The character of Christ: the correlation of moral philosophy and Christology in Anglican theology 1830-1870

Sedgwick, Peter Humphrey

How to cite:

Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
ABSTRACT

Revd. Peter Sedgwick. The Correlation of Moral Philosophy and Christology in Anglican Theology, 1830-1870

The thesis argues that the influence of eighteenth-century moral philosophy on Victorian theology is seriously neglected. Its period is 1830-1870, but it looks back to Butler's work, and forward to the publication of Lux Mundi in 1889. Moral philosophy conceptualized the idea of a moral agent in ways seminal for a theology of the humanity of Christ (or The Character of Christ). Tractarian systematic theology was concerned about this and informed on it. It reflects the influence of moral philosophy in its epistemology of faith and its presentation of Christology, quite apart from ethical issues. Chapter One is an introduction justifying the theoretical position lying behind the chronological narrative and outlining the controversies that existed in 1830 in moral philosophy and Christology. Chapter Two shows the achievement of Butler in turning Anglican moralism into philosophical rigour and a theology of divine providential action. Chapter Three begins with the revival of systematic theology in 1830 by Newman and Robert Wilberforce, and demonstrates the complex inter-relationship of character, Christology and epistemology. Chapter Four contrasts the Anglican reception of the Butlerian tradition in moral philosophy with its handling by Mill. Determinism and agnosticism are the legacy which philosophical radicalism bequeathed to the nineteenth century theologian thereafter. Chapter Five offers a freewill defence by Seeley, Newman's view of Seeley, and the greatest mid-Victorian attack on agnosticism, the 1866 Bamptons of Henry Liddon. This results in a virtual rejection by Liddon of the use of moral philosophy by previous theologians, and the establishment of a theological ghetto. Chapter Six summarizes the narrative, demonstrates that Lux Mundi revived the use of moral philosophy in using Bradley and Green, and draws further theoretical conclusions on the relationship of character, moral philosophy and Christology.
DECLARATION

None of this material has been submitted for any previous degree.

It is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the result of joint research.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.

No quotation from it should be published without his prior consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
At every stage I have benefited from discussion with others. This thesis takes up my interest in English political philosophy, which I studied for a History degree at Cambridge, ethics, which I taught at Birmingham University from 1979-1982, and most of all Christology. I must in particular thank my academic supervisor, the Rev. Professor Stephen Sykes, for patiently bringing together my chaotic thoughts into this thesis. He suggested the initial subject, and without him it would never have become a unified subject. His time and insight has been incalculable. I must also mention my debt to many colleagues in the Birmingham University Department of Theology. Most of all I must thank Rev. Dan Hardy for his deep knowledge of historical theology and philosophy.

This work would not have been possible without much financial assistance. In particular I am grateful to the Department of Education for an initial grant, the Bishop of Durham in appointing me to a small parish as a base for research, and to the Cleaver Trustees for a generous grant. Lastly, I must mention how much I owe to the loving support of my wife Helena, who gave me the determination to persevere through academic and parish commitments. It is dedicated to her.
"THE CHARACTER OF CHRIST"

THE CORRELATION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND
CHRISTOLOGY IN ANGLICAN THEOLOGY 1830-1870

A thesis submitted for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

PETER HUMPHREY SEDGWICK

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without
his prior written consent and information derived
from it should be acknowledged.

Department of Theology
University of Durham

July 1982
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 2.</strong> CHARACTER IN BISHOP BUTLER'S MORAL THEOLOGY: 1720-1740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction: The Relevance of Butler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Butler on Character - Preliminary Considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Summary of Argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Nature of Butler's Thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Theistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Lack of Christology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Unsystematic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Implications for the Thesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Presuppositions of Butler's Arguments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ethical Objectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Human Nature as a Basic Datum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Empiricism and Fact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Creation, Design and Teleology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Unity of the Four Presuppositions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Role of Character in Butler's Thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Defence of Personal Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Character Defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Passions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Self-Love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Benevolence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Formation of Character by Moral Discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) The Character of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The Character of Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) The Formation of Human Character by God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Summary: The Contribution of Butler to Theology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHAPTER 3.** NEWMAN AND WILBERFORCE: 1830-1850 | 97 |
| I. Introduction to Tractarian Theology | 99 |
| II. Newman's Christology and Moral Philosophy | 106 |
| 1. Introduction | 106 |
| 2. The Idea of Christianity | 111 |
| (a) The Nature of the Idea | 111 |
| (b) The Expression of the Idea | 117 |
| (c) The Apprehension of the Idea | 122 |
| (d) Conscience and Apprehension | 125 |
3. The Indwelling of Christ .. .. .. .. 14
4. The Return to the Gospels .. .. .. .. 146
5. Pain, Sin and Ignorance in Christ .. .. .. .. 150
6. The Character of Christ in Men .. .. .. .. 159
7. Summary .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 164

III Wilberforce's Christology and Moral Philosophy .. 167
1. Introduction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 167
2. Rationalism and Idealism .. .. .. .. 169
3. The Character of Christ in Scripture .. .. 180
4. Pain, Sin and Ignorance in Christ .. .. .. .. 190
5. The Character of Christ and Mediation .. .. 194
6. Summary .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 210

IV Summary - Newman and Wilberforce .. .. .. .. 211

CHAPTER 4. JOHN STUART MILL AND THE DETERMINATION OF CHARACTER .. .. 214
I. Introduction to Philosophical Radicalism .. .. 216
II. John Stuart Mill .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 221
1. Inductivism .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 221
2. Determinism .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 225
3. The Attack on Christianity .. .. .. .. .. 229
4. Mill's own view of character .. .. .. .. .. 233

ON LIBERTY

III. Summary .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 248

CHAPTER 5 THE CHARACTER OF CHRIST

I. Introduction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 253
II. John Seeley's Ecce Homo .. .. .. .. .. 254
III. Reactions to Seeley; Newman on Ecce Homo .. .. 262
IV. H.P. Liddon .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 267
1. Introduction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 267
2. The 1866 Bamptons .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 271
3. The Character of Christ .. .. .. .. .. .. 274
4. The Knowledge of Christ .. .. .. .. .. .. 280
5. The Obedience and Work of Christ .. .. .. .. .. 290
7. Summary .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 304
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The original intention of the enquiry of which this thesis is the fruit was to study the use of the phrase and concept "the character of Christ" in late nineteenth and early twentieth century theology. This was a period when popular apologetic for Christianity, abandoning the traditional "proofs" from miracle and prophecy, turned for ammunition to the apparently more acceptable realm of moral personhood. What happened to this apologetic under the corrosive influence of modern psychology was, it appeared, a story demanding an analytic narrator.

It turned out, however, that the laying of the requisite foundation for this enterprise itself revealed a considerable lacuna in the state of theological scholarship. For whereas the histories of Victorian theology had often described the prominence of philosophical idealism for the theology of the later nineteenth century, much less attention had been given to the undermining of the theologies of the middle years by the moral philosophy of Bishop Butler. Thus while the focus of the enquiry remained the "character of Christ", the historical centre of the enquiry shifted to the work of a group of Tractarians, Newman, (though we shall not be restricted to his Anglican works), Wilberforce and Liddon, whose writings frequently deployed the concept of character, and contributed very largely to its later popularity. The original investigation remains to be
carried out, but the present writer dares to claim that it can now be done on a more secure basis.

The limits assigned to the thesis, 1830 - 1870, are justified in that they span the era when empiricism was unchallenged at Oxford. It was only in 1866 when T. H. Green became a tutor at Balliol College, Oxford, that the tide began to turn against empiricism. By 1882, when Green died, idealism was far more prominent. This thesis is concerned with one expression of English empiricism, which was the moral philosophy of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Justification for restricting enquiry to the Tractarian Movement in the Church of England can be offered on two grounds. First, Tractarians were deeply aware of the significance of empiricism and moral philosophy. It is a notorious oversimplification to see the Tractarian Movement as simply a protest movement against Oxford Liberalism. It certainly was that, but the movement was more closely imprinted by much of what it opposed than its condemnation might at first suggest. Secondly, the Tractarian Movement held that the central locus of systematic theology lay in the Incarnation. Their development of Christologies to support this conviction provides the natural matrix for the consideration of the character of Christ, which is our theme.

The restriction of the thesis to five main thinkers is
again deliberate. The three principal theologians in the Tractarian movement were Newman, Robert Milberforce and Liddon. All three had a veneration for Butler, and all three discussed Christology in the terms set by Chalcedon. The two other thinkers are both philosophers. Butler inspired the three theologians, while J. S. Mill challenged them to rethink their anthropology.

Certain theologians and philosophers of the period are conspicuous by their absence from this study, and on the principal ones a word of explanation must be offered. Adam Sedgwick was a geologist who wrote in defence of a literal reading of Genesis. His defence of a theology resting on the design argument was harmonized with a reverence for Butler, but this Anglican moralism and theology of science passed over Christology in the main. Another writer who went into much greater depth on Christ was James Martineau. His Unitarianism was derived from a careful philosophical study, which included Butler. He is excluded partly for reasons of space, and partly because his Christology is so foreign to the Chalcedonian definition. Henry Sidgwick began to teach at Cambridge from 1859, but his moral philosophy was not influential in theology. Hence these three are all excluded from this story because they are not relevant to the interplay of moral philosophy and Christology in Victorian England. Matthew Arnold has more claim to be considered, but the debate he initiated really began at the end of the period covered by this thesis, and was conducted with the philosophers and clergy of the late nineteenth century.
all five thinkers studied in this thesis used the term "character". It is not used by all five to the same degree, nor in the same way. Yet it always has a moral dimension, and is grounded in empirical philosophy. With the exception of Hill, it also expresses man's fundamental disposition in the eyes of God. The term recurs again and again throughout this period, and refers to the correlation of moral philosophy and theology. After 1870 two changes occur in the term. First, it comes to have a non-moral reference in psychology, although Bain, who was a friend of Hill's and who pioneered the transition from empirical philosophy to psychology, had used it this way previously. J. S. Mill wrote of his father: "In psychology his fundamental doctrine was the formation of all human character by circumstances, through the universal principle of association, and the consequent unlimited possibility of improving the moral and intellectual condition of mankind by education". (1) J. S. Mill shared his father's association of psychology and morality. Bain did not, and his work pioneered the scientific study of psychology and social biology, such as Galton's *Hereditary Genius* of 1869 (2). Secondly, the concept of character comes to have idealist connotations of self-realisation in philosophy. In theology the self is realized through the work of the Spirit which brings to man the fruits of the atonement. For example, "Christ the perfect Penitent" is an example of the future development of character after 1870. A further task remains to be carried out on the period after 1870 which would show the subtly altered relation between moral philosophy and
One final justification for the restriction of the scope of this thesis lies in the agreement of all the three theologians to treat Christology explicitly within the terms provided by the Chalcedonian definition. Precisely their acceptance of this limit enables us to identify with some precision the precise terms on which their respective Christologies reflect the impact of moral theology. It is their Christocentrism, of course, which ensures the permeation of the influence of moral theology throughout their work. Whether implicitly as in Newman's Lectures on Justification, or explicitly as in Wilberforce's The Doctrine of the Incarnation or Liddon's The Divinity of Christ, the Christocentrism of these theologians stressed the life of Christ rather than his work. Evangelical theology from 1800 - 1830 was Christocentric but emphasised the death of Christ. Tractarian theology however took the Chalcedonian formula, and then spoke of Christ's "character" revealed in his life and death. They developed the term "character" through moral philosophy, moving from Chalcedon to Butler. The intention of the thesis is to explain the compactness of that statement.

Christology is studied in this thesis as it was expressed at Chalcedon. The form and structure of the Chalcedonian formula gave the determinants within which Tractarian theology could work. After 1870, many theologians found these structures a hindrance, and sought to move away from
them. However, the Tractarian theologians from 1830 - 1870 found Chalcedon a profound expression of the truth of the incarnation.

There are of course many aspects of theology which are studied alongside Christology. The doctrines of the atonement, eschatology and creation show the nature and activity of God in the world and reveal the fundamentally theistic emphasis in a Chalcedonian understanding of the Incarnation. A Christocentric theology will have as its ultimate locus the person and work of Christ, but it will also be contextualised by study of these other doctrines. Hence reference will be made in this thesis to doctrines other than Christology from time to time.

Chalcedon itself was not a piece of constructive or original theology. It echoes Cyril's second letter to Nestorius, the Tome of Leo and other documents. Nevertheless, it embodies significant Christological content. (3) The Athanasian Creed was also a significant document for the Tractarians, and caused a great controversy in the Church of England from 1867 when attempts were made to reduce its liturgical use (4). Four aspects of Christology are worth elucidating from this statement. These four are:

(i) the Lordship of Christ arising from the action of God in Christ;
(ii) the dependence of Christ on God;
(iii) the (kenotic) condescension of God in Christ;
(iv) the "adam-hood of Christ, or his representative humanity." (5)
To these four aspects, the statements continually refer. Thus Chalcedon speaks of "one and the same Son and Only-begotten, the divine logos, the Lord Jesus Christ". This summarizes God's action in Christ. The Athanasian Creed runs "inferior to the Father, as touching his humanity", which expresses the dependence of the humanity of Christ on God. The Athanasian Creed also expresses the condescension of God to man, when it says "suffered for our salvation; descended into hell". The representative manhood of Christ is shown in Chalcedon's claim that Christ was "in all things like unto us, sin only excepted."

In these statements, the cultic soteriology of the dependence of Christ and the condescension of God is very marked. Each of the three theologians felt that the Chalcedonian definition and Athanasian Creed re-expressed Johannine and Pauline theology, and felt also that they must reinterpret this for their own day. They saw the life of Christ as an obedient sacrifice, and continually returned to the significance of every element of Christ's life and character for such a sacrifice.

Each theologian studied in the thesis believed that the humanity of Christ expressed the action of God. Furthermore, each theologian understood what human nature was by relating it to the Incarnation. They did not simply move from the Incarnation to a definition of humanity, nor vice versa. Rather the two were in tension. This tension is resolved by allowing for a certain givenness in human nature from the creation while attaining a new understanding of humanity
through the Incarnation.

The four aspects of Christology constantly reappear in interrelated form in our writers. The action of God in Christ is, in the first place, described in detail by each theologian. Equally the action of God in man whom He has made is worked out in terms of a sustaining Providence. The effect of the action of God in Christ for humanity is then shown. Next, the dependence of Christ upon God is shown to be unique. Each theologian asks if humanity also is dependent upon God, and describes the fallen resistance which our humanity offers to this need for dependence. A further question worked out in this thesis is whether the dependence of Christ upon God alters the nature of His humanity. Thirdly, the question is asked as to how God's condescending love for man is shown through Christ. This question relates to the previous section on the fall of man (for Liddon and Wilberforce), where man experiences the wrath of God and not his love. Newman is more guarded on the contrast. However, the cost of the Incarnation for all three theologians is carefully delineated.

Finally, there is the solidarity of Christ with men. He lives in His life the steps of all men and from this the imitation of Christ can begin. Sinful man is alone, separated by the sin that is a divisive influence in creation.

Each of these questions concerns the nature of humanity, the way in which humanity can be related to other parts of Christian doctrine, and the new understanding offered by
the Incarnation.

It has already been noted that what ultimately mattered for these theologians was what is called a cultic (or sacrificial) soteriology, in which is revealed "the significance of every element of Christ's life and character" for the sacrifice of this life. The discussion given above referred to the new understanding of humanity offered by the Incarnation. Character and humanity are not identical concepts. What is their relationship? The thesis claims that the transcendent significance of Christ's humanity is revealed when the character of Christ can be shown.

It is certainly true that the nature of Christ's humanity was different from our own because of the effect of the divine action upon it. Yet what may be different need not express an ultimate, transcendent significance. The Chalcedonian formula speaks of Christ being without sin, and of being consubstantial with the Father as to his Godhead, and with us as to his Manhood. I shall argue that the three theologians studied here saw the transcendent significance of Christ's humanity in the formation of Christ's personal character. This character expressed the perfect response of man to God which is His sacrifice, and revealed the perfect love of God to man. The argument will also show that it is Butler's moral philosophy which enabled the value of that character to be demonstrated in Christology.

The term character is liable, as we have already noted, to
be used in different ways. An urgent question, therefore, arises concerning its coherence as a concept. An adequate working definition sees character as dependent upon a prior unity in human nature, expressing itself in thought and action in a consistent manner. It refers first to the expression of a unified nature in action, and secondly to the dispositions which govern a man. Thus one can include in the term character attitudes, intentions and patterns of behaviour. Moral virtues can be ascribed to a character.

Therefore before one can speak of character, one must speak of human nature. Hence the thesis is taken up in large part with the questions which can be put concerning Christ’s humanity if one accepts the consequences which follow from the Chalcedonian definition in Christology. Divine action, human dependence and divine self-giving will all affect the humanity of Christ. In detail, there will be consequences for human knowledge and will. Thus we are bound to study how our writers understand the cognitive, volitional and affective humanity of Christ as it manifests divine action and perfect human response. This emphasis is in turn governed by a theology which is Christocentric and places the locus of theology at the Incarnation. The result of the analysis is, however, that one moves to an appreciation of the character of Christ in the sacrifice of His life and death.

If one element of the originality claimed by this thesis is the importance of the work of Butler for the Tractarian
Christology, it is no part of the claim that this influence was in any sense exclusive. On the contrary, in addition to the concepts offered by Butler, we are obliged to take into account the whole of the eighteenth century "British Moralist" tradition, which was also used by the Tractarians in a way not previously realized. This tradition includes Sellon, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume, Price and Adam Smith. A further point made by the thesis is that there was a tension between their use of the Fathers and the British Moralists. It is therefore essential that Butler should be studied in depth, and related to his background. Reference to patristic anthropology occurs continually in the thesis. As one would expect, Augustine's view of human knowledge and of sin is demonstrably important. So too is the controversy on traducianism and creationism, concerning the origin of the soul. Equally, Cyril's theory of the instrumental nature of Christ's humanity is important for Newman. Finally, Aristotle naturally is mentioned as a major influence on Newman. Since in this case, there is already a full-length study of the relationship of Aristotle and Newman, it is sufficient to allude to the salient points.

After looking at each writer's treatment of human nature, we pass to the significance of the term character in a particular thinker. Again the work of Butler is crucial. There are limitations in Butler's thought. His view of character is not related to Christ, and his theory of the atonement (as the work of Christ) is very sketchy indeed.
Nonetheless, we can see in Butler the way moral virtues are developed. This background enables the writer to move from the sinless, consubstantial human nature of Christ to his character, which reveals to the eye of faith the transcendent, saving significance of his life and work, which may be called his sacrifice. Newman especially emphasised the importance of character here.

The thesis which is to be tested here is that when the Tractarians spoke of Christ's humanity and his character, they did so in relation to an inheritance from moral philosophy, without elucidation of which there can be no profound understanding of their Christology, and ultimately of their theology as a whole. This contrasts sharply with the conventional account given of the influence of Butler in the modern histories of the period, where Butler is usually mentioned (if at all), as the proponent of a theory of analogy used in a sophisticated apologetic to be employed when the traditional arguments for the validity of Christianity seemed weak and unconvincing. My claim is that Butler's value is at least as great in developing the theological anthropology of Christ in this period. Hence Owen Chadwick, Reardon, Elliot-Binns and even the eminent philosopher C. C. J. Webb are all in error in neglecting the importance of the British Moralists for the conceptualisation of Christ's humanity and character in Tractarian theology. (6).

The chronological outline of the thesis can briefly be
given. The second chapter after this introduction examines Butler, with the emphasis primarily on the sermons. However the analogy contextualizes the redemptive activity of God, which is the backdrop to his view of character. The analysis of Butler leads into Chapter Three, where Newman and Wilberforce are studied. They were concerned with whether Christ suffered, whether His will was self-centred, and whether He was omniscient. They then pass to Christ's character, with moral virtues, dispositions, and ideals. Such a character is redemptive, unique and final. An additional point is that Newman is concerned with the character of a Christian. The "indwelling" of Christ creates a Christian character. Yet it is also true that to know the humanity and character of Christ for Newman required a prior pre-understanding, based on a formed moral character. Hence there is a digression on the interrelationship of man's character in knowing God, the character of Christ and the character of the Christian who knows God in Christ.

Chapter Four contrasts the influence of Butler on Newman and Wilberforce with the alternative views of John Stuart Mill. Mill felt human nature was not what Butler said it was. Yet he also was concerned about character, and part of his System of Logic is devoted to this very term. It also occurs often in Liberty and Utilitarianism. The thesis thus claims that Newman and Wilberforce disagreed on what character was when speaking of Christ, at times using Butler and at times the Fathers. But a deeper dis-
agreement for them both was with J. S. Mill. Chapter Five looks at one famous Tractarian attempt to answer Mill and to carry on the Anglican work of Newman and Wilberforce. This was the Christology of H. H. Liddon. Chapter Six summarizes the thesis. There seem to be for the thinkers in the thesis three different views of what character is. Butler argues that it is the object of a judgement on the quality of an agent who has integrated his desires in action. Newman and Hill unite at least in seeing character as a conceptual tool for the analysis of intentions and motives that arises in exploring the reasons for action. Wilberforce sees character as a corporate ideal, Liddon as an individual ideal, which can be expressed in such a way as to affect the society in which the ideal is expressed.

Thus the enquiry concludes that for the Tractarians the dispositional character of Christ revealed the activity of the Godhead through the instrument of the humanity and showed the redemptive significance of Christ's humanity. That is the thesis' primary claim; the second argument is that the Tractarians took the term character from Butler, and that therefore no adequate account can be given of their christology which overlooks moral philosophy. Accordingly what follows should be read in two ways. Firstly as an historical study of the (seriously neglected) influence of Bishop Butler upon Victorian Christology, but secondly as an enquiry concerned with the difference between character and human nature, and thus with the relationship between moral philosophy and theology. The two ways are united by the fact that Newman, Wilberforce and Liddon both demonstrate the
influence of Butler and also show that they distinguished between human nature and character, using moral philosophy as they did so.
"There is a greater variety of parts in what we call a character, than there are features in a face: and the morality of that is no more determined by one part, than the beauty and deformity of this is by one single feature: each is to be judged of by all the parts or features, not taken singly but together."

Sermon 12.9, Upon the Love of our Neighbour, from 15 Sermons preached at the Rolls Chapel. 1726.
CHAPTER 2

CHARACTER IN BUTLER'S MORAL THEOLOGY 1720-1740

Introduction - The Relevance of Butler

I. Butler on Character - Preliminary Considerations
   1. Summary of Argument
   2. The Nature of Butler's Thought
      (a) Theistic
      (b) Lack of Christology
      (c) Unsystematic
   3. Implications of the thesis

II. The Presuppositions of Butler's Arguments
   1. Ethical Objectivity
   2. Human Nature as a Basic Datum
   3. Empiricism and fact
   4. Creation, Design and Teleology
   5. The Unity of the Four Presuppositions

III. The Role of Character in Butler's Thought
   1. The Defence of Personal Identity
   2. Character Defined
      (a) Passions
      (b) Self-love
      (c) Benevolence
      (d) Conscience
      (e) Summary
   3. The Formation of Character by Moral Discipline
      (a) The Character of God
      (b) The Character of Men
      (c) The Formation of Human Character by God

Summary: The Contribution of Butler to Theology
INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANCE OF BUTLER

Anglican theology was not marked in the eighteenth century by any great interest in a systematic exposition of Christology, although there was a persistent Unitarian controversy. This came to a climax from 1783-1790 between Bishop Horsley of St. Asaph and the Unitarian divine, Dr. Priestley. Nor did the Evangelical Revival help. It returned to the themes of Providence and Salvation. Evangelicals tended to concentrate on the Atonement and the experience of forgiveness. It was the Tractarian Movement which revived Christology as a study of interest to Anglicanism from 1830-1845. Among his many works Newman wrote on Athanasius and the Arian controversy. He also published both the University Sermons and the Parochial and Plain Sermons. These had a profound spiritual significance, and were deeply Christological.

By 1848, the first systematic work on the Incarnation appeared. Robert Wilberforce's Doctrine of the Incarnation marks the beginning of Christological controversy. The interpretation of this renewed interest in Christology is complex. It is not to be understood as a mere recrudescence of High Anglicanism, returning to patristic sources and seeking to revive a Christocentric theology and spirituality. A further reason is that both Newman and Wilberforce had inherited that concern with the nature of man which informed the aspiration to holiness so characteristic of the Oxford/Tractarian Movement. This concern came from the eighteenth century British moralists, Shaftesbury, Butler and Hume, but especially Butler. Out of this concern they were able to present the person of Christ in a particular way. For Newman and Wilberforce, the centre of the Gospel was not merely Christ the
divine Son of God. Christ was for them the Pattern Man, the man of perfect character, and this claim they could carefully work out by using the traditions of moral philosophy. But there were problems too. Alexandrian Christology in one respect could be helpful in stressing the unity of Christ, as in the formula of Cyril of Alexandria, "one incarnate nature of the Word of God." But this Christology could also create difficulties in speaking of Christ as man. There is a tension between Christian Platonism and the influence of Butler when talking of Christ, the Pattern Man, or the character of Christ. The tension is heightened by Wilberforce's desire to answer Strauss' Life of Jesus, published in English in 1846. The period 1846-1848 is the opening of Christological controversy.

Wilberforce's answer to the translation of Strauss, and Liddon's later reply to Mill both centre around the concepts of humanity, moral character and Christology. 1846-1848 sees the emergence of the debate in full blown form which is studied in this thesis.

Newman took the concept of character further. How one knew the indwelling Christ was by a reference to the Christ of the gospels; only so could the power of Christ in man be described. So character applied to Christ, could describe that Person who now dwelt in a Christian's heart by faith.

Yet the very process of faith involved a moral discernment of divine reality. Conscience and the illative sense witnessed to the truth of Christ's divinity and humanity. But both conscience and
the illative sense stemmed from a person's character. Once again the moral tradition of the eighteenth century emerges as a vital factor in the new developments.

Moreover, it was axiomatic for these writers that a Christian grows in holiness and depth of truth. The sanctification of a Christian never ends. What he grows into is a partial realization of the perfect character of Christ. Again the moral tradition of the eighteenth century is crucial. Alike in speaking of Christ, knowing Christ, and in the search for our sanctification the concern with morality and character is crucial.

All this presupposes a tradition to build upon. It was there, and the Tractarian reverenced it. Butler became a central figure for them. The purpose of my argument in this second Chapter of the thesis is, therefore, as follows. Butler was a philosopher whose methodology became central both in its method of cumulative probabilities to attain certitude and in its analogical reasoning between material and spiritual reality. For sacramentalists such as the Tractarians The Analogy became very important. The Tractarian also fought against the cold rationalism of agnostics and sceptics, and here the method of certitude was important. But a third use of Butler was the detailed analysis Butler gave of the complexity of human character, his resolution of this complexity by talk of a system in human nature, and his firm concentration on the possibility of redemption and future judgement for a Christian's character. In other words, it is not merely the form of Butler's argument that mattered to the Tractarians, it was what he was writing about. Butler had great
weaknesses, characteristic of his age. The Christology is weak, the interest in systematic theology low, the appreciation of history slight. But as a moralist he provided a phenomenology of moral evil, and a structure for "the private theatre of the soul". The Tractarians never forgot this.

This thesis then seeks to show that the revival of Christology in Anglicanism from 1830 in England, carried with it a commitment to carrying on the tradition of moral philosophy that began with Locke. The Tractarians did not merely preach Christ, they preached the character of Christ. They presented Him to those with characters needing to receive Him but also able to receive Him: to men aware of the claims of holiness upon their souls and of their own imperfections. They preached to an educated audience who also knew Butler. So, although this thesis is concerned with Christology from 1830 to 1870, it is to Butler we must first go to understand why his influence was so seminal upon a Christology written 80 years and more after his death. Butler the theologian, philosopher and moralist provides many of the ideas and language of a later generation: we must first see what Butler's own ideas were.

Hence a thesis that covers the period 1830-1870 begins with a long survey of a moral philosopher a century earlier. Butler is surveyed in exhaustive detail, because he was so influential for these theologians. Still more, the work on Butler's methodology as it influenced Newman's Grammar of Assent has been done often. Yet the correlation of "character" between the two men has not been worked out. Indeed, Butler's masterly treatment of character has been ignored
by these theologians fascinated by his treatment of analogy. Since Butler's Sermons have been studied only by moral philosophers, his Analogy only by philosophical theologians, and his overall work rather glibly placed in histories of the eighteenth century, histories of apologetics, or histories of Christian ethics, it is high time that the entire corpus of Butler's work is studied from the viewpoint of a systematic theologian. The Tractarians regarded him this way, and that is why he is studied at length in this thesis. The justification for beginning a thesis on Christology from 1830-1870 with Butler is that he is crucially influential for systematic theology and he has not been studied before in this way.

I. BUTLER ON CHARACTER - PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

1. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Butler's ethical theory is coterminus with his theological one. He did not separate out his thought into moral philosophy and theology, but achieved an untidy, loose but ultimately coherent vision of man made in the image of God. Butler is of interest to this thesis precisely because, as will be argued, the concept of character holds together the theological and philosophical sides of his thought. In the fairly meagre writing on Butler in the last twenty years the concept of character has been ignored.

Butler is not a theologian fond of telling stories, with characters who interact and held our attention. Character for Butler is a technical concept that unites a system of thought both
philosophical and theological, and which is inherently untidy. But one cannot have a character without telling some story about it, and so we find Butler meditating on the story of David and Nathan, and the story of Balaam and his ass. Yet character for Butler is part of the essence of morality, which he calls "the thing itself", and having got character off the ground by telling a story, he concentrates on "the thing itself". It is important to note that what has been called narrative theology in recent years is not found in Butler. A narrative theology requires characters, but characters do not require narrative theology. Character is a more basic theological concept than narrative in my view. Character is what men make of themselves, and what Butler relates to the way of the world as both a theologian, moralist and philosopher. Character is good or bad, and religion is true or false. If religion is true, then one sort of character is better than another. It is better that men have violent emotions which cause evil, than that they turn in on themselves in settled evil of endless complexity. This is not merely good moral advice. The "common passions" can be harmonized, and eternal life won once true Christianity has made men sanctified. The alternative is serenity based on a prolonged self-deceit about one's moral failings. The price of this is the avoidance of knowledge of "a higher judgment, upon which our whole being depends."(1) Thus it is ultimately a theological focussing on redemption and judgment which governs this interest in character. Religion

"requires real fairness of mind and honesty of heart. And, if people will be wicked, they had better of the two be so from the common vicious passions without such refinements, than from this deep and calm
source of delusion; which undermines the whole principle of good... and corrupts conscience, which is the guide of life."(2)

The stages of the argument we shall pursue are as follows:

(i) Butler's thought is theistic throughout, and I will argue that talk of its independence from theology is inaccurate. But it is neither systematic nor Christological. It stands deliberately in the Wisdom tradition, and at times appears Stoical.

(ii) There are four underlying presuppositions in his thought. It is ethical, factual, naturalist and teleological. The Telos lies in the final ethical judgment of God in a "future life". This world is one of moral probation, where God attempts to create in man a character like his own. Thus the ethical and teleological aspects are related.

(iii) There are four moves necessary for this claim to be vindicated. First, if God is to deal with man as a moral agent at all, he must have personal identity and moral responsibility. Second, the concept of character is worked by means of proportion, a term taken from an earlier philosopher, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (henceforth simply called Shaftesbury), who was taught by Locke. Third, the Analogy of Religion discusses the predicament of man. Man is wicked, finite, ignorant and unbalanced. He is then, (as MacKinnon says), alienated from himself. Yet he is redeemed as God causes a new character to be created in him. Fourth, the character of man is related to the love of God, and to those "who call themselves Christians".

2. THE NATURE OF BUTLER'S THOUGHT

Butler's work is characterized by the presence of certain basic features, to which we must briefly turn our attention.

(a) Butler's Theism

Butler's thought is theistic in the sense that Philosophy and
Theology cannot be separated in his writings. His thought has an inherent unity.

It is suggested by T.A. Roberts in his commentary on the Sermons that Butler has a theological ethic only in the broadest sense of man being created by God. While this is a "very important regard", Roberts nevertheless holds that for Butler right and wrong are so "prior to all will whatever". It is thus prior to the will of God as well. So it is not strictly a theological or Christian ethic, argues Roberts but Butler argues that men have very limited knowledge. All they can properly know is morality. It is true that for Butler this is the case, (and things are right or wrong), whatever our will may want. But what is the relation of morality to the created universe? Butler's God is absolute and omniscient, and we do not know how He works. "The methods and designs of Providence"\(^{(3)}\) are beyond us. The power of God is greater than morality, although it does not alter morality. Butler's ethic is primarily one of goodness, the goodness of God. Science is only a diversion if it attempts to explain creation in ways that do not benefit man, relieve pain and establish religion.\(^{(4)}\)

"God Almighty undoubtedly foresaw the disorders, both natural and moral, which would happen in this state of things. If upon this we set ourselves to search and examine why He did not prevent them; we shall, I am afraid, be in danger of running into somewhat worse than impertinent curiosity".\(^{(5)}\)

"It is easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance, as it is the common, is really a satisfactory answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of Providence".\(^{(6)}\)
Butler is secondly a theistic thinker because he is Eudaimonistic. Professor Burnaby's *Amor Dei* places Butler at the end of the line of theologians from Augustine who affirm the validity of human longing for God. It is not, as Nygren argues in *Agape and Eros*, an inherently corrupt desire that man has to be fulfilled in God. Butler notes that God is only found by those who seek for the ultimate. Beyond right and wrong, and deeper than morality, Butler seeks for "something which may be to us that satisfactory good we are enquiring after". "Nothing is more certain than that an infinite being may Himself be, if He pleases, the supply to all the capacities of our nature". Yet the way to know God is by morality, though the resignation of our will to his, "when our will is lost and resolved into His". We are not simply to seek to make others happy, but to follow "the ways" which He has directed. This identification of morality and divine commands again shows how theological Butler's thought is. We must seek to promote good "in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice". We feel moral obligations because God lays them upon us, and we feel them "quite distinct from a perception that the observance or violation of them is for the happiness or misery of our fellow creatures". Lastly, Butler is a theist, because, as well as the regulative and Eudaimonist aspects of his thought, he is a believer in providence. "The happiness of the world is the concern of him who is the Lord and the proprietor of it". "The dealings of God with the children of men are not yet completed and cannot be judged of by that part which is before us". Evil exists, and Butler does not minimize it. But it is not a fault in the creation, and only our ignorance makes us
think so. "All shall be set right at the final distribution of things". (14)

(b) Lack of Christology

Butler has a theory of the offices of Christ in the Analogy, and he defends the natural probability of Christ's mediation. But his ethical and philosophical system works on general laws. Christ enables us to keep these laws, and the generality of law is broad enough to encompass miracles. The mediation of Christ enables us to avoid our punishment, although as noted later Butler's theory of the atonement is inchoate. Butler holds to a retributivist theory of punishment, which of course would be analogous in human society to divine action in nature: Christ then only illustrates what the moral requirements of God are in his government of men. Butler's theological ethic is thus theist, not deist nor Christological. Christ illustrates the general requirements of morality, but this morality is established by God, who intervenes providentially in human life. Butler may not be reduced to a theory of general providence and revelation, nor is his ethic fully autonomous. He escapes the categories of the theological debates of the present day. Christ is not the centre of his theology or ethics, yet man is not the sole agent of his actions, for God constantly intervenes in human life.

The New Testament epistles only have force so long as the local conditions and usages remain. They were addressed especially to their age, which has now past. So the prescriptions of the apostolic epistles "cannot at this time be urged in that manner, and
with that force which they were to be primitive Christians." (15)

A prior obligation on all men to the Christian revelation is the created nature of man, which enshrines the natural law of virtue. This is a greater obligation than the historical truth that "God sent His Son into the world to save it and the motives which arise from the peculiar relations of Christians, as members one of another under Christ our head". (16) The reason given is similar to that of the young Hegel in his early writings. For Butler, as for Hegel in his Early Theological Writings, the sufferings of the early Church turned Christians to meditate on the sufferings of Christ, and hence to a form of union with Christ. Yet to say "we are one Body in Christ" is merely "an additional motive, over and above moral considerations, to the discharge of the several duties and offices of a Christian". (17) Furthermore, Butler claims that "the inspired writers" of the New Testament agree with him on the prior importance of natural morality.

Natural morality or natural law is not clearly defined. It was left to a successor of Butler, Thomas Reid, of Scotland, to work out a theory of the rational content of morality known by the intuition of reason. Butler gave no such emphasis to rational intuition (although traces of it are there) nor is there any categorical relation of the moral law to the laws of natural phenomena. Their unity is found in the will of God, not in the identification of a prescriptive moral law with a descriptive natural law, as in classical Thomism. Natural law is natural for Butler because when men are moral they are true to their nature. Butler felt rational intuition was too narrowing an epistemology for man: rather man knew what was right by conscience, both a feeling and a movement of reason. Butler was
neither a rationalist nor an advocate of moral sense as feeling alone. There is a "natural order of human conduct" revealed in the complexity of moral and religious psychology as it mediates the will of God to men.

(c) Absence of System

There are three reasons why Butler may be classed as unsystematic. The point is important because eighteenth century Protestant Lutheran and Reformed theology was either highly systematic or else affected by Pietist irrationalism. Likewise, Roman Catholic writings on ethics oscillated between sentimental devotion and Thomist manuals. Butler is neither, as a theologian. His theology comes through his sermons, and is untidy and yet coherent.

Butler is unsystematic because he uses two diametrically opposed styles. The sermons work out an anthropology which is highly articulated in Sermons 1-3, but recurs in later sermons in short bursts. Yet the Sermons are complemented by the closeknit, reflective style of the philosophy of religion in The Analogy. Lastly, there is the compressed argument of the Dissertations, especially of Personal Identity. Unless the form of the argument bears no relation to the content, Butler is building an argument in several different styles.

Secondly, it is impossible to supplement Butler's writings with his private papers or occasional writings. He praised the virtues of silence, spent several years writing The Analogy at Stanhope, Co. Durham, where he was described as 'buried', and ordered his papers to be destroyed in his will. All that remains are his philosophical letters to Samuel Clarke, the episcopal charges, a few letters and
six Sermons apart from the *Rolls Sermons* and *The Analogy*. Little is known of him as a man.

Thirdly, moral philosophers have had a field day arguing whether the references in *The Sermons* and *The Analogy* place Butler as a sentimentalist or a rationalist. This point is not germane to the thesis, but it illustrates the unsystematic nature of his writing. Yet Butler never appears to be careless. In a detailed examination of his literary style, Duncan-Jones shows how Butler carefully weighed his words. He was probably as careful in philosophy. Butler appeals to probability in his arguments. This has provoked discussion and argument. J.R. Lucas approves of this handling of reason against Hume's "flat" concept of reason, while Anders Jeffner rejects the methodology as going beyond the evidence. Lucas identifies Butler, indeed, with Cleanthes in Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, where Cleanthes appeals to probability. Lucas ignores Jeffner's careful refutation of this identification, however. Butler's use of probability was neither imitated nor portrayed by Hume. But his actual style of arguing is also cumulative and probable. Gradually men are convinced by the weight of the whole argument, and its many-sidedness. If this is the data that should count when arguing, so also should the literary style be many-sided, which above all should be weighty. Fifteen closely argued sermons together give all of Butler's doctrine of man, and not, as MacKinnon rightly says, the first three entitled 'On Human Nature'.

There is then an alternative to Protestant and Catholic theology. It is inductive, philosophically acute, with careful language, complex
arguments, and untidy but overwhelming appeals to the whole past reflection on one theme. So Butler builds up his case keeping close to human experience, the transcendent reality of God, and the ever-pressing reality of conscience. Newman regarded The Analogy and the Sermons as masterpieces. Yet they are certainly as unsystematic as any theology could be.

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THESIS

The greatness of Anglican theology in the period 1830-1870 lay to a considerable degree in the fact that it attempted a profound engagement with a living tradition of moral philosophy. Even when the theologian and moral philosopher, Butler, who had launched this enterprise became no longer fully credible, theologians did not simply abandon moral philosophy. So deeply had Butler influenced Tractarianism that the theologians of the mid- and late nineteenth century felt they had to come to terms with the dominant moral philosophy. Liddon, therefore, was preoccupied with questions of free will and conscience in his Christology, and attempted to refute J.S. Mill and the utilitarian determinists. The anthropology constitutive of a Christology was based on a philosophically rigorous account of man as a moral agent. To put it another way, one of the most famous contributions of British empiricism to philosophy is the eighteenth century school of "the British moralists." This centred for Anglican theologians on Butler. This school not only had implications for ethics, it had profound implications for Christology, and one of the best features of English, and especially Anglican, theology from 1830-1870 was that it responded so well to Butler, and other moralists.
We must now discover why Butler had the influence he exercised so strongly.

II. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF BUTLER'S ARGUMENTS

How then should Butler be interpreted? Not by appealing to his use of theological loci nor by an adherence to philosophical arguments which follow one school or another. Butler was a very private man with his own vision of life. The four aspects of the expression of that vision are not inherently theological. The four are his concern with teleology, naturalism, ethical objectivity, and empiricism. In the hands of an evolutionary ethicist, one could be agnostic and defend the existence of moral value, which was found in an emerging pattern in human nature, and thus transcend the is/ought distinction with an appeal to the empirical authority of fact. Yet Butler argued that only if we see all four under the Providence of God do we fully enlarge our vision aright. Jeffner (19) and Duncan-Jones (20) see the appeal to Providence as emotivist. But Butler's appeal to Providence is an epistemological claim of how a thing is held in being and presented to our perception. As MacKinnon again notes, "It is when we come to terms with the particularities of our actual nature that we are made most sharply aware of the transcendent claims of morality". (21) God's government is discovered when we "come to terms with the particularities" of our own untidy lives.
1. FIRST PRESUPPOSITION - ETHICAL OBJECTIVITY

In a famous passage, Butler appeals to the belief of moralists, ancient and modern, that there exists "the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever". (22) This abstract argument is supported by an appeal to the authority of fact, which must wait until we discuss this theme in Section 3. below. Yet the co-existence of abstraction and empiricism is typical: it defies neat compartmentalising. There is then

"an original standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all will but which unalterably determines the will of God to exercise that moral government over the world, which religion teaches, i.e., finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act right or wrong". (23)

While I have argued that one must place talk of 'determining God's will' in the context of epistemological finitude, and the mystery of providence, it remains a striking claim for Butler to make on behalf of ethical objectivity.

Morality will remain even if all religion should cease. Religion for Butler is of two sorts, natural and revealed. Natural religion is the worship of a God who governs the world morally and responds to our moral actions in a future life. It includes the other religions than Christianity. Revealed religion is simply Christianity. However, the identification of revealed religion with Christianity was not carried on to a confessional theology. Butler shows little interest in expounding the 39 Articles of the Anglican Church. He moved as an adolescent from the Free Churches to a philosophical theology that accepted Christian revelation as true, if partial, and he
also accepted an erastian and sacramental ecclesiology. This inevitably was bound to lead him into Anglicanism, but he was not a defender of its doctrinal stance per se. Newman felt Butler was "the greatest name in the Anglican Church" but ironically Newman felt no twinge of betrayal to Butler when he left Anglicanism, despite Newman's life-long veneration of Butler. This was because Butler's place in Anglicanism was not as a defender of its confessional theology, but because Anglicanism gave Butler a philosophical and sacramental home.

If the proof of religion no longer convinced men, and for Butler proof was necessary for religion to be acceptable, then God would no longer be worshipped. The assertion of God's glory would be rejected: "yet still, let the assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations would remain certain". Butler did not, of course, mean that men could not deny moral obligations, since he knew Hobbes had done so, and he carefully refuted Hobbesian egoism. For something to be 'undeniably true' it had to be so only if the reality of human nature would force a man to assert this. Hobbes could only deny this truth of moral obligation by ignoring the reality of human nature for his own philosophical system.

The moral faculty by which we judge whether an action is right or wrong is conscience. Right and wrong are primarily predicted of actions, and of characters expressing themselves in actions. Again Butler's thought defies neat categories. Religion is, at the lowest account, relevant to ethics by rendering explicit the sanctions for ethical behaviour, whether as reward or punishment.
"Now if human creatures are endowed with such a moral nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural object of which is actions; moral government must consist in rendering them happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect or depart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty". (26)

Whether Butler believes that ethical judgments can simply be defended on the basis of fact is uncertain. At one point Butler advances a theory of naturalism in moral obligation. "Your obligation to obey this law .... is its being the law of your nature". (27) Yet "that authority and obligation which is a constituent part of reflex approbation" (28), goes beyond any authority of the nature of man. It is grounded in the nature of the universe itself. This constraint of moral obligation is mediated and known via human nature, however: it is a 'known obligation'. (29) Thus a human disposition to avoid immoral action is not dependent on a prudential self-awareness grounded in our foreknowledge of divine punishment if we transgress the will of God, but is rather merely the result of our obligations to ourselves: we are by our "very nature a law to ourselves". "It is not foreknowledge of the punishment which renders us obnoxious to it; but merely violating a known obligation". (30)

Inherent in moral judgment is the concept of ill-desert, or good-desert. Although disposition and character are evaluated by action in which they are expressed, the description of an action is more than the consequences which it causes. Inherent in description is the concept both of moral value and moral desert, a desert which postulates three agencies which carry out the sanction required. These are nature, man and God. All actions are moral actions, for 'mere'
empiricism is inadequate. But all moral actions involve moral government. Butler gives an illuminating example. A man is left to die alone. Yet is this a moral action? If one has in all innocence caught the plague, it is not a treatment one deserves, although it may be a prudent course of action to avoid infection of others. Butler implies there are other cases where one might deserve such abandonment.

In all moral epistemology, we condemn or reward, and what we condemn or reward is not co-humanity, solidarity or, in Butler's words, the love of our neighbour, but this virtue is commended together with justice and truth ('veracity'). Again the description of an action is not enough if it is given only in empirical terms; it refers also to a non-natural reality, and is inherently related to it. Yet Butler is no Kantian. There is only one reality, and that is the one we all know with our senses, reason and conscience. Any world "behind" this world is a fantasy, unless one speaks of the divine government within this world. Butler equally charts a different course from the one Kant was to follow when he denies the importance of whether an action was done to benefit an agent or not. Actions are good if they accord with benevolence, justice and truth, for action for one's own interest is a perfectly proper way of behaving. So Butler writes in defence of these points:

"We are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an over-balance of happiness or misery". (31)

"Benevolence, and the want of it, simply considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice". (32)
"We may judge and determine that an action is morally good or evil, before we so much as consider whether it is interested or disinterested .... Self-love, in its due degree, is as just and morally good, as any affection whatever".(33)

"Moral obligations arise immediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which one cannot violate without being self-condemned".(34)

Yet, as said above, all this is known and mediated through the nature of men. So it is to the second of Butler's presuppositions that we now turn.

2. SECOND PRESUPPOSITION - HUMAN NATURE

There are three basic points to be made concerning Butler's theory of human nature, as it is related to ethics and to character.

First, man can if he wishes know himself more easily than he knows anything else. As will be seen later in the Section on personal identity, Butler holds that the essence of man is reason, will and memory. Since Butler had no interest in the unconscious, man for Butler need not be a mystery to himself. We have a privileged access to our own minds, and to our intentions. Thus the fall of man is demonstrated by the fact that we are often, and quite unnaturally, strangers to ourselves.(34b) The nature of man is a crucial concept in this thesis, and we will study the term "natural" in Liddon and in Wilberforce.

Second, the word natural is for Butler the place where the glory of God is revealed. God's holiness and majesty is found as man is seen to be created and sustained by God. Man's nature is "in-formed"
by God, and the nature of man includes his intellectual creativity and moral relationships. Thus man's relationship to God is where man is most himself: to be with God is not to open oneself to a heteronomous lawgiver, but to be oneself. In the stress on both the theonomous nature of man as a law to himself, and on the relational aspects of man as part of the 'natural' rather than the physical, Butler anticipates current Roman Catholic views on natural law in such theologians as Schuller and Fuchs. (35) God is ontologically and epistemologically transcendent, but he is partially revealed in human life here and now, not merely in the Bible. The Pauline usage of natural in Romans 1 and 2 is approved of as giving a biblical basis to natural law much as contemporary Catholic theologians such as Schuller argue, and this is also a passage where Butler finds a reference to conscience. Human nature is made far better than we know by God: the faults in nature are due to our abuse of it.

"Men may speak of the degeneracy and corruption of the world according to the experience they have had of it; but human nature, considered as the divine workmanship, should methinks be treated as sacred: for 'in the image of God made He man'. "(36) Thus the Imago Dei in Butler is ontological, not relational as in Protestant theology of this period. Man is God's creature because he is who he is, which is to say, made in a certain determinate way by God: and this he can never lose as a rational agent.

Thirdly, the correlation of the ethical realm with human existence renders the transition from ethical theory to ethical practice imprecise. Yet, equally, the theory itself will not be clear cut, precise and certain. Logical demonstrations of ethical theory are improper.
As MacKinnon notes, the influence of Aristotle's *Ethics* is strong in Butler and the theologian so influenced also by Butler, Newman.

"We can only achieve that degree of accuracy (\(\mathcal{L_\mu}\)) that its subject matter permits". (37) This puts an end to the speculations of his age that a "Newton of the moral sciences" might arise. The laws of morality were not reducible to anything akin to mathematical theory, and if they were reduced in this way, there were meaningless. Yet Butler is often seen as a theologian highly impressed with the parallels between scientific and theological reasonings. Unlike Protestant theology, the impact of eighteenth century science went deep into his conception of theology. Theology was to do with experience; it was inductive; it had its authority, as science had; it worked on laws. So Mossner has identified Butler with the Deist Cleanthes (38), and Jeffner has identified him with the theologians of the design argument. But Butler is more subtle than Mossner or Jeffner will allow. He sought for inspiration in scientific methodology, but his knowledge of it enabled him to know the limits of this same methodology. The difference between theology and science is not that of faith and reason, the invisible and visible: it is between that which never can be reduced to rational coherence, and that which can. Men and God are free; nature is not. So the distinction is between the proper limits of his knowledge, and what lies outside them, in the searching agnosticism of the 15th Sermon.

"It is to be observed, then, that as there are express determinate acts of wickedness, such as murder, adultery and theft: so, on the other hand, there are numberless cases in which the vice and wickedness cannot be exactly defined; but consists in a certain general temper or course of action".
He writes in Sermon 10 of the Rolls Sermons, "Whoever will consider the whole commerce of human life will see that a great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the intercourse amongst mankind, cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules. Yet in these cases there is a right and a wrong. But who can define precisely, wherein that contracted spirit and hard usage of others consist, as murder and theft may be defined?"(41)

3. THIRD SUPPOSITION - EMPIRICISM AND FACT

If defined at all, life will be known by the methods of empirical knowledge, guided by reason and morality. Like Newman subsequently, Butler was glad to be an empiricist. The complexity of human nature was for him part of the complexity of design in the world as a whole. Intuition was an insufficient ground for asserting the existence of ethical objectivity. Ethically objective truth was known through conscience as it guided the true performance of human nature. But Butler held that a careful examination of facts would reveal a pattern, an analogy, between the workings of nature and religious truth. Although Butler could make assertions in an a priori manner, especially when influenced by Clarke, more commonly he starts "from a matter of fact, namely what the particular nature of man is ....; from thence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to the whole nature".(42) One clear example of this is his disagreement with Thomas Hobbes that man is totally egotistic. Butler has two stratagems. One is to show the verbal inconsistencies of the Hobbist view; but the deeper appeal is to empirical data. The whole question

"is a mere question of fact, or natural history, not
provable immediately by reason. It is therefore to be judged of and determined in the same way other facts or matters of natural history are: from a matter of fact, namely what the particular nature of man is ....; from whence it proceeds to determine what course it is". (43)

"It is a mere question of fact, or natural history, not provable immediately by reason. It is therefore to be judged of and determined in the same way other facts or matters of natural history are: by appealing to the external senses, or inward perceptions respectively, as the matter under consideration is cognizable by one or the other by arguing from acknowledged facts and actions". (44)

This leads to an inevitable imprecision in theory. "I never heard of strict demonstration of matter of fact" (45) is an admission that conjoins a certain contingency in conclusions to an imprecision in theory. But religion is factual, and the price must be paid. It is worth paying because, in this case, theory reflects reality. Probability will be a sufficient way of arguing. "Even natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact". (46) Men are aware of the pressure of divine judgment in their actions, which is an experiential claim and thus within the realm of fact. Yet Christianity is no different. Natural religion is factual because it relies on an experiential epistemology; revealed religion is factual because it is historical.

"This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of events before they come to pass: doctrines also are matters of fact; and precepts come under the same notion". (47)
4. FOURTH PRESUPPOSITION - TELEOLOGY, OR DESIGN IN CREATION

The influence of Samuel Clarke was marked here, and Butler's thought reflects a tension between empirical common sense and the Platonic strain found since Ralph Cudworth in Anglicanism. Unlike Berkeley, his thought is highly realist, but the tone shifts to one of assertion and vision, not detailed comparisons of empirical facts. Yet there is in his sermons an alteration between the appeal to the empirical and the alternative, intuitive, rational vision. There is no temporal break between one view and the other. This has always made him a difficult theologian to classify.

Clarke wrote that between things which exist

"there are certain necessary and eternal differences of things, and certain consequent fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another; not depending on any positive constitutions founded unchangeably in the nature and reason of things". (48)

Theology should take as its model, to use a contemporary metaphor, the geometrical proportions of bodies, when describing both the relationship of aspects of creation to each other, and the response of human agents to their environment.

It is only a short step from this argument to go on to ascribe purpose to the necessary fittingness of things, and the ascription of teleological function to the harmony of creation was indeed made by Butler. He thus formulated the medieval view of a Great Chain by Being from God to man into a view of the indwelling of God, manifested by the recognition in a true vision of the harmony of all things.
There is a "generous movement of mind" in creation. Wherever man looks, he can discern function, and functionalism in creation manifests "the work of an intelligent mind". (50)

Butler, however, alters the classic design argument. It was a repeated criticism of the design argument that it said nothing either about moral perfection and wickedness, or made any reference to the character of God. Butler is aware of these points and attempts to meet them. He was, however, not influential, and many Christian scientists repeated the amoral design argument up to Darwin, with an equally predictable criticism from evangelicals who placed their theological locus on the reality of sin. (51) How did Butler reformulate the argument from design?

Butler argued that as physiological facts manifest function and so design, so too do the passions; (this will be explained in the section on character). Furthermore, there is a correlation between physiological and animate function on the one hand, and moral and spiritual function on the other, since the creation is designed by God's wisdom and foresight to be the theatre of human passions. Some parts of creation with their design are the fit objects of attention of the nature of man, with his design.

"The due and proper use of any natural faculty or power, is to be judged of by the end or design for which it was given us .... There could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the passions: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than another". (52)
Furthermore, this design is not eternal and static. At least in relation to men, human nature is designed by God to combat the finitude of men. Finitude in this context is neither to be described as epistemological limitations, nor is it the limitations of creation. It is not the blindness of men surveying God's actions in the world, nor men's lack of strength and their mortality. To be infinite is to be harmonious, and to be filled and whole; to be finite is to risk at every moment the disturbance of proportion and balance in one's creation by God. This point is of great importance when we come later to look directly at character. Design is not only flexible, it is inherently good. Moral evil

"is the only deformity in the creation, and the only reasonable object of abhorrence and dislike(53) ... no passion God hath endued us with can be in itself evil(54) .... our passions are as really a part of our constitution as our senses; since the former as really belongs to our condition of nature as the latter; to get rid of either is equally a violation of and breaking in upon that nature and constitution He has given us. Both our senses and our passions are a supply to the imperfection of our nature: thus they shew that we are such sort of creatures, as to stand in need of those helps which higher orders of creatures do not".(55)

The theologian then stands with the moralist in observing human nature, as it expresses itself in character.

"As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise moral obligations may be shown by different methods. If the real nature of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such purposes only, or more than to any other; this is a reason to believe the Author of that nature intended it for those purposes".(56)

The result will be "a certain determinate course of action suitable to those circumstances".(57)
5. THE UNITY OF THE FOUR PRESUPPOSITIONS

The import of ethical objectivity and teleology lies in the preparation of man for a future life. Christianity is for Butler the only possible answer to the soteriological needs of man, and revelation confirms and builds on the witness of natural religion to the need of man for redemption.

"Christiinity is not only an external institution of natural religion, and a new promulgation of God's general providence, as righteous governor and judge of the world: but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are represented, in scripture, to be in a state of ruin". (58)

The ruin of man is his betrayal of the way of life God had made him for, and his refusal to consider the possibility of a future life either as punishment or reward for this one.

So the Analogy of Religion opens with a defence of the existence of a future life. It is "palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall cease to be, at death" (59) because there is "a very considerable degree of probability" (60) against it. Butler argues on the basis of cumulative evidence. Since we will not return to this point again, it is perhaps worth noticing that Butler here abandons a strict reliance on fact, to prove immortality. The denial of moral egoism in The Sermons is a matter of fact known by the senses, (61) but The Analogy relegates the senses to aids to perception. (62) Reason is a better guide than sense data. Sense data are material, but the dissolution of matter is no barrier to a belief in immortality. (63) Reason, memory and affection are the essence of human nature, and the
suspension or destruction of these "is no part of the idea of death, nor is implied in our notion of it". (64)

III. THE ROLE OF CHARACTER IN BUTLER'S THOUGHT

Butler has shown in his Sermons that God intervenes in human life with creative power by His moral will. Man has the possibility of immortality, which in The Analogy Butler tries to show is probable. It is reasonable to suppose that the teleology found in the structure of creation is related to immortality for men. Why this is important for this thesis is that Butler turns, as the first English theologian to do so, to working out systematically how men can be redeemed, and their characters formed, by discipline and grace. Butler elaborates conscience into a philosophical theory and a theology of Divine Judgment. Earlier Anglicans were more concerned with moral theology for its own sake. Such men as Robert Sanderson (Nine Cases of Conscience Occasionally Determined, 1678) or Jeremy Taylor did not place their teaching in such a rigorous framework. Their concern was more practical, although also very influential. So the question "has man a soul?" is taken for granted. What matters is that it is a soul with identity through changing "impressions". This soul can know itself, enter into a personal relationship with God, and be redeemed. The intense fascination found in British empirical philosophy of the eighteenth century with what the soul thinks is common to the agnostic Hume and the Anglican Butler. This fascination with 'the performances within the structure of the private theatre of the soul' is entirely natural to Newman. Newman was not prepared to deal
with Christianity simply as a series of dogmas. It was the belief of an individual in another individual who was God and Man; it was the relationship of God and the self. Now Butler's thought is untidy, and disparate: he could at times echo Clarke, the great exponent of a priori truths, and at times he seems to look forward to his greater adversary, Hume, in an entirely empiricist manner. But a careful reading of Butler can see him deny that the soul is simply a bundle of impressions, arising from the senses (as Hume later claimed), and move from a defence of identity to an expression of what it means for X to have a character. If these two points are granted, Butler argues, then characters can be formed in certain ways - and this is what Christianity is all about; here is the defence of redemption and the atonement; here is Christianity made relevant against Deism. Now all this depends on the previous argument given above: that is to say, that ethical objectivity is real, human nature and empiricism are where one argues the case for Christianity, and the world has a meaning and purpose in its structure.

This is only one way of reading Butler, as a defender of Christianity on the terms of his opponents, which are not the terms usually read into eighteenth century histories. Butler did not simply play the design argument, use reason against Deism, or redefine what it meant to reason. He was also a moral philosopher who argued that the current fascination of moral philosophy with the soul and its actions was proper, but this introspection led on to religion, Christianity and what a later generation called spirituality. The argument of this thesis is that this is an entirely reasonable way of reading Butler, and hence it is quite appropriate to interpret the
occurrence of character in subsequent theology as a direct result of Butler's influence on future thinkers.

All this depended on the revival of interest in 'holiness' in theology, on the revival of Christology of which character would be predicted and on an interest in the soul seeking faith. We then turn to four steps in Butler's thought:

(1) the defence of personal identity, or that man has a soul,
(2) that this soul can be defined as having a good or bad character,
(3) that this character can be altered and sustained,
(4) that here Christianity rests on its case, as the truest expression of (1) - (3).

1. STEP ONE - THE DEFENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

The Dissertation of Personal Identity and Part 1, Chapter 6 of The Analogy are two places where Butler faces the problem of who man is, and what it means to speak of personal responsibility. If man is ultimately of no ontological significance, questions of a future life are irrelevant. If the significance of human life can further only be described as the localization of states of consciousness in continuous sequence, the transition from this world to the next is still a problem. It will be hard to establish the relationship of further experiences beyond death to experiences during this life.

Secondly, if man is merely a form of sequential consciousness in linear progression, man is continually changing. Therefore, it is an unjustified act to ascribe moral responsibility for past actions to
the present recipients of conscious experiences, even if for that moment only until they change again. Furthermore, if men are determined by necessity, moral responsibility ceases to be an unjustified ascription and becomes meaningless altogether. If this is the case, talk of moral probation is empty and questions of future existences again becomes irrelevant, unless God acts in a purely arbitrary way. Indeed, even Calvin argued that man was morally worthy of divine punishment, although God could act as he willed, a point strongly emphasized by T.H.L. Parker in Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God. God is not conceived of as arbitrary by any major Christian theologian: man deserves the free judgment of God. If man is not morally free, the structure of the world will be teleological still but cannot serve the ethical redemption of man.

Personal identity of the soul is what character is built upon. A character can only exist if there is an "I" who never changes, even if the "I" has an identity known only to God. But men can recognize identity, even if they do not know what it is they recognize, and even if they cannot define it. Men can recognize, but not define, the mathematical terms of equality and similitude, says Butler. Men recognize identity, because they use the term in surveying the past by memory. The term is presupposed in memory, and we identify with the "impressions" given in memory our personal identity. But loss of memory means we cannot simply argue from memory to identity of personality, which is the basis for character. We can lose our consciousness of what we felt or thought last week, and still know we were a person last week, and further know that our friends gave that person a character; that is, who I am for my friends.
However, we do require the full awareness of consciousness at the moment of action and feeling to be a person. We have to be aware we are acting or feeling to be a person. Not to know what we are doing or feeling is not to be a personal being. To be hypnotized, drugged or insane is not to be a person in this argument. But it is not necessary to be able to recall that consciousness of action or feeling after the event in memory to have been the person who had these experiences, or simply to be a person. Consciousness is thus partly necessary but not entirely so for personal identity. It is necessary at the time, but not later. Identity refers to being the same person over all time. Locke noted that consciousness was never the same from one moment to the next, and then like Butler refused to equate consciousness and identity. His eighteenth century followers, such as Hartley, disagreed, and denied personal identity, and so personality, as of ontological importance.

Butler's three replies to those who denied the existence of identity are as follows: Our intuition denies that our identity is unimportant in reality. We intuitively know who we are over time, and this is a knowledge of the same being over time. Secondly, he follows Locke in saying that there is a unity to our experiences, or a root which is personal being. Being and substance refer alike to personal identity, but Butler intends no rehabilitation of "Ousia" after Locke's analysis of matter into primary and secondary qualities. Substance is merely the ultimate reference point of experience.

"All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments and sufferings of the same living being. And they are so, prior to all consideration of
its remembering or forgetting: since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past matter of fact".\(69\)

Thirdly, there is the existence of memory, which tells us on the basis of the concept of identity that we are the person we remember, so far as we do remember. To doubt our memory not on detail but as a whole requires deductive reasoning or intuitive perception. But we have to use memory to think at all: so we are using memory to doubt memory. The argument for Butler is absurd.

But memory is more than a defence of identity. When we remember, we reflect on the past. "Naturally and unavoidably" reflection involves moral judgements on "actions and characters".\(70\) The step in this section on character which Butler will make later in this thesis is to show that all moral judgment in fact is ultimately only the providence of God as he rewards or punishes men. If we assume this for the moment, we realize that to be judged both by man and God involves moral responsibility.\(71\) So like Kant, Butler places the existence of moral judgment as a way of establishing freedom: but unlike Kant, there is no duality of phenomenal necessity/noumenal freedom. Butler rejects determinism altogether. Next, Butler argues than men act as if they were free. Butler will again later argue for the existence of laws which express the judgment of God on men. Laws follow actions and inflict pleasure or pain, and so does our own approval or disapproval. Both express the will of God on men, which is a judgment here and now. The important point in this context is that Butler says men are aware of this fact. Thus for Butler the fact of a human life is never simply actions and feelings, even with thoughts.
Humanity always has a privileged awareness of itself, a partial anticipation of God's judgment in the future final judgment and in the immediate present of divine judgment now and an awareness of mortality. Since men are aware of divine judgment - an awareness which at times plays a role similar to that of modern understanding of the unconscious - they act as if they were able to affect its course; that is to say, as if they were free. "The constitution of the present world, and the conditions in which we are actually placed, is as if we were free". (72)

We now pass from a defence of personal identity and personal moral responsibility to what the concept of character meant for Butler. Personal being refers to identity and responsibility in Butler: it is an abbreviation of a whole argument. This being is the basis of human character, but a Christian character will ensure the survival of being beyond death. Personal being survives bodily change, and is recalled by memory, existing as a component of that privileged access to our own soul. By that memory we judge our past and others; but the judgment of God has already been passed in the consequences of the actions for the agent, while the final judgment is yet to come. The moral judgment of memory involved in being a person is thus proleptic and anticipatory of divine judgment. We act as if we were free, as indeed we are. There is no hint of acting simply as if, on the basis that we cannot do anything else, even if it may be an illusion. Butler's thought is a unity: he does not argue that scientists must perceive as if we were determined, theologians as if we were free, as developed by some philosophers, and discussed by Robin Gill's Social Context of Theology. Lastly, we are free whether we remember
ourselves or not, and in that freedom we make our characters.

Characters are made though we forget how we took the choices involved. "To say that it (consciousness) makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember". (73)

So the discussion of personal being is not a digression in Butler. First of all, it is the substructure on which character is built. Character requires continuity, and not an occasional understanding of humanity. Modern ethical thought repeats this insight of Butler's. Theologians such as Gustafson make a strong attack on the consistently occasionalist anthropology of Barth and Bultmann. Man only exists in repeated actions: there is no structural continuity over time, which makes it hard to speak of character at all. (74) Character requires freedom, and above all it requires responsibility. Secondly, the survival of personal being into another world where God will be fully known is a perfectly valid goal in the development of character. Personal being in Butler is purely formal: beyond a reference to memory and reason as being superior to the senses and matter, it has no content. So Butler places personal being and character in temporal, reciprocal relation: we build on one to ensure its survival later.

We turn now to character, human nature and the key concept of proportion.

2. **STEP TWO - CHARACTER DEFINED**

What is character? Butler nowhere gives an answer. Yet an answer may be attempted. When a person acts in a persistent manner...
over time, he is described as having a certain character. Newman, it may be hazarded, would not have agreed. Character for Newman was what moved the mind to grasp certain principles on which one acted. The difference is that for Newman action involves reasons for action; true action is premeditated. In making choices, the mind moves in a certain way. What moves the mind to choose is not argument and reasoned evidence, but the moral disposition to select certain arguments. Further, having chosen certain arguments, the person acts in a certain way. Why one chooses certain actions, and the style of action, is due to character or moral disposition. This is explored in Chapter Three.

Butler, and R. Wilberforce following him, argues differently. Men are very complex. They may be kind, but they may also be prone to laziness, carelessness or self-indulgence. The effect of combining these, and other factors, may be, to give an example, that a man filled with kindness and deeply moved by the experience of suffering is regarded by a neighbour as no friend in trouble at all. Although kind, he is slow to act, makes mistakes, and excuses himself far too easily. Better the cold dispassionate attention of the neighbour who fulfils his promises with speed and is remorseless on himself for failure or mistake. Which is the kind, or benevolent, character? Butler would have replied that it was the second helper, who acted as was wanted, even without the deepest Christian character. The former helper deceives us, and himself: he is the man who builds his house on sand, and will be swept away. But the man who gives help and simply despises his neighbour is no kind man: character is not the simple result of actions, it is the result of balancing all the "forces"
within one, and achieving an effective, disciplined, consistent will to do the good. How does this differ from Newman? The answer is only my conjecture. Both use conscience, both study the inner workings of a man. But Newman is fascinated with why he, or another man, decides to follow a course of action; what makes, to use the famous illustration, a general fight a battle in this way and not that. The illative sense rests on character. Butler asks how men can do good and not evil; why they believe X and not Y is of no interest to him. (In another famous instance, Butler once asked his chaplain in his Bristol garden as they walked together in the depth of the night why governments in history had sometimes acted in the strange way they had. Butler received no reply and Butler's only answer was to dismiss the question with the frivolous suggestion that they were all subjected for periods to collective madness. The reasons for action baffled him.) But Newman and Butler wrote on the importance of moral psychology, and of moral discipline. Butler's influence never left Newman.

If a good character for Butler is the result of self-discipline on the moral chaos within, which results in a settled disposition to do good and which achieves good actions, it is important that the moral chaos, the 'private theatre of the soul', is mapped out.

Butler thus described what man is. He is a hierarchy of responses to his environment. At the lowest there are the common passions. We need food, warmth, sex and we seek them out. We also seek out fame, security and other intangible objects. Next there are the faculties and affections which co-ordinate the discipline the passions: the affection of benevolence and the faculty of self-love.
Lastly, conscience is the stern governor which guides, approves or condemns. All of these components can be emotions; all save the passions can be rational. Reason is not "the slave of the passions", although, of course, Hume made this claim after Butler's death.

The way the components come together Butler describes as "proportion". It does not suffice to say that men must act decisively, or than men must obey their God.

Butler equally is dissatisfied with appeals to act in a loving, human or a compassionate way. Men may often act in these ways, but fail to curb their emotional responses or fail to realize the degree of discipline necessarily required to do a "loving" act. The truly loving or compassionate man is the one who knows himself, though he feels only a moderate degree of sympathy with his fellow men. This man has learnt to overcome ambition, to act from integrity and to discipline himself to rise above resentment. So his effect on his neighbour will not be harmful, and will be to his benefit. Other men may have greater sympathy with others, but acting from ambition, and unrestricted self-interest, their acts of genuine kindness are irretrievably spoilt as they become subservient to the goal of, let us say, the politician on the make - however genuine his sense of his neighbour's grievances. Compassionate men are those who at the end of the day do more harm than good. The fruits of the tree thus indicate what sort of tree it is that bears them. Nor finally is goodness the same as a good character; goodness is a word only used of virtue, and the result of right actions. It is hardly knowable, but Butler holds by faith that God possesses it perfectly. If good characters are rare, goodness
itself is hardly seen on earth. Butler speaks more often of evil than of good. But goodness can be achieved, and will be found after this life.

Never before had English theology so carefully delineated the source of moral action and the mediation of moral knowledge. After Butler, the character of the one who heard the gospel was to be crucial. To anticipate what is to be further analysed in Chapter Three, early Tractarianism, (which it is not too strong to say venerated Butler), spoke of the necessity of unifying morality and dogma, which is the content of the third chapter of this thesis. The importance of Butler was not that English spirituality had ignored the character of the individual Christians before, but that there was no worked out theory, nor was it of crucial importance in its relationship to theology. For Butler, a good character brought one nearer one's goal, the vision of God. It was part of the act of returning to God. A relationship in faith to Christ was not enough. Beyond the stress on relationship to Christ, so characteristic of the Reformation, there lay the older Catholic emphasis on attaining to God - with his grace certainly - but also by every one of one's actions. Sins mattered; sin was not the only concern. The origin of good actions and sins alike was character. Augustine's teleology inherited not only a deep Platonism but an Aristotelian concern with character, and to this latter Butler returned. Because of this "catholic" emphasis, he was naturally congenial to the revival of Anglo Catholicism in the early Tractarian movement. (75)

To return to Butler's analysis of man, he realized that
Christianity was no longer respected fully intellectually. Because he believed that his view was traditional, biblical and more especially Pauline, Butler could speak of the relationship of "Christianity" to the world. He implied by this that there was a "worldly" intellectual viewpoint which was partially antagonistic to Christian theology and philosophy. But more commonly, Butler spoke of what was natural or not, meaning by this what was in accordance with God's creative purpose and act. "Nature is frequently spoken of as consisting in those passions which are strongest and most influence the actions". 

Butler holds that this is absurd: otherwise "the passion of anger, and the affection of parents to their children, would be called equally natural". What is then the "real proper nature of man?" 

"Men may act according to that principle or inclination which for the present happens to be strongest and yet act in a way disproportionate to, and violate his proper nature .... And since such an action is utterly disproportionate to the nature of man, it is in the strictest and most proper sense unnatural; this word expressing that disproportion .... which disproportion arises, not from considering the action singly in itself, or in its consequences; but from comparison of it with the nature of the agent".

The nature of the agent takes up the theme of Plato's Republic, where reason, spirit and passion have to be rightly ordered into the true nature of men. So for Butler the right order is

"fully adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch, it appears, that its nature, i.e., constitution, is adapted to measure time. What in fact or event commonly happens is nothing to this question. Every work of art is apt to be out of order; but this is so far from being according to its system, that let the disorder increase, and it will totally destroy it".
The Definition of Character

We will now give a detailed account of character, which will follow the pattern set out below:

(A) Passions
(B) Self-love
(C) Benevolence
(D) Conscience
(E) Summary

The Definition of Character - (A) Passions

Without distinguishing what Butler means precisely by passions, affections and appetites, we may note that a passion is directed outside man. Men seek objects that are tangible or objectives which are not. The only inner-directed passions are emotional, such as the desire to increase fame. Duncan-Jones makes two valid criticisms of this point of Butler's. First, there certainly exist passions directed to myself and not to external objects which do not involve emotion, e.g., not merely the desire to write this thesis (external object) but the desire to stop worrying about it (which, in theory at least, could be an emotionless desire). Second, to speak of objects external to man as the object of a passion or passions is too broad a concept. Butler lumps together objects and objectives in an unhelpful way. A passion is "a direct simple tendency towards such and such objects, without distinction of the means by which they are to be obtained". But there is a reason why it is important that the object of a passion should be primarily external. The teleological structure of the world means that there is a "prior suitableness" between a passion and its proper, external object. This suitableness results in pleasure as a
passion is fulfilled properly. In a trivial manner, we are fitted and pleased to eat fruit, not stones (83): there are less clear but more subtle reflections on this theme. The wisdom of God in the Wisdom literature is a powerful influence on Butler. The Wisdom literature is cited in Sermon 4, (where Ecclesiasticus is cited three times), Sermon 6.11, (where Ecclesiasticus is cited once) and Sermon 16, (where Ecclesiasticus is cited six times). Job is cited in Sermons 8, 10 and 15. Proverbs is cited in Sermons 7 (once), 9 (twice), 10 (twice), and 15 (once). This textual exegesis of Butler shows that the Wisdom literature operates as a controlling hermeneutical norm for Butler. The Gospels elucidate in narrative form the life of Christ who himself demonstrates the Wisdom of God and effects our own imitation of the wise man. Implicitly, Christ is the 'power and wisdom of God' in Butler's theology.

The Definition of Character - (B) Self-love

Yet actions motivated by passions may also be motivated by self-love. Self-love does not necessarily bring happiness. Happiness is the correspondence by man of his will to God's creation: the conformity of human intention to teleological structure. It is the proper fulfilment of man. "The desire of happiness is no more the thing itself, than the desire of riches is the possession or enjoyment of them. People may love themselves with the most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely miserable". (84) Conversely, "happiness consists in the gratification of certain affections, appetites, passions, with objects which are by nature adapted to them. Self-love may indeed set
us on work to gratify these: but happiness or enjoyment has no immediate connection with self-love, but arises from such gratification alone". (85)

Self-love involves not happiness but long term self interest, and is a proper part of the good character, unjustly maligned as selfishness. What can go wrong is misguided self-love, or unenlightened self-love. Thus part of a harmonious character is the reward of self by the environment, mediating the love of God to creation. So self-denial, while necessary for the discipline of self-love, is not ultimately fulfilment. The via negativa in spirituality was only a corrective, and man was wrong to deny the passion given him by God. "The very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object .... take away these affections and you leave self-love absolutely nothing at all to employ itself about: no end or object for it to pursue, excepting only that of avoiding pain". (86)

It is impossible to measure whether an action was motivated by a passion, and thus by the object to which the passion was directed, or by self-love alone, or by a combination. We can in principle know for ourselves the reasons for our actions, but others cannot. Since men have a right to be happy, (because in a teleological universe there is no reason why the creator should not wish for the proper fulfilment of the passions he has given men in an environment he has also made for their due exercise), the correct course should be to work with self-love. Compatible with benevolence and with selfishness, compassion and malice, it will vary from person to person in intensity. "Benevolence and the pursuit of public good hath at least as great
respect to self-love and the pursuit of private good, as any other particular passions, and their respective pursuits". But Christianity for Butler was intellectually on the defensive. Almost without argument, Butler assumes that his audience hearing and reading his Sermons will think otherwise. Men thus turn from the love of their neighbour, assuming that benevolence and self-love must be opposed. "The thing to be lamented is, not that men have so great regard to their own good or interest in the present world, for they have not enough; but that they have so little to the good of others". So Butler decides to work on man's acute awareness of his own self-interest. He must persuade men to be good.

"Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good as such, yet that, when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it".

Why is Butler ultimately confident that there is a place for argument and reason in persuading men to be good? Mossner's answer is that Butler reflects the age of reason, yet it is also a Christian optimism in the midst of a life often "vicious" and "a ruin". Butler never despairs of men.

"Whereas there is plainly benevolence or goodwill, there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude; but only eager desires after such and such external goods, which .... the most abandoned would choose to obtain by innocent means if they were as easy and as effectual to their end .... the principles and passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self-love and benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right behaviour with regard to others as well as himself, and only secondarily and accidentally to what is evil".
However, Butler's optimism can at times appear complacent, in ways that suggest that sacrifice was no part of the common ethic of man. There is no sense of the absence of God in the face of disease, poverty and war. Butler was remembered for his own deep generosity to the poor, but he appears to see life from the viewpoint of the benefactor.

"Benevolence and self-love .... are so perfectly coincident that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree". (92)

"In the common course of life, there is seldom any inconsistency between our duty and what is called interest; it is much rarer that there is any inconsistency between duty and what is really our present interest; meaning by interest happiness and satisfaction. Self-love, then .... does in general perfectly coincide with virtue, and leads us to one and the same course of life". (93)

"Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always leads us in the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident: for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the future and the whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things". (94)

The Definition of Character - (C) Benevolence

Benevolence will be "subservient to self-love by being the instrument of private enjoyment". (95) Yet benevolence certainly exists: in Butler's careful anthropology, it is closer to the basic passions of men than the rational self-awareness of self-love, but it can be guided by reason as well. Hence he calls benevolence "an affection to the good of our fellow creatures", (96) rather than a faculty which presupposes an inherent rationality. Men can be inspired purely by feelings of good will, but true good is achieved when we "consider" the situation and see ourselves as "having a real share in his happiness"; (97) (this refers here to the neighbour). Butler appeals to the moral feelings of the ordinary man, and in a
later form called by Scottish philosophers "a philosophy of common-sense". The role of reason, then, is to weigh up the consequences of an action carefully, but also to acknowledge that family ties are more urgent than others due to the charge given us by God. Reason is intuitive, and like the Book of Proverbs, there is a clear presupposition of an inner order given by God known by this reason. Reason is not the speculative intellect. Reason has a certain inbuilt agnosticism with it, but at the same time careful thought could sharpen its gaze where men acted only from feeling. Neither the systematizing of scientific knowledge nor the despising of reason appealed in this vision of the response of man to his world. "There possibly may be reasons which originally made it fit that many things should be concealed from us .... I am afraid we think too highly of ourselves; of our rank in creation, and of what is done to us". "When benevolence is said to be the sum of virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind propension". (99) But as

"a principle in reasonable creatures and so to be directed by their reason: for reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral agent. And that will lead us to consider distant consequences, as well as the immediate tendency of an action: it will teach us, that the care of some persons, suppose children and families, is particularly committed to our charge by Nature and Providence; as also that there are other circumstances, suppose friendship or former obligations, which require that we do good to some, preferably to others". (100)

The Definition of Character - (D) Conscience

The final guide of men is conscience, which is not a part of man, but the careful judgment of reason and emotion together on what is to
be done, as well as the education of past actions. Man has the capacity to know himself if he wills.

"That which is called considering what is our duty in a particular case is very often nothing but endeavouring to explain it away. Thus those courses which, if men would fairly attend to the dictates of their own consciences, they would see to be corruption .... are refined upon .... and thus every moral obligation whatever may be evaded". (101)

Man for Butler is the supreme part of the creation because he can act morally and reflect on this. "The guide assigned us by the author of our nature", (102) conscience, distinguished man from the rest of creation. Only conscience can "reflect on his (man's) own nature, his aversions, affections and passions". (103) It is worth stressing this because the theological influence on Newman was profound. Conscience for Newman "is a connecting principle between the creature and his Creator; and the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by habits of personal religion". (104) For Butler, conscience was the link between man and God because the authority of conscience "goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own". (105) Conscience can only be defined through the idea of direction and supremacy. Self-love may appear overwhelming, but the authority of conscience "is an obligation the most near and intimate, the most certain and known". (106) It is, as Baelz says, the rule of a constitutional king, which takes into account even the lowest human desires.

Yet conscience is often ignored. Butler returns to "that scorn which one sees rising upon the faces of people who are said to know the world, when mention is made of a disinterested, generous or public-
spirited action". Moral discipline is shunned by men, but Butler anticipates the later evangelical crusade for a moral reformation.

"How greatly we want it need not be proved to anyone who is acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind". (107)

Others, and Hume was later to follow them, argued that morality was only an expression of our approval or disapproval. Why we approved rested on feelings which were not inherently reliable as to what constituted good or bad. Virtue and vice for Hume became a matter of prudence. For other contemporary writers, what mattered was how we knew the right or wrong, but this point did not worry Butler. Approval was connected to a knowledge of virtue, however it was done. The true character was virtuous: it was not a matter of words. "We have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters .... and on doing this we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert". (108) Conscience could be called "moral reason, moral sense, or Divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding or as a perception of the heart; or, which seems the truth, as including both". (109)

Lastly, conscience lacked authority because of the diversity of its pronouncements and the pluriformity of moral ideals worldwide. Butler is weak here: he simply denies the charge, perhaps not realizing how much modern relativism was to increase. Butler is content to state

"Nor is it all doubtful in the general what course of action this faculty .... approves .... It is what kind
which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public; it is that which the primacy and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth .... enforce the practice of upon mankind; namely justice, veracity and the common good". (110)

Man may be called made in God's image because he has a conscience and acts upon it. It is not their relationship to God which defines this image, but an "in-forming" (111) of man's contents by "this voice of God", as Newman later called it. Not to be informed by it was to lack order, and content becomes formless. As in Plato (112), there is a rather artificial analogy with the State.

"And as in government the constitution is broken in upon, and violated by power and strength prevailing over authority; so the constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or principles within, prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme over them all". (113)

The Definition of Character - (E) Summary

Having discussed the components of moral character in Butler, we come now to the key concept of proportion. Every element in character has its own strength, and this results in harmony. The criterion of a right action is not that a good character caused it, for this would be to infer moral value from a fact, but rather from the fact that conscience intuits than an action is right, we infer that the principles are in harmony. One may contrast this with Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury's Characteristics of Men directly equated virtue with a good character, or a balance between the natural affections, which were desires for the public good, and self-affections, which were bodily appetites. Here there is no question of goodness and
good character standing in a teleological relation to one another.

As T.A. Roberts writes, on Shaftesbury, "A man is by nature good when his impulses are so harmonized that he becomes a perfect instrument for promoting the good of others. Here Shaftesbury uses notions such as proportion, balance, harmony of the natural desires, so that too much benevolence or too much parental love can be a bad thing". (114)

For Butler, a balanced constitution is only good where good is clearly used in a non-moral sense. Good here means 'as one was created to be', or 'being natural'. Hence part of a good character is the notion of balance, from which Butler inferred the notion of restraint. Human beings must "submit to these restraints, which upon the whole are attended with more satisfaction than uneasiness". (115)

In part, this approaches stoicism. Cicero's De Officiis is praised for recognising the necessity of obedience to the true form of nature. (116) But stoicism is in error for its praise of a passionless life. Restraint in Butler does not lead to the eradication of passion. God may be without passions, but the image of God is not the same as the complete imitation of God. Man was created with passions, and man should live as he was made, not as his maker may be. To be passionless is to have a bad character, or an inhuman, or unnatural, one.

"Both our senses and our passions are a supply to the imperfection of our nature: thus they show that we are such sort of creatures, as to stand in need of those helps which higher orders of creatures do not". (117) "In general, experience will shew, that as want of natural appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some bodily disease; so the apathy the stoics talk of, as much supposes, or is accompanied with, somewhat amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health of the mind". (118)
Man often has to rely on faith that all his passions were given him for a reason, although he may exaggerate this passion beyond its due degree, as often happens with the passion of resentment. The effect of restraint on character is, however, good. "When virtue is become habitual, when the temper of it is acquired, what was before confinement ceases to be so, by becoming choice and delight". One may compare this with Aristotle's Nicomachaean Ethics, as Roberts does; "The pleasure or pain that accompanies the acts must be taken as a test of the formed habit or character".

Character is always expressed in actions, but the discernment of character in action is hard. It is not enough to know that someone is kind, shrewd or gentle: it is how this character trait affects his actions which matters.

"From hence it comes to pass, that though we were able to look into the inward contexture of the heart, and see with the greatest exactness in what degree any one principle is in a particular man; we could not from thence determine, how far that principle would go towards forming the character, or what influence it would have upon the actions, unless we could likewise discern what other principles prevailed in him, and see the proportion which that one bears to the other".

Men thus often judge character wrongly. They speak of their neighbour's character "in a free, careless and unreserved manner". To misjudge a man is to do him wrong. Butler however feels that not only are men often criticized unfairly, but evil men often deceive the innocent. They should be exposed as Christ gently exposed the Pharisees in Mark 12: 38-40. It is harmful that "there be a man, who bears a fair character in the world,"
whom yet we know to be without faith or honesty, to be really an ill man .... It is in reality of as great importance to the good of society, that the characters of bad men should be known, as that the characters of good men should".\(^{(123)}\)

But "doubtfulness of the character of others" is a dangerous attitude if carried too far. We should rest on accepting them as good if they do good: "Let us then proceed to the course of behaviour, the actions they produce".\(^{(124)}\) We should also be prepared to accept that we will sometimes be deceived; we should not retaliate. "A real good man .... had rather forego his own right, than run the venture of doing even a hard thing".\(^{(125)}\) A Christian character includes "meekness, and in some degree easiness of temper, readiness to forego our right for the sake of peace as well as in the way of compassion". The Scriptures are not "a book of theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for mankind". But a Christian character is not purely moral: resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety; it includes in it all that is good and is a source of the most settled and quiet composure of mind .... a combination of fear, hope and love".\(^{(126)}\)

Three quotations will end this long section on what character means to Butler. One set out the theory, the other two give examples. The theory is a theory of proportion, order and conscience (the higher principle of reflection).

"The several appetites, passions and particular affections ... are in proportion to each other. This proportion is just and perfect, when all those under principles are perfectly coincident with conscience, so far as their nature permits, and in all cases under its absolute and entire direction. The least excess or defect, the least alteration of the due proportions amongst themselves, or of their coincidence with conscience, though not proceeding into action, is some degree of disorder in the moral constitution. But
perfection, though plainly intelligible and supposable, was never attained by any man. If the higher principle of reflection maintains its place, and as much as it can corrects that disorder, and hinders it from breaking out into action, this is all that can be expected in such a creature as man. And though the appetites and passions have not their exact due proportion to each other; though they often strive for mastery with judgment and reflection: yet, since the superiority of this principle to all others is the chief respect which forms the constitution, so far as this superiority is maintained, the character, the man, is good, worthy, virtuous". (127)

The two examples are those of compassion and benevolence. On compassion, Butler writes:

"Thus, though two men should have the affection of compassion in the same degree exactly; yet one may have the principle of resentment, or of ambition so strong in him; as to prevail over that of compassion, and prevent its having any influence upon his actions; so that he may deserve the character of an hard or cruel man: whereas the other having compassion in just the same degree only, yet having resentment or ambition in a lower degree, his compassion may prevail over them, so as to influence his actions, and to denominate his temper compassionate". (128)

Benevolence is also a matter of its proportion to self-love. This proportion will

"denominate men's character as to virtue. Suppose then one man to have the principle of benevolence in a higher degree, than another; it will not follow from hence, that his general temper, or character, or actions, will be more benevolent than the other's. For he may have self-love in such a degree as quite to prevail over benevolence". (129)

3. STEP THREE - THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER BY MORAL DISCIPLINE

We come now to the placing of human character in the plot God has arranged for it. Nature is anthropocentric and the teleological
structure of the world is there to provide "a state of probation, intended for moral discipline and improvement".\(^{130}\) If there appears today some unease with the idea that this world was created to perfect man's moral character\(^{131}\), Butler was convinced that this was the case. For the perfection of moral character in man took man beyond the ontological imago dei within him, which existed whether or not man was in relation to anyone else, and into a relationship of the imitation of the perfection of God. God himself can be imagined as having a character by man, and man can model his character on God. So this third section is in three parts, as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
\item The Character of God.
\item The Character of Men.
\item The Formation of Human Character by God.
\end{enumerate}

\textbf{(a) The Character of God}

When Butler is arguing against necessity, he denies that if this doctrine is true (which he assumes is so, only for the sake of argument) it will in any case affect God's character. There is evidence and design and the work of final causes in the world, and thus there is a designer, who must have some character and will. (Butler does not consider Hume's criticism made 30 years later that even if there is evidence of design, it will only show a force, or creation itself as designer, which could well be impersonal, and thus have no character at all).\(^ {132}\)

If God the designer has some character notwithstanding necessity, this necessity is reconcilable with the particular character of benevolence, tenacity and justice in him. Since men under necessity
are seen to make themselves either cruel or benevolent, why may God not have the same sort of freedom to make himself? Secondly, the attributes of character are inferred from the type of action produced by the agent. Butler holds that by intuition we see God governing us as a wise civil government or father might. The result is a state of benevolence and justice on earth. So God is benevolent, true and just. Questions of necessity only arise if one asks if God had to be like this: they do not (by analogy with men) affect the fact that he can in principle be just, nor that he actually is. As for the restriction of divine freedom by casual necessity, Butler dismisses it by asserting the omnipotence of God.

"Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority or government, to a Being who can have no competitions or interfering of interests with his creatures and his subjects".\(^{(133)}\)

Turning from the defensive argument for Christianity, Butler in the thirteenth sermon outlines a method of constructing the character of God. It is worth following this sermon through as an illustration of his theological method. A similar way of reasoning was to be followed by Ian Ramsey in his work on religious language, models and paradigms. Indeed, Ian Ramsey retained an interest in Butler and lectured on his thought.

He begins by arguing that we are able to conceive of a finite being greater than ourselves or our fellowmen. Such a creature could ally goodness and reason, so that they became a uniform principle of action. This "temper and character" would be "absolutely good and perfect".\(^{(134)}\)
But although this structure would always be the same, it could well appear very varied. Thus the character of such a being could affect us in several different ways. We would be inclined to see this character at times as just, merciful, wise or powerful, yet these aspects in their manifold variety would really be from the same character. For such a creature to be immovably good, there would have to be a particular strength of mind, and this in itself would be venerated, apart from the goodness itself. Yet all these human responses to a perfectly good character would be subordinate to the response of love.

"Superior excellence of any kind, as well as superior wisdom and power, is the object of awe and reverence to all creatures, whatever their moral character be: but so far as creatures of the lowest rank were good, so far the view of this character is simply good, must appear amiable to them, be the object of, or beget love". (136)

Butler now draws on an earlier philosophical work, Hutcheson's Inquiry concerning moral good and evil. Hutcheson pointed out that to love was to judge a person well, and morality was built up through "approbation of any person by our moral sense". (137) So if Butler's creature were to become our friend, we too would realize that his approval and friendship would reciprocate our love and cause our "satisfaction and enjoyment". Yet, Butler goes on, we could also imagine this creature was our guardian, who governed us to live in some future life. So the character of God is established by his actions, and his actions produce our moral character, if we will let him. In short, God's character becomes known as he affects our character, but there is always some element of mystery in the knowledge...
of God. "His scheme of government was too vast for our capacities to comprehend, remembering still that he is perfectly good, and our friend, as well as our governor". So reverence and awe are added to the emotion of love. In an infinite degree of greatness we come to some concept of Almighty God, who is not known with our senses, but is still known with some certainty. Butler thus concludes that such a Being will satisfy all our needs. "As the whole attention of life should be to obey his commands; so the highest enjoyment of it must arise from the contemplation of this character, and our relation to it, from a consciousness of his favour and approbation".

(b) The Character of Men

When he felt pressed to define religion, Butler did not refer to the supernatural. He defined religion in terms of its function: "religion being intended for a trial and exercise of the morality of a person's character". Action for the good must not result from the supremacy of reason convincing us of the moral claim, nor must it come from a superiority in strength of love over other passions. There must be an integration of a person's dispositions into a fixed and habitual character. This is "the purpose of virtue and religion". Religion thus forms character, and tries it before God: there is a making and a testing in continuous relationship with each other. Butler holds that the aim of religion is "that the whole character be formed upon thought and reflection; that every action be directed by some determinate rule, some other rule than the strength and prevalency of any principle or passion". Benevolence is not the whole of virtue, and may justify injustice or persecution.
The just character accepts suffering as a way of strengthening character: it is reminiscent of Romans 5: 3-4. "More than that, we rejoice in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope".

But Greek tragedy would have influenced Butler as much as the Pauline passage. Butler constantly alludes in The Analogy and Sermons to passages from Aristotle or the Stoics, Xenophon and Plato - it would have been part of a standard Oxford degree course at that time. It is worth considering the difference between Butler and Greek tragedy on suffering and morality, since both are tragic in their view of man.

Greek tragedy was religious in tone and attitude. Sin was punished by suffering in Aeschylus; Sophocles vindicates the laws of God against human pride, or Hubris. Butler would have entirely agreed on these two points, as much of Chapters 2-5 of The Analogy make very clear. But Greek tragedy dealt with humanity as a whole. It was man who was broken and remade; character acted only as a medium for man and the action of morality upon man. Character was simple, general and typological: the universal is conveyed through the particular. Characters generally did not develop. In Butler, character is complex and particularist: no two men are alike, no two situations the same. Man is generally the same in broad outline, but the forces of passion, will and circumstances mould him in particular ways. What is of crucial importance is how this man will bend or break under the strain of, say, possessing great riches, and how situations produce many different responses. Neither is man ever beyond redemption, nor ever secure: there is a dynamic amidst the
hierarchy of human nature. Nor is the complexity of human character ever fully known, as the citation of Ps 139 makes clear. God knows the depths of character: man is always searching. Yet it is not simply an interest in moral evil that binds Butler and Greek tragedy together. There is also a profound agnosticism, amazement at the persistency of humanity's stubborn self-deceit, and the vindication of the right in the daily course of nature by the punishment of the wicked through divine, general laws, remorseless in their execution. The hidden actions of God and the phenomenology of moral evil are bound up with a retributivist view of divine punishment which is sombre, melancholy and by no means full of simple joy, where one rejoices in sufferings. Butler is, in short, closer to Greek tragedy than to any triumphalist view of the Christian life.\(^{(145)}\) The formation of character is painful for many men.

Man is, as has already been pointed out in this chapter, a stranger to his own character in this life. Men are partial to themselves - which is "surprising", "unaccountable", "nothing of more melancholy reflection". Yet, as has again been stressed in this chapter, "it would certainly be no great difficulty to know our own character, what passes within, the bent and bias of our mind; much less would there be any difficulty in judging rightly of our own actions".\(^{(146)}\) "Man is thus by his very nature a law to himself".\(^{(147)}\) If he wants to, man can know himself as God does. But men are plagued by too great self-love, which causes an "absence of doubt"\(^{(148)}\) on themselves and can "prejudice and darken the understanding".\(^{(149)}\) Even men who wish to do what is right are overcome by a strong passion, such as ambition, or are totally obsessed with one particular pursuit
in life, which narrows them and develops an unbalanced character.

At times, Butler's sense of the greatness and moral purity of God meets a vision of human depravity that is reminiscent of Calvin. Butler admits there is enormous waste in creation, yet what survives shows the designing hand of God. Men are similarly no more than seeds. However it is far "more terrible" to see as a Christian "the present and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves, i.e., by vice". A clear vision will see

"the various temptations with which we are surrounded; our experience of the deceits of wickedness; having been in many instances led wrong ourselves; the great viciousness of the world; the infinite disorders consequent upon it; our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, or from the sight of it in others". (151)

At every moment we are perilously close to losing our "innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious and wretched". For many people it had been better that they had never been born; the sole purpose of their lives is only to serve as a warning to others. God has tremendous power over us to bring us into justified misery. "Ever-lasting impressions" bear upon us, forcing us to struggle to "preserve or integrity". (152)

Man is a unique being in his own right: Yet he is also dependent on the world. He is known with intuitive immediacy as moral, with dignity and rationality yet he is passionate, and part of creation. As MacKinnon says, these paradoxes only coexist in a religious vision. Man is alienated from himself, but his redemptive knowledge is unified in Christianity. He is constantly aware of new possibilities in human
experience as new facts are presented to him, but his basic structure of humanity is a gift. There is in a religious vision a "unity, even the substantial character, of that human life he must live under the guidance and authority of conscience". (153) So Butler is for MacKinnon a rare example of the Christian aware of tragedy: "If he lacks Hegel's overt recognition of the significance of the tragic, yet by his method he displays continual awareness of the presence of tragic contradiction in human life". (154) This may be questioned, however. Butler's Christology is so weak, and so much passes over the moral struggle of Christ, that Butler's theology at times is tragic, at times simply accepts the work of Christ as done without struggle.

Rather Butler's view of God is of a loving father. Christ is gentle and mild: the eschatology so dominant in recent theology is no problem to him, since it is simply ignored. Christ - to be considered in Part 4, character and the love of God - is a help to man, and an example of patient moral perseverance. Improvement in moral character is by the power of habit. Christ is habitually good. But there is nothing in his Christology to suggest the moral struggle of Christ.

Habitual action is passive or active, bodily or mental. Passive acts are acts of understanding or simple responses; active acts are acts of speech, or acts embodying intentionality. (155) Bodily active habits are produced by repetitive acts over time of our bodies, irrespective of the reasons for action. This is, of course, a very different understanding of intentionality from that of Anscombe, Geach or Kenny. Active acts for Butler are what Austin would have called
illocutionary acts. They are meant to affect others. Mental habits occur when there is a repetitive action for certain reasons, which is a practical use of the reason. So we form our actions, and dispositions to act. While passive habits lose in power by repetition, active habits gain in strength. (We become less aware of bloodshed as we encounter it as a stretcher-bearer on a battlefield while our skill in handling the wounded grows with our familiarity. Thus the recruit is shocked and clumsy; the experienced nurse unmoved and skilful. But if one only is repeatedly shocked, and does not respond by learning a skill, one will turn away indifferent to the pain around one, and becomes purely callous and hard.)

So we pass through the discipline of encountering moral and physical evil. The forces which change us impinge less deeply on the consciousness over time:

"Experience confirms this: for active principles, at the very time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing our practice .... thus a new character, in several respects, may be formed". (156)

So the work of God is constant in causing people to manifest their characters in as perfect a way as possible. "The manifestation of persons' characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the carrying on a great part of that general course of nature, which comes under our observation". Character is not only formed, it is also restrained. We learn caution against deceit, acquire modernisation, and "some aptitude and readiness in restraining" oneself.
Three reasons make this a religious formation of character, and not merely man's making of himself.

First, the formation of character is to fit us for future life in communion with God. Such a life will be continuous with the present one, but there will be a direct awareness of the will of God: more direct, that is, than the sense of morality as God's commands, known on earth. It will also be fully part of the communion of saints, and the communal nature of life there will require a certain type of character able to bear the direct sense of God and to join with other redeemed Christians there. A character that is not remade would find such a life impossible. So the formation of character is not simply for this life. (158)

Secondly, the Church by its discipline and teaching will mould the character of a Christian. Christ left such a body to follow on his own work.

"By admonition and reproof, as well as instruction; by a general, regular discipline, and public exercises of religion; the body of Christ, as the scripture speaks, should be edified; i.e., trained up in piety and virtue for a higher and better state". (155)

Butler's own charges to the clergy of Durham as their Bishop spell this out in detail. Religion is a power in men's lives, but the 'form' of religion promotes this power. The work of Christ is 'not to supersede our own endeavours, but to render them effectual .... the greater festivals of the Church .... of course lead you to ....
the Christian practice which arises out of them”.

Thirdly, and most importantly, man makes his character by the action of history and environment. Yet God works through history and nature. God works by regards and by punishments as the consequences of good and bad actions affect men. Self-inflicted misery is inevitable in the long term on those who will not obey their consciences. Men do not expect the disasters that ensue on foolish actions. As well as the actions of men on other men, which expresses the will of God through praise and condemnation (common sense philosophy holds that overall humanity will know what is right and wrong), self-acting laws enact pleasant or painful consequences. God is no less our governor because he works in this way. Butler does not rule out miracles, and argues from them as a sure proof of the credibility of Christianity, but in general he rejects special intervention by God in showing man his duty. Conscience, the Scriptures and the laws of nature are enough. Butler rejects the exegesis of Philo, followed by Origen, that God directly constrained Balaam to bless when in fact he wished to curse. God acts by general laws, which produce more benevolence, veracity and justice, in the long term.

The balance in nature of divine government in favour of virtue is neither invariable nor always clear, but the balance of probability is certain. Virtue will triumph in society given time, and is always approved of by our moral nature. Not only our condemnation, but the punishment of civil society and the state, serve the purposes of God. Butler is not simply a conservative,
although he tends to see morality embodied in institutions, which thus
fulfil their creation as bearers of authority by preserving that
morality God puts in men's hearts.

If men feel oppressed, they will rebel and vindicate the
authority of God. But human coexistence is not simply the enactment
of moral judgments. God is benevolent to the wicked as well as the
good, and this benevolence is joined to his truth and justice. So men
must be benevolent, whatever a person's character is. At the same
time, they will condemn vice. Man has a right to live, unless he
should be drastically punished, and this right of survival is greater
than their deserving of condemnation. In practice, disapproval
should not prevent giving full-hearted charity to all men, except in
cases of extreme retribution. The two quotations stand side by side
reflecting the two sides of God's nature, his character of benevolence
and his character as a judge:

"It is not man's being a social creature, much less
his being a moral agent, from whence alone our
obligations of goodwill towards him arise. There
is an obligation to it prior to either of these,
arising from his being a sensible creature; that is,
capable of happiness or misery. Now this obligation
cannot be superseded by his moral character ....".(170)

"From our moral nature, joined with God's having put
our happiness and misery in many respects in each
other's power, it cannot but be, that vice as such,
some kinds and instances of it at least, will be
infamous, and men will be disposed to punish it as in
itself detestable ....".(171)

Religion then shows us who is the author of our punishments and
rewards. Christianity is primarily revelatory. Butler says little
about the grace of God in human life, although it is assumed as aiding
men. Christianity republishes natural religion in fresh simplicity, and greater authority. Miracles and prophecies enforce the teaching of divine government.

"Revelation teaches us that the next stage of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but the mystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail shall then be finished; and he will take to him his great power, and will reign, by rendering to everyone according to his works". (172)

Since actions always demonstrate character, a reference to work is in fact a reference to the enactment of character over time in goodness. It is not simply the relationship to Christ that matters. This is what has been called an "exitus et reditus" theology. Man by his works returns through grace to God; in a teleologically structured universe, man goes "with the grain" to his goal.

Butler at times resembles Bucer and Calvin. Did he read them? Perhaps, for he was brought up in a nonconformist college of high academic standing. Like Bucer and Calvin, Butler interprets much Old Testament ethical teaching as natural law relevant today. Like Calvin, Butler will sometimes defend the injunctions in the Pentateuch simply as valid as a divine command. Like Calvin, Butler has read much Greek moral philosophy. (174) But despite these three similarities, unlike Calvin, Butler primarily sees the Old Testament through the stories of characters (Nathan, Balaam, David) and through the Wisdom tradition. The Wisdom tradition justifies morality from creation, and from the self-acting process of divine judgment. Here Butler finds a deep influence of Hellenic thought. "A man without self-control is like a city broken in two" (Proverbs 25.28). The
Wisdom tradition again stresses the teleology of the world; ("The Lord has made everything for its purpose", (Proverbs 16.24)) while, of course, the Book of Job shows the due ignorance of man. Ecclesiastes 4 17 reveals the inevitability of judgment, ("I said in my heart, God will judge the righteous and the wicked, for he has appointed a time for every matter, and for every work"). Professor von Rad has said that "the thinking of the wise men was never from the very beginning stimulated by signs of divine activity in history. Rather, they felt themselves stimulated above all by the much older question of humanity .... the problem of a phenomenology of man .... tied to an environment in which he found himself both as subject and object, active and passive". (176) So Butler also ignores history, and hardly mentions divine action in history.

Given the reflections of a theological appraisal of God's action in history, the incarnation of Christ is for Butler a revelation of the mediatorial role necessary for any achievement in ethical behaviour. All men need the help of another: Christ is the deepest and most ultimate help available in regenerating character. Men know what they ought to do - Butler cites Romans 2.14-15 on natural law, with particular instances of natural law being given in the forgiveness of injuries by compassion, (178) in Mt. 6.16 and 18.35, and in the love of our neighbour, where the reference is to Romans 13.9. (179) Christ enables us to achieve this. It is thus not a Christological ethic, and thus is obviously unlike Calvin and most Reformed theology. Nor is there any separation of the realms of nature and grace. All is of grace, if men will but avail themselves of it. The Church makes grace available by the sacraments, (180) but it is not the specific realm of
grace against the world which is fallen by sin.

Christ's mediatorial work is one of the points where Butler's theology fails him. He resorts to proof texts, and refuses to place propitiation and expiation in any worked out theory of the atonement. Wherever there is action in history, as here or the divine command to kill in the Old Testament, a pure fideism develops. How the sacrifice of Christ was effective Butler does not know. He finds analogies in everyday life to mediation and to vicarious suffering, and leaves the matter there. Christ is priest, prophet and King, but again it is only texts that matter. The atonement is given more weight than the incarnation, but the teaching of Christ is separated off in a Socratic manner. Kierkegaard would have objected to Butler as much as he did to Hegel. As for the Spirit, it is referred to as 'our guide and sanctifier' but it is not related to the role of reason and conscience.

An example, Christ has a perfect character, but it is only a reference made in passing: "the perfect example of goodness in our own nature". Christ acts out of pure benevolence to men, and the incarnation and atonement are both revelatory from a life as subject to sorrow as ours is, and also fully salvific. So we are reformed, taught our duty and able to perform it. But there are more references to David or Balaam than to Christ. Butler again refers in passing to Christ, who shows us humility through his birth, shows us frankness and gentleness in his exposure of Pharisaic pride, and shows us grief in his mourning for Lazarus. This would be acceptable if character was only a general medium like Greek mythology for symbolizing the fate
of humanity through the events of life. Butler understands character far more as the infinite particularity of man in a world made to nourish and support him. It is thus a weakness that Christ's character is not given the particularity his theory requires.

One way that a character of Christ could have been developed (as was partly developed by a theologian deeply influenced by him, James Martineau, a century later) was through the role of worship. To know God is not merely to be shown what to do and how it is to be done, it is to have one's character deepened, and made more perfect. Goodness in a character flows over into a love of goodness, which in turn deepens the goodness of that character.

"To be a just, a good, a righteous man plainly carries with it a peculiar affection to or love of justice, goodness, righteousness, when these principles are the objects of contemplation .... (this) cannot but be in those who have any degree of real goodness in themselves, and who discern and take notice of the same principles in others". (187)

Benevolence "must be" connected with the love of the most benevolent being, God, and so one will be made more benevolent oneself.

"The love of God, as being perfectly good, is the love of perfect goodness, contemplated in a being or person. Thus morality and religion, virtue and piety, will at last necessarily coincide, run up to one and the same point, and love will be in all senses "the end of the commandment"." (188)

The unity of character causes perfect fulfilment. Butler breaks into the psalmists adoration of God: "in thy presence is the fullness of joy, and at thy right hand there is pleasure for evermore". (189)
John Burnaby's *Amor Dei* ends with a study of the love of God across the centuries in Christian theologians, including Bernard, Fenelon and Butler, with whom he concludes. The irony of Butler is well brought out by Burnaby: after all concession has been made to self-interest, 'the favourite passion', and it has been treated "with the utmost tenderness and concern for its interests", Butler goes on to ask in a prayer at the end of Sermon 12, *On the Love of Our Neighbour*, for growth in perfection.

"Thou has placed us in various kindreds, friendships, and relations, as the school of discipline for our affections; help us, by the due exercise of them, to improve to perfection; till all partial affection be lost in that entire universal one, and Thou, O God, shall be all in all".

The love of God is not prudential: "something more must be meant than merely that we live in hope of rewards or fear of punishments from Him". Burnaby compares the disinterestedness of a normal, affective love in Butler with that of François de Sales. We love God because we respond to "a righteousness which we can trust because it is everlasting and changeless". We do not love out of reward, nor even as Fenelon argued without considering the regard that we hope for nonetheless, for the sake of God's glory. Love for Butler as for Augustine goes beyond regard to self; "the very notion of affection implies resting in its objects as an end". Butler's discussion of the externality of the direction of the passions passes from the realm of moral philosophy to the orthodoxy of spirituality.
IV. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER TWO

In Butler, we see the full development of the eighteenth century's interest in moral philosophy. I do not wish to argue that he was greater than David Hume, for such a comparison adds little to his interest today. Rather he takes a view as a moral psychologist of man which could see him in his full complexity, yet achieve a radical simplicity in his need for redemption. For Butler, his ethical theory only confirmed man's need for Christianity, which as a Bishop he laboured to defend in the sceptical climate of eighteenth-century England. Newman found in him a subtle cast of mind, which took man as he was, with much evil cast among the good. The detail of his moral psychology, the stress on conscience and the relationship of character to action were the beginnings of a long theological engagement with the question of the nature of man. We turn in Chapter Three for the full development of Butler's moral psychology in the Tractarian movement. Chapter Two then may be summarized as showing that the nature of man is known through moral philosophy, and not simply through experience or as a brute fact. The Tractarians felt that Evangelicals committed the first error, the Utilitarians the second. For Newman, and his fellow Tractarians, God was revealed through the Church; it was man who was the unknown factor.
"Moral character in itself – whether good or bad, as exhibited in thought and conduct, surely cannot be duly represented in words."

J.H. Newman,
University Sermons, No. 5
CHAPTER 3

I. Introduction

II. Newman
   1. Introduction and Outline
   2. The Idea of Christianity
      (i) Nature of the Idea
      (ii) Expression of the Idea
      (iii) Apprehension of the Idea
      (iv) Conscience and the Apprehension of the Idea
   3. The Indwelling of Christ
   4. The Return to the Gospels
   5. Pain, Sin and Ignorance, in the Gospels
   6. The Character of Christ in Men
   7. Summary

III. Wilberforce
   1. Introduction
   2. Rationalism and Idealism
   3. The Character of Christ
   4. Pain, Sin and Ignorance, in the Gospels
   5. Character and Meditation
   6. Summary

IV. Summary of Chapter
CHAPTER 3.

I. INTRODUCTION

Christology was important for Tractarianism because the movement was concerned with holiness and a moral life. Between 1800 and 1840 the theological locus of preaching and doctrine ceased to be the atonement and became the incarnation. This change expressed the Tractarian belief that the incarnation revealed the god-man relationship in a fundamental way that concerned Christians of any age.

The power of Christ, in his relationship with man, lay in his indwelling in the Christian. The conscious revival of the term 'indwelling' expressed the Tractarian sense that Christ dwelt in the hearts of men through the agency of the Holy Spirit. This indwelling justified and sanctified a believer. Therefore the relationship between Christ on earth and his incarnation, and the indwelling Christ now became crucial.

The Tractarians claimed that the nature of the Christ of the incarnation was such that he would wish to be with his followers today. Such was his 'character' or the sort of man he was. His inner being was of a quality that would seek union with the Christian now. This third chapter will therefore attempt to unravel what is meant when one says 'the sort of man he was', rather than 'the sort of person who would indeed act like that'. Butler, it is suggested, saw character
as the final resolution of many motives and desires into one compound action. Thus such a man would act rashly, compassionately or with self-deceit. Newman, it is equally suggested, prefers to look at the inner being of a man. Why does such a man have such a desire at all? Why does Christ seek obedience as the inner motif of all his actions, even if obedience may combine with other desires to express itself at one moment as angry at the Pharisees, and at another tender to his Mother? In short, if Butler sees character as the final expression of moral action, I will argue that Newman's great debt to Butler does not preclude him from presenting the concept of character differently, as the inner nature of man, which perhaps is never fully seen by other men.

To return to the theme of indwelling, Newman explains the indwelling of Christ in Christians now by reference to the character of the God-man presented in the Gospels. Since the indwelling could not fully be described, except backwards with reference to the Fourth Gospel, and obliquely with reference to the effects of the indwelling, the indwelling became a form of "knowledge by acquaintance". This type of knowledge is only one form of knowledge, and cannot fully replace the necessity to give formal, propositional description of what is known. Yet without the awareness of Christ's presence with man, the knowledge of a propositional description would never be sought. So the description that Christ is the Son of God, incarnate, etc., depends upon, as a causal condition, but does not fully replace, the knowledge of how Christ comes to man today. But equally the knowledge of Christ indwelling in man today leads on to the necessity...
of an attempt to describe this Christ, which implies the necessity of a
description of the character of Christ, at the incarnation.

The power of the indwelling Christ, and his very presence, is not
a series of attributes, such as love, joy, peace and holiness. It is
the activity of God, through the Holy Spirit. It is related to the
being of the incarnate Christ, whose character was such that He sought
to dwell in man today. The attributes of this character were love,
peace, holiness, and others. Furthermore, the result of the
indwelling of this Christ should produce a character in man, whose
attributes are the same. So one has the following hermeneutical
method in speaking of character for the Tractarians:

(a) One begins with the awareness of election, and the
indwelling of Christ, after the decision for faith
has been made (which is presupposed here for the sake of
brevity).

(b) One relates this presence of Christ to the character
of Christ in the Gospels, and so understands why
this Christ should come to man today.

(c) The character of Christ in the Gospels has certain
clear moral attributes.

(d) The result of the indwelling in any man of Christ
should produce a type of character in man that is
discernible and be within certain limits.

(e) One of these limits is that (d) will have the same
moral attributes at least in part as the character
of Christ in the Gospels.

(f) Another limit will be that any Christian character
will have an interest in what was the character of
Christ in the Gospels - he will read the Scriptures.

(g) However, due to the sinfulness of all men, including
Christians, the relationship of a Christian character
to the character of Christ in the Gospels will only
be (i) moral, as in (e)
(ii) imitative, as in (f)
(iii) dependent on the prevenient grace given in (a).
Therefore, because of (g) there is always an ontological gulf between a Christian character and the character of Christ in the Gospels, and this:

(i) controls all talk on justification of imparted righteousness; and

(ii) renders all talk of a Christian character being "deified", or of deification, as only analogical.

(On this point, see p. 112 of the thesis.)

The problem of how the humanity of Christ could be known persuaded Newman to use Butler. In speaking of the hypostatic union, Newman turned to Athanasius. When describing the effect of the indwelling upon man, the terms familiar for Butler come into play, such as conscience, responsibility and the relationship of will, knowledge and passion. But are the concepts of Athanasius and Butler in fact able to be correlated so easily? Both for Newman and Robert Wilberforce this will be a formidable problem.

There are two sections to this chapter. Following this brief introduction, which we will conclude shortly with an historical account of why the Tractarians were interested in Butler at all, we shall devote section Newman. Newman developed the concept of Idea, and within this placed the lesser concept of pattern humanity. He was also intensely interested in individual character, in relation to his interest in evangelism. Next, as a second section, Robert Wilberforce's different account of a pattern is recounted, as a mediatorial role. The concept of a mediatorial pattern in character leads into a mediatorial account of the Sacraments. At all times, we will be studying the subtle interplay of Christology, and moral philosophy, in these two sections.
We conclude this introduction with an historical account of the influence of Bishop Butler. By 1830, Butler and Aristotle were part of the formalized structure of the Honours School of Literae Humaniores at Oxford, and in 1833 Butler became compulsory reading for Greats. Goldwin Smith described The Analogy as 'the Oxford Koran - a universal solvent of the theological difficulties'. Gladstone in 1860 praised Butler as above every author as a guide for "the intellectual difficulties and temptations" of these times. Butler lasted alongside Aristotle's Ethics and Politics until 1860, when he ceased to be compulsory reading. It was Jowett, interested in Hegel and German idealism, who replaced Butler with the Platonic dialogues. This marked the beginning of the rise of Oxford Idealism and T.H. Green, who influenced a later generation of theologians. But up to 1860, Butler's influence was profound, and an older generation of theologians praised him up to the end of the nineteenth century. R.W. Church wrote appreciatively of Butler in 1838 as a student at Oxford, and in 1880 gave a lecture on him in Salisbury Cathedral as dean of St. Paul's Cathedral. Earlier, Keble considered The Analogy to contain "the principles of all belief, our assent to the several doctrines of the Gospel being but the application of these principles." Butler was valued by these men - and Froude, Pusey and others could all be cited in equally adulatory tones - for a variety of reasons. Primarily, Butler was able to articulate philosophically the "extreme wonder and reverence" (Froude's words) at this world and our place in it. He opposed rationalism and provided a strong foundation for faith. It was this methodological support which was expressed in the tribute to him by the Poet Laureate Robert Southey, in the epitaph to Butler,
unveiled at Bristol Cathedral in 1834 as a man to be honoured for "rendering philosophy subservient to faith, and finding in outward and visible things the type and evidence of those within the veil." Butler had come to be firmly established as the philosophical apologist for Christianity at Oxford, and for the Anglican Church.

But there were other reasons why Butler was so popular. The usual theologian who is thought of as providing a philosophical defence of Christianity at this time is, of course, Archdeacon Paley, with his utilitarian morality and his advocacy of the design argument. Many, however, were sceptical of Paley, both morally and philosophically. Paley certainly had enormous influence. His Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy were compulsory reading at Cambridge since 1786. But the rise of a secular form of utilitarianism (discussed in the next chapter) worried the older defenders of liberal Christianity. Adam Sedgwick, a scientist with liberal views on theology if conservative against evolution preferred Butler to Paley's "debasing influence". Whewell, master of Trinity, pushed this change through in 1838. Butler's Sermons replaced Paley. By 1848 Whewell published a commentary on the Sermons, and F.D. Maurice began to popularize his own version of Butler from 1853. Maurice studied at Cambridge in the 1820's, and would have read Butler there. (4)

The primary advocate of Butler, however, was of course, Newman. (4a) Much of this influence I will leave to the discussion which follows of Newman's understanding of character, rather than repeat myself, but a few historical points may be made. The death of Hurrell Froude in 1836 gave Newman the chance to choose a book as a keepsake; he tried
for: The Analogy, but it had been taken by some other friend before him. In 1852, Newman commemorated the centenary of Butler’s death by presenting a letter of Butler to Oriel College, Oxford. In 1864, writing The Apologia, he described the reading of The Analogy in 1823 as "an era" in his religious opinions. He wrote extensively there on why Butler mattered so much to him. Again, in 1870, The Grammar of Assent is marked with references to Butler. So from 1823 to 1870 Newman returned to Butler again and again: Butler was "the greatest name in the Anglican Church", wrote Newman, when writing to Oriel in 1852. Newman was, however, not persuasive to men like Stephens and Patterson. Within 8 years he was dropped at Oxford, and other Universities followed. The Tractarians continued to venerate him, but unless one was a High Churchman, Butler was ignored. As Rashdall wrote in the 1920's, "Up to a few years ago Butler's Analogy still held its place among the few books usually prescribed for Ordination Candidates. It has certainly begun most rightly to disappear". (5)

Outside of theological colleges Scott Holland wrote in 1908, "His work still remains outside the current of living speculation."

Butler influenced Newman in many ways. Particular aspects will be traced throughout this chapter. The apprehension of the Idea by conscience depends heavily on Butler, as shown on pages 131-141. Equally, the vastness of Providence is well appreciated by them both. Yet it is a morally unified Providence that governs the affairs of men. Thus, although it may seem to be a disparate series of moral attributes which men find in Almighty God, in fact mercy and judgment, truth and purity are but aspects of one comprehensive goodness. On page 132.
Butler’s influence is traced again. Later, Aristotle’s concept of θρόσπεστος is added as another factor in Newman’s moral thought (cf. page 152).

To end this introduction, one brief example will clarify the discussion. Newman marked his copy of Butler’s Sermons extensively. Much of this chapter is based on my study of this copy. The only recent reference to these notes is one slight reference in an article. Most of the emendations are on divine judgment, character, and self-observation. Several sermons have passages heavily underlined. Such close study, with reference to Plato, and comments in Greek and English, show how much The Sermons meant to Newman. Indeed, for whatever reason, at a later period Newman bought a second copy of The Sermons, which is unmarked. It is, then, to Newman that we turn for a closer study of Butler’s influence, and for an understanding or what character meant to Newman.

II. NEWMAN

1. INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE

The section first moves from Newman’s concept of the Idea of Christianity to the means by which the Idea is apprehended. Hence in the first part of the section on Newman there is a general discussion of the Idea. Its objectivity and living quality is brought out so that the question of the development of doctrine must be alluded to. But the concern of the thesis is not with this aspect of Newman’s
The Idea is expressed in a threefold manner. Since the Idea is made personal and transcendent in Jesus Christ, the expression of it must be congruent with the nature of Christ. The way the Idea is expressed will be discussed, with relation to the Church, Scripture and propositional doctrines. Here we find the first relation to character, and moral philosophy. Part of the expression of the Idea lies in the character of Christ within Scripture. Yet a detailed discussion of this is postponed. For the question now arises as to how this Idea is to be grasped by men. This takes the section into the celebrated division between real and notional assent.

Again this aspect of Newman's thought is not my primary concern. Two aspects of character are relevant, however. First, action and the living out of the Christian faith is the result of accepting the Idea. The relation of action and character is all important, and will be considered later. Secondly, the role of conscience and the illative sense in moving from notional to real assent is crucial. Here the philosophy of Butler in delineating how we come to know (epistemology) through our character may be contrasted with Newman's. Here too the authority of conscience for Newman may be placed alongside Butler's. As with Butler, the authority of conscience is known only by a prior realization of moral responsibility, punishment, justice and divine action. Here we find Butler's understanding of character as the "thing itself" redeemed by divine punishment will be also central to Newman. Newman's discussion of moral responsibility and the unity of moral action lie behind the authority of conscience through which men
Yet Butler and Newman were not united on the exact definition of conscience. Most of all they disagreed on the role it played. For Butler, the authority of conscience unified the nature of man. For Newman, it made concrete the Idea of Christianity. This leads on to the next part of the discussion of Newman. We move from the role of character and conscience in knowing the Idea of Christianity, which is personalized as the power of Christ, to the Idea itself, and Christology and part of the Idea. Christology falls into two parts. There is the indwelling of Christ in man, and secondly the character of Christ in the Gospels. I have already indicated that the second means of expressing the Idea of Christianity are the Scriptures, the other two being the Church and dogmatic propositions. Part of the imagery of the Scriptures is Christ's character. Hence Christology can form the expression of the Idea in two ways. Under the character of Christ in the Gospels, it is part of Scriptural imagery. As dogmatic impositions, it is part of that corpus of belief which the Church (which is itself the first expression of the Idea) defines and defends.

The indwelling of Christ is discussed with relation to sanctification. Yet it swiftly leads onto the character of Christ in the Gospels. This was regarded by many of Newman's contemporaries as an epoch in their religious belief. The Gospels made Christ live as example, teacher and character. Newman is thus of interest to this thesis primarily as one who handles Scripture as an expression of character. Propositional Christology therefore is important for
Newman, especially in Tractarian theology, but this thesis ignores in large measure this aspect. As with Newman’s methodology, we select the interest in character. In methodology, we do not study the Idea in depth, nor real assent. What is of great interest is how human character and conscience is defined, and how the Idea is known by conscience. Moral philosophy defines character. Character is important for real assent. In Christology, the monarchia in Tractarian theology elicits as a theory Newman’s conviction of Christ’s pre-existence. But what is of real interest is how propositional doctrines on Christology interact with the Scriptural presentation of character. Equally, the scriptural presentation of character is not the same as the moral value of Christ. It is extremely important to stress in this introduction that although moral philosophy is used by Newman in defining character, character is not to be defined simply as moral value. Christ is not primarily moral, but an agent who has certain qualities, such as responsibility, deliberation and intention. Like Bonhoeffer's Christology, Newman sees Christ as a person, and not as a vehicle for expressing moral value. To repeat the point, Christ is a man who acts. Moral philosophy delineates this action formally. As Newman said, "we need but define". Christ is not to be spoken of as one who primarily is supremely loving, or indeed expressing any other moral action.

Yet how does Christ act? At this point all the questions arise. What is the relationship of the divine and human natures in speaking of Christ's character? What does it mean to speak of evil as an "inner-leprosy"? What is a truly voluntary action? What is the
relationship of body and mind in speaking about pain? Can morally responsible action be ignorant? How do beliefs relate to action?

After discussing these aspects of character, we move to the final part of this section on Newman. At the beginning of this introduction, I mentioned that action was the result of accepting the Idea. The relation of action to character in the Christian is all important. This may seem to be repeating the above paragraph, but there is a crucial difference. The Christian faces all the above questions, but he is indwelt by Christ. Christ is the Word, but the Christian is indwelt by Christ. To put it differently, Christ has a character. The Christian has a character too, which is not only Christ-like but Christ-formed. This character controls all action.

We have moved in a circle. The first part of this section considered the role of character in methodology and epistemology. The second placed the character of Christ in the Gospels as a crucial part of what is known by the Christian. The third part discusses how Christ forms the Christian character, and how this character is related to epistemology, evangelism, and the formation of habits.

Some quotations from Newman may summarize these three arguments.

On character in reasoning, Newman writes

"Some of these habits of mind which are throughout the Bible represented as alone pleasing in the sight of God, are the very habits which are necessary for scientific investigation, and without which it is quite impossible to extend the sphere of our knowledge." (6a)

On the importance of Christ's character in the Gospels, he writes
"Without an immediate apprehension of the personal character of our Saviour, what professes to be faith is little more than an act of ratiocination."

"Our Lord is the pattern of human nature in its perfection." (6b)

Finally, there is Christ's character which is to be formed in man.

Newman puts systematic doctrine below character in being the fruit of Scripture

"The object of the written word be, not to unfold a system for our intellectual contemplation, but to secure the formation of a certain character."

"Moral character in itself - whether good or bad, as exhibited in thought and conduct, cannot be duly represented in words." (6c)

The following plan will be adopted in this section on Newman.

It is a development of the introduction to Newman given above.

(2) (i) The Idea of Christianity
    (ii) The Idea Expressed: The Church, Scripture, Doctrine.
    (iii) Apprehension of the Idea: by means of
    (iv) Conscience/Illative Sense/Probability
(3) The Indwelling of Christ
(4) The Return to the Gospels
(5) Pain, Sin and Ignorance in the Gospels
(6) The Character of Christ in Men
(7) Summary

At varying points the influence of Butler will be brought out.

Yet Butler's philosophy and theology provides only the starting point of this original and profound theologian. We turn then to the idea of Christianity in Newman, which we approach through the theme of the Indwelling of Christ, and its relationship to the Christ of the Gospels.

2. (a) THE "IDEA"OF CHRISTIANITY

In his apologetic defence of Christianity Newman began with
humanity's need of a saviour, and by the time of the Athanasian Treatises and the Lectures on Justification found his answer in the work of Christ by indwelling. It has been shown recently that in the early days of the Oxford Movement, Christological devotion permeated much of Newman's thought on the Trinity, Atonement and Justification, as well as the more obvious topics such as the Incarnation. Since Newman was not a systematic theologian, there are traces of the relation of Christology to these theological loci throughout the sermons and the historical works.

"We are by nature the captives and prisoners of our inordinate and unruly passions and desires; we are not our own masters, till our Lord sets us free; and the main question is, how does He set us free, and by what instrumentality? ... Here we answer, first, by bringing home to us the broad and living law of liberty and His own pattern which He has provided for us ... An opportunity of imitation is not enough. A powerful internal grace is necessary, however great the beauty of the Moral Law and its Author, in order to set us free and convert the human heart."(7)

Divinization was the state attained by a redeemed man through his relationship with the humanity of Jesus. But atonement, incarnation, regeneration, and justification are all one sacrament. (8) Thus Incarnation Cross and Resurrection are but one act, and the power of the sacrifice of the Cross is set up within man, converting man into a sacrifice. Justification sets up the cross within a man sealing a man as a Christian. But this is not enough. "The Cross must be brought home to us not in word, but in power, and this is the work of the Spirit."(9) The work of the Spirit in power is given by Christ to men after his Resurrection.
"The Divine Life which raised Him, flowed over and availed unto our rising from sin and condemnation. It wrought a change in His Sacred Manhood, which became spiritual without His ceasing to be a man, and was in a wonderful way imparted to us as a new-creating, transforming Power in our hearts." (10)

Following the Calvinist who had influenced him as an undergraduate, Thomas Scott, who wrote that this age was the age of the Spirit, Newman claimed that we are indwelt by the Spirit, and the Spirit completes the redemption wrought in us by Christ. (11)

The Parochial Sermons fills this out. There was for Newman a mysterious link between Christ's departure and the return of Christ in the person of the Spirit. Christ by rising gained new life for man. Christ by ascending released the new life on man through the Spirit. The two are features of the one act. Our justification is Christ in us. Raised by the Spirit, we are declared to be God's Sons (12) because Christ substitutes the Spirit for himself, not as a second best, but as a real and personal visitation by the Spirit: Christ is present, spiritually, in his humanity. (13) The Spirit "has not so come that Christ does not care, but rather He cares that Christ may come in His coming. Through the Holy Ghost we have communion with the Father and Son." (14) It was a view which united Wilberforce and Newman. The Spirit

"came to join men to Christ, to supply the loss which would else have attended Our Lord's Ascension, that He who was withdrawn according to his carnal propinquity might be brought more near by the spiritual presence." (15)

"This Blessed Spirit becomes the agent, through which that sanctified humanity of the Son of God exerts its renewing influence upon the defiled humanity of His brethren."
Such a view of Wilberforce's is close to Newman, when he writes "This is to be justified to receive the Divine Presence within us, and be made a Temple of the Holy Ghost". (16) "The greatest and special gift is the actual presence, as well as the power within us of the Incarnate Son as a principle or of sanctification, or rather of deification." (17)

But two questions at once arise. How is this presence and power to be apprehended, and secondly, in what way is the apprehended humanity of Christ to be described? Newman's attempt to meet these two points illustrate one of the ways the influence of Butler is manifested. They also raise the difficult question of the relationship of propositional statements to the one person of Christ, and the further question of how a pluriformity of propositions expressing the one person can also generate in our minds the Idea of Christ. Newman is working methodologically with three aspects of apprehension; the object of the apprehension, or person of Christ; secondly, the Idea which expresses that person; thirdly, propositional statements which delineate the Idea in formal terms, and images generated by the power of the Idea in our minds. Dogma, expressed in propositions, is verifiable through our possession of Christ, in our hearts, as a Person. Theological dogma thus expresses our inner life, Christ's relationship to that life, and the daily living of that life.

The images of the Idea are found primarily in Scripture, and the richness of Biblical Theology in its full, undiscovered extent, (unsystematic and various although it is) is not less than revealed theological dogma for Newman. The two questions are in fact closely
related. The presence and power of Christ is apprehended by real assent working in a personal, uniquely incommunicable situation on concrete imagery. Concrete imagery is described first in Scripture, and then translated formally into propositional statements.

The truth of religion cannot be detached from its history, so the development of ideas is introduced. Anything that is perceived corporeally only discloses one aspect of itself but as more disclosures combine a totality is revealed. So it is with the Idea of Christianity. Commensurate with the totality of its possible aspects, it will however be presented in different aspects of varying power and depth for the individuals which apprehend it. The diversity of presentations of the Idea will create greater impressions on those who are receptive. A concrete Idea cannot be fully expressed under one aspect in its content and meaning, so the definition of the Idea will equally fail to be given by any one linguistic expression. A living Idea, whether real or not, is of a nature to assist and possess the mind, it may be said to have life, that is, to live in the mind which is its recipient. Christianity is undoubtedly a living Idea. Ideas can live or die whether or not they are real or false. A real Idea will correspond to objective reality and an Idea may be entirely false while being a living Idea. "The number of persons holding an Idea is no warrant for its objective character, else the many never could be wrong. This use of objectivity in Ideas represents Newman's use of Christian Platonism, as Lash notes. The more intense the consideration we give Ideas, the more the linguistic expressions we in fact study witness to the power of the Idea to which they belong.
Gradually the aspects of an Idea come together, and the truth of it is revealed in its essential meaning. So development and truth are continually related: The true meaning or truth of an Idea is revealed by development. The Idea in one sense never changes, but it is more complete at its final appearance or form. So the origins of an Idea cannot be the sole criterion of its value. An Idea means a concrete construction, or living power of the mind, with a significant historical mission to fulfil. But an Idea is not a judgment exercised on things coming before the mind. Although part of the 1845 essay might suggest this "the term seems to refer to an objective entity, existing independently of and influencing the minds of men". (21) Time is needed for the comprehension of an Idea. So to speak of the development of an Idea does not imply that an Idea is imperfect, but that it is not yet fully understood. As an Idea develops it becomes more complex, and more concrete. Christianity for Newman is the most complex and concrete of all Ideas, and so will develop most fully and richly. Catholic Christianity in particular overcomes all competing influences, and all tendencies making for its dissolution. Newman qualifies his understanding of what it means for an Idea to live. The vitality of a church came to indicate the reality or truth of a church. Because it lives, there is a pointer to its truth. Life is due to the indwelling of the Spirit. In his letters and diaries (22) he wrote "I believe I was the first writer who made life the true mark of a church". Christ could indeed personalize the Idea, (23) thus expressing the transcendence of its beyond human effort. The presence of the unseen Christ is identified with the Idea. Newman used the Idea repeatedly in the Essay on Development as a principle, meaning the
"deep psychological spasms motivating understanding and activity". Elsewhere Christ, risen and present in the power of the Spirit, is spoken of as a principle of life in the church: "That divine and adorable Form, which the Apostles saw and handled, after ascending into heaven became a principle of life, a secret origin of existence to all who believe, through the gracious ministration of the Holy Ghost." (24)

Whether Newman's theory of development is at all adequate, or still more controversially whether the criteria for discerning the development are valid, is not the concern of this essay. Rather we must move to the way the Idea of Christianity is expressed by means of Creeds and dogmas which are propositional, and by means of images and historical facts which are not. How the idea of Christianity can be known by men will determine in what way men will know the nature of Christ, who is their saviour.

2. (b) THE EXPRESSION OF THE IDEA

In the 11th University Sermon Newman wrote that

"half the controversies in the world are verbal ones; and, could they be brought to a plain issue, they would be brought to a prompt termination. Peoples engaged in them would then perceive, either that in substance they agreed together, or that their difference was one of the first principles. We need not dispute, we need not prove, we need but define." (25)

There was, then, a clear need to define the Idea of Christianity. But how was the Idea to be expressed? This is of course a different question, although a related one, to the question of how the Idea was
to be apprehended. The Idea itself could only be rendered into words in certain ways without the risk or betrayal: this shows Newman's persistent concern with language. Newman attacked Thomas Erskine because he felt that Erskine's use of the term manifestation was not making "a fact evident" but "making the reason of it intelligible". (26)

But the mystery of the Cross could not be removed. There was a complete break with the 'rationalism' Newman felt Erskine represented, and which through Whateley had once influenced Newman himself ten years earlier. Language is "but an artificial system adapted for particular purposes, which have been determined by our wants". (27)

If mystery had to be preserved, and language was artificial, Newman was aware of the danger of over generalization. In a striking passage in Tract 73, he compared Christian faith to the view at twilight. Here and there large objects stand out against the sky, but we do not know how they are related, nor should we try to form a comprehensive theory when we are so ignorant. Logical symmetry in theology was inherently destructive.

Thus there had to be a continual self-restraint on the part of those who defined dogma. In the 1843 Sermon, The Theory of Development in Religious Doctrine, Newman wrote

"As definitions are not intended to go beyond their subject, but to be adequate to it, so the dogmatic statements of the Divine Nature used in our confessions, however multiplied cannot say more than is implied in the original idea, considered in its completeness, without the risk of heresy. Creeds and dogmas live in the one idea which they are designed to express, and which alone

* Newman does not capitalize this "idea".
is substantive; and are necessary only because the human mind cannot reflect upon that idea except piecemeal, cannot use it in its oneness and entireness, nor without resolving it into a series of aspects and relations. And in matter of fact these expressions are never equivalent to it; we are able indeed to define the creations of our minds, for they are what we make them and nothing else; but it were as easy to create what is real as to define it."

Once again in this long quotation the problem that finally emerges is one of definition. There are, then, three ways in which Newman looks for the definition and expression of an Idea. The first is that of the Church itself, and especially the mysterious facts of the Sacraments. (That the Gospel is portrayed by the Church is an old and persistent theme in Catholic theology, seen for instance in Michael Ramsey's Gospel and the Catholic Church, 1936.) For Newman, the Church is "that new language which Christ has brought us". And it is through the Church that the Idea of Christ is made plain, or manifest (in Newman's restricted sense of that term, viz making a fact evident, not explaining its rationale). (28)

"He has shown us that to come to Him for life is a literal bodily action; not a mere figure, not a mere movement of the heart towards Him, but an action of the visible limbs; not a mere secret faith, but a coming to Church, a passing on along the aisle to His holy table ... If then a man does not seek Him where He is, there is no profit in seeking Him where He is not. What is the good of sitting at home seeking Him, when His presence is in the Holy Eucharist?"(29)

Next, the Idea is presented in the Images of Scripture, which has a rich and complex theology. Again the concern with language breaks out at once

"Even the words of inspired Scripture (are) imperfect
and defective ... in consequence of the medium it uses and the beings it addresses. It uses human language, and it addresses man; and neither can man compass, nor can his hundred tongues utter, the mysteries of the spiritual world, and God's dealings in this."(30)

Much of Newman's understanding of Scripture was typological. "Joshua, A type of Christ and his Followers" explores the relationship between the Old and New Testaments. Even the name Joshua is "as if a silent sign, made to us by the All merciful God, that even then He had before Him the thought of redemption". (31) The typology is extensive - his office, followers, works and relationship to God's intended Salvation. Equally in Volume seven of the Parochial Sermons Moses is the type of Christ.

In all his writings on Scripture, the application to the Christian is paramount. "Scripture A Record of Human Sorrow" sees "the austere character of Scripture" as the gift of God to us, lest we become too easily swayed by the pleasures of the world. Indeed, Scripture was written by Christians "quite aware from the first of its own prospective future". (32) But within Scripture itself are the words of Christ. The style of Christ's preaching is "distinct from any other part of Scripture, showing itself in solemn declarations."(33) All his words are "evidence of a legislature in germ, afterwards to be developed, a code of divine truth which was ever to be before men's eyes, to be the subject of investigation and interpretation, and the guide in controversy".

Also within Scripture as part of the second way of expressing the Idea of Christianity is "Our Lord's Character". Without
anticipating the later section on the Character of Christ is the Gospels, it is worth noting that the Idea of Christianity is expressed by this portrayal of Christ. It comes "with its own evidence dispensing with extrinsic proof, and claiming authoritatively by itself the faith and devotion of all to whom it is presented". The simplicity of Scriptural language testifies to the way the character of Christ unites the aspects of the Idea of Christianity.

"It is the point, to which, after all and in fact, all religious minds tend, and in which they ultimately rest, even if they do not start from it. Without an immediate apprehension of the personal character of our Saviour, what professes to be faith is little more than an act of ratiocination." (34)

So "the life of Christ brings together and concentrates truths, it collects the scattered rays of light". (35)

"When, then, they have logical grounds presented to them for holding that the recorded picture of our Lord is its own evidence, that it comes with its own reality and authority, that His " revelatio " is " revelata " in the very act of being a " revelatio ", it is as if He Himself said to them, as He once said to His disciples, 'It is I, be not afraid! ..." (36)

Newman found the problem of inspiration of Scripture difficult, especially as Propaganda constrained him. Rejecting the view that inspiration meant actual dictation, and yet holding that it was more than freedom from error, he held that there was only one sense of the text that had authority, even if there were millions of devotional applications allowed by God as edifying, and indeed foreseen by Him. But the definition of the authoritative sense of the text could only be done by the divinely appointed Church. However "we know only in
part and probably what the divine sense is. The Church has never taken on herself an authoritative consent in extenso." Inspiration can be defined as the fact that 'in every word and clause' there is 'a sense or senses' which is divine, and "claims our absolute homage and our profound faith". But this sense is largely only latent, and probably known. (37)

Newman lastly saw the Idea enshrined in propositional dogmas. These he accepted unconditionally. They developed over time, and were defined by the Church which was given the power to define truth by Christ. But propositional truth had to be related to the Idea of Christianity given through the Church and through Scripture. Apprehension of the Idea always involved an image of Christ if it was to be real assent to propositions: the latter required the former, indeed, for real assent. The dogmas of the Catholic Church are protected by that Church's infallibility, and implicit faith must be given in what cannot fully be understood by all. Theological reasoning considers them as notional assent, and held them as truths through its intellect; religious imagination holds them as reality, and gives real assent to them. Both relate to the Idea which is greater than either. (38)

2. (c ) APPREHENSION OF THE IDEA

Ever since his conversion at the age of 15

"When I was 15 in the autumn of 1816 a great change of thought took place in me. I fell under the influence of a definite creed and received into my intellect
impressions of dogma, which, through God's mercy, have never been effaced or obscured." (39)

Newman was certain of the value of conversion in religion. This belief took him through various stages of thought, culminating in the 1870 Grammar of Assent. That men should come to believe in Christianity was all important, but the Idea could not be sold, but only presented and then left. On several occasions, Newman felt that it was enough if one preached Christ boldly by describing the truths of Christianity. But only by relying on "Divine Grace and human freedom" would a preacher ever convince men: if he tried to sell Christianity, he would fail. Describing what it meant to be a Christian evangelist, preaching on the four last things, Newman said the preacher would have the

"true earnestness the horror or the rapture, of one who witnesses a conflagration ... (he will be) always simple, grave, emphatic and peremptory; and all this not because he has proposed to himself to be so, but because certain intellectual convictions involve certain external manifestations". (40)

In the Grammar of Assent, Newman analyses the mind's apprehension of propositions. When one grasps the meaning of a judgment made in a proposition, an apprehension occurs, and this will be either notional or real. Notional apprehension grasps the meaning of terms as abstract generalities, real apprehension grasps the things, concrete facts or the Idea to which the terms refer. In other words, notional assent accepts propositions, real assent realizes that the terms referred to in a proposition actually exist concretely. So the same proposition can be assented to by the mind in a real or notional way.
If it is to be grasped in a real way then images of that truth must be realized by the individual mind also. First, then, God is "known", and then the image is supplied.

"We must know concerning God before we can feel love, fear, hope, or trust towards Him. Devotion must have its objects: those objects, as being supernatural, when not represented to our senses by material symbols, must be set before the mind in propositions: The formula which embodies a dogma for the theologian readily suggests an object for the worshipper. It seems a truism to say, yet it is all that I have been saying that in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason."

Newman, however, clearly distinguished between types of reasoning. This leads one into the means of apprehension of the Idea by probability, the illative sense and conscience, but before moving thence certain points should be made. One can know, or rather assent, to a proposition either in a notional or real way, and real assent only occurs when an image is present which is concrete and living. But certain precautions are necessary. Although images may be sharp and vivid, the objects of the proposition may deceive us, and not in fact exist. Secondly, real assent in itself is not the same as action: beyond real assent, there is always the living out of the Christian Faith. Real assent is necessary for action, but it is not that itself. "Without certitude in religious faith, there may be much deceiving of profession and of observance, but there can be no habit of prayer, no directness of devotion, no intercourse with the unseen, no generosity of self-sacrifice." Thirdly, real assent is always of a personal character, and this is not easily communicated. This theme will be picked up later, in the section on The Character of Christ in Men.
2. (d) THE APPREHENSION OF THE IDEA BY CONSCIENCE/ILLATIVE SENSE/
PROBABILITY

So far the influence of Butler has not been very apparent, yet it is one of the points of this thesis that in Newman the influence of his moral philosophy was as great as that of The Analogy. This point is argued both in J.M. Cameron's studies of Newman in his collected essays, The Night Battle, and in Donald MacKinnon's introduction to the University Sermons.

In real assent the whole of our personality responds. Logical processes only play a subordinate role. It is an emotional, volitional and rational act, wholly personal, and not analysable into degrees of strength. It is an immediate concrete act, and doubt is not in the act of assent if it exists at all, but in the proposition of Fact/Idea to which assent is directed, whereas inference is conditioned, mediated, conceptual and imageless. At most there is only probability. This is the classical British empirical epistemology of Locke, and the eighteenth century followers of him. Newman replaces inference with the subjective certitude of the individual spirit, personal and whole. The objectivity of truth is not however purely resting on this subjectivity, for there is always the control of the notional assent as well, the method of evidences and probabilities, and the far greater control of ecclesiastical authority. I realise this is only a very partial account of the illative sense, but I am concerned to relate the witness of the conscience to the Idea of Christianity, and then the resulting indwelling by the Spirit, which is described and defined
by the witness of Christ in the Gospels. A short account of Newman will inevitably lack depth.

The apprehension of the Idea by real assent is covered by the gift of faith from God. However, real assent and faith will be defective if they do not have a firm moral basis. Much of Newman's thought centred on the possibility of working out why faith could be presented as appealing to the morality that is found in the man aware of his conscience. If belief and unbelief both go beyond reason, and both believer and unbeliever view evidence in the light of an antecedent presumption, why should a person believe? Not from the light of evidences, as was found in Paley, nor even from the argument of Butler on the analogy of religion, although this argument is very strong in the Second University Sermon of 1830. \(^{(43)}\) By the mid 1830s Newman can write of Christianity providing "an emancipation from the tyranny of the visible world", and his conviction that "the whole system of what is called cause and effect, is one of mystery". Rather Newman turns to reflection upon conscience, leading to the affirmation of "the existence of a transcendent judge". \(^{(44)}\) This is the first step in the life of faith. All men have the capacity to make moral judgments. What is needed is the exercise of obedience. Even in University Sermon Two, where the life of reason (in the Paleyan sense) is still a striving aid to faith, Newman can write "Conscience is the essential principle and sanction of Religion in the mind". Like Butler, conscience is accorded a natural authority among men. Again, like Butler in the 15th Rolls Sermon on the ignorance of man, Newman believes that Providence is too vast a scheme for men to understand. What matters
is that men are placed "in a state of discipline and improvement" for Butler, and their knowledge should aim only at the "fear of the Lord".\footnote{45}

So Newman could write to a correspondent in 1870

"Something I must assume, and in assuming Conscience I assume what is least to assume, and what most men will admit. Half the world knows nothing of the argument from design - and when you have got it, you do not prove by it the moral attributes of God, except very faintly. Design teaches me power, skill and goodness - not sanctity, not mercy, not a future judgment, which three are of the essence of religion. \footnote{46}

We now turn to a close examination of Newman and Butler on conscience.

Newman first must be distinguished from Butler on his treatment of character in relation to reasoning. For Butler, moral disposition is closely related to intellectual reasoning. The insufficiency of intellectual proof serves as a development of moral character. In examining insufficient proof, we practice moral virtues. The truth of Revelation is not imposed. It is also not known intuitively, but it is deduced from certain premisses through inference. Since probability is not opposed to certitude, but to demonstration, the correlation of an analogical method of reasoning with an acceptance of probability as a guide of life places great stress on the person who will achieve this correlation. Yet this correlation will enable man to deal with the problem of the insufficiency of Revelation geographically and intellectually. Both the problem of why there was not a universal revelation, and why the intellectual proof of the existence of God is not conclusive can be only resolved when the (negative) analogy is made with the pattern of ordinary life, with its uncertainties, inconclusive demonstrations of truth, and yet the reliability of probability as a
Insufficiency of proof can always act as an excuse for the person who does not wish to believe. Moral disposition for Butler is that which brings a true care and attention to the facts. It guides the individual to spell out the implications of insufficient proof. It makes up for the lack of time ordinary men have to consider a Paleyan proof of God's existence with a moral attitude which can accept implications without taking time to trace out the exact steps.

External reasoning then for Butler is supplemented by moral disposition. "Les dispositions morales chez Butler ... font qu'un homme attache plus d'importance aux éléments qui se présentent, qu'il cherche la vérité avec plus de temps à cette recherche importante". (47) Such external reasoning and the spur of conscience to discipline this reasoning aright is what one also finds in the early Newman. An important point is that the role of moral disposition and reason will change in Newman.

In the First University Sermon, The Philosophical Temper first enjoined by the Gospel, Newman echoes Butler.

"Some of those habits of mind which are throughout the Bible represented as alone pleasing in the sight of God, are the very habits which are necessary for scientific investigation, and without which it is quite impossible to extend the sphere of our knowledge."

Such a reasoning is external and analogous in theology to science. It thus can be called generically scientific reasoning. The contribution
of Christianity is that one must be earnest in seeking the truth. One must be patient and cautious. Above all, one should be prepared to reason without yet having full knowledge of the facts of the case ("to be willing to be ignorant for a time ... waiting for further light") and to join with other thinkers in searching for truth. These distinctive points of Christianity establish "an original character - only the scattered traces of it being found in authors unacquainted with the Bible".

Yet this is really Butler's argument, not the distinctiveness of Christianity agreed by all theologians. It is the correlation of Aristotelian phronesis with Christian humility and Koinonia to achieve a greater understanding of truth.

"An argument will almost be established in favour of Christianity, as having conferred an intellectual as well as a spiritual benefit on the world."

Newman turned away from this in three directions, which we must briefly examine. All represent the changing influence of Butler, 'the greatest name in the Anglican church' as Newman said once, upon the thought of Butler. First, Newman supplemented the moral certitude of Butler with the strength of faith and love. Thus the calmness of the authority of conscience which should discipline the attentive mind enquiring after Christianity which is there in Butler and the First University Sermon becomes supplemented by the Apologia's acknowledgment of Keble's stress on emotional commitment beyond probable reasoning. Secondly, Newman came to value the importance of speculative certainty as well as moral certainty, and took care to let his correspondents
know that this distance had opened up between himself and Butler, as in his letter of October 24, 1864. Thirdly, Newman developed not merely Butler's view on antecedent probability as seen in the first point on the influence of Keble, but his own theory of implicit reasoning. Here he used Butler's theory of cumulative evidence, but breaks the correlation of inference and assent. Instead Newman turns to informal inference through the illative sense. Indeed, the way a mind reasoned informally would use as its material the cumulative evidences of Butler in detail, but Butler is far removed both from the unconditional assent reached by informal inference which Newman established, and from Newman's use of implicit, internal reasonings.

Thus we have discussed the role of the character in relation to reasoning. There is a complex relationship of Butler's moral philosophy to Newman. In summary, Butler heavily influences the early University Sermons. Next, Newman rejects Butler's calmness for the emotional, Romantic view of faith leaping beyond reason in the Apologia, which reflects in Newman's view the influence of Keble. Thirdly, Butler's philosophical or logical method returns once Newman was under scrutiny at Rome, as a way of establishing certitude for Newman, but Newman selects only part of Butler. He accepts cumulative probability, but rejects Butler's external reasoning and inference with conditional assent for implicit reasoning, the illative sense and unconditional assent. There is less of the philosophical attitude of mind enjoined by Butler for human character, for that never returned once Newman had ceased to be Anglican, but the influence of moral
We turn then to Newman's usage of Butler on the authority of conscience, in moving to an apprehension of the Idea of Christianity. It is worth indicating the way the argument is moving. If Newman believes that the authority of conscience apprehends the Idea of Christianity, Newman must defend the place of moral punishment, the existence of human responsibility, and justice. Butler, it must be again said, believed that conscience was an impressive way of disciplining external, intellectual study of miracles, prophecies, and other evidence, and was prepared to use the discipline of conscience to supplement external reasoning, and so to arrive at moral certitude. Newman, seeking speculative certitude, used both romanticism's development of religious devotion to supplement intellectual reasoning, but also turned to internal evidence as a way not of proving the existence of God, but of making his existence credible. Hence Newman turned to the authority of conscience as a step to the proof of God's existence, a step which Butler never took. We must study Newman's views on moral responsibility, justice and the authority of conscience. All show the way moral philosophy integrates closely with anthropology in Newman's theological method. Newman, unlike Butler, will directly use the place of conscience in man as a way to knowing God.

On moral responsibility, Newman stresses the unity of moral action. Although Butler also establishes this point, Newman again alters it. Butler does not agree that virtue can be unified under benevolence, yet despite this rejection of a morally unifying disposition he is deeply concerned that humanity has one moral faculty
concerned with actions evaluated as good or evil. All of man's moral nature, such as compassion, judgments, resentments, etc., can be placed under the ultimate unifying principle of a good or bad nature. Newman argues that even a child can unify the moral attributes of God. MacKinnon notes Butler's concern with the systematic unity of human nature in its enormous complexity. Newman transfers the argument to God himself as well as man, so defending the divine unity on the predicate of moral action. (This is a point not noticed by MacKinnon who is however writing on the University Sermons not the Grammar of Assent.) A child for Newman sees God as lawgiver, upholding truth, purity, justice and kindness. All of these can be unified under the common attribute of goodness, not of course benevolence, and so all aspects of goodness are "indivisible, correlative, supplementary of each other in one and the same Personality, so that there is no aspect of goodness which God is not".

From moral action comes moral responsibility. In University Sermon Eight, "Human Responsibility as Independent of Circumstances." Newman again follows Butler's Analogy and Sermons. Newman argues that the supremacy of the law of conscience is morally absolute. So Butler argues in the first three of his Sermons. Newman writes that external circumstances are irrelevant "in the judgment which is ultimately to be made upon our conduct and character". As Butler argues in The Analogy, Newman sees divine action as manifested in the course of nature and in human feelings of praise or guilt. Scripture confirms the working of nature. There is a unity to Scripture, and the "stern morality" of Leviticus and Ezekiel is repeated in the passage from Galatians.
"God is not mocked". It may seem that when Paul writes on freedom from the law he is "at first sight opposite", but this is not the case. Paul corroborates the working of nature. Newman, like Butler, is elaborating a natural law theory on the necessity of punishment in the formation of moral character. There are many emendations in Newman's handwriting in his 1836 copy of Butler's *Sermons* at the Oratory on this point, which I have closely consulted. Indeed, Newman added the words "So Plato, *Laws*" to his underlining of the preface to Butler's sermons, "In whatever sense we understand justice ... the end of Divine punishment is no other than that of civil punishment, namely, to prevent future mischief". Newman also underlined twice the words in Butler's two sermons to the House of Lords on 30th January 1741 and 11th June 1747 on the interaction of divine and human punishment. Lastly, it may be pointed out that in the passage in the Preface where Butler denies that God's future punishment for men implies divine malice towards men, Newman again underlines this, and equally underlines the passage heavily where in Sermon Fifteen Butler defines religion as submission to the Divine Will.

The evidence is overwhelming. Newman built the theology of the Eighth University Sermon on the basis of the improvement of moral character by divine praise and punishment, and so followed Butler. Thus Newman could write

"Praise to the obedient, punishment on the transgressor, is the revealed rule of God's government from the beginning to the consummation of all things." (59)

But an important point must be made. In a piece of detective work,
which does not describe however in detail the emendations given above, J. Robinson shows that this 1835-6 copy of Butler's Sermons was probably bought in the 1860s, and thus was used for the Grammar of Assent. If, then, the 1830-40 University Sermons reflect Butler's influence, so too does the Grammar of Assent.

In some ways, indeed, the Eighth University Sermon, which discusses Calvinism and scientific determinism, anticipates much of the section in the next chapter on Mill and character. Man for Newman attempts to remove the weight of moral responsibility by developing theories of fatalism. Utilitarian determinism (Newman uses the term fatalism) is rejected because it undervalues the power of the passions. Following the general language of eighteenth-century moral philosophy, Newman sees passion as internal impulses. Unlike Butler, who saw them as morally neutral until man decides how they are to be evaluated in relation to the object external to him, Newman describes these as moral temptations. The reality of temptation means that Newman denies any theory at all of determinism. We will return to this in the next chapter. Calvinism, which Mill also rejected but for very different reasons as we shall see, was rejected by Newman because it ignored the character and power of the affections. Affections are for Newman the principled dispositions of the moral agent. Butler saw affections as passions which were disciplined by reason, which then with conscience produced the faculty of benevolence, or any other moral disposition. Newman prefers to see the discipline which results in principled dispositions as lying in reason and conscience, but also in authority and the Church. In any case,
Calvinism is wrong since a doctrine of prelapsarian, predestined election allows no room for

"the resistance of the will; or for self-discipline, as the medium by which faith and holiness are connected together".

Newman believes that the "Scriptural principle" must govern the systematic derivation of predestination from Scripture which Calvin achieved. This "Scriptural principle" is the independence of mind in the moral judgment of character, self-denial, and the education of conscience. This is a dangerous argument, however.

"A doctrine such as this may be perverted into a contempt of authority, a neglect of the Church, and an arrogant reliance on self."

But the dangers therein, and the mystery of divine election, and even the increasing popularity of the theory of social determinism, cannot override Scriptural truth.

"It is preposterous in us to attempt to direct our course by the distant landmarks of the Divine counsels which are but dimly revealed to us, overlooking the clear track close before our eyes provided for our needs ... Even though the march of society be conducted on a superhuman law, yet, while it moves against Scripture truth, it is not God's ordinance."

Before moving into the authority of conscience, we must briefly note Newman's treatment of justice. Once again, the debt to Butler is great. Duty, justice and purity are original instincts in men. Inductively and cumulatively, Newman's argument moves from moral experience to the justice of God. Unlike F.D. Maurice's Theological
Essays, which argued that an overconcentration on sin in evangelical preaching resulted from a sinfully morbid preoccupation with the failure of self, Newman argued that a failure to realize the enormity of divine justice confronting man's sin was itself sinful. A sanctified Christian will praise divine justice. Newman equates what is natural with what is theologically right. It is extremely important to notice this. Butler has a use of 'natural' which is descriptive and prescriptive, but is not simply theological, although the prescription rests on theological premisses. Newman however can write in University Sermon Six, "On Justice as a Principle of Divine Governance," that "it is also natural to feel indignation when vice triumphs" but shortly afterwards that only "the Saints" add indignation and justice to benevolence. This equation will be traced further in this thesis to Liddon's use of the term 'natural' as referring both to man now, man as he ought to be now and as God can make him now, and to pre-lapsarian Adam.

The attack on the reduction of theological virtue to benevolence earned the praise of his fellow Tractarians, and R.W. Church's Oxford Movement expressed the approval of many who looked back on these sermons as a watershed in moral theology: (62) Newman had reacted against

"the poverty, softness, restlessness, worldliness, the blunted and impaired sense of truth, which reigned with little check in the recognized fashions of professing Christianity; the want of depth both of thought and feeling; the strange blindness to, the real sternness, nay the austerity of the New Testament."

Finally, then, as a result of a belief in the government of God
by reward and punishment through the approval and disapproval of society and individuals, as a result further of a belief in moral responsibility, and of justice as a principle of divine governance, Newman can come to the witness of conscience to the authority and majesty of God. Butler's use of the concept of conscience is fundamental here, but it must again be repeated that Butler used intellectual reasoning upon external evidences, disciplined by the use of conscience in the right use of thought, to arrive at a probable intellectual assent which could be supplemented by moral certitude. Newman used in The Grammar of Assent an implicit reasoning, dependent on the moral cast of mind of a person and supplemented by religious faith and devotion, which studied both external evidences and conscience's witness itself, to arrive at speculative certitude which resulted (through the illative sense's implicit reasoning) in unconditional assent. Butler contributed both probability to this argument of Newman's as a basic methodological tool, cumulative evidence beyond miracles and prophecy, and the existence of conscience conceptually defined, but he did not himself reason implicitly on the existence of the authority of conscience as a way to God. Much of the material Newman used methodologically came from Butler, but the argument is Newman's alone.

How far then did Newman and Butler agree on the role of conscience in the concept of character? Both agreed that conscience is related to Providence. For Butler, Providence works with Nature. "The care of some persons, suppose children and families, is particularly committed to our charge by Nature and Providence". Furthermore, Providence uses the qualities in men governed by
conscience. God "foresaw the irregularities and disorders" which would happen to men, and so gave man a particular, moral being, with innate senses of resentment against injustices, compassion at misfortune and other such qualities. Newman equally stresses the reality of Providence in conscience. God works "through, with, and beneath these physical, and social and moral laws, of which our experience informs us". The experience of moral laws is through conscience. Providence works through the system of cause and effect in the visible world. This world is

"the veil, yet still partially the symbol and index: so that all that exists or happens visibly, conceals and yet suggests, and above all subserves, a system of persons, facts and events beyond itself." (63)

Newman correlates Providence and the actions of men in the opposite way to Butler. Butler assumes the existence of God and argues that the existence of human feelings is a mark of his handiwork. Newman argues from human feelings expressed in actions to the existence of God. "One little deed done against nature" (the use of the term nature here is not what is prescriptively good, but what is ordinary, and contradicts the use on pp. 136 of the thesis), or one act of self-sacrifice testifies to God's existence. The agency of correlation between Providence and men's action is, however, the same for both, namely conscience, expressed in Christian faith.

But Newman had a deeper difference with Butler, or indeed Coleridge, whose use of conscience follows Butler's. Newman believed that one could argue from the witness of conscience to a moral law, and thence to the need of further revelation. Conscience creates in men
"a thirst, an impatience, for the knowledge of that unseen Lord who speaks in their hearts". Why is this so? (64)

Butler and Newman agreed that there were two aspects to conscience, the judicial office, which approved or condemned, and the moral sense, which evaluated acts as right or wrong. (65) For Newman, the authority of conscience is like the aesthetic sense of beauty or ugliness. Yet in three ways conscience is not the same as an aesthetic sense. Conscience is concerned with people, and not with things. Secondly, taste is its own evidence, while conscience "daily discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions". (66) This shows that conscience goes beyond itself. Thirdly, no one feels fear at reflection on conduct that is seen not to have been beautiful. However conscience condemns past acts which are immoral with distress and remorse, even though the acts were useful, pleasant and not witnessed. Following Aquinas, Newman argues that the personal self-transcendent and fearful aspects of conscience imply the recognition of a living object, "and this men call God". This is not a proof of God, but the establishing of the possibility of giving a real assent to the existence of God.

If

"we feel responsibility, are shamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claim upon us we fear". (67)

Newman does not say that it is natural to obey conscience. He has two different authorities here. The first is Aquinas' *De Veritate*, which Newman noted carefully on the passages of synderesis. This is a habitus of the human soul, which cannot err, and judges human actions
since it has a habitus in regard to the first principles of human action. In the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, Newman quotes Aquinas directly. Secondly, Newman follows (without saying whom in particular he follows) the English moral sense school. A typical representative is Lord Kames' Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion. The moral sense "plainly bears upon it the mark of authority over all our appetites and passions. It is the voice of God within us". (68) The authority of the moral sense lies in its plainly being our duty. For Butler, human nature is held together as a natural system by the authority of conscience, but Newman simply argues that conscience is authoritative and must be obeyed. But Butler, the authority of conscience is established by its function in relation to its jurisdiction over the passions. For Newman, it is "the aboriginal Vicar of Christ".

Since Butler argued that conscience judged particular actions, later English idealists such as Bradley felt that all actions could be right or wrong for Butler. But Butler, following the element of classification in Aristotle's Ethics, in fact classed actions judged by conscience in types. Actions included

"active or practical principles, those principles from which men would act, if occasions and circumstances give them power". (69)

Hence the authority of conscience for Butler judges classes of activity in relation to the system of human nature. Newman oscillated on this. In the Grammar of Assent he followed Butler, but the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk claims that conscience deals with an action to
be done, in particular.

We can now conclude this section on how the conscience apprehends the Idea. Because the sense of duty is always infallible, even where the particular judgment on an act is wrong, Newman can defend the absolute authority of conscience. Indeed, in his Letter to Pusey on his Eirenicon, Newman admitted that

"A faulty conscience, faithfully obeyed, through God's mercy in the long run brought one right".

Newman knows that man has to develop his own inner being.

"It is committed to the personal efforts of each individual of the species; each of us has the prerogative of completing his inchoate and rudimental nature, and of developing his own perfection out of the living elements with which his mind began to be."(70)

Yet even as the development of character occurs, the basic existence of the moral sense is constant. The moral sense can be weakened, so that it becomes "faint shadows and tracings, certain indeed, but delicate, fragile, and almost evanescent". The sense of obligation also can "fade away and die out". (71) Thus Newman believes that although formally conscience is always present, it can be substantively destroyed. What, however, is not so tentative is that conscience can change, but still exist, in its deliberations. Newman is not proving the existence of God, and Yearley's account seems to lay too much weight on what conscience can do. Rather it can lead men to God if they wish to let it do so. It is not that conscience is a form of wish-fulfillment, as Freud was later to argue. We have a need, which is not a neurosis, even if it is indeed bound up with guilt, fear and desire. This need
leads onto God.

"Contemplating or revolving on this feeling the mind will reasonably conclude that it is an unseen father who is the object of the feeling. And this father has necessarily some of those special attributes which belong to the notion of God. He is invisible - He is the searcher of hearts - He is omniscient as far as man is concerned - He is (to our notions) omnipotent."(72)

Thus Newman affirms the existence of God from conscience, and affirmation built on faith. It is not proof, for it is beyond that. It is the apprehension of the Idea which mattered. Butler only attempted to establish the reality of a sense of obligation when attacking Hobbes' egoism. He assumed this sense and the existence of God as present in human consciousness. Newman was different.

T.J. Norris notes on Newman that

"The great permanent and universally present 'facts' or phenomena of human psychology, were the point of departure, and the means of verification, for any theory or practice of science, natural or theological."

Against this must be set MacKinnon's view that it is a great mistake to treat Newman as "a romantic, for whom the inner life was somehow its own justification". (73) Both Newman and Butler argued from conscience. For Butler the authority of conscience unified the nature of man. For Newman it made concrete the Idea of Christianity, the indwelling of Christ, and the truth of divine Providence. We turn then to Newman's discussion of the indwelling of Christ. I leave Newman's more detailed use of Butler on analogy and the addition to this methodological argument of the importance of a visible ecclesiology in revelation in Butler - as in the Apologia. This chapter is on the relation of character and conscience to Christology.
3. THE INDWELLING OF CHRIST

The individual Christian appropriates the grace of redemption in the act of communion, but the Sacraments are committed to the mystical body and incorporate us into it. In a sermon on the Communion of Saints, Newman wrote of

"that divine and adorable form, which the apostles saw and handled after ascending into heaven became a principle of life, a secret origin of existence to all who believe, through the precious ministrations of the Holy Ghost." (74)

"It has been the great design of Christ to connect all his followers into one, and to secure this, he has lodged his blessing in the body collectively to oblige them to meet together if they would gain grace each for himself." (75)

The Church was the means of grace for Newman. Liturgical forms are not adiaphora, but indicate divine truths and are inherently sacramental. Hence liturgical forms require validly ordained clergy. Hardelin writes, "Unity is (the) characteristic sacrament" (76) of the New Covenant. Its priests are not priests at the side of, or independently of, the One High Priest, but as being his representative they share in the one priesthood of Christ. Similarly the eucharistic sacrifice is not essentially a new sacrifice, but a continuation and "a mysterious representation of his meritorious sacrifice in the sight of Almighty God".

Thus, for Newman, ecclesiology and sacramental theology are inextricably governed by Christology. But even considered from the standpoint of the individual Christian, rather than from the standpoint of priesthood and sacraments which minister to him, each person unites.
individually with Christ. In his commentary on Athanasius against the Arians (vol. 2, p. 193-5) he writes

"Our Lord by becoming man, has found a way whereby to sanctify that nature of which his own manhood is the pattern specimen. He inhabits us personally, and this inhabitation is effected by the channel of the Sacraments ... By this indwelling, our Lord is the immediate arche of spiritual life to each of his elect individually ... It is plain that there is a special presence of God in those who are real members of our Lord ... soul and body because of the indwelling of the Lord, so elevated above their natural state, so sacred, that to profane them is sacrilege."

But how is Christ who indwells in us to be known? There is the problem that men do not easily speak of indwelling. Not only has the term lapsed in Christian speech, "men do think that a saving state is one where the mind merely looks to Christ - a virtual antinomianism". (77)

If, then, there was implicit antinomianism, and a refusal to speak of sanctification, there was also the problem of how Christ dwells in man. He indwells through the Spirit, pervading us "as light pervades a building, or as a perfume fills the folds of some honourable robe". (78)

But, lastly, even granted that indwelling and sanctification are acknowledged, granted that by some means the presence of Christ can be described, as He acts in man, how is Christ to be worshipped, adored, and communicated? In a sermon, (79) Newman points to the difficulty. Spiritual presence is real enough, but it indicates what cannot be seen, heard "approached by any of the senses", nor made present in place. It is by an "unknown way" that Christ comes to us, and he "annuls time and space". (80)

So Newman withdrew the believer from the world. "There are but
two beings in the whole universe, our own soul and the God who made it."(81) But while men might be certain of their personal relationship with Christ, there was still a need to speak of Christ.

It is not from uncertainty that Newman turned from religious experience to the character of Christ in the Gospels. Newman had complete certainty in Christ: "certainty, then, is essential to the Christian; and if he is to persevere to the end, his certitude must include in it a principle of persistence". (82) But how was Christ to be preached and worshipped? The answer is to "enlarge, as they can bear it, on the person, natures, attributes, offices and work of him who once regenerated them, and is now ready to pardon; to dwell upon his recorded words and deeds on earth". This is of course allied to the preaching of Christ in his "mysterious greatness as the only-begotten Son, one with the Father, yet distinct from him". But it is highly significant that there are two arguments in Newman's apologetic. (83) One demonstrates the possibility by informal reasoning of a person attaining absolute certitude on the presence of Christ in his life as a believer (real assent). The other is to fill out this belief by the content of preaching Christ, as he was active on earth. The character of Christ gives content to the belief of the Christian. It is, of course, not merely the humanity of Christ, but the humanity and divinity of Christ that is worshipped; but the humanity of Christ can be placed from where the believer can grasp the incarnation.

Arguing against natural theology the same point is made: (84)

"To know Christ is to discern the Father of all, as manifested through His only begotten Son incarnate."
In the natural world we have glimpses, frequent and startling of his glorious attributes ... but ... they do not allow us in any comfortable sense to know God... And thus the gospels, which contain the memorials of this wonderful grace are our principal treasures. They may be called the text of the revelation; and the epistles, especially St. Paul's are as comments upon it, unfolding and illustrating it in its various parts, raising history into doctrine, ordinances into sacraments, detached words or actions into principles and thus everywhere dutifully preaching his person, work and will."

Further, the Creeds only point back, as does the Church itself, to the incarnation: "(they) speak of no ideal being, such as the imagination alone contemplates, but of the very Son of God, whose life is recorded in the Gospels".

Perhaps the point being made can best be summarized in a quotation from R.W. Church. "Evangelical theology has dwelt upon the work of Christ, and laid comparatively little stress on his example, or the picture left us of his personality and life. It regarded the Epistles of St. Paul as the last word of the Gospel message ... (After Newman) the great name no longer stood for an abstract symbol of doctrine, but for a living master, who could teach as well as save ... It was a change in the look and use of scripture which some can still look back to as an epoch in their religious history."(85)

4. THE RETURN TO THE GOSPELS

There is a unity to Christ: Newman defends Cyril's use of one nature incarnate. The flesh of Christ is taken on at the incarnation, nor is the perfection of Christ's nature affected by the incarnation. Hence the nature of Christ is one, and always has been so. The
incarnation makes no difference to the unity.

But it is an incarnate unity that we know, and is preached.

"It is called incarnate in order to express the dependence, subordination, and restriction of his humanity, which (1) has neither principle nor personality (2) has no distinct sonship, though it involves a new generation (3) is not possessed of the fulness of characteristics which attained to any other specimen of our race. On which account while it is recognised as a perfect nature, it may be spoken of as existing after the manner of an attribute rather than of a substantive being, which it really is." (86)

His divine nature, then "carried with it in his incarnation that identity or personality". (87) Upon His divine Sonship the mind "is providentially intended to rest throughout". (88) This famous passage goes on to condemn those who call themselves orthodox, but have never considered Christ both as God and Man, yet one nature, "complete and entire in his personality". We only "know" Christ when we incorporate into his nature the attributes and offices we ascribe to Him. "What do we gain from words, however correct and abundant, if they end with themselves, instead of lighting up the image of the Incarnate Son on our hearts?"

We must then cease to ascribe value to Christ. Newman turns against the evangelical piety of his youth, and the importance of experienced forgiveness. We must no longer see Christ as idea or vision but as the activity of God on earth: we must learn to

"leave off vague statements about his love, his willingness to receive the sinner, his imparting repentance and spiritual aid and the like, and view him in his particular and actual works, set before us in scripture OR surely we have not derived
from the gospels that very benefit which they are intended to convey". (89)

Against the thought of Christ in our minds, which may fade away, the reality, objectivity and actuality of Christ in the gospels is emphasized at length.

Consequently, the incarnation will still be mysterious. It can be described and outlined, but not explained. "Mystery is the necessary note of divine revelation, that is, mystery subjective to the human mind." But it is a full manhood which he assumes, in that every feeling, passion and wish is there "except as is of the nature of sin". (90) Before the incarnation the Word was above human feelings; afterwards, he "began to think and act as a man, with all man's faculties, affections, and imperfections, sin excepted". (91)

This leaves many questions unanswered. In the same sermon he wrote of the unity: "His divine nature indeed pervaded his manhood, so that every deed and word of his in the flesh savoured of eternity and infinity; but, on the other hand, from the time he was born of the Virgin Mary, he had a natural fear of danger, a natural shrinking from pain, though ever subject to the ruling influence of that holy and eternal essence which was in him;" (92) Christ for Newman lost nothing by the incarnation, but he added, "not so much a nature (though it was strictly a nature) as the substance of a manhood which was not substantive". (93) Perhaps the clearest expression of this is in "Christ, the Son of God made Man:"

"We must ever remember that though He was in nature perfect man, He was not man in exactly the same sense in which any
one of us is a man ... though man, He was not, strictly speaking, in the English sense of the word, a man."(94)

This was because the person of Christ, the was always one with His Divinity, or , and this took to itself a manhood, a second , but not a second person. (95) Yet Christ was as much man as if he had ceased to be God, as much God as if He had never been man. Not a paradox, this Catholic dogma is expressed in individual propositions which the mind assents to really, not notionally. So it apprehends the Idea, the whole, by faith, which is the unity of Christ, the mystery to us of God and Man. Newman thus ultimately repudiates Cyril: Christ does have two natures (only so, Newman knew, could he remain Anglican without denying Chalcedonian orthodoxy) but the second nature was "what might be called an additional attribute".

Christ's humanity was the instrument (organon) of his divinity. His humanity after the incarnation is perfect, and the attributes of perfection are as inseparably united with the Word as his justice or wisdom. (96) Unity with the Word meant that the humanity was divinized. There was no compromise, but a transformation. Christ shared our infirmities but they are never sinful infirmities, whereas ours are. Both Christ and ourselves gain by suffering: "As we gained happiness through suffering, so do we arrive at holiness through infirmity, because man's very condition is a fallen one, and in passing out of the country of sin, he necessarily passes through it."(97) The emphasis on the benefits of suffering is very striking, and the treatment of suffering, pain, sin and ignorance very detailed. With an examination of these three areas we conclude this study of Newman, on the Christ of the gospels.
Divinity intensifies the suffering of Christ. The fact of pain depends on the sensibility which receives it, the experience of pain depends on the intellect which comprehends it, the measure of pain depends on the power with which it is received. The human soul of Christ was the link between divine Word and human body, and felt all these three. Christ experienced "a natural shrinking from pain, though ever subject to the ruling influence of that Holy and Eternal Essence which was in Him".\(^{(98)}\) Nor had Christ any comforts.

"It is nothing to the purpose to say that He would be supported under His trial by the consciousness of innocence and the anticipation of triumph; for His trial consisted in the withdrawal, as of other causes of consolation, so of that very consciousness and anticipation."\(^{(99)}\)

Evil for Christ is internal. It clung about Christ in Gethsemane, and "filled His conscience, and found its way into every sense and part of His mind, and spread over Him a moral leprosy".\(^{(ibid)}\) Nor was this suffering avoidable; to follow the argument that Christ only suffers by an act of will in each case is to follow Eutyches\(^{(100)}\) into heresy. The free will of Christ will be discussed below, but what matters here is that Christ was subject to the laws of the body for Newman. So Christ's sufferings could be our pattern: "Pain, which by nature leads us only to ourselves, carries on the Christian mind from the thought of self to the contemplation of Christ, His passion, His merits and His victory."\(^{(101)}\) Christ not only conquered evil, He is man's example. So again the cross does not remove pain, but "He has graciously proposed the history of His sufferings as an example for us
as an example of bearing all pain and cruel usage with patience and charity. And a great privilege this pattern is.”^ (102) But the sufferings of Christ are also to be adored. Christ is sinless, and his sufferings are our atonement, not merely our pattern.

Newman moved away from the position that

"the nature of man and the necessity of human life were superseded by the divine will which was the supreme law to which His manhood was subject, and which admitted the ordinary necessities and properties of the flesh when and as far as it thought fit". (103)

So Newman later stressed the free will of Christ as human. Divine Will is "the sovereign disposal of His orders and commands". Human will is "the intellectual soul's power of willing", given it after God's image, and given power by God at its creation "to prefer and to obey, and to do the divine will". (104) Does this mean that the divine will intervenes in Christ's incarnation repeatedly? Newman has been compared to Chrysostom. (In eos qui ad synaxim non occurrunt.) Chrysostom felt Christ only acted as man to prove the reality of the economy, or out of condescension. Newman certainly could write

"And so, when he said 'It is finished' He showed that He was still contemplating with a clear intellect, 'the travail of His soul, and was satisfied', and in solemn surrender of Himself into His Father's hand, He showed where the mind rested in the midst of its darkness." (105)

Again he wrote "Never did He sorrow, or fear ... but He first willed to be sorrowful, or afraid." (106) Yet his premeditated action, this pre-willing, depended on the sinlessness of Christ, rather than on the divinity. It was indeed a human will that was moved by the divine will,
but one free as unconstrained and able to harmonize his will.

"Thus his death was voluntary - not a debt to sin, but the free will offering of the sinless and undefiled. Such it was, had He been but a man, being even in His human nature altogether perfect." (107)

Newman of course knew Aristotle well. While no direct link can be proved, Newman's thought on this subject can usefully be compared with Aristotle on voluntary actions, where involuntary acts are primarily those of compulsion where the compulsion "is not influenced by anything contributed by the person under compulsion". (108) Since Newman constantly stressed the unity of Christ, no discussion of the influence or compulsion of the divine will on the human could suggest "compulsion", since Christ's person is the divine will or person, and therefore He entirely contributes to the "compulsion". The other reason for involuntary action according to Aristotle is action done in ignorance: obviously if Christ knew the will of His Father, this discussion is irrelevant. Lastly, Aristotle passes on to discuss "προαιρεσις" (or electio in medieval translations). It expressed the choice of ends and the means. The important thing to note is that it always involves full deliberation, choice of the good, and freedom from passion. Προαιρεσις is 'the deliberate desire of something within our power'. (109) The deliberation comes first, then the selection, lastly the desire of following the result of the deliberation. It may be then that what Strange objects to as "Christ's actions on the cross presented by Newman as those of a craftsman executing his task with deliberate and consummate skill" really reflects a deep engagement with the conditions of a voluntary action at the point of maximum crisis, to a
mind deeply imbued with Aristotle. Here we see the influence of moral philosophy directly on Christology. As Newman wrote in The Idea of a University,

"While we are men we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyse the thoughts, feelings, views and opinions of human kind." (110)

If Christology is an event, of God becoming man and man thus coming to God, the mental antecedents to the action which make up the event must be spelt out. If, further, an action is not morally valid unless it is premeditated, then an action which is not morally valid will not be salvific. Hence, the event of Christology is here determined by the necessary mental conditions which make up a human event. These conditions are established for Butler and Newman alike by Aristotle. Putting it more sharply, Newman could believe miracles which violated the laws of nature, but his Christology never violated the laws of what it meant to act in a human, and morally valid way. So Butler (Dissertation on Virtue 2) distinguished men from animals because they had the power to reflect on actions.

Divinity in the person of the Son suffered, and the power of the Son suffered in the humanity of the Son. Can persons ever suffer, then? Only when there is self-consciousness of suffering. (111) But this answer surely falls under the condemnation passed by Cameron on the dated, and unreal, empiricist philosophy which divided up soul and body. He tries to claim both that the soul lacks extension, and is an invisible principle which thinks and yet that soul 'thinks and acts in the body'. As Cameron says, if the body is his, and not he, can one
go to church and take one's body along with one? This view of Newman's
ends in an "intellectual morass", and, at other times Newman speaks of
Abraham, not Abraham's soul; not of his soul only without his body, but
of Abraham as one man. And Newman was not happy about his answer of
the soul contemplating his pain: in his private diary of 1877 he
wrote 'I can't answer this question to this day, and have always
dreaded it', on the question of whether the Son of God suffered pain. (112)

Newman's empiricism thus was a problem to him. How soul and
body could engage in dualism on the question of pain was ultimately an
answer that gave no comfort. Far better was his stress on the unity
of Christ's two wills, as in the question of ignorance and sin. But
here another problem occurs! If ignorance was sinful, could Christ be
ignorant?

Newman wrote against Erskine and Irving. But Newman did not feel
sin was of the essence of man. It was a fault of the will which was
overcome in Christ by the "Divine Power of the Word". Christ's flesh
was fallen, a point which sharply distinguishes him from Wilberforce.
Our flesh was Christ's flesh, "that flesh which was enslaved to sin",
as Athanasius had said. (113) But it was not only the power of the Holy
Spirit that preserved Christ's humanity from sin. It was the
sanctification of it by the work of the divine nature. So Christ could
not sin, had no earthly father, and was sinless as Adam was. Yet he
took on Him our fallen nature. The gap is bridged by the work of
sanctification. To be sinless is not to be unfallen. Infirmities
are not intrinsically sinful. Christ was then inherently holy for
Newman.
But Christ was not ignorant, for the man of self-control can always govern his lower nature, much as Butler had suggested. (114) So we subordinate our animal 'souls' to our rational, and Christ subordinated His rational soul to the Divine Nature. It was only an analogy as an attempt to explain the controlling of the divine mind by the human. (115) In 1834, he spoke of Christ gaining knowledge by experience, and later of Christ as all-knowing, yet partially ignorant. At this time he was content to follow Athanasius, seeing the Word as all-knowing, but as a man ignorant of this knowledge (e.g. of the Last Judgment). (116) But Newman then changed his mind.

By 1842, writing on The Athanasian treatises, he came to feel that while Christ could have been ignorant as a man, for his nature was fallen, yet in fact he was deified by the Word. He even referred to the Beatific Vision enjoyed by his union with the Word. But he did not contrast experiential knowledge gained exclusively by the humanity, with the infused knowledge of the beatific vision, as R. Wilberforce did. Ignorance came to be seen as sinful, the consequence of sin. As he became more Catholic, he preached and wrote on the perfect knowledge of Christ's received from the Godhead at conception, and Christ's omniscience. (117) This view of human knowledge represented a tension between his patristic theology, and his view that knowledge is by sense impressions, as in the last University Sermon:

"Revelation sets before it certain supernatural facts and actions, beings and principles; these make a certain impression or image upon it; and this impression spontaneously, or even necessarily becomes the subject of reflection on the part of the mind itself, which proceeds to investigate it, and to draw it forth in successive and distinct sentences." (118)
This seems to indicate ignorance until the drawing forth is complete, not as sinful ignorance but part of human reason. We may contrast that with an 1857 Dublin sermon where Newman writes

"there was He in His human nature, who as God, is everywhere; there was He, as regards His human soul conscious from the first with a full intelligence, and feeling the extreme irksomeness of the prison-house, full of grace as it was".

There appears to have been a collapse of empiricist reasoning at this point, even if on human experience of himself, or other men, he remained empiricist. (119)

Newman's understanding of Christ as saviour was complex. He did not like a stress on Christ which exalted his value for men, always preferring to speak of his words and actions. These were the actions of a hidden Saviour: "There is no reason for supposing that, while He was with them, they apprehended the awful truth, that He is very God in our nature." So Christ was not recognized by virtue of his apparent holiness. That whole line of development is rejected. It is wrong to see His Divinity as "a special grace or presence or participation of divine glory, such as is the prerogative of saints". He is not 'a man singularly inhabited by a Divine Presence'. (120) This is only to adore "a Catholic Saint". (121)

Rather Christ is an internal pattern for men.

"Much as it is to have a perfect pattern set before us, how is this pattern practically available, unless an inward grace is communicated from His Person to realize this pattern in us?" (122)
So, Christ is the example for men, because his grace can reorder the Christian (as will be shown on p. 161). "Our Lord is the pattern of human nature in its perfection" but this perfection is only achieved by great moral effort, and "circumstances of strict devotion". (123)

Only by fasting and prayer can we be like Christ, for Christ's perfection involves the means as well as the ends; the concept of \( \text{πράξεως} \) recurs, as the way to perfection is always by the way which is most effective. (Aristotle argued this first in his Ethics)

"It is taking on us a cross after His pattern not a mere refraining from sin, for He had no sin, but a giving up what we might lawfully use." (124)

Newman has been judged to be in error in this section for his treatment of suffering in relation to the will of Christ. He has also been criticized for turning to the idea of immediate knowledge in Christ's humanity, with its correlative abandonment of the constraints of human ignorance. (125) But Newman's greatness lies in his expression of the faith of Christ. The faith of Christ involves desire. Desire to be obedient involves pressing faith to the point of apparent self-destruction. For Newman, humanity is controlled by the Divine Word, yet it has to act to achieve the divine purpose. Although "action is the criterion of true faith", yet action for Newman ultimately depends on belief and desire. Christ's intention is commissive. It expresses a commitment to act and look upon the world in a fixed way. His intention is also verdictive. It expresses a final verdict (or judgment) upon the falsity of human behaviour which needs redemption. Knowledge involves an act of judgment, but this act (or faith-act) is
prior to the historical events (or bodily actions) in Christ's life.

Our faith is a response to Christ's faith, opening ourselves further to the events which spring from that life, which are at work today - the judgment and reconciliation of men by the action of God in the world today. Faith in Christ involves apprehending the drama of God becoming man, and man coming to God, for Newman, and so the drama which contextualizes the event of the Incarnation is the drama of the reconciliation of God and man. This eventually has its roots in the Trinity. So Newman writes:

"To discern our immortality is necessarily connected with fear and trembling and repentance, in the case of every Christian". "This indeed is (faith's) trial and its praise so to hang upon the thought of Him, and desire Him ... to act in the way which seems on the whole most likely to please Him. Action is the criterion of true faith." (126)

Belief involves commitment, suffering, and self-denial. It involves desiring as Christ did. Because the character of Christ involves the way of the cross, we realize our own failures, but this drives men on beyond self-commitment to the reality of redemption, to the mystery of the cross and to facts beyond the Christian life. (127) For Newman, the character of Christ is related to the Trinitarian doctrine of the Monarchia because this doctrine facilitates our apprehension of the divine drama or plot which is the incarnation, and against which act alone the character of Christ takes on an outline and a shape imitatatable by men.
Committed to moral freedom, and questing for truth, the Christian character is obedient, above all else. Once one has achieved a moral character, obedience ought to be given to the totality of revelation. In the early University Sermons, especially the Fifth, "Personal Influence the means of propagating the truth," the Anglican Newman argued that one could not reject parts of the whole of revelation. Ecclesiastical dogma is part of the totality of revelation, and it is formed from the church's own character of holiness. The church approves or disapproves of actions, and particularizes the consciences of all right-thinking men. On their behalf, it carries out Newman's own emendation of Butler's sermons "εἰκόνα is the voice of the conscience of the world." Out of this moral approval, the church can also synthesize theological opinions into ecclesiastical dogma. It should not be judged by those of less regenerate character. The holiness of the Primitive Church is "as near an approach to the pattern of Christ as fallen men will ever attain ... guided by the Spirit".

Part of the Primitive Church is the testimony in Scripture. The witness of Scripture is to cause that holiness to be formed again in man. Holiness is not simply gained by theological reasoning from Scripture; again Newman wrote in his margin by hand on Butler's Sermons "ἵπποις δεινοίς differs from Ξείλης" (moral choice differs from knowledge). Scripture is not meant to cause our understanding of theology systematically, but to create a Christian character:
"The object of the written word be, not to unfold a system for our intellectual contemplation, but to secure the formation of a certain character."

This character alone can understand the way the mind of the early church reasoned on the basis of its approximation to the Pattern of Christ:

"The body of opinions formed under these circumstances - not accidental and superficial, the mere reflection of what goes on in the world, but the natural and almost spontaneous result of the formed and finished character within."

The Patristic theology of episcopacy, or infant baptism with baptismal regeneration, can only be known on the basis of the moral quality of the affirming authority in the early church. The point of accepting this theology also is not to know certain opinions theologically, but to become like Christ. Epistemologically the mind of the early Church can only be understood in the way proper to it, which is the way the Church itself was formed by a search for holiness inseparably joined to truth.

It is an argument of coherence:

"It is not a mere set of opinions that he has to promulgate, which may lodge on the surface of the mind; but he is to be an instrument in changing (as Scripture speaks) the heart, and modelling all men after one exemplar; making them like himself, or rather like One above himself, who is the beginning of a new creation."

This formation of a moral quality in man dispels the uncertain apprehension of theological knowledge, changing the grasp from variable feeling to a stronger, more definite knowledge. "Truth dawns
continually brighter". This leads onto evangelism. Evangelism is always by individuals who are Christ-like. The Church itself contains wheat and tares. Only by Christian obedience in the individual is certainty gained, and certainty shows itself to others, thus attracting their interest. So evangelism begins from the Christian. But it is difficult to portray much of the argument above in detail with a clarity some would expect. Moral truth, the apprehension of it and the person also apprehends it are not easily rendered in language. Newman repeatedly stresses that he is not being obscure for the sake of it. A Christlike character is a pattern rendered only in halftones.

"Moral character in itself - whether good or bad, as exhibited in thought and conduct, surely cannot be duly represented in words. We may, indeed, by an effort, reduce it in a certain degree to this arbitrary medium; but in its combined dimensions it is impossible to write and read a man."

However, Newman did attempt to describe the ideal character of Christ on one occasion. Paul's description of a Christian character in Philippians 4.4 is one which suggests a complete tranquillity on the part of Paul, although his career was turbulent. There is a total independence of circumstances. Newman makes a subtle point. Again, it is not the description of moral character that matters, but the involvement of the way the description is presented with the actual description itself that is crucial. Such an independence and moderation found in Paul is only the result of divine grace. This moderation is caused by a belief that

"Christ's battle will last till the end; that Christ's cause will triumph in the end; that his Church will last till He comes" ... "Let the Church
be removed, and the world will soon come to its end." (128)

We may contrast this with MacKinnon's introduction to the University Sermons, where MacKinnon argues that Newman rejected any direct empirical correlation of history and providence in hoping for the visible reign of Christ.

So a Christian character is marked by simplicity, meekness, cheerfulness and above all serenity. Joy, peace and calmness will always be evident. Newman, in this point differing from Moberly, considers that sorrowing penitence is only for a while. It should be replaced when earnest repentance is achieved with a joy mixed with fear. The text of this sermon is "Rejoice in the Lord always".

Philosophy dwelt only in conjecture and opinion, but religion believed that God recognized the Christian worshipper. In this recognition the Christian was moulded by God. There was no passive reception of arguments. A personal relationship leads to irrevocable changes in the human beings involved, and a personal relationship with God is a state of affairs where the human beings are deeply affected, in every part of their being. Newman's heroine Callista in the novel of the same name felt that religion was the soul's response to a God who had taken notice of the soul. (129)

There are two final points that should be made on the character of Christ in men. They concern the control of mind, and the formation of habits. The control of mind in a true Christian was a cardinal principle of William Law's A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life,
and of other writers who succeeded him in the Evangelical tradition. Law wrote that devotion was 'a state of the heart'. It is to be increased with spiritual practices:

"A temper that is to grow and increase like our reason and judgment, and to be formed in us by such a regular, diligent use of proper means, as are necessary to form any otherwise habit of mind."(130)

Evangelicals such as William Beveridge, whom Newman read when he was aged sixteen, or Philip Doddridge, could agree that all thoughts could be stopped and examined. Newman also believed that the mind could be disciplined, and speaks in a way unlike the Apologia of being religious and thus calm, sober and deliberate. We have earlier noted that Butler stressed the role of moral dispositions in disciplining reasoning. Here we see the direct formation of moral discipline. Newman wrote to his mother that "moral truth is gained by patient study, by calm reflection, silently as the dew falls".(131)

Secondly, Newman believed that the formation of habits was all-important. The mind could be difficult to control. "The management of our hearts is quite above us" he wrote in an early sermon, and later he returned to this theme: "How difficult to regulate his thoughts through the day". So if habits could be formed, the mind could turn away from a monotonous self-examination of whether one is being devout enough. Hence Newman could write to Ward late in life agreeing that first principles were the outcome of wrong habits. Habits could be built up over time.(132)

Thus with a mind controlled and habits formed, Newman can assert
that such a character is the ultimate criterion of truth.

"Our criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual and moral character of the person maintaining them, and the ultimate, silent effect of his arguments or conclusions upon our minds." (133)

The character of Christ is self-authenticating. It is joyful and therefore spontaneous, but the joy springs from an obedience fashioned in the control of mind and heart. Beyond habits lay the formation of divine attributes by God in the soul. Thus the Christian returns to the perfection of the Early Church, and in so doing penetrates ever more deeply into the knowledge possessed by the Early Church. It has often been noted that Newman's motto, 'Cor ad Cor loquitur' (Heart speaks to Heart) epitomizes not merely a way of communicating, but an expression of what was ultimately basic in the Christian life.

7. SUMMARY

What we have shown in this treatment of Newman is the correlation of character with three aspects of Newman's theology. The introduction to Newman outlined these aspects. They are the rule of conscience and the illative sense in epistemology, the character of Christ in the gospels, and the character of Christ in men.

Character is thus an integral part of the Idea of Christianity. Character interacts with the Idea, as it does with Christology also. Character apprehends the Idea, and we have discussed this first aspect of character at length. But the Idea is also presented through the character of Christ in the gospels. This character of Christ is not
merely scriptural imagery. It is the outworking of God becoming man in the Incarnation. The humanity is an instrument of the divinity, but the obedience of the incarnate Christ depended on his sinlessness. This is Newman's second use of character.

As stressed in the introduction, Christ's actions are delineated by Newman in terms of moral philosophy. We can now summarize what we have achieved. If Newman believes of Christ that "his death was voluntary - the free will offering of the sinless", we can see that lying behind this statement is a concept of what it means to be freely human. Only the man with a true conscience will apprehend this idea, yet even the freedom of Christ can be difficult to render. If the action is free, omniscient (for the character of Christ is divine and human) and fully premeditated, can the suffering of Christ be fully human? We have seen that at times Newman doubted this formulation of free action. Yet the question of how beliefs relate to action must be in terms of intentionality, and of goals to be sought. This must be premeditated.

We move to the third part of the section on Newman's use of character. The Christian who responds to the Incarnation is one with a Christ-like and Christ-formed character. As he responds, he manifests joy and simplicity. The mind is slowly disciplined and God forms attributes in the soul. The Incarnation is the supreme action of Providence. Response to this places one consciously within the action of Providence and moral laws now. Action, intention and character are disciplined.
In all this Butler's concept of character is presupposed, but further developed. The essential difference is two-fold. First, character for Butler is the sum total of human action. Yet Newman argued that character is the expression of our inner, prior intention in action. This is a marked change. Secondly, Newman totally alters the context in which character acts. Christ's character is contextualised in divine action. Christocentric theology furthermore means that Christ's character is central for human character today. There are problems of compatibility between the divine and human natures in Christ, but the significance of Christ's character is deepest for theology.

To conclude, Newman has transformed the concept of character from Butler's thought. But his was only one possible approach. Others would handle the concepts of moral philosophy very differently. In particular, Robert Wilberforce would try to ally Butler's empirical moral philosophy with an attempt to understand German Idealism, and place this at the service of sacramental Christology. We turn to this very different aspect of Tractarianism. In this section, I shall be arguing that it is very important to realize how different these two Tractarian theologians were in their approach to Butler, moral philosophy and character, as they sought to express the centrality of Christ's person and work. The differences in Tractarian theology are not simply ecclesiological or Christological per se, but stem from their attitude to moral philosophy and the English philosophical inheritance. Newman and Wilberforce are irreconcilable, and are united only in their defence of a Catholic understanding of "the Faith".
III. WILBERFORCE

1. INTRODUCTION

Wilberforce expresses a concern with the historical and cultural setting of character which is totally unlike Butler. Yet he has no wish to become a relativist in any sense. He is the first theologian to write with the express intention of attacking rationalism and liberal theology. Newman, of course, combatted this, but his writing lacks the polemical aggressiveness of Wilberforce. Wilberforce is a deeply systematic writer, who writes both about the ratio credendi and the ratio essendi.

Wilberforce turns to the idealist speculations of Gunther and the patristic theology of traducianism on the origin of the soul. Mankind becomes a collective unity for Wilberforce, yet "personality" is the final principle of individual identity. What "personality" actually means, and how it is related to man's spiritual unity as a race, or to human character, is a question to discuss, especially with reference to Butler.

Yet as well as the discussion of "personality", Wilberforce uses Butler's view of man to demonstrate the nature of sin. Conscience, proportion, and the details of moral psychology are all Butlerian terms which he uses. They sit uneasily with reference to idealism. Still more are they irreconcilable with Alexandrian Christology.

For Wilberforce will move from talk of the witness of man's conscience to deriving the humanity of man today from the Incarnation onto "the sentiments of collective humanity". This triple use of an
ultimate arbiter on the nature of man is rich and complex, but Wilberforce has to argue hard to hold it together. Does he succeed? I argue that he does not do so.

I move next to the detailed examination of these points, in the context of sin, ignorance and pain. Wilberforce at this point becomes heavily neo-Platonic, arguing for intuition and anamnesis as key epistemological terms. By way of this argument, Wilberforce considers the perfection of Christ. The argument is, however, heavily criticized by the Roman Catholic editor T.M. Capes in his magazine The Rambler, later edited by Newman himself. Newman was unsympathetic to its criticism.

Finally, Wilberforce moves away from a concern with character altogether. From the perfection of his character, Christ can act as mediator. Mediation is essentially sacramental, and takes Wilberforce into ecclesiology. The perfect character of Christ's humanity is only a mediatorial reality if it is present in His Church today. Wilberforce totally ignores how men know the Christian faith, never discusses conscience, nor the character of a Christian as he acts in the world.

Wilberforce is one of the most learned English theologians of the early nineteenth century. His lively mind pulls together many strands. The criticism that remains is one of the dissolution of the alliance of theology and moral philosophy into a many-splendoured thing which never quite comes off. The reader is left poised somewhere between earth and heaven, humanity and the individual. In a strange way, he moves from the anthropological, historical studies of early Victorian England to the unearthly timelessness of Christ in the Church. We must now see how he makes the transition.
Wilberforce's concept of character gave far greater attention than Newman's to the context in which man was placed. He began to develop a theology which paid close attention to the anthropological and scientific basis of human nature. His concept of character ultimately was much weaker than Newman's, for he treated sacramental efficacy as working in men in a way that constantly threatened to become impersonal and which suggested analogies with the pipeline theory of grace. The presence of Christ in the believer is not the personal indwelling that engages with the personality of the particular Christian in a complex relationship which Newman described so carefully in its components of apprehension of faith and sanctification. Rather the presence of Christ is an objective power that regenerates the faith of the believer, and increases his commitment to the Catholic Church. Yet the fixity of Wilberforce's principles and the rather mechanical expression of his thought conceals a deep attempt to grapple with the nature of man, and his need for redemption.

Wilberforce was concerned with what he saw as the arch-enemy in religion, rationalism and subjectivism. Rationalism denies that there can be any special providence of God at all, nor that religion can express in analogical language an alternative system of spiritual causality and power.

"Personal is the dispensation of the Gospel. It rests not, like the theories of Rationalistic philosophy, on the self-relying development of man's inherent powers, but on the advent of an external Saviour."(134) "The principle of Rationalism is, that man's improvement
may be effected through those gifts which God bestowed upon him by creation, in as much as sufficient means of intercourse with the Supreme Spirit were provided by the law of his nature. Whereas the Church deals with man as a fallen race, whose original means of intercourse with God have been obstructed, and which needs a new and supernatural channel for the entrance of heavenly gifts.” (135)

Wilberforce's objection to rationalism is thus the fact of sin, and the corruption of the means of communication with God. But a further point developed by rationalism is that divine action is always general, not particular. It detracts from

"the reality of that objective and actual influence, which Christ the Mediator is pleased to exert. Its tendency is to resolve His actions into a metaphor and His existence into a figure of speech. His specific and personal agency as the Eternal Son, who in the fulness of time conjoined Himself to man's nature for the recovery of a fallen race, is merged in the general action of that ultimate Spirit, whom, none but atheists professedly reject." (136)

Wilberforce recognizes that rationalism accepts the action of an external Spirit, which can be known by man. The question remains as to how it may be known. Is it known through "the natural means of connection with God ... the intercourse of mind with mind"?

"The connection with God, i.e. which man received by creation, and which Rationalism affirms to be sufficient for his wants, is more compatible with man's natural position than that new system of Mediation which has been revealed in the Gospel." (136)

Further than this, not only does Rationalism uphold the sufficiency of natural theology and deny the particular activity of God in the incarnation or elsewhere, it also questions the possibility of God working through material agency in a spiritual way, so that one may speak
of co-causality. Sacramental efficacy is questioned by such a
theology as being anything more than external witness to human endeavour. There is "an abstract improbability that external ordinances can be the means of obtaining internal gifts". The views which Wilberforce attacks are not in fact Rationalist at all. A Rationalist like Godwin would be appalled to find that his combination of rationalism and atheism could be stretched so far as to cover what is in fact liberal Christianity. Wilberforce was attacking men like Strauss in Germany, but in England his indirect target was John Hey, first Norrisian Professor at Cambridge from 1780-1795, whose Lectures on Divinity were recommended by the Bishops to Cambridge Anglican ordinands. Hey's lecture on Article 2 of the 39 Articles, "Of the Word or Son of God, which was made very man", is an example of Wilberforce's target. The theology of Hey is worth quoting as an example of the "rationalism" that had grown between Butler and Tractarianism.

"As it seems to be of great consequence that we speak the same thing, and as men are generally more affected by sounds than ideas, we might propose it as a question, whether the word God, in such expressions as 'God the Son' and 'God the holy Ghost', could be omitted in our offices without a material fault. Though Christ seems to us to be called God in several places, yet there is some dispute on that head; and, for the sake of Unity, we would pay all possible respect to the opinions of our adversaries. I should imagine, that such an omission would tend, almost as much as anything to mollify and conciliate."

These lectures "circulated widely", but the latitudinarianism of Hey's successors, such as Hampden's Bampton's of 1832, was no longer unchallenged by the 1830s. Wilberforce's main work, the Bampton Lectures, The Doctrine of the Incarnation, came out in 1848.

* (Words underlined are in italics in original)
As for Wilberforce's second subject of criticism, subjectivism, Wilberforce felt that this was the fruit of a religious revival that had gone wrong. Wilberforce was, of course, the son of one of the leading lay evangelicals of the previous generation, William Wilberforce, whose Practical View of Christianity had sold as widely as Hey had, and which had popularized the moral teachings of a liberal Calvinism. But Robert felt his father's work needed correcting now. The story of the Wilberforce's does not need retelling here after David Newsome's treatment in The Parting of Friends.

"In the last age, the first object required was to provoke men to a seriousness which was too often wanting, and thus to call them to an examination of their own hearts. But it is time that the subjective revival of the last age should assume also an objective character. If this be neglected, it will gradually die out, like so many other religious revivals." (138)

Subjective enthusiasm turns into infidelity. Wilberforce quotes Harnet Martineau's Eastern Life, who writes "that all genuine faith is - other circumstances being the same - of about equal value. The value is in the act of faith more than in the object". Here the objection is that the truth of Christianity is in danger: Martineau will argue that "it is of very high importance that the objects of faith should be the loftiest and the purest that in any particular age can be attained", but still believes that questions of salvation afflict men needlessly. (Eastern Life, vol. 3, p. 289). (139) All religions appear on a par as regards abstract truth, and the purpose of religion is self-expression of religious feelings.

Wilberforce wished to re-establish an objective theological
system, but one which could be related to the historical and anthropological studies flourishing at Oxford. C.C.J. Webb noted that the evangelicalism which Wilberforce attacked was preoccupied "with the inner drama of one's own spiritual life", much as Rousseau had been in his writings, but this individualism was allied to "a lack of interest in the individual's historical setting and antecedents", which again is a feature of the late eighteenth century, as in Kant. Wilberforce wishes to change the whole tone of theology to a concern with the objective, the historical and the traditional. This resulted in a concern much greater than Newman's for systematic theology, the study of history and anthropology as the 'ratio credendi', and a defence of ecclesiastical authority and tradition. Newman, by contrast, took dogma as all important, but in a less formal and systematic way, and never moved away from his fascination with the inner life of the individual. While a careful and rigorous historian, he lacked the feel for anthropological studies found in Wilberforce.

Theology for Wilberforce was the articulation of the means of salvation for man. It could never be true that "men afflict themselves needlessly about one another's safety, as regards points of spiritual belief", which was the view of Harriet Martineau. Rather in the life of man, there was always a disposition to look for a type, or pattern, to express what out "consciousness imperfectly witnesses". The idea of a pattern in man's life is justified historically. But an historical justification is only relevant because it is analogous to the search for a pattern in human life in contemporary spirituality. Despite Wilberforce's desire to clarify and organize the external truths of
Christianity, he will begin with examples of religious faith that are indistinct, subjective and syncretist. Examples of faith akin to Christianity lack spiritual awareness, but they are not rivals, nor are they to be despised. There is then a curious contrast between the ultimate goal of rigid, external truths in a dogmantic system, and the original development of his theology from historical facts.

In a manner reminiscent of Schleiermacher's *Speeches on Religion*, Wilberforce argues that ideal men throughout history have been poets, expressing in words the collective personality of men, or Kings, expressing by office our collective will, or heroes, expressing by character our collective nature. There is a "hereditary bond of brotherhood" in man. Wilberforce brings natural theology in after he has rejected Rationalism, the self-sufficiency of man in knowing God. Not only is there validity in the natural search by man for God, the Gospel actually perfects the natural dispositions of man. But the Gospel only does this, and elevates the qualities of humanity, by external grace.

"It is a characteristic of the Gospel to give a higher employment to every faculty of the understanding, and a nobler object to every affection of the heart". (140)

Man therefore is perfected in Christ, and Christ crowns the searchings of man for the nature of salvation, but the incarnation is a difference in kind, not in degree, because

"the restoration of the ancient pattern of man, is not attained through the natural perfection of individuals, but because in Christ, Our Lord, was the personal presence of that Divine Word, which was above nature". (141)
There is a serious theological problem here. On page 7, Wilberforce had written that the pattern exhibited by poets was

"set forth by the Providence of God to vindicate for all of us what nature could effect, and that, in these representatives of our race, we might recognize our common benefactors".

This might indicate a logos Christology, as Gore later was to work out in the 1891 Bamptons on The Incarnation. But Wilberforce sees Christ rather as completing the search begun by man and yet only in Christ is there "the first renewal of man's race"; only in the Incarnation, "in Him, and not in them, is the original principle of movement".

However, Wilberforce is primarily concerned in this opening passage to establish the unity of man. Reviewing the old controversy in scholasticism between Creationism and Traducianism, he asserts that there is such a thing as collective human nature in a physiological, and behaviourist sense. Wilberforce is prepared to argue from similarities in lower orders of creation to higher. Similarities in fossils and molluscs form a genus in palaeontology, and similarities in men form an anthropological genus. There is no attempt to argue that material causality in the lower orders of creation must be different from spiritual causality in the higher. Although Wilberforce was no scientist he attempted to recognize the importance natural science should have in forming any doctrine of creation. He wrote

"There is something amazing in that plastic nature which can maintain the almost imperceptible intervals between so many continuous lives of animal life, and reproduce the types of every kind in endless accession, without
confusion, variety or decay. This is one of God's great works, whereby he binds the supremacy of law and the prodigality of nature." (143)

In man there is a real bond "by which every man is tied to that primitive type, which perpetuates itself in him and in all others ...

The constant repetition of the same results, under similar circumstances, leads us to infer the existence of some real though imponderable agent ... (nominalism must not) deny the existence of external realities, because we have not the power of making them." This passage was changed in later editions after 1859. (144)

Such community of nature extends to man's spiritual side. There is a common moral nature in man. "There is a moral instinct, by which we feel assured that the sentiments which live in our own heart, will be responded to in that of our brother." Wilberforce is, of course, aware that traducianism was very suspect in explaining the origin of the soul. (145)

Some of the Fathers, such as Gregory of Nyssa, and Tertullian, in De Anima, explained the existence of the soul by transmission from parents to children. Augustine saw the soul as generated spiritually and in his final Retractions was uncertain whether the soul was an immediate creation or not. Condemned by the Pope in 498AD, Traducianism was not revived until Rosmini popularized it in the nineteenth century. Wilberforce never alludes to Rosmini, but he does quote Gunther with great approval. (146)

Anton Gunther, like Rosmini, was a Catholic philosopher who speculated on German idealism. Both were condemned as heretical
eventually: the interest of them now lies in their early attempts to reconcile sacramentalism with idealism. Gunther read Schelling and Hegel, and argued for the unity of natural and supernatural truth, with the possibility of the Incarnation being explained by man. He was not condemned until 1857 when he was 74. He submitted to this decision. His importance for Wilberforce was that he wrote in German, (for German was a language Wilberforce had deliberately learnt as a means of developing Sacramentalist theology in a manner congruent with Romanticism and Idealism), and that he attempted a new defence of sacramentalism. Wilberforce quotes the Vorschule zur Speculativen Theologie of 1828–9, which he describes as "able". Rosmini wrote in Italian, and argued for the idea of indeterminate-being, innate in man. Gunther almost certainly read Rosmini. The point of this digression is to show that there was a strand of Roman Catholic theology around 1830–40 written by theologians of mature years who knew Schelling and Hegel well. Such theology postulated the unity of man, and placed the human soul in a cosmic relationship that could approach pantheism. There is much in Gunther that reflects a loose Hegelian understanding of ideas, even though he was never judged as severely of ontologism as Rosmini. (147) The problem that faces Wilberforce is this. If we place the human soul in a cosmic unity, what becomes of individuality and the uniqueness of human salvation? Is not Christ simply the highest form of the Idea, a subtle approach to pantheism? Certainly the passage of Gunther, obscure though it is quoted by Wilberforce on page 53 of the Incarnation raises many questions. It is worth quoting in full, to show how the desire to reconcile anthropological-science and dogmatic theology can yield a dangerous result:
"The Idea of man, as originally conceived in the mind of the Creator, is not merely that of an individual or person, but as the same time that of a race. This, when properly understood, does not imply merely a collective, but an organic being. By this Idea, as being his original thought, God's acts of creation for the support of the race are directed. If therefore the first man, as the representative of the race became its father, broke off the connection between his Spirit and the Godhead, the Creative Impulse on the part of God could never sever that connection and take away that breach, which he had allowed to be produced in the case of the solitary first man. And why could it not? Because, by such an act of alteration and renewal, God would have been at variance with Himself by reason of that Idea, which he had originally formed of mankind as a race." (148)

How then are we to speak of the personality of man? Like Gunther, Wilberforce supports traducianism for the animal life of man, and again like Gunther he will see the spiritual life of man as a unity. But how is Gunther's defence of the immediate creation of the soul (at birth or conception) to be reconciled with this theory? Wilberforce wavers. He admits that creationism "may be thought inconsistent with the general argument of this work". Furthermore, as regards the soul, "there may be enough to maintain its traditive character". What he turns to is "the spirit of man, with its peculiar principle of personality ... and immediate work of God's creative will".

Personality is "supposed to be incapable of being transmitted", either spiritually or more crudely by physical generation. Again it is the christological defence which Wilberforce uses. After quoting Hilary's De Trinitate, he goes on to write "It is certain that He who took our whole nature did not take the principle of Personality according to the law of Traducianism". (149)

But what is the principle of Personality? Wilberforce builds up
a case for the collective unity of human striving, and then pulls back and speaks of the uniqueness of the act of Christ. Secondly, he discusses the spiritual unity of all human nature as an Idea in the mind of God, and then pulls back and speaks of the unique principle of personality in Christ. The same move is therefore made twice. Much evidence is given by Wilberforce in speaking of the unity of man. It thus becomes absolutely crucial for Wilberforce to break out of the idealist and historical system which he has built up.

One last point is worth making. Little has been written on Wilberforce, except on his eucharistic theology by Professor Mascall. It is however extremely striking that no one at the time commented on Wilberforce's idealist views and no other theologian then probably even read Gunther, nor Olhausen's *Commentary on Romans*, from which Wilberforce took a quotation on the organic unity of man by Stahl in his *Philosophy of Law*. Wilberforce was entirely seen as upholding the Tractarian view of baptismal regeneration, as also refuting Hume (page 339) and Locke (page 32), and as expounding classical Anglicanism and the Fathers. He was never seen in the wider European context, and his ecclesiology which followed Möhler, and anthropology, following Gunther, was regarded as being part of the attack on Anglican latitudinarianism and evangelicalism, whereas it was in fact far more than that. Wilberforce was a theologian far in advance of his age, however praised by his contemporaries. (Gladstone called him "our modern Athanasius.") He died in Rome preparing for the Roman Catholic priesthood, feeling alone and rather rejected in England in 1857. It was the same year Gunther's works were condemned by the Index at Rome.
Wilberforce makes much of the difference between image and likeness in man, and so builds up the idea of personality. There is virtually no difference between personality in Wilberforce and character in Butler: the terminology is confusing, but the ideas are the same. This is how Wilberforce escapes from the threat to the individuality of man. Christ is the ideal of the human race because in him personality is formed in a unique way by the indwelling of the God conscience and the organization of the common principles of man's moral and spiritual nature is what makes man unique. Butler's influence is evident. Man is part of a unity, but how he utilizes his spiritual heritage sets him apart. Out of the regeneration of man comes intuitive knowledge and the triumph over suffering. Man thus achieves a complete change. He is part of a whole; "the deeper a man is, the more conscious will he be of those inward principles of unity which radiate from the centre" (Stahl, quoted page 35, from Olhausen's Commentary on Romans). But he is disordered. He thus needs to attain a true individuality of personality. He does this by joining another unity, the Catholic Church, which was for Möhler "the living figure of Christ, manifesting himself, and working through all ages". Although critical of Möhler on the Incarnation, he used him more appreciatively in his work on the Eucharist.

3. THE CHARACTER OF CHRIST IN WILBERFORCE

"The indications of what is high and holy in man's being need not be questioned. The principle of life to which all primitive mythologies witness, which the ancient mysteries of Egypt and Greece were designed probably to illustrate is truly a chain, which links us to the
Almighty ... His coming gives the explanation of those principles which else seemed too large and noble for our being and state."(150)

The principles are the same as in Butler, except that conscience is only the "imago dei," not the likeness of God. Because it is the likeness of God that would seem to form personality (although this must be qualified, see below), only in Christ does man have true personality. Like most opponents of the Protestant Confessions, such as the Augsburg and Westminster, appetite and material impulse are seen as neutral. There is the same distinction as in Butler between the passions and affections which are bodily, and conscience and will which are spiritual. Again like Butler, sinfulness lies in the disorder of man.

"Now in Adam, all these parts of our nature were not only good in themselves, but they were happily co-ordinated, the one to the other. Appetite was not rebellious against reason (in Butlerian terms, this is an affection such as benevolence or self-love), nor passion against conscience."(151)

What causes moral failure is the direction of the object of the passions and affections. This is precisely Butler's argument, and Chapter One will not be repeated. "Not, of course, that the constituents of our nature can change their character, since they are either indifferent, like the bodily appetites, or good, like the moral virtues; but they become evil in us, because the general disorganization of our constitution diverts each of them from their proper aim and service." Butler spent several sermons proving that there was a "proper aim and service"; I can only assume that the historical influence of Butler demonstrated in the introduction to Chapter Two was so great that Wilberforce could assume people would agree with this presupposition in the argument.
Wilberforce argues that empirically one can show that gratitude remains as a principle in all men, but it has been weakened. "The corruption of nature, then, does not lie in these separate portions of it, but in that perversion of man, as a whole by which their harmony is disturbed, and their purposes frustrated." It is "the witness of man's conscience" that is the final appeal that establishes truth. Again Butler's reasoning is similar.

However, personality is not the same as conscience. Here Wilberforce places his moral reasoning in a wider context than Butler, who offered a purely formal definition of man as the principle of identity over time. Wilberforce writes

"Wherein lies that personality which makes each man a separate individual, and thus responsible for the deeds done in the body before the throne of God, it is vain to conjecture. Of all our constituent parts, will seems the most to resemble it; yet even will it is not, for in Christ was one person, yet two wills. Neither is it the same thing with conscience, however closely they are combined. Enough that it is a principle unlike ought besides in the universe, except that it be found in those spiritual essences which exist along with and around us in the creation of God."(152)

But in fact this problem was to return with the publication of Lux Mundi, a later Anglo-Catholic work on the Incarnation by several theologians, including Gore and Moberly. It lies in the problem of kenotic Christology, biblical exegesis and the nature of salvation. Once again, the point must be made: It was the theological climate that allowed Wilberforce to veer away from the wind so sharply without being challenged, for in 1848 the nature of personality was as yet not a matter of open controversy, except with the (infidel) utilitarians.
By 1890, talk of a "spiritual essence" would have provoked angry comment by theological reviewers such as Rashdall and Garvie, and agnostics such as Sidgwick. Lux Mundi is a different theological era from Wilberforce's speculations.

Wilberforce accepts that there is a distinction between image and likeness in man. The image of God refers to "the nature and constitution of man's mind" - the conscience and will. But the supremacy of mind gives power to the bodily nature, and "three effects are derived especially from the gift of God's image: first, Lordship over the earth and lower animals; secondly, knowledge of God's works in creation, with which the possession of language was intimately connected; thirdly, intercourse with God, from whom man received direct instructions respecting his conduct". This argument is related to an exegesis of Genesis 1-3. The fall does not destroy the image of God, and the conscience is merely overshadowed. But the likeness of God, which was the divine indwelling is lost. Quoting the 4th Gospel, Chrysostom's De Gen. Hom 15, and Athanasius Or. II c. Arian 68, Wilberforce holds that "the guiding light then of original humanity, was not merely that perfection of natural understanding which resulted from the happy constitution of man's inherent powers, but a special and supernatural indwelling of the great Author of all knowledge". Wilberforce is content to claim that the pattern form is perfectly developed in Christ.

"In Adam was humanity, and the presence of the Word superadded as a guiding light. In Christ was God the Word by personal presence who for our sakes had added to Himself human flesh";
Christ thus by indwelling in man restores by his character the harmony and balance of man.

There is thus rather a confusion of thought present here. The analysis of human nature as a collective unity is idealist, and he uses this as a criticism of Kant, speaking of the wants of society which deny a purely individualist account of man's inner judgment. Secondly, there is an analysis of human nature which defines the nature of sin in terms that closely follow Butler, just as he discusses Butler's view of the atonement. But a third element is an Alexandrian Christology whereby the nature of humanity is only derived from the incarnation.

"Although we were made after God's image, and are called so on our own account; but it is by reason of the true image and glory of God which dwelt in us, namely, His word, which afterwards for our sakes became flesh, that we have the gift of this appellation."

Christ "vouchsafed actually to introduce Himself into the line of transmitted humanity, so as to gain a real relationship to all its inheritors; and the character in which this was effected corresponded so exactly with the original type in which our nature was moulded, as to make Him a new Head to mankind". (155)

It would seem that the dominant element is the Alexandrian. "The discriminating considerations of the Son's personality were thus laid in the nature of the Deity itself." (156) Because the perfection of humanity depends upon the entry of "supernatural power" and "the Spirit without measure", so in Christ was a perfect pattern created. But a perfection which depended on indwelling can only be known by a faith given by indwelling.

"And as in Him was the only perfect pattern of humanity,
so in union with Him is the only real source of knowledge". For not only did He give the Faith a higher object in the revealed truths of the Gospel, but He exalted the principle of Faith itself through that higher nature which He communicated to His earthly members ... Thus are Christian Faith and Christian Reason no longer the natural judgment of the children of creation, but the inspired judgment of the children of grace. Though the union of each individual with the Pattern of Humanity, are his natural qualities exalted. His inferior faculties are re-moulded on the perfect type of manhood". (157)

But this judgment is not simply that of individual Faith. Once again the idealist strand recurs. Speaking of truth, he writes "Its reflection must be sought for, then, in the judgment of the regenerate race, as the verdict of natural conscience in the sentiments of collective humanity". The Church's faith is "regenerate ... collective ... conscience". Union with the collective body, the Church, in a mystical sense enables a higher reason to oppose the "mere development of those faculties which by creation were imparted to our race". (158)

But at the same time Wilberforce can attack Hume, who denied the objectivity of morals, by placing between individual judgment and the judgment of faith a middle term, the "inherent conviction of the race ... a truth which had commended itself to the faith of humanity". (159)

So the character of Christ in Wilberforce is made up of three distinct theological aspects. There is his participation in "the principles which lie hid in the race at large", (159)(a) as he quoted Aristotle's Politics, as well as in the collective humanity of man, the "substance" which Locke had denied and Stillingfleet's defence of which Wilberforce cites. (160) This idealism finds further expression in Mohler's views of the Church, as the extension of the incarnation,
the form in which God existed for the world. Secondly, there is the analysis of human nature, which can draw heavily on Butler, but with the two caveats that this nature is part of the human race, and therefore as well as conscience there are references to 'the faith of humanity', and secondly, that this nature is only perfected by divine indwelling. A Butlerian anthropology is thus being stretched to include a loose form of idealism at the one end, and a high Christology at the other. For, thirdly, faith alone knows the perfection of humanity in Christ. Christ is perfect-human nature, and on this pattern we must build. But the problem of discernment is acute. If man has appetites and passions with a proper purpose, then any man can know what is right or wrong, natural or unnatural. This is Butler's position, and it consistently holds that what is natural is open to any conscience not caught in self-deception. If man only knows himself in Christ, then a true humanity is only available to faith given by grace. What one cannot do is to attempt to speak both of the "only perfect pattern of humanity" known by faith and the "proper aim and service" of our constitution known by "the witness of man's conscience". Wilberforce is building an edifice with presuppositions which are ultimately incompatible.

"The personal presence of that Divine Word, which was above nature" (161) made Wilberforce's Christ ultimately removed from much of the preceding argument. Strange points out that Newman's Christ was a pattern for man more because Christ shared in the human lot than as an ideal. He contrasts Newman with Wilberforce on this point. The above analysis is much more detailed than Strange's, who only refers to Wilberforce in passing, but it confirms the point. One could put
it, as Strange does, in this way. Christ is a man for Newman, whom we must follow. Christ is the man, the collective character or pattern of the race, for Wilberforce. But only Christians know that this is so.

Yet for Wilberforce the above analysis only presents the possibility of Christ uniting himself with man. What he was by nature, he must now become by sympathy. I will conclude this section on Wilberforce by showing how the action of Christ further removed him in Wilberforce's eyes from what was known by a man unregenerate by indwelling. The test cases are ignorance and suffering carried through to death. Christ was not ignorant, nor could he be put to death unless he willed it so.

Christ exhibits sympathy with man. He suffers, and shows love for men, in his healing. But the relationship of healing and divine power to suffering only raises the question of how men are to conceive the limitations of the incarnate Christ. Christ suffers because he voluntarily accepted all of man's pain, fear and death. By taking flesh he experienced the suffering of humanity. "His manhood contributed to the acts or passions of that Divine Person manifest in the flesh." Thus the personality of Christ enters on the Divine Word, which indwells the perfection of manhood. But perfection is an 'attribute or quality' which can only be predicted of what is necessary in man. Sickness is an accidental blemish on humanity. So Christ could not have been ill at any time. It was a theological impossibility that physical suffering which involved the deterioration of the bodily nature of man could happen. "The very circumstances which rendered his sympathy so perfect, precluded participation in the
accidental particulars of human sickness." (162) Yet Wilberforce is concerned with Mt 8.17, where Isaiah is quoted that Christ bore our sicknesses. He gives two answers to this. The first follows Mt 8.16, where bearing sickness involves the act of healing, rather than suffering them. Equally bearing sins involves the atonement. But, secondly, Christ did not suffer all forms of death. The varied forms are accidental circumstances of the common event of death. Equally all forms of sickness have a common end in death, which Christ shared.

"But their individual conditions arise commonly from intemperance or from some original defect in the attempering of the elements of our being. These causes could not exist in Him, who was the Head and type of Man's nature." (162)

He follows the Summa Theologica in this argument, which relies heavily on a distinction between accidental and necessary humanity. At this point he is far from the empirical instances of man's spiritual nature in discussing 'pattern men'.

There is here a refusal to participate in any discussion of physical causality at all. Healing miracles are accepted "as though the effect was a natural consequence of his character". (163) Like Cyril of Alexandria whom he refers to, the consequence of indwelling is physical restoration to all which participates in this transformed flesh. Most strikingly of all Christ's human flesh was immortal, as Adam's was. Again the patristic evidence is taken as precedent, in particular Augustine's exegesis of Gen 3-22 on the tree of life, which confers immortality, in De.Pecc.Mor. 1-3 and De Civitate Dei, 13-23. "The spiritual immortality which belonged to Him by nature, was a perpetual antidote to His body's death. So that when this event
This argument was pressed further. The sympathy given by Christ to all sufferers was actually increased by his representative nature, which in its perfection prevented his experience of sickness. But although sympathy can be present without experience, certain experiences are part of the generic qualifications of humanity, and had to be exhibited in a body which, as the body of the Head of humanity, represented all the qualifications of man. "Therefore, He submitted to fear, because it belongs to humanity; to pain, because none escape it; to death because it is appointed for all." (165)

There are then three ways in which Wilberforce analyses human nature as a physical characteristic. Some elements Christ held like any other man. Professor Sykes, in his discussion of aspective and empirical humanity, points out that we assume that when someone is seen to be human, that he is like us in all relevant characteristics. (166) But this was only true of the physiological components of humanity for Wilberforce. For a second group of characteristics, pain, fear and death, it was necessary that Christ should experience them, but only possible because he agreed to suspend the operation of his perfected humanity. A third group of characteristics, that of the decay of one's body, was impossible on all accounts for Christ. This was an imperfection which was accidental and logically incompatible with perfection which represented collective, or universal humanity.

But sympathy in human nature is thus related to participation in events, if not always to direct experience. "Mere abstract knowledge
of the existence of suffering”, does not produce sympathy. So Wilberforce steers a careful course. Christ was a man filled with love. Yet suffering is a less great evil than sin, and the effect of pain checks sin.

"His true perception of the real evils of man's nature, His estimate of the effects of guilt, His discernment that pain was an evil so much lighter than sin - this guided the general course of his sympathy."(168)

But an end to pain would create "the growth of those still greater moral evils which are in a measure kept in control by physical wants". The destruction of pain is possible, but it is deliberately foregone.

"In his hands, so far as his Godhead was concerned, was lodged even at that season all power in heaven and earth. All sicknesses, which afflicted any of the sons of men, might have been healed by him in a moment."(169)

4. IGNORANCE AND SIN

Christ knew all things, even as an infant. Nor did he pretend ignorance. Man's ignorance comes from rebellion, which caused God to withdraw the divine gift of guidance. This

"is in itself not more inconsistent with the principles of justice than the removal of any other endowment which man could not challenge as a right, though it had been mercifully bestowed upon him. All that is necessary is, that we should not so wholly identify the sinfulness of man with that loss of guidance on which it followed, as to destroy the individual responsibility of Adam's children."(170)

Ignorance and sin are closely related. This is the familiar Augustinian combination that false knowledge is related to moral
wickedness, and clearly assumed by the Tractarians. H. Liddon, discussed in the next chapter, felt it was a "perfect mystery" that a man of the moral stature of F.D. Maurice could have such unorthodox views on everlasting punishment.

Christ's will was entirely free. It was not transformed to be a will of a new humanity, nor was it sinful flesh. It was, as Leo argued in his Tome the will of Adam before the fall. But it was only this so long as the divine indwelling was with Him. In a passage that he does not expound, Wilberforce says "This burden of deprivation He endured through His man's nature when, in some manner to us unknown, He withdrew from it the succours of Deity." At this point temptation fully occurred, and Christ cried out that He had been forsaken. "It may be that it was impossible that perfect sympathy for man's weaknesses should exist, where man's temptations had not been actually undergone."

Elsewhere, Christ had a perfect nature implying "the complete development both of body and mind, so far as they were consistent with personal union with the nature of God". The union with the Word enabled Christ to have the first will since Adam which was completely free, which was its normal condition and perfect state.

"This perfect liberty is gained only in Him, in whom the unlimited presence of God's Spirit supplied the place of that divine guidance which had been given to our first parent; and counteracted the tendency to concupiscence which had been transmitted to his Progeny."(172)

Wilberforce makes much of the moral coinherence of the Trinity. (173)
He refuses to attribute personality directly to the Divine Unity or to the three Persons, arguing that "there may exist some other than that limited and relative personality by which each man is divided from all connatural substances". There is a "reality of their Personal distinction" which is "essential primary and archetypal", and prior to revelation.\(^{(174)}\) The importance of Trinitarianism for a discussion of sin and ignorance is that the Incarnation reflects a prior distinction within the Godhead, and it is from a "natural law of His Divine Being" that "the Son is the image and representative of the Father".\(^{(175)}\)

But the coinherence of the Trinity is essentially moral, and a relationship of love. "The moral attributes of Godhead make up the true 'Brightness of its Glory'."\(^{(176)}\) "One effectual manner, in which the early Church witnessed to that higher ideal, under which the Godhead had been exhibited by its true Pattern-Image, was to give the first lesson to mankind of universal love." Since this is the starting point of Christian theology, the knowledge of the Father by the Son, and that of the Son by the Father, is all one. He quotes Athanasius (C Arian, 4-12). Wilberforce argues that the knowledge of the Eternal Son is communicated to the humanity of the Incarnate Son by the power of the Spirit.

"Even according to His man's nature, He was not, properly speaking, a creature, though consisting of created elements; for whereas all creation was His own work, He himself was moulded according to His manhood, out of the created substance which He had made, by the informing power of the Holy Ghost."\(^{(177)}\)

Thus the Incarnation can deify man, by joining him to the power of the Spirit indwelling man. This regeneration alone, can prevent
the power of sin. The Incarnation is the keystone of his thought.

"It looks to an actual alteration in the condition of mankind, through the admission of a member into its ranks in whom, and through whom, it attained an unprecedented elevation. Unless we discern this real impulse which was bestowed upon humanity, the doctrines of Atonement and Sanctification, though confessed in words, become a mere phraseology." (178)

Incarnation and sinlessness are thus bound together. But they are further related to ignorance, which completes this section on the character of Christ. The divine omniscience fills the incarnate Word. "The essential happiness of God consists in the knowledge and love of Himself; and this reflected perfectly from one Person of the Godhead to another." Perfect self-knowledge implies that "all higher branches of truth ... "rest on this reality". "The real existence of the Ever-Blessed Trinity must be received as before all creation, and as underlying all knowledge." Wilberforce places the intellectual system of Hegel and other idealists as "an illustration only and shadow of those great realities, which exist around and above us, and by Revelation have been made known to our minds". (179)

The humanity of Christ is the recipient of divine omniscience, in so far as it is a fit recipient. There is, then, a direct relation between sinlessness and knowledge. Wilberforce has an account of the development of Christ's human knowledge, the "tedious path of inference and knowledge", which yet was also guided by "inward inspiration". Long before Christ could reason intellectually, he was familiar with these truths "by way of intuition". (180) The two kinds of knowledge are brought together when Our Lord "lifted up His eyes, and saw
Nathanael coming to Him", yet told him afterwards that "before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the figtree, I saw thee". (John 1: 47-48.) Wilberforce denies that this is a contradiction, and the argument relies on the Platonic idea of anamnesis. We have knowledge stored up in our minds, and forget it, but recall it later. This knowledge is made up of principles which we possess by the constitution of our nature. David Newsome discusses how this Platonic epistemology that men at birth carry with them innate knowledge in the form of principles which later they realized by deduction as adults was influential at this period - most famously, of course, in Wordsworth's Immortality Ode. So Wilberforce writes "Why do we allow things, save from discerning them to be true? How do we know them to be true, save that the elements of judgment are laid up within us? Whence were these originally derived?" The answer he gives is that they are derived from our nature as Sons of God.

5. CHARACTER AND MEDIATION

Lastly, Christ's understanding was not merely not infirm. The understanding achieved complete perfection. The object of knowledge shaped that knowledge and "the excellence of its normal state lay in the complete reflection of God's image, the very condition of which was uninterrupted intercourse with the Creator". At this stage in his argument, the passage passes over into a condemnation of lower ways of reasoning, which are not related to Faith.

"By being a fit subject for the reception of God's glory, was man distinguished from the beasts of the field. But
by seeking after knowledge in his own way he lost that true knowledge which cometh from God only. He forgot that 'the knowledge of the Holy is understanding'.

Perfection of understanding is only related to knowledge of God.

Hence Wilberforce ranks in depth of thought the canonical authors. Paul is compared with John, the one earnest the other deeply contemplative. But Christ's character has a universality which compels reverence even in the simplest acts and words. Human genius expresses itself in "thoughts of all-adapting power"; so Newman argued for the correlation of style and moral and spiritual perfection. In genius, the scattered thoughts of their race are concentrated into one expression. The thoughts of Christ thus transcend the barriers of every condition. Inspiration may produce the perfection in men of individual endowments, but indwelling causes exaltation and elevation of every endowment in Christ, "for in others we see the single colours of a reflected lustre; but in Him the concentrated glory of an original radiance is all that we can discern".

Because of this, there are layers of knowledge in man which can be elevated by Christ. Quoting the seventeenth century Platonist Cudworth, he argues that we have a presage in our minds of "some higher good and perfection than either power or knowledge", but this is "uncertain and glimmering" until elevated by Christ. Newman as J.M. Cameron points out refused to escape from the intellectual challenge of empiricism by postulating intuitive knowledge which was of a higher order, but Wilberforce will both use Platonism, and German idealism, alongside an analysis of human nature taken from Butler.
At one time he speaks of conscience, the disorganization of the system of human nature, and the passions of men seeking the wrong object. Along with this he will discuss the intellectual searchings of Aristotle in the *Politics* and *Ethics*, in a way familiar to eighteenth century moralists. At the same time this way of discussing the character of Christ as the pattern for all men, which is a logical extension of Butler, is conjoined with a belief in the collective humanity existing as an Idea in the mind of God. The transmission of human souls can be at least entertained, and levels of knowledge analysed into doctrines that recall Platonic anamnesis, intellectual intuition and direct vision of God. Nor is the latter confined for men to life after death. Intercourse with God results in a moulding of the human mind.

It is worth noticing here an extremely hostile review of Wilberforce's work from *The Rambler*, (187a) the magazine founded by J.M. Capes in 1848. Although this magazine was the organ of liberal Roman Catholicism, and was edited by Newman for a few months in 1859, the review article by Capes himself in 1849 on *The Doctrine of the Incarnation* would have pleased the most hostile opponent of Anglicanism within the English Roman Catholic Church.

Capes' argument was simple. There was a highly developed epistemological conceptual structure which had existed within Roman Catholic theology for many centuries. Capes assumed that this would answer Wilberforce's problems, but Wilberforce had not read it. So Wilberforce constantly misapplied technical terms in a loose manner. Capes went on to allege that this was inevitable, since Wilberforce was an Anglican. It was not merely that Anglican theology was ill-developed
systematically, but that all Anglicans lacked divine grace to carry out such development.

Capes had a five-fold typology which could be applied to Christ's knowledge. There was firstly beatific knowledge, known by the elect in heaven; secondly, intuition, which was prelapsarian, human knowledge also possessed by angels; thirdly natural knowledge, such as the proofs of divine existence available to all men; fourth, faith, given at conversion; and fifth, intellectual faith, which was the development of simple faith, and only available to Roman Catholics. Wilberforce had written that revelation brought the mind into immediate contact with invisible things, and "thus is the inner man endowed with the gift of intuition". In particular, the Apostles were inspired in a unique way, or had intuition, which their successors did not have. Capes pointed out that intuition is a prelapsarian term. It is worth stressing this since Liddon's work on the character of Christ, discussed in Chapter Five, will be aware of this point. Capes thus remarks "His language is inaccurate, not to call it at times unmeaning, and representative of no real thoughts whatsoever."(188) Furthermore, Christ's soul did not know by inspiration as Wilberforce had claimed, but by beatific knowledge. Again Liddon will be aware of the far more technical nature of the theological terms of Roman Catholicism.

More importantly, it is worth noticing that Wilberforce is forced by a paucity of terms to use the same term, "inspiration", for Christ's knowledge, and Apostolic knowledge. Capes is aware of this mistake, and does not believe that Wilberforce resolves the dilemma by arguing that Christ's ministry was perfected by obedience, which, unlike the
way he knew, was a direct result of the indwelling of the Word, and not simply from divine inspiration. Capes also objects to Wilberforce's idealism, and paradoxically also attacks Wilberforce for not also considering Scotism. Scotism would of course have been very congruent with Wilberforce's idealism. Capes wishes to argue that the Spirit is only there as a gift to all men as a result of the Incarnation, whether the Incarnation was caused by sin or not. Wilberforce argues that the Spirit is (in Capes' words) "given to all men naturally", before they have sinned. Yet the Incarnation is the result of sin for Wilberforce. So the gift of the Spirit which is given independently of sin, cannot, as Capes perceptively notices, be the result of the Incarnation alone, which is dependent on sin, in Wilberforce's theology. The only alternative, if Wilberforce will not discuss Scotist views of the Incarnation, is to distinguish the Spirit given at creation from that given at the Incarnation, in Capes' view. Capes attacks Wilberforce for not doing that either. "What meaning does he attach to the words 'influence of the Divine Spirit', 'inherit', and other phrases?"

Although this is a hostile review, which only praises Wilberforce occasionally to damn him more fully later as the waste of a good intellect, Capes' distrust of idealism seems justified. Capes wrote

"To confound this peculiar (spiritual) gift, which was bestowed on humanity through the Incarnation of Christ, with that general influence of the Divine Spirit, which all men inherit from their creation, is virtually a form of Rationalism."

Allied to this is Wilberforce's refusal to discuss the nature of faith.
The review drew a letter from Newman to Capes. Newman knew Wilberforce well, and wrote him more friendly letters, encouraging his eventual conversion to Roman Catholicism. Newman alludes to several passages in Capes' review, although the letter as now printed (189a) does not make this clear. Newman agrees that Wilberforce has to develop "the whole doctrine for himself". "Take the doctrine of the Incarnation itself, and see how little you get from Hooker and Pearson in detail — and where else will you go?" Another quotation that Newman uses is Capes' description of the traps in the way of an Anglican systematic theologian: "Articles, Canons, Acts of Parliament, historical precedents, and like miseries". This does not mean that Newman subscribed to Capes' own typological classification of Christ's knowledge. Newman was too empirical for that. He did however see the difficulty Wilberforce had in writing a systematic Christology, which Newman did not attempt, either as an Anglican or after his conversion. Capes' review was a form of imperialism, which Newman did not attack directly, but to which he was generally unsympathetic. The whole episode illustrates both the fact of Wilberforce's attempted alliance of systematic theology and philosophy on the character of Christ, and a contemporary awareness of its somewhat preliminary and exploratory character. (189b)

Wilberforce's work represents as a whole an attempt to stand within the pattern of intellectual life which characterized his own day, and yet to combine in an eclectic manner the contributions of German and English idealism. In addition, we find the strong influence of the Fathers, which outweighs all else, and to which Wilberforce constantly
recurs. His discussion of Christ's ignorance is ultimately a wrestling with four patristic writers - Athanasius, Augustine, Ambrose and John of Damascus. Ignorance is only a manner of speech for Christ in these writers, a method of condescension to human weakness, and having established the compatibility of divergent statements in the patristic corpus, Wilberforce essentially rests his case.

Yet in defending the mediatorial role of Christ among men, Christ is judged by those among whom he was incarnate, to be perfect by means of their ordinary knowledge. Not by intuition, nor by any recourse to common humanity of which he was the collective representative, but by conscience is Christ known to be perfect. Through reason and love Christ's character is impressed on men. This is Christ the moral example. The problem is given with the reference to "more exalted communications) with His Disciples, and the gradual assent from earthly things to heavenly things which Christ moved to with His closest followers, and a world with which Christ was familiar. The two worlds do not appear to meet, and the problem is made more acute in the scattered references to race, organic community and Idea of humanity. If the moral unity of man has to be demonstrated because it is now known that anthropological diversity is a feature of the human race in a way of which Butler was profoundly ignorant, Wilberforce must do more than allude to the followers of Schelling and Hegel by quoting unconnected passages. Nor can he simply claim that moral instinct is innate and will always triumph over cultural differences. What one finds in Wilberforce's account of the character of Christ is a complete duality. Unable to sin, unable to die until the Word suspends the
immortality consequent on his union, knowing all things by intuition, the representative of a collective race, Christ's humanity is perfect in all respects. Yet he appeals to men who sin and die, who reason intellectually and judge by conscience, not by faith or divine illumination. He is their Pattern, and their Ideal. But he is also the Son of God, the Incarnate Word, with a humanity that departed at the Ascension and returned under the gift of the Spirit. In this apprehension of Christ's character Wilberforce builds his soteriology with which account we will end this discussion of him.

On the basis of the perfection of his character revealed in the Incarnation, Christ can act as mediator. The criteria of belief in Christ are "not the mere acts of Our Lord, but those conditions of His character on which their value is dependent". Incarnation is more profound a concept than Atonement, a view which opposed the liberal Calvinism of an earlier generation of evangelicals. Adopting the Atonement as a belief need not result in a Christian conversion; "whereas if the Doctrine of Our Lord's Incarnation is once truly accepted, His mediation follows as its necessary result". Through the humanity of Christ, men are joined with Him by the office of the Holy Spirit in being made regenerate by the power of salvation. "It was not only that Christ exhibited the natural qualities of manhood, but that He conferred upon it a power which was above nature." Reverting to his idealist speculations, he writes

"that the principle of nature owes its existence to the fact that every tribe is set forth in its leader, that all races have their type, that the limits of the class are expressed in its model, and that throughout God's world there is a law of hereditary transmission and
family headship". (197)

In Christ we are joined to a similar law of grace, which is the body of Christ, the unity of the Church, a mystical body filled with spiritual power. "From this central source, then, flows all the life of renewed humanity". (197) Schleiermacher, Whateley and the Quakers are all seen as denying the reality of the mystical body, the Church. Wilberforce cites Domer's *Lehre von der Person Christi* to refute Schleiermacher, (198) the central issue for Wilberforce and Dorner being that Schleiermacher's denial of man's nature being united with the Son of God results in an inability to see the life of the Trinity present in the Church.

"He could not suppose it to be the mystical body of the Eternal Son, united by spiritual presence to his glorified humanity, because there was wanting in his system that substratum for such a doctrine which the truth of the Trinity could alone supply."(199)

Christ and the Church are not rivals, as Schleiermacher alleged in *The Christian Faith*: (200) "Catholicism is that system which represents the relation of the individual to Christ to be dependent on the relation to the Church; Protestantism, that which represents the relation of the individual to the Church to be dependent on his relation to Christ."

For salvation in Wilberforce's view

"is brought about in our union with the Church which is His body mystical ... for that which joins men to Christ's mystical body the Church, is their union with His man's nature, and their means of union with His man's nature is bestowed in His Church, or body mystical". (201)

Christ is one with his Church. "The Church of Christ is His body; His presence is its life; its blessing the gift of spiritual union with His man's nature." (202) Ultimately, Christology and ecclesiology stand
or fall together, and both depend on the humanity of Christ being a perfect mediator between God and man. The perfect character of Christ's humanity, joined to the Word fitted to become incarnate by virtue of its eternal relationships within the Trinity, is only a mediatorial relativity if it is present in His Church today, but this presence depends on the prior existence of that perfect character in the Incarnation.

"To assert the truth of Christ's presence - the reality of that union which binds the whole mystical body of His Church to the manhood of the Incarnate Word - is to maintain the reality of His mediation, and the absolute necessity of that bond by which heaven and earth are united."(203)

Ultimately, however, Wilberforce's concern is to defend the objective reality and necessity of the Sacraments. Because this is so, Wilberforce has little interest in the interior life of the Christian today, and the concern with the re-presentation of the character of Christ in man is of little importance. This is a highly important difference from Newman. Wilberforce did not wish to write on the importance of personal influence in evangelism, nor of the illative sense. Men know by faith, and faith is a gift of the Church. One joins the church because of the compelling intellectual power of Christian apologetics, and the attractiveness of regenerate humanity. Beyond this, Wilberforce's austerity did not venture. There is something slightly offputting in a writer who could lose many of his family by their early death, (204) and yet defend the correctness of Christ's refusal to end pain, for the superior moral benefits that resulted. Why men did or did not believe was of little interest to Wilberforce; why they should believe was all important. The Doctrine
of the Incarnation is a work of apologetics written in the heat of controversy, which remains rather aloof, and intellectual. Only the vastness of human religiosity and the complexity of patristic Christology elicit much warmth. The other passages which are indeed polemical are the closing passages on "the increasing commotions of daily life ... the strange aspect of falling monarchies ... everything established is crumbling away". 1848, the year of publication, was "'the year of Revolutions'" throughout Europe. Wilberforce's answer is sacramental worship. But "a chilling apathy has withdrawn attention from that principle of life in Him, which should quicken all His members". (205)

"The closed doors of our sanctuaries and their silent altars" offer a rebuke to Anglicanism for its neglect of the Eucharist. Wilberforce's book was part of a theology of baptism, eucharist and incarnation. The 1847 Gorham Judgement, with its introduction of State control (in Wilberforce's eyes) of Christian doctrine, and denial of baptismal regeneration, made the Doctrine of the Incarnation a more polemical work than it might have been in its final pages. By 1854, Wilberforce became a Roman Catholic. He died in 1857, a sick and lonely man.

Finally, therefore, Wilberforce's views on Sacraments must be outlined, because it is for this reason that he fails to discuss the interior life of discipleship and morality, which one might have expected. Wilberforce was criticized by an American, S.H. Turner, on this point in 1851. Turner wrote, in a pseudonymous work,

"A view of the incarnation which dwells on that amazing development of God's inconceivable love to fallen man, as if it were almost entirely available by imparting to Christ's Church through Sacramental union his sanctified humanity, is in danger of losing sight of the great
fundamental doctrine of the atonement, or at least of undervaluing its importance, and also of individual duty and interest as regards one's own religious character and personal responsibility ... the moral means through which in a moral and rational being this sanctification is to be effected." (206)

Wilberforce, however, was arguing for the existence of objective truths. If Christ is the head of humanity, then there must be streams by which grace is passed to His members. By the sacraments we are united to Christ's Body, and on this principle of objective union rest the other means of communion with Christ, "those affections and sympathies, which open into the fullness of their divine life". Only by a "real" union can men be sure of their union with Christ.

Wilberforce divides Christianity into sacramental and anti-sacramental. The sermon caused offence at Oxford with the dogmatic view that "to accept his Mediation as a truth is to receive that Sacramental System, whereby He is come into the flesh as the re-creator of mankind". There were many who argued that justification by faith was at least as great a consequence of mediation. Wilberforce was unrepentant: in another Sermon 'The Mystery of Humanity' he urged that (207)

"men who would be shocked if the reality of Our Lord's Atonement were questioned do not perceive that the reality of our union with Him is just as fundamental a verity of the Gospel". "Some persons have lost sight of the interior nature of these blessed ordinances; their secret significance, as the means whereby we are united to the Incarnate Word has been forgotten..."

Church authority is always placed above private illumination, or enlightenment. Once one accepts the authority of Scripture, one must rest on the judgment of the Church which acknowledged them to be the Word. "The gift of individual enlightenment is subordinate to man's
general relation to Him." And since Christ is known individually by Christians only after his union, the principle of the subordination of the former gift to the latter must always be kept in mind. "We cannot speak too highly of this enlightening blessing, so long as we maintain that due subordination which keeps up the recollection of its source." The Sacramental union with Christ gives a true faith.

"From recognizing a true presence of Christ in these ordinances, are we carried onto a genuine belief that the natures are really united in his adorable person. For if Godhead and Manhood are truly united in Christ, both must co-operate in these offices which he discharges towards mankind." (208)

By Sacramental union, we are regenerate, given a true vision of Christ and avail ourselves of Christ's continual intercession before the Father. The Church re-presents the sacrifice of the Cross to the Father. Wilberforce denied however that there was any value in trans-substantiation. This would "withdraw men from that reference to the person of Christ ... they would gain no more virtue sacramentally through any material transformation ... the benefit of Sacraments results from the spiritual influence of Christ". (209)

The inscrutability of grace is seen however as "parallel to the transmission of natural powers". There is a great "evil of allowing internal emotion to supercede external ordinances", as in pietism or the quieter worship of the Quakers". Rather, a true faith rests on union with Christ through the Sacraments. There is a clear distinction between faith and reason. Faith is a higher form of knowledge. It is an original source of knowledge, co-ordinate with reason, which limits the authority of reason, while increasing its sphere of knowledge". Reason thus is prior to faith, and the servant of faith, since after faith there is a creed to articulate the truths of the Christian faith. (210)
But such reason must always respect the authority of scripture and the church; for Sacramental grace is the means by which reason is uplifted. Sacramental grace is also the inner life of the church, and prevents it becoming a mere formal system.

"These doctrines are ... our right security against substituting the Church as a formal system in place of its head ... So long as the Church is regarded as an external system, based on certain laws, and administered by certain leaders, it can never fail to enlist a measure of that party spirit which belongs to men's nature, and thus to draw away attention from the holy purposes for which it was instituted. The only safeguard against this danger is due subordination of its external framework to its internal principle; and the constant recognition that its life depends, not on the gifts of government but as the gifts of grace." (211)

Sacraments then are an extension of the incarnation. "Allow the scheme of mediation to be essential to man's recovery, let it depend on union with that Personal Being in whom holiness and truth become incarnate, and the Sacramental system follows of course." Wilberforce's Christ performs his atoning sacrifice so that his mediatorial office might benefit future humanity. During the course of his book, Wilberforce defines the Incarnation as resting upon the belief in the Trinity, and with the eternal derivation of the Son continuing in the assumption of flesh through the hypostatical union. So Wilberforce argues that the mutual interdependence of Chalcedon and Trinitarian theology has always been at the centre of a true Catholic theology.

The sacraments ultimately rest on the novel concept of the pattern man in Wilberforce which demonstrates the perfection of Christ. He holds together the unity of mankind, and focusses the pantheistic
undertones onto the original Creator of human pluriformity. He establishes the reconciliation of image and likeness in man, remoulding the natural qualities of man into a higher form. Thus he acts as an intervention from without on the capacities of mankind. He acts decisively and exclusively in the Sacraments today.

For the character of Christ is not afflicted by the elements of mortality. As humanity's finest expression, he showed his sympathy with his fellowmen by condescension in his emotions; yet the purpose of this was purely revelatory. Christ could have felt no degrading emotions, and could have removed suffering altogether. What Christ never pretended was to suffer ignorance, for to have pretended this would have been to have denied the power of the indwelling Spirit of God. Wilberforce argues for degrees of knowledge, although as we have seen his argument did not impress Roman Catholic reviewers with their own careful views on epistemology.

This perfection related the contingent world of human finitude and fallenness with the eternal world of truth. Men could believe in the reality of grace through the perfection of Christ's humanity. Union with this humanity produced regeneration for men. The Character of Christ is thus an empirical demonstration of the truth of Christianity, and the means of salvation. The argument that the humanity of Christ in the sacraments is not the same as the incarnate character of Christ, which is also a human character, is refuted by certain presuppositions held by Wilberforce. Chief among these was that any humanity created by God must be intrinsically perfect in its original formation, which is demonstrated in the re-presentation of the original humanity in a way.
reminiscent of Irenaeus. Salvation is a return to this state, through the "illumination" of man. Christ's character was "illumined", physically perfect, and omnipresent. Salvation now is by the humanity of Christ in the Sacraments, which has the power to make us perfect like Christ. Perfection involves a humanity beyond the vicissitudes of time and change.

What this suggests is that there is a profound dichotomy between what it means to be a man and what Wilberforce would wish the concept to be. Temporality appears to be fully integrated into Wilberforce's theology at the beginning of the Doctrine of the Incarnation, insofar as the book opens with a discussion of the history of human culture and the growth of primitive religion. Yet towards the final chapters one notices a desire to escape from the uncertainties of life. The Christian is removed from earth to heaven to dwell with Christ on high, while a prisoner in his body on earth. Ultimately the character of Christ in this work points to a doctrine of creation irreconcilable with the full totality of human life in its contingent relationships. The components of this created totality are the experience of change and decay, (so powerfully expressed in Newman's belief that to be perfect on earth is to have changed often) the experience of learning by observation, and the experience of moral uncertainty before moral action. Wilberforce prefers a different version, where the character of Christ, as one contemplates it from the enriching grace of sacramental union with Christ,

"may give peace amidst the collisions and oneness amidst the distractions of the public mind". "Nature is elevated above itself ... none save man's Creator can guide him.
amidst the uncertainties of his present state."

7. SUMMARY

Wilberforce transforms Butler's use of character. He is heavily dependent on the perfection of Christ's character as the basis for sacramental theology. Yet time and again he moves away from his reliance on Butler. What he does not do is to integrate his thought with his philosophical presuppositions.

The difference with Newman is also striking. There is nothing on how conscience may be defined, although the introduction to Wilberforce refers to the witness of man's conscience. The problems with sin, pain and ignorance were mentioned in the introduction, but they are not really problems at all for Wilberforce. Christ's humanity becomes increasingly theologically defined.

Finally, I have shown how Wilberforce leaves history and anthropology, for sacramental theology. The work was part of a trilogy on the Sacraments, flanked by volumes on Baptism and the Eucharist. Here he was profoundly original. Yet, as the introduction argued, the evidence suggests that Wilberforce does not in the end integrate his Christology with his interest in history, and the result is a profoundly ambivalent understanding of character.
IV. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER THREE

We have examined at length the two theologians, Newman and Robert Wilberforce, who demonstrate what I believe to be key components of Victorian Christology. They saw the problems in speaking of Christ's humanity as it acted. They used moral philosophy and literature indirectly, (as in the beginning of Wilberforce's work) to demonstrate what it meant to have a character. They take for granted the correlation of culture and theology, and seek to synthesize (Wilberforce) or transform (Newman) culture by theology. All the points made in chapter One are demonstrated in Chapter Three. Chapter One outlines the theoretical argument, Chapter Two gives the moral philosophy background, and Chapter Three unites it to Christology.

Chapter Three contrasts Newman and Wilberforce. In particular, the section on Newman shows how much Newman used the concept of character in epistemology, Scripture and the Christian life. Questions were raised about the compatibility of all his empirical arguments with the theological ones. Most of all, Newman demonstrates the subtle meaning of character. After one has surveyed the vast panorama of the divine economy, how does the inner workings of Christ's mind and will relate to this Providential plan of the Trinity as it redeems and "deifies" man? The answer is the meaning of character. It could perhaps be summarized as the perception by the whole person of the truth of the reality which confronts them. Their assimilation of that perception is what character means for Newman.

For Wilberforce, character emerges as the central support for the
mediation of Christ. Christ is far less tested by pain, suffering and dilemmas of action. He is the pattern man whom Christians are called to follow. Once again Wilberforce's approach raises questions. Most of all there are questions of coherence in the complex richness of his thought.

Chapter Three has demonstrated that Christology can be delineated in terms of moral philosophy. Who Christ is in the Gospels is a question of why he acts the way he does for Newman, but of how he perfects man's humanity for Wilberforce. Whether character for Christ and the Christian can mean the same thing is the all-important question. Certainly Newman and Wilberforce use the term character of Christ and the Christian. The survey has demonstrated the tensions involved in predicating the same term of two different realities, Christ and the Christian.

Finally, we look forward to Chapter Four. Two points must be made. First, morality need not be defined as Plato and Aristotle defined it, as did also the British Moralist school of the eighteenth century, including Butler. This defines morality as the cultivation of dispositions of character, virtues, and the good person. For Newman and Wilberforce, Biblical morality contextualized aspects of formal Greek moral philosophy. It took the formal questions of virtue and vice and placed them in the context of gift and call, grace and demand, and judgement and forgiveness. For the two theologians, the Christian remained under law after conversion. Conversion adhered in the law of Christ, which would result in final judgement after death. The Lutheran dichotomy of law/grace is opposed by Newman and Wilberforce. If
Biblical morality contextualized formal Greek ethics, moral philosophy conceptualized Christian morality. But what happens if there is a wholesale attack on morality as understood in the last two chapters? What are the consequences for Christology? What happens if the link between theology or Biblical ethics can no longer relate to moral philosophy because that whole moral philosophy tradition is under attack? This is a question with two aspects. Formally it pulls the rug out from under a formal conceptualization of Christ's humanity. Ethically, it destroys the understanding of Christian morality.

The second point to be made is that Newman and Wilberforce are placing the centre of their theology in the Incarnation. Hence we see how God acts now in Christians and the Church from the Incarnation, and the Atonement or the Resurrection. But again what happens if freedom, moral responsibility and integrity are simply denied? How does one speak of humanity if man has a determined character?

Chapter Four discusses the attack made by the eminent philosopher, J. S. Mill. He concentrated on two aspects, which are the two points made above. Should morality not be seen in terms of consequences and rules, not of moral virtue? (There were others who directly attacked Butler's standing, and he ceased to be read at Oxford as a set text). Secondly, Mill denied man was free. His integrity is the result of accepting this necessity. With this debate we move into Chapter Four.
"I saw that though our character is formed by circumstances, our own desires can do much to shape those circumstances; and that what is really inspiring and enabling in the doctrine of free will, is the conviction that we have real power over the formation of our character."

J. S. Mill  The System of Logic
CHAPTER 4

John Stuart Mill and The Determinism of Character.

1. Introduction. The Philosophical Radicals

2. John Stuart Mill
   (1) Inductivism
   (2) Determinism
   (3) The Attack on Christianity
   (4) Mill’s own view of character. On Liberty

3. Summary
Introduction: The Philosophical Radicals

The utilitarian and agnostic attack on Butler, Newman and Wilberforce was basically philosophical, not theological. Philosophically, the "Christian" argument has two main weaknesses. First, there is an unstated assumption of human freedom. But it is not made clear how human freedom is reconcilable with continuity of character over time. If freedom means that our actions now can be in principle quite different from an hour ago, how do we speak of moral disposition at all? The failure to spell out the relationship of necessity, freedom and continuity led to a counterargument by Mill. We shall trace several of Mill's arguments in Chapter Four, concerned with freewill and responsibility. The second weakness is that the growth of individual character is not related to society at all, nor is there any attempt to show how the social nature of mankind may require certain social structures if it is to be developed. (1). A Thomist Natural Law philosopher would not have made this mistake, and it is a fault of Newman and Butler that they gave so little concern to the relationship of man and society. Nor is there any attempt to evaluate morally the growth of social wellbeing against individual sanctification. Again, Mill relates individual character closely to the wellbeing of society.
Many writers have found it difficult to classify Mill. Some, like Cowling, have seen him as an intolerant social reformer. Others, like Urmson, see him as the first sophisticated utilitarian. Newman valued Mill's work on logic. I am concerned with him as one who reintroduces character into utilitarian thought. He is not an obvious theist, whatever the status of his final reflections on religion. He is still a determinist, concerned with society, but uniting this with character.

This chapter offers more than a narrative of Victorian intellectual history. Even if it did only that, it would have shown how the relationship of Christianity and culture was increasingly one where culture became emancipated from Victorian theology. Its deeper concern is to show that character has always to defend the metaphysical presuppositions of freewill, establish a frontier of hope, and yet be fully immersed in the tragedy of mankind, if it is to be a concept worthy of use in theology. The question of freewill brings in the freedom of divine grace. Freewill only makes sense if it is related to the sheer contingency of historical events, and their utter particularity. The concern of this chapter is to show a weakness in Newman's theory of character, and therefore a possible weakness in any modern Christian use of the concept. Newman defended freewill, but his failure to place character in a fully historically determined context meant that he never took the measure
of what the historicity of character implies. This is odd for a writer who worked out a seminal theory of development in doctrine, but the awareness of historical change is not the same as the awareness of being conditioned by one's time and place. It is this deeper awareness which was so important to the philosophical radicals, even if they resolved it into determinism. J. S. Mill inherits the work of the philosophical radicals, and his writing on character and determinism is an attempt by him to fashion their views into his own.

Chapter Four is thus the key chapter in this thesis. It is a thesis which describes the failure of theology (or a thesis of tragedy.) The unity of Butler, Newman and Wilberforce suggest for all their tensions, a new attempt to form a Christian anthropology, relating the humanity of Christ to the action and belief of the Christian. Their question is, "What does it mean to be human?". Yet their resolution of this point, however complex and contradictory it may be, is only the opening part of a dialectical movement. The antithesis lies in this chapter, Chapter Four. Is there a synthesis? The tragedy is that Liddon fails, for all his brilliance, to provide one. Anglican theology had to wait to 1889, the year of Lux Mundi, to provide one instead. By then the debate with theology had been won by the agnostics for many people.

The argument which we will present in this thesis may
be repeated to draw it out. Victorian Christology contained an implicit moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is not only about the meaning of terms such as "good", it is about their status in reality ("ontology") and it is also about how men act at all. Moral psychology is related to a philosophy of action. So the work of Bishop Butler, who died approximately eighty years before this thesis opens in 1830, governed the thought of Cardinal Newman and Robert Wilberforce on the question of how humanity in Christ acted, or how men acted today. Newman by his length of life, preserved Butler's influence until the 1870's, and indeed he defended Butler until he died in 1890. Dean R. W. Church defended Butler also, and was active until his death in 1875. But most theologians felt the real attack came with Mill in the 1840's and 1850's. Mill does not, on the whole, name his opponents, but the context of the debate makes it clear. The thesis thus could be entitled "The fortunes of Butler at the hands of theologians and philosophers", or "Nineteenth Century Theology's search for an anthropology on which to build its Christology".

Primarily, Mill introduced into the discussion on man a scientific objectivity grounded on an inductive philosophical method. (2). This we must explore first of all. The previous philosophers cited were not concerned primarily with inductivism for its own sake. Mill was, and he changed the whole style of argument in England. Secondly, we must show that character may be
a double-edged weapon for a theologian. Although Mill rejected outright determinism, yet he never denied how great was the constraint placed by circumstances on man. Hence his determinism was covert, but in fact it was as great. Character for Mill was only the development of what was pre-determined to develop anyway.

Was Mill sympathetic to the Christian doctrine of man? It seems very doubtful. Thirdly, it has not so far been stated in this thesis that there may be anything wrong with a religious determination of character per se. Mill full-bloodedly demonstrates the intolerance, bigotry and paradoxically the negative ethos of a religious concern with character at its worst. Somewhere in this thesis, the case for atheism or agnosticism should be put against a character modelled on Christ. Mill provides it with enormous passion. Even if Christianity is true, it ought not to be so, would be his claim.

More subtly, if character can provide a moral persuasion for the truth claims of Christianity, may it not also damage them irreparably? Finally, Mill explores a totally new development. In this fourth aspect of Mill's thought, we consider what an aesthetic consideration of character might mean. This treatment was extended in a far deeper way by G. E. Moore and Leslie Stephen's daughter, Virginia Woolf, but it remains true that Mill as a moral philosopher was one of the first to discuss the value of an "energetic character", a non-customary character, and of aesthetic appreciation of life. Mill at his death provides a major alternative to moral discipline,
holiness and self-denial. His work On Liberty is the most famous presentation of his argument.

These four points may be summarized as the establishment of Inductivism, the discussion of determinism, the passionate attack on religion when involved with character, and the presentation of an aesthetic character. Mill represents in this thesis the most sustained anti-Christian position, which, it must be said, Newman and Wilberforce did not meet directly. Newman relied on the presentation of Christ, and left his preaching to convince without refuting the opposition's case. Wilberforce died too young to encounter the force of Mill's arguments. Liddon, on the other hand, who is discussed at the end of this chapter, did try to rebut Mill's. Although he is deeply coherent and impressive, he essentially writes in a theological ghetto, where his only hearers are the faithful, even if many were young and able to be swayed for or against Christianity. Liddon must have converted few of Mill's adherents to the Christian faith. (The second appendix - of Bishop Talbot's memoirs - confirms this point in part).

We turn then to Mill's writings on inductivism.

Mill on Inductivism

Mill's system of logic developed his theory of language. All words are either names or else are words which have meaning only in a context. Thus Socrates is a name, but "of" is merely contextual. Names are connotative or non-connotative. Connotative names denote subjects
and imply attributes. White denotes white things and conveys the attribute of whiteness. Every proper name conveys no attribute, such as Socrates, but denotes people. Conversely the word whiteness denotes nothing, and conveys no attributes of an observed object. If all propositions convey names, (as Socrates is a man) with names being connotative, how do we find which propositions are true? True propositions are ones where the subject denoted and the complied attribute are grounded in verifiable phenomena.

Verifiably phenomena can be observed with regularity, thus placing them under laws. Given that we can know the totality of the causes of human nature, human nature is predictable. But all that "human nature"
means is the aggregate result of scientific observation. The properties of individual men combine to determine 'humanity'. Thus man suffers, is ignorant, and observes laws of predictable behaviour. Talk about Jesus is only hypothetical and tentative, since he is not available for measurement. Biblical criticism reveals for biblical historians how a clear historical record has been obscured by those who went beyond mankind's previous observations in the light of past evidence. Mill preferred Greek historiography to Biblical records. The humanity of Jesus is only a matter of inference, therefore.

Social laws are inferred from the components of the system, as with any entity. The components of the system are individual psychological histories. Although neurophysiology could not yet be fully established, nevertheless it would advance in time. What was known was that

"a volition is a moral effect which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical events follow their physical courses". (6)

Hartley's Observations on Man established associationist psychology, where ideas were thought to be the results of vibrations set up by sensation.

From psychology, Mill moved to the science of character, or ethology. These laws were hypothetical, affirming that x would happen if not counteracted. Ethological predictions had to be verified, to see if they could accord furthermore with previous psychological data. (7) Thus the character of Christ could have been established had records been kept of Christ's psychological history, and predictions made of
his likely behaviour, unless counteracted. We move in the direction of the lives of Jesus movement of the late nineteenth century, but it should be noted that Mill stresses the countervailing forces heavily, as well as the forces which made up character:

"Supposing any given set of circumstances, and then considering what, according to the laws of mind, will be the influence of those circumstances on the formation of character." (7) (b)

Mill hoped that the laws of character would be as simple as the laws of natural science. (8) Even if these laws were counteracted, by other variables, in their final result, yet it would be a great step forward to know these laws.

From knowledge of laws, phenomena could be influenced:

"There may be great power of influencing phenomena with a very imperfect knowledge of the causes by which they are in any given instance determined. ... The phenomena of society might not only be completely dependent on known causes, but the mode of action of those causes might be reducible to laws of considerable simplicity, and yet no two cases might admit of being treated in precisely the same manner." (9)

For Butler, all facts contained an implicit moral evaluation able to be seen by the true conscience. For Mill, all facts contain the possibility of implicit transformation able to be seen by the true social scientist. This section on Inductivism closes with the correlation of conceptuality and social engineering in two quotations which are self-explanatory:

"If the facts are rightly classed under the conceptions, it is because there is in the facts themselves, something of which the conception is itself a copy; and which if we cannot directly perceive, it is because of the limited
powers of our organs and not because the thing itself is not there."

"Ethology is the origin and source of all those qualities in human beings which are interesting to us, either as facts to be produced, to be avoided or merely to be understood; and the object is to determine, from the general laws of the mind, combined with the general position of our species in the universe, what actual or possible combinations of circumstances are capable of promoting or of preventing the production of these qualities ... And when ethology shall be thus prepared, practical education will be the mere transformation of those principles into a parallel system of precepts and the adaptation of these to the sum total of the individual circumstances which exist in each particular case." (10)

(2) **Mill on Determinism**

Mill opposed Fatalism, which denied the possibility of any change in the situation at all. However, Mill believed that few men were consistent fatalists. Rather men might act from wishes and choices which are determined entirely by characters, themselves formed by agencies we cannot alter.

"Our character having been made for us, and not by us, we are not responsible for it, nor for the actions it leads to, and shouts in fain attempt to alter them." (11)

This view Mill also opposed. We can change the ability of circumstances to influence us, by placing ourselves under other circumstances. So Mill can confidently say, "We are exactly as capable of making our own character if we will, as others are of making it for us." Causation is not the same as constraint. "When we say that human actions will take place of necessity, we only mean that they will certainly happen if nothing prevents."(12)
Mill thus is attempting to rebut determinism. Yet there are serious obstacles in his path. What of the language of blame? What future has moral worth, actions or agents? Lastly, how far is volition itself an unsought accompaniment in its contents of human life?

In one sense, the whole argument can be short-circuited. Since for a utilitarian, it is actions which have real value, and not agents, Mill need only be concerned about the future. He need not worry about the freedom or constraint which caused the past. Approval of actions is prospective, but there can even then be no definite rules. First, Mill feared the re-establishment of social tradition governing our behaviour if rules were allowed again. Secondly, Mill believed that rules broke down into exceptions: "Let us envelope our proposition with what exceptions and qualifications we may, fresh exceptions will turn up, and fresh qualifications be found necessary, the moment anyone attempts to act upon it." (13)

But Mill was concerned about responsibility, agents and volition. Let us consider each in turn. Responsibility is related to punishment. The threat of pain, or the memory of it, will force the reform of a character. Unpredictable behaviour under this threat is for Mill a sign of irresponsibility. However, certainty that one may be trusted in a situation establishes integrity. Certainty that one can be trusted is brought about by the power of prediction. Since freedom is intrinsically related to responsibility, the necessity that establishes predictability enhances its correlate, freedom:

"Given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of
the individual, the manner in which we will act may be unerringly inferred ... if we know the individual thoroughly, and know all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event... We do not feel the less free because those to whom we are intimately known are well assured how we shall will to act in a particular case. We often, on the contrary, regard the doubt what our conduct will be as a mask of ignorance of our character and sometimes even resent it as an imputation."(14)

If this is a correct argument, the language of blame could be abandoned. But Mill did not wish to do this, even though the implications for an attack on Christianity would have been considerable. Furthermore, it is not clear how the concept of blame influences the future in a utilitarian concept of moral action.

Mill made sense of the concept of blame by associationism. We resent what will harm us, and socially we combine to express our resentment. This disapproval is felt by the recipient as a deterrent, and often internalized. We fear the cause of being resented, or disapproved of, since we transfer the fear of resentment to its cause, which need not be those who resent (as Butler argued in the Sermons) but the object which provoked resentment, which is our harmful action. Without justification, Mill equates dread of what will produce resentment, with feeling guilty about an action. Another of Mill's arguments is that blame and responsibility can for a utilitarian preserve law and order. This is an indirect answer to the role that blame could play in a utilitarian world. By threatening people, we change their actions, and we do this by punishing them, giving reasons why they deserve punishment, which is blame. Yet it is not an argument which morally justifies blame, but only establishes its
social effectiveness. Nor does our feeling that we are guilty of past actions establish that we feel we ought to feel guilty. Later theologians in the nineteenth century, such as R.C. Moberly in *Atonement and Personality*, were concerned with our justified feelings of guilt and penitence. Mill's arguments never get beyond feeling pain oneself at one's actions, rather than feeling one ought to feel pain. The moral ought is ignored.

We move then to volition. If one does not want to change, Mill admits we will not be able to. Yet can we "want to want to change," as Augustine discussed in his *Confessions*? Mill argues that we do not control our volitions. Volition is a state of mind:

"A volition is not an efficient but a physical cause. Our will causes our bodily actions in the same sense, and in no other, in which cold causes ice or a spark causes an explosion of gunpowder. The volition, a state of our mind, is the antecedent, the motion of our limbs in conformity to the volition is the consequence." (15)

This is an argument after the event. The Christian claim that sanctification raises the mind to think upon God is countered by Mill with the claim that grace is no such perfecting agency. Volition is a mystery, and can only be influenced after it has occurred for the correct action by the power of sanctions. Thus Mill opposed Butler's successors. Mill felt one could predict actions because of the power of sanctions, but not the volitions they affected. Christians felt that one might after conversion think more of good, but since the evil thought could not be eliminated, and free will was a mystery, one could never predict anyone's future actions for the combination of thoughts into action was quite unpredictable. Newman held that there was hope
of eternal life for any man until his death, and that one was never
saved until death, since one could fall away at the last. At
Gethsemane, Newman saw Christ filled with evil like pollution in his
inner being and even mind, and yet by grace Christ could will good
thoughts, and deliberate upon them, finally accomplishing the obedience
of the cross. Much though Newman appreciated the System of Logic,
he ignored Mill's denial of free will, which is what it was. Mill
denied we had power to produce volition:

"I am wholly ignorant of possessing any such power.
I can indeed influence my volitions, but only as other
people can influence my volitions, by the employment
of appropriate means. Direct power over my volitions
I have none." (16)

Newman's originality lay in his empiricist epistemology. Ethically,
he followed Butler, even if Butler would certainly have failed to concur
with Newman's equation of conscience with Papal Infallibility in the
1874 Letter to the Duke of Norfolk.

The conclusion is that Mill thought he had free will, a theme
with which we will introduce the fourth section of this discussion of
Mill. Yet fairness is not a word Mill uses very often. Guilt and
responsibility are ignored ultimately. It does not seem that Mill
moved away from Determinism.

(3) The Attack on Christianity

Before we move to an exposition of Mill's creative thought, we
must survey his attack on Christianity. There is great irony in the
fact that from 1870 theology was forced to discuss character because the agnostic Mill had made the term so prominent on his terms, whereas before then theology had used the concept as a valuable heritage from Butler's philosophy. The irony was profound. Before 1840, Christians appreciated character against the godless concern with social change of the utilitarians. After 1870, Christianity in England was forced, especially in Anglicanism, to rebut the agnostic use of character.

It may be pointed out now that much of Victorian concern with tragedy, as was also true of Greek tragedy, stems from the idea of the corruption of the good. The fatal flaw made by the hero is not relevant to the use of "character" by theology; but the idea of "reversal" is. The irony of tragic reversal is deeply appropriate to the way theologians took up the concept of "character", only to see it turned by their agnostic opponents into a weapon against the truth of Christianity. If Christianity was scientifically discredited by Darwin, in short, it was equally regarded as immoral by Mill.

Again, we must set out Mill's argument schematically, before tracing it in detail. Mill considers the capacity of a belief to enter into conflict. Conflict, as Liddon also noted, strengthens beliefs and characters. But the most controversial beliefs are sectarian religious ones. This is not the same as New Testament Christianity. Even this is reliant on Judaistic or Greek ethical thought. So what should be done with religion? Mill gives two answers. First, Christianity should now presuppose utilitarian morality, as the New Testament relied on Greek morality. Secondly, the spirit of religion which inspires morality should turn from negative self-denial to
positive appreciation of life. With this, we will be in a position to enter the final section on Mill, his positive enunciation of aesthetic and moral character.

There are three aspects to this section on Mill. First we discuss the nature of belief in relation to character. Secondly, we will discuss sectarian Christianity in relation to the New Testament, and its history in relation to its background. Thirdly, we will consider Mill's denunciation of the objectivity of conscience in religion, his belief in utilitarianism, and positive values.

First, Mill's views on belief are not here concerned with its relation to knowledge or right opinion. Rather he believed that all beliefs can become unthinking orthodoxies. This was an evil, insofar as man did not know the reason for belief. Gradually the belief itself atrophies, and "the words which convey it cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate". But the more controversial a belief, the more strongly will it be held, and the more fully will it be discussed by its adherents. Such belief has a deep effect on character. Yet Christianity no longer is held in this way:

"To what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs without ever being realised in the imagination, the feelings or the understanding is exemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the doctrines of Christianity." (18)

Christians no longer test their conduct by the maxims of the New Testament. The level of belief is not sufficient to move the believer to action. Yet, as we shall see in the crucial last section on Mill,
character was built by education and external sanction. Religion was potentially a very powerful sanction.

Mill's views on sectarianism, secondly, grow out of this. Christian morality has always presupposed some other code; but by the Middle Ages this social morality on which Christianity rested as a code for the ordinary man was itself the creation of theologians. Christ did not intend to provide a complete moral code, and the attempt to provide such a code theologically independently of the surrounding cultural development was a mistake. This morality was negative and passive, far too governed by rewards and threats, of heaven and hell. But this medieval ethical code was preferable to the Reformation which succeeded it. This has now taken the dominant position in Christianity, precisely because individual beliefs are so controversial.

"Even with the strictly religious, who are much in earnest about their doctrines, and attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in general, it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively active in their minds is that which was made by Calvin or Knox, or some such person much nearer in character to themselves. The sayings of Christ co-exist passively in their minds producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland." (20)

Thirdly, what should religion attempt to do now ethically? It should abandon its pretence to objectivity. Next, it should become utilitarian. Finally, it should become positive. Conscience is neither objective nor infallible, against Butler. It is "a subjective feeling in our minds" produced by internalizing others' resentments on oneself. This is 'the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality' (23)
Finally religion must abandon self-denial. Social obligation is ignored by Christian ethics, and indeed much Victorian morality that was beneficial stemmed from the Renaissance. The current sense of honour and dignity is an example. European civilization was renewed by the continued influence of the Renaissance. The basis of a theistic moral code should not be obedience to divine will but aspiration to our conception of Divine Goodness. The present moral code produces "a low, abject, senile type of character". Although Mill's criticisms were resented, it may be noted that the ethical thought of later theology such as Lux Mundi represents a shift in this direction. This section closes with a contrast of Calvinism and "pagan self-assertion". It leads into the final section on Mill's positive views. Mill felt that self-government was a good Christian ideal, held also by Platonism, but it had turned into self-repression:

"If it be any part of religion to believe that man was made by a good Being, it is more consistent with that faith to believe that this Being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed, and that he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to the ideal conception embodied in them, every increase in any of their capacities of comprehension, of action and of enjoyment." (25)

(4) **Mill's Own View of Character**

Mill developed finally a coherent view of character. He was concerned with three aspects. First, how did one educate youth into achieving character? Secondly, what was the nature of character so achieved? Thirdly, how did it govern itself, once it was established?
The Utilitarian morality of action has changed to a direct study of moral life, based on reflection upon experience and literature. The imagination is esteemed, and the scientific inductivism Mill had established is allied to personal intuition and explanation. It is empirical, but inwardly so. Analytical philosophy was manipulative, as Mill felt his father had educated him into a desire for social improvement. Rather "will is the child of desire". Desire here is desire for oneself.

"I saw that though our character is formed by circumstances, our own desires can do much to shape those circumstances; and that what is really inspiring and enabling in the doctrine of free will, is the conviction that we have real power over the formation of our own character; that our will, by influencing some of our own circumstances, can modify our future habits or capabilities of willing." (26)

How then is the education of character achieved? Will is, in the singular, for Mill the permanent character of the self. Following Locke and Butler, Mill holds that will is not volition. It is not only a state of mind. Nor is it simply the desire which makes me act. It is, as Locke said, a causal disposition, or a power of the self. Men may have many such conflicting dispositions. It comes to mean in British empiricism the permanent character of man. Mill describes will as character's "active phenomenon". At first, for Mill, will is a habitual expression of desire. As fixity of purpose deepens, however, will acts against desires. This might be from habit, from a long term pleasure found in the object, or from a sense of duty. Mill uses the word character to describe this overcoming of desire.
Education thus is a key term for Mill. Mill may be contrasted with Newman here, and indeed serves as a counterbalance to Anglican theology on character. Newman believed that "beyond the world", there lay "the devil, who is sitting in ambush behind it". Mill did not accept this view of man as a moral battleground. Rather children must have their will resisted, and so learn to appreciate the limits of desire. Once this is achieved man can grow as a character.

Both Newman and Mill see a place for punishment. Newman calls Butler "the great master of this doctrine". Newman sees vicarious punishment as part of the development of character, as God has a providential order. Human character is established in relation to this order. Both providential order and social structure are built on spiritual principles. God intervenes constantly in the world to uphold these principles. Thus vicarious punishment is, via providential order and society, very much a part of character and daily life. Again Butler is quoted. Men daily satisfy the claims of justice towards someone else in their own person. Parents suffer for their children, and wives for their husbands. "Vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of everyday's experience" writes Newman quoting Butler. Butler writes:

"The world's being under the righteous government of God does indeed imply that finally and upon the whole, every one shall receive according to his personal deserts; and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine government. But during the progress, and, for aught we know, even in order to the completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and absolutely necessary."
The idea that vicarious punishment is related to society, which is based itself on a vicarious principle, outlasts the influence of Butler's own works. Later theologians such as Moberly in 1900 in *Atonement and Personality* will reapply the idea to Christ, the perfect penitent.

Mill, however, believes that punishment is very limited. There are two reasons why this is so. Punishment violated the self-government of men. This is the third of Mill's three aspects of character which we discuss in this section, and we will return to it. Secondly, punishment only checks the onrush of human desire. It has no positive value. One might add, in parenthesis, that Mill would also have agreed with D.F. Strauss, who wrote in Socinian vein that "a moral debt, however, if it is not expiated by the one who has incurred it, is not expiated at all".

The relationship of substitutionary atonement theories to Christology takes us too far from our theme (30) It is relevant, however, in that moral philosophy is concerned with the concepts of morally vicarious and substitutive punishment, as ways of establishing character. My concern here is to show that Mill wishes to achieve character by a process of character building. He does not make any sense of a view in which men suffer punishments for one another, and so vindicate the moral order, on which character depends. To put it bluntly, character may be evolved as a response to another's vicarious action on one's behalf. Alternatively, this may be rubbish, and character built on the strengthening of exemplary ideals. Newman takes the former view, Mill the latter.
Mill analyses character into artificial and natural habits. Duty is artificial as an experience, sympathy is not. The argument follows Hume. Punishment checks natural habits, which are antisocial affections. "Young children have affections, but not moral feelings; and children whose will is never resisted, never acquire them." Punishment checks affections. It is not fair, it is useful (or utilitarian, of course). But it must be supplemented by building ideals. Ideals are found in actions or rules of action. They are moral examples, or ideals, if they have a good influence, and can be grafted in by education upon a person.

"The long duration of a belief ... is at least proof of an adaptation in it to some portion or other of the human mind." (31 a)

"An essential part of the morality or immorality of an action or a rule of action, consists in its influence upon the agents own mind. Many actions, moreover, produce effects upon the character of other persons besides the agent." (31 b)

While Newman would agree to this, he would not feel it was the sole truth of education. Mill felt that it was. If one desires money and also desires not to have this desire, natural emotions can be used to strengthen this wish to be free from desire of money. Mill thus denies any inherent worth in moral passion. What matters is how this moral passion strengthens or weakens one's character.

Poetry was important for Mill. Mill found in Wordsworth, as did Newman, an important stimulus. Again Mill and Newman disagree strongly on why Wordsworth was important. For Newman, Wordsworth pointed to the intimations of spiritual reality. The imaginative power can be
defined as the ability to evoke invisible truth from the material world. Poetic creation is one such process. Yet Newman repudiates Wordsworth ultimately. The point is crucial in understanding the difference between Mill and Newman on character.

Newman saw as he grew older that "the Word" was not literature. The Inspired Word

"is no picture of life, but an anticipation of death and judgement. Human literature is about all things, grave or gay, painful or pleasant, but the Inspired Word views them only in one aspect and as they tend to one scope". (33)

Indeed, Wordsworth's delight in the minds of children is contrasted with the future delight of heaven. For Newman, character was realised as men acted. He was indwelt by the Word, and in action man was formed into a particular character. There is a dynamic understanding of discipline at work. Literature pleases man, but Scripture moulds him. For Mill, man is a vast series of human feelings. Literature strengthens man. Literature is moral and aesthetic and the two combine to help human development. Mill persuades man to be better, and his heroes are the fruit of much reflection and thought. They are educated, liberal idealists. Newman felt life was for action, "sub specie aeternitatis."

Mill thus quotes Wordsworth:

"feelings too of unremembered pleasure: such perhaps, As have no slight or trivial influence On that best portion of a good man's life ..."(34)

These feelings aid the development of character:
"So feeling comes in aid
Of feeling, and diversity of strength
Attends us, if but once we have been strong".

Moral character is thus only unified by education. For Butler, character is united by man's conscience. Mill can sound like Butler when he writes that "The maintenance of a sure balance among the faculties now seemed to me of primary importance". But Mill can also feel that this balance is purely artificial. Character is an artificial construction, made by men. A "dutiful character" is purely artificial. Hence man could experiment with a variety of character formations: "There is no reason that all human existence should be construed on some one or some small number of patterns". Mill was prepared to construct a scheme to measure organic desires and pleasures. Yet psychology and the study of character, ethology, is not compatible with Mill's Wordsworthian appreciation of poetry.

Mill is found wanting on this point by many modern commentators. Mill develops associationist psychology and the rationalism of Butler's day. He goes beyond it to the

"still, sad music of humanity"

He develops character in a world where there is no God and no ultimate free will. There is instead a highly-developed philosophy. This justifies inductive reasoning from experience, and the work of the sociologist. The educationalist is meant to work with Mill's philosophy to produce a better character. Punishment is excluded, and vicarious suffering ignored. Inner, spiritual meanings of life are also problematic. But this contrast with Newman, Wilberforce and
Butler breaks when it comes to its resolution. How, or why, does an aesthetic, poetic character justify itself as either superior to the religious person, and how does it come at the end of such a strictly, scientific argument?

I have argued in Chapter Three that Newman and Wilberforce cannot combine English moral philosophy of the eighteenth century with Alexandrian Christology. Tensions break out as Christ's character is also the presence of the omniscient and impersonal Word. For Mill the impersonal nature of science, with its thorough development of man's faculties in education, takes a view of man at variance with Romanticism: exaltation of the innate personality in man. Science develops Eighteenth century rationalism to the limit. But poetry is a way of altering that development of rationalism. Will character for Mill be scientifically educated, or poetically evoked? Two different models are at work. In Mill, as in the theologians, the term "character" conceals profound methodological weaknesses. Mill unites character as determined by rationalist, Eighteenth century theory with Victorian Romanticism. Newman united character with patristic theology. For both the unity was a strain.

It remains to say a little of Mill's description of an aesthetic character. Mill believed that character should be developed by making (35) choices. There are other desirable qualities than virtue, after all. The "beauties of character" have been undervalued by utilitarian theorists. Artistic perception is required to appreciate an aesthetic character. Pagan self-assertion is a virtue in its own right. Such a character has "energy". Butler believed that a character built
up by proportion could be governed by a proportion in society. A belief in order without man enhanced order within man. Hence liturgy and church order were not adiaphora but necessary ways of governing man. Mill rejected the whole concept. Mill felt man could govern himself. "Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced: when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to co-exist with them remain weak and inactive. It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill, it is because their consciences are weak." Strong feelings for Mill are "but another name for energy". The best use of man is always found in an energetic nature. Strong impulses can often be governed by strong consciences for a conscience is a moral impulse. It is not clear how Mill distinguishes moral impulses from others, except by the answer that a moral impulse has to be educated to judge actions. Strong impulses also lead to the most "cultivated feelings". So sensibility, self-control, love of virtue and strength of feelings are all found together. Mill concludes his argument, "A person whose desire and impulses are his own - are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture - is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character."

The alternative to this view Mill believed lay all around him (36). All that could be done was to fight against it. "To be held by rigid
rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may undo itself in resisting the restraint." In 1842 Sterling noted that Mill had turned away from politics to the reform of individual character. As Mill wrote in that year, "It is becoming more and more evident to me that the mental regeneration of Europe must precede its social regeneration". By his writings and his personal fame Mill became a prophet of individualism to many who would once have read Butler. The older moral philosophy that inspired Newman was waning.

Much of Mill's arguments for a true development of character are found in On Liberty, a work we have already cited several times. Mill saw the future development of human character as being of cardinal importance. We have already contrasted Mill's inductive method in knowing with the reliance on dogmatic propositions found in the Tractarians. Mill argued from evidence, and proportioned his assessment to the degree of probability of the evidence. Jesus of Nazareth did not have evidence presented in the Gospels on his behalf which would justify the ascription of divinity to him.

A further component of Mill's theory of knowledge was that in science repeated experiments could serve to verify
a scientific theory. The true scientist for Mill attended to empirical evidence, argued inductively and repeated his experiments. Mill, as we have seen, would not accept religious claims unless there was evidence to prove the divinity of Jesus. Mill also used the experimental method when he discussed the implications of belief in everyday living. Mill argued in On Liberty that "as it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so it is that there should be experiments in living". (37)

Mill appears to accept that real experiments can take place in styles of living. However it is not clear how Mill felt that the observer could detach himself from his experiments so that his reactions ceased to affect his view of other experiments. It is also at this point however, that experiments in living may prove irreversible. In Butler's Sermons on self-deceit, and on the love of our neighbour, there is a strong argument that once we bind ourselves by ways of behaviour, we cannot break free very easily. It is true that society may be able to have insight into the values of different styles of life if widespread social divergences occur. This is true of our own society, but social pluralism is not accurately described as "experiments in living".

Mill's belief in liberty is very deep. However, it is certainly possible to notice that there is a repeated acceptance of the value of coercion in moral education.
Moral education for children can develop a sense of obligation and justice. "To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others as their object." However, this quotation is only a "caveat" against too fullscale an acceptance of Mill's views on the worth of liberty. Nonetheless his belief in self-determination was very marked. Mill did not simply mean by liberty freedom from interference, for liberty had intrinsic value for Mill, and there is for Mill no intrinsic value in letting a man trust in a bridge he does not know to be unsound. The value of negative liberty for Mill was because it made certain goods possible such as the development of new forms of character, or because it secures for its possessor the absence of certain evils. Mill could also mean by liberty the pursuit of one's good and the development of oneself. "Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual".

This thesis is not concerned with the critics of Mill's views, on the limits of government's interference, or on the distinction between self and other regarding actions. It is concerned to bring out Mill's desire to encourage experiments in living, and to allow each person the freedom to determine his own destiny. However liberty did not entail indifference to character. Any character was open to persuasion, and no one had the
right to complain of the persuasion of opinion unless
his social conduct was "specially excellent". Yet conduct
which could be criticized was not conduct which was
morally wrong.

The final point then which we must make on Mill's theory
of character is to point out that virtue was a matter
of opinion. The words moral and immoral cannot be applied
correctly to self-regarding conduct. Self-regarding
faults are "not properly immoralities, and to whatever
pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness".\(^{(41)}\)

Only when one breaks one's duties to others is
one an object of moral censure. It is true that there
are immoral dispositions, such as malice or envy, and they
constitute "a bad and odious moral character".\(^{(42)}\)

But these dispositions are immoral because they involve
antisocial behaviour to others as the consequence of such
dispositions. Thus it was quite possible to try to per­
suade people to accept one's own view of a good character,
but it remained only an opinion.

In terms of Tractarian theology, or indeed of Butler,
Mill is a complete opponent. He respects as meaningless
the idea of growth in moral and spiritual excellence when
applied to a self-regarding character, and he praised
experiments in living. He denied that self-regarding
faults were immoral, and he returned again and again to
the constraints on humanity. Character is an artificial
construction made by men, and yet it is the most valuable
thing a man can devote himself to. His searching analysis of human self-development shows that he was the most profound Victorian sceptic's presented in the period covered by this thesis. On Liberty remains today a cardinal document in the search for tolerance and social pluralism. But it is not the way of moral growth, in the sense that Butler and Newman would have argued that an objective morality applied to self-regarding character as much as to other-regarding character and actions.

What then, do we make of Mill? He represents an entirely different account of character. He is concerned with the laws of the universe. Newman attacked such men as deceiving themselves. Knowledge through intellect is not virtue. Mill felt man was entirely an individualist. E. H. Carr feels that this individualism was characteristic of Victorian liberalism, and instances Burckhardt's Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy as a comparable European work. Yet it was always opposed by other thinkers as is shown when Acton wrote in 1863 in The Home and Foreign Review that "nothing causes more error or unfairness than the interest which is inspired by individual characters". Newman was also strongly an individualist. Religion he considered a battlefield, which "is the heart of the individual". But he opposed Mill because Newman's individual was caught between the Church and Satan. For Acton, as for He- el, individuals express the will of their age. There are hints of this in Wilberforce. Mill thus represents for this thesis the com-
plete antithesis of Newman in his stress on education, determinism, science and agnosticism. Methodologically, his view of character is quite alien to Newman. Yet I have tried to show Mill's weaknesses also. In their individualism, Mill and Newman are deceptively united; in fact, they are polar opposites.
This thesis is concerned with the interrelationship of Christology and moral philosophy which presents in new ways Christian anthropology, or what we have called "the character of Christ". John Stuart Mill was an agnostic, who was interested in the character of the individual, especially the character of genius. Yet we will find in the next chapter that this agnostic writer altered the debate on anthropology for theologians. His recognition of man's social nature, which is both a threat to individualism and yet the environment he must grow in, is taken up by Liddon, Seeley and others.

Mill also presents an alternative to Newman. Although it is true that Mill and Newman are interested in the springs of character, nonetheless, Mill's method and conclusions are deeply at variance with Tractarianism. His method is inductive, relying only on the weight of historical evidence, and then moving to speculation on social laws which can form character. Out of this speculation Mill hoped to influence the formation of character for his own say. The view of Mill's does not give men the absolute freedom to decide his destiny which Newman held was important. Nor can it make sense of Butler's concern with moral feelings, irrespective of their effect on events. The chapter thus studies in detail what is meant by Mill when he combines interest
in the concept of character with a redefinition of Butler's view of blame and responsibility. Hill's study of volition, or the state of one's mind prior to action, is also considered. Hill argued that volitions were able to be determined by sanctions so that the right action can be produced.

Hill's view of character as energetic and as closely related to the beliefs held by a man concludes the chapter. There are then two sections to the chapter on Mill. The first section discusses how characters can be known, influenced and placed in a context of free will for moral action. The second section moves on to the content of what character is. This involves consideration of what importance religious beliefs might be for the character which held them. Character building, education and artistic perception all combine to build Mill's ideal character. The chapter finishes with a discussion of On Liberty as the essence of Mill's defence of character.

What is the relevance of a chapter on Mill in a thesis concerned with theological anthropology? The answer is that he highlights the way in which man is a social animal, endowed with aesthetic sensibility. These elements of character grow in importance until by 1900 the school which wrote Lux Mundi will take them for granted. The image of God includes man's relationship to his fellow men and his appreciation of beauty.
Secondly, Mill is relevant because he raises serious metaphysical issues of free will, determinism and the meaning of vicarious action in punishment. Man for Mill is limited in what he can do. He does not have complete free will nor can vicarious action by others elicit the moral response. Mill desires. Finally, Mill distinguishes between what is natural and artificial, amoral and moral in human virtues. Much more could have been written on this point. Mill denies that the process of the inner development of one's feelings is of moral value, although it is of great importance to the individual. Moral value can only be ascribed to what affects someone else. Yet Mill claimed that there was a unique spiritual value in human creativity, which must be recognized as requiring true liberty to sustain its growth. The next chapter turns to the varying answers which theologians gave to Mill's criticisms of religious belief in relationship to character, and to their vain attempts to vindicate free will and responsibility in a way which rehabilitated the tradition which stemmed from Butler.
Character is that whereby the individual is marked off from the prescribed standard or level of typical manhood. Yet the closest analysis of the actual Human Life of Jesus reveals a moral portrait not only unlike any that men have witnessed before or since, but especially remarkable in that it presents an equally balanced and entirely harmonious representation of all the normal elements of our perfected moral nature.

H.P. Liddon,
The Divinity of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ
CHAPTER 5

THE CHARACTER OF CHRIST

1. Introduction
2. John Seeley's Ecce Homo
3. Reactions to Seeley; Newman on Ecce Homo
4. H.P. Liddon
   (i) Introduction
   (ii) The 1866 Bamptons
   (iii) The Character of Christ
   (iv) The Knowledge of Christ
   (v) The Obedience and Work of Christ
   (vi) The Presence and Example of Christ
   (vii) Summary
5. Summary
CHAPTER 5.

THE CHARACTER OF CHRIST

I. INTRODUCTION

Chapter Five examines two theologians. One was an amateur, non-dogmatic, popular writer, J.R. Seeley. The other was highly professional, erudite and astringent, H.P. Liddon. Both wrote on the character of Christ, and sold in huge numbers. J.R. Seeley was heavily criticized for his lack of competence, so we include a section on the reactions to Seeley. Liddon's scholarship was faultless, so he stands as the end of this thesis. In him the mid-Victorian concern with character comes to a climax.

Seeley wrote on the relationship of character to national life. He answers the criticisms of Chapter Four, by relating man and society. He also reveals in his disastrous ending the problem of evil for any theory of character which Chapter Four raised. Seeley avoided this question by rhetoric.

Liddon's work is more skilful. The complexity of his work is intense. He interweaves biblical exegesis, epistemology, character and soteriology. Evil is defeated by the sinlessness of Christ. Physical evil is however ignored by Liddon. Liddon shows how Anglican theology has now developed its own epistemology, which is a variant of the Roman Catholic position. It also has its own understanding of the place of
the Church in society. But the problem is that Liddon no longer wishes to form an alliance with moral philosophy, or indeed with non-theological disciplines. He drives theology into a ghetto from which later theologians would find it hard to return.

Liddon spent his life trying to prevent them doing this.

II. JOHN SEELEY'S ECCE HOMO

Seeley's work Ecce Homo is included here for two reasons. Primarily his work is representative of a nondogmatic concern (in the technical sense) with theology and morality, and hence the appreciation of character as exemplarist is paramount. Secondly, however, Seeley ought to be included in a survey as wide as this, because one of the strands of Victorian theology not considered so far, which clearly has links with Butler is the "Broad Church Tradition". Coleridge knew the eighteenth century moralists well and their concern with conscience. From Coleridge's On the Constitution of the Church and State according to the Idea of Each (1830), and other theological writings, many links can be traced. John Coulson has elucidated the references in Newman's Autobiography, the Apologia pro Vita Sua (1860) in his Newman and the Common Tradition. F.D. Maurice was influenced by Coleridge greatly and through Coleridge came to lecture on moral philosophy, conscience and Butler at Cambridge. These lectures were published as The Conscience (1868). A third influence of Coleridge was on the Liberal Anglicans, whom we have mentioned in their criticism of David Hume, among them Henry Milman, who wrote on character in his 1827 Bampton Lectures, The Character and Conduct of the Apostles considered as an Evidence of
Christianity (1827), and Connop Thirlwall. But a further and fourth relationship with Coleridge was the identification of religion and social morality found in some of the Liberal Anglicans, such as Thomas Arnold's *Principles of Church Reform* (1833). This relationship was not the complex dialectic of religion and morality found in Newman, nor the importance of conscience found in Maurice, nor yet again the historical sense of character found in Milman. It was instead (and Seeley, Matthew Arnold and Stanley are prominent here) concerned to stress that religion was open to every citizen of a Christian country and it believed that by engaging in the expression of social institutions, man could be made moral and Christian. (A similar identification of morality and social institutions can be found throughout Europe at this time, such as in the historians and politicians Guizot and Taine in France.)

Character was as much part of national life as it was for Leslie Stephen. What sort of person a national leader was mattered greatly to them both. The organic society expressed itself through the union of Church and State for Seeley, but not for the agnostic Stephen. Such a union could act as a point of mediation between the new, popular culture and the older benefits of a traditional culture. A National Church could express the beliefs of a country. Such a church had to have national leaders, who found their example in the outlines of character presented in Seeley's *Ecce Homo*.

Religion on this theory is not private, but an expression of nationalism. Supernatural religion is harmful and too interior. True religion is based on civic pride and Christianity. Seeley wrote in
Essays on Church Policy:

"The clergy should draw largely upon English history and biography for illustrations of their moral teaching. Carlyle has said that every nation's true Bible is its history. If the Hebrew history be a cosmopolitan Bible, or rather the first part of one, I think there should be national Bibles also, and I can imagine no more proper and nobler task for a clergy than the perpetual elaborating of such a national monument." (1)

There is a close relationship between the consecration of the images of our ancestors and our own salvation by the purification of moral character. Seeley's answer to determinism is not to deny its case, but to move outwards to the wider context of the setting of character in national destiny. Christianity had once lifted humanity out of submission to fate, but now a new national region must be found, building on Jesus of Nazareth. Seeley wished to unite traditional Christianity with national self-reflection upon a nation's past.

"However many mistakes might be made in the estimate of character, however many false idols set up, however much exaggerated declamation achieved, however often the torch of history might be warped to gain a moral, the continual application of a large number of minds to the work of sifting our history for the purpose of preserving in memory whatever in it was memorable, would I believe, result in nothing less than this (national monument) ... in the end there would spring up an idealized history, which would become familiar to every imagination and give a new sureness and continuousness to the progress of the national mind, and a new elevation to individual character." (2)

In fact, Seeley detected a decline in national character, which he typified as masculine, unsentimental, individualist, and unloquacious. Whatever the prejudices revealed in such preferences, Seeley is making a particular point which is that individual self-determination is to be taken as the norm, but this is no longer possible, due to the decline of
the wider context, patriotism. Seeley quotes Coleridge's dictum 
"Cosmopolitanism is not possible but by antecedence of patriotism".(3)

Seeley's Ecce Homo was thus not a theological work in its own right; it linked theology and politics in what was essentially a moral stance. But it placed the character of Christ at the centre of his thought. "The Baptist's opinion of Christ's character then is summed up for us in the title he gave him, the Lamb of God taking away the sins of the world." The Baptist was no such lamb, for the term stands for a eudamonistic conception of inner serenity not possessed by the Baptist.(4) The security is given from a sense of the protection of the Father, and from this security there comes a great confidence.

Confident serenity is used to winnow national failure. The sifting of the nation to make of it a fit partner for Almighty God was Seeley's view of Christ's work.(5) "Christ's work ... consisted in collecting all the better spirits of the nation, and bringing them under that revised covenant which we call Christianity, and which survived and diffused itself after the fall of the Temple." Seeley saw Christ as the 'true Israel', the fulfilment of the Old Testament holy nation.

Before going further into Ecce Homo, it is worth summarizing the argument. Determinism can be refuted by the wider context of self-determination, which is national culture. Christ and the religion he founded can purify such a culture, but culture also has always needed reform by reflection on its past. Seeley believes that he is only making explicit historically what has always in fact been the case, and his theological reflections on Christ and his historical accounts of
English nationalism that made him a professional historian go hand in hand. It is with the particular Christological reflection that we are concerned here.

Jesus' plan was simple. The decline of Israelite theocracy in the Jewish nation into ruin could be reversed. Jesus wished to restore the old title of King, and give it a wholly spiritual and universal meaning. He would be the spiritual king of a divine society, built on belief in God and benevolence towards men. With astonishing success, Jesus built this "divine society".

"No other career ever had so much unity; no other biography is so simple or can so well afford to disperse with details. Men in general take up scheme after scheme ... and therefore most biographies are compelled to pass from one subject to another ... But Christ found one plan and executed it: no important change took place in his mode of thinking, speaking or acting; at least the evidence does not enable us to trace any such change."

Jesus' simplicity of version was marked with great composure and inner peace. He was accepted by many for his personality or character (the words are synonymous here) was unique.

"It is not more certain that Christ presented himself to men as the founder, legislator and judge of a divine society than it is certain that men have accepted him in these characters, that the divine society has been founded, that it has lasted nearly two thousand years, that it has extended over a large and the most highly civilized portion of the earth's surface, and that it continues full of vigour at the present
Christian civilization then was Jesus' intention. Christianity and culture are synonymous, to use Niebuhr's typology of the relationship of Christianity to culture. Jesus appealed to the heart, not to the head. Jesus' appeal sprang from "the enthusiasm of humanity" and this moral and spiritual benevolence was contagious. Hence, "the personality of Christ" was the key to Seeley's thought. It was the personality of Christ exciting a veneration and worship which effaced in the minds of his followers their hereditary and habitual worships.

But out of this appeal there came the religious establishment of moral laws. Written on the heart, these were three in number. The law of philanthropy required provision for material need of all men. The law of edification was in two parts, the law of mercy to the neglected, and the law of resentment, causing criticism of the proud and immoral. Thirdly the law of forgiveness defined the law of a Christian's life. These moral laws reformed the remnant of Israel, which spread across the world.

Seeley was very careful. He wrote anonymously, and must have enjoyed speculation that the author was Newman. Ecce Homo did not deny Christ's divinity, and spoke of the actions of Jesus as coming from one who "considered heaven and hell to be in his hand". He was unique; "it was the will of God to beget no second son like him". Jesus could judge the deed, the motive, the temptation and all forms of ignorance. Nor could miracles be denied. To do so was to destroy the credibility of the documents. Yet Seeley did not affirm Christ's
divinity either, nor even mention resurrection, second coming or atonement.

Between the self-devotion of Christ (Seeley uses the terms Jesus and Christ interchangeably) and the Christian certain relations can be traced. The example of Christ plunges us into society. (12)

"He expects us to merge our private interests, absolutely in those of this society ... Christ does not regard the society as new, but rather as one which had subsisted from the beginning in the Maker's plan, but had been broken up through the jealousies and narrowness of men."

But within that society, Christ gives man the "power of making laws for himself".

"Christ also considers it necessary to control the passions, but he places them under the dominion not of reason but of a new and more powerful passion. The healthy mind of the philosophers is a composed, tranquil and impartial state: the healthy mind of Christ is in an elevated and enthusiastic state. Both are exempt from perturbation and unsteadiness, but the one by being immovable fixed, the other by being always powerfully attracted in one direction." (13)

The "Enthusiasm of Humanity" is thus the kernel of Seeley's work. The character of Christ was filled with such love for men that he went beyond virtuous actions to "unaffected enthusiasm of goodness". He did not merely abstain from vice, he regarded as vicious thought with horror. Such an example of "holiness" repeats itself in a few men century after century. Such men's actions and presence "has shamed the bad, and made the good better and has been felt at times like the presence of God Himself. And if this be so, has Christ failed? or can Christianity die?" (14) Christianity has modified "individual character even more than objective morality". The springs of this change rest in
the secret "deep of personality" of Christ, which is a mystery to men. By imitation of him, determinism is refuted.

At the close of Ecce Homo, Seeley brings in another subject in the final pages. He suddenly discusses the problem of evil and death, and promises a second volume (never in fact written) where the work of Christ in reconciling men to nature will be shown. Christ reveals "new views of the Power by which the world is governed, by his own triumph over death, and by his revelation of eternity". Ecce Homo ends in mystery.

"The story of his life will always remain the one record in which the moral perfection of men stands revealed in its root and its unity, the hidden spring made palpably manifest by which the whole machine is moved. And as in the will of God, this unique man was elected to a unique sorrow, and holds as undisputed a sovereignty in suffering as in self-devotion, all lesser examples and lives will for ever hold a subordinate place, and serve chiefly to reflect light on the central and original Example. In his wounds all human sorrows will hide themselves, and all human self-denials support themselves against his cross."(15)

We see then in Ecce Homo a retreat against the criticisms made by the many agnostics so far discussed in the previous Chapter. Was there really much difference between the agnosticism of this period and the character of Jesus in Ecce Homo?

Seeley wished to graft ideas onto the character of Christ and to reinterpret the New Testament accordingly.
Seeley preferred to rely not on the value of an idea as a sanction applied to humanity, but on the value of character, however much shrouded in mystery and ambiguity.

III. REACTIONS TO SEELEY; NEWMAN ON ECCE HOMO

Seeley's book was the literary sensation of the 1860s. Varying estimations have been made of his circulation since its publication in 1865, but perhaps the simplest is the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church which speaks of "its immense circulation". Within three years it went through nine editions. R.W. Church as an Anglican theologian interested in character said he was perplexed although it has been pointed out that this may have been a charitable remark since Church believed the author to have been his old mentor, Newman. Church felt that Ecce Homo concentrated apologetically purely on Christ's humanity, to lead one onto his divinity by inference, and spoke of the work's "deep religious seriousness". It was a deliberately novel approach to meet unbelief on its own ground. A.P. Stanley a Broad Church theologian, agreed with this view.

"Let the enthusiasm of humanity have its perfect work, and the English nation would undergo a regeneration such as no critical discoveries could undermine, and no theological controversy could embitter. If the view here taken of the essence of Christ's teaching be the truth or anything like the truth, then, whatever theory we may form of His abstract nature will be wholly inadequate to shake His transcendent greatness in the scheme of history,"
human or divine, or His claim upon our moral allegiance."(18)

Such a viewpoint was to be expected, for Stanley felt the importance of national religion deeply. But Gladstone as a high Churchman could agree with Church, and so demonstrate the confusion Ecce Homo was bringing about. For, as we shall see later in this section, Newman was confused, while other Tractarians, such as Liddon and Pusey were very hostile. Gladstone wrote that the work was suited to the "religious exigencies" of the 1860s, when Mill, Eliot and Darwin(19) all posed a threat, to say nothing of the confusion caused by Essays and Reviews (1860). Gladstone felt that Ecce Homo "confines itself to approaching the character of our Saviour on its human side".

Newman was not greatly interested in Ecce Homo, but turned to it out of courtesy to Gladstone, who sent Newman his defence of it. (20) But when others pressed Newman to write about it, his interest increased slightly. He felt an attempt to open liberal minds to catholic thought was important but difficult. He was persuaded to write an article in The Month, later reprinted in Discussions and Arguments (1897). Newman concentrated his approval on Seeley's emphasis upon the inner power of the personality of Christ. Homer, Socrates, Caesar and Newton made discoveries, but Christ's discovery is Himself. If men's discoveries outlive them, then Christ's discovery of Himself cannot outlive Himself, except insofar as He is the Galilean carpenter, the man of whom in his lifetime many things might have been predicated, but are now forgotten. But the true essence of Christ cannot die, "The recorded picture of our Lord is its own evidence ... it carries with it its own reality and authority". Seeley almost approaches the doctrine that "to every one
of His subjects individually is He a first element and perennial source of life".

But Newman would not accept an opposition between theological beliefs inferred by induction from the facts of Christ's character, as recorded in the Gospels and what "church doctors or even apostles have sealed with their authority". Newman wrote, "Now, what Catholics, what Church doctors, as well as Apostles, have ever lived on, is not any number of theological canons or decrees, but ... the Christ Himself as He is represented in concrete existence in the Gospels." Newman argued for the character and conduct of our Lord, His words, His deeds, His sufferings, His work, which are the very food of our devotion and rule of our life. In this, however, Newman included the full divinity and humanity of Christ and his life and work, including the Resurrection. Newman rejected Seeley's opposition between the human life of our Lord, and church teaching about Him. While theological propositions were indeed not necessary, a Christian worshipped the full Person of Christ by immediate devotion. Dogma was not simply propositional statements, but the full expression of the Person of Christ. Seeley appealed to character, and so too did Newman. But it was a different character which they apprehended. Indeed, it was a present character for Newman, that of the risen Christ. For Seeley it was always a past Christ. Lastly, Newman appealed to the authority of Christ. This authority illuminates the Person of Christ and led people to know Christ more deeply, as Strange points out:

"The acceptance of the authority which lies at the foundation of Christian belief is not a substitute for personal knowledge of Christ, as Seeley suggested:"
it is rather a sign that that knowledge is coming to fruition."(23)

By recognizing the identity of Christ, one recognizes his authority, which is his intrinsic power. Seeley rested his appeal not on the inductive authority of facts but the facts of the Gospels historically reconstructed. Newman argued that this was facile. If the character so discovered itself had authority, there was no reason to ignore this.

A different reaction to Seeley which can be briefly alluded to, was that of the moral philosopher, H. Sidgwick, who resigned his fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge because Trinity still required subscription to the Anglican Thirty Nine Articles: Sidgwick had become an agnostic. (Sidgwick's honesty was in contrast to the duplicity of other agnostics who took the oath to keep their fellowships. It was Sidgwick's honesty that persuaded Lightfoot to drop his belief in the necessity of subscription.) Sidgwick retained a deep interest in Christianity, and his correspondence records many arguments such as the issue of clerical subscription with Rashdall. Sidgwick challenged Seeley's statement that "The morality of Christ is theoretically perfect, and not subject, as Mosaic morality was, to a further development". Sidgwick replied that all moral and religious truths grow, nor could the tree be found in the seed. All moral heroes, being human, are imperfect. A moral innovator will have faults, but his greatness lies not in what he did but in the power his ideas possess in future. "We imitate our other patterns and examples in the essence, not the limitations of their virtues." One cannot ignore the limitations of
earthly development and the barriers of circumstance.

Ecce Homo divided the "Tractarians" for the first time since Newman's secession (with the exception of Mansel's Bampton's on agnosticism and analogy, but Mansel was no true Tractarian). Church, Gladstone and Newman were partially in favour, Newman of course now a Roman Catholic and the least in favour of the three. Liddon, Pusey and other Tractarians were hostile. Historians are uncertain on why the division came, suggesting that theological method could divide people united on party lines. The answer however is fairly clear. Seeley had exploited an old interest of the Tractarians on character, but done it in a way not obviously hostile and imbued with rationalist philosophy, such as Renan's Vie de Jésus (1863, and English translation at once) and Strauss' Leben Jesu (1836, translated into English by George Eliot, 1846). Seeley's Jesus was partially orthodox, denied nothing, and by inference could become a stepping stone to faith. Some Tractarians such as Liddon provided their own counter-blast, The Divinity of Our Lord, considered next in this chapter. Pusey held to his own theory of Christological Epistemology, with degrees of beatific and infused knowledge, but this was in the Roman Catholic tradition. Only Tractarians genuinely interested in Christ's humanity per se could respond favourably, such as Newman and Church. Their interest in the humanity stemmed, I have argued, from a deep immersion in English moral philosophy and its account of the humanity of a moral agent, especially in Butler. So it was no wonder that Seeley perplexed the Tractarians. He was within that tradition, refuting determinism, and yet very liberal in his approach. Seeley's Ecce Homo is of interest to this thesis.
because it acted as a trap for unwary apologists to fall into on character. He was no real student of moral philosophy, but his historical skill and theological insight allowed him to develop the concept of character in a new way. The orthodox Anglican theologian was often puzzled.

IV. H.P. LIDDON

1. INTRODUCTION

By far the most effective defender of Anglican orthodoxy in this period was Henry Parry Liddon (1829-90). He was the author of the 1866 Bampton Lectures, *The Divinity of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ*, given at short notice after the original candidate withdrew. Liddon had applied to give the Lectures, but lost by the casting vote. When the successful candidate was unable to prepare his lectures in time, Liddon worked furiously to write what became a Tractarian classic. Liddon read all the Victorian liberal writers on Christology in preparing them, occasionally venting his anger in his private diary, published as his *Life and Letters* after his death. In particular, he took as his target the anonymous *Ecce Homo*, written the year before. *Ecce Homo* and *The Divinity* continued to sell in great numbers for the rest of the century. *The Divinity* was a sell-out at once and a shorter abridged version was then produced. Both editions, the full and the abridged, grew in popularity. In the fourteen years to 1880, no less than twenty five thousand copies of Liddon's work were sold. In 1880, a ninth edition was enlarged to answer the Unitarians, and until Liddon died a
new edition came out each year, with new refutations of liberal thought, each edition numbering eight hundred copies. The final edition, the twentieth, came out in 1903. By 1937, J.M. Creed could describe it as a little read classic of Victorian Theology. Seeley's work also averaged a new edition every year until the 1890s being reprinted in 1908 and 1970, the latter with a preface by John Robinson. Together these two works kept Christology in the forefront of theological thought until 1889, the year of Lux Mundi.

Liddon did not merely defend the faith by his writings. From 1870, Liddon led a dual career. On Sundays, he preached lengthy sermons to a crowded St. Paul's Cathedral, which were printed every few years, running into many volumes, all of which sold well, and added to his reputation as perhaps the best AngloCatholic (the term now preferred to Tractarian) preacher in London. During the week, he lectured in Oxford as Dean Ireland's Professor of Exegesis. Together, the lectures, sermons, Bamptons and occasional public rallies on a particular issue such as the prosecution of clergy or liturgical reform made Liddon the leading defender of Anglo Catholicism, against the liberals. Generations of Anglo Catholics heard of Strauss, even Schelling and Kant, through Liddon's refutation of them. Of all the wholesale rejections of "Liberalism", Liddon's was the most forthright, skilful and conservative.

What sort of man was he? He died young, aged 60. He never sought originality or fame, but had a lively humour, strong personality and a restless manner dominating a conversation by the force of his presence. Born in 1829, he came to Oxford in 1846 fully a Tractarian,
only to find Newman had left the movement shocked by his departure. He joined Pusey and remained his follower all his life, eventually writing his life. Henry Scott Holland and Charles Gore were in turn to become Liddon's disciples as young men. Later, in the Dictionary of National Biography, Leslie Stephen's rule of allowing favourable articles on entries was followed by inviting Scott Holland to write Liddon's entry. (The rule was broken only once, by Stephen himself, on F.D. Maurice, a man Stephen despised and on whom he wrote an insulting article. Part of Holland's entry ran:

"His mental structure was marked by an intense permanence ... his central position was unaffected by new discoveries. There was no assimilation of them with the texture of his thought ... He was intensely Latin in mental structure, and delighted in calling himself an ecclesiastic ... His typical abhorrence was a misty Teutonism. This dislike held him aloof from all philosophies of development. He bent himself on his sermons to exclude originality of idea."

Pusey was later embarrassed by his early writings in the 1820s on rationalism in Germany (as the D.N.B. entry on him makes clear) but Liddon always was a conservative. There were no early skeletons of past flirtations with liberalism to unearth.

His career was controversial. He became the first Vice-Principal of the newly-founded Cuddesdon College, but Bishop Wilberforce who founded it sacrificed him when the Evangelicals obtained an investigation into the teaching there. He was too advanced a sacramentalist. He was a friend of many of the Ritualist clergy and helped in their defence when they were prosecuted. He declined many attempts to make him a Bishop, from the 1860s onwards, and became known as a theologian who had
refused offers of a bishopric from both Mr. Gladstone (Liberal), and Lord Salisbury (Conservative), as well as pleas from fellow clergy. He helped found Keble College and Pusey House, appointing Charles Gore of Pusey House in 1884 as the first Principal in 1884. In 1872, he threatened resignation from ministerial office if the damnatory clauses of the Athenasian Creed were removed from public worship, and got his way. He campaigned to abolish any vestige of State jurisdiction over the clergy, preferring the freedom of the Old Catholics, and took an active part in the 1875 Bonn conference with them, forming a friendship with Dollinger. In 1889, he discovered that Gore and Scott Holland had evolved into a dialogue with progressive thought. The news broke him, and his health, failing since 1886 although then only fifty seven, did not survive the blow. He died aged sixty in 1890. He was remembered as the liveliest and cleverest of the Anglo Catholic conservatives, vivacious and humorous yet caustic to woolly-mindedness. He failed to get T.H. Green removed from the Examining Board of Oxford for Greats in 1870, and fought all attempts at educational reform in Oxford. He cared little for State establishment, but Oxford (and less so Cambridge) as religious universities was a cause dear to his heart. He felt the 1882 University Reforms disestablished Oxford, and that henceforth Keble College, Pusey House and the theological faculty would have to fight for the true Faith. The desertion of Gore at Pusey House and Scott Holland in the Oxford theological faculty was therefore a blow which he could not comprehend and still less did he sympathize with the idealism of T.H. Green.

We conclude this introduction with a brief description of Liddon's argument. It opens with an attack on three fronts, against Kantians,
Unitarians and the romantic writers about Jesus. Liddon's Jesus is dogmatically defined. But the character of Jesus in its sincerity, unselfishness, obedience and humility leads into the argument that such a character can only combine self-assertion with humility if he is divine.

Liddon moves on to discuss the knowledge possessed by Christ, and the relation between his divine and human knowledge. The concept of infused knowledge is crucial for Liddon. It is superior to the witness of conscience, for the concept of infused and infallible knowledge is dogmatically necessary for theology, even if men's consciences today may find it hard to ratify the content of that teaching.

The work of Christ is the establishment of the Kingdom of God. Like Newman, he sees Christ's character leading into ecclesiology, but the difference with Newman is great. Again, like Newman, Liddon discusses the presence of Christ today. Unlike Newman, indwelling is not mentioned. Christ is present as he is adored in worship; he is present as a living example; he is present in Scripture, from Genesis to Revelation.

We turn then to the most elaborate Christology in England of the mid-nineteenth century, which was meant to answer the critics of Christianity once and for all.

2. **THE 1866 BAMPTONS**

The work we will consider is his Bampton's. We will study it thematically, not as he wrote it, beginning with the theme of character.
From this, we will move to a consideration of Christ's knowledge, and from thence to the theme of redemption. The theme of character will be concerned with Unitarianism, Idealism and impersonal humanity.

Liddon opened his work with a great attack, the first in Anglican theology, on what is still a current topic, which is the replacement of ontological truth with moral and regulative ideals. Liddon is concerned to establish the historical reality and the personal nature of Christ in his office as Pattern and Representative of the Human Race. Christ is Messiah and Son of Man, and thus "fulfills and exhausts that moral Ideal to which man's highest and best aspirations have ever pointed onward". Kant has only a transcendental, regulative Ideal of Moral Perfection as the ultimate predicate of the Son of God; Jacobi will not accept worship of the historical Jesus since it is idolatry, Fichte sees Jesus as the one who first communicates an insight into the absolute unity of man with God, and thus communicated the highest knowledge man can possess. Liddon objects on two grounds to all these, as to Schelling and Hegel. There is a lack of true objective in their thought. "Religion to support itself, must rest consciously on its object; the intellectual apprehension of that object as true is an integral element of religion." Arising out of this, the second objection is that Liddon is concerned with the redemption of the whole of reality, whereas these philosophers are concerned with moral or epistemological concerns.

Liddon in his Second Preface also attacks Unitarians, or Deists. The 1860s were a decade before atheism was open, as it became from 1870 with Stephen, Huxley, Clifford and Spencer, and Liddon decided to force
the issue on the readers of Seeley, Renan, Strauss and Martineau (J. and H.). Liddon feels that there is a creeping denial of Catholic truth from a dislike of the language of the Nicene Creed, to an open aversion and eventual denial of Nicaea, which advanced eventually beyond Socinianism to covert humanism. Liddon accepts that man is not totally fallen. He has a sense of moral beauty, and this gives the humanist case some credibility. But the argument from character will not defend the liberal case. Liddon knew Seeley, and others, argued from the character of Christ. They all laid special stress on the "beauty and perfection of Christ's Human Character". It aspires to analyze, to study, to imitate that character, in a degree which was, it thinks, impossible during these ages of dogma which it professes to have closed. Against this claim, Liddon argues that Christ always insists on "the most energetic proclamation of himself". If Christ is not divine, then he is an egoist, and cannot be good. The argument from Old Testament prophecy is historically prior to the argument from character, but the character of Christ is first "in the order of the formation of conviction". The character of Christ supports the collateral evidence of Old Testament prophecy and Apostolic faith, but it is also an argument independent of them. Newman and Wilberforce do not see the argument quite so openly as an apologetic. Liddon undoubtedly was influenced by the changing style of the 1860s, and the increased emphasis on character. Liddon addressed himself to those who believed in God and assigned a special place to Scripture, but were hesitant on Christ's divinity or on the implications which followed from it. Not only did Liddon hope to strengthen Anglicans, he was prepared to pass over his sacramentalism if by so doing he could form a union with
nonconformity in defending the divinity of Christ. The churches should unite to defend the central article of the creed.

These then were Liddon's opponents. Firstly, he attacked those influenced by German philosophy, and secondly he attacked liberal Unitarians. Christ was both an historical figure and divine. He was above all fully personal. It is because he feels Schleiermacher's absolute dependence could lead logically to dependence on impersonal laws in a way that denied both personality and human freedom that he also rejected Schleiermacher, although he read him and Dorner. The submission of the human soul to the will of God is a matter of a free, personal response.

3. **THE CHARACTER OF CHRIST**

If Liddon made his opponents very clear, he also limited the argument from character before he began to deploy it. Renan's "semi-fabulous" hero, the infant Christ of Berlioz, or the many popular romantic portrayals of Jesus have all one fault in common. A Christ who is conceived of as only pictured in an ancient literature may indeed furnish you with the theme of a magnificent poetry, "but he cannot be the object of your Religious Life". Religion requires a Living Person, and theological definitions "assert the exact force of the revealed statements respecting the Eternal Life of Christ". Christ can be known today "before the eye of the soul which seeks him". Once one asserts that Christ is alive today one must "leave the strictly historical and aesthetical treatment of the Gospel record of His life
and character". One moved to Catholic or heretical theological definitions. What is more, the argument from character can be dangerous. The human character of Christ, it is argued, has served moral progress by acting as an exemplar and ideal, whereas dogmas of divinity have only caused bitterness. Christ required no confession of his divinity, and it is only a theological abstraction. These arguments of Channing, the American Unitarian, and others are objectionable to Liddon. The full confession of the divinity only arose after the Resurrection, as Romans 1.4 shows. Morality must acknowledge the divinity if it is true, for morality cannot oppose truth.

Further, Christian worship becomes insincere without the dogma of Christ's divinity. The character of Christ then may help beliefs but it is not the whole of belief, if the character is taken simply as his humanity. So the character of Christ will be Liddon's theme, but it is a limited theme.

Liddon's view of character rests on his definition of the term. He returns to the view of character, as being "equally balanced and entirely harmonious". This concept is not the same as the views of J.S. Mill. Character for Mill was the accentuation of certain features, such as having a strong character. Mill also stressed the fact of characters' interaction with environment through certain features of their character. Liddon prefers a view which is detached from the interaction of society. Liddon's Christ is first of all considered in himself before he is placed in relation to society. This is a valiant attempt to ignore, just as Martineau did, the pressure of the determinist case. In particular, Liddon's views of Christ's knowledge
and of his free will must be brought out to show just how non-empirical and unrelated to society his view of the character of Christ is. But before we turn to these underlying presuppositions of character portrayal, Liddon's content of the character of Christ should be set out.

Liddon, realizing that no one else outside theology and a "Butlerian" moral philosophy will use the term character in this way at all, begins with an apology for using the term at all. There is "some impropriety" in so doing. (31)

"In modern language 'character' generally implies the predominance or the absence of some side or sides of that great whole which we picture to ourselves in the background of each individual man as the true and complete ideal of human nature."

"This predominance or absence of particular traits or faculties, this precise combination of active or of passive qualities, determines the moral flavour of each individual life, and constitutes character."

Again it may be questioned just how far Mill was concerned with moral flavour. The argument in Chapter Four has tried to bring out the alternatives of aesthetic enjoyment in J.S. Mill, as well as the moral element so strongly there in Seeley and of course Liddon.

"Character is that whereby the individual is marked off from the prescribed standard or level of typical manhood. Yet the closest analysis of the actual Human Life of Jesus reveals a moral Portrait not only unlike any that men have witnessed before or since, but especially remarkable in that it presents an equally balanced and entirely harmonious representation of all the normal elements of our perfected moral nature."
A perfected moral character is present in Christ because certain empirical facts are present. One is his sincerity, exposing all hypocrisy, which is an important point Liddon relies on Newman for, quoting Newman's discussion of unreal words in the Parochial Sermons. Such exposure is present in Luke 14 (Take up your cross, to Simon Peter), John 6 (You seek me because you ate the loaves), and Matthew 10 (why do you call me God). Sincerity does not disguise its moral antagonism to evil. The next point is the moral unselfishness involved in obedience to the will of God (John 5 and Matthew 26), and devotion to the needs of humanity. Liddon here attempts to go beyond Seeley by adding obedience to divine will to devotion to humanity. Moral renunciation is involved in both, but they are not the same thing. A third point is Christ's humility, shown in his portrayal of himself as meek (Matthew 11), and what Liddon believes is a humble refusal to talk of miracles (Matthew 9 and Luke 8). Christ actually won his moral attributes by suffering. He earned the sympathy, admiration and honour of men. These qualities are not eternal attributes of divinity, but moral predicates of the humanity.

Since there is an inherent contingency about the employment of such predicates, Liddon can defend the divinity of Christ by arguing that only under one condition can the ascription of such predicates be justified. That condition is the simultaneous predicate of divinity and moral quality. Why is this so? The answer is that Liddon points to an additional factor in the biblical story of Christ, which is his constant self-assertion. It is not logically improper to ascribe the predicates of humility, unselfishness and sincerity to the humanity of
Christ, but it is morally improper when taken in conjunction with his self-assertion, unless there is simultaneously the predication of the divinity to his moral character. Only so can one be morally justified in speaking of self-assertion and humility in the same breath of Christ. Liddon writes that self-sacrifice is "a suspected and tainted thing, when it goes hand in hand with a consistent effort to give unwarranted prominence to self". Christ plainly brought his death upon Himself by denouncing the Pharisees in Jerusalem "at a critical moment". "If he be not the divine victim freely offering himself for men upon the altar of the Cross, may He not be what Christian lips cannot force themselves to utter?" 

If Christ is not divine, he was not only not humble and selfless, he is not sincere. He made his claims too plain to be innocent of the charge of deception. The Christ of Renan is plainly insincere in his Vie de Jesus, for he uses the language of divinity and enacts the raising of Lazarus who is not in fact yet dead. Renan's Christ is only a man, but also therefore an impostor.

There is then no alternative. It is easier to believe that God should have become incarnate on earth, where Man's own being is a mystery to himself, than that the one human life which realizes all our ideals should have been guilty about himself of rank arrogance, self-seeking and insincerity.

"It is easier, in short, to believe that God has consummated His works of wonder and of mercy by a crowning self-Revelation in which mercy and beauty reach their climax, than to close the moral eye to the brightest spot that meets it in human history and since a bare Theism reproduces the main difficulties of Christianity without any of its compensations
to see at last in man's inexplicable destiny only the justification of his despair."

This is Liddon's empirical case for Christianity. It is obviously the case that Liddon is scornful of Biblical Criticism, and calls the Tübingen school "a highly-developed stage of an orthodox gnosis". But lying behind the factual claims for Christ are the metaphysical questions of epistemology and free will. Lastly, there is Liddon's concern with society, redemption and Christ's interaction with human life. These are then three levels on which Liddon writes, which are:

(a) A character of Christ strikingly apart from social pressures, and not determined by historical accidents, with a proportioned beauty and harmony of moral being quite unlike other humanist portrayals of his day. This part we have just outlined above.

(b) The metaphysical presuppositions which underpin (a), and are concerned with the divinity that is predicated in (a) which revolve around the questions of epistemology and free will.

(c) The way this character outlined in (a) and with the presuppositions given in (b) acts upon (not in) society so as to produce redemption, a new world and an end to sin. In this way some constraints outlined in Chapter Four may have their tragic consequences changed by the 'power of the Spirit’. Grace is a power to act and so enables a different sort of freewill, the freewill of a choice undetermined by social, environmental or hereditary constraints. Thus in (c) Liddon brings in a defence of freewill which will rebut the empiricist determinism of character. We turn to the metaphysical presuppositions of epistemology and freewill.
Liddon here must be taken with Pusey, for the two thought closely on this issue, and Pusey clearly made explicit on some occasions what Liddon accepted implicitly. I shall note particularly a sermon written by Pusey, but significantly read by Liddon due to Pusey's old age and ill health, the 1878 Oxford University Sermon, "Unscience, not Science, adverse to Faith". I shall supplement this with Liddon's own thought. Pusey was prepared to give much ground to science. It is possibly true that evolution correctly describes the growth of life, and that Genesis is historically false on the Creation; even that inorganic life may have transferred to organic. But reason itself is a miracle. So too morality, religion, conscience and immortality are known only by revelation. Thus "the soul is no subject of physical science". If descent from apes can be proved, Pusey would argue that God supplemented "the law of inheritance" with direct creation of a soul. We have already seen Wilberforce equivocate on the creationist/ traducionist argument in Chapter Three. Pusey's hostility to idealism meant that every soul had an individual relation with God. He made no sense of the view held by Rosmini, and partly attractive to Wilberforce, that the parents generated a sensitive soul which God changed by illumination into a spiritual soul. It is a constant theme in Pusey and Liddon that there is a direct creation by God of the soul. In Chapter Five of the Bamptons, Liddon takes refuge in the mystery of man's being:

"How does spirit thus league itself with matter? Where and what is the life-principle of the body? Where is the exact frontier-line between sense and consciousness, between brain and thought, between the
act of will and the movement of muscle? Is human nature then so utterly commonplace, and have its secrets been so entirely unravelled by contemporary science, as entitle us to demand of the Almighty God that when He reveals Himself to us He shall disrobe himself of mystery? If we reject his self-revelation in the person of Jesus Christ on the ground of our inability to understand the difficulties, great and undeniable, although not greater than we might have anticipated, which do in fact surmount it; are we also prepared to conclude that, because we cannot explain how a spiritual principle like the soul can be robed in and act through a material body, we will therefore close our eyes to the arguments which certify us that the soul is an immaterial essence, and take refuges from this oppressive sense of mystery in some doctrine of consistent materialism? (38)

In arguing this way, Liddon is not however simply throwing up his hands and saying that he cannot make sense of man. Rather Liddon argues that the dignity of man is a proper part of Christianity, but this dignity rests both on the mystery of the Incarnation and the unfathomable goodness of the Creation. So, in turn, the creation of man upholds the dignity of the incarnation. It is a circular argument, but it can be no other. It is not an argument that rests on one foundation, but rather on the illuminated reason of the collective church continually studying the original revelation by explanatory inferences. (39) The Incarnation is the assumption of what God had created, and the final proclamation through Christ of what has been partially proclaimed in man. This proclamation is that God upholds all things, unveiling his presence through creation, and showing Himself to be a free intelligent agent. It is thus worth noticing very markedly that the arguments of Gore's Bampton Lectures of 1891 are not original. Christ as the final revelation of creation is an argument found in Liddon. God is able to create a being.

"who will reveal him perfectly and of necessity as expressing
Yet the other side of this circular argument is that the dignity of man rests on the Incarnation. Since Christ has taken humanity and borne it to heaven, we cannot be "mere animal organisms, without any immaterial soul or future destiny". Liddon naturally is aware of J.S. Mill's radical associates, much alluded to in the section on Mill, such as Alexander Bain. He attacks physiological reductionism because it is incompatible with seeing creation as a gift of God:

"it destroys that high and legitimate estimate of God's natural gifts to man which is an important element of earnest and healthy morality in the individual, and which is still more essential to the onward march of our social progress".

Modern science seems "possessed by an infatuated passion for the degradation of mankind". It is important to make clear Liddon's argument. Man is sinful, and needs redemption, but in himself he is basically good, and the soul is his greatest attribute. Determinism degrades the spiritual nature of man. Liddon is a great conservative, opposed to modern thought, and he is not at all disposed to welcome new ideas, but he believes in the free will of man and his responsibility. Liddon is the last defender within this thesis of the views derived from Bishop Butler that in man God has revealed himself as a God who creates man complete in himself, with a conscience, desires and reason, and not needing history or any other discipline to place him in his world. Liddon believes man can be read as he is and would not have accepted later Victorian theologians such as Gore's belief that the essence of
man is one thing, but the cultural expression of his knowledge another. Nor would he have made much sense of Moberly's belief in true or real will and man's apparent will. So Liddon reasserts his belief in the ahiistorical spiritual essence of humanity and said that his opposition to science was because

"it even denies to man the possession of any spiritual nature whatever; thought is asserted to be inherent in the substance of the brain; belief in the existence of an immaterial essence is treated as an unscientific and superstitious prejudice; virtuous and vicious actions are alluded to as alike results of purely physical agencies; man is to all intents and purposes a soulless brute". (44)

Thus reason and the Incarnation interact to forbid speculation which sees actions as not morally free but the result of "purely physical agencies". Both belief in the Creation and the Incarnation deny that this is how moral actions can be determined by external forces. But it must again be emphasised that although Liddon believes that man is morally free, he also believes that he is sinful. Because he is sinful, he is captive to sin. So at this point the argument of the humanist radical that man is constrained by social or environmental forces, and Liddon's argument that man is captive to sin are similar, although the agreement is only on the fact of captivity, not on why he is captive. Liddon will however later assert that that captivity can be broken by the Kingdom of God, to which nearly a quarter of the Bamptons is devoted. It is, of course, a fact that the radicals did not believe that social constraints could be altered.

Redemption is brought by Christ. What is Liddon's view of Christ's knowledge? There are two aspects of epistemology that must
now be discussed, since we have now dealt with Liddon's view of the
dignity and responsibility of man in epistemology and action. These
two aspects of Christological knowledge are, first, the question of
infused knowledge, and secondly the question of Christ's omniscience as
man. After discussing these, we will mention briefly the question of
the obedience of Christ's human nature as a question of free will, if it
was entirely determined by the Eternal Word. We will then pass on to
the Kingdom of God.

Pusey and Liddon actually disagreed on Christ's knowledge as man.
They both agreed that he had as God omniscient knowledge, and as man
knowledge gained by experience. But was this all? In between lay the
Augustinian doctrine of infused knowledge and the Thomist doctrine of the
beatific vision. Pusey held that Christ possessed both, but Liddon only
accepted the reality of the Augustinian doctrine. Thomas justified the
beatific vision of "SCIENTIA BEATA", from the experience of Christian
mystical prayer, where the agents felt that they were granted a share in
complete knowledge. The elect in heaven will also possess this as they
share in the knowledge of the Trinity through the light of glory (LUMEN
GLORIAE). Such knowledge can be anticipated by a few on earth, including
Christ as man. Liddon however felt a hostility to mysticism. But
Pusey's acceptance of this which took him alongside the Roman Catholic
view (as for instance, outlined by Pohle-Preuss in his Christology of
1913) was allied to the Augustinian epistemology. Liddon did find
this congenial. For Augustine, Adam was in an original state of
blessedness. The body of Adam was obedient to his soul, and potentially
immortal. Augustine took this view from Ambrose, who wrote of man's
original blessedness "redupertus amictu sapientiae ac iustitiae".\(^{(46)}\)

So if man was originally perfect and innocent, he could know all things in a way that did not depend on experience and classification. Such a view is taken from Augustine's *De Genesi*, where man's knowledge in Adam before the fall is inherently different from what it is now.\(^{(47)}\) For Liddon, this prelapsarian knowledge in Adam is reproduced in the angels in Solomon and in Christ.\(^{(48)}\) However, this gift was natural for the angels and Christ, but conferred on Adam and Solomon. We should notice that since Adam is the natural man for Liddon, Butler's view of what is natural, which came under strain in Robert Wilberforce as seen in Chapter Three with its alliance of Alexandrian Christology and idealism, has now finally given way to a purely theological view of what is "natural". Yet Liddon can in other respects argue that man has a conscience, soul and responsibility in a way that follows Butler. The inconsistency is marked. Pusey's sermon, which was read by Liddon as his advocate for the old man, put the perfection of Adam as follows:

"It lies as the basis of our faith that man was created in the perfection of our nature, endowed with supernatural grace, with a full freedom of choice such as man, until restored by Christ, had not had since."\(^{(49)}\)

Christ's knowledge for Liddon then was omniscient as God, experiential as man, but also infused as man. Liddon cites Colossians 2.3, following Augustine, "In him are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge".

Now if Christ's human nature has both experiential and infused knowledge, how will they both be related to Christ's divine knowledge? Cyrilline Christology held that one divine nature of the Word of God assumed humanity but totally determined it at all times. This humanity
was prophesied in the Old Testament, and is typological. Christ's humanity is the type of Moses', Isaiah's and Jeremiah's. Pusey advocated this view, and it can be found glimpsed in Newman's writings in the Parochial Sermons on typology. Liddon however stressed the two natures of humanity and divinity, which affected one another through some way similar to Luther's "communicatio idiomatum." (It is not clear what Liddon's exact views on this theological hypothesis was.) The two natures shared in the divine attributes of eternity, omnipotence and omniscience by virtue of the hypostatic union, which Liddon explicitly defended in Chapters Five and Seven. Thus these qualities become positive attributes to the humanity. But Christ could communicate either by virtue of experience, infused knowledge, or his divine omniscience. Prior to the foundation of the Kingdom of God, Christ was seen by his followers as divine and human. Seeley said that this was not possible, and that his divinity, if it was correct to predicate this of Christ, could only be inferred from his work on the foundation of the Kingdom of God. Seeley of course held that Christ only had one nature.

Liddon expressed the alternative methods of Christ's communication with man in a quotation which is lengthy but crucial:

"If, by an infused knowledge He was, even as a child, 'full of truth', yet, that He might enter with the sympathy of experience into the various conditions of our intellectual life, He would seem to have acquired, by the slow labour of observation and inference, a new mastery over truths which He already in another sense possessed. Such a co-existence of growth in knowledge, with a possession of all its ultimate results would not be without a parallel in ordinary human life... We can then conceive that the reality of our Lord's intellectual development would not necessarily be inconsistent with the simultaneous perfection of His knowledge. As Man, he might have received an infused knowledge of a truth, and yet have possession through
experience and in detail of that which was latent in His mind, in order to correspond with the intellectual conditions of human life.\(^{(50)}\)

Such an Augustinian view of knowledge was common in Oxford among Anglo-Catholics, but it was not held elsewhere, and it was to lose ground during the century. By 1893 William Bright, Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Oxford, could deplore the fact that it was the fashion to "depress, to the lowest depths, Augustinianism". Liddon, however, took this aspect of Augustine concerned with infused knowledge as central to his Bamptons.\(^{(51)}\)

Liddon denied that Christ was ever ignorant. In the final pages, infallibility is asserted as the original and necessary endowment of Christ's "higher" nature. Through this attribute, Christ can exercise a prophetic ministry which is part of his mediatorship. Hence, although it might appear from Luke 2.52 that Christ increased in wisdom, He was in fact the Word, full of Truth. The discrepancy is resolved by arguing that Christ relearned his Knowledge. Liddon's analogy, which he admits is remote, is human learning in moral experience. What we know intuitively, or human knowledge through empirical inference or experience which is parallel to the previously held knowledge of mathematical theory or traditional knowledge. It is indeed a remote analogy, since this only confirms what we already know, whereas the biblical passage speaks of an increase in wisdom.

But Liddon's argument now advances by a different tactic. It is true that Christ's ignorance of the Parousia in Mark 13.32 was accepted as human ignorance by Irenaeus, Athanasius and Cyril of
Alexandria. This human ignorance was part of Christ's condescension in the Incarnation. Liddon explains that a single personality can have two spheres of existence, thus being both omnipresent as God and present as man, blessed as God and suffering as man, and so on this one occasion knowing as God but ignorant as man. Yet it was a deliberate denial by Christ to his human soul of ignorance. There is no warranty for inferring any other argument on ignorance. Christ also knew "superhumanly" about the future, about man and about the divine will. The Matthean statement that only the Son "knoweth the Father" is a passage that confirms his infused knowledge and divine omniscience. Thus on every occasion, but one Christ is not ignorant. Limitation of knowledge, lastly, if avowed, is not liability to error, so long as the condition is made that one will know in advance of one's limitation of knowledge. Paul, indeed, was very limited and yet 1 [Corinthians 13] surveying his limitations does not prevent Paul claiming infallibility, as he does, says Liddon, in [Galatians 1.8]. Paul saw himself as limited and yet infallible as a teacher of religious truth. "Infallibility may be conferred on a human teacher with very limited knowledge, by a special endowment presenting him from error."(52)

The echo of self-deceit so prevalent in Butler's Sermons re-occurs in the Bamptons when Liddon puts the alternative that either Christ correctly believed he was teaching the truth on the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy, or else he was ignorant. Since he could always have known the truth because he had the capacity of infused knowledge this is an argument about a sophisticated form of self-deception. Liddon's rebut of what came to be known as the Kenotic argument (held by late
Victorian theologians such as Gore in England) rests on two premises. One is that Christ had the capacity of infused knowledge. The second is that if He did not know with this capacity he was only deceiving himself. Gore simply rejected the argument that infused knowledge existed at all. But because Liddon holds to this argument, Liddon denies that Christ was infallibly knowledgeable on moral truth but fallible on factual truth. If it is the case that one could have known factual truth, it is culpable ignorance or self-deceit not to have known this. This then is a moral point. There is therefore no distinction between the factual and the moral way of knowledge. Liddon writes:

"The attempted distinction between a critical judgement of historical or philological facts, and a moral judgement of strictly spiritual and moral truths, is inapplicable to a case in which the moral judgement is no less involved than the intellectual."[53]

Liddon is not prepared to allow this distinction to be reopened by more critical exegetes, who affirm that what Christ knows is true because their conscience ratifies it. He is not a theologian who gives conscience the dominant role, but only a role in conjunction with the biblical record. In much the same way, Newman argued in his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk that "there need be antagonism between Papal infallibility and conscience". Liddon writes:

"You say that here your conscience ratifies his teaching?... Is then your conscience in very truth the only and ultimate teacher? Have you anticipated, and might you dispense with the teaching of Christ? And what if your conscience, as is surely not impossible, has itself been warped or misled?"[53]

This is not an attack on the judicial authority of conscience, because elsewhere in the book the strength of the Kingdom of God is said to rest
on the human conscience, which is its seat of power. Although, as we shall see, the Church is equated with the Kingdom of God, the inner dynamic of ecclesiology is "the idea (it is not made clear in what sense the word idea is used, nor whether it is related to Newman's Ideas discussed in Chapter Three) of a strictly independent society of spiritual beings with enlightened and purified consciences ..." What Liddon is resisting is the Coleridgean concept of biblical inspiration which is affirmed as true because of its resonance with the moral sense, located partly within the conscience, and with what Coleridge called "Reason". Coleridge's theories of inspiration are too complex to be discussed here, but the point Liddon is making is clear. Christ's teaching is self-evidently true and authoritative for any Christian. The reason is that Christ is infallible. Liddon believes therefore that a mistaken identification of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch would demonstrate his failure to "know" the character of God.

5. THE OBEDIENCE AND WORK OF CHRIST

We turn briefly to the question of Christ's human obedience to the Word. Manhood is impersonal, in Christ, with the Word taking the place of "created individuality" and supplying the root of feeling, thought and will. As with Newman the humanity is an organ of the divinity, with the humanity "wrapped around His Being". Christ is truly man, for "if Christ be not truly man, the chasm which parted Earth and heaven has not been bridged over". But there is no particular beauty about the humanity. Holiness is the moral premiss for the search for
Christ's divinity, but it is not the ontological conclusion. Holiness is neither beauty nor what makes Christ divine.

"Nor is the reality of His manhood impaired by any exceptional beauty whether of outward form or of mental endowment, such as might become One 'fairer than the children of men' and taking precedence of them in all things, since in Him our nature does not resume its true and typical excellence as the consuming glory of the visible creation of God."(57)

Christ's character then is sincere, selfless, humble and obedient - in a word, holy - but it is not physically or mentally exceptional. Yet he knows all things. The dichotomy is explained because inferential reasoning in Christ is quite ordinary, and not exceptional, but directly infused knowledge can make up for what He would not otherwise know.

But this quite ordinary character is nonetheless obedient. The will and desire of the humanity is "in unfaltering harmony with the law of absolute truth". Even the thoughts of Christ, unlike Mill's supposition, are in accord with the divine will.

"Its general movements are not less spontaneous nor do its affections flow less freely, because no sinful impulse finds a place within it, and each pulse of its moral and mental life is in conscious harmony with, and in subjection to, an all-holy will."(58)

Christ's obedience is wrought by the Word supplying "the root of thought and feeling and will". There is no creative individuality in the humanity, nor is it personal humanity but impersonal. Yet "Christ's manhood is not unreal because it is impersonal". There is the personhood of the Eternal Word instead. Equally there is "a robe of mystery, which
Faith must acknowledge, but she cannot hope to penetrate", created by "the prerogatives of Our Lord's manhood".\(^{(59)}\) Lastly, the response of the humanity to the Word is not merely an 'unfaltering harmony' but the expression of complete sinlessness. It appears that Christ could not have sinned at all, "because the entail of any taint of transmitted sin is in Him cut off by a supernatural birth of a Virgin Mother". Once again we see the strong Augustinian influence upon Liddon. Sin is a vitium transmitted sexually to each man. Liddon is very strong in his language here, for the Word does not become flesh, but rather He "acts upon humankind" through the "unmutilated perfection" of the created Nature which he "has wrapped around His Being". Divinity implies distinction from creation, and thus "destroys any view of pantheism".\(^{(60)}\)

We pass then to the work of Christ, which is the establishment of the Kingdom of God. This concept was intrinsically connected with the motif of obedience, which dominates his entire reference to it. So Liddon attacked the author of the anonymous Ecce Homo. Liddon's own favourite for the authorship was the liberal cleric and headmaster Frederick Temple, who had earlier written an essay in Essays and Reviews (1860) which Liddon detested. Temple later became Archbishop of Canterbury, after Liddon's death. Liddon wrote privately in his diary against Temple's liberal views on education which he connected with his supposed authorship of Ecce Homo:

"The passage on Education in the chapter headed 'The Laws of Edification', and the theory, again and again put forward of law as ceasing with education's earlier stages, instead of being obeyed afterwards on higher principles, are unmistakable traces of his thought."\(^{(61)}\)
Thus for Seeley Christ's exemplarist role for a Christian rendered unnecessary the place of laws in the Christian life, whereas for Liddon the character of Christ was one who gave laws to be obeyed with the heart. Seeley's idea of sin was, as we have seen, connected with his desire for national renewal. Sin, moral obligation and social relations all expressed aspects, either positively or negatively, of the same reality for Seeley. Liddon opposes this view:

"The Gospels present us with the Scriptural idea of sin, provoking God's wrath and establishing between God and man a state of enmity, and this idea points very urgently - at least in a moral universe - to some awful interposition which shall bring relief. But the Biblical idea of sin is a vitally distinct thing from the impoverished modern conception of anti-social vice, in which man, and not God, is the insulted and offended person, but which the protection of individual rights and the well-being of society are held to be of more account than the reign of peace and purity within the soul."

Liddon simply defies the humanist concern with man in interaction with society, and re-establishes a direct man/God relationship which alone can bring 'peace and purity'. The man/God relationship is not purely individual however, for it is placed within the context of the formation by Christ of a society. This society has laws which transcend the Jewish Law, while this 'third use of the law' is only kept by individuals. So individuals are always placed within a Christian society, and are never purely individuals, but the laws of the society are only kept by individuals.

"The vital principle of His legislation, namely, that moral obedience shall be enforced, not merely in the performance of or abstinence from outward acts, but in the deepest and most secret springs of thought and motive, is traced in its application to certain specific prescriptions of the Older Law; while other ancient enactments are modified or set
aside by the stricter purity, the genuine simplicity of motive and character, the entire unselfishness, and the superiority to personal prejudices and exclusiveness which the New Lawgiver insisted on."

But it would not be right to see this as an invisible society of men, joined by their worship of Christ under the marks of the Church. Christ is accepted or rejected in the person of the rulers of the kingdom of God. Christ came to found a visible government, entitled to deferential and entire obedience, as Matthew 10.40 (He that receiveth you, receiveth me), makes clear. Christ is the founder of a Kingdom. His whole life was spent proclaiming it, promulgating and codifying its laws, instituting channels of organic life, and by the conquest of death opening it to all men. The Parables describe it as a vast imperial system in the great shoal of fishes (Matthew 13.47) and an attractive influence on men, in the treasure in the field. Above all, Christ was audacious in his plan. It springs from him complete and entire, through the Sermon on the Mount, the Parables and the Charge to the Twelve. He is not influenced by anyone, and the plan itself is original.

"He actually gave a practical and energetic form to the idea of a strictly independent society of spiritual beings, with enlightened and purified consciences, cramped by no national or local bounds of privilege, and destined to spread throughout earth and heaven." (63)

Yet it is not the plan itself that matters. What matters is its success. Here is Liddon's final engagement with rationalist thought. The characters of men are not determined as modern thought would have us believe, but can be vivified by the presence of Christ in his Church:
"The Christian life springs from and is sustained by the apprehension of Christ present in His Church, present in and with His members as a living spirit.

The Kingdom of God thus establishes the progress of Man. (64) "Is it not a simple matter of fact that at this moment the progress of the human race is entirely identified with the spread of the influence of the nations of Christendom?" (65) Although the influence of rationalism seems very great, it is mostly impotent, despite the 'highest speculative energy of it'. By directing men to another world, Christianity achieved the deepest penetration of the human soul ever achieved. It has

"revolutionized his convictions, raised his will, and then exposed its triumph in the altered social system of that section of the human race which has generally received it". (66)

Liddon mentions the Holy Spirit very little. He says that the Church carries forward this Kingdom sustained by the Spirit, but it is only a passing reference. It is the belief in the presence of Christ that matters. Liddon then gives a long historical account of how the Church grew, surviving against all the odds.

6. **THE PRESENCE AND EXAMPLE OF CHRIST**

We come to the final development of Liddon's work on the character of Christ. Liddon places Christ's character in three relations to the believer. Christ's character can be adored. Secondly, he can become an example. Thirdly, he can be found in the Old Testament if a proper hermeneutic is employed.
We turn first to the adoration of Christ. This raises the fundamental question of the worship of Christ, and the relation of dogma to the historical Jesus. Dogma, the formation of theological propositions about Christ, is not simply stating supernatural truths against the natural portrayal of the historical Jesus.

"The ethical beauty, nay the moral integrity, of Our Lord's character, is dependent, whether we will it or not, upon the reality of His miracles. The miraculous is inextricably interwoven with the whole life of Christ." (67)

Miracles then, as symbolic representations of Christ's redemptive action and as pointers to his 'Superhuman manhood' show that the Character of Christ is inherently supernatural. The Christ of history is the Christ of dogma. The Christian is called to adore His manhood. Admiration is not adoration. (68) Admiration requires an assumption of equality with the (finite) object admired, and then a judgement, a form of criticism or a reference of the object to our criterion of ideals. Hence one is able to form an estimation of oneself, by self-appreciation, with a reference to the object or person admired. Adoration is mental self-annihilation before a greatness beyond all finite and human standards. Admiration may lead into adoration, but then it falls away since "the object altogether transcends any standard of excellence or beauty with which man can compare Him". (69)

Adoration can be expressed in language, which is worship, or in action. Adoration is also expressed by the intellectual conceptualizing of the object of worship, the homo-ousion. The expression of adoration through action leads to many different biblical stories, which Liddon recounts: the Wise Men; the request for healing which is implicit
adoration because of the form of the request such as by the leper or by
Jairus; the offering of thanksgiving to Christ after the stilling of
the storm, and of course the worship after the Resurrection. Again this
idea of adoration in action is related to the basic argument that Christ
would only allow worship of God, and yet does not stop worship of himself.
Christ is either insincere or divine. The Ascension leads into the
full worship of Christ, in the Epistles and Early Church Fathers. This
is not only worship of his divinity but of his humanity, for the lamb
slain in the Apocalypse is a symbol of the manhood, as is Paul's
invocation of the name of Jesus, when he wrote that Jesus is Lord.
Again the contrast is brought out that the Epistles forbid worship of
the creation. In Acts 14, Paul and Barnabas stop worship of themselves,
and Colossians 2.18 and Revelation 22.8 censure worship of the angels.

Christ then is worshipped as man on earth and as present in His
church today. This is the link between the presence of Christ now and
the character of Christ then. Out of worship of Jesus we are led to an
awareness of our union with Him. "We cannot reflect ... on our union
with Jesus without finding ourselves face to face with the Being and
Attributes of Him with whom in Jesus we are made one."

So the purpose of Religion - which for Liddon is Christianity,
because it has the secret of the Kingdom - is to place the person of
Christ before men now to be worshipped and to renew their moral life.
Dogma asserts "the exact force of the revealed statements respecting the
Eternal Life of Christ". Christ is known today "before the eye of the
soul which sees him". The purpose of the historical character of Christ
is to found a society in which the present Christ could be known.
One objection remains. How can a Christian take as his example the humanity of Christ which he adores? We approach it indefinitely ever closer by the power of grace given through the divinity of Christ. But we never fully approach it. Thus Liddon has in fact two measurements for the Christian life, that of imitatio Christi and that of moral regeneration:

"Man does not in his natural state love his brother man, except it be from motives of interest or blood relationship ... Society is an agglomeration of self-loving beings, whose ruling instincts are shaped by force or by prudence into a political whole, but who are ever ready as opportunity may arise, to break forth into the excesses of an unchecked barbarism. It is the Incarnation which has thus saved society again and again from the revelation of despotic violence of unbridled ambitions, by putting into the field of political activity the corrective, compensating force of active self-denial." (70)

Natural here is quite incompatible with the quotation given above from page 23 that in Christ our nature resumed 'its true and typical excellence'. Nor is it compatible with Butler's use of the term. There are then three meanings of 'natural' in Liddon's Bamptons that of prelapsarian Adam on page 23, that of violent ambition on page 493, and on page 112, that of a reference to spiritual beings with renewed consciences which is an implied reference to Butler's use of natural. (72) These three are not compatible. But the real force of Liddon's argument is that Christ's character is to be taken without reference to moral philosophy, although that is not the same as saying that Liddon does not rely on moral philosophy for his arguments and conceptual structure. Rather Christ's character stands on its own.

It makes an impression on the believer that is very forceful and
designed to make the greatest impact:

"If argument from prophecy could be discredited, by assigning new dates to the prophetical books, and by theories of a cultured political foresight; if the faith of the Apostles could be accounted for, upon grounds which referred it to their individual peculiarities of thought and temper; there would still remain the unique phenomenon of the sublimest of characters inseparably linked, in the Person of Jesus, to the most energetic proclamation of self." (71)

This character is intrinsically related to the divinity by the insincerity of self-deception argument:

"When this is acknowledged, a man must either have such self-assertion on its sufficient justification by accepting the Church's faith in the Deity of Christ; or he must regard it as fatal to the moral beauty of Christ's Human Character - 'Christus si non Deus non bonus'." (70)

So the character of Christ transcends the limitations a humanist account of it might give and stands both in its holiness and in its divinity, its omniscience and its obedience, in its full splendour. The third place where Christ's character is found is in the predictions made about it in the Old Testament. Since the predictions made in the Old Testament only exist in the form of Liddon's particular presentation of them, a very specific methodology of biblical inspiration is developed.

The Bamptons follow a deliberate pattern. The first chapter introduces the theme of the humanity and hints at the later development of character in the Bamptons. The second chapter is devoted to the inspiration of Scripture, and the predictions of Christ's divinity made therein. The third chapter takes up the theme of the moral regeneration of society via the purification of conscience, which is established through the Kingdom of God. The next three chapters, four to six, spell out the divinity of
Christ in the New Testament and relate it to the character of Christ.
The final two chapters defend the worship of Christ, the use of the term
homo-ousion and the consequences of belief in Christ's divinity. So
the themes of character, divinity, biblical inspiration and the Kingdom
of God recur through the entire work. Virtually no chapter does not
elaborate each of these four themes, although individual chapters stress
one of these themes in particular, whether it be the methodological
presuppositions of biblical exegesis, the exegesis itself or the three
results of the exegesis, character, kingdom and the divinity of Christ.
This is not a sacramentalist theology unlike Wilberforce's. The
Sacraments are included in the final chapter, but the work is far more
biblical than Wilberforce's Incarnation. Liddon's work is also far more
tightly knit than Newman's. It is the first attempt to combine biblical
exegesis with a systematic structure coherently developed. However,
it rejected any new understanding of exegesis.

Christ's understanding of the Old Testament determines its value
for Liddon, but the worth of the Old Testament is that Moses foreshadows
the work of Christ and enables a Pauline Christology to be developed.
"Prophecy is entitled to submissive attention when she proceeds to assert
that the Christ whom she has described is more than man." But the force
of prophetic description is established by Christ's assertion of the
Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. The facts of history only verify
what is true empirically. There is a deeper prospective thrust of
prophecy in its "higher utterances, which lie beyond the verification of
the human senses". Liddon thus places theology outside the
criticisms of most of the critics examined in this chapter. Any merely
moral examination of Christ will appear to have great force. It will stress

"the beauty and perfection of Christ's Human Character. It aspires to analyze, to study, to imitate that character in a degree which was, it thinks, impossible during these ages of dogma which it professes to have closed."(74)

Liddon however believes that the authority of the Old Testament is a factor ignored by such critics. Likewise the unity of the Bible is vitiated by the selective coherence to parts of it which reveal a liberal Christ in the methodology of the humanist critics.

"To undervalue these portions of truth which cannot be made rhetorically or privately available to excite religious feeling, is to accept a principle which, in the long run, is destructive of the Faith."(75)

Thus Liddon claims that the Old Testament is not a storehouse of quotations for the writers of the Epistles, and especially Paul. The true force of the hermeneutical principle is found when the unity of the Old Testament perceived by the writers of the Epistles is recognized in our own time:

"A deeper insight will discover such manifest unity of drift and purpose, both moral and intellectual, as to imply the continuous action of a Single Mind. To this unity Scripture itself bears witness, and nowhere more emphatically than in the text before us."(76)

So the Character of Christ in the Old Testament reveals God's activity, but it is also produced by divine activity. God forms the unity of Scripture as a witness to that unity. Character and methodology combine. (77)
"There are also occult references to this doctrine (the divinity of Christ and the moral worth of his character) which we are not likely to detect (in the Old Testament), unless, while seeking them, we are furnished with an exegetical principle, such as was that of the organic unity of Scripture, as understood by the ancient Church." (78)

The hidden, or occult, Old Testament references to the divinity of Christ are there as part of the preparation for the Incarnation. Liddon assumes that the events recorded in the Old Testament are there to furnish the basis for a written revelation:

"Would not God appear to have been training His people, by this long and mysterious series of communications, at length to recognize and to worship Him when hidden under, and indissolubly one with, a created nature?" (79)

Thus the whole of Scripture reflects a particular unity. Just as Christ had unity of divine consciousness despite a growth in knowledge ("unity of consciousness in a human life is not forfeited by growth of knowledge, or by difference of circumstances, or by varieties of experience") (80), so too is Scripture the complete revelation of Christ despite different measures and levels of Revelation. Moses' writings determine the reference to Abraham in Galatians 3:8. (81)

"Such a position is only intelligible when placed in the light of a belief in the fundamental unity of all revelation, underlying, and strictly compatible with its superficial variety. And this true, internal Unity of Scripture, even when the exact canonical limits of Scripture were still unfixed, was a common article of belief to all Christian antiquity ... According to the tenor of Christian belief, Moses, St. Paul and St. John are severally regarded as free yet docile organs of infallible intelligence, who places them at different points along the line of His action in human history; who through them and others, as the ages pass before Him slowly unveils His
mind; who anticipates the fulness of later revelations by the hints contained in His earlier disclosures; Who in the compass of His boundless wisdom 'reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly ordereth all things'.

Nor is this merely a general revelation of the incarnation. Prophecy foretells every part of the character, divinity and work of Christ:

"The Human Life of the Messiah, His supernatural birth, His character, His death, His triumph, are predicted in the Old Testament with a minuteness which utterly defies the rationalistic insinuation, that the argument from prophecy in favour of Christ's claims may after all be resolved into an adroit manipulation of sundry more or less irrelevant quotations."

It is not relevant to this thesis to list all of Liddon's arguments for establishing how the Old Testament reveals Christ's character. Liddon argues that this argument is correct because it is a traditional way of handling biblical material. Tradition has a value in itself, but especially so within Christianity. Liddon is saying to his critics that any argument about who Christ was must be conducted in a way acceptable to the Church itself, so all the references to hope in Biblical exegesis must be offset by an appeal to tradition, without which the Church would not be what it is today:

"that principle to which the Christian Church owes her sacred volume itself, no less that her treasure of formulated doctrine, and the structural conditions and sacramental sources of her life - that principle to which each generation of human society is deeply and inevitably indebted for the accumulated social and political experiences of the generations before it."
Liddon develops Christology to a new degree in the nineteenth century. He unites systematic theology, philosophy and biblical exegesis beyond the work of Wilberforce. His Bamptons deservedly became the standard mid-Victorian "Systematics". We have shown how there are many themes in the Bamptons. Liddon is not afraid to explore questions of method and substance. Thus he wrote on biblical inspiration, tradition as revelation, concepts of epistemology and exegesis. This methodology lies scattered throughout the work. He then passes on to Christology and character. Finally he moves to the Kingdom of God, the Church, and Christian society.

It is a vast theme. We have noticed that Liddon accepts the two natures of Christ, even if the humanity is impersonal and a vehicle for the divinity. We have brought out the nature of man's need for redemption today for Liddon as well. Yet we have finally shown how many are the problems Liddon leaves unresolved.

First, we must notice how difficult Liddon finds the term "natural". He can use it of Adam, of sinful man, or like Butler of the "balanced" character of Man. All alike are spoken of as "natural". They are not compatible.

Secondly, Liddon enters the determinist controversy by an extremely involved epistemology. Christ is free, because he is governed by the divine Word. How he knows is a matter of constantly more intricate defence of texts in the Gospel for Liddon. Liddon becomes a prisoner in his own ghetto of the Bible. The Character of Christ throws backwards
onto the Old Testament a unity of purpose, and finds in the Kingdom of
God the goal of its endeavours.

Thirdly, we have shown that the alliance with moral philosophy is
now over. Christ's character for Liddon is obedient and the vehicle of
the Word. Butler's moral philosophy is heard at times when Liddon speaks
of the Christian. More often, Liddon sees English empiricism as a devil
to be exercised by Tractarian worship and sound belief. One wonders
how Newman viewed this development.

Fourthly, Liddon sets a new standard for Christology. Any further
work must be versed in biblical exegesis, patristics and modern theology
and philosophy. It is a measure of its greatness that from 1866 the
Bampton's remained the main systematic volume until Gore's 1891 Bampton's,
Westcott's 1892 The Gospel of Life and Hort's 1893 The Way, The Truth and
The Life.

To conclude this summary of Liddon, we make three points:

(i) The purpose of Christ's incarnation for Liddon is to found a society
in which the Eternal, present Christ may be known to man. Christ
incarnate has a nature infused with knowledge and essentially
prelapsarian, as the truly natural man. Such a society should
renew the moral character of men. The discussion of Christ's
divinity is obviously theological. But there is a division between
the theological working out of epistemology and natural being, and
the basic structure of human nature, which is taken from Butler,
and moral philosophy. Yet again this same Christ is an example
in terms of moral philosophy (the natural man) and theology (the
sinless one determined by the Word).

(ii) The historical Christ relates to the present Christ through worship and adoration. What is adored is the character of the historical Christ. Such a figure does not appear to have a relationship to the present primarily in terms of function. The Adoration of Christ is the adoration of a pre-Existent figure, revealed as Son of God by the Resurrection (Romans 1.4 is cited by Liddon).

(iii) Historical portrayals of Christ which are not adored in worship can become purely descriptive. Worship takes the Christian into dogma and theology. Opposing the Unitarians Martineau (J) and Channing, Liddon argues that one must "leave the strictly historical and aesthetical treatment of the Gospel record of His Life and Character".

V. SUMMARY

This chapter has shown how various were the responses to the agnostic challenges of mid-Victorian England. Together Seeley, Newman and Liddon show how theologians attempted to rebut the agnostic position.

One point to be stressed in conclusion to Chapter Five is that Newman and Liddon turned to the authority of Christ for a defence of his character. Equally they both claimed Christ was present today. Thirdly, dogma and exegesis combine to give a dogmatic character of Christ. How different this was from Seeley, who appealed to the effect of Christ's work among men. Christ has no intrinsic authority. Nor is he present today, save in his example. The divergence is striking.
A second point we have discovered is that Seeley and Liddon both stress the work of Christ in building a "divine society". We have come far from the individualism of Butler, which was not seriously challenged by Newman. This divine society is the answer to the concern with social improvement, which we noticed so strongly in Chapter Four.

Thirdly, we must notice that neither Liddon nor Seeley have really understood the dimensions introduced by Mill. Mill's aesthetic regeneration of character strikes little echo in the character of Christ represented by Seeley and Liddon. They appear to be trying to outdo the utilitarians in their stress on the "useful" work of Christ. Indeed, studies of Victorian Evangelical and Tractarian popular novels could be cited to corroborate this point. Nor is the awareness of tragedy found in Butler ever found in Liddon at all. For the followers of Liddon and Seeley optimism was justified. The fight was over, and the battle was won.

Hence we must summarize the evangelistic import of Liddon's theology as essentially a failure. Despite the enormous respect which the Bamptons of 1866 justifiably produced, and the brilliant synthesis of form and content into a full scale systematic volume, Liddon leads Victorian theology away from the questions of mid-Victorian culture. If Tillich's theological method of correlating the questions of culture and the answers of theology has anything to commend it, and I believe it has, Liddon in the end is a massive failure. He is brilliant in scholarship. Seeley is brilliant.
in style. But could the artistic concerns of men be placed under the sway of the Christian faith? Could moral philosophy be re-united with theology? Could evil be explained and tragedy ended? A later generation of theologians, among them Westcott, Moberly and Gore, would give better answers, but not for twenty five more years. Until then, Liddon held sway in the field of systematics, despite the advances made in biblical studies at Cambridge. That is a mark of Liddon's achievement, and of his danger for theology.
CHAPTER SIX
Summary of the Thesis

The thesis begins with tracing the relevance of Bishop Butler. The Tractarian Movement revived Christology as a study of interest to Anglicanism from 1830 - 1845. There was within this revival a concern with Christ both as Son of God and as Pattern Man. This term is a synonym for character. Christ had a perfect character. The detailed analysis Butler gave of the complexity of human character was dependent upon his resolution of this complexity by talk of a system in human nature. The Tractarians used Butler to analyze human nature so that they could write of Christ's human nature and His character.

There were other reasons why the Tractarians turned to Butler. The process of faith involved a moral discernment of divine reality. Conscience and the illative sense witnessed for Newman to the idea of Christianity. But both conscience and the illative sense stemmed from a person's character. The influence of Butler is again crucial in the analysis.

A third reason why Butler was of such great importance is the concept of sanctification. Sanctification implies a growth into the character of Christ. The holiness and self-control of a Christian involves the formation of a character in man which requires some knowledge of what that
The primary importance of Butler for this thesis is, however, the character of Christ Himself. Thus the thesis claims that the Tractarians spoke both of the human nature and the character of Christ, and that they realised that human nature is the material out of which character develops. It is also a claim of the thesis that in their very protest against the liberalism of Oxford University the Tractarian emphasis on holiness and the study of the character of Christ implied a commitment to carrying on the tradition of moral philosophy that began with Locke. The Tractarians preached the character of Christ, and turned to Butler to explore what character might mean. The thesis claims that Butler has been neglected in the study of Tractarian Christology. It is not merely that one influence on the revival of Christology from 1830 - 1845 has been neglected, but that in neglecting it the importance of moral philosophy has not been realised. It is a great mistake that the study of Butler is at present carried on primarily in University Departments of philosophy, with rare exceptions. It is no less evidently a mistake that the search for humanity in speaking of Christ's human nature has not usually involved moral philosophy.

Butler's analysis of character can be briefly outlined. He works in a theistic and unsystematic way, with little reference to Christology. Because this is so, he tends to be referred to implicitly by the Tractarians, rather than quoted explicitly. Yet the presuppositions Butler
held do not disappear easily. Butler held to the objectivity of morality. This can be found in each Tractarian writer. It is a cardinal axiom of their thought that God has a "moral government over the world, which religion teaches." There is "an original standard of right and wrong in actions". Every moral description implied moral evaluation for Butler, and so it did for the Tractarians. Yet this is not a Kantian evaluation of human action. Men have a proper concern with what will benefit their salvation.

Butler also is concerned with the image of God in man, and with the inevitable imperfections in speaking of human experience at all. This impressed Newman, and the influence of Butler on Newman's University Sermons is well-known. It is one of the few places where the link between Butler and the Tractarians is well-charted. However, Butler could still make assertions on the basis of human nature. He was not simply silent because it was difficult to speak of man. He believed that there was a "real nature" of man adapted to God's purposes. The purpose of God is the redemption of mankind.

Butler saw character as the outcome of human response to his environment. Man is a hierarchy of responses, from the common passions, through the faculties and affections which co-ordinate the discipline of the passions, to the stem government of conscience. The integration of the components which make up human nature is described by Butler as "proportion" and character is the result of this balancing of the forces within man. It is not that which
decides a course of action as it was for Newman but rather that achieves certain actions over time. Butler is a moral psychologist, yet he does not investigate the reasons for action, as Newman did. What he investigates is how the turbulence within man can be disciplined a right.

The thesis has explored what Butler meant by passions, affections and faculties. It has examined Butler's defence of self-love, and his refutation of the thesis that benevolence is the whole of virtue. It notes that Butler believed that man could be persuaded to be good, and that conscience could be awakened by the preacher. The authority of conscience is paramount, yet often ignored by man.

Lastly, and most importantly for the thesis, Butler asserts that character can be formed by moral discipline. The relationship between God's character and our own is one which should satisfy all the needs of man. This relationship is the essence of religion, for religion is "intended for a trial and exercise of the morality of a person's character." Religion is not simply morality. It is the exercise of morality, in forming character. Butler, as we have said, reminds one of Romans 5: 3-4: "suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character." Butler is not especially optimistic. The thesis examined with care Butler's relationship with Greek tragedy when Butler speaks of "the present and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves." Butler holds that in the pain and sorrow of mankind God moulds man into a character fit for Himself, yet God also usually works through nature, not by special intervention. Butler concludes in the
Sermons with praise of a "righteousness which we can trust because it is everlasting and changeless." At this point, the thesis relates Augustine to Butler. John Burnaby compares the spirituality of the two men across the centuries. Augustine is a theologian whom we will return to in later chapters.

In the third chapter the three concerns of Newman are examined. These are the character of men as they come to faith, the character of Christ, and the character of the Christian disciple. The influence of Butler is carefully brought out in studying Newman. Newman analyses the nature of Christ's humanity and His character. Character is not the final expression of moral action, which it was for Butler. Butler sees character as the proportioned and integrated relationship of the responses within man to his environment. Newman sees character as the reason for action, and the inner being of a man. Butler sees character as the final resolution of many motives and desires into one compound action. Some men are compassionate and have compassion as the dominant motif or strand in their character. Others deceive themselves, and their character is a mystery, veiled in self-deceit. Newman instead looks at why men act. An obedient character, as Christ is or has, is one who seeks to eradicate certain desires and cultivate other ones. In short, the thesis seeks to show that Butler heavily influenced Newman, but that they held different views on what character was.

Newman relates the character of Christ to the character of the Christian by the theme of indwelling. Yet this
theme is always referred to the way scripture presents the character of Christ. Chapter Three discusses the way conversion occurs for a Christian, and emphasizes the importance of conscience in Newman and in Butler. The two men also agree on Providence, which forms character in the Christian. Newman developed his own theory of real assent to the Idea of Christianity when discussing conversion. He relates the Idea of Christianity to Christology.

Christology involves Newman in a discussion of how Christ acts. The activity of God, Christ's dependence upon God and God's self-giving are all crucial to Newman. The first chapter presented the Tractarians as viewing Christology through the definitions of Chalcedon and the Athanasian Creed. Here we find another difference between Butler and the Tractarians, including Newman. It is evident that one can transform the way a character can be seen if it is placed against a drama or plot in which it plays a role. The Tractarians took the concept of character against the background of God's action. This is especially true of Newman's view of Christ's character.

I have also argued in the first chapter that the Tractarians believed that humanity was not the same as character. The detailed study of Newman's view of the humanity of Christ shows that for him, the humanity of Christ is an attribute of the divine nature, and is entirely dependent upon God. Here the analysis given in Chapter One of the dependence shown in the humanity of Christ is made clear. Newman explicitly wrote "It is called incarnate in order to express the dependence ... of his humanity." The
Action of God in Christ is shown in the transformation of the humanity, which Newman calls "deification." The self-giving of God through the humanity is related by Newman to Trinitarian doctrine, where in the inner relations of the Trinity the Father has a status as the origin of the Godhead. From the Trinity Newman passes to the obedient descent of the Son to mankind at great cost to Himself.

The limits of Chalcedon upon the depiction of human nature now emerge in some detail. We discover that Newman's view of the deification of Christ's knowledge is in some tension with his earlier position that Christ learnt through experience. The inconsistency here is also found in the suffering of Christ, with regard to pain. The transformation of Christ's will at Gethsemane shows the action of God in Christ very clearly.

Newman's position on the transformation of Christ's humanity is thus shown, and it is related to Cyril's view of the humanity as an instrument. The influence of Butler is seen when Christ's rational activity is given as the basis for His identity and recalls Butler's similar answer to the question as to what was identity outlined in Chapter Two. The further importance of Butler is seen when Newman suggests that the subordination of Christ's rational soul to the Divine Word gives Him omniscience, which recalls Butler's view of the authority of conscience necessary for man's gaining moral unity and knowledge.
The character of Christ springs out of Newman's analysis of the humanity of Christ. Again, moral philosophy is important. As we had earlier discovered, character is not the same as moral value for Newman. Christ is not primarily moral, but an agent who has qualities defined by moral philosophy, such as intentionality, deliberation and responsibility. Christ is a man who acts, and moral philosophy delineates this agency in formal terms.

What it means to be freely human is a key point for Newman. Character expresses the transcendent significance of human nature, which is the claim advanced in Chapter One. The significance of Christ's humanity is that his character is obedient (dependent) and transformed (the acts of God in Christ). Obedience and transformation make Christ truly free. His humanity was self-moved, in terms Aristotle would have used and as the thesis has argued Newman was indebted to Aristotle. His character was responsible. It is a character which condemns sin and responds to the Father. It is contextualised by Scriptural typology which emphasises the redemptive purposes of God. The moral unity of divine action is met by the responses of a character formed by God as his own. Newman, I have argued, takes up Butler's theory of how God forms human character and applies it to Christ. "He learned obedience through what he suffered," is a passage which expresses in words from Hebrews (5: 7-9) Newman's adoption of Butler's theory of the formation of human character by God.
Newman goes beyond Butler in seeing human passions as temptations. Newman has a view of character which requires that moral choice must be deliberate. Newman felt that Christ's death was voluntary and deliberately willed by the human will. It was not controlled by the Word. The premeditated action was possible since Christ had a sinless character, but this refers to His human character. A Christ under authority defies temptation, and so grows in holiness.

Newman's theory of character, to conclude, is not the same as his analysis of human nature. The thesis shows difficulties in his view of human nature, as for instance on Christ's way of knowing, but Newman is clear what character involves. The character of Christ is threefold. It expresses an inner commitment to act in a certain way. It expresses a verdict on human sin. It results in action. "Action is the criterion of human faith." Christ's character is self-moved, responsible and effective. It is not the same as moral value, and must not be reduced to it.

Christians are to follow His character as their pattern. Newman believed that "without an immediate apprehension of the personal character of our Saviour, what professes to be faith is little more than an act of ratiocination". If the thesis requires a proof text to justify the argument this would be it. The character of Christ unifies the Idea of Christianity epistemologically, but is also our
moral ideal. The object of scripture is to ensure the formation of character which responds to the indwelling of Christ.

Newman therefore sees Christ's character as obedient, and as set against the drama of the self-giving of the Godhead. He takes up all the Chalcedonian themes of dependence, divine action and self-giving and fashions them with the aid of moral philosophy into the character of Christ. The incarnation yields "the pattern specimen," and in this pattern Newman sees character as impossible to depict fully in words, yet Newman held that a character involves intention to act and the dispositions which govern an action. The formation of intentions is thus the key to Newman's theory of character.

Chapter Three then turns to Wilberforce, the first major systematic theologian in the Tractarian Movement, but more rigid in his conclusions than Newman. This does not mean that he was unoriginal, which is far from being the case, as his reading of German idealism and his interest in culture and history clearly shows. He is concerned about the relationship of the collective unity of mankind, and sets this against the principle of personal identity which he loosely defines as personality.

Thus human nature and character are contextualised by Wilberforce in terms of "the sentiments of collective humanity". This is a new departure for theology. Wilber-
force is a theologian who also is both heavily indebted to the Fathers and to Butler's view of conscience. Thus the thesis shows that he is a complex theologian and I have argued that English empiricism, German idealism and Alexandrian Christology are not easily reconciled.

Wilberforce's view of human nature is examined in detail. As usual, the Chalcedonian limits of Christology take the Word as determinant for the humanity, and so the themes of divine activity, dependence on God, and divine self-giving recur. The examination focuses on the areas of sin, ignorance and pain, which were also the areas looked at in Newman's Christology. As said above, Wilberforce is more systematic than Newman. Another point which may be mentioned from Chapter One, which is the Introductory Chapter, is the way Christology can be understood more fully if studied alongside other doctrines, even if a Christocentric theology will determine those doctrines by its Christological emphasis. Wilberforce illustrates this point in a marked way, relating Christology to sacramental theology and ecclesiology.

Thus the action of God in Christ at the Incarnation, which renders Christ's humanity uniquely glorious, nevertheless has the present action of God in Christ in the eucharistic sacrifice as the primary emphasis for Wilberforce's Christology. The dependence of Christ's humanity on God is unique, because Christ stands outside the spiritual unity of man as an "organic race." Christ is unique in being
dependent as an individual, not as part of collective humanity. The effect of divine action and dependence on God for the humanity is that it restores the likeness of God in man. Wilberforce, we discovered, followed Augustine and others of the Fathers in equating ignorance with the effects of moral evil. Hence Wilberforce argues that Christ's knowledge is unique, for Christ was uniquely sinless. Wilberforce uses the term "intuition" to describe this process of knowledge, but it is in fact a reference to inward inspiration. The suffering of Christ again is experienced by Him in a unique way. Wilberforce is shown in the thesis to view humanity as having accidental and essential attributes, with sickness as an accidental attribute. Christ could never experience this blemish. He could however die and suffer if He willed His body to experience this. The question of will is crucial. Wilberforce argues that Christ's will is that of man before the Fall. Moral evil is only experienced on the Cross for a moment as the aid of the Spirit is withdrawn. The thesis contrasts Newman and Wilberforce. Newman sees Christ's will as fallen, yet sinless due to the power of the Spirit. Wilberforce sees the influence of the Spirit as preserving a prelapsarian will. Newman sees Christ shrinking from pain; but Wilberforce denies that this could be so. Newman at times could argue for Christ's human knowledge as being developed by experience, but Wilberforce again argues for the "intuitive" knowledge of Christ.

Wilberforce's view of mankind was criticized by Roman
Catholic writers such as Capes, whom we have discussed in the thesis. Wilberforce is shown in the thesis as using Butler's view of conscience, but does not refer explicitly to Butler. His view of Christ's humanity contains within itself tensions in as much as it is informed by themes from empiricism, idealism and the Fathers.

Lastly, the thesis examines Wilberforce's view of character. The perfection of Christ's character allows Christ to act as mediator between God and man. The mediation stems from the Athanasian Creed, where Christ's unity is "One; not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh: but by taking of the manhood into God." This manhood expresses mediation through its character. Wilberforce argues that the "ancient pattern of man" in its collective unity is partially restored by poets, kings and heroes. The true Pattern man is Christ. Christ is uniquely dependent upon God in His humanity and is outside the "race," because He is elevated by the Word. However, His character is within that collective "ancient pattern" by acting as mediator between God and Man. What then is character for Wilberforce? It is different from Butler and from Newman. It is neither the proportioned integration of man's passions and affections, which it was for Butler, nor is it the inner being of man as it forms intentions and moral choices, which it was for Newman. It is instead the representation of collective humanity in an individual. It is a collective ideal, partially realized in each one of us, but fully realized in Christ.
Because Christ has such a character, the value of a Christian's belief is dependent upon those conditions of his character. Christ's character also mediates between God and man. The perfect character of Christ's humanity, joined to the Word with its eternal relationships within the Trinity, becomes a mediatorial reality through its presence in the sacraments. The difficulty here is that this sacramental theology is neither related to Wilberforce's use of Butler on conscience, nor to Wilberforce's interest in history. Thus we have character as a collective ideal, character as governed by conscience, and character as sacramental mediation.

Thus the thesis shows in Chapter Three just how differently Butler, moral philosophy and character could be correlated by the Tractarians with Chalcedonian Christology. Yet there was in Newman and Wilberforce a willingness to use moral philosophy and in particular Butler. The claim of the thesis that the Tractarians differentiated between human nature and character is substantiated in Chapters Two and Three, and the neglect of Butler as a moral philosopher in the history of Tractarianism is shown to be a weakness.

Chapters Four and Five widen the focus slightly. Chapter Four is on Hill, while Chapter Five moves through Seeley, and Newman and Sidgwick's reaction to Seeley, onto Liddon. The focus changes in two ways.

First, moral philosophy ceases to be simply about the tradition in which Butler was so critical for the Tract-
arians. Behind J. S. Mill lay the work of the utilitarian and philosophical radicals, which is not interested primarily in virtues, intentions and dispositions, but in society and the consequences of an action. Secondly, a Christocentric theology looks to the life of Christ at the Incarnation as the locus of theology. Many moral philosophers after Mill doubted the freedom or moral responsibility (in the sense in which guilt or blame could be felt by an agent for his action) of human life.

Chapter Four thus is concerned above all with Mill's view of human nature. Chapter Five in essence constitutes an examination of the substance of Liddon's reply to Mill. Mill was concerned with the problem of freewill, and was not in the least inclined to allow theologians to take Chalcedon as an unchallengeable starting point. He argued that character and human nature were empirically observed. There was the scientific possibility of establishing what human nature was at a certain time and place. It was not acceptable to determine the humanity of Christ dogmatically. Yet Mill was not interested in research into human nature for its own sake. Rather he wished to transform the society of his day by using this research in certain directions. Society could be transformed because Mill believed that man could be altered by social pressures and constraints. Man was the result of his environment. Human nature and character were thus artificial productions. The thesis argues that for Mill, the threat of pain will force the reform of a bad character. Blame and guilt become concepts
which are not true but socially useful. Mill denied we had direct power over our volitions.

Christianity is wrong because as a religion it cultivates the wrong sort of self-denial in character. It also claims an objectivity conscience does not have. On Liberty shows that education can develop causal dispositions, so that genius is fostered, and aesthetic character is formed. Mill did not differ in his view of character from Newman. Inner dispositions, intentions and motive concerned them both. Where they did differ was in the fact that Mill denied we had freedom over our volitions, and that Mill was prepared to use this acceptable character. Essentially Mill and Newman see man as being profoundly interesting in having a character, but they differ radically on the freedom man has in forming that character.

Chapter Five is the final development of the thesis. The complexity of Liddon’s theology is very great. The skill of his systematic theology compels admiration for the elaboration of exegesis and character. Yet the problems arise precisely because Liddon goes beyond the Tractarian tradition. It is ironic that whereas Tractarianism began as a protest against Oxford liberalism which in its earliest days used moral philosophy, the second generation Tractarians, such as Liddon, abandoned their links with moral philosophy precisely in defence of the tradition they intended. Thus in a sense they destroyed the value of the tradition which they were determined to preserve.
Liddon sees Christ as giving dignity to human nature. There is still some influence of Butler on Liddon, but it is hard to maintain against the Patristic and systematic theology Liddon uses so often. Christ takes the flesh Adam held before the fall. Liddon follows Augustine's De Genesi more closely than Wilberforce does. The act of God in Christ is seen when Liddon writes of Christ's infused knowledge, free will and supernatural grace. Liddon turns to Augustine when he wishes to indicate the transformed nature of humanity held by Christ, but to Butler when he speaks of ordinary human nature. The seat of power in man (or the Kingdom of God) is for Liddon a purified conscience, as the thesis has brought out. The dependence of Christ on God is shown again with reference to Augustine. The "vitium" of sin affects human will, except for Christ whose supernatural birth affects his will which is obedient and dependent in God for its personality. Liddon is reserved on the suffering of Christ and the divine self-giving. Indeed, Liddon's Christ affects the world more than it affects him.

The character of Christ has authority for Liddon, and it is a character which builds a society. This attempt to answer Hill by pointing to the power of Christ over men, his supernaturally bestowed free will unaffected by the sinful constraints of the surrounding environment, and the society he built is a skilful but essentially polemical argument. Liddon's theory of character can be briefly given. It is, first, that which distinguishes individuals.
It is the ultimate outward appearance in man, in the same way as "prosopon" was used in Chalcedonian Christology. Christ has one "prosopon" at Chalcedon, and not two as Nestorianus argues. Liddon agreed, but he used character to convey the same meaning as "prosopon". Secondly, Liddon holds that there is a true human nature, which is an ideal man can and should follow. Such an ideal in fact is an ideal character, because it refers to actions and thoughts consistently expressed over time. Thirdly, Christ's character is balanced and proportioned. Thus after using the Fathers to define Christ's human nature in terms of knowledge, will and feeling, Liddon returns to Butler for at least the theory of character he holds. Yet unlike Butler there is also an emphasis on the result of this character, which is the foundation of the kingdom.

We must now summarize the claims the thesis has made. There seem to be different views of character held by the five main thinkers in the thesis. Butler sees it as the sum total of human desires when disciplined by reason and conscience. It is placed against the redemption of man by God, and is formed by God. Newman is influenced by Butler, but he turns to Christ's character, and brings this much closer into relation with the events of the Incarnation. Character is the inner disposition of self, and gives reasons for why men have desires and intentions at all. Character is free and not to be created by social pressures. The invisible number of the elect are indwelt by Christ who knows His own. Mill has a similar view of
the definition of character to Newman, but disagrees sharply with him on the key questions of freedom, and education. Man is not free and can have a good character made by the right education. The wrong education will ruin genius. So Mill and Newman end by being far apart. Mill's genius was an anathema to Newman, and Newman's belief in grace meaningless to Mill.

As well as Butler's view of character as the expression of an integrated desire in action, and Newman and Mill's interest in why men act, there are the two theologians who wrote systematically. Wilberforce turns to character as the expression of a collective ideal, while Liddon holds to an ideal less sharply defined and more individually expressed. Character is what enables man to act on society for Liddon. At the risk of simplifying, there seem to be three alternatives here. Character can be the judgement of oneself or others on how one acts by integrating one's desires. This is Butler's view. Secondly, it can explore why one acts by looking at intentions and motives. This view is common to Newman and Mill, for all their later disagreements. Thirdly, it can express an ideal, which is collective for Wilberforce and individualist for Liddon, and in expressing an ideal it comes to have effects in society.

Common human language tends to slide all three meanings without much precision. We speak of a typical clergyman or academic, and refer to his expression in character of
traits, or if we are complimentary, we speak of a fine scholarly or priestly disposition, and refer to his embodiment of an ideal. We speak of characters as devious, sly or cunning, such as Rollo's Obadiah gloe. This refers to motives or intentions. We finally speak of powerful or weak, loving or evil character, and could refer to motives, but more likely refer to the integration of desires in action.

We also contextualise characters in plots and dramas. Newman's pattern of Christ's character was set against the context of eternity. In Newman pattern and context interpenetrate. Christ's life discerns the context of His life, which is the redemptive self-giving of God as God acts in His life to save mankind. This context determines, because Christ is obedient to the Father's will, the pattern (or character) of Christ's life. It explains why Christ acted as He did. Yet the pattern of Christ's life reveals the context to new generations.

In conclusion, the thesis claims that Tractarian Christology has been seriously misread in the past. The influence of Butler is ignored. The use of moral philosophy in alliance with theology is a sign of the openness of their thought, even if it narrowed under Hill's attack and in Riddon's over-rigid mind. Most of all, the transcendent significance of the humanity of Christ, as Christ acts independent obedience to the will of God, is fully expressed in His character, whether as integrated in action, or as deter-
mining intentions and motives, or finally as expressing an ideal for men. Tractarian Christology used character in all three ways, and employed moral philosophy to allow them to do so.

Finally we return to the original intention of the thesis. Character was a highly developed concept in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century theology. Most of the writers who contributed to *Lux Mundi* used the concept frequently. We find, however, a new alliance between theology and philosophy. There are, I believe, important similarities between Bradley's *Ethical Studies* and Koberly's *Atonement and Personality*. There is also the more well-known influence of T. H. Green on Bishop Gore. Yet there is also the growth of modern psychology which dissolved character into the interaction of the conscious and unconscious mind. It was the demise of idealist philosophy, the emergence of a new generation of liberal theologians after 1900, and the influence of Freudian psychology which finally ended the alliance of moral philosophy and Tractarian theology by the second or third decade of the twentieth century. This second stage of the correlation of Christology and moral philosophy, focused in the concept of character, remains to be written. This thesis has laid the foundation for this work, in tracing the emergence of character in Anglican Christology from 1830 - 1870.
APPENDIX TO THE THESIS

CHAPTER TWO - NOTE ON BOOKS USED

The Commentators have not been much used, since they tend to be philosophical, rather than theological. On the whole I have tried to let Butler speak for himself, occasionally citing a commentator or challenging an opinion. The basic recent commentaries are in sharp antithesis in their scarcity to the Victorian profusion of 'guides to Bishop Butler'. Since 1950, there have been references to Butler in Hudson's Intuitionist Ethics and T.A. Roberts' The Concept of Benevolence (1978). Full ethical commentary is given by Austin Duncan-Jones, Butler's Moral Philosophy (1952), and a brilliant comparison of him with Kant and Utilitarianism is offered in D. MacKinnon's, A Study in Ethical Theory (1957). A. Jeffner wrote a detailed and philosophically highly acute comparison with Hume in Butler and Hume on Religion (1966), but it is in general hostile to the objectivity which Butler presupposes in ethics. Lastly, there is J.R. Lucas' Durham Cathedral Lecture of 1978, which discusses Butler on probability. As for articles, there are 5 articles on Butler in philosophical journals from 1948 - 1952: since the debate died away, three articles have been written in 1959;78 and 81. The standard commentary, which discusses the periodical debate well, is T.A. Roberts 1970 SPCK edition of the 15 Sermons. References to The Analogy of Religion use the 1896 Gladstone or the 1906 Bayne Everyman edition.

Before 1950, it is worth mentioning Rashdall's article in The
Modern Churchman, vol. 16, 1926-27, two articles by Broad (Hibbert Journal, Journal 1923 and 1922, vols 22 and 21), Broad's Five types of ethical theory (1930), and Mossner's Bishop Butler and The Age of Reason (1936). W.R. Matthews wrote an introduction to the Sermons in 1914. (I have not been able to trace an English work published in 1964 in Holland, R. Carlsson's Butler's Ethics.)
APPENDIX TWO

Edward Talbot's Memories of Mill and Liddon

Part of the ground covered in these chapters can be found in narrative form in the memoirs of Bishop Edward Talbot, *Memories of Early Life*, (Hodder, 1924). Talbot was born in 1844, and became the first Warden of Keble College, Oxford in 1870, after Liddon had declined the post. After later parochial work, he was appointed successively as Bishop of Rochester, Southwark and Winchester. His main intellectual contribution was an essay in *Lux Mundi* (1889) on "The Preparation in History for Christ".

Talbot records two episodes in his memoirs which are of interest. The first concerns the impact of Tractarianism on his father, and the shock of the conversion of some Tractarians to Roman Catholicism. There is little which is original in this part of the memoirs which, apart from personal details, could not be found in Hewsome's *Parting of Friends*. What Talbot does record, is however the feeling in the 1850's - 1860's of the exhilaration which Tractarian reform brought to the Church of England, despite the loss of Newman, Wilberforce and others. It was a sense of "being upon a rising tide". (p11). The second episode is his depiction of Oxford in 1862. "The prevailing intellectual tone of the university", especially of the cleverest of the younger generation, was opposed to Christianity. Many who listened to the university sermons were "not docile;
nor sympathetic; very critical; perhaps some of them not a little cynical or even contemptuous. They chilled me". (p42). Talbot directly contrasts this "cold current" with the previous sense of a "rising tide" within the Church of England. Talbot attributes this hostility towards Christianity to J. S. Mill. It is therefore, perhaps worth depicting Talbot's careful description of the ways in which Mill and Liddon were influential in the Oxford of the 1860's, which is the final decade covered by this thesis.

Mill was influential due to the range of his thought. His two volumes on logic were studied by Talbot, and his thought on metaphysics, society and economics equally impinged on the university. Although Mill had not written directly then on theism, his views were known and respected. The reason for his effect was the consistency "hammering in upon us the same inductive lines of thought" (p43). Mill was prepared to explain "what we had thought ultimate data". (p44). The "primary authority" of conscience was thus challenged. The effect on Talbot was great, for two reasons. First, Talbot saw the bigotry opposing Darwin, and drew analogous conclusions to the truth of the inductive methodology of Darwin in Mill. Secondly, there was much in Talbot which wanted an "inductive theology", a point we will explain in the next paragraph on Liddon's influence. The effect of Mill on Talbot was that his religious faith was not quite separate from his phil-
Talbot also knew the leaders of the Tractarian movement when he became a "Senior Student" and Tutor in Modern History at Christ Church, Oxford in 1866-7. He describes Pusey, Liddon, Mozley, Church and Edward King. Talbot was a close friend of Liddon's in later life, but he was never uncritical of Liddon. Academically Liddon was inferior to Pusey in Talbot's view, but his oratory carried his strong influence across Oxford. He represented the end of the Tractarian era by the 1860's, although he was not yet forty himself. The future of a sacramental ecclesiology lay with R. W. Church, actually fifteen years older than Liddon, and the election of Henry Scott Holland and R. T. Moberly to Senior Studentships at Christ Church by 1870. Talbot's memoirs end (p78), with a fascinating comment of Liddon's on one of Scott Holland's University Sermons, which Talbot records as showing the eclipse of Liddon's theology before the movement which led to Lux Mundi, and which lies outside this thesis. Liddon said "I was brought up, you know, dear friend, to think that Theology was a deductive science, but Holland seems to regard it as inductive". Talbot comments that "the saying was, I think, a little crude, yet it cut deep into what was passing ... the austerity and aloofness of the old Tractarians passed away, not without
grievous loss for some of us of moral severity and spiritual discipline. But we were responding to the grip and appeal of what was true and beautiful, and (so we believed) ultimately Christian in other forms”. It was with men like Talbot, Scott Holland and Herbert that the challenge offered by Hill was finally answered, but that would take us beyond this thesis.
Chapter 1


P. Abrams, *The Origins of British Sociology 1834-1914* p89

3. The relevant passages of the Council of Chalcedon in 451 and of the *Athenasian Creed* are given below. Part of the Chalcedonian formula is:

"Our Lord Jesus Christ is one and the same Son, the same perfect in Godhead, the same perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man, the same consisting of a rational soul and a body: homoousios with the Father as to his Godhead, and the same homoousios with us as to his manhood; in all things like unto us, sin only excepted; begotten of the Father before the ages as to his Godhead, and in the last days, the same, for us and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin Theotokos as to his manhood .... One and the same Christ Son, Lord, Only-begotten made known in two natures without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the difference of the natures having been in no wise taken away by reason of the union, but rather the properties of each being preserved, and both concurring into one prosopon and one hypostatis - not parted or divided into two prosopa but one, and the same Son and Only-begotten, the divine Logos, the Lord Jesus Christ".

The Anglican Book of Common Prayer translates the *Athenasian Creed* in part as follows:
"Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man; God, of the Substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and Man, of the Substance of his Mother, 'born in the world; Perfect God and perfect Man: of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting;' Equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead: and inferior to the Father, as touching his Manhood. Who although he be God and Man: yet he is not two, but one Christ; One; not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh: but by taking of the Manhood into God; One altogether; not by confusion of substance: but by unity of Person. For us the reasonable soul and flesh is one man: so God and Man is one Christ; Who suffered for our salvation: descended into hell, rose again the third day from the dead".


5. This passage draws heavily on the article by S. W. Sykes in The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology ed. Hebbelthwaite and Sutherland.

6. The treatment of Butler is very varied, in the histories of the period.

Chadwick's Victorian Church refers to Butler's Analogy as one of "the old faithful books which proved Christianity true" but which "were becoming useless". (p539). He does not refer to the Sermons, but correctly notes the appeal The analogy had for an older generation, including such liberals as Provost Hawkins.

Webb gives some of the most profound treatment, and in Religious Thought in the Oxford Movement he
sees Butler as "the great master of the Oxford philosophical school" at that time, alongside Aristotle. This pre-eminence influenced the Tractarians in seeing that "the root of religion in general and of Christian religion in particular was in the moral consciousness." Webb notes that this is Butler's own view, and therefore religious progress requires moral effort alongside grace. Yet Webb does not follow this insight through. He is unlike many of the others in paying attention to Butler's moral philosophy but he does not refer to the Sermons in particular. One further point which he makes in passing is that the moral implications of their spirituality and indebtedness to Butler led later tractarians to be more critical of the received tradition in doctrine than the founders of the Oxford Movement were. However he gives no evidence for this, and it does not seem typical of Butler to criticize systematic theology for moral reasons. (Religious Thought, p50 and 53). Webb's other two books refer to Butler but do not relate him to the nineteenth century.

Reardon is a historian who is aware of the repeated echo of Butler in Newman's writings. That the foundation of religion is conscience, that the Analogy was influential, and that probability is the guide of life are the categories under which Reardon places the relationship of Butler to Newman,
(pages 110, 139, 142, and 292). What one misses is an account of anthropology, and the formation of character by Providence, which this thesis has sought to bring out. It is not merely that Newman took morality very seriously, but that he found the nature of human character to be first discussed in Butler.

Elliot-Binns is helpful in showing how little the European Enlightenment referred to Butler. (p132).

Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy* gives him three lines which are incorrect, and the Encyclopaedias never do more than mention him. *Butler's thought is presented in an original way as judging Victorian theology and culture for its self-deceit* (p499), and failure to take the revelation of God through Nature seriously (p170). There is however, no mention of him in relation to Newman at all.

Storr's *Development of English Theology* is almost entirely taken up with the Analogy, which he sees Mansel extending as a theological method in his 1859 Bamptons. (p50, 55, 58, 419).

Tulloch places J. S. Mill as one of the opponents of Newman, but he ignores Mill's anthropology. Butler is only briefly alluded to (p102), for his Sacramentalism which influenced Keble, and his
theory of probability which shaped Newman's thought. Tulloch dismisses the theory of probability as being "little more than a process of make-belief".

Thus the treatment of Butler is most extensive in Reardon, and most suggestive in Webb. This thesis claims however that the influence which marked Newman as deeply as anything from Butler was Butler's interest in the formation of moral character by the providential action of God in creation.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Sermon§ 7, para 16 (hence S7-16).
2. S10-16.
4. S8-1. Curiosity is the Second Temptation for Augustine, after sensuality and before love of oneself (Confessions, Bk. 10).
5. Analogy Book 1, ch 7 (hence A1-7).
11. DV 10.
15. S1-1.
16b. The ref is to the 1801 Spirit of Christianity. Hegel, Early Theol. Writings ed. T. Knox, p. 301.
17. S1-1.
20. Duncan-Jones Ch. 3, secs. 3-5 "undefinable".
22. A2-8 (para 24) The Analogy chapter paras are in Gladstone's 1896 edition only.
25. S2; S3.
27. S3-5.
28. Pr 27.
29. PR 29.
30. Pr 29.
31. DV 8.
32. DV 8.
33. Pr 39.
34. Al-7 (21) (paragraph 21).
34b. S10-2.
35. Gustafson, Protestant and RC Ethics, pp. 82/3.
36. S8-17.
37. MacKinnon, Newman's University Sermons, p. XIII.
38. Mossner, p. 164.
41. S10-10.
42. Preface to Sermons, 12 (Pr 12).
43. S1-6 fn.
44. S1-6 fn.
45. 2nd letter to Clarke 23/11/1713.
46. A2-8 (paras 14-16-25-26).
47. A2-7 (33).
50. Al-3 (1).
52. S4-7 ... S11-6.
53. S8-17.
54. S8-3.
55. S5-3.
56. S2-1.
57. S6-1.
58. A2-1 (16).
60. Al-1 (32).
61. S1-6.
62. Al-1 (17).
63. Al-1 (20).
64. Al-1 (26).
65. Parker, p. 32.
67. DPI 3-8.
68. DPI 5.
69. DPI 9.
70. Dissertation on Virtue 1.
71. Al-6 (22).
72. Al-6 (9).
73. DPI 3.
75. and Butler was accused of being a secret Catholic - Mossner 206.
76. S2-6.
77. S2-5.
78. S2-10.
79. S2-10.
80. Pr 14.
81. Duncan-Jones p. 48 ff.
82. S2-13.
83. S11-6.
84. S11-9.
85. S11-16.
86. Pr 37.
87. S11-16.
88. Preface 40.
89. S11-20.
90. Mossner, p. 236.
91. S1-12.
92. S1-6.
93. S3-8.
94. S3-9.
95. S11-19.
96. S11-11.
98. S15-8, S15-10.
100. S12-27.
101. S7-14.
102. 23-5.
103. S1-8.


105. S2-8.


108. DV1.

109. DV1.

110. DV1.

111. the phrase is Schuller's.

112. Republic 435e, etc. cf Temple W. Plato and Christianity, 1916, for discussion.

113. S3-2.

114. Roberts, 157, citing Shaftesbury.

115. S3-8.

116. S5-11.

117. S5-3.

118. S5-11.

119. S3-8.

120. Roberts 161 - NIC Ethics 2-3.

121. S12-10.

122. S4-16.

123. S4-17.


125. S12-21.

126. S14-3.

127. S3-2 fn.

128. S12-10.
129. S12-11.
131. Oppenheimer p. 74.
132. Dialogues pt 4 and 9 (p 34 & 59, H.D. Aiken edn.).
133. Al-6 (13).
139. S13-10.
140. A2-8 (21).
141. S2-3.
142. DV10 cf. MacKinnon's comments with reverence to C20 fascism in
   A Study in Ethical Theory.
144. p. 237 Lowes Dickinson.
145. Explorations in Theology 5, pp. 82 onwards.
146. S10-2.
147. Preface 29.
149. S10-6.
150. Institutes Ch2, Bk 2 of Wendel p. 189.
151. Al-5 (31).
152. Al-5 (31).
156. A1-5 (8).
159. A2-1 (11).
160. Charge to the clergy of Durham 1751, Sect. 9.
163. A2-2 (whole chapter).
164. S7-6.
165. A1-7 (1).
166. A1-3 (5-7).
173. Wendel: Calvin p. 206: "for Calvin the Decalogue is only a special application of the natural law".
174. T. Parker, J.N. Calvin, A Biography, Chs. 2 & 3.
175. A2-3 (27).
177. S2-4 + S2-8.
179. S12.
181. A2-5, esp (13) (18) (22).
182. A2-7.
183. A2-1 (17).
185. S4-17.
186. S10-11.
188. S12-33.
189. S14-17.
191. Jeffner, p. 214 sees Butler as dividing men into 'men' and 'honest men'. This seems too subtle a point; for Butler honesty was the norm, "deviancy" abnormal.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER 3

1. D. Newsome, *Two Classes of Men*, p. 73.

2. E. C. Mossner, *Bishop Butler and the age of reason*, p. 244.
   R.W. Church, *Pascal and other Sermons*, p. 25. There are many references to Butler by R.W. Church. He praised Lightfoot's acceptance of the Bishopric of Durham in 1879 by calling him a worthy successor to Butler. In 1833, as a student, he wrote "It is a great wish of mine to be properly acquainted with Butler, to lay the foundations of my own mind amid his works - to have him ever facing me and imbuing me with his spirit." R.W. Church, *Life and Letters*, p. 17 and p. 326. Smith's *life of Church* sees Church as the person who passed on the respect for Butler to the younger generation of Gore and Henson. *Life*, p. 280 and pp. 266-8.


4. Ibid., pp. 201-3.

5. Mossner, p. 228.
   H. Rashdall, *God and Man*, p. 231, on Butler.
   The links between Butler and Newman are discussed by J. Boekrad, *The Personal Conquest of truth according to Newman.*
   J.M. Cameron, *The Night Battle*.
   A. Harderlin, *The Tractarian Understanding of the Eucharist*.
   N. Lash, *Newman on Development*.
   E. Mossner, op. cit.
6 (a) University Sermon 1

6 (b) PS 6, p.4 Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching, cited Przywara, p.63

6 (c) University Sermon 5


10. J., p. 239.


"Righteousness not of us but in us."

13. PPS 6, p. 121. "The Spiritual Presence of Christ in his Church."


21. Lash, p. 47.


23. Lash, p. 75.

24. PPS 4, p. 170, "The Communion of Saints."

Cameron, op. cit., p. 206.


27. US, p. 85.

28. The portrayal of the Gospel by the Church is seen again in Michael Ramsey's *The Gospel and the Catholic Church*, 1936. It is a persistent theme in Catholic theology.

PPS 5, p. 44, "Unreal Words".


29. PPS 7, p. 149, "Attendance on Holy Communion".


32. PPS 1, 325, "Scripture A Record of Human Sorrow".


35. US, p. 27.


Cameron's articles in The Night Battle are fundamental here.

Boekrad, op. cit., p. 288.

Yet see Boekrad, p. 108, citing Newman, *Essays Critical and Historical*, p. 57 - Catholicity of the Anglican Church:

"What a note of the Church is the mere production of a man like Butler, a pregnant fast which must be meditated on."

Furthermore, de Smet, p. 34, cites twenty usages of Newman's dependence on Butler's Analogy, such as the prophecy of Christ's coming at a fixed date, and his revelation at the expected time.

despite Butler's Sermon 12.27.

Butler, *A Dissertation upon the nature of Virtue* (DV) 8, p. 151.

58. Ibid.
59. US p. 137.
60. for instance of this, cf. Robinson's article.
       Butler, Sermon 12.27.
       J. Robinson, op. cit.
       W. de Smet, op. cit.
64. Coulson, Rediscovery, p. 128.
65. Butler, Sermon 2.8.
68. Essay II, Chapter III, Kames.
71. Yearley 13-14 and 154.
       Yearley also cites the following references on conscience:
       Idea of a University, pp. 514-515.
Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching,

PS II, pp. 17-21.

University Sermons, pp. 120-135 (1843 edn).

Occasional Sermons, pp. 64-65 (1857 edn).


73. Norris, Newman and his theological method, p. 15.

MacKinnon, Introduction to University Sermons, p. 16.

74. PS 4, 170. The Communion of Saints.

75. Harderlin, The Eucharist in the Nineteenth Century, p. 81, cites unpublished MS Sermon of 1829.

76. Harderlin, op. cit., p. 82.

Justification, pp. 198 and 205.


Ath. 2, pp. 193-195.


78. PS 2, p. 224 "The Indwelling Spirit".

79. PS 6, p. 137, "The Eucharistic Presence" (An Easter Sermon).

80. PS 3, p. 277 "Regenerating Baptism".

81. PS 1 pp. 19-20 "The Immortality of the Soul".

82. GA, p. 220.

83. Justification, p. 373.

84. PS 2, pp. 154-5 "Saving Knowledge" (Easter Monday).

86. Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical, pp. 380-381 (1831 edn).


88. PS 3, p. 170 "The Humiliation of the Eternal Son".

89. PS 3, p. 130 "Tears of Christ at the Grave of Lazarus".

90. PS 5, p. 118.

Ath 2, pp. 92-3, cited Strange.

91. PS 3, p. 166 "The Humiliation of the Eternal Son".

92. Ibid.


94. PS 6, p. 62 "Christ, the Son of God Made Man".

95. Ath 2, pp. 426-7, cited Strange p. 60.

96. PS 6, p. 6 "Christ, the Son of God Made Man".

97. PS 5, p. 210 "Sins of Infirmity".

98. PS 3, p. 166 "The Humiliation of the Eternal Son".

99. Discourses to Mixed Congregations, p. 354, 1850, "Mental Sufferings of Our God in His Passion".

100. Ath 2, p. 296, cited Strange p. 89.

101. PS 3, p. 148 "Bodily Suffering".


105. PS 3, p. 149 "Bodily Suffering".

106. Discourses, p. 349.


GA 9.2 on Ethics; on phronesis.


111. LD 19, p. 356.

LD 19, p. 381.

Strange, op. cit., pp. 92-3.


113. Wilberforce, *Bampton*, Ch. II.

Arians 1.43.

Strange, p. 84.

114. Butler, 1st 3 *Sermons*.

LD 19, p. 367.

Strange, p. 73, cites unpublished sermon, MS 408, pp. 2-3.

PS 3, p. 167 "The Humiliation of the Eternal Son".

115. PS 3, p. 139 "Bodily Suffering".

PS 5, p. 305 "Affliction, a School of Comfort".

Cf "Even He Himself ... condescended to gain knowledge by experience".

PS 5, pp. 305-6.


117. LD 13, p. 3.

118. US p. 320.

119. *Occasional Sermons*, p. 82, 1870 edn.


Strange, p. 77.
120. *Ath* 2, p. 393.


122. Tracts, p. 319.

123. PS 6, p. 4 "Fasting, a source of trial".

124. PS 7, p. 91 "The Duty of Self-Denial". Aristotle, Ethics, p. 84

"This was the peculiar character in which Christ came to Earth".

125. LD 13, p. 456.


PS 1, pp. 19-20.


Sermon 14, Butler, Essay on Development, p. 204.

Dessain, Spiritual Theories, p. 45. Cameron, Night Battle, p. 94.


132. Vargish, pp. 29, 30, 62.

PS 1, pp. 172-3.

Yearley, p. 140.

PS 5, p. 214 "Sins of Infirmity".

The letter to Ward is given in Ward's Life of Newman, II, p. 492.

133. Vargish, p. 185, cited GA 302.

137. Creed, p. 72.
138. Inc. p. 4.
139. Ibid.
141. Inc. p. 9.
142. Ibid.
144. Inc. p. 25.
145. Inc. p. 33.
146. On pages 29 and 53.
149. P. 29 Inc.
152. Inc. p. 42.
153. Inc. p. 47.
155. For the idealism, p. 335 Inc; for Butler, p. 161; Alexandrian p. 55 (Inc.). The quotation is from Athanasius, *Orat 3 contra Anan*, sec 10.
156. Inc. p. 103.
158. Inc. p. 342.
160. Inc. p. 32.
162. Inc. p. 62.
163. Inc. p. 63.
164. Inc. p. 65.
165. Inc. p. 61.
167. Inc. p. 75.
168. Inc. p. 76.
169. Inc. p. 75.
170. Inc. p. 52.
171. P.T. Marsh, The Victorian Church in Decline, H.P. Liddon, Life and Letters, pp. 73-75 (letter to the Dean of Westminster, March 10, 1864. The Dean was A. Stanley, one of Liddon's few "Liberal" friends).
172. Inc. p. 67.
175. Inc. p. 118.
176. Inc. p. 119.
178. Ibid.
179. Inc. p. 122.
180. Inc. p. 72.
181. Inc. p. 73.
183. Inc. p. 74.
184. Inc. p. 76.
185. Inc. p. 77.
186. *Intellectual System*, pp. 4-9, quoted Inc. p. 80.
188. Capes, p. 584.
190. Inc. p. 150.
191. Inc. p. 53.
192. Inc. p. 33.
193. Inc. p. 182.
194. Inc. p. 146.
195. Inc. p. 199.
196. Inc. p. 201.
201. Inc. p. 317.
203. Inc. p. 326.
204. Newsome, *The Parting of Friends*.


211. Inc. p. 351.

211. Inc. p. 10.

212. Inc. p. 370.
References to Chapter IV

2. Passmore, p29
5. Passmore, pp17-19
   Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p562.
7. a/b SL 4 - 4 - 1, pp217-238
8. SL 6 - 2 - 3, p424
9. SL 6 - 5 - 2, p452 and 6 - 10 - 1 and 2, 6 - 5 - 4/6
10. SL 6 Chapter V of Theology, or the Science of the Formation of Character. Letwin, p265
11. Examination, p585
12. SL 6 - 2 - 3, pp424-6
Aphorisms (1837) in *Dissertations and Discussions*, I.

SL 6 - 2 - 3.

SL 3 - 5 - 11.

Examination, p. 361.

Ryan, p. 128.

On Liberty, pp. 99-100. (cited O.L.)

O.L. p. 108.

O.L. p. 100.

Utilitarianism, p. 26. (cited Uhl)

Util. p. 27.

Util. p. 16.

On Liberty, p. 108.

O.L. p. 120.


Yearly, p. 29.

Vargish, p. 111.

Analogy, 2 - 5 - 7.


Jesus God and Man 1968; *Apostles Creed* p. 36; and unpublished paper by S.W. Sykes on this concept.


Vargish, p. 102. cf note 20.

Parochial and Plain Sermons, 2 - 67.

Ryan, pp. 252-254.

Britton, p. 67 (Wordsworth, *Prelude* Book XII), and pp. 73-74, p. 217.
35. Util p18
36. O.L. p116
37. O.L. p114-5
38. C.L. p121
39. O.L. p152
40. O.L. p73 and p75
41. O.L. p135
42. O.L. p135
43. Carr What is History? Chapter II
44. Vargish. p.111.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER 5

3. Ibid., p. 246 (Essays, p. 266).
4. Ecce Homo, p. 5.
5. Ibid., p. 7.
7. Ibid., p. 50.
8. Ibid., p. 146.
9. Ibid., p. 125.
11. Ibid., p. 51.
12. Ibid., p. 134.
15. Ibid., p. 302.

17. Pals, p. 74, cites Church, Guardian, 7/2/1866.
18. Ibid., p. 78 cites Macmillans, June 1866.
19. Ibid., p. 81 cites Good Words, 1868.
20. Strange, Clergy Review, pp. 142-7. (The Month, June 1866.)
23. Strange, p. 147.
28. cf Bentley.
30. Ibid., p. 192.
31. Ibid., p. 192.
34. End of Chapter One.
35. Ibid., p. 204.
36. Ibid., p. 209.
37. Knox and Vidler, op. cit.
39. Ibid., p. 440.
40. Ibid., p. 268. Gore's 1891 Bampton lectures were *The Incarnation of the Son of God*.
41. Ibid., p. 454.
42. Ibid., p. 451.
43. Ibid., p. 450.
44. Ibid., p. 451.
45. Knox and Vidler, op. cit.
47. De *Genesi*, ad litt 2.8.
49. Knox and Vidler, op. cit.
50. Liddon, Bampton's.
51. Kemp, p. 158.
52. Liddon, Bampton's, p. 468.
53. Ibid., p. 472.
54. Ibid., p. 162.
56. Ibid., p. 23.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., p. 30.
61. Life and Letters, p. 82.
62. Liddon, Bampton's, p. 97.
63. Ibid., p. 112.
64. Ibid., p. 127.
65. Ibid., p. 120.
66. Ibid., p. 125.
67. Ibid., p. 166.
68. Ibid., p. 360.
69. Ibid., p. 362.
70. Ibid., p. 493.
71. Ibid., 2nd Preface.
72. Ibid., p. 192 repeats the argument of p. 112.
73. Ibid., p. 97.
74. Ibid., Preface.
75. Ibid., p. 42.
76. Ibid., p. 44.
77. Ibid., p. 48.
78. Ibid., p. 49.
79. Ibid., p. 58.
80. Ibid., p. 47.
81. Ibid., p. 45.
82. Ibid., p. 46.
83. Ibid., p. 95.
84. Ibid., p. 72.
PRIMARY BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle  The Nicomachean Ethics  E. T. J. A. K. Thompson  
London; Penguin Books 1969  
Penguin Books 1967  
T. Arnold  The Principles of Church Reform  London;  
B. Fellowes 1853  
Athenasius  Orations Against Anans  E. T. W. Bright  
Oxford; Oxford University Press 1873  
Augustine  The city of God  E. T. G. Walsh  New York  
Image Books 1958  
Idem  Confessions  E. T. R. S. Pine-Coffin  
London; Penguin Books 1971  
Idem  On the merits and remissions of sins  E. T. J.  
Walsh. Anti-Pelagian Works Vol I.  
Edinburgh; T. & T. Clark 1872  
Idem  De Genesi ad Litteram  Patrologia Latina  
ed. J. F. Migne, Vol xxxiv; Paris; 1863  
Clarendon Press 1896  
J. Butler  Rolls Sermons, ed. T. Roberts. London;  
SPCK 1970  
J. Butler  Works, vol. 1  London; (Newman's 1st copy,  
annotated) 1813  
J. Butler  Sermons, London/Oxford; CUP (Newman's 2nd  
copy) 1836  
J. Capes  "Protestant views of the Doctrine of the Incarnation"  
The Rambler  London; April 1849
R. W. Church  The Oxford Movement  London; Macmillan 1892
Idem  Pascal and other Sermons  London; Macmillan 1895
Idem  Village Sermons  London; Macmillan 1897
Idem  Life and Letters ed. M. G. Church London; Macmillan 1897
J. Chrysostom  De Genesi (Homily 15) Patrologia Graeca ed. J. P. Migne Vol LIV Paris; 1862
Cicero  On Duties E. T. G. Gardiner, London; Methuen 1899
S. T. Coleridge  On the Constitution of Church and State according to the Idea of each London; J. M. Dent 1972
Essays and Reviews  London; Longmans 1866
C. Gore,  The Incarnation of the Son of God  London; Longman 1891
A. Gunther  Vorschule zur Speculativen Theologie, Wien; J. B. Wallishauer, 1828
D. Hartley  Observations on Man, his frame, his duty and his expectations  (1749) Gainsville, Florida; Scholars Facsimiles and Reprints, 1966.
G. W. F. Hegel  Early Theological Writings  (E. T. T. M. Knox) Chicago; Chicago University Press 1948
J. Hey  Lectures on Divinity Cambridge; Cam Univ Press 1798
H. S. Holland "H. P. Liddon" in Dictionary of National Biography London; Vol 33 1893

F. J. A. Hort The Way, the Truth, the Life London; Macmillan 1893

D. Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion London; Collier Macmillan 1977

F. Hutcheson An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (2nd edn) London; J. Darby 1726

Lord Kames (Henry Hare) Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion Edinburgh; A. Kinkarld and A. Donaldson 1751

W. Law A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life London; J. N. Dent 1967

H. F. Liddon The Divinity of Our Lord London; Rivington 1868

Idem Life and Letters ed. J. Johnston. London; Longmans 1904

Lux Mundi ed. C. Gore (9th edn) London; T. Murray 1890

H. Martineau Eastern Life London; E. Moxon 1848

F. D. Maurice The Conscience London; Macmillan 1868

Idem Theological Essays London; J. Clarke 1957

Idem Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy London; Macmillan 1872

J. S. Mill Dissertations and Discussions 4 vols. London; Longmans 1867 - 1875

Idem Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (5th edn). London; Longmans, 1878
Idem System of Logic (5th edn) London; Longmans 1865

Idem On Liberty London; J. M. Bent 1962

Idem Utilitarianism London; J. M. Bent 1962

H. Hilman The Character and Conduct of the Apostles considered as an evidence of Christianity Oxford; Oxford Univ Press 1827

R. C. Roberly Atonement and Personality London; J. Murray 1907


Idem A Newman Synthesis ed S. Przywara New York; Sheed & Ward 1945

Idem University Sermons; London; S:CK 1970

Idem The Anans of the Fourth Century (5th edn) London; Pickering 1883

Idem Parochial and Plain Sermons London; Rivington 1845

Idem Lectures on the Prophetic Office of the Church London; Rivington 1837

Idem Discussions and Arguments (7th edn) London; Rivington 1891

Idem Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification London; Rivington 1833

Idem Idea of a University London; Longman 1899

Idem Essays Critical and Historical London; Pickering 1871

Idem Apologia pro Vita Sua London; Collins - Fontana 1965
Idem, Sermons preached on various occasions
Maryland; Westminster Press 1968

Idem, An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent
London; Longmans 1903

Idem, Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical
London;ickering 1874

Idem, Sermons bearing on Subjects of the Day
London; Rivington 1871

Idem, Letters and Diaries ed C. S. Dessain

H. C. Hausem Commentary on Romans Edinburgh: T. T Clark (Clark's foreign theological library, Vol 13) 1846


T. Pohle, Christology (with A. Freuss) St. Louis; B. Herder 1913.


E. Fuesey, Unscience, not Science, adverse to Faith Oxford; T. Parker 1879

E. Kenan, Life of Jesus London; Trubnov 1864

K. Sanderson, Nine Cases of Conscience Occasionally Determined London; T. Brome 1878

F. Schleiermacher, Speeches on Religion London;
I. S. Godfrey  *The Christian Faith*  Edinburgh; T & T Clark 1926
J. R. Seeley  *Rome Vane*  London; Macmillan 1913
Third Earl of Shaftesbury (A. A. Cooper)  *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*  London; Longmans 1870
F. Stahle  *Die Philosophie des Rechts*  Heidelberg; J. Mohr 1847
D. F. Strauss  *Life of Jesus*  London; Allen and Unwin 1913
J. Taylor  *Ductor Libitantium*  London; R. Royston 1680
Tertullian  *On the Soul*  in Nicene Christian Library  Vol 4  Edinburgh; T & T Clark 1870
Thomas Aquinas  *The Disputed Questions on Truth*  Chicago; H. Regnery 1950
I. S. Godfrey  *Summa Theologiae*  London; Lyle and Spottiswoode 1963 - 1975
B. F. Westcott  *The Gospel of Life*  London; Macmillan 1892
V. Shevell  *Commentary on Butler's Three Sermons on Human Nature*  Cambridge; Belingtons 1843
R. Milberforce  *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*  London; Kayley and Smith 1879
W. Milberforce  *A Practical View of the Prevailing Religious System of Professed Christians*  London; T. Cadell 1797
W. Wordsworth  *"Immutability (sic)" in Essays no. 4. Lyceum 3 vols London; J. J. Dent 1879
SECONDARY BIBLIOGRAPHY

P. Abrams  The Origins of British Sociology 1834 - 1914
Chicago and London; University of Chicago Press 1972

N. Annan  L. Stephen  London; MacGibbon and Kee 1951

J. Astley  "Revelation"  Theology vol 83 1980

A. J. Ayer  Hume  London; Oxford University Press 1980

J. Baillie  Our Knowledge of God  London; Oxford University Press 1963

A. E. Baker  Bishop Butler  London; SPCK 1923

J. Bentley  Ritualism in Politics  Oxford; Oxford University Press 1978

A. J. Boekraad  The personal conquest of truth according to Newman  Louvain; Editions Nauwelaerts 1955

A. J. Boekraad & H. Tristram  The Argument from Con-science to the Existence of God. Louvain; Editions Nauwelaerts 1961

D. Bonhoeffer  Christology  London; Collins - Fontana 1968

Idem  Ethics  London; SCM Press 1978

K. Britton  J. S. Mill  London; Penguin 1953

C. H. Broad  Five types of Ethical Theory  London; Kegan Paul 1930

Idem  "Butler's Ethics"  Hibbert Journal vol 21 1923

Idem  "Butler as a Theologian"  Hibbert Journal vol 22, 1923

J. Burckhardt  Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy  London; Phaidon 1965
J. Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, London; Hodder and Stoughton 1938


J. M. Cameron, *The Light Battle*, London; Burns and Oates 1962

S. Carpenter, *Church and People 1789 - 1889*, London; SPCK 1933


*Idem*, *The Victorian Church*, 2 vols London; Black 1966 - 70

*Idem*, *From Bossuet to Newman*, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 1957


A. M. Fairbairn, *Catholicism, Roman and Anglican*, London; Hodder and Stoughton 1999

J. C. Flugel, *A Hundred Years of Psychology 1833 - 1933*, London; Duckworth 1933
D. Forbes The Liberal Anglican View of History
Cambridge; Cambridge Univ Press 1952

W. Frankena Ethics New York; Prentice Hall 1963

R. Gill The Social Context of Theology London;
Howbrays 1975

J. Gillispie Genesis and Geology New York; Harper 1959

W. Gladstone Studies subsidiary to the works of Bishop
Butler. Oxford; Clarendon Press 1896

J. Gustafson Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics
Chicago; Univ of Chicago Press 1978

E. Halévy The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism
Faber; London 1952

R. Halliday John Stuart Mill London; Allen and Unwin
1976

A. Härderlin The Tractarian Understanding of the
Eucharist Uppsala; Studia Historico
Ecclesiastica Upsaliensia no. 8 1965

A. Härderlin "The Eucharist in the Theology of
the nineteenth Century" in Eucharistic
Theology Then and Now London; S. CK
(Theological Collections Vol 9) 1968

J. D. Holmes Theological Papers of J. H. Newman on
Biblical Inspiration Oxford; Clarendon
Press 1979

W. Hudson Ethical Intuitionism London; Macmillan 1967

Idem Modern Moral Philosophy London; Macmillan 1970

Idem A Century of Moral Philosophy Guildford;
Lutterworth 1980
A. Jeffner Butler and Hume on Religion Stockholm; Diakonistyrelsens Bokforlag 1966

E. W. Kemp ed. Man, Fallen and Free London; Hodder and Stoughton 1969


W. Knox and A. Vidler The Development of Modern Catholicism London; Philip Allan 1933

L. Lancaster Masters of Political Thought: Volume 3 Hegel to Dewey London; Harrap 1959

G. Langford Human Action New York; Doubleday 1972

T. A. Langford In Search of Foundations: English Theology 1900-1920 New York; Abingdon Press 1969

N. Lash Newman on Development London; Steed and Ward 1975

S. Letwin The Pursuit of Certainty Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 1965

A. Lovejoy The Great Chain of Being New York; Harper 1965

G. Lowes Dickinson The Greek View of Life London; Methuen 1896

J. R. Lucas Butler's Philosophy of Religion Vindicated Durham; Dean and Chapter, Durham Cathedral Bookshop 1978

A. MacIntyre A Short History of Ethics London; Routledge and Paul 1967

D. Mackinnon  
*A Study in Ethical Theory*  
London;  
Black 1957

Idem  
"Introduction", *Newman J, The University*  
Sermons  
London; SPCK 1970

Idem  
*Exploration in Theology Vol 5*  
London;  
SPCK 1979

G. Mahoney  
*Newman and Aristotle on Conscience*  
Birmingham; Dept of Theology, Univ. of  
Birmingham  
PhD Thesis (Unpublished) 1967

F. T. Marsh  
*The Victorian Church in Decline*  
London;  
Routledge and Paul 1969

E. Mascall  
"The Eucharistic Theology of R. Wilberforce"  
*Theology Vol 49* 1946

R. Metz  
*A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*  
E. T. J. H. Harvey  
London; Allen and Unwin 1938

H. Meynell  
*God and the World*  
London; SPCK 1971

E. C. Mossner  
*Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason*  
New York; Macmillan 1936

J. L. Murphy  
"Influence of Bishop Butler on Religious Thought"  
*Theological Studies Vol 24*

L. Newsome  
*The Parting of Friends*  
London; John Murray 1966

Idem  
*Two Classes of Men*  
London: John Murray 1974

H. R. Niebuhr  
*Christ and Culture*  
London; Faber and  
Faber 1952

A. Nygren  
*Agape and Eros*  
London; SPCK 1939

T. J. Norris  
*Newman and his Theological Method*  
Leiden;  
E. J. Brill 1977
H. Oppenheimer  Incarnation and Immanence  London; Hodder and Stoughton 1973
Idem  "Ought and Is" in Duty and Discernment ed G. Dunstan London; SCM 1974
G. Lutka  Akape  Yale; Yale University Press 1972
E. Rals  "The Reception of Noce Homo" Historical Episcopal Church USA 1965
V. Fannenberg  Jesus, God and Man  London; SCM Press 1968
Idem  The Apostles Creed  London; SCM Press 1976
T. Packer  Calvin's Doctrine of the knowledge of God Edinburgh; Oliver and Boyd. 1969
Idem  John Calvin  London; J. M. Dent 1975
J. Passmore  A Hundred Years of Philosophy  London; Penguin Books 1968
J. Lamenatz  The English Utilitarians  Oxford; Blackwell 1958
A. Quinton  The Politics of Imperfection  London; Faber 1978
Idem  Utilitarian Ethics  London; Macmillan 1973
I. T. Ramsey  J. Butler: Some Features of his life and thought  London; Friends of Dr. Williams Library. Twenty Third Lecture 1969
H. Ramsey  The Gospel and the Catholic Church  London; Longmans 1936
H. Rashdall  God and Man  Oxford; Oxford University Press 1930
B. Reardon  From Coleridge to Gore  London; Longmans 1971
A. Richardson  History, sacred and Profane  London; SPCK 1964

T. A. Roberts  Introduction to J. Butler, 15 Sermons  London; SPCK 1970

Idem  The Concept of Benevolence  London; Macmillan 1973

M. V. Roberts  Coleridge  Birmingham; Dept of Theology  Univ of Birmingham PhD. Thesis (unpublished) 1981

J. Robinson  "Newman's Use of Butler's Arguments"  Downside Review  Vol 76 1958

H. Ryan  J. S. Mill  London; Routledge and Paul 1974

J. B. Schneewind  Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Loral  Philosophy  Oxford; Clarendon Press 1977


L. de Smet  "L'influence de Butler sur la théorie de l'Ét de Foi chez Newman"  Newman - Studien 1964

B. A. Smith  Dean Church - the Anglican Response to Newman  London; Oxford Univ Press 1958

V. P. Storr  The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century 1800-1860  London; Longman's 1913


A. Symondson ed. The Victorian Crisis of Faith. London; SPCK 1970

E. S. Talbot Memoirs of Early Life. London; Howbrays 1924

J. Tulloch Movements of Religious Thought in Britain. London; Longmans 1885

W. Temple Plato and Christianity. London; Macmillan 1916

G. von Rad Wisdom in Israel. London; SCM 1972


J. Ward Life of Newman. London; Longmans 1912


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>Religious Thought in England since 1850</td>
<td>Oxford; Oxford Univ Press</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Wendel</td>
<td>Calvin</td>
<td>London; Collins</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. M. Liddon</td>
<td>H. M. Liddon, a Centenary Memoir</td>
<td>London; Kowbrays</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Lormell</td>
<td>Sir John Seeley and the Uses of History</td>
<td>Cambridge; Cambridge Univ Press</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>