation. In Aristotle a friend is not to be loved for the personal qualities of his being but by his possession of the abstract quality of the Good. Not that he is but what he is. Aristotle defines three kinds of
friendship: that of utility, the business relationship; that of pleasure, the sensual relationship; and perfect friendship based on goodness. The perfect friendship was the subject of the last quotation and immediately preceding it can be read, 'for these people each alike wish good for the other qua good' and immediately following it, 'Accordingly the friendship of such men lasts so long as they remain good'. Despite the existence of altruistic passages, it is clear that Aristotle regards what is actually being shared as an abstract quality of goodness, and the respect for persons by virtue of their individuality is not a concern. A good deal of attention is then given to the role of the self. The actual bond between the friendship of goodness is not described as love, for 'the good are friends for each other's sake, because their bond is goodness', although subsequently Aristotle does note that 'friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection'.

In this affection to the good between friends the self is fulfilled, 'And in loving a friend they are loving their own good. For when a good man becomes a friend to another he becomes that other's good: so each loves his own good, and repays what he receives by wishing the good of the other and giving him pleasure', and earlier, 'each individual loves what is good for himself'. A long passage is then given over to the thought that friends reflect our feeling towards ourselves and these arguments lead to a consideration of the specific problem, is self-love
Self-love is justifiable and indeed fulfilling only in the case of the good man, who since he is properly ordered towards the good, will in loving himself benefit himself and others. This is the rationale behind the friendship of the good, that the sharing of this quality seen in each other is mutually attracting and fulfilling. There is much here that seems commendable, there is certainly much indisputable practical wisdom - to give is better than to receive.

It might seem as if Aristotle's arguments could be applied to the reconciliation of Jesus' own enigmatic statements. However two things militate against this: one in his conception of the highest category of personal communion being the abstract notion of the 'good' rather than the personal quality of 'love' commended in the New Testament; secondly his analysis of the ideal or 'magnanimous' man. He is Aristotle's hero, the good man of proper friendship. This is the man who has practised himself in the art of being good. He possesses a proper self-estimation of himself founded on his real character. He knows he is good and expects to be treated as such, which is no more than he deserves. Humility is here totally ruled out, and Aristotle condemns 'pusillanimous' man. As for 'magnanimous' man, he can be likened to today's self-sufficient man, full of self-control and independence, for 'He is disposed to confer benefits, but is ashamed to accept them, because the one is an act of the superior and the other that of an inferior'.

...
Despite the apparent parallels to Jesus' enigmatic commendation of self-love, Aristotle's self-love is radically different because it is not conceived within the category of grace. This as will be seen is fundamental to an understanding of Jesus' position, whereas Aristotle speaks of self-love from a position of utter self-sufficiency. This tendency has been noted by both Krook and Vlastos.15 Krook significantly entitles her chapter on Aristotle as 'Self-sufficiency for love'. She puts him in a secularist utilitarian tradition embracing Hume, Bentham and Mill. All three types of Aristotelian man, Speculative i.e. contemplative, Magnanimous and the Perfect Friend share the common characteristic of self-sufficiency. Magnanimous man is in her eyes today's secular man. He has perfect self-control, he knows where he is going, and so is titled the Man of Justifiable Pride. Krook notes how Plato and St. Paul regard it as virtuous to suffer injustice, while for Aristotle it is slavish and poor spirited.16 Aristotelian self-sufficiency establishes a 'love' free from need or claim, which in Krook's judgement is not the love either of Plato or the New Testament but is a form of pride, in which you admire in the other only what you know to be good in yourself. Vlastos concluded that love in Aristotle is not love for a person qua person but is a mutual recognition of abstract qualities. It is between members of a social élite, who can afford disinterested affection for their peers, assured that it will be returned by virtue of their
To turn to Platonic love, Vlastos cannot interpret this as being personal. From the *Lysis* he notes that love is received only in response to the production of a good:

'become wise . . . everyone will love you . . . otherwise no one will love you'.

He notes that there is no sense of 'for the other's sake', let alone the Christian treatment of the other as an absolute end. The root of this view as noted in our first chapter, is the Platonic belief that love is not a constitutive category of being itself. Rather, it is symbolic of a lack, love is essentially need-orientated, such that 'if one were in want of nothing one would feel no affection and he who felt no affection would not love'.

This leads to the doctrine of the Forms by which all beings seek to approximate to the ideal form, and this in turn produces Plato's vision of the Good. The problem here is that the ideal Good is not a loving God; hence the lack of affection and love in the ideal which is surely the opposite of the New Testament intentions. This, as will be seen later, is one of the main points in Nygren's major albeit problematic study, *Agape and Eros*.

In the *Republic*, Vlastos notes how the ideal society is held together by bonds of fraternal love but poses the question as to whether this love is a form of enlightened self-interest, to maintain the system. As Socrates told *Lysis*, 'You will be loved only if you are useful', the doctrine of love in the *Lysis* fits the *Republic* well.
Whatever a man can claim in the Republic is tied to what he does and not that he is. Vlastos remarks how Popper has labelled the Republic, 'collectivist and political utilitarianism' and that 'Plato recognises only one ultimate standard of justice - the interest of the state. Morality is nothing but political hygiene'. Although love has a role in Plato, it is not firmly welded to personal being as the highest category of existence in the manner normally attributed to Christianity, and this affects self-aspiration. The end of man as noted in the Symposium is to lose self-awareness in the vision of the 'idea'. Vlastos holds that in the Platonic doctrine of love, the person itself is not loved but the image of the all embracing yet lifeless 'idea' in him.

Two questions arise for Christian teaching in consequence of this analysis of Greek thought. Firstly in terms of the final end, what sort of self-fulfillment does Christianity speak of in consequence of its stress on the living God and his grace, and secondly, how in the present is that end achievable? This second question requires an analysis of the role of self involved in 'Love your neighbour as yourself'. Within Christianity two broad trends of response can be identified. / negative, usually Protestant strand, which greatly stresses the Fall and God's sovereignty and grace; this tends to write down self-regard. Yet peculiar to this tradition is the great value given to the self in terms of private judgement. On the Catholic side, with a less grave view of the Fall and a developed natural theology,
the role of the self receives greater attention. Yet here again, a tradition within a tradition, that is asceticism, appears to the outsider to lay great stress on utter self-abnegation. It is this last tradition with its stress on self-deprivation that has often been the target of those who accuse Christianity of having a reward-centered ethic, but founded upon other-worldly fruition.

Amongst recent Protestant authors one who has tackled the issue from what might be termed the classic Protestant position is Anders Nygren. Nygren has specific headings on Self and Neighbour love, but in order fully to appreciate his position therein, his wider position needs to be understood. His basic thesis is simple, that the natural fallen state of man is well seen in what he terms Greek Eros. This is utterly man centered; it starts from the incompleteness of man and his consequent need to fulfil himself.

Throughout the book the 'deadly rivalry' of Eros and Agape are stressed. In his introduction he writes that 'It is a fact beyond contradiction that the idea of Eros and Agape belong to two different spiritual worlds', and that one must 'begin by emphasizing their complete disparity'.

Eros is man's desire for self fulfillment, and because of this stress on self it is held to be wholly erroneous. No aspirations of man are allowed by Nygren to be of any saving significance. Nygren contrasts Eros with its fatal stress on self concern and its Greek origin with the Christian idea of Agape. Their root difference in Nygren's eyes lies in causality. Eros is 'caused', being brought about by
desire and need, seeing value in the object of desire. Agape is the very opposite—it is repeatedly stressed how Agape is spontaneous and uncaused. It has no need in itself for man's love and is not created by any worthiness on man's part. That such a God, unaffected by man's response is suspiciously similar to the Platonic goes unnoticed by Nygren.

That the consequences of these views are reflected in his consideration of the nature of man and thus the role of self is clear: 'Agape is the direct opposite of that love which is called out by the worthiness of its object'; and, 'The man whom God loves has not any value in himself. His value consists simply in the fact that God loves him'. 26 Clearly self-love will not find much scope here. In the narrowest sense of the doctrine of contingency Nygren may be granted to be right but it is clear that he is not thinking along these lines. Man's value can be seen in two senses. Considered absolutely as a creature, or as we encounter him existing de facto. 27 In the former sense all theists would have to support Nygren's comments that man's value derives not from any eternal pre-existence but derivatively in being a creature. This though does not seem to be how Nygren sees the issue. For him, man's lacking any value in himself is not so much a consequence of his being a creature but of his being a fallen creature.

The argument continues in this ambiguous vein. Of Ritschl's 'the infinite value of the human soul', he
comments that this is 'not a basic Christian idea at all'. Here also Harnack's phrase, 'all who bear the human form are of more value than the whole world', is condemned. Nygren is allowing only two options in the estimation of man: the Greek view of his eternal immutable value, and his own that man has no worth in himself apart from the flow of divine agape in him, and that this does not flow in fallen man. Indeed to become a Christian is to allow this agape into one's life. There is though an essential third way which however demands a natural theology. This in Nygren's view is hopelessly tangled up with Greek Eros. This natural theology would say that since man is a creature of God, even as fallen he is still of incomparable worth. The 'infinite value of the human soul' is i.e. derivable from two sources, from a philosophy of immortality, which he condemns, and from the theology of creation which he nowhere considers.

Since Eros is all of men, not as created but as fallen and thus condemnable, and agape is all of God and the only form of love allowable, it can be argued that Nygren evacuates man of his independent existence. Commenting on the love commandment, he states that as the Divine love is unconditional, so man's self surrender is unconditional. This paves the way for the argument that in responding to God man does not actually respond himself; rather, he is a means by which God's agape flows from God to man and so back to God. Once again a peculiar doubleness is manifest.
Read one way Nygren can make sense; neighbour love is held to spring out of God's love, there is brotherhood only in fatherhood. Is this saying that a concept of creation is essential from which to derive neighbour love? Or is he saying that only in God's agape, in which man can have no independent role of self since he is fallen, can man love others? The answer is clear in comments such as, 'natural affection is not love at all in the deeper sense but only a form of self-love'. So self-love is utterly to be condemned in Nygren's eyes. Neighbour love is only Christian so long as it is united with God's agape. This seems an exclusivist position stemming from a radical view of the worthlessness of man's activities outside the clear boundaries of God's activities. 31

Doubts that might be had as to whether Nygren has any conception of a third option between his understanding of agape and the Greek view of eros are dispelled in his comments on Jesus' advocating 'as thyself'. For such a major text it is remarkable how Nygren sees fit to dispatch the interpretation of this verse in two paragraphs. There is no consideration of other viewpoints beyond his saying, 'Perhaps it need not be said that this idea of self-love is alien to the New Testament . . . and if there had not been a desire on other grounds to include self-love among the ethical demands of Christianity, there would be no motive for seeking to find it in the New Testament commandment'. Nygren writes that 'Self-love is man's natural
condition; it is also the basis of the perversion of his will to evil'. Few passages could better illustrate the prejudices of the author, who will not consider any other view of self-love beyond the condemnation of it being the cause of the Fall. This need not follow at all, since men's creation might well embrace a role for self-love as God-given, which man in the freedom of his will chose to abuse. To present self-love as irretrievably sinful and thus the cause of his downfall is to be blinkered. Selfishness and self-love in many philosophical treatises have been two entirely different matters. Nygren is not interested in the possibilities of such distinctions and so gives scanty treatment to the phrase 'as thyself'. It is given only the minimum interpretation, that at least as a starting point love others as much as yourself, and from that go on to overcome self-love. The words of Jesus are not taken as definitive but as a crude rhetorical maxim for Christian behaviour.

It is no surprise that Nygren uses his section on Paul to reinforce his stand. Accordingly, 'man's self-giving to God ... is no more than a response ... it is but a reflection of God's own love. It lacks all the essential marks of Agape, it is not spontaneous or creative.' The possibility which would still preserve the sovereignty of God and the contingency of man that God creates man as a contingent equal is not considered. Yet an Anglican theologian like William Temple could write, 'in so far as
God and man are spiritual they are of one kind . . .
(likewise of their rationality) . . . But in so far as God creates, redeems and sanctifies while man is created, redeemed and sanctified they are of two kinds. God is not creature, man is not creator'.

This is not for Nygren, who quoting Paul, 'I live and yet no longer I but Christ liveth in me', is enabled to write of neighbour love that 'it is not really man but God who is the subject of this love'. Further 'he has nothing of his own to give, the love which he shows his neighbour is God's Agape in him'. Nygren's doctrine of agape is used in the case of neighbour love to evacuate all content from the self, replacing it by God's agape. As for self-love, that is beyond the pale as the cause of the perversion in the first place. He specifically remarks on the attempt to distinguish a right and wrong self-love, that it was erroneous to find it in the Gospels, and it is alien to Paul too, the only self-love there is, is the root of all sin.

The final attack on any role for self-love is delivered in his summary chapter. Once again only one possible meaning for eros and self-love can be considered, that which condemns it. The notion that self-love may have a role as a feature properly pertaining to the creature, a God-given self-concern for God's sake (remember 'need' and 'God' in chapter 1), albeit which may be abused, is impossible in the face of such strong judgement as, 'But agape has no place for self-love. Christianity does not recognise self-
love as Christian. It recognises love to God and love to one's neighbour, but self-love is the great enemy which must be overcome. Self-love separates man from God.\(^39\)

Added to this is a definition of neighbour-love as 'inexplicable, unless this love is *Agape* and is not really a human love at all, but God's own *Agape* operating in man'.\(^40\) The charge must be made that Nygren's theology is not only an utter condemnation of all forms of self-concern and thus self-fulfil-ment, but it also evacuates any independence of being from man.

Strong language may seem to have been used in this assessment of Nygren but this is only in consequence of his own approach. He makes no attempt at reconciliation in his analysis of the ideas of *Eros* and *Agape*. Possible distinctions that could be made between the Greek philosophical view which may fit his portrait, and Christian reflections upon it, are not considered. Indeed such distinctions are alluded to as being of no value whatsoever.\(^41\) Distinctions between self regard, selfishness, self-centredness and self-fulfil-ment are ignored, all are lumped together. Nygren's scheme can have no role whatsoever for self-love and self-fulfil-ment and leaves man's existence as an independent being created by God seriously prejudiced; *Agape*-love to God lacks entirely the egocentric note and is identical with the complete abandonment of self. And there is one form of love for which *Agape* has no place - self-love.\(^42\) Nygren claims objectivity for his study,\(^43\)
but the reverse is the case. What could better illustrate the role of presuppositions in his study than the assertion that *agape* 'starts from the conviction of man's own worthlessness. When man has fallen away from God he is wholly lost and of no value at all'.

Another famous Protestant treatise on the topic of self-love is that provided by Søren Kierkegaard. Here the author is at pains to take seriously the 'as yourself' and to provide a role for self-love. Condemnation is reserved for poetic or spontaneous love, (an odd contrast with Nygren's advocacy of spontaneity). Love that is voluntary in humans is not necessarily eternal. This is because love founded on particular relationships is exposed to the whims of temperament. Loves of partiality can quickly become hate: alone of all loves only the duty of neighbour love is free from the dangers of partiality by virtue of its universal and commandable character. Unlike Nygren, although self-love is condemned by Kierkegaard as leading to partiality and being the root of particular relations, it is not implacably opposed to God's love—rather a transformation has to be effected. According to Kierkegaard, the genius of 'as yourself' is that the command 'wrenches open the lock of self-love'. Jesus is seen as not talking of an ideal, for self-love is as with Nygren fundamentally flawed. Instead Jesus the pragmatist knows the enormity of self-love within people and in this saying endeavours to turn this resource outwards. 'As yourself' is as clever as
the Golden Rule, for by the addition of these two words escape from neighbour-love is made impossible. Self-love is totally exposed and left nothing for itself.

Kierkegaard thus strongly condemns self-love as practised, for being divisive and leading to partiality in the love of others. The 'as yourself' reverses this effect and turns selfishness inescapably into neighbour-love. He does though allow that the 'as yourself' is taking into account a proper form of self-love. The command of Matthew 22:39 is also saying 'You shall love yourself the right way'. Kierkegaard believes that Christianity teaches proper self-love and this makes possible proper neighbour-love, for ultimately the two are one and the same. A role for self-love is being provided in a manner very different from Nygren. The point is developed further under the heading 'You shall love your neighbour'. There distinctions of preference - the poetic love which is a form of self-love must be removed. However this is certainly not to cease loving either the beloved or oneself. Instead it is to turn the wrong form of self-love and love for the beloved into the right form. This is a warning against self-abandonment and abnegation. To cease loving the beloved would be to turn the 'word neighbour into the greatest fraud ever discovered'. If Kierkegaard does do a disservice to partial loves in the supremacy he accords to neighbour love, he has still given them some role as a genuine love.

As a contrast to these Protestant positions, three exponents of the classic Catholic position may be cited,
namely Geach, Häring and Mortimer. The latter is an Anglo-Catholic, whose analysis of love starts from the position that all love has two sides to it, a selfish and a selfless element. People are loved for the pleasure loving another gives, and for the qualities in the other which call forth our love. Thus God is loved both because in loving him we find our own happiness and because his own character of perfect goodness demands our love. The contrast to Nygren is immense, the starting points are poles apart. The portrait Mortimer has given of the two elements of love, would immediately earn from Nygren the condemnation that this is *eros*, man's own self-seeking founded on the conviction of his own inalienable worth.

It could be argued though, that Mortimer's convictions stem from a theology of creation in which man although fallen is still the creature of God. The inalienable worth man has, is not derived from the structure of the soul as in the Greek view, rather it is given to him by virtue of his being a creature. This is the 'image of God' which though obscured is still present. Man is not 'wholly lost and of no value at all', since he is God's creature. God has a role for him in relation to his creation and thus a proper estimate of his own role in God's order is essential for his proper functioning in that order. If love is the proper relation between God and his creatures, there cannot be eradicated either a proper self love desiring enjoyment and possession, or a selfless love desiring the good and happiness of the beloved. Within God these two elements are to be found
because God is not monad but Trinity. The problem with Nygren's *agape* is that it is unidirectional, there is no life within God, for the Trinity is absent. As seen in our first chapter, with the Trinity present both types of love, the selfless and the self-regarding can be conceived of within God and so within man.

The theology of self-love must be seen as controlled by the theology of creation and of the Fall. Behind this the influence of the Trinity can be detected, relation within God relates to relation in man. If God can have a self-regarding element (need) through the Trinity, then so can man. The notion of loves being caused, so inimical to Nygren's uncaused *agape* because of its connotations of *erōs*, is acceptable to Mortimer because the notion of causality, in terms of value calling forth love, is inherent in the Trinity and thus acceptable in the created order. God has not created man in order to swamp his God-given independence in a flow of divine *agape*. According to Mortimer the selfish element in man's love of God is the true enlightened self-love - in him alone is peace and happiness, eternal life. This end is contingent upon God, it is not the immortality of Greek *erōs* which Nygren may rightly condemn but with which he should not label all other Christian attempts to assess self-love. Mortimer firmly says that all men by nature must desire their own good and happiness. Such self-concern is not the product of the Fall which may, however, abuse and warp it.
it is both the de facto state of affairs and the constitutive duty of the creature, the basis of self-preservation. It is not self-concern that is at fault but the means by which man prosecutes that end. When man ceases to regard self-concern in relation to his end as a creature of God, but regards self-concern as carte blanche for selfishness, than he is fallen. Man should know that his own best interest is in recognising his Creaturehood and thus dependence upon his Creator, - self-love is fatal only when tied to a concept of man's own independence.

The self regarding element in love ought to be the God given faculty of appreciating our status as creature, and so for Mortimer the selfless element in man's love of God is the will to serve God, placing him and his will above everything else. As creatures there can be a proper role for self-love because God the creator wishes to 'give good things to them that ask him'. This can be done only when tied to the return element of selfless love in obedience towards the Creator. The distinction that Nygren would not consider is vital. The flaw is not inherent in self-love but is inherent in selfishness or self-will, the desire to take decisions without reference to the Creator, this is what perverts self-love. Mortimer shows his awareness of the problem by stressing the role of free will. Free will is a gift of God but it is free will rather than self-love which predicates the possibility of selfishness and thus sin.
Häring's consideration of the subject occurs in his monumental work on moral theology.\textsuperscript{57} It has been suggested that the theology of Creation and of Trinity controls the Catholic viewpoint while the Protestant position is controlled by a certain theology of the Fall and sin. Häring illustrates this in his early stress on the role of the Trinity. He has a heading entitled 'Participation in the Triune love of God',\textsuperscript{58} and herein may be read that 'To be in Christ and in the covenant of his love with the Church means to be incorporate in the life of the Triune God. Only in Christ do we have access to the mystery of the life and love of the Holy Trinity'. Quickly following on is, 'every kind of love is an inclination toward some good based on consciousness of value'.\textsuperscript{59} This is utterly at odds with Nygren's thought. This is because with Nygren agape finds no expression within the life of God, it is wholly outward-going yet not stimulated by value. It is a most odd conception with no role for self-regard and none for the value of its object. With Häring the practical difference of his Trinitarian commitment is clear. Love within the Trinity is called out by virtue of the value of each to each, and so love as response to value is not \textit{a priori} alien to the being of God in the manner suggested by Nygren.

Consequently a completely different picture of man's relation to God and of his own self-understanding is provided by Häring in comparison with Nygren. Häring advocates as a motive, the highest form of eudaemonism,
'Once man realises that only God can make him happy ... then he already has true love', Nygren and Kierkegaard would have condemned such talk as being of eros or preferential love. Haring, however, is at pains to distinguish his position from that of the Platonists; 'Supernatural hope is that undreamed of fulfilment of the Greek Platonic eros ... which knows no rest until it has ascended to the divine. And yet supernatural hope is essentially distinct from the Greek eros for it does not spring from man himself but from the gracious and unmerited bounty and condescension of God who awakens ... a hope', The inclinations within man toward a divine end, which Nygren labels as a self-concern alien to the will of God, are in Haring the gracious gift of God impelling man to himself. In the light of our first chapter's comments on need and God, the harmony between Trinity, love and self concern ought now to be evident.

Self-concern, a proper estimation of one's role within God's world and not selfishness, can and ought to be a grace. Supernatural hope, the hope of self and corporate fulfilment in the divine, is not 'the flight of mere man', while it involves an image of God totally different from that of the Greeks'. The essential difference between the Greek and Christian God is that the Greek God cannot love, he is an abstract end, while the Christian God is an active and loving God as is greatly stressed by Haring. Nygren
possessed the same distinction, but while he defined the Greek God as being at the root of all theologies having a role for self, and the Christian God as being totally agapeistic and opposed to self-concern, Hēring's concept of the Living God is of one who out of love implants in man the desire for himself. This is because it is proper to him as a creature, whereas in Greek eros, the desire was born out of frustration with earthly incompletion. Properly speaking, the Christian desire for God rejoices in its earthiness, its creatureliness, whereas to the Greek this was repugnant. Hēring's conclusions are opposed to those of Nygren, yet his system like Nygren's is all of grace, 'without any merit on our part'. 64 Since it is all of grace, so it can allow our genuine freedom and a role for self concern as proper to the creature. Here are two theologians who achieve diametrically opposite results from the same premise, that all is of grace. Very different concepts of grace's operation in the world, of creation, of the Fall, and ultimately of the nature of being within God, are responsible for this divergence, not allegiance or otherwise to the Greek Platonists.

In complete variance to Nygren, Hēring has asserted that God is the proper object of man's own love, because he was created to this end: 'The virtue of love also has God for its object. We are privileged to love God himself'. 65 Emil Brunner is specifically condemned, and thus implicitly Nygren, for contending 'that God himself accepts no love
from us because he has no need of our love. While God may not depend on our love in order to exist, that does not mean that he does not want or will not accept our love, — again, a distinction Nygren fails to recognise. In Haring's words, 'the true God has no need of our love but he wills to be loved by us'. It could be contended that it is Trinitarian theology that enables this distinction to be made with its portrayal of love overflowing from the fullness of life within the Trinity, a love that does not depend but delights in giving and accepting. Without the Trinity it is hard to see reciprocity within divine love. Nygren's portrait certainly has no role for it, for him all true love, God's love, is one-way agapeistic love. With the Trinity, without prejudicing man's own contingency and God's sovereignty, since there is reciprocity within the Godhead, God's desire for man's response can be seen as being a feature by grace of God's relation to man. By God's own free choice it can be held that God's love will need to be reciprocated by men for its fulfillment, not because it is necessarily so but because he has chosen it to be so. This is essential groundwork for a proper estimation of self-love in a creature of God.

Thus when Haring moves from the ontological content of love to the practical content of neighbour love, he starts as a consequence of the preceding ontology, by stressing the 'inner unity of Divine love, love of self, love of neighbour'. Through the theology of the Trinity
and of Creation the three loves are all essentially inter-related in the divine plan. For, Nygren the only love of any validity would have been the latter, and that would not be an independent love of man but God's agape active in man. Whereas we argue that God's sovereignty must be so construed as not to prejudice the independence of his own creature, Nygren does so prejudice man, whereas Høring does not. For Høring the 'I' of a person signifies a subsistent being spiritually conscious of self. This 'I' is only meaningful with 'Thou' and to fail to perceive the 'Thou' is to be defective in love and to fail to find our own essential personhood. 'I' have my being only because of, and in conjunction with, the 'thou' of my neighbour and in Christian terms with the 'Thou' of God. Self-fulfillment of 'I' is thus found in a proper attention to 'Thou'. Selfishness will never fulfill 'I'. So the essential distinction between proper and improper self-love which Nygren condemns, is found to be essential: 'Only if there is the movement of love from the I to the thou which takes the thou as seriously as the I itself are both firmly fixed in themselves'.

Høring notes the connection between self-fulfillment and creation. As creatures whose root of being, even as fallen creatures, is orientated to God, 'We are really I, only ourselves fully when we face the thou of God'. Is this then the sense of 'as yourself' intended by Jesus? It will never be possible to judge the mind of Jesus but there are these two choices: that Jesus meant as Nygren or
Kierkegaard hold, that 'as yourself' was a clever gambit in exposing the masque of self-love, or that Jesus in this phrase was organically linking the three loves in one entity - love of God, of self, and of neighbour being fundamental to the created harmony. Håring opts for the threefold tie in which love of God is the guarantee of the ordering of self and neighbour love. The relation to God is realised on earth by the relation to our neighbour. Håring notes John's exhortation, 'How can he who does not love his brother whom he sees, love God whom he does not see?'71 God has created these loves and without him they will be fruitless. He is love's centre, so 'love of self and love of neighbour cannot reach the depth essential for preservation and fulfilment unless both seek and find in God their origin and centre'.72 Or quoting Augustine, 'Only those who love themselves for God's sake love themselves as they should'.73

With a positive concept of divine creation it is thus entirely possible for the Christian to have a lively and genuine role for self-love free of the sinful element of selfishness, while still being a genuine form of self-concern in a manner non-existent in Nygrén. Man is a creature of God created to glorify God and to serve his neighbour. Unto this end he is constituted and in this he can fulfil himself and his aspirations beyond all the dreams of pleasure that selfishness can prompt. Indeed such are the rewards promised by Jesus for his followers
that the accusation can be made that Jesus' ethic is reward or self-centred, a charge that will be answered presently.

The proper form of self-love consequent upon the action of God's grace Häring calls the Supernatural love of self and neighbour. In his judgement it transcends in value natural or human love, yet to be efficacious and fruitful it must be rooted in natural love. Rightly ordered natural love is itself a product of God's grace, as an indirect consequence of creation. Natural love is our own love over which men have the power of abuse, so when man abuses natural love in selfishness this is a false self-abandonment. Considering sin, it may be said that 'all sin flows from a disordered seeking of self, a self-seeking, which is not open to charity'.\textsuperscript{74} False self-love is for Häring the great enemy of love for God which embraces proper self-love, so again the distinction Nygren will not make is here held to be vital.

Accordingly when considering duty, Häring holds that the first duty of proper self-love as a creature of God is to curb our native egoism, this concern for rampant selfishness that is a consequence of the Fall.\textsuperscript{75} Under the heading of 'The Standard "as yourself"', Häring emphasizes the latter clause which the 'Scripture splendidly illustrates'.\textsuperscript{77} Neighbour love is to be as much a part of my proper nature as self-love, for neither is selfish love. Rather Christian self-love is 'the holy love of self in God' and not the 'naturally noble love of self' - the Greek view.\textsuperscript{78} This is 'a love of self which is a participation
in Christ's own love for us'. It is the priority of God or Christ's love that can give a proper meaning for self-love and neighbour love. Without this Christocentricity, self-love may earn the condemnation Nygren gives it. Haring and Nygren both stress Christocentricity; one of them is enabled by this to remove meaning from man as an individual and so of concern for himself. The other uses this Christocentricity to achieve a concept of self and neighbour love by which both are preserved and stressed as necessary for the health of one another. The theology of creation and of its end is decisive in freeing self-love, either from the accusations Nygren justifiably makes of Greek thought, or from his consequent concept of agape by which man's own individual integrity is negated.

The third author cited in our 'Catholic' analysis was Geach. His analysis of the role of self-love flows out of his analysis of, and the necessity for, Trinitarian theology. His work is therefore most appropriate to our heading on that subject. Suffice it to say that through the Trinity, Geach holds that self-regard and self-giving within the being of God create a perfect harmony. God loves men and men love God not for their individuality to be destroyed but for it to be fulfilled, and as creatures it must be that their creator fulfills them. God's jealousy, adopting an Old Testament theme, is for his creatures' sake, he is jealous for us as his creatures for our own best interest. The paradoxical viewpoint is maintained that
God's jealousy is a necessary factor in making men free. God wants men to love him both for his sake and their own. For his sake because he is the creator and since he is himself love, he is to be loved not to 'satisfy him' but for goodness' sake. For our sake, self-love is appropriate because men are God's creatures and thus he wishes good things for them. Geach goes so far as to maintain that unselfishness is not only not a virtue ascribable to God, it is just not a virtue. This is because in itself unselfishness or selfishness is not the moral criterion, for instance, certain unselfish actions may be highly immoral, such as bravery in battle for an immoral cause. Likewise certain self-regarding actions may be highly virtuous, such as the acquisition of knowledge. It is the end that is being sought in being self-concerned or unselfish that determines the morality of the stance. St. Paul is clear that one can lack charity even if one gave all one's goods to feed the poor and offered one's body to be burnt. The conclusion must be that undiscriminating love or attachment, to others or a cause, is not charity. Love, to be Paul's charis, must be towards the right causes, and for Paul that is to be tied to the love of God.

Numerous theologians have endeavoured to chart the varying strands of opinion concerning self-love. One such is Gene Outka. He characterises four general responses to the issue: Self-love as wholly nefarious; Self-love as normal, reasonable and prudent; Self-love as justified
derivatively; Self-love as a definite obligation. Significantly a general move throughout the spectrum is seen from Protestant to Catholic authors respectively. Concerning the first position of self-love as wholly nefarious, Outka identifies numerous associations with this viewpoint. It is generally linked as in Reinhold Niebuhr, with a strong view of sin such that self-love, pride and sin are identified. This negative view of self-love is also typically linked to a view of acquisitiveness. That is, this type of self-love is such that in relation to all others the individual's predominant aim is private satisfaction. Outka notes that Nygren opts for such a view of self-love in which this private acquisitiveness effectively governs all the actions of man. Outka condemns this viewpoint and maintains that Nygren's portrayal of men as 'psychological egoists' is inaccurate. Nygren's major mistake in this analysis is to hold that such self-love is the sole spring of behaviour for all. This destroys human freedom for it allows no other stimuli for action aside from God's direct agape. Had Nygren said that such self-love is a basic trend in man then the possibility of free conversion and a genuine reversal of this trend, respecting man's integrity would have been possible - this is a question of the operation of grace.

As Outka notes, Nygren can only have two world views utterly opposed to one another, eros against agape, whereas Outka makes the essential distinction which has underlain much of this chapter's earlier discussion on the consequences
of the doctrine of creation. That is, the distinction between a natural human life apart from God's sustaining grace, which is Nygren's position, and the actual human life where God is always inescapably active and sustaining. Viewpoints such as Nygren's may be held to be in danger of advocating a radical dualism between man and God. Outka notes the point by using a quotation from MacLagan: 'There may be a concept of "natural man" that refers to no actual individual, but only to a purely hypothetical being, that is to say, to man as he would be were it not for the grace of God, but as in fact he never is, since this is God's world, which he has not abandoned.'

The portrayal of 'self-love as normal, reasonable and prudent' is moving into the centre of the spectrum. Here self-love is neither virtuous nor evil, rather it is the state in which man the creature presently finds himself. It is the desire for self-preservation that has preserved the species while at the same time being able to cause considerable hurt within the species. Its dangers are more towards narrow-mindedness than incorrigible selfishness. Outka takes as an exponent of this view Paul Ramsey. Self-love is taken in this instance as the paradigm for the meaning of other-regard. He says 'How exactly do you love yourself? Answer this question and you will know how a Christian should love his neighbour.' It is assumed that one can love oneself properly as God intends and not as de facto occurs wrongly. The essence of this
position is that self-love may reasonably be universalised, so as men rightly value their own interests, so men must value others. Self-love is not wrong provided others are valued equally. This is very different from saying, 'How much I value myself, I must destroy that valuation, negate myself and turn myself entirely to others'. Outka appreciates that a distinction between a wrong and a right self-love is unavoidable. The wrong sort of self-seeking is self-defeating because the self is never rich in isolation, the principle of relation being fundamental to true individuality. Whereas self-giving produces self-enhancement and fulfillment, and this could be said from both a Christian and humanist viewpoint.

The third position is that of self-love as justified derivatively. In this, deliberate concern for the agent's own welfare is permissible so long as this can be derived from other regard. The scriptural warrant for this would be provided by a parable like that concerning the talents. The implication is that there is the obligation to develop one's own abilities for the sake of others. Numerous practical examples are given of this, for instance, an agent should stand up for his own and others' human rights when by neglecting to do so, others are encouraged to further their own corruption. An agent should further assert himself when the rights of those close to him are threatened e.g. the family. Finally, an agent should consider himself in order not to burden others by creating
needless problems. Simone Weil in her own concern for others became so extreme in her ascetical practices that she was a burden to those around her. A happy and cheerful person full of his own joie de vivre is a blessing and liberation to others. Proper self-love in this analysis has a pragmatic role to play in harmony with other love. The two loves are inseparable because neighbour love will wish the neighbour's own good which will include a correct estimate of his own self.

The final position is that of self-love as a definite obligation. The two authors cited here by Oitka are both Roman Catholics, D'Arcy and Johann.91 As already noted, D'Arcy's own standpoint is one of deliberate opposition to Nygren's viewpoint. D'Arcy characterises eros as active self-regarding love, and agape as passive self-sacrificing love. In the fashion of Geach he regards neither eros or agape, self-love or self-sacrifice, as ends in themselves. He believes both are corruptible and both have a proper ideal founded in God by which they may become compatible. Both taken to excess give roughly the same dangers: 'Selfishness is only a vice if it means an undue regard; unselfishness is only a virtue if it is countered by selfrespect. 'The two loves therefore so far from being opposites appear to require the presence of each other'.92 From this point of view it is not surprising that D'Arcy is very critical of Nygren. Particularly criticised is Nygren's identification of Greek eros with all other non-agapeistic forms of life. Not only is there this confusion
over the bounds of eros but he is also critical of Nygren's use of the concept of God's sovereignty. D'Arcy is worried that Nygren evacuates man's independent reality and that Nygren has not given a concept of sovereignty such that man's relative self-dependence and freewill, themselves the God-given creative product of love, are preserved.  

Nygren prejudices man's independence in his concept of God's all-sovereign agape. D'Arcy is moved to criticise this, for 'if all agape in man is the divine nature itself, how can man escape being wholly divine or else radically separate?'  

Either way man as an independent creature ceases to exist and with the latter Nygren seems to create a radical dualism.

Outka's analysis thus conveniently shows how differing assessments of self-love are derived from differing churchmanships with their varying beliefs concerning the nature of creation, sin and grace. He also charts the possibilities in analysing self-love positively, from a pragmatic viewpoint to that of a theological virtue alongside self-giving. Geach's own, and Outka's explicit, use of D'Arcy's separation of the issue of self or other love from the final ideal is very helpful. Nygren makes agape the final ideal and eros the ultimate enemy. Consequently in not using the principle of relation which demands both loves, he destroys man and reduces God to a monad. Geach, Outka, D'Arcy and implicitly Häring by their harmony of the two loves resolve this tendency.

A similar analysis, though in a more psychological vein, is provided by D. D. Williams. He starts by noting the
as God's agent was charged to subdue and govern the world. His creativity is God given, God has handed over certain of his sovereign powers to man as his intended agent, albeit under divine judgement, so it defeats God's own purpose when man's own creativity is denigrated.

Williams takes Erich Fromm as an example of those who have reacted against this 'self-denying' strand in Christianity. His philosophical basis is that of psychological self-realisation. Against this Fromm sees Christian faith as restraining freedom and repressing productive love. He rails against the Protestant Reformers, 'Luther's relation to God was one of complete submission'. Whereas in complete contrast Nygren was able to write that 'Luther departs from the traditional idea which discovers a commandment of self-love in the commandment of love to one's neighbours, that he finds this latter to contain a direct prohibition of every kind of self-love'. In response to the criticisms of Fromm and Camus, Williams presents a psychological analysis of the Christian view of self.

This is seen clearly in his view of the ideal: 'All the human loves, sex, comradeship, humanitarian and religious love of the good and beautiful belong in the fulfilled self. They will be transformed in self-giving yet they must live for they constitute personal life'. Nygren started from the presupposition of a certain nature of God, viz. his concept of agape, to which mankind and eros were tailored to fit and so lost their existence. Williams starts from the opposite end with a concept of man, which although it may be
'fulfilled' or 'transformed', cannot radically be altered. The loves of men known in this present state have to be retained, such that it is the concept of God which will need altering rather than the concept of man. This may sound radical, but two justifications for this can be given. There is the argument by analogy, that our prior experience of love is human, and that to speak of the divine without reference to the human is to speak nonsense. Secondly, since God himself created this nature and its loves, his own actions upon us will be in harmony with our nature, not out of necessity but as deliberate policy. This returns one to the nature of the Fall and Creation argument, and it also holds out the possibility of a considerable change in our understanding of God. A recent illustration of this stance which has been illustrated at great length is Vanstone's work. Traherne too, at a much earlier date, was happy to see the natural loves of possession as the material for transformation into felicity. 102

Williams for his part is employing the same scheme and has a thesis that two aspects of the human loves prepare men for God's agape. Human loves 'have the power to open up the self and to show the requirement for self-giving', and 'they reach the limits of self-fulfillment and so can acknowledge that only a love which transcends the human loves can fulfill the self'. 103 Williams is maintaining, as Geach and D'Arcy hold from different traditions, that the human loves can be good or bad, unlike Nygren whose position he specifically
condemns. Human love is not wholly to be despised - the loathed distinction between proper and false self love is used. Thus Williams 'specifically rejects ... (that) ... agape is a complete contradiction of human love'.

His psychological insights coupled with his starting with man is clearly seen in his treatment of the Fall. Concerning it, he writes that 'men's loves have the ability to go wrong and so need the redeeming influence of agape'. From the statement that every self can find integrity only in change and by risking relationships with others, he notes that this inherent risk frightens men. 'Psychological blocking', where men do not take the risk of change and refuse to use their capabilities to the full is for Williams a much more subtle view of sin than man consciously at the centre of his every wrong act.

The traverse across the spectrum of views has now reached its fullest extent: Catholic and Protestant, Conservative and Radical have been examined. In Williams, man is to the fore to such an extent that if anyone is prejudiced it is God, whereas in Nygren it was the other way around. In all the various authors, the consequences of creation theology and of beliefs concerning the Fall have been shown to be directly related to their portrayal of the role of self-fulfillment in man. Despite the criticism made of it, the value of the distinction between false and proper self-love has been seen in a very wide variety of authors ranging from Geach to Williams, whose churchmanship.
is very different. It is contended that this distinction was intended by Jesus in his pronouncement 'as thyself'. He perceived that his Father's creation intended in its eventual harmony to include the happiness of all, derived from the Father who intends to give good things to his children. Recourse is thus made to one of the initial objections to the sayings of Jesus, that the talk of self-denial is in fact self-centred. This is the idea that sacrifice is for the sake of eternal regard: chastise yourself now on earth and you will find eternal bliss. Is selfish prudence thus the ethic of the gospel?

It cannot be disputed that there are two strands, at the least paradoxical, in the Gospel. There are the classic texts of self denial, 'if any man would follow me let him deny himself'. Yet even amongst these texts the element of self-fulfilment is present. Each Beatitude receives its sanction in a promise. Mark writes that 'if any one would be first he must be last and servant of all'. A little later, Jesus having exhorted his followers to leave all for the gospel promises they 'shall receive a hundredfold'. Jesus tells the 'rich ruler' what he must do to 'have treasure in heaven'. Does this mean that all the stress by Jesus on obedience and self-forgetfulness before God and love of the neighbour has lost its validity? Kenneth Kirk in a significant consideration of this issue concluded that this paradoxical mixture of themes was a deliberate act of Jesus. The basis of Kirk's answer to the problem
is to employ the same distinction used by Geach and others, that self-forgetfulness like selfishness, for its own sake is wrong. Self-forgetfulness is never an end in itself, but can only be a servant to an end, in this case the establishment of the Kingdom of God. Kirk notes that Baron Von Hügel pointed out that Jesus promised reward never for reward's sake or as a payment for self-forgetfulness. Reward is simply not linked to self-centred acquisition. Rather reward is only presented in response to another motive, that of obedience to God and Christ. Thus in a text with both the element of self-sacrifice and reward present one reads, 'whoever loses his life for my sake and the Gospel's will save it'. The key proviso has been added, 'for my sake and the Gospel's'. Fidelity to Christ for the sake of who he is, is the motive for Christian renunciation. To give up joys now for joys in eternity is not the motive for renunciation and would be to forfeit the reward.

It ought to be stressed that self-forgetfulness and self-concern must not be presented as ends in themselves. Taken alone they are amoral as Geach noted; it is the ends they serve that give them value. In this case the end is the realisation of creaturehood which is the realisation of the Kingdom of God in fidelity to him. For this end's fruition, roles for both self-forgetfulness and self concern are needed. Thus the reward motif in the Gospels is not to be assessed on the human scale of return for services
rendered. The parables of the prodigal son and of the labourers in the vineyard teach that reward is not quantitative. The principle of the labourer's payment was not pay in exact proportion to work done, rather more was given than was expected, which incited the displeasure of the one group who expected payment for services rendered—the labourers who in fact received full and fair payment for their services and yet were displeased with the charity of their master. The essence of the reward motif is not prudence but grace, overwhelming gift beyond expectation. That all sinners are blessed out of all proportion to their deserts is the essence of Jesus' forgiveness: 'We are all unprofitable servants'.

Kirk's reasoning is that reward is grace, it is introduced not to attract man's prudence but as the inescapable consequence of the Kingdom's fruition. It cannot be earned, it is simply given as the inescapable consequence of the obedience which allows God to establish his Kingdom. At the same time, it declares that the self-forgetfulness and self-love commended by these texts are not ends in themselves but rather are harmoniously linked in the attainment of the Kingdom. In the rationale behind this, return is necessary to creation and God's sovereignty. As Haring saw, self-love and neighbour love can only be held together and find fruition, in love of God. The love of God must be prior to all things and only from this can flow a proper sense of the other two loves because it is in
God's plan for this to be so. Since the Creation and the Kingdom are intended to be good and God given, the joy promised in return for obedience is not a commercial bargain but the gift of one who wishes the very best for his creatures. He can obtain this end only by our own free co-operation, since God desires men and not automatons, and this is the essence of gracious love.

Flew picks up the same two points in his study of New Testament ethics, that Jesus transforms reward with his conception of God's gracious dealings with man, and the conception that service of God is duty, performed out of love that cannot be assessed in terms of work or earnings. Since it might still be asked why Jesus used what is to our eyes an ambiguous terms, Flew explains how natural it was for Jesus to adopt its use. It was a subtle play on Jewish use as in the parable of the labourers. The traditional Jewish scheme was that of God punishing sin and rewarding merit. Reward in the Jewish sense possessed a religious use with which Christians today no longer identify because it has acquired connotations of recompense for service. The problem for the Jews was that this had already happened to the term in its links with 'works' and the 'law'. Jesus' use represents an attack on this trend and an endeavour to return it to the use of the gift of love.

New Testament scholars show that for Jesus the use of 'reward' and a role for 'self' are a direct product of his beliefs concerning the end of man, what is called Beatitude.
Maritain, a Roman Catholic, considers this matter in his treatise on morals. He starts his discussion by noting the text, 'Today thou shalt be with me in Paradise'. Being with Christ in the Kingdom is the absolute end of man in which the three loves of God, self and neighbour meet. For Maritain this is because this is the statement of lovers and not the apprehension of the Platonic idea of the supreme value, good. The happiness here is not simple pleasure and he links Beatitude and Paul's saying, that 'Eye hath not seen...'. Maritain's words can be taken as a philosophical commentary upon the biblical use of 'reward' attached to grace used by Kirk and Flew. Thus he emphasises the same point concerning motive as they did. The motive for Beatitude or reward is not a selfish desire of the same for oneself, but firstly the desire to obey God. Maritain places God first, then our own concerns are relevant but only as his creatures. He does this by distinguishing between man's absolute ultimate end - God, and his subjective ultimate end - man's own end, the vision of God. From the priority of God flows a proper role for man's self-love as a creature of God. Maritain explicitly aims to overcome the egocentricity of Aristotelian eudaemonism, in that man's absolute end, although fulfilling for man, is absolutely and personally other. Here is why Nygren has gone so wrong, in refusing to allow that while Greek eros could not respond to a living God as an end and an 'other', Christian reflection on self-love may, while not necessarily, so respond. In this case it is the living 'other' who defines
and creates the possibility of man's own end.

The varieties of 'self-love' are nearly as varied as the varieties of 'love' itself. Despite this variety it does prove possible to comment on certain factors inherent in the Christian position as portrayed in the authors considered. Notwithstanding the status of his study, it will first be said that the major work of Nygren on this subject does not contribute to an understanding of the problem. On the basis of this study it would appear to possess two major flaws. The identification of Greek eros with all Christian attempts to justify self-love, which Nygren repudiates, does not hold. Two of the authors considered, Häring and Maritain, who have a high view of self-love, deliberately noted that their work stemmed from the theology of grace and was radically different from Greek expectations. This exposes the second of Nygren's errors. He does not appreciate that the varying Christian strands on self-love do not stem from allegiance or otherwise to the Greeks but to differing understandings of basic doctrines like the Trinity, Creation, Fall and Grace. The consequences of this variety have been clearly seen in the difference between the 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' presentations. A positive view of creation as involving man's own end and a less negative view of the consequences of the Fall have generally enabled the Catholic position to develop a role for self-love. This use of creation is a feature that cannot possibly be derived from Greek philosophy, which lacks the notion of God's creating the world good. In
fact Nygren and the Greeks share a position of distrust for the created order!

The concept of Beatitude, personal and lively communion in the life of God, is also alien to the Greek view of abstract contemplation. Yet this is a major element in the analysis of self-love given by Häring and Maritain. The differences between Christian Beatitude and the Greek Platonic view are seen in the manner by which the Christian presentation is tied to the New Testament theme of reward. This theme, held up by its detractors as selfish, has been shown to be a major New Testament theme which links the three loves of God, self and neighbour in a living whole - witnessed to by Kirk, Flew and Maritain. Nygren may well be correct with his analysis of Greek thought but he is wrong to tar other strands of Christendom with the same brush.

The distinction between proper and false self-love which Nygren adamantly refused to allow has also been shown to be vital from a variety of viewpoints. Mortimer, Geach, Kirk and Williams all perceive that selfishness is not equal to self-love. Linguistically this study has shown that for a large and varied element of Christendom, it is essential to distinguish between the negative forces of selfishness and self-centredness and what may be the positive forces of self-love, such as self-fulfillment and self-concern, whether out of concern for our end as God's creatures - Häring and D'Arcy, or out of a positive psychological assessment of these drives - Williams. The overwhelming conclusion to
this study must be to note the futility of trying to understand self-love in a Christian sense, in isolation from other doctrinal considerations. All the authors offering a positive assessment of self-love, offer that only having previously asserted that self-love can never be an end in itself. Geach and Kirk emphasized how drives like self-love and self-giving in themselves do not contain moral value, but only acquire that in relation to the ends they serve. Christian self-love is a positive value offering eternal bliss to the individual, telling him his happiness is important, but only in relation to the happiness of others, with all men seen as the creatures of God who by his grace alone has the ability to bring about this Kingdom.
CHAPTER FIVE
LOVE AS COMMANDMENT

For Christians it may be difficult to appreciate just how distinctive and peculiar Jesus' Love Commandment is. Certainly there are non-Christians who would argue that it is a contradiction in terms. This is in part because there are many whose conception of love is one dominated by emotionalism and irrationality. Those who stress love as spontaneous and uncaused including such Christians as Nygren, or alternatively those who reduce it to mere causal attraction, for example, Stendhal, only reinforce this idea.\(^1\)

Karl Popper's book *The Open Society and its Enemies* is an example of what follows when the sense of love as commandment cannot be recognised. In a chapter significantly entitled 'The Revolt against Reason', Popper states, 'But I hold that he who teaches that not reason but love should rule opens the way for those who rule by hate'. For Popper love is opposed to reason and is simply an emotion, thus, 'no emotion, not even love can replace rule of institution controlled by reason'.\(^2\) Granted its identification of love with emotionalism and irrationality, Popper's conclusion clearly follows. One can see why Popper is unable to make
sense of the commandment to love.

Whether the Love Commandment is seen as irrational or not depends on how love is understood. Arguably for those who cannot believe in God it is very difficult to avoid Popper's negative assessment of love's normative role.

Likewise Greek Philosophy, that other great intellectual inheritance of Western society outside Christianity, would have found the Love Commandment unintelligible in its Christian formulation. Love for Plato and Aristotle was certainly not despised but it was not normative in itself. For instance love is hardly a normative principle of Plato's *Republic*. As Nygren argues, the Greek *eros* is desire for something else, it is not a complete entity in itself. For the Greeks love was desire for happiness, 'eudaemonism'. The object of this desire, in so far as conceived of as God, was impassible and immutable. God could not love, that is, desire anything. Men only loved because they were incomplete and hence desired something for their completion. Love was not the highest category of existence for the Greeks.

It was the Jewish conception of a loving God remote from emotionalism that prepared the ground for Jesus' command, and made it intelligible. Indeed Jesus' answer to the question 'What is the greatest commandment?' was a coupling (probably unique) of Deuteronomy 6:5 and Leviticus 19:18. V. P. Furnish concluded after a critical study respecting the integrity of the differing New Testament traditions, that the Love Commandment was both genuine to Jesus and
central to his message and mission. It was a formulation that grew out of his Jewish upbringing. The Golden Rule in its negative form was certainly known to Judaism, that is, 'Do not do unto others as you would not have done unto yourself'. Christ's unique contribution was to give commands to love a central place in His Gospel. Furnish notes how the evangelists alter the force of the command, while yet retaining its centrality. For instance, Matthew sees the Love Commandment as the key to the meaning of the whole of the law, and as the essential content of the righteousness of Jesus' followers. By contrast, Luke sets the Christian Love Commandment against the Greek ethic of reciprocity. Both tie the commandment into the call to repentance and discipleship, whereas John throughout his gospel and particularly at 13:34, 'A new commandment I give unto you...', shows the new commandment to be the prime motivating force of Jesus' mission. With John, the priority of the Father's love towards the Son is constantly stressed.

New Testament studies show that it is impossible to treat Jesus' love ethic uniformly, but that it is undeniably central to his gospel.

The central significance of the New Testament commendation of love is that it is formulated in a command to love. It is noticeable that Nygren, despite having a heading 'The commandment of love in its Christian meaning', uses this section to evacuate all meaning from command. Man as an independent agent ceases to exist. What is commanded is that God's agape, spontaneous and uncaused, should flow through
man as a mere vessel. As divine love is unconditional so man's self-surrender is unconditional. With Nygren the Love Commandment is not a command to men but just a means of releasing the flow of God's agape. A different approach may be seen in Fletcher's *Situation Ethics*. Here the Love Commandment is taken as a distillation of the essential essence of the law. It becomes the criterion by which all forms of legalism must be judged. Quite aside from whether love can be commanded and whether the New Testament account is consistent, theologians themselves produce quite divergent accounts of the Love Commandment.

Furnish's analysis makes the point against those unable to see the logic of commanding love, that it is precisely because love is commanded, not from the natural affections of the lover or by the natural attractiveness of the beloved, but from an exterior source, that it can be commanded. Commanding love makes sense only when love is held to be the fundamental universal principle of being - 'God is love.' Furnish makes the point (whether in conscious opposition to Nygren or not) that love can be commanded precisely because Christian love is not spontaneous and uncaused, which is Nygren's ideal of love, and ironically that of many moderns. Christian love grounded in the nature of God is regular, reliable and steadfast - God's nature is to be trusted. Furnish quotes as examples of theologians who have set out to advocate the Love Commandment, Kant and Kierkegaard. Of Kant's discussion of the 'great commandment' he remarks that Kant at least knew that the New
Testament Love Commandment was not dependent upon aroused feelings. This love that can be commanded Kant called 'Practical Love' and it was to be distinguished from filial or marital love which are derived from the affections.

Kierkegaard discusses the subject at length in his book *Works of Love* principally in the second chapter entitled 'You shall love'. Kierkegaard deals with the two chief issues raised by Matthew 22:39, of which here only the question of commandment interests us, the other issue being the question of self-love. That man should love under the 'thou shalt' of eternity is paradoxical (in the manner of the prayer 'whose service is perfect freedom'). Kierkegaard presents the apparent contradiction that love is duty, but this analysis far from being contradictory describes the nature of eternal love. Since love is on this view constitutive of the universe and is not just an aspect of human character it can therefore be commanded. He urges Christians not to see it as an amazing injunction. For the Pagan it may be a stunning idea lacking parallel, but for the Christian love is commanded and not left to the whims of passion. Indeed so strong is Kierkegaard's portrayal of love as commandment over the private loves, that it may be felt he does the latter an injustice. He tells his readers that the love that is voluntary in mankind is not necessarily eternal: 'Only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secure' and 'security of the eternal casts out all anxiety'. Whereas spontaneous love can be tested for its validity, this is impossible with
eternal love, indeed it is an insult to test love that is of God. Since God's love is eternal, it is necessary both for him and his creatures to love. It is therefore entirely appropriate for this love to be commanded for it is simply commanding men to conform to their eternal character. Love that seeks a test is uncertain love, and this spontaneous love can equally well turn into hate and jealousy.\textsuperscript{10} Positively speaking Kierkegaard does allow for the possibility of its being turned into eternal love.

Subsequently he reaffirms the paradox, 'only when it is a duty to love, only then is love made eternally free in blessed independence'.\textsuperscript{11} It may be unconscious, but it seems as if Kierkegaard is echoing the rationale of monastic spirituality in his portrayal of 'You shall' as liberating in that it attaches one to all and not to particular objects. In the monastic parallel one is free by being available to all: 'it is the bringing of your potential for love into the new and unlimited fruitfulness of the Kingdom'.\textsuperscript{12} A connection may also be seen to Romans 6:15ff of man being a slave of one of two masters: being the slave of the loving God, he must obey his master's command to love. Kierkegaard further develops the contrast between eternal and spontaneous love by holding that eternal love, that is God's love, is not dependent. It needs nothing and is therefore free love, whereas so-called spontaneous and human love depends upon the response of the other, it needs the other to acknowledge it. Eternal love has no dependence on being loved but
wishes to love others. In the light of our own earlier chapters we would want to add what Kierkegaard does not, that is, from this stems the divine creativity, love flowing out of the plenitude of love within the Godhead. It would also be desirable to introduce the Trinity in order to avoid monadism and give a role to relation and need, elements characteristic of love in our analysis, within the Godhead.

For Kierkegaard, love seen as duty is freed from the despair consequent upon the need to choose a particular object of love and to be reciprocated by that particular which is the lot of spontaneous love. The command burns out what is unsound in love, that is, whatever is not eternal and not therefore of universal value. Kierkegaard's study revolves around the three words 'You', 'Shall', and 'Neighbour'. In his analysis of the latter he demonstrates that while it is never an obligation to find the beloved, it is an obligation to love the neighbour — this is the ethical task which is the origin of all tasks. The point at issue is that 'erotic loves are preferential and the passion of preference', while Christian love is self-renunciation. Love as commandment is to be justified from two aspects. Firstly, ontologically, if love is the constitutive category of the universe, it can be commanded as the means by which men fulfill their proper nature. Secondly, if this is so, it must if its universal character is to be seen, be reflected pre-eminently in universal neighbour love rather than private preferential affective...
love. The Love Commandment commands neighbourly love and does not command preferential love though this is not ruled out, indeed John presents the relationship of Jesus to the beloved disciple. 15

The danger of the language of universal love is that the love command ceases to have any appeal to particular persons. Rather it can become either a vague ideal or perhaps worse, be taken as the justification for a very impersonal 'do-gooding' in which the object is to suppress the emotions. Furnish in his biblical analysis, sets out to counter this by stating that thus to be commanded is to be addressed as an individual. The parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37), which may be compared to Matthew 22:34-40 and granted to be a Lukan construction, is there to give an example of the real concrete possibilities for love's action. The stress upon 'Go and do thou likewise' is because the neighbour is the next person in need to be encountered. The various differences in the answer to the question, 'Which is the greatest commandment?' are there because the Lukan redaction stressed the link to the parable wherein the whole complex is hortatory. That is to say that the story is so arranged that the one who gives the answer is himself exhorted to go and do as the Samaritan did.

The punch of the Lukan story lies not in the formulation of the commandment as in Matthew, where Jesus is with probably to be understood as the New Moses; but / Luke's theme of Jesus having to urge the Lawyer to do what he
acknowledges to be right, in contrast to the Samaritan who simply acts where the need is without worrying over whom he is helping. Thus the Lawyer's actual question, 'And just who is my neighbour?' is never actually answered. It is not the object of mercy whom Luke makes the centre of the discussion but the subject, the doer who is the focus of the debate. Thus the confession Jesus extracts is 'The one who performed an act of Mercy'. The stress is thus laid on the hearer, and his duties to all, not on an erudite definition of who the neighbour is.

There is however, the contrasting danger of using the Love Commandment to avoid the inspired type of action the Parable of the Good Samaritan wishes to encourage and this needs illustration. It is a tendency noticeable in Catholic casuistry dominated by rationalist demands, that love ought to conform to a certain ideal of reason, such that the emotions have no role. An example of this tendency, albeit now not so much in vogue, is the Anglo-Catholic R. C. Mortimer's book, *The Elements of Moral Theology*, in a chapter entitled 'Love'. Mortimer outlines St. Thomas' three degrees of love: firstly, love to avoid sin and opposition to the will of God, that is to resist temptation; secondly, to increase love by seeking out love; and thirdly, there is only one object of this love, to cleave to God and to enjoy him. So love begins by turning from the world and self, increases by drawing men to God and is perfected by finding and resting in God.
Aquinas' portrayal does show just how ideals of what love is have changed. Very few contemporary philosophers would feel able to recommend his analysis. Yet from the Christian viewpoint it is to be commended, in linking love not just to the private emotional life but to the ontological structure of the world. It is this approach that is fundamental to making sense of love as commandment. But is this to erect an utter divide between love as an explicative category of the universe and its role in the emotions? Although Kierkegaard was at pains to stress the priority of love as willing the neighbour's good, he does at least grant that affective love can be harmonised with neighbour love. He argues that one has to remove all distinctions of preference in order to love the neighbour, but that this is precisely not to cease loving the beloved but to include all in the same category of love as the beloved. This has to be done, or else there arises the very problem of neighbour love being no love. Kierkegaard's bogey is the language of preference: the poetic love which is a love of friendship lacking any ethical content, but having overcome this, he is prepared to allow human warmth in love a place.

Mortimer, however, having concluded from Aquinas that Christian love is not so much intensity of feeling but rather a judgement of value, translated into action, and that being told to love God is a question of adopting the will to put him utterly first, then goes on to drive a
wedge between loving as will and loving as emotion. This is despite the fact that Aquinas himself avoided this pitfall. He wrote that 'love is the source of all the emotions', and goes as far as to say that 'joy and delight are in God . . . Therefore in God there is love'.

Yet Mortimer, instead of choosing to put one before the other, to regard will as more reliable than feeling while not disparaging feeling as valueless, opposes the two. He is led this way by his stress on rationality against which emotion is the force of chaos, Hence neighbour love is described by Mortimer as 'love for him as a rational creature'.

Against the wholeness of man; his rationality, his emotions, his body and his spirit, one faculty alone is singled out. Significantly a category like joy has nowhere been discussed and the problem is reinforced by Mortimer's discussion of Jesus' comments on love of enemies.

He states that it is 'clear this has nothing to do essentially with any feeling of liking or affection towards them'. This type of statement must evacuate all meaning from the word love. It adds weight to those who object that Christian love is just a self-righteous moralism. Mortimer would hold that the affections have no involvement because what is demanded is simply willing the best for the other, in this case an enemy. As has been argued at times, it may well be best for your enemy's soul if you burn him at the stake. The conception of love allowed here is purely intellectual. Now it is not desirable to dispense
with the reasonable element of man; on the contrary, lacking it love would be formless undisciplined passion, but reason has to operate with love without being equated with it. There has to be as an ideal, a role for the affections to play in the Christian conception of love, or else there is an identification of love and reason in the ideal. This would create a purely cerebral God and Heaven.

Mortimer makes no distinction between an enemy possessing certain traits and having the potential for them. The same may be said of the believer. Hence it might be said that if an enemy is loved in accordance with Jesus' demands, one will, agreeing with Mortimer, wish him the best for his own sake. Alongside Mortimer it is also accepted that attraction and friendliness may not de facto be felt towards him and vice versa. However, against Mortimer, the hope should be allowed of the potential for mutual attraction and friendship, if it is Christian love that is being offered. The accent then is on future potential, since as Aquinas said with reference to the love of enemies, 'they are loved inasmuch as they are creatures of God, made to his image and capable of enjoying him'. Particular affections or preferential love are not being talked of here. Rather if Christian love involves the whole man, it must have a role for the affections, not just a cerebral content. If so, then this ideal will involve neighbour love and so too enemy love. A distinction is thus essential between the possession of affection, which may not be exercised at a given moment, and the potential for affection and
friendship as an ideal, which must be present in every Christian relationship and which is not present in Mortimer's analysis. It could be said that the approach to this issue reflects the manner of heavenly communion anticipated by the subject. Another distinction Mortimer might have made would have been between love being governed by emotionalism, which is agreed to be undesirable, and love being separate from emotion. Mortimer seems to hold that for love not to be governed by emotionalism, it has to be separated from emotion and closely identified with our rational faculties. It may, however, be held that the former does not necessitate the latter.

In order to believe in a God concerned for the whole man as created and not just the rationality beloved of some, then it must be concluded that our enemies and thus all men have the potential to be lovable because they are God's creatures. Hence there must always be the open possibility for affectionate warmth being offered by the Christian if Christianity is to avoid giving cause to its detractors.

An author who is alive to the dangers of too weak a presentation of neighbour love, simply as general concern, and aware that commanding love is both problematic and abused is D. Z. Phillips. He has the assumption that it is very difficult to define love. There are, at least in people's minds, a very wide variety of 'loves', of which the Christian neighbour love command is one in particular. The logical contradiction potentially involved in the Love Commandment is best illustrated by asking whether it is...
possible to have a duty to love? For Kant duty is the highest motive but it makes no sense to say that a couple fall in love out of duty. To say that neighbour love is a duty might not be to love at all. Neighbour love to be intelligible needs to be separated from other loves and if it is a duty, that needs explanation. Indeed Christians do justify the duty of neighbour love, though not in terms of duty, but as a consequence of their world view. Men are members of the creation of the God of love and thus duty has to be seen in terms of God and not merely in itself.

Neighbour love as a command cannot be understood without God, its rationale is not self evident, hence its connection by Jesus to the first commandment. It cannot be conceived of without the command to love God or else the logical problem mentioned is created. Of the many other loves, they all depend on the particularity of the relationship, e.g. wife, friends, and pets. However Christianity commands that all men be loved, because of the common feature that all men share, namely that they are all the children of God. The theology of creation is here acting as the basis of Christian neighbour love. Neighbour and particular love act at different levels, yet each is love understood as a warm concern and attachment. Personal love values this person such that the loss thereof produces despair, whereas neighbour love values being. Both are essential yet different, if there is to be a balanced view of love, free of the despair of isolation that we shall note in Dostoyevsky. It is the same point Kierkegaard made,
in saying that, 'the neighbour is your equal, the neighbour is not your beloved for whom you have a passionate partiality', and, 'he is your neighbour through equality with you before God'.

Likewise Jesus not only commanded neighbour love, he commended particular relations, 'and the two shall become one flesh, so that they are no more two but one'.

Phillips is also at pains to recognise the strength of objections to neighbour love. He quotes Camus on Scheler, 'Humanity is loved in general, in order to avoid loving anybody in particular'. He commends Kant's assessment of men not 'merely as means' but in every case 'as ends in themselves'. Phillips holds that to obtain an interpretation of Christian neighbour love aimed at this end and free of the objections mentioned, much that has previously passed for neighbour love has to be dispensed with. His basis for this judgement is to argue that if men are neighbours through equality with Christ, then this has not been very evident in the relationship between the believer and the non-believer. In his consideration though, he does not distinguish between the performance of the church and the teaching of Jesus. If the church can be shown to be failing in its devotion to Jesus' teaching, then it is not just a new interpretation that is required but a return to the words of the Lord. To say this is simple, but the problem is one of great antiquity. Alongside the radical statements and actions recorded by the Synoptics, in the later work of
John, the exclusivist element appears in the translation of neighbour love into love of the brethren.

It should have been clear throughout the argument that it is the different conceptions of love, by which people analyse the Love Commandment that produce the differing assessments of it. The class of objection seen brought against it today that have just been discussed would not have made any sense to the Jew listening to Jesus, brought up with a very different world picture. First, associations made with love in today's society might safely be said to be romantic love, whereas in Jewish society they would have been / God the Father, for theirs was a theocracy.

Thus a major element now to be discussed, is the link between love as commandment and the conception of God's sovereignty known to the Jews and presented by Jesus.

Furnish in his book stresses the link as does T. W. Manson in Ethics and the Gospel. "Furnish in his conclusion, having shown how significant for the commendation of love is that it is commanded, then shows how the rationale of that command lies in its being the sovereign command of a sovereign lord. The notion of the Kingdom of God both in Jesus' and the Jew's use is fundamental here. Since the Jews saw themselves as a community, created; sustained and ruled by God, the notion of God's commanding love made ready sense. Thus love of God and of neighbour is commanded in the Old Testament and Jesus himself can make it the centrepoint of his ethic. Since he sees himself as God's
earthly agent, for him to issue the command to love is straightforward. It does not involve him in the philosophical problems of commanding love that are encountered today. The problem for Jesus and the Jews witnessed by the varying New Testament treatments of the issue is the relation between Jesus' pronouncements and the Jewish law. It is because the sovereignty of God is presupposed that love for neighbour is tied to love of God in the New Testament. In this presentation the brotherhood of man is not self-evident but follows on from the Fatherhood and thus rule of God. It is God's sovereignty that gives cohesion to the whole system, hence Paul's stress on God's love in the redeeming death of Christ and in his identification of love as the gift of the Spirit: 30 likewise John's stress on love as the eschatological power of union between Father and Son. 31

Just as the contemporary world view is unfamiliar with the theme of God's sovereignty, it is also unfamiliar with the related New Testament theme of mankind's bondage. Granted the particularly Pauline preoccupation with this theme, 32 nonetheless it is the rationale behind such remarks of Jesus as 'no-one can be the servant of two masters'. 33

Man in the biblical picture is free only in respect of choosing which master he shall serve; freedom in the New Testament is more a matter of liberation from sin, than freedom to do all. The present stress on its nature as If man does choose God, that sovereign may without contradiction command love as being the style of life required to serve him. Thus
it is the nature of the King that is determinative. Hence Manson in his study makes much of the Semitic idea of kingship, in which the stress lies not so much on the idea of the kingdom as a physical realm, but more upon allegiance to the King as a person and the consequent character necessary to win such an allegiance. Jesus is the Christian's king and this is built upon the Old Testament background to kingship. The quality of the Christian ethic is derived from the one who is himself its interpreter and exemplifier. It is because of the loving nature of the Christian king that the moral problem of God's sovereign power raised by Vanstone, as discussed earlier by ourselves, is overcome.

It has been seen then how the context in which it is understood, its own, or that of another era, renders the Love Commandment intelligible or unintelligible. Furnish has provided a good example of the Protestant recovery of the love ethic built around New Testament study. In Roman Catholic moral theology a revival of interest has also occurred. This may be seen in such a textbook as Härning's *The Law of Christ*. He has a heading under which he notes that Kant and Scheler while starting from totally different premises reach the same conclusion that love cannot be the object of a mere precept. According to Härning, for Kant love belongs to the 'pathological order', it is not a moral but a sensual appetite, whereas with Scheler, one either does or does not possess it - it is simply futile to prescribe it, 'you must love' being nonsense. This reveals
how both of these authors have allowed their own world view to affect their judgement of the very different biblical world view. Scheler cannot accept the commandment at all while Kant restricts it. Although not noted by Häring, Kant accepts the commandment. The problem is that he terms it 'practical love' and separates it from the emotions, and it is this latter that Häring questions. Kant's position is that practical or neighbour love is commandable, but that this is very different from the impossibility of prescribing affectionate feeling. Certainly the latter is so but need it then follow that the desirability of involving the affections is then denied? 

Häring regards the New Testament precept as meaningful because of men's God-given ability and duty to love. Being a Catholic, he is able to use Natural Theology to construct a creation ethic or world view in which the ability and duty to love are intelligible. On this analysis love ought not firstly to be understood as sentimental and affective. All are agreed this sort of love cannot be prescribed, rather love is universally personal before it is preferentially so. This is because on this world view, love is the ground of all being in God, who is himself a community of persons in love. Häring gives four consequences following on from encountering the Love Commandment. It is intended to remove all obstacles between men and God's love. Since only love that is recognised elicits response, there is need for devotion and meditation upon God's love for us. The Love Commandment is thus woven into the fabric of
worship. Without the sustenance of worship it ceases to be
a living form in the manner intended. That is, since it is
a command to love God and neighbour, the first relation
which sustains the second has itself to be nourished.
Thirdly, the precept of love demands a free submission of
the will, which as a creature, created in God's image, man
is free to do. This is a recurrence of the bondage to the
world or God theme: and fourthly the precept demands loving
acts.

In a later section of the book, love towards enemies
as neighbours is given prominent attention. In his
judgement it is the acid test of the attitude to one's
neighbour, does love for them spring out of divine love?
God's own love for man is not just the love of friendship,
although it is that - 'I have called you friends', but
it was also love for mankind as an enemy. God himself
exemplifies enemy love. The objective of the divine
love of enemies is the destruction of the enmity. God
desires to make friends out of enemies and this likewise
must be the aim for Christians, in marked contrast to
Mortimer's stand. Enemy love is directed at him not
because he is an enemy but for the sake of his potential,
as a creature created for communion with God. Despite this
positive stance, there is one comment of Häring's alarmingly
reminiscent of the 'old Catholicism', which could potentially
justify many of the accusations that are labelled against
the commandment to love the neighbour. He states that
'the Damned have eternally shut themselves off from the
community of fellowship in the divine love. Hence they can no longer be the object of our Christian neighbour love. They have utterly ceased to be our neighbour.\(^1\) Coupled with his high view of church structure this is a recipe for a dangerous partisanship.

The eminent moralist Bishop Butler addressed himself to the Love Commandment in two of his sermons.\(^2\) Butler's tenor reflects the growing rationalism of the era. He regards love of the neighbour as being one with charity of benevolence. It is an affection to the good and happiness of one's fellows. It becomes a universalisable and therefore sanctionable disposition because God is our end who desires this happiness. Since the human race is so enormous there is this danger that universal love is just a phrase. The command, though, was to love a person in the form of my neighbour - thus Butler emphasizes a very close interpretation of neighbour amongst those whom we know.

The problem with this exegesis of the Love Commandment is that it lacks bite. He commands meekness, temperance and consideration of others, his good man is a Parson Woodford, a generous open hearted man in a well-ordered society. This conception of neighbour good as it is, would be stressed by crisis. It does not impel one towards social concern at injustice, in the manner many have reacted to the commandment.

Our analysis thus far has been around the actual love commandment, the philosophical peculiarity concerning the command nature of Jesus' saying, the connection between the
two great commandments, and the debate concerning the role of emotion and reason in this commandment. It is instructive to turn to literary examples, to two authors who have perceived the necessity and existence of the universal love spoken of by the New Testament commandment, firstly in a poem of W. H. Auden's written on the eve of World War Two. The key lines are 'For the error bred in the bone of each woman and each man craves what it cannot have, not universal love but to be loved alone', and in the last but one stanza the blunt comment, 'We must love one another or die'. Auden has seen what the Love Commandment is founded upon, that where particular love is put first, dissolution must follow on the lines shown in Sartre's book *Intimacy* or Anaïs Nin's *A spy in the house of love*.

In the latter, Sabina, the centre figure, struggles to make her affairs fulfilling and increasingly finds the converse. At first she is happy that her affairs 'free her': 'She opened her eyes to contemplate the piercing joy of her liberation: she was free . . . to enjoy without love . . . That was the meaning of freedom. Free of attachment, dependency and the capacity for pain'. This brings her no joy and this freedom is no freedom in the sense developed throughout this thesis: Yet ironically, (remembering earlier chapters) the Greek picture of God which has been greatly criticised would surely warm to the quotation above, here being instanced as the incarnation of loveless freedom. Certainly Sabina finds it so, she finds that 'she had lost herself somewhere along the frontier between her inventions,
her fantasies and her true self... she had walked into pure chaos'. Finally she is forced to recognise that she does need love, and that all her affairs do is to contribute to a fruitless disintegration of self. She is shown that love must involve the acceptance of all the 'faces' of the whole person. Perhaps Nin might not accept the thesis that particular love can only find order in an acceptance of universal love, but she well shows the consequences of its non-acceptance. If love is merely attachment between individuals, it can play no role in the ethics of society which is precisely the position of Popper cited earlier. Auden commends universal love as a necessary priority before particular love and this in turn reflects a world view in which love is tied to the universe's ground of being.

The other author whose advocacy of brotherly love is to be studied is Dostoyevsky in the Brothers Karamazov. The dominant theme of the chapter 'The Russian Monk' repeated twice nearly word for word is that 'You must realise that everyone is really responsible for everyone and everything.' The author devotes several pages to showing how competition in society and concern for image degrade a man, 'And really what had I done to deserve that another man, a man like me created in God's image should wait on me'. In this advocacy of brotherly love he recognises the necessity for a spiritual transformation. Science is impotent to undertake such a work even if it might demonstrate the advantage; ethics treated as a humanity lacks strength. Dostoyevsky assesses the situation of his fellows: 'For
today everyone is still striving to keep his individuality as far apart... (he)... still wishes to experience the fullness of life in himself alone". 49 This 'leads to the fullness of self-destruction for instead of full self-realisation they relapse into complete isolation'. 50

Wherever universal love does not precede particular love—not to the latter's destruction, but for the latter's proper orientation, then, 'in our age all men are separated into self-contained units, everyone crawls into his own hole, everyone separates himself from his neighbour'. 51 And, 'For he is used to relying on himself alone and has separated himself as a self-contained unit'. 52

In this novel Dostoyevsky has given great weight to emphasizing neighbour love as a necessity against contemporary trends to individualism. These make love unintelligible and therefore not commandable outside private relations or even within them! Yet in the marriage contract one chooses freely to accept an obligation to love one's spouse. Earlier, the New Testament's presentation of freedom was shown as a choice of masters and Dostoyevsky notes this too. 53 He characterises the world's view of freedom as freedom to have and not to serve, it seeks to give the freest possible expression to desire rather than to self-control and temperance. So he states that 'It is no wonder that instead of gaining freedom they have fallen into slavery and instead of serving the cause of brotherly love... sink into separation and isolation'. 54 That he thinks that without the divine sanction of love this collapse is inevitable is
clear: 'And why they are right according to their view for
if you have no God then why worry about crime?' 55

By contrast Richard Robinson in An Atheist's Values
gives an atheistic attempt to assess the Christian commendation
of love. 56 This is concerned not with debunking per se
but is an endeavour to achieve as positive an assessment of
value as one can from an atheistic standpoint. In his
analysis love is significantly placed after the universal
values of 'truth' and 'reason'. Much of what he says might
be commended. Love the virtue is to be the right habitual
conduct of love the emotion. He allows that historically
the New Testament is responsible for elevating love into
a moral virtue. It is characterised negatively as the
withering of hate, 'love your enemies', and positively as
the creation of pleasant amiable converse between friends.
He makes much of 'Greater love hath no man . . .'
and its relation to friendship. What he leaves then is the
commendation of pleasant friendship as a good thing, which
it is, but he goes no further. There is no manner in which
love is universal, neither is it the key to morals, and the
Love Commandment is simply not mentioned. If a loving
force beyond men cannot be spoken of, then this commendation
of love as amiability is as far as can be got. Love as
commandment depends upon love having an ontological reality
greater than just individual friendship.

Perhaps the overriding conclusion of this study is that
the Love Commandment does only make sense to the converted.
One's ontology or world view controls whether one can
understand its rationale or not. In order to make it intelligible, the assumption of a variety of forms of love has to be made, of which passionate particular love is just one, and not necessarily the most important one. Most important is the need to hold that love is a constitutive element of the universe and God. The Love Commandment is thus derivative, it certainly is so in the New Testament where it is the second commandment after the first. The commandment's intelligibility comes from the beliefs it presupposes concerning God and of his sovereignty over his creation. This also shows how difficult it is to analyse it in its own terms: it requires study of the theology of creation and a philosophical study of the types of love. Briefly speaking this latter involves us in the role of relation within the being of man and God, and hence study of the Trinity. It may well be this latter that is the ultimate rationale behind the sense of the Love Commandment - but that is to be returned to where this work started.
FOOTNOTES

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3/4. Ibid., p. 91.

5. Ibid., p. 92.

6. Martin Buber, I and Thou.


9. Ibid., p. 56.

10. Ibid., p. 11-14.


13. Plato, 203A.


15/16. Ibid., p. 130.


18. Ibid., p. 82.

19. Ibid., p. 83.

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22. P. T. Geach, The Virtues, ch. 4, 'Charity'.

23. Ibid., p. 71.


25. Descartes, p. 109 and Geach, p. 77. Descartes has no mention of Trinity in this chapter on God.

26. Geach, p. 80.


31. In the Synoptics see among others Mark 2:19, 'with the bridegroom'; Luke 16:29, 'follow me', i.e. 'be with me'.


35. Häring, p. 83.

36/37. Ibid., p. 84.

38. Ibid., p. 87.


40. Ibid., 8:1.

41. Ibid., 4:30.

42. Ibid., 5:15.

43. Ibid., 5:12.
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44. Ibid., 15:43.
45. Ibid., 9:4 and 10:18.
46/47. Ibid., 8:14.
49. T. Traherne, Centuries. For Traherne and mysticism see p. xiv of Hilda Vaughan's introduction to the Faith Press ed. For an example of Traherne's positive use of the world see Traherne, Second Century 62, 'love is the true means by which the world is enjoyed'.
50. Ibid., 2nd. C. 26.
51. Vanstone, pp. 64, and our chs. 2 and 3. Bear in mind that in correspondence with the author Vanstone admits to using very few theological sources for his work. Williams, Oman, and Lucas all used in our ch. 3 as parallel material were not familiar. Traherne although not mentioned in our discussion was not noted either in Vanstone's book itself or in response to my enquiry re sources.
52. Traherne, 4th. c 72.
53. Ibid., 3rd. c 19.
54. Ibid., 2nd. c 24.
55. Ibid., 2nd c 26.
56. Ibid., 2nd c 39.
57. Ibid., 3rd. c 64.
58. Plato, Symposium, 200E.
59. Ibid., 201A & 204B&C.
60. Ibid., 210C to 211D.
61. Traherne, 2nd. c 39.
62-64. Ibid., 2nd. c 40.
65. Ibid., 2nd. c 42 and 43.
66. Both previous quotations in para: Traherne, 2nd. c 46.
67. Ibid., 2nd. c 47.
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68/69. Ibid., 2nd. c 48.

70. Ibid., 2nd. c 50.

71. Ibid., 2nd. c 49.


74/74. Traherne, 4th. c 57.

75. Ibid., 4th. c 54.

76-78. Ibid., 4th. c 55.

79. Ibid., 4th. c 65.

80. Gene Outka, Agape: an Ethical Analysis, ch. 1 section 1:A, also p. 34ff.


82. Ibid., p. 54.

83. Ibid., p. 55.

84. Ibid., p. 54. Nygren's italics.

85. Ibid., p. 174.

86. Ibid., p. 92.

87. Ibid., p. 96.

88. Ibid., p. 112 and John 3:25 'As the Father loveth the Son' and John 15:12.

89. Ibid., p. 117.

90. Ibid., p. 113 and John 16:27.

91. Ibid., p. 168.

92. Outka, p. 27

93. Ibid., p. 34.


95. Vanstone, p. 52.
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96. Joseph Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*. Note his chapter headings, e.g. 'Love as the only norm' and 'Love only is always good', is not goodness?

97. Fletcher, p. 18ff: his implacable opposition to any reconciliation of love and law.


100. John 14:21 and 15:15.


103. G. M. Newlands, *Theology of the Love of God*. Interestingly, Protestant Process Theology does see the relational value of the Trinity, e.g. Norman Pittenger, *The Lure of Divine Love*, p. 133ff. It is however not presented therein as integral to the main thrust of the argument, more as a helpful aside.

104. Newlands, p. 201ff.

CHAPTER TWO - CREATION ETHICS


2. Cf. Augustine, *Confessions*, Bk13:33: 'Your works proclaim your glory and because of this we love you and it is in our love for you that they proclaim your glory'.


4. Ibid., p. 22.

5. Ibid., p. 23.

6. Ibid., p. 27.

7. Ibid., p. 29.


10. Vanstone, p. 32.

11. Ibid., p. 33.

12. Ibid., p. 51.

13. Ibid., p. 46.

14-16. Ibid., p. 47.

17. Ibid., p. 48.


19. Ibid., p. 64.

20. Ibid., p. 65.


23. Dostoyevsky, Bk. 5:4, 'Rebellion'.

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26. Ibid., p. 296.
27. Ibid., p. 301.
28. Ibid., p. 306.
31. Ibid., p. 308.
32. Vanstone, back cover of Darton Longman and Todd ed.
33. Vanstone, p. XI.
34. Mary Midgley, Beast and Man, p. 255.
35. Ibid., p. 28.
36. Ibid., p. 33.
37. Ibid., p. 36.
38. Ibid., Chapter 6, 'Altruism and Egoism'.
39-40. Vanstone, p. 65. Our point is that Vanstone's treatment of Aberfan is as physical evil, though it might as an aside be argued that Aberfan was moral evil, in Vanstone's analysis though, Aberfan may be ranked alongside an earthquake.
41. Dostoyevsky, Bk. 5:4, 'Rebellion', p. 287.
44. Ibid., p. 86.
45. Ibid., p. 88.
46. Mary Midgley, 'The Objection to Systematic Humbug', in Heart and Mind.
47. Martin Buber, I and Thou, both p. 73.
49. Ibid., p. 75.
50. Ibid., p. 76, the theme p. 76ff.
52. Ibid., p. viii quoting D.H.L. himself.
53. Ibid., p. 33.
54. Ibid., p. 33.
55. Ibid., p. 34.
56. Ibid., p. 38.
57. Ibid., p. 39.
58. Ibid., p. 64.
60. Mary Midgley, 'The Objection to Systematic Humbug', quoting Thomas Traherne, Centuries, 1st. C. 41.
61. Thomas Traherne, Centuries, 1st. C. 12.
62. Ibid., 2nd. C. 48.
64. Ibid., 2nd. C. 48, and pp. 73-76.
65. Ibid., 2nd. C. 93.
66. Ibid., 2nd. C. 94.
67. Ibid., 2nd. C. 78.
68/69. Ibid., 2nd. C. 79.
70. Ibid., 2nd. C. 62.
71. Ibid., 4th. C. 71.
72/73. Ibid., 4th. C. 72, and Romans 8:18ff, my italics.
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74. Traherne, 4th. C. 75.
75. Ibid., 4th. C. end of 79, opening of 80.
77. Ibid., p. 49 for quotation, pp. 49-50 for the flavour of Nygren's message.
78. Ibid., p. 54.
79. Ibid., p. 174.
80. Ibid., p. 55.
81. Traherne, 4th. C. 76.
83. Traherne, 1st. C. 19.
84. Williams, Ch. 8:1 and 8:6.
85. Ibid., p. 130 also see Irenaeus, Haer. 3 23,5. J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p. 171.
86. See our Ch. 3 p. 26ff.
87. Williams, p. 131, and Kelly, p. 171, who notes how such a concept of Original Righteousness and its loss is not to be found in Irenaeus.
88. Williams, p. 131ff. In his account the Fall is weakened (parallel to Vanstone); in his case to psychological blocking in relationships. See our exegesis of Williams, ch. 4 p. 37.
89. J. Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 73ff; our chapter 4, 'Self love', p. 4.43.
90. Jürgen Moltmann, Theology and Joy, see our chapter 3, p. 21.
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2. Ibid., p. 42.

3. Ibid., p. 45ff.


5. Vanstone, p. 50ff.

6. Ibid., p. 52.


8. Ibid., p. 149.

9. Ibid., p. 17.

10. Ibid., p. 29 and Ephesians 5:29-32.

11. Ibid., p. 45.


13. Ibid., p. 59.

14. Ibid., p. 64.

15/16. Ibid., p. 63.

17. Sproxton, p. 86.


20. Ibid., p. 60.


22. Vanstone, p. 64.

23. Ibid., p. 65.

24. Ibid., p. 67.

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29. J. R. Lucas, Freedom and Grace, p. 29; and see p. 34ff of our own Ch. 3.


32. Romans 9:20ff.


34. Ibid., p. 16.

35. Vanstone, previous two quotations both p. 61.

36. Hosea ch. 3, and the Song of Songs.

37. Vanstone, p. 61.


40-42. Moltmann, p. 58.

43. Vanstone, p. 61.

44/45. Oman, p. 29.


47. Ibid., 1:36.

48. Ibid., 1:5.

49. Pelagius, de. gest. Pel. 20 and de. grat. Chr. 2:14.

50. Oman, p. 35.

51. Lucas, Ch. 1 for the general discussion; p. 2 for this point.


53. Lucas, p. 4.
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54. Augustine, Confessions, Penguin edition, see p. 101, Bk. 5:8, or p. 140, Bk. 7:6: 'So to cure my obstinacy you found me a friend'.

55. Ibid., p. 192, Bk. 9:8.

56. Refer back to our comments on Irenaeus and Fall, Ch. 2, pp. 35ff.


59. Lucas, p. 5.

60. Ibid., p. 6.


63. Augustine, Confessions, Bk. 9:1, p. 181.


67. Ibid., p. 7.

68. Ibid., p. 12.

69. Ibid., Ch. 4.

70/71. Ibid., p. 29.

72. Ibid., p. 28. see also p. 5.

73-76. Ibid., p. 29.

77-80. Ibid., p. 30.

81. Sproxton, p. 79.

82. Ibid., p. 118 for both preceding quotations.

83-84. Oman, p. 39.

85. Ibid., p. 40.

86-89. Ibid., p. 41.
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90. Oman, p. 42.
91. Ibid., p. 86.
92. Ibid., p. 87.
93. Ibid., p. 87.
94. Ibid., p. 87.
95. Ibid., p. 88.
96. Ibid., p. 90.
97. See our Ch. 2, p. 10.
100. M. C. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love, p. 82.
102. Sproston, p. 118.
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5. Aristotle, Ethics, Bks. 8-9.
6. Ibid., 1156b.
7. Ibid., 1156b.
8. Ibid., 1157a.
9. Ibid., 1159a.
10. Ibid., 1157b.
11. Ibid., 1155b.
12. Ibid., 1168b.
13. Ibid., 1123a.
15. D. Krook, Three Traditions of Moral Thought, Ch. 3; Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies, Ch. 1.
17. Vlastos, Ch. 1.
18. Plato, Lysis, 210CD.
19. Ibid., 215BC.
20. Ibid., 219D.
22. Plato, Symposium, 210E.
23. Vlastos, p. 31.
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27. Same distinctions noted in Outka and Maclagan. See my Ch. 4, p. 30.


29. Ibid., p. 65.

30. Ibid., p. 66-71.

31. Ibid., p. 71.

32. Ibid., p. 72.

33. Ibid., p. 92.

34. William Temple, quoted in George Appleton, Journey for a Soul, p. 142.


36. Ibid., p. 95.

37/38. Ibid., p. 96.

39. Ibid., p. 170.

40. Ibid., p. 169.

41. Ibid., p. 170.

42. Ibid., p. 174.


44. Ibid., p. 174.


46. Ibid., p. 34.

47. Ibid., p. 39.

48/49. Ibid., p. 73.

50. Ibid., p. 76.

51. R. C. Mortimer, The Elements of Moral Theology, Ch. 9.


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55. Matthew 7:11.


58-61. Ibid., p. 87.

62-64. Ibid., p. 88.

65. Ibid., p. 89.

66/67. Ibid., p. 89. Here Häring and Maritain (4:42-43) should be added as theologians advocating God's desire for man's response talked of at 1:7ff.

68. Ibid., p. 351.

69. Ibid., p. 351. Read this in the light of our discussion on relation, I:1ff.

70. Ibid., p. 352.


72. Ibid., p. 352.

73. Ibid., p. 352, quoting Augustine, Retractiones, 1:83.

74. Ibid., p. 355.

75. Ibid., p. 356.

76/78. Ibid., p. 377.

79. Ibid., p. 378.

80. P. T. Geach, The Virtues, Ch. 4, 'Charity'.

81. Ibid., p. 82.

82. 1 Corinthians 13:3.

83. Gene Outka, Agape. An ethical analysis, Ch. 2.

84. Ibid., p. 56.

85. Ibid., p. 63.

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87. Outka, p. 64, quoting Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, p. 99-100.
88. Outka, p. 68ff.
89. Matthew 25:14ff.
90. Outka, p. 69, citing R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 117.
93. D'Arcy, Ch. 2.
94. D'Arcy, in footnote p. 58. Faber ed.
95. D. D. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, Ch. 10.
96. Williams, p. 193; Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, pp. 29-30.
97. Williams, p. 193; Dag Hammarskjöld, Markings, p. 89.
101. Williams, p. 204.
102. T. Traherne, Centuries, 1st. C., 22-23.
103. Williams, p. 204.
104. Ibid., p. 208.
105-7. Ibid., p. 204.
107. Ibid., p. 207.
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114. Mark, 8:35.
120. 1 Corinthians, 11:9.
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6. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics, Ch. 4, 'Love is the only norm'.

7. 1 John 4:8.

8. Furnish, Conclusion, Section IA.


10. Ibid., p. 99.

11. Ibid., p. 52.

12. Brakkenstein Community, Rule for a new brother, p. 17. The link between celibacy and Kierkegaard on neighbour love is not inappropriate since religious perceive the value of celibacy in relation to neighbour love: 'it is acceptable only in order to give oneself more fully to one's neighbour'. (from The Rule of Taize, p. 81).


18. Kierkegaard, p. 73.

19. Ibid., p. 64.

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22. Ibid., p. 140.
27. Mark 10:8.
31. e.g. John 15:10, 10:7, 3:35.
32. Romans 6:15ff.
33. Matthew 16:24. The following comments are made without prejudice to my own stand concerning the importance of choice at 3:28ff. Here I am simply trying to point out what I see as the Biblical portrait.
40. Romans 5:8ff.
41. Hübinger, p. 361.
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44. Anaïs Nin, A Spy in the House of Love, p. 45.

45. Ibid., p. 98.

46. Ibid., p. 121.


48. Ibid., p. 350.

49/50. Ibid., p. 356.

51/52. Ibid., p. 357.

53/54. Ibid., p. 369.

55. Ibid., p. 371.

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