Substitution and representation: patterns of thought in Christian atonement theology

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ABSTRACT

Substitution and Representation:
Patterns of thought
in Christian Atonement Theology

David Jonathon Peter Hewlett

This thesis examines the use of the terms Substitution and Representation as they are found to occur in Christian Atonement Theology. It is a theological investigation into the use of the terms, in order to establish their meaning and the relation between them.

Both terms are first subjected to a phenomenological enquiry in order to disclose the various patterns of thought in which the terms function and which they help to generate. The part played by the terms within these different contexts, together with the models they espouse, are then critically analysed and evaluated. In this way the full complexity of the terms Substitution and Representation is examined, the appropriateness of their range of meanings tested, and the part they play in Christian Atonement Theology determined.

To test the adequacy and accuracy of this analysis a more detailed study is made of the work of D. Söllle, Christ the Representative. Her place within the continuing debate surrounding the terms is established, and more light is shed on the use and meaning of the terms Substitution and Representation.
Substitution and Representation: Patterns of Thought in Christian Atonement Theology

by

David Jonathon Peter Hewlett

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of the Thesis

This thesis is an attempt to answer the question 'what do the terms substitution and representation mean when they are used in the context of Christian atonement theology?' The initial impulse that prompted this study of the terms substitution and representation was provided by the following passage found in the translators' preface to the opening volume of K. Barth's Church Dogmatics on the doctrine of reconciliation and which comments on the difficulty of the term Stellvertretung:

"Stellvertretung ... enshrines the notions both of representation and substitution, and never the one without the other. Representation by itself is particularly inadequate as a rendering, though this aspect is present, and the word is used more often perhaps than it ought to be in view of the prevailing prejudice against substitution. In most cases the latter is both fuller and truer, but, as the text discloses, it is given a sense more radical than is normally the case in English, because Barth envisages it as a total displacement of sinful man by the incarnate, crucified and risen Son; and also more comprehensive, because it is related to the whole life and work of Jesus Christ, including His heavenly intercession (1)."

A number of questions are immediately raised by these comments. What is the nature and force of this 'prevailing prejudice against substitution'? What is the meaning of the term representation, so that despite being
'particularly inadequate' it may be reluctantly used as a more acceptable alternative to the term substitution? What is the relation between the terms substitution and representation, what 'aspects' are signified by the respective terms, such that both may be 'enshrined' in a single term with 'never the one without the other'? These questions indicate, at least in a preliminary way, the need for a closer study of the terms substitution and representation and the relation between them. However, two problems are immediately encountered which hinder any attempt to clarify their respective meanings.

First, leaving aside any specific theological meaning the terms might have, in their everyday use their meaning is often very similar so that it is difficult to locate precisely where any distinction might lie that will assist in clarifying their theological meaning (2). For example, there are numerous circumstances where an act by proxy can be appropriately described by either of the words substitution or representation: a speaker standing in for another as his substitute and representing him; a foster parent substituting for the absent parent yet also representing them; a delegate representing a group of people and yet in some sense acting as the substitute for each individual. In each case the terms substitution and representation are both appropriate, although there are equally clearly situations where both terms are not appropriate. A substitute in a football team cannot be described as a representative; an ambassador represents his country but it would be unusual to describe him as a substitute for
that country; a lawyer represents a client in court but the term substitute would only be used reluctantly and with care. In other words, there seems to be much common ground shared between the two terms in which their meanings are very similar - a common ground usually indicated by dictionaries as expressing the sense of standing in the place of another - but there is also the recognition that there are differences in meaning between the two terms which is conveyed by an unease with certain inappropriate uses, despite the fact that it is hard to articulate precisely the basis for their divergence.

Second, when it comes to the theological use of the terms substitution and representation the problem lies in the fact that both terms have become to a greater or lesser extent 'keywords' or 'theological labels'(3). These labels come to characterise certain patterns of thought, and can be used to evoke them, despite the fact that in addition to the close resemblances within these patterns of thought there may also be important divergences. Because the terms become keywords for these patterns of thought, not only may significant points of difference be overlooked, but also the many layers of meaning which each term can express may be ignored. For example, the designation 'penal substitution' is familiar, but even a cursory examination will show that as there are significantly different theories of punishment so also there may be significantly different theories of penal substitution. Moreover, what if there are substitutionary theories of the atonement which explicitly exclude the notion of punishment? Are these, as some would claim, no longer
theories of substitution? What happens to the keyword substitution when this divergence is recognised? Equally, the same is true for theories of representation. What is the point of contact between a view of the representative work of Christ in which Christ initiates a ministry which all his community must perpetuate, and that view of the representative work of Christ in which Christ is the inclusive Man, the one who performs the work of all humanity? These varying uses of the terms have yet to be demonstrated and described, but it will be one of the main arguments of this work that the 'keywords' substitution and representation, far from being simple and readily intelligible terms, conceal or embody many different meanings which render them extremely complex terms, demanding careful analysis.

Some Recent Discussions of the Terms

It might be thought that the discussion of these two terms would have been exhausted, particularly given the history of the term substitution and the controversy it has aroused. However, a brief examination of a number of recent writers who specifically consider the two terms will serve to demonstrate the need for a study of the terms that recognises their complexity and attempts to unravel the many different meanings which each term is capable of bearing.

L. Morris, a large part of whose writing has been devoted to studies of the atonement, opens his discussion of the terms with the observation that the term represent-
ative 'seems to mean much the same as substitutionary, but without quite the same clarity' (4). However, along with a number of other writers he argues that the distinctive meaning or reference of the term representation belongs in the sphere of 'personal delegation', a context that is said decisively to rule out the term as being 'unsuitable for Christian theology' (5). In this respect Morris is no doubt accepting the view of J. Denney that a 'representative, in all ordinary circumstances, is provided or appointed by those whom he represents, and it is practically impossible to divest the term of the associations which this involves, misleading as they are in the present instance' (6).

However, only a few pages later Morris quotes with approval the view of R. Ottley that 'Christ was our substitute ... in virtue of his representative character as the head and flower of our race, in whom humanity is "summed up"' (7), so seeming to accept a use of the term representation without explanation or comment. To complete the confusion Morris proceeds to outline the 'Biblical view of substitution' where substitution is reckoned to be 'inclusive', so that Christ's work may be described as a 'representative and inclusive substitution' (8). Morris' somewhat cavalier treatment of the term representation, in contrast to the more sensitive and careful attention given to the term substitution, would seem to indicate that there is a 'prevailing prejudice' to be found against the former term as much as the latter.

The same objections can be levelled against
J. Packer (9), whose work on the language of substitution will be given careful study in the next chapter, but despite his recognition of the complexity of theological language, particularly interpretative terms like substitution, no such recognition is accorded to the term representation. Packer accepts Denney's view of the significance of a representative, although he does recognise that there is 'in addition to this rather specialised usage' a sense in which a representative 'involves others, for good or ill, in the consequences of what one does' (10).

It is in this sense that Jesus can be called the representative of humanity. Packer, therefore, identifies four reasons for dismissing the term representative 'as both confusing and confused':

... first, that we chose Christ to act for us, second that the death we die in him is of the same order as the death he died for us, and third, that by dying in Christ we atone for our sins - all of which are false. Here now is a further reason for rejecting the proposal - namely, that it misses or muffs the point that what Christ bore on the cross was the Godforsakeness of penal judgement which we shall never have to bear because he accepted it in our place (11).

Thus, Packer is prepared to accept that the term representation conveys some idea of the relation between Christ and humanity, although he defines that only in terms of the consequences that Christ's work has for humanity, and that the two ideas 'representation and substitution are complementary, not alternatives' (12).

Unfortunately, the advocates of the term representation are often equally culpable in failing to treat seriously the complexity and nuances of meaning that
are present in the concept of substitution, preferring instead to attack what is assumed to be a self-evident moral and theological absurdity. As A. Beacock comments on the work of H. A. Hodges:

He groups under the heading 'substitutionary' or 'vicarious' atonement all theories which contain this idea in one form or another. Yet when he is criticising them he seems to have in mind a particular theory, and a rather crude one at that, of penal substitution (13).

In contrast to the term substitution advocates of the term representation would wish to express at least one of the following elements in their use of the term. First, the sense of personal presentation before God in Christ, as A. Richardson indicates when he comments that 'a substitute takes or usurps our place whereas a representative keeps it open for us, acts on our behalf and causes us to be present where in fact we cannot personally appear' (14). Second, the term representation may express the sense that the work of Christ is not something independent of man, but something to be 'owned and appropriated' (15). Third, the term representation may be used to express the conviction that Christ's work does not consist in a bearing of punishment, but in an offering of holiness, obedience or confession on behalf of man. As P. T. Forsyth puts it:

I should, therefore, express the difference between the old view and the new by saying that the one emphasises substitutionary expiation and the other emphasises solidary reparation, consisting of due honour of God's holiness, and the honouring of that and not of his honour (16).

Finally, in this preliminary examination of the recent discussion of the terms substitution and
representation mention should be made of two works which
deal more exclusively in this matter. The first discussion
is to be found in an article by G. Mather entitled 'The
Atonement: Representative or Substitutionary?' (17). Mather
suggests that both terms 'may be properly regarded as
different emphases of the same fundamental truth' (18).
He examines the work of L. Morris as an advocate of the term
substitution and V. Taylor for a presentation of the concept
of representation. Having outlined the position of both
writers he concludes that the two terms 'far from being
exclusive, are in fact complementary' (19). Each term
expresses a 'necessary aspect of the whole truth' (20), so
that the issue between them hinges upon the following
question:

To what degree does the believer undergo the
experience of Christ and reproduce this work?
In so far as the experience and work of the
believer are the same or similar, the sacrifice
of Christ will be spoken of in terms of
representation; in so far as they are different,
it will be spoken of in terms of substitution.
Representation emphasises similarity: substitu-
ton emphasises dissimilarity (21).

Mather's work contains a useful description of the use of
the terms substitution and representation by Morris and
Taylor, but his conclusion that the terms are complementary
is premature in the light of the fact that the account of
the terms given by no means exhausts their possibilities
and certainly does not represent an adequate basis on which
to determine their respective meanings and roles.

The second discussion of the terms is found in
the work of D. Sölle entitled 'Christ the Representative'
(22). Because of the importance of this work for the
present study, and because of her somewhat individual approach to the subject, combining as she does the notion of a post-theistic theology with the concept of representation, a separate chapter is necessary to do her work justice. Chapter VI, therefore, will consist of a detailed account of her work, and an evaluation and critique of her argument. It will be shown that despite the distinctiveness of Sölle's approach, there are none the less many points of contact between it and the patterns of thought that have been disclosed in the first part of this enquiry. Sölle's work is therefore examined not only for the sake of an assessment of any contribution towards the clarification of the terms substitution and representation, but also as a test case for the adequacy and accuracy of the work contained in the main part of this study.

The Method and Content of the Thesis

The brief description of the terms substitution and representation given in the course of this introduction has indicated that any attempt to investigate their respective meanings in the context of Christian atonement theology must recognise and accommodate their complexity and variety of meaning. For this reason Chapters II and III will consist of a description of the terms substitution and representation, and the range of meanings that they are held to be capable of expressing. Chapter II will describe the full range of meanings that may be comprehended in the term substitution, to be followed in Chapter III by
a similar exercise with respect to the term representation. Both chapters consist of phenomenological studies of the terms, drawing on the work of theologians both past and present, adducing illustrations to demonstrate patterns of meaning that are appropriate to both terms. These illustrations are not intended to represent an adequate or complete account of the thought or work of any particular theologian, but simply to describe and illustrate the range of meanings accorded to both terms.

An obvious objection to the pattern of this investigation may be formulated as follows: is not every use of the terms, substitution and representation, context-specific, not merely in relation to a theologian's own thought but also to his own times? Would not instances of the terms substitution and representation occurring in the minds of theologians vary according to different social contexts? Indeed they would, and if the purpose of this thesis were exhaustively to document the use of the terms over their entire history the absence of detailed consideration of their social contexts would be a fatal objection to its methodology.

But, in fact, the resources of historical theology are available for use in ways other than historical study. Such is the nature of Christian theology that theologians of the past are taken to be our contemporaries; and it is as diverse instances of the contemporary use of the terms substitution and representation that reference will be made to theologians of the past. By a 'phenomenological study of the terms' is meant, in this instance, the
occurrence of the terms in present circulation, including those which derive from the selective use of the past by contemporary theology.

Because the primary concern of the thesis is with the terms substitution and representation themselves, severe restriction is placed on the use of literature of other languages. A study of equivalent terms in other languages would have been revealing, but impossible within the limits of this thesis. However, the quotation with which this introduction began, commenting on the difficulty of the term Stellvertretung demonstrates the relevance of this study for other languages. Clearly, where a work exists in translation the terms substitution and representation, where used, are taken as further examples of their range of meanings, although it is not thereby claimed that the author's intention or meaning has been comprehensively considered.

On the basis of this description of the full range of meanings of both terms there can take place an evaluation and assessment of the various patterns of meaning that have emerged. Because this descriptive study reveals that both terms are in fact reckoned to express a range of meanings that transcend any simple distinction between the two terms, Chapters IV and V will undertake the task of evaluation in a different form. Chapter IV will consider and assess the ways in which both the terms substitution and representation express the meaning of the work of Christ and their function in this context. Chapter V will consider and assess the ways in which both
terms function in the context of a description of the relation between Christ and mankind. The reasons for this division of the material will become clear as the study proceeds, but it ensures that the terms are treated in their full complexity and that their full range of meanings are recognised. As has already been mentioned, Chapter VI consists of a detailed analysis and critique of Sölle's work 'Christ the Representative', in order to determine the particular contribution she makes to the discussion of the terms. The concluding Chapter VII summarises the findings of the enquiry and offers some comments on their significance for Christian atonement theology.
CHAPTER II
PATTERNS OF SUBSTITUTION IN CHRISTIAN ATONEMENT THEOLOGY

Introduction

The term substitution has for some time been the subject of considerable theological odium, to such an extent that in 1948 F. W. Camfield, himself wishing to defend the use of the term, could say:

If there is one conclusion which had come almost to be taken for granted in enlightened Christian quarters it is that the idea of substitution has led theology on a wrong track; and that the word 'substitution' must now be dropped from the doctrine of the atonement as too heavily laden with false and even misleading connotations (1).

The situation cannot be said to have altered largely today (2).

Before beginning this enquiry into the theological meaning and use of the term substitution it may help to outline some non-theological uses of the word. The most common and general use of the word is its description of a replacement or the act of replacement that takes place in a sports team. The substitute in this context replaces an injured or inadequate member of the team, who, as a result, has no further part to play. This act of substitution describes a straightforward exchange, although it should be noted that this exchange only takes place within the clearly defined limits and rules of a game. A second use of the word substitution carries different connotations: ersatz products, coffee or tobacco substitutes, replace a genuine product but are intended
to fulfil the same purposes, either more cheaply or in some other sense as an improvement on the original. A substitute product is thus different in some sense but equivalent in another. This notion of equivalence in association with the term substitution is also an integral feature of certain technical uses of the word in logic, medicine and ciphers, where a different expression or product may be substituted for another because it functions as an equivalent. Finally, the notion of replacement comes to the fore when the term substitution is used, as it was in the American Civil war, to describe a man hired to replace a drafted man. This was the same as the French system of remplaçant, where the term substitute described either the replacement or the fee that could be paid to avoid the draft.

Thus, the non-theological uses of the term substitution can be characterised by the concepts of exchange, replacement and equivalence, and while some uses of the term are only appropriate to things, others are applicable to people in specific circumstances. As an introduction to the theological uses of the term substitution these examples are instructive, but it is readily apparent that any theological use gives the term a more specific content by employing it in specific contexts and in association with particular theological concepts.

To anticipate the results of this chapter it will be shown that the term substitution stands in relation to a cluster of widely divergent ideas and that it functions as an interpretative tool, employed to articulate
and order theological material in order to establish and preserve central and formative relations within this diverse material. This study can therefore be said to demonstrate in a practical sense the main contention of J. I. Packer, who argues more theoretically and abstractly for an understanding of this interpretative function of the term (3). It will therefore be helpful to outline the main points of Packer's argument, not because it provides the basis for the study which follows, but because it complements and highlights one of its conclusions.

Packer focusses on two characteristics of theological thought. First, the character of God's reality and work as mystery:

... a reality distinct from us which in our very apprehending of it remains unfathomable to us: a reality which we acknowledge as actual without knowing how it is possible, and which we therefore describe as incomprehensible (4).

Second, when this dimension of 'mystery' is recognised and respected it will become evident that ordinary language is 'stretched' when attempts are made to speak of these mysteries (5). Theological language consists, therefore, of models, which are 'analogies with a purpose', functioning in a particular way to 'inform us about our relationship with God and through the Holy Spirit enable us to unify, clarify and intensify our experience in that relationship'(6). Within Christian theology different types of model are to be found: the control models of scripture, the dogmatic models of the Church, and the interpretative models, like that of substitution, standing 'between Scripture and defined dogma ... for stating the faith to contemporaries' (7).
Because Packer recognises the interpretative status of the term substitution he can, first, distinguish the term from the context of penalty, although he believes this to be a correct 'qualifier' (8); second, it allows him to locate and define the concept of substitution within a pattern of diverse and wide ranging theological criteria, so that their unity and clarity may be apprehended (9). Thus, Packer chides those who have seen the concept of substitution in a 'rationalist' (10) way as though it explained 'how' the work of Christ saves men (11). On the contrary, Packer believes that as an interpretative tool the function of the term is to express and bring to our awareness central Christian experiences and insights, namely the fact of 'the remission of my sins ... to correlate my knowledge of being guilty before God with my knowledge that ... no question of my ever being judged for my sins can now arise' (12).

Whether Packer is correct in the particular interpretative function he assigns to the term substitution will be questioned, but his analysis of the term as an interpretative tool operating in the context of differing qualifiers will be confirmed by the phenomenological study of the term which follows in this present chapter. In the first section the use of the term substitution will be considered in the context of the term 'penalty', illustrating the variety of motifs and ideas that can be grouped under the general heading 'penal substitution'. In section 2 the use of the term substitution will be considered in the context of ideas of
public order or government. The bulk of the material of this chapter will be found within these two sections since these contexts provide the normal and most controversial occasions for the use of the term substitution. Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the use of the term substitution in the context of non-penal descriptions of satisfaction and in the context of descriptions of a conflict with the powers of evil. The latter context in particular contributes little to an understanding of the term substitution but both sections point up possible areas of confusion and the ability of the term to function in diverse circumstances. Finally, in section 5, the use of the term substitution is considered in the context of the idea of 'inclusiveness', thus illustrating a different and surprising use of the term.

1. Substitution in the Context of 'Penalty'

There can be no doubt that it is due to the association of the terms substitution and penalty that the former term has come to be castigated as 'sub-Christian' and immoral (13). The force with which this position has been both attacked and defended has led many to consider the term substitution solely within the particular context of such ideas and has helped to create the illusion that the phrase 'penal substitution' describes a single or self-evident conceptual framework (14). In reality the situation is very different. First, as shall be seen the association of substitution and penalty constitutes
only one out of a number of contextual frameworks for the qualification and interpretation of the term substitution. Second, the material of this section will demonstrate that even within the description 'penal substitution' there is room for significant diversity (15). It will become evident that the concepts described by the phrase 'penal substitution' can respond to critical pressure or to insights that are generated by the concepts themselves, thus bringing about change in the pattern of theological ideas which may still remain under the increasingly diffuse and complex description of 'penal substitution'. It will be one of the tasks of this section to clarify these different patterns of penal substitution by pointing up the differences that are to be found between them. It should be noted that no attempt will be made to trace or to argue for a particular historical development of these different patterns, even to locate the causes for such a development. The only concern of this section is to demonstrate and describe with precision the different patterns of thought that can be expressed under the heading 'penal substitution'.

Before proceeding with a description of these different patterns it should be remembered that the designation 'penal substitution' is a comparatively recent addition to theological terminology (16). It is well known that the Reformation writers largely took over the existing vocabulary revolving around the term satisfaction which continued to provide the key element in atonement theology despite a change of context. As late as 1886
A. A. Hodge could prefer to organise his work on the atonement around the term satisfaction, pointing out that the terms substitution and vicarious were ambiguous and open to a number of inadequate and misleading definitions (17). The term substitution is used comparatively infrequently before the 19th century, with terms like 'sponsor' or 'surety' being preferred (18).

The account of the use of the term substitution in the context of penalty begins with the following quotations from the work of W. G. T. Shedd:

In every instance of transgression the penalty of law must be inflicted, either personally or vicariously; either upon the transgressor or upon his substitute. The remission of penalty under the divine administration is not absolute but relative. It may be omitted in respect to the real criminal, but, if so, it must be inflicted upon someone in his place. ... Justice necessarily demands that sin be punished, but not necessarily in the person of the sinner (19).

The same thoughts are given clear expression by J. Owen:

God may give to everyone his own, or what is due to every one, in the infliction of punishment, although he do not inflict it on sinners themselves, but on their surety, substituted in their room and stead (20).

This form of expression of the concept of penal substitution is characterised by the logical and consistent development of three basic propositions. First, God is conceived as a just law-giver. This proposition is illustrated, again by Shedd when he says:

All true scientific development of the doctrine of the Atonement, it is very evident, must take its departure from the idea of divine justice. This conception is the primary one in the Biblical representation of this doctrine ... we shall find that just in proportion as the mind of the Church obtained a distinct and philosophic conception of this great attribute, as an absolute and necessary principle in the divine nature,
and in human nature, was it enabled to specify with distinctness the real meaning and purport of the Redeemer's Passion, and to exhibit the rational and necessary grounds for it (21).

Second, transgression of God's law must be met with punishment. L. Berkhof writes that punishment denotes:

... [that] pain or loss which is directly or indirectly inflicted by the Law-giver, in vindication of His justice outraged by the violation of the law. It originates in the righteousness or punitive justice of God, by which He maintains Himself as the Holy One and necessarily demands holiness and righteousness in all His rational creatures. Punishment ... is, in fact, a debt that is due to the essential justice of God (22).

Shedd expresses the relation between transgression and punishment with customary directness when he says:

Retributive justice is necessary in its operation. The claim of the law upon the transgressor for punishment is absolute and indefeasible. The eternal Judge may or may not exercise mercy, but He must exercise justice (23).

Third, God is merciful and loving towards sinners in that He permits a substitution, so that their due punishment falls not on the guilty, but on their substitute. J. Owen remarks that:

Christ dying for us as a surety ... being made a curse for us, was an undergoing of death, punishment, curse, wrath, not only for our good, but directly in our stead; a commutation and subrogation of his person in the room and place of ours, being allowed and of God accepted (24).

Chapter IV of this thesis will deal in more detail with the analysis and criticism of this model of penal substitution; for the moment it is necessary simply to continue with its description. This may best be done by focussing on some of the shifts in meaning that can take place even within the framework of thought designated
by the phrase 'penal substitution'. By examining the different senses in which Christ's work is said to be penal or to have a penal reference, it will be demonstrated that the phrase 'penal substitution' describes a range of conceptions such that any serious consideration of 'the theory of penal substitution' must recognise this internal diversity and any subsequent criticism must respect the fact that different expressions of this theory are not equally vulnerable to any particular critique.

The first understanding of the term *penal* in the phrase 'penal substitution' to be considered involves the close association of the concepts of penalty, punishment and suffering. If suffering is the dominant feature of punishment then interest may well be focussed on the thought of the physical or spiritual pain suffered by Christ. Of course, a choice made between speaking of Christ's physical or of his spiritual torment may already reflect a divergence in thought as to the role of suffering in this particular punishment. Many writers who wish to speak of Christ suffering the punishment of sinners may well regret the language of S. Charnock, who writes that God was:

> desirous to hear Christ groaning, and see him bleeding ... He refused not to strike him that He might be well pleased with us; quenched His sword in the blood of His Son that it might be for ever wet (25).

Instead, it is more probable that while not forgetting the physical pain suffered by Christ, it is some form of spiritual anguish which is seen to constitute his real suffering (26).
Further, if suffering is taken to be a fundamental characteristic of punishment, interest may well be focussed on the amount of suffering endured. Once it has been accepted that Christ's substitution consists in his receiving the punishment for our sins, then of necessity it must be asserted that he really does suffer that identical punishment, or else both a rational and consistent basis for God's forgiveness will be abandoned and the Christian's certainty of his liberation from punishment will be taken away (27). In other words it is necessary that Christ's sufferings are seen to be the same in kind and extent as the penalty that was due to the sinners themselves. This can be seen in a relatively undeveloped manner in Calvin, particularly in his exposition of Christ's descent into Hell.

Nothing had been done if Christ had only endured corporeal death. In order to interpose between us and God's anger, and satisfy his righteous judgement, it was necessary that he should feel the weight of divine vengeence. ... Like a sponsor and surety for the guilty, and, as it were, subjected to condemnation, he undertook and paid all the penalties which must have been exacted from them, the only exception being, that the pains of death could not hold him. Hence there is nothing strange in its being said that he descended to Hell, seeing he endured the death which is inflicted on the wicked by an angry God. ... Not only was the body of Christ given up as the price of redemption, but ... he bore in his soul the torures of condemned and ruined man (28).

J. Owen is more specific when he says that:

... if God laid the punishment of our sins upon Christ, certainly it was the punishment that was due to them; mention is everywhere made of a commutation of persons, the just suffering for the unjust, the sponsor for the offender ... but of a change of punishment there is no mention at all (29).
Owen translates the language of pecuniary debt from 'things real' to 'things personal' and argues that there are two possible ways of seeing satisfaction (30):

First, by a solution, or paying the very thing that is in the obligation, either by the party himself that is bound, or by some other in his stead: as, if I owe a man £20, and my friend goeth and payeth it, my creditor is fully satisfied. Secondly, by a solution, or a paying of so much, although in another kind, not the same that is in the obligation, which by the creditor's acceptation stands in the lieu of it; upon which also, freedom from the obligation followeth, not necessarily, but by virtue of an act of favour (31).

It is on this choice, between an identical payment and a token that is accepted as a favour that Owen states his case against Socinus (32).

However, although the language of an identical payment may be said to be logically and evangelically most rigorous and consistent, the difficulties involved in such a concept prompt the use of a more subtle idea, that of equivalence. 'Substitution excludes identity of suffering: it does not exclude equivalence', A. H. Strong argues (33), following the statement of W. G. T. Shedd that:

... a golden eagle is worth a thousand copper cents. The penalty paid by Christ is strictly and literally equivalent to that which the sinner would have borne, although it is not identical. The vicarious bearing of it excludes the latter (34).

Thus, by employing the language of equivalence, the rigour and consistency of the argument of penal substitution appears to be sustained, while the precise nature of Christ's suffering is left unstated. How then are Christ's sufferings constituted an equivalent? Primarily because of the 'dignity' consequent upon the union of the divine
with the human in Christ (35). The dignity of the subject as the divine-human person renders such human sufferings of the highest possible value, such that they more than constitute an equivalent to the sufferings due to sinful humanity. Owen relates this divine dignity to the duration of the sufferings of Christ: such sufferings, although taking place only in a 'limited season', could fully satisfy divine justice (36). Shedd, too, believes that the suffering of Christ:

... contains the element of infinitude, which is the element of value in the case, with even greater precision than the satisfaction of the creature does; because it is the suffering of a strictly infinite Person in a finite time, while the latter is only the suffering of a finite person in an endless, but not strictly infinite time (37).

The notion of equivalence functions in response to the Socinian critique that there was no intrinsic value to the sufferings of Christ or to the satisfaction he is said to have made. However, an increasing reticence can be detected in the use of this concept to indicate a quantifiable amount of suffering and it comes instead to express simply the certainty that what Christ has accomplished is both adequate and appropriate for the satisfaction of God's justice. That there is a tension between the stricter, more logical language of an identical substitution and this ambivalent and ambiguous use of the concept of an equivalent substitution can be shown by the discussions to be found in the work of A. A. Hodge and C. Hodge (38). Both are seen to be theologians struggling to express a notion of equivalent substitution that falls
neither into the sheer implausibility and the difficulties associated with the language of literal identity of punishment, nor into the inadequacies of a substituted punishment that bears no relation to the penalty that the sinner ought to have borne. A. A. Hodge writes that Christ:

... did not render a pecuniary satisfaction, and therefore did not suffer the same degree or duration, nor in all respects the same kind, of sufferings which the law would have inflicted on the sinner in person. But he did suffer the very penalty of the law - that is, sin was punished in him with strict rigour of justice. His sufferings were no substitute for a penalty, but those very penal evils which rigorous justice demanded of this exalted person, when he stood in our place, as a full equivalent of all that was demanded of us. The substitution of a divine for a human victim necessarily involved a change in the quality, though none whatsoever in the legal relations, of the suffering (39).

C. Hodge is even more ambivalent, for although he recognises that justice demands 'a real satisfaction', he also sees that Christ did not suffer an 'exact quid pro quo, so much for so much', but that his suffering and death were 'adequate to accomplish all the ends designed by the punishment of the sins of men' (40). In fact, when:

... we say that Christ's sufferings were penal ... we say nothing as to the nature or the degree of the pains which He endured. We only say ... that they were designed for the satisfaction of justice (41).

However, Hodge realises that such a statement could be misunderstood, so he immediately adds:

... it is not to be inferred from this, however, that either the kind or degree of our Lord's sufferings was a matter of indifference ... He would not have suffered as He did, nor to the degree He did, unless there had been an adequate reason for it. ... There must be enough of self-sacrifice and suffering to give dignity and inherent value to the proffered atonement (42).
Both A. A. Hodge and C. Hodge oscillate between the thought of the intrinsic value of Christ's sufferings as constituted by his dignity as a divine human person, and the value of Christ's sufferings as determined by God's acceptance of them as an adequate and full satisfaction of His justice. In other words, it would appear to be the case that for the logical or rational pattern of thought which speaks of the satisfaction of God's justice through the infliction of a substituted penalty it is essential that this is in all strictness and rigour our penalty falling on another; but, the problems of conceiving of an identical penalty falling on another lead to statements which assert the equivalence of Christ's penalty to that which should have been endured by sinners themselves where such statements can be sustained only by an appeal both to an intrinsic worth and to an extrinsic worth determined solely by God. Thus, what might have appeared as a rational and logical pattern of thought is found to contain ambiguities that cast doubt on the very principle involved in the notion of a substituted penalty which fully satisfies justice in all its legal demands (43).

By focussing on the concept of penalty, and seeing the different ways in which penalty is seen to be related to Christ's substitution, a variety of patterns of thought has been disclosed, all of which fall under the heading of penal substitution but which in fact express quite different understandings of Christ's substitutionary work. However, the discussion so far has been confined to the narrow understanding of penalty and
justice as exemplified by the three propositions listed above, but it is quite apparent that the language of penal substitution can be sustained even in a very different conceptual framework. This is the case when the concept of penalty is associated directly with death rather than with suffering or punishment although the resulting pattern of substitution is still described as penal substitution (44). The association of penalty and death has two consequences.

First, it facilitates understanding that Christ did in fact suffer the penalty for sin. If sin and death are 'indissolubly united' (45), in the sense of a 'cause' and an 'effect' (46), then the death of Jesus must have a direct reference to sin. Sin issues in death, for that is the consequence of a Holy God (47).

God, as the One who is separated personally from man, is the angry One: the necessary effect of this separation is the opposite of the effect of personal communion with God, absolute disaster, death in the pronounced human sense (48).

Therefore, Jesus, by his death, fulfilled the holy will of God which decrees that sin issues in death, so that because he came 'to die our death' (49) God's love 'breaks through' (50) his wrath and he may forgive without denying His holy nature.

Second, the association of penalty with death allows for a change in perspective on how it is that Jesus' undergoing of death satisfies God. God is satisfied, not because an equivalent quantity of punishment deserved by sinners has been meted out to Christ, but because God's holy nature has been confirmed that sin issues in death. For E. Brunner, because he retains the language
of penalty and equivalence, these consequences are less clearly visible, although the following statement reflects this change in awareness:

The objective aspect of the Atonement, therefore, may be summed up thus: it consists in the combination of inflexible righteousness, with its penalties, and transcendent love; thus it means that the world-dualism caused by sin, which issues finally in death, is declared valid, and at the same time the overwhelming reality of the Divine Love is also justified (51).

For J. Denney, the change is more apparent:

... in His atoning work Christ is our Substitute. ... He enters into all the responsibilities that sin has created for us, and He does justice to them in His death. ... In perfect sinlessness He consents even to die, to submit to that awful experience in which the final reaction of God's holiness against sin is expressed. Death was not His due: it was something alien to One who did nothing amiss. But it was our due, and because it was ours He made it His. ... He died [for our sins], and in so doing acknowledged the sanctity of that order in which sin and death are indissolubly united ... for how could men be saved if there were not made in humanity an acknowledgement of all that sin is to God, and of the justice of all that is entailed by sin under God's constitution of the world (52)?

Despite the close association of this language with the penal language that has already been described, it is evident that there are differences which are not superficial, and the term substitution is required to reflect and express these changing conceptual frameworks.

Another change in the conceptual framework for a penal understanding of the term substitution can be discerned in the work of W. Pannenberg, which deserves mention despite its individual character (53). The concept of substitution employed by Pannenberg is shaped by his hermeneutical presupposition that theological statements must be justified 'from the human course of
the event', not 'on the basis of the incarnation' (54). In other words, Pannenberg will not allow the theological claim of Christ's divinity to be employed as an explanation of the rationale of the cross (55). Instead, Pannenberg gives distinctive content to the concept of substitution by understanding Jesus' death as the revelation of 'the punishment suffered in our place for the blasphemous existence of humanity' (56). Jesus is judged and condemned as a blasphemer, but his resurrection by God shows that this judgement is unjust and invalid, so that 'not he but the one who rejected him in the name of the law was the blasphemer' (57). This inversion of standards shows that those 'who rejected him as a blasphemer ... were the real blasphemers' who 'rightly deserved the punishment that he received. Thus, he bore their punishment' (58). The logical problems raised by this use of the concept of blasphemy of which Christ's judges are guilty only after his resurrection have been well argued by H. Neie, but they are only of concern here to the extent that they indicate that Pannenberg's treatment of the problem has not indisputably clarified how it is that one may justly suffer the punishment due to another (59). Further, it should be noted, that although the concept of substitution may be legitimised in this way from the historical events of Jesus' death the penal aspect of the substitution receives little attention as the significance of this death is explored (60).

Finally, although it might seem to be going beyond the bounds set by the heading of 'penal substitution' it is instructive to note some uses of the term
substitution in which a penal context is denied and yet which appears to be evoked by the demands of the concept of substitution itself. F. W. Camfield, in an article already cited, attempts to outline a non-penal theory of the atonement based on the thought of P. T. Forsyth that 'not suffering, not death, not punishment, as such, but holiness' was the satisfying element in Christ's sacrifice (61). However, despite this intention, penal language reappears: 'The infliction and judgement which we could not bear, he bore for us' (62). Since the nature of this infliction is not specified further it remains unclear as to what part the concept of judgement is supposed to play in the satisfaction made by Christ (63). H. Neie detects in Moltmann's use of the term Stellvertretung (consistently translated as representation) a similar 'ambivalence' which arises because 'he too is arrested by the concept of God as the legislator who redeems intra legem' (64). Certainly such statements as 'God passes judgement on Himself, God takes the judgement on the sin of man upon Himself; He assigns to Himself the fate that men should by rights endure' (65), make use of a penal framework of thought, which Neie sees as creating an 'insoluble tension between the Christ and God who suffer out of love on our behalf and the God who suffers penally and vicariously the judgement on the unforgiveable sin and the unexpiateable' (66). Moltmann himself rejects as partial and inadequate the Jewish concept of expiatory sacrifice (67), but does not appear to have expunged such ideas from his own theology, perhaps because 'a judgemental connotation is ineradicably part and parcel of the understanding of Christ's suffering
within the framework of Luther's *theologia crucis* (68).

A similar ambiguity, which can only be touched on here, is the rejection by K. Barth of the concept of punishment as the 'main concept', and particularly as the means by which satisfaction is offered to the wrath of God - 'the latter thought is quite foreign to the New Testament' (69). With regard to the idea that 'we are spared punishment by what Jesus Christ has done for us' Barth argues that 'the New Testament statements concerning the passion and death of Jesus Christ are not at all or only indirectly in this direction' (70). None the less, as a recent discussion has demonstrated (71), some confusion is created because Barth still continues to construe the atonement within the 'framework' taken from the 'sphere of the law' (72), and thus would appear to employ a penal understanding of substitution.

**Summary and Observations**

In this first section attention has been focussed on the penal context of the term 'substitution', a context that for many indelibly characterises the term, so that to speak of substitution a penal framework of thought is automatically evoked. It remains to be seen in the rest of this chapter how far it is true that the concept of substitution is tied to this penal framework, but for the moment some points can be noted in summary of the material so far investigated.

First, it has been demonstrated that within a penal framework of thought there are a number of significantly different understandings of the concept of substitution,
with such 'theories' differing not just in emphasis, but in fundamental areas respecting the nature and purpose of penalty together with the manner of substitution that is appropriate to these different understandings. It is not just a difference of emphasis that sees, on the one hand, penalty being inflicted on the substitute Christ so that God's wrath may be mercifully diverted, and on the other hand, as the upholding of the moral order of the universe. Neither is it an insignificant variation that some see Christ as suffering the precise penalty that would have fallen on the sinners themselves; others see Christ as a suitable equivalent so that the demands of God's laws are fulfilled in a way that God Himself decrees to be fitting; others again see Christ substituting himself for men so that the validity of the law is demonstrated and God's government upheld. All of these variations are, and can be, described to a greater or lesser extent under the heading of penal substitution, but as the term 'penal' expresses different meanings and insights, so too the term 'substitution' comes to be associated with different patterns of thought and so carries with it these different associations.

Second, it follows from this divergence that different expressions of penal substitution are not necessarily equally vulnerable to points of criticism. It does not clarify the situation, nor does it do justice to the complexity of the issues, to seize on the least palatable expression of penal substitution in order to dismiss it as sub-christian, and thus claim to have disposed of the problem.
Third, doubt has been cast on the claim that the conceptual framework of penal substitution offers in itself a rational explanation of Christ's saving work, since the notion of penal substitution can only be substantiated by an appeal to the idea of equivalence, not to the literal identity of Christ's substitution. Any use of the idea of equivalence, however, necessitates some form of appeal to God who decrees or accepts that there is indeed an equivalent. In other words, the logic of penal substitution is not to be found in a 'closed system', explicable in its own terms as a consistent explanation of Christ's saving work, for at its heart there is found to lie an appeal to God to accept this particular substituted work, which can be advanced on rational grounds only in the sense that it is somehow 'fitting', but which ultimately is seen to be a pure act of grace.

Fourth, it would appear to be the case that even in cases where those wishing to use the term 'substitution' dissociate it from a penal context, the term may carry with it that understanding, which then reappears without examination, or it may evoke that context in the minds of others and so create confusion.

Thus, the results of this section investigating the use of the term substitution in the context of concepts of penalty may be summed up by saying that the 'theories of penal substitution' describe a range of interpretations as to the nature of the penalty said to be involved in Christ's substitutionary work, and so also describe a range of perceptions as to the content and meaning of the
term substitution itself. Such theories shade almost imperceptibly into theories that are claimed to be non-penal, and they share significantly in presuppositions that extend beyond the confines of any particular definition of penal substitution. It is this latter point that must now receive further consideration and illustration under the heading of 'substitution in the context of public order'.

2. Substitution in the Context of Public Order

In the previous section it was demonstrated that the language of penal substitution could accommodate expressions concerning Christ's death where his sufferings were seen as the means of preserving the order of God's government. This was not necessarily seen to contradict the principle statement that God's government is preserved precisely because it is our penalty that is suffered, but the ambiguous use of the concept of equivalence can be seen to open up the possibility of conceiving of God being satisfied through a means other than the literal penal substitution of Christ in the place of the sinner (73). The origin of this development is associated with the name of Hugo Grotius (74), despite the fact that Grotius saw himself as defending the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction (75). The 'theory' linked with his name, the 'Governmental' theory of the atonement, which was quickly seen by the orthodox to pose a serious threat, could be developed because Grotius' treatment of the satisfaction made by Christ regarded his sufferings not as the penal consequence
of our sin as administered by the law but as demonstrating an act of deference to the law, an act which is substituted in place of the punishment of offenders so that God's righteousness is proved as effectively as would have been the case had offenders received their punishment (76). In other words, Christ does not suffer penalty instead of us, in the sense of bearing the just desert of our sins, bearing our punishment, but rather his suffering is substituted for our punishment, replacing punishment, but meeting the same ends (77). This is a subtle distinction, but its force may be discerned more clearly by considering the conceptual transformation that is involved from two perspectives.

First, the concept of law is changed so that the appropriate understanding is no longer governed by the practice of criminal law, which is taken to demand retribution in the form of punishment, but instead by the demands of public order or rectitude. Sin violates the moral order of the universe, which is in itself an expression of God's order or holiness, so sin is a challenge to God's government. It would be perfectly just of God to punish the offender as a way of upholding the sanctity of his law and as a way of maintaining that order by deterring others, but there is no necessity which compels God to act in this way. God is not bound by the law, precisely because it is His law and therefore serves Him and the community which He governs (78). Rather, God is free to forgive so long as the order of this government, His public order which maintains the good of the universe, is maintained. To forgive freely, with no
action on God's part, would be to allow the breakdown of the order of the universe in that the law would be flouted, and would be seen to be flouted, with the result that there would be no compelling reason for it not to be flouted again in the future (79). But, Christ's sufferings are shown to uphold this moral order, for God clearly reveals His abhorrence of sin and demonstrates its seriousness for the order of the universe. Christ's death was a satisfaction, but it was not a satisfaction of distributive justice relating to the punishment of crimes, but of rectoral justice which relates to God's regard for the good of the universe (80).

Second, it can be seen that although the term 'penal' may still be used, in this context it is given the meaning of 'penal example' (81). Penalty is no longer seen to be the necessary punishment of sin, but instead is understood to be the expression of God's hatred of sin in His desire to uphold public law, which is now seen to be maintained because in the suffering of Christ there is an effective warning and deterrent against further sin.

There is therefore nothing wrong in this, that God whose is the highest authority in all matters not in themselves unjust, and is himself subject to no law, willed to use the sufferings and death of Christ to establish a weighty example against the immense guilt of all, with whom Christ was most closely allied, by nature, by sovereignty, by surety (82).

When these two changes in perspective are recognised it can be seen that the treatment of the satisfaction made by Christ described by the term 'governmental' is clearly differentiated from theories of penal
substitution. The conceptual framework of the purpose and manner of punishment has completely changed, and therefore the character of the substitution involved is also quite different. Those who recognised this change argued that the concept of substitution should no longer be used, as it had been emptied of its 'real' meaning, i.e., the meaning associated with a penal framework of thought (83), but the problem with this demand is to recognise when the context is penal and when it is governmental.

For example, the following quotation from R. Wardlaw demonstrates just how difficult it is to specify precisely the context of the argument and thus to determine the sense being given to the term substitution:

The righteousness of God is declared, or made manifest, by the infliction of the penalty of transgression on the person of Jesus Christ, as the voluntary surety and substitute of the guilty (84).

(The context at present seems to be firmly located in a penal framework, but Wardlaw continues):

The two great ends of public justice are, the glory of God, and, in connection with it, the general good of his creatures. -It is essentially necessary to the attainment of these ends ... that if any sinner be pardoned, it should be in such a way as, while it displays the Divine mercy, shall at the same time testify the Divine abhorrence of his sins (85).

The logic of substitution is then understood to be found in the fact that:

... all the ends of public justice are fully answered. The law retains its complete unmitigated perfection ... while the riches of mercy are displayed, for the encouragement of sinners to return to God, the solemn lesson is at the same time taught, by a most convincing example, that rebellion cannot be persisted in with impunity; and motives are thus addressed to the fear of evil, as well as to the desire of good (86).
Three points can be noted to conclude this section on the understanding of substitution in the context of public order. First, there is quite clearly a significant change in the concept of substitution when employed in this context as opposed to the contexts provided by the concepts of penalty outlined in section 1. This difference may be expressed in several ways: either, Christ suffers not as our substitute in bearing the penalty due to our sins, but as a substitute for punishment displaying divine abhorrence against sin; or, Christ does not suffer our punishment but is substituted as an example, witnessing to the moral order of the universe.

However, second, it is equally important to recognise that although these two contexts of penal and governmental ideas do offer significantly different accounts of how God is satisfied in the death of Christ, there is also continuity between them. Not only are the concepts of both areas of thought combined and muddled by those who wish to use the language of satisfaction, but more importantly, the governmental pattern of thought can be seen to be a reflection of an ambivalence discovered already in the concept of penalty. Even within the framework of penal theories of substitution the difficulty of the assertion that Christ has born our penalty because of our sins gives rise to an ambivalence in the language of equivalence so that Christ's sufferings are said to be adequate by God's decree; the governmental theories of substitution stand within the tradition of this problem, but offer a solution which separates further still any intrinsic relation between Christ's suffering and our penalty.
Third, within these shifting patterns of thought the term substitution is continually employed and it has to adapt to the changing context in which it finds itself. When the governmental context is clearly articulated it can be seen that the term substitution takes on a quite different meaning from that of its penal context. Christ is no longer our substitute in the sense of taking our place and suffering our punishment; rather, he is substituted by God instead of our punishment as a means of declaring His nature and purpose. In other words, when the term substitution is used it relates not to an exchange of persons, Christ for men, but an exchange of method, Christ displaying the divine abhorrence of sin substituted for our punishment (87). The logic of the term has changed, as has its function in theological vocabulary.

3. Substitution in the Context of Satisfaction

It has been noted already in the course of this chapter that the term substitution has only recently come to occupy a prominent place as a conceptual theological term in doctrines of the atonement and that the term satisfaction formerly occupied a more central and significant role. In the previous two sections reference has been made to the way substitutionary terminology changes in the context of penal understandings of satisfaction, but our concern is now with the reference of the term substitution to a non-penal understanding of satisfaction. Attention will be focussed on the work of Anselm, although it may be disputed that such a non-penal understanding of
satisfaction is to be found in the Cur Deus Homo (88). Therefore, an outline of the argument that serves to characterise Anselm's concept of satisfaction will be given which seeks to demonstrate wherein such an understanding is significantly different from the penal concepts of satisfaction that have already been described (89). The point of this section is not the provision of a fully adequate outline of Anselm's atonement theology, so much as an illustration of the fact that the term substitution can be used in the context of an understanding of satisfaction that is at least claimed to be non-penal, and that it is given a different contextual framework from which its meaning is derived, a meaning which is therefore possibly different. The following, therefore, is an attempt to focus on certain themes that shape the Anselmian concept of satisfaction (90).

First, there needs to be considered Anselm's view of sin and the consequences it has for man. Sin is a failure of the whole man to subject his will to the will of God, a failure of the creature to give the Creator what is desired of him (91). Unatoned sin requires punishment, lest it be unjustly forgiven, and thus it follows that either man must make satisfaction for this sin against God or he must be punished (92). Since satisfaction can only be effected by man making a positive gift to God, over and above any repentance and correction of the sin, Anselm regards it as impossible that man can render this satisfaction, principally because man already owes everything to God so that nothing remains to be offered as a gift (93). Therefore, since man's offence is so serious
in being a violation of God and of His Kingdom, he must be punished (94).

Second, there needs to be considered Anselm's view of the Incarnation and its purpose. God does not wish man to perish because of his sin; indeed, this would be quite unfitting since God's purposes would then be frustrated, but for man to be saved satisfaction must be made (95). The solution is provided by God Himself becoming man, who because of His sinless life can offer the one thing which is not demanded of Him - His life (96). The offering made by the God-man, the free gift of his life, is a genuine satisfaction made by man, but because it was the offering of the God-man, it was a gift greater than all the sin and dishonour done to God, and can therefore be the means whereby God's honour is restored so that there is no longer the necessity that man be punished (97).

Third, there needs to be considered Anselm's view of the application of the work of Christ. The God-man satisfies the violated honour of God, but it does not thereby automatically follow that men are freed from their debt (98). But, because the free gift of the God-man can be said to merit a reward, and because he himself needs nothing, in his love and mercy, and in harmony with the saving purposes of God he gives his reward instead to the men whom he came to save (99).

From these three points it should be clear that the language of penalty is inappropriate as a central description of Christ's work of satisfaction. Although the sinner's death may be said to be the penalty for sin,
Christ's death is offered precisely not as penalty but as an overwhelming gift to God. We must, therefore, agree with J. McIntyre that 'St Anselm's theory cannot without considerable explanation be called "penal"' (100), and disagree with those who, like Brunner, see Anselm's concept of satisfaction as holding 'the balance evenly between the ideas of penalty and sacrifice' (101). McIntyre comments:

... while St Anselm does not draw his argument to any conclusive statement, we may fairly say that the position is one of vicarious ... or representative satisfaction. .... If the word 'substitution' were not so frequently used in the phrase 'penal substitution' ... then the phrase 'substitutionary satisfaction' would not be inappropriate. Man ought to make the satisfaction, but the Deus-homo substitutes Himself for man and achieves that end to the honour of God (102).

Thus, it is possible to employ the language of substitution in the context of an understanding of satisfaction that contains little or no emphasis on the role of penalty in that satisfaction. It must not be hastily assumed, therefore, that either of the terms, substitution or satisfaction, and in particular, in their conjunction as substitutive satisfaction, must necessarily evoke a penal context for their interpretation of the work of Christ. When the term substitution is employed to describe Anselm's thought, or any comparable framework, its import and significance must be clearly and carefully differentiated from the meaning given to the term in a penal context. For McIntyre the sense of the term is limited simply to the fact that Christ does for men what they could not do for themselves, but the nature of the work of satisfaction performed in the place of man directs
attention away from certain aspects of substitution and
does a bit of another's attention instead on other aspects. For the main
thrust of Anselm's argument is not that Christ underwent
something that ought to have been undergone by man, but
that he did something which man ought to have done but
had failed to do. In other words, if the term substitution
is characterised by the notions of replacement or commut-
ation so that it can be said that Christ stands in our
place and in our stead, then the term can not be approp-
riately used to describe Anselm's thought as McIntyre
interprets it. However, as McIntyre realises, the term
substitution also carries in its basic meaning of an
exchange the sense of one standing in the place where
another ought to be but in fact is not. According to this
sense the term substitution can appropriately describe
Christ's work of satisfaction in which in my stead and
place he gives to God perfect obedience and thus restores
God's honour. Thus, as McIntyre observes, the term
substitution can be used in this context and is given
an appropriate meaning, but only with careful qualific-
ation and in the full recognition of the different
direction indicated by the term from that of its use in
a penal context.

4. Substitution in the Context of the Defeat of

the Devil

The material in this section may be treated
briefly, since it is apparent that the use of the term
substitution in the context of the defeat of the devil is
not of primary significance for an understanding or
definition of the term itself. None the less, as in the previous section, the language of substitution may be employed in this context, where its meaning is determined by the understanding that Christ, in defeating the forces of evil, does something in man's place of which man himself is incapable of doing. K. Heim sees a substitutionary dimension of Christ's work against 'the Satanic will of rebellion' (103) and explains it in this way:

Only the One whose life was a sacrifice without blemish to God could attempt the fight with the dark power without being wounded by its arrows. He fought a battle in which, if we had attempted it, we should not have stood a chance. What He did we cannot do. That is acting by proxy in the strict, exclusive sense of the word. ... It is precisely the exclusive character of His vicarious work for us that has that compelling power (104).

Indeed, for Heim, it is only in this context of a battle that the language of substitution becomes intelligible, for only here is there no immoral transfer of guilt, but an intervention by Christ to fight on our behalf and to stand for us where only he could stand (105).

In a similar vein G. Aulén comments:

It is clear, however, that the affirmation of Christian faith to the effect that the work of Christ was 'for us', 'for our sake', ultimately includes the conception 'in our stead'. The first expressions tend to be superceded by the latter. This approach to the work of Christ is intimately connected with the idea of his struggle and victory over the demonic forces. This struggle and victory have occurred for our sake, for our salvation and redemption. But since we have been unable to accomplish this work ourselves, it has manifestly been done in our stead (106).

G. Lefebvre makes explicit the connection between Christ's ransom and the term substitution:

Just as the notion of substitutive satisfaction ... necessarily involves a relationship towards God, to whom satisfaction is given by means of
sacrifice, so the notion of substitutive material ransom indicates a relationship towards the powers of evil in so far as they have illegitimately arrogated this power to themselves (107).

Furthermore, Lefebvre links this substitution with penal concepts by emphasising the persecution and captivity of Christ at the hands of Satan's agents.

Hence, if our Lord, in order to free us from this chastisement, from this slavery, from this captivity, had to substitute himself for us and endure from the agents of Satan the pains which we deserved, then truly he was a slave and captive (108).

Finally, J. Packer believes the term substitution to be appropriate to describe the work of Christ in overcoming the devil:

The assumption is that man's plight is created entirely by hostile cosmic forces distinct from God; yet, seeing Jesus as our champion, exponents of this view would still properly call him our substitute, just as all the Israelites who declined Goliath's challenge in 1 Sam 17:8-11 would properly call David their substitute (109).

Thus, in this admittedly limited use of the term substitution, similar characteristics to those found in the last section are apparent, in that the main thrust of the argument points away from an understanding of substitution in which our place, together with its accompanying judgement or responsibilities, is said to be occupied by Christ, and instead points to a work done by Christ of which we are ourselves incapable.

5. Substitution and Inclusiveness

In the course of the study so far the attempt has been made to illustrate and describe the varying conceptual contexts in which the language of substitution
may be located and to explore the varying content that can then be given to the term as it is used to explicate the manner of Christ's salvific work. These varying contexts have given rise to, and express different possibilities for, a range of understandings of the nature of Christ's work before God. The present section introduces a different topic in that the content of the term substitution is now to be found in the explication of the relationship that exists between Christ and those for whom his work is performed. This new context is, therefore, not to be regarded as another alternative to those that have already been discussed, in the sense that a penal context can be regarded as an alternative to a non-penal context, but instead it should be seen as providing material for another sort of 'qualifier' (l10) which is to be applied to the term substitution to express and clarify the relation between the substitute and those for whom he is substituted. This new context is described by the qualifier 'inclusive', where the concept of 'inclusive substitution' is not tied exclusively to any particular view of substitution, but where the term 'inclusive' may be employed to a greater or lesser extent to qualify the meaning of substitution in almost any context (l11).

Before turning to illustrate this theme two comments are needed to clarify the situation. First, the context that is expressed by the term 'inclusive' is one that occupies a prominent place in any discussion of the term representation. It will become clear in the following chapter that one of the central claims of those wishing to use the term representation is that it expresses this
sense of inclusiveness more adequately than the phrase 'inclusive substitution'. Thus, it should be borne in mind that an exploration of the theme of inclusivity will be carried out in greater detail in the illustration of the term representation. At present our concern lies solely with the effect of the concept of inclusivity on the term substitution and with the specific sense in which the phrase 'inclusive substitution' is understood.

Second, the general description of 'inclusive substitution' conceals two divergent patterns of thought, which must be recognised and differentiated. The first of these derives from the work of P. Marheineke, who signifies by the phrase 'inclusive substitution' his understanding of Christ as a 'central individual', and 'centre of history', who is determinative because he manifests 'embryonically world unity and world consummation' in his God-manhood (112). Marheineke is exploring the Pauline and Irenean motif of the Second Adam and the recapitulation of all things in him (113), but his concern is to provide a 'Christological interpretation of history' (114), and only in this sense to relate the concept of inclusivity to the substitutionary work of Christ. In other words, Marheineke's use of the phrase 'inclusive substitution' is closely related to certain uses of the term representation that express an understanding of Christ as archetype or prototype, a motif that will receive more detailed attention in the next chapter.

The second pattern of thought that can be expressed by the phrase 'inclusive substitution', and the one that is to be considered in this section, is perhaps
best illustrated by the following words of L. Morris:

Nothing less than this is adequate to the biblical view of oneness with Christ as the necessary correlate of substitution. ... The biblical substitution is not a purely external, more or less academic kind of substitution. It is a substitution in which the believer is existentially involved. He is caught up in the struggle. He is transformed. Substitution is inclusive (115).

Thus, according to this pattern of thought, the notion of inclusive substitution is employed to counter the charge of externality or exclusiveness that would seem to be implied in the use of the term substitution alone. The meaning that is given to substitution of an act 'in our stead', or 'in our place', is now to be understood not as a replacement, but as an act in which believers (or possibly all humanity) are also 'involved'. As G. Capaldi comments:

The concept of 'substitution' must receive its content within the context of a Christ who acts once for all but yet to whom we are united in our actions as part of that original act. Hence 'substitution' can never be taken to mean simply 'replacement' (116).

Capaldi goes on to explain this act of Christ as that which is:

... inclusive of my act in its own full particularity and individuality. For Jesus Christ makes room for my act; his act is precisely to provide time and place for my act (117).

W. Pannenberg, in a section entitled 'the concept of inclusive substitution' relates this inclusivity to the overcoming of death (118). Jesus dies alone, excluded 'from the nearness of God' and from 'community with the God whose coming Kingship he had proclaimed' (119). But, his substitution is inclusive so that:
... no one else must die this death of eternal damnation, to the extent that he has community with Jesus. Men still have to die, - Jesus' substitution does not take man's place in that sense - but now their death is taken into the community of Jesus' dying so that they have a hope beyond death, the hope of the coming resurrection to the life that has already appeared in him (120).

However, it remains true that the concept of inclusive substitution is not widely employed in these specific and explicit senses. This must be partly a result of the obvious difficulties of associating two concepts that would normally appear to be mutually contradictory. How can an act that is initially defined as being performed in my place, in stead of me, also be understood to include me and my own act? The logical and theological problems involved in the concept of inclusive substitution will be investigated more fully in chapter V, but it is already clear that the new and strange content that is being given to the term substitution raises serious questions as to its continuing intelligibility. It would also appear to be the case that the concept of inclusive substitution is employed comparatively rarely because the concept of representation is believed to express this inclusive dimension, and thus a combination of the terms substitution and representation is more common than the problematic phrase 'inclusive substitution'.

Thus, W. Wolf says that Christ:

... is our 'substitute' in that he does what we could never do by our own power, but it is a representative and inclusive 'substitution' (121).

The inverted commas around the term 'substitution' betray Wolf's unease with the use of the term in this context. Thus, it may be concluded that not only does the phrase
'inclusive substitution' raise questions as to the credibility and coherence of such a concept, but so too does a particular combination of the terms substitution and representation (122).

**Summary and Observations**

The use of the term substitution has been examined and described as it is found in the contexts of penalty, public order, satisfaction, victory, and inclusiveness. Attention was focussed on the first two contexts of penalty and public order since it is these contexts that are generally understood to provide the setting for the term and where its meaning is said to be established. It was observed, even within this limited contextual framework, that the term substitution could express significantly different meanings, thus already demonstrating that the term is not a simple concept with a single or narrowly defined meaning and that it can not be used in ways that assume a self-evident or self-explanatory meaning. The discussion of the contexts of satisfaction and victory demonstrates that even if the term substitution is not central or determinative here, it could none the less be employed and in so doing could express and evoke a different range of meanings. Finally, the concept of inclusiveness as employed in relation to the term substitution was seen to open up yet another conceptual sphere in which the term was claimed to have a direct reference. The impression that results from the complete study is one of the complexity of the term
substitution as evinced by the range and variety of the meanings that it has been held to be capable of expressing.

One further observation must be made to prepare for the critical discussion and analysis of these findings in Chapter IV. It has become clear that the term substitution is an interpretative conceptual tool which organises and expresses a cluster of concepts that are held to play some part in Christian thought on the atonement. To adopt Packer's terminology, these concepts may include the primary 'control' models of scripture, but they may equally well include models which bear some relation to scripture but which gain more precise content from other sources - e.g. the concept of penalty, which has been seen to be only partially and indirectly linked with the Bible (123). The term substitution is employed to organise and express the relationship between a number of these concepts, and in so doing, becomes coloured by the resulting framework of thought. The development that then takes place around the term, and which is the cause of such confusion, is a complex process involving an interplay between these different concepts and between these concepts and the different frameworks of thought of which they are, to a greater or lesser extent, a part; an interplay that may sometimes be occasioned by a creative ability of the term itself. Thus, in giving conceptual clarity and systematic structure to these various concepts, the term substitution itself provides the opportunity for new insights and fresh developments, perhaps even for opposing or contradictory statements, as the resulting concept of substitution is tested against the range of
concepts which it is attempting to interpret. Therefore, in any assessment of the term substitution this complex interplay that takes place between the different concepts, between the term substitution and certain specific concepts, and between the resulting conceptual framework and other concepts, must be recognised. This means that there is only limited value in taking a 'known' definition of the term substitution and judging other meanings in relation to this. Rather, this first chapter has demonstrated that the complexity and variety of the meanings given to the term substitution is an inevitable consequence of the complexity of the conceptual frameworks in which the Christian doctrine of the atonement is expressed.
CHAPTER III
PATTERNS OF REPRESENTATION IN CHRISTIAN
ATONEMENT THEOLOGY

Introduction

Our study turns now from examination of the diversity and range of meanings that can be given to the term substitution and focusses attention instead on the use of the term representation in the context of Christian atonement theology. As in the last chapter, where a brief look at modern theological uses of the word substitution helped to introduce its specific theological senses, so too an account of the non-theological uses of the term representation will assist in the understanding of its theological uses. In the case of the term representation this is of even greater importance since the possible range of meanings is far broader than was possible for the term substitution. Three different aspects of the term can be readily portrayed.

First, the political meaning of representation. It has already been noted that critics of the theological use of the term representation see this constitutional or elective reference as a decisive reason for its inadmissability in atonement theology since it cannot be said that we elect or appoint Christ as our
representative (1). However, even a brief glance at the discussion which surrounds the political concept of representation reveals that such a criticism construes the meaning of representation too narrowly and simplistically. G. Sartori lists no fewer than seven alternative descriptions of democratic representation, listed here not only because they demonstrate the complexity of this language, but also because they will be seen to be paralleled by various theological uses of the term.

i) The people freely and periodically elect a Body of Representatives - the electoral theory of representation.

ii) The governors are accountable or responsible to the governed - the responsibility theory of representation.

iii) The governors are agents or delegates who carry out the instructions received from their electors - the mandate theory of representation.

iv) The people feel the same as the state - the idem sentire, or syntony, theory of representation.

v) The people consent to the decisions of their governors - the consent theory of representation.

vi) The people share, in some significant way, in the making of relevant political decisions - the participation theory of representation.

vii) The governors are a representative sample of the governed - the resemblance, or mirroring theory of representation (2).

Thus, in the political sense of the term representation, to be able to say that A represents B is to invoke any number of complex models which serve to substantiate or warrant such a description (3). If this is borne in mind in any enquiry into the theological use of the term representation it should guard against any premature rejection of the term on the grounds of a simplistic picture of election.
Second, there is the more general sense in which the term representation functions to denote 'a making present', either of a person or a thing. It is in this sense that a lawyer may be said to represent a client, a salesman to represent a company or product, an ambassador to represent a monarch or head of state. In all such cases the representative speaks for and acts in the name of the one represented so that the two parties are in some sense identified, and the representative can both be regarded and treated as though he 'embodied' the person or the one represented (4). In the case of the lawyer representing a client the position is not so much that he 'makes him present' but that he enables him to appear in the most favourable light, and in this way so to act on his behalf. However, in case it be supposed that this concept of representation is confined to the area of personal delegation it should be noted also that a national represents his country, whether he wishes it or not. The American hostages held in Iran represented America, and it was assumed almost without question that an act of violence against them could be legitimately construed as an act of violence against America, or against all Americans. Similarly, a soldier represents his country, not just in the sense of fighting for it, but by the identification of their fates and actions. A soldier who flees from battle is taken to shame his country, precisely because it is his country that is represented in that situation. Thus, representation involves patterns of identification, between people and between things, so that any 'making
present' is not simply a game of make-believe but an issue of real importance (5).

Third, representation can also involve the sense of 'typification'. Thus, someone or something is said to be representative of a larger group if he or it is a typical example, embodying or bringing to expression the characteristics of that group. On the other hand, this sense of representation may carry with it the idea of the ideal or exemplar of a group, as one who does not simply sum up characteristics already present, but who embodies ideal qualities for which the rest of the group must struggle but for whom they are normative (6). This idea of representation may also carry with it a more abstract aspect in which the sense of representation is closely identified with the concept of a symbol. A lion represents or symbolises strength, a character in a story represents or symbolises good or evil, and models or diagrams may represent or symbolise realities in a manner that is possible to grasp.

These examples by no means exhaust the possibilities of the term representation, but they indicate something of its complexity and point to the range and variety of meaning that can be expected as the theological concept of representation is explored. To facilitate this description the material in this chapter will be divided into three parts, each of which expresses a facet or dimension that is taken to be of particular significance to the term representation. First, the use of the term will be explored as it gives expression to an understanding of the work of Christ that is said
to be done 'on our behalf' but not 'in our stead'.

Second, the use of the term will be considered as it expresses the conviction that Christ's work has a communal or inclusive character. Third, the use of the term representation will be considered that expresses the Ideal or archetypal quality of Christ. In all three parts these general headings provide the context in which a detailed examination can be made of the variety of uses to which the term representation can be put. As will become clear, the boundaries between these different meanings are not clearly defined, and the different uses are not mutually exclusive, so that the thought of any one theologian may well range across the whole spectrum of thought, a phenomenon that accounts in part for the attractiveness of the term. This means that, as with the first chapter, the material used here to illustrate these different uses should not be taken to be an adequate account of any particular theologian's thought or work, but instead as a means of illustrating and advertising the complexity, variety and range of the term representation.

1. Representation and the Work of Christ

It is a commonplace among writers on the atonement that the term substitution describes an act that is done in our stead, while the term representation describes an act performed on our behalf, and although a sharp distinction is often said to be present between these two expressions it is generally the case that the
nature of the distinction remains unclear (7). This
discussion of the appropriateness of the terms substitu-
tion and representation is often closely linked to a
discussion of the New Testament prepositions ἀντι and
ὑπὲρ (8). However, it must be clear that if the terms
substitution and representation are given meaning
primarily from their contextual frameworks, as this
study argues, a discussion of these prepositions can be
of only limited significance for the terms themselves.
In addition, the task of determining the meaning of these
prepositions is itself fraught with difficulty (9), a
fact which prompted R. Dale to comment that 'the fact of
the Atonement - if it be fact - is neither to be
established nor imperilled by controversies on the force
of a greek preposition, about whose precise value
scholars can have any grave doubt' (10). An act may be
performed on our behalf by being done in our stead, and
an act performed in our stead may perhaps be rightly
interpreted as being on our behalf, but there is no
necessary exclusion of one from the other. If a
distinction is to be made between these expressions, and
thus between certain uses of the terms substitution and
representation, the distinction must be introduced on
the basis of the different contextual frameworks which
only then may give some substance to the claim that there
is a significant difference between a work done in our
stead and a work done on our behalf. These phrases
have to be given content, and, as has been shown, the
content of the phrase 'in our stead' has proved remarkably
diverse; it remains to be shown that the content of the
phrase 'on our behalf' is equally complex. Four different, but overlapping contexts will be examined in this section to illustrate this use of the term representation as expressing a work of Christ done on our behalf.

a) There may be briefly considered the use of the term representation in the context of the 'active obedience' of Christ, as may be evinced by the following quotation from the work of A. A. Hodge:

... when we say that Christ was the substitute of his people we affirm this to be true of him viewed in his function as a sacrifice. When we say that he is the Representative, we affirm this to be true of him as the second Adam or federal Head, undertaking and discharging all the obligations of the broken law in our stead (11).

Hodge relates this obedience of Christ to his position as second Adam or federal Head, concepts which will be examined in more detail later, but H. Smith uses the term representation to describe the obedience of Christ in the course of an examination of Patristic writings:

Salvation may be regarded as the result of the Incarnation itself; or of Christ's active obedience as our Representative, not necessarily as that of his substitutionary death (12).

Referring to Irenaeus' understanding of 'recapitulation' he says 'here we have the effect of Christ's "Active Obedience" as not only our example, but our Representative' (13). Christ is termed our representative in his fulfilment of the law's requirements because, even though there may be nothing that the believer's work can add to this fulfilment, and thus, although it is a work done 'in our stead', yet Christian discipleship
requires that his pattern of obedience is brought to bear on the believer's life, in order that it may begin to become his own, and therefore Christ's work is one of representation fulfilling perfectly what must be repeated imperfectly. V. Taylor comments on Christ's obedience:

The obedience is also representative obedience; it is the obedience which men ought to offer to God, and which they would offer if they fulfilled the obligations of their sonship. As representing men, Christ in His suffering offers that obedience, truly embodied in Himself, in their name and for their sake, not by way of barter or exchange, but with the intention that they should identify themselves with it and so offer it themselves (14).

b) It is in the context of a theory of sacrificial offering that the term representation is most commonly used in connection with an act of Christ performed on our behalf. This interpretation of the meaning and rationale of sacrifice is raised in conscious opposition to the view of sacrifice that sees a confirmation therein of the principle of penal substitution and it diverges sharply from it. In this new interpretation three aspects or features of sacrifice can be related to the concept of representation.

First, the notion of identification, associated with the laying of the hands of the offerer on the head of the victim, an act which does not transfer sin but which identifies the animal victim with the guilty party and thus constitutes it the representative of that person. The language of identification will be explored more fully in section 2 of this chapter, but for the moment
it can be noted that this identification precludes the possibility of regarding the animal as a substitute and leads instead to the view that the animal's death represents the desire of the worshipper to give his life totally to God while recognising his own impurity and defilement. Thus, for example, S. C. Gayford comments:

We have seen that the connection between offerer and victim was so close that it could in no unreal sense be called an identity, and that the laying on of hands symbolically represented the identification ... the offering was not merely 'vicarious' in the sense of being made instead of, in the place of (vice), another. The victim was not a substitute but a Representative, a deputy, for that other, and in symbol identified with him (15).

Second, instead of the sacrifice being viewed as a process of punishment, the aspect of 'offering' is emphasised. In the animal the worshipper offers to God a purified and sanctified life, an act which expresses the worshipper's desire to be so regarded by God, to be presented before God as this pure and pleasing gift (16). If Christ's death is regarded as a sacrifice his role will be seen not as victim but as Priest, the one in whom we are presented before God, so that God looks on us only as we are in him, a holy and pure offering acceptable in his sight (17). V. Taylor well expresses this aspect of the representative offering of Christ:

The truer view of the representative activity of Jesus is one which recognises that in His suffering and death He has expressed and effected that which no individual man has the power or spirituality to achieve, but into which, in virtue of an ever-deepening fellowship with Him, man can progressively enter so that it becomes their offering to God (18).
Third, consequent upon this notion of identification and the idea that Christ's sacrifice is an offering to God, the concept of representation expresses the sense in which the offerer is obliged to participate in the life of the offering by the conformation of his own actions and attitudes to those expressed by his representative (19). Thus, it may be claimed that the crucial distinction between a substitutionary sacrifice and a representative offering is that in the latter there is a moral obligation on the part of the one represented to repeat and appropriate in his own life the qualities that have been claimed as potentially his in the person of his representative. This concept of representation as an imitative participation extends beyond the confines of sacrificial views of the atonement but its characteristics are to be clearly seen here. Thus, for Taylor, the representative offering of Christ does not 'indicate one whose activity lies apart from ourselves, or serves instead of our own, but one whose service leaves in our hands the decisive word in the affirmation of faith' (20). This means that with respect to Christ's offering of obedience, submission and penitence it is in the name and for the sake of men 'not by way or barter or exchange, but with the intention that they should identify themselves with it and so offer it themselves' (21).

c) The theme of sacrifice leads on naturally to the theme of intercession as a context where Christ is
said to act as a representative on our behalf. The theme receives detailed treatment in F. Schleiermacher who argues that representation consists of two points:

Christ appears before the Father, first, to establish our fellowship with Him, and then, further, to support our prayer before the Father. ... in virtue, therefore, of that relation to us which is based upon His peculiar dignity He remains the representative of the whole human race, for like the High Priest, He brings our prayer before God and conveys to us the divine blessings (22).

d) The term representation has been commonly used in the context of describing the theory of 'vicarious penitence', and the conviction that Christ on our behalf representatively offered a perfect penitence to the Father's judgement on sin. Although neither McLeod Campbell (23) nor Moberly (24), the main proponents of this view, give an important place to the term representation, by the early part of this century their views could be described under the heading of 'the representative theory' (25). This description is also aided by such writers as V. Taylor who give an important place to the term representation within the context of the language of vicarious penitence (26). However, this description can be misleading if the concept of representation is identified or allied in any particular way with the concept of penitence. It is correct to indicate that in the theory of vicarious penitence a significant place may be given to the concept of representation as it denotes the identification of Christ with mankind and the union that must be entered
into between each individual and Christ which establishes and applies the vicarious quality of Christ's penitence, but there is no intrinsic or necessary connection between the concept of representation and penitence. The theory of vicarious penitence may well include the concept of representation, but there is no connection close enough to warrant its description as 'the representative theory'.

Summary

The first part of this chapter has demonstrated how the term representation functions to express the conviction that Christ's work is in some sense 'on our behalf'. In the first three contexts described - the active obedience of Christ, his sacrificial offering, and his heavenly intercession - it was shown how the term representation was employed to designate these works as being on our behalf and some basic characteristics were thereby illustrated which were taken to differentiate the term representation from the term substitution. This was seen most clearly in the description of the use of the term representation in the context of sacrificial language, emphasising the continuity between Christ's work and our response through his identification with us, through the presentation and offering of himself to God with which we are identified, and through our imitation of, and participation in, those qualities and actions which evince the purity and holiness of his life. Throughout the discussion, however,
(and this point came to the fore while considering the theory of vicarious or representative penitence) it was impossible to avoid making reference to the use of the term representation that is concerned to describe not the character of Christ's work but the nature of his relation to us. That is, to answer the problem of how any work may be said to be in the place of, or on behalf of, another. It is this use of the term representation to describe the inclusive character of Christ and his relation to mankind that must now be considered.

2. Representation in the Context of Inclusivity

In this section the fundamental question that the term representation is said to answer is 'what is the relation between Christ and other men such that his work can be said to be for them?' In other words the term representation is now considered not in the context of the work of Christ but in the context of the relation between Christ and others (27). Thus, with this use of the term representation, there may be found some complementary description of Christ's work which utilises the term substitution; or it may be the case that the term representation will carry a number of meanings which express both the relation that subsists between Christ and others and the manner of his work. This double reference of the term explains in part its complexity and the difficulties inherent in accurately determining its meaning, but the situation is complicated
further by the variety of means by which the relation between Christ and others may be expressed. In order to help clarify these different expressions and uses of the term representation the material in this section will be grouped under two main headings: the organic relation and the elective relation. The material as a whole points towards the concept of representation as expressing inclusivity or community, and the divisions found in this section are not intended to signify precise or sharp boundaries, but only to point up the different ways in which the term can be used to signify the inclusive character of Christ's work. There is, of course, a fluidity and ease of movement across this spectrum of thought, and the quotations adduced from a range of theologians are not intended to be an exhaustive description of their thought but simply a means of highlighting and illustrating the different patterns of thought that can be expressed in this context by the term representation.

a) **Representation and the Organic Relation Between Christ and Humanity**

The term 'organic' in the above heading is perhaps misleading if it is taken to refer only to a 'biological' context, for the material in this section will describe a range of concepts that illustrate some dimension of inclusiveness that is ontological in its formulation. Clearly there is an abundance of theological material that describes such a relation between
Christ and humanity, but our concern here is limited to the specific use of such material within the context of the term representation, or to such material that the term representation is taken to describe or evoke. In order to recognise and appreciate the complexity and diversity of this material the following description will proceed from three different perspectives. First, there will be described the relation denoted by the term representation that employs the language of Christ's assumption of Man or Humanity in the Incarnation. Second, there will be described the relation denoted by the term representation that employs the language of solidarity, corporeity, or incorporation. Third, a number of biblical motifs are selected together with comments that serve to demonstrate the use made of such language to describe the organic relation between Christ and others with the aid of the term representation.

1) The first approach to be described that associates the term representation with an organic relation between Christ and others involves a pattern of thought that sees in Christ's incarnation the assumption of Man or Humanity so that all individual men are thereby included 'in Christ' (28). This pattern of thought is exemplified in the writing of R. C. Moberly who argues that as Christ is to be understood not as a God among Gods but as perfect God so too he must be understood not as a man among men but as Man:
His relation to the race was not a differentiating but a consumating relation. He was not generically but inclusively man (29).

E. Mascall comments on the same theme:

In the language of traditional theology, Christ both paid man's debt to God and destroyed the power of the devil. And we must notice for the fulfilment of both these aspects of redemption it is necessary that he shall be both the consubstantial Son of God the Father and also, in his impersonal and universal human nature, the representative of all mankind (30).

With respect to this 'debt' which must be paid, Mascall uses the terminology of representation to remove the 'crudity and barbarity' of some views of the atonement, for there is 'no question of the wrong person being punished for the offence, for Christ is one with us in his function as the representative and universal man, consubstantial with us as touching the manhood' (31).

One of the main problems that arises in illustrating this theme of Christ as Man and the representative of all men is to know precisely in what sense such terms as man, Man, the Man, humanity or Humanity are being used. In Chapter V a careful analysis will be offered of the different models that underlie these expressions, but for the moment the theme will simply be illustrated. Thus, J. Dunn comments that:

... in Paul's theology Jesus represents man, not just a man, on the cross, ... the point is that he died not instead of man, but as man (32).

B. Westcott comments that:

If Christ had been born as other men, he would have been one man of many, limited by an individual manhood, and not in very truth the Son of Man, the perfect representative of the
whole race. ... We can see that the Divine personality of the Son, the Son of God, the Son of Man, harmonises the two facts of a true manhood and a universal manhood in Christ, and gives to this Humanity that absolute completeness in which each man to the end of time can find the fulfilment of his partial nature, and through which the will of God could be accomplished for all under the conditions of earthly existence (33).

Two additional points about this language of the universal and representative humanity of Christ need to be made at this stage. First, such language is widely to be found in those writers previously examined in the context of substitutionary expressions of the atonement. P. Van Buren makes considerable use of the term representative to denote Calvin’s emphasis on the fact that it is our flesh that Christ lays down for our salvation, and that it is his and our humanity that is risen and ascended to heaven:

Christ did not die as a single man, alone and to Himself; He died as our representative, so that we are united with Him in His death, because of the union He has made between Himself and ourselves by becoming our true Substitute, and we have therefore died with him (34).

In a different context Anselm can use the language of 'human nature' to link the salvific effect of Christ in individuals to his one act of satisfaction:

For he who was not obliged [to undergo] death and who, having kept justice, would have avoided death, freely and for the sake of justice endured death, which was inflicted upon him. Thus, in that man human nature freely and out of no obligation gave to God something of its own, so that it might redeem itself in others in whom it did not have what it, as a result of indebtedness, was required to pay (35).

Second, it should not be thought that writers who use this language of Christ’s representative humanity
are unaware of the difficulties involved, or that they suppose themselves to be committed to a particular philosophical stance on the status of universals (36). For example, J. Torrance claims that his description of Jesus as representative and inclusive humanity does not involve a platonic concept of the Ideal man, for if it did:

... then the important thing would be not Jesus as an individual, but the Ideal, the Principle he embodied. It is rather the thoroughly non-dualistic biblical thought of Jesus being not only a man but the Man in whom God has given Himself to the world and for the world, that his purposes for Man might be brought to fulfilment (37).

ii) The second approach to be considered of the use of the term representation in the context of an inclusive relation which is said to exist between Christ and others is associated with the language of 'corporeity' and 'solidarity'. As was mentioned earlier there is no clear boundary between this material and that of the previous sub-section, but a number of new perspectives will be seen to be given to the term representation by this new material so as to warrant this differentiation.

The language of corporeity is probably given most explicit consideration in the use of the phrase 'corporate personality' (38). G. Lampe, commenting on a range of scriptural ideas – the summing up of men in Christ the New Adam, the ἄρχως of the epistle to the Hebrews – claims that behind this language:
There lies the Hebraic idea of corporate personality, the notion which finds expression in the Old Testament tendency to think of the nation collectively as a single person, Israel; to mingle ... the thought of the patriarchs as individuals with the idea of the same patriarchs as the corporate personae of the tribes which traced their descent from them, so that the ancestor can stand for the tribe as its Representative. ... life is more than the life of the individual ... it extends to the group, bound together as a single entity, capable of being represented by, summed up in and almost personified by a single individual life (39).

Christ is the representative of man because he includes them (40) in his corporate personality and can act as one on behalf of the many (41).

However, the language of corporeity extends beyond the notions of corporate personality in its bearing on the use of the term representation. The motif of the Body of Christ is significant in this respect since it can offer another context for defining the inclusiveness of Christ so that he may be man's representative. L. Thornton writes:

When Christ died something happened once for all, not only to him who died, but to all for whom he died. They also died with him upon the cross. ... The Messiah and his people together form one organism. It was this new organism which was nailed to the cross and which was afterwards triumphantly raised from the dead. To it, in principle, all mankind belongs; and therefore, in some sense, 'they all died' upon the cross. They were identified with their representative in what he there did for them, just as in that same event he was identified with them in their sinful condition (42).

For Thornton the concept of the body of Christ has a double reference in that it points back to the physical constitution of Jesus and points forward to the reality
of the Church (43). This double reference allows Thornton to make statements about the inclusive quality of Jesus' physical constitution and the acts which he performed as, for example, 'Christ and the Church are one flesh ... the mystical body was implicitly included in the mortal body from the first' (44).

A more usual use of the language of corporeity, however, is to be found in the concept of incorporation. This incorporation of the believer into Christ may be regarded as the realisation of a representation which was already potential in Christ's assumption of humanity (45); or incorporation may be regarded as the act that actually constitutes Christ as our representative:

... Christ is the inclusive representative of the people of God, or redeemed humanity, which constitutes in union with him a sort of corporate personality. ... Now Christ died and rose again, and 'as One has died for all, then all have died' (2 Cor 5:14) - all, that is to say, who are incorporated in that people of God which is 'the body of Christ' (46).

In addition to the use of the language of corporeity to express the inclusive and representative significance of Christ there is also to be found the closely connected language of solidarity.

... The priestly office expresses the fact that Christ is on the side of man, that in solidarity with him he lets himself come under the pressure of history, its guilt, its oppression (συγκίνησις), and its finitude. Here then, being true man, he is man's representative and in this capacity stands over against God (47).

The language of solidarity may function simply as an alternative to the language of incorporation, preserving the physical or ontological form of the union by the
concept of 'being made solid' with Christ (48). The language of solidarity, however, takes on a different set of ideas when it is used in the context of the idea of social solidarity, a solidarity that is constituted by patterns of dependence and interaction. B. Westcott observes that:

50 years ago the term 'solidarity' and the idea which it conveys were alike strange or unknown. We had not apprehended in any living way that we are, as St Paul says, literally members of one another, as men and nations (49).

H. Johnson sees solidarity:

... Both in terms of heredity and environment. We are linked with the human race in the sense that we draw the raw material of personality from our ancestors through the medium of heredity. ... We are also connected to the rest of humanity through the medium of environment. What others do vitally effects us for good or ill; what we do does not merely concern us, but has effects upon our fellow men (50).

It is this phenomenon of solidarity that explains our 'link' with Christ and thus how his act is a 'victory achieved by the One for the Many' (51). This, too, seems to be what E. Peterman means by representative physical satisfaction:

Christ himself is representative in the order of physical reality, for Christ, in solidarity with human history, is the event that re-orients history's deviation; in solidarity with human society, he is that social Person who is able to shape the form of social living, in solidarity with men, he is that person who is able to convert man's person and restore his nature (52).

iii) This third sub-section is not concerned to provide any new subject matter with regard to the
inclusive and representative work of Christ but to illustrate the way in which this language can function to interpret biblical themes. To this end four passages have been chosen that specifically relate the term representation to four different motifs. First, the motif of Adam:

Adam is a name which stands to [Paul] for the 'corporate personality' of mankind, and a new 'corporate personality' is created in Christ. All that Christ did and suffered he did and suffered as 'inclusive Representative' of the new humanity which emerges in him. This idea is very fundamental to Paul's thought about the person and work of Christ (53).

Second, the motif of the High Priest:

The covenant between Yahweh and Israel was concentrated as it were, in the person of the High Priest ... it is this thought that lies behind the New Testament and patristic understanding of the inclusive and representative humanity of Christ, the Mediator of the New Covenant, who represents God to man and man to God in his own Person as the One on behalf of the Many (54).

Third, the motif of the Son of Man:

In the manhood of Jesus Christ is summed up the whole human race. He is not just one among many, a son of man, but One in whom all others are represented, the Son of Man (55).

Fourth, the motif of the New Israel:

The New Israel, according to the New Testament thought, is 'in Christ' as the Jews were in Abraham, or as mankind was in Adam. The Messiah, the Christ, is at once an individual person - Jesus of Nazareth - and he is more: he is, as the representative and (as it were) the constitutive person of the New Israel, potentially inclusive. He includes, he is one with, the New Israel; and the New Israel is one with, it united to, him, as its head (56).

b) Representation and Election

While the association of representation and
election is perhaps not surprising in a democratic context, the treatment of this pattern of ideas may not be supposed to occur most naturally under the general heading of an inclusive relation. However, even when an elected representative is considered within a political sphere, inclusive language is not judged to be out of place (57). An MP represents his constituents, speaking and acting in their name, concentrating them, as it were, into a single person in whom they might be said to be 'present'. While it should be noted that this pattern of democratic concepts goes some way towards an understanding of the theological use of the term representation within the context of election, it is by no means a sufficient description. For, as shall be seen, it is precisely the concern of those who use such theological language of representation and election to establish the inclusive relation between Christ and others not in a constitutional sense but in terms of an ontological unity or community. J. Owen indicates this idea when he describes Christ as the Federal Head of the elect so that:

... when he is punished, they also are punished: for in this point of view the federal head, and those represented by him, are not considered as distinct, but as one: for although they are not one in respect of personal unity, they are however one; that is, one body, in mystical union: yea, one mystical Christ: viz the surety is the head, those represented by him the members; and when the head is punished, the members also are punished (58).

The point is argued by H. Martin who pays more exclusive attention to the concepts of the Covenant and
the Federal Union so that the substitutionary work of Christ may be grounded in a 'real' relation with 'those for whom his atonement is available' (59).

The eternal covenant oneness - the federal union - grounds the representative character of the Messiah and his substitution and suretyship. Each of these three relations indeed, leans for support on that which precedes it: suretyship justified by substitution; substitution by real representation; representation, by federal union or covenant oneness. And here ultimately the series terminates and rests - rests in the unchangeable council and will of the sacred three (60).

However, to illustrate the way in which the elective relation between Christ and humanity can be associated with the term representation, the use made of that term by the translators of Barth's Church Dogmatics will be briefly described (61).

If we listen to what scripture says concerning man, then at the point where our attention and thoughts are allowed to rest there is revealed an elect man, the elect man, and united in Him and represented by Him an elect people (62).

In other words, although election is a decision; and as such has verbal parallels with a constitutional pattern of election and representation (63), precisely because it is the decision of God this election is decisive and constitutive for every man. Because Jesus Christ is electing God and elected man in him is known the decision of God concerning men, and Jesus' history becomes the decisive and constitutive history of all men (64). In Jesus, therefore, God is not dealing with humanity as such, or with an abstract humanum, but with one man, from whom all others take their being and their history
(65). Because of the primacy and completeness of the election of Jesus Christ and because of the derivative and dependent, but still decisive election that is made known concerning other men, ontological statements have to be made to describe this relation, but they are statements which are grounded in the decision of God which as such is decisive for the being of man (66).

The character and purpose of the election of Jesus Christ and therefore the election of all individuals in him shall be illustrated shortly, but first it should be noted that this pattern of election and representation cuts right across one of the most common objections that is raised against the use of the term representation. As was noted in Chapter I the objection is raised that the term representation always suggests or posits a relation between two parties that is established from the side of the constituent, so that the representative is considered to be dependent upon the constituent and cannot be conceived apart from him (67). However, in the use of the terms election and representation in the Church Dogmatics there could be no suggestion of this manner of relation. Election is the decision of God concerning men, and Christ is man's representative solely because all other elect are elect in him despite their decision concerning their representative (68). This pattern of representation is not established from the side of the constituent but rather is one that establishes the constituent (69).

The character and content of this representation
can best be illustrated by a consideration of the twofold form that Christ's election takes - the rejection of man and the election to exaltation and participation in the glory of God (70).

First, regarding man as sinner, God wills his rejection, which is to say, his destruction (71). It is not simply a matter of the bearing away of sin, for sin only has reality in the orientation of the man who turns from God and therefore hastens to his destruction: it is the man of sin who is judged and rejected by God (72).

This is what happened when Jesus Christ, who willed to make Himself the bearer and Representative of sin, caused sin to be taken and killed on the cross in His own person (as that of the one great sinner). And in that way, not by suffering our punishment as such, but in the deliverence of sinful man and sin itself to destruction, which He accomplished when He suffered our punishment, He has ... blocked the source of our destruction; ... He has saved us from destruction and rescued us from eternal death (73).

The election of Jesus Christ is therefore, in this first sense an election to rejection, to be the decision of God concerning all the rejected, to be the representative of all who are rejected, so that in him judgement is passed on man, and therefore our judgement and destruction comes to pass.

It is [at Golgotha] to death that He bows his head and commits Himself. In and with the fulfilment there of the will of God it is nothingness which can triumph over Him - and in and with Him over the whole of the human race represented by Him ... It is also to the wrath of God ... that Jesus commits Himself and in and with Himself the world and the individual sinner. The reconciliation of the world with God which took place in Jesus Christ had therefore the meaning that a radical end was made of Him and therefore of the world (74).
Second, the election of Christ and our election in Him, establishes him not only as our representative, as the one man in whom all are destroyed, but also as the one man in whom all are raised to new life and are exalted to fellowship with God (75).

As He is man, the first born Brother of all men, He is the Head and Representative of man. He Himself is only as we also are elected and called in Him. But if it is the declaration of the New Testament witness that He Himself was not only dead, but also the One who is alive from the dead, He reveals that in and with Himself we also are alive—because we are elected and called in Him. The fact that we see our own humiliation in His is not the end of the story. The revelation of His majesty discloses also the relative and subordinate but genuine majesty to which we are elected and called in Him. In the revelation of His being as the New Man He reveals us too in a new being. In and with His life from death He manifests our life as it is saved in Him, as it is graciously... posited afresh in the fellowship with God which had been forfeited (76).

Thus, it can be seen that the term representation indicates the inclusive reality of Christ, an inclusiveness that is established as a result of the primacy and decisiveness of his election, and which renders his history of rejection and election determinative for the history and being of all individual men. As man's representative, he undergoes our death (and us in him) and as man's representative he is exalted and raised (and us in him) (77).

Summary

This discussion of the use of the term representation in Barth's Church Dogmatics brings to an end
the illustration of the term representation in the general context of inclusivity. In it attention has been focussed on those themes and approaches that denote by the term representation the inclusive significance of Christ, first through an examination of organic models - the description of Christ's assumption of Humanity or Man, the description of Christ as a corporate personality, the description of Christ as one into whom believers are incorporated or with whom they are brought into a relation of solidarity - and second through an examination of the theme of election - the description of Christ as the one chosen by God who is therefore the representative of God's dealings with all men. In all these cases the term representation could be employed to express a particular understanding of the relation between Christ and others, and thus, to express a considerable range and variety of meanings. This range of meanings is found in addition to those already described in section 1 of this chapter which expressed an understanding of the nature of the work of Christ. One final context in which the term representation functions and expresses another set of meanings must now be considered to complete this demonstration of its use: the description of Christ as the Ideal Man.

3. Representation in the Context of Christ as the Ideal Man

The third dimension that may be present in the
use of the term representation picks up a common non-
theological use of the word where it means 'illustrative'
or 'typical'. The precise characteristics of this
language are not easily discerned, for there is no
sharp distinction between a person or act which is said
to be representative as a typical or determinative reality,
and the person who, or work which, is representative in
that it includes or embodies the person or act of another.
Perhaps the distinction can best be grasped by an
examination of the subtle difference between the phrases
'Christ the representative man' and 'Christ the
representative of man'. While the use of the term
representative in the description of Christ as the
representative man is not of central significance in
the debate concerning the meaning of representation and
its relation to the term substitution, it is another
element in an already complex field of meanings and
associations and it is a use that may often be found to
underlie other uses of the term and so may be a confusion
if its role is not dearly recognised.

To indicate this use of the term representative
the following statement is taken from the work of J. Dunn:

When we talk of Christ as representative man
we mean that what is true of him in particular
is true of men in general. When we say Adam
is representative man in his fallenness, we
mean that all men are fallen. So when Paul
says Christ died as representative man he means
that there is no other end possible for men -
all mankind dies, as he died, as flesh, as the
end of sinful flesh, as the destruction of
sin (78).

In his article Dunn oscillates between this use of the
term representative to describe Christ or Adam as the manifestation or typification of a particular sort of existence, and the use of the term to describe Christ as one who includes others, but it is not clear what the relation is between the two concepts or indeed that Dunn is aware of using the term in these different senses (79). In the quotation given above Dunn would seem to regard Christ as representative man in that he manifests or typifies man's condition - one whose end is death - but he continues:

Beyond death he no longer represents all men, fallen man. In his risen life he represents only those who identify themselves with him, with his death (in baptism), only those who acknowledge the Risen One as Lord (2 Cor 5:15) (80).

In his resurrection Jesus is representative man in that he typifies or manifests the condition only of those who identify with him (81). This use of the term seems to be closely related to H. Turner's definition of a representative as 'someone who sums up and makes articulate in word or deed the unexpressed aspirations and muddled gropings of the group he represents' (82).

This understanding of Christ as the representative man can be developed in two ways. First, his representative character may be related to certain qualities or attributes (83).

If Christ had been born as other men, He would have been one man of many, limited by an individual manhood, and not in very truth the Son of Man, the perfect representative of the whole race. ... the life of Christ, the human life of Christ ... is a universal life, universal in character and experience: in the personal discipline of unnoticed solitude, and
in the broad conflicts of public ministry: universal by the absence of every transitory element: universal by the embodiment of every essential feature of man's nobility (84).

G. Stevens argues that:

... in Jesus Christ we see humanity at its climax; he is the typical, representative man. His life and work must also partake in that representative character. His relation to mankind is such that in his career and characteristic acts and experiences we are to see revealed the true law of life for all men (81).

J. Robinson attempts to remove this talk of Jesus as the representative man from the context both of the man who had everything and from the context of the man who was everything, and prefers instead to see in Christ the single quality of the one who is for all:

According to the New Testament Jesus is the man of God, the Son of God, God for us, precisely as he is not the man for himself, but the man for others, the man for all: he is the representative man, who dies - and lives - for all. He is the universal man, the final man, the man for all space and all time (86).

Second, the representative character of Christ can be related more closely to the union of divine and human natures in his person, and to his ideal, archetypal or prototypical status for all human aspiration and development (87). For T. Strong, man is the pinnacle of nature, but each individual is limited by his finite existence, and:

... so long as humanity was made up of limited individuals, so long as the Word of God was partially revealed in some one aspect in each, the ideal of humanity was not yet realised. For this the world was to wait till the Fulness of God should dwell among men bodily, till the Word should be incarnate (88).
So, Christ's humanity is representative and exemplary because 'He represented ideally the true and proper relations in which man should stand to God' (89). Christ, therefore, is the representative man because he brings to realisation an ideal of human perfection and destiny (90). E. Teselle, commenting on Hegel, refers Christ's representative character specifically to the unity of divine and human nature, which are already resolved within God but which:

... must first be represented (Vorgestellt) in an individual other than the ones who come to discover it, and this of course is the significance of Jesus. What makes such representation necessary is that they, occupied with their customary sphere of worldly activity, are unaware of their intrinsic potentialities; ... when Jesus exhibits, in his finite particularity, a fully achieved unity between God and man, he acts out the message that God is not alien to man and that man is even being taken up into God's life. It is appropriate, Hegel thinks, that there be one individual who represents the idea, for the idea also is one, concrete and real in God, not an abstraction from a multiplicity of individuals (91).

It is in this context that the phrase 'inclusive substitution' is also used, particularly as it describes the thought of Marheinecke as he expounds the significance of Christ as the centre of history (92).

Whether the phrase 'Christ the representative man' is used to describe a quality, or whether it describes an archetypal state or condition, the concept of representation will generally include some reference to the imitation or participation from the side of the believer in order to make what is representative in Christ his own. Thus, for Stevens, the fact that Christ
is the typical, representative man, means 'that in him we see what humanity truly and ideally is, then may we not also dare to hold [with Paul] that we must in principle repeat his life and death and resurrection in ourselves in order to realise his salvation' (93). In other words, Christ is representative 'in the order of signs' as E. Peterman puts it, 'for what happened in Christ manifests what must happen in man in order that he be delivered from sin, namely, a death to the flesh when a person, fortified by grace, resists to death the sinful ways of nature' (94).

To anticipate at least one of the themes that will emerge from the study of D. Sölle, the following quotation of J. Robinson indicates the continuing relevance and force of this use of the term representation:

... The realisation is fitfully dawning that 'God' now means, for us, not an invisible being with whom we can have direct communication as it were on the end of a telephone; but that by which he is represented, his surrogate - the power of a love that lives and suffers for others. ... that is the way Jesus pioneered, the first representative of the 'new being' (95).

Finally, attention must be drawn before the close of this study to the use of the term representation that describes Jesus as the representative of God. It is difficult to know precisely what sense has been given to the term when it is used in this context, for it may mean that Jesus 'presents' God, that is, brings Him near to men, and therefore represents Him to men, but it seems that at root the meaning of the term must
be 'to actualise', 'manifest' or 'embody' in the sense that has been seen above to apply to the description of Jesus as the representative man. Thielicke refers this representation of God by Christ to the doctrine of the prophetic office which expresses the conviction that Christ:

... who controls the active Word of judgement and grace, is on the side of God. He is God's representative and thus far stands over against men (96).

For Thielicke to describe Christ thus is to make 'ontic' statements about his person (97), but this would not seem to follow from J. Robinson's statement that because Jesus:

... is the one completely obedient man, who 'always' does his Father's will, right 'to the end', ... he is the perfect reflection or representation of God, in the way that an only son may be said to be the very image of his father (98).

Thus, this use of the term representation to describe Christ as the representative of God fails to clarify the meaning of the term, for the sense in which Christ represents God clearly shares the ambiguity already found to be present in the term representation. However, its use should be noted, not only because it enhances the attractiveness of the term, since it is held to be capable of expressing the relation of Christ both to God and to men, but also because it is a theme that recurs in D. Sölle's work, a theme that will be treated in greater detail in Chapter VI.
Summary and Observations

The use of the term representation has been examined and described as it is found in three different contexts - the interpretation of the work of Christ, the inclusiveness of Christ's person and work, and the ideal quality of Christ. Within each of these contexts a variety of expressions and meanings was discerned and the use of the term representation was thereby illustrated. As with the term substitution it has been demonstrated that the term representation is a complex theological tool that can express and evoke a wide range of meanings in the course of interpreting diverse material that is held to be of relevance for understanding the salvific work of Christ, particularly in its relation to humanity. Thus, as with the term substitution, because such a range of different meanings accrue to the term representation, it cannot be assumed that in a particular use its meaning will be self-evident or self-explanatory, nor can the term be treated in a critical discussion as though it only had one meaning or a limited range of applications.

Chapter V will be an attempt to explore and analyse critically the appropriateness and suitability of the term in Christian atonement theology on the basis of a recognition of this variety of meanings and of the range of contexts in which the term functions.

In one respect this examination has differed from that accorded to the term substitution, for the term
representation has not been the subject of a prolonged and critical discussion with regard to its meaning or appropriateness, and therefore with regard to the problems involved in its use, in the complexity of its meaning, and in the range of its application. Thus, whereas there was found to be considerable discussion within the context of different meanings of the term substitution, with one meaning being measured critically against another, this internal dialogue is lacking in respect to the term representation, with two results: first, the term is measured against the term substitution, uncritically using the variety and range of meaning to oppose a narrow and restricted understanding of substitution (a situation that can, of course, be reversed when the complexity and variety of the term substitution is recognised and is measured against a narrow and restricted understanding of representation); second, the term representation may be used in a variety of ways, passing from one meaning to another, without a sufficiently critical attitude to this movement because the various meanings stand under the general auspices of the term representation.

Finally, this study of the use of representation in these varying contexts has disclosed material which will be shown to bear directly or indirectly on D. Sölle's work in 'Christ the Representative'. Although much in that book is novel and involves a reassessment of the term representation it will become clear that not only is there a significant degree of continuity, but also
that some of the ambiguities in Sölle's work can be illustrated and highlighted from the ambiguities that have already been found to be present in the use of the term.
CHAPTER IV
THE USE OF THE TERMS SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION TO DESCRIBE THE WORK OF CHRIST

Introduction

The material of Chapters II and III has demonstrated the range of meanings that the terms substitution and representation can be said to bear and the variety of contexts in which they have been held to be relevant and applicable. A picture has, therefore, emerged of two terms that are intimately related in the history of the discussion of Christian atonement theology, but whose meanings, while coinciding to a certain extent, can be seen to diverge and to reflect substantially different understandings or aspects of Christ's salvific work. It is possible, therefore, to make some preliminary comments on the use and relation of the terms substitution and representation before considering a critical analysis and clarification of their respective meanings.

First, it has become clear that the terms cannot be used as though their meanings are self-evident or as though they can evoke only one context for understanding the work of Christ; as a minimum it must be said that the terms deserve a more careful consideration and delineation if they are to be of continuing use in
discussions on a doctrine of the atonement.

Second, with the range and variety of meanings that have been shown to be expressed by both terms it is clear that they do not fulfil an identical role in Christian atonement theology and therefore cannot be treated as interchangeable or synonymous terms. It follows also that the terms should not be assumed to be complementary without careful discrimination and delineation to ensure the appropriateness or possibility of such a conjunction.

Third, because of the range and variety of meanings and contexts that have been described, any evaluation and criticism of their meaning must take account of their full complexity and cannot be satisfied with general comments that fail to recognise this diversity.

The purpose of this and the following chapter is to engage in a critical analysis and discussion of the terms, taking account not only of their interpretative function, but also of the range and complexity of their meaning as evinced by the previous studies. In order to facilitate this discussion and to ensure that the terms are accorded their full range of meanings and complexity, the examination will make use of the fact disclosed in Chapters II and III that each term has two aspects to it, or better, that each term functions in two areas of thought that are related and yet which refer to substantially different concerns. On the one hand, it can be seen that both the terms substitution and representation
are employed to interpret and express the manner and content of Christ's saving work; on the other hand, both terms can also be seen to interpret and express the manner and characteristics of the relation between Christ and mankind, or the relation of his work to others. This is not to argue for or perpetuate a facile distinction between the person and work of Christ but to recognise that both terms contribute to an understanding of the atonement in both these areas of thought, thus explaining both their overlapping concerns and their divergence of meaning. By examining the part played by both terms in each of these aspects it is possible to ensure that not only are the full ranges of meaning of both terms adequately discussed, but also that the relation and the divergence between the terms is most clearly recognised. In this chapter, therefore, the contribution of both terms is examined as they seek to interpret and express the manner of Christ's work, although recognising that the focus of attention will be on the term substitution. In the following chapter the contribution of both terms is examined as they seek to interpret and express the manner of the relation between Christ and mankind, recognising in this instance that the focus of attention will be on the term representation.

The course of this chapter will be as follows. Since the terms substitution and representation have been described as interpretative tools which aid understanding of the salvific work of Christ, it is necessary to review the character of the Biblical material that can be said
to bear upon and generate these interpretative models (1). There then follows four sections, each involving a critical examination of some central theme that was disclosed in Chapters II and III in the context of the work of Christ. The first of these critical examinations probes the claim that substitutionary terminology, and particularly that which arises in a penal context, has the function of an explanation of Christ's work which is based upon a rational and consistent system of thought. The second discussion analyses the various concepts of justice that shape the concept of substitution and enquires critically into the problems and the value of these different expressions of substitution. The third discussion examines the claim that substitutionary terminology demands a concept of the atonement that is morally irrelevant to man because Christ's work is morally exclusive. It is in this context that the claim of the term representation to present a morally relevant understanding of atonement will be scrutinised. The fourth discussion focusses briefly on the Christological and Trinitarian dimension of substitutionary terminology in this context. The chapter concludes with some observations and comments on the meaning and use of the terms to express an understanding of the work of Christ.

1. The Bearing of Biblical Material on the Use of the Terms to Describe the Work of Christ

Four themes will be identified which bear on
the use of the terms substitution and representation in the context of the work of Christ.

a) **The Theme of Sacrifice**

The use of sacrificial terminology in the New Testament (1 Cor 5:7, 1 Pet 1:18-19, Eph 5:2, Jn 1:29, Heb 9:15f, et al) points, not only to the sacrificial rites of the Old Testament patterns of worship (2), and not only to concepts of sacrifice mediated through Graeco-Roman culture (3), but also to the reality of Christ's sacrifice which is seen to be not merely an instance of a general occurrence but the sacrifice which controls and interprets all other sacrifices and to which they are pointers and shadows (4). This complex use of sacrificial language, together with the recognition that it is impossible to describe with certainty the Old Testament rationale of sacrifice, generates a wide variety of interpretations concerning the significance and meaning of Christ's sacrificial death (5). At least three different interpretations can be cited which embody and reflect different understandings of the terms substitution and representation.

i) A sacrifice may be said to be the God appointed method whereby the penalty due to sin can be meted out on an animal victim in the place of the guilty party, so that the claims of divine justice are satisfied and God is thereby propitiated. C. Hodge gives a clear summary of this interpretation of sacrifice:
1) That the design of such offerings was to propitiate God; to satisfy His justice, and to render it consistent and proper that the offence for which they were offered should be forgiven; 2) That this propitiation of God was secured by the expiation of guilt; by such an offering as covered sin, so that it did not appear before Him as demanding punishment; 3) That this expiation was effected by vicarious punishment; the victim being substituted for the offender, bearing his guilt, and suffering the penalty which he had incurred; 4) That the effect of such sin-offerings was the pardon of the offender, and his restoration to favour and to the enjoyment of the privileges which he had forfeited (6).

Hodge concludes that if this is the correct interpretation of Old Testament sacrifices then there can be no doubt that Christ's death is similarly to be understood (7). It is clear that this interpretation of sacrifice stands in close relation to patterns of penal substitution, focussing on the expiation of sin by the propitiation of God through the exchange of an innocent victim for a guilty party and the destruction of this victim (8). Christ's sacrifice is therefore understood primarily in terms of the sacrificial sin-offering.

ii) A sacrifice may be regarded as an offering accepted by God which is adequate or appropriate to satisfy conditions under which He will forgive the offender.

Christ did not make satisfaction by enduring the punishment which we sinners had merited. This does not belong to the nature of a sacrifice, and has nothing in common with it. For sacrifices are not payments of debts, as is evident from those offered under the law. The beasts that were slain for transgressors did not expiate the penalty which they merited, nor was their blood a sufficient \(\text{λύτρων}\) for the
soul of man. But they were oblations only, by which the transgressor endeavoured to turn the mind of God to compassion, and to obtain remission from Him (9).

Thus, sacrifice is seen as an act of homage which testifies to a repentance and which moves God to compassion.

iii) A sacrifice may be regarded as an offering that demonstrates and signifies the relation in worship in which a man stands before God. It is the costly submission of devotion and service which expresses the self-offering of the worshipper. V. Taylor argues that:

... The aim of sacrifice is a restored fellowship; its medium is a representative offering; its spiritual condition is the attitude of the worshipper; its rationale is the offering of life; its culmination is sharing in the life offered by means of the sacred meal. These ideas form a natural background against which the Passion-sayings can be readily understood (10).

Sacrifice is therefore the movement from man to God, initiated by God, but in which man participates—and through the offering provided is enabled to enter into the presence of God, not in his sinful and impure condition but as represented by the purity and holiness of the offering.

The complexity and fluidity of sacrificial concepts prohibits any definitive interpretation, but it is significant that interpretations of sacrifice are shaped by presuppositions concerning Christ's salvific work so that they are seen to be not so much a foundation for an understanding of substitutionary or representative
patterns of atonement but embodiments or reflections of those various patterns.

b) **The Theme of Redemption**

The decisive experience of Israel in its liberation from Egypt, the expectations of redemption from bondage throughout the history of Israel, the redemption that was possible for slaves or captives, the redemption that was possible for certain wrongs, the redemption that followed from certain sacrifices, all form the background for the New Testament use of the term redemption, together with its cognate terms, to describe the salvific work of Christ (11). Its use in the New Testament is infrequent: λύτρον occurring only at Mark 10:45 (Matt 20:28), ἀντίλύτρον at I Tim 2:6, λύτρῳ at Titus 2:14 and I Pet 1:18-19. Paul's use of the term ἀπολύτρωσις is more frequent, but has the general meaning of deliverance, referring to the bondage of sin (Eph 1:7, Col 1:14, Rom 3:24, Titus 2:14), or to the bondage of creation (Rom 8:23). The writer of the letter to the Hebrews uses both λύτρωσις and ἀπολύτρωσις, in the first instance in the context of sacrifice and in the second to refer to the deliverance from the transgressions of the first covenant (12). Gal 3:13 and 4:5 speak of deliverance from the curse and bondage of the law, but here Paul uses the verb ἐθαγοράζω. In I Pet 1:18 deliverance is from a vain manner of life, whereas Mark 10:45 gives no clear conception of what the 'many' are ransomed from. Thus, the theme of
redemption employs various images of deliverance, many of which are associated with some form of price or cost whereby such liberation is brought about, in order to describe and express the change that has come about for the believer, contrasting old patterns of bondage to new patterns of freedom. The variety of contexts in which redemption terminology appears suggests that the means of redemption may be variously construed, but the force of the image is on the reality of the deliverance for the believer.

c) The Judicial Theme

Judicial terminology is evident in the Old Testament and New Testament in terms such as ἐκκένωμαι, παράστημα, βία, but the relation between judgement and Christ's death is far from clear (13). J. Jeremias argues that any allusion or appeal to the figure of the suffering servant involves an implicit plea to a judicial setting in which the innocent receives the judgement and punishment of the guilty (14). In the New Testament Col 2:14 can be cited as illustrating another use of judicial language but the exegetical problems of this passage together with those of Rom 3:21 ff, Rom 8:3 ff, Gal 3:13, and II Cor 5:21 are well known. It seems to be the case that because both Old and New Testaments speak of the judgement that is due to sin, a general context is established in which the forgiveness of sins is viewed despite the fact that a dichotomy appears between the judgement that is past
and the judgement that is still to come. Before commenting further on the character and basis of the New Testament judicial language it is necessary to point out that the New Testament makes no explicit connection between the concept of punishment and the death of Christ. It is possible to interpret judgement, curse and sin in penal terms, but this interpretation is dependent upon the selection of particular judicial frameworks and does not follow self-evidently from the notion of judgement in the New Testament. At best the New Testament points only partly in the direction of penal concepts to interpret the death of Christ and it gives no clear warrant for the development or interpretation of judicial categories from this perspective (15).

However, there is good reason for judicial categories, and inherent within these categories the possibility of penal interpretation, since the character of Christ's history embodies the tension between judgement and justification, rejection and acceptance. Jesus' story is one of unjust suffering (16), and of subsequent vindication; but the theological problematic that demands interpretation is due to the interrelation between this man and the God he calls Father in the light of this story of judgement and justification. As one who claims and proclaims the Kingdom, and thus himself and his God, his death and resurrection are not accidents of history but events which 'involve' God. Thus, Paul's use of χαθομα to refer not to the betrayal of Judas, but to the handing over of Jesus
by God, represents the profoundest theological insight into the significance of the death and resurrection of this man (17). By their silence and acquiescence in this death, both Jesus and his God fill the event with meaning, and the resurrection impels both the necessity and the direction of theological reflection on this event as an event of life and death, judgement and justification, rejection and election, betrayal and unity of will, defeat and vindication. Thus, the theological issues are not superimposed on an otherwise simple 'Gospel of Jesus' but are themselves the very material and problematic out of which and in which the first Christians perceived and articulated the reality of salvation.

(d) The Theme of Reversal and Exchange

It follows from the character of Christ's story that at its heart, and in a manner that carries profound theological significance, there lies a pattern of exchange, a reversal, or an exchange of roles, which is a 'blessed exchange' (Diognetus) (18) because it is the articulation of a fundamental 'for us' (19). As in the Old Testament the remnant experience a reversal of roles for the sake of many, as in the Gospels where the Lord becomes a servant, as Barabbas is released but Jesus is condemned, so the theme of reversal and exchange emerges (20). Gal 3:13, II Cor 5:21, 8:9, in their different ways seek to articulate and interpret this pattern of exchange, seeing in it not only the mystery and
outworking of God's love but also the impulse for Christian discipleship and service. M. Hooker is right to draw attention to the fact that II Cor 5:21 speaks not of a simple exchange (which she characterises as substitution) but of an interchange (which she terms representation) because our righteousness is found 'in him', and this insight will form an important basis for our discussion and evaluation of the terms substitution and representation as they describe the relation between Christ and his people (21). However, it seems as though this 'interchange' is itself the development of the more basic pattern of exchange, a development possibly occasioned by the misuse of the pattern of exchange where it was taken to mean that there was no continuing dependence of the believer upon Christ, or that there was no place for present suffering or humiliation in the Christian life because Christ had suffered, or that Christ's exchange brought about salvation, glory and riches for the believer. Paul therefore, according to Hooker, has to correct the distortion by emphasising the continued dependence on, and identification with, Christ so that Christians only share in Christ's glory through sharing in his sufferings (22). The pattern of exchange as an articulation of a basic experience of salvation may need correction or refinement, but it none the less functions as a primary theological model which the terms substitution and representation seek to articulate within their own contextual frameworks to interpret the saving work of
Christ.

In this brief review of four biblical themes the intention has not been to find a doctrine of substitution or representation in the Bible but rather to highlight those motifs that seem to give grounds for such language in Christian atonement theology, and which may serve as a check and restraint upon their use as theological interpretative tools. In order to help assess the value of these terms and the frameworks in which they operate, their coherence and consistency will be examined, using the changes and variations that have taken place in their meaning and use to focus on those areas of difficulty and ambiguity which exist. In this way a clearer picture will emerge of the strengths and weaknesses, uses and limitations, of the various patterns of thought that have been described. Using Packer's terminology the recognition of the interpretative role of the terms as models which seek to articulate and interpret the 'control models' of scripture means that the models themselves can be tested and evaluated in terms of their own consistency, and particularly as the different 'qualifiers' modify and shape the models in new ways (23). In addition, recognising the relation between such models and the primary models of the Bible, the attempt must be made to determine to what degree the framework and patterns of thought comprised in the new models illustrate, illuminate, or possibly distort and misconstrue those biblical insights.
In Chapter II it was demonstrated that certain patterns of substitution, particularly those designated by the phrase 'penal substitution', derived some of their significance from the supposition that they offered an explanation of Christ's work (24). At the time it was noted that doubt had been cast on this explanatory role of the term substitution, since it was clear that not only did the qualifier 'penal' undergo significant variations in the attempt to 'make sense' of the death of Christ, but also the resulting pattern of substitution was neither as consistent nor as 'rational' as might at first sight be supposed. It is now necessary to examine this claim rather more closely, since if it can be demonstrated that even this use of substitution actually supports the claim that the term substitution is being used as a model which helps to articulate and interpret material that is not susceptible to rational explanation, then the argument for the interpretative status of the term is considerably strengthened.

a) First, it was seen to be the case that the validity of such a view depended upon the fact that the substitution of Christ in our place to receive our punishment was to be taken with absolute seriousness. Since the force of the explanation resided in the fact that 'God must punish' but that punishment may fall on
a substitute instead of the guilty, it is necessary to assert that the punishment suffered by Christ is, in all literalness, our punishment (25). Clearly this context provides for an unambiguous use of the term substitution, for the exchange that takes place between Christ and sinful man is spatially and conceptually governed by a one to one correspondence. Christ in our place, ourselves in Christ's place (26). But it is precisely this direct and unambiguous substitution that is so problematic. The suffering experienced by Christ, that is his punishment, does not appear to correspond directly to that which is due to man - eternal punishment or eternal death (27). Further, the suffering experienced by one man cannot easily be seen to correspond directly to a multiplicity of punishments that are due to each man individually. Given these problems of construeing Christ's exchange with guilty man as the occupation of an identical place or the reception of an identical punishment, the notion of 'equivalence' is developed (28).

The term equivalence allows the theologian to assert that although there can be no identity between Christ's suffering and that which is due to us, there is none the less an equivalence which continues to 'explain' why Christ's death satisfies God's justice (29). The equivalence of Christ's suffering is established by the christological argument from the dignity of his person as the God-man, so that although identical neither in duration nor perhaps in kind to the sufferings due to men, the fact that they are the sufferings of this man
renders them an equivalent, thus preserving the rationale that God's justice is satisfied (30). But the problems are now clear: to assert equivalence recognises implicitly that a comparison is made on the basis of an accepted scale of values. The example often quoted of 100 dollars gold being exactly equivalent to 100 dollars silver demonstrates that it is only on the basis of an agreed or accepted convention that there is reckoned to be such equivalence. To recognise this logic of the concept of equivalence, is however, to strike at the very heart of its intention as an explanatory device, for it must be remembered that the rationale of the argument depended upon the fact that there is a necessity in the justice of God that the punishment due to our sin is inflicted. The concept of equivalence now implies that it is no longer our punishment that Christ suffers in our place but a suffering and punishment that is different, although it bears some relation to our due, but which is accepted by God in its place (31). In other words, the use of the concept of equivalence only appears to sustain the rationale of the argument that was necessary for the intelligibility of the model of penal substitution; in reality the concepts of punishment and justice are subtly changed, so that the central insight of the model (that in Christ's suffering he receives the judgement due to man's sin) is lost and the model instead becomes an explanation of Christ's death expressing the 'insight' that God cannot forgive without inflicting some punishment (32).
b) Second, the difficulty in the formulation of the model of penal substitution can be approached from another angle, which highlights the difficulty by exposing the ambiguity of the concept of justice which is employed. In order to argue for the necessity of the infliction of punishment a concept of justice is invoked which reflects the thought-forms of criminal law. In technical terms this form of law may be called distributive justice. Such justice demands that crime be punished because, as an infringement of law, punishment is the inevitable and necessary consequence. However, in order to assert the exchange of punishment that is said to have taken place between Christ and sinful man, an appeal has to be made to a concept of justice known as commutative or civil justice, a concept that is expressed in terms of payments of debts. By means of this appeal the concept of equivalence, or even that of the identity of the punishment, may be sustained, but at the expense of introducing an anomaly into the argument which again attacks the very principles on which it is based. The anomalies are that under civil law there is no necessity for a debt to be repaid, but only a relative good; nor can punishment have any part to play in the payment or non-payment of a debt. In other words, the conceptual framework provided by the practices of criminal law to articulate the exchange that takes place between Christ and man breaks down because criminal law does not allow such an exchange; the appeal to civil law makes the exchange possible,
but not if punishment or suffering is involved (33).

Thus, the patterns of substitution that articulate the exchange between Christ and his people in terms of punishment in the context of criminal law, do not offer an explanation of the work of Christ, but because they appear to do so and because such an 'explanation' must 'work', the concepts of punishment and justice are altered and adapted, which results only in the loss of awareness as to the function of the model and the pattern of exchange to which it bears witness. The models not only fail as explanations since they are not coherent, but also they mislead and draw attention away from the central insight they were intended to express. It is this latter problem that must now be explored more fully, by examining critically the concepts of justice in which the reversal or exchange between Christ and his people is said to take place.

3. The Problem of Substitution in the Context of Law

In Chapter II three different patterns of substitution were identified, all of which used the terminology of law, but which expressed different models of the atonement (34). Since this section focusses on the critical problems of substitution as an intelligible or viable concept within this context it is necessary to do full justice to the different
patterns of substitution that have been disclosed. An examination and evaluation of substitutionary terminology will therefore be made in the three contexts of criminal law, civil law, and pecuniary law, recognising that in these different contexts the concept of substitution will become vulnerable to criticism in different ways.

a) The Use of Substitutionary Terminology in the Context of Criminal Law

Regardless of the specific interpretation of the manner of punishment, whether it be physical, spiritual, or emotional suffering, two types of substitution are possible within the context of criminal law. First, punishment may be thought of as being 'deflected' onto another party, which remains innocent and holy even or precisely in its acceptance of such suffering (35). The objections to this concept are familiar and compelling. i) God is conceived as wielding a retributive force which must find an outlet apart from the sin which occasioned such wrath, but such a notion departs from the New Testament and Old Testament understanding of sin and judgement, where the penalty is bound up with the act of sin, where any 'problem' of forgiveness lies not in the nature of God, i.e., in the need to exercise punishment, but in the obstinacy and disobedience of those whom He wishes to save (36).

ii) The notion of a 'deflected' punishment indicates a curious distortion of criminal law, for there is no intrinsic connection between sin and its punishment;
rather, the ideas of criminal law are taken to substantiate a general framework in which sin demands punishment, but this is used to justify a retributive principle where the infliction of punishment regardless of who is punished is a necessity for God. Such a concept of 'deflected' punishment, while giving clear articulation of the substitution of Christ, misuses ideas of criminal law to establish a principle of retribution that conflicts with the basic principles on which the notion of criminal law is based, and therefore cannot be considered a suitable model for further interpretation of the atonement (37).

Second, and more commonly, it is argued that a transfer of sin or guilt or liability to punishment takes place, so that the victim, while innocent in one sense, in another sense is guilty in that it is reckoned to be guilty and may therefore be justly punished. It is possible merely to assert, as for example does C. Hodge, that such a transfer is possible because 'the Bible asserts and assumes no moral principle which does not underlie all the providential dealings of God with individuals or with nations' (38). The rite of sacrifice is interpreted and understood to embody this principle (39), as is the statement that God 'visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children' (Ex 20:5) (40).

However, it is clear that if the framework of criminal law is being employed to give expression to the conviction that sin demands punishment, then to
posit a transfer of sin from the guilty to the innocent is in fact to articulate an awareness of the incomprehensible grace of God. For in criminal law there can be no precedent for an act that is fundamentally unjust (within the criteria of this type of law), and the conditions that theologians list in the attempt to determine how in God's justice it can be said to be just only serve to highlight this fact (41). The basic proposition that sin demands punishment as rooted in the character of God Himself seems well founded, but the use of the framework of criminal law to articulate this conviction only serves to demonstrate the free mercy and grace of God when he does not punish someone as they deserve: it cannot articulate the justice of punishing an innocent party in stead of the guilty.

The problem is that if Christ's death is seen as the means by which the retributive justice of God becomes instead the strange righteousness of God which freely justifies the ungodly, then it is but a short step to argue that the cause is due to the infliction of God's retributive justice on Christ in his death. But it is precisely this last step which, while it is not disqualified, is not encouraged or demanded by the New Testament interpretations and accounts of Christ's death. There is little direct evidence that the New Testament sees Christ's death as a punishment inflicted by God, although it is possible to construe the New Testament in this way, particularly, as has been shown, if the language of sacrifice is held to be explicitly
penal in character. Rather, it seems to be the case that because the New Testament relates Christ's death to sin, and because sin in other contexts is related to punishment, then it is held to be the case that Christ's death is to be related directly to punishment. The sequence of thought is logically justified, but it is only indirectly present in the New Testament, and this by itself should be sufficient to limit the range and applicability of such an interpretation, and should certainly caution against the reading of the New Testament solely or even primarily from this perspective.

b) The Use of Substitutionary Terminology in the Context of Civil Law

This framework of thought represents a development of, or an alternative within, the concept of criminal law, for God is not held to punish sin as a necessary consequence of His own reaction to sin, but rather that in His position as Ruler or Governor of the world it is to the good of the world that the validity of the law be demonstrated and upheld, so that Christ's suffering demonstrates the abhorrence of God towards sin, exhibits the consequence of sin in a morally ordered world, and holds out the deterrent against future sins, so allowing God to withhold punishment from the sinner himself without bringing about a breakdown in the moral fabric of His kingdom. Put more technically in the language of the Edwardian school of New England theology, Christ satisfies neither distributive justice which
refers to the punishment of crimes, nor commutative justice which refers to the payment of debts, but rectoral justice which refers to the good of the universe (42).

When the atonement is seen in this framework of civil law the resulting model must be judged to be inadequate on a number of grounds. First, as H. Bushnell shows, the context provides no justification for seeing any relation between Christ's suffering and the preservation of moral order (43). Since Christ's suffering is neither a punishment for sin nor a result of sin there is no basis for seeing in it the abhorrence of God upon sin, and therefore there is no reason why it should uphold any moral order (44). Second, since the suffering that Christ undergoes bears at best only an indirect relation to anything due to man or any condition experienced by man as a sinner, the basic insight offered by the interpretation is not that of an exchange which takes place between Christ and his people, but only an exchange of means of forgiveness (45). Third, whatever the assessment of this understanding, it must be noted that the term substitution comes to reflect this new pattern of exchange, so that properly speaking Christ may not be described as man's substitute but only that his sufferings are substituted in the place of our punishment (46).

A more complex situation is involved when the above pattern of thought is taken to complement or
correct other judicial understandings of the atonement (47). Here it may be argued that Christ bears the consequences of sin, and that his punishment is substituted for our punishment, not because of any retributive principle in God, but because in so doing the validity of the law is upheld along with the moral order of the world, so that God may withhold punishment from the sinner without compromising His righteousness (48). There is a sense in which this pattern of thought is more adequate to interpret the work of Christ, in that God is no longer regarded as being bound to a particular form of retributive justice, and therefore that Christ's death may be seen in terms other than those that are strictly penal, without there being lost the insight that sin and judgement are inextricably interwoven. However, two points of possible confusion should be noted.

First, because this pattern of thought does not need to assert the penal character of Christ's death, it may use the less clearly defined language of Christ bearing 'the consequences of our sins', primarily in the sense of 'dying our death'. While this may remove the offensiveness of some penal language, it also blurs the basic issue of the significance of this 'death' or of 'these consequences'. Simply by replacing the concept of punishment with these less clearly defined penalties it is not clear that the argument has been substantially altered but only that it has been less clearly stated. The only circumstance which does
change the argument is when the consequences of sin that Christ suffers are related less to the direct judgement of God and more to a natural process which is only indirectly due to God. Thus, it is possible to see in Christ's death God's confirmation of the reality of sin, without it being explicitly stated that God punishes or inflicts anything on Christ (49).

Second, even in this latter case the link between Christ's suffering or death and our sin remains ambiguous and problematic. Some framework is still necessary in which it may be asserted that it is the consequences of our sins that Christ suffers, or that it is our death which he dies, or else the pattern of thought reverts to that outlined above as construed solely in terms of civil law together with its critical problems. It seems to be the case that in order to make sense of the terms 'consequences of our sins' or 'our death' tacit appeal has to be made to those patterns of thought which are embodied in criminal law and which have already been criticised. The virtue of this pattern of thought, despite these confusions, is that it can be more clearly seen as an interpretative model which articulates the exchange between Christ and his people while minimising those features of the model that arise from a strictly retributive view of punishment.

c) The Use of Substitutionary Terminology in the Context of Pecuniary Law

In the context of the model that describes the
satisfaction of God through the payment of a debt on the analogy of pecuniary or commutative law, the term substitution can be seen to be less problematic, in that there is no difficulty in conceiving of one being able to discharge the debts of another. So long as the character of this debt is not construed in penal terms there seems to be no inherent objection to a substituted payment by another which satisfies the creditor. However, the problem at once arises as to the adequacy of the analogy of sin as a debt and consequently as to the adequacy of this model for the atonement. It is not the case that the concept of a debt precludes a moral and serious understanding of sin, for there is nothing strange in referring to a debt of service, a debt of honour, a debt of love or a debt of obedience. In all such cases sin is given the fullest seriousness for this debt is before God to whom is due absolute service, honour, love and obedience. The analogy of debt can make quite clear the structure of sin as the non-fulfilment of the highest personal responsibilities before God (50).

The question that comes to the fore when sin is construed as debt in this way is whether the analogy of the vicarious payment of this debt can still be conceived. Is it possible to use the language of debt after the analogy of financial transactions when the content of the debt has been expressed in such personal, moral and individual terms, which transcends pecuniary
analogies? In other words the model of a pecuniary debt warrants the use of the concept of substitution, since there are no longer moral or legal problems inherent in such a vicarious payment, but as soon as the language of 'debt' is filled out and personalised in the sort of context that can relate it to the seriousness of sin the model, as a substitutionary model becomes susceptible to all the moral and legal objections previously encountered. The strength of the pecuniary model is that the fundamental reality of the exchange in which Christ fulfils the debt which is owed to God in our place is capable of clear articulation, since Christ pays our debt in obedience, love, service and honour. By means of an analogy of a vicarious act that is instantly intelligible, the character of Christ's vicarious act is at once articulated and illuminated despite the fact that a literal application of the payment of this debt is not instantly intelligible. This is in contrast to a penal exchange, where the vicarious aspect is not intelligible even in analogy since there are no general circumstances in which the innocent suffers justly for the guilty. The analogy of a debt carries with it potential misunderstandings, as does any model, but at its heart it illuminates and expresses the exchange that takes place between Christ and his people.

It is significant that, although the term substitution has been used until now to describe this vicarious payment of debts, the analogy on which it
rests allows for a recognition of the relation between this debt and the consequent response of mankind. Although Christ pays our debt and therefore man is free of his debt before God, the term representation may be employed at this point to express the insight that there is a continuing debt before God which man must pay and into which he is drawn by virtue of the character of Christ's work.

4. The Moral Relevance of the Terms Substitution and Representation

In this section the claim is critically investigated that patterns of substitution are essentially morally irrelevant while patterns of representation embody or generate moral value. The controlling presupposition for such claims is that the concept of atonement refers not solely or primarily to the satisfaction of sin before God but partially or wholly to the moral growth of the individual or community so that sin is overcome in reality and reconciliation is thereby effected between man and God. The use of the term substitution is held to denote or imply an exclusive work before God, removing from the sphere of atonement the moral state and growth of the individual which thus renders the act of atonement itself morally irrelevant. As shall be seen, the term representation may be employed to answer or avoid this charge of exclusiveness so that the atonement itself
can be seen to have moral content and relevance.

The claim that the concept of atonement itself must consist of a reconciliation between God and man which is based on man's actual moral condition and God's moral nature is put succinctly by Rashdall:

For those who believe in a righteous God, God must be supposed to act in a way which the moral consciousness approves. If a man has actually returned to the right moral state - for this is what repentance means - a righteous God must forgive the past, must judge him according to what he is, and not according to anything he was and has ceased to be (51).

It would not seem possible that the term substitution could continue to function in this new context of thought on the atonement, but the following quotation from Bushnell provides an instructive example of how theological vocabulary is thought to be capable of new meaning:

... Christ, in what is called His vicarious sacrifice, simply engages, at the expense of great suffering and even of death itself, to bring us out of our sins themselves and so out of their penalties: being Himself profoundly identified with us in our fallen state, and burdened in feeling with our evils (52). ...this vicarious sacrifice only does and suffers, and comes into substitution for, just what any and all love will, according to its degree (53).

Although it is understandable that Bushnell should want to retain traditional vocabulary it is not clear how the term substitution can express the identification of Christ with humanity (54).

However, Bushnell picks up a theme, common in this context of the moral relevance of atonement, in which Christ is said to 'bring us out of our sins',
that is, to be not simply an example to be followed, but a power of life which enables and informs our response. In this pattern of thought the term substitution may still have a limited role, in that it may indicate the uniqueness, difference or pre-eminence of Christ's life over the secondary and derivative response of our moral growth. In a similar sense Christ may be seen as the sponsor or guarantor of our new life, who not only initiates it, but also completely realises it, so that even the goal of moral growth is determined by his accomplishment (55). In these contexts, in a limited sense, Christ may be described as our substitute in that his is our sole power and end, and his substitutionary role which sets him apart from mankind may be contrasted with a representative role in which he and mankind are brought together in a close relation (56).

However, because the focus of this pattern of thought is upon an imitation or participation in Christ's work by man which gives that work atoning value, it is more common that the term representation be introduced in place of the term substitution.

Christ is one who represents before God a human nature in its moral stature and fullness which is pleasing to God, an offering which man may claim as that of his representative, thus putting himself within that sphere of moral intent which Christ inspires and completes (57). Or again, Christ in his holiness and perfect moral nature represents mankind in the sense
that he creates by his power that pattern of a new humanity which is to be realised by individuals and the community which follow him (58).

Two points must be considered in the light of this discussion. First, any distinction to be drawn between those views of atonement which are said to be morally relevant and those which, by virtue of Christ's substitutionary work, are not, must be stated with precision if it is to be of any value, because the majority of those using the term substitution would wish to see the moral relevance of Christ's work in terms of a response which is subsequent to, and dependent upon, Christ's own work (59). Similarly, those who use the term representation in this context do not normally wish to deny the primacy and necessity of Christ's work which sets our own response in motion (60). In other words, the usual context for the use of the terms substitution and representation is formed by the common ground of Christ's atoning work initiating, empowering, and in some sense including the response of others (61). The use of the term substitution does not necessarily denote the moral irrelevance of Christ's work, but focusses and concentrates on the primacy of this work, to such an extent that this is regarded as constituting atonement, while man's response, although significant, is secondary and dependent. Equally, the use of the term representation does not necessarily relativise Christ's work, but focusses attention instead on the fact that without
the response or the creation of the new humanity, Christ's work cannot be considered to be atoning. There is a distinction, but it can be drawn only in terms of a difference of perspective, emphasis, or degree (62). The term substitution highlights one aspect of Christ's work, laying stress on its bearing on God; the term representation highlights the bearing of that same atoning work on man, but in any description of the atonement both aspects would be present.

Second, this point can be brought out clearly by noting that those patterns of thought which focus on the moral relevance of Christ's work still presuppose some framework in which the language of forgiveness, repentance, moral worth, and adequacy still have meaning. Moral evil or lack of holiness are said to be 'judged' by God; repentance is said to be a 'condition' for God's forgiveness; the term 'forgiveness' itself is meaningless apart from some framework in which condemnation is presupposed or judged to be appropriate. In other words, to whatever degree atonement is expressed in terms of its bearing on man, its presuppositions, explicit or implicit, will contain some frame of reference which is directed towards God. It is particularly the case that when the term representation is used in this context it cannot be assumed to solve or remove problems of construing the atonement in its bearing on God; rather, it is more often the case that this aspect is presupposed but never clearly articulated or interpreted.
5. Substitution, the Atonement, and the Trinity

There will, almost by necessity, be some reflection and articulation of trinitarian insights to the doctrine of the atonement, as has been demonstrated by the concept of the infinite merit of Anselm's God-man, or the infinite dignity of Christ which gives infinite value to the suffering of the God-man, or even the concept of the perfect holiness and offering of Christ (63). In all such examples christological or trinitarian insights are an integral part of reflection on the atonement and constitute a part of the basic 'data' which demands evaluation and consideration (64). However, there is a more explicit use of trinitarian insights when it is claimed that substitutionary models, particularly those which involve suffering or punishment, are given greater coherence and intelligibility by the assertion that in this act God receives on Himself His own punishment and judgement (65). Thus, such a trinitarian model may counter the accusation that it is unjust for the innocent to be punished or judged in place of the guilty by arguing that there is no injustice if the punisher himself assumes the place of punishment (66).

However, the use of trinitarian insights in this context, rather than rendering the concept of substitution more intelligible, in fact translate the problems that have been encountered in the use of such judicial language into the concept of God. It leads
to the concept of an opposition within God, between His justice and mercy, or between His wrath and love.

Side by side in the Godhead, there dwell the impulse to punish and the desire to pardon; but the desire to pardon is realised, in act, by carrying out the impulse to punish; not indeed upon the person of the criminal, but upon that of his substitute. And the substitute is the punisher himself.... The divine compassion itself bears the infliction of the Divine indignation, in the place of the transgressor (67).

Such language is, indeed, only making explicit the logical conclusion of penal substitutionary thought, but in making it explicit and using it as an explanation of the rationale of substitution, the character of the exchange thereby articulated is transformed (68). An act that was perceived to focus on the relation between man and God, and on the condition of man before God, now becomes an act within God, with Christ's humanity instrumental and passive, having no significance for our humanity. The general New Testament insight of the exchange that takes place between Christ and his people before God has become so narrowly focussed in penal terms that it has become a transaction between God and God, virtually independent of the human story which formed its origin and impulse (69).

An alternative may be posited, that God substitutes Himself in the place of man, not to receive upon Himself His punishment, but to 'absorb' the sin and disease of man, and to take upon Himself man's alienation (70). G. Berkouwer comments:
... the theopaschite tendency in the new doctrine of reconciliation, the new doctrine of 'substitution', is a human attempt to present the trinitarian background of the incarnation in a logical synthesis. But in so doing it oversteps the limits of speculation, because the new doctrine is not concerned with the mercy, the concern, the initiative of God, of which the Confessions of the Church are full, but it speaks of God abandoning Himself, of God's taking upon Himself the misery and sin of the world, so that it brings in a separate concept, namely, the suffering of God, although it immediately adds: 'in Christ' (71).

Thus, it cannot be said that the concept of substitution, particularly concepts of penal substitution, become more intelligible or more coherent when viewed from this perspective of God substituting Himself, punishing Himself in place of the guilty. Further, when the term substitution is employed in this context, it is often held to express the sense of God's identification with the human situation or plight - a sense of the term that must be rejected for the same reasons as it has already been rejected in the context of Christ's identification with man.

Summary and Conclusions

From the critical analysis of the term substitution, and in a limited sense, the term representation, the following summary is offered together with some concluding remarks. The attempt has been made to characterise and describe the scriptural material that is held to warrant or generate substitutionary language and 'theories' of the atonement. From this material there emerged a basic pattern of reversal and exchange
which was rooted in the story of Jesus and his relation to God, but which could articulate in varying forms the salvific reality of Christian experience. This pattern of exchange could then constitute a source against which various substitutionary models could be checked in order to determine the sense in which they were interpretative of Christ's salvific work. In order to treat the actual patterns of substitution and representation as they refer to the work of Christ in their full complexity, four areas of their use were examined critically, areas which themselves arose from the material of Chapters II and III. From this critical discussion the following points have emerged.

First, where Chapter II described the variety of the uses of the term substitution, which indicated that the term functioned as an interpretative tool, the present discussion has demonstrated that substitutionary terminology is misunderstood if it is regarded as having explanatory power or significance in Christian doctrines of the atonement. In section 2) of this chapter it was demonstrated that substitutionary 'theories' which claimed explanatory power were always dependent upon and subordinate to the mysterious and inexplicable grace of God which wills and brings about salvation. The various expressions of penal substitution, which are most commonly held to embody a rational explanation of Christ's work, were shown to develop and change as their failure to explain became apparent, or as the explanation offered conflicted with other Christian
insights. Ultimately, it was argued, the categories of law, whether criminal, civil or private, could provide contextual frameworks within which interpretations of the New Testament insight of an exchange can be offered, but these models are misconstrued and they mislead if they are taken to explain 'how' the work of Christ saves.

Second, two particular patterns of substitutionary thought were judged to be inappropriate to describe the atonement. On the one hand, the exclusive use of the concept of civil law failed both to substantiate the use of the term substitution since the pattern of exchange articulated did not refer to an exchange of Christ with man, and it failed to provide a coherent framework in which Christ's work could be expressed and interpreted. On the other hand, the use of the term substitution to express a pattern of identification, whether that be the identification of Christ or God with man, was found to be misleading and unjustified.

Third, in considering the broad range of penal patterns of substitution, this discussion points to the conclusion that, with certain qualifications, penal language can provide a contextual framework within which the work of Christ may be expressed and within which the concept of substitution articulates and interprets the pattern of exchange between Christ and his people that was discerned in scripture. Qualifications are, however, necessary and can be summarised
under four headings: a) the penal framework is only acceptable if it is construed as an interpretative model, and it becomes unsuitable for Christian atonement theology if it assumes the role of an explanatory system; b) the penal framework is only acceptable if it is construed as one among a number of interpretative models, all of which articulate some dimension of the work of Christ, and it becomes unsuitable if it assumes the role of a control mechanism, subordinating the diverse models of scripture to its single insight; c) although penal language may constitute the framework for an interpretative model, it should be recognised that the judicial categories of the New Testament do not demand, or are not necessarily best interpreted by, such a framework; the New Testament itself does not give prominence to penal terms, and such an interpretation of the judicial and cultic language is in danger of directing attention away from the New Testament; d) the various models of penal substitution must be assessed not only by their ability to interpret a pattern of exchange that articulates an experience of salvation but also by their ability to cohere with other patterns of Christian thought. An interpretative model must be evaluated not simply by its success in interpreting one dimension of Christian thought, but by its ability to illuminate a wider pattern of thought, and it is on this account that models of penal substitution are found to be least adequate. Only narrow and restricted understandings of God, sin and
justice are admitted by these models, and the work of Christ is seen narrowly in terms of His death, excluding salvific significance to his ministry, life and resurrection. If penal frameworks are still to have a place in atonement theology, the models which they espouse must be more modest and limited in their range and significance.

Fourth, those patterns of substitution which were formulated within a non-penal framework were shown to contribute significantly to an understanding of atonement, since they better preserved their interpretative character, they raised fewer problems with regard to the central conviction of the vicariousness of Christ's work, and they proved better able to accommodate and open up other insights into the significance of Christ's work and its relation to man. Although problems clearly arise in relation to these models they must none the less be recognised as contributing significantly to any future discussion of the use of substitutionary or representative terminology in the doctrine of the atonement.

Finally, with regard to the relation of the terms substitution and representation, on the evidence of this discussion both terms were found to have a part to play. In relation to an interpretation of the work of Christ the use of the term representation was not held to solve the difficulties that arose as a result of judicial or penal frameworks, but in non-penal contexts it could aid interpreting the sense in which
Christ's work is appropriated and is relevant to man's moral condition. A more complete evaluation of the two terms must, however, wait until their role in expressing the relation between Christ and his people or mankind has been examined.
CHAPTER V
THE USE OF THE TERMS SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION TO DESCRIBE THE RELATION BETWEEN CHRIST AND HUMANITY

Introduction

The second central issue that serves to determine the range of meanings of the terms substitution and representation is that of the relation of Christ to humanity, or the relation of Christ to a certain section of humanity. As in the previous chapter we will be concerned first of all to describe the biblical motifs that generate this discussion, and then we will assess the various models specifically related to the terms substitution and representation that have been employed to interpret and order this biblical material.

1. The Bearing of Biblical Material on the Use of the Terms Substitution and Representation to Describe the Relation Between Christ and Humanity

We begin by describing briefly four biblical themes that indicate and express some relation between Christ and other people.

a) The New Testament language of \( \epsilon\nu \chi\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\epsilon\omicron \) : since this subject has been exhaustively treated by a number
of writers (1), it will be sufficient simply to indicate
the subject matter under examination by listing the
nine headings under which E. Best groups all of the
New Testament texts. 1) The form A is in Christ;
2) the form A does or is something to B in Christ;
3) the form A does something in the Lord; 4) the form
A is X in the Lord, where X denotes some quality;
5) the form God does something to us in Christ;
6) the form 'the gift of God that is in Christ Jesus';
7) the form A, B, C, are one in Christ; 8) passages
of cosmic significance; 9) natural forms that are not
distinctive (2).

The variety of uses and contexts in which
this phrase occurs weighs against any simple meaning
or definition being given. As has been noted the
phrase can frequently mean no more than our word
'Christian' (3). Or, it may be argued, the phrase is
simply an expressive use of an instrumental meaning
so that the ΕΥ lies close to the meaning of διά (4).
In this instrumental sense the phrase may denote the
sphere of reference of salvation, being accomplished
by (in) Christ and not by (in) me: '... the term sums
up what has come about for believers through Christ
and constitutes salvation' (5). If it is denied that
this phrase carries any more than this instrumental
sense then its meaning may be taken to be 'the new
basic and all-comprehending reality', the reality of
the Body of Christ, the Church (6). In Bornkamm's
words:
Quite often it only expresses membership of the church. Obviously, no profound theological, let alone 'mystic', meaning should be wrested from such turns of phrase (7).

However, following Deissmann's monograph on the subject many writers believe the preposition to express a spatial dimension so that the believer is regarded as being physically in Christ (8). This may be conceived of as a participation in the 'ethereal substance', the 'sphere of vitalism', of the exalted pneumatic Christ. Or, following A. Schweitzer, the phrase \( \epsilon w \ Xe\iota\sigma\tau\_\varepsilon \) may be taken to refer to the sharing in a quasi-physical sense, or the grafting into, the corporeity of Christ (9). This refers to the mode of being of Christ appropriate to the conditions of the Messianic Kingdom which again results in the preposition being given local force to indicate a sphere in which the elect live (10). Théo Preiss contends that this concept of Christ as an ethereal substance must be rejected, for Paul's idea of new life is no diffuse mysticism but flows from justification and remission of sins and is expressed in 'the most common and secular business terms' (11). Thus R. P. Martin concludes that being in Christ 'is a cipher for a network of relationships both divine and human ... that stem from Paul's orientation as a justified sinner and a redeemed man' (12). This relational interpretation is further strengthened when it is noted that the phrase appears in those very passages where judicial language is employed (Rom 3:24, 8:1, 2 Cor 5:21).
Clearly, there is no discernable consensus of opinion as to the meaning of the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ, although several main alternatives have become apparent. The phrase may be taken to denote a spatial reference, pointing to a physical relation constituted by an act of inclusion or incorporation; the phrase may be taken in an instrumental sense, expressing a concentrated interest on the particular agency of Christ; the phrase may be taken to express a network of relationships within both the unity of the Church and between Christ and the Christian as an expression of the reconciling activity of Christ; the phrase may be taken to express the ultimate grounding of all reality as all things are created and consummated in Christ. However, the valuable term 'interchange', coined by M. Hooker, expresses clearly the main thrust of this language in its bearing on soteriology (13). The term points not only to the reversal and transforming reality of Christ's salvific work, to the change involved, but also to the concentration on the person of Christ and on the immediacy of the involvement in relation and participation on the part of the believer.

b) The second biblical theme, that is closely related to the language of ἐν Χριστῷ, is the description of the Church, or the community of believers, as the Body of Christ (14). Commentators are divided as to whether this description is a result and extension of the language of being ἐν Χριστῷ, or whether the
description of Christ's Body is primary and generates the description of being in Christ (15). Whatever the precise relation, the description of the Church as the Body of Christ bears on the relation between Christ and believers in two different ways, depending on the perspective adopted.

First, the description of the Church as the Body of Christ can emphasise and explicate the nature of the relation between Christ and believer, or between Christ and the Church, as that which exists between a head and a body (16). Basic to this view are such passages as Col 1:18 - 'He is the Head of the Body, the Church; he is the beginning, the first-born from the dead, that in everything he might be preeminent' - and Eph 1:22-23 - 'God has put all things under his feet and has made him the head over all things for the Church, which is his body, the fulness of him who fills all in all'. As Küng comments, 'the concept of the head always carries overtones of the ruler' and it is this sense of Christ standing over and against the members of his body that is to the fore (17).

Second, the description of the Church as the Body of Christ can serve to characterise the union between believers, so that the 'one body' constitutes the continuing corporeal reality of Christ on earth (18). By being members of this one body it is emphasised that failure to maintain unity in belief and practise is tantamount to separation from and a denial of Christ. Since the believers in their life together make up the
Body of Christ, the life of this body must be congruous with the paradigmatic life of Christ, which means that this many-membered body can be identified to an extent with Christ as the form of his continuing corporeal presence in the world. Thus, the context of this description of the Church as the Body of Christ is found to be paraenetic or hortatory, as can be demonstrated by the principal texts of 1 Cor 12:12 ff and Rom 12:4 ff (19). While these two perspectives on the Church as the Body of Christ are not contradictory, they do develop distinctive insights from the description of the 'Body', which result in quite different models of the relation between Christ and believers.

c) The third biblical theme, which deserves separate treatment despite its close relation with the theme of being in Christ, is found in the texts 1 Cor 15:21 ff and Rom 5:12 ff. In these passages parallels are drawn and explored between Adam and Christ, in which it is argued certain similarities can be asserted as well as certain dissimilarities (20). That there is a parallel between the two figures is established by the complementary phrases ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, and through the designation ἀνθρώπος to describe both figures. The fact that the phrase ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ can be directly preceded by a parallel δι’ ἀνθρώπου warns against taking the relation between man and Christ in any simple, local or inclusive sense. Equally Barrett's questions should be borne in mind in
any consideration of these texts:

In what sense is the whole race in Adam? Is it the same sense or some other that all men are in Christ? Are the 'all' who are in Christ the same as the 'all' who are in Adam? (21).

That there is a contrast between Adam and Christ is expressed by a number of statements of opposite or contrasting ideas. Death is contrasted with resurrection, disobedience with obedience, judgement with justification, and sin with grace. In addition, Christ's work is contrasted with that of Adam by its scope and range. This may be indicated by the repeated πολὺ μᾶλλον, and by such terms as ἐπείσοδος, πλευράς, and ὑπερεπτείσεως. Finally the contrast is expressed between the 'spiritual' or 'heavenly' character of Christ together with the consequences for those who are 'in him' and the 'physical' or 'earthly' character of Adam together with those consequences for men. Despite these contrasts, which mitigate against any simply parallelism between Adam and Christ, a basic pattern of interchange is once again being given expression. Whatever the precise force of the phrase ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ it is clear that it is the condition of man as characterised by his sin, the solidarity of all men in sin and in its consequences of death that is being considered. Equally, whatever the precise force of the phrase ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ a contrast is being drawn which both defines the quality of the change between the old and the new, and the person 'in whom' this change has been wrought, and the interrelation between the old and
The fourth biblical theme that bears on the relation between Christ and the believer is to be found in the use of the phrase σὺν Χριστῷ together with those verbs prefixed by σὺν (22). Commentators have recognised that due to the close relation between the phrases ἐν Χριστῷ and σὺν Χριστῷ the one must be interpreted in the light of the other, but it is not easy to see how these different descriptions are related to one another. The principle texts are to be found in Rom 6:4-11, Eph 2:5-6, Gal 2:20, 2 Tim 2:11-12, with additional references made almost in passing in Rom 8:17, Col 2:20 and 3:1. In every case the reference is to suffering, dying, rising, living or reigning with Christ, thus stamping such language with an unmistakable soteriological significance.

However, it is again the case that any simple explanation or account of our presence with Christ is controverted by the variations as to the time of this participation (23). For example, in the texts where baptism is the specified context, Rom 6:4-11 describes the believer as having died with Christ, as being raised with him in the future and as being dead to sin in the present, whereas in Col 2:12-15 not only the death of the believer but also his resurrection is said to be in the past. A similar contrast is to be found between the texts of 2 Tim 2:11-12 and Eph 2:5-6, this time relating to the time of our exaltation. As with the
phrase ἐν Χριστῷ, so the description σὺν Χριστῷ focusses attention on the relation between Christ's salvific work and the participation of the believer in that work, but the New Testament leaves open the possibility of expressing this relation in terms not only of participation and interchange but also of imitation and duplication (24).

The four biblical themes outlined above provide basic insights concerning the relation between Christ and others, a relation that could be expressed from the side of the believer by such terms as identification, incorporation, participation and imitation. As was indicated in the previous chapter, the presence of this language alongside the language of exchange (Rom 3:23, 2 Cor 5:21, 2 Cor 8:9), acting possibly as a corrective of certain misinterpretations of this exchange, points to a model of 'interchange' (25). In this language of interchange, participation, and identification physical or spatial metaphors are employed which result in patterns of interpretation that are equally 'concrete'. Chapter III demonstrated the patterns of thought and the interpretative models that can be employed in the context of the terms substitution and representation to express and interpret these metaphors - the concept of Man or Humanity, the concept of corporateness or solidarity, the concepts of centre, paradigm and consummator. In this chapter a critical examination will take place of such models, evaluating their ability to express coherently the biblical insights as to the
manner in which our destiny and existence is 'bound up' with that of Christ. As in the previous chapter, where both the terms substitution and representation were considered in the context of the work of Christ, so too in the context of the relation between Christ and his people both terms will be considered. Although in this instance the term representation has been found to play the larger part, the contribution of the term substitution to express the relation between Christ and others, particularly in the phrase 'inclusive substitution', must be considered and assessed. As in the previous chapter the method employed will be to test both the coherence of the model in its relation to other Christian insights and the ability of the model to express and interpret the biblical themes outlined above.

2. The Theological Context in Which Christ's Relation to Others is Defined

As was shown in the description and discussion of the term substitution, it is a common belief that if the external and remote patterns of thought that are associated with the term could be lessened, emphasising instead the immediacy and internality of Christ's work, then the concept of atonement should become more coherent and intelligible. R. Dale expresses this conviction in the following way:
... no clear and articulate conception of that relation of Christ to mankind which renders it possible for him to sustain a representative character, appears to have rooted itself in the popular theology, or in the moral and spiritual life of Christendom. ... The general and growing dissatisfaction with the theory of expiation has probably arisen partly from this cause, and it will be impossible for that theory to retain its place in the theological thought of the church, unless it can be shown that the Death of Christ ... for the sins of men is the highest expression of an eternal relation between Christ and the human race, - a relation which ... has nothing in it to offend the higher reason or to provoke antagonism, and is capable of verification by the Christian consciousness (26).

If it can be affirmed that the believer is 'in Christ', included in him, then it may be possible to argue that 'in Christ' mankind receives its punishment for sin, or that 'in Christ' man dies and is resurrected to new life, or that 'in Christ' man lives a life of obedience and sacrifice pleasing to God. The various expressions of the relation of Christ to mankind are not tied to any particular model of the work of Christ; indeed, as Mozley comments in connection with 'the modern notion of Christ as the Representative Man', the theory of the 'inclusive humanity' of Christ 'is not self-sufficient: it needs to be helped out from other sources before we can say what it is that Christ, or mankind in Christ, does to make amends for sin' (27).

However, if some inclusive relation is to be affirmed, then it is apparent that some conceptual framework must be employed in which this relation may be given expression. The first such model to be examined is that of Christ as the Universal Man, or more simply as The Man, which is then followed by an examination of
the models of Christ as the Corporate man, the models of solidarity, and the models of archetype and centre, in each case considering the model in specific relation to the terms substitution and representation as they are used in the context of Christian atonement theology.

a) **The Model of Christ the Universal Man**

The model of the Universal Manhood of Christ can be found expressed in the following way: Christ was a man - on that all will be agreed - but he is also more than a man; his manhood is God's manhood, he is the man, he is Man, he is the totality of all humanity, he is all men (28). In this sense, Christ is the one who includes in himself all other members of the human race. The argument for Christ's Universal humanity can be expressed more precisely in the following way: all individual men are human, belonging to the species 'man', but only Christ can be described as humanity, as being in himself the reality that transcends and yet embraces all members of the species. His manhood, therefore, is generic, not simply one of a kind, not differentiated from others in the way that all individual members of a species are differentiated, but consummating, Universal and inclusive (29). As Man he stands in relation to men not by any external agency of deputation or delegation, but by the inclusive relation constituted by the fact that we are literally in him, so that what he does all men do, what happens to him happens in actual fact to all men. As K. Adam
has said:

He is not merely a man, he is the Man; not one individual member of mankind but the Head of Mankind, its new beginning, the first born among his brethren, the New Adam. Just as the first Adam ... was not a man like us other men, but was the man, the God appointed representative of the whole race who in himself contained germinally all possible men ... so our Lord ... is the New Man ... whose life and fate are our life and fate also (30).

A common form in which this argument is to be found is when a writer feels free to pass without comment or explanation from the designation 'a man' to the general terms man, human nature or humanity. This is especially true in the case of the transition so often effected from 'a man' to 'Man' (31).

The tradition which lies behind the designation of Christ as the Universal man is extensive and varied. In the Patristic period there can be little doubt that some such concept provided the conceptual framework for what is often called the physical theory of the atonement, and it may be claimed that it provided the impetus for the development of christological language concerning Christ's nature as true man. G. S. Hendry argues that the term ὄμοιός when applied to Christ's manhood was intended to assert an ontological relation with the race of men so that 'just as it was true to say that "God was in Christ", so also there is a sense in which it could be said that "Man was in Christ"' (32). Hendry illustrates this position not only from eastern writers such as Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa, but also from the western Hilary of Poitiers (33). As Hendry points out none of these
writers feel the necessity of justifying this language of Universal manhood, nor do they seek to explain on what basis the language of ontological union is employed (34). It would seem that as G. Rupp says:

... In the ecclesiastically normative formulation of Chalcedon ... the affirmation that Christ is consubstantial with men in his humanity assumes a Realist ontology only implicitly. But the conception of universal or generic human nature in any case functions more or less consciously as a cultural presupposition in the Patristic and early medieval period to facilitate comprehension of the connection between Christ's work and successive generations of believers (35).

H. E. W. Turner recognises the part played by Platonic philosophy in this 'cultural presupposition', especially in Gregory of Nyssa for whom the 'Platonic conceptions of Universals ... is basic to his theology' (36), but the following statement of John of Damascus exemplifies this Patristic presupposition.

Essence (δύσια) is predicated of the individual: therefore in each individual of the species the essence is perfect (or complete). Therefore neither do the individuals differ from one another in essence, but only in respect of the accidents which are their characteristic properties. For they define the individual as 'essence together with accidents'. So that the individual has what is common together with that which individualises it, besides existing substantially in itself. But the essence does not exist substantially in itself, but is only seen in the individuals. When, then, one of the individuals suffers, all the essence, in respect of which the individual has suffered, so far as it is capable of suffering, is said to have suffered in one of its individuals; without, however, its being necessary that all the individuals of the same species should suffer with the individual that actually suffers (37).

In the medieval period it is generally recognised that the question as to the status of
Universals is 'one of the dominant intellectual issues', but the discussion does not appear to have been related closely to soteriology (38). According to Ch Duquoc Thomas Aquinas loses sight of the ontological root of the Universality of Christ, treating men as a mosaic of separate individuals connected only by their actions, so that 'en dernier analyse, c'est donc la grâce sanctificante qui est le principe immédiat de l'universalité de l'humanité individuelle de Jésus' (39). It is only in the 19th century that the concept of Christ as the Universal man again comes to the fore as a theological concept for soteriology (40). C. Hodge lists among German theologians the names of Nitsch, Olhausen and Ebrard; among British theologians the names of Maurice and Morrell; and among American theologians the school of Mercersburg following a professor Harbaugh (41). In Chapter III a number of contemporary examples were given, but it should also be noted that in Chapter II reference was made to the concept of inclusive substitution which may also be intended to express the conviction that an inclusive relation exists between Christ and his people by virtue of his Universal humanity (42).

However, as might be expected, the notion of Christ's Universal manhood has been heavily criticised by theologians, generally from the 'common sense' perspective that the term humanity is an abstract noun, as is the term Man, so to speak of Jesus as Man or Humanity as the one who includes all men is meaningless
or unintelligible (43). Thus, for example, C. Hodge
complains that in addition to being merely speculative,
ethically impossible, anthropocentric and materialist,
the concept of the universal man is impossible since:

There is no conceivable sense in which Christ
had in Himself the whole of humanity, when
millions of other men existed around him.
This whole theory ... rests on an unintelligible,
or meaningless proposition (44).

Similarly Denney rejects 'the fantastic abstraction
of a racial act' (45), and V. F. Storr asks 'Do we
mean that humanity has a life of its own apart from
the individuals who compose it?' (46). He concludes
that 'I find it very difficult to attach any meaning
to the phrase "Christ was inclusive man" which makes it
possible for me to think of the death on the Cross as
an act in which all humanity shared' (47).

H. E. W. Turner, commenting on the σωφατη of
Athanasius asks:

Is this humanity a single humanity or humanity
as such? If the former, how can the assumption
by the Λογος of a particular humanity avail
for the sins of humanity as a whole? If the
latter, can any convincing significance be
attached to a humanity which lacks part-
icularity? We are here confronted with the
dilemma which was to embarrass the Greek
tradition of Christology for centuries, and
which perhaps has not been successfully overcome
even yet (48).

On a more aggressive note Rashdall opposes the concept
of Christ as Universal man on the grounds that it
testifies to a false 'metaphysical theory', supposedly
derived from Plato, but an 'insult' to him (49). The
result of this 'bastard platonism' (50) is that Christ
is regarded as a 'metaphysical entity which had somehow
got incarnated in a human body' and which necessarily replaces the person of the Christ of history by an impersonal, unreal and metaphysical Christ (51). These comments are specifically addressed to Moberly, but more generally he comments that 'a Universal cannot be a particular member of the class indicated by the class-name' (52). M. Wiles, commenting on the Patristic understanding of a Universal human nature, recognises that such a concept is understandable and intelligible within the context of platonic thought forms, but that although:

there is something in common between all men, which we are indicating by our use of the words 'human nature' ... I doubt if many people today can really visualise or express that which is common to mankind as a whole as strongly as our principle seems to require if it is to retain its verisimilitude (53).

It may help in an assessment of the language of Christ as the Universal, inclusive and representative man, to outline the different ways in which it is possible to use the language of universals, and thereby to reach some understanding of the theological use appropriate to this language (54). First, a universal may be spoken of in the sense of a reality which has logical and ontological priority over the particulars which participate in and derive their characteristics from the universal. In this sense the Universal man is conceived as a reality standing over and before all individual men, who only are men in that they participate in the universal. In the incarnation Christ may be thought to have been united to this
universal, or he may be thought of as the universal which has been given specific form (55).

Second, a universal may be taken as the common specific form which can be apprehended in a group of objects which enables both their common classification and the recognition of their individual status. In this sense universals cannot be said to exist in the same sense that individuals exist, for the individual is unique and cannot be common to many whereas the universal is that which is common to many and therefore cannot be. However, in this view, the universal can act as a subject, since something can meaningfully be said of it, and it can be predicated of an object. In this sense, to speak of a Universal man is not meaningless, but it would not be possible to speak of him in the same sense of which the individual is spoken (56).

Third, a universal may be construed as a necessary accompaniment to the perception of reality, functioning in the mind as a regulative concept which enables the observer to perceive and recognise reality. The universal is the presupposition or the product of the ability to classify and recognise community amongst complex and diverse forms. The universal is therefore an epistemological category that allows for the recognition of the individual and the class or species to which he belongs. The Universal man is thus a logical and epistemological construct which corresponds to the observer's experience of the complex reality of individual humans (57).
From this outline of the different ways in which the language of universals may be used it follows that the use of such language by a theologian does not necessarily commit him to a particular metaphysic. Rather, it is the case that the theologian uses the language of universals in order to express the New Testament insight that individual human destiny is 'bound up with' the person of Christ, that his life is decisive for the life of all men, and that his relation with God is constitutive of our relation. In other words, the language of universals is an immediate expression and consequence of the conviction of the universality of Christ. Indeed, a careful study of Patristic writers who draw heavily on such language points to this conclusion, in that distinctions are carefully drawn so as to subordinate the metaphysical context implied in the language of universals to the tensions and claims of Christian faith (58). Thus, the language of universals can be a powerful model for interpreting Christian insights, where the ambiguity and diversity of this language, which results from the different metaphysics in which it is formulated, is not the immediate concern of the theologian. As a model its coherence is founded not upon a particular metaphysic, but upon the significance of Christ, of whom it is said that he is 'before' all men in such a way that all other men are wholly dependent upon him; that he is the 'summation' of all men in such a way that our common human nature is seen to receive its
full expression and destiny; that he is a paradigmatic form of humanity in such a way that individuals may define their actions and experience in the light and on the basis of his.

When a theologian moves from the language of 'man' to that of 'Man', or from a human nature to Humanity, he is drawing upon a model which has its roots deep in the structure of human perception, thought and language and which functions to express and interpret the universal significance of Christ.

However, there are occasions where this language would appear to be misconstrued and misused, where the charges of 'bastard Platonism', 'outmoded realism', have more force. For example, what is the significance and status of the language that as Jesus is Man, Universal Man, all men are thereby punished in his punishment, or all men die in his death and are raised in his resurrection? On the understanding given above, such language would be construed as expressing the significance of Christ's work, its universality, in the sense that if punishment is seen to be a legitimate understanding of that work then salvation is apprehended as liberation from punishment, and that liberation is effected through a universal range and efficacy. Equally, Jesus as Man undergoing death and resurrection expresses the conviction that the history of this man is decisive and constitutive for the history of all men. However, this language often seems to be employed and understood not as an interpretation which
expresses Christ's universal significance, but as an explanation which justifies the belief that Christ's work is salvific for other men (59). The pattern of thought that, for example, finds Christ to be a substitute in the sense of bearing our punishment or death, and then seeks to apply that insight by appealing to the universal category 'Man', not only misconstrues such language, but also fails to recognise the origin and impulse of its use. The very fact that Christ is seen to bear our punishment or our death suggests that his universal significance is an implicit part of language about his salvific work, which may be expressed and interpreted by means of universal categories, but is not to be explained or justified by them. Such a view reverses the pattern and direction of Christian thought and experience and distorts the significance of the language of universals by failing to recognise their interpretative function as models.

b) The Model of Christ as Corporate Man

The second model that may be employed to substantiate the language of the inclusiveness of Christ draws specifically on the scriptural theme of the Body, and indeed, has been advanced as the Hebraic pattern of thought over and against the 'Greek' concept of the Universal man (60). As was noted in Chapter III this model can be employed to express both the consequences of Christ's saving work, that we are thereby incorporated into his Body, and to denote the presupposition for
that work, that in Christ, the corporate man, all men have already died (61). The oscillation between these two patterns of thought plays on the ambiguity of the phrase 'the Body of Christ' which can be taken to refer both to the physical constitution of the earthly Jesus and to the community of the church in its communion with the exalted Jesus (62). The concern of this section is to examine the models of Corporate Personality and the Body which substantiate this language of corporeity and incorporation.

i) The concept of Corporate Personality was first advanced by H. W. Robinson (63) and it was rapidly seized upon by many commentators as a means of rendering intelligible 'a much too crude mythology' (64). Robinson himself gave the term a restricted place, because, as shall be seen, the logic of his argument dictated that the notion of corporate personality could play no part in a contemporary understanding of the relation between Christ and mankind (65). However, because the term corporate personality has become such a familiar part of theological vocabulary, its origin as an anthropological construct to characterise patterns of 'primitive mentality' is often ignored. J. W. Rogerson has subjected the concept to an anthropological enquiry and argues that a distinction be made between 'corporate responsibility' which is a phenomenon of social groupings regarded without differentiation by law, and the psychological dimension that the term corporate
personality is meant to indicate, that is, the inability of the primitive consciousness to distinguish between the individual and the group in the way in which modern man does, and the corresponding notion that the individual personality was conceived as being capable of extension in society (66).

Rogerson rightly argues that this latter dimension be rejected as an account of Hebrew thought and institutions (67). In proposing it Robinson was drawing on the anthropological theories of Lévy-Bruhl, who argued that primitive mentalities, as opposed to civilized mentalities, thought and perceived within a network of alien concepts (68). Lévy-Bruhl argued that such primitive mentalities thought in terms of 'participatory representations', so that identifications between objects, persons and animals could readily be made (69). Robinson applies this theory to Hebrew thought and institutions, arguing that the ability of a prophet to represent or 'be' God and the ability of the individual to be identified with his family or nation are not figures of speech or metaphors but literal statements of fact (70). The term corporate personality was therefore supposed to be an explanation of patterns of Hebrew thought and behaviour that are now problematic and alien.

Two comments must be made concerning the use of this anthropological theory. First, for a number of reasons Lévy-Bruhl's theory of primitive mentalities and their manner of perceiving the world has been
largely rejected by anthropologists. Lévy-Bruhl was possibly right to seek the resolution and meaning of certain patterns of thought and behaviour within the context of social structures, but he was wrong in his interpretation of those structures and in his view of primitive mentality (71). In particular the supposed identifications between individuals, animals and groups on closer inspection proves to be far more subtle and less problematic than might have been supposed (72). While corporate patterns of thought are certainly present in the Old Testament and while these patterns may be elucidated by an understanding of the social structure of corporate responsibility, Lévy-Bruhl’s theory of primitive mentality cannot be drawn upon by the theologian to substantiate the concept of corporate personality as a psychological or ontological description.

Second, even if Lévy-Bruhl's theory were correct it would be impossible to apply the concept of corporate personality to the person of Christ as an explanation of his inclusive salvific work. Not only can there be no justification for applying a theory of primitive mentality to first century Jews and Greeks, but also its use as an explanatory or interpretative device for a contemporary 'civilized mentality' must also be illegitimate (73). The commentator cannot have it both ways: either Lévy-Bruhl is correct, in which case the theory of corporate personality must be tied strictly to the primitive mentality of the early Hebrews and remain contradictory or 'pre-logical' to us;
or, Lévy-Bruhl is incorrect in his description of primitive mentality, in which case there is no justification for a continued use of the concept of corporate personality as an explanation of that mentality (74). It appears to be the case that theologians employed the concept of corporate personality because it seems to explain how and why the New Testament saw Christ as a Universal figure to whom all are related so that they may be said to be really or potentially 'in him'. Not only, however, does the understanding of corporate personality rest on a spurious abstraction from Hebrew thought and is inapplicable to the New Testament, but also its continued use as an 'explanation' of the significance of Christ reveals the misunderstanding to which language about the universality of Christ is prone (75).

ii) The language of the 'Body' is more evidently a model which is expressive of relations rather than an explanation or a constitutive reality, and is therefore less open to misconstruction than the model of corporate personality. None the less, caution must be exercised when considering the view, for example, of L. S. Thornton, where the relation to Christ expressed by the concept of 'the Body of Christ' (the Church) is referred also to the body of Christ (his physical constitution), particularly in his work on the cross (76). Rather, the model of incorporation, more clearly expresses the conviction of the universal significance of Christ,
interpreting and illuminating the sphere of relationships and responsibilities into which the Christian enters. The same may be said for the concept of 'solidarity' as it expresses the inclusive significance of Christ in terms of the 'physical' model of union or conjunction. In both cases the commentator is doing little more than repeating scriptural analogies without making explicit the frameworks of thought on which such analogies are dependent. It is more likely that if appeal is made to the concept of the Body or to the notion of solidarity it will be undergirded by a recognition of a social awareness of community and interdependence and will be given expression in terms of patterns of social solidarity.

iii) The presupposition for the model of social solidarity is that every person 'is involved in the society in which he lives by what he does and by his share in the deeds of others' (77). The structure of vocation, the division of labour, the common biological and psychological heritage all involve relationships of dependence so that not only do the actions of one affect the fate of others, but it may be said that all are involved in the actions of others (78). However, a distinction must be drawn to preserve the validity of the model of solidarity between the consequences of actions and the actions themselves. The patterns of dependence, and the social structures that order human existence, clearly result in a participation in the
consequences of the actions of others, but only by distorting the language of dependence can it be said that in the participation of these consequences there takes place a participation in the events themselves (79).

Further, this distinction between consequences and actions, or between effects and causes, must be recognised when appeal is made to the model of social solidarity to establish the possibility and reality of a vicarious bearing of judgement, guilt, or punishment (80). The fact that another may be involved in the consequences of the sin of another does not establish that they are therefore involved in the sin itself. As H. Neie comments:

> Personal guilt and responsibility, in spite of all sharing with others who contributed to my failure through their sin of commission or omission, is not transferable. No one can vicariously bear my guilt even if he (she) bears the consequences of my failure (81).

Thus, the language of social solidarity may articulate the conviction of Christ's universal and decisive significance, and it may interpret this significance by means of patterns of dependence with which all are familiar, but when viewed more closely the model does not point to the New Testament insight that the believer is engaged with Christ himself, but rather indicates a relation between Christ and the believer which is expressed in terms of actions and their consequences.

The intention of the model is to interpret the sense in which the believer is 'bound up' with Christ, but it
succeeds only in establishing a relation of dependence, and thus it fails to interpret the pattern of interchange which the New Testament applies between Christ and his people.

c) The Model of Christ as Archetype or Centre

Attention must now be focussed on the use of the terms representation and inclusive substitution to describe the 'inclusive character' of Christ not in ontological terms but in terms of his quality as an archetype, prototype or centre - the 'typical' man who embodies, introduces and inspires a new humanity which hereafter looks to him both as its source and goal (82). In this pattern of thought Christ's universality is interpreted and expressed not in terms of an ontological inclusion in his being or work, but in relational terms of dependence and invitation. In Chapter III it was shown that this relation could be referred either to particular qualities exhibited by Christ which are taken as determinative and normative for all other men, as for example his love, obedience etc; or to particular conditions of Christ's being which are taken as archetypal and constitutive for the being of other men (his God-manhood, the union of divine and human) (83). Whatever the quality or condition of Christ that is taken to be fundamental and salvific, the relation that is posited with men follows a similar pattern: that which is evinced in Christ has universal significance as being determinative
for men, to be realised and reflected in their individual existences, and as constitutive for all men initiating a new pattern of humanity, realising a destiny for mankind that is the first fruit of every individual's destiny.

It would be possible only to see this pattern of thought in terms of its philosophical or metaphysical origins and to charge it as being 'Hegelian' or 'Kantian', as the concept of Christ as Man could be labelled 'Platonic', but such a criticism would miss what is significant in this contribution, in that once again a range of models are employed to interpret the universal significance of Christ (84). Two comments, however, should be noted.

First, in this designation and description of Christ the term representation plays an important part, for it contains and evokes a double reference. On the one hand, to describe Christ as representative can point to Christ himself, in whatever quality or condition that is taken to be the embodiment of true humanity. On the other hand, to describe Christ as representative can point instead to his followers in the sense that what is seen in Christ is to be realised or reproduced in them. This double reference of the term representation allows a complex pattern of relation and association to be established that binds together the representative and those who are represented in networks of dependence which constantly evoke both the source and the goal of Christian
Second, this use of the term representation can be seen to underlie and establish its interpretative role in the ontological contexts that have been examined. The term representation can evoke an inclusive relation which can be expressed in ontological terms precisely because the pattern of the relationship embraces both partners in a description of their associated roles. In this sense the use of the term representation in a political context is revealing, for the use of the term allows a transition to be made from the language of a functional relation which serves the end of the constituent to the language of the actual presence of the constituent 'in' the person of the representative. Such a transition is not invalid when the term representation is allowed to evoke this double reference of mutual interdependence and responsibility. It is only when this pattern of relation fails on one side that representation becomes misrepresentation and to speak of a 'real' presence becomes morally impossible.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter attention has been focussed on the manner of the relation that exists between the believer and Christ, as this relation bears on the use of the terms representation and substitution. Four New Testament themes were examined which indicated a
pattern of inter-relation, dependence and community, a pattern that was seen to be well expressed by the term 'interchange'. Three different sets of models which arose from the description of the terms in Chapters II and III, were then examined as they attempted to interpret and order this biblical material: the models of Christ as Man or Universal Man; the models of Christ as a corporate person, as a Body, and as existing within patterns of solidarity; the models of Christ as archetypal, typical or exemplary man.

As in the previous chapter conclusions are offered on the basis of an assessment of the models in their ability to interpret and express the New Testament insights of the relation between Christ and men, and on the basis of the coherence of these models as they act as interpretative frameworks, particularly in their relation to the terms substitution and representation which can be used in these contexts. On these criteria two models were judged to be inadequate to aid interpretation. First, the model of corporate personality, when used to express the inclusive relation between Christ and his people, was seen to be an artificial abstraction from the biblical material and from the point of view of its own coherence could not be used to interpret the significance of Christ. Second, the model of social solidarity, to which appeal is often made in the context both of the language of corporate personality and that of the Body, was seen to be inadequate as it could indicate only the relation of
dependence between the believer and Christ, but it could not interpret the immediacy of this relation or its interdependence as witnessed to by the New Testament.

In the course of this chapter it has twice been noted that the phrase 'inclusive substitution' could be used to express the relation between Christ and his people. On the one hand it could express the ontological relation of inclusiveness, while on the other hand, it could be employed to express the universal significance and centrality of Christ. In both contexts the meaning and intelligibility of the phrase must be challenged. In the first place, referring to the inclusive significance of the work of Christ, the phrase is at best confusing and at worst contradictory. The term substitution, as was shown in Chapter IV, is closely allied to a pattern of exchange, a pattern that may be expressed and interpreted in varying conceptual frameworks, but one which demands the use of phrases such as 'in our place', and 'in our stead'. It is understandable that those who wish to use the term substitution should wish also to recognise the force of the New Testament description of being 'in Christ' or 'with Christ', but the mere addition of the term 'inclusive' to the concept of substitution that is otherwise defined in terms of an exchange, or of an exclusive work means either that doubt is cast on the validity of the term substitution, or that its inclusive character is not really taken seriously, or that Christian atonement theology is faced with a fundamental
contradiction. It may be true to argue that the models of substitution and inclusiveness both have a part to play in illuminating and interpreting the Christian understanding of atonement, but to use a phrase like 'inclusive substitution' demonstrates that the purpose and function of these models has not been grasped. In the second place, the use of the phrase 'inclusive substitution' in the context of describing Christ as the centre of humanity, or the one who has universal significance, is simply misleading. The term substitution in this context is used in a sense that bears little relation to the patterns of thought that are usually associated with the term, and the addition of the term 'inclusive', while indicating the changed context of the substitutionary thought does not evoke or express this new context. Indeed it seems to be the case that traditional language is preserved for the sake of appearances, which, however, conceals a markedly different pattern of thought.

The examination of the New Testament themes of the inclusive and universal significance of Christ indicated that this language is a significant part of the problematic that demands interpretation and expression as the meaning of the atoning work of Christ is explored. The subsequent Christological affirmations of Chalcedon and Nicea impressed this language with an ontological frame of reference which continues to exert a powerful influence on soteriological thought. It is in this context that the language of Christ as Man or
Universal Man was recognised to express and articulate his universal significance, so that, despite the difficulties and problems encountered in these formulations, the attempt is true to the fundamental insight that between Christ and his people there exists a relationship such that man can be said to be 'bound up' with Christ. It was recognised that although these models appeal to underlying linguistic and philosophical discussions as to the status of Universals, they are not themselves philosophical constructs that can be accepted or rejected on the grounds of their 'Platonism' or 'Nominalism'. Rather, an awareness of the philosophical discussion and problems should serve to underline the appropriateness of the models as appealing to a fundamental character of human discourse and perception, and should also indicate the limits of the model, preventing it from becoming an explanation which is dependent upon a particular philosophical tradition or metaphysical view. Provided that the description of Christ as Man is seen to be interpretative of his universal significance, and does not become an explanation of inclusive patterns of thought, the model has an important role in atonement theology. The reservation that must accompany it lies precisely in the fact that the model is so easily and frequently misconstrued to authorise certain explanatory patterns of thought.

However, the final section of the chapter also demonstrated that the universality of Christ could be expressed and interpreted through the models of archetype
and centre. Despite the fact that these models make use of functional rather than ontological descriptions, the characteristics of interchange and inclusiveness are preserved. The relation between an image and its reflection, between an archetype and its copy, is complex and mutually defined, so that a pattern of interrelation and interdependence emerges which powerfully interprets the New Testament themes of 'in Christ' and 'with Christ'. It seems inevitable that functional descriptions appear inferior to ontological descriptions of inclusiveness or relation, but in this context at least they are not to be despised as they articulate and interpret the extent to which the believer is 'bound up' with Christ.

The part played by the term representation in this complex set of models must now be considered. First, the term representation is understood in three senses that are often described as wholly separate, but which in fact are seen to overlap to a considerable extent and to depend on the meanings of each other. It would be possible to define the term representation in the light of the models of section a) as referring to a person who literally includes others in himself, who is a representative of others because he is in some sense a supra-individual; to define the term in the light of the models of section b) as referring to a person whose individuality is extended to embrace others so that they may be said to be a part of their representative; to define the term in the light of the models of
section c) as referring to a person who initiates or typifies a quality or an action which is understood to be determinative and of central significance for others.

However, to define the term representation in these three different ways would be to fail to recognise the complex, ambiguous and often undisclosed structure of representation that is always present. For these three expressions of the phenomenon of representation reflect the ambiguity that is always present in the term between 'counting as present' and 'being present', between 'participation' and 'delegation', and between 'embodiment' and 'response'. When a literal inclusiveness is said to be denoted by the term representation it is clear that the language of 'being counted as present' is being 'stretched' by the insight that a representative is something that, or someone who, actually embodies or typifies those who are represented, so that it is often hard to distinguish between the language of Christ 'the representative of man' and Christ 'the representative man', although fundamentally different patterns of thought are being employed and evoked. Similarly, the language of Christ incorporating others so that they may be represented by him constantly oscillates between the individual and the supra-individual, between the earthly reality of Jesus and the spiritual constitution of the Church. The concept of representation used to describe this relation between Christ and man constantly reflects and embodies these different insights, so that the structure
of representation is never simple but always involves an appeal to a complex set of representative relationships.

Second, the complex set of associations attached to the term representation is further enlarged by considering the patterns of representation that were discussed in Chapters III and IV, as the term was taken to refer to the work of Christ. As was shown, these patterns of representation describe and define the work of Christ in terms of the manner in which it becomes our work, in terms of our dependence upon it, and in terms of our continuing dependence upon it, as through Christ we are brought into the presence of God. Clearly this use of the term representation to express the work of Christ is not independent of its use to express the relation between Christ and man, for it draws upon common themes and ideas, but it refers these insights to a different context and so further enhances the term representation in its ability to evoke and express the conceptual matter of the Christian faith in its complexity. In this context the association of the term representation with the term 'interchange' is attractive, in that not only does it allow for development and expression of the inter-relationship that is understood to be a part of the New Testament witness to the salvific reality of Christ, but also it allows for the development and expression of the reality of the reversal or change that is involved in and occurs as a result of this saving work.
Thus, it may be concluded that the term representation expresses by means of various contextual frameworks the New Testament insight that believers are 'bound up' with Christ in a pattern of relationships that expresses and evokes structures of dependence and responsibility, participation and imitation, presence and absence.
CHAPTER VI
SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION IN THE WORK OF
D. SÖLLE

Introduction

Having completed our examination of the terms substitution and representation as they have been found to occur in the formulation of doctrines of the atonement, and having discussed and criticised their range of meanings together with the models that are held to be appropriate to articulate those meanings, the task remains to examine in greater depth the work of one theologian who has given specific attention to the terms and their use. The theologian in question is D. Sölle, and the work in which she deals with these issues is entitled 'Christ the Representative' (1). As has been stated in the introduction to this study the examination of Sölle's work that is found in this chapter stands parenthetically to the main body of the thesis, contributing towards an understanding of the terms substitution and representation and acting as a test case and a reference point to check on the analysis of the terms that has so far been offered. The reasons for Sölle's work occupying this place will become clearer throughout the course of this chapter, but briefly stated Sölle writes from a vantage point
and with intentions that are unique to this enquiry and which render any discussion of her contribution highly problematic. In particular two features of her work must be singled out to illustrate the eccentricity of her approach.

First, the controlling presupposition of Sölle's examination, and the framework in which she elucidates the meaning of substitution and representation is that theology, as a 'reflective description of certain experiences' (2), can only be conceived within a post-theistic experience of the world (3). Theological reflection must now be determined by 'the new experience of God which characterises our contemporary situation, the experience of the individual who finds himself insecure and alone in a completely changed world and society' (4). Sölle employs the familiar phrase 'the death of God' to give 'theological expression to these changed psychosocial conditions' (5). The characteristics of these changed conditions will be considered in more precise detail shortly, particularly in their bearing on the formulation of Christology and Soteriology, but for the moment it must simply be recognised that for Sölle 'atheism is merely a different mode of speech from theism' (6).

Second, this post-theistic context of 'theology' means that Sölle's formulation of the concept of representation is integrally bound up with her intention to express anthropologically what was formerly expressed theologically (7). In other words the term representation
embraces a complex set of functions, all of which are interrelated in Sölle's intentions, which are difficult to disentangle from one another, and whose precise force and manner of interrelation is difficult to perceive. One function of the term representation is to express the character of Christ's representation of men before God, but because Sölle has already argued that the structure of representation itself is the key to the quest for human identity, the phrase 'before God' adds nothing new to the term representation (8). Thus, it is the function of the term representation to translate theological language into anthropological language, and the pattern of representation disclosed must be seen to be integrally bound up with that intention. In a similar fashion Sölle also employs the term to express Christ's representation of God to man, and again the structure of representation becomes the means by which this theological language can be given anthropological content. In this case (as is perhaps also the case with Christ's representation of man before God) the issue is further complicated by the fact that theological language is not wholly expressed by anthropological language since God is said still to have a future, although what this future is remains ambiguous.

Thus, because of the distinctive theological context in which Sölle wishes to examine the meaning of the terms substitution and representation, and because of the variety of functions given to the latter term, a separate examination has been regarded as
appropriate to grasp the complexity of Sölle's investigation and to relate her discussion to the main body of this study.

The intention of the chapter is as follows. First, the phenomenon of representation and its relation to the question of identity as conceived by Sölle will be described and discussed. Second, the specific characteristics that Sölle uses to describe Christ's work of representation will be examined. Third, Sölle's understanding and criticism of the term substitution will be considered. Finally, some assessment will be made of Sölle's use and understanding of the terms, together with an assessment of the contribution of her work in the light of the analysis of the terms that has already been offered in this study.

1. The Phenomenon of Representation as Conceived by D. Sölle

Part One of 'Christ the Representative' is sub-titled 'A Provisional Interpretation', whose specific task is to 'describe the phenomenon of representation, and to illustrate its structures from a sociological and anthropological standpoint' (9). This description is necessary since the concept of representation 'can only be used to describe the work of Jesus if it is firmly rooted in human relationships in society - in other words, only if it matches a universal phenomenon in our world as well' (10).
However it is necessary to recognise and clarify the two controlling presuppositions of the enquiry which are mentioned in a preliminary fashion in an introductory chapter to the book.

The first presupposition is constituted by the question 'how can one achieve personal identity?' (11). The search for the 'Kingdom of identity' (12), the longing of man for identity, is regarded as 'axiomatic' (13) and in need of no further demonstration.

Whether there ever have been or ever will be human lives not engaged in this search for personal identity cannot be demonstrated empirically or historically. Nor does this lessen the gravity of the question for ourselves (14).

No further discussion is offered at this point by Sölle to clarify what is meant by personal identity, nor to substantiate the claim that the search for identity constitutes the 'unconditional' (15) for contemporary man, but the reasons for the crisis of identity become apparent when Sölle's second controlling presupposition is considered.

This presupposition refers to the circumstances and conditions under which man's longing for identity takes place, the historical condition experienced as 'the death of God' and embodied in a post-theistic culture and pattern of thought (16). For Sölle the phrase 'the death of God' describes an experience which the terms theism and atheism both alike fail to recognise, for this is a 'new experience of God' (17), the historical condition of 'the absolute'. (18), 'the
experience of the individual who finds himself insecure and alone in a completely changed world and society' (19). The point is not whether God exists, and those who claim either that he does exist or that he does not are both alike in their naivety and in their 'undisturbed ideological confidence' (20) which fails to grasp the nettle of our time, which is that the experience of God is that of 'the absence of God' (21).
Our condition is one of constant uncertainty which cannot be ignored but which makes it impossible for us either to answer or to forget the questions of meaning and purpose which confront us (22).

It is under these new conditions that the longing for identity takes on its particular features, for in man's search for identity is discovered a concern for the absolute - in other words, a concern that corresponds in anthropological terms to the theological language of God.

For what does it mean to assert that God is dead if, and so long as, there is still something which concerns us unconditionally? Is not atheism merely a different mode of speech from theism? Does not everything depend on anthropology, that is to say on the problem of the irreplaceable man who is seeking personal identity and can never be freed from this search? (23)

Thus, Sölle makes the connection that will be of crucial significance for her understanding and use of the term representation: for if the question of identity expresses the same concern as the question of God, and if identity is seen to be gained by the phenomenon that Sölle terms representation, then it may be argued that the
structure of representation itself will be the appropriate anthropological language to express the theistic language of a previous age. In this way the term representation acquires its pivotal function as a concept that interprets theological reality and at the same time translates this reality into a form suitable for a post-theistic understanding.

Thus, the two presuppositions of the search for personal identity and of the contemporary experience of the death of God form the context for the discussion which Sölle pursues in the next six chapters with regard to the phenomenon of representation as a universal phenomenon rooted in social relationships.

Sölle begins that discussion with a 'linguistic enquiry' (24), in which she attempts to disentangle the confusion between substitution and representation to which 'current linguistic usage ... has become insensitive' (25). Sölle sees four criteria or characteristics which determine the phenomenon of representation: it is a temporary expedient; it is limited in its scope to specific areas; it is conditional on the approval of the one represented; it is incomplete so that the representative only plays a role and thus safeguards the memory of the one represented (26). Substitution, on the other hand, is characterised by Sölle as permanent rather than temporary; total in its scope rather than limited; unconditional rather than conditional; complete and final, so that the one who is represented is replaced, forgotten and treated
impersonally as a thing (27). Thus, for Sölle, the blurring of the distinction between substitution and representation is a reflection of a depersonalised world where people can be treated as things, where 'substitution is a final exchange of dead impersonal or depersonalised being, whereas representation is the provisional intervention of persons on behalf of persons' (28).

It is difficult to know the precise purpose of this 'linguistic enquiry' in the context of the work as a whole, for, standing as it does at the beginning of the work it is clearly intended to ground the terms substitution and representation in common discourse so that any similar patterns disclosed in the unfamiliar discourse of the search for identity or in the technical language of Christology might be appropriately named and recognised. However, the definitions or portrayals of the terms are stated dogmatically with little illustration or explanation and while they reflect, at least in part, some of the meanings which are associated with the terms, a more thorough 'enquiry' would have revealed alternative uses and contexts which 'colour' the terms somewhat differently. If these alternatives had been noted and discussed it would not have been so easy for Sölle to identify each of the terms with a particular theological or anthropological stance, nor would it have been possible to draw the contrast between them in quite so explicit a way. For example, in considering the use of the
term representation Sölle fails to make any mention of the political dimension of the term, which forms its most common context and is one which embodies ambiguities and subtleties that are central to the phenomenon of representation as it is commonly perceived. Equally, in connection with the term substitution, Sölle rightly identifies the characteristic of exchange, but quite arbitrarily decides that exchange and replacement always treat one as a dead or as an impersonal thing. It is true only in the pattern of an exchange which is constituted by a simple either/or, as in the case of a substitute for a football team, where the substitute is a replacement to the detriment or disadvantage of the one who is replaced. In a more complex pattern of exchange it is possible to express the situation where an exchange may displace someone from one position to enable him to take up a place which is of greater advantage to him. By focussing on the pattern of exchange that involves only the notion of either being 'in' or being 'written off' Sölle fails to realise that this concept of substitution does not exhaust the possibilities open to the term. Whether or not it is possible to construct an understanding of Christ's work which involves this more complex pattern of exchange is irrelevant here; what is at issue is whether Sölle's account of the use of the terms can be called an 'enquiry', or whether the meaning of the terms has not already been fixed upon as a result of her particular interpretation of the significance of Christ's work (29).
However, whatever the limitations of the linguistic enquiry, the main substance of the examination of the phenomenon of representation follows in Chapters 2-6, and it is this material that must now be considered. In these chapters Sölle explores the different ways in which personal identity has been sought, preserved and threatened in Western culture, tracing the process that has given rise to the present challenge to identity, and suggesting some of the criteria that are necessary if personal identity is to be gained.

In the Western medieval culture identity was assured because the theistic framework of belief allowed for the conviction that the individual was known to God, that his soul (identity) was safe in heaven, whatever the circumstances of his earthly life; in fact, despite the 'role' that he was called on to play in his mortal life. The irreplaceability of the individual is guaranteed because identity (the real self) is safe in heaven with God (30). However, with the breakdown of this theistic confidence the 'role' performed on earth becomes increasingly the only reality and this, far from securing identity, only serves to highlight the way in which the individual is not significant, since in his role he is always replaceable and can be treated as an 'it' (31). Sölle sees in German Idealism, notably in Hegel, a conspicuous protest against this process: a protest which affirms the irreplaceability of the individual not only because of his differentiation from God, which is expressed in his relationship with God
and in God's 'interest' in him, but also because of his differentiation from society which he achieves through his work and which must be overcome to 'make himself what he is' (32). After Hegel, Sölle believes, these two aspects fell apart, and identity is conceived either in terms of the 'infinite value of the soul' (Harnack) (33) or in the heroic achievement of the exceptional individual (34). In the modern world, despite our conviction that man is irreplaceable, the reality is that most people are seen, and see themselves, as cogs in a machine, valued not for who they are but only for the particular function demanded of them (35). Identity is not possible, either because one simply accepts replaceability or because to attempt to make ourselves irreplaceable is to attempt the impossible (36).

What hope then is there for identity? Sölle answers that I become 'irreplaceable only for those who love me' (37), that is those who do not write me off when I fail but give me more time. It is those who love me (who expect more from me than what I appear to be at present) and those who hope in me (who allow me more time to fulfill my potential) who hold my place open for me, intervening on my behalf, not to replace me, but to enable me to reach that place for myself. But this is what Sölle has outlined in her linguistic enquiry as 'representation', and so it becomes true to say that it is as I experience representation that I gain my identity or that identity becomes a possibility (38). Representation takes seriously the irreplaceability
of man in that it is temporary, limited, conditional and incomplete, but it also recognises that the individual cannot always stand heroically on his own but needs that sort of assistance which gives him time, holds his place open, waiting for him until he is once again capable and present. Thus, representation recognises that man is dependent upon others, but it also allows for identity to emerge because the dependence expressed by the representation is of the kind that establishes and safeguards the irrereplaceability of the individual.

If the person is no longer regarded as irreplaceable, representation becomes unnecessary, substitution will do. Only the irreplaceable man, who cannot abandon the search for personal identity, wants to be represented; but for him it is essential. He depends upon representation because he exists in time (39).

Thus, the phenomenon of representation is characterised by temporality and personality which are also the conditions under which identity is said to be capable of realisation.

2. The Structure of Christ's Representation

The provisional enquiry carried out by Sölle in Part I of her work described the two criteria of temporality and personality which together were said to ensure a pattern of representation rather than substitution, and therefore to be the conditions under which identity may be realised. In Part II of the work
Sölle reviews a number of different attempts to express the significance of Christ's work, using the two criteria as a test of their adequacy and concluding that these two conditions were:

... too easily lost sight of, with the result that personality was depersonalised. The irreplaceable individual became a mere pawn in God's chess game, and temporality (the basis of the hope of the represented) was ignored in the interests of a supra-temporal and timeless salvation mechanism, which lost none of its patent artificiality by being labelled 'salvation history' (40).

The material found in Part II will be of indirect interest only so far as it assists in showing more clearly what Sölle's own intentions and meanings are as she engages in the constructive work of Part III.

In this third section of the work Sölle is concerned to determine the relation between the structure of representation as an anthropological reality and the significance of Christ's person and work. As a preliminary statement Sölle claims that:

... from now on representation is not just a postulate of the reason, nor an everyday occurrence, but the really decisive event of all human history. Anthropology and christology are related as question and answer. In Tillich's terminology, they exist in correlation. To ask about the structures of living representation is necessarily to ask about Christ (41).

In order to substantiate this claim and to elucidate the meaning of Christ's representation, Sölle selects three 'basic principles' which 'seem relevant' - identification, dependence and provisionality - to be examined to see 'what light they throw on christology', and to assist in interpreting more precisely the
representation which was provisionally defined as personal and temporal (42). Because Christ's representation is not only the representation of man before God, but also the representation of God before man, the order of Sölle's own exposition will be followed here, considering first the bearing of these three principles on the representation of Christ before God.

a) Christ - the Representative of Man before God

Christ's representation of man before God is first of all provisional, not in the sense that a 'precursor of someone greater' is provisional, but as an 'ultimate and final provisionality' (43). Sölle sees Christian anti-semitism as a direct consequence of failing to recognise this provisionality, for the final Christ is a 'totalitarian' Christ (44), and those 'who have the final Christ need no future' (45), for the present and the past become decisive. The final Christ can only mean the crowding out of those 'underdogs' and 'also rans' (46) who need a future, but if 'the still invisible kingdom of God remains open as something still future rather than as something which already exists and has to be defended by all available means [then] there cannot possibly be any ground for the brash and confident Messianism which makes pogroms and courts of inquisition possible' (47). It is only in the provisional Christ that 'the kingdom of God is at the same time present and still not present' (48). It is only in 'the pure and limited
representation of the One who is now already where we have not yet arrived and who waits for us as the forerunner' (49) that there is given a future, and it is only when the Church recognises this that Christians, too, can remain open to the future God and can take responsibility for the world as its spokesman and champion (50).

Christ's representation of man before God is not only as forerunner, it is also as one who 'identifies with those who follow after, those who remain behind, those who no longer move forward' (51). This identification can no longer be conceived after the pattern of a 'mythical exchange' (52) of personality, no matter how we may long for such an identification: rather, identification is to be conceived after the pattern of a teacher, one who gives himself to his pupils, holding open the place for them which in their ignorance cannot yet be attained, but gradually effacing himself and making himself superfluous as the pupil grows to maturity (53). Christ is the teacher whose interest in us secures us time. But he is not the "eternal" teacher whose work is never done' (54), he desires rather that 'we should graduate from his school to his Kingdom' (55), calling us to freedom and responsibility.

With the identification of the teacher and the pupil Sölle believes she has found a means of tackling the problem of punishment, for modern educational theory stresses that 'punishment is only meaningful if
the person who inflicts it himself suffers under the punishment he sets' (56). The representative act of the teacher in identifying with the pupil in punishment 'abolishes the difference between the agent and the acted upon' (57), so that as punishment is seen 'as the restoration of a broken personal relationship' (58) there is no longer room for 'those strange theological controversies about law or grace, God's justice or Christ's mercy, which land us in an artificial yet irreducible tension' (59). Rather, 'representing us provisionally, Christ punishes us in such a way that he suffers himself' (60). What is this punishment? In a post-metaphysical world the only possible view of punishment is 'the complex of social relationships' (61) which our actions shape and which operates on us in a 'deadly cycle' (62). When Christ identifies with us it is with those who are the agents of their own punishment.

Christ makes the prison warders aware of the prison in which they themselves live, and he does so by showing that he himself is its prisoner. ... Because Christ identifies himself with us in teaching and in punishing, he enables us to accept ourselves as guilty but also to be at peace (63).

In Christ's representation of man before God he makes himself dependent on us, suffering for us by suffering because of us. 'Representation can only be thought of as a conditional and not as an automatically effective event' (64) so that in his representation Christ puts himself at risk. When representation involves identification, the representative cannot
refuse to be involved or wish to withdraw; rather, 'the forerunner is shown up in all his provisionality when no one follows him' (65). The resurrection is not a reversal of this dependence, a final victory which makes the cross a transitional stage. The resurrection is 'simply an anticipatory sign of hope' (66), for otherwise the future would be assured, there would be nothing new to expect, 'simply the unfolding of the pre-determined' (67). The resurrection does not 'abrogate this law of the world - the law that love itself is destroyed, when it identifies itself with those who are destroying themselves' (68), rather, 'in the symbol of the resurrection, this shadow of the cross so imprinted itself in reality, that it can never again be forgotten as the key concept for the objective onlooker and as the possibility of life for those who accept this identification of another with themselves' (69).

Christ's representation of man, therefore, is marked by provisionality, identification, and dependence. Sölle now claims that to add the phrase 'before God' is rhetorical if these basic characteristics have been understood correctly.

All the anthropological characteristics we have described - that man needs a forerunner if he is to gain an extension of time; that man acquires identity through the identification of another; that when he acts representatively he makes himself dependent and suffers, because he puts himself at risk, all these statements speak of God, and do so in fact in the only possible theological sense by speaking of what God does in us (70).
God has made himself 'implicit in our history' (71), so the only way to speak of God is to speak of man; the only way to be or to act for God is to be in 'radical existence for others' (72). Thus, when representation takes place there also God is present and is spoken of, but the vocable God adds nothing new to what has been said. This language of representation is language about 'God' for it is unconditional, absolute language, and in a post-theistic age corresponds to what was previously said and experienced as a direct and 'in that sense religious relation to God' (73).

Christ is provisional - if we add 'to God' we emphasise the provisionality but say nothing new.

Christ makes himself dependent on us - if we say 'dependent on God', this simply means that Christ is radically surrendered to men.

Christ identifies himself with us - if we add 'before God' it amounts to the same thing, for whenever this identification takes place, God is there (74).

b) Christ - God's Representative Among Men

Sölle argues that the representation of God by Christ has been ignored by dogmatics because in a theistic age the concept of a God who acts can be 'more or less taken for granted' (75). In a post-theistic age, where this sort of religious immediacy is no longer possible, and where any 'metaphysical "positing" of God [is] to remain a prisoner within the private sphere of individual religious aptitudes and experiences' (76), the 'truth that Christ represents the absent God
first takes on its full significance' (77). For there are two options open: either 'we can assume that God's absence means he is dead, and so seek or create a substitute for him' (78), a function which modern technological society attempts; or, 'we can regard his absence as a possible mode of his being-for-us' (79). In this case 'man depends on their being someone to represent the irreplaceable God' (80). Thus, Christ provisionally holds the place of the absent God open, his representative activity is to hold together the two experiences of 'the death of God and of faith in Christ's resurrection' (81), and to mediate them into a new unity - 'a theology after the death of God' (82). Christ is not God's replacement, but his forerunner, and that means that whenever anyone engages in the task of representation, whenever 'a man acts or suffers in God's stead' (83), there Christ's cause is served and God is represented. This is the form, the 'cipher"Christ"' (84) in which:

Jesus continues alive to the end of the world - as the consciousness of those who represent God and claim him for each other. Where this representative claim on God is made, the implicit Christ is present. For it is not only Christ who represents God in the world. Christ's friends and brothers also represent God by allowing God - and this means necessarily those as well who need him - time (85).

In representing God Christ identifies with him so that God is now identified with Christ.

The God whom men believed in, and for centuries worshipped as the God who sits on his heavenly throne, comes to be regarded instead ... from the time of the man Jesus of Nazareth, as a disinherit and homeless being whom one might any day meet at any street corner (86).
In identifying with God, Christ played God's role and in the process 'God has changed' (87).

In Christ God himself left the immediacy of heaven ... went out from himself into unrecognition. ... The very God of power was played under conditions of helplessness, ... homelessness, in the far country. Christ ... claimed God for this new mode of existence - powerless, homeless, in alienation (88).

Christ's representation is now 'the only possible experience of God' (89), and what is real for Christ is also real for his followers: 'we, too, can now play God for one another' (90).

In representing God, 'Christ put himself in the place of God' (91), and yet he also made himself dependent upon God, acting in the name of God, putting himself 'unreservedly into the hands of the God who can accept or reject him' (92). So, too, whenever we do 'the same as Christ did, namely lay claim to God for each other, we too make ourselves dependent on God, by putting our existence at risk' (93). Put in non-theistic terms this means that if we cease clinging to our longing for happiness and pursue the 'way of love' (94) then in the pain and the renunciation of dependence in representation identity is discovered. As we identify with Christ and so participate in suffering as the representatives of God we wait for God's identity, a personalised world, the Kingdom of God.

God wills to be represented. He has made himself representable. He has made himself conditional, provisional. He has become dependent; he has mediated himself into the world. He became man (95).
Thus, Christ's representation of God before man, no less than his representation of man before God, is characterised by provisionality, identification, and dependence. Because such characteristics constitute the conditions under which identity appears the language of representation functions to provide a 'theology after the death of God' which answers the longing for identity and which safeguards the future of God. Before continuing with an assessment of this structure of Christ's representation, a brief examination of Sölle's understanding of the concept of substitution is necessary.

3. The Use and Meaning of Substitution

As has already been mentioned Sölle discovers in her linguistic enquiry that substitution is marked by the characteristics of permanence, totality, and completeness; features that are appropriate to a depersonalised or an impersonal world where identity is impossible because people are treated as replaceable things. In religious terms Sölle sees this substitution most clearly in a magical view of the world, found even in the Old Testament, when dealing with ideas like the scapegoat.

The important thing is not who removes the sin. What matters is that it disappears from the human sphere (96).

The agent which removes the sin may be a goat or a stick or stone. Modern technology bears a remarkable
resemblance to this magical world view, for technology assumes universal interchangeability, although the basis in magic is a lack of recognition of the distinction between things and persons, whereas in technology the basis is in the exchangeability of methods of production.

Magical representation (sic), a natural growth on the soil of a pre-personal era, approximates to the technological substitution of post-personal thought (97).

According to Sölle the New Testament liberates the concept of substitution from any magical view of its efficacy by using a range of metaphors to elucidate the significance of Christ's work \( \delta\nu\epsilon\gamma\mu\omega \) (98). This was achieved by relating substitution to historicity, universalisation, voluntariness, and suffering. These features are said to remove Christ's substitution from a magical sphere and therefore to express the sense of personal representation, but succeeding interpretations are seen by Sölle to lack the 'personalist' (99) dimension and so to tend towards substitution. Anselm is seen as an example of this tendency, for despite a 'personalist view of sin' (100), the notion of a satisfaction offered to God by Christ 'creates salvation independently of those he represents' (101) so that it lacks that provisional and dependent quality.

However, the strongest criticism is reserved for Barth's 'objectivist interpretation' (102) which fails to indicate 'any distinction between substitution and representation' (103). Barth, according to Sölle, 'turns Christ into a replacement' (104) so that the
relationship between Christ and those who are represented 'is not conceived in personal terms' (105). This is because Christ's work is seen by Barth to be complete, which implies 'the complete incapacitation of man' (106), and because it is seen to be independent of any relation between the representative and those represented, so that the representative becomes a substitute and a replacement acting irrespective of the wishes of those who are supposed to be represented. Sölle locates the basic reasons for this depersonalising interpretation of Barth's to lie in his failure to recognise the perspective of time and constantly speaking instead of man's place - a feature more appropriate to things (107).

If substitutionary ideas remain dominant in Christian theology, that is, if exclusivist christologies and soteriologies persist as the proper formulation of Christian belief, Sölle believes that the contribution made by theology to the loss of identity will be continued so that the possibility of the establishment of the 'Kingdom of identity' becomes remote. Sölle is thus committed to eradicating any patterns of thought that display the characteristics of permanence, totality, unconditionality, and completeness - in other words, any of the hallmarks she identifies as belonging to the concept of substitution.
4. An Assessment of the Use by Sölle of the Terms Substitution and Representation

Sölle has attempted to give the 'unfamiliar and almost unintelligible' (108) term representation a new content, removing it from its traditional place in dogmatics under the heading of the Priestly work of Christ and giving it a central role for christology and indeed for theology. The commitment to the term representation has already been noted as a consequence of its function as a correlative term to express in anthropological terms what was formerly said in theological terms, and the difficulty that this causes in attempting to uncover the precise thrust of Sölle's argument, particularly in relation to her understanding of the representative work of Christ before God. While it is not the concern here to enter into a detailed comment on Sölle's convictions that the experience of the death of God is formative for our age, and that any religious or metaphysical 'positing' of God is simply naïve or irrelevant, it must never the less be recognised that it is on the basis of this assumption that Sölle is able to make the link between the anthropological structure of representation, the longing for identity, and the significance of Christ as the representative of man and God. What the present assessment must consider is the contribution that Sölle makes towards an understanding of the terms substitution and representation, the manner in which she employs them,
the points of contact between this use and those uses already outlined in the course of this enquiry, together with the points of originality and divergence, and the problems involved in Sölle's use of the terms. The three characteristics shall therefore be considered that Sölle believes are appropriate to distinguish representation from substitution — provisionality, dependence and identification — and then some reflection will be offered on some more general issues her study raises, particularly in the light of our own analysis of the terms and their uses.

a) The Provisionality of Christ's Representation

With regard to the provisionality of Christ, Sölle highlights a dimension of the term representation which has been noted in other contexts, namely the reference of the term to the responsibility of those represented to reflect and continue the actions of the representative. As was noted in Chapter V such an obligation could be interpreted and expressed in a number of different ways, but it was seen to be a persistent and central feature of the term. However, it should be noted that Sölle radicalises this aspect of representation by her insistence on the necessity that the representative becomes superfluous, vanishing totally in favour of those represented, thus disallowing, in contrast to many who would wish to use this feature of the term, the possibility of some exclusive or unique element of Christ's work which always renders
his work of representation significant and primary, so that any subsequent repetition or imitation remains secondary and derivative. While it was recognised in Chapter V that there was considerable difficulty in recognising on the part of some writers precisely what element of Christ's work remained exclusive, and what the basis was for that exclusivity, Sölle's own position of pressing for the superfluity of the representative, and thus, in principle at least, the denial of any unique status to Christ's work, is no less problematic.

The dilemma can be expressed in the following way (109): if the task of the representative is to make himself superfluous, to hold the place open of someone who is temporarily incapacitated, then it must be the case that the sought for identity is a recovery of a lost identity, a restoration of an identity that was once possessed but for some reason now awaits discovery. The superfluity of the representative carries as its correlate a concept of identity that is 'objectively there', an identity that is 'there' but is waiting for its recovery (110).

Certainly there are times when Sölle speaks of identity in these terms, and in fact at one point seems to indicate that our future identity made possible by Christ's work of representation is constituted as the identity of a direct relation to God, in other words by a return to a former identity (111). However, Sölle also speaks in another sense, where the identity
awaited is not something to be regained, but is something genuinely new, made possible by the particular character of Christ's representation, and therefore depending upon that work for its actualisation. In this second sense of identity a different concept of representation is involved, for it is not possible to speak of the superfluity of the representative when the act of representation has been creative rather than restorative. As Moltmann puts it:

A representative can only make himself superfluous when the place is objectively there and cannot be occupied for a while by the real occupant for reasons of subjective weakness and incapacity. But if the place is not there or is not yet there in its full and free form, but first must be made ready, the the representative does not make himself superfluous like an employment agency, but so to speak founds a new firm. In that case he has an effect not only on the subjective incapacity of the occupant of the place, but also on the making of the place. He not only represents but creates. ... In that case his representation is not just mediation for a while but also the basis for the new being and the new identity which goes beyond the self-identity that men always desire (112).

Thus, Sølle's work is not free from an ambiguity in the concept of representation, which is reflected in the correlative concept of identity, so that the actual content of Christ's representative work remains in doubt. It is significant that precisely the same problems are encountered when considering the other aspect of Christ's provisional work of representation - his representation of God before man. R. Jensen puts it this way:
Jesus' representation of God must be non-identity with God, so as to leave an open future, something to expect more than what is— for this is the very point of our quest for identity. God's identity in our history still remains future, and the very function of his representative is to hold this future open for him.

But here Sölle stops. She does not take us further on this promising path. We wait for her to give content to this talk of God's future, to tell us what to 'expect'. But this she refuses to do. Instead she bends everything back on itself, by identifying Christ's waiting for God to take over with his waiting for us to respond to his representation. There is a sense in which this too is right. But it does not suffice to give content to the promise made by Christ's provisionality. Indeed, the only future beyond Christ's representation which Sölle ever mentions is the return of immediate religious certainty (113).

The characteristic of provisionality can certainly function to clarify the concept of representation and to express the conviction that the representative initiates and inspires a work which is to be continued or realised by those who are represented, but the radical content given to the notion of provisionality expressed in Sölle's understanding of the eventual superfluity of the representative conceals a fundamental problem in the concept of identity employed and the work of representation that is said to make such identity possible.

b) The Dependence of Christ's Representation

The second characteristic that Sölle uses to characterise Christ's representative work is that of his dependence on us and on God, a dependence which involves his putting himself at risk, depending on the
assent of another for the success of his work. In this respect Sölle is surely correct to emphasise this dependence as a basic characteristic of representation, and further, to regard suffering as the indispensable correlate of dependence. It is the fact that Christ suffers because of man that he is seen to be 'radically surrendered' (114) to man. As was noted in Chapters II and IV one of the dangers confronting a substitutionary view of Christ's work was that while suffering could be elevated to a central place in understanding the significance of Christ's death, paradoxically that suffering could come to be treated more and more artificially and abstractly so that an essential component of suffering - self giving - would appear to have been forgotten. By emphasising the characteristic of Christ's dependence on man and on God so that he has 'nothing of himself to fall back on' (115), not even 'God behind him' (116) as a guarantee of success, Sölle can give a distinctive recognition to the place of suffering within the representative work of Christ.

However, it is disappointing that Sölle does not give more attention to the sense in which Christ is dependent on God, instead of again simply turning everything in on itself and seeing Christ's dependence only in terms of his dependence on us, and therefore of God's dependence on us.

[Christ] depends upon God by depending on us and living by our decisions. But that is to say that God depends on us, that he is at risk because he has linked his destiny with ours (117).
If Christ's dependence upon God turns out to mean chiefly God making himself dependent (118), then it is a pity that Sölle's understanding of Christ's dependence on us does not have a similar implication of our dependence upon Christ. In fact, for all Sölle's talk of a dialectic of dependence and responsibility, it is difficult to substantiate the claim that we remain dependent in any sense upon Christ, or that Christ remains dependent on God. The dialectic is all but swallowed up so that Sölle can mediate the two elements into the new synthesis of a 'theology after the death of God', and it only reappears in an attenuated form to give some justification for the continuing use of christological or theological language.

c) The Identification of Christ's Representation

The third characteristic that Sölle selects as appropriate to the term representation is again one that is familiar from the description of the uses of the terms in previous chapters, the concept of identification. Sölle rejects as 'mythical' (119) any patterns of exchange such as a transfer of qualities or deserts, but closely associates the language of identification with that of acceptance.

Identification is the readiness to accept without limit, without conditions. It means acceptance as a matter of course (120).

Furthermore, Sölle argues, it is only as we know ourselves to be accepted by another that we can learn to accept ourselves and hence to attain our identity.
Sölle believes that, rightly handled, the 'pattern of the teacher' (121) can illuminate this identification in acceptance and can therefore give content to the concept of representation. A teacher is not one 'who conveys certain intellectual goods' (122), nor one who simply imparts knowledge, for 'a teacher who does not also give himself - in, with, and under the facts which he conveys - is not a genuine teacher' (123). Thus, a true teacher holds the pupil's place open, effacing himself as the pupil comes to occupy that position of maturity which the teacher has made possible and which he has safeguarded.

Two initial comments must be made concerning this pattern of identification. First, the rejection of 'mythical' patterns of identification and exchange is based on the total rejection of any 'metaphysical' view of reality for contemporary western man. The universality of this experience has already been questioned, but it remains pertinent to ask whether or not Christian theology should remain a reflection of contemporary thought, or whether it should be creative of alternative patterns of thought, especially since Sölle realises that there is a possible 'experience' of such 'mythical exchanges' (124). Since Sölle believes that the Christian faith has something important to say about the reality of representation as 'a decisive event of all human history' (125), theology is clearly seen as a discipline which attempts to shape thinking and acting. Despite this, Sölle
limits the scope of such creative activity by deciding that in particular areas of thought theological thought must operate within the parameters set by the contemporary consciousness of self. Whether this is an adequate foundation for the rejection of any Christian metaphysical language must be disputed.

Second, the purpose of Christ’s identification with us, illustrated by the teacher/pupil relationship, remains unclear. The teacher encourages the pupil to take responsibility for himself and for his world, i.e. to become adult, and this is apparently the purpose of Christ’s identification with us. The representative must become superfluous, and cannot remain the eternal teacher and yet this surely dissolves the dialectic Sölle is anxious to establish between identity and non-identity, dependence and responsibility. When the pupil reaches maturity, when he reaches the place that has been held open by the teacher, he becomes independent. He did depend on the teacher to reach this position, but does so no longer. Sölle, of course, would wish to argue that the position of maturity is precisely the point at which we accept our dependence on others and our responsibility for them, and in this sense the dialectic is continued, but the dialectic of Christ’s representation has vanished into our representation as he makes himself superfluous, like the true teacher, and even in Sölle’s terms that must be ground for questioning the
representative character of his work.

The real test for this pattern of identification occurs when Sölle uses it as a 'cleansing and clarifying ... touchstone' (126), for the concept of punishment. Punishment, Sölle believes, can be regarded as expiatory or rehabilitative, and she holds that both views are 'relevant for theology' (127). Both, however, must be viewed from the perspective of Christ as teacher, rather than simply as judge, for 'according to Maharenko, the infliction of punishment is only meaningful if the person who inflicts it himself suffers under the punishment he sets' (128). Thus, 'representing us provisionally, Christ punishes us in such a way that he suffers himself' (129). Punishment cannot then be regarded as an 'educative device which God needed in order to assert himself' (130), for that would be a 'metaphysical error' (131); rather, Sölle believes that punishment, and the agent of punishment, 'the punishing God, is nothing other than the whole complex of social relationships' (132).

In this concrete worldly form, punishment is seen in the fact that those who destroy hope live themselves in an atmosphere of hopelessness. What they imagined they were inflicting on others they were really inflicting on themselves, and it marks them out. The curse of the evil deed is that it recoils upon the world and the 'I' inexorably. The liar deceives himself, the man who treats other men as prisoners is himself imprisoned. The loveless are bored; and there is no need for any worse form of punishment, perhaps in some post-mortal hell, than this abandonment to a world thus produced and determined (133).

Christ, in his role as true teacher, 'suffers everything
which results from the destruction of hope' (134).

Christ's entire life is determined by this unending identification with those who are the agents of their own punishment. Christ makes the prison warders aware of the prison in which they themselves live, and he does so by showing that he himself is its prisoner. ... Christ belongs to both parties at the same time; he punishes and is punished. He thereby excludes any idea of punishment as a predetermined fate. It ceases to take by surprise those on whom it falls, as if it were something meaningless, for the judge identifies himself with the condemned, the teacher shares the punishment alongside the pupil (135).

Because Christ shares the punishment through his identification with the 'botched cause' (136) of another the pupil can learn 'to identify himself with his own cause' (137).

What are we to make of this view of punishment and of Christ's role in it? Two questions would seem to challenge Sülle's view that the pattern of identification of the teacher gives the only theological content to the notion of punishment. First, how in Sülle's view does Christ himself impose punishment on us? Since punishment is the complex of social relationships it does not seem possible to speak meaningfully of Christ punishing us. If Sülle means that Christ is somehow the creator of the pattern of social relationships in which 'the evil deed ... recoils upon the world and the 'I' inexorably', then she is guilty of a 'metaphysical' judgement on the significance of Christ's person. If, on the other hand, we are meant to take seriously the statements that it is ourselves who are the agents of our own punishment, and
that the agent of punishment 'is nothing other than the whole complex of social relationships', then to state that this is Christ punishing us is simply an arbitrary application of the cipher 'Christ' and one that would seem to be intended to persuade the reader that the subject under discussion relates to punishment. For to remove the personal and relational elements from the source of this complex of social relationships is to cease to be able to see them as punishments and to see them instead solely as a part of a causal nexus.

Second, how does Christ, in Sölle's terms, make the prison warders aware of the prison in which they themselves live? Sölle's answer is that 'he does so by showing that he himself is its prisoner', but how is that so, and how does that disclosure reveal the prison of the warders? Sölle seems to be clinging to some notion of the unjust or undeserved suffering of Christ, but on what basis does she postulate this? Her only contribution is to state that 'as teacher - or precursor - Christ has reached a different stage' (138), but that surely is a piece of vague rhetoric which cannot bear the weight of argument that is put on it to declare Christ's 'separateness' (139) from us in order that he may acknowledge and impose punishment. Furthermore, the connection between Christ's acknowledgement of punishment and the revelation that the prison warders are themselves prisoners remains unclear and unexplained. Sölle may have dispensed with mythical patterns of exchange and identification, but she has
raised in their place a pattern of identification which fails to answer the central problem of how such identification may be salvific.

Thus, we have now considered in greater detail the three characteristics that Sölle believes distinguish the concept of representation from that of substitution - provisonality, dependence and identification. In each case it has been found that such characteristics clarify and refine motifs that have been seen previously in the study, and that such characteristics are not inappropriate to the concept of representation. However, it has also been noted that fundamental problems are caused by Sölle's desire to refer the language of representation to the possibility of a post-theistic theology and to give it a non-metaphysical content. While the characteristics she identifies correspond to a significant degree to patterns of representation that have been previously discussed (thus confirming the adequacy and accuracy of the analysis offered there), the specific content given to them proves to be unsatisfactory and susceptible to a similar range of problems that have already been encountered in the use of the term representation.

In conclusion, the value and scope of Sölle's work must be questioned in the light of our own description and analysis of the terms substitution and representation, for it would appear that her understanding of the terms, while embodying many of the elements of previous discussions, despite their
presentation in a novel context, lacks an awareness of the breadth of meaning of the terms so that her analysis remains insensitive to other possibilities inherent in them. It was earlier noted that the political dimension of the term representation was scarcely touched upon by Sölle and yet she can hardly fail to be aware of the possibilities and ambiguities inherent in such a frame of reference. Again, to dismiss the complex treatment of the term representation as denoting 'a making present', together with the wide range of models used to articulate this conviction, as 'mythical' is to dismiss without comment some of the most significant and complex uses of the term.

In a similar fashion, Sölle rejects with a minimal amount of argument the term substitution as being always depersonalising, and yet the history of the discussion of the concept has been well aware of this criticism and has sought in a number of ways to remove or at least alleviate the force of such objections. To fail to note either the intentions of such attempts, or to fail to consider their results is to ignore the complexity of the concept of substitution.

This lack of sensitivity to patterns of substitution and representation that differ from her own is demonstrated most signally in Sölle's discussion of Barth's understanding of Stellvertretung. The failure to note the persistent and sophisticated debate in which Barth engages as he expresses both the exclusiveness and yet the total inclusiveness of Christ's
work, its character as a once for all event within God and yet its determinative character as a foundation for the new life of man, its character as destruction and yet not as punishment, its links with the already complex and subtle understanding of election, is an indication of the inadequacy not only of Sölle's treatment of Barth but more importantly of her own analysis which fails to come to terms with the full complexity and scope of the terms substitution and representation.
CHAPTER VII

SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION:
THEIR MEANING AND USE IN ATONEMENT THEOLOGY

To conclude this study of the terms substitution and representation it is necessary to draw together the conclusions and observations of the former chapters. From this material some general points will be made regarding the terms as they have been found to function in atonement theology, followed by some specific comments relevant to each term, which will be followed in turn by some comments on the relation between the terms. Finally, the implications of this study for 'a doctrine of the atonement' will be considered.

1. General Observations on the Terms Substitution and Representation

First, and most obviously, both the terms have been shown to be highly complex theological words, expressing a range and variety of meanings. The term substitution was shown to denote a range of ideas that far exceeded the limits normally imposed by the phrase 'penal substitution'; and even within the general parameters set by the latter description there was found to be not simply differences of
emphasis but fundamental differences of meaning which radically shaped both the concept of substitution employed and the general interpretation that has been offered of the significance of the work of Christ. Further, in contrast to the common assumption that the framework of penal substitution formed the only valid context for the use of the term, it was argued that certain non-penal formulations of the concept were of decisive importance for the meaning of substitution and for its continued use as a theological term. Thus, with regard to the concept of substitution, there can be no doubt that a complex term of theological vocabulary is being considered, and to ignore or minimise this complexity is either to engage in shadow boxing, or to shelter behind unexplored and undisclosed ambiguities.

In a similar sense the term representation was also shown to be capable of expressing a wide range of meanings. Because this term has not been subject to the same intensity of theological scrutiny as substitution, and because it is less closely allied to particular theological schools or traditions, it was shown that the task of discrimination between these different meanings was correspondingly difficult and that the transition from one set of ideas to another could be accomplished with relative ease. This fluidity of meaning in the term representation was seen, in part, to account for its popularity as an alternative to the term substitution, particularly because it was claimed to be able to function both in the context of an
interpretation of Christ's work and also in the context of the application and relation of this work to others. Without at present commenting on this claim the term representation has been clearly shown to be a complex theological term that expresses a range of insights concerning the work of Christ and the relation of that work to others.

Second, the above conclusion has important implications for the method of using the terms substitution and representation in the course of a theological enquiry. If their complexity is recognised, then it is simply not possible to approach a particular text or a particular theme with the question 'are substitutionary ideas present here or representative ones?' Such a question reveals that the enquiry is still being conducted as though the meaning of the terms could be assumed or could be taken as self-evident. Their meaning clearly cannot be assumed to be self-evident and therefore some careful delineation must take place prior to such a question being asked so that the reader is clearly informed as to what the distinction is in any particular instance. In a similar vein, the sort of study made by L. Morris must be judged to be seriously flawed by the fact that Biblical concepts like propitiation, sacrifice, redemption, and ransom are seen to witness to substitution or to embody substitutionary ideas, and yet it is clear that the term 'substitution' is being used so indiscriminately
that any such observations are virtually meaningless (1). A critical reading of Morris' work suggests that the term substitution is used as a theological portmanteau which blurs the distinctions between the different contexts under discussion and creates the illusion that substitution is a 'key word' necessary for a correct understanding of the different Biblical language related to God's salvific activity.

Third, the study has demonstrated that the terms are 'contextualised': they only receive meaning in particular contexts, and that variations in meaning and distinctions between meanings depend on the contexts in which they operate (2). Thus, it can be seen that the sort of distinction offered between substitution and representation such that the former means 'in our stead' and the latter 'in our behalf' is wholly inadequate. These two phrases can only assist in differentiating between the terms if the contextual frameworks which support such a distinction are made explicit. As long as these frameworks remain unstated, little or no content is given to the terms and no clarification if offered as to their meaning. The distinction between substitution as an exclusive work and representation as inclusive has more substance, but only because it appropriately describes a particular set of meanings of both terms. However, to raise this as a general criterion for determining the use or rejection of either term not only fails to recognise that other meanings are possible, but also fails to
recognise that both terms may express exclusivity and inclusivity in particular contexts.

Fourth, following from the demonstrable complexity of the terms, and their inherently contextual nature, it has been shown that it is not possible to engage in a criticism of the terms themselves as though they expressed self-evident theological realities, nor is it possible to consider the range of meanings of the terms as equally vulnerable to a particular critical point. Rather, by letting the terms speak for themselves, advertising the contextual frameworks in which they were found to acquire distinctive meaning and content, it has been shown that the terms must be critically engaged within their context, and the recognition must be allowed that different contexts are not equally vulnerable to the same criticisms.

Fifth, the recognition of the contextual nature of both terms promotes a sensitivity to the change and development that takes place within the meanings of the terms and between the terms themselves. For example, having identified a particular pattern of penal substitution, the recognition of a change in the meaning of penalty enables and facilitates the recognition of a different pattern of substitution; and where a different use of the term substitution is observed a means is provided to detect the changes in the contextual framework that surrounds the term. Thus, not only does a study of the terms substitution and representation provide a sensitive means to detect
changes in patterns of thought, but the process of development within those patterns of thought comes to be more readily perceived as ideas are tested and weighed in relation to the varying contexts and options that are available.

2. The Meaning and Use of the Term Substitution

Taking first the use of the term substitution as it was understood within the general description of the heading 'penal substitution', three distinctive patterns of thought were identified. First, the use of the term substitution which operated within the context of a framework of criminal law to articulate the conviction that in his death Christ suffered or bore an identical punishment that would have fallen on guilty man had that exchange not taken place. Second, the use of the term substitution which continued to operate within the general field of criminal law, but which was modified by the statement that Christ did not suffer an identical punishment, but an equivalent punishment which was accepted by God as satisfying his justice. Third, the use of the term substitution in a context that is distanced from the framework of criminal law, modifying still further the sense in which it may be said that Christ bore our punishment, and expressing the conviction that not punishment, but legal desert, is the guiding concept, so that it may be said that Christ died our death, substituted for us
to give expression to God's law and satisfying the
demands for a just and moral universe in which God may
still remit punishment.

These three views are, and can be, all described
under the general heading of penal substitution, and
yet it is clear that the differences between them are
highly significant. Three comments will suffice to
summarise the conclusions reached in Chapters II and IV.

1) The change that comes about in the description
and function of the concept of criminal law testifies
to the fact that the term 'penalty' is not a 'given'
in the data for a doctrine of atonement, but is rather
a construct built out of more general perceptions regard­ing
the relation of God to man. Even when the
bald statement 'God must punish' is given as a self-evident theological truth, the question is by no means
settled as to what that punishment means, for the
concept of penalty is dependent upon particular frame­works, although the same words are used. Furthermore,
the concept of substitution owes in part its resilience
to the fact that this framework of law may subtly change,
allowing the theologian to move across a spectrum of
thought to counter different objections and propositions.
He may do this under the auspices of the general terms
penalty and justice, thus seeming to establish firmly
this framework as the necessary context for an under­standing of substitution, when in reality he is employing
several different frameworks which are not easily
reconcilable. The apparent uniformity of the concept of penal substitution is an illusion, and a dangerous one because it encourages the belief that any other view surrenders the justice or holiness of God. In reality, the understanding of the justice of God within the description of penal substitution has already undergone significant change and variation, a fact which tells against any claim to be a necessary or self-evident pattern of substitution.

ii) This variation within the concepts of penalty and law, which is most clearly seen in the debate surrounding the identity, equivalence or appropriateness of Christ's punishment also demonstrates quite clearly that the concept of penal substitution cannot be raised as the only theory which rationally and logically 'explains' the atonement. Whether or not this was its original intention is hard to tell, but on no account was it found to be capable of realising the claim that a rational and consistent explanation was provided. The assertion of an identical punishment could only be an assertion which is incapable of demonstration or rationalisation; the more sophisticated concept of an equivalent punishment which might be held to supply a rational basis for an explanation of how the atonement worked was shown to depend on an appeal to an act of God's grace which accepted that there was an equivalence; the corresponding notion of appropriateness confirms the suspicion that the framework of criminal law is in
abeyance, and some other basis for seeing Christ's death as penal is being asserted. No single pattern of penal substitution proved to be capable of bearing the explanatory role of why and how Christ's punishment secures the salvation of man, contrary to much popular expectation, indeed the extraordinary thing is that it might have been thought to do so. What is not surprising is that such patterns of thought should be thought to be fitting, and it is in the consequent interplay between what is regarded as fitting for God's justice, for man's redemption, for God's love, and for man's moral convictions that the various patterns of penal substitution are built up and are adapted.

iii) Partly on the grounds of this internal variation in the concepts of penalty and law, and partly on the grounds of the Biblical testimony to the relation between punishment and atonement, it was argued that the relation between forgiveness and penalty was not direct or necessary, but rather indirect, so that vicarious punishment in whatever sense of the term might be able to articulate a perception of forgiveness, but it did not of itself constitute the basis of atonement, its rationale, or its only expression.

These three comments all refer to the various patterns of penal substitution that were disclosed in the course of the investigation into the uses of the term substitution. However, into this already confused
and confusing mix of ideas must be put four more ingredients.

First, while it was noted that some expressions of 'penal' substitution employed a concept of penalty that was progressively distanced from the context of criminal law and from concepts of retributive justice, there are also expressions still employing the term substitution that continue this process to the point where not only is the designation 'penal' misleading but the concept of substitution itself is transformed. Thus, the use of substitution in the framework of law that is interpreted in civil terms, a use which explicitly rejects the notion that Christ was punished by God, favouring instead the formulation that Christ's sufferings are an appropriate substitution for our punishment, was seen to remove the term substitution both from the context of penalty and indeed from those patterns of exchange which it was formerly intended to express. Neither the use of the term substitution in this context nor the framework of civil law was difficult to refute; what was more problematic was the way in which this range of ideas was mixed, often almost indistinguishably, with other more recognisable patterns of 'penal' substitution to provide support and an additional framework to give intelligibility to the term substitution. Although the different contexts afforded by 'penal' and 'civil' law appear to complement each other in many examples cited, it was argued that the manifestly different frameworks, presuppositions and
intentions rendered such mixing of ideas misleading and invalid. In these instances no genuine interpretation is offered, rather several interpretations, united by common terms although used in different ways, between which the theologian oscillates fitfully according to the question he is answering or the objection he is meeting. The synthesis presented is an illusion, although one that is difficult to expose because of the flexibility and ambiguity of the concepts in question.

Second, leaving penal context behind, an investigation into the possibility of the use of the term substitution with the concept of satisfaction demonstrated that a coherent and intelligible pattern of ideas could result. In fact, it was argued, that when pecuniary analogies were used the substitutionary bearing of the argument became more intelligible and proved an effective method of expressing and interpreting the significance of Christ's work. Its drawback was found in the fact that as due seriousness was given to the personal dimension of the debt to be paid so the possibility of this debt being paid by another recedes. However, this investigation exposes the underlying ambiguity of many uses of the term substitution in that different analogical relations are employed at different points to demonstrate the reality of substitution, failing to note that these different relations cannot be unified but must remain in opposition or in contrast to each other. This is true of
the varying patterns of law that are employed in the internal dialogue within the concept of penal substitution, but it is also true of the dialogue between penal and non-penal formulations of substitution. It is frequently the case that pecuniary analogies will be advanced in order to validate the concept of substitution, and penal analogies in order to express the judgement due to sin, and then for both to be 'combined' to explain or interpret the significance of the death of Christ. Again, an oscillation between conflicting contextual frameworks is concealed by the availability of common terms and the ambiguity of the language employed. The very language of 'paying the penalty' demonstrates just how deeply rooted is the conviction that pecuniary and penal language are mutually interpretative, and yet closer examination reveals clearly the error in this judgement.

Third, partly in order to demonstrate the versatility of the term substitution and partly to disclose the sense that is often taken to be fundamental to its meaning, the use of the term was examined in the context not of any kind of 'passion', but in an active sense where Christ is said to defeat the powers of evil in place of man. While this is not a common context for the use of the term, the sense given of 'doing what man could not do' is common. In fact, as the 'passive' dimension of the term comes under increasing attack, particularly as the penal framework of the term is abandoned as it becomes increasingly
hard to speak of Christ suffering in place of man, so it becomes increasingly attractive to refer substitution to Christ's act as waged in man's place, and therefore of benefit to him. Thus, the concept of substitution may be commended on the grounds that it speaks of performing an act which someone else cannot do - an acceptable sense of the term - but not if the act in question is the suffering of a penalty or a judgement.

Fourth, the final pattern of thought that the term substitution sought to express and evoke concerned the relation between Christ and man rather than the content of Christ's work. Most explicit of these uses was the concept of 'inclusive substitution', a concept that seemed designed to repudiate the charge of externality, exclusiveness or moral indifference, but which failed to commend itself since it lacked the conceptual frameworks to elucidate or interpret such inclusivity, and it merely seemed to assert a new sense of substitution in flat contradiction to patterns of thought that were still being retained and utilised. It could not be accepted that merely by adding the word inclusive to the term substitution was anything substantial being said, unless the concept of substitution were recognised to be shaped and altered by this new context. Since no such recognition was apparent it might be concluded that the concept of inclusive substitution is merely an apologetic device used to deflect criticism of a particular concept, suggesting another more congenial pattern of thought.
and claiming the benefits of both patterns of thought despite their essential contradictory nature.

Thus, with these four broad patterns of thought engendered by the term substitution the picture has emerged of a term that stands in relation to a cluster of divergent and varied theological concepts. Since these theological concepts are themselves variations which stem from reflection on unresolved or ambiguous theological themes - law (whether expressed in criminal, civil or private terms), bondage (whether expressed in penal, demonic or moral terms) - there is no simple recourse to 'scripture' to prove or disprove a particular cluster selection, nor to establish definitively the 'correct' framework or set of criteria to guide such a selection. All that can be done, and that has been effected here, is to test the appropriateness of any particular selection of concepts, to test the resulting patterns of thought against one another in order to discern the fundamental reality that they are attempting to interpret, and to test the part played by the term substitution in these different frameworks for its coherence and its ability to direct the enquirer to the heart of the matter.

3. The Meaning and Use of the Term Representation

In the presentation of the concept of representation it was noted that linguistic convention allows for three general areas of use of the word -
delegation, presentation and typification. Similarly, it was found that the theological use of the term included and built on these general patterns of thought so that a theological term was generated with a range of meanings that spanned a number of different contexts and issues, but which also related and unified them by virtue of their being expressed by a single term. This range of meanings was divided into three broad patterns of thought which can be briefly reviewed here together with the critical comments that were offered.

First, representation carries with it the sense of an active work of Christ in contrast to the passive suffering that was taken to be characteristic of the term substitution. Thus, representation could interpret and express the obedience of Christ, his fulfilment of the Law, his offering of a holy and pure 'sacrifice', or simply the perfection of his own humanity to God. In each case, however loosely, it may be claimed that Christ accomplishes something, perhaps something of which man was incapable and yet which was necessary both for his own self-realisation and for the purposes of God. Thus, what might appear to be an exclusive work is revealed to be of immediate benefit to men in that what was formerly impossible is now a potential reality, what was only glimpsed is now realised perfectly. Thus, the content of the representative work of Christ is comprised of a pattern of offering, fulfilment and obedience in contrast to the substitutionary patterns of suffering, punishment and
judgement. Underlying this contrast is the perception that a vicarious **action** has a different moral status from a vicarious passion; and the term representation comes in part to express this conviction that atonement consists not of a vicarious suffering but an offering; not a death but the free gift of a life; not a judgement but a true holiness and obedience.

However, this description of the content of the work of Christ is clearly shaped by the remaining two areas of meaning open to the term representation, in that the nature of the work is of the kind that is coherent with the concept of the 'making present' of man in Christ to God, and of the 'typification' of the destiny or ideal of each individual. Therefore, this first sense of representation cannot be viewed in isolation from these two other ranges of meaning, for it is constantly drawing on them and providing them with material in order to present a coherent and wide ranging interpretation of the significance of Christ's death.

When the second sense of the term representation is considered, that of 'making present', this interaction with the range of meanings of the representative work of Christ must be borne in mind, but so too must the possibility that this use of representation will be referred to quite different patterns of thought as to the content and nature of Christ's work. What emerged from the study of this use of representation was a range of models that could be employed to
articulate the manner in which such a 'making present' was to be conceived. The sense in which one could be said to be made present in another ranged from the conviction that all humanity was literally included in the one man Christ, to the conviction that one can be said to be present in another if, through imitation of actions, or participation in aims and objectives, a relation of sponsorship or discipleship is entered upon. Elucidating and substantiating this range of convictions is a set of models which can be reviewed under three headings.

First, the model which makes use of the language of universals, whether explicitly or implicitly, to express the conviction of the literal inclusiveness of the person of Christ. While it was recognised that this model expresses a deeply rooted perception of the universal and archetypal quality of certain acts or experiences, it was also clear that such language could be easily misconstrued. For example, if it was argued that since Christ was universal Man, all humanity was punished by God in his punishment, and therefore 'I' have been punished by God. The language of universals may be misconstrued, and yet it was recognised to be a powerful articulation of the conviction of the universality of Christ's salvific work; of the conviction and interpretation of his universal significance, but such language cannot be considered to provide an explanation of how a particular theory of atonement can be said to work.
The second set of models relate representation and inclusiveness by means of physical or organic concepts: incorporation and all related 'Body' language, organism, and certain patterns of solidarity. Much of this language was used in direct appeal to the Biblical language of 'in Christ', 'with Christ', and 'the Body of Christ', with little further development or substantiation. However, the model of corporate personality proved popular in giving this language some additional foundation and to commend it to modern readers. It was argued that not only was the concept of corporate personality not clearly an adequate description of the Biblical patterns of thought, least of all of New Testament patterns of thought, but that the concept cannot be used to undergird and rationalise the act of the One on behalf of the many, or to explain how the many are present in the One. The concept of corporate personality does not justify or fund the concept of representation, but, like the physical or organic models of the relation of Christ to others it can function to articulate the conviction that mankind or believers are 'bound up' with the person and work of Christ. Once again, the use of such models and their association with the concept of representation is a powerful pointer to the universality of Christ's salvific work.

The third set of models portrayed the relation of Christ to others by means of patterns of dependence and interaction that were basically causal in nature.
The model of social solidarity was prominent in this respect, although it was noted that the model was often believed to be capable of portraying more than a pattern of cause and effect, dependence and responsibility, and to support the more 'physical' models of solidarity.

The examination of the range of models employed to express the relation of Christ to others demonstrated two things. First, the only way in which such language could be understood and assessed was in terms of its interpretative account of the universality of Christ. In order to articulate the fundamental soteriological significance of Christ's act as one for others it is necessary to give some account that communicates and expresses this universality. The models are not explanations of how this act can be said to be for others, but they are present to communicate and indicate the perception that this is the significance of the act.

Second, the models and the range of convictions concerning the universal significance of Christ's act were not only appropriately expressed by the term representation, but are endemic within the complexity and ambiguity of that term. Representation was shown to denote or invoke a complex and varied set of perceptions that allow for the articulation of fundamental insights concerning the relations of one person to another, without necessarily making those perceptions conscious or explicit. Any use of the term representation
be it theological, political or constitutional, relies on these unspoken perceptions and constantly embodies the unresolved tensions that are involved. The questions: what is representation? how are the interests of one represented by another? how does one person stand for another? have no answer, only a variety of answers, none of which are wholly adequate, but all of which play a part in authorising and establishing the use of such language.

The term representation is so far shown to consist of a fluid range of ideas revolving around the sense of 'making present', constantly shifting from one perspective to another, evoking and invoking a range of insights and models to attempt to articulate the manner of the relation that subsists between Christ and others.

The third general area in which the term representation comes to have meaning and which reflected another aspect of its general linguistic use was found in the sense of typification or exemplification. When applied to the person of Christ, it was noted that such ideas were treated with suspicion and regarded as inferior to the supposedly 'ontological' christological formulations. The foregoing analysis queried the strict ontological status of these formulations, showing them to be more complex and ambiguous; this latter use of representation cannot therefore be rejected or slighted for this reason. On the contrary, two points become evident.
First, the use of the language of archetype, prototype, ideal, and pioneer showed a depth and sophistication that removes it far from the level of 'mere example'. This language sets out to preserve fully the unique work of Christ in his initiation, demonstration and realisation of a destiny now capable of realisation, imitation and pursuit by mankind. There is both a creative act and a future consummation; there is still an unresolved tension between an 'objective' work and the 'not yet' of man's only partially realised destiny. Whatever the shortcomings and idiosyncracies of particular expressions of these convictions, they are expressions of the same convictions that prompted the development of ontological patterns of thought.

Second, this use of the term representation could not be dissociated from the former two general areas of use; rather, it became apparent that many of the senses of the term representation described by these ideas of typification and exemplification constituted the background and framework for those uses of the term that appeared to be more 'physical' or 'ontological'. Not only did it become clear in particular instances that the distinction between Christ as the representative man and Christ as the representative of man had almost disappeared, so that Christ was the representative of man because he was representative man, or that he was representative man because he was representative of man, but more
significantly this pattern of thought could be detected in almost any use of the term representation. Any talk of political representation will involve the same issues: whether a delegate represents a party, or is representative of his constituents; whether a delegate represents his constituents and how he can do so unless he is representative (typical) of their views. It is readily apparent that the theological use of the term representation involves and is confronted by the same set of issues. Thus, in addition to the range of models already described that elucidate Christ's representative relation to others stands this new set of ideas, not simply as an alternative mode of expression and interpretation, but as a pattern of thought that penetrates, shapes and even undergirds most other uses of the term. Far from being slighted, due recognition should be given to the part played by these ideas in any formulation of the concept of representation.

4. The Relation of the Terms Substitution and Representation

Some comments must now be addressed to the question of the relation between the terms substitution and representation although no clear cut or easy answers are possible. Such generalisations as 'the terms are complementary' or 'both terms are needed', while not untrue, are not particularly helpful. For if one of the conclusions of this study is that the
meaning of each term is constantly shifting within (often loosely) given parameters then the question of the relation of the terms, or of their complementary status, becomes virtually impossible to answer with any precision. Further, if the terms are agreed to function in the manner described, then their 'meaning' becomes much more elusive, built up from the patterns of thought and the variety of models which establish such patterns. Therefore, neither is it possible, on the basis of this study, simply to draw up respective lists of meanings, the various combinations of which can then be checked for their complementary quality.

What this study has suggested is that, as has often been recognised, but not always treated in an assessment of the terms, both substitution and representation function within two general contexts: to interpret the content of the work of Christ, and to interpret the manner of the relation of this work to others. Clearly, between these two contexts there will always be some relation since this is inherent within the fundamental concerns of Christ's salvific work. To this extent, then, it is not surprising to see most of the staunch proponents of the term substitution using also the term representation without explanation or apology in the course of their work. Between these two general contexts there will be, and there needs to be, some complementary relation and use.

However, it has become equally apparent from this study that not every relation between the terms is
complementary, nor that every expression is appropriately complemented. Some expressions are mutually exclusive, and their use together is little more than a juggling with words, or the concealment of unexplained and unadvertised changes in meaning. Thus, it was noted, different uses of the term substitution which were not complementary could give the appearance of being complementary through being labelled 'substitution'; equally, it was noted that part of the success of the term representation was due to its ability to bring new contexts into relation with one another, and yet it is also clear that there are uses of the term representation which are not self evidently complementary but which describe quite different perceptions as to the meaning and significance of Christ. Most obviously, it is not at all clear that certain meanings of substitution are complementary with certain meanings of representation, particularly if either term is used to give coherence or rational justification to the other.

There are no simple solutions to the problem of the relation between the terms: all that can be said is that each detectable shade of meaning that is being suggested in relation to another be tested on its own merits and in its own setting to determine the appropriateness of such a combination of meanings. The purpose of this study has been to advertise and promote sensitivity to this range of meanings and to describe their content and purpose so that their presence
and implications may be more reliably discerned in any particular setting.

5. Theological Language and Doctrines of the Atonement

Some final comments and observations must now be made concerning the significance of this study for the wider issues of the meaning and purpose of doctrines of the atonement. This is particularly so as both terms occupy prominent positions in such doctrines and are often treated as 'keywords' which express and evoke them. It is in this area that the first implication of the study is to be found, for it ought to be clear that it is highly misleading to suggest that there is such a thing as 'substitutionary doctrine' or a 'representative doctrine' of the atonement. It is inevitable that theological shorthand will be developed, but the terms substitution and representation are themselves distorted, and their complexity overlooked, if they are taken to portray doctrinal stances in this fashion. Any label, of course, prohibits exploration and recognition of diversity and variety, but in the case of the terms substitution and representation there is no justification for elevating them to 'keyword' status and positive harm is caused if they are.

However, a more significant implication of the present study is to query not only the 'keyword' status
of such terms as substitution and representation, but also the contribution they are supposed to make to a 'doctrine' of the atonement. Throughout the study the distinction has been drawn between explanatory and interpretative functions, although it has been recognised that the distinction cannot be drawn sharply, or that the two aspects are always divided. None the less, a common perception of the terms is that they do have an explanatory role that is designed to answer questions 'how' and 'why'. Furthermore, particularly with the term substitution, they are held in this explanatory role to render consistent and coherent diverse areas of Christian theology, creating a theological system that binds together a range of different theological insights. It is precisely this system-forming capability of the term substitution which makes it a keyword for its supporters, so that a challenge to the term necessarily is said to involve an attack on the entire theological framework. In the study, this explanatory function of the terms was consistently challenged and was shown to rest on a fundamental misapprehension of each term as it actually functioned and as to what it was capable of realising. If, then, the terms are not explanatory but interpretative within frameworks that seek to articulate and apprehend the character and significance of Christ's 'story', then the 'doctrines' which they express and evoke are incorrectly seen as answering the questions 'how' and 'why', but are themselves the attempt to
apprehend within a particular conceptual form an appropriate expression of Christ's salvific work.

A doctrine of the atonement, then, can be understood as an interpretative construct for viewing and communicating the nature and significance of Christ in his relation to man and to God. A possible parallel to express this use of the term 'doctrine' is provided by the concept of ethics as a 'convention' which embodies and shapes moral decisions (3). An ethical proposition stems from a complex set of interactions between perceptions of the world, man and God, but is given a form that is conceptualised and institutionalised in order that the moral insight might be articulated and preserved. In the same way this study has shown how the terms substitution and representation both arise from basic perceptions as to the relations between God and man, perceptions that are themselves shaped and conditioned by the reading of Christ's story, and it has shown how the terms seek to embody, express and interpret those insights in a clear conceptual framework. The resulting patterns of thought are ascribed doctrinal significance in order that Christ's story may be correctly perceived as having an ultimate significance, and that the content of this story might be related to our own needs, aspirations and destiny, thus securing for it soteriological significance. In the patterns of thought which make up such doctrines the terms substitution and representation are an important part of the process of conceptualising and
institutionalising such relations, enabling the ordering, expression and interpretation of theological concepts such that they may help to embody and communicate the significance of Christ. As such they remain an integral part of the language of Christian atonement theology, in all their complexity and variety.
Endnotes to Chapter I

1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1 (1956), p. vii. Full bibliographical details for this and subsequent documents are given in the bibliography at the end of this thesis.

2. For example, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'represent' in the following way:

   To stand for or in place of (a person or thing); ... To take or fill the place of (another) in some respect or for some purpose; to be a substitute in some capacity for (a person or body); to act for (another) by deputed right.

   However, the same dictionary defines a 'substitute' as:

   One exercising deputed authority; a deputy, delegate. ... One who acts in place of another. ... A thing put in the place of another.

   The difficulty in disentangling the meanings of the two terms in their non-theological senses has resulted in either the mistaken belief that the two terms can be used interchangeably as expressing substantially the same meaning, or in the equally mistaken belief that the terms can never be capable of any precision in theological contexts.

3. As, for example, the term 'substitution' is treated by J. Dwight Pentecost, Things which Become Sound Doctrine (1974), pp. 50-60.


5. Morris, p. 408.


11. Packer, p. 34.
12. Packer, p. 34.
15. Vincent Taylor, Jesus and His Sacrifice (1937), p. 283. See also the discussion of the term representative found on pp. 281-285, 305-312 of the same work.
18. Mather, p. 266.
20. Mather, p. 270.
Endnotes to Chapter II


3. Packer, pp. 3-16.


6. Packer, p. 11.


8. Packer, p. 25f. Packer acknowledges the work of Ian T. Ramsey as the source for his language of 'model' and 'qualifier'. A qualifier is understood by Packer to characterise a model and to provide a frame of reference in which a model is anchored.

9. Packer, pp. 29-43. Packer cites five areas of theological thought in which the term substitution both functions and by which it must be shaped. These are as follows: a) Substitution and retribution; b) Substitution and solidarity; c) Substitution and mystery; d) Substitution and salvation; e) Substitution and divine love. A similar pattern is followed in Leon Morris, The Cross in the New Testament (1965), pp. 404-419, and in The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross (1955), pp. 270-280. In Morris' case it is difficult to understand the place of these comments since they seem to modify or contradict an already defined concept of substitution that has been employed throughout the books in question. In Packer's case it is through and in these theological areas that the term substitution comes to be given meaning and is understood as a theological concept.


12. Packer, p. 27.


Here again the simplicity of the formula [we are saved by Christ's bearing the punishment of our sins] obscures many variant strands.


The meaning of the terms substitution and vicarious - these terms are admitted even in a loose sense by Socinians, and are paraded by Maurice, Young and Jowett, and very much in the same loose, indifferent sense by Barnes and the advocates of the Governmental Atonement Theory. When these parties say that Christ was substituted for us and that his sufferings are vicarious, they mean nothing more than that He suffered in our behalf, for our benefit. We hold, on the other hand, that Christ was in a strict and exact sense, the substitute of his people: ... he assumed all our legal responsibilities, and thus assumed our law-place, binding himself to do in our stead all that the law demanded of him when he suffered the penalty due to us, and rendered the obedience upon which our wellbeing was made to depend.

18. For example, in John Owen's work on the atonement the term substitution is seldom used, and then as a verb rather than as a noun, but the language of Christ as sponsor and surety is commonplace. See Of the Satisfaction of Christ p. 65, 119, 122, 420, et al; *The Death of Death in the Death of Christ* (1648), reveals a similar use of the terms. See also Paul Van Buren, *Christ in our Place - The Substitutionary Character of Calvin's Doctrine of Reconciliation* (1957), pp. 47-50 'surety and substitution'.


   Cf Goodwin's comment that God's justice must have:

   its full pennyworth out of Christ. He let wrath suck the blood of his soul, till it falls off, as the leech when it is filled and breaks.


   But Christ's sufferings owe their intrinsic import to the fact that they are not merely physical, but spiritual sufferings, sufferings of his divine-human person.


27. This is the central thrust of the writings of John Owen on the atonement; see particularly *The Death of Death in the Death of Christ* (1648), p. 247; *Of the Satisfaction of Christ* p. 122.


32. Owen, p. 361.

It was by surrendering to death the body which He had taken, as an offering and sacrifice free from every stain, that He forthwith abolished death for His human brethren by the offering of the equivalent. For naturally, since the Word of God was above all, when He offered His own temple and bodily instrument as a substitute for the life of all, He fulfilled in death all that was required.

Eternity is not absolutely in the curse of the law, but as a finite creature is cursed thereby. If a sinner could at once admit upon himself that which is equal in divine justice to his offence, and so make satisfaction, there might be an end to his punishment in time. But a finite, and every way limited creature, having sinned his eternity in this world, against an eternal and infinite God, must abide by it for ever. This was Christ free from: the dignity of his person was such, as that he could fully satisfy divine justice, in a limited season; after which, God in justice loosed the pains of death, for it was impossible that he should be detained thereby.
efficacy in those respects of rigour of justice, according to the judgement of God. Consequently, what Christ suffered is by no means the same with what his people would have suffered, when considered as suffering, but is precisely the very same when considered as penalty.

A. A. Hodge rejects Owen's view that Christ suffered an identical penalty, although he commends and respects the reasons for that conclusion (p. 61). Cf. further Hugh R. Mackintosh, Historic Theories of Atonement (1920) pp. 110-111, for his comments on the difference between 'acceptation' (something fictitious, of little or no value) and 'acceptiliation' (something appropriate but of less value).

41. Hodge, p. 474.
42. Hodge, p. 474f.
43. This theme will be examined more fully in Chapter IV.
44. For example, the practice of describing the work of J. Denney as exemplifying the concept of penal substitution, despite the fact that nowhere, so far as I can determine, does he use the designation to describe his own thought.
47. Brunner, p. 480f.
51. Brunner, p. 520.
Methodological reasons do not permit us to work in this way with the incarnation as a theological presupposition. To do so would make the humanity of Jesus' life problematic from the very beginning. To be sure, all christological considerations tend towards the idea of the incarnation; it can, however, only constitute the conclusion of christology. If it is put instead at the beginning, all christological concepts, including that of penal suffering, are given a mythological tone.

Cf. further his comments on pp. 34-37.

Pannenberg translates the penal element of Jesus' condemnation into the more general anthropological statement that man is subject to death 'because of his being closed in upon himself, while his destiny to openness to the world still points beyond death', Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 62. See the comments of Neie, op. cit., pp. 140-144. The use made by Pannenberg of the concept of inclusive substitution will be discussed later in this chapter.

See also the use of the term substitute in Alexander B. Macaulay, The Death of Jesus (1938), where it is related not to an 'equivalent' punishment, but to the conviction that salvation is propter Christum. None the less, no clue is given to the significance of this act, an element which is not denied, but which is given no coherent content.


68. Neie, op. cit., p. 204.


70. Barth, p. 253.


75. See for example this summary:

   Christ was chastised by God, that is was punished; that Christ did bear our sins, (that is the punishment of our sins); that he was made sin, that is, subjected to the punishment of sin; that he was made a curse unto God, or liable to the curse, that is the punishment of the law: But the passion of Christ itself, having been full of torments, bloody and ignominious, is a very fit matter of punishment.

   Grotius, p. 35.

76. Grotius, p. 70:

   The right of punishing in a Governor is not either the right of absolute Lordship, or the right of the thing credited. ... The power of punishing is not for the sake of the punisher, but for the sake of some community; for all punishment hath the common good proposed, to wit, the preservation of order and example.

77. See the succinct statement of Archibald A. Hodge, *The Atonement* (1868), p. 156:

A Substitute is not a different man in a different place, but a different man in the same place.


80. Stevens, op. cit., p. 264f.

81. As for example in the translation of Grotius by Foster quoted in Stevens, op. cit., p. 165.

82. Grotius, op. cit., p. lllf.

83. See the comments of Archibald A. Hodge, op. cit., p. 37f. given above at note 17.


86. Wardlaw, p. 211. John C. Macdonnell, *The Doctrine of the Atonement* (1858), p. 198f. clearly expresses the conviction that a middle path is to be desired between on the one hand the extremes of penal language and on the other Socinian expressions of the atonement.

On this point, there are two extremes to be considered, the one which makes the sacrifice to be identical with the legal penalty of sin; and the other which denies that sacrifice has any reference to punishment at all.

... But if we discard the notion of atonement being only a particular form of punishment, and regard it as the substitute which Divine wisdom has appointed to take its place in certain cases; let us enquire reverently whether we can discover any fitness in the substitute for the part assigned to it, either by its fulfilling the same ends as punishment, or by its preventing the evils which might arise from simple remission.

87. See Macdonnell, p. 197:

Let us remark that expiation is not punishment. ... Expiation is rather a commutation.
of punishment - a substitute for it - which must be supposed to answer the same or higher ends in the Divine Government, than those for which punishment was ordained; but with more tenderness to the offender.

88. As for example Emil Brunner argues when he comments that Anselm elaborates the 'idea of penal expiation', The Mediator (1934), p. 481. See also p. 458, 475.

89. Extensive use will be made of the work by John McIntyre, St Anselm and his Critics (1954).


91. See Anselm Cur Deus Homo 1/11, 1/12, 1/15; also McIntyre, op. cit., pp. 68-76.

92. Anselm, op. cit., 1/12; McIntyre, op. cit., pp. 78-116.

93. Anselm, op. cit., 1/20, 1/24; McIntyre, op. cit., pp. 77-81.

94. For the problems in the force of this 'must' see McIntyre pp. 96-104.

95. Anselm, op. cit., 1/25, 2/4, 2/5; McIntyre, op. cit., pp. 117-121.

96. Anselm, op. cit., 2/6, 2/11, 2/14; McIntyre, op. cit., p. 121ff.


98. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo 2/19; McIntyre, op. cit., pp. 178-185.


100. McIntyre, op. cit., p. 172.


102. McIntyre, op. cit., p. 172.

104. Heim, p. 116f.

105. Heim, p. 116f.


108. Lefebvre, p. 95.


110. The term 'qualifier' is used by Packer, see the comment at n.8.

111. Although, as will become more obvious, certain formulations of the concept of substitution lend themselves more readily than others to the ideas expressed in the qualifier 'inclusive'.

112. James Richmond, *Ritschl, A Reappraisal* (1978) p. 204. Philip Marheineke's views are to be found in *Die Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft* (1819). See also the comment of Isaak A. Dorner, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ* Div 2 Vol III (1863), p. 123:

> With Christ God is most completely one; only on the ground of this man's unity with God can humanity likewise be united with God. ... Jesus Christ is the Son of God, as the man who is individual in His universality and universal in His individuality; He is the human nature created by God in its full integrity and illability, and for that reason as the second Adam, the representative of humanity, He is the truth of the first Adam.

113. Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 263 terms Marheineke's concept one of 'inclusive substitution', so that Jesus' dying includes ours in itself and thereby transforms the latter into a dying in hope.

114. Richmond, op. cit., p. 204. Indeed it might be said that this use of the phrase 'inclusive substitution' rests simply on a matter of translation which could be resolved by the use of the term representation.


117. Capaldi, p. 214.

118. Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 263.

119. Pannenberg, p. 263.

120. Pannenberg, p. 263.

121. William J. Wolf, No Cross, No Crown (1957, p. 64. According to Wolf this inclusivity of Christ's work is 'implied in the Biblical understanding of the corporate nature of man' (p. 64).

122. Thus, the reservations concerning Mather's conclusion that the terms substitution and representation are 'complementary', are seen to be justified - see Chapter I n.19.

123. See Packer, op. cit., p. 12.
Endnotes to Chapter III

1. See Chapter I, and the discussion there of Leon Morris and James Denney. See also the following quotation from H. W. Clark, The Cross and the Eternal Order (1943), p. 158:

For instance, to speak of Christ as 'the Representative Man' causes us ... to picture immediately a relationship originating from man as its source. A Representative sums up, so to say, what exists in those whom he represents: he acts for those who stand behind him in accordance with the inspiration and instructions they transmit to him, translating these into whatever speech or action successive occasions may require; and such a relation is constructed and construed, be it noted, along a line which starts from the constituency, not from the Representative himself.


3. See Alfred de Grazia, "Representation", International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences p. 462:

Obviously representation must consist of unconscious as well as conscious relations, expressive as well as sanctioned actions, unknown as well as known actions. Otherwise one falls into the trap of regarding as determinative of the representative relation solely conscious, known legislative behaviour - parameters that are more often missing than present in the setting about which the scholar wishes to say 'A is represented by M'.

4. The metaphor of the body is almost impossible to avoid as an illustration of the relation between representative and constituent as the language of 'embody' and 'incorporate' demonstrates. It is not surprising that the same terms should occur prominently in the theological use of the term representation. See section 2, part ii of this chapter.

5. The concept of identification, like the metaphor of the body, will again feature significantly in the theological use of the term representation.

6. Both the exemplary and the ideal aspects of
representation will be explored more fully in section 3 of this chapter.

7. For example, see in W. F. Lofthouse, Ethics and Atonement (1906), p. 133:

We must ask what is meant by the vicariousness of Christ's sufferings. We mean that he suffered instead of us. When we call his sufferings representative we mean that he suffered on our behalf. The difference sounds unimportant; but between the two phrases lies a whole theological gulf.


9. The following footnote must suffice to give some indication of the discussion that surrounds the two words. If the word \( \delta\nu\tau\iota \) is considered, it is commonly agreed that its basic meaning refers to an exchange which takes place when one party stands in the place of another, (see the article "\( \delta\nu\tau\iota \) " by BühSEL in the Theological Dictionary of the Bible edited by G. Kittel). Thus, the word may properly be rendered by such phrases as 'instead of' or 'in the place of'. However, it may also be claimed that there are instances where the sense of the word is less specific so that it is better rendered 'on behalf of' or 'for the sake of' (BÜHSEL considers this to be a second possible sense of \( \delta\nu\tau\iota \)). R. E. Davies in "Christ in our Place - the Contribution of the Prepositions", The Tyndale Bulletin Vol 21 (1970) pp. 71-91, disputes this and considers the various examples that might indicate the contrary. Davies, indeed, implies that the attempt to weaken the force of \( \delta\nu\tau\iota \) is pursued not for linguistic grounds but because of an independently conceived prejudice against the possibility of this interpretation of Christ's death (Davies, p. 80f.). However, Davies' arguments concerning Matt 17:27 are unconvincing, which together with Eph 5:31 and II Thess 2:10
indicates that \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \tau \iota \) does not necessarily mean 'instead of', but that the context is significant for determining its meaning, and in reference to Christ's death it is precisely this context that is in question.

Turning to the word \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \) the general meaning 'on behalf of' is generally agreed upon (see the article "\( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \)" by Riesenfeld in The Theological Dictionary of the Bible edited by G. Kittel). However, it may be claimed that \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \) has a more specific sense that lies closer to the meaning of \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \tau \iota \) as described above (see Davies, op. cit., p. 82f.; Richard C. Trench, New Testament Synonyms (1865), quotes classical writers to this effect and includes Philemon 13 and, perhaps, I Cor 15:29; Maximilian Zerwick, Biblical Greek (1963), mentions in addition John 11:50 as well as Gal 3:13, II Cor 5:14f and I Tim 2:6, although the reasons for including these latter texts are less clear). The arguments adduced by Davies for giving the more specific sense to \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \) rely on the premise that an act performed on behalf of another may be so reckoned because it is performed in the stead of another. This can no doubt be true, but it is not certainly always the case, and cannot be proposed as a linguistic argument for reckoning \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \tau \iota \) to mean the same as \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \). Davies' reason for advancing this meaning of \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \) becomes clear as he considers the use of the phrase \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \ \phi \mu \omicron \nu \omicron \) to describe the death of Christ. Since the word \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \), Davies argues, may embrace the meaning of the word \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \tau \iota \), we are justified in rendering the phrase \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \ \phi \mu \omicron \nu \omicron \) as 'instead of us'. R. W. Dale is more precise when he says that the preposition \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \) 'can only be alleged in support of the vicarious or substitutionary character of his death, because if his death had not that character, it is impossible to see how it could have secured for us the kind of benefits attributed to it' (Dale, op. cit., p. 476). Trench takes a similar line when he comments:

If we only had the word \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \) we should not be entitled to construct a vicarious and penal soteriology. Only because of the presence of the word \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \tau \iota \) are we led to assume that when we see \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \) we understand it as signifying also 'in our stead'.

Thus, it should be clear that the linguistic discussion of the words \( \upsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \) and \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \tau \iota \) is itself surrounded and shaped by doctrinal considerations which relate to the use of the terms substitution and representation. It cannot be said that a
discussion of the prepositions in question contributes to an understanding of the terms, or that it resolves the dilemma of which term may appropriately be used.


We owed obedience and could not pay it. Christ put himself in the position of being able to represent us. He became a man, that he might be the righteous man in our place, putting us to one side, as it were, and taking over the responsibility of performing our work and paying our debt.

Paul M. van Buren, Christ in our Place (1957), p. 31. See the entire discussion on pp. 27-39 where the terms substitute and representative are used virtually interchangeably.


16. See, for example, Moule, op. cit., p. 56.


Would Denney have been willing to use 'presentation', or ought he not to have allowed that Jesus presents as an acceptable sacrifice to God the ideal new Humanity his holy work creates, and of which he is himself the consecrated first fruits in humanity?

See for example the following comment of Albrecht Ritschl, *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* (1902), paragraph 56:

If Christ assures himself, by the obedience indicated, of his nearness, his priestly relation, to God, that includes the intention that the existing and future community should seek the same position. That is to say, Christ as a Priest is the representative of the community which he brings to God through the perfect fulfilment of his personal life. This use of representation is inclusive, not, as it generally is, exclusive. The meaning of the idea is not that what Christ does as Priest, the community does not require to do; but rather that what Christ does as a Priest in the first place and as the representative of the community, there the community itself has accordingly to take up its position.

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23. John McCleod Campbell, *The Nature of the Atonement* (1856), uses the term only in passing and in no clear technical sense.

24. R. C. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality* (1901), uses the term sparingly and then in the context of Christ as inclusive man, not specifically in the context of the offering of penitence.


27. There is no intention to polarise artificially a doctrine of the person and a doctrine of the work of Christ, but simply to indicate the two main contexts or frameworks of thought in which the term representation is employed and in which it is given meaning.

28. See for example the comment of John C. MacDonnell, *The Doctrine of the Atonement* (1858), p. 176:

This peculiarity of Christ's human nature - by which he was not only a perfect man, but
in some sense comprehended all men - theologians have in vain striven to express. In dogmatic teaching it has been called 'impersonalitas'; and we hear continually such expressions as the 'true man' - the 'representative man' - the 'archetype of humanity' - and such like.

29. Moberly, op. cit., p. 86. For the whole discussion see pp. 82-92.


31. Mascall, p. 75.


33. Brooke F. Westcott, The Victory of the Cross (1889), p. 44.

34. Van Buren, op. cit., p. 80. See the following comment on p. 53 where similar thoughts are expressed but where the terms substitution and representation are confused:

As the substitute for all men, He received their punishment; at the same time they received that punishment, for His death was accepted as the death of all sinful humanity. God's wrath against men was spent in that our flesh was put to death to endure the punishment that we deserved. Here we see the full implication of the idea of substitution. It would be only a step further to say that to stand in the place of another is to be that other, and to be truly represented by another is to have that other become oneself. But that is to make substitution into complete identity, and Calvin does not do that, for identity means the end of representation.

35. Anselm, A Meditation on Human Redemption p. 140.

36. See further the criticisms of Hastings Rashdall, Archibald A. Hodge, and Maurice Wiles as cited in Chapter V.


38. For a critical discussion of this concept and its background see Chapter V.

40. For the 'physical' or 'concrete' description of corporate personality and the inclusiveness thereby denoted see Jacques de Fraine, Adam et son Lignage (1959), particularly the following on p. 17:

Il faut comprendre cette représentation d'une façon éminemment concrete: il n'est pas question d'une fiction juridique abstraite, qui met l'accent sur le « comme si », mais bien plutôt d'une vue intuitive et physique.

41. For further illustrations of the use of the language of corporate personality see Charles H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (1936), p. 80, where corporate personality is paralleled with the 'inclusive representative of the new humanity which emerges in him'; Edmund F. Sutcliffe, Providence and Suffering in the Old and New Testaments (1953), pp. 52-70, 93f; Ernest Best, One Body in Christ (1955), pp. 44-65, 83-114, 203-207; Russell P. Sheed, Man in Community (1958); H. Wheeler Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man (1911), and "The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality" in Werden und Wesen des Alten Testaments (1936); and Redemption and Revelation (1942); Aubrey R. Johnson, The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God (1961); Harry Johnson, The Humanity of the Saviour (1962), pp. 213-221.


43. Thornton, p. 273.

44. Thornton, p. 316.

45. See, for example, Thornton, p. 316, 320.

46. Dodd, op. cit., p. 86. The distinction between a representation which is the assumption of humanity to be realised in individuals, and the representation which can be attributed to Christ as a corollary of the incorporation of individuals into union with him can seldom be clearly drawn, although the emphases and tendencies of the different expressions are usually apparent. Dunn, op. cit., p. 131, attempts the unusual course of arguing that while Christ is the representative of humanity in his death - that is, he dies for all - he is the representative only of his own people in his resurrection:
Jesus' representative capacity before resurrection ... is different from his representative capacity after resurrection. ... In short, as last Adam Jesus represents only those who experience life-giving Spirit.

R. P. Martin agrees with Dunn in his insistence on Christ as the Representative Man, but disagrees that there can be two different representative capacities. Since he is reluctant to say that Jesus' representative capacity after the resurrection is that of all humanity, he has to argue that the death suffered by Christ of 'all' (II Cor 5:14f) is a death only on 'his people's behalf' and one 'in which they have a share'. See Ralph P. Martin, Reconciliation (1981), pp. 99-101. However, as shall be seen, Dunn is able to describe Christ as having two representative capacities because he employs two different uses of the term representation, and it is in part Martin's failure to recognise this that causes him to limit Christ's representative capacity only to those who respond to him.


49. Brooke F. Westcott, Christus Consummator (1886), p. 120. For the entire discussion of the meaning of solidarity see pp. 120-124.

50. Johnson, op. cit., p. 213. Johnson uses the term representation to express this interdependence of the human race, but the word substitution may be used instead as for example in the following comment of Nels F. S. Ferré, Christ and the Christian (1958), p. 154:
Morality, therefore, at its depths, is social. It is substitutionary both from the past and from the present. We act as we do, and are able to act as we do, because others through the ages and an innumerable company have acted and now act in our stead.

51. Johnson, op. cit., p. 213.

52. F. L. Peterman, article "Redemption" The Catholic Encyclopedia p. 158. See also the statement of R. C. Moberly, Atonement and Personality (1901), p. 87:

Even the wider phrase 'solidarity of humanity', is one which ... is growing in directness and depth of significance. Whatever we do, we do not for ourselves alone. ... What I am is what I am in relation to an environment.


57. See the discussion and comments earlier in this chapter.

58. John Owen, Of the Satisfaction of Christ, p. 469.


60. Martin, p. 212f.


62. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II, 2, p. 58. See also pp. 7-8, 53.

63. See the interesting discussion in S. Matthews, The Atonement and the Social Process (1930), who links the increasing popularity of democratic
patterns of theological thought with the growth of western political democracy, and particularly the following comment on p. 135:

The representative quality of both Adam and Jesus is an indication of the new social mind which in the 17th century was developing the formulas of democracy. Such representation was, of course, far enough from being strictly democratic, for neither had the race elected Adam nor the elect selected Christ as their representative. To this extent, therefore, it would be quite impossible to regard the federal theology as an expression of democracy, and yet in a sense the democratic element is implied in that the believer is enabled to regard Christ as his representative, and thus to take advantage of the fact that Christ had borne the punishment of the elect.

64. Barth, Church Dogmatics II, 2, p. 103. For Barth's presentation of Christ as electing God and elected man see para 33 pp. 94-145, especially p. 116f.

65. Barth, Church Dogmatics II, 2, p. 8:

The partner of God which cannot now be thought away is neither 'man' as an idea, nor 'humanity', nor indeed a large or small total of individual men. It is the one man Jesus and the people represented in Him. Only secondarily, and for his sake, is it 'man', and 'humanity' and the whole remaining cosmos.

Or again, p. 55:

In the Bible we are not concerned with the abstract concept of man, or with the human race as a whole, or with the being and destiny of the individual man as such.

However, see also Church Dogmatics IV, 2, p. 46f where the idea of a humanum is differentiated from 'the concrete possibility of one man in a specific form' which is a 'human existence determined, elected and prepared' so that as this one man he has 'a direct relevance for all other men [and] signifies the promise of the basic alteration and determination of what we all are as men'. Thus, even though Barth can say 'in Jesus Christ it is not merely one man, but the humanum of all men, which is posited and exalted as such to unity with God' (p. 49), it is only in the light of God's election of this one man that this humanum can be given possibility and content.
66. See Barth, *Church Dogmatics* II 2 p. 116f.

... His election is the original and all-inclusive election; the election which is absolutely unique, but which in this very uniqueness is universally meaningful and efficacious, because it is the election of Him who Himself elects.

Cf also IV 1 p. 35f; IV 2 p. 36, 117, 269-271.


68. See Barth, *Church Dogmatics* IV 2 p. 270:

... in the union of God with our human existence which then took place uniquely in the existence of this one man, prior to our attitude to it, before we are in any position to accept or reject it, with no need for repetition either in our soul or elsewhere, we ... were taken up (quite irrespective and even in defiance of our own actions and merits) into the fellowship with God for which we were ordained but which we ourselves had broken; and that we are therefore taken up into this fellowship in Him, this One.

69. A similar pattern of thought is evident in Peter T. Forsyth, *The Work of Christ* (1965), p. 168, who reckons that even the word 'representation' misleads us to think of Christ as the spiritual protagonist of a democracy, drawing his power from those he represents; and it muddles the truth that his relation to us is royal and not elective, that it is creative and not merely expository'. Nonetheless, Forsyth continues to speak of a representation 'by one who creates by his act the humanity he represents, and does not merely sponsor it' (p.151).

70. See Barth, *Church Dogmatics* II 2 p. 94 for the programmatic statement.

71. Barth, *Church Dogmatics* IV 1 p. 296:

Order is created then not by any setting aside of sins, but by that of the sinner himself, of the σύνεν της ἀμαρτίας (Rom 6:6),
of the συμφωνία τῆς σαρκίς (Col 2:11), of the subject of sin. ... no word of separating him from his sin, or his sin from him. He stands or falls with it. If it disappears, he disappears. And this is what happened on Golgotha ... in His own person, in His giving up to death, He actually took away sinful man, causing him to disappear.

Cf Gerrit C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth (1956), p. 135f, although the term substitution is consistently used instead of representation.

72. See Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1, p. 251.
73. Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1, p. 254.
74. Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1, p. 306.
75. Cf Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1, p. 311, 316, 350, 354f; Church Dogmatics IV, 2, p. 269, 275, et al.; Berkouwer, op. cit., p. 136ff.
76. Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 2, p. 300.
77. Cf the summary in Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1, p. 309.
79. See footnote 46 above for references to Dunn in relation to R. Martin's comments on representation in II Cor 5:14f.
80. Dunn, op. cit., p. 130.
81. It is never entirely clear whether Dunn wishes to understand this latter representation as the activity of Christ in bringing man before God, acting as their mediator in a form of representation already described; or whether Jesus in his resurrection is representative in the sense of manifesting or exemplifying new life. Such phrases as the following would seem to indicate the latter meaning of representation:

... For Paul Jesus in his life and death is representative man, representative of fallen man - by living out that fallenness to the death and overcoming it in resurrection he becomes representative of new life, of new man (p. 129).
Jesus too is representative man. He represents a new kind of man - man who not only dies but lives again. The first Adam represents physical man - man given over to death; the last Adam represents pneumatic man - man alive from the dead (p. 127).

However, the impression also gained from Dunn's argument is that representation is essentially a personal phenomenon; one represents another by 'solidarity' (p. 126), representing the sinner in his sin as in a sacrifice (p. 134f.), and not only representing man to God but God to man (p. 140). The two patterns of thought are closely related, but they are distinct, and employ quite different connotations of the term representation.


87. See the comprehensive discussion of this christology in Eugene Teselle, Christ in Context (1975).

88. Thomas B. Strong, A Manual of Theology (1892), p. 267. See the whole discussion on Christ as the representative man pp. 266-278.

89. Strong, p. 276.

90. See, for example, the comment of W. A. Lofthouse, Ethics and Atonement (1906), p. 245f:

If he was God made visible to man, he was man set before the face of God. Nor was he the type, simply of what man was meant to be; he exerted in himself the renewing energy which actually approximated men to that type; as men drew near to him, they became like him; he was 'formed' in them. He thus represented man before God: he was, in attitude, purpose and will, what man was to
become when reconciled to God, and what man would actually become through him.

91. Teselle, op. cit., p. 102.
92. See the discussion in Chapter II and the literature cited.
94. Peterman, op. cit., p. 158.
96. Thielicke, op. cit., p. 366.
97. Thielicke, p. 364.
1. This is not an attempt to describe a 'Biblical doctrine' of substitution or representation, but simply to identify and illustrate some themes that have been seen to shape understanding of the terms and which can be reckoned to function in a fundamental way to generate the distinctive patterns of thought that the terms are intended to express and clarify.


5. For the relation of sacrificial motifs to the death of Christ see among others: Frances Young, Sacrifice and the Death of Christ (1975); Vincent Taylor, Jesus and His Sacrifice (1955); Sykes, in Bourdillon and Fortes, op. cit.; C. William Swain, "'For our Sins': The Image of Sacrifice in the Thought of the Apostle Paul", Interpretation Vol 17 No 2 (1963), pp. 131-139; John P. Smith, Four Discourses on the Sacrifice and Priesthood of Jesus Christ (1828); Charles F. D. Moule, The Sacrifice of Christ (1950); Frederick D. Maurice, The Doctrine of Sacrifice Deduced from the Scriptures (1854); Eugene Masure, Le Sacrifice du Chef (1932); A. Ian Dunlop, "Christ's Sacrifice for Sin", Scottish Journal of Theology Vol 13 (1960), pp. 385-393; F. W. Dillistone, The Christian Understanding of Atonement (1968), pp. 29-75; Marcus Barth, Was Christ's Death a Sacrifice? (1961); Oliver C. Quick, The Gospel of the New World (1944).


16. For a development of this theme see Elizabeth R. Moberly, Suffering, Innocent and Guilty (1978).

17. See Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (1981), the section 'The surrender of the Son' pp. 80-83.

18. Ep. ad Diognetus ix:

Ti x' aIlo tov amorphias h'min 'Iouv'OY kalwvsti; ev tin diakosinwi mou tonv anormon h'min kai asvekvn ev monv tri Tiv tou Theou; 

E tis glukies antallagheis, E tis evagxnias diakosinwi, E tiv apostoikistin anagkasin, Eiv anormia men pollwv ev dikai evi kevra diakosinw 

de eiv ev polloi anormo diakosw.

Moberly translates 

'0 the sweetness of the interchange' Atonement and Personality (1901), p. 330. More normally it is rendered '0 sweet exchange' or sometimes simply 'substitution', as in Archibald A. Hodge, The Atonement (1868).


The New Testament writers thought of Christ as making an exchange for us, and this view was current in the earliest days of the Church.

... Today it can be given effective and clear expression in the context of substitution.

'Here in Christ', writes Heinrich Vogel, 'is a substitution or an exchange, full of wonder and comfort. Christ experienced our death and entered hell; we experience his life and enter his blessed state. Just as he takes for his own everything that is ours, including our guilt and death, so that all that is his, his holiness and his eternal life become ours.'

See also Gerrit C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth (1956), p. 106: "The content of Golgotha is therefore identical with the great exchange negotiated at Golgotha, as an exchange which cannot be undone through all eternity for it is God's eternal decision. Because of this exchange there is nothing to condemn any more in those who are in Christ."
20. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics IV, 1*, pp. 223-228, gives this theme classic expression. See the following comment on p. 226:

There is in fact a complete reversal, an exchange of roles. ... The Judge allows Himself to be judged.

For references to the 'exchange' with Barabbas see p. 226, 230.


22. See Hooker, "Interchange and Suffering" pp. 76-77, 82-83.


26. However, it should be recognised that a certain amount of confusion may be admitted even in the use of the phrase 'he bore our punishment', since this may also be construed in a somewhat looser fashion to mean that he bore the punishment that bears an intrinsic relation to our punishment and cannot be separated from our deserts although it is not an identical punishment to that which was due to us.

27. See for example the quotation in John K. Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement* (1915), p.210:

If physical death be the penalty of sin, then Christ's death does not in fact save us from this penalty. But did Christ then suffer *eternal* death, commonly called damnation, in order to save us from that penalty? Obviously not. So it is not clear, to say the least, in what sense Christ did in fact endure the penalty due to mankind.
28. See Chapter II, section 1, for illustration of this process.

29. Again, there is no consistent use of the term equivalence. Its similarity to the term 'equality' approaches the meaning of 'identity' referred to above; on the other hand, it may be used more explicitly as a term of measurement where identity is excluded but 'appropriateness' maintained. In the context of criminal judicial procedure see the discussion on the term equivalence in Walter Moberly, The Ethics of Punishment (1968), pp. 194-196.

30. See the discussions of A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge and A. H. Strong as cited in Chapter II.

31. A similar point is made in George Stevens, The Christian Doctrine of Salvation (1905), p. 161, where the concept of acceptio is seen to be a necessary part of any formulation of penal substitution - the very point that the language of substitution was supposed to deny.

32. Packer, op. cit., p. 31:

The word penal is there, not to prompt theoretical puzzlement about the transferring of guilt, but to articulate the insight of believers who ... are constrained to say 'Jesus was bearing the judgement I deserved (and deserve), the penalty for my sins, the punishment due to me' ...

See also the comment of Paul Althaus "The Cross of Christ" in Mysterium Christi, edited by G. K. Bell and D. A. Deismann (1930), p. 204:

The effect of the emphasis on equivalence has been to rationalise the mystery of forgiveness, which means that it does not sufficiently stress the incalculable wonder of forgiveness which simply faces us. Reconciliation and forgiveness belong together, but not equivalence and forgiveness.

33. Stevens, op. cit., p. 160 gives the argument forcefully.

34. Chapter II, sections 1, 2 and 3.

35. Although some of the language of penal substitution approaches such a position, it is more often portrayed in caricature by its opponents.
36. See Travis, op. cit.; Von Rad, op. cit., p. 264-272; H. H. Rowley, The Faith of Israel (1956), pp. 87-98, and the following comment on p. 90:

Nowhere is sin thought of as atoned for by punishment, so that by the mere fact of punishment fellowship is restored.


38. C. Hodge, op. cit., p. 531.

39. Cf above section 1(a) of this chapter and the literature cited.

40. The futility of such generalisation from scriptural verses is seen when this reference is simply contrasted with Jer 31:30a:

But each is to die for his own sin.

41. See for example Smith, op. cit., pp. 51-52; Augustus H. Strong, Systematic Theology (1886), pp. 416-419; Robert Hall, Works Vol I (1831), pp. 494-517; Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (1958), p. 376 which summarizes such arguments as follows:

(1) that the guilty party himself is not in a position to bear the penalty through to the end, so that a righteous relation results;
(2) that the transfer does not encroach upon the rights and privileges of innocent third parties, nor cause them to suffer hardships and privations; (3) that the person enduring the penalty is not himself already indebted to justice, and does not owe all his services to the government; and (4) that the guilty party retains the consciousness of his guilt and of the fact that the substitute is suffering for
him. In view of all this it will be understood that the transfer of penal debt is well-nigh, if not entirely, impossible among men. But in the case of Christ, which is altogether unique, because in it a situation obtained which has no parallel, all the conditions named were met. There was no injustice of any kind.

42. Stevens, op. cit., p. 203.


44. Bushnell, p. 309:

If he is put in our place to suffer the penalty of our sins, then we can easily see abhorrence to our sins expressed in his suffering. But mere severities and pain laid upon him, even though God violated His own deep sympathies and loving approbations to do it, can only show the fact of something very abhorrent somewhere, and is much more likely to raise abhorrence in us, than to signify God's abhorrence to us.

45. Horace Bushnell, Forgiveness and Law (1874), p. 145f:

The public justice is not made by Christ's endurance of any man's penalty, but is a public character of justice made up for God, by what expression of justice may be yielded in Christ's death, conceived to be equal to the expression of justice that would be afforded by all the penalties exacted of all the world. In this view Christ is the virtual substitute or compensation for all the pains of all transgression. Sometimes a different way of statement is adopted, to escape the obvious objection that, as Christ is supposed to suffer what is really nobody's penalty in particular, his suffering can not make any expression of God's justice at all; his death, therefore, it is said, expresses the abhorrence of God to sin, as the penalties exacted of all wrongdoers would, and so they make up the desired character of justice.

46. For example, the comment of Strong, op. cit., p. 740 on the 'Grotian' view of atonement: 'Christ does not suffer the precise penalty of the law, but God graciously accepts his suffering as a substitute for the penalty'. 
47. See the examples quoted in Chapter II from Wardlaw, Macdonnal et al.

48. While this pattern of thought cannot strictly speaking be labelled a retributive theory of punishment, the sense in which punishment or suffering 'validates' the moral order is seldom clear, and particularly the relation between the suffering of Christ and the upholding of the moral order seems to draw its force from hidden presuppositions. Within this way of thinking a deterrent view of punishment is often also included in that Christ's suffering is held to deter future sinners and thus to contribute to the preservation of the moral order. The view that deterrence and punishment should not be related in this fashion can be forcefully argued and is widely accepted, however, public perceptions and hidden presuppositions often introduce deterrence as a supposed justification for penal theory and practice.

49. Clearly, there are certain attractions in this view, but it can be no more than an interim or diversionary argument, for the point at issue is still the relation of God to this natural order. If there is said to be no relation (an unlikely conception) then it is hard to see how such an instance of innocent suffering is atoning; if God is held to be responsible for the creation of this natural order then the question still arises as to the justice of God in accepting innocent suffering as atoning.

50. See the discussion in John McIntyre, *Anselm and His Critics* (1954).


54. As Strong, op. cit., p. 735 comments on the 'Bushnellian' or 'moral influence' patterns of atonement:

   ... it substitutes a subordinate effect of the atonement for its chief aim, and yet unfairly appropriates the name 'vicarious', which belongs only to the latter. Suffering with the sinner is by no means suffering in his stead.
If ... we wish to regard these two aspects of the High-priestly office of Christ in their indivisibility, ... then we may ... call Christ our satisfying representative: in the senses, first, that in virtue of his ideal dignity he so represents, in his redemptive activity, the perfecting of human nature, that in virtue of our having become one with him God sees and regards the totality of believers only in him; and second, that his sympathy with sin, which was strong enough to stimulate a redemptive activity sufficient for the assumption of all men into his vital fellowship, ... perpetually serves to make complete and perfect our imperfect consciousness of sin.


God forgives sin in advance upon receipt of a guarantee that sin will be put away. This guarantee is, as it were, furnished to God by mankind in the person of their representative, the second Adam. God may safely forgive the sins of the world in advance, since in Christ he has the assurance of the emancipation from sin of all who will enter into fellowship with him.

See for example the work of Vincent Taylor, where despite ambiguities in the presentation of precisely what is done in Christ's work there is no doubt that his representation is a creative work which is unique in that it initiates the response of men, but universal in that it consumates that response; Jesus and His Sacrifice (1955) p. 283, 306ff; The Atonement in New Testament Teaching (1940), p. 184ff, 194ff; Forgiveness and Reconciliation (1941), p. 206.

62. Mather, p. 270:

The two concepts representation and substitution, far from being exclusive, are in fact complementary; each presents a necessary aspect of the whole truth. The issue of representation and substitution hinges upon the problem: to what degree does the believer undergo the experience of Christ and reproduce this work? In so far as the experience and work of the believer are the same or similar, the sacrifice of Christ will be spoken of in terms of representation; in so far as they are different, it will be spoken of in terms of substitution. Representation emphasises similarity; substitution emphasises dissimilarity.

While not wishing to limit the issue of representation and substitution to the single problem given above, in this context of the moral relevance of both terms Mather's conclusion is largely correct.


64. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Jesus, God and Man* (1968), p. 279 is one of the few specifically to reject such a view.


66. For example Strong, op. cit., p. 752:

This substitution is unknown to mere law, and above and beyond the powers of law. ... the righteousness of law is maintained, in that the source of all law, the judge and punisher Himself voluntarily submits to bear the penalty and bears it in the human nature that has sinned.

67. Quoted in Horace Bushnell, *The Vicarious Sacrifice* (1866), p. 316f, the author is not named but is probably W. G. T. Shedd.

68. See the comments of Bushnell, p. 317f.

The new doctrine places the wrath element at the top of the line which runs downward and thus the wrath conflict is projected into God himself, which he solves divinely by undergoing and overcoming the judgement and by surrendering himself in mercy.

See also the discussion in T. J. Crawford, The Doctrine of Holy Scripture Respecting the Atonement pp. 452-455 where the looseness of this language is recognised but no division is admitted in God.


3. For example, Conzelmann, op. cit., p. 209.


5. Bornkamm, op. cit., p. 155. See also Conzelmann, op. cit., p. 211f.


17. Küng, p. 236.

18. See Küng, p. 224-236 and the literature cited.


23. See Best, op. cit., p. 44f.


25. See the argument of Morna Hooker in 'Interchange and Suffering" in Horbury and McNeil, op. cit., pp. 76f., 82f.


28. See Chapter III section 2(a)(i) for illustrations of this theme. In addition see the comment of

Jesus is not a man. He is *man*. Whatever happens to Him happens to man. It happens to all men, and therefore it happens also to us. The name Jesus contains within itself the whole of humanity and the whole of God.


31. For example, see Dunn, op. cit., p. 128: 'Indeed, he became ὁ ἁμαρτωλός that is, not just as one man among many but as *man*, as representative man - man, who, be it noted, is immediately described as subject, obedient to death.'


33. Hendry, pp. 46-54.

34. Hendry, p. 25f., 45, 60.


40. Rupp, op. cit., p. 39f.; Hendry, op. cit., p. 98 attributes to Hegel the reopening of the question.


42. A discussion of the relation between the terms 'inclusive substitution' and 'representation' will be deferred until the end of this chapter.

Now Christ's action was not the action of humanity in Him; it is impossible to treat such a conception at once seriously and lucidly; nor is it the meaning of St Paul's 'one died for all: therefore all died'.

44. Hodge, op. cit., p. 536.


46. Vernon F. Storr, The Problem of the Cross (1924), p. 121. See the whole chapter in which Moberly and Mcleod Campbell are discussed entitled 'Christ our Representative' pp. 117-129.

47. Storr, p. 121.


54. See Aaron, op. cit.; C. Landesman (ed), The Problem of Universals (1971); A. Quinton, The Nature of Things (1973); N. Wetterstorff, On Universals (1970); Rupp, op. cit., pp. 32-40; and the literature cited in these works.

55. An approximation to the theory of Universals commonly labelled 'Platonic'.

56. An approximation to the theory of Universals commonly labelled 'Aristotelian'.

57. An approximation to the theory of Universals commonly labelled 'conceptualist'.


59. I can put no other construction on, for example,

60. Wiles, op. cit., p. 117.


62. See for example Thornton, op. cit., p. 316f.


64. Ernst Käsemann, Commentary on Romans (1980), p. 142.

65. See his comment in Redemption and Revelation (1942), p. 257:

... but we certainly cannot simply transfer the ancient conception of corporate personality to a modern theology; our whole way of regarding life ... is far too individualistic.


67. Rogerson, op. cit., p. 13:

The Hebrew thought which is allegedly so different from our own is not just based on the application to Israel of alleged mental processes of primitives; it is also an abstraction from those Israelite Institutions which corporate responsibility sought to explain, formed into an entity labelled 'Hebrew thought' and then imposed on the rest of the Old Testament regardless of social context.
68. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Les Fonctions Mentales dans les sociétés Inférieures (1912); La Mentalité Primitive (1922).

69. See E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion (1965), pp. 78-90 for a full and sympathetic treatment of Lévy-Bruhl's thought. See also de Fraine, op. cit., pp. 29-32.


71. See the discussion in Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 88ff.

72. See the comments of Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (1979), p. 73-93; Rogerson, op. cit., p. 10.

73. See Rogerson, p. 6f., 13.

74. See the comments of Robinson himself in Redemption and Revelation (1942), p. 257; The Christian Doctrine of Man (1926), p. 244. However, as both Evans-Pritchard and Douglas note, while the theory of primitive mentality and corporate personality may be wrong, it is possible that contemporary western man is also 'prelogical' in many respects, and the judgements we make concerning the world and our relation to it are not necessarily rational or scientific. As far as the concept of Corporate Personality is concerned, it remains the case that it cannot be used as an explanation of alien or problematic conceptions of the saving work of Christ, nor is it appropriate as an elucidation of the universal significance of Christ.

75. See the conclusion of Rogerson, op. cit., p. 14:

In the interests of clarity it would therefore be best to drop the term corporate personality completely, and at the same time to abandon any attempt to explain Old Testament phenomena in terms of primitive mentality.


77. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus, God and Man (1968), p. 268.

78. See for example the comments of Harry Johnson, The Humanity of the Saviour (1962), p. 213.


Our modern feeling of the solidarity of mankind does not presuppose anything in the least similar to this type of mystical doctrine; what it does presuppose is the almost limitless reaction of individuals and their acts upon other personalities. This is the true analogue to the work of Christ.


82. See Eugene Teselle, *Christ in Context* (1975), for a discussion of this theme.

83. Chapter III, section 3.

84. Neither should it be uncritically supposed, as Teselle is at pains to demonstrate, that this 'archetypal' Christology is necessarily inferior to an 'ontological' formulation of Christology. Provided that full recognition is accorded to the significance and status of an archetype, or even an exemplar, Teselle believes that full justice can be done to an interpretation of the person and work of Christ.
Endnotes to Chapter VI

1. The English text used throughout this chapter will be D. Lewis' translation of 'Stellvertretung - Ein Kapital Theologie nach dem Tode Gottes' (Kreug Verlag, 1965), published as 'Christ the Representative - an essay in theology after the "death of God"' (SCM London 1967), and any references to the German are cited from the 1982 edition.

2. Sölle, Christ the Representative p. 10.


4. Sölle, Christ the Representative, p. 11.

5. Sölle, p. 12.

6. Sölle, p. 44.

7. See Sölle, p. 127.

8. See the entire chapter 'Before God', Sölle, pp. 127-129.


10. Sölle, p. 15.


15. See Sölle, p. 128.


17. Sölle, p. 11 (my italics).


19. Sölle, p. 11.


23. Sölle, p. 44.

24. The title of Chapter 1, pp. 19-23.


26. See the comments in Sölle, p. 20f.

27. See the comments in Sölle, p. 21.


29. The point is made forcefully by Helmut Gollwitzer in Von der Stellvertretung Gottes (1967), pp. 28-30. Gollwitzer goes on to note the inadequacy of Sölle's characterization of substitution as replacement as necessarily impersonal:

Es kommt nur darauf an, wie man das Wort 'personal' faßt, ob die Analyse des Vorverständnisses unbefangen genug geschieht und ob sie offen ist für Veränderung da, wo es sich um göttliche Stellvertretung handelt, offen dafür, daß wir hier zwar sicher nicht unter das Menschliche herab, aber möglicherweise aber das Menschliche hinaufgeführt werden. Dafür ist nötig einzukalkulieren, daß Stellvertretung der Person auch ersetzendes Tun umschließen kann. Darauf, daß das Verhältnis der Personen nicht ersetzend sei, kommt es an, nicht aber darauf, daß ihr Tun nicht ersetzend sei.

30. See Sölle, op. cit., p. 25.

31. See Sölle, p. 26ff.

32. See Sölle, pp. 31-35.

33. Sölle, p. 36.

34. See Sölle, p. 37ff.

35. See Sölle, p. 39f.

36. See Sölle, p. 41.

37. Sölle, p. 46.

38. See Sölle, p. 55.
41. Sölle, p. 102f.
42. See Sölle, p. 106.
43. Sölle, p. 107.
44. Sölle, p. 109.
45. Sölle, p. 110.
46. Sölle, p. 110.
47. Sölle, p. 110.
49. Sölle, p. 110.
50. See Sölle, p. 112.
51. Sölle, p. 113.
52. Sölle, p. 114 ("mythischen Austausch" German edition p. 130).
53. See Sölle, p. 115f.
55. Sölle, p. 117.
56. Sölle, p. 119.
57. Sölle, p. 119.
58. Sölle, p. 119.
59. Sölle, p. 119.
60. Sölle, p. 120.
61. Sölle, p. 120.
62. Sölle, p. 120.
63. Sölle, p. 121f.
64. Sölle, p. 123.
65. Sölle, p. 125.
68. Sölle, p. 126.
69. Sölle, p. 126.
70. Sölle, p. 127.
71. Sölle, p. 128.
72. Sölle, p. 128.
73. Sölle, p. 128.
74. Sölle, p. 129.
75. Sölle, p. 130.
76. Sölle, p. 131.
77. Sölle, p. 131.
78. Sölle, p. 131.
79. Sölle, p. 131.
80. Sölle, p. 132.
82. Sölle, p. 134.
83. Sölle, p. 134.
84. Sölle, p. 136.
85. Sölle, p. 136.
86. Sölle, p. 138.
87. Sölle, p. 140.
88. Sölle, p. 142.
90. Sölle, p. 143.
91. Sölle, p. 143.
92. Sölle, p. 143.
93. Sölle, p. 144.
94. Sölle, p. 146.
95. Sölle, p. 149.
96. Sölle, p. 65.
97. Sölle, p. 66.
98. See Sölle, p. 67ff.
100. Sölle, p. 73.
102. The title of Chapter 13.
103. Sölle, p. 89.
104. Sölle, p. 89.
105. Sölle, p. 89.
106. Sölle, p. 90.
107. See Sölle, p. 91.
110. See Moltmann, p. 264.
111. See the following comment of Sölle, op. cit., p. 127:
   But acceptance of oneself, as one who lives in postponement, means nothing else except running ahead 'to God' and knowing that one's real life or identity is in him. What is known to be in him, saved in him - namely, our identity, which is not here but from which we derive the strength to deny plainly and definitely what actually is given - is symbolized in Christ.
112. Moltmann, op. cit., p. 263.
113. R. Jenson, God after God (1969), p. 65. Jenson describes Sölle's concept of representation as "a valuable contribution; were I now attempting a soteriology I would appropriate it whole" (p. 64). However, although he recognises that "the ontological position of the whole discussion is left ambiguous" (p. 64) he does not appear to recognise that this ambiguity in relation to the future of God has its correlate in an ambiguous content of man's hoped for identity.
114. Sölle, op. cit., p. 129.
117. Sölle, p. 144.

118. See the conclusion to the Chapter on Christ's dependence on God where Sölle states, p.149:

God wills to be represented. He has made himself representable. ... He has become dependent; he has mediated himself into the world. He became man.

120. Sölle, p. 115.
121. Sölle, p. 115.
122. Sölle, p. 115.

124. See Sölle's comments (p. 114) that illustrate the 'hint given by the unconscious', within the fields of psychoanalysis, the 'omnipotence of thoughts', and those societies that are shaped by a 'less differentiated sense of the body'.

125. Sölle, p. 102f.
126. Sölle, p. 119.
127. Sölle, p. 118.
128. Sölle, p. 119.
129. Sölle, p. 120.
130. Sölle, p. 120.
131. Sölle, p. 120.
132. Sölle, p. 120.
133. Sölle, p. 121.
134. Sölle, p. 121.
135. Sölle, p. 121f.
136. Sölle, p. 122.
137. Sölle, p. 122.
139. Sölle, p. 122.
Endnotes to Chapter VII


2. It must again be stressed that the contexts under discussion in this thesis are primarily theological. This is not to minimise or discount the significance of a study of the social, economic, political and linguistic contexts in which the terms operate.

3. See, for example, the work of G. Dunstan, particularly in his work *The Artifice of Ethics* (1974).
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