The logic of educational studies: a philosophical investigation of the literature, 1952 - 1961

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THE LOGIC OF EDUCATIONAL STUDIES:
A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE LITERATURE,
1952 - 1961

In Two Volumes

VOLUME TWO

Arthur Tubb

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In particular, in establishing and maintaining a large Department of Education in a new college from 1968 to its closure in 1980, the writer had to weigh the claims made by the various discipline-teams and school-orientated teams for teaching time, resources, etc. This could be done only by becoming familiar with the various branches of educational studies from which arguments in support of these claims were derived.

An early sign of this was the establishment of the curriculum as a field of study. See J.F. Kerr (ed.), Changing The Curriculum (London: University of London Press, 1968) where he argues, in introducing contributions from each of the disciplines, for: 'the notion that the curriculum is the natural core for...courses for teachers so that it becomes the reason for the inclusion of selected topics from the separate disciplines and the integrating force for all the elements of the course' (p.9).

J. Passmore, 'Historiography of Philosophy', in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. 6 (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1967) pp.226-230. Passmore is, of course, known in educational circles for work which is more clearly relevant to educational concerns - particularly for his The Perfectibility of Man (London: Duckworth, 1970) and his recent The Philosophy of Teaching (London: Duckworth, 1980) which serves to remind us that this most erudite historian of philosophy and acknowledged expositor of philosophical method (Philosophical Reasoning (London: Duckworth, 1961); and 'Philosophy' in Edwards, Encyclopedia, Vol. 6, pp. 216-226) was trained in the 1930s as a secondary school teacher. We shall find that he is not the only first-class pure philosopher with such a background.

Passmore, 'Historiography', p.229.

The new period is, of course, 1952 to 1961, during which the so-called 'mush' labelled in the following quotation was produced. It will be argued that 'mush' is not an appropriate description and that Peter Chambers' type of solution does not solve the problem of teacher preparation. See P. Chambers, 'The Study of Education in the Colleges. Harking Back!', Chapter 4 in J.W. Tibble (ed.), The Future of Teacher Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971). Chambers argues for rigorous specialization in one area arising out of relevant curriculum theory, giving the student choice: 'The specialist movement was almost certainly necessary to change educational theory from "mush" to "mesh", but on its own it would have remained sterile and arid. The future demands a new level of integration in which the rigorous and disciplined pursuit of some specialism acts as a focus for integrating a student's understanding of the theoretical bases of his work as a teacher.' p.71. An interesting comment was made at that time by J.P. Tuck in a
thorough review-article on five books concerned with teacher education – including the James Report. As will be mentioned at several points during this thesis, Tuck has been a consistently good reviewer for over three decades – always balanced, knowledgeable and fair, even though he leaves the reader in no doubt that he has his own point of view. He says, of Chambers' suggestions: 'This kind of muddle makes one wonder whether it is not urgently necessary to re-formulate educational studies as an independent group of topics, related to other subjects but not dismembered by them'. 'Review Article', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (October 1972), p.326. He makes, too, the perceptive remark: 'In the attempt to develop a philosophy of teacher education the colleges have been anxious to remove the apparent dichotomy between the academic and the professional parts of their work, and to introduce an integrated approach.' (p.323). The whole of the present thesis could be described as an attempt to explore this 'apparent dichotomy' (in at least two of its dimensions) as it appears in many different contexts.

6 Peters' exceptions can be noted, for two of them will feature heavily in the chapters ahead: 'When I moved over into the field of philosophy of education I found very little which was particularly helpful save the perceptive writings of Louis Arnaud Reid, my predecessor in the chair at the University of London Institute of Education. 'Preface' to Psychology and Ethical Development (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), pp.14-15. He excepts Israel Scheffler and Michael Oakeshott, in addition, from the charge.

7 William Taylor is perhaps best-known for making this judgement, in 'The Sociology of Education', Chapter 6 in J.W. Tibble, (ed.) The Study of Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966). Taylor contrasts those who 'have been trained in university departments' (p.181) with 'those with interests rather than qualifications in the subject' (p.188). Close attention will be paid to the background to this attitude as a 'political' sub-theme of this thesis.

8 'The British Journal of Educational Studies', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, (November 1952), p.67. The Editor of the journal was the historian A.C.F. Beales and the manifesto appeared under 'Notes and News' (pp. 67-71), a repeated feature of great interest for the period covered in this thesis. Thirty years later a very interesting account of the founding of the Standing Conference on Studies in Education and the establishment of a new journal was given in 'Notes on the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Standing Conference on Studies in Education', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 230-233. In it Roger Webster makes a
remark that will be seen to have great significance for the argument presented in the present work: 'When the Standing Conference was created in the fifties, many of us saw it simply as a means of counteracting the over-emphasis on educational psychology that we felt characterized educational studies at that time' (p.230).

A little later than the event of 1952, further organization of educational studies at national level was accomplished by the establishment of an index to the literature. See The Librarians of Institutes of Education, British Education Index, Vol. 1 (August 1954). (London: Library Association, 1954).


11 Yet, as we shall show in detail, two of the contributors to this famous volume - its Editor and Ben Morris - appear constantly in the period under present investigation as spokesmen for a 'generalist' position on educational theory which is quite contrary to the use to which The Study of Education was put in teacher-training institutions during an era of expansion and career-making. An explanation of their involvement in the volume is implied though not developed in the content of this thesis.

12 As P.H. Nowell-Smith says, in a philosophical text which has, as we shall see, great significance for a proper view of the logic of educational studies: 'a philosopher can only make his own views clear by contrasting them with those of his predecessors'. Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), p.22.

13 For the moment it will suffice to comment that the origin of the debate was in the pure philosophical journal Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 52 (27th October, 1955). Papers were printed of contributions by Harry Broudy and Kingsley Price for a meeting of the American Philosophical Association on 27th December 1955 on the philosophy of education.

14 For an indication of the wide range of periodicals available at
the time of which only the more theoretical constitute the object of the present inquiry, see N.R. Tempest, 'Educational periodicals in England', International Review of Education, Vol. 2 (March 1956), pp.118-119.

This journal has been available in, for example, the Library of the University of Durham since its first issue as far back as 1931 as Harvard Teachers Record. It became Harvard Educational Review with Vol. 7 (1937). It is of interest to note that Vol. 1 contains W.H. Kilpatrick, 'A Defense of Philosophy in Education' (November 1931), pp.117-122, which was his debate of: 'Resolved, that for some of the vital problems of education philosophy not science is and must remain a guide to the solution'. Footnote, p.117. We shall find many echoes of this resolution in our own inquiry. They will be found, too, not only in the literature of education extended to give some coverage of American, Australian and European sources, but in the literature of philosophy itself, in particular, the writings of professional philosophers such as Stephen Toulmin, John Wisdom and Edwin Burtt — writings not commonly associated with the concerns of 'education' — are brought to bear on an argument which, without them, would lack an important illumination.
Chapter One
The Historical Field: From the Particular to the General

1 To anticipate a major assertion of a seminal work (I. Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1960)) certain aspects of which will be considered in detail later, we can offer a quotation the relevance of which will become increasingly clear as this investigation proceeds. Scheffler says, of important elements in the language of disciplines:

'When such definitions are taken out of the context of professional research activity, however, and embodied in statements addressed to the public or to teachers or professionals of another sort, often in an institutional setting, they must be judged in this role as other definitions are judged in the same capacity.' (p.13)

In a word, descriptive disciplines feature within a normative framework when they are disciplines 'of' education developed in the institutional context of teacher education.


3 Though in America the issues were already part of history. See S. Cohen, 'The History of the History of American Education, 1900-1976: The Uses of the Past', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 46, No. 3, (August 1976) pp.298-330. Cohen refers back to 'the struggles, primarily in the 1930s and 1940s, between those who would make the field purely "functional" - addressed to teacher training and to contemporary social problems - and those who would make it an academic discipline' (p.298); and analyzes, with impressive detail, the legacy of these struggles throughout our period and beyond.

possible extensions of the content of history of education. Apart from the curriculum being an area for exploration, there is, he says, 'A great field remaining for the research student...One day, perhaps, these many local studies will provide the basis for a national synthesis'. (p.66) This theme can be found also in B. Simon, 'Leicestershire Schools 1625-40', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (November 1954), pp.42-56, where he says, of the regional study of education, that it will form the basis of a 'reconstruction that must be made if the history of education is to be firmly based on a foundation of fact.' (p.42) All such improvements in content are, of course, irrelevant to the logical question of the place of history in the training of teachers.

As Armytage says, with characteristic vigour: 'The sharp end of the contemporary conflict is up in the no man's land of ideas, and we need a group of intellectual commandos of the Dilthey and Collingwood variety to essay a contemporary raid into the Geisteswissenschaften and to plot a new speculum mentis'. Armytage, 'Place of History' p.119.

As Armytage says, in characteristic style, to a University audience: 'But a good teacher needs more than mere technique, he needs a high outlook, he must not be what Ortega would call a sub-man, and high outlooks are formed by emancipating ourselves from the past, a task which demands understanding the past'. W.H.G. Armytage, 'Can Education Departments Educate?' Universities Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 (August 1955) pp.388-395.

Armytage, 'Place of History', p.118.


'It is but natural, in a swiftly changing time, to try and lift our heads and see what forces have carried us to where we now are. Our historians have become, more than ever, our consciences, pointing out what we ought to have done, and indicating what we should not have done. Especially in the educational world, where loose thinking, charlatanry and sheer vested interest jostle integrity, dedication and altruism, is the moral function of the historian important. He alone can
disentangle the various strands in a complex situation and enable us to marshal our ideas for a fresh encounter with the future.' (p.37)


11 Again, the whole passage is revealing:

'For too long, education departments have played on sections of the University periphery with bits and pieces of other studies, pejoratively labelled "educational". They have shrunken from the centre, from the union of Arts and Science (History and Nature) since their equipment is shabby and always deteriorating. They might start by jettisoning some of their equipment in their B echelons: the literacy tests, the antiquarian catalogues of acts and reformers, and the pedagogic panoply of audio-visual aids; and then embark (as a first step) on experimental courses in the history and philosophy of science, conducted, not by some pretentious second rater, but by someone specially recruited for the task.' Ibid, p.120.

12 Armytage, 'Education Departments', p.389.


14 See, as a preliminary example, H.M. Knox, 'Research in Educational Theory', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (November 1952), pp.52-55 which ends with a dismissal of 'much of the duplicated statistical outpourings that frequently pass for educational research'. (p.55)

15 Armytage also (not yet a Professor) addressed the Standing Conference in December 1953 on the history of education. See 'The Standing Conference', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1954) pp.170-171 for the context of a discussion in which the historian editor, A.C.F. Beales, asks, concerning the kind of material which we have seen Armytage criticize and which was clearly dominating the new journal: 'Has the history of education and its documentation received an undue amount of attention in the earliest numbers?' (p.170)

16 See J.D. Browne, Teachers of Teachers: A History of the Association of Teachers in Colleges and Departments of Education (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979) for the very complex relationship which existed between these two worlds. She was, as we shall see later, involved at first hand.
Browne, ibid, p.138, has a comment which points to this dimension:

'The Education departments tended to exist on the periphery of Universities, so that there were dangers to members of staff whose interests appeared to be linked too closely with those outside universities. There may have been a certain amount of intellectual and social snobbery in the position, but for the most part it was a recognition of the hard facts of the educational structure, facts which were erected into formidable barriers by the fostering of the binary system.'

See above (note 11).

It will be shown, in particular, that the 'new' disciplines of analytical philosophy and empirically-orientated sociology were based on the 'authority' of particular kinds of University training. Peters and Taylor, cited in the Introduction, are obvious examples of the new disciplinarians.


In brief, he argues against the 'covering law' theory: 'The historian does not seek a causal explanation in terms of universal laws. What he does seek is the explanation of a particular piece of human behaviour.' Ibid, p.114.

Ibid, p.112.

Burston was to develop his views on school history teaching in many influential publications. The essence of his approach, based explicitly on critical philosophy of history is, as expressed more fully later, 'that all teaching techniques and syllabuses inevitably rest upon assumptions about the nature of one's subject, its logic of explanation and its purpose and value in education'. 'Preface to First Edition', Principles of History Teaching 2nd edition (London: Methuen, 1972), n.p.

These are questions for which what might be called a 'vertical translation' of Burston's work (from history for the general education of school pupils upwards to history of education for both the personal and professional education of teachers) provides, at least, answers which are prosaic enough to be discussable. His later 'The Place of History in Education', in W.H. Burston and C.W. Green (eds.), Handbook for History Teachers 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1972), pp.3-17 is so clearly relevant to this issue that it is surprising that no 'translation' of it into Armytage's title ('The Place of the History of Education in Training Courses for Teachers') has been
attempted in the literature we are investigating.

This, similarly, can be regarded as a 'horizontal' translation of Burston's thesis.


Ibid, p.31.

Ibid, p.31.

Like all generalists, he stresses 'integration': 'Only concrete knowledge can be the vehicle for such integration. On the psychological side this springs naturally and only from studies of the actual children they teach. But history can be made to function in exactly the same concrete way, as a natural extension of this knowledge by way of the environment of these children, into questions of how they came to be precisely here, the educational experience of their parents and teachers, the origin and development of this particular school and of education in that particular area.' Ibid, p.31.

For a thorough later application of this kind of thinking to the continued education of teachers working for a degree see the first unit of the innovative Open University course E200. Contemporary Issues In Education, written thirty years later: P. Barnes, Education Through Autobiography (Milton Keynes: The Open University 1981). Barnes gives as his reason for an approach to educational studies through the autobiographies of his students that:

'By relating these issues to personal experience, I hope to illustrate that they have significance for the individual, even though they are often discussed at an abstract, academic level which seems far removed from people's day-to-day lives.' (p.6)

Morris, 'Educational Scholarship', p.31.

Ibid, p.34.

Ibid, p.34. We shall encounter Morris at many points in this investigation, invariably attempting to place specialist contributions to the study of Education within a wide 'philosophical' framework. As an example we can give here his comment - on his characteristic view that we should look inwards to our 'nature' - that 'It is old, and in these days, old fashioned philosophy', 'Education and Individuality', New Era, Vol. 33, No. 4 (April 1952), p.75. With reference to the work of 'scholars' in the other disciplines that we shall be examining in the next three chapters he makes a typical comment: 'An
exclusive reliance on scientific abstractions and an over-emphasis on a purely logical philosophy of language is in part responsible I believe for our failure to think adequately about education, and about the relation of the individual to society'. Ibid, pp.75-76.

33 'The Standing Conference', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 1957), p.167. The whole account seems to the writer to catch the essence of the political dimension of academic discussion.

34 The varieties of personalism are many, but all would be likely to subscribe to the view that is put well by a contemporary American philosopher, who says:

'The person resists analysis into simpler constituents. It is a metaphysical ultimate for which traditional categories are conceptually inadequate'. R. Abel, Man is the Measure (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p.195. We shall find that Abel is just the first of several fine philosophers whose work is, here and there in this thesis, brought to bear on 'educational' themes - to ensure that discussion of them is less parochial than it would otherwise be.
Chapter Two

The Psychological Field: A Focus for Philosophy

1 Years later, D.P. Ausubel, a psychologist with a firmer grasp of logic than most, completed decades of work in this area with *Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968). There he distinguishes educational psychology from general psychology in a manner which is of importance for this thesis: 'Another way of epitomizing the difference between the two disciplines is to say that general aspects of learning interest the psychologist, whereas classroom learning, that is, deliberatedly guided learning of subject matter in a social context, is the special province of the educational psychologist. The subject matter of educational psychology, therefore, can be inferred directly from the problems facing the class teacher'. pp.8-9.

We shall turn on a number of occasions to Ausubel's early work in this chapter and - particularly - in the parallel chapter of Period Two.

2 In this period the technical philosophers are still waiting in the wings, assimilating Ryle and Wittgenstein. See G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), particularly 'Ch. X. Psychology'; and L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), which concludes with his famous verdict on psychology: 'The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science";...For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion.' (p.232 in Reprint of English Text, 1981).

3 On the standpoint of this scientific tradition one of the most influential of contemporary moral philosophers writes in this period: 'I think it would be a great pity, then, if those studying education should become so enamoured of pure science that they should suppose that value judgments were only for "others".' C.L. Stevenson, 'The Scientist's Role and the Aims of Education', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Fall 1954), p.238.


London Institute, Bearings, p.vii.


Ibid, p.44. See also C.M. Fleming, 'The Place of Psychology in the Training of Teachers', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (November 1954) pp.17-23. Once more she offers more history than logic, with little attention to the large implications of the term 'place'.

London Institute, Bearings, pp.187-188.


London Institute, Bearings, p.157. Wall's peroration strongly implies the complex imponderables of the teachers' classroom reality which, in other contexts, draws attention to the teacher as a person rather than a technician - as someone practising an art rather than applying psychological principles:

'Pedagogic method and the mode of presentation of material to be learned will facilitate the child's understanding. The choice of the right time and the appropriate stage in growth will make his learning easier. The teacher's rapport with his pupil, his understanding of and sympathy with him as an individual, will provide the climate favourable to learning. Social demands, immediate and remote, our philosophies, our respect for and knowledge of cultural values, will suggest the content of curricula. All these, however, partake of leading the horse to water. Only those aspects of the pupil's total past and present
environment which tend to arouse his participation, to create or stimulate needs, and to turn the energies of his emotional life outwards, towards contact with experience will in fact bring him to learn.' (p.166)

14 E.A. Peel, The Psychological Basis of Education (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1956), p.2. For contrasting reviews see the long comment by Cyril Burt in British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 3 (November 1956), pp.218-222; and the observations of Elizabeth Richardson (whose work we shall examine fully in Chapter Five) in Education for Teaching, No. 45 (February 1958), pp.43-46.

15 Peel, Psychological Basis, p.4.


17 Peel, 'Some Contributions', pp.67-68.

18 Ibid, p.70. This passage, even more than that from Wall in Note 13 above, would be a good specimen for analysis in a beginner's philosophy class. It is interesting - given Peel's picture-thinking - that an admirable plain man's introduction to modern philosophical method was published at about this time - J. Wilson, Language and The Pursuit of Truth (London: Cambridge University Press, 1956) - and briefly reviewed with condescension within the sector we are examining: P.P. Brown, Review of Wilson, British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 1957), pp.185-186. Wilson was, as is well-known, to become the Socratic gadfly on the rump of educational studies, showing increasing activity into the 1980s.

19 B.F. Skinner, 'The Science of Learning and the Art of Teaching', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring 1954), p.93. The preceding passage to that in the text shows a confidence not to be found in eclectic learning theorists:

'The modern classroom does not, however, offer much evidence that research in the field of learning has been respected or used. This condition is no doubt partly due to the limitations of earlier research. But it has been encouraged by a too hasty conclusion that the laboratory study of learning is inherently limited because it cannot take into account the realities of the classroom. In the light of our increasing knowledge of the learning process we should, instead, insist upon dealing with those realities and forcing a substantial change in them.' (p.93)

This Skinnerian confidence is based on his Science and Human


Morris's pre-war experience in schools and as a Lecturer in Education at Glasgow University before becoming Senior Psychologist to the War Office Selection Boards and then taking a staff post at the Tavistock Institute enters clearly into his philosophical position on scientific psychology. A similar position to that of Morris can be found tucked away in a specialist journal. W. Harding, 'Education Through Psychology', Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, Vol. 28 (January 1956), pp.5-14.

22 'This attitude is indeed not uncommon in contemporary England and it is usually the expression of an implicit act of evaluation whereby other approaches to the study of education are accorded inferior status. Moreover there are not a few to whom the term educational research seems to be almost synonymous with educational psychology, and educational psychology almost synonymous with statistical methods. Indeed until very recently the only learned journal published in this country dealing with the results of researches in education was one confined to psychological studies, largely of a statistical nature. Morris, 'Educational Research', p.78.

The 'learned journal' reference is, of course, to British Journal of Educational Psychology. The position in relation to it planned for the British Journal of Educational Studies is shown in the Editor's assurance that the new journal 'will not be narrowly specialist' but will have 'broad objects'. A.C.F. Beales, 'The British Journal of Educational Studies', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (November 1952), p.67.

23 Morris, 'Educational Research', p.85. See also B.A. Fletcher, 'Humanist Research at the University of Bristol Institute of Education', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (November 1953), pp.84-86. Morris was to become Professor of Education at Bristol University in 1956 on what can be seen as the principle of 'horses for courses'.


27 However, the confident position often taken on the application of depth psychology can be further judged from the comment by J.L. Henderson, one of the contributors to the *New Era* symposium, in another article ('Jung's Analytical Psychology and its Significance for Education in the Light of Recent Literature', *International Review of Education*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1956), pp.368-372) where he claims that 'the educational implications of Analytical Psychology are even more challenging and far-reaching' (p.368) than those of both Freud and Adler, without making at all clear what Freud's, Adler's or Jung's implications are. It is interesting that Freud's daughter in an article of the period much more modestly restricts her advice to warning teachers of young children against becoming mother substitutes. See A. Freud, 'The Role of the Teacher', *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Fall 1952), pp.229-234.

28 J.O. Wisdom, 'Psychology and Educational Outlook', *Journal of Education*, Vol. 88 (June 1956), p.245. It can be noted that this John Wisdom, editor of British Journal for the Philosophy of Science for many years, was like his more famous philosopher cousin (John Wisdom of Cambridge University) very interested in a 'technical' way in psycho-analysis without being an uncritical convert to its universal applicability. We shall later encounter Wisdom playing a much wider philosophical role which bears on this investigation.

29 Ibid, p.245.


33 D.P. Ausubel, 'The Nature of Educational Research', *Educational Theory*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October 1953), pp.314-320. Ausubel argues here that there are two approaches to education, one of which relies on sources other than research. Within the second, research-based approach there should be emphasis placed on development at a level other than the traditional 'basic research' or over-simple 'extrapolated research' - an autonomous 'applied' level of a type we shall be describing more fully later. See also Ausubel's other 'educational' concerns of this period in *The Theory and Problems of Adolescent Development* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1954).


38 P.H., Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), p.82.


41 H.C. Lindgren, Educational Psychology in the Classroom (New York: Wiley, 1956). Lindgren's text-book was to run to very many editions during the following quarter of a century.

42 Ibid, p.ix.


44 Coladarci, 'Relevancy', p.14. It can be noted that the original work from which this now-popular movement can be said to flow was S. Corey, Action Research to Improve School Practices (New York: Teachers College, 1953).


46 Ibid, p.59. See Note 2 above for the Wittgensteinian context of Ryle's criticism of scientific psychology.


Chapter Three

Varieties of Rigour in the Philosophical Field

1 It is common, in turning to philosophy, to focus on the 'isms' to be found there in abundance as standard positions of a skeletal kind. J.O. Urmson points to the reasons and the dangers, when he says that:

'some account can be given of the main answers to philosophical questions, those standard positions held so frequently as to be given a name such as realism, idealism, monism, dualism, nominalism, conceptualism, rationalism, and empiricism; these "isms" are rather skeletons of positions than full answers and no philosopher worthy of consideration can be adequately described as holding any combination of these "isms", for he always has his own peculiar contribution to make; but no reading of philosophy is possible without some understanding of these terms, dangerous and misleading though many of them are.'


5 Ibid, p.32.


Ibid, p.16.

L.A. Reid, Review of Henry, Modern Philosophies, Education for Teaching, No. 42 (February 1957), p.49. Reid's critical review contrasts strikingly with that of A.C.F. Beales, British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (November 1955), pp.82-83. the latter showing no recognition of what Reid refers to as 'the superficial chat full of claptrap phrases, which is unfortunately so pervasive and so depressing' (p.48). A typical professional philosopher's more positive contribution on a favourite topic by the Reid of this period is his 'Aesthetic Meaning', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 55 (1954-55), pp.219-250.


Reid, Review of Henry, p.49.


Bantock described himself years later as having 'a mind which, in so far as it has been trained at all, has been exercised on literature, supplemented by a little philosophy'. (This is quoted only from memory: the sense is certainly accurate). It is


21 Ibid, p.23.


24 J. Pilley, Review of Bantock, Freedom and Authority, British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 1952), pp.184-186. Bantock's book was very widely reviewed. See for example: W. Walsh, Bulletin of Education, No. 29 (November 1952), pp.26-29. He naturally approves the Leavisite position he finds in Bantock's 'arresting and original achievement' (p.29). See also J. Hemming, New Era, Vol. 34, No. 2 (February 1953), pp.32-36, who responds quite differently. It is fascinating to note - concerning the 'networks' of individuals-in-relation within educational literature - the reciprocal congratulations offered by Bantock in reviewing Walsh's The Use of Imagination (London: Chatto and Windus, 1959), Universities Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (November 1959), pp.87-90. He does not spare his praise for a fellow-Leavisite: 'Yet "magnificent" is the right note on which to end this review. For this is one of the few books on education of our time which, widely read and comprehended, could bring us from our parochial and ultimately trivial quarrels about method and organization to a sense of the humanity for which we ought on fact to be educating'. (p.89)


21


28 H.D. Aiken, 'Moral Philosophy and Education', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 1955), p.59. The context is revealing. Aiken argues, like Scheffler, that 'the analytical philosopher has not at all abandoned philosophy's ancient search for wisdom, but on the contrary is contributing his own important share to the world's all too skimpy fund of practical understanding. He makes his contributions partly by providing us with sharper tools and partly in a more direct way by freeing us from ancient myths and fetishes which have created endless confusion and needless disagreement about matters that are not necessary parts of the tragedy of human existence'. Ibid, p.59.

29 These papers were (as mentioned in the Introduction) presented at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association on 27th December 1955. It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which the presence of Dewey and pupils of the stature of Ernest Nagel and Sidney Hook was a factor in the seriousness with which American pure philosophers took the problems of educational philosophy. Certainly no such clear model existed in Britain: for example, Bertrand Russell's views on education have little connection with his technical philosophy.


31 Broudy, 'How Philosophical?', p.618.


34 W.K. Frankena, 'Toward a Philosophy of Philosophy of Education', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 1956), pp.94-98. Apart from other distinguished contributors mentioned below, T. Brameld can be identified in the symposium as one who

35 Frankena, 'Toward a Philosophy', pp.94-95.
36 Ibid, p.97.
37 Ibid, p.97.
39 Ibid, p.121.
40 Ibid, p.123.
42 Edel, 'Aims and Content', p.126. We can, at this point, expand the reference in our text to the interesting relationship between Edel and Peters. The review by Edel of Ethics and Education was very thorough and was recognized by Peters as important enough not only to be given the usual reply in the American journal which featured it but, also, to be referred to in Peters' later writings. To pursue the latter would take us too far from the present inquiry, but a comparison of the original review and rejoinder is useful for showing two fundamentally different attitudes to philosophy. See A. Edel,
Review of Ethics and Education, Studies in Philosophy and Education, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1968), pp.23-34 and R.S. Peters, 'Reply to Abraham Edel', pp.34-38 in the same volume. Edel's comment on cuts in the American edition is significant. As he says, they will 'strengthen the image in the United States of the linguistic philosopher at the expense of the philosopher resting on a base of the sciences and history of man'. (p.34)


43 H.S. Broudy, 'Philosophy of Education...A Review and Comment', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 1956), pp.289-290. His more general comment is even more revealing:

'It would seem in looking over the whole array of papers that the philosophy of education even before it is fully born is already in danger of (a) being volatilized into the rare atmosphere of pure philosophy, (b) being lost in the more viscous flow of enculturation, or (c) being starved by too lean a diet.' (p.291)


46 Ibid, p.66.

47 Ibid, p.66. For a view that philosophy of education should be taught by competent pure philosophers (like every other 'philosophy of') see the article by the eminent editor of the unique series The Library of Living Philosophers: P.A. Schilpp, 'The Distinctive Function of "Philosophy of Education" As A Discipline', Educational Theory, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1953), pp.257-268.

48 Price, 'Note', p.67.
Chapter Four

The Social Field and the Appearance of Sociology

1. A.C.F. Beales, the Editor responsible for using the term 'social' rather than 'sociological' in the British Journal of Educational Studies manifesto, was — we can usefully emphasize — a historian.


3. See B.P. Brown et al 'Editorial', Bulletin of Education, No. 29 (November, 1952), p.16 which says: 'We are happy to print in this number a group of articles on social studies and social psychology and their place in the training course. Several of these articles sprang from the initiating stimulus of Mr. K.G. Collier's paper, which he offered as an immediate target. The subject is explosively controversial and this is rightly reflected in the diverse approach of the several contributors'.

   It can be noted that, in addition to K.G. Collier, the other two men on the Editorial Board — T.W. Eason and J.W. Tibble — emerged as major proponents of general theory in the coming rigour-relevance debate (one very publicly: the other more behind the scenes).


6. Ginsberg's Sociology (London: Oxford University Press, 1934) has a first chapter on 'Scope and Method of Sociology' which ends with a statement of the view from which he was never to depart: 'A complete study of human life thus involves a synthesis, but not a fusion, of social science and social philosophy' (p.37).

8 Ibid, p.6.


13 Ibid, p.xi.

14 Ibid, p.xi.

15 'Chapter IX. Beyond Sociology'.

16 See, for example, for a clear indication of his broad concerns, A.K.C. Ottaway, 'Mental Health in the Training of Teachers', Bulletin of Education, No. 27 (February 1952), pp.7-11.

17 Ottaway, Education and Society, p.1.

18 A very famous reviewer of Ottaway's book gives support to the view that educational theory, like political theory, is inescapably normative, in asking: 'But why is Mr. Ottaway so apologetic about the introduction of value judgments into his work?...he has fallen under the spell of the so-called "scientific sociologists"'. G.D.H. Cole, 'Review of Education and Society', Journal of Education, Vol. 86, No. 1015 (February 1954), p.84.


20 One teacher-training commentater notes, of this aspect of Ottaway's work, that 'it may be recommended to the many students who have wondered why they should study the history of education'. A.H. Stewart, 'Review of Education and Society', Education for Teaching, No. 32 (May 1954), p.38.

21 Ottaway, Education and Society, p.16.

22 Ibid, p.16.


It can be noted that Ottaway made his own translation of Durkheim for the purposes of this article. It was not until the


26 Ibid, p.223.

27 He says: 'The first task of a scientific educational sociology is to provide the data by the use of which plans can be made and principles implemented'. *Ibid*, p.224. At about the same time he reviews, for the same journal, O. Banks, *Parity and Prestige in English Secondary Education* (London: Routledge, 1955) - *British Journal of Sociology*, 6 (1955), p.377 and refers again to the empirical work: 'While not being a substitute for the more exact investigations of educational opportunity and social status now available, it fills in the essential historical background to such studies' (p.378). See also W.H.F. Barnes, 'Education and Society: A Philosopher's Approach', Educational Review, Vol. 8 (February 1956), pp.86-100. Barnes was one of the few British professional philosophers of the period to take an interest in such topics.


29 It can be noted that an interest in Mead and education was developing. See R. Dreeben, 'Political and Educational ideas in the Writing of George Herbert Mead', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 1955), pp.157-168. Dreeben acknowledges the helpful criticism of Scheffler, thereby illustrating the inter-relationship of disciplinary interests in the context of education.

   Mead was, of course, to become a significant figure in the sociology of education of the 1970s. See the section 'Meadian man', in the context of 'Ch. 2. 'Social Control and Models of Man'. B. Davies, *Social Control and Education* (London: Methuen, 1976). See also, in Davies, pp.103-104, for an unusual view of Mannheim himself.

30 Stewart, 'Mannheim', p.112.

31 Ibid, p.112.

1953), pp.298-329.

It is interesting to note two of the other contributions to the special issue under scrutiny: (i) N.R. Dixon, 'Social Class and Education: An Annotated Bibliography', pp.330-338. This bibliography has 69 items covering the period 1943-1953; (ii) An article by W.A. Brookover, who was soon to produce A Sociology of Education (New York: American Book Co., 1955), the first attempt to examine education from a pure sociological rather than an applied educational-sociological point of view.


33 Gross, 'Critique', p.299.
34 Ibid, p.299.
38 The reviewer of Floud, Halsey and Martin's Social Class in British Journal of Educational Studies, R.R. Dale, refers to it immediately as a 'landmark in educational sociology'. Vol. 6, No. 1 (November 1957), p.81. See, for early 'empirical' sociology of an 'amateur' kind: W.A.L. Blyth, 'An Exploratory Enquiry Into the Relation between Habitat and Outlook Among


41 Ibid, p.427.


To complete this autobiographical aside, engendered by Morris's reference to the positive influence on him of Pilley, mention can be made of the influence of a 'negative' kind of Paul Hirst on the present writer - an influence evident in the attempt of this thesis to show that a 'Hirstian' concept of 'educational theory' was at work in the literature long before his time; and evident, in relation to Hirst's 'other' thesis which has taken an equal grip on teacher education, in another sustained piece of criticism of the writer, focused like the present one closely on the literature: A. Tubb, 'An Examination of Hirst's "Forms of Knowledge" Thesis in Relation to Its Philosophical Sources and Its Educational Critics'. M.A. (ed.) Dissertation, University of Durham, 1977.


44 Ibid, p.47


47  Morris, 'Research', p.46.
Chapter Five

The Pedagogical Field of General Theory

1 The comment is by W. Walsh, an educationist who, like many with a background in literature, was disposed in a similar fashion to Bantock to want to fuse many elements in educational thinking: 'The Literary Critic and the Education of an Elite', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May 1956), p.139. His Bantockian posture is to be seen in a passage which is striking for the way it echoes the central argument of this thesis: 'In an age of illiberal technicians and technical humanists, we have to develop a central intelligence, to train the accomplished non-specialist mind. For two reasons literary criticism is eminently qualified to be the discipline by which the mind is perfected...the complexity of its undertaking is such that it is bound to take a ranging view of its function and to reject any rigid limitation of its sphere of interest. It is impelled at all times to go beyond its own frontiers into the provinces of other disciplines'. Ibid, p.150.


3 Ibid, p.43.

4 The whole passage is a good example of a 'philosophical' position standing in need of the kind of careful philosophizing described in the chapter on philosophy of education. It presents an over-simplified logical picture, yet suggests some grasp of the need for inter-related theory:

'Educational theory, as taught, sometimes tends to confuse the means and ends of education. This is perhaps more true of continental teaching, where the material often appears as a single subject, "pedagogics", but even in Great Britain there are occasionally signs that the differences between methods and aims are not sufficiently emphasized. This is very unfortunate, for much harm is done when the person primarily interested in ends is unable to recognize or make clear the limits of his means. Conversely, the educational psychologist may sometimes find himself trespassing on the grounds of the philosopher. The problem is not met so frequently when it is customary to teach Principles and Psychology separately and at the same time to present them so that the effect of the one on the other is more apparent to the student. Dr Sparrow's article clearly draws our attention to the confusion which may arise when these two sides to educational theory are not clearly stated.'


14 Ibid, p.347.


16 Holmes, 'Teacher of Teachers', p.11.

17 Ibid, p.11.

18 It will be recalled that Kerr's observation on the curriculum as the 'natural core' of teacher education (Note 2 in the Introduction) was not made until 1968.

19 Holmes, 'Teacher of Teachers', p.12.


21 Two remarks by Passmore in his 'Historiography of Philosophy' are relevant: (i) 'The cultural historian...takes...seriously the sociohistorical affiliations of the philosophers he is discussing.' (p.228); (ii) 'The cultural historian is certainly correct in rejecting the view that philosophy is wholly
autonomous.' (p.229).

29 C. Bibby et al, 'Symposium: The Three Year Course in Training College', Education for Teaching, No. 32 (May 1954), p.16. The editorial by [K.G. Collier] to this issue identifies, in two of its contributors, both the composite theory and the institutional context provided by colleges in the hope that the theory would be comprehended in a personal way; that is, two notions which are stressed in the present chapter. As Collier puts it: 'Mr Holmes' insistence on the need for a more rigorous and comprehensive clarification of our educational values, taking full account of the ethical, historical, psychological and sociological factors involved, and Miss Jebb's reference to Newman: the college community "which gives breath to living teaching...which haunts the home where it has been born, and which imbues and forms, more or less, every individual who is successively brought under its shadow".' 'Editorial', Education For Teaching, No. 32 (May 1954), p.2.
30 Bibby, 'The Three Year Course', p.17.
31 Ibid, p.17.
32 Ibid, p.18.
34 Ibid, p.28.


37 Dent, 'Outsider's Comment', p.35.

38 Ibid, p.36.


41 Certainly Universities do still pay what Tibbie calls 'lip service' in pronouncements such as the following: 'The common aim of all...courses - whether calling primarily for the study of one or two subjects in depth or the study of three or more subjects on a broader basis - is to produce minds which are trained, which are capable of recognizing the unity of knowledge, despite its "compartmentalization", and which can be applied more effectively in later years'. University of Durham, General Prospectus 1983-84 (Durham: University of Durham, 1982), p.11.

42 Berry and Wilson, 'Reflections', p.20.

43 Ibid, p.20.

44 Ibid, p.20.


46 Ibid, p.32.


Much later, following decades of pure philosophical development in which 'technical' analyses of the concept of Person moved closer to the central interests of philosophers, an American philosopher of wide-ranging interests (from whom we quoted earlier) was to say: "...it is the person who learns, who makes choices, who doubts, who acts and strives, who grows, who is guided by morality, who has an inner standpoint, who is creative". R. Abel, *Man Is The Measure* (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p.195. Substitute 'the teacher' for 'the person' here and we have a contemporary Pilleyian viewpoint. The whole of Abel's 'Chapter 17. The Person' bears admirably on the present argument.

Positivism, to Pilley, presupposes 'that human beings are nothing but natural objects whose behaviour like that of a physical object is entirely explicable by reference to antecedent circumstances'. Ibid, p.22. One would guess that he would come up with answers to all the twenty-five questions asked by Abel concerning 'intention' as an explanation of human action - in 'Chapter 20. Intention, Action and Free Will', Abel, *Man Is The Measure*, pp.235-248.
right — so much so, indeed, that they have been under fire in recent years for developing theory at the expense of practice'.
Ibid, p.10.

63 Ibid, p.10.

64 'Only about half of the writing, however, has been from the psychological field. The other group of articles has been concerned with the history of education 'S.C. Gordon, Research Publications of the University of Durham Institute of Education', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (November 1954), p.89.


66 'University of Birmingham Institute of Education: Educational Review', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (May 1955), p.188. It is interesting to note that the reviewer himself is uninformative about his own notion of 'theory', classifying the articles as 'A, Theory; B, Surveys of Fields; C, Accounts of Modern Methods of Teaching; D, Reports of Original Research or Experiments'. Ibid, p.188.


68 Ibid, p.52.

69 A definitive later argument for this distinction was to be offered by Mauritz Johnson, Jr., 'Definitions and Models in Curriculum Theory', Educational Theory, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1967), pp.127-140. His views appeared in the British literature not long after in 'The Translation of Curriculum into Instruction', Journal of Curriculum Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 1969), pp.115-131. The first issue of this journal appeared in November 1968, as this field of study became the institutionalized focus for efforts to inter-relate the disciplines with the school more clearly in view.

70 Joselin, 'Curriculum Development', p.56.

71 Ibid, p.56.

72 Ibid, p.58.
The following passage indicates both characteristics:

'The curriculum field came to life as a self-conscious area of speculation and inquiry early in the 1920s. It proceeded to evolve and sub-divide itself in an orderly way...for forty years....After 1955 the entire field came under such fundamental questioning that the discourse became scattered, old questions were being asked as if they had not been thought of before, and the process of curriculum development had been largely restructured'. A.W. Foshay and L.A. Beilin, 'Curriculum'; in R.L. Ebel (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Educational Research, 4th ed. (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969), p.275.


They included L.J. Cronbach, N.L. Gage, C.W. Harris and R.M. Travers.

Bloom, Taxonomy, p.2.

It is of interest that the state of the field at this time in Australia - a country whose literature we shall occasionally sample - reflected the American rather than the British scene. See W.R. Connell, 'A Glossary of Curriculum Terms', Forum of Education, Vol. 14, No. 1 (July 1955), pp.16-22.


Ibid, p.310.

Ibid, p.310.

See A.N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education (London: Williams & Norgate, 1929), particularly for his notions concerning inert ideas and the characteristic rhythm in learning which moves from initial romance to precision and final generalization.
87  Collier, 'Theory and Practice', p.29.
Chapter Six

Words and the World in the Philosophy of Education


2. The most public of what is here referred to as 'conventional overviews' is the 'Thirtieth Anniversary Issue' of *British Journal of Educational Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (February 1982). The whole issue (which covers sociology, psychology, philosophy and history of education together with other areas of less central importance) pays mere lip-service to the literature of the 1950s. A careful reading of the contributions of Olive Banks, Ann Clarke, Robert Dearden, Brian Simon and Alan Blyth (offering a kind of general view) confirms the judgement that they all regard the early 1960s as the real starting point, in spite of the courtesy offered to the journal in which they write of taking 1952 as the beginning of the story. The articles in question are:


In the light of the argument presented in this thesis, it is interesting to note the number of questions asked by the Editor, Margaret Sutherland (whom we shall shortly meet in our account of earlier times): 'Is there indeed one discipline of Education or are there simply a number of disciplines of education? Specialisms have grown: for professional advancement in Education it seems necessary today to be a specialist. Yet what is the outcome of uncoordinated digging at the chalkface? Surely specialists must achieve and retain awareness of the work of colleagues in other disciplines? Surely there must be some overriding principles which determine the value judgments and policy decisions of the educative process? Can philosophy of education produce these? Yet few philosophers of education today seem polymath and generalist enough to assimilate and coordinate the findings of other specialists. In particular, what approach to the disciplines of education is appropriate for the teacher (of children or adults)?' 'Editorial', p.6. (The first draft of this thesis was, of course, written long before this anniversary issue recalling 1952 appeared.)

p.570. It is interesting to see the contrast provided by W.H.F. Barnes' review in Philosophy, Vol. 34, No. 128 (January 1959), pp.85-87, particularly in the comment that O'Connor 'reveals himself as being a rationalist and anti-metaphysical positivist with some strong leanings towards more recent linguistic doctrines' (p.86). An example of actual 'educational' philosophizing in this most popular of philosophical journals is G. Ardley, 'What Kind of Education?', Philosophy, Vol. 35 (1960), pp.153-157. Its tone can be compared with the discussion of another concept relevant to educational thinking in the 'other' journal commonly taken by professional philosophers: B.J. Diggs, 'A Technical Ought', Mind, Vol. 69 (1960), pp.301-317.

4 Quinton, Review, p.569. The classic compilation of readings which shows the range of positions in the 'school' to which O'Connor belongs was soon to appear: A.J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).


6 As McClellan puts it: 'At the present time, but in strictest continuity with its historical tradition, British analysis has broadened its scope and is attempting to explicate the logic of the myriad uses of language in everyday life'. Ibid, p.87.

7 Ibid, p.87.

8 With reference to O'Connor's kind of question, McClellan says: 'one has the feeling that he would lack the necessary background in understanding (or is it better called sympathy?) to comprehend the answers if someone should give them to him'. Ibid, p.87.

9 McClellan adopts a tone of voice which anticipates Hirst in saying: 'To think that one can analyze the job of educational theories with just the distinctions developed in the analysis of scientific theories is simply naive'. Ibid, p.88.

10 A.M. Kean, 'Philosophy and Education', Journal of Education, Vol. 89, No. 1056 (July 1957), p.310. He is a most unimpressed reviewer, claiming that he has heard it all before; that what appears pathological to one philosopher may well be normal to a more sensitive mind; and that the key presented by O'Connor 'will not open any of the doors we want it to open'. Ibid, p.312. It is interesting to compare Kean's review with his own positive views from Period One, to be found in 'What is Education?' Researches and Studies, Vol. 13 (January 1956), pp.45-54. Kean's comments on O'Connor can be compared with those
of another reviewer in another of the educational journals which do not recruit pure philosophers for the task. R. Hamilton turns from the imprecision of educational language 'with a certain relief to the new school of philosophical analysis'. Review, Educational Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (June 1958), p.254. In contrast, referring to a volume edited by A.V. Judges which we will examine shortly, he says that 'other schools define philosophy differently and consequently have a different view of education'. Ibid, p.256. He thereby begs O'Connor's question in a manner which O'Connor, a noted logician, would no doubt expect from a non-philosopher.


12 Reid, Review of O'Connor, p.89. The nature of this lopsidedness comes out very clearly in Reid's very thorough review of another philosopher who is more to his liking, when he claims that: 'Descartes....Hume....Mill....Bertrand Russell....the neo-empiricists...have all exhorted us to the philosopher's religion of doubt', not realizing that 'Doubt in fact can only exist within a framework of belief.' Review-article on M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958); British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (November 1959), pp.69-70.

13 L.A. Reid, 'Problems of Teaching Philosophy of Education', in G.Z.F. Bereday and J.A. Lauwerys (eds.), The Year Book of Education, 1957: Education and Philosophy (London: Evans, 1957), p.531. It is more than likely that Reid, unlike most others on the evidence of the literature, was familiar with the American work examined in the present chapter. He was to say in his valedictory lecture five years later (14th June 1962): 'Recently there have been some stirrings. A lot has been going on in America during the last ten years: the Americans have at least made a start'. Philosophy and the Theory and Practice of Education (London: Evans for the University of London Institute of Education, 1965), p.6.

14 Reid, 'Problems', p.532. It is as appropriate here as anywhere to make reference to Lionel Elvin's contribution to the parent volume that contains Reid's article. For Elvin was to 'think things together' in two later books whose arguments relate closely to our own investigation. These are Education and Contemporary Society (London: Watts, 1965) and The Place of Commonsense in Educational Thought (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977). No doubt Elvin's experiences as Director of the University of London Institute of Education from 1958 to 1973 - that is, during the period when the differentiation of educational studies took place, offered limited satisfaction and
led to the demand for re-integration - were causal in relation to the non-specialist standpoint he occupies. But, as Director of the Department of Education at UNESCO from 1950 to 1956 and as Principal of Ruskin College before that (1944 to 1950) he had already been involved in education at a high administrative level in contexts which demand a generalist response to meet wide overall responsibilities. See, in our Period Two, his 'The Philosophy of UNESCO', in Bereday and Laugher's, Education and Philosophy, pp.294-314, and 'Tradition and Experiment in Education', New Era, Vol. 40, No. 2 (February 1959), pp.21-27. It can be noted that Elvin, like J.P. Tuck, is one of the 'old guard' who has written some splendid reviews of contemporary offerings since his retirement. See, for instance, his review of Robin Barrow's The Philosophy of Schooling (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1981), British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol, 30, No. 3 (October 1982), pp.353-354. Tuck's 1958 review of the big volume from which this background note has developed will be mentioned later in this chapter and also in Chapter 9 to make a point of relevance to general theory.

Reid, 'Teaching Philosophy', p.534. Reid, of whom A.J. Ayer was to write, with reference to his own appointment, as against Reid, to a chair in pure philosophy at London University: 'His style of philosophy was so different from mine that I was surprised that the issue should have come to rest between us', (Part of My Life (London: Collins, 1977), p.308) is not short of sayings which confirm this commitment to synthesis and the related attitude to narrow technical philosophers. At the same time he is equally critical of sloppy amateurs. These two statements are typical:

'The great problems of philosophy include problems of the nature of man, his freedom, his knowledge', he asserts. Reid, 'Teaching Philosophy', p.533. Yet, 'Much that is dubbed "philosophy" of education is contained in books no respectable philosopher would be seen dead with'. Ibid, p.543.

One educationist, who was well aware of Reid's low opinion of much 'philosophy' in education as expressed in this comment, is well worth reading on this matter alongside Reid. In W.S. Fowler, 'Is There A Philosophy of Education', Studies in Education, Vol. 3, No. 1 (July 1958), pp.20-26, it is argued that there is always a core of educational problems 'which requires a synthetic philosophy to offer an answer' (p.25); and Fowler quotes from Michael Oakeshott, whom, it will be recalled, Peters was to praise later.


18 Ibid, p.162.

19 The relevant passage in Scheffler illuminates well the logical issue:

'If we picture philosophical analysis as a sovereign subject with its own territory bordering on other dominions only at specific points, we shall be tempted to construe the philosophy of education as having primarily ambassadorial functions - to bring greetings from analysis to the neighbouring land of education and to arrange congenial tours for foreigners. If, on the contrary, we picture philosophical analysis as a set of precision tools for the maintenance and repair of delicate intellectual machinery, we shall expect philosophy of education to deal with the most intimate mechanisms of discourse on education: its peculiar idioms and metaphors, forms of reasoning, theoretical conflicts and puzzles, distinctions and classifications'. Ibid, p.163.


21 Curt Ducasse reaches an interesting conclusion which echoes Pilley and the personalists, when he says: 'that an education is humanly right in proportion as it is as liberal as the circumstances of the individual concerned permit. Essentially, liberal education is liberating education'. 'What Can Philosophy Contribute To Educational Theory?', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Fall 1958), p.297. This can be related to the characteristic statement of Pilley, that:

'It is the extent to which our pupils succeed in unifying their studies as activities of an integral, informed understanding and character that is the criterion by which we must judge whether our teaching is succeeding in any real sense.', 'The Boundaries of Subjects', Researches and Studies, Vol. 20 (July 1959), p.74.


It is significant that Frankena in writing for educationists offers the names of two groups of professional moral philosophers - one British and one American - whose work bears on education in what Frankena thinks of as the 'technical' post-Deweyian era. These are: R.M. Hare, S.E. Toulmin, S.N. Hampshire, P.H. Nowell-Smith; and K. Baier, H.D. Aiken, P. Edwards, A.I. Melden, J. Rawls. The 'common approach', according to Frankena, originates in the philosophical tradition which focusses on language and which stems from the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and G.E. Moore. It was in the following year that there appeared a comprehensive work in that tradition which, as its title implies, has strong implications for the argument of this thesis: S. Hampshire, Thought and Action (London: Chatto and Windus, 1959). An influential article of relevance by one of those named by Frankena is A.I. Melden, 'Reasons for Action and Matters of Fact', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 35 (1961-62), pp.45-60. We shall see presently that later developments in the philosophy of Stephen Toulmin illuminate an important aspect of this thesis.

This is very evident in the passage where Frankena argues that we 'must not be wholly concerned with developing first-order dispositions...but more generally with cultivating such second order dispositions as integrity, self-control, and a readiness to be governed by impartial and objective thinking and fact-finding'. Ibid, p.312. Again, a 'translation' from teaching pupils to teaching teachers to teach pupils can be fruitfully made of: 'I have not said much about methods. This is mainly a matter for psychologists and educational scientists...One general remark I must make, namely, that the methods of moral education must be moral'. Ibid, p.313. We find this last point - that the manner of teaching is morally constrained - is a central one in the approach of Peters which was to be developed during the following decades. It is emphasized wherever Frankena writes. For example, he says in reviewing C.A. Baylis, Ethics, (New York: Holt, 1958), in Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer 1959), pp.251-253: 'any answers to questions about the goals and even the methods of education must depend in part on moral considerations' (p.251) - a clear statement of the normative nature of educational thinking at all levels. A very interesting article of his which illustrates his own
philosophizing about dispositions appears in an issue of the important American pure philosophy journal The Monist which was devoted to the 'General Topic: Philosophy of Education', Vol. 52, No. 1 (January 1968); that is, W.K. Frankena, 'Educational Values and Goals: Some Dispositions To Be Fostered', pp.1-10. In passing, it can be noted that Frankena's philosophical standing was such that, on another occasion, he himself became the single topic for a whole issue of The Monist, i.e. 'The Philosophy of William Frankena', Vol. 64, No. 3 (July 1981) pp.271-417 (10 articles).

30 G.E. Barton, 'Comment', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Fall 1958), p.314. Barton recognizes, of course, (for all his concern with practicalities) that indirect illumination of the nature of the thinking which must guide practice can be gained from Frankena who, he says, 'has explicitly offered his paper, not as an argument on our central problem, but as an example of how a philosopher can contribute to education'. Ibid, p.314.


33 Ibid, p.316.

34 Ibid, p.317.

35 This is, of course, Abraham Edel, whose early work was examined in Period One, where his relationship to Peters was mentioned. Here we can note that he later returned to his critique of Peters in a substantial article whose main point is expressed as follows: 'Peters in adding a reflection on the translation and point of analysis paraphrases Wittgenstein: "conceptual analysis leaves everything as it is". That is, the ethical and social decisions are separate and come after the analysis is completed. I have been arguing that they are integral to the analysis at the points of choice throughout, together with the empirical, scientific, and historical considerations'. 'Analytical Philosophy of Education at the Crossroads', in J.F. Doyle (ed.), Educational Judgments: Papers in the Philosophy of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp.232-257 (p.252).

36 Barton, 'Comment', p.318.


38 For example, in moving from the fifth to the sixth of his analyses, he refines talk of 'many-track' dispositions which result from successful teaching into:

"Having an education" refers to a "two-track" believing disposition...believing that something is the case; but being disposed to do something constitutes a second track' K. Price,'On "Having an Education"', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Fall 1958), p.333. Once more we can note an argument focussed on pupil-learners can be applied just as well to teacher-learners receiving their own professional education.


40 Price, 'Having An Education', p.335.

41 Scheffler, 'Comment', p.338. The key passage in Scheffler, which is of importance not only in this critique but because it is a foretaste of an important development of Scheffler's views which was in the making, is: 'Professor Price's view seems to me, in sum, a kind of impression theory of education, in which sentences take the place of ideas impressed on the tablet of the mind. This theory, even in its new linguistic form, still fails to do justice to education as the shaping of will and conduct, and it construes the teaching of skills, and even of facts, in an inappropriately mechanical way'. Ibid, p.339. The later publication of Scheffler which is anticipated here is 'Philosophical Models of Teaching', Harvard Educational Review', Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring 1965), pp.131-143 where this 'impression' model is compared with an 'insight' model and a 'rule' model.


46 Ibid, p.3.

47 Ibid, p.3. In addition Scheffler makes an important distinction (which Hirst was to emphasize much later) when he argues that
the aim of analysis is not the direct solution of practical problems, for 'these problems typically involve much more (or much less) than conceptual difficulty and the influence of philosophy on educational practice must correspondingly be concerned as much more subtle and indirect'. Ibid, p.3-4.

48 Ibid, p.5.


50 Scheffler's catholicity extended only to analytical philosophy, as can be seen in his review of Morton White's ambitious Toward Reunion in Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). About this famous pragmatic analyst he says that White attempts 'an integration of various philosophic perspectives, among themselves, and with other aspects of life. What he wants to achieve is a philosophical wholeness, in which theorizing, doing, evaluating, and feeling are all seen in their connectedness', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter 1957), p.157. While Scheffler is, as usual, thorough in his description of what he criticizes, his analysis of 'the slippery concept of reunion' (p.158) firmly indicates the conviction about analysis seen in his introduction to the readings above. The philosophy of what he calls 'a warmer, grander, more speculative era', (p.156) can hardly, in his view, be reunited with analytical approaches, even though such approaches are not now confined to that branch which 'throughout its short life, presented a particularly austere face to the world' (p.156). From our point of view, the fact that this review appears in an educational journal is significant in showing the high level at which the American discussion was taking place. Scheffler's involvement at the same time in deep technical philosophizing can be seen in I. Scheffler and N. Chomsky, 'What Is Said to Be', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 59, (1958-59), pp.71-82. This is a comment on Willard Quine's ontology.


54 Ibid, p.3.

55 Ibid, p.3.


59 R.D. Archambault, Review, Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 1961), p.353. Archambault, who was to play a catalytic role in introducing analytical philosophy of education to Britain, stresses the emphasis placed by Scheffler on the importance of context which makes this first systematic work illustrative in its own mode of philosophizing of 'a completely different view of the nature, function and scope of educational philosophy'. (p.354) Yet he expresses reservations - in spite of his suggesting that the stables are not yet clean enough in education - on behalf of those, whom we have identified, who want 'to go beyond analysis and towards synthetic statements which, to be sure, would not be intended to serve as prescriptions, but rather as enlightened suggestions for improvement in policy'. (p.355) His awkward distinction between 'prescription' and 'enlightened suggestion' illustrates the difficulty felt at that time by intuitive sceptics about the full analytical claim. His ambivalence is much in evidence in spite of the praise he bestows.


64 Ibid, p.107. Later, Scheffler was to criticize explicitly the Skinnerian basis of the programmed instruction boom in 'A Note on Behaviorism As Educational Theory', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1962), pp.210-213. Here a passage from Scheffler can be offered which is the definitive comment on all attempts, ancient and modern (for they exist still), to induct teachers through 'demonstration lessons' without careful preparation and follow-up: 'It does not follow that teaching may be described as a standard pattern of movements even where it is successful, let alone where it is not. It is thus mistaken to think that one may learn to teach by mastering some distinctive pattern of movement, or that we can teach people to teach by prescribing such a pattern for them, formulated in general rules. What can reasonably be done in the way of teaching people
to teach presents, indeed, a crucial problem'. Scheffler, *Language of Education*, p.68.


66 It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which Scheffler's aim that everyone concerned with education should philosophize in his manner rather than merely trying 'to understand the results and the course of past philosophizing' (Ibid, p.4.) has been achieved. It could be suggested that the 'Cook's tour' from Plato to Dewey which was to be condemned by Peters has become the shorter tour from Scheffler to Peters and Hirst (or, in Britain, the mini-tour from Peters to Hirst) so far as many students and their teachers are concerned. This is particularly unfortunate if another claim made for analysis - that it is not really new (going back to Socrates) - is accepted. The 'wider, substantive interests of maturity' (Ibid, p.8.) of contemporary philosophical analysis which has issued, in Scheffler's account, in this revolution in philosophy of education would certainly seem, to some, to imply that philosophy's self-engrossed linguistic turn has been over-done, and that the broader interests of the cited tradition should not be abandoned.


69 Archambault, 'Concept of Need', p.61.


71 B.O. Smith and R.H. Ennis (eds.), *Language and Concepts in Education* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961) p.iv. It is interesting to note that the book was merely 'received', not reviewed by the *Harvard Educational Review* and not even noticed.
by the British Journal of Educational Studies.

72 Smith and Ennis, *Language and Concepts*, p. [i].

73 *Ibid*, p.[iii].


82 As Peters says: 'The difficulty about developing a science of psychology is that, in a sense, we already know too much about human behaviour, albeit in a rather unco-ordinated manner. Common-sense, which is incorporated in the concepts of ordinary
language, has creamed off most of the vital distinctions'. Ibid, p.155. He is clearly strongly committed to ordinary language analysis which, as is shown here, grounds its findings in the science of the past out of which present language has emerged. This disallows a participation in the development of conceptual schemes which are not already implicit in ordinary language. We can note that Peters' later participation in a series of important conferences of philosophers and psychologists organized in the 1960s and 1970s therefore represented a significant development from the position indicated here. See the four books which emerged from the conferences, edited by Theodore Mischel: Human Action: Conceptual and Empirical Issues (New York: Academic Press, 1969); Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971); Understanding Other Persons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974); The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977).

83 Clearly Peters' work in philosophical psychology entered as an important element into the broadcast talks which, when they appeared in The Listener along with correspondence, led Scheffler to invite Peters as a Visiting Professor to Harvard University in 1961. Peters, on his return, then took up in 1962 the chair in Philosophy of Education at London University vacated by Reid. A later commentary is illuminating on these matters:

'Because of his early youth centre work and his teaching experience he had maintained an interest in education, but he moved into philosophy of education in a rather unusual way. He had begun to give a number of broadcast talks on topics such as authority and responsibility, and searching around for another subject to discuss 'he hit upon the aims of education'. 'R.S. Peters: A Commentary by Peter Hobson', in R.S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), p.458.

It is interesting to note that this remark (made with Peters' approval) shows a perception of himself by Peters which is at odds with the perceptions of others such as Edel – particularly when it continues with: 'These mixed interests, he came to find, were best satisfied in the philosophy of education, where, as far as he was concerned, everything came together'. Ibid, p.458.

84 Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education, p.84.

85 Ibid, p.87. The characteristic emphasis on manner comes out throughout Peters' work. For example: 'These very general aims are neither goals nor are they end-products. Like "happiness" they are high-sounding ways of talking about doing some things rather than others and doing them in a certain manner'. Ibid, p.86. This is such a distinctive characteristic of the
'rationality theory' of teaching being developed here by Peters that a later commentator, Jane Martin, whom we have recently mentioned as a bright young pupil of Scheffler, formulated it as a standard abbreviation: RCM as 'rationality constraint on manner'. J.R. Martin, Explaining, Understanding and Teaching (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p.93.

86 Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education, p.92.
87 Ibid, p.94.
88 Ibid, p.95.
89 Ibid, p.97. Again, with Peters as with so many other writers we have considered, we can translate a school-related notion into the context of teacher-education. Here for instance, in discussing 'experience', he makes a relevant point which many in subsequent uses of his work were to ignore in favour of taking his emphasis on the need for 'real' philosophy of education in teacher-training: 'neither information nor rules include fool-proof tips about their application. And we only learn to apply rules by applying them - usually under skilled supervision'. Ibid, p.100.

Of course this follows from his central thesis: 'My own view is that the manner in which we pass on rules matters as much as the rules which we pass on'. Ibid, p.116.

91 Ibid, p.103.
92 Ibid, p.108.
93 Ibid, p.111.
95 Ibid, p.118. At this point we can appropriately refer to Bantock's review of Peters' first book on education. It is quite long and entitled 'The Charismatic Teacher' to underline what the reviewer, writing with the confidence of an 'old hand' in Education, believes Peters has missed in his analysis. In brief Bantock advances a kind of personalism - charismatic personalism - exemplified by Heathcliff in Wuthering Heights. He says, in fine Bantockian style: 'All this may seem remote from Mr. Peters' tidy little book...I don't believe it is...the whole experience of Wuthering Heights seems to me to indicate forces at work in the effect of one personality on another which the rationalist either ignores or shudders away from'. Universities Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 (February 1960), p.196.

96 Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education, p.119. All the work which Peters had done, not only in writing The Concept of
Motivation but also in revising Brett's book [See R.S. Peters (ed.) Brett's History of Psychology (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953. Edited and abridged one-volume edition. Revised edition, 1962)] focuses on this theme to produce the view that 'the basic sciences of man must be rather like social anthropology'. Ibid, p.126. From this Wittgensteinian notion follows the challenging prescription that psychologists should study education rather than teachers studying psychology:

'For just as the very learning of a language or of science, history, and mathematics opens up a common world for us, a form of life which we share with others; so also does the manner in which we are initiated into the paths cut by human language and conventions determine to a large extent the ways in which we walk differently along them'. Authority, Responsibility and Education, p.128.

97 Ibid, p.129.

98 Ibid, p.134. As to Piaget, Peters shows an early enthusiasm which to some extent is dictated by the context in which he is arguing when he says:

'Piaget is of vital importance to educationists because he takes language and concept formation very seriously'. Ibid, p.130.

Later he was to emphasize, under the influence of D.W. Hamlyn, the limitations which arise because Piaget attempts to bridge the gap between philosophical and empirical-psychological concerns in his genetic psychology. We have already examined this problem. Peters puts it thus, in his 'General Editor's Note' to D.W. Hamlyn, Experience and the Growth of Understanding (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978):

'However, Piaget's account is flawed by its biological model and by its failure to deal adequately with the problem of objectivity'. [unpaged].


100 It will be recalled from our Introduction that one origin of the present thesis was Peters' provocative remark that when he came into philosophy of education he 'found very little which was particularly helpful in the literature'. Peters, Ethical Development, pp.14-15.

101 We have already considered Reid's contribution to this compendium of Bereday and Lauwerys - Education and Philosophy.

102 J.A. Lauwerys and B. Holmes, 'Editors' Introduction: Education
and Philosophy' in Bereday and Lauwerys, Education and Philosophy, p.1-29. The position of Holmes is unusual in that, though he only formally 'assisted' in the editing of the whole volume, his influence on it was strong.

The whole passage has significance as a comment on ordinary-language analysis:

'...philosophers are much more the creatures of their time and of their own upbringing than they themselves - or their followers, for that matter - think. To use modern jargon, they are culture-bound to a greater degree than is usually realized. Philosophers usually begin by "defining their terms" and by examining the assumptions they make. These terms are taken from a particular language, itself the crystallized deposit of centuries of social experience of a particular kind and as deeply affected by encrusted habits of thought as by geographical and climatic conditions'. Ibid, pp.6-7.

The authors claim in fact not to be concerned, in such observations, with the sociology of knowledge in a rigorous sense, but merely to be pointing out important background factors.

B-A. Scharfstein. The Philosophers: Their Lives and the Nature of Their Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). Scharfstein, a most unusual but highly-regarded Professor of Philosophy at Tel-Aviv University, studied philosophy in the United States when, as he puts it, 'John Dewey was still alive'. Ibid, p.25. His relevance to the present thesis can be judged from his confession that, 'Throughout my professional life in philosophy, it has been my advantage and disadvantage that I have remained interested in many other fields - history, sociology, anthropology, psychology, literature, art, and the exact sciences.' Ibid, p.25.

In this introduction, the intellectual influences on Holmes in particular can be seen: first that of Dewey and then of Karl Popper. The resulting 'critical dualism' will reappear explicitly in the later chapter on educational theory.

Lauwerys and Holmes,'Editors' Introduction', p.20. Their position is, indeed, close to Scharfstein when he says, earlier, of philosophers: 'Often, the analysis or refutation of the thoughts they express would require the consideration not of their statements, but, rather, of their individual experiences, their early education, their
relations with parents and friends'. Ibid, p.20.

110 Ibid, p.27.

111 Ibid, p.29.

112 K. Price, 'General Conclusions', in Bereday and Lauwerys, Education and Philosophy, p.568. In a typical passage Price explains these terms within the available logical alternatives:

'The relation between philosophy and education, then, is a relation between theories. The essays suggest that it is a logical relation, i.e. one such that acceptance of one set of metaphysical, ethical, or epistemological doctrines commits one to a certain educational theory, justifies holding that educational theory and explains its various ingredients. It is these concepts of commitment, justification, and explanation which are involved in the notion of reliance as it is employed in the assertion that education relies upon philosophy. The denial that philosophy is related to education, here, is the view that philosophy either does not commit one to, does not justify, or does not explain any educational theory'. Ibid, p.568.

In this passage can be seen Price's 'content', similar to that touched on as influencing Frankena in Period One and anticipating the systematic exposition he was to give it in Education and Philosophical Thought (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1962). There is evident, too, that style of analysis which Scheffler regarded as 'mechanical'.

113 Price, 'General Conclusions', p.569.


116 Of interest to us are two educationists and two professional

117 Judges, Philosophic Mind, p.9.

118 Reid, 'Philosophy and Education', p.198.


120 Ibid, p.204. The parent volume was reviewed by no less than O'Connor: Review, Philosophy, Vol. 34 (1959), p.87. A comparison can be made with the judgement of a non-philosopher writing in a non-philosophical journal: H.C. Barnard, Review, British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May 1958), pp.175-177. Bantock, too, reviewed the book for Universities Quarterly - Vol. 11, No. 4 (August 1957), pp.415-419 - and makes an incidental comment which, in the light of the present investigation, is even more significant than even he realized: 'The work of Hare, Toulmin and Nowell-Smith has a good deal to teach the educational philosopher'. (p.416).


125 Ibid, p.386.


127 Though personalism has strong European and American traditions, it is Macmurray's work which most strongly influences the Scots writers on education - such as Pilley, Reid, Morris and Inglis - who feature in the British literature. Macmurray's mature work was published in our Period Two: The Form of the Personal Vol.1: The Self as Agent (London: Faber & Faber, 1957) and The Form of the Personal Vol.2: Persons in Relation (London: Faber & Faber, 1961). An American non-theistic use of personalism can be found in H. Soderquist, 'Personalistic Naturalism and the Ends of Education', Educational Theory, Vol. 4, Jo. 1 (January 1954), pp.49-53.
128 Inglis, 'Personalism', p.388.

129 Ibid, p.389. The influence of Martin Buber can be noted here, along with the humanistic psychological tradition associated with, for example, G.W. Allport. Allport's Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955) had not long been published. Its existential viewpoint, critical of trivial a-human research carried out in the name of psychology, would support Inglis's views. On Buber, see A.V. Judges, 'Martin Buber', in A.V. Judges (ed.), The Function of Teaching (London: Faber & Faber, 1959), pp.89-108.

130 Inglis, 'Personalism', p.390.

131 Ibid, p.391. Inglis is perhaps attempting to have his cake and his penny when he states that 'All serious discourse in education or in philosophy has been sobered by the insistence of philosophical analysis on the careful use of language and the need for verification'. (Ibid, p.392) - given the obvious antagonism between the two kinds of philosophy he is 'introducing' into education to be found in a literature which he seems not to be familiar with.

132 Ibid, p.393.

133 Of general analytical philosophy, the remark of Passmore in the chapter 'Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language' in his highly-acclaimed history of modern philosophy is to the point. Concerning the doctrine of 'spheres of influence' he says that it 'has recently attracted a good many admirers, particularly amongst those who desire to be uncritically religious without ceasing to be critically philosophical', A Hundred Years of Philosophy 2nd ed., (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) p.450. He also points out that the "philosophical psychologists", several of whom are Roman Catholics, Ibid, p.609, note 13, argue against a 'science of man' very much in the manner of the neo-scholasticism that is derived from Aquinas. Also relevant to these remarks is Passmore's article, 'Christianity and Positivism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1957), pp.125-136. In analytical philosophy of education, it can be surmised that both Peters and Hirst have a religious commitment; though neither makes his views explicit in the way that Reid, for example, insists on doing.

134 Inglis, 'Personalism', p.394.


136 J.F. Soltis, An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts, 2nd edition (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley,
The quotation is taken from the chapter 'Analysis: Its Limits and Uses' which is an illuminating commentary from a point in history - the late 1970s - when the enthusiasm for analysis was more commonly perceived as the over-enthusiasm to which we have been drawing attention in our own investigation.


In contrast with Kneller, Cerf was a 'pure' professional philosopher of standing. For example, his later review of the monograph series, in which Peters propounded his views on motivation and (as we shall see) Peter Winch propounded his on social science, was an important contribution to a deep philosophical discussion: 'Studies In Philosophical Psychology', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 22, No. 4 (June 1962), pp.537-558. This long discussion ends with an unimpressed comment by Cerf, writing at a distance from Oxford, on the most striking phenomenon of contemporary English philosophy: 'Wittgenstein had...originality, but Wittgensteinians en masse are more likely to end as Wittgensteininnies!' (p.558).

typical assertion is that: 'The greatest danger to our world is the threat to personal values' (p.170). The writer must admit that he personally warms to such statements - interpreted, of course, in his own way!

142 H. Read, Sir, 'The Limitations Of A Scientific Philosophy', Educational Review, Vol. 10 (February 1958), p.104. He asks the question: 'Is it possible that life acquires meaning only to the extent that man is creative?', Ibid, p.107, while identifying the renowned logical empiricist Hans Reichenbach as his main target. It is interesting, therefore, to seek out Reichenbach's own comments on art. He says: 'The scientific philosopher does not want to belittle the value of emotions, nor would he like to live without them. His life may be as rich in passion and sentiment as that of any literary man - but he refuses to mingle emotion and cognition', The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), p.312.


148 We can note here that Ernest Gellner's provocative Words and Things (London: Gollancz, 1959), having the explanatory subtitle An Examination of and an Attack on, Linguistic Philosophy, was published during this period. It opens with the judgement, relevant to the matter in the text, that:

'Linguistic Philosophy is a certain cluster of views about the world, language and philosophy...It merits treatment as "a philosophy", that is, a distinctive outlook, a way of looking at things'. (p.39 in revised edition; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979)

Twenty years later, his new, long Introduction to his 'scandalous' book ends with a similar comment, following a review of developments in linguistic philosophy since the 1950s, as Gellner re-asserts that 'we must see this doctrine itself as one philosophical doctrine amongst others. And then it is seen
to be false'. (p.37)

149 J.O. Wisdom, Philosophy and its Place in Our Culture (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1975), p.3, note 1. It is significant that Wisdom had departed from the British philosophical scene several years before this book was produced. It is a thorough attempt by a distinguished philosopher towards the end of a lifetime's reflection to challenge systematically what he calls 'The logico-positivist dynasty' (p.1). His starting point in opposing philosophers 'who believed there are no living issues in philosophy' (p.1) is shown in the following passage which can be related to O'Connor's views:

'Although I hold that every one of its major contentions was false, it introduced a regimen of hygiene into philosophy that was badly needed, though it should not be forgotten in these hypochondriacal days that excessive hygiene is tiresome, psychologically damaging, and physiologically dangerous.'(p.1).

150 S.J. Curtis, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (London: University Internal Press, 1958), p.v. Nevertheless, he says: 'The author...has not concealed his own standpoint, namely that he accepts in general the great tradition of the philosophia perennis, the main stream of Western philosophy from Plato onwards and he firmly believes that the ideal education is one based upon the Christian Way of Life'. Ibid, p.vi.


This is his title for Chapter 21.


Ibid, p.xiii.
Ibid, p.xiv. Burtt is thus of the company of Wisdom, Gellner, Danto, Scharfstein and (as we shall see shortly) Toulmin: not that they form a school, but they are evidence of a type of non-dogmatic philosophizing which contrasts markedly with the orthodoxy that philosophy of education became.

F.C. Neff, 'The Status of John Dewey in American Educational Thought: A Current Appraisal', Researches and Studies, Vol. 17 (January 1958), p.31. It is interesting to note that 'reason' in the sense understood by those who were developing the rationality theory of teaching prevailed very much against Deweyian approaches for 'reasons' which we have suggested at many points to be in need of scrutiny.
Chapter Seven

Scientists, Humanists and Autonomists in Educational Psychology


2. Ibid, p.38. He adds: 'Conventional classifications of behavior - learning, motivation, emotion, and so forth - tend to break down under his analysis. A search for variables involved in the establishment, maintenance, and change of behavior invades all these fields'. Ibid, p.38, emphasizing the quite radical nature of Skinner's analysis.


5. They contribute to a symposium which, like the earlier one on philosophy and educational theory, was held at Northwestern University's School of Education. It was, significantly, part of a 'bridging' project undertaken by the School's Department of Psychology. See 'A Symposium: "Can The Laws of Learning be Applied in the Classroom?'', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring 1959), p.83.


C.D. Hardie, in 'Notes from Readers: "Can the Laws of Learning Be Applied in the Classroom?"' Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 1960), p.78. He was writing from Tasmania with characteristic vigilance. His conclusion on the issue has a ring to it which is familiar to us as a 'first principles' approach: 'The conclusion I would draw is that educators or educational psychologists should go on their way building up knowledge about classroom behaviour, and need not feel that an adequate educational psychology must wait for the discovery of fundamental laws about learning'. Ibid, p.79.


Ibid, p.97.

Ibid, p.102.


Lumsdale and Glaser, Programmed Learning, p.574.

standpoint which is not unfamiliar to us from the total literature of this early period when he uses Malinowski's notion of 'respectable magic' to talk of 'Magic, Mystification and Professionalism' and to declare 'My defence of educational technology (and also, by the way, of behaviourism) is therefore of a kind which devotees may not find very palatable'. (p.21). His point, like our own on many occasions, is that the apparently rigorous intellectual arguments in favour of a particular perspective on education must be seen in their organizational context. From within the ranks, as it were, he is prepared to argue that educational technology as it was massively developed twenty years after our period is 'respectable magic', being as good as but no better than the 'magic' of other professions; having its own 'professional box of tricks', 'tricks without theory', 'tricks without explanation', (pp.21-22). On 'professionalism in general' (p.24) he argues that much literature consists in 'defending the faith' (p.27), an apposite description of that dimension to the literature of our own periods which we have identified. Even where the arguments are couched - as they are in the era of programmed learning which prepared the way for the emergence of a ramified educational technology - in terms of intellectual rigour, we must realize that this is far from being the whole story.

19 Ibid, p.60.
20 J.S. Bruner, J.S. Goodnow and G.A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (New York: Wiley, 1956). This classic investigation was important in contributing to a cognitive psychology which opposed Skinner's radical behaviourism.


27 Ibid, p. vi.


31 [J. Piaget], 'Children's Thinking - The Figural Aspect and the Operational Aspect', *National Froebel Foundation Bulletin*, No. 127 (December 1960), p. 1. The article is a reconstruction of Piaget's lecture which had his approval.

32 [J. Piaget], 'The Relation Between Perceptual and Conceptual Development', *National Froebel Foundation Bulletin*, No. 130 (June 1961), p. 1. This, too, is an approved abridgement of Piaget's lecture: it was given in the Department of Child Development.

33 A definitive account was, of course, provided almost twenty years after Piaget said, in this London lecture: 'And there can thus be no doubt that there is more in intelligence than there
is in the senses' (Ibid, p.6.). It was given by David Hamlyn in Experience and the Growth of Understanding (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). It can be noted that Hamlyn's sustained essay in philosophical psychology as applied to education, which proceeds to an original position through an examination of Skinner and Chomsky as well as Piaget, is a refinement of the Peters-Winch viewpoint which is examined in this thesis. It therefore ultimately derives from Wittgenstein and represents just one position in philosophy in the relationship between the philosopher's and the psychologist's interest in mind.


36 At this point we can simply mention that Simon continued to publicize Soviet psychology, editing Psychology in the Soviet...


38 Rogers, 'The Person', p.12.


40 Ibid, p.18.

41 Ibid, p.19.

42 Ibid, pp.24-25. The emphasis on the personal is, of course, the major theme of his book of this period: On Becoming A Person (London: Constable, 1961).

43 It is, as we have earlier noted, an issue which stems from the work of Soren Kierkegaard, whose influence on Rogers was as great as on all those in the broad existentialist movement which in fact emerged from his writings. The notion of 'subjective truth', as developed in, say, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Copenhagen, 1846) is that we grasp what is true by personal effort, committing ourselves, creating our own nature against the pressure of abstract generalizations wished on us by society. In a Sartrian word, 'existence precedes essence' again. The educational implications of this slogan can be further seen in: C.R. Rogers, 'Significant Learning: In Therapy and In Education', Educational Leadership, Vol. 16, No. 4 (January 1959), pp.232-249.
44 K.G. Collier, 'The Teaching of Psychology in Training Colleges', British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 30 (June 1960), p.104. The academic position of this journal is indicated by the fact that this manuscript was received in 1958. See also K.G. Collier, 'The Study of Students' Attitudes', Education for Teaching, Vol. 42 (February 1957), pp.34-41.


47 [K.G. Collier et al], 'Some Problems', Education for Teaching, No. 42 (February 1957), p.6. Of the six articles in [K.G. Collier et al], 'Symposium: Teaching Psychology to Student Teachers', pp.3-33 that of J.L. Henderson can be mentioned for its theistic discussion of personal relationships, in line with an interesting tendency we have noted before: 'A Mirror for Teachers: The Student's Self-Knowledge', pp.7-12.


49 G.H. Bantock, 'Freud and Education I', Educational Review, Vol. 12 (November 1959), pp.3-13. 'Freud and Education II', Educational Review, Vol. 12 (February 1960), pp.94-102. Interestingly, this two-article account is based on a paper given at Bristol University, which we identified earlier as having a 'humanistically' orientated Department of Education with Morris as professor.

50 Ibid, p.3. Bantock adds that 'Freud, indeed, implicitly recognises this by calling his psychology a "meta-psychology", thus implying a speculative as well as an empirical element' (p.3).

51 Ibid, p.98.


53 An examination of McFarland's writings, aimed at showing how philosophy liberally conceived permeated his work, is to be found in A. Tubb, 'The Philosophy of H.S.N. McFarland', Durham and Newcastle Research Review, Vol. 9, No. 45 (Autumn 1980), pp.154-162.


56 McFarland, 'Educational Philosophy', p.38.

57 Ibid, p.46.

58 Ibid, p.45.


60 Ibid, p.209.


69 For he considers the 'social view of man' with the 'philosophical' tolerance of a generalist who concludes that 'To regard men as "the creatures of society" is to underestimate the unique creative quality of individual people, but social psychology and sociology, wisely interpreted, can make a worthwhile contribution to human education', ibid, p.208.

70 Ibid, p.209.


72 Ibid, p.218.

Lovell, Educational Psychology, pp.16-17.

Ibid, p.16.


Loukes, Review, p.90.


Fleming, Teaching, p.12

C. Burt, 'The Impact of Psychology on Education', in G.Z.F. Bereday and J.A. Lauwerys (eds.), The Yearbook of Education 1957: Education and Philosophy (London: Evans, 1957), pp.163-180. The inclusion of Burt's article in this particular yearbook, which we have, of course, examined under the heading of philosophy of education, confirms the heterogenous contents of that volume and also the interpenetration of issues in the literature of education.


Ibid, p.180. Burt's notion that the teacher is in the best position for solving his own problems looks strangely tautological!


Ibid, p.133.

Ibid, p.135. He is explicit about those who 'attempt to teach the students ill-digested "facts" and "theories". The Journal of the Association of Colleges and Departments of Education recently produced a number specially devoted to the teaching of educational psychology which contains some examples'. Ibid, p.135.

Ibid, p.135. The correspondence which followed Wiseman's article shows the extent to which the concept of 'educational psychology' was unclear in the minds of readers of the journal. See 'Correspondence: On Wiseman's Article "Trends In Educational Psychology", British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 29 (November 1959), pp.264-267.
Chapter Eight
Sociology of Education or Educational Sociology?


2 Ibid, p.63.

3 Ibid, p.67.


5 Ibid, p.193. That is: 'They are facts which constitute, and result from, customs, habits, beliefs, ways of life, and which all arise from the relationships between people'. Ibid, p.193.


7 Ibid, p.195.

8 Ibid, p.196.

9 A footnote of Ottaway's is both informative and, in view of his eclipse, somewhat sad: 'In September 1959 a Conference on Educational Sociology was arranged by the Institute of Education of the University of Leicester. A brief report of this has been privately circulated. The main discussion concerned the extent and scope of the teaching of sociology in training colleges and departments of education. There is also a sub-committee of the British Sociological Association which is collecting information on the same topic, and which held a meeting during the Conference. A group of northern university teachers held a follow-up meeting in Leeds in December 1959', Ibid, p.199, note 16.

10 Ibid, p.198. Ottaway was not to publish anything in the field, which was associated at that time with him above all others, until his article, 'Durkheim on Education' appeared in 1968: British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 1968), pp.5-16. By this time the political arithmeticians were so well established that they themselves then constituted an orthodoxy which was under impending attack.

12 Collier, Social Purposes, p.xii.
16 Ibid, p.165.
17 Ibid, p.165
18 Ibid, p.166.
23 Ibid, p.168.
perspective which takes seriously the cultural and historical context, Toulmin suggests 'how far the scope and opportunity exist for the operation of familiar political mechanisms, even within the most high-minded of intellectual professions'. Ibid, p.266.

31 Ibid, p.266.
34 Ibid, p.170. It can be noted again that the later Bernstein's commentary bears relevantly on this planned micro-level work that is of seemingly greater relevance to the teacher: 'If educational psychology had not been so preoccupied with the diagnosis and measurement of skills, child development and personality, but instead had developed a social psychology relevant to education, the story might have been different'. 'The Sociology of Education: A Brief Account', p.151. That is, if the 'social' aspect of education, such as we have seen emphasized in, say, the approach of the psychologist C.M. Fleming, had been taken seriously, the legitimization of the problems and process of industrialization as the content of a new sociology would not have taken place so rapidly; though, as Bernstein says, 'Once the approach was established as a taught course, with the development of a university syllabus, reading lists, examination papers and finally textbooks, it became difficult for some to think outside of what became the legitimate contents'. Ibid, p.151.

Our point has throughout been that 'the legitimate contents' of a normative educational theory which pays regard to the 'social' dimension did in fact exist but was overwhelmed by an insistence on 'real' sociology by an expansionist group. Establishing credentials is, in Bernstein's words, 'particularly important when the new subject is to be created out of a low status field of research, such as education'. Ibid, p.150. This, of course, raises all the questions about education as a field of research against education as normative theory which we have discussed in detail throughout this thesis.

36 Ibid, p.171.
Ibid, p.172. They are particularly hard on Mannheim, especially his failure 'to undertake any analysis of the part actually played by education in various social changes which would have illuminated its varying role - sometimes cause, sometimes condition, and sometimes consequence of change'. Ibid, p.173.

Ibid, p.172. It is of interest to note that in their contribution to the most respected transatlantic educational journal, written to bring what Bernstein calls the 'news' ('the "news" of much contemporary sociology appears to be news about the conditions necessary for creating acceptable news', 'The Sociology of Education: A Brief Account', p.146) to the Americans, they omit the three paragraphs on Mannheim and Durkheim (pp.168-169), in presenting their own positive methodological recommendations. Their 'Education and Social Structure: Theories and Methods', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Fall 1959), pp.288-296 is otherwise their 'II. Theories and Methods in the Sociology of Education' taken from the trend report and modified slightly only in the wording.

Toulmin, Human Understanding, p.262.

Floud and Halsey, 'Trend Report', p.192. The self-consciousness of these thinkers with respect to their pre-eminence as pioneers of these 'real' approaches in sociology can be further noted in Halsey's review of an early American attempt to produce a text which itself purported to emphasize rigor: A.H. Halsey, Review of O.G. Brim, Sociology and the Field of Education (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958), Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer 1959), pp.262-264. Halsey argues that Brim employs the simple functionalist categories which Malinowski had used to explain primitive societies, and he passes the meaningful comment that, 'in view of the probable future importance of the field of sociology, it must be recognized that Mr. Brim's approach raises some issues of principle concerning his coverage of the literature and the adequacy of his framework of discussion to contain the study of educational institutions in a highly differentiated and changing society'. Ibid, p.263. Thus he implies that the British approach is superior to the Parsonian version of such inadequate functionalism, which Brim espouses, - thereby carrying the message to the American audience that sociology which assumes a consensus-society is inadequate.


Toulmin, Human Understanding, p.277.

Ibid, p.12. The 'Introduction', pp.1-12, by Floud and Halsey is the part of the book which is most concerned with the 'logic' of the subject. Apart from that part, two articles have a bearing on the present thesis in that they indicate aspects of the sociology of education which have potential relevance to the class teacher - aspects that are not afforded the main emphasis in these early 'institutionalization' moves: (i) B. Bernstein, 'Social Class and Linguistic Development: A Theory of Social Learning', pp.288-314 (based on his 'Some Sociological Determinants of Perception', British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9 (June 1958), pp.159-174); (ii) T. Parsons, 'The School Class as a Social System: Some of Its Functions in American Society', pp.434-455. See, with respect to the influential functionalism of the latter: M. Black (ed.), The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961).

P. Halmos (ed.), The Teaching of Sociology to Students of Education and Social Work (Keele: University College of North Staffordshire, 1961). This is Sociological Review Monograph No. 4. The 'Introduction' by T.H. Marshall, pp.5-11, is illuminating, written by a 'Big Name' in sociology who substituted history for Ginsberg's philosophy as the 'related discipline'.

J. Floud, 'Sociology and Education', in Halmos, Teaching of Sociology, p.58.

Ibid, p.58.

At this point we can mention some of Floud's other work of the period. Her chapter 'Karl Mannheim' in A.V. Judges (ed.), The Function of Teaching (London: Faber, 1959), pp.40-66, is quite long and, in some parts, not unsympathetic to its subject. However, her final judgement refers to 'the curious mixture Mannheim offered of the commonplace and the visionary' (p.60). Her review of P.A. Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences (Chicago: Regnery, 1956), British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (November 1957), pp.84-86 also reveals strongly her empiricist position on social theory. In relation to a different kind of sociologist, so too does her review - again in the British Journal of Educational Studies - of C.W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); Vol. 9, No. 1 (November 1960), pp.75-76.

Floud, 'Sociology and Education', p.61.


52 Ibid, p.109. As he says: 'It is interesting that Durkheim, who knew nothing of psycho-analysis, had long before made a correlation between the disorganization of society and the disorganization of personality'. Ibid, p.109.

53 Ibid, p.111

54 It is of interest to note the contrast between Ottaway here and Bantock's utilization of the then little-known work of Schutz which we shall examine shortly. Ottaway cites the main verstehen tradition, going back to Wilhelm Dilthey's notion of the understanding of cultural events in terms of the meanings attached to them by individuals, and Max Weber's detailed extension of this notion. However, Ottaway's wide interests have clearly not taken him as far as Schutz's use of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to underpin Weber in a philosophical way - with the result of a kind of interpretative sociology which was to assume great importance much later in the sociology of education. Bantock, it can be said again, is - as we shall see below - an unparalleled generalist in his knowledge of what is developing in the various disciplines.


59 Ibid, p.45. It is interesting to set down the bare facts of Taylor's career in the light of observations already made by sociologists and by philosophers about this 'personal' aspect of a discipline's advocacy: Teaching, 1953-59; Senior Lecturer
in Education, St. Luke's College, Exeter, 1959-61; Head of Education Department, Bede College, Durham, 1961-64; Tutor and Lecturer in Education, University of Oxford, 1964-1966; Professor of Education and Director of the School of Education, University of Bristol, 1966-1973; Director, University of London Institute of Education, 1973-1983; Principal, University of London, from 1983. He was to give an account of the structuring of work in Education during his three years at Bede College in 'The Organisation of Educational Studies', Education for Teaching, No. 65 (November 1964), pp.28-35. The present writer's experience of this course and his eventual responsibility for it was an important factor in the development of two convictions which underlie this thesis: first, that thinking about education is inescapably generalist; second, that there is a gap between the reality of institutional practice and the published 'theory' of that practice such as is to be found, for example, in Taylor's article.

60 Taylor, 'Sociology of Education in Training College', p.45.


63 Ibid, p.47.

64 The first in the relevant series of monographs, collectively entitled Studies in Philosophical Psychology and largely devoted to logical problems, was P. Geach's renowned Mental Acts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).


66 Ibid, p.3.

67 Ibid, p.3.

68 Ibid, p.23.

69 This controversial notion can be best described in D.W. Hamlyn's later comment, which identifies the appropriate phrase from which it is derived: 'Wittgenstein has emphasised the important role that is played by what he calls "forms of life" in which we all share, and which provide the foundation

70 Winch, Idea of a Social Science, p.43. It is interesting to note the exact contrary being expressed by Ernest Gellner throughout the last chapter of his polemical critique - summed up in his assertion that 'Linguistic Philosophy is itself a pseudo-sociology', Words and Things 2nd edition (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p.252.

71 Winch, Idea of a Social Science, p.115.

72 The sub-title of M.F.D. Young's Knowledge and Control (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971) is New Directions for the Sociology of Education. This is a book which was conceived at the Durham Conference of the British Sociological Association in April 1970 and represents the organization of opposition to the predominant macro-functional sociology by those who see man as a creator of 'meanings'.


74 Ibid, p.269
75 Ibid, p.269.
76 Ibid, p.270.
77 Ibid, p.271.
78 Ibid, p.271. This notion Bantock takes from D.H. Lawrence.
80 We can speculate that the content of Bantock's critique may explain why the article appears in an American journal rather than the British journal whose title is the same as the article itself. His praise of Peters and Winch leads to an expression of viewpoint which is very much at odds with that of the British journal in question. As Bantock says: 'It is disturbing to find how little modern philosophical techniques of linguistic analysis and clarification have affected our thinking about social science research'. Ibid, p.272.


Ibid, p.242. He refers to Neil Gross, whom we have, of course, identified in Period One as the leader in this approach.


Ibid, p.286.


Ibid, p.287.


Ibid, p.129. In contrast with such work Gross says: 'Brokover's recent book constitutes the first effort in more than a quarter century to examine the school system from a consistently sociological, rather than an "applied education" frame of reference', Ibid, p.129. He thereby puts a value on the book which can be compared with Roucek's judgement of it as rather arrogant.

99 Ibid, p.130.

100 Ibid, p.130.

101 Ibid, p.133. Nevertheless, he adds: 'This does not change the fact that sociology is also an autonomous field of study' (p.133).

102 Ibid, p.135. Langeveld then emphasizes what to him is the obvious corollary: 'Only by interpreting the "object" or "field" primarily in terms of situation and by further analysis of that situation, shall we be able to understand that "education" and "sociology" must meet, and must meet in education if the result is to be of practical educational value' (p.135).

103 Ibid, p.135.


106 Ibid, p.172. We can attach - for the sake of completeness! - to this last reference to the last of the disciplines (before we move to a final consideration of general educational theory) the only article worthy of note concerning the history of education in Period Two. It hardly bears comparison with Armytage whose powerful voice was heard so long ago at the beginning of Period One. J.D. Browne, Principal of Coventry Training College, writes on 'An Experiment in the Teaching of the History of Education', Educational Review, Vol. 10 (November 1957), pp.29-40. She asks: 'What will be the place of the history of education in the future scheme? (p.29); and answers, on the basis of long experience with students, that the history of educational ideas is more meaningful than the arid institutional history commonly offered. As to the latter area, she perhaps sounds more like Morris commenting on Armytage than Armytage himself: 'The problem is to find a way of active participation on the part of students which will deepen their understanding of what the present schools have grown from and have, to some extent, overcome. If their conception of education in the immediate past becomes real enough, it may well help to put some of our present aspirations into perspective' (p.29). Or perhaps we had best say, in leaving the history of education with this second brief comment, that she offers a realistic interpretation of both Morris and Armytage - translated into talk of school log-books, family histories and all the other devices for involving
students at first hand in local history in the hope of showing its significance as an essential subject for intending teachers. In view of the small part played by this discipline in our investigation, such a final comment would seem to be fair.
Chapter Nine

The Many Levels of General Theory of Education


2. Ibid., p.184. The power of her analysis is such that it is not surprising to find that J.P. Tuck, already identified as a very balanced generalist, singles it out for comment in his thorough review of the vast volume in which it is hidden: British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May 1958), pp.171-175.


4. Ibid., p.185.

5. Ibid., p.185.

6. Ibid., p.186.

7. Ibid., p.186.

8. Ibid., p.186.


10. Ibid., p.187.

11. Ibid., p.189.

12. Ibid., p.189.

13. C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). It will be recalled that Stevenson, one of the most significant developers of contemporary noncognitivism in ethics, contributed to Harvard Educational Review in our Period One the very relevant article, 'The Scientist's Role and the Aims of Education', Vol. 24, No. 4 (Fall 1954), pp.231-238.


15. Ibid., p.189.

16. Ibid., p.192.

18 Ibid, p.17.


21 As mentioned in Chapter 6 she subsequently became Editor of the British Journal of Educational Studies, following the long reign of the historian Rudolf Beales who edited the journal from 1952 to 1974. So as recently as 1982 she was pleading for an approach to educational studies similar to that found here when she says, with reference to the established disciplines of education: 'But the major problem we confront today is that of integrating the products of all these fields of endeavour' – as a preface to the set of searching questions she asks which have already been recorded in Note 2 to Chapter 6; 'Editorial' (to Thirtieth Anniversary Issue), British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (February 1982), p.6. Two further comments can now be made in recollecting this splendidly revealing passage. First, that it is revealing – of both the inadequate contents of the whole historic issue of the journal and of the clear perception of the later Margaret Sutherland of that 'intuitive' truth about the subject Education which, in the earlier article of hers, must have been too much in disguise for us to see it. The second must really be 'No Comment', in that our own detailed argument around the concepts of 'polymathy', 'generalism' and 'philosophy' in a wide sense was, as we remarked earlier, fully drafted long before the appearance of this Editorial.

22 A.E. Best, 'The Empty Prescription in Educational Theory', Universities Quarterly, Vol. 14 (June 1960), pp.232-242. His Oxford B.Litt. thesis, awarded a few years earlier, was entitled 'Educational Theory: A Critical Examination of Its Methods and Vocabulary' and was thus a very early academic exercise in analytical philosophy applied to education. Unusual, too, is the fact that he was school teaching (in a Public School) at the time this article was published.


24 M.V.C. Jeffreys, Glaucon: An Inquiry Into the Aims of Education (London: Pitman, 1950). It can be noted that Chapter II of this book is called 'The Personal' (pp.10–24). The writer belongs to a generation of Educationists who were 'brought up on', as it were, books like Glaucon, and so regard it more kindly than does Best. Jeffreys on more 'political' matters can be seen in two thoughtful contributions to the debate: 'The Future of Teacher Training', Educational Review, Vol. 14 (November 1961), pp.3-9;


[A.M. Kean], 'Foreword', Researches and Studies, Vol. 22 (December 1961), p.5. He leads in to this phrase with an explicit statement of the general educationist's relationship to disciplines, when he says: 'there is always a tendency on the part of those engaged in "Education" to think of the more precisely definable studies as means for the understanding of the complex of "Education", rather than as disciplines in their own right...In the last resort, in the study of "Education", eclecticism must be dominant' (p.5).


In view of the heavy emphasis placed on the verb 'to constitute' found in the work of the 1960s with which Morris was (oddly and formally) associated, it is of interest to note his argument here that the disciplines 'cannot be said to constitute' Education (p.7).


42 Ibid, p.166.


45 Ibid, p.168. It is interesting to note Inglis's style, as reported here, for this particular face-to-face audience of peers, when he characterizes Personalism: 'Personalism has reminded us of our common humanity and paradoxically enough of our uniqueness. We are born, we live our very own lives and die alone: these are true of all and they are true of each other. These experiences belong to the teacher and the taught, to the man and to the woman, to the white and to the coloured, to the more intelligent and to the less intelligent, to the adjusted and to the maladjusted, to the religious and to the irreligious'. Ibid, pp.167-168.


49 'Conference: Disciplines of Learning in Universities and Training Colleges', Education for Teaching, No. 50 (November 1959), p.37. It will be recalled that Peters' address 'What Is a Discipline?' provided the material for "Experience" and the Function of the Educator" in his Authority, Responsibility and Education already examined. It is not printed in this issue of the journal, but is utilized in Catherine Fletcher's Editorial

50 'Disciplines of Learning', p.44.

51 Ibid, p.45. The whole passage sums up what would have been a common response to Peters by those who were proud of their existing professional discipline: 'It called for the appreciation of all the needs of childhood, including the aesthetic and emotional sides, thus involving kinds of experience hardly touched on by Dr. Peters; for a sympathetic but unsentimental understanding of other people, whether children or colleagues; for a power of discrimination amongst values in a world where there is no established creed but many conflicting ideologies. All this could not be achieved by logical study for it was directly dependent on feeling and imaginative intuition.' Ibid, p.45.

52 Ambivalence is clearly shown in the comment: 'These first discussions showed widespread realisation that some academic stiffening might be necessary in training college courses, but a no less strong determination not to sacrifice theory based on practice and experience for formal study.' Ibid, p.46.


54 Ibid, p.37.

55 Ibid, p.38.

Ibid, p.53.

The content of the previously mentioned Open University course E200. Contemporary Issues in Education, introduced in 1981, would no doubt have gained Langeveld's approval, being 'designed for all those interested in education, whether for professional or personal reasons. We feel that it is as relevant to parents...as it is to teachers, school governors and managers, administrators, local politicians and members of the caring professions...the course covers a very wide range of educational issues. We have broadened the definition of education beyond' the confines of the formal system to include the informal educational experiences through which we acquire knowledge and skills. How, for example, do we learn to become parents? How are we changed by working? These processes are just as educational, we consider, as lessons in school or in any other formal educational institution'. A. Finch and S. Reedy, Introduction and Guide (Milton Keynes: Open University, 1981), p.4. The 32 units of the course, ranging from the family as educator of the young child through formal institutions into adult working life and the family again, amply bear out this claim - as the writer can testify, having taught it to mature students drawn from all walks of life (not just professional teachers).

Langeveld, 'Disintegration', p.60.

Ibid, p.60.

Ibid, p.61.

Ibid, p.63.

As the unusually wide-ranging philosopher Reuben Abel says of the 'third gulf' which he attempts to bridge in a splendid book: 'The third gulf is a transatlantic one, both literally (that is, between the English-speaking nations and continental Europe) and figuratively. It firmly separates the analytic philosophers, who insist on logic, precision, and clarity, from the imaginative metaphysicians, who claim that their vision resists the rigor of those requirements'. Man is the Measure: A Cordial Invitation to the Central Problems of Philosophy (New York: Free Press, 1976), p.xx. Abel's other two gulfs are relevant to our inquiry: 'first, the abyss that scares the
layman away from professional philosophy; second, the no-man's
land between philosophy and other sorts of intellectual

M. Golby, 'Curriculum Theory', in D. Unwin and R. McAleese
(eds.), The Encyclopaedia of Educational Media Communications

B.O. Smith, W.O. Stanley and T.H. Shores, Fundamentals of
Curriculum Development, 2nd edition (New York: World Books,
1957).

G.A. Beauchamp, Curriculum Theory (Wilmette, Illinois: Kagg
Press, 1961), p.111. We can, at this point, note (as promised
in Period One) that Jerome Bruner had just produced The Process
of Education (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1960). Based on the Woods Hole conference, it is what
one reviewer called a 'lovely book', but is difficult to
classify. This difficulty illustrates, in a sense, one of our
major themes. As we have already 'located' Bruner in relation
to Piaget and Ausubel, we can leave this influential little
book by just recording Bruner's own summary of its emphases, as
'four themes and one conjecture: the themes of structure,
readiness, intuition, and interest, and the conjecture of how
best to aid the teacher in the task of instruction'. (p.16). On
the conjecture we can note a comment between whose lines we can
certainly read something of significance in the light of our
inquiry: 'Teaching machines were demonstrated by Professor B.F.
Skinner of Harvard, and the demonstration led to a lively, at
times stormy, discussion'. (p.xi).

Bruner was, of course, to produce within a few years his
distillation of research and reflection on education in a book
whose very title could well stand at the head of this, our last chapter. Toward A Theory of Instruction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap-Harvard, 1966). These two - and other - 'educational' books are the product of the middle period in the career of a unique psychologist which is eloquently described in his recent In Search of Mind: Essays in Autobiography (New York: Harper and Row, 1983). This contains the comment - very relevant to our investigation - that 'psychology is more splintered, less unified, more beset by contradictions than it was when I started. Even the Cognitive Revolution risks being trivialized by the narrowness with which psychology defines its specialized research problems. Much of it stems from our wish to have a distinctive identity as psychologists, to be free of our parent, philosophy' (p.280). This is an appropriate point to relate - briefly and dramatically - Ausubel to Bruner by giving a comment from Ausubel's review of Theory of Instruction. He says: 'This is not a very important book!' - Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1966), p.337 - and goes on to deliver some heavy blows which point to the 'political' dimension that we have found omni-present in educational writing. One further observation on this will suffice. It comes from a later collaborator and popularizer of Ausubel who says: 'A rather monotonous public speaking style has not helped to arouse popular enthusiasm for Ausubel's arguments. One can only speculate on the position his theory would occupy in education if he had the stage charm, humor and forensic skills of Jerome Bruner or B.F. Skinner', J.D. Novak, A Theory of Education (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p.73. Novak develops his point in a footnote: 'Ausubel received the E.L. Thorndike Award from the American Psychological Association in 1976 for "outstanding contribution to educational psychology". This followed a period when most of his research papers and books were rejected by editorial boards with prominent APA members' (p.76, note 4).

The present writer can testify to the resistance engendered by Ausubel's unbending prose style (and the appearance of Herbartianism in his standpoint) in college teachers of Education - a resistance which time, patient exposure and discussion can overcome. It took from 1968 to 1971 and a weekly seminar before Ausubelian notions were accepted as more appropriate for the Education course for which the writer was responsible than the supposedly 'rigorous' orthodox psychology and supposedly 'relevant' or 'child centred' methods that different groups of tutors with different backgrounds and intellectual 'capital' initially wanted. Thereafter, for a decade, an Ausubel-influenced course was accepted simply because it 'worked'.

The traditionalism was identified by a later 'systematic' writer who comments on Nisbet as coping with 'the problem of selecting subject matter by taking the school subjects for granted and, by a sort of hindsight, discovering what they can contribute to the general aims...Though this approach may provide valuable background material for the curriculum-planners, it is illicit curriculum process in that it derives goals from subject matter instead of selecting subject matter with a view to achieving goals'. D.K. Wheeler, Curriculum Process (London: University of London Press, 1967), p.181. See also the review of Nisbet by F.F. Gregory in Education for Teaching, No. 46 (May 1958), pp.48-50.

Nisbet, Purpose in the Curriculum, p.12


Ibid, p.162.

Ibid, p. 163.


Ibid, p.189.

Ibid, p.182.

Ibid, p.189.

Ibid, p.190.

Ibid, p.190. It is significant that a book aimed at commonsensical, practical observations should cite an educational 'philosopher' whose own attempt at explaining the process of human learning in The Education of Man was so pervasively ontological.

G.Z.F. Bereday and J.H. Lauwerys (eds.), The Yearbook of Education 1958: The Secondary School Curriculum (London: Evans, 1958). It can be noted that Holmes features as a contributor to the long 'Editors' Introduction: The Content of Education' (pp.1-33). In view of his early significance as a generalist in this thesis and of Lauwerys' even earlier importance prior to our Period One, it is of relevance to record Holmes' later comment in the intellectual autobiography which introduces an important book of his in the 1980s that (with reference to his tutor Lauwerys): 'Under his charismatic guidance the books
which contributed most to my conceptual position were...John Dewey's *How We Think* and Karl R. Popper's *Open Society and Its Enemies* and *Logik der Forschung*. Comparative Education: Some Considerations of Method (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), p.2. This remark throws light on the philosophical background to one species of generalism, particularly as this shows itself at the 'level' of comparative education which has not been our main concern. See also B. Holmes, 'Education as a Profession', Education for Teaching, Vol. 44 (November 1957), pp.42-48.


91 Ibid, p.3.


93 Ibid, p.18.

94 Ibid, p.32-33.

95 Ibid, p.33.


98 From our point of view the influence on Holmes' stand-point of American thinkers whom we have examined is significant. As he was to say of an older generation of generalists: 'Among this generation B.O. Smith, W.O. Stanley, Harry S. Broudy, Archie Anderson and Theodore Brameld influenced me most'. Some Considerations of Method, p.9. One American writer whom Holmes does not mention - and one who like Holmes was to emerge later as an important educationist with a practical orientation - is J.J. Schwab. An article by him within this period worth looking at for its Brunerian approach to the relationship between reasoning and feeling is 'On The Corruption of Education By Psychology', School Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Summer 1958), pp.169-184.


100 Ibid, p.49.

101 Ibid, p.49.

Ibid, p.444

Ibid, p.446.

Ibid, p.448. The disputants were employed in the same university school.


Ibid, p.449.


Ibid, p.118.

Ibid, p.120.

Ibid, p.120.

Ibid, p.121.


Ibid, p.9. It is interesting to note that the retired but still very active Bantock, over two decades later, reviewed a new-style book by Peters (R.S. Peters, Essays on Educators (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981)) with the Knoxian welcome: 'It is good to see the professor of the philosophy of education at the London Institute turning his attention to important educational writers of the past'. British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (October 1982), p.354.
Bantock's identification of 'the vice of excessive contemporaneity' (p.354) in educational philosophy is similar to Knox's, which itself was made at a time when, as we have seen, the 'vice' was being urged as a virtue. It bears, too, on our general theme to note Bantock's judgement of Peters' 'new' use of past thinkers as compared with his own: 'In general Professor Peters treats these theorists as whetstones on which to sharpen his own claws...he reveals no extension of awareness as a result of his scrutiny; and this clashes with my own experience. As a result of my own work on the history of educational theory during the last few years, I have both clarified my mind and extended my consciousness, historically and experientially i.e. in relation to current problems'. Ibid, p.355.

The typically insightful review by the longstanding (and also retired) Educationist J.P. Tuck of G.H. Bantock, The Parochialism of the Present: Contemporary Issues in Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) in British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (October 1982), pp.350-352, bears similarly on the theme, when he says that the book urges 'a strongly held individual conviction, namely that educational theory and practice today suffer from a lack of attention to the principles and methods of the past, caused by the absence of essential historical and literary studies in the education of teachers and possibly also of educational research workers' (p.350).

Tuck adds: 'Most thoughtful students of education would agree that there has been a tendency for the subject to suffer in this way in recent years' (p.350). It can be said again that Tuck's reviews from the early 1950s into the 1980s have been a consistent source of informed good sense on the subject of Education. He is always unpretentiously 'philosophical'; and the absence of a large work in this genre from his pen is perhaps an indication that some of the best thinking in Education goes into institutional course-planning and teaching rather than into that more public expression of it referred to throughout this thesis as 'the literature of Education'. Some of his notable reviews from various periods can be mentioned here, for they bear strongly on our themes: Review of R.K. Hall and J.A. Lauwerys (eds.), The Year Book of Education 1955 [Guidance and Counselling ] (London: Evans, 1955), British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May 1956), pp.172-176; Review of G.H. Bantock, Education, Culture and the Emotions (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 1968), pp.72-73 in which there is a perceptive comment on the one-sidedness of

121 Knox, Educational Method, p.21.

122 Ibid, p.169. His further comment is revealing as an additional implied criticism of those tendencies in psychology-dominated theorizing which we have noted he was one of the first to make: 'This is our own aim in studying method, and if it is lacking in scientific rigour we should remember Rousseau's paradox that the scientific atmosphere destroys science. In teaching, no less than in preaching, the letter killeth but the spirit giveth light' (p.169).

123 A.D. Woodruff, Basic Concepts of Teaching (San Francisco: Chandler, 1961).


125 Ibid, p.v.

126 Ibid, p.vi.


Apart from other roles mentioned earlier, Tibble was Secretary-Treasurer of the Standing Conference on Studies in Education from the date of the initial Conference of 19th December 1951 until 1955, and continued with the separated Secretaryship until 1962. Later he was Chairman: from 1968 to his death in 1971. It is of relevance to this thesis to record that Professor Tibble acted as a consultant from 1968 to 1971 to the writer when he was planning and implementing the above-mentioned course in Education for Certificate students in a new College of Education. The nature of this course was 'generalist' in the sense developed in the present account and was much influenced by seminars held with the Education Department of the college by Professor Tibble in which this perspective was thoroughly discussed in relation to the frame of reference supplied by Tibble's *The Study of Education* - a work whose effect on teacher-education the present writer thought was proving to be disastrous in its encouragement of 'politically' motivated tutor-specialization in an age of 'expansion' at the expense of all other considerations.


Ibid, p.10.

Morris, 'Some Major Issues', p.22. In this serial symposium Morris is responding, as an educationist, to an administrator (Note 130 above).


Ibid, p.244.
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