The humanity of Christ in the theology of Athanasius of Alexandria

Pettersen, Alvyn Lorang

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THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST
IN THE
THEOLOGY OF ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA.

- by -

Alvyn Lorang PETERSEN. B.A.

A thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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This study is concerned with the understanding of Christ's humanity in the thought of Athanasius of Alexandria. In its attempt to describe the place of that humanity in the understanding of the person of Christ, and of its role in his work of salvation, reference will be made primarily to the following works of the bishop: the Contra Gentes - De Incarnatione, the Contra Arianos 1-3, the Tomus ad Antiochenos, the Epistula ad Epictetum and the Epistolae ad Serapionem 1-4. Where relevant, and where not merely repeating what is already to be found in the above works, the remaining writings of Athanasius are discussed.

The investigation falls into three sections. The first of these involves a critical investigation of previous studies of the subject, the main result of which is that the anthropological model used therein for interpreting the thought of Athanasius is too precise and too philosophical; for the soul and the body, in Athanasius' mind, are not the two very specifically defined, independent, antithetical elements of Greek philosophy. The second section entails an analysis of Athanasius' anthropological model, and its application to the thought of the five main works being studied. The last section attempts to draw conclusions, and to focus anew upon the particular questions raised over the years by Athanasian scholars in their study of this subject.

For Athanasius humanity is contingent being, held in existence only by the providential care of the divine Logos. This humanity is described by two main terms, anthropos and soma. Anthropos seems to signify man's individuality, which lies in God's gracious bestowal upon him of rationality and spirituality through his participation in the Logos. Soma, meanwhile, suggests man's creaturely and originate mortality, in which man is one with the whole of creation. In short, anthropos is man in his responsible relation to God, and soma is man in his creaturely distinction from the Creator.
Given this anthropological understanding, Athanasius' Christology can be interpreted. The bestowal of the gifts of knowledge, immortality and incorruptibility upon Christ's body are to be seen as that bestowal upon man in his ignorant, mortal and corruptible creatureliness. Christ's passions being attributed to his body is to be understood as their being attributed to that which is over against the incorporeal Logos, to man in his passible creatureliness. Christ's death, the separation of the Logos from his assumed body, is to be interpreted as the Logos' withholding of his providential and creative care, which leads to the physical disintegration of man in his mortality.

Meanwhile, the qualifying of Christ's soma by the term anthropos, in a manner very reminiscent of the Nicene formula whereby the Arian denial of Christ's human soul is excluded, seems to suggest that Athanasius recognises a full humanity in Christ. This seems to be the case despite the references to the Logos as the enlightening and directive principle in the assumed humanity, and to the humanity as the passive organ, or instrument, of the Logos, both of which references are to be understood in the context of the creation and recreation of man's contingent nature.

The humanity so conceived is the point of contact between the Saviour and that saved. For in as much as that humanity was man's humanity, which the Logos assumed, it is that in and through which man's salvation was effected; and insofar as that humanity is inseparable from the divine Logos, it is that in and through which that salvation is ever guaranteed.
PREFACE

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. B. Bonner and to Dr. A. Loades, both of the department of Theology in the University of Durham, for their constant encouragement and support. I want also to express my appreciation for the help and advice of my supervisor, Mr. George Dragas, of the same university.

In all proper names and all technical terms standard modern spelling is used, except in quotations where the form used is as in the source quoted.

All Greek words quoted have been transliterated into English characters.


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ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Athanasius:

CG Contra Gentes
DI De Incarnatione
C.Ar. Contra Arianos
Ad.Epict. Ad Epictetum
Ad.Ser. Ad Serapionem
Tome Tomus ad Antiochenes
De Vit.Ant. De Vita Antonii.

Works by other ancient writers:

Eran. Theodoret. Eranistes.
c.Synus. Diodere. Fragmenta ex libris contra Synousiastas

Other works:

Ang. Angelicum (Rome).
BZNW. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft (Berlin).
CQR. Church Quarterly Review (London).
CTQ. Concordia Theological Quarterly (Indiana).
EH. Ecclesiastical History.
ET. English translation.
Greg. Gregorianum (Rome).
HTR. Harvard Theological Review (Cambridge, Mass.).
JES. Journal of Ecumenical Studies (New Jersey).
MSR. Mélanges de Science Religieuse (Lille).
OCP. Orientalia Christiana Periodica (Rome).
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<tr>
<td>PG.</td>
<td>Patrologia Graeca (Migne).</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHE.</td>
<td>Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique (Louvain).</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSR.</td>
<td>Recherches de Science Religieuse (Paris).</td>
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<td>SC.</td>
<td>Sources Chrétiennes (Paris).</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJT.</td>
<td>Scottish Journal of Theology (Edinburgh).</td>
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<td>S.Th.</td>
<td>Studia Theologica (Lund).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Th.Q.</td>
<td>Theologische Quartalschrift (Tubingen)</td>
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<td>TU.</td>
<td>Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur (Leipzig-Berlin).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vig.C.</td>
<td>Vigiliae Christianae: A review of early Christian Life and Language (Amsterdam).</td>
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<td>VS.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Review of earlier Athanasian scholarship concerning the humanity of Christ.

"He was made man that we might be made divine, and he manifested himself by a body that we might receive the idea of the unseen Father; and he endured the insolence of men that we might inherit immortality". (1)

Central to Athanasius' Christology is his soteriology. According to him, man had fallen, having lost God's gracious gift of being "in the Image" and immortal, and had become apart from God, "irrational" and subject to corruptible mortality. It was to redeem man from this that the divine Logos became incarnate; being truly God, and remaining so impassibly and immutably, he became man that man might thereby share again in the Image of God; he assumed a body that in his death all might die; he became flesh for all. Such is generally agreed by Athanasian scholars. It is recognised that for Athanasius God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. What is not generally agreed, however, and what indeed has been disputed ever since 1841, the year in which the then leader of the Tübingen school, the Hegelian F.C. Baur, wrote his Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes (2), is the precise Athanasian understanding of Christ's humanity. For in that book Baur denied that Athanasius admitted a human soul in Christ, thus accusing the Alexandrian of a docetic Christology. Baur was the first scholar to propose this view. He was not, however, the last. For in the long debate concerning this matter, many were to follow him. It is the progression of this debate that we shall trace in this chapter.

Two main positions have been held in this debate. There is that which accepts Baur's thesis, and that which rejects it. The former, which tends to understand Athanasius' Christology in terms of a Logos-sarx pattern, is represented by such scholars as A.Stulcken(3),
M. Richard (4), J. Roldanus (5) and A. Grillmeier (6). The latter, which tends to see the Christology rather in terms of the Logos-anthropos pattern, is supported by scholars who include G. Voisin (7), E. Weigl (8), R.V. Sellers (9), J. Lebon (10) and P. Galtier (11). Both positions work with a common anthropological model, that in which anthropos is composed of psuche and soma/sarx; and it is through this model that they view the various matters which lead them to their respective positions.

It is through a review of these various matters, and of the several interpretations given to them, that we shall trace the progression of the debate concerning Christ's humanity which Baur started in 1841.

a. The human soul of Christ is not mentioned explicitly in the earlier works of Athanasius.

All the scholars mentioned above acknowledge that Athanasius does not mention Christ's human soul explicitly. Yet this absence of explicit mention is explained differently. I.A. Dorner, in his History of the development of the doctrine of the person of Christ (12), was one of the first to explain this seeming silence. He explained it by arguing firstly that Athanasius saw his task as a Christian teacher as that of confessing the substance of the Christian faith, as set forth in the Nicene Creed, and not that of indulging in doctrinal speculation in general, particularly upon the place of the human soul in Christ. Again, the contemporary understanding of the nature of a person had no existence in the time of Athanasius, but arose out of the ideas of being, essence and substance. Consequently it was natural for Athanasius to leave the question of personality on the side for the time, and to devote his attention exclusively to that of essence, that is, the idea of the Logos and of humanity, endeavouring to demonstrate that as to essence each belonged to, and required, the other. Dorner, moreover, thought that for Athanasius to admit a soul in the Christ might mean the entry of the freedom of the soul, and thus
threaten the stability of the faith and the divine-human union in Christ, by making the Christ the Arian treptos Christos and by rendering the certainty of redemption doubtful.

G. Voisin explained the silence differently (13). According to him, Athanasius did not treat the question of Christ's soul in the pre-362 writings since Origen, in his heterodoxical writings upon the soul and free will of Christ, had discouraged further thought on the matter temporarily. A second reason, Voisin posited, was that in the early Church it was Christ's divinity, and not his humanity, which was readily acknowledged, that was under question. Indeed, it was only in the late fourth century that the question of Christ's human soul arose. (14) Finally, Voisin asserted that the Arian theology with which Athanasius was mainly concerned prior to 362 was essentially a theological, and not a Christological, problem. Consequently, Athanasius "ne dit rien de la théorie Christologique de ses adversaires, ni pour la condamner, ni pour l'apprécier" (15).

P. Galtier, in his article "S. Athanase et l'âme humaine du Christ" (16), accounts for the silence in yet another manner. For Galtier saw the real question as being one of theology, and not of anthropology; he saw the question for Athanasius and his readers as not "de ce qui constitue l'homme et de ce qui fait un corps humain"(17) because for both of them "to become man" meant "to become like them". Rather the problem was that a man like themselves, who had lived their life and died their death, was other than they, being the divine Son of God. Hence the persistence with which Athanasius showed that Christ was not merely man, but also God. Indeed, according to Galtier, Athanasius' general philosophy of man forbids the conclusion from his not speaking of a soul in Christ explicitly that he had deprived Christ of it. "L'exposé qu'il en a fait dans l'introduction au De Incarnatione qu'est son Contra Gentes impose, au contraire, d'admettre que, sauf dénégation formelle de sa part, elle reste toujours présente à son esprit" (18). Yet, to Galtier's mind, even had Athanasius turned to the question of the human soul
in Christ in his disputes with the Arians, it is doubtful whether Athanasius would have accepted their docetic Christology; for Galtier thinks that Athanasius had such faith in the Logos' divinity, and therefore its distinction from that which is creaturely, including the soul and the body, that it is hard to imagine that the Alexandrian would have allowed the divine Logos to take the place of the creaturely soul in Christ. Athanasius' understanding of the salvific incarnation similarly suggests that he would not have accepted the Arian anthropology. For Athanasius, the incarnation meant that the Logos became man, namely soul and body, and that he died and rose again, having suffered for all men; in this he must have been like all men in his nature. In short, "la foi qu'il avait a sa parfaite divinite le lui aurait interdit et aussi la conception qu'il se faisait de l'incarnation".(19).

Unlike the above-mentioned scholars who, in one way or another, do not allow that the question of Christ's human soul was an issue in the debate between Athanasius and the Arians, A. Gesche (20) holds that it was. Yet Gesche does not therefore think that Athanasius' silence upon the matter implies that he shared the Arian anthropology. Rather Gesche thinks that it never occurred to Athanasius to reply to the Arians by asserting that the Christ had a soul. The bishop's preoccupations were of another order, being concerned with Christ's divinity. This, Gesche felt, was a regrettable situation, as it certainly weakened the scope of Athanasius' reply to the Arians, although it did not exclude a soul from the Christ as conceived by Athanasius.

There is, however, another body of opinion which interprets this silence of Athanasius upon the human soul of Christ as tantamount to a denial of its existence. Representatives of this opinion include K. Hoss (21), M. Richard (22) J.N.D. Kelly (23) and A. Grillmeier (24). Over against historians of doctrine like G. Voisin, who explain the silence regarding the human soul of Christ in Athanasius' works by saying that the problem of a human soul in the Saviour was not posed before 362, Richard argued that "il nous semble bien qu'au cours de cette
periode, une fois au moins cette question s'est posée et très explicitement à saint Athanase, à savoir lorsqu'il a entrepris de réfuter dans son 3me. traité contre les Ariens les arguments que ces hérétiques prétendaient tirer de la psychologie humaine du Christ, telle que nous la révèlent les évangiles" (25); for the Arians argued from the passions of the incarnate Logos to the Logos being possible and mutable, and so a creature. Against this Athanasius argued that the Divine Logos was impassible and that the human frailties of Christ had to be referred to the flesh which the Logos had become; both the corporeal and the psychological weaknesses were to be seen as ta idia tes sarkos (26). This, however, meant a coupling of two dissimilar weaknesses on one plane, that of flesh, which Richard found embarrassing, as such as not only to minimise the arguments of the Arians but also to fight shy of the necessity of admitting a psychological subject in the assumed flesh. Richard's conclusion is precise: "la caractère psychologique du l'argumentation est..... tout à fait patent, et l'on ne voit pas bien à première vue comment un théologien partisan du consubstantiel pourrait faire face à ce problème sans évoquer l'âme humaine du Christ" (27). To Richard's mind, however, it was not simply the matter of the attribution of Christ's psychological weaknesses that revealed that the problem of the existence of the human soul of Christ had been posed prior to 362. For Richard felt that it was "une thèse bien attestée de la Christologie arienne" (28) that the divine Logos had taken the place of the soul of Christ. "Le Verbe, en s'incarnant, n'aurait assumé qu'un corps sans âme" (29). Yet Athanasius never reproached his opponents of having forgotten the human soul of Christ. "Ils ne les accuse pas nonplus d'en avoir fait un être à part, mais bel et bien de l'avoir concu comme un homme ordinaire" (30). This was the case even though the Arians attributed psychological weaknesses to the Logos himself, a position against which orthodoxy could most easily argue by positing a human soul as the subject of these psychological passions, and so protect the divine and impassible Logos. This Athanasius did not do. He referred
these passions which were not properly corporeal to the assumed flesh and remained silent on the matter of a human soul. In the light of omitting mention of Christ's human soul, Richard felt that Athanasius' Christ had to be understood "du type Verbe-sarx au sens strict" (31). Yet Richard did continue: "il faut ajouter qu'on ne trouve chez lui aucune negation formelle de l'ame du Sauveur. Il a simplement construit son systeme christologique sans elle parce qu'il n'en avait pas percu le besoin...." (32). Only after 362 did Athanasius take account of this lacuna and admitted the full humanity of Christ in the face of the Apollinarian threat. J.N.D. Kelly followed Richard by noting that Athanasius failed to make any clear and unambiguous mention of Christ's soul (33); A. Grillmeier, meanwhile, though realising that his argument was but one drawn from silence, acknowledged that "in every passage where he gives a positive interpretation of the person of Jesus Christ, his being and his redeeming work, Athanasius has refrained from including the human soul of the Lord in a really visible way" (34).

Ortiz de Urbina, in his article "L'anima umana di Christo secundo S. Atanasio" (35) tried to reduce the force of these arguments from silence. He allowed that the Arians denied the existence of the soul of Christ; yet he argued that Athanasius did not discuss this lest he complicated the debate unnecessarily. Hence, in using the terms body and flesh and in attributing to them, as representatives of Christ's humanity, all its weaknesses and humiliations, Athanasius did so only to refute the Arians' subordination of the Logos. Their use did not bear upon Christ's humanity.

b. The Incarnation was asserted to be aletheia.

E. Weigl stressed the centrality of the true incarnation of the divine Logos for Athanasius' theology. "Der Logos ist auch phusei, phusei kai ou thesei Mensch geworden" (36). Thus Christ "ist Gott und Mensch und zwar ganz Gott und zwar Mensch" (37). For, while the immutable Logos truly became man, he naturally remained God. As God, the Logos is the Son, and thus consubstantial with his Father.
As man, however, he is genuinely man. For while the flesh is properly the Logos', it is not consubstantial with the divinity of the Logos. Rather, the assumed humanity, born in truth and in reality of Mary, is one with all men; through its kinship with creation it is that in which all creatures share.

The integrity of the assumed humanity Dorner also seems to allow, as he recognises that Athanasius acknowledged that the body assumed by the divine Logos was "no other body than our own" (38), and was "our nature" (39).

Roldanus, however, understands the matter of the reality of the incarnation in a different fashion; for, in relation to Ad.Epict. 6-7, he notes that Athanasius recognises the immutable Logos' truly being in man as the prerequisite for man's salvation, the duality of both the Logos and the body being necessarily preserved in the incarnation, that the Logos might share in humanity and man in his divinity (40). It is in this sense therefore that the incarnation is genuine, the guarantee of man's full salvation.

Richard, meanwhile, asserted that the critical factor in the matter being discussed here is not the reality of the incarnation so much as the nature of the humanity which the Logos really became; what is of most importance here is the meaning of the "man" which the divine Logos truly became. Indeed, Richard finds the term "humanity" not to be problematic to the thesis that Athanasius' Christology is Apollinarian. For he who admits that the Logos has become man has the right to speak of his humanity, however conceived, and to oppose this humanity to the divinity. Indeed, Apollinarius, who denied the human soul in his Christ, used "humanity" to signify Christ's human side, his body; to Richard's mind, Athanasius might well have used the term in the same restricted sense.

c. Anthropological terminology.

With the Christological clauses "the Logos assumed a body" or "being clothed in Flesh" G. Vcsin found no difficulty. He did not think that they implied that the divine Logos assumed only a body, devoid of a human soul.
For, by drawing attention to 3.C.Ar.30 and Ad_Ser. 7, Voisin noted that in relation to John 1.14 Athanasius remarked that it was the tradition of Scripture to signify "man" by "flesh". He further remarked that "flesh" and "humanity" are interchangeable in Christological passages in the Athanasian corpus (41) and that the referring of psychological terms to the "flesh" pointed to the flesh being more than mere flesh. As regards the use of "body", Voisin pointed to Contra Gentes 28 (42), where Athanasius gave approval to the philosophers' view that the world is a great "body" by himself opposing to the Logos the created things, amongst which are men, whom he terms members of this great "body", the cosmos. Consequently, Voisin felt that "flesh" and "body" were not to be interpreted "au pied de la lettre", but in the light of the term "man" (43).

That this principle of interpretation should be adopted is further suggested by C.G. 20. For therein Voisin notes that Athanasius "remarque... qu' il serait plus digne d'un Dieu de se manifester par l'organe d'un être animé et raisonnable, que par des statues sans âme, et sans mouvement comme sont les idoltes du paganisme" (44). Given such, it is reasonable to suppose that Athanasius understood that "body" in and through which he saw the divine Logos revealed as "un être animé et raisonnable".

Indeed, the use of "flesh" and "body" in Christological settings Voisin did not see as necessarily implying that Athanasius was doubtful of the existence of a human soul in Christ. For the usage of these terms had to be seen in the light of the practice of the Early Church. According to Voisin, it was the tradition of the Church, in its wish to explain the mystery of the Incarnation in simple terms, to understand it as the appearance in visible body of the invisible God, a description which incidentally highlighted the humiliation of the divine Logos (45). Moreover, the Symbols of the time used "became flesh" to define the Incarnation. It was also in keeping with the language of the earlier Fathers. For Irenaeus, one of Athanasius' great forerunners, who recognised the existence of a soul in Christ, used the Christological terms filius hominis factus est and carnegn assumptasit (46). Voisin
therefore felt that "on comprend... qu'il soit contenté d'exprimer la doctrine de l'église touchant l'humanité de Christ dans les termes consacrés par l'usage de l'écriture, des Pères et des Symboles" (47).

Lastly, Veisin accounts for the use of the terms "flesh" and "body" by suggesting that they were required by Athanasius' sotericology. For not only did the Logos come in the flesh to destroy in it the rule of death and corruption (48), but also the Logos revealed himself through his miracles in the visible body which was essentially one with the visible creation, the cosmic body in which men were seeking for God.

Other explanations of the Christological use of "body" and "flesh" in Athanasius exist. Weigl, for instance, did not think that Athanasius' referring to Christ's humanity as his "body", "flesh" or "organ" necessarily points to a docetic Christology. For he believed that Athanasius felt no necessity to discuss the meaning of these terms, the Apollinarian crisis not yet having gained great momentum. Indeed, "die Ausdrücke soma, sàrx, anthropoces gelten Athanasius für das ganzemenschliche Individuum ohne Abstrich, samt Einschluss der Seele, ähnlich wie wir Mensch sagen und beide Bestandteile verstehen" (49).

Prestige adds to his arguments by asserting that 15.12-14: "the Logos of God took to himself a body and lived as a man among men, and took the senses of all men...." reveals that "took a body" is to be interpreted in terms of "became man" (50). Galtier, meanwhile, refers to 1 C.Ár. 45, where it is stated that Christ was exalted in his humanity, and that in that humanity, all men were exalted. From this passage Galtier concludes that the "man" of the Logos was "un homme semblable à tous les autres", and that the assumed body was seen as "constitué comme eux... de même nature que le nôtre" (51). This conclusion Galtier corroborates through reference to the CG-DI, where the thought is propounded that man is both soul and body (52). "Il s'agit uniquement de savoir s'il a jamais concu que quelqu'un put être vraiment homme sans avoir à la fois un corps et une âme" (53). For the soul of man is the immortal life of the body, through the departure of which the body dies. For Galtier therefore the humanity which the Logos assumed in becoming man was "de nos corps et
semblable à eux" (54). Tixeront recognises that Athanasius' description of Christ's humanity as "dwelling", "temple", "organ", "covering", "apparel" and "mantle" suggests a docetic Christology. Yet, for all that, he does maintain that "the humanity assumed by the Word is complete in its physical elements" (55). For although Athanasius did not maintain in an explicit manner that Christ had a human soul prior to 362, Tixeront believes that for Athanasius a full humanity in Christ was needed if man was to be wholly saved. Moreover, Tixeront interpreted the psychological passions which Athanasius attributed to Christ's humanity as necessarily dictating the existence of a rational soul in Christ, the subject of all these various affections (56). Dorner also explains the reference to Christ's humanity as "dwelling", "temple", "body" and "flesh" in terms of soteriology, but a different soteriology. Dorner felt that for Athanasius the enemy to be vanquished was principally death, which was natural to the body. Certainly the impotence of the soul to know itself immortal was represented as one of the grounds of incarnation; but according to Dorner, in the form that Athanasius puts forward his thought, it was not necessary for the Christ to appropriate or feel substitutionally this impotence himself for its removal from all men. The thinking merely required that Christ should admit into himself the objective principle of death, and that he should take upon himself the debt of men. Such a theory of salvation therefore supplied no place for a more careful consideration of the question of a human soul of Christ, and therefore accounted for the particular anthropological terms used by Athanasius in his Christology (57).

Meanwhile Hoss interpreted Athanasius' use of "the Logos assumed a body" differently. For he believed that Athanasius worked from a hellenistic perspective, whereby men were composed of the body and the soul. The former was terrestrial, sensible and proper to humanity, while the latter was a divine element which originated from heaven, and constituted man's participation in the divine. In all of Athanasius' theology, according to Hoss, the Incarnation is presented as a union of the divine Logos to a human body, the Logos not being united to an individual man, but being clothed in a unique manner with a human flesh in the
organism of a body. In this presentation of the Incarnation the presence of a human soul is not mentioned. Hoss concludes therefore that the divine element which in everyman is the soul is in Christ the Logos himself (58).

Richard interprets Athanasius' incarnational terminology differently from Hoss, but yet to the same end. Of the terminology itself he notes that Athanasius never says that the Logos assumed anything other than Flesh or a body, the presence of a human soul never being asserted. He also notes that the descriptions of the Logos' indwelling a body, or being clothed in flesh all point to a formal Apollinarianism at the very least. With regard to the "man" which the Logos became, Richard interprets this as a man without a soul. For Richard believes that Athanasius, who was not ignorant that the Arians asserted the pre-existence of the Logos, and that they recognised in him a dignity superior to that of the angels, admitted without difficulty that their Logos had in the incarnation truly become man, and had eventually taken the form of an ordinary man, in all senses. "Autrement dit, de point du vue anthropologique, il n'aurait aucune critique à leur faire" (59). This Richard finds explicable in that Athanasius, like many other Fathers, was Platonic. For such the spiritual soul of man was, to a lesser or greater degree, "une sorte d'ange égaré dans la chair" (60). It was in the light of this that Athanasius was able to accept that "le Christ des Ariens était vraiment un homme et même un homme ordinaire puisqu'il avait apparent perdu toutes ses pérogatives célestes. C'était un esprit incarné et cela suffisait" (61).

Richard does not agree with people like Galtier, who asserts that the equation of "he became flesh" with "he became man" in 3 C. Ar. 30 implies that to say that the Logos became flesh is not merely to say that he became "tout chair" but that he was clothed with flesh and became man (62). He does not think that the Greek of 3 C. Ar. 30 is absolute: it is not meant that everywhere and always Scripture calls man "flesh". Rather Richard holds that the Greek is used here to justify the interpretation of John 1.14 as "he became man" and then only in the context of the argument that the divine Logos became man, and did
not enter upon man, as he had upon the prophets of the Old Testament. C. Ar. 30 therefore equates "he became man" and "he became flesh" and not "man" and "flesh". Thus Richard believes that it still remains for the Athanasian scholar to discover the sense which Athanasius gives to "he became man"; and this sense Richard derives from Athanasius' unprotesting admittance of the Arian Christ, for whom there was no human soul, as "bien un homme et meme un homme tout pareil aux autres" (63).

C.E. Raven (64) was another who believed that Athanasius was Apollinarian in his Christology, thinking that Athanasius used "man", "humanity" and its cognates interchangeably with, and in the same sense as, "body" and "flesh".

Over against Hoss, Richard and Raven, J.N.D. Kelly and A. Grillmeier think that the linguistic evidence is not clear. Kelly recognised that Athanasius regularly described Christ's human nature as "flesh" and "body"; he admitted that such language was traditional, reflecting New Testament usage, a matter to which Athanasius himself drew attention (65). Yet, for all that, Kelly saw the linguistic evidence as "inconclusive" (66). Grillmeier himself felt that the arguing from terms, by which those favouring the thesis that Christ had a human soul used "man", while the opposition used "flesh" and "body", was too vague. For not only were Athanasius' anthropological terms not used with the precision of Aristotle or the Schoolmen, but also these terms were traditional. For Eusebius of Caesarea and Apollinarius, both of whom denied the human soul of Christ, used the term "man" and Cyril of Alexandria, who admitted the human soul, used the clause "he became flesh". For Grillmeier therefore it was "clear that an analysis of words cannot be conclusive.... We must.... begin above all with theological notions". (67).

d. The Logos as the hegemon in Christ.

E. Weigl believed that in Athanasius' theology the divine Logos was "das dominierende Element der Verbindung" (68) and "das hegemonische Prinzip in der gottmenschlichen Einheit" (69), and was therefore to be described as "der Beherrschter und Träger des leiblichen Teils" (70). Yet, for all that, Weigl did not think either that the Alexandrian saw the assumed flesh as "unpersonlich", or that he thought
that through its absorption into the divine person of the Logos Christ's humanity obtained "ihre persönlich menschliche Konstitution" (71). For he felt that for terminological, soteriological and psychological reasons it must be admitted that Christ's humanity was, to Athanasius' thinking, "persönlich".

Tied in with the matter of the Logos being "das hegemonische Prinzip in der gottmenschlichen Einheit" is that of Christ's human will. With regard to this matter, Weigl was of the opinion that it would be to seek for an Arian or Antiochene Christ were one to seek for a separate human will, over against the divine, in Christ. Indeed, he felt that the question of the human will of Christ was a slightly false one. For prior to the Fall Adam's nature was free from sinful struggles: his "Wille was noch einheitlich (monotropes), nicht zum Bösen inklinierend" (72); and it was this free, yet monotropes will that Christ was recreating in himself for all men. It is in the light of this that Weigl saw not only the miracle of becoming, whereby the Logos became the one "hegemonische Prinzip" in Christ, but also the oneness and continuity of the Logos, both before and after his incarnation.

Tixeront and Dorner take much the same line as Weigl with respect to the Logos' relation to his humanity: the former acknowledged that "in Jesus the hegemonic principle, the principle of the single personality, is in the Word" (73), while the latter asserted that "in fact, he (sc. Athanasius) looked upon the Logos as the motive, hegemonic, personal principle in the God-man" (74). Yet both, for much the same reasons as Weigl, recognise the presence of a human soul in Athanasius' Christ. Dorner's view of that human soul is, however, such that he denies that there were therefore two persons in the Christ; for while the soul was a power when considered in relation to what was below it, in relation to what was above, it was void form, or susceptibility, which acquired its determinate actuality through the incarnation alone. Consequently, for Dorner, however many hints of a human soul in Christ may be found in the Athanasian corpus, one thing is lacking, namely freedom of choice. "Athanasius demands neither freedom of choice, nor a duality of wills for the God-man" (75), even though he lays great stress upon it for man. This absence Dorner tries to explain: a duality of wills would not fit the henosis
phusike of the divine and human in Christ; by attributing choice, and thus mutability, to Christ, Athanasius would be approaching the Arian position whereby the stability of Christ's salvific incarnation was threatened; finally, Dorner compares Athanasius with Hilary in this matter, suggesting that possibly the problem in Athanasius should be seen along the more developed lines of Hilary's thought. For the latter, Christ had a free will only as in opposition to constraint; he had freedom of will even as the Father has it. Thus the volitional unity of the God-man with the Father is immediate, being grounded in the very nature, whereas other men have the capacity of choosing between good and evil (76).

As against Weigl, Dorner and Tixeront, Stülcken considers that the fact that all the human experiences and actions of Christ became acts of salvation for man because the Logos of God was their subject is to be interpreted as meaning that in Athanasius' soteriology a human soul in Christ was a negligible element (77).

In a fuller account of the matter, Grillmeier follows Stülcken's lead. According to Grillmeier, Athanasius saw the divine Logos as the creative and life-giving principle towards the world. The human rational soul, on the other hand, was the most perfect copy of the Logos within the earthly, corporeal creation. It fulfilled towards the body the function that the Logos had in the cosmos. In short, it was a logos in microcosm. When, however, the Logos became man, "Athanasius' view might be put in these words: where the original itself appears with all its power, the copy, with its secondary and derived power, must at least surrender its function, even if it does not give place altogether" (78). For the fleshly nature of the Christ is only a part of the great cosmos-soma; and if the Logos can give life to the whole world-soma, he can so much more to the assumed body.

When therefore the Logos became man, he indwelt the assumed humanity perfectly, intrinsically and substantially, as indeed he had to do in order to effect the redemption of the body which he had inherited. He became the principle which gave life and movement to the body of Christ, acting as its hegemoniken (79). It is, however, in this very speaking of the life-giving functions of the Logos to his
flesh that Athanasius seems to forget the human soul of Christ. "Indeed, he seems to leave no place for it" (80). For the Logos is not merely the personal subject of Christ's bodily life; he is also the real, physical source of all the actions of that life.

It follows, moreover, from the fact that the Logos has become the sole motivating power or principle in Christ that the decisive spiritual and moral acts of Christ must be assigned to the Logos in a way which appears to imply more than a mere appropriation after the manner of communicativ idiomatum. For example, in the redemption and in the passion and death of Christ, Athanasius seems to make the Logos not merely the personal agent in the act, the principium quod, but also the physical principle of achievement, the principium quo. Athanasius therefore makes the Logos the first and sole subject of all Christ's life. "The whole of the Athanasian picture of Christ is stamped with this immediacy of the Logos which everywhere throws into relief the physical activity of the Logos, even though it is at the same time mediated through the bodily reality of Christ's humanity (81).

This conception of the Logos as the principle of all life in Christ Grillmeier sees confirmed in Athanasius' use of the "organ" concept. For, to Grillmeier's mind, the "organ" concept appears to be rather dangerously exaggerated, the Christ being but the Logos who directs, and the body which is its instrument, or "organ".

c. The attribution of psychological passions.

One of Weigl's arguments for the presence of a human soul in Athanasius' Christology rests upon those passages which attribute ignorance and fear to Christ. According to Weigl, neither the impassible Logos, nor the assumed body are to be judged suitable subjects of these passions. Thus one must assume that there is a human soul in the Christ to be their subject. Voisin, Tixeront, Urbina and Galtier (82) all follow this line, insisting that the referring of psychological terms to the flesh of Christ points to that flesh being more than mere flesh.

With their thesis Richard disagrees violently. For it is his belief that the Arians asserted that the Logos was not the Power of God, a position which they deduced
by pointing to Christ's fear at the time of his passion. This assertion Athanasius rejected, referring this fear not to the divine Logos but to his humanity. Yet although "le caractère psychologique de l'argumentation est cette fois tout à fait patent, et l'on ne voit pas bien à première vue comment un théologien partisan du consubstantiel pourrait faire face à ce problème sans évoquer l'âme humaine du Christ" (83), there is no mention of a soul; the passions are referred by Athanasius to Christ's humanity, a humanity which for other reasons Richard sees as devoid of a human soul (84).

Indeed it seems to Richard that partly to protect the Logos from these passions, and partly because there was no human soul in Athanasius' Christ to which they ought to be referred, both his ignorance and the fear which he experienced at his passion are not given their true weight. For, to Richard's mind, the ignorance is not an ignorantia de facto, but an "ignorantia de iure"; since, in his divinity the Logos is omniscient, the Saviour, the Logos incarnate knew, but showed himself ignorant for man's benefit (85). Meanwhile, the fear which Athanasius attributes to the Christ in his passion was te nomizomene deilia (86), a fear which Richard feels points to the fact that the Alexandrian was not certain whether to attribute a true sensation of fear to the suffering Christ.

It ought to be noted at this stage that Galtier does not allow the force of Richard's argument that Athanasius' failure to apply Christ's psychological passions to a human soul meant that he denied the soul's existence. For, had the general subject of discussion for Athanasius been that of the "psychologie humaine du Christ" Galtier would have agreed with Richard. The question, however, was still that of the divinity of the Logos. Hence Athanasius' task, according to Galtier, was to refer these psychological passions to the assumed flesh, the Logos' human aspect, and so protect the divinity of the Logos.

Others, however, follow Richard's lead. F.M. Young, in her article "A reconsideration of Alexandrian Christology" (87), noted that Athanasius treated Christ's tears, fears and ignorance as means of displaying that the Logos had really assumed the weaknesses of the flesh for man's salvation. Yet Athanasius "was driven to claiming a pretense
of fear, to admitting that the Logos is open to the charge of having lied when Jesus claimed to be ignorant, even to saying *ta hemon eminnesato* (88)" (89). Thus, for Young, "the humanity of Christ according to Athanasius seems to lack conviction" (90). For Athanasius did not even make positive use of a fallible human soul to account for Christ's psychological conflicts. H.E.W. Turner also finds within Athanasius' writing a tendency to reduce the compass of Christ's psychological passions to passions of the flesh, in order to accommodate them to their divine subject; he sees in the Athanasian exegesis a kind of flinching from the more poignantly human experiences in the Gospels which appears to border upon "psychological docetism" (91).

Roldanus followed the line of Richard and those who think like him. He develops it, however, in his treatment of 3. C^Ar^ 57, where Athanasius treats Christ's prayer, "Let this cup pass from me". From the treatment of this text Roldanus concludes that there was not in the Athanasian Christ a human subject which had to align its will with that of God. Thus "le Saveur......n'a pas connu de combat intérieur" (92). Indeed, in relation to this text Roldanus notes that "ce n'est pas un sujet humain qui parle ici mais la seule Personne du Verbe qui, par là, montre combien réellement il s'est approprié la chair opprimée par la peur et combien réellement, par conséquent, les hommes sont délivrés de cette peur" (93).

With this interpretation of 3 C^Ar. 57 Sellers had disagreed for some time. For, treating the interpretation of Christ's crying, "now is my soul troubled..." and "remove this cup from me...", Sellers noted that over against the Arians, Athanasius has said that these affections were not proper to the nature of the Logos, but to the passible flesh (94); these affections were proper to the flesh (95); in Gethsemane the flesh was in terror (96). It seemed therefore to Sellers that the flesh as flesh was at these times able to assert itself, the flesh possessing the power of self-determination. To him it seemed therefore that the individual character of the Lord's manhood was implicit in Athanasius' teaching. It is true that this individual character is robbed of its reality by the Logos intervening in the human life of Christ, "lightening" the sufferings of the flesh (97), and destroying its terror (98).
"It is apparent", Sellers remarks, "that he does not make use of this implied 'self-determination' doctrine. For one sees in Athanasius the idea that the Logos so intervenes in the human life of Jesus Christ that it is robbed of the individual character which must belong to it if it is to be truly human.... But this does not mean that Athanasius is an Apollinarian: surely it means no more than that a principle, implicit in his teaching, is not brought out"(99).

f. Christ's advance in wisdom.

Dorner maintains that Athanasius could not have referred Christ's progress in wisdom to his assumed body (100), any more than he could to that of man. Yet it was equally impossible that he should have referred it to the divine Logos (101). Dorner feels therefore that there is no alternative but to say that Athanasius presupposed the existence of a human soul in the human nature of the Christ, even though he did not give special prominence to it as a constituent element of the complete human nature.

Sellers takes much the same line as Dorner. He believes that Christ's growth in stature and in wisdom implies that Christ's is a manhood which is individual in its qualities; yet he also believes that the implication is not developed. For while Christ's physical growth is real, his intellectual and spiritual growth is no more than the gradual unveiling of the godhead in its incarnate state (102). That it is but this gradual unveiling of the divine mind, as recognised by Sellers, does not, however, trouble Prestige. For, for him, the moral and intellectual growth of Christ, looked at from the aspect of his divinity, is indeed the voluntary unveiling of the divine mind (103).

With the above Richard disagreed (104). According to him, the Arians saw Christ's growth in wisdom as more support for the view that the Logos was limited, and not truly omniscient God. To protect the divine Logos from these heretical views, Athanasius attributed this development to the Logos' assumed body, which Richard understood literally. For in the same context Athanasius continued to speak of the stature of the same body. Further, underlying this interpretation of Athanasius' statement is Richard's thought that properly this growth in wisdom ought to have been referred to a human soul, if Christ had had one. Indeed, in this connection, Richard also drew
attention to the transformation of *proekte sophia* to 
*proekte en sophia* to *proekopten en te Sophia*, which
he sees as a possible attempt to eliminate the need for
a psychological interpretation of Luke 2.52., and therefore
for a human soul to be the subject of this psychological
development.

g. Christ's receipt of gifts from God.

Richard seems to be alone in treating this matter in
respect of the question of whether or not Athanasius'
Christology is docetic. According to the Arians, Christ's
receiving gifts from God meant that the Logos was wanting
and therefore imperfect. This Athanasius naturally
rejected: the Divine Logos was the bestower of gifts, while
his body was the recipient, it requiring them for its
salvation. This response by Athanasius to the Arians
Richard did not, however, find satisfactory, especially
as he understands the recipient of these gifts in terms of
a Logos-*sarx* schema. For "sans doute la chair ou le corps,
au sens strict, ne semblent pas constituer le réceptacle
ideal, même comme instrument du Verbe, pour les dons de
gloire et de puissance" (105).

h. Christ's death and descensus ad infernos.

Roldanus, who is concerned with the soteriological
consequences of the presence, or absence, of Christ's
human soul (106), felt that the Athanasian picture of
the death and descent into hell of Christ confirmed the
unimportance of the soul of Christ for salvation. For,
in this picture there is no mention of his human soul.
Death, for Athanasius, is usually seen as the separation
of the body and soul. Yet in Christ's case, it consists of
the Logos' separation from his assumed body, the instrument
whereby he worked his salvation. "Qu'il se taise
entièrement ici sur le thème de l'âme a toujours étonné.
S'il avait dû en parler quelque part, c'est justement
au moment de la mort du Sauveur qu'il aurait dû être
question de l'âme, au moins comme 'grandeur physique' "(107).
Similarly the soul does not seem soteriologically important
for Christ's descent into hell. For it is the Logos, and
not his body, who descends to the souls in Hades (108).
Hence "la présence du Verbe seul et hors du corps a été
vraisemblablement suffisante pour délivrer aussi les âmes séparées de leurs corps et pour les conduire à la resurrection corporelle. La prédication dans la royaume des morts est un élément de ce triomphe et elle est aussi une œuvre exclusivement divine" (109).

Over against the view of Roldanus, lie those of Lebon and Galtier. In the light of the texts of DI.22, 24 and ad Epict.6, 5 Lebon thought that Athanasius understood Christ's death in terms of the separation of the Logos and his assumed body, an understanding which was in line with that of Eusebius of Caesarea (110), Ephiphanius (111) and Ambrose of Milan (112). That understanding, however, Lebon did not think implied that Athanasius had no place for a human soul in the Christ: "il serait......excessif et illégitime d'en tirer une preuve que S.Athanase refuse l'âme humaine au Christ"(113). For while it is true that death was expressed by the separation of the Logos and the body, this statement, 'the Logos having been loosed from it (sc. his body) in the sight of all...', simply adds a statement of death to one of illness, 'if it had happened that his body had been ill'. Here "la nature intime, la manière d'être de cette mort" is not explained (114).

Indeed, even if one were to accept the variant reading, te tou Logou dialusei, which initially seems to assign "la raison de la mort du corps" (115), it must be noted that nothing shows that the intention of the phrase's inclusion was the addition of this detail. Rather, its inclusion was only briefly noted, it playing no role in the development of the thought of the passage.

Moreover, Lebon remarks that when the question of the existence of the soul in Christ arose in 362, Athanasius' answer was in the affirmative, "sans trahir aucunement la conscience d'avoir du, pour ce faire, modifier sa pensée et son enseignement antérieurs"(116).

Unlike Lebon, who treats the question of the physical presence of Christ's human soul, Galtier treats the question of both its physical presence and its theological role. In the DI, Galtier notes, Athanasius mentions that the humanity assumed by the Logos to enable him to die man's death was to_hemeteron. Indeed, it was "de nos corps et semblable à eux" (117). For if Christ was to die man's
death, it was necessary for the Christ to have a human nature similar to theirs. Galtier therefore concludes that "il serait difficile...de faire entendre plus clairement que le corps du Christ, à son origine près, était de même nature que le nôtre et donc, vivant à cause de son âme et mourant quand il en serait séparé" (118). Were there not a human soul in the humanity of Christ as conceived by Athanasius, Christ would not have been able to die "la mort de tous les hommes" (119). Indeed, the death of Christ had to be that of men, that to which they had been condemned by God on account of their sin; and such a death was that caused by the separation of the immortal soul from the mortal body. Had Christ not suffered such a death, men would not have been saved from the death to which they had been subjected. Thus it was, according to Galtier, that the immortal Logos assumed a body like man's, animated by a human soul, and thereby died the death of all men.

Galtier readily agreed that the death of Christ was also the death of the Logos, visualised in the immortal Logos laying aside his mortal body. This Galtier explains by asserting that the immortal Logos was said to suffer death simply because the Logos was in the body which suffered death, it being his body. That the death occurred through the separation of the Logos from the body is due to the fact that the Logos accepted death voluntarily. Had it not been so, death would not have occurred, since the Logos was Life itself, and the mortal body the body of that Life; the death of the body would not therefore have occurred if the Logos, the Life, had not abandoned it. Hence the divine Logos abandoned his body, not to cause its death, but to permit it and to render it possible. In short, "l'essentiel reste, en effet, pour S.Athanase, que la mort du Christ fut une mort d'homme, une mort semblable à celle de tous les hommes et donc, comme il l'avait expliqué dans Contra Gentes, due à la séparation de l'âme et du corps. Or, par là même, il fait entendre que, dans le Christ, il voit un corps animé lui aussi comme le nôtre" (120).

For Galtier, the doctrine of Christ's vicarious death in 1-3 C.Ar.is similar to that outlined in the CG-DI. For the immortal Logos died in his mortal body, and in thus dying, died the death that all men died. Consequently it was not a body devoid of a soul which died. For otherwise,
"la victime... aurait ressemblé à ces êtres sans vie et sans âme, auxquels il avait raille les paiens de leur rendre leur hommages" (121). Moreover, according to 1-3 C.Ar., that human element which was offered to death, and which rose again, is distinct from the Divine Logos; it is that through which all other men are said to participate in the resurrection. This again confirms, to Galtier's mind that the assumed humanity "est avec eux d'une même nature" (122).

1. Christ did not assume soma apsachon, oud' anaistheton, oud' aneceton

According to Voisin, it was with the Council of Alexandria of 362 that Athanasius made his first explicit reference to Christ's soul, in asserting that the Saviour did not assume a soma apsachon, oud' anaistheton, oud' aneceton. "Ces paroles", said Voisin, "signifient au sens obvie que le Verbe a pris tous les éléments qui constituent la nature humaine et par là s'est fait homme" (123). Consequently, Voisin rejected Hoss' view that Athanasius merely adopted the equivocal formulae of the Apollinarians in his Tome of 362 (124). For in the light of Apollinarius' letter of c.375 to the Bishops of Egypt (125) and of Athanasius' letter to Epictetus (126), this seems not to have been the case.

Yet even after this assertion by Athanasius in 362, the Alexandrian was not openly anti-Apollinarian in insisting upon a soul in Christ. For the Apollinarian theology only came to the fore in the last years of Athanasius' life. Hence Voisin concluded that "c'est après sa mort que les Pères de l'église auront a défendre contre l'apollinarisme la présence dans le Christ de l'âme et de l'esprit humain" (127).

With Voisin's interpretation of Tome 7 as meaning that the divine Logos became fully man, Sellers (128), Prestige (129) and Gesche (130) agree. Yet while Sellers and Prestige also agree with Voisin in maintaining that Athanasius made some, albeit very little, theological use of Christ's human soul, Gesche denies that usage.

Grillmeier, however, rejected Tome 7 as a passage which implied that the human soul of Christ was a theological factor for Athanasius. For, working initially from the clause "nor was the salvation effected in the Logos himself
a salvation of body only, but of the soul also", Grillmeier notes that here the redemption of the whole man, body and soul, derives not from the Logos' taking of a soul, but from the Logos himself, he being the cause of the redeeming work. "The communication of the Logos is....the cause of the redemption of the whole man. Hence the soul of Christ is not a theological factor" (131). This view, Roldanus not only holds (132) but also corroborates through reference to 2.C.Ar. 70, where Athanasius states that man's divinisation depends upon the fact that "le Christ devrait être vrai Dieu, mais on note aussi qu'il n'est pas question d'une véritable humanité qui lui serait propre, mais seulement de sa chair humaine....Sa conception du salut depend en effet tout autant de la communauté de la 'sarx' humaine du Christ avec la nôtre, que de la communauté de sa nature divine avec celle du Père" (133). Much in the same vein is Roldanus' understanding of the instrumentality of the assumed humanity. "Il apparaît à nouveau que chez Athanase seule la divinité du Christ est l'auteur du salut alors que l'humanité n'en est que l'instrument" (134).

Grillmeier then turns to the next clause in Tome 7, "for it was not possible when the Lord had become man for us, that the body should have been without reason". Grillmeier puts the emphasis upon "Lord" and not upon "had become man", and therefore concluded that because the divine Logos had become man, his body could not have been without reason. For the Logos was the primary source of reason (135). For Christ, therefore, the Logos was the ultimate principle of reason.

Finally Grillmeier comes to the statement that the assumed body was not apsuchon. This might be interpreted as "lifeless", it being but a small step from making the Logos the hegemon of the flesh of Christ to making it the final source of all forms of life in the human nature of Christ (136). Given, however, that the Church always saw apsuchon as meaning "soulless", it seems correct to see here a recognition of the soul of Christ in the Christological expressions of the Tome. The reality of the soul is not, however, stressed here as it would have been by the later adversaries of Apollinarius.
Grillmeier introduced the ad Epict. of Athanasius to support the above interpretation of Tome 7. For in the ad Epict. only the object to be redeemed, man, is mentioned; on man's side, the totality of redemption is asserted. When, however, the cause of redemption is introduced, only the divine Logos is mentioned, and not the assumption of a body and soul in Christ. The statement that the Redeemer "really, in truth became man" is not seen as affirming the fullness of man's humanity, but as confirming, against the views of the docetists, the reality of the assumed body. "It does no more than stress the reality of the incarnation" (137).

Grillmeier's conclusion therefore with regard to Athanasius' opinions regarding the human soul of Christ in the years after 362 is that even in the Tome and ad Epict. "Where the problem has now come under open discussion, the human soul of Christ has not yet become a theological principle.....(although it can be assumed with some certainty that we have a statement on the soul of Christ as a physical factor)"(138).

Galtier, meanwhile, believed that Athanasius' approbation of the symbol issued by the synod of Alexandria of 362 "n'impliquerait par elle-même sa croyance à la présence d'une âme humaine dans le Christ qu'autant qu'on le saurait d'avance convaincu de cette doctrine"(139). For if the Tome is interpreted along the lines of the theology of Gregory of Nazianzus, or of Epiphanius, for both of whom the principle quod non est assumptum non est sanatum was true, one must recognise that the passage not only asserts that Christ possessed a human soul, but also that he did so in order that man's soul might be saved. If, on the other hand, Tome 7 is interpreted in the same fashion as such people as Apollinarius or Vitalis did, for whom the divine Logos took the place of the human soul in Christ, one cannot deduce from the context that a human soul was recognised within the humanity of Christ. To Galtier's mind, therefore, it is not clear either whether the Tome admitted the existence of a human soul in the incarnate Logos or not, or even whether Athanasius shared the theological outlook of the composers of the Tome or not. Galtier therefore believed that the only proper method was to answer the all-important question
"a-t-il toujours admis dès avant 362, qu'il y eût dans le Christ une âme, une intelligence comme la nôtre ?" (140), and to interpret the Tome in the light of this answer. It ought to be noted that Galtier's answer to this question is positive, and that therefore he eventually allows that Tome 7 does refer to the human soul assumed by the divine Logos in his saving incarnation.

j. **Christ assumed a human soul, as well as a human body, in order to redeem man's soul and body.**

Dorner was one of these scholars who believed that Athanasius taught that man's entire nature, of which the human soul formed an essential feature, was redeemed and re-established in the divine by the Logos incarnate. For Dorner it followed therefore that that which the divine Logos assumed and constituted a part of himself was man's complete nature, soul and body (141). Indeed, Galtier makes much of this argument in his article. For he stresses that if Christ was to die man's death, it was necessary for the Christ to have a human nature similar to theirs. For were there no human soul in the humanity of Christ, Christ would not have been able to die "la mort de tous les hommes"(142). Meanwhile Dorner corroborated the idea that the human soul of Christ was necessary to the whole salvation of man by noting that however important the role played in Athanasius' system by the ideas of death and immortality, the Alexandrian did not limit redemption solely to these. For he knew something of guilt and sin. It was necessary therefore, according to Dorner, to admit their subject, the soul, in the treatment of their elimination (143).

Over against Dorner, Hess maintained that the human soul of Christ was not necessary to Athanasius' soteriology. For, according to him, Athanasius' doctrine of salvation was that in which only the body was in need of salvation in the strict sense of the word. It alone required that basic transformation from corruption and mortality to incorruption and immortality, achieved only through its union with the divine nature. On the other hand, the divine image of the soul, in virtue of which man knew the Creator, had not been effaced, but only obscured by its turning away from God. Hence the divine Logos, through the miracles, was able to
lead the soul back to its knowledge of the true God, therein returning it to its pristine purity (144).

Roldanus also disagrees with Dorner; yet he does not agree with Hoss that man's human soul did not need saving in the strict sense of the word. For he did allow that Athanasius pointed to the salvation of the whole man, both soul and body (145). Yet, having looked at Athanasius' treatment of Christ's death and descent into hell and having noted the sense of 2 CAr. 70, Tome 7 and ad Epist. 6-7, Roldanus came to the conclusion that this salvation of the whole man was effected through, on the one hand, the incarnation, whereby men, being incorporated into Christ and dying in him, found their condemnation to death fulfilled, and, on the other, the divine Logos himself. For "c'est le Verbe comme seul sujet dans la chair qui en est le réalisateur" (146). Either way Christ's human soul is unimportant. For Athanasius, according to Roldanus, "le salut et la divinisation de l'homme sont entièrement l'œuvre de Dieu" (147).

k. Christ exalted all humanity in himself.

From 1 CAr. 45 it is seen that Christ was exalted in his humanity. Yet in that humanity all men were exalted. Thus it seems to Galtier that the man which the Logos became and which was exalted, was "un homme semblable à tous les autres"; the assumed body which was raised was "constitué comme eux...de même nature que le nôtre" (148). For was Christ's exalted humanity not such, men would not have been exalted in Christ from the death to which they had been subjected.

l. Christ as the second Adam.

From his reading of 1-3 CAr. Galtier believes that for Athanasius men are in Christ, receiving through him grace in that he is their forerunner. Yet, to Galtier's mind, Christ can only represent man, and man can only be in him if he, the Logos incarnate, is like them. This, however, has meaning only if, like man, the Logos incarnate possesses a soul which enlivens his assumed humanity (149). Sellers follows this line of argument to some degree. For, to his mind, Athanasius built upon the soteriological idea that Jesus Christ was the second Adam and that, carrying forward this idea, he was fully
man. Sellers thought, however, that Athanasius did not live long enough to perceive that it was necessary for him to put forward an explicit declaration concerning the constituent parts of that whole man (150).

Roldanus also allows this representative role to Athanasius' Christ. For Athanasius' Christ, in taking the place of all men, and representing them all, became the head of a new humanity, even as Adam was that of the former humanity. For "Christ, en tant qu'homme, avait accompli ce qu'Adam n'avait pu faire....l'humanité est rassemblée en Christ sous un nouveau Chef qui, dans son incorruptibilité divine exprime sa sauvegarde, de même qu'Adam, dans son instabilité humaine, signifiait sa chute"(151). Christ is consequently the "tête unique de corps de l'humanité nouvelle"(152), the "principe et fondement de la nouvelle humanité" (153),"la base de l'humanité re-créeée" (154) and the "nouveau Chef" (155). Yet, that Christ was for Athanasius this Second Adam did not mean that the Christ necessarily had a human soul. For Roldanus thinks that this representative role had to be interpreted along the following lines. Athanasius acknowledged that the Logos not only was united to men through a body like theirs, but also had rendered "l'existence corporelle en tant que telle, indétachable de lui"(156); consequently the Logos inhabited man while men "étaient compris dans la sarx de Christ" (157); God shared in man's existence and men in God's through the Logos' assumed humanity which was common essentially to both Christ and men. The soteriological results of this were several: on the one hand God revealed himself through Christ's humanity to men. On the other hand, men, being incorporated in the God-man, were anointed with the Holy Spirit when "la chair, revêtue par le Verbe, a été ointe en Lui et par Lui" (158) and "étaient delivrés du peché et de la malédiction parce qu'ils sont morts par la mort de Christ, d'autre part qu'ils sont élevés de même parce qu'ils étaient inclus dans l'ascension de Christ"(159). In short, men were saved in the sharing of God's life in Christ. For "les hommes deviennent parfaits par la communion avec le corps parfait de Christ"(160). Here, therefore, Athanasius' picture of Christ as the second Adam is interpreted in terms of a Logos-sarx schema, according to which the human soul of the Christ is an unnecessary factor.
As we noted in the beginning of this chapter, and as can be noted from the above tracing of the debate concerning the humanity of Christ, the method of Athanasian scholars is generally to use a common anthropological model, according to which man is composed of soul and body/flesh, interpreted in the case of Christ in terms either of a Logos-sarx or of a Logos-anthrocpos schema, the particular schema being chosen in the light of Athanasius' doctrine.

Upon this we must comment. It seems to the present writer, firstly, that Athanasius' anthropological model is not closed, static and philosophical. It is not that in which humanity is seen as composed of components, nor that in which soul and body stand in antithesis, both being entities in themselves, and consequently distinct from the deity. Rather, for Athanasius, the anthropological model is open, dynamic and relational. It is that in which the theological setting of creation and providence determine the relational and functional conception of man; it is that in which the doctrine of a creator, providential God, rather than the concept of empiricism, colour the understanding of man.

For Athanasius, therefore, humanity is contingent, depending for its existence upon the continuous creation of the divine Logos. Thus while it is essentially distinct from God in its creatureliness, it is not independent; for it exists only in and through the life-giving Logos of the Father.

For Athanasius the soul is logical, incorruptible, and 'in the image of God'. Yet it is only such in as much as it shares in the grace of the nature of the Logos, who is himself the Logos, the incorruptible Image of God. The soul is therefore dependent upon the Logos for its very nature and existence.

In its relation to the incorporeal Father, meanwhile, the body is distinct as regards its nature, but not to its existence. For it exists in the Logos alone, the providential creator. Indeed, as soon as the providential care of the Logos towards the body ceases, the body dies, and fades to nothing. In its relation, however, to other creatures, it is essentially one. For the body constitutes
the whole life substance of man, beast or object as organised in the corporeal form. Indeed, the body is not that which partitions off a man from his neighbour, but that which bounds him in life with all men and nature, so that he can never make his unique answer to God as an isolated individual, apart from his relation to his neighbour. Thus while a person has his own body, that body is essentially and naturally one with the rest of creation. His individuality lies rather in the uniqueness of the divine word to every man, which demanded of him an inalienable response, a relationship shown in man's logicality.

Nor did Athanasius think of man as a loosely-linked combination of soul and body. For him, man is an essential union of the two; for while the soul directs the body, the body is the means of the soul's activity. The soul does not seek liberation from the body, but is proper to it. For the body apart from the soul is not a man, but an irrational beast. Moreover, while death is a separation of the soul from the body, man's proper end is the joyful reunion of the soul and the body in the general resurrection. Indeed, although distinct from the soul, the body is not opposed to it, as the body would have been if it had been part of the closed system of philosophy.

For Athanasius therefore physiology was subordinated to the question of the relation of the whole man, as part of the solidarity of creation, to God. All his thinking was done in this theological dimension of man's relatedness to God. It follows therefore that all his anthropological terms are, in a sense, to be seen as designating or qualifying this fundamental relationship of man to God; they are devoted to expressing a deep understanding of the theological truth of man's nature.

It also seems that to interpret Athanasius' thought in terms of either a *logos-sarx* or a *logos-anthropos* schema is to be unfair in one's treatment of the bishop's thinking. For it is of importance to the interpretation of Athanasius' thought to see it not as either a *logos-sarx* or a *logos-anthropos* schema, but both a *logos-sarx* and a *logos-anthropos* framework, as Athanasius uses all
three concepts: Logos-sarx, Logos-soma and Logos-
antropos in his explanation of the incarnation. Moreover these frameworks are further complemented and clarified by the terms sarx, soma, anthrопos and hos anthrопos, used in a Christological setting, and the nouns ensarkosis, ensomatosis and enanthropesis. To interpret the Alexandrian's theology only in terms either of a loges-sarx or a loges-anthrops framework is therefore to distort Athanasius' thought by incarcerating it within the strictures of a schema, which is true, but not the whole truth, of that thinking. Moreover, the interpretation of the bishop's thought in terms of only one of these frameworks results in the more conducive expressions being abstracted from their contexts, and being related to the framework, the rest, which do not fit so well, being set aside as non-technical or atypical.

Lastly, the use of Athanasius' doctrine to determine the schema according to which Christ's humanity is to be understood seems unjustified. For it appears that one cannot argue from Athanasius' doctrinal views to his understanding of the humanity of man, as the understanding of these doctrines depends to a large extent upon whether Christ's humanity was docetic or not. To give but one example, it seems that Sellers argued that since the whole man was saved by the Logos incarnate, the whole man, soul and body, was assumed by the Logos. To show, however, that it was not a docetic Christ who saved the whole man, it is necessary to show that the Christ had a human soul. For otherwise it is theoretically possible that as in Apollinarius' thought, so in Athanasius' thought, as Roldanus imagines, it was merely the divine Logos in a body who effected a total salvation. Indeed, this method is circular; for one is studying the doctrines to decide whether or not the Athanasian Christ was docetic, and yet one needs to know whether or not the Athanasian Christ was docetic in order to determine how to interpret these doctrines.

It seems therefore that we must see Athanasius' understanding of man as theological. From this view of humanity will come a different conception of the humanity assumed by the divine Logos, and of the salvation effected through it. Moreover, the questions asked of Christ's
humanity will receive different answers under this new understanding of humanity. For the understanding of the humanity will determine the questions asked and will colour the answers given.
INTRODUCTION

FOOTNOTES

(1) DI 54. 11-14
(13) G. Voisin. cc. 230f.
(14) cf. Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus who were concerned with trinitarian theology when dealing with the Arians. They only turned to Christological matters they began to deal with the Apollinarians. cf. A. von Harnack. "Outlines of the History of Dogma" ET (London) 1893.
(15) Voisin.cc. 235 cf. J. Lebon cc. 21
(16) P. Galtier.cc. 570f.
(17) ib. 578 cf. ib. 582 "Entre S. Athanase.....et les Ariens, c'est toujours la divinite du Verbe qui est en cause"
(18) ib. 579
(19) ib. 583
(20) A. Gesché. "L' Âme humaine de Jesus" R.H.E. 54 (1959) p. 385-425
(21) K. Hoss. "Studien über das Schrifttum und die Theologie des Athanasius auf Grund: eine Echtheitsuchung von Athanasius 'Contra Gentes' und 'De Incarnatione' " (Fribourg-en-Brisgau) 1899.
(22) M. Richard. cc.
(24) A. Grillmeier. cc.
(25) M. Richard. cc. 6
(26) cf. Athan. 3 C.Ar. 31-33
(27) Richard cc.31
(28) ib. 10
(29) ib.10
(30) ib.11 cf.13: selon notre docteur le Christ des Ariens était vraiment un homme et même une homme ordinaire.
(31) ib. 46
(32) ib. 53
(33) J.N.D. Kelly oc. 287
(34) A. Grillmeier oc. 310
(35) I. Ortiz de Urbana. "L'anima umana di Christo secundo S. Atanasio" OCP XV (1954) 27-43
(36) Weigl. oc.40
(37) ib. 65-66
(38) Dorner oc.252
(39) ib. 253
(40) Roldanus oc.261
(41) eg. III C.Ar. 41 cf. I C.Ar. 41; III C.Ar. 43; 56.
(42) cf. DI 41-2; II C.Ar. 28; 69.
(43) cf. A. Gesche oc.408: according to him, Athanasius considered man a dichotomous being, composed of body and soul. Also according to him there is no reason to suggest that the Alexandrian thought of Jesus, the Logos as man, as anthropologically other than such a dichotomous man
(44) Voisin oc.236
(46) cf. R.V. Sellers oc.42: who felt that Athanasius was merely using those anthropological terms in current circulation amongst the Alexandrian theologians. G.L. Prestige Fathers and Heretics (London) 1968. p.106 asserted that the use of soma in itself need not suggest the absence of a human soul in Christ. For both Eustathius of Antioch (apud Theodoret Eran.57D; 236C, (PG 83)) and Diodere (c.Synus.Frag.2 PG 33) refer to Christ's human nature as his soma, and yet admit his human soul. cf.Sellers oc. 42: who drew attention to Cyril of Alexandria who used the term body of the Christ, in whom there was a human and rational soul.
(47) Voisin oc.233
(48) cf. DI 3-7, 8, 44, etc.
(49) Weigl oc.69
(50) G.Prestige oc. 105-106
(51) Galtier oc. 571
(52) CG 30-34
(53) Galtier oc. 572
(54) ib. 573
(55) Tixeront. History of Dogmas (ET) London 1930 p.120
(56) ib. p.116
(57) Dorner oc. 259 f.
(58) ib. 19,77
(59) Richard 12
(60) ib. 13
(61) ib. 13 cf. note 90. cf.ib.17
(62) Galtier oc. 572
(63) Richard 17
(64) C.E. Raven. Apollinarianism. (1923) p.83f; 91f.
(65) III C.Ar.30
(66) Kelly oc. 287
(67) Grillmeier oc. 309
(126) Athanasius ad Epict. 2 cf.ib.7
(127) Voisin oc.247
(128) Sellers oc. 43
(129) Prestige oc.105-106
(130) Gesché oc.408-409
(131) Grillmeier oc.322
(132) Roldanus oc.260
(133) ib.164
(134) ib.212 cf.ib.234, 356
(135) cf. Athanasius De Vita Ant. 82
(136) cf. Roldanus oc.363; Kelly oc.287-289
(137) Grillmeier oc.324 cf.Roldanus oc.262-263
(138) ib.325. cf.Roldanus oc.260; Kelly oc.288
(139) Galtier oc.569
(140) ib. 569
(141) Dorner oc.349f.; Tixeront 120f.; Voisin 237f.
(142) Galtier oc.575
(144) Hoss oc.77
(145) Roldanus oc.260; cf.Athanasius Tome 7; ad Epict.6-7
(146) ib.268 cf.ib.273 cf. Grillmeier oc.324-325
(147) ib. 276
(148) Galtier oc.571
(149) ib.580
(150) Sellers oc.43-44
(151) Roldanus oc.355
(152) ib.141
(153) ib.156
(154) ib.219
(155) ib.355
(156) ib.122
(157) ib.355
(158) ib.154 cf.ib.357
(159) ib.205 cf.ib.358
(160) ib.155
CHAPTER I

THE CONTRA GENTES - DE INCARNATIONE

The study of Athanasius' understanding of the humanity of Christ as portrayed in the CG-DI, a work dating from c.A.D. 328-335 (1), amounts essentially to a study of the DI, as there are no Christological statements in the CG. Yet it does not amount solely to a study of the DI, for the CG does confirm and corroborate the picture of humanity painted in the DI and so helps to establish our comprehension of Athanasius' view of the humanity assumed by the divine Logos in his incarnation.

Before, however, we embark upon this study, we must note certain points, in the light of which we must read the CG-DI. To disregard these would be to disregard the nature of the first work of Athanasius, and so would make impossible an accurate representation of his thought.

Although the CG-DI sets out to expound "the Incarnation of the Logos......and his divine manifestation to us" (2) and to offer a paradigm of the Christian faith (3), its main emphasis is upon the divinity of the Logos. For it demonstrates that the Christ is God the Logos and the Power of God; even where it aims to refute both the Jews who slander and the Greeks who mock (4) the Logos' becoming man, it corrects their false, limited conceptions of the incarnation which are inconsistent with the divine nature of the Logos by showing that that which in the incarnation is explained heretically as human is in truth divine and that that considered impossible and unsuitable is in fact possible and suiting his goodness, a refutation which is based upon a particular understanding of the divinity of the Logos of God. It appears therefore that Athanasius starts from the divinity of the Logos. Thus even where Athanasius is treating Christ's human passions, he does so in relation to Christ's impassible economy as the Divine Logos, and allows only that which is consistent with the Divine Logos becoming man. The emphasis in the CG-DI therefore is less upon the man which the Logos became, than upon the Logos himself, the Divine Logos being central to all the incarnational thought.

Again, the CG-DI concentrates upon the "why" of the incarnation of the divine Logos rather than the "how." This
is partly because Athanasius could not see the incarnation apart from the salvation effected through it and partly because he admitted the mystery of God's becoming man and therefore the impossibility of explaining the mechanics of the incarnation.

This first treatise of Athanasius has a reverential and devotional tone and quality which is not so obvious in his later, polemical works. This quality arises partly from its scriptural background, partly from the reader whom it is addressing and partly from the intention of the writing. The background to his thought is Scriptural: it is from such that Athanasius drew his thoughts (4), and to such that his reader is referred for elaboration upon the divine manifestation of the Logos (5). Like his mentors, the Biblical theologians who were witnesses to the divinity of Christ, Athanasius preferred to confess the reality of the very God who became very man for the sake of man, without entering into any philosophical speculation regarding the Logos' assumed humanity and its relation to its divine subject. The reader whom Athanasius is addressing is a Christian. He is twice referred to as "Lover of Christ" (6), in contrast to the contentious and argumentative party of those outside the Church, and is probably to be included amongst the lovers of learning (8), the seekers after truth, a truth which for Athanasius has its ultimate centre in God, the Truth. Athanasius' intention in writing is to explain the Christian faith in a reverential manner (9), in order that his reader might have greater and stronger devotion towards the Logos. This devotional aspect of the writing even appears in DI 33-55 where Athanasius treats of the denial of the divinity of the Christ by the Jews and the Greeks. For while the chapters form a refutation of the unbelief of the Jews and of the mockery of the Greeks, they are not primarily polemical in tone. They do not constitute a direct confrontation between Athanasius and the heterodox parties, as for example the later C. Ar. 1-3 do, but offer suggestions as to how the Christian reader might refute the same; whereas in the C. Ar. 1-3 and similar works the addressee is the heretic, in the DI he is a young Christian. These chapters therefore are primarily assurances to the Christian that his faith is reasonable and confirmation
that answers exist to the objections that the heretics might raise; they are for the establishing of men in the Christian faith and for settling such doubts as may have arisen in the minds of Christians as a result of the unbelief and mockery of the non-Christians.

It is not surprising, therefore, that a catechetical element appears in the conclusion of the dual work. For in DI. 57 Athanasius exhorts all his readers to live pure and righteous lives: without a pure mind and life modelled upon those of the saints, no-one can apprehend the Truth. The DI therefore is not to be seen as abstract theorising and speculation upon a Christological subject, either for its own sake, or in order to refute heterodox opposition. It is a work very much bound up with the Christian life.

The DI is, then, not a speculative, polemical work. It is rather a confessional, devotional and catechetical work, based on Scripture and written for a Christian, in order to expound, in a reverential manner, the saving incarnation of the Lord Jesus Christ and thereby bring the reader to a deeper and more mature appreciation of his Redeemer. It is in the light of this that the questions and answers of this study of Athanasius' understanding of the humanity of Christ, as portrayed in the CG-DI, must be formulated.

Central to Athanasius' understanding of the Incarnation is the divinity of the Logos. Having spent the larger part of the CG upon the question of the true divinity of the Logos, Athanasius tends to accept such as "given" in the DI. Hence the Logos, the subject of the Incarnation, was God the Lord. He was the Very Logos of the Father and the true Son of God, the adjective alethinos, over against the possible alethes, with its connotation of "held to be true", emphasising the genuine reality of his divine sonship. He was the Wisdom, the Power of God the Father and Life itself. As such he was the Creator and the Governor and Ruler of the Universe. Being so divine through his intimate communion with the Father, the Logos shared in the divine nature, being incorporeal, impassible and incorruptible.

Athanasius' portrait of the Logos also hints at the latter's eternity and immutability. For over against the past tenses of the verbs which describe the Logos' appearance as man in the sphere of space and time (10), the
verbs which describe Christ's divinity are always in the present. He is God; he is the very Logos of the Father. The use in these contexts of *huparchen* (11) and of *on* (12), through the connotations which they bear as continuous presents, carries an openness; the eternal, as opposed to the everlasting, "being" which they imply stands in marked contrast with the "becoming" of the Incarnation of the Logos; the eternal and infinite economy of the divine Logos, in which he is eternally begotten of the Father, is contrasted with the temporal and finite economy of the Logos as man, in which he was born of Mary in Bethlehem. Yet it is not merely to the existence of the Logos prior to his incarnation that Athanasius refers this openness of being. Rather, while the divine Logos has become man, has revealed himself and has endured men's insults, he remains the impassible, incorruptible Very God, the Logos. Indeed, it is only in reference to the temporal world that the Logos is the subject of temporal action; he created the universe; he became incarnate; he will come again in glory. Apart from these actions in time towards the material world, the divine Logos, in his immaterial being, merely "is", being beyond all time, with its beginnings, alterations and ends. It appears, then, that through the Incarnation the divine Logos did not then come into existence, nor was altered in his divine essence. For in and through the Incarnation the divine Logos, who ever was, became man, while yet remaining the eternal and immutable Logos of God.

That it was not only at the time of his birth of Mary that the Logos came into existence finds confirmation elsewhere: for long before this divine manifestation the Logos existed, being among other things the agent in the Father's creation of the universe. Furthermore, Athanasius notes that the Logos came to man's realm "not that he was previously distant; for no part of creation is left deprived of him; but he fills the universe, being in union with his Father......" (13). Such a statement certainly implies that the Logos pre-existed the incarnation, in that he co-existed with the Father, caring providentially for the creation. This same point is made in CG 41 where it is stated that it was only through the providence of the Logos that the world, created from nothing, was able
to remain firm, and thus not slip back into non-existence. The Logos therefore of necessity pre-existed the creation and so could not have only come into existence through the Incarnation.

Nordid the Incarnation constitute an alteration in the divine being of the Logos. He did not cease to be what he was, but while truly becoming mortal, possible man, the Logos as God remained eternally divine, immortal and impassible. Hence, while he became man through his incarnation, he was not merely a man, but also God the Logos and Wisdom of the true God. He became man and yet remained God the Logos. Indeed, had he not remained God, he would not have been able to redeem man from death, and point man beyond himself to God the Father, both of which actions - redemption and enlightenment - are central to the purpose of the incarnation.

Certainly God the Logos incarnate was born, appeared as man, died and rose again; he truly ate and drank human food; he endured man's insults. Yet these passions in no way imply an alteration in the divine nature of the Logos in his Incarnation. In being born of Mary, the divine Logos did not suffer; when he was in the body he himself was not polluted, not being affected in himself at all by the weaknesses and passions natural to the body. 54.14ff. makes the same point, but in a more explicit manner: while Christ suffered for men, the Logos who became man was harmed in no respect as he was impassible and incorruptible, the Very Logos and God. In short, the Logos as man suffered, but the Logos himself, still being the impassible and incorruptible divine Logos, remained true to his nature. Again, it was the assumed body of the Logos as body which was naturally possible, which was born, ate and suffered, and its passions may be predicated of the divine Logos only in that the body was no-one else's but the Lord's. They were those of the Logos not by nature, but by assumption; they were rightly and properly referred to the Logos thus as he had truly become man by assuming humanity, the reality of which the passions demonstrated. While therefore the Logos incarnate suffered in this manner, that suffering never overtook its divine subject. For while the Logos suffered, he did so only in his body, as the man which he had become, his body as body being the centre of his passions; the divine
Logos therefore suffered only through the assumed possible humanity.

Christ's death must be interpreted in the same manner. The Logos incarnate died. He did so, however, not because the Logos as God was no longer immortal and incorruptible, but because of the mortal body which the Logos had assumed; in himself the Logos was unable to die, being the immortal Son of the Father, and so took to himself a body which could die that he might die for all men. Hence Christ was unable not to die, in that his humanity was mortal; and yet he was unable to remain dead in that the same humanity was the temple of Life.

Similarly, Christ suffered corruption in that his assumed humanity was corruptible by nature, but yet rose incorruptible in that he who had assumed it was incorruptible.

It is clear, therefore, that in Athanasius' doctrine the Logos, in becoming man, underwent no alteration in his divine being. The passibility which he endured was his, not by nature, but in that it naturally pertained to the humanity which he had made his own through the Incarnation. It was his only by appropriation and not by nature. Indeed, had the Logos undergone any alteration in his divine being through the Incarnation, the salvation from the suffering, mortality and corruption which the Logos sought to effect in and through his own divinity would not have been achieved.

It is in the light of this immutability of his divine being that the condescension of the Logos in becoming man must be understood. It is true that the Logos underwent humiliation in becoming man; he came down to men and in his descent submitted to man's corruption. Besides the use of the verb katerchesthai and its cognates - a verb which, rather interestingly in this connection, is used very vividly of Christ's submission and descent to death (15) - one other term is used by Athanasius to point to God's condescension in the Incarnation. That is the noun euteleia (16). The incarnation was euteles for God the Logos, in that in it God as man suffered infamously. There was, however, more to the meaning of this humiliation than that. The clue to this further meaning lies in the fact that Athanasius thinks that over against his first appearance, the Logos will come
again "in his own glory......in his own greatness" (17). The implication therefore is that while in his second coming God will appear in his obvious glory and power, his first coming, that effected in the Incarnation, is one in which his glorious power is veiled by his humanity, an idea which correlates with the use of Hebrews 10.20 in 25.26. It also ties in with the idea that in his Incarnation the Logos did not wish merely to effect a splendid theophany but willed to appear in a form from which men might benefit: "for as a good teacher who cares for his pupils always condescends to teach by simpler means those who cannot profit by more advanced things, so does the Logos of God...." (18). It is interesting that within this very teaching-simile the verb sugkatabainein a verb used of the Logos' incarnation, is used of the process of limiting the presentation of that which one wishes to teach to the situation and capacity of one's pupils. It seems therefore that the humbling of the Logos in the Incarnation is not to be seen in terms of a degradation of the being of the divine Logos, but in terms of the Logos' self-limiting of his glorious power for soteriological reasons.

One problem still faces us regarding this humiliation of the Logos in his Incarnation. When the noun euteleia is used in 1.13, 21 to describe the incarnation, it is qualified. Hence 1.13 reads tes dokouses euteleias tou Logou and 1.21 te nomizomen euteleias tou Logou. We cannot, however, suppose from these references that the humiliation of the Logos was in any way unreal or feigned. For this same term, euteleia, is used also in 56.11 of the incarnation of the divine Logos, and there it is qualified by the phrase meta_tap_eineinatos, a phrase which echoes Paul's statement of Phil.2.8. etapeinosen heauton. The incarnation was an "apparent" humiliation, not in the sense that humiliation was in any way unreal, but in the sense that the incarnation was considered by non-Christians as nothing more than an humiliation of the divine Logos; yet what they, in their mockery and unbelief, thought to be most unsuitable and improper, seeing it as merely a degradation of the glorious Logos, was in fact a great witness to God's divinity; for through death he rose again, overthrew the rule of evil, and re-established the kingdom of heaven.
Hence what was seen solely as a degradation of the divine Logos has in truth been no such degradation, but has led to God's greater exaltation by men as they realise from his Incarnation who is God and who God is.

Consequently, the Logos' condescension is in leaving the Father's side, where alone he is truly at rest and in coming to men in a form which they could appreciate. It was an apparent condescension, however, only in the sense that, while his divinity was veiled by his assumed flesh, he did not cease to be divine in any manner. Certainly the condescension of the Logos was not a degradation of the divine nature of the Logos, as the Jews and the Greeks considered it to be. Rather the divine Logos remained eternally the glorious Son of the Father, while yet humbling himself in becoming man.

Two other consequences of the Logos' remaining fully divine while yet becoming man are, on the one hand, that it is not the Logos who is bettered or worsened, in becoming man, but the humanity which is bettered, and, on the other, that the Creator Logos is not limited in and through his Incarnation.

As we have already noticed, the divine Logos did not suffer when he became man, his human passions being peculiar to the body in itself, and to the Logos only through their assumption. Hence while being in a body the Logos was not polluted nor adulterated. Rather, just as he was in all, and he did not partake of all, but gave everything life and sustenance, so the all-holy Logos of God was made known in a body, and yet was not therein affected. All influence was from the all-holy and incorruptible Logos to the mortal body, thereby bringing about the vivification, purification and sanctification of the humanity. The Logos gave of his divine nature as all-holy to the body in sanctifying it and thus bettered it. In giving of his own nature, the Logos did not, however, suffer alteration either for better or worse. For in himself, although being in all, he did not partake of created being, being in essence "beyond all". Hence while the body, an essential part of the whole creation, shares by grace in the Logos, the Logos does not in essence share in the body, although he became man. All movement was from the divine to the human; it is the divine which is the subject, the initiator, and it can never
become the object of creaturely action. This is partly because of the immense essential void between Creator and creature which Athanasius admits in DI II, and which dictates not that the creation reaches up to the Creator, but that the Creator graciously stoops down to creation; and partly because any life in creation, and therefore any action, finds its ultimate origin in the Providential Creator Logos.

We turn now to the point that the Logos was not limited when he became man. Indeed, had he been so, he would have undergone an alteration in his divine nature in the Incarnation, and thus have been no longer the omnipresent Creator Logos of God.

Central to Athanasius' thought upon this matter was the fact that in regard to his nature the Creator Logos was related to the assumed body in the same way as he was to the rest of creation, of which the body was an essential part. While the divine Logos was creatively active in the whole of creation, ordering and extending his providence over all, thereby giving life to all, separately and collectively, and thus contained creation, he was not contained himself by it. For in regard to his divine nature he, as the incorporeal Creator, was in essence beyond the whole of the corporeal creation, and hence was complete in all respects in his Father only, with whom alone the Logos, the Scn, had total affinity, in both his activity and his being. On the essential level, therefore, the relation of the divine Logos to his assumed body was the same as that to the rest of creation, in that the assumed humanity was essentially one with the rest of creation. Thus while the body was his own through his appropriation of it for man's salvation, and he was in it, moving and controlling it, giving it life and being revealed through it, the Logos was not bound or enclosed by it; for he was, as Logos, beyond creatureliness, being only at rest in the Father.

Hence, even as the Logos was active towards each and every part of creation, and yet, in being beyond each in regard to his divine being, was not limited in his providential care towards that alone, but encompassed all creation in his creative power, so the Logos, while in his assumed humanity and enlivening it, was beyond it, and thus was providentially active to all creation. Creation
therefore, was not deprived of his providential action. Rather, containing all, the incarnate Logos still enlivened creation, and still was visible through his providential action in the world. As the divine Logos, he was in man and yet in all.

Because God the Logos did not undergo any alteration in his divine being in his Incarnation, and hence was not limited by the assumption of a limited, weak body, but continued to care for all creation through his providence, the Logos as man was distinct from man, who was limited in his finitude. For while the Logos in the body was able to influence objects other than his own body, man, able to reflect upon those things beyond his own body, was not able to affect them. Here, because of the Logos' nature which is beyond creatureliness, lies a distinction of potential between the incarnate divine Logos and creaturely man.

That the Logos was not limited in his power through his incarnation is made again in 42.30ff. Even as the Logos contains the universe, being present to each and every part, ordering it and enlivening it, and thus invisibly reveals himself in it and through it, so the Logos is actively in the assumed humanity, which is a part of the whole creation, contains it, and is not contained. The basis of the argument in Ch. 42 is again that of Ch. 17, namely that, in regard to the respective natures, the relation of the divine Logos to his assumed humanity, which is an essential part of the whole of creation, is the same as his relation to the whole of creation. Indeed, the similarity of relationships is stressed by the fact that in both Ch. 17 and Ch. 42 the verbs used to describe the divine Logos' relation to his assumed body are those used to describe his relationship to the whole creation. This relationship of the divine Logos to creation, whether the world at large, or his assumed humanity, is always that of the Creator to his creation, in which the Creator controls, and is not controlled by the creation. Yet, within this relationship there is the particular and peculiar relationship designated by ἵδικα and its cognates. Despite the essential distinction between the Logos and his body, there is that peculiar and individual relationship of assumption. That the Logos was not limited by his
incarnation is further stressed by an image: a human mind, which is present throughout the whole of a man, is known by a part of the body, the tongue. That, however, does not mean that the nature of the mind is thereby diminished. Even so the divine Logos is present throughout the whole of creation, and yet is known through a part of that whole, the assumed humanity. Similarly, that does not mean that the being, and therefore the power, of the divine Logos is thereby diminished.

It seems therefore clear that the implication derived from the present tenses used to describe the divinity of the Logos, that he was eternally immutable, and that therefore the Logos underwent no alteration in his divine nature in his incarnation, was rightly taken up. For it seems that while the Logos truly became man, he remained eternally and immutably God, being by nature impassible, immortal and incorruptible. He was therefore not limited in his becoming finite man, although he humbled himself for the salvation of mankind.

Moving from the divinity of the Logos, we turn to the incarnation itself. To describe the humanity which the Logos therein assumed, Athanasius uses many phrases and clauses, to the study of which we now turn.

The incarnation Athanasius describes in his DI in two main manners: it is that in which the divine Logos becomes something in himself, and that in which he assumes something from beyond himself to himself.

In his incarnation the divine Logos became man (21). He dwelt among men, sharing their lives. As a result of this becoming man, and also as a proof of its reality, the divine Logos as man was therefore born, lived, suffered and died. While however the divine Logos did truly become man, and thus entered into the finite and human realm, he did not cease to be God. He was man; yet he was not merely man. He was also God: "he was not merely a man, but God, even the Logos and Wisdom of the true God"(22). Interestingly enough, he who is so described as not being merely a man, but God, is not described in the Johannine manner. The "he became flesh", which is so frequent an incarnational formula in C.Ar. 1-3, is missing from the CG-DI.

Equally, in becoming incarnate, the divine and incorporeal Logos took to himself a creaturely body (23).
The body which he thus had (24), and which he thus bore (25) was also described in terms of that with which the Logos was clothed and that in which he dwelt: the Logos put on a body (26); he indwelt the temple which was his humanity (27). The image of "being clothed with a body" is one which reflects traditional ecclesiastical language concerning the Incarnation. It maintains a necessary distinction between the divine Logos, who is the subject clothed, and the assumed body, the clothing. Yet it also conveys the idea of the closeness of the union between the two. Certainly there is no need to see here any hint of docetism, as though the Logos appeared through a veil of humanity, being clothed with it. For "to be clothed" is used in a rich and varied metaphorical manner in LXX (28) in the N.T. (29) and in extra-biblical Greek (30), as is its equivalent in Latin, *induere* (31). The usage of clothing oneself in strength, righteousness, glory and salvation carries no suggestion of putting on a mask. The idiom rather refers to an act in which one enters into actual relations. Indeed, it is interesting that Chrysostom (32) notes that *endusasthai tina* was that used in his time in a sense similar to that of the English idiom "to be wrapped up in someone". Hence "to be clothed with a body/flesh" conveys the idea of the distinction of the Logos and the assumed humanity, and yet points to the total embracing of the creaturely by the divine. The image of the Logos indwelling his assumed body, a description drawn from John 2.19,21, is again a common biblical expression for the very real presence of God to a person. It expresses the relationship of God to a person. Certainly, in this context it does not dictate a particular anthropological understanding of the Logos incarnate.

Through the divine Logos having become man by the assumption of a body, there is reflected both a relationship of intimacy and of distinction within the incarnation. The relation of intimacy coincides with the Logos' becoming man in himself and that of distinction with his assumption of a body from beyond himself to himself.

That relationship of intimacy is reflected both in the divine Logos' being with men, and in his being present to his humanity. The verbs *eina* (33), *genesthai* (34), *suneinai* (35) and *pareinai* (36) describe this relationship.
Two nouns fulfill the same function: diagoge and epibasis and cognates (37). These verbs and nouns are rather interesting. For two of them are used elsewhere in contexts which throw some light upon their use here: einai and epibainai are found not only describing the relation of the divine Logos to his assumed humanity, but also that of the divine Logos to the corporeal world (38). Meanwhile suneinai is used in 8.4 and 17.26 to describe the supremely intimate relation of the Logos, the Son, to his Father, God, and in 8.23 to describe a man's conjugal relation to a woman.

As a result of the Logos' being present in the assumed humanity, the humanity shares in the Logos' grace. It should, however, be noted that this is a "one way" participation. For the Logos, while being in creation through the incarnation, did not partake of all. The Logos therefore gives of himself to the wanting body, an essential part of the material world, but yet remains immutably the divine Logos, lacking nothing. Another description of this "sharing" is provided by the verb sumplekein. The assumed body is entwined by Life even as it once was ensnared in corruption and death. Content is given to this "sharing" of the humanity in the Logos by the verbs kinein, kratein, photizein, energein and zoopoiein. It is noteworthy that this participation is not to be understood as referring to "nature" at all. For the assumed humanity does not share by nature in the divine Logos, the impassible void of the 'creature-Creator' forbidding that. Rather it is seen in terms of the body sharing in the enlivening power of the Logos. Also worth noting is that these verbs are not to be seen primarily, if at all, as asserting a particular type of anthropology for the Logos incarnate, but as stating the manner in which the assumed humanity exists in, and only in, the divine Logos, the Life. For it is only through the creation sharing in the Logos, who is truly from the Father, that it is saved from falling back into that nihil from which it was created. This sharing of creation in the divine Logos is explained in terms of the Logos being its directive force. The Logos, through his creatio continua, moves, directs, enlivens and enlightens the cosmos. These same verbs, as we have seen, are also used of the sharing of the assumed body in the Logos. Thus just as the Logos
acts as the directive and enlivening principle to the world, so he does to the assumed humanity. Either the very same verbs, or their synonyms, are therefore used in exactly the same sense of Christ's body and the creaturely world, of which the former is an essential part. Moreover, several of the same verbs are again taken up in the Athanasian use of Acts 17.28, which has for its point of reference the dependence upon the Logos, the Life, that creatureliness has for its existence.

That is not to say, however, that there is no difference between the acts of creation and of incarnation. Since the Creator Logos of God remains such while yet becoming man, his relation in respect of his divine nature remains the same in Incarnation as it was in creation. Yet whereas in creation the divine Logos remained ever against creation, being involved in it only in a creative manner, in the Incarnation the Logos was still so involved, but was also integrally involved in it that he made his own a part of that creation, an human body, and in that he became man.

This intimate relationship of the divine Logos to his assumed humanity is also seen in the altering of the incarnational image of the Logos' putting on a body, into an image of salvation: "the body put on the incorporeal Logos of God, and thus no longer fears death or corruption, having Life itself as a covering, by which corruption is destroyed" (40). The alternating of the divine Logos and of the body as the subject and object of the verb "to put on" points to the intimacy whence the body's salvation stemmed.

The relationship of distinction, meanwhile, is equally manifest. For the body is that which the divine Logos never became, the body always remaining the object of the Logos' assumption. It is that which the Logos took to himself, a clause which safeguards the distinction of the Logos in his divinity and in his humanity, ensuring that the clause "to become man" is not understood in terms of a coming into being, or an alteration in the immutable nature of the Logos. Again, the body is that which the Logos uses (41), it being the σῶμα through which the Logos became man to reveal himself (42). It was that in which the divine Logos sojourned (43) even though not being naturally "at home" in his body.
The reason for this distinction lies in the Logos being the creator, and the humanity being the creature, the former being essentially other than the latter. That the one is essentially distinct from the other is clear. For the divine Logos was he who fashioned and created this body for himself of Mary (44). Indeed, it is this body which was created particularly for the Logos; it existed and was complete in him. In fact, it seems that apart from the creative act of the Logos in assuming it, that human body would not have existed. It follows therefore that the divine Logos is the bestower of life, and that the body is that dependent for its existence upon the Logos. In other words, the Logos is the subject, and the giver, while the body is the object and the recipient. Hence, while the body receives of the divine Logos, the Logos, as the ultimate subject and bestower, cannot become the recipient at the hands of the humanity. The divine and immaterial Logos by definition cannot become the body.

The verbs used in the DI to describe the incarnation seem therefore to point to the fact that the assumed humanity, however conceived, was truly borne by the divine Logos, without his having then altered in his very nature. They point to the special nature of the relationship of the Creator Logos to his own creaturely humanity. The verbs do, however, also make certain implications regarding the humanity itself. The body is contingent, existing only in and through the providential care of the Logos. Indeed, it seems that apart from the act of the Logos in assuming it, the human body would not have existed. More interestingly, the verbs of creating, in their Christological use, are used only with soma, and not anthropos. This, coupled with the fact that the verbs, kinein, zeepoiein, krakein and phctizein, verbs used in Ch. 17 and 41-43 to relate the creative Logos to the creaturely world, are used in the same chapter to describe the relation of the Logos to his creaturely body, suggests that Athanasius may use body to connote especially that which relates a man to the rest of creation essentially.

Moreover, there seems to be a distinction between anthropos and soma, revealed through the verbs used to relate them separately to the Logos. The Logos became
man, but never body, while the Logos assumed a body, but
never a man. It seems therefore that while the body may
be a "possession" of someone, the man cannot. It is a
more open, enigmatic quality. Consequently the Logos'
becoming man denotes a "becoming" of the Logos himself,
in an act which affects him personally, while the Logos'
taking humanity denotes an action of the Logos which
affects something "external", although related to
himself. This distinction seems to be part of the thinking
that asserts that the body is particularly related to
the material creation, and that man is related to God in
his being "in the image of God".

Athanasius' understanding of man as *soma* and
*anthropos* depends upon such a crucial duality. For
Man was created in both an essential and a rational
sense; he had both a body and a soul. For, along with
the rest of creation he was created by the Father through
the Logos from nothing. Yet he alone of creation was
also created 'in the image of God'. This duality is not,
however, the scientific one of Greek philosophy, in which
man, a composite of body and soul, is considered as man
*per se*. Rather, Athanasius understood man as *home
religiosus*, seeing him in a dynamic relationship with God,
as a creature who is in the image of God. It is therefore
within this theological perspective of man as created in
God rather than as a biological entity, that we must
consider the *anthropos* which the Logos became in assuming
his *soma*.

In his creation from nothing, whereby he shares in
creation's instability, man was one with the rest of
creation. Therefore, like the rest of creation, he was
by nature mortal and corruptible. He was weak and
dissoluble because of the nature of his existence and
therefore, like the rest of creation, he was not able to
persist for ever. This essential unity of man and
creatures is made again in DC.11. Man, being created from
nothing, and being fashioned with a body, differed in no
way from irrational creatures, but was one by nature. For
it is only in man being *logike* - which is his rationality
and spirituality deriving from the Logos - that man differs
from irrational creatures. Indeed, it is this essential
unity of the creaturely body of man and of creation that forms the basis for Athanasius' argument in Di. 41ff. for the propriety of the Logos' incarnation. This same oneness in creatureliness moreover forms the basis for the common distinction of man and creation from the incorporeal Logos, where corporeality is the mark of the creaturely world, and incorporeality that of the spiritual. Thus it is that we have the contrast in CG. 2-3 between "sensual things and all bodily impressions" and "the divine and intelligible realities in heaven", between "the body" and "God", and between "what was closer - and what was closer was the body and its sensations" and "the better things..... and intelligible reality".

Man, as anthrpopos, was however distinct from the rest of creation. For man was made in the image of God. He was given to share in the Logos' power, and to become rational, therein differing from irrational creatures in knowing more than just terrestrial objects, and in remaining in felicity in the knowledge of God the Father through the Son. He was unique among creatures in this rationality, which was seen both in his critical self-discipline, and in his intimate relationship with the Godhead. Thus while in the body man was essentially distinct from the incorporeal God, in his rationality he was bold to approach God, to live the divine life in and through God's grace.

The same contrast within man is briefly summarised in Di 4.26-29: "for man is by nature mortal in that he was created from nothing. But because of his likeness to him who exists, if he had kept this through contemplating God, he would have blunted his natural corruption and would have remained incorruptible". The contrast is brought out by the "men.....de......." and then emphasised by the pointed reference to man's corporeality, and to his relationship in the image of God. Being created from nothing, he is creaturely and mortal. However, in his likeness to God, he dulls his corruption, becoming incorruptible through the grace of God. Thus man is both nothing and yet everything, an idea which recalls the Psalmist's words of Ps. 8. 4-5.

Man, therefore, must be seen both in relation to creation and to God. Being created ex nihilo, he is
essentially one with the rest of creation in their common weakness and finitude, and in their marked contrast with their Creator, God. Yet man is also distinct from the rest of creation in being rational, a relationship with God marked by mercy and grace, as indeed it had to be, given the radical gulf between creatures and Creator, and the innate weakness of the created, thereby making it impossible for man to reach in and through himself to God.

This same duality within man, in his relation to creation and to God, is to be seen again in CG.30-34. This seems to be the case despite the thesis of Louth. For the differences to which Louth refers in his article "The concept of the soul in Athanasius' Contra Gentes - De Incarnatione" (45) appear to be differences of emphasis and not of content. (46)

These chapters have in the past been interpreted anthropologically. If it were right to do so, we should have here a very different picture to the theological one of the DI which we have just considered. Yet it seems not right to interpret these chapters so. Ch. 30 of the CG is a turning point in the argument of Athanasius' book: evil has been shown to be nothing other than error in men's lives. Moreover, this error is a culpable error. For man has within himself the way of truth that will bring him to the true God; and this way is none other than each man's soul and the mind within it. Lest, however, impious man still make excuses and refuse to admit that they have a soul, thinking that man is nothing more than the visible form of the body, Athanasius turns to the task of showing briefly that each man has a soul, which is rational. Ch. 30-34 are not therefore an attempt by Athanasius to show that man has a soul, understood as a physiological entity opposed to his body, but to establish that man has within himself the ability to contemplate and apprehend God through his logical soul, and therefore that man has no pretext for his godlessness. Ch. 30-34 are thus an attempt to show that man is capax Dei, and therefore must be interpreted in a theological, rather than a physiological, manner.
According to Athanasius, the above heretical position asserted that man had no rational soul, but was simply the visible form of the body. The orthodox position, however, countered by stating that while man had a material body, he was more than merely material, he was both physical, to be considered essentially, and spiritual, or capax Dei. He was not only a creature in relation to other creatures, as he would have been if he were only body; he was a creature in a gracious relation to his divine Creator. The contrast of Ch. 30-34 is therefore that between body and soul as anthropological entities, but between two different concepts of man, that which sees him as body only, and that which sees him as a psyche-somatic unity, between that which sees man as incapax Dei and that which views him as capax Dei through his rationality which he graciously receives of the Logos.

Ch. 31 is the chapter which portrays both man's oneness with, and yet distinction from, the rest of animals most clearly. For it demonstrates that man is one with irrational creatures in their common nature, and yet that he is superior to them in his rationality. In other words, man both has a body and is rational; and it is to demonstrate this that this chapter sets out to do. Irrational creatures see what is at hand, and make for what they see, even if they thereby come to harm. Man, in common with the irrational creatures, sees what is at hand, but, in contrast, does not rush upon it, but judges it lest he come to harm. Man therefore shares the sensual sensations of animals, but, unlike them, applies to these his higher, critical, logical appreciation. Ch. 31 therefore seems to see man in his body as essentially one with animals, the irrational creatures, sharing their physicality. On the other hand, it seems to view man in his rationality, a faculty peculiar to man, as a critical being, superior to the rest of creation.

The duality of man is further stressed in Ch. 32ff. For while the man in his body is finite and limited, mortal and transitory, in his soul man is free spatially, and is immortal.

As with the DI, sc Ch. 30ff. points to man as a dichotomous being; he is made up of a mortal body and an
immortal soul. This however does not amount to an anthropological picture of man. For to say that man is body and soul is not to make a physiological, but a theological statement. It is to say that although man shares essentially in the creaturely realm, he also transcends it, thus communing with the supernatural and spiritual; "body" is man's creatureliness, which is *incapax Dei*, while the "rational soul" is man *capax Dei*.

Man's body is therefore his creatureliness; it is that which unites him in creation. It is not therefore that which separates one man from another, but that which binds them together in their common creatureliness.

Confirmation of this understanding of man's body seems to lie in Athanasius' treatment of Christ's death. Certainly Christ's death was his own death, suffered on behalf of all men. Indeed, the individuality of Christ's death is confirmed by his humanity being individual, being one body. Yet while there is the emphasis upon the unique death of Christ for all, there is also a hinting at the corporate aspect of this death. For while Christ himself died for all men, all died in him. This union between the individual humanity of Christ and that effected though it on the one hand, and on the other the humanity of men, and that effected in it, runs right through the chapters dealing with the death of Christ. For the humanity is his humanity, and yet it is like men's, or ever man's. Again, Christ died, and yet all died in him. Death's power was concluded in Christ's body, and yet it no longer had influence over like men. For, by making the body his own, the Life which is the Logos raised it to life, and at the same time, by the grace of the resurrection, rid men of death; because of the Logos indwelling the assumed humanity, the humanity remained incorruptible, and so corruption ceased from all men. Thus, in the Logos dying, the debt owed by all men to death was fulfilled. The Logos' body is therefore his in that he made it for himself of Mary. Yet it is also man's, in that it is essentially one with men's. In that body the Son of God was united to all men by its essential similarity to them (47). Thus what the divine Logos graciously bestowed upon his own humanity, he, in doing so, graciously bestowed upon man's. Here
again the body is that in which one cannot act as an isolated individual, apart from one's relation to one's neighbours; one's actions therefore have immediate repercussions upon others.

From this understanding of the relation of Christ's body to men's, it might seem that Athanasius is merely reflecting the Platonic thought of his contemporaries here. That, however, is not the case. For, among other things, Athanasius did not denigrate the body of man, or see it as a prison in which the divine soul of man was incarcerated, as Plato did. Any parallels between the two thinkers is merely formal. For whether Athanasius uses the Greek vocabulary of the philosophers, or quotes passages from the Platonic corpus, he does so merely to communicate his theological ideas to those who have been brought up to think in the then contemporary thought-forms of Neo-Platonism.

Man, on the other hand, is man in his rationality and spirituality. It is that which constitutes man's individuality. For it is man's personal response to the enabling gift of grace by the divine Logos. It is crucial however to note that this human individuality is bound up in the mystery of grace, which is the mystery of man's living relationship with the Logos. The human individuality for Athanasius is not therefore a possession of a human creature; it is a dynamic gift by the Creator Logos and a gracious sharing by the man. For the human individuality is individual in the Logos' making creaturely man in the image of God, and it is preserved in its individuality in the Logos as the kat' eikona is in the Eikon. It is realised in the concrete relation of man to the Logos.

The meaning of flesh in the Christological passages in the DI is much the same as that of body. In the particular Athanasian passages, as opposed to the quotations drawn from the New Testament, flesh is employed to qualify Christ's birth of Mary, in the line of Jesse. Recalling Romans 1.3-4, 37.26 refers to Christ's birth according to the flesh, where flesh refers to the physical or natural order, as opposed to the spiritual and supernatural. His birth here referred to is his miraculous, yet human, birth of Mary, his entry
into the creaturely world, as opposed to his eternal, supernatural generation of God the Father. Most interesting for the understanding of the relation of the term "flesh" and Christ's birth is the quotation of Matthew 19.5, where "flesh" is again used in a "birth" context. Here we find an emphasis upon the intimate and essential relatedness of the members of one family, of the parents and their offspring. This same connotation of the essential kinship of parents and offspring would seem to be present in the birth of the divine Logos according to the flesh of Mary. Therein is effected the essential union of God and mankind in Mary.

These are but outlines of Athanasius' thought. Yet they must remain such. For Athanasius' description of man is bold; it is always revealing different nuances, and hence cannot be tied down in a strict, philosophical manner. For rather than being cold and logical, Athanasius' thought is open, dynamic, relational and functional.

Athenasius' Christology involves both "becoming man" by the Logos, and his assumption of the concrete, human, creaturely existence. The former is his participation by grace in the image of the Father, wherein a man is individual, while the latter is his assumption of man's corporeal being.

Since *anthropos* is to be understood in an individual and personal sense, and as existing in its relation to the divine Logos, the statement that the Logos became *anthropos* implies that the divine Logos became a human person in his saving economy in Christ. That it is "became human" is noteworthy. For since man's individuality is individual in the Logos, through the sharing in the power of the Logos, man can never be a self-existent being; he exists in grace, through the individuality of the Logos in his operation *ad extra*. That the Logos became human does not mean however that the Logos converted to a human person. For even when he became a reflection of the Image economically, he was still the Son and the Image of God. This is driven home by Athanasius' often repeated statement that Christ was not merely man, but God the Logos. Nor however does this formula imply that there were two independent subjects in Christ, the divine and the human.
Nestorianism is ruled out by Athanasius' refusal to admit that man's individuality is a thing in itself, and by his assertion that it only exists in its dynamic relation of grace to the Logos. The mystery of the Incarnation is the dynamic concurrence of the non-contingent individuality of God and the contingent individuality of man. For the Logos, who is the eternal individual, became human without ceasing to be divine. He, as the Image of God, became "internalised" in himself in becoming man in the Image of God. For he, as the originator of all human individuality, became that human individuality, which is only individual in the Individual Logos, the subject of that becoming. The Logos therefore does not enter into man, as Nestorianism will require, but became in particular what true man in God was in general. The becoming is individual. Yet as the individual cannot be seen abstractly, but only in concrete in the body, the Logos' becoming man necessarily presupposes a human substance. The incarnation therefore involves the individual becoming of man, and thus the union of very God and very man in the one Christ.

The presupposition of the assumption of human substance which underlies the Logos' individual becoming is basic to a right understanding of the Logos acting as man, and his being in man. While there is one individual being in the Incarnate Logos, the Logos become man, there are two natures, both individual, or personal, in the one Christ, the divine and the human. For while the one Christ is similar in nature to man, he is yet more than man as the inequality of his nature to man's reveals. "As man" refers to the human economy of the Logos, in which he is revealed, born, suffers and dies. Over against this the Logos as God is impassible. The suggestion is therefore that these two economies are not to be confused, although they do have a common subject, the incarnate Logos. The same point is driven home by the repeated argument that the one person of the incarnate Logos is man, but not merely man, but God, even the Logos and Wisdom of the true God. Besides witnessing to the two natures in Christ, such phrases, rather than denying that the Logos became man, confirm that the Logos did not undergo any change in his eternal divinity in becoming incarnate. That it does
not deny the true becoming of the Logos we have but to note the "what man was ever....."of.51.6 which refers to Christ.

The other main Christological phrase, which includes the term 'man', is "the Logos in man". Given that man for Athanasius is the person or the individual and that 'in' is normally employed by him to relate the Logos to the creaturely realm of matter, one might be excused for seeing here an anticipation of Nestorian thought. Yet this is far from Athanasius' intention. He insists that the Logos became man, rather than entered into man. His aim here is not to deny the individual becoming of the Logos in the Incarnation but to safeguard the truth that in becoming man the Logos did not alter through conversion into a man. This is the same as that which is intended in the Alexandrian's saying that the Logos was not simply man, nor was mere man.

As to why Athanasius used "in" here, the preposition normally reserved to relate the Logos to the creaturely, material realm, the contexts of the passages involved may explain. Ch. 17 and 41-42 compare the relationship of the Logos to his assumed humanity with his relationship to creation. Ch. 17 is dealing with the Logos not being limited by the Incarnation. As the Logos is in the whole creation, and acts in it, giving it life, but is not confused and confined by it, so the Logos is in man, giving it life and yet is not confused with, or confined by it. Ch. 41 is answering the question of the propriety of the Incarnation. It is allowable for the Logos to appear and come into the cosmos, which is a great body; it is equally allowable for the Logos to appear in a body, and to come in man. Ch. 42 concerns much the same problem: if it is not unfitting for the Logos to be in creation, which is created from nothing, neither is it unfitting for the Logos to be in man, which is created from nothing. In these references therefore "man", through these comparisons, is seen as an essential part of the creation. What holds good for creation holds good for man, as a part of it. This understanding of man in terms of body is confirmed by the way that the two terms overlap in the same passage. Hence man is seen here as an essential part of the creaturely realm. It is virtually
synonymous with body in these contexts. Therefore it is not surprising that Athanasius uses the preposition "in" with it.

It should here be noted that while the Logos was in man, he was only perfectly at rest in his Father. This does not, however, mean that the divine Logos was imperfectly incarnate. For we have already noted that the Logos truly became man, and as man suffered a full human economy. Rather such language points to the natural difference between God the Logos and creation, which includes his assumed humanity. As incorporeal Logos, God the Son is essentially one only with the incorporeal Father from whom he is begotten. He therefore is distinct from the corporeal creation, and thus cannot be by nature at rest, or at one with it. This therefore is but another way of asserting that the Logos was not naturally creaturely. It is no comment upon the reality of the incarnation which occurred not as a result of the Logos' nature, but his gracious love towards men.

Given that body and flesh denote primarily man's essential unity with creation, the Logos' assumption of a body or flesh points to his becoming substantially one with creation, and creaturely man. It is in making his own that which was totally alien to him that the miracle of the saving descent of the Logos to man occurs. Yet in becoming man through the assumption of a human body the Logos did not cease to have individuality. For, even though the body was that which bound the Logos to the rest of creation in a most intimate and substantial manner, the humanity which the Logos assumed was individual; it was his own, being distinct in that it was the Logos' body ever against every other body, and that it was none other than \textit{to kuriakon soma} (48). This latter phrase is but synonymous with \textit{to tcu Kuricu soma}, the phrase following closely both in context and sense a direct reference to the Logos, the \textit{Kurios} who overcame death through his body. Certainly \textit{to kuriakon soma} is not meant to suggest that the assumed body was naturally alien, and essentially ever against man's. For it is stressed very frequently in the \textit{DI} that the assumed humanity was naturally similar to man's.

This assumption of the body is never seen as a "becoming"; the Logos never "became" a body; for the
Logos, while becoming creaturely man, never ceased to be God by nature. He could not therefore "become" creatureliness. Thus while we see the intimate relation of the divine Logos to his creaturely body, an intimacy portrayed through the use of such verbs as suneinai, idiopoiein and oikein, we have always the implication of the distinction of him who is the subject of the assumption, and the body, between the incorporeal Creator Logos and the body created from nothing. Thereby is confirmed the essential distinction of the Creator Logos who endured no alteration in his divinity through the Incarnation, and the creation.

The assumption of a body by the Logos is also understood as lying behind the statement that the Logos was active "in" a body. This is to be understood in a locative sense: in the incarnation the divine Logos was active in creation in his body, an essential part of that creation. Yet it is also to be seen in an instrumental sense, and it is to corroborate this that the alternative "through" the body is used, a phrase which is used in a similar instrumental sense of a man in 56.26, where the usage echoes 2 Cor. 5.10. In short, the Logos worked through his body even as men accomplished deeds in their bodies. Also present in this phrase is the idea of the distinction of the Logos and his assumed humanity, a distinction which once again points to the Logos remaining God even in his incarnation. Thus it was that the divine Logos worked through the assumed humanity, indwelling it in a most intimate fashion, and thus effecting the salvation of the body through its receiving grace of the divine Logos, and through his indwelling of it.

Throughout recent Athanasian research, the question of the human soul of Christ has been studied. In line with the other pre-362 tracts of Athanasius, the CG-DI does not mention explicitly the human soul of Christ. This we would explain by the general fact that Athanasius avoids the topic after Origen's heterodoxical treatment of the matter, and by the specific fact that the CG-DI is concerned to bring about through an explanation of the incarnation of the divine Logos a greater veneration of the Son of God by the Christian reader. In short, the question of Christ's human soul is not being posed by either the author or the reader of this tract. Hence one cannot say that this silence points to a denial of the soul of Christ by Athanasius.
It is our contention, however, that Athanasius alludes to a full humanity of Christ. For in his referring to Christ's humanity as man, and as a human body, and in his alternating man with body, Athanasius points to the humanity being not merely creaturely. It is not merely a body but a human body, the distinction being that while as body the Logos incarnate shares essentially in the creatureliness of all created from nothing, as man he is rational, or personal, the mark of mankind. Grillmeier, however, has argued (49) that it is useless to argue from either the term body or man to a particular view of Christ's humanity. For he believes that Athanasius did not use these anthropological terms with the precision of Aristotle or of the Schoolmen, and as yet has no "dyophysite" terminology. Further, Eusebius of Caesarea and Apollinarius can use the selfsame terms, man and 'he became man' and yet at the same time deny Christ's soul, while Cyril of Alexandria can use the language of the Logos-sarx framework in his early writings, and yet expressly acknowledge a full human nature in the Lord. "Thus it is clear that an analysis of words cannot be conclusive" (50). Two points must be made against this. How Eusebius, Apollinarius and Cyril use particular anthropological terms in Christological settings does not dictate that Athanasius uses the same terms in comparable ways. All that the above demonstrates is that the terms man, body and flesh can be used in a variety of ways, and that their meaning must be discerned for each author from his own writings and thoughts. Again, Athanasius may not have the strictly logical framework of the Schoolmen, whereby soul and body equals man. Yet he does know a fundamental difference between man, who is rational, and irrational animals, and a fundamental unity between men and animals in their common creatureliness, signified by body, that which separates creation from the increate Creator. These are basically theological distinctions. But they have significance for Christ's humanity. Thus when we are told that the Logos did not merely wish to be in a body, as he would be in accordance with an Apollinarian Christology, but assumed a human body in becoming man, we are being told that he assumed more than the body of irrational animals. He assumed a rational body, one
which through its participation in the Logos, the Image of God, was rational. This is tantamount to saying that the Logos incarnate was personal. For man was distinct from animals in being rational, in the image of God or in having a rational soul. Thus the Logos incarnate is not merely in a body, but has become man, and as such is distinct from irrational creation in his rationality.

Grillmeier has argued for a docetic Christ in Athanasius from several doctrines.

According to Grillmeier (51), the Logos became the principle which gave life and movement to the body of Christ; he became not merely the personal subject of Christ's bodily life, but also the real, physical source of all the actions of his life. Resulting from the Logos' becoming the sole motivating power or principle in Christ is the view that the decisive spiritual and moral acts of Christ must be assigned to the Logos in a way which appears to imply more than an appropriation after the manner of communicatio idicmatum. For example, in the redemption and in the passion and death of Christ, Athanasius seems to make the Logos not merely the personal agent in the act, the principium quod, but also the physical principle of achievement, the principium quo. Athanasius therefore makes the Logos the first and the sole subject in Christ's life, so leaving no place for the human soul.

Several points need to be made against the above. While Athanasius is very concerned to demonstrate the reality of the incarnation by showing that the Logos as man is the subject of Christ's spiritual and moral acts, it is not true to say that Athanasius attributes these acts to the Logos in a manner which exceeds communicatio idicmatum. For to do so would be to make the divine Logos passible. Rather, Athanasius insists that even when the Logos became man, the Logos as God remained impassible; indeed, it was through the Logos remaining impassible in his divine economy that he redeemed men from their passions. That the divine Logos did not suffer by any other means than communicatio idicmatum is made again in Ch. 17, 18 and 43. For while the Logos as God was incarnate as a passible man, as the Son of the Father he did not share in the passions of the man he had become; they were his only in so far as the assumed, passible
humanity was truly his. Thus, throughout the work, Athanasius refers, either explicitly or implicitly, Christ's passions to the Logos as man alone; never does he compromise the principle of communicatio idicmatum.

What then are we to make of such passages as Ch. 17 and 41-42 where the Logos is pictured as he who enlivens, moves and directs his assumed humanity? Grillmeier, indeed, draws attention to the particular clause autes auto zecpeicr (52). Here we should, in the first place, note that the autc stands, not merely for body, but for the human body, namely body in its relationship to the Image of God. This humanity, usually referred to as body, is also referred to as the human body, as we have seen, and as man. Likewise in Ch. 41-42, the humanity is seen as not merely the body but also the human body and man. Thus the humanity which the Logos moves is more than a mere body; it is a rational body. How then are the verbs in these chapters to be understood? This is best seen in the context of the particular arguments. The basis of the argument of Ch. 17 is that just as the divine Logos is in creation, keeping it in its orderly existence and yet is not limited in his powers, so the Logos is in Christ's humanity, giving it existence and yet not being limited by it. For that which applies to creation as a whole, applies also to Christ's humanity, and that humanity was an essential part of the whole creation. The basis of the argument of Ch. 41-42 is much the same: as it was fitting that the divine Logos should be in creation through his coming into it, enlivening it and thus being made known through it, so it was fitting for the divine Logos to be in the assumed humanity, having come into it, to enliven it and so be made known through it. For what was fitting for the whole of creation was fitting for an essential part of it, namely Christ's humanity. The basis of both these arguments therefore is that Christ's humanity, understood in accordance with its definition as body, human body and man, is essentially part of creation and that therefore what is fitting for the latter is fitting for the former. Indeed, it is to point to the humanity's oneness with the rest of creation that not only the humanity is referred to as body, the hallmark of man's common creatureliness with all that is created from nothing, but also that the same
verbs are used to relate the Logos to his assumed humanity as are used to relate him to his created cosmos. The common verbs point to the oneness of the two in relation to their divine creator Logos, rather than to any particular anthropological picture of Christ's humanity. The verbs 'to give light and life', 'to move' and 'activate', 'to come upon' and 'to be in' thus describe the essential relationship of the immaterial Logos to the material creation, of which the assumed body is a natural part. Indeed, they point to the particular "creator-creature" relationship of the Logos to the world: for it is in that gift of light and life that the divine Logos brings and keeps that creation with which the assumed body is one from the non-existence whence it originally came. It is in this creative sense that the self-existent Logos is the subject of all contingent creation. Indeed, were the Creator Logos to cease to be this subject, the humanity and its world, which depend upon this subjectivity of the Logos for their existence, would cease to exist. It is therefore this understanding of creation which lies behind the meaning of these verbs, and behind the arguments in Ch. 17 and 41-42 that whatever is admitted as proper regarding the relation of the divine Logos to the world in general must be admitted as proper for his relationship to an essential part of the same world, the assumed humanity.

Christ's physiology is not therefore under discussion at all in the two arguments. Indeed, it would be an error to force a physiological interpretation from the analogy of Ch. 17.14-21. For the point of the analogy is one of difference: man is in creation, and can consider things at a distance, but he cannot influence them; the divine Logos in man is not so. For while he is in his assumed humanity, having become man, he is not limited by it, but he controls both his humanity and the rest of creation. The Logos incarnate, being superior to finite man in his divine economy ad extra, still controls the universe in his role as providential Creator. The point of the analogy is not more. One ought therefore not to force the analogy in order to establish an anthropological statement from an image which is not intended to give any such statement. The analogy in Ch. 42.1-8 is one of similarity: even as a man is active throughout his whole
body and is therefore active in a part of the whole, so the divine Logos is active in the whole of creation and is therefore active in a part of this whole, the assumed humanity. Again the point of the analogy is such and no more; it likewise ought not therefore to be forced into making a physiological statement.

It seems therefore that in Ch. 17 and 41-42 we are dealing with the relation of the divine Logos to his assumed humanity. In the former it is being shown that the divine Logos was not limited by his humanity, while in the latter that it was not improper for the divine Creator Logos to work through, and be manifested in, his assumed humanity. For reasons completely separate, namely the use of the man and its cognates as qualifications of the body, it is seen that the assumed humanity in each of these two contexts is not to be understood in a docetic manner.

It seems therefore that Athanasius draws a clear distinction between the divine, impassible Logos and the assumed humanity which he became. He also makes it clear that while the divine Logos gives life to his humanity - in that the divine Logos was Life itself, and in that the humanity only existed in and through its creation by the divine Logos - the same Logos in a body enters truly into man's economy. Hence Grillmeier is both right and wrong in saying that the Logos was not merely the principium quod but also the principium quoc in Christ. He is right in the sense that the Logos is both; he is wrong, however, in the sense that it is the Logos as man who is the principium quod, and the Logos as God who is the principium quoc; Grillmeier fails to note this vital distinction. For while the Logos as man suffers and dies, it is the Logos as God, in his impassibility, incorruptibility and immortality who redeems man from his passions and from death.

It is therefore to the Logos as man that we must look if we wish to discover the personal agent in Christ. It is the qualification 'as man' which we must interpret; for it signifies that the Logos has become logical, the Image of God has become 'in the image of God'. In other words, the Logos has become "internalised" within itself. The person of the divine Logos has become man's person,
which is personal only in the divine Logos. Therein lies the mystery of the personality of Christ, God the Logos become man.

It is noteworthy that there is not an independent human scul in the Christ. It cannot be independent as, according to Athanasius, the scul is not self-existent, as in the idealistic philosophy of the Greeks; it is dependent, existing only in the Logos, being logical or 'in the image' only in the Logos of God. Moreover, the true "becoming man" of the divine Logos rules out an independent scul. That, however, does not mean that the Logos changed into a scul, or that the scul ceased to exist in its absorption into the Logos. For by the divine Logos becoming man, the Logos made his assumed humanity logical, 'in the image', human or personal. For only in its being within the person of the divine Logos was the man Jesus personal. Thus the "becoming man" by the divine Logos gave the man Jesus personality. It did not annihilate such.

Grillmeier (53) further sees the description of the body as tc_crganen as dangerous, especially when coupled with his interpretation of the Logos as the principle of all life in Christ.

The description of Christ's humanity as tc_crganen occurs mainly in Ch. 42-45, which are concerned with the propriety of the divine Logos assuming creatureliness in order thereby to effect his self-revelation and to bring about man's redemption from mortality to Life. The divine Logos used a part of creation, his assumed humanity, to reveal himself to men, even as he used the whole creation for general revelation. He also used man's humanity to effect man's safeguarding from corruptible mortality, and to bring him to Life. The context therefore is soteriological and theological. It is not anthropological. To search therefore for an anthropological meaning for crganen is therefore to force the context in which the term is found. Indeed, as confirmation that the term is not to be interpreted anthropologically, but instrumentally, we find 43. 1-3, where it is used in the context of inanimate objects. For Athanasius is answering the question why the Logos did not reveal himself through a better instrument, such as the sun or moon or stars, or fire, or air, but rather used mere man. Organen therefore
is not any more than the instrument whereby the divine Logos, the Redeemer of creation, works. It has no implications for the fullness, or otherwise, of Christ's humanity, even as here it has no particular implications about the constitution of the sun or the moon.

Further, that the *organon* to which the Logos relates is not merely a body seems to be clear from the various qualifications of the term which occur. 42. 20-21 reads "the Logos used as an instrument for his revelation that (sc. man) in which he was......". 42.34-35 reads "he used the body of a man as an instrument for the revelation of the Truth"; and 43.21 reads "he took to himself a human body as an instrument". Similarly, the *organon* can be *anthropinon* or *anthropion*. We must give content to these qualifications of *organon*, namely *anthropos* and its cognates. The body used as an instrument is not therefore mere body; it is the total man which the divine Logos becomes to redeem man.

One of the areas in which Christ's body was used as an instrument is that of revelation. For the divine Logos revealed himself in a body. Even here this body is not to be understood in an Apollinarian manner. For this usage is to be explained in its context. Men, who had been created to know God, had turned from him, and were seeking for God in creation. The merciful God therefore decided to reveal himself in that very place where they were seeking for God. Since men were seeking for God in corporeal things, the divine Logos took a body, and lived as a man amidst men; he shared in that creatureliness through his body, which was substantially one with it. Hence the divine Logos revealed himself through a body corresponding to men's; so he brought men to himself as man, that through the works effected through his body men might realise that his works were not human but those of God, and thence deduce that he was not merely man, but God also. That this body is to be understood in this contextual manner, and not as implying a particular anthropology, is confirmed by the fact that this same act of revelation by the Logos is also described as having occurred in a human body (54) or in a man (55). It is therefore within this general context of a full humanity, and not a mere body, that this act of revelation seems to have occurred.
Christ's death has also been seen as pointing to docetism. Grillmeier, among other scholars, recognises that Athanasius seems to have conceived of death as the separation of soul and body. In Christ's case, however, the death is once referred to as "the Logos having been loosed from it (sc. body)"(57), where the simple fact of the separation of the Logos and his body at the death of Christ is mentioned in passing, but is not stressed, and is generally described as "having surrendered it (sc. body) to death, he offered it to the Father..." or as "it was fitting for him to put aside the body" (58), the Logos later raising it up again an incorruptible body. Understanding body in a literal fashion, and comparing Christ's death, the separation of the divine Logos from his assumed body, with man's death, the separation of the soul from the body, Grillmeier concludes that there is no place in Athanasius' understanding of Christ's death for a human soul in Christ.

It is our contention, however, that Grillmeier's interpretation of these points is not correct. The first point which must be made is a general one: chapters 8-10 and 20-27, which cover Athanasius' understanding of Christ's death, set out to explain "why", and not "how", Christ died in the manner that he did, upon the cross, before the view of all men, and to show that in dying and rising again, Christ rescued man from his condemnation to death, and raised him again to incorruptible immortality. Thus these chapters are essentially theological. It is therefore not too wise to try to establish a physiology from passages which Athanasius does not intend to provide such. Certainly Athanasius believed that Christ effected this theological task of salvation in the physical realm of man. Thus one cannot dissociate the theological and the natural. Yet here Athanasius is discussing primarily the theological task of salvation. Thus while we may not conclude from this passage that Christ's humanity is docetic, we ought not to draw from this passage Athanasius' anthropological thought. Rather, we ought to draw his theological thought from those passages in which he is discussing such, and his anthropological thought from those passages in which he discusses such. Then we may see the anthropological thought as discerned as underlying those passages dealing with the theological thought.
While this may be a conservative method, it is a safe method, and it will guard us against making false assumptions here about Athanasius' anthropological thought through misinterpreting his theological thought.

We turn now to consider the particular terms *dialuesthai* and cognates, *apotithemi* and synonyms, and *soma*. *Dialuesthai* is used in 21.5, 8, 25, and *dialusis* in 28.5 to describe man's death. This dissolution points, however, not primarily to the separation of the soul from the body, but to the physical disintegration of man in his mortality (59). For as 28.5 reveals, we are dealing essentially with the dissolution of the body and not with the separation from it of the soul. For man, being created from nothing, is by nature in a state of flux and dissolution and is only prevented from dissolving to nothing through the providential care of the divine Logos. Death, or this sinking back into the *nihil* whence man was created, occurs therefore through the Creator Logos' withholding from a particular creature his creative care. It must be noted as well that even where death is seen as the separation of the soul, which is through grace immortal, from the body, in an ultimate sense death again occurs from the withdrawal of the Logos, Very Life, from man. For while the soul is the *hegemon* and life-principle of its body, it is so only in and through the Logos. It is the rational or directive force in man's creatureliness only by its participation in the Logos himself. Indeed, for Athanasius, all things, including the soul of man, live and move and have their being in the Logos. Therefore, even in the context of the soul's separation from the body in death, death ultimately stems from the Logos withholding from the soul that life in which it directs the body. The clause "the Logos having been loosed from it (sc. body)" occurs in a theological context, in which the author is answering the question why Christ died in a particular manner, and in doing so, why Christ died. Man's death, meanwhile - namely that in which man's death is seen as the separation of his soul from his body - is explained theologically as the withdrawal of the Logos' providential care from man's creatureliness, and so answers the question of "why" rather than "how" man dies.
It seems therefore that we have here a parallel between Christ's and men's deaths. For the explanation of the former occurs in theological setting, in reply to a "why" question, while that of the latter is treated in a theological manner, and explains primarily "why" man dies. It seems therefore that the Logos' being loosed from his body ought to be interpreted in a theological, and not physiological, manner, along the lines of the understanding of man's death. This would mean that "the Logos having been loosed from it (sc. body)" would be understood as meaning that Christ's body, his assumed humanity, died because the Logos withdrew his life-giving power, in order to enable it to die for all. This passage would therefore been seen in theological terms, and would be understood to be making no comment upon Christ's anthropology. This theological interpretation fits the context. For Christ's humanity could not have died had not the Logos permitted it, as Galtier so rightly notes (60). For it was in the incorruptible and immortal Logos' wearing his body that he protected it from corruptible death and it was only through his not hindering death that Christ died, the implication being that he would have been able to hinder it had he so wished to do, but that he did not as he had come for the very purpose of dying on behalf of all. Indeed, had he not accepted that death imposed by others, permitting it to come upon his mortal humanity, he would not have died. For he had no death himself, being Life; nor could he give death to his own body, as he was the Logos of God, Life itself. It seems therefore that had the Logos not permitted his death by withdrawing his incorruptible, life-giving power, his humanity would not have died, and his redeeming sacrifice would not have occurred. To interpret 22.23-24 as meaning that Christ's death occurred through the Life-giving Logos permitting his assumed humanity to die by loosing himself from that humanity fits its theological context and makes Christ die in the fashion of those similar to him; an anthropocological interpretation of 22.23-24, which does not fit the context, the argumentative setting, and which is not at one with Athanasius' theological understanding of man's death, is therefore not to be accepted.
"To put aside the body" has been interpreted physiologically as meaning that Christ's death consisted of the Logos' separation from his body, even as man's was that of the soul's from the body. As we have noted above, Ch. 20-27 are not physiological, but theological, in tone. Moreover, this phrase will not allow a physiological interpretation. For "he put it aside privately" (61) is merely synonymous with "he hid his body privately by itself" (62) and bears no particularly physiological interpretation. Again, "to put aside the body" is used generally in Greek literature to describe the death and burial of a person, and bears no particular anthropological meaning. Yet again, 21.17 mentions that the Logos could not put aside his assumed humanity in private, as man. Man, with whom the Logos is here compared, cannot, however, put aside his own soul from his body in a physiological manner. For he is not the master of his own destiny and life in this sense. Thus to make 21.16-17, with its comparison of Christ with man, meaningful, we cannot accept a physiological interpretation of the passage, but must see it as merely pointing to dying in private. Again this phrase, like other phrases such as "to hand over a body to death" or "to offer a body to death", which also can be used, although incorrectly, to posit a docetic humanity in Christ, are to be seen over against the Logos' assumption of humanity. For being immortal, and yet needing to die for all, the Logos assumed a body capable of dying; the assumption was seen only in theological terms, namely to effect man's recreation in and through God. Consequently, since the assumed humanity of the Logos was taken that in it he might die for all, it is reasonable to recognise that the Logos "put aside" his mortal body, that in its death the Logos might die for all. Hence, "to put aside the body" et al. are to be interpreted as the necessary response to "to assume a body" and are to be seen in the theological context of the working out of man's salvation through the sacrificial death in the body for all men. They are therefore not physiological statements.

The body which is the object from which the Logos is loosed, or which he proffers to death, is the body which the Logos assumed from Mary and which elsewhere
is otherwise referred to as a human body, or man. If we are going to recognise a continuity between the humanity born of Mary, and that offered in death, and if we are going to give the theological meaning due to man, and human, we cannot interpret "body" in Ch. 20ff. in a literal manner. It is rather the full humanity of the Logos which is offered in death, a death which occurs through the enabling of the divine Logos. That "body" is not to be interpreted literally is confirmed by the facts that the Logos' death in a body to effect man's redemption to incorruptibility and immortality is interpreted in 10.38-39 as: "through the incarnation of God the Logos were effected the overthrow of death and the resurrection of life...". Further corroboration of this point occurs in Athanasius' description of the Logos' relation to man in his body. The Logos is one with all men through a body similar to theirs; he assumed a body for a sacrifice on behalf of bodies similar to his; he offered his body as an antipsuchon for all men; he therefore brought it about that all died in him, that by the offering of a like body the Logos abolished death from all who were like him, and that the power of the law having been fulfilled in the Lord's body, the law unto death, no longer had influence over men like him. The body is therefore that through which the Logos and man, in his physical totality, are one in common creatureliness; it is that assumed to be sacrificed for like bodies, otherwise referred to as "all men" or "us men", these being more personal terms; it is the substitute for all men in death, a substitution which is not very meaningful if the body assumed is but a body, while man is both body and soul; it is that in which the law, to which like men are subject, is fulfilled. There seems therefore to be a certain correlation between the body of the Lord and men like him. Finally, this correlation between Christ's humanity and men's is suggested by the quoting of Heb. 2.14-15, "since the children have partaken of blood and flesh, he equally partook of them....", with the implication that just as men partook of a full, yet frail humanity, so did the Logos incarnate. While, therefore, there may not be enough here to suggest that Athanasius was deliberately treating the matter of Christ's soul in the sacrificial death, there is certainly
enough to suggest that body is not to be interpreted in a literal fashion.

It is worth noting why Athanasius uses only "body", and then in an unqualified form, in those chapters in which he is treating Christ's death, while elsewhere he refers to "the human body" and "man". For example, in Ch. 11-16, which deal with man's restoration "in the image", the Logos' humanity is so defined. One of the reasons for the use of an unqualified "body" in Chapters 8-10 and 20-27 is that it follows closely Scriptural usage, for which Athanasius has great respect. For there one finds Christological statements such as Heb.10.10, "through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all", 1 Pet.2.24, "he bore our sins in his body on the tree" and non-Christological ones as 1.Ccr.13.3, "and if I deliver my body to be burnt...". Even as these are not to be interpreted in an anthropological manner, but as signifying that weak creatureliness in which man dies, so ought the Athanasian phrases. Again, "body" is particularly used in this context in that the immortal Logos assumed a mortal and corruptible body that in it he might die, and that he might die in a manner natural to man - that is, as a consequence of the creatureliness of the body. By so dying, he defeated men's death and corruption, and showed himself to be Light and Life.

For, by the Logos relating to the body, which was in need of salvation, even as the body was related to corruptible mortality from which it required saving, the relation of death and its attendant corruption to the human body was superseded by that of the Logos to the body. So having put on the immortality of the Logos, the mortal body was enlivened, death having been effaced, and rose up immortal and incorruptible. Yet again, Athanasius' emphasis in these contexts is important as to why he almost exclusively terms Christ's humanity "body" here: the emphasis is upon the man, in his mortal body, which the Logos became in so far as it was through this that the Logos died for all; it is not however so much upon the content of that humanity. For Athanasius is not so much concerned here about whether Christ had a human soul or not, as about whether the assumed humanity of the Logos was naturally one with men's in its corruptibility and mortality and whether that humanity became truly his.
For it was only by that humanity being totally appropriated by the incorrupt and immortal Logos, the Life of God, that the former benefitted and was redeemed from its mortality and corruption; it was only in the Logos making the assumed humanity his very own and thereby giving it the grace of incorruptible immortality that such grace came to men.

Thus even as in Ch. 11-16, with their treatment of man's restoration "in the image", Athanasius refers to Christ's humanity as a "human body" or "man", "man" and its cognates being the hall-mark of man's rationality, or relationship to the Logos, so Athanasius refers to Christ's humanity in Ch.8-10 and 20-27, in their dealing with man's salvation from the corruption and mortality natural to his body, as body, it being the hall-mark of that nature from which man is to be redeemed.

It seems therefore that those passages which touch upon the relation of the Logos as God to creatureliness, upon Christ's instrumental humanity and upon Christ's death, make no pretence to comment upon the fullness, or otherwise, of Christ's humanity, and should not be expected therefore to supply such comment for modern scholarship. Yet it appears that the description of Christ's humanity as man, a man's body and a human body, understood theologically, must be given value. For in being human, Christ's humanity is distinct from the rest of irrational creation; it is logical or in the image of God. Here lies its human personality. Yet this personality is not the Platonic, idealistic, self-existent soul which most scholarship has sought, as Athanasius does not visualise the human soul in this abstract manner. Rather the human soul is personal in the eternal person of the divine Logos, apart from which the human person becomes impersonal (63).

Closely related to this matter of the human personality of the Logos incarnate is that of the human mind of the Christ. Like the human soul of the Christ, the human mind is not mentioned explicitly. Yet, also like the human soul of the Christ, the human mind is recognised in an implicit manner. For, for Athanasius, the human mind is closely connected with the human soul, and is not as distinct as scholars like Kannengiesser suggest (64).
According to him, it is the *nous* in man which is the basis of his conformity with the Logos, man's original state being an exercise of pure mind in contemplation of the Logos. At the fall, however, passions and the senses asserted themselves, and thus overthrew the hegemony of the *nous*. In short, for Kannengiesser, both God's approach to man, and man's ideal response to God, are intellectual acts. Such a view seems however to be highly selective. For such an appreciation of the worship of God through his Logos in a "noetic ecstasy" does not really take seriously the perceptible world, which Athanasius incidentally not only takes for granted but also insists is good. Such a comprehension does not account for the fact that whenever Athanasius wants to describe man's actual fallen state, he tends to speak of the soul, and not of the mind. Yet perhaps more importantly, such a consideration does not allow for the organic connection that Athanasius seems to establish between the mind and the soul. This connection is manifested severally. The soul, with its mind, is that whereby God is seen and apprehended (65); the soul, with its mind, perceives what is good and what is right (66); the soul, confident in the purity of its mind, converses with the saints and angels (67). Equally, when man had fallen, there was need of the conversion of man in his soul and mind (68). Indeed, one of the more interesting references to this connection in the context of the fall appears in CG.26.24f. where Athanasius notes that "if men had consulted the mind of their souls, they would not have fallen headlong into error, nor have denied the true God, the Father of Christ.". It is interesting because of a rhetoric question which precedes the above quotation, where Athanasius asks "is it right to consider those who worship (the Greek gods) to be men, and not rather to pity them as less rational than animals (*hos alogon alogoterous*) and less spiritual than those without spirit (*ton apsuchon apsuchoterous*) ....". (69). For the description of the false worshippers introduces the fact that in denying the true God, they had failed to consult the mind of their souls. A second manifestation of this connection of the mind and the soul is seen in the various passages in which Athanasius uses the terms
interchangeably. The mind (70), or the soul (71), is that through which man perceives God. Similarly, in the fall, the mind (72), or the soul (73), was abused and was fixed upon irrational things. Indeed, the interchangeability is all the more telling, given the retention of the same function for both the soul and the mind. A final manner in which this connection of the mind and the soul is made clear is that whereby the soul, with its mind, is referred to as a rational soul. In CG.30.19f. Athanasius sets out to establish the existence of "each one's soul and the mind within it". Hence Athanasius asserts that "it is necessary to show briefly for the sake of the simple that each man has a soul, and that this is rational.". Indeed, in indicating that the "soul of man is rational" (75), Athanasius draws attention to the fact that "the senses of the body are tuned like a lyre; when an understanding mind guides them, then the soul distinguishes and knows what it is doing. But this is confined to men, and is the reasoning faculty of a man's soul (to logikon tes psuches ton anthropon).". (76). It seems therefore that for Athanasius the mind is not the equivalent of the soul. Yet the one is so closely connected with the other that the one can be substituted for the other in this theological discourse. This may be partly because of Athanasius' seeming lack of concern for anthropological exactitude when dealing with primarily theological issues, partly because of his seeming unwillingness to distinguish radically between rationality and spirituality, and partly because the need to distinguish the mind from the soul in Christological exposition had not yet arisen. It seems moreover that the soul, with its mind, can be and is encompassed by Athanasius by the general term "rational soul.". Given such an understanding of the soul, and its mind, it seems that insofar as Athanasius recognises in the Christ a human soul, and more especially a rational human soul, so far Athanasius recognises in him a human mind. Because, however, of the nature of the discussion of the soul and its mind, and because of the stage to which that discussion had then evolved, the recognition of the human mind of the Logos incarnate is rather gentle and general. It is implicit and not explicit.

Given that Athanasius seems to recognise a human personality in the Logos as man, we must ask whether the Alexandrian father makes any theological use of this same.
Before attempting to answer this question, we must note that the matter of Christ's human personality is not one under particular consideration in the DI, for the various reasons which we have suggested; rather it is implied. Consequently, any theological function which this implied human personality of Christ has will also be implied and suggested, rather than explicitly expressed. Indeed, in the DI the central term for Christ's humanity seems to be "body". For whether treating Christ's birth, life or death, or the relation of the divine Logos to his assumed humanity, which is essentially one with creation, his humanity is defined as "body". This is because the "body" points to man in his mortal creatureliness. Hence by representing Christ's humanity as "body" Athanasius contributes to his argument. Thus when Athanasius wishes to point to the oneness of the incorporeal Logos and creatively man, brought about by the incarnation, he uses "body", a term with its connotations of common creatureliness. When referring to Christ's birth of Mary, and the humanity which the Logos fashioned for himself, the term "body", with its creaturely emphasis, fits the creative verb "to fashion". Christ's passions are related to his body for theological reasons: passions are characteristic of earthly bodies, in that they arise from man's instability as a being created from nothing. The incorporeal Logos died in the body as it was in and through the mortality of the body that men died. Moreover, he died in the body as he wished to save men from the mortality and corruption which were essentially connected with their bodies, and as he wished to raise them to life again. He therefore had to assume a body in order that he might counter the mortal corruption essentially connected with it, by giving new life in the general resurrection. As the bodiless Word, the Logos was invisible, and as men were vainly looking for God in creation, the divine Logos took a body, an essential part of creation, and thus met men in the place where they were looking for him. Even the arguments of Ch.17 and Ch.40-45 as to the divine Logos' not being limited in his providential care of the cosmos by being incarnate and as to the appropriateness of the incarnation, are based upon the oneness of the assumed humanity with all creation. Thus "body", with its overtone of creatureliness, is most suited to the axiom of these arguments. This use of "body" to describe Christ's humanity, a usage dictated by argumentative rather than anthropological reasons, means again that in these chapters at least the place of the personhood of Christ in man's salvation will not be stressed. Moreover, it must be noted that even as man's personality is personal only in the eternal person of the divine Logos, so is Christ's. It is therefore, as we have seen, not a self-existent and independent personality. Certainly it is not a physical entity. Consequently, it cannot have an independent role in the salvation of mankind.
Its role will lie not in an active programme. For it is only the divine Logos, the bequeather of Logicality and incorruptible immortality, who, in the final analysis, can have this active part. Rather its role, like that of the body to which it is intrinsically related, is passive. For the personal body receives of the grace of the divine Logos, and through its total oneness with man's personal body, so does man's. It is therefore for this passive, receptive role that we must look.

Given that Athanasius refers to Christ's humanity as body in many of the passages in the DI, it is noteworthy that he often introduces the qualification "human", or its cognates, and so points to the personal characteristics of that body of Christ. Hence insofar as the Logos' humanity has a theological role in man's salvation, so Christ's human personality has, in that it is inseparably connected with the personal body, and in that it exists in, and only in the Logos whose humanity it is. Indeed, in Athanasius' description of both the renewal of man in the knowledge of God, and his resurrection from mortal corruption, Christ's human body is seen as theologically important. For with regard to the renewal of man in the knowledge of God, Athanasius notes that it can be effected properly and securely only by the Logos becoming man by taking a body like men's. For therein the divine Logos reveals himself in the creation in which men were seeking for God. Indeed, in thus asserting the propriety of the incarnation, Athanasius denies the possibility of this recreation either by created beings or through general revelation, or the law and the prophets. The immediacy of the divine Logos, who reveals and is revealed, and the human body, through which the revelation occurs, and to which it is made, is that which guarantees this salvation in knowledge. The importance of this immediacy of the divine Logos and the human body for the salvation moreover is stressed by the very fact that even in those passages where Athanasius is emphasising that it was necessary that the salvation of man in the image should stem from the very Logos of God, it appears to be important that the divine Logos should take a mortal body. For therein men might be renewed in the image; the all holy Son of the Father, who is the Image of the Father, came to man's realm in order to renew man who had been made in his likeness (77). The fact of the incarnation is all the more striking here as the context is that of an argument that only the divine Logos could renew man in God's image. With regard to man's resurrection from mortal corruption Athanasius meanwhile asserts that a mere act of will on the part of God is not sufficient. A creative fiat by God would not have sufficed. For it would not have identified the divine healer with man in his essential need; it would not have allowed man to receive of the
Logos' divinity through a like body, and thus to have been restored in the incorruptible life in God. Indeed, the saving relating of the divine Logos to man could not have been merely external. For while the body's mortality would have been overcome by the Logos if the Logos had been outside, and not in the body, the corruption attendant upon that mortality would have remained in the body. The relating therefore had to be internal and intimate, even as death and corruption were related to the body; the saviour, the Logos, had to relate to the body, which was in need of salvation, even as the body was related to that from which it required saving. Death and corruption were not outside the body, but involved with it and in it; death dominated the body, being joined to it. Consequently it was necessary that the Logos should similarly be bound to the body by being in it. The relating of death and its attendant corruption to the human body was therefore superseded by that of the enlivening and incorruptible Logos to the body. In that the Logos put on this mortal body, the body received life as a covering. In putting on life and immortality, the incorporeal Logos of God, the mortal body was enlivened, death having been effaced, and rose up immortal, having cast aside its corruption. It is therefore through this intimate relation of the Logos to the body that the needy humanity was healed. Here again the intimate assumption of humanity is theologically important. This becoming man by assuming a body like man's was necessary to the total security of man's complete salvation by the divine Logos. Indeed, this idea may lie behind the statement of 8.18-19, where it is noted that the Logos did not wish to be in a body, nor merely to appear. Rather, when he came to effect man's salvation, the Logos wanted to be intimately and inseparably related to man's humanity. In other words, man's whole salvation was bound up with the Logos' complete assumption of man's humanity. Equally interesting in this respect are Ch.11-16 and Ch.41-43, where Athanasius is treating the recreation of man in the image, and therefore in the knowledge of God, as he describes Christ's humanity frequently as his human body or as man. In other words, where the recreation of man's personality in God is at stake, Athanasius emphasises the human personality of Christ in God. There seems therefore to be a relationship between the recreation of man in his personality and Christ's human personality in the divine Logos. This emphasis upon Christ's human personality in the context of man's personal salvation is all the more telling when seen against the seeming silence of those passages in which, for argumentative reasons, the personal aspect of Christ's humanity is left to the side.

It seems therefore that generally the place of the human personality of Christ is quietly in the background of Athanasius' theology in the DI.
its presence being signified by the qualification by the term "human"
and its cognates of Christ's body, through which man's salvation is worked.
In those chapters, however, where the recreation of man's personality is
being discussed, the human personality comes more to the fore. Christ's
human personality therefore is a theological factor in Athanasius'
theology of salvation, but only in a passive and receptive manner.

There is therefore in the CG-P1 the basis for an understanding of
Christ's humanity. Taken to effect man's salvation, Christ's humanity
is complete in both its relation to man's frail, corrupt and mortal
creatureliness through his assumed body, and its relation to man's
rationality, by which man knows God, through the man which he becomes. It
is through this humanity then that the divine Logos, the Son of God,
graciously bestows the rationality, incorruption and immortality to all
men that all men might be re-vitalised and re-established in their real
and true relationship of worship to God, and so enjoy the life of paradise.
CHAPTER 1.

Footnotes


2. 1.10-11. cf. 55.33-34; 56.2-3

3. 56.1-2

4. 56.6-10

5. 56.3ff.

6. 1.9; 56.3

7. 25.1-2

8. 25.3. cf. 56.10

9. cf. 1.9ff.

10. 1.30 cf.1.27; 42.34

11. 1.28; 32.28; 48.41

12. 54.15

13. 8.2-4

14. 18.2-3.

15. 50.16

16. 1.13, 21.

17. 56.12-13

18. 15.1-4

19. 17.5ff.

20. 42.31ff.

21. 18.8, 17; 44.11

22. 16.5-6. cf. 37.13-14

23. 8.17. cf. 31.25; 43.21; 45.1

24. 18.9. cf. 21.38-39

25. 1.27. cf. 21.43

26. cf. 44.47-49

27. 8.24-25; 9.6, 11, 16-17; 20.29 etc.

28. eg. 2 Chron. 6.41; Job.8.22; Is.52.1.

29. eg. Lk.24.49; 1 Cor.15.53f; Eph.4.24; 6.11,14.

30. eg. Aristophanes *Ec.* 228


32. eg. Chrysostom *PG.*60. col. 627

33. 17.1-2

34. 4.10-11; 8.18-19. cf. 41.22.

35. 18.4. cf. 5.7.

36. 18.10
37. 19.20; 20.28. cf. 20.38; 31.28; 41.21-22; 43.21-22
38. 17.5; 41.20-21. cf. 41.23, 25
39. 17.2, 10, 22-23, 35-36 cf. 41.26-27; 42.7-8; 45.2
40. 44.47-49
41. 42.34; 43.3; 44.11-12; 45.3-4.
42. 29.13-14; 42.10; 1.25; 16.2 etc.
43. 27.7; 29.6; 35.16; 38.21-22 etc.
44. 8.24; 18.32,34.
46. cf. Appendix 1.
47. 9.13. cf. 9.16-17
48. 8.30-31; 20.31; 22.17; 30.12; 31.24
49. Grillmeier oc. 308-9
50. ib. 309
51. ib. 310 ff.
52. 17.10
53. Grillmeier oc. 317-18
54. 1.30; 4.10-11; 15.32-33; 41.26
55. 33.28; 43.40. cf. 37.24-25
56. Grillmeier oc. 315-17
57. 22.23
58. 8.27-28; 21.19 cf. 16.17; 21.17; 22.7, 13; 25.28
59. cf. CG. 41 passim.
60. Galtier oc. 574-5
61. 21.17-18
62. 23.1-3
63. cf. 12.29; 13.1
65. CG.30.19f. cf. ib. 34.13f.
66. ib.31.20-21.
67. ib.33.27. cf. ib.3.29f.
68. DI.14.21,26.
69. CG.26.21-23.
71. eg. CG.2.33. cf. ib.8.8-9.
72. eg. CG.19.7. cf. ib.8.1f.
73. eg. CG.19.17. cf. ib.3.1f.
75. ib.31.1-2.
76. ib.31.32-35.
77. DI.13.29-30, 32-34; 14.5-7.
CHAPTER 2

CONTRA ARIANOS 1

Written, as its title suggests, against the Arians, this text is concerned with the controversy between the Catholics and the Arians, not as to whether our Lord was God, but as to whether he was essentially the Son of God, the solution of the former question being involved in that of the latter. It is concerned with the question as to which of the two theologies sets forth the Lord Jesus Christ as God and Son of the Father. Indeed, that the question of the divine Sonship of the Logos dominates this anti-Arian work is clearly seen from a consideration of the general content: Ch. 11-29 deal with the matter of the divine Sonship, showing it to be eternal, to be real, even though not like earthly sonship, and to be, in fact, the only true sonship. Ch. 30-34 discuss the term agenesis, and its relation to the divine Son, the only-begotten of the Father. Ch. 35-36 treat the immutability of the Son. Ch. 37ff. treat the texts of Phil. 2.9, Ps.45.6-7 and Heb. 1.4, which relate to the exaltation of the incarnate Son, and which the Arians had used to support their denial of the eternal and divine Sonship of the Logos of God. Nor is it surprising that the content of the work is such. For the Arian position against which Athanasius is here arguing is concerned not with Christ's humanity, but with his essential divinity. The Arian stand-point, as outlined in ch. 5-7, maintains the complete distinction of the Father and the Son; it asserts that God was not always a Father, being once alone, and that the Son was not always in existence, having, before time, been created from nothing, and so was to be numbered amongst creatures in their essential distinction from the eternal, uncreated Creator God. In short, for Athanasius, Arius was an atheist, who denied the Son, numbering him amongst the creatures. Indeed, so central to CAr.1 is the question of the divine Sonship of the Logos that even when treating such topics as revelation, the bestowing of the Holy Spirit upon men, the resurrection and the incarnation, the doctrine of the Logos' Sonship is seen as the background against which all these are rightly interpreted. In 8.36ff, for example, Athanasius asks Arius how he can speak truly of the Father when he denies the Son who
reveals him? How can he be orthodox concerning the Spirit, while he speaks profanely of the Logos who supplies the Spirit? How will he be trusted in his beliefs about the resurrection, when he denies that Christ became the first-begotten from the death for men? And how he would not err in respect towards the incarnate presence of the Logos, when he is simply ignorant of the Son's true and genuine generation of the Father?

It is, however, not only true that a right appreciation of the enfleshed presence of the Logos is dependent upon a right understanding of the Son's genuine and true generation of the Father, but also that the incarnate nature of the Logos is only treated in C. Ar. 1 where it is required to explain some part of the Son's human economy, and thereby protect the true divinity of the Son from the heterodoxical allegations of the Arians. Thus it is that the incarnation of the Logos is mentioned in ch. 37 ff only to explain the texts Phil. 2.9, Ps. 45.6-7 and Heb. 1.4 in their orthodox sense, and to show that "highly exalted" and "has given" of Phil. 2.9, that "has anointed" of Ps. 45.6-7 and that "being made" of Heb. 1.4 do not refer to the divine nature of the Logos, and so imply that it is creaturely, but relate to his assumed humanity, which is essentially distinct from the divine subject of that assumption. In fact, the humanity of Christ is not a subject in its own right in C. Ar. 1., but is introduced only to safeguard the divine economy of the Logos from that which is proper to his human economy. That the humanity of Christ is not a subject of consideration in its own right in the C. Ar. 1. is confirmed by Athanasius' outline of the Arian theses which he intends to treat in this text. In this outline in ch. 5–7 the humanity of Christ is not mentioned as one of the topics of which Arius held heterodoxical views, and which Athanasius therefore had to treat.

That the humanity of Christ, the subject of this study, is seen in the C. Ar. 1. in respect of the doctrine of the eternal, divine Sonship of the Logos is true. Yet it is not to be considered simply in terms of the Logos' divine Sonship, but in terms of the divine Sonship in its soteriological aspect. Christ's humanity was, for Athanasius, that in which and through which man's salvation was effected. Yet that salvation, which was worked out for men in Christ, stems from the very Sonship of the Logos.
Had not the Logos been truly the Son of God, the reality of redemption and grace would not have been realised. The truth of God would not have been vouchsafed for sinful man in Christ; man's fellowship with God and his adoption as a son of God would not have occurred. For Christ would not have had as his own that which it was necessary to give to man for his salvation.

Christ's humanity, variously described as flesh, body and man, is to be seen in its contrast with God. It is consequently to be seen as signifying humanity ever against divinity in the first place, and not primarily as particular subtleties of a strictly worked out anthropoclogy. It is moreover to be seen in its soteriological context, where the humanity is treated as that assumed to guarantee man's salvation, and in its theological context, in which the humanity is not treated in its own right, but as that through which the divine Logos is protected from allegations of being creaturely, and therefore mutable and possible. It is against this background that our study must proceed. For not to do so, and to forget this soteriological and theological setting, would be to introduce overtones and elements foreign to Athanasius' intention.

As in Athanasius' first work, the **CG-DI**, sc in C.**Ar.**1, the Logos of God is the subject of the Incarnaticn. Described variously as the Son of the Father, the only-begotten Wisdom, God the Lord, the King, the Light from Light, Power and very Image of the Father's essence, the Framer of existence, and the Saviour, the Logos is seen as being by nature eternal, co-existent with the Father, unalterable and unchangeable. He is he who is one (HEN) with the Father (1).

Nor do verses such as Ps. 45.6-7, Prov.8.22, Phil.2.5-11 or Heb.1.4 call into question this eternal divinity of the Logos of God. For they do not have their point of reference in the eternal essence of the Son of the Father, but in the embodied presence of the Saviour; they refer to the human economy of the divine Logos, in which he was baptised, died and rose again on behalf of all. Indeed, even such an initially startling verse as Acts 2.36 "and God made him both Lord and Christ", does not cast doubt upon the eternal divinity, as it likewise has its point of reference not in the uncreated being of the divine Logos, but in his assumed, created humanity, in and
through which the Logos fulfilled his mission as the Christ for men, and in which he revealed to men his eternal nature as Lord.

It was this divine Logos, consubstantial and co-eternal with the Father, who became incarnate.

For convenience we shall divide Athanasius' description of the Incarnation in the 《Ar.》 into four sections. The first will cover the general description of the incarnation; the second the Athanasian description of that which the Logos became in himself; the third that of that which the Logos took from without himself to himself; and the fourth will treat the remaining references to the human economy of the divine Logos. Before, however, embarking upon this consideration of Athanasius' understanding of the Incarnation, we must emphasise that this categorising of the incarnational descriptions into four groups is done only for ease of presentation. It is not because the Alexandrian's thought consists in four rigid categories. Indeed, each of these groups of incarnational descriptions reacts upon and qualifies the meaning of the others; it is the sum total of the meaning of all four groups that forms the picture of Athanasius' understanding of Christ's humanity.

Under the heading of general descriptions of the incarnation, we must note Athanasius' reference to the divine Logos' incarnate presence, to his visitation, and to his ministry amongst men and for men. The incarnate presence of the Logos is described both as the enfleshed presence and as the embodied presence, the latter being the argumentative alternative to "and the Lord became man"(2). It is in this presence of the Logos that the death enforced by the dispensation of the Law is finally destroyed. Hence this presence of the divine Logos is to be seen as a soteriological presence of God amongst men. The epidemic of the Logos is also compared and contrasted with the dispensation of the Law, under which nothing was effected with regards to man's salvation, as it was only through the visitation of the Lord Jesus Christ that the will of the Father for man's salvation was perfected. There is, incidentally, implicit in this description of the incarnation of the Logos the thought that the incarnation was not natural for the divine Logos, epidemic and epidemein carrying with them the idea of sojourning, of the divine
Leges not being properly "at home" in his incarnate state. This is not, however, to cast doubt upon the reality of his incarnation, but to show both that the Leges is naturally God, and thus one with the Father, and that the divine Leges is incarnate by grace, and not by nature. The third general description of the incarnation in C.Ar.1 is he diakonia of the divine Leges. Effected in time, in the creaturely realm by the eternal Leges, who as divine Leges is beyond time and creation, this ministry is better than that effected through the Law and the Prophets; the ministry of the Son is better than the ministry of the servants(3). It is better in the sense that while the earlier of the two ministries was able to enforce the law of God upon man unto death, but was not able to rescue them from its condemnatory grip, this latter effected man's salvation from the death which had reigned over him through the law, by fulfilling both the law and the death consequent to man's transgression of that law. Tied in with this description of the incarnation as ministry, whereby the Leges came to minister and to grant salvation to all, is the idea of the Leges, who is the Lord, becoming a servant, a minister ministering to the needs of frail man. Here therefore is found, very succinctly, the miracle of grace and humility, revealed in the philanthropic self-humiliation of the divine Leges in becoming man.

The second group of descriptions of the Incarnation in the C.Ar. 1. concern those which describe the process of the divine Leges becoming something in himself, the incarnational act which affects the Leges himself.

Central to Athanasius' incarnational theology is the truth that the divine Leges became man; he became flesh. To these traditional Christological statements Athanasius adds others. The Son of the noble Father, he who existed in the form of God, humbled himself and became a servant instead of, and on behalf of men. The divine Leges, the Lord, became for man's sake the slave. Herein came about a complete inversion of roles, through which there occurred a true humiliation of the Leges. These sentiments contained in 43.41-2 are, of course, echoes of Phil.2.5-11, which is actually quoted twice in C.Ar. 1, at 40.28-36 and 47.30-31. Yet the idea of the self-humiliation of the Image, the immortal Leges, is prevalent elsewhere. 40.8; 41.33-34; 42.7-9; 43.32-33; 44.28, and 50.17-18 all stress, in a Philippian
manner, the humiliation of him whose, through being in the
form of God, took the form of man or the form of a slave.
40.38-1 also stresses that the humiliation was genuine,
the divine Logos in no way being bettered through his
incarnation. Yet, for all that, the divine Logos was not
humiliated in himself, but remained ever the glorious Son
of the Father. Rather, the humiliation was related to his
humanity, and was the Logos' only through his assumption
cf flesh, through man's body of humiliation being his very
own. This same self-humiliation of the divine Logos is
otherwise referred to as the descent to man of the Son,
the Lord of Glory, the Highest, the heavenly man from on
high. These superlative epithets, used of the Son, only
emphasise the degree of self-humiliation undertaken by the
Logos in his becoming man. At the same time, the verb 'to
descend', is used, especially in Ch.44, to describe the
death of Christ, that sacrifice being the acme of this
self-humiliation of the divine Logos, the Life of God.

Athanasius' affirmation that the divine Logos became
man, of which the Logos' becoming a servant is but a
qualification, is coloured by the rejection of the two
heterodoxical views that Christ is by nature wholly man,
and nothing more, and that Christ was not God the Son, the
Logos, before he became man, but that he became such as a
result of his virtuous human life. In other words,
Athanasius is denying either that the Logos altered in
his very nature in becoming man, or that he only then came
into being. Indeed, Athanasius asserts that he was eternally
the Logos of the Father, and that so being divine, he
became man, or the Son of man; the divine Logos, while
everally one of the Trinity, became man for man's sake.
Indeed, Athanasius reveals in several ways that the divine
Logos did not undergo any alteration in his divine being in
becoming man: there is the clear rejection of the hetero-
doxical views mentioned above; there is the use of the
continuous present tense of the verb "to be", with its
suggestion of eternal immutability, which stands in marked
contrast with the use of the aorist and perfect tenses of
the verb "to become", with its connotation of an event
accomplished in time and space. Again, there is the phrase
"the Logos, as man", in which the Logos is still seen as
divine, but also as the Logos who has qualified his existence
by assuming to himself a human economy. The implications of
all these suggests that the eternally divine Logos became man, while yet remaining eternally divine. This implication is confirmed in three related areas: the divine Logos who is eternally worshipped with God before his incarnation is still worshipped as divine even after becoming man; and in no way is this worship idolatrous, which it would have been had the Logos ceased in any way to be the true son of God after his incarnation. Again, the Son, the Creator Logos, who became man and so is called Jesus, still controls the universe through his providential care. Lastly, the divine Logos, through whom the Holy Spirit flows to men, sanctifies himself as man, and in doing so, sanctifies men. He is therefore still the divine Sanctifier, even while he was incarnate. It is clear therefore that the divine Logos did not alter when he became man (4), but remained what he had ever been, namely the divine Creator Logos, the Son of the Father.

This "becoming man" of the Logos did not affect either the state or the being of the divine Logos because "becoming" is not used of the being of the divine Logos (5), of which the verb "to be", with its connotations of eternal immutability, alone can be, and is used, in an unqualified sense. Rather, "to become" is used of originate existence (6), of which the divine Logos was not a partaker, except in and through his assumed humanity. Thus "henceforth let them understand 'become'... of his enfleshed presence" (7). A further reason as to why "to become" is not to be referred to the divine Logos, but only to his assumed humanity, lies in the fact that, according to Athanasius, the phrase "he became" is used in Scripture to signify, not the beginning of being, but the beginning of help to the needy (8). Thus "becoming" in a helping context refers not to any original coming into being, nor to the essence of the benefactor, but the beneficence coming from the helper to the helped. When, therefore, it is said of God that "he became man" in order to help man, by redeeming him, it is said not in order to denote any original becoming - for God is without beginning and unoriginate - but the salvation which came to be for men from him (9). It was therefore in relation to the originate manhood which the divine Logos assumed for all, that the "becoming" man of the Logos is to be understood.

Similarly, it is in relation to this same originate manhood that the Son of God's "being made" the Son of Man
is to be understood. For the verb "to make" is a term associated with creaturely existence, of which the divine Logos partook only through his incarnation, and not with the divine Son, with whom the term eternal Demiourge (10) is naturally and properly related. The Logos' being made man therefore points to the Logos' creaturely existence as man; it does not imply that the Logos, who is truly different in kind, different in essence from things originate, being proper to the Father's essence and one in nature with it, was a created work, and one of things originate, as the Arians supposed. When therefore it is said that God became or was made man, it is not said in order to imply that the Divine Logos underwent an essential alteration in either his state or being.

As a result of the divine Logos' having experienced no alteration in his eternal divinity in having become incarnate, the divine Logos himself cannot be said to have been either bettered or belittled thereby.

That the divine Logos did not receive promotion in and through the incarnation is seen mainly in the context of Athanasius' exposition of certain biblical texts, over against their heterodoxical interpretation by the Arians. Statements such as "having become greater", drawn from Heb.1.4, and "wherefore God has exalted him", taken from Phil.2.9, do not imply that the Logos was of an originate nature who was then promoted to Sonship through grace as a reward for his virtuous life amongst men. For these statements are not to be understood of the eternal essence of the Son of the Father but of the embodied presence of the Saviour. They therefore have no meaning for the eternally immutable divinity of the Son of God. Indeed, to suggest with the Arians that such statements implied that the Logos incarnate was seeking promotion through his virtuous living was to introduce irregularities into one's theology. For one would then be asserting that the divine Son of the Father humbled himself by taking the form of a servant in order to seek for himself what by nature he already had, in order to obtain for himself that grace which he had bestowed from all eternity and in order to gain for himself that name which was above every other name, and at which every knee should bow, when he had been worshipped eternally, as verses such as Ps.20.7; 54.1; 72.17; Jn.1.1 and Heb.1.6 reveal.
Further confirmation that it was not the divine Logos who was bettered in and through his incarnation lies in Athanasius' understanding of soteriology. Athanasius rejected the Arian conception of the incarnation, whereby the Logos did not promote his assumed humanity, but was himself promoted through it, a view whereby the orthodox doctrine of salvation was undermined. Rather, Athanasius maintained that the eternally worshipped Son, the Lord of Glory, the Highest, became incarnate, not to be promoted himself, but to promote those things wanting promotion; the Logos, the Son of God, became man not to receive the title of "Son" and of "God" as a reward for virtue, titles which were his from eternity, but to effect man's promotion, by deifying men through making them the sons of the Father. Indeed, that the benefits accrued through the incarnation were not the Logos' but men's is driven home in Ch.43. For in no way did the incarnation constitute a promotion for the Logos. It rather constituted an utter humiliation. For while being by nature God, unwanting and complete, and therefore not open to advancement, and while being the very Light of God, the divine Logos became incarnate by assuming a body of humiliation, or a flesh enslaved to sin; while being eternally the Lord of creation, he became man by taking the form of a slave. For the divine Logos therefore the incarnation meant a self-humiliation, and not a promotion and advancement. Indeed, even the grace bestowed by the divine Logos upon himself as man was not for his own betterment, but for man's sake. For in receiving that grace, men were bettered in and through Christ. Men were rescued from the fantasies of the demons which were destroyed by Christ; they were brought from idolatry to the worship of the true God, the Father of Jesus Christ; they were redeemed from sin; they were raised from death and exalted to heaven, being brought into God's presence, as God was in them in and through Christ, the cause of men's being raised from mortality to life being the very same as that of Christ's being raised. For even as the divine Logos was in his assumed humanity and caused it to rise, so the Lord was in men through Christ and caused them to rise. Further, men, through their kinship with the body of the incarnate Logos, had become the temple of God, a phrase drawn from Pauline usage, and used in a similarly non-anthropological sense in the DI of Christ,
as that denoting the complete indwelling of Jesus by God the Logos; they were made sons of God, and consequently the Lord was worshipped in them. In comparison with the divine Logos who experienced humiliation in and through the incarnation, man's exaltation in Christ is all the more marked.

It is clear therefore that the divine Logos was not bettered in his becoming man for all. For being God, the Logos became man, and not, as the Arians maintained, being man, the Logos later became God.

Equally, the divine Logos was not belittled in becoming man. His divine essence did not suffer either a defect or affection thereby. For any defect or affection suffered in and through the incarnation by the Logos was suffered by the divine Logos as man, such being peculiar to his possible and finite humanity alone. Indeed, such were the divine Logos' only through his assumption of them in the incarnation and therefore directly affected his eternal nature as God in no manner. In fact, had the divine Logos suffered any belittling in regard to his essential divinity through his incarnation, the effective salvation of men would have been denied. For had the Logos who truly became incarnate for men not been truly God, the salvation of man, which was the Father's glory, would not have occurred.

That the divine Logos did not undergo any alteration in his divine state or being in becoming man is therefore corroborated in that the divine Logos did not undergo either promotion or belittling in his incarnation.

Although, however, the divine Logos remained truly God while yet becoming man, he did become true man. For in becoming man, he became one with originate existence; in being made man, he established a unity with created existence; in becoming man as men are, he was enabled to identify himself with all other men, whom he wished to deify. Indeed, had the Lord not become true man, men would not have been saved. Through the Logos becoming man as men are, the Logos established an essential oneness between the man Christ and all other men. When, however, we say "essential oneness", we mean that solidarity of the divine Logos with men, effected in the creatureliness of fallen man, and not in his evil. For otherwise Christ's
sinlessness would have been tarnished. Indeed, it is only in that fallen man is evil in his action, and not in his nature, that the Logos can establish that unity; had man in his fallen nature been evil in being, the sinless Logos could not have been united with him for man’s salvation. It was, however, through the Logos becoming one with man in and through the incarnation that the union of the person of the Logos and that of man, was effected. Through the identification of the Logos and men in man, men were redeemed.

The same emphases regarding the incarnation of the divine Logos are made in the Christological statements of the Logos becoming flesh. For it was not the Father, but the divine Logos who became flesh, and who in becoming flesh was not affected in his divine nature. For his essence was eternal and equal to God’s. Indeed, the eternal and immutable existence of the divine Logos, as implied by the use of the continuous present tense of the verb "to be" in regard to the divine being, stands in marked contrast with his entry into the realm of time through his incarnation, an entry demonstrated by the use of the temporal adverbs "when...", "before..." and "after..." (11), and the use of the past tenses of the verb "to become", with their reference to events in time. One of the most marked examples of this contrast of the Logos' eternal existence with his incarnate existence within the bounds of time must be 44.1 where we read that "being God, the Logos became flesh, the continuous present tense standing out against the perfect of "to become". Finally, soteriology lies behind Athanasius' conception of the incarnation; the divine Logos became flesh, and thus man, in order that in identifying himself with man, he might redeem men unto himself. Hence the incarnation was for the betterment not of Christ, but of man.

The third group of descriptions which we here meet is that describing the humanity which the Logos assumed from outside to himself. The Logos assumed flesh or a body; he put on flesh or a body; he bore flesh or man's body. Thus the humanity and the body is his; in other words, the assumed body became the body of the Lord.

Most of these incarnational statements we have already met in the CG-DI. Yet one point which is raised in 43.33-34 must be discussed: the Logos assumed ter
doulotheisan sarka te hamartia. On first appearance, this seems to point to Christ's being sinful - an impression apparently confirmed by the statement that the Logos bore the sins of man in his own body on the tree. This initial impression, which runs contrary to the orthodox belief in the sinlessness of Christ, is, however, mistaken. In the first place, the assertion that the Logos bore the sins of man in his own body on the tree, which seems to confirm the statement that Christ assumed sinful flesh, is in fact no confirmation; it is simply a near quotation of 1 Pet.2.24, where the point at issue is not the question of whether or not Christ was sinless, but the saving death of Christ, as a result of which men might die to sin and live to righteousness. Secondly, the statement that the divine Logos assumed ter doulotheisan sarka te hamartia occurs in a passage which is not concerned with the sinlessness, or otherwise, of Christ, but with asserting that it was not the Logos who was benefitted in and through the Incarnation, as the Arians maintained, but men. Indeed, Athanasius asserts this both explicitly and implicitly. He maintains explicitly that "it was not the Logos, as Logos, who received this so great grace, but we..." and that "the Logos gained nothing from us for his own promotion; rather we were promoted from him". The same point he also makes implicitly; for in contrasting men with the Logos, a contrast the point of which is made keener by the use of men.......de (12), the bishop of Alexandria asserted that while men in and through the incarnation were exalted from death to life, having been given power and grace in Christ, the Logos was eternally the highest Lord, the Lord who bestows grace, he who was in the form of God. The Son of a noble Father was not bettered in the incarnation, received no prize of virtue nor any promotion, but was humbled. For the incarnation meant for the Logos the assumption of our humble body, of the form of a servant or of ter doulotheisan sarka. Indeed, even what grace the Logos as man did receive, he received not for his own benefit, but on account of man and for man.

It seems therefore that the phrase ter doulotheisan sarka te hamartia must be considered in the context of the argument that the Logos was not bettered in and
Generally speaking, therefore, the phrase signifies the self-abasement of the divine Logos in the Incarnation. For it stands over against the eternal and natural Lordship of God and the exaltation of men in Christ; it stands as a synonym with to tapeinon hemon soma and doulou... morphen.

More particularly the phrase signifies not the enslavement to sin, but by sin. For sin, for Athanasius, is not an object, with its own self-existent substance, but is activity. Consequently, flesh enslaved by sin is man's corruptible and mortal nature, which makes its presence felt amongst men because of their turning in sin from God, whose divine intention it was to keep man apart from corruptible mortality for life in God.

That ten doulotheisan sarka te hamartia is to be understood as mortal and corruptible flesh, created from nothing, and not as sinful flesh, in which the sin is natural and innate to the flesh, an idea utterly alien to Athanasius' idea of creation by a good God who is incapable of creating anything evil, seems to find support elsewhere. For, the phrase is, as we have noted, synonymous with the phrases "our humble body" and "form of a servant", neither of which carry the sense of sinful flesh. Again, the clause "the Saviour humbled himself in assuming our humble body" (14) finds an echo in "being in the form of God, he humbled himself" (15) and the clause "he took the form of a servant" (16), in "he became a servant instead of us, and on our behalf" (17) while endusamenos ten doulotheisan sarka te hamartia (18) is taken up by ei gap me anthropos ho Kurios egegonei...(19). Admittedly the incarnational sentence of 43.2-3 is conditional, while that of 43.33-34 is not; yet the sense of 43.2-3 is positive as the ei gar me....ouk an.... of 43.2-3, and the oud' an.....all'... of 43.4-5 demonstrate. If we then understand the phrase ten doulotheisan sarka te hamartia as mortal and corruptible flesh, we find this sense picked up in the sentence of 43.22ff. For according to 43.22ff, if the Logos had not become man, men would not have been redeemed from sin, nor raised from the dead, but would have remained mortal. For the Logos to have effected man's resurrection, however, required the divine Logos, who could not die in himself, since he is Life, to assume man's mortal and corruptible humanity.
In it alone he was able to die for all. Consequently, given the particular soteriological context of 43.2-5, it seems necessary to understand \( \text{ei gar me archrhopos he Kurios egegeceni} \) as meaning "if the Lord has not become mortal and corruptible man..." or "if the Lord had not assumed mortal and corruptible flesh...". Hence 43.2-5 seems to confirm the sense of \( \text{ten douloltheisan sarka te hamartia} \) as meaning "mortal and corruptible flesh". CG.3.10-13 meanwhile asserts that men, being unwilling to turn away from these things close at hand, \( \text{sunekleisan beauten ten psuchen} \) in the pleasures of the body, and in the end forget the power which they had received from God in the beginning. For Athanasius, to be unwilling to turn away from \( \text{ta eggutero} \) is to be unwilling to turn to God and to be in communion with Him; in other words, it is to be sinful, as it is action independent of God's Will. Further, to forget the power which they had received from God in the beginning is, amongst other things, to forget, and therefore not to benefit from, the gift of life in God. Hence CG.3.10-13 means that as a result of sin, men imprisoned themselves in the pleasures of the body, and thus eventually forfeited the life given of God. In short, the imprisonment of one's humanity in activities not centred in God results in death. In line with this, \( \text{ten douloltheisan sarka te hamartia} \) would also seem to mean that the flesh imprisoned in sin, or egocentric activity, is mortal.

\( \text{ten douloltheisan sarka te hamartia} \) is therefore man's humanity in its subjection to death and corruption as a result of man's sin. Indeed, it must be stressed that while Christ's humanity is mortal, it is mortal not as a result of his own sin, but man's; for the Logos assumed man's body, which through man's sin had become mortal. \( \text{ten douloltheisan sarka te hamartia} \) is that pure and yet mortal humanity which the divine Logos assumed that he might bring men from being slaves to sin to being slaves to God, the relationship so characterised by the total "belongingness", the total obligation, the total commitment and the total accountability of man to God.

To see the phrase of 43.33-34 as not implying that the Christ was sinful agrees with 60.39-40, where Rcm.8.3 is quoted. For the reference to the Son's being sent \( \text{en hemoicmati sarkes hamartias} \) seems to suggest not that the
incarnation was in any way docetic, but that the assumed flesh of the Logos was pure and spotless. Moreover, to see the phrase of 43.33-34 as meaning mortal and corruptible flesh ties in with the statements that corruptible and mortal men were of one body with Christ, and that the Logos became mortal man as men.

The fourth group of incarnational statements are those describing the Logos' human economy. As man or in the flesh the Logos was baptised in the Jordan; as man, humanly or as the Son of man, he received of the Father that grace which he as God always had, and thus was anointed with the Holy Spirit in the flesh or as man. The Logos as man expelled demons through the power of the Holy Spirit, the Logos acknowledging that it was only through that divine power that he could expel such, saying such not because he had suffered demotion in his divinely powerful being, but on account of the flesh which he had assumed. The Logos suffered in the body, bore man's sin in the body and died for men as man, in his own flesh or bodily. This death the immortal Logos was able to suffer for all only in that he was able to offer his assumed body, which was open to death, to death. Having died in the body, the incarnate Logos was exalted in his manhood or as man. For God the Logos being in the body, his assumed body or his humanity, over against his immortal and immutable divine essence, was exalted from the dead, and the Logos as man or humanly was introduced into heaven. Thus was effected the human economy of the divine Logos for all.

Athanasius' description of the incarnation in C.Ar. 1. is therefore much the same as that in the earlier CG-DI. The impassible and simple God became that which was naturally distinct from himself by assuming humanity, while yet remaining true to his own divine nature. In this he effected man's salvation. Certainly, given the similar phraseology and the similar usage, and given no reason to interpret the Christological clauses of C.Ar.1. differently from those of the CG-DI, we may assume that they are to be understood as they are in the CG-DI. The only real difference in the description of the incarnation in C.Ar.1. from that in the CG-DI is that rather than clauses of the Logos' assumption of a body, the most common clause of
the DI, the clause of the Logos' becoming man predominates here. Again, in the DI, the Johannine Christological formula, the Logos became flesh, does not appear, while in the C. Ar. 1. it does, although usually in a qualified manner. Thus the same tenets of the Christian Faith seem to be maintained here even though the various formulae used to put these forward are not used here with the same frequency.

The divine Logos became man "in the last days" or "in the consummation of the ages". Clearly echoing Heb. 1.2, these phrases imply more than merely that the divine Logos, who as God was eternal, and thus beyond time, entered into the finite sphere of time, important though this fact is. For the use of the adjective eschatos, and more especially of the noun sumpleteia, points to the time of the divine Logos' entry into time as being the supreme moment of human history. For, from man's point of view, it was the point in time when God, who had previously been present amongst mankind through his veiled revelations in creation and through the prophets, chose to become immediately present to men as man. Meanwhile, from God's point of view, it was the precise moment at which God in his infinite wisdom chose to enter into man's finite realm; that point of time was the only proper point of time for God's incarnation.

Having become man, and having thus entered into the finite sphere of space and time, the Logos lived a human life. Of the many events that he experienced as man, Athanasius treats four: Christ's baptism in the river Jordan; Christ's natural love of righteousness and hatred of evil; Christ's exaltation; and his reception of a name above every other name. All of these, it must be noted, were treated as a result of Athanasius' exposition of two texts, Ps. 45.6-7 and Phil. 2.5-11, both of which his enemies, the Arians, saw as supporting the thesis that the Logos was a creature who was made God by grace, in recognition of his virtuous life. As might be therefore expected, they are treated by Athanasius in such a manner as to show that they give no such support; their exposition concentrates upon showing that they cannot refer to the eternally true divinity of the Logos, and upon how and why this divine Logos was the subject of the activity referred to in these verses. Although the matter
of how and why the divine Logos was the subject of the activity referred to in these verses is only of secondary importance to the theme of C.Ar.1., in that it is treated only to safeguard the true divinity of the Logos against the heterodoxical onslaughts of the Arians and not for its own sake, it is this matter to which our study brings us.

We shall begin with Christ's baptism, treated as a result of Athanasius' consideration of Ps. 45.7b., "God has anointed you with the oil of gladness...". Central to Athanasius' understanding of the baptism of Christ is the fact that it was not the divine Logos who was anointed therein. For he was the Sanctifier rather than the sanctified; he was the bestower of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit being his. He it was therefore who imparted the Holy Spirit in anointing. Rather, it was the Logos as man who was anointed. Indeed, the divine Logos, the Radiance of the Father, who bestows the Holy Spirit upon others could be said to have been anointed and sanctified only in that the body which was anointed by the divine Logos was the divine Logos' through his becoming man. It was only in this sense therefore that the divine Logos could be said to have been sanctified.

This baptism of Christ was not for the benefit of the Logos, however considered. For the divine Logos was not anointed that he might become either God, Son, Logos, or King. For the Logos had pre-existed his anointing as man, being by nature eternally the Son of God, the Lord. Moreover, unlike the historical kings of Israel, who were not kings until their anointing, the Logos, as the Image of God, was the eternal King; being God he ever ruled God's eternal kingdom. The baptism of the Logos did not therefore mark the beginning of his kingship as God. Indeed, the divine Logos was lacking in nothing and therefore could not have been bettered by any means, let alone the anointing which he himself administered. Consequently, the Logos' baptism was not for the benefit of the divine Logos, he not being open to any initiation or extension of his reign whatsoever. Nor was the Logos as man anointed for his own benefit. For the Logos was anointed on account of us and for us; the Logos was sanctified for our sake. Man, rather than Christ, was therefore benefitted by the latter's anointing with the
The effectiveness of the anointing of the Christ for all men was dependent upon the body of Christ which the Logos anointed being man's. For in Christ's body being our body, that body anointed in Christ was man's. Thus in Christ's washing in the Jordan, all men were washed; in Christ's baptism, all men were baptised; in Christ's sanctification by being anointed with the Holy Spirit, all men were sanctified and anointed in Christ. For in the Logos as God bestowing upon himself as man the Holy Spirit, he brought about the indwelling and intimacy of the Spirit in men in Christ; in the divine Logos' sanctifying himself as man, he brought men to be the temple of God. For in himself, as man, and by him, as God, the Holy Spirit was given, not arbitrarily, but to the saints.

Athanasius explains therefore not only how Christ's baptism is to be understood, but also why it was necessary. The reason given is much the same as that given in the Di for the necessity of man's whole salvation: man had been created in the image of God by the divine Logos originally, and it was right that men, having fallen from this pristine state, should be ransomed from their sin, and recreated in their former obedient relationship in the image of God.

This recreation of man "in the image" by the gift of the Holy Spirit could not, however, have been effected otherwise than through the divine Logos' anointing of Christ for all men. For only the divine Logos could effect the reunion of man and God in this relationship, the angels having transgressed God's law, and men having disobeyed his will, and both therefore having relinquished the grace which was necessary for that reuniting of men 'in the image' of God. Indeed, had the Logos been originate, and created from nothing, he would have been one of all those requiring salvation through the gift of the Holy Spirit, and hence would not have been the Christ, the author of their salvation. However, the Logos was the divine Image of God, and therefore was fit and able to unite man and the Holy Spirit. He was fit to recreate them in their relation in the image of God in that he had created them in such originally; he was fit to be the expected Christ, whom God had promised to men through his
prophets and saints, and to be the Anointed, *Christos*, in whom all men were anointed with the Holy Spirit, in that the Logos was God, the Son, the eternal King, the Radiance and the Expression of the Father. The Logos was able, however, to reunite men with the Holy Spirit in that the Holy Spirit was his, and that he, and he alone, was its bestower. Altogether, therefore, it was right and proper that the divine Logos undertook the task of freeing those under the curse of the law to the freedom of participation 'in the image' of God. Again, the divine Logos could only securely effect the reunion of men and the Holy Spirit in Christ. For even as men would not have been redeemed and exalted unless when being God, the Logos had taken the form of a servant, and therein been exalted for all, so men would not have shared of the Holy Spirit, and have been sanctified unless the Giver of the Spirit had himself been anointed for men. For men have received the grace of participation in the Holy Spirit securely only since the divine Logos incarnate was anointed. For the eternal Logos has always dispensed the Holy Spirit to the saints, thereby sanctifying them before and after the incarnation in that what he had to give he always had to give. Yet before the incarnation, the Bestower and the recipients of the Holy Spirit were two parties. Therefore the gift of the Holy Spirit could be refused. After the Incarnation, however, the two were the same (20). For the Logos as God gave the Holy Spirit to himself as man. Thus there was no possibility of refusing this gift of the Holy Spirit, and therefore the saving gift was secured for all men in Christ.

Thus it was that human flesh was first securely sanctified in Christ, the Logos as man having received the Holy Spirit; men then received in Christ the sequel of the grace of the Spirit, receiving of the fullness of Christ.

Nor does Athanasius find it either incongruous or incredible that the Logos who bestows the Holy Spirit is said to have been anointed himself with that same Spirit. For whereas the Logos, in being anointed with this Spirit, may be less than the Spirit (21), he is so only on account of his humanity, which he had assumed in becoming man. As the divine Logos, however, he is still eternally equal to the Holy Spirit in their common divinity (22). Yet
this inferiority of the Logos as man to the Holy Spirit, and the eternal equality of the Logos as God with the same Spirit is not unparalleled elsewhere. For in the Gospels, it is said that the Logos expelled demons through the power of the Holy Spirit. Yet this was not to imply that the divine Logos was inferior to the Holy Spirit which he bestows. Rather it is said on account of the flesh which the Logos assumed in becoming incarnate, and because that flesh did not have in itself sufficient strength to effect exorcisms, apart from the Holy Spirit. Similarly, blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is said in the Gospels to be unforgivable, while that against the Son of Man is pardonable, teaching which might suggest that the Logos was subordinated to the Holy Spirit. Yet this supposition would not be correct, except in so far as it relates to the humanity of the Logos. For whereas the Logos as man is inferior to the Holy Spirit, the Logos as God is equal. Thus even as there is no incongruity, nor reason for incredibility in these two examples from the Gospels, so there is none in that the Logos as man is inferior to the Holy Spirit with whom he is anointed, and yet is, as God, eternally equal to him in the one Godhead.

The second aspect of the Logos' human economy which Athanasius treats is Christ's love of righteousness and hatred of evil. The Logos incarnate did not love righteousness and eschew evil either because he was mutable, or through fear of the retribution which is wreaked upon him who breaks the righteous will of God the Father. For had he been mutable, he would not have acted so. For it is of the nature of a mutable essence to turn from one thing to another, and not to remain ever constant in choice, as the Christ did in regards to righteousness and evil. For while originate, or mutable nature may be turned to righteousness at one particular moment, it may turn to evil at the next. Indeed, this very mutability has been seen in the case of the practices of both angels and men. For while angels have transgressed God's righteous will, men have disobeyed his commands. Further, the first Adam, who was mutable by nature, himself turned from righteousness to sin, and so brought sin's fatal consequences upon both himself and mankind. It seems clear therefore that Christ's constant and unswerving devotion
to righteousness points not to, but beyond, a mutable nature, to his immutability as God and to his having eternally the immutability and unalterableness of the Father, as a result of which he was always righteous. Nor did the Christ show preference for righteousness, while yet being capable of the opposite, which was a characteristic of originate beings. Rather, the Logos incarnate loved righteousness and hated evil ever as the divine Father, with whom the divine Logos was eternally one, loved the one and hated the other. Thus even as God the Father was said to act thus because he was by nature God, and the righteous Judge, so the Logos, the Image of God the Father, being by nature the righteous, just and holy Judge, the Lover of virtue and the very author of righteousness, naturally loved righteousness and hated wickedness. Indeed, not to have done so would have been to have acted contrary to his very nature as God the Logos, and of this he was naturally incapable.

In the incarnation the Logos, the Lord, who was eternally and naturally immutable, and who remained eternally such, assumed mutable flesh. Thus while the assumed humanity was naturally mutable, and therefore open to alteration in itself, it remained immutable by grace in the face of temptation in that it was the flesh of the Logos, the immutable and unchanging Lord. Thus the Christ only loved righteousness and hated evil in that his humanity was God's.

This virtuous life of Christ was not however a mere tour de force. Rather, it was to be of service to men. For through men's disobedience to God's will, their state had been rendered insecure; they had been brought from life eternal in God to death. There was therefore need of one who was immutable that thereby men might have an image and type unto virtue. This therefore the Logos incarnate provided. For the assumed mutable flesh was that of the immutable Logos. It therefore was unaffected by the attacks of the Devil. Herein the Christ provided men with an image and example unto virtue. Yet he also provided men with a type unto virtue. For in that the assumed mutable flesh was man's, man's flesh was henceforth made immune to the assaults of the Devil and made free in order to fulfil the righteousness of the law, in that Christ condemned sin in his flesh.
Thus, even as the first Adam, who was naturally mutable, through sin brought the whole cosmos to death, the second Adam, Christ, his humanity being mutable in its common essentiality with men's but immutable by grace in that it was the eternally and naturally immutable Logos', through righteousness brought the whole world to life in God.

The third aspect of the incarnation treated in C. Ar. I. is Christ's reception of the name which is above every name, which Athanasius understood as deification by grace. This bestowal of grace by the Father upon the Christ Athanasius did not relate to the Logos as God, but to the Logos as man. For this was seen as the divine Logos' giving to himself as man that grace which he as God had had from eternity. Yet, as in all the preceding cases, so here the Logos gave himself this grace not for his own benefit, but on man's account and for man, that thereby deifying his humanity, which was man's, he might secure the deification of all mankind.

The last aspect of the human economy of the divine Logos which Athanasius treats here is Christ's exaltation. This exaltation was not that of the divine Logos, as the Arians believed. For it could not be his, as the divine Logos ever was and is equal to God; he was he who was equal to the Father, being like in all respects to the Father. The Logos was therefore the immutable Son whose true nature was the unchangeable nature, which is the Father's. His true nature was therefore not open to any alteration, whether for better or for worse. Being the Logos of the Father who is the highest, he himself was highest necessarily. In this respect therefore he was incapable of being exalted, being naturally beyond the need of any advancement. Moreover, the divine Logos was in fact the Lord and Framer of heaven through whom men were brought to this exaltation, and not he who was himself exalted. Indeed, were one to believe with the Arians that it was the divine Logos who was exalted, one would be introducing an incredible incongruity into one's theology. For one would be supposing that the Logos of the Father humbled himself by taking the form of a servant in order to seek for himself what he already naturally had, in order to obtain for himself that grace of which he had been the eternal Bestower, and in order
to gain for himself the name which was above every other name, and at which every knee should bow when he had been worshipped eternally.

Any exaltation, then, was that of the humanity of Christ, the assumption of which constituted not a bettering or exaltation for the Logos but a self-humiliation. Indeed, the exaltation of the Logos had to be referred to his human economy, as exaltation could only occur from a position of humiliation, and the Logos experienced humiliation only when he became man. In that condition alone could the eternal and immortal Logos of the Father, having taken the form of a slave by the assumption of man who was wanting on account of the humble estate of the flesh and of death, die a sacrificial death for all and thereby experience true humiliation. Thus while the humiliation of Christ occurred in that he died for all, he was exalted in that he was raised from death into the presence of the Father.

That the divine Logos was not he who was exalted is again stressed in Athanasius' explanation of why the exaltation of Christ occurred. Far from being he who was raised, it was the Logos who effected the raising. Basing his explanation upon Ps.24, Athanasius notes that the exaltation, the re-entry into heaven, was not effected for the Logos as God, as the gates of heaven were not shut to him, the Lord and Maker of all. Rather, they were first shut and then opened for the man Jesus, but only because he who had become that man Jesus was the divine Logos, the King of Glory. The gates were thrown open for the Logos as man in order that the Logos as God, the subject of the incarnation, and yet also the eternal King of glory, might make his triumphant entry.

As in the previous aspects of the incarnation, so here, Christ's exaltation is seen as not being for the benefit of the Logos, even as man. Rather, he was exalted for men; for in exalting himself, the Logos exalted men, since the humanity which the Logos assumed and which he exalted was man's with all the needs of a humble and mortal flesh. Thus, as Christ was exalted from the dead to heaven, so all in Christ were exalted, being raised from the dead and introduced into heaven; for in being made righteous for men, Christ opened for men the gates of heaven, which had been formerly closed to them.
Christ's exaltation must therefore be understood in the same sense as his sanctification. The divine Logos, the Sanctifier, sanctifies himself as man, not that he may himself become holy, but that in himself he may sanctify all men. In a like manner the divine Logos exalts himself as man that he may exalt all men in himself. The exaltation, like the sanctification, is therefore redeeming, and is in no way beneficial to the divine Logos, the source and originator of man's redemption.

Taking up the idea implied in 41.10ff, that when the gates of heaven were opened for Christ on behalf of all men, they were opened so that the divine Logos, the King of Glory, might come in, Ch.44 posits an alternative interpretation of Christ's exaltation. This second interpretation is not, however, inconsistent with the first exposition, saying the same thing is a parallel manner. According to this alternative interpretation the exaltation of Christ, spoken of in Phil.2.9-10, is not spoken of the divine Logos. For he himself is the highest, like the Father. Rather, it is said in reference to the resurrection from the dead which the Logos as man experienced. For while truly becoming man, the divine Logos remained the eternal and immutable Life of God, as the phrase hcs_zoe.cn (23) implies. Thus while the Logos as man died, the Logos as God raised himself as man from death to a new life; because he, who was God, the Son of God, and the heavenly Second Adam, was in that humanity in and through which the Logos died, death did not rule over the Christ, but he was raised from death. It is clear therefore that the Christ was not raised and exalted by God as a reward for virtue or advance, in respect of the righteous life which Jesus had lived, as the Arians supposed; he was raised solely because Christ's humanity was the divine Logos' and therefore could not but be exalted.

It is noteworthy that even in this alternative interpretation of Christ, referred to in Phil. 2.9-10, where the emphasis is upon the individual Christ and not upon the exaltation of all men in Christ, there is no idea of Christ bettering himself. For the Christ died not for himself, but in order to enliven all men through his power.

From Athanasius' exposition of Christ's anointing,
love of righteousness, receipt of grace and exaltation, it is again confirmed that the divine Logos did not either then come into existence, or suffer an alteration in his divinity when he became man. He remained his eternally divine self, while yet becoming truly man. He thus was able to effect truly and securely the salvation of mankind in himself from sin and death to God and life.

It appears from the above interpretation of the human economy of the divine Logos that soteriology prevades the whole of Athanasius' Christology. It is that which makes the incarnation meaningful for a full and wholesome relation of God to man, and man to God, by not leaving the incarnation a mere theophany of God's power and glory. Indeed, the meaning of every aspect of the incarnation is made clear through this doctrine. Thus the true Logos becomes man that man may become divine; every passion that the divine Logos made man suffers, every grace that he enjoys, he does not for himself but for all men, that all men might share in his triumph over sin and its consequences, and might thus be brought in and through Christ to God.

While we have already glimpsed the outline of Athanasius' understanding of man's salvation, as outlined in C. Ar. 1., we have yet to notice certain specific points in this connection.

Central to Athanasius' understanding of the incarnation is the fact that God has given Christ grace; the Father bestowed grace upon his Son who has become man. For as the Son of Man, the Son is said humanly to receive what proceeds from himself, as the humanity which none other than the divine Son had assumed was a natural recipient of grace. The fact that the Son as man received what proceeds from himself as God does not, however, contradict the belief of Athanasius, taken from Phil. 2.9, that it was God the Father who bestowed the grace upon his Son in the incarnation.

It is, indeed, central to Athanasius' theology that what the Father gives, he gives through the Son, and therefore that what the Son always had to give, he always had according to the Father's godhead and perfection, which was his. Thus while the Son gave what he always had, he gave it to himself as man from
his Father. For all that the Father does and gives, he does and gives through his Son. Thus, for example, when God the Logos anointed himself as man with the Holy Spirit, the divine Logos bestowed the gift of the Holy Spirit, which he had received from the Father, upon himself as man. In short, therefore the incarnation is the intimate working of the Trinity ad extra to man for man.

Also permeating Athanasius' understanding of the incarnation is the concept of mission. The divine Logos came to man in order to undertake his mission to men; he was sent to man as the authorized agent or representative of the Father. For he came to man in order to effect as the second Adam what had not been effected in the first Adam. For although being created for a righteous life in communion with God, the first Adam, being mutable by nature, fell to the temptation of the Devil, and thus transgressed God's law. Thus came sin, and through sin death, to all who were of Adam. Men therefore died and remained dead as death ruled over them. Christ was the second Adam. He was, however, from heaven, being the Son of God made man. Thus while he could experience temptation as man, he remained immutable in its face. Consequently, he did not yield to the attack of the Devil, but defeated him, and therefore sin itself. A result of this was that in thus overthrowing the Devil, Christ gave to all men the power to resist his assaults and thus to live in Christ the righteous life in communion with God for which they had been created. Thus, whereas all men were brought to sin in the first Adam, all men were brought to righteousness in the second Adam, the Christ.

It is not only in rescuing man from his falling into temptation, but also in redeeming man from the consequences of sin in the first Adam — mortality and corruption — that the role of Christ as the second Adam is unique and essential. For whereas all died in Adam, all were made alive in Christ. For, being the divine Son of God in an assumed, mortal humanity, the Logos incarnate died for all in respect of his assumed mortality, but alone rose in integrity from the dead for all men, in respect of the Son being the eternal Life of God. Thus no longer in Adam are men all dying,
but in Christ men all are being made alive.

This contrast of the first and second Adam extends to a consideration of the old and the new dispensations. As we have briefly noted, in explaining Heb.1.4., Athanasius expounds the phrase, being made so much better than the angels, not as referring to the essence of the Logos, in comparison with originate things, but as referring to the enfleshed sojourning of the Logos, in comparison with the former dispensation of the Law and the prophets. According to Athanasius, inasmuch as Christ excelled in nature those who were sent before by him, so by that much also the grace which came from and through him was better than the ministry effected by the angels.

The new dispensation was better than the old in the sense that he who effected the new ministry was better in nature than those who effected the former ministry. For the true Son of the Father, the Demiurgus, who was peculiar to the incorporeal Father and other than all that is originate, was the subject of the new dispensation, while the "angels" of God, the Prophets, who were but men and essentially of the originate sphere, being servants and those brought into being by the Demiurgus, were the subjects of the old dispensation. Christ, the Logos incarnate, therefore far cutshone, in nature, those who were sent before him.

Indeed, the essential supercicity of the subject of the new dispensation over those of the old is witnessed by the use of the very word 'better'. For had it been intended that the new dispensation was better than the old, but had been worked by a similar being to those who worked the old, the Christ and the Prophets being one in kind and there being a natural kinship between the Son and the Prophets, the new dispensation would have been said to have been "greater" or "more honourable" than the old. Thus a comparison between Christ and the Prophets would have been made. A comparison, however, is that in which like things are compared. Thus, by comparing Christ with the Prophets one would be pointing to their kinship. However, 'better' was used, and thereby a contrast of the Christ with the Prophets was introduced. Yet a contrast marks a difference, it being that in which dissimilar things are
put side by side. Thus the comparative adjective 'better' marks the essential distinction between the Son and the 'angels', the subjects of the new and old dispensations respectively.

The superiority of the new dispensation to the old is also noticeable as regards the grace which comes from and through their two respective subjects. Under the first dispensation, whose hallmark is 'law', the world is found guilty, being under the Law. For men walk according to the flesh, and not according to God's will; flesh, or man in his creaturely frailty, being bound by sin, cannot receive the divine mind; and death reigns over all. In short, no one is perfected by the Law, but only just punishments are meted out. Moreover, God is known only in Judaea, and even where the Truth is known, it is known only in a typological and shadowy form.

The second dispensation, that effected through Christ, is marked by 'grace'. For in and through it, Christ took upon himself the universal condemnation, endured it, and so saved all humanity from it; he released flesh, or frail man, from the consequences of its transgressions, rendering it receptive of the Leges; he destroyed death. Thus the Christ perfected the work of the Father. For he rendered righteous grace to all men, and thus effected that men walked according to the Spirit. Further, through Christ God was known throughout the whole world, and this Truth now known was now totally revealed, and no longer known only enigmatically.

In short, the sacrifice, the hope and the premises in Christ are better. For "it is the function of servants to demand the fruits and not mere but of the Son and Master to forgive the debts and to transfer the vineyard" (24).

Here we have therefore, in reference to the better ministry of Christ of Heb.1.4, an elaboration and expansion of the role of Christ as the Second Adam, through whom the full salvation of man was truly effected.

As will have been noticed already, Athanasius continues in the C. Ar. 1 his idea that man's salvation is related to man being re-established in both his knowledge of God and in his righteous life of gracious communion with his divine Creator.
For man to be re-established in the knowledge of God the Father required the Logos to be essentially divine. For man could only know God as his Father through the real Son through whom the Father was made known. Thus, since men were to be recreated in their knowledge of God as Father, and since the recreation could occur through the Son of the Father alone, the Logos who effected such a recreation was necessarily the eternal Son of the Father. Apart from this essential divinity with the Father, man's renewal in his knowledge of God was impossible.

Similarly, the eternal divinity of the Logos was imperative for the redemption of man's being. This Athanasius stresses in several places: had the Logos, the Lord, not become man, men would not have been saved; had the Logos who had truly become incarnate for men not been truly God, the salvation of man, which was the Father's glory, would not have been effectd. The Arian denial of the eternal and natural divinity of the Logos of the Father by their supposing him to be a creature therefore amounted to a denial of the effectiveness of man's salvation. Indeed, had the Logos been created from nothing, and so have been one of all others, he would not have been able to be the Christ, the author of their salvation.

Resulting from these statements it is clear that men could not have effected their own salvation. Indeed, not only were they not able to effect their own salvation, but also they were not sufficient to do so, in that they had disobeyed God's holy will. Rather, it was necessary that the eternally immutable Logos of God effected their salvation. For he alone was sufficient to unite man and God in the Holy Spirit. For his alone was the Holy Spirit to give. Moreover, only the divine Logos could save, exalt, make sons of God, or divinise men. For men could be gods only through participation in the divine Logos; it was only through the Son that men could therefore become the sons of God.

Thus it was that the subject of the incarnation was truly God, being true God of true God; he was God phusei kat'cusan (25); he was unalterable, after resemblance of the unalterable Father.

Not only, however, was the essential divinity of
the Logos necessary to man's salvation; so also was his incarnation. Thus a divine fiat was not sufficient to guarantee man's recreation in God; a bestowal of grace upon man from without was not that which would secure man's redemption. For it was only in Christ, the divine Logos incarnate, that men left behind their former state which was insecure as a result of their mutable nature, and entered into a secure state. Only in Christ were men redeemed securely to God. For it was only by the immutable Logos becoming mutable man, and yet remaining truly immutable, and therein meeting and countering the Devil on behalf of all men, that men were freed to fulfil the righteousness of God's will. Only since the divine Logos, the Giver of the Holy Spirit, had himself been anointed for men, have men truly shared of the Spirit, and have they been sanctified. For men received the grace of participation in the Holy Spirit securely only since the divine Logos incarnate was anointed. Human flesh was first sanctified in him, the Logos as man having received the Spirit; men therer received the sequel of the grace of the Spirit, receiving of his fulness. Again, only by the referring of the "exaltation" of Phil.2.9 to the true humanity, akin to man's, but assumed in Christ by the very Logos of God, was that exaltation, the resurrection from the dead to the very presence of God, made secure for men, and were sin and death conquered by Christ for all.

Man's salvation therefore was secured only in Christ. This thought parallels DI.44 where it is seen that only by the immortal Logos' becoming intimately involved in man's mortal humanity, was man guaranteed true salvation from death to an eternal life in God.

The idea of man's salvation in Christ is stressed in C.A.1: because the Christ was washed in the Jordan, men were washed in him; because he received the Holy Spirit, men received the Holy Spirit; because he was exalted from death into the presence of God, men were so raised. There is here a very close connection between Christ and those in Christ. Yet it does not amount to a corporate humanity which the divine Logos assumed in becoming man, and in which all men are. For there is a distinction between Christ and the Christians. Christ is he to whom the divine Logos gives his grace for all.
Thus Christ is distinct from those on whose behalf he is working. Again, Christ is distinct from the Christians in that he is the one in whom all others are baptised, anointed, sanctified, and exalted from death to God. Finally, he is the second Adam, the man who acts for all other men. There is therefore both a distinction and a connection between Christ and those in Christ. For Christ is their Forerunner, leading like men, and yet distinct from them in that he is their leader. It is interesting to note that as we suggested in the chapter on the CG-DI, so here the basis of men's sharing in Christ's redemptive work is their common creatureliness. For men receive the Holy Spirit which was given to Christ in Jordan on account of his bearing their body, while men become in Christ God's temple and the sons of God on account of the kinship to his body. That the body, man's common essentiality, is that whereby men share in Christ's reception of God's saving gifts of grace seems to confirm our view that 'body' is not to be understood in Athanasius' thought as that physiological entity which separates one body from another, but as that common creatureliness in which all men act and inter-act upon one another.

Connected with the divine Logos' effecting within himself the salvation of man, is what we have formerly called the "internalisation" of the Logos. For in becoming man, the Logos had become logical, and the Image of God 'in the image of God'. This same internalisation seems to occur in the C. Ar. 1, although here the emphasis is upon the redemption aspects: the Bestower of the Holy Spirit bestowed the Spirit upon himself; the divine Logos sanctified himself; the Logos, the Life of God, exalts himself. Yet, as with the Logos becoming logical, so with his sanctifying and exalting himself, he does not become "internalised" for his own benefit, but on man's account, and for his sake; this internalisation is to ensure that man's salvation is secure.

An interesting aspect of the incarnation which follows from this "internalisation" of the divine Logos in the incarnation is the reflexive nature of his becoming man. For whereas men are acted upon from without, God's grace to men necessarily stemming from its divine, incorporeal source, the Logos acts upon himself from
within. For he as God works towards himself as man, therein ensuring that the grace received, which constitutes man's salvation, is secure. For true to man's needy nature, man and the man Jesus are passive, being the recipients of grace. The divine Logos, on the other hand, remains the active bestower of God. Yet mysteriously and miraculously, the active Logos becomes the passive man, while yet remaining eternally active; in Christ the bestower and the recipient become one, thus securing man's receipt of grace in Christ.

The answer to the question of whether or not Athanasius admitted a human soul in Christ has long been disputed. Certainly, a human soul of Christ is not mentioned explicitly in Contra Arians 1. That, however, is explicable. Athanasius does not think in strictly physiological terms; he certainly does not set cut to formulate a list of the component parts of Christ's humanity. For him, as we have seen, 'body', 'flesh' and 'man', that which the divine Logos assumes or becomes in his incarnation, are not closed concepts, but functional and relational; they are the means whereby Athanasius explains the relationship of the divine Logos and his humanity, rather than the composition of the Logos' humanity. Furthermore, Athanasius works from a biblical standpoint. His exposition of the Incarnation was therefore scriptural. Like the New Testament, Athanasius was not particularly concerned with the physiology of Christ, but only with the fact that the Logos truly became man for men. Again, the existence of the soul of Christ seems not to have been a matter of primary concern for the Arians. Certainly there is no mention of their concern with it in Ch. 5-7 where Athanasius outlines the Arian thought which he aimed to counter. Rather, the emphasis there seems to be their belief in the non-essential divinity of the Son of God. Thus Athanasius was concerned to show in Contra Arians 1 not that the Christ has a rational, human soul, but that the Logos did not become God through betterment, but that he was eternally the immutable Son of the Father.

Certainly we cannot argue that Athanasius pictures Arian thought in ch. 5-7 as he wished it to be pictured, and so avoided having to treat the question of the human soul of Christ, supposedly because he did not believe in
its existence. It is clear from several points that the Arian problem was primarily a theological one. The descriptions the Arians are given point in this direction: the Arians are those "who have set themselves in array against the godhead of Christ" (26) and who "by all their words have attempted to do away with the godhead of Christ" (27); they are "those who separate the Son from the substance and divinity of the Father, and alienate the Logos from the Father" (28) and so "denied the only-begotten Son of God" (29). Meanwhile, Socrates reports in the opening chapters of his history that Arianism arose through its leader's discussion of the unity "of the Holy Trinity" (30). Again, whether we look at reports of the Arian theology, or the orthodox replies to these reports, we find that Arianism was concerned with the pre-eminence and pre-existence of God the Father over his Son, and with the subordination of the Son through the allying of the latter's nature with the rest of creation. Further, the ecumenical council of Nicea, called especially to counter the Arian problem, demonstrates both in its main statements and in its anathemas that fourth century Catholicism saw the Arian heresy as emphatically centred upon the question of the Logos' essential divinity. Moreover, the term *homoousios*, which was introduced into the Nicene creed to assert the total oneness of the Father and the Son, was for a long time a bone of contention. Indeed, Theodoret records that by the time of the synod of Nice in Thrace the phrases *cusia* and *homoousias* were erased from the creed, and the term *homoiousia* inserted in their place (31). Whatever this means for the relative merits of these Christological terms, it does mean that it was the divinity of the Son which was the contentious Christological point in the years immediately after Nicea. It seems therefore that for the Arians the question of the divinity of the Son was central. Indeed, ever when the humanity of Christ was treated, it was not treated for its own sake. For as Alexander, the bishop of Alexandria, wrote in a letter probably to Alexander of Thessalonica, the Arians "have constructed a workshop for contending against Christ, denying the godhead of our Saviour, and preaching that he is only the equal of others. Having collected the passages which speak of his plan of salvation and his
humiliation for our sakes, they endeavour from these to collect the preaching of their impiety, ignoring altogether the passages in which his eternal godhead and unutterable glory with the Father are set forth..."(32). He later continues, noting that the Arians, "retaining in their memories the words that came to be used with respect of his saving passion, and abasement and exanimation, and what they call his poverty, and in short all those things to which our Saviour submitted for our sakes, bring them forward to refute his supreme and eternal godhead. But of those words which signify his natural glory and nobility and abiding with the Father, they have become unmindful..."(33). To orthodox eyes therefore the problem here was not that the Arians were denying the reality of Christ's humanity, but that they were using this real humanity of the Christ as a support for their theory of the inferiority of the Son to the Father; they were applying the weaknesses of the humanity of Christ to his impassible divinity; they were confusing the two economies of the Son of the Father. Even therefore where the humanity is being treated, the matter firmly at stake is the divinity of the Son, his impassibility and immutability by nature, and not the true humanity of the Son incarnate, upon the reality of which in fact the sharpness of the Arian attack against the triune God rested. Indeed, had the reality of the humanity of Christ been open to question for the Arians, their use of the same as a means of attack upon the divinity of the Son would have been questionable also. This, however, certainly was not the case.

It seems therefore that it was Christ's divinity which was the concern of the Arians and which Athanasius therefore rightly concentrated upon in C.Ar.1. Indeed, it was only later in the Arian controversy, when the divinity of the Holy Spirit was called into question by the Tropici that Athanasius was required to deal specifically with the matter of the human soul of Christ; and that Athanasius did in his Tome. An explicit treatment of Christ's human soul was not therefore a primary concern for him in his anti-Arian polemic.

Yet, for all this, there seems to have been an element of the humanity of Christ which was open to dispute. The element was not central to the Arian heresy.
Nor was it stated openly as an Arian belief. Rather it
must be inferred from the various creeds which were being
put around at the time of Nicea.

Prior to the formulation of the Nicene creed, the
church seems to have been somewhat indefinite, anthrop­
ologically speaking, in its credal statements regarding
the incarnation. The creed of Caesarea, for example,
merely recorded that the "Logon sarkothenta kai en
anthropois politeusamenon" (34). The Council of Nicea,
however, seems deliberately to have altered this in­
carnational indefiniteness. For it asserted that the
Logos "for our salvation, kai sarkothenta kai enanthropesanta"
(35). This qualification of sarkothenta by enanthropesanta
seems to imply that the Council wished to rule out any
possibility of thinking that Christ did not assume a human
soul when he became incarnate, a position which the term
sarkothenta, when unqualified, allowed.

If such is the case, the exclusion of a denial of
Christ's human soul by an anti-Arian symbol may suggest
that Arius and his followers held the view that the
incarnate Son did not have a human and rational soul.
Indeed, this suggestion may be confirmed by the events
of 331. For in 331 Arius and his adherents were eager to
be received back into the communion of the Catholic Church.
Accordingly they submitted to the emperor Constantine a
written statement of faith, upon the basis of which they
sought to show their oneness with the rest of the Catholic
Church. This recantation Socrates records in his
Ecclesiastical History. Besides the expected avoidance
of the term homoousios, in admitting that "we believe
in one God the Father Almighty, and in the Lord Jesus
Christ, who was of him before all ages...." (36), Arius
fails to recall the Nicene phraseology concerning the
Incarnation, stating that ton (sc.Logon) katelthenta kai
sarkothenta kai pathonta (37).

Given, however, that Arius did not write his
recantation in a casual manner, but gave thought to that
which he admitted, and given the fact that he was at
least trying the give the impression that he agreed with
the Nicene Creed, and therefore would presumably have
used Nicean phrases whenever he could, it seems strange
that he did not use the Nicene clause "for our salvation
he came down, kai sarkothenta kai enanthropesanta"(38),
unless he did not accept that formulation. If he did
not accept that, it would suggest that we are not so far
from the truth in seeing something in the particular
form of the creed as accepted by the council of Nicea.
For if there was not a particular nuance being inferred
therein, there is no reason why Arius could not have
accepted the Nicene clause on this particular point.
All in all, it seems that it is right to see in this
clause of the Nicene creed an assertion of the totality
of the humanity assumed by the Son in his incarnation,
and to believe that Arius was not prepared to assert the
same.

The Arians seem therefore to have denied the human
soul of Christ through their description of Christ's
incarnation by sarkothenta and its cognates alone.
Orthodoxy, on the other hand, affirmed Christ's full
humanity through the Nicene creed's sarkothenta kai
enanthropesanta, the qualification of sarkothenta by
enanthropesanta excluding the seeming denial of Christ's
human soul. If therefore Athanasius describes Christ's
humanity in this, or a cognate manner, especially in an
anti-Arian context, it would seem reasonable to suppose
that the bishop is countering in the Nicene fashion the
Arian denial of Christ's human soul. It is true that if
Athanasius does use some such incarnational language it
might be explained as mere coincidence that both he and
the Nicene Creed use the same. But coincidence would not
be a very viable explanation in the light of the fact
that the creed of Nicea was propagated as the standard
and orthodox reply to Arianism, that, since it was a
formula that could be committed to memory very easily, any
reply to Arian heresy would probably have been formulated
in the terms of this same creed, and that Athanasius, the
great ecclesiast, who had been Alexander's right hand man
at the Council of 325, admits that the Council of Nicea
was called for the very purpose of countering Arianism.

As we have already noticed, Athanasius uses both
the Christological clause 'he became man' and 'he became
flesh'. Although generally used separately, they have
the collective meaning for the whole work of the Nicene
sarkothenta kai enanthropesanta. A usage more like the Nicene is, however, also found: 45.18-19 asserts that it was "not the Father, who became flesh, but his Logos, who became man". Thus it is of the divine Logos,"when he became man...when the Logos became flesh" (39) that the ministry of Christ, referred to in Heb.1.4, ought to be related. For it was while"being the Logos, he became flesh, and so having become man"(40) that his ministry became superior. This is seen in the fact that"as man in his own flesh"he endured death for all men (41) and that there occurred the redeeming exaltation"of his humanity, his flesh...when the Logos became flesh"(42).

It is in the light of the Arian refusal to admit the enanthropesis, over against the ensarkosis, of the divine Logos that we must also consider 45.11ff:"if therefore he did not become man", the exaltation of Christ is not to be referred to the incarnate Logos. "But if the Logos became flesh, of necessity the resurrection, as in the case of a man, must be ascribed to him...."

Even more interesting in this context is 53.38ff. For there Athanasius asserts that in interpreting the clause, the Logos became flesh, the Arians should either interpret it aright, or deny that the Lord became even man.

It seems from the above therefore that the Logos' incarnational state is described in Nicene terms, sarkothenta and its cognates being qualified by enanthropesanta and its cognates, and that the Johannine Christological formula, the Logos became flesh, was to be interpreted as the Lord became man. Both of these stand in marked contrast with the Arian assertion, against which the Nicene creed took its stand, that the Logos only became flesh, and by that understanding that the Logos took the place of the human soul in Christ's flesh.

That Athanasius seems to describe the incarnation of the divine Logos in the Nicene manner whereby the Arian denial of a human soul of Christ is excluded is noteworthy. Its noteworthiness is however increased when we remember that the "flesh" and "man" which the Logos became in his incarnation are not to be interpreted in a physiological sense, but in a theological manner. Hence to admit that the divine Logos became man is more than merely to give, for stylistic reasons, an alternative
to "became flesh"; it is to qualify the latter. For it is to assent to the fact that the divine Logos not only became one with men in their common creatureliness, by becoming men's flesh, but also that he became one with men in that which distinguishes mankind from the rest of irrational creatureliness. For in becoming man, the divine Logos became "in the image" and rational. That Athanasius admits that the divine Logos became man is not therefore merely the ringing of the changes upon the Logos' becoming flesh, but is the assertion in Nicene terms of the fullness of Christ's humanity in the face of the Arian denial of Christ's human soul.

Confirmation that Athanasius did not deny the fullness of Christ's humanity seems to lie in two other areas. Athanasius asserts that the divine Logos "became" man or flesh. If, however, one is to give any content to the verb "became", which Athanasius seems to do, it must be seen over against "entered into...", and its synonyms, the latter being the Arian understanding of the relation of the Logos to his assumed humanity. Consequently, in asserting that the divine Logos became man, rather than entered into man, Athanasius seems to be veering away from an Apollinarian understanding of the incarnation, in which the Logos is encapsulated in the body. Again, while in the CG-DI the majority of incarnational statements took the form of 'he took a body', 'he put on a body', etc., 'he became flesh' not appearing at all, and 'he became man' only comparatively infrequently, in C.Ar. 1. the number of incarnational phrases involving the assumption of the body has dropped remarkably, while the majority of incarnational statements appear as 'he became man' and 'he became flesh'. One implication from the alteration of emphasis from the assumption of body in the CG-DI to the becoming man or flesh of C.Ar.1. seems to be the exclusion of an Apollinarian Christology. For while the 'he took a body', and similar statements, may allow for an Apollinarian interpretation of Christ's humanity, the statements 'he became man' and 'he became flesh' do not so readily. For the verb 'to become', as we have seen already, does not favour easily such an interpretation, and the noun 'flesh', qualified by 'man', in a Nicene fashion, and
understood in a theological and not physiological manner, seems to exclude such a Christological view. This alteration in emphasis is all the more telling when one notices the contexts of the two texts. The CG-DI was concerned with Christ's presence amongst men, and especially with the salvific consequences of this presence. Since it was from the mortality and corruption of the body of man that man needed saving, and since it was in the creaturely cosmos, the great worldly 'body', that man was seeking for God, God the Logos assumed a creaturely body that he might save men from the mortal and corruptible nature of their bodies, and that he might reveal himself in the material creatureliness in which men were looking for God. That Athanasius emphasised the Logos' assumption of a creaturely body is therefore fitting for the context and the content of the CG-DI. The aim of the C.Ar.1., on the other hand, was only secondarily concerned with Christ's humanity, its emphasis being upon the safeguarding of the Logos' essential divinity. Where, however, Athanasius does consider Christ's humanity, he does so in a Nicene manner, and so excludes the Arians' denial of a soul in Christ. To this end therefore he altered his emphasis in his description of the incarnation from the Logos' assumption of a body to his becoming flesh by becoming man. Athanasius' stress therefore upon the divine Logos' becoming man and flesh, and his playing down his assumption of body, fits the context and content of C.Ar.1. with its pro-Nicene, anti-Arian emphasis.

One further point requires treatment in this context: Athanasius often asserts that the Logos sanctified himself (43) and that he bestowed the Holy Spirit upon himself (44), by which he means that the divine Logos sanctified his assumed humanity by bestowing upon it the Spirit. From this we cannot argue, however, that Christ's humanity is therefore personal, body being the synonym of himself. For the methodology here is suspect. Consider the analogous situation, "I hit my nose" and "I hit myself". In this example "nose" and "myself" are interchangeable. Yet their interchangeability does not imply that "nose" has here become a personal term, or a
technical term for the whole person. Indeed, the statement "I hit my nose" means that I hit only my nose, and no other part of my physique. Certainly, it does not mean that I hit my inner man. It is true that in the "nose" the whole man is involved, but not comprehended. It does not therefore clarify the picture to say that the whole man is viewed "under the aspect of" the nose. In so far as the nose represents the whole man, that is true. To say so without qualification, however, tends to blur the picture by putting the emphasis upon unitary wholeness where the emphasis belongs on a representative part of the man. We are therefore dealing with a part for the whole, and its being a part for the whole does not imply that the part is the whole or has become a technical term for it. It is simply too much to read into a common figure of speech the fact that every time an anthropological term alternates with a personal pronoun, a holistic, or metonomical meaning occurs. Thus in 46.24 and 26 we cannot argue from the alternation of 'man' and a personal pronoun to the term 'man' being personal. Again, in the passages where this alternation occurs, "himsel" takes the place of "body". Here the former is rightly understood only in reference to the latter for which it is a pronoun. Consequently, it is only in the light of our right understanding of 'body', Christ's assumed humanity, that we can discern whether "himsel" ought to be understood as referring to a full humanity of Christ or not. For if 'body' is to be understood literally, 'himsel' does not do so; if, on the other hand, 'body' points beyond a literal body to a full creatureliness, 'himsel', its pronoun, points to Christ's full humanity. In fact, the second of these two possibilities seems the more likely. For while the Logos sanctifies himself in sanctifying his humanity, his humanity is often described as 'man'- "I give to myself, when become man, the Spirit; and I sanctify myself, having become man in him" (45) - 'man' being a term which qualifies 'myself', and points to the fullness of Christ's personal humanity.

Given therefore that Athanasius does not mention the human soul of Christ explicitly because that was not of primary concern for the Arians, and therefore for an
anti-Arian polemical work, and given that Athanasius excludes the denial of a human soul of Christ by the Nicene assertion that the Logos became flesh by becoming man, it seems that Athanasius continues in C.Ar. 1. to assert in his quiet manner that Christ's humanity was whole.

It but remains for us to consider the matter of Christ's human will. Several scholars have recently asserted that Christ's human will is not treated in Athanasius' theology. R.V. Sellers, for example, asserts that while the individual character of Christ's humanity is implicit in Athanasius' teaching, Athanasius does portray the Logos as so intervening in the human life of Christ that "it is robbed of the individual character which must belong to it if it is to be truly human". (46). Prestige meanwhile maintains that Athanasius retained little interest in Christ as a distinctive human being; he felt that Athanasius disregarded the importance of Christ's human consciousness, being thoroughly pre-occupied with the thought of God in Christ reconciling the world to himself (47).

In reply to these positions we should make the following observations.

To search for an independent human will in Christ, to seek that is for a double consciousness or a double will in Jesus, the one human and beset with limitations, the other infinite and divine, is to proceed, at least to some extent, from a particular dogmatic stance which is not entirely Athanasian. For such a search would stem from certain a priori tendencies, which really only come to their fullness in the dialogue of monothelitism and dyothylitism in the seventh century. In a sense therefore this search is the imposing upon Athanasian material of a dogmatic schematisation of a later origin.

Again, C.Ar. 1. is concerned with rejecting the Arian view that the divine Logos was of a mutable nature, that he has free will and that he was not like a stone, remaining by himself unmoveable. This view arose from their particular theology: God the Son was seen as a creature, created from nothing. This Athanasius countered by pointing out that the divine Logos was he who was equal to God; he was he who was one with the Father; he was
peculiar to the Father's essence. Consequently he was perfect, immutable and unchangeable. For he was not at all originate, the nature of which was open to change. Rather he was of the immutable nature of the Father, begotten of the Father of whose immutable essence it was not right that a mutable Logos nor a changing wisdom should be born. Moreover, being the eternal Logos and true Son of God, very Wisdom and the Truth, he could not alter or change, but had to stay in one and the same condition. It is clear therefore that the question of an independent human will of Christ was not really raised in Athanasius' controversy with the Arians, and was therefore not treated as a particular question in the C.Ar. 1., for which the divine Logos' immutability was one of the central issues.

Given therefore that the problem of Christ's human will was not really treated fully until the seventh century, and that the C.Ar. 1. is essentially concerned with countering the Arian propositions that the very nature of the Logos of God was mutable, it should not surprise us greatly if Athanasius does not give much thought to this question raised by Sellers and Prestige.

It is moreover to be noted that the question of the human will of Christ as raised by Sellers and Prestige is not really conceived in Athanasian terms. Sellers is looking for the "individual character" of Christ, while Prestige is searching for a distinctive human being. They therefore seem to be seeking to break the marvellous unity of impression created by Christ's person, by admitting two separate persons in the Christ, and thus making nonsense of the Logos' truly becoming man. Again, Sellers was seeking for that individuality which was necessary if Christ was truly human. Yet, for Athanasius humanity was not totally individual, except in its inalienable response to God's self-revelation. Indeed, even autexousios man was properly subject to God's will or commands. For by exercising his will to remain obedient to God's will, man remained truly human, thus living the life God truly designed for him; by exercising his own will against God, man turned ipso facto from God to idolatry, and thus lost his humanity, which was dependent upon his relation in grace to God. Humanity for Athanasius was therefore not that which was marked by individuality, but by dependence
upon God. Sellers also objects that the Logos so intervened in the human life of Jesus that there was an exclusion of a human will. This, as we shall see, is not so. The human will was admitted, but it was taken up by the divine Logos. For only thus was its salvation effected.

It seems, in fact, that any attempt to find in Athanasius' Christ an independent human will which is capable of opposing the divine will is likely to fail. For the divine Logos did not enter into man, as he did the Old Testament prophets, in whose case there was the possibility of a divine will and a human will, and therefore the possibility of human obedience or disobedience to the divine will. Rather, in Christ's case, the divine will became the human will in the divine Logos' becoming the man Jesus. Again, even as the Logos as God gave grace, the Holy Spirit and power, so the Logos as man received the same, in order to ensure man's salvation. For in the Logos receiving as man, man receives of him, as man is in Christ. Similarly, the Logos as God reveals the will of the Father, while the Logos as man receives this will, and in receiving it, was obedient to it. For to be disobedient, to exercise his own independent free will, would have prevented him from receiving the revelation of the will of the Father through the Logos as God. Yet it is inconceivable that the Logos as man was not the recipient of this revelation. For him not to be the recipient of God's will would be to break the intimate unity of the God-man, and so destroy the security of man's salvation in Christ from the temptation to sin, to obedience to God. Indeed, to exercise a will independently of the divine will was not proper to Christ. For he was sinless, and necessarily remained so, for to sin meant to turn away from God. For Christ, however, this would have meant the disuniting of the Logos become man, or the turning away from the divine Logos by the man Jesus who existed only in and through the will of the divine Logos. Sin therefore would have constituted the end of the saving incarnation. Meanwhile, the human soul of Christ, like man's, was not a self-existent entity, but depended upon the Logos for its existence, since it lived and moved and had its being in the Logos alone. It could not therefore have an independent will. If it had asserted
itself against the Logos, and thus shown its independence, it would have turned from him in whom it existed, and hence have lost its existence, and therefore its ability to command or express its own self. Again, sin for Athanasius is a failure to be receptive; it is rebellion and the selfish activity of the ego. Sinlessness, on the other hand, is the reception of grace, and not deliberately doing good, an activity which can so easily degenerate into a Pharisaic boast. Receptivity is therefore man's proper characteristic. In being sinless therefore Christ was alone truly receptive of grace; he as man was uniquely responsive to the ultimate ground of his being, to the Logos as God, and as such was truly human. For in the flesh, the Logos assumed all weaknesses apart from sin, namely the refusal to respond to God's will. Thus the possibility of seeing in Christ an independent human will, and opposing subject, is not there. Further, the Logos incarnate would not have remained immutably like the Immutable nor fully in the Father if he had become mutable and changeable when made man; he would not have been perfect, being open to change and development; nor would the revelation of the immutable Father have been secure if Christ had been open to an independent human will. For unless the Logos had remained immutable even when incarnate, he who had seen the Son would not have necessarily seen the Father, nor he who had known the Son have known the Father. Lastly, the divine Logos, as we have seen, underwent no alteration whatsoever in becoming man. Thus being holy and righteous by nature and not being altered on account of the flesh, the Logos incarnate naturally loved righteousness and hated iniquity; in other words, he could not have exercised an independent human will.

There seems therefore to be no possibility of there being a human will in Christ capable of opposing the Logos. Any such opposition would cause the incarnate Logos to cease to exist, with the "becoming man" of the Logos being brought to an end.

That does not mean that Athanasius disregarded Christ's human consciousness, as Prestige suggests. On the contrary, Athanasius recognised that the flesh assumed by the divine and immutable Logos was created from nothing.
Being originate, it had an alterable nature; it was mutable and changing in its creatureliness. Yet Athanasius also recognised that anything which was mutable by nature could not secure man's salvation. For as such, it was open to alteration, and consequently, sin through temptation. For even Adam altered, became open to sin, and through sin, introduced the whole world to death. Rather, to ensure man's salvation from sin, there was need of one whose innocence from such could be guaranteed, and who might provide for men the immutability of the righteousness of the Logos as an image and type for virtue. It was proper therefore that the Second Adam, the incarnate Logos, might be immutable, that in the Devil's assaults against him being powerless, the Devil's attacks against all men who were in him might also be to no avail. Consequently, the divine Logos, who was immutable by nature, assumed mutable flesh. He was not, however, altered in his immutability thus. Rather, it was in this mutable flesh being assumed by the immutable Logos that he condemned sin. Through his power the Logos rendered the assumed flesh immutable in the face of temptation; through the same power he rendered all men immutable before the assaults of the Devil. Most interesting in this context is the fact that the Alexandrian considers that by empowering the assumed mutable flesh, an empowering which virtually amounts to a rendering the flesh immutable in the face of temptation, the Logos rendered the same flesh free, that henceforth it might fulfil the righteousness of the Law in itself. This freedom is not therefore an abstract and philosophical freedom. It is a freedom from sin to righteousness, for which flesh was created; this freedom is a freedom to righteousness, and a freedom effected, not through its own innate power, but through the power bestowed upon it from without, from the divinely immutable Logos. Both Christ's and men's true freedom therefore is a qualified freedom; it is that ensured by the gracious power of the divine Logos; it is freedom from sin; it is freedom to effect God's righteousness. Thus even as man's true freedom is seen in his obedience to the righteous will of God, so Christ's true freedom is seen in his rightful love of righteousness and hatred of evil.
That Athanasius allows for a human consciousness which is manifest in his obedient life of righteousness is clear. One must then, however, ask whether this conception of Christ's human will by Athanasius rules out Christ's suffering temptation even as men suffer it. To answer this we must note how Athanasius understood man's falling into sin. Certainly the cause of temptation does not lie in that by which men are tempted. For all such are good, being created by a God who is incapable of creating evil. Rather, temptation stems from man's attitude to these objects. Thus an object in itself is good; but when man views it in a selfish manner, the same object becomes the source of temptation to covetousness. Similarly, a woman in herself is good, but when viewed in a purely sexual manner, becomes the means of temptation to lust. In short, therefore, in place of viewing objects through the divine perspective, man began to view them in the creaturely. In place of respecting creatureliness as the creation of the divine Creator, man began to worship creation. Thus arose temptation and sin. Christ was faced with the same objects, which in themselves were good, but which had through men's attitudes become the source of their temptation. Yet because of the Logos' truly becoming man while yet truly remaining the righteous Logos of God, the Christ never took an unrighteous attitude to these subject. Thus while the assumed flesh of the Logos was potentially open to temptation in its being mutable by nature, it was saved from any such temptation to sin through the immutable attitude of righteousness of the God-man towards God's creation. It was therefore in this righteous relation of the Christ to creation that the Logos incarnate defeated the Devil for all men. Christ therefore met all potential temptations to sin, and yet made them null and void as a result of his nature. Thus was man's salvation truly and effectively achieved in Christ.

It seems therefore that Athanasius recognises Christ's human consciousness. It is, however, not the independent will looked for by such scholars as Sellers and Prestige. It is the dependent will, which is truly human, even as humanity is truly human in God. It is truly free only when it is freed from slavery to sin in
order to serve the living God; for in Christ above all, the object of the ascetic life, the subduing of one's own will and the allowing of the Logos to take over the self, the submerging of the human subject as the receptive instrument of the divine Logos, is truly effected. Athanasius' Christology as portrayed in C.Ar.1. is not therefore basically docetic; rather it rests upon the receptivity of man, the quality which is the hallmark of humanity. For Christ in his human nature was truly receptive of grace alone; he alone was entirely sinless, being entirely receptive of and obedient to God's will, and in this uniqueness Christ was more truly human than any other man.

The bulk of the C.Ar. 1 is concerned with countering the heterodoxical interpretation of several biblical texts which were taken by the Arians as suggesting that the Logos was not eternally true God, but was a creature that was adopted as divine as a result of its virtuous life. The C.Ar. 1 is therefore mainly a theological work. Yet it does cast some light upon Athanasius' understanding of Christ's humanity. It is that which the eternally divine Logos of the Father assumed in order to guarantee in it man's salvation. For by becoming man, Christ effected the re-union of the Creator and the creature, God and man.
Footnotes

1. 1.35.2-3.
2. 53.40 cf.ib.1-2
3. 55.18-19.
4. 48.10-11
5. 60.33-36; 62.20-21
6. cf. 60.29-30; 63.8-10
7. 62.35-37; cf.ib.22-23; 64.2
8. 63.9-10
9. 63.34-36
10. 25.11-12; 58.26
11. 41.11; 42.26
12. 43.29, 32, 33, 36.
13. 43.32-33
14. 43.32-33
15. 43.41-1 cf. Phil. 2.6-8.
16. 43.33. cf. Phil.2.7.
17. 43.1-2
18. 43.33-34
19. 43.2-3
20. 48.22
21. 50.27
22. 50.1-5.
23. 44.15
24. 59.24-25
25. 39.19
28. Theodoret. in Theodoret Kirchengeschichte. o.c. 2.8.34.1-4.
29. ib. 1.26.3.6-7
31. cf. Theodoret. oc. 2.8.38.9-10
32. Alexander of Alexandria in Theodoret Kirchengeschichte oc. 1.4.4. 11-16.
33. ib. 1.4.37.9-15.

35. Socrates. oc. 1.8.

nb. when we say that Nicea seems deliberately to have altered the incarnational indefiniteness of such creeds as that of Caesarea, we do not mean to imply that Caesarea was, or was intended by Eusebius of Caesarea, to be the basis of the Nicene creed. Indeed, J.N.D. Kelly, in his Early Christian Creeds, 3rd.ed. pp.220ff., points out that there is no suggestion in Socrates' Ecclesiastical History that either Eusebius or Constantine thought that the final document of the Council of Nicea should be the actual Caesarean creed, with the Nicene key words included. Rather, the alteration in the incarnational formula in Nicea is probably more a reaction on anthropological grounds to those local creeds of which Caesarea is but one example than to Caesarea in particular.

36. ib. 1.26
37. ib. 1.26
38 ib. 1.8
39. 64. 2-3.
40 62. 17-18
41. 41.34-35
42. 41.27. cf.41. 26, 28-29, 30.
43. eg. 46.24
44. eg. 46.26
45. 46. 26-27. cf. 47.30-31
46. R.V. Sellers. oc. 43
47. G.L. Prestige. oc. 115
Like the C.Ar.1., Athanasius' C.Ar.2. is concerned with countering the Arian doctrine that the Son of God was a creature. Working from the texts Heb.3.1-2, "consider Jesus, the high priest of our confession, who was faithful to him who made him", Acts 2.36,"God has made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified"and Prov. 8.22,"the Lord created me the beginning of his ways," all of which the Arians used to support their case, Athanasius aimed to demonstrate that these verses referred not to the eternal existence of the divine Logos, but to the assumption in time of a human nature by the Son of God, in order to effect in it man's salvation. This anti-Arian work is therefore essentially concerned with the safeguarding of the increate and eternal being of the Logos, the Son of God, from the heterodoxical assertions of the Arians. It is consequently not primarily an anthropological work. Certainly it is not a work which primarily sets out to treat the "how" of the incarnation, a question which for Athanasius is integrally bound up in the mystery of God's becoming man. Even, however, where the work does treat Christ's humanity, it does so only in so far as it is necessary thereby to protect the immutability and impassibility of the divine Logos.

We must therefore approach our study of Christ's humanity as portrayed in C.Ar.2 with the same caution as that shown in our study of C.Ar.1. Certainly we cannot rightly expect to lift a fully-fledged anthropology from this work, such as will answer our every question. Nor, however, can we safely conclude that the absence of any part of an anthropology, which we now feel to be vital to a satisfactory Christology, necessarily means that Athanasius did not consider, or even denied, its existence. For any argument from silence is dangerous, and is even more so when the source of one's study is not primarily concerned with the subject upon which the work is silent.

As ever, Athanasius' starting point for his treat-
ment of the Incarnation is the divine Logos. Against every assertion of the Arians, and in line with true orthodoxy, the Alexandrian asserted that it was the eternally divine Son of God who became incarnate. It was therefore the very Logos of God, who is from the Father, the Logos, who by nature is Lord or the Wisdom of God, who entered into the temporal and contingent world through the incarnation.

In *C.Ar.* 2 Athanasius again uses all the richness and variety of the description of the Incarnation available to him from both Scripture and Tradition. To these we now turn our attention. As in our treatment of Athanasius' incarnational phraseology in *C.Ar.* 1., so here we shall divide these descriptions into groups. Yet we must emphasise again that while we are going to group these phrases in this matter, we are doing so merely for ease of presentation. Certainly we are not intending to force Athanasius' thought in any way; nor do we mean to imply that there is in Athanasius' thought any particularly strict schematisation. Indeed, the various phrases of each group qualify the meaning and sense of those of other groups.

The first group of Athanasian descriptions of the Incarnation is small. It covers those general phrases: the incarnation of the Son of the Father, naturally referred to as *he enanthropesis* (1), is also described as *he epidemia* (2), a term which, with its connotation of sojourning, implies that the divine Logos did not become man as a consequence of his nature, and as the Logos' coming to man (3), a description the missionary emphasis of which comes out very clearly in 55.22-23, "the Saviour came both to raise men up, and to destroy the works of the devil", and 55.2-5, "for our salvation, to abolish death, to condemn sin, to give sight to the blind, and to raise all from the dead, has he come". The Logos' human economy (4) is another form of the general description of the incarnation, which brings out the saving element of this Christ-event in creaturely flesh. Finally, in this first group of incarnational descriptions there is that whereby the Incarnation is spoken of as *he ensarkos parousia* (5), the miraculous and mysterious reconciling presence of God in the world.
The second group of phrases used to describe the incarnation covers those which speak of the divine Logos' becoming something in himself. The most common description of the incarnation occurs in this group. About forty occurrences of the clause 'the Logos became man' (6), with its soteriological qualification, are met in C.Ar. 2. There are also two occurrences of 'the Logos became the son of man' (7). Meanwhile, the Johannine Christological formula 'the Logos became flesh' occurs some fifteen times (8).

Central to the Logos' becoming incarnate is his becoming man. For in the Logos' becoming man there is the atonement of the eternal Person of the divine Logos and of the finite person of man, of which the term anthropos is the hall-mark. For this atonement means the renewal of man's personality which is personal only in its gracious relationship to the Logos.

This atonement is not, however, solely one of persons. For it involves activity in the essential realm, as the phrase he somatike genesis (9) suggests. We say "in the essential realm" because Athanasius did not recognise a substantial alteration in the divine Logos' nature in the incarnation, as we shall see. Indeed, this startling phrase, for startling it is, given that Athanasius never thinks of the Logos becoming a body, points to the Logos' incarnation being his immediate entry into the originate world, created by himself from nothing.

That the divine Logos' becoming man did not constitute either his then coming into existence, or his then undergoing a change in respect of his divine nature, is stressed in C.Ar. 2.

That the incarnation did not constitute the beginning of the Logos' being is clear from the fact that the forming which the Logos underwent for man's salvation, according to Prov.8.22, signified not the beginning of his being, but the incarnation (10). That the incarnation did not mean the coming into existence of the Logos is then worked out in several areas, all of which confirm the above statement. The Logos is the Creator God. He therefore necessarily pre-exists all that which comes into being through him, and of which his assumed,
creaturely 'body' is an essential part. Again, although flesh is necessary for man's existence in that he cannot exist in abstracto, the Logos did not assume flesh in order to exist but in order to sanctify the flesh (11). It follows therefore that the divine Logos was not dependent upon the assumption of flesh for the beginning of existence. Rather, even as God, when he becomes a God and a defence to those to whom he has promised to be a God, does not then become God more than before, nor then begins to become God, but what he ever is, that he then willingly becomes to those in need, so Christ, also being by nature Lord and eternal King, "does not become Lord more than he was when he is sent forth, nor then begins to be both Lord and King; but what he is ever, that he then is made according to the flesh" (12). For the incarnation did not constitute a beginning of being of the Logos, but the beginning of the revelation of his Lordship, and its extension even over the disobedient (13). This same point is again made in a rather interesting comparison of the Logos' becoming man with Aaron's becoming high priest. For working upon the basis that the Old Testament is a foreshadowing of the New Testament, Athanasius argues from the life of Aaron to that of Christ. Aaron did not come into being when he became high priest. Rather, being man, and remaining the same, he put on his high priestly robes and took up his office (14). Thus the "became" of "became high priest" referred not to his existence, but to his ministry. In the same manner, the Logos did not come into being when he became high priest for men. "For he did not become other than himself on taking flesh, but was the same." (15). For the "became" and "was made" of the Logos' becoming and being made high priest refer not to his essence, but to his ministry as high priest, brought about by his putting on soma to geneton kai poieton which he could offer for us (16). It is clear therefore that the incarnation did not constitute the coming into existence of the Logos, but only the beginning of his redeeming ministry wherein he revealed himself as Lord and Saviour to men.

Nor did the incarnation constitute a change in the being of the divine Logos. "For being the Son of the true God, he remained immutable and unaltered in his human economy" (17); "the Son is faithful, being ever the same
and unchanging, deceiving neither in his essence nor in his promise" (18). 8.30 meanwhile reads 'he did not become other than himself on taking flesh, but was the same as before'. Nor is this merely a nominal doctrine mentioned where Athanasius' attention is drawn to its necessity. Rather, it undergirds Athanasius' incarnational theology at several points: even as the comparison of the Logos' becoming man's high priest with Aaron's becoming Israel's shows that the coming into being of neither was implied in their election to their respective priesthoods, so it also reveals that their election did not mean their alteration in nature. For even as Aaron was truly man before he became high priest, and remained truly man even when he took on his priestly office, so the divine Logos was truly God before he was made the high priest of mankind, and did not become other than himself in taking the flesh, but remained the same, remaining truly God while fulfilling his priestly role. Again, the use of the continuous present in such clauses as "being the Lord" (19), with its connotation of eternal immutability, suggests the continued existence of the divine Logos in his incarnation. This suggestion seems corroborated by the facts that the Logos incarnate was "not merely man, but God in a body, still being the same Lord" (20), and that even when made man, the Logos was the same yesterday, today and forever, being unchangeable by nature (21). Several incarnational phrases similarly point to the divine Logos' not having undergone an essential alteration in his incarnation. Both the phrase "as man" and "in man" are alternative ways of referring to the human economy of the divine Logos in such a manner as to stress the impassibility of the Son of God. For the Logos remains God while truly acting "as man" or "in man". Certainly the first of these two incarnational phrases is not aimed at suggesting that the Logos incarnate was docetic, the Logos merely appearing "as man". Nor does the second suggest Nestorianism, the Logos being merely "in man". For both of these two possible interpretations are excluded by the ever-repeated 'the Logos became man'. The use of schema in reference to Christ's humanity-"Jesus, whom you saw in the shape of a man" (22)-makes this same point. The use of
'schema' naturally reflects Phil.2.8,"and being found in human form", a passage which is treated in C.Ar.1. Yet the use of 'schema' goes further than merely recalling Phil.2.8. Its use is intended to take into account the fact that the Son of God was not changed into man in being sent by his Father to mankind, but that he rather remained truly himself, while still being found in the form of man. The intention is not to call into question in any way, or to water down the reality of Christ's humanity, but to draw attention to the fact that while the Son of God became man, he never became man and nothing more, nor even man indwelt by the Holy Spirit and nothing more, as though he had ceased being truly God in his becoming incarnate. Statements such as 47.10-12,"hearing, the Logos became flesh, we do not conceive the whole Logos himself to be flesh, but to have put on flesh, and become man",make the same point. The Logos did not undergo a change in divine nature by altering into mere flesh in and through his incarnation, as is clearly stated. Indeed, this point is stressed further in the latter part of this clause, "to have put on flesh....". For there we see that while the divine Logos had become man, he was yet distinct in his divinity from the humanity with which he had clothed himself.

The divine Logos therefore did not undergo either a coming into existence, or a change of nature in and through his incarnation. This was partly because the Logos "is", while the creaturely, of which the Logos assumed humanity, "becomes". For the Logos in the Godhead exists in himself eternally, while the creature, which is originate, is contingent and temporal, existing only in as far as it participates in the enlivening grace of the divine Logos. Given such, the non-contingent Logos necessarily precedes the contingent creation. Moreover, in that the world of "becoming" exists only in and through that of "Being", the realm of "Being", the divine realm, cannot be impaired through its contact with that of "becoming", the originate realm, while the latter can be improved by contact with the former. Hence, the incarnation of the divine Logos necessarily entails a saving entry of the non-contingent Logos into the contingent world, but in which the divine Logos cannot undergo either a coming into existence, or a change of nature. Indeed,
if the Logos did undergo any change of divine nature, and so cease to be the eternally non-contingent creator Logos of God, the preservation and salvation of the contingent world would cease to be. That the divine Logos of God underwent no such alteration is also partly due to the point of reference of the verb 'to become'. For this verb does not refer to the divine Logos. For while this verb is used of the Logos, it is not spoken of him as if to imply that he was a creature or wholly originate (23). For it was not used of the divine Logos, of whom the verb 'to be' is proper (24). Rather, being peculiar to man, the verb 'to become' is seen as signifying not the Logos' essence, but his having become man (25), and his redeeming high priestly role which was made possible by the assumption of a soma to geneton kai poieton (26). The Logos' becoming man therefore has its point of reference in the saving economy in his originate humanity, and not in his eternal being. It therefore does not imply an essential alteration in the Logos' divine being.

Since the divine Logos underwent no change in becoming man, but remained eternally fully divine, it follows that the divine Logos underwent no belittling, nor any bettering in and through his incarnation. It is clearly stated that the divine Logos was not limited in and through the incarnation. "For the assumption of the flesh did not enslave the Logos, who by nature is Lord"(27). Indeed, just as the being of the Logos was not impaired in his becoming man, so his acting was not hindered. For his act is in a sense his being. For he acts in accordance with his nature, and his nature is known in his act, the one existing in and through the other. Therefore, the incarnation meant no more and no less than the revelation of the eternally immutable and omnipotent Creator Lord through the veil of the assumed humanity: "though having become man, he experienced no loss by that human passion, but rather, in being made man, he is manifested as Lord of the living and the dead"(28).

Similarly, being fully God, and remaining such while truly becoming man, the Logos necessarily was above any bettering as a result of the Incarnation, a point greatly stressed in C.Ar.1. Hence Athanasius can truthfully say that the divine Logos became man not on account of himself but for our salvation. He therefore became man not for
his own benefit, but for mankind's.

Despite the fact that the divine Logos suffered no diminution in his divine being or act through his incarnation, he did endure self-humiliation. Most common as descriptions of this self-humiliation are those which are drawn from Phil.2.7, "he emptied himself, taking the form of a slave", and which echo the same,"being the Lord, he was in the form of a slave"(29). This humiliation was not, however, one imposed upon the Logos from without. For the willingness of the Logos to undergo this humiliation is seen from the fact that the Logos himself is the subject, as well as the object of this humbling:"the Logos taking upon himself this condescension and assimilation to the works of creation"(30).

Like other aspects of the incarnation, this self-humiliation is seen in its soteriological context. Indeed, the saving purpose of this humiliation is made clear in such clauses as,"the Logos' condescension to the creatures, according to which he has become the brother of many" (31), and the humiliation,"undertaken that we might forthwith know his loftiness and his majesty, which is the Father's"(32), the latter of which still implies that the Logos was humbled only in and through his human economy, in himself being still the eternally omnipotent Son of the Highest.

The third group of incarnational phrases which deserve consideration are those which describe the Logos' assuming something from without to himself. The Logos put on flesh (33) or a body (34). Consequently, the divine Logos bore flesh (35) and was robed in it (36). Having taken flesh (37) or a body (38), he was said to have flesh (39) or a body (40). In short the assumed flesh and body was now his (41).

Central to the understanding of the humanity which the Logos assumed is the fact that it is essentially one with man's creaturely humanity. Thus, while it was born of the ever-virgin Mary, it was man's humanity. Consequently Christ's humanity was like man's. For the Logos had become like men through his incarnation. It was therefore creaturely, the humanity having been especially prepared by the Father for the Logos, the Logos having thus been made man. Related to the fact that the Logos' humanity was created is the fact that while 7.16-17 notes
that the assumed flesh was from the earth, the passage continues "having Mary for the mother of his body as if virgin earth". This does not amount, however, to a contradiction. For the points of the two clauses are different. That the assumed humanity was 'from the earth' is in line with the meaning of it being 'creaturely', namely that it shares in the creaturely weakness of man's nature, created from nothing. The point of the second clause is the revealing, albeit indirectly, of Christ's peculiarity. For not only was he born of a virgin, but also he was a second Adam, the first Adam having been created from the untilled earth of the Garden of Eden.

All in all, therefore, Christ's humanity was genuine, being one with mankind's.

Before we pass on to the fourth group of incarnational descriptions, we ought to consider the verbs used to describe the relationship of the divine Logos to the assumed humanity. These verbs are of four main kinds; there are those which convey the idea of being clothed in humanity, namely the verbs enduesthai, ependuesthai, endiduskesthai, peritheinai, periballein and kaluptesthai. With these must be connected the verb phorein. There are then the verbs of taking, lambanein, proslambanein and analambanein. Thirdly, there is the verb of having, echein, and finally those of creating, poiein and ktizein.

The image of being clothed with humanity, as we have already seen in relation to the verb enduesthai, does not imply that the incarnation was thought of as docetic by Athanasius in any way whatsoever; it does not bring into doubt the reality of either the subject of the clothing or the clothing itself. Indeed, in non-incarnational contexts in the C.Ar.2. the same verbs are used where the point of issue is not the uncertainty of the subject of him clothed, or of the clothing, but the natural distinction between the two. Thus, for example, Aaron put on the ephod, breastplate and robe; he was clothed with the high priestly robes. Moreover, periballein is used in 10.37-38 to state that man cannot exist in abstracto, but must be clothed in flesh, "men being clothed in flesh, in order to be and to subsist". There is therefore not any intention here of suggesting that man is docetic, and not truly fleshy. Nor does this
image point to any uncertainty in the intimacy of relation between the divine Logos and his covering of humanity. For this image of clothing must be understood in the light of the qualifying incarnation statement that 'the Logos became man', with which the clothing metaphor is very frequently connected. This metaphor, drawn originally from Scripture, rather implies the putting on, or the assumption of, that which is not natural to him who is the subject of the assumption. Thus it is used in a non-incarnational context in connection with the clothing of mortal and corruptible man with divine grace: "being clothed with immortality and incorruption" (42), and in an incarnational context of the immortal and incorruptible Logos with a mortal body. Further, the verb functions to distinguish the clothed and the clothing, while yet preserving the closest connection between the two, as is necessitated by the Logos' becoming that flesh. Only once is ependuesthai used in C.Ar. 2., "the Lord having put over himself our flesh" (43). Here, even more so than with the other verbs of clothing, the distinction in unity in the incarnate Logos is maintained. For the addition of the prefix epi- stresses that the assumed humanity was not natural to the divine Logos, but was that taken from without to himself.

Of the verbs used to describe the Logos' being clothed in flesh, the verb kaluptesthai is most likely to suggest that the assumed flesh is but a veil to the divinity of the Logos. For in 7.6 - 8.18, a passage to which we have already but very briefly referred, Athanasius argues that just as Aaron put on the robes of his office as high priest, so the divine Logos put on the flesh of his high priestly role. The point of the passage, however, is that just as Aaron was a man prior to his becoming high priest, and continued to be man when he had become such, so the divine Logos was the divine Logos of the Father before he became man's high priest in his human economy, and remained the divine Logos even when fulfilling this high priestly role. The point of the passage is not therefore the reality, or otherwise, of the humanity, or of the Logos' relation to it. Aaron was the same, and did not change by putting on his high priestly robes of his office, 'but remained the same, only being robed' (44); he was man, and continued to be man even
when he became high priest, the verb "became" here not referring to his being, but to his ministry. In the same way, the divine Logos did not come into being, nor become other than himself on taking flesh, "but was the same, having robed himself with flesh" (45), his "becoming" high priest similarly not referring to his divine essence, but to his ministry in the originate world. Indeed, Athanasius draws out the parallelism between Aaron and the Logos to such an extent that even as Aaron was clothed with the robes that marked his high priesthood, so the Logos was clothed with the flesh which signified his more perfect high priesthood. Yet in neither case is the reality of the insignia of the two priesthoods in any doubt.

Kaluptesthai is used, not to suggest docetism, but to signify the immutability of the divine Logos in the Incarnation. Through this verb the distinction of the subject and the object of the incarnation is therefore maintained, that their distinct and full natures might be retained. Indeed, herein lies the thought that was later to be expressed in Chalcedon as "one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, make known in two natures without confusion, without change...."

Similarly, the comparison of the Logos' having put on man's flesh with a man's putting on a cloak in 52.13ff. is not meant to suggest that Christ's humanity formed but an envelope for his divinity. For, again, the point of the comparison is to demonstrate that the incarnation did not constitute either a coming into existence, or a change of nature of the divine Logos, and not to comment upon the relation of Christ's humanity to his divinity. For if a son were sent by his father to rescue some servants who had, through their own carelessness, fallen into the hands of enemies; and if he were, before setting out, to put on like dress to the servants', and were to fashion himself like them, lest the capturers, recognising him as the master, should take flight and so prevent his descent to those who were hidden under the earth by them; if then he were to reply to one asking him why he did the above, that "thus my Father formed and prepared me for his works", he would not have intended this reply to be seen as implying that either he was a servant, or one of the works, or that he had just experienced the beginning of his existence. Rather, he would have intended the
reply to have been seen within the context of his mission of rescue. In the same way, the Logos put over himself our flesh, and was found in the form of a man, and having therefore said "the Lord founded me the beginning of his ways for his works", meant this to be understood of his mission of salvation, and not as signifying either that he was a work or that he had just come into being.

The point of this passage therefore is to show that statements like Prov.8.22 ought not to have been referred to the being of the Logos, but to his soteriological mission. Indeed, if this passage, which finds its paradigm in Scripture, says anything about the Logos' incarnate state, it says that even as the son identified himself totally with those whom he was sent to save, so the Logos identified himself with men.

The point of the incarnational clause "the Logos assumed flesh" is much the same as that of the clothing metaphor. It stresses the essential distinction between the creator Logos and his assumed creaturely humanity. Yet, unlike the clothing metaphor, in which there is a feeling of intimacy within the essential distinction of the Logos and his humanity, the lambanein formula emphasises the distinction more than the union. This emphasis is brought about by both the distinction implicit in the incarnational statement in which there is a divine subject who takes, and a human object which is taken, and by the use of the prefix pros- in proslepsis tes sarkos and in the verb proslambanein (46), a prefix which stresses the distinction, and which therefore fulfils much the same function as the epi- of ependuesthai. Through this distinction between the divine Logos and the humanity which is naturally external to him, but which became a possession of his, Athanasius maintains the immutability of the Logos in his becoming man.

Yet, for all this distinction implied in the above Christological clause, the implication of union is not absent. For it is naturally present both in the verb "to assume", and in the fact that the Logos takes this naturally distinct humanity to himself, therein effecting the miraculous union of the creaturely and the divine.

analambanein, a cognate of the above, also maintains the distinction of the assumer and the assumed. Yet it seems to point moreover to the saving identification of
the above two. For in taking up man's nature, the Logos raised it up again to God whence it had fallen. The prefix ana- seems therefore to have the same force as that prefix in the soteriological verbs anakainizein, anaktizein and ananein.

The clause 'to have a body', like the clothing metaphor and the clause 'to assume a body', also emphasises the distinction of the divine Logos and the assumed humanity, thereby stressing again that in becoming man, the Logos did not undergo an essential alteration.

The incarnational clauses poieisthai anthrōpos and ktizesthai anthropos are both lifted from three verses studied in C.Ar. 2, namely Prov. 8.22, Acts 2.36 and Heb. 3.2. Like gignesthai, the verbs refer to the human economy: "when he put on human flesh, then he is said to have been created and made" (47). Certainly, these verbs cannot be referred to the divine Logos, as though implying that he was made or that he had experienced a beginning of his being through his creation. For "'to be made' is peculiar to man" (48). Hence, the two verbs in question, poieisthai and ktizesthai, point to the Logos' involvement in the creaturely realm: through his assumption of humanity, the Creator had become one with his creation. Thus "'he was made' must be understood as if the Logos, being Framer of all, afterwards was made High priest, by putting on a body which was made: therefore he is said to be made" (49).

Not only, however, was the verb 'to be made' fittingly applied to the Logos' human economy in terms of his assumed creatureliness, but it was also understood in terms of the revelation of the divinity of the Logos. For through reference to Acts 2.22, and through close attention to the actual wording, Athanasius deduced that 'he made' in Acts 2.36 was synonymous with 'he manifested'. Hence that "God made him (sc. Jesus) both Lord and Christ" is taken to mean that through the acts of Christ, and especially through his passion, God has shown Christ to be not merely man, but God in a body, and Lord also, the Christ" (50). From this it is therefore clear what the true nature of the incarnate Logos was. For in becoming man, in entering into the creaturely world, the Logos did not cease to be God which he was eternally. For the
incarnation, the Logos' being created man, did not constitute the Logos' beginning to be, but the beginning of the manifestation of his Lordship, and its extension even over the disobedient.

The fourth group of incarnational descriptions concerns the Logos' human economy. Having come upon man's humanity (51), the Logos indwelt man's flesh (52) and was in flesh (53) or a body; he was found in the likeness of man (54). It was in this respect therefore that the Logos was created (55); he was said to have been created bodily (56). Consequently, having come into being according to the flesh (57), the Logos walked this earth as man (58); he died and rose again as man (59). Thus it was that salvation was effected in the flesh (60). For God revealed himself in a man (61); he manifested his rule bodily (62), or humanly (63); he received the condemnation of man through the flesh (64); he destroyed the Devil in the flesh (65). Thus in his humanity the Logos became the foundation of the Church and the Vine of which Christians are the branches. All these, it must be noted, are said of the divine Logos humanly in that he has become man, and are not said of the divine Logos as they, being human activities, cannot be said of God who is not as man (66).

Christ's humanity, here described mainly as 'flesh' and 'body', but occasionally as 'man', is the medium in which man's salvation is effected; it is that in which both the revelation of God to man, and the redemption of man from the grip of the Devil to the freedom of God is achieved.

The adverbial phrases 'as man', 'humanly' and 'bodily' merely qualify those events and actions which belong peculiarly to Christ's humanity, and which are totally alien to his eternal divinity. The phrase 'according to the flesh' and 'according to the humanity' have much the same point. They may best be understood as meaning "as a man" or "so far as his humanity is concerned". For they relate to the Logos' assumed humanity, over against his eternal divinity. By using these, Athanasius implies that the fact of Christ's humanity, in respect of which what has been said is true, is not the whole truth about him. "The origination of the Son" or "the creation of the Saviour" are valid descriptions of the Logos so far
as they are applicable, but the reach of their applicability is not coterminous with the fullness of the person of the divine Logos. This, however, is not say that 'according to the flesh' defines the Son's origination, or the creatureliness of the Saviour as something belonging only to his earthly, historical life. For so to interpret them is to impose upon them, quite unjustifiably, a meaning inconsistent with the truth of the resurrection of Christ. For belief in the resurrection of Jesus necessarily involves, for Athanasius, the belief that, as the risen and exalted Lord, he still possesses the same human nature, albeit glorified, as he assumed in the Incarnation. Hence 'according to the flesh' and 'according to the humanity' refer to Christ's human nature, and not solely to his earthly life.

Of those Christological phrases which describe the incarnational state of the Logos, we have already treated 'in the form of a man' as revealing that the Logos did not undergo any alteration in his divine being when he became man. The phrase 'in the flesh' and 'in the body' make the same point. Although sounding rather Apollinarian, they are not. For their sense is qualified by the Johannine Christological formula, 'the Logos became flesh'. Rather, these phrases assert the Logos' relation to the creaturely aspect of man's being, maintaining that within this relation 'in the flesh', the Logos continues to be distinct from the humanity in which he is, and therefore that he was not converted into flesh as the Johannine formula might suggest.

Closely tied in with the idea that the Logos was 'in the flesh' is the idea that he indwelt the flesh. Although this verb can be used to describe a human soul's indwelling its body (67), in Christian literature it is more often used to describe God's taking up his abode in man (68), or the Holy Spirit's indwelling people (69). Given Athanasius' particular feeling for Scripture, and his understanding of Christ's humanity, a matter to which we shall soon turn, 'to indwell the flesh' would therefore seem to point to the divine Logos' indwelling of creaturely humanity, to the former's dominion over, and lasting connection with, the latter, and yet to the essential distinction in unity of the indwelling Logos and the indwelt flesh.
Given the Logos' indwelling of his humanity, it is easy to understand his indwelling "amongst men" (70), a thought that echoes John 1.14. For the Logos indwelt men in that the Logos indwelt the flesh, through which (71) men were like Christ.

The last statement that we must consider here is 76.9: 'the Logos who came into our flesh', which ought to be compared with 71.25: 'the Father has made me into flesh, that I might become man'. This latter clause is not an anthropological clause. For the clause appears in a passage whose intention it is to show that Scripture deliberately says that the "Lord created me eis erga" in Prov.8.22, in order to make clear that he who was created was not one with creation. To say eis erga there therefore is akin to saying 'the Father made me into flesh, that I might become man'. That, however, is not to say that the Logos was a 'work'. For even as he who enters into a house is not part of that house, but is other, than the house, so he who is created eis erga is by nature other than the works. The point of the statement of 71.25 is therefore to maintain the essential distinction between the divine Logos and the humanity which he became. Meanwhile 76.9 appears in a soteriological context, according to which man's salvation was dependent upon the Logos' coming into our flesh and being created in it a beginning of ways for his works.

epibainein eis therefore is not meant to be interpreted in a particularly physiological manner. Rather, it but conveys the idea of the divine Logos' taking control over the flesh upon which he comes, in order to effect in it man's salvation.

The fifth and last group of incarnational descriptions of the Logos are those general titles of the Logos "as man", most of which are taken from Scripture, and all of which have a Scriptural sense. Having become man, the Logos is the Vine, of which men in Christ are the branches; he is the foundation upon which those in Christ become a temple of the Holy Spirit, who indwells them; he is man's brother, not in his divine nature, but in and through the act of incarnation. For when he put on creatureliness, and became like man in his body, he became the brother of men. The Logos as man became man's
guide, in that he led men to the kingdom of heaven, and to his heavenly Father. Finally, the Logos as man was the first begotten. This he was only in his incarnate existence, in his self-humiliation by his assumption of temporal and mortal humanity. For in the context of his eternal generation of his Father, the Logos was the eternally only-begotten.

Athanasius entitles Christ both 'first begotten' and 'the first-begotten of creation, of many brothers, and of the dead': Christ is 'first-begotten' in the unqualified sense, in that while all flesh was lost in and through Adam, the flesh of the Logos, in that it was the divine Logos', was saved. As such, it was the first of others to be freed, men subsequently being incorporated in the Logos' humanity and therefore being saved through it. The Logos was the first-begotten of all creation not in the sense that he was essentially one with creatures, and yet the first of them in time. For, as the divine Logos, he was other than creation. Rather, the Logos was the first-begotten of creation, not in the passive sense of the epithet, but in its active sense. For he was such because of the Father's love towards men through which the Logos both created and recreated the whole universe. For the Logos created and sustained all; indeed, originate objects could not have endured the Logos' nature, which was the untempered splendour of the Father, unless the Logos, in the Father's love, had supported them, had taken hold of them and had brought them to existence. Further the Logos recreated the originate world, delivering it from corruption to liberty in God through his adoption of it in and through the incarnation. Christ was also the first-begotten amongst many brothers because of the likeness of the flesh of Christ to men's and the consequential kinship of men's and Christ's flesh. Finally, Christ was the first-begotten or the first-fruit from the dead, not because he was the first of men to die, but because, having undergone death for men, Christ destroyed it and was thus the first to rise from death. He having risen from death, men also rose from him and on account of him. They rose, however, only on account of him, and therefore after him.

Just before we pass to the question of the reality, or otherwise, of Christ's humanity, we may delay a moment
to consider what appears to be two fundamental aspects of the Christology of C.Ar.2. For here attention is drawn to both that which the divine Logos becomes in himself, and to that which the divine Logos assumed from without himself as a possession. For while the divine Logos can, and does, become man, he cannot take, put on or have man. Meanwhile, the Logos can, and does, have a body, having taken it, or having put it on, but he cannot become a body. As regards flesh, this the divine Logos can become, as the Johannine Christological formula suggests; he can also, however, take, put on and have the same. It would seem therefore that for Athanasius the Logos can be something in himself, and the Logos can assume something to himself, the first "something" being 'man' and 'flesh', understood in a Johannine sense, and the second "something" being 'flesh' and 'body' (72). These two aspects of Athanasius' Christology become more meaningful, however, in the light of Athanasius' understanding of man. As we have already noted in our study of the CG-DI, man existed under two aspects. He was corporeal, having a limited and creaturely body which bound him essentially with the whole of creation. Yet he was also rational through his participation by grace in the divine Logos, and therein was distinct from the rest of irrational creation. Given these two aspects of man, one corporeal and the other logical, we can understand the particular use of the verbs in Athanasius' Christology. Man's rationality, to which Athanasius often points with the term 'man', is a gift of grace, being a true participation in the divine Logos. Consequently, man's rationality cannot be a human possession, an object which man has of himself. Thus, it cannot be said, in a Christological setting, that the Logos assumed, or had, 'man', 'man' being still the dynamic sharing in the divine Logos. Since, however, 'man' is this dynamic gift of grace, the divine Logos can properly become it. For such is the divine Logos becoming logical, the Image of God becoming 'in the image of God'; it is a not improper internalising of the divine Logos in his becoming man. Man's corporeality, of which the body is the hall-mark, is his essential sharing in creatureliness. In that it is other than the Creator Logos, it can be an object to be possessed by the Logos, and therefore it is
reasonable for Athanasius to assert in his Christological statements that the Son assumed or had a body. It is not reasonable, however, for the Alexandrian to assert that the Logos became a body. For such would have been to suggest that the Creator became creation, that God underwent a change in his nature in his incarnation, and that the essential distinction of Creator and creature, so central to Athanasius' theology, was broken down. 'Flesh' meanwhile finds itself in an ambivalent position. For it corresponds with 'man', which the Logos becomes in himself, and with 'body', man's creatureliness, which he assumed to himself. This ambivalence is, however, understandable. For in flesh being frail and weak creatureliness, it is naturally connected with 'body'; in and through its use in John 1.14 it is, however, understandably related to the man which the divine Logos becomes.

The question of the reality of Christ's humanity must be considered in two spheres, the natural and the physiological. By the natural, we mean the essential oneness with the rest of creation; was Christ's humanity naturally one with all other men's? By the physiological we mean the completeness of Christ's humanity; was Christ's humanity physiologically one with men's?

The answer to the question as to whether Christ's humanity was genuine naturally must be affirmative. For the humanity was man's. Through his becoming man, he became like men. For in his incarnation the divine Logos received ta hemon (73), the oneness of nature between Christ and men being stressed in the subsequent clause, "we being incorporated and compacted and bound together in him through the likeness of the flesh"; in becoming incarnate the Logos, like us, himself took part in flesh and blood (74), a thought which obviously stems from Heb. 2.14-18, with its stress upon the essential creaturely oneness of the man Jesus and men. Further, in becoming man, the Logos became man's brother and first-begotten. 'Brother', as we have seen, is not an anthropological term. It points rather to the covenant fellowship between, and the spiritual brotherhood of men and Christ, both effected through man's being in Christ. 'First-begotten' continues the same train of thought. Christ was the first to die and the first to rise again for all. To call Christ man's
brother and first-begotten, however, is meaningless if Christ is different from mankind. Hence to give these terms their full meaning, it is necessary to assert that the man Jesus was one with all other men. That Christ's humanity was genuine is further stressed in two other areas. Athanasius asserts in Ch. 70 that men would not have been freed from sin and its curse unless the flesh which the Logos put on was by nature human (75). For otherwise man would not have had anything in common with the divine Logos, who essentially was other, and from whom salvation came. In other words, Christ's humanity was one with those whom he had come to save. The second area concerns Athanasius' rejection of certain relatively insignificant errors of some heretics in 43.25ff: "these errors lie against the truth in some certain respects, either erring concerning the Lord's body, as if he did not have flesh of Mary, or as if he did not die at all, nor became man, but only appeared; and he was not truly, and seemed to have a body when he had not; and he seemed to appear as a man, as visions in a dream...". All these heterodoxical positions support docetism, a theology in which the incarnate Logos has no true, passible human nature which is one with men's. Given therefore that these statements are recognised by Athanasius as heterodoxical, and that Athanasius is trying to maintain an orthodox position, it is reasonable to suppose that Athanasius held the contrary of these views. Hence he believed that the Lord had flesh of Mary, that the Logos wholly became man and that he truly had a body.

According to Athanasius therefore Christ's humanity is genuine in nature. It was therefore created and made. Having been taken from the earth, it shared in the common weakness of all animate creatureliness. It was frail and weak and consequently mortal. The only difference between Christ's humanity and men's was that while the latter suffered from sin, the former was sinless. That, however, did not affect the picture of the assumed humanity. For as we have already seen, Athanasius thought of sin as an action, and not as a state natural to that creatureliness created of the good God.

Athanasius does describe Christ's humanity as to anthropinon on occasions (76). This might be seen as bringing into doubt the reality of Christ's humanity in
that it seems to point to an abstract and universal concept, which is philosophically more important than the particular human being who exemplifies and embodies this universal. Yet, to see this term as pointing towards a docetic Christology would be un-Athanasian. For not only does Athanasius not hold with the philosophical idea of the universal having a prior and independent existence of its own, over against the particular, the anthropinon, in this particular case having its existence only in the concrete and particular person who exists in God, in Jesus, but also to anthropinon is to be understood in the light of the much more frequent incarnational statement 'the Logos became man', "man" being a particular individual. The term to anthropinon does not therefore introduce any idea of Christ's humanity being in any way docetic. Rather it seems to be a bridge between the terms 'man' and 'body' both in terms of grammar and of meaning. For the root of anthropinon naturally points to anthropos, while the form suggests to anthropinon soma. In this general term therefore we have both the idea of the individuality of the Christ, in and through his being "in the image"of the divine Logos, and yet his bond with all men; for it is not according to the nature of the divinity, but according to his humanity that men are knit into the divine Logos. In that respect therefore his humanity is not that which isolates him from his neighbours, but that which binds them together in their creaturely society. Here in the one term, therefore, we see both the intensive and the extensive humanity of Christ.

The statement of 66.31-32, the perfect Logos of God put around him an imperfect body could equally be seen as suggesting that Christ's humanity was somehow docetic. This, however, would not be right. For the assumption of an imperfect body does not impair the perfect and sinless being of the Christ. For by 'imperfect' is meant only a lack of immortality and a path to Paradise (77), which is, in short, an absence of grace. Nor indeed, is this wanting of grace a state of sin, but the result of an act of sin, but an act of sin on the part of man and not of Christ, the turning by men from God, the source of all grace. The assumption therefore of an imperfect body is not the assumption of a docetic humanity by the Logos, but his essential identifying of himself with man in his plight.
of mortal corruptibility. It is the assumption of man's mortality that he might recreate it in the enlivening grace of the Father.

We turn now to the question of whether or not Christ's humanity was complete physiologically. As we have already noted in earlier chapters, this was not a central question for Athanasius. For C.Ar. 1-3 are concerned primarily with Christ's divinity, and not his humanity; again, the anthropological terms in Athanasius are to be seen in the light of their theological setting, 'body' and 'flesh' pointing to the essential oneness of a person with the rest of creation, and 'man' and 'soul' to the relation of a person to the divine Logos. However, there are clues to the answer of this question. The Christ was man's 'brother' and 'first-begotten'. If we are to give these terms their full meaning anthropologically, we must admit that the Logos assumed a full and real humanity. For otherwise the Logos incarnate would differ from other men, and therefore would not meaningfully be men's brother and first-begotten. Again, the humanity assumed by the divine Logos was a human body or human flesh. Hence that assumed was not merely man's body over against an animal's. For 'body' and 'flesh' are not understood primarily in this sense by Athanasius, they both being that common creatureliness in which both men and animals share. Rather the distinctiveness of the human body or human flesh is theological. According to the CG-DI that which distinguishes man from the irrational animals is not his creatureliness, but his rational soul, his being graciously in the image of God. Hence, for the assumed body to be human, as opposed to irrational, it had to be rational. Hence the body which the divine Logos assumed is like men's in both its relationship to creation and its relationship to God. Again, when the Logos became incarnate, the Logos of God put on flesh and became man (78). This sentence does more than merely summarise the mystery of God's becoming man. It also serves as a bulwark against Arianism. For it represents the kai sarkothenta kai enanthropesanta of the Nicene creed, whereby the Arian tenet that the Logos took flesh only, without a human soul, was excluded (79). Athanasius preserves the same polemical point in the above incarnational statement. Meanwhile, the Logos assumed a body like ours; he was made similar to fellow men in all
aspects. This the Logos became when he became man: "he was made like (men) when he became man, having put on our flesh" (80), a description of the Incarnation which again is reminiscent of the Nicene clause which excluded the Lucianic denial of Christ's human soul. Hence, it seems that the Logos became man like men when he became fully man. Finally, 47.10-12 is essentially concerned to stress that the divine Logos did not undergo an alteration in his divine being in becoming flesh. However, in maintaining this position, Athanasius delivers an interesting interpretation of John 1.14: "hearing the Logos became flesh', we do not conceive the whole Logos himself to be flesh, but to have put on flesh and become man." John 1.14 is therefore to be interpreted in the Nicene fashion; it is not to be understood as meaning that the Logos assumed an irrational body, but a human body or rational body.

It seems therefore that as in C.Ar.1., so here, Athanasius still counters the Arians' denial of Christ's human soul in the Nicene manner.

Of equal interest to this question is 70.39-1, which asserts that "we would not have been delivered from sin and the curse, unless it had been truly human flesh which the Logos put on. For we should have had nothing in common with what was foreign." In other words, man's salvation depended upon the divine Logos' assumption of a truly human flesh. This phrase, in the light of the thought of CG-DI and of the anti-Lucianic phrase of the Nicene creed, makes Christ's full humanity theologically important to man's salvation. Here we find a statement, although not expanded, of the importance of both Christ's rational soul and his body for man's salvation. Without his having the former, man has nothing in common with Christ in the realm of rationality; without his having the latter, man has nothing in common with Christ in the realm of creatureliness. Without, however, anything in common with Christ, men could not be in Christ and therefore be saved.

There are hints therefore in the C.Ar.2 of Christ's human soul being both a physical and a theological factor in Athanasius' theology.

The incarnation meant not only the entry into space by the divine Logos, but also his entry into time. Thus the eternal Logos, who is beyond time, entered into time, as the temporal clauses such as 9.24 "then he was made
like (men) when he became man" and 13.4 "even before he became man" suggest.

As in the CG-DI, so in C.Ar.2, Athanasius still maintains that the Logos did not become man as a consequence of his nature, but by grace.

During Athanasius' exposition of Prov. 8.22, he states that "when the Logos became men, he then assigned the reason why he took flesh" (81). Underlying this statement is the thought that the divine Logos is self-sufficient and totally free, and that it is only in his becoming man that this self-sufficiency becomes qualified; thereby he enters into the contingent world. It follows therefore that there was nothing in his self-sufficiency that requires him to become a part of the contingent world through his incarnation; he does not become man as a result of his divine nature. Rather, that which causes the divine Logos' becoming man lies outside his divine being, and within the human and contingent realm.

This same point is made again in 10.37-39: "men are clothed in flesh in order to exist...; but the Logos of God was made man in order to sanctify the flesh." In order to exist therefore, the Logos did not require to be a part of the contingent and creaturely realm. Hence the Logos' becoming a part of it resulted not from his incorporeal and immaterial nature.

It is clear therefore that the divine Logos did not become man on his own account. Rather the cause of his incarnation lay in men: "the need of men preceded his becoming man, apart from which he would not have put on flesh" (82); he was made man for us (83). While, however, the divine Logos would not have become man but for the need of man, men did not have in themselves the ability to coerce the Logos to become incarnate. Rather the act was an act of grace, worked for men's benefit. "The Logos, in grace towards us, became man" (84); he effected it through his own free will and in his own mercy: "the Logos of God, who loves men, put on created flesh at the Father's will" (85).

Thus, just as the original creation came into being through the perfect goodness and mercy of God, so the recreation, or salvation, of man occurred through the benevolence and graciousness of God. Perhaps, however, the clearest parallelism in motivation between the creation
and the recreation of man by God lies in Di.3 and C.Arist. 2.77. For even as God was the very source of goodness and so could not but create the cosmos, so God, "being good, ...being always good" (86), willed man's recreation and salvation.

We turn finally to Athanasius' understanding of man's salvation as outlined in C.Arist. 2. Soteriology, for Athanasius, is a trinitarian event. For the Father wills the Son to become man that the gift of the Holy Spirit might be secured for all men in Christ. It is also a predestined event. Basing his thought upon such passages as Eph.1.3-5 and 2 Tim.1.8-10, Athanasius believed that the saving incarnation of the divine Logos was predestined, a predestination whose cause was both kindly and wonderful. For it was not fitting for God to devise man's salvation subsequent to his creation. For otherwise, God would appear not to have known what was about to happen to man; had man's salvation not been ordained beforehand, God's omniscience would have appeared endangered. Thus God formed man through his Logos; yet he also foresaw that although created good, man would in time transgress his will, and therefore be expelled from paradise. Being loving and good, and not wishing to begrudge men their existence, God therefore prepared salvation for men in and through their Creator, the divine Logos. Therefore, once having fallen, men did not remain in death, but rose again and remained immortal, their salvation and redemption having been predestined in the Logos.

Having given this outline of the predestined salvation of mankind, Athanasius turns to certain points connected with this subject, and which arise from the two biblical passages, Eph.1.3-5 and 2 Tim.1.8-10. Firstly, men were elect even before they came into existence in that they were represented in him beforehand; they were predestined to adoption even before they were created, in that the divine Logos, who was "founded before the world" had taken upon himself that economy on man's behalf; they had an inheritance predestined for them in that the divine Logos was eternally destined to take, for man's sake, upon himself through the flesh all that inheritance of judgment which would lie against men, and so bring about their becoming sons of God in Christ; they received grace "before the world began" in that the grace later given to man was
stored in Christ from eternity. Secondly, Athanasius reiterates that it was right and proper that man's salvation should have been predestined in the eternal God. For God foreknew that man's weak nature would need help and salvation, and it would have been unfitting for the Father, who was eternally good to refuse to give this succour. Moreover, even as the wise architect who proposes to build a house, consults about repairing it lest it should become dilapidated after its having been built, and even provides the means of repair should the need arise, so God founded in Christ man's recreation even prior to man's existence.

Thus man's salvation, according to Athanasius, was one whose will and purpose was prepared before time, but whose effect only occurred when the need arose, and when the Logos came amongst men to meet that need (87).

For the salvation of men to be effective, two conditions were necessary: of paramount importance, the Logos had to be truly God; again, the Logos had to become truly man of men.

That the Logos was essentially divine is Athanasius' main point of argument with the Arians. Its importance for man's salvation, however, Athanasius stresses in several passages. None other but the Lord was able to be the source of man's salvation. Indeed, salvation, or deification, would be secure, and true man would be united to true divinity only through the divine Logos' becoming incarnate. For had it not been the divine Logos who became man, man would not have been made capable of divinity, as it was only the Logos of God who had in himself the power to bestow divinity.

Certainly, had the Logos been a creature alone, man's salvation would not have been effected. For a creature could not recreate creation; "for a creature could not join creatures to God, itself seeking one to join it; nor could a portion of creation have been creation's salvation, it needing salvation itself..."(88). Moreover, had the Saviour of men, the Logos, been a creature, man would have been ever in peril of death. For being caught in the endless battle between the creaturely Son and the creaturely Devil, man would have had none in whom and through whom he might be saved both from the fear of
death which stems from the Devil, and to live eternally in holy communion with God.

Thus it is clearly true that for Athanasius man would not have been deified if he had been joined to a creature; he would not have been saved unless the Son was truly God; he would not have been brought into God's presence unless the subject of the incarnation was naturally and truly the Father's Logos; and he would not have been made divine "unless he who became flesh was naturally of the Father and was his true and peculiar Logos..."(89).

It follows from the above that man therefore could not have effected his own salvation. For in the original creation men had been unfaithful to God's holy will, and hence had brought about the fall of creation. In the face of such weakness, it was necessary therefore to find someone else to renew the original creation, and to preserve intact this new creation. Again, man, being a creature, would not have been able to rejoin man to God. "For how had a work been joined to the Creator by a work? or what succour had come from like to like, when one as well as the other need it?"(90)

Thus, mortal men could not undo God's sentence, nor remit man's sin, both being works of God's doing alone.

It was not, however, sufficient for this divine Logos to effect man's salvation from without the human sphere. For while it would have been possible for God to have recreated man in the image of God merely through his creative word, such was not expedient. Rather his becoming man was the only means of effecting man's salvation which would have been both profitable for man, and fitting. For had God but undone the curse upon man by his creative fiat, man would have been released from that curse. Yet he would have become only a second Adam, such as Adam was before the Fall, in that he would have received grace from without, it not being united to the body; he would have become even as he had been when initially placed in Paradise, if even that, he having then learnt to transgress God's will, a lesson which he had not experienced in his initial creation. Moreover, his salvation would not then have been secure. For had he been tempted again by the Serpent, he would have yielded, and thus, remaining under guilt no less than before, man would again have stood in
in need of God to undo yet again the curse of sin unto death through his divine fiat. Indeed, as often as he sinned, so often would he stand in need of forgiveness. Under such a method of salvation man would have remained ever in danger of being enslaved to sin and never free from sin; moreover, being in themselves flesh, they would have been worsened ever by the Law on account of the weakness of the flesh.

Given therefore that salvation effected externally to man's limited realm was not satisfactory, the divine Logos, the source of man's new life, entered into the creaturely realm. The divine Logos became man. Yet, even then, had the Logos not become truly man, man would not have been saved; he would not have been freed from sin and the curse unless the flesh which the Logos put on was truly human. For otherwise man would have had nothing in common with what was foreign; there would have been no point of contact between man in need of salvation and the Saviour, the divine Logos. Indeed, this point of contact is central to Athanasius' understanding of salvation. For in the Logos' assuming man's flesh, man became united to the Logos through the kinship of the flesh. By the divine Logos' assumption of human categories, men were incorporated, and compacted and bound together in him through the likeness of the flesh. Thus the divine Logos assumed through man's flesh all that inheritance of judgement which lay against men, and man shared in Christ's resurrection and eternal life in God, abiding immortal and incorruptible. In short, Christ's humanity is that whereby the divine Logos, the Life of God, identifies essentially, and securely, with men, and thereby man shares fully in God's grace.

This same point, which incidentally echoes the thought of DI.44, is made again in Ch.56, even though under a different guise there. For Athanasius states that "if he was not created for us, we are not created in him; and if not created in him, we have him not in ourselves, but externally..."(91). For if the Logos was not created for man, he would have remained but a teacher for men, and sin would not have lost its reign over man's flesh, being inherent, and not cast out of it. In fact, however, the Logos was created for us. Hence, through his indwelling the flesh, sin was perfectly expelled from it, and men
received a free mind. In Ch. 56 therefore the centrality of the divine Logos' essential identification with man in and through his assumed humanity for the security of man's salvation is again stressed.

The identification of the divine Logos with man through the creaturely body is again emphasised in Ch. 61. The Logos is "like man in respect of the body; he is man's brother on account of the likeness of body". (92). Therefore as the body is the means of the divine Logos' identification with men, so it is also the medium of his grace to men. Thus through it came the revelation of God, and the salvation of men. In short, the humanity of the divine Logos was one with men's, but in its being the Logos', it was saved. Yet in that man's humanity was essentially one with Christ's, man's humanity was saved in Christ's. "Christ's flesh was saved and liberated, as being the Logos' body; henceforth, we being incorporated with it, are saved after its pattern". (93).

It seems clear therefore that for Athanasius the source of salvation was the essentially divine Son of God. Equally, it seems certain that the outworking of this salvation had to take place in intimate communion with creaturely man. For this reason therefore the divine Logos had to become fully man for all men. For in the incarnate Logos, man's salvation was guaranteed. Here therefore Athanasius gives a fuller meaning to the entitling Christ's humanity to organon.

As in the CG-DI, so here Athanasius still sees man's salvation as being twofold; it is the renewal of man's knowledge of God, and the redemption of man from the mortality and corruption natural to him, to a life in God.

As a result of man's foolish wilfulness, he became ignorant of the true God, preferring the non-existent to the Truth. God, however, was not willing for this to continue. Thus God, "in pity and desiring to be known by all, made his own Son to put on a human body and become man.....that in this he might deliver all from false worship and corruption and might himself become Lord and King of all". (94). The same point is made in 16.10-11,"in being made man he is manifested as Lord of the living and the dead.". Thus was the renewal of man's knowledge of God effected.
Two points must be made with reference to this renewal in the knowledge of God: the Logos did not merely effect a glorious theophany in his self-revelation. He revealed himself in mercy, in a manner which men could bear, and therefore appreciate, the Logos having become one with those to whom he was revealing himself, and in such a way that not the Father but men, who were truly men only in their cognitive relationship to the Father, might benefit. Again, statements such as 14.7, "he did not make him simply man, but made him that he might be Lord of all men", are not to be seen as suggesting that the Father's lordship was in any way whatsoever dependent upon the world. For 14.7, and like statements, are concerned with the revelation of God's lordship, and not with his statements, are concerned with the revelation of God's lordship, and not with his nature. "For the Christ, being by nature Lord and King eternal, does not become Lord more than he was at the time he is sent forth; nor then does he begin to be Lord and King. For what he is ever, that he is then made according to the flesh". (95).

In other words, the Logos' lordship was not dependent upon the recognition of it by man; for he was Lord eternally. 14.7 therefore means that God's lordship was revealed through the Incarnation in such a manner that men recognised it, and rightly and willingly submitted to it. In and through Christ men were brought to a right realisation of their true and glorious position as servants of the true lord; they were brought to assenting to the eternal kingship of God, which was his naturally from eternity.

While it is the same Wisdom of God who formerly manifested itself through its own image in creatures, and who more recently revealed itself, and in itself the Father, in its becoming man, the subsequent self-revelation was more certain. For formerly God willed to be known through a shadowy image of wisdom which was in creatures. Now, however, the Father had made the true Wisdom to take flesh itself, and to reveal the Godhead therein, that by faith in him, all who believe might be saved. Incidentally, it is worth noting here that while from elsewhere it is clear that salvation is open to all men, this passage seems to suggest that only those who truly respond to God's redeeming activity towards man will be saved. Here again
we have evidence that Athanasius does not accept universalism.

When treating Christ's salvation of man, Athanasius in fact concentrates upon man's redemption from his corruptible mortality.

Man was originally created perfect and complete by God. However, through man's sin in Adam, he was expelled from Paradise, paradise being synonymous with joyous communion with God; he was found wanting, that missing from man being immortality, and the path to paradise; he became dead through his sin.

Although such mortality was man's rightful reward for his transgressing of God's will, God was not willing to leave man in this state. For it was unfitting that this work of God should remain imperfect. Therefore the divine Logos, through his love for men, humbled himself and became man. The perfect Logos of God assumed man's imperfect body. Through this assumption, the Logos therefore took upon himself the mortality and the curse upon man, without, however, himself becoming mortality, or curse and sin. This flesh, which he had assumed, the Logos then offered to death. In that the assumed humanity of the Logos was mortal, God the Logos died in it. In, however, that the body was that of the divine Logos, it rose again, being liberated from death. Thus the very flesh which through transgression the first Adam put to death, the same flesh the Logos, the Second Adam, made alive.

The Logos' raising his own body had far-reaching consequences. Men, who were incorporate with it, were saved after its pattern. Thus since Christ offered his assumed humanity to death on behalf of all who were liable to death, all men died through it and the sentence was completed. For in receiving on behalf of all men all the inheritance of judgement against them, the Christ paid the debt in their stead. In and through Christ's resurrection, men were raised; they were freed from sin, and given a free mind. Moreover, the Christ perfected what was missing to man, namely immortality and the way to paradise; in Christ men attained unto the perfect man and remained immortal and incorruptible. For he had been in the Image of God, and his flesh had been sanctified by its receiving the gift of the Holy Spirit. In short, the Logos incarnate recreated man capable of godhead.
As a result of the redemption of man in Christ, man's relationship with God became more intimate. For in and through the Logos' dwelling in men, the Creator God became "Father" to them; in their receiving the Spirit of the Son, men became children of God. Moreover, in the divine Logos' becoming man, the divine Creator of man became man's brother. So the reconciliation of God and man was effected.

As we have seen, man had become imperfect through his transgression of God's will and was recreated unto perfect manhood, having been perfected in Christ. Considering that Athanasius asserts that man had been created perfect originally and seeing that he was recreated perfect in Christ, one might suppose that man had merely been restored as he had been made in the beginning. Yet one would be wrong to suppose such. For man had been recreated meizóni charití (96). For having risen from the dead, men no longer feared death, but in Christ reigned in the heavens. For whereas originally man had feared death, the grace of God, namely the Law, which protected him from it being external, now man no longer feared mortality, the protective grace of God being internal. For God had made that grace inseparably man's through his taking flesh and bestowing grace upon it in Christ.

A few brief points, which arise from Athanasius' understanding of the atonement of God's being and men's, remain to be noted. As in his earlier works, so in C.Ar.2, Christ's humanity is seen in both its intensive and its extensive aspects. It is Christ's personally, taken to be the organ in and through which the salvation of all other men is effected. Yet it is also that humanity in which all men are, in which all men die and in which all are exalted. Again, the divine Logos incarnate is he who frees man from sin and from the bondage of corruption. He it is who gives man true freedom. This freedom is, however, not an abstract freedom. It is a freedom with responsibilities. For it is a freedom to God, and is consequently the enigmatic freedom to serve man's true Lord, God. In C.Ar.2 Jesus Christ was again both High Priest and victim, he offering himself in his sacrificial death to his Father for all men. Christ was not, however, eternally High priest, but only everlastingly. For being the Logos eternally, he was later made high priest. As
high priest, Christ was supreme. For whereas under the Law there was a succession of high priests, Christ's high priesthood was without transition or succession; he was the faithful high priest, remaining for ever. Similarly, Christ's sacrifice far outpassed those of the period of the Law. For the latter were effective for the cleansing of the guilt that arose from a particular wrong doing. Yet their effectiveness passed away with time, new wrong-doing requiring new sacrifices to effect the cleansing from guilt. Christ's sacrifice, however, was piste. For having happened once, it perfected everything, and remained for ever (97), not coming to nought. Lastly, man's salvation was not solely a passive event. He did not merely receive the grace of salvation automatically. Rather, as we have seen, although salvation was available to all, it was effected only in those who believed in Christ; for in judgement each man shall receive according to his works. In other words, for Athanasius, to be in Christ was not merely a passive and receptive state. Rather, it was an activity by all in the strength of God's grace. It included an outward, active confirmation of one's state of being saved in Christ.

As in the CG-DI, so in the C.Ar.2., Athanasius allows the various theological passages to dictate the use of the various Christological formulae. Thus while Athanasius was speaking in the CG-DI of the Logos' revelation in creation, or his death, Athanasius referred to the Logos' doing so in his assumed body, it being that which particularly pointed to the Logos' sharing in man's creatureliness and mortality. Similarly, when the Alexandrian was speaking of the Logos' healing of man in the image, he referred the healing to the Logos' becoming man, 'man' being the hall-mark of man's participation in the Image of God. While this fitting of particular Christological formulae to suitable contexts exists in the C.Ar.2, it is not as obvious as in the CG-DI. This is partly because the C.Ar. 1-3 are more concerned with the Sonship of the Logos than his incarnate state, and partly because Athanasius is eager to qualify the individual statements regarding Christology, and thus to exclude either the belief that the Logos altered in his eternally divine nature in becoming man or flesh, or the denial of
the Logos' assuming a rational human soul in his assuming flesh or a body. Yet the fitting of Christological formulae to particular contexts does exist in the C.Ar. 2. Athanasius uses such clauses as "the Logos assumed a body" to maintain the essential distinction between the Creator and creation, 'incorporeality' being the hall-mark of the Creator God, and 'corporeality' that of creation. Again, Athanasius uses body and flesh, the latter in its substantial sense, in the context of Christ's death (98), the Logos dying only in and through the mortality of man's creatureliness. Further, 'body' and its cognates are used both to emphasise the oneness achieved in the Incarnation between the immaterial Creator Logos and the material creation (99), and to explain the Logos' creation in respect of his assumption of human creatureliness (100). 'Man', with its personal overtones, is also used in fitting contexts. For when wishing to concentrate upon the fullness of the human personhood of Christ, Athanasius uses the Christological formula 'the Logos became man' in order to qualify other Christological statements which are ambiguous upon that subject.
CHAPTER 3.

Footnotes

1. 10.25 cf. 53.7; 60.3
2. 67.9, 10 cf. 77.34-35
3. 8.21-22. cf. 8.1-2; 51.34-35; 68.15, 16, 19; 69.41
4. 6.24; 12.1. cf. 9.25-26; 45.18-19; 51.37-38; 53.10-11; 75.9-10, 39
5. 6.24; 55.23-24; 72.9 cf. 10 -21; 66.12, 14
6. eg. 1.27-28; 4.14 cf. 53.16-17
7. 1.6; 69.41-1
8. eg. 1.29; 7.33; 8.36 cf. 67.16
9. 67.16
10. 53.7
11. 10.38-39
12. 14.19-21
13. 12.30-32
14. 8.23-29
15. 8.30
16. 8.33-34 cf. 1. C.Ar. 63-64
17. 6.22-24
18. 10.14-15
19. 10.39
20. 12.19-20
21. 10.23-24 cf. Heb. 13.8
22. 16.6 cf. 52.25
23. 5.18 cf. ib.30; 8.31-32
24. 8.37-38
25. 11.17-18 cf. 8.38-39; 11.16
26. 8.33-34
27. 14.10 cf. ib.21
28. 16.8-11
29. 10.39 cf. 1.33; 14.9
30. 51.38-39
31. 62.39-40
32. 10.28-29
33. 7.36-37 cf. 9.25, 29-30; 47.11; 52.24; 65.26
34. 8.33-34 cf. 14.39; 47.20; 66.31-32; 74.31-32
35. 54.7 cf. 66.10; 63.3-4
36. 8.31
37. 7.16-17 cf. 8.30; 66.17-18; 69.1
38. 10.2-3; cf. 44.10; 70.32-33
39. cf. 43.37
40. cf. 43.39; 55.25-26
41. 61.25; 65.30; cf. 12.7; 55.13; 61.25; 66.33; 69.3
42. 69. 7-8
43. 52.24
44. 8.24
45. 8.30-31
46. 14.10; 66.17; 70.10
47. 61.14-15 cf. 14.6
48. 8.38-39
49. cf. 8.31-35; 12.1, 6; 47.19-23
50. 12.19-20
51. 76.9
52. 53.27; 56.1; 61.9 cf. John 1.14
53. 10.35-36 cf. 12.19; 15.36-37; 16.39
54. 16.6 cf. 52.25; Phil. 2.7
55. 66.15-16 cf. 14.21
56. 67.18
57. 53.18
58. 8.39-40
59. 61.31-32
60. 70.12-13; 76.10
61. 16.16
62. 52.32
63. 52.33
64. 76.36
65. 69.19 cf. Rom. 8.3
66. 35.8
67. eg. Josephus. Bell. 6.55
68. eg. 2 Cor. 6.16
69. eg. Rom. 8.11; 1 Tim. 1.4
70. 61.9
71. 74.17
72. G.D. Dragas. "egeneto anthropos" Theologia (Athens) 1976
73. 74.32
74. 9.22 cf. 55.27 ff.
75. 70.39-1
76. 4.15; 12.6; 18.25
77. 66.34-35
78. 67.26-27 cf. 9.24-25; 14.37; 47.11-12; 52.24-25; 54.7-8; 61.12; 67.25-26
79. cf. Epiphanius. Ancor. 33
80. 9.23-24
81. 54.6-7
82. 54.8 cf. 56.15-16
83. 11.9 cf. 47.21; 55.2
84. 61.18
85. 7.15-17; 65.25-26
86. 77.24
87. 77.33-35
88. 69.38-40
89. 70.2-3 cf. ib. 35-37
90. 67.28-30
91. 56.25-27
92. 61.22 cf. ib. 20
93. 61.24-26
94. 14.37-3
95. 14.18-21
96. 67.22-23
97. 9.38
98. eg. 7.18; 14.39
99. cf. 6.24; 10.21; 61.19; 70.32-33
100. eg. 10.3; 47.20; 66.32
CHAPTER 4.

CONTRA ARIANOS 3

C.Ar. 3 is very like C.Ar. 1-2 in its purpose. It sets out principally to counter the Arian threat to the traditional trinitarian thought of the Church, and their removal of the essential distinction between the divine Creator Logos and the creaturely cosmos. It is true that unlike the C.Ar. 1-2, C.Ar. 3 treats of certain of the Gospel references to the human passions of Christ. Yet C.Ar. 3 does not treat them for their own sake, as it might have done, had it been a work particularly concerned with expounding Christ's humanity. Rather, C.Ar. 3 treats the Gospel references to the human passions of Christ, by the misinterpretation of which the Arians ranked in creation him by whom the creation was made and so separated the unity of the Father and the Son, in order to safeguard the true divinity which the Logos shared perfectly with his Father. By attributing Christ's mutability and passibility referred to in the incarnational verses of the Gospels to the human economy of the Logos, C.Ar. 3 preserved intact the immutable and impassible Logos in his divine economy. It seems therefore that Athanasius, in answer to Arianism, sets out in C.Ar. 3 to preserve the unity of the Godhead, and to maintain the distinction of the divine Creator and creature, by attributing the various Christological verses of the Gospels to the appropriate economies of the Logos, either divine or human.

It follows from this that Athanasius is not therefore attempting in C.Ar. 3 to establish an anthropology for the incarnate Logos. He only treats of Christ's humanity as a means to an end. Hence while we must remember in our study of Christ's humanity as portrayed in C.Ar. 3 that the subject of our research is but a means to an end for Athanasius' work, we may yet, with care, study that means.

As throughout the earlier books of the C.Ar., so here the divine Logos of the Father is the subject of the incarnation. He who became man is always God, the Son, the Logos, being both the effulgence and wisdom of the Father, as witnessed by all of the divinely inspired Scriptures.
As the divine Logos, the Son of the Father, the Lord, he is incorporeal, the mark of the true Godhead; he is eternal and immutable as the use of \textit{aei} and of the continuous present tense of \textit{einai} in such phrases as \textit{aei on theos} (1) suggests; he is he who orders the cosmos in accordance with the Father's will through his providential creation. Being the creator of the universe, he is dissimilar from originate beings, but similar to the Father (2), being proper to the Father's essence. The subject of the incarnation is therefore really and truly one with his own Father.

It was this divine Logos of the Father who became man, an incarnation which is described variously. To these descriptions we now turn. For ease of presentation, and no other reason, we shall use again the form of presentation adopted in our earlier studies of \textit{C.Ar. 1 and 2}.

In the most general sense, the Incarnation of the divine Logos was described as the enfleshed presence of the Saviour (3) and as the sojourning of the Logos (4), wherein the divine Logos sojourned amongst men in order to effect their salvation, the soteriological motif being particularly clear in 39.38ff and 39.3ff. \textit{epidemein} is also used in 30.28, in reference to heterodoxical Christological thought. For there Athanasius warns his readers not to believe that as in former days the Logos came upon the various saints so even now he came upon a man. \textit{epidemein eis} is here used as a synonym with \textit{eis anthropon elthe} and \textit{eis hekaston ton hagion egeneto} (5), and as opposed in meaning to \textit{anthropos gegone} (6). \textit{epidemia} and its cognates therefore seem to have their point of reference in the divine Logos, and not so much in his assumed humanity; they seem to describe the sojourning of the eternal Logos in the sphere of time and space - a sojourn which, as it itself suggests, was not consequential upon his divine nature - rather than to expound the particular relationship of the divine Logos to the man whom he became by entering into the sphere of time and space. The description of the incarnation as the enfleshed presence of the Logos and the sojourning of the Logos have both been met before in \textit{C.Ar. 1 and 2}. That of the incarnation as the human ministry of the Logos (7) is new to \textit{C.Ar. Leitourgia} brings with it the idea of pious service rendered to God, and to the community of man. For it encompasses both the
cultic sense, drawn from Old Testament usage, and the idea of doing things which are related, not to private concerns, but to the national community as a political unity, an idea especially prevalent in Homeric thought. The term therefore picks up the idea of Christ being the Priest of God acting for the salvation of mankind.

More particularly, the incarnation is described as the divine Logos' becoming something in himself. He became man (8); he became the Son of Man (9). For he had become human, having endured human generation (10). The incarnation is also spoken of in the Johannine manner; the divine Logos of the Father became flesh (11).

Central to Athanasius' understanding of the Incarnation is the belief that the divine Logos broke into the originate realm in a unique manner. When he became man, he truly became man. He did not merely enter (12) into a man (13) or merely effect an epiphany (14) by coming upon the man Jesus as he had formerly upon the saints and prophets (15). Rather in becoming man, the divine Logos experienced true becoming; he himself entered into the originate world of becoming.

Nor need the phrase hote gegonen eis auto (soma) (16) cause us to doubt the reality of the Logos' becoming. There is here no intention whatsoever to deny the true becoming of the Logos by a suggestion of latent Apollinarianism. For, as we have already seen, Athanasius asserts that the divine Logos became man, and did not enter into a man, and it is in the light of this that we must understand 39.40-41. Again, gegonen eis auto (soma) is paralleled by the phrase tes eis ten sarka kathedou (17), the latter phrase being qualified in turn by the Johannine Christological formula "the Logos became flesh" (18). Indeed, the clauses "when he came into it (sc.body), then he received those things from the Father" and "those things which he says that he received when he became flesh" (19) are virtually synonymous, with the latter ruling out a literal, and Appollinarian interpretation of the former. Indeed, "body" is one of the anthropological terms which Athanasius does not use as a complement to the verb "become" in any Christological statements; he never asserts that the Logos "became a body", since such a statement is open to the heterodoxical idea that the divine Creator Logos ceased to be Creator through
an essential alteration in his nature in being made a creature. Given therefore that \textit{gegenen eli} is a form predetermined in this context by particular theological considerations, one ought to be wary of taking too literal an interpretation of this formula. It seems better therefore to interpret the clause in terms of the Logos' self-abasement, effected in his coming down to man's frail flesh. Such would fit in with the use of \textit{kathodos} in 39.1. Moreover, the expression introduces an ironical tone which befits the anti-Arian polemic. For, by the use of this phrase, Athanasius makes the Arians assert the rather foolish statement that the Logos humbled himself in order to better himself through receiving the Father's benevolence. Moreover, this interpretation of 39.40-41 preserves the magnanimous feeling of the incarnation itself. In a manner very reminiscent of Phi.2., the great Pauline \textit{Carmen Christi} which Athanasius so often uses, this passage then asserts that the All-glorious Son humbled himself even unto men's mortal flesh in order to meet men in the depths to which they had brought themselves, and in order to exalt men in himself to the very presence of his Father, their Creator.

In truly becoming man, the divine Logos became true man. For in becoming human, he became one of men, and shared in their frail creatureliness. In becoming man, he became like us, being weak, needy, corruptible and mortal. He became passible, the passions themselves being confirmation of the reality and non-docetic nature of the assumed humanity. Through the Logos' becoming man, he bore and shared man's infirmities; men's passions became his through his being bound together with all men in their common frailty. Thus it is clear that the divine Logos truly became one with the creaturely realm which was opposed, essentially, to him through the incarnation. For he became one with creation in his assumption of "human flesh, it being whole with the affections proper to it." (20).

The incarnation of the Logos therefore seems not to be docetic on the natural level. Given this, therefore, it seems that we ought not to interpret \textit{ta hemon emimesato} of 57.4-5 in a literal fashion. This supposition is confirmed by a consideration of the context of this clause; for Athanasius notes in 57.2f that it was not proper for
men's flesh to be corruptible and to remain naturally mortal. Therefore the Logos put on that flesh and thus rendered it incorruptible. It is this thought of which 57.4-6 is an explanation, as the "for..." of 57.4 reveals. For even as he, namely the Logos of 57.3, who was in man's creatureliness "imitated our condition", namely the putting on of man's mortal and corruptible flesh, so men received of him and partook of that immortality which is from him. In the light of 57.2-3, "imitated our condition" must therefore be seen in terms of the Logos' putting on man's corruptible and mortal flesh. Further, the balancing 57.4-6 will not allow the verb 'imitated' to be understood in a docetic fashion. For the sense of 57.4-6 is that even as the divine Logos was in man, and hence shared in humanity, so man was in the divine Logos and shared in his divinity. Man's true indwelling in God was therefore dependent upon the true indwelling of the divine Logos in man; God's coinherence in man effected man's in God.

'Imitated' must therefore be understood as not casting doubt upon the reality of Christ's humanity. This can be done, however, without forcing the sense of the verb. For in Heb.13.7, for example, we read "imitate the faith". The verb 'imitate' does not call into question here the reality of that imitated. Rather, it points to the making one's own the faith of those being imitated in all its force. 3 John 11 reads "do not imitate evil, but good". Here again there is no question of the reality of the evil or the good. Rather, 'imitate' points to the making one's own "the good". Even so in C.Ar. 3.57.4-5, where there is no reason to doubt the reality of "our condition", we ought to interpret 'imitate' in the sense of making one's own.

The verb 'imitate' does not therefore serve the purpose of casting doubt upon the reality of Christ's passions, as Richard suggests (21). It rather seems to serve the purpose of "form" in the phrase "having taken the form of a slave" and of "likeness" in the phrase "being in the likeness of man" (22). It points to the fact that the humanity was not naturally the divine Logos'; the human condition which the divine Logos imitated was truly his, in that he appropriated it, and yet it was not his as a consequence of his nature. Such seems to be the point
of the clause "he imitated our condition", and not the denial of the reality of Christ's human passions.

It is clear therefore that the Logos had a body, not in appearance, but in truth; Christ's humanity was not docetic in the physical sense. Yet despite such assertions, Athanasius never mentions Christ's human soul explicitly in C.Ar. 1-3. That, however, does not mean that Christ's humanity was docetic on the physiological level. For to assert that the Logos truly had a body is to assert that the Logos had a body, not in abstracto, but existing only in and through the Logos, in his creative act. Only there does it remain, and apart from the divine Logos, it would cease to exist (23). The assumed humanity participates vitally in the divine Logos. For Athanasius, however, man in his creatureliness, his body, is personal through his sharing in the Logos through the grace of being "in the image". Thus it seems that through Christ's body sharing vitally in the divine Logos, it becomes truly personal.

This conclusion seems to be confirmed by several other points. Through the Incarnation, the divine Logos became as we are, a comparison, the point of reference of which need not be limited to Christ's human passions alone. Then, to describe the incarnation Athanasius not only uses the laconic Christological clause "the Logos became man", but also the fuller "having taken flesh, he became man" (24), the similar "having assumed a body, he became man" (25) and their more abbreviated forms "a whole human flesh" and "a human body" (26). These Christological phrases recall the clause of the Nicene creed: sarkothenta kai enanthropesanta, which was included to exclude the Lucianic tenet, later taken up by the Arians, that the Logos had assumed a soulless body. Again, the assumed humanity was human; but it was so only in so far as it was 'in the image' of God the Logos (27). Hence, in saying that Christ's humanity was human, as opposed to that of the irrational creatures, one was making a theological statement, in asserting that the humanity was rational, and so personal. Again, according to ch. 30, the Christological formula "the Logos became flesh" was to be interpreted as "he became man". It seems therefore that Jn. 1.14 is to be interpreted in a Nicene, and anti-Lucianic
fashion, the clause "he became man" qualifying "he became flesh" even as 'enanthropesanta' of the Nicene creed qualifies 'sarkothenta'. Voisin, indeed, wishing to show that the anthropological terms 'flesh' and 'body' ought not to be understood literally in Athanasius' incarnational passages, but "comme des expressions consacrées par l'usage, servant à désigner la nature humaine du Sauveur" (28), invoked as his first reason for this thesis the fact that, with respect to John 1.14, 'the Logos became flesh', Athanasius remarked that it was the practice of Scripture to call man "flesh, it being the custom of Scripture to call man 'flesh'" (29). Richard is, however, probably right in seeing the above interpretation as being too absolute (30). For it is unlikely that by "it being the custom of Scripture" Athanasius meant that everywhere and always Scripture calls man 'flesh'. "Il est donc évident qu'il ne veut pas insinuer ici que chaque fois qu'il (sc. Athanase) emploiera le mot 'chair', il faudra l'entendre au sens qui'il a dans les textes cités de Joel et de Daniel, c'est à dire du genre humain". (31). While, however, we may agree with Richard against Voisin that the Christological use of "flesh" is not always to be interpreted as "man", we may still believe that 3 C.Ar.30 gives yet one more reason for asserting that the Logos became man in the fullest sense of man, understood in the sense of the anti-Lucianic formula of the Nicean symbol. Certainly the fact that the theme of ch. 30, that of the Logos becoming man, and his not entering upon man, is typical of the works "de tous les partisans d'un schéma christologique Verbe- sarx contre ceux du schéma Verbe-homme" (32), need not make one reject this Nicene interpretation of John 1.14, as though Athanasius must have been, on the basis of 3 C.Ar.30, a supporter of a Logos-sarx Christology. For whether or not the theme of Ch. 30 is typical of a Logos-sarx Christology, that theme is of utmost importance to Christian orthodoxy. For the Logos did not enter upon man, but became man. It is therefore within this latter context that we must understand 3 C.Ar.30.

Indeed, the supposition that 3 C.Ar.30 ought to be understood in this fuller, Nicene sense seems to be confirmed by the context of the passage. For this passage
critique à leur faire". (34) This Richard stresses by referring to Ch. 26-28, and especially by quoting: "if then he is an ordinary man as the rest, then let him, as a man, advance. This, however, is the sentiment of the Samosatene, which indeed you virtually entertain, though in name you deny it because of men" (35). This lack of difference between the anthropologies of the Arians and Athanasius stemmed, according to Richard, from the fact that Athanasius was "sion platonicien, du moins platonisant" (36). Accordingly, for Athanasius "l'âme spirituelle de l'homme a toujours été plus ou moins d'ange égaré dans la chair. L'idée d'un esprit fait par nature pour s'unir à un corps, si elle avait déjà quelques adeptes, était en tout cas fort peu répandue". (37). It was from this philosophical background therefore that "selon notre docteur, le Christ des Ariens était vraiment un homme et même un homme ordinaire puisqu'il avait apparemment perdu toutes ses prérogatives célestes. C'était un esprit incarné et cela suffisait". (38).

For Richard, this common Platonic anthropology of Athanasius and the Arians meant therefore that Athanasius recognised that the Arians' incarnate Logos was truly man, and consequently did not counter their denial of Christ's human soul, seeing their Logos as fulfilling the role of that soul. Indeed, Athanasius' reaction points to his not recognising a human soul in his own Christ.

With this position we must disagree.

For, on a general level, even when Athanasius says that the Arians conceived of the Logos incarnate as but a "man", he is thinking of "man" over against God. What is at issue for Athanasius is the divinity of the Logos, whereby man is redeemed. Had the issue been anthropological, Athanasius' general comment would have been telling. Given, however, that the cause of concern is Christ's divinity, this general treatment of the Arians' conception of man is not very important. On a more particular level, it seems that Athanasius did find fault with the Arian understanding of Christ's humanity. For some fifteen times at least Athanasius describes the Incarnation in the anti-Arian manner of the Nicene creed (39). Thus Athanasius does not recognise the Arian Christ as an ordinary, rational, or personal man. Again, while Athanasius may show occasional Platonic traces in his thought, and more often than not
was written against those who believed that "as in former times the Logos was used to come upon each of the saints, so now he sojourned in a man". To establish this, these men employed John 1.14, which allowed for the Logos to become the directive force of the flesh, which by implication of 3. C.Ar. 30, was understood literally. These men were hoi asebeis, a title often used of the Arians, who, on the basis of their view that the Logos merely appeared in a man, would ask of Christ "why do you, being a man, make yourself God?".

The title, hoi asebeis, the belief that the Christ was but man, and that the Logos but came upon man, that is flesh, all seem to point to the Arians.

It seems therefore that this passage was not only written against those who believed that the Logos only came upon man, but also, by implication, against those who thought that the Logos took the place of the soul in that man.

Athanasius' emphasis in 3 C.Ar. 30 therefore concerns the true becoming of the Logos. By implication, it is suggested that in "becoming" man, he did not take the place of the soul of the assumed flesh, but took flesh in becoming truly man. Becoming "man" therefore for Athanasius was more than the assumption of mere flesh; the Logos incarnate was more than the divine Logos and a soulless flesh. Hence we seem to have here an indirect denial of the Logos' assuming a soulless body.

Lastly, to assert with Grillmeier (33) that the divine Logos took the place of the human soul in the assumed humanity requires there to be not a becoming man by the Logos, but an entry into creatureliness. Yet it is the contrary that Athanasius maintains in 30.24-25: "he became man, and did not enter into man".

It seems therefore that the divine Logos became fully human: he mysteriously became human in all senses of that word. Moreover, it seems that Athanasius therefore did counter the Arians' denial of Christ's human soul.

Richard, however, not only denies that Athanasius refuted the Arians' denial of Christ's human soul, but also asserts that Athanasius believed that the Arians' Logos incarnate "était véritablement devenu homme et même qu'il avait tout à fait figure d'homme ordinaire. Autrement dit, du point de vue anthropologique, il n'avait aucune
these are but superficial traces, he does not believe that man was "une sorte d'ange égaré dans la chair" (40). For Athanasius, the human soul was not an object as Richard suggests. It was much more a relationship between God and man; it was man in his rationality, or "in the image", sharing by grace through the Logos, the Image of God. Further, the soul was not "égaré". It was distinct from the body; yet it was created for man by a good and benevolent God, and was thus proper to its body. Had it been "égaré", as Richard suggests, it would have created a theological problem for Athanasius, the good Creator being made the author of an improper creation.

Again, to suggest that Athanasius' anthropology was Platonic, and that the spiritual soul of man was "une sorte d'ange égaré dans la chair", is to suggest that properly the soul and the body belong apart, and that they will separate to their proper and respective states at death. For Athanasius, however, both in creation and in re-creation to a blessed post-mortem existence, the soul and the body are seen together. Indeed, for them to be apart is death, and to be united true living. It is not right therefore to say that Athanasius believed the Arian Christ to be "un homme ordinaire" because he saw man as an "ange égaré dans le chair". Indeed, Richard's argument here is rather prejudged. According to him, Athanasius was Platonic; he therefore believed that man was a soul imprisoned in a body, and that Christ was a Logos, who was divine, and not creaturely as the Arians suggested, bound in a body. Because, however, Richard has already judged Athanasius to be Platonic (41), he must necessarily decide that the soul of Christ, the subject of his enquiry, does not exist.

Finally, 51.17-21 does not assert that Athanasius accepted the Arian understanding of Christ's humanity. For this passage which Richard sees as asserting that Athanasius saw the Arian Christ as "un homme ordinaire", is a conditional, and not an absolute statement. If the Christ was "a man, as all other men," (42)...., if he was "an ordinary man as the rest" (43)...., he would be said to advance"as man.". He, however, was not such a man. He was rather God bearing flesh (44), the Logos who became flesh (45) and who had become man (46). He therefore advanced only in his human economy. One cannot base one's understanding of Athanasius'
conception of Christ's humanity upon a conditional statement which he then rejects. Nor can one derive a belief in Athanasius' acceptance of the Arian Christ as "un homme ordinaire" from such a statement. Rather, one must derive one's understanding of Athanasius' view of Christ's humanity from the various qualifications of that humanity, as we have above. Nor is it sufficient to take only the protasis of 51.16-17 or of 51.17-18, and to assert that Athanasius believed that the Arian Christ was a man as all other men, or an ordinary man as the rest. To do so is to forget again the very important point that one is basing one's argument upon a conditional statement which is later rejected. Moreover, the contrast in Ch. 51 is between Christ as a man and as God bearing flesh. It is therefore a theological contrast between Christ as a creature, and Christ as true God incarnate, between Jesus as man, just man and no more, and the man Jesus who is God incarnate, understood in a Nicene fashion, the Christological phrases of 51.17, 21, 22, 27 qualifying one another. To understand Ch. 51 in an anthropological and physiological sense is therefore forced, if not in fact illegitimate.

Final confirmation that Athanasius does not accept the Arian Christ as "un homme ordinaire" (47) comes through a comparison of 51.16-18 with 54.2-3. For the former "is Jesus Christ man as all other men, or is he God bearing flesh? If then he is an ordinary man as the rest...." is picked up by the latter, "if the speaker is mere man....; but if he is the Logos in the flesh...." For these similarly-used clauses demonstrate that "man as all other men" is understood as "ordinary man" or "mere man", over against "God bearing flesh", or "the Logos in the flesh". Yet it is clear that Athanasius denies that when the divine Logos became man, he became ordinary man or mere man (48). Rather, he became God incarnate (49). It seems clear therefore that in 51.16ff Athanasius did not accept the Arian understanding of the manhood of Christ. For not only did he assert the fullness of Christ's humanity in Nicene language, but he also defined the Arian Christ as altogether man from earth, and not from heaven (50) - a doctrine with which he disagreed clearly by stressing that Christ was from heaven (51).
Although therefore the divine Logos truly became man, he did not cease to be truly God; he did not experience either a coming into existence or an alteration in his divine nature in his incarnation. "For when he became man, he did not cease to be God; nor, since he was God, did he shrink from what is man's. God forbid. Rather, being God, he assumed flesh."(52). The same point is made explicitly in 32.25-27 where it is stated that when the natural and true Son from God became man, he was no less Lord, and God and Saviour. Such a becoming of the divine Logos in his incarnation is confirmed severally: the Logos did not begin to exist, or cease to be truly God when he became incarnate. For he was ever God, and is ever God, despite his incarnation, as 29.38 f:"he who was ever God, and is the Son, being the Logos.....became man" and 31.17:"always being God, he later became man", suggest. For the use of "always", of the present "is" in "is the Son...", and of "being God...", the continuous present participle, all point to the divine Logos' eternal impassibility and immutability, and stand in marked contrast with the perfect tense of "became...", which marks the true event of the incarnation which is now already a part of past history. Again, in becoming man the Logos did not become some ordinary man (53) or mere man (54). For God the Logos was not injured in becoming man; "being impassible by nature, he remains as he is, not being harmed by affections"(55). Again, it was not the divine Logos, but the assumed humanity which was bettered in and through the incarnation (56).

Because there was no coming into existence nor alteration in his divine being in the Logos' incarnation, it was the divinity which indwelt the flesh; because the divine Logos became man without ceasing to be very God, the Logos"received as man the power which he always has as God"(57), the Logos being both the man whom he had become, and also the eternal God whom he was eternally, as the perfect tense "received", in contrast with the present "always has", poignantly shows; because Christ was truly God, the Logos was still worshipped as Christ, being Lord, and not an originate thing, no ordinary man (58).

Indeed, the use of the Johannine Christological formula, the Logos became flesh, seems to point to the same conclusion regarding the Logos' becoming man. For
hearing it, one is not to believe that "the whole Logos himself is flesh, but that having put on flesh, he became man..."(59). Rather, the divine Logos truly became man while truly remaining God.

The other manner in which Athanasius explains the relation of the divine Logos to his humanity is that in which the humanity is seen as an assumption of something from without the Logos to himself. Thus the divine Logos assumed flesh or a body (60); he bore flesh or a body (61), for he had put on flesh or a body (62). Thus the divine Logos has flesh or a body (63).

Through this assumption, the assumed humanity became the Logos'. Thus he indwelt it; he was not outside it, nor the humanity outside the Logos. For through the incarnation came about a mutual indwelling of the assumed humanity and the divine Logos. "For he was very God in the flesh, and it was true flesh in the Logos"(64). This humanity which the divine Logos had assumed to be his organ was thus the temple of God.

These descriptions of the Logos' assumption of humanity convey, to varying degrees, the concept of unity in diversity, of the one Christ of two natures, human and divine; they maintain the distinction of the Logos who is, and the humanity which he has. For the Logos is God, while he has humanity, the divinity being natural to him, while the humanity is assumed from without. The incorporeal Logos stands over against the assumed creatureliness, body being the mark of creatureliness in its contrast with the incorporeal Creator. It follows, moreover, from this essential distinction that the assumed creatureliness was not natural, nor necessary, to the divine Creator Logos. Hence the Logos did not become man as a consequence of his divine nature.

While, however, the assumed humanity was essentially distinct from the divine Logos, it was his own. Indeed, the closeness of the union of the two is brought out in 31.32-33: "the body which in him (sc.Logos) bore them (sc. sins) was his own (autou idion) body" where idion cannot be interpreted as the casual equivalent of autou, without its becoming tautological with the preceding word. It must therefore be given its full meaning of "belonging to" and of "own".

We have already noticed with reference to 'body' that
the assumed humanity is that creatureliness which is essentially distinct from the divine Creator. That the assumed humanity is this common creatureliness in which all men share is confirmed in respect to 'flesh'. For Ch. 20 falls in that section of C.Ar.3 which deals with Jn. 17.11, and especially the clause "that they may be one as we are". It is there argued that men should learn from the invisible nature of the Godhead to live together in agreement. It should not, however, be argued from this verse that men are essentially one with the Father and the Son. For only like things are ranked with like, and the Logos is unlike men, but like the Father. Hence the Logos is linked essentially with the Father, and all flesh is ranked together in kind (65). Here flesh is therefore that common, uniting creatureliness of man. Moreover, Athanasius notes that it is the custom of Scripture to denote 'man' by the term 'flesh'. Indeed, "both Daniel and Joel call mankind 'flesh' " (66). Flesh here is therefore the equivalent of the human race; it is the common creatureliness which unites and binds together man with man. 'Flesh' is thus an alternative epithet for that common creatureliness which was essentially opposed to the divine Creator Logos, and which the Logos assumed to effect by the mystery of grace the atonement of creature and Creator.

Given therefore that the divine Logos assumed man's common creatureliness, his indwelling humanity meant his indwelling man. Indeed, by the Logos' making his humanity his 'temple of God', he rendered all men the temple of God.

With reference to the Logos' becoming incarnate through his assumption of humanity, there remain three topics to be treated, each of which if wrongly interpreted can give a wrong understanding of the fullness of Christ's humanity.

Athanasius uses the verb 'periballein' and its cognates (67) to describe the relation of the divine Logos to his assumed humanity. There is, however, no intention here of using any of these words in the Platonic sense of the body clothing the immortal soul. For the contexts will not allow this. In both cases Athanasius has re-phrased Jr.10.38 to fit the Arian controversy: "though you believe not in me, seeing me clad in a human body, yet believe the works, that you may know that 'I am in the Father, and the Father in me' " (68) and "if you do not
believe in me because of the clothing of the body, yet believe in the works, that you may know that 'I am in the Father, and the Father in me' " (69). If the Arians will not acknowledge the Logos as Logos, but seeing his humanity, suppose him to be a creature, they should look to his works, which witness to his divinity, and thus recognise that the Logos is in the Father, and the Father in the Logos. The contexts of these passages are therefore primarily theological. The assumed body is not that which stands over against the soul, but is Christ's weak creatureliness which stands over against the Logos' divinity. Indeed, even anthropologically speaking, the body is the human body or rational and personal. It thus seems better to understand 'to clothe' along the lines of enduesthai, being used metaphorically, and therefore not implying any docetism with regards to the humanity of Christ.

Christ's humanity is once described in C.Ar.3 as 'the temple of God' (70). This is not meant to suggest that the assumed humanity is but an envelope in which the divine Logos is. It is rather a title taken from John 2.19,21, and used to stress that the body of Jesus is the focus of God's power amongst men. Indeed, this epithet picks up the idea lying behind the verb 'to tabernacle' as used in the quotation of Jn.1.14 in 29.7 and 30.23-24. For that verb is related to the noun the tabernacle being the place where God was believed to make his presence felt.

In and through the incarnation, the assumed humanity became the organ of the Logos (71). This epithet is not an anthropological one, as Grillmeier implies (72), but a soteriological one. It does not therefore point to an impersonal Christology. Indeed, according to 31.19 that humanity which the Logos uses as an organ is the body which the Logos had as a result of becoming man, the 'he becoming man' qualifying 'he had a body', after the manner of the anti-Arian Nicene creed. Moreover, it was to anthropinon (73), humanity which was rational, and therefore personal, which was the Logos' organ. The humanity of Christ was rather "the organ of Wisdom or the operation and the shining forth of the godhead" (74). Yet it was not merely the medium of an epiphany, but also that through which soteriological acts were effected, which in turn witnessed to the divinity of their agent, the Logos. Indeed, not
only was the humanity not solely the medium of revelation, but it was properly not such solely. For the incarnation was more than a mere epiphany; it was a becoming man for all.

The incarnation of the Logos is further described in terms of Christ's human economy. In that the divine Logos appropriated to himself the creatureliness of man's flesh by the transference of man's weakness to himself, he hungered and thirsted as man or in the flesh; he suffered as man, humanly, or in the flesh; he was ignorant as man, humanly, or in the flesh, and therefore asked questions as man, humanly or in the flesh. He was afraid as man, humanly or in the flesh. The Logos, however, also received of God's grace in his human economy. He developed in grace as man, humanly or in the flesh; he received power and glory from the Father as man, humanly or in the flesh; and he was exalted as man or in the flesh.

It is in respect of the Logos remaining eternally God, while yet becoming truly man that Athanasius views Christ in terms of this human economy, over against his divine economy, as God, divinely or in his divinity. Thus while as God, the Logos is beyond the finite and creaturely world in his person and power, being the impassible Son, one with the Father in being and act, as man the Logos is limited and weak, sharing totally in man's creatureliness.

To Athanasius' mind, the recognition of these two economies of the divine Logos incarnate is not the result of the imposing a later view upon an earlier biblical thought; it is not the result of reading Scripture in terms of his particular presuppositions. For Athanasius believed that the scope and character of holy Scripture witnessed to these two economies of Christ. Indeed, while not quoting all the available Scriptural passages in support of these economies, he refers to Gen.1.3, 6, 26, Jn.1.1-3 and Phil.2.6. as pointing to Christ's divine economy, and to Mt.1.23, Jn.1.14 and Phil.2.7-8 as pointing to his human economy.

There certainly is no intention in the use of the phrase 'as man' to suggest a docetic Christology. For the divine Logos truly became man, as we have noted, and as the passions which he suffered as man show: "these passions were manifested because he had a body, not in appearance, but in truth."(75). Further the Logos only entered upon his human economy when having assumed flesh, he became man;
he only spoke and suffered humanly when bearing flesh, he became man (76). Hence, the divine Logos only suffered as man or in the flesh when he became man, the description of which recalls the Nicene clause sarkothena kai enanthropesanta which was inserted into an anti-Arian creed in order to exclude the rejection of Christ's human soul. Hence, it seems that Christ as true man truly suffered as man.

While there are two economies in Christ, equivalent to his two natures, there is but one subject, as befits the "becoming" of the Logos as man. A clear example of the singleness of subject in the Christ occurs in Athanasius' treatment of Mt.26.39, where Athanasius notes that 'human was the saying, "let this cup pass"....and divine was the act whereby the same caused the sun to fail'(77).

Hence, even where the two economies are clearly differentiated by the use of men.....de......, we find the common subject stressed by the ho autos, "the same". This point is again succinctly put in 35.22-28: "if we see him doing or saying anything divinely through the instrument of his own body, we may know that he so works, being God; and if we see him speaking or suffering humanly, we may not be ignorant that he bore flesh and became man, and thus he so acts and speaks. For if we recognise what is proper to each, and see and understand that both these things and those are done by one, we are right in our faith.". The subject of the two distinct economies is the one Christ, the Logos become man.

It is worth noting that Athanasius' treatment of Christ's economies support our conclusions that in becoming man, the Logos truly became man, while yet not suffering any essential alteration in his divine nature. That the subject of both Christ's divine and his human economies is one points to the reality of the divine Logos' becoming man. That what the Logos does divinely is distinct from what he does humanly, being proper to his divinity, points to the Logos' still being truly God, while yet having become man.

In becoming man, the divine Logos was not drawing near to man from the far distance. "For in place nothing is far from God, but in nature only all things are far from him...."(78). He never played the role of the metaphysically-distant deity of the Epicureans, which existed in grand isolation from the world that he set in motion. Rather,
the divine Logos who became man was he who was ever concerned for his creation through his providence. He who was concerned for the cosmos from without as its creator became, through the incarnation, he who was concerned for it from within, as the man Jesus, its Saviour.

It was this philanthropic Logos of the Father who became man. This meant therefore the unique irruption of the eternal Logos, who is beyond time, into the contingent realm of time. "He who was ever God, and is the Son, later assumed flesh and became man" (79). Yet this entry into time was not a chance entry. It was that effected at the end of the age, in the climactic moment of history, climactic above all in the sense that his entry effected the termination and consummation of the ages which prepared men for the long-awaited Messiah, the Christ.

Through his entry into the sphere of space and time, the divine Logos humbled himself. For in becoming man, the Logos of God humbled himself in taking the form of a slave. For as man, the divine Logos was subjected to human passions; the same Logos, who as God was beyond passibility, suffered in and through that humanity which he assumed. For he suffered those sufferings which were true to his humanity, and which therefore pointed to the fact that the eternal God was truly incarnate, because it became the divine Logos, in putting on human flesh, to put on it whole, with the affections proper to it, and not to remain external to the flesh that suffered. Thus while the Logos as God remained eternally one with God, the same Logos as man was humbled in his being in passible flesh.

One of the consequences of this self-abasement of the divine Logos of the Father was his receipt of power from the Godhead. It was not, however, the divine Logos who received this power. For he was not needy himself, being the Giver and Bestower of grace to others; he always had had that grace which he had eternally from the Father, the Son having all that the Father has from his exact likeness and identity to the Father. Rather, the Logos received this grace as man, on account of the body which, being man's fallen flesh, was in need of glorification; he received it in his assumed humanity, and in the flesh that he became. Thus the Logos received as man what he always had as God. He who glorifies others glorified himself as man (80).
It is noteworthy that it was only through the intimacy of a true incarnation that it could be said that the divine Logos received of the bounty of the Godhead. It was only in that it was his flesh, which he had assumed when he became man, and in which he was in and through his incarnation, that received this grace, that it could be said that the Logos received this grace.

While it is true that the divine Logos bestowed grace upon himself as man, he did not do so on his own account, but that of the flesh. For the Logos received this grace as man that henceforth men in Christ might have the power to withstand evil, having become in Christ partakers of a divine nature (81), and that they might reign everlastingly in heaven, having been delivered from their natural corruption. Indeed, not to recognise that the Logos bestowed grace upon himself for all men would be to strip human nature of the grace which men received in and through Christ, and thus rather than to see men bettered through the incarnation, to see the Logos bettered thereby. Consequently, not to recognise the truth of the Logos incarnate receiving grace, not on his own account, but flesh's, is to destroy man's salvation.

The bestowal of this grace upon men could not have been effected properly otherwise than in Christ. For the bestowal had to be internalised within man's sphere. Indeed, for the transcendent God to have bestowed such grace upon man from without would have left man's salvation insecure. For while man would have been able to receive this grace, he would also have been liable to lose it again, as the case of Adam reveals. Thus, in order that the grace given might be irrevocable, and secure for man, (82), Christ made his own that grace, receiving as man the power which he always had as God. The Logos received as man in order that, flesh having received in him, the gift of grace might henceforth abide through that flesh securely for us.

To Richard, Athanasius' explanation of Christ's receipt of grace is not entirely satisfactory. For, "sans doute la chair ou le corps, au sens strict, ne semblent pas constituer le réceptacle idéal, même comme instrument du Verbe, pour les dons de gloire et de
puissance" (83). Certainly, it is true that the Logos receives the grace of his Father on account of his body or on account of his flesh (84). For man's flesh, which the Logos assumed, was in need of glorification. Yet the Logos also received humanly, as man or when he became man (85). The divine Logos therefore received the grace of his Father on account of his body. That body is, however, to be understood in the light of the other incarnational clauses, which complement and clarify Athanasius' thought here.

Of particular interest is the fact that this so qualified body, on account of which the Logos received the gift of grace, is to be understood in terms of a theological distinction from the incorporeal and immaterial Logos of God, and not in terms of a physiological distinction from the human soul. For the body, on account of which the grace is bestowed, is contrasted with the divine Logos who is beyond need; the flesh, on account of which the bestowal is made, is contrasted with the divine Logos himself. The flesh which receives the grace, since it is in need of glorification, stands in contrast with he who glorifies others, the Logos of God; the receiving humanity is contrasted with the deity of the Logos. The Christ receives as man what he always had as God. The context is therefore theological. It is therefore in this context that we must see the humanity which receives. That body, on whose account the grace was bestowed upon the Logos incarnate, is therefore to be seen as man's creatureliness, of which 'body' is the traditional Athanasian hallmark, in its contrast with the Creator God, and not as man's body, over against his soul.

That the body or flesh on account of which the bestowal was made was not to be understood "au sens strict" (86) is established in 38.24-26 where Athanasius explains how the Logos was said to have received of God: the flesh itself received; but since that which received was in the Logos, and since he had assumed that flesh by becoming man, he is said himself to have received. The clause "having assumed flesh, he became man" (87), which is part of this explanation, echoes the Nicene formula which excludes the Arian denial of a human soul in Christ. It seems therefore that the humanity on whose account the grace was bestowed was full, its totality being asserted
in the Nicene manner.

The humanity which received the grace in Christ was fully human. Yet its creatureliness was stressed by its being referred to as body and flesh. This Athanasius stressed partly because the grace was given to man in his creatureliness, because he was therein naturally needy, and partly because it was man in his creatureliness who required deification from his natural corruption and mortality through his receipt of grace; it was in his creatureliness, in his mutable and corruptible mortality, that man needed the stability given by the grace of recreation worked by God in Christ.

The use of body in the context of the explanation of Christ's receipt of the gifts of glory and power is therefore most suitable for both its theological and soteriological context. Indeed, given Athanasius' understanding of body as that in which one cannot act in isolation from one's fellow man, being bound together in common creatureliness through one's body, 'body' is also suitable as the organ in and through which the Logos effected the salvation of man in his creaturely need.

During his life as a man, Christ asked several questions: he asked of the whereabouts of the dead Lazarus; he asked his disciples whom men thought that he was; and on the occasion of the feeding of the five thousand, he asked his disciples how many loaves they had. None of these questions can, however, be applied to the divine Logos, thus suggesting that the divine Logos was ignorant, and therefore not the Wisdom of God, but a creature.

Athanasius begins to show that these questions are not thus applicable by asserting that questions do not necessarily imply ignorance on the part of him who asks the question. Thus, for example, God can ask where Adam is and where Abel, Cain's brother, is while yet knowing the answer. Indeed, when Christ asked his disciples how many loaves there were, he asked although he knew. For he asked, to prove Philip, as he knew what he would do. Converting these paradigms to the other problem areas, Athanasius therefore maintained that the Lord can ask where Lazarus was and whom men thought that he was, and yet not be ignorant of the answers.

Not only therefore do these questions not
necessarily imply that the divine Logos is ignorant of the answers to his questions, but also that ignorance is not proper to the divine Logos, who, being omniscient, knows all even before it comes to be, prescience being proper to the Creator Logos, and ignorance not proper. For he was the medium of God's revelation of knowledge to man. Hence, for example, if the Father revealed to Peter the answer to the question that the Lord put at Caesarea Philippi, it is plain that through the Son that revelation was made. For no-one knows the Son save the Father, neither the Father save the Son and he to whomsoever the Son reveals him. If then, it is certain that the Lord who asked Peter whom men thought that he, the Christ, was, having first revealed to Peter from the Father that he was the Christ, the Son of the living God, next asked the question, it is clear therefore that while Christ asked the question, he knew divinely what Peter would reply.

Thus Athanasius felt that these questions properly did not imply an ignorance on the part of the divine Logos of the Father. For the ignorance which was implied by them referred not to the Godhead, but to his assumed humanity. For ignorance is proper for the flesh (88). The Son of God only inquired of his disciples as man, when he had been clad in flesh. Thus he asked, for example, of the whereabouts of Lazarus humanly, and of man's opinions of himself humanly or in the flesh.

It is worth noting here that the fact that Athanasius asserts that Christ's questions do not necessarily imply Christ's ignorance does not mean that Athanasius is in doubt about the reality of Christ's ignorance. Nor does it mean that Athanasius holds a view in ch. 37 that is contrary and contradictory to that held elsewhere, as though ch. 37 did not allow for Christ's ignorance, which was elsewhere recognised. For the point of ch. 37 is not that questions do not imply ignorance, but that questions do not necessarily imply ignorance. This, however, is true only in the case of the Lord, or the Son, but not in the case of the man Jesus, the Logos incarnate. In short, the aim of Ch. 37 is to defend the omniscience of the divine Logos, and not to question the reality of the ignorance of the Logos become man.

It seems therefore that Richard's argument that
Christ's ignorance was not genuine must fall. Having noted that the flesh was indeed ignorant, while the divine Logos knows all even before it comes into being, Richard asked whether one should therefore conclude "que le Verbe a ignoré, non en tant que Verbe, mais en tant que devenu homme ?" (89). To Richard's mind, however, "S.Athanase évite visiblement de dire cela. On sent que cette idée lui repugne" (90). Rather, he says that the Logos inquired as man, or in the flesh. However, Richard has already noted that for Athanasius a question "n'impliquait pas une ignorance réelle" (91). Richard therefore notes that not only does Athanasius not say that the Logos incarnate was ignorant, but also that he asked questions, and those questions do not imply ignorance. He concludes therefore that Athanasius was not ready to admit true ignorance in Christ. This conclusion Richard supports from two other positions. Firstly, he quotes 38.7-10: "He asked questions; for the all-holy Logos of God, who endured all things for our sakes, did this, that, so carrying our ignorance, he might vouchsafe to us the knowledge of his own only and true Father...". "Tout ceci est bien subtil. Il fallait que le Verbe porte notre ignorance pour la détruire. C'est pourquoi il a posé quelques questions, c'est à dire des actes spécifiquement humains dont la raison d'être est l'ignorance de la chair, mais qui n'impliquent pas nécessairement une ignorance réelle dans le sujet qui questionne". (92). Secondly, Richard refers to ch. 50 where Athanasius referred the Arians to the questions of God to Adam and to Cain. "Puis il ajoute que logiquement s'ils veulent accuser le Christ d'ignorance à cause de ses questions, ils doivent, avec les manichéens, attribuer le même faiblesse au Dieu de l'A.T. Ceci confirme notre interprétation du ch.38. Ce sont en effet les interrogations humaines du Saveur qu'il compare là avec celles de Dieu dans la Genèse "(93).

Richard's thesis concerning Christ's ignorance must, however, fall. In the first place, as we have already noted, the argument of Athanasius that questions do not necessarily imply ignorance has its point of reference in the divine economy of the Logos, and not in the human. Moreover, central to Athanasius' argument that questions do not necessarily imply ignorance is the
qualifying term "necessarily" (94). For while questions do not necessarily imply ignorance, they can do so. Thus for Athanasius, while Christ's questions do not imply ignorance on the part of the divine Logos, they do on the part of the Logos incarnate. Consequently, this argument that questions do not necessarily imply ignorance should not be applied to the statements of the Logos inquiring humanly, or in the flesh, as though it was to be inferred that Christ's ignorance was not entirely genuine. Indeed, the questions of the Logos as man seem to be taken as pointing to ignorance on the part of the incarnate Son. For, having shown that the questions of the incarnate Logos do not imply ignorance in the divine Logos, Athanasius continues "if they still persist on account of his asking, then they must be told that in the Godhead indeed ignorance is not, but to the flesh ignorance is proper." (95).

The Arians insisted that Christ's questions point to his ignorance; from this they concluded that the Logos was ignorant, and therefore not divine. Athanasius' reaction to this was not, however, to deny that Christ's questions implied ignorance. Indeed, he stressed the connection between "to ask" and "ignorance" (96). Rather, he admitted the ignorance, but stressed that it was not the divine Logos', but that creatureliness' in its essential distinction from the divine Creator Logos who assumed it. It seems therefore that Athanasius allows Christ's questions to imply a true ignorance on the part of the man Jesus. Secondly, Richard suggests that Athanasius visibly avoids saying that the Christ was ignorant "en tant que devenu homme" (97). Yet, in his treatement of Christ's knowledge of the last day, Athanasius states that "since he had become man, he is not ashamed, because of the flesh, which is ignorant, to say, 'I do not know'..." (98). In other words, Athanasius does admit that the Logos was ignorant "en tant que devenu homme". Moreover, the statement of 38.7-10 does not suggest that Christ's ignorance was in any way docetic. For the subject of 38.7-10 is the all-holy Logos of God, who endured all for our sake; that the Logos endured "all" points to the fact that not only need true ignorance not be excluded from Christ's experience, but also that true ignorance is not incompatible
with the human economy of the Logos; that the Logos endured all implies that the divine Logos underwent an experience which was degrading for himself. Such true ignorance would have been, he being God's Wisdom. However, had a feigned ignorance been part of that "all" which the Logos endured, that humiliation implied in the verb _hupomenein_ would have been non-existent. For to endure docetic ignorance is not to endure; it is therefore not to suffer the implied humiliation. Further, 38.9 includes the clause "and so carrying our ignorance". This clause may be understood either as to be interpreted in the light of "he asked", or as an interpretation of the same. It might be seen as meaning that the Logos bore man's ignorance in that he asked questions. Those questions did not, however, necessarily imply ignorance. Thus the ignorance which Christ bore was not entirely real. This is how Richard understands this clause (99). On the other hand, it might be seen as meaning that the Logos asked questions, and thus bore man's ignorance, the latter clause confirming that in asking questions Jesus showed his true ignorance. Given, however, that, in terms of the human economy of the Logos, questions do, according to Athanasius, imply ignorance, and given that the 'so'(houto) of the clause "and so carrying our ignorance" not only points to this clause being the qualification of the verb "to ask", but also acts as positive confirmation of the fact that Christ bore man's flesh, it seems better to accept the second interpretation suggested above. Indeed, not to accept this interpretation would mean the acceptance of an interpretation which was self-contradictory. For while Christ would be said to have borne man's ignorance which was real, Christ's ignorance would not have been real, it being suggested only by questions which did not imply ignorance. In short, therefore, Christ would not have borne man's ignorance. That Christ necessarily experienced man's true ignorance in order to effect man's salvation from it to the knowledge of the true God seems confirmed in 57.26 where Athanasius remarks that the Christ abolished by human means all human failings, that the Christ redeemed man from his ignorance by assuming man's own ignorance and thus defeating it in himself.

It seems therefore that since the Logos asks questions humanly or in the flesh, questions being a mark of ignorance,
since he assumed flesh that was ignorant, and since he bore man's ignorance, the Logos of Athanasius was ignorant as man. Indeed, that Christ's ignorance is real is confirmed from other points: if the ignorance of Christ were not real, it would not have been necessary to defend the divine, omniscient Logos from it; Athanasius mentions that the Logos did not shrink from the ignorance which was man's. If, however, that ignorance had not been genuine, there would have been no point in mentioning this fact, nor any reason for the Logos' shrinking from the non-existent. Finally, ignorance was one of those bodily affections which showed that the Logos had a true body and that the body was his own. Had the ignorance of Christ been false, that ignorance would have been no such evidence.

Christ, the incarnate All Holy Logos of God, endured this ignorance for man's sake; he bore man's ignorance that he might vouchsafe for men the knowledge of his own only and true Father, and of himself. As therefore with his receipt of grace of the Father, so here, the Logos endured his human economy to ensure and guarantee man's salvation.

Christ's statement of Mk. 13.32 to the effect that "concerning the day, and the hour no-one knows, neither the angels, nor the Son" receives a rather lengthy treatment in C.Ar.3. Yet its interpretation is much in line with the above exposition of Christ's questions.

Central to Athanasius' exposition of this statement is the fact that the Creator Logos, the divine Son who knew the Father, knew all things. "For it is proper for the Logos to know."(100). Thus the divine Logos of the Father knew the time of the last day. For it was proper for the Son to know the day from the Father, the Son being in the Father, and knowing all things from the Father through his likeness to the Father.

Christ therefore did not say that the Son was ignorant through a deficiency in the divine Logos, but on account of his flesh (101). For having become man for man (102), by assuming ignorant flesh, with men, as man the Logos was ignorant. Indeed, it was right that this statement of human ignorance should be attributed to Christ's humanity. For not only was this statement made not before the Logos became man, but also while it was proper
for the divine Logos to know, it was proper for man not to know (103).

Thus it is clear that the same person, ὁ ἄυτος, (104), both knows and does not know. For as God, as Logos and as Creator he knows divinely(105). Meanwhile he is ignorant as man, humanly or in the flesh, on account of his assumed humanity (106).

Evidence that Mk. 13.32 does not imply an ignorance on the part of the divine Logos Athanasius finds in two areas. He finds an analogy to Mk. 13.32 in the Pauline statement of 2 Cor.12.2 that he knew a man in Christ, about fourteen years ago, whether in the body he knew not, or whether out of the body he knew not, God alone knowing; for while Athanasius recognises that Paul asserts his ignorance here, he believes that this assertion was rhetorical, with Paul in fact truly knowing the facts. From this analogy Athanasius concludes that he who gave Paul the power to know, must, for that very reason, have known himself. Thus, while the divine Logos said, "No, not the Son....", he said so, while yet knowing himself. Again, when Christ ascended, his disciples asked him again when the end would be. In reply, he said that it was not for them to know, but did not say humanly, "No, not the Son....", as he had previously. This he did not answer since, his flesh having risen, having shed its mortality, and having been deified, it was not fitting for him to reply after the manner of the flesh, that is, admitting his ignorance as incarnate Logos, but to teach divinely, that is, revealing his knowledge as divine Logos. From this post-resurrection event, it seems therefore clear to Athanasius that the divine Logos was not amongst that group of people from whom the knowledge of the time of the end was rightfully withheld, but that with the Father he knew of that date.

The statement "No, not the Son...." is not, however, a lie: "he said, 'no, the Son did not know'; and in saying this, he did not lie" (107). This Richard understood as showing "que notre Docteur avait parfaitement conscience d'avoir présenté comme apparante l'ignorance du Sauveur, car l'objection qu'il s'est cru obligé d'écartier, à ce point de sa démonstration, de l'esprit de ses lecteurs c'est: "Donc le Christ a menti" (108). Athanasius' intention in asserting that the statement "No, not the
Son...." is not a lie is not, however, to qualify the presentation of Christ's apparent ignorance. For Christ's ignorance was real, as we shall see. Rather, it was to counter a possible implication of his exposition. Athanasius had insisted many times that the Son of God, the divine Logos, was in no way ignorant. Yet Mk.13.32 asserted that Christ said that no-one knew of the end time, not even the Son. From these two statements it might therefore be supposed that one was untrue. If the Son of God was truly omniscient, was Mk.13.32 a lie? To this Athanasius replies, no. It was not the Son of God who was ignorant, but the Logos as man. For 48.26-27 was not said divinely of the Logos. Rather, it was said 'humanly...as man'(109), having its point of reference in the Logos' human economy. Indeed, that this is the point of reference is emphasised in 43.39-1 where Athanasius draws attention to the fact that it was not the Son of God who is the subject of the ignorance of Mk.13.32, but simply the Son (110), an epithet which Athanasius interprets as the Son of Man (111).

Given therefore that Mk.13.32 is not a lie, the ignorance implied there must be genuine. Indeed, the ignorance is shown to be real by two facts. The ignorance is that of which the Logos could be ashamed, but as man was not. If however that ignorance had been in any way docetic, this statement would have been meaningless. Again, the Logos as man was ignorant in order to show the reality of his humanity, a point which would not have been made had the ignorance not been genuine. We may therefore reject Richard's view that Christ's ignorance was "une ignorance de droit, non de fait"(112), which he experienced as a right of his assumption of ignorant flesh.

Mk.13.32 was therefore nothing more than an admission of the true ignorance concerning the last day by the Son of Man, the Logos as man. It has no meaning for the divine Son of the Father.

It must moreover be stressed that the use of the analogy of 2 Cor.12.2 is not to call into question the reality of Christ's ignorance. It does not establish that "l'ignorance du Christ n'était qu'apparente"(114). Rather, it is to show that a statement of ignorance by the Logos as man need not mean an admittance of ignorance by the Logos as God. Even as Paul can say that he is ignorant, while yet knowing that which he denies, so the Logos can say that he is ignorant as man, while yet knowing as God that which he
denies as man. Indeed, were the intention of this analogy to deny the reality of Christ's ignorance, man's salvation from ignorance to the knowledge of God, through the Christ's conquering of the assumed ignorance of man, would be denied.

It was true ignorance which the Logos assumed in and through his incarnation for men's profit. For in that the incarnate Logos knew of and revealed to men the penultimate events in the history of the cosmos, men were forewarned of the end events, and so saved from fear of them. Moreover, men were saved from the possibility of being deceived by false prophets and false Christs in the last days. Yet, even as it was beneficial for men to know this, it was expedient for them not to know the end. For had men known the time of the end, they would have become lax in their Christian practices in the time before the end, only living a godly life at the very time of the end. As it was, however, being ignorant of the time of the end, men were preserved in the Christian life; they reached for that before them and forgot that behind. Thus, being always prepared for the return of Christ, men were secured unto salvation.

The last aspect of Christ's knowledge of God that Athanasius treats in C.Ar.3 is his advance in wisdom, in stature, and in grace with God and man. (115)

The subject of this advance was not the Logos the Wisdom of God. For he was perfect, being in the Father; he was the Son of God who was equal with the Father. He was therefore beyond progress.

Rather the Logos advanced humanly; his assumed humanity advanced. For advance belongs to men (116). Indeed, that it was in his human economy that the Logos advanced is confirmed by the fact that Lk. 2.52 refers to Christ's increase in stature, an increase which can have its point of reference only in Christ's humanity. For the divine Logos, who was incorporeal, was not open to measurement of stature which is peculiar to bodies.

Yet, while it was the humanity of the Logos and not the divine Logos which advanced, it could still be said that the Logos advanced in the flesh. For the advance did not take place when the Logos was external to the flesh that advanced. Rather, the flesh that advanced was in him, and was therefore called his. Its advance was therefore
his advance.

This advance of Christ in stature was his natural growth as man; the progress in wisdom and grace was the advance of the Logos as man in himself, as God, the Wisdom of God (117); it was the gradual transcending of the assumed human nature through its being deified in and through the divine Logos; it was the revelation to all of the assumed humanity's role as the instrument of Wisdom for the activity and manifestation of the Godhead. For the divine Logos revealed himself in his assumed body, thereby manifesting the Godhead in the assumed humanity to all men, and causing man to recognise that Christ's body was the temple of God, God being in it. In short, therefore, the more the divinity of God was revealed in Christ, the more the grace of the Logos as man increased before all men (118).

As we have seen, Christ's development in stature was referred to his body. From this fact Richard deduces therefore not only that "Athanase entend evidemment le corps au sens strict" (119), but also that all Christ's development is to be referred to this strictly conceived body. This deduction is not, however, entirely fair to Athanasius' intention. For while it is true that Athanasius notes that "the advance is of the body" (120), he does so for no anthropological reason. Rather, he does so for a theological cause. For the immediate context is that in which Athanasius stresses that it was not the divine Logos, but the Logos incarnate who advanced. For this is made clear by the fact that Luke has mentioned 'stature' in Lk.2.52. The divine Logos however, being God, is not measured by stature. Only bodies are. Thus the advance mentioned in Lk.2.52 cannot be referred to the incorporeal Logos of God, as the Arians wished, but only to the body assumed by the Logos.

It is clear from this theological context therefore that body is intended only to mark the creaturely and material aspect of man, over against the creative and immaterial aspect of God. To understand 'body' in any more of a physiological manner, as Richard does, is to stress the writing of Athanasius.

That to understand body, the point of reference of Christ's advance, in a strictly literal and anthropological sense is unfair to Athanasius' intention is confirmed
elsewhere. For Athanasius explains Christ's advance not only in terms of Christ's body, but also in terms of his humanity and of his flesh; he advanced as man, humanly or in the flesh. In fairness to Athanasius one must allow all these explanations to qualify the explanation of 52.27-28, and allow the latter to qualify the former. Moreover, in 53.9-13 Athanasius notes that Christ's passions, which include his advance, point to the fact that the Logos became man and bore true flesh, a clause that recalls that of the Nicene creed which excludes the denial of Christ's human soul. Thus it seems that rather than Christ's advance being referred only to his body, understood literally, it is referred to Christ's full humanity, of which the advance is evident.

This advancement of Christ, whose reality is seen from the fact that it was evidence that the Logos became man and bore true flesh, the Logos underwent, not for himself, but for men. For the Logos advanced as man in order that men's advancement might endure, and, on account of the accompanying Logos, fail not. For Christ's advance meant the imparting from Wisdom to men through Christ of deification and grace. For, through the Logos' having taken man's flesh, the sin and natural corruption of men was obliterated in Christ according to men's likeness and kinship to the flesh of the Logos; for in having assumed man's humanity, Christ's advancement in grace and wisdom in and through his humanity was man's advancement in grace and wisdom. Even in this respect therefore the Logos' incarnation was saving.

While Richard acknowledges that Athanasius explains Christ's advance in wisdom in terms of soteriology, he sees this as an Athanasian attempt to avoid attributing to Christ "une croissance intérieur de la grace" (121). This same process Richard sees in the fact that this same progress "notre Docteur....définit extrinsèquement par son effet sur les spectateurs" (122). While it is true that Athanasius did explain Christ's advance in wisdom in terms of its soteriological effect upon others, this is not to be seen as pointing to an avoidance of Christ's true development. For we must see this exposition against three points: in C.Ar.3 Athanasius' aim was primarily to defend the divine Logos from the heretical assertions of the Arians, and not to explain Christ's increase; again,
Athanasius emphasises the soteriological effects of Christ's life, that he might stress, against the views of the Arians, that Christ's increase in wisdom was not for the benefit of the divine Logos, but men; lastly, the increase of others has as its presupposition the increase of the Christ. For men progress in Christ in that their humanity, which was assumed by the Logos, progressed. The first two points are manifest in 52.31ff. For there Athanasius notes that as the man Jesus grew, so the manifestation of the wisdom of God increased, the result being the gradual realisation by all that Jesus was the Son of God. It was thus to be seen that to advance in wisdom was not the advance of Wisdom itself, but manhood's in it. Hence to explain Christ's advance in wisdom and knowledge in terms of the redemption of man from ignorance to the Truth of God is not to avoid admitting Christ's intrinsic, or personal, development in wisdom, but to stress that it was not the divine Logos, the Wisdom of God, who developed, but the man Jesus, for the sake of all men. The third consideration in the light of which Christ's development is to be read is manifest in Ch.53. For 52.36 notes that the advance mentioned in Lk.2.52 is that of men according to their likeness and kinship to the flesh of the Logos; 53.22ff. reveals that while Christ's humanity advanced, that advance had wide soteriological effects. In both these references Christ's intrinsic development preceded the extrinsic; his personal development preceded that of all men in Christ. For while the Logos did advance personally, or intrinsically, in that it was his humanity, from which he was not external, which advanced, he advanced for all. It therefore necessarily had an extrinsic, or soteriological, result.

Christ's personal advance is not stressed in Ch.52-53. Yet Richard is wrong to deny its existence. Nor does the fact that Athanasius transformed the proekopte sophia of Lk.2.52 into proekopten en sophia, and then into proekepton en te sophia (123) point to the Alexandrian's intention "d'écartner toute interprétation psychologique de ce texte" (124). For this transformation does not alter the sense of the gospel verse for Athanasius. For the source and the centre of all knowledge for Athanasius is the Truth, the Wisdom of God. Hence, for one to develop personally
in wisdom, is for one to develop personally in one's knowledge of the Wisdom of God. This fact also, incidentally, explains why the other side of the coin to developing in wisdom is the manifestation of God, the Wisdom, in revelation (125).

The last of Christ's human passions which Athanasius treats at length in his C.Ar.3 is his fear in the face of death. Working particularly from such texts as Mt.26.39 and Mk.15.34, Athanasius maintains that they must be understood in the same way as those verses concerning Christ's growth in grace were. Thus, even as it was Christ's flesh which increased, and yet he was said to have developed on account of the body being his own, so it was Christ's humanity which was afraid, and the Logos was afraid only in so far as his was that humanity.

For the divine Logos did not fear, as he was eternally God, being ever in the Father, and never being deserted by him; he was eternally Life; he was impassible by nature. Hence it would have been unseemly and irreligious to have said that the divine Logos feared death. For fear was not proper to the nature of the Logos in himself. Indeed, it would have been ridiculous to have suggested that the Logos who rescued others from death was afraid of that same death.

Rather, it was the assumed humanity which suffered this fear; the Logos suffered humanly or in the flesh. That this fear was to be referred to the assumed humanity is made clear. For, it was not said that the Logos was afraid prior to his taking flesh; it was said humanly, only when the Logos had become flesh by becoming man; it was said on account of his human body. Secondly, fear was one of Christ's human attributes. It was one of his human qualities. Hence it was proper to his body, his flesh or the humanity (126) that the divine Logos assumed. Again, it was the flesh, and not the divine Logos, which was possible, and therefore open to fear. Indeed, fear of death and the like, which were qualities of the body, were not to be related to the incorporeal Logos of the Father unless and until the same incorporeal Logos assumed a mortal and corruptible body. This he did of Mary. Thus, it was only when he had become incarnate, that he was in a suffering, weeping and fearful body, that those things proper to the flesh were ascribed to the Logos, in his body.
It is clear therefore that the Logos did not fear death in his divinity but only humanly. A corollary of this is that it is the same person, the Logos who is both above fear, and yet who fears. For as God he is beyond fear, but as man he shares man's fears.

An interesting point arises in 55.32-34, where Athanasius notes that the Logos permitted his body to weep and hunger, and to show those things proper to a body. This is not, however, to be interpreted along the lines of 58.14 where Athanasius notes that the Logos let his own body suffer. For, in this latter case, the allowing the body to suffer is the opposite of preventing those who were conspiring against him, even though he was able to prevent them. In the former case, however, permission for his body to suffer is effected in order to reveal his passible body, the clause "by his permitting it to weep..." acting as an epexegetical clause to the clause "he who shewed that his body was passible". This is the same idea as that put forward in DI.18 where it is noted that it is said that the Logos incarnate was born, ate and drank in order to show that the Logos had, not a fantasical, but true body.

The Logos did not suffer, however, in and for himself. For even as contumely came upon Christ, that it might no longer touch those in Christ, since it had been destroyed in him, so fear came upon him on all men's account. For the Logos became man and suffered as man in order that he might lighten the passions of the flesh, and might free the flesh from them. For by assuming fear, Christ joined his divine will, or courage, to human weakness, the result of which was to destroy this fear, and to render men courageous and fearless in the face of death. In short, Christ suffered in the flesh in order that he might render flesh impassible and immortal.

One point which arises from Christ's redemption of man from fear, and which we must consider, is that Athanasius notes that men were rendered undaunted in the face of death te nomizomene deilia (127); even as the Logos destroyed death with death, and all man's human weaknesses humanly, so he removed man's fear te nomizomene deilia (128). This phrase has been seen by Richard, amongst others (129), as fighting shy of admitting the reality of Christ's psychological passions, and hence as a move towards a docetic Christology. The conclusion,
however, that this phrase questions the reality of Christ's fear of death is dubious. For the phrase must be seen against the background of an admittance of Christ's fear. Athanasius' admittance of the reality of Christ's fear appears from the very outset of Ch.54. For in the first ten lines Athanasius reports that Christ was troubled and wept; he notes that "Behold, he went, and said 'now is my soul troubled' and he besought that the cup might pass away"; he continues, "yes, it is written, that he wept.... and that he said 'I am troubled', and on the cross he said.....'why have you forsaken me?' and he besought that the cup might pass away. Thus certainly it is written" (130). The repeated use of the verbs "to be troubled" and "to weep", the twofold reference to Mt.26.39, the mention of the cry of dereliction, the emphatic "yes, it is written" and "thus certainly it is written", and the inclusion of the particles "behold" and "yes..." all point strongly to a recognition by Athanasius of Christ's fear. That Christ's fear is real is confirmed by the fact that the characteristics of the body, of which Christ's fear is, exist to demonstrate the Logos' incarnation in a passible humanity (131). This point is made again in 55.34-36. For whereas the miracles of Christ reveal that it was God who was incarnate, his passions show that it was a passible flesh which that God assumed. Had Christ's fear therefore not been recognised as genuine, the basis of these two arguments would be non-existent. Further, Athanasius is eager to safeguard the divine Logos from this fear:"it was not the divinity which was fearful"(132);"it is not right to say that the Lord was afraid"(133). That Athanasius was so keen not to allow this fear to be attributed to the divine Logos would seem therefore to suggest that the reality of that fear was truly recognised.

It is against this background of the reality of Christ's fear in the face of death that the phrase te nomizomene deilia should be seen. It seems, moreover, that even within the immediate context of the phrase, the reality of Christ's fear is recognised. For while Athanasius refers to te nomizomene deilia in 57.27, he refers to Christ's fearing humanly in 57.29,31-33. Further, Athanasius' soteriological thought seems to support its reality. For while the Logos destroyed death by undergoing death, and every human passion by suffering in his humanity,
he destroyed men's fear by \textit{te nomizomene deilia} (134). Given the two precedents of death and of every human passion being destroyed by the Logos enduring truly these very things, and given that the fear was one of these human passions which were destroyed by the Logos' truly enduring them, it seems likely that man's fear was destroyed by the Logos' truly enduring the same. This is especially likely given the use of the \textit{hos gar}.....\textit{houto}.....(135) which emphasises the similitude between the destruction of death by true death and the destruction of fear \textit{te nomizomene deilia}. Indeed, this likelihood is made virtually certain by 57.11-13. For therein Athanasius notes that the divine Logos assumed fearful flesh in order that thereby he might combine his own will, the divine courage, to human weakness, man's fear. Having thus destroyed this affection, he rendered men undaunted in the face of death. In short, it was by the assumption of man's fear into his divine will in Christ that man was redeemed from fear. The reality of Christ's fear, emphasised by the use of "fearful flesh", and of "human weakness" and by the fact that fear had to be destroyed, is therefore necessary to the true redemption of man from fear.

It seems therefore that \textit{te nomizomene deilia}, used in the context of the rendering man fearless of death, is not to be interpreted in a docetic manner; it is not to be taken to mean "feigned fear". Rather, it seems that the phrase should be interpreted in the light of \textit{hos hos meta deilian lalein nomizousin hoi Christomachoi}.....(136), the subordinate clause of the sentence in which the disputed phrase occurs. Seeing \textit{nomizomene} of the phrase \textit{te nomizomene deilia} as picking up the preceding \textit{nomizousin}, we arrive at the following sense for 57.14-16:"he, whom Christ's enemies consider to have spoken in fear, has by that fear considered as his by the Arians rendered men undaunting and fearless....."The phrase \textit{te nomizomene deilia} does not therefore imply that the fear was feigned, but that it was considered the Logos' by the Arians. The phrase is therefore but a taking up of an Arian phrase in an anti-Arian polemic. There may be also the idea present in the use of this phrase that the fear was not the Logos', not not his in the sense that the fear was feigned, but in the sense that it was not the divine Logos', being his only
through his incarnation. While, however, this idea is in keeping with Athanasius' Christology, if it does underlie the phrase τὸ νομιζόμενον δείλια, it does so only in a very subordinate way to the other, better established interpretation.

That τὸ νομιζόμενον δείλια ought to be interpreted as "that fear considered as his by the Arians" seems confirmed by 37.34-35, "he who is considered by them as ignorant, is he who foreknew the reasonings of his disciples....". For here νομίζεσθαι fulfils the same function as that which we suggest it fulfils in ch.57; it points out that the Arians considered the Logos himself to be ignorant and fearful. The verb actually does not bring one to the conclusion that Athanasius "n'était pas du tout disposé à lui attribuer un sentiment psychologique de crainte", as Richard suggests (137).

Nor need the reference in chapter 57 to the Logos "lightening" the sufferings of the flesh, and to him "destroying" its terror, lead us to a similar conclusion. For the reason for this alleviation by the Logos of the human passions was not to undermine the full humanity. Rather the reason lies in the fact that in the Christ the divine Logos and the human body are in continuous interaction, the former continuously redeeming the latter. For the Logos-body relation is dynamic, and not static. Hence, suffering not being proper to the blessed state of the saved, the divine Logos redeems the suffering body by relieving the sufferer. This suffering however, is not docetic. For it is only genuine suffering that needs "lightening". The saving Logos similarly delivered the fearful body by imparting to it knowledge that it was acting in the will of God in facing death, thereby removing the fear that stems from ignorance. Fear, for Athanasius, was natural to the body, and resulted from doubt. Over against that, man was confident when fully in the will of God. For he knew then that what he was doing was right and fitting, and so not to be feared. The will of God, or revelation, removed fear and gave confidence. This was what happened in the case of the Logos incarnate: the body naturally feared its death, but the Logos' revelation that the death was right and proper for that body "destroyed" that fear.

This release from suffering and fear must not therefore
be seen as a minimising of the human individuality of the Christ, but as the natural consequence of the saving Logos being incarnate, a consequence that rebounds in man's salvation from such passions, leaving him to live in courageous joy and peace in God.

As regards Christ's fear Richard notes that Athanasius asserted that the Logos was afraid because he had a "fearful flesh" (138). He never, however, asserted that the "Christ was afraid". Moreover, to explain Christ's fear, Athanasius resorted to "l'argument soteriologique, donc extrinsèque" (139). From these several points Richard then concludes that "il semble bien admettre la possibilité d'un mouvement physiologique de peur dans la chair du Sauveur. Il ne va pas plus loin". (140). This is tantamount to suggesting that Athanasius was afraid of attributing true fear to Christ himself, personally. This, however, was not the case.

Athanasius explained Christ's fear in terms of his assumed humanity, not because he was afraid of saying that Christ was fearful, but because he wished to make very clear that the Logos did not fear as God. For by stressing that the Logos suffered thus only as man, or in the flesh, because he had assumed a body of which fear was proper, Athanasius made very clear that the Logos as God in no way was fearful. Had, however, Athanasius merely asserted that the Logos had feared, the point of the Logos as God not being fearful would not have been made so certainly. Hence it was through an appreciation of how best to counter the Arians' assertion that the divine Logos suffered fear that Athanasius stressed that the Logos suffered thus only through his assumption of flesh to which fear was natural. It was not because he was afraid to attribute fear to Christ personally that he explained the fear in that manner.

Richard also remarks upon the fact that Athanasius explains Christ's fear soteriologically. This he sees as an extrinsic explanation, the implication being that Athanasius was afraid to attribute fear to Christ intrinsically, or personally. The soteriological explanation of Christ's fear is extrinsic. Yet that is only natural. For, as with all of the Logos' human economy, so with Christ's fear, he suffered it for the sake of all. Indeed, because the Logos became man on behalf of men, there is nothing which the Logos thereby suffered which he could
have suffered for his own sake, or intrinsically. Rather, that which the Logos suffered personally, or intrinsically, he suffered for all, or extrinsically. In the context of Athanasius' explanation of Christ's fear, and in the face of the Arian thesis, the Logos' intrinsic suffering is therefore explained as that which the Logos suffers as man, or in the flesh, and his extrinsic suffering as that which he suffers on behalf of all.

There is therefore, despite what Richard says, an admission in C.Ar.3 of the personal experience of fear by Christ for all men.

Certainly since the publication in 1947 of Richard's study of the human soul of Christ, attention has been drawn to two considerations which arise from Athanasius' treatment of Christ's passions. Firstly, Athanasius seems not to distinguish Christ's psychological passions from his physical, but refers both to the assumed flesh. Secondly, Athanasius does not invoke a human soul of Christ to explain Christ's psychological passions, but is content to refer them to the assumed humanity. The conclusion drawn from these two considerations is that Athanasius certainly fails to allow for a theological function of a soul in Christ, and may fail even to allow for its physical existence whatsoever.

These considerations and conclusions we must reconsider. Athanasius certainly relates both the physical and psychological passions to Christ's flesh; he hungers, thirsts and toils in the flesh; he also deprecates the cup of death and was afraid in the flesh. The reason, however, why Athanasius does not distinguish Christ's physical from his psychological passions is not because of a defective humanity in Jesus, but because of theological considerations. Athanasius was primarily concerned in C.Ar.1-3 with the safeguarding of the divine Logos from those creaturely categories which the Arians sought to apply to him; he was concerned to distinguish clearly the divine from the human. Working therefore within this framework of the divinity and the humanity, or the divine economy and the human of the Logos, Athanasius was not concerned to distinguish Christ's physical passions from his psychological, but only to distinguish them both from the divinity of the Logos. Thus it is that he can combine them both under the label of tas dia ten sarka legomenas
asthenieias (141), them both being human, in its contrast with to apathes tes tou Logou phuseos (142). Moreover, within this context 'flesh' is not that seen over against the 'soul', but creatureliness over against divinity. Thus it is that Athanasius uses 1 Pet.4.1: "thus Christ suffered for us in the flesh" as the form of explanation of all those passions, both physical and psychological, which are natural to the creatureliness of man, but which are utterly alien to the impassible nature of the Creator Logos.

Moreover, why Athanasius feels that it is proper to attribute both the physical and the psychological passions of Christ to his assumed body or flesh is because of Athanasius' particular anthropology. For it is clear from CG.41.10-12 that the body, being composed of parts, and being created from nothing, is naturally unstable, and is weak and mortal when considered by itself. In his being in the image of God through the grace of God, however, man enjoys a life without sorrow, pain or care. Further, man in his corporeality is ignorant. For he is not capable"by himself of knowing the Creator, or of taking any thought of God in that he was uncreated, whereas man had been made from nothing, and he was incorporeal, but man had been fashioned here below with a body..."(143); in his body man is ignorant of the divine Logos, the Wisdom of God, from whom stems all knowledge. However, through the grace of being in the image and likeness of God (144), men know God, the source of all wisdom. It seems therefore that man in his corporeality is by nature passible, mutable and ignorant, whereas, in his logicality, in his being in the image of God, he is by grace impassible, constant and wise. It is therefore to the corporeality of man that weaknesses are to be attributed. It is therefore fitting that Athanasius attributes Christ's passions to Christ's assumed creatureliness, his body or flesh.

That, in fact, Christ's body to which Christ's passions are attributed is his creatureliness, and not that physiological object over against the human soul, is clear from Athanasius' treatment of Christ's passions. For, in his description of Christ's reception of the gifts of grace, it is clear that while it is not the divine Logos who is wanting, it is the body which is; he received as man what
he always had. In his description of the questions asked by Christ, Athanasius notes that it was the flesh that was ignorant and not the divine Logos; Christ inquired in the flesh of what he knew in his divinity. As regards Christ's ignorance of the day of judgement, Athanasius remarks that Christ admitted his ignorance on account of his human flesh, although as God he was not ignorant; for he knew as Logos but was ignorant as man. In his exposition of Christ's growth in grace and wisdom, Athanasius states that the Logos advanced not in himself as the divine Son, but humanly, as the Logos was not open to increase, while the body was. Finally, in his treatment of Christ's passions Athanasius says that it was not the divine Logos who suffered, but the Logos incarnate. For while the divine Logos was impassible, his assumed humanity was passible. These are but a sample taken from the many examples from which it is clear that Christ's humanity to which his passions are attributed is that over against the divine Logos; it is man's creatureliness over against God's divinity, and not man's body over against his soul. This is most clearly confirmed in 34.38-39, "the passions are not proper to the very Logos by nature, but proper by nature to the very flesh..." (145). For, in this passage where Logos and flesh are clearly opposites in a theological contrast, the passions referred to are both the physical and psychological passions that Christ suffered (146), the Logos is the eternally divine Logos of the Father, and the flesh is man in his creaturely weakness. The soteriological consequences of Christ's passibility further confirms that 'flesh' can be that creatureliness to which, theologically speaking, all passions belong. For through Christ's passion all men are made alive, the flesh no longer being earthly, but henceforth being made rational (147); they no longer remained true to their creaturely, passible nature, but were made rational in their flesh, their creatureliness, by being redeemed from the passions proper to the flesh in its finite creatureliness.

Confirmation that the body to which Christ's passions are attributed is not to be seen as the human body over against the soul is found in the use of the anthropological language which is used in those passages in which Athanasius treats these passions. For, Athanasius not only asserts
that Christ suffered in his body or flesh, but also that he did so humanly or as man. Christ's body, to which his passions are referred, must therefore be understood in the light of this "anthropic" qualification. Again, Athanasius explains Christ's passions in terms of Christ's humanity, which is described in a manner which echoes the Nicene formula whereby the denial of Christ's human soul was excluded. For in his description of Christ's receipt of the gifts of grace, it is clear that the Christ is said to have received humanly, on account of the body; he received having assumed flesh, and become man. In his description of the questions asked by Christ, Athanasius notes that it was the Son who, even now being clothed in flesh, as man asked these questions. As regards Christ's ignorance of the day of judgement, Athanasius remarks that Christ did not admit this ignorance "before he became man.... but when the Logos became flesh...". Nor was he ashamed of his ignorance when he became man, on account of his ignorant flesh. For he admitted his ignorance, in that he had flesh like men's, and he had become man. In his exposition of Christ's progress in grace and wisdom, Athanasius states that Christ's advance points to the truth of the fact that the Logos had become man, and bore true flesh. Finally, in his treatment of Christ's passions, Athanasius says that the Logos only suffered these when the Logos became flesh and became man; he therefore feared as, having become man, he had a fearful flesh. It seems clear from the above therefore that Athanasius is keen to assert, through Nicene language, the fullness of the humanity to which Christ's passions were attributed.

Given therefore that Athanasius attributes Christ's passions, both physical and psychological, to a full humanity, one might wonder why he does not refer Christ's psychological passions explicitly to Christ's soul. The reason that Athanasius is content to leave the question of Christ's humanity here seems to be that Athanasius was concerned only to safeguard the divinity of the Logos, as we have noted, and not to give an exhaustive analysis of the passions, both physical and psychological, of the Christ. There are, however, two further reasons as to why Athanasius probably left the matter where it stood.
The first is to do with the Logos' "becoming" man. To have attributed such to Christ's soul would have destroyed, for Athanasius, the "becoming" of the incarnation, through the introduction of two subjects in the one Christ, the impassible Logos and the passible, human soul. The second reason is soteriological: it was only by the immutable and impassible Logos' truly suffering in Christ man's weaknesses that the former secured the latter's redemption; only by the Logos' implanting his divine will upon man's weakness, and thereby triumphing over it was salvation truly effected. Had the psychological passions of Christ been applied to Christ's human soul, this salvific combination of God and man would not have been made so certainly in Athanasius.

It seems therefore that in Athanasius' treatment of Christ's passions, Athanasius does recognise "une veritable psychologie humaine" (148), despite Richard's views. These passions, both physical and psychological, Athanasius attributes to the assumed humanity of Christ, of which the creaturely body or flesh is the anthropological hallmark; for they are naturally those of Christ's full humanity, and not of his impassible divinity.

Athanasius again casts a little light upon the question of Christ's human will in C.Ar.3. For, in keeping with ch.62 where it is noted that the divine Son was good by nature, and that it was of rational nature, or man, to choose either evil or good, ch.57 witnesses that Christ, as God, is naturally faithful to the divine will of the Father, and yet fearful, as man, of completing that divine will. For while as man the Logos was pleading for the removal from himself of the cup of death, as God, the Logos was willing God's will. Thus, he willed that which he deprecated. As is common with Athanasius' Christological thought, the thought here is further explained in soteriological terms. For by the divine Logos, who was secure in his courageous obedience to the Father's will, becoming fearful man, the divine will was combined to the weak, human will, that the weak human will might be destroyed in Christ. By the divine Logos giving courage to his assumed human will, the Logos effected the salvation of man's will. A corollary to this is that had the assumed human will of Christ persisted in its fear, and therefore exercised its own independence, its salvation by its union to the divine will in Christ would not have been effected. In other
words, the salvation of man's will was dependent upon the Logos' human will being obedient ultimately to the divine will or command.

It is interesting to note that the conflict of wills in Christ was not that between the divine Logos and the assumed human soul of Christ. It was that between the Logos in himself and the Logos as man; it was that between the divine Logos and the Logos incarnate, who is personal as the clause "having become man, he possessed a fearful flesh", reminiscent of the Nicene creed, shows. The subject of both is therefore the same (149). For the distinction in wills lies in the economies and not in the person of Christ, the Christ being one person in two economies.

Here indeed, is a more realistic interpretation of the internal conflict of Christ than that sought by those who believe that the conflict ought to be seen in terms of that between the divine Logos and a human soul, between a divine and a human principle. For the latter belief, which incidentally requires of Athanasius an Antiochene Christology in which the becoming man of the Logos is not true, seeks for a conflict which is not a truly internal conflict, as man knows and understands an internal conflict. For the conflict otherwise sought is that between two essentially distinct entities. However, Athanasius' conception of Christ's internal conflict fits man's understanding of internal conflict because, for Athanasius, the same Logos is both afraid and courageous. Meanwhile, for man the internal conflict is that experienced by the same one person: "I wish to do something" but "I know that it is wrong". It is the same 'I' who wishes to do it, and yet wishes not to do so. There are not two principles battling against one another. Rather, in terms of Christian theology, I as flesh, in my creaturely weakness, wish to do something, but I as a new man in God through Christ do not wish to do it (150). Athanasius' picture of the one Christ wishing one thing in the flesh, or as man, but wishing another thing as God, tallies much more closely with this experienced internal conflict than the more philosophical Antiochene theology.

Christ's weak human will, exemplified in his fear of death, is real, as 57.4,7,8-9,11 and al. suggest. Yet it is lost in Christ's constant and courageous divine will. That the will of the Logos as man is lost in the will of
the same as God need not make one suppose, however, that there is not a satisfactory human psychology here. For the passive role of the human nature of the Saviour is not only close to the traditional affirmations about the salvific obedience of the incarnate one, but is also consistent with the claim that man is only free when he is freed from slavery to sin to serve the living God. For, for Athanasius, the object of asceticism was to subdue one's will, and to allow the Logos to take over the self; this was expressed pictorially in the belief that the monk became the battle-ground fought over by the Logos and the devils. Indeed, in the true ascetic, the human subject is submerged as the receptive instrument of the Logos: "this was Antony's first triumph against the Devil; or rather, it was the first triumph of the Saviour in Antony."(151). In terms therefore of this understanding of man, the Alexandrian's Christology is not basically docetic. Rather, in Christ's human will being lost in God's, Christ was supremely human.

We next turn to Athanasius' portrayal of Christ's death in C.Ar. 3.23. The belief that the Saviour suffered death in his descent to Hades is further treated in 57.32ff. For having quoted John 10.18, and having said that this was not spoken by the Logos humanly, Athanasius states that "the Lord himself being immortal, but having a mortal flesh, had power, as God, to be separated from his body, and to take it again, when he would"(152). For this Richard notes firstly that "tout le monde concédera volontiers qu'ici le mot 'corps' est employé au sens le plus strict" (153), and secondly that while "toutes les philosophies spiritualistes" understand death as the separation of the soul from the body, "ici S.Athanase nous décrit la mort du Christ comme la séparation du Verbe et de son corps, autrement dit il attribue au Verbe la fonction d'âme du Christ. Celle fois nous le prenons pour ainsi dire sur le fait. Le Christ mourant qu'il nous présente est Verbe et corps (au sens strict). Il n'y a pas place en lui pour une âme humaine" (154).

While we would not disagree with Richard's statement that death is here usually understood as the separation of the soul from the body, we would disagree with him about his implied understanding of this separation, with his belief that the 'body' of 57.39 is used "au sens le plus
strict", and with the conclusions that he draws from this for Athanasius' Christology.

Man's death is seen in Athanasius as the separation of his soul from his body. Yet that soul is not conceived in a Platonic sense. It is not a possession of man; it is not a self-existent source of life in a mortal body. Rather it is a relationship of creaturely man in the divine Logos through grace; it is man's sharing in the Image of God; it is his participation in the Son of the Father whereby through grace man's corruption and mortality is blunted. Hence death, the separation of soul from body, is the ceasing of creaturely, corporeal man from sharing in the gracious, enlivening relationship with God. It is the breaking of the gracious relationship in which and through which man's corruptibility and mortality is blunted. Ultimately therefore death for man is his removal from his relationship with the divine Logos and his subjection to his natural mortality. To say therefore that the divine Logos, Life, separated himself from his assumed humanity is not necessarily to exclude a human soul from Christ. Rather, it is to say that ultimately Christ's assumed body died in the same way, theologically speaking, as does man in his creaturely, bodily existence. Indeed, to seek for an explicit mention of Christ's human soul in this context would amount to seeking for a second subject in the incarnate Logos, thereby destroying the oneness of the Logos become man, and to expect the Alexandrian Athanasius to propound an Antiochene theology. Certainly, to expect the Alexandrian to write "that the Lord, himself being immortal, but having a mortal flesh, had power as God to separate the soul from his own body" would be to expect the improbable.

That the 'body' of 57.39 ought to be understood literally we find difficult. For we do not believe that 57.32ff. is an exposition of Christ's death in an anthropological fashion, and we are therefore wary of lifting a major anthropological position from it. Moreover, we believe that 'body' here is used to signify not the body over against the soul, but creatureliness over against divinity.

That 57.32ff. is not an anthropological exposition of Christ's death seems clear. Athanasius is treating here the Arian interpretation of John 12.27, "now is my soul
troubled...", from which it was argued that the Logos was mutable, and so a creature. Against this Athanasius noted that while the Logos voiced such fears, the same Logos also had the power to lay down, and to take up his life when he wished; it was the same Logos who showed both fear and power, fear in his human economy and the power in his divinity. Athanasius' aim in 57.32ff. is therefore to safeguard the oneness of the person, and the fullness and wholeness of the two natures, both human and divine, in the incarnate Logos. It is to this end that 57.32ff. therefore appears, and not to establish an anthropology. In order to safeguard the one Christ in two economies, Athanasius stresses the one person and the two economies: the Logos acts humanly and yet divinely; it is of the flesh to fear while it is of the divine Logos to have power; man does not have the power to die when he wishes, dying through the necessity of his mortal nature; the divine Logos, on the other hand, dies when he wishes through his removal of himself from his assumed body. The emphasis here is theological, being upon the power of the divine Logos, and the weakness of man in his flesh. For through this emphasis, it is made clear that John 12.27, with its implication of weakness, cannot be applied to the divine Logos, in his enlivening power, but must be applied to the weak humanity which he assumed. 57.32ff. is not therefore setting out to establish a particular anthropology.

Athanasius' use of Ps.15.10 seems to confirm this conclusion. For this verse, under the influence of Acts 2.31, was often applied to Christ by Christian antiquity. For those who asserted the assumption of a full humanity by the divine Logos used it not only to prove that during his time in the tomb the Christ did not undergo corruption, but also to prove against the Arians, and later against the Apollinarians, that the Logos had truly assumed a human soul. This Didymus the Blind (155) and Theodoret (156) did. Athanasius, however, was interested only in the verse's point regarding non-corruption, seemingly understanding the "you shall not leave my soul in Hades" not in an anthropological sense, but as meaning that Christ was not left in Hades to suffer corruption. It seems therefore that while Athanasius could have used Ps.15.10 in an anthropological
sense, he did not, as it was not to his mind required by the context.

That 'body' ought to be understood as the assumed creatureliness of the Logos, over against the divine Logos, fits the theological context, which we have outlined above. For it fits the theological contrast of 'flesh' and 'man' with 'the Lord' much better than would the anthropological understanding of 'body' as that over against 'soul. Moreover, that 'body' ought to be understood as "creatureliness" fits the thought of 57.37ff. For Athanasius begins by saying 'the Lord himself being immortal, yet had mortal flesh'. This 'flesh' which the Logos has seems to be man in his creatureliness. For firstly, the 'flesh' of 57.38 seems to recall the 'flesh' of 57.34, which is understood as mutable, weak and passible creatureliness; secondly, it is that over against the immortal Creator Logos, and therefore presumably creation; again, it is mortal flesh, 'flesh' being, with 'body', one of Athanasius' theological epithets for man in his weakness and mortality; again, given that the context is that of Christ's death, and given that the immortal Lord had this mortal flesh in order that he might die through it, 57.38 recalls DI.9:'being immortal and the Son of the Father the Logos was not able to die; therefore he took to himself a body which could die...', in which the assumed body is that mortal creatureliness in and through which the incorporeal Logos might die for all. It is from this creatureliness which the divine Logos assumed that the Logos had power to separate himself, and which he could take up again. The clause 'to be separated from the body, and to take it again' echoes 'to lay down my life....and to take it again' (157). From this parallelism it is clear that the emphasis here is upon life and death, and upon their centres, the divine Logos and mortal creatureliness respectively. For the humanity of Christ to live required it to be assumed, or reassumed by the divine Logos. For the body of Christ existed only in and for the Logos; it came into existence through the Logos' requiring it; he made and moulded it for himself alone. Further, it only continued to exist in so far as it was in the Logos, its Life, as indeed any creature continued to exist only in so far as it lived and moved and had its being in God, the providential Creator. On the other hand, however, for the
body of Christ to die meant the separation of the body from the life giving grace of the Logos of the Father. Given therefore that 'body' of 57.39 picks up 'flesh' of 57.38, and that the sense of "mortal and weak creatureliness" for 'body' fits the theological context of the life-death contrast of 57.39, it seems likely that 'body' ought not to be interpreted in a strictly anthropological sense. Further, the phrase 'and to take it again' points to the resurrection of man's corruptible mortality in the Christ, rather than to the resurrection of man's body over against his soul. This again suggests that 'body' of 57.39 ought not to be interpreted in a strictly anthropological sense.

57.40 continues the explanation of 'and to take it again'. This it does by quoting Ps. 15.10, with its statement that the Christ did not experience corruption in death. This he did not experience because while his assumed humanity was corruptible, it did not remain mortal in accordance with its own nature, but on account of the Logos who put it on, rose incorruptible. Here the flesh spoken of is again man in his corruption and mortality which is natural to his creatureliness. Given therefore that 57.40-44 is a soteriological explanation of 'and to take it again', and that the flesh which the Logos raised is man in his creatureliness, the 'body' of 57.39 seems to be the same.

One further point seems to suggest that 'body' of 57.39 is not to be interpreted in a strictly anthropological sense. The flesh which the immortal Lord assumed, the body which he assumed again in resurrection is that flesh which remains incorruptible as a consequence of its being clothed with the Logos. Yet it is also because the same Logos is in the same body that men, receiving him, share in his immortality. There seems therefore to be a distinct correlation between the naturally mortal body which in its assumption by the Logos is graciously clothed in immortality, and mortal men who through their receipt of the Logos share in his immortality. That correlation seems to lie in their common creatureliness which is naturally mortal and corruptible.

From the point of view of both context and content therefore 'body' of 57.39 seems not to be a physiological term. Rather, it seems to be that theological epithet
which Athanasius uses to suggest man in his frail creatureliness, that exists only in and through the life-giving, providential Logos.

The aim of 57.32ff. is therefore not to provide a detailed exposition of Athanasius' anthropological conception of Christ's death. It merely sets out to explain that the divine Logos, unlike man, has the power to lay down his own life. Through thus showing the power of the Logos as God, Athanasius reveals that John 12.27 cannot be referred to him in that economy. It refers rather to the Logos in his human economy. This theological explanation is the aim of 57.32ff; certainly an anthropological exposition is not its purpose.

We turn now to Christ's cry of dereliction. Referred to in 54.37-38, 56.23-24 and 57.29, Athanasius only explains that it is said by the Logos incarnate, and not by the divine Logos as the Arians supposed. He does not actually explain how Christ's humanity was abandoned by the Father. For such does not require treatment in this anti-Arian context.

M. Richard, however, denies that Athanasius conceded "que le Verbe incarné ait pu, même en tant qu'homme, être abandonné du Père" (158). Firstly, Richard notes that Athanasius admits only that the Christ said that he was abandoned; secondly, this saying that he had been abandoned was explained "extrinsèquement" only; thirdly, Richard believes that the Athanasian text only requires Christ to express the cry of dereliction to effect man's salvation for God. "Rien ne nous permet d'ajouter que, selon notre Docteur, pour être efficace, cette parole ait du traduire un sentiment personnel du Christ mourant" (159). Finally, the manner in which Athanasius presented the miracles which happened at Christ's death appears to Richard to exclude the reality of Christ's dereliction by the Father.

With Richard's position we must take issue again. For, while admitting that Athanasius only notes that Christ said "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?", we do not believe that this meant that Christ was not thought to have been forsaken. For the point of dispute with the Arians was not as to whether or not the saying pointed to a true event, but as to whether or not the divine Logos was its subject. Indeed, that the Alexandrian bishop was so eager to relate this saying to the assumed flesh, and not to
the divine Logos, seems to suggest that behind the words lay a true dereliction. Again, Richard, quoting 56.26-29, maintains that Christ's cry of dereliction is explained extrinsically, the implication being therefore that the Christ did not experience the dereliction intrinsically, or personally. Certainly Athanasius explains the cry in a soteriological fashion. Yet, that explanation, "that he might himself lighten those very passions of the flesh, and free it from them" (160), rests upon the main clause "since the Lord became man and these things are said and done as from a man..." (161). From this main clause it seems that Christ's dereliction was not merely that spoken of (cf. λεγέται ταῦτα) but was also that which took place (cf. γίνεται ταῦτα) in Christ's humanity. It therefore took place intrinsically; and it was upon this intrinsic experience that the extrinsic, or soteriological, explanation depended. The redemption of the flesh from this dereliction therefore depended upon more than the mere pronouncement of the cry of dereliction, as Richard suggests. It depended upon the Christ's overcoming that dereliction in his own flesh for all men. Indeed, that man's salvation from this dereliction depends upon Christ's suffering the same as man seems to be confirmed by the statement 'by human means he destroyed all human weaknesses' (162). Finally, Athanasius notes that "behold, when he says, why have you forsaken me?, the Father showed that he was ever, and even then in him. For then the earth, knowing its Lord who spoke, straightway trembled, and the veil was rent, the sun was hidden and the rocks were torn asunder..." (163). The point of this passage is not to cast doubt upon the reality of the dereliction experienced by the Logos incarnate. Its point is rather to show that while the Logos as man was abandoned by the Father, the same Logos, but as God, was not. Thus, in this passage, Athanasius notes that the Logos as man admitted his dereliction, and yet that the Father was ever with the same Logos in his divine economy, as Master. This for Athanasius is the miracle of the incarnation: that the same person, the one Logos, can be both forsaken by the Father, and yet eternally one with him, the former in his human economy, and the latter in his divine.

Certainly Athanasius does not explain Christ's abandon-ment by the Father, as Jouassard rightly notes (164). For
such an explanation is not necessary to his anti-Arian thesis. Yet it is tempting to suppose that the abandoning by the Father which the man Jesus experienced is that which Christ's full humanity experienced in the divine Logos' relinquishing it to death.

As is clear from Athanasius' treatment of the life of Jesus, soteriology pervades his Christology; the salvific mission dictates his incarnational thought. For him, the Logos did not become man on his own account, but that of flesh's, or man's, such being the philanthropic good will of the Father.

This general pervasiveness of soteriological thought within Athanasius' Christology we have already seen. It does, however, remain for us to emphasise certain points of Athanasius' soteriology which have not yet been made very plain.

Christ's saving incarnation stands in marked contrast with God's presence to man in previous times. For while formerly the divine Logos came upon individual prophets, more recently, he became one with all men through truly becoming man; formerly the Logos merely appeared to men through theophanies, while recently he has become incarnate. The results of these two different types of presence of the divine Logos to men is equally contrasted. For while in Adam all die, in the divine Logos who has assumed man's creaturely weakness, men rise from their weakness, are released from the curse of sin, the mark of the former dispensation of Law, and are made alive; while in Adam all die, in Christ, the second Adam, all are made alive.

Central to this successful salvation in Christ is both the true divinity and the true humanity of Christ.

Man's salvation was dependent upon the truly divine Logos becoming man: "For whence is this their perfecting, but that I, your Logos, having borne their body, became man...".(165). For it was through men's passions sharing in the Impassible one that men became impassible and free from those passions (166); through man's corruptible mortality participating in the divine Logos, men rose, to abide ever immortal and incorruptible in the presence of God (167); it is from the Logos that men are divinised. Indeed, that this grace to man depended upon the divinity of the Logos was because this same grace originated in the Father, and was given through the Son, because of their oneness, and the oneness of their giving (168).
Salvation was also dependent, however, upon the humanity of Christ. "For unless I had come and borne this their body, not one of them would have been perfected, but all would have remained corruptible." (169).

Indeed, it was in the Logos' being born of Mary that he transferred man's origin to himself, that man, no longer remaining as mere earth, and returning to the earth from which he had been created, might, being knit to the divine Logos, be carried to heaven by him. It was in the Logos' assuming man's passions that man, no longer as being man, but as proper to the Logos, might share in life eternal. It was through the Logos as man receiving grace, advancing in knowledge and triumphing over fear that men were truly saved, being the recipients of grace and divinisation "according to their likeness and kinship to the flesh of the Logos" (170).

As we have already noted, the humanity in which the Logos suffered for all was whole. The implication of this is therefore that a full humanity in Christ was necessary to man's salvation. This is confirmed in the more explicit statements of 23.3-5: "when is this their perfecting, but that I, your Logos, having taken their body, became man..." and 34.18-20: "as the Lord, having put on the body, became man, so we men are deified by the Logos...".

For here man's perfection and deification are said to be dependent upon the divine Logos' assuming humanity, which is described in terms similar to the Nicene formula whereby the Arian denial of the human soul of Christ was excluded. Christ's full humanity was recognised as necessary for man's full salvation.

Athanasius' treatment of the soteriological consequences of Christ's passions has already revealed that it was not only necessary for Christ's humanity to be a full humanity, but also that it was necessary for it to be the Logos' very own humanity for the salvation effected in and through it to be guaranteed. For the Logos received grace that, "the flesh receiving in him, henceforth from it the gift might abide surely for us" (171). This point is further stressed as a point in its own right in ch.31-33. For "being external to the body, and only healing it, as he had always done, he should leave men subject still to death" (172). Had God but thought to redeem men by the divine fiat whereby he had originally called them into
existence, men would have been left still subject to sin, and its consequences of corruption and mortality, and still liable to those affections proper to their creaturely nature.

Christ's humanity has importance not only in its intensive, or personal, but also in its extensive, or redeeming aspect. For it is clear that the Logos, as an individual man, received that which he always had as God; in so receiving, however, he also safeguarded that received as irrevocable, and secure for men. It seems therefore that men share somehow in Christ's humanity which receives. Similarly, Christ's individual advancement ensured that men's advancement might abide, and fail not, because of the Logos which is involved. Christ's advance therefore has become man's. For as the Logos reveals himself to his humanity, and thereby advances it in knowledge, so as he reveals himself through his humanity to all men, he advances them in knowledge. Further, by overcoming his fear of death, Christ rendered men brave and fearless. By destroying man's cowardice through conquering his own fear through his will, Christ has rendered all men fearless of death. To explain this mysterious sharing in Christ by all men, it is not sufficient merely to see Christ as an example. For that would not explain men being in Christ; moreover, to make Christ but an example would be to put the Logos outside that in need of salvation, and thus to render that salvation insecure. Rather, it must be explained in terms of the Logos' assumption of man's flesh, that common creatureliness in which all men share essentially. For, in the Logos' assuming and in bearing man's flesh, "men were assumed by the Logos through his flesh, and all were borne" (173). It was only by the divine Logos, the Life, becoming involved with that which was subject to corruption through his assuming a mortal body that corruption was blunted. It seems therefore that while the humanity of Christ is intensive, being peculiar to Christ, it is also extensive, being that in which all men are.

Salvation is made secure in Christ for men, as we have seen. This is because the Logos incarnate is in microcosm what mankind in his creaturely relation to his divine Creator is in macrocosm. For in his divinity the
Logos gives what he always has from the Father to his humanity which, being needy, receives, even as in his divinity the Logos has always given what he has had eternally to all mankind in their need. In Christ therefore is focussed most perfectly the gracious action of God to all men. Yet, whereas in other cases there is a radical distinction between the Giver and the receiver, God and all mankind, here there is a perfect atonement of the Giver and the Receiver. For the Giver and the Receiver are the one person, the Logos, but in his two economies, as God and as man respectively. Given therefore that the Giver and the Receiver are the one person, the giving and receiving, or God's salvation of man in Christ, is guaranteed.

Man's salvation was therefore effected by the divine Logos in man's humanity. Of this salvation from the curse which the perfect Logos became in man and for man and from the sin which he bore in his sinlessness, two points require comment. Firstly, the incarnation effected the perfect unity of God and man. It was perfect in that it was a union in which mankind was freed from corruption and mortality and was full of God. It was a union in which all mankind was borne in Christ, all therefore being one body and one spirit, and thus growing into a complete man; all had oneness with the Logos' body, and had become one in it. For the divine Logos was in man on account of his body, men therefore becoming one according to the body in the Logos, and all men becoming one body as they shared in the one Christ, having the one Lord. This perfect union of God and man was not, however, one of nature, but of grace and of love. Man's perfect union in God was dependent therefore upon the true Logos assuming true humanity, in and through which men were bound essentially with Christ's body, and through it, in grace, with the divine Logos. For as the assumed body of Christ partook of the divine Logos by grace, so men in Christ partook of the divine Logos. Secondly, the confirmation, or first-fruit, of man's salvation was the resurrection of Christ's body, a concept completely alien to the Platonic thought of the purification and release of the soul from its bodily imprisonment. For in the resurrection was the fulfilment of that movement whereby Christ entered upon his active ministry as true God and true man in one person, in a union
which penetrated into man's sinful humanity, and created room for itself in the midst of man's estrangement, at once gathering sinful man into one body with the Saviour, and opening up a new and living way into the Holiest. Herein was witnessed the complete atonement of the covenant faithfullness of God and the unfaithfullness of man.

Like its predecessors, C.Ar.3 concentrates upon the true divinity of the Logos, the very Son of the very Father, rejecting the Arian denial of such. Against this divinity, the treatise posits Christ's humanity, generally described as flesh or body, these being the theological epithets of Athanasius for humanity, the common creatureliness in which all men share in their essential distinction from the incorporeal and immaterial Logos of God. This humanity is however total, despite any implication that the above epithet may give. For it is described even in those passages where Athanasius is treating Christ's passions in terms of the Nicene incarnational statement whereby the Arian denial of the human soul of Christ is excluded. This humanity was not, however, assumed by the divine Logos for his own sake, but for all men's, soteriology pervading the Christological thought of Athanasius.
Footnotes

1. 31.15 cf. 27.8
2. 20.17-18
3. 28.40 cf. 35.30-31
4. 23.40-41 cf. 23.2; 31.9; 39.38
5. 30.24-25, 27
6. cf. 30.24
7. 44.6-7
8. 29.40 cf. 30.23, 24; 31.8 etc.
9. 30.33-35
10. 43.1; 51.37
11. 10.36-37 cf. 27.8; 29.7; 30.23 etc.
12. 30.25, 28
13. 30.24, 28
14. cf. 30.27-30
15. cf. 30.26-29
16. 39.40-41
17. 39.41-1
18. cf. 39.38, 5, 6
19. 39.40-41, 6
20. 32.12-13
21. Richard oc. 34-35
22. cf. 29.10-11; Phil. 2.7
23. cf. 57.37ff.
24. 29.40; 31.12-13; 35.25 etc.
25. 23.3; 27.9; 34.19 etc.
26. 32.12-13; 55.37; 56.14 etc.
27. cf. CG 30-34; DI 11
28. Voisin oc. 231
29. 30.38-1
30. Richard oc. 17
31. ib. 17
32. ib. 16
33. Grillmeier oc. 311-312
34. Richard oc. 12
35. 51.17-21
36. Richard oc. 12
37. ib. 12-13
38. ib. 13
39. cf. 23.3; 29.40; 30.23; 31.12-13, 17, 19; 34.19 etc.
40. Richard oc. 13
41. ib. 12
42. 51.16-17
43. 51.18
44. 51.17, 21
45. 51.22
46. 51.27
47. Richard oc. 17
48. 32.24; 54.1-2 cf. 2 C Ar. 15.36-38; 16.6ff; 16.40-3
49. cf. 53.25-26
50. 55.28-29
51. 33.10
52. 38.1-3
53. 32.24
54. 54.1-2 cf. 51.16-22; 55.27
55. 34.2-3 cf. 32.14-15
56. cf. 39.1-4
57. 38.22-23
58. 32.24-26
59. 2 C Ar. 47.10-12
60. 23.3 cf. 29.39; 38.3, 25; 52.20; 55.35; 56.15-16
61. 41.26 cf. 23.36; 27.9; 35.25; 48.31; 51.17 etc.
62. 22.31 cf. 32.12-13; 34.40-41; 44.2; 50.4-5; 55.37-38; 67.29
63. 27.23 cf. 27.34-35; 31.19; 32.11; 38.24; 45.11; 57.11,38
64. 41.23-24; cf. 38.25; 40.38; 53.17
65. 20.17
66. 30.5 cf. Joel 2.28; Bel and Drag.5
67. 55.37-39; 67.29-30
68. 55.37-39
69. 67.29-30
70. cf. 53.8
71. 31.19; 35.22-23 cf. 31.26; 32.39-1
72. Grillmeier oc. 317-318
73. 53.22
74. 53.23-24
75. 32.10-11 cf. 31.31-33
76. 29.39-40; 35.24-26
77. 57.29-31
78. 22.7-8 cf. DI 8.1ff.
79. 29.38-40 cf. 31.17; 39.6, 43.25-27 etc.
80. 38.23
81. 40.33
82. 38.20-21
83. Richard oc. 30
84. 38.15; 39.7 cf. 40.38
85. 38.22, 25; 40.32, 37, 4
86. Richard oc. 30
87. 38.25
88. 37.31 cf. 38.39-40
89. Richard oc. 28
90. ib. 28
91. ib. 28
92. ib. 29
93. ib. 29 note 2
94. 37.20
95. 37.29-31
96. 37.30-31 cf. 38.39-40
97. Richard oc. 28
98. 43.37-38 cf. 43.19-20, 25-27, 35 etc.
99. Richard oc. 29
100. 43.28
101. 43.19
102. cf. 45.6-7
103. 43.28, 35-36 cf. 43.20-21; 45.1, 10; 46.31
104. 48.13
105. 43.39; 44.8; 45.12-13; 46.37; 48.20
106. 43.19, 35, 39; 45.2, 12; 46.30,36; 47.7; 48.21,27,35
107. 48.26-27
108. Richard oc. 44-45
109. 48.27 cf. 48.35
110. 43.1 cf. 43.40
111. 43.1
112. Richard oc. 45
113. ib. 43-45
114. ib. 44
115. 51.12-13 cf. Lk.2.52
116. 52.24 cf. 52.27-28
117. 52.40-2
118. 52.30-31
119. Richard oc. 40
120. 52.27-28
121. Richard oc. 40
122. ib. 40
123. 52.37; 53.22
124. Richard oc. 41
125. cf. Prestige oc. 115
126. 56.12, 19, 21, 22-23 cf. 55.4
127. 57.15
128. 57.25-28
129. Richard oc. 35
130. 54.33-39
131. 55.32 cf. 56.14, 21-23
132. 56.22
133. 56.31
134. 57.25-27
135. 57.25-27
136. 57.14
137. Richard oc. 35
138. ib. 34
139. ib. 34
140. ib. 34
141. 34.22-23 cf. ib. 29
142. 34.22
143. DI 11.3-6
144. DI 11.17
145. cf. 34.37
146. 34.25-36
147. 33.19-21
148. Richard oc. 46
149. cf. 57.9, 10, 30
150. cf. Rom. 7.19 ff.
151. De Vit. Ant. 7
152. 57.37-40
153. Richard oc. 36
154. ib. 36
155. PG.39. 1233 BC.
156. PG. 80. 964
157. 57.33, 39
158. Richard oc. 33
159. ib. 34
160. 56.27-28
161. 56.26-27
162. 57.26
163. 56.37-3
165. 23.2-3
166. 34.4-5 cf. 33.29-32; 33.1-4
167. 33.4-6
168. 12.1-2
169. 23.36-37 cf. ib. 3-5
170. 53.6
171. 40.37-1
172. 31.29-30 cf. 32.39 DI 44.19ff.
173. 22.37; 34.20-21 cf. the use of proslambanein in 31.12; 38.3,24 and of phorein in 23.36; 27.9; 56.15-16
174. 22.35-36
Like many of the previous works studied, the starting point of Athanasius' incarnational theology in the "Tomus ad Antiochenos" is the essential divinity of the Logos of the Father; it was the Logos who was very God, who became man. It was the Logos himself, the Lord, the Only-begotten Son of God, the Saviour who became incarnate. As the divine subject of the incarnation, the Logos was naturally in the form of God, and was the Son, "who is of the Father's essence, being consubstantial with the Father"(1).

He it was who became man. Generally described as the economy according to the flesh (2) and as the Logos' incarnation, and becoming man (3), the incarnation was that becoming man by the Logos of the Father at the consummation of the ages (4), a phrase drawn from Hebrews 9.26 which designates the consummation of the ages of preparation through God's law and prophets for Christ's coming. More particularly, the incarnation is described as that which the divine Logos both becomes in himself, and assumes to himself from without. For firstly, the divine Logos became man or the son of man (5); he became flesh (6), a clause drawn from the Johannine Christological formula; he became the first-born of many brethren (7), a clause which, with the "became the son of man" of 7.25-26, seems to emphasise the essential filial union of the man Jesus and all men. Secondly, the divine Logos had a body (8), having assumed the form of a slave (9) of Mary (10).

This self-abasement of the glorious Logos of the Father through the incarnation, a humiliation signified by the use of the 'taking the form of a slave' of the Carmen Christi of Philippians, is a genuine self-abasement. For the incarnation of the divine Logos, whereby it occurred, was a true incarnation. For "the Logos did not, as he came to the prophets, so dwell in a holy man at the consummation of the ages...."(11). The divine Logos did not merely come upon and overshadow the man Jesus, as he had upon his previous messengers to mankind, his prophets. Rather, he became man, thus effecting truly in himself the complete atonement of God and man. Indeed, the reality of the divine Logos' becoming man is stressed by the
contrast of the disjunctive sense of "he dwelt in a holy man" of 7.15-16, in which the separation of the divine Logos and the creaturely man is emphasised, with the cumulative sense of "the Logos became flesh, and... having taken the form of a slave, became man from Mary after the flesh" of 7.16-18, in which the union of the divine Logos with the creaturely man is underlined. The reality of the incarnation is further emphasised by the fact that as man the impassible Logos suffers (12).

Although the divine Logos truly became man, he did not cease to be truly divine. For he did not undergo either a coming into existence, or an alteration in his being in becoming man. Admittedly, this is not made clear explicitly in the Tome. Yet it is implied. For the use of the continuous present tense of the verb *einaí* in contrast with the perfect tense of *gignesthai* in such clauses as "being the true son of God, he became also the son of man, and being God's only-begotten Son, the same also became the first-born amongst many brethren"(13), suggest the eternity and immutability of the divine Logos. Again, the use of "the Logos had a body", in contrast with "the Logos became man/flesh", stresses the essential distinction between the divine Creator Logos and the assumed creaturely body in the Christ, thereby pointing to the continuing divinity of the Logos incarnate. Moreover, the incarnate economy of the Logos is "the economy according to the flesh". Over against this there is "the economy according to the divinity" of the Logos in which the Logos acts divinely (14); and it is this divine economy of the Logos which again stresses, and witnesses to, the eternal divinity of the Logos incarnate. These implicit references to the divine Logos' remaining very God while becoming very man is confirmed as orthodox in the appended letter of Paulinus. For, in it, Paulinus notes that "concerning the Logos of the Father becoming man for us, I hold as it is written that....the Logos was made flesh, not in the sense of those most impious persons who say that he has undergone a change but that he has become man for us..."(15).

Given therefore that the divine Logos became very man while remaining truly God, it follows, as we have briefly noticed, that the Christ acts in accordance with both his divine and his human natures. Thus, while he raised
Lazarus from the dead divinely (16), opened the eyes of a man born blind divinely (17) and opened the graves and raised the dead divinely (18), he yet had to inquire humanly as to where the deceased Lazarus lay (19), to spit as man, in the body (20) in order to make the clay with which to anoint the eyes of the man born blind, and to suffer in the flesh (21). These two economies, each genuine in itself, and each proper to the respective natures of the divine Logos incarnate, are both witnesses to the veracity of the divine Logos become man, while yet remaining fully divine.

While, however, the two economies are essentially distinct, as the use of the contrasting "men....de" in "anthropinos men....theikos de.....", "somatikos men ....theikos de.....", sarki men.....theikos de....." of 7.30-34 reveal, the subject of both are the same. For "there was not one who raised up Lazarus, and another who asked concerning him; but the same it was that said as man 'where does Lazarus lie?' , and as God raised him up....." (22). For the eternal Logos was the one subject of both economies in that while the becoming of the incarnation was neither a beginning of existence, nor an alteration, it was real, the divine Logos truly becoming the man Jesus.

This incarnation was not undertaken for the benefit of the immutable Logos, who by nature was beyond any increase. Rather, it was undertaken for men. For in the Logos incarnate the whole of humanity is perfectly and wholly freed from sin, quickened from the dead and introduced into the kingdom of heaven. Three brief points are noteworthy here: firstly, man's salvation in Christ was perfect and complete (23); it was completely guaranteed in the action of God in Christ, nothing being left to the chance of having been left to man's insecure and weak will. Secondly, man's salvation was that received from God, the passive words "was delivered", "was enlivened" and "was given access" (24) pointing to the action of the Godhead. For salvation was received from God in that only God could forgive sin, and as Life itself revitalise man in the kingdom of heaven. Lastly, man's salvation was effected in the incarnate Logos (25). For while the gift of life to man necessarily had to stem from the divine Logos, Life itself, that gift was only secured for man in its being
given to man in Christ, by its bestowal upon the humanity of Christ, which was one with all humanity.

We turn now to the much vexed question of the existence, or otherwise, of Christ's human soul. The central passage in the Tome for the answering of this question is 7.21-25: "they confessed also that the Saviour had not a body without a soul, nor without sense nor intelligence: for it was not possible, when the Lord had become man for us, that his body should be without intelligence: nor was the salvation effected in the Logos himself that of a body alone, but of a soul also" (26).

This passage is not an interpolation into Chapter 7, the omission of which would make the text more of a unity in its answering of the question as to whether the incarnation of the Logos was to be regarded as the Logos' becoming man, or his coming into man. For the only argument in favour of the interpolation hypothesis is that the omission of 7.21-25 would make the chapter more of a unity. That argument is, however, insufficient, especially as the statement about Christ's soul has a completely Athanasian ring about it, as we shall see. Rather, this passage is one which Athanasius composed and addressed to the Antiochenes. Indeed, even though it is written in the third person plural, "they confessed this also....." (27), it is that with which Athanasius agrees, as is made clear: Athanasius writes to his readers, "these things then being thus confessed, we exhort you not hastily to condemn those who so confess, and so explain the phrases which they use, nor to reject them, but rather to accept them...."(28); Athanasius requests his readers not to condemn those who confess the orthodox statements of chapter 7. Again, Athanasius exhorts the recipients of the Tome to read it in public to their congregations (29). Both of these points imply that Athanasius accepted the sense of the Christological declarations of the Synod of Alexandria, as recorded in Tome 7.

7.21-25 falls into three parts, all of which deserve our attention. There is the proposition: "the Saviour had not a body without a soul, nor sense, nor intelligence"; there are then two substantiations, "for it was not possible, when the Lord became man for us, that his body should be without intelligence" and "nor was the salvation effected in the Logos himself that of a body only, but of a soul
also". That these two latter clauses are substantiations is clear from the explanatory word "for" in 7.23 which introduces both clauses, and which acts as the conjunction between these two clauses and the main clause of 7.22. That these are two substantiations, and not one, is clear from the fact that the clause "nor was the salvation... etc." is not dependent upon the clause "for it was not possible...", the verb of the former being finite, \textit{gegenen}, and not an infinitive.

The proposition "the Saviour had not a body without a soul (\textit{apsuchon}) nor sense, nor intelligence", we shall study first. On first appearances, this proposition seems to admit clearly the existence of a human and rational soul in Christ. With this, however, Kelly disagrees. For, working from the thesis that the divine Logos is the \textit{hegemon} in Christ, the final source of all forms of life in the human nature of Christ, he interprets \textit{apsuchon} as 'lifeless' and understands 7.22 as meaning, not that the Logos incarnate possessed a created mind, but that the Logos himself was the vivifying principle of his body, and served as the intelligence or soul of the God-man (30). This understanding of 7.22 Kelly corroborates by noting three points: the formula was evidently put forward at Alexandria by the adherents of the \textit{Logos-sarx} Christology in order to counter objections to the suggestion that that Christology implied a maimed humanity, by asserting that it was misleading to represent Christ's humanity as being incomplete on the \textit{Logos-sarx} theology, as the Logos, the archetype of the mind or soul, had united himself to his flesh; Apollinarius understood these words in this sense; and, this interpretation of 7.21-25 accords much better than the immediate impression with the Alexandrian Christology in general and with the Alexandrian conception of the mind, or \textit{nous}, as the image of the divine Logos. With Kelly, however, we must disagree. For firstly, even if this Christological statement was put forward only by adherents of a strict \textit{Logos-sarx} Christology, which is doubtful, it is not therefore the case that Athanasius would have understood it in a strict \textit{Logos-sarx} manner. For Athanasius did not, as we have seen, expound his doctrine of Christ simply in terms of a \textit{Logos-sarx} schema. He also used a \textit{Logos-soma} and a \textit{Logos-anthropos} framework, each formula complementing and clarifying the others. It
is within this wide, Nicene perspective that Athanasius understood the Tome. Indeed, that it is through this wide, Nicene perspective that the Tome is to be read is clear, moreover, from the fact that the credal statement that it contains is the product of an Alexandrian council, at which representatives from the Latin West were present, and which was designed to satisfy and encourage Nicene supporters in Antioch, people of another area and another Christological tradition. The formulae of the council are therefore most likely to be carefully considered statements of the theology of the Catholic Church as a whole, as represented by such anti-Arians as Eusebius of Vercelli. It is therefore according to this broader, Nicene perspective, rather than in line with the narrow Logos-sarx Christological schema of Kelly's thesis, that Athanasius' personal theological opinions must be seen here. Secondly, the simple fact that Apollinarius understood the Tome in a strictly Logos-sarx fashion in no way means that Athanasius understood it similarly. Again, the fact that the Alexandrian theologians generally thought of the divine Logos as ultimately the hegemon in Christ, and of man's mind, or nous, as the image of the divine Logos does not mean that a human soul in Christ is thereby excluded. For this seems so from the parallels between the individual human nature of Christ and human nature in general. More importantly, ecclesiastical tradition will not allow us to follow Kelly and interpret apsuchon as "lifeless". For Socrates, in his Ecclesiastical History, notes that at the synod of Alexandria "they also declared that the Logos in being made man, assumed not only flesh (ensarkon), but also a soul (empsuchomenon), in accordance with the views of the early ecclesiastics...Irenaeus, Clemens, Apollinarius of Hierapolis, and Serapion who presided over the Church at Antioch, assure us in their several works, that it was the generally received opinion that Christ in his incarnation was endowed with a soul (empsuchon)....Origen also everywhere in his extant works accepts that the Incarnate God took on himself a human soul (empsuchon)..." (31). From the contrast of ensarkon with empsuchomenon, it seems clear that apsuchon of the Synod of 362 is not to be understood as "lifeless" but as "without a soul". This point is driven home yet more clearly by the contrast of soma with psuche in Sozomen's Ecclesiastical History: "the bishops
of many cities had assembled in Alexandria with Athanasius and Eusebius, and had confirmed the Nicene doctrines.... They declared that the human nature assumed by God the Logos is to be regarded as consisting of not a perfect body only (ou mono to somati....), but also of a perfect soul (psuche), even as was taught by the ancient church philosophers...." (32).

It seems therefore that Kelly's argument is a case of special pleading, and that the initial impression of Tome 7.22, that the Christ had a rational human soul, must be allowed as that which Athanasius accepted as orthodox.

The first substantiation of the main proposition reads that "it was not possible, when the Lord had become man for us, that his body should be without intelligence". To Grillmeier's mind the key to the right understanding of this clause lies in the "when the Lord.....for us", in which he places the emphasis upon "the Lord" (33). He therefore reasons that 7.23-24 means that since he, the Lord or the Logos, had become man, his body could not have been without intelligence. Approaching this question from the presuppositions present in the thought of a Logos-sarx Christology, and not in the light of any of the later controversies, Grillmeier then concludes that this intelligence in Christ is not grounded in Christ himself primarily and exclusively in a created principle, in a creaturely soul, since for Christ, as for all men (34), the divine Logos was the ultimate principle of intelligence. However, although Grillmeier reckons that the intelligence acknowledged in Christ's ou anoeton soma derived from the divine Logos and not primarily from a created soul, he does allow that the fact that even though in Christ the intelligence is ultimately grounded in the Logos, a human soul is not therefore excluded (35). With Grillmeier's general conclusions here we would not disagree; but certain qualifications must be noted. While we acknowledge that the emphasis here is upon the Logos as the ultimate source of rationality, we do not believe that the "....had become man for us" is redundant. Again, as we have noted in reference to Kelly's thesis, we do not think that Tome 7.23-24 is to be interpreted solely in terms of a Logos-sarx framework, in order to arrive at a correct understanding of Athanasius' comprehension of Tome 7. Rather, Tome 7 is to be understood in the light of the several
Christological frameworks that Athanasius uses. Moreover, while admitting that man's reason stems ultimately from the divine Logos, we would hold that for Athanasius that rationality is made manifest in man's rational soul. Hence it seems that Tome 7.23-24 means that since the divine Logos, the source of rationality, became man, the body that he assumed in becoming man was not "without intelligence" or without a rational soul, that manifestation of rationality. Herein lies a substantiation of the main proposition of 7.22.

Noteworthy here is the fact that while the substantiation of 7.23-24 helps establish the presence of a physical soul in Christ, it does not attribute a theological role to that soul. That, however, does not mean that the soul of Christ has no theological role; but even if it has, that role has no place in the argument of 7.22-24. For the point of the substantiation of 7.23-24 is to establish the fact of Christ's soul, the point of the proposition of 7.22. To establish that, mention of that soul's theological importance was not necessary.

The second substantiation reads "nor was the salvation effected in the Logos himself that of a body alone, but of a soul also". From this Grillmeier notes two things. Firstly, only the object to be redeemed, man and his soul, is mentioned. "Nothing is....said about the being of Christ himself" (36). Secondly, the salvation of the whole man is worked out in the Logos himself. For "the communication of the Logos is....the cause of the redemption of the whole man. Here.....the 'soul' of Christ is no theological factor" (37). Upon this latter point we must comment. It is true that the salvation of the whole man stems en auto to Logo, from the divine Logos. For he alone has the divinity to give in grace to man, in order to deify him, and to save him from his mortal and corruptible nature. Yet that does not mean that a human soul is absent from the Christ. For, from elsewhere in the Athanasian corpus, we have learnt that man's salvation is guaranteed only in Christ. Only in God's grace being bestowed upon the man Jesus whom the divine Logos has become, and upon all men in Jesus, was salvation for all secured. It seems clear therefore that for Athanasius, while salvation
originates in the divine Logos, it is mediated and secured for all men in the humanity of Christ.

One other point needs to be made with regard to Grillmeier's thoughts upon this substantiation. Grillmeier studies Tome 7.24-25 in itself, and not as a substantiation of a proposition. For if he had done the latter, he would not have said that the soul of Christ is no theological factor in man's salvation. For when 7.24-25 is seen as the substantiation of 7.22, we discover that Athanasius' argument is that in that men are wholly saved, Christ's "body" is not "without a soul, nor without sense, nor intelligence". There is therefore an implied connection between men's souls and Christ's soul. That is not to say, however, that the soul of Christ is the source of the salvation of men's souls. Rather, it is the means, or organ, of that salvation. For, even as the wills of men are secured to God in that the divine Logos assumed a human will in becoming man, and so preserved it unto righteousness, so the soul, the hegemon in man, is secured to God by its having been assumed unto salvation in Christ.

It seems therefore that, contrary to the views of Kelly, Tome 7.21-25 does assert the physical existence of Christ's soul, and that contrary to the views of Grillmeier and Roldanus (38), it acknowledges, albeit only implicitly, the theological function of that soul.

Confirmation of this conclusion is found in Tome 7.13-21. For the "for they confessed this also..." (39) looks back to the "what these confessed..." of 7.13-14, as the explanatory "for" of 7.21 suggests. Indeed, that 7.21-25 ought to be understood in the light of 7.13-21 seems corroborated by a parallelism between the two passages: the "what they confessed" of 7.13-14 is paralleled by the "they confessed this also" of 7.21; the admission of the divine Logos' truly becoming man, and fully man, the cumulative effect of "the Logos himself became flesh, and, having taken the form of a slave, became man of Mary, after the flesh" (40), both marking the reality of the manhood, and in its echoing the Nicene sarkothenta kai enanthropesanta, excluding the denial of a human soul in Christ, is paralleled by the explicit assertion that "the Saviour had not a
body without a soul, nor without sense, nor intelligence" (41); the recognition of the full salvation of man in the statement "in him the human race was perfectly and wholly delivered from sin" (42) is paralleled by that of "nor was the salvation effected in the Logos himself a salvation of body only, but of the soul also" (43).

Given this parallelism, it is noteworthy that while in 7.21-25 we find that since men are wholly saved in Christ, Christ has a soul, in 7.13-21 we find that since the Christ has a full humanity, the presence of the soul being asserted in the Nicene manner, men are saved fully. Indeed, the connection between the divine Logos (44) truly and fully becoming man, and the full salvation of man is stressed by the use of "in him" in "from Mary after the flesh he became man for us, and thus in him the human race was perfectly and wholly delivered..." (45). The implicit acknowledgement of the theological role of Christ's human soul of 7.21-25 is therefore made explicit in 7.13-21, in the opposite side of the coin to the former.

It is worth remembering, however, that, according to 7.13-21, man's full salvation is not dependent solely upon Christ's having a human soul, as though that soul were the source of salvation. Rather it was dependent upon the divine Logos truly remaining eternally divine, while yet becoming, rather than coming upon, true and whole man (46). Both a full and eternal divinity and a full and genuine humanity in the one Christ were necessary for man's full salvation.

It only remains for us to consider what kind of soul it was that Athanasius admits that Christ has. Christ's soul is described adjectivally, and not nominally, in the Tome. For it is not an object in itself. This is because it exists only in and through grace, being man's personal relation in grace to the divine Logos. For Athanasius therefore the human soul is not a possession of a human creature, but a dynamic gift which is maintained by the Creator Logos.

It is noteworthy here that the admission of the soul of Christ as adjectival, and as bound up with the mystery of grace, ties in with the idea found earlier in the Athanasian corpus, that man was "in the image of God" or personal only in the person of the divine Logos, the
Image of God. Christ's soul is therefore one in kind with man's, his soul being personal only as man's is "in the image of God".

Connected with the fact that the soul of Christ is not an object in itself, is the fact that there is only one subject in Christ (47). That one subject is not, however, the divine Logos in himself, nor the humanity itself, which the Logos assumed. It is the Logos incarnate, or the Logos become man, both body and soul. It follows from this therefore that while the soul of Christ takes part in the salvific work of Christ, in that it is of the man whom the divine Logos became in his incarnation, the soul of Christ does not have a role in itself in the same. For it is not an independent and self-existent object in the Logos incarnate. The soul of Christ cannot act in itself over against the divine Logos in Christ in that it is that which exists only in the divine Logos, and is that which the divine Logos has become in his incarnation.

Christ's soul is therefore similar to man's being 'in the image' in that it cannot exist or act in itself; it exists in the grace of the Providential Creator alone and acts only through its body.

In the chapter upon C.Ar.1, when treating the question of the human soul of Christ, we noted that that human soul was not explicitly mentioned there. The main reason for this seemed to be that it was Christ's divinity which then was the main concern of the Arians, and that it was that upon which Athanasius therefore rightly concentrated in his anti-Arian polemic. Indeed, it was only later in the controversy, when the divinity of the Holy Spirit was called into question by the Tropici, that Athanasius was truly faced with the question of whether or not to admit a human soul in Christ. It is therefore of great interest that the Tome, a work written in this later stage of the controversy, and in which there is reference to the council of Alexandria of A.D.362 - whose aims included the profession of the Nicene creed, the condemnation of the Arian heresy, and the solution of the question of the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with God the Father - does answer the question regarding the human soul of Christ in the affirmative. Its reference to Christ's soul, explicit in Ch.7 and implicit in the use
of the Nicene incarnational formulae which exclude a denial of a human soul, thus confirm our findings in the chapters upon C.Arian 1-3. The Tome is then the measure by which Athanasius' earlier works, and especially the anti-Arian ones, are rightly judged.

From Athanasius' Tome it seems therefore that the true Logos of the Father, while remaining God, became truly and fully man in order that in Christ men might be saved from corruption unto the life in holy communion with God the Creator.
Footnotes

1. cf. 11.39-40 cf. the Nicene creed.
2. 7.11
3. 7.36 cf. 10.12; 11.30-31
4. 7.16
5. 7.18, 23, 25-26; 10.12-13; 11.33-34, 36-37
6. 7.16-17 cf. 11.32
7. 7.26-27
8. cf. 7.22
9. 7.17 cf. Phil.2.7
10. 7.17-18 cf. 11.34-35; Rom. 1.3-4
11. 7.14-16
12. cf. 7.29-34
13. 7.25-27
14. cf. 7.31, 32, 34
15. 11.30-34
16. 7.29, 31
17. 7.32-33
18. 7.34
19. 7.29-31
20. 7.31-32
21. 7.33 cf. 1 Peter 4.1
22. 7.28-31 cf. 7.31 ff.
23. 7.19
24. 7.19-20
25. 7.16-21
26. cf. 11.35-37
27. 7.21
28. 8.38-40
29. cf. 9.22 ff.
30. cf. Kelly oc. 288
31. Socrates. E.H. 3.7
32. Sozomen. E.H. 5.12
33. Grillmeier. oc. 322
34. cf. Athanasius De Vit. Ant. 74
35. Grillmeier. oc. 323
36. ib. 321
37. ib. 322
38. cf. Roldanus. oc. 260
39. 7.21
40. 7.16-18 cf. 7.36
41. 7.22
42. 7.19-20
43. 7.24-25
44. cf. 7.17
45. 7.17-19
46. 7.13-18 cf. 7.22-25
47. 7.28-31
The *Ad Epictetum* deals with the relation of the historical Christ to the eternal Son. Questions had been raised at Corinth, similar to those which had troubled the Eastern Church generally, and which were to come to a head in the system of Apollinarius, whose distinctive tenets are not, however, mentioned in this letter. Some of the Epictetus' flock had been anxious to place the Nicene doctrine in intelligible connection with the matter of the Gospel narrative, and had debated the issue before their bishop. Their tentative solutions had fallen into two classes, both of which proceeded from the assumption, incidentally countered by Athanasius, that the manhood of Christ was such that, if invested with divine attributes, it would introduce a fourth aspect to the Trinity. To avoid this difficulty, one party identified the Logos with the manhood, by assuming either that the Logos was changed, in his incarnation, into flesh, or that the flesh itself was unnatural, being of the divine essence. The other party excluded the man Jesus from the Trinity, explaining his relation to God along the lines of Photinus.

It was in the face of these tentative suggestions that Epictetus wrote to Athanasius seeking his opinion, and that Athanasius duly gave his views.

Fundamental to Athanasius' reply to Epictetus is his belief that he who became incarnate was very God. The Logos was the impassible and incorporeal Logos of God (1); he was by nature God (2); he was the Lord, the Omnipotent One; and he was, contrary to the belief of some, the true Son of the true Father, he who was consubstantial with the Father, but was not the Father himself (3). As such therefore he was essentially God, being like the Father in all things but his fatherhood (4).

The divine Logos was consequently naturally distinct from creation, in that he was naturally distinct from his body (5), which was an integral and natural part of the whole of creation (6). Indeed, this essential distinction of the divine Logos from creation is brought out even more clearly in contrasting those statements which describe the divine Logos as one who, being of the Father's essence (7),
is immaterial, intangible, and impassible (8), with those that picture his body, that integral part of creation, as that which, being of Mary or "from the earth" (9) is naturally material, tangible and passible (10). It follows therefore that the subject of the incarnation, for Athanasius, is very God, and as such is distinct in his lordly role as Creator from creaturely man.

It was this very God, the Logos, who bridged the otherwise unbridgeable gulf between God and man in becoming incarnate.

Generally being described as the sojourning of the Logos (11), and as the 'coming of the line of David' (12), a description in which the eternally divine sonship of the Logos is contrasted in a very Pauline manner with the temporal and human sonship of the Logos of the Davidic line (13), the incarnation is understood under two aspects: that which the divine Logos becomes in himself, and that which he takes to himself to be his own possession.

The divine Logos became man (14) or flesh (15), the latter being the well-known Johannine Christological formula.

These two Christological clauses which Athanasius, arguing upon the basis of Joel 2.28, sees as synonymous, are not, however, to be understood as meaning that the divine Logos thereby ceased to be truly divine by becoming man. For even as it was said that the Logos became accursed in that "he took upon himself the curse on our behalf" (16), so it is also said that the Logos became flesh "not by being changed into flesh, but....in assuming living flesh, and becoming man" (17). Indeed, the assertion that the Logos did not undergo an alteration in relation to his divine nature through his incarnation is confirmed elsewhere; for "in becoming flesh the divine Logos did not turn into it" (18). Rather, by remaining truly divine the Logos remained impassible and incorporeal, hallmarks of true divinity, while yet in a passible body (19). He remained God, the Lord of glory while being in the body which was ingloriously nailed and dishonoured. He remained the universal Creator whom the sun, a creature, recognised, even when the Creator was in the outraged body upon the cross (20).

Moreover, that this divinity lost none of its power in the incarnation is confirmed in Ch.6, where Athanasius notes that the Logos incarnate could have checked his passions, an act only possible for a superhuman being.
Yet he did not, refraining not by force of circumstance, but through deliberate choice (22). Finally, the usages of the verbs "to become" and "to be" corroborate the above findings. For "to become" is not used in connection with "body" lest it imply that the divine Logos changed in his own nature (23). Again, in connection with the post-resurrection meeting of Thomas and Christ, Athanasius notes that Christ did not say "as you see me to be flesh and bone", but "as you see me to have", in order that it might not be thought that the Logos himself was changed into these things, but that he had them (24). Athanasius thus recognises the immutability of the divine Logos even in his incarnation. Indeed, the eternal immutability of the divine Logos while yet incarnate is demonstrated by the use of the continuous present of the verb "to be". This continuous sense of "to be" is especially evident when used over against "to have become", the latter being an infinitive which can have the sense of "coming into existence" or "being born". The verb "to be", then, is a properly continuous tense, implying neither beginning nor end of existence. It asserts that the Logos belongs to the eternal, heavenly world, and that he is the first and the last, the eternal Lord, wherein he is one with the Father.

Given then that the divine Logos did not undergo any alteration in his being as God in and through his incarnation, and given, moreover, that the assumed body of the Logos was not consubstantial with his divinity, it follows that the reference in 2.15 to to kuriakon soma is not to be understood to mean that the assumed body became divine by nature. Rather it ought to be understood as an alternative to the to soma tou Kuriou of 7.32 et al.

The incarnational becoming of the Logos did not, however, entail his coming into being; for since the assumed humanity was not co-eternal with the Son, as Athanasius' strong disavowal in Ch.2 demonstrates, the Logos himself must necessarily pre-exist it, being eternally God, the Son of the Father. Indeed, while the Logos exist eternally in and with the Father and Holy Spirit, the body which he assumed in becoming man only came into being when the Logos took it to himself; for it exists only in and through him: "They all will reasonably condemn themselves who have thought that the flesh derived from Mary existed before her, and that the Logos, prior to her, had a human soul, and
 existed in it always even before his coming " (25).

Despite all these qualifications Athanasius nevertheless asserts that the becoming is real and can ask incredulously: "Who ever heard in the Church, or even from Christians, that the Lord wore a body putatively, and not in truth?" (26); or again, "How can they wish to be called Christians who say that the Logos had descended upon a holy man as upon one of the prophets, and has not himself become man, taking the body from Mary; but that Christ is one person, while the Logos of God, who before Mary and before the ages was Son of the Father, is another?" (27). For Athanasius, "becoming man" is very truth (28); it is not a mere fantasy, being but theoretical (29). On the contrary, the birth was genuine. Indeed, that "becoming man" is not merely incidental and external, but truly real, is stressed by Athanasius' explicit denial that"the Logos came upon a holy man, as upon one of the prophets" (30), and his affirmation that he became man, having assumed a body from Mary (31). In short, the Logos did not merely touch the man Jesus from without, as he touched the Old Testament prophets by grace; he became that very man Jesus. Consequently, there is in the Christ but one subject, the Logos; it was "the very Logos" who, although impassible, endured the marks of the nails; it was "the same" who, while being "intangible", was beaten and scourged (32).

Yet, since the divine Logos did not undergo any alteration in his divine being when truly becoming man, that one subject of the incarnation, the Logos, endured two economies, one relating to his immutable divinity, and one to his assumed humanity. For, as God, the Logos was impassible, but, as man, he suffered; "in the body which was circumcised, and carried, and ate and drank, and was weary, and was nailed on a tree, and suffered, there was the impassible and incorporeal Logos of God" (33). Hence one arrives at the paradoxical situation wherein the one subject, the Logos, is both impassible and passible: "the same it was who suffered, and yet suffered not" (34).

Before we pass on to consider the other understanding of the incarnation, we must note how it is that the impassible Logos is seen to be the subject of the sufferings of Christ. The body, as we have already seen, is passible and therefore suffers naturally. However, in that the impassible Logos has made his own the body and its
categories, and in that he has united himself to it, he has referred its passions to himself as their subject: "for what the Logos' human body suffered, this the Logos, dwelling in the body, ascribed to himself" (35). Thus, for example, when the body is smitten, the Logos, who has assumed that body, views himself as having been smitten, and thus as suffering. Yet it must be stressed that it is only in and through this assumption of the body that those categories natural to the body, and essentially alien to the divine Logos, are applicable to the impassible Logos. Herein the humanity remains the natural subject of its passions, while the Logos becomes its subject only in the incarnation, and not in and through himself. This is confirmed in 6.13-17, part of which we have already cited: "it is strange that he it was who suffered and yet suffered not. Suffered, because his own body suffered, and he was in it, which thus suffered; did not suffer, because the Logos, being by nature God, is impassible. And while he, the incorporeal, was in the passible body, the body had in it the impassible Logos...". Here we then find succinct witness to the Logos having become truly passible man, while yet being truly impassible God, having endured no change in his divine being through his incarnation.

The incarnation was also seen as a transitive act in which the Logos took humanity to himself from without. Historically, at the optimum point in time (36), the divine Logos assumed humanity, an assumption which is variously described by the verbs lambanein and its cognates (37), enduesthai (38), phorein (39), idiopoiein (40), dechesthai (41) and metapoein (42). The divine Logos therefore had humanity (43), and was thus en somati or en anthropino somati (44) and en sarki (45), the humanity then being the Logos'.

These verbs used to describe the relationship of the Logos to his assumed humanity, and indeed, the generic term epidemia, and its cognates (46), with its implication of the divine Logos not being native to the creaturely realm, all stress the distinction of the divine Logos from the creaturely body, and so emphatically deny the alteration of the divine being in its incarnation. For all of these verbs, and especially that prefixed by epi- (47), point to the humanity being that which was taken from without the divine Logos, and which was therefore unable to affect the
Logos in his divine essence. Indeed, the distinction of "he who assumed" and "that assumed" in the incarnation is stressed explicitly on several occasions. 4.18-19, with its statement that "God came in a human body", seems to point to the distinction. For it is found in the context of an argument against the consubstantiality of the divine Logos with the creaturely humanity. In this context, the phraseology of 4.18-19 stresses especially the otherness of the divine Logos to the humanity assumed. 5.30-32, "in the circumcised body...there was the impassible and incorporeal Logos of God", in the context of an argument that the divine Logos' essence did not undergo any alteration in and through its incarnation, again stresses the distinction of the divine assumer and the creaturely assumed. 8.9-10, perhaps more so than 5.30-32, stresses this distinction: "the Logos himself was not changed into bones and flesh, but came in the flesh". Had the latter part of this sentence been the Johannine Christological formula, the immutability of the divine Logos in becoming man would not have been made so clear. The use, however, of "came in the flesh", stresses the otherness of the divine Logos to his creaturely flesh. Further, 7.2-4 stresses, through the use of a transitive verb, the fact that the divine Logos was unaffected in his being in the incarnation. For "he did not say 'As you see me to be flesh and bones' but 'to have', that it might not be thought that the Logos himself had changed into those things, but that he had them". The transitive verb "to have", in contrast with the intransitive verb "to be", emphasises the natural distinction between the eternally divine Logos and the assumed creatureliness.

Yet, within the context of this natural distinction of "he who assumes" and "that assumed", there is also an emphasis upon the unity of the immutable Logos and the mutable body. The divine Logos was in complete fellowship with it through his making it his own (48). The Logos is related to the body in such a manner that that relationship is described by the verb suneînai, a verb used in DI 17.26 of the Son's relationship to the Father, and in DI 8.23 of a husband's to a wife. Moreover, there are statements suggesting the intimacy of the divine Logos and his assumed humanity. 6.16-17, "the incorporeal One was in the passible body; and the body had in it the impassible Logos" stresses
such a unity explicitly. Meanwhile the various uses of the verbs "to have" and "to be clothed" imply such a unity. For the former verb is used to describe the relationship of both the Logos to his body and the body to the Logos (49); the latter verb is used similarly. For it describes the relationship both of the Logos to his assumed humanity, and of man's humanity, that assumed by the divine Logos on behalf of all, to the Logos (50).

In these descriptions of the incarnation therefore the mystery of God made man is again asserted; it is described to the same end as by the descriptions, according to which the Logos became something in himself, but by different means. For here again the divine Logos is seen as remaining Logos, and as such is viewed as totally distinct from the creaturely body. Yet that incarnation so seen is also thought of as totally genuine. Hence the naturally distinct Logos is closely related to the body. Indeed, the whole mystery is summarised in the sentence "the incorporeal One was in the body" (51).

The humanity assumed by the Logos was born of Mary, of the seed of David. Here we come across one of the few references to Christ's messianic qualifications through the Davidic descent. Yet there is no intention in this reference to rule out the virgin birth through the use of the phrase "of the seed of David", as the statements of the Davidic descent themselves reveal: "after the flesh of the seed of David, and of the flesh of Mary" (52). Moreover 5.6-23 witness clearly to the centrality of the virgin birth for Athanasius' theology. For birth of the Virgin, in Athanasius' mind, precludes docetism (53). Noteworthy however in regard to the fact of the virgin birth is the passivity and obedience of Mary, which points to the divine initiative in the creative act of incarnation, and which counters any form of synergism, of the cooperation of man with God, in the divine becoming.

As we have already noted, the virgin birth is used in Athanasius' argument to preclude a docetic Christology. Indeed, the body assumed in the incarnation is not to be considered docetic in any sense of the word. For that body is similar in all respects to man's, as 5.7-8 reveals: "it befitted him to be made like his brethren in all respects, and to take a body like us " (54). It is "the same as man's" (55), and is therefore alethinon (56), an
adjective which conveys the sense of true or genuine in a more essential manner than *alethes*. Consequently, in common with every man's humanity with which Christ's humanity is similar, that body is creaturely, being by nature from the earth. It is therefore not consubstantial with the godhead, being but similar to man's for whose sake it was created. Nor is it co-eternal with the eternal Logos of God. Rather, it stems from the point of its assumption of Mary. Being taken of her, it was passible and mortal. This same anti-docetic position is stated in 2.6-8 and in Ch.5 passim. For in the former passage Athanasius counters the view that the Logos was incarnate putatively only by asking: "Who has ever heard... that putatively, and not in reality the Lord wore a body". For him therefore the incarnation was genuine, being real. The latter passage re-emphasises this. For Athanasius notes with regard to the virgin birth that Gabriel announced to Mary "what is born of thee" that "what was born might be believed to be naturally from her, inasmuch as Nature clearly shows that it is impossible for a virgin to produce milk unless she has brought forth, and impossible for a body to be nourished with milk...unless it had previously been naturally brought forth" (57). Docetism is hereby eliminated.

Yet in respect of this anti-docetic stance we must raise two points. Firstly the body which the Logos assumed, he assumed without sin (58). Sin, however, is sometimes seen as integral to weak humanity. Was therefore Christ's humanity truly human? The answer to this question must be positive. For the view that sin is integral to man's creatureliness does not coincide with Athanasius' theology. For him, man is truly human as he is created by and in God. Yet God, being good, cannot create that which is evil. Man as created by him is in his origin therefore good. For Athanasius therefore sinless man is in fact true man. Thus in assuming sinless humanity, the Logos was assuming true, and not docetic humanity. Secondly, Christ's humanity is described as *kuriakon soma*. This, however, does not bring to question the reality of that humanity. For, as we have already noted, that very *kuriakon soma* is not consubstantial with the divinity of the Logos, but is only by grace the body of the Lord; *kuriakon* is simply an epithet used to
qualify that particular body assumed by the Logos, ho Kurios, and to identify and single out that body from all other bodies. This second point therefore does not question the reality of that assumed humanity of the Logos.

Another topic, closely related to the question of docetism, must now be considered, namely, whether or not Christ's humanity was true in a psychological sense.

In 7.29-30 man is seen as bipartite: "not the body alone, but the whole man, body and soul....". Yet there is no explicit mention in this letter of Christ having a human soul, as well as a body, in his becoming man. Rather, the Logos, and not the human soul, is seen as the subject of the assumed body in 6.3-4; the body is considered as the temple of God (59); and the Logos seems to be that which alone stands over against the mortal body in the description of Christ's death in 5.32-6.1. Such has therefore led some to deny the existence of a rational soul in the theandric Christ, as portrayed in the ad Epict. To this denial therefore we must now turn our minds.

That Athanasius does not explicitly mention Christ's human soul in this tract need not concern us too much. Had Athanasius been setting out to counter Apollinarian thought in this letter, and had he not mentioned a rational soul of Christ in the face of the Apollinarian denial, it might reasonably be supposed that he accepted that denial; but this letter is not setting out to counter Apollinarianism, but to respond to the views either that Christ's humanity was not real, being consubstantial with the divinity of the Logos, or that the divine Logos had undergone an essential alteration in respect of his divine being through his incarnation, and had altered to bones and flesh. Given such purposes, the question of the existence or otherwise of a rational human soul of Christ is very much secondary, and the omittance of either an explicit affirmation or denial of its existence is insignificant.

6.1-2, "it is shown to all that the body was not the Logos, but body of the Logos" gives a clue to the tenor of Ch.6, and to the light in which such statements as "the incorporeal One was in the passible body"(60) are to be understood. They are not to be understood as anthropological, but as theological statements. For the purpose of the
chapter is to argue against the view that the divine Logos, in becoming incarnate, changed into bones and flesh. It is in the light of such a theological, and not anthropological argument, therefore, that 6.2ff. is to be comprehended.

Given this theological argument, in which Athanasius wants to demonstrate the essential distinction of the assumed humanity, and of him who assumed it, the divine Logos, how are we to understand that assumed humanity and that divine Logos? The assumed humanity is what is weak, open to touch and suffering, mortal and corruptible. It is that material creatureliness which is essentially over against the immaterial Creator Logos. The divine Logos who assumed that creatureliness is, on the other hand, he who is incorporeal, and who is not open to touch and to passion, both of which are properties of the "body". It seems therefore that within the context of the theological argument that the divine Logos did not alter into bones and flesh in and through his incarnation, the distinction between the divine Logos and the assumed humanity is duly pressed. The particular Christological clauses of Ch.6 therefore seem not to serve an anthropological but a theological purpose.

That Ch. 6 does serve this theological purpose is confirmed by the fact that the Logos does not act as the subject of the assumed humanity in his true divinity. For as the immaterial, intangible and impassible Logos he cannot be so. The Logos is not the subject in Christ in and by himself. He is the subject in so far as he has become incarnate. As divine Logos he is anything but subject in Christ, being eternally impassible and incorporeal, and is thus essentially distinct from the passible body. In so far, however, as the Logos has made the body his own, he is the subject of his own body, but only in his human economy; he is subject in that he has assumed to himself a body which is the sphere of such passions. The subject of Christ therefore is the"Logos in a human body", where "human body" must be understood in theological terms as that human creatureliness essentially over against the divine Logos.

It is therefore mistaken to understand such passages as 6.3ff. as portraying the Logos, and not a human soul, as the subject of the assumed body. For in the first place
this is not an anthropological but a theological passage. Secondly, the subject in Christ is not the Logos, but the "Logos in the body", where "body" is not to be understood in an anthropological manner as that over against the human soul but in a theological manner as that passible and frail creatureliness over against the immaterial Creator Logos.

Nor need the fact that the assumed humanity is the "temple of the Logos" concern us in our inquiry into the reality of Christ's humanity. For it probably has its point of reference in John 2.21: "he spoke of the temple of his body" (61), rather than in an anthropological statement which suggests that the Christ is but the divine Logos indwelling the assumed humanity, like a temple, and which therefore implies the absence of a human soul. Indeed, the qualification of "temple" by "filled full of the Godhead" (62) recalls the Old Testamental concept of the glory of the Lord filling the Temple (63), and thus indirectly suggests that the body of Christ is the temple of the New Covenant, and that this clause therefore is not a veiled anthropological reference.

5.32-6.1, the brief description of Christ's death in the ad Epist., has been seen as clear evidence of the absence of a rational human soul in Christ. Yet the force of the passage is not such as has sometimes been supposed. For the context of the argument here is theological and not anthropological; the reference to Christ's death is to explain not Christ's humanity but to show that the divine Logos in becoming man did not alter in himself into bones and flesh. Moreover, the body which the divine Logos lays in his tomb is again not to be understood anthropologically, but theologically. For that body is not set over and against the human soul, but over and against the impassible and incorporeal Logos of God (64). The body is therefore to be understood as that creatureliness which is open to passion and death, the complete antithesis of the impassible, asomatic Creator Logos. Confirmation that "body" here is to be understood as man in his creatureliness is found in 6.38-1, where there is reference to the body as that which Joseph wrapped in a linen cloth, and laid in the tomb at Golgotha. That body therefore is not to be seen as that anthropological entity over against the human soul, but as man in his physical
being and his mortality. It is in the light of these two considerations therefore that we must look at Athanasius' argument that the Logos did not become the body in the incarnation. This Athanasius demonstrates through reference to Christ's descent into hell. It was the body which was laid in the tomb when the Logos went to preach to the souls of the departed in Hades. Yet had the Logos become "body" in his incarnation, there would have been no need for a tomb. For the body itself would have descended to Hades to preach (65). Such, however, was not the case. Hence there cannot have been a "becoming a body" by the Logos.

That the body was buried as the mortal aspect of Christ is indisputable (66). That it was the Logos who went to preach to the souls in Hades is also indisputable, and in keeping with 1 Peter 3.19 (67). That he who went to preach to the souls of the departed is distinct from that humanity laid in the tomb (68) is very much in keeping with the purpose of the argument, that the Logos did not become "body" in becoming incarnate. Yet that the Logos' separation from the body in death is akin to that of the soul from the body in its last hour (69), and that the Logos has taken the place of the soul in Christ, are not at all clear. For this separation, upon which the whole case stands or falls, is not itself established. For the "he went forth.....to preach" of 5.33 (70) is but the equivalent of the "he went and preached" of 1 Peter 3.19. Meanwhile the "was separated" of 5.33, which almost appears to be parenthetical in the reference to 1 Peter 3.19, and which verbally seems connected with the separation of the soul and body in death (71), is in fact in the negative, and not positive. For the Logos leaves the body in its grave, in order to complete his descent into hell, and yet"was not separated from it (sc.body)" (72). Hence this passage seems to mark not a similarity between the Logos and the soul, but a difference. For in the case of the death of Christ, the Logos is not ultimately removed from the assumed humanity, while in the case of any other man the soul is removed from its body. Underlying the clause which contains "was separated", therefore, is probably not the idea that the Logos has taken the place of the soul in the life and death of the assumed "body", but that by not being separated from the body even when he was in Hades,
the Logos, the Life, effected the continuous existence of his assumed humanity through its resurrection for all. Moreover, in this context in which 1 Peter is being mentioned, that which departs to preach to the souls of the departed must be the "Christos" of 1 Peter 3.18, or the Logos incarnate of ad Epict. 5 - 6, and not a human soul. Indeed, that Logos incarnate of ad Epict. 5-6 may be given meaning by the very phrase "was not separated from it" (73). For traditionally that phrase has been taken to have its point of reference only in the separation, and therefore distinction, of the divine Logos from his assumed humanity. Yet it may also have its point of reference in the fact that the divine Logos did not depart to preach in Hades as divine Logos, but only as Logos "not separated from his body" or as incarnate. For certainly this secondary point of reference would fit into the context of the argument that the impassible Logos of God did not undergo any essential alteration in regard to his divine essence in and through his incarnation, an alteration which would be implied if one allowed Christ's death to be interpreted along the lines of a "Logos-sarx" Christology, in which the divine and impassible Logos would relinquish his assumed body, and himself descend to Hades, so suffering mortality. If, however, one allows this secondary interpretation, Christ's death is to be seen as the burial of the assumed body, and the procession of the Logos incarnate, "not separated from his body" to the souls of the departed, the procession being that of the Logos in that he alone had that divinity necessary for the salvation of the departed, but of the Logos incarnate, as the divine Logos, being impassible and immortal, was not able to endure death in himself (74), even for man's sake.

Thus the saving work of the Logos in Hades is not to be seen as "un oeuvre exclusivement divine", executed by "la présence du Logos seul", as Roldanus supposes (75). Rather it is to be seen as the saving work of the divine Logos, mediated through his humanity, to the incarcerated souls of the departed.

All in all, therefore, 5.32-6.1 seems to aim at commenting upon the distinction of the Logos from his assumed humanity, and not upon the place of a rational and human soul in Christ.
These four points whereby the denial of Christ's human soul has been argued are thus to be interpreted otherwise than anthropologically. Moreover, there seem to be hints elsewhere, the cumulative effect of which is to suggest that the Christ as portrayed in the ad Epict. is empsuchos.

As we have noted, the divine Logos became man, or flesh. Yet he did not enter into, nor come upon one particular man. Consequently, to expect Athanasius to admit that Christ had a soul distinct from the Logos, as we find in Antiochene theology, is unlikely. For to do so would not only be to call into question the reality of the becoming of the Logos, but would also be to act in a manner contrary to the statements of 2.27-29 and 11.2-5. For if Athanasius were to admit that the Christ was composed of soul plus body plus Logos, he would be admitting that the divine Logos had come upon a man, and not become man. It seems therefore that any human soul in Christ will be portrayed not as a self-existent physiological entity, but as intimately related to, and integrally bound up with, the Logos truly become man.

Three points seem to suggest that the Christ had a rational human soul: echoing Hebrews 2.16-17, Athanasius asserts that the divine Logos was made like man in all respects, the all inclusive phrase "in all respects" not reasonably being cut short of implying likeness to men in having common rational souls. It should be noted here, however, that such clauses as ta hemon autos dechomenos (76) are not to be interpreted in this anthropological manner. For ta hemon which are assumed are nothing but men's passions, corruption and mortality which the Christ destroys that he might clothe men in ta heautou, namely his impassibility, incorruption and immortality. Again, Athanasius uses in the ad Epict. those clauses that echo the Nicene formula sarkothenta kai enanthropesanta, whereby the denial of Christ's rational soul was excluded. Athanasius asserts that "he assumed living flesh, and became man" (77) and "assuming flesh, he proceeded forth as man" (78). Lastly, that humanity assumed by the Logos was a 'human body' (79), the 'body' being not that of the "irrational creatures", but of rational man, the hall-mark of which was the rational soul.

These three points may be confirmed elsewhere. For
in Ch. 8, again arguing against the view that the assumed humanity was consubstantial with the Godhead, Athanasius states that: "they all will reasonably condemn themselves who have thought that the flesh derived from Mary existed before her, and that the Logos, prior to her, had a human soul...."(80). While being cautious lest we force the passage too far, we may note that Athanasius denies the pre-existence of either a human flesh or soul. Yet Athanasius admits that Christ had a human flesh from Mary. Perhaps we may therefore see in the latter half of the above statement a hint to the effect that Christ had a human soul, but not one which was pre-existent.

The second passage which may provide confirmation for the above conclusion again lies in Ch. 8. Working from Joel 2.28, Athanasius asserts that to say 'the Logos became flesh' is equivalent to saying, 'the Logos became man' (81). Yet the "flesh" of the LXX text of Joel upon the basis of which the above equation is made is understood not as ta aloga zoa, but anthropoi. In other words, there seems to be a connection between the "flesh" that the Logos becomes, and rational humanity. Indeed, this is confirmed in 8.19-20, where it is stated that the promise recorded in Joel 2.28 was not made "to the irrational animals but to men", for whose sake the Logos became man also; there is therefore this connection between the man whom the Logos became, and those for whom he came, rational man, the hallmark of whose rationality is the "rational soul".

Ch. 7 asserts that the divine Logos truly became man, as the salvation of the whole man reveals (82). Implied in this argument therefore is the belief that there is some connection or inter-relation between Christ's and man's humanity. Yet man's humanity is seen as not "body only, but the whole man, body and soul" (83). Given therefore that there seems to be a correlation between man's humanity, which is redeemed, and Christ's humanity, through which the Logos redeems man, and that the term "man", that which the Logos becomes (84), is interpreted in a related passage as soul and body (85), we may not be so far from the truth if we conclude that Christ's humanity is empsuchos.

It seems therefore that that humanity assumed by the divine Logos was truly creaturely, and truly human. Hence it was that the divine, incorporeal Logos assumed to himself
a creaturely body, without becoming it, when he became critical, rational and logical man. His incarnation therefore was natural in the sense that he assumed true human nature, but not in that of his having altered in his very divine being; it was personal in that the divine person truly became a human person.

Despite the fact that the humanity assumed by the Logos was marvellously whole, and despite the fact that the divine Logos incurred no alteration in his being as God, the incarnation was seen by Athanasius as an humiliation. This was partly because the divine Creator Logos was united with a mere creaturely body, partly because it was in the passible body that the impassible Logos suffered, and partly because the divine Logos thereby suffered great insult. For "God, even the Lord of glory, was in a body which was ingloriously nailed and dishonoured" and the "Creator was in an outraged body" (86), two statements in which attention is drawn to the disgraceful and unjust treatment of Christ by the Jews, and by the Roman forces of first century Palestine. That the Logos underwent humiliation in and through his incarnation is certain. Yet Athanasius has not really explained that humiliation in relation to the immutable and eternal Logos who became man.

Soteriology dominates Athanasius' incarnational theology. For the Logos became man for man's sake. Consequently it was not the Logos who was bettered through the incarnation; it was not the Triune God who was benefitted through the Logos' becoming man. For the Triune God, being always perfect, was not open to either addition or diminution (87). Rather, it was humanity which benefitted through the incarnation of the perfect Logos, who was incapable of betterment, a great addition accruing to the human body itself from its fellowship and union with the Logos (88).

The salvation which effected that betterment was no mere fantasy, but genuine, and extended to the whole man. For the Logos himself, in becoming man, worked man's salvation. Through offering that human incapacity which he received in becoming man, in his sacrificial death to the Father, the Logos effected man's ransom. He put an end to our bodily passions by destroying them through his divine impassibility. He clothed our mortal and corruptible
frames in immortality and in incorruption; he made our sensual bodies spiritual, and led our earthly bodies unto the gates of heaven. Therein the Logos' body was raised from the dead, to be the forerunner in the general resurrection. In short, therefore, the divine Logos, the Life-Giver, enlivened the mortal humanity of men by clothing it in his divine capacity (89), and by making it to participate by grace in his divinity.

As we have noted, the Logos assumed humanity for the sake of all. Hence it was that the Logos worked man's salvation in that assumed from men to himself. Man's mortal humanity was made immortal in Christ's humanity through the divine Logos' dynamic presence in it. Hence Christ's humanity is to be seen both intensively and extensively; it is that humanity proper to the Logos through his incarnation, and yet it is that in which all men share in the Logos become man; it is Christ's own humanity, and yet that creaturely humanity common to all men.

In his statement that the Logos assumed humanity for all, Athanasius implies that Christ's humanity is an essential part of the soteriological process. This is borne out in Ch.7. For in answer to the question of whether man's redemption to incorruptible immortality was but putative, Athanasius notes:"the Saviour having in very truth become man, the salvation of the whole man was brought about" (90). Indeed, had the Logos been incarnate putatively, or in an imaginary way, the salvation and resurrection of man would have been but imaginary. It seems therefore that Christ's humanity is that in and through which man's salvation is effected and guaranteed. The fact, however, that man's genuine salvation, that of the whole man, soul and body (91), was that effected in the Logos himself (92) need not cause us to alter our opinion. For, that that salvation was effected "in the Logos himself" does not mean that Christ's physicality did not play a soteriological role. Indeed, the preceding sentences, 7.24-28, maintain that it did. Rather, the phrase "in the Logos himself" is but to be understood to mean that the salvation effected in and through Christ's humanity has its origin and source in, and only in, the truly divine Logos of the Father. Moreover, the fact that the salvation of "the whole man", interpreted as "soul and
body", was guaranteed by the Logos becoming in truth man, and that the salvation of "the whole man, soul and body" points to the reality (93) of the "human body of the Lord" (94), a phrase which in itself suggests Christ's human rational soul, both suggest that not only Christ's body, but also his rational soul, play an active part in the redemption of man.

Given that Christ's humanity plays an important part in the salvation of men, it is interesting to note that Athanasius recognises a continuity between the pre- and post-resurrection Christ (95). For Athanasius, belief in the resurrection of Jesus necessarily involves believing that, as the risen and exalted Lord, he still possesses the same human nature, albeit glorified, as he assumed in the incarnation. Indeed, it is this very continuity which underlies man's salvation. For in that it is Christ's mortal flesh, assumed for all, that dies, and that it is the same mortality clothed in incorruptible immortality that rises from the dead, it is man who dies in Christ, and yet rises again in Christ.

Since it seems to be the case that the oneness of Christ's humanity with men's is necessary for a real and full salvation, it must be asked whether the fact that the Christ was sinless (96) threatens the reality and fullness of that salvation. Can Christ be really one with men, if he is sinless, and they sinful? For Athanasius, the answer to this question is affirmative. In the first place, for Athanasius, sin is not a state, but an action, and so does not affect the reality or otherwise of the incarnation. Moreover, sin, although very much part of the human experience, is not natural to humanity. Mortality and corruption on the other hand are. Thus, when the divine Logos became man, he truly took to himself that which was natural to man, corruptible mortality, but not that which was essentially alien to humanity, sin. Hence the divine Logos incarnate did truly become one with all men, for their salvation, so that the Logos might exchange their natural mortality for his natural immortality, and that he, as God, might, as only God might do, forgive their sins.

In the ad Epict. therefore we again find that the divine Logos became man, while yet remaining God, in order that the divine Logos might bestow in grace his own divinity upon that humanity for all men. As such therefore, he is unique, being totally distinct from the former prophets and messengers of God.
Footnotes

1. 5.32
2. 6.15 cf. 7.2; 8.20; 10.26, 34; 12.26-27
3. cf. 2.31-33; 4.19-21; 9.40-1; 10.34
4. 4.20-21 cf. 6.15-16; 9.40-1
5. 6.2; 9.1-2 cf. 4.20-21; 8.7-8
6. 4.26-27 cf. 4.28-29, 34-35; 9.19
7. 4.21
8. 5.32; 6.6, 8, 16-17
9. 4.22, 26
10. 6.16 cf. 6.11,14; 7.38; 10.35-36
11. 4.43 cf. 8.24; 11.11-12
12. 2.22-24 cf. 5.6-7; 12.27
13. cf. Rom. 1.3-4
14. 7.24 cf. 2.29; 8.16, 17-18, 20; 12.27
15. 8.10-11 cf. 8.15-16, 17; 9.12; 11.23
16. 8.14
17. cf. 8.15-16
18. 8.15 cf. 2.4-6; 6.35-38; 7.1-2, 8.9-10
19. 5.30-32 cf. 6.15-17
20. 10.34-35
21. 10.38-39
22. 6.4-5
23. 4.1-2
24. 7.2-4
25. 8.21-24
26. 2.6-8
27. 2.27-31
28. 7.24
29. 7.23
30. 2.27-28 cf. ch.11 passim.
31. 2.29
32. 6.3-4, 7-8
33. 5.30-32
34. 6.13-14
35. 6.11-12 cf. 11.20-21
36. 11.11-12 cf. Heb. 1.2; 9.26
37. 9.20 cf. 2.29; 4.2; 5.6-9; 8.15-16; 12.25-26
38. 2.17-18 cf. 4.1, 3
39. 2.6-8
40. 6.5-6
41. 6.19
42. 2.12-13
43. 7.3, 4
44. 4.18-19; 6.15 cf. 7.25, 36; 8.7-8
45. 10.18 cf. 8.10
46. 4.43; 11.11-12
47. eg. epilambanein
48. cf. 6.4-6
49. 6.17 cf. 7.3
50. 2.17-18; 10.1
51. 6.16-17
52. 12.27 cf. 2.23-24
53. cf. 5.19
54. cf. 6.19 Hebrews 2.16-17
55. 7.32-33
56. 7.32 cf. 7.24
57. 5.20-23
58. 4.3-4
59. 10.37
60. 6.16-17
61. cf. 1 Cor. 3.16-17; 6.19; 2 Cor. 6.16
62. 10.37 cf. 11.15-16
63. cf. 2 Chron. 7.1,3; Is.6.1; Ezek.43.5; 44.4
64. 5.32
65. cf. 6.35-38
66. 5.32-33 cf. 6.38-1
67. 5.33-34 cf. 6.38. 1 Peter 3.19
68. 6.38
69. cf. CG 32-33
70. cf. 6.37-38
71. cf. CG 33.11-12
72. 5.33
73. 5.33
74. cf. DI 9
75. Roldanus oc. 267
76. 6.20-22
77. 8.15-16
78. 12.25-26 cf. 2.29
79. 6.11; 7.30-31; 8.33; 9.8, 16 etc.
80. 8.21-24
81. 8.16-18
82. 7.24-25
83. 7.28-29
84. 7.24
85. 7.29-30
86. 10.34-35, 38-39
87. 9.21 cf. 9.3-5
88. 9.16-18 cf. 9.12-14
89. cf. 6.20
90. 7.24-25
91. 7.29-30
92. 7.30
93. cf. 7.32
94. 7.30-32
95. 7.4-5
96. cf. 4.3
Athanasius' letters ad Serapionem 1-4 need not delay us long, for they are largely concerned with the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Yet we must pay them some attention since even in treating that subject Athanasius covers some Christological matters, and especially in the Ad Serapionem 2.

Central to the Christology even here is the divinity of the Logos, the Son, Wisdom and Power of the Father, the eternity and immutability of which is stressed by the emphatic use of the continuous present tense of the verb einai (1).

He it was who, without undergoing any alteration in his very Godhead, became incarnate at the completion of the ages (2), a phrase taken from Hebrews 9.26 to signify the climactic entry of God into the realm of time and space to effect the long awaited redemption of man. This incarnation, described in Ad Ser.1 as the 'sojourning' or 'fleshly presence'(3) of the Logos of God, whereby he came to attend and stand by man's side, epithets paralleled elsewhere in the Athanasian corpus, is seen at once from an intransitive and a transitive perspective. For it is that in which the divine Logos both became that which is other than himself, and assumes that which is alien to himself; he becomes 'man' (4) or 'flesh' (5), the latter phrase echoing the famous Johannine Christological formula. The Logos, however, also had a 'human body' (6), a creatureliness which the Creator Logos in his Holy Spirit had moulded and conformed to himself of Mary, and which the divine Logos, having assumed, wore.

Through these descriptions of the incarnation, descriptions common from other Athanasian works, the Alexandrian bishop relates the entry of the Father's Logos into man's realm. It is, firstly, the entry of the infinite Logos of God into the sphere of time past, present and future. Indeed, the boundless eternity experienced by the Logos in his immutable divinity, and the temporality of the finitude of his incarnation, are stressed in the contrast of the continuous present and past tenses. For while the Logos is (7) God, he has become (8) man. Similarly, while man knows that the Logos is God (9),
and knows that the same 'became man' (10). Secondly, the incarnation involves the entry of the incorporeal Creator Logos into corporeal, creaturely being. For thereby the divine Logos has assumed a body, that being, as we have seen, Athanasius' common description of man in his limited and frail humanity, whose creatureliness is stressed by its having been "moulded" and "conformed", verbs common to creation narratives. Again, the incarnation involved the assumption of a full humanity; for the body assumed was 'a human body' (11), the human quality of which is seen in theological terms: the body is human in that it is rational, or that it is directed by a rational soul. Indeed, in Ad.Ser. 2.9.26f Athanasius seems to want to stress that the humanity assumed was 'human' or rational. For in explaining the verb ektise of Prov. 8.22, Athanasius does not refer it merely to Christ's 'body' which naturally connects with the verb 'to found', 'body' being for Athanasius a hallmark of man's creatureliness, but relates the verb to "his human (body)... as he became man, and was created" (12), to anthropinon and its cognates referring to rational man, over against irrational animals. Further, at the end of Ch.7, in explaining John 1.14, Athanasius makes reference to both John 8.40, and 1 Tim. 2.5, in both of which the noun 'man' appears, in order to assert that to say "'the Logos became flesh' is to say 'he became man'" (13). Certainly Athanasius does argue that to say that "the Logos became flesh" is to say that "the Logos became man" in order that he might use John 1.14 to support his assertion that the eternal Logos became man. Yet that he is so concerned to interpret John 1.14 in terms of 'he became man' seems to suggest that it was of great importance to Athanasius that the Logos did not become mere flesh, but truly man.

It seems clear therefore that the divine Logos truly became man, a man who did not exist apart from the Logos' incarnation. Indeed, through the act of self-humiliation the impersonal humanity became personal in the person of the Logos. Yet, while the divine Logos truly became man, the divine Logos did not cease to be very God, as the use of the continuous present tense of the verb "to be", with its connotations of eternity and immutability, and as the use of the transitive verbs, such as 'to have', 'to assume' and 'to bear', with the implied separation of their Creator
subjects and creaturely objects, suggest. In short, being truly God, the Logos became man, without ceasing to be true God.

Having become man, human qualities were referred to the Logos. Hence it was that it was said that the incarnate Logos was baptised, and that 'humanly' he hungered, thirsted, was smitten, wept, slept and finally endured death upon the cross. Moreover, it was in relation to this human economy that both Prov. 8.22 and Mark 13.32 are to be related, and not to his divine economy. For in respect of Prov. 8.22, it must be remembered that 'he founded' refers to the Logos' humanity, which was one with all men's, and which therefore was naturally created and made, and not to his divinity, to which the act of creating is appropriate. Prov. 8.22 does not therefore deny the Godhead of the Logos, as the Arians supposed, but asserts that he who is God truly became man in his full creatureliness. In respect to Mark 13.32, meanwhile, the verse admitting the Son's ignorance regarding the time of the Last Day, Athanasius asserts over against the Arians that this was not said by the divine Logos as though he were by nature a creature. Indeed, that this admittance of ignorance was not made by the divine Logos was made clear by the quoting of Mt. 11.27 and John 16.30, whence the Alexandrian feels that it is clear that there was not anything of which the divine Logos was ignorant, in that he is the Logos through whom all things came to be; and as "all things" include the Last Day, it will come to be through him. Rather, Mark 13.32 was said to have been spoken by the Logos "as man". For it belonged to man to be ignorant(14); therefore inasmuch as the Logos was made man, the Logos incarnate displayed that ignorance which belonged to men(15). For he had truly become man. It is noteworthy that Athanasius here asserts a corollary of the above, that the Logos displayed human ignorance in order to show that he really had a human body. In ch. 9 therefore Mark 13.32 is here clearly and immediately connected with the fact of the incarnation, as it is not in 3 C.Ar.48, a connection which counters Richard's suggestion that Christ's ignorance was but feigned. For not only was that very ignorance that which proved that Christ's humanity was not at all docetic (16), but also the ignorance of Christ was that assumed in order than men might be saved from it (17).
Just before we pass on to the matter of salvation as described in the letters to Serapion, it is worth noting what it is to which Athanasius attributes Christ's ignorance, an ignorance whose reality we have already noted. Christ's ignorance is that which is admitted 'humanly' and 'as man' (18). For when the divine Logos became man, to whose nature ignorance properly belonged, he truly revealed human ignorance. It seems therefore that when Athanasius explains Christ's ignorance here, he attributes it to the Logos as man, the term for Athanasius of rational man, made in the image of God. Even when Athanasius refers ignorance to Christ's body, he does so by referring it to a human body, over against an irrational body of an animal. In 2 Ad Ser. therefore it seems that Christ's ignorance, whose reality is acknowledged, is attributed to a fully human and rational body; there seems to be no psychological docetism here.

In 3 C.Ar., however, as we have already noted, Christ's ignorance has been referred to his flesh. Does 2 Ad Ser. therefore mark a development in Athanasius' thought? It is a development in so far as the passage in 2 Ad. Ser. is more explicit than that in 3 C.Ar. But it is not a development in thought. For in the former passage the humanity to which Christ's ignorance belongs is understood as that over against the divine Son, who knows all; the contrast here is between humanity, or creatureliness, and the Son, or the Creator. In the latter passage, the flesh to which Christ's ignorance is referred, and which, as we have tried to show, is to be seen as full humanity, is understood as that over against the Creator Logos, who is omniscient. Thus in both passages the ignorance of Christ is referred not to the Creator Logos of God, but to his assumed creatureliness, a creatureliness which is, however, fully human. In the two passages therefore Mark 13.32 is explained in the same way, but through different terminology; the thought is the same but the vocabulary different.

Even though touched upon only briefly in 1-4 Ad Ser, salvation is the main cause and consequence of the incarnation; the divine Logos became man on account of man's salvation. His was not the benefit. For, as we have already hinted, the divine Logos neither came into existence, nor experienced a change in being in and through the
Incarnation; when the divine Logos became man, he neither ceased to be the eternal Son of the Father, nor did he only then come into being. As regards the Logos himself, he became man only for the sake and benefit of sinful man.

Generally speaking, the incarnation effected the reconciliation of all things (20). For, by assuming a human body, the divine Logos effected the joining and presenting of all creation to the Father, since by taking to himself a body, the divine Logos effected a perfect union between creation, of which the body was an essential part, and God, with whom the Son was one. More particularly, the divine Logos effected in and through his incarnation the reconciliation of part of that creation with God; in becoming man, the Christ endured our death and destroyed it. Thereby he redeemed humanity, and presented it perfect and holy to the Father. So man was restored to his original relationship of pure and unimpaired communion with the Father.

It seems therefore that by retaining his divinity, the Logos remained ever one with God the Father; yet by assuming humanity, the Logos established a oneness through it with all creation. Thus in the case of the one Christ, the full and perfect reconciliation of Creator and creation was effected and guaranteed. Indeed, in the exalted Christ, the whole of creation was offered to the Father, thereby achieving the redemption of all.

Once again, in Athanasius' letter to Serapion, it seems that there is the one person, the Logos, in the Christ, and two natures, the divine and the human, both being personal in the Logos himself; it also seems that in this Christ the atonement of God and man, of Creator and creation, is secured. For creation has been assumed into divinity in the assumption of humanity by the divine Logos in the Christ.
CHAPTER 7

Footnotes

1. Ad Ser. 2.7.4-6 cf. Ad Ser. 1.7.4-6
2. ib. 2.7.7
3. Ad Ser. 1.9.37,38
4. Ad Ser. 2.7.7, 10, 13-14; 8.35; 9.15, 18 cf. Ad Ser. 1.9.35
5. ib. 2.7.9, 10 cf. Ad Ser. 1.9.27
6. ib. 2.9.19, 26
7. ib. 7.4, 5
8. ib. 2.7.7
9. ib. 2.8.27
10. ib. 2.8.35
11. ib. 2.9.19, 26
12. ib. 2.9.26-27
13. ib. 2.7.9-10
14. ib. 2.9.16 cf. ib. 2.9.14, 31
15. ib. 2.9.17-18
16. ib. 2.9.19
17. ib. 2.9.20-21
18. ib. 2.14. 31
19. ib. 2.9.19
20. Ad Ser. 1.31.2-3 cf. Col. 1.20
CONCLUSION

For Athanasius the assumption of creatureliness by the Creator Logos in the Incarnation was the result not of natural necessity, but of the loving goodness of God. That creatureliness was therefore not an infinite, non-contingent and self-existent part of the Godhead. Rather, like the rest of God's creation, it was finite, contingent and existent only in the gracious and continuous creation of the divine Logos. Consequently, like the rest of creation, it was kept from slipping into ultimate dissolution and maintained in existence only through being enabled to participate in the creative grace of God. Similarly, in the work of salvation, it was saved only by being graciously taken by the divine Logos to participate in the infinite source of Life, the Godhead. Thus, in both the work of creation and redemption, the humanity of Christ reflected its finite and contingent nature. While, however, the humanity of Christ was limited in itself, it was not limiting. For even as the whole creation was limited, and yet did not limit the God who held that creation in existence, so the humanity, which was an essential part of that creation, was limited, but did not limit the infinite Creator Logos who had assumed it, and who redeemed it to life.

Christ's humanity was therefore an essential part of the whole creation. Indeed, as such, it was naturally set over against the Creator God. Yet that did not make for an impropriety in respect of the Creator God's assumption of that which was essentially other than he. For even as it was right and proper that God should be involved in the whole creation, maintaining it in existence through his providential care, so it was proper that the same God should be involved in a part of that creation, the assumed humanity, effecting through it the redemption of the whole creation. Thus Christ's humanity, though one with the limited and contingent universe, was a medium appropriate for the Son of God's redemptive work.

That humanity of Christ, as we have seen, is described by three main anthropological terms, by anthropos, soma and sarx. These terms do not, however, give a strictly mechanical picture of Athanasius' understanding of man. For while each term signifies a particular general truth, each term alone does not signify that truth. The terms
are used to fit the particular context in which they are used, qualifying each other in order to portray man in his dynamic relationship with God, *homo religiosus*. The term *anthropos* tends to signify man in his individuality, an individuality which lies in his relation to God. In that, man's individuality is not something innate to himself, but something bestowed upon man through grace. It is by participation in the Logos, the Image of God, that man is made an individual in his "logicality" and his being "in the image of God". Consequently, it is in man being "anthropic" that he is rational and spiritual, two qualities which Athanasius hardly distinguishes. It is in this that man is distinct, through grace, from the rest of irrational creation, with which he is naturally one, and is responsible to God. *Soma*, meanwhile, suggests man's creaturely and originate mortality. It is that which distinguishes man, by nature, from the incorporeal God, and relates him to the whole of creation. Christ's body is therefore that through which he is one with the rest of men. This is not to say, however, that Christ's humanity is a corporate one, for there is a distinction between his and other men's. Yet there is a common essentiality, Christ's body being seen not in that which separates one body from another, but as the common creatureliness in which all men act and interact upon one another. In that sense Christ's humanity is not therefore truly Platonic. *Sarx* is sometimes used to signify mankind in general. More frequently, however, it refers to man in his weakness and need, being synonymous in this usage with *soma* as that common creatureliness which unites and binds all men together.

For Athanasius therefore man is not understood in the strictly Platonic fashion. Man does not consist of two distinct elements, a soul and a body; he is not the sum of two parts. Rather he is bipartite in so far as in his humanity he is man in his relation to God, while in his body he is man in his relation to the rest of creation. He is bipartite in a relational sense, being man in his gracious relation to God, and body in his natural relation to creation.

It is with this understanding of the anthropological terms therefore that we must interpret the incarnational thought of Athanasius.
Part of Athanasius’ incarnational thought is the bestowal of gifts by God upon the assumed body. That the bestowal was upon the body has been understood by Richard both as being inappropriate, and as suggesting a deficient humanity in Christ. From our study, it seems that neither of these two points are correct. For what was inappropriate was the bestowal of gifts upon the Logos, as the Arians would have; and what was appropriate was the bestowal of gifts upon the "body", which was understood not as that in contrast with the soul, but as that which was in contrast with the incorporeal Logos. Indeed, the propriety lay in the bestowal of these gifts of knowledge and wisdom, and immortality and incorruption by the divine Logos, who was not needy, upon the needy body, which was naturally ignorant, moral and corrupt. Nor need such a bestowal of grace signify a deficient humanity in Christ. For that body represents man in his creatureliness, in opposition to the divine Creator Logos, and not man in his corporeality, over against his soul. Again, that body, upon which the gifts were rained, was qualified in the Nicene manner, whereby Athanasius seems to exclude a denial of a human soul.

Christ’s passions, which are of both a physical and a psychological nature, are attributed by Athanasius to his body or flesh. From this Voisin has argued that the flesh therefore has a human soul, the subject of these passions. Richard, on the other hand, has explained this attribution on the grounds that the passions had to be attributed in this manner, as there was no human soul to be their subject. Neither of these positions seems really plausible, as it would appear that Athanasius attributes all Christ’s passions to his body or flesh, as they represent man in his finite creatureliness, or man in his passibility. Moreover, they are attributed to this body which is understood, not in terms of that which is over against the soul, but that which is over against the incorporeal Logos. As with the bestowal of the gifts of grace upon the Christ, so here, the body which suffers is to be seen in the context of the anti-Arian safeguarding the impassible Logos of God from being the subject of the passions. Indeed, it seems that it is because of this attempt in 1-3 C.Ar. to preserve the divinity of the Logos from creaturely categories that
Athanasius makes no attempt to distinguish the physical from the psychological passions. It follows from the above, therefore, that this attribution of passions to Christ's body bears no anthropological meaning. Any anthropological meaning that there may be must be drawn not from the fact that the psychological passions are referred to Christ's body, but from the facts that the body is generally described in a Nicene fashion, and that the element to which the psychological passion of ignorance belongs in 2 Ad Ser, is not the body of 1-3 C.Ar. but man.

Christ's death, meanwhile, is seen as the separation of the Logos and his assumed body, in which the Logos' withholding of providential and creative care leads to the physical disintegration of man in his mortality. It is the laying aside of the assumed body, understood not as that over and against the soul, but as over and against the incorporeal Logos. It is the necessary response to the initial "taking of a body", whereby the divine Logos became incarnate. Having laid aside in death the assumed humanity, the divine Logos was not separated from it. For as the incarnate Logos, or the Christ of 1 Peter 3.18, the Logos me choristheis somatos descended to Hades to preach to the souls of the departed.

From the above, however, it is not clear whether or not the incarnate Logos actually had a human soul. From other areas of study, however, there seem to be hints to suggest that he had. That soul would seem to be not the independent soul of Platonism, but that which exists only in and through the gracious mercy of the divine Creator Logos.

Prior to A.D. 362 it is readily admitted by all sides that a human soul of Christ is not mentioned explicitly. But that may be explained, partly by the fact that then the problem was not so much a psychological as a theological one, in which the true divinity of the Logos was being debated, and partly by the fact that Athanasius' works tend to avoid doctrinal speculation.

While there appears to be no explicit reference to the human soul of the Christ in Athanasius' writing prior to 362, there seems to be implicit reference. For Athanasius does not, apparently, accept the Arian Christological model, in which the divine Logos takes the place of the human soul. Neither his anthropology nor his Christological formulae
will allow this. His anthropology will not permit the acceptance of the Arians' Platonic thought in which the soul is an independent element, to which the body is improper, while his Christological formulae seem to be such that they qualify one another after the manner of the Nicene creed, according to which the Arians' denial of the human soul of Christ is countered. This implicit reference to the human soul of Christ by Athanasius seems to be confirmed by his use of Joel 2.28 and John 1.14. For in 3 C.Ar.30, where Athanasius is arguing against the Arians' denial of Christ's full humanity, it is asserted that the divine Logos did not enter upon man, but became man, and "man" qualified after the manner of the Nicene creed. This is interesting, given that in the Ad Epict., a work in which the human soul of Christ is admitted, there is again a connection between "the Logos became flesh" and "the Logos became man" through the use both of Joel 2.28 and of anthropological qualifications along the lines of Nicea.

Arguments against the present of a human soul in Christ have been advanced. These, however, are not very telling. Indeed, when they are seen in their contexts, wherein the Nicene qualification of Christ's humanity often occurs, they are not at all telling.

Arguments from assertions that the Logos "wore", "indwelt" and "had" a body are not convincing. For the body which the Logos wore was a "human body", "human" not as a result of its essential nature, but of its being made "in the image of God", in which lies its rationality and spirituality. Indeed, these verbs are but traditional biblical terms, which the church had adopted in its Christological exposition, and which asserted not anthropological truths, but divine truths of the real presence of God to a person; "to be clothed" with God, "to be indwelt" by God emphasised God's nearness to man. The verbs of "taking" and "having", meanwhile, stressed the distinction between him who took and what was taken, between the divine Creator Logos and the created body, in a way that the formulae of "becoming" man or flesh could not. Nor need arguments from the assertions that the divine Logos took a "body" worry us. For that body was a human body, qualified after the manner of Nicea. Moreover, such statements as "the Logos took a 'body'" seem to have
been used in a contextual manner. Thus, in those contexts in which Athanasius wanted to write of the divine Logos' involvement in creation, in death, and in corruption, he tended to refer to the Logos' body, which was naturally part of the creaturely world of death and corruption. Indeed, Athanasius can use 'man' in a similar contextual manner. Thus, for instance, when Athanasius is treating the re-creation of man in the image of God, he tends to use the term 'man' in his Christological formulae, a term which particularly suggests man sharing in the Image of God.

From the fact that Athanasius sees the Logos as the enlightening and directive principle in his assumed body, it has been concluded that the Logos had taken the place of the human soul in Christ. Such, however, is not the case. For that body, which, incidentally, is qualified in the anti-Arian manner of the Nicene creed, is to be understood not in contrast to a human soul, but in contrast to the divine Creator Logos. It is an essential part of creation, which, like the rest of creation, is maintained by the enlivening creativity of the Logos from slipping to that state of non-being whence all initially came. Moreover, while the Logos who conserves the whole of creation, of which the assumed humanity is a part, and who prevents it from slipping into non-existence, is the same Logos as he who directs the assumed humanity, that Logos effects these two offices in respect of two different economies. For as God the Logos holds the universe in order; and as man the Logos is the directive principle in the Christ. A distinction in Christ needs therefore to be made. The Logos in Christ is the prncipium quod in his being Logos incarnate: as man he acts, fears and dies. He is, however, the prncipium quo in his divinity: as God the Logos leaves the assumed humanity, in order to allow it to die; he enlivens the mortal body; and he raises it from the dead. Indeed, not to make this distinction would be to risk seeing the Logos as the principle in Christ in such a way that more than an appropriation after the manner of communicatio idiomatum was implied; it would be to risk making the impassible Logos passible.

Often coupled with the argument against the presence of a human soul in Christ of the Logos being the directive force in Christ is that drawn from the description of the
assumed humanity as the 'organ' of the Logos. This need not delay us. For this term is not an anthropological term. Indeed, Athanasius can refer to the sun or the moon as being an 'organ' of the activity of the divine Logos. The term merely alludes to the assumed humanity being the medium, or vehicle, through which the divine Logos effected his saving incarnation. Again, the humanity referred to by Athanasius as the 'organ' of the divine Logos is qualified in the manner of the Nicene creed, a qualification which seems to exclude the idea of a deficient humanity.

Also connected with the idea of the Logos being the directive force in the assumed humanity is the conception of the passivity of that humanity. That passivity is explicible in two ways. Firstly, the fact that the divine Logos always remains the active bestower of grace upon the assumed humanity preserves the important distinction of the non-contingent Logos of God and the contingent humanity, which is ever in need of enlivening grace. Secondly, that passivity represents the true humanity of man. For, for Athanasius, man is truly man in his responsible relationship of receptive obedience to God. He is most truly fulfilled when fulfilling the will of God. Indeed, for Athanasius, a man who is not passive in his humanity is he who asserts his own will against others', including that of God. That assertion is self-assertion, which is egocentric, and therefore sinful. That passivity in which humanity actively submits its will to God's is that in which man is truly free in his service of God.

Those "individuating characteristics", for which Sellers (1) is searching, and that "distinctive human being", for which Prestige (2) is looking, are not to be seen as self-assertive actions. Rather they are to be found in man's willing and selfless assent to the divine will: they are to be understood in Christ's total and positive response to God's word. For in that response lay his distinction, both from God to whom he was obedient, and from men for whom he was obedient.

After A.D. 362 Athanasius seems to make explicit the implicit acceptance of the human soul of Christ. This he does in both his Tome and his Ad Epict. For, both from internal linguistic and from external historical
evidence, the presence of a human, rational soul in the Christ seems asserted.

It seems therefore that not only the incarnation, however conceived, is real, but also the full humanity assumed in and through that incarnation.

That full humanity, in which the rational soul is not stressed, plays a most important role in the salvation effected through the incarnation. For that humanity is an important point of contact between the Saviour and that saved. For, inasmuch as that humanity was our humanity, which the Logos assumed, it is that in and through which our salvation was effected; and insofar as that humanity is inseparable from the divine Logos, it is that in and through which that salvation is ever guaranteed. Through the Logos' countering in his assumed humanity our frailty, he countered our frailty in our humanity. Indeed, the importance of that humanity to Athanasius' soteriological thought is made plain in his assertion that had the incarnation been but a "phantasy", so would the salvation effected through it.

The question of the human will of the Christ seems not to have been treated by Athanasius in his works to any great extent; yet what hints there are, are very much in keeping with his understanding of man as a being who in his frail body is created from nothing, and who in his soul is not independent of the directive and effective grace of God. For Athanasius, the assumed flesh is mutable in itself. That flesh does not, however, exist in the Incarnation in itself, but only in and through its assumption by the Logos. In its assumption by the immutable Logos, that flesh, which is by nature mutable, becomes immutable by grace. Therein lies the redemption of the mutable will of man. There seems therefore to be two wills in the Christ, the will of the flesh, which is man's frail will, and the will of the Logos, into which that will is assumed for redemption. In practice, however, there is only one effective will. For the will of the flesh is made in Christ the will of God. Indeed, not to have this one effective will, but to find an individual will in Christ, in opposition to the divine, would be a violation of Athanasius' theological principles, as the assertion of an individual human will is egocentric, and
therefore sinful. Rather, the human consciousness in
the true man, Christ, is buried in its total obedience
to the divine will, being free in its service of God.
The human will in the true Christian, or indeed in
Christ himself, exists, but is so submerged in its
compliance with God's will that it is not emphasised.
The object of true asceticism was to subdue one's own
will, and allow the Logos to take over the self. In the
ture ascetic, the human subject becomes submerged and
is transformed into the receptive instrument of the Logos.
Receptivity was therefore man's proper characteristic.
For Athanasius, Christ was in his human nature alone
truly receptive; he alone was entirely sinless, and in
this uniqueness he was most truly human. He was the
Man for all men.

For Athanasius, then, the humanity of Christ, which
existed only in the continuous creative care of the
divine Logos, was truly and fully human; that true
humanity was that through which man's full humanity
was redeemed and reconciled to God.
CONCLUSION

Footnotes

1. Sellers oc. 44
2. Prestige oc. 115
APPENDIX

The concept of the soul in Athanasius' Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione - two different estimates?

In his article "The concept of the soul in Athanasius' Contra Gentes - De Incarnatione" (1) Louth maintains that in the CG the concept of the soul has prominence in the light of the Neo-platonic idea of contemplation; he asserts that the idea of contemplation and interest in the soul as such go together. He suggests, however, that in the DI the concept of the soul sinks into comparative unimportance, the neo-Platonic notion of contemplation having been removed. "In the De Incarnatione Athanasius...... (makes) his anthropology turn on man's relation to God through the Word - man kat' eikona and logikos - rather than on the soul and contemplation. It is in fact a complete break with the approach of the Contra Gentes".(2).

The basis for the recognition of this complete break, which, incidentally, would make impossible the corroboration of the duality of man as portrayed in the DI by reference to the CG, is primarily a comparison of the accounts in the two parts of the CG-DI of the primal state and the fall. According to Louth the account of CG 2f. "turns on man's contemplation of God, and his falling away from this by turning to the contemplations of the body and its sensations" (3). Man's fall was that from a state of contemplation to a state subject to sensual passions and pleasures. In that latter state mortality was seen as the "mere thneta phronein" (4), and as the fear of losing attachment to the sensual pleasures to which man had turned. Redemption is therefore the "restoration of pure vision....by purification...."(5). This interpretation of CG 2f. Louth finds supported by the idea in CG 8 and 34 of the soul as a mirror in which, when pure, the Word is reflected and can be contemplated. The parallel account of the primal state and the fall in DI 3ff. is, according to Louth, "quite different" (6). Rather than being a timeless account, it is historical; it is about how first men disobeyed God, and so marred their state of being created "in the image". Rather than using allegorical
exegesis, the account in the DI is realistic, turning not on intellectual contemplation, but on the obedience and disobedience of man. The consequences of the fall are death and decay, and are embedded in reality. Here man, of whom there is a "very pessimistic view" (7) can be redeemed only by the Logos incarnate. Indeed, the development of the idea in DI 7 that repentance would not suffice for man to return to incorruption contrasts markedly with CG 30-34, where "Athenasius sees the soul even of a fallen man as rational, immortal and capable of the vision of God, and where redemption is, apparently, within the power of every man" (8).

That there are these different estimates of the soul in the CG and the DI is however debatable. The idea that CG 2f. turns on man's contemplation of God and his falling away from this, and that the parallel account in the DI is quite different is very moot. For according to the CG man was made in the image of the Logos (9); he was made perceptive of reality through his similarity to the Logos (10). Indeed, as long as man kept that likeness (11) he would never abandon the concept of God (12), but would contemplate in purity the Image of the Father, and thus the Father (13); he would thus live an idyllic, immortal and blessed life in communion with God and all the saints (14). According to the DI, meanwhile, man was created in the image of God (15). Being so made, he was rational (16), and so was to remain in felicity, living the true life in paradise, in communion with all the saints (17). Indeed, had man continued in the grace of the holy participation in the Logos, man would have escaped the consequences of his mortal nature (18); had he kept his likeness to God through contemplating him man would have blunted his natural corruption and would have remained incorruptible (19).

Yet man did not continue in that grace. According to the CG man turned from the reality of God to closer, creaturely objects (20). According to the DI man disobeyed the will of God by which he would have been secured in paradise (21). That disobedience, however, is explained in terms of man disregarding God (22), of him turning from the understanding of God (23) and of him inventing wickedness (24), an explanation whose similarity to that of the CG is noted (25). Indeed, this similarity to the CG is explicit in DI 4.21-25, where it is noted
"because men were deprived of the understanding of God, and had turned to things which do not exist... then they were also deprived of eternal existence".

and in DI 5.2-5, where it says that:

"men, turning away from things eternal, and by the counsel of the devil turning towards things corruptible, were themselves the cause of the corruption in death".

It seems therefore that the inter-relating of man in the image of God and his contemplating God in purity plays an important role in the accounts of the creation and the fall in both the CG and the DI. Certainly the emphasis upon man knowing God through contemplation is great in CG 2f. Yet that is explicable in terms of the aim of the CG, which is to instruct men in the knowledge of religion and of the truth of the universe (26), and to refute the ignorance of unbelievers (27). Similarly the emphasis upon man's relationship to the Logos in DI 3f. is understandable in terms of the work's aim of telling of the incarnation of the Logos (28).

The suggestion that the view of man in the DI is very pessimistic, and that it contrasts with the hopeful view of the CG is also open to question. Certainly in the DI man is seen as weak and unstable in nature, and so as needing divine pity. He is open to death and decay, the consequences of the fall. He is to be redeemed only by the Logos incarnate. Yet man is also seen there as having extra grace (29), as sharing in the power of the Logos (30) and as being created to remain in joyful incorruption. Hence the pessimistic view of man is countered by an optimistic one. The passage in the DI therefore echoes the tension of the Psalmist, according to whom man is nothing and yet is little less than God (31). This pessimistic view, however, is understandable. For the aim of the reciting of the creation narrative in a work concerned with the Logos' incarnation is to reveal the reason for the incarnation, a reason which does not lie in the Logos himself. For he became man on account of man (32). Equally the emphasis on obedience and disobedience in the account of the primal state and the fall in the DI fits
this context. For by so stressing the culpability of man, Athanasius emphasises that the divine Logos became incarnate for man's salvation in mercy, and not as a consequence of his nature. Meanwhile the optimistic view of man in the CG is equally understandable. For by allowing such a view Athanasius contributed to his persuading the unbeliever that he could know God his creator. Yet this optimistic view of man is also coloured by more sobering thoughts. For that man is seen as weak, and naturally unstable (33). He was created in the image of God that he might never abandon the concept of God (34). He was given special power by the Logos that he might converse with God and might live the life immortal (35). Yet for all that he gave himself up to bodily desires (36). Rather than living the immortal life of God, he came to fear death and separation from the body (37).

Louth draws a distinction between the concept of mortality in the CG and that in the DI. Certainly the consequences of the fall, death and decay, are seen in the DI as embedded in reality. Yet in the CG they are not seen as "the mere thneta phronein" (38) as Louth maintains. For that thneta phronein is the turning from God and the relinquishing of that grace and special power given by the Logos to man that thereby man might live the immortal and blessed life in the company of God and his saints. It is the actual turning from him in whom man lived and moved and had his being. The reality of death so conceived is confirmed in Ch.41-42 where Athanasius draws attention to the transient nature of mortal man.

Finally Louth draws attention to seemingly different conceptions of man's redemption. According to him redemption is seen in the CG as the restoration of the pure vision of God by purification; it is that within the power of every man. For, according to CG 30-34 "Athansius sees the soul even of a fallen man as rational, immortal and capable of the vision of God" (39). According to the DI redemption is only by the Logos incarnate; repentance is not sufficient. Certainly Athanasius does admit that all men are capable of the vision of God. Yet such an admission is set not within the context of an explanation of the doctrine of redemption, but of that of creation and natural revelation. Indeed, this is made
clear in ch. 47. For in this concluding chapter of the CG Athanasius mentions this "road of truth" whereby man could know God, and yet mentions that within the context of the argument of the CG, that men have rejected the knowledge of God (40) and have failed to recognise him (41) despite the fact that God is revealed in his creation (42). The reference to the "road of truth" both here and in ch. 30-34 points therefore to the foolishness of man in not recognising God the creator, a folly for which man is culpable. It seems therefore that according to the CG the recognition of God the creator, and not redemption, is within the power of every man, albeit a power bestowed upon man by God. Meanwhile the emphasis of the DI upon redemption by the Logos incarnate occurs within an exposition of the doctrine of the incarnation, and within a recognition of man's insecure knowledge of God. For the DI recognised, in the light of the CG, that man, although created to know God, was not secure in his knowledge of God. Hence it admitted that only by the Logos becoming man was man secured in that redeeming knowledge of God.

It seems therefore that the estimates of man in the CG and in the DI are not so different. Rather, the emphases are different, and these are dictated largely by the differing contexts.
APPENDIX

Footnotes

2. ib. 230
3. ib. 227
4. ib. 228
5. ib. 228
6. ib. 228
7. ib. 227
8. ib. 227
9. CG 2.8-9.18
10. CG 2.9-10
11. CG 2.11 cf. 2.13-14
12. CG 2.11-12
13. CG 2.16-18
14. CG 2.11-15
15. DI 3.16-17, 19-22; 5.1-2, 6-7
16. DI 3.22
17. DI 3.23-24
18. DI 5.6-7
19. DI 4.27-29
20. CG 3.2f.
21. DI 3.27f.
22. DI 4.12
23. DI 4.13
24. DI 4.13-14
25. DI 4.14
26. CG 1.1-3
27. CG 1.42-43
28. DI 1.10
29. DI 3.16-17, 19; 5.1-2, 6-7
30. DI 3.21
31. cf. Ps. 8.3-8
32. DI 1.25f.
33. CG 41 passim.
34. CG 2.11-12
35. CG 2.13-15
36. CG 3.24-25
37. CG 2.15; 3.29-30
38. Louth oc. 228
39. ib. 227
40. CG 47.14-18
41. cf. CG 47.28-31
42. CG 47.1-13
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