Man’s creation and salvation according to George V. Florovsky

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The task of the thesis is to systematize the doctrine of the creation and the salvation of man as presented in the essays of one of the most important Orthodox theologians: George V. Florovsky (1893 - 1979).

The doctrine of creation is the presupposition for Florovsky's whole theology, for it lays down the basics and foundations of all other doctrines. Creation implies (first of all) the categories of space and time for created beings in distinction with the divine mode of existence. These two different modes of existence imply, on the one hand, the reality of creaturely freedom and its consequences (the Fall, sin, evil and freedom of choice), and on the other, the divine freedom to create, which for Florovsky necessitates the distinction in God between the divine being and the divine energies. While the first part of the doctrine of creation is concerned with the distinguishing principle between God and man, i.e. 'nature', the second part deals with the personal aspect of this relationship, which is the doctrine of theosis.

The doctrine of the salvation of man is constructed in the same way as the doctrine of creation, i.e. according to the distinction between nature and person. Thus, Christology is concerned with the healing of human nature, which is ultimately the abolition of mortality. Ecclesiology is the doctrine concerning the salvation of the human person. Being the body of Christ, the church is the realm for this salvation, for it is the church which offers the divine means of salvation, the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist.

In conclusion, a critical assessment of Florovsky's doctrine considers his fundamental distinction between nature and person from a Lutheran perspective.
Man's Creation and Salvation

according to George V. Florovsky

Christoph Georg Friedrich Künkel
submitted for the degree of
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to the
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table of Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface .......................................................... 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: The Doctrine of Creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A  The Rejection of the Greek Cosmology .......................... 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B  Creation is Contingent ............................................ 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Two basic statements ............................................. 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The world might not have existed at all - Anthropology ........ 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Mutability - Immutability ....................................... 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. The world has a beginning, yet no end .......................... 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Time and eternity: two different modes of existence .......... 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Creaturely Freedom ................................................ 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1. The real freedom ............................................... 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2. The freedom of choice .......................................... 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2.1. The Fall ..................................................... 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2.2. The problem of evil .......................................... 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2.3. Freedom of choice - the disfigured freedom ............... 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2.3.1. Peccatum originale and nature ........................... 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2.3.2. Sin and person ........................................... 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. The world is contingent - conclusions .......................... 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. God could not have created at all - the doctrine of God ........ 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. God is free - the distinction between nature and energy ...... 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. The divine energies ............................................. 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. God is the free Creator - conclusions .......................... 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C  The Doctrine of Theosis ............................................... 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Synergy between man and God ....................................... 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Man's ascetic achievements ........................................ 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Union of God and Man: theosis .................................... 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conclusions ....................................................... 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D  Cur deus homo? ...................................................... 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E  The Doctrine of Creation - conclusion ............................ 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter II: The Salvation of Man

A  The Salvation of Human Nature - Christology ......................... 74
   1. God's response to the misery of man ................................ 74
   2. God became man ......................................................... 77
   3. The passion and death of Christ ..................................... 82
   4. Christ, the redeemer - soteriology .................................. 86
      4.1. The three redeeming works of Christ .............................. 86
      4.2. The abolition of human death ..................................... 89
         4.2.1. The doctrine of human death ................................ 89
            4.2.1.1. The definition of death ................................. 90
            4.2.1.2. Human nature as composition of soul and body ....... 91
            4.2.1.3. Man's death ............................................. 93
      4.2.2. Christ's descent into Hell ..................................... 95
   5. Conclusions ............................................................ 98

B  The salvation of the Christian person - Ecclesiology ................. 100
   1. The problem .............................................................. 100
   2. The church as the realm for salvation ................................ 101
   3. History as the framework for the possibility of the salvation of
      the human person ....................................................... 107
   4. The sacraments as the divine means for the salvation .............. 108
      4.1. What is a sacrament? ............................................. 109
      4.2. The sacrament of baptism ........................................ 109
      4.3. The sacrament of the eucharist ................................ 113
      4.4. Christ, the one sacrament ....................................... 115
   5. Conclusions ............................................................ 116

C  The Christian Hope - conclusions ....................................... 117
Chapter III: A Critical Assessment of Florovsky's Doctrine

1. The construction of Florovsky's doctrine of man ..................120
2. The importance of the distinction between 'nature' and 'person' in Florovsky's doctrine ..................122
3. The distinction between the divine nature (being) and the divine energies (act) ..................124
   3.1. The unknowability of God's being - a criticism of apophatic theology ..........................126
   3.2. Freedom of God and certainty of faith ..................129
   3.3. Conclusions ..................................................133
4. The distinction between the human nature (being) and the human person (act) ..................133
   4.1. The necessity for the distinction ..................133
   4.2. Grace and sin, and the distinction between nature and person ..................135
   4.3. Conclusions ..................................................137
5. The distinction between 'nature' and 'person' - An Ecumenical task ..........................138

Notes ........................................................................141

Bibliography ..................................................180
Preface

The ultimate reason for the existence of this study originates in several talks about Orthodoxy with Father George Dragas and a rather controversial systematic seminar about Florovsky's essay 'The Resurrection of Life'. Due to these discussions I became interested in Orthodox theology and - encouraged by Father Dragas - decided to give some of my time to a more detailed study of this theology, which seems to be rather unknown in the West. Father George Florovsky is commonly regarded as one of the greatest contemporary Orthodox Theologians and I decided to work on his theology, concentrating on his doctrine about man, because most of his important theological works have been published in English.

Before discussing Florovsky's theology I want to give a brief biography of this Orthodox theologian. Born on the 28.8.1893 as the fourth and youngest child to the Orthodox priest V.A. Florovsky and his wife C. Georgievny, Georges Vasilievich Florovsky was an Assistant Professor at the University of Odessa for philosophy from 1919-1920. Because of the Civil War he left Russia in January 1920 and became a member of the Russian Academia Collegium in Prague (1921), where he lectured in philosophy of law until 1926. From 1926-1948 he held the Chair for Patristics in the Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris. It was from the very beginning of this time that Florovsky got involved in the ecumenical movement, being one of the leading Orthodox theologians at several meetings of the World Council of Churches. In 1948 Florovsky went to the USA to become Professor of Theology in St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary in New York City and held this post until 1955, being simultaneously Adjunct Professor for History and Theology of Eastern Orthodoxy at the Union Theological Seminary. From 1956 until 1964 Florovsky held the Chair of Eastern Church History at Harvard University and finally taught Slavic Studies at Princeton University as Professor Emeritus until he died on the 11.9.1979 in Princeton, New Jersey. Being an Orthodox Priest since 1932, Florovsky always tried to combine his wide ranging academic skills with his personal faith, which is obvious if one reads some of his sermons as well as his essays. Being more a historian than a systematic theologian, he is regarded as a conservative Orthodox theologian, who asked for a return 'back to the Fathers'. Though he never really clarified in a systematic way what he wanted theology to be he asked for a "neopatristic synthesis", which attempts to combine
the theology of the theologians of the Orthodox tradition with contemporary questions, although the patristic theology had to have its clear preeminence over modern attempts. This becomes clear if one reads only some of Florovsky's essays. He wrote only four bigger works which are all concerned with Church history, while his systematic thoughts are laid down in several essays. "Florovsky cultivated a lapidary style. Every facet of what he wrote was sharply honed before it left his desk - with a view to the abiding place it would have in the canon of Orthodox literature". Maybe this explains why Florovsky did not produce many books. He writes very concisely and mostly on just one topic, never attempting to present an Orthodox dogmatic. This, however, involves the fact that he presupposes many doctrines without explaining them in any detail. This was one of the difficulties one had to face in reading this theology.

My task was to systematize Florovsky's thoughts and to present them in a systematic way. This involved the problem of expounding underlying thoughts and presuppositions as well as combining different subjects presented by Florovsky on different occasions. This does not mean that the construction of the thesis is arbitrarily and does not represent Florovsky's way of discussing the problems, because 1. his various essays offer links, which clarify possible connections to subjects relating to the matter of concern, and 2. his two basic essays, which relate to the doctrine of man, "Creaturehood" and "Redemption" offer a certain construction, which I followed in my systematic exposition of Florovsky's thoughts. In the course of the research it became clear that it was necessary to present Florovsky's doctrine of Creation, of God and his Christology in detail in order to get a more complete insight into his understanding of the situation of man coram deo. This indicates already that I had to refer to essays of different periods, in order to present Florovsky's doctrines in a fair way. It is surprising however to find that this is possible without having to look for any change or development in Florovsky's ideas. Reading essays from different periods one finds out that Florovsky is very often literally quoting earlier essays, adding only a few points. To exemplify this one might refer to his essay 'Redemption', published in 1930, which was the basis for several other essays which consist of either shortened quotations, or exact quotations from 'Redemption'. Thus:
Similar observations can be made with reference to other essays as well. This consistency in theology appears to be strange, especially if one is aware of the fact that Florovsky had several discussions with other theologians from other traditions. Only in the essays 'Holy Spirit' and 'High Calling' one feels an influence of Karl Barth's theology, which is due to the fact that Florovsky met Barth in Bonn in the early thirties and was rather fascinated by his "new" approach to theology. But this influence did not last long. Thus Florovsky remained faithful to the Orthodox tradition and tried to present it in a new way. This, however, involves from the very beginning that his theology is timeless and does not look for the contemporary needs of theology presented by contemporary problems. This is not a negative judgement, but wants to assert that Florovsky saw the answer to the problems of today in a theology which attempts to be a 'neopatristic synthesis'.

For Florovsky man is first of all created. Consequently our exposition of Florovsky's theology concerning man has to start with the doctrine of creation, for the statement that man is a creature can only be understood in the wider context of the creation of all things. This chapter will be followed by Florovsky's doctrine of the salvation of man, which will finally lead us to a critical assessment of his theology concerning man. I do not want to conceal that the thesis is written by a Lutheran and consequently critical remarks will be presented from this perspective. However, a lot that should have been said, could not be said, because of the size of the thesis. Thus the thesis should be understood as an attempt to understand a theologian from another tradition in order to open up a discussion, which is free from prejudices.

Before starting the actual thesis I want to thank those people I am especially indebted to and without whose help my work would not have been possible. As my supervisor Father George Dragas helped me through several extensive discussions to get into the Orthodox frame of mind and to understand the teaching of his teacher in a better way.
The German Academic Exchange Service made my stay in Durham possible by granting a generous scholarship. I am especially indebted to Miss Jane Peek and Mr Nic Humphries who bore all my personal miseries in the course of writing the thesis and helped a great deal while listening to me.
I The Doctrine of Creation

To talk about man as a creature presupposes that there is a creator. Thus one cannot talk about the creature without talking at the same time about the creator and the actual event of creation. Florovsky therefore starts his doctrine about the creation of man with the rejection of any concepts which understand the world as self-sufficient and eternal. Though our main concern will be the problem of man, we have to look into the general doctrine of creation as well. In rejecting other concepts, which try to explain the world, Florovsky outlines already some main topics of his theology.

A The Rejection of the Greek Cosmology

The world is created. This assertion rejects all concepts which regard the world as self-sufficient, eternal or evolutionary. Ultimately there are two cosmologies which oppose each other and are irreconcilable. Today we call them evolution and creation but they are in the last resort precisely the Greek and the Christian. This seems to be quite obvious, but the main difference between these two concepts is their understanding of time.

Despite various trends in Greek philosophy, Florovsky sees a common pattern in all systems: the idea of an eternal cosmos. This can be stated by means of the following quotations from Aristotle:

"For what is of necessity coincides with what is always, since that which must be, cannot possibly not be: hence a thing is eternal, if its being is necessary; and if the coming-to-be of a thing is therefore necessary, its coming-to-be is eternal, and if eternal, necessary. If it is to be eternal, it cannot proceed in a straight line, because it can have no source .... but there must be a source of coming-to-be though without coming-to-be itself being limited, and it must be eternal. Therefore it must be a cyclical process." The consequence is that time is a limited number of motions and thus a reiteration of itself. Nothing really new is going to happen, no innovations are possible. This cosmology derives from astronomical observations, where everything seems to be in a continuous, though in the end meaningless and tiresome cyclical movement. The biblical concept of time however is that of a linear movement.

Florovsky is strongly opposed to the Greek concept: "There is no sense of creative duty in the Greek mind." This is not an argument
yet this statement against the logical Greek concept shows what Florovsky is up to. History is the place for activity, for creative acts and achievements. He refuses to regard the world as a kind of perpetuum mobile, where nothing new can happen. Due to the assertion that 'the world is created' Christianity has to insist on the validity of history and time. Florovsky clarifies this in his essays, "The predicament of the christian historian", where he starts with Max Bloch's statement: "Christianity is a religion of historians". And he is aware of "a continuing anti-historical attitude" among theologians, especially those influenced by existentialism and the Bultmann School. Against these Florovsky stresses the historicity of the Christian belief, which is bound up with events in time, with the deeds of God. "Time begins and ends, but in time human destiny is accomplished. Time itself is essentially unique, and never comes back .... The concreteness of purpose binds, from within, the stream of events into an organic whole. Creaturely activity in time forms history, that is Florovsky's stress.

In Florovsky's arguments against the Greek cosmology we find another hint to a subject of importance in his theology. Referring to the Stoics and their concept of the 'apokatastasis panton' he objects to the fact that in their system the continuity of the individual existence is not taken into account. If history is the place for action and innovations, this has to be done through individuals. Already Origen protested against the Greek concept in saying: "If this is true, then free will is destroyed". This in itself is not yet an argument against the philosophers, but in taking up this Origenistic view, Florovsky clearly shows what the main characteristic of the individuals is: their freedom, which enables them to bring about these innovations. Here lies his second stress. He insists on and validates both on the grounds of his doctrine of creation. Thus we may say that the Christian cosmology with its stress on history and the activity of individuals is one big argument against the Greek cyclical idea of the world.

To say the world is created implies a beginning of the world. But how can we make this assertion if nobody is able to testify to it? This question is interwoven with the problem of time. If one does not want to conceive of the world as eternal, one has to assert a beginning of time. Because of this problem Augustin said: procul
dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore. But this transition from non-existence to existence, this beginning of time, which is not time yet, is inaccessible to human mind. We are not capable to think of the transition from nothingness to being, from eternity to time. Though Florovsky does not explain, why this is so, he is right in stressing man's incapacity to conceive of a real beginning. Because to think of a beginning always implies that something has come to an end. Kant calls this 'something' empty time, but if it is an empty time, nothing can come into being in this time, because then this empty time would have been "full". His second argument against the conceivability of a beginning of time runs as follows: if I say the world has no beginning, i.e. it is infinite as regards time, then up to the present moment an infinite time has passed. But time is still going on, consequently infinity is growing, which would be a contradiction in terms. Thus we cannot conceive of a beginning of time.

But according to Florovsky there is a way to comprehend this beginning: "We always calculate time in an inverse order, back from the present, retrograding into the depth of time, going backwards in the temporal sequence". And going backward one comes to a halt, which is still calculable from within the temporal sequence. But it is the notion of the beginning of time which makes us stop, the impossibility of an infinite retrogression into the past, because a "first unit is absolutely postulated in the temporal series, before which there are no other links, no other moments of time, because there was no change and no sequence whatever", i.e. eternity. Without any doubt, this is a good argument - though from experience. But looking in Aristotle and other Greek philosophers one is easily convinced that there is no "prohibition" at all to go back into the past infinitly, no absolute necessity for such "postulating the impossibility of an infinite retrogression". Postulating this beginning of time means on the one hand that the "'number' of the times past" is limited, but on the other hand it involves the danger of thinking of a cause for time in order to give time a meaning. Consequently this cause would be an inseparable part of the existing effect. Both the cause and the effect would be connected within a higher frame of meaning which would mean that both belong necessarily to the same context of being. But in Christian thinking God is the free Creator of time. He freely commits himself to time.
Thus he never belongs necessarily to time, though he might act in
time, but this acting in time is his free decision which is not
imposed upon him. Florovsky must have seen this difficulty. In
his essay "The Idea of Creation in Christian Philosophy", published
in 1949 i.e. 21 years later than "Creature and Creaturehood", which is
not as clear at this point, we have a little hint to this. Firstly
he says: "What does really matter is just this postulate of the halt"
in the retrogression in time. Then he denies the Kantian "empty
time", because God does not precede the created world in time" but
"celsitudine semper praesentis aeternitatis" and finally concludes:
"We cannot understand the transition from Divine eternity to
duration or the succession of times, precisely because this is no
homogeneous transition but an ultimate hiatus and rupture. Thus
to conceive of the world and of time as created is an act of belief
and cannot be demonstrated, postulated or in any way deduced from
experience. One may ask why Florovsky still postulates the halt in
the retrogression of time. If Florovsky wants to stress that God
is the free Creator one may enquire whether such an attempt to
conceive the inconceivable, i.e. the beginning of the world, supports
this assertion or confuses it.

The doctrine of creation as an article of faith is the argument
against the Greek cosmology. Florovsky refers to Augustin: "Viam
rectam sequentes quae nobis est Christus. Eo duce et salvatore, a
vano et inepto circuitu iter fidei mentemque avertamus". Augustin
is arguing against the Greek cyclical concepts in pointing out the
inconsistencies of these especially Platonic views, joyfully concluding:
"Circuitus illi iam explosi sunt". Florovsky does not go this way,
nor as one might expect after this quotation, a christological one.
"The radical refutation of a cyclical conception was possible only in
the context of a coherent doctrine of Creation". Surprisingly,
Florovsky continues: "Christian Eschatology does inextricably depend
upon an adequate doctrine of creation" and not upon Christology!
This sets the course for the following discussion. Though Florovsky
can be Christological in his arguments, to a Lutheran he does not seem
to be able to be Christocentric enough. This will have its
implications for the doctrine of creation. But coming back to the
Augustinian quotation, we are compelled to ask why does Florovsky
refer to Augustin at all? Though he does not mention it explicitly
he must presuppose that Christ(ology) is relevant or even the starting point for a doctrine of creation. Whether he really fulfills this expectation we will have to decide once we have presented his full conception.

To reject the Greek concept of cosmology one has to have a doctrine of creation, which first of all involves the assertion of a beginning of time. This beginning of time is inconceivable according to Florovsky, though comprehensible and imaginable, if one postulates it. Thus the assertion that the world is created is an article of faith, a Christian datum.

**B Creation is contingent**

1. Two basic statements

According to Florovsky perhaps the best definition of creation is as follows: "A created world is a world, which might not have existed at all"\(^1\). It must be noticed that through this definition the actual event and act of creation is not mentioned, but a fact is described. However, alongside this basic statement occurring several times\(^2\) goes the other, which is already one implication of it: "God could have not created at all"\(^3\) these two statements cannot be separated from each other, though it is interesting to note that Florovsky seems to subordinate the latter to the former\(^4\). Both have in common the stress on the contingency of the world as well as the contingency of its origin. This contingency finds its expression in the freedom of man and God. Man and God are the two primary subjects and the two basic statements refer to each of them respectively.

In the following chapters I shall try to point out some consequences which emerge from these two sentences and which - furthermore - will be relevant for Florovsky's doctrine of man, since it is in his doctrine of creation that he lays down the basic presupposition to his entire theology\(^5\).

2. The world might not have existed at all - anthropology

2.1 Mutability - Immutability

What cannot be said about Christ as God must be said about the world: \(\not\exists\ \nu\ \tau\varepsilon\ \deltaι\ \pi\omicron\ \kappa\nu\ \not\exists\). We cannot give any proper and sufficient reason for the existence of the world which derives from its existence. To assert that the world is created means that there is "an ultimate and contingent 'surplus' of existence"\(^6\). God is not alone any more but
created this new reality outside himself. By the will of God the world came into being and does exist. And here lies the mystery of creation: the world is contingent, but it originates in this ultimate act of God, who was entirely free when he created. But because the world is contingent it is mutable, and because it originates in the ultimate act of God it is immutable. How this contradiction makes sense we will have to see now.

The world came out of nothing, it suddenly existed. Consequently there was a change, though not a change in time, from non-existence to existence. Creation therefore is an event of a metahistorical character. The world is originated in a changing event. Before the world was there was nothing, and even this nothing was not. Nothing apart from God existed. But now the world exists due to God's contingent act of creation, originated in the change. "If then things are created, it follows that they are also wholly mutable. For things whose existence originated in change, must also be subject to change whether it be that they perish or that they become other than they are by act or will". Man is mutable in contrast to God who is immutable, because he is the creator-God. He has no beginning, while the world has a beginning. And this beginning is the reason for man's mutability and thus opens up history, a story between man and God. A history, where innovation, new and unplanned things could happen, because man is mutable. Therefore man is a historic, a 'geschichtliches' being. A first question arises here: Through his act of creation God opens up a history between man and himself, he wants to be the 'thou' for mankind. But does this mean that he must be open to the mutations which are going to happen in this historical process as well? God's immutability refers to his being as well as to his will. But will there be a lively intercourse between man and God, if the one is mutable and the other immutable and unchangeable? What is precisely the contact between man and God if one starts with these antinomous ontological distinctions?

Man's openness to change and history is limited. A change from being into non-being will never be ultimate. For "immutable above all is the microcosm man, and immutable are man's hypostases". This immutability refers just to the impossibility of falling into non-existence of the beings once created. Before going into further detail we have to find out what Florovsky means by the term microcosm and hypostasis.
He does not explain these terms and takes their understanding for granted. The complementary term to hypostasis is nature. But is nature equivalent to microcosm? Or is the distinction one between body and soul or person and nature? Do both denote the same? In his essays concerning eschatology Florovsky uses for example the terms soul, body, hypostases, concerned with creation he uses hypostases, person, spirit, nature, essence and others, but he never clarifies what the relation of the one to the other is. Up to this day this seems to be one of the main problems for patristic study in general because the Fathers used all kinds of different terms but hardly defined them and when they did so it was still possible to use them with a totally different meaning in another context. Florovsky admits these difficulties: "The problem of terminology remains as long as ancient idioms are still used .... It must be always remembered that words don't express of themselves the ideas that are intended to be expressed". One may ask here, how successful Florovsky has been in applying this truth to his own terminology. The hard fact remains that we have to find out ourselves, what the meaning of some of Florovsky's key ideas, which are intended to be expressed, are.

The term 'microcosm' has a very long tradition and is obviously related to the world as macrocosm. To describe man as a microcosm was due to the fact that this idea has been used by philosophers a long time before Christian theologians used it. There is, however, an important difference. Generalizing one might say that Greek philosophy and Oriental tradition understood the term in the way that man was formed after the pattern of the cosmos. While the Christian tradition was faced with the problem that man is on the one hand taken from the earth, and therefore is in the image of material creation, on the other hand he has been created in the image and likeness of God. This latter view implies a supernatural destiny for man: deification, which could not be fulfilled by man being a microcosm but related only to the created matter. No, he had a middle position between the created and the Creator, participating, as it were, in both (in the Creator by grace, in the created by nature). Man reflects the outside of the world like a mirror, unites even the opposites in himself and has the task to keep the diversity of the world in a unity in himself. Thus being a microcosm is a function: "every kind of life is combined in him, and
But man could not realize this function without being related to the cause of the unity of the macrocosm: God. He participates in God through his being in the image of God. "Each hypostasis in its own being and existence is sealed by a particular ray of the good pleasure of God's love and will. And in this sense, all things are in God - in 'image' (ἐν ἴδεα καὶ θεαματισμό ναι) but not by nature". This is not yet what is usually called the image of God in man, but that which belongs to human nature and cannot be lost. It is "innate in man's very nature" in order to sustain him. God is always present in man's nature with his grace. Without this man would not really be a microcosm, because the macrocosm is essentially dependent upon God. Thus if man is to reflect the world in himself and therefore also the relationship between the world and its Creator, then man must have this innate fixity of God in himself.

What we have described so far shows that the term microcosm refers to the human nature, which is common to all. Everybody is a microcosm by nature and everybody had the task to fulfil this natural function. Consequently the term nature does not just refer to matter, is not something static as pure material, but constantly asking to fulfil this function of uniting the extremes of the created world in himself. Because of this innate grace of God human nature is always moved towards God. Man has naturally a capacity for God, for relating to him and in the end uniting with him completely. This is the destiny of his nature, the destiny of all human nature. The differences between men are due to the fact that each one of them realizes his innate capacities in a different way. Because man is created and thus dependent upon God, he is naturally attracted to God. "'Nature' always depends on 'supernature'". This capacity for God is according to S. Maximus the λόγος φύσεως.

Concluding our short discussion on microcosm one might say: What God is for the world, that is the soul for the body. This is the analogy between the world as macrocosm and man as microcosm. But this is not just a predicate for man but implies as we already mentioned a function. Because man as a microcosm unites the opposite tendencies which are found in the world in himself, he is the mediator for the ultimate destiny of the whole creation: deification. According to S. Maximus we find five divisions in the fallen world which man by nature is called to overcome: The division between
1. the created and the uncreated, 2. the intelligible and the sensible, 3. heaven and earth, 4. paradise and the world inhabited by man and 5. man and woman. This work of mediation is to be a fruit of man's relationship to God and will finally lead to the transfiguration of the whole world. On the other hand, however, if man does not fulfill his mediatorial function the whole world will be (and was) involved in this failure of man as well. But the goal of creation is the differentiated unity of all creatures in God. Therefore whatever man does in relation to his creator has cosmic implications.

Man being a microcosm is the mediator between God and the world. But nature is not identical with man. Nature denotes what is common to all man. It pertains to the principle of being which is common to all in the same way, while the principle of the individual being is related to the term hypostasis. Hypostasis can be defined as the individual actualisation of the common nature. It is nothing which can be subtracted from the individual man. Man is not on the one hand or even in one part hypostasis and on the other hand nature. Hypostasis and nature are two aspects of the one individual man. They cannot be separated from each other, but have to be distinguished. Thus man is one hypostasis in one nature, but never just nature or just hypostasis.

Returning now to our starting point we have to say: Man though emerging out of a change and consequently being subject to change and therefore open to history is immutable in two ways, both describing man as one hypostasis in one nature. 1. Man is immutable as regards his nature in the sense that he is and will always be a microcosm, thus the mediator. 2. Man is immutable as regards his hypostasis in the sense that God wants every hypostasis to exist, because he created it. To avoid any misunderstandings: these two points are not to be separated but want to say the same: man is immutable in the sense that once created he cannot return to non-existence. But in as much as he is open to history and changes, he is also mutable. This paradox of existence and change in man is never overcome.

The term immutable is usually a term for God's being. Mutability in God would mean that he is not perfect but lacks something. If Florovsky stresses man's immutability he stresses the connection between God and man. Man is in his very existence
totally dependent on God. He is not self sufficient. The fact that man is created for existence is irrevocable, but now it depends on man himself what he makes with his existence, how he realizes God's free gift of being. Behind this concept lies the following scheme. There are two acts of God, where he alone is active in his divine freedom: 1. \( \text{To } \nu \nu \nu \), i.e. the creation of a reality outside God and other than himself. 2. \( \text{To } \mu \mu \nu \nu \), i.e. God's guarantee that his creation will exist for ever. This has been revealed in his redemptive work in Christ. These two acts sola gratia dei correspond to two acts done by God and man in synergy. Man has to actualize his \( \text{To } \nu \nu \nu \), into a \( \text{To } \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \) through faith, and his \( \text{To } \mu \mu \nu \nu \), into a \( \text{To } \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \) through deification. And these acts of man have their ontological basis in the fact that man is open to change. He is expected to realize his being, the capabilities he has. Before we go into this problem we have to notice that this important starting point is doubtlessly a philosophical one. Man's being is lacking the immutability of being, which is only applicable to God's being. This applies both to man's original state as well as to his fallen state. Originated in change, man is subject to change. The condition sine qua non for man's realisation of his capability of change as motion is his being in time. Time, i.e. history is the place where man has to realize his being in relation to God. But how is this possible, if God is immutable, and as such cannot be related to time qua being? This seems to be absolutely impossible, because "time and eternity cannot be added together: they have no common measure, they are as it were two different modes of existence". The first question which emerges from this statement is: How was the incarnation of the Godman Christ Jesus possible, if Florovsky's statement is true? Is he not the "common measure" of time and eternity and is he not the one who gives the meaning to both, eternity and time? We will have to see how Florovsky tries to solve this problem. We may do this in several steps: 1. the world is created for eternal existence - how is this related to time? 2. what does it mean that time and eternity are two different modes of existence and what are its implications? 3. If there is a gap between God and man, then creation though always dependent upon God's sustaining power and grace is to a certain extent independent and therefore free. How is this freedom of the creatures used and in which way does this affect God?
2.2 The world has a beginning, yet no end

God is immutable even in his acts. Consequently he is eternally the Creator and therefore his act of creation will not be revoked. God's word endureth for ever (1 Petr 1,25). This means for the world: it has a beginning, yet no end; and for God: a free self-limitation. "Freedom is essentially antinomical. The creative fiat of God is a free, but ultimate act of God". In creating something, a new reality besides God himself, God limits himself - but freely. Nobody, not even he himself forced him to create. It is an act of pure divine freedom. But this act cannot be revoked, because God is immutable. This is the "antinomy of freedom".

The world is created for existence (Wisd. Sal. 1,14) and for nothing else. Consequently it has no power of self-annihilation. It cannot return into nothingness again. The world might not have existed at all, but now it exists and there is no way back, no way behind this existence. Florovsky goes on to argue: Because the world only exists in time, time itself is a creature. The world was created together with time, but not in time. The beginning of the world, i.e. the beginning of time is according to S. Basil the Great not yet time, nor even a fraction of time, just as the beginning of a road is not yet the road itself. Though Florovsky is not explicit at this point and does not refer to Basil's following argument he would have agreed with S. Basil's assertion, that God created the world in "less than an instant". There is no sequence in God's creative acts, but he created everything in one moment. But time will come to an end. Man's final destiny is his deification, his unification with God. And because of this final destiny "man is called to 'eternity', not to 'history'. This is why 'history' must come to its close, to its end". History is the - passing - place to realize this final purpose of God's creation. But at the same stage this process will come to an end. History will be fulfilled and consummated. This telos is implied in the design of the creation itself. Time will cease (Rev. 10,6), temporal sequence will be broken. "But let us remember, the end of time will not be the end of creaturely existence." Thus the created world can also exist in another manner, which is yet inconceivable but might be called eternity. The main characteristic of this existence outside time is that the world is not subject to change anymore. But there seems
to be an obvious contradiction in Florovsky's argument: For if creation is created for eternal existence and time itself is a creature, it must therefore exist eternally and cannot cease. Or to put the question positively: How are time and eternity related to each other in this concept? Florovsky is quite clear at this point: "Time and eternity cannot be added together: they have no common measure, they are, as it were, different dimensions of existence". Consequently time and eternity are incommensurable and therefore - as long as time exists - both possible, able to co-exist. They exist in a parallel way, never crossing each other until time ceases to be. We have mentioned the problem of the incarnation emerging from this concept. Florovsky will have to give an answer to this problem of the relation between time and eternity, which surpasses the Aristotelian definition of time which Florovsky refers to: "Time is precisely the number of movements estimated according to its before and after". Though Florovsky does not indicate anywhere that his understanding of time goes further than Aristotle's definition, he must have conceived of time in a different way as well because of the mentioned Christological problem and the idea of deification. We will come back to this question when discussing these two points at length. For our present purposes it is sufficient to remember, that the world has a beginning yet no end, though time will finish and history will be consummated.

2.3 Time and eternity: two different modes of existence.

To live in time or to live in eternity are two different and incommensurable modes of existence. This is the same distinction as between the created and the uncreated. Only created beings live in time, while the uncreated lives in eternity and is eternal KAT' OUSIAV. Consequently creation excludes all consubstantiality of the creator and the created. Though the existence of the world is only due to God's creative act constituting a continuous dependence of the world upon God, there is an infinite distance between God and his Creatures, a distance οὖσιν ἀληθείας γένεσις. This distance is never removed. Consequently God will never be man by nature and man will never be God by nature. "Nihilque in ea (creatione) esse quod ad trinitatem pertineat, nisi quod Trinitatis condidit". That does not mean, however, that the two are an antithesis of the absolute and the relative the Infinite and the Finite, which are complementary and correlative, thus only possible together. There is only one principle: God himself. He is the creator. But there are two natures, as the formula of Chalcedon clearly stated.
In contrast to the problem of the beginning of time, Florovsky is very clear. God is absolutely supreme, free and not bound by anything. The difference of the two natures is not overcome in Christ. They remain \( \text{λευγρός} \ \text{δικαιός} \ \text{διαφύτως} \ \text{διαφύτως} \) (Chalcedon) united with each other. Hence the heterogeneity of created beings and the Son of God. Due to the Arian controversy the early Christian Fathers stressed the difference between the generation of the Son, which refers to his consubstantiality with the Father, and the creation of the world out of nothing, which involves a complete dissimilarity of nature (\( \text{φύλλον} \)), which will never be overcome. But how will the eternity of God be related to the eternity of man after time has ceased? "Eternity' and 'time' are two different modes of existence. They differ essentially - in quality, not just in measure or length. There is a difference in quality between time and eternity in the same way as there is a difference in nature between man and God. But this difference in nature (\( \text{φύλλον} \)) will not be overcome. How then is deification to be understood? Before proceeding to this question other problems have to be considered. For according to Florovsky the assertion of two different modes of existence, of a difference in nature (\( \text{φύλλον} \)) leads to the conclusion of the "independence and substantiality" of creatures. Thus the problem of human freedom originates in the fact of an unbridgeable ontological difference. Because God and man live in two incompatible spheres one has to assert that they are (in a certain sense) independent and thus free. The freedom of the creatures however is the necessary presupposition for the doctrine of deification, because union with God is possible only in the realm of freedom.

2.4 Creaturely freedom

"Creation is not a phenomenon but a 'substance'. The reality and substantiality of the created nature is manifested first of all in creaturely freedom. With this statement we come to the heart of Florovsky's doctrine of creation. Creation is not just an act which is done once and has no further consequences. No, creation establishes something totally new, which endures. And this is first of all described through the term freedom. What is this freedom of the created world? First of all it must be stated that this freedom applies only to mankind. Man is free and his deeds of behaviour have actual implications for the inanimated world. Man's freedom has cosmic implications because man as the microcosm is the mediator.
God "honoured man with freedom that good might belong no less to him who chose it than to him who planted its seed." This is the autonomy of man, the origin for everything that is happening in the created world. Therefore according to Florovsky freedom is not just a real possibility but an actuality bound up with man's nature. Man is honoured with this freedom and thus given the task to use it, i.e. to ascend to and unite with God by his own efforts and achievements. This starting point sets the course for our following discussion: What does man's freedom consist of and how does he use it?

2.4.1 The real freedom

Freedom of man is usually defined as the freedom of choosing between two or more things. But this freedom of choice is a libertas minor, a disfigured freedom, a freedom diminished and impoverished, a freedom as it exists after the fall among fallen beings. It is the freedom to choose between good and evil. But this freedom did not exist in the first man, because evil was not a possibility yet. "Freedom of choice is only a remote and pale reflection of real freedom." This real freedom of the primordial man consisted in "a total surrender to the divine arms." Man followed God's vocation, innate in his very nature. We mentioned this already, when we explored the notion of man as a microcosm. Creation "by its very existence witnesses to and proclaims its creaturehood, it proclaims that it has been produced." It points beyond its own limits as, by its own nature, is always directed to its Maker and Creator. To live according to this nature is to realize real freedom. And this is the same as to say: To live according to God's will, i.e. to love him with filial devotion and obedience is real freedom. Man is not free from something, but free to do something: to love God. Before his fall this love "was not yet a sacrifice. Innocent man had nothing to sacrifice, for everything he possessed came from the Grace of God." Florovsky stresses the absolute dependence of man upon God for all that he is and has. Original man is unable to give anything to God, because he has nothing which is withheld from him. Living in this real freedom everything original man possesses is already given to God. After the fall, however, when man does not fulfil his innate capacities of love and service, he has to give to God what he withholds from him. This is a sacrifice. Consequently the real freedom of Adam before the fall is
not an abstract, neutral or undecided freedom. It is always directed toward God and is bound up to him. It is in this relation only that man realizes his natural capabilities and lives out his real freedom.

Human life in its original mode was not something static. Man had to realize his nature and he did so. Ultimate effort was needed to achieve this. Florovsky distinguishes human nature from all other created nature. Created nature is bound to a natural process which develops its germs, realizes its natural potentialities hidden in its nature. "But man (alone) is more than a 'natural being', and it is in him that the general idea of creation is fully revealed or disclosed - man is a little 'world', a microcosm." And therefore the mediator between God and the created world as we have already seen. Being a microcosm he is able to achieve transcendence, i.e. "to surpass himself and to rise towards God, and even more than that - to partake in the divine life. It is only by this participation that man becomes fully himself." Here we have a clear expression of what Orthodox theology calls 'deification' - a notion which originates from 2 Petr. 1,4: Θεός κοινωνός ζωής. The Petrine text is not understood as a simple metaphor or as a merely rhetorical expression. Thus creation is not understood just as a phenomenon which establishes a relationship with God. But it has the final goal to unite everything in God, so that God may be all in all (1 Cor. 15,28): and this is understood ontologically, i.e. in terms of substance. Man is called to realize this purpose which Florovsky calls "ontological ascent or growth". Consequently man is fully man when he experiences ek-stasis. His true nature is always revealed as an ek-stasis of being. But this highly dynamic existence does not lead to a transsubstantiation of human beings but to an "impregnation with grace". This fulfilment of being by grace was the goal for the primordial man and still remains the same for fallen man. It is from this goal that history is decisively validated: "the historic process is, as it were, an imitative creation." "God did not only create us from nothing, but he also granted us by the grace of his word to live a divine life (τὸ ηὐτὰ θεοῦ ἐξῆν)". This grace of God is the grace of the real freedom, which enables man to ascend and to unite with God in a historic process. Consequently Rahner may say: "Radikale Abhängigkeit und echte Wirklichkeit wachsen im gleichen und nicht im umgekehrten Maße." But the decisive difference between
Rahner and Florovsky is that the former understands this sentence as referring to the relationship between God and man in a functional sense, whereas the latter as referring to the relationship between God and man in an ontological sense. Man's ascent to God is supported by God's descending grace. But this synergy of man and God does not destroy "the ancient law of human freedom". Man is not forced by God, but he is capable of falling away from God's grace, which is never irresistible. This presupposes that man was not created in a perfect status. He was capable of resisting God, of sinning and finally of death. Referring to Athanasius, Florovsky says: "Man is mortal by nature", because, as we have already said, created existence is always a gift of God. He created the world sola gratia for eternal existence. But this possibility of sinning was inherent in man's real but not absolute freedom, though he did not have to realize it. By actualizing his capability of sinning, he lost his real freedom and 'gained' the freedom of choice. Falling away from God man does not cease to exist. But life is lost due to the fall. Being and life do not coincide. Man fell into a state for which he was not created, but which he was capable of. It seems obvious that there must have been such a time, when real freedom was really lived otherwise the ontological consequences deriving from the fall of the first man, Adam, could not be conceived of. On the other hand, it is clear, that this time of realized real freedom is not the same as that freedom after time has ceased. For man, being created, had to ascend to God by his own efforts in synergy with God's grace. This was a constant process of further deification, overshadowed by man's capability of sin and death. While in the final state of 'eternal life' men will live in absolute communion with God, in a state of blessedness: posse non peccare is overcome into a non posse peccare.

2.4.2 The freedom of choice

2.4.2.1 The fall

We have already stated that there was no choice between good and evil for prelapsarian man, because evil did not yet exist. Unfallen man could only relate to God in love and filial obedience whereas fallen man is bound to himself in "self-eroticism, pride and vanity". The latter became the case when Adam fell away from God. And the result of the disjunction between man and God was the disjunction between man's person and nature. This last sentence sums up what Florovsky
understands by the fall of man. He calls this a metahistorical event, man's metaphysical suicide. It is man's failure to fulfil his final destiny to unite with God and to live in perfect communion with him in order to be truly man. This suicide is only metaphysical because man does not have the power of complete self-annihilation. Though denying God's reality and love man is never independent of God in his creaturely being, which is always given and sustained by God. But this metaphysical suicide has real consequences for man, it is an "ontological suicide". The ontological structure of man runs out of tune, loses its original harmony of real freedom. But how could this happen? Why did man commit this fall, which Florovsky calls a "tragedy of misguided love"? We will outline Florovsky's thoughts on this in the following section, but firstly we have to look more closely at the precise meaning of the phrase "tragedy of misguided love", because it is of great importance for the following discussion. We will be concerned with the event of the fall itself, the will in nature and person, and the problem of evil.

The fall of man is a "tragedy of misguided love". Living in real freedom man loved God and nothing else. That was his destiny, the purpose of creation. But men "began to consider themselves and cleaving to the body and the other senses, deceived as it were in their own interests, they fell into selfish desires and preferred their own good to the contemplation of the divine. Wasting their time thus and being unwilling to turn away from things close at hand, they imprisoned in the pleasures of their body their souls which had become disordered and defiled by all kinds of desires and in the end they forgot the power they had received from God in the beginning." We cannot know why man stopped contemplating God, because our present generation is in the fallen state, thus we cannot imagine what the real freedom was like. One cannot ask an insane person to give reasons for his insanity. However, Florovsky considers Origen to have come "very close to the correct solution, when he attributed the origin of evil .... either to boredom and idleness (desidia et laboris taedium in servando bono) or to satiety of Divine contemplation and love".

We must bring to notice that the first sinner did not choose evil but acted in a wrong way, and in doing so brought evil into being. To say that he chose evil would mean that he chose his nature being the only thing to choose besides God. But nature in itself is never evil.
It can be corrupted but it is never corruption itself. We have already seen that creaturely nature is always open to that which is beyond nature. Creaturely nature is and remains good. Thus the fall of Adam is a personal act. Sin is always personal, not natural! Nature is directed to the pleasure of contemplating God. And this innate activity, this steady will for ascent towards God has to be realized by the person. But the first sinner treated his nature as an end in itself: "The human fall consists precisely in the fact that man limits himself to himself, that man falls, as it were, in love with himself". The powers of nature which are open to God or to a certain purpose beyond themselves become an end in themselves, because of a failure of the person. Instead of loving the one who is only worth loving man fell in love with himself. Therefore Florovsky calls the fall a "tragedy of misguided love", or more precisely, it is the "infidelity of love". Thus evil has its negative character.

S. Maximus the Confessor described the fall of man in terms of will. Man's openness to God, innate in his nature, is his natural will, ἡλήμα φυσικὸν, which, being natural, remains sinless even after the fall. It constitutes human freedom and belongs to man's nature in the same way as reason does. Οὕτως εἶναι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἀδύνατον. This natural will is the 'power station' one might say, for all natural movements toward their ultimate end. It is because created things can never be an end in themselves (only God is αὐτότοκος) that the end of their natural movement is supernatural, i.e. in God. If the end of nature is God then the natural will always desires what is in harmony with its nature, and it remains unfallen. Because nature is God's good and unchangeable creature, which cannot become bad. The most important thing, however, is freedom: οὔτεὶ γὰρ τὸτε ὅλεν ἄδεικτος, ἀλλὰ φύεται ἀληθικῶς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. καὶ τάλιν, εἰ φύεται λογικῶς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. τὸ δὲ φύεται λογικῶς καὶ φύεται αὐτεξουσίως. τὸ δὲ φύεται αὐτεξουσίως ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν. The natural will, we may conclude, is the power for self-determination, for freedom. The term ἡλήμα φυσικὸν immediately actualizes the second level of human existence, the τρόπος ἑξάξιος i.e. how man uses his natural will? Maximus calls the use of natural will ἡλήμα γνωμικὸν because it is directed to the end of human existence. Man in real freedom did not need this gnomic will; one might even say, "he did not have one", because he lived in absolute
accordance with his natural will, i.e. in communion with God through love and obedience. Gnomic will and natural will were originally almost identical, but there was no divergence between them. They were congruent. It was only after the fall that they appeared as distinct and divergent. Because man misused his power for self-determination and made himself the end of his natural desires, a new status in man's structure is "achieved". Man's use of his natural will is not certain anymore, but becomes arbitrary, because now man has to choose between different pleasures. Choosing however, always implies ignorance of what is ultimately good for oneself, uncertainty as to the result of the thing chosen, and an acceptance of contraries with judgement of them. Consequently, selection does not denote an act of will but a disposition or a habit of will. Thus what happens through the fall is a perversion of man's aims in self-determination - rather than an annihilation or complete destruction of the capacity to be self-determined.

Instead of realizing his κενωμενον εις θεον, man becomes the homo in se incurvatus through his personal act of sinning. According to Florovsky man becomes decentralized. Fallen man lives within two points of reference: God and the imaginative god, man himself. "There are now two tendencies which intersect and cross each other, both remaining essentially different." This is a decisive point. Man's original freedom is not completely lost through the fall. Though his natural will is overpowered and perverted by the emergence of an arbitrary and gnomic will it still remains as a human posses for a return to God. "The will of fallen man has certainly the wrong inclination, but it is still to some extent free and has freely to accept the act of God (in Christ), by which salvation is brought to man." When Athanasius says "man forgot the power they had received from God in the beginning" he obviously presupposes that this power is still there even though sin has obscured its actualisation. Florovsky speaks of the despiritualisation of personality, though personality in this passage does not refer to man's hypostasis, but to his natural freedom. In using the term person he stresses the strong connection between nature and hypostasis, showing that the two aspects cannot be separated from each other. "Since personality is the 'image of God' in spiritual beings, personal character can only be preserved in a constant conversation with God. Separated from God personality vanishes, is stricken with spiritual sterility."
conclusion we may sum up Florovsky's thoughts as follows: Due to the separation from God, man fell into sin. The reason for this is not knowable, though ultimately it is understood as an "infidelity of love". This perversion is the result of an act of the personal gnomic will, not of nature, but nature has to bear the consequences of this revolt against God. The result of the fall is basically a dualism, which separates man from God and acquires cosmological dimensions. Having described the "pure facts" of the fall, we may now turn to an examination of the character of evil and sin.

2.4.2.2 The problem of evil

"Evil comes .... from the created spirit and not from matter"\(^{93}\). This statement is antiplatonic and stresses the original sinlessness of human nature. "For sin does not belong to human nature, but is a parasitic and abnormal growth"\(^{94}\). Though we may like to ask here whether this understanding leads to the assumption that evil is just accidental we have to keep in mind the distinction between nature and personal will, which has already been mentioned. Evil is an act of the hypostatic will, "is a perverse personal activity"\(^{95}\). But there is a difficulty here. If the gnomic will is a habit, does that mean that being a person is in itself sinful? Is sin according to Florovsky not just the sin of the person, but even the being of the person? This is a difficult question to answer. In his essay "The darkness of Night" Florovsky uses the terms person, personality and depersonalisation. How does one understand two sentences like the following: "evil is a perverse personal activity" and "evil depersonalizes personality itself"\(^{96}\)? It seems to me that Florovsky describes two things with the same term. Paraphrasing the two sentences he wants to say: Evil is an activity of the person. But being executed by the personal will evil has personal consequences, namely the perversion of the person. This perversion is a process which never comes to its final goal, the complete loss of personality. Though evil causes the disintegration of man, this never comes to an end because of creation. A total disintegration of the human structure would mean man's return to non-existence by the way of corruption. But the "violation of the law and disobedience did not abolish the original purpose of God. The abolition would have violated the truth of God"\(^{97}\). Thus the power of evil is limited, the creation will never be subject to total dissolution. Returning
to our initial question this means man will never become as strong and powerful as God is. On the other hand, we have to conclude that though evil depersonalizes man, it never reaches its final goal, man's complete depersonalisation. Therefore our question whether Florovsky identifies evil with person has to be answered with a 'no'.

One of the consequences of the fall is the decentralisation of man. His whole personality was centred around God before the fall; but now it has two centres. "In the state of evil there is always a tension between the two solicitations: the 'I' and something impersonal, represented by instincts or rather by passions"\(^98\). Florovsky does not describe these passions in any detail. "Passions are always impersonal; they are concentrations of cosmic energies\(^99\). Whatever 'cosmic' means in this context, Florovsky wants to assert that these passions are creaturely, i.e. they originate in man's creaturely movement. The description of the person entangled in passions must remain dark and mythological, because man cannot really describe their origin, but he knows that, though they may come from something beyond himself, these passions are his own. "Passions are the place, the seat of evil in the human person\(^100\). They possess the person so that in the end not the person but the passions act upon him: fata trahunt. Consequently Florovsky's description of the fallen man, who is governed by passions, has to be vague and can be nothing but an attempt to explain the inexplicable: Man "doubts the existence and the possibility of freedom in general ... And, as a consequence he loses his personality, his personal identity\(^101\). We have already discussed this problem. Man has always a small residue of personality in him, though he might be overpowered by the passions. Finally Florovsky sharpens his point to an extent which reminds one of similar Lutheran statements. But we will have to see whether Florovsky really takes up this position. "The 'man of the passions' is not at all free, although he can give the impression of activity and energy. He is nothing but a 'ball' of impersonal influences\(^102\), and "the abuse of freedom, which drives man away from God, culminates ultimately in the bondage of sin and passions and kills freedom altogether\(^103\). I summed up these quotations to show that Florovsky conceives of a process of evil doing which results in being captive of passions. Because each hypostasis has to actualize and use its nature on its own it comes to different stages of sinning and corruption. Man forgets his freedom, doubts the existence of the
possibility of freedom, depersonalizes and finally submits to the passions which means that ultimately his freedom is killed. It depends entirely on the person and its gnomic will to what extent it allows evil to rule over it. But if evil rules the person nature is affected by this, because the passions are directed to man's own nature and have a corrupting effect upon it. They impose the 'law of sin' into nature.

"Evil in man is an ignorance (ignorantia) and an insensibility, the blindness of reason and the hardness of heart. Man seals himself up, encloses himself in himself and separates himself." But enclosing himself, man loses himself, his inner life becomes chaotic because of tendencies in himself which oppose each other. There is a split in man introduced by sin. The passions can only exist because of the good, they use the good energies for the wrong purposes: "The elements are the same in the original world and in the fallen world. But the principle of organisation changed." Misuse of these good natural energies results in an "abnormal growth" in nature. Nature itself is affected by the passions, because nature is the end for the law of sin, which is a new law, "a kind of anti-law". Man turns to himself in a way which destroys his own nature. And this process of destruction happens individually in different ways and to different extents. Thus evil cuts the common human nature into pieces, it divides one man from another because of their different opinions and imaginations, which instigate contrary actions. Florovsky concludes: "Evil is divided within itself: it is a discord and a disharmony, inordinatio." This disorganized, chaotic character of evil does not only lead to a division in the common human nature and therefore to trouble, including fights and even wars among mankind, but acquires cosmic implications because of man's special position as mediator. The law of sin is not only imposed on human nature but also into the entire creation. "The entire world is poisoned by evil and malevolent energies, and the entire world suffers because of it." Consequently everybody and everything is involved in this great process of evil, of suffering because of sin. "Man's apostasy estranges the whole creation from God, devastates it and as it were, deprives it of God. The fall of man shatters the cosmic harmony." This becomes clear in the last effect of evil: death.

Florovsky assumes that death is only contrary to human nature,
because man was created for immortality. But in the state of the fallen creature man is no longer in communion with God, does no longer partake in the divine nature and therefore falls into the law of nature. "From the nature of the dumb animals mortality is transferred to a nature created for immortality". For the life of animals death was not a predicate of informity but rather a mark for their generating power. But for man death is a tragedy, a catastrophe because it is not just the death of an individual existence but the death of personality itself. And personality is far more than mere individuality because it was created for eternal communion with God. The capability of death which was inherent in human nature was actualized by the fall of Adam. And through this original sin (mortality) human nature in general is corrupted, since all men derive from Adam genetically. Speaking of the corruption of the human nature means that sin is not accidental but has ontological consequences. Florovsky has no special doctrine of original sin. He refers to it several times but rather briefly. But he would agree with Father Aghiorougissis: "So there is no determinism in inheriting Adam's guilt. What man inherits is the sinful condition, the corruption of human nature and consequent death, for which the person of Adam (!) is responsible. Human persons are likewise sinful not because they sinned in Adam, but because all human beings are also personal sinners". With the fall, evil came into existence and the condition of human nature changed. If this is what Florovsky says, then it is understandable why he conceives of the fall as a metahistorical event. Without this event one cannot argue for a change in human nature. On the other hand - on my assumption of agreement between Florovsky and Aghiorougissis - Florovsky seems to have denied the guilt-character of original sin. He always stresses the corruption of human nature, which cannot be overcome by mere repentance. In other words, he stresses the ontological character and implications of the fall.

To say that evil introduces ontological consequences into human nature means that a new "reality" is created. Three "kinds" of 'reality' apply now: God, his good creation and evil. But here the question must be raised as to how evil as the 'third reality' could enter the world, if God is held to be the creator of all things? "Evil is precisely that which opposes itself to and resists God,
it perverts his design and repudiates his ordinances"\textsuperscript{116}.

Consequently it cannot have been created by God. God would contradict himself if he created something which is designed to destroy his work. But since only the creator establishes sufficient reasons for the existence of anything apart from himself, one has to say that there is no reason for the existence of evil at all, though it exists. Thus evil is a phenomenon omnino non fundatum. Evil "possesses an existence in not existing at all. For there is no other origin for evil except the negation of the existent, and the truly existent forms the substance of the good. That therefore which is not to be found in the existent must be found in the non-existent\textsuperscript{117}. But though there is no reason for the existence of evil there is a cause for it: the fall of man, which was an "infidelity of love"\textsuperscript{118}. Yet it has no proper nature. It is έν τῷ μη ἡμῖν ἃν ἕκαστον ἔχον\textsuperscript{119}, has no substance, is ἄνωτέρων 120 and therefore has to live like a parasite through the good\textsuperscript{121}.

Though evil has no existence in the proper theological sense it is a reality in creation, a reality which is counter-productive or as Florovsky nicely puts it: it has a "miraculous force of imitating creation"\textsuperscript{122}, in bringing new realities into being, which oppose God's purpose. We have already seem some of the consequences evil has, but there is one of eschatological importance. "The Good is seriously limited and oppressed by the insurrection of Evil .... Evil is an ontological danger"\textsuperscript{123} which increases its power continuously. Evil is not something static but a perpetual process, spreading from the personal to the impersonal and thereby establishing new realities. "In the fallen world there is an incomprehensible surplus which has entered existence against the will of God"\textsuperscript{124}. And the world, God's good creation has to struggle against the influences, against the anti-creative power of evil.

Finally we have to ask how the reality of evil affects God's relationship with the world. God created man as a free being in order that man might ascend to God freely and by his own efforts. But man did not fulfil his task, which is innate in his very nature. Instead he fell away from God, and in doing so evil entered the world. Man and the whole cosmos were separated from God into a chaotic existence. God tolerated this failure of man because he never forces his grace upon man. Man is created as an entirely free subject, who is responsible for his deeds. God's love wants man to respond freely and
without this free response God's love, i.e. his grace, is 'powerless'. Because "sin and evil came not from an external impurity, but from an internal failure, from the perversion of the will .... sin is overcome only by inner conversion and change"\textsuperscript{125}. On the other hand repentance is not enough to overcome the result of the fall, corruption. Repentance is just an interruption of sin, but does not deliver from the corrupted state of nature\textsuperscript{126}. If God wants to be faithful to his creative word, then he cannot do anything about those men, who do not want to ascend to him. He is limited by the existence of evil.

Florovsky puts it into positive terms: "this burdensome (!) gift of freedom is the ultimate mark of Divine love and benevolence towards man\textsuperscript{127}". And he is right to stress that this freedom is indeed "burdensome". But not the freedom of man, but the possibility of hell, i.e. the possible existence of men in eternal separation from God is the ultimate sting of the problem of evil. Since God does not revoke the being of his creation. When man, however, in misusing his freedom actualizes his capability of eternal resistance against God, evil exists for ever. And this eternal existence of evil is the limitation of God. Florovsky rejects the Hellenistic thought that evil because of its unstable character must inevitably disappear at the end. For nothing which is not rooted in a divine decree could possibly endure for ever. But for Florovsky man's free decision is the higher value. God never does any harm to man's freedom\textsuperscript{128}. Therefore he is limited in the sense that he has to tolerate man's decision, if he wants to be faithful to his free act of creating man in creaturely freedom. Florovsky thus describes the act of creation as God's "kenosis"\textsuperscript{129} or even as the "risque divin"\textsuperscript{130}. But this limitation of God's will\textsuperscript{131} consisting of the existence of eternal hell is not one which is forced upon him from outside, it is a self-imposed limitation, a free kenosis. This does not necessarily lead to a doctrine of predestination, but asserts an implied fore-knowledge of God. One question however remains. Florovsky says: "This false production (of evil) will undergo the last Judgement of the Creator, but the power of Divine Love, as we are positively instructed by the Scripture\textsuperscript{132}, will not surpass either the resistance of the 'sons of perdition' or the ravages produced by sin\textsuperscript{133}. One may ask what kind of love is this, which comes of a father agreeing that his children go into eternal perdition? Is this decree of creaturely freedom of greater value than God's love to his creation in that sense which he
revealed in Christ? Florovsky presupposes at this point a certain relationship between love and freedom. In Florovsky's understanding love seems to tolerate the misuse of human freedom. The question is whether love implies an imposition or forcing, or whether it is free and gentle. We will consider the relation between love and freedom in Florovsky's conception after we have presented his full doctrine.

2.4.2.3 Freedom of Choice the disfigured freedom

In our final section about the creaturely freedom we have to recapitulate everything that has been said so far. We will have to answer the question, what is man in his present state. And this question reaches its ultimate point, when we consider man's freedom in relation to God. The answer to this question sets the course for all other discussions on subjects of theology. This applies especially to Florovsky, who stresses the problem of freedom in all his writings. It is very surprising however to read his first statement about this problem. "Speculation about the freedom of choice is always barren and ambiguous." Our following discussion will be an exegesis of this basic statement.

To talk about the libertas minor is barren because it is just a "pale reflection of the real freedom." Adam and Eve enjoyed before the fall, a reflection of that state man was created for. The originally intended purpose of man's freedom was to lead to a constant responsive movement. "Man's freedom is essentially a responsive freedom - a freedom to accept God's will. 'Pure freedom' can be professed only by atheists." Thus man is never in a neutral position, where he decides which of two ways he should go. His freedom is always a realized freedom which already responds. We have to conclude then that, according to Florovsky, freedom is always relational and its character depends on the quality of this relation. Thus freedom is a description of the situation between man and God. Consequently "the shape of human life - and now we may probably add, the shape and destiny of the cosmos - depends upon the synergism or conflict of the two wills, divine and creaturely." This is the reason why speculation about the freedom of choice is always ambiguous. Because of the unpredictable nature of this relationship between God and man we may ask of what kind is the balance between the divine and the creaturely freedom? History and time is the place where these two freedoms meet, struggle or
coincide. And it is in history and time that the freedom of man has been misused. Man's highest predicate, his freedom, which is "a constitutive part of the image of God" became a burden for man, a "burdensome gift" and it made God suffer.

In the two preceding sections we were concerned with the problems of the fall, of evil and sin. In order to point out the ambiguity of the doctrine of man's freedom of choice, we now have to summarize our results. This will be done by means of clarifying a distinction which I already presupposed but never emphasized in particular. It is the traditional distinction between peccatum originale and peccatum actuale, between corruption and sin on the background of the distinction between nature and hypostasis or \( \nu \varepsilon \lambda \gamma \mu \sigma \varphi \varepsilon \iota \kappa \omicron \nu \) and \( \nu \varepsilon \lambda \gamma \mu \sigma \gamma \mu \nu \iota \kappa \omicron \nu \). Only on the background of these distinctions is an approach to the problem of freedom of choice possible.

2.4.2.3.1 peccatum originale and nature

"Because of the Fall and Original Sin, all (!) mankind fell into mortality and corruption." Since then the nature of man is not only liable to mortality but having actualized this capability will necessarily die. Because all mankind generates from the first sinner Adam, all without any exception are mortal and will die. Death has power over the human nature because the law of sin is imposed upon it.

"And even the highest righteousness under the law could (not) save man from the inevitability of empirical death." Man's decision to fall away from God has this irreversible consequence upon his nature. He has the capacity to persevere in the "choice" once made, but he cannot return, his nature is corrupted once and for all. Because of this Florovsky describes man's state as lost in sin and corruption in terms which recall similar statements of Luther.

"It is as though there were two souls within each person. Good and evil are strangely mixed. But no synthesis is possible. 'Natural' Good is too weak to resist evil." The good which Florovsky is referring to is the image of God or in terms of S. Maximus the \( \nu \varepsilon \lambda \gamma \mu \sigma \varphi \varepsilon \iota \kappa \omicron \nu \). Due to the fall man lost his relation to God for which he was created, "turned into what he was by nature." And one characteristic moment of his created nature is his being in the image of God. It is quite surprising that Florovsky does not say much about man being in the image of God, we have only a few hints, which
we will sum up briefly. Man is created in the image of God in order to use his image character to become like God. Thus image refers to the potential, likeness to the fulfilled, realized potential of becoming like God. And this image is manifested in Man's freedom. But being a potential of man's nature it is affected by the fall, it is subject to corruption, but it is never lost. Florovsky describes the present state of the image of God in man in different terms: It is "paralysed in a certain sense (??), and rendered ineffective," wounded and mutilated, .... poisoned. The corruption of the nature is "a sort of fading away of the 'image of God' in man." His image is still there, but it is oppressed, too weak to resist evil and passions. We obviously come to an ambiguity here. On the one hand Florovsky stresses that man's corruption is irreversible by man's own effort. Man cannot restore himself to his proper nature. On the other hand the image of God "is nevertheless preserved intact, and that is why there is always, even in the abyss, an ontological receptacle for Divine appeal." We have to conclude that there is an ontological split in man's nature since the fall: corrupted nature and the image of God, which though belonging to nature is indestructible.

Since the human nature is totally entrapped in corruption and the image of God in man though still intact made powerless by evil and is thus ineffective, man's nature cannot be restored to its original condition by man's own achievements. Only God can heal Man's corruption and deliver the image of God from all evil powers. This will be an act sola gratia dei and has already been achieved for all mankind in Christ. Through his redeeming work he overcame death and corruption. Thus "nature is healed and restored with a certain compulsion, by the mighty power of God's omnipotent and invincible grace."

2.4.2.3.2 sin and person
Florovsky conceives of original sin in an ontological way. Sin is for him precisely an ontological problem, but not a problem which primarily wants to describe the changed situation between God and man. To my mind in western dogmatics the doctrine of the peccatum originale intended to prove that all mankind is subjected to sin. But the problem is that it rationalizes the phenomenon of sin and localizes it
within the human structure. Gen. 3 does not try to explain where sin comes from nor how sin works, it just tells the story of an inexplicable reality, that sin exists. Why am I responsible for an act which I never committed, why do I have to suffer death and corruption, if the first man sinned? The doctrine of original sin wants to explain first of all that sin is always my deed, that it is something original in my existence, from which I cannot separate myself. Original sin belongs to me and that is a fact, from which I cannot distinguish myself. We cannot understand where we committed sin in the first place, though we know that we are sinners. The reason for the impossibility of explaining what original sin is, consists in the fact that we cannot set ourselves outside a state of sin. The enemy of sin is not man, but God himself and entrapped in sin we are God's enemies. Thus we can only conceive of sin, if we have been saved from sin by God. Though, even then, sin remains a mystery to us, because in relation to God we cannot distinguish ourselves from sin. It is God who distinguishes between ourselves and our sin: In Christ God saved man from the powers of sin (Rom 5,6ff). He abolished sin, but saved us. It is from this starting point that we must talk about original sin. Explaining it however in an ontological way is to try to explain the unexplainable, to try to solve what is a mystery, which is only solved and overcome in Christ. This does not do justice to the phenomenon of sin.

Florovsky's ontological explanation of original sin does not include any concept of reatus or guilt of man's actual sin. This becomes clear in his controversy with Brunner, who operates with a different - Orthodox theology might call it monastic - view of man. According to Brunner man cannot resist God eternally. This is the problem Florovsky is concerned with. For Brunner man has to respond, to echo the decision God has already made about him and for him. Thus there is no real choice between two ways, but just one option: to obey God's predestination, his primordial will. Florovsky comments that "all this is perfectly true", but then he turns round and points out what seems to him is missing in Brunner's view: "Brunner discusses the whole problem exclusively in the perspective of the divine will. For that reason he misses the very point of the paradox. He simply ignores the human aspect of the problem". Although Florovsky's statement seems to be fair, nevertheless we feel bound to ask, how he conceives of the precise relation of the will of God and
man's will in this context. Is God really powerless, when he wants to save the obstinate? But let us return to Florovsky's comment, which may elucidate his point of view i.e. to the "human aspect of the problem". After accusing Brunner of being afraid of using ontic categories Florovsky asserts: "Indeed, man is a sinner, but he is, first of all, man .... that is - to be what we are designed to be": persons, who freely respond to God. When Florovsky here asserts that man is a sinner he refers to the corrupted natural condition of man. Corrupted nature does not imply the notion of natural corruption, because corruption is a violation of nature and, not a result of nature. This corrupted nature is in fact nothing but the result of man being a sinner, it is the result of the wrong act, not a wrong being. Hence man's image character is still intact. Here it is very important to note that it is not sufficient to describe man only in terms of his nature. Man is always a hypostasis in one nature. It is this hypostatic character of the human being that Florovsky seems to have in mind, when he says that man is first of all man. Thus he opposes Brunner's monistic - as he understands it - view with his personal view of man.

We have already tried to define hypostasis as the realisation of what is inherent to human nature, as the actualisation of human nature. Thus we understand: 1. why the hypostatic will of the fallen man is , i.e. ambiguous and 2. why the gnomic will is a habit rather than the directed will: For if what we described as the image character of man is the right opposite to that which we described as the corruption of the nature then there are always two tendencies in man. The person has always two points of reference: the good and the evil, thus he has to choose and cannot escape this necessity of choice. Choice however, is by definition a sign of ignorance, uncertainty etc., as we already discussed. Therefore we have to say that the freedom of choice is a sign of the fallen man. In other words: the hypostatic will as a is the expression of the fact that man is fallen . But though man is unable to cure his corrupted nature he is able to heal his will - in freedom. Being in the position of choice he can choose either sin or the ascent to God. Thus sin is the actual sin and has its seat in the will. "Sinfulness is disclosed in events, in sinful acts and actions". Thus sinfulness is not a habit. Consequently sinning can be interrupted or even stopped through repentance, which is nothing but directing the
gnomic will towards the good, i.e. God. But this act of penitence must be a free act. "The whole meaning of the healing of the will is in its free conversion. The will of man must turn itself to God, there must be a free and spontaneous response of love and adoration". Man has to choose God in denying himself, he has to undertake all efforts to reach out for God. Florovsky sums this up in a sermon: "The gift of life, of true life, has been given to men (in Christ), and is being given to them constantly, and abundantly, and increasingly (through the Holy Spirit). It is given but not always readily 'received'. For in order to be truly quickened one has to overcome one's fleshly desires, 'to put aside all worldly cares', pride and prejudice, hatred and selfishness and self-complacency, and even to renounce one's self. Otherwise one would quench the Spirit. God knocks perpetually at the gate of human hearts, but it is man himself, who can open them". God never violates man's freedom, even if it is just this abnormal freedom of choice. Or in the words of S. Maximus: "The Spirit does not produce an undesired resolve, but it transforms a chosen purpose into theosis", for sin and evil are not originated in something external to man, but come from a perversion of his will.

2.5 The world is contingent - conclusions

The doctrine of the creation of the world opposes any concepts of a world without a beginning of the existing world. It also asserts that the existing world is not necessary, hence its contingency. This contingency emphasizes that there is an order of the existing. As contingent the world has a beginning which opens up a process of history. Even in this process the existent world is not self-sufficient but utterly dependent on its Creator. Due to this fact two realities are juxtaposed: the existence of the world is immutable, because God created the world for eternal existence and will not revoke his creative word. The reality of the once created world is intransitory and even all evil powers trying to dissolve God's good order cannot lead to the non-existence of the world. On the other hand, the nature of the world is mutable, involving changes in history because it originated in a change from nothingness into existence, by God's creating will. "In creaturehood a great wonder is revealed. The world might not have existed at all. And this which might not have existed, for which there were no inevitable causes or bases, does exist". This contingent existence of the world is its most
important mark. Contingency implies the idea and reality of freedom. First of all we have "the miracle of the Divine Freedom" because God decided to create this new reality without any compulsion. But in setting the world side by side with his own reality he shows his freedom by giving freedom to mankind. The created reality was given free will in order to respond to the Creator. But this act of creation included the risk of man misusing his freedom and setting up a new reality which was not originally intended by God. Therefore, we have to conclude that both the existence of the world and what happens in it are contingent. The latter is contingent to the extent that men use their powers freely, but this is limited by the fact that they can never fall back into non-existence i.e. that their freedom is not absolute. God's power and freedom remain and are superior to man's activity, because he is the Creator of this contingent world, which might not have existed at all.

If, however, God's act of creation is contingent, how does this relate to his own being and freedom? We have already quoted Florovsky's phrase that the creation is the free and ultimate act of God. In bringing this new reality into existence, God binds himself to something new. We will now have to look at the problem, how his freedom is affected by man's freedom and what the final purpose of his creation is. In other words, we have to deal with the problem of God's freedom, the distinction between energies and nature of God and finally with the eastern doctrine of deification.

3. God could not have created at all - the doctrine of God

3.1 God is free - the distinction between nature and energy

"Creation is a miracle of Divine freedom". Thus God's creation is the result of his free and contingent act. Florovsky refers to Duns Scotus, when he asserts this basic presupposition: Thus "Procedit autem rerum creatio a Deo non aliqua necessitate, vel essentiae, vel scientiae, vel voluntatis, sed ex mera libertate, quae non movetur et multo minus necessiatur ab aliquo extra se ad causandum". We have to distinguish between an external and an internal constraint upon God. Obviously it is impossible that there has been any external constraints upon God before anything had been created. In creation God is determined only by himself. The existence of the world does not add anything new to his being, it is absolutely unnecessary for
his own being. Thus he creates ex mera libertate. His own being is necessary, but the existence of the world is contingent.

It is not easy however to prove that there is no internal compulsion for God to create, one might even say a necessity. How is God's will to create something other than himself, his revelation 'ad extra', related to his own being? Discussing this problem, Florovsky always starts with Origen. According to Origen one cannot conceive of God without asserting at the same time that he is the creator. If God is immutable, he could not have "become" the creator but he must have been such. The same thought is stated as follows: If God is the ΠΑΝΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ, and he is such from eternity, then the world, Τὰ ΠΆΝΤΑ, must have existed from eternity, so that God could be the Lord of all things from eternity. Consequently the world has no beginning and "any clear distinction between 'generation' and 'creation' was actually impossible - both were eternal relations, indeed 'necessary' relations, as it were, intrinsic for the Divine Being". For Origen one cannot conceive of God being the Father without the Son, and in the same way one cannot conceive of God being the Creator without the existence of the world. Because God is immutable, i.e. because there cannot be any change in him, Origen asserts that God had to create necessarily to realize the fulness of his powers and potentialities. He had to reveal himself for the sake of the completeness of his own being. Florovsky remarks here that "even if one rejects the Origenistic notion of the infinitude of real past time and recognizes the beginning of time, the question remains: Does not at least the thought of the world belong to the absolute necessity of the Divine Being?". Thus God in his eternal self-contemplation must of necessity have contemplated something other than himself, the "image of the world", which he would create. For Florovsky it is obvious that if one does not want to introduce some kind of arbitrariness into the divine being, which in fact contradicts his immutability, one cannot accept the above syllogism of Origen. The assertion that God is the free Creator, not necessitated by anything, contradicts any idea which conceives of the world as coeternal with God. To reject this is to introduce the idea of the actual existing world into the inner trinitarian life of God and therefore turn the world into a co-determining principle in the Godhead. Here lies the core of Florovsky's argument. The question, how God's being is related to his act of creation is ultimately a question which
decides about the doctrine of God. Florovsky solves the problem by taking up the views of the Fathers which propound the well known distinction between will and nature (essence). As he states it:

"The idea of the world has its basis not in the essence but in the will of God." But one cannot help asking whether this distinction between will and nature introduces a split into the divine being? God is eternal in his essence and exists eternally as the triune God, who as the Father begot the Son and as the Spirit proceeds from the Father. There is no beginning in the existence of the Trinity because its essence is eternal. It is immutable, without any becoming or sequence whatsoever. But there is according to Florovsky "another kind of eternity than the Divine essence", which is the eternity of the divine will. Florovsky admits that it is very hard to conceive of these two eternities without thinking of a temporal sequence. But he describes the difference between them by saying that God does not have in his essence the idea of creation, (this would lead to a mixture between the idea and the essence), rather he thinks it up and thus "becomes" the Creator, though from everlasting. Obviously the intention of this distinction is to safeguard God's freedom. He is absolutely free by nature and his thinking is not conditioned by anything. The non-existence of the world would not have made any difference to his eternal being. If God would have not created, he would still be the Triune God contemplating himself in the fulness of his pleasure. Thus the eternity of the will of God is an absolutely free eternity as distinct from the "necessary" eternity of his essence. The existence of the world is only owed to his free creative will and pleasure. This means that God could have not created at all.

How are will and nature of God related to each other? "God's 'Being' has an absolute ontological priority over God's action and will." Florovsky also explains that this is not to be understood by means of a temporal sequence, but of a logical order: God's being in Trinity is a datum. Creation is an act of the Divine will, which is common to all three hypostases. Thus the Fatherhood of God must necessarily proceed his Creatorhood. The οἰκουμενικός and the Ἰσολογία of the Godhead have to be distinguished carefully in order that God's freedom may be preserved.

Creation is an act of the divine and therefore eternal will of God. God thinks up the "image of the world" from eternity, but he
does this freely without any internal or external constraint. This plan for the world to be created does not belong to the essence of the Trinity. "The 'Mind' 'makes them up' only out of the superabundance of love," but it is a surplus in the Godhead completely unnecessary for its being. For Florovsky the fundamental truth is that before the created things emerge into reality God has worked out a pattern for them. These patterns are his pretemporal councils, which give each creature their distinctive characters. As God's councils, they are unchangeable, perfect and eternal. God created the world according to these plans, which are God's predestinations, his pageréixmata. The question which naturally arises at this point concerns the relationship between the pageréixmata and the actual things. Florovsky talks about the eternal existence of these predestinations in terms of time. They exist "before" the actual things come into existence substantially, "everything which is preordained by God in advance and then brought into existence." How are these pre-existent councils related to the existent world? This is the question we need to answer before we return to the doctrine of the Godhead and the problem of the relationship between nature and will.

Florovsky is very careful and precise at this point. It is not the ideas that emerge and are brought into existence, but the things which are based on them and which are created everything ex nihilo. The ideas and the creatures are by no means identical. "Quomodo ergo Deo nota erant quae non erant? Proinde, antequam fierent, et erant et non erant; erant in Dei scientia, non erant in sua (creata) natura." Thus there is no passage from eternal existence as ideas into temporal existence as matter. The distance of natures is not overcome. God creates totally ex nihilo, without infusing anything divine into the creatures. But he creates according to his design, which he thought up. The creation of the preordained creatures is the new reality, the first and absolute beginning of the world, not the "image of the world" in God's will. "God created according to his idea or ideas, and not out of his idea." The world is shaped after God's ideas, they become "the bearer or carrier of this idea, without being ever existentially identified with it." It is obvious that the aim of the argument is the doctrine of the two modes of existence, hence the freedom of man and God.

We may now return to the question, how God's will is related to his nature, bearing in mind the distinction between the ideas and the
creatures: how are God’s predestinations related to his being? We already stated that being is superior to God’s act or will. Both however are eternal, and thus this superiority is only a logical assumption. The important point is that they have to be distinguished. According to the old Orthodox doctrine we cannot know God’s being:

But we can know God by his operations, which are his revelations to the world. Thus we cannot talk about or describe the essence of God, but only name his manifestations on earth, which are true manifestations of his Divine life. These acts of God are not just means to get to know him, they are inseparable from his essence, hence they are God himself, God in his operations ad extra. He is his energies. And the ultimate basis or root for these energies is the divine essence. Though both are closely interrelated they have to be distinguished, or as Dionysius Areopagita put it: To taumov kai to 'egov. Florovsky distinguishes them as two different forms of existence of the Godhead. God’s essence is his being in Trinity (ad intra) and (distinct from this) his energies are his being in act (ad extra). There is a real distinction in (!) God between his being and his act. With his energies God manifests himself to the world. These manifestations are not just God’s opera. Though Florovsky agrees with the principle 'opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa', the energies do not just denote the praesentia operativa, sicut agens adest ei in quod agit, but they are God himself. Thus we have to say that God in essence always remains in the unknowable transcendence, but in his energies he is in the world. The energies of God are not just accidental but "part" of the eternal Godhead, which he would have manifested "beyond His essence .... even if creatures did not exist".

Because God manifests himself in his energies in the world he is. Thus God is always present on earth in his "life giving acts". We may then say that God is able to act in time through his energies. By means of these energies he himself is 'in time', meets mankind, though with his essence he remains outside our knowability and time. Only in Christ his "essence enters time" as well. In his energies which are God himself and have to be distinguished from his essence, God is in history. There is "no need therefore to escape time or history in order to meet God. For God is meeting man in history, i.e. in the human element, in the midst of man’s daily existence".
essence still remains unapproachable, but he reveals himself. "This constitutes the mystery, or the 'paradox' of the revelation." A mystery indeed, if one applies it to the problem of God acting in time. Florovsky only refers to the problematic term 'mystery indeed' but never states, as we have seen, that God is in solid unity with mankind in time personally. The energies are not a fourth hypostasis, and therefore, even if God meets man in his energies his person remains transcendent. Florovsky's understanding of God's creating the world "cum tempore, sed non in tempore" implies that God never creates in time, and yet creation in time seems to be the natural consequence of his presentation of the doctrine about the divine energies. Though God is able to act in time through and in his energies, he remains outside time and space according to his **οὐκ εἰν τῇ ΤΙΕΩ ΣΠΟΡΕΛΕΛΕΛ.** But does this tear God into pieces? Does one have to say that he is a composite being?

These objections referring to the simplicity of God had to be faced by Gregory Palamas who finally formulated this eastern doctrine of the distinction between will and nature, energy and essence or grace and essence. There is a real distinction between God's being and his grace. For if one does not distinguish between them there would be no difference between the generation of the Son and the creation of the world. Both would be acts of the one essence of God, thus the world or the image of the world would be coeternal and co-determining with him, which would lead to the consequence that God's act of creation is not free. This obviously implies that the distinction is not just a logical construction but a real one. To be and to act are two completely different modes of existence - even for God! Apart from this argument the unknowability of the divine being leads to the same consequence in a soteriological way. With and in his energies God approaches his creatures, God "moves toward man and embraces him by His own 'grace' and action, without leaving that **φυσις ἀγγελλων,** in which he eternally abides," God makes himself knowable but remains unknowable in his essence. Though there is a real distinction in God, there is no division. For the energies are not accidental, **εὐφρέβη κότοι** nor created, nor do they have a beginning. Grace and essence have to be distinguished but they are strongly linked together for the energies proceed from the essence. They are "an eternal
Thus the energies differ from God's essence, but they are in no way separated from it. They have to be conceived of as introducing a real distinction in God, but this should not lead to the assumption that there is a division in God, which makes his being a composite. The creation presupposes the Trinity, and the seal lies over the whole creation, yet one must not therefore introduce cosmological motifs into the definition of the Trinitarian Being. Consequently the distinction between the essence and grace of God does not lead to the assumption that the Trinity is not involved in Creation. God creates.

The distinction between being and energy was necessary for identification of the "act" of generation and the act of creation was to be avoided and God's freedom was to be maintained. No act of revelation introduces any change into the divine nature, which remains free throughout. There is no natural necessity for God to reveal himself. Consequently he might not have created at all. "We can dare to name (it) the Divine Contingency. But it is contingency modo divino." This decision of the divine will, which as the will of God is immutable, constitutes the contingent existence of the world. This will is eternal, though not coeternal with the divine nature. This distinction between two eternities however is a logical one and is made in order to reject any kind of necessity for God to create. Florovsky tries to explain this by referring to the Scholastic distinction between 'potentia absoluta' and 'potentia ordinata'.

God is free. Florovsky upholds this truth on the basis of the Patristic distinction between God's grace and God's nature, which was sanctioned by Orthodox Church councils. This distinction however is hardly accepted in contemporary non-Orthodox theology. Roman Catholic and Protestant theologies alike find their starting points in contemporary Bible exegesis, Patristic studies and scholastic or reformed theology, which rejected the Patristic distinction. This poses a number of fundamental questions not at least connected with theology and a number of fundamental questions especially concerned with the freedom of God. Though these questions are of extreme importance for theology we cannot discuss them here, but we will return to them in the second chapter. Our present purpose has been to show how Florovsky conceives of God's freedom. This has led us to the real distinction in God between nature and grace. What remains for us to do is the investigation of the purpose of the grace of God, which is rested in the divine energies.
3.2 The divine energies
God thought up the world from eternity. These thoughts are the "image of creation" in God, thus unchangeable, always remaining transcendent and never subject to a becoming. God creates ex nihilo according to his ideas, to his plan or, as Florovsky calls it, predestination. Because this image of the world is "never involved in temporal change, (it) is compatible with temporal beginning, with the entering-into-being of the bearers of the eternal decrees". Florovsky must conceive of a sort of "double-creation", if he, as we have seen, cannot think of God creating in time. Consequently the design of the world would be an act of his eternal will, his first creation, the emergence of the actual existing world his second. Florovsky does not call this a "double-creation" but makes the distinction between "thinking up the image of the world" and "creating the new reality according to this image". One has to be aware however of the fact that the divine energies are as such God. If one does not want to conceive of the images of the world as a constitutive element of the Godhead then they cannot be eternally "in" the energies. Thus God "started", though from eternity, to contemplate something other than himself in his energies.

The beings created out of nothing become the bearers of the eternal predestinations. But the patterns do not become part of the created being, such as the platonic λόγος κατάγματικος but they are "the truth of a thing, its transcendental entelechy". We have to conclude two things. The energies proceeding from the triune God are manifold. Every man is created according to one special plan, thus for everybody there is a special ray of grace. "Out of eternity, God in the council of his good pleasure, beholds all the innumerable myriads of created hypostases, wills them, and to each one of them manifests Himself in a different way." But these images of God were not realized properly. God did not create man completely according to his image. He created man imperfect. This is the conclusion drawn from Florovsky's statement, that "these 'prototypes' are not exactly inescapable 'laws of nature'. They are designs and calls". Thus the created man is asked to become. Interpreting Florovsky ad optimam partem one could say, that God created man for a common history of achievements. This is probably what he intends, though he stresses his favourite doctrine: man's freedom. "There is in creation a supra-natural goal, founded on freedom, of a free participation in
and union with God." Consequently the image of the world in God serves a double purpose: it is the plan according to which man is created and it is the goal, the final destiny of what man should become. This is another antinomy of creation, "or rather the eschatological aspect of the same basic antinomy of creation .... Historical process is ultimately dyotheletic, the Will of God is mediated through the will of man." Man is called to become what he is supposed to be. And this becoming was the task for mankind when it was originally created. Man existing in the image of God has the call to conform to the eternal image of the world, God's predestination in partaking in these divine energies, which are always present in everyone, though without mixing with the created nature.

Before we deal with this doctrine, which is the climax of the doctrine of creation, for it combines man's contingent freedom with God's creative and uncreated will, the doctrine of theosis, we have to look into the doctrine of the image of God again. So far we have seen that Florovsky uses the term imago dei in two senses. On the one hand man is created in the image of God and "the reality of 'image' in general is not compromised by its (man's) factual inadequacy," due to his fallen state. On the other hand Florovsky uses 'imago dei' to denote the image of the world in God's will, his predestination. But what is their relationship to each other? Man is created in the image of God according to the image of God, which is a divine energy and which he has had from eternity in his mind. This is Florovsky's view.

Man is in the image (\( \tau \) \( \alpha \) \( \tau \) ' \( \epsilon \) \( \iota \) \( \kappa \) \( \omicron \) \( \nu \) ) but never the imago dei (\( \zeta \) \( \epsilon \) \( \iota \) \( \kappa \) \( \omicron \) \( \nu \) \( \sigma \) \( \nu \)). Only Christ is imago dei and he is imago dei by nature, \( \kappa \alpha \tau \_ \varphi \omicron \omicron \omicron \). Thus we have three different connotations of the imago dei a) the Logos b) the predestinations and c) \( \tau \) \( \alpha \) \( \kappa \) \( \tau \) ' \( \epsilon \) \( \iota \) \( \kappa \) \( \omicron \) \( \nu \) \( \alpha \). It is significant, however, that Florovsky is not referring to the imago dei in the essays I have read, which is Christ, though there are patristic bases for it. It should be clear by now that he does not do so in order to safeguard God's freedom. The price for this, however, is the concept of the distinction in God between nature, hypostases and energies. Consequently Florovsky's doctrine of God is developed without developing the doctrine of the Trinity first. It is developed from ontological problems emerging from his (O.T. biblical)
approach to the doctrine of creation, an approach which neglects that God revealed himself in Christ. And this is especially surprising, because the Fathers referred already to a relationship between the three images, thus combining Christology, the doctrine of creation and anthropology. Irenaeus asserted that man was "modelled after His own (God's) Son" and this proleptically, in anticipation of the incarnate Word. Thus the image has been manifested in the incarnate one. This however is supposed to be anthropomorphic language and should not lead to a corporeal understanding of the Divinity, but wants to describe the total structure of man. It is obvious that we come to rather difficult and important questions here which we will return to later.

3.3 God is the free Creator - conclusions

The previous section dealt with the problem of the contingency of the existence of the world, which found its expression in the question of the freedom of man. We were bound to ask how this freedom is related to the freedom of the Creator. The task was to prove that God was not necessitated to create the world, but that his act of creation was free, i.e. an expression of his absolute freedom. To solve this problem we had to discuss Florovsky's doctrine of God, which he develops precisely from this problem. According to Florovsky the assertion that God was free not to create at all can be upheld only if one distinguishes in God between the divine nature and the divine energies. God's being in three hypostases is distinct from his acting through his energies. This distinction between God's being and God's act does not destroy the simplicity of God, because the energies proceed from the nature of God, but they have to be distinguished from God's being. It is important to note that these energies, which are the grace of God, are not something different from God but God himself. God is his energies. By means of these energies God is in contact with everything beyond himself. Thus in his energies God is in time and space, while his nature cannot be contained in these categories and is thus not known to man. Man knows God only by means of his energies. Every creature is sealed by a single ray of grace, i.e. by one energy, which is the entelechy and call for every single creature. The question arose how these energies, present in every single creature, are related to the creature. Florovsky solved this problem with his doctrine about the imago dei. According to this doctrine one has to
distinguish three different connotations of the term *imago dei*: The energies are God's eternal predestinations according to which the creatures were created ex nihilo. Consequently the difference between the divine predestinations (the *logoi*), which are eternal, and the image of God in man (*τὸ κατ' ἰκόνα*) is ontological. Christ is the third image of God and he alone is *imago dei* by nature. We have to ask how this latter connotation of the term *imago dei* relates to the two previous ones. We will find that the doctrine of theosis, which will be our next concern, answers this question. Deification is the event where the predestinations, the energies of God, meet with the human freedom. Thus the previous section and this section will find their connection and climax in the doctrine of theosis, for deification is the original purpose of God's free creation. It is necessary however, to keep in mind the previous expositions of the freedom of God and man, which have their basis in the fundamental distinction between being and act (nature and person; nature and energies). One reason why the doctrine of theosis does not have a real equivalent in western theology might be this strict distinction.

C The Doctrine of Theosis

1. Synergy between man and God

Through creation time and consequently history started. God created the world ex mera libertate for a living communication with his creatures. Thus "historical process is ultimately dyothelitic"¹. God's will and man's will are supposed to meet. This was the ultimate purpose of God's free creation. And because God granted freedom to man, because God and man live in two different modes of existence, the encounter between God and man was an absolutely free encounter. "An appeal to freedom was implied in the act of creation itself, namely in the creation of rational beings"². This appeal to man's freedom still remains after man fell away from God's love deliberately. God remained faithful to his love for his creatures despite all the evil man brought into existence. His eternal design and predestination according to which man was created, were not simply forced upon man, but were the call, the final goal man had to ascend and conform to freely. The aim of creation was man's becoming conformed to God's predestinations, to partake in the divine grace. But "it is impossible to live in God, and to live in servitude, driven by fear or coercion.
To live in God means to live like God and the first sign of likeness to God is freedom - 'self-ruled' as the ancient Fathers said - it means creative power and decision of will. Thus the grace of God is not irresistible, but is coming in the mystery of freedom, i.e. it is freely and continually given by God and has to be accepted in freedom by man. This however means that for any encounter of man with God, i.e. for man's salvation, a synergy between man and God is absolutely necessary. Without man's own free efforts man cannot be saved. "Paradoxically, nobody can be saved by love divine alone, unless it is responded by grateful love of human persons." This however does only apply to the human will. Man's nature is restored in Christ "with a certain compulsion," but the healing of man's will depends on his synergy with the divine grace. Thus there is a real problem to solve for man. His destiny, his existence depends on himself. It is utterly dependent on man whether he just exists or whether he really lives, i.e. in union with God. "This is the ontological law of spiritual existence, even the law of life itself." Man must turn freely to God responding to his eternal call. If Adam would have done so, immortality would have been granted to him. Though he was mortal by nature he could have gained the divine immortality, he could have become a deus assumptus. Exactly this free turning of man to God is required of man. Adam was supposed to use his freedom in order to become completely deified, fallen men are asked to turn to God, asked for a free conversion of the will in order that Man's gnomic will may be healed and men may live in communion with God. Consequently this synergy is always an act of salvation. Man is called to cooperate in God's saving acts. God's appeal to man's freedom is nothing but an appeal to man's cooperation in the process of salvation. But this cooperation is a real task for man. It is not simply a 'yes' to God's love, not just an acceptance of his commandments. This synergy requires man's efforts, his total commitment.

Before discussing the 'how' of man's efforts we have to stress one point. Florovsky uses the term 'calls' to describe God's grace. But these "calls" should not be confounded with what the reformed theologians call the 'word of God', which frees man. God's grace according to Florovsky are his predestinations, his eternal images, which he thought up from all eternity for every single creature. And man has -mysteriously - the capacity to know these images and surpass himself. "In a certain sense, this goal itself is 'natural' and
proper to the one who does the constructive acts, so that the attainment of this goal is somehow also the subject's realization of himself. This self-realization of man is required. But it cannot come to its final end without being assisted by God's grace, which does not compromise man's freedom. "An anointing shower of grace responds to this inclination (of man), crowning the efforts of the creatures." We have to conclude that man's divine call, as Florovsky calls it, is nothing but his existence according to the indisputable reality that God created him, is nothing but his creaturehood. This is not yet a living encounter. Man is asked to live up to this fact. If he fulfils this task grace is granted to him. Thus Florovsky's assertion that God's action is always the first one, that the initiative is his refers just to God's eternal decisions, but not to his life-giving word which he actually gives to every man. The creation and redemption are God's act, his initiative, to which man has to respond, in synergy.

Florovsky sees fallen man as free in the sense that he is able to respond to his Creator and this response is answered by God's "shower of grace". But one has to ask how this optimistic doctrine of man compares with the (Protestant) doctrine of man's depravity and inability to want and to do anything for his salvation without God's previous assistance. In (Protestant) theology man is a sinner (though his creaturehood is not dissolved by sin), who is unable and unwilling to ascend to God of his own accord. He needs God's free grace in order to free himself from the bondage of sin. It is this initiative of God, which leads to man's sanctification, i.e. to his act of responsive love. Florovsky's concept of the synergy between man and God however ignores this hard realism of the fall and leads to conclusions, which are quite dangerous. I will try to point out these problems by examining the implications of his doctrine regarding the Incarnation.

Florovsky feels that Mary is not just one special "case" in human history. Though she serves a special and unique purpose in God's plan she is the "representative of the human race." "She exemplified in her person, as it were, the whole of humanity." We shall not discuss the Mariology here, but we must note that although Florovsky states "Mariology is to be but a chapter in the treatise on the Incarnation, never to be extended into an independent 'treatise'". Yet he puts Mariology in a different context by
making Mary the representative of the human race. By doing this he departs from Christology and moves to a general anthropology, making this the context of Mariology as well as Ecclesiology. Therefore it is justified to expound the problem of synergy as the problem of Mariology.

Mary was chosen before all time to be the Mother of God. This was her unique predestination. Thus she would and finally did participate in the divine mystery of redemption, "of the redeeming re-creation of the world". In the case of Mary the work of cooperation with the divine will and act resulted in the Incarnation. In the same way every man participates in the work of healing his will. Man has to turn to God freely, who assists and supports this conversion by a condescension of grace. Through the value and relevance of these two acts, Mary participates in the work of redemption and man in the work of healing his will, the formal structure is the same in both cases. Man and God act together in synergy. Thus this grace of predestination is not forced upon Mary, but she had to respond to her special call, to the annunciation. This act of response is of immense importance: On the one hand there is an obvious parallel, which was already stated by the Fathers: "As the human race fell into bondage to death by means of a virgin; virginal disobedience having been balanced in the opposite scale by virginal obedience". This fact of a counterbalance is seconded by a more important argument: Florovsky is quoting the Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow and is certainly in agreement with him: "Her (Mary's) humble Let it be was necessary (!) for the realization of God's mighty Let it be". One could start silly speculations about the real possibility, and according to Florovsky's understanding of man's freedom it was indeed a real possibility for Mary not to obey God's "request". The speculation about this would be silly, but there is a theological problem of great importance behind this: How are man's freedom and God's predestination related to each other? According to Florovsky grace is never irresistible, never forced upon man's will and even when cooperating with the human freedom grace does not compromise man's freedom. Consequently we have to assume that God can be taken by surprise by human actions. His predestinations can simply fail to achieve what they were intended for. God is made powerless because of the possible resistance of that man who uses his freedom. This powerlessness is, however, self-imposed, because
God wants to encounter man in freedom. On the other hand it is obvious that according to this concept Mary's obedience was necessary for God's plan. And her obedience influenced his acts. Do we have to conclude, that man is able to influence God? We leave this open now, as regards Mary, however "the word of the creature caused (!) the Creator to descend into the world". The formulation is dangerous indeed. But if one wants to stress human freedom to the extent Florovsky wants to stress it, it is easy to come to consequences like this. He concludes that God never acts alone. Though the initiative is his (he created, he wanted to redeem, he asked (?) Mary etc.), "man had to have his active share in the mystery". Cooperation is required in any case and without this cooperation God's acts remain in a certain sense useless: God created the world, so that man may live in communion with him. If man failed in doing so, he lost God and God "lost" man's free personal response. God redeemed the world in Christ, so that we may become the sons of God again, but if man does not "justify that resurrection for himself", man will live in eternal condemnation and separation from God. Thus, without man's cooperation nothing can really happen in the history of salvation.

How did Mary cooperate? She was obedient and this was her "freedom of cooperation", which "is just what human freedom means". She had the freedom to obey God, to respond to him freely in total obedience. This does not mean however that her sins were forgiven, that her nature was incorrupted or even immaculate conceived, but shows her purity, which is described through the term 'Ever-Virgin'. We have to remember that purity does not refer to nature, but to man's will. Man is able to restore his will by his own efforts assisted by the divine grace. But he has the task to take the first step, use his freedom to ascend toward God. "Yet, her personal purity was possible even in an unredeemed world", not just possible, but necessary, because God never acts with man without man's cooperation. Having expounded the synergy between God and man we will now ask of what kind the acts are, by means of which man has to cooperate with the divine energies in order to heal his will.

2. Man's ascetic achievements
Florovsky is not very explicit about the "constructive acts" man has to do in order to realize himself. This however is logical because
man "does not realize himself merely out of himself. Because the goal lies beyond nature, it is an invitation to a living and free encounter and union with God." Thus the acts of every man are different from each other. They cannot be generalized because God predestined each person in a special way, thus their encounter will be unique. But nevertheless, something can be said about man's action, about his free and voluntary ascent toward God, which is absolutely necessary for the salvation of his will. Everyone is asked to follow God and this was possible and necessary even in the unredeemed world. Thus repentance is the first of all acts of man. This means a radical change of man's life. "Each one must personally and freely associate himself with Christ, the Lord, the Saviour, the Redeemer, in the confession of faith, in the choice of love, in the mystical oath of allegiance." We already discussed the one side of man's relationship to God: freedom. The other one is asceticism. Because God does not force his grace upon man, he has to approach God out of his own creative mind, he has to do ascetic acts. But these acts must not be understood as a new law, they are done freely, motivated by love. Thus the mystery of freedom in the synergy between God and man coincides with the asceticism of man: God grants freedom to man because of his love and man ascends towards God motivated by his love. Thus in the end freedom and asceticism are nothing but love. Man's ascent to God must be motivated by love and thus is free.

Precisely this was the purity Mary achieved. The title 'Ever-Virgin' does not just refer to a physical state, but is the outward sign for a spiritual and inner attitude. Mary was free from passions, had reached the state of ἡ ἑαυτῷ καταθέτουσα. Thus her innermost was governed by God's will, she dedicated herself completely to God. This personal purity, which could have been achieved by anybody, is safeguarded by the work of God's grace, who acts in synergy with man's self-dedication to God. But this does not mean perfection yet. Mary and everyone else is still liable to temptation. But temptations had to be and were overcome by her personal purity, by her efforts. Thus one has to defend oneself against "any 'erotic involvement, any sensual or selfish desires or passions, any dissipation of the heart and mind." Florovsky does not go into any detail but leaves this all in its general sense. He is careful in stressing that this should not be understood as a new code for morality: "Ascesis does not
consist of prohibitions. It is an activity, a 'working out' of one's self. It is dynamic. Thus we cannot talk about these acts in an abstract way. They exist only when they are enacted. Love is only real when it is experienced, but words cannot grasp the fullness of the phenomenon of love. And because asceticism is motivated by love and in the end nothing but love, it cannot be contained or described in words. On the other hand the task of asceticism "is infinite because the pattern of perfection is infinite, God's perfection". Thus asceticism is always antinomical: Though it starts with total obedience and humble devotion to God, with self-renunciation and self-limitation it leads to and achieves at the same moment creative freedom, which overcomes self-limitation, abandons all partiality, because of the surrender to God. Only through and in humility man can find complete freedom. "Humility is not merely the precedent, it is the actual force of freedom. Ascetic renunciation is an opening of the spirit, its release". Freedom is realized in this humility which seeks God, because in ascending towards God in love and obedience man fulfils what he is created for and thus realizes his freedom, the power of which is his image of God. Because this image, which was overpowered by the passions, is freed through the ascetic achievements of man (to a certain extent), Florovsky speaks of man "working out himself", i.e. what is inherent in man's nature.

Florovsky admits however that this is a difficult task for man. "There is a problem to solve" and "asceticism does not always lead to creativity", i.e. to freedom. "It is hard indeed, for a fleshly man, to enter into the spirit of this Love Divine, which extends its rays to sinners, and publicans and adulterers (i.e. the image of God), and is ready to suffer death for their sake, while they are enemies of God". According to Florovsky man testifies his freedom in thankfulness. His freedom is now used in a proper way, i.e. it is directed towards God, in constant thanksgiving. This thankfulness for God's loving grace has to be expressed not just in words, but in deeds of charity. Again Florovsky gives only a very general outline of the character of these deeds when he refers to Isaac of Syria, who defined purity as "a heart which is merciful to every created being", which is expressed first of all in prayer and then in active care. Consequently "the ultimate purpose of Christian training - and Christ Himself is the supreme 'Instructor' (the paidagogus) of human souls - is precisely to develop this prayerful and grateful disposition, this habit of constant thanksgiving."
The description of Christ as "the supreme 'Instructor'" gives a hint how Florovsky conceives of this working out of oneself. Though Florovsky does not deal with this problem in any detail he might presuppose the preaching of the word of Christ. Thus it would be the preaching of the world of God which frees man and enables him to ascend to God. On the other hand one might interpret this sentence with a special emphasis on the words 'human souls'. Consequently Christ would be "the supreme 'Instructor'", because his image is reflected in the human soul, for the soul is the seat of the imago dei in man. Thus man would be instructed by his innate capacities. Both interpretations should not be understood as alternatives but complementary to each other. Both, the preaching of the word of God and man's innate capacity to know God, enable man to develop "this habit of constant thanksgiving". This is probably what Florovsky wants to say, though we must note, that Florovsky takes the preaching of the world of God for granted and does not develop a special doctrine about this important matter.

One question however remains and we have mentioned it already: Is God's grace granted to man according to man's ascetic achievements, to his efforts? Thus, does man have a right to receive God's grace because of his merits? The latter question is not correct, because man does not act independently of God but in synergy, though the two involved wills remain free throughout. Consequently God's grace is according to Florovsky always a free gift, but at the same time it is a reward for man's efforts, for the degree of his self-dedication to God. This however leads again to the critical question whether God can be influenced or taken by surprise by man's achievements, thus to the problem of how freedom and predestination are related to each other.

3. Union of God and man: theosis

The term θέωσις sounds rather offensive in western and modern ears. It is hard to translate it in an appropriate way, for the term 'deification' denoted in Greek philosophy of religion the process of men becoming gods, for example, emperors were worshipped as gods. This however is not at all intended by the eastern doctrine of θέωσις. It must be noted first of all that this doctrine derives from Christology and is summoned up in the old sentence: God made himself man in order that man might become God. In and through Christ it is granted to all men to become like God, he opened the way for men to become "sons of God", though always remaining a creature. Thus the
term theosis denotes both the ultimate goal and the limit of creaturely existence. Man's striving for God finds its goal in the "partaking in the divine nature" (2 Petr. 1,4), i.e. in an intimate sharing in the divine life. It is at once the limit of creaturely existence in so far as man always remains a creature and God always remains his creator. Consequently man's "becoming God" refers not to man's being, to man's nature, but to his person. The distinction between ὑποτάσσεται and ὑποτάσσεσθαι on the side of the creature, and the distinction between ὁ ήθικα ἐν τίσιν ὑποτάσσεσθαι and ἐνεργεῖα on the side of God has to be kept and strictly observed. For in the process of theosis man partakes in the divine energies, but never in the divine being, i.e. in his inner trinitarian life. Would man partake in the divine being, then creatures would be part of the Trinity. This however is safeguarded and hindered by the distinction between the being and the energies of God. Man partakes in the divine energies not κατὰ oûcían but κατὰ μετουσίαν. The grace of God however is not - as the Roman Catholic doctrine asserts - just a gift or even created, but God himself. "Physis remains a category of distinction between God and man .... Charis remains relational-personal notion, conjoining personally God and man."

By his ascetic achievements man ascends towards God, tries to conform to the divine predestinations, the divine call. Because this ascent happens only in a simultaneous synergy between man and God "any such realization of one's self is a rupture - a leap from the plane of nature onto the plane of grace, because this realization is the acquisition of the Spirit, is participation in God."

Man "leaves", as it were, his natural state to reach out into the transcendent, to conform to his "transcendent entelechy". This however does not mean that man's nature is changed in substance. Man fulfills what he is created for: he relates to God personally, but he remains a creature and no trans-substantiation takes place. "The term theosis is indeed quite embarrassing, if we would think in 'ontological' categories. Thus theosis means a "personal encounter. It is that intimate intercourse of man and God, in which the whole of human existence is, as it were permeated by the Divine presence." Man's efforts of striving for God's predestination are met by a condescension of divine grace. Thus it is nothing but logical that S. Maximus identifies the grace of predestination, and this is indeed a grace and not something abstract, with the deifying grace. Both
are the same divine energy, in which man partakes, though his
nature does not change in substance during this process.

It has to be mentioned that this energy is appropriated to
the Holy Spirit. The partaking in the divine energy is "the
acquisition of the Spirit". "All are called to holiness, to the
acquiring of the Spirit .... The gift of faith, and the gift of
prayer, and the gift of love are given by the Holy Ghost .... It
is being in the Spirit, unity with God, participation in life", because God is life. This however means that the deifying grace is
appropriated to the works, to the activity of the Holy Spirit, but
the dogmatic principle 'opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa'
remains correct: The energies proceed as we have seen, from the
triune being of God. Thus man partakes in the divine energies which
are common to all three persons of the Trinity, but not in the third
hypostasis.

"In its efforts to acquire the Spirit, the human hypostases
becomes a vehicle and vessel of grace". This sums up the process
of theosis. Man strives freely towards God and according to the
measure of efforts the divine grace dwells in him. Taking up the
picture of man as a vessel for grace we have to conclude that there
are different degrees of sanctification among mankind. God "comes
to dwell not as He is in Himself, because He is incontainable by any
creature - but according to the measure of the capacity and
receptivity of man". We already stated below that Florovsky
conceives of the sinful men as entrapped by passions to different
measures and degrees. Thus it is dependent on man's free activity,
on the use of his freedom how much he falls into sin or to what extent
he acquires the Spirit. There is no simple either good or bad, but
different degrees in fallenness or saintliness of man. The reason for
this is the dynamic understanding of evil and love as personal
activities. Both are insatiable, man either falls into even deeper
states of corruption or climbs up "the uninterrupted way of ascension".
The final goal of man's existence is common to all, but "there are
different degrees in its fulfillment".

The means of acquiring the Spirit might be different among men,
but in the end these ascetic works are not decisive for man's theosis
everything depends on the degree of his love, which becomes manifest
in works. The inner motivation is important, not the works in them-
selves. Because "the soul and the whole nature of man is sanctified,
not by the power of works, but by the power of Grace. Thus man is sanctified sola gratia in the sense 'only through grace', but the necessary presupposition is his inner motivation, his love and devotion for God, which expresses itself in works. But he gains grace only according to the degree of his love - this, however, at once, for God and man act together in synergy. The sola gratia in this understanding does not mean that God acts unconditionally. Because of Florovsky's insistence on man's freedom he cannot conceive of God acting sola gratia in the sense reformed theologians use it - with man, i.e. as a creatio ex nihilo.

We have to consider one further problem, which might emerge from the understanding of a quantified grace. Is the unity of the members of the church in danger, if one conceives of different degrees of saintliness? Though Christians "through uniting with Christ (in baptism) ... unite likewise with each other in a most sincere concord of love", so that "in this great unity all empirical distinctions and barriers are done away with", the disunity of persons remains because of different degrees in saintliness. The unity in Christ refers to the nature of men, which is restored for everybody in baptism, but the unity in persons does not exist, not even in the church. But isn't the church unified because all its members are baptized into one Spirit (1 Cor 12,13)? Or in the words of Florovsky: "The essence of the church is in its unity, for the church is the Mansion of the One Spirit". There is another antimony here. Christians are unified in the church through the one Spirit, which is the Spirit of God for all of them. But they are in disunity to the degree of the acquisition of the Spirit. This disunity will be overcome in the last judgement. Then those who will be saved will attain the completion of "this mysterious, and terrifying, and unspeakable double-naturedness for the sake of which the world was made".

To achieve this "double-naturedness" is the ultimate purpose of man's existence. He will be completely inter-penetrated by the divine energies, though the created and the divine do not mix, but remain distinct as it is clearly stated in the four negative adverbs of the Chalcedonian formula. 'Man was created to become like God' therefore means precisely to become like Christ, not to become Christ. For Christ is God by nature, man however are gods by grace. "The salvation of those who are saved (!) is accomplished by grace and not
by nature" 64. God saved man's nature in Christ, but man's will was still to be saved and this only in the synergy between man and God's grace. This however leads us to another difference between Christ and man: "In Christ the entire fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily (Col 3:9) according to essence, in us, on the contrary, there is not (!) the fulness of the Godhead according to grace" 65 but just according to the measure of man's capacity, which varies individually. Man's double-naturedness consists in his partaking in the divine grace; Christ's double-naturedness consists in his assuming human nature, though being divine by nature. Thus man's double-naturedness is one according to grace, Christ's one according to nature. In both cases however, the two elements are united through the hypostasis. There is a sort of "hypostatic" union which man attains through deification, though the term 'hypostatic' is inadequate here. Christ united the human nature and the divine nature hypostatically. Man unites - assisted by God - his nature with the divine energies, thus it is a union by and in grace, but not a substantial union, to be understood in ontological terms 66. Despite these differences it is obvious that the doctrine of theosis has its roots in Christology.

"By the hypostatic Incarnation of the Word the way of the ascent is re-opened for the redeemed (!) humanity. For men are given (again) the power to become the sons of God (Joh 1:12)" 67. Though Florovsky puts the 'again' in brackets it explains what theosis is about. Man was created in order to unite with God 68: "Life in God. For this purpose God in his pre-eternal council has created man" 69. Thus Adam had the task to unite with God, "he has to overgrow and overcome himself. Man can only realize himself by surmounting his own 'natural' limits .... by mounting beyond his own nature" 70, thus he had to create himself. But Adam failed in doing so. He did not fulfil the task and consequently became corrupted and actualized his capability of mortality. The chance of perfection, of union with God, of becoming God, thus of gaining immortality and incorruptibility by grace was gone. And because all men generate from Adam there was no possibility to regain this chance. Even Mary's purity was just a purity of will but she could not overcome her corrupted nature, thus could not reach a perfect union with God 73. Thus "true asceticism is inspired by the task of transfiguration and a reinstatement of the world in its originally created beauty, from which it fell into sin" 74.
This presupposes however that the way to a real union with God has been reopened, which could be done only by God. "With the Incarnation of the Word the first fruit of human nature is unalterably grafted into the Divine life, and hence to all creatures the way to communion with this life is open, the way of adoption by God". Consequently Christ is at once the one who makes theosis possible again and the eternal example for man's deification.

The ascetic life obtains its foundation and vindication in the ideal of a personal union in the divine energies or as the ancient ascetics used to say in "the ideal of the mysterious marriage of the souls with Christ". This has become possible again through the work of Christ, thus for the redeemed humanity. "Its eternal predestination, to become the vessel of grace Divine has been reopened through Christ's saving of the human nature. "Since therefore, nature cannot save itself but is entirely dependent upon the Incarnation for its salvation, the threat of pelagianism, which Luther and the Reformation feared so much, is no longer there". This is certainly correct if one applies it only to man's nature, which Thunberg does not do. But even after the incarnation and the salvation of man's nature man has the task to ascend to God in order to save his will. This activity is absolutely necessary for his salvation. God cannot save man without his cooperation. This is the Orthodox doctrine according to Florovsky. Luther however conceived of the entire being of man as saved solo Christo and therefore sola gratia, sola verbo and sola fide.

According to Florovsky history is very important for theology. We saw in the beginning that he stresses individuality and history. The reason for his emphasis on the individuality, i.e. the personal aspect of man has become clear now: man has to work out himself, find his destiny and ascend to it. And this is a steady process, thus takes place in history. History is the only place where man's final salvation, his theosis can happen. Therefore Florovsky stressed and validated history from the beginning. Man has the task whether he just wants to exist or whether he wants to live. According to Augustine however life and existence are not the same, thus man has to choose between this alternative. History is the place for human activity, to be more precise, for human creativity, for man has the task to create himself. Thus "the meaning of history consists in this -
that the freedom of creation should respond by accepting the pre-temporal counsel of God, that it should respond both in word and in deed. Therefore history is not just a sequence of time passing by meaningless, but the place for the salvation of men and therefore in the end history of salvation. God as well as men act in history to bring about man's salvation and they act together in synergy, which is necessary, because God granted man freedom. "Because it pleased God to save creation not by compulsion but by freedom alone (!) .... the process of ascent to God must (!) be accomplished by her own powers - with God's help, to be sure (!)". This last "to be sure" shows again where Florovsky's emphasis lies: man's freedom. Though we have shown that God's grace is absolutely necessary for the salvation of man in Florovsky's concept, he stresses man's freedom far more than the divine grace.

Man is asked to use his freedom, so that "'Eschatological treasures' are .... collected even in this life. Otherwise this life is frustrated". Thus history is a "sacred process", the Christian bound to history. On the other hand in this life in history, where eschatological treasures are already collected, man is beyond history. He expects the consummation of time and is therefore never absorbed in history. Because of this process of deification man is on the one hand in history and uses his time for his ascent to God, but on the other hand he is already "out of time," because he dedicated himself completely to God, loses himself and is even forgetting himself in his love for God. And due to this process which takes place in the church "time is mysteriously overcome". Man lives in God and thus already in the realized hope of the final consummation of history, of overcoming the limitations of the sequence of time. Deified men "have to transcend history for the sake of that 'which cannot be contained in earthly shores'".

4. Conclusions
For Florovsky man is called by the divine grace to raise up to God, to unite with the divine energies. This requires man's free cooperation. The synergy between man and God is necessary for the salvation of man. He must respond to the divine calls of predestination through ascetic achievements. He has to purify his gnomic will through obedient love for his creator, which is necessarily expressed in works. These efforts of man are crowned by God's grace to the degree man tried to ascend to God. Thus the synergy between man and God happens
simultaneously, and not in the way that first man works for some merits and is then granted grace as a reward according to his achievements. "Theosis describes man's involvement in such a mighty act of God upon him that he is raised up to find the true centre of his existence not in himself but in Holy God, where he lives and moves and has his being in the uncreated but creative energy of the Holy Spirit". Theosis is the goal of the Christian existence, the aim for which God created man. But it must not be understood in pantheistic terms. Man does not become a part of the divine being. "Theosis, as the 'eschatology of transfiguration', is an infinite ascent toward the Infinite but never fully encircling the Infinite". God's freedom is not compromised by theosis, for man partakes in the divine energies, not in his being. Thus theosis is a personal encounter, a union of man with the divine energies. This happens to various degrees, but man is asked to gain his own double-naturedness in this union by the means of a synergic ascent to God. "Orthodox teaching, in speaking of theosis and sharing in the divine life, emphasizes the absolute creatureliness of man, who nevertheless has been created to share in the divine life in a dynamic and creative way through Christ and the Holy Spirit". Man unites with the divine energies but he always remains a creature. God's being God is not compromised by man's ascent but established, because he made this ascent of man possible through his redemption in Christ. Through the fall man had lost his capability for a theosis, but this way is reopened again for the redeemed humanity through Christ. Thus theosis denotes not just a state pro ante for man, but means the possibility to ascend even further: man was created, fell, was redeemed according to his nature and is now able to partake in the divine life with his will. In the same way however as the fall of Adam had cosmic implications because of man's mediator position, the theosis of man has cosmic implications. The fate of the world is dependent on man's action in history, for man has to fulfil his task in time. He is able to collect "eschatological treasures" in his present life and thereby bring about his own and the salvation of the world.

Before we proceed we might ask some questions and state agreement regarding the doctrine of theosis. We have tried to point out that it is very hard to explain the relationship between God's predestinations and man's free action. According to Florovsky man's synergy
with God is a completely free creativity, where God continually offers his love and man either accepts or rejects it. Because God created man with freedom and wants to relate with him only in freedom he limited himself insofar as his grace is "powerless", if man does not conform to his grace. Florovsky wants to conceive of such a self-imposed limitation of God because of his insistence on man's freedom.

The other problem consists in the understanding of the salvation of man in the sense that man becomes more than man, a deified creature. From being a created man, man becomes subhuman through the fall and will be superhuman through deification, after the redemptive work of Christ restored the original state of man's nature. Completely permeated by the divine grace the deified man will be "superhuman". If Christ however is the example for this, i.e. that he according to his human nature was the first deified man, then he did not establish something new in the sense that we have a third category of being now: God, deified man and man, but he showed what man really is. The term theosis has a dangerous overtone insofar as it suggests that man becomes like God, thus something other than man, but through the salvation man becomes man. Nothing but exactly this is ultimately the intention of the eastern doctrine of theosis. If the Protestant theology conceives of God's grace as God himself, thus God's act of justification sola gratia is his self-giving to men, this means ultimately nothing different than the Orthodox concept of theosis, where man participates in God, in his energies.

The differences however must not be overlooked: 1. According to Florovsky grace is present in man only to the degree of man's efforts. Thus he quantifies God's grace, while the Protestant theology always stressed that God's grace is tota gratia, because it is God himself, who gives himself to man. 2. Man's synergy with God is absolutely necessary for man's salvation in the Orthodox concept, while the Protestant theology conceives of God saving sola gratia and of man as passive, because he is entrapped and lost in sin. All his activity out of himself would lead into even deeper sin, because then in trying to work out his own salvation man would attempt more than can be done by God alone. 3. Orthodox theology has to conceive of a real distinction in God between his energies and his being in order to uphold the doctrine of theosis, while Protestant theology cannot make this distinction for christological reasons.
These three differences are the most obvious ones and by far not all of them. In the end they may be reduced to different Christologies, which are however based on a different understanding of the Bible. While the Protestant (western) side tries to go the biblical way with a juridical concept of the relationship between God and man, which does justice to the results of modern biblical scholarship, the Orthodox theology tries to go a biblical way, which is overlapped by hellenistic philosophy. The main presupposition is the distinction between nature and person, which cannot be derived from the Scriptures and has to be established before these texts are approached. Despite these important differences it would be worthwhile comparing the Orthodox doctrine of theosis with the western concept of grace and sanctification. I have tried to make the point that despite the means one comes to the conclusions, the different terms ultimately want to denote similar matters. But language and terms are never neutral. They express and show the special emphasis, thus cannot and must not be overlooked in any search for common beliefs.

We have to conclude our discussion of the doctrine of theosis with the statement that though the doctrine is the climax of the doctrine of creation, it already implies eschatological aspects. The eschatology is prefigured in the doctrine of creation. This coherence of different doctrines is without any doubt the strength of Florovsky's concept and this impression will become even stronger when we proceed to the special Eschatology. As a Lutheran however we have to say that the weakness of the concept is the subordination of Christology to the doctrine of creation, Christology is on the one hand based on Christian cosmology and has on the other hand eschatological implications, it is even the main article of Eschatology. But everything depends on the doctrine of creation.

As I have already intimated on several occasions Florovsky conceives of man as being created in an imperfect state; he was liable to mortality. Consequently the work of Christ, the destruction of man's mortality must have been prefigured in the original purpose of creation. How Florovsky validates this purpose will be our concern in the following section.
D. Cur deus homo?

"The question about the ultimate purpose of the Incarnation was never formally discussed in the Patristic Age"¹. This is Florovsky's opening statement on the question. The fathers saw the ultimate purpose in God's Incarnation in his redemption of man and some passages in Florovsky's writings show that he is in full agreement with this: "The ultimate meaning of the august mystery of the Incarnation is precisely in that paradoxical identification of God with the needs and concerns of man,"² i.e. man's corrupted nature and his mortality. "The heavenly Father was moved by the misery of man, and sent his Son, because he loved the world"³. "Christ had to die in order to abrogate death and corruption"⁴ – this was the basic conviction of the fathers, which was neither questioned or doubted and did not need any proof.

God sent his Son to overcome the consequences of man's fall. Thus Adam's fall was the reason for the incarnation. Do we have to draw the conclusion, that God did not determine his Son for the Incarnation from all eternity? Rupert of Deutz (died 1135) was the first theologian who raised this question formally in the middle ages and came to the conclusion that "antequam Deus quidquam faceret a principio, et quando haec vel illa faciebat, hoc erat in propositione, ut ergo Verbum Dei, Verbum Deus caro fierem, et in hominibus magna charitate et summa humilitate, quae vere deliciae sunt"⁵. This view was taken up by many other mediaeval theologians, who then had to contend with the opposite view, that the Word was incarnate just because of man's fall⁶. According to Florovsky one cannot say that the Fathers regarded the redeeming purpose as the only reason for the incarnation and he is able to prove this in the writings of S. Maximus who declared that the original purpose of the creation was the incarnation. Being the "only Father who was directly concerned with the problem ..., he stated plainly that the Incarnation should be regarded as an absolute and primary purpose of God in the act of Creation"⁷. S! Maximus was commenting on 1.Petr. 1,19f (Χριστοῦ ἁγγελομένου ἐν πάσῃ καταβολῇ κόσμω): "For on account of Christ that is to say the mystery concerning Christ, all time and that which is in time have found the beginning and the end of their existence in Christ. For before time there was secretly purposed a union of the ages, of the determined and the indeterminate, of the measurable
and the Immeasurable, of the finite and the Infinite, of the creation and the Creator, of motion and of rest - a union which was made manifest in Christ during these last times. This statement emphasizes two aspects: On the one hand the christological foundations of creation. This "whole concept is strictly 'theocentric', and at the same time 'Christocentric'". But there is a decisive point here, which must not be forgotten. Florovsky quickly adds, that "one has to distinguish most carefully between the eternal being of the Logos, in the bosom of the Holy Trinity, and the 'economy' of His Incarnation". Thus, what sounds so familiar in western ears is not at all intended. The incarnation is, as we have already seen, an act of economy, not something which has to be expressed in theology, i.e. in the description of the being of God as well. But it is correct that "Man is created in order that God may become man" and this was predestined already in eternity in Christ. Thus Christ's incarnation is the ultimate purpose of creation. On the other hand this purpose was to serve the ultimate salvation of man: his theosis. By the union of God and man, man is deified. This unity has been made possible and has been accomplished through the incarnation, because even Adam was created in an "imperfect" way: he was liable to mortality. This imperfection of the human nature had to be overcome in order that man could live in a personal union with God for ever. Thus Christ would have been incarnated even without the fall, because the original plan of God's creation included the incarnation of the Word.

Florovsky is quite happy about his discovery in the writings of S. Maximus, but this understanding is not yet his own opinion, though he is attracted by it. He asserts that the theory of S. Maximus (and western theologians) is "'hypothetical' (or 'convenient') .... and it seems that the 'hypothesis' of an Incarnation apart from the Fall is at least permissible in the system of Orthodox theology", but this as well as other theologoumena should not "be accepted if it has been clearly disavowed by an authoritative or 'dogmatic' pronouncement of the Church". At the moment this theory can claim nothing more but "probability". Therefore he finally concludes: "An adequate answer to the question of the 'motive' of the incarnation can be given only in the context of the general doctrine of Creation". We have to note the difference between a theologoumenon and a dogma. The latter is the official teaching of the church, sanctioned by a church council, while the former is an opinion of one or many theologians, which may claim probability but has not yet been
accepted by an official church council. Florovsky takes up a middle position. He does not attempt to reject this opinion and he is to a certain extent in full agreement with it. To my mind, however, this question seems to be of extreme importance and deserves more attention in a doctrine of creation than Florovsky is giving to it, for the whole construction of the doctrine of creation depends on this Christological problem. We will see, however, that Florovsky is concerned with this question 'Cur deus homo' again, when he presents the introduction to the problem of man's redemption. The redemption of the world in Christ presupposes the existence of this world, i.e. its creation. Florovsky tries to follow this sequence, which is open to critical questions.

E: The Doctrine of Creation - conclusion

The assertion of the creation of the world rejects all concepts which regard the world as self-sufficient, because it declares that the existing things derive from the creative act of a Creator. Thus the assertion of creation states first of all that there is a relationship between the world and its creator. Florovsky described this relation by the term 'contingent' and thus 'free'. The existence of the world is not at all necessary, i.e. it might not have existed at all. The doctrine of creation wants to explain precisely this contingency of the existence of the world. We have already mentioned that Florovsky formally subordinates the contingency of the act of creation by God to the contingency of the existence of the world. The contingency of the world is the starting point for his doctrine of creation. The term 'contingency', however, implies two complementary terms: 1. an order of existence, i.e. two different natures, and 2. freedom.

These two problems were Florovsky's main concern in the doctrine of creation and they reflect the basic distinction, which underlies his whole theology, the distinction between nature and person. Considering these two problems on the background of this distinction we will try to sum up Florovsky's exposition of the doctrine of creation.

When reading Florovsky's doctrine of creation a western theologian might be surprised by the fact that Christology does not seem to be very relevant for this topic of theology. But it is necessary to note and for the correct understanding of Florovsky's theology of fundamental importance, that he presupposes Christology in the sense, that his basic distinctions between the divine and human nature and between nature and person are based on nothing else but the Chalcedonian formula. The term 'one hypostasis in two natures'
establishes these distinctions. Considering this fact, one could say that Florovsky is Christocentric in his theology, for it is precisely this term which underlies his doctrine of creation as well as all other doctrines. Thus we shall attempt to summarize Florovsky's doctrine of creation by referring to these distinctions in discussing a) the distinction between natures, b) the distinction between nature and person in man and in God and c) the relation of the persons to each other.

Creation implies first of all that there is something created and somebody who creates. For Florovsky this indisputable fact leads first of all to the assertion of a fundamental difference, a difference in nature: God, the Creator is uncreated and thus eternal, while the world is created, i.e. utterly dependent on God, thus it has a beginning. Florovsky stressed this fundamental difference in asserting that God and man live in two different modes of existence. God's nature is never contained in time and space, while man is subjected to these categories for ever. Thus transubstantiation of any kind is impossible. Nature therefore remains the distinguishing principle in the relationship between the uncreated God and his creatures.

But they are conjoined through person, which is the complementary term to 'nature'. Florovsky distinguishes carefully between nature and person in God as well as in man. By means of the two terms 'nature' and 'person' he tries to describe man. Man is one hypostasis in one nature, but never just hypostasis or just nature. The life of man depends on the relation between his nature and his person. Florovsky therefore presupposes that man is a creature and its innate capacities, especially its striving towards God, determines man's fate. The goal of human existence is that man lives in accordance with his nature, i.e. in harmony with God. This harmony, however, ran out of tune due to the fall. The human structure lost its original, incorrupt constitution and became decentralized. From now onward man had to work for his redemption, for the redemption of his person, which was in the bondage of sin, while man's nature is corrupted once and for all and can be restored only through the act of God. The possibility of a destruction of the composition of nature and person, which on the side of man leads to the ultimate mark of corruption, death, does not exist for God. He is always in agreement with his nature. We have seen, however, that Florovsky introduced a further distinction in his doctrine of God: the distinction between God's
being and God's act, between God's nature and his energies. Whether this distinction in God is a necessary distinction, will be discussed later, but we have to note, that for Florovsky it is precisely this distinction, which makes a contact between the two natures possible. God relates to man by means of his energies, which are uncreated and, though they are distinct from the divine nature, God himself.

Creation asserts a relation between the Creator and his creatures. God meets man in his energies and tries to establish a fruitful relation to his creature. Due to the difference in nature Florovsky asserted the freedom of God as well as man. The difference in natures implies necessarily the freedom of the Creator and his creatures. Though God granted man creaturely freedom, which man should have used for an ascent towards God, man misused this freedom, in order to live on his own. It has to be noticed that Florovsky introduces the problem of freedom when he talks about the difference in nature. This difference establishes the fundamental fact of freedom. Because this difference is never overcome, the freedom of man still exists even after he suffered corruption due to the fall. Man is asked to use his freedom in the synergy with the divine energies, in order to achieve deification. The final deification of all creation was the original purpose of God's free act of creating something other than himself. This however reveals a dynamic understanding of creation, for from the beginning man had the task of achieving this deification. The necessary presupposition for this is time, i.e. history, and individuality, i.e. freedom. In due course of the exposition of Florovsky's doctrine of creation we come across these two subjects, which find their climax in the doctrine of theosis. Theosis however is the task to become like Christ, to achieve double-naturedness. It is from this point of view that the Christological question comes into the doctrine of creation again. Now we understand why Florovsky was attracted to the theologoumenon, which includes the incarnation in the original plan of creation.

This brief summary of Florovsky's doctrine of creation showed his Christological concern. The Christological definition of Chalcedon and the soteriological conception of theosis, the example of which is Christ, are the underlying principles of Florovsky's presentation. Our task will be to ask whether it is sufficient to base the doctrine of creation on these principles, and whether these
principles are correct and necessary principles for contemporary theology. This will lead us to a critical assessment of what Florovsky means when he talks about freedom and time.
II The Salvation of Man

According to Florovsky the doctrine of creation lays down all fundamental presuppositions for any theological doctrine. God’s motive to create the world was his love. Because of this love God granted man creaturely freedom, which is the highest predicative for the human being. Although man misused this gift, he was not abandoned by God. Because God loved the world he wanted to save it from perdition. The salvation of man is a twofold thing, for man is one hypostasis in one nature. Consequently Florovsky conceives of the salvation of man on the basis of the distinction between nature and person. The salvation of human nature is the work of Christ, i.e. an act sola gratia dei, while the salvation of the human person happens in synergy between the divine energies and free human activity. As regards the latter we have to deal with Ecclesiology, as regards the former we have to consider Florovsky’s Christology.

A. The Salvation of Human Nature - Christology

We have already seen that the incarnation was included in the original plan of creation. Florovsky conceives of man as created in an imperfect state: his nature is liable to mortality. It did depend on man, whether he actualized this capacity or not. To overcome this possibility into an impossibility was to be the work of Christ. This original intention of God - if it is permitted to express it like this - had become even more relevant for the human beings, since their nature was irreversibly corrupted. Thus the question 'cur deus homo' could be answered in a twofold way. Florovsky’s view on this problem will be our first concern, which will be followed by his doctrine of the incarnation and his doctrine of the passion and death of Christ. These three steps are necessary presuppositions for the Soteriology, which is our main concern.

1. God’s response to the misery of man

"We cannot dogmatically insist that redemption was the only ’motive’ or reason for the Incarnation. Yet we have to deal with the fact of the Incarnation, and not with its idea". This statement answers the question 'cur deus homo?' in a twofold way. Florovsky wants to assert both God’s eternal will for the incarnation, and the necessity for the incarnation in order to save human nature. These two are the
reasons for the incarnation, though Florovsky gives more emphasis to the actual event of the incarnation. We have to recall however that man was created "neither 'immortal' nor 'mortal', but rather 'capable of both'". Adam could have become immortal by grace but even then he would still have been capable of falling away from God, thus of mortality. We have to conclude from this that the motive for the incarnation was inherent in the very act of creation already, because Christ would have been incarnated even without the fall in order to achieve the immortality of human nature, i.e. to make man incapable of falling away from God into non-existence. This however applies to man's nature and not to his will! We have seen that Florovsky is attracted to this supralapsarian concept of the incarnation, but that his emphasis lies clearly on the redeeming impact of the event of God becoming man. "Salvation for man is above all an escape from the 'bondage of corruption' (Rom. 8,21), i.e. the restoration of the original wholeness and stability of human nature, or the resurrection".

Due to the fall man's nature became corrupted. This corruption, which is the dehumanized status of the fallen creature, could not be overcome by pure repentance. Because God loved his creatures and did not want them to fall into non-existence he became man, assumed human nature, "that, whereas man had turned to corruption, he might turn them back again to incorruption, and might give them life for death in that he made the body his own, and by the grace of the resurrection had rid them of death as straw is destroyed by fire". Man was unable to overcome his own mortality, only God as the giver of life could do this. Thus "We needed an Incarnate God; God put to death, that we might live". Florovsky is stressing that this "was not the necessity of this world. This was, as it were the necessity of Love Divine, a necessity of a Divine order". Only in this context it is allowed to say that "Evil causes God himself to suffer". The love of God is the link between the two motives of the incarnation of Christ. God loved the world from eternity, his act of creation was an act of divine love. But this implied already the final purpose of the salvation of man from his capability of mortality. Thus in the incarnation "God's eternal will is accomplished, 'the mystery from eternity hidden and to angels unknown'". Due to the fall however God had to save man from his corruption, because being corrupted man could not live in a perfect communion with God.
God had to overcome man's mortality in order to make possible man's eternal communion of man with God. In any case, even if man had not fallen, the status of mankind would have been changed because of the incarnation. Since the incarnation though man is still dying, his death is transient, because man will be resurrected. "The full victory of Christ will be revealed and accomplished in the general Resurrection, of which Christ's Resurrection is a token and a pledge"\(^\text{11}\).

God willed the incarnation because of his love for his creatures. In creating something other than himself God limited himself in so far as he wants to care for his creatures. The existence of the created world is irrevocable and this is God's self-limitation which he imposed upon himself in an act of will. His kenosis, as Florovsky calls it, toward something other than himself reaches its climax in the cross of Christ\(^\text{12}\). And though Florovsky can say that the incarnation was necessary for the salvation of man, he always emphasizes God's freedom, which is God's freedom of love. Because he loves his creatures and is not necessitated by anything else, he becomes man. Florovsky therefore dismisses any concepts which imply a necessary satisfaction of God\(^\text{13}\). Christ's death on the cross was not necessary for God's being. "Even from a merely moral point of view, the whole significance of sacrifice, is not the denial itself, but the sacrificial power of love"\(^\text{14}\). In the discussion of the doctrine of creation we saw already that love always implies freedom for Florovsky. God loves mankind in granting them freedom. This applies to the Christology as well. God loves the world in Christ in the sense that he heals the nature of man, but leaves the will of man uncompromised. "Probably a recreation of fallen mankind by the mighty intervention of the Divine omnipotence would have seemed to us simpler and more merciful"\(^\text{15}\), but God saves man only by cooperating with him, i.e. in freedom out of love. God's redemption in Christ is in the end not only a recreation of the corrupted human nature, but it is a step further, for now the way is opened for man to unite with God completely, to gain deification. "Not only does human nature return to its once lost communion with God. The Incarnation is also a new revelation, the new and further step .... in the Incarnation of the word human nature is not merely anointed with a superabundant overflowing of grace, but was assumed into an intimate and hypostatical unity with Divinity itself"\(^\text{16}\). What I have tried to
intimate above as different levels of human existence, is already stated here. Man's fallen nature is restored to its original state and thus the possibility of an eternal and complete communion with God, which is a task for the will of man, is now open to everybody.

This statement however leads us to the first result: Though Florovsky says that "Christianity is the Religion of the Cross" he is far from being a representative of a theologia crucis. Though "our redemption means a Divine 'coming down', a Divine condescending, and not simply an ascending of man" Florovsky warns theologians "against all kenotic exaggeration". The cross no doubt shows humility and love, but it is above all the sign of glory and victory, for death is abolished and man is now able to become like God. Therefore Florovsky says that "the tree of the Cross is an 'ever-glorious tree'". The Christ-event is not just the salvation of human nature, but this step furthers the glorification of man, for it opened the way for man's final deification, which is the task he has to fulfil in synergy with the divine energies.

The incarnation of God in Christ is a mystery which can only be apprehended in faith. "Decisive evidence, in matters of faith, is precisely testimonium Spiritus Sancti interum .... This 'evidence' is available only in the Church and through the Church .... It is precisely through the 'common mind' of the Church that the Holy Spirit speaks to the believers". This means that the incarnation has to be interpreted according to the statements of the ecumenical councils and in the interpretation of the Orthodox Church. These explanations are attempts to bear witness to the mystery of the Christ-event and cannot be taken in abstracto. This is Florovsky's hermeneutical starting point for the explicit Christology. Consequently we have to expect a very orthodox presentation of this doctrine. Whether this is so will be our concern in the next sections.

2. God became man

In the incarnation God identified himself with man in Christ. "The Incarnation is an intimate and personal identification of God with man, with the needs and misery of man." Thus the redeeming work of Christ is "a personal intervention of God in the life of man". The incarnation is first of all a personal act of God. Florovsky emphasizes this personal aspect in many places. The natural
aspect, i.e. the aspect concerned with the two natures, remains the distinguishing principle between God and man, while the person unites both natures. The divine nature and the human nature can only coexist in a hypostatic union, but they are never confused, changed, separated or divided (Chalcedon) in this union. In the historical figure of Jesus God revealed himself personally. "No new person came into being when the Son of Mary was conceived and born, but the Eternal Son of God was made man". God himself, the second person of the Trinity, appears in the human nature. "The uniqueness, the marvel of this historical figure consists in the fact that He who became visible, Whom we saw, was the Son of God, the Saviour of the World". God is the God-man Christ and as such He was in history and met men personally. But Florovsky continues: "Therefore it is that human limits, belonging to the world of two dimensions, cannot encompass this Image. It transcends them; and within historical boundaries we see what is super-historical, what is above the earth". With these difficult sentences Florovsky tries to explain the incarnation. The divine can never be subjected to the two dimensions of time and space, which constitute the world. God's being is always "super-historical", i.e. out of time, thus eternal, and "above the earth", i.e. never in space. These predicates referring to the being of God are obviously taken from Greek philosophy (and cannot be proved to be biblical). According to these presuppositions God's \( \text{oúcía} \) is "outside" time and space, but he is in time and space through the hypostatic union with the human nature of Christ. The humanity of Christ is united with the divinity in a unique way, which is always transcendent. Thus God is united to humanity in this manhood, which is his, in the hypostatic union. And because of this union God who is always invisible in his being became visible - in his manhood. As far as this manhood is concerned, God was in time and space, was visible etc., thus in Christ we see what is per se always transcending all understanding and all categories of man. The divine nature is hypostatically united with the human nature, consequently time and eternity, space and spacelessness, visibility and invisibility etc. are united in this person, but they remain distinct from each other, as the Chalcedon formula clearly stated.
Before going any further it might be appropriate to enquire how this Christological dogma could be related to the doctrine of the divine energies, which are, as I have shown, God's revelations ad extra. Florovsky does not discuss this connection at all. He does not even mention the divine energies in his essays, which deal with doctrines other than creation. In Florovsky's thought the doctrine of the divine energies seems to be primarily connected with the doctrine of creation, and not with Redemption. Nevertheless one could try to work out the place of the divine energies in a Christological context. The Sixth Ecumenical Council of Constantinople summoned in 680/681 AD, asserted that in Christ there "are two natural wills and two natural operations (energies) indivisibly, inconvertibly, inseparably, inconfusedly according to the teaching of the Holy Fathers .... We glorify two natural operations .... that is to say a divine operation and a human operation, according to the divine preacher Leo, who most distinctly asserts as follows: 'For each form does in communion with the other what pertains properly to it, the Word, namely, doing that which pertains to the Word and the flesh doing that which pertains to the flesh.' These two energies are both the capacities of nature, thus there is one human and one divine energy. The divine energy is one and proceeds from the divine being, which is God in Trinity. In the hypostatic union of Christ this divine natural energy is working together with his human natural energy in synergy. Interpreting the doctrine of the energies in this way one might say that the incarnation is an act of economy.

"Christus mori missus, nasci quoque necessario habuit, ut mori posset .... forma moriendi causa nascendi est." In order to overcome man's natural mortality God "had" to become man, he had to assume human nature. The death of Christ is the final purpose of the incarnation, but we will first look at the event of the incarnation itself, for it has in itself already soteriological implications.

As far as I can see Florovsky refers to the kenotic hymn Phil. 2 only once: Christ is "the Lord of Glory under that guise of the servant" he deliberately took upon himself. The second person of the Trinity assumed human nature, not a human person. Florovsky teaches the anhypostasis of Christ's human person, which is enhypostatized into the divine person. This is of cardinal importance for the whole soteriology. For according to the basic christological
principle 'That is saved which is united with God' only the human nature, being united with the divine hypostatically, is saved. The will of man has to unite, i.e. to save itself in synergy with the divine energies. Consequently "the name Theotokos stresses the fact that the Child whom Mary bore was not a 'simple man', not a human person, but the only begotten Son of God, 'One of the Holy Trinity', yet Incarnate". Christ is man in assuming human nature, which is not just one aspect of Christ, but it is assumed into a real unity with the divine nature. We will discuss later how this becoming man affects the divinity of Christ, whether Florovsky can say that God dies or whether he asserts that God dies only in his humanity. Thus we will have to deal with the question how the anhypostasia of Christ's human nature is related to the enhypostasis in the divine person of Christ.

In the God-man Christ there was the fulness of human nature, as well as the fulness of the divine nature. Both natures were genuine and complete. Florovsky teaches however that Christ did not assume a corrupted nature. Though his human nature is assumed from Mary and thus consubstantial with the nature of the fallen creature, it is not corrupted. Florovsky does not attempt to solve this obvious contradiction by postulating a doctrine of immaculate conception. As he states: "We have to stand in awe and trembling on the threshold of the mystery". Florovsky also asserts that Christ's human nature is not lacking anything, for evil is 

\[\text{corruption}\]

and abnormal growth in human nature. Due to his uncorrupted nature Christ did not have to die, but to be subjected to the power of death was the free act of incarnate God. It is true indeed, that "everything depends here upon our anthropological presuppositions".

We have to conclude that the human nature, which is assumed into the divine hypostases is that first formed human nature, nature in the pre-fallen, undorrupted state. But even this nature was liable to corruption, i.e. to death. John Damascene suggested a distinction between meanings for the word 'corruption'. On the one hand it denotes the passive states of man such as hunger, thirst and even death. Man is capable of all these by nature. And in this sense the human nature of Christ was corrupted. But it is not corrupted in the sense the nature of the fallen man is corrupted, i.e. it is not only liable to death but inevitably must die. In other words, Christ's death is not the wages of sin, but his free submission to death - in order to overcome death.
God's assumption of human nature does not limit his Divinity, it "was, on the contrary, a lifting-up of man, a 'deification' of human nature". This is the deification Adam could have achieved. The human nature, though still liable to mortality, is deified because it is united with the divine nature in the divine hypostasis. This is, one might say, the second soteriological achievement of the incarnation. The first one is the assumption, the second one the deification and the third one the immortality of human nature.

Because God is united with the human nature for ever, human nature is deified already through the incarnation. Due to the hypostatic union two completely new things have happened: God in the flesh and man in heaven. The intimate communion between man and God is established and this is the first act of salvation, because "thereby the image of God is again re-established in man". Human nature is brought into communion with God again and consequently the image of God in man cannot be overcome, changed or quenched by evil powers anymore. It is interesting to notice that Florovsky regards the incarnation already as the essence of salvation. The Incarnation is the important matter, not just the cross. We might even say that Florovsky "distinguishes" two acts of salvation: the incarnation and the cross. They must however not be separated from each other but constitute as a whole the one redeeming work of Christ. The two are different aspects of the redemption of the human nature, because "Our Lord's life is one organic whole, and his redeeming action cannot be exclusively connected with any one particular moment in that life". Florovsky can even say that the cross is nothing but an "extension of the Incarnation". Ultimately both are the one redeeming work of God, the salvation of human nature through assumption, deification and the gift of immortality. The latter, however, could be achieved only through the death of Christ. Being a pure and incorrupted man Christ's life in this corrupted world inevitably had to be a life of suffering. Though Christ brings the salvation, the world rejects him, which finally leads to the death of Jesus. We have to keep in mind however that this death was not of natural necessity for Christ as it is for the fallen creatures, but it is his free will and decision to die.
3. The passion and death of Christ

We saw that God's response to the misery of the fallen world was the incarnation of his only begotten Son. In assuming a spotless and incorrupted human nature Christ became man in order to die, i.e. to overcome the ultimate misery of man, his mortality. The death of Christ however is his free decision. To clarify this freedom Florovsky refers to a distinction, which was already made by John Damascene and S. Maximus\(^{50}\): the distinction "between the assumption of human nature and the taking up of sin by Christ"\(^{51}\). Christ assumes human nature, but he wills death. According to Florovsky the taking up of sin is an act of will, which does not lead to the consequence that Christ must die because of this sin. The only necessity for Christ's death is the necessity of the divine will. "This 'Divine necessity' of the death on the Cross passes all understanding indeed"\(^{52}\), but it is ultimately an act of God's love for mankind. This divine δικαιοσύνη of the death of Christ manifests his freedom, the freedom of the person, as well as the freedom of nature. Florovsky's stress lies on this freedom of God to die according to his humanity. Emphasising this divine freedom however, Florovsky does not give a satisfactory interpretation of the agony of Christ in the garden, he leaves this problem undiscussed in order to stress that Christ "was not a passive victim, but the Conqueror, even in his uttermost humiliation. He knew that this humiliation was no mere endurance or obedience, but the very path of Glory and the ultimate victory"\(^{53}\). This means however that Christ's death changes the meaning of human death, because man's death is inevitable, while Christ's death is "a sort of new death, for everything was in the power of the dying One and death did not come to his body until he desired it"\(^{54}\). Florovsky underlines this freedom of Christ in taking up death when he interprets the Last Supper as the free anticipation of the death on the cross. "By offering His body as food, He clearly showed that the sacrificial offering of the lamb had already (!) been accomplished"\(^{55}\). In giving his own body and blood to his disciples his death is anticipated and the salvation of human nature is already implied in this sacramental celebration.

Whether this interpretation of the Last Supper narrative can be proved to be a correct exegesis or not, shall be left out here. But it is obvious that Florovsky wants to emphasize the freedom of Christ and therefore dismisses other interpretations of Christ's death as inadequate.
The cross is not to be interpreted in ways which suggest that there were special conditions, which necessitated Christ's death, because this death was absolutely free, an act of divine love and therefore conditioned only by God. This is certainly an important and correct point. Florovsky therefore dismisses the "moral, and still more the legal or juridical conceptions"\textsuperscript{56}, which try to interpret the cross in setting the work of redemption into the higher frame of a legal concept. In order to safeguard God's freedom Florovsky is opposed to the concepts of a justitia vindicativa\textsuperscript{57}, of a justitia retributiva, "which might possibly have been in the death of even a righteous man"\textsuperscript{58} and of a satisfactio vicaria\textsuperscript{59}. All these conceptions of a vindicatory justice cannot explain the cross, for they "can never be more than colourless anthropomorphism"\textsuperscript{60}. The freedom of God is the only reason and adequate concept for the cross, the freedom of God and therefore his love. Love is the only condition for the crucifixion and thus Florovsky dismisses the Godforesakenness of Christ\textsuperscript{62}, because according to Florovsky - love does not want suffering and death, but freedom and glory. Therefore Florovsky conceives of the cross as a place of supreme glory.

"The death of Christ is itself already the victory over death, not only as a triumph of humility and love, but above all as a victory of immortality and love. It is a victory not only because it is followed by the Resurrection. The Resurrection only reveals and discloses the victory achieved on the Cross. The Resurrection is already achieved in the very falling-asleep of the God-man's\textsuperscript{64}. The death of Christ was a victory not so much because it was the death of an innocent man, but because it was the death of the Incarnate God. Florovsky is interested in the fact that the Incarnate God died, but dismisses all concepts referring to ransom, penalty etc. Because it is God who subjects himself in all loving freedom to death, this death is already the end of death. Death is made powerless and therefore the sign of the cross is not so much a sign of humility but the sign of supreme glory and victory. Christ "lays down his life, but he has power to take it again; and the veil is rent, for the mysterious doors of heaven are opened; the rocks are cleft, the dead rise .... He dies, but he gives life, and by his death he
destroys death. He is buried, but he rises again. He goes down into hell, but he brings up the souls. Because the death of the incarnate God destroys death "it is by the Cross that ultimate Joy enters the world." This conception of a theologia gloria is Florovsky's opposition to a mere theologia crucis. God's freedom is manifested on the cross in order to glorify him and his creature. Thus "Orthodox Theology is emphatically a 'theology of glory' but only because it is primarily a 'theology of the Cross'."

"Life put to death, Life Divine sentenced to death by men - this is the mystery of the Crucifixion." Do we have to say that God died on the cross? This is a most crucial question to answer when reading Florovsky's explanations. Florovsky is close to this position of the death of God, but he never reaches it. He says several times, that God dies, but only in his humanity. Nature however cannot be looked upon apart from hypostasis. These two are different aspects of the same thing. As regards Christ's death this scheme however becomes uncertain in Florovsky's system. He says: "The Lord died on the Cross .... this was the death of (!) the incarnate Word, death within the indivisible Hypostasis of the Word made man, the death of the 'enhypostatized' humanity." How are we to understand these four explanations of Christ's death? I suppose one has to give special emphasis to the words "incarnate", "made men" and "humanity". God dies only in so far as his humanity is concerned, this however does not afflict the divine person.

In taking up the philosophical definition of the human death as the separation of soul and body, Florovsky asserts that Christ's death was an incorrupted death in the sense that the divine hypostasis holds the disconnected elements of human nature together. Both remain united though being separated from each other in death.

"The Lord's body (!) suffered the corruption that is, the separation of the soul from the body. But in no way did it undergo that sort of corruption, which is the complete destruction of the flesh and decomposition." Thus the humanity of Christ dies, but the divine hypostasis lives, is life, consequently it is a death within the hypostasis of God. The assumed human nature suffers the separation of soul and body because the divine person willed death, human death. But though human nature is united with the hypostasis, one cannot say - according to Florovsky - that God dies, he dies only
according to his humanity. Florovsky's emphasis on the distinction between person and nature, which is the pre-eminent presupposition for his whole theology, leads him to a position, which is close to a position which asserts the suffering and death of God, but because of his stress on this distinction he cannot assert it properly. Taking up Christological positions which are closer to Alexandria than to Antioch with the emphasis on the Divinity of Christ and on the anhypostasia of the human nature, Florovsky cannot admit the suffering of God, or even the death of God. Though he is close to this position his habit of distinguishing person and nature seems to lead to a position which almost separates them from each other and overlooks their unity. For it is impossible to talk about the death of human nature without talking at the same time about the death of the person. A real death can only be somebody's death, for only somebody can die, i.e. a person. This however means that Christ died, because "there was no human hypostasis in Christ". We come back to the consequences of Florovsky's concept of the death of Christ in our conclusions.

Florovsky comes now to the soteriological implications of Christ's death and continues with the assertion that this death of Christ was "a human death indeed but obviously death within the hypostases of the Word, the Incarnate Word. And thence a resurrecting death". Because Christ's death was an incorrupted death and therefore death and corruption were made powerless in this death, this death is the beginning of the resurrection of human nature. In his voluntary act of willing and taking up death Christ overcame death. This aspect of Christ's victory over death is seconded by the other that his death was not like human death, i.e. the wages of sin, but an incorrupted death. This death is nothing but a passing through to life, to immortality. Therefore Florovsky and the Orthodox tradition assert that the crucifixion is the day of glory and victory.

There two aspects of Christ's death - his free volition to die and the dying as an incorrupt - are summed up in the term sacrifice. Florovsky is referring to this in describing the whole Christ-event. "The sacrificial offering begins on earth and is consummated in heaven". Sacrifice is a surrender, this however not in a moral sense, but Florovsky quickly stresses that the significance of sacrifice is the power of love. Love is the ultimate motive for Christ's incarnation and death. Christ did not just permit death to come, did not just surrender to the inevitability of the political
forces, but willed his death. Thus his sacrifice is not understood as a sacrifice for God in order to please or to satisfy God. "The sacrifice is not merely an offering, but rather a dedication, a consecration to God". Christ offers his human nature to God in order to unite it with God to a perfect union in immortality. Thus in this offering human nature is cleansed. "The power of a sacrificial offering is in its cleansing and hallowing effect. And the power of the Cross is that the Cross is the path to Glory". Florovsky introduces a counter-distinction between the remission of sins and the glorification of man. Both are as it were effects of Christ's sacrifice on the cross. Through the cross the sins of men are forgiven, washed away. Florovsky therefore speaks of a "baptism with blood". "The death on the Cross as a baptism by blood is the very essence of the redeeming mystery of the Cross". Man's nature is cleansed from all the evil effects corruption and passions had upon it. This washing away of sin is what Florovsky understands, when he talks about the forgiveness of sin, i.e. about the justification of man through Christ. The corruption of man's nature is overcome, but this is seconded by the more important fact that all infirmities of human nature are overcome in this baptism of blood as well. Man's capability of mortality is washed away as other natural infirmities, (which Florovsky does not list). Thus this sacrificial blood of Christ is the way to the resurrection of all mankind, i.e. to man's glorification. The sacrifice of the cross has therefore a twofold effect: the forgiveness of sins and the granting of immortality. We will now consider how Florovsky conceives of the redeeming work of Christ, i.e. the salvation of man.

4. Christ, the redeemer - Soteriology

4.1 The three redeeming works of Christ

Through the fall of Adam all human nature became decentralized, split into two, which finally was revealed in the inevitable death of every man. In death the human being is decomposed and vanishes. Through the redemption of Christ this split in human nature is healed completely. The power of death, i.e. the power to destruct the human structure, is overcome. "In the second Adam the potentiality of immortality by purity and obedience was sublimated and actualized into the impossibility of death". We have to remember however that
this applies only to nature. Nature is healed with a certain compulsion, without the consent of man, i.e. sola gratia. The will of man is not healed in the redeeming work of Christ because God loves man. Love however is in Florovsky's conception always an appeal to human freedom. "Love does not impose the healing by compulsion as it might have done", but calls man to ascend to God in utter freedom. Man's dehumanized status of mortality is overcome in Christ for "the integrity of human fabric or composition is restored. Human existence is again rendered truly human". Thus the way for a perfect theosis is opened for man, he is enabled to ascend to God in freedom, following the path of theosis because his nature will not be decomposed anymore, its structure will stay stable, even when it dies. For men will still die, but the hopelessness of death is overcome, thus death gained a new meaning, for Christ is resurrected from the dead.

The christian hope for the immortality of human nature is rooted in the historical event of the self-revelation of God, i.e. in the redemptive work of Christ. I mentioned above the three main effects of salvation, which cannot be separated from each other but may be presented in a certain order. The first effect of the incarnation is the assumption of human nature into an everlasting communion with God. "From now on human nature is inseparably united with the Godhead in the indivisible unity of the hypostasis of the Incarnate Word". Human nature was separated from God due to the fall and became destabilised, but now through the gracious act of God it is reintroduced into the communion with the divine. This assumption was not only the assumption "of human nature, but also of all the fulness of human life". The term 'fulness' wants to denote that Christ was a real man who experienced what a created man did experience, though - strangely enough - the divine hypostasis continues unchanged in the incarnation. There are only effects for the human nature, for it is deified in this union with the divine.

The second effect of the redemptive work of Christ is the gift of immortality to man. Christ achieves this in taking up the sin of man. The work of assuming human nature is an essential and natural appropriation to Christ, while the taking up of sin is the personal and relative appropriation to Christ. This reflects again the distinction between nature and person, to be found even in Florovsky's
Soteriology! Because of this personal aspect Florovsky emphasized the free and unnecessitated activity of Christ. Because of his love for mankind he takes upon himself the sin of mankind. "He bears it in such a way that it does not constitute His own sin, or violate the purity and integrity of His nature and will". Christ does not have to die, but wills to offer this sacrifice. "In this sense the Lord appropriated to himself both the curse and our desertion, things having no relation to (his) nature, but it was thus that he took our person and placed himself in line with us". Taking the sins of the world to himself in all freedom Christ had to die, for death is the wages of sin, which Christ took upon himself freely. Everything depends here on the stress on the freedom of Christ, because Florovsky does not want to understand Christ's death as a ransom, a penalty or in any juridical sense. "The sin was destroyed only on the tree of the cross, thus death could be overcome only through the death of life in order that life may come from the grave. Through Christ's death the condemnation of each death is abolished, human death is no longer the wages of sin, but "death is rendered powerless, and to all human nature is given the power of 'potentia' of resurrection". Consequently everyone will be resurrected. Though everyone is still going to die, death is not the end of human existence. To be dead is a transient status for man, because everyone will be resurrected, for the pledge is given: Christ is risen. Man regained the power for the resurrection through Christ, thus Florovsky calls the incarnation "the quickening of man, as it were, the resurrection of human nature", which was revealed through the resurrection of Christ. This brings man back to his original state and even further, for he gains immortality, eternal existence. This is the recreation of human nature and at the same time a new creation, for from now on man is not mortal anymore. The decomposition of man's nature is overcome, once and for all. In death soul and body will be separated but they will be united again. Thus death has a new meaning, for "Death is transfigured into Resurrection", each grave already points to the general resurrection of man, i.e. to his eternal existence.

The highlight of the redemptive work of Christ is the third one: the deification of human nature. It is again the doctrine of theosis
which sums up the natural and the personal aspect of Christ's work, i.e. the assumption of and the gift of immortality to human nature. For the resurrection of human nature and its assumption into everlasting communion with God has made human nature receptive to the Holy Spirit again. Because human nature is recreated to its original fulness men have "the power to be, or to become, children of God, that is - to be what we are designed to be. We have already mentioned that a true and complete theosis is only possible for the redeemed humanity. Freed from all human infirmities and from mortality man is capable of an everlasting communion with God. Florovsky, however, goes one step further: "By His Ascension the Lord not only opened to man the entrance of heaven, not only appeared before the face of God on our behalf and for our sake, but likewise 'transferred man' to the high places. Human nature appears in heaven, thus the ultimate point of redemption is the glorification of man. In the ascension "Christ is also 'the first-fruits' and His glory is the glory of human nature. Theosis is the ultimate purpose and goal of Christ's redemption. The term theosis sums up what Florovsky means, when he speaks about the redemption of man and it is again the goal of another doctrine, it is the highlight of Christology!

4.2. The abolition of human death

4.2.1 The doctrine of human death

Death is a catastrophe for man, a complete failure, for he was created for eternal existence. Therefore Florovsky asserts many times that death is ultimately not at all human, it is antihuman. Every man has to die because of his sinful condition, because of original sin. Thus death is the self-revelation of man's fallen state, for "mortality reflects man's estrangement from God." This obvious and inevitable sign of man's sinful state is "the basic principle of the whole Christian anthropology." This sets the course for our discussion. It is death which ultimately defines man! This however is not to be understood in a philosophical way, but - as Florovsky hastens to emphasize - in a theological way, i.e. death is and must be understood as the wages of sin (Rom 6,23). Consequently, death is not fully explained if one refers only to the old Platonic definition of death as the separation of soul and body, but one has to conceive of death first of all in the theological sense.
as the wages of sin. Florovsky attempts to combine these two explanations in his doctrine of death. Here lies the special point of his doctrine, though we feel compelled to ask, whether it is biblical and thus necessary to talk of these two aspects.

We mentioned above that Florovsky uses the distinction between nature and person even in his Soteriology. The final goal of the redemptive work of Christ is the gift of immortality to mankind. This was achieved through Christ's death on the cross. We have to remember however the distinctions between corruption and sin which refers to the distinction between nature and person. This however is reflected in Florovsky's understanding of the death of Christ. The taking up of man's sins was - as we have seen - the personal and relative appropriation to Christ, which has to be distinguished from the explanation of physical sides of Christ's death. Consequently Florovsky conceives of two deaths: the theological death, which is the wages of sin, and the physical death, which is concerned with the explanation of what actually happens to man's nature in death, i.e. the separation of the soul from the body. Due to Christ's death on the cross the death, which is the wages of sin, is overcome once and for all, because Christ took the sins of man to himself. This is the meaning of the theological death, referring to the personal aspect of man. This aspect of the death of Christ is complemented by the physical aspect of death, which will be our concern in the following section. This will lead us to a closer understanding of Florovsky's anthropology, because he presents his doctrine of the death of Christ after he expounded his doctrine of the human death. We may ask however whether this procedure leads to the danger of introducing elements into Christology which are alien to the Christian belief.

4.2.1.1 The definition of death

"We may still use the old definition of death: it is a separation of soul from body, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ζωής ἐπικατάλειψις (Nemesius, De natura hominis 2 ...)." This however must not be understood as a release of the soul out of the prison of the body, but in a theological sense. Due to the fall man had to die because "the soul loses its vital power, is no more able to quicken the body." The soul is the life-giving principle of human nature, but overpowered by evil and passions it cannot uphold the connection to the body.
The union of both becomes unstable, insecure and is finally broken. Consequently what we described above as the negative and corrupting effect of evil upon the human nature applies only to the body. The body is corrupted, the soul however is and remains pure. Florovsky therefore sees a particula veri in the platonic concept of the release of the soul from the body in death. "And indeed only too often the soul lives in the bondage of the flesh. Platonism was right in its endeavour to set free the reasonable soul from the bondage of fleshly desires"." This however must not lead to the abandonment of the body: "Christianity insists on the purification of the body as well". Why? This statement leads us to the anthropological statement that man's nature is a composition of the soul and the body.

4.2.1.2. Human nature as composition of soul and body
"One may speak of man as being 'one hypostasis in two natures', and not only of, but precisely in two natures". Consequently we have to avoid first of all one possible misunderstanding: the soul is not the hypostasis but an element of the human nature, which is composed of soul and body. But man is never just soul or just body. Both are necessary parts to compose the human nature. Thus only when they are united a human being exists. Florovsky stresses this very strongly in pointing out that the Christian tradition in this respect clings more to Aristotle than to Plato, for Aristotle emphasized the unity of soul and body. The separation of them means that man does not exist any longer. Before continuing with what human death is, we want to have a closer look at Florovsky's understanding of the human soul.

The soul is not immortal by nature for \( \delta \theta \delta \alpha \nu \alpha \tau \zeta \zeta \) \( \delta \eta \) \( \lambda \alpha \) and \( \delta \gamma \nu \upsilon \nu \eta \zeta \alpha \xi \) \( \delta \lambda \alpha \) \( \chi \) \( \iota \) \( \kappa \) \( \alpha \iota \). Florovsky's description of the soul follows Justin's arguments: the soul is not life, but partakes in the divine life and therefore has life. Thus if one calls the soul immortal one has to say that it is immortal by the grace of its Creator. The soul is a creature, thus contingent and with a beginning. But what has been said about creation in general applies especially to the soul: it has a beginning, yet no end. Because it originates in God's eternal creative decree it exists for ever, is immortal. Thus "'Immortality is not an attribute of the soul, but something which ultimately depends upon man's relationship with God, his Master and Creator". This relationship has to be
understood as static. God creates the soul once, so that it exists for ever. The soul cannot lose its existence because no provisions are made to revoke God's creative fiat. "The concept of an immortal soul may be a Platonic accretion, but the notion of an 'indestructible person' is an integral part of the Gospel". Florovsky admits that the concept of the immortalitas animae is Platonic, but he tried to give this its special theological interpretation in asserting that the soul is a creature of God, thus has life in itself only insofar as it derives from God and partakes in the divine life. According to the last quoted statement man's soul is what makes the personality. Is the soul equivalent to the image of God in man? We have already stated that Florovsky is not explicit about the imago-dei-doctrine. But it may be said, that the soul is the seat of the image of God in man. In the corrupted state the body is affected and in a process of decomposition, while the image is overpowered, weakened etc. As a fallen creature man "is far from God, and God's face is not reflected in his soul". Thus we have to conclude that the soul is the bearer of the divine image according to which man was created. The soul is the bearer of individuality, of personality, and the seat of the natural will, which always strives after God, is always looking for an intimate communion with its Creator. Because it wants to relate to God it is the life-giving principle in man, his natural, though created and God-given power to live. We can now correct what we stated above: human nature is the common principle of mankind as regards the body. The soul however bears the individual marks, though being a part of human nature as well. "The idea of personality itself was a great Christian contribution to philosophy", which conceived of the uniqueness of the individual man in a static way, it was a "'sculptural' uniqueness an invariable crystallization of a frozen image".

Concluding this brief presentation we may say that man is one hypostasis in two natures, soul and body. The body is the common principle to all mankind, while the soul denotes the particular. It bears the personality of man, as it is formed by the hypostasis. In this unity they build the nature of man and compose his being. Separated from each other man ceases to exist, for he is neither just soul nor just body. We saw above that the fallen creature destructs this composition, that the human structure runs out of tune, because of personal sin and corruption. Consequently the body becomes corrupted, while the soul remains unharmed in its good tendencies,
i.e. does not lose its function of being the place for the imago dei, but it is overpowered and overshadowed by the evil passions which come from the person. Death is the ultimate consequence of this disharmony, the ultimate destruction of man's nature as composition of soul and body. We will now see how Florovsky conceives of this.

Though Florovsky does not talk about the matter, we may now try to summarize briefly how he conceives of man. Man is one hypostasis in two natures. This means negatively that man is neither just soul nor just body. Thus we may define hypostasis as the event of the connection of these two natures. If these two natures are separated the hypostasis does not exist any longer. But is it possible to define the exact character of these two natures? As far as I understand Florovsky, it is wrong to define the body as mere corporality. Florovsky probably tries to describe these natures in attributing certain characteristics to them, but he cannot describe them fully. Thus these two natures are open concepts, which cannot be enclosed by any description. He tries to distinguish the two in ascribing the personal aspects of man to the soul. Thus the soul is the bearer of the individual characteristics, in theological terms, it is the bearer of the imago dei. This however does not mean that soul is identical with hypostasis, for, as I have said, hypostasis is the event of the connection of the two natures.

Florovsky therefore asserts that man always lives within two solicitations, soul and body. Whether man, i.e. the being composed of soul and body, is a sinner or whether he lives in accordance to God's will depends on the quality of the relation of these two natures. It is the quality of the connection of soul and body which makes the hypostasis good or bad. Thus hypostasis is not to be understood as a "part" of the human construction, but it is the actualization of one's nature. The quality of the connection of the two natures however depends on the hypostasis, for it is the hypostasis which "uses" its nature.

4.2.1.3 Man's death

Immortality is in itself a negative term, for it points to its opposite, to mortality. One cannot talk about immortality without talking about death. In this obvious fact Florovsky sees the reason for the Christian opposition against a natural immortalitas animae, which Greek philosophy postulated. In Christ mortality and
immortality were united hypostatically and in the same way man as the hypostases in two natures unites his mortal body with his immortal (though not by nature but by grace) soul. But to be fully human man needs both natures. This is obvious for Florovsky just from the phenomenon of the fear of death "In the fear of death the pathos of human wholeness is manifested", for death separates soul and body and thus destroys the human wholeness. Thus death deprives man of his privileged position in the creation as the only creature, which was created for eternal existence. This failure is due to man's lost relationship to God, which man forsakes deliberately. Consequently death is first of all the self-revelation of sin, because death is the wages of sin. It reveals man's true condition, his corrupted body and his overpowered soul. The soul is not able any longer to give life to the body, and therefore the body dies. Florovsky therefore asserts that "the question of death is first the question of the human body, of the corporality of man". Due to the separation of the body from the soul man is no more, or as Florovsky puts it: "A dead man is not fully human". This is a dangerous statement emerging from the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. The soul still exists, i.e. a part of man is still there, is still living, but its other part fades away, or as Florovsky puts it: is cleansed. This effect however is the second and even more important aspect of the human death: "Death is already, as it were, the anticipation of the resurrection. By death God not only punishes (!) but also heals fallen and ruined human nature". Death has in itself by the grace of God a twofold and good meaning. First it cuts the sinful life and evil short. Secondly it serves God's good and healing purpose, for the dead body does not just decompose into nothingness, but it is cleansed from all abnormal growth of evil and purified to its original fashion. Thus human death implies already and from all times a possibility of a resurrection of the spotless body. This purification is, one might say, a natural process, intended and initiated by God. Consequently Florovsky limits the power of death just to one single point: the impossibility of returning to life. Soul and body cannot be reunited by their own power, but they are ready for such a reunion, for the resurrection. Only through the work of Christ even this power of death has been overcome, for Christ overcame death in his descent into hell. Thereby he freed the souls and opened the way for the resurrection of the bodies.
of all men. Discussing the descensus ad infernos in the following section we will return to the question of who died on the cross.

4.2.2. Christ's descent into hell

The descent into hell is for Florovsky the most important event in the order of salvation. "Good Saturday is more than Easter-Eve", because it is "not only the eve of our salvation, (but) it is the very day of our salvation .... (for) the descent into Hell is already the Resurrection". It will be our concern in the following discussion to point out what Florovsky means by these statements and why - in his conception - the descent into hell sums up the salvation of man through Christ.

Before Florovsky is able to expound this doctrine he has to explain what he actually means when he talks about hell. An appropriate understanding of hell is the necessary presupposition for this topic. Hell has two meanings, is a twofold reality. On the one hand it is already experienced in the life of the sinner as his estrangement from God, which he wanted to live in, "it is a reality, to which many human beings are even now committed, by their own will". On the other hand it denotes the realm of death, i.e. the realm of mortality and corruption, the realm of the disembodied souls. It is "rather a place of mortal anguish than a place of penal torments". Because all men have died, they were all in hell, thus hell is the 'prison of the spirits'. Though the souls of all men are in this place of discarnation, Florovsky conceives of two different hells, because it is inconceivable to him "that the souls of the unrepentant sinners and the Prophets of the Old Dispensation .... were in the same 'hell'", but they were nevertheless under the power of Satan, "since they were confined in death by the grip of ontological powerlessness, not because of their personal perversions". Florovsky is not interested in the notion of hell as a place of endless suffering, torment or fire, but it is the place of death.

It is precisely into this realm of disembodied souls that Christ descended to. To be more precise: where Christ's human soul descended to as well as all other human souls. But there is an important difference here to the death of man. For in Christ's case the soul of his human nature "never ceased to be the 'vital power' of the body", because Christ's death was an incorrupted death. Thus the disembodiment of the soul was a separation from the body, but it was not a complete rupture, the potentia resurrectionis...
was already manifest in Christ's human soul, because the soul was united with the divine nature in the divine hypostases. As this deified soul "the soul of Christ descends into Hell .... unseparated from the Divinity\(^{144}\) and "by the power of His appearance and preaching, set them (the disembodied souls) free, (and) .... show(ed) them their deliverance"\(^{145}\). We have to conclude that God himself entered the realm of death, entered hell in order to free the souls, to give them life. The souls saw the living Christ\(^{146}\). Through this appearance of life in the realm of death hell is destroyed once and for all. Life destroys death and thus "there is not one dead in the grave"\(^{147}\), for the potential resurrection is and thus immortality is grafted into the human nature. Because this potential of life is granted to the soul, it is able to reunite again with its body. This potential is a new creation. At this point we have to correct Florovsky. Because the soul gains this potential, death is not just a problem of the body\(^{148}\), but of the soul as well. It needed this potential to reunite with the body. Christ's soul had this power already, thus was able to reunite with the body. Christ "knitted together again the disconnected elements, cementing them together, as it were, with a cement of His Divine power, and recombining what was severed in a union never to be broken. And this is the Resurrection\(^{149}\). The reunification of the soul with the body is the resurrection of the dead and therefore Christ's death foreshadows already his resurrection as well as man's. "Death itself is transmuted into resurrection"\(^{150}\), because "by the descent into Hell He (Christ) quickens death itself"\(^{151}\), he gives power to the resurrection of the souls, for he himself is the resurrection and the life (Joh 11,25). The descent into hell is the resurrection of the dead in the sense that the souls are given the power of reuniting with the body. This is a potential, but it is not realized yet. Before Christ's appearance in hell, which destroyed hell, all souls were in this realm of death. Now they are in an intermediary state at rest, awaiting the general resurrection. Florovsky is not very explicit about this matter. In the same way as he conceived of two hells, one for the believers and one for non-believers, he conceives of two states for the disembodied souls: The souls of the saints, of those who believed in Christ "are alive and share - in anticipation, but really - the everlasting life"\(^{152}\), but they are still awaiting the reunification with their bodies\(^{153}\).
This concept is the starting point and justification for a doctrine of the communion of saints, for the living believers share their life in Christ with the life in Christ of the dead souls\(^1\). Those souls however which belong to persons, who did not believe at all or not enough are in another intermediary state, separated from God. Only once Florovsky speaks about purgatory, which "includes but believers, those of good intentions, pledged to Christ, but deficient in growth and achievement\(^2\). This does not imply a chance for radical conversion\(^3\). Nevertheless, wherever the souls are, all of them await their reunification with their bodies.

We have already mentioned that the body is cleansed in human death from all its infirmities. We will conclude this section with a brief look into this matter as regards Christ in order to show that the salvation of human nature in Florovsky's theology includes the body and shows in which way it will be resurrected. In the same way as the soul remained connected to the divine hypostasis in Christ's death, the body is not abandoned by the divinity. "The Lord's flesh does not suffer corruption, it remains incorruptible even in death itself, i.e. alive (!), as though it had never died\(^4\). There is no need for Christ's body to be cleansed from evil growths, for Christ was free from corruption. In this state of incorruption his body has been transfigured into a state of glory, "has been clothed in power and light\(^5\), as Florovsky tries to describe this new body. This process was accomplished in the triduum mortis of Christ's death. For common men it takes from his death to the actual day of the general resurrection. This process implies a true renewal of what has been and one step further, for the body is now perfected, because immortality is grafted into it. This is a real change in the human condition, though it is not a completely new, i.e. different creature, which evolves. The body is transferred into a body of glory, of impeccable perfection\(^6\). Christ as the first one who rose from the dead had this body of glory. This was not just a resurrection for a time, i.e. a prolongation of the previous life which would finally end in another death, but "His glorified Body was already exempt from the fleshly order of existence\(^7\), i.e. mortality.

Florovsky emphasized this fact of immortality strongly. Mortality was the sign of the fallen creature, immortality, the sign of the saved man. In his glorified body Christ appeared after the
resurrection, with a body completely deified. Man is promised to receive such a glorified body as well. Florovsky argues according to 1.Cor 15,13.16: "St Paul meant to say that the Resurrection of Christ would become meaningless if it were not a universal accomplishment, if the whole Body were not implicitly 'pre-resurrected with the Head'. This emphasizes again that the healing of the human nature is universal. The potential resurrection is granted to all souls and everybody will be glorified until the day of the general resurrection. Human nature as a whole will be saved and remain incorruptible, immortal and deified. Whether man agrees with this or not does not really matter, because this recreation of human nature is a new creation in the sense that it is God's act alone, that he heals nature with a certain compulsion, because it is his free and loving will to save man. Thus from henceforth every disembodiment of the soul will be but temporary. Consequently "no one, so far as nature is concerned, can escape Christ's kingly rule, can alienate himself from the power of the resurrection." The healing of the will however must be strictly distinguished from this. Man's nature is saved in and through Christ, but the salvation of his will is man's own task, which he has to fulfil in the synergy between the divine energies and his own.

5. Conclusions
Florovsky's Christology was prefigured in his doctrine of creation, which laid down the necessary presuppositions for the doctrine of redemption. The incarnation of his Son was God's response to the misery of man, who was in the bondage of sin. Man's nature, entangled in corruption, could only be healed by God alone, this was the ultimate motive for the incarnation. Describing the person of Christ, Florovsky clings more to the Alexandrian Christology than to Antioch, for he conceives of Christ in the Chalcedonian terms with a special emphasis on the Godhead of Christ. This became obvious as regards Florovsky's doctrine of the enhypostasia of human nature. In the exposition of the doctrine of creation we have already noted that nature is the distinguishing principle between the divine and the human. Florovsky upholds this with his emphasis on the fact that "there was no human person in Christ". Concluding from this Florovsky asserted that the salvation through Christ is the salvation
of human nature only, for "what is not assumed is not saved". This however gives rise to some questions: How is human nature understood in this context? Does the human nature of Christ bear special personal marks like the human soul does in the human composition of human nature? From the exposition of presuppositions in the doctrine of creation we may assume that, though there is no human hypostasis in Christ, his human nature bears the marks of personality in its soul as every other human nature does. This however gives rise to the question, how Florovsky conceives of the activity of the man Jesus. Contemporary western theology asserts that the main characteristic of the man Jesus was his preaching of the faith. According to Florovsky the kingdom of God consists in the fact of theosis, of the union between the divine and the human. Therefore we may assert that Florovsky sums up the activity of the historical Jesus when he speaks of the union of natures. This is why he understood the assumption of human nature as the first soteriological act of Christ. We feel compelled to ask, however, whether this procedure is legitimate, for it presupposes a certain understanding of what divine and human nature is. Before one can speak of the kingdom of God and thus of Christ's earthly activity, Florovsky has to explain what he understands when speaking of the divine and the human nature. We will have to ask however, who establishes this distinction? This will be our concern in the last chapter.

As regards the passion and death of Christ Florovsky's special emphasis was the voluntary character of Jesus' act. Christ willed his death in order to save man, but he was not forced to die. Here lies the ultimate reason why Florovsky's theology is a theologia gloriae. Christ's death on the cross resulted in a twofold understanding of death. We tried to distinguish between the theological and the physical meaning of the death of the Godman. Because Christ willed his death, though he was innocent, this death could not be the wages of sin, but it is the abolition of sin. Christ died for the sins of all men, because he wanted to take these sins to himself. This personal appropriation of death, which is the theological meaning of Christ's death, has to be distinguished from the implications, which are appropriated to the physical death of Christ. Consequently Florovsky used the distinction between person and nature to describe the soteriological implications of the death of
Christ. In order to describe the physical death Florovsky had to clarify the necessary presuppositions, i.e. human nature as the composition of soul and body, the immoralitas animae and the place of death, hell, which involved the exposition of an anthropology which reminded us of the Aristotelian definition of man as the 'animal rationale'. We will have to ask 1. whether this traditional definition of man is sufficient for theological purposes, and 2. whether this definition is the biblical definition of man.

The salvation of human nature is an act, sola gratia dei. The possibility of man's mortality, which had become an inevitability for the fallen creature, is overcome into immortality. This restoration of the human nature and its new creation as an immortal nature happens without the consent of man. But man is one hypostasis in one nature, i.e. his person needs to be healed as well. Because God granted creaturely freedom to mankind he wants to save the human person only in synergy with the human will. We will see in the following section how Florovsky conceives of this, having in mind the distinction between nature and person. We will have to answer the question whether the salvific act of Christ is limited to human nature or whether it already has implications for the salvation of the human person as well.

B. The Salvation of the Christian Person - Ecclesiology
1. The problem
The subtitle for this section is 'Ecclesiology', because only in the realm of the church man can be saved completely: extra ecclesia nulla salus. However, the exclusion of an extensive discussion of this doctrine may be justified in so far as I am concerned with the salvation of man. Though the Ecclesiology is vital for Florovsky's anthropology, it is sufficient to present only his main points. On the other hand it is not just the church which saves man, but it is his own task as well, which he has to fulfil in the realm of the church. This was expounded in the doctrine of deification. Theosis is a process in history, which man needs time to fulfil his task of completing his union with the divine energies. This process is initiated and brought forward in the sacramental life of the Christian, especially in baptism and through the eucharist.
Thus the construction for the following section is obvious: the church as the realm for the salvation of the human person will be our first problem. History provides the framework for the possibility to fulfil this task. The sacraments are finally the divine means to achieve this salvation of the Christian person. All this could be summarized in the subtitle 'realized eschatology', though Florovsky does not like this, "because the very eschaton is not yet realized: sacred history has not yet been closed. One may prefer the phrase: 'the inaugurated eschatology'". This fine expression keeps the tension between what happened in history in Christ and what is to happen at the end of history. "The end has begun," this might be the formulation for the paradox we have to face in this passage.

2. The church as the realm for salvation

Jesus had told his disciples that after he had gone the Holy Spirit would come and explain everything (Joh 16,7). Thus the feast of the ascension of Christ, his disappearance from his disciples is of high value for the Christians, because "the joy of the Ascension lies in the promise of the Spirit". Christ ascended and the Holy Spirit came down as the life-giver. Christ had made men receptive for the spirit again, who reveals what had happened in Christ, sanctifies and ultimately unites man with God. "All this is done through the Church, which is 'the Body of Christ'", it is the house of the Holy Spirit, and consequently the place of God's abiding presence. According to Florovsky one must not conceive of the church as being nothing more than a company of believers. The church is the body of Christ and therefore belongs to its head. The head and the body are inseparable from each other and cannot exist apart from each other. This argument presupposes that Christ assumed human nature into an everlasting union. Since the incarnation Christ is the one hypostasis in two natures. It is therefore not surprising that Florovsky talks about the church in christological terms: The church has two natures, "it is the living organism of the God-man", for the divine and the human are united in it. Florovsky refers to Augustin's phrase "totus Christus, caput et corpus" in order to describe the salvation of man. Christ as the caput saved human nature, the church as the corpus saved human person. Both are inseparable from each other and form together
totus Christus. But Christ is of course superior to the Church. The church only completes and fulfils his work, unites everybody in Christ. Due to the distinction between nature and person of man Florovsky conceives of two different salvations, which complement each other. He therefore concludes: "The church is the Body of Christ, because it is his complement." Thus the church has its basis and aim in Christ and nowhere else. It is not just a human club, but the divinely instituted and guarded divine-human assembly of believers, which has the task to save human persons. Florovsky therefore sharply phrases that ecclesiology is nothing but extended Christology. Christ is everlastingly present in the church and continues his work of reconciliation in the church. This abiding presence of Christ gives special authority and significance to the Church. First of all her identity is preserved through this presence throughout all ages, i.e. it is not utterly dependent on man's action. Florovsky goes even further in his christocentric arguments in asserting: "The Church is a Kingdom not of this world and an eternal Kingdom, for it has an eternal King - Christ." Thus "Christianity is the Church," for being a Christian means to belong to the body of Christ, and within this body one belongs to Christ. For Florovsky it is impossible to be a christian without the church: unus Christianus, nullus Christianus. It is only in the church where the salvation of Christ is available to all men, where it is completed. Consequently "extra ecclesiam nulla salus. That is to say, there is no salvation but in Christ." This formulation shows very clearly the tight connection between the church and Christ, which Florovsky is so keen to emphasize. Christ is the foundation of the church and his work is fulfilled and completed in the due course of the life of the church, which is sustained by Christ's everlasting presence in his body. The Augustinian phrase of totus Christus, caput et corpur, which Florovsky likes so much, conceives of the salvation of man as totus Christus. The name "Christus" stands for salvation, which is the salvation of human nature through the God-man Christ and the salvation of the human person through the free conversion of man in the realm of the church, which supplies the necessary help and means to achieve this salvation. The aim of this twofold salvation in this toto Christo is the transfiguration of man, his double-naturedness or theosis. Thus, totus Christus stands for God's acting as well as for man's synergy with the divine
energies, i.e. God's acting for man. 'Christus' is understood in terms of act and not in terms of being.

This explains why Florovsky does not talk about the church as it is or should be, but about the acting church, always keeping the link to the foundation of this community: Christ. "The mystery of the Incarnation is still, as it were, continuously enacted in the church, and its 'implications' are revealed and disclosed in devotional experience and in sacramental participation". Devotion and sacraments are the two distinctive marks of the church. Both serve the same purpose: the deification of man. Incorporation into Christ is the essence and aim of the worshipping church. Because Christ is only present in the church there is no incorporation into Christ outside the church. Thus the church is the mother of all Christians in the sense that she makes the new life in Christ available to man. Mater ecclesia however corresponds Virgo Mater, for Mary anticipated this incorporation and transfiguration of herself as an implication of her office as the theotokos, in giving her human nature to the redeemer of mankind. Mary was the co-redeemer and in a similar sense the church is the co-redeemer. This parallel has its foundation in the assumption of the free will of the fallen creature and the consequent doctrine of the synergy between man and God. Co-redemption presupposes in both cases the active participation of man in God's saving purpose.

Because of Christ's presence in the church Christians have already a foretaste of the resurrection of all, i.e. of an everlasting and close communion with God. Thus the church is sort of outer-worldly, not from this world and does not belong to it. Due to this character of the church the two determining dimensions of human life, time and space are irrelevant. Especially time is rendered powerless. Florovsky is especially interested in this category because he is concerned with mortality and immortality. Mortality is first of all the question of the end, but precisely this is overcome in the realm of the church. Though the church does exist in time and is still on its way to the final consummation "time has no power and no strength in it". This means that time, the passing moment, which will not come back but is gone once and for ever, lost its threatening character. Time does not flow anymore, but stands still, unites what is past with what is present. Florovsky does not
talk about the time to come. Present and past are united by "the power of grace, which gathers together in catholic unity of life that which had become separated by walls built in the course of time .... This time - conquering unity is manifested and revealed in the experience of the Church, especially in its Eucharistic experience". The unity of believers, the communio sanctorum is granted by Christ in a time conquering way. In Christ time and eternity and therefore the dead and the living are united. "In Him they (the saints) are alive, in Him we are still united with them, although separated by death". Thus the church on earth is united with the "glorified and triumphant Church" of the saints. Consequently the church is the unity of mankind. It unites men having lived before with the presently living in the expectation of the final consummation. The dead Christians are alive and live already in the state which is still future for the living Christians, but may be experienced mystically in the church. Consequently, past and present are united in Christ for a common and even now experienced future. This however means, that time is summoned into one, the past is the present as well as the future. This understanding leads us to the doctrine of the two lives of the church. It lives on the one hand on earth and in this world and at once is not at all from this world but transcends it already in its existence.

The church as the body of Christ experiences the life in and with Christ, its head, because the kingdom has come in Christ and its fulfilment is inaugurated. These are the two reference points for the Christians. On the one hand there is the glorious victory of Christ in the past history and the experience of this in the church. On the other hand the Christians expect the fulfilment and final consummation of the church. Though experiencing the fulness of communion with God the church is still on its way and therefore lives in two dimensions at once. "Yet, it is essentially the same Church that has this dual life, duas vitas". The church is on its way until the number of Christians is fulfilled. This is a strange idea Florovsky refers to quite frequently. As long as this process of collecting Christians is going on, the church has to bear this tension of two lives, a tension which is constituted by the very nature of the church! Florovsky is talking about the universal church, not about the single local churches, because he cannot conceive of one church bearing this tension in its actual life. We
have seen that the church is always 'out of this world', that Christians are strangers in this earth, because time and space are mysteriously overcome and evil does not exist for Christians anymore, because they live already in communion with God. Thus in the past as well as today Christians retired from this world, enclosed themselves in quiet places and founded "heavenly cities", i.e. monasteries. They escaped, as Florovsky likes to call it, into the desert. The church in the desert is the church "to be constituted as an exclusive and 'totalitarian' society, endeavouring to satisfy all requirements of the believers, both 'temporal' and 'spiritual', paying no attention to the existing order and leaving nothing to the external world". This was one possibility for the church while the other is the "Christianization of the world, subduing the whole life to Christian rule and authority, to reform and reorganize secular life on Christian principles, to build the Christian city". This is the church of the 'empire', which attempts to transform the world in order to establish the kingdom of God by the means of theocracy. Those two ways are a choice, a choice of an either-or, for both are consistent in themselves - according to Florovsky. One church cannot live in the desert as well as in the empire, for nobody can serve two Lords at once. Consequently "the unity of the christian task is broken" from the very beginning! The conception of the church of the desert attempts to live up to the experience of its other-worldliness, of its separation from evil and society and of its common life in Christ, i.e. it tries to live up to the divine nature of the church. While the church of the empire attempts to live up to the experience of the salvation of the human person for all mankind, of the task for man to free himself from the passions and evil in synergy with the divine energies, i.e. it tries to live up to the human nature of the church. Florovsky sees no way to reconcile these two different kinds of church. They are not just two sides of the same coin, but originate from the very nature of the church universal. "In the last resort however it is only a symptom of the ultimate antinomy (i.e. the human and the divine nature). The problem simply has no historical solution". Here is a limit to Florovsky's understanding of the two natures. No unification is possible whatsoever. One has to ask the critical question whether this alternative is indeed inevitable. Whether this is the question of the Christian church. Everything
depends here on Christology and the view one has on the unity of
the two natures in Christ. Losing the tension between the two
natures and surrendering to their difference means to misunder­
stand the whole Christ-event. Only if one keeps this tension and
bears it, one may be called a Christian. This was precisely the
point which the Lutheran doctrine of the two rules or regiments of
God wants to make, if it is understood properly. Florovsky tries
to keep this tension and has made up his mind, which position he
wants to be emphasized. There are several passages in his writings
where he calls for the activity of the church in the world.

"Christians are also the Sons of Eternity, i.e. prospective citizens
are also of the Heavenly Jerusalem. Yet problems and needs of
'this age' in no case and in no sense can be dismissed or disregarded
since the Christians are called to work and service precisely 'in
this world' and 'in this age'". This however does not sound like
a programmatic conception for a theocratic system. The church is
still on its way to the final consummation and this way is in any
way a sacred way, because the church is already the kingdom. Thus
Florovsky never loses this eschatological aspect and keeps the
tension.

"The sacred history of redemption is still going on. It is now
the history of the Church that is the body of Christ". Church
history is not profane history, but the history of redemption.
The church is the realm for the salvation of man, thus it is a
missionary body, called to propagate the kingdom of God. "History
was theologically vindicated precisely by this missionary concern
of the Church". The church has the task to go into the world
and complete the body of Christ until the church will be Christus
amans seipsum. Thus the church is always living in the tension
between the past, the present and the future, because the life had
come in Christ, is completed in the church and will be consummated
on the last day. This tension in time "is a tension between destiny
and decision", because time is the only chance for man to accept
what has happened in Christ. The realm to accept this is the body of
Christ, his church, which initiates and completes the final salvation
of man, the salvation of the human person. The church is the place
of Christians, is Christianity, i.e. the place of the union of the
divine and the human. Thus double-naturedness, theosis is once again
the final goal the life in the church - and of the doctrine of the
church.
3. History as the framework for the possibility of the salvation of man.

Christianity has its roots in the historical event of Christ, thus it is first of all historical. We saw above that the very notion of creation implies a final telos for the created beings, which is their everlasting communion with their creator. "History has to have an end at which it is 'fulfilled' or 'consummated'\(^4\), because the Christians expect the parousia of Christ. Christ will come again and is already present in his church. The experience of Christ's presence in the church necessitates the orientation toward the future, because with the coming of Christ history will come to an end. History seems to be a negative term in this context. It denotes the flow of time and consequently the ultimate threat of human life: mortality. This inevitable end of human life will be overcome in the end of time, in the parousia of Christ. Future will be no problem any more, because it will be already fulfilled time. This might be what Florovsky wants to say. We have already seen that he conceives of the church as an 'island' in the midst of the world, where time and space have become irrelevant, because Christians live already in eternity foretasting, as it were, the resurrection. "History is no more than a passing frame .... is no more a theological problem"\(^5\). Time as this continuous flow of moments lost its threatening character and man is the master of time through and in Christ.

This threatening side of the meaning of the term history goes along with a positive one. Man is a historical being in Florovsky's concept. His personality is constituted by his timely experience. We came across this meaning of history already several times. History is the place, where man has to work-out himself, to strive for the communion with God etc. Consequently Florovsky asserts that the end of time does not mean the end of man's historical experience. "I would cease to be Myself if my concrete, i.e. historical experience is simply substracted. History therefore will not fade away completely even in the 'age to come', if the concreteness of human life is to be preserved"\(^6\). We have to conclude that man's existence in time sets the framework for the possibility for his salvation. Time gives him the chance to work out his personality. Thus history is primarily challenging, it is the time for decisions, sets the choice before him, what he wants to be. This is man's task which he was created for, thus history is in its positive sense
a "creative process". Christians are called to participate in Christ's redeeming work by spreading the gospel and bringing the people to Christ, i.e. to the Church. On the one hand Christians anticipate the kingdom already in history, and on the other hand they have to ask other men to use their freedom in deciding for Christ. History is thus the framework for the possibility of the salvation of men, for only in history man can respond to the divine deeds, to the divine energies.

For those who deliberately do not want to turn to God, God's councils and predestinations are not made void, but turn out to be "a judgement, the force of wrath, a consuming fire". We may talk of a judgement and condemnation of man already in his present life. Thus the decision once made has its implications and consequences even now. But even in the end these decisions are not made irrelevant. In the same way as the life of the Christian will lead to a life of blessedness, the life of the unbeliever will be a life of estrangement from its creator. As everybody else, he will be resurrected, but to judgement. "And in this will be completed the mystery and the tragedy of human freedom." In and through Christ history was validated to such an importance! It is the only chance for man to relate to God. It is the time to work out oneself in one of the two directions: either to spend one's life in utter separation from God, or to go the way of a steady transfiguration of one's self in the realm of the church. In history man has to decide this either-or question in order to become himself, for history constitutes the personality of man.

4. The sacraments as the divine means for the salvation

After having seen that the church is the realm and history is the framework for the possibility of the salvation of the human person, we now come to the problem of the means of this salvation. How is the will to be cured from all evil and sin? How does man partake in the divine nature? This is first of all a free human activity. Man has to fulfil the task which is set before him, to ascend to God and associate with him. We have already talked about the ascetic achievements man has to fulfil. Further means and even the realization of this task are however the sacraments. They are the means which lead to the final theosis, which is of course, the ultimate aim and goal of the salvation of the human person.
4.1. What is a sacrament?
Florovsky is quite brief about the special character of sacraments. He simply states: "Sacraments are instituted in order to enable man to participate in Christ's redeeming death and thereby to gain the grace of His resurrection". Consequently sacraments are not some human inventions or human acts, but "sanctifying acts in which the Holy Ghost is breathing, through them is manifested the union with Christ and the contact with God". We may conclude two things: first, the sacraments point to the Christ-event, they are Christ-centric and thus "an extension of the Incarnation", because in them the union between the divine and the human is disclosed and made available for believers. Secondly, the sacraments are not just memories of the past events. Terms like "union with Christ" have to be taken in their literal sense. The reality of the union of the divine and the human nature in Christ is disclosed as well as conveyed to the believer. The sacraments are a real imitation of the Christ-event. Florovsky sums up these two points by saying: "In the sacraments, the Incarnation, the true reunion of man with God in Christ, is consummated". Consequently it is precisely through the sacraments that man is initiated into the Christian life and sustained in his process of sanctification. Through the sacraments Christians become the chosen people who live already another worldly life in the kingdom of Christ. Thus the sacraments as the means which convey the divine life upon man, bring about the salvation of man's person and thereby constitute the Christian man.

Florovsky is not explicit about the number of sacraments. He emphasizes the unity of baptism, chrism and eucharist and points out that the eucharist is the supreme sacrament after which there is nothing more to long for, but he expounds only the sacrament of baptism, explains the eucharist briefly and leaves the sacrament of chrism undisussed. The reason for this procedure has to be seen in his favourite topic: freedom. It is the free decision of man to become a Christian, i.e. to ask for baptism. This starting point however leaves no room for the Orthodox sacrament of chrism and takes the eucharist as the given highlight of worship.

4.2. The sacrament of baptism
Through the redeeming work of Christ human nature was freed from corruption and gained the potentiality of the bodily resurrection.
Consequently man has become immortal. Though he still dies this death is transitory and will be rendered powerless by the resurrection of all men. This is a rather mechanical understanding of the redemption, but it is nevertheless one of the two understandings of the salvation of man. The believer as well as the unbeliever will be resurrected, this is an undisputable and inevitable reality of human life. Yet there is a difference, because "each must justify that resurrection for himself .... The immortality of nature, the permanence of existence, must be actualized into a life in the Spirit". We have to recall the Augustinian notion, which Florovsky uses quite frequently, that life and existence are not the same, but they differ essentially in quality. True life is life in and with Christ. Eternal existence, i.e. immortality is granted to all men, eternal life however is offered to man, i.e. he has the task to receive it, he is asked to respond to God's mighty act in synergy with the divine grace in order to restore his will. Thus "the Kingdom of Heaven, and the beatic vision, and union with Christ, presume the desire .... and therefore are available only for those who have longed for the and loved and desired". Though Florovsky states that "nobody can be compelled to desire", he says nothing about the way and the means how this desire should be established. What it involves first of all is repentance. This means that before being a Christian, man has to repent. "We must 'reject ourselves' to be able to enter the catholocity of the Church". This repentance means a real αἰματιά, a radical inner change, the change of being deliberately far from God and resisting his grace to a life with him and a participation in his divine energies. The act of repentance is finally sealed in the baptism, the act of self-renunciation is completed in order to be baptized. "In holy Christening the one to be enlightened leaves 'this world' and forsakes its vanity as if freeing himself and stepping out of the natural order of things, out of the order of 'flesh and blood' he goes over to an order of grace". This clarifies again what kind of difference it is Florovsky conceives of, the difference between a natural and a supranatural life, between existence and life. The laws and orders of both spheres are completely different. Therefore repentance and finally baptism mark the step of a radical change in the personality of man.
After man has repented he is going to be baptized and thereby becomes a member of the church. Florovsky does not say anything about the required degree of inner change, but insists on the pre-eminence of repentance over against baptism in the timely order. Through the baptism the believer is united with Christ, with his body, which is the church, as well as with Christ himself. Baptism is first of all an "'imitative' sharing of His (Christ's) Passion to acquire 'salvation in reality' .... It is not only an 'imitation', but rather a participation, or a similitude". The man to be christened shares actively in the salvation of himself. This cannot be understood in the way that he does what Christ has done for him already, but it is to be understood as an act of synergy. Baptism reflects and imitates what has happened in and with Christ. Thus "the symbolism of baptism is definitely a symbolism of Christ's death and resurrection". This symbolism has reality because it is through baptism that man becomes a member of the body of Christ and unites with him. Florovsky is following Gregory of Nyssa's explanation of baptism. He saw two aspects of the washing with water: birth and death. "Death is 'represented' in the element of water, and as Christ rose again to life, so also the newly-baptized, united with Him in bodily nature, 'doth imitate the resurrection on the third day'". In baptism man descends sacramentally into the darkness of death, but through Christ's salvation this death is already the beginning of the resurrection. Florovsky therefore understands Christ's grave as the "life-giving grave .... as a font of baptism, as a source of birth into life everlasting". Thus the human nature is turned into a state of incorruption already in baptism - in anticipation. Man will still die, but the resurrection is already anticipated. "Yet in baptism the resurrection is in a way already initiated. Baptism is the start, and the resurrection is the end and consummation". Florovsky therefore emphasizes that man is already changed, thus the natural change is not just a matter of the future. The anticipation of the resurrection gained in baptism is a real change of the state of man's nature, it is a renewal as well as a change. Following Christ's death and resurrection sacramentally leads to this new birth. "Christians are born again to real and everlasting life (not just existence) only (!) through their baptismal death and burial in Christ".
Because baptism is an act of man's decision it does not just involve the anticipated healing of nature already in this life but the transformation of will as well. This does not happen automatically but in the free synergy with the divine grace. In the act of baptism divine grace does descend, but it cannot quicken the obstinate will, it needs its consent. Though Florovsky asserts that this "does not subordinate the baptismal grace to human license", this grace is in fact rendered powerless if the baptized person does not respond to and corroborate with it. To safeguard the doctrine about the freedom of man Florovsky has to say in fact that God cannot do anything against man's resistance. All his assertions that God's grace is not subordinated to man's freedom are nothing but postulations without any basis. Florovsky gives christological reasons for the necessity of the human synergy: "because baptism is a sacramental dying with Christ, a participation in His voluntary (!) death, in His sacrificial Love .... (the transfiguration of the whole man) can be achieved only in freedom." In the same way as Christ's death was his voluntary act of love, the baptism of the believer has to have its motivation in his free love and response to God. If this happens baptism is the restoration of the human fulness, which was diminished in the fallen creature. Nature as well as person are healed through baptism.

Thus through baptism and the following life as a Christian "in the fulness of the communion of the Church the catholic transfiguration of personality is accomplished." Baptism as the death with Christ marks at the same time the beginning of the process of a life with Christ, i.e. of a continuous ascension toward God. This free activity of ascending to God is however a task for man, which he has to fulfill. Florovsky therefore concludes that "if the soul is not cleansed and purified in the free exercise of will, baptism proves to be fruitless." Man is asked to actualize his baptismal grace. He is asked to establish a proper relationship between his soul and his body in order that he might live in accordance to his nature. Consequently the ontological distinction between person and nature is an irrelevant distinction for the baptized man, for through baptism the split in the human composition is healed and made irrelevant. This makes it clear again that baptism is an act of initiation. It marks the end of a life in corruption and sin and is the starting point for a new activity, the life in communion...
with God. Thus baptism is the cause for a beatific life in contrast with mere existence\textsuperscript{80}, because "it is the sacrament of deification"\textsuperscript{81}. Deification in the very precise sense that man has been adopted as a son of God. Anointed by the Spirit men became the children of God, because they put on Christ (Gal 3,27), they are in image of Christ\textsuperscript{82}. In asserting this Florovsky emphasizes again the christological roots and bases for the doctrine of baptism. Because of Christ's salvation he can therefore say that baptism is the law of true life, of life in eternal communion with God\textsuperscript{83}.

Baptism is the "sacrament of deification", because it is the imitative sharing in Christ's death and resurrection and thereby the transfiguration of the whole of the human structure. Baptized Christians are on their way to the final consummation of their lives but they are already changed, because they are deified, i.e. adopted children of God. We saw that baptism needs the cooperation of man with the condescending grace. It is the first of all synergic acts between man and God and initiates the Christian life in the church. Because it needs necessarily the free human consent, it is obvious that Florovsky would have been opposed to infant-baptism. Babies cannot respond and transfigure their will! This suggestion is supported by the fact that Florovsky does not discuss the Orthodox sacrament of chrism at all. This is certainly a good and correct thing, though it is doubtful whether Florovsky is Orthodox in this matter. The Orthodox doctrine (as well as a great deal of western theology) teaches a substitutional faith of the godparents or the natural parents, which is however antibiblical and dogmatically most problematic, in one word: wrong.

4.3. The sacrament of the eucharist.
"The Eucharist is the heart of the Church, the Sacrament of Redemption in an eminent sense"\textsuperscript{84}, consequently the supreme of all sacraments. Florovsky agrees with Cabisilas' assertion that there is nothing more to long for, if one partakes in the eucharist\textsuperscript{85}. The reason for this is obvious if one understands that the eucharist is not just an imitation but in reality the same last supper in the upper room, Jesus had together with his disciples. This means that the table is exactly the same table as the one in the upper room,
which itself is exactly the same as the room the eucharist is now celebrated in. Even the celebrant is the same i.e. Christ himself. "The priest stands fulfilling the figure, but the power and grace are of God". Thus the last supper is not repeated, but it is enacted being truly the same as the "first" Last Supper. We saw above that Florovsky conceives of the Last Supper as an anticipation of Christ's sacrifice on the Cross. Consequently the eucharist is a reenacting of this sacrifice. It is Christ who is offered. "The Eucharist is a sacrifice, not because Jesus is slain again, but because the same Body and the same sacrificial Blood are actually here on the Altar, offered and presented". For a western mind it is quite difficult to conceive of this realism. Florovsky wants to say that in the symbolism of the eucharist the sacrifice of Christ is present in the same way as it was present in the upper room in the year of the crucifixion of Christ. Therefore the eucharist happens in a sphere which overcomes time. Time has no value and significance at all in this celebration. Florovsky therefore asserts that each eucharist is a celebration together with the whole church, i.e. in communion of all saints of all ages. Consequently the eucharist is the celebration of the unity of all believers of the unity of the church - in Christ. For if the eucharist enacts the same celebration of the upper room then this sacrament does not just remind the salvation in Christ, but is itself the salvation of man. According to this understanding man unites with the human nature of Christ in the eucharist. In eating Christ's flesh and blood man's own sinful nature becomes transformed. "The sacred meal effects between Christ and us a closer union than that which was realized by our parents when they begot us. In truth he does not only share with us the same particles of his flesh or some drops of his blood, but gives us both in all their fulness: he is not only a principle of life as are our parents, but in very truth life itself. Through this inner participation in Christ life eternal is engrafted into the human life. It is therefore "a foretaste of the Resurrection", not just an imitation, but a real foretaste.

One has to take the realism of this doctrine seriously to grasp the difference to the doctrine of baptism. The baptism was an imitation through which the immortality was bestowed unto the human
nature and the foundation for a life in Christ was laid, while the eucharist is a real foretaste of the permanent life and communion with Christ. Because even the Christian is still sinning the eucharist has to be repeated in order to unite with Christ frequently. Thus human activity is required for this sacrament as well. Man is asked to prepare himself for this union with Christ, for the bestowing of true life upon him. We may therefore conclude by saying, that baptism is the initial sacrament which, in freeing from corruption of nature, prepares the way for the deification of man. The eucharist however is the sharing into the glorification of man in a union with Christ, For these two reasons Florovsky asserts that both sacraments are already a foretaste of the resurrection. This resurrection however does not only mean the resurrection of the body, but the resurrection for a life in eternal communion with God, i.e. for the state of blessedness. In the same way the doctrine of baptism was strictly christological, the doctrine of the eucharist has its foundations in Christ. Because the eucharist is the Last Supper Florovsky can say that "Christ is still acting as the High Priest in his Church". He is still offering to God, which happens in the church as the body of Christ as well as in heaven, "where Christ presented and is still presenting us to God, as the eternal High Priest".

4.4. Christ, the one sacrament
We saw that the sacrament of baptism and eucharist enable man to partake in God and bring about his salvation. Because baptism is the beginning and the eucharist the continuous participation of a life in Christ both sacraments are necessary for the salvation of man, because they are the means of this salvation, salvation itself. How does this relate to the salvation in Christ? Due to the realism of both sacraments one has to conclude from Florovsky's presentation of the doctrine of the sacraments that the two sacraments of baptism and eucharist are in fact the sacrament of Christ. Christ is the one sacrament in the same way as the sacraments are the extension of the incarnation. Asked about the number of sacraments Florovsky would probably answer that there is only one sacrament: Christ. But we have seen that "man had to have his active share in the mystery", i.e. he "must justify that resurrection for himself". To become and to be a Christian
requires man's personal participation in the act of salvation and this active participation is the healing of his will as distinct from the healing of his nature. An active share is required and is absolutely necessary. Florovsky leaves it open how man is able to have his share in the mystery of salvation, i.e. how he is able to believe. He has the capacity for this in his freedom of choice. But one may ask which sinner wants to choose the divine life?

5. Conclusions

We have seen that the doctrine of the salvation of the human person was governed by the Christological presupposition, that Christ's salvation of human nature needs completion. This completion however does not happen apart from Christ, but it is made available for mankind in the realm of the church, which is the body of Christ. Consequently Florovsky reflected the distinction between person and nature in the categories of the particular and the common. Human nature is common to all men and could be saved by one single person, by Jesus Christ, while the term 'person' denotes the particular in every man, which needs to be saved in a particular way. Both, the common and the particular find their basis in Christ. He is the head of the church, which is the realm for the salvation of the human person. Consequently Florovsky described the whole act of the salvation of man by the term 'Christus'.

The necessary presupposition for the particular salvation of every single person is time, for man lives in time and has his special time to work for his salvation. Therefore we were concerned with history as the framework for the possibility for the salvation of the human person. Because this salvation refers to individuals Florovsky could not give detailed information about the means of salvation. It depends on the human person, whether he accepts the divine means for his salvation or whether he disregards them. The sacraments as the divine means for the salvation of man are offered in the church in order that man may respond to them. Here we may ask, how man is able to respond to God, if he has not heard the word of God. We noted already that the category of the word of God is hardly mentioned in Florovsky's theology. Do we have to assume that Florovsky presupposes the pre-aching of the word of
God? The fact that he is not referring to this aspect of the Christian faith in any detail is surprising and we will have to ask why he does not do so. On the other hand we will have to ask, how man's freedom is related to God's grace. Does the "Effectivity" of divine grace depend on human license? Do we have to say, with reference to Florovsky's doctrine on baptism for example, that it is entirely up to man to make God's grace work? We came across this problem before, when we discussed the predestination of Mary. How does God's predestination relate to man's creaturely freedom? The problem of creaturely freedom will be our concern in the last chapter.

The distinction between nature and person was the necessary presupposition for Florovsky's doctrine of the salvation of man. We may therefore say that the description of man as a 'hypostasis in one nature' is an ontological definition of man. The quality of man's relationship to his own nature determines his life. If this relationship is a continuous struggle, man does not live in harmony with himself, because he does not live in accordance with God's will. Because of the salvation of the human being, however, man is asked to look into the future with good hope, for this future is a future with the promise of an end to this ontological distinction.

C. The Christian Hope - Conclusion

Christ the king has come already, but the kingdom of God is still to come. Though Christians partake even in their earthly life in the divine nature and enjoy the realm of the church the foretaste of the resurrection, they are still awaiting the final consummation of time. But the pledge is given. Because of the incarnation which manifested God's relationship to man, God "is intimately associated with human endeavours". As we have seen, Florovsky teaches that God assumed human nature for ever, thus human nature is essentially conjoined with the divine, God is sharing the troubles and miseries of man and grants his presence to the believers in the church. "life came forth from the grave, but the fulness of life is still to come". Man unites with God, but he is expecting the final consummation of this share. The power of death is overcome, but man is still dying. Sin and passions are still reigning in the world,
though their power has been broken in Christ, and therefore Christians expect the end of this reign, they expect the final realization of Christ's regiment. Thus "it is only (!) in Christ and through Him that we have any title for hope". Christians look for the parousia of Christ, which will be a judgement for the unbelievers and a consummation for the believers. Christians therefore are confident in their looking into the future. Florovsky does not talk about the judgement according to works, but asserts that believers will be resurrected for an eternal life. This hope however matures to different degrees, because it depends upon the ascetic achievement. Christians are called to associate with God and this means first of all a call to action. "Christian hope is intrinsically a call to action". Action means the human activity which is done in accordance with the divine will, which has been manifested on the cross. Florovsky is not explicit about these actions, because of his individualistic approach to the matter. But "in the present world, so sorely disturbed and discouraged, it is not enough just to proclaim as to preach the hope. We have to evidence our hope by our faithful and devout cooperation with the divine purpose". Thus the hope for the final consummation of history is necessary for being a Christian and he may look forward to this in confidence, because the "Parousia is a 'return', as much as it is an ultimate novelty. The last things are centred around Christ". The coming of Christ is a return for the Christians, nothing really new is going to happen, because they already lived in communion with Christ. It is a novelty only for the unbelievers, for the parousia of Christ means a judgement for them. Here we come to the doubleness which has occurred several times already during the presentation of Florovsky's doctrine. There are two "classes" of people: the believer and the unbeliever. And according to these two "sorts" of men we have two hells, two deaths etc.

The classification of men into Christians and unbelievers and consequently the distinctions between death for eternal life and death for judgement, life eternal and existence in eternal condemnation etc. have their roots in the distinction between person and nature. This distinction was once again the underlying principle of Florovsky's doctrine. The doctrine of man's
salvation was governed by this distinction, which is the Chalcedonian formulation to describe the person of Christ. The salvation of human nature is complemented by the salvation of the human person. This is the same as to say, that Christology necessarily needs Ecclesiology, i.e. that the work of Christ is completed in the church, which is the body of Christ. The strength of Florovsky's presentation is that he does not stop with this distinction but leads to the solution of this ontological difference: the Christian hope. Christians are asked to hope for a life in a complete and everlasting harmony, which is "life in Christ". This eschatological dimension of the Christian faith is never lost in Florovsky's doctrine and it clearly shows his pastoral concern as a theologian for the church.
III A Critical Assessment of Florovsky's Doctrine of Man

1. The construction of Florovsky's doctrine of man

This section will be concerned with finding out the principle according to which Florovsky developed his doctrine of the creation and salvation of man. For Florovsky man is first of all created, which establishes the fundamental difference between the divine and the human nature. This difference is an ontological one, i.e. a difference of being. As regards being, the created and the uncreated are kept apart. In as much as time and eternity are rooted in the created and uncreated being they are kept apart, but in as much as they are rooted in created and uncreated act they are drawn together. Therefore referring to the ontological order of existence Florovsky asserted that God and man live "in two different modes of existence". This ontological difference raises the fundamental issue of freedom. The freedom of creatures is rooted in precisely this ontological fact. This original creaturely (natural) freedom was described by the term 'imago dei' or 'innate capacity to ascend toward God'. Thus Florovsky conceives of 'nature' as a relational notion. Quid being nature is already uninhibitedly related to God, its Creator. This aspect of man was the one side of Florovsky's doctrine of creation, describing the being of man in terms of nature. The doctrine of nature, which sets the divine nature side by side with the human nature and consequently describes the unbridgeable hiatus between God and man, asks for the complementary problem of 'being' i.e. 'act'. Both aspects are complementary because it is impossible to conceive of being without act and vice versa. Florovsky combined both aspects in so far as he prefigured the possible act of man already in his description of human nature. Because of his relational conception of human nature man has the task of living according to this nature, i.e. to relate to God. Consequently the ideal man is the man who actualizes the capacity of nature, which is the freedom to relate to God in filial obedience and love. In this case man's act reflects his being and nothing else. This congruence of being and act would ultimately lead to the theosis of man. We may therefore say that from the very beginning Florovsky's understanding of man is a dynamic one. If the human person in taking up his natural relation to his Creator related to God, he lives in harmony with himself, because he lives in harmony with God. This life with God is conceived of as a
continuous process of endless theosis. The origin of this dynamic understanding of man in his relation to God finds its roots in the fundamental distinction between nature and person, between being and act. This distinction was reflected in the construction of the doctrine of creation. The first part of the doctrine was mainly concerned with the creation of nature and the consequences deriving from this doctrine, while the second part, the doctrine of theosis related to the human person. To find its complement in which is the same as to say that creation establishes the difference in natures while theosis asserts the union of persons. We may therefore conclude, that the doctrine of creation as a whole was already governed by the distinction between being and act.

The same observation can be made about Florovsky's doctrine of the salvation of man. Due to the possibility of the mortality of human nature which became an inevitability for man on account of the fall, the Son of God was made man in order to overcome this lack in being. Thus human nature should be made immortal by God's interference. The concern of Florovsky's Christology was the healing of human nature in general, while his Ecclesiology was concerned with the problem of the healing of the human person. Consequently his doctrine of the salvation of man as well as his doctrine of creation are constructed according to the fundamental distinction between nature and person. The connection between both doctrines consists in the fact that creation has been made eternal, i.e. that which relates to 'nature' and the doctrine of creation, is changed into which relates to Christology, and that the possibility of which relates to person (act) and the doctrine of theosis, is changed into the possibility of which relates to Ecclesiology.

Concerning the being of man Florovsky conceived of God's acts sola gratia dei, which excluded any contribution of man. This grace of God is irresistible, but man is given the responsibility on account of it. Ultimately, however, the foundation for man's acting is his nature, which, from this point of view, has a clear priority over the person. Yet, according to Florovsky, the idea of person is the great Christian contribution to philosophy. The main point here is that the acts of the person are decisive for what happens to his nature. This presupposes the idea of creaturely freedom, which was one of Florovsky's main concerns. The relation between man and God, i.e. the relation of persons
is a relation of freedom. He therefore conceived of the doctrines concerning the human person, i.e. act, in terms of a synergy between God and man. This focuses on doctrines concerning the activity of man, i.e. the doctrine of history and of freedom, which ultimately leads to a theology with an individualistic emphasis.

2. The importance of the distinction between nature and person in Florovsky's doctrine

The distinctions between nature and person and between being and act are the fundamental presupposition to Florovsky's whole theological concept. There is hardly any doctrine where these distinctions are not reflected. Where is the possible origin for these presuppositions? The categories of 'nature' and 'person' were used in the discussion of the early church concerning the person of Christ, which involved the definition of the Trinity as "one nature in three persons". Thus the distinction between nature and person originated in the early Church's doctrine of God. It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to consider the roots and development of this doctrine and its terminology. Therefore we simply note here that Florovsky has in mind the doctrine of the early Church on Christ and the Trinity when he speaks of 'nature' and 'person'. We may ask however, whether the mere use of this distinction is sufficient for the development of an adequate doctrine. To my mind, the 'usus' of Christ's work is fundamental for all doctrines. Focusing on the person of Christ without explicit reference to Christ's work in all doctrines is a serious problem. Before developing this point in detail we may inquire into the purpose of the distinction between nature and person in Florovsky's doctrine.

The assertion of two different natures, which live in two different modes of existence, tries to explain the radical difference between the uncreated God and the created creatures. These two natures can by no means be mixed or confused: they remain radically distinct from each other for ever, and thus no transubstantiation is possible. Florovsky's correct emphasis on the radical difference between these two natures intends to stress the freedom of God. God does not need the existing world, he is superior to it in all respects. In one word: God is the Creator. On the other side this difference asserts the utter dependence of man upon God. Man's life is God's free gift, and includes creaturely freedom, for the relation to God is, according to God's eternal will, a
relation of freedom, though this relation never overcomes the utter difference in nature. Consequently 'nature' is the differentiating principle in Florovsky's theology.

As far as the 'person' is concerned these two natures are united. It is by means of person and the divine energies that man and God can and do meet. Thus the category of 'person' stresses the unity of the created and the uncreated. This unity or intercourse between man and God, however, is understood as something dynamic, for it is an intercourse between to active free subjects. Consequently the term 'person' stresses the subjective side of the relation between God and man, while 'nature' denotes the objective aspect of this relation. We have seen that this personal encounter is a task for man. The way in which he realizes the capacities of his nature determines his existence.

Florovsky described the structure of original man as a congruence of nature and person. This ideal state of the human structure was lost through the fall. The good composition of man ran out of tune and lost its original harmony. According to Florovsky two problems arise for man here and both are related to the distinction between nature and person. Due to the fall man's nature became mortal and was enslaved to the destructive power of death. Florovsky therefore describes the sinful state of man's existence by the term 'mortality', which sums up the consequences of man's act upon his nature. On the side of the human person the fall resulted in a disfigured freedom, the freedom of choice. Thus 'person' denotes man's responsibility coram deo. Man is confronted with the choice between life and existence, to use Augustine's distinction again. In this perspective the work of Christ is twofold, on the one hand it is the salvation of human nature from corruption and death, and on the other hand it is a challenge which touches man's person and heals the disfigured freedom, for man has to "justify the resurrection for himself". According to Florovsky the human structure became problematic to man due to the fall. The creaturely being could not be dissolved by the personal act of sin. This led to the antinomy in man between 'the law of sin' and 'the law of nature', the latter being the law of God innate in man's very nature. Though man's nature is corrupted because of the fall, it still remains God's good creation. Though man's acts are acts of sin, he still retains his creaturely being, i.e. he can never escape from his creaturehood.
In conclusion we may say that the distinction between person and nature serves the purpose to stress firstly the difference between God and man as regards their nature and secondly the possibility of a personal unity between God and man. The distinction becomes relevant for the selfconsciousness of man when the sin is introduced into man, because sin, the personal act of revolt against God's law, separates the human person from his good nature. Though the point of the natural difference to God and personal unity with God may not be overlooked, one has to say that it is the problem of sin which brings the distinction between nature and person to the mind of man. Man as a sinner experiences the distinction between his nature and his person. Consequently we may say that it is sin which differentiates the human person from his nature in setting the human person in opposition to his nature.

At this point we have to ask, however, whether it is correct to assert that sin differentiates the human person from his nature in the sense that man realizes the split in the human composition. This problem is concerned with the question of the situation of man coram deo, which finds its expression in the question of a free will. Before we consider this important problem, we have to discuss Florovsky's notion that the contact between man and God is a "personal encounter". We feel compelled to ask, in which way have we to conceive of the divine energies as personal expressions of God. This consideration of the doctrine of God is necessary in order to understand the doctrine of man.

3. The distinction between the divine nature (being) and the divine energies (act).

Florovsky introduced the real distinction in God between his being and his energies in order to assert that creation is a free divine act and in no way is necessary for the completeness of God's existence. But to my mind the simplicity of God which he postulates is too abstract, a notion, not at all concrete. God's being has no effect and his effective reality is conceived of in a real distinction from his being. Thus both are conceived of as two divine spheres\(^1\). The relation between the two is the fact that the energies are conceived of as proceeding from the being of God. This however leads to the conclusion that the being of God is "completely formless and the form of God completely lacking in being"\(^2\). This becomes clear when Florovsky asserts that the "intra-Divine life is hidden from our understanding"\(^3\), it is "absolutely
incommunicable to the creatures⁴, and "all soteriological motifs must be eliminated⁵ in a doctrine of the Trinity. Does this mean that the doctrine of the Trinity is no εὐαγγέλιον? Or that it is, as it were, an additional theological expression for something of minor importance? The doctrine of the Trinity seems to be in this view an existentially irrelevant article. "Die Wahrheit des Glaubens indessen ist Konkret. Die Trinitätslehre, die ihrerseits durchaus abstrakt formuliert werden kann und muß, erfüllt ihre Funktion erst dann wenn sie das mysterium trinitatis als konkrete Wahrheit einsichtig werden läßt"⁶.

One might be tempted to say that according to Florovsky's presentation the Trinity is concrete in the sense that the energies proceed from the Divine love⁷. But how can he assert this, if we cannot assert anything about God's innertrinitarian life, if God does not reveal his nature, but only his will, i.e. his energies, which have to be distinguished carefully from the divine being in three hypostases? The question becomes even more relevant, if one takes up biblical statements about God who is the Σωτήρ and the one who kills, who loves and punishes etc. And this is not just - as Florovsky would probably say - anthropomorphic language which refers to the divine act, because Christ himself, i.e. not only his humanity, γενόμενος ὁμώ ∑αμιτης (Gal 3,13). In other words, how do we understand God in the context of gospel and law? Most certainly not in simply asserting that God is love, without giving reasons for the description of the divine being! Thus how does one know that God's energies are love, because they proceed from love? There can be no certainty at all, if there is something behind the energies which could be totally different from God's relations to the world revealed in his energies. How can one know that God will not act in a completely different way in the future? We may summarize the problem of the doctrine of the divine energies in stating the following conclusion. According to Florovsky man partakes in the divine energies and consequently becomes a deified creature. Florovsky called this a "personal encounter" between man and God, but he denied at the same time that the energies are divine hypostasis. But in which way is theosis a personal encounter between man and God, if the energies are 1. distinct from the divine being in three hypostases and 2. no hypostases themselves?

This problem has to be discussed in the wider context of the doctrine of God. We will therefore consider Florovsky's distinction between nature and person as regards his doctrine of God in presenting the
problems of his conception and a rough attempt to demonstrate how the problem could be solved. We will start to do this by considering the basic Orthodox concept that the being of God is ultimately unknowable.

3.1. The unknowability of God's being - a criticism of apophatic theology.

According to Florovsky, God reveals himself in his energies and only through them. Thus he is always ἵπτεκελνα τῆς οὐδείς with his being. Consequently one cannot talk about God's being in an affirmative way but has to use apophatic language, which means that we talk about God from the furthest possible distance and in doing so one has to say, that even these expressions are inadequate to describe the divine being. Consequently the only appropriate way to talk about God's being (essence) is to be silent. Thus apophatic language leads, to use Lossky's terminology, to a knowledge of God's being, which is complete ignorance, it leads into a precise silence. Revelation in this concept opens up and strengthens the impossibility to talk about God's being. Thus revelation leads into even greater veiledness and mysterious superiority of God in being, over the created being of the world. The original purpose of apophatic theology is to safeguard God's absolute being. Florovsky tries to achieve this by asserting, that "it would be unfitting and fruitless to introduce the notion of will into the internal life of the Godhead, for the sake of defining the relation between the Hypostases, because the Persons of the All-Holy-Trinity exist above any kind of relation and action, and by their Being determine the relations between Themselves". He wants to assert the absolute remoteness and freedom of the essence of God. No qualification of a psychological order should be asserted of the Trinity, because that would be an act of will. Lossky goes even further in saying that assertions like 'God's being is love' are inadequate, because 1. the unity of the divine hypostases is even greater than love and 2. love is an expression for a "common manifestation, the 'love-energy' possessed by the three hypostases". Does this understanding of God's being restrict his being to an incommunicable solitude? Do we not have to say that to conceive of God as love "heißt ja auf jeden Fall: Gott als Selbstmitteilung zu denken"?
but God reveals his mystery without explaining it. Thus the true task to assert the freedom of God's being should not lead to the consequence that one cannot talk about God's being at all. It is precisely because God's being is love, that his revelation reveals his being, and not just τὰ τὴν φύσιν.

According to Florovsky and the Orthodox doctrine God is not completely unknowable in his being, because the knowledge of God's existence is innate in man's nature, thus ὅτι μὲν ὁὐν ἔστι θεός, ἔγιλον, τι δ' ἔστιν κατ' ουσίαν καὶ φύσιν, ἀκατάληπτον τούτο τανταλικαὶ καὶ ἀγνώστον. But how can one say that there is something without saying that this something is? The mere fact that there is something does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that this something has to be called God. Florovsky, taking up this line of a long eastern and western tradition, now asserts that we know God through his energies. From these energies we may conclude to the being of God. But according to Florovsky even this should not be done: "The relations of the three Hypostases must be defined without any relation to the creature, preconceived, realized, fallen into sin, saved or sanctified. The Trinity remains a mystery, which man cannot know and our assertions about it are inadequate, because deus semper maior. The assertion that God is being is unknowable seems to safeguard the right assertion that God's nature is a mystery. But is the reason for the mystery of God our incapability to express this or do we not have to say that God constitutes this mystery himself? To put it in other words: The assertion of the complete unknowability of God on the one hand and the assertion of God's revealedness in his energies on the other hand led to the conclusion that God himself is "split" into his being and his acting, that there is a real distinction in God. It was a necessary distinction for Florovsky in order to assert the freedom of God, and it is this distinction in God which constitutes the divine mystery. But "die Berufung Gottes als eines Geheimnisses kommt ohnehin immer zu spät. In das Geheimnis, das Gott ist, kann der Mensch seinerseits nur berufen werden. Daß dies geschehen ist, behauptet der christliche Glaube, der damit allerdings zugleich die Verschlossenheit dieses Geheimnisses bestreitet."

Concluding we may say that there are christological arguments which oppose apophatic theology. To conceive of God as love means, that one cannot conceive of God's being as an incommunicable solitude, because the
love, which is his being, constitutes relations in God himself. These relations imply already the readiness of God to surpass his level of existence for the sake of something other than himself. On the other hand apophatic theology asserts the impability of man to describe the divine being. But because God revealed himself in Christ, he asked man to partake in his mystery. It is God himself who establishes the mystery, but remains being the mystery. We may therefore say that the distinction between being and God is problematic and we may conclude this section in asking whether apophatic theology really fulfills the purpose of emphasizing the difference in nature between man and God.

The hypothesis is that apophatic theology does not keep the difference between God and man. This may seem surprising because the starting point and "necessity" for apophatic theology was exactly this point. The criticism of anthropomorphic language, (and man's language is necessarily anthropomorphic) centres on the fact that one talks about God as if he is man, thus does not conceive of God as God, who is absolutely transcendent and not to be confounded with the creatures. Consequently apophatic theology asks in the end for a de-humanisation of theological language. This however leads to the disappearance of God into the unknowable and unexpressable, or into ignorance and thereby God loses his concrete (!) dissimilarity as regards man. Because God is dehumanised in this way he cannot be a concrete partner for man. Florovsky would probably reject this criticism with the assertion that God is the partner of man as God i.e. by means of the divine energies. The divine will is, however, secondary to the divine being, as we have seen, and consequently we have to repeat earlier criticism: Man cannot be sure whether there are divine predestinations, which oppose the predestinations which have been realized already. Thus the question of the doctrine of God, which includes the problem of the relation of divine being and divine act, is ultimately a question which confronts man with the problem of certainty of faith. Because man cannot know the divine being according to Florovsky's concept man cannot be sure whether or not God is going to continue his acts by means of the divine energies, which are grace and as such God himself. We may therefore say that apophatic theology makes impossible the concrete difference between God and man in being, and consequently it has to postulate this difference in an abstract way.
The discussion of the unknowability of God's being resulted in the question of the certainty of the Christian faith, because the relation between the divine being and the divine act seems to be problematic due to the criticisms, which I have tried to point out. Consequently, we have to consider this problem in the following section which finally will lead us to a Christological solution.

3.2. The freedom of God and the certainty of faith

The problem of divine freedom and the problem of human certainty of faith are strongly interrelated. This was our conclusion drawn from the criticism of Florovsky's doctrine of God, which is based on the distinction between the divine being and the divine energies. In order to present the problem of concern we shall briefly recall Florovsky's argument and the objections, which have been expressed so far.

Florovsky came to the real distinction in God between his being and his energies in order to safeguard God's freedom as the Creator. God thinks up the world from eternity, which is an act of will. The basis for this thinking up must be - according to Florovsky - the divine being, which is love, for the divine energies proceed from the being. Concluding from Florovsky's arguments, however, we feel compelled to assert that to conceive of God's being as love is an impossible assertion, because - according to Florovsky - one cannot say anything about the inner trinitarian life, thus we cannot say that God's being is love. God cannot be the Creator "from all eternity" in his being, because then God would have to create in order to complete his Godhead, not just his being however, but his will as well, which has to be distinguished from the divine being, but which is God himself. Consequently the "image of the world" in God is thought up "at some instant in eternity", which is an act of will. This means that God "becomes", as it were, the Creator. Why God thought up the world is indeed ultimately unknowable, but if we cannot assert that God is love, as I have tried to show concluding from Florovsky's argument, then this act of predestination is arbitrary in so far as God could still have predestined something else, which is still unknown and unrevealed, the destruction of the world in the year 2000 for example. In saying this I do not want to assert that God already revealed everything that he predestined, but he revealed the way in which he wants to be together with mankind and that this predestination is irrevocable, for it is "rooted" in the divine being, which I try to present below. My argument stands and falls with the term of a 'double-natured creation' of God. Though Florovsky asserted that "introducing a kind of impious fortuitousness or arbitrariness in its (the creations)
existence and genesis .... is contradictory and derogatory to the Divine Wisdom"23, the distinction in God between being and energies leads to this assumption of arbitrariness, which is indeed an impious thought.

We may therefore say that Florovsky failed to show a proper relation between the divine being and the divine act, by answering the question, why one should call the divine energies an expression of the divine being, which is love, by means of postulates only, such as the following: "Indeed it would be absurd to contend that God's goodness and mercy are just His voluntary habit, and not part of his nature"24. But God revealed himself in Christ and by means of this revelation he gave an answer to the problem of the freedom of God, which includes the problem of certainty of faith. We will try to outline a solution for these problems briefly.

God does not act arbitrarily, because he in his entire Godhead is love and therefore free. Because he is free he is love. "So wie Liebe niemals erzwungen werden kann, sondern sich in einem sehr genauen Sinn von selbst einstellt, so ist Gott von sich selbst her, was er ist, eben Liebe. In diesem Sinn ist Freiheit ein konstitutives Moment der Liebe"25. God is free, this means he is unconditioned. He conditions himself, but he is not conditioned by anything else. But to be unconditioned does not mean anything if it is not concrete. The scientific idea of the "big bang" at the beginning of the world is for example conceived of as unconditioned as well! Thus to be unconditioned can imply being unmotivated. To conceive of God as unmotivated and unconditioned means therefore to understand his acts as events of pure arbitrariness, to understand God as a mysterium tremendum. God however is not acting arbitrarily but determines himself and he does this freely. "Gott bestimmt sich selbst. Und Gott bestimmt sich .... Die theologische Kategorie für diesen ontologischen Sachverhalt heißt Freiheit"26. "Sequitur nunc, liberum arbitrium esse plane divinum nomen, nec ulli posse competere quam soli divinae maiestati"27. Thus God's freedom is always concrete and directed28. God is free in determining himself for his being man in the man Jesus in order to be God in and with this man. Here lies the origin of the doctrine of the Trinity, which conceived of God as Trinity because of the belief of the early Christians that God was in this man Jesus29. But in the forthcoming tradition one conceived of God without conceiving of the crucified as God. Thus God's freedom was understood in an abstract sense. But God is free in so far as this
freedom is concrete. And this concreteness of God is eternal, it is not an act of will, but is his being. Thus God is "quatenus indutus et proditus verbo suo, quo nobis esse obtulit". But this includes the mystery of the Trinity: "Illud summum mysterium proditum etc, Christum filium Dei factum hominem, Esse Deum trinum et unum, Christum pro nobis passum et regnaturum aeternaliter". Thus Melanchthon's sentence, which could have been said by Florovsky as well, "Mysteria divinitatis rectius adoraverimus quam vestigaverimus" is wrong in the sense that not the whole mystery has been revealed, thus that something behind this revelation might endanger the revelation in Christ. Luther rejects this in saying 'quae supra nos nihil ad nos', emphasizing that God's revelation is definitive and the "deus absconditus" no help for us at all, quite on the contrary, he is and becomes the devil for us, because we (!) make him the devil. Consequently the veiledness of the triune God is not a mystery which cannot be known at all, but it is a mysterium (!) proditum. This however was forgotten in the formulation of the trinitarian dogma. Because one introduced alien philosophical and metaphysical principles such as the principle of immutability, apathy etc. These metaphysical principles however were not "given by God", i.e. "Necessitated" interpretations of his deeds, but men gave priority to metaphysical ideas though having correct intentions.

From all eternity God determined himself in Christ to come to man. This eternal self-determination manifests God's freedom. Thus we have to conceive of God in a concrete way as an eternal being in movement. This being of God however has to be conceived of in an hermeneutical circle. God determines himself freely to be God not without coming to this man Jesus from all eternity. "Gott kommt von Gott; aber er will nicht ohne uns zu sich selbst kommen. Gott kommt zu Gott - aber mit dem Menschen. Deshalb gehört schon zu Gottes Göttlichkeit seine Menschlichkeit. Das ist es, was die Theologie endlich zu lernen hat (!) " This does not mean that the existence of man is necessary for God to be God. His self-determination has to be conceived of as his free and unconditional manifestation of his freedom. Thus God relates from all eternity to man in Christ. To talk about a potentia absoluta dei denotes only that God is already determined by nothing but himself, but he never has this potentia absoluta as an unmotivated potential. In this self-determined existence God is complete and the actual existence
of the world does not add anything to his being. But he is eternally related to man in Christ. On the other hand we must not conceive of God creating arbitrarily. This is only possible if the being of man to be created already moves the being of God from all eternity, i.e. in Christ. "Eben diese Selbstbestimmung impliziert nun aber, wenn sie wirklich Entscheidung der Liebe ist, mit einem anderen und nur mit diesem zu sich selber kommen zu wollen, die Freiheit eines Gegenübers von Gott und Mensch".

We are not at the stage that we can answer the Origenistic problem: God is indeed the Creator from all eternity, because he determined himself freely not to be God without coming to man. But this does not mean that he needs the creatures for this, for God comes to man from all eternity in his son and in coming from God the Father, God comes to God the Son. From all eternity God is ready to create, thus the Creator, but there is no necessity for him to create in order to complete his Godhead.

In conclusion we may say that the freedom of God the Creator may be asserted without the distinction between the divine being and the divine energies. The omission of the doctrine of the divine energies was necessary for Christological reasons, which include at the same time the certainty of man's faith. Because we do not have to distinguish between being and act in God, as two divine spheres, man can be sure of the fact that God does not revoke his purpose for creation, for he guarantees the existence of the world by means of his Son. From this brief exposition we may come to the conclusion that God's being is not distinct from his act, for even before the world existed God related to himself in self-contemplation. This event of God's self-relation is his being, which is love. Because this being is love it implies already the readiness to relate to something other than himself, i.e. to man. We may therefore assert that God's being is his becoming. However, we may say this only because of the revelation of God in Christ. "Who God is and what it is to be divine is something we have to learn where God has revealed Himself and His nature: the essence of the divine. And if he revealed Himself in Jesus Christ as the God who does this, it is not for us to be wiser than He and to say that it is in contradiction with the divine essence .... but to learn to correct our notions of the being of God, to reconstitute them in the light that He does this".
3.3 Conclusions

The concern of this section is the question, whether we may speak of a "personal encounter" between God and man in Florovsky's doctrine. Having brought forward some criticism on Florovsky's doctrine of God, we may now say that the Hesychast doctrine of the divine energies leads to deep problems concerning precisely the relationship between God and man. Due to the criticism we felt compelled to regard the distinction between nature and energy in God as deficient for Christological reasons. Being and act are not to be distinguished in God. Due to the principle that we can speak about God only because of his revelation in Christ we will have to ask in the following section whether this principle applies to the doctrine of man as well. Consequently we will return to the question, who sets the difference in man between his nature and his person or is it possible to abandon this distinction altogether?

4. The distinction between human nature (being) and human person (act)

4.1. The necessity for the distinction

According to Florovsky man is one hypostasis in one nature. It is the idea of personality which distinguished man from all other creatures. The human 'person' is the differentia specifica of the highest creature among all other creatures. But even the human nature is different from all other nature, for it is the bearer of the image of God. For Florovsky nature is a relational term, because human nature relates to its Creator qua being. One might even say that human nature is a kind of "power station", the energies of which are always directed toward God. Thus 'nature' denotes ultimately nothing else but the creatureliness of the human being. This creatureliness of nature has to be actualized by the human person. Consequently the relation of human nature to God, which is indestructable, has to be actualized by the relation of the human person to his own nature.

Florovsky's emphasis on the creatureliness of man, his stress on the objective fact, that man is created as a necessary component of every Christian doctrine of creation. God relates to his creatures and especially to man, because he is the Creator of all things. This is an objective reality, which cannot be neglected. Therefore it is correct, if Florovsky asserts that the salvation of human nature is the content of Christology, for the redeeming work of Christ establishes the relation
of God to man once again. Once again God's loving relation to man is a reality which nobody, whether he likes it or not, can possibly escape from, because "God wants all men to be saved (1 Tim 2,4). If this reality of God's continuous relation to all men is denoted with the term 'nature', theologians should not quarrel about this. The fact that God is and remains to be the Creator, even if man has fallen away from him, is irrevocable and indestructable.

We feel compelled to ask, however, whether man is conscious of this objective fact. Whether man has the natural potential to know about his creaturehood. Florovsky asserted this, and consequently he claimed that fallen man experiences on the one hand his good nature with its tendency to relate to God and on the other hand his evil doing. He denoted this state of man with the term 'gnomic will', which describes the disfigured freedom of man, the freedom of choice. Since man had fallen, he had to choose whether he wanted to be with God or whether he wanted to deny the objective reality that he is created. But the potential of relating to God was inherent in man's very nature and it was not abolished by sin and corruption. Due to Paul's arguments in Rom 1,18 - 3,20 we feel compelled to regard this concept of freedom of man as incorrect. Rom 3,10ff speaks a very clear and precise language in this respect: οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ καλὸς οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὁ κακὸς, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ κακὸς ἔστιν τὸν ἐὰν ἀποκρίσθη. There is nobody who seeks for God, because all men are lost under the power of sin. Paul never speaks of the potential of man to relate to the objective reality of creation and redemption. Enclosed in sin, man does not and he cannot realize this objectivity subjectively. If man has any freedom at all as regards his own salvation it is the "freedom" to decide against God, for man is lost in sin. Luther once described this reality of fallen man in saying: "immo vellet se esse deum et deum non esse deum". Fallen man does not want to relate to God, but this does not mean that God does not want to relate to man anymore. It is God, to be more precise, it is God in Christ, who always relates to man. He wants all men to be saved and therefore he has decided for man in all freedom. For the sake of man he saves man even if man has fallen away from him. We will clarify this point in asking once again, how Florovsky conceived of the subjective side of man lost in sin.
According to Florovsky it is the personal act of sinning which alienates the person from his own nature. Fallen man experiences the split in the human composition, which finds its best expression in the reality of a freedom of choice. It is the reality of sin which differentiates nature and person. The relation of the human person to his nature has become uncertain and untrue. But once again we have to consider the categories of objectivity and subjectivity. They simply want to denote the difference in point of view. Concerning our problem this means: Does man experience the split in his composition? This would be the subjective point of view, while the objective point of view states, that fallen man is living within two points of reference, his good nature and sin. Florovsky asserts the truth of both viewpoints. To my mind, however, Paul does not mean this at all. One might be tempted to argue that Rom 7,1^-25 is completely in line with Florovsky's arguments, but a detailed exegesis shows that this is not so. Rom 7 states that the objective view of fallen man, i.e. man as a sinner does the wrong things, although he is God's creature and should act according to this reality. But - and this is the point of Paul's argument - fallen man does not experience this. Objectively it is sin which alienates the human person from his nature, but subjectively man does not experience this at all. It is for this reason that Paul asserts that man is lost in sin. We will consider these assertions systematically when we discuss the character of sin in relation to the distinction between nature and person.

We have seen, however, that man has to be conceived of as one hypostasis in one nature, though it does not matter whether one uses the categories of 'nature' and 'person' or others. The meaning of the things concerned is decisive. Man related to himself and in doing so he relates to others. Because of this ontological fact a distinction between 'nature' and 'person' is necessary.

4.2. Grace and sin, and the distinction between nature and person.

According to Florovsky sin alienates the human person from his nature in the sense that the human composition runs out of tune. This failure in act is experienced by man. But we may ask whether a sinner really suffers from his sin. If we speak about sinner here we mean the sinner who has not heard about the loving God. Thus we reject the concept of an innate knowledge of God. The man entrapped in sin does not know about
his sin, for sin does not reveal itself as sin. On the contrary sin tries to deceive man in suggesting that he is self-sufficient and independent, thus that he does not need the Creator. In this sense we must say that sin does not differentiate the human person from his nature but tries to identify the two. Man is what he does, his act is his being. This is what fallen man experiences, though - objectively - he deceives himself, for he acts against God, the Creator, which may be described by saying, that man acts against his nature. It is the special characteristic of sin that it does not differentiate between being and act, for sin does not bring about any knowledge about its sinful character. Florovsky could agree with this conception, though he would insist on the fact that man's innate potential for God cannot be overcome by sin. But we have said already that what is denoted with nature primarily means the relation of God to man, but does not necessarily mean the relation of man to God. God sticks to his creation, even after the fall. One might therefore say, that it is the "tragedy of sin", that though it attempts to identify being and act in man it is never able to come to its ultimate end, for it is God himself who wants all men to be saved and he therefore relates to man continuously, even if man does not relate to him.

Sin does not reveal its sinful character, but it needs to be revealed as sinful. Thus something coming from outside the human composition, which is entrapped in sin, has to bring the knowledge of the sinful character of man. The New Testament asserts that it is the grace of God which differentiates the fallen man. Grace differentiates the human person from his nature, differentiates being and act. For it is God, who justifies the ungodly being of man, but he condemns the sinful acts. Because of God's interference, because of his justifying word sin is revealed as sinful and the human being is made just in the eyes of God. Thus God's grace differentiates between being and act in revealing the character of sin, which is its nothingness (δύναμις), and in denying the power of sin, for the human being is freed from sin. The Lutheran formula which describes man as 'simul iustus et peccator' reflects precisely this distinction. But it does not identify 'being' with 'iustus' and 'act' with 'peccator'. For the ultimate revelation of the character of sin will be the judgement according to works. This judgement will judge man's acts. It will make public the good deeds of man and at once it will reveal the sinful acts of man. But this
judgement will bring sin to its ultimate truth: the ultimate punishment of sin will be made an objective reality by God's condemning word. Thus God's grace differentiates man's being from human acts in revealing their true character and importance. In this sense we may say that the distinction between nature and person is a salvific distinction, for it reveals what man really is: a justified sinner. The Christian experiences the distinction between being and act because of his faith. He may know by the grace of God that God justifies the ungodly. Therefore a Christian will necessarily try to serve God in doing what is according to God's will. They give their bodies as a living sacrifice to God (Rom 12,1) and this is their service. Thus justification and sanctification cannot be separated.

We have already mentioned that it is the strength of Florovsky's conception, that the distinction between nature and person is not the ultimate truth. In the same sense as nature and person have been congruent in original man, nature and person will be congruent in the eternal life in communion with God. In the conception which I have presented, this identification of being and act is an eschatological implication. For if sin has been revealed as sin and as such has been given to self-destruction, man is what he does: a creature, which is loved by God and which loves God.

4.3. Conclusions

The attentive reader might ask where the difference between Florovsky and the criticism, which has been brought forward, really is, for it should be obvious that there is a great deal of agreement between the two positions. The basic difference is the answer to the question, who differentiates the human person from the human nature, or, to put it in Lutheran terms, who differentiates person and the works of this person. The categories are not really important to describe the difference, for both talk about being and act. But Florovsky asserts that fallen man experiences the distinction between nature and person, while to a Lutheran theologian only the Christian knows about this distinction. He knows about sin, because it has been forgiven. Thus it is the grace of God, his gift of δίκαιος, which differentiates his being and his act. In this sense the distinction is a salvific distinction.

Though both positions agree on many points this difference is of immense importance, because it comes to bear on other doctrines such as
the doctrine of human freedom which have to be formulated in quite a
different way. Any synergism between God and man is excluded in a
Lutheran conception of the salvation of man. As regards the doctrine
of death Lutheran theology has to start with different conceptions.
One could continue to list issues where this difference has applications
but this would be beyond the scope of this thesis.

5. The distinction between 'nature' and 'person' - an ecumenical
task.

The main presupposition for Florovsky's whole theology is the patristic
distinction between nature and person. Though he never states or
discusses this distinction explicitly, it is the underlying principle
of his doctrine. This involves the difficulty to find out the exact
meaning of these two principles, because their meaning can be established
only by studying the expounded doctrines, where this distinction is
already used, which however may lead to the danger that the meaning of
the principles in use varies according to the doctrine of particular
concern. The criticism, which has been brought forward, however showed
that the distinction is not a necessity for all theological doctrines:
God is his act and he differentiates being and act in man because of
man's sin. Thus the distinction between nature and person, between being
and act is not a presupposition to the doctrines in the proposed conception
but it is established by the situation of man coram deo. This is the
conclusion drawn from our brief exposition, which consequently leads to
a different approach to almost all other doctrines, which could not be
expounded here.

Despite the necessary objections to Florovsky's doctrine from a
Lutheran perspective both traditions have the task to learn from each
other, because the distinctions between nature and person (Florovsky)
or between person and work (Lutheran theology) seem to denote similar
matters.

In the Lutheran tradition the doctrine of sanctification has been
overlooked to a great extent, for one concentrated on the doctrine of
justification, which is the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae.
But this should not lead to a neglect of the personal (in Florovsky's
sense) aspect of man. The Orthodox doctrine of theosis is certainly
worthy of consideration by the West, because it seems as if contemporary
ethics could find an even more profound Christological basis in this
conception.
What has been said about the doctrine of sanctification applies to ecclesiology as well. For various reasons Lutheran theology is to a certain extent deficient in ecclesiology. Though the differences between the two traditions as regards this matter will be clear very soon, it could be rather helpful for the Lutheran theology to consider the Orthodox conception to a greater extent. In the end this will be a more detailed study of the patristic tradition, which is the foundation of the Orthodox heritage.

This leads us to the third issue, which is concerned with the fundamental principles of both traditions. In the preface to one of his major works Florovsky described where he thought the fundamental issues for any theology should be found: "In our day the Orthodox theologian can only find for himself the true measure and living source of creative inspiration in the patristic tradition .... Yet the return to the fathers must not be solely intellectual or historical, it must be a return in spirit and prayer, a living and creative self-restoration to the fulness of the Church in the entirety of sacred tradition .... Healthy theological sensitivity .... can only be restored in our ecclesiastical society through a return to the fathers." Thus what Florovsky describes as a "return to the fathers" or a "neo-patristic synthesis" is not so much a method, but a theological existence of man. Reading his essays one easily gets an impression of what neopatristic synthesis, being a form of theological existence of man, can look like. Florovsky's hermeneutics, which should be examined to a far greater extent, seem to oppose the Lutheran principle of 'sola scriptura'. Indeed it is a problem for Lutheran hermeneutics to deal with the patristic tradition in an appropriate way and this issue needs particular attention. Hereby it will be relevant to regard these patristic texts not just as historical documents, but to look how they are used and interpreted by the Orthodox Church.

On the other side Orthodox theology could learn something from the so called "Word of God Theology", which to my mind is a more appropriate consequence from contemporary exegesis. The event-character of the relationship between God and man has ontological implications, which cannot be overlooked. This problem will lead to the question whether ontology may and should be expressed in terms of relation. The criticism which has been brought forward is a little attempt to do this.
In conclusion we may say that the distinction between nature and person should be considered in both traditions with reference to what seems to be missing on one's own tradition, but is already used in another tradition, though the particular use and meaning of it may be deficient. But despite the differences in traditions and conceptions it is obvious that there is a common ground in Orthodox and Lutheran theology. The ecumenical task would be the detailed considerations of the distinction between nature and person in its origins. This will clarify presuppositions and lead to a better understanding between the two Christian Churches, which ultimately helps to live as Christians today. This task presupposes, however, that first of all theologians from both traditions should listen to each other and be ready to learn something from the other side. This thesis represents an attempt to do just this.
Notes

The footnotes are numbered according to the subsections of the chapters. If the text does not suggest otherwise notes without further reference refer to essays by Florovsky, the full titles of which may be found in the bibliography.

The reference refers to the abbreviation for a particular essay and gives the page number.

Quotations of the Fathers have usually been verified in the edition of the Patristic texts by Migne. PG stands for Patrologia Graeca, PL stands for Patrologia Latina. This reference is followed by the number of the respective volume and the page number. The abbreviations for the Patristic texts are those commonly used. Unless further indication is given, the translation of Patristic texts was done by Florovsky or, in matters of importance, his translation was amended by the author.

Cross-references are given with the respective page number of the text.

NOTES FOR PAGES 6 to 11

Preface


2. T. E. Bird 344.

3. Cf. for the abbreviations, which refer to an essay by Florovsky, the bibliography.

I The Doctrine of Creation

A The rejection of the greek cosmology

1. Idea 54.

2. De gen. et corr. II 11, 337b 35

3. Ibid. 338a 6-11

4. Ibid. 338a 20

5. Redemption 127

6. Predicament 31

7. Ibid. 32

8. Redemption 129

9. Ibid. 128, 9a contra Celsum IV 67 etc.
NOTES FOR PAGES 12 to 15

10. De civ. dei XI t; PL XLI 322


12. Florovsky refers to this idea 57 and calls it a "fiction". He does not mention Kant.

13. Creaturehood 44. The background for this thought might be S. Basil the Great. Cf. hexamh.1 n.6 "ascending into the past".

14. Ibid.

15. Idea 57. Though the Greek philosophers conceived of an eternal time, this time needed to be moved forward. Aristotle conceived of this in calling God the unmoved mover. All beings long to become like God, i.e. unmoved. Thus God is loved by everything. In tolerating this being loved the unmoved God moves everything.

16. Florovsky is referring to Aristotle's definition of time: "Time is the number of movement estimated according to its before and after" (Phys.4,3).

17. Augustin, Confessiones 11,16

18. Idea 57.


20. Ibid.


22. Ibid.

B The Creation is contingent

1. Idea 54.

2. Creaturehood 45,51; Athanasius 40.

3. Creaturehood 56; Athanasius 40; Idea 55.

4. Cf. Idea 54, where this statement is nothing else but an implication of the thesis that the world might not have existed at all. Or Creaturehood 51, where Florovsky first discusses the possible existence of the world and then God's freedom. But he says: "Only by the contrary approach (i.e. God could have not created at all) can the mystery of creation (i.e. the world might not have existed at all) be clarified". We will come back to this point after discussing the implications both statements have.


7. John of Damascus, de fide orth. I,3 PG XLIV 796 A. Cf. also Athanasius 49; "Since the whole Creation had once begun, by the will and pleasure of God, 'out of nothing', an ultimate 'meanic' tendency was inherent in the very 'nature' of all creaturely things".
NOTES FOR PAGES 15 to 18

8. Creaturehood 50

9. It must be noted that this is one of the difficulties in the understanding of Florovsky's essays. To find out his presuppositions is sometimes almost a question of guessing. But we have some hints - here the terms microcosm and hypostasis - to find out what he means though he does not give explicit information about the matter.

10. Florovsky can say: Man is "One hypostasis in two natures" Res. of Life 223. Cf. also Redemption 197 ff.


14. Cf. Nemesius, de natura homin. I PG 40, 529 B. See also Creaturehood 73.

15. Redemption 106.

16. Creaturehood 73.

17. Darkness 85.

18. Cf. below the discussion of Florovsky's doctrine of the divine energies.


21. Soul and body being the two natures, which are united in the one hypostases. Cf. Note 10.

22. We will discuss the doctrine of deification later. The basis for it is Christological. It is nicely summarized by Athanasius: "God became man in order that we may become Gods" (de inc. et c. arianos 8; PG XXVI 996).

23. Cf. PG 91, 1304 D -1305 A. See also Lossky 108.


NOTES FOR PAGES 19 to 21

27. Cf. for example Plato, Timaeus 27d-30c (especially 29b. See also A. E. Taylor, A commentary on Plato's Timaeus. Oxford 1962 p.59f.; cf. 37c-38a ("Now the nature of that living being was everlasting, and this it was impossible to confer wholly on a creature. But he devised the making of a moving likeness of everlastingness" 37d, transl. Taylor). And Republica 380d-381c.


29. How Florovsky understands this problem of God being the eternal creator will be discussed below.

30. Idea 56.

31. Creaturehood 49.

32. Cf. S. Basil, in hexam h.1 n.6 PG XXIX 16. He continues: "If some objector tells us that the beginning of time is a time, he ought then, as he knows well, to submit it to the division of time - a beginning, a middle and an end. Now, it is ridiculous to imagine a beginning of a beginning .... Thus then, if it is said, 'in the beginning God created', it is to teach us that at the will of God the world arose in less than an instant .... 'God made summarily', that is to say all at once and in a moment". Cf. also h.1 n.7, where Basil is more explicit on this matter.

33. Cf. note 32. Cf. also Augustin on this matter.

34. Cf. Augustin, de civ. dei XI t and the following discussion on the problem below pp.14-19.

35. Last Things 253. Also Christianity 128: "Christian goal, in any case, transcends history as it transcends culture. But man was created to inherit eternity". Cf. also Christ. 3.

36. "Rev. 10,6 does not mean that time itself comes to an end .... All that is meant is that the judgement of God will not be delayed any longer" (Delling, article ἡ ἐσχάτη ἐρωτήματα, in Theological dictionary of the New Testament, vol.9 p.592). Whether this time of the eschatological judgement coincides with the end of time is a foreign question to the text. There will be no further delay until the antiChrist begins his reign. After all the forerunning plagues and evils everything will culminate in the coming of the antiChrist. And this reign is to begin very soon: ἡ ἐσχάτη ἐρωτήματα. Thus it is problematical to use this verse as a scriptural proof for the question whether time will cease or not.

37. Idea 57.


40. Idea 58.
NOTES FOR PAGES 21 to 23

41. Idea 57.

42. Aristotle, Physic 4,3

43. Cf. Athanasius 56.

44. John of Damascus, de fide orth. I,13; PG XCVI 583.

45. Cf. Creaturehood 46 f.

46. Augustin, de genesi ad lit. I imp.c.2; PL XXXIV 221.

47. Cf. above p.43

48. Idea 57.

49. Creaturehood 48. Cf also p.46


51. Cf. Idea 55: "The idea of Creation implies therefore some ultimate duality in existence. God and the Creature. This is an end of absolute freedom".

52. Gregory of Nazianz, Or.45 in S. Pascha n.28; PG XXXVI 661.

53. Augustin. I could not verify this reference in the works of Augustin.

54. Darkness 84f.

55. Darkness 87.

56. Darkness 85.

57. Cf. above p.414


59. Cf. Athanasius 40. The difficult question arises here, whether Florovsky teaches a natural theology or not. Is it possible for men, looking for example at the good laws of nature to deduce the thought that this is all ordered and created by God? Florovsky only says: "The very existence of the world points out to Another, to the existence of God" (Idea 54), which would mean that the world witnesses its creaturehood, that it derived from somewhere else, but does it point to the God who revealed himself in Christ? "Indeed the very existence of the world pointed, for Christians (!) to the Other, as its Lord and Maker" (Athanasius 40). Whether there is a difference between Christians and Non-Christians is not quite clear in Florovsky's motions on this problem. In another place Florovsky asserts that this natural knowledge of God is not yet a
NOTES FOR PAGES 23 to 24

59 continued...

a revelation but a manifestation. "In Nature and in the human soul we find only 'certain traces of God', 'vestigia Dei naturalia'. But, so far, this is no theophany" (Holy Spirit 5). Florovsky is never quite explicit about this problem but concludes, that "so-called 'natural theology' is no theology in the true sense of the word. It is rather a philosophy, a word about the 'Unknown God', towards whom the restless human soul reaches out, but has not yet found ... it is only through Revelation that true theology becomes possible (Holy Spirit 7). Whether these statements from 1932 are influenced by Florovsky's acquaintance with Karl Barth, who rejected any kind of natural theology so vehemently especially at this time, cannot be discussed here.

60. Darkness 85.

61. Cf. Greek Orthodox Theological Review, Vol. XIII No.2 p.210, where Florovsky is very clear about this, in referring to S. Maximus' position: "The emphasis of Maximus on human nature is that it cannot be regarded as composed of certain given human characteristics. It is something dynamic. 'To be fully man and fully human means to be in conformity with God's will'.


63. Ibid.

64. The phrase Ἰδία φύσις is platonie (Critias 120d-121a; Legg. III 691; Phaedron 322a) but also found in Xenophon (Hell.Vii 1,2) and Aristotle (Part. anim. IV 10). The participation in the divine nature is sometimes spoken of as innate and sometimes as attained by efforts (Aristotle, eth X 7,8). After Plato man and God were seen as having a related nature, which man can get to know in knowledge and understanding. This was certainly understood in terms of nature and not just in terms of relation (More references to the greek philosophers can be found in: J.B. Mayor, The Epistle of St. Jude and the second epistle of St. Peter. London 1907 p.87 ff)!

The word Ἰδία occurs only three times in the New Testament: Acts 17,29 (The speech on the Aeropag) and in 2. Petr. 1,3f, thus always in a hellenistic context of thoughts. 2.Petr. 1,4 wants to say that the believer will be in perfect communion with God when the eschatological hopes have been fulfilled, i.e. at the time of the parousia. This is expressed in the language of greek philosophy of religion. Cf. also Bilaniuk pp.340-347 for the biblical and historical background of this doctrine.

65. Idea 74.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.
NOTES FOR PAGES 24 to 27

68. Athanasius, de incarnatione 5.


70. Adv. haeres. IV 37,1; PG VII 1099.

71. "In the prefallen nature, one can perhaps speak of lack and flows" (Darkness 86). The ultimate purpose of creation was eternal life: non posse peccare (immortality by nature) instead of a posse non peccare (immortality by grace including the possibility of death because of self-imposed sin). Consequently one might say that Christ would have been incarnated even without the fall. Cf. Ethos 26: "The act of Creation has been completed on the Cross". Cf. also Xintaras' references to the imperfect state of man (p.52 note 13) in the teaching of the Fathers. Cf. also Irenaeus' teaching on the problem summarized with quotations in: H. Bettenson, The early Christian Fathers. Bungay 1969. p.67-69.

72. Athanasius, de incarnatione 5. Cf. Redemption 143 and Athanasius 41f, 49f and 56.

73. Augustin, de genesi ad litt. I,5; PL XXXIV 250.

74. Darkness 86.

75. Idea 75.

76. Darkness 85.

77. Athanasius, contra gentes 3. Florovsky follows Athanasius' concept, Cf. Darkness 85.

78. De pricipiis II 9-2; 8-3; quoted Darkness 89.

79. Darkness 85.

80. Darkness 86.

81. Florovsky refers to S. Maximus' doctrine of the human will explicitly only in a footnote (Redemption 280f.), but mentions it however in several other places, without explaining it.

82. Cf. S. Maximus PG 91, 12C and 280 A. A very good historical survey about the whole question, which was at the time of S. Maximus primarily a Christological one, can be found in the Greek Orthodox Theological Review, Vol. XIII no.2 1968 pp.196-208: Paul Verghese, Monothelite controversy: a historical survey.
NOTES FOR PAGES 27 to 31

83. S. Maximus, ad Marynum c.5: PG XCI, 45D.

84. S. Maximus, disputatio cum Phyrrho: PG XCI, 304 C.

85. Cf. Balthasar P.258, who describes Maximus' thoughts from another perspective.

86. S. Maximus, : PG XCI, 192 A.

87. Here lies the reason why a gnomic will is not applied to Christ. This was Maximus' main concern in his discussion and controversy with the Monothelites.


89. Darkness 86.

90. Thunberg, Sinners 11.

91. See note 77.

92. Darkness 87.

93. Darkness 86.

94. Redemption 98.

95. Darkness 87.

96. Ibid.

97. Redemption 109. The "violation of the truth of God" is an unusual expression for Florovsky. Truth of God is his creative Word which cannot be revoked, because God is faithful to his Creation. Cf. above.

98. Darkness 87.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Darkness 88.

103. Idea 75.

104. Darkness 90. The question, whether sin is just ignorance or has further effects, is of great importance for the question of general salvation. Cf. Florovsky's polemic against this in Res. of Life 20.
NOTES FOR PAGES 31 to 33

105. Darkness 90.


107. Creaturehood 50.

108. Ibid.

109. Darkness 89.

110. Redemption 106. Cf. also Idea 77.

111. Gregory of Nyss., Orat. cat. cap. 8. Florovsky’s formulation is sharper: "death is the self-revelation of sin". (Redemption 108) To avoid misunderstandings: Florovsky does not intend to identify the law of nature with the sin. Nature is always good, though liable to corruption.

112. Cf. Athanasius, de incarnatione 4-5; PG XXV, 194.

113. Aghiorgoussis, Sin 185.

114. Cf. Last Things 248: "It seems imperative to regard it (the fall) as event, in whatever manner it may be visualized or interpreted".


117. Gregory of Nyssa, de anima et resurrection; PG XLVI, 93 B.

118. Cf. Gregory of Nazianz, Oratio XL, in baptismo; PG XXXVI, 424 A: "Evil is our work and the evil one's, and came upon us through our heedlessness, but not from our Creator".

119. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, de anima et res.; PG XLVI, 93 B.

120. John of Damascus, contra Manich. n.14; PG XCIV, 1517. The origin for this thought is obviously philosophical and might be found in Plotinus, Enneades II, 4, 16: "That which has nothing, because it is in want, or rather is want, must necessarily be evil. For it is not want or wealth but want of thought, want of virtue, of beauty, strength, shape, form, quality". and III, 2, 5: "The principle is that evil by definition is a falling short of good, and cannot be in full strength in this Sphere, where it is lodged in the alien: the good here is in something else, in something distinct from the Good, and this something else constitutes the falling short for it is not good. And this is why evil is ineradicable: there is, first, the fact that in relation to this principle of Good, thing will always stay less than thing, and besides, all things came into being through it, and are what they are by standing away from it". We will discuss the problem of the ineradicability of evil below.
NOTES FOR PAGES 33 to 35

121. The doctrine about the ἀρουεία of evil is of importance for Christology. We come to these questions later, but cf. Barth, Church Dogmatics I,2 p.152ff and Redemption 98, 140.

122. Darkness 82.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid. Cf. also idea 77.

125. Redemption 152.


127. Redemption 103.


129. Last Things 254 and others.

130. Last Things 264, Florovsky uses the term of Jean Guitton.

131. The limitation of God applies not to his being, but to his will, "insofar as another 'will' has been 'called into existence', a will which could not have existed at all " (Last Things 246).

132. Florovsky could think of Mt 12,32; 25,46; Mk 9,48; 14,21; Lk 16,26; Joh 3,36: and 1.Kor 1,18.

133. Idea 77.

134. Darkness 84.

135. Darkness 87.

136. Cf. Creaturehood 76.

137. Last Things 256.

138. Cf. Creaturehood 48f: "Creaturally freedom is disclosed first of all in the equal possibility of two ways: to and away from God. This duality of ways is not a mere formal or logical possibility, but a real (!) possibility .... Freedom consists not only in the possibility, but also in the necessity of autonomous choice". These sentences seem to contradict what I have just said. But Florovsky does not want to assert that man can put himself outside his relation to God, that he is capable of considering this relation from an outside position. Instead he would agree with Athanasius: "As soon as the thought (of separation from God) came into their heads, they became corruptible, and being enthroned death ruled over them" (de incarnatione 4-5; PG XXV 194). Florovsky formulates this point so open to misunderstandings because he wants to say that this "is not a binding necessity of creaturally nature" (Creaturehood 49), to ascent towards God and to live in communion with him.
NOTES FOR PAGES 35 to 38

139. Last Things 264.


141. Redemption 103.

142. Cf. Darkness 83. This is not referring to God's nature.

143. Redemption 141.

144. Ibid.


146. Cf. Darkness 90: "He who descended voluntarily into the abyss of evil cannot reascend from there by himself. His energies are exhausted", but not lost!

147. Cf. above p.30 and Luther, de servo arbitrio, Weimarer Ausgabe XVIII.

148. Darkness 91.

149. Athanasius, de incarnatione 4; PG XXV, 194.


152. Darkness 91.

153. Redemption 106.


155. Darkness 90. Cf. also High Calling 32, Holy Spirit 6, where Florovský defines the image of God in man as his capability to listen to God's word and to preserve it.

156. Cf. Redemption 147.


158. The difficulty of the essay "The last things and the last events" is that one is never quite sure whether Florovský just lists what Brunner says or gives his own opinion, because he hardly uses terms of western theology or is strictly concerned with Christology. A sentence like "The essence of sin can be discerned only in the light of Christ - in the light of redemption" (Last Things 248) is not to be found in other places, where Florovský is concerned with the problem of sin. The reason for this is, as I have been arguing, his ontological point of view. Cf. also Weber, Grundlagen I pp.658ff.
NOTES FOR PAGES 38 to 43

159. Last Things 256.
160. Last Things 257.
161. Last Things 258f.
162. Cf. Last Things 248: "The abuse became a habit".
163. Last Things 248.
164. Redemption 147. Cf. also Idea 75, Last Things 262, Redemption 152 and others.
165. Valley 15.
166. Quaestiones ad Thalas. 6; PG XC, 280.
167. Idea 55.
168. Idea 55.
169. Creaturehood 52, also Idea 59.
170. Questiones Distputatae re rerum principio, quaestio IV, art I No.3 and 4; Opera Omnia, edition nova juxta editionem.
171. Cf. Creaturehood 52ff, Athanasius 42ff and Idea 60f.
172. Athanasius 43.
173. Creaturehood 54.
174. Cf. Athanasius 59: "No real advance can be achieved in the realm of 'Theology' until the realm of 'Oikonomia' had been properly ordered".
176. Florovsky can even say: "There is, as it were, something of 'natural' or essential necessity" (Idea 59. Cf. also Creaturehood 57 and others), i.e. God's being in Trinity. The term is not very fortunate, but Florovsky wants to express that the triune God is a datum, an indisputable fact. God never existed other than as the Trinity (Cf. Athanasius 53).
177. Creaturehood 56.
178. Cf. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III,1,70. He rejects any sort of eternal idea of the world: "If there is no creature and therefore no time prior to creation, it is no less true that there is no creation prior to the creature and time".
179. Creaturehood 56. Cf. also Athanasius 52.
180. The distinction between nature and will ultimately runs into Christological distinctions between two different "acts" of God: creation and generation. How that is so can only be shown by a careful and extensive investigation. Florovsky often refers to the latter distinction as allucidating the doctrine of creation and the freedom of God.

181. Athanasius 53

182. Creaturehood 59

183. Cf. John Damascus, de fide orth I,9; PG XCIV, 837: "He contemplated everything from before its being, from eternity pondering it in his mind. Hence each Thing receives its being at a determined time according to his (God's) timeless and decisive thought, which is predestination, and image, and pattern".

184. Cf. note 183 and Dionysius Areopagita, de div. nom. V,8; PG III, 824.

185. Creaturehood 60

186. Augustin, de gen ad litt. 5,18; PL XXXIV, 334.

187. Therefore we cannot speak about an analogia entis in creation. the will of God is not his being. There can only be iconic analogy.

188. Idea 64.

189. Idea 65.

190. John Damascene, de fide orth. I,1; PG XCIV, 789. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Quod non sint tres Dii, PG XLV, 121 B: "We have come to know that the essence of God has no name and it is inexpressible, and we assert that any name, whether it has come to be known through human nature or whether it was handed to us through the Scriptures, it is an interpretation of something to be understood of the nature of God, but it does not contain in itself the meaning of his nature itself .... On the contrary, no matter what name we give to the very essence of God, this shows something that has relation to the essence", i.e. his energies, which have to be distinguished from the nature of God. God in his essence is unknowable. This is a basic Christian doctrine. We cannot know of what "material" God consists of. But does this mean that we do not know his being? According to Orthodox Theology we have to distinguish "in (!) God his nature, which is one; and three hypostases; and the uncreated energy, which proceeds from and manifests forth the nature from which it is inseparable" (Lossky 74. Cf. also 79 and Florovsky's footnote on the problem in Creaturehood 274, where he refers to the Fathers). Thus there are, so to say, three divine spheres, which altogether constitute God, but which have to be distinguished from each other. The question how the energies manifest the divine nature will be discussed later, but it may be said already, that Florovsky would not express this in the way Lossky does in this quotation. God's triune nature remains unknown, inaccessible and cannot be described in terms deriving from God's revelation in his energies (Cf. the discussion of this problematic stand point below pp.26f).
NOTES FOR PAGES 45 to 46


192. De div. nomine 9; PG III, 909.


194. Cf. Creaturehood 64.


196. Cf. Athanasius, de decreatis II; καὶ ἐν τῷ βαθὺ κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν ἐν τοῖς πάντων πάλιν ἐπὶ κατὰ τὴν ἕλεων ψυχήν.

197. Lossky 74. The language can be nothing but apophatic to describe this. "In using such defective expressions, such inadequate images, we acknowledge the absolute non-relative character of the natural and expansive energy, proper to God" (74). Cf. also Idea 67, where Florovsky deals with the inadequacy of human language to express these problems: "... every word becomes dumb and inexact ....".


199. Creaturehood 66. The question of the creatio continua arises here: is the initial act of creation completed or is God still at work? Florovsky is not explicit on this matter: Man's innate tendency to fall back into non-existence is limited because the world is "maintained solely by the continuous action(!) of the Creator" (Athanasius 50). But this "continuous action" is not a creatio ex nihilo. By this argument Florovsky wants to safeguard his assertion that the world cannot fall into non-existence again. "If they (the created beings) do not actually perish it is only by the grace of the Creator" (Athanasius 56), "Who in His love and mercy constantly cares for it (the creation)" (Asceticism 11), which is his energy. But this is not understood as a new act of God. It is rather the consequence of Florovsky's ontological presuppositions. Because man originates in nothing he "exists over an abyss of nothingness, ever ready to fall into it .... and .... is only saved from 'natural corruption' (i.e. non-existence) by the power of heavenly Grace" (Redemption 104f). We already discussed the limitation of man's liability to death, which was never understood as an activity of God, but emerged from ontological presuppositions.

200. Cf. Revelation 21: "And the climax (of God's revelation in history) was reached, when God entered history himself, and for ever; when the Word of God was incarnate and 'made man'". Cf. also Holy Spirit 8.

201. Revelation 20.

202. Florovsky refers to 1.Tim 6,16, though it is doubtful that a distinction between esse and energy is in view of the author of 1.Tim.
NOTES FOR PAGES 46 to 48

203. Revelation 21.

204. Florovsky sees the beginning of this doctrine already in S. Athanasius (Cf. Athanasius 52 and G. Dragas, Grace and
time Nature according to St. Athanasius in Athanasiou pp. 99-142),
St. Basil (Cf. Ad Amphilochus, PG XXXII, 869 A-B), Gregory of
Nysa (Cf. Cant. h. XI, PG XLIX 1013B), Gregory Nanzianz
(Cf. Oratio 38, Cant. h. XI in Theophani, PG XXXVI, 317B).
For Gregory Palamas Cf. J Meyendorf, A study of Gregory Palamas,

205. Gregory Palamas, Capita physica Throl. 68F; PG CL, 1169.

206. Cf. Athanasius 61f; Palamas 117, 119; Creaturehood 67f.

207. Palamas 117.

208. Cf. Gregory Palamas, Capita physica Theol. 127; PG CL 1209, see
also cap. phys. theol. 135; PG CL 1216.

209. Cf. Redemption 275, note 81, which I could not verify.


210a Idea 70. The idea is older and can already be found in John
Damascene, de fide orth. I, 14; PG XLIV
καὶ μὲν ἐνίκησιν ἡ ζωὴ ἐν θαλαμὴ καὶ εὐγγέλιον.

211. Cf. Creaturehood 68: "None of these energies is hypostastic, nor
hypostases itself, and their incalculable multiplicity introduces
no composition into the Divine Being". Cf. also Gregory Palamas,
Theophanes; PG CL 929 A.

212. Creaturehood 70.

213. Idea 73.


215. Cf. Athanasius 52: "But, obviously, 'being' preceeds 'will'.


217. Cf. Palamas 117. Gregory Palamas' distinction was finally
accepted at the councils of Constantinople 1341 and 1351.

218. Cf. Florovsky's correct statement Palamas 118: "In fact, the
teaching of St. Gregory affects the whole system of theology,
the whole body of Christian doctrine". Therefore I have to
discuss the problems of this doctrine below in Section III 2.

219. Creaturehood 61. In saying this Florovsky asserts again that the
divine and the human live in two different modes of existence.
NOTES FOR PAGES 48 TO 52

220. Creaturehood 62.

221. Creaturehood 72f.

222. Idea 74.

223. Creaturehood 73.

224. Idea 75.

225. Theophilus 122. Florovsky asserts this in describing Apa Aphou's position in his controversy with Theophilus of Alexandria. Florovsky's position is identical with this. It is interesting and for the interpretation of Florovsky's view of great importance, that he does not refer to those statements of the Fathers he is quoting in 'Theophilus' and 'Anthropomorphites' in his essays concerned particularly with the doctrine of creation. He wrote the latter as a dogmatician, the former however as a historian of dogma, if one is allowed to make this distinction. (Florovsky would most certainly have disliked this, but he never asserts his agreement with the described positions in the historical essays). Thus giving other patristic opinions of the concept of the imago dei in the historical essay than in the essays on creation he clearly reveals where his main interest and concern is. What consequences this has, will be shown in the following.

226. The only reference I could find is in Holy Spirit 7. But there it is mentioned by chance and has no further implications for the context.

227. Cf. Creaturehood 272 note 49, where Florovsky refers to John Damascene's concept of the three images. In stressing that the "sharp distinction between these is essence of nature" Florovsky loses the Christological point of this doctrine.

228. Adv. Haer. V,6. Cf. also V, 16,2; "For in times long past, it was said that man was created after the image of God, but it was not actually shown for the Word was as yet invisible, after whose image man was created".

C. The doctrine of Theosis

1. Idea 75.

2. Mother 181. Cf. also Mother 177; "Man is never dealt with by God as if he was a tool in the hands of a master. For man is a living person".

3. High Calling 34.

4. Last Things 262.

5. Redemption 147.
6. Cf. Valley 17: "The destiny of man is decided in human hearts. Will they be locked up even at the knocking of the Heavenly Father? Or will man succeed in unlocking them in response to the call of Divine Love?".

7. Cf. Idea 76.

8. Res. of Life 231.


10. Cf. Redemption 102, 155 and Mother 177.

11. Creaturehood 74.

12. Ibid.

13. Cf. for example Mother 181.


15. Mother 176.


17. Mother 173. Florovsky does fulfill this to the extent that he deals with the incarnation in explaining the term Ἰερός κοσμός. But referring to the second term 'E ver-Virgin', which he supposes describes Mary completely in combination with the first one (Cf. Mother 171), he has given the starting point for other than Christological arguments, finally leading to ecclesiology: "The Mother of God is truly the common mother of all the living, of the whole Christian race, born or reborn in the Spirit and truth" (Mother 187). Maryology however which leaves the christological context, which is the only relevance for any talking about Mary, is a "false doctrine", "because it is an arbitrary innovation of the face of Scripture and the early Church, and (2) because this innovation consists essentially in a falsification of the Christian truth" (K. Barth, Church Dogmatics. Vol. 1,2 138 and 143. Cf. also his explication of this rejection of Mariology apart from an article of Christology in the pages 144ff.).

18. Mother 177.

19. It is obvious that Mary needed the annunciation, i.e. God's word came to her, was spoken to her and then she responded. I am not sure whether the annunciation is necessary in Florovsky's concept. Because if everybody mysteriously knows his calling, his predestination, then Mary could have known her special task. Florovsky, however, is not explicit enough on the doctrine of predestination, so that one can be sure about the doctrine.

NOTES FOR PAGES 54 to 57


23. Philaret of Moscow op. cit. (Note 21).

24. Mother 181.

25. Redemption 152f.

26. Mother 181.

27. Mother 182.

28. Creaturehood 74.

29. Redemption 148. Florovsky's language is very strong here: "must" and "has to". But he gives no hint who the giver of these commandments is. According to Florovsky's concept it must be either man himself, listening to his innate capacity for God, or the Church.

30. Mother 184.

31. Christianity 127.

32. Ibid.

33. Asceticism 11.

34. The nature of man cannot be freed by man, because it is corrupted, but man can stop the process of personalisation, which has effects on his nature (Cf. above pp.23f).

35. Idea 74.

36. Christianity 128.

37. Bethlehem 5.

38. Cf. Mercy 4: "A free man wants to be thankful".

39. I could not verify this quotation, which Florovsky gives in Veneration 206. He refers to "48 Word", which probably refers to S. Isaac's of Syria's liber de contemptu mundi, cap. 48 de ostio secretorum; PG LXXXCI part 1, 875f. S. Isaac's statements are: "Gratia post gratiam data est hominibus" (875A). "Lignum vitae est charitas ex qua excidit Adam, et ulterius non occurrat sibi gaudium, sed in terra spinarum operatur et laborat" (875B). And he finally comes to a formulation Florovsky might have thought of: Deus charitas est. Igitur vitam ex deo fructificat, qui in charitate vivit; .... Charitas enim sufficiens et nutrire hominem pro cibo et potu; .... hoc est vinum quod laetificat cor hominis". (875 D - 876 A).
NOTES FOR PAGES 57 to 59

40. Florovsky thinks of 1.Kor 4,15 and not of Gal 3,24f, where the law is the παραλαβεσθαι την χρήστον.

41. Mercy 2.

42. Cf. Idea 74: "The free effort and the grace are not separable in this ontological ascent or growth of 'reasonable beings' - yet there is no confusion nor composition".

43. We clarify this in the third section. Two small hints can be found in Mother 177f. ("The unique position of the Virgin Mary is obviously not her own achievement, nor simply a 'reward' for her 'merits' - nor even perhaps was the fulness of grace given to her in a 'prevision' of her merits and virtues") and in Mercy 3 ("Every good and perfect gift comes from the Fathers .... not so much as a reward, but rather as a grant.") It is obvious in both quotations that Florovsky does not exclude the idea of man gaining merits in front of God.


45. Cf. Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. V preface; PG 7,1120. Athanasius, De Inc. 54; PG XXV, 192B and ad Adaphium 4; PG Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio catechatica magna 25; PG XLV, 65D. We come back to the Christological origin of the doctrine at the end of the section. Cf. below p. 418.

46. Dragas, Athanasian 142. His essay 'Nature and Grace according to St. Athanasius' is to a certain extent concerned with our problem. We will see later, however, whether it is possible to speak of charis as the personal conjunction between man and God.

47. Creaturehood 74.


49. Cf. Idea 74, Creaturehood 74, Palamas 115, and Anastasius of Sinai, Hodegos 2; PG LXXXIX, 77B-C: Θείως ἐκεῖνη, καὶ ἀνθρώπου πνεύματι, οὐκ ὡς ρίζης ἐκεῖνης, οὐκ ἡμέρας ἡμέρας ... Θείως ἡμέρας τοῦ πτωχοῦ μείζων δοσαν αὐτοῖς, ὃς αὐτοῖς ἐκείνης ψεύδους ἀλλοιωσάν.

50. Palamas 115. There is however a terminological problem here. In Idea 74, Florovsky talks about the "ontological ascent or growth" of man. Ontological refers here to the two different modes of existence. Man has "to surpass himself and to raise towards God" (Ibid). One could speak of the two different ontological levels, which meet in deification, are united though not mixed.

51. Palamas 115.

52. Cf. Ad ion. eubic. 43, PG XCI, 639: "He has created us for this purpose, that we might become participants of the Divine nature and partakers of eternity's very self, and that we might appear to Him (continued.)
Continued.... in His likeness, by deification through grace, through which is brought about the coming-into-being of all that exists, and the bringing-into-being and genesis of what does exist'. It must be noted, however that Maximus does not refer to the christological starting point of the doctrine of theosis in this passage.

53. Creaturehood 74.
54. High Calling 34.
55. Creaturehood 76.
56. St. Macarius of Egypt, de amore 28; PG XXIV, 932.
57. High Calling 35.
58. High Calling 37.
59. High Calling 36.
60. Communion 14.
61. Ibid.
63. Creaturehood 77.
64. S. Maximus, cap. theol. et oecon. Cent I 67; PG XCI 1108."
67. Idea 74.
68. Cf. Creaturehood 76; Grace "in a manner imbued with it (man's nature), so that by it God's creative will is accomplished - the will which has summoned that-which-is-not into being in order to receive those that will come into His communion".
69. High Calling 37. Cf. also Year 3, where Florovsky quotes S. Maximus.
70. Idea 76.
71. Cf. Idea 74: "In this rising he realizes himself, as it were, creates himself".
72. Cf. Palamas 115. Immortality and incorruption are the two main gifts of theosis. Adam could gain them only by grace, but his nature would have been liable to corruption and death still. Only in Christ this imperfection of nature is overcome, then man can start his process of a continual union with God in a perfect way.
73. Cf. Mother 182: "The 'privileges' of the divine Motherhood do not depend upon a 'freedom from original sin'".

74. Asceticism 11.

75. Creaturehood 75.

76. High Calling 35.

77. Idea 74.

78. Thunberg, Sinners 12.

79. Cf. de gen. ad litt. I,5: "Non hoc est ei esse quod vivere".

80. Creaturehood 77.

81. Cf. Christ 2: "History is much more than a stage on which human destinies are played out. History itself is the 'history of Salvation', to be ultimately 'consummated'".

82. Creaturehood 77.

83. Christianity 20. Cf. also Christ 3.

84. Ibid.

85. Cf. especially Predicament.

86. Cf. High Calling 35. The Lover however does not forget himself in the act of loving somebody. He is totally at and with the other, but in doing so he is related to himself, he gains his own being. Cf. Jüngel, Geheimnis 430-453. Jüngel defines love as follows (434): "Liebe erschöpft uns, formal geurteilt, als Ereignis einer inmitten noch so großer und mit Recht noch so großer Selbstbezogenheit immer noch größeren Selbstlosigkeit. Und Liebe wurde, material geurteilt, verstanden als die sich ereignende Einheit von Leben und Tod zugunsten des Lebens".


88. Christianity 130.

89. T.F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, London 1965, p.243. Cf. also Torrance's remarkable section about the problem of grace (Ibid'pp.169-191), which touches our problem. In referring to the Roman Catholic doctrine of grace, comparing it to the reformed standpoint with reference to the teaching of the Fathers about grace and theosis Torrance gives an excellent survey about the different concepts.

90. Williams, Georges V. Florovsky 75.

91. Stephanopulos, Theosis 160.
NOTES FOR PAGES 66 to 69

92. Cf. Torrance, op. cit. (Chapter C note 39) 183.

93. Florovsky always insists that the Orthodox doctrine is and has to be a Christianized Hellenism (Cf. for example: Christianity CW II 123; The Fathers of the Church and the Old Testament CW IV 38; The ways of Russian theology CW IV 195), instead of a hellenized Christianity. I do not believe that this is a true description of the difference between western and eastern theology.

94. Cf. Pat, Age 63.

95. Cf. Last Things 245: "The mystery of the last things is grounded in the primary paradox of Creation", which "constitutes the basic paradox of Christian faith, to which all other (!) mysteries of God can be traced back, or rather in which they are implied" (246) or 265: "Eschatology is the realm of antinomies. These antinomies are rooted and grounded in the basic mystery of creation".

D. Cur deus homo?

1. Cur 164.
2. Christ 2.
5. Cf. de gloria et honore filii hominis super Matthaeum, liber 13, PL CLXVIII 1628 B: "Hic primum illud quaeere libet utrum iste Filius Dei, de quo his sermo est, etiam si peccatum propter quod omnes morimur, non intercessisset, homo fieret, an non". The reference in Cur 310 note 3 is wrong, it is PL 168 and not PL 148.
6. The glorificatione trinitatis, liber 3,20; PL CLXIX 72D.
7. Florovsky gives a very good survey about these two different opinions in Cur 165-7 with explicit references.
8. Cf. Cur 164. Florovsky agrees (Ibid.) with B. Westcott, the Gospel of Creation, in: The Epistles of St. John, the Greek Text with notes and essays. London 1892, 3rd ed., p.288: "It may perhaps be truly said that the thought of an Incarnation independent of the Fall harmonizes with the general tenor of Greek Theology", which Wescott tries to prove on pp.319ff.
10. Quaestio ad Thalassium; PG XC 621 A-B. Cf. the context, quoted by Florovsky in Cur 168f.
NOTES FOR PAGES 69 to 75


15. Cur 170.

16. Cur 314 note 18. I do not know when this doctrine was officially disavowed by a council of the Orthodox Church. But this quotation clearly shows how much Florovsky agrees with an official teaching authority of the Church. On the other hand it seems to me that this statement clearly shows the bondage of Orthodox systematic teaching and theology.


III The Salvation of Man

A. The salvation of man's nature - Christology

1. Lamb 21.

2. The question whether this is due to the disavowing of a supralapsarian concept by the Orthodox Church (Cf. Cur 314) or Florovsky's interest in the event of the incarnation may be left open. Cf. Lamb 21: "We may not deal with abstract possibilities actually unrealized and frustrated, nor build the doctrinal synthesis on the analysis of probabilities, in fact of a causa irrealis". There is however clear scriptural evidence for the primordial purpose of God that Christ would be incarnated: 1.Petr. 1,20; Rev 13,8; Eph 1,4; et al.

3. Ref. of Life 217. Cf. above p.25

4. Cf. Res. of Life 217, which is not as clear at this point, but the general line of Florovsky's teaching seems to be that he conceives of man as originally created in an imperfect manner, which has to be perfected by man's own efforts and finally has to be saved from its capability of corruption by Christ.


6. Athanasius, de incarnatione 8 MG XXV 109, Transl. Thomas.

7. Gregory of Nazianzus, oratio XLI in S. Pascha 28; MG XXXVI 661. Cf. also Tertullian, de carne Christi 6: "Forma moriendi causa nascendi est".
NOTES FOR PAGES 75 to 77

8. Res. of Life 225.


10. Redemption 96. Cf. also Redemption 100: "The mystery of the Cross begins in eternity, 'in the sanctuary of the Holy Trinity, unapproachable for creatures'".

11. Lamb 22.


13. Cf. Redemption 102. One might especially think of Anselm’s tract 'Cur deus homo?', which was the basis for such an understanding.


15. Redemption 102.


17. Cf. above p. 66.

18. Tree 11. It is interesting to notice that the preface to this essay, which continues as a worldly quotation of Redemption, pp. 131-159, sounds very much like a theologia crucis. I could not find any other passage in any of Florovsky's essays where he is so emphatic about the Cross.

19. Lamb 16.

20. Lamb 25. Cf. also Redemption 137.


23. Lamb 16.

24. Cf. Loyalty 203f, where Florovsky shows what he means when he talks about the church: "As a member and priest of the Orthodox Church I believe that the Church in which I was baptized and brought up is in very truth the Church, i.e. the true Church and the only true Church,... I am compelled to regard all other churches as deficient and in many cases I can identify these deficiencies accurately enough. Therefore, for me, Christian reunion is just universal conversion to Orthodoxy". (I am aware of the fact that personal statements are unfitting in an academic thesis, though I want to excuse the fact that I cannot comment on this quotation without becoming very angry and consequently rather impolite).

NOTES FOR PAGES 77 to 81


27. Ibid.


31. The definition of Faith. 6th ecumenical council, session 18
   Fathers Vol XIV, the seven ecumenical councils of the undivided
   church, Oxford 1900, p.345.

32. Cf. above Creature hood 71

33. Tertullian, de carne Christi 6, ML II URY 746.

34. Lamb 19. We have already seen that Horovsky warns theologians
   against a kenotic over-emphasis. May this be the reason for the
   rare occurrence of the important theologoumenon. Another reason
   maybe that Florovsky is interested in the ontological problems
   of Christology, but does not talk much about the event-character
   of Salvation.

35. Mother 173. Cf. also Redemption 132, 137, 301; Res. of Life 226;
   Year 3f; and Lamb 15f, 25.

36. Cf. Lamb 15f; Redemption 97.

37. Cf. Mother 176. Florovsky is referring to John Damascene, de
   fide orth. III, 12.

38. Mother 183. Before this he dismissed the Roman Catholic dogma of
   the immaculate conception as "an unnecessary complication" (182).
   Cf. also Year 3: "In the very birth of Christ the order of nature
   is potentially overcome". Saying this Florovsky does not want to
   go into speculation but emphasizes that "the higher (birth of all
   men) is prefigured and revealed" (Ibid.). We will discuss the
   problem of the sinlessness of Christ later.


41. Cf. de fide orth. III, 28; MG XLIV, 1097 and 1190.

42. Redemption 97. Cf. also Redemption 102: "... human nature
   already deified by its assumption into the hypostases of the Word".

43. Cf. John Damascene, de fide orth. III, 12; MG XLIV, 1032: τὴν
   πρόσελιψιν, τὴν ὄσικην, τὴν κατάθεσιν ἀπό τοῦ λόγου.
NOTES FOR PAGES 81 to 84

44. Cf. Res. of Life 225; Year 2.

45. Cf. Ascension 26; Res. of Life 225.

46. Redemption 98.

47. Res. of Life 225; Redemption 95f.


49. Res. of Life 226.


51. Redemption 98.

52. Redemption 100.

53. Redemption 101. The same interest of Florovsky can be found in the following observation: Florovsky superscribed the passage about Christ's sacrificial death in 'Tree' 12 - "High Priest and Victim", in 'Redemption' 131 however - "High Priest and Redeemer". I presume that the latter is a correction made by Florovsky, when CW II was published. Christ is a victim, but he is primarily the active redeemer, because he wills the redemption, i.e. his death.

54. John Chrysostom, in Ioann. 485,2; MG LIX 462.

55. Redemption 135. Cf. also Redemption 301 Note 100 and 157.


57. Ibid.

58. Redemption 102.

59. Redemption 282 Note 15, Cf. also Res. of Life 226.

60. Maximus, ad Marynum presb.; MG XCI 129.


64. Lamb 25. Cf. also similar expressions in Faith 26; Res. of Life 226 and Redemption 138f.

65. Gregory of Nazianzus orat. 41.


67. Cf. High Calling 32; Redemption 132.
NOTES FOR PAGES 84 to 87

68. Ethos 26.

69. Valley 14.

70. Cf. Redemption 132f, 136; Res. of Life 226f and Pat. Age 65.

71. Res. of Life 227.

72. Cf. for example Redemption 132: "On Golgatha the Incarnate Lord .... offers in sacrifice His own human nature".

73. Cf. below p. 90


75. Synaxarion of Good Saturday, quoted Redemption 303 note 114.

76. Redemption 132.

77. Cf. Lamb 25; Pat. Age 65.

78. Redemption 131.


80. Redemption 131. Cf. also Redemption 101: According to Florovsky the idea of sacrifice is an anthropomorphism, if one understands it as a satisfaction of God. It must be understood in terms of Glory and victory over death.

81. Redemption 132.

82. Cf. Redemption 133; Res. of Life 227. The language Florovsky is using sounds rather offensive to modern ears, but Florovsky's intention is to draw a parallel between the sacrament of the cross with the outpouring of blood and the sacrament of baptism with the outpouring of water. Cf. below. pp. 109f.

83. Redemption 133.

84. Cf. Redemption 147; Res. of Life 230, where Florovsky refers to the Adam-Christ-typology and asserts that "this parallel was drawn already by St. Irenaeus" (Res. of Life 230). Rom 5 however drew this parallel in the first place, though in an understanding which does not suit Florovsky's presupposition of the distinction between person and nature.

85. Res. of Life 230.

86. Cf. Redemption 146; Lamb 27; Res. of Life 230 and above p.10.

87. Redemption 97.

88. Lamb 27.

89. Year 2f.
NOTES FOR PAGES 87 to 89

90. Redemption 97.

91. Florovsky refers to Irenaeus (Redemption 280 note 5), who exemplifies this in adv. haer. II 22,4; "For he came to save all through himself - all, I say, who through him are regenerated into God, infants, children, boys, young men and elders. Therefore he passed through every age, and became an infant for infants, sanctifying all the infants; a child among children, sanctifying all of that age (etc) .... Thus he passed to his death, so that he might be 'the first begotten from the dead'". (Trans. Hitchcock 1916 p.61).


93. Lamb 20.

94. John Damascene, de fide orth. III, 25; MG XLIV 1903. I inserted the addition 'his' because Christ had to die not because of a necessity of his nature, but because he wanted to die.

95. Mother 182.

96. Redemption 145. For 'potentia resurrectionis' see below. pp.109f

97. Redemption 96. Cf. also Redemption 109,145.

98. Florovsky uses the term 'new creation' to describe the abolition of mortality. Cf. Christianity 129f: immortality can be experienced even in time; Veneration 208: Since Christ and through Christ "again commenced a long row of human beings"; Res. of Life 230: "The Resurrection of Christ is a new beginning .... an ultimate step in Salvation"; Lamb 27.

99. High Calling 32.

100. Cf. Redemption 110,114

101. Last Things 258f. Cf. also Mother 175.

102. Ascension 26. Cf. especially the quotation from the Orthodox Liturgy for the feast of the ascension (Ibid.).

103. High Calling 32. Cf. also Redemption 132.

104. Cf. Redemption 106,283 note 20; Res. of Life 221ff; Pat. Age 77; Lamb 23.

105. Res of Life 223.

106. Redemption 111.

107. Cf. Res. of Life 223: "To stress human mortality does not mean to offer a 'naturalistic' interpretation of human tragedy, but, on the contrary, it means to trace the human predicament to its ultimate religious roots".
108. Res. of Life 220. Cf. also Lamb 23; Redemption 146, 306f. The definition of death can be found also in Plato, Phaedo 64 C. It derives from the Platonic Socrates and became the classical description of death. It was regarded as a correct and self-evident presupposition.

109. Florovsky is always emphasizing this at great length, referring to Plotinus, Cicero etc. Cf. Redemption 111ff.

110. Res. of Life 224.

111. Redemption 114.

112. Redemption 115.

113. Res. of Life 223. Cf. also Redemption 107f.


115. Cf. Florovsk's presentation of the development of the understanding of the unity of human nature in Redemption 115-120.

116. Florovsky does not say what the body is. Apart from his description of it through the term 'flesh' one has to assume that body denotes the corporeality of man (Cf. Redemption 105). In Res. of Life 221, Florovsky follows Pseudo-Justin's description of man as a "rational animal", which is obviously the Aristotelian definition of man: οὐν λέγειν ἵματιν. He might be in full agreement with this traditional definition, which would mean that soul is the distinctive sign of man, which distinguishes him from all other creatures. This definition of man was vigorously attacked by Luther in his tract 'de homine', because it is not a theological description of man.

117. Justin, dialogus cum Trypho 5.

118. Cf. Justin, op.cit. 6 and Res. of Life 216, 218 and 240.

119. Res. of Life 217.

120. Last Things 259.

121. Cf. also Res. of Life 214f.

122. High Calling 33. Cf. also Redemption 107, 283 note 23.

123. Redemption 119. Cf. also Redemption 125.

124. Redemption 125.

125. Cf. Res. of Life 220.
NOTES FOR PAGES 94 to 95

126. Redemption 107. This argument is only convincing if man knows about his immortal soul. Does man have this self-knowledge? This must be doubted, apart from all other objections to a conception of an immortal soul.


128. Florovsky calls this an "ontological infirmity of the soul" (Redemption 141).

129. Redemption 105. Cf. the small addition I have to make to this below p. 96.

130. Res. of Life 222.

131. Redemption 108.

132. Florovsky is not clear whether God wills the death of every single man or whether this is just a natural process.

133. Cf. Redemption 132f, 108. The idea of a purifying death can be found in Gregory of Nyssa, oratio cat. 35.

134. Cf. Redemption 145 quoting John Chrysostom, in hebr. h.17,2, MG LXIII, 129.

135. Res. of Life 229.

136. Redemption 139. This understanding is rejected in those ikons, which present the resurrection as the descent into hell (Cf. Redemption 302 note 112). It might be confusing that Florovsky declares so many days as the most important ones for man's salvation. It can be Good Friday (= Cross), Holy Thursday (= eucharist), Good Saturday (= descent into hell), Easter Sunday (= Resurrection), Ascension day (= glorification of Christ and human nature) or Pentecost (= giving of the Holy Spirit). Each one of these is declared as the most important one by Florovsky in various essays on different occasions. Despite this difference there is a greater emphasis on Good Saturday because it combines all aspects of these days of salvation.

137. Last Things 261. Cf. also 146; Redemption 140.

138. Redemption 141.


140. Cf. 1.Petr. 3,19 which Florovsky understands in this way (Redemption 303).

141. Redemption 140f.

142. Redemption 141. This reflects again the different degrees of corruption of the individual. Cf. above. pp. 30ff.

143. Redemption 144.
144. Redemption 140. It is clear that the hypostasis of Christ does not cease to exist for it is still the hypostasis of the divine nature. Even if the human nature is broken, the hypostasis lives. This concept makes it again clear that the human nature of Christ does not really affect the divine hypostasis. Thus God dies only in his human nature but the hypostasis is unharmed by this event.

145. Redemption 142.

146. Listening souls however compel to regard the body as accidental.

147. Redemption 141.

148. Cf. above p. 94

149. Redemption 146.

150. Redemption 142.

151. Redemption 143.

152. Last Things 259. Cf. also 259f: "Death is a catastrophe. But persons survive, and those in Christ are still also alive - even in the state of death". It is obvious that Florovsky here equates person and soul. The postulate that only the unity of soul and body form a human hypostasis and thus a human being is obviously neglected.


155. Last Things 262. Prof. Basileiades, Athens, told me that the Orthodox theology does not teach a purgatory, which cleanses souls, as the Roman Catholics do.

156. Ibid.

157. Redemption 139f.

158. Redemption 144.

159. Cf. Redemption 120, 145f, 150; Controvery 113.


161. Cf. for Origen's position on Christ's glorified body Florovsky's summary on his description in Controvery 113f.

162. Redemption 145.

163. Redemption 147.
B The salvation of the Christian person - Ecclesiology

1. Revelation 36.

2. Ascension 27.

3. Cf. ibid and above p. 96. The restoration of the image of God in man is the recreation of his capacity for God.


5. Ascension 27.

6. Cf. High Calling 33.

7. Cf. Ascension 28 and John Chrysostom, on Ephesians 1,22.

8. Florovsky gives some hints to this position: Lamb 14, Year 2.

9. High Calling 33.

10. Cf. Veneration 208; Communion 20; Pat. Age 66.

11. Communion 19. In this way Florovsky wishes to explain the πλήρωσις of Christ (Eph 1,23).


13. Cf. Lamb 28; Christ 2; Pat. Age 66.


15. Veneration 203.


17. Lamb 27.

18. Mother 186.


21. Cf. especially Florovsky's essays on monasticism, for example Christianity 126: "Monasticism is in principle, an exodus from the world".

22. Veneration 203.

23. Catholicity 45.


25. Ibid.
NOTES FOR PAGES 104 to 108


27. Pat. Age 64.


29. Florovsky emphasizes that this could never be an individualistic retreat from the world, because unus Christianus, nullus Christianus. Cf. Social Problem 133, 137.

30. Church 70.

31. Ibid. Cf. also Faith 28.

32. Church 70.

33. Ibid.

34. Faith 30. Cf. also Social Problems 140-2, where Florovsky strongly argues against an antimaterial attitude of Christians.

35. Revelation 36.

36. Pat. Age 66.

37. Augustin, in psalmo 26 sermo 2 n.23.

38. Res. of Life 234.

39. Cf. above and Predicament

40. Last Things 247. Florovsky postulates this without giving proper reasons.


42. Last Things 244.

43. Christianity 129. Cf. also Last things 247, where Florovsky applies the same to God: "What takes place in time is significant - significant and real for God himself". But notions about the problem of history and God/man are quite rare in his essays. He prefers the categories of ontology and hardly conceives of the relation between man and God in terms of events.

44. Cf. Last Things 252.

45. Cf. Redemption 129; Faith 20f.


47. Cf. above; Valley 16f.
NOTES FOR PAGES 108 to 110

48. Creaturehood 72. This is one of the two passages I could find, where Florovsky speaks about the relation of the living man resisting God. The Other one states: "But above the image (of God in man) the Proto-Image always shines, sometimes with a gladening, sometimes with a threatening, light". (Creaturehood 73). It is impossible however to answer the question whether Florovsky would say, that God enforces the evil-doing of these resisting men, a concept which Luther thought of.

49. Florovsky refers to Joh 5,29.

50. Redemption 151.

51. Cf. above p.69f.

52. Redemption 156.

53. High Calling 33.

54. Lamb 28. Florovsky never states that Christ is the only sacrament, but due to the close connection between the sacraments and Christ's sacrifice, he is very close to this position and would probably agree with such an argument. Cf. below pp. 115f.

55. Lamb 28. Cf. also Redemption 156,159.

56. Cf. High Calling 33.

57. Cf. Redemption 156f.

58. Redemption 152f.


60. Redemption 148. Cf. also Lamb 27.

61. Ibid.

62. Catholicity 43.

63. Florovsky's stress on the pre-eminence of repentance over baptism suggests that he is opposed to the baptism of infants. In Lamb 28 he clearly expresses: "First, faith and 'repentance' are required .... Then (!) Baptism". With the emphasis on the personal aspect of repentance as an inner change it may be concluded that he is opposed to the (wrong) idea of a substitutional faith (of the godparents or natural parents) as well. Florovsky comes to this correct result because of his starting point of man's freedom and consequently his task to save himself in a synergy with the divine grace. This however leads to the dangerous understanding that it is man alone who decides whether he wants to be saved or not. Thus, baptism would not be a sacrament but a mere personal act, which could be separated from the "divine aspect".
NOTES FOR PAGES 110 to 113

64. Veneration 201. It should be noted that the church is here understood as something 'supernatural', something inbetween the created nature, i.e. the inanimated, and the divine. 'Supernatural' denotes the proper human sphere as the sphere of the mediator between God and his creation.

65. Cf. Veneration 201f.


67. Lamb 28. Cf. also Redemption 149; Res. of Life 22. Florovsky refers to Rom 6,3f; Col 2,12; 2.Tim 2,11.


69. High Calling 32. Cf. also Communion 3: "There is a deep resemblance between baptism and burial (or death), the death of a Christian being also the day of his mystical birth".

70. Redemption 154f. Cf. also Lamb 28; Res. of Life 236.

71. Redemption 150.

72. Res. of Life 225. This quotation indicates that baptism is necessary for the final salvation of man. Florovsky however never states this explicitly apart from this quotation.

73. Redemption 155.

74. Ibid.

75. Cf. Redemption 151.

76. Catholicity 43.

77. Cf. Redemption 150: "Baptismal regeneration and ascesis are joined together: "The death with Christ and the resurrection are already operative within believers".


79. Cf. Redemption 307f, where Florovsky refers to Gregory of Nyssa's position.


81. High Calling 33f.

82. Cf. Res. of Life 235.

83. Cf. Redemption 96; Res. of Life 225.

84. Redemption 156.
85. Cf. Redemption 156f. As regards the sacraments Florovsky follows to a large extent Nicolas Cabasilas. In his treatise 'The life in Christ', Cabasilas is concerned with the sacramental life of the Christian and its effects, i.e. the complete transfiguration of man into a deified creature. Beside Gregory Palamas, Cabasilas (1322/3 to 138?) is the second later Orthodox Father. Florovsky refers to for a great deal. He was a defender of Gregory's doctrine of the divine energies, when Palamas was Nicolas' Bishop in Thessalonica. Though Cabasilas does not refer to Palamas' hesychast doctrine explicitly he agrees with it. Cf. Bobrinskoy's introduction to Cabasilas in "Life in Christ" pp.17-42.

86. John Chrysostom, de proditione Iudaee I,6; MG XLIX, 380. Florovsky is referring to him, when he asserts the identity of everything in the celebration of the eucharist with the things in the upper room.

87. Cf. above p. 82.

88. Redemption 156.

89. Cf. Veneration 207.

90. Cf. Redemption 308, where Florovsky refers to Odo Casels' explanation of sacramental symbolism and its realism.

91. Nicolas Cabasilas, vita in Christo; MG CL, 612 CD.

92. Redemption 158.


94. Redemption 131.

95. Mother 181.

96. Redemption 152f.

The Christian Hope

1. Cf. Pat. Age 64.

2. Christ 3.

3. Valley 15.


5. Cf. Ibid.


7. Christ 3.

8. Cf. Ibid and above pp. 60f.

9. Christ 4. This would be a good starting point for Florovsky's ethics.
III A Critical Assessment of Florovsky's Doctrine

2. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. II, 1, 332. The term 'form' however is not very fortunate.
3. Creaturehood 66.
4. Idea 69.
5. Idea 72.
6. Jüngel, Verhältnis 354. Cf. also Rahner, de trinitate 322: "Dieses Geheimnis scheint nur um seiner selbst willen mitgeteilt zu sein. Es bleibt, auch nach seiner Mitteilung, als Wirklichkeit in sich selbst verschlossen".
7. Creaturehood 69.
8. Plato, Politeia II, 379 a. Cf. also Jüngel, Geheimnis 316f, who shows that the assertion of the impossibility to talk about God's being is a Platonic notion.
10. Creaturehood 69.
11. Lossky 81.
15. John Damascene, de fide orth. I,1; PG XCIV 797.
19. Cf. explicitly on this problem: Jüngel, Geheimnis 307-408, especially 334, 343f, 381f and 405f.
20. Cf. above p.43.

22. The term 'double-creation' is unfortunate. It just wants to denote the coming into existence of something other than the Godhead. And even the thought of a creation shows that God is already "outside" himself, that he started to think about something other than himself. It is - to use a scholastic term - an "opus ad extra internum"

23. Creaturehood 55.


25. Jüngel, Geheimnis 301.

26. Jüngel, Geheimnis 45. Cf. Year 3, where Florovsky uses quite the same terms in referring to S. Maximus, but he means something different.

27. M. Luther, de servo arbitrio. WA 18, 636, 27-29.

28. Luther however in asserting that freedom is "plane divinum nomen" speaks of man as having no free will. Man can only be freed. This does not mean that Luther does not speak about man's freedom! Cf. his tract "de libertate Christiana".

29. Cf. Idea 71f: "In the course of theological reflection, it is exactly the person of the Incarnate Word which is the starting point. But for formulating triadological faith, abstraction must be made of Christology too".


32. Loci communes rerum theologicae seu hypotyposes theologicae. 1521. Cf. also Barth's discussion on this in Church Dogmatic vol. II,1 259f. Also Weber, Grundlagen I 442-5.

33. Cf. M. Luther, Genesisvorlesung 1535-45. WA 44 586,26-19. This is not the place to discuss Luther's difficult distinction between 'deus absconditus' and 'deus revelatus'. Cf. for the discussion of the problem G. Ebeling, Luther pp.259-279.

34. It must be emphasized that God is still a mystery, but it is a revealed mystery! Cf. Rahner de trinitate 345: "Es ist selbstverständlich, das die Trinitätslehre dauernd sich des Geheimnisses bewußt bleiben muß, daß der göttlichen Wirlichkeit wenigstens quoad nos jetzt und immer, also auch in der visio beata zukommt .... daß dieses Geheimnis wesentlich identisch ist mit dem Geheimnis der absoluten Selbstmitteilung Gottes in Christus und seinem Geist an uns". Cf. also Rahner, de trinitate 349.

NOTES FOR PAGES 131 TO 139

36. Jüngel, Geheimnis 47.


38. Jüngel, Geheimnis 48. The result of this is a new (?) concept and understanding of the divine being including the fact that the imminent Trinity is the economic and the economic Trinity is the imminent. (Cf. Rahner, de trinitate, which is taken up by Jüngel in 'Verhältnis' and in 'Geheimnis' 508ff.) Thus the doctrine of the Trinity is not an unnecessary supplement of theology, but its basis and starting point (Cf. Rahner, de trinitate; and Barth's construction of his Church Dogmatics). The starting point for the doctrine of the Trinity however is God's revelation in Christ.

39. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol IV, 1 p.186.

40. Martin Luther, disputatio cum scholast. theol. These 17. WA 1,225.

41. A detailed exegesis of Rom 7, 14-25 could not be included here. Cf. for the problem Bultmann, Rom 7; Bormkamm and Käsemann.

42. At this point the question of 'gospel' and 'law' becomes relevant. Whether we speak of 'law and gospel' (Luther) or of 'gospel and law' (Barth) is of immense importance in this context, though we cannot discuss it here. To denote the problem I therefore use the term 'grace of God', for both, gospel as well as law, are the expressions of God's grace.


44. Florovsky wrote quite a number of essays on this issue. Though he does not explain the term "neopatristic synthesis", it should be possible to find his exact understanding of the term.
1. Primary Sources

Florovsky's writings have partly been published in his 'Collected Works' (CW), which were published by Nordland Publishing Company, Belmont, Massachusetts, USA. Vol.1 in 1972, Vol.2 in 1974, Vol.3 in 1976 and Vol.4 in 1975. Though all essays are of great interest I list only those which are of special relevance for this thesis.

Florovsky's essays are listed in alphabetical order, which refers to the abbreviation I chose for each essay. This abbreviation stands in brackets after the exact reference.

The Anthropomorphites in the Egyptian Desert (1958) in CW 4; 89-96 (Anthropomorphites).


Antinomies of Christian History: Empire and Desert (1957) in: CW 2; 67-100. (Antinomies).

And ascended into heaven .... In: St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly Vol II No.3 (1954); 23-28. (Ascension).


St. Athanasius' Concept of Creation (1962). In CW 3; 39-62 (Athanasius).

From Bethlehem to Calvary. In: St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly Vol II No.2 1954; 3-6. (Bethlehem).

The Catholicity of the Church (1934). In: CW 1; 37-56. (Catholicity).

Christ, the Hope of the World. In: St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly Vol III No.1/2 (1954/55); 2-4. (Christ).

Christianity and Civilization (1952). In: CW 2; 121-130. (Christianity).

The Church: Her nature and Task (1948). In: CW 1; 57-72. (Church)

The Church Universal. In: St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly Vol II No.4 (1954; 2-4) (Church Universal).


Iconoclastic Controversy (1950). In: CW 2; 101-120. (Controversy).

Creation and Creaturehood (1928). In: CW 3; 43-78. (Creaturehood).

The Darkness of Night (1948). In: CW 3; 81-91. (Darkness).


Patristic Theology and the Ethos of the Orthodox Church (1960). In: CW 4; 11-30. (Ethos).

The Gospel of the Resurrection (I Kor. 15) Published by the Student Christian Association of Greece. Athens 1951.


On the Prize of High Calling. In: Journal of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius. No. 11 (1931); 31-37. (High Calling).


Holy Ikons (1954). In CW 3; 209-212. (Ikons).


The Last Things and the Last Events (1962). In: CW 3; 243-265. (Last Things).


The Patristic Age and Eschatology: An Introduction (1956). In CW 4; 63-78. (Pat. Age).


Redemption (1930). In: CW 3; 95-159. (Redemption).

Revelation and Interpretation (1951). In: CW 1; 17-36. (Revelation).

The Social Problem in the Eastern Orthodox Church (1950). In: CW 2; 131-142. (Social Problem).


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