The making of Lebanese foreign policy: The case of the 2006 Hizbollah-Israeli war

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The making of Lebanese foreign policy:

The case of the 2006 Hizballah-Israeli war

Henrietta Charlotte Wilkins

The thesis is submitted for the degree of doctor of philosophy

School of Government and International Affairs

University of Durham

January 2011
Abstract

This thesis assesses the relevance of Waltz and Wendt’s systemic theories of international relations for understanding Lebanon’s international political behaviour during the 2006 war. It tests the hypothesis that substate factors, especially identity, are more important than systemic factors for affecting the conditions against which states make foreign policy-decisions. Using data collected from interviews and the analysis of primary and secondary sources, it looks at the decisions made by the Lebanese government in the context of the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah. It seeks to identify whether factors at the systemic, state or sub-state levels were the main influence on Lebanese foreign policy-making during this period. It concludes that sub-state identities were a crucial factor affecting Lebanon’s international political behaviour and foreign policy-making capacity because they fractured the state from below and compromised its ability to act like a united, rational and coherent security-maximising actor. As a result the state was unable to react to systemic structures in the way systemic theories of international relations assume. However, as the war progressed and Lebanon came under increasing threat from Israel, different internal groups united together and the state, temporarily, began to act like a rational, security maximising actor as Waltz and Wendt assume. This means that Waltz and Wendt’s theories of international relations are unable to fully account for the conditions affecting Lebanese foreign policy making during the initial stages of the war. This highlights the need for a more pluralistic approach to fully understand the conditions that affect the foreign policy-making of the Lebanese state.
Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work of others which is used in the thesis is credited to the author in question in the text. None of the materials in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree qualification at this or any other university.

Signed…………………………….. Date……………………………………

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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIPAC</td>
<td>The American Israel Public Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARAMCO</td>
<td>Arabian American Oil Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPM</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-8</td>
<td>The Group of Eight</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Israeli Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRG</td>
<td>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEGMA</td>
<td>Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRNA</td>
<td>Islamic Republic News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Internal Security Forces (of Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAU</td>
<td>Lebanese American University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANA</td>
<td>Syrian Arab News Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>South Lebanese Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSNP</td>
<td>Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STL</td>
<td>Special Tribunal for Lebanon</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>What the Papers Say</td>
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Map of Lebanon (2010)
Map of south Lebanon (2006)
Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis addresses the hypothesis that factors at the state and sub-state levels are more important than those at the systemic level for understanding Lebanese foreign policy. It does this by looking at the capacity of Waltz and Wendt’s systemic theories of international relations to explain the conditions that affected Lebanon’s international political behaviour and foreign policy making capacity during the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah. In doing so, it hopes to produce a more nuanced and locally specific understanding of the dynamics of Lebanese foreign policy-making and a critique of systemic theories of international relations.


It will argue that systemic theories, such as Waltz’s neorealism and Wendt’s social constructivism are unable to fully explain Lebanon’s international political behaviour because they focus on factors at the systemic level and ignore those at the state and sub-state levels. It will show that sub-state identity plays a vital role in influencing the foreign policy decisions made by the Lebanese state. This is because it prevents the state from acting as unitary, rational, security maximising actor, as systemic theories assume, which affects how it relates to systemic levels. Furthermore, the neorealist idea of the state as a security maximiser sees the main threat to the state as coming from outside the state. However, threats to Arab state, and the Lebanese state in particular, often come from within. This means that internal factors need to be accounted for alongside external factors if we are to fully understand the dynamics affecting its foreign policy-making capacity.

This thesis argues that systemic theories of international relations offer an inherently
“Western” conception of international relations and are unable to account for the specific characteristics of the Arab state. It does this by using the three tiers of analysis that focuses on the systemic, state and sub-state levels. It explains that the exceptional nature of the Arab world, due to issues of identity from a pan-regional and historical perspective and the nature of the state, means that theoretical efforts have generally been unable to account for Arab foreign policy. Its main arguments are that: (i) Arab states have been constructed by their cultural and political legacies, which means they are either weak or authoritarian and influences how foreign policy decisions are made; (ii) there are competing identities within the Arab state which affect its capacity to make foreign policy decisions because they seek to control the state and because they are also able to extend their influence beyond state borders, as seen with Pan-Arabism; and (iii) conflicts and insecurity within the regional system and the balance of power affects how Arab states formulate foreign policy by forcing states to bandwagon with each other to strengthen their regional position.

To explore these arguments, this thesis focuses on Lebanon during the 2006 war between Hizballah and Israel. It argues that during the first part of the war Lebanon was unable to act like a neorealist unit and security maximising state because of the impact of sub-state identities that fractured the state and its foreign policy-making capacity. However, as the war progressed and the Israeli threat increased different groups in Lebanon united and the state began to act as a more coherent actor. Although, a significant amount of research has been carried out on the foreign policies of Arab states, there has only been limited research into Lebanese foreign policy. The literature that exists argues that foreign policy in Lebanon is incoherent because Lebanon is an example of an Arab state that is fractured by identity and systemic structures. This study builds on this literature and assesses the impact of identity and systemic structures on Lebanese foreign policy during the 2006 war.

The 2006 war was chosen as a case study because existential attacks on a state’s existence, such as the launch of a full-scale war against it by a neighbour, test its strength and resilience. Most accounts of foreign policy derived from international relations theory would expect a state to be able to develop a coherent foreign policy when it is being attacked by a neighbouring state. This thesis looks at why Lebanon
did not act in this way until the later stages of the 2006 war. Under conditions of armed attack we should be able to see if it is identity or systemic structures that prevented this from happening. If there is evidence that one is more or less important than the other then it provides a contribution to the literature on Arab foreign policy and a greater understanding of the relevance of systemic theories of international relations.

Using material gathered from interviews, the media and official documents this thesis will test the hypothesis outlined above. It will do this by drawing on over three years of research, two of which were spent living and working in Lebanon. This includes using data collected from semi-structured interviews and from the analysis of primary and secondary material. Data collected from interviews was important because it gave insight into the voices of different identity groups in Lebanon. Added to this was data collected from other primary sources, such as official statements and reports produced by governments and international organisations during the war. Secondary sources were used when it was difficult to find or access the relevant primary material.

The time I spent in Lebanon increased my understanding of the complexities of the Lebanese political system and the country’s social and cultural intricacies. It also helped me build relationships with academics, journalists, diplomats, researchers, representatives of international organisations and people on the street. This enabled me to gain trust and access individuals and information in a way that I would not have been able to if I had spent less time there. Furthermore, travelling throughout Lebanon during this period, including to south Lebanon and the sites of different battles during the 2006 war, has given me an appreciation of the landscapes and environments in which different events took place. These experiences deepened and broadened my understanding of Lebanon and the dynamics of the war.

It is also important to acknowledge possible sources of bias and misrepresentation in the data I collected. First, the interviews mainly took place with people either from, or deeply embedded within Lebanese society, which gave a strong Lebanese voice to my research. This was due to time and financial restrictions, which prevented travel to other countries in the region, with the exception of one interview that took place in
Syria. It was also difficult to access decision-makers in these countries without a well-developed network. However, carrying out interviews in other parts of the region would have given me a greater regional understanding of events and deepened the quality of my research.

Secondly, secondary discourses are liable to be affected by errors in translation and the political slant of the writer, translator or editor. Thirdly, it was difficult to access some primary discourses, especially those produced by governments and organisations such as Syria, Iran, the Arab League and Hizballah. It was easier to access policy documents and statements produced by Western-orientated governments and organisations which led to an overrepresentation of their position in my research. I tried to rebalance this by talking to people from as wide a range of political backgrounds as possible, triangulating my data, and accessing as wide a range of media sources as possible, including articles in different languages translated by BBC Monitoring.

The main body of the thesis starts with Chapter 2. This provides an overview of the literature on the foreign policy of Arab states and looks at the relevance of systemic theories for understanding the conditions that affect how Arab states make foreign policy within the context of the three tiers of analysis. Chapter 3 looks at the ability of systemic theories to account for the conditions affecting Lebanese foreign policy-making. It argues that factors at systemic, state and sub-state levels of analysis are all important, but that sub-state identity is especially important because it compromises the coherence of the Lebanese state. Chapter 4 outlines the methodology and chapter 5 provides an overview of the 2006 war. Chapter 6 looks at how systemic structures affected foreign policy-making during the war, and chapter 7 looks at the impact of factors at the state and sub-state levels, especially sub-state identity on Lebanese foreign policy during the war.

In conclusion, this thesis partially supports its initial hypothesis. It argues that factors at the sub-state level, especially identity, were more important than systemic structures and anarchic pressures for affecting Lebanese foreign policy during the initial stages of the war. This is because they prevented the state from acting like a
single, unitary, rational, security maximising actor, even when it was under conditions of armed attack. This affected the way the Lebanese state responded to systemic pressures and prevented it from conforming to the expectations of systemic theories. However, as the war progressed substate differences became less important and the state became united against the external threat. This shows that, by ignoring dynamics at the unit-level, Waltz and Wendt’s systemic theories of international relations are unable to fully account for the factors affecting how the Lebanese state interacts at the international level and the factors affecting its ability to formulate foreign policy. This supports criticisms levied at systemic theories of international relations for ignoring unit-level factors and calls for a more inclusive theoretical medium through which to assess the international political behaviour of the Lebanese state.
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework: the foreign policy of Arab states

This chapter offers a critical assessment of systemic approaches to international relations and their ability to understand the foreign policy-making of Arab states. It focuses on Waltz’s neorealism (1979) and Wendt’s social constructivism (1992), two of the most influential theories of international relations to have emerged during the last century. These theories focus on the role of systemic structures and take a state-centric approach that sees the state as a rational, unitary, security maximising actor. It then looks at the available literature on the international relations of Arab states to gain insight into the dynamics affecting the foreign policies of these states and the relevance of these theories in this context. International relations theories are not foreign policy theories, however, they are important for understanding the context in which foreign policy decision-making takes place because they focus on the wider factors that affect a state’s ability to function within the international system.

The first section considers the foreign policy of Arab states using Waltz’s (1959) three tier levels of analysis, before assessing the limitations of Waltz’s and Wendt’s theories within this framework. It looks at how these theories have been criticised because of their state-centric focus and failure to understand how dynamics at the state and sub-state levels compromise state cohesion and shape a state’s international political behaviour. The next section reviews the existing literature on international relations and foreign policy in Arab states to draw out the relevant issues and ideas addressed by analysts using the three levels of analysis. It argues that, alongside systemic factors, state and sub-state factors, especially identity, have an important impact upon the state and its capacity to make foreign policy decisions. This means that state and sub-state factors, such as substate identity, state institutions and domestic political games, are also important alongside systemic factors, such as the post-colonial state and the penetrated nature of the regional system, for understanding the international political behaviour of some states. This is outlined by Hinnebusch who argues, ‘especially in the Middle East, the state cannot be assumed, as realism does, to be a unitary actor responding chiefly to system-level determinants (external threats and opportunities)’ (Hinnebusch, 2003: 6).
2.1 Theoretical framework

This section outlines the theoretical framework used in this thesis. It looks at the three tiers of analysis before focusing on Waltz and Wendt’s systemic theories of international relations.

Waltz’s three levels of analysis focuses on the individual, the state and society, and the international system, and it offers a useful framework for analysing the factors affecting the foreign policies of Arab states (Waltz, 1959). Mingst describes the individual level as ‘the personality, perceptions, choices, and activities’ of individual decision makers and participants; the state or domestic level as looking at the type of state, whether it is democratic or authoritarian, the type of economic system (capitalist or socialist) and interest groups within the country, including the national interest; and the international system, which includes the anarchic nature of that system and the role played by international and regional organisations (Mingst, 2008: 63-64). Understanding the role played by factors at each of these levels is vital for understanding Arab states and their foreign policies. Stuart argues that in comparative foreign policy it is important to understand the interaction between these levels rather than seeing them as ‘distinct and competing levels of analysis’ (Stuart, 2008: 582).

Korany and Dessouki use the three levels of analysis in their book The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalisation (2008), to look at the factors determining Arab states foreign policy-making. The aim of the book is to combine in-depth fieldwork with theoretical insight into foreign policy-making to develop an understanding of how international relations theory can be applied and developed in non-Western contexts. They explain that domestic factors have become increasingly

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1 Korany and Dessouki argue that relatively little research has been carried out into Arab states’ foreign policy and that the research that has been carried out is largely descriptive or prescriptive. They explain that it is missing ‘rigorous conceptualisation of foreign policy analysis’ that aims to understand how foreign policy is actually made and implemented and ‘how these states view the world and their role in it’. They give four main reasons to explain this. First, during the 1950s and 1960s the newly independent, post-colonial states were not considered to have firm independent foreign policies; secondly, it was difficult to find data on the foreign policies of these states because they were classified
intertwined with regional and global ones and cannot be looked at in isolation (Korany and Dessouki, 2008: 3). Rosenau also argues that there has been an increasing blurring between issues at the international and domestic levels and that the border between them is ‘becoming ever more rugged and […] indistinguishable within a seamless web’ (Rosenau, 1997: 5). This means that foreign policymakers have to ‘omni-balance’ between external and internal pressures (Hinnebusch, 2002: 15).

The three tiers of analysis provides a useful framework for understanding foreign policy-making in Arab states and for critically analysing the ability of systemic theories of international behaviour to explain their international political behaviour. These states formulate foreign policy in similar ways due to: common cultural and linguistic traditions (supra-state identity); the leading role taken by the military or elements of the middle classes such as businessmen, in the state apparatus (state level); and because they share problems due to underdevelopment resulting from inequalities in global economic structures (systemic level). They formulate foreign policy differently due to: the dynamics of the domestic environment that includes the level of influence of internal identity groups (sub-state level); the state’s capacity to resist penetration by external forces (state level); and due to the level of state formation and the different ways in which imperial and colonial forces have impacted on different states (systemic level).

In his book Theory of International Politics Kenneth Waltz looks at the structure of the international system rather than the internal politics of the state to explain how certain features, such as war and security struggles, occur within international politics (Mingst, 2008: 66; Waltz, 1979). He explains the recurrence of these features by looking at how power is distributed among states at the systemic level within an anarchically structured international system. Waltz defines states as sovereign,
unitary, rational utility maximising units; anarchy as the ‘lack of a common power or central authority to enforce rules and maintain order in the system’; and power as ‘the combined capabilities of the state, which gives states a position in the international system and shapes their behaviour’ (Lamy, 2004: 185-186).

Waltz argues that it is the distribution of power within the international system that explains patterns of security and conflict, not the ideological character of individual states (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004: 169). This is because states pursue security maximising behaviour independently from factors at the state and sub-state levels. He focuses on the balance of power and argues that the structure of the international system affects the distribution of power within it. This creates three different patterns of system polarity, unipolar, bipolar and multipolar, depending on the number of great powers (Mingst, 2008: 84). A unipolar system has one great power and is based on hegemony, a bipolar system has two great powers and gives a stable balance of power, and a multipolar system becomes increasingly insecure as the number of great powers within it increases, up to a maximum of six or seven.

In Waltz’s world, states will always make foreign policy decisions that maximise their power and security as determined by the anarchical structure of the international system and the structure of the international system shapes all foreign policy decisions (Lamy, 2004: 185, 209). The distribution of power or capabilities between states at the systemic level affects how states behave and formulate policies rather than the nature of individual states (Hinnebusch 2002:18; Dunne and Schmidt 2004:169; Lamy 2004:186). Therefore, when faced with the same systemic environment states will always make the same foreign policy decisions and the intentions or actions of actors at the state and sub-state levels will have no impact on these decisions. In this case the systemic level always influences factors at the state and sub-state levels, and there is no feedback mechanism or means through which factors at the state and sub-state levels can influence the systemic level.

Waltz’s neorealism has been criticised for failing to recognise the impact of factors at the state and sub-state level on a state’s behaviour (Buzan, 2004: 10; Lamy, 2004: 217; Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 16). As Lamy explains, it means that neorealism is
unable to explain ‘foreign policy behaviour that challenges the norm of national interest over human interests’ (Lamy, 2004: 218). Furthermore, by assuming that states put their national interest or regime survival first when pursuing foreign policy decisions, it fails to recognise that a state’s interests might change due to political and cultural differences at a national level (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 2).

Neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy because it ignores unit-levels (state-levels) of analysis in its explanation of how the international system impacts on the international political behaviour of states. However, it is useful for understanding the environment within which states operate. For example, it provides insight into the behaviour of weak states by recognising that their foreign policy options are limited by the distribution of capabilities amongst the great powers, which leaves them with several choices. It means that they can choose neutrality, they can bandwagon with one of the great powers in the hope of receiving protection and other advantages, or they can balance or ally with other small or weak states in the hope of creating a coalition of states that can resist the influence and demands of the great powers.

Ehteshami and Hinnebusch apply neorealism to the Middle East in their book The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (2002). They focus on security maximising as the main factor influencing state behaviour and they look at regional balances of power and the number of great powers within the regional system, rather than nationalist or ideological factors such as pan-Arabism, to explain states’ behaviour. However, this book does not take a strict neorealist approach because it also looks at the role played by internal politics and the ideological character of different Middle Eastern states. In the introduction, Hinnebusch argues that realism is important because ‘transnational norms restraining interstate conduct are least institutionalised in the Middle East’, while conditions that pluralists assume will control realist power struggles are weak or missing in the region, such as ‘democratic culture and economic interdependence’ (Hinnebusch, 2002: 21).

Wendt’s theory of social constructivism was developed in the wake of criticisms levied against neorealism for neglecting the unit-level and the impact of the political character of state units on the nature of the international system (see Ruggie, 1983;
Ashley, 1984). However, like Waltz, Wendt also looks at how the character of the international system affects the behaviour of the units, namely states, within it, and how these units interact and are affected by an anarchically structured international system. He argues that besides material factors, systemic structures of power are also affected by cultural norms ‘such as knowledge, rules, beliefs’ resulting from identity and the interaction of states (Hinnebusch, 2003: 12). Wendt argues that these norms not only constrain actors but also construct them and constitute their identities (Barnett, 2004: 255, 267). Unlike Waltz, Wendt argues that the structures of the international system are the result of ideational rather than material factors, however, he also takes a state-centric approach that sees states as the dominant political actors in the international system (Wendt, 1992: 424).

Wendt acknowledges that factors at the state level have some impact on the way the state interacts with the international system and he argues that a state’s foreign policy represents and reproduces ‘a particular conception of who they are’ (Wendt, 1999: 340-341). This is seen in his ‘cultures of anarchy’, which looks at how the anarchic nature of the international system produces different patterns of international behaviour. These patterns depend on whether states see each other as friends, rivals or enemies, which largely depends on the character of individual states. This opposes neorealism’s vision of structure which Wendt argues ‘does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other’s sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on’ (Wendt, 1992: 396). However, Wendt ignores factors at the unit-level (state-level) that do not fit into his understanding of the enemies, rivals, friends, categories. Like Waltz, he also continues to see the state as a unitary, rational security maximising actor.

In common with other international relations theories, neorealism and social constructivism have been criticised for their Western-centric outlook and for failing to understand the dynamics of non-Western countries. Blaney and Inayatullah look at ‘international relations from below’ to argue that developing countries exist within a theoretical and practical framework established and reproduced by those ‘above’, namely developed countries (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2008: 663-664). Chakrabarty also argues that social sciences are a product of the West and have ‘been produced in
relative, and sometimes absolute, ignorance of the majority of humankind – that is, those living in non-Western countries’ (Chakrabarty, 2000: 29).

2.2 Systemic theories and Arab states

By taking a state-centric systemic approach and denying or limiting the importance of factors at the state and sub-state levels, Waltz and Wendt are unable to explain the international political behaviour of Arab states. This is because Arab states do not fit their definition of the state as a strong actor capable of forming a robust foreign policy that prioritises its national interest. This is because, firstly, Arabs states lack a secure national identity due to an identity-sovereignty mismatch embedded in the conditions present at their formation. This has led to low levels of cooperation between governments and people and left them permeable to outside actors and influences (Fawcett, 2005: 177). Secondly, they have failed to consolidate due to core-periphery relations imposed by external actors and because the idea of a state as a ‘rational actor’ depends on a certain level of state formation that has not been reached in the Middle East (Hinnebusch, 2003: 2). The absence of a strong and cohesive state and the existence of different sub-state identity groups with different interests means that whoever controls the government is able to formulate policy in their own interest rather than in the interest of the state. It also means that minorities within a fragmented state may pursue their own foreign policy direction, which can be very different from their governments, as seen in Lebanon (Barnett, 2007: 201).

Job explains that realist concepts such as territoriality, sovereignty, nation-statehood, non-intervention, and separating domestic and foreign policy cannot be applied to developing states, including Arab states. This is because they are often penetrated by another state or external actor, which leads to a blurring of boundaries between internal and external, domestic and international factors. He gives four reasons why realism may not be applicable to developing states. First, they may lack a single nation existing within their state borders and have different communal groups promoting their own self-interests. Secondly, the regimes in power often lack popular legitimacy because they only represent the interests of a particular sector in society and not those of the entire population. Thirdly, they often have weak institutions that prevent the state establishing peace and order and ensuring the security of their populations, and finally, because the main threats to the regime are often internal
rather than external (Job, 1992: 12, 17-18).

Pluralism provides an alternative to systemic theories understanding of a state's behaviour by looking within the state. It does not see the state as a unitary actor and recognises that there are forces besides the state and the system that influence its behaviour. As Hinnebusch explains, these include sub-state domestic actors such as ‘competing bureaucracies, interest groups, and public opinion […] the role of leadership beliefs and images’ as well as supra-state and trans-state actors and the role played by international regimes (Hinnebusch, 2003: 13). Hinnebusch argues that pluralism’s ‘problematising of the state’ is important for understanding states in the Middle East because it shows the problem with realism’s definition of the state as a cohesive unit following ‘national interests’ (Hinnebusch, 2003: 2).

The following section overviews the existing literature on international relations and foreign policy in the Middle East. It draws out the relevant issues and ideas addressed by different analysts that affect foreign policy-making within the framework of the three levels of analysis discussed above.

2.3 Systemic level: regional system

This section looks at the how factors at the systemic level have impacted on the form and type of Arab states’ foreign policy. It defines the Middle East regional system before looking at how regional and international actors have affected its dynamics. It argues that external actors have been able to enter the regional system and influence its nature due to inherent weaknesses within it. They influenced the way in which it was formed and global core-periphery structures have allowed these actors to continue affecting its dynamics since then. This has created the current regional system that is, broadly speaking, divided up between two regional alliances that are both competing with each other for control of the region.

Hinnebusch defines the Middle East regional system as being centred around an Arab core, united by a regional identity but fragmented by the state system, and ringed by a non-Arab periphery consisting of Turkey, Iran and Israel (Hinnebusch, 2003: 1). Noble argues that within this system the power pattern between Arab states is relatively balanced and that those with stronger military capabilities tend to have
weaker economies, while those with the strongest economies, such as the Gulf States, have weaker military capabilities (Noble, 2008: 124). Events within the Middle East are closely connected, as explained by James Baker former US Secretary of State in 2006: ‘all key issues in the Middle East are inextricably interlinked [and cannot be] addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues, interests and unresolved conflicts’ (Baker and Lynch, 2006).

2.3.1 External penetration of the regional state system

The region system is vulnerable to penetration by international actors and threats from non-Arab neighbours due to divisions within the Arab World and the lack of a dominant regional power that has prevented the formation of a common Arab foreign policy (Hinnebusch, 2002a: 29). The region is also an important part of the international system because it is strategically and materially valuable for several reasons: it is a key transit route between the East and the West; it is rich in mineral resources that are of vital strategic interest; issues of immigration and terrorism originating in the region have wider economic and political implications; and because of Israel which maintains close relations with the West. Western states, including France, the UK, the US, as well as Russia, and in more recent times China, have pursued policies aimed at maximising their control over the region. They have done this, for example, by fragmenting the region into individual states, by supporting rentier states and maintaining client elites, and by helping sustain the region’s economic dependence on the international system (Hinnebusch, 2002: 254).

In the hope of controlling the Middle East, Western countries have imposed wider systemic constraints on the region that have impacted upon Arab states foreign policies. This includes the construction of the regional state system and the impact of the global economic and political system. Hinnebusch argues that the way the regional state system was constructed and the negative impact of core-periphery relations has had a major impact on the behaviour of regional states and caused many

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2 China has pursued economic policies aimed at increasing its control in the region but it has not adopted military or hard power policies, unlike the US, Russia and some European states, especially France and the UK.
conflicts (Hinnebusch, 2003: 1). As Noble explains, ‘while elites at the state level make foreign policy decisions based on what governments would like to do conditions at the systemic level affect what they actually can do’ (Noble, 2008: 67). Furthermore, core countries have maintained control over the foreign and domestic policies of developing countries so that they conform to their regional objectives. They have done this, for example, by applying conditions to any aid or arms they give (Job, 1992: 30).

During the Cold War the US and USSR invested heavily in the region (Buzan and Weever, 2003: 197). Halperin argues that during this period the West supported Islamists to combat the influence of communism. This led to the destruction of left-wing parties in the region and contributed to a democratic deficit in the region, which means that nowadays Arab countries lack a well developed political left to oppose right-wing or authoritarian politicians (Halperin, 2005). However, the bi-polar international system during the Cold War gave Arab states greater freedom to determine their own foreign policies by allowing them to bargain for influence and support by playing the superpowers off against each other.

In its role as the global hegemon, which it assumed at the end of the Cold War, the US is now the most important external actor within the Middle East regional system. With the disintegration of the USSR, the US was free to establish a new liberal economic world order, while Arab states lost the support of the USSR, which restricted their ability to pursue independent foreign policies. This has led Hinnebusch to argue that nowadays the region is as penetrated as it was during colonial times (Hinnebusch, 2002: 3). However, as Halliday explains, although Western powers have economically and politically penetrated the region, they have never managed to control ideas and social forces within it (Halliday, 2005: 70-71).

The US is an especially important actor in the region for several reasons. Due to: the military, diplomatic and economic support it gives Israel and its regional Arab allies; its own military presence in the region especially in the Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan; and because of its global hegemonic status that allows it to dominate international organisations such as the UN. However, Buzan argues that, despite its heavy
engagement in the Middle East, the US is not an internal or regional actor in the way it is in other parts of the world, such as Asia-Pacific, North Atlantic, and the Western hemisphere. It is still seen as an external power in the Middle East because it never created the same ‘overarching frameworks of shared identity’ that it constructed in other regions. However, Buzan recognises that ‘the strong influence of religious lobbies in US politics does create the basis for an identity bond’ with the region. He argues that the US is interested in the region due to Israel, oil and terrorism and that if they disappear this interest is likely to fade (Buzan, 2004: 104).

One of the most important ways external powers impacted on the Middle East was by imposing a Westphalian state system on the region. The Middle East regional state system was established after the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, due to the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), the Balfour Agreement (1917), and the Versailles Peace Conference (1919) (Hirst, 2010: 276). Arguably, core-periphery relations combined with weaknesses in the regional system enabled imperialist powers to impose a state system built around institutions, bureaucracy and armed forces modelled on European ideas and beliefs (Migdal, 1988: 6). This system sowed the seeds for many conflicts in the region and affected the behaviour of Arab states and their foreign policies. It did this by supporting client elites, creating rentier states and causing a regional backlash that led to the rise of Arab nationalism and political Islam. It also destroyed a pre-existing regional economy and gave Western powers economic access to the region which prevented the Arab World becoming a powerful and united economic force and a threat to Western interests (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 2002: 3; Hinnebusch, 2003: 22).

The regional system also weakened the newly formed states and prevented them from formulating coherent foreign policies. It did this by creating a ‘misfit between identity and sovereignty, nation and state’ (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 2002: 29). This reduced the legitimacy of the states’ in the eyes of their new citizens and has had serious repercussions ever since (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 198). The new state borders reflected imperialist strategies of ‘divide and rule’ because they were drawn up to reflect the interests of Western powers, rather than those of the region (Ayoob, 1993: 42-43). They ignored previously existing boundaries leading to conflict
between already existing religious, cultural and ethnic identities and the new state identities. These conflicts undermined the legitimacy of the new states, and laid the foundations for future irredentist conflicts. It meant that people in the region were suddenly expected to identify with states that held no political, religious or cultural meaning for them and to obey rulers to whom they held no loyalty. As a consequence, sub-state and supra-state identity groups have challenged the sovereignty of Arab states and limited their foreign policy-making capacity ever since. It meant that, in the words of Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, the Arab world became ‘one nation, many states’ (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 2002: 29).

Hinnebusch argues that the way Arab states were formed and their reaction to imperialist forces determined whether they had revisionist or status quo foreign policy orientations (Hinnebusch, 2002: 252). In contrast to status quo states, revisionist states oppose Western penetration of the region and hold irredentist ambitions due to unresolved identity or border issues. Hinnebusch argues that once a foreign policy-making direction has been established it positions the state within the regional and international state system and sets its policy-making on a certain course that is difficult to change. He argues that if identity were the most important factor then Syria and Jordan, which had many common characteristics when they were formed, would have followed similar foreign policy directions. If systemic pressures were the most important factor then they would have allied with the core powers in a similar way. He explains that states have different foreign policy directions due to differences in identity embedded in state structures at the time they were formed that shaped their foreign policy direction (Hinnebusch, 2002: 252-254).

According to Hinnebusch, since Arab states were formed the structure of the global economic and political system has created a system in which developed countries have been able to exploit less-developed ones and create an international system of domination and dependency. This distinct core-periphery relationship places Arab states in the peripheries and creates an international balance of power that has allowed core countries to continue to influence politics and economics within the Middle East. This means that the region has remained underdeveloped due to Western penetration which has made it economically dependent on the West and subject to Western
domination (Hinnebusch, 2003: 35). Arab economies became dependent on the West because: Arab states are mainly primary product producers who depend on a single export such as cotton or oil; their human capital is underdeveloped; and their economies depend on the core for the technology and manufactured goods (Hinnebusch, 2002: 254). Many of them remain dependent states today, which leaves them politically and economically weak and unable to pursue foreign policies that differ from the demands of the core (Hinnebusch, 2003: 35).

Core-periphery relations are reinforced by client elites in peripheral states that often share economic and political interests with core powers, align their countries foreign policy agenda with them, and often fail to prioritise their state’s national or regional development (Hinnebusch, 2003: 35). Hinnebusch argues that this shows a ‘classic dependency alliance between the ‘core of the core’ and the ‘core of the periphery’ at the expense of the periphery’ which affects foreign policy-making because ‘rather than balancing against intrusive external powers […] dependent elites typically ‘bandwagon’ with a global patron to contain more immediate regional or domestic threats’ (emphasis in original) (Hinnebusch, 2003: 3-4, 35, 51). He gives the example of Saudi petrodollars that are heavily invested in US economic markets and which gives Saudi elites an incentive to support these markets through their foreign and domestic policies. Oil producing states in the Gulf also rely on the US for their security and arms supplies because they are militarily weak but surrounded by military powerful but oil poor Arab states. This has had significant implications on their foreign policies and as a result they have allowed a US military presence on their land since the 1990s to protect them from their neighbouring countries (Hinnebusch, 2003: 41).

Therefore, Arab states are weak because the conditions under which they were formed damaged their legitimacy. This has prevented state elites from governing in a way that satisfies the economic and subjective needs of their people and from adapting to the economic and political challenges of globalisation (Roberson, 2002: 63). It has caused them to adopt either revisionist or status quo foreign policies, and it has placed them in the peripheries of an exploitative core-periphery economic and political system. This means that regimes have either had to promote nationalist ideologies to gain
domestic support or that their foreign policies have focused on securing external support to help them manage domestic problems and push through their domestic agenda because they are too weak to push through domestic policies on their own.

2.3.2 Regional conflict and security

Regional conflict and security has also had an important impact on Arab states’ foreign policies. Buzan and Wæver argue that the region is characterised by different conflicts. These include religious conflicts between the Arab core and the non-Arab periphery, for example between Judaism and Islam and between Shi’a and Sunni, as well as inter-Arab rivalry over issues such as territory, water and ideology, and conflict due to Arab nationalism (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 193). Buzan and Wæver describe the region as being split up into three dominant ‘sub regional security complexes’, the Levant, the Gulf and the Maghreb. The Arab-Israeli conflict is the main conflict in the Levant; conflicts in the Gulf region include the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), and the Gulf Wars (1990 and 2003), as well as regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia over Islamic ideology; and conflict in the Maghreb includes clashes over Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 188-193).

Non-Arab peripheral states have been closely involved in regional conflicts and are a vital part of the regional balance of power because they threaten the Arab core either in isolation or in alliance with external actors from outside the regional system (Hinnebusch, 2002: 29). Israel and Iran are especially important regional players due to their military power. Iran also has an increasing ideological influence due to a resurging interest in Islamic ideas and movements and a growing mobilisation amongst Shi’a in the region. Iran’s regional strength has been enhanced since the 1990s due to three wars waged in the region by the US, two in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. These wars weakened Al-Qaeda and destroyed Saddam Hussein, both enemies of Iran (Mossaad, 2008: 255). In contrast, Israel has become the most dominant regional power in military and economic terms due to its close relationship with the US, which allows it to pursue revisionist policies and claim territory from its Arab neighbours (Noble, 2008: 72, 99).

US support for Israel has allowed it to become the source of much regional instability.
It was created by Western powers and it has received financial and military support from core countries, France in the 1950s and the US since then. US support has enabled it to become the strongest economic, military and arguably political power in the region and it has allowed the US to maintain an indirect presence in the region (Noble, 2008: 112; Ayoob, 1993: 45). Israel was the main recipient of US aid from 1976-2003 until it was displaced by Iraq and, as Sharp explains in a report for the US Congress, ‘US military aid has helped transform Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the world’ (Sharp, 2009: 1). Sultan argues that Israel receives close to $3 billion annually from the US, of which 75% must be spent buying weapons from the US military industrial complex (Sultan, 2008: 99-113). As Seale explains, Israel is given ‘extraordinary immunity by the US in the form of political, diplomatic and strategic support’ (Seale, 2006). However, despite this Israel still maintains its independence and often pursues policies that contradict US regional aims. This was seen, for example in 2010 when it failed to stop construction in the Occupied Territories despite repeated calls by the Obama administration for it to do so (Al Jazeera, 2010).

Besides geopolitical reasons, the US also maintains a close relationship with Israel due to the influence of Christian and Jewish lobbies, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), within the power structures of US politics. This has made Israel into ‘something like a fifty-first state’ (Prestowitz, 2003: 211-212). Hirst argues that during George W. Bush’s presidency there were many pro-Israeli neoconservatives within his administration, with some making it into positions of great power (Hirst, 2010: 280; Vest, 2002). This led a US official to tell the Washington Post that the ‘Likudniks’ are really in charge now (Washington Post, 2003). A Focus Web report argues that since 1948 the West, led by the US, has typically ignored Israeli state terrorism and violations of international law, including United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 242 and 338 that called for a sovereign Palestinian state and for Israel to return to its pre-1967 borders. It also

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3 Likudniks is a Yiddish term for supporters of Sharon's political party.

4 For an overview of this relationship see ‘The Israeli lobby and US foreign policy’ (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006).
argues that the West has tried to maintain a regional balance of power that supports Israel’s position by, for example, allowing it to develop a nuclear programme (Focus Web, 2006).

Israel has nuclear weapons, long-range missiles and advanced national intelligence gathering abilities. Its military strength combined with its revisionist tendencies make it a threat both to its immediate neighbours and to more distant Arab states (Noble, 2008: 111). Although it mainly poses a conventional realist threat it is also the source of unconventional security concerns for Arab states because of its ability to apply economic pressure. The need to share resources in the region, such as water, is one of the main issues affecting Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, and its neighbouring countries, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 212).

As the most significant and on-going conflict in the Levant, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major security concern for Arab states and a significant factor shaping their foreign policies. It originated as a localised struggle between the Palestinians and the Israelis but it quickly developed into hostility between Israel and the wider Arab and Islamic world and became a defining feature of Arab nationalism (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 191). Support for the Palestinian cause enhanced the legitimacy of Arab governments in the eyes of their people and united Arab states across the region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 191-193). Diplomatic relations between Israel and some Arab states, especially Jordan and Egypt, have improved due to advances in the Arab-Israeli peace process which has altered the foreign policy of these states towards Israel (Noble, 2008: 100). However, Israel is likely to remain a major regional security concern and a significant influence on the foreign policies of Arab states for the foreseeable future.

Ayoob argues that the international system and the global balance of power affects the security of regional states and exacerbates existing security problems. This is largely because of the failure of developed states to link the security of developing states with the security of the international system. In doing so, core states reflect the belief that regional conflicts have no impact on the security of the international system. As a result, since the end of the Second World War political and economic activity at the
systemic level has been conducted with little regard for how it will affect security in
developing countries, which have often been used as pawns in wider regional and
international conflicts. Therefore, insecurity and conflict has continued within and
between developing countries especially in the Middle East, as seen in the eight-year
war between Iran and Iraq and with the Arab-Israeli conflict (Ayoob, 1993: 37).

This section shows that the regional system has had a significant affect on the foreign
policy of Arab states due to ongoing regional conflicts, divisions in the region and the
lack of a dominant regional power. These factors have allowed external actors to
influence the form and structure of individual states within the regional system. This
led to the creation of weak states because of the way in which external actors formed
the regional state system and created a regional imbalance of power by allying with
regional states, such as Israel. As discussed below, these states have been left
vulnerable to supra-state and sub-state actors and they have bandwagoned with
external actors to support their regional and domestic policy agendas. External actors
have also sowed the seeds for regional wars and security complexes, which has
further undermined the stability of individual states.

2.4 State level

This section looks at the nature or structure of the state and its decision-making
capacity. It does this by focusing on whether the state is weak, authoritarian (fierce),
or democratic$. This involves looking at the strength of its institutions, the level of
social control it is able to exert over its people, its resources, its reliance on coercive
power and the legitimacy of its regime.

Arab states are weak for several reasons: due to a lack of regime legitimacy because
society is fractured along communal, class or ideological lines; due to the limited
capacities of the states institutions; and, in the case of authoritarian or fierce states,
due to their reliance on coercive power. The nature of the state has a significant

$Ayubi defines authoritarian states as fierce because the state holds a high level of despotic power and
the state (and its rulers) are able ‘to act arbitrarily and without constitutional restraint’ (Ayubi, 1995:
450).
influence on a state’s foreign policy-making ability with stronger states making stronger foreign policy decisions.

The state can be defined as ‘a political organisation that is the basis for government in a given territory’ (Migdal, 1988: 18, 24). It plays a dominant role in international politics and it is the basic unit of international bodies such as the UN, NATO and the IMF. It functions through a set of institutions that pass legislation and rules, such as the cabinet of ministers, parliament, courts of law, police and armed forces, and it gains legitimacy at regional and international levels from the recognition of other states (Miller, 2003: 4). Weber defines the state as holding ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’, while sovereignty means that the state has the ultimate authority to make and enforce laws within its territorial borders (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004: 172). Job splits the state into four parts: its power potential which is the extent to which it can mobilise its population and the resources it can extract; its infrastructural capacity and ability to deliver services; its coercive capacity referring to its military and police forces; and its level of social cohesion and ability to construct a national identity (Job, 1992: 22).

State strength can be defined in different ways. Thomas argues that it relates to the institutional capabilities of the state (Thomas, 1989: 182); Buzan argues that weak states are ones that are forced to focus on domestic threats to their governments’ security (Buzan, 1983: 67). Migdal argues that strong states are those with the ability to encourage people to do what they want them to do (Migdal, 1988: xvii); and Noble defines weak or fragmented states as having ‘deep vertical, horizontal and ideological cleavages and institutions and regimes lacking legitimacy and capacity’. He argues that they have low levels of political institutionalisation and high levels of political instability, which challenges regimes and their ideological direction and weakens state institutions and state cohesion (Noble, 2008: 68-69). As Hill explains, ‘Where we find weak, failed, quasi or prebendal states we shall probably find weak, erratic and dependent foreign policies. […] It is notable how little impact the Lebanon makes on its regional environment, compared to its equally small but unfractured neighbours, Syria and Jordan’ (Hill, 2003: 224).
Migdal defines authoritarian or totalitarian states as those which hold absolute social control over a society and are able to stop other social organisations from challenging this control. He explains that states become more liberal and democratic when they allow other organisations a greater role in the social control of a society (Migdal, 1988: 29). They are more likely to have strong, rigid and inflexible foreign policies compared with fragmented states that tend to have fragile foreign policies. Buzan and Wæver explain that in Arab states there is little democracy and dictatorships are common, which means that most states in the region are ‘towards the weak end of the spectrum of socio-political cohesion’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 194). Regimes in rentier states tend to be authoritarian because they have been able to delink themselves from civil society. This is because of the strong relations between them, oil resources and international capital, and because they do not rely on their populations for taxes to fund their policies (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 194).

Arab states are weak because they lack authority due to the conditions under which they were formed that created a legitimacy gap by failing to match the identities of domestic populations to that of the state. Legitimacy derived from correspondence between a national and state identity is assumed by realism, but is not natural to Arab states (Hinnebusch, 2002: 10). A high level of legitimacy and social cohesion allows a state to mobilise its population to act in the interest of the state and build strong institutions (Migdal, 1988: 21-22). Weak states are often prevented from developing into strong actors by the influence of strong social organisations such as families, clans and multinational companies. This destroys the realist idea of a nation-state as having a united national identity reinforced by state institutions (Job, 1992: 17). Migdal explains that a high level of social control is achieved when the state succeeds in promoting its own behaviour and set of values as the dominant norm over those professed by internal or external groups that aspire to create their own rules within the state (Migdal, 1988: 23). He argues that when the Arab state system was created it forced the regional dynamics of social control to change. Pre-existing groups who exerted social control in the region were unwilling to give up control to the new states and the success of the postcolonial state has depended on its ability to take social control away from these groups (Migdal, 1988: 27-31).
Poor relations between the state and its people means that domestic and regional populations may not recognise the state as a legitimate entity, creating a disintegrated state with limited capacity to formulate a coherent foreign policy. This affects the state’s ability to manage pressure from different levels making it highly susceptible to cross-border influences and ideologies, as seen in Iraq and Lebanon. It also means that the state lacks the institutional capacity to defend itself from external threats (Buzan, 1983: 65-69). State elites need to hold enough legitimacy over state institutions to be able to make foreign policies that have a degree of independence from domestic demands, while at the same time maintaining a certain level of public support. Otherwise, they may not be able to mobilise state tools, such as the army, and the state may fracture internally if different groups within the state oppose its policies.

Hinnebusch uses two models to explain the foreign policies of states in the Middle East, the domestic vulnerability model and the leadership-dominant model. They both assume that state formation is weak and that states lack the necessary institutions for carrying out foreign policy. According to the domestic vulnerability model of foreign policy-making the main threats to developing states are internal rather than external. This means that foreign policy is used by regimes to ensure their survival, either by using nationalism to give them domestic legitimacy or by securing external support against domestic problems. This model is important for Arab states because, as Hinnebusch explains, they lack secure national identities and democratic accountability and suffer legitimacy deficits. However, it ignores the importance of external threats and their impact on foreign policy-making. The leadership-dominant model focuses on leaders as having no domestic institutional restraints, which means that they are able to dominate foreign policy. However, Hinnebusch explains that this is problematic because it imagines ‘a domestic vacuum’, which is unlikely because even leaders of authoritarian regimes face some domestic constraints (Hinnebusch, 2002: 10).

2.5 Supra-state and sub-state identity

Identity at both sub-state and supra-state levels also has an important influence on Arab states foreign policy. The growing importance of identity in shaping interaction between states was outlined by the US National Intelligence Council report in 2004, *Mapping the Global Future*, which stated that ‘part of the pressure on governance will
come from new forms of identity politics centred on religious convictions [and that] religious identities provide followers with a ready-made community that serves as a social safety net’ (quoted in Korany and Dessouki, 2008: 47). Political decision-making based on identity rather than a state’s economic or political interests is illustrated by organisations such as the Arab League and the Commonwealth of Nations. There is little economic or political incentive for states to join these organisations and membership is based on a desire to maintain and reproduce a common identity.

Identity is defined by constructivists as a fluid rather than a static concept, constructed and reproduced through discourses, ideas and institutions in different historical contexts at domestic, regional and international levels. Lynch argues that it changes alongside the social forces that shape it and that it determines individual and collective action by influencing the way people think and behave (Lynch, 2002: 28). Telhami & Barnett argue that most definitions of identity start with ‘an understanding of oneself in relationship to others’. This means that participation in a social context, such as an institution, gives an individual an identity, while national and state identities, which are distinctly different, come from interaction with other nations and states. They define state identity as being ‘the corporate and officially demarcated identity linked to the state apparatus’, and national identity as ‘a group of people who aspire to or have a historical homeland, share a common myth and historical memories, have legal rights or duties for all members, and have markers to distinguish themselves from others’ (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 8). Arab state identity can therefore be seen as something constructed and shaped by the interaction between Arab leaders over time (Barnett, 2004: 262; Hinnebusch, 2002: 8).

Identity is important for understanding the foreign policies of Arab states because sub-state and supra-state identities challenge the hegemony of the state as a static entity and the main producer of foreign policy, as assumed by Waltz and Wendt. It affects the nature and interests of the actors involved in foreign policy-making and shapes state institutions, the foreign policies they make, and the systemic structures in which they operate. Identity also influences or restrains state behaviour as a result of public struggles to create a state identity, which changes the nature of the state
Arab countries share many aspects of a strong common identity. They have a high level of linguistic and cultural homogeneity and they share a religious, cultural and ethnic identity that predates the regional state system. Arab states and individuals within the region often hold several identities and this is problematic for state sovereignty when conflicts of interest develop between them. Telhami and Barnett look at the role of identity politics in understanding the foreign policy of Middle East states in their book *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (2002). They argue that systemic and rationalist perspectives are unable to explain many factors affecting the foreign policies of states in the region and that identity is an important factor for Arab states for several reasons: it is part of the cultural landscape and determines what is possible within a society, such as the type of government that a society considers legitimate; it can affect foreign policy choices, for example it is important for understanding Iran’s role in Lebanon; and it can be used as an ideological tool to achieve state goals, as discussed below (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 7).

The three levels of analysis offer important insight into the impact of identity on Arab states. Hinnebusch argues that systemic structures play an important role in shaping state and sub-state identities and in influencing states’ decision-making strategies. In return, systemic structures are shaped and affected by state identities, and state identities are partly constructed by state elites through their discourses and interaction with their populations (Hinnebusch, 2005: 243). An example of systemic structures shaping Arab state identity from the top down is seen with elite identities in oil rich Arab states. These identities were created by imperialist structures and global economic structures enabled them to retain rentier states and authoritarian systems of governance. Kamal Kharrazi, the former Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, recognised the role global structures play in shaping identity when he argued that identity is formed by economic conditions because ‘the world is divided into two cultures, one of ‘exclusion’, one of ‘inclusion’ (quoted in Halliday, 2005: 35).

After decolonisation pan-regional identity movements such as pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism affected many states in the region. These ideologies challenged the
sovereignty of the new states and prevented them from forming national identities. Hinnebusch and Ehteshami argue that Arab nationalism and political Islam share similarities despite the secular nature of Arabism and the religious dimension of political Islam. They both resist Western regional penetration, oppose the existence of Israel, prioritise loyalty to the *Umma* (the worldwide Muslim community) over loyalty to the state, and support the Palestinian cause (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 2002: 33). They also reinforce national identity and the transnational character of the Arab nation (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 19). Supra-state identities were formed as a backlash against Western influence in the region and the negative impact of globalisation. They are anti-imperialist movements that embrace anti-western and anti-Zionist ideology. Other regional trans-state identities include Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Supra-state identities have undermined the sovereignty of Arab states and influenced their foreign policies (Hinnebusch, 2005: 243). They blur the boundaries between the domestic and regional levels and affect the attitudes and opinions of both Arab people and their ruling elites (Buzan and Wœver, 2003: 195-196). This is because they oppose the nation-state structure and undermine state legitimacy and the functioning of the state system from above. They affect the ability of Arab states to make independent foreign policy decisions and they damage their sovereignty by competing for control of the state from beyond its borders. For example, many regimes in the region have embraced the struggle against Israel to enhance their legitimacy at the pan-Arab level. This has stopped them from reaching a peace agreement with Israel out of fears that it will increase their internal security concerns, even if it is in their best political and economic interests.

Supra-state identities have been used as ideological tools by ruling elites in Arab states for political reasons. They have been manipulated them to further their political and economic interests and justify their foreign policy agendas. This was seen in the 1960s and 1970s when leaders in Egypt and Syria used a pan-Arab identity to increase domestic support for their political decisions (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 16). State leaders have used Arab nationalism as an ideological tool, because it gives them 'symbolic and political capital by showing they were the fiercest defenders of
Arabism’ (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 20). However, as Telhami and Barnett argue, even if state elites are manipulating identity it is not purely an ideological force and these elites tend to build upon and manipulate a pre-existing cultural framework, blurring the boundaries between identity and identity as an ideological tool (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 12, 16-17).

Arab nationalism or pan-Arabism shaped the identities and interests of Arab states from the end of the Second World War until it started to decline after Israel’s victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 20; Barnett, 2004: 263). It orientated states’ foreign policy decisions around a set of common values that reflected the oneness of the Arab nation and the belief that it had been split up by colonial powers. Hinnebusch describes pan-Arabism as being about rejecting Western domination, defending the Palestinian cause, focusing on the importance of Arab unity, and expecting Arab states to act together to defend Arab interests on the global stage (Hinnebusch, 2003: 62). It also opposes Israel, which it sees it as a temporary phenomenon that was imposed on the region by Western colonialism (Spyer, 2008: 10). Hinnebusch argues that it increased the autonomy of Arab states and enhanced their position in the international system by creating a degree of unity within the Arab world against external interference (Hinnebusch, 2003: 28).

However, Arab nationalism became problematic because it challenged individual state sovereignty, and because stronger states, particularly Egypt, were more focused on achieving regional hegemony than on building regional unity. It created a tension in foreign policy between pan-Arab norms and state interest and, in combination with the new challenges posed by globalisation, states found it increasingly difficult to adhere to pan-Arab norms. Ayoob argues that it also weakened Arab states’ respect for each other’s sovereignty. It means that the interference of one state in the affairs of another is not considered to be as serious as it would be in other parts of the world, for example Syria’s role in Lebanon from 1976-2005 (Ayoob, 1993: 49). Hinnebusch explains that the Arab League tried to stop Arab nationalism impinging on individual state sovereignty by attempting to institutionalise respect for individual state sovereignty while also recognising shared Arab identities. However, it failed because its authority had been damaged by its inability to mobilise a coordinated Arab
The decline of Arab nationalism initially gave Arab states greater freedom to pursue foreign policies that reflected a national rather than an ideological interest. This meant that the norms and values of sovereignty and national identity became more important than pan-Arab alternatives. However, Arab states failed to create viable national identities to replace Pan-Arabism, and populations started embracing smaller sub-state identities or emerging supra-state identities such as political Islam. This meant that states’ foreign policies continued to be weakened by internal and external factors. Hinnebusch argues that the decline of pan-Arabism weakened states because they had to operate individually rather than as part of a collective and more powerful Arab entity. This began with the Arab’s military defeat against Israel in 1967, which caused states to turn to their own self-help strategies and prioritise state survival over any trans-state identity (Hinnebusch, 2003: 179-180, 226). The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979 accelerated the decline of pan-Arabism as individual states began to pursue more realist style foreign policies. It showed a paradigm shift in which Egypt, the previous Pan-Arab leader, prioritised its own state sovereignty over pan-Arab norms. The 1990-1991 Gulf War further damaged pan-Arabism when several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Morocco and the UAE, joined a US-led coalition against Iraq. By allying with the West against a fellow Arab state, their foreign policies were prioritising their own geopolitical interests over pan-Arab interests.

Nowadays, most Arab states maintain close economic and security links with the West, which has further weakened pan-Arabism’s influence over their foreign policies. US economic or security gains offer a greater incentive to Arab state interests than appeals to pan-Arabism (Hinnebusch, 2003: 237). Hopes for a pan-Arab revival have also been hindered by the lack of regional integration that has pushed Arab states further into self-help strategies. However, Nonneman argues that new internal and external pressures on Arab states may encourage its revival (Nonneman, 2005: 24). One viable alternative comes from political Islam which gained support as pan-Arabism declined. However, as Buzan and Wæver explain, although Islamists make up the opposition in many Arab states they are too fragmented and weak to
offer a credible substitute to the current state system and state regimes (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 194).

Modern technology, such as satellite technology and the Internet has boosted the role of supra-state identities. Telhami and Barnett explain that, aided by the existence of a common regional language, it has widened and deepened the transnational nature of supra-state identities. Technology has increased levels of communication, which has maintained and reinforced the cultural connectivity of the Arab region. This has eroded states’ capacity to control information and it has increased the spread and growth of a common Arab worldview and regional perspective, including created a more united foreign policy outlook (Telhami and Barnett, 2002).

Alongside supra-state identities, sub-state identities coming, for example, from clans, tribes and religion also have an important influence on foreign policy. They are important because of the way in which the regional state system was formed which split up pre-existing communities and social groups. This was because it imposed state boundaries on a region where loyalty had traditionally been to the family or tribe rather than to the state. This weakened the new states because their citizens were often more loyal to local sub-state identities that to any national or state identity. The new borders split these communities between different states, which meant that their members were more likely to identify with members of their own community in another state than with their own state (Hinnebusch, 2002: 7). For example, the Druze who are split between Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan, and the Kurds who are split between Syria, Iraq and Turkey. As a result, states in the region have become territorial states rather than nation states (Hinnebusch, 2002: 8).

Sub-state identities are important because national identities do not match state identities (Hinnebusch, 2003: 2). They play an important role in determining Arab states foreign policies because they often pursue foreign policies independently from the state. This can slow down or stall the state’s foreign policy-making ability and in extreme cases cause the state to fragment, as seen in Lebanon. Their presence means that there are different points of power and authority within the state, which leads to internal challenges to the state. Managing internal security problems therefore
becomes the main objective for elites in developing countries (Ayoob, 1992: 66). As a result, the state may choose to bandwagon with an external actor to secure their support against domestic threats.

Therefore, sub-state and supra-state identities play an important role in affecting the foreign policies of Arab states by fracturing the state and affecting its legitimacy and ability to formulate a coherent foreign policy. They are strong due to the formation of the regional system that failed to incorporate pre-existing identities into the new states structures. This led to a backlash against imperialist interference in the region and a rise in supra-state ideologies such as Arab nationalism and pan Islam.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter looks at the existing literature on Arab states foreign policies, which shows us that factors at the systemic, state and sub-state levels all impact on Arab states’ international political behaviour. Weaknesses within the regional system have allowed external actors to enter the system and influence its form and structure. The way in which imperialist forces constructed the regional state system at the end of the Ottoman Empire created weak states with weak institutions. These states have been unable to act as rational security maximising actors and they have been undermined by challenges from both sub-state and supra-state identities. As a result, they have chosen to bandwagon with other regional and international states to balance against regional threats and manage internal and external challenges to their existence.

Therefore, a state’s unity cannot be taken for granted, which shows the limitations of Waltz and Wendt’s theories for explaining the background against which Arab states make foreign policy. This is because these theories concentrate on the systems level and fail to properly consider the various levels at which identity is constructed and how this affects state cohesion. Waltz does not look at identity at all, and Wendt limits his understanding to how identity is manifested at the level of state interaction with the systemic level. This means that they focus on a one way causal process from the systemic to the state level without reciprocity, except in a limited way by Wendt. Neorealists argue that the systemic level determines the state and sub-state levels and there is no feedback mechanism through which the state and sub-state levels can influence the nature of the systemic level. Constructivists, such as Wendt, recognise
that this feedback mechanism can exist but they continue to view the system as affecting the state and sub-state levels by encouraging rational, security-maximising behaviour.

However, the literature looked at in this chapter shows us that identity is important at both the state and the sub-state levels. It is important at the state level because it affects the strength of the state and its institutions. It is important at the sub-state and supra-state levels because of the way in which different identities exert pressure on states to pursue particular foreign policies independent from realist considerations such as power-maximising and power-balancing behaviour. The impact identity has on the state’s ability to interact with the systemic level shows the need to moderate Wendt and Waltz’s theories so that they recognise specificities at the state and sub-state levels.

In this case pluralism offers a more insightful theoretical framework for understanding Lebanese foreign policy because it allows us to account for the impact of sub-state actors on the state’s international political behaviour. Pluralism does not see the state as a united actor and recognises that, besides the state, there are many different factors that influence the international political behaviour of states. As Hinnebusch explains, these include competing bureaucracies, interest groups, public opinion, the impact of supra-state and trans-state actors and the position of the leaders (Hinnebusch, 2003). Pluralism is defined by Willetts as being ‘the theoretical approach that considers all organised groups as being potential political actors and analyses the processes by which actors mobilise support to achieve policy goals’ (Willetts, 1998: 289)

This leads to the framework for analysing Lebanese foreign policy used in the rest of the thesis, which argues that state and sub-state factors are more important than systemic factors for understanding Lebanese foreign policy making. To investigate this further, the next chapter starts with an overview of the literature on the history of Lebanese foreign policy before assessing how factors at the three tiers of analysis have affected the dynamics of the Lebanese state and its foreign policy-making.
Chapter 3: Historical overview of Lebanese foreign policy

By looking at existing literature on Lebanon and Lebanese foreign policy this chapter shows how the three levels of analysis introduced in the previous chapter explain foreign policy-making in Lebanon. It starts by giving a brief history of Lebanese foreign policy before identifying the dynamics within the regional system and at the state and sub-state levels that influence Lebanese foreign policy-making. Very little has been written specifically on this subject and the main literature reviewed here, alongside more general literature on Lebanon, includes: Nassif Hitti, *The Foreign Policy of Lebanon* (1989); Tom Pierre Najem, *Lebanon and Europe: The Foreign Policy of a Penetrated State* (2005); Ghassan Salame, *Is a Lebanese Foreign Policy Possible?* (1988); Paul Salem, *Reflections on Lebanon’s Foreign Policy* (1994); and Basel Salloukh, *The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon* (2008).

The argument is that sub-state identities are important factors that weaken the Lebanese state and influence foreign policy-making for two reasons: they form the basis for groups to pursue their own foreign policy directions by allying with different external powers, which gives these powers leverage in Lebanon and creates multiple foreign policy agendas coexisting in Lebanon; and they influence the state level because Lebanese political and institutional structures are built around conflicting identities. It also argues that the regional system plays an important role in influencing Lebanese foreign policy because weaknesses within the system have allowed external actors to influence its dynamics. They constructed the regional state system and external regional and international forces continue to have an impact on Lebanon.

This chapter concludes that these sub-state identities prevent the Lebanese state from acting as a unitary, rational security maximising actor when making foreign policy decisions. Instead Lebanese foreign policy-making processes are about pursuing ‘factional’ interests that are often significantly indebted to the interests of external actors. The literature reviewed in the previous chapter combined with the narrative of Lebanese foreign policy below suggests a hypothesis that the rest of this thesis sets out to test. This is that sub-state identities are more important that systemic factors for affecting the formation of Lebanese foreign policy, because they compromise the integrity of the state and its ability to behave as a rational, security maximising actor.
3.1 Pre 1920 to the end of French mandate

The following section provides a brief history of Lebanese foreign policy from the 17th century until the outbreak of the 2006 war. It identifies how factors at each of the three levels of analysis impacted on Lebanese foreign policy during this period.

The history of Lebanon’s foreign relations, like Lebanon’s history, has been written in diverse ways reflecting the country’s different and competing identities. Some people trace them back to the 17th century Druze Prince, Fakh al-Din who, it is argued, laid the foundations for an autonomous Lebanon through his 1608 military pact with Tuscany (Salem, 1994: 70). The Mount Lebanon region is the ancestral home of the Druze and the Maronites who both established themselves there during the seventh century and who have been engaged in periodic episodes of conflict ever since. During the Crusades the Maronites moved close to Europe and this relationship was strengthened when they entered into full union with the Catholic Church in Rome in 1736 (Hirst, 2010: 9). The first major European interference in the Mount Lebanon region since the crusades was in 1860 when five European powers (France, Prussia, Russia, Britain and Austria) intervened after a massacre of the Christians by the Druze (Najem, 2005: 115).

The French, who were a leading Roman Catholic power at that time, felt they were the natural protectors of the Maronites and helped set up the 1861 Règlement Organique which established Mount Lebanon as an autonomous and largely Christian region within the Ottoman Empire under European protection (Hirst, 2010: 11; Salibi, 2005: 16). Najem argues that since then Lebanese Maronites have looked to the French for security and economic support and the French have been instrumental in shaping their politics and identity (Najem, 2005: 115). The Règlement Organique gave each community its own laws and powers of political representation, which later formed the basis of the confessional system crystallised by the French mandate in 1920.

The French, in coordination with the Maronites, established Greater Lebanon in 1920 when the area was placed under a French-held League of Nations mandate that lasted until 1943. They extended the borders of the previously autonomous and
predominantly Christian Ottoman region of Mount Lebanon so that it doubled in size to include Beirut, Tyre, Sidon and Tripoli as well as the Beqaa valley (Hirst, 2010: 10). The areas annexed to the Mount Lebanon region previously belonged to the Greater Syria region within the Ottoman Empire. They were predominantly economically underdeveloped Muslim areas whose inhabitants did not want to be subordinated to the Christians (Hirst, 2010: 11; Salloukh, 2009: 4). The French extended Mount Lebanon’s borders in this way to grant Maronites wishes for a larger country. However, as Hinnebusch argues, the inclusion of poorer Muslim areas created an unstable country that remains divided along religious and economic lines to this day (Hinnebusch, 2003: 56). Salloukh explains that these divisions were deepened by the failure of Lebanon’s Christian dominated government to encourage the Muslims to identify with the new state (Salloukh, 2009: 4).

Forces present when the Lebanese state was formed failed to create a strong national identity and identity remained based around loyalty to religion, the village, family and kin, rather than to an ethnic nation or nation state (Lewis, 2005: 287; Salibi, 2005: 55). As a result, Lebanon remains fractured along sectarian, ideological, economic, regional and cultural lines that are rooted in its history and formation to this day. Understanding Lebanese society and politics means understanding its tribal structure and tribal rivalries. As Salibi explains, ‘To create a country is one thing; to create a nationality is another’ (Salibi, 2005: 19). This has allowed the Lebanese to prioritise religious and community identities over a national identity.

Lebanon was thus born with an intense identity crisis and state authority was repeatedly challenged by sub-state and supra-state identities, making it a weak state that was unable to establish a robust foreign policy from its outset. Internally, a substantial percentage of the population did not support the idea of a Lebanese state and did not want to be part of it. Any attempts to build a national Lebanese identity during the French mandate, such as giving Lebanon its own administrative bureaucracy, flag and national anthem, failed because of disagreement over identity and nationality (Salibi, 2005: 27). In addition to internal challenges, external challenges to the Lebanese state came because it included land that had previously been part of Greater Syria and Arabia (Hinnebusch, 2003: 56). The newly established
state of Syria refused to accept that former ‘Syrian’ territory had been added to Greater Lebanon, which led to Syrian and Arab nationalist demands for the dissolution of Lebanon and the reunification of Greater Syria (Salibi, 2005: 28). Different groups within Lebanon held on to their own ideas about what Lebanon should be and how it should conduct its foreign affairs. This means that from the beginning the foreign policy of the Lebanese state was heavily fractured between different sub-state groups.

The identity of the new Lebanese state was broadly divided between the Christians and the Muslims. The majority of the Christians argued that they were Lebanese and descended from a common Phoenician heritage, thus distinguishing themselves from the Arab world. They rejected an Arab identity despite the fact they spoke Arabic and shared cultural traits with other Arabs (Salibi, 2005: 27). In contrast, a predominantly, but not exclusively, Muslim group argued that Lebanon was an artificial state and that they were all Arabs and part of Greater Syrian or the wider Islamic ‘Umma’. Since Greater Lebanon was formed in 1920 the Lebanese have been arguing about whether their national identity is Lebanese, Arab, Mediterranean or Phoenician (Kaufman, 2006: 169). When the French mandate ended in 1943, Lebanon lost the protection of France and was exposed to destabilising internal and external forces. The Christian political establishment, backed by France, wanted Lebanon to succeed as a state while the Muslim opposition, backed by Syria wanted it to fail (Salibi, 2005: 36-37). Confrontation between these two groups prevented the Lebanese state developing into a cohesive actor with strong and robust foreign and domestic policies.

### 3.2 The National Pact to the Civil War

The official foreign policy of the Lebanese state started when Lebanon gained independence in 1943. Lebanon’s political system was outlined in the 1943 National Pact, an unwritten agreement that built on the 1926 Constitution and established a confessional system of government. It balanced between a Lebanese identity and an Arab identity and it was a compromise between the Christians and the Muslims. As well as France, Britain, Syria and Egypt all played an important role in helping design the National Pact, which was, as Traboulsi explains, the start of an ‘enduring legacy by which the Lebanese entity was to be periodically reproduced by means of a compromise between the dominant regional and international powers’ (Traboulsi,
This shows that the link between the system, the state, and the sub-state was already forming at this time.

By establishing a confessional system of political power sharing, the National Pact formalised the pre-existing sectarian system of political representation in Mount Lebanon (Salloukh, 2009: 3). The National Pact was intended to incorporate Lebanon’s religious and cultural diversity rather than create political uniformity, but it actually ‘exacerbated and institutionalised communal differences’ (United States Institute of Peace, 2007). It reflected the political roots of many important Lebanese families, which can be traced back to the feudal system that existed in the region before the start of the Ottoman Empire (Harris, 1997: 26-32). For example, the disproportionate political power held by the Druze today relative to their numbers is an example of how old feudal distributions of power have been transferred into modern politics (Hanf, 1993: 55-62; Szekely, 2008: 13).

The confessional system was based around religious rather than secular values and it shared political power between the eighteen officially recognised sectarian communities in Lebanon. It did this by giving each religious community a proportional share in the government. Political power was allocated based on the 1932 consensus and parliamentary seats were divided between Christians and Muslims on a 6:5 ratio. This prevented a common Lebanese identity emerging by allocating a religious identity to the main political posts in Lebanon and encouraging political loyalties and ambitions to develop along confessional lines. The post of the president was given to a Maronite, the prime minister to a Sunni, the speaker of parliament to a Shi’a and the chief of staff of the army to a Druze (Hanf, 1993: 71). The amount of power allocated to the Maronite president allowed him to dominate the political, security, financial and judicial powers of the state, and the Maronites also dominated major security and military positions (Salloukh, 2009: 7).

It was hoped that the confessional system would allow Lebanon to develop into a harmonious multi-confessional society, rather than have a single homogenous national identity. However, this did not happen and the complexity of ethnic, religious and confessional identities enshrined in the political system created a deeply divided
society in which sectarian groups were allowed to retain control over their own communities (Najem, 2005: 102). Furthermore, the state’s institutions constantly reproduced these identities at their own expense and became fragmented along identity lines. The Lebanese looked to their confessional communities rather than the nation state for leadership and protection, a situation that has continued to this day and which has prevented the development of a common citizenship and strong democratic structures. This has prevented a streamlining of foreign policy and encouraged fragmentation of the state because it allows sub-state groups to maintain and pursue their own foreign policy objectives.

The National Pact also gave Lebanon a neutral foreign policy that focused on balancing between the western orientation of the Christians and the eastern orientation of the Muslims. It wanted to ensure that neither group felt alienated and tried to upset the state’s delicate political balance (Najem, 2005: 102 & 116). In foreign policy terms it tried to resolve Lebanon’s identity dilemma by describing it as ‘an independent state with an Arab face’, and by giving priority to its relations with Arab states on condition that they recognised Lebanese sovereignty and independence (Salloukh, 2008: 285). The Maronites agreed to officially recognise Lebanon’s Arab character and give up European protection, and the Muslims agreed to acknowledge Lebanon’s independence as a state and give up any hope of being reintegrated into Greater Syria (Hirst, 2010: 11). Salem explains that this ‘double negation’ outlined what foreign policy decisions could not be made rather than which ones could, which devalued Lebanon’s foreign policy because decisions were made for negative rather than positive reasons (Salem, 1994: 70).

Other states, such as Switzerland, Sweden and Ireland have upheld long traditions of neutral foreign policy orientations. They have been able to do this because they are either politically and militarily strong enough to defend themselves from external attack or because they are protected by various treaties and agreements that respect their neutrality (Salem, 1994: 72). In contrast, Lebanon’s state has been too weak to defend its territory from military or ideological assaults. Furthermore, Lebanon has been unable to follow a neutral foreign policy formula because it exists within a region that does not tolerate neutrality (Salem, 2008c).
Although the state adopted a neutral foreign policy orientation, sub-state groups in Lebanon did not. Unable to express their foreign policy choices through the ‘neutral’ Lebanese state, these groups developed their own external alliances. This gave external actors influence over events in Lebanon through their Lebanese proxies, which compromised the neutrality of the state as it allowed external factors to influence Lebanon. It meant that foreign policies of sub-state groups deviated from the states neutral orientation and it heightened distrust and divisions between them (Najem, 2005: 102-103).

The failure of the state to develop a strong foreign policy direction damaged public perceptions of the state. It meant that the Lebanese saw the state as being too weak to develop effective foreign policies and unable to represent their needs. Salem believes that if the state had followed a stronger foreign policy orientation it would have won greater public support. This is because when a state takes on a more active foreign policy role and becomes involved in international conflict related activities, such as building an army and preparing for war, it can increase national and social unity. He argues that Lebanon’s neutral foreign policy failed to provide a foreign policy framework for Lebanon to follow in the future and failed to outline where Lebanon would stand in conflicts such as the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also prevented the Lebanese state from building effective alliances with other states (Salem, 1994: 71-72).

After the National Pact, Lebanese foreign policy tried to balance between the West and the non-aligned movement without isolating itself from the Soviet Union (Salamé, 1988: 355). Since then, the Lebanese government has tried to maintain good relations with the West as well as supporting Arab causes at the international level. From the time of the National Pact to the outbreak of civil war in 1975 the Maronites sought to control the state and were unwilling to share political power equally with the Muslims, making it difficult to reach political agreements between the different communities (Salibi, 2005: 36).

In a compromise between the Maronites and the Muslims over Lebanon’s foreign
policy direction, Lebanon entered into a number of regional agreements that affirmed its relations with the Arab world and its commitment to Arab issues. These included the 1944 inter-Arab Alexandria Protocol, the 1945 Charter of the League of Arab States and the 1950 Arab Common Defence Economic Cooperation Pact (Salem, 1994: 73). Lebanon signed these agreements on condition that Arab states formally agreed to recognise Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence. For example, in the Alexandria Protocol Arab states agreed to support ‘the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon’ (Salem, 1994: 74; Salloukh, 2008: 285). Lebanon also became a founding member of the Arab League, which meant it should officially take the Arab side in foreign policy decisions (Salem, 2008c). It followed Arab policy by rejecting proposals for a Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) in 1951, by not taking part in the Baghdad Pact and by supporting the Palestinian cause (Salem, 1994: 74).

However, whenever Lebanon has deviated too far from its neutral foreign policy orientation it has experienced instability. This was seen during the 1950s and 1960s when the government began developing a more Western orientation especially due to the impact of Nasserism and Arab Nationalism that increased insecurity amongst the Christians. This was strongly opposed by the Muslims and it upset Lebanon’s delicate political balance. For example, in 1957 Lebanon moved closer to the West by accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine, and in 1958 President Camille Chamoun’s alliance with the US against Nasser was met with strong Muslim opposition and triggered the 1958 Lebanese civil war.

Under Fouad Chehab’s presidency (1958-1964) foreign policy became more balanced between the West and Arab world. Chehab tried to maintain close economic, political, diplomatic and military relation with the West at the international level and with the Soviet Union’s allies who were supporting the Arab cause against Israel at the regional level (Salem, 1994: 74; Salamé, 1988: 355). External actors also penetrated the regional system and played an important role in Lebanese affairs and stability in Lebanon. For example, the US tried to exert influence over Lebanon because it was important as a transit state for transporting oil for the Arabian-American Oil Company.
via the Trans-Arabian pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Saida in Lebanon from 1950 until the pipeline was closed in 1976. Gendzier argues that, as a result, Lebanon’s history has been directly linked to the US’s oil and political interests since World War II (Gendzier, 2006: 177-179).

The Palestinians have also played an important role in Lebanese affairs, affecting its stability and showing the impact of regional forces on Lebanon’s foreign policy. The Arab defeat against Israel in 1967 heightened militarisation of the Palestinian cause and in 1969 the Cairo Agreement was signed which allowed Palestinians to carry arms in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. This had wider implications on Lebanon’s national security and sovereignty as the Lebanese state gave up some control over the means of violence within its territory. The presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon also upset its delicate confessional balance. This was because they allied with the Sunni’s and contributed to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war. This shows how the regional system and sub-state identity weakened and finally fractured the Lebanese state. It also shows a split between the foreign policy orientations of the Christians and Muslims. A predominantly Christian side wanted Lebanon to take a neutral role in regional politics, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and objected to the Palestinians launching attacks against Israel from Lebanese land. In contrast, a predominantly, but not exclusively Muslim side took an Arab nationalist position and wanted a pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli foreign policy orientation. Salloukh argues that the Muslims also adopted this position as a way of opposing Maronite power and of addressing inequalities implicit within the sectarian balance of political power (Salloukh, 2008: 295).

Supra-state identities, especially Arab nationalism, also had an important impact on Lebanese foreign policy during this period. Hinnebusch explains that pressure from

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6 The Arabian-American Oil Company has been known as Aramco since 1988, which is Saudi Arabia’s state owned national oil company.

7 Despite changing demographics, the distribution of political power remains based on the 1932 consensus. No further census has taken place since then because parity between religious groups is such a sensitive issue.
domestic pro-Arab nationalists prevented Lebanon from joining the Baghdad Pact (1955-1979). Furthermore, the Eisenhower doctrine, which Lebanon accepted in 1957, was promoted as a way for the US to support Arab states threatened by communism, but was actually about the US trying to contain Arab nationalism (Hinnebusch, 2003: 25-27). Hinnebusch explains that the US was concerned that the United Arab Republic (UAR) would expand to include Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, alongside Egypt and Syria. This would have given it control of a large part of the region’s oil and have had a serious impact on Western oil interests. US troops landed in Lebanon in 1958 as part of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and again in Lebanon after the 1968 Iraqi revolution to stabilise the pro-western government and prevent the Pan-Arab movement from gaining a hold (Hinnebusch, 2003: 25-27).

3.3 The Civil War 1975 -1990

Between 1975-1990 Lebanon was ravaged by civil war when relations between different internal identity groups broke down drawing in external forces, fracturing the already fragile state, and preventing all forms of official policy-making (Roberson, 1998: 2; Mubarek, 2003: 1-6). Sub-state identities played an important role in contributing to its outbreak, combined with regional factors such as the destabilising Palestinian presence in Lebanon. There had also been a significant increase in the ratio of Muslims to Christians since the National Pact was agreed. This meant that the distribution of political power no longer reflected the true demographics within the country, creating resentment amongst the Muslims. Therefore, in order to strengthen their domestic position and gain political weight, the Muslims allied with the Palestinians against the Christians. During this period sub-state actors also bandwagoned with external actors to improve their domestic positions which turned Lebanon into ‘a black hole into which many outside influences and interventions (local and global) were drawn’ (Roberson, 1998: 5).

The civil war caused Lebanese foreign policy to fragment alongside the Lebanese state leaving it vulnerable to external actors. Salem explains that as the Lebanese state fractured into its different confessional groups its foreign policy shattered alongside it. As a result, different groups in Lebanon built up their own relations with external actors, that included Israel, Syria, Iran, Libya, Iraq and the Soviet Union (Salem, 1994: 75). The state lost nearly all its sovereignty, independence and authority, which
meant it was very difficult for it to pursue its own foreign policy direction and it came under the influence of external powers.

Salem explains that during the presidency of Elias Sarkis (1976-1982) Lebanon’s official foreign policy reflected Syrian objectives, but this changed during Amine Gemayel’s presidency (1982-1988) when he adopted a pro-US foreign policy. This reflects the power Syria and the US held in Lebanon during these periods and the impact of the regional system on Lebanese foreign policy. However, Gemayel’s pro-US foreign policy was opposed by many Muslims, which led to an uprising in 1984, after which the US withdrew from Lebanon and Gemayel’s government unsuccessfully tried to gain Syrian support. During the same period links between sub-state actors and their foreign sponsors strengthened and Iran’s influence in Lebanon increased after Hizballah was formed in 1982 (Salem, 1994: 75). When Gemayel’s term ended in 1988 a dispute over his successor led to the formation of two rival governments, one under Michel Aoun, which was supported by Iraq, the other under Salim el-Hoss, which was supported by Syria. The crisis ended when internal forces supported by Syria and with the US’s consent ousted Aoun and sent him into exile in France.

During the civil war Lebanon became the site of a proxy war for regional and international conflicts as different sub-state groups, supported by their external patrons fought against each other (Hinnebusch, 2003: 56). External powers heightened intra-Lebanese divisions by exploiting intense internal struggles between the predominantly Christian Lebanese versus the Palestinians and pro-Palestinian Lebanese (Gendzier, 2006: 179). State institutions fragmented, including the armed forces, which disintegrated along sectarian lines when its members prioritised loyalty to their sectarian communities over loyalty to the Lebanese state and joined their sectarian militias (Salloukh, 2009: 8). Cold War superpower rivalry also played an important role and the USSR financially and militarily supported the Palestinians and Syrians while the US supported right-wing Christians (Fisk, 2001: 468). However, as Ayoob argues, because the USSR knew it was weaker that the US it was reluctant to allow conflicts to escalate, as seen after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Ayoob, 1993: 40).
In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon in the hope of removing the PLO and the Syrians and of imposing a client regime there. It succeeded in forcing the PLO’s to move its base to Tunisia but it did not manage to establish a Lebanese government sympathetic to its needs. Hinnebusch explains that Israel invaded with support from the pro-Israeli Reagan administration in the US and that Arab states were unable to form a coalition against the invasion in the wake of the divisions caused by the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and the Iran-Iraq war (Hinnebusch, 2003: 185-187). Israel had three main goals in Lebanon which were: managing the PLO’s military presence; supporting Christian militias fighting the Palestinians; and opposing Syria’s military presence (Mubarek, 2003: 7). However, its invasion led to the creation of Hizballah amongst the Shi’a who rose up against the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon. From 1982 until 2000 Israel tried to contain the threat of non-state actors in south Lebanon, especially Hizballah and the Palestinian forces. It did this by maintaining a security zone in south Lebanon with the help of its Lebanese proxy, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), which was made up from its rightwing Lebanese Christian allies.

The civil war ended with the Ta’if Accord that laid down the foundations for Lebanon’s future political system. It was an agreement between Lebanon’s political parties that was reached under Saudi and US supervision in Saudi Arabia on 22 October 1989. However, it was rejected by Michel Aoun, one of the prime ministers in the two governments that existed at that time. This meant that it could not be implemented until Syrian backed Lebanese forces defeated Aoun in 1990. The Ta’if Accord, like the National Pact, was the result of external interference in Lebanon that had led to ‘a compromise between the dominant regional and international powers’ (Salloukh, 2009: 9). It is an example of how external actors shaped and controlled Lebanese political agreements, and of how the regional system impacted on Lebanese foreign policy.

In an attempt to ensure that Lebanon’s political system reflected its current demographic balance and to stop the Lebanese state fracturing along sectarian lines, the Ta’if Accord gave more power to the Muslims. It did this by weakening the role of the Maronite president, increasing the power of the Sunni prime minister and the
Shi’a speaker of parliament and establishing equal parliamentary representation between Christians and Muslims (Salloukh, 2008: 288). For example, it amended article 52 of the Constitution which had given the president sole power to negotiate international treaties and it made decisions based on the approval of the prime minister and the cabinet (Salloukh, 2008: 287). It also established a ‘troika’ system, whereby policy decisions needed agreement between the president, prime minister and speaker of parliament. Salem argues that, while the Ta’if Accord addressed the political injustice felt by the Muslims, it did little to decrease the insecurity of the Christians, which is why it failed to bring security to Lebanon (Salem, 1994: 73).

The Ta’if Accord placed new limits on Lebanese foreign policy and it restricted Lebanese sovereignty in favour of Syria, which controlled Lebanon from the end of the civil war until 2005. Salem argues that it gave Syria effective control over Lebanon by referring to common strategic, political and economic interests between the two countries. He also explains that it also affected Lebanese neutrality and orientated it more towards Syria. It did this by replacing the National Pact’s reference to Lebanon as ‘an independent country with an ‘Arab face’ with the declaration that Lebanon is ‘Arab in its identity and association’. He explains that this, at least hypothetically, committed Lebanon to a pro-Arab foreign policy orientation. (Salem, 1994: 76). Syrian control over Lebanon meant that Lebanese presidents were chosen by Syria and reflected Syrian interests. The president also continued to dominate foreign policy decision-making despite the fact that the decision-making power had been transferred to the cabinet by the Ta’if Accord (Salloukh, 2008: 298).

In reality, the Ta’if Accord reinforced rather than addressed the problem of clientalism and sectarianism within the Lebanese political system. Salloukh explains that it reproduced the sectarian political system while at the same time expecting these sectarian elites to work against their own interests and create a non-sectarian system. This was seen in the way in which the Ta’if Accord was ignored when up to 6,000 ex-combatants were accepted into the Lebanese armed forces. This had been banned under Ta’if and their inclusion gave the militias a hold over state institutions, which hardened the sectarian system. Employment in public sector posts also continued to be based upon sectarian or clientelist associations, which meant that the political
system continued to be fractured along sectarian lines. Salloukh argues ‘the inter-
sectarian rent seeking strategies of ex-warlords-cum-postwar politicians, and regional 
and sectarian postwar redistribual strategies transformed state institutions and the 
bureaucracy into sectarian fiefdoms’ (Salloukh, 2009: 9-16).

**3.4 1990 until the 2006 war**

When the civil war ended in 1990, Lebanon found itself under Syrian control within a 
regional environment shaped by unrestrained US influence after the collapse of the 
USSR and the end of the Cold War (Salem, 1994: 80). Syrian troops first entered 
Lebanon in 1976 to control Palestinian forces and they remained there until they 
withdrew in 2005. Salem argues that they were able to take control of Lebanon in 
1990 due to a combination of domestic and external factors. Domestically, divisions 
between the Christians allowed Syria to take on a mediating role and increase its 
influence in Lebanon, while externally, the US gave Syria the freedom to take control 
in Lebanon because it had joined the anti-Iraq coalition in the 1990-1991 Kuwait war 
(Salem, 1994: 77). Lebanon’s policies reflected Syria’s geopolitical aims and its 
hopes that Russia, France and the EU would be able to counterbalance the US’s 
influence both in Lebanon and the wider region. However, Russia was unable to play 
a strong role in Lebanon and the wider region due to its own domestic economic and 
social problems (Ismael, 2000: 249). The Soviet Union had been Syria’s long-time 
superpower patron and Syria’s position was considerably weakened after its collapse, 
which had an impact on Lebanon, due Syria domination (Najem, 2005: 105). 
Furthermore, during this period Lebanon’s economy was characterised by a huge 
national debt due to the cost of post-war reconstruction, a rentier economy, 
deindustrialisation, a service-orientated economy, and ‘politicised economic decision-
making’ (Salloukh, 2009: 21).

During its occupation of Lebanon, Syria maintained a strong military and political 
presence. It dominated Lebanon’s foreign and defence policies, controlled the 
appointment of Lebanese politicians and rebuilt the Lebanese political system 
according to its own priorities (Hinnebusch, 1998: 140). This was formalised in 
several treaties which included the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and 
Coordination in May 1991 and the Defence and Security Agreement in September 
1991 (Mubarek, 2003: 19). These treaties gave Syria extensive control over Lebanese
affairs, including its foreign and domestic policies (Salloukh, 2009: 15 & 19). However, Najem argues that, despite the fact Syria dominated Lebanese policymaking, an independent Lebanese foreign policy was still important during this period for three reasons: first, forces in Lebanon still existed that had played an important historical role in shaping and determining Lebanese foreign policy; secondly, most Lebanese still wanted a Lebanese foreign policy that reflected Lebanese interests; thirdly, political and economic conditions in Lebanon were very different from those in Syria. This meant that, despite Syria’s dominance, Lebanon still had the capacity to pursue an independent foreign policy under the right conditions (Najem, 2005: 100).

Under Syrian influence Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policies adopted a pro-Syrian, pro-Arab orientation at both regional and international levels (Mubarek, 2003: 40; Hancock, 1998: 163). Syria dominated the Lebanese political system to such an extent that, as Salem argues, all domestic policy was under foreign control and there was in fact no domestic policy in Lebanon, only foreign policy (Salem, 1994: 69). Officially, the aim of Lebanese foreign policy was to end Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, to free Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails and to repatriate Palestinian refugees (Salloukh, 2008: 296). Any peace deal between Lebanon and Israel was made conditional on a Syrian-Israeli one. Hinnebusch argues that, during his premiership, Syria stopped Rafik Hariri from reaching a settlement with Israel under UN resolution 425 (Hinnebusch, 1998: 157). Syria also implemented the Ta’if Accord so that it enabled it to maintain its control over Lebanon and its presence there enabled it pressurise Israel, especially regarding the occupied Golan Heights (Mubarek, 2003: 21). Withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon became a bilateral issue between the two countries. Consequently, the pro-Syrian Lebanese government gave Syrian troops indefinite leave to remain in Lebanon and made their withdrawal dependent on reaching a settlement over the Arab-Israeli conflict (Salloukh, 2009: 13; 2008: 307).

Syria failed to disarm Hizballah despite the Ta’if calling for the disarmament of all sectarian militias. It allowed Hizballah to keep its arms so that it could act as a resistance force against Israel, which still occupied Lebanese territory in south Lebanon, and to inadvertently allow Syria to pressurise Israel over the Golan Heights.
This allowed Hizballah to dominate south Lebanon and to build up extensive social, political and military networks. Najem argues that an armed Hizballah strengthened Syria’s position in Lebanon. This is because it allowed Syria to present itself as the only force capable of controlling Hizballah, which gave it international status and an important bargaining power with Israel especially regarding the Golan Heights. He also explains that the decision to allow Hizballah to remained armed was neither in the interest of the Lebanese state nor of the Lebanese people. This was because Hizballah’s status as a resistance militia against Israel gave Israel a reason to continue occupying southern Lebanon on the grounds that it was maintaining an important security zone between itself and Hizballah (Najem, 2005: 103-104).

Syrian occupation also prevented different sub-state groups from freely pursuing relations with their external patrons, thereby reducing the influence of sub-state identities and non-Syrian external actors on Lebanese foreign policy. Hinnebusch explains that Syria played different Lebanese groups off against each other to deepen its hold over Lebanon in a classic case of ‘divide and rule’, and that it economically and politically rewarded those who collaborated with it (Hinnebusch, 1998: 149). However, Salloukh argues that sub-state groups were not entirely muted during this period and that some managed to pursue independent foreign policies, particularly those Christians who strongly opposed Lebanon’s Syrian oriented foreign policy (Salloukh, 2008: 296). Furthermore, Christian dissatisfaction with the political situation in post-war Lebanon exacerbated sectarian divisions despite Syria’s authoritarian grip over the state (Salloukh, 2009: 19).

While Syria occupied most of Lebanon, Israel continued to occupy parts of south Lebanon until 2000, when it withdrew its troops from everywhere except for Ghajar, and the contested Kfarshouba Hills and Shebaa Farms areas. The Israeli departure was seen as a failure for Israel because it withdrew unconditionally and without international pressure (Achcar, 2007: 41). It left due to the high number of casualties it had incurred in the face of Hizballah’s resistance and it was the first time an Arab force had managed to force Israel to withdraw from occupied land. Israel failed to achieve a peace agreement with Syria before it left and after its departure Hizballah grew politically and militarily stronger in south Lebanon. After it withdrew Israel
remained preoccupied by Syrian interventions in Lebanon, including Syria’s role in supplying Hizballah with weapons as part of a broader Syrian-Iranian alliance.

With Syria’s consent, Hizballah held exclusive control over military and civilian activity in non-Israeli occupied parts of south Lebanon. This was extended to areas occupied by Israel after its withdrawal in 2000, after which it continued to occupy most of south Lebanon until the war in July 2006. This strengthened Hizballah’s position as an independent sub-state actor and it shows how a regional actor empowered a sub-state Lebanese group and contributed to the fracturing of the Lebanese state. During this period Hizballah built up a large military infrastructure in south Lebanon with the help of Syria and Iran. By the time the 2006 war started Hizballah’s military infrastructure included a network of underground tunnels running along the Israeli border that posed a significant security threat to northern Israel. Scuffles continued across the border between Hizballah and Israel with, for example, Hizballah kidnapping Israeli soldiers in October 2000 and attempting to kidnap soldiers in November 2005 (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 40). Hizballah also wounded an Israeli army soldier in May 2006 when it fired on an Israeli army base in upper Galilee (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). However, these cross-borders incidents provoked a minor Israel response.

Tension began to rise against Syrian occupation due to an accumulation of factors at domestic, regional and international levels. These included growing regional and international calls for Syria to withdraw. The US started to criticise Syria’s occupation of Lebanon in 2003 and France and other European governments joined it in 2004. In September 2004, UNSCR 1559 was adopted which reflected the ambitions of the US and its allies (UNSCR, 2004). It tried to assert the sovereign authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese government over its land by calling for Syria to leave Lebanon and for Hizballah to disarm. The US wanted Lebanon to join it as part of its ‘with us or against us’ doctrines, and it warned the country that it needed to integrate into the international community and that its existence depended on its ability to

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8 After the 2006 war the Lebanese army and UNIFIL troops were deployed in the area as part of UNSCR 1701.
comply with US demands (Hirst, 2010: 294). However, the Lebanese government was under Syrian control and it resisted UN and US pressure.

Pressure was also mounting within Lebanon due to a number of political assassinations that had taken place aimed at anti-Syrian figures, most notably, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri who was killed in a car bomb on 14 February 2005. Hariri had resigned as prime minister in October 2004 in opposition to Syrian interference in Lebanon, especially after it pressurised the Lebanese parliament to extend the term of the pro-Syrian President, Emile Lahoud, by three years until 2007. Hariri’s assassination triggered a series of large-scale demonstrations in Lebanon known as the Independence Intifada or the US-dubbed ‘Cedar Revolution’ that called for an end to Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

Anti-Syrian tension intensified and on 28 February 2005 the pro-Syrian Lebanese government resigned and called for new elections. France and the US also renewed their calls for Syrian troops to leave Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 1559. A few days later, on 2 March, Syria announced that it would end its military presence in Lebanon. As a result, Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hizballah, called for a pro-Syrian rally to be held in Beirut on March 8. Six days later, on March 14, the anti-Syrian opposition organised a large rally against Syria, which also marked a month after Rafik Hariri’s assassination. After this Lebanese politics was split between two different alliances, the pro-Syrian March 8 alliance named after the day of the pro-Syrian demonstration in Beirut, and the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance named after the day of the anti-Syrian demonstration in Beirut. These alliances showed a Sunni-Shi’a divide in Lebanon, with Sunnis mainly supporting March 14 and Shi’a mainly supporting March 8. At the time they were formed the main Christian leaders were either in prison or exile. Samir Geagea was released from prison in July 2005, where he had been since 1994, and Michel Aoun returned from exile in France in May 2005, where he had been since the end of the civil war. Geagea subsequently allied with March 14 Alliance and Aoun with the March 8 Alliance.

After nearly 30 years of occupation and in response to anti-Syrian sentiments the last Syrian troops left Lebanon on 26 April 2005. Despite withdrawing militarily, Syria
retains considerable interest in Lebanon and it still holds significant influence over Lebanese security, economic and political networks. This prevents Lebanon from making too many moves against Syrian interests (Najem 2005:104-105; Noble 2008:143; Goksel 2009:2). Syria has continued to maintain ‘a covert intelligence presence’ in Lebanon since then (US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2007). It also maintains its links with Lebanon through its alliance with Hizballah and other members of the March 8 Alliance. Furthermore, Lebanon’s only passable land crossing and a vital commercial and trading route goes through Syria. This means that part of Lebanon’s economy relies on maintaining good foreign relations with Syria. After Syrian troops left Lebanon, Syria temporarily closed the land border to Lebanese commercial traffic which damaged Lebanon’s economy (Salloukh, 2008: 288).

The Syrians left behind a power vacuum and a battle for control of the Lebanese state began between the Sunni-led March 14 and the Shi’a-led March 8 Alliances. Hirst argues that the Independence Intifada led to a deepening of divisions within Lebanese society and a huge crisis of Lebanese national identity. It also increased external interference in Lebanese affairs with the US, Israel and so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states backing March 14 and the Iranian-led, Islamo-nationalist alliance backing March 8 (Hirst, 2010: 312). Salloukh argues that since Syria’s departure the fight between different domestic, regional and international actors for control of Lebanese foreign policy has resumed, with regional and international groups supporting and manipulating local proxies and Lebanon continuing to lack a united national foreign policy (Salloukh, 2008: 299). Salloukh explains that Syria’s withdrawal ‘unleashed an intense conflict in Lebanon […] over which sect or alliance of sects would control the post-Syria Lebanese state’ and to which regional and international actors this state would be allied to. He also explains that the Christian political establishment was politically ostracised in the post-Syrian era and that ‘the sectarian balance of political power was tipped in favour of the Sunni and Shi’a political elites’ (Salloukh, 2010: 140). As a result, sub-state identities failed to be reconciled under a single Lebanese national identity and divisions between them continued to prevent the formation of a single, unitary foreign policy orientation.
This split between the mainly Sunni March 14 alliance which is allied with the regions so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states, and the mainly Shi’a March 8 alliance which is allied with Iran and Syria, also reflects a Shi’a-Sunni schism in Lebanese politics within a Sunni dominated political system. This differs from the past when we saw a Christian-Muslim schism within a Maronite dominated political system (see International Crisis Group, 2005). Growing divisions between Lebanon’s Sunni and Shi’a populations have continued to hinder attempts to create a united national identity (Harris, 2008: 3). Major events in Lebanon since Syria’s withdrawal show continuing sectarian power struggles, including UNSCR 1701 and the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) (Salloukh, 2009: 22-23).

Hirst argues that future civil conflict in Lebanon will develop between the Sunni and Shi’a rather than the Christians and Muslim ones as they have in the past with, for example, recent troubles breaking out in mixed Sunni-Shi’a areas rather than along ‘old Muslim-Christian fault lines’ (Hirst, 2010: 321). The battle between these two political alliances is presented as a political-ideological struggle that has damaged Lebanese sovereignty and, due to the presence of external actors, prevented the state formulating independent foreign policy decisions. Divisions between the March 8 and the March 14 Alliances and their external sponsors shows that the lack of any real distinction between the domestic and foreign spheres, as seen during the civil war, continues in contemporary Lebanon. External patrons still support sub-state groups in their domestic power struggles and in return these external actors are using Lebanon as a site for their proxy wars.

The March 8 alliance is dominated by the Shi’a and also includes a significant number of Christians and supporters from other sectarian groups. It maintains close relations with Syria and opposes the influence of the US and its allies in Lebanon and the wider region. The main political parties in the alliance are Shi’a Hizballah and Shi’a Amal, which are led by Hassan Nasrallah and Nabih Berri. They are joined by the Christian led parties of the Free Patriotic Movement under Michel Aoun and the Marada Movement under Suleiman Frangieh. Other members include the Lebanese branch of the secular Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP).
Aoun allied with the March 8 Alliance in February 2006 when he signed a memorandum of understanding with Hizballah. Salloukh explains that he did this for several reasons. He believed allying with the Shi’a would be best for the future of the Christians in Lebanon because they are going to be the strongest group in the future. He also believed that the Christians needed the Shi’a to counterbalance Sunni power in Lebanon after the Sunnis were allocated a greater share of power proportional to the Christians by the Ta’if Accord that ended the civil war in 1990. Allying with the Shi’a allowed Aoun to negotiate with the Lebanese Sunni from a position of power. Aoun also saw Syria as an important counterbalance to Saudi Arabian influence in Lebanon, which he feared was growing due to its close relations with the March 14 Alliance (Salloukh, 2010a). Aoun’s support for Hizballah and March 8 was important for absorbing sectarian tensions because without Aoun and his supporters March 8 would be a predominantly Shi’a alliance. Aoun adds a Christian dimension which means that March 8 is not seen as a purely Shi’a alliance acting alone.

The March 14 alliance is largely made up from the Sunni with a significant number of Christians and, until August 2009, the Druze. It is closely allied with US-backed Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, and it is close to the West, particularly France and the US. Members of the March 14 coalition oppose Syrian and Iranian intervention in Lebanon and the wider region. They see disarming Hizballah as a primary way to counterbalance this influence but they lack the military or political means to force Hizballah to disarm. This alliance is made up from the Sunni Future Movement led by Saad Hariri, the Christian Kataeb party under Amine Gemayel and the Lebanese Forces under Samir Geagea and, from 2005-2009, the Druze represented by Walid Jumblatt and his Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Salloukh explains that the Christians who are allied with March 14 see Hizballah as Lebanon’s main enemy because they fear Iran and Syria’s influence in Lebanon. They have allied with the Sunni’s and Saudi Arabia because they believe it is the best way to counterbalance this influence (Salloukh, 2010a).

March 14 won the parliamentary elections in Lebanon held between May and June 2005 after winning 72 out of 128 seats and a coalition government was formed under Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The 24-member cabinet that was formed included 15
members of Hariri’s Future Movement and five members of the Hizballah-Amal alliance (UNSC, 2005). It was a weak government and differences in opinion between March 8 and March 14 MPs prevented it from reaching agreement on key issues. As a result, in February 2006 Siniora announced the establishment of the National Dialogue as a forum in which politicians from across the Lebanese political arena could meet to discuss and hopefully come to an agreement on Lebanon’s domestic and foreign concerns. Talks centred around issues such as the disarmament of Hizballah, the international tribunal into the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the extension of President Lahoud’s presidency.

In February 2006, in accordance with UNSCR 1664, the government agreed to establish an international-Lebanese tribunal into the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) (UNSCR, 2006). However, this was decided by majority rather than consensual voting, which caused March 8 members of the cabinet to temporarily walk out of the government. This decision to hold the STL took place after the Mehlis Report was released in October 2005. This was the outcome of a UN investigation into the assassination of Rafik Hariri that implicated Syrian officials in his murder. During National Dialogue talks held in March 2006, Lebanese political leaders agreed to disarm Palestinian factions by September of that year (US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2007). However, talks failed to reach an agreement on whether or not Hizballah should be disarmed and on who should replace Lahoud as president after the end of his term in 2007. Due to deep disagreements between the different political leaders talks stopped in early July 2006, just before the outbreak of the 2006 war.

During this period, the Lebanese government did not ask Hizballah to disarm or to give up its control over south Lebanon due to concerns this would trigger sectarian conflict between Shi’a Hizballah and the Sunni dominated government. In addition, any decision to disarm Hizballah was strongly opposed by March 8 MPs. Therefore, despite hoping to disarm Hizballah, March 14 members of the cabinet had to choose ‘cooption over confrontation’ (Makovsky and White, 2006: 4). Furthermore, the government also lacked the military capacity to disarm Hizballah. This meant that UN calls for Hizballah’s disarmament, as detailed in UNSCR 1559 (2004) and UNSCR
1664 (2006), remained unanswered. Hizballah kept its arms and its weapons continued to threaten Israel’s northern border.

By unravelling Lebanese foreign policy, this historical narrative shows the need to closely scrutinise Lebanon’s domestic politics, particularly with regard to the building and weaknesses of state institutions. It demonstrates how factors at the three levels of analysis have worked to create a feedback mechanism, which affects foreign policy-making by consistently weakening the state. The weak regional system was easily penetrated by external actors who designed the Lebanese state in collusion with a sub-state group in such a way that it empowered sub-state identities at the expense of the state. These sub-state identities bandwagoned with external actors to improve their domestic position and in doing so allowed actors within the regional system to influence events in Lebanon, further weakening the Lebanese state and fracturing its foreign policy. As a result, the unity and cohesion of the Lebanese state has been compromised, and it is unable to conform to the definition of the state as a unitary, rational, security maximising actor that is central to Waltz and Wendt’s theories.

3.5 The confessional system: empowering sub-state identities

‘This society is not a society in the real sense of the word, because there is no such thing as a Lebanese community. There is no Lebanese social unit. Lebanon is a collection of sects and socio-religious communities. This [...] is not a society, not a community, not a nation’ Kamal Jumblatt (quoted in Mackey, 2006: 82-83).

The second part of this chapter looks in greater detail at the impact of the regional system and sub-state identities on the state and their effect on Lebanese foreign policy. Drawing from the evidence provided in the previous narrative, it argues that sub-state identities have had a significant impact on Lebanese foreign policy and state cohesion for two main reasons: firstly, they give external powers influence in Lebanon; secondly, they fracture the state because political and institutional structures are based on multiple conflicting identities. Both of these factors weaken the sovereignty of the state, compromising its integrity and preventing it from acting like a unitary security maximising rational actor as Waltz and Wendt assume. It also argues that systemic interests, which may draw selectively from sub-state or supra-state identities, can force the weak state to pursue foreign policies that do not
necessarily maximise power or serve rational security interests. They have been able to do this for several reasons including the construction of the regional state system and the Lebanese state by external powers; the relations built up between external and internal actors; the impact of regional wars and conflicts; and the impact of supra-state identities.

The Lebanese state is weak because it was externally constructed by the French, in collusion with a sub-state identity group, the Maronites, in the context of a penetrated regional system. When the Lebanese state was formed, pre-existing identities were incorporated into the political system of the new state via its confessional system. This weakened the new state by strengthening sub-state identities over a national or state identity. As a political system it has prevented the development of democratic values, created weak institutions, lacks transparency, and has supported sectarian rather than national affiliations (Salloukh, 2010: 143). It ensured that Lebanon became, and remains, a state fractured by different internal identity groups that bandwagon with external actors within the regional and international systems to bolster their domestic position. Therefore, the state is unable to exert social control over different groups within its boundaries, which has led to a weak and fragmented state, as outlined by Midgal (Migdal, 1988: 2).

These sub-state groups erode the state’s sovereign authority by taking on, for example, social, security and legal functions, which would normally be the state’s responsibility. They also give community and religious leaders immense power because they act as intermediaries between their community or sect and the state, which enables them to mobilise their clients around political issues. A UNDP report explains that sects in Lebanon have both a religious and a political role. They are responsible for protecting the religious interests of the members of their sects, through education and because they have authority over personal status laws, as enshrined in the constitution. They also have a political role because they hold political privileges within the state, which enables them to focus on increasing their sect’s political power and influence over state institutions (UNDP, 2009: 23). Prioritising sectarian identities over a national identity reduces the state’s legitimacy and increases its insecurity. It forces the state to focus more on securing external support against internally
destabilising internal forces than on creating policies against external threats (Hinnebusch, 2002: 15).

Hizballah is one of the most important sub-state actors. It challenges Lebanese state sovereignty and fills the vacuum left by the weak state. It is both a political and a religious movement and it is an internal actor and external Lebanese actor due to its close relations with Iran (Sultan, 2008: 9). It has well-developed political and social structures and its independent foreign policy agenda has led commentators, as Kifner explains, to argue that Hizballah has become a ‘state within a state’. However, due to the extreme weakness of the Lebanese state, Saad Ghorayeb argues that Hizballah has not become ‘a state within a state’ but a ‘state within a nonstate’ (Kifner, 2006). Hizballah has taken over the role of the state by defending Lebanese sovereignty from Israeli occupation and providing social services to communities in south Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa Valley and Dahiyeh, who have mostly been ignored by the government.

The lack of a strong state with a strong national identity has affected Lebanese foreign policy in several ways as discussed below. It has created multiple foreign policies, weak state institutions and a foreign policy that prioritises economic decisions over social and cultural ones. It has allowed external actors to influence foreign policy decisions.

3.5.1 Multiple foreign policies

The absence of a national identity means that sub-state groups pursue their own foreign policies rather than a united state foreign policy. They bandwagon with external actors to bolster their own domestic position and in doing so prioritise their sectarian interests over those of the state. This means that multiple foreign policies coexist in Lebanon alongside the official state foreign policy, which has led Korany and Dessouki to argue that Lebanon’s foreign policy has been ‘ethnicised’ (Korany and Dessouki, 2008: 491). Timur Goksel, former senior adviser and official spokesman for UNIFIL, explains that during his work with UNIFIL part of his role was to deal with the Lebanese foreign ministry but, because they have nothing to do with foreign policy, he ended up dealing with groups and organisations. ‘I dealt with the army, I dealt with Amal, I dealt with Hizballah, […] I even dealt with the south Lebanese Army – the Israeli militia. I dealt with everybody I wasn’t supposed to deal
with because these are the guys that call the shots’ (Goksel, 2009: 6).

The state also has several foreign policies because it is divided between representatives from different sub-state groups. This means that, besides the official foreign policy conducted by the prime minister and the president, politicians and parties have their own foreign policies (Salem, 2008c). Therefore, when talking about Lebanese foreign policy it is important to define exactly which foreign policy is being talked about. As Salloukh asks: is it the foreign policy of ‘the president, the prime minister, the speaker of parliament, the foreign minister, the variable sectarian sub-state actors, or all of the above?’ (Salloukh, 2008: 283). For example, Hizballah members of parliament support an entirely different foreign policy with its own defence budget from March 14 members of the government.

According to Salem sub-state foreign policies exist in Lebanon for several reasons. First, different groups and communities in Lebanon have maintained strong historical, political, social and cultural links to foreign powers. For example, the Maronites have held strong historical connections with the French, the Shi’a with Iran and the Sunnis with several Muslim empires. Secondly, the nonalignment policy of the National Pact prevented individual groups from developing their foreign interests through the central government, which forced them to develop their own interests independently from the state. Thirdly, the National Pact left the Muslims feeling they had been unjustly treated and the Christians feeling insecure. The Muslims, therefore, joined forces with the Palestinians in the 1970s, which heightened insecurity amongst the Christians and forced them to seek external support from countries that have included France, Syria, Israel and the US (Salem, 1994: 73).

These multiple foreign policies have prevented the formation of a united national foreign policy. This has contributed to growing divisions between different sects and their increasing reliance on external actors. This means that, as Salem argues, foreign policy in Lebanon has generally been weak, with no clearly defined objectives, no strong alliances and no major treaties with anyone, because of the fear that taking a major decision will upset somebody somewhere (Salem, 2008c). This means that there is no strategic foreign policy in Lebanon and it has become about reacting to
events rather than creating new initiatives (Interview E, 2008; Interview F, 2009). It has also led to internal conflict on several occasions: in 1957 when disagreement over the decision of the pro-Western government to adopt the Eisenhower Doctrine ended in the 1958 civil war; in the late 1960s and early 1970s over support for the Palestinian movement which led to the 1975-1990 civil war; and in 1990 over how Lebanese relations with Syria would develop after the end of the Civil War (Salloukh, 2008: 284).

Hizballah is one example of a sub-state group following its own foreign policy. Its failure to give up its arms limits the Lebanese state’s sovereign authority and allows Hizballah to pursue an independent foreign policy. The state is unable to disarm Hizballah because it lacks the capacity. Hizballah argues that it needs its arms to liberate the remaining Lebanese territory under Israeli occupation in the Shebaa Farms and Ghajar, and that it is the only Lebanese force with any capacity to resist Israel. Hizballah’s arms limit the sovereign authority of the Lebanese state but at the same time, by seeking to liberate Lebanese land, Hizballah is also seeking to restore Lebanese sovereignty over its territory. This enables Hizballah to have a significant impact on Lebanese foreign policy and, as Salloukh argues, since Syria’s withdrawal Hizballah has opposed government attempts to adopt a pro-US or anti-Syrian foreign policy orientation, it has rejected UN calls for sub-state groups to disarm and it has accepted the presence of UNIFIL in the south, as detailed in UN resolution 1559 (Salloukh, 2008: 292). Although Hizballah’s weapons damage the sovereign authority of the Lebanese state, at the same time they protect the sovereignty of Lebanese territory from external attack because there is no other force in Lebanon capable of doing so.

3.5.2 Influence of external actors

The weak confessional state means that sub-state groups seek support from external actors to bolster their domestic position, and external actors are keen to sponsor internal actors in pursuit of their regional wars and conflicts. By doing this, sub-state groups have been prioritising their own interests over a national interest, undermining the states’ ability to function, and contributing to a blurring of foreign and domestic boundaries. As Salamé explains: ‘One is struck by the organic relation between the internal scene and the external regional and international balance of power – in
Lebanon there is no clear-cut distinction between the two – which are intertwined and interdependent’ (Salamé, 1988: 347). Sub-state groups have been able to build up alliances with external actors because the state is too weak to stop them. As a result there is more interest in regional relationships than domestic affairs and nation building, which has further exacerbated internal fracturing along sectarian lines (Mubarek, 2003: 24).

The gap left by the failure of internal actors to reach a consensus on foreign policy issues has enabled external actors to influence Lebanese domestic and foreign policy (Salloukh, 2008: 283). This leaves Lebanon highly vulnerable to shifts in the regional system and to the desires of sub-state identities. Recognising how domestic and foreign boundaries have become blurred is key to understanding politics in Lebanon and the factors shaping its foreign policy. Since the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, the main external actors involved in Lebanon have been the US and Saudi Arabia who support the March 14 Alliance, and Iran and Syria who support the March 8 Alliance. Iranian and Syrian support for Hizballah transcends state boundaries and has turned it into a strong and well-armed sub-state group. Hizballah challenges state sovereign authority in south Lebanon, is able to instigate wars with Israel, as seen in 2006, and its bloc in government now holds veto power over government decisions within a national unity government. External actors have affected Lebanese foreign policy by sponsoring sub-state groups, by the influence of supra-state identities, and by the impact of regional and international conflicts on Lebanon.

The US’s relationship with the March 14 alliance has had a strong impact on Lebanese affairs. Its policies in Lebanon have directly affected the Lebanese government and deepened internal divisions by financially and militarily supporting the March 14 forces and sidelining the March 8 alliance. It has meant that, as Goksel explains, when the prime minister (Fouad Siniora) makes Lebanese foreign policy decisions he is very careful not to offend the US (Goksel, 2009: 1). Hafez argues that, ‘the US ambassador in Lebanon interferes in minute details of Lebanese affairs – the composition and structure of the army and internal security forces and other government agencies. Through its ambassador the US has become a party in Lebanese politics and part of the internal struggle siding with one group of Lebanese against the
One way the US affects affairs in Lebanon is by trying to influence its military apparatus. From 2005-2008 the US gave $250 million in military assistance to Lebanon, making it the second largest per capita recipient of US military funding in the world (Schenker, 2008). Hafez explains that, because the US sees the army as too complacent towards the resistance, it has sought to change its ‘ideology and structure’. He supports his argument using the example of Terry Rod Larson, who was sent to the region by the UN in the aftermath of the 2006 war, and who supported the US’s agenda. Hafez explains that Larson spoke about arming the internal security forces rather than the army, which implied that ‘that the internal security forces were in the ‘safe’ hands of the ‘parliamentary majority’ opposing Hizballah’, while the army was dominated by forces close to Hizballah (Hafez, 2008: 204).

Sultan also argues that the US is seeking to change the structures of the Lebanese army and security services so that they better serve US interests and reduce the power of the Shi’a in Lebanese politics. This is visible by the fact that Shi’a make up only 10 percent of the new recruits to the Interior Ministry-run police force (Sultan, 2008: 114). Noe explains that the US has failed to provide the Lebanese army with the resources it needs to combat internal and external threats to Lebanese national security. He argues that properly equipping the Lebanese army would strengthen the Lebanese state and take away Hizballah’s justification for continuing to bear arms. Hizballah defends its arms on the basis that the state’s army and security forces are too weak to protect Lebanon from external attack, especially from Israel (Noe, 2008: 5).

The US has also been accused of contributing to the fragmentation of the Lebanese state by covertly funding Sunni extremist groups in north Lebanon. Hersh and Sultan argue that the US reached an agreement with Saudi Arabia that it should secretly fund Sunni insurgents in Lebanon to balance against the growing Shi’a influence in the country (Sultan, 2008: 90; Hersh, 2007). This led to the 2007 confrontations in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp between the Lebanese army and Sunni Islamist group Fatah al-Islam, which was being funded by Saudi money channelled
through Saad Hariri (Sultan, 2008: 92). Sultan argues that US support for militant groups in Lebanon such as Fatah al-Islam and for the weak government is destabilising Lebanon and could ultimately lead to civil conflict and the disintegration of Lebanon (Sultan, 2008: 115).

It has also been argued that the US’s treatment of Hizballah has damaged democracy in Lebanon. Salem and Ottaway explain that this includes failing to recognise the group, labelling it a terrorist organisation, imposing sanctions on it and trying to stop the Lebanese government from compromising with it (Salem and Ottaway, 2008). As a result opinion in Lebanon has become polarised, divisions between the government and Hizballah have deepened, Hizballah has grown more popular with those opposing the US and it has strengthened its ties with Iran and Syria (Haugbolle, 2006: 32-33; Tocci, 2007: 2). Tocci argues that Hizballah is a mass political movement that has been democratically elected by the people and enjoys extensive domestic support, and that it will not disappear under the pressure of international policies (Tocci, 2007: 1).

The weak state has also increased its vulnerability to supra-state identities, especially Arab nationalism and political Islam. They have played an important role in shaping and determining Lebanese foreign policy by creating an agenda that the government should follow, or should be seen to follow, even if it deviates from state interests. This impinges on Lebanon’s sovereignty by affecting its ability to make independent foreign policy decisions because, as Mubarak explains, neither Arab nationalism nor political Islam recognise state boundaries (Interview I, 2009; Salloukh, 2009a). Arab nationalism has pressurised regional states into pursuing foreign policies that conform to its ideology. This rejects Western domination, defends the Palestinian cause, promotes Arab unity, and defends Arab interests in international politics (Hinnebusch, 2003: 62). It has also prevented Lebanon from reaching a peace agreement with Israel, because it would go against its ideology.

Support for these ideologies is also split in Lebanon along identity lines. Pan-Arabism is mainly supported by the Muslims and it has alienated many Maronites because it sees Lebanon as part of Syria and not as a separate nation-state (Salibi, 2005: 28). Pan-Arabism’s decline left an identity vacuum that increased regional states
susceptibility to other supra-state identities or to sub-state identities. This was especially problematic in Lebanon due to the weakness of the Lebanese state and since the early 1980s political Islam has become increasingly influential amongst the Lebanese Shi’a due to deepening relations between Iran and Hizballah (Hinnebusch, 2003: 183; see Harik, 2007: 19).

The influence of external actors, combined with its size, geographical location, and fragmented nature makes Lebanon especially susceptible to regional events and conflicts (Hirst, 2010: 2; Khalaf, 2002: 320; Mubarek, 2003: 2). This is because stability in Lebanon depends on a stable regional political order. As a Soviet Ambassador once said, ‘when the bears fight, God help the rabbits’ (Interview C, 2008). Throughout its history Lebanon has been caught between regional and international conflicts and, through their relations with sub-state actors, external actors have controlled conditions of war and peace in Lebanon preventing the Lebanese government articulating a coherent foreign policy (Roberson, 1998: 2). It has been repeatedly used as a site for proxy wars between wider regional and international conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq conflict in the 1980s, and conflict between the US and Iran. This has turned the Lebanese people into surrogate victims of other people’s conflicts’ (Kerr, 2006: 19). It also allows external actors to destabilise Lebanon and its foreign policy and it has forced the Lebanese government into a position where it needs to formulate foreign policy to manage the regional context.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has had a major impact on Lebanon and it continues to have a destabilising impact on Lebanon’s political system, state structure and foreign policy. Different external players involved in the conflict, such as Israel, Syria and the Palestinians, have used Lebanon and their proxy actors in Lebanon as a means to pursue the conflict (El-Hoss, 2008: 149). Lebanon’s Arab identity prevented it maintaining a neutral position in the conflict, and its geographical location between Israel and Syria has meant that both countries have used it as a proxy site to confront each other. Iran has also gained a foothold in the conflict and a more regional role through its sponsorship of Hizballah. Lebanon became particularly involved in the conflict after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war when it was forced to take a side despite the
fact that it was too weak to formulate a strong foreign policy (El-Hoss, 2008: 149; Mubarek, 2003: 2).

During the 1967 war Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel and soon after Lebanon became the main base for the Palestinian resistance movement after they were expelled from Jordan in 1971. Syria encouraged the PLO to move to Lebanon and armed them so they could fight against Israel and help undo the results of the 1967 war, which included Syria regaining control of the Golan Heights (Salem, 2008c). Since then, the Palestinians have played a destabilising role in Lebanon by upsetting, or threatening to upset, the political balance between the Muslims and the Christians. They have also been involved in confrontations with the Israelis along the Lebanese-Israeli border and their confrontations with the Lebanese Christians contributed to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975.

Weakness within the Lebanese state also allowed the Palestinians to take a foothold in Lebanon (Mubarek, 2003: 4). This was seen with the 1969 Cairo Agreement when the Lebanese ceded jurisdiction over Palestinian camps in Lebanon to the Palestinians. In doing so, they eroded Lebanese sovereignty, independence and security and by 1975 the Palestinians in Lebanon were largely functioning as a state within a state (Mubarek, 2003: 5). Nowadays, Lebanon continues to act as a base for Palestinian guerrilla activity against Israel and Palestinian camps have been linked to extremist Islamist groups. Rockets launched into Israel since 2006 have been blamed on Palestinian militants in Lebanon (BBC News Online, 2009). Their presence in Lebanon shows the extent to which an external group has been able to influence internal Lebanese politics and how the external Arab-Israeli conflict became a domestic Lebanese issue, blurring the boundaries between foreign and domestic policies.

External actors have therefore influenced Lebanese foreign policy by: their relationships with internal Lebanese actors, which gives them leverage within the

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9 They were expelled following Black September in 1970.
10 The Cairo Agreement was repealed by the Lebanese government in 1987 (Hijazi, 1987).
Lebanese political system; the influence of supra-state identities; and by the impact of regional wars and conflicts.

3.5.3 Weak institutions

The confessional system is built around clientelist networks which has paralysed state institutions. In this system, government positions and state resources are allocated according to sect and the system is maintained by ‘clientalistic neopatrimonial networks of parochial ethnic politicians’ (Salloukh, 2010: 143). Lebanon institutions are weak because the confessional system distributes power between the different religious sects and emphasises power sharing rather than the building of effective institutions. The four main ministries, finance, defence, the interior and foreign are distributed between a Maronite, a Greek Orthodox, a Sunni and a Shi’a (Salem, 2008c). This means that no group can govern Lebanon alone and all appointments to the public sector are made according to sectarian allocation. This happens even though it prevents the effective functioning of government institutions due to the diverging foreign and domestic interests of different groups.

The lack of strong institutions in Lebanon has had a significant impact on its foreign policy and prevented it from acting as a sovereign state and monopolising the means of violence within its territory. A sovereign state being a state that can control its borders and its security, provide protection and manage political order (Salem, 2008b: 1). Lebanon is ranked thirty-four on The Fund for Peace’s ‘Failed States Index 2010’ which ranks 177 countries according to varies criteria to determine their level of failure. It classifies failed states as those that lack state cohesion and performance according to twelve social, political and economic indicators of state vulnerability (Fund for Peace, 2010). In 2008, the Fund for Peace classified three out of five of Lebanon’s core state institutions as weak. They were leadership, military and police, and it classified the other two, the judiciary and civil service, as moderate (Fund for Peace, 2008).

These divisions are visible in the foreign ministry. Salloukh explains that appointments to public sector posts, including within the foreign ministry, have become heavily politicised and based on clientelism rather than meritocracy. He also argues that foreign policy makers from a particular group or sect prioritise their own
needs over those of another group. For example, the Maronite president dominated foreign policy-making in the pre civil war period and a Sunni prime minister has dominated it since the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. Between 1944 and 2007 there have been 84 foreign ministers in Lebanon and the position has been dominated by the Greek Catholics while the Shi’a have been seriously underrepresented (see appendix 5) (Salloukh, 2008: 300, 481). In the last few years the foreign minister has been a Shi’ a. This means that foreign policy decisions are shaped by sectarian identities and made in the interests of individuals or groups rather than in the interest of the state.

This was seen in Siniora’s government, where the foreign minister, Fawzi Salloukh, was more involved in bureaucracy than foreign policy because his policy interests differed from those of the prime minister. Salloukh was from Amal, part of the March 8 Alliance, while Siniora was from the Future Party, the main party in the March 14 Alliance. The political position of Salloukh was outlined by a former politician and specialist in foreign affairs who said in 2008, ‘the power of Iran and Hizballah rings the foreign minister of Lebanon now, Mr Salloukh’ (Interview C, 2008). In consequence, Siniora did not trust Salloukh to conduct foreign policy and he did not liaise with him, choosing to conduct foreign policy himself. Salloukh rarely talked to Siniora who did not trust him to deal with foreign policy-making (Hirst, 2010: 317). While he was foreign minister Salloukh was often the last to know what was going on and that his role was largely about consular management, such as processing visas, and foreign policy protocol, such as receiving ambassadors\(^\text{11}\) (Salem, 2008c).

The weakness of the confessional state is also manifested in the army. During Syrian occupation the army was held together by a strong pro-Syrian orientation, but since Syria’s military withdrawal it has been weakened by a resurfacing of sectarian divisions (Salloukh, 2008: 294). Members of the army come from different communities and prioritise the interests of their community over those of the state. This means it is liable to fragment along sectarian lines if it is deployed during a conflict, as seen in the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War (Salamé, 1988: 357).

\(^{11}\) Fawzi Salloukh was Lebanese foreign minister from 2005-2009 in Fouad Siniora’s government.
The weak army has affected Lebanese foreign policy in three ways. First, it has prevented the government from pushing through its domestic agenda by restricting its ability to use force to control internal threats. This forces government members to bandwagon with external actors to support their domestic agendas and to resolve internal conflicts. For example, the 1958 civil war that was resolved with US and Egyptian assistance (Salloukh, 2008: 291-293). In more recent times, the Siniora Government has been accused of using the UN in its power struggle against Hizballah, for example, by invoking UNSCR 1559 and UNSCR 1701 to push for Hizballah’s disarmament (Salloukh, 2009: 25). Secondly, when it is confronted by an external threat the government is unable to defend Lebanon militarily and it has to resort to diplomatic means or use the influence of external patrons instead. Thirdly, the army’s failure to guarantee the domestic security of its citizens forces them to seek protection from their sectarian or confessional communities, who in turn seek support from external sponsors. As a result, the weak army contributes to further fragmentation of Lebanese state and society and of its foreign policy.

3.5.3 Prioritising economic interests

The confessional nature of the Lebanese state means that since its formation economic and business interests have been prioritised over political and social interests. As Najem argues, from the time of the National Pact until the start of the 1975 civil war the Lebanese state prioritised economic interests because political and cultural ones issues were so sensitive. Economic interests were seen to represent a common national interest that transcends internal divisions (Najem, 2005: 102, 117). From 1990 until 2005, while Syria controlled Lebanon, it dominated Lebanese political affairs including its foreign policy, but it left the Lebanese government free to make economic decisions.

Syria’s departure from Lebanon has left the US free to promote the Western free market economic model in Lebanon (Sensenig-Dabbous, 2006: 19). As a result, Lebanon has become heavily influenced by neoliberal economics. Businessmen and financial markets have had a growing influence over foreign policy decisions, which has led to the privatisation of Lebanese foreign policy, with foreign policy decisions being made in favour of business interests (Korany and Dessouki, 2008: 491). Salem
argues that some politicians are just businessmen who focus on economic issues rather than military issues such as building a large army (Salem, 2008c). This has contributed to a further weakening the army, rendering it less effective for pursuing foreign policy decisions.

Quilty argues that, by adopting neo-liberal values the Lebanese government has created a minimalist state in which political elites prioritise business interests over those of a more Keynesian regulating state. This is in line with the anti ‘big government’ stance adopted by neo-liberals in global economic markets. In this context Lebanon’s political class has favoured open borders over protectionism, promoted trade and banking over industry and agriculture, and open labour markets over trade union rights (Quilty, 2006: 81-82). The government has focused on Beirut and the Mount Lebanon region and favoured the interests of big business at the expense of other parts of the country that are generally more rural and less wealthy. By alienating groups in other parts of Lebanon the government has encouraged them to seek external alliances and develop independent foreign policies to bolster their domestic position.

Lebanon’s foreign policy has been shaped by its reliance on economic relations with other states. Its economy relies heavily on tourism revenues, Arab investors, and remittances that mainly come from Gulf States. Lebanese expatriates in the oil-rich Gulf countries sent $4.5 million in remittances back to Lebanon in 2003, while deposits in Lebanese banks from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE have maintained the stability of the Lebanese pound (Salloukh, 2008: 290). Salloukh explains that Lebanon’s economic reliance on Gulf States has influenced its foreign policy towards them. For example, Lebanon was the first Arab state to verbally object to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Furthermore, in 2003, Saudi Arabia threatened to economically penalise Lebanese expatriates living in Saudi Arabia after an anti-Hariri television channel in Lebanon broadcast an anti-Saudi program. Saudi Arabia also used its economic power to force Lebanon to change its pro-Egyptian orientation during the Arab Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s (Salloukh, 2008: 290-291).

Therefore, Lebanon’s confessional system, combined with external occupation of
Lebanon and the influence of global economic relations, has created a Lebanese foreign policy that prioritises economic issues over social and political ones

3.3 Conclusion

Using the literature on Lebanese foreign policy, this chapter looked at how the three different tiers of analysis, the system, state and sub-state, have impacted on Lebanese foreign policy. It showed us that, in the case of Lebanon, identity plays a very specific role in influencing the nature of the state. This is due to the particular configuration of multiple identities at the sub-state level, the manner in which they shape the state, for example by weakening its institutions, and the relationships they maintain with external regional actors. This has created multiple foreign policy agendas and has meant that official foreign policy tends to prioritise economic decisions over social and cultural ones. This exerts pressure on the state to respond to the regional system, or to formulate foreign policies that are not always dictated by the need to maximise the state’s power and security. This can also actively undermine the state’s ability to formulate, or even to implement, any consistent foreign policy at all.

This establishes the hypothesis that will be tested in the rest of this thesis that factors at the unit level (the state and sub-state levels) are more important than systemic levels of analysis for understanding Lebanese foreign policy. This means that Waltz’s neorealism and Wendt’s social constructivism, which argue that foreign policy is shaped by the dynamics of the international and regional systems, are unable to explain the dynamics of Lebanese foreign policy. Waltz relies on a set of claims about the universal nature of structural forces and the nature of the state which argues that, independent of who the foreign policy decision maker is, states will always make the same decisions when confronted with the same set of circumstances. Wendt also takes a state centric approach and sees the systemic level as the main factor affecting a state’s international political behaviour. However, the evidence from the literature suggests that factors at the unit-level rather than the structural level are more likely to determine the foreign policy choices of decisions-makers, especially because the state does not always hold sovereignty and sovereign authority over its territory and cannot always act in a rational, security maximising way.

The rest of the thesis will test this hypothesis against events during the 2006 war
between Hizballah and Israel. It will do this by looking at primary resources produced during the war by governments and international organisations and by looking at existing analysis of the war. This will be supported by data collected from interviews carried out in Lebanon, which give direct access to the thoughts of those involved in the decision-making process and how their actions were interpreted by analysts, journalists and academics. It aims to assess the impact of each of the levels of analysis on Lebanese foreign policy-making during the war.
Chapter 4: Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodology used in this thesis. The first section looks at the “meta-methodology”, how the thesis has been structured and constructed to test the hypothesis. The second section looks at the “micro-methodology”, which is how the fieldwork data was collected and interpreted using two qualitative methods, semi-structured interviews and the analysis of other forms of primary and secondary material.

4.1 ‘Meta-methodology’

This thesis tests, and ultimately supports, the hypothesis that factors at the unit level are more important than systemic levels of analysis for understanding Lebanese foreign policy. It uses the case study of the 2006 Hizballah-Israeli war, to show how sub-state identities fracture the state. It argues during the first part of the war they prevented the state from behaving like a rational, security maximising actor, as systemic theories assume, which affected how it reacted to systemic factors and formulated foreign policy.

The following chapters provide an overview of the war before looking at how the relative role played by structural dynamics, such as the regional balance of power, can be weighed against the role played by factors at the state and sub-state levels, especially sub-state identity. This approach uses the framework provided by the three tiers of analysis to identify the main issues affecting a state’s international political behaviour and to test the relevance of Waltz and Wendt’s systemic theories of international relations for understanding the international political behaviour of Lebanon.

The hypothesis could have been tested by looking at other events or time periods in Lebanon’s history however, the 2006 war was chosen because there has been limited research into the event. Furthermore, existential attacks on a state’s existence, such as the launch of a full-scale war against it by a neighbour, are an important test of its strength and resilience. During such an attack, most accounts of foreign policy derived from international relations theory would expect a state to be able to develop a coherent foreign policy based on mobilisation for resistance. Assessing the reasons
why the Lebanese state did not react like this during the war identifies the main factor or factors affecting the dynamics of Lebanese foreign policy.

This issue is addressed in the following chapters. Chapter 5 gives a brief narrative of events in Lebanon and the surrounding area before, during and after the war and provides the context for the subsequent analysis. Chapter 6 looks at how the structural dynamics of the region during the conflict impacted upon the foreign policy decisions of the Lebanese government and assesses the relevance of systemic analysis. It concludes that systemic analysis shows that the state lacked the capacity to carry out foreign policy but is unable to explain why. It argues that it is necessary to look at what was going on at the state and sub-state levels to understand why this happened, which is explored in the next chapter.

Chapter 7 looks at how the identity of different sub-state groups affected the behaviour of the state during the war. They were able to do this because the government was made up from a coalition of different sectarian identities that responded to the interests and dynamics of their sectarian group rather than those of the state. As a result, foreign policy fractured along identity lines. Furthermore, when the government was able to agree on a foreign policy direction it was unable to implement it because identity had fractured and weakened state institutions leaving the state too weak to do so. This meant that the foreign policy produced during the 2006 war was not the government’s foreign policy, but the foreign policy of diverse actors embedded within the Lebanese state and its institutions. It concludes that identity at the unit level is the main factor that affected the foreign policy choices made by different members of the Lebanese government during the 2006 war.

Chapter 8, concludes that the Lebanese state’s foreign policy is not always the result of responses to regional structural determinants but that it is also due to unit-level identity based considerations. It also concludes that, by ignoring dynamics at the unit-level, Waltz and Wendt’s systemic theories of international relations are unable to account for all the factors affecting the behaviour of Lebanon at the international level. This is because, in this case, unit-level factors prevented the state from acting as a rational, security maximising actor as these theories would assume. This shows a
need to recognise the plurality of factors that exist beyond systemic structures and affect a state’s international political behaviour.

4.2 ‘Micro-methodology’

This thesis uses qualitative and interpretative data gathered from interviews and the analysis of other primary and secondary sources. Data from interviews gave the research a strong Lebanese perspective. With the exception of one interview that took place in Syria, they were all carried out in Lebanon with individuals either from, or deeply embedded within Lebanese society. This was because time and financial restrictions prevented research from being carried out in other countries in the region, especially Israel and Syria. It was also due to difficulties finding people outside Lebanon willing to talk on the subject. For example, Israeli academics contacted in the UK were not responsive. However, the emphasis on Lebanese voices was also important because the thesis focuses on how different identities in Lebanon fracture the Lebanese state and restrict its decision-making ability capacity. Data from interviews was complemented with data gathered from other primary and secondary sources. Primary sources gave direct access to how people involved in the war interpreted events and to the decisions made by officials actors, such as government representatives and representatives of international organisations. Secondary material was important because it filled the gaps where it was difficult to access primary material.

Qualitative methods were used because, as Devine argues, they look at how and why decisions are made and they provide flexibility by looking at reality as something that has been socially constructed and evolves and changes. They are also useful because they try to gain a deeper understanding of human experiences and activities. This is because they focus on beliefs, values and concepts, to understand what is happening, rather than trying to make predictions about what will happen and establish universal truths in the same way as quantitative methods do (Devine, 2002: 201). They were important for my research because they offered insight into how those involved in understanding and analysing the war saw and interpreted events.

However, it is important to recognise that qualitative methods are not objective for several reasons. First, they often use a much smaller number of samples than
quantitative methods, which raises questions about their representativeness and reliability. However, this is compensated for by the fact that they allow more in-depth studies. Secondly, neutrality is compromised during the collection and analysis of data. For example, the way data is collected and interpreted reflects the values and life experiences of the researcher and needs to be taken into account (Devine, 2002: 205-206; Devine and Heath, 1999: 9-10). Devine argues that all empirical material whether quantitative or qualitative can be interpreted in different ways and there is no single interpretation which is the ‘truth’. This means that qualitative researchers should not look for objectivity in their research (Devine, 2002: 205-206). As Holstein and Gubrium argue, all knowledge is socially constructed and formed by the research process (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004: 141-142).

4.2.1 Semi-structured interviews

Interviews are one of the most commonly used methods for gathering data in social research. Qualitative or in-depth interviews are either structured or unstructured. They tend to be fairly long, which means they use a smaller sample of interviewees than more structured forms of data collection such as questionnaires. They are recorded and transcribed before the data is analysed and interpreted (Seale, 1998: 208; Devine, 2002: 198). Semi-structured interviews include more questions and provide a stronger framework than unstructured interviews. In unstructured interviews the interviewer usually asks one question and allows the interviewee to respond freely (Bryman, 2008: 438).

This research used semi-structured interviews because of their flexibility and because they produce detailed responses. They are also valuable because they give the interviewer some control over the direction of the interview by using open-ended questions and allowing the interviewer to ask spontaneous questions (Bryman, 2008: 438). They also let interviewees talk in greater depth about a topic and expand on issues that are important to them (Devine, 2002: 198; Seale, 1998: 205). This makes them, in effect, ‘guided conversations’ and makes them a useful way for understanding people’s interpretation of events (Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 9). Their format also avoids an unbalanced relationship developing between the interviewer and interviewee because the interviewee is able to ask questions and set the agenda. This allows interviewees to influence the direction of the interview and means they are not
simply answering the questions that the researcher considers important (Seale, 1998: 205). However, they contain enough structure to keep the interview focused on the research topic. Furthermore, because they are flexible and because they carry out the interviews themselves, the researcher is able to follow up on any important leads or points during the interview. It also allows them to ask spontaneous questions, clarify any points that are unclear and change the order or wording of the questions depending on the context and focus as the interview progresses. Additional interviews can also be carried out if necessary (Bryman, 2008: 438).

By allowing me to speak in-depth to individuals from a variety of different backgrounds and political perspectives, semi-structured interviews detailed data on my topic. This gave insight into the voices of different identity groups in Lebanon and an understanding of how sub-state identities shape Lebanese foreign policy decision-making. Most of the interviews were elite interviews, a form of semi-structured interview with an expert on the research topic. Burnham et al argue that this type of interview is important for research aimed at understanding decision-makers (Burnham et al., 2004: 206). They gave me insight into the decisions made by politicians and diplomats during the war. My research was also complemented by interviews with non-specialists as well data gleaned from primary and secondary sources, to ensure a broader understanding of the subject.

Before the interviews a list of questions were drawn up after extensive research into the topic. Questions became more perceptive as interviews progressed and with enhanced understanding of the situation in Lebanon. Therefore, interviews carried out towards the end of my research were more insightful than those at the beginning. Semi-structured interviews also allow for repeat interviewing and a number of people were interviewed several times as knowledge of the subject deepened. The questions were designed to directly address the research topic but at the same time to be open enough to allow flexibility. This gave interviewees the opportunity to expand on topics and give their own interpretation of events. They were also designed to be as neutral and unbiased as possible and to avoid leading questions that could influence the interviewee’s response (Bryman, 2008: 442).
A list of initial interviewees was drawn up from recommendations made to me by Lebanese friends in the UK, through contacts made while carrying out research at the Carnegie Centre for Middle East Studies in Beirut and through Internet searches. Interviewees also suggested further people to interview, which led to a snowball effect. This was a good way to establish further contacts with experts in the field but it also led to the potential for bias with contacts coming from the same social seams (Devine, 2002: 205). I tried to prevent this from happening by contacting with people with as wide a range of political views and positions as possible and by directly contacting individual groups and parties, for example, by going directly to Hizballah’s public relations office in Dahiyeh in Beirut’s southern suburbs and to Siniora’s offices in Saida.

Interviewees were selected based on various criteria. They included: individuals who had been involved in decision-making during the war either as part of the Lebanese government or political apparatus, or as part of an external diplomatic mission or international organisation such as the UN; academics and political commentators who were based either at a university or within a think-tank setting and who had analysed or sought to understand the dynamics of the 2006 war within an academic context; members of the media who were in Lebanon during the war and who had experienced events as they unfolded; other experts in Lebanese affairs. The in-depth nature and length of the interviews meant that only a small sample of people was taken. There were many more academics, journalists and political representatives that could have been contacted, both in Lebanon and overseas, which would have provided greater depth to my research.

Potential interviewees were contacted either by email or telephone. They were told the topic and purpose of the research and asked if they were prepared to take part. Most people were willing to help, although on occasions several follow-up calls or emails were needed to arrange the interview. Sometimes access was difficult, especially with high-level officials such as Siniora, who was unavailable for interview despite several attempts being made in person, by email and by telephone. It was also difficult to arrange an interview with a Hizballah representative. After an interview was granted further research was carried out into the interviewee either through word
of mouth or by looking for further information in journals, books or on the Internet. This allowed interview questions to be tailored to their specialism. For example, a foreign diplomat would be asked questions relating to the role their country played in affecting events during the war or a member of UNIFIL would be asked about the UN’s role.

Interviewees were generally very cooperative and keen to voice their opinions. Their responses were guided by the structure of the interview but allowed them to expand on issues that were not directly addressed by the interview questions. This raised important additional points, however, at times the topic of the interviewed waived and it could be difficult to bring the interview back to the subject under discussion. Most interviews were recorded except where the interviewee objected, and general information was taken down such as name, occupation and gender (Bryman, 2008: 442). Recording the interviews allowed interpretation not just of what people said but of how they said it. It prevented any distraction caused by taking notes (Bryman, 2008: 451). It also provided a precise record of what was said, which helped avoid ambiguity and gave something to refer back to at a later date if further clarification was needed.

During the interview I tried to be flexible and responsive and to minimise my impact on the quality and type of information gathered. I followed up on interesting issues, clarified points that were unclear and changed the order of the questions, or omitted questions where necessary. I tried to minimise my impact on the interview by: remaining neutral and recognising both sides of the argument to minimise my impact on the interviewee’s response; taking on a ‘non-directive role’ and allowing the interviewee to describe things in their own words and expand on important issues (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004: 144; Seale, 1998: 207). I also gave interviewees time to think so they could give more insightful responses (Jones, 2005: 208). I also answered interviewee’s questions and was honest about the purpose of my research and possible uses of their findings, to ensure the whole process was as clear and transparent as possible (Oakley, 1981: 41).

Interviews usually took place in offices but some were carried out in cafes depending
on the interviewee’s preference. Interviews that took place in cafes were often affected by background noise, which made it difficult to transcribe them. If the interviewee did not have enough time to meet in person or was not in Lebanon telephone interviews took place instead. They produced similar data as to face-to-face interviews but it was difficult to build up the same rapport with the interviewee or to understand their responses by reading their body language and reactions to questions (Bryman, 2008: 457).

Interviews were transcribed and analysed to identify relevant themes and points of interests. Efforts were made to transcribe precisely what was said including pauses, coughs, and ‘umm’s’ and ‘ahh’s’, because they can affect the meaning of what was said. Interviews were then interpreted and possible sources of bias or misrepresentation were identified to identify how the neutrality of the data might have been compromised. This included recognising how the interviewer and interviewee constructed the knowledge produced and understanding that the data generated offers only one perspective of events and one vision of the world (Seale, 1998: 203-209). For example, the interviewer will have influenced the interviewee’s response and caused them to reply in a particular way, for example by offering responses to ‘please or impress’ the researcher (Devine, 2002: 206). Several issues of representativeness and reliability arose during my research:

1. My position as a foreign female student will have affected the way I was treated and the responses generated. Interviewees may have seen me as new to Lebanese politics and given predictable responses not expecting me to have enough understanding of events to be able to see through their bias or because they wanted to influence my opinion.

2. A number of interviewees were cautious about the political implications of what they were saying. This meant, for example, that they did not want to be named or they did not want to open up on certain issues, while others gave more information when the conversation was not being recorded. This limited the quality of the data collected but heightened my awareness of sensitive issues.

3. Interviews took place in English because I had insufficient language skills to carry them out in either Arabic of French. This did not appear to be a problem
as the main figures involved in the political decision-making process, as well as academics and journalists were all fluent in English, often as natives. However, it meant I was unable to approach anyone who only spoke in Arabic or French, who may have been able to give me a different perspective on events. Furthermore, carrying out the interviews in Arabic may have led to richer responses and greater rapport as the interviewee may have seen me as someone who was more involved in events, rather than simply an outsider. However, I triangulated data to ensure that nothing crucial was missing by carrying out interviews with a wide range of academic analysts and decision-makers.

4.2.2 Analysis of primary and secondary material

Data gathered from interviews was supported by data gathered from other primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included official documents produced by different governments and international organisations. These included official policy documents, statements and accounts of ministerial meetings produced during the war by the Lebanese, Israeli and US governments and by international organisations and forums such as the UN and the G8. The secondary discourses were written by academics, journalists and policymakers and largely focused at Lebanese foreign policy and events during the war. They included media sources, translated by BBC Monitoring where necessary, from Lebanon, Israel, France, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Syria and the UK and the US. Sources included AFP, Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, Al Manar, AP, BBC News Online, Daily Star, Haaretz, New York Times, Reuters, Ya Libnan, Ynet News.

Discourses were selected according to quality rather than the quantity and their relevance to the research question (Tonkiss, 1998: 253). During their analysis I tried to recognise issues of impartiality and bias and to understand how different values had been embedded within them. This included recognising that they had been written in a specific social context and showed a particular view of reality by, for example, emphasising a particular argument or point of view or using a particular type of language (Gill, 2000: 174-176). I focused on understanding how they had been written to create and reproduce social meanings, identities and ideas. This included understanding which ideas have been taken for granted and which accounts or perspectives have been included and excluded (Tonkiss, 1998: 255-258). For
example, articles in the media were likely to reflect the political bias of its author or editor, while those produced by a government or international organisations to represent a particular political position. The meaning of translated documents can be compromised due to misinterpretation, errors in translation, the political slant of the translator or editor, or the loss of nuances specific to the original language.

It was also difficult to access certain discourses, for example those produced by governments and organisations such as Syria, Iran, the Arab League and Hizballah. This was because they were not available in the public domain or because they had not been translated from Arabic. It was easier to access other discourses, such as those produced by the Lebanese government or by the UN because they had originally been written in English, and were more likely to have been released into the public domain. This creates an imbalance in my research because it analyses more data produced by the members of the US-led alliance, especially the UN, and US, Israeli and Lebanese government, than by those of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. However, I tried to address this by triangulating my findings and talking to people from as wide a variety of backgrounds as possible.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter provides an outline of the methodology used to assess whether unit levels of analysis are more important than systemic levels of analysis for understanding Lebanese foreign policy in the context of the 2006 war. This question is addressed in the following chapters using data gathered from unstructured interviews and primary and secondary sources. Despite certain limitations relating to bias and representation this data produced some rich data that enabled an in-depth analysis of the research question. Furthermore, I made every effort to verify the credibility of the data and my analysis of it by double-checking the information and testing it by speaking to prominent experts in the field. The following chapters use this data to produce an outline of events and to look at how factors at the systemic, state and sub-state levels affected foreign policy-making decision-making during the war.
Chapter 5: Regional and domestic implications of the 2006 war

This chapter gives a brief chronology of the main events that took place before, during and after the war before looking at the impact it had on its main actors, on Lebanon and on the wider region. This provides the context for testing the hypothesis in chapters 7 and 8.

The 2006 Lebanon war is also known as ‘The 2006 Israeli-Hizballah War’ and ‘The Sixth [Arab-Israeli] War’. In Lebanon it is called ‘The July War’ and in Israel it is known as ‘The Second Lebanon War’. It was not a traditional war in the sense of a war between two states, neither was it a guerrilla war defined as ‘guerrilla resistance to a state’s government or military within the state’s territory’ (Tilley, 2006: 160). It was, in effect, an asymmetric war between Israel and Hizballah\textsuperscript{12} in which a sub-state actor was confronted by a state with one of the strongest armies in the world\textsuperscript{13}.

5.1 History of Israeli-Lebanese border disputes

Disagreements have been taking place over what now constitutes the Israeli-Lebanese border since the end of the Ottoman Empire. Zionist interest in south Lebanon can be traced back to 1918, before either the Israeli or Lebanese states were established. At this time it was suggested that the borders of a new Israeli state should extend ‘from the north Litani River in Lebanon up to the Banias River in Syria’ (Sultan, 2008: 73). At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Zionist leaders wanted the borders of the new state to include all the territories up to and including the Litani River (Chomsky, 1980: 3). Israel was interested in the area for historical and strategic reasons. Hirst

\textsuperscript{12} During the war Hizballah were joined by non-Shi’a Lebanese who were fighting alongside them, including twelve communists who were killed in the fighting (Focus Web, 2006: 7). As Exum explains many of the people fighting and defending villages such as Bint Jbeil and Maroun al-Ras were not regular Hizballah fighters but just ordinary people living in the area and fighting to defend their country and their land (Exum, 2006: 9). Less-religious Shi’a and members of other religious and political groups supported Hizballah because it had taken on the role of the state in south Lebanon by providing social services and defending Lebanese sovereignty.

\textsuperscript{13} Asymmetric war ‘is warfare conducted between parties of unequal strength. The weaker party seeks to neutralise its opponent’s strengths, including its technological superiority, by exploiting its weaknesses. One strategy of asymmetric warfare is guerrilla warfare’ (Mingst, 2008: 223).
explains that, historically, Israel believed that two Jewish tribes had lived in the area in ancient times leading to claims that Israel’s first colony came from Sidon or Saida, which is now located in south Lebanon. Strategically, it wanted a border further north because it would have improved the defensive capabilities and security interests of the future Israeli state and given it access to the Litani River (Hirst, 2010: 22-23). Sultan argues that, nowadays, Israel is still interested in the area due to its water resources. This is because the river offers a vital source of water for north Israel, which Israel needs to continue growing. As a result, it has been trying to gain access to the waters of the Litani for decades, and it invaded Lebanon in 1949, 1958 and 1978 to secure access to the Litani River (Sultan, 2008: 79-80).

Disputes along the border intensified in the late 1960s when cross-border clashes took place between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war (Hirst, 2010: 92). Tensions were heightened by the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which gave the PLO authority over Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and paved the way for the PLO to establish an unofficial ‘state within a state’ in Lebanon. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon greatly increased after Black September in 1970 when King Hussein expelled Palestinian militants on the grounds that they were conspiring against his regime. After this the PLO and thousands of Palestinian fighters moved to Lebanon. The PLO then began using south Lebanon as a base from which to carry out attacks against Israel. This threatened the security of northern Israel and provoked Israel to retaliate. It caused the Israelis to invade south Lebanon in 1978 in Operation Litani in the hope of destroying PLO guerrillas who were attacking northern Israel. As a result, the UN adopted UNSCRs 425 and 426 in March 1978, which sought to establish peace and security in south Lebanon and called for Israel to withdraw and for the Lebanese government to establish control over all its territory. They also established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to ensure peace and stability in the area and it has remained in south Lebanon ever since.

However, Israel failed to remove the PLO from south Lebanon in 1978 and their existence in the area continued to pose a threat to the security of northern Israel. In order to address this fact, despite the fact that the border was stable at the time, the
Israelis invaded Lebanon again in 1982 in Operation Peace for Galilee. After advancing as far as Beirut, they succeeded in forcing PLO troops to leave Lebanon. Israel then supported Bashir Gemayel’s bid for president of Lebanon. They hoped that his leadership would give Lebanon a pro-Israeli government, allow a Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement to be reached and secure the stability of its northern border. Bashir Gemayel was a senior member of the Phalange party and founder of the Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia that Israel had been supporting during the civil war to counteract Palestinian and Syrian influence in Lebanon. He was elected president of Lebanon on 23 August 1982 but assassinated nine days later by a bomb at the Phalange headquarters in Beirut. His brother, Amine Gemayel, replaced him as president however his government was too weak to ensure the security of Israel’s northern border and cross-border confrontations continued.

The Israelis occupied south Lebanon from 1982 until 2000 with the help of their Lebanese proxy, a Christian militia called the South Lebanese Army (SLA). Hizballah was formed in 1982 with Iranian support in reaction to the Israeli occupation. History repeated itself and, like the PLO before, Hizballah began launching rockets into northern Israel. During this period two major Israeli attacks took place on south Lebanon in 1993 and in 1996. Israel argued that they were to stop Hizballah’s attacks on northern Israel. However, Hirst gives a different explanation. He argues that Hizballah’s rockets rarely killed anyone in north Israel and that the real reason the Israelis reacted in this way was because Hizballah had killed too many Israeli soldiers in occupied south Lebanon. They also hoped that their attacks would turn the Lebanese people against Hizballah and facilitate an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement (Hirst, 2010: 249). In 2000, the Israeli government decided to withdraw from south Lebanon in the face of public protests over the high number of Israeli military casualties incurred in Israeli-occupied south Lebanon. On 16 June 2000, the UNSC concluded that Israel had fully withdrawn from Lebanese territory in accordance with UNSCR 425. However, the Lebanese government and Hizballah argue that Israel continues to occupy Lebanese territory in the Shebaa Farms, Ghajar village and Kfar Shouba Hills, which are located on the border between Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
Therefore, the history of Lebanese-Israeli border disputes has been defined by a combination of factors. These are: the impact of the Palestinian refugee problem, Hizballah and Palestinian forces destabilising the Israeli-Lebanese border, Israel’s need to secure its border and maximise its defensive capabilities, Israel’s desire to gain access to the waters of the Litani River and to secure access to area which it considers historically part of its history. In seeking to achieve these goals it has arguably become an existential threat to Lebanon, by invading, occupying and attacking Lebanese territory and continuing to threaten stability in Lebanon from across the border.

5.2 The Middle East in 2006: Lebanon in the regional context

At the time of the 2006 war the region was split up into two different alliances, the US-led alliance and the Syria-Iranian-led alliance, in what has commonly been called a new Arab Cold war (Young, 2009). Malcolm Kerr highlighted the first fracturing of the regional system into different alliances when he spoke about an Arab Cold War, referring to the conflict waged between Arab states in the 1950s and 1960s. At this time the region was divided between Arab nationalist states and traditional monarchies (Kerr, 1971). Nowadays, the two alliances reflect the need for weaker states and non-state actors to bandwagon with stronger ones to strengthen their regional position. Conflict between these two alliances reflects a common goal, with each one trying to alter or change the current regional balance of power in its favour. Confrontation between them also draws in non-Arab powers such as Iran, Israel and the US.

The Syrian-Iranian alliance is dominated by Shi’a Iran but it combines sectarian groups by drawing in non-state actors such as Shi’a Hizballah, Sunni Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood. Iran and Syria have maintained strong relations since 1979 when they allied together out of a common fear of Saddam Hussein after he took power in Iraq in July 1979 (Hirst, 2010: 180-181; Moubayed, 2006). Furthermore, since the 1990-1991 Gulf War weakened Iraq, Iran has been free to develop a regional role proportional to its size, which places it in confrontation with Israel, the other major regional power (Hirst, 2010: 254). This alliance aims to alter the regional balance of power in its favour and to limit the regional influence of the US, Israel and their allies and prevent them from creating a new regional order. Hirst
argues that Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, believes that the US is the only barrier preventing Iran from achieving regional supremacy (Hirst, 2010: 322).

The second alliance is led by the US and includes Israel, the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states, which are Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and most of the Gulf States. These actors are united in their fear of Iran and Syria’s regional ambitions and they are concerned about their relations with Hizballah and Hamas and other non-state regional actors. Hirst explains that the members of this alliance are so diverse that they are only united in their opposition to the Iranian-Syrian-led alliance. He explains that citizens of the ‘moderate’ Arab states, not the regimes, dislike the US and Israel as much as the members of the opposing alliance (Hirst, 2010: 277). Fears of Iran’s regional assertiveness were expressed at a US Senate Hearing on 19 September 2006, when its chairman, Richard Lugar, spoke about Iran’s growing regional assertiveness and the threat its nuclear weapons programme posed to the regional order (United States Senate, 2006).

Members of this alliance are particularly concerned about Iran’s nuclear weapons because a nuclear-armed Iran would threaten Israel’s status as the only nuclear power in the region and heighten fears over regional nuclear proliferation14 (Mossaad, 2008: 259; Tilley, 2006: 157). This was seen on 31 July 2006 when Israeli vice Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, expressed a fear that Iran was trying to acquire nuclear capacity and argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would encourage regional and international nuclear proliferation (Peres, 2006). A nuclear Iran would also be able to supply nuclear capabilities to its supporters in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine that could be used against the interests of the US and its allies in the region. This issue was raised at a US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 28 October 2003 when the chairman spoke about Iran’s support for Hizballah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. He said, ‘Iran continues to pose a serious regional and global security threat through its active support for terrorism and its continued efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty’

14 Israel has not officially admitted it possesses nuclear weapons.
This alliance is fuelled by the US’s agenda for a new Middle East regional order that was reinforced during George W. Bush’s administration (2001-2009). It aims to establish a new regional order under US and Israeli control that restricts the ambitions of the Iranian-Syrian led alliance. The hope was that this new US sponsored regional order would endorse US values of democracy and human rights and adopt an economic system that would support Israel’s regional objectives (Mossaad, 2008: 259; El-Khadem, 2008: 9). Focus Web argues that, as part of its regional aims, the US wants to impose unrestrained neo-liberal economic reforms on the region, as instructed by the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO (Focus Web, 2006: 7).

The US hopes to achieve its goals by creating a coalition of pro-US Sunni Arab states or regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, which would pressurise Iran and Syria into controlling Hizballah (Hersh, 2006: 4). Sultan argues that as part of its plan for a new Middle East the US has gone about recruiting ‘a cadre of docile Arab rulers, willing to acquiesce to the West yet authoritarian enough to control their own people’. These include King Abdullah of Jordan, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Fouad Siniora in Lebanon and Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority have been asked to join this ‘special club’ (Sultan, 2008: 112). Successfully implementing this regional order means removing the main points of resistance to US and Israeli regional ambitions, which are Hizballah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Iran’s nuclear programme, and the Syrian and Iranian regimes (Gendzier, 2006: 183; Nafaa, 2008: 284).

However, a Lebanese academic argues that actors in this alliance do not always have the same vision as the US and that Israel and the US have different regional objectives. For example, Washington would like to see a peace deal between Israel and Syria with the Golan Heights returned to Syria but the Israelis have no interest in giving up this land (Interview B, 2009). Israel does not want to give up the Golan Heights because of their strategic value and because they are an important regional source of water (BBC News Online, 2010). Therefore, although they share the same overall goal of creating a new regional order system with Israel as its hegemon, they
have different visions of how this should be achieved.

‘Moderate’ Arab regimes and members of the US-led alliance have also expressed concerns about a growing regional Sunni-Shi’a divide. They are concerned that Iran is exploiting and supporting Shi’a identities in Iraq and supporting Shi’a and non-Shi’a movements in other parts of the region, such as Hizballah and Hamas (Choucair 2006:13; Noe 2008:1; Hirst 2010:325). In 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan described an emerging ‘crescent of Shi’a movements in the region stretching from the shores of the Gulf, via Iraq and Syria, to a Hizballah dominated Lebanon’. This idea was strengthened by growing sectarian violence in Iraq, especially after the Shi’a won the 2005 parliamentary elections displacing Iraq’s Sunni minority (Hirst, 2010: 320).

However, the idea of a regional Sunni-Shi’a divide has been challenged. Western and so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states have been criticised for using it as a way to further their security interests and distract attention away from their own realist ambitions (Noe, 2008: 1). There is no clear division in the region between the Sunni and the Shi’a, and Shi’a Iran is also allied with a majority Sunni Syria, Sunni Hamas, and other Sunni groups, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Professor Menashri of Tel Aviv University argues that, although the strength of Shi’a in some parts of the region has grown, there is no alliance between them. He argues that they come from different schools of thought and that the Shi’a in Iran and the Shi’a in Iraq follow different Shi’a spiritual leaders, with those in Iran following Khomeini and those in Iraq following Sistani (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 257). Emphasising a division between the Sunni and Shi’a has also been used as a political tool to disable Hizballah and its regional allies. As Noe explains, it meant that Hizballah was not seen as ‘a rationally calculating national liberation movement that could be contained over time; instead it was a radically religious cult obedient to external dictates and irrational aims’ (Noe, 2008: 1).

At the time of the 2006 war, regional divisions between the US-led alliance and the Iranian-Syrian led alliance were manifested in Lebanon through their Lebanese proxies, the March 14 and the March 8 alliances, as discussed earlier. Lebanon had become an important player in the struggle for control of the region, because of its
weak state, which has allowed both sides to ally with Lebanese proxies and confront each other in Lebanon through them. This shows that Lebanon continues to be used as a site for broader regional and international conflicts.

Iran and Syria’s alliance with the March 8 coalition has allowed them to pursue their regional objectives within the Lebanese context. Despite sharing common goals, Syria and Iran have their own agendas in Lebanon that they have to be careful about pursuing without compromising those of the other. Hirst argues that, Iran is interested in the full-scale ‘Islamicisation’ of Lebanon or all-out visionary jihad, while Syria wants control over Lebanon, which is an important bargaining tool with Israel for the return of the Golan Heights (Hirst, 2010: 181-182).

Hizballah is important because it acts as a regional agent for the Syrian-Iranian alliance. At the same Syrian and Iranian support has allowed Hizballah to grow into a strong domestic actor and it has strengthened the position of the Shi’a in south Lebanon, a community that has been long neglected by the Lebanese government. Both countries give considerable military and political support to Hizballah, allowing it to establish and maintain itself as a ‘state within a state’ and grow into the strongest armed group in Lebanon. For example, Samii argues that Hizballah would not exist as it is if it was not for its strong military, financial, ideological and political links with Iran and Syria (Samii, 2008: 32-33). This has helped fragment Lebanese foreign policy and given Syria and Iran significant influence over events in Lebanon.

Iran supports Hizballah spiritually, militarily and financially and Sultan argues that Hizballah remains loyal to Shi’a clerics in Iran (Sultan, 2008: 9). Iran has supported Hizballah for over twenty-five years and it receives more support from Iran than any other internal Lebanese actor is given by its external proxy (Kerr, 2006: 18). Estimates suggest that Iran gives Hizballah at least $100 million per annum, however figures are difficult to verify due to the lack of accurate data (Mossaad, 2008: 257). Goksel argues that although the Shi’a diaspora, especially in West Africa, South America and the US, provide financial support for Hizballah’s humanitarian services, most of Hizballah’s military spending comes from Iran (Goksel, 2009: 8). Choucair argues that such a high level of financial support means that Iran is not only
supporting Hizballah for ideological reasons but that it is also seeking to increase its regional influence (Choucair, 2006: 13).

Hizballah is a key regional ally for Iran for two main reasons. It acts as a defensive deterrent in case of a US or Israeli strike on Iran because of its ability to strike northern Israel, and it enables Iran to extend its regional role by giving it a frontline in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Tilley, 2006: 158; Parsi, 2007: 219; Salem, 2008c). Having a leading role in this conflict is important for Iran because it enables it to extend its regional influence and places it at the forefront of any conflict with Israel and by default with the US (Salloukh, 2008: 308). It also allows Iran to take a leading role in the mobilisation of Islamic political movements in the region and to intervene in Arab issues such as the Palestinian cause. This is because Hizballah is both Shi’a and Arab, while Iran is not Arab making it difficult for it to get involved in Arab matters. Involvement in the Palestinian cause also enhances Iran’s regional role because it is the only regional issue that unites radical Sunni and Shi’a Islamists. Hirst explains that before 2006 ‘Hizballah was not only making itself a bridge between Shiism and Sunnism, Iran and the Arabs, but [it was] the only external force engaged in active combat on the Palestinians’ behalf. This allowed it to project itself as the spearhead of the whole Arab/Muslim struggle against the historic Zionist foe’ (Hirst, 2010: 273).

Syria has also supported Hizballah in several ways. During its occupation of Lebanon it allowed Hizballah to retain its arms, which enabled it to develop its own security apparatus outside the Lebanese state and to control parts of Beirut’s southern suburbs which became off-limits to the state (Salloukh, 2009: 19). It has also allowed and continues to allow arms from Iran to be transferred to Hizballah across the Lebanese-Syrian border. If these arms transfers stopped it would substantially weaken Hizballah’s position and strengthen the power of the Lebanese state (Salem, 2008: 6). Salloukh describes the relationship between Hizballah and Syria as being like ‘the relationship between an individual who needs a blood transplant everyday and there’s only one clinic and that clinic is Syria. Whether you like it or not you have to be on good terms with Syria […]. Where would you get your arms from if not from Syria? […] The arteries of Hizballah have to pass by Syria’ (Salloukh, 2009a).
Hizballah is important to Syria for several reasons. It allows Syria to retain its influence in Lebanon which gives Syria greater leverage in negotiations with Israel over the Golan Heights by allowing it to carry on an indirect war against Israel (Salem, 2008b: 1). It also sustains Syria’s regional role by upholding its support for the Palestinian cause (Interview B, 2009). Furthermore, it helps Syrian efforts to contain Israeli and US influence in Lebanon and it prevents a separate Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement from taking place without Syria’s consent (Salem 1994:78; Hinnebusch 1998:140; Mubarek 2003:12; Choucair 2006a:13).

In contrast, the US-led alliance is allied to the March 14 alliance and aims to disable Hizballah in order to curb the regional influence of Iran and Syria. It wants the March 14-led Lebanese government to reassert sovereign authority over its territory and monopoly over the means of violence. It sees Hizballah as one of Iran’s regional sources of power and believes that Iran is a destabilising regional influence. During a hearing at the US Senate on 29 September 2006 the Chairman, Richard Lugar, argued that Iran ‘trains, finances, and equips Hizballah, the state within a state in Lebanon’. He also argued that limiting Hizballah’s arms would curb Iran’s regional influence (United States Senate, 2006). Israeli Foreign Ministry Deputy DG Gideon Meir also said ‘Syria and Iran support these groups [Hamas and Hizballah], not only because they support their ideology, but also because they provide Damascus and Tehran with a tool to strengthen the influence of their own regimes and to divert attention from other issues [such as Iran’s nuclear weapons] which have exposed them lately to international pressure’ (Meir, 2006). Furthermore, disabling Hizballah would enable the US or Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities without fearing a retaliatory attack by Hizballah on northern Israel.

The US is also interested in adding Lebanon to its list of ‘moderate’ Arab states. This is important because the US sees Lebanon as the only successful example of its attempts to democratise the Middle East after the failure of its democratisation policies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US views the Lebanese government as one of the ‘crown jewels of Middle East democracy’ (Hersh, 2006), and ‘one of the few successes in the Bush administration’s Middle East policy’ (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007: 307). This was apparent in US resolution 869, submitted to the US House of
Representatives on 14 June 2006, which spoke about the ‘incipient expansion of democratic rights’ in Lebanon in the context of the US War on Terror. It said that, ‘the United States and our allies have achieved momentous victories through […] the peaceful resolution of Lebanon’s Cedar revolution, which freed its people from Syrian oppression’ (US House of Representatives, 2006).

So-called ‘moderate’ Arab Sunni states also want Hizballah to be disarmed and restrictions placed on Iran and Syria’s regional influence. Out of these states, Saudi Arabia has the most influence in Lebanon where it holds extensive business interests, and it supports the Lebanese Sunni community to counterbalance the impact of Iran and Syria (Salem, 2008a: 22). Hirst argues that these states are more afraid of Hizballah than Israel because of Hizballah’s popularity amongst the Arab people. This is because it has a ‘potentially explosive impact on their ‘street’ and the possibility to create instability by inciting an all-out ‘militant and armed jihad’ against Israel and its occupation of Palestinian land (Hirst, 2010: 274). They are also concerned that Iran and regional Shi’a movements could destabilise their Shi’a populations and cause internal instability. This is a particular concern for Saudi Arabia due to its large Shi’a population, which has the potential to be destabilised by regional forces and rise up against the Saudi regime (Salem, 2008c). Arab states in the Gulf region also fear Iran because of its military strength and potential to develop nuclear weapon that would enable it to dominate the Gulf region (Khalaji, 2008; Salem, 2008c). US government documents released by Wikileaks in November 2010 revealed that Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries have been privately urging the US to strike Iran (Leigh, 2010; Andoni, 2010).

Therefore, regional divisions between these two alliances, centred on Hizballah, made Lebanon ripe for a new conflict.

5.3 Narrative of the conflict
The war was triggered by events that took place on 12 July when Hizballah crossed the border between Israel and Lebanon, killing three Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two more in an operation it called ‘True Promise’ (Hirst, 2010: 328-329). Five more Israeli soldiers were killed in a rescue attempt. Israel responded to the kidnapping by launching a heavy aerial bombardment of Lebanon, which it said was in retaliation for
Hizballah’s attack and to secure the release of the kidnapped soldiers. Israel argued that it would only stop its attacks after the unconditional return of two kidnapped soldiers and once Hizballah had withdrawn to the area north of the Litani River.

Despite the provocative nature of the kidnapping Hizballah argued that it had not expected Israel to retaliate in such a way (Exum, 2006: 2). It had carried out similar attacks across the border in the past and Israel’s response had been restrained and limited to the border area. However, unlike before Hizballah’s attack had not taken place in Shebaa Farms, a disputed area, but across an internationally recognised border making it, as Goksel says, a ‘casus belli’ (Goksel, 2009: 6). After the war Nasrallah said that the most he thought Israel would do would be to ‘just retaliate a bit, bomb a couple of targets and that would be the end of it’ (Shadid, 2006). Goksel also believes that Hizballah had expected Israel to just shell a few places as they had done after Hizballah had kidnapped three soldiers in the Shebaa Farms area in 2000 (Goksel, 2009: 6).

In the first few days of the war Israel imposed a complete land, sea and air blockade on Lebanon and bombed significant parts of its infrastructure. It bombed Beirut’s international airport, the buildings of Hizballah-run Al-Manar TV, and Shi’a civilian areas in south Lebanon and in Beirut’s southern suburbs. It did this in the hope of destroying Hizballah’s residences and offices and of undermining domestic support for the party. It then started small ground attacks into south Lebanon and dropped leaflets across the area warning the population to avoid areas where Hizballah is based in an attempt to undermine support for Hizballah. Hizballah responded by launching rockets into northern Israel, hitting as far as Haifa. Israel’s actions created a wave of refugees fleeing Beirut’s southern suburbs, while Hizballah’s attacks caused panic in northern Israel. On 14 July, Hizballah launched an anti-ship missile against the Israeli boat INS Hanit that was anchored just offshore from Beirut, killing four members of its crew (Harel, 2006). In the first few days of the war Nasrallah offered to stop bombing Israel if it stopped its assault on Lebanon, but this did not happen (Sultan, 2008: 30).

On 15 July, international diplomatic efforts began to try to resolve the conflict when
the UN special delegation to Israel and Lebanon arrived in the region (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 112). However, despite domestic pressure from its own National Security Council, Olmert’s government did not stop the attacks on Lebanon. It was reassured by the US’s support, which was eager to see Hizballah dismantled as long as civilian casualties were contained, and by the international community’s condemnation of Hizballah and Hamas at the G8 summit in St Petersburg from 15-17 July (G8 Russia, 2006).

In common with the demands of much of the international community, Olmert continued to call for several things before he would suspend military action. On 17 July, he demanded the return of the kidnapped soldiers, a complete ceasefire, the deployment of the Lebanese army in south Lebanon, the removal of Hizballah from the area, and fulfilment of UNSCR 1559 (Olmert, 2006a). His failure to compromise on these issues damaged any chances of achieving a quick resolution to the conflict (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 107-108). Despite initial accusations against the Lebanese government Olmert stopped blaming it for the attack on 17 July when he recognised that it took place ‘without the consent of the Lebanese government and without the assistance of its military’ (Olmert, 2006a).

By 16 July, the death toll had reached 160 in Lebanon and 24 in Israel (Sultan, 2008: 36; Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 112). Anti-war protest grew in Israel, and on July 17, Haaretz columnist Gideon Levy wrote, ‘Regrettably, the Israel Defence Force once again looks like the neighbourhood bully. A soldier was abducted in Gaza? All of Gaza will pay. Eight soldiers are killed and two abducted to Lebanon? All of Lebanon will pay. One and only one language is spoken by Israel, the language of force’ (Head, 2006).

The next day Livni said that Israel had begun seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict that would take place ‘in parallel to the military operations’ (Livni, 2006a). Israel made it clear that a diplomatic solution was needed before a ceasefire could take place. It said that diplomatic negotiations to end the fighting needed to be based on the principles outlined by the G8. These were the immediate and unconditional release of the abducted soldiers and the implementation of UNSCR 1559 (Israeli
Mini
stry of Foreign Affairs, 2006g). It also said that it wanted to secure the release of the kidnapped Israeli soldiers before seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006h).

On 19 July, fighting intensified when the Battle of Maroun al-Ras broke out in a small village that is an important Hizballah stronghold in southern Lebanon near the Israeli border. After several days of intense fighting the battle ended and Israel argued that it had been victorious, but Hizballah argued that Israel never fully took the village (Crooke and Perry, 2006). By 24 July, the death toll had reached 380 in Lebanon and 37 in Israel (Sultan, 2008: 40). Hizballah continued to fight back amidst Israel’s heavy attacks and it intensified rocket attacks into northern Israel. The Battle of Bint Jbeil began on the 23 July and lasted until the 29 July (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 142). This was one of the main battles of the war, which took place in the town of Bint Jbeil, another Hizballah stronghold in south Lebanon close to the Israeli border. Criticism continued to mount in Israel over the war and a Jerusalem Post journalist asked, ‘What are our goals in this war anyway?’ (Pleffer, 2006).

Domestic disapproval, combined with the failure of the Israeli army to secure a quick victory forced the Olmert government to take a more moderate position. On 23 July, Olmert asked for at least a partial withdrawal of Hizballah from south Lebanon, an embargo on weapons transfers and international supervision of Lebanese-Syrian borders to stop the transfer of weapons across them (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 145). On 25 July, four UN military observers from Austria, Canada, China and Finland were killed when the Israeli army fired on a UN Observer post in Khiam in south Lebanon (BBC News Online, 2006). On the same day two Red Cross ambulances were hit by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) as they transported injured civilians to Tyre (Sultan, 2008: 40).

At the UNSC meeting on 21 July, Siniora called for an internal Lebanese consensus over steps to defuse the crisis. He explained that any attempts to address the sovereignty of the Lebanese government over its territory could not ignore what he called, ‘core issues’, which included the Shebaa Farms. During the meeting Olmert and Livni called for the unconditional return of the Israeli soldiers, and argued that
any solution to the conflict would need to guarantee Israel’s security from terrorist rocket attacks along its northern border. This meant deploying the Lebanese army in south Lebanon and disarming Hizballah and other militant groups (UNSC, 2006b). On 24 July, Livni continued to push for a diplomatic solution alongside a ceasefire, arguing that a ceasefire alone would ‘create a vacuum that Hizballah will fill with more terrorism’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006j).

In the following days diplomatic efforts intensified when Condoleezza Rice visited the region. On 24 July, she met with Berri and they discussed issues including: the creation of a buffer zone in south Lebanon patrolled by the Lebanese army and UNIFIL; the exchange of Lebanese and Israeli prisoners or ‘detainees’; the return of refugees to south Lebanon; international aid for the reconstruction effort in Lebanon; and an emphasis on solving the Shebaa Farms problem through the UN. Rice did not mention disarming Hizballah but she did, under Berri’s insistence, acknowledge that Shebaa Farms had a ‘Lebanese character’ (Pakradouni: 424). She then flew to Israel where she talked with political leaders the following day. During her talks she discussed ways to manage the growing humanitarian crisis in Lebanon and made it clear that things should not return to the way they were before the war (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006j; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006k). The US also put forward a plan for ending the war, however it was rejected by Israel over clauses relating to the exchange of prisoners and the return of Shebaa Farms (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 158). On 26 July, in an attempt to end the war, Siniora presented his seven-point plan in front of an international audience at the Rome Conference15. Three days later, Israel rejected UN calls for a three-day truce to allow humanitarian aid to reach south Lebanon (Mulholland, 2006).

In the following days Hizballah’s attacks against Israel intensified forcing Israelis

15 The conference was attended by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, attended the conference alongside officials and diplomats from Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Canada, Russia, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the European Union and the World Bank. The Vatican attended as an observer. Israel, Hizballah, Syria and Iran were not present (AP, 2006a).
living in northern Israel to seek shelter or leave the area. At the same time Israeli military casualties in Lebanon continued to rise. Israel continued attacking south Lebanon and heavy shelling destroyed the town of Bint Jbeil close to the border. This created a wave of Lebanese refugees heading north to escape the destruction (Pakradouni: 422). The direction of the war changed after an Israeli airstrike killed 28 civilians, including 16 children, on 30 July in the village of Qana in south Lebanon (Human Rights Watch, 2006). As a result, Israel was criticised at an international level and international and Arab public opinion began rallying behind Hizballah (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 163). The Qana bombing was particularly distressing because the village had already become a synonym for Israeli army massacres in Lebanon after Israel had shelled a UNIFIL compound there in 1996 killing 106 civilians, of whom more than half were children (Fisk, 2009).

Despite the tragedy in Qana, Olmert gave a speech the following day saying, ‘there is no ceasefire and there will be no ceasefire’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006m). Defence Minister Amir Peretz also rejected the idea of a ceasefire, saying ‘Only by overcoming terrorism can we achieve peace’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006n). However, a 48-hour ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon was established after the Lebanese government called for an immediate ceasefire at the UNSC meeting on 31 July (AFP, 2006h).

After the ceasefire ended both sides resumed their attacks. The Israeli cabinet also approved a ground offensive aimed at destroying any remaining Hizballah missiles left in the area between its northern border and the Litani River (Pakradouni: 429). It was responding to mounting pressure from within Israel for a full-scale ground assault on south Lebanon, something many argued should have happened from the start of the war. It hoped this would seriously damage Hizballah and give Israel greater leverage to secure a ceasefire on its own terms (Hirst, 2010: 370). In the following days Israel also threatened to attack Beirut and it bombed areas as far as Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley (Pakradouni: 430; Reuters, 2007). Fighting continued along the border including in Bint Jbeil where it lasted until the end of the war. At the same time Hizballah’s rockets continued to kill civilians in northern Israel (Reuters, 2007).
International diplomatic efforts intensified and a draft version of a UN resolution to end the war was presented to the UN Security Council on 5 August, which was drafted under France and US mediation. However, the resolution was withdrawn due to objections from both Lebanon and Israel (see 6.2.3.1). On 7 August, the Lebanese government agreed to send 15,000 Lebanese troops into south Lebanon on condition that Israeli troops leave the country (Al Manar TV, 2006b). After an emergency meeting of the Arab League in Beirut on 7 August, an Arab delegation was sent to New York the next day to push for parts of Siniora’s Seven Point Plan to be included in the final UN resolution16 (CNN, 2006a). Changes were made and the final resolution included a call for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

From this point onwards, Arab governments and the UN began to coordinate their diplomatic efforts in an attempt to bring about a satisfactory end to the fighting. Negotiations centred on the Shebaa Farms, the deployment of Lebanese soldiers in south Lebanon, an arms embargo on weapons to Lebanon, and the supervision of the Lebanese-Syrian border to prevent the transfer of arms across it (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 202). However, the Israelis were not happy with the resolution. They felt that the US had given in too quickly to the French who had adopted the Arab position and they were concerned about how effective an enhanced UNIFIL force would be at keeping the peace (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a). They decided to continue striking Lebanon using air, sea and ground forces (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006b). On the 11 August, an amended version of the draft resolution was approved by the UN Security Council as UNSCR 1701 and it was accepted by the Lebanese government and Hizballah the following day (Reuters, 2006).

However, the Israelis voted for the ceasefire to be postponed for sixty hours and launched a large-scale ground offensive into Lebanon (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 206, 212-217). They continued to bomb the southern suburbs of Beirut while their

16 The delegation was made up from Sheikh Abdullah Bin-Zayid, UAE Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Arab League Council; Hamad Bin-Jasim Bin-Jabr Al Thani, the Qatari Foreign Minister and Arab states representative at the UN Security Council; and Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa.
military casualties continued to mount (Pakradouni: 430-431; Blecher, 2006: 34). The Israelis received the final version of the resolution a few hours after the start of the ground offensive. They approved it on 12 August but said it was too late to stop their ground offensive. Livni said that Israel did not want to leave a situation on the ground in which Israeli troops would withdraw and leave a vacuum which Hizballah would fill before international troops and UNIFIL could be deployed in the region\(^\text{17}\) (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a). However, it is more likely that they continued because Olmert, Peretz and Halutz wanted the war to end with at least a partial Israeli victory to save some of its credibility (Hirst, 2010: 371). During this final phase of the war thirty-three Israeli soldiers were killed, Israel carpeted south Lebanon in cluster bombs and Hizballah fired two-hundred and fifty missiles into northern Israel (Hirst, 2010: 372, 374). Israel finally agreed to UNSCR 1701 on 13 August and, after thirty-four days, fighting finally stopped at 0800 local time (0500 GMT) on 14 August (AFP, 2006c).

After the fighting stopped the UN called for an end to Israeli air and sea blockades of Lebanon which were finally lifted on the 7 and 8 September 2006 (BBC News Online, 2006b). On 16 July 2008, in accordance with UNSCR 1701, the coffins of the two kidnapped soldiers were exchanged by Hizballah for Samir Kuntar, four Hizballah fighters and the bodies of several other Lebanese and Palestinian militants who had been held in Israel\(^\text{18}\) (Haaretz, 2008).

During the war, about one thousand Lebanese had been killed most of whom were civilians, while in Israel one hundred and sixteen Israeli soldiers were killed and forty three Israeli civilians, the majority of whom were Arab-Israelis (Achcar, 2007: 94; BBC News Online, 2007). Israel had dropped an average of three thousand bombs a day on Lebanon and Hizballah had fired a total of approximately four thousand rockets and small missiles into Israel throughout the whole period (Daily Star, 2006a).

\(^\text{17}\) After the end of the war Olmert and his supporters argued that the ground operation was necessary to place the Israel army in a good position to resume fighting should the ceasefire collapse (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 228).

\(^\text{18}\) Samir Kuntar is a Druze who was the longest serving Lebanese prisoner held in Israel.
Israel argued that it had only attacked ‘facilities which directly served the terrorist organisations in their attacks against Israel’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006o). In contrast, on 23 August 2006 Amnesty International argued that Israel’s actions suggested a ‘policy of punishing both the Lebanese government and the civilian population’ (Amnesty International, 2006).

5.4 The aftermath

After the end of the war, and in accordance with clause 11 of UNSCR 1701, Lebanese soldiers were deployed in the south Lebanon alongside UNIFIL to take control of the area as Israeli forces withdrew (Reuters, 2007). France, Italy and Spain contributed significant numbers of troops as part of the enhanced UNIFIL force, which was led by France until early 2007 when Italy took over (Norton, 2006). The enhanced UNIFIL force was known as UNIFIL II and, as a European diplomat explains, it was created as ‘a quick reaction force’ to strengthen UNIFIL in south Lebanon and to improve its coordination and credibility (Interview J, 2009). The expanded mandate allowed UNIFIL to use force to ensure that the area under its jurisdiction was not being used for ‘hostile activities’ and in case of any forceful attempts to stop it from carrying out its duties (UN News Centre, 2006). Since UNSCR 1701 was approved, UNIFIL have said they will not try to disarm Hizballah and will only intercept arms transfers at the request of the Lebanese government (De Quetteville and Hirst, 2006).

However, an enhanced military presence has not stopped Hizballah from rearming and threatening the security of the Lebanese-Israeli border in the long term. Israel has also continued to violate UNSCR 1701 by making incursions across the border into Lebanese land and air space (Janelle, 2006). Israeli cross border flyovers were criticised by Kofi Annan after Israeli planes dived in an aggressive way at French peacekeeping troops in south Lebanon in November 2006 (Haaretz, 2006). Since the end of the war, several suggestions have been made about the best way to disarm Hizballah. These vary from completely removing their arms to integrating them into the Lebanese army, or using them as ‘a sort of civil defence league or national guard’ (Sultan, 2008: 47). However, the reality is that there is no force in Lebanon strong enough to disarm Hizballah, as demonstrated in May 2008 when Hizballah took over downtown Beirut.
5.5 Who won?

Both Israel and Hizballah suffered losses and gains during the war. Israel failed to disarm Hizballah and, despite the presence of an enlarged UNIFIL and the presence of Lebanese troops south of the Litani River, Hizballah continues to control the area. However, the deployment of an enhanced UNIFIL force and the Lebanese army in south Lebanon has secured Israel’s northern border in the short term.

Hizballah can be seen as the victor in the war simply because it survived an asymmetric war against an enemy which was militarily superior and supported by the US. As Elias Hanna, a retired general in the Lebanese army, explains, quoting from an unknown source, ‘Hizballah won because it didn’t lose, Israel lost because it didn’t win’ (Hanna, 2010). Since the end of the war Hizballah has enhanced its weapons arsenal with the help of its external patrons Syria and Iran. A US official said that by December 2010 Hizballah had over 50,000 rockets and missiles in its possession supplied by Syria and Iran (AFP, 2010). During the war Hizballah continued to fight back despite Israel’s powerful bombing campaign and it inflicted damage both on the Israeli army and on northern Israel. It also won the media war and Israel was seen as the main offender due to the way regional media, such as Hizballah’s TV channel Al-Manar and Qatar’s Al Jazeera, depicted events during the war (Kalb and Saivetz, 2007).

The war also exposed the weakness of the Israeli army and had a positive psychological impact on the Arab nation by destroying the image of Israeli invincibility. Furthermore, Hizballah’s successful performance exposed the failure of Arab regimes to stand up to Israel and their reliance on the ineffectual US led peace process rather than the military option to protect the Arab system. Hirst argues that this means that Hizballah’s performance strengthened the Iranian-Syrian led alliance over that of the ‘moderate’ Arab states. After the war, Iranian president Ahmadinejad announced that there would be ‘a new Middle East’ which would be one ‘without America and a usurper Zionist regime’ (Hirst, 2010: 376-379).

The war validated Hizballah’s justification for continuing to bear arms by exposing the weaknesses of the Lebanese army and showing that Hizballah was the only
internal force able to defend Lebanese sovereignty from external attack. It allowed Hizballah to recover its status as a resistance movement against Israeli occupation, and it showed its ability to stand up to Israel. This was important because it had been seen as a deterrence threat rather than a resistance movement since Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000. The war also showed that, if the Israelis could not disarm Hizballah, there is little chance that a Lebanese force would be able to do so. Nasrallah argued on 14 August that, although disarming Hizballah was ‘part of the long-term and lasting solution’ for Lebanon, in the meantime ‘Lebanon is still being threatened and might be attacked any time. Who will defend this country? Who will teach the enemy a lesson? Who will make the enemy pay a heavy price?’ He argued that neither the Lebanese army nor UNIFIL would be able to protect Lebanon from future Israeli attacks (Al Manar TV, 2006e).

After the war, Hizballah’s strong performance enhanced its popularity and allowed it to assert itself in Lebanon, in the region, and at an international level. This happened despite Israeli hopes that their heavy bombardment would turn the Lebanese people against Hizballah, weaken it politically, and damage its credibility (Quilty, 2006a). Since the end of the war Nasrallah has achieved iconic status in the region. Hizballah’s victory was celebrated throughout the region and banners and posters of Nasrallah and Hizballah were hung up in streets all over the Arab world (Focus Web, 2006). Pakradouni explains that, ‘For all this enthusiastic youth [in the Arab world] the name of Nasrallah becomes a synonym of ‘divine promise’’ (Pakradouni: 421). A poll conducted by Telhamy-Zogby in Arab states in July 2007 showed that Hassan Nasrallah was the most popular leader in the Middle East (Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2007). Many people in the Arab world hoped Nasrallah would be able to fill a gap left by a real lack of leadership within the regional system (Ahmad, 2008: 247). Hirst argues that Hizballah’s successful performance gave it authority and prestige in three areas, the pan-Arab nationalist, the sectarian and the Islamist (Hirst, 2010: 278).

However, the war also heightened tensions between Hizballah and other political parties and groups in Lebanon creating a volatile domestic political situation, increasingly divided politics, and increased Sunni-Shi’a tensions in the postwar
period. This meant that Hizballah had to focus more on domestic than regional politics during this period (Hirst, 2010: 380). Opponents within Lebanon criticised Hizballah for continuing to support a Syrian-Iranian agenda and for being unwilling to disarm even if Shebaa Farms was returned to Lebanon. They argued that it opposed the establishment of an international tribunal into the assassination of Rafik Hariri and continued to function as a state within a state (Salem, 2008a: 18). Samir Geagea denounced Nasrallah’s victory and argued that a proper Lebanese state could only be established once a solution was found to Hizballah’s arms and once Hizballah stopped operating as a mini-state within a state (Dakroub, 2006). Critics also believed that Hizballah had manipulated the idea it had achieved a great victory to push Lebanon closer to Syria and Iran. Young explained that Nasrallah had managed ‘to impose a narrative of success’ by asserting that Hizballah had won the war and that he used this to try and gain political ground by demanding veto power in the government (Young, 2009a: 4).

Despite its weak military performance Israel still benefitted from the war in several ways. Since the war ended Hizballah has not been involved in any cross-border raids and the number of rockets launched across the border into Israel has been dramatically reduced. This is due to the presence of a bolstered UNIFIL force and the Lebanese army in south Lebanon, which have restricted Hizballah’s freedom of activity along the border area. Several rockets have been launched into northern Israel but it is thought that they were launched by Palestinian groups rather than Hizballah (Haaretz, 2009). This shows that the deployment of an enhanced UNIFIL and the Lebanese army in south Lebanon has been successful at protecting the security of Israel’s northern border in the short term. Hizballah is also likely to think twice before carrying out another attack against Israel due to the extensive damage Israeli air strikes caused to Hizballah’s military and social resources, Lebanon’s Shi’a community in south Lebanon, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and Lebanon’s infrastructure and economy (Hirst, 2010: 381). Since the end of the war, Nasrallah has admitted that he would not have let the kidnapping take place if he had known what the consequences would be (AFP, 2006g).

The war also weakened Hizballah’s military capacity and Iran’s regional position. It
exposed Hizballah’s military strategies and tactics allowing the US and Israel to make better preparations for any future confrontation. UNSCR 1701 also fulfilled Israel’s hopes of curbing Hizballah’s freedom of movement in south Lebanon by calling for the deployment of an enhanced UNIFIL force in the area alongside the Lebanese army. Hirst argues that this loss of freedom of movement seriously weakened Hizballah’s modus operandi and made it more difficult to launch cross-border attacks into northern Israel (Hirst, 2010: 381). Israeli foreign minister in the war, Tzipi Livni argued on 12 August that UNSCR 1701 was good for Israel because it imposed an arms embargo on Hizballah (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006c).

However, it has been argued that Israel won the war because it did not want to defeat Hizballah. A Lebanese academic also argues that Israel won the war because its aim was to weaken not defeat Hizballah. He believes that if Israel had really wanted to win the war it would have sent large numbers of tanks and troops into Lebanon and annihilated Hizballah. He argues that Israel wanted to keep Hizballah as a problem in south Lebanon so that UN troops would be sent there to create a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel. Keeping Hizballah as a threat allows Israel to justify getting all the latest weapons from the Pentagon and it prevents a peace deal being reached between Israel and Lebanon. It also means that Hizballah remains a constant problem for Lebanon, and that Israel has an excuse to cause extensive damage to Lebanese infrastructure in any future confrontation (see also: Hirst, 2010: 381). He suggests that Israel deliberately left Lebanon with the problem of Hizballah after the war in the hope that it would eventually implode and the Lebanese would start ‘cutting each others’ throats all over again’. This is important because Israel prefers to maintain the status quo than enter into a peace deal where they have to make concessions such as giving up the Golan Heights, the Shebba Farms, the West Bank or to stop building settlements in the Occupied Territories. Instead, he argues, they set Lebanon back by hitting infrastructure, to create ‘human tragedies’ so any real possibility of peace becomes more remote (Interview B, 2009).

Internal and external critics argue that Israel failed to achieve any of its political and military goals in the war and that it undermined its deterrence power in the region while enhancing Hizballah’s position at domestic, regional and international levels.
Israel did not manage to disarm or disable Hizballah or to secure the release of its kidnapped soldiers. At the beginning of the war Olmert argued that Israel needed three things before it would stop fighting, none of which were achieved by the end of the conflict. They were: (i) full implementation of UNSCR 1559, which includes a clause calling for the dismantling of ‘all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias’ referring to Hizballah and the Palestinians; (ii) no more rocket attacks to be launched into Israel from southern Lebanon; and (iii) the return of the kidnapped soldiers (Blanford, 2006: 73). It also wanted the Lebanese government to hold full sovereignty over its territory and for the Lebanese army to be deployed along the Israeli border, the only one of its objectives it achieved by the end of the war (Spyer, 2008: 4). Hirst also explains that, despite arguing it had been victorious, the Israeli army never really managed to conquer or occupy any of the villages in the south, especially Bint Jbeil and Maroun al-Ras where most of the heavy fighting took place (Hirst, 2010: 355).

Israel’s failure to secure a victory destroyed its image of invincibility and exposed its susceptibility to different forms of military combat, especially guerrilla warfare. This seriously damaged its psyche because it is a country that expects and needs to win every war to ensure its survival. Israel’s performance was by looked at in the Winograd Report, the Israeli government’s own assessment of events during the war. This identified failures at all levels of Israel’s political and military institutions and strongly criticised key decision makers within Israel (New York Times, 2008). Israel showed that it was unprepared for Hizballah which was well equipped, well trained, highly motivated by religion and a need to defend its land, and which had intimate knowledge of the land it was fighting on. Salloukh argues that Israel made mistakes, lacked relevant information, communicated badly and miscalculated Hizballah’s military arsenal (Salloukh, 2009a). Failings in the war further weakened the Olmert government and Olmert’s ratings dropped in the postwar period (AFP, 2006f). Repercussions from the war led to the resignation of Dan Halutz the chief of staff of the Israeli army in January 2007 (Ynet News, 2007).

5.6 Lebanon after the war

The war weakened Lebanon economically, socially and politically and caused extensive damage to Lebanon’s infrastructure, to south Lebanon and to Beirut’s southern suburbs (see appendix 4). The UNDP estimated that the direct and indirect
costs of the war to the Lebanese economy were US$5 billion and that the industrial and tourist sectors suffered the biggest losses. This led to stagnation and inflation in the Lebanese economy. Lebanon’s infrastructure was also seriously damaged, including ninety one bridges, three airports, as eleven hospitals, thirty five health clinics, and three hundred and forty two schools. In addition, UNDP reports that close to 1.2 million unexploded ordinances were dropped over an estimated area of thrity two million metres in south Lebanon in the last days of the conflict. They contaminated agricultural land and added to the 430,000 landmines left after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 (UNDP, 2009: 42). Israeli clusters bombs dropped in south Lebanon during the conflict continued to injure and kill Lebanese long after the war ended. In the following year they killed thirty people and injured two hundred (Rappaport, 2006).

Hizballah took the lead in reconstruction efforts and filled the gap left by the weak state which was heavily criticised for being ineffectual during the postwar period (Quilty, 2006). The failure of the state to play a strong role highlighted its weaknesses, growing divisions in Lebanese society, the clientelist nature of Lebanese politics and the influence of external actors on Lebanese politics. Fattouh & Kolb argued that a transparent reconstruction effort was needed on a nationwide scale that should be separate from ‘political manoeuvring and internal bickering’ (Fattouh and Kolb, 2006: 103). However, they argue that the government was unable to do much because it was still reliant on international donors and personal donations from supporters, due to the financial costs of rebuilding after the 1975-1990 civil war (Fattouh and Kolb, 2006: 110). Furthermore, much of the aid given by Western governments had conditions attached to it, which restricted the government’s freedom to do as it liked.

After the end of the war Siniora had to guarantee donors at a conference in Stockholm that aid would not end up in Hizballah’s hands, which caused problems because Hizballah was part of the government at the time (Fattouh and Kolb, 2006: 104-106). The inability or unwillingness of the government to share Western aid for reconstruction of the south with Hizballah also enhanced divisions between Hizballah and the government and increased Hizballah’s reliance on Iran (Tocci, 2007: 7). Iran
gave significant amounts of aid to fund the reconstruction of south Lebanon. However other states also financed the reconstruction efforts. For example, Qatar, a predominantly Sunni country, funded the rebuilding of Bint Jbeil, a Shi’a village, and in doing so crossed any Sunni-Shi’a regional divide (Sultan, 2008: 54).

The war also exacerbated political divisions between the March 8 and the March 14 alliances. Internal divisions within the Lebanese government and state surfaced in the political troubles that affected Lebanon after the war ended. A political stalemate emerged after six March 8 ministers, five of whom were Shi’a, resigned on 11 and 12 November 2006 because they wanted Siniora to form a national unity government in which March 8 would hold veto power (Razzouk, 2006). They said that the Siniora government was unrepresentative of the people, and they disagreed with its position on issues such as Hizballah arms and the decision to support the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) into the assassination of former prime minister, Rafik Hariri (Razzouk, 2006). Their resignations made the Siniora government illegitimate because it no longer included any Shi’a representatives. This contravened the principle of intra-communal consensus which says that the Lebanese government needs to contain representatives from each of the country’s major sects (Hirst, 2010: 385).

Siniora refused to accept their resignations in an attempt to keep the government functioning. Members of the March 14 alliance said that they had resigned from the government to stall the STL by disabling the government. This was because it seemed likely that the tribunal would implicate important Syrian figures in the assassination. In protest at the government, the March 8 Alliance organised a sit-in protest in central Beirut that started in December 2006 and lasted until 21 May 2008 when the Doha Agreement was signed. The protestors called for Siniora and his government to resign and criticised it for being too close to the US (Razzouk, 2006a). Syria was also

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19 The Doha agreement was reached between rival Lebanese factions in Doha, Qatar under the invitation of Qatar’s prince Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. It ended the 18-month long political crisis in Lebanon and led to Michel Suleiman being sworn in as the president of Lebanon on 25 May 2008 (Khalil, 2008).
accused of numerous assassinations of anti-Syrian figures that took place in Lebanon in this period in order to incapacitate or destroy the government. The political situation was especially sensitive because pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud’s term was coming to an end and both the March 8 alliance and the March 14 alliance wanted a new president that supported their political position (Hirst, 2010: 385).

When Lahoud’s presidency ended in November 2007 a lack of agreement over his successor meant that the post lay vacant for six months until the Doha Agreement. During this period state institutions were paralysed, the economy slowed down and the security situation was unstable. Violence broke out on 8 May 2008 between the government and the March 8 alliance over Hizballah’s communications network and threatened to escalate into civil war (Zablit, 2008). During the fighting, Hizballah forces seized control of several neighbourhoods in west Beirut from the Hariri-led Future Movement in the worst fighting in Beirut since the civil war. This showed Hizballah’s military superiority over other groups in Lebanon. The fighting ended thirteen days later on 21 May when all concerned parties signed the Doha Agreement under Arab League mediation.

The Doha Agreement was a victory for Hizballah and the March 8 Alliance because it granted nearly all their demands. Hirst explains that these included a consensual president, a national unity government in which they held veto power, and a new, and in their eyes fairer, electoral law for the next general election. The issue of Hizballah’s weapons was also left open for discussion in the National Dialogue (Hirst, 2010: 393). By giving the Shi’a veto power the Doha Agreement finalised the consociational nature of the Lebanese system. This reflected Hizballah’s belief that the government should be made up from a consociation of sects rather than from whoever wins the majority of seats in government. After this, foreign policy-making became more complex because both sides held veto power over government decisions making it very difficult to reach an agreement (Salloukh, 2010a).

Since the Doha Agreement, Lebanon has started moving closer to Syria and Iran suggesting that the Shi’a have won the battle with the Sunni over control of post-Syria Lebanon. The security situation has improved but there are still distinct underlying
political and security problems. For example, clashes that erupted in Tripoli in July 2008 between opposition supported Alawite groups and a number of Sunni groups, and two bombs which targeted the Lebanese army in August and September 2008 (BBC News Online, 2008; Reuters, 2008). Furthermore, suggestions that the STL’s indictment due out at the start of 2011 will implicate senior Hizballah officials in the assassination of Rafik Hariri has led to a new threat of civil violence in the country. These episodes of unrest show that political divisions and tensions continue to simmer between the Sunni and Shi’a in Lebanon and have explosive potential.

In sum, the war left Lebanon in economic and political chaos. It destabilised existing balances and it forced difficult issues, specifically Hizballah’s armed status, to the front of the government agenda.

5.7 The Regional Implications of the 2006 War

The implications of the 2006 war stretched beyond Lebanon and the post-war period was a time of heightened regional instability with greater regional Sunni-Shi’a tensions. By increasing Hizballah’s popularity across the Arab world it raised fears amongst the US and its allies that other groups in the region, such as Hamas, would copy Hizballah’s techniques (Salem, 2008a: 19; Exum, 2006: 14). Hizballah’s strong performance also made the US realise that it needed to deal with Iran and Syria if it wanted to manage Hizballah. As the US was not talking to Iran this meant it needed Syria to make Hizballah ‘toe the line’ (Goksel, 2010: 1). Furthermore, UNSCR 1701 had regional implications because, by attempting to curb Hizballah’s power, it was also restricting the regional outreach of both Iran and Syria.

The war was also important because it showed that Iran and its proxy Hizballah were a serious counterbalance to US and Israeli regional ambitions. This strengthened Iran’s credibility and popularity and its goal of leading the Islamic world. Hizballah’s robust performance showed that an Arab force, backed by a non-Arab actor could stand up to the Israeli army. Therefore, despite having one of the most powerful armies in the world, Israel was not invincible. The war also positioned Iran, through Hizballah and Hamas, as an important actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It allowed it take a lead role in what had traditionally been Arab causes, such as support for the creation of a Palestinian state. However, the war also had negative implications for
Iran because it caused extensive damage to Lebanon’s Shi’a community, which Iran has been supporting for several decades. It also exposed Hizballah’s missile capacity and military tactics to the US and Israel before it was really necessary. The war also boosted Syria’s position in Lebanon, however UNSCR 1701 limited Hizballah’s freedom of movement in south Lebanon, which reduced Syria’s ability to pressurise Israel by using Hizballah to launch small-scale cross-border attacks.

5.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, it seems that the war took place due to a combination of regional and domestic factors. At the regional level it was about a clash between the ambitions of the two regional alliances that were able to play out their conflicts using their proxy actors in Lebanon. At the domestic level, it was due to the Lebanese state’s failure to exert its sovereignty and sovereign authority over its territory and to control the activities of sub-state actors within its borders. It was also a continuation of clashes across the Lebanese-Israel border that had taken on a violent nature since the arrival of the PLO in Lebanon at the end of the 1960s. The UN resolution to end the war was an attempt to maintain peace across this border and within the wider region in line with the vision of the US-led alliance to establish a new regional order. The war caused extensive damage to Lebanon’s infrastructure and it drew attention to several important issues within the region and within Lebanon. It showed Hizballah’s potential as an important regional actor, which strengthened the regional position of Iran and Syria. Furthermore, it highlighted the weakness of the Lebanese government and growing divisions between the March 8 and March 14 alliances, which manifested themselves in a political stalemate between the two sides in the post-war period.

The war was an important test for Lebanon’s foreign policy because it placed the Lebanese government in a position where it needed to orchestrate a coherent response to an existential attack on the Lebanese state by one of its neighbours. However, the Lebanese government failed to articulate a strong foreign policy response and act like a security maximising actor as systemic theories would expect. This leads to the question of why it was unable to act in this way and what were the main factors affecting its behaviour. These will be addressed in the following chapters.
Chapter 6: Systemic explanations of the 2006 war and their influence on Lebanese foreign policy-making

This chapter looks at how the impact of the regional system on the outbreak and progress of the war shaped Lebanese foreign policy. It focuses on how the foreign policy of the Lebanese government responded to, was dictated by and subordinated to, regional systemic drivers. Lebanese foreign policy needs to be understood within the regional and international context, particularly in relation to the split between the US-led and the Syrian-Iranian led alliances. This is because the split between them goes to the heart of the Lebanese government through their alliances with the March 8 and March 14 alliances and affects any policies the government tries to make. During the war, international and regional actors played an important role in determining when and on what conditions the war would end and in supporting both Hizballah and the Siniora government. As a result Siniora was forced to design a foreign policy that relied on the support of external actors to make it happen.

It concludes that the regional system played a role in influencing the foreign policy of the Lebanese government during the war for several reasons. First, external regional and international actors used Lebanese groups as proxies to pursue their own regional objectives. They offered them political, military and financial support and influenced their foreign policy objectives. This was visible with the split between the Syrian-Iranian backed March 8 alliance and the March 14 alliance that was supported by the US-led coalition. Secondly, weaknesses in the Lebanese state meant that the government needed external actors to help it formulate foreign policy (ending the war) and to implement its domestic objectives (disarming Hizballah). International and regional actors played an important role in determining the date and the conditions on which the war ended, as detailed in UNSCR 1701, which tried to limit Hizballah’s power in south Lebanon. Thirdly, the failure of members of the US-led alliance to call for an immediate ceasefire weakened the Lebanese state and its government’s capacity to make foreign policy decisions. As a result, stability in Lebanon is fundamentally linked to regional stability and the agendas of foreign actors and the nature of the regional system are played out within the Lebanese context.
However, this chapter also shows that, despite being able to explain the outbreak and conduct of the war, a systemic analysis is unable to explain why there was a virtual absence of a Lebanese foreign policy and why Siniora was so vulnerable to external interests. This can only be explained by the looking at role played by sub-state actors, which is the focus of Chapter 7.

6.1 The outbreak of the war as a result of the regional system

The thesis has established so far that the 2006 conflict reflected a battle between the Iranian-Syrian alliance and the US-led alliance and the systemic movements that were taking place between them. Both sides seek to control Lebanon through their Lebanese proxies and they played out their opposing agendas during the war. This weakened the Lebanese government and fractured its foreign policy-making capacity because its members had to compete with the agenda of external actors allied with internal proxies (including themselves) when making foreign policy decisions.

Hizballah’s cross-border raid on 12 July 2006 when it kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and in doing so sparked the start of the war has to be understood within the wider regional context because Hizballah only exists due to regional dynamics. Even if Hizballah was acting in its own domestic interests and could exist independently, it would not be an important regional player if it had not been militarily, politically and financially backed by Iran since its formation in the 1980s (Salem, 2007; US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2006). Both the US and Israel have accused Iran of more than simply supporting Hizballah during the 2006 war, but of working with Hizballah and financing and arming it via Syria in the period before the war started. The US office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism released a report on 28 April 2006 which said that, ‘Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups […] with extensive funding, training, and weapons’ (US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2006). In this case, Hizballah was only able to take on Israel in the war because of ongoing support from Iran and Syria.

Hizballah has also been accused of following Iranian and Syrian orders during the war. The Israeli representative told a UNSC meeting on 14 July that Hizballah ‘was acting as ‘the bloody finger’ on the hand of the long reaching arm of Iran’ (UNSC, 2006). Members of the US-led alliance argued that Iran pushed Hizballah to start the
war because it wanted to distract attention away from its nuclear program, which was to be an important part of the agenda at the G8 summit in Russia from 15 to 17 July 2006 (Council for Foreign Relations, 2007). Olmert said on 18 July that ‘the timing of the action in the north was not coincidental and had been coordinated with Iran in order to divert international attention away from the Iranian issue’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006g). Peres and Livni also released a statement on 8 August saying: ‘The kidnapping was timed for several days before the G8 summit meeting involving the countries that were supposed to promote a resolution preventing Iran from advancing its nuclear programs’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a).

However, these accusations have been denied. Deeb argues that Hizballah makes decisions that reflect the needs of its constituents in Lebanon and that, despite their close relationship, Iran does not necessarily tell Hizballah what to do or what policies and decisions to make (Deeb, 2006: 117). Goksel argues: ‘Iranians are very, very diplomatic, they are very tactful, they never directly interfere’ (Goksel, 2009: 2). Mroueh also argues that, although Hizballah would not take a decision that was completely at odds with Iran, it has the freedom to make its own decisions (Mroueh, 2009: 2). It is also unlikely that Iran would have told Hizballah to attack Israel because it would not have wanted to mobilise its most important regional ally before it was really necessary, for example in the case of a US or Israeli strike against its nuclear facilities.

Hirst argues that Hizballah felt it had to react to the severity of Israel’s attacks on Gaza in Operation Summer Rains, which had started on 28 June and lasted until 26 November 2006. Israel had attacked Gaza in retaliation for the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006 by Palestinian forces (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006p). Besides causing significant Palestinian casualties, Israel had also arrested a hundred members of Hamas, including senior officials, ministers and legislators during the operation (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006l). Hirst argues that if Hizballah had not responded to these attacks it would have failed to support the Palestinian cause, a main factor in its jihad. This means it would have lost credibility amongst its supporters making it similar to Arab regimes who had done little to support the Palestinians in Gaza (Hirst, 2010: 331).
Israel’s response to Hizballah’s cross-border raid on 12 July also needs to be interpreted within the regional context otherwise it is simply seen as an overreaction to a minor border violation, and much more extreme than its reaction to previous cross-border disputes. In this case, Israel reacted in the way it did because it interpreted Hizballah’s actions as part of a wider attempt by the Iranian-Syrian alliance to move the regional balance of power away from its interests.

This was recognised by Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni when she argued at a press conference on 19 July that there was a need to combat the regional threat posed by Iran. She defended Israel against accusations that its attacks on Lebanon were extreme, arguing that they were proportional because their goal was to defend Israel from a wider regional threat rather than from ‘a concrete situation on the ground’. She described the threat as coming from Iran through Hizballah (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006h). On 23 July, she said ‘The situation we’re fighting in now […] will recur, with funds and weapons coming into Lebanon from Iran, through Syria, maybe with even more Syrian arms added along the way’. She also said ‘The nature of the threat is also clear - it is a regional threat, related to the Hizballah - Syria - Iran - Hamas axis’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006i).

On 8 August, Peres and Livni also defended Israel’s reaction to the 12 July kidnapping, saying that it aimed ‘to send a clear and unequivocal message to Nasrallah and to Hizballah, and from there to Syria and to Iran and to Hamas and to anyone who wishes the annihilation of the State of Israel, that there is no such thing as a balance of terror, because we are no longer afraid’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a). Israel’s extreme response pushed the Lebanese government into a position where it was forced to negotiate an end to violent attacks from a neighbouring state, which was responding to the actions of Hizballah, a non-government actor that was not supported by the majority within the government.

Israel’s reaction, possibly in co-ordination with the US, was also focused on achieving its wider goal of disarming Hizballah and weakening Iran and Syria. This was recognised by Kofi Annan in his address to the UNSC on 20 July, when he said that
Israel had ‘confirmed its operation in Lebanon had wider and more far-reaching goals than the return of the captured soldiers, and that its aim was to end the threat posed by Hizballah’ (UNSC, 2006a). Israel also hoped that its attacks would turn Lebanese domestic opinion against Hizballah. As Goksel says, ‘The idea behind causing such horrific damage to civilian infrastructure was to convince the population to turn on Hizballah’ (quoted in Sultan, 2008: 34).

It has been argued that Israel and the US had been planning to attack Lebanon and destroy Hizballah for some time and were waiting for the right moment (Achcar, 2007: 72-80; Kalman, 2006). Hersh argues that discussions had taken place between the Israeli military and the US about confronting Hizballah long before 12 July 2006. He explains that Israeli officials had visited Washington ‘to get a green light for the bombing operation and to find out how much the US would bear’. He also argues that the Bush administration wanted to carry out an attack on Hizballah before striking Iran (Hersh, 2006: 1-3).

Israel has denied accusations that the war was pre-planned in collaboration with the US. The Israeli report into the war, the Winograd Commission, concluded that Israel had not been prepared for war. Israeli officials also argued that Israel did not need to be encouraged to take part in a conflict aimed at destroying Hizballah. David Siegel, spokesman at the Israeli Embassy in Washington explained that Israel ‘did not plan the campaign […] that decision was forced on us [by Hizballah]’ (quoted in Hersh, 2006: 2). Yossi Melman, a journalist working for Haaretz said that, although the Bush administration may have been happy for Israel to confront Hizballah, ‘Israel did not need to be pushed, because Israel has been wanting to get rid of Hizballah. […] By provoking Israel, Hizballah provided that opportunity’ (quoted in Hersh, 2006: 2).

Israel apparent lack of preparation shows that it may not have pre-planned a war, however, its performance in the war focused on furthering its own regional goals and the goals of the US-led alliance. This is illustrated by its prioritising of a diplomatic solution to the war over a ceasefire. It is most probable that the possibility of using military action to weaken Iran and is regional allies had been discussed by members of this alliance before the war broke out. Sultan argues that the war was not so much
about protecting Israel’s interests and destroying Hizballah as it was about gaining access to the water of the Litani River. She argues that a lack of water in Israel truly threatens the country’s future, while Hizballah is little more than a ‘nuisance’ to Israel (Sultan, 2008: 82). It seems likely that the war was a combination of these two factors. There is a great deal of evidence to show that the US-led alliance was keen to eliminate Hizballah and weaken Iran’s regional role, especially over its nuclear weapons. At the same time Israel been seeking to gain access to the Litani water for a long time (see section 5.1), however it is unlikely that it would have launched a full-scale war with Lebanon and had US backing to purely for this reason.

At the time of the war recent regional events had created a heightened sense of insecurity in Israel. Hizballah’s operation had also taken place just over two weeks after the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in Gaza. This double kidnapping on two of its borders created a sense of panic in Israel, and led to concerns that it was being attacked simultaneously by Hizballah and Palestinian fighters who were working together. Hersh argues that Hamas and Hizballah were working together against Israel. He explains that a US government consultant with close links to Israel told him that war became inevitable after the Israeli army tapped into communications between Hamas and Hizballah in late spring 2006 in which Hamas asked Hizballah to ‘warm up’ the north (Hersh, 2006). As a result, Israel reacted by trying to reassert its regional position and military competence (Salloukh, 2009a). Olmert recognised this in a speech on 17 July, when he talked about his enemies challenging ‘the sovereignty of the State of Israel and the safety of its residents’ first in the south and then in the north. He then argued, ‘Our enemies misinterpreted our willingness to exercise restraint as a sign of weakness. They were wrong!’ (Olmert, 2006a).

The double kidnapping also meant that Israel was being attacked from two territories it had recently withdrawn, Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005. This politically undermined its decision to withdraw and made it look weak. Therefore, Israel also attacked Lebanon to assert its military power in the region and to show Hizballah and Hamas that they could not strike Israel whenever they liked (Hirst, 2010: 332). Olmert expressed this at the end of the war when he said on 14 August, ‘The decision by the
Government of Israel not to ignore the situation, [...] clarified to all peoples and nations that the State of Israel would not absorb any more attacks on its sovereignty [...] it would respond with force to any act of terror, from the north or the south, from the east or from the sea. Anywhere’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006e).

6.2 Regional and international responses to the war

The split between the two regional alliances was visible in their reaction to events at the start of the war, which shaped the progress of the war. Iran and Syria, as well as the Arab public, supported Hizballah, which enabled it to show a strong front against Israel and to challenge the Lebanese government’s status as the primary actor formulating foreign policy. Furthermore, the failure of members of the US-led alliance to call for an immediate ceasefire encouraged Israel to continue its assault and weakened the Lebanese government and its foreign policy-making capacity. However, the dynamics of the war changed when the governments’ of ‘moderate’ Arab states changed their position under pressure from Arab public opinion and supported the Lebanese government’s goals. They did this by pushing forward international diplomatic efforts to secure an immediate ceasefire. The divisions between the two alliances was recognised by Peres and Livni when they released a statement on 8 August saying there were two sides to this war, ‘Israel, along with the Lebanese government, and the international community on one side, and Hizballah, Hamas, Syria and Iran on the other side. There is great clarity in the international community regarding the threat’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a).

The split between the positions of the different Arab states was seen in the Arab League’s reaction to the war. At a meeting to discuss the crisis in Cairo on 15 July 2006 it was unable to find a common position and Arab foreign ministers released different statements on the crisis (AP, 2006). On 15 July, George Jabour, a Syrian MP, argued that the war had happened and Lebanon had been targeted because of a lack of unity in the Arab world, which made individual states vulnerable to attack. He argued that these divisions were apparent in the failure of the Arab states to discuss a final Arab resolution at the meeting (Al Arabiya TV, 2006).

6.2.1 Iranian-Syrian alliance

Iran and Syria politically and militarily backed Hizballah during the war for different
reasons. Iran’s support for Hizballah gave it a frontline in the Arab-Israeli war and a lead role in uniting Sunni and Shi’a in the region. Syria’s support for Hizballah enable it to gain greater control over Lebanon and greater leverage in negotiations for the return of the Israeli occupied Golan Heights. This fragmented Lebanese foreign policy during the war because Iranian and Syrian help allowed Hizballah, a sub-state group, to pursue its own foreign policy agenda.

By supporting Hizballah, Iran was able to take a frontline in the Arab-Israeli war, one of the main issues uniting Sunni and Shi’a in the region. During the 2006 war some Sunni groups joined Shi’a Iran and Shi’a Hizballah in their confrontation against Israel. These included the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which called for ten thousand Egyptian mujahedeen to be sent to Lebanon to join their ‘Shi’a brethren’ (Hirst, 2010: 359). Roy explains that the unity created by the war between the Sunni and Shi’a was especially important because the Shi’a have typically been marginalised by Sunni regimes, for example Bahrain and Iraq. Roy argues that Iran will only be able to continue leading the anti-Israel movement as long as Hizballah embodies three values: Lebanese nationalism, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic solidarity towards Palestinians, and support for Iran (Roy, 2007: 204-205). Hizballah and Iran have also used anti-Zionist sentiments to unite Sunni and Shi’a. As Hirst explains, ‘For Hizballah, as for Khomeini, there was nothing like the anti-Zionist resistance, or the so-called ‘Jerusalem liberation culture’, to unite all Muslims in a common cause’ (Hirst, 2010: 217).

Iran’s political support for Hizballah was seen throughout the war. On 16 July, at the World Congress of International Socialists held in Greece the Iranian Foreign Minister, Manuchehr Mottaki, attacked Israel’s actions and argued that they were against all ‘international norms’ and a ‘continuation of previous heinous crimes in the regime and throughout Palestine’. He also criticised international bodies, especially the UN, for showing indifference and he argued that the UNSC had ‘reacted with either one-sided statements in support of the Zionist regime or neutral and ineffective declarations’. He then argued that the aim of Iran was to ‘deescalate the crisis and to avoid further destabilisation and insecurity in the region’ (IRNA, 2006). At the UNSC Meeting on 21 July, the Iranian representative argued that Israel’s attacks were ‘part
of their designs on Lebanon’ seen in their repeated violations of Lebanese borders and airspace, and in their failure to give up the Shebaa farms and return Lebanese detainees held in Israel (UNSC, 2006b). On 31 July, Armin, an Iranian reformist said, ‘These are the days of the beginning of the annihilation of the Zionist regime and the wiping out of all its plans’ (E’témad-e Melli, 2006).

Syria also had its own regional ambitions that it hoped to achieve through its alliance with Iran and support for Hizballah. It wanted to regain control of Lebanon and to gain greater bargaining power with the US and Israel over the return of the Golan Heights. It hoped the war would paralyse or cause the anti-Syrian Siniora-led government to collapse, allowing it to strengthen its hold over Lebanon. The close relationship between Syria and the March 8 Alliance was expressed by Nabih Berri on 28 July when he argued, ‘Syria is not only a friendly country, but it is a brotherly country as well’ (Egyptian Satellite TV, 2006). Walid Muallem, the Syrian foreign minister, expressed Syria’s unlimited support for Hizballah and George Jabour, a Syrian MP, described the kidnapping as a ‘heroic operation’ (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 154, 181; Al Arabiya TV, 2006). At the UNSC Meeting on 21 July 2006, the Syrian representative argued that Israel was ‘committing war crimes and crimes against humanity […] against the territory and the people of Lebanon and of Palestine’ (UNSC, 2006b). Walid Muallem also walked out of the Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers held in Beirut on 7 August in protest at the Siniora government and its pro-US agenda (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 181).

Iran and Syria gave Hizballah vital military support during the war. Iranian planes would deliver arms to Syrian airports that were then sent to Lebanon via the Bekaa valley and Lebanon’s northern border using Syrian trucks (Cordesman, 2006). It was reported that Hizballah had launched liquid-fuel missiles against Israel that had been developed by Iran (Ynet News, 2006a). Some of the weapons used by Hizballah originated in Russia, including Russian anti-tank missiles and rocket propelled grenades that had been sold to Syria and then bought from Syria using Iranian funds and sent to Hizballah (Spyer, 2008: 3; Exum, 2006: 5). Brigadier Yossi Kuperwasser of the Israeli army argued during the war, ‘what we face is an infantry division with state-of-the-art-weaponry. […] They have some of the most advanced antitank
missiles in the world’ (Blanford, 2006: 71). Iran has openly admitted its support for Hizballah, and in 2009 Iran's speaker of parliament, Ali Larijani said ‘The Islamic Republic of Iran supports Hizballah and Hamas because they are defending their countries' territories’ (Press TV, 2009).

It has also been argued that Iran helps train Hizballah fighters and that Iranians were fighting alongside Hizballah during the war (Samii, 2008: 32; Ynet News, 2006). On 1 August, Riyadh Qahwaji, Director of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), argued that ‘all Hizballah elements […] have received training and armament from Iran’ (Al Arabiya TV, 2006e). However, Exum argues that, although they receive high levels of training and support from Iran, Hizballah fighters have greater fighting experience and may actually be training Iranians (Exum, 2006: 7). Although it is highly likely they are exchanging skills and knowledge, Iran is able to offer better training camps and training conditions than Hizballah, especially in the use of heavy weapons. Furthermore, claims that Iranians fought in the war were dismissed by Riyadh Qahwaji who argued ‘so far I have not seen anything to indicate the presence of non-Lebanese fighters, particularly Iranian, in the Lebanese arena’ (Al Arabiya TV, 2006e).

6.2.2 US-led alliance

The US-led alliance supported Israel’s position at the start of the war. However, this changed as the war progressed and members of this alliance, with the exception of the US, began calling for an immediate ceasefire. Their failure to call for an immediate ceasefire and initial support for Israel prolonged the attacks and weakened the Lebanese government’s foreign policy-making capacity. Israel interpreted their failure to call for an immediate ceasefire at the start of the war as a sign that the ‘international’ community supported its actions, which encouraged it to continue its assault against Hizballah (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 106). It was also interpreted by people in Lebanon that the US approved the Israeli attacks. As Timur Goksel argued, ‘people are shocked and enraged that the US has given the green light to destroy their country, they’re shocked to think that their friends – the US, France, Saudi Arabia – are colluding with Israel to destroy Lebanon’ (quoted in Sultan, 2008: 34).

At the international conference in Rome on 26 July, key international players outlined
their positions towards the situation in Lebanon. The UN said its objectives which were to send an enhanced UN force to Lebanon and to place the Shebaa Farms under UN control, while the EU and the US wanted ‘a ceasefire as long as the attacks against Israel do not continue and as long as the state gets the monopoly of power and weapons on its whole territory’ (Pakradouni: 427). The end statement of the conference called for an urgent but not immediate ceasefire (Reuters, 2007). Israel interpreted this as consent from the international community to continue its attacks on Lebanon, as stated by Israeli Justice Minister, Haim Ramon, on 27 July, when he said ‘We received yesterday at the Rome conference permission from the world [...] to continue the operation’ (BBC News Online, 2006a).

During the Rome conference, divisions appeared between France and the US over the nature of a ceasefire. France wanted a ceasefire first so that an international force could be deployed on the ground to ‘unblock the political situation’, while the US wanted a political solution before a ceasefire and for the ceasefire to be part of a ‘global solution’ (Pakradouni: 426). This reflected US hopes that the war would damage Hizballah’s military capacities, which it still considered possible at that time. France, however, thought that this goal was far too ambitious and damaging for Lebanon. Both countries were defending the interests and positions of their regional allies. The US was defending Israel and France the Lebanese Christians, and by extension the March 14-led government (Pellégrini, 2010).

As the war advanced, with the exception of mainly the US and Israel, most members of this alliance began pushing for a diplomatic resolution and a UN resolution to end the war. This change was due to the excessive damage inflicted on south Lebanon, rising Lebanese casualties, especially after the Qana airstrike, extensive Israeli attacks targeting non-Hizballah parts of Lebanon, and when it became clear that Israel was not going to achieve a clear victory over Hizballah. The importance of the international community’s role in ending the war was recognised by members of the Siniora government. On 22 July, during a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Pierre Gemayel asked the government to give Siniora greater leeway to help him negotiate with the international community to reach an ‘end to the total destruction of the country’ (Pakradouni: 423). It meant that Siniora recognised that if he wanted his
foreign policy to be successfully implemented, he needed to design it so that powerful external actors would support it.

6.3.2.1 US

During the war, the US supported Israel’s goals and gave it the diplomatic cover to continue the war, which weakened the Lebanese government and its foreign policy-making capacity. The US’s reaction to the war reflected the desire to eliminate or weaken Hizballah and alter the regional balance of power in its favour. Pellégrini argues that during the war the US showed that it was willing to use military means to get rid of Hizballah and to use Israel as an intermediate tool to achieve its goal (Pellégrini, 2010: 78). He also argues that the US mainly sees Lebanon ‘through the Israeli prism, which can only be distorting’ (Pellégrini, 2010: 78). On 21 July, John Bolton told the UNSC that everyone in the chamber faced a common enemy called terrorism, which is not just coming from organisations like Hizballah and Hamas, but also from their sponsors, Tehran and Damascus. He argued that they should seize the current crisis to ‘once and forever dismantle Hizballah, restore Lebanon’s democratic control over all of its territory, and lay the foundations that would allow Israel to live in peace with its neighbours’ (UNSC, 2006b).

The war also reflected US ambitions to create a new regional order. Statements made by the US showed that it saw the war as part of a bigger geopolitical attempt to redraw the map of the region and alter the regional balance of power. On 21 July, Condoleezza Rice said ‘What we're seeing here [...] are the birth pangs of a new Middle East and whatever we do, we have to be certain that we are pushing forward to the new Middle East, not going back to the old one’ (AFP, 2006e). A week later, on 28 July, President Bush told a press conference, ‘This is a moment of intense conflict in the Middle East. Yet, our aim is to turn it into a moment of opportunity and a chance for broader change in the region’ (Bush, 2006c).

Commentators and journalists both during and after the war also argued that the US wanted to use Lebanon to help it manage the current situation in Iraq. The 2006 war gave the US a chance to confront the Iranians who were intervening in Iraq, and the Syrians who were ‘assisting terrorist cells working against the US army [in Iraq]’, using Israel, its regional proxy (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 154). In April 2006, the
US State Department’s Office for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism published a report which argued that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was ‘increasingly involved in supplying lethal assistance to Iraqi militant groups, which destabilises Iraq’ (US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2006). The US also linked Iran and Syria to the Mahdi army that it claimed was threatening stability in Iraq20 (Howard, 2007). Furthermore, there have been claims of strong links between the Mahdi army and Hizballah and that members of the Mahdi army trained in Lebanon both before and after the 2006 war (Latif and Sands, 2007).

As discussed below, the US responded to the war by doing four main things. It supported Israel militarily and politically, it blamed Hizballah and its allies for the war; it delayed calling for a ceasefire and it supported March 14 elements of the Lebanese government. This affected the Lebanese government’s foreign policy by complicating attempts to achieve a ceasefire, creating a more powerful neighbour for the government to negotiate with, and exacerbating divisions between the March 14 and March 8 elements within the government.

US support for Israel and both their common desire to prolong the war and eliminate Hizballah left the Siniora-led government with three options. First, it could become a US proxy with no autonomy to make its own decisions or policies. Secondly, it could initially support the US and Israeli aims during the war of disarming Hizballah but then, when the damage becomes too great, demand support for a ceasefire. This indicates autonomy of policy but not capability. Thirdly, it could completely reject the war even though it has no capacity to stand up to the US. The Siniora-led government opted for the second choice, however all of these choices would have subjected Lebanon to an enormous level of damage in order to advance US and Israeli regional aims and to get them both to commit to a ceasefire. This suggests that external actors, most notably the US, play an extreme role in determining what happens in the regional system and that the system is, as the theoretical literature suggests, highly penetrated.

20 The Mahdi army is a paramilitary army created in Iraq in 2003 by the Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr (Howard, 2007).
During the war the US’s political and military support for Israel allowed the latter to carry out an extensive attack against Lebanon and complicated attempts to achieve a ceasefire. The US’s reaction to the war was outlined in resolution 923 submitted to the US House of Representatives on 18 July 2006. This resolution condemned the attacks against Israel, saying that they were a ‘clear act of war’ that undermined regional stability and that Israel had a right to defend itself from such attacks. It also blamed the Lebanese government for failing to take care of Hizballah and for incorporating members of the organisation into its cabinet, and Syria and Iran for financing and supporting Hizballah (US House of Representatives, 2008). US bias towards Israel was seen in discourses produced during the war. For example, on 18 July, George Bush referred to ‘Israeli military forces’ and ‘Hizballah terrorists’ (emphasis added), legitimising the actions of the Israelis and delegitimizing those of Hizballah (Bush, 2006b). Furthermore, the US acted on behalf of Israel in negotiations for UNSCR 1701 and, as Sultan argues, ‘it ensured that in the final ceasefire resolution Israel (and therefore itself) was cleared of any blame’ (Sultan, 2008: 5).

The US expressed political support for Israel on 20 July when the US Congress voted overwhelmingly, with four hundred and ten for and eight against, for the motion: ‘Condemning the recent attacks against the State of Israel, holding terrorists and their state-sponsors accountable for such attacks, supporting Israel’s right to defend itself […]’ (Office of the Clerk, 2006). On 31 July, Shimon Peres talks about the moral and political support of the US saying: ‘at this time, I don’t see the slightest distinction between the American people, the Jewish community, and the State of Israel. It’s great to be together on the right side, not to lose hope, and to understand the nature and the cost and the difficulty of maintaining this struggle’ (Peres, 2006). On 13 August, Olmert thanked the US for its assistance during the war and Bush replied ‘that his heart was with the residents of Israel who suffered the attacks perpetrated by the Hizballah’, which he called ‘a terror organisation within a country’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006d).

US military support gave Israel the means to attack Hizballah and, by default,
Lebanon. Pellégrini argues, ‘It is well known that in this conflict the Israelis are not only benefiting from sophisticated ammunitions provided by the US, but also intelligence support that is mainly provided by satellites’ (Pellégrini, 2010: 78). During the war the US sent Israel a total of $300 million in aviation fuel that allowed it to continue its airstrikes (Seale, 2006). This was seen on 14 July when the US Congress was notified about a possible sale of JP-8 aviation fuel to Israel that would ‘contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country’ and which ‘will enable Israel to maintain the operational capability of its aircraft inventory’ (US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2006). On 21 July, the US privately approved a request from Olmert and the Israeli army for precision-guided missiles (Cloud, 2006). The Bush administration also approved a request for thirteen hundred US-made M26 cluster bombs to be sent to Israel during the war, even though Israel’s use of these bombs contravened the US Arms Export Control Act that does not allow weapons such as cluster bombs to be used in populated areas (Sultan, 2008: 60; Gendzier, 2006: 184). Pellégrini explains, that the US also deployed the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) off the Lebanese coast and proposed on 27 July to establish a team of US military staff within UNIFIL during the war. He argues that this team would have transmitted information on the ground back to the US which could then have been communicated back to Tsahal (the Israeli Defence Forces) (Pellégrini, 2010: 78).

The US blamed Hizballah for the war and for the region’s problems and, by refusing to negotiate with the group, made it more difficult to reach a ceasefire. It also refused to speak to Iran until it stopped enriching nuclear materials and, although it made contact with Syria, Bush said on 7 August that its response had not been very positive (Bush, 2006d). Bush blamed Syria, Iran and Hizballah for the region’s crises. At a joint news conference held with Blair on 28 July, he accused them of being ‘willing to kill and to use violence to stop the spread of peace and democracy’ (Bush, 2006c). On 14 August, the US blamed the suffering of the Lebanese people in the war on Hizballah and its state sponsors Iran and Syria (Christian Newswire, 2006).

The US did not push for an immediate ceasefire because it wanted to ensure a permanent change to the situation on the ground before the fighting stopped. This
meant disarming Hizballah and stopping the transfer of weapons to the group across the border from Syria. However, it underestimated Hizballah’s strength. Its failure to call for an immediate ceasefire prolonged the war giving Israel more time to carry out its military objectives and weakening the Lebanese government. On 16 July Bush failed to call for an immediate ceasefire and instead accused Hizballah of being the root cause of instability in the region. He said, ‘in order to solve this problem, it’s really important for the world to address the root cause’ (Bush, 2006a). John Bolton, US ambassador to the UN, told the BBC on 22 March 2007 that the US wanted Israel to ‘eliminate Hizballah’s military capacity’ before any ceasefire and that it had only started calling for an end to hostilities once it was clear that Israel would not be able to disarm Hizballah (BBC News Online, 2007a).

On 7 August, Bush justified his failure to call for an immediate ceasefire saying that it was more important to secure a long-term solution to the conflict. He said, ‘Part of the problem in the past in the Middle East is people would paper over the root cause of the problem, and therefore, the situation would seemingly be quiet, and then lo and behold, there’d be another crisis. And innocent people would suffer. And so our strategy all along has been, of course we want to have a cessation of hostilities, but what we want to do in the same time is to make sure that there is a way forward for the Lebanese Government to secure its own country so that there’s peace in the region’ (Bush, 2006d).

The US continued to block an immediate ceasefire even though most other members of the US-led coalition supported one. At the Rome Conference diplomatic sources said that ‘most countries involved in the talks want an immediate cease-fire, while the U.S. contends a simple cessation of hostilities is not enough’ (CNN, 2006). However, after the tragedy in Qana the US started to realise that Israel would not be able to disable Hizballah and, along with Israel, it began looking for the best way to secure a ceasefire and the least embarrassing exit route from the war for Israel (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 165). On 7 August, Bush said he would support a draft UN Resolution that called for a end to hostilities (Bush, 2006d).

Besides disabling Hizballah, the US also hoped to strengthen March 14 elements of
the Lebanese government in line with its wider goal of spreading democracy in the region. Bush expressed US support for the Lebanese government on 13 July, saying that its ‘newfound independence has come under attack in recent days from terrorists and their state sponsors, who see freedom and democracy as a threat. The United States and its allies will stand with those in Lebanon who continue to struggle for their independence and sovereignty and who refuse to give over their country to extremism and terror’ (Bush, 2006). Pakradouni explains that on 24 July, during Rice’s visit to Lebanon, she supported Siniora and spoke about his ‘courage and resistance’. He says that at the end of the meeting officials were convinced that the US and the prime minister of Lebanon had the same position and the same goals (Pakradouni: 424).

US support for the Siniora-government also raised criticisms in Lebanon that it was too close to the US. Khalidi argues that Siniora was seen as ‘Bush’s man in Lebanon’ and as friends with Israel by default (Khalidi, 2009: 3). The close relationship meant that there was, as Salloukh explains, ‘a kind off implicit agreement [with the Lebanese government] that the Israelis should be left to do their work’ (Salloukh, 2009a). A Lebanese academic argues that their close relations meant that the Siniora-led government asked the US to persuade the Israelis not to destroy downtown Beirut, which was a showcase of the ‘Hariri reconstruction myth’21 (Interview B, 2009). A senior Hizballah representative also argued that Bush saw Siniora as an asset to US security (Interview G, 2009).

However, despite expressing a desire to strengthen the Lebanese government by prolonging the Israeli attacks, the US’s actions actual weakened it. On 14 July, Lebanon’s representative at the UN Council said that, by ignoring Lebanon’s calls to negotiate the crisis through the UN and other actors, Israel had shown its intention to escalate the crisis, to ‘kill and destroy’ and to implement the scorched-earth policy for which it is known (UNSC, 2006). At the UNSC meeting on 20 July, Kofi Annan outlined that Israel’s operations were not weakening popular support for Hizballah,

21 He says ‘myth’ to highlight accusations that during the reconstruction process lots of money ended up in private pockets.
but were in fact weakening the Lebanese government. He argued, ‘the very government which Israel wants to extend its control has itself become a hostage to the crisis, is less able than ever to deploy its forces in the areas necessary to control Hizballah, and is appealing to the international community for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire’ (UNSC, 2006a). The US was the only actor that could stop Israel from attacking Lebanon and its failure to call for an immediate ceasefire showed that it was prioritising its own regional ambitions over the interests of both Lebanon and the Siniora-led government. This became clear when the US failed to call for a ceasefire despite reports showing that Israel’s attacks were weakening Siniora’s government.

By blaming Hizballah, supporting Israel and failing to call for an immediate ceasefire, the US government prevented a quick end to the war and enhanced Hizballah’s position by allowing it to show its ability to withstand Israel’s attacks. This affected Lebanese foreign policy by weakening the position of the Lebanese government and strengthening Hizballah’s popularity. This enhanced divisions within Lebanon and made it more difficult for the Lebanese government to create a coherent foreign policy response. It meant that the Siniora-led government had to design a foreign policy agenda that was supported by the US if it was to be implemented.

6.3.2.2 France

France played an important role in the war because its historical and cultural connections and current strategic interests make it keen to support the Lebanese state. Despite being part of the EU, France pursues a unilateral policy towards Lebanon based on its own interests (Goksel, 2010: 1). Lebanon is important to France because of historical links with the Maronite Christians and because of its role as the mandate power in Lebanon from 1920 to 1946. It is also an important strategic focus because France holds more influence there than in any other country in the region. Nafaa argues that France became so involved in the 2006 war because it wanted to regain some of its old regional influence (Nafaa, 2008: 284). Furthermore, because the Middle East is internationally important, retaining a role in Lebanon allows France to boost its status at the international level.

France’s support for the Siniora-led government was visible throughout the war when
it criticised Israel for damaging the Lebanese state and called for the matter to be referred to the UN. However, like the US, it failed to call for an immediate ceasefire at the start of the war. On 13 July, Philippe Douste-Blazy, the French foreign minister, said, ‘For several hours, there has been a bombardment of an airport of an entirely sovereign country, a friend of France [...] this is a disproportionate act of war [...] the matter should be referred to the United Nations Security Council as soon as possible’ (Urquhart, 2006). On 14 July, Jean-Marc de La Sablière, French Ambassador to the UN, who held the French Presidency of the UNSC during July 2006, told the UNSC that Israel’s response ‘threatened to erase Lebanese efforts to restore its economy and state authority throughout the territory, as well as to consolidate democracy’ (UNSC, 2006). However, a week later Mr. De La Sablière called for an immediate end to the hostilities and to ‘give the search for a diplomatic solution a chance’. He also argued that by ‘destroying the country’s infrastructure, strangling its economy and targeting the Lebanese army, Israel is greatly weakening the Lebanese State’ (UNSC, 2006b).

After the war, on 23 August, French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy stressed the need to preserve the sovereignty of the Lebanese State whilst giving the Israelis security (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006q).

France was an important diplomatic actor during the war and it represented Lebanon in negotiations for UNSCR 1701. It supported the Lebanese government and pushed for the US to include parts of Siniora’s plan in the final UN resolution after Lebanon rejected the draft UN resolution. It acted as an important ‘counterweight to and chief interlocutor of the Americans’ because it was pushing for an immediate ceasefire, in contrast to the US which wanted an agreement first before a ceasefire (Hirst, 2010: 367). A European diplomat argues that during the war France was trying to find a compromise between security in Israel and security in Lebanon and its biggest task in the negotiations was persuading the US to act (Interview J, 2009). Pellégrini argued that because France is a major contributor to UNIFIL it is kept up to date on the situation on the ground, which gave it a key advantage in negotiating an effective resolution to end the conflict (Pellégrini, 2010: 78). In contrast, the US is less familiar with events on the ground because it does not have a military force stationed there, making it less able to understand the complexities of the Lebanon political and security situation.
Like the Siniora-led government, France also expressed concern Syria was trying to retake control of Lebanon. Jacques Chirac, French President during the war, maintained close relations with the Hariri family and France had adopted tough policies towards Syria after it was accused of being involved in Rafik Hariri’s assassination. Piccard argued in 2006 that France upset Syria by upholding UNSCR’s 1559 and 1680, by closely supporting March 14, and by allying with the US to isolate Syria (Picard, 2006: 148). However, France wanted to maintain good relations with Iran due to the large number of French soldiers deployed in south Lebanon as part of the reinforced UNIFIL force under UNSCR 1701, which was also under French command (Bahout, 2007: 189). This was visible at the end of the war when the French foreign minister visited the Iranian embassy in Beirut and, after meeting his Iranian counterpart, said that Iran was an element of stability in the region (Bahout, 2007: 191).

France played an important role during the war. It supported the Siniora-led government’s foreign policy agenda by pushing for an immediate ceasefire, reflecting its greater understanding of the situation on the ground and the difficulties involved in trying to disarm Hizballah and by pushing for UNSCR 1701 to include parts of the Siniora Plan.

6.3.2.4 ‘Moderate’ Arab states

During the war, the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states supported the Siniora-led Lebanese government, criticised Hizballah for starting the war, and failed to call for an immediate ceasefire. It was the first time that Arab states had openly condemned the actions of an Arab actor against Israel. It is likely that the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states secretly wanted to prolong the war in the hope that Israel would destroy

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22 UNSCR 1559 calls for the Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon and for Hizballah to disarm so that the Lebanese government could exert sovereignty over all its land (UNSCR, 2004).

23 UNSCR 1680 calls for the implementation of UNSCR 1559, the delineation of the border between Lebanon and Syria, controls to be placed on arms being transferred into Lebanon, and further efforts to disarm militias and reassert the government’s authority over all its territory (UNSCR, 2006a).
Hizballah, however, this actually ended up weakening the Lebanese state.

At the start of war, they issued statements criticising both the kidnapping and Israel’s response. By failing to call for an immediate ceasefire they encouraged Israel to continue its assault. Salloukh argues ‘I think it is difficult to predict whether the Israelis would have [reacted in the way they did to the kidnapping], without this regional situation where they literally found themselves pushed and urged by so-called moderate Arab states to go in’ (Salloukh, 2009a). Olmert’s outlined this position in his statement on 14 July when he said that some Arab countries were aware of what was happening and approved of it (Pakradouni: 417). Olmert spoke about Arab support for Israel, saying ‘See for yourselves how many Arab-Muslim countries distance themselves from Hizballah and join the majority of world nations which denounce this terrorist organisation and justify Israel's right to self-defence’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006m).

On July 14, Jordan and Egypt condemned the Israeli aggression, backed up the Lebanese government and attacked Hizballah saying ‘We condemn the irresponsible escalatory acts that have the potential to lead the region into a dangerous situation’ (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 103). On 15 July, Saudi Arabia also issued a statement heavily criticising Hizballah’s behaviour (Al Jazeera, 2006a), while Saudi religious sages described Hizballah as the ‘party of Satan’ not the ‘party of God’ (Ynet News, 2006b). Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, the Palestinian Authority, the UAE and Bahrain released a statement the following day saying that Hizballah had engaged in ‘unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible acts’ (AP, 2006). In response, Hizballah told the Arab League meeting in Cairo on 15 July that ‘an Arab and international plot was afoot, along with forces in Lebanon, that was designed to liquidate us’ (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 103). The initial failure of moderate Arab states to support Hizballah was seen in the region as ‘a stab in the back by servile Arabs of valiant ones’ and led to growing hostility from the Arab public against their regimes (Hirst, 2010: 360). After the war, referring to elites in so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states, Nasrallah said that whenever they are ‘torn between two choices – between Jerusalem, their people and the dignity of their homeland on the one hand and their thrones on the other – they always chose their thrones’ (Hirst, 2010: 377).
Despite failing to call for an immediate ceasefire, the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states also expressed support for the Siniora government. On 18 July, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, stressed that Saudi Arabia stood besides the legitimate authorities in Lebanon and fully supported the Lebanese government and its goals ‘in preserving the interest of Lebanon, in maintaining its independence and in asserting its authority over the whole of Lebanon’ (Al Arabiya TV, 2006a). On 27 July, King Abdullah of Jordan expressed his fears that the 2006 war was an attempt by Israel to weaken and destroy the Lebanese state so that Lebanon could be taken over by Syria’s allies (Al Arabiya TV, 2006c).

Some Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Jordan, financially supported the Lebanese government during and after the conflict. At the start of the war, King Abdullah of Jordan offered fifty million dollars in aid to Lebanon (Qatari Al-Jazeera Satellite TV, 2006). Saudi Arabia also helped with the post-war reconstruction effort and provided a grant of five hundred million dollars to establish an Arab and international fund to support the reconstruction of Lebanon (Al Arabiya TV, 2006c). Their financial assistance strengthened the position of the Siniora-led government and its foreign policy agenda and helped counterbalance the power and influence of Iran and Syria in Lebanon, especially in the postwar period.

As the war progressed ‘moderate’ Arab states changed their position and began pushing for a ceasefire under pressure from Arab public opinion, which encouraged international diplomatic efforts to secure an end to the fighting. The high level of support for Hizballah from amongst the Arab public was recognised by the Egyptian poet Ahmed Fouad Negm who said, ‘I asked the man who sweeps the street under my building what he thought, and he said: ‘Uncle Ahmed, he [Nasrallah] has awakened the dead man inside me! May God make him triumphant’ (MacFacquhar, 2006). On 27 July, the Egyptian government praised the resistance and called for an end to the war. The Saudi Grand Mufti retracted a fatwa it had issued against Hizballah and the Saudi government supported calls for a ceasefire and attempts to find a comprehensive solution to the crisis (Al Arabiya TV, 2006c). Jordanian and Kuwaiti intellectuals praised Hizballah and argued that the war had destroyed Israel’s image of
invincibility (Focus Web, 2006: 7-8).

The Arab public was especially outraged by the high civilian death toll in Lebanon, particularly after the tragic events in Qana on 30 July, which helped turn the elites of ‘moderate’ Arab states against the war. After this, Prince Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia told Rice that if this was her ‘new Middle East […] we would rather go back to the old’ (Middle East Reporter, 2006). On 30 July, referring to ‘the ugly crime perpetrated by Israeli forces in Qana’ the King of Jordan said, ‘This criminal aggression constitutes a blatant violation of the law and all international conventions’ (Halaby, 2006). On 31 July, Khouri argued ‘The hope on the Arab side is that […] Hizballah's continued military steadfastness will channel increasingly angry Arab public opinion towards pushing Arab governments to support a negotiated solution’ (Khouri, 2006). The ‘moderate’ Arab states change in opinion weakened Israel’s position by forcing it to face a hostile regional environment and pushed it to seek a diplomatic end to hostilities. This helped the Lebanese government push forward its foreign policy agenda and secure an agreement to end the war.

6.2.3 The international forum

Other external actors and forums that had an important impact on events during the 2006 war are the UN and the G8. At the start of the war they supported US and Israeli goals by blaming Hizballah for the war, failing to call for an immediate ceasefire and supporting the Siniora-led Lebanese government. Their failure to call for an immediate ceasefire also weakened the Lebanese government.

Later in the war the UN changed its position and started calling for an immediate ceasefire and protection of the Lebanese government, which helped push forward diplomatic negotiations to end the fighting. The UN also provided a forum in which negotiations to end the war took place, in the form of UNSCR 1701, and the deployment of an enhanced UNIFIL force in Lebanon supported the Lebanese government’s aspirations to assert its sovereign authority over all its territory.

During the war the UN lost credibility in the region by failing to defend the values it claims to uphold. On its website it argues that it is an organisation devoted to achieving international peace and security and to promoting peacekeeping, peace
building and conflict prevention (United Nations, 2010). However, it did not support these values during the war because it failed to call for an immediate ceasefire and to stop Israel intensifying its assault on Lebanon in the run up to the end of the war. This led Robert Falk, Professor Emeritus of international law at Princeton University, to argue that ‘the UN is all too often a geopolitical tool for powerful superpowers rather than an instrument for the enforcement of international law’ (Falk and Bali, 2006). The UN’s credibility in the region was already under question before the war because of its failure to ensure Israel’s compliance with previous UN resolutions. This reflects realist arguments that international organisations only work because they are an extension of states’ interests.

On the second day of the war UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan condemned Hizballah’s attack and called for the immediate and unconditional release of the kidnapped soldiers, but not for an immediate end to hostilities (UNSC, 2006). On 17 July, five days into the war, Kofi Annan started to talk about ending hostilities at the G8 Conference, but he did not demand an immediate end to the fighting. He called for a cessation of hostilities ‘as soon as practicable in order to give time for a multinational ‘stabilisation force’ to be established along the Israeli-Lebanese border’ (AFP, 2006d).

However, Annan soon changed his position and on 20 July told the UNSC that there needed to be an immediate cessation of hostilities (UNSC, 2006a). On 21 July, Mr. Vijay Nambiar, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General, outlined the two political goals of the UN, which were to urgently secure a cessation of hostilities and to develop a political framework for ending the war. It was hoped this framework would ensure a ‘full and durable ceasefire’, prevent a return to the situation before 12 July, end the threat Hizballah posed to Israel, and ensure full respect for the sovereignty of the Lebanese government (UNSC, 2006b).

However, UN calls for an immediate ceasefire were ignored. As Annan acknowledged on 30 July, this brought into question the authority of the UN and led to further loss of life, something which provoked ‘moral outrage throughout the world’ (UNSC, 2006c). Anger against the UN ended in a number of protestors setting
fire to the UN headquarters in Beirut. Annan responded by arguing that, although Israel has a right to defend itself, its way of doing so was ‘wholly unacceptable’, and he again called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, which was again ignored by Israel (UNSC, 2006c).

Despite heavy criticism the UN played an important role both during and after the war. It provided a forum for discussions to end the crisis and its role in Lebanon increased after the war ended when an enlarged UNIFIL force was deployed in south Lebanon. Various UN agencies were also involved in humanitarian efforts during the war, including the UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organisation (WHO), UNIFIL, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (UNSC, 2006b). The Siniora-led government recognised the importance of the UN and it made frequent appeals to the organisation for help in ending the war. Siniora kept in regular contact with Kofi Annan and his government stressed its willingness to negotiate with Israel through the UN. This was apparent early in the war, when the Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed that ‘negotiations and discussions should take place through the United Nations and Arab and friendly countries’ (Qatari Al-Jazeera Satellite TV, 2006).

The UN also supported the Lebanese government over Hizballah, reflecting its position as an organisation that defends the Westphalian state system from war and conflict, but also reflecting the agenda of the US-led alliance. On 20 July, Kofi Annan argued that it was clear the Lebanese government had no advance knowledge of the attack and that Hizballah’s actions were holding ‘an entire nation hostage’. Annan also argued that, although Israel had a right to defend itself, its actions had failed to weaken Hizballah and, in the words of Siniora, ‘torn the country to shreds’. He explained that, despite Israel’s hopes that the sovereign authority of the Lebanese government would be extended over all its territory, its actions had in fact weakened the Lebanese government and made it ‘less able than ever to deploy its forces in the areas necessary to control Hizballah’ (UNSC, 2006a).

The G8 also played an important role in the war and the 32nd G8 summit was held in
St Petersburg from 15-17 July 2006. It is not an international actor, but it is an important forum in which major power debate their interests. The end statement of the summit reflected the goals of the US-led alliance by supporting Israel’s agenda. It blamed the crisis on extremist forces, namely Hamas and Hizballah, for trying to destabilise the region and ‘frustrate the aspirations of Palestinian, Israeli and Lebanese people for democracy and peace’. It asked for UNSCR 1559 to be implemented, which calls for Hizballah to be disarmed and it supported Israel’s military requests by calling for the return of the kidnapped soldiers and an end to shelling of Israeli territory. It also failed to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and instead called for the conditions to be created to allow this to happen. It failed to recognise any of Hizballah’s demands, which were also the demands of the Lebanese government. These included the return of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel, the withdrawal of Israel from occupied Lebanese territory and an end to Israeli violations of Lebanon’s borders by air, sea, or land. However, it criticised Israel and called on it to avoid injuring civilians and infrastructure, which would undermine the stability of the Lebanese government (G8 Russia, 2006).

The G8’s position weakened the Siniora-led government by prolonging the war and failing to support its foreign policy agenda by bringing about an urgent end to hostilities. After the summit, Siniora argued that the international community had deserted Lebanon and that international attempts to resolve the crisis had been designed to give Israel more time to achieve its military objectives (Al Arabiya TV, 2006b). The failure to call for an immediate ceasefire also strengthened the position of Israel, and encouraged it to continue its assault, which undermined the Lebanese government. Olmert said after the summit, ‘We can all see how the majority of the international community supports our battle against the terror organizations and our efforts to remove this threat from the Middle East’ (Olmert, 2006a). Israeli Foreign Minster Tzipi Livni said after the summit that the G8 statement shows that ‘Israel and the international community share common values and are facing a common problem which is expressed through the actions of extreme terrorist elements, such as

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24 The G8 summit was attended by the core G8 members: France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, US, EC, as well as other national leaders and heads of international organisations.
Hizballah and Hamas. […] Israel believes along with the international community that these extremist elements are responsible for the conflict’ (Livni, 2006). On 19 July, Livni also said that ‘Israel intends to work with the international community, based on the principles outlined in the statement issued by the G8 on July 16’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006h).

6.2.3.1 UNSCR 1701: The First Diplomatic Outcome

France and the US were the main actors involved in negotiating UNSCR 1701. During the last days of the conflict the French Ambassador to the UN, Marc de La Sablière, and the US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, met daily to discuss the proposed UN resolution (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 201). On 5 August, they presented a draft UN resolution (AFP, 2006). This was the first serious result of international diplomatic efforts to achieve a ceasefire and it was rejected by both Lebanon and Israel. Israel wanted the resolution to mention Hizballah by name and objected to any comparison being made between the kidnapped Israeli soldiers and the Lebanese held in Israeli jails (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a). The Lebanese government and Hizballah rejected the resolution because it failed to include aspects of the Siniora Plan which called on Israel to withdraw from south Lebanon (Ya Libnan, 2006). Sultan argues that the resolution was biased because it called for Israel to cease its ‘offensive actions’, which meant that ‘defensive actions’ could continue. As Israel argued that all its military incursions in Lebanon were defensive, it failed to call for an end to Israeli attacks. At the same time it called on Hizballah to halt all military actions, blamed it for being the aggressor, and failed to recognise Israel’s disproportionate response (Sultan, 2008: 45).

The final UNSCR 1701 was a compromise between the French and the US. The French Ambassador to the UN, Jean-Marc La Sablière, explained that the resolution aimed to end the war, to create a new situation without Hizballah south of the Litani River, and to ensure a long-term solution to the situation (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 218). It included the decision to strengthen UNIFIL by increasing the number of UNIFIL soldiers deployed and by giving it a new, clearer and stronger mandate. Negotiations for the resolution also reflected the different positions of the US and France. Bahout argued that the US first wanted to achieve a long-term solution to the problem before establishing a ceasefire and that its main goals were to get rid off or
disarm Hizballah, turn the Lebanese political scene against it and turn Lebanon against Syria and Iran. In contrast France’s goals were less ambitious and focused on achieving a ceasefire first followed by a solution to the conflict. France also wanted to limit Hizballah’s military capacity and to integrate it into local politics in the best possible way for its March 14 allies, so as to stabilise Lebanon and limit Syria’s influence (Bahout, 2007: 189). Picard also argues that France differed from the US over UNSCR 1701 because it supported Lebanese wishes to retain their sovereignty despite the presence of UNIFIL troops in the south (Picard, 2006: 148).

Once it was finalised, UNSCR 1701 was widely supported by members of the international community including the US, France, the EU, Russia, China, Turkey, Japan and Singapore (AFP, 2006b). US President George Bush praised UNSCR 1701 and said, ‘I now urge the international community to turn words into action and make every effort to bring lasting peace to the region’ (AFP, 2006b). Chirac said ‘I hail the unanimous adoption tonight by the UN Security Council of a resolution calling for a complete cessation of hostilities in Lebanon’. It was also backed by the EU and its President ‘urged all parties to fully respect the resolution’ and called for it to be immediately implemented (AFP, 2006b). However, the entire international community did not support it, and analysts and members of the Iranian-Syrian led alliance criticised it, as detailed below. The resolution’s failure to address these criticisms limited its long-term effectiveness.

UNSCR 1701 was criticised in several ways. Picard argues that it reflects the ‘dualistic understanding’ of France and US towards Lebanon, which positions a democratic Lebanon belonging to the March 14 alliance against the forces of Islamist Hizballah backed by Syria and Iran. She also argued that this shows its failure to understand the complexities of Lebanese politics at the domestic level (Picard, 2006: 142). France and the US were criticised for using the UN resolution to pressurise Iran, Syria and Hizballah into conforming to their demands and of creating a regional security agenda in line with US and Israeli regional objectives. This is because the resolution calls for the disarmament of Hizballah and limits its freedom of movement in south Lebanon by deploying the Lebanese army and an enhanced UNIFIL force in the region (Picard, 2006: 147; Leenders et al., 2006: 7). The resolution restricted
Hizballah’s freedom of movement while failing to curtail Israel’s ability to strike Lebanon. This illustrates how international actors have used their influence over international organisations to impose their will on the Middle East regional system.

UNSCR 1701 was also criticised by Iran and Syria, who argued that it compromised the neutrality of the UN by its bias towards Israel. They said that it was designed to disarm Hizballah, something Israel had failed to achieve militarily during the war, that it reflected an Israeli agenda and Israeli military goals, and that it failed to condemn the brutality of Israel’s actions. The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), Syria’s official news agency, said ‘Syria is sorry that the resolution shied away from recognising Israel's responsibility for its savage attacks on civilians and its destruction of Lebanese infrastructure, which constitute war crimes’ (Reuters, 2006). Iran rejected the resolution on the grounds that it was biased and ambiguous because it only called for an end to ‘offensive’ Israeli military operations (AFP, 2006b). Iranian Foreign Minister said on state television that the ‘UN resolution 1701 is completely one-sided and it serves the Zionist regime's interests’ (AFP, 2006b). It was also criticised in the Jordan Times for failing to resolve issues such as the release of Lebanese prisoners and the future of the Shebaa Farms (Jordan Times, 2006).

International diplomatic negotiations, therefore, played an important role in bolstering the position of the Lebanese government, but they did little to increase unity in Lebanon and help build peace and stability in the postwar region through a strong and fair UN resolution. UNSCR 1701 supported the foreign and domestic policy objectives of the Siniora-led government by, for example, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of Hizballah. However, because of its bias towards Israel, it exacerbated existing divisions in the government and incapacitated its policy-making capacity in the post-war period.

6.2.4 Appeals for regional and international support

Part of Siniora’s foreign policy agenda during the war was to seek regional and international support to end the war. This shows the weakness of the Lebanese state and its vulnerability to international and regional forces. It also shows that foreign policy needs to be supported by external actors to ensure its implementation.
During the war, Siniora appealed directly to Arab governments and emphasised Lebanon’s regional role and Arab identity. This was seen at the start of the war, on 15 July, when Siniora asked Lebanon’s ‘friends around the world to come to its assistance, to exert pressure to stop the aggression and to provide humanitarian aid’ (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006). He also argued on 16 July that the government’s role was ‘to maintain contact with all Arab and foreign countries in order to reach a comprehensive and immediate ceasefire’ (Qatari Al-Jazeera Satellite TV, 2006). On the same day, he broke down into tears during a speech when he pleaded with the UN to broker a ceasefire (AP, 2006). This attracted international attention to the desperate plight of his government. On 30 July, after the Qana massacre he also appealed to all Lebanese and Arabs and ‘peace-loving people in the world, asking them to back Lebanon and support the process of an immediate and unconditional cease-fire’ (Al Manar TV, 2006g).

Siniora also tried to secure regional assistance for his government at the conference of Arab foreign ministers on 7 August 2006. During the conference he argued that Arab leaders had already played an important role ‘in pressuring the major powers and the rest of the international community’. However, he explained that Lebanon needed to combine its own resources with those of its Arab friends and international humanitarian actors if it wanted to survive the crisis and achieve a ceasefire. He asked for regional help to pressurise the international community into designing a UN resolution that included Lebanese demands, and to support Lebanon once the war ended. He argued that Lebanon needed regional help with relief efforts and reconstruction after the war and regional political and diplomatic support to stop future attacks. He added that Lebanon has chosen an Arab identity and that Arab states have a ‘right and duty’ to stand with Lebanon, this means that the ‘security of the Arabs is one, and the Arab future is one’ (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006e). He used Islamic terms of reference and quoted a Koranic verse at the end of his speech to

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25 Lebanese demands, as detailed in Siniora’s Seven-Point Plan, called for a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire, a simultaneous and complete Israeli withdrawal, liberation of the Shebaa Farms, exchange of prisoners, and extension of Lebanese government authority over all its territory (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006e).
emphasise his religious connections with the Islamic world (Lebanese LBC Sat TV, 2006). Siniora was successful at invoking regional support and after the conference a delegation of Arab ministers went to New York to lobby for the position of the Lebanese government. They helped Siniora push forward his foreign policy agenda and, after their visit, parts of Siniora’s Seven Point Plan were incorporated into UNSCR 1701.

Besides appealing to regional actors Siniora made direct appeals to international actors. On 19 July, he released a statement asking the international community to ensure ‘an immediate humanitarian ceasefire and assistance to my war ravaged country’ (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006a). He asked for help again at the Rome Conference on 26 July and after the Qana massacre on 30 July, when he asked the diplomatic corps ‘to urge [their] governments, especially those who are members of the Security Council, to back our request for an immediate session of the Security Council and our call for an unconditional cease-fire’ (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006c). On 9 August, Siniora asked for international help to ensure that Israel abided by international humanitarian law (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006f). The final decision of UNSCR 1701 to send Lebanese troops and a reinforced UNIFIL force into south Lebanon shows that the Siniora-led government worked with international and regional actors to ensure the Lebanese state held sovereign authority over south Lebanon, something the government was too weak to do alone.

Despite being close to the US and its allies, Siniora also criticised ‘international’ initiatives during the war aimed at supporting the Lebanese government. On 19 July, he argued that they failed to develop into ‘clear-cut plans’ and that they gave Israel more time to carry out its attacks on Lebanon in the hope that it would destroy Hizbullah (Al Arabiya TV, 2006b). Siniora also argued that the ‘international’ community had contributed to the war by not giving Lebanon the support it needed in the pre-war period. He argued that it had failed to help the Lebanese government secure sovereignty over the south of Lebanon or to disarm the armed resistance in the run up to the war, things which should have been happened in accordance with the
Ta'if Accord26 (Al Arabiya TV, 2006b). It can, therefore, be argued that members of the international community contributed to the outbreak of the war and complicated efforts by the Lebanese government to achieve a ceasefire.

International and regional backing was important for supporting the Lebanese government in the war because it raised the profile of the government’s policies at an international level and influenced when, and under what conditions the war would end.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter shows that the regional system had an important impact on Lebanese foreign policy during the 2006 war. It does this by identifying the interests of the different regional and international actors in Lebanon during the war and by showing how they shaped and prolonged the war. During the war the regional system affected Lebanese foreign policy because of the influence of external actors on sub-state groups, which consolidated existing divisions within Lebanon and weakened the state and its capacity to make foreign policy decisions. This also meant that Siniora was forced to devise a foreign policy that relied on the support of external actors to make it happen. The question is why Siniora was so vulnerable to external interests, something that cannot be answered by looking at systemic factors, but only by understanding the connections between sub-state identity actors and external actors and the relationship between sub-state identity groups themselves.

This chapter shows us that a systemic level of analysis can account for certain aspects of Lebanese foreign policy-making but not for everything. For example, it does not explain why and how external actors were able to penetrate Lebanon, and why Lebanon was so divided between different domestic groups. It concludes that there was not in fact much foreign policy taking place in Lebanon during the war because the Lebanese state lacked the capacity to carry any out, but it does not explain why the state was so ineffective. To answer this question it is necessary to look beyond

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26 The Ta’if Accord was a Saudi brokered peace deal to end the Lebanese civil war that was signed in October 1989 and ratified in November 1990.
systemic structures and focusing on what was happening within the Lebanese state at the state and sub-state levels, which is the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 7: State and sub-state factors affecting Lebanese foreign policy during the 2006 war

This chapter looks at the reason why the Lebanese government was so vulnerable to external interests by looking at the precise connections between external actors and sub-state actors and the relations between sub-state actors themselves. It starts by looking at how identities were visible in Lebanon during the war before assessing why and how sectarian divisions prevented the state from implementing a strong foreign policy. It then looks at how these weaknesses were manifested in the government’s response to the outbreak and progress of the war, focusing particularly on Siniora’s Seven Point Plan and UNSCR 1701.

It argues that divisions in the state prevented the government from formulating a coherent response to the war in several ways. First, the government’s lack of sovereign authority gave sub-state groups, especially Hizballah, the power to take on the state’s role and project their own foreign policy agendas. It also meant that the government formulated foreign policy to help it push through domestic policy decisions, such as disarming Hizballah. Secondly, the government was split between members of the 8 March and 14 March alliances who held different foreign policy objectives, making it difficult to reach consensus over foreign policy decisions. Thirdly, the government lacked strong institutions and was unable to mobilise the necessary state tools and resources, such as the Lebanese army, to protect the Lebanese state from external attack. This meant that it had to resort to diplomatic rather than military solutions to end the war.

It concludes that during the war sub-state identity fractured foreign policy and prevented the state from acting like a rational, unitary actor within the regional system. This is because the government is made up from a coalition of different sectarian identities that respond to the interests and dynamics of their sectarian group rather than to the interests of the state. These sectarian groups are allied with and influenced by external actors. Furthermore, when the government is able to agree on a foreign policy direction it is unable to implement it because identity has fractured and weakened state institutions. This shows that foreign policy is not only the result of responses to regional structural determinants but to unit-level identity based
considerations. Furthermore, this chapter shows that the only time groups in Lebanon are able to share a common foreign policy interest is when the state itself is under existential threat. It is only at that point that links with external actors become less important that the links between the groups, in the way they approach foreign policy-making.

### 7.1 Identity and the 2006 war

Politics and religion are inseparable in Lebanon because all religious identities have a political agenda, and all religious groups are political groups. Therefore, every political move made, every external alliance formed and every foreign policy decision taken is to further the political position of a confessional group. This makes religious identity the driving force behind every political decision made in Lebanon. The March 8 and March 14 alliances follow their own political agendas, which reflect a Sunni-Shi’a conflict for control over post-Syria Lebanon. This mirrors a wider regional conflict between Sunni and Shi’a that also places Western allied Arab states against an Iranian-Syrian alliance. These alliances show that there are two principal or primary identity groups in Lebanon, the Sunni and the Shi’a, and that the Christians and other smaller identity groups are forced to bandwagon with either one depending on which best defends their interests.

In this context, the 2006 war can be seen as part of an internal sectarian conflict between the Sunni and Shi’a for control of post-Syria Lebanon. This conflict started after the Syrians withdrew from Lebanon in 2005 and it draws in domestic, regional and international actors. It was a fight between the Sunni, represented by Hariri’s Future Movement, and the Shi’a, represented by Hizballah, with each side bandwagoning with an external actor (Salloukh, 2009a). The Sunni bandwagoned with the US and Israel against their local enemy the Shi’a, while the Shi’a bandwagoned with Iran and Syria against the Sunni. This illustrates how identity shapes Lebanon because each group’s identity affects how it sees the identity of Lebanon and its foreign policy orientation. As Salloukh argues, the Sunni have a mercantile vision of Lebanon while the Shi’a see Lebanon as a bastion against Israel (Salloukh, 2010a). Furthermore, Aoun’s alliance with March 8 was important in the war because it meant that March 8 was not simply a Shi’a alliance acting alone. This prevented the war from being just a war between Hizballah and Israel (Salloukh,
The war took place at a time when identity groups in Lebanon were reaching roughly equal proportions, with approximately each group, the Christians, Shi’a, and Sunni, each representing roughly thirty percent of the population. This makes it difficult for the country to function because the groups are jostling against each other for control over Lebanon and the lack of a dominant group means that there is no real leadership. Furthermore, demographic projections suggesting that the Shi’a will be the dominant group in Lebanon in the future have heightened insecurity amongst the Christians and Sunni. This is manifested in an increasing search by these groups for ways to hold onto power by bandwagoning with other internal actors and with external actors or states. Projections suggest that by 2081 Christians will make up 11% of the population, Sunni 36.6% and Shi’a 44.83% (The Monthly, 2007: 10).

Lebanon remained politically divided during the war with both the March 8 and March 14 alliances pursuing their own political agendas and pre-existing political differences continuing to influence events. Salloukh argues that the war did not unite Lebanon and that divisions remained clear throughout the conflict. Members of the March 14 alliance believed Hizballah was responsible for the destruction to Lebanon and hoped it would be destroyed so they could take complete control over state institutions (Salloukh, 2009a). A Lebanese academic explains that the war in 2006 took place at a time of heightened sectarianism within the country and that this became more obvious after the end of the war, especially when Hizballah began taking a more active role in domestic politics (Interview I, 2009).

Divisions during the war have been described by a foreign diplomat who explained ‘Lebanon suffers from schizophrenia. Christians, Sunnis, Druze – everybody wanted the war to end and for Beirut and its vicinity to return to the good old days. While Israel was bombing Dahiyeh, people were living it up in the discotheques. One evening I sat in a bar in Beirut. The idea of deploying an international force in the South seemed to be gathering momentum that week. Three Christian females at the bar said that you had to look on the positive side: ‘There’ll soon be thousands of European guys we can go out with’. The diplomat also argued that ‘In Rumana, 40
minutes from Beirut, wild parties were the rage. The main road was jammed with cars loaded with people out for a good time […] The Christians wanted the war to be over as quickly as possible for another reason: They were afraid the Shi’a would become squatters in the Christian areas of the North and not leave’ (quoted in Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 168).

International divisions were seen within Lebanon’s March 14 Christian community, parts of which supported the Israeli attack on Lebanon. An article by WPS on 10 August 2006 argued that some Christians in Lebanon, fearful of their own weakening position, their declining numbers and the rising power of Hizballah, were not ‘averse’ to the Israeli airstrikes on the Shi’a. They also supported the airstrikes because the majority of Christians lived in the north, and most airstrikes targeted south Lebanon. The article argues that a Maronite Christian group, The Lebanese Foundation for Peace, sent an open letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressing support for the Israeli attack on Hizballah and calling for ‘the complete destruction of the infrastructure of terrorism’. The letter argued that, since Israel withdrew from south Lebanon in 2000, Hizballah ‘has not ceased its terrorist activities, military actions, and acts of provocation on the border of Israel – and, assisted by Syria and Iran, it has turned south Lebanon into a terrorist base, supported by 12,000 Iranian rockets, threatening peace initiatives in the Middle East’. The letter speaks ‘in the name of the majority of Lebanese citizens’ and asks Israel to accept ‘thousands of volunteers who wish to take up arms in order to rid their homeland of fundamentalism’. It also wishes the Israeli government success ‘in its resistance to the terrorist autonomy in south Lebanon and the Gaza sector’ (WPS, 2006). This also reflects their hope that destroying Hizballah could lead to the restoration of the Christian’s former dominant position in Lebanon.

Divisions were also seen in the Shi’a community, which was not necessarily united behind Hizballah during the war. Salloukh believes that deep down there was a lot of anger, much of it silent, within the Shi’a community about whether Hizballah’s kidnapping had really been worth it because of the extensive destruction it caused to south Lebanon (Salloukh, 2009a). He argues that ‘Israel’s devastating summer 2006 military campaign against Hizballah triggered a critical debate within the Shi’a
community, with many voices demanding a re-examination of Hizballah’s regional alliances and loyalties, especially its Iranian military and political connections’. However, the March 14 alliance’s campaign to ‘demonise the Shi’a as Lebanon’s “other” community to undermine their political weight in post-Syria Lebanon backfired, rallying most Shi’a around Hizballah and Berri’s Amal Movement in defence of sectarian privileges’ (Salloukh, 2010: 146-147). Salloukh explains that there was also a lot of fear about what would happen to the Shi’a community if Hizballah were destroyed, which is why Nabih Berri’s role was so important. Berri tried to keep a distance between himself and Hizballah so that if it was defeated he could ‘emerge and pick up the pieces’ as representative of the Lebanese Shi’a (Salloukh, 2009a).

7.2 The impact of the weak state on foreign policy during the 2006 war

As discussed in chapter 3, the Lebanese state is weak because it is a confessional state built around substate identity groups and clientelist networks. This means it lacks sovereign authority and has weak and largely ineffectual institutions. This affects foreign policy because the state lacks control over the means of violence within its territory and the necessary state tools to mobilise in case of external attack. It also means that the government tries to co-opt foreign policy to help it push through its domestic agenda.

Arguably, the most conclusive evidence that the state’s lack of sovereign authority impacted upon policy during the war was the fact that Hizballah was able to trigger a full-scale war against Israel without the consent of the Lebanese government. Hizballah’s actions prevented the state acting as a single, unitary, rational and sovereign actor and it affected Lebanese foreign policy during the war for several reasons:

1. Hizballah took over the state’s role. It was able to trigger a full-scale war with Israel in pursuit of its own foreign policy objectives and during the war it assumed the role of protector of the Lebanese state and negotiated indirectly with Israel.

2. The Lebanese government had to take Hizballah’s position into account when it made foreign policy decisions during the war. This was because: it was the
actual force confronting Israel not the Lebanese state; Hizballah’s successful military performance and strong public support for the group meant that the government could not sideline it when making foreign policy decisions; there were several Hizballah MPs and March 8 representatives in the government and state apparatus, who directly influenced and fragmented the government’s decision-making capacity.

3. Hizballah’s strong military performance strengthened the negotiating position of the Lebanese government and prevented Israel from walking all over Lebanon. For example, it enabled the government to negotiate a final UN resolution that was more favourable for Lebanon than the initial draft UN resolution. Nafaa argues that Hizballah’s successful military performance and ability to resist the Israeli attacks strengthened the Lebanese government and isolated those who supported US objectives (Nafaa, 2008: 281).

By starting the war Hizballah pushed the Lebanese government into a position where it was forced to negotiate an end to a war it had not started and by pursuing its own foreign policy objectives during the war it fractured and weakened the foreign policy of the Lebanese government. The government’s inability to control decisions of war and peace over its territory or control those making such decisions brings into question the very existence of a functioning Lebanese state. The state’s lack of sovereign authority and monopoly over the means of violence within its territory has allowed Hizballah to continue carrying arms, to exert a high level of control over south Lebanon and to start a war with Israel.

During the war, Hizballah, rather than the Lebanese state, assumed the role of the protector of Lebanese sovereignty by defending Lebanon from Israel’s attacks. The Lebanese state was unable to fill this role because it was incapacitated by weak and divided institutions. Nasrallah questioned the sovereignty of the state and on 14 August said ‘We believe in the state, but which state? The strong, capable, fair, defiant and reassuring state that would make every Lebanese feel that it represents them. […] Is the state we have now that kind of state – a strong, capable, defiant and fair state that can reassure all the sects, sectors, and political currents in Lebanon?’ (Al Manar TV, 2006e). Hizballah’s role as representative of Lebanon was also visible
when Rice visited Lebanon on 24 July. Although she spoke with Siniora, her main talks took place with Nabih Berri who was negotiating on behalf of Hizballah (Pakradouni: 424). In this case external actors negotiated foreign policy issues with representatives of a sub-state group rather than with those of the state.

Hizballah argues that it carried out the kidnapping to further its foreign policy objectives. On 25 July, it said it aims were to liberate the Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory in the disputed Shebaa Farms and Ghajar areas; to exchange the kidnapped Israeli soldiers for Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails; to obtain maps of the landmines planted by Israel in south Lebanon when it withdrew in 2000; and to stop Israeli land, air and sea incursions into Lebanese territory. It also argued that it was resisting attempts to impose a US regional order and turn Lebanon into what Nasrallah described as an ‘American-Zionist state […] run by Lebanese puppets’ (Al Manar TV, 2006f). On 3 August, Nasrallah argued, ‘I want to stress that, regardless of the results of this war, Lebanon will not be American. Lebanon will not be Israeli. Lebanon will not be one of the sites of the new Middle East that Bush and Condoleezza Rice want’ (Al Manar TV, 2006).

Harel and Issacharoff argue that Nasrallah carried out the kidnapping to divert attention away from its political difficulties at the time, which included discussions that were taking place at the National Dialogue over the issue of its arms. They also argue that Nasrallah had made promises to free Lebanese prisoners and he felt obliged to live up to these promises. On June 8, a few days before the kidnapping Nasrallah had said that Israeli soldiers would be taken prisoner and used as bargaining chips for the release of Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 56-57). Hizballah was seeking the release of Samir Kuntar, a Druze who was the longest serving Lebanese prisoner held in Israel, along with three other prisoners.

Hizballah also took on the state’s role by negotiating indirectly with Israel during the

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27 Nabih Berri is also speaker of the Lebanese parliament and therefore a government representative, however his talks with Rice took place in his capacity as Hizballah’s representative.
This was seen at a press conference on 12 July, when Nasrallah told Israel that he was ready to start indirect negotiations for a ceasefire, and again on 15 July when he threatened Israel saying ‘if the enemy goes on bombing without any limit we will do the same’ (Pakradouni: 412, 421). He also told the Israeli’s on 3 August, ‘If you attack our cities, villages, civilians and infrastructure, we will react. Whenever you decide to stop your campaigns [...] we will halt our rocket attacks on the Israeli settlements and cities’ (Al Manar TV, 2006). Nasrallah repeatedly asserted the need to protect and reinforce Lebanese sovereignty through negotiations and on 25 June he argued, ‘[…] we can never accept any condition that will humiliate our country, people or resistance. Nor will we accept any formula that could come at the expense of national interests, sovereignty, independence’ (Al Manar TV, 2006f).

Hizballah’s position as protector of the Lebanese state was strongly contested by members of the March 14 Alliance, who accused Hizballah of damaging the government’s sovereignty. A senior member of the Siniora government and member of March 14 argued that March 14 did not see Hizballah as an effective way to protect Lebanon because it was an independent military force allied to Syria and Iran. He explained that it had not been nominated by the Lebanese people to represent them and it had not been legitimised by Lebanese institutions (Interview A, 2009). Lebanese journalist Hisham Melhem also argued that many people in the country were unhappy with Hizballah ‘acting as a state within a state, undermining Lebanese sovereignty […] and making decisions that will impact on Lebanese sovereignty, Lebanon’s future, without consulting anybody, maybe except the folks in Tehran and Damascus’ (Online News Hour, 2006). Michael Young argued that Hizballah was staging a ‘coup d’état’ against the anti-Syrian government and parliamentary majority that oppose Hizballah (Young, 2006).

7.2.1 Weak institutions

Besides lacking sovereign authority the state was also undermined by its weak institutions, especially the government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). This made it very difficult for the government to reach a consensus on policy issues. It also

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28 Hizballah does not negotiate with Israel directly.
meant that, even if the government had managed to agree on a foreign policy direction, it was unable to implement it due to its weak institutions. The weak institutions reflect divisions between the March 8 and the March 14 Alliances. During the war, the March 14 alliance held the majority in the Siniora-led government after winning 72 out of 128 seats in the 2005 general elections. The 24-member cabinet that was formed included 15 members of the March 14 Alliance, six members of the March 8 Alliance and three independents. March 8 members of government included the President, Emile Lahoud, the Foreign Minister, Fawzi Salloukh, and the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri and two Hizballah MPs, Muhammad Fneish and Trad Hamadeh. March 14 Members of the government included the Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora, Minister of State Michel Pharaon and the Minister of Industry, Pierre Gemayel. This fracturing led Salloukh to argue that during the war ‘there was nothing called the state, there were different factions of the state and each faction had its own interest’ (Salloukh, 2009a).

The fragmented government was visible during the war because it was divided over its foreign policy direction and objectives. Even though March 14 held the majority, the government still had to balance between March 8 and March 14 members of the government as well as Hizballah before any decisions could be taken. The March 14 dominated government had to be careful not to alienate other groups when making decisions because of fears it would lead to civil unrest and the collapse of the government, as seen during the civil war. The Opposition’s ability to cripple the government was seen in the aftermath of the 2006 war, when March 8 members of the cabinet paralysed the government by resigning in protest over its policies. Therefore, even though March 14 held the majority in the Siniora government the Opposition were still able to obstruct events. It could do this by: refusing to cooperate and not turning up to Ministerial meetings; mobilising its supporters to stage mass demonstrations, as seen in the downtown sit-in protests from December 2006 to May 2008; or by creating civil unrest as seen in the troubles in May 2008.

The presence of members of Hizballah in the government also affected the way Israeli responded to the kidnapping. At the start of the war Israel blamed the Lebanese government for the kidnapping on the grounds there were two Hizballah MPs in the
Lebanese cabinet when the kidnapping took place and because the Lebanese government had failed to disarm Hizballah in the run up to the war as detailed in UNSCR 1559 (Daily Star, 2006). On 12 July, Ehud Olmert described the kidnapping as ‘an act of war’ and argued, ‘we were attacked by a sovereign country. […] the Lebanese government, which Hizballah is part of, is trying to upset regional stability’ (Olmert, 2006). However, Israel soon changed its position and on 16 July, the Israeli cabinet released an official report stating that, despite having engaged in military operations in Lebanon, its war was with Hizballah and not the Lebanese government. It said, ‘Israel is not fighting Lebanon but the terrorist element there, led by Nasrallah and his cohorts, who have made Lebanon a hostage and created Syrian and Iranian sponsored terrorist enclaves of murder’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006f). Daniel Ayalon, Israeli Ambassador to the US, argued at the start of the war that the Lebanese government needed to exercise its sovereign authority over Hizballah if it wanted to be considered a viable entity. He argued ‘if they do not control Hizballah, we will have to do the work. […] if they do not keep peace and quiet on our northern border, they cannot have impunity’ (Online News Hour, 2006).

Divisions between members of the March 8 and March 14 alliances are seen in other state institutions, including the LAF. This was apparent during the war when the military was not deployed to protect Lebanon from Israeli attacks and the country was defended by a Hizballah-led alliance. This shows the government’s inability to use state tools to defend against a sovereign attack on its territory. It meant that the government had to resort to diplomatic rather than military means to defend its country and to rely on external allies to help it end the conflict. During the war, the LAF was not deployed for several reasons. First, there was a fear in the government that mobilising it would have given Israel a justification to indiscriminately bomb all of Lebanon and it would have escalated the war from one between a state and a sub-state actor into a war between two states. Secondly, it is possible that March 14 members of the government did not want to deploy the LAF against Israel because they wanted to give Israel time to defeat Hizballah so that it would be removed from the Lebanese political scene, bolstering their domestic position.

Thirdly, the LAF is made up from members of different religious groups with
different sectarian loyalties. There is a strong fear that it would break up along confessional lines if it was deployed in a conflict situation, which would most likely lead to civil war. Data about the sectarian breakdown of the LAF is highly sensitive and there are no reliable official figures. However, in a *WikiLeaks* cable dated 1 April 2010, Elias Murr, the Minister of Defence, revealed that the Shi’a made up 58% of the army in 2006. He also revealed that this had changed and that by April 2010 the army was made up from 25% Christian, 25% Shi’a and 50% from Sunni’s and Druze. He argued that this showed that in 2010 the Shi’a no longer posed a threat to the stability of the LAF (The Mideastwire Blog, 2010). This shows that during the 2006 war the Shi’a made up the greatest proportion of the LAF. There was therefore a high chance that they would have refused to engage in activity that undermined Hizballah’s interests and in doing so would have incapacitated the LAF and split it along sectarian lines. In this case, internal divisions within the state’s apparatus restricted the government’s decision-making capacity and the decision over whether or not to deploy the army was based on sectarian factors and not the needs of the Lebanese state.

Fourthly, the Lebanese army lacked the military equipment and resources to fight an Israeli army equipped with all the latest military technology. This was confirmed by Elias Murr during a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2006, when he asked the government for $36 million to ensure the army had enough ammunition for five days, because at the time they only had enough for one day (Pakradouni: 413). Michel Suleiman the Head of the Army also criticised the army’s limited resources during a Council of Ministers meeting on 18 July when he said that it has been reduced to ‘a simple organism of help and aid’ (Pakradouni: 421). Noe argues that if the Lebanese army had been properly equipped after Syria’s withdrawal in 2005 and if Hizballah’s ‘four bleeding wounds’ had been removed the 2006 war would not have happened, because there would have been no occupied land or prisoners to swap and therefore there would have been no support in Lebanon for Hizballah’s kidnapping (Noe, 2008: 5). Hizballah’s four bleeding wounds are: (i) Israel’s refusal to hand over maps of Israeli-planted landmines in south Lebanon; (ii) Israel’s refusal to return all Lebanese prisoners; (iii) Israel’s illegal flyovers of Lebanon; (iv) and Israel’s refusal to return all Lebanese occupied territory, most notably Shebaa Farms (Noe, 2008: 4).
However, the government did discuss the potential role of the army during the war. At the start of the fighting Michel Suleiman explained that the army would pursue two objectives during the conflict: it would fight back against a potential Israeli landing on Lebanon’s beaches and it would provide humanitarian assistance to any potential refugees (Pakradouni: 412-413). On the 14 July, President Lahoud met military units deployed in the field and displaced refugees and civilians and told them ‘don’t let the resistance fight alone’ showing his support for the March 8 alliance (Pakradouni: 419). Despite these appeals, the army never engaged in military activity, even though between thirty five and fifty soldiers were killed in Tyre and near the Ministry of Defence Building outside Beirut in Israeli attacks during the war (Hanna, 2010; UNSC, 2006b).

The decision over whether or not to deploy the Lebanese army in south Lebanon also revealed divisions within the Lebanese government. This was visible at a Council of Ministers meeting on 13 July, when Siniora issued a statement recommending that Hizballah should be disarmed and that the Lebanese army should be sent to south Lebanon. As described by Pakradouni, during the meeting, Muhammad Fneish and Emile Lahoud attacked the statement while Siniora and Marwan Hamade, backed by the Ministers Nayla Moawad, Ahmad Fatfat, Jhazi Aridi and Michelle Pharaon, defended it (Pakradouni: 415-416). Pakradouni explains that members of March 14 wanted the army to go to south Lebanon to reassert the Lebanese state’s sovereign authority over the area. Referring to Hizballah, Siniora argued that by doing this they would be able to stop different internal factions making and endorsing independent decisions over the country’s political direction. He was backed by Marwan Hamade who argued that the government needed to clarify, both within Lebanon and to external actors that it upholds the Lebanese Constitution, which ‘places the power of decision-making in the hands of the Council of Ministers and nowhere else’. He told Hizballah MP Muhammad Fneish that no internal Lebanese actors had the right to take Lebanon on a ‘path towards destruction’ and that Hizballah’s actions were justified (Pakradouni: 415-416).

However, March 8 ministers opposed the deployment of the army in south Lebanon,
believing it could lead to internal conflict. This is because it would threaten Hizballah’s position by limiting its authority in the area and raise fears that the army might try to disarm it. Lahoud said that the government should not deploy the army and risk internal conflict simply to please Israel. He argued that Siniora’s statement was an attempt by March 14 to push March 8 into making concessions they were unable to get them to make before the war. Fneish also argued that deploying the army failed to solve anything and simply created a bigger problem. Due to these disagreements the text of Siniora’s statement was altered to include two important points. That any mention of the Blue Line and the international resolution would not oppose the Resistance’s right to recover occupied Lebanese territory; and that any decision to deploy the army in south Lebanon would not necessarily mean that it would be deployed up to the Israeli border (Pakradouni: 415-417).

Later in the war, the government made the decision to send the army to south Lebanon. Despite initial objections from members of the March 8 alliance, Nasrallah agreed to its deployment. On 9 August he argued that it would enhance state sovereignty and minimise the impact of non-Lebanese forces sent to the area that could be pursuing a hidden agenda (referring to UNIFIL). He argued that the decision to deploy the army would improve Lebanon’s position when negotiating for amendments to the draft UN resolution by showing that the government was at least trying to exert control over all its territory (Al Manar TV, 2006c). It is also possible that Nasrallah agreed to this because the Resistance had been weakened by Israel’s attacks and he wanted to end the war as soon as possible. He may have been concerned about losing support and legitimacy amongst the Lebanese if he was seen to be obstructing attempts to end the war and government efforts to exert its sovereign authority over Lebanese territory. When the army was deployed in south Lebanon after the war and in accordance with UNSCR 1701 the Lebanese state began ‘flying its flag’ for the first time after a long period over all Lebanese territory (Fattouh and Kolb, 2006: 96). Deploying the Lebanese army in south Lebanon showed Israel and the international community that the Lebanese state, at least theoretically, controlled

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29 Deploying the Lebanese army in south Lebanon was one of Israel’s demands at the start of the war.
its territory.

7.3 The response of the Lebanese Government to the outbreak of war

The Siniora-led government’s reaction to the outbreak of the war reflected divisions between the US allied 14 March alliance and the Iranian-Syrian allied March 8 alliance. Members of the March 14 alliance criticised Hizballah, and March 8 forces, many of whom were members of Hizballah. The government was torn between the majority in the government who, in common with the US-led alliance, wanted to disable Hizballah, and the need to protest against an external military attack on its country’s sovereignty. These divisions prevented the emergence of a single, coherent and pro-active foreign policy.

Hizballah’s kidnapping left the Lebanese government with two choices. It could join Hizballah and fight with it against Israel, or it could argue that it had nothing to do with the kidnapping and oppose Hizballah’s position. If it had chosen the first option it would have given Israel the freedom to attack the whole Lebanese state, rather than limit its strikes to mainly Hizballah areas. It was also unlikely that this would happen because the predominantly March 14 government did not support Hizballah’s position at the start of the war. The government chose the second option, but in either case, the actions of a sub-state group, supported by external actors, affected the foreign policy choices of the government.

Salem also argues that Israel interpreted the fact the government denounced the kidnapping and blamed Hizballah for the assault at the start of the war as support for them to continue their attacks (Salem, 2008a: 15). However, Traboulsi explains that, although the government ‘gave some legal caution to Hizballah, […] they did not condemn Hizballah’, even though their earlier statements rejected any responsibility for the kidnapping (Traboulsi, 2009: 2). The failure to condemn Hizballah illustrates the weakness of the Lebanese government and its inability to criticise a sub-state group that had acted independently from the majority within the Lebanese government.

The official statement released by the Lebanese government at the start of the war had to tread a fine line by not deepening Lebanon’s internal identity divisions and not
provoking a more intensive Israeli attack. March 14 members of the government did not want to support Hizballah because, in this case, Israel would have been able to justify launching a full-scale attack against the Lebanese state. This would also have humiliated them by showing how little control they held over the government, despite being the majority. Supporting Hizballah would have meant supporting the position of a sub-state group that was pursuing a different agenda to that of the March 14 dominated government. In addition, some March 14 members privately hoped Israel would destroy Hizballah. On the other hand, they did not want the government to find itself in a position of direct conflict with the resistance and exacerbate internal divisions within Lebanon. Furthermore, some members of the government either supported or were members of Hizballah. It is also likely that the government did not want to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the Lebanese people if it was seen to be supporting Israel’s position as it bombarded Lebanon.

The government was clearly divided over whether or not to support Hizballah, which weakened its ability to make decisions and underlined the regional alliances of each coalition. These divisions were visible on 12 July when the government prepared its official response to the outbreak of the war. Siniora proposed a statement that said ‘the government was not informed of the operation and does not approve of it’. However, this was opposed by Fneish who argued that saying the government did not approve of the operation was a political position that placed it in direct conflict with the Resistance. After further discussion, a weaker statement was issued which said, ‘The government is not responsible for what is happening and what has happened’ (Pakradouni: 412). Divisions were also seen later on in the same meeting when Fneish asked Siniora for clarification that if things deteriorated he would not ‘put all the blame on us when it is Israel alone that is responsible for what is happening, because it has refused to solve the problem of detainees through the UN or other mediators’ (Pakradouni: 414). Marwan Hamade, MP and a member of the March 14 coalition, also attacked President Lahoud saying ‘look at what your friends have done’, to which Lahoud replied that the Resistance would win the war30 (Pakradouni: 412).

30 Lahoud was an ally of the March 8 alliance
Members of March 14 blamed Hizballah for the conflict and for giving Israel an excuse to launch another war on Lebanon. They were angry that the whole country had to pay for a decision Hizballah had taken by itself, which clearly challenged the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. On 12 July, at the Council of Ministers meeting, Jumblatt argued that Hizballah should not be able to make unilateral decisions about whether or not Lebanon goes to war. He was supported by other members of March 14 who argued that Israel would win the war and accused Hizballah of following and executing a Syrio-Iranian agenda (Pakradouni: 420). On 14 July, Amine Gemayel argued that, although Hizballah had carried out the attacks on its own, all the Lebanese people would have to pay for their actions (Al Jazeera, 2006).

Divisions were seen in the government in the following days when, for example, the foreign minister, Fawzi Salloukh, told *Al-Hayat* newspaper on 16 July, ‘by its daring, humanitarian and selfless public service, the resistance had saved the Arabs from their current state of affairs, liberated Lebanon and restored Arab pride and the spirit of Arabism’ (quoted in Ahmad, 2008: 243). President Lahoud also led a media campaign during the war promoting the idea that Israel would not be able to beat Hizballah and that Israel had been preparing to launch an operation against Hizballah before 12 July 2006 (Pakradouni: 415).

It has been argued that March 14 members of the government supported Israel’s military campaign and failed to call for a ceasefire at the start of the war because they wanted Hizballah to be destroyed or disarmed (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 76). They hoped that destroying Hizballah would alter the balance of power between different groups in Lebanon in their favour (Interview I, 2009). This was revealed by Elias Murr who, according to cables released by *WikiLeaks* on 2 December 2010, told US Embassy Officials in Lebanon on 11 March 2010 that, ‘The Christians were supporting Israel in 2006 until they started bombing their bridges’ (Al-Akhbar, 2010).

Khalidi argues that certain sectors in the Sunni community and the far right Christian community and Jumblatt, all members of the March 14 alliance at the time, were hoping, ‘not perhaps for a full Israeli victory […] but for a very hard slap on the
wrist of Hizballah’ (Khalidi, 2009: 4). The Israeli media reported that members of the Lebanese government had contacted Israeli officials to ask them to carry on the military campaign against Hizballah (Leenders, 2006: 44-45). However, as Traboulsi emphasises, although many in the ruling circles of March 14 and in the moderate Arab states were backing a ‘sweeping Israeli victory’ they were more interested in weakening the opposition party [Hizballah] than in supporting Israel (Traboulsi, 2009: 2). The fact that some members of the government would have supported a military strike by an external state against Lebanon to achieve their domestic agenda clearly illustrates the divisions and weaknesses of the Lebanese state.

7.4 The Government’s response as the war progresses

However, three days after the start of the war and as the extensive destruction continued, Siniora was forced to stand up for Lebanon and act in the sovereign interests of his country (Al Alam TV, 2006). The fact that the government took so long to issue a statement condemning the Israeli attacks and calling for an immediate ceasefire showed its inability to act as a rational security maximising actor. It also showed the extent to which its foreign policy was paralysed by divisions between the two alliances and their external sponsors.

On 15 July, Siniora issued a statement condemning the ‘Israeli aggression’ and calling for three things, ‘an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire under the auspices of the UN’; ‘to extend the authority of the government over all territories in cooperation with the UN in south Lebanon’; and he appealed on behalf of Lebanon ‘to all its friends around the world to come to its assistance, exert pressure to stop the aggression and provide humanitarian aid’ (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006). He showed the overlap between his own interests and those of the US-led alliance when he argued that his government’s objectives were to ensure full Lebanese authority and sovereignty over its land, which implied the need to disarm Hizballah. Siniora also supported Hizballah’s agenda by calling for an end to Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory and he called for external help to bolster the government’s position. However, the Lebanese government remained weak as seen on the 16 July when Siniora burst into tears while pleading on television for an end to the fighting (AP, 2006).
As the war progressed the government tried to exert its position as the legitimate authority of Lebanon. On the 22 July, it called for an immediate ceasefire, stressed the unity of the Lebanese state and affirmed its sovereign authority. It also strongly condemned the Israeli aggression for targeting vital facilities and civilians and warned that its attacks threatened international and regional peace and security (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006b). The government tried to continue functioning and civil servants were told to keep reporting to work. The Council of Ministers argued that even though it is difficult to move around ‘national interest requires every one of us to carry out his duty so that all institutions can be mobilised in the face of the aggression and so that they can serve the people’ (Qatari Al-Jazeera Satellite TV, 2006). March 14 members of the government also started moving closer to Hizballah when it became apparent that Israel posed a greater threat to the Lebanese state than Hizballah.

However, analysts have argued that the state was largely ineffectual during the war. They have blamed this on its clientelist nature and a lack of interest in south Lebanon. Quilty criticises state employees for failing to actively assess the situation and distribute aid during the war according to need, which he blames on Lebanon’s clientelist state and the neo-liberal international order. He argues that this meant the government left the responsibility for managing and distributing aid to clientele networks ‘the state’s political surrogates’, and international aid organisations (Quilty, 2006: 89-90). In contrast, Goksel argues that the government played a minimal role in aid distribution and largely left it to Lebanese and foreign NGOs because its members did not really care about south Lebanon and did not want to travel there. In contrast, Hizballah paid out compensation within a few hours of the ceasefire, which explains why people are more loyal to them than to the state (Goksel, 2009: 10-11).

7.4.1 Calling for an immediate ceasefire

On 15 July, three days after the start of the war, Siniora called for ‘a total and immediate ceasefire […] under the auspices of the United Nations’ (Al Alam TV, 2006). He called again for an immediate ceasefire and international help in achieving it on 18 July and at the UNSC meeting on 21 July (Al Arabiya TV, 2006b; UNSC, 2006b). Siniora’s calls for an immediate ceasefire show that he was trying to regain legitimacy for his government. It was also an attempt to reassert the government’s
role as the official protector of the Lebanese state and territory, after Hizballah had assumed this position at the start of the war. However, some members of the March 14 Alliance continued to oppose a ceasefire showing divisions between members of this alliance in the government. On July 18, Walid Jumblatt argued the US and Israeli position that there was no point in a ceasefire if it did not include a new political order (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008: 117).

A week after the tragic events in Qana, Siniora outlined that, despite the government’s focus on achieving an immediate and unconditional ceasefire and calls by the UN to this effect, it had still not been achieved. He argued that Israel continued to commit daily crimes against Lebanon and to violate ‘norms of war and peace and international human laws’ (Lebanese LBC Sat TV, 2006). He also argued that it was important to achieve a ceasefire that would be ‘permanent and comprehensive’ and that ‘deals with the root of the problem’ (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006e).

The Siniora-led government was able to increase its push for a ceasefire as Hizballah’s legitimacy increased as popular opinion in Lebanon and the region began turning against the US. This was visible in a poll released by the Beirut Centre for Research and Information two weeks into the conflict in which 87% of Lebanese polled said they supported Hizballah’s fight against Israel and only 8% said they felt the US supported Lebanon31 (Blanford, 2006b). Hizballah was seen as the only force in Lebanon that was doing anything to protect the country from Israeli aggression. An educated, middle-class professional argued, ‘Look what America gives us, bombs and missiles. I was never a political person and never with Hizballah but now after this I am with Hizballah’ (quoted in Blanford, 2006b). Leenders argues that Hizballah’s discourses contained ‘strong populist overtones’ that enabled it to increase its popular

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31 Young argues that the poll that was carried out by Beirut Centre for Research and Information showing that the majority of Lebanese were behind Hizballah was based on weighted questions. He explains that 87% responded positively to the question ‘do you support the Resistance against the Israeli aggression of Lebanon?’ However, ‘If you ask me do I support the Resistance against Israeli aggression, well I’m not going to say I support Israeli aggression, so automatically the question looks like I support the Resistance’ (Young, 2009a: 3).
support by reaching out to ordinary Lebanese and Arabs in the region, and identifying with the ‘silent majority’ (Leenders, 2006: 44).

7.4.2 Stressing unity

Faced with clear divisions in his government, Siniora stressed unity as a political tool to strengthen his government’s position and the authority of the Lebanese state. Unity between the different groups was also the only way his government would be able to pursue a united and coherent foreign policy agenda. Throughout the war, Siniora repeatedly emphasised the idea of a united Lebanon with a united government to mobilise people behind the government and strengthen his legitimacy as the rightful representative of Lebanon. This helped his government to make decisions, gain greater regional and international credibility, avoid accusations that it was allied with Israel, promote its foreign policy agenda over the agenda of any other internal group, and ensure that its position was not sidelined in negotiations to end the war.

By stressing a united Lebanon, Siniora was asking the Lebanese to subordinate their confessional identities, at least temporarily, to the idea of a national identity. This manufactured Lebanese national identity was important because it created the appearance of national unity centred on resistance to the Israeli aggression. It is also likely that it prevented Lebanon from fragmenting along sectarian lines during the war, which would have been disastrous for Lebanon and its government would have had to manage internal fragmentation at the same time as an external assault. Unity helped Lebanon survive the severity of Israel’s attacks, once they were seen as a much greater threat to Lebanon than internal political fighting.

This was seen on 15 July, when Siniora argued, ‘the best response to this aggression and every other aggression is for us together as government and citizens to walk down the same path, that will help ensure our resilience and stability. It is the path of a united and capable state, of a single authority able to protect all its citizens, their rights, and security’ (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006). The government released a statement on 16 July, in an attempt to unite the country, to show that it was not allied with Israel and to show that it was also suffering at the hands of the Israelis. It read ‘The Israeli aggression does not target one group or region; it is an all-out aggression against the Lebanese people and their interests, institutions and future’ (Qatari Al-Jazeera
On 21 July, at a UNSC meeting, Siniora outlined that Lebanon would need to reach internal consensus on any steps to defuse the crisis to avoid any group feeling alienated (UNSC, 2006b). Six days later, Al-Aradi, the Lebanese information minister, made a similar point when he argued that a united Lebanese cabinet shows ‘a cohesive people, a cohesive state, and a government that is capable of making any decision, a cohesive government that has clear vision and knows where it is going’. He said that Siniora had emphasised the need for a strong level of national unity and solidarity to strengthen Lebanon’s position against Israel’s attacks and stop the fighting (Al Arabiya TV, 2006c).

Israel hoped that its heavy bombardment would cause the Lebanese people and political establishment to turn against Hizballah, however, this did not happen and the Lebanese united against their aggression (Deeb, 2006: 116). Michel Suleiman explained during a Council of Ministers meeting on 18 July that Israel’s hopes that targeting some of the army’s positions would cause conflict between the soldiers and the Resistance, and within the army, were not achieved (Pakradouni: 421). Siniora also outlined unity and countered accusations he was allied with Israel when he argued that, even if Israel destroyed Lebanon, no one in Lebanon would agree to sign a unilateral peace agreement them. On 19 July, he argued ‘Lebanon will be the last Arab country to sign a peace agreement with Israel’ (Al Arabiya TV, 2006b).

The Siniora-led government also emphasised that it shared foreign policy interests with Hizballah. Siniora explained that Hizballah’s demands to end the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory and for the return of Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails were Lebanese as well as Hizballah’s demands. On 19 July, Siniora argued, ‘The occupied Lebanese territory is not a Hizballah territory. It belongs to Lebanon and the Lebanese’. He also called for an end to Israeli occupation of Lebanese land before the disarmament of Hizballah. This was important because Hizballah justifies its arms on the basis of Israel’s continuing occupation of Shebaa Farms and Ghajar village. He argued that, although Israel says the state must disarm Hizballah, the Lebanese state needs the ‘tools’ to disarm them, which means ending
the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. This is because ‘Hizballah’s arms are not the cause. Hizballah is the result of the occupation, the aggression. Let us solve this problem and the need for Hizballah arms will be removed’ (Al Arabiya TV, 2006b). He also stated that any process addressing the sovereignty of the Lebanese government over the entire country would need to address the issue of the Shebaa Farms and other, what he called, ‘core issues’, which were also important for Hizballah (UNSC, 2006b).

As the war progressed the government began supporting Hizballah when it realised the group might not be destroyed by Israel, and that Israel in fact posed a greater threat to the Lebanese state than Hizballah. Siniora told Hizballah on 28 July that Lebanon needed to ‘keep two irons in the fire, that of military resistance to (Israeli) aggression but also put forward plans as the forthcoming diplomatic battle will be hard. […] If we do nothing and play the waiting game we risk the UN Security Council imposing conditions that are not in our favour’ (AFP, 2006a).

Unity was also important due to Israel’s increasingly aggressive attacks, including the Israeli airstrike in Qana on 30 July that killed twenty eight civilians including sixteen children (Human Rights Watch, 2006). After events in Qana, the Lebanese government moved closer to Hizballah. It released a statement together with Hizballah saying that they refused to enter into any diplomatic negotiations until a ceasefire was assured. Siniora also cancelled a meeting with Condoleezza Rice and thanked Hizballah for its ‘sacrifices for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon’ (Global Insight, 2006).

On 8 August, the demands of the Siniora-led government included all of Hizballah’s foreign policy objectives as stated at the start of the war, minus the issue of releasing Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. They were: for an immediate Israeli withdrawal behind the Blue Line; for a long term political settlement to be reached over the Shebaa Farms; and for international guarantees that Israel will respect the integrity of Lebanese borders and stop making frequent intrusions into Lebanese airspace (Al Jazeera, 2006b).
This showed that Hizballah was no longer seen as the main threat to Lebanese sovereignty and that Lebanon was presenting a united front and focusing all its efforts on surviving the Israeli onslaught. It also shows that unity was only possible when all the different factions shared a common threat. When it was only south Lebanon being attacked, Siniora could afford to let Hizballah take the blame, however, once the threat grew this was no longer possible. In other words, it was only possible to create a single, united foreign policy as a reaction to something, and not as a proactive force coming from within Lebanon.

The government’s position was strengthened when Hizballah outlined that it supported a strong and united government with sovereign authority over all its territory to avoid accusation that it was contributing to the fragmentation of Lebanon along political and sectarian lines. It is likely Nasrallah, like Siniora, argued that unity in Lebanon was vital to ensure the country would survive Israel’s attacks.

On 28 July, Grand Ayatollah Hassan Fadlallah explained that Hizballah ‘is ready to study the question of the deployment of an international force on the condition that it respects Lebanese sovereignty. Thus all of us together are taking the same position within the government […] . Nobody in Lebanon is opposed to Lebanese sovereignty being extended over all its territory’ (AFP, 2006a). On 9 August, Nasrallah argued that reports in the Israeli media saying that members of the Lebanese government were contacting Israeli officials to ask them to carry on the military campaign were untrue and Israeli attempts to create divisions amongst the Lebanese people, the Lebanese government and Lebanese political forces. He also said that Hizballah backed Siniora’s Seven-Point Plan to ‘reinforce national unity, and that ‘What is most important […] is our eagerness and endeavour to secure government and political solidarity in the country on political and official levels’ (Al Manar TV, 2006c).

This shows that the only time all the groups in Lebanon can share a common foreign policy interest is when they are under a common existential threat. It is at this point that links with each other become more important than links with their external sponsors in their approach towards foreign policy making.
7.4.3 Affirming its sovereign authority and control

As the war progressed, Siniora continued to affirm the authority of the government through official announcements and speeches. This reflected increasing pressure on the government to reinforce its role as representative of the Lebanese people rather than Hizballah. This was important due to Hizballah’s rising popularity and to counteract Hizballah suspicions that ‘March 14 ‘loyalists’ were betraying Lebanon’s Arab and Islamic identity by turning to the US’ (Hirst, 2010: 317). This was seen when, referring to the 14 March majority, Nasrallah argued that ‘what they had to do was assure us that their decisions and positions are not dictated by Washington’ (Noe, 2007: 357, 361). One of the goals of the March 14 Alliance was for the government to regain full sovereignty over Lebanese land. It wanted to weaken Hizballah and restore the government’s sovereign authority over south Lebanon, which meant addressing the issue of Hizballah’s arms. It also wanted to restore Lebanese sovereignty over the Israeli occupied Lebanese land in Ghajar and the disputed Shebaa Farms area.

This was seen on 15 July, when Siniora announced that reasserting Lebanese sovereignty in south Lebanon was one of the government’s objectives. He criticised both Israel and Hizballah and said that the government hoped to work with the UN to ensure the Lebanese state achieved full authority and sovereignty over its territory (Al Alam TV, 2006; AP, 2006). Throughout the war Siniora kept on repeating in his speeches that the state should be the sole authority in Lebanon and weapons should only be held by the state. The need to do this was a clear indication of the absence of state authority and its failure to monopolise the means of violence within its territory. On 15 July, Siniora called for full conformity to the 1949 truces and the 1990 Ta’if Accord, which focused on restoring Lebanese sovereignty and sovereign authority (Al Alam TV, 2006). On 19 July, he called for ‘a lasting solution, enabling the state to

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32 The 1949 agreement was signed between Lebanon and its Arab neighbours in March 1949 to end the 1948 war Arab-Israeli war. It drew up an armistice line, the Green Line, which established the border between Israel and its neighbours, including Lebanon (Lebanon-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, 1949). The Ta’if Accord focused on re-establishing Lebanese sovereign control in south Lebanon, and called for the disarmament of all national and non-national militias and for Lebanon to be freed from Israeli occupation.
become the only authority in Lebanon and making the official arms the only arms allowed in Lebanon’ (Al Arabiya TV, 2006b). He also argued this on 8 August and after the end of the war on the 17 August when he said ‘This state cannot be replaced by statelets or semi-states’ (Al Arabiya TV, 2006d; Al Manar TV, 2006h).

The government also tried to assert its authority by taking a more active role in negotiations. On 19 July Siniora said that, although the Lebanese government had not been aware of the kidnapping and could not be held responsible for it, it was prepared to hold the necessary negotiations to resolve the situation (Al Arabiya TV, 2006b). The Lebanese representative at the UNSC meeting on 21 July reiterated Siniora’s calls to reassert the government’s political authority and said that Lebanon held Israel responsible for the humanitarian, economic and reconstruction catastrophe and that it would push Israel for compensation (UNSC, 2006b).

By reasserting its sovereign authority the Siniora-led government was strengthening its position and ability to make foreign policy decisions.

7.5 Diplomatic negotiations

During the war the government negotiated with Hizballah and with the international community, including the US, the EU and the UN to achieve a ceasefire (Interview A, 2009). Divisions between the foreign policy agendas of different sub-state groups can be seen in the foreign policy decisions made by the Lebanese government throughout the war and the documents produced, these were Siniora’s Seven Point Plan, the draft UN resolution and UNSCR 1701. The Seven Point Plan shows the position of the Siniora-led Lebanese government and the draft UN resolution shows the position of the US and France. The differences between each of them and UNSCR 1701 show the negotiating skills of each group. For example, the difference between the draft UN resolution and UNSCR 1701 shows the extent to which France and the US changed their position under Lebanese and Arab pressure. The difference between the Siniora Plan and UNSCR 1701 shows the extent to which Siniora changed his position under pressure from France, the US and Hizballah. Salloukh argues that the differences between the Seven-Point Plan and UNSCR 1701 outline the differences between the foreign policy choices of Siniora and Hizballah and show how each actor tried to shape the war in a contest to win control over post-Syria Lebanon. He explains that
this is because the Seven-Point Plan embodied Siniora’s foreign policy objectives, while Hizballah’s foreign policy was to reject the Seven-Point Plan and negotiate a new position, as seen in UNSCR 1701 (Salloukh, 2009a).

7.5.1 Siniora’s Seven Point Plan

The main foreign policy document produced by the government during the war was Siniora’s Seven-Point Plan. It was presented at the Rome Conference on 26 July and parts of it were incorporated into UNSCR 1701. It was an attempt by the Siniora government to secure international support to end the conflict and to strengthen its credibility. It allowed the government to play a part in ending a war it had not started and to show that it speaks for Lebanon, not Hizballah. By presenting the Plan Siniora emphasised that he, as head of the Lebanese government, represented Lebanon, not Hizballah. After the Rome Conference Siniora made several appeals for regional and international support for the Plan. It was widely approved and backed by actors that included the EU and the Arab League, as well as by an Islamic Summit held in Kuala Lumpur on 3 August and a conference of Arab foreign ministers held on 7 August (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006e).

The Seven Point Plan reflected the objectives of regional actors and the need for regional and international assistance to help restore security to Lebanon. Clause 4 called for the disarmament of Hizballah inline with the US’s position, by arguing that ‘there will be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese state’ (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006d). This showed the extent to which Siniora’s objectives were allied with the US and its allies and the extent to which the objectives of regional and international actors were manifested within Lebanese foreign policy. Clause 7 of the plan also called for the international community ‘to support Lebanon on all levels’, showing the need for external assistance to help Lebanon recover from the war (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006d).

The Plan was also an attempt by Siniora to negotiate ceasefire conditions favourable to March 14 and it conditioned the end of the war on the disarmament of Hizballah. It was seen as a victory moment for Siniora. As Khalidi explains it enabled Siniora to ‘refashion himself as a saviour of the Lebanese state’, to outmanoeuvre Hizballah and to appear as if he had fashioned a diplomatic victory (Khalidi, 2009: 2). Young argues
that Siniora presented the plan at a time when no one knew what to do. He explains that the Israelis, the international community, the UN, and Hizballah were all unsure of the next move, while the US only knew that it wanted to weaken Hizballah (Young, 2009a: 2).

The Plan also revealed divisions in the Lebanese government. Siniora had told the Rome Conference that March 8 actors had accepted the Plan to strengthen the position of his government. However, this was untrue and government ministers were divided over the issue (Salloukh, 2010a). Pakradouni describes events at the Lebanese Council of Ministers meeting on 27 July after Siniora returned from Rome. During the meeting Lahoud criticised Siniora’s visit saying that the Council of Ministers had not approved of the Seven Point Plan before it was presented at the Rome Conference. Lahoud criticised the third and fourth points of the plan, arguing that the third point, which calls for Shebaa Farms to be placed under UN control, failed to mention what would happen to the water resources in the area coveted by Israel; while the fourth point calls for the state to re-establish authority over its territory and for Hizballah to be disarmed something that, if enforced, is likely to lead to internal instability in Lebanon (see appendix 2) (Pakradouni: 427).

By calling for the Lebanese state to exert its sovereign authority over all Lebanese territory, Siniora was using the Seven-Point Plan to gain international support for a domestic agenda that the state was too weak to assert. He was using international support to push through March 14’s domestic agenda despite the fact that some members of the government and the state opposed it. At the same time, Siniora was also aligning his government’s agenda with that of the US-led regional alliance, and showing that their interests were the same. This illustrates how groups in Lebanon bandwagon with external actors in pursuit of their domestic agendas.

Hizballah did not initially support the Seven Point Plan, which it saw as a way for March 14 to continue the conflict against it using diplomatic means. This was because it called for Hizballah’s disarmament (clause 4) and restricted its freedom of movement in south Lebanon (clause 5). As Salloukh argues, the Plan was seen as a way for Siniora and his allies in the government to force Hizballah to accept certain
things it would not have accepted before the war (Salloukh, 2009a). Young explains that Hizballah is unhappy with anything that restricts its autonomy in the South. He argues that the plan was not about disarming Hizballah, which is unrealistic, but about reducing Hizballah’s ‘margin of manoeuvre’ by deploying the Lebanese army in south Lebanon and asserting the state’s right to control territory up to its southern border (Young, 2009a: 3-4). It is unrealistic to talk about disarming Hizballah because there is no force in Lebanon strong enough to do so.

Despite disagreements Hizballah agreed to the plan on the 28 July in what can be seen as an attempt to reinforce national unity, to prevent internal unrest and to avoid being accused of obstructing attempts to end the war. It is also likely that Hizballah’s priority was to end the war. Berri also emphasised the need for national unity and argued that any rumours suggesting Amal and Hizballah had rejected the Seven-Point Plan were designed to create internal divisions (Egyptian Satellite TV, 2006). March 14 argued that Hizballah’s support for the plan symbolised national unity and was a step towards ‘improving the credibility of the Lebanese government on the world stage’ (AFP, 2006a).

By now, Siniora has moved towards supporting Hizballah’s resistance and Hizballah has moved towards supporting Siniora’s plan. This shows that mutual tactical interest has brought them together into a common foreign policy, rather than anything more substantive relating to their position as Lebanese. This provides further evidence to show that a proactive foreign policy only happens when the sectarian identity groups share a common interest in making one.

7.5.2 UNSCR 1701

The Siniora-led government reacted badly to the draft resolution to end the war which was presented on 5 August. This is because it failed to meet many of Lebanon’s requirements as set out in the Seven Point Plan and because it called for a ‘cessation of hostilities’ rather than a ceasefire (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006g; Ya Libnan, 2006). Hizballah also criticised the draft resolution in a show of unity with the Lebanese government, reflecting their common desire to the end the war on the best possible terms for Lebanon (Ya Libnan, 2006).
The draft resolution was problematic because it called on Hizballah to stop its attacks while only calling for Israel to cease all offensive actions. This was unfair because Israel had claimed that all the wars it had launched against Lebanon up until then had been in self-defence, which meant that the resolution left Lebanon exposed to Israeli ‘defensive’ attacks and failed to guarantee an end to hostilities (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006g). Furthermore, the draft resolution did not call for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, and it allowed Israel to remain in Lebanon until an international force was in place. It also called for the immediate release of the kidnapped Israeli soldiers, while leaving the issue of Lebanese prisoners to be resolved at a later date (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006g). Siniora argued that the idea of an enhanced UNIFIL with a more powerful mandate would directly challenge Lebanese sovereignty (Rebuild Lebanon, 2006g).

On 9 August, Nasrallah argued that the draft resolution was ‘unfair and unjust’ and gave ‘the Israelis through politics and international pressures what they failed to obtain through fighting’. He also argued that it did not place any blame on Israel for ‘their war crimes, massacres, acts of genocide in Lebanon and the systematic destruction of Lebanon’, which he argued was due to US veto power in the UN Security Council (Al Manar TV, 2006c). On 6 August, Berri argued, on behalf of Lebanon, that the draft resolution would return Lebanon to a ‘pre-24 June 2000 stage’, and that it disregarded the Seven Point Plan that had been ‘unanimously agreed upon by all Lebanese forces’ (Al Manar TV, 2006a). This shows a split at this stage between the Lebanese government and the Opposition versus the US and France who had designed the plan. France and the US appeared to be prioritising their relations with Israel over their relations with March 14 parts of the Siniora-government.

The UN Security Council adopted the final version of UNSCR on 11 August. The resolution incorporated parts of the Siniora Plan, for example, by calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Despite supporting it outwardly in order to bring an end to the fighting, internally, the Lebanese government’s reaction to the resolution was split between its two political alliances. March 14 members of government supported the resolution while March 8 members of government called it unfair and unjust but agreed to it to end the fighting.
These divisions were seen at the Council of Minsters meeting on 13 August. Siniora explained that UNSCR 1701 meant that the only weapons in the South would be those of the Lebanese army and he told Hizballah MP, Muhammad Fneish, ‘It stipulates that there should be no weapons. What will you do with yours? Do you want to hide them, give them to the army or move them north of the Litani?’ Fneish then asks Siniora if the army plans to search the houses because, he explains, all the inhabitants of Aïta Chaab, a village close to the border with Israel, are armed. At the end of the meeting Lahoud told Fneish that the government was just about to make a decision about disarming Hizballah and that he should stop attending government meetings until this issue had been removed from the agenda (Pakradouni: 432-433).

Members of March 14 supported UNSCR 1701, which incorporated parts of the Siniora plan and March 14 MP Pierre Gemayel argued that, by accepting UNSCR 1701, for the first time Lebanon had raised the possibility of being victorious on ‘both the military and the political front at the same time’ (Pakradouni: 432). This was because it addressed many of their domestic political goals by calling for the disarmament of Hizballah (clause 3) and for the deployment of the Lebanese army and an enhanced UNIFIL force in south Lebanon (clause 2) (see appendix 3). The deployment of the Lebanese army meant that the sovereign authority of the Lebanese government was asserted in south Lebanon for the first time since the start of the civil war in 1975.

By incorporating the agenda of the March 14 Alliance, UNSCR 1701 shows how March 14 elements within the government used foreign policy, by way of international mandates, to implement their domestic policy and assert the sovereign authority of the Lebanese state. However, since the end of the war Hizballah has continued rearming and building up its military arsenal in south Lebanon. Therefore, even an international mandate has failed to help the March 14 dominated government implement its domestic political agenda. This means that, despite their intentions, March 14 members of the government did not succeed in using diplomatic negotiations to outmanoeuvre Hizballah and to achieve their domestic goals.
Hizballah saw UNSCR 1701 as a way to continue the battle against it using other means but agreed to it because it did not want to obstruct attempts to end the war (Salem, 2008a: 18; Pakradouni: 432). It argued that the government hoped to enforce it on behalf of the US and Israel in such a way that it would disarm Hizballah (Salem, 2008a: 16). Furthermore, if UNSCR 1701 had been fully implemented it would have stopped Hizballah from being able to strike Israel. During a Council of Ministers meeting on 1 August, Lahoud referred to the resolution saying ‘we won the war militarily. We shouldn’t lose it politically and by doing so punish the ones who gave their lives to defend their country’ (Pakradouni: 432).

On 12 August, Hizballah also called the resolution ‘unfair’ and ‘unjust’ for not condemning Israel for its ‘aggression’ and ‘horrible massacres’ and for holding Hizballah responsible for starting the aggression (Al Manar TV, 2006d). Fneish argued that it was unfair because it absolved Israel of any blame and called for the immediate and unconditional release of the Israeli soldiers but not of the Lebanese held in Israel (Pakradouni: 432). The resolution also represented Hizballah as an aggressor because it talked about ‘Hizballah’s attack on Israel’ and not Israel’s attack on Hizballah (UNSCR, 2006b). Hizballah also argued that the resolution reflected an Israeli or western agenda and Ahmad Malli, a Hizballah official, asked why an enlarged UNIFIL force was not going to be deployed on the Israeli side of the border as well (WPS, 2006a).

However, the resolution also showed Hizballah’s ability to influence negotiations because it was more favourable to its interests than early drafts of the resolution or the Seven-Point Plan had been. This is because there is no direct reference to the decommissioning of its weapons arsenal in UNSCR 1701, unlike the Seven-Point Plan which conditions the end of the war on Hizballah’s disarmament (Salloukh, 2010a). Point four of the Seven-Point Plan states that ‘there will be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese state’ (see appendix 2). Whereas UNSCR 1701 says ‘there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon’ (see appendix 3). By avoiding directly calling for the disarmament of Hizballah UNSCR 1701 also avoided any potential conflict of interest that could lead to internal
instability in Lebanon. Saad-Ghorayeb argues that the resolution is at least part of a victory for Hizballah because it includes more of its interests and concerns than earlier drafts of the resolution (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2006b: 2).

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter shows that the weak state influenced foreign policy during the 2006 war in several ways. First, the state was too weak to exert full sovereign authority over its territory, which allowed sub-state groups, such as Hizballah to take on the role of the state and shape its foreign policy direction. Secondly, sectarian divisions, seen in divisions between the March 8 and March 14 alliances, allowed external actors to penetrate Lebanon and prevented a single, cohesive and pro-active foreign policy from emerging. This was because these alliances were each pursuing their own foreign policy agendas, which were strongly linked to the foreign policy agendas of their external sponsors. Thirdly, the government was unable to mobilise the necessary state tools such as the army to defend itself from external attack, which forced the government to focus on developing a diplomatic rather than a military strategy to end the fighting. It also meant that that if the government had been able to reach a common foreign policy agenda it would have been unable to implement it.

Fourthly, the government was too weak to push through domestic policies on its own making it unable to assert state sovereign control and sovereign authority over all its territory. It therefore, tried to use international mandates, such as UNSCR 1701, to help it achieve its domestic goals, which meant that it was formulating foreign policy to achieve domestic rather than foreign policy objectives. Fifthly, it shows that the only time all the different groups in Lebanon are able to share a common foreign interest is when the state is under existential threat. It is only at that point that their links with external actors become less important than their links with each other in their approach towards foreign policy-making.

Therefore, this chapter shows that to understand how systemic structures affected Lebanese foreign policy, you need to understand the role played by sub-state identity. This is because sub-state identity explains why external actors were able to penetrate Lebanon and why Lebanon is so divided between different groups. Identity in Lebanon is manifested in the confessional system, which has created a divided state
with weak institutions and allowed external actors to interfere in Lebanese politics. As a result, foreign policy is largely absent from Lebanon. This was seen during the 2006 war, were there was very little real foreign policy taking place because the state lacked the capacity. This is because identity played a major role in determining the foreign policy choices of the different members of the government.

This leads to the conclusion that identity at the unit level of analysis creates a fragmented foreign policy because the government is a coalition of sectarian identities that each respond to different identity-based interests and dynamics. Furthermore, when the government is able to reach a consensus on a policy issue it is unable to implement it because sectarianism has left the state too weak to do so by creating weak and ineffectual institutions. This means that identity plays a much more significant role in shaping Lebanon’s foreign policy than regional structural dynamics.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis uses the example of the 2006 war in Lebanon to partially support its initial hypothesis that sub-state identities are more important that factors at the systemic level for affecting the international political behaviour of the Lebanese states. It argues that sub-state identity had more of an impact than systemic determinants on the foreign policy choices made by different members of the Lebanese government during the first stage of the 2006 war, however as the Israeli threat increased the state united and began behaving like a rational security-maximising actor. Sub-state identities played a significant role because the Lebanese government is made up from a coalition of different sectarian identities that respond to the interests and dynamics of their sectarian group and their external affiliations over the interests of the state. This means that the foreign policy produced during the 2006 war was not the state’s foreign policy, but the foreign policy of diverse actors embedded within the Lebanese state and its institutions. Furthermore, when the government is able to agree on a foreign policy direction it is unable to implement it because identity has fractured and weakened state institutions leaving the state too weak to do so.

This means that, by ignoring dynamics at the unit-level, Waltz and Wendt’s systemic theories of international relations are unable to account for all the factors affecting how states interact at the international level. It also calls for a more pluralistic understanding of Lebanese foreign policy, as offered by pluralism, which does not take the state a united, rational security maximising actor. Instead, pluralism accounts for the wide variety of different factors that can influence the international political behaviour of states, including sub-state actors and identity groups as well as supra-state and trans-state actors.

The thesis addressed the hypothesis by looking at factors at the systemic, state and substate levels. Chapter 2 started by outlining the theoretical framework used in the thesis. It did this by looking at how the three levels of analysis can be used to assess the relevance of Waltz’s neorealism and Wendt’s social constructivism for understanding the foreign policy-making of Arab states. It concluded that these theories are limited because they ignore the impact of identity at the supra-state and
sub-state levels on a state’s international political behaviour. It argued that identity is important because it prevents the state from acting like a united, rational, security-maximising actor. It then established a framework for analysing Arab states foreign policy that recognises the influence identity has on foreign policy-making. This framework looks at the interaction between factors at the systemic, state and sub-state levels, and the feedback loop that exists between them.

Chapter 3 used the framework developed in the previous chapter to look at the dynamics of Lebanese foreign policy-making. It provided a narrative of Lebanese foreign policy and then looked at Lebanese foreign policy-making in the context of the three tiers of analysis. It argued that the systemic level influences Lebanese foreign policy because external actors sponsor external actors. It also argued that the sub-state level affects foreign policy because sub-state identities fragment the Lebanese state due to the confessional nature of its political system. These sub-state identities pursue competing foreign policies by bandwagoning with external actors to strengthen their domestic positions and in doing so they fragment state institutions. It showed that sub-state identities are the main factor affecting the state’s ability to formulate foreign policy. This is because they prevent it from acting like a unitary, rational, security maximising actor with a foreign policy that prioritises a coherent Lebanese national interest. Instead Lebanon’s foreign policy is shaped by factional interests that often reflect the national interests of other states, especially Syria, Iran, the US and Saudi Arabia.

The fourth chapter outlined the methodology used to research this hypothesis in the rest of the thesis. It explained how the data was collected and interpreted using qualitative methods, which included semi-structured interviews and the analyses of other primary discourses and secondary discourses.

The fifth chapter provided a narrative of the main events that took place during the 2006 war. It described the history of the Lebanese-Israel border disputes and assessed the aftermath of the conflict and its impact on Lebanon and the wider region. It argued that the war was significant because it placed the Lebanese government in a position where it needed to orchestrate a coherent response to an existential attack on the
Lebanese state.

Chapter 6 focused on the how the regional system influenced and affected the outbreak and progress of the war and shaped Lebanese foreign policy. It did this by identifying the different interests of external actors in Lebanon during the war and by looking at how their behaviour shaped the war as it progressed. It concluded that the regional system had a major influence on Lebanon due to external actors sponsoring Lebanese proxies and using the country as an arena in which to pursue regional and international power struggles. As a result, it argued, stability in Lebanon is fundamentally linked to regional stability and the agendas of foreign actors and the nature of the regional system are played out within the Lebanese context. This chapter also showed that the influence of external actors meant that Siniora was forced to devise a foreign policy that relied on their support in order to make it happen. However it was unable to explain why Siniora was so vulnerable to these external interests. This is something that cannot be answered by systemic factors, but only by looking at the precise connections between external actors and sub-state actors and the relationships between sub-state identity groups themselves. This was explored in the following chapter.

Chapter 7 argued that to understand the role and impact of the regional system on Lebanon’s foreign policy during the war it is necessary to understand the role played by the nature of the state and internal identities at the unit-level. It concluded that sub-state identities were the main factor that affected the foreign policy choices made by the different members of the Lebanese government during the war. This is because the government’s foreign policy was fractured between different sectarian identities that responded to the interests and dynamics of their sectarian group over the interests of the state. Furthermore, when the government was able to agree on a foreign policy direction it was unable to implement it because identity had fractured and weakened state institutions leaving the state too weak to do so.

Chapter 7 also looked at the link between external penetration of the system and Lebanon’s weak position in the system, and the sectarian divisions that weakened the Lebanese state and prevented it from forming a strong and pro-active foreign policy.
It showed that the only time the Lebanese government was able to form a coherent foreign policy during the war was when the state itself came under existential threat. It was only at that point that the links between external actors and sub-state groups became less important than the links between the different sub-state groups in Lebanon in their approach towards foreign policy. This shows that foreign policy is not the result of responses to regional structural determinants but to unit-level identity based considerations that prevented the state responding to systemic structures as a coherent actor during the war.

This thesis has broader significance both in relation to the Waltz and Wendt’s theories and for modern Lebanon. It shows the limitations of systemic theories for explaining the international political relations of Arab states in general and Lebanon in particular. This is because these theories fail to recognise that sub-state and supra-state identities are able to compromise the coherence of the state and prevent it from behaving like a rational, security maximising actor. It, therefore, calls for the need to deepen and broaden systemic international relations theories so that they recognise the plurality of factors that exist beyond systemic structures and which affect a state’s international political behaviour.

This research is significant for modern Lebanon because it highlights the main factors that prevent the Lebanese state behaving as a strong and coherent actor and from formulating a coherent foreign policy. It outlines the failings of the confessional political system that has empowered sub-state actors, fractured state institutions, and heightened inequality and insecurity amongst the Lebanese people. This has led internal groups to bandwagon with external states and actors in order to strengthen their domestic position. This means that any attempts to create a stronger and more coherent Lebanese state with a robust foreign policy need to address the insecurity and injustices felt by different groups in Lebanon which causes them to bandwagon with external actors. This would strengthen the state and enable the government to construct a foreign policy that focuses more on building relations that maximise the security of the Lebanese state within the regional and international systems, than on bolstering the domestic status of different groups within Lebanon.
This study is limited by its over reliance on voices from within Lebanon and documents produced by members of the US-led alliance. This reflects the difficulties in accessing material, especially policy documents and statements produced by Hizballah, and by the Syrian and Iranian governments. Due to time and financial restrictions it relies heavily on interviews that took place Lebanon with individuals either from, or deeply embedded within Lebanese society. These interviews gave the research a distinctly Lebanese slant, however it also gave insight into how people from different identity groups in Lebanon understand Lebanese foreign policy, which was an important part of my research. Furthermore, the two years I spent living and working Lebanon enhanced the quality of my research. However, it also made me aware of the need to spend even more time there in order to gain a deeper and more perceptive understanding of a particularly complex political environment.

Further research could either further develop this study by using its framework to look at foreign policy making during other events and time periods in Lebanon and in other Arab states. It could build on it by gaining a greater regional understanding of events by accessing discourses produced by members of the Syrian-Iranian alliance and by other countries in the region. It could also look at how various factors affected the government’s foreign policy on other occasions, for example during proceedings to establish the STL, or during a longer time period such as the five years since the Syrian withdrawal. It would also be interesting to assess attempts that have been made to minimise the impact of the confessional system on Lebanese politics and assess possible ways in which these inequalities could be addressed in the future. This research could be expanded further by applying more recent theories of international relations, such as new approaches to realism as addressed by Stephen David in his article ‘Third World Alignment’ (David, 1991).
### Appendix 1: Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adam, Udi</td>
<td>Head of Israel’s Northern Command (2005 - September 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Akhbar</td>
<td>A daily Arabic newspaper published in Beirut that started operating in July 2006. It is pro-Syrian and a principle newspaper of the March 8 alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Alam TV</td>
<td>Iranian Arabic satellite television station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Arabiya TV</td>
<td>An Arabic-language satellite television news station based in Dubai and partly owned by Saudi broadcaster Middle East Broadcasting Centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aradi, Ghazi</td>
<td>Lebanese information minister during the 2006 war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Hayat</td>
<td>Arabic language daily pan-Arab newspaper founded in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Manar TV</td>
<td>Hizballah’s TV station broadcast from Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Sharq al-Awsat</td>
<td>Arabic international newspaper, published by H.H. Saudi Research &amp; Marketing (UK) Ltd. Its headquarters is in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud</td>
<td>President of Iran (2005-to date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>A Shi’a Lebanese political movement founded in 1975. Amal means hope in Arabic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annan, Kofi</td>
<td>Secretary General of the UN (January 1997- December 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aoun, Michel</td>
<td>Leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, a Christian political party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARAMCO</td>
<td>The state owned national oil company of Saudi Arabia. It was previously known as the Arabian American Oil Company (1933-1988).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Assad, Bashar</td>
<td>President of Syria (2000 - to date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayalon, Daniel</td>
<td>Israeli ambassador to the US (2002-2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad Pact</td>
<td>Pact between Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the UK to contain the influence of the USSR. It lasted from 1955 until 1979.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berri, Nabih</td>
<td>Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament (1992 - to date), leader of Amal (1984 - to date), Shi’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black September</td>
<td>The name given to events that took place in 1970 when King Hussein of Jordan suppressed Palestinian militancy within his country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blair, Tony</td>
<td>Prime minister of the UK, 2 May 1997 – 27 June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue line</td>
<td>The official border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel published by the UN in June 2000 after the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush, George W.</td>
<td>President of the US (January 2001 – January 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolton, John</td>
<td>US ambassador to the UN (August 2005 – December 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement reached between the Lebanese government and the PLO in 1969, which gave the PLO the sole right to police Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and prevented Lebanese authorities from entering them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirac, Jacques</td>
<td>President of France (May 1995 – May 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahiyeh</td>
<td>A mainly Shi’a neighbourhood of south Beirut and a Hizballah stronghold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Star, The</td>
<td>Lebanese English language newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de La Sablière, Jean-Marc</td>
<td>French ambassador to the UN (2002-2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doha Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement reached in Doha, Qatar on 21 May 2008 between rival Lebanese factions that was held at the invitation of Qatar’s prince, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. It ended the 18-month long political crisis in Lebanon and led to the election of Michael Suleiman as President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Religious community found in Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan. The Druze stem from Ismaili Islam but they are not considered part of Islam by other Muslims because they do not follow the Five Pillars of Islam and they hold their religious meetings on Thursday not Friday (Sultan, 2008: 148).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E'temad-e Melli</td>
<td>Iranian newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadlallah, Hassan</td>
<td>Grand Ayatollah and prominent Lebanese Twelver Shi’a Muslim cleric, who some regarded as Hizballah’s spiritual leader until his death in July 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>A Christian Lebanese political party headed by Michel Aoun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fneish, Muhammad</td>
<td>Lebanese minister of energy and one of Hizballah’s representatives in the Siniora government (July 2005-November 2006). He became the minister of labour in 2008 and he was named the state minister for administrative development after the 2009 elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Movement</td>
<td>Also known as Mustaqbal in Arabic, it is a Sunni Lebanese political movement, currently led by Saad Hariri. It won the majority in the 2005 and 2009 Lebanese parliamentary elections and it is the largest member of the March 14 Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>The Group of Eight is a forum for the government’s of the world’s major economic democracies. It is made up from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geagea, Samir</td>
<td>Leader of the Lebanese Forces (Christian).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemayel, Bashir</td>
<td>Senior member of the Phalange party and commander of the Lebanese Forces during the start of the Lebanese civil war. He was elected President of Lebanon in August 1982 but assassinated by a bomb nine days later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Gemayel, Pierre            | Lebanese politician and member of the Kataeb party. He was assassinated in November 2006 when he was minister of...
industry.

Ghajar
A village located on the border between Lebanon and the Israeli occupied Golan Heights. After Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, the Blue Line drawn up by the UN allocated the northern part of the village to Lebanon and the southern part to Israel. The Israelis reoccupied the northern part of the village during the 2006 war. However, Israel approved a plan to pull out of the northern part of the village on 19 November 2010 (Al Jazeera, 2010a).

Golan Heights
A plateau bordering Syria, Israel and Lebanon. It is Syrian territory occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Gulf Cooperation Council
The GCC is comprised of the oil rich states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Green Line
Also called the pre-1967 border and the 1949 Armistice line. It was the demarcation line set out between Israel and its neighbours, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt after the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

Halutz, Dan
Chief of staff of the Israeli Defence Forces (June 2005 - January 2007).

Hamadeh, Marwan
Druze, member of the Progressive Socialist Party. Minister of telecommunications during the 2006 war.

Hamadeh, Trad

Hamas
Meaning ‘Islamic Resistance Movement’ in Arabic, it is a Sunni movement founded in 1987 out of the Muslim Brotherhood. It won the Palestinian elections in January 2006.

Hariri, Rafik

Hariri, Saad
Sunni, prime minister (November 2009 – to date), leader of the Future Movement, son of Rafik Hariri.

Hizballah
Meaning ‘Party of God’. It is a Lebanese Shi’a political and military party, which was established in 1985 in reaction to the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon.

Israeli Defence Force (IDF)
Known in Israel as Tzahal. They are the Israeli state’s military forces, made up from a ground force, an air force and a navy.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (ICRG)
A branch of Iran’s military that was formed in 1979 after the Iranian revolution.

IRNA
Islamic Republic News Agency, official news agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Jabour, George
Syrian MP

Jumblatt, Kamal
Former Lebanese Druze politician and father of Walid Jumblatt. He founded the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) in March 1949 and was assassinated in March 1977.

Jumblatt, Walid
Druze politician, who became leader of the PSP after his father was assassinated in 1977.

Kataeb Party
Also known as the Phalange and the Lebanese Social Democratic Party. It is a right-wing Lebanese Christian
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keyhan</td>
<td>Iranian newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kfar Shouba Hills</td>
<td>Seized by the Israelis from Syria along with Shebaa Farms in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Lebanon and Syria claim it is Lebanese territory but Israel argues it is Syria not Lebanese land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuntar, Samir</td>
<td>A Lebanese Druze and former member of the PLO who was the longest serving Lebanese prisoner in Israel after spending more than three decades in an Israeli jail before being released in July 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahoud, Emile</td>
<td>President of Lebanon during the 2006 war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
<td>A Lebanese political party, founded as a Christian militia during the Lebanese civil war as the Lebanese Front in 1976. Samir Geagea has led the party since 1986.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)</td>
<td>The military component of the Lebanese state. It was founded in August 1945 and is made up from the army, the navy and the air force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levant</td>
<td>An area in the eastern Mediterranean covering Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livni, Tzipi</td>
<td>Israeli foreign minister (2006-2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’ariv</td>
<td>Hebrew language daily newspaper published in Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahdi</td>
<td>The prophesied redeemer of Islam who will arrive on earth before the Day of Judgement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahdi Army, The</td>
<td>A paramilitary army that was created in Iraq in 2003 by the Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marada Movement</td>
<td>A Lebanese political party and former Christian militia during the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war. It is led by Suleiman Frangieh and is a member of the March 8 Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8 Alliance</td>
<td>Also known as the Opposition. A Lebanese political coalition closely allied with Syria and Iran. It was named after the pro-Syrian demonstrations that took place in Beirut on 8 March 2005 after the assassination of Rafik Hariri. It is predominantly made up from: 1) Hizballah led by Hassan Nasrallah (Shi’a) 2) Amal led by Nabih Berri (Shi’a) 3) The Free Patriotic Movement, led by Michel Aoun (Christian) 4) The Marada Movement led by Suleiman Frangieh (Christian) 5) The Lebanese branch of the SSNP (secular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14 Alliance</td>
<td>A Lebanese political coalition that is supported by the US and Saudi Arabia and other western or pro-western governments. It was named after the anti-Syrian demonstrations that took place in Beirut on 14 March 2005 after the assassination of Rafik Hariri. It is predominantly made up from: 1) The Future Movement, led by Saad Hariri (Sunni) 2) The Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea (Christian) 3) The Kataeb/Phalange party led by Amine Gemayel (Christian) 4) The Progressive Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblatt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Druze) was part of this coalition until Jumblatt left the coalition and started moving closer to the March 8 Alliance in August 2009 (Salem, 2009).

Maronite
An Eastern Catholic church, whose members make up one of the main ethno-religious groups in Lebanon. Its heritage can be traced back to the 5th century Syriac monk, St. Maroun.

Mehlis Report
Released in October 2005, the result of a UN investigation into the assassination of Rafik Hariri. It implicated high-ranking members of the Syrian and Lebanese governments in the assassination.

Middle East
All the members of the Arab league plus the non-Arab peripheral powers, Iran, Israel and Turkey.

Moderate Arab states
Largely made up from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and some Gulf States

Muallem, Walid
Syrian foreign minister (February 2006 - to date)

Murr, Elias
Lebanese defence minister since July 2005, he was wounded in a car bomb in Beirut on 12 July 2005.

Naharnet
Lebanese online English language news

Nasrallah, Hassan
Leader of Hizballah (1992 - present) (Shi’a)

National Dialogue
Established in February 2006 as a forum in which Lebanese politicians could meet to discuss Lebanon’s domestic and foreign concerns. These included the disarmament of Hizballah, the international tribunal into the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the extension of President Lahoud’s presidency.

National Pact, The
An unwritten agreement from 1943 that formed the basis of the newly independent Lebanese state.

Now Lebanon
Lebanese online English language news

Olmert, Ehud
Prime minister of Israel (April 2006 - March 2009)

Operation Grapes of Wrath
Israel’s name for the military operation it carried out on Lebanon in 1996. It aimed to stop Hizballah’s border attacks into northern Israel.

Operation Peace for Galilee
Israel’s name for its invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to remove the PLO from Lebanon and prevent it threatening Israel’s northern border.

Operation Summer Rains
Israel’s name for the major ground operation it launched in the Gaza Strip to suppress the fire of rockets from Gaza into Israel and to recover the kidnapped Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit. It lasted between 28 June 2006 and 26 November 2006.

Operation True Promise
Hizballah’s name for the operation in which they kidnapped two Israeli soldiers across the Lebanese-Israeli border, sparking the 2006 war between Hizballah and Israel.

The Opposition
See the March 8 alliance.

Pakradouni, Karim
President of the Kataeb Party (2001-2007), he resigned from the party in 2008.

Pellégrini, Alain
Commander of UNIFIL (January 2004 - February 2007)

Peres, Shimon
Israeli vice prime minister during the 2006 war

Peretz, Amir
Israeli defence minister (May 2006 - June 2007)

Phalange
See Kataeb.

Press TV
Iranian television network, broadcasts in English
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Progressive Socialist Party</strong></td>
<td>Lebanese political party under the leadership of Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt. Officially secular, it is largely supported by Lebanon’s Druze community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resistance, The</strong></td>
<td>Those opposing the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. It is predominantly made up from Hizballah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rice, Condoleezza</strong></td>
<td>US secretary of state (2005-2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salloukh, Fawzi</strong></td>
<td>Lebanese minister of foreign affairs (July 2005 - November 2009) (Shi’a), an independent who is closely allied to Amal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SANA</strong></td>
<td>Syrian Arab News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seven Point Plan, The</strong></td>
<td>Siniora’s plan to end the 2006 war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shalit, Gilad</strong></td>
<td>Israeli soldier kidnapped in Gaza on 25 June 2006 by Palestinian forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shebaa Farms</strong></td>
<td>Israeli occupied land located between Lebanon and the Israeli occupied Golan Heights. Both Lebanon and Syria agree that the territory is Lebanese, but Israel argues it is Syrian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shi’a</strong></td>
<td>The second largest denomination of Islam after Sunni. The Shi’a believe that Ali was the rightful descendant of Muhammad and reject the legitimacy of the first three caliphs. Ali was Muhammad’s cousin and married to his daughter, Fatimah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Siniora, Fouad</strong></td>
<td>Former Lebanese prime minister (July 2005 - November 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Siniora Plan</strong></td>
<td>See Seven Point Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Siyasat-e Ruz</strong></td>
<td>Iranian newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sunni</strong></td>
<td>The largest branch of Islam, which accepts the first four caliphs as Muhammad’s rightful successors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Lebanese Army</strong></td>
<td>A Lebanese militia that was started during the civil war. Saad Haddad led it from 1979 and Antoine Lahad led it after 1984. Israel supported it from 1982-2000, when it helped Israel fight the PLO and Hizballah in south Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The South/ south Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>Lebanese territory south of the Litani river.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)</strong></td>
<td>A criminal tribunal set up to by the UN in coordination with Lebanon to investigate the assassination of Rafik Hariri. It opened in March 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suleiman, Michel</strong></td>
<td>Head of the army, president of Lebanon (2008 - to date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syrian Social Nationalist Party</strong></td>
<td>A secular nationalist political party based in Syria and Lebanon that would like to see the establishment of a Syrian nationalist state spanning the Fertile Crescent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ta’if Agreement</strong></td>
<td>An agreement to end the Lebanese civil war. Negotiated in Ta’if in Saudi Arabia, it was signed in October 1989 and ratified in November 1989.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tsahal</strong></td>
<td>Another name for the IDF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umma</strong></td>
<td>The worldwide Muslim community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Arab Republic (UAR)</strong></td>
<td>A union between Egypt and Syria that lasted from 1958 to 1961, until Syria left. Egypt continued to be known as the UAR until 1971.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNSCR 425</strong></td>
<td>UN resolution adopted in March 1978 five days after the Israeli invasion. It called on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and for UNIFIL to be established.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNSCR 1559  UN resolution adopted on 2 September 2004 which calls for: ‘respect for the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, the end of foreign interference in Lebanon, and the disarming and disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias’ (US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2007).

UNSCR 1664  UN Resolution adopted in March 2006 to establish an international tribunal into the killing of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri.

UNSCR 1680  UN resolution adopted in May 2006 that calls for: the implementation of UNSCR 1559, the delineation of the border between Lebanon and Syria, controls to be placed on arms being transferred into Lebanon, and further efforts to disarm militias and reassert the governments authority over all its territory.

UNSCR 1701  UN resolution adopted in August 2006 to end the war between Israel and Hizballah.

Welch, David  US assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs (March 2005- December 2008)

Winograd Commission, The  Israeli enquiry held into events during the 2006 war. It harshly criticised decision-makers in Israel.

WPS (What the Papers Say)  Russian independent media monitoring company

Yediot Ahronot  Most widely circulated daily newspaper published in Hebrew. Its headquarters are in Tel Aviv, Israel

Ya Libnan  Lebanese online English language news

ynetnews.com  Official website of Israeli daily newspaper Yediot Ahronot
Appendix 2: Text of Siniora’s seven-point plan
An immediate and comprehensive cease-fire and a declaration of agreement on the following issues:

1. An undertaking to release the Lebanese and Israeli prisoners and detainees through the ICRC.

2. The withdrawal of the Israeli army behind the Blue Line, and the return of the displaced to their villages.

3. A commitment from the Security Council to place the Shebaa Farms area and the Kfarshouba Hills under UN jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully settled. While in UN custody, the area will be accessible to Lebanese property owners there. Further, Israel surrenders all remaining landmine maps in South Lebanon to the UN.

4. The Lebanese government extends its authority over its territory through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese state as stipulated in the Ta’if national reconciliation document.

5. The UN international force, operating in South Lebanon, is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, as needed, in order to undertake urgent humanitarian and relief work and guarantee stability and security in the south so that those who fled their homes can return.

6. The UN, in cooperation with the relevant parties, undertakes the necessary measures to once again put into effect the Armistice Agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel in 1949, and to insure adherence to the provisions of that agreement, as well as to explore possible amendments to or development of said provisions, as necessary.

7. The international community commits to support Lebanon on all levels, and to assist it in facing the tremendous burden resulting from the human, social, and economic tragedy, which has afflicted the country, especially in the areas of relief, reconstruction and rebuilding of the national economy

(Source: Rebuild Lebanon, 2006d).
Appendix 3: Text of UNSCR 1701

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on 11 August 2006

The Security Council,


Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizballah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,

Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area,

Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties,

Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict,
Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizballah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Ta’if Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;

4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

6. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area; full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Ta’if Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680
(2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;

no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;

no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;

provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines Lebanon in Israel’s possession;

9. Invites the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and expresses its intention to be actively involved;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Ta’if Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;

11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):
(a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
(b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;
(c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
(d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
(e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;
(f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

13. **Requests** the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, **urges** Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and **expresses** its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

14. **Calls upon** the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and **requests** UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

15. **Decides** further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft:
    (a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and
    (b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above; except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11;

16. **Decides** to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and **expresses its intention** to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

17. **Requests** the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

18. **Stresses** the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

19. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter

(UNSCR, 2006b).
Appendix 4: Map of locations bombed in Lebanon during the 2006 war

Source: (Sultan, 2008: viii)
### Appendix 5: Lebanese Foreign Ministers by Sect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Cabinets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salim Taqla</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>25/9/1943-2/7/1944 3/7/1944-9/1/1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henri Far'awn</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>13/1/1945-22/8/1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamid Franjieh</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>13/1/1945-22/8/1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe Taqla</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>22/5/1946-14/12/1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henri Far'awn</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>14/12/1946-7/6/1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamid Franjieh</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>7/6/1947-26/7/1948 26/7/1948-1/10/1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe Taqla</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>1/10/1949-14/2/1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Helou</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>14/2/1951-7/6/1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe Taqla</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>11/2/1952-9/9/1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>30/4/1953-16/8/1953</td>
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<td>24/9/1958-14/10/1958</td>
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Source: Ministry of Foreign and Expatriate Affairs, Beirut, Lebanon (taken from Salloukh, 2008: 309-311), with information added to the last two rows.
Appendix 6: List of interviews

2. Timur Goksel, former senior adviser and official spokesman for UNIFIL, he worked for UNIFIL for over 20 years, he is also a lecturer at the American University of Beirut (AUB). Location: Rawda Café, Beirut, 13 May 2009, 10.30, recorded.
5. Fawwaz Traboulsi, Lecturer in political science at LAU, Beirut. Location: AUB, 25 June 2009, 13.00, recorded
7. Saad Hariri, Leader of the Future Movement, Prime Minister of Lebanon (2009-to date). Location: Koreitum, Beirut, 16 November 2008, recorded
9. Tarif Khalidi, Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies, AUB. Location: telephone interview, 24 June 2009, 14.00, recorded.
10. Basel Salloukh, LAU, 8 June 2010, 13.00, not recorded
11. Timur Goksel. Location: Café Reservoir, Beirut, 11 August 2010, 17.00, not recorded
12. Elias Hanna, retired general in the Lebanese army and senior lecturer in geopolitics at AUB. Location: telephone interview, 10 June 2010, 12.00, not recorded.
14. Interview B: Lecturer at the LAU. Location: Beirut, 18 June 2009, 14.00, recorded, anonymous.
15. Interview C: former politician and specialist in foreign affairs. Location: Lebanon, 27 November 2008, 11.00, recorded, anonymous.
17. Interview E: senior member of the Lebanese foreign ministry. Location: Beirut, 16 November 2008, 11.00, recorded, anonymous.
18. Interview F: senior politician. Location: Beirut, 23 June 2009, 17.15, not recorded, anonymous.
19. Interview G: Hizballah representative. Location: Beirut, 26 June 2009, 18.00, not recorded, anonymous.
20. Interview H: Lecturer at LAU. Location: Beirut, 22 June 2009, 10.00, not recorded, anonymous.
21. Interview I: Lecturer at LAU. Location: Lebanon, 26 June 2009, 12.30, recorded, anonymous.
22. Interview J: European diplomat. Location: Beirut, 8 December 2009, 18.00, not recorded, anonymous.
23. Interview K: senior representative of an international organisation. Location:
Damascus, 13 December 2008, 12.00, not recorded, anonymous.
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