John Buddle (1773 - 1843) agent and entrepreneur in the north-east coal trade

Hiskey, Christine E.
Christine E. Hiskey

John Buddle
(1773 - 1843)
Agent and Entrepreneur in the North-East Coal Trade

Thesis submitted for the M. Litt. Degree
University of Durham, Department of History
1978
Contents

List of Illustrations i
Acknowledgements ii
Statement of Copyright iii
Note on Glossary iii
Abstract iv

I
Introduction:
  Outline of Career. The Sources. Early Life. 1

II
"The Craft call'd Viewers" 7

III
"The 'Mighty Chiefs' of Oppression" 22

IV
Gentlemen and Adventurers 30

V
"Know the Man" 37

VI
Wallsend and Tanfield Moor 65

VII
Consultant Viewer and Engineer:
  Head Viewer. The Lambton Collieries. Consultant
  Viewer. Work Outside the North East. Work Abroad.
  Non-Colliery Engineering. 77

VIII
Londonderry Agent - The Situation in 1819 96

IX
The Londonderry Hierarchy 102

X
Strategy and Tactics at the Londonderry Collieries:
  Transport and Shipping. Underground Improvements.
  Territorial Policy. Conclusions. 121

XI
Seaham Harbour:
  The Later Years. 150

XII
Buddle, Londonderry and the Coal Trade:
  Introductory. Attitudes to Regulation. The Mainte-
  nance of Price. The Pursuit of Quantity.
  Relationships within the Wear Trade. Relationships
  with the Tyne. Relationship of Buddle and Londonderry.
  187

XIII
"A Black Cloud that O'er Spreads Me":
  Conclusions. 226

XIV
Buddle as Colliery Owner 263

XV
Labour Relations 288

XVI
Conclusion 298

References and Notes 302

Bibliography 344
Illustrations

Maps and Plans

Tyne and Wear Collieries 117
Penshaw, Rainton and Nesham's line to Sunderland, 1820 120
New inclined plane and engine plane from Penshaw to the staiths, 1819 123
Rainton and Pittington, 1835 138
Proposed harbour at Dalden Ness, 1823 158
Seaham Harbour, 1834 160
Crawcrook and Stella Coal Co. royalties 278
Buddle's Terms for Valuations and Views 76
Ventilation and Pillar Working 93
Years of Regulated Trade, 1819-34 186
Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the staff of the Mining Institute in Newcastle, the Northumberland Record Office, and the Department of Palaeography and Diplomatic, University of Durham, for their willing help during my visits and with postal enquiries. As an archivist in the Durham Record Office I was in a fortunate position for undertaking research (out of office hours) and I am grateful for help received then and since.

The staff of several libraries and Record Offices (particularly Newcastle City Library; Dorset; Gwent, Clwyd, Glamorgan, Corporation of London, and Gloucestershire Record Offices) have kindly answered postal queries; Lord Lambton allowed me to look at the Lambton Archives; and I have also appreciated correspondence or discussions with Professor A.W. Skempton, Miss M.B. Weinstock, Dr. C. Russell, and the Head of Registry Services and the Mining Records Officer at the NCB (North East Area.) My sister, Miss S.A. Cobbold gave me most useful help with the maps. My mother, Mrs. M.H. Cobbold, has typed and re-typed with inexhaustible patience and interest.

My supervisor at the University of Durham, A.J. Heesom, by his unfailing help and interest, has given me invaluable guidance and encouragement and enhanced my enjoyment of the research.
Copyright

The Copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without her prior written consent, and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Note on Glossary

Where technical terms are not explained in the text or notes, the reader is referred to G.C. Greenwell, A Glossary of Terms used in the Coal Trade of Northumberland and Durham (3rd. ed., London, 1888; facsimile reprint, Newcastle, 1970).
John Buddle (1773-1843)
Agent and Entrepreneur in the North-East Coal Trade

Christine E. Hiskey

Abstract

The name of John Buddle is well known to historians interested in the coal-mining industry, or in the history of Northumberland and Durham, in the first half of the nineteenth century. The present study is, however, surprisingly the first to make him the subject of an academic monograph rather than a source for occasional references in research on associated topics.

The thesis is based on Buddle's correspondence, diaries and working papers in the Durham and Northumberland County Record Offices and the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers. It examines the background to Buddle's career - the viewers, agents and entrepreneurs in the north-east coal-field; Buddle's training; and his character, and leisure and business interests. It then investigates Buddle's work: as a colliery viewer on an occasional or consultant basis (without, however, attempting any detailed consideration of engineering); as manager or agent of two Tyne collieries; as an entrepreneur in his own collieries on the Tyne; and as colliery agent for twenty-four years to the third Marquess of Londonderry, one of the great coal-owners on the River Wear. This latter topic embraces the management structure of the Londonderry collieries; the policy and tactics pursued in mining and shipping the coal, and acquiring colliery land; the building of Seaham Harbour; relations with the Coal Trade organisation on its regulation of the vend; and Londonderry's financial affairs. A further chapter considers Buddle's attitude to labour relations, including the 1851-2 pitmen's strike.

An examination of Buddle's intimate involvement in all these areas sheds light on topics such as the role of agency in general, the state of the north-east coal trade in the first half of the nineteenth century, and management in the age of new industrialisation.
Tyne and Wear Collieries
showing places mentioned in the text
Chapter I

Introduction

John Buddle achieved both fame and fortune in his lifetime. He was the object of reminiscences in local newspapers and the Colliery Guardian in the 1840s, 1875 and 1900. Historians have recognised him as the epitome of the achievements of the north-east coal industry in the first half of the nineteenth century and have appreciated him as a most articulate authority on its circumstances. Nevertheless, they have hailed him in passing rather than cultivated his acquaintance.

Buddle was a colliery viewer. The viewer was "the chief man of every colliery", responsible for planning and conducting" the great operations and works of the mine," and Buddle was one of a long line of viewers in the great Northumberland and Durham coal-field, whose practical experience and technical skills not only made them important figures locally but also established them as expert consultants for less advanced coal-fields in Britain and abroad. Martin Jude, Secretary to the National Miners' Association, who could hardly be accused of partiality towards viewers, agreed with his questioner before a Select Committee in 1853 that the chief viewers were "generally a superior class of men in the North of England" and that he did not know "any class of men in mining, in any other parts of the country, superior to them in intelligence and experience. Buddle was an outstanding example, combining a love of pit work with exemplary attention to paper work, and practical skills with theoretical understanding.

Buddle was also a colliery manager, distinguishing between his viewing posts, which were many, and his position as manager at Wallsend, Tanfield Moor and Lord Londonderry's collieries. These management posts represent, by chance, three stages in the history of the coal-field, which was evolving rapidly in the first half of the nineteenth century - Tanfield Moor was one of the old, west Durham collieries which were suffering from the rise of the new deep collieries in the Tyne basin; Wallsend, when Buddle was first connected with it, was the most famous of these new ventures, but by the end of his life it
had ceded supremacy to the two or three great colliery concerns on the Wear; Lord Londonderry's was one of these.

Buddie was colliery agent to the third Marquess of Londonderry, one of the wealthiest and most powerful of Durham coal-owners, for twenty-four years. During the period 1819 to 1843, Buddie not only directed Lord Londonderry's mining affairs but also influenced territorial and entrepreneurial policy; he was financial adviser and an electioneering agent; he conducted relations with the Coal Trade, the organisation of colliery owners and agents which controlled prices and vend (or sales) in the north-east in order to obtain optimum conditions in the London and coastal markets; and Buddie and Londonderry together conceived and built Seaham Harbour. Only one modern study of Londonderry has been attempted, and Dr. Sturgess' analysis of the relationship between Buddie and his employer does not inspire confidence.

Buddie maintained his interest in mining on the Tyne, where he continued as viewer and also owned shares in several collieries. He was for many years Secretary of the Tyne Coal Trade, a powerful influence in its meetings and a frequent representative of its interests, and he was often called upon to give evidence in parliamentary committees on the coal industry.

In private life Buddie was an active and wealthy member of the professional and land-owning class of Newcastle-upon-Tyne and its neighbourhood. He played a prominent part in local societies and functions, mixing as a social equal with the gentry and nobility who employed him, and counted among his visitors and correspondents many eminent men in various spheres of life. He owned ships and land as well as collieries, and invested in banks and railways. It was with justification that his influence and reputation in virtually every aspect of the important Northumberland and Durham coal-field - as viewer, manager or agent, entrepreneur and as a personality - won him the title of "John Buddie, the King of the Coal Trade."

The Sources

There is a remarkable range of documentary material on John Buddie, much of it from his own pen. Captain Frank Buddie Atkinson, probably a great-great-nephew, deposited a large collection at the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers, including place books or diaries, letter books and several volumes of reports, valuations and technical material. These were probably among the papers
from Buddie's offices at Wallsend and Newcastle, and from the office at Penshaw colliery (the centre of Londonderry's concerns) which Londonderry's trustee and solicitor both considered as Buddie's private office; Buddie had bequeathed his "professional plans, papers, books and instruments" and his library to his nephew Robert Atkinson.  

On the day after Buddie's death, Robert Atkinson and another of Buddie's executors went to the colliery office at Penshaw and removed his papers. They later returned all material relating to Londonderry's collieries and affairs - presumably the same papers which now form part of the Londonderry Papers deposited by the 9th Marquess in the Durham Record Office in 1963. They refused, however, despite Londonderry's vehement wishes, to return Londonderry's letters to Buddie. They proposed an arrangement whereby these letters would be placed in a box with two locks and deposited with a third party (John Clayton, a Newcastle solicitor) for ten years "and then given up to your lordship." Londonderry strongly objected to such an arrangement but probably had to accede to it as the executors had a legal right to hold letters containing directions to Buddie, "for his justification." These letters, however, are not among the Londonderry Papers in the Durham Record Office and have not been traced elsewhere. Letters to Buddie (other than from Londonderry) and various working papers form part of the National Coal Board records also deposited in the Durham Record Office. This deposit also includes a great deal of material relating to the Stella Coal Company and its partners, and it appears that the Stella Coal Company, of which Buddie had been a founder, for some reason had custody of many of his papers, including some of those deposited at the Mining Institute as well as at the Durham Record Office.

The Minute Books of the Coal Trade organisation are held at the Northumberland County Record Office, where there are also various items by Buddie relating to local collieries.

The material available on Buddie is rendered doubly valuable and rewarding by his conscientious attention to paper work, and his expressive and articulate style of writing, without, however, any trace of historical self-consciousness. He easily escapes his own epitaph on a contemporary viewer - "when he dies all his information will go to the grave with him." Buddie's papers are still under-exploited as a source of information for wider surveys or detailed monographs, but they enable a study of his own career to reveal a great deal of useful
information on the coal industry in the north-east in the first half of the nineteenth century."

Early life

John Buddie was born on 15th November 1773 at Kyo, near Lanchester in the north-west of Durham county. He was the only son of John Buddie senior, born at Chester-le-Street in 1743, the son of George Buddies [sic]. The family preserved links with Chester-le-Street many years later: John Buddie senior was buried there in 1806 despite having become well-established at Wallsend, and so was his widow in 1827. At least until the 1830s, Buddie owned a tannery there which was leased out."

The Durham historian, Fordyce, reported a tradition that John Buddie senior conducted a school at Chester-le-Street, and the Northumberland biographer, Welford, described him as "a schoolmaster of repute", but he does not appear in schoolmasters' licences. By 1766 he had probably moved to Bushblades, near Tanfield, although two years later he was married at Chester-le-Street to a local girl, Ann Heay, the daughter of a farmer. John and Ann Buddie are described as living at Kyo in all their children's baptism entries - Margaret (born 1768), Mary (born 1769, married Whitfield Burnett, a colliery surgeon), Ann (born 1773, unmarried), John (1773) and Eleanor (born 1777, married Smart Atkinson)."

Unfortunately the father's occupation is not given in his marriage entry nor in the baptism entries of his first four children, but in 1777 he was described as a coal viewer. Exactly how and when Buddie senior left teaching for colliery viewing is not clear. There was a colliery at Bushblades, where he went on leaving Chester-le-Street, belonging to George Silvertop; Buddie was viewer there by 1768-179 and his inscription in the front of an old book of boring and sinking notes suggests that he was taking an interest in such matters as early as 1765."

Buddie senior appears to have brought an academic and scientific approach to viewing: he was said to have been a correspondent of Emerson, Hutton and other eminent men, and he published in 1778 a reprint of the Marquess of Worcester's Century of Inventions, with an appendix "containing an historical account of the fire engine for raising water"; in 1780 a diagram and description of a machine for drawing coals with water, and in 1789 an account of Curr's improved method of drawing coals.
His reputation while at Bushblades colliery must have grown strongly for in about 1792, after eleven years of problems in winning Wallsend colliery, a particularly difficult new venture in the Tyne basin, William Russell employed John Buddle senior as his viewer.\textsuperscript{17} Henceforth, Buddle built a considerable reputation; he succeeded at Wallsend despite numerous difficulties from heavy feeders of water and from firedamp and explosions; in 1792 he was appointed viewer to the Bishop of Durham, and in 1800 to the Dean and Chapter of Durham, two of the largest coal lessors in the area;\textsuperscript{18} and he had a wide practice as a consultant viewer, including various Tyne collieries and the Wear collieries belonging to Sir Henry Vane-Tempest and to the trustees of John George Lambton, the latter of whom he represented at meetings of the Wear Coal Trade organisation. His reputation evidently spread to other areas, for in 1801 he viewed one of the Duke of Norfolk's collieries near Sheffield; it is possible that he had undertaken similar business for the Duke as early as 1773.\textsuperscript{19} He was responsible for the invention of cast-iron tubs in segments, used for holding back feeders of water in pit shafts, and he experimented with John Curr's flat ropes, shaft conductors and underground cast-iron railway.\textsuperscript{20}

John Buddle junior is said to have received only one year's formal schooling and to have been educated almost entirely by his father.\textsuperscript{21} Buddle told Londonderry, in connection with Lord Ashley's Bill on the employment of women and children in mines, that "I myself was initiated into the mysteries of pit-work when not quite six years old," and in cross-examination before a parliamentary committee, he specifically stated that he had been "brought up a lad in a pit."\textsuperscript{22}

As the Newcastle Journal pointed out, however, a month after Buddle's death, an insinuation in a London paper that Buddle had risen from being "a mere pit lad" was erroneous:

"Mr. Buddle was the only son of a colliery viewer of great eminence. The elder Mr. Buddle was a man of considerable literary and scientific attainments and he bestowed great care in educating his son in every branch of knowledge which could be advantageous to him in his intended profession. Mr. Buddle therefore was a well-educated gentleman from the beginning of his career."\textsuperscript{23}

Buddle acted as his father's assistant at Wallsend and in his other viewing work, his father giving him a proportion of his salaries for the latter; in the 1790s he gained valuable experience
by frequently accompanying his father and other viewers in views and reports. In 1799, when Buddie was twenty-six, his father told Arthur Mowbray, who was apparently contemplating a purchase of coal at Bedlington, that,

"I should be very happy on any opening being likely to take place of a colliery here to introduce my son to a small share therein, as he is now from practice etc. fully competent to see justice done in such a weighty engagement." 25

Some months later, Buddie wrote a report for colliery owners who then thought that it would be "prudent to have the benefit of your father's opinion along with your own," but from about 1801, Buddie was receiving salaries and fees on his own account, beginning to buy shares in collieries and taking on probably his first apprentice. 26

When his father died in 1806, Buddie's practice was well-established. He appears to have succeeded almost automatically to his father's management post at Wallsend and his viewing at Lambton, though not to viewing for the Bishop and the Dean and Chapter of Durham. He expressed his willingness to attend to George Silvertop's colliery concerns when he wrote to notify Silvertop of his father's death, but he was already established in many of his regular viewing posts before his father died. 27 He had received perhaps the best training available to a viewer - to be born into the profession, to act as his father's assistant and to combine an early training in pitmanship with an intellectual approach. 28 The father, though details of his career are elusive, was well-known and would have remained so, if for nothing else, for his achievement in winning Wallsend colliery. Within a few years of his death, however, he was far outstripped by his son.
Chapter II

"The Craft call'd Viewers"

Nothing demonstrates better the professional identity and pride that colliery viewers had attained by the end of Buddle's career than the ori de coeur of 'A True Conservative' writing to Lord Londonderry shortly after Buddle's death in 1843:

"There is much mystery and humbug thrown over the performance of the Craft call'd Viewers."

He had, perhaps, some excuse for such an attitude. The professional and personal characteristics of many viewers were such that they could be recalled long after their hey-day by an elderly miner, and their names were linked with the collieries they had directed often far more closely than were the owners'; yet the skill on which such fame rested had been gathered from years of practical work and experience - a viewer who had been a common pitman and was a poor scholar might nevertheless understand "sulphur upon a candle", while another viewer who had served an apprenticeship might fail at a colliery because "it was fiery and he did not understand it." 'A True Conservative' was in good company in his puzzlement, for a cross-examiner before a House of Commons Committee in 1836 unwittingly demonstrated the divergence between, on the one hand, a layman's idea of a viewer, and, on the other hand, the way in which Buddle was "converting the old colliery viewer into the mining engineer":

"Cross examination by Mr. Wilkinson:
You are not an engineer, I think, Mr. Buddle?
- I believe I am.
Have you ever acted professionally as an engineer?
- I am so far an engineer that I was thought worthy of being appointed a member of the Institute of Engineers in London.
Has that ever been your pursuit in life?
- It has.
For what space of time?
- All my life.
Do you mean to say there is no difference between the business of a coal viewer and an engineer?
- There is; one is a branch of the other."

Matthias Dunn's History of the Viewers, recording the reminiscences of Samuel Haggerstone, an elderly furnace-keeper whom he met at Hebburn Colliery in 1811-12, is in itself indicative both of the sense of
professional identity among viewers in the mid-nineteenth century, when Dunn considered it worthwhile to transcribe the notes of his conversation with Haggerstone, and of the status accorded to viewers as far back as Haggerstone's memory could reach. Unfortunately, Haggerstone's memory for dates was hazy. Nevertheless, starting roughly from the days of the famous William Brown of Throokley in the mid-eighteenth century, he and Dunn between them reveal some significant characteristics of Buddle's professional predecessors and contemporaries.

Training was a vital consideration. Simon Donnison, viewer at Lambton, whose career can be ascribed to the first half of the eighteenth century, was said to have been the first to take on an apprentice. His successor at Lambton, William Newton, who was "declining" by 1750, had several apprentices. Henceforth, Haggerstone tended to mention the fact that particular viewers had not served their time, as an evident cause of their failure. One or two indications can be found as to the nature of such apprenticeship, at least in the early nineteenth century. In 1826, Thomas Croudace, one of the Lambton viewers, asked Buddle's advice for one of his colleagues, Thomas Crawford, who had been asked to take an apprentice and was not sure how much to charge, including board and lodging. Crawford had no need of an apprentice and was only taking him to learn the art and craft of viewing for three or four years, "which may be deemed a fair time to serve." A few months later, Buddle was asked about indenturing to a viewer the third son (one of ten children) of Thomas Croudace himself, who had just died. The boy was aged fourteen, the best scholar at Houghton school, and it was hoped to find a viewer who did not require a premium to take him.

The heyday of the apprenticeship system was probably around the turn of the century when schools of viewers developed around the leading figures. Matthias Dunn remembered that between the schools of George Johnson, Thomas Barnes (died 1801, aged 36) and Buddle, each of whom succeeded in turn as "the greatest viewer in Tyne and Wear," "a perpetual rivalship existed." The viewers who had served an apprenticeship with these men also included some famous names. George Johnson was viewer at Wallsend until it was taken by Russell in 1781, after which he went to Willington, succeeding the famous William Brown. He also won many other collieries. His apprentices included John Watson, who "afterwards became a leading man in the River Tyne," holding numerous places as viewer and owning shares in several collieries. Watson had a reputation for good judgement and "an excellent general knowledge.
of the district," but eventually he "lost a great deal of his influence by neglecting the minutiae of his profession, as well as becoming enamoured of the Turf, in which study he much excelled." It was probably this "Jacky" Watson whom Buddle encountered as a viewer at the new Hetton colliery in the 1820s and whose arrest for debt was rumoured in 1825. Thomas Barnes achieved fame for his introduction of panel working at Walker colliery in 1795; he was also viewer at Felling, Sheriff Hill and Lawson's Main, Byker. His apprentices included John Straker who was viewer at half a dozen collieries, and seemed destined for fame but subsequently lost most of his places and, in Haggerstone's opinion, was "unsuccessful in both winning and working collieries"; Thomas Easton, viewer for Brandling at Hebburn, "a good practical man and great economist," and George Hill, who succeeded Barnes and Straker as viewer at Walker and Felling.

As early as 1811-12, Buddle was said to have had "a good many apprentices and some he has made grand viewers," but little is known about them. The clearest reference in Buddle's own papers to his taking an apprentice was in 1802, when he charged a fee of £150 for John Sibbet. This may be the Mr. Sibbet who accompanied Buddle and his father to a meeting of the owners of Elswick Colliery to plan the new winning in 1804 and who reappears in 1825-26 requesting Buddle's advice about Unthank Colliery in Northumberland. Haggerstone's account implied that Edward Nelson was also apprenticed to Buddle, "and none could dispute him for a viewer if Buddle could have given him a good conduct." Buddle later started a corn-milling business in partnership with Nelson and shared an interest in Heaton colliery with him. Haggerstone also said that Matthias Dunn "served Buddle", but Dunn himself said that he had been apprenticed to Thomas Smith of Lambton from 1804. It may have been open to an ambitious young man such as Dunn to serve under more than one viewer, particularly as, according to Dunn, Thomas Smith "never aspired to extensive practice as a general viewer." It is more likely, however, that when Haggerstone said that Dunn "served Buddle" he was considering the first post of a young viewer just out of apprenticeship as an extension of his training.

In fact, one of the benefits of the apprenticeship system was invariably that apprentices developed naturally into assistants, and hence were introduced into their first posts through the influence of their masters. Buddle did the same for his apprentices: by 1804 he was paying Edward Nelson a salary of £50, and made him his assistant at
Wallsend and Hebburn. Nelson appears to have boarded with Buddie's mother in their Wallsend house - probably a survival from his apprenticeship days. Similarly, by about 1811-12, Matthias Dunn was acting as Buddie's assistant, chiefly at Hebburn and Jarrow, and receiving a salary of £150 from him. George Hunter may well have been another apprentice of Buddie's to have graduated to assistant. In 1815 he appears surveying at Wemyss for Buddie, and by 1816 he was receiving an annual salary of £100. It is probable that this was the same George Hunter who married Buddie's niece, acted as his clerk in Coal Trade meetings, and accompanied him as his deputy viewer when Buddie was appointed to the Vane-Tempest collieries in 1819, remaining there until his death in 1851.

The evidence available, vague though it is, does not suggest, however, that apprenticeship was necessarily the most common or even the most successful form of training. To have served under a great viewer was clearly a feature worth noting, but a great many viewers apparently served no formal apprenticeship, and alternative methods of training produced some of the most famous viewers. It is possible in fact that the "schools" of viewers were composed of assistants as much as of apprentices, particularly when such men as Johnson, Barnes and Buddie and many lesser viewers, held several posts and therefore needed either subordinate resident viewers or general assistants. On numerous occasions Buddie specifically mentioned his "assistants." In 1818, for example, at the request of a Mr. da Costa, he sent one of his assistants - probably George Hunter - to Portugal; he was absent for six months during which time Buddie paid his salary. In 1824, Buddie accepted a commission to view part of the Hetton coal "provided I was not too much hurried and could be allowed to employ my assistants in the most laborious parts of the investigation." In 1839 his assistant, Oliver, stepped in to fill the gap at Washington after the death of the resident viewer, Thomas Morriss.

In a few cases reputable viewers had come from outside the coal trade. Sober Watkin senior, for example, whom George Johnson had noticed as "a shrewd sensible man" and had promoted as his assistant, was said to have been a gentleman's servant before becoming a pitman. Dunn remembered that he was "very little of a scholar but was much esteemed for his management of pitmen." He became viewer at various times at Lumley, Lambton, Gravrock and Custon, and was employed "during an arduous litigation" in Cumberland; he later joined in working the Vane-Tempest collieries as a sub-contractor at the turn of the century.

William Stobart was also said to have been a servant, but, having acquired
some education, he too became assistant to his master, Donnison, and "afterwards professed viewing and being a man of good address and well able to express himself in writing, he succeeded in acquiring a good many appointments as check viewer and would have got rich," had it not been for his involvement with Arthur Mowbray in the ill-fated Durham Bank. Such men were, however, exceptions. Moreover, although Haggerstone thought that Watkin and Stobart had "taught more viewers than all the viewers of both Tyne and Wear," he concluded that "of all that they have made, there is few of them much employed."  

By far the more common road to becoming a viewer was from the ranks of the pitmen. Haggerstone observed of many viewers that they were not taught viewers but had been brought up as pitmen, rising through the ranks of deputy and overman. This type of career clearly persisted in the first half of the nineteenth century and Buddie was a firm advocate of its worth. During the controversy in 1842 over those aspects of Lord Ashley's Bill which dealt with the education of the pit lads, Buddie quoted "the old collier's distich":

"First a trapper, then a putter,
Neist a hewer — overman,
and synce a viewer." 24

Of course, this type of career raised questions of how a man who had started in the pits as a young trapper could acquire the education to become eventually an overman (responsible for making out the pay-bills) or even a viewer. Buddie cited examples from the Londonderry collieries to demonstrate that there were no insuperable obstacles providing there were "some exciting cause for the acquirement of education."

"Cramming it into the heads of those who don't feel the inclination to receive it, only nauseates," but good pitmen, rising through the ranks, could, and did, learn to read and write as adults in order to become overmen. 25 Buddie's opinion was borne out by quite a different authority - Martin Jude, Secretary to the National Miners' Association, who told a House of Commons Select Committee in 1853 that "the head viewers all serve their time or apprenticeship to the trade, and none are allowed to be head viewers except they go through this process." The under-viewers, or managing viewers, "are taken from the most intelligent of the workmen; probably those who have gone through all the stages from the deputy and overman to an under-viewer." 26

Probably the surest foundation for success as a viewer, however, was to be born into the profession — already a well-established
tradition by the time Buddie joined it. The most famous eighteenth-
century example was the Smith family. Edward Smith the elder re-won
Shatershaugh colliery after a great explosion, and was said to be "the
first man who ever put a fire lamp into a pit." His son, Edward junior
(o.1728-1808), viewer at Lambton, Murton and Newbottle, "stood very
high as a scholar and a practical viewer, understood engineering in its
then rude state, and took a leading part in the improvement of
ventilation." His son, Thomas "was at a very early age appointed to
succeed" him in the Lambton collieries, and was "esteemed a first-
rate practical man and a good scholar," but unambitious and "a great
slave to detail." Another son, John, was also "highly esteemed" as
a viewer at Newbottle where he succeeded his father, and at Houghton,
Lumley and Oxcloose. The other three sons, William, Ralph and Edward
were also brought up as viewers but were less successful. There were
numerous lesser examples.

Following the same tradition later into the nineteenth
century, Thomas Morriss, the Washington viewer who died in 1839, had
succeeded his father, also Thomas, in that position. The two sons
of Thomas Morriss junior in turn became viewers, and it was probably
one of these, Robert, whom Buddie recommended to Londonderry in 1843
as "a proper young man to be initiated into the concerns, as Hunter's
successor," for Buddie had been Russell's consultant viewer at
Washington while Morriss was resident viewer. At about the same
period, one of the lower viewers at the Londonderry collieries,
Longstaff, had a son whom Buddie considered by 1842 could well
deputise for his father.

At the higher end of the scale of viewers, Thomas John Taylor
(1811-61), although given a university education, undoubtedly owed
much to his family background. His father had been a mining engineer;
his uncle, Hugh, who became his guardian on the early death of his
father, had been trained as a viewer and was mineral agent to the
Duke of Northumberland. Similarly, Thomas Young Hall (1802-70) was
the son of James Hall (died 1841) who was said to have worked under
John Buddie senior at Wallsend and to have succeeded him as viewer
at Greenside, near Ryton. T.Y.Hall combined several types of training:
"after passing through an unusual amount of the drudgery of a common
pit boy, served an apprenticeship under his father and the eminent
John Buddie...at Townley, Whitefield and Chopwell collieries." He later became viewer to North Hetton, Black Boy, and South Hetton,
and to English-owned mines in Virginia. With Buddie and A.L.Potter,
he became one of the founders of the Stella Coal Company. Robert Simpson (1811-94) who was said to have been trained by T.Y.Hall, was appointed resident viewer for the new Stella Coal Company in 1840 at the age of twenty-six; he was later its managing partner for many years. His son, John Bell Simpson (1837-1926) in turn became managing director of the Stella Coal Company and of several other colliery companies, and had a wide practice as a consultant colliery engineer; the next generation - particularly Frank Simpson (1865-1949) - continued the line until Nationalisation in 1948.

Whether a viewer was trained by apprenticeship, practical experience or parental instruction, great emphasis was laid on two qualifications in particular: scientific and scholarly understanding, and practical "breeding." Numerous viewers already owed a great part of their fame to their application of engineering to pit work - Thomas Barnes and Buddie were the most noted, but Edward Smith senior, William Brown of Throckley and, in Cumberland, Carlisle and James Spedding had already shown the way. Wider scientific interests were also becoming apparent – both Edward Smiths, like John Buddie senior, were "celebrated mathematicians," and many viewers took a keen interest in geology. More tangible signs of formal education and qualification, however, were only just beginning to appear in the first half of the nineteenth century. Buddie's own career epitomises this development, for towards the end of his life, in May 1837, he twice met three Durham University professors at their invitation, to discuss the idea of establishing a class in Mining and Civil Engineering at the University. It was opened in the following January, reputedly the first such course established by an academic body, and two years later, Temple Chevallier, Professor of Mathematics, was most anxious that Buddie should examine the first two students. They were examined by two professors in German, French and Italian; Physical Science, Mathematics, Astronomy and Chemistry; and - by Buddie - in Engineering: "I of course found him very deficient in practical engineering." Chevallier was particularly keen to see the class well-established and hoped it would not only supply "an acknowledged deficiency in the system of general education," but also, with some extension, contribute to the prevention of accidents in mines. He looked forward to the founding of a Professorship in Practical Engineering and Mining. The course was not, however successful - significantly attributed by one authority to the contemporary system
of apprenticeship - and it came to an end after six or seven years. Nevertheless, there are various indications of the new trend. Hugh Taylor and Buddle both sent their nephews, Thomas John Taylor and Robert Atkinson, to Edinburgh University before launching them as viewers. In 1842 Buddle was asked by Sir Thomas Phillips, a Welsh coal owner, to take as his pupil for six or twelve months, the son of a colliery owner in Monmouthshire (perhaps Sir Thomas's own son) who had a university education and now wished to gain practical experience underground. More unusual, perhaps, was the fact that the young man wanted such training "so as to manage his own property." There is no indication as to whether Buddle agreed to the proposition, but he was interested enough to make enquiries about Sir Thomas. In the same year, Buddle was approached by a Newcastle solicitor whose son, George Barras Reed, wished to become a viewer. He had been one of the first students in Civil Engineering and Mining on the new Durham University course, gaining distinction in all three branches - Mathematical, Physical and Practical Science; Geology, Chemistry and Mineralogy; and Modern Languages. He had since worked for a year under the Middlesbrough Dock engineer. Again, there is no indication as to whether Buddle accepted him or of his future career.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the well-established and growing trend towards giving colliery viewing an academic scientific basis, great emphasis was still laid, as always, on the need for skills and knowledge that could only be acquired through years of practical experience. Edward Smith junior was remembered as "a practical viewer" as well as a scholar; Sober Watkin junior "did not aspire to much science" but was "a good practical viewer"; Thomas Easton was "a good pit viewer." Hugh Taylor, discussing in a letter to Buddle whom they should appoint to assist them in a view at Backworth, showed that such distinctions remained valid in the early nineteenth century, for he favoured the under-viewer at Whitley - "a man of superior talent, a very good surveyor and a good practiced pitman" - while he considered that Dunn would be "quite competent for the report business." The old pitman, Haggerstone, however, found it quite acceptable that viewers who had established their reputation should give up their underground work, including even William Brown and John Watson. Of the latter he commented:

"when any misfortune happens in the collieries, he has left off going down the pits, and maybe on account of his bad health, but he has always been
looked up as a good judge in winning and working collieries. Altho' he does not go down the pits he gives the underviewers proper rules to go by. When Mr. Brown became a great viewer he did not go down the pits and many of the head viewers do not go down till the pits get to work again. I think John Watson is right in biding at bank."

George Johnson was also said to have stopped going down the pits after his success in winning Heaton."

Buddle, on the other hand, was one of the greatest exponents of the importance of practical pitmanship, in his own work and in his attitude to training. As early as 1811, Haggerstone considered that Buddie had "proved himself to be a good pit viewer" and was, "fully acquainted with all the rules and customs that belong to a fiery colliery. He had experienced them himself more than all the great head viewers ever did before him. When misfortunes happen he goes down along with the men and bides with them and sees that everything is done by his order for the occasion." Untile the other famous viewers, Buddie's love of pit-work remained with him throughout his life. He told the House of Commons Committee in 1836 that although he had always lived in Durham, "I believe I know it better underground than above." To the end of his life he made regular underground views of the collieries with which he was connected, either as a matter of routine or for a specific purpose, such as devising a scheme for the introduction of the "tub and slide" system. Eight hours underground merited special mention in his Place Book but he was then sixty-six years old. Similarly, he never lost his habit of personal underground supervision in emergencies, such as when the dams against the feeders of water in Percy-main colliery gave way in 1838. His yardstick for himself and for others was that of a pitman: when Londonderry's financial work began to absorb a large proportion of his attention, he lamented that "I feel as if I were making a bad financier and spoiling (I have the vanity to think) a good pitman;" when his nephew, whom he was training as a viewer, inherited some property, he hoped it would not spoil "the pitman;" and when his assistant, George Hunter, was unable to perform his duties because of his "fits of inebriety," Buddie particularly regretted it because "Hunter's forte [sic] is that of a pitman and I do not know a better one." The basis for such skills was long experience. Buddie did not limit its importance to viewers alone. One of his reasons for
opposing Lord Ashley's Bill in 1842, as he told Hedworth Lambton M.P., was that he and several fellow viewers whom he had consulted were convinced that if boys were not initiated into pit work before the age of thirteen or fourteen, "they never will become colliers." He told Londonderry at the same time that "our peculiar race of spitmen"

can only be kept up by breeding - it never could be recruited from an adult population." This was not an attitude brought forth only by the proposed Bill, although it goes a long way towards explaining the opposition of men such as Buddie to some of the clauses. Twenty years earlier, he had emphasised to Londonderry that the overmen killed in an explosion at Rainton should be replaced by men of experience and ability, "a main object" which he said was generally not sufficiently attended to:

"in the new appointments none shall be placed or promoted unless they pass a satisfactory examination as to pitmanship." On another occasion, describing how one of the Londonderry overmen, Charlton, had risen through the ranks from being a trapper, Buddie gave a clear definition of "pitmanship": Charlton had proved himself,

"an expert and first-rate pitman; that is understanding the nature and practice of ventilation, and the management of a fiery pit in all its details, and showed himself to be a man of resource in cases of emergency." There are indications that the training of pitmen in the collieries under Buddie was sufficiently important for them to be remembered by him even when they had subsequently moved away, for he mentioned in 1824 that the overman and wasteman killed at Newbottle (a colliery not under his direction) had been "élèves" of his. John Peile, Lord Lonsdale's viewer at his Whitehaven collieries, corroborated such an attitude. In 1823, when asking Buddie's advice about pillar working and locks for the Davy lamps, he complained that the Cumberland pitmen "are a most ignorant race and few of them are regularly bred." This caused problems not merely in efficient working but also in safety standards: most of Peile's pitmen were "Irish and other trampers, that turn only to us when no other employment can be had, and it may be readily conceived how ignorant they must be of their own safety and how difficult to impress their minds with a proper sense of care and of danger." If "breeding" was important for the pitmen, Buddie considered it essential for viewers. Moreover, it is clear that, as the coal trade expanded rapidly, there was considerable demand for well-trained viewers.
In 1825, when the owners of Seghlll colliery attempted to lure Hunter away from the Londonderry collieries, Buddle told Londonderry that, "people of this description have been very much sought after of late and are very scarce. Hunter won't be difficult to please and satisfy, but he has for some time past known that young men of his breeding and standing have been better paid than himself." 57

The new Hetton Company had particular difficulties finding a viewer of sufficient standing. In March 1823 Buddle told Londonderry that the Company was "tampering" with one of Russell's agents, John Reay, Buddle's assistant viewer at Wallsend; "they are very ill off as no man of respectability who is at all comfortably situated will go near them." Seven months later, Thomas Croudace, the Lambton viewer, told Buddle that he had been offered a share in the Company and a liberal salary if he would take on the management; in January 1824 a similar approach was made to Buddle himself, and in 1832 Hunter was offered a salary of £1,200 with the usual perquisites, for the management and viewing. 58 Hunter, however, remained with Londonderry, but in 1843 Buddle was convinced that he would have to be replaced because of his fits of drunkenness, and he emphasised the problems of finding a successor:

"There are plenty of half-bred pitmen - young viewers which have been reared in the new mushroom collieries. But we require a thorough bred one, of experience and resource, with some brains in his head. A description of man which is not to be picked up every day, as all those of character and name are engaged." 59

As the coal trade expanded and technical problems increased, the demand for good viewers was felt not only in the north-east but throughout Great Britain and abroad. The Newcastle coal-field had long been the source to which other areas looked for expert recruits or specialist consultation. 60 William Dixon (1753-1824), for example, who by 1800 was a leading authority in the west of Scotland, had gone there from Tyneside; and John Curr, well-known as the Duke of Norfolk's viewer at Sheffield, was one of the remarkable group of viewers which originated in the Greenside area of north-west Durham. 61 Several less famous viewers had worked in Sweden, Wales and Cumberland. 62 The trend continued in the early nineteenth century as the winning of deeper and more dangerous mines and the existence of an established pool of experts, ensured the continued pre-eminence of north-east techniques and skills.

Pitmen as well as viewers were in demand. In 1815, John Peile at Whitehaven asked Buddle to send an under-viewer and waste-man to help control an underground fire as "the overmen we have are all ignorant in
these matters." In 1823 he again asked for two over-men and two deputies as he had doubts about his own overmen's judgement in the new pillar-working. More striking than the well-established links with Cumberland were a request to Buddle in 1825 for twenty miners to go to Wales, for "our Welsh miners are a very idle set," and the fact that in 1839 Buddle sent out six experienced colliers as well as a viewer to restore to a working state a colliery in Virginia.

Buddle's own circle particularly demonstrates the range covered by relatively unknown north-eastern viewers. The "school" of viewers round him clearly included several viewers who looked to him for help in finding new posts and whom Buddle would remember when approached by potential employers. In 1821, for example, Buddle gave John Henderson the chance of going to Spain as "mines superintendent" for the Royal Company of Guadalquivir at Seville, on whose behalf Buddle's help had been sought. Henderson was then at Silkstone colliery in Yorkshire; he already had experience abroad having spent eighteen months boring in Sweden at a salary of £365 p.a. Henderson did not go to Spain, but two years later the post of manager at the Earl of Elgin's collieries in Fyfe fell vacant; for at least nine years Buddle had had the "superintendence" and "principal direction" over these collieries, and Henderson was appointed to the post and continued to receive Buddle's advice and instructions. By June 1825 Henderson was again looking for a new post; by another lucky coincidence, Buddle had mentioned him to a person looking for a viewer to the Australian Company, and in July 1826 Henderson embarked at Spithead in the "Australia."

His was by no means an isolated case. In 1842 Buddle was asked by A.J. Freire-Marreco (whom he had known well when Marreco had been Secretary to the Stanhope and Tyne Railway Company before he returned to his native Portugal) to engage a viewer for a company working coal on the Tagus, near Lisbon. Buddle had been asked a few months earlier by Michael Forster, viewer at Butterknowle colliery, for help in finding a new post; Forster in the meantime had spent three months in Spain, and on his return Buddle recommended him to Marreco and negotiated a salary for him. Buddle suggested £500 p.a. on the grounds that, "there are now enquiries from other quarters for persons of this description; an inexperienced young man has recently been engaged to go to the South of France at a salary of £600 p.a. I am told, Mr. Forster has received four guineas a day and his travelling expenses for his view in Spain."
In the end, Forster agreed to £200 for six months, having been assured that commodities were very cheap in Portugal.

Respect for the specialist skills of colliery viewers appears on the whole to have insulated them from problems of industrial relations, whether with employers or pitmen. Such problems affected agents much more frequently than viewers. Nevertheless, Samuel Haggerstone and Matthias Dunn were aware of the importance of labour relations, for they noted that John Leighton, at one time chief viewer to the Grand Allies, had been a favourite among the working classes; that the great George Johnson had been "well liked among the pitmen," and that Sober Watkin senior was "esteemed much for his management of pitmen." Buddle himself, despite his experiences during the strike of 1831-2, had a particular reputation for popularity among the pitmen. There are, however, one or two indications of incipient sources of conflict. The experience of Matthias Dunn at Hetton colliery demonstrates that the relationship of viewer and pitmen could be affected by considerations other than the viewer's technical abilities: in 1832 the workmen at Hetton demanded the resignation of Dunn because he was a "papist," and shortly afterwards, Buddle reported that Dunn in fact had been dismissed "after a year's trial." Relations with employers, as might be expected, centred on the question of responsibility of the viewer. Buddle senior withdrew his services to Flatworth colliery in 1800 on the grounds of lack of consultation of him by the owners; on the other hand, Benwell colliery suffered for some years from a viewer who was "above consulting the Company respecting their own concerns" and treated them "with silent contempt by concealing from them whatever measures he might choose to adopt until they should be carried into effect." A letter from South Wales to T.Y. Hall many years later, in 1866, suggests a far more dangerous problem, as it attributed an explosion at Gethin colliery to a combination of not only faulty ventilation and undisciplined Welsh colliers but also pressure on the viewers by the managing partners; in fact, the writer suggested that mining engineers and managers should be paid from public funds. This does not, however, appear to have been a problem encountered by north-east viewers in the period under consideration; their experience and standing doubtless enabled them to avoid any such pressure.

Few viewers before the mid-nineteenth century acquired the professional reputation and social standing of Buddle, although in 1842 - towards the end of Buddle's life - the Children's Employment
Chapter II

Commission heard that the Durham viewers "are looked up to as men of eminence, holding a distinguished position in society." There are indications that Buddie's own achievements were based on a long tradition of professional competence encouraging social ambitions. There were, of course, some back-sliders who served to emphasise the standards demanded, for Samuel Haggerstone and Dunn frequently explained the failure of an aspiring viewer by the fact that he "turned unsteady." There is an explanation here, in the well-established fact that "unsteadiness" and viewing could not succeed together, for Buddie's violent disapproval when his assistant, George Hunter, turned to drink in the early 1840s.

Among the successful viewers, however, several had already begun to show the profession's social self-confidence. Many before Buddie had become very rich. Others had a more intangible but recognisable achievement: Richard Humble "got to be a gentleman viewer," serving Charles Brandling at Leeds; Sober Watkin senior had "a grand house" built at Byker in pursuit of his aspirations to succeed his late master, George Johnson, as a great viewer; his son was "looked on as a gentleman viewer"; Thomas Laverick "made a gentleman of himself"; the great George Johnson bought an estate at Wolverhampton. Many viewers before Buddie had also owned shares in collieries, several of them with less caution and success than Buddie. One or two ventured into undertaking collieries by the ten and were invariably unsuccessful financially: Lewis Legg and Sober Watkin senior at the Vane-Tempest collieries and John Cole at Lumley in the 1770s.

This was a period in which various professions were establishing greater social and professional prestige than they had formerly enjoyed, including, for example, solicitors and, slightly later, land agents. In the case of colliery viewers or engineers, Buddie's life spanned the transition. Colliery engineers of the second half of the nineteenth century, such as John Bell Simpson, despite being products of a long professional tradition, seem hardly the same breed as the viewers at the turn of the century. Simpson - son of a viewer who had been trained by a pupil of Buddie's father - became a director of several collieries and engineering and electrical companies; mining engineer or consultant to the Duke of Northumberland, Lord Riddle, and several lesser coal owners; President of the Institute of Mining Engineers; Justice of the Peace for Durham; an active member of local government for many years, and President of his local Conservative Association. His
second wife was the widow of Buddle Atkinson, probably Buddle's great-nephew. His son — the third generation of colliery engineers in the family — was educated at Rugby and eventually established the family firmly in the ranks of the local baronetage.

"A true Conservative" urged Londonderry after Buddle's death, to avoid replacing him by another viewer:

"You have plenty of subordinate agents to manage your collieries — they only want a sort of commanding officer, and it is not essential that he should be a viewer. You need not be at a loss to get a proper man, there are plenty of them in Newcastle conversant with colliery affairs and would gladly relinquish their business to become your agent, and a consultation of viewers can be had any day, if ever needful."

The anonymous writer's anxiety that Londonderry should in future steer clear of "what is call'd a head viewer," such as Buddle, involuntarily testifies to the role played by viewers in the north-east coal-field. This testimony is the more striking because a large part of Buddle's fame and influence in the coal trade undoubtedly came, not from his work as a viewer per se, but from his position as Lord Londonderry's agent.
"The 'Mighty Chiefs' of Oppression"

To slur over Buddie's exertions as Londonderry's agent, as did "A True Conservative" in his emphasis on Buddle's position as a viewer, was to do Buddie less than justice. His training and inclinations were those of a viewer, but his parallel career as Londonderry's agent demonstrated that he was equally capable of identifying entirely with that rôle. Moreover, just as he advocated the cause of the "thorough bred" pitman and viewer, Buddie also developed and expressed a clear philosophy of the agent. This was no accident, for he clearly distinguished between viewer and agent; he commented to Londonderry (refuting suggestions from another source that Buddie's absorption in Londonderry's affairs caused him to neglect Russell's business) that,

"as I am not hampered with the details of Agency in his affairs, but merely to my professional department, which I have at my fingersends, I feel that I do him ample justice. In this I wish to draw my distinct line. I will be his viewer, and advise him as a friend, in all matters which do not clash with your lordship's affairs; but I cannot be his Agent."

Buddie's thoughts on agents were particularly significant because they were formulated at a time when there was considerable, though sporadic, controversy about the rôle of agents in the north-east coal trade. Whitton, one of the Vane-Tempest solicitors, very much on the fringe of the industry, commented to Lord Stewart (later Lord Londonderry) as early as 1819, that,

"A Coal Owner is altogether in the power of his manager and agents. I have often been told that there is the greatest possible jealousy and adverse private feeling between the coal owners and such feelings are transferred to the chief and subordinate agents."

The pitmen's strike of 1831-32 brought forth similar sentiments from quite a different source. Whatever the political reasons for blaming the agents rather than the coal owners in the first instance,
there was evidently some foundation in fact for the miners' allegations:

"We believe that these fines are not generally known among the coal owners, but they leave their agents to transact their business, thus their agents, many of whom are part owners, may impose upon us fines arbitrarily, to enrich themselves and make them petty Coal-owners, and thus become the 'Mighty Chiefs' of oppression in the North, and saddle it upon those innocent gentlemen who embark capital in order to promote trade and commerce in the county." 3

Another pamphleteer considered that the coal owners had been "misled and influenced by the misrepresentations and false statements given by their Agents," although conceding that many of the viewers, agents and overseers "are men of honour, principle and humanity." 4

Buddle, however, had many years earlier anticipated such arguments. The fact that he mentioned them less often, if at all, after the 1831-32 strike was understandable in view of the fact that he had taken the brunt of the pitmen's threats while Londonderry conceded to their demands.

Buddle's attitude to the position of colliery agents embodied two principles: firstly, that the agent should not have any personal interests that could conflict with those of his master, and secondly, that there should be limits to the power of the agent beyond which his employer should take over.

As early as 1808-9 Buddle expressed his conviction that certain agents were manipulating their duties to their own ends. This was not exclusively a problem connected with ostensibly powerful agents, for Buddle considered that the difficulties experienced in establishing a Regulation were partly caused by two Tyne coal owners who were:

"governed by their clerks in the fitting offices, who being stimulated by the hopes of numerous toys and snacks got by freighting have the knack of persuading their masters that it is the best way to vend their coals. I am credibly informed that some of those gentlemen in the fitting offices make £4,000 p.a. at least in this way over and above their salaries, which I believe is more in many instances than their employers make." 5

In the following year, 1809, he voiced similar fears to Nathaniel Ellison, one of the owners of Hebburn Colliery, although it is not clear what had prompted the letter:

"Here again I must lament a circumstance, which I think I have before named to you, which is the impolicy
in any colliery concerns of allowing the agents and their masters to have different interests, and more especially when the agents happen to be weak, insolent or conceited men, or perhaps a compound of the whole, who are much more industrious in seeking to raise up hobgoblins to frighten their masters into such measures as may best serve their own interests, or by a mischievous officiousness endeavour to wriggle themselves into favour, than to promote the real welfare of their employers.

When Buddle's appointment to the Vane-Tempest collieries was under consideration in 1819, one of Lord Stewart's advisers told him that Buddle had met doubts about "the independence of his mind and conduct" by giving an assurance that "he is not engaged in the management of any colliery whatever or the sale of any coals" and that his only engagements on the Wear were as an engineer or consultant viewer. Henceforth, Buddle took care to keep Londonderry informed, when circumstances seemed to require it, of the extent of his other interests in the coal trade, for,

"connected as I now have the honor to be with your lordship, I deem it due to that confidence with which your lordship has honoured me, that you should distinctly be acquainted with the connections etc. of the person in whom you have reposed such confidence."

This did not prevent Londonderry questioning the disinterestedness of some of Buddle's more unpalatable advice - invariably on the question of Regulation - but Buddle was always ready on such occasions to explain the limited extent of his involvement in the coal trade outside the Londonderry concerns.

Buddle also showed a strong inclination to point out to his employers not merely the dangers of allowing their agents to have too much power but also the virtues of involvement by the employers themselves. He welcomed personal contacts and regular correspondence with all his employers, whether W.M. Pitt (the absentee owner of Tanfield Moor Colliery), the Russells at Wallsend or Lord Londonderry, for, as he told W.M. Pitt,

"in all matters of real business I have always been of opinion that the more direct the line we pursue, the better. I have likewise found from experience, that the more my employers know of their own affairs and my manner of acting in them, the more comfortable and satisfactory it is to myself."

As early as 1808 he had felt that the influence of men such as Sir T.H. Liddell and Partners' agent, Lambert, was contributing to
the difficulties within the Coal Trade, for he suspected Lambert of misinforming his employers.

Despite the frequent disagreements between Londonderry and Buddie, their relationship was usually in complete accord with Buddie's ideas of what an agent-employer relationship should be: the coal owner taking an active interest through regular correspondence, frequent personal consultations and tours of inspection, scrutiny of pay-bills and accounts and the exercise of personal diplomacy — whether with bankers or fellow coal owners — at levels where the agent could do no more.

Inevitably, however, Buddie at times fell between two fires in his capacity as Londonderry's agent. In June 1825, for example, he was under orders from Londonderry to accept a basis no lower than 130,000 chaldrons in the face of extreme jealousy on the part of both Lambton and the Hetton Company. The extent to which Buddie was bound in such crises by Londonderry's orders is clear — "At any rate I don't yield an inch without orders — particularly if bullied" — but at the same time he was laying full details of the situation before Londonderry and explaining that he felt "a degree of embarrassment" at the situation, unwilling to concede to the feeling of the Wear meetings, which were dominated by the Lambton influence, "without your lordship's entire sanction," but also fearful of the price reductions that were risked "by adhering too pertinaciously to our principles." At the beginning of July, Buddie told Londonderry clearly that he would have to rely entirely on Londonderry's orders as Buddie was at a loss as to what to advise. The doubts Buddie expressed in his letters to Londonderry, however, were clearly not allowed to weaken his representation of him at the Coal Trade meetings, for one of the small Tyne coal owners, James Losh, never an admirer of Buddie's, had no hesitation in blaming the agent:

"June 18th.: I attended a general meeting of the coal trade today... had a good deal of altercation with Mr. Buddie who (by having too many irons in the fire and not being over scrupulous) appears to me to do much harm." 12

The type of agent-employer relationship that existed, on the whole, between Buddie and Londonderry was by no means universal. In Buddie's own experience, he found it worthy of comment when young John George Lambton and William Russell of Brancepeth began to show an interest in their colliery concerns. Not surprisingly, therefore,
Buddle felt free in his letters to Londonderry to comment stringently both on over-powerful agents and inactive coal owners. Richard Lambert, for example, agent to the Partnership (Lord Ravensworth - the former Sir Thomas Henry Liddell - and Partners) whose attitude had worried Buddie in 1808, was still a source of concern in the early 1820s.

In 1822 Buddie felt that his "obstinacy and unbusinesslike conduct" was the principle bar to reaching an agreement on Regulation on the Tyne, and hinted at the sort of qualities an agent needed, and in which Lambert was lacking, to succeed in the complicated diplomacy required in the coal trade of the early 19th century:

"He is a personal friend of mine, and I believe as honest and honorable minded man, as can be. But in business a mere baby, without temper, management or resource of mind equal to such circumstances as we have now to combat in the Trade."

Lambert, however, was not the only agent causing difficulties:

"as far as I can gather, there will be much less difficulty with the coal owners who attend personally to represent their own interest, than with certain agents who attend to represent the interests of others.

Buddle repeated to Londonderry what he had told Matthew Russell and Nathaniel Ellison many years earlier, but pointing out also that coal owners as well as agents were often at fault:

"I don't recollect that I have ever informed your lordship, that there are many of us on those occasions, far bigger men, than our masters. Especially such of us, as have not got masters, who give themselves the trouble to become acquainted, in some degree, further with their own concerns, than hardly knowing when they do make some profit, and grumbling when they make none; but without being able duly to appreciate the cause, either of the one or the other."

Lambert's employer, Lord Ravensworth, may well have incurred such strictures on occasion, for in March 1824 a special Tyne committee meeting was held to consider Lambert's failure to attend committee meetings and to reply to communications about irregularities such as freighting, and the committee decided to contact Lord Ravensworth himself. The latter, however, replied that he saw no need for the owners' interference with their agent. A few months later, in July 1824, Lambert again would not agree to proposed arrangements for the Tyne first-class collieries, and Buddie commented:

"A notion prevails that some of us agents are getting too big, and worse to deal with than our masters, and that a meeting of our masters is requisite, to bring
us down to our proper level, and put us all to rights again: - there is probably a good deal of truth in this observation."

As a result, it was decided that William Brandling would contact Lambton and Ravensworth while Buddie wrote to Londonderry, to sound out the possibility of a meeting of the principals of the two rivers.¹⁴ There were, however, no further moves towards Regulation before the beginning of the following year.

On occasion, Buddie clearly welcomed the rôle that the coal owners themselves could play. In June 1827, Buddie was again acting strictly under orders - and somewhat fluctuating ones - as the thorny problem of an extra quantity for the new North Pittington colliery was tackled. An award was made and then revised. The Coal Trade meeting was reportedly afraid to open the revised award for fear of breaking up the Regulation, so Cochrane of the Hetton Company took it down to London to open it with Londonderry and Lambton, and an agreement on Regulation was promptly reached between them. Buddie considered it a sensible solution:

"All these great points ought if possible to be settled by principals, and those of the greatest weight, too, in the first instance. I have often regretted that this could not be contrived, as matters occur on those occasions which might easily be adjusted by personal communication between principals, but which grow into almost insurmountable difficulties between agents."¹⁵

On occasion, the influence of a coal owner was deliberately brought to bear on an agent. Lord Ravensworth, who had been reluctant to intervene with his own agent, was more amenable in relation to a tenant's agent. Matthew Atkinson, agent to Burdon who was Lord Ravensworth's tenant at Team Colliery, refused to act within the Coal Trade rules for signing the Regulation agreement in January 1828, and was apparently brought round after Lord Ravensworth, to whom Buddie had written, spoke to Burdon about it.¹⁶ Then in June 1829, Atkinson again refused to agree to the proposed Regulation on the terms negotiated between the principal owners while together in London. Lord Ravensworth was anxious to help, and eventually at a meeting between Buddie and Lord Durham and his agents, a plan was worked out for several individuals secretly to indemnify Lord Ravensworth for an abatement of his tenant's rent, as an inducement to the latter to accede to the Regulation.¹⁷
On the whole, an excess of power in the hands of agents was inevitably the aspect of the employer-agent relationship which attracted most comment. It was, however, a two-way problem. Buddie found it highly inconvenient and even improper, first when Lord Durham refused to give any of his agents authority to speak for him in 1829, and subsequently when Londonderry — according to Buddie's interpretation — withdrew similar authority from Buddie and Hunter in 1831-32.

The status and work of agents varied even more than that of viewers. Many agents were viewers — Buddie, Thomas Fenwick (agent to the Bishop and the Dean and Chapter of Durham) and Hugh Taylor (mineral agent and later Commissioner for the Duke of Northumberland). Others were essentially land agents by training — Arthur Mowbray (for Sir Henry Vane-Tempest) and Henry Morton (for the Earl of Durham). In lesser concerns the agent might well have been the fitter — in 1800, W.M. Pitt, absentee owner of Tanfield Moor, appointed Nathaniel Clayton "agent for the management of his colliery" and "fitter or agent for selling the coals thereof"; a situation that remained until Buddie was appointed Pitt's agent in 1822. In the case of small colliery companies, one of the partners frequently acted as the company's agent in Coal Trade affairs, such as Surtees for Benwell and Humble Lamb for Elswick, but their rôle was obviously quite different from that of agents directing the management of large concerns in which collieries might be the most important but not the only feature. Despite this variety, there are indications that, at least in the larger concerns, certain standards of training and qualifications were beginning to be demanded. When the Hetton Company made approaches to Buddie's assistant-viewer at Wallsend to be their agent, Buddie commented that he would do for the "petty details" but that he was not of sufficient calibre for "general management." It is of course possible that Buddie's opinion was influenced by the high standards he expected of senior pitmen and viewers, and that he was therefore ahead of the general attitude; he was certainly alive to the qualities necessary in a land agent, for in 1824 he told Londonderry that he was making enquiries for one, "and as yet have only heard of one any way likely. There are plenty gaping for places, but they are either fine gentlemen or mere clod-hoppers — either above or below your Lordship's pitch." A year later, Buddie's comments on William Russell's affairs revealed
particularly clearly, the already-developing ideas on the qualifications and rôle of an agent:

"He is much at a loss for a respectable and competent person to fill the latter office, he has his regular establishment of colliery and land agents, but none of them are [sic] of sufficient calibre to undertake the general management of his affairs. And he now feels sensibly that a lawyer, especially his present one, won't do."
Chapter IV

Gentlemen and Adventurers

The north-eastern colliery entrepreneur, unlike his viewers and agents and unlike his counterparts in other industries, is an elusive figure. At one end of the scale there were Lord Londonderry and Lord Durham, who dominated the Wear trade and whose involvement is well documented by virtue of the preservation of their family archives. At the other end were numerous men, each owning a small share in a small second-class Tyne colliery, and of whom little more than the name is known.

Most of the colliery entrepreneurs in the north-east were lessees and sub-lessees of the coal they worked. A list of the collieries and their owners on the Tyne and Wear, drawn up by Buddie in 1828, shows that of forty-one collieries on the Tyne only five were worked by the owners of the coal. They were mostly land owners - the Reverend R. Brandling of Gosforth, Cuthbert Ellison of Hebburn (although he had taken over from lessees only in the previous year), Charles Blackett of Wylam, Richard Burdon Sanderson of Jesmond, and William Morton Pitt who had inherited Tanfield Moor colliery but lived in Dorset. Their collieries give no clue as to why their owners should have chosen to work them - Gosforth was classified as a first-class colliery, Hebburn and Tanfield Moor were second-class and Wylam was third-class. On the Wear, there were seventeen collieries of which four were worked by the coal owners - Penshaw by Lord Londonderry, Harraton and New Penshaw by Lord Durham and Beamish by J.M. Davison. The Reverend Brandling had shares in other collieries with his brothers, and Cuthbert Ellison had a share in one other colliery; otherwise, except for Lord Londonderry and Lord Durham, working the coal they owned was the limit of this group's involvement in mining: they had not chosen to extend their involvement by leasing other coal.

A rough analysis of Buddie's list shows that in 1828 there were approximately seventy-two people (counting the Hetton Company as one) owning shares in fifty-eight collieries. Half of these owners
each had an interest in only one colliery; this could vary from being sole proprietor or lessee (which was the case at only seven collieries, four of which were worked by the owners of the coal) to being one of several un-equal partners, any one of whom might have only a small stake in the colliery. About another fifteen owned shares in only two collieries. Buddle told the Select Committee on the Coal Trade in 1830 that some shares in colliery companies were as small as sixty-fourths. Practically all those who had ventured into a share in only one or two collieries were in partnership with two to five partners, who might include a more experienced entrepreneur. They included a member of a Newcastle banking family (Aubone Surtees), a shipbuilder (Thomas Brown), colliery viewers (John Straker, John Watson), a Catholic lawyer (James Losh), a Dorsetshire M.P. (W.M.Pitt) and local land owners (particularly those working their own coal, and also the Marquess of Bute who, in 1828, was working Garesfield and Westerleigh collieries in partnership with Miss Simpson, grand-daughter of the Earl of Strathmore).

The ten or so men who each owned shares in three or four collieries showed a distinct tendency to stay with partners whom they already knew. This happened not only in obvious cases such as the Partnership of Lord Ravensworth and Lord Wharncliffe (involved in six collieries) or families such as the Brandlings. Humble Lamb owned shares at this time in four collieries; three of his five partners at Backworth were also his partners in Percy Main and had no other colliery interests outside those two collieries; of his other two partners in Backworth one (Buddle) also had a share with him in Elswick. Buddle also had shares in four collieries in this particular year, and in only one of these was he involved with men who did not also have an interest in one of his other collieries. The same applied to the other men who owned shares in three or four collieries - the Brandling brothers, Thomas Taylor, Joseph Lamb, William Clark, Carr, William Russell and Thomas Wade. These men, like those whose colliery interests were more limited, included colliery viewers (Buddle, Taylor) and land owners (Russell, the Brandlings, the Lambs).

On the Tyne, only the Partnership (Lord Ravensworth and Partners) owned as many as five collieries. On the Wear, William Russell owned Washington and a share in North Hetton; and Thomas Wade, who had a share in Washington, was also involved in Lord Ravensworth's
Mount-moor colliery; otherwise, (except that the Hetton Company's Elemore winning is listed as a separate colliery) only Lord Londonderry and Lord Durham owned more than one colliery.

There was little overlap at this time between the Tyne and the Wear entrepreneurs. William Russell, with Thomas Wade, owned Wallsend on the Tyne as well as the Wear collieries mentioned above, but the situation is blurred by the fact that collieries such as Washington and Mount-moor carried their coals to both the south bank of the Tyne and the north bank of the Wear.

The information given in Buddie's list of 1828 is, of course, of limited value: it is confined to the situation in only one year; it gives no indication of the size of the shareholdings; it does not include the Tees trade which was just beginning its rapid development; and without more knowledge of the individuals listed, it cannot define the type of man who invested in collieries. Nevertheless, it does suggest that even apart from the landed nobility, a considerable amount of the capital behind Tyne and Wear collieries at this period came from local landowners. It enables the tentative conclusions to be made that, in 1828, approximately 70% of colliery owners on the two rivers (about 51 men) owned shares in only one or two collieries, and most of them shared the enterprise with several partners; there were only about ten men who each invested in three or four collieries, and only the noble entrepreneurs - Durham, Ravensworth and (though not at this time) Londonderry - who owned more.

Their basic motive must have been financial gain but it may well have been influenced to a surprising extent by other factors. Humble Lamb, for example, apparently became involved in later years in mining at Crawrook in north-west Durham, in order to preserve his position as a local landowner and lord of the manor, and to exclude a competitor whom he disliked. Friendship also played a rôle - Lamb suggested that Buddie had persuaded him, against his better judgement, to join in Elswick colliery, and Buddie's initial idea of forming the Stella Coal Company depended upon joining with old friends, including Lamb.

If the basic motive was, nevertheless, financial profit, then another common characteristic the entrepreneurs had in abundance was the willingness to take the financial risk of involvement in undertakings of considerable size in a notoriously fluctuating Trade:
"it is that kind of uncertain thing that everyone forms a particular idea that his is to be a profitable concern, whatever the others may be."

The large proportion of investors who limited themselves to a part-share in one or two collieries, and the small number of larger coal owners, indicate the amount of capital and risk-taking required in the north-east collieries. The leaders of the industry - Londonderry, Durham, the Hetton Company and Lord Ravensworth's Partnership - were estimated to have invested £500,000 each; at the other end of the scale, the Lamb brothers and Buddle had £5,000 tied up in Crawrook, which had not even progressed beyond the initial sinking. Even in 1815, the smallest underground workforce in a Tyne colliery was 57 and the largest 537 - the average was over 180; on the Wear the smallest was 83, the largest 1,005 and the average over 280. Buddle was remarkably successful in hedging himself against failure or fluctuation - his shares were mostly small, he exercised at least partial supervision over most of the collieries in which he invested, and he probably gained as much from salaries or rents as from dividends. Normally, however, the risks were considerable. The Dean and Chapter, lessors of much of the coal in County Durham, were impressed by Buddle's argument in 1820 when opening negotiations for a renewal of Lord Londonderry's Rainton lease, that,

"it would be difficult to meet with any other person possessing the combined requisites of capital, inclination and nerve to adventure in such an unwieldy undertaking."

He pointed out the advantage to the county of having "a person of his lordship's consequence and energy of character to reside amongst us, but which we could not expect unless he had an object of sufficient importance, to interest him deeply in the affairs of the county" and followed up his argument with the suggestion that Lord Stewart (as he then was) could more safely invest the capital of £100,000, which was the sum involved in the present negotiations, for interest of £%, rather than involve himself in the troubles and anxieties attendant upon coal-mining, even with the prospect of gaining 15%.

Ten years later, in 1830, Buddle told the Select Committee of the House of Commons that a profit of 14% on the original outlay of capital would be the maximum, under the most favourable circumstances, and that taking into account the redemption of the capital, the clear profit would be only 5%. In some collieries, he said, "the annual
overplus over the annual cost" was not more than 5% on the capital sum, "therefore I contend there is no profit whatever" over the term."

There were numerous instances of lesser coal owners finding themselves in difficulties, whether through fluctuations in the trade or unexpected accidents. In 1833 Buddle reported that Thomas Wade "has fallen the first victim to the fall of the price of coals" and was to be made bankrupt; possibly referring to Mount-moor colliery, Buddle explained that Wade was "brought to a stand by Lambton's bank refusing to advance the money for his colliery pay - the account being over-drawn £6,000" and that his shares in that colliery and in Washington would be sold. The events of 1833 also affected Percy Main colliery (one of those in which Humble Lamb was involved) which divided £37,800 in 1832-37. Two of those years, 1833 and 1834, were years of free trade and showed little profit; the next three years were the best the trade as a whole had experienced for some time, and profits in those years averaged £6,300p.a. which, Buddle reported, "considering the fluctuating nature of the coal trade...even exclusive of the mining risk, can only be considered a very moderate profit, and leaving but a small margin to meet casualties." In the following year, 1838, the colliery was flooded. Despite the abatement of rents by the lessor, the Duke of Northumberland, the extra expense and the loss of production "swept away the profits of the best three years which the Trade may probably ever see again" and four years after the flooding, Buddle could see little prospect of again working the colliery to a profit.

Unprofitability quite frequently prompted owners to sell or sub-let their collieries. By 1833, William Russell was finding North Hetton "a most wretched losing concern" and three years later he sold it; in 1835 he also thought of selling his Wallsend colliery after the disastrous explosion there; in 1839 he decided to let Washington, "a miserable bad concern" because it was losing money, and a year later he let it to the son-in-law and two sons of Edward Backhouse, the Sunderland banker. In some instances, it was only the failure to find purchasers that persuaded entrepreneurs to continue: this happened at, for example, at Elswick in 1807, Sheriff Hill in 1824 and Wallsend in 1835.

Lack of evidence makes it difficult to assess the role of the colliery owners, as distinct from their viewers, in entrepreneurial functions. It was not unknown for owners to be deceived by their agents.
in managerial matters; even Captain Blackett, working his own coal at Wylam, had apparently been "robbed" three times by his fitting agents and was "quite a greenhorn" in Coal Trade matters. Owners such as these were hardly likely to involve themselves deeply in entrepreneurial matters, although it was an earlier generation of the Blackett family at Wylam who had shown a pioneering interest in using locomotives on the colliery railway. On the whole, it appears to have been those men who had relatively extensive interests in the industry who displayed the greatest energy and initiative. Buddie did so largely in his capacity as viewer as well as part-owner; Humble and Joseph Lamb, who had no professional connections with the industry, took a keen interest in managerial organisation and marketing; R.W.Brandling was for many years chairman of the Tyne Coal Trade organisation, and the Brandling family had some claim to being technological innovators; Thomas Wade, who had a quarter share in Russell's Washington colliery (at least until 1833) managed it for him, with the assistance of a resident viewer and of Buddie as head viewer. At Russell's Wallsend colliery and at the Londonderry collieries, it was Buddie, as viewer, who made the technical decisions concerning the site, the application of technology, the working and marketing of the coal and the organisation of the work-force, but it was the owners who decided to embark in the industry or to increase their investment, who bore the risks and showed the depth of their commitment by employing and encouraging an expert such as Buddie. The same applied, in the 1830s and later, to the difficult and expensive new ventures in eastern Durham, which were clearly founded on an entrepreneurial spirit in their owners even though many aspects of each enterprise depended on the technical expertise of their viewers.

Between 1834 and 1840, the number of collieries on the Tyne, Wear and Tees increased from 64 to 101. A different class of entrepreneur was appearing on the scene, particularly as the Tees area was opened up, and Buddie lamented the new era he saw arriving in the industry:

"it will fall into the hands of grasping speculators, and neck or nothing adventurers in joint stock companies. I have been apprehensive of this ever since the Hetton Company got fairly afloat and other adventurers came into the field...though I did not reckon on the ruin coming so soon."

Londonderry, Durham and the Hetton Company managed to prevent Russell's
North Hetton colliery from falling into the hands of a joint-stock company, to be called the County of Durham Joint Stock Coal Company, in 1836, but in the following year Buddle reported to Londonderry the opening up of collieries by several new companies, "and the ground being now about taken up in the County of Durham, the spirit of colliery adventure has been extended into Northumberland." Three years later, new collieries were still opening in the south of Durham at a rapid rate; Buddle reported that the great monied partners in one of them - Castle Eden - were all London silk-mercers, and "enormously rich." In the following year, even the old Tanfield Moor colliery, which Buddle himself had considered buying, was sold to a corn-merchant.

The first of these competitors, the Hetton Company, had been financed, at least in part, by London capital - Lord Londonderry enviously commented that Arthur Mowbray, "by dint of prowling round the Royal Exchange and Stock Market...completely got Hetton under weight in London." Others of the new undertakings, however, had local connections - the Pembertons who sank Monkwearmouth colliery were a local family; Colonel Braddyll of the South Hetton Coal Company owned land in Cumberland and Lancashire as well as in Durham and had shown interest in sharing Lord Londonderry's enterprise of Seaham Harbour. Humble Lamb and Hugh Taylor, the Duke of Northumberland's mineral agent, apparently had shares in the Haswell Coal Company but they seem to have been exceptional cases of Tyne coal owners taking advantage of the new development of the south Durham coal. These companies, sinking their mines in new ground to deep seams below the magnesian limestone, displayed remarkable enterprise, capital investment and technical skill.

From the point of view of the old established coal owners such as Londonderry, Buddle could see the opening of numerous new collieries in the south of the county causing "mischief and disturbance to the established and regular trade of the country." It was fast becoming no longer "a gentlemanlike business." Nevertheless, he had to pay grudging tribute to the new breed of entrepreneurs:

"notwithstanding the unpropitious aspect of the Trade, new collieries opened by fresh adventurers are opening in this country daily, but by far the greater number of those adventurers are strangers - mostly London capitalists. London seems to be the place where all the spare capital of the country is concentrated, and where also the greatest spirit of enterprise prevails."
"Know the Man"

Buddie's work as an agent and a colliery engineer speak to his professional competence and, indeed, pre-eminence; his personal life and social standing demonstrate the self-respect and the public reputation with which he endowed his profession. Buddie himself attached particular importance to his "character", in the sense of integrity and reputation. He told Lord Londonderry more than once that his efforts in Londonderry's service were limited only by his principles of "strict probity," and when Londonderry wanted Buddie to include a non-colliery charge in the pay-bill, contrary to Buddie's agreement with the bank, Buddie expressed his problem to Sir Henry Browne:

"It puzzles me how to reconcile conscience and duty in this affair...by what scale are we to measure a breach of honor? does it admit of the smallest crack or flaw? pray answer me this. I think not." ^2

Those who knew Buddie well, recognised his firm adherence to such principles. On a different occasion, Sir Henry Browne agreed that "character and health are the first things to be considered. If friends or employers require from us the sacrifice of either one or the other, it is our decided duty to choose others." Similarly Humble Lamb, one of Buddie's friends and coal trade associates, recognised the quandary in which Buddie was placed when Londonderry, despite Buddie's advice, threatened to disrupt the Regulation:

"The Trade cannot blame you - you do not break your word or your honor...consequently I should say there is no cause why you should give up a beneficial situation for fear of tarnishing your character." ^3

Edmund McDonnell, the Londonderry trustee, also appreciated the significance of Buddie's attitude, when writing to Lord Londonderry after the latter's rift with Buddie in 1841:

"Remember he is considered by the whole world (and he knows himself) to be a man of the highest
character and integrity, and of undoubted ability... Altho'I don't defend what he said, if you considered all - his high character and integrity - you should not have goaded him to such a state of excitement... I wish you would remember that with a man of Buddie's kind disposition there must have been something very strong and wounding to have induced him to speak as he did."4

During the same period, Buddie explained to McDonnell that, although he felt that his correspondence with Lord Londonderry ought to be resumed,

"the real truth of the matter is, that after his lordship's harsh letters to me last May, I do not know how to resume my correspondence with him...I do not harbour any vindictive or unkind feeling whatever towards his lordship...but...I cannot lose sight of what is due to my own character and position."5

Such principles reveal a great deal about Buddie's personality and the public reputation that he achieved. They also had immediate practical results in, for example, his conduct of Londonderry's financial affairs. He was proud of the fact that "none of my acceptances, since I undertook the management of Lord Londonderry's cash concerns, has been dishonored"; his acceptances, he told Londonderry, had unlimited credit. Eventually, however, the shortage of cash in the Londonderry concerns became so great that he felt his own reputation was being injured; he felt "torture and agony" at having to break his promises of remittances.6

This was not a matter of mere personal concern: as early as 1824 he had cast an envious eye at the state of the Lambton finances - "the public have unlimited confidence in him from his punctuality (which is proverbial) in the payment of tradesmen and interest. This enables him at all times to borrow with ease and on the best terms any sum he may require for a particular object."7 It followed inevitably, both from Buddie's principles and from his recognition of their practical importance, that he abhorred debt:

"Next to plague, pestilence or famine, I consider debt as the very greatest of human curses. It causes the noblest spirits to crouch at the meanest, and the loftiest head to bow to the most contemptible reptiles in the human shape."8

It was perhaps the strength of his own principles - the maintenance of reputation, the keeping of promises, hatred of debt - and his belief in the practical importance of preserving personal credit
Chapter V

in order to maintain financial credit, that caused the management of the Londonderry finances to be such a source of worry for him. Buddle's professional reputation was for innovation and improvement, and for considerable physical courage. Yet his correspondence with Londonderry reveals - not surprisingly - that his achievements were based on inherent level-headedness and caution. Particularly in financial affairs, he looked for order and certainty, for a decisive policy rather than temporary expedients. This characteristic was a good balance for Londonderry's personality. When the latter wrote of his lack of fear in the face of banking difficulties in 1826, Buddle reminded him that "we must however exert all our prudence as well as our courage - the exigencies of our affairs require both." When Londonderry's affairs reached a crisis in 1832-33, Buddle wrote that he despaired of temporary expedients; Londonderry having replied - not very constructively - that he must not despair, Buddle responded in more pointed terms: "I by no means despair, but feel myself obliged to look prudently round - I am a plain matter-of-fact person and cannot reconcile myself to the notion of trusting the chapter of accidents for anything - particularly in such weighty concerns as ours, we ought to act upon fixed and certain principles." Not long afterwards, he apologised to Lord Londonderry for his low spirits when they had last met:

"I have all my life been in the habit of weighing cause and effect, and deducing probable results accordingly. I cannot therefore feel comfortable when matters of importance are left to chance, or what is generally called good luck. I have no confidence in good luck and therefore neither invoke nor trust to it - it cannot therefore disappoint me."

Ten weeks later, Buddle was still sorely tried by the divergence between his and Londonderry's characters: "you say that you rely on that providence which has never yet forsaken you - be it so. But my dear lord pray recollect that our present difficulties originate in matters of £s. and d...It is not therefore for us to invoke Jove but at once to set our shoulders to the wheel."

Buddle candidly admitted that he was "a bit of a growler" and he frequently apologised for the serious tone of some of his letters. This was not merely a device to impress Londonderry with the gravity of the current situation; Buddle considered it part of his duty to lay full information and observations before Londonderry, and he also found letter-writing to be a means of clarifying his
thoughts and relieving his feelings. Particularly after Londonderry objected to Buddle's writing such full letters to Sir Henry Browne, as Buddle told Londonderry, "I have no one who can know anything of my misery but your lordship and I therefore trust your lordship will excuse my writing in such doleful tones." Buddle emphasised, however, that although he considered his first duty to Londonderry was to advise, his second duty was to obey. Indeed, adverse circumstances frequently caused him to react finally with "a buoyancy of spirits." Thus, in January 1828, having failed to persuade Londonderry not to risk breaking up the Regulation, Buddle assured him that, nevertheless, he "never was in greater force, in all my life, than at present, in point of health and spirits, nor in better fighting trim; and whenever your lordship gives the word I will be found at my post and will do my duty." A few months later he apologised for annoying Londonderry with his fears of an injunction by Braddyll or Robertson against the work recently started at Seaham Harbour:

"When I feel any anxiety or uneasiness on particular points, I cannot conceal it from your lordship, and croaking a bit always relieves me, when labouring under an attack of the fidgets. Altho' I am subject to occasional attacks of this complaint it never reaches such a height as to deprive me of my energy, and although it may pinch me by an occasional pang till I croak to your lordship in the Cabinet, it never will affect my conduct in the field."

The exact nature of Buddle's illness in 1831 is not known. At the beginning of August he reported an attack of influenza, but a few days later, in a dictated letter which he signed in an extremely large and shaky hand, he told Londonderry that he had been "knocked down by an attack of nervous fever." He expected to be "on his legs" after five or six days, to be followed by a fortnight at Harrogate. In fact, he was unable even to hold a pen until the middle of October, when he rightly commented, "the state of my nerves you will best judge from my tremulous hand." He wrote a few short business letters to Londonderry during November and December, and at the end of the year travelled with his sister to his friend and fellow colliery viewer, John Peile, at Whitehaven, and then on to other friends in Bristol. At the end of January he went to London and resumed his normal work, conducting various financial negotiations for Londonderry before returning to the north-east in April. Clearly the illness which incapacitated him from business for five to six months must have been
some sort of nervous breakdown; Matthias Dunn said that "the then adopted policy" or, in his more critical deleted version, "the recreant conduct," of Lord Londonderry, and the pitmen's strike "got the better of his nerves and it was thought that he would never again rally." The strains of the year, combined with his natural propensity to take a serious view of affairs, had clearly been too much for his normal resilience to difficulties. For the remainder of his life, however, another eleven years, he continued his work with far more than the "tolerable activity...by sufferance or for consultation" that Dunn conceded to him. In the Londonderry affairs, and indeed in his view of the coal trade, he was older, wiser and perhaps not a little disillusioned. His "buoyancy of spirits" gave way to a steady determination to persevere in his duty, and the impression drawn from his correspondence is that in the Londonderry affairs, the presence of the Trust, placing him at one remove from Lord Londonderry, and sharing the burden of responsibility with the trustee, McDonnell, allowed him the expression of the greater, or subtly different, independence and self-confidence that age, experience and his own reputation encouraged in him.

As to the rest of Buddie's character, his friends knew him to be a kind man. McDonnell told Londonderry that he was "a very good-natured man and of very kind feelings." Buddie was content to leave £4,000 due to him in the Londonderry concerns, telling Londonderry that "in conformity to my long-established rules of life," "I have always been ready to assist a friend." Obituaries and local histories emphasised his unostentatious private charitable donations.

On the other hand, Matthias Dunn in his History of the Viewers (which a later colliery engineer described as "one of the most scurrilous documents I have read") said that although Buddie could be "an ardent friend", he was "jealous and vindictive to his rivals." Either Dunn's or a later hand deleted a more critical version: "he was an ardent friend where he took a fancy but he was ungenerous to those of his satellites who sought to work themselves into an independent position; in rivalry and in enmity he was inexorable." Dunn's was clearly a prejudiced opinion, but Buddie could certainly be irascible as well as good-natured. In his later years, the terms in which he spoke of Londonderry show that his reserves of patience and restraint were well-nigh exhausted; thus his unusually strong criticism of Londonderry, as confided to
Londonderry's trustee and solicitor, resulted from his exasperation after his row with Londonderry in May 1841 rather than a considered judgement on Londonderry's character; he accused Londonderry, only a week after their row, of writing "such a Farrago of stuff, as no man but himself could have committed to paper - such a jumble of fact and fiction, Blarney and blame, vituperation and buttering as is truly characteristic of the source from which it emanates."

Not long after their reconciliation at the end of 1841, Buddie continued to express his exasperation - "Lord Londonderry will I am sure stick at nothing to accomplish his objects - no feelings of decency or delicacy to anybody stand in his way and he will take the advice of any knave or fool who will pander to his one-sided selfish views."22

With subordinates, although Buddie displayed great consideration in the normal course of events - such as attempting to obtain better salaries for several of the lower Londonderry agents - he had little patience with those who erred. As early as 1811, Buddie had a reputation for being "so expert in every work that he will not let any man beat or deceive him. If he find him out once he will not let him deceive him again."23 When suspicions arose of fraud in the sale of wheat by one of the best farmers on the colliery farms, Buddie advised him to resign as his confidence in him was shaken, and he also knew "that he is obnoxious to Lord Londonderry."

When the case against him was shortly afterwards proved, however, Buddie dismissed him immediately.24 Buddie's relationship with George Hunter, his immediate subordinate in the Londonderry collieries, is particularly revealing. Hunter had apparently been assistant to Buddie since at least 1815 and so joined the Vane-Tempest collieries with Buddie in 1819.25 He married Buddie's niece, Mary Ann, and Buddie wrote to him in friendly terms although the impression is that Hunter never outgrew the position of assistant (and probably pupil.) Hunter and his wife did not feature in Buddie's leisure life in anything approaching the degree in which Buddie's favourite nephew, Robert Atkinson, did, and under the Londonderry trust, relations between them were slightly strained by Hunter acceding to Londonderry's demands more than Buddie would have liked. Nevertheless, as chief agent, Buddie fully looked after Hunter's interests; in particular, he frequently urged on Londonderry the need to lessen the demands of financial work on Hunter, the worry of which was a
serious threat to Hunter's health. Evidently there was no permanent result, for under the later years of the Trust, Hunter was involved to a greater degree than ever in Londonderry's local financial transactions. In 1843, Hunter succumbed to "periodical tippling fits." Londonderry had little understanding of the probable cause - "as to paying bills etc. it really is not so heavy an affair as to make a man groan and sink under it" - and suggested obtaining a "solemn compact" from Hunter to cease drinking. Buddie, on the other hand, having attempted for years to lessen the pressure on Hunter, and having obtained, a year earlier, a promise from him to mend his ways, had no patience with such a violation of his code of behaviour whatever the cause and however strong his connection with the subordinate. He found such conduct "most inconvenient, effusive and disgusting"; "so utterly disgusting to me that I really cannot bear it"; "it puts me into a fever of vexation and mortification." He suggested several times the need to look for a replacement for Hunter and welcomed Londonderry's eventual decision to dismiss him, although reminding Londonderry that six months' notice was normal and should be allowed to Hunter. Buddie died not long afterwards. As Hindhaugh took over control after his death, he found Hunter "incapable of attending to business for several days owing to one of his unhappy fits of intemperance," but Londonderry was evidently reluctant to part with Hunter after their long connection and he in fact continued in the Londonderry concerns until his death in 1851. The episode is illustrative, not merely of Buddie's personal character but of the different approach between that of the professional agent - demanding proper conduct and efficiency from his subordinates - and the traditional landowner, less preoccupied with maximum efficiency when other considerations intruded.

Lower down the scale of Buddie's subordinates, his own manservant or clerk, Robert May, learned to his cost the high standards demanded by Buddie; he wrote a distraught letter in 1823, complaining of "trotting and tramping" in Buddie's service: "I return you thanks for the support which I have had from you for five years, by way of charity...but at the same time I feel I have been treated with too much contumely...Since I came to you I have been under a system of terror." A month or so later he wrote again to Buddie, a chastened letter in a much neater hand, requesting reinstatement but asking to work either at the Coal Trade Office in Newcastle or at Wallsend.
colliery "for I dread the thoughts of having to walk another winter... I would prefer my old situation before any other, except in some few things which you could easily remove." 31

As might be expected, in family life Buddie occupied a patriarchal position, although he never married. His home was Wallsend House, "one of the smaller mansion houses" at Wallsend, which his father had occupied when appointed to the management of the colliery; its gardens stretched down to "A" pit. 32 His mother and his unmarried sister, Ann, ran this house, and in the 1820s a house was built for him at Penshaw colliery where his widowed sister, Mary Burnett, took residence. A colliery engineer, G.C. Greenwell, recalled a visit, when he was an apprentice, to the Wallsend house: "I was much surprised at the condition of his room. The man of his great reputation and wealth slept in a room carpetless and nearly bare of furniture, and showed that whatever fortunes he was instrumental in making for others, he cared little for luxury himself." 33

Buddie had several nephews and nieces, and there are occasional references in his Place Books to parties at Christmas and the New Year, when the families of two of his nephews, Robert Atkinson and Thomas Burnett, visited him, and his great-nephews and nieces were entertained with the magic lantern and "fantasmagoria." His favourite way of spending an evening at home - usually Sunday evening - was to be joined only by Robert Atkinson and Thomas Burnett, and perhaps a friend, for a musical evening. 34

Buddie's favourite nephew was Robert Atkinson to whom he was "more than a father." 35 Buddie sent him to Mr. Pybus's school in Edinburgh, at least between the ages of 12 and 14, and then, at about sixteen, sent him to London (having arranged for him to lodge with his artist and musician friend, Robert Mackreth) in order to have private violin lessons from Nicholas Mori (1797-1839) the leader of the Philharmonic and a member of the first board of professors at the new Academy of Music. Mackreth was to attend to Atkinson's drawing, particularly perspective. 36 The following year Buddie sent Atkinson to Edinburgh University - only a year or two before his friend, Hugh Taylor, colliery agent to the Duke of Northumberland, sent his nephew and ward, Thomas John Taylor, there. 37 Unlike T.J. Taylor, Atkinson does not appear to have graduated but, if his letters are to be believed, he enthusiastically attended classes on meteorology, hydrography and mineralogy by Robert Jameson,
Regius professor of natural history; Professor Thomas Hope's course on chemistry and Professor Sir John Leslie's on mechanics. On his return to Wallsend, Buddle continued his "bringing up to my own profession." Despite the academic and artistic education that Buddle had taken pains to provide, he still attached the greatest importance to this practical training; at about this time, Atkinson inherited two farms worth about £600p.a., and Buddle commented, "as he is a steady lad, I hope it won't spoil the pitman." A year or so later, in August 1826, Atkinson was established as resident viewer at Bewicke's Wallsend, or Percy-main colliery (where Buddle's friend, Humble Lamb, was one of the owners). In 1842 Buddle recommended him as manager of Seaton Delaval colliery and he was appointed at £500p.a. This was a good salary - T.J. Taylor, nephew of Hugh and Thomas Taylor, a few years younger than Atkinson but similarly educated, had been appointed viewer and agent to the East Holywell Coal Company in 1838 at a salary of £200. When the Stella Coal Company was formed in 1839, Buddle gave Atkinson two of his shares, "to establish in the Trade as a beginning." Unfortunately there is little opportunity to judge the effects of such an upbringing for Atkinson died less than two years after Buddle, at the age of thirty-eight.

Smart Atkinson, another nephew, went into farming. He appears, in 1832, asking Buddle for several hundred pounds to buy stock and implements, and in the following year, having rashly asked for Buddle's signature to a mortgage deed for £300, he incurred a lecture on the dangers of mortgages - "the first step in the road to ruin." Outside the family as well, Buddle was a patriarchal figure. Hugh Taylor brought his nephew, "young Tom" (cousin of the more famous T.J. Taylor) to the Coal Trade office for Buddle to give him "a lecture on the irregularity of his conduct, and to admonish him to better behaviour in the future. The father of the young man, Mr. Thomas Taylor, is in a very precarious state of health." It is remarkable that a man of such standing as Hugh Taylor - one of the Duke of Northumberland's commissioners - should so value Buddle's influence. Buddle was even asked to lecture his own doctor about "his system of living." An anecdote told by the historian of Wallsend suggests that Buddle assumed a patriarchal rôle in the village, too: when a house owner attempted to take in part of the village green with his garden, Buddle's pitmen "demolished the objectionable railing, and he rode on horseback over and over the enclosed ground. To impress this event upon the memory of the public, he had ale, bread and cheese and cakes provided on the green for all and sundry." This
anecdote was very likely true, for in 1838 Buddie mentioned to an acquaintance that one Peacock had trespassed on Wallsend Green, and was advised that any person had a right to pull down the fence that Peacock had erected.47

Buddie was commander of the Wallsend Rifle Corps, raised by the colliery owner, William Russell, in 1803, when it consisted of 151 men. During the pitmen's strike of 1831, twenty of Buddie's "old riflemen" served as Special Constables with him and helped him to fortify his property against the attack he expected.48

Buddie began to keep a detailed personal Place Book or Diary in 1834. It may be that until the 1830s he had little private life to record, but the great range of his interests and his avidity for meeting people and collecting information and experiences, suggest that - unlike, for example, Haedy, the Duke of Bedford's estate agent, or Bradshaw, the Superintendent Trustee of the Duke of Bridgewater - he had always found time for his personal pursuits.49

Music played a central rôle. Buddie was an accomplished 'cellist, and established and led a group of chamber musicians in Newcastle from about 1825 - apparently the Septet Club which he frequently mentioned in the Place Books, meeting every fortnight throughout the season from November to April.50 He was also interested in the violin, the viol da gamba and other viols, and guitars.51 He was frequently invited to musical soirées and when not enjoying a quartet at home, or attending the Septet Club, he joined fellow amateurs at his friends' houses and even at the Barracks:

"April 1842: Robert Atkinson, William Jay [a regular musical companion] and myself dined at the Barracks, as Captain Barlow's guests at the Mess of the 61st Regiment, and we had a quartet with Captain Barlow afterwards. We had a very good dinner and the party consisted of 16 or 18, including we three and three artillery officers. They were exceedingly polite and Colonel Forbes is a very gentleman-like person."52

On occasion, Buddie entertained leading musicians: "at home in the evening - had some music with Mr. Haywood the celebrated violoncellist... a most extraordinary performer... little if anything inferior to Paganini." Only a week before his death, the famous 'cellist Lindley stayed overnight with Buddie, giving the latter the opportunity to play bass to his 'cello.53 At the other extreme, Buddie had apparently given "practical patronage" to instrumental music by the pitmen.54
Chapter V

Buddle was an avid concert-goer, both in Newcastle and during his business trips to London where he also visited the opera and ballet, recording the programmes and his opinion of the performances in his Place Book. When in 1842 it was proposed to establish a Musical Festival in Newcastle, Buddle was one of the committee and it was during the Festival that he provided hospitality for Lindley.

Buddle's activities were not, however, confined to music. He found time for an occasional pleasure outing and paid frequent visits to the theatre, showing a wide range of taste: "the great wizard King's...juggling performance at the Music Hall"; "to see Mr. Kay perform the part of Jack Howie - I was much pleased with his acting"; "The Bride of Lammermoor - we were very well entertained."

He was one of the proprietors of the Newcastle Theatre who were responsible for buying the new theatre from Grainger, the architect, in 1836, and at their request he later devised a plan for warming the entrance passage to the pit by a hot-water system.

He was seen frequently at a variety of Newcastle social and cultural functions. He was a guest at the Mayor's Ball, the Assize Ball and the Mayor's dinners on the monarchs' birthdays. He was on the committee of eight local members of the British Association which was responsible for organising the Association's meeting in Newcastle in 1838; he was vice-president, and read a paper on the North-East Coalfield to the Geological Section. On at least one occasion, he chaired a committee formed in 1837 to try to establish a botanical garden in the city; he was vice-president of the Society for the Promotion of Fine Arts; chairman (as one of the stewards for Northumberland) at the Infirmary Dinner, "supported on the right by the High Sheriff...and on the left by the Mayor of Newcastle," and his patronage in Infirmary affairs was sought by aspiring surgeons.

He was a founder member of the Literary and Philosophical Society established in 1793 and enjoyed with omnivorous enthusiasm its famous lecture courses; he was a friend (and fellow Unitarian) of the Reverend William Turner who held the permanent lectureship from 1803 to 1833; he enjoyed George Combe's lectures on phrenology and Professor Thomas Adams' courses on music, acoustics and optics, as well as, for example, "a very interesting paper" on Icelandic language and history. He was a founder member of the Society of Antiquaries, formed in 1813, although he took no regular part in its proceedings;
and a leading supporter and vice-president of the Natural History Society, established in 1829, to which he contributed several papers, including one on the need for a repository for mining records, which was achieved nine years after his death by the foundation of the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers.  

His circle of friends and acquaintances was vast, embracing much of the professional class of Newcastle - men such as Armorner Donkin (1779-1851), a partner in the solicitors' practice of Donkin and Stable, fellow stalwart of the Literary and Philosophical Society, a member and later alderman of the town council and "a liberal of the Whig school" - a phrase which approximates to Buddle's political ideas; John Hodgson (1779-1845), the historian of Northumberland who read over a manuscript for Buddle (probably his Report of a Society for Preventing Accidents in Coal Mines) and borrowed books from him; Thomas Sopwith (1803-79), the engineer; Colonel Mills, a connection of the Russells of Brancepeth; Sir Henry Browne whom Buddle had first met through Lord Stewart (to whom Browne had been A.D.C.) and who became a firm friend; and Humble Lamb who was a J.P., owned land in Dumfries and Cumberland as well as Durham, and had shares in at least eight collieries, in many of which Buddle was also a partner. He was invited to Lambton to meet the writer, Harriet Martineau, in 1833, and on her return from America in 1836, spent the evening at a friend's house to renew the acquaintance.  

Buddle's home at Wallsend was rightly reputed to have been "for nearly half a century...the resort of most of the scientific strangers who visited the North of England" - men such as Sir George McKenzie, the Icelandic traveller; Leifchild, the Children's Employment Commissioner; Robertson Buchanan, the civil engineer from Edinburgh to whom he had originally been introduced in 1815 by an old friend, Dr. James Hamel, the Russian traveller and physician. The famous entrepreneur, William Dixon, of the Calder iron works, sent George Wilson of Hurlet colliery and alum works to Buddle with a letter of introduction; Dixon himself had been rendered the same service by Robert Bald, colliery agent to the Earl of Mar, who also visited Buddle's home.  

Buddle's professional connections with the Russells of Brancepeth, the Lambtons and Lord Londonderry, also involved him in considerable social activities, and on a greater scale than would
necessarily be accorded to an agent. Matthew Russell (1765-1822) whom Buddle described as "my best and oldest friend" - the son of the man who appointed the Buddles to the management of Wallsend colliery - invited Buddle to combine a business discussion with a day's shooting at Brancepeth Castle; years later Buddle joined a four-day house party at the Castle, during which he enjoyed a "tableau vivant" and a Ball, day-time rehearsals and evening concerts followed by dancing, and an outing to see a bag-fox turned off. A few months later he joined a select overnight party to meet Sir George and Lady Drummond.  

Buddle was invited to both Brancepeth and Lamton Hall on different occasions, to meet the Duke of Sussex. He was, however, a frequent guest at Lamton, as at Brancepeth, on less formal occasions long after his direct connection with the Lamton concerns had ceased in 1819. Usually the Lamton agent, Henry Morton, and occasionally the secretary and tutor were also present, but outside the family circle, Buddle's fellow guests were people such as Sir Cuthbert Sharp (Collector of the Customs at Sunderland), Lord and Lady Grey and local gentry. On one occasion he sat next to the recently appointed Bishop of Durham, Edward Maltby - "had much conversation with him, and found him a most accessible and agreeable man. He gave me a cordial invitation to visit him at Auckland." Less than three weeks after this meeting over dinner, Buddle received a letter notifying him of his appointment as the Bishop's viewer on Thomas Fenwick's dismissal. Buddle immediately wrote to Henry Morton at Lamton:

"I am quite aware, through whose friendly interposition I am indebted for this appointment, and as you are aware that circumstances will not permit me, to make my acknowledgements personally, for this sort of kindness, may I request that you will avail yourself of some fitting occasion to let it be known, in the proper quarter, how highly I appreciate this disinterested act of kindness." Lord Durham's friendship could obviously be of practical use on occasion. In fact this first meeting with the bishop proved to be the beginning of a strong personal acquaintance as well as professional connection, for Buddle dined with the bishop on several occasions and was urged to stay at Auckland Castle when in the neighbourhood. It is particularly indicative of Buddle's tact and social acceptability that, despite the business and political rivalry between Lord Durham and Lord Londonderry, the former could give such hospitality - and
practical help - to the latter's agent. Buddie certainly considered his work for Londonderry no bar to his feelings of attachment towards the Lambtons: in 1840 he contributed £25 to a fund set up by the friends of the late Earl for the erection of a public monument, and in 1841 he attended Lady Durham's funeral - "although the funeral was considered private, only the relations, agents and tenants being invited, I was invited as being the consultant viewer and an old connexion of the family."^3

Buddie's work for Londonderry naturally meant that he frequently dined at Wyndyard or Seaham Hall, inviting himself as necessary when business matters needed discussion, and he also stayed there in Londonderry's absence. He was invited to occasions such as Lady Londonderry's birthday, when "a large assemblage of the neighbouring gentry and clergy" was entertained to dinner and dancing.76 Perhaps more indicative of the degree of social intercourse between Londonderry and Buddie were occasions when Londonderry dined at Penshaw and when Buddie was invited to Wyndyard (shortly after the Duke of Cambridge had visited the Londonderry collieries) to meet the duke again, "who wished to see me to have further conversation with me on colliery affairs. I had a long conversation with the duke, in his room, on ventilation, the mode of working collieries, the nature of the pitmen's employment, their mode of life etc., etc. He seemed however to be more inclined to ask a number of questions than to endeavour to obtain solid information." A few days later, Buddie lunched at Seaham Hall to meet the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria.75

In addition to the social life that Buddie enjoyed with his large circle of local associates and with the local landowners and nobility who employed him, his range of interests involved him in correspondence with men such as Henry de la Beche, Roderick Impey Murchison, Charles Lyell, William Buckland and Richard Griffith, the eminent geologists.76 When he visited Edinburgh, Buckland took him to a meeting of the Royal Society, where he enjoyed papers on "the mode in which musket balls and other foreign bodies become enclosed in the ivory tusk of the elephant," and "an analysis of the Berg Meal, from Umea." He found another paper, "on the theory of waves," "too hypothetical and elementary to be satisfactory."77 Virtually wherever Buddie travelled on business he found old, or made new friends. On two visits to London he dined at the Geological Club
with such men as Buckland, Professor Whelwell, Sir John Trevelyan, Sir John Macneil and Thomas Sopwith - "a most agreeable party, teaming with good humour, good sense and intelligence." On one of these visits to London he obtained a tour of Newgate prison with the principal turnkey, and on the following day breakfasted with Sir James Duke, a leading coal factor, at the Old Bailey before visiting the court. During that same visit he breakfasted with Cubitt, the engineer. In 1842 he was elected a member of the Athenæum Club and on his next visit to London was introduced to the Club by Milne of the Office of Woods, whom Buddie had met through the Dean Forest Commission business.

Where Buddie did not meet old friends, he showed a ready knack for finding congenial companions. In the course of his correspondence with Londonderry, he had a tendency to speak derogatorily of certain individuals and groups with whom he had to deal - particularly lawyers, bankers, and the churchmen of the Dean and Chapter of Durham. In his personal life, however, Buddie clearly enjoyed meeting all types of people. On a survey for coal in Ireland, his colleagues were Captain Portlock of the Royal Engineers, an Ordnance surveyor, and a Mr. McAdam, whom he found respectively to be "an excellent geologist and mineralogist" and "a well-informed and scientific person" - "very agreeable persons." Going on to Glenarm, the home of McDonnell, the Londonderry trustee, Buddie there enjoyed meeting the Bishop of Derry and his family. He then caught the ferry from Donaghadee to Port Patrick and at the end of the journey invited the captains of the packets to dine with him.

Buddie also had a remarkable curiosity and enthusiasm for any type of knowledge or experience. In 1841, at the age of nearly sixty-eight, he went to Bartonholme in Scotland on a business matter. The matter having been postponed, he went on to Arran in company with two or three other colliery viewers. He spent several hours walking on Goats Fell mountain recording in his Place Book all he observed. Two days later, returning to Glasgow, the party visited the birthplace in Ayr of Robert Burns. Buddie drew a sketch and diagram of the cottage in his Place Book and described it with the same observation and accuracy that he brought to his mining work:

"the kitchen in which the poet was born is only 12ft. x 15", but the kitchen is reduced to 9ft. by the closet in which the bed stands. It is now a whiskey shop and is inhabited by an old drunken
miller of the name of Gaudy and his wife - they are both over eighty and have inhabited the house upwards of 40 years, during which Gaudy has hardly ever been sober. These people remember Burns very well, Gaudy says he was by no means a lively companion. These people have brought up a large family in the cottage and the old woman says she has had "mair fash with the guid man than we aye the rest o' her business." They have it on a lease which has 4½ years to run."

On the following day, Buddie travelled overnight from Ayr to Belfast, via Glasgow; finding McDonnell was not at home, he returned to England, arriving back in Newcastle two days later. The steamers in which he travelled, and features such as Ardrossan harbour and Belfast docks all merited detailed inquiry and notes; Buddie even asked one of the Belfast dock labourers about his rates of pay.

A few months later, Buddie was in London on Coal Trade business and Londonderry affairs. A not-untypical day illustrates his energy and versatility. On 19th March he led a Coal Trade deputation to Sir Robert Peel. He then had a long discussion with Lord and Lady Londonderry before calling on the Bishop of Durham with whom he "had a little general conversation and chit-chat." Finding McDonnell was not available, he went on to the Egyptian Hall to see a skeleton dug out of the banks of the "Mesuri" in America. Then, "in passing along the Strand, my notice was attracted by a placard with the words 'Extraordinary Female Curiosity' in large letters upon it - admittance 1/-" A Frenchman ushered him into a room where there was a short figure standing on a pedestal:

"The creature told me it was Swiss by birth, and that it was a complete hermaphrodite. For 5/- it offered to show me the organs of regeneration, which it said were quite perfect for both sexes. I however declined this, being quite satisfied and disgusted with what I had already seen."

Buddie then attended a meeting at the Tavistock, concerning the Seaham coal partnership, before returning to Newcastle. Travelling occupied a considerable part of Buddie's time. Railways helped him - "I can now accomplish in 18 or 20 hours what a year ago required 2½ days" (speaking of a journey to Newnham, Gloucestershire) - but in my case, problems of travel were no deterrent. In 1837, for example, he visited London at the end of August, spent a few days at Workington in Cumberland at the beginning of October and a week in Ireland in mid-November. In mid-October 1841, he went to Shefnal, near Wolverhampton, to view collieries involved in a
dispute and on the day after his arrival spent nine hours down the pits; two days later he went to London to attend to Office of Woods and Londonderry Trust matters, also finding time for several concerts and a visit to a musical instrument maker. Four days later he continued to Bristol where he had a consultation on the Ebbw Vale iron works before travelling, on the following day, to Dowlais. Here he stayed for three days with Sir John and Lady Charlotte Guest while participating in negotiations for the renewals of their Dowlais mines and works lease, and finally arrived back in Newcastle on the 31st October.  

A typical week taken at random, spent on local business three weeks after his return from Dowlais, consisted of a day spent in his own office and in the Percy, Tanfield-moor and Wortley colliery offices, followed by a Coal Trade executive committee meeting; an unusually quiet Sunday at home; a view of Backworth colliery on the following day; on the next day a meeting at Stella to discuss the affairs of Towneley Main colliery, followed by dinner at Benwell colliery; the following day was spent at Wallsend colliery bill-day, and the next at the Percy-main office for that colliery's bill-day.  

Local business could involve considerable travelling. One day, having stayed at Bishop Auckland the previous night, Buddie spent the day viewing two collieries:

"I then returned to dinner at a public house at Butterknowle at ½ past 5 o'clock. I ran down the Hagger-Lee branch of railway 4½ miles on a dandy-waggon to St. Helens, where I had left my gig. I then went to the Talbot at Bishop Auckland from where I had taken a horse in the morning, and took my own horse and returned by Durham, where I stayed ½ an hour to bait, and arrived at Penshers at ½ past 11 o'clock at night, having had a long day."  

He usually travelled on horseback or by gig - he kept a saddle and a gig horse, and expected, once Seaham Harbour came into his sphere of operations, to have to replace them quite frequently. Even so, he told Londonderry that his own travelling was not as much as Oliver's, who was responsible for the purchase and sale of farming stock and of horses and corn for the collieries.  

Despite Buddie's active private life, the range of his interests and the time and energy necessarily absorbed in travelling, he was noted not merely for his technical skill but also for his
extreme efficiency in paper-work. He told Londonderry early in their connection that "a little extra exertion, at any time when circumstances require it, has no terrors for me. Nature has blessed me with a good constitution, and I have been brought up to habits of industry. I never have been accustomed to measure out my hours of labour, and dread no degree of fatigue." Even Matthias Dunn admitted that "his habits were those of great regularity and industry, going down two or three pits a day whilst he kept the most minute and methodical details of his proceedings." He kept meticulous view-books for each colliery at which he acted as viewer, recording not only the problems or possibilities that occurred and the measures that were introduced, but also details of the strata, state of the roof, course of ventilation and so on. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, John Bell Simpson, a highly reputable colliery engineer, considered that Buddle's notebooks were a splendid example to young men then rising in the profession.

In addition, as is indicated by this study, Buddle conducted a vast and articulate correspondence. Armorer Donkin, writing to Lord Londonderry in 1832 to warn him that Buddle's health was still not strong after his long illness in the previous year, told him that,

"the portion of his business which causes him the greatest labour and anxiety, and is most injurious to his health, is the writing of letters. In the mechanical operation of writing he is not quick, and he is so scrupulously accurate as to the subject matter of what he commits to paper, that his correspondence requires more labour of the brain, as well as more time than that of almost any other man. In addition to this, he makes it a point of conscience to be very punctual in replying to all letters which he receives, whether he has anything of immediate importance to communicate or not. I have often heard him say, in reply to my entreaties to afford himself a little time for relaxation - 'I could do the whole of my business with ease, and have time enough left for a little amusement, if I had only to do the business, and not to write about it. But my friends are naturally anxious to know what is going on, they keep constantly writing to me, and I cannot help writing answers, though the business is not thereby forwarded one jot, but the contrary, for the time which is occupied in writing could frequently be applied in doing the business to which the letters relate.'"

Donkin then went on to ask Londonderry to write as few letters as possible to Buddle, and to request Buddle not to reply unless essential. Whatever Donkin thought, however, Buddle clearly felt that regular and full correspondence with his employers was an essential part of
his work, for George Hunter told Londonderry some time later that "Donkin's letter to your lordship is likely to do Mr. Buddie harm, in as much as you decline writing him. I have found these last few days that he was uneasy, and cannot tell what is the reason your lordship has not written him." 94

Londonderry was not the only person with whom Buddie maintained a regular and detailed correspondence. Londonderry's affairs alone involved frequent letters to the various subordinate agents, solicitors, creditors and trustees. Buddie also reported - though on a lesser scale - to the other colliery owners for whom he acted, and his own business interests required considerable correspondence. As was usual in businesses of this period, he conducted his paper-work in his own hand; he kept copies of many of his out-letters.95

Nevertheless, despite his efficiency in his paper-work - an attribute by no means necessarily shared by his fellow colliery viewers96 - his first love always remained pit work. As has been seen, his training was essentially practical, and he attached the greatest importance to practical "breeding" for others, both pitmen and viewers. His liking for pit work was not, however, an accepted norm. Many famous viewers such as George Johnson, John Watson and William Brown of Throckley, had given up going down the pit when they became established in their profession, and even an old pitman such as Samuel Haggerstone saw nothing wrong in this.97 Buddie, however, was perhaps most in his element underground. At the end of several weeks in London he was looking forward to returning to the north as "for want of my usual out-door work I am suffering in health."

Similarly, as his monthly visit to Backhouse's bank loomed, he confessed that "five or six hours spent in a coal-pit is quite delightful compared with one spent in the Bank."98 A young apprentice accompanied Buddie down a pit in 1839 and it was then, so he remembered many years later, "that I was most impressed with what was Mr. Buddie 'at home' - Mr. Buddie down a pit and Mr. Buddie above ground in society were very different men. In the former he adopted the dialect and words of the pitman, and with blackened faces, to hear him and one of them in conversation, you could not tell which was which, and could only do so from the manner of the two."99

Buddie showed the same adroitness and efficiency in managing
his own affairs as he brought to his employers' interests. He acquired a considerable reputation for this; he was urged to take shares in the Ebbw Vale iron works as, if he "should approve of them and take an interest in them," there would be no difficulty in recommending the concern to other monied people who would complete the new company.

Buddle's investment was chiefly in the spheres which he knew best from his professional work - collieries and shipping. His attitude to land owning was similarly motivated - an economic rather than a social investment. In the 1810s he bought an estate at Benwell, near Newcastle; in 1822 he intended using the arrears of his Londonderry salary to repay a mortgage on it. In about 1835 Buddle donated part of this land for the New Episcopal Chapel and graveyard (in which he and his sister were buried) - now St. James's parish church. He never lived on this estate but he benefitted from it in at least one way that was becoming common among landowners: in the mid 1820s he sat on a committee to decide on the relative merits of a railway or canal between Newcastle and Carlisle; a railway having been decided on, he asked for Londonderry's help in "forwarding the Bill through the two Houses" as he was "interested in the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway which passes through my land at Benwell" and in 1838 he received £1,365 compensation from the Company.

Buddle also had small farming interests which, at one time, he must have adopted with enthusiasm, for one of his correspondents felt it worthwhile to ask him in 1823 "who collects such excellent hay-seeds" and how to farm a certain field. In 1826, however, Buddle wrote that, "as to farming, I am glad to say that I disengaged myself entirely from it last May...I am satisfied that under the present state and prospects of the country, there is not the least chance of its becoming a trade worth following during our life-time."

The events in the Coal Trade of 1829 and the early 1830s, however, profoundly shook Buddle's confidence in the future of colliery investments. In 1832 he told Londonderry that "the coal trade has of late years been the best, indeed the only good trade in the kingdom, but I am of opinion that nothing short of a miracle can now prevent its being brought into the same sort of miserable state as lead, iron, copper etc." He expected it to fall into the hands of speculators and joint-stock companies, and the best that could be hoped was that a period of free-trade would establish fair
competition prices so that the trade would "then become a regular sort of jog-trot trade to live by - but certainly not a fortune-making one." Three years later, in 1835, he convinced McDonnell that "the golden days of coal property are gone forever and that if any concern can make £20,000 a year it will be a great thing in future." 105

It was these feelings which prompted Buddle's reconsideration of investment in farming land, for, as he told Londonderry in 1833 when describing the decline of the coal trade, "my plan will now be to back out of the Trade as soon as circumstances will permit; to put my little floating property into a few acres and endeavour to spend the rest of my days in tranquility as a mere spectator of passing events." 106 In 1836 he bought the 144-acre Hooker-gate farm, near Chopwell and Winlaton (near his Towneley colliery interests in north-west Durham) for £2,940. The farm, coal and house were at that time let for £120p.a., which, Buddle calculated, would give him a return of £24.1.7½ per cent." Shortly after the purchase, Buddle inspected the property to consider "what is best to be done with it, for its improvement and future management" and it appears that he received reports about such matters as clearing trees and sale of crops, but there is little to suggest a more active interest in farming or in his position as landlord. 107

Time confirmed his reversion to investment in land, for in 1842 he told Thomas Evans at Dowlais that he agreed with his advice not to invest in the Ebbw Vale iron works, for "indeed, business of any kind has now become so precarious owing to over-production and competition that I have nearly about made up my mind not to extend myself any further in business but to realise and invest my money in land, and satisfy myself with less in trust." 108

Buddle's interest from his private property (which he was proud was free from mortgages) and from mortgage interest on other people's, was a useful stand-by; when his colliery profits and salaries for viewing all but disappeared during the coal trade crisis of 1831-32, he told Londonderry that he was temporarily dependent on his property, "which is not large, but clear of all encumbrance." 109 He also considered on several occasions the merits of investing in industries other than coal but was chary of embarking on ventures of which he had little professional knowledge, particularly if they were not local. In 1839 he had chance of investing in coal mines in Virginia, America, but while happy to send out a young viewer,
T.Y. Hall, and six experienced colliers to restore the colliery for its English owner, Colonel Heth, Buddle felt that "unless the result of Hall's investigation goes far to substantiate the prospects held out in the Prospectus, I shall decline embarking in it, as nothing but the prospect of making profit very far indeed beyond what I can make by employing my money in this country could induce me to do so." "At about the same time, he considered buying "at a ready money price," John Waldie's "glass-house concern" (the Northumberland Glass Company) but he eventually decided instead to invest in railway debentures at 5%, telling Waldie that he had "made up my mind not to enter into any kind of mercantile or manufacturing concerns. Former experience has taught me that it is best for the shoe-maker to stick to his last." Similarly, when Buddle was asked to consider investment in Ebbw Vale in 1841, he replied that, "the only principle on which I could entertain the notion of embarking in it was, that I could see my way clearly for making a better percentage of my money by investing it there, than I could do at home." Thomas Evans at Dowlais agreed with Buddle's attitude: he told Buddle that Ebbw Vale could make good profits but it was not under economical management: "if you were in a position to go and manage the works yourself" then investment in it would be more feasible. As has been seen, Buddle discarded the idea of investment in Ebbw Vale in favour of land, but he told Evans he might reconsider if something "very tempting came up in the iron trade." An industry to which Buddle was more favourably inclined was shipping, and his investment in it dated from the period at which he developed a close professional connection with it, through the opening of Seaham Harbour in 1831. The first coals from the Harbour were taken by Buddle's ship, the "Lord Seaham," built by T. and R. Brown and launched at Jarrow a few days beforehand. The "Lord Seaham" cost over £2,300. By June 1832 - eleven months after the opening of the Harbour - it had loaded eleven times, the value of the coal amounting to about £1,950. This was placed to Buddle's account towards the payment of money owing to him by Lord Londonderry but Buddle was afraid that under current market prices the ship was losing money. It was, however, normally profitable enough for Buddle to extend his shipping interests, and looking back over the intervening years, in 1842, Buddle said that, although the "Lord Seaham" had
again made no profit for the past two years, in previous years it had made a profit of £200p.a. and over - even £500 one year."\(^{116}\)

Buddle soon added two other ships, for in 1833 Thomas Brown sold the "Jane" and "Robert" for him and advised caution in buying new ships as it was likely that the Baltic timber duty would soon be taken off.\(^{117}\) Buddle told Londonderry that, if his loan to Londonderry in January 1835 had been repaid, he would have had a ship built during that year and that his inability to do so had cost him the opportunity of making at least £1,500 during 1836, one of the best years known for shipping.\(^{118}\) In 1837, on the recommendation of Spence (possibly the Londonderry fitter) and "as the prospect for the shipping is very good at present," Buddle bought a new ship which was being built at Sunderland, of about 16 keels burden, or 225 tons, costing £2,450 "cash payment." This was apparently the "John Buddle" launched at Sunderland at the end of May.\(^{119}\) In November of the same year, Buddle paid Spence the first instalment for building a new ship to be called the "Mary and Ann," but in February 1839, as a result of a quarrel with Londonderry over alleged favouritism in loading ships at Seaham, Buddle arranged with Spence that this ship and the "Lord Seaham" should be offered for sale at £2,500 and £1,800 respectively.\(^{120}\) This was apparently either cancelled or unsuccessful; in August 1840 Buddle offered the South Hetton Coal Company "my three ships to carry your South Hetton coals from Seaham Harbour to London for twelve months, for 9/6d per ton" and the offer was accepted with reference to the "Lord Seaham" and "John Buddle." It is likely that these ships were among those to which Buddle referred as having been built "of a proper draught of water, on purpose to suit the place Seaham Harbour and to be steadily attached to it."\(^{121}\)

Apart from a tannery at Chester-le-Street, probably inherited from one of his parents and treated as a business investment,\(^{122}\) Buddle's other business ventures were, like shipping, at least on the fringe of the coal industry. In the early 1800s he entered into partnership with William Redhead and one of his subordinates at Wallsend colliery, Edward Nelson, in a steam flour mill, with a view to grinding corn for the colliers and starting business in a small way in the corn trade. Being in the midst of a serious grain shortage, but with the coal owners bound to supply subsidised corn to their pitmen, the venture showed a combination of investment and managerial
Buddle contacted an agent on the Corn Exchange in London for a supply of rye; offered only barley, which the pitmen refused to eat, Buddie nevertheless continued in his venture for some years, although by 1807 he had reached the conclusion that milling was a bad trade, requiring a large capital. In that year, Matthew Russell apparently had to give financial help to "the unfortunate concern of Nelson and Co." The equipment - a 30h.p. Boulton and Watts engine, with four pairs of French stones, two dressing cylinders and a cloth mill, shilling mill and brushing cylinder for cleaning wheat - had cost £5,000 to erect and Buddle estimated that it required the same amount to operate it, or more when the price of grain was high.¹²

Buddle and Nelson also conducted some unspecified "speculations" in hay and oats at this period; sums between £5 and £15 were entered by Buddie in his cash-book under this head.¹²

Irregular sums also came from commissions for acting as agent between the Butterley Iron Company and collieries to which the Company supplied machinery: in 1810 Buddle received £17.10.0d commission on £700 for a 16h.p. engine, and £16.18.0d on £676 for a railway. The latter sum was presumably the 2½% discount he mentioned to the Butterley Iron Company in connection with supplying iron rails to Backworth Colliery to replace the existing wooden ones. Such mediation was apparently common, for Buddie mentioned that he had competitors who would take coal in payment and that "the extended credit can alone put me upon a footing with them."¹²

Among his shares, mortgages and loans which can be traced, a considerable amount was invested in railways. In 1836 Buddle lent £5,000 to the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway on the personal bond of some of the directors, at 5%. The Company offered to repay this in cash in 1839 but at the same time Buddle agreed to lend another £7,000 on debentures. In fact, the debentures, dated 1839, which were found after his death, amounted to £10,000. He also held at least 160 shares in the Railway, dated 1830-41, and a few shares in the North of England Railway Company.¹²

Buddle was one of the largest share-holders in the Tyne Dock Company and had been invited by his friend, A.J.F. Marreco, to stand as its chairman, which he declined to accept owing to the demands on his time, although he was a member of the Provisional Committee when the Company was formed, and a keen supporter of the undertaking.¹² The other share certificates found and listed by his
executors consisted of a considerable number in various insurance companies and at least seven hundred in the District Bank. 129

Buddle had considerable private business transactions with local banks. He was "much pressed" in 1832 by the promoters to take fifty £10 shares in the proposed Newcastle Joint Stock Bank and to become a director but he decided against it: "I think it will do good to the country, but why should I embark in more business, having as much or more on hand than I can manage with comfort." 130

On more than one occasion, however, he made considerable loans to banks: £7,500 in February 1839 to Backhouse's, the bank he had so much dreaded visiting on Londonderry's business, "on their mortgage deed on the Northern Joint Stock Bank on 4% p.a." on condition of having the money returned at any time on one month's notice; and £10,000 in May 1842 to the District Bank, "on an accountable receipt to have security on mortgage when required." 131

The general impression is of cautious, safe investment in areas that Buddie was acquainted with professionally. Thus although the fortunes of the collieries in which he had a share, and of the coal owners who paid his salaries, might fluctuate with the state of trade, at least Buddie was able to keep his finger on the pulse. At his death he was reputed to be worth over £150,000. 132

The picture is growing of a man with wide interests; an accomplished musician; good company at many types of occasion; one of the circle of "the leaders of thought and opinion in Newcastle" who made up the Reverend William Turner's Unitarian congregation and met together at the "Lit. and Phil."; and enduringly attached to the practical skills in which he had been trained. Perhaps the most obvious sign of local status, however, escaped Buddie until the last years of his life; appointment to the Bench of magistrates. Rowland Burdon, the chairman of the Bench, told Lord Londonderry in 1842 that "as to Mr. Buddle personally, there can be but one feeling of respect. His fortune and character fully entitle him to the office." 136 Unlike land agents, however, who were frequently appointed as magistrates - either because of their own personal status or because they were the representative of a great landlord - Buddle's position as a colliery agent was a long-standing bar to his acceptability. 135 It was Lord Londonderry's appointment as Lord Lieutenant and custos rotulorum for the county of Durham in 1842 that at last opened the way for Buddle's appointment as a magistrate.
Buddie was first proposed as a J.P. in 1831. At this time the Bishop of Durham was custos rotulorum, with the power of recommending magistrates to the Lord Chancellor. The suggestion that three coal agents, including Buddie and Henry Morton, should be inserted in the bishop's list sparked off a controversy similar to one in 1810 which had questioned the extension of the bishop's recommendatory power to actually omitting proposed candidates from his list. According to a letter from Dr. J.R. Fenwick to James Losh, the bishop in 1831 refused to include the agents' names. Fenwick agreed with the bishop's attitude as did Losh, the Catholic lawyer and minor coal owner who, in any case, had no liking for Buddie. "I really think (from my local knowledge) that Colliery Viewers will neither be acceptable (as brethren) to the present Magistrates nor in fact proper men for Justices of the Peace." The same objections by the magistracy still existed when Buddie was appointed eleven years later, when Rowland Burdon, their chairman, explained to Londonderry that in 1831, Lord Durham's wish that his agent, Morton, should be placed on the Commission of the Peace had been thwarted by "the very general dissatisfaction on the part of the bench." Their objection was based on the feeling that an agent would frequently find himself deciding on disputes between pitmen and employers and that, even if he were not directly involved in such disputes, "his feelings would probably be biased by the natural sympathies of his situation," or that at all events the pitmen would suppose so.

The magistrates' attitude may well have had some justification. As early as 1825, speaking in connection with the coal owners' actions against the Pitmen's Union, Buddie had complained that, "We are completely let down in the county of Durham for want of an energetic magistracy." This was an attitude fully shared by Morton. In 1832 he drafted a "memoir" urging the need for stipendiary magistrates, and urged Buddie to discuss it with Lord Durham while they were both in London after altering it first if he wished: "You and I have frequently discussed the state of the magistracy and police in these districts...and pronounced upon its incompetency, its inadequacy in the present times to preserve the peace, tranquility and security in these districts so gorged with population, and no one will deny that the late stick [the strike of 1831] fully confirmed these observations."

Nevertheless, according to Buddie in 1842, when commenting
Chapter V

on Rowland Burdon's letter to Lord Londonderry quoted above, Buddie
had in fact declined the appointment in the past: "the very reasons
urged by Mr. Burdon embrace the very principle on which I declined
the appointment so long." He said he had been named at the same
time as Morton and that he had known from a friend on the Bench
the strong objections by the magistracy to the appointment of agents.
He went on to give some indications of the reasons for his eventual
agreement to the appointment in 1842. He said that on the previous
occasion in 1832, Morton had been rejected not merely because he was
an agent but because he was at that time an uncertified bankrupt; the
Commission already included several agents and managers - Stobart of
Etherley, Lamb of Ryton, William Bell, Ramsay of Derwenthaugh - and
"a swarm" of coal owners, including Rowland Burdon himself, who lived
near his lessee's collieries and was liable to adjudicate daily in
disputes; and the mixture of elements on the Bench was a built-in
safeguard against partiality. Buddie went on to tell Lord Londonderry
that he had been told that the real reason for the magistrates'
objections to Buddie were as "a satellite of your lordship."
Buddie, as many an agent must have done, accepted his employer's
influence in such matters as quite normal:

"I told my friend that I had been placed upon the
Bench by your lordship's good opinion, that I
felt confident I should do nothing to discredit
that opinion." [46]

This discussion in November 1842 between Rowland Burdon
(writing on behalf of his fellow magistrates), Londonderry and
Buddie; was academic. The Clerk of the Peace had received London-
derry's recommendations in the middle of September for forwarding
to the Lord Chancellor; by the end of the month Buddie's nomination
had been approved, and arrangements had already been made in the
middle of October for him to take the necessary oaths. Londonderry
invited the magistracy's opinions only in his speech to the Bench
some days later. [46] Londonderry himself had no doubts about the value
of Buddie's appointment despite the recent incidents of friction
between them. Burdon based his argument on the fears that colliery
agents were necessarily influenced, on the Bench, by their employers'
interests and were necessarily in opposition to the pitmen. London-
derry on the other hand, had experienced ample indications of Buddie's
independence of attitude and had a less stark, more realistic view
of Buddie's relations with the pitmen. He took the logical attitude
that in a colliery district the experience of the agents would be a useful and necessary contribution to the Bench:

"To know all that is going forward amongst these men, to crush in its infancy any alarming experience, to have a friendly as well as a watchful eye over the habits of the colliers at all times, must be peculiarly the duties of the principal agents and I cannot but think their immediate development of them to the magistracy and their joint deliberation on them would be of the greatest possible public advantage."

In fact, Buddie had already had an unsolicited indication of his use in this role when the Clerk of the Peace for Northumberland requested his views for the Northumberland J.Ps on the feeling among pitmen, in view of current disturbances in manufacturing districts and a reported strike at Thornley colliery.

Londonderry's final argument in justification of Buddie's appointment as a J.P. indicates the level to which Buddie, in particular, had raised the status of his profession:

"Of course I do not mean to argue that it would be advisable to place many colliery agents in the magistracy nor include many that are little known, but I do think men of high intellectual endowments, high character, and complete independence should not have the bar of exclusion because they direct collieries."
Wallsend and Tanfield Moor

The only two collieries of which Buddie was manager, apart from Lord Londonderry's concerns, were the Tyne collieries of Wallsend and Tanfield Moor: the former, the most famous colliery of the nineteenth century and the latter a small concern owned by a Dorset M.P. With these two exceptions, as Buddie later told Lord Londonderry, he had nothing to do with the management, as distinct from the viewing, of any Tyne colliery.

Wallsend, on the river Tyne just below Newcastle, was Buddie's oldest connection in the coal trade. His father had been appointed its viewer in 1792, his first major post after some years making himself known as a viewer at Bushblades in north-west Durham. The family moved to a house near the A pit at Wallsend, which remained Buddie's home throughout his life, and Buddie, then aged nineteen, acted as his father's assistant, succeeded him at his death in 1806 and remained closely connected with Wallsend and its owners, the Russells of Brancepeth, until his death - a connection of over fifty years. When Matthew Russell died in 1822, Buddie referred to him as "my best and oldest friend," and said that the family, "to whom I have been attached from my youth," had "never let slip any opportunity of promoting my welfare." Matthew's son, William (1798-1850) caused Buddie and his other associates some anxiety with his betting, "wild oats," "wavering of opinion" and "versatility" during the 1820s. His affairs were largely conducted by his lawyer, Gregson; his uncle, Charles Tennyson and Buddie. The latter's rôle consisted of managing the colliery and advising Russell "as a friend" but stopped short of "the details of Agency," at least after Buddie's appointment as Londonderry's agent.

Buddie advised Russell generally on his other collieries, Washington and North Hetton (bought from Londonderry) but had no other connection with their management.

A prominent mining engineer, speaking at the end of the
nineteenth century, recalled Wallsend's reputation as "not only the most difficult of collieries to manage in the early days, but it also produced the very best coal in the world; and he believed that it was then the most commercially successful." He added that "it had one great advantage in its favour - it was managed by Mr. John Buddie jun..." At its height, Wallsend colliery was "the most profitable colliery ever worked in the district" and the name Wallsend came to be used for the best coals from other collieries on the Tyne, Wear and Tees.

It is not intended to examine in detail Buddie's work in colliery engineering (nor to discuss the causes of the great explosion at Wallsend in 1835 when over one hundred men were killed) but the following summary is necessary to indicate the status which Wallsend and Buddie together achieved in the early nineteenth century north-east coal industry. The last forty years of the eighteenth century were characterised in the Newcastle coal-field by a move from shallow workings with numerous pits, near the outcrops of the seams in the west, in favour of deeper sinkings to reach the renowned High Main seam where it dipped down towards the east. The application of the steam engine to pumping, for which Thomas Barnes of Throckley had done so much in the middle of the century, enabled these deeper seams to be drained; but deep shafts and deep and extensive workings brought other problems as well, notably the sinking of the shafts themselves, ventilation, underground transport and winding to bank, and the general need for increased efficiency to justify the increased expenses. Preceded only by Walker and Willington, Wallsend colliery was one of the first attempts to tap these new sources, and it amply demonstrated the types of problems associated with such workings.

The Wallsend coal, owned by the Dean and Chapter of Durham, was in 1778 leased to Messrs. Chapman and Company. The first pit was lost in quicksand but the second was sunk through the sand by means of piling, and the thick, high quality High Main seam was reached in 1781 at a depth of 666 feet by this pit (A pit) and another shaft (B pit). The colliery was sold in the same year to William Russell (1734-1817), a Sunderland coal-fitter, and Thomas Wade. Throughout the 1780s it was dogged by frequent fires and explosions, many of them caused by the steel mill (used for lighting) igniting the fire-damp. The problems of creating sufficient ventilation to
counteract the presence of fire-damp called for more shafts; in about 1786 the C and D shafts were begun, coming into operation in 1790, and for some years there were no further explosions. The E pit was begun in 1791 and completed, under the Buddles, in 1793: eventually there were eight shafts on a royalty of 1,250 acres, a "strikingly large number of shafts." The Bensham seam, opened in 1821, was found to be as dangerous as the old High Main seam; by 1835 five pits were sunk to it.

One of John Buddle senior's first measures after his appointment in 1792 was to strengthen the measures taken for securing the shafts against the great problem of feeders of water. He replaced the piling in the original A pit by cast-iron tubbing in place of the usual wood - the first use of such tubbing. A few years later, in 1796-99, at Percy-main colliery, Buddle introduced a refinement by having the cast-iron tubbing made in segments for fitting together in the pit. It was John Buddle junior who then went on to improve the ventilation at Wallsend by his introduction of double or compound ventilation. Wallsend colliery was also the scene for Buddle's development of panel working, for more efficient use of the pillars. All these improvements, arising from the difficulties at Wallsend, were soon adopted throughout the coal-field.

Buddle's papers relating to Wallsend are incomplete, referring mainly to 1807-8 and the 1830s. As it happens, however, these patches of information are particularly revealing about two distinct phases in the colliery's history: its height as the leading first-class Tyne colliery, and its decline, fewer than thirty years later, when it produced coals fit only for coastal markets and gas works.

By the end of the first decade of the century, nine first-class collieries in the lower Tyne basin (Wallsend, Hebburn, Willington, Walker, Bigges-main, Heaton, Temple's-main, Percy-main and Killingworth) dominated the coal trade. In 1804, for example, the total vend by the thirty-five collieries in the Tyne, Hartley and Blyth area was 799,460 chaldrons, but only seven collieries had an individual vend above 33,000 chaldrons. Of these seven, three had a vend of between 34,000 and 38,000; another three lay between 41,000 and just over 44,000, and Wallsend was far ahead at nearly 61,000 chaldrons. The Coal Trade minutes for the early years of the century refer chiefly to binding arrangements and wages, but
Buddle's letters to William (senior) and Matthew Russell in 1807-8 clearly illustrate the coal trade affairs at that time. In April 1807 a Coal Trade meeting was called to discuss an advance of price but failed to agree. At the end of the year a new move was made by certain members of the first-class collieries to obtain a regulation of quantities for three months by the "below-bridge" owners; as a result, a meeting of the best collieries, held on the eve of a general meeting in January 1808, unanimously agreed that "a regulation of the nine best collieries should take place, whether the inferior ones might think proper to come into the measure or not." The meeting then considered vend figures, produced by Buddle, for the first three months of 1806:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;By the nine best (chaldrons)&quot;</td>
<td>11,864</td>
<td>23,953</td>
<td>20,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By the inferior</td>
<td>7,452</td>
<td>17,016</td>
<td>18,044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and as a result, "it was agreed to keep the best collieries in a class by themselves; and assuming the vend of the present month to be 23,000 chaldrons, it was agreed that the best collieries should take 12,000 of that quantity, and leave the remaining 8,000 [sic] for the inferior sorts to divide amongst them. Whether this plan may be approved by the inferior sorts or not, will be knowing [sic] tomorrow, but should they not come into the plan, it is not apprehended that their opposition can prevent the best collieries from carrying it into effect."

The inferior collieries at the general meeting on the following day did voice strong objections to the large proportion claimed by the best collieries; although some concessions were made to them, by the beginning of February it was clear that the inferior collieries could not be brought into the regulation, but the best collieries stood firm in continuing their regulation for the three months, while negotiations went on to extend it for a full year.

When an advance in price had been suggested in April 1807, most of the first-class collieries, some unable to work, and others to vend, a large quantity, had been more eager for a limitation of quantity. Wallsend was in quite a different situation, for as Buddle wrote to Russell,

"I think your interest in that respect, under existing circumstances, is completely at variance with theirs, and that quantity is more your object, than even an advance of price, if a stipulation and consequent reduction of quantity is to be made the basis of that advance, which seems to be what the majority are aiming at."
By the end of 1807, as has been seen, the best collieries were in agreement on a short-term regulation of quantities; the bases were to be fixed on the average vend of 1804-6 but Buddle felt that "it will not be admissible on the part of Mr. Russell unless it will allow Wallsend about 65,000." In fact, new winnings, as reflected in the number of additional hewers allowed at the binding, were taken into account and gave Wallsend a basis of 68,000 chaldrons. The next highest was Hebburn on 43,000. Subsequently, however, when concessions were made to the inferior collieries, Buddle advised the Russells, when considering Regulation for the full year, to insist on a certain quantity — say 64,000 or 66,000 — rather than be "subject to a fluctuating vend as calculated from a general basis": "This I believe was allowed Mr. Russell during a former regulation." This was the line taken by Buddle and Russell; when the bases were named later in 1808, their choice lay between accepting a basis of 70,000 (which Buddle calculated would give an actual vend of about 58-60,000) or insisting on a certain vend of 65,000, which the other best collieries strongly opposed.

In January 1808, increases in working expenses due to the price of oats, ropes and timber had convinced all the best collieries of the need for the advance in price on which they had been unable to agree in April of the previous year. Buddle felt that certain of them, including Wallsend, could put on 2/- whenever they chose, Regulation or no Regulation, but he was anxious that it should be a general measure in the context of a Regulation, as it would otherwise reduce their vends. The question became more urgent when the shipowners' clubs began to penalise ships loading coals whose prices had been advanced, Hebburn apparently already having advanced its prices. Buddle worked to gain agreement for an advance, "without having occasion to say anything about quantity"; Willington, which was aiming for the same basis as Wallsend, was reluctant, but Buddle approached the Wear trade to encourage an early meeting there, to consider advancing prices, with the result that Willington agreed to an advance provided it was general on both Tyne and Wear. Should the Wear fail to act, Buddle advocated a "liberal" reduction — "I believe the more decisive the stroke and the more severe the storm, the sooner will the atmosphere be purified."

Buddle's attitude to Regulation at this period, and for this particular colliery, evidently able to work and vend virtually
whatever quantity it wished regardless of Regulation, is in strong contrast to his policy for the Londonderry collieries, beset by much stronger competition, some twenty years later. He and Russell were in favour of Regulation but they aimed to use it to gain maximum vend (insisting if necessary on a guaranteed vend for themselves while the other participants had a fluctuating vend on their basis); price advances, especially if accompanied by reduced quantities, were of less importance and when Buddle did advocate them, he wanted only the minimum necessary to meet increases in working costs and to retaliate against the dangerous precedent of the ship owners attempting to force reductions.

Twenty years later, the best Tyne collieries had ceded their leadership of the trade to the east Durham collieries. The High Main seam, the source of the high quality household coal that had made Wallsend's fame, was exhausted at Wallsend by the late 1820s; in 1830 Wallsend was still included among the Tyne first-class collieries (that is those whose prices were above 28/- per chaldron) but the High Main seam was finally closed after the strike of 1831. Sinking had been made in 1821 to the Bensham seam, a good-quality gas coal, and it was this that henceforth provided Wallsend's vend. In 1834, when the Willington owners were considering laying off an engine, thus throwing extra water into Wallsend, Buddle told them, "that I considered Wallsend colliery was chiefly carried on for the benefit of the parish," and in the following year, after the disastrous explosion, Russell tried to let the colliery. With these reservations, neither of which necessarily reflects the real state of the colliery, Wallsend in the 1830s was undoubtedly now an inferior colliery, but still remarkably buoyant.

By 1835, Wallsend's role in coal trade affairs was typified by its inclusion at a special meeting of "the regular gas coal collieries." As Buddle told William Russell in 1840, the coal could not be sold in the London market:

"it is entirely, with the exception of a few gas coals for which we only receive 17/6 a chaldron, a coasting trade, and is not fit either for steam boat nor foreign exportation." Nevertheless, at a time when almost all the inferior collieries were complaining of lack of profit under the Regulation,

"Wallsend is not in the category of complainants, as we have a free vend for all we are allowed, which is more I believe than any other colliery on the Tyne"
can do. And our underground affairs I am glad to say are in a very comfortable state."

Russell, seeing the short issues and swayed by others' opinions, was inclined to question the benefits of Regulation but - in contrast to 1807-8 - it was now Regulation, not her own powers, that gave WallSEND her advantage, as Buddie pointed out:

"the fact is the colliery stands upon a larger basis than any other of similar calibre, and we are enabled to sell the coals without freighting."

"..My present conviction is that WallSEND stands relatively better on the general Basis, than she is entitled to do, considering the quality of the coal. We have a steady trade coastwise at our full price. but not so much as the Regulation gives us. How then is the colliery to do better without Regulation?"

The colliery survived for eleven years after Buddie's death but ceased to work in June 1854 as a result of the flooding of the Tyne basin workings when collieries stopped pumping the exhausted High Main seam.

Tanfield Moor colliery, to the south of the Tyne in north-west Durham, was owned by William Morton Pitt (1754-1836), the younger son of a Hampshire family, M.P. for Poole and then Dorset for forty-five years, active in local affairs in Dorset. He had inherited the colliery and, although normally resident in Dorset, in 1828 (out of the forty-one Tyne collieries) he was one of only four coal owners who themselves worked rather than leased their collieries.

Since 1800, Pitt's agent had been Nathaniel Clayton, a fitter, but in 1822 he called in Buddie to investigate the colliery, probably because of declining profits over the preceding two years. Buddie took over the management, and Clayton's rôle was limited to the fitting (which was also under Buddie's control in 1839). Why Buddie should have agreed to do so is not clear, but it is likely that he had connections with Pitt from his father's years at Bushblades, only a couple of miles from Tanfield Moor. He managed the colliery until Pitt's death in 1836 (and apparently continued to do so until it was sold in 1841) and remained true to his intention to establish "a system of management and correspondence, which may keep you in regular communication with your affairs in this quarter - not to tease [sic] you with trifling matters but to give you sufficient information on all material points."

He wrote frequently and fully to Pitt on all aspects of the colliery's affairs. Pitt, for his part, took a keen interest in the concern and in Coal Trade affairs;
by 1828 he was confiding in Budde regarding his general financial affairs, "considering you as a true friend, as a considerate person, and as one who really takes a real and lively interest in my general concerns." 22

The colliery typifies the plight in the early nineteenth century of the old collieries on the upper Tyne, as collieries such as Wallsend were opened up in the lower Tyne basin. 23 There were two basic problems: transport costs and limited demand. Transport costs attracted Budde's attention immediately. The colliery lay over seven miles from the Tyne at Dunston staith; being well "above bridge," the coals then had to be shipped by keels. The ideal solution would have been a direct line to a below-bridge quay; only a month after making his initial examination of the colliery, Budde opened discussions with Lord Bute's Pontop colliery agents for a joint railway to Jarrow quay, which proved abortive. 24 Wayleave rents were responsible for cutting profits "most cruelly" in 1826; in the following year Budde took advantage of his new intimacy with the lessors, Lord and Lady Ravensworth, arising from contacts during the Duke of Wellington's visit to the north, to have "much conversation with them on the disadvantageous situation of the West Country collieries." 25 In 1830 he again considered applying to the wayleave landlords, including Lord Ravensworth, for an abatement of rent but was not hopeful "as everybody seems to be getting the longer the poorer"; he did succeed, however, in arranging to share Lord Bute's South Moor waggonway to Dunston staith. 26 In the following year he estimated that the cost of leading on the wooden railway to Dunston staith (including actual leading costs, wayleaves and repairs) was 5/8d per chaldron; staith expenses and keel dues increased this to 10/- 27. An important change, however, came in 1833-34, when the new Stanhope and Tyne Railway Company was in a position to treat for leading the coals and shipping them by spout at South Shields. 28 Budde was viewer for the Stanhope and Tyne Railway Company's collieries and was involved in calculating the railway's price for leading the Tanfield Moor coals. 29 As arrangements were reaching a conclusion, the Carlisle or Blaydon Railway Company also offered to lead the coals for shipping by spout at Hebburn Quay; Budde told the Stanhope and Tyne director of this rival offer, with the result that he obtained a lower price (6/3d per chaldron instead of the original proposal of 6/3½d) for the South Shields line, which
was in any case preferable to Hebburn. The new leading charges, free of fixed annual wayleaves and paid only on actual leadings, amounted to a 4/- reduction per chaldron on the old leading costs:

"in fact it amounts to a renovation of the colliery, and will I trust enable it to live under the greatly changed circumstances of the Trade." \(^\text{31}\)

The circumstances of the trade in the following year prompted Buddie to comment that if it had not been for the new method of shipment, Tanfield Moor "could not have kept its head above water." \(^\text{32}\)

The other basic problem for the colliery, which proved to be beyond Buddie's control, was lack of sufficient demand for its coal. Although pure and of excellent quality, it was soft and so of use only for specialist manufacturing purposes, whose demand was inelastic, however low the price. \(^\text{33}\)

Lack of demand for the Tanfield Moor coals showed itself in low vends and low prices. The Tanfield Moor vends had shown great regularity until about 1817; they then suffered a drop of about 25% and remained more uncertain than previously. \(^\text{34}\) Consequently, underground affairs being entirely satisfactory, Buddie commented, "our prosperity, I conceive, will depend entirely upon the extent of our vend," \(^\text{35}\) After the collapse of the Regulation in 1829, however, although the size of the vend remained on average much the same as in the previous twelve years, it could not be achieved without freighting or other methods of "forcing" it. This was partly due to low London prices so that ship owners were reluctant to load, but also to lack of demand for the coals. \(^\text{36}\) Buddie attempted to remedy the situation by establishing a coasting trade to render the colliery less dependent on the London market; in 1831 he had some success in vending to Scotland but was then undersold, and cut out of the Scottish market in the following year. \(^\text{37}\) The problem therefore continued throughout the 1830s. Buddie's enquiries in 1833 suggested that it was chiefly due to "the general decline of business in London, in the branches of trade in which these coals are used - that is to say, coach-spring making and smith work. The consumers do not grudge the price but they can not take their usual quantity." The vend in this year was only 13,024 chaldrons (compared with 17,130 chaldrons in 1831) and practically the whole of this had to be sent by freighting. \(^\text{38}\) As Buddie commented in 1835, "we were forced to adopt this mode of carrying on our vend during the open trade of 1829, and have been obliged for the most part to
continue it ever since." By now, prices had also fallen so low that they were "losing prices" and consequently, "to have pushed the vend under such circumstances would have been absolutely ruinous. I was glad therefore to work no more coals than was barely necessary to occupy the establishment and allow the workmen a maintenance." 39

Buddle also blamed "the unfortunate fighting year of 1829" for destroying Tanfield Moor's former standing in the London market and permanently lowering its prices which, until then, had been steady for twenty years. 40 In December 1830, London prices were such that to have induced the ship owners to load, the price at the fitting office should have been only 18/- per chaldron which would barely cover costs. 41 Working costs were low but leading costs high, which limited the colliery's competitiveness. In 1827, for example, it had already lost one of its best customers, Whitbread's brewery, to the Marquess of Bute's cheaper coals, and in 1833 Tanfield Lea and other collieries were undercutting it. 42 The further "terrible shock" of open trade in 1831-33, with its general reduction of prices, removed the normal demand for Tanfield Moor coals, and their prices and vend continued to fall. The price regulation on the Tyne in 1833 did little to help as there was still no demand for them at their nominal price of 20/- per chaldron. 43 Early in 1834, the prices obtained when freighting were as low as 15/3½d. By June, matters improved as the Regulation restored in March began to take effect and the ship owners took the full regulated vend at 20/- but the average price for the year was still, as in 1833, a "losing price." 44

In 1834 or 1835, to overcome the problem of fluctuating supply at the London market, when different factors might sell two or three cargoes on the same day, Buddle decided to consign all Tanfield Moor coals to one factor, Messrs. Duke and Hill. As a result, the coals began to sell regularly at their full nominal price (in 1835) of 24/- per chaldron. 45 It was presumably the disruptions in the coal trade of 1829-33 that had prevented Buddle pursuing any earlier this policy of obtaining "the full price for the quantity which the legitimate demand requires." But as Buddle pointed out, the appetite of the market was now so squeamish that extreme care was needed in feeding it. Demand was so limited that it barely kept the workings on a sufficient scale to cover standing expenses. 46
The declining vend had already caused two years of falling profits when Buddie took over the management of the colliery towards the end of 1822. Buddie's measures in 1822-3 included working the pillar-coal in Bushblades waste (under the adjoining royalty, owned by Pontop colliery) in return for draining it with the Tanfield Moor engine, so that by 1825 it supplied two-thirds of the vend; ending the agency on the London Coal Exchange which Clayton had maintained; and introducing his personal attendance and examination of accounts. He apparently had immediate effects, for Pitt wrote that "the produce is so far beyond my expectation." The profits for 1824 were about £5,650, slightly short of Buddie's target but apparently a great improvement on earlier years, for Pitt again expressed his gratitude for Buddie's "extraordinary exertions" and his "real surprise" at the results of the year. The profits for 1826 were affected by increased costs; those for 1827 threatened to be badly affected by the extremely languid state of the summer trade, but unusual demand at the end of the year brought them up again to nearly £6,000. The open trade of 1829 and 1831-2 then destroyed these advances: net profit in 1829 was £107; in 1830 £1,358 and in 1833 there was a loss of £774.

Pitt appears to have been in perpetual financial difficulties even before the colliery troubles in the 1830s. When he died in 1836 it was probable that the colliery would have to be sold as it was mortgaged for £53,000 and interest on the mortgage was in arrears; Buddie valued it at about £21,478 for the present working division, and observed that,

"from the great quantity of coal remaining to be worked in this colliery, I should consider it more an object of speculation, than a subject for valuation, on which account it is that I have advised the sale to be attempted by sealed tenders. Those who look merely to immediate profit will only offer a low price, while those who speculate on the future will offer more liberally."

Apparently nothing more was done about the sale until 1838, when Buddie and John Clayton agreed to join one of the factors, Sir James Duke, in purchasing it if it could be obtained for £15,000 or £16,000. The sale at last took place in 1841, under a decree in Chancery, apparently to satisfy Pitt's creditors. Buddie and Clayton fixed their limit at £13,000 but Buddie wrote to Lord Londonderry after the sale, that Berkley, "the bankrupt corn merchant" who had "again made a fortune by the sliding scale" had bought it for £16,800.
Buddle's only regret, as he told Duke, in their not becoming the purchasers, was "that it might lessen that degree of cordial business connexion which has so long existed between us to mutual satisfaction." Buddle was glad to hear that Berkley was retaining Duke as the factor, but thought that,

"you have a very sombre prospect before you and I really cannot anticipate your being able to maintain that preference for the Tanfield Moor coals which they have hitherto maintained. This consideration makes me feel perfectly satisfied that we were not the purchasers...It seems very clear that the race of ruin has commenced amongst the soft coal collieries, and when it is to end and how it is to end who can tell?"?

The colliery, however, was closed only in 1947.
John Buddie, Colliery Viewer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERMS</th>
<th>VALUATION OF COLLIERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>£5,000 to 10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. The above is exclusive of Travelling Expenses.

- Inspections, underground: £5 5 0
- Ditto, aboveground: £3 3 0
- Consultations: £1 1 0
- Written Opinion: £2 2 0
- Copy of Boring, or Report: £1 1 0
- Time spent in Travelling, per Day: £2 2 0
- Making Estimates, and valuing: £3 3 0
- Colliery Stock, per Day: £0 0 0

N.B. (in bold)
Chapter VII

Consultant Viewer and Engineer

When Buddie was appointed to the management of Lord Stewart's collieries in 1819 he had behind him twenty years' practice as a colliery viewer. The foundations of his career had been laid at Wallsend, his father's first important appointment, but this management post had been the exception in the younger Buddie's experience; before his employment as Londonderry's colliery agent, "nothing 'till then of sufficient magnitude offered, as my independent profession was both more agreeable and profitable to me, than tying myself up to the management and mere agency of any - even the most extensive colliery on either River, your lordship's or Mr.Lambton's excepted."

Buddie's "independent profession" consisted of several permanent salaried posts as viewer or check-viewer to local collieries; innumerable commissions for viewing or advising on a particular occasion; spasmodic calls from certain colliery owners outside the north-east who invariably looked to Buddie for specialist help in crises; and occasional opportunities for involvement in non-colliery engineering. Although Buddie told Londonderry in 1823 that since his employment at the Vane-Tempest collieries he had "declined several of my regular professional engagements and nearly all occasional business - certainly all but some of my oldest commitments," he continued to undertake quite extensive work, probably representing choice commissions for many of which Buddie specified the conditions under which he would accept the work, such as using his assistants for the more routine tasks. The north-east had long been a source of temporary specialist help for less advanced coal-fields and it remained so in the first half of the nineteenth century; the reputation of such men as Buddie, Matthias Dunn and T.Y.Hall attracted calls for help from coal-fields as far apart as Wales and Scotland; America and Russia; France, Spain and Portugal. Locally, it was normal for leading viewers not only to undertake individual views or valuations, but also to hold several regular salaried posts, to such an extent
that an anonymous writer was prompted to comment to Londonderry after Buddie's death, "what is call'd a head viewer, contrives to obtain so many appointments, that he can never be intimately acquainted with the minutiae of any concern he pretends to manage." It was probably unusual for a capable viewer not to develop such a practice - Matthias Dunn obviously considered it so when he commented that Thomas Smith of Lambton "never aspired to extensive practice as a general viewer." From a purely practical view, such appointments provided the bread-and-butter for viewers as they possibly did for other engineers. Thomas Sopwith (1803-79), for example, was anxious to obtain "a fixed appointment as a sort of nucleus in ones profession, which in respect of desultory engagements seems almost at a universal and general standstill." On a lesser local scale, it appears to have been possible for viewers lower in the hierarchy to undertake occasional special commissions in addition to their normal salaried posts. In 1840, for example, Buddie on behalf of William Russell, the owner of Wallsend and Washington collieries, appointed George Hunter, resident viewer at Londonderry's collieries, and Thorman, another employee of Londonderry's, to value the Washington stock for Russell; and some years earlier, Hunter had at least considered the possibility of attending occasionally at Hetton to supervise the underground workings while still employed full-time by Londonderry.

**Head Viewer**

Several of Buddie's salaried posts as viewer were at collieries in which he owned a share - Benwell (1803-43), Heaton (1807-21), Sheriff Hill (1804-10), Backworth (1813-31) and Elswick (1804-43). He was also viewer at some time for at least three or four other Tyne collieries (in addition to Wallsend and Tanfield Moor which he managed) - Percy Main, Hebburn and Jarrow. Buddie's connection with Percy Main, in which his friend, Humble Lamb, was a partner, began in 1802 when he received £200 for attending during a winning; he continued as viewer at the same salary at least until 1810 and probably until his death. Buddie apparently became viewer at Hebburn at about the same time, receiving an annual salary of £150 from the end of 1803, although his view books survive only from 1808 or 1809. At the beginning of 1810, Matthias Dunn was appointed assistant viewer; in July Buddie gave notice of his intention to relinquish the viewing at the end of
the year (his reason is not known) and a resident viewer was appointed, a post to which Dunn succeeded in 1813. Some years later, the Hebburn Company agreed to allow Dunn to continue as their viewer although he had recently undertaken the superintendence of another Tyne colliery. Hebburn was apparently run by a Board of owners, and despite his notice of resignation in 1810, Buddie was still involved in its meetings in the 1820s until, in 1826, the lessor, Cuthbert Ellison, intending to work the colliery himself, gave notice that he would not renew the lease on its expiry in the following year. Buddie became viewer at Jarrow in 1811, a few years later than at Percy Main and Hebburn, at a salary of £300, remaining its viewer at least until 1830; viewing arrangements were perhaps subsequently revised for in 1832 the owner, Thomas Brown, accepted Buddie's offer to give advice to the resident viewer at a fee of £50 p.a.

Buddie's cash books indicate that he was also viewer to Cowpen colliery, at least in 1801-2, at a salary of £100 p.a., and to Walker colliery, at least from 1806 to 1808 at a salary of £150. In 1802 he also received £120 salary from the Dean and Chapter; his father had been appointed their viewer 1800 and Buddie was assisting in views and reports for them in 1803-4 but there is no evidence to suggest that Buddie viewed for them in later years, and in 1816 Thomas Fenwick began a long career as their viewer. Dunn mentioned none of these posts when he listed the collieries at which Buddie was viewer in 1812. On the Wear, Buddie was also viewer to Washington colliery, belonging to Russell, the owner of Wallsend.

In addition, Buddie was check-viewer for two Tyne coal owners, protecting their interests as lessors of the coal: Ralph Riddell for Kenton and Coxlodge (at a salary of £21 in 1808) and the Reverend John Collinson for Felling and Tyne Main.

Buddie was evidently justified in telling Londonderry that his private practice as a viewer was more profitable than any one management post. His salary and allowances from Londonderry in 1819 were about £900 p.a.; in 1805, however, he was already earning salaries of over £750 in addition to fees for "sundry views." The salaries probably included Percy Main (£200 p.a.), Hebburn (£150), Benwell (£200) and Wallsend (£200). Two years later he could add £100 for Elswick, £200 for Heaton and £150 for Walker - an income of £1200 for regular viewing salaries alone.

All these posts dated from early in Buddie's career. His
appointment as Londonderry's manager did not cause him to relinquish those he still held and in the 1830s he even added to them. In 1830, Jonathan Backhouse, brother of Londonderry's Sunderland banker, asked Buddie to take on the post of "manager" at his Black Boy colliery, in the south of Durham, visiting the colliery two or three times a year to direct the agents during Backhouse's two-year absence in America on a Quaker preaching tour. Buddie told Londonderry that, "altho' God knows I have more to manage than I can get thro' even by working myself almost to death," he "deemed it politick" to accept the appointment, as Jonathan Backhouse tended to soften his brother Edward's stringent attitude to Londonderry's finances. Two years later, the Stanhope and Tyne Railway Company accepted a proposal by Buddie to be their general superintendent and mining engineer at a salary of £200. Buddie had only just described the Company to Londonderry as "a parcel of gulls in London, with empty sculls and fat purses" but he served it efficiently for over ten years. In 1837, on Thomas Fenwick's dismissal after twenty-nine years' service, Buddie became viewer to the Bishop of Durham, in delayed succession to his father.

With the minor exceptions of some of the Dean and Chapter work and Washington colliery, and the later additions of Black Boy and the Bishop's mines, all these posts were on the Tyne.

From 1806 to 1819, however, Buddie was also viewer for the collieries on the Wear owned by John George Lambton (1792-1840), later first Earl of Durham. His father in 1800 had entered on the inspection of the Lambton collieries, on behalf of the trustees of the late William Henry Lambton [died 1797] during the minority of his heir. Buddie succeeded his father in the post on the latter's death in 1806 and remained in it even after John George Lambton came of age, relinquishing it only when he was appointed manager of Lord Stewart's collieries in 1819. His salary was £150 p.a. — £50 less than for some of his other viewing posts. According to Buddie, Lambton's collieries were the only ones, apart from Lord Londonderry's, that would have tempted him into management or agency rather than into viewing. In fact, he never became manager of the Lambton collieries — Dunn variously described him as merely "viewer" or "consulting viewer" but his position there is worth considering in some detail. In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the Lambton and Vane-Tempest collieries led the Wear coal trade neck and neck, far ahead of the rest.
Chapter VII

of the field; the Lambton post was Buddie's first venture into a large concern composed of several distinct collieries; but, while preparing him in this respect for his later career with Lambton's, rival, it also involved him in professional relationships unlike any he encountered elsewhere.

The Lambton Collieries:

Since 1784 the Lambton collieries had been worked by undertakers, or subcontractors. This system had been tried at the Vane-Tempest collieries between 1799 and 1809 but with two or three minor exceptions it was otherwise quite abnormal in the north-east coalfield.21

The principal Lambton collieries were Pelton Fell or Flatts, leased from the Bishop of Durham and let as a separate concern to Messrs. Martindale and Ramsay as undertakers; and Lumley (leased from the Earl of Scarborough), Penshaw, Lambton, Harraton and Burnmoor, worked until 1803 by Featherstonhaugh and Company and from 1803 by Fenwick and Company.22 Little is known about the Lambton undertakers. The undertakers' accounts and Buddie's view-books clearly name the undertakers at Pelton Fell as Martindale and Ramsey or Ramsay, but the latter might well be the Ramshaw who, according to Matthias Dunn, "was many years connected with Mr. Martindale" in working the colliery. This was apparently James Ramshaw who had been an overman before becoming a viewer; his son Thomas became "an assistant viewer to Mr. Thomas Smith at Lambton colliery till the time of his death about 1812. He was much patronised by Mr. John Buddie and frequently accompanied him to views and the making of reports." This could accord with Buddie's mention of Thomas Ramsay's death in 1810.24 At least one of the Lambton undertakers, therefore, came from a family of viewers. Of the others, Featherstonhaugh may have been a Sunderland glass-manufacturer and magistrate and may have owned shares in Heaton colliery on the Tyne, with the Fenwicks; Martindale may well have been the Secretary of the Wear Coal Trade.25

Buddie had already been involved by his father in viewing at Lambton and in examining the undertakers' accounts, and within the first few months of his own appointment, he went down at least eleven of the pits, recording full details of the strata, state of the roof, measurements of the workings, rates of wages and estimates of remaining coal. Each March or April he ascertained the price per chaldron to
be paid to the undertakers for the previous year, based on an examination of the working expenses; he also checked the cash-books against the vouchers and examined and closed the undertakers' accounts.  

Four well-known viewers who had been acquainted with several north-eastern collieries (including Lambton's) which had been let to undertakers, summarised the division of responsibility between owner and undertakers as "placing in the hands of the contractor not only the seams of coal but the care, charge and management of the air and water courses etc...with the whole of the live and dead stock." Inevitably, however, the presence of efficient professional viewers at Lambton, headed by the Buddies, meant that there was a great deal of consultation between the undertakers and the owner's viewers. Buddie attended at the collieries approximately every two weeks and he himself was responsible for providing the initiative in certain important spheres. 

His view-books show that his advice was sought by the undertakers when problems arose with underground drainage (which was the undertakers' responsibility) and that his influence was also felt in what was apparently the sphere of the undertakers, when he recommended leaving a barrier in case the pillars should later be wrought; or when he suggested an alteration in the size of the wall and board workings. His frequent involvement, often including an underground examination, may have been caused by the fact that the difficult winnings of the Wear coal-field encouraged the undertakers to consult Buddie's technical expertise to a greater extent than may have been required under their contract, but it suggests also that the relationship between the colliery owner (or his viewer) and his undertakers in the north-east was fundamentally different from that in areas such as Staffordshire where the undertaking system was more usual.

As at the Tyne collieries for which Buddie was viewer, he worked in co-operation with resident viewers; their presence alongside the undertakers confirms that in the north-east it was not the absence of a pool of viewers that encouraged the survival of the undertaking system. Buddie's view-books mention the viewers - Thomas Smith, Thomas Croudace and Thomas Crawford - only occasionally but they were men of some note. The eighteenth century viewers at Lambton had been of mixed repute but towards the end of the century the collieries were supervised by the famous Smith family, in particular Edward Smith junior (c.1728-1808) who, like his father was a celebrated
mathematician, a scholar with an understanding of engineering, as well as a great practical viewer. The viewer contemporary with Buddle was Thomas, the son of Edward Smith junior, who had succeeded his father in the Lambton collieries "at a very early age" and was the most successful of five brothers trained as viewers. As his former apprentice, Matthias Dunn, later described him, "he was esteemed a first rate practical man and a good scholar." Dunn went on to say that "a great part of Mr. Smith's life was spent in the service of Messrs. Fenwick and Co.," the undertakers, so it is probable that Buddle exercised a general supervision for Lambton, while Smith was concerned with the routine operations of the coal work. Like the other viewers, he remained at Lambton after the undertaking ceased and was succeeded, according to Dunn, by one of his colleagues, Thomas Crawford. Buddle's later relations with the Lambton collieries, in the 1820s, were conducted mostly with the third viewer, Thomas Croudace, who was evidently responsible for Lambton's Coal Trade affairs. In 1817 Croudace described himself as having been Lambton's agent at the collieries for the past twenty years and "receiver and manager" for the last three.

Buddle's relationship with the owner of the collieries was infrequent and largely nominal. Until 1813, his highest responsibility was to the sole acting trustee under William Lambton's will, and guardian of his heir: the family solicitor, Thomas Wilkinson, of Dinsdale, near Darlington. Buddle met him usually once a year in April, when the terms of the contract with the undertakers were being decided and the year's accounts closed. Apparently any reports that Buddle made at these meetings were only verbal (although the detail in his note-books would ensure that he had an accurate record on hand), for in 1810 when he drew up a special report for Wilkinson, he suggested that in future a yearly report would be advisable.

Buddle's report to Wilkinson in 1810 was "to endeavour to account for the comparatively small profits which the Lambton collieries have produced for several years past." In it, he hinted at a possible reason for the introduction of the undertaking system: that is, the pressure of competition. The High Main seam - at a moderate depth, thick, easy to work, and of high quality - had been over-worked at a time when rivals were fewer and sales almost unlimited, with the result that nearly the whole vend now had to be supplied from the lower seams (which were both inferior in quality
and more expensive to work) and "that preference which was necessary to enable the Lambton collieries to obtain their accustomed vend could with difficulty be maintained." It is not clear, however, whether the effects of this competition had been felt before William Lambton first let to undertakers in 1784. The situation was strikingly similar to that which Buddie was to find a few years later at Lord Stewart's neighbouring Penshaw colliery.34

As causes of the falling profits, Buddie was chiefly concerned with "the immense increase in price on every article of colliery consumption, as well as on the price of labour," during the Napoleonic wars. The viewers who reported on the undertaking system generally, in 1814, emphasised that "there are certain things continued to be done at the owner's expense" and these included not only capital outlay on new sinkings, new machines and new waggonways, but also increases in working prices, extra binding money paid to the pitmen, and corn for the horses and the workmen's bread when it rose above a certain price.35 All these items rose steeply around the turn of the century. Increases in the price of timber, ropes, horses and wages were such that it was generally estimated in the trade that working charges had increased by 3/- to 3/6d. per chaldron in the two or three years up to 1800. Binding money and corn prices also rose steeply. In 1800 the binding money was £4,000 and in 1804 nearly £6,900 above normal. Oats for the horses in 1800 cost over twice the price per quarter at which Lambton had to meet the excess, with the result that Lambton had to pay over £4,000 towards them. In 1801 Lambton's subsidy on his workmen's bread-corn was costing him £5,278 - an increase of about £1,400 since the previous year. Hay for the horses increased in price by £2,000 in the same year.36 It was thus the price increases on articles of consumption that accounted for the greater part of £17,500 that Lambton's trustees had to expend in 1800 over the price agreed with the undertakers, and these prices continued to rise in the following years.

During the period 1800-1809, the total expenditure above the price paid to the undertakers was about £100,000. Of this, about £65,100 "may fairly be considered as involved in stock, and in extending the colliery concerns of the family," that is, buying pumping engines to clear the exhausted upper seams; sinking new pits to the lower seams; and building workmen's houses. In 1804-6 the increase in stock during Featherstonhaugh's contract was valued
at over £18,000, largely because "the use of machinery for drawing coals was generally adopted" during his undertaking.

The price to the undertakers was of course adjusted to take into account their increased working costs; it rose from 11/8d in 1800 to 14/10d in 1809, of which only about 4d was the undertakers' allowance. This increase in costs was not off-set, however, by an increase in selling price, and the presence of the undertakers does not appear to have hedged the owner of the collieries against fluctuations in trade. In 1807, for example, as the undertakers' price was rising, profits were "materially lessened" by a reduction of 4/-per chaldron, which had been found necessary to compete with "illicit practices" of other Wear coal owners in vending their coals. Low prices affected profits even more than did the high price of materials, particularly after 1805, when Buddie was one of the prime movers in the combination of the coal owners to stop subsidising the workmen's corn and to reduce binding money. The problem of low prices continued at least until March 1809 when the Trade took measures to regulate the vend, resulting at Lambton in a reduction of workings and therefore of expenditure. In the meantime, however, the poor state of the trade and the high price of timber, combined with difficulties in working, had caused the abandonment of a new winning at Penshaw which had been planned to secure a new supply of High Main coal and to render the colliery independent of Sir Henry Vane's pumping engine. The presence of the undertakers was of no benefit in these circumstances. In the words of the viewers who reported on the system in 1814, the list of items for which the owner remained liable, "keeps the door open and brings charges on the colliery considerably more than was in the outset imagined, or could be guarded against."

In 1813 John George Lambton came of age. Probably as a result of Buddle's report on the declining profits, Lambton decided in July 1812 to try to let the collieries. In September, however, he delayed advertising them and at the end of the year decided to take them into his own hands. The need to provide a management structure to take over from the undertakers appears to have received a cautious and cumbersome response. Lord Stewart, taking over from his wife's trustees, appointed Buddle to virtually sole control and played a most active part himself. Lambton, on the other hand, taking over from his guardians, empowered a Frenchman, Count Soepeaux, who had
been befriended by his father in France in 1785, "to manage his affairs," and established a system of Colliery Boards. It was an unusual arrangement, at least in such a formal shape. The meetings were held monthly or less frequently, usually at Lambton Hall; the Board consisted of Count Scepeaux, Smith, Croudace and Buddie, and occasionally Lambton. The Board dealt with a wide variety of matters, from rents to fairly routine underground operations or technical decisions - the type of issues that, a few years later, Buddie was competently handling alone for Lord Stewart. On the other hand, there are indications that, despite the clumsiness of the structure, management at Lambton was by no means stagnant: in 1814, for example, a locomotive was introduced on the waggonways, designed by William and Edward Chapman. Buddie was probably directly responsible for this advance as the Chapmans had first tried their engine at Heaton where Buddie was also viewer.

The system of Colliery Boards was still in operation when Buddie left the Lambton collieries in 1819. It was only in 1823 - ten years after Lambton had taken the working of the collieries into his own hands - that Buddie noticed that "Mr. Lambton is just beginning apparently to become very active and attentive to his colliery affairs," and he clearly detected weaknesses in the Lambton management throughout the 1820s, lasting until Henry Morton, the agent, and Stephenson, the auditor, were given effective control at the end of the decade. Matters proceeded fairly smoothly until the death of Thomas Croudace in February 1827. A few months later Buddie noted the appearance of Stephenson as auditor in overall control, but throughout 1828, writing to Londonderry, he reported fluctuations in the authority of certain members of the Lambton hierarchy: dismissal for incompetency followed by reinstatement, resignations followed by a return to favour, and friction between one of the older agents and the newcomer Stephenson. In July 1828 one of the Lambton fitters who had just resigned, told Buddie that "Lord Durham's executive at the collieries is in a great state of confusion," and nine months later the situation had hardly improved:

"For once Lord Durham has told the truth, he is certainly in a deplorable state. The only man who really knows anything about the interior and home departments is old Tommy Smith the viewer, but he is completely hors de combat and in a dying state. He has not been a writer, nor are any of the staff record writers. Smith has everything in his head, but when he dies all his information will
go to the grave with him," Lord Durham shows a deplorable want of understanding, sense, tact, or knowledge of business, not to endeavour at least to appoint a more efficient staff, and to establish proper discipline and subordination in it."

Consultant Viewer

It was normal for resident or head viewers to call in independent colleagues on a particular occasion (just as Buddie instructed four well-known viewers to investigate the explosion at Wallsend in 1835), and Buddie undertook numerous such commissions for a single view and report, although after his appointment to the Londonderry concerns he found it necessary "in a great degree, to give up my desultory viewing and engineering business." Coal owners, as well as viewers, instructed him to make views or valuations - in 1825, for example, Buddie was "pulled about and worried on all sides for valuations etc, from miserable coal-owners, in the present wretched state of the trade." Occasionally pitmen, too, sought his services, as in 1837 when Killingworth pitmen asked him to act as referee in a dispute with their viewer about the number of lights in an underground tram-way - a request which involved an inspection at five o'clock in the morning.

Trade rivalry had no effect on this type of technical co-operation; Croudace, the Lambton viewer, sought Buddie's help in 1825 in dealing with the dangerous state of Newbottle pit; in 1830 Buddie was assisting Morton, the Lambton agent, "in a neighbourly way, in some knotty points"; in 1833, when Londonderry and Hetton were completely at loggerheads in Coal Trade affairs, one of the Hetton viewers asked Buddie to view a pit which was "a nest of troubles"; and in 1837 Buddie was called up at two o'clock in the morning by a Hetton viewer when fire broke out in one of the pits, and he spent the next few hours at Hetton advising on how to proceed. The fact that Buddie was Londonderry's agent did not prevent Lord Durham's instructing him to view and report on his collieries in 1835 when he was contemplating a withdrawal from the industry - a report which involved financial as well as technical investigations. Nevertheless, Londonderry apparently worried that "any little collateral business of that nature" should distract Buddie from his duty to Londonderry's concerns.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that a view of a rival's mines could be of great interest. In 1824, as Hetton colliery was...
gathering strength, Buddie was asked to view the colliery by one of the Hetton lessors who suspected he was being cheated by the lessees; although particularly busy at the time, Buddie could not resist this "peep into the enemy's camp." In 1841, when Londonderry hinted at sending an independent viewer to investigate his collieries, Buddie warned that Londonderry "ought to consider what the consequences of exposing the situation and powers of the collieries thus may be, in the position they hold in the Trade." Nevertheless, Buddie, like Londonderry, was writing under stress on this occasion. In fact his Hetton view convinced him of Hetton's great potential, which he publicly mentioned. The frequency with which viewers and coal owners sought outside expert help from other viewers demonstrates that the profession was scrupulous in preserving its independence.

Work Outside the North-East

Several of Buddie's most important connections with collieries in other parts of Britain dated, like much of his local work, from the first decade of the century, indicating that his reputation at that time was already widespread.

There were long-standing links between the Cumberland coal-field and the north-east of which one of the best known benefits was the invention of "coursing the air" by James Spedding (d.1788), manager of the Lowther family's collieries at Whitehaven and Workington. By the early nineteenth century, John Peile, later assisted by his son Williamson, was viewer to the Lowthers (Earls of Lonsdale), and at this period the flow of technical help appears to have been in the opposite direction. In 1807, for example, Buddie was advising Peile on the introduction of cast-iron railways and roily wheels underground; in 1809, at the Earl's request, Buddie viewed and reported (with Thomas Ramsey, his protegé at Lambton) on a feeder of water at Whitehaven; in 1815 he spent two days at Whitehaven supervising measures against a pit fire. On the latter occasion Peile asked Buddie, not only for his "personal advice with all possible dispatch," but also to recommend and send an under-viewer and a waste-man. In the same year, Peile hoped to spend a week in the north-east looking at Buddie's various colliery improvements, in particular the new locomotive at Heaton. Whether or not the visit was made, Buddie arranged for Crowther to make a locomotive for Peile according to Chapman's design, but it was apparently unsuccessful at Whitehaven.
Buddle's advice also caused Peile to introduce Davy's recently invented safety-lamp into the Whitehaven pits and to explore the possibilities of underground engines. In the 1820s Peile continued to seek Buddle's advice on fire-damp, working pillars, looks on the Davy lamps and on obtaining experienced overmen and deputies from the north-east. Buddle also gave advice in a dispute over a lease of coal at St. Bees, and in 1838 he was consulted on the deep winning of coal under the sea in the Howgill division of Whitehaven colliery.

At the neighbouring Workington colliery, the owner, J. C. Curwen, also consulted Buddle, at least from 1814, when Buddle made several underground inspections for him. In 1816 a new pit was planned and was named after Buddle; nearly twenty years later, when the colliery had been flooded by the sea, Buddle expected this pit to "form the key to the renovation of the colliery." Matthias Dunn had apparently some responsibility for the management of the colliery at this time, for during a dispute with Buddle as to the cause of the breaking-in of the sea, he accused Buddle of trying to oust him from the management and "taking the money out of country gentlemen's pockets." Buddle had certainly been involved, shortly after the flooding, in the appointment of a "principal colliery manager" and the virtual pensioning-off of the existing viewer.

Buddle's other spheres of influence were in Scotland and Wales. From about 1814, he was involved almost every year in making inspections and giving advice for the 7th Earl of Elgin (1766-1841), one of the most energetic of Scottish coal owners, operating his own collieries in Fife. The Earl himself corresponded with Buddle on plans for his Urquhart colliery and on general colliery affairs; Elgin's viewer in the 1810s, William Gafton, reported progress to Buddle and requested his advice, and attributed to Buddle "the superintendence and giving the principle direction in Lord Elgin's colliery under my management." Elgin found it difficult to obtain locally "such a viewer as could give advice (as in the case of your great concerns) by continual superintendence" - but in 1822-23, apparently as a result of a suggestion by Buddle some years earlier, he appointed "a young man conversant with colliery matters" who could "make the regular measurements before each pay, and such a report as to keep me constantly up to the proceedings of the day." Nevertheless, in 1822 he borrowed an underviewer from Buddle for a few weeks, and in 1823 he appointed a protege of Buddle's, John Henderson, as viewer; the latter reported to Buddle and acted for some time strictly
on Buddie's instructions, received either by letter or through Elgin when the Earl visited Buddie on his way north, 67 Henderson left Elgin in 1826, finding the Earl "very fickle," but throughout the 1830s Buddie continued to correspond with Elgin, whom he described to Londonderry as "a great friend," and to visit his collieries. 68 In 1840, however, he had to advise that the colliery be let, "considering the over-done and precarious state of the Coal Trade generally," 69

Another Fife coalowner, Lieutenant Colonel Wenyss, also used Buddie, though probably with less regularity. 70 There were also various single commissions in Scotland—eight days viewing John Wanchepe's colliery at Newton near Edinburgh in 1805; acting as umpire in 1839 in a case of trespass between the Duke of Buccleugh and Lord Lothian; reporting in 1840 on a plan for drainage of three collieries near Edinburgh, in which the owners had agreed to co-operate; and helping Colonel Fullarton, owner of Bartonholm colliery in Ayr, when he was involved in a dispute in 1841-2 over flooding in Lord Eglin ton's adjoining collieries. 71

Buddie's reputation in Wales appears to have been established considerably later than in Scotland, although the availability of rail travel was probably as important a factor as any in the growth of his business in Wales in the 1830s. Nevertheless, in 1817 Buddie was consulted by Edward Roscoe, owner of a colliery at Bagillt or Dee Bank in Flintshire, possibly in connection with a recent explosion there. 72 In the early 1840s, Buddie visited the Talacre Coal and Iron Company's collieries at Photon, also in Flintshire, and attended a meeting of the Company in London; his nephew was told that "Buddle might take the management of those concerns in which case I would have to make periodical visits for him," and an overman was sent from the north-east on trial as an "underground bailiff" to the Talacre mines. 73 On the opposite bank of the Dee, Buddie visited Ness colliery to advise on improvements to prevent its being undersold by the North Wales collieries. 74 In South Wales, Buddie went to Swansea in 1832 (a four-day journey) to survey the Duke of Beaufort's colliery at Landore and to negotiate the renewal of his lease. 75 Buddie's strongest connection in the area, however, was with Sir Josiah Guest M.P. (1785-1852), the iron-master and coal owner of Dowlais in Glamorgan. In 1834 Buddie spent two weeks on a view and a further two days estimating and reporting, for which his total fee was £80.16.0d, including travel. He visited Dowlais again in 1840, and in the following year he met with Sir Josiah and Robert Stephenson (acting for Sir Josiah's lessor, the Marquess of Bute) in London for discussions on the renewal of the
Dowlais lease, and subsequently spent some days as a guest at Dowlais Hall while participating in negotiations for the renewal. 

Buddle apparently visited other coal-fields less frequently, possibly because easier workings had less need for expert help from the north-east. His report on collieries near Stockport, Cheshire, in 1827, or his view of two collieries near Wolverhampton involved in a dispute in 1841, were therefore unusual. 

Of a rather different nature was Buddle's involvement in mining in the Forest of Dean. In 1826 the surveyor of the Crown Lands asked Buddle to undertake an inspection and report on the Forest of Dean collieries if the Commission of Woods decided one were necessary. It was a task that appealed to Buddle for, as he told Londonderry, "altho' I have declined business of this sort generally, I should rather like to see a mining country which is entirely new to me...It is always adding to one's stock of professional experience." Apparently nothing came of this suggestion until 1832, when Buddle was asked to make a view and report for the Commissioners of Woods, on the best measures for working the coal and defining the limits of the different workings, and on the value of the Crown's interests. He employed Thomas Sopwith to do the surveys on which his estimates and report were based. This job was doubtless a result of the establishment of a Commission in the previous year to investigate the problem of colliery limits and other matters. The Commission's work resulted in the Dean Forest Mines Act of 1838 under which Mining Commissioners were appointed; Buddle was appointed president or umpire of the three-man Commission. The results of its work, in the Award of Coal Mines in 1841, paved the way for profound changes in the organisation and scale of the Forest's industries.

Work Abroad

There were several notable instances of Buddle's opinion being sought in Portugal, South America, Russia and Nova Scotia. In 1818 he sent one of his assistants to Portugal for six months to survey mines prior to Buddle's writing a report upon them. Some years later Buddle corresponded with Prince Lieven on the coal mines of Russia and "sent a person out to explore the country." A similar procedure was followed when the owner of mines in Virginia approached Buddle for help after a colliery fire in 1839; the owner (Colonel Heth), Buddle, Thomas Sopwith and T.Y.Hall decided to send out six experienced colliers to restore the colliery, to be accompanied by Hall, who achieved great success there.
Three years later, Buddie's advice on mining affairs at the same colliery, with particular regard to a fire in one of the pits, was sought by letter.

In the 1830s Buddie was involved in the General Mining Association's activities at the Sydney and Albion mines in Nova Scotia. As early as 1834 he wrote a report on Sydney colliery, but the majority of the surviving evidence relates to 1839. In that year Buddie acted for the London-based Association - supervising the construction and trials of three locomotives built by Timothy Hackworth at Shildon, engaging enginemen to accompany the locomotives to Nova Scotia, settling a dispute with Hackworth about the quality and cost of turntables sent out to the mines, and so on. The locomotives, three of the first to run in British North America, were named the Hercules, Samson, and John Buddie. Three years later, Buddie was again ordering equipment for shipment, and on occasion he gave technical mining advice.

Non-Colliery Engineering

Buddie was elected a member of the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1832 and he prided himself on being an engineer. He considered colliery viewing a branch of engineering but he also welcomed opportunities to involve himself in other spheres. His most enduring contribution was at Seaham Harbour, where he was involved in engineering as well as in management. This gave him a lasting interest in harbours: Sir Matthew White Ridley consulted him in 1837 on proposed improvements to Blyth harbour, and in 1841 he was retained by the Exchequer Bill Loan Commissioners to report on Warkworth harbour. He took a great interest in any harbours that he found the opportunity to visit and his comments suggest self-confidence in his judgements; Donaghadee he considered "in point of principle seems most defective" and Ardrossan he found "a complete failure in point of traffic." Other minor engineering work arose naturally from his skills as a colliery viewer. In April 1808, for example, he gave advice to the directors of the Thames Archway Company, whose attempts to build a tunnel under the Thames between Rotherhithe and Limehouse proved abortive; he reported on the drainage in the Arkendale lead mines in Yorkshire, and investigated the mineral wells at the Crown Inn at Harrogate and gave evidence for the proprietor, whom rival innkeepers were accusing of damaging the public sulphur well; and on several occasions in 1839-41 advised the Earl of Talbot of Ingestre, in Staffordshire, on his brine springs and salt works.

There is some tenuous evidence to suggest that Buddie was not
an immediate convert to locomotive engines. In 1825, Sir Henry Hardinge, 
Lord Londonderry's friend, had the impression that Buddle "did not think 
they would answer," and in 1830, after the death of Huskisson at the 
opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, Buddle commented to 
Londonderry that he did not think it would be "either safe, prudent or 
advantageous to drive the locomotive engines at the speed talked of." Nevertheless, within a very few years Buddle was taking an enthusiastic 
interest in railways. In 1832, he undertook to "set out" the line for 
the proposed Durham Junction Railway from South Shields to Durham, 
because it lies so exactly in my line of operations, and is besides, the sort of thing which 'I have at my fingersends.' As in the case of 
some of his consultant colliery work, he left surveyors to make surveys, plans and sections, before he proceeded with the engineering side. He urged Londonderry to pursue the idea of a branch to Seaham Harbour; 
Londonderry objected on the grounds of alienating the voters of Sunderland, and a year later, Buddle told Londonderry that "your lordship expressed 
your hostility so decidedly to this measure..that I decided to relinquish 
the engineering of it." The railway was not built and Buddle had to 
advocate under cross-examination in the House of Commons Committee on the 
South Durham Railway (to which the Tyne and Wear Coal Trade, and 
particularly Londonderry, were strongly opposed) that, although he had 
been "consulting engineer in several public railways" he had never laid 
out a public line of railway that had been executed.

Conclusion
The technical achievements of Buddle's career as a viewer are 
outside the scope of this thesis, but although improvements in mining 
technology were not - or have not been considered by historians - as 
big as inventions in, for example, the textile industry, the 
reputation that Buddle gained in his lifetime was a result of his 
technical preeminence, and some of his achievements were of enduring 
importance.

In 1810 Buddle devised a system of dividing the underground 
ventilating current, known as double or compound ventilation - an 
 improvement on James Spedding's system of "couraing the air", introduced 
from Cumberland in the 1760s. As a result, the dangers of ventilating 
furnaces were reduced and the current remained fresher throughout its 
passage. Buddle first tried the system in a new pit at Wallsend and then 
extended it to other collieries under his direction, such as Percy Main,
COURSING THE AIR AND ROBBING THE PILLARS (Barnes’ system)

One main current - has to pass over furnace at upcast shaft.

DOUBLE OR COMPOUND VENTILATION (Buddle’s system)

Main current split at bottom of downcast shaft or in workings.
Dumb drifts conduct explosive return current to upcast shaft without passing over furnace.
Hebburn and Heaton. It was adopted in the Wear collieries within a few years. Towards the end of his life, Buddle was apparently unaware of the improvements on his system made by Ralph Elliott, a viewer at Lord Londonderry’s Penshaw colliery; and since that period the volume and velocity of the currents have greatly increased and the underground furnace has been replaced by surface fans. Nevertheless, the basic principle of Buddle’s split-air system has not been superseded.

In the same year, and again in Wallsend G pit, Buddle introduced the system of panel working whereby solid barriers of coal were left in order to divide the workings into districts within which the pillars could be worked. As a method of increasing productivity and reducing the danger of creeps, it was a great improvement on previous methods of "robbing" the pillars. The Newcastle, or pillar and stall method of working has since tended to be replaced by the longwall or Shropshire system throughout the country, but where it survived into this century, it used Buddle’s system of panel working.

Buddle also played a significant part in testing the inventions of others and in disseminating knowledge of recent improvements - the Davy lamp; Chapman’s locomotive; John Curr’s flat ropes, cast-iron rails and shaft conductors; T.Y.Hall’s tub and slide system for raising coals up the shaft, which on Buddle’s recommendation spread to North America. He was also probably the first to recognise the dangerous part played by dust in underground explosions, which was fully investigated only at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The collieries for which Buddle was viewer did not escape serious accidents, such as the flooding of Heaton colliery in 1815 (75 dead) or the Wallsend explosion in 1835 (102 dead.) A pamphleteer, during the pitmen’s strike of 1831, was clearly thinking of Buddle when he wrote of those who were "troubled with the vision of their own blood-stained guilty consciences" and haunted by "the meagre ghosts" of the Heaton victims. The pamphleteer ignored the fact that such disasters also resulted in disruption of the workings and lost production - after the Wallsend explosion, Buddle was doubtful whether it was worthwhile to restore the colliery; they were not caused by ruthless management, but by the dangers of mining in the deep, fiery collieries of the north-east, despite the skills and experience of viewers such as Buddle.

It is indicative of the extent to which Buddle and the other leading consultant viewers developed mining theory, as well as of their own experience, that they could assess from a distance or during a brief
visit the situation in strange mines, and write reports on the basis of surveys conducted by their assistants. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that Buddle was the tip of the ice-berg: at the beginning of this century, the Durham and Northumberland miners had the reputation of being "some of the finest manual workers in the country" and it is clear that, nearly a century earlier, Buddle was able to call on assistant viewers and ordinary pitmen who were capable, and apparently willing to be sent to Scotland or Wales, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Australia, Sweden or America to apply their own skills to strange mines.
Londonderry Agent: The Situation in 1819

The marriage of Charles William, Lord Stewart (1778-1856) to Frances Anne Vane-Tempest (1800-65) on 3rd April 1819 was a controversial affair. Despite the Lord Chancellor's comment that, "he never recollected a single case in which it was thought prudent that the propriety of a marriage should be made the subject of public discussion," the public had been regaled with details of the Chancery case in which Frances Anne's mother, the Countess of Antrim, supported the proposed marriage, while her daughter's paternal aunt, her other guardian, brought forth arguments against it which embraced objections to Lord Stewart's character, morals and fortune. Of less public interest, but waged with equal conviction by its protagonists, was the controversy over the management of Frances Anne's collieries, which had begun some years before Lord Stewart appeared on the scene and was ended only by his forthright assumption of control over his bride's collieries and his appointment of John Buddle to their management.

Lord Stewart, soldier and diplomat, was a member of the Irish nobility, son of the first Marquess of Londonderry and half-brother of the second (perhaps better known as Viscount Castlereagh) whom he was to succeed in 1822. Frances Anne was the only child of Sir Henry Vane-Tempest who had inherited the combined patrimony of the old Durham families of Vane and Tempest. He had died suddenly in 1813, leaving his daughter, one of the greatest heiresses in England (although "the world supposed her to be three times as rich as she really was," being still under age, a ward of Chancery. The chief value of her estates in Durham lay in her collieries, particularly the freehold one at Penshaw, and that under lease from the Dean and Chapter at Rainton.

As Buddle pointed out later, the collieries at Penshaw and Rainton were in a highly favourable natural situation with hardly any of the normal disadvantages such as excessive water, dykes or inflammable air. Sir Henry Vane-Tempest had let his collieries to undertakers or sub-contractors in 1799 shortly after coming into possession of them,
and the system continued until 1809. The arrangement was not a success for the undertakers. The first undertaker, Lewis Legg, a viewer at Rainton, "lost a considerable sum of money" through his contract; he was followed in 1801 by Longridge, Leviss and Watkin and in 1804 by Croudace and Watkin. Sober Watkin was a well-known viewer but his undertaking also was a financial failure, and his successors, Longridge and Pringle, ended in bankruptcy in 1809. The system was probably not particularly profitable for Sir Henry although he did try in 1809 to find new undertakers.

In August 1813, only four years after the end of the undertaking system at the Vane-Tempest collieries, Sir Henry died. The collieries were placed under the control of a Master in Chancery and as Arthur Mowbray, the colliery manager during Frances Anne's minority, later commented,

"matters in general, when placed in the Court of Chancery, pass slowly on...and coal-mines, in their nature being a very fluctuating property and little understood in London, have made those concerns during the minority very complexed."

It was not until March 1814 that the Master approved carrying on the collieries; Mowbray, a banker and land agent who had been employed by Sir Henry since the 1790s, was appointed manager and receiver. Meanwhile, Thomas Laverick, since 1798 viewer and resident agent to Sir Henry, died. He had been a reputable viewer, "brought up about Bushblades with old Mr. Buddle"; he had represented Sir Henry's interests while the collieries were let to undertakers and then had taken over their management when the undertaking ended in 1809. Arthur Mowbray admitted to Frances Anne's uncle, Michael Angelo Taylor, in January 1815, that since Laverick's death, no effectual direction had been given to the collieries and that "many impediments," including the loss of fitters to other coal owners, "materially interfered" in their management.

Shortly afterwards, however, in August 1815, Mowbray was bankrupted by the failure of the Durham Bank in which he was a partner. The Master decided that Mowbray should continue as manager, but that a separate receiver should be appointed. Subsequent disputes between Mowbray and the receiver caused Mowbray, apparently forgetful of what he had said in January 1815 about the lack of direction after Laverick's death, to exaggerate his own role in retrospect. A list he made of his duties covered the entire range of colliery management, though arranged in a haphazard manner and including technical matters, which were obviously (though perhaps not to the Master in Chancery) the
In later years he specifically stated that, until his bankruptcy, he had had "the entire management" of the collieries for about eighteen years. The Master in Chancery supported Mowbray's claims: he had continued Mowbray as manager after his bankruptcy in view of his "great skill and experience" and his "judgement and success" in the management of the collieries.

Mowbray's claims were vigorously rebutted, however, by Lady Antrim and various expert witnesses when friction between Mowbray and the receiver, John Gregson, came to a head in 1818. Gregson and several viewers testified that Mowbray "was very seldom at the collieries when worked by undertakers," other than to make the contract with them "under Mr. Buddle's and Mr. Laverick's advice...which was all the care and superintendence he could possibly bestow" being only a land agent and banker; Sir Henry had thought highly of Laverick and the latter had had the immediate management of the collieries; Mowbray's activities were limited to the conduct of relations with the Coal Trade and the fitters.

The proposed alternative to Mowbray in 1818 was that John Buddle be appointed manager and receiver. Buddle's father had helped his old colleague, Laverick, in arrangements with the undertakers at the turn of the century and Buddle himself had been instructed in 1817 as a consultant, so that, as Lady Antrim's solicitor, Whitton, later commented, "he knows the collieries of Lord Stewart underground well." His reputation as a leading viewer was already well-established and it was perhaps significant that he probably already knew John Gregson, the dismissed receiver, through their mutual connections with the Russells of Brancepeth. Nevertheless, apart from a note in his cash book of a fee from Lady Frances Anne for eighteen days in London in April 1818, "when sent for by Mr. Whitton respecting the management of the collieries", Buddle's own papers reveal nothing of the controversy nor of the possibility of such an appointment.

The affidavits in support of Mowbray's dismissal and Buddle's appointment capture, to an unusual extent, the state of contemporary thought on the qualifications for and duties of colliery management. Gregson considered it a strong point against Mowbray that he had not been "brought up" in colliery management, and the draft affidavit of a colliery agent declared that not only had Mowbray insufficient judgement, knowledge and experience in colliery management but moreover "nor can he...acquire the same." Buddle, on the other hand, was "esteemed
to be of superior knowledge skill and information in the management of collieries," for "from his early education and habits" he was well acquainted with general colliery business, and "most particularly well qualified to direct... the workings of a colliery underground from his early education and introduction thereto by his father." At this time Buddie was forty-five years old, and his father had been dead for twelve years: such was the lasting importance of early training. In contrast to Mowbray, Buddie was "justly esteemed to be a very skilful engineer and miner," and his technical proficiency also had a bearing on the management of the work force. Finally, the viewers' affidavits declared that Buddie, unlike Mowbray in his present "dependent situation," was, "well informed with the concerns of life and peculiarly well qualified to deal with the fitters of the coals."^1

The Master, however, dismissed both Mowbray and Gregson, but immediately re-appointed Mowbray as manager and brought back Thomas Bigge, who had held the office for a few months in 1815-16, as receiver.22 Mowbray was therefore still manager of the collieries when Frances Anne married Lord Stewart in April 1819. Six days after the wedding, William Groom, one of Lord Stewart's many legal advisers, told him that he had received a letter from Bigge's brother, who was an old school-friend of Groom's, "recommending Mowbray in the strongest terms"; he urged Lord and Lady Stewart not to act, "until you can see with your own eyes, and understand with your own understanding."23 Groom, however, was too late. Lord Stewart had already acted. Within three days of the marriage, Whitton had received orders to instruct Buddie to value the colliery stock,24 Whitton himself wrote a report on the state of colliery affairs and the disputes about their management, in which he expressed himself greatly in favour of Buddie's replacing Mowbray; in fact, it was against Whitton that Groom's cautions were directed.25 Even so, Lord Stewart's vigorous determination caught Whitton unawares; he advised against the estate survey which Lord Stewart had proposed at the same time as Buddie's valuation of the collieries, until Lord Stewart made it clear that his reasons were "personal" and involved "some of those who have acted in the concerns"; and only ten weeks later, after a row with Lord Stewart over the security for Coutts' loan, Whitton resigned, "to protect myself from further degradation and unjust reproach."26 During April, Lord Stewart also ordered Mowbray to report to him and to "revise" the documents and reports he had made since Sir Henry's death, and he also obtained information and papers from William Vizard, solicitor
to Frances Anne's guardian. The valuation of the colliery stock, which Buddie had begun on 9th April, and a statement of the colliery finances were submitted by John Buddie (for the marriage trustees) and John Iveson (for Lord Stewart) on 31st May. 27

The valuation of the colliery stock by Buddie was clearly a normal temporary commission for a specific task, for Buddie later explained that he had charged his yearly salary as colliery manager from 9th April rather than from 10th June, when he was appointed manager, only because his fees for the valuation would have exceeded the rate of the annual salary on which he was eventually appointed. 28 Already, however, Buddie was taking a wider rôle in the concerns; on his first day at the collieries he asked to see the plans of the workings, which he believed had not been "conducted in the most judicious manner," and within a few days he was anxious to discuss "several important matters" with Lord Stewart and Whitton. 29

In fact, during the first week of June, Buddie submitted a full report on Penshaw colliery; one on Rainton apparently followed a few weeks later. Lord Stewart replied on 9th June, approving Buddie's proposals and adding suggestions of his own - an early indication of the detailed scope of his interest in the collieries. There was already an understanding between Lord Stewart and Buddie on the latter's appointment, for Lord Stewart in this letter suggested paying Buddie with a percentage of the profits. Mowbray was dismissed on the same day, Lord Stewart informing him that "there are radical evils which can only be got the better of by an entire change of system..." 30 The changeover was to be immediate, Lord Stewart being anxious to have it accomplished before he again left England, and although until 1st January 1822 Buddie shared joint management of the collieries with John Iveson, Lord Stewart was already referring to Buddie's "sole superintendence" of the colliery concerns. 31

It was not surprising that Groom, Whitton and, indeed, Mowbray and the viewer, Wood, felt that Lord Stewart's rapid and decisive assumption of control over his bride's collieries was high-handed. 32 Nevertheless, Lord Stewart quite rightly told Mowbray that his decisions had been made after thorough enquiries and examination of documents; if he did not already know, these rapidly would have told him that the greatest problem facing the collieries for the past twenty years had been management. Freeing the collieries from the cumbersome machinery of Chancery could not automatically revive their fortunes;
high-handed or not, Lord Stewart showed more understanding and
determination than had Lambton, in a similar situation, six years earlier,
and certainly more than did William Vizard, who wrote to William Groom
at the end of April 1819, that, as a result of the measures adopted
during the minority of Lady Stewart,

"nothing remains to Lord Stewart but to reap the advantages." 33
The Londonderry Hierarchy

Buddle's first letters to Iveson at the end of June 1819, shortly after his appointment, demonstrate that he was already immersed in providing for the next month's vend, advancing the price of the Wallsend or best coal, and improving the waggonways. For some time, however, he was also concerned with effecting the changes in personnel and establishing management routine.  

Arthur Mowbray took his dismissal with bad grace. Within a few days of beginning his valuation of the colliery stock in April, Buddle had suspected that Watson, Wood and Robson, the viewers, had been instructed by Mowbray not to co-operate with him, and Whitton commented that "the same untoward conduct is now showing itself in Mr. Mowbray by his interference with the agents as hath before been experienced."  

At the beginning of August, Buddle wrote that Mowbray had "refused to deliver up the papers and possession of the desks etc. till he receives an order from the Master in Chancery," and later in the month Mowbray was still at Penshaw, "going dawering about here all the week like a goose cut in the head." Buddle suspected Mowbray of causing dissatisfaction among the fitters, but by late November he had more serious cause for alarm as rumours spread that Mowbray was endeavouring to raise a party to take Hetton colliery to rival the Vane-Tempest concerns.  

Lord Stewart was still prepared to think the best of Mowbray after his long connection with the family, for in February 1820 he hoped to settle his salary arrears (at last fixed at £500 p.a.) and then to "consider further as to the mode of doing something beyond it for him." He expected Mowbray to reciprocate such consideration: "if he even now acts as he ought as an old servant of the family, I should be sorry not to part well."  

Even three years later, Londonderry suggested that Mowbray's loyalty to the family should have extended to securing Hetton for them. But Lambton's agent, Croudace, as well as Buddle, considered that "Mowbray has no feelings towards any human being further than to answer his own views," and although the original impetus behind Mowbray's competition
with the Vane-Tempest collieries faded, Mowbray and the Hetton Company
were to be one of Buddie’s major pre-occupations for many years.6
Buddie and Londonderry rarely spoke respectfully of Mowbray’s character
and ability, but Londonderry later cast envious glances at his ability
to muster shareholders and had learned an early lesson from his success
at Hetton, commenting when the fitting agent was dismissed from
Seaham in 1839, that,

"Care must certainly be taken, as in Mowbray’s case
that the knavish malcontents and delinquents in leaving
our concerns do not revenge themselves by information
or means derived from our employ."7

John Wood, viewer at Penshaw under Mowbray, was asked by
Lord Stewart to co-operate with Buddie, but his allegiance clearly lay
with Mowbray and he left his house and office at Penshaw at the end
of July. By 1824 he had reappeared as agent to Lord Ravensworth and
Partners at Mount-moor colliery, and by 1829 he had joined Mowbray at
the Hetton Company.8 One Dent was then appointed as what Buddie called
"barrack master," his wife also being employed to manage the household,
and during the following weeks Buddie frequently mentioned "mounting
guard" at the colliery office: there apparently was some real fear of
interference by Mowbray.9 The premises at Penshaw consisted of two
neighbouring houses including living accommodation and offices. A new
house was built for Buddie during the 1820s and from 1825 was run by
his widowed sister, Mary Burnett; it was suitable even for entertaining
to lunch a party of thirty-nine members of the nobility and gentry
during Lord Seaham’s coming-of-age celebrations in 1842, and the "lawn"
in front was apparently large enough to be the scene of a dinner given
to 2,000 workmen on the same occasion. The business of the Penshaw
colliery office covered Rainton as well as Penshaw and by 1843 it
employed a book-keeper, cashier and at least four other office-workers
as well as the viewers.10

With Mowbray and Wood out of the way, Buddie had few problems
with the other agents. He paid a correct observance to his joint or
even nominally subordinate status in relation to John Iveson; in the
early months he corresponded only with Iveson, although this was partly
due to Lord Stewart’s absence abroad, and his letters were frequent —
up to ten a month — and detailed. He requested instructions, and he
often expressed his eagerness for consultation, as later with
Lord Stewart himself, but his letters reveal the rapidity and ease with
which he became involved in the Vane-Tempest collieries. Lord Stewart
was delighted with the management of the concerns by Iveson and Buddie, resisting complaints by William Groom about Iveson. After the first few months, Buddie appears to have had some difficulty in obtaining the necessary instructions from Iveson, and Iveson disappeared from view almost completely at the end of 1821; this clearly coincides with Buddie's promotion as sole manager from January 1822.

The overall impression of the agency arrangements in Durham that Buddie now headed is one of economy in both numbers and salaries. Buddie pointed out in 1826 that in numerical force, "our staff is inferior to that of our neighbours," particularly Lord Durham's. The effects were chiefly felt in financial affairs which, even as they grew in complexity, continued to fall on the existing colliery agents, with the result that there were irregularities in accounts and excessive pressure on the agents. In 1829, after a suggestion had been made to Londonderry for improving the system of payments at the collieries, Buddie pointed out that he had recommended in his first report ten years earlier, "the plan of not allowing the same person both to superintend and pay for work, and also of not allowing the same individual both to purchase materials etc. and pay for them," but that "we have never been able to carry it into full effect as it could not have been done without an increase of agents." He cited the case of James Oliver, the colliery farms agent, who had too much out-doors work to do to allow him time to keep regular sets of books and accounts. Technical management was probably less affected; although Buddie complained that money matters and endless letter writing prevented his giving "that attention to my legitimate professional objects...which is satisfactory to myself," he never specifically urged the appointment of a financial or general manager to release him from his non-technical duties. The greater numbers on the Lambton staff did not prevent a serious break-down in the "executive" in 1828-9; Buddie's range of managerial as well as technical competence, and his vast reserves of energy and resilience, were an effective alternative to greater numbers of colliery agents.

Sturgess has claimed that Londonderry's agents' efforts "were amply rewarded"; in fact, their salaries were moderate, or even low, compared with similar professionals not only in the Durham coal-field but elsewhere. This, however, appears not to have had an adverse effect on the concerns. Lord Stewart suggested to Buddie on his appointment that he should perhaps be paid 5% of the net profits; Buddie preferred a salary, for when Londonderry resurrected the proposal seven years later
Buddie replied that,

"If the concerns were my own, I could not do more. I only want a fair remuneration for my professional services."

When a list of the agents' salaries was drawn up in 1839, Buddie's appeared at £800 p.a. with allowances and perquisites which were estimated after his death to make his remuneration worth about £900. It had probably been much the same when Buddie was appointed, for in December 1822 (when the total of his salary at a supposed rate of £800 from April 1819 would have been £2,932) the arrears due to him, with interest, amounted to £2,379, despite the fact that he had on occasion charged £600 for his salary in the pay-bills. Buddie's salary remained in arrears by at least this amount, certainly until the mid-1830s, with his full agreement.

Buddie's immediate subordinate, George Hunter, showed in a similar manner that loyalty to the Londonderry family outweighed financial considerations. He was resident viewer at Penshaw, where the colliery administration was centred, with resident viewers under him at Rainton and Pittington, but he also undertook a great amount of Londonderry's personal financial work. In 1828 his salary was £300 p.a.; by 1839 it had risen to £500 plus allowances. Buddie was clearly not dependent on his salary from Londonderry, and in any case could hardly have found a more demanding and prestigious position; Hunter, however, resisted at least two tempting offers to join other concerns. In 1825 Buddie reported to Londonderry that "a young man, just of Hunter's standing," the viewer at Seghill colliery, had been killed and that Hunter had been offered the post on £450 p.a. with an advance of £100 when the colliery started production:

"He is staggered by the offer, but at the same time has no wish to leave his present situation, in which he is very comfortable. I have therefore desired him to negative this application and to rely on your lordship's consideration."

In 1832 Hunter received an even more tempting offer. This came after at least six months of great strain; Buddie, who himself had been seriously ill and unable to work for four or five months the previous year, was continually warning Londonderry of his "very serious apprehensions" that Hunter was "worrying and fretting himself to death" over his financial work. In this midst of this situation, Hunter was approached by Arthur Mowbray for the Hetton Company, which was in need of a manager with training as a viewer, and was offered £1,260 p.a.
with house, candles, cows and horse. Londonderry came to know of the offer through Buddie who told him that,

"George, has given him [Mowbray] a very proper answer, viz., that your lordship has behaved so handsomely to him and made him so comfortable that he could not think of listening to any proposition of the sort." 22

It may be that other considerations influenced Hunter, such as professional attachment to the collieries which he had known for thirteen years, or preference to working under a manager such as Buddie, to taking on the whole responsibility of a rival concern; the Hetton Company made him further offers to act as a part-time consultant, but Hunter was anxious, "to take no more business in hand than I can do well." The most important influence, however, was loyalty to Londonderry, for when Londonderry took up the matter with Hunter, the latter replied,

"that it is not altogether money that I am anxious for... I have always considered, I had some grounds for placing confidence in your lordship inasmuch as being asked not to leave you but to attach myself to the family and which I promised to do, consequently I am bound to do so, as long as I can remain comfortable." 24

When Buddie died in October 1843, Hunter was under notice to leave the concerns in March 1844 as a result of excessive drinking. Buddie had felt far more annoyed by Hunter's lapses than had Londonderry and by the end of the year, Londonderry was apparently making overtures to "tide on thro' the year 1844." Hunter's letter on the occasion suggests that Londonderry was partly motivated by a reluctance to break connection of twenty-five years, and partly by the fact that he and McDonnell, the trustee, would need Hunter's services. 27 Hindhaugh, the auditor under the Trust, was to take over some of the Coal Trade management but without either Buddie (of whom McDonnell had said that he had a "superiority of intellect...not to be found in any other man") or Hunter (who, Buddie had emphasised, would be extremely difficult to replace), the Londonderry collieries would have been drastically short of technical management. 28

When telling Londonderry of the Hetton Company's offer to Hunter in 1832, Buddie had commented,

"These are really troublesome neighbours, they give their engineers and viewers double the salaries we give, which causes dissatisfaction, Robson has frequently applied to me for an increase, but poor Longstaff says nothing, though greatly underpaid. All this is very uncomfortable." 29

John Robson, the viewer at Rainton (who had evidently survived the...
changeover in 1819) and William Longstaff, the viewer at Pittington, were still working for Londonderry in 1843 despite their dissatisfaction over salaries, which were then £200 and £150.24

The colliery staff increased very little during the twenty years after Buddle's appointment. In 1839 the "management, viewing and agency" staff at Penshaw consisted of Buddle, Hunter, Newby (sub-book-keeper), James Oliver (colliery and farming livestock and corn), Anthony Penrith (book-keeper and sub-cashier), Ralph Elliott (underviewer) and Nathaniel Hindhaugh (the auditor under the Trust). At Rainton there was Robson, the viewer, and at Pittington, William Longstaff, assisted by his son John. In addition, there were John Thorman (engineer, in charge of machinery) and John Bailey (timber measurer). There were then the fitting departments at Sunderland (Tanner and Co. - the fitters - and two men) and at Seaham (fitting agent and two clerks), and the harbour master and his deputy at the Harbour.25 There was apparently no proper fitting office at Sunderland, at least in 1824, the fitters' receipts being managed at a public house, and even in 1843, the Seaham fitting office was at Rutherford's, a public house or shop which also supplied groceries to Seaham Hall.30

Buddle was in frequent contact with the colliery viewers, the Penshaw staff and the agents at Seaham, either by letter or in person. When necessary, correspondence could be rapid, a letter being written and replied to during one day; a boy ("little Dan" or Tom) was employed to carry letters and could be called upon to start before the normal business of the day began or to arrive after Buddle had gone to bed.32 Every fortnight there was the regular "Bill and Council day, when all accounts are examined, pit and engineering plans etc. discussed with viewers and engineer, and orders for stores etc. given at Pensher office."33 This was possibly the fortnightly pay-day which Buddle attended for all the collieries (on the Tyne as well as Londonderry's) with which he was involved. In December 1825, when the banking crisis caused Backhouse to be reluctant about providing money for the pay, Buddle had particular cause to be glad that he had been "at his post."34 A less business-like meeting was the pay-dinner after the monthly pay, at which the viewers and senior agents sometimes entertained a few neighbouring yeomen, tradesmen or fitters.35 Buddle used such occasions to maintain discipline in the hierarchy, to which he attached considerable importance, as has been seen from his condemnation of the break-down in the Lambton management structure in 1828-9. Even at his first pay-
dinner in June 1819 he found "an opportunity of introducing a lecture on discipline." Another regular meeting, at the beginning of each month, was the receipt-day at Sunderland. Fitters paid for the coals they had shipped. Buddle made a point of presiding on the occasion; when detained in London he told Hawkes to attend "to keep up the respectability of the meeting." He was doubtless referring to the dinner at the end of the day's proceedings; after a good receipt on another occasion, "Hawkes told me that they all got fou,. I left them early,.if they do not behave better in future I must look sharper after them." When Londonderry queried the expenditure on pay- and fitters'-dinners, Buddle replied that he thought the expense useless but that they were a custom from "time immemorial." He added that "the presiding at such parties is by no means congenial with my habits and feelings." One young viewer, however, could still remember over sixty years later, that at the dinner which usually followed a "rent or binding day," Buddle would preside and "sometimes be prevailed upon to sing a vernacular song shortly before he left the table," delivering it with great verve in the Tyneside dialect.

Buddle also had considerable contacts with the Durham estates staff. Even when the collieries and the estates were competing for funds when finances were difficult, Buddle's letters to Hawkes, the estate agent, display a friendship and humour rarely found in his other Londonderry correspondence. Buddle had some degree of moral authority even in estate management for when Hawkes had a dispute with a huntsman, Buddle was concerned to maintain "the principles of a well-regulated establishment," and suggested to Londonderry how to reply to the huntsman, while Buddle himself was to tell Hawkes what were Londonderry's feelings. After Hawkes' death in 1827, Buddle was occasionally involved in estate matters. Normally, however, he had little control over the estate staff; he could, for instance, only remonstrate with Londonderry when Prosser, one of the Wynyard agents, suggested increasing the scale of building work at Wynyard, or when he ran up tradesmen's bills. Occasionally Buddle was also in direct communication with Andrews, the agent at Comber in Ireland, but only on the subject of Irish rents promised to Backhouse, the country bankers.

Londonderry naturally used his collieries and estates for electioneering purposes. Buddle disapproved of such expenditure, but
Chapter IX

he headed the colliery hierarchy in this as much as in other spheres, although Gregson, the solicitor, "always mainly directed the electioneering interests." In Londonderry's own words, in electioneering, "the agents and solicitors of the patron are far more important and greater than himself." In 1820, Buddle's role began with the general election of 1820, and his long-standing connection with the Russells of Brancepeth immediately proved useful when he obtained half of Russell's interest for Hardinge, Londonderry's candidate for Durham City. In fact, either Buddle or his father had been responsible twenty years earlier for mustering freemen and pitmen for old William Russell's own electioneering. In 1823, Buddle reported that Russell's support was again available but was kept inconspicuous as a result of Russell's "disgust with the "body of Black Coats" {the Dean and Chapter}. Russell apparently promised his support for Londonderry's new City candidate, Sir Roger Gresley, until Sir William Chaytor, one of the Whig candidates, threatened to oppose Russell in the County contest; consequently Russell adopted a stance of strict neutrality and said his freemen and agents were to act as they pleased. Having made sure of this permission, Buddle promptly took over the task of inducing the freemen employed in Russell's collieries to vote for Gresley, and obtained the backing of Morriss (the viewer at Russell's Washington colliery) and the other agents.

In Londonderry's own collieries, Buddle's primary task was to attach the freemen to Londonderry's interest by giving them employment. To begin with, Buddle showed little aversion to doing so although the task was made difficult by the "prodigious swarm of petty freeholders" in the county who were motivated, Buddle thought, by "downright detestation of the clergy," and "to a man are reformers." In April 1820, Buddle received specific orders from Londonderry to apply "the electioneering resources of the collieries to the increase of the family interest in the city"; Buddle had already been in correspondence with Hardinge about it but was finding it difficult to act quietly because the freemen were so demanding. By the time of the next election in 1823, Buddle was becoming seriously concerned at the expense of electioneering, but immediately after it, Sir Henry Hardinge was instructing Buddle on those to be "petted and considered" at Sunderland, which he considered as second in importance only to Durham itself. Buddle himself was quick to see from the start the opportunities that Seaham gave for employing and housing freemen, as first the quarry and then the harbour and town.
took shape; and he accepted, and even emphasised, that freemen should be given preference when a new schoolmaster at Rainton and new fitters were appointed. By 1830, eighty freemen and twenty influential relations were directly employed, and Londonderry apparently suggested financing young men to gain their freeman status. The pressure of finances now strongly affected Buddle's attitude, but he resented also the way electioneering interfered with good management: "the spunging and impertinence of the freemen is quite a disgusting nuisance." A year later, in July 1831, the number of freemen employed had risen to 130 or 140, including six smiths and forty joiners and labourers more than necessary; they worked as they pleased, the labourers from nine to three with an hour for lunch, and the pay-bills were "swelled up fearfully" by them. Londonderry, however, sent instructions in June 1832 that resident freemen who had been dismissed were to be re-employed, which Buddle agreed was cheaper than trying to attach them at election time. In addition, as many as possible were to be "housed within limits, before the registry takes place" - a strategy that apparently was not achieved in time. The Reform Act appeared to make little difference to Londonderry's tactics. In 1835 Morton, Lord Durham's agent, denied Londonderry's accusations that he had been enticing voters away by the promise of "good employment" - "they knew it was illegal to make any such promise." It was clearly not the illegality of such tactics that bothered Londonderry, but the fear that Lord Durham was poaching freemen in violation of the "good understanding" on local politics, as on business matters, that had been established between them. Buddle's opinion of the Durham City freemen - "the most corrupt and morally depraved of their species" - two years later, in 1837, suggests that their allegiance still depended not only on the services of the "Rose and Crown" during polling, but also on employment in the years between elections.

Buddle and the other agents were also actively involved in other methods of influence. In 1823, Hardinge's plans for Sunderland (where, as Buddle had reported eighteen months earlier, Lambton's fitters were able to influence the keelmen and castors "as well as a show-man manages his puppets") included "a large expenditure upon the spot" as well as the offer of employment. Hunter was to "relieve the indigent" and "give a few coals" but without display and "taking care to avoid the better classes of both parties." At election time itself, a good display was important; in 1830 Hunter and Watson were to meet
Sir Roger Gresley as he entered the county at Darlington; Buddie and Groom (the London solicitor) would join the party at Durham, with the colliery band, over one hundred men from the collieries and Seaham, and more from the City and the estates. Buddie and Hunter and three other agents were canvassing the northern counties; Buddie himself was covering the area within twenty miles of Newcastle.56

After the sweeping Whig victory in Durham and Tyneside in 1832, including the defeat of the sitting Tory candidate for Durham City, Arthur Trevor (elected in 1831 after Gresley’s election in 1830 had been successfully petitioned against), Buddie’s own political opinions became a factor—real or imagined—in Londonderry’s electioneering. Buddie maintained that politics was a subject "in which I never did nor never will meddle," but Lady Londonderry apparently found cause to feel that Buddie’s opinions were contrary to the family’s wishes, and wrote to him requesting an explanation.57 Buddie replied that he was "a reforming Tory" believing, in particular, in reform of the Church. On the recent City election, Buddie commented that he had been most anxious for Trevor’s return—"knowing...the great expense the retaining of this seat has been to the family." He had always followed Londonderry’s orders on employing freemen but, he said, Londonderry’s banking affairs with Chaytor had prevented him from taking "a decidedly hostile part" against the Whig banker; and he denied Lady Londonderry’s suggestion "that the election was lost from the want of due exertion on the part of the agents, as I have reason to believe they exerted themselves to the utmost to ensure success." To Lady Londonderry’s "kind and indulgent" attitude to his own position, he replied that in the city of Durham, in which he had no property, "I shall consider myself in precisely the same situation as the lowest of the Agents."

The matter was not closed, however, for in 1835 Buddie had to refute sentiments that had allegedly been expressed by him about Trevor—"I assure your ladyship that both my time and attention are too fully occupied at this juncture with matters of more pressing interest, to allow me to meddle in such matters."58 As usual, whatever the doubts about Buddie’s personal opinions, they had little effect on his duty as agent: during the following week he canvassed for Trevor and consulted with Trevor’s electioneering agents at his committee room.59

Two years later, in 1837, Londonderry’s introduction of
the Hon. Thomas Henry Liddell for the Northern division of the county caused much greater problems. Again, Londonderry did not expect Buddle's own feelings to affect his direction of electioneering:

"I do not ask you to interfere or appear yourself, but I call upon you most earnestly to state to every man in our employment in the collieries that they are now called upon to shew their attachment to the family and to me."

Gregson, however, refused either to vote or to act for Liddell on the grounds that it had always been "the policy of the Wynyard House to resist the introduction of any member of the Ravensworth party." Londonderry found this particularly awkward because already "the head agent is known to have sentiments different from mine." As he told Gregson, however,

"Your case is different from Mr. Buddle's. He has no interest in the county. He was brought lately into the affairs and has always kept out of election matters from his peculiar powers. This has been winked at, but I confess, it has made me always uncomfortable."

In fact, on the very day that Londonderry wrote to Gregson, Buddle had gone to Seaham Hall where Londonderry had summoned all the agents, colliery overmen and principal tenants to meet him:

"His lordship addressed the parties (about 25 in number) at considerable length, stating the great importance to the Conservative Cause of supporting Mr. Liddell... and implored the parties present to exert themselves night and day to procure Mr. Liddell's return, as if they should fail in this, Lady Londonderry and himself had made up their minds never to set foot in the County of Durham again."

On his way home from Seaham, Buddle voted in Newcastle for the Whigs, Ord and Bigge, and on the following day went to N. Shields to vote for Sir Charles Edward Grey. Nevertheless, he maintained appearances at Durham, leading the "cavalcade of freemen" through the city and attending the nomination for the county candidates and the chairing of Liddell after his success; but he noted with evident disapproval the "exulting nature" of the speeches and the "very abusive language" against Lord Durham and the ministry; and when it was all over he refused to dine at the Hall with the other agents to receive Lord and Lady Londonderry's thanks;

"as I found Mr. Liddell with his brother etc. were to be there, I thought it most prudent not to be of the party, as I could not approve of their politics."

Despite Buddle's personal views, Londonderry had recently sought his
opinion on Durham City politics. Buddie pleaded ignorance; his electioneering for Londonderry evidently consisted of mustering support without involvement in the political life of the city, the centerpiece of Vane-Tempest influence. Buddie's own contacts and interests were in Newcastle, not Durham.

In March 1843, Londonderry suspected that Buddie's "nephew Atkinson and all were on the qui vive for the Liberals. It is difficult to know how to manage." Within four months, however, after Dungannon's election had been declared void, Londonderry himself was supporting the Liberal, Bright, rather than the Conservative, Purvis, who had come forward "without having had communication with Lord L. on the subject." Although Londonderry's "Instructions to Agents" were neutral, he subsequently told Buddie categorically that he wished Bright to be returned, and Buddie had no doubt that Bright's victory was "in consequence of Lord Londonderry's freemen having voted for Mr. Bright." Buddie's diary has little to say about his opinion of Londonderry's conduct of this election, but it was certainly not enthusiastic, and his reaction when Londonderry asked him to have certain articles from the London papers inserted in the Durham Advertiser was lukewarm.

Londonderry was not immune to the attitude of suspicion of servants and agents that had been so prevalent in landed circles. Buddie's nephew was told by George Hunter that "the Marquis would not stick at opening a letter" even if it were addressed to Buddie. Buddie and Londonderry were both particularly sensitive about patronage by Buddie, but the available evidence testifies to excessive suspicion by Londonderry rather than the exercise of influence by Buddie. Some unknown circumstance caused Buddie to tell Sir Henry Browne in 1827 that he wished it to be "distinctly understood that I have neither relative, friend nor dependant in the world I either have or wish to provide for." Early in 1839, when mismanagement in the Seaham Harbour accounts was discovered, Londonderry passed on to McDonnell allegations which prompted McDonnell to reply that "Buddie is not disposed to press or indeed to recommend any appointment without careful enquiry." Four years later, however, a letter from Londonderry again prompted Buddie to write that, "I beg it to be distinctly understood that I must decline recommending anyone to an agency in your lordship's concerns. I have neither friend nor relation in the world who require my assistance in
this way and I therefore hold myself perfectly independent in that respect." 70

As early as 1824 Londonderry voiced allegations of "fortune making" by his agents, apparently because of their respectable appearance, to which Buddie replied that "none of them, with the exception of one (old Legg) [a viewer] dissipate their means in the public houses." 71 Most of Londonderry's suspicion of his agents, however, was prompted by the Trust of 1834. On the eve of its establishment, Londonderry sent a memorandum to Buddie "as to new arrangement of agencies," of which only two minor features are mentioned in Buddie's letters. At about the same time Londonderry wrote to McDonnell voicing suspicions of the agents acting in conspiracy with the bankers. 72 Seven months later, Buddie received a letter from Londonderry "which relates to the agents and more particularly to my own position." He delayed answering in order to give it full consideration and his only observation was apparently,

"that the alternative which your lordship offers only leaves one course open to me. And altho' it will be a great relief and comfort to me personally, I shall not take it, to the prejudice of your lordship or the family. I am not the man to quit the ship while she is in danger, but when she is brought to her moorings in smooth water so that I can quit with credit, I hope I may be permitted to step quietly on shore."

Londonderry's annotation suggests that this was not entirely the expected reply: "There is good feeling in this - how is it to be answered." 73

When relations between Londonderry and Buddie broke down in the summer of 1841, Londonderry's accusations of mismanagement and of agents concerned only with "their own high salaries," or worse, flew thick and fast. Three months after his row with Buddie, he apparently hinted that Hunter was influenced by his own colliery interests which, McDonnell pointed out, were limited to a sixteenth share in a small above-bridge Tyne colliery "which he has had for the last sixteen years and which he says you knew of." 74 Such episodes were the product of frustration and emotion rather than careful consideration, as was Londonderry's suggestion in March 1843 (immediately after a brush with Buddie over supplies from the collieries for personal use) that it was "desirable that Messrs, Robson and others should be discharged." Buddie's reply was forthright: "If your lordship thinks the collieries can be carried on without viewers, I must at once honestly and frankly tell your lordship that they cannot." 75
Chapter IX

Buddle successfully resisted such additional economies in the agency, but seven months later he died. Barely five weeks after his death, Hunter received Londonderry's "opinion and ideas as to agencies etc." and shortly afterwards Londonderry sent a "Memorandum on Colliery Reform" and "List of Agents' Salaries" to Hindhaugh, the auditor, who was temporarily supervising the concerns. Londonderry proposed a new scale of salaries, amounting to £1,860 for the collieries, £230 for the estates and £650 for the Harbour. The total for the collieries was considerably less than the total salaries of only the viewers and responsible Penshaw staff in 1839, but it is not known whom Londonderry included in his list. Hunter had not been happy with Londonderry's proposals, and Hindhaugh and McDonnell both felt that the proposed wage reductions for various subordinate staff would be impolitic and at variance with the reasonable claims of the parties, whose salaries are not extravagant." Hindhaugh also urged that Longstaff's salary of £150 be increased; "whether one looks at the labour and responsibility of the situation or the rate at which viewers are paid in the Trade generally, a claim for an addition cannot be resisted." Londonderry, however, declared that he "never was till lately aware of the monstrous gross amount of agencies," and emphasised his determination for economies:

"If you cannot afford a physician at a guinea fee, you must take the apothecary at 5s. and hope for the best results...neither is it a reason because the salaries are not extravagant, or that others pay the same, that I should not be served for less if I can accomplish it... and if not by North Country men, by Scotch or such."

Londonderry went on to specify those who should be dismissed if they did not accept the proposed reductions, and he also refused to increase Longstaff's salary. Hindhaugh had suggested an alternative way of economising by reorganising the top positions and not filling the posts then vacant - Buddle's worth £900 p.a. and two minor posts worth £320 together. He suggested a competent manager could be obtained at Hunter's salary (Hunter being still under notice):

"there wants only an individual to superintend the labour of the whole and direct it to a common purpose...Whether he should be a viewer or not does not appear important."

Londonderry apparently had little to say on Hindhaugh's idea of a new manager; he perhaps took it for granted that Buddle would (or could) not be replaced, and he wished no alteration in the viewing department.
In fact, he was already considering retaining Hunter; whatever his attitude to the subordinate staff, he had perhaps heeded Buddle's warning, only a few months previously, that a "thorough bred" viewer to replace Hunter would be extremely difficult to find. Hunter remained as the chief viewer until his death in 1851. Londonderry described Hindhaugh's salary as "far too high" and accused him of spending insufficient time at Penshaw and Seaham, but he too continued, probably as auditor (as before) and manager of relations with the Coal Trade. After Hunter's death, a colliery viewer, George Elliot, was appointed to the management of the collieries.

In colliery management and in other spheres (such as general policy and financial affairs) Buddle was subordinate, until 1834, only to Londonderry. Nevertheless, he had considerable contacts with the various lawyers - Gregson, Londonderry's legal adviser and country solicitor, and the Grooms, London solicitors to the marriage settlement trustees - and had a low opinion of the profession: "Of all the prigs in the world, good Lord deliver us from Legal Prigs." William Groom complained strongly about Iveson in 1820-21, but Buddle does not appear to have attracted criticism from any of Londonderry's lawyers or agents. Despite Buddle's early hopes of seeing the day when business could be done "without being hampered by the leaden feet and iron claws of the law," Gregson became one of Buddle's chief confidantes as his exasperation with Londonderry grew under the Trust of 1834.

On an informal level, Buddle greatly valued "an occasional conference" and written contacts with Sir Henry Browne (knighted in 1826) who had been Londonderry's A.D.C. and a colleague at the Vienna Embassy. Early in 1823 Londonderry hinted that Buddle was writing more freely to Browne than Londonderry wished but later that year Londonderry asked Browne to act as auditor, a role he apparently filled quite actively, at least until 1828, by personal attendance and through occasional correspondence. Browne returned Buddle's regard - "I honor the productions of our age in the persons of such men as you two [Buddle and Thomas Sopwith] more than I do half the dukes and marquisses of the peerage." Under the Trust established in 1834 to administer Londonderry's financial affairs, a new figure was introduced into the hierarchy - that of the trustee, Edmund McDonnell (formerly Phelps), second husband of the Countess of Antrim, Lady Londonderry's mother.
McDonnell, too, had a high opinion of Buddie. - "a man whose friendship and talent and integrity is beyond all value, beyond all suspicion." 95

It was always, however, his relationship with Londonderry which dominated Buddle's career as Vane-Tempest agent. The eloquence and vehemence of Buddle's adverse opinions of Londonderry in the last two or three years of his life, and their frequent disagreements, even in earlier years, tend to obscure the fact that for many years they welcomed the frank expression of each other's characters and policies and worked together with mutual respect, and even with affection. 96

Buddle had obviously thought carefully about his relationship with Londonderry. His basic principle was devotion to the family, as could be seen in every sphere of his responsibility. But his day-to-day relationship with Londonderry was also based on a clearly defined code of behaviour. He genuinely sought close consultation with his employer; he welcomed Londonderry's resignation from diplomatic life in 1822 in order to spend more time on the management of his private affairs, and attached great importance to Londonderry's presence in the north, particularly at times of crisis in the coal trade or banking affairs. He also liked Londonderry to be well-informed on routine matters - this is of course evident in his letters, but he also on occasion encouraged Londonderry to spend a day looking over the collieries, and they had frequent consultations at Wynyard, Penshaw or Seaham and occasionally in London. 97 Buddle frequently expressed the view that he would be "wanting in duty to that confidence with which your lordship has honored me" if he did not express his opinions frankly, but he believed that,

"Advising is the first branch of my duty, but obeying is the second, and I hope your lordship will never find me pressing the former, to the exclusion of the latter, when the sole responsibility is with your lordship." 98

Buddle did not give in easily, however. On more than one occasion, having urged his opinion to no avail, he explicitly stated that he would act strictly on orders and wished nothing left to his discretion; he clearly felt that such a situation was abnormal and unsatisfactory. 99

Until the passage of years soured their relationship towards the end of Buddle's life, Buddle appears to have had a genuine appreciation of Londonderry's sense of dignity:

"To think of so noble a spirit being oppressed from the want of pecuniary means, to think of the gallant defender of his country, who never bent his neck before the enemies
of that country, having to crouch to a Jew-Quaker, banker, or an arrogant lawyer has often filled me with regret, and chagrin indescribable."

His attitude on this occasion was doubtless emphasised by his own abhorrence of debt, but he had recently expressed similar views on the preservation of Londonderry's honour and dignity in relation to the Coal Trade.  

Londonderry's attitude towards Buddle is more difficult to define from the available evidence. Buddle's principle of providing full information and frank opinions was obviously encouraged by him, and he, too, welcomed the chance of "a quiet prose, to put me in heart." He had no hesitation in contributing ideas and arguments of his own, and the surviving correspondence naturally tends to highlight the occasions on which he and Buddle differed, but there was another side to their relationship. He expressed in his letters his approval of Buddle's conduct - approval which "wonderfully invigorated" Buddle, and Buddle said "the kindness and confidence with which your lordship has always treated me" was "invaluable." There were also gifts (one in 1825 with an inscription at which "my old mother cried for joy at the honor conferred on her son"; a colt, as plans for Seaham Harbour came to fruition; "a new, splendid and costly service of plate" on the opening of the Harbour). Buddle was brought well to the fore by Londonderry on occasions such as the visit of the Duke of Wellington to the collieries in 1827, when Buddle delivered the speech of welcome, entertained the party to dinner in his new house at Penshaw, and was toasted by the Duke; similarly at the opening of Seaham Harbour, when Buddle presided at the dinner at Seaham Hall ("the Noble Marquis wishing to be considered as a guest"), and the visit of the Duke of Cambridge in 1842, when the party was again entertained at Buddle's house.

The year 1831 was a particularly difficult one, with the pitmen's strike, a rift between Londonderry and the rest of the Coal Trade, and growing financial problems, on all of which Buddle and Londonderry disagreed. One particularly frank and firm letter from Buddle evidently aroused in Londonderry fears that Buddle might abandon the task, for Buddle had to reassure him:  

"I have this morning received your lordship's affecting letter of the 1st inst. - for God's sake, my dear Lord, never for one moment imagine that I should even dream of deserting you, or the interests of your family - come what may."
Less than a month later Buddle was taken seriously ill and there was undoubted sincerity in Londonderry's letters to Sir Cuthbert Sharp: early bulletins from the doctors were favourable, and "I trust and hope in God they will continue. I would look to nothing else but with the most abject despair." As Buddle recovered, he thanked Londonderry for his "unexampled kindness and more than brotherly solicitude. It is all deeply engraven on my heart."  

This same year, however, appears in retrospect to mark the beginning of the deterioration in the relationship. Buddle found it increasingly difficult to keep his patience: "it is not thro' an arrogant or captious spirit that I may sometimes in the warmth of discussion urge my opinions with more than becoming vehemence - I am very sensible of my failing in this respect and can only plead the sincerity of my intentions in mitigation." Londonderry at about the same time accused Buddle of attempting to control his authority, of wishing to sacrifice Londonderry's interests to those of the Coal Trade or to frighten him into Regulation. Although Buddle's advocacy of a Trust in 1834 apparently worried Londonderry not least because he felt that Buddle contemplated a separation of their "interest and intercourse" of the past fifteen years, relations between them deteriorated quite rapidly under the Trust. Londonderry was embittered by its restrictions, and Buddle (who by 1834 was over sixty years old) had had his resilience to set-backs and disagreements sapped by the events of the early 1830s; his row with Londonderry in 1841 and his letters to his friends at the same time impart the feeling that old age, coming at the end of a long and close association between two self-willed men, was responsible for at least some of the vehemence. After their reconciliation, however, Buddle took a leading part in the Duke of Cambridge's visit, and was appointed a J.P. through Londonderry's influence.  

A fair assessment of the relationship which survived its own problems for twenty-five years, and played a leading part in the north-east during that time, is probably better drawn from the period before 1834. On the eve of the establishment of the Trust, Buddle revealed something of his own and Londonderry's characters when he wrote that, notwithstanding their differences of opinion,  

"I never could impugn your lordship's motives, but on the contrary was always ready to give your lordship full credit for the integrity of your intentions."  

Similarly, two stray letters from Londonderry to Buddle in 1829 show
a side of Londonderry not often appreciated by his contemporaries or historians, and some idea why the relationship survived to Buddle's death:

"We are in an ocean of sorrows, and I have unhappily embarked you as my pilot, and I assure you unfeignedly the thoughts I am often expos'd to, of how much I must lag upon you, and how totally inadequate any remuneration or friendship of mine is to repay all I see you labor under for the common weal of me and mine, hang heavily around my heart. But yet I feel you are a superior creature, and that in any emergency you would always protect this house."
Based on EYE PLAN OF PART OF THE RIVER WEAR SHOWING THE LINE OF MESSRS. NESHAM & CO.'S RAILWAY TO SUNDERLAND AND THE LINES BY WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO CONNECT LORD STEWART'S RAILWAYS FROM RAINTON & PENSHER COLLIeries WITH THE SAME.

By John Buddle, 11 February 1920.
Looking back in later years to the situation that Lord Stewart had inherited in April 1819, Buddie commented that:

"it is questionable whether such a coincidence of adverse circumstances ever before occurred in the property of any family. Widely different indeed would have been the state of affairs if under my lady's minority the property had been so managed as to produce that accumulation of money which it ought to have done. What are now mountains to be surmounted would in that case only have been mole-hills."

His work for Londonderry had four major aspects - technical management, territorial policy, direction of relations with the Coal Trade, and the conduct of financial affairs. This chapter will consider the two former aspects.

Transport and Shipping

Like several of the problems which Buddie tackled, the need to improve transport of the coal from pit to ship had been recognised for some time but action had been postponed. The coals from the Vane-Tempest collieries were led by horses along waggonways to staiths on the Wear at Penshaw, to be loaded into keels for shipment down to Sunderland where they were again transferred by manual labour - by the castors - into ships. Mowbray said in January 1815, that he had had several conversations with Sir Henry Vane-Tempest (who had died in 1813) about leading the coals by railway to spouts at Sunderland, "which I am persuaded would have been attempted if matters had been convenient." The spouts were open-topped but otherwise closed, with a slide at the bottom; the waggons ran up over them at the end of the railway and the bottom of the waggon was then opened, dropping the coals down the spout into the ship below. In 1815, as steam engines were reducing the cost of the proposed railway, Mowbray had a report made by Edward Steel, the viewer who had been responsible for the railway to Sunderland from Nesham's Newbottle colliery. Steel estimated that the complete project of leading to Sunderland on an iron railway
by steam power would save £13,854 p.a. The question was referred to the Master in Chancery but was vetoed by the Countess of Antrim, Sir Henry's widow, as a creditor of the collieries. The viewer she consulted, John Smith, agreed with the project in principle but strongly disputed the estimates that Mowbray produced. Despite an attempt by Mrs. Taylor (Frances Anne's aunt, and wife of her guardian) to bring the sixteen-year-old Frances Anne's persuasion to bear on her mother, the Countess of Antrim remained adamant, and the Master, in the early months of 1817, therefore refused his authority for the plan to proceed.

In 1819 Buddie approached the problem from a different angle, evolving plans for sharing the use of Nesham's waggonway from Newbottle. This decision, in place of Mowbray's aim of building a new railway, was perhaps influenced by the advice to Lord Stewart of such men as the solicitor, Whitton, who hoped that large expenditure would be avoided until the collieries were free of debt. The need for shipping facilities on the coast was emphasised, however, by the freezing of the Wear from the 24th December 1819 to 24th January 1820; such interruption to the vend threatened the fitters' financial stability, and the accumulation of coals at the pits and staiths caused breakage and therefore financial loss.

Buddie drew up detailed estimates for Iveson and Stewart to consider in February 1820. Savings on keel dues, casting and fittage would outweigh the cost, leaving a gain of 1/12d. per chaldron, or £1,718.15.0d p.a. on 30,000 chaldrons. There would be added advantages such as reduction of loss from stockpiling and breakage of coals, and freedom to ship at all seasons. The scheme also had the added attractions of preventing Mowbray and his Hetton colliery from pursuing the same opportunity to use Nesham's way, and of encouraging the Dean and Chapter to renew the Rainton lease, as any new lessees would need to find an entire new line of way.

Not long afterwards, however, Buddie postponed his plans. Tactical considerations had lessened as hopes appeared of success with the Dean and Chapter, and of opening negotiations for Hetton; and in any case Nesham's spouts and Lambton's tub-loading system at Sunderland had aroused hostility among the keelmen and castors. Buddie now viewed the Sunderland railway scheme rather as a matter of future convenience, than an object of immediate attention.

In October 1822, however, the purchase of Newbottle colliery
by Lambton again suggested to Buddle the possibility of sharing Nesham's old waggonway, this time with Lambton. The problem that now appeared was one of wayleaves, but Buddle armed Lambton's agent, Croudace, with "a great gun for him to fire off against the several land proprietors" - the threat that Lambton and Londonderry would use the line to Sunderland only if wayleaves were reduced. Part of Buddle's intention was to show the Dean and Chapter that Londonderry had a line of way ready for his freehold "low collieries" at West Herrington. The scheme was delayed, however, by Croudace's "jog-trot" way of doing business, exacerbated, Buddle concluded, by his growing jealousy of the Londonderry concerns. Consequently Buddle began to make exploratory moves for another line of way to Sunderland, and for a shipping place there for tubs and spouts. In the meantime, plans had been escalating for Seaham Harbour, and Londonderry and Buddle decided to go ahead with Benjamin Thompson's scheme for a line to Seaham rather than Sunderland. Buddle expected the Newbottle line to Sunderland to be used until Thompson's project could be put into operation, but both matters were postponed by financial problems in May 1823.

Londonderry's own harbour at Seaham, linked directly to the collieries by railway, was eventually built in 1828-31 and it ended active consideration of a line to Sunderland and shipping by spout there, except for a brief revival of the idea in 1833-4, when Buddle felt that new conditions in Coal Trade affairs called for new measures. Buddle had thought little of Lambton's experiment in dismissing his fitters and taking the fittage into his own hands in 1825, but in the 1830s he considered either ending Londonderry's fitting system entirely, relying on spouts at Sunderland, or - to retain the loyalty of those fitters who were also Sunderland ship owners - ending the keel system but allowing the fitters to ship by spout at a much reduced fittage charge. Buddle's freedom of action was limited by the fact that Londonderry was indebted to the fitters for renewed bills and a loan, and it is not clear whether any part of his tentative plan was put into operation; Hindhaugh mentioned after Buddle's death that some coals were still brought down to Sunderland in keels.

Independently of the Sunderland plan, Buddle had introduced measures immediately after his appointment, to improve the existing leading and shipping provisions. Again, Mowbray had to some extent
NEW INCLINED PLANE AND ENGINE PLANE FROM PENSHEW TO THE STRAITHS

Based on plan by John Buddle, 5 October 1819. D/14/5 309 (s)

Not to scale. = = new line ——— old line

"The wagons are to be taken by horses from the bottom of the plane, B, to the several spouts."
contemplated similar measures; he told Lord Stewart in April 1819 that he had suggested earlier that year the replacement of horses by machinery on parts of the railways, but the Court of Chancery had not authorised it because of Frances Anne's forthcoming marriage. Buddle took up the question as one of his earliest concerns. Although in his formal report in August 1819 he declared that the improvements would be executed gradually, to limit expenditure, he admitted to Iveson that the anticipated savings on leading costs made him feel "a penchant for being rather liberal on the score of improvements on the waggonway." His earliest move was to lower part of the waggonway, with a view to laying-off the "helping-up" horses. Despite long legal wrangles with the wayleave lessor, Mary Story, the cut was nearly ready for use early in August 1819. A new inclined plane was also begun in June and was in use by mid-November, with an engine plane. Double waggons were introduced, and by the middle of August were regularly leading forty-six keel-loads a day - forty-one from Rainton and five from Penshaw. By the end of the month twenty horses had already been laid off by the double waggons alone. Mowbray had said four months earlier that eighty horses were employed in leading to the Wear; Buddle's measures appear therefore to have permitted a 25% decrease which, at horsekeep costs of £85 p.a. for each horse, amounted to a considerable saving.

Five years later, however, in June 1824, Buddle reminded Londonderry that the gradual replacement of waggonway horses by machinery had been delayed by the expense, and as oats had nearly doubled in price since 1819-22, the purchase and feeding of the "enormous" stock of horses remained a prime cause of heavy expenditure at the collieries. Nevertheless, improvement of the railways was a continuing process. In 1834 Buddle told the solicitor Richard Groom that since April 1819 "Lord Londonderry has been constantly and progressively increasing the stock by new purchases, and the way and branches have been changed and shifted from place to place and extended as the operations of the colliery required."

The natural corollary to such improvements in the existing system of leading coals was to improve the method of shipping them. The scheme of shipping by spout at Sunderland having been shelved for tactical reasons in 1820 and again in 1823, Buddle introduced in its place the tub system, whereby the waggons of coal were lowered by a drop at Penshaw staith into keels fitted with tubs which were
then transferred by machine from the keels into the ships at Sunderland. The first branch of the system - the drops - was begun in February 1821 using the machinery invented by the engineer, William Chapman, in 1807, for use at Benwell colliery on the Tyne where Buddle was at that time consulting viewer. Buddle had been apprehensive that the introduction of the tub system would cause an outcry among the fitters, keelmen and castors similar to that aroused by Lambton's introduction of tubs at Sunderland. As the Londonderry drops were to be at the Penshaw staith, however, Buddle found that the fitters welcomed the move. Two of the largest fitters, Surfield and Tanner, made approaches to take all the Wallsends shipped by tub; their expenses by this system being lower, they offered a reduction in fittage of 2/- per chaldron.

Preparations were made in February 1822 for the second stage of the system - the transfer of tubs from keels to ships at Sunderland again using a machine invented by William Chapman. Arrangements were made for a military presence but trouble was avoided by conducting the trials, at the fitters' suggestion, at a time when the harbour was full and the castors busy. The operation of the system was perhaps delayed by the break-down of the Coal Trade Regulation which made it politic for Buddle to avoid meeting the fitters for some time as he persisted in maintaining prices, but the Regulation was restored by the beginning of July, and by the end of that month "the Transferer" was working well, loading "two keels of tubs" per hour onto the ships. By the middle of August this had increased to three keels - twenty-four chaldrons - as the engineers gained experience. So far only ten keels had been fitted to take the tubs; Buddle recommended that these be increased to at least twenty-two (at a conversion cost of £640 each) in which case 25,000 chaldrons p.a. could be shipped by the tub system at what was virtually an increase in price of £2,500. He also planned to have a fixed Transferer on shore as well as the present floating one, and to give all the fitters a share in its use as they were becoming envious of the fitters receiving the tub coals. By 1828, the coals shipped at Sunderland were handled in the proportion of eight by tubs to three by keels; the tub system had evidently been expanded rapidly in the previous five or six years.

The tub system not only reduced costs but it also lessened the problem of breakage of the coal. It did not provide the great benefit that a railway to spouts at Sunderland would have given - freedom to ship whatever the effects of ice or flooding on the Wear.
This aim was to be achieved by Seaham Harbour. The reduction in direct costs, however, was comparable with that expected from a new railway and spouts: the latter had been estimated to save 1/12d per chaldron over shipping by keels; the tub system was expected to save 2/- per chaldron and did in fact save 1/- per chaldron.

**Underground Improvements**

It is indicative of the wide range of a colliery engineer's responsibilities that one of Buddle's earliest and most important series of improvements was directed at the transport of the coal from the pit-head to the shipping place and its transfer to keel and ship. It was accompanied, however, by an equally radical re-casting of underground policy. As in the case of leading and shipping the coals, there are indications that Mowbray knew of some of the problems, but it was left to Buddle to make a diagnosis and prescribe a remedy.

Buddle's report on Rainton in 1819 has not been traced, but it is clear that the situation concerning underground management, and in particular the question of pillar-working, was much the same in both Penshaw and Rainton collieries. In his report on Penshaw in June 1819, Buddle pointed out that the pillars had first been lost in 1797 due to a creep caused by an error of judgement in not leaving sufficiently strong pillars. Laverick realised in 1804-5 the need for larger pillars "with the evident intention, of accomplishing a general and effectual working of the pillars," but either Laverick or his successors had delayed working the pillars and had pursued the plan only in parts of two seams in one pit. Mowbray had been told in 1814 that the Five Quarter and High Main seams at Rainton had been exhausted; two pits could be continued in work only by working the pillars, but the drowned waste would have to be cleared first; and new pits were having to be sunk to the Hutton seam. Buddle in 1819 emphasised that the failure in management which had caused this situation was, to him, "perfectly unaccountable." The expense of keeping open such extensive wastes, the deterioration of the pillars by standing so long, the cost of preparing them to be worked, and the premature expense of sinking to the Hutton seam amounted to "a most extensive and irreparable injury to the colliery." Moreover, the system of sinking to the lower seams to obtain a further supply of whole coal, instead of supplementing it with pillar coal, meant that there was now little whole coal available.24
Buddle took steps to work the pillars immediately. In August 1819 he reported that interior barriers had been planned and partially executed ready for a working of the pillars. In February 1820, two independent viewers, whom he had instructed, strongly endorsed a general working of the pillars, to be controlled by the existing barrier of whole coal against the adjoining Hetton colliery, and by barriers formed by stowing on the other sides. They estimated that in an acre of the Hutton seam (4ft. 4ins. thick) there would be 2,330 chaldrons of coal, of which 878 chaldrons were won by the first working. After a partial working of the pillars, half of the total contents would still necessarily be left to support the roof and prevent creep; after a general working of the pillars, on the other hand, all but 452 chaldrons would have been won. These were probably optimum figures as they related to the Hutton seam in the Hazard pit which had only recently been opened, but they demonstrate the amount of coal lost when pillars were worked inefficiently.

Buddle knew, as Mowbray had known, that the Dean and Chapter were anxious for the pillars to be worked but he maintained that the terms of the lease did not bind the lessee to work them at all, and he only agreed with the Dean and Chapter viewer, Fenwick, to try a general working "as a favour." Buddle's purpose in obtaining the opinions of two independent viewers on his proposed pillar-working was partly to show the Dean and Chapter that it would be in their interests to renew Lord Stewart's lease in order to encourage him to undertake the maximum working of the pillars. He hoped the viewers' report would also help to "quiet any clamour" among the notoriously conservative pitmen as working the pillars to this extent was new on the Wear. The Peiles, managers of Lord Lonsdale's Cumberland collieries, experienced similar difficulties when they attempted to introduce pillar-working there in 1823.

Working the pillars and improving the transport and shipping of the coals are two of the most interesting aspects of Buddle's work in the early years at the Londonderry collieries, demonstrating both the technical and the tactical considerations he brought to bear. There were, however, several other significant measures. Early in 1819 Mowbray had improved the quality of the coals and increased the price to the fitter by 3/- per chaldron; Buddle rapidly extended this policy. Barely three weeks after his appointment, he introduced Wallsends (best quality coals) after investigating the skreening
system and finding that the Wallsends would pay better than the second-class or Eden-main coal. By August he had also advanced their price; henceforth they were established as equal to the best Tyne coals in price as well as quality. 28 Then workings were "rationalised" - expensive and inferior seams in two pits were laid off and the workmen distributed among the five remaining pits; the Whitefield pit was "placed in a more safe and economical state and will now work to profit"; while plans were projected for working the pillars in the Hazard pit, it was found expedient to obtain the Dean and Chapter's consent to obtain the maximum produce possible by one working only from the Resolution pit. Underground carriages and railways were improved, for Buddle's initial report in June 1819 had declared that "it does not ever seem to have struck the minds of the managers" that the railways should not have "merely followed the working in their progress through the natural undulations of the seam" and that inclined planes and a small steam engine could have replaced some of the horses. As waggon horses above ground were also replaced by machinery, Buddle intended to convert the stables at Chilton into houses for the Rainton colliers, thus saving £3,180d.p.a. travelling expenses (Penshaw to Rainton) for each workman. An oil cistern was built to hold a year's supply of oil and thus overcome another of Buddle's criticisms in his first report - the system by which the overmen bought the lamp oil and then supplied it to the men at a profit. Measures were taken to have all the collieries' smith work done by their own smiths, for errors discovered in the scales at Rainton used for weighing the iron-work had prompted Buddle to comment that, "I really doubt that we shall never be able to get quit of all the filth which has so long clogged the wheels of these concerns; nothing but time, patience and perseverance can accomplish it." 30

After the early 1820s it is difficult to trace technical improvements made by Buddle, but some indication is given by various stock valuations and balance sheets. Iveson and Buddle valued the stock in April 1819 at £63,789, covering dead and live stock, stock at the colliery farms and coals resting at the pits. 31 Vizard, solicitor to Lady Stewart's guardian during her minority, wrote at this time that, except for improvements in leading the coals and the Rainton lease renewals, he could "see no cause for any future considerable expense." 32 In fact, over the next 4\(\frac{1}{2}\) years, the stock increased by 50% to £95,697 in December 1823. Dead stock increased at such a rate that it then
accounted for 85% of the total compared with 65% in April 1819; resting coals - 10% of the total stock in 1819 - had been cleared by 1821-2. Improvements at the collieries continued to demand increased expenditure on stock throughout the 1820s. In 1829 Hunter estimated for Buddle that over £34,800 had been spent on machinery, waggonways and sinking pits at Rainton alone since 1820, excluding the Meadows winning and the renewal fine. In 1834 Buddle estimated the total increase on the Rainton stock since 1819, at £52,235. Of this, nearly £11,000 had been spent on the railway and machinery for shipping coals, increasing their value from £13,136 in 1819 to £24,063 fifteen years later. 

As early as 1811 Buddle was reputed to "not spare the owners' money where it is necessary" and the accounts for 1820 to 1823 caused Londonderry to suggest that "as there is an outlay and increase of above £23,000 in stock that we ought now to make a much greater profit by increased working." More than once Buddle explained large pay-bills or a lower balance by expenditure on improvements, such as the tub system and the drainage of Rainton colliery.

Many other factors, however, apart from improvements reflected in increasing value of stock, could affect the profitability of the collieries; the factor to which Buddle himself attached particular importance was the maintenance of the selling price to the fitters. He believed in the principle of Regulation, that is, restriction of vend for the sake of maintaining prices, so that his increase in stock was not usually directed at increasing output. Mowbray's increase of stock, on the other hand, had been directed at maximum output rather than maximum profits. When Mowbray was appointed in 1813, the profits were said to be about £7,000 p.a. and Mowbray variously stated the vend at the same period (1812) to be about 72,010 or 90,910 chaldrons. In 1818 the vend was 101,483 and Mowbray considered that the collieries were capable of working 180,000 chaldrons. The profit figures submitted by Mowbray for 1814-18 are, however, unreliable. Londonderry concluded that profits under Mowbray had averaged only about £8,000 despite the increase in vend; Vizard, who was favourably inclined towards Mowbray, estimated total profits between 1813 and 1819 at £100,000 which gives an annual average of, say, £18,180. The profits for 1820-23, apart from the exceptionally good year of 1820 when they reached £46,300, were on average, about £28,000. Figures for the remainder of the decade up to 1828, calculated from vend figures and an average profit per chaldron of 5/-, give an
average of nearly £29,000. The next available figures of profits are under the Trust, from 1834 to 1841, when they fluctuated considerably but averaged around £29,400. On this admittedly scanty data, profits after the exceptional year of 1820 appear to have remained fairly steady at around £28,000 and £29,000 and even increased slightly within that range.

The evidence, therefore, suggests that Buddle's technical strategy involving, firstly, considerable expenditure on new or replacement stock, designed to reduce working costs to a minimum by the proper application of machinery, and, secondly, reorganisation of the workings, was successful in initially raising the average annual profits from something between £8,000 and £18,000 to about £28,000, without increasing output beyond the levels allowed by membership of the Regulation; and then in maintaining at least this level on average, throughout the next two decades.

The impression from Buddle's correspondence after about 1822-3 is that he was increasingly pre-occupied with Coal Trade matters and with Londonderry's financial demands on the collieries. He continued to give over-all direction to the technical management of the collieries but, in 1832 he specifically told Londonderry that there were "many colliery matters which I could turn my attention to with advantage to your lordship's interest, if it were not for the constant mental occupation which money matters require."

Territorial Policy

Buddle was undoubtedly appointed to the management of the Vane-Tempest collieries on the strength of his specialist technical reputation. The new approach that he immediately brought to bear on what were, in many cases, old problems, by itself justified Lord Stewart's confidence in him. He was the epitome of a growing professionalism which appeared earlier in colliery viewing than in estate management. In this respect he had little in common with the old family connections, local gentry, retired army officers or solicitors, whose character rather than professional training still qualified them for appointment as major landowners' agents, but who could be expected to understand the needs and hopes of a noble family. Yet one of the most remarkable features of Buddle's work for Lord Stewart, later Lord Londonderry, was his intuitive attachment to forwarding the long-term interests of the Vane-Tempest family. Throughout Buddle's connection with Londonderry,
his professional work was grounded firmly on the basic principle of securing that family’s fortunes. Buddie had no doubts on where those interests lay:

"We must always bear in mind that we are essentially a coal family and therefore that nothing but the most urgent necessity should by rights impel us to alienate any of that description of property. Which be it remembered, when brought into activity, gives infinitely more political influence than the mere landed property under which it lies." Territorial as well as technical considerations consequently occupied a great deal of Buddie's energy and thoughts.

The Rainton Leases

Buddie's major concern was with the leases from the Dean and Chapter, particularly that of Rainton colliery. This was so basic to the Londonderry coal trade that in some respects it can hardly be classed with Buddie's minor territorial manoeuvres. On the other hand, it was by no means always a foregone conclusion that the Rainton lease would be renewed, and the vicissitudes suffered in the course of the various negotiations reveal many of the typical considerations of a major coal owner.

Rainton colliery lay under a large tract of country of about 4,000 acres, including East and West Rainton, Moorsley, Pittington and Moor House. It had been held of the Dean and Chapter of Durham by the Tempest family for several generations. The Dean and Chapter were the largest coal owners in Durham, rivalled only by the bishopric. Their leases were usually for twenty-one years, renewable at the end of every seven - such renewals being known as "filling-up" the term, as the number of years of the lease that had elapsed were added to the remaining years to make it up again to twenty-one years. The Select Committee on Church Leases stated that "a rent - usually nominal - was reserved, and a fine, from which the lessor's revenue in fact came, was payable at each time of renewal." In fact, the situation could be greatly complicated - the tentale rent, far from being nominal, could be a major factor in determining the most profitable amount of coal to be worked, and not only the size of the fine but also the basis on which it was estimated were major points of contention between Buddie and the Chapter.

The lease with which Buddie was first concerned, when he took over the management of the Vane-Tempest collieries in 1819, was that granted in July 1805 to the trustees under the will of the late John Tempest. This lease was due to expire in 1826. According to
the accepted practice it should have been renewed in 1812. Buddle's predecessor, Arthus Mowbray, had failed to apply to the Dean and Chapter for renewal until 1814 in the belief that the custom was invariably to renew. In November 1814, however, the Dean and Chapter declined to renew the lease. Mowbray appears to have accepted this decision with equanimity but a further attempt was made to negotiate the lease in 1815. Buddle was consulted as to the proper amount of the fine and estimated that it ought not to exceed £17,000 to £18,000 to renew the ten years' lapse in the present lease. Mowbray and others estimated it at £6,800. The Dean and Chapter's figure was £27,000. All those connected with the concerns—Vizard, Taylor, and Lady Antrim—agreed with the Chancery Master's consequent decision not to accede to the Chapter's demands.45

The marriage of Frances Anne to Lord Stewart in 1819 provided a new opportunity for re-opening negotiations. Buddle urged it as of the greatest importance and negotiations were opened with the Dean and Chapter shortly after the arrival of Lord Stewart and Buddle in 1819.46

The Vane-Tempest collieries were in a weak bargaining position. The Dean and Chapter had been steadily increasing their demands for over twenty years. Before the new lease was granted in 1805, there had been negotiations for filling-up the term under the previous lease of 1794. Buddle had been employed on this occasion by the Dean and Chapter to estimate the fine they should charge, and he pointed out to them that the fine paid in 1794 had been enormous, due to the ignorance of Sir Henry Vane-Tempest's agent. His own recommendation for a renewal fine of about £700 was apparently not followed when the lease was at last renewed in 1805, for Thomas Fenwick, the Dean and Chapter's viewer, later admitted to Buddle that the 1805 fine—like that of 1794—had been "exorbitant."47 The refusal of the Master in Chancery to accede to the Dean and Chapter's figure of £27,000 for the next fine in 1814-15 had done nothing to dampen their ambition.

Meanwhile, however, the importance of Rainton to the Vane-Tempest concerns had greatly increased. As early as 1804, Buddle knew that the higher seams had been largely exhausted, and he told the Dean and Chapter then that Rainton colliery was, consequently, a secondary consideration with Sir Henry Vane-Tempest as he could obtain far superior
coal from his other colliery at Penshaw. Between about 1804-5 and 1819, however, as Buddie found when he reported to Lord Stewart on Penshaw colliery in 1819, mismanagement had caused nearly all the whole coal in Penshaw colliery to be exhausted, so that Rainton had gained greatly in importance. As he told Lord Stewart in January 1820, in the midst of their protracted and so far unsuccessful negotiations with the Dean and Chapter,

"when I consider, in case the Rainton mines should pass into other hand at the expiration of the lease in 1826, that it would be impracticable by any means from the freehold colliery in its mangled state, even with the annexation of the baronets' coal, to support your lordship's present rank in the coal trade, I am excited to very uncomfortable feelings."^49

Whatever the long-term prospects for Rainton colliery, it still supplied sufficient coal in 1821 to warrant the employment of 1,099 men,^50 and until the 1830s it was to be the mainstay of the Londonderry coal production.

The negotiations for renewal in 1819 were conducted largely by Iveson, Buddie's co-manager. The Dean and Chapter's estimate for the fine was £56,000, and, despite the importance that Buddie attached to the renewal of the lease, which by now had only seven years to run, he advised against such a fine, not only because of its size but also because of the basis on which it was calculated. He pointed out that the "universal custom" was to let collieries by a tentale rent and that the Dean and Chapter's fine ought to be calculated as "the purchase of the tentale rent, i.e. paying of the rent in advance for the whole term of the lease." The Dean and Chapter, however, had calculated the fine "on an annuity, to arise from a division of the profits." Buddie objected strongly to this innovation which, "considering the uncertainty of mining and the instability of the Coal Trade... would tend to damp that spirit of enterprise... which constitutes the very essence of mining."^51 The Dean and Chapter had been considering it for some time, for in 1803-5 Buddie had been called upon to estimate a fine on the basis of profits, as well as the tentale rent, although he had favoured the latter, and in 1815 he had warned Vizard that the Dean and Chapter would not agree that a tentale was the most eligible plan.^52

In 1819-20 Buddie apparently was opposed to any fine higher than about £40,000. Lord Stewart, impressed by the first year's profits from his collieries, was ready to pay more but Buddie was
able for a while to restrain Londonderry's approach and thus to avoid any appearance of anxiety to renew the lease. His delight in tactical manoeuvring became apparent as he used even his plans for railways and pillar-working as elements in his campaign. Whether or not the Dean and Chapter were influenced by these factors, in March 1820 Budde reported with delight that there had been "a mutiny in the Chapter," with the "insurgents" sending a message to the Londonderry agents to ask if the negotiations were still open. Budde took over the negotiations, with evident enjoyment, and they were at last concluded in July 1820. According to a later memorandum, the fine amounted to over £51,000 in which case Lord Stewart had conceded more than had the Dean and Chapter. This figure, however, probably included the farm leases; another document stated that the colliery fine was £40,000. In either case, some concession as to the amount of the fine had been gained. Budde had been unable, however, either to check the trend towards estimating the fine on profits, or to convince the Chapter to any lasting degree that their idea of the profits were, as he maintained, "outrageous." This remained a lasting grievance with him: the principle was "both novel and unfair."

Buddle reached the conclusion in 1820 that the Dean and Chapter "do not act upon any fixed principle of calculation, but merely upon a plan for extorting all they can get." The most his negotiating skill could achieve, as subsequent renewals fell due, was to mitigate the size of the Chapter's demands.

The lease having been renewed in 1820, the next renewal or "filling-up" was due in 1827. Negotiations failed then but were re-opened from time to time until agreement was reached in February 1832. Once again, Budde and Londonderry brought to bear all the arguments they could muster, ranging from a hint that "the march of intellect will bear no rapacity from the Church," to figures showing the near-exhaustion of the best part of the mine, the high level of investment and the great increase in engine power needed to cope with feeders of water. Budde reckoned on a tentale of 22/- on an annual vend of 100,000 chaldrons, giving a fine of just over £15,000. The Dean and Chapter's calculations, based on profits of 8/6d per chaldron on 60,000 chaldrons, and interest at 8%, gave a fine of over £42,700. Budde considered the average profit since 1820 to be only 5/- per chaldron and he maintained that the normal rate of interest to cover a lessee's risk was 14%; even on the Dean and Chapter's basis of
calculation, therefore, he could justify a fine of no more than £22,000 or at worse £30,900.

Buddie's negotiating power was weakened by the peak reached by selling prices in 1827 and 1828 and, with the collapse of Regulation in 1829, Londonderry's large unrestricted vend, which was merely "working for the rooks, and showing them the powers of our colliery." Not surprisingly, therefore, after spasmodic negotiations during which Buddie spoke of the "abominable" and "scandalous" terms for renewal, when agreement was finally reached in 1831, it was on the Dean and Chapter's terms and the fine amounted to nearly £42,000. Even so, Buddie advised Sir John Beckett, the marriage settlement trustee, that even with this "full and most ample fine," renewal would still greatly benefit the settled estates and collieries.

The next renewal was due in 1838 and by that time the situation was greatly complicated by the existence of the 1834 Trust and Londonderry's antipathy towards it. The basic situation remained the same: even now, with Pittington in production and prospects of new winnings at Seaham and Seaton, the importance of Rainton to the family was such that the Dean and Chapter held the trump card. Unfortunately Buddie's correspondence is incomplete for 1836, 1837 and part of 1838. It is clear, however, that he had been urging, and Londonderry had been resisting, the need for renewal, and that negotiations for this renewal were in the hands of the marriage settlement trustees.

Agreement was eventually reached in 1841. Buddie at this time was not in direct communication with Londonderry but he told John Gregson, the solicitor, that "the accomplishment of this renewal is an affair of the most vital importance to Lord Londonderry's family." Buddie was doubtful how Londonderry would react and he warned McDonnell that "to allow the opportunity to slip past would be an act of the most gross mismanagement." He considered it of such importance that, if necessary, the trustees should renew independently of Londonderry. As Buddie wrote, however, Londonderry, despite his fears that expenditure on the renewal would prolong the Trust, did in fact give his consent. Buddie was delighted with the news, particularly in view of the attractions of Rainton to speculators; the renewal was "a capital bargain" for the family, "as regards its influence and consequence not only in the Coal Trade but also politically and generally in this part of the County."
Chapter X

The renewals of Rainton colliery lease from the Dean and Chapter have been dealt with in some detail; they exemplify the way in which the study of a single industrial figure can shed light on situations and problems that were common to other protagonists in his sphere. Although Buddie had to concede a great deal to the Dean and Chapter, the history of the successive renewals demonstrates how important it was for such an agent, firstly, to understand the contribution made to the general concerns by any one area of investment, and secondly, to be capable of hard, high-level negotiating. It also demonstrates the power that the Dean and Chapter of Durham held over their colliery lessees. Londonderry or his trustees had to furnish a total of about £100,000 for three renewals — with a tentale rent also coming into operation, at least in the 1820s, when production exceeded a certain level — in addition to capital investment in stock and working costs; yet the renewal of the lease was never a routine matter by passive lessors. Moreover, it was the Chapter itself who dictated the terms and conducted the majority of the negotiations; Buddie referred to their viewer, Fenwick, only as their “carrier pigeon.”

North Pittington

Buddie estimated in 1832 — for the benefit of Sir John Beckett, the trustee under the marriage settlement, not for the Dean and Chapter — that Rainton could provide an annual yield of 80,000 chaldrons for nearly forty-one years, giving an annual profit of, say, £24,000. The situation was not, however, as clear-cut as this would suggest, for another report by Buddie and Hunter three years later, stated that “if the system of mixing the pillar and whole coal were to be carried on to the usual extent the mine would be reduced to a pillar-coal colliery only” before the lease expired in eighteen years' time. This situation was avoided by adding in the 1820s another Dean and Chapter leasehold colliery to the Londonderry possessions: that of North Pittington.

Buddie mentioned Pittington to Londonderry at least as early as April 1822. This tract of coal lay immediately adjacent to Londonderry’s Rainton colliery: added to the family’s possessions, Buddie considered it would give the key to all the coal between Hetton and Durham and keep the family at the head of the coal trade for a century. Buddie’s main concern at this stage was to secure it “not so much for the value of the thing itself, as for the sake of
preventing any other party from forming a connection with the Revd. Body for any colliery in the vicinity of Rainton." The potential competitors appeared to be "an entire new set of adventurers," the same group who had "plagued" Lambton over his recent purchase of Nesham's Newbottle colliery, always nibbling at any coal likely to come on the market "and with the Chapter they will get into the right soil for doing us mischief." The group included Thomas Bradyll, and they had plans for a harbour at Hawthorn Dene. Buddie discovered at the end of the year that the "grand coalition" was completely "in nubibus," but his fears returned in May 1823 when he found that Mowbray, as indeed he had originally expected, was now involved.

In the event, at the end of 1823, the Dean and Chapter gave Londonderry the first chance of the coal. Negotiations were concluded in January 1825 for a 21-year lease, on a fine of £11,831.3.6d., a tentale of 50/- to come into operation on a yearly quantity of over 30,000 chaldrons.

Londonderry was evidently impressed by Buddie's arguments in favour of buying Pittington. The final negotiations had been conducted by Londonderry himself, using calculations furnished by Buddie. Nevertheless, Londonderry almost immediately contemplated selling the newly-acquired colliery ground: at the beginning of November, eight months after the commencement of the lease, Buddie found Londonderry's suggestion of selling Pittington "most distressing" in view of his hopes for it, and three weeks later he said he would "drain my ingenuity to the very dregs" to avoid its sale.

The expenditure on the Rainton renewals was clearly unavoidable unless the family were seriously to consider withdrawing from the coal trade. The Pittington colliery, however, was the most important of several purchases made in the face of great financial odds, for reasons which would not give immediate financial advantages. Pittington could not make an immediate financial contribution to the concerns, for Buddie estimated that £20,000 would be needed to bring it into production. Moreover, the year in which the lease was purchased - 1825 - was one of particular financial difficulty for Londonderry. Buddie felt the intense pressure of such difficulties at least as much as did Londonderry, but they could not take precedence over excluding competitors with relation to the Dean and Chapter, avoiding the introduction of "a new party into the Trade" to compete with the established coal owners, and protecting Londonderry's "consequence
and influence as a coal-owner." He also felt that Pittington - like Seaham - would give good grounds for a claim for additional quantity under the Regulation, although a Referee's award in March 1827 refused such an allowance and it was subsequently obtained - like that for Seaham - only after considerable difficulty.  

Londonderry was persuaded to drop his ideas of selling, and sinking began in January 1826. The first coals were led in June 1827, but the Hutton seam - the best coal - was not reached until June 1828, and the colliery was not "fairly into work" until 1830. The delays had been caused by greater difficulties than expected from the depth and from water. Once these problems had been overcome Pittington became an integral part of the Londonderry collieries, and its importance was much greater than the initial emphasis on excluding competition. It was now an essential partner to Rainton.

Pittington's role in the Londonderry concerns became the centre of much debate in 1833 and 1834. At the end of 1833 Londonderry again toyed with the idea of selling it. His finances were by this time reaching a crisis, as no one knew better than Buddle, but Buddle urged Londonderry not to contemplate parting with Pittington. "Colliery property can never be restored, any or every thing else may." At the beginning of 1834 the Joint Stock Bank threatened to seize Pittington and Londonderry was at last forced to agree to the Trust which his advisers and the Bank directors had been urging. This paved the way for an agreement later in the year between the trustees under the 1834 Trust (particularly Edmund McDonnell) and the trustees under the marriage settlement (particularly Sir John Beckett). Pittington was to be sold to the settled collieries and the proceeds would be applied to reduce the bank balance. Buddle entirely agreed with the proposal, and the report drawn up by Hunter and himself demonstrated the role now played by Pittington in the Londonderry concerns. The primary consideration was the fact that Pittington supplied the whole coal for mixing with Rainton pillar coal. Without it, 10,000 chaldrons of Wallsend per annum would be lost, which at 4/- per chaldron - the price difference between Wallsends and the second-class Eden-main - would amount to £2,000 per annum. Furthermore, if Pittington were sold to strangers, Rainton would have to bear the whole cost of the railway, and replace the drainage and other facilities which Pittington furnished.

Londonderry reproached Buddle for opposing the sale of
PLAN SHOWING POSITIONS OF RAINTON AND PITTINGTON COLLIERIES & RAILWAYS

Based on plan by John Buddle, 13 March 1835

ORO, D/12/8 244.
Pittington which Londonderry had contemplated at the end of 1833 and for supporting, only a few months later, its sale to the trustees. Buddle pointed out that if Londonderry had sold the colliery for £80,000 he could have saved £4,000 interest by paying off debts, but would have lost the family an annual income of from £10,000 to £14,000, and in his opinion, "Rainton colliery could not have been carried on a single month without a complete and entire breaking up of the property." His opinion had not changed, that the sale of the colliery away from the family "would ruin the property, but its sale to the trustees was "an expedient to save it for the family." 77

Minor Acquisitions

The renewals of the Rainton lease and the acquisition of Pittington, together with the purchase of the Seaham estate at the end of 1821 - which is considered in a separate chapter - were the most important territorial achievements for the Londonderry collieries. The early 1820s, however, were characterised also by other acquisitions, less directly connected with coal production but revealing typical complementary considerations of a great coal owner.

The earliest of these acquisitions was an estate at South Biddick, and Buddle's motives in this transaction were typical of his attitude to purchases which followed. He recommended the purchase of South Biddick or Biddick Waterville estate in February 1821; ownership of this coal would enable the pillars in neighbouring Penshaw to be worked, and also the barriers which at present protected Penshaw from the water in Biddick old waste and which contained more coal than the Biddick estate itself. Important though these considerations were, Buddle laid greater emphasis on more subtle factors, for in April 1821 he told Lord Stewart that he favoured the purchase "to preserve the balance of power, in the scale of your colliery politics." 78 Buddle and Hawkes completed the purchase shortly afterwards at a price of £21,000; Buddle told Ivenson they had gone beyond the latter's idea of price because of the importance of the estate to Lord Stewart. Buddle was delighted that Stewart now had independent communication to the river without going through Lambton's ground, and that he was consequently in a position to grant favours rather than to have to request them. Lambton's agent, Croudace, was puzzled as to why Stewart should want the estate; Buddle considered that it would have been useful to Lambton in "a (colliery) view" and was relieved that
Chapter X

Lambton's agents had not been fully aware of the command it gave over wayleaves. 79

It was only a matter of days after the auction, according to Buddie, before Lambton and his agents realised the importance of the estate and, as Buddie expected, they soon made an approach for it. Provided wayleave to the river was reserved, Buddie was ready to sell the estate to Lambton, and early in 1822 part of the land and the buildings were sold to Lambton for £16,000 with Stewart retaining the remainder and all the coal. Part of the purchase price was retained until Stewart cleared the subsisting mortgage: as the Londonderry finances worsened in the later 1820s, Lambton's auditor, Stephenson, threatened an action in equity for the completion of the title. In the late 1830s, as the Londonderry trustees worked to clear Londonderry's finances, the remaining part of the estate was sold by them to Lambton, now Lord Durham. 90

In April 1819, shortly before his dismissal, Arthur Mowbray, in his report to Lord Stewart, had suggested that consideration should be given to buying Sir Ralph Noel's land near Penshaw, and land belonging to a minor, the son of the late Dawson Lambton of Biddick. 81 The former estate was probably the land and coal known as "the three baronets' estate," belonging to Sir Ralph Noel, Sir Francis Blake and Sir John Thorold, at West Herrington, bordering on Lord Stewart's Penshaw estate. Years earlier, Sir Henry Vane-Tempest had considered leasing the coal but Buddie's motives for recommending the purchase were "political": the Herrington estate "will round out Penshaw capitaly." 82 His continuing concern was to obtain wayleaves independent of Lord Lambton. The purchase was completed at the end of 1821, a few months after South Biddick, and, as Buddie expected, Croudace took the news of the purchase badly. The sight of the estate, as Buddie and he happened to pass it one evening, "excited him so strongly that he went off at once like a rocket, and whizzed about me violently, 'till the composition was exhausted." Buddie managed to reassure him, "after a long prose, on horseback, by moonlight," but only a few days later Lambton purchased an estate at Herrington with what Buddie recognised as strikingly similar motives; he considered that it showed "much more the excessive alarm of our antagonists for their own security, than an effort to cramp us." 83

As well as preserving the balance of power with Lambton, the purchase of the three baronets' estate was also made to work in
relationship to the Dean and Chapter. Linked with Buddie's proposal for using Nesham's railway to Sunderland, which would be the best line for the Herrington coal, Buddie intended it to show the Dean and Chapter "that we can work up any quantity we may require beyond their limitation, from our own mines, without putting an extra shilling into their pockets." This was part of a clear, specific policy for Buddie: "I have therefore always looked forward to the accretion of the family-coal-property, as a sort of counterpoise to the rapacity of the Rooks."

Having achieved the aim of securing an independent line of access to the river for the "low collieries," Buddie arrived at an agreement with Croudace within the next few weeks for a division of the estate, and in May 1823 the purchase money was apportioned between them. In the late 1830s, as in the case of South Biddick, the remainder of the estate was sold to Lord Durham, to whom the coal had already been let.

At almost the same period - October to November 1821 - another estate at West Harrington came onto the market: that of Dawson Lambton, which Mowbray had also mentioned. Again, Buddie was quicker than the Lambton agents: Loraine, one of Lambton's agents, applied for the coal under the estate in December 1821 and was disappointed to find Buddie before him. Like the baronets' estate, Dawson Lambton's was to provide a future reserve of freehold coal as a balance to the Dean and Chapter leasehold mines and, more immediately, independent way-leaves. Its future, like that of Pittington, was in jeopardy as Londonderry looked for ways of relieving financial problems in 1826, but as always, Buddie felt that future prospects should be insulated from current finances; "coute qui coute, this property must be preserved for Lord Seaham. It is one of the great foundation stones (yet unquarried it is true) of his future grandeur." He begged Lord Londonderry to forget the idea of selling it: "pray, pray, my lord, don't allow this idea to dwell upon your mind for a moment." At the end of the year Buddie confided in Sir Henry Browne that due to non-payment of its mortgage, it seemed doubtful whether the estate could be kept, and he considered that parting with it "will give Lambton the complete whip-hand of us with respect to all future way-leave arrangements to the Wear or Sunderland." The problem was evidently overcome, however, as the estate remained to be sold, with Biddick and the baronets', to Lord Durham in 1838.
Hetton

Not all Buddie's territorial manoeuvres were successful. In fact, one of his first major concerns was his most important failure: the Hetton colliery. The colliery was an exceptional success story in the nineteenth century north-east coal industry, for within a few years of coming into production it took its place alongside Londonderry and Lampton to form "the big three" on the Wear. It demonstrates what was at stake when Buddie attempted to act against potential competitors.

One of the owners of the Hetton coal, John Lyons, had started the winning in 1810, when the cost was estimated at £53,000. In the following decade he spent £13,000 on sinking twenty fathoms; some buildings had been constructed but no railway; and he fell into financial difficulties. Mowbray had suggested as early as 1816 that Lyons' Hetton colliery should be rented by Frances Anne and he reminded Lord Stewart of this in April 1819. Hetton was the obvious possibility - indeed the only one - when Buddie was considering substitutes for Rainton, should the Dean and Chapter renewal negotiations fail in January 1820, but he said then that "indeed, whether we renew with the Chapter or not, it has always been my opinion that the Hetton coal mines ought to be possessed by your lordship's family."

Buddie would have preferred to leave the matter dormant for a few years but, particularly in view of Lyons' pecuniary troubles, the risk of competition was too great. Mowbray himself was already "nibbling about the concern," and in any case its reputation for good coal might attract "some monied adventurer."

Lord Stewart and Iveson agreed, so Buddie approached Lyons' trustees. He found the position concerning Lyons' coal complicated by the machinations of Tahourdin, Lyons' solicitor, but he also discovered that Clutterbuck and others owned shares in the coal. Buddie immediately opened negotiations with Clutterbuck's agent. His overwhelming concern at this stage was to exclude competitors, particularly Mowbray, for by the beginning of July Buddie feared that "Arthur and Co, have secured Hetton and that the junta are plotting to step between the Chapter and us also." He was relieved when he secured two major shares, Clutterbuck's and Emerson's, in July 1820, for Lord Stewart was "fully aware of and duly appreciates the importance of keeping mischievous rivals out of the way." "

Buddie was confident that "we have hung up a scarecrow which will frighten Arthur and Co. out of the field." Lyons and
Tahourdin, however, promptly attempted to force a division of the coal which Lyons, Clutterbuck and Emerson held as tenants in common, by filing a bill in Chancery; Buddie wrote to Iveson in October that "I am greatly mortified in having to inform you that I have but too much reason to believe, after all, that Mowbray's party are now determined to go on with Hetton." By the end of the year they had begun sinking two large double pits; two of Lord Stewart's largest fitters - Hayton and Horn - had become partners in the Hetton Company; and the new rival was also "hiving away" such key workmen as the master sinker from the Vane-Tempest collieries.

Buddie was more philosophical in defeat than was Lord Stewart. He was "mortified to find that my lord takes it up so seriously"; they had done their best to obtain the concern but circumstances had been beyond their control. Henceforth, however, Hetton was to be a major preoccupation of Buddie's. For a year or so he retained hopes of being able to thwart its progress. Towards the end of 1822 rumours of "civil war" at Hetton, caused by problems of raising finance and centring on the ever-controversial figure of "old Arthur", caused Buddie to hope that the partnership might "tumble to pieces" and that Londonderry could then come in for the spoil. But Mowbray retrieved his position and at the end of 1822 and the beginning of 1823, the Company reached the Hutton seam and the high quality of the coal confirmed that the concern would continue.

Later in 1823 Buddie's and Londonderry's hopes of interference revived temporarily when two of the partners, Scruton and Light, decided to sell their shares. Buddie warned Croudace that if the concern came onto the market he would not expect any opposition from Lambton, as the Hetton colliery fell entirely in Londonderry's line of operations. Londonderry echoed this attitude and took it further when he wrote to Sir Cuthbert Sharp: "I consider Mr. Lambton would not be a competitor in it, as I studiously avoided interfering with him in Newbottle, and Hetton is not only in our Beat but that old rogue Mowbray if he had behaved gratefully owed it to the family to secure it for them." Buddie advised Londonderry not to buy Scruton's and Light's shares as he would merely become a partner and bolster up the present company. Again, Londonderry took his advice, commenting to Sir Cuthbert Sharp shortly after the receipt of Buddie's letter, that "it would not do to be the ark to save the drowning men." Sir Cuthbert saw little danger of this happening, for
he replied that "Mowbray would sacrifice the concern rather than
admit your lordship." In fact, Baker of Elemore bought the shares.
Buddle, however, acting on inside information, gleaned from long
conversations with the banker, Edward Backhouse, had hopes of an
opening arising through him for "laying hold" of Hetton, and had
"every reason to believe that he highly favors the idea of your lord­
ship becoming the proprietor of the whole concern." Londonderry
recognised Buddle's rôle in Backhouse's attitude:

"It seems to me...that the best purchaser and the best
security for the money-lenders is such a sterling
concern as ours managed under Buddle, and if I had
money on the concern or possessed shares I declare to
God I would rather yield it up to another, with Buddle
to manage it, and take the security, than labor on in
the mutilated and discordant state the machine must
remain in, so long as the old manager Mowbray is always
scheming and intriguing." [61]

Such hopes were strong enough to delay the transfer of
Londonderry's banking business to a different bank; Buddle reminded
Croudace in writing that he expected Lambton to preserve strict
neutrality in the matter; and he decided to press Backhouse to give
a distinct undertaking to give preference to Londonderry should the
concern come onto the market. Londonderry, for his part, felt that
if the opportunity arose he would give precedence to Hetton over his
nascent plans for Seaham Harbour. Buddle was puzzled by a development
a few weeks later, in January 1824, when Backhouse offered shares to
Buddle if he would take on the management; Buddle was not interested
although the offer was repeated a month later, and the short-lived
and vague hopes of Londonderry being able to acquire the concern, blew
over, for, as Londonderry had already conceded, "I fear..this rotten
co-partnership will struggle on for some years yet."

This marked a turning-point in Londonderry's relations with
Hetton in two respects. The success of its coal having assured the
company of survival, Mowbray applied early in 1824 to buy the
Clutterbuck and Emerson coal from Londonderry. Buddle and Londonderry
eventually decided to try instead to agree with the Hetton Company
for the division of coal and then to sell Londonderry's share to
William Russell of Brancepeth. Londonderry reached agreement with
Russell in October 1824 but the Hetton Company delayed and obstructed
negotiations."[65] After initial dismay, Buddle responded with typical
aplomb. He opened "a sort of bye-play or under-plot" with Tahourdin,
Lyons' solicitor. He cultivated a new acquaintance, Francis Mascall, a barrister whose father was about to let his coal to the Hetton Company, and reported to Londonderry that, "I think I have got the old fox Mowbray and the legal prig into a see-saw" which he hoped would force Hetton to think more favourably of the division. In the meantime, on Buddie's suggestion, Londonderry wrote directly to Captain Cochrane of the Hetton Company, a move that Buddie felt would flatter him, and Buddie volunteered to "replace myself on terms of business friendship with Arthur." This diplomacy was successful, although Buddie was amused by the turn it had taken: "to crown the whole Arthur and I will be getting thick as tinkers." The division and sale were at last completed in April 1825.\textsuperscript{105}

The firm establishment of the Hetton Company early in 1824 marked not merely the end of Londonderry's hopes of interference, but the establishment of the Hetton Company as a major competitor with the Londonderry collieries in the Coal Trade. The Hetton Company wasted no time in making its demands known to the Trade: as early as July 1823 they put in a claim for a basis of 100,000 chaldrons.\textsuperscript{106} Londonderry and Lambton united in opposing such a claim but their joint action against Hetton was short-lived, for by January 1824 it was clear to Buddie that Lambton's personal friendship with Baker and with Captain Cochrane was turning him towards a neutral position, and even to one of alliance with Hetton.\textsuperscript{107}

As in so much of Buddie's business, several tactical considerations were involved in any one situation. When the Hetton Company refused to agree to a division of the coal in December 1824, Buddie echoed his earliest fears about Hetton - that they intended to compete against Londonderry for Rainton - and added,

"My jealousy suggests another reason also - from Lambton's great jealousy of Russell being introduced at all on the South banks of the Wear. There are so many wheels within wheels nowadays, and your lordship's power excites so much envy in the trade, that, one cannot help being suspicious of every channel through which the poison of jealousy or envy may flow by any possibility."\textsuperscript{108}

Lambton's change in attitude towards Hetton hastened the recognition of the rôle it was to play in the Coal Trade. In June 1824, although in the end the Coal Trade meeting had declared the regulation to be at an end, "rather than submit to the clandestine conduct of the Hetton Company," Lambton himself had been prepared to compromise over Hetton's over-vend.\textsuperscript{109} A year later, in June 1825,
Buddie had an opportunity to judge Hetton's powers for himself. He found the colliery in a capital state, with plans for four large double pits, each to have a 50 h.p. winding engine - the largest engines erected at that time for drawing coals: "in two years, if all prospers with them, they will be in a state to raise more coals than either us or Mr. Lambton." He expected Hetton to be able, within two years, to produce 100,000 chaldrons - an increase in supply that no possible increase in demand could absorb and which must necessitate a large reduction in price. By now, Buddie's expectations of Londonderry's becoming the object of both Lambton's and Hetton's jealousy had come true. Moreover, when moves had been made two months previously, in April 1825, to restore the Regulation, it had become abundantly clear that Hetton was to be an enduring power: the demands of the "three choice spirits," Mowbray, Croudace and Buddie, "staggered the small fry". In the middle of June Buddie referred to "the three great concerns, as they are now called, on the Wear."

North Hetton

The inauguration of a definite policy of renewing the Rainton lease, the purchase of the Pittington lease, the acquisition of the three estates at Biddick and West Herrington and the abortive attempts to acquire, or at least to prevent others acquiring, the Hetton colliery, were all implemented within the first three or four years of Londonderry's ownership and Buddie's management of the collieries. The only significant addition made throughout the next twenty years was North Hetton.

North Hetton was the colliery formed on that part of the Hetton coal which Londonderry had acquired from Clutterbuck and Emerson and had subsequently sold to William Russell. Russell took 6/10 shares, Charles Tennyson (his uncle) two, Colonel Grey one and his solicitor, Gregson, one. By the mid 1830s, however, Russell and Tennyson were thoroughly disillusioned by the concern and decided to sell. In May 1836 Buddie heard that the colliery was to be sold to a man named Barrett for £65,000 but that Londonderry could have it for the same price if he wished. Buddie's advice was that Londonderry should have nothing to do with it, but a few days later it was announced that the colliery was sold to a new joint-stock company, to be called the County of Durham Joint Stock Coal Company. It is not clear on whose initiative the move was made but a meeting between Buddle, Morton and
on behalf of Lord Durham, and four members of the Hetton Company, at which they unanimously agreed to purchase the colliery jointly, to preserve their ability to form at least a Regulation of the best Wear collieries. It was the eternal motive of excluding competitors, although by the mid-1830s it was no longer a question of more or less gentlemanly rivalry between "the big three", but of survival against new speculators. Six weeks later, in July 1836, their offer was accepted; possession of the colliery was taken in August and the first Board of Management held in September.

Conclusion

Two and a half years after his appointment as Lord Stewart's manager, in the face of increasing financial difficulties, Buddle looked back over what had been achieved so far in the Londonderry concerns. His policy was clearly stated: Londonderry's "prodigious exertions" had been called forth by circumstances:

"To have omitted to take advantage of such circumstances, for the purpose of extending and securing the interests of a family, whose consequence in this county we may reasonably hope will extend to the latest posterity, could not in my humble judgment have been justified on any grounds whatever."

The response to those circumstances amounted to the renovation of the family colliery property: begun by the renewal of the Rainton colliery lease; furthered by the purchase of Biddick, the baronets' and Dawson's estates, and Seaham; and to be completed by the building of Dalden harbour. Buddle conceded that to a partial or timid observer, the present situation might appear sombre but he contrasted it to the situation in 1819, when the family's freehold mine at Penshaw had been nearly exhausted and the leasehold colliery at Rainton had only six years to run, with no prospect of renewal. Now the latter was filled up to a term of twenty-one years, great additions had been made to the freehold colliery, large sums had been spent in improving and extending the works, and the landed property had also incidentally been increased. Pecuniary difficulties were inevitable, but Buddle expected the finances soon to gain strength and vigour.

The reasons why finances did not permanently improve will be examined in a later chapter, but they were largely unconnected with Buddle's and Londonderry's territorial policy. The essence of the latter was to consolidate and extend the family's interests whenever opportunity arose, regardless of current financial demands, and it
so happened that the major opportunities occurred almost simultaneously within the first three or four years of Buddie's and Londonderry's connection with the collieries."

The situation on the Wear, dominated in the early 1820s by Londonderry and Lambton, lent itself to particularly clearly defined spheres of influence and to a strong consciousness of their importance. As has been seen, Buddie and Londonderry were emphatic that Hetton lay within their sphere. Buddie was just ahead of the Lambton agents in all three purchases – Biddick, the baronets' and Dawson Lambton's – and nearly two years later Buddie felt that Croudace was still not quite rid of his "spleen" over the first two. It may be that the prompt sales of parts of these estates to Lambton was the result of remonstrances by Croudace but the impression is that Buddie took a much more positive line than did Croudace, or even Morton, Croudace's successor. In 1825 Buddie protested to Croudace about Lambton's taking the Littleton and Ravensflat coal:

"I rubbed him down rather smartly on this indelicate affair and unneighbourly proceeding, and made him admit that he had come too much upon our skirts with regard to the Ravensflat, and he felt it so strongly as to say that if it interfered with our line of operations, in connecting our other property, they would give it up to us." 119

In 1831 Morton took the West Grange or Kepier coal, near Durham City, for Lambton (now Lord Durham) which Buddie again considered "unneighbourly" as he had told Morton he expected to take it for Londonderry. Morton was a tougher proposition than Croudace but Buddie thought he could "bamboozle him and lead him such a life about it that in the end he may be glad to give it up to us." 120 Such an attitude epitomises the extent to which Buddie negotiated and acted on behalf of his employer, and also thought and planned for "his" family, identifying entirely with its interests. 120
Seaham Harbour

"The very thoughts of it almost make me 'dance in my shoes'."  

Seaham Harbour was one of the great interests and pleasures of Buddie's work for Londonderry and even of his whole career. The details of the undertaking fall outside the scope of this study but as the port and railway were designed specifically to confirm Londonderry's pre-eminence as a coal owner, an examination of Buddie's contribution provides a microcosm of his work as an agent in the coal trade: his motivation, the range and limitations of his vision, his responsibilities and achievements, and the inter-action of his relations with his employer.

Seaham Harbour was built by Lord Londonderry between 1828 and 1831 (with considerable later improvements) at a point on the Durham coast near the village of Dalden, or Dawdon, where a natural cove formed an ideal site about five miles south of Sunderland. The suitability of this site for a harbour had been recognised as early as 1817; the civil engineer, William Chapman, had drafted plans for "port Milbanke" for the then owner in 1820, over a year before Lord Stewart bought the estate, and although the harbour was not started until 1828, Buddie and his employer aimed for the construction of a harbour as soon as the purchase was completed in 1821. The building of the harbour was accompanied by the laying of a railway to link it with the Londonderry collieries at Rainton about seven miles inland.

Sunderland had always been the centre of the coal trade for those collieries within reach of the Wear, rivalled in the north-east coal trade only by Newcastle and its Tyne coals a few miles to the north. The coals were carried down the river by keel to Sunderland; one or two collieries - Nesham's Newbottle colliery and later the Lambton and Hetton collieries - led their coals by railway directly to Sunderland. The Londonderry collieries, however, particularly Rainton, lay in the immediate hinter-land of Seaham: were the new harbour built, a railway providing a short, cheap independent overland
route to the ships would also be feasible. To this extent, therefore, Seaham was intended as a rival even to Sunderland: the Londonderry trade, the greatest on the Wear, would gradually be transferred to Seaham.

During the 1820s the only other port of any significance in Durham (other than South Shields which was chiefly connected with the Tyne trade) was Stockton, twenty-five miles to the south of Sunderland, on the other great Durham river, the Tees. By the time that work was at last started on Seaham, the Stockton-Darlington railway, opening up the coal field in the south of the county, was already enabling the Tees to develop into a force to be reckoned with by the Tyne and Wear. Of more urgent concern to Seaham itself, however, as the deep seams of coal under the magnesian limestone in its hinterland were opened up, was the development in the early 1830s of the port of Hartlepool, barely twelve miles south along the coast and also served by its own railway. During the same period, the Durham and Sunderland Railway succeeded in providing direct access to Sunderland for the coal field to the north-east of Durham City.

During the second half of the nineteenth century there grew up at Seaham Harbour, brick and glass works and blast furnaces; the Londonderry Railway was built to link it with the Durham and Sunderland Railway and the harbour itself was extended and improved, and still functions. But although there was no question of the contribution it made to the Londonderry coal trade, even in its hey-day it never equalled the general importance of its younger contemporaries, Hartlepool and Middlesbrough, let alone the strongholds of Stockton and Sunderland.

Buddle's attitude to the Harbour, like his lasting preference for pit work, confirms that he felt himself to be an engineer above all else: "this great job interests me the longer the more and keeps both head and hands at work." The rapidity with which he could familiarise himself with all aspects of a scheme, was revealed more in this undertaking than in any other: "my schemes for making it work to advantage in various ways are quite endless. My prayer is, for patience, to enable me to wait with becoming decency until it is possible to set it going." He assured Lady Londonderry that "as to asking me one thousand or ten thousand questions on this subject, your ladyship need not be under the slightest concern, or have any scruples, as I can talk about it with pleasure from morning till night. In short I
talk about nothing else.." Even Lord Londonderry, far less inclined to caution than was Buddie, responded to Buddie's suggestion that Lord Seaham could perhaps lay the foundation stone of the south pier only a year after work was started, with the comment, "it is a capital settlement but you must be a d--d bold fellow to propose it and dream we shall accomplish it." Buddie's reply was simply, "I really think I never saw my way more clearly in any undertaking than I do in this."

The first mention of Seaham in Buddie's letters to Lord Stewart was on 16th November 1821 when he merely commented that he was glad that Stewart was considering its purchase. Buddie frequently brought to Londonderry's attention suitable properties for extending or consolidating the family's coal property; at this same period he was negotiating for estates at South Biddick and West Herrington. It is clear that in the case of Seaham, too, the initiative had come from Buddie. Three days after his first reference to Seaham, the estate was sold by Doyle and Lushington, trustees for Sir Ralph Noel, to John Dyke, agent for John Gregson. The manipulations lying behind this transaction were explained by Lord Stewart, writing to one of the Grooms, the London solicitors:

"The quiet purchase which we have made here is completed and we have to give £63,000 for the Seaham estate. Dr. Lushington had the sale of it. It was necessary therefore as I always fall foul of him to keep me in the background. Gregson had bought or rather wanted to buy the property for £60,000. If he, in his circumstances would have given this sum, the property for our position can not be dear. Gregson handed the property to me when Buddie made such an immense point of it as affording here-after a harbour for our coals to be shipped from."

A few days later he again emphasised Buddie's rôle in persuading him to embark on such a large purchase: "the purchase is naturally an immense pull upon me now, but I feel satisfied that I am acting right about it, as it promises under Buddie's speculations an immense return." When it became clear that Lord Stewart, not Gregson, was the purchaser, Lushington requested an explanation of the negotiations leading to the purchase and although he maintained that he would have had no objection to Lord Stewart, Gregson commented, "they are not very well pleased that we have succeeded in the purchase." The phrasing suggests that the purchase had been a joint manoeuvre between Stewart and Gregson (who was his country solicitor), but Gregson assured Lushington that Lord Stewart had not known of Gregson's
proposed purchase until "a very few days before its termination" and that "at a very late period his lordship was advised that the projected harbour may hereafter be of importance, and became desirous of having that part of the estate;" Gregson had therefore agreed to divide the estate with Lord Stewart." Lushington, had he known that the value of the portion retained by Gregson amounted to only £4,750 out of the total of £63,000, could not have been convinced by this explanation. Whatever the exact course of the arrangement between Stewart and Gregson, however, Buddle, who was associated with Gregson through their joint work for the Russells of Brancepeth as well as through Stewart's affairs, clearly played a central role.

Buddle's reasons for purchasing Seaham were an expression of his basic motivation in his service to Lord Stewart - the protection and enlargement of the family's fortunes. "It has seldom happened," he wrote, "that such an opportunity has occurred for the aggrandizement of a family, at comparatively so small a cost, as is presented by the construction of this harbour," particularly as "the landed property is manifestly too small...to support efficiently Lord Seaham and the Wynyard establishment." Buddle envisaged that the Seaham Harbour and railway would compete in the general coal trade of the area. This was an attitude not originally shared by Londonderry. In 1824, when William Russell of Brancepeth suggested sharing the cost and the use of the harbour and railway, Buddle told him that Londonderry "never contemplated the accommodating of any person...as it was entirely projected as a private speculation," and Londonderry's objections to Russell's proposal were overcome only by Buddle's reassurance that Russell was suggesting joint exclusive use, not a public railway like the Stockton project. Londonderry, however, was won round to Buddle's view for he later told Sir Cuthbert Sharp (Collector of the Customs at Sunderland) that he had always thought "that another port between Stockton and Sunderland is indispensable," and at the foundation-stone ceremony in 1828 he declared that he was building the harbour "less for his own advantage than for serving the public, and for advancing the commercial interests of the county of Durham." By the time that a start was made on the Seaham Harbour and railway, the Stockton-Darlington railway was well established; Buddle was already keeping a close eye on the trade of Stockton and had been told by a reliable source that the Tees would become "a formidable rival of the Tyne and Wear." Nevertheless, in 1828 Buddle still had a vision of the future more enthusiastic than well-judged:
"The collieries it is to be hoped will last for many years, but still the time will arrive when they must be exhausted, and cease to be productive. Not so, however, with the Harbour, as it is evidently the most eligible shipping place on the coast, not only for the best part of the great coal-field between the Wear and the Tees, but also for the produce of the lead-mines in Weardale etc. It cannot therefore fail to be a source of revenue to the family for long and long after the collieries, to which it is to be the outlet in the first instance, have become extinct. At a future period it will, I have no doubt, become the parent of a publick railway thro' the very heart of the county."

Within a few years, however, there arose a closer rival in the new port of Hartlepool. Buddle and Morton co-operated in mustering opposition to the Hartlepool railway locally while their employers opposed the Bill in Parliament; Morton urged "it will ruin us all if it be carried." Yet a year later, in 1833, Buddle still clung to his opinion that Hartlepool - "a Quixotic scheme" - and Middlesbrough - "a baby house affair" - could not compete with Seaham, which he had no doubt would become "the general shipping place for coals from the adjacent country." John Rennie, however, had told Londonderry only shortly after the beginning of work on the harbour in 1828, that Seaham would never do for "any national or general purpose" for which Hartlepool was far superior: Seaham could only be a private shipping place for coal. The same conclusion was drawn by the solicitor, Richard Groom (representing the interests of Lord Seaham), when discussing in 1834 the suggestion that the trustees under the marriage settlement should sell the Rainton and Pittington collieries, "amounting to a withdrawal from the Coal Trade," and use the proceeds to purchase Seaham Harbour from Londonderry. The opinion of Cartwright, another adviser, was the same:

"Mr. Cartwright thinks the value of the Harbour as a possession independent of the family colliery concerns very questionable."

Although Londonderry's original idea of the harbour as a private shipping place had been sacrificed long ago to the need to share its cost and its facilities, any ambitions of widening its importance lay in abeyance until 1835-6 when moves were made to open it for the general shipment of coal. Then, it will be seen, only three years after Buddle's summary dismissal of Hartlepool, specific measures had to be considered to enable Seaham to compete with a newer port. Henceforth Londonderry kept a jealous eye on Seaham's position vis-a-vis
its rival - in 1838, for example, Buddle had to investigate allegations by him that the South Hetton Company, under contract to ship some of its coals at Seaham, was giving undue preference to Hartlepool.\[22\]

Not only did Buddle and Londonderry hope to establish Seaham as a port of general importance between Sunderland and Stockton, but they also clung to an over-optimistic view of the railway and harbour as a means of checking the colliery and railway speculations which became an increasing source of concern to the established coal owners and wayleave proprietors. At the end of 1822 Buddle regretted that a start had not been possible immediately the estate was bought as he felt that such a move would have deterred the Stockton and Darlington Railway promoters and perhaps at the same time have made possible some financial backing from Edward Backhouse's bank which now, however, was committed to the Stockton Railway. By the following April (1823) when Buddle still hoped to break ground that summer, which "might be of some importance in checking that spirit of speculation which is now getting so much abroad in the county", his immediate concern was the rumour that a group led by Thomas Braddyll, and including Arthur Mowbray, was also contemplating the building of a harbour. In July 1824 another opportunity occurred, so Buddle thought, to hinder the Stockton railway when William Russell suggested that if he could ship his North Hetton coals through Seaham, he would drop his support of the Stockton railway.\[22\] All matters, however, then lay in abeyance until renewed attempts at finding sources of finance were made in 1828, and by that time Buddle was hoping "if we could only make a demonstration on the ground this summer, that it would completely knock the Clarence Railway on the head."\[24\]

Buddle's most enthusiastic views of the general importance of Seaham Harbour were never justified, but his more usual attitude to the enterprise was to consider it a vital contribution to his basic policy that the future prosperity of the Londonderry family depended upon the preservation of its ascendancy in the coal trade, and in this he was fully supported by Cartwright, one of Londonderry's London advisers:

"The united properties of the Harbour, Pittington and Rainton operate upon the value of each other in a manner to make the whole of immense value."\[25\]

Buddle saw the harbour and railway as the "chef d'oeuvre of our colliery
operations. It will give us the whip-hand of all our rivals."\(^{26}\) As the years passed the accomplishment of the project appeared of increasing importance for, as he told Londonderry, he believed it was "the only thing we can look to, to enable us to keep at the head of the trade of the Wear for any length of time to come." By the end of 1829, after a disastrous year of unregulated trade, Buddie urged that "the accomplishing of the Harbour is of vital importance - it is death, or victory, with us."\(^{27}\)

The basic contribution that Buddie expected the railway and harbour to make to the Londonderry coal trade was the saving of expense in leading and shipping the coals. In 1823 Buddie estimated for Telford that the cost of leading the coal along the six miles of the proposed railway to Seaham would be 3\(^1/4\)d per chaldron, as opposed to 8\(^6/9\)d per chaldron for moving it by railway to the staiths on the Wear (five miles) and then by keel to Sunderland (seven miles). On 50,000 chaldrons annually this would amount to over £13,000 and, as Buddie told Telford, this was the minimum envisaged. Actual shipments in 1823 were 120,000 chaldrons and these could all be shipped through the Harbour if it were made capable of handling them.\(^{28}\) At this period, the introduction of the tub system in place of the normal keels had only just begun, but even on a more conservative estimate by Buddie in 1828, by which time the proportion of tubs to keels, at Sunderland, was eight to three (with the tubs saving 1/- per chaldron) the net annual saving expected from Seaham Harbour still amounted to £10,000.\(^{29}\) Moreover, Buddie told Telford, the railway would put the harbour into communication with all the Londonderry collieries, embracing six thousand acres of "colliery ground."

Buddie also attached great importance to the fact that "the Harbour once in operation, frosts, snows and floods would have no terror for us."\(^{30}\) Without it, the amount of vend was regularly affected each December, January and February by the freezing of the Wear and the subsequent flooding - a particularly serious consideration when Lambton and the Hetton Company were freely shipping by spout at Sunderland.

A basic corollary to reduced costs and greater freedom from the weather was the possibility of claiming an additional quantity under the Regulation. Buddie noted this immediately he heard of Stewart's proposed purchase of the estate: "it may eventually lead to the establishment of a new port and additional vend of coals entirely
distinct from the present Sunderland establishment." Lambton's agent, Croudace, evidently feared such a development almost as soon as Buddle hoped for it. He at first dismissed the harbour plans as a "visionary project," but within two months, according to Buddle, both Lambton and Croudace appeared "under some sort of alarm" about it. When Croudace was at last clearly told by Buddle of the intention to ship the Londonderry coals at Seaham,

"all his passions were at once excited. The combined feelings of envy and jealousy...operated so powerfully that I was apprehensive lest he should expire on the spot. In his ravings he vowed that the example of a harbour at Dalden would be a bait to lure all the adventurers in the country to win collieries wherever an acre of coal was to be found, and to make harbours in every creek on the coast, and therefore entirely ruin our own colliery concerns...I pacified him by contending that...I thought the more demonstration your lordship and Mr. Lambton made of extending your works on a magnificent scale, the less likelihood there would be of interlopers interfering with us."

As Buddle recognised, however, the real reason for "poor Croudace's anguish arises from the apprehensions that we shall take 40,000 to 50,000 chaldrons a year to Dalden, over and above what we may vend at Sunderland."

The appeal that the Harbour made to two of Buddle's most basic characteristics - his love of engineering and his dedication to serving the interests of the Vane-Tempest family by strengthening its position as a coal owner - caused his rôle in the enterprise to be far greater than might have been expected of a colliery agent. Indeed, Buddle was driven to point out many years later, when excess expenditure on the Harbour was one of several accusations by Londonderry that caused a long and bitter rift in their relationship in 1841, that, "by-the-bye," he did not think the "engineering department" was "strictly within the line of my duty" as a colliery manager. Despite this retrospective observation, Buddle had entered with enthusiasm into the undertaking. It was settled immediately that he was to supervise it and his involvement embraced every sphere - the harbour, the railway linking it to the collieries, the town, and the finances - and may conveniently be considered under those heads.

The Harbour

Although problems of finance delayed breaking the ground for the harbour until September 1828, it was originally intended to begin work immediately after the purchase of the estate in November 1821.
Within ten days of hearing of the completion of the purchase, Buddie had studied the report drawn up in 1820 for Sir Ralph Noel, by William Chapman, the engineer, for a projected harbour. Early in 1822 Buddie and Chapman had borings made and traced out the outlines of the harbour. Buddie rapidly gained confidence in his ability to cope with this new sphere: "I now think myself so much master of the subject, as to venture to commence operations without Mr. Chapman's personal attendance, should it be necessary." Plans formulated at this stage, at a meeting between Lord Stewart, Buddie and Chapman, were for a small harbour capable of shipping 20,000 to 30,000 chaldrons per annum, later to become part of a larger scheme, and to be started as soon as possible after May 1822.

Early in April 1822, however, the financial position forced Buddie to urge that work on the harbour, as well as on the house at Wynyard, be suspended for at least a year so that the colliery profits could be applied solely to the liquidation of mortgages on new purchases. Conferences between Chapman and Buddie were then resumed in January 1823; Buddie was hopeful that arrangements might be far enough advanced for Londonderry to lay the foundation stone during the summer, and by June, Chapman was working in situ and preparing to meet contractors with a view to gaining estimates. Plans were thus well advanced when, at Londonderry's suggestion, Buddie sought the opinions of John Rennie and Thomas Telford in September and October 1823, and found that although they agreed with Chapman's basic plan, they both recommended stronger piers and complete excavation of the south basin, with a full pier rather than a breakwater, at a greatly increased cost. Rennie pointed out that he was accustomed to large government harbours and could not risk his reputation for the sake of economy, and Chapman remained convinced that his own plan was still feasible. Buddie, however, while prepared to examine similar small harbours and to try to ascertain what improvements were essential, immediately felt the need for great caution. By the end of the year his counsel of caution had prevailed, and the problems of finance delayed the beginning of work on the harbour for another five years.

In September 1828 Londonderry and Buddie made the decision quite suddenly to go ahead; within a few days Buddie had marked out the ground for the "advanced guard" to begin work; Chapman joined him on the 12th September and the ground was broken on the 15th September. Henceforth the work progressed with remarkable speed and with considerable éclat. Buddie was particularly alive to the importance of the latter: "it is political effect which we aim at in the first instance."
Plan of proposed harbour at Dalden Ness
28 October 1823
Based on DRO, J/Lo/E 573 (10).
This attitude was partly prompted by his hopes of discouraging the Clarence Railway but he was in any case always attentive to the family's public relations. He reported with delight that "Sunderland is in commotion and tag rag and bobtail are swarming over to see, really 'if the news is true'." He allowed the erection of booths to serve as taverns for the workmen quartered in the farm-houses and to take advantage of the fair-ground atmosphere each Sunday. He was already, barely ten days after the commencement of work, producing elaborate ideas for a foundation stone ceremony, and he continued to report with delight the "machinery and exertion, with all the bustle and yo-hi>-aying at low water to get the foundation blocks laid before the tide returns," and such incidents as Captain Cochrane of the Hetton Company placing a wager of one hundred guineas on the harbour shipping coal within three years.

The foundation stone was laid by Lord Londonderry on 26th November 1828, ten weeks after the work had begun. Buddie acted as major domo, arranging everything from the guest lists to the beef and beer for the workmen and the supervision of the "household officers." Ten days beforehand he noted with great satisfaction that "the thing is causing an immense sensation in the country, and there will be such an assemblage of people as was almost never before witnessed." The proceedings on the day marked one of several occasions when Londonderry paid public tribute to Buddie and when the agent figured nearly as largely as his employer. Buddie's work on Seaham Harbour - at least until the mid-1830s - always attracted Londonderry's most fulsome appreciation in private; it can also be surmised that on public occasions Londonderry took pride in his employment of a well-known expert. Nevertheless, his attitude towards Buddie on this occasion may have been prompted by suggestions made by Sir Cuthbert Sharp with whom Londonderry agreed that,

"In fact it is his work, his action, his creation and his merit alone. I cannot write all I wish or would say to him, it might look like flattery, but I wish you to..arrange..that the valuable name of John Buddle stands recorded on the official engravings etc. in the most conspicuous manner." 43

The ceremony was opened by a speech by Buddie on his presenting to Lord Londonderry a silver trowel, engraved with an inscription and a plan of the harbour, and with a handle of polished Rainton coal. After a speech by Sir Cuthbert, Londonderry then laid
the foundation stone over a glass case containing a brass plate, the inscription on which included the words,

"In this undertaking, the Founder has been chiefly advised by the tried Experience and indefatigable Industry of his valued Friend and Agent, John Buddie Esq. of Wallsend."

In his speech, while paying tribute to "the well-known talents and ingenuity of our distinguished Civil Engineer Mr. Chapman," Londonderry declared, "in the face of the county, that to my excellent friend and agent Mr. Buddie, and to his talents and comprehensive mind, this project chiefly owes its present existence - to him I attribute the merit of launching me in this undertaking."  

As Londonderry acknowledged, Buddie had exercised general supervision over the building of the harbour and was to continue to do so until his death fifteen years later. From the start he had accompanied Chapman on his visits to the cove to decide the lay-out of the harbour. Even in the early 1820s Chapman was already a highly experienced and reputable engineer, but this had not deterred Buddie from his wish to examine Scarborough harbour, "to satisfy myself of the efficacy of his plan of building the breakwaters."

Again, when confronted in 1823 by Rennie's and Telford's recommendation of modifications to Chapman's plan, Buddie had expected to be able to learn a great deal from personal inspection of various small Irish harbours, although he was careful to add that it would be presumptuous to imagine that he alone could then decide on the most eligible plan for Seaham. By the time the foundation stone was at last laid in 1828 Chapman's experience and reputation had grown even further - Seaham Harbour was to be his last work, for he died in 1832 - but Buddie still ventured to involve himself fully in the engineering. In November 1828, for example, he took up a suggestion by Logan (the engineer at Donaghadee harbour in Ireland, sent over to Seaham by Londonderry so that Buddie could "suck his brain") of building a coffer dam to facilitate the construction of the inner harbour, and extended the idea to enable the basin to be deepened to five to ten feet below the water mark which, with the aid of a dredging machine, would allow the ships to remain afloat at low water. Chapman showed little enthusiasm for Buddie's "pet notion" but it was apparently adopted.

A staff was gradually established at the Harbour but no resident engineer was appointed either to act under Chapman or to take charge of the extensions and improvements after his death. On
Seaham Harbour
by Thomas Nicholson, November 1834
Based on DRO, D/Lo/E 605
Nicholson, the master mason, was invested in 1828 with the duties of a "clerk of works" and apparently performed them quite satisfactorily, inspite of the fact that Londonderry remarked many years later that he had never considered Nicholson a proper person to be in command at Seaham.* In the early stages of the Harbour, Buddie also employed a young colliery viewer to make surveys, measure out the contract work and supervise the workmen, and in later years an establishment, including a superintendent fitter and fitting-office clerks, grew up to deal with the trade of the harbour. These were all, however, essentially subordinates; the supervisory role in both the engineering and the managerial departments was reserved to Buddie. After Chapman's death Buddie had intended asking Telford to act as "consulting engineer" but Telford's health preventing his even visiting Seaham to report on it for the Exchequer Bill Loan Office; instead he relied on plans and estimates furnished by Buddie, having such confidence in the latter's "judgement, experience and integrity." Consequently the great amount of work done after Chapman's death - the completion of the long south pier forming the south harbour opening off the inner harbour, and the completion of the south dock with entrances from both the outer and the south harbours - was under Buddie's sole supervision.

The Railway

The railway from the collieries at Rainton to the harbour was an integral part of Buddie's project. He drafted a route for the railway and began surveys and wayleave negotiations at the same time as his earliest plans for the harbour, and was emphatic that the harbour and railway be treated as a single project, including in the crucial matter of the Exchequer Bill Loan, particularly as the greater part of the loan would be spent on the railway in the first instance. As with the harbour, Buddie took the widest possible view of the importance of the railway, particularly when dealing with potential wayleave lessors; as early as 1821 he told one, "that the opening out of the country by railway could not but be highly beneficial to all landed proprietors thro' whose property it might have to pass," and that therefore they should offer favourable wayleaves to induce Lord Stewart to embark in such an expensive project.

During the second half of 1822, Lord Stewart and Buddie approved a proposal by Benjamin Thompson for laying a railway and
leading the coals to Dalden by contract. In the meantime, however, Buddie would not abandon the alternative project of sharing the old waggonway from Newbottle to Sunderland; this, followed by Thompson's line to Dalden, Buddie envisaged, "would give us the ascendancy over all others, in the shipping of coals." By May 1823 Buddie's wayleave negotiations were nearing completion and he was making detailed surveys of the line, when financial problems caused the railway to be shelved, with the harbour, until 1828. Londonderry then decided to build both railway and harbour entirely out of his own resources. Less than a month after work was begun, however, Buddie was approached by William Harrison (who was later connected with the Stanhope and Tyne Railway) with a proposal for constructing the railway and carrying the coal by contract. Buddie recommended that it be considered to release all resources for the harbour, and Londonderry immediately agreed. After considerable negotiations over the term for redemption (finally agreeing on Londonderry's having an option after nine years) Buddie concluded the contract with Harrison in November 1828. Londonderry responded to "the perfecting and final conclusion of our great contract...the sealing of our vast operation...completed in every part with all your zeal, watchfulness and consummate ability" with a gift of a bay colt, to be called "Contracts." The celebrations, however, were premature: Shakespear Reed, Harrison's financial backer, attempted to withdraw on the grounds that his wife disliked his involvement in business speculation. Londonderry and Buddie remained firm with "little Shakey" but, nevertheless, Harrison's financial backing appears to have collapsed. After "a long and solitary ramble over the harbour," Londonderry responded in characteristic fashion: "Let us...rip up our own way and lay it at once towards Seaham...take the whole into our own fist. Pitch Shakey and Co. to the devil." Buddie replied, just as characteristically, that "the greatness and boldness" of Londonderry's suggestion "makes me a little nervous," especially as building at Wynyard was to continue and recent purchases of land had to be paid for. A week later, however, his head "quite full of railway scheming," Buddie suggested that "if Shakey would lend us £10,000 as a bonus for letting him off," they could after all build the railway themselves. In the end this was not achieved but instead - Harrison having faded from the scene - Shakespear Reed and Thompson, the contractor originally proposed in 1822, were brought into contact and reached agreement.
in April 1829, Reed providing the finance and Thompson organising the work. Work was at last begun in July 1829.\textsuperscript{57}

Although Buddie welcomed the financial relief brought about by letting the railway under contract, he declared that "I shall not die in peace unless I see the way clearly open to the whole concern being entirely your lordship's own property."\textsuperscript{60} At the end of Thompson's term considerable difficulties were experienced over the valuation of the railway, but Buddie was at last able to take possession of the railway for Londonderry in January 1841.\textsuperscript{61}

The Town

Plans for a carefully designed town which might "rise with the harbour" were contemplated as early as February 1822 and by March 1823 Buddie had hit upon the idea of granting building leases both to help finance the harbour and to encourage the establishment of a "colony" - "to the great benefit of the Seaham estate."\textsuperscript{62} Plans and projects then gathered momentum. Sir Henry Hardinge having expressed the opinion that the site of the town was admirably suited for a bathing place, Buddie promptly elaborated on an idea of using the steam engine which would be needed to remove ballast from the ships, to circulate hot or cold sea-water, for "plunging or shower baths," to every house in the town and every room in the hotel. Despite such hopeful visions Buddie was above all cautious and economical. Only the following day he dismissed Chapman's suggestion that workmen's houses should be built and an inspector of works employed, in favour of waiting until finances were clarified and then having the houses built by contract under the supervision of the existing master mason.\textsuperscript{63} A later suggestion by Buddie in 1828 combined both vision and economy: he proposed that the sewage be discharged into tanks and used on the Seaham estate, and that the latter should also have the right to all manure in the town except where a tenant also farmed Londonderry land, in which case he should be bound to lay his manure there.\textsuperscript{64}

In addition to his interest in such details, Buddie was as fully involved in planning the town with the architect, John Dobson, as he was in the harbour and railway, accompanying Dobson on his initial surveys in 1823 and taking a keen interest in plans for the town when the project was revived in 1828.\textsuperscript{65} He again suggested building leases, proposing in September 1828 to sell forty-two acres at 4/- or 5/- per square yard; by November he modified this to 3½d per square yard.
The only impediment to such a plan was the lack of a fixed site and plan for the town, so Buddie suggested that an architect be employed to revise Dobson's crescent-shaped plan. Buddie also proposed that at some distance from the town there ought to be "a village of neat houses for the sailors, pilots, carpenters etc." with the site perhaps let on leases for lives "so as to give the lessees the power of voting for the County members. This might add greatly to the family influence in the County." The latter aspect proved impossible for legal reasons, and Londonderry - anxious to avoid any delay - disagreed that Dobson's plan needed revision. Londonderry also disliked Buddie's suggestion about the separate workmen's houses as he wished as many houses as possible to be built in the town itself to "produce effect and action." These views apparently underwent some modification, however, for not long afterwards, in reply to Dobson's suggestion that the quality of the town should be to the south of the harbour, Londonderry maintained instead that it ought to be near to Seaham Hall, "so to place the raff and ragamuffins and cabins etc. at this northern side would never do." Buddie and Londonderry also disagreed over the question of an inn which Londonderry was emphatic should be built immediately "by hook or by crook" for the accommodation of family visitors in the winter. Buddie was loth to divert £2,000 from the primary objects and it took him nearly three weeks so to convince Londonderry.

In October 1828 Buddie hoped that £10,000 in each of the following two years might be forthcoming from the sale of building leases. By July 1832, however, only sixty-six plots had been taken and one hundred houses built. The population continued to grow - from 138 in 1821 to 2017 in 1841, but the year of open trade in 1829 and the financial problems of the 1830s forced the concentration of all resources on the prime objects, and consideration of the town faded. As Buddie said in 1838, "the building and attaching of ships to the Harbour, is the true, the only way in fact of promoting the building of houses, and the business and prosperity of the Town."71

The Finance

As in Buddie's colliery work, the only reservation in his enjoyment of the enterprise was the problem of finance:

"The doing of the work really appears to me, like nothing, the financial part of the business alone seems to burden my mind and to give it incessant occupation. If it was not for this, my heart would be as light as a feather and I could whistle and sing over it from noon 'till night, great as the undertaking is."72
Financial uncertainty was anathema to Buddie who was, at least in financial matters, predominantly cautious. As has already been seen, the importance he attached to the Harbour did not cloud his appreciation of its financial demands. Nevertheless, this amalgam of enthusiasm and caution, combined with Londonderry's rôle, resulted in some curious vacillations in their approach to the Harbour finances which it will be helpful to summarise before/chronological sequence.

There were two issues to be decided - the question of building by contractors or by direct labour, and the question of either external or internal finance. It will be seen that although the original scheme was for the work to be done by contractors who would be paid from colliery resources, from an early stage both Buddie and Londonderry preferred the idea of direct labour under internal control, and it was this ideal which they at last achieved with their almost impetuous start on the harbour in September 1828. The strange Robertson-Braddyll interlude in 1826-28, on which the conclusion cannot be avoided that eagerness to have the work begun caused judgement to succumb to enthusiasm, was the exception which proved the rule. The reversion to using contractors for the railway in 1828-29 was, on the other hand, a more studied decision designed to release capital for the harbour. Even after this decision, however, as has been seen, both Londonderry, and to a smaller extent, Buddie, were briefly tempted to try again the idea of direct labour and private finance for the railway, before a contract was at last concluded.

The choice between internal and external finance was a more complex question as there was a variety of alternatives. Londonderry's attitude varied considerably. He tended to prefer expedients such as a further mortgage or raising money on a life annuity - the types of commitment of which he already had too many. Yet, although he disliked Buddie's scheme in 1822-23 of external finance from a company, in 1826 he told Sir Cuthbert Sharp that "if I could find some friends as share-holders...I think we should not be long in giving the object a trial. If old Mowbray had this, he would get shareholders forthwith, but I have less genius for looking out for extraneous aid." Despite the success of the Exchequer Bill Loan negotiations in 1823, Londonderry still contemplated in 1828 the possibilities of raising finance among the monied people in London and it was not until 1832 that the Exchequer Bill Loan scheme was revived. Buddie's attitude, on the other hand, was governed by the
consistent aim that the harbour and railway should pay for themselves. His ideal was to find the initial capital privately (from the sale of non-investment property and from colliery proceeds) but he was more ready than Londonderry to consider schemes for external finance so long as they were consonant with his "self-paying principle"—whether his abortive company scheme, or his initiation of the Exchequer Bill Loan on the security of the harbour, or the granting of transport and shipping facilities to other concerns on payment of a toll.

It was this approach which eventually governed the financing of the harbour, as will be seen from the following chronological account.

The early estimates for a small harbour capable of future extension were about £7,000 plus about £6,000 for the outer piers. Buddle's view of the finances at this time was that sales of "some of the remote parts of the property" would relieve the pressure of recent mortgages and that henceforth the coal trade and prudent economy in every department would "complete the great work." By April 1822, however, it became clear that all colliery resources would be needed to meet mortgage repayments, and he therefore recommended to Londonderry the suspension of operations, both at the Harbour and on the building of the house at Wynyard, for a year.

Towards the end of 1822, when Buddle was beginning to feel that if the Wynyard building were to be recommenced during 1823, then the railway would have to be deferred for yet another year, he reminded Londonderry of the proposal that Thompson made earlier in the year for building the railway and leading the coal to Sunderland and Dalden by contract. Being so closely linked with Dalden, the proposal forced urgent consideration of sources of finance for the harbour. It had apparently been presumed in early discussions that the harbour would be built by contractors; they were mentioned in February 1822 and again when plans were revived a year later. Thompson's proposal, however, now caused Buddle to consider various schemes of finance during the winter of 1822-23. His favourite was "to have the money raised in the way of a bridge or canal company, by letting it out in shares" with an option to buy up the shares after a few years. He suggested thirty shares of £500 each (presuming the harbour to cost about £15,000), and the shareholders' interest of 10% to be secured by a toll on the coals; he was attracted by the idea of launching the company in Sunderland rather than in London.
in order to give the ship-owners and fitters an interest in the success of the harbour. Buddie kept this plan in view for some months because of the difficulties of raising money internally, but Londonderry preferred the idea of a second mortgage and was reluctant to consider any form of external finance; Buddie agreed in principle that private finance would be the most satisfactory course.

In May 1823, however, Buddie produced the idea which, several years later, was in fact to provide much of the capital for the undertaking. He remembered a system of "parliamentary loans" introduced in 1817 for works which would give employment to the labouring classes and suggested that a loan of £10,000 to £15,000 from this source would enable the work to be done "within ourselves," "which I should decidedly prefer to having either the railway or harbour done by contract." Although Thompson was still in play and Chapman was preparing to meet contractors prior to estimates being submitted, both Londonderry and Buddie had evidently moved right away from the original assumption that the work should be done by contract.

For the next three months Buddie was occupied with the application to the Exchequer Bill Loan Commissioners. The loan was to be for £20,000 on Londonderry's personal security, with possible collateral security from the surplus value of the Seaham estate over the existing mortgage of £35,000; the term of repayment was eight years, which Buddie considered highly objectionable but which was apparently the best that could be obtained on such security. Buddie, however, suggested that repayment should not start until the works were completed, care being taken to spend the loan "in the most procrastinated manner possible, so as to protract the term of repayment to the utmost extent," and possibly receiving the loan in instalments to avoid having to lodge it in a bank at a reduced rate of interest.

The loan was eventually granted at the beginning of September 1823 but as hopes rose of being able to begin work on the harbour, Londonderry suggested taking the opinion of John Rennie, as well as that of the Commissioners' engineer, Telford. Estimates of the cost had already grown since the estimate of February 1822; in addition to the £20,000 loan Londonderry would have to find £20,000 over two years for the railway. The modifications that Rennie recommended in his report swelled the estimated cost of the harbour to £42,000 -
double the current estimates. As Buddie wrote to Telford, "you will readily conceive that I do not feel very comfortable on the occasion, and I have no doubt of its being an unexpected result to Lord Londonderry's mind. I therefore feel very much embarrassed what course to advise his lordship to take." Pointing out to Telford that Rennie's estimate would require an advance of £45,000 from Londonderry in addition to the proposed Exchequer Loan, in order to build both harbour and railway, he requested Telford's opinion on asking for an increased loan. Telford replied that it should be possible to obtain £40,000 from the Commissioners, but Buddie doubted the prudence of entering into so large an engagement and the whole plan was in fact shelved soon afterwards.

A major consideration of Buddie's was the fact that Londonderry was also set upon rebuilding the house at Wynyard — a point which Buddie mentioned to Telford. This problem had also partly caused the postponement in 1822-23 and it was to remain a persistent difficulty. Years later, when Londonderry's whole financial situation was causing Buddie intense anxiety and Londonderry defended his expenditure as having been on family objects, that is, the house and harbour, Buddie reflected that "the only particular in which I have differed with your lordship has been as to the order in which these objects have been pursued. The Harbour, in my humble judgement, ought to have come first — it is to produce income — the other is dead-weight — but I have, I fear, on various occasions said more on this subject than in strict propriety became me." At the end of 1823 another consideration which later proved to be abortive, was the possibility of the Hetton colliery coming on to the market. As early as 23rd October — shortly after the receipt of Rennie's report — Londonderry told Sir Cuthbert Sharp that "the accounts I have of my harbor are most favourable. But if I thought Hetton would be at market I might pause." It was apparently this to which Buddie referred when he wrote to Telford early in December that delays were being caused by "certain collateral circumstances tending greatly to enhance the importance of the Harbour." The basic financial problem, however, was already showing itself as being simply overspending, regardless of major items such as Wynyard or of potential objects such as Hetton. Buddie lamented the obstacles that prevented turning "the energies of our minds to savings and improvements, instead of wasting them on the irksome task of incessantly labouring how to meet pressing demands." This situation continued throughout 1825, and
in 1826 was worsened by the collapse of the Regulation.

Despite this situation, Buddie and Londonderry entertained great hopes during the second half of 1826 of being able to revive the harbour scheme, due to the appearance on the scene of Alexander Robertson. Robertson, a builder by trade, apparently resurrected the idea of building the harbour - and also the town - by contract, with external financial backing which eventually turned out to be from Thomas Braddyll. Buddie's confidence in Robertson was shaken by the latter's extravagant notions of the ground rent for the town but otherwise he considered Robertson "sagacious, rational and intelligent." Negotiations proceeded rapidly, with the expectation that Robertson would break ground in January 1827. When Robertson's financial backers had not materialised by the New Year, Buddie and Londonderry began to have serious doubts, but in October 1827 a revised agreement was drafted for a lease of the harbour and railway to T.R.G. Braddyll, with Robertson as "consulting and confirming party." At some time in November 1827, however, patience with Robertson was finally exhausted. Despite the months of prevarication, the scheme with Robertson was abandoned only at such a late stage that there were still threats of legal action by him months later. Londonderry then opened direct negotiations with Braddyll alone, either to provide £50,000 towards the cost of the harbour, or as a lessee to build the harbour and railway himself. Despite the fact that Buddie had been told six months earlier by Percival Forster, Braddyll's land agent, that Braddyll had exhausted his finances in building his house, Buddie and Londonderry continued to cling to their hopes for another nine months despite increasing doubts: as Buddie wrote to Londonderry in May 1828, "I don't know what to say of Braddyll and the Seaham affair - it all looks like a shuffle...on his part. He seems afraid to go on and unwilling to relinquish the undertaking." At last on 20th August 1828 the heads of a lease to Braddyll were drafted, for ninety-nine years, the lessee to construct the harbour and railway, paying a certain annual rent for the site. The transactions of the two years 1826-28 thus provide a curious commentary on the extent to which both Buddie and Londonderry - both acting almost out of character - were prepared to waive their aims of private finance and direct labour, if only a start could be made on the harbour.

Clearly, however, both Londonderry and Buddie still hankered after the independent financing and building of the harbour and railway,
for early in September 1828 events suddenly moved with a speed and
decision in vivid contrast to the delays and doubts of the past five
years. Apparently the initiative came from Londonderry, with Buddle
quick to respond. On 3rd September Londonderry told Buddle that he
had decided to begin the harbour himself and to break off negotia-
tions with Braddyll. On 7th September Buddle described his prepara-
tions for at last breaking ground, in a letter which, Londonderry said,
"has been taken by Lady Londonderry and is placed in her archives as
the corner-stone of our great edifice, and as a record of the
indefatigable zeal, talent and sterling rectitude with which you have
ever conducted the affairs of our House." Londonderry suggested that
the money to finance this sudden commencement of work be raised on
a life annuity but, as always, Buddle preferred the "self-paying
principle" and suggested the course which was eventually followed:

"When I come to consider that Robertson, Braddyll and
others have reckoned on raising the greater part of
the money for completing the Harbour, on the security
of the work itself, as it proceeded, I say to myself,
why cannot we do the same?..let us make the best push
we can, with the means we can scrape together this back-
end, and get the nucleus formed; and then try to raise
money upon the security of the harbour, alone, arranging
to pay off the principle and interest out of its earning."

The ground was broken less than a week later.

Whether they had never been- fully reconciled to the idea
of the harbour and railway being built under contract or whether
merely exasperated beyond endurance by the prevarications of Robertson
and Braddyll during the past two years, both Buddle and Londonderry
now had no doubts about "the ultimate benefits to result..from being
the sole and independent-proprietor of this great work." The beginning
of the work at this time, however, appears to have arisen largely
out of the impetus generated by the abortive negotiations for external
finance, for there was little change in Londonderry's own financial
position except for a loan of £10,000 obtained from Backhouses on
the security of the North Pittington lease in February 1828. A
threatened breakdown in the Regulation at the beginning of the year,
caused by Londonderry's claims, had been averted but vends had continued
low into the middle of the year, and even at the end of August,
Londonderry was on the verge of breaking up the Regulation because
of Lord Durham's overs, a move that in Buddle's view would have had
disastrous results.

During the remainder of 1828, however, both Londonderry and Buddie, now that work at the harbour had at last begun, succeeded in finding preliminary sources of finance with remarkably little trouble. Londonderry went to Ireland immediately after telling Braddyll of his determination to proceed alone and undertook to send £500 per month until his return to England at Christmas, to be furnished by the Irish rents "or stopped from such overplus as you reckon to me." When he sent the first instalment from Ireland in mid-October his hopes had risen to being able to send a total of £4,000 by the end of the year; not surprisingly Buddie responded that "your lordship's financial efforts positively astonish me." Another £500 per month (for two months) was to be charged to the colliery pays. In addition Lady Londonderry offered her quarterly allowances. Reluctance to accept "such a noble tribute" caused Buddie to remember the idea he had first suggested in 1823 of selling-off building sites on long leases, to which Londonderry readily agreed. Then at the beginning of October 1828 Harrison made his proposal to build the railway by contract; Buddie and Londonderry agreed to it in order to release capital for the harbour.

Buddie then summarised the financial position: within the first two years he hoped to build the north pier and a small harbour in the cove - the inner or north harbour - at a cost of £25,000; deducting from this total the £5,000 to be provided from the collieries and the Irish remittances by the end of 1828, there remained £10,000 per annum to be found from the sale of building leases to complete the first stage of the harbour by the end of 1830, by which time Harrison considered the railway would also be ready. Buddie soon found, however, that he had overpriced the building leases and by early November he was feeling "quite sober and serious" due to the problems of financing the work during the following year for, as usual, no colliery surplus could be expected for the first five months, but to have the north division open by September 1830, as planned, would require £1,200 per month to be found from January 1829.

Although Londonderry's and Buddie's efforts during September to December 1828 were directed at financing the harbour from internal resources alone, neither of them lost sight of the possibility of raising a loan on the security of the harbour once a start had been made on building it. Arthur Mowbray's success in establishing the Hetton Company, after his dismissal from the Vane-Tempest collieries
in 1819, clearly haunted Londonderry, for only a few weeks after deciding to begin work without external financial help, Londonderry suggested that in view of Buddle's "new and now intimate relations" with Mowbray, the latter might be able to pave the way for Buddle to raise money in London. Buddle was to be in London on Coal Trade business early in 1829 and could take the opportunity to sound out the monied people there. Even Rennie, while unimpressed by Seaham's prospects, agreed to help Buddle with the monied interest - "I think his offers of service were only produced by my lady's eyes, who looked and listened to him with awe." In the end nothing came of these ideas. Instead Braddyll was again approached, at Buddle's suggestion, with the aim of fore-stalling his threats of an injunction and a coalition with the still-aggrieved Robertson, as well as easing the harbour finances. Londonderry reached agreement in principle with Braddyll and then Buddle negotiated the details with Braddyll's agent, Forster, on the lines of a loan of £15,000 to £20,000 from Braddyll towards the building of the harbour, to be repaid out of the proceeds of a toll of 1/6d per chaldron on Braddyll's South Hetton coals which were to be given shipping facilities at the Harbour as soon as the colliery was in production.

The agreement was finalised in December 1828. By July of the following year only £2,000 had been received from Braddyll and by the end of that year it was clear that there would be no more payments, Braddyll being "cleaned out" by the building of his house, Conishead Priory. The situation by the end of 1829 was, therefore, that "ample finance" had been available for the first four months' work on the harbour but that during 1829 Braddyll's contribution had failed, and the effects of open trade and of the currency crisis had seriously affected Londonderry's general finances. Thus, although the work had still proceeded - the coffer dam was built, the basin excavated and a lime kiln brought into operation - the end of 1829 marked a watershed in the affairs of the harbour: "all this is very bad and embarrassing," as to have to stop work would be "the most disastrous affair that could happen to us. It would destroy all confidence as to the ultimate accomplishment of the works, and knock the building speculations on the head. Something must be done." The most that Buddle could do, however, faced as usual by the expectation of low colliery receipts during the winter and spring, was to recommend that the harbour establishment be cut down "to a shadow" and that Londonderry make strict
economies and sacrifices in his affairs generally."

Londonderry promised to do so, but with little effect."

During 1830 and 1831 the financial situation continued to deteriorate drastically: the Wynyard building continued; vends did not revive as usual in June; the remittance of the Irish rents promised to Backhouses fell far short - £5,000 instead of £12,000; and electioneering in 1830 and 1831 cost £25,000. Then in the early months of 1831 the gathering unrest among the pitmen erupted, costing £20,000 in defalcation of receipts during the two months of the strike."

In July 1831, however, the Harbour was officially opened for coal trade, only a few months later than the target (September 1830) set in 1828. Since its conception ten years earlier - notwithstanding the considerable frustrations since experienced - the enterprise had prompted greater cordiality between Buddle and Londonderry than had any other sphere of their association. Such a tangible, constructive, public achievement had inspired and delighted them both, providing almost light relief from the more arduous and routine problems of Londonderry's business affairs. By all appearances the opening ceremony was the culmination of their efforts. The first cargo was loaded into Buddle's own ship, the Lord Seaham which had been launched at Jarrow only a few days previously. After the ship had sailed, a dinner was held at Seaham Hall "on the invitation of Mr. Buddle, who ably presided on the occasion (the Noble Marquis wishing to be considered as a guest). The dinner was served on a new, splendid and costly service of plate, which was presented on this occasion by the Marquis of Londonderry to his 'friend and agent', Mr. Buddle.""

The times, though, were changing. It was only in the previous few weeks that the state of the pitmen had quietened and their abuse and threats to Buddle personally had ceased. The attitude of Backhouse, the banker, towards Buddle had completely exhausted and depressed him. Londonderry was at loggerheads with the Trade and with Buddle, over his concessions to the pitmen and his claims for quantity - the latter, ironically, a direct result of the opening of the Harbour. Londonderry insisted on sending a letter to the Coal Trade committee claiming an increased quantity for Seaham, whereas Buddle felt that to make such a formal claim now, when finances for the completion of the Harbour were extremely uncertain, was ill-timed."

In these circumstances, in strong contrast to his delight over the publicity given to the foundation-stone ceremony in 1828, Buddle, in
July 1831, could only deplore the fact that news of the opening of the harbour had leaked out, providing the pitmen with an excuse to lay the pits idle and thus lower the month's receipt.  

The particular strains of the year undoubtedly contributed to the sudden illness, less than three weeks after the official opening of the Harbour, which was to prevent Buddie from attending to Londonderry's affairs for nearly six months. One of his first letters as he gradually recovered was to recommend that, "as a general principle we ought to endeavour to get all the additional quantity we can for Seaham, but not to push matters to extremity, so as to bring about a reduction of the price of coals." He was convinced that there were strong grounds for negotiation in precedents such as Newbottle colliery, whose vend was quadrupled when it started to ship at Sunderland instead of into keels at Penshaw staith, and Brandling's Coxlodge colliery which similarly benefitted when its place of shipment was moved from above to below bridge on the Tyne. Nevertheless, although Buddie beseeched him to resort to negotiation to preserve the Regulation, Londonderry persisted in pushing his claims on the Trade with the result that the over-vend on the Wear, caused chiefly by the Londonderry collieries, finally precipitated the Coal Trade crisis of 1832-33. In the meantime Londonderry's financial standing continued to deteriorate rapidly and one of Buddie's first recommendations when he resumed activities in February was that, "nothing but 'holding hard' and diminishing expenditure, at all points, to the lowest possible state can enable us to extricate ourselves from the difficulties which beset us on all sides. I would therefore advise...that the Harbour operations should be totally suspended forthwith."  

Nevertheless, the work apparently continued on a low scale, £460 and £390, for example, being spent out of the colliery profits in the two pays in June 1832. The future of the harbour was then secured by the eventual fruition of the Exchequer Bill Loan scheme, which had been first suggested by Buddie in 1823. In September 1828 both Buddie and Gregson had advised that some progress be made in the work before endeavouring to effect a loan and the matter had lain dormant until Buddie successfully negotiated a loan of £35,000 during August 1832 to May 1833. The draft application to the Commissioners makes clear that whatever the difficulties, the struggle to find sources of finance and to protect the harbour from the general worsening of Londonderry's finances, had been remarkably successful,
for the Commissioners were told that over £101,300 had been expended on the harbour in the four years September 1828 to July 1832. This sum must have included as much of Braddyll's loan as had been forthcoming and it may have embraced other sources of finance apart from Londonderry's own contribution (the sale of building leases and perhaps even Thompson's expenditure on the railway.) Nevertheless, it represents a considerable achievement in terms of average monthly outlay on the harbour.

The loan was sought to assist in the improvement of the shipping capacity of the harbour within the "exterior defences" that had already been built: at present the harbour was barely sufficient for Londonderry's own needs but was under contract (under the loan agreement of December 1828) to ship half as much again from Braddyll's new South Hetton colliery which would soon be in production. Shipments of Londonderry's coal had totalled 30,922 chaldrons from the opening of the harbour in July 1831 to the end of the year, and 49,376 in the current year up to August 15th.

The negotiation of the loan was a personal triumph for Buddie: the application and correspondence were in his name on behalf of Londonderry, and he visited London in August and October-November 1832 to negotiate the loan, and again in April-May 1833 when the conditions attached to the loan had made it unacceptable. Londonderry evidently attached great importance to Buddie's role at this critical juncture - "How far you might have power to work the point personally with Brickwood, Telford and the Commissioners is another point for consideration." Buddie's last visit to London was successful for when he returned he brought £35,000 worth of Bills with him. It appears that one of the factors in his success was his consent, and his obtaining the consent of one of the Newcastle Joint Stock Bank directors, to join in Londonderry's bond to the Crown, "that the money shall be expended, bona fide, on the object for which it is lent." This was clearly a wise precaution by the Exchequer Bill Loan Office: as early as August 1823, when Buddie first thought of such a loan, Londonderry had suggested using it "to get quit of Edward's friendship," to which Buddie had replied that it could be applied only to the specific object for which it was granted. Londonderry, however, had not abandoned the idea for in May 1833, barely three weeks after Buddie had obtained the long-awaited loan, Sir Henry Browne wrote to Buddie in reply to a letter from him:
"I cannot tell you how much it has interested me, by its clear and consistent statement of facts and your own feelings upon them. Nothing on earth should cause me to waver, were I in your place, as to the strict application of the Exchequer Bills - there is no special pleading that can for a moment stand against honesty - that money was obtained for the Harbour and to the Harbour alone it should go. The day will come when Lord Londonderry himself will thank you for your firmness in this respect. Yours is a hard and difficult position, at this moment, my dear friend."

Londonderry persisted, for in July Buddle wrote to him that it was most painful to him to be continually urged to act contrary to his principle of "strict probity" and that he would rather join with Londonderry to petition the Board for a new bond, with different signatories. Three weeks later Buddle still found it necessary to urge in the most emphatic and earnest terms that the loan must be considered sacred to the Harbour, being the only source for that work which "must work out and effect the earthly salvation of our Family."

Londonderry apparently pursued the matter no further, for in January to March 1836 Buddle negotiated a further Exchequer Bill Loan of £10,000 for the purpose of building two jetty-piers to give further protection in easterly gales to the southern part of the south harbour where light vessels lay before entering the dock.

The Later Years

Although the finances for Seaham Harbour were thus secured by the Exchequer Bill Loans of 1833 and 1836, after the developments of 1829-31 it had only been a matter of time before the state of Londonderry's other finances forced the establishment of a Trust in 1834, with Buddle the colliery manager under the trustees. Henceforth, in the atmosphere of Londonderry's violent suspicion and dislike of the Trust, Seaham Harbour - in the earlier years their pride and joy - became a focus of friction between Londonderry and Buddle that eventually culminated in a complete and bitter six-month rift between them. The root cause of this climax was, inevitably, the question of finance, but in the years leading up to it there occurred other incidents which hinged on the problems of management.

The establishment of the Trust in control of Londonderry's affairs coincided with the expansion of trade at the Harbour. Small quantities of Bradylly's South Hetton coals were shipped, under the loan agreement, as the colliery began production in 1833 (6,000 ch. shipped)
This shipping arrangement was extended in 1835 and negotiations concluded in the same year with the Haswell Company and the North Hetton Company, each concern being granted a total shipping capacity of 40,000 chaldrons per annum, at a toll of between 1/- and 1/6d per chaldron. Actual shipments through the Harbour were:\[13\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1836</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Londonderry</td>
<td>60,000 ch.</td>
<td>66,500 ch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Hetton</td>
<td>37,400 &quot;</td>
<td>25,100 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haswell</td>
<td>11,000 &quot;</td>
<td>29,200 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hetton</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,100 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These individual agreements presaged a policy of opening the Harbour for general shipment of coal, recommended by Buddle and approved by Londonderry in July 1836 in order to compete with Hartlepool and Sunderland in the shipment of coal from the coal-field to the south-east and north-east of Durham city: "Seaham Harbour lying much nearer to the best part of this coal district than either Sunderland or Hartlepool, the point for consideration, therefore is, how to make other circumstances equal, so as to secure the preference to Seaham."[13]

In such a situation it was a matter of particular concern to Buddle when he discovered in December 1836 that the negligence of the Harbour pilots at night, about which there had been complaints for some time past, was losing ships to Sunderland, Stockton and Hartlepool and also causing the North Hetton Company's shipments to fall short. Buddle acted by appointing a Board of Inquiry consisting of Trinity House representatives, ship owners, captains and the Haswell and South Hetton fitters. Possibly as a result of their recommendations and certainly in accordance with suggestions made personally by William Lee, the Haswell fitter, Buddle then wrote to William Spence, the superintendent fitter, to suggest the abolition of partnerships among the pilots, the dismissal of any pilots found drunk, and the appointment of a Harbour Master.[13] The latter recommendation, at least, was not carried out.[13]

Buddle recognised the indiscipline among the pilots to be a symptom of failures in management and intended the Board of Inquiry to be a means of ascertaining a more satisfactory system. Londonderry was not directly involved in the incident but it provides an early indication of management problems at the Harbour. A crisis over this question of management came in 1838-39 when Londonderry, having restlessly endured over four years' restriction under the Trust, seized two
opportunities for some degree of retaliation against Edmund McDonnell, the trustee, and Buddie, now officially agent under the Trust. The circumstances were allegations of favouritism in the loading of ships at Seaham Harbour, followed shortly afterwards by the discovery of discrepancies in the accounts of Spence, the fitter. Londonderry accused the Harbour management of showing undue favour to Buddie's and McDonnell's own ships in the loading rota. McDonnell refuted this; his ships (the "Glenarm Castle" and "Lady Anne") had each made seven voyages during the year 1838, and Buddie's (the "John Buddle" and "Lord Seaham") had made seven and eight trips respectively, which was much the same number as for other owners' ships. McDonnell, however, took measures to sell his ships and Buddie first ordered his no longer to load at Seaham - a move to which Londonderry objected - and then decided to sell them. Buddie's letter to McDonnell on the former occasion is worth quoting at length as it demonstrates how sensitive the relationship between Buddie and Londonderry had become under the Trust and how it focused on Seaham Harbour:

"...I really feel for you in consideration of the bother and boring which you must have had during your late sojourn at M[ount] St[jewart] about all this stuff respecting the ships and shops etc. It is really too absurd to waste so much time and paper about. It all amounts to nothing more than what is summed up in Hudebrass's well-known distich, 'Convince a man against his will,' etc.

Lord L's reasons for continuing my ships at the Harbour are of a piece with all the rest of his sophistry and special pleading on the subject. I have replied that for what 'the feeling of the public mind' may be with respect to the removal of my ships troubles me not, it is the feeling of my own mind which I have to regard. I have done it as an act of self-defence against a source of suspicion and annoyance...

I am of opinion, if Lord L. had set about to contrive how to do the utmost possible injury to the Harbour, that he could not have hit upon a more effectual plan of accomplishing his object, than by banishing those vessels which have been built of a proper draught of water, on purpose to suit the place, and to be steadily attached to it. He seems to be utterly unaware or regardless of the true basis and principles on which the prosperity of the place depends..."

The accusations of favouritism obviously rankled deeply with Buddie; a few days later, telling McDonnell of a possibility of sending steam coal to Lisbon through A.J.F. Marreco, Buddie commented: "But Marreco is a business friend of mine. Query then may not this
connexion become the source of another inflection of jealous feeling, as according to the modern code of morality, it would seem that no man can be supposed to deal honorably and honestly with anyone except strangers!!" 11.

Following hard on the heels of these allegations of mismanagement in the shipping business of the harbour, came the discovery of discrepancies in Spence's accounts and their investigation by the auditor, Hindhaugh. Londonderry took full advantage of such an opportunity to assert his authority which he had felt to be shackled by the Trust, and he wrote to Buddie in tones which suggest that he found a certain degree of satisfaction in the circumstances:

"Nor should I be candid if I did not express to you my utter amazement how you and Hunter with your penetrating cleverness and talents should have allowed all the rascally proceedings to have gone on so long undetected. How came I to discover all this? You both must have been in a dream. And as you are now awake I call upon you and expect promptitude, decision, exposure of the knaves, and rewards for those who have saved us from this whirlpool of malversation." 14

Writing to McDonnell, he blamed Buddle's "easy good nature" for allowing him to be "entirely humbugged," and congratulated himself on his part in uncovering the fraud - another jibe in reaction to the hated Trust:

"...if it had not been for his own individual foresight, everybody connected with the collieries and harbor, and many daily visiting it, would have permitted all this abuse to continue and it never would have been brought to light." 15

Buddle could make little response other than "all that I can say for myself and Hunter is that we have been most grossly deceived and duped by a person who had to all appearance your Lordship's entire confidence." 16 Clearly, Londonderry was at least justified in pointing the weakness in the chain of command:

"In future he does expect that entire responsibility should attach to the head agents of all the concerns at colliery and harbor, and that Mr. Hunter should not say he took no notice of Harbor concerns because the place was the hobby horse of Mr. Buddle, and Mr. Buddle should not say he was unmindful of contracts or all number of details because Spence was a favourite of Lord and Lady Londonderry's and enjoyed their confidence. All this in a great concern, is not right." 17

McDonnell admitted to Hindhaugh that he was "fearful there had been something very loose in the mode of conducting the business
at Seaham," but he blamed the mismanagement on the appointment of Spence in the first place, "and giving the inordinate power he possessed to a man of his calibre." The basic problems clearly went deeper than this, lying in the system of accounting and in the management structure. It is remarkable that few lessons had been learned from experience at the collieries. Hindhaugh's investigation of the Seaham accounts led him to agree with Spence that the accounts had been kept in such disorder and confusion for the first two or three years after the opening of the Harbour in 1831, that accuracy was impossible. The management system at the Harbour also suffered from the same prevarication and over-economy that had been experienced at the collieries. At this date, the Harbour establishment apparently consisted of Spence as superintendent fitter, with fitting office clerks, and Thomas Nicholson the master mason and quarry superintendent who had also exercised the duties of clerk of works during the building of the harbour. Londonderry told Buddie that he had "long thought T.Nicholson a very useless lazy gentleman at the Harbor with his fine expensive house, gardens and handsome enclosures with all harbor timber. He has long had your weak side." There was as yet no harbour master; Buddie reminded McDonnell when refuting Londonderry's charges of mismanagement in the loading of ships, that "the appointment of a Harbour-master has all along been considered desirable, and you will recollect that after being recommended by the two Trinity House brethren last autumn, it was deferred owing to the throng of the shipping season being over, and to save the salary." Spence and Nicholson reported to Buddie on such matters as the progress of the works, the state of trade and size of vend. Londonderry considered that in future Hunter should be held responsible for the Harbour affairs and should report to Buddie, "who unfortunately is too much at a distance to take charge of the minutiae." McDonnell however, chose instead to emphasise Buddie's responsibility in an attempt to clarify and strengthen the management structure: he instructed all agents,

"that one and all must receive no orders or do any act except thro' the manager whom I hold responsible for the conduct of all, and I have told Buddie that while I am Trustee I shall hold him strictly responsible. He says he is perfectly willing to be so under such an arrangement and I shall take care to give every order thro' him. It is I am sure the only way of working this great and complicated machine,"
This was clearly intended as a pointed hint to Londonderry himself, for Buddie and McDonnell both considered that Londonderry's own role was one of the weaknesses in the harbour management. Buddie had only recently commented to McDonnell with reference to Londonderry's action over the Seaham ships, that "as to management, the present transaction shows that the name of manager is little more than an empty title," and McDonnell clearly disapproved of the fact that the miscreant Spence had been "in long and intimate correspondence" directly with Londonderry. Other incidents supported Buddie's and McDonnell's attitude: the Harbour management, like that at the collieries, was liable to interruption for electioneering purposes, as when Londonderry ordered Nicholson to leave his subordinate, Thorman, to manage the Harbour so that Nicholson could devote all his own time, attention and exertion to managing the election interest and the freemen.

The management of the Harbour was rearranged as a result of the crisis. An ex-naval lieutenant, Usher, was appointed harbour master, and Lee - possibly the former Haswell fitter - replaced Spence. Lee and Usher were each on a salary of £200.

Despite this overhaul of management, however, Londonderry continued to pass on to McDonnell anonymous allegations against Buddie. In July 1839 McDonnell replied with exasperation, "it is time to put a stop to this anonymous slander": the attacks on Buddie he considered disgraceful - "I never saw a man of such zealous integrity in my life. He, like you and others, has been deceived in Spence" and the episode must be accounted as good experience for the future. At Londonderry's request he gave Usher a caution, "but not as against Buddie - I should consider nothing so unjust or so improper. I will hold Buddie strictly responsible but I will never weaken his authority or that responsibility by holding him up as an object of suspicion to those who are to receive his orders and act by his directions."

Henceforth, until Buddie's death, there was almost continuous friction, centred on the Harbour, between him and Londonderry. It is ironical that much of this friction arose from the beginnings of the famous Seaham and Seaton collieries, sunk with great skill through the difficult magnesian limestone belt in the east of the coal-field. In November 1838 - in the midst of Londonderry's dissatisfaction with the shipping situation at Seaham - the Lambton and Hetton representatives
approached Buddie to arrange to begin the winning of the Seaton coal which the three concerns jointly owned, as the payment of the dead rents was becoming onerous. Buddie immediately saw difficulties from the "impracticable humour under which Lord Londonderry labours in all matters relating to prospective family benefits." Nothing was done until a year later when Morton (for Lord Durham) and Wood (for the Hetton Company) proposed to rent Londonderry's Seaham coal, which Buddie anticipated would link with a partnership arrangement for winning the Seaton coal as a joint concern with it. When McDonnell concluded an agreement for the letting of the coal in January 1840, Buddie considered it "eventually the most beneficial transaction for the interests of the Family which has occurred during Lord Londonderry's administration of its affairs." Londonderry himself, however, remained unconvinced and Buddie felt to an even greater extent the frustration of his hopes for securing the future interests of Seaham Harbour, when in 1841 the initial borings at Seaham proved favourable, with the Hetton Company and Morton eager to begin sinking, and Braddyll's neighbouring winning at Dalden was overcoming its difficulties:

"These two concerns would give ample employment to the Harbour, for an indefinite period of time, and render it quite independent of way-leaves etc. from the more distant collieries, and thereby greatly enhance the value of the Harbour and indeed of the whole of the Seaham estate. But this I apprehend is building castles in the air, as Lord L. like an incubus on the property will prevent as far as he can every measure for its real benefit from being carried into effect."”

Londonderry's attitude was not, however, the only problem: even while welcoming the Partnership's offer for Londonderry's Seaham coal, Buddie warned McDonnell that he knew, "that Lord Durham has an absolute horror of, and utter aversion to connecting himself in business in any way whatever with Lord Londonderry. And I also know that the Hetton Company, collectively and individually, feel equally averse to being connected with him."

Even when favourable borings encouraged Morton and the Hetton Company to urge the beginning of sinking, Buddie commented to McDonnell on their proposals for financing the scheme, "the truth is, entre nous, that they are afraid of having any money transactions with Lord Londonderry..neither of them will take our word about money-matters, and they are completely bamboozled as to the propriety of going into this partnership concern at all with us."’

Nevertheless, after a nine-hour meeting of the Board of the
Seaham Coal Company, the Durham, Hetton and Londonderry agents decided to begin the winning of Seaham colliery. It was apparently a majority decision; Buddie recognising that "the partnership to be continued and the immediate commencement of the winning won't be palatable to his Lordship." Londonderry indeed remained adamant that he should be quit of the Seaham and Seaton partnership, and Buddie finally bowed to his decision, "as it is quite clear that such heterogenous and discordant elements never can be brought to amalgamate and go on smoothly together." In May-June 1842, therefore, Buddie drafted a plan "for adjusting this affair amicably," which Londonderry approved and the matter then subsided from importance during Buddie's lifetime.\(^{162}\)

The details of the early stages of the Seaham and Seaton collieries furnish a running commentary on Buddie's and McDonnell's preoccupation with protecting the future interests of the family, in which they considered Seaham Harbour to play a key rôle, and the continual friction with Londonderry that centred on Seaham. Against this background there erupted in 1841 a fiercer conflict between Buddie and Londonderry over Seaham. The issue was again the old one of finance: Londonderry alleged that colliery profits were being syphoned off to pay for unnecessary improvements to the Harbour, thus postponing the extinction of debt and therefore prolonging the Trust. At an interview at Holdemesse House in May 1841,

"...he alleged that...a great deal of unnecessary expense was going on at the Harbour in "embellishment," building walls etc. That he could prove this and much more, and that he was determined to have an inquiry instituted into those matters..."

He also made general accusations of mismanagement against his colliery agents and Buddie decided "not to hold any further correspondence" with him.\(^{163}\) Their correspondence was resumed in November, only after lengthy mediation by McDonnell, and they did not meet again until December. The dispute prompted Buddie to draw up an outline of the Harbour accounts from the beginning of the Trust in 1834 to 1840. An examination can therefore be made of the "self-paying principle" always advocated by Buddie as the basis for financing Seaham Harbour.\(^{164}\)

As has been seen, when the first Exchequer Bill Loan of £35,000 was obtained in 1833, Londonderry had already spent £101,300 on the Harbour since the beginning of work in September 1828. In the
following year Londonderry's affairs had been placed under the Trust, and it was concerning expenditure on the Harbour by the Trust that Londonderry made his allegations in 1841. As Chapman's original plans were completed expenditure had been steadily falling, from £17,138.6.1ld in 1834 to £2,689,0.2d. in 1840. The total gross expenditure on the Harbour during the seven years of the Trust so far was £48,129.15.7d. Buddle objected, however, that Londonderry had failed to set against this figure the £20,636.16.0d, remaining from the 1833 Loan when the Trustees took over, and the contribution to date (£25,156.6.4d.) of the Loan of £10,000 obtained in 1836. These sums immediately reduced the gross expenditure figure to £22,236,13.3d. or, were the remainder of the £10,000 Loan also to be applied "in relief of the Harbour charges," to only £17,492.19.7d. Against this figure, Buddle set profits of £3,905,12.9d, plus £708.14.0d from the lime works. The total expenditure on the Harbour from colliery proceeds over the seven years thus amounted to only £12,878.12.10d, "being on the average £1,840 p.a., an annual charge much less than the saving in the charges of leading and shipment effected by means of the Harbour."

The figures for the last year under consideration - 1840 - were even more striking. Expenditure was £2,689,0.2d; with the profits of harbour and lime works amounting to £2,476,12.9d, net payment for the Harbour from rents and colliery profits totalled £212.7.5d. There was also a profit of £2,354.2.4d from the railway "which would not have existed if the Harbour had been destroyed or less efficient." Taking this into account, the result "leaves the sum of £2,141.14.1ld actually contributed in 1840 through the instrumentality of the Harbour to the yearly surplus applicable to the reduction of debt, without taking into account the saving in the expense of the heading and shipment of the coals, etc., the continuance of which the completion and preservation of the Harbour was essential."

The whole incident, taking place barely two years before Buddle's death, provides a fitting tailpiece to the first years of Seaham Harbour. The Harbour was built and was becoming the centre of the Londonderry concerns; the railway and harbour handled at least half of the Londonderry production and they were beginning to pay for themselves, and even produce a profit, from transport and shipment for other colliery concerns. Yet for the greater part of its existence Seaham Harbour had been a major source of dissenison between the owner and his agent. The personalities of both men had much to do with such
a result - Londonderry jealously asserting his right to dispose of his wealth as he saw fit and to exercise his authority in the sources of that wealth; Buddie equally jealously trying to insulate the colliery and harbour finances from the non-commercial needs and expenses of a noble house. Both personalities were additionally magnified, to the point even of distortion, by the circumstances of the Trust created just as Seaham Harbour was coming into full operation. Yet it would be wrong to dismiss such marked incidences of friction between two strong-minded men as mere personality clashes. They were, after all, employer and agent, and interdependent. There were much more significant elements involved, touched but hardly grasped by the men dealing with them.

There was firstly the problem of accountancy. Buddie could calculate and report the expected savings from the harbour and railway and to some extent the cost of the first stage of building, but there is little evidence to indicate any built-in control over subsequent expenditure and even less to suggest that there was any certainty that the requisite finance would be available at any given time. The coal trade was of course a notoriously fluctuating source of income but this emphasises rather than excuses the fact that such a large off-shoot as Seaham Harbour appears to have had little protection or control other than that exercised by the manager personally. Moreover, the basic machinery of accounting was sadly lacking, at least up to 1834, and even in 1839 all involved admitted that there had been a considerable degree of defalcation of the accounts by Spence. This latter incident, as has been seen, also involved the second major element in the later history of the Harbour: the fact that the question of management had not yet been given a decisive response. If any situation called for delegation and specialisation, it was the Harbour, but lessons had not been learned from experience at the collieries - important measures were delayed for the sake of saving a salary.

The need for improvements in accountancy and management was sensed without being clearly identified. The conclusion is difficult to resist, that here lay the source of the anxieties, doubts and friction that beset the undertaking - an undertaking so novel for those concerned, involving so much capital and so many hopes, that it strained the existing limits of management and accountancy almost as soon as it was begun. Yet the enterprise reached a successful completion:
the limitations of personal control by one man were becoming apparent, but in such a concern as this in which a commercial enterprise could not be separated from the other interests and the vagaries of the aristocratic land owner who owned it, the ability and the character of the sole manager were still crucial."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tyne</th>
<th>Wear</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>Collapsed in February/March</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>Regulation from March</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>Regulation ended in March - restored in June</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td>Renewed in June</td>
<td>Negotiations delayed renewal until August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>Maintained partial Regulation</td>
<td>Declared at end in June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>Partial Regulation continued. Full Regulation from 30th July</td>
<td>Open until 30th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>Collapsed in April</td>
<td>Collapse followed Tyne's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>Regulation from 1st February</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>Renewed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>Declared open in January</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restored in September</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>Regulation, but ineffective by June</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- at end by November</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>Regulation from March</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Buddie, Londonderry and the Coal Trade

If relations between the Londonderry collieries and the Coal Trade of the Wear and the Tyne formed at times one of the most difficult areas of Buddie's work for Londonderry, this was not due to the complexities of tactical decisions and manoeuvres, of which Buddie had a masterly understanding. Chronological treatment, although tempting as a means of demonstrating the continually fluctuating problems of Coal Trade management, has been discarded because of its complexity. Instead, after a summary of the background, certain broad features will be examined: the respective attitudes of Buddie and Londonderry to Regulation; the maintenance of price and the pursuit of quantity; relationships within the Wear Trade; relationships with the Tyne; and, finally, the relationship of Buddie and Londonderry concerning the Coal Trade.

The origins and the formal machinery of the Coal Trade in the north-east have been examined elsewhere; the following is therefore a brief and simplified account. The coal owners on the Wear and the Tyne formed two autonomous but co-operating bodies for the purpose of controlling the amount and the price of the coals sold to ship owners. The collieries shipping their coals from the Tyne had the larger share of the trade - a vend of 625,845 chaldrons in 1814 compared with 360,814 ch. from the Wear - and even before the great increase in new winnings in the 1820s this Tyne trade was split between numerous collieries. They were divided between the categories of first-class collieries of which the leaders were Wallsend (whose name was now applied to first-class coals produced by any colliery), Percy-main and Willington, and which dominated the trade in size, vend and quality; and the much greater number of inferior collieries - smaller concerns producing second-class coals largely for the coastal markets.

The Wear coalfield, by contrast, had fewer collieries and was dominated early in the century by the Vane-Tempest and the Lambton
collieries. In 1814, out of the total vend of 360,814 chaldrons by twelve collieries the Vane-Tempest collieries accounted for nearly 95,000 ch. and Lambton for over 91,500 ch. Their nearest competitor stood at only 37,328 ch. In the 1820s they were joined by a third great power, the Hetton Company. They produced two basic types of coal, known as Wallsends, sold chiefly through the London market, and inferior coals sold at the coastal or bye markets (principally King's Lynn) or to local tradesmen, under a variety of names - Stewart's Eden-main, Burdon-main and South-main, and Lambton's Primrose and Lyons-main.

Each river conducted its affairs through a committee; the Wear committee included each colliery but the Tyne committee was elected from that river's more numerous body of owners and agents. There were also less frequent general meetings of the coal owners themselves. The Wear met at Chester-le-Street, the Tyne at Newcastle. Relations between the two rivers were conducted by joint meetings of the two committees, and at critical junctures by meetings of the coal owners of the two rivers. In practice, affairs on the Wear were greatly dominated by the two or three great powers frequently acting outside the formal machinery of committee and meetings. On the Tyne, the impression arises of greater democracy, but the nine or so first-class collieries still largely dictated the course of events and there was at times a formally constituted committee for the first-class.

The method of regulating the size of the vend so as to keep the market supplied at the optimum price, was, in essentials, as follows: the two rivers first agreed on their relative contributions to the market, usually in the proportion of 3/5 of the total output for the Tyne and 2/5 for the Wear. Each river then divided its share between its collieries, allocating a "basis" for the duration of the current Regulation which reflected the relative status of the collieries. The actual vend or sale allowance was calculated by the committee according to market conditions, for each month in advance, and was allocated as a "quantity" or "issue", on the principle of so many chaldrons per thousand on the basis.

Relative prices were also settled by discussion and were less controversial than the basis, although, of course, under open trade when quantity was unrestricted except by market conditions, price became of great importance.

Periods of open trade were caused, basically, either by
failure to agree on the distribution of the basis when the Regulation
came up for renewal each year, or by infractions of the rules during
the course of a Regulation to such an extent that the Regulation
collapsed.

Londonderry's position in the Coal Trade is clear: having
inherited the Vane-Tempest collieries by marriage, he became one of
the two great powers on the Wear. His and Buddle's primary objective
was to maintain this ascendancy, though against increasing odds.
Buddle, however, was closely involved in the affairs of the Coal
Trade quite independently of his position as Londonderry's agent.
He was secretary of the Tyne committee from 1805 to 1831 and was
therefore present at most of its meetings. The history of his secretary-
ship itself demonstrates the peculiar role he played in the Coal
Trade. It was originally a salaried post, Buddle being paid £100 p.a.
plus expenses when he was first appointed, but from December 1825
he apparently continued to act without remuneration. After London-
derry's breach with the Coal Trade in May 1831 over the pitmen's
strike, Buddle ceased to attend the meetings as his agent and "after
the unfortunate meeting of 6th May 1831..I have not acted officially
in any way." Nevertheless, two years later he was still considered
by many people to be in charge - Tennyson of the North Hetton Company
expected him to call a special meeting in August 1833, and in December
of that year as Buddle was about to leave for London, he told London-
derry that some people were objecting to his leaving the north-east
at that juncture, but "the Trade have no right to expect any official
services from me."  

Buddle also deputed for Russell, the owner of Wallsend
colliery, on the Tyne committee and he regularly represented Wallsend
and Jarrow at general meetings of the Tyne coal owners. These
activities and his secretaryship of the Tyne continued after his
appointment as agent for the Vane-Tempest collieries in 1819, although
of course he henceforth attended the Wear meetings (which he had
already occasionally joined in his capacity as Lambton's agent), and
his relations with the Wear owners became of paramount importance.
He was frequently called on to represent the Coal Trade in London
either as a member of Trade deputations, such as those in 1824 and
1831 on coal duties, and that of 1836 which co-ordinated opposition
to the South Durham Railway Bill, or as an expert witness before
parliamentary committees, particularly those on the Coal Trade in 1829 and 1830. Buddle's attitude to the Coal Trade was thus moulded by influences other than the sole interests of the Vane-Tempest collieries. Indeed, it was doubtless part of that early "breeding" which was so respected by his professional colleagues. His father was a regular Wear committee member (probably representing Lambton) at the time when Buddle was becoming established on the Tyne, and his early training at Wallsend colliery made a lasting impression on him, for in 1823 he compared the disruptive Hetton Company with "my old master Russell":

"Did he ever break a regulation, or prevent one, altho' possessed of the most money-making colliery that ever was or ever will again be in the Trade? No, no, he had too much sagacity for that and his moral was "Live and let live" - altho' he liked to live well himself."

Attitudes to Regulation

Buddle's basic premise was summarised by him in a letter to Londonderry in 1835:

"The true spirit and principle of a regulation is that it should benefit all classes, and make the whole trade move harmoniously, and beneficially, as if it belonged to one joint stock company. How then can any individual possessed of common sense and a justly balanced mind think to pursue his own particular interest, to the prejudice of the Body? Has not this been tried again and again, by the powerful, the obstinate or the presumptuous, in every class of the Trade, and has not the result been invariably the same - a complete failure."

Buddle's belief in the benefits of Regulation was for nearly twenty-five years - virtually the last twenty-five years of the Regulation's existence - a constant and powerful factor in the conduct of relations between the Londonderry collieries and the Coal Trade.

His attitude was not, however, static. On occasion, 'political' circumstances prompted Buddle temporarily to look to 'war'. The cause could be the need to retaliate against infringements of the Regulation by Lambton - "I still maintain my opinion in favour of regulation, but I am not so blinded with my passion for it, as to sacrifice every feeling of honor and propriety for the sake of maintaining the system;" or to demonstrate ascendancy over up-start competitors such as Hetton - "I think it of importance to our ulterior views as to quantity to convince...every...freebooter in the Trade that we will not be trifled with or duped."
By the late 1820s Buddle's attitude to Regulation was being influenced also by gradual permanent changes in the Coal Trade. In particular, the "enormous increase" of new collieries caused him to frequently express the view that only a period of open trade would "effect a thorough reform in the Trade," and that the Regulation could not continue much longer, as the monthly issues would not provide a living vend: "the simple fact is that there are one third more collieries open than are sufficient to supply the Trade." "Thanks to the public railways," he felt it was now generally agreed that the existing Regulation was too unwieldy. By the 1830s, however, the Londonderry finances had worsened drastically and, as always, they influenced Buddle's attitude to Regulation, as summarised in a report by Buddle and Hunter in October 1833 after ten months of open trade: "It is not our opinion that the regulating of the Trade is the most prudent method of conducting it in future," because they felt it could not last much longer, "and it is purely in consideration of the Marquis of Londonderry's present pecuniary position" that they urged him to seek Regulation. By August 1842 the state of trade caused Buddle to feel that the time had come when the Regulation "can be no longer of service to us," and his proposed alternative was a separate Regulation of the first-class collieries. A meeting of the agents of the best collieries, in March 1843, decided to try to continue the existing Regulation and it still survived therefore when Buddle died in October 1843. It collapsed after the miners' strike of 1844 although sporadic attempts at its revival continued for the next ten years.

Whether as a matter of principle or of policy, Buddle thus adhered to Regulation while admitting temporary departures from it. The great rifts of 1829-32 perhaps caused him to analyse his attitude, for in the early 1830s he defined it particularly clearly for Londonderry:

"I agree that any future regulation will be but a patched-up affair, but in point of fact what have regulations ever been but patched-up affairs? And in the name of common sense why should not coal-owners, like other tradesmen, patch up or resort to any kind of expedient whatever, to avert impending and certain ruin? and to enable them to carry on their business to a fair and reasonable profit instead of loss? The Trade is constantly fluctuating and changing, it is therefore only to be managed by expedients and patching to meet its varying circumstances." He could not, however, tolerate unbusinesslike vacillation. By the
early 1830s (as his secretaryship on the Tyne came to an end) he was running out of patience with long committee meetings and their verbose chairman, but he also had a more damning criticism to make: "unless the committees will make up their minds to conduct the affairs of the regulation on the broad basis of fair dealing to all parties, and deal with individuals, on principle, as men of business, let the wind blow as it may, instead of endeavouring to humour their unreasonable or capricious views as favoured children rather than rational beings, which is now too much the practice, the regulation cannot be continued."

He wrote equally frankly to Londonderry on the attitudes of the great coal owners, including Londonderry:

"my line would be to treat the subject of the Coal Trade as a sheer matter of business in every respect, which in plain truth it really is, and nothing else."

Londonderry's attitude to Regulation is more difficult to define, partly because he did not believe in it as a matter of principle, as did his agent, but also because the evidence of his own words is not available for Londonderry as it is for Buddie. As Buddie strongly hinted, Londonderry's attitude to the Trade was often influenced by personal or political feelings rather than by business considerations. This was hardly surprising for, lacking Buddie's long up-bringing and wider involvement in the coal trade, he never overcame his suspicion of Regulation. He felt that it benefitted only the small inferior collieries by limiting the large concerns such as his own, and he was never convinced that a restricted vend gave higher prices and higher profits than the Londonderry collieries could achieve under open trade. In both cases, he was influenced more by pride in the strength of Londonderry collieries than by the arguments Buddie constantly put forward to refute both ideas. On the other hand, in the 1830s Buddie was more than once tempted to agree with the idea of a trial of strength in open trade: the basic flaw in Londonderry's attitude during this period was his failure to realise, as did Buddie, that the state of his finances now drastically limited his freedom.

To Londonderry there has been ascribed the rôle of "chief offender", "an irresponsible individualist" in the affairs of the Coal Trade. Such judgements perhaps reflected the bias of the evidence; the sources now available suggest that Londonderry's allegiance to Regulation was not particularly weaker than his rivals'.
Indeed, the views of Lambton and his agent, Croudace, on Regulation were so unformed in the early 1820s that they relied to a great extent on the lead given by Buddie and even by Londonderry; when Buddie found it necessary to cool this relationship, it was Lambton's personal friendship with a member of the Hetton Company that next influenced Lambton's attitude. When Lambton eventually formed a reasoned policy on Regulation it was no more idealistic or altruistic than Londonderry's, for within the broad framework of Regulation there was room for considerable variation. James Losh, a lawyer with shares in a Tyne colliery, blamed Lord Londonderry and Lord Durham equally for their "childish irritation and jealousy" in Coal Trade affairs, even though he was, in Buddie's words, "a great Whig friend and supporter of Lord Durham's." While Londonderry's higher proportion of Wallsend coals enabled Buddie to pursue higher prices, there was a recurrent theme at Lambton of seeking low prices and large quantities - still within Regulation - in order to vend their large amounts of cheaper, inferior coals. This policy of low prices and large issues was in Buddie's view short-sighted and destructive; by June 1835, after fifteen months of such Regulation, the amount of unsold Wear Wallsend coals lying in ships in London was "far beyond anything that was experienced during the fighting trade," and the Tyne inferior collieries were being driven "to a state of desperation." As for the third Wear power, the Hetton Company's attitude to Regulation was so governed by its immediate circumstances that it hardly amounted to a commitment. In the 1820s, when Mowbray's influence was strong, Buddie considered the Company "as a pack of madmen, with swords in their hands slashing about them on all sides, ruthless of consequence." Even in the 1830s, with ten years of Coal Trade experience behind it, Buddie saw that the Company was still pursuing a naive policy of low prices in an attempt to ruin their rivals. Were the material that is available on Londonderry also available for the Hetton Company, the latter might well inherit the cloak of unprincipled trouble-maker that has hitherto been cast over Londonderry.

The Maintenance of Price

Buddie repeatedly emphasised to Londonderry that "the sole object of regulation is to obtain Price," otherwise it would be "ridiculous" to regulate at all; but working at "the utmost stretch"
to produce quantity could not compensate for even a small reduction in price.27

The little available evidence on the situation before 1819 suggests that Buddie's predecessor in the Vane-Tempest collieries, Arthur Mowbray, had held quite an opposite view of Regulation. He opposed the idea of reduced quantities favoured by Coal Trade meetings in 1813 as a means of advancing prices,28 and Buddie commented in later years on the attitude of the Hetton Company, in which Mowbray was a partner, "This was always old Arthur's system — to force a vend 'neck or nothing,' and brag of the quantity vended — not of the profits — the latter always appeared to be a secondary object with him."29

Buddie implemented his own policy immediately by taking advantage of the Regulation formed in June 1819 soon after his appointment to the Vane-Tempest management, to raise the price of Stewart's Wallsends while also increasing their proportion in the total output of the Vane-Tempest collieries. The pattern was immediately established that Stewart's Wallsends would henceforth stand level in quality and price with the best of the old Tyne Wallsends and therefore considerably ahead of Lambton's Primrose coals.30

The question of the quality of the coal is worth some additional examination. It is known that it was taken into account in fixing the bases of the collieries and that of course it affected the settlement of price differentials between the first-class and the inferior coals at the start of Regulation.31 Buddie, however, handled quality with particular finesse in support of his strategy for advancing or maintaining his own prices. Usually his preoccupation was with the price to the ships but an incident in November 1820 shows that he also kept a close eye on the London market, for he discovered that "the radical coal-buyers," disliking Lord Stewart's politics, had raised "a d—l of a hue and cry" against the "character" of his coals. Buddie decided "to send the coals rather better than usual," this would reduce the quantity slightly but "character is everything to us."32 Another of Buddie's manipulation of the quality/price relationship occurred in 1822: Croudace was pressing for joint price reductions, but rather than reduce the price of Wallsend and Eden-main, which would bring down their prices at London, Buddie contemplated manufacturing a new, inferior coal
(by screening only the dust out of Londonderry's South-main, at present used only for tradesmen) merely to keep Croudace company if he insisted on reducing the prices of his inferior sorts.^^

During the periods of open trade in 1820 and from March to June 1822, Buddie apparently managed to avoid reducing his new prices, with the result that by October 1822, although that month's Vane-Tempest vend of 12,247 chaldrons was not particularly high, the receipt from sales stood at £14,179 and was the largest ever: "so much for supporting the prices."^^ During 1823 and 1824, the new Hetton Company interrupted the Regulation but the first-class collieries managed to maintain a partial Regulation. By the time that full Regulation was re-established on 30 July 1825, it was clear that the Hetton Company was now competing with Londonderry and Lambton for the leadership of the Wear. The era of peaceful advance and maintenance of price had ended.

Henceforth, although maintenance of price was always Buddie's aim, there was a clear shift of emphasis to using price reduction as a weapon against competition. Under Regulated trade, once quantity was settled, there was no point in charging an impractically high price or an unnecessarily low one, and prices were not often, therefore, a subject of conflict.^^ In periods of open trade, on the other hand, prices were all-important. The skill and deliberation with which Buddie manipulated price reductions in open trade therefore provide some of the best evidence for his basic belief in maintaining prices. He would continue to resist price reduction until the precise moment when the smallest possible reduction would have the maximum impact.

On occasion Buddie used price reduction in retaliation against competitors. In April 1826, for example, after the Regulation collapsed on the Tyne, the Wear owners agreed to maintain prices to give the Tyne a chance to retrieve its Regulation but the Londonderry fitters soon reported that they were coming to a stand-still. Their customers were demanding the same terms as prevailed at the Lambton and Hetton spouts where prices were in effect reduced by the giving of "good content" - a move which the Londonderry keels could not compete; by early May, Hetton was giving an extra measure of one in ten, tantamount to a reduction of 3/6d per chaldron on their Wallsends. Buddie retaliated, after much discussion with the fitters, by reluctantly taking off the 2/- on
Wallsends and 1/- on Eden-main that had been achieved by the Regulation in the previous August. He passed it off as a bonus in lieu of large measure at their competitors' spouts. As Buddie expected, the Hetton Company raised a hue and cry but an agreement was eventually reached, due, Buddie was convinced, to "the decisive step of reduction." 36 Londonderry was not, of course, the only coal owner to use price reduction as a deliberate weapon against competitors. In January 1833, for example, Buddie wrote that,

"Redhead acknowledges that it was the premeditated plan of the Hetton Company to freight so as to run down prices 10/- or 12/- per chaldron to force the trade, meaning your lordship, to come to terms." 37

On other occasions Buddie used price reduction as a last resort to restore movement in the market after a period of open-trade and therefore over-supply. This happened in July 1826 when the state of trade was such that Buddie "never before either felt or saw anything like it." Again, as in May 1826, Buddie presented this 2/- reduction as a bonus rather than as a straight reduction on the certified price, the latter being complete anathema to his basic principle of price maintenance. 38

As Londonderry's finances worsened, Buddie contemplated periods of open trade, and price reductions during such periods, even more reluctantly. The latter became not so much a positive weapon against competitors but a last resort in order to keep up with them. This was the situation when the Regulation established in 1827 broke up in January 1829. A committee of Londonderry fitters immediately recommended a straight reduction of 4/- per chaldron to combat inducements given to ship owners by Lord Durham and the Hetton Company, but Buddie refused to allow it without Londonderry's authority, considering the probable decrease in income of £20,000 to £25,000 as "too momentous" for his own discretion. 39 Londonderry soon authorised it but further reductions were then in the air. Buddie provided Londonderry with calculations whose result was "rather curious, as at the reduced prices contemplated, it shews that the greatest vend does not produce the greatest profit." Whatever the blow that a further reduction might strike against rivals, it would also mean heavy expenditure on extra workings, the risk of bad debts and, above all, the prospect of working only for the profit of the Dean and Chapter whose rents were based on the amount worked. Buddie therefore recommended avoiding a further
reduction." Within the week, however, he was having to revise this view. By early March 1829 the freighting instigated by Mowbray at the Hetton Company was equivalent to a reduction of 10/- per chaldron; at his present prices, therefore, Londonderry could expect a vend of only 80,000 chaldrons. By the end of March Buddie was "most desperately puzzled" as to the best course: trade generally was at a stand and reduction seemed necessary merely in order to keep moving. Stockpiling coal on the staith was no answer as breakages would amount to a loss of 7/- per chaldron.*" In fact, before 1st April Buddie took off 2/-, and the effect was rapid: on 2nd April, Cochrane of the Hetton Company, though more moderate than Mowbray, was still against any co-operation to maintain the price of Wallsends: but by the following day, having heard of Buddie's reduction, he was ready to consider Regulation. Lord Durham's people, too, were said to be dumbfounded: "Notwithstanding the tremendous sacrifice of price and profit which we are making," Buddie was satisfied it had been the right decision."

Throughout the 1830s, Buddie's freedom of action on prices was affected by Londonderry's financial position. In 1833, as numerous new collieries were opened, Buddie declared that if he had been free to follow his personal opinion, he would allow open trade to sort out "fair competition prices." But as Londonderry's finances reached a crisis, the Londonderry concerns could not afford open trade (even though Londonderry himself was holding out against Regulation): profits of £30,000 should have been obtained from the "enormous" vend but were expected to reach only £18,000 due to the cost of freighting. Buddie therefore strove to establish a sub-regulation to end freighting and advance prices, but at the end of the year, merely to keep trade moving, he, Lambton and Hetton were forced to a joint freighting agreement."

The Regulation was at last restored in March 1834 after a break of eighteen months and the following year or two demonstrate the rôle played by price adjustment during Regulation" though from a far more defensive position than in the golden days of 1819-20. In March 1834 prices stood at 26/6d, a reduction of 6/- on the old price before the latest period of open-trade - as Buddie said, "a tremendous defalcation," but much higher than 12/- to 16/- which Buddie had described as "fair competition prices" five months earlier." Buddie was unhappy with the Trade's policy of low prices.
and large issues but he was hampered by the belief among other coal owners that higher prices would encourage competition by the Scotch, Welsh and Yorkshire coals. He eventually carried his point, except for the Durham and Hetton agents, early in September, aided by the Tees' declaration that they would have to reduce prices if the Wear could not increase theirs."

This Regulation as renewed with apparently little trouble in March 1835 but by May Buddie foresaw that the inferior Tyne collieries were unlikely to agree for much longer to Regulations which benefitted the larger collieries at their expense in the coastal markets. Typically, he saw price adjustment as the remedy: raising the price of Wallsends, which the London market could bear, would curtail their vend coastwise and leave the inferior coals "an opening in their legitimate markets." Morton and Wood had at last come round to the idea, having been convinced by Buddie of the "entire humbug" of their fears of Yorkshire, Scotch and Welsh competition which, Buddie pointed out, affected only the inferior coals. Early in June, therefore, Buddie decided to "start the hare" for an advance of 2/- and a renewal of the Regulation at the end of the year. He soon afterwards began to arrange a separate regulation of the best collieries which he felt might be more practicable, but in the event the coal owners of the three rivers managed to agree to a continuance of the general Regulation."

During the remaining eight years of Buddie's life, the dominating feature of the Coal Trade was the massive increase in production caused by the opening-up of new collieries. In 1840 Buddie estimated that since 1834 the number of collieries on the Tyne, Wear and Tees had increased from 64 to 101. Quantity rather than price pre-occupied the Coal Trade committees. Nevertheless, over-supply inevitably affected prices. The year 1842 illustrates the situation. In January 1842 the Regulation was renewed and attempts were made to apportion supply to the estimated demand and to gain the co-operation of factors and ship owners in maintaining the London selling prices at set rates, sufficient to enable the ship owners to pay present prices to the coal owners and to receive reasonable rates for freight. The scheme failed; London prices for best coals tumbled, ships with unsold cargoes accumulated at market, and the bribing of ship owners with over-measure sometimes amounted to giving 60 cwt. per chaldron instead of the proper 53 cwt. During
the summer Stewart's Wallsends were down to 20/- per ton at London; their price to the ship owners was 11/6d which after payment of various dues, left only 6/- for the freight "which considering that they have to lie from three to five weeks before they can get delivered is absolutely ruinous." Londonderry's best customers among the ship owners were going over to Lambton and Hetton who were freighting on their own account at 7/- per ton, although they were thereby actually losing 1/6d per ton. The remedy, in Buddie's view, was either to freight ships directly and thereby lose all profit, or to reduce by 1/2d and thus relinquish the Regulation.

The Pursuit of Quantity

Buddie's attitude to the Coal Trade was to achieve optimum prices through Regulation; Londonderry's was to aim for quantity, whether in regulated or in open trade, to demonstrate ascendancy in the Trade. Londonderry never relinquished his claim to the position to which he had acceded by marriage - that of leading coal owner in the north-east. His income, of course, depended on success in the coal trade, but the fact that he was not always susceptible to Buddie's reasoned arguments in favour of price rather than quantity suggests that quantity seemed to have a political and social significance of its own. Londonderry was not alone in his attitude: Buddie reported in June 1825,

"it is clear that Lambton's agents would regulate on any terms, if we would only allow them to hang upon our skirts - only let Mr.Lambton stand on the same basis and they will take anything. Arthur Mowbray cries out 'Let me have 2/3 of Lord L-dy's quantity and I don't care what you call the basis'. Your lordship is the great object of all their jealousy." 52

The days of Londonderry predominance, however, were numbered. In 1819, out of a total Wear basis of 381,000 chaldrons, Lord Stewart and John George Lambton were each allotted 100,000 - well over double the basis of their nearest competitor. The appearance of the Hetton Coal Company drastically altered this situation. In 1823 the new company also claimed 100,000 although it was forced to accept only half that amount. In 1825 Londonderry demanded 130,000; he eventually lowered this to 125,000 but would not yield to pressure from Lambton and Hetton to accept 124,000. The deadlock was broken only by the Wear chairman adding 3,000 chaldrons to the Wear basis, giving 125,000 to Londonderry and Lambton, with Hetton now at 90,000. Three years later in 1828, Londonderry
claimed a basis of 145,000. The Wear meeting had proposed 142,000 but acceded to his demand rather than sacrifice the renewal of the Regulation. In the following year the Wear basis was submitted to a reference and Buddie expected it to renew Londonderry's basis of 145,000 with Durham on the same and to raise Hetton from 112,000 to about 125,000 or 130,000. Instead, the award placed all three powers level at 138,000.\footnote{57}

No sooner was Londonderry forced to accept the fact that two powers now ran neck and neck with him on the Wear, than a new rival appeared in the field: the growing number of new collieries, particularly on the Tyne. The power struggle between the Wear leaders had pushed the Wear basis up, while the Tyne basis had been split between ever-increasing numbers with the result that some of the best Tyne collieries had seen their bases reduced by half.\footnote{55} The over-vend on the Wear, caused by infractions of the Regulation in 1831-32, aggravated the situation and during 1832 the Tyne adopted an unprecedented offensive attitude. It took until March 1834 to re-establish a general Regulation and it was not long before the problem reappeared. Eventually the battle became one for survival rather than mere rivalry. To Buddie this situation suggested that the time had come, if the other leading collieries agreed, to abandon the general Regulation and attempt a separate Regulation of the first-class collieries. After Buddie's death Londonderry echoed this idea but even now his objections to proposed new rules reflected his attachment to the historical position of his collieries rather than an understanding of the practical problem:

"The small coal-owner of yesterday's creation with perhaps little or no capital, is about to be ranged and placed in the direction of the Coal Trade affairs on the same level by vote as all the great established old collieries, with their 1 or 200,000£ capital upon the premises of their concerns. No good can be done by a new general division of bases. Take the old bases as they stand and let there be fair reference for all the new collieries since 1837 or 1838. I cannot for a moment believe that either Lord Durham or Hetton will embark in a sea of uncertainty and abandon a just, an old and surely an equitable position.\footnote{56}"

Even under Regulation, when the basis had been settled, there were opportunities for the pursuit of quantity. In the early years the improvements introduced by Buddie in the quality and proportion of the best Wallsend coals attracted Londonderry's attention.
At the end of 1823, for example, he apparently suggested that the superior quality of his coals would insulate them from price reductions if the Regulation were abandoned. Buddie refuted this idea but agreed with Londonderry that Londonderry's larger proportion of superior coals entitled him to claim a larger quantity on the basis; just over a year later he reported that Lambton's inability to work such a large quantity of best coals meant that "Croudace's jealousy of our vend is excessive." 87

After the early 1820s, the emphasis shifted to increased powers of production and shipment, and on each occasion Londonderry's aims led to trouble in the Coal Trade. In 1824-5 they centred on North Hetton. Buddie and Londonderry agreed in 1824 on the idea of claiming an extra 30,000 on the basis for the new colliery, but in 1825, when the Regulation came up for renewal, there was uproar in both Wear and Tyne meetings over Londonderry's claims for 130,000. After nearly three months of "deplorable" vend, with price reductions looming, Buddie "never was more at a loss what to advise," the alternatives being concessions on Londonderry's demands for quantity or reductions of Buddie's cherished prices. In the end the general desire for Regulation enabled a short-term compromise to be made, but during the dispute Buddie made a pointed comment to Londonderry:

"The great error of the coal-owners on both sides is their proneness to deceive themselves by underrating the powers of their neighbours and overrating their own." 88

By 1827 North Pittington colliery provided new grounds for claiming an increased basis. The Wear basis was submitted to the decision of referees but when the award was made in March it made no allowance for North Pittington. Buddie commented, "in all my experience of the Trade, I never recollect having witnessed anything more absurd," and one of Buddie's Tyne friends agreed that Londonderry, "compared with the others...has cause to complain and there is little doubt if the thing is revised justice will be done to N.Pittington." Londonderry made a formal protest and on the grounds of a technicality a revised award was agreed. 89

In July 1831 when Buddie felt that a continuation of Regulation was essential, not least to re-establish confidence and unanimity in the face of the pitmen, Londonderry decided to announce to the Coal Trade his claims for an increased basis arising from his new powers of shipment at Seaham Harbour. Buddie apparently succeeded in his efforts to persuade Londonderry to postpone his demands, but
in May 1832 Londonderry went ahead. Buddie urged him to accept the Trade's offer of a reference in order to prevent a collapse of the Regulation, but instead Londonderry pursued it by over-vending and by insisting on a specific quantity.** Strongly though Buddie disapproved of such action it apparently had some degree of acceptability, for when the Hatton Company later proposed a retrospective reference on the overs and shorts of 1831-2, Buddie considered that Lord Durham had more to fear from it than had Londonderry: the latter had over-vended to establish his Seaham claim while Durham had over-vended merely because Londonderry was doing so.** The Regulation inevitably soon came to an end and nearly a year later Buddie noted that neither the Trade nor Londonderry had "in the least relaxed your respective opinions."** In October 1833, Sir Henry Browne, who knew Londonderry well, considered that Londonderry's adherence to Regulation would depend entirely on the size of his vend.** It was not until March 1834 that Londonderry's worsening finances forced him to agree to a reference (on both Seaham and the vends of 1831-2) in order that the Regulation might be restored.

Increased powers of production or shipment thus gave Londonderry an opportunity to pursue quantity even under Regulation. Under open-trade the pursuit of quantity was inevitably dominated for immediate purposes by cut-throat competition for vend. This was largely Buddie's responsibility and on occasion it came as a relief: "the worry and turmoil as a committee man in endeavouring to get people to do what was best for their own interest under a regulation was a thousand times more wearing and irksome to me than any event that war can produce will be."** Such a mood, however, was invariably short-lived. The contest could take several forms. Ultimately there was open price reduction, but under cover of nominal certificate prices there were various hidden inducements available, such as allowing the fitters to bribe the ships' captains or giving "good measure" or a bonus in lieu.** The fitters occasionally resorted to more unusual methods - in June 1825 when (during a partial Regulation) contrary winds had delayed the arrival of ships for loading, the fitters had scouts out as far as Flamborough Head and Scarborough, and were "cruising in steam boats and freighting the ships at sea!"** This is quite new and if persisted in for any length of time must inevitably bring on their ruin,"** When over-supply resulted in prices too low for the ship owners, the coal
owners themselves resorted to freighting or chartering ships on their own account; at times such as these, the Londonderry fitters, many of whom owned ships, were an invaluable asset. On the whole, Buddle and Londonderry were particularly reluctant to resort to "underhand tricks" such as freighting or giving good content.

Behind this competition for vend in open trade there still lay the long-term motive of demonstration of power. Buddle occasionally expressed a limited sympathy with such a cause; in October 1828, during a Regulation, he argued that a period of open trade would soon be the only way to demonstrate and resolve the relative powers of the coal owners. In February 1829, just after the Regulation had collapsed, he told Londonderry that the choice lay between aiming for the greatest possible profit under the circumstances and "making the largest possible vend with the view of placing us at the head of the Trade in the event of any future treaty for a Regulation." He repeated this view in November 1832 - open trade "would enable every man fairly to measure his strength and to know his real powers, which has never yet been fairly tried" - and again early in the following month when, considering that the Londonderry collieries could "run the best of them neck and neck," he maintained that "nothing but a decided general action and victory can secure a permanent peace." On each of these occasions, however, such views were tempered by immediate practical considerations in which he always reverted to his attachment to the maintenance of price, particularly as Londonderry's financial position demanded colliery profits rather than a destructive "war" to end all wars.

Buddle perhaps erred in judgement when he so freely analysed in his letters to Londonderry his own thoughts on ideal strategies as well as on the immediate situation, for in both 1828-9 and 1832-3, "war" did follow, and on both occasions Londonderry's policy of using it to demonstrate his powers backfired miserably, not least because his rivals were also committed to such a policy. In January 1829 the immediate causus belli was Lord Durham's refusal to accept a system of reference and Buddle felt that Londonderry's declaration of war was justified. Buddle had perhaps miscalculated the position; he soon came round to thinking that the main battle was between Londonderry and Hetton. The latter was freighting heavily, pursuing vend without regard to profit, but, as Buddle acknowledged, the Company was clearly aware that high vend during
a contest carried great weight in negotiating any subsequent
Regulation.' Buddie was desperate for peace as soon as Durham conceded
the point in May 1829 for although they had succeeded in forcing
Lord Durham "to cry 'enough'",
"the Hetton Company, I am persuaded, will in the end be
the greater gainers by the War, as I don't think they
will again, either by reference or otherwise, be placed
upon a basis so relatively low as their former one." 71
Well over a year later Buddie still smarted from such a development -
"I really don't know whether I can ever quite forgive [Lord Durham]
for committing that folly" of destroying the Regulation in December
1828 and thus allowing their rivals to run neck and neck with both
Londonderry and Durham. 72

In 1832-3 Londonderry himself rejected a reference,
preferring to establish his claims for Seaham by demonstrating his
powers in open trade: "Give me or get me my due, upon proof -
better surely than reference." 73 In June 1833 Buddie had to agree
with Londonderry that they had the best of the trade at present,
but only a fortnight later, he warned that,
"In my judgement, the War has been long enough, indeed
too long carried on, for the full attainment of your
lordship's object, viz. to shew your superior powers
of working and vending - which under any circumstances
of negotiation or reference, must have had due consideration
and produced its fair and proper effect. The face of
affairs is, however, changing daily, as our rivals are
gaining strength...from which my apprehension is, that
the longer the War is continued, the worse Peace we
shall make." 74

By July, Londonderry had agreed to take part in negotiations for
a Regulation but just as Buddie found it hard to forgive Lord
Durham's action in December 1828, so he found it equally difficult
to forget Londonderry's in December 1832. He agreed with London­
derry that his superiority in vend was now clearly shown, but, "my
opinion is that we might, by negotiation, have gained all that we
ever shall gain by the sword, and more, and thereby have saved the
blood which has been spilt." 75

Relationships Within the Wear Trade

The formal structure of the Wear Coal Trade has been only
briefly described elsewhere, largely by analogy with the Tyne. 76 It
is clear (the Londonderry Papers having since become available)
that much greater weight should be given to the rôle, on the Wear,
of the three powerful coal owners and their agents, who often dictated the course of events through private contacts.

Buddle’s letters to Iveson and Lord Stewart in the early 1820s contain few references to Coal Trade meetings on the Wear. Buddle’s aim of raising and maintaining prices, whether under regulated or open trade, was achieved by co-operation between Buddle and Lambton’s agent, Croudace, in which Buddle provided the initiative and determination. Thus, after months of working on Croudace, Buddle persuaded him in March 1821 to advance the price of Eden-main and Primrose coals; an agreement with the fitters theoretically ruled out such an advance unless it were general by all Wear collieries, but Buddle commented, “this lead being taken by us, all the small fry will immediately follow.”

The events after the collapse of the Regulation on the Tyne in March 1822 again exemplify the relationship: after two months of relatively high Wear prices, Croudace’s nerve faltered, but Buddle resisted his wish for a large reduction for another month; then, as a result of a meeting with Londonderry (to whom Buddle was sending regular bulletins on the situation) Lambton sent another agent, Loraine, to discuss the situation with Buddle; Buddle gained Loraine’s agreement and together they “brought Croudace round” (“over a beef steak”) to maintaining prices on the Wear until the Tyne succeeded in settling its affairs.

Buddle was pleased with the relationship established during this period between Londonderry and Lambton: “it will effectually guard us against the curse of civil war and leave us to act against any foreign enemy with vigour.” As he foresaw, co-operation soon became necessary to resist the infractions of the Regulation by the new Hetton Company during the early months of 1823 and their claims for quantity in the following months. Buddle felt that Croudace was not showing as much pluck as he would have liked, but Lambton himself wished to meet Buddle “before making up his mind entirely as to the course which he should pursue.” The Hetton Company had been demanding a reference in the hope of splitting the difference between their claim for 100,000 chaldrons and the Trade’s idea of 50,000 ch. A Wear meeting referred the matter to Lambton and Buddle (in Londonderry’s absence) and Buddle then convinced Lambton of the need for “war” if the Hetton Company would not back down:

“He scouts the idea of a reference altogether in this case, as he is of opinion, considering the great share of the trade which your lordship and himself possess,
that you are entitled to dictate what the basis of the several collieries ought to be." 81

There could be no clearer statement of the way in which the Wear affairs were run in the early 1820s.

Co-operation between Londonderry and Lambton over prices and upstart competitors, did not, of course, preclude day-to-day competition. During their alliance of 1823, Buddie twice had to explain to Londonderry why Lambton's vend was larger than his - evidently in response to queries by Londonderry - and to reassure Londonderry when the latter expressed disappointment that his Wallsends did not command a higher price than Lambton's at London. 82

When the allocation of their own bases was at stake, there came a limit to the co-operation between the two leading powers. In October 1823, two months after the routing of the Hetton Company by Buddie and Lambton, a meeting of the joint committee of the two rivers was held, at which Buddie held out for a larger quantity than the Trade proposed. Croudace had been directed by Lambton,

"to consult with me and to do as I might do on the part of your lordship. I don't exactly like this sort of hunting in couples with Croudace at all times, as it may grow into a sort of identity of interests, that cannot at all times be expected to accord with your lordship's particular views and interests, I must therefore evade the shackles without ever however doing it in such a way as to give offence." 83

In any case, Buddie already felt that because of various matters other than the Coal Trade, Croudace's "jealousy of our power is on all occasions breaking out," and shortly afterwards, when Buddie met Croudace to discuss Londonderry's claim for quantity, Croudace "broke out in a violent fit of petulance." 84 Within a few weeks Buddie was reporting the growing personal friendship between Lambton and Captain Cochrane of the Hetton Company, and subsequently Lambton's neutrality and even sympathy towards Hetton. In May 1824 Cochrane told Buddie that Lambton had said that if he had known of the Company's real situation and capital, "he would not have been so tight upon them as to quantity." Croudace, despite his recent attitude towards Buddie, was uneasy about "Lambton's temporising with Cochrane" for Buddie felt he "dreads the rising power of the common enemy more than we do." 85

The Hetton claims caused the Wear Regulation to collapse in June 1824, and by the time negotiations were started a year later to re-establish
it, it was clear that Lambton and Hetton were united in their jealousy of and opposition to Londonderry. Henceforth it was always a three-sided relationship that dominated the Wear trade: Buddle reported a comment by Mowbray in 1829 that "t'Marquess, Lord Durham and t'Hetton Company might easily make t'regulation on't Wear themselves."

Alliances were still formed and broken but they now might include Hetton as an equal power. Moreover, instead of the regular understanding between agents of the early 1820s, they were specific agreements reached by the principals, as for example in June 1827 when Londonderry, Lambton and Cochrane resolved their dispute about a reference, at a meeting in London. In June 1829, when Londonderry and Lambton had a similar meeting, Buddle regretted that Cochrane's sanction had not also been obtained in London. In December 1833 and January 1834, meetings and letters between Londonderry, Durham and Mowbray again paved the way for the re-establishment of Regulation. The irony of such "high diplomacy" after more than two years of bitter disputes, did not go unnoticed; R.W.Brandling, chairman of the Tyne Coal Trade, was amused by the copy of Londonderry's first letter to Mowbray, which Buddle had sent to him, and commented, "Misery they say makes us acquainted with strange bedfellows but certainly I was not prepared for a proposal to tumble into the same trundle-bed with my lord and old Arthur; if we could only persuade my Lady and Madam from Edinbro' to join the party we should be a merry set."

It was rare (after the early 1820s) to find any longer-term working alliance between the powers, although there were temporary alliances such as in July 1833, when Buddle, Morton (for Lord Durham) and the North Hetton Company agreed to act in unison against the Hetton Company. The situation changed again, however, in the later 1830s; by 1835 Buddle felt that a separate formal Regulation of the best collieries would be necessary in view of "an additional supply of nearly 200,000 chaldrons coming into the market annually, and how this is to be provided for under regulation I cannot imagine." Not long afterwards, the details were being worked out by Buddle, Morton and Wood (for the Hetton Company) and they hoped to bring in South Hetton, Haswell, North Hetton and the best Tyne collieries. Evidence is lacking for 1836-38 but it appears that in 1837 a "Triple Alliance" was in operation with "our two powerful neighbours" which Buddle hoped would protect them from
sudden large falls in prices. In 1840 Morton and the Hetton, Haswell and South Hetton collieries were again in agreement with Buddie's idea of a separate first-class Regulation, "on the principle of a proportional quantity and standard price." The problem now, as increasing numbers of new collieries were opened in Durham, was to know where to draw the line in deciding on the participants in such an agreement. Over the next two years it appeared that a Regulation of the best Durham collieries alone would have to include not only the three old powers of Londonderry, Lambton and Hetton and the slightly younger ones of North and South Hetton and Haswell, but also Thornley, Cassop, Crowtrees, Wingate Grange, Castle Eden and others. In the event, the full Regulation survived for another two years, until after Buddie's death. Nevertheless, such attempts at sub-regulations, and Londonderry's support for them, provide a more significant indication of normal Coal Trade relationships on the Wear in the late 1830s than do the misgivings expressed by Londonderry's neighbours about joining him in a colliery company.

A brief survey of the history of a scheme of reference for settling disputes over quantities will further illustrate the relationship of the Wear powers. Sweezy claimed that reference was not introduced on a regular basis until 1829, but in fact it had been discussed or used in virtually every year since 1823 in relation to settling disputes on the Wear. The attitudes of the Wear powers on each occasion demonstrate that none of them was particularly influenced by a question of principle. In 1823, as has been seen, the Hetton Company sought to gain by submitting its claims to reference, and Lambton and Buddie were united in their opposition to such a move. In 1825, Buddie hit on the idea of a reference to decide Londonderry's claims and to cut the ground from under those who were blaming Londonderry for preventing agreement on Regulation; Londonderry adopted this idea with enthusiasm; Lambton and Hetton were strongly opposed to it, and the issue was eventually side-stepped only by a short-term compromise by the Trade. This Regulation broke down prematurely in 1826; when negotiations were re-opened there was a feeling on the Wear in favour of a reference and Londonderry had expressed himself in agreement with it, during after-dinner conversations. Buddie therefore stated Londonderry's agreement at a general meeting at the end of December 1826, only to find that Londonderry had changed his views. Buddie reacted firmly and
Londonderry retreated, merely suggesting the addition of two Tyne viewers to the three proposed referees. Repercussions continued, however, throughout 1827 and 1828. The Wear meeting objected to the viewers having voting powers and Buddie acquiesced for the sake of settling the matter. When the referees' award was made in March 1827, however, its treatment of Londonderry's basis surprised both Buddle and Londonderry, and Buddle regretted that the viewers had not had "the full authority of referees as originally intended by your lordship." A Coal Trade meeting soon afterwards decided to submit the award to revision on the grounds of this irregularity; Buddle was relieved, "as I think it entirely exonerates me from anything like personal responsibility." Understandably, when the revised award was ready, the Coal Trade meeting was wary of opening it, so Cochrane of the Hetton Company was instructed to take it to Londonderry and Lambton in London. At a meeting at Holdenesse House, the three principals reached agreement concerning the Regulation, and apparently a new reference, and this new award was made in September.

This Regulation was renewed in February 1828 but before the end of April a new problem arose out of the reference question. Lord Durham was demurring about adjusting his over-vend of 1827, accumulated as a result of the alteration in his basis by the last award; the dispute concerned the date at which the retrospective award became binding. The Hetton Company seemed inclined to wink at the over-vend; Buddle and Londonderry agreed that, alone if necessary, they must press for its correction but, on Londonderry's instructions, Buddle was anxious to avoid their being "made the prime movers." Buddle eventually managed at the end of June-1828 to arrange that a Wear meeting should discuss the matter; the general feeling was to ignore the problem rather than risk breaking up the Regulation, but the meeting agreed to ask the referees what they understood by the award, which was as much as Buddle wanted, "not wishing, in compliance with your lordship's wishes, to appear to act with anything like hostile feelings towards Lord Durham." It was only when the matter was still not settled by the end of August that Londonderry took a firmer line, sending Buddle instructions apparently to start unrestricted vend, but he was persuaded by the Trade to suspend them until a reply to the Trade's representations was received from Lord Durham. On 2nd September Buddle reported, "the storm has
blown over and we continue at peace" as Durham had consented to
the award acting retrospectively and thereby gave up some of his
over-vend for that year. This was the situation behind Londonderry's
threat to vend freely in August 1828: the enforcement of a referees'
award on the Wear, not a dispute between Tyne and Wear about current
over-vend by the Wear."

The central role played by the question of reference in the
long suspension of Regulation in 1829 is well known; Lord Durham
objected to the reference system proposed for the settling of
disputes between the rivers, on the grounds that "he will not place
his interests at the disposal of the Tyne committee, nor allow
them to be judges on questions relating to the Wear alone." Buddle
considered, as in 1825, that his real motive was that he and his
agents "are eaten up with jealousy and envy of our superior position,
and are afraid to come into collision with us, in an investigation
of powers and quality etc.", and Buddle - supported by Cochrane of
the Hetton Company - took the lead in keeping the committee firm
on the point of reference." The referees were not, in fact, needed
to settle the proportions of the basis between the two rivers when
the Regulation was at last negotiated."

In the breakdown of Regulation in 1832, Buddle again
considered that "the question of reference was the origin of all
the mischief" (this time, to decide Londonderry's claims for Seaham
Harbour) and on this occasion, Londonderry opposed and Lord Durham
supported the reference proposal as strongly as they had adopted
the contrary views three years earlier."

This was perhaps not
surprising, as Londonderry's consent to a reference in 1827 had not
ensured an extra allowance for North Pittington, and his insistence
in 1829 that Lord Durham should agree to a reference had been of no
benefit to Londonderry as the eventual reference placed Londonderry,
Durham and Hetton all level."

By the beginning of 1833, Londonderry
was apparently ready to consider Regulation but the Hetton Company
now stepped in to demand a retrospective reference on the over and
shorts of 1831-2, and Morton (for Lord Durham) was as opposed to
this reference as was Londonderry. Agreement on Regulation in January-
February 1834 apparently depended more on private agreement reached
by the three Wear powers than on the establishment of the reference
principle."
Relationships with the Tyne

Buddie's involvement with the Coal Trade of both rivers made him particularly aware of their inter-action. His observations are therefore an important supplement to the formal details of the Coal Trade minute books, which provide little clear evidence of the relationship between the Wear and the Tyne. Accounts written before Buddie's letters to Londonderry were available suggest that relations between the rivers were conducted only through the committees and the general meetings; that at least until 1829 the rivers used "war as a method of settling their differences;" that all crises, particularly after 1825, were precipitated by the Wear first-class collieries to whom the lower Tyne collieries were surrendering their supremacy; and that the inferior collieries (chiefly on the Tyne) although less benefitted by Regulation, clung more tenaciously to it in principle than did the first-class collieries.

Buddie's evidence indicates that this is too simplified a picture.

During the 1820s, it is true, the initiative can been seen to pass from the Tyne to the Wear. In 1820 and again in 1822, it was the failure of the Tyne owners to agree among themselves that caused the collapse of the Regulation. In both years Buddie managed to keep up his own prices, despite in 1822 the clamour of protest among the Sunderland fitters (who during April saw fifty of their customers leave Sunderland for Newcastle) but the Wear was powerless to form a Regulation while there was open trade on the Tyne. In such a situation, relations between the two rivers tended to follow a regular pattern. The "innocent" river would first make representations to the offender; thus, early in May 1822 Buddie reported to Londonderry,

"Croudace has been on a grand diplomattick mission - under the rose / the most refractory of the Tyne coal-owners. The job was planned at our tea-drinking at Penshier. Croudace being an independent character from the Wear, goes with the most friendly and disinterested intentions, to point out the folly of persisting in the present system on the Tyne. He finds those who have hitherto been unreasonable, coming to their sober senses, and willing to do what may be thought right. In consequence we call a meeting of the Wear coal-owners and they resolve to request a general meeting of the Newcastle Gentlemen next Saturday, when the Wear gentlemen will meet them, to endeavour to get them to adopt some measures to put a stop to the mischief which is going on on the Tyne. Our plan is to endeavour by cool argument to get them to regulate their prices at least, and to put them on a fair footing with the Wear."

"
If such representations failed the victim would then retaliate: "we must menace them with a reduction." In the event, the Tyne agreed to stop freighting Sunderland ships, but it was not brought to the point of Regulation, by the market prices and the cost of freighting, for another six weeks. During those weeks Buddle, encouraged by Londonderry, stuck resolutely to his carefully nurtured prices but reported that he was "fighting almost single-handed against the whole of the coal- and ship-owners of Sunderland for this point." Clearly it took unusual nerve and vision for a Wear owner to stand out for so long against fighting the other river on its own destructive terms.

A year later, in May 1823, the initiative was beginning to shift. As usual, it was accepted that the Wear could do little towards a Regulation until an understanding was reached on the Tyne. By now, however, the Hetton Company had appeared on the scene and had been summoned to a Wear meeting to obtain its agreement in principle to Regulation. This time, when Buddle declared he would vend freely until the Hetton Company co-operated, it was the turn of the Tyne to seek the co-operation of the Wear, or rather of Londonderry, as without it the Regulation on the Tyne could not be maintained. When Regulation was established, the Tyne continued to make representations to the Wear on the subject of the latter's great increase in basis, caused largely by Londonderry's claims, but it is significant that by the end of the year the debate was between Londonderry and Lambton, with the Tyne and the rest of the Wear helplessly awaiting its outcome. With the exception of 1826, this established the pattern for some years: the Wear powers increasingly dictating the course of events and the Tyne trying to avoid collapse of the Regulation. In 1824 the Wear declared the Regulation at an end because of the behaviour of the Hetton Company, but the leading Tyne collieries agreed to support their prices under a Regulation of the first-class collieries only. This was still the situation when negotiations were started for a general Regulation early in 1825. The claims of the three big Wear powers, particularly Londonderry, then caused an uproar at both the Wear and the Tyne meetings; in April the chairman of the Tyne committee accepted that Regulation entirely depended on Londonderry, Lambton and Hetton; in May and June the Tyne twice postponed a declaration of war in the hope that the Wear would sort out its problems, and
a Regulation was at last established from 1st August. In April 1826, however, before its year was completed, the Regulation again broke down. Londonderry has been blamed for causing the collapse by over-vending but Buddle's evidence sheds new light. There had already been "great irregularities" on each river, and ten days before the Regulation collapsed, Buddle had requested Londonderry's instructions as to whether he should exceed the regulated vend. The majority of the Tyne collieries were in exactly the same position as Londonderry, unable to afford to submit to the short issues necessary to raise the market prices: "the disease seems to be quite incurable." On the other hand, the few opulent Tyne collieries were unwilling to be held back, and it was the delegate of one of these, Percy-main, who broke up the Regulation with his declaration at a Coal Trade meeting,

"That in consequence of the late irregularities committed by the Trade, he would not any longer restrict his vend, nor advance the price of his coals to their former standard."

This outcome happened to suit Londonderry and Buddle, but even Lambton's agent, Billy Loraine, placed the blame squarely on Percy-main: "he thought the Tyne gentlemen could never again ask Lord Londonderry and Mr. Lambton to enter into any regulations after such a complete breach of faith." The collapse of the Tyne Regulation gave Buddle, on Londonderry's instructions, the opportunity to aim immediately for maximum vend. Lambton and Hetton fought to bind the Wear to maintaining prices and limiting quantities, but from purely selfish motives: Lambton's vend had suffered from his recent dismissal of his fitters, so that "our policy in point of vend is unfortunately at complete variance with Lambton's," who would want to see Londonderry's vend restricted; and the Hetton Company, having already freighted thirty ships, and always able to give good measure at the spouts, had everything to gain from a nominal price regulation.

A Regulation was restored in February 1827 and the following two years passed under Regulation. As has already been noted, however, the Regulation was threatened, though not broken, during 1828 by a dispute between Lambton and Londonderry over the former's overs in the previous year. It is interesting that in August 1828, at a joint committee meeting, the Wear communicated to the Tyne documents relating to the "misunderstanding", and requested the Tyne's opinion so far as it concerned relations between the rivers. The Tyne
apparently had nothing constructive to say but, a week later, it was clearly the prime mover in the Trade's request to Londonderry to suspend his determination to break up the agreement with the Tyne. When Lord Durham conceded the point at issue, the Trade agreed to make up Londonderry's deficiency of vend for 1827 (that is, his share of Lord Durham's overs,) with the Tyne hoping that the Wear would bear its fair proportion but undertaking in any case to make up the deficiency. \[13\]

When the Regulation eventually collapsed in January 1829 it was due once more to a Wear dispute, with the Tyne appealing to the very end to the Wear to settle its differences. After the joint committee meeting on 24th January 1829, which at last declared the Trade open as a result of Lord Durham's rejection of a "tribunal of appeal," the Tyne committee called for a further Tyne meeting on 3rd February to consider measures "to protect the interests of the coal-owners on the Tyne." Buddle wrote to Londonderry that, to his surprise, the General Meeting of the Tyne on 3rd February even now did not "draw the sword" but instead again appealed to the Wear, that is, as Buddle pointed out, to Lord Durham. \[19\] Londonderry reacted strongly, informing the Wear committee that he would not tolerate "the further humiliation of delay, intreaty and suspense," and ordering Buddle to attend no more meetings but to "sell and work every coal you can produce." The Wear committee not surprisingly disliked the tone of Londonderry's letter but it did not entertain any more overtures from the Tyne. \[19\]

The initiative had thus passed to the great Wear collieries. The situation did not, however, remain static. The Tyne had not let the growing power of the Wear collieries go unnoticed; as early as 1823 Buddle had reported that it had voiced objections to the large increase in the Wear basis, and in 1828 Buddle had felt that a renewal of the Regulation would be unlikely unless the Wear gave up to the Tyne a considerable part of its basis, for the ever-increasing claims of the great Wear collieries combined with the ever-increasing numbers of Tyne collieries had caused the Tyne bases to be drastically reduced, sometimes by over half. One of the best Tyne collieries, Bewicke and Craster's Wallsend (that is, Percy-main) now had a basis of only 45,000 chaldrons and this in the year when Londonderry had successfully insisted on 145,000 chaldrons. \[11\] Buddle was in an exceptional position to judge such feelings for he was usually present at
the Tyne committee meetings and he was also in close touch with opinion on the Tyne through, for example, other partners in his Tyne collieries. One small coal owner, the Catholic lawyer James Losh, confided to his diary at about this time that "the folly of Lord Londonderry and the intrigues of his agent, Mr. Buddie, and the pride and obstinacy of Lord Durham, seem likely to throw everything into confusion and we little personages must suffer the absurdities of our magnificent fellow tradesmen." Buddie's friends, too, did not mince their words when talking about Londonderry's share of responsibility, as one of the three Wear powers, for the situation. In February 1827, for example, when the Tyne had allowed the Wear an issue of 80 to the thousand while the Tyne had only 60, Humble Lamb wrote,

"I see considerable difficulty in ever getting it back as the old Th—f I fear has no principle and will bewilder us if he can — no doubt the Secretary was kept away for that express purpose. If any of your brethren there were in difficulties they ought to have borrowed a few thousand chaldrons from the Marquis and Lambton for the month, but the Tyne ought not to bolster up your good friends and honest neighbours. It is like giving a man a long start to win a race; we ought to have started fair and then the best take the profits and as Brandling says, d—n the devil and Arthur."

With this background, any over-vend by the Wear naturally caused uproar on the Tyne. But a third factor also had been gradually emerging: the strength of the Tyne inferior collieries in open trade. In 1825 Buddie had commented on their beating the Wear in the "bye" markets, and in the following year he considered that "the present struggle in the Trade is shewing clearly that the inferior collieries are not be crushed by the large ones. So far this is quite a new light thrown on the subject."

In 1832 these three factors - the Tyne's objections to the shift of power to the Wear, over-vending by the Wear even given its growing basis, and the success of the inferior Tyne collieries in previous periods of open trade - combined to give a new twist to relations between the two rivers. In September of that year, Londonderry's over-vend (in support of his claim for Seaham Harbour) turned a meeting of the two committees into a "bear-garden;" the Tyne objected strongly to being "humbugged by the notion of a regulation." Two months later Buddie told Londonderry that he had "every reason to believe that the affairs of the Trade will soon be placed in an entire new position by the Tyne adopting the line of offensive operations."
By now Buddie was not attending Coal Trade meetings as he was not authorised by Londonderry to make any concessions but he was still aware of the feelings on the Tyne. He had had a conversation with George Johnson, a viewer and partner in Willington, who was, "decidedly against regulating in future unless such reductions were made on the enormous vends of the Wear collieries as would give the Tyne collieries such vends as would leave them something like a reasonable profit. He added 'if we are obliged to carry on a profitless trade, it shall not at any rate be under regulation'."

A month later the situation had hardened - "altogether new language and a new state of things." The Tyne was now (in contrast to the 1820s) determined to make no further overtures to the Wear; they would consider Regulation only if the bases of the two rivers were amalgamated and apportioned among the collieries on both rivers together; and Buddie had never seen such determination by the Tyne against, in particular, the three great Wear powers. Throughout the following months the Tyne acted on its own under a Regulation of price but not of quantity, and the inferior Tyne collieries showed their strength; their second-class coals sold for almost as much as the Wear Wallends, and as "they have always been too insignificant to get into debt, and their owners have other sources and don't live upon them," they were prepared for a long campaign. Even in June 1833, when preliminary steps towards Regulation were at last under way (and when Londonderry had only a few days previously accused Buddie of trying to frighten him into Regulation) Buddie still felt that the Tyne was looking to the ruin of the great powers on the Wear, and he anticipated great difficulties from the inferior collieries in the negotiations.

In the event, it was the Hetton Company which proved the stumbling block, holding out long after the Tyne had come round to considering a Regulation to include the Wear. Even after a Regulation was eventually established, however, the Tyne inferior collieries remained unhappy; "the best collieries who can always sell their quantity, press for larger issues, and obtain them too, than the inferior collieries can vend," forcing the latter out of the coastal markets and so glutting the London market, lowering the prices and reducing or destroying their profits - "they allege therefore that the regulation is merely for the benefit of the best collieries." Buddie initiated some degree of relief for them by raising the price
of Wallsends, but the growing number of new collieries during the 1830s prevented any permanent solution. By 1842 Buddie felt that a Regulation of the first-class collieries might be the best solution for Londonderry, but the Tyne inferior collieries were equally doubtful about renewing the Regulation: they were going to ruin under it and would rather try their fortunes in open trade. Londonderry had suspected that he was being held back by the Regulation for the sake of the Tyne inferior collieries: the latter felt that Regulation was merely strengthening the hand of the three first-class Wear powers.

The possibility of a conflict of interests arising from Buddie's many-sided involvement in the Coal Trade, which was unparalleled by any other agent or owner, did not of course go unnoticed. There is little evidence that any shared the view of James Losh, who considered that Buddie "(by having too many irons in the fire and not being over scrupulous) appears to me to do much harm," and even that "Mr. Buddie's ascendency has done infinite mischief to the coal trade ever since I have had anything to do with it." Lambton's agent, Croudace, felt that "when a person is himself very considerably interested in the other River, his judgement may be a little biased," but he was writing to Lambton in May 1822, trying to justify his desire to make a large reduction in Wear prices, while Buddie, with greater nerve, resisted his wishes; Croudace was hardly convinced by his own hints of bias - "I really do not wish to say that it is so, at the same time I think you will not think it unfair to presume so." In the event, Lambton favoured Buddie's rather than Croudace's tactics. Nevertheless, Lord Wharncliffe wrote to his partner, Lord Ravensworth, during the disputes of 1829, that, "Buddie, Lord Londerry's agent is certainly a man of great influence in the Tyne committee, and he has at least two others who are supposed to follow his leading upon all occasions. It is therefore unnatural that the coal-owners on the Wear [i.e. Lord Durham] should object to a dispute about their quantities being referred to a Committee where he has so much influence."

It is intriguing to speculate that Buddie might have used his influence on the Tyne committee on Londonderry's behalf, for this would have provided a counterpoise to the numerical domination of the Wear by Lambton and his lessees, of which Buddie complained in 1825. There is little in Buddie's letters to suggest that this was so, however, and the surviving comments of his friends on the Tyne were rarely respectful of Londonderry. A more obvious possibility was conflict
between Buddle's close understanding of the Tyne trade and his loyalty to Londonderry, and this came under scrutiny by Londonderry himself. In December 1826, for example, the latter commented that he was being committed to Regulation because of distress on the Tyne, and in January 1833 he again suggested that Buddle wished to sacrifice Londonderry's personal interests to those of the general trade. Buddle of course refuted all such suggestions. Nevertheless, at times he walked a tight-ropé. A clear example occurs as early as 1823.

In July, when the Regulation had officially expired and the Hetton Company's claims were preventing its renewal, Buddle declared to the Wear meeting that the Londonderry collieries would vend freely in the interval before the Hetton Company's decision was received; at the Tyne meeting on the following day, at which Buddle was present as usual as secretary, the Wear secretary, Martindale, attended to report this situation, with the result that Buddle as Tyne secretary, was instructed to write to Londonderry to ask him to continue the old Regulation until the Hetton Company could reply - a measure of which Buddle personally approved, not least because of the state of Londonderry's finances. Despite Londonderry's uneasiness, the Regulation was maintained until the Hetton Company agreed to the new one, but problems continued for the rest of the year as the Tyne objected to the large increase of the Wear basis, chiefly caused by Londonderry's claims. While continuing to present a determined front at the meetings of the two committees, and to Groudace, Buddle was simultaneously trying to convince Londonderry of the fallacy of the latter's arguments. The result was that by November, Londonderry was assuming that Buddle's interests in the Tyne collieries placed him in "a very delicate and difficult situation" - an idea that Buddle took care to refute in detail. Only a month before this comment by Londonderry, a more realistic assessment of Buddle's rôle than that made by Losh, Wharncliffe or Londonderry, had been made by George Waldie, a Tyne coal owner:

"Your situation and knowledge of the claims of each enables you I hope to be very powerful as a peacemaker, between the contending parties and their separate interests."  

This was the rôle that Buddle consistently played but it was fraught with difficulties.
The Relationship of Buddie and Londonderry

As in Londonderry's general affairs, Buddie was anxious to "let the proper line be distinctly drawn, as between the agent and his master." Londonderry had been "pleased to complement me on the deference which your lordship pays to my advice" on Regulation, and Buddie would "always feel it incumbent upon me to offer to your lordship my candid opinion and best judgement," but "my insisting or even pressing my opinions against your lordship's own sound judgement, beyond the proper line of duty, would be unbecoming at least, if not impertinent, and I trust that I never shall forfeit your lordship's good opinion by committing myself wilfully in that way." It says much for Buddie's powers of persuasion and for Londonderry's ability to subdue the misgivings about Regulation that he had always felt, that the Regulation lasted as long as it did; such an outcome could not have been achieved by a coal owner acting as an "irresponsible individualist" and an agent who was habitually critical of him.

Londonderry took a direct interest in Coal Trade matters, whether querying the benefits of Regulation or keeping an eye on the size of the vend. In the absence of Londonderry's letters to Buddie, it is difficult to differentiate between their spheres of responsibility; Buddie had authority to conduct and conclude Coal Trade negotiations, although Londonderry quite frequently gave specific instructions as to the basis to be claimed and as to how far Buddie should pursue such claims; and on occasions Londonderry personally negotiated Regulation with his fellow principals or, less frequently, with the Trade at large.

The most obvious evidence for serious disagreement between Londonderry and Buddie would of course be the withdrawal of responsibility from Buddie: this happened to some extent in 1831-33 but it was foreshadowed during 1827 which, though outwardly a quiet year, was dominated for Buddie and Londonderry by the latter's claim for an increased basis for North Pittington. At the end of 1826, Londonderry had changed his mind about agreeing to a reference; Buddie already felt committed on that point but offered to lay Londonderry's letter before a Trade meeting and state that he had no discretion on the matter. "Let matters turn as they may," he continued, "I shall take good care not to risk the placing myself in such a position again." Londonderry retreated. A reference was made but allocated no extra allowance for Pittington. Buddie felt this far more deeply than appears in his letters to Londonderry, for his friend,
Humble Lamb, wrote to assure him that,

"I never can bring myself to think that the marquess would like to dissolve partnership with you, his affairs are too complex to admit a fresh man to advise with him."

Lamb had perhaps not understood what was concerning Buddie, for ten days later he wrote in a different vein: if Londonderry, he wrote, "will break the promise he has given the Trade after committing his honor to the hands of three wise men...the Trade cannot blame you - you do not break either your word or your honor, but on the contrary you have done your utmost to keep all together." During the remainder of 1827 and early in 1828, Buddie felt that he "really cannot think of continually opposing my opinions to his lordship's" on the Regulation." In June 1827 he welcomed the rôle played by Londonderry, Lambton and Cochrane in personally settling the question of the revised award, and in 1828, when Londonderry's claims were again larger than the Coal Trade proposal, Buddie took no part in the Wear discussions, and Londonderry was considered an absentee, "in consequence of my not possessing any discretionary power." The Trade eventually acceded to Londonderry's claim, pursued by letter direct from him to the Coal Trade secretary (although Buddie saw the letter first) with Buddie taking no part in the discussion."

In 1831 Buddie's and Londonderry's policies were more directly opposed to each other, both on Londonderry's concessions to the striking pitmen in May, and on his intention to claim an extra quantity on the basis for Seaham Harbour. This time Buddie apparently felt more strongly than in 1827 that Londonderry's actions affected his own position, for two years later, Buddie reminded Londonderry that "ever since the unfortunate transactions in May 1831 it has not been clearly understood by the trade that your lordship would be bound by act of mine, or of Hunter, further than suited your convenience... From that period it is considered that your lordship has in a great measure severed yourself from the Trade." Moreover, "after the unfortunate meeting of 6th May 1831, from which may be dated the ruin of the trade," Buddie had declined to act as secretary or in any official capacity to the Trade. He was determined "in future to be quite passive in all general Coal Trade affairs." Early in August 1831, Buddie was "knocked down by an attack of nervous fever," and he did not resume his direction of Londonderry's affairs in the north-east until May 1832.
In the meantime, Londonderry went ahead with his claim for Seaham Harbour and it is clear that Hunter, Buddie's deputy, agreed with Londonderry rather than with Buddie. Buddle urged submitting the question to a reference but Hunter's advice had always been "for your lordship to endeavour to come to a Regulation on an annual vend", for as he told Londonderry "you would never submit the Harbour to go to reference - this was always your Lordship's point, and I have always considered it impossible to turn you from it." The Coal Trade apparently realised the effect of Buddle's long absence, for Hunter told Londonderry that "some of the Coal Trade people look at me as if I had been the means of this difference, as your lordship's adviser during Mr. B's absence, or your lordship would not have acted as you have done as to the Pitmen at the Stick, and the claim of vend etc.; however, I protest against the whole of it, as I have only one course to pursue, viz. to abide by your directions." Hunter's attitude was markedly more passive than Buddie's, in normal circumstances. Hunter was also most concerned that Londonderry should "keep all my remarks and calculations to yourself" because "I am sure Mr. Buddie would feel hurt, and think I had taken too much upon me without consulting him." 160

By the time Buddie returned to the north-east, Londonderry had evidently made up his mind to insist on a specific quantity for Seaham Harbour. Buddle was now acting strictly on instructions, and when the first Wear meeting was held after Buddle's return, Buddle said he would attend it, to keep up appearances, but "will avoid mixing myself up in the Regulation affair - I will leave that entirely to your lordship's superior diplomacy." Consequently when the Trade agreed on 19th June 1832 to extend the Regulation to the end of 1833 to enable the collieries in conflict with the Union to make up their shorts, Buddle reported to Londonderry that "as I had no instructions from your lordship relative to the above matters, I did not of course represent the collieries." A fortnight later another general meeting agreed that the wages paid by the collieries which had succeeded in binding men would be the lowest allowed by the bonds, to prevent payment to the Union for the strikers, and again, "when I perceived what the feeling of the meeting was," wrote Buddle, "I sneaked off, not feeling myself authorised on the part of your lordship to sanction it, altho' I am quite satisfied
of the sound policy of the measure." During the remainder of the year Buddie avoided attending meetings and, as in January 1828, Londonderry corresponded directly with the Trade. In fact, according to Hunter, Londonderry wrote to the Trade early in October 1832, that "I never would allow my agents since I differed with the Coal Meeting at Newcastle in my last attendance to act or decide for me in Coal Matters, and claim the privilege to act for myself." Buddie took this strictly literally: "all we can do, is to act as mere messengers as it is not competent to us to attend any meetings as representatives." The impression from Hunter's letter to Londonderry at about the same time is that this was Buddie's opinion, and perhaps not Hunter's.

By November 1832 the Regulation appeared to be an entire dead letter. In his individual capacity, Buddie suggested to the Tyne committee that an attempt should be made to negotiate a Regulation for 1833, starting with carte blanche "without reference to the transactions of the present year." Shortly afterwards Buddie was summoned to a Tyne committee meeting, "when I found the business was to receive the report of the Wear Committee on your lordship's last letter, and which if I had known, I certainly should not have been present, as it put me in the way of hearing many harsh things said, in reference to your lordship's general conduct towards the Trade at large." As no progress appeared possible to settling the disputes of the current year, Hugh Taylor mentioned to the Wear men the idea of starting anew for 1833, but the discussion was ended by Londonderry's refusal in his letter to allow Seaham Harbour quantity to be settled by a reference.

Although Buddie considered himself not authorised to attend Wear meetings for Londonderry, the latter continued to conduct his Coal Trade affairs only by letter, despite Buddie's appeals to him to come to the north-east: Buddie considered that matters might have been resolved in December 1832 if only Londonderry had been "in the field." By the end of the year Londonderry was apparently thinking of involving his agents again, for he wrote to Hunter in terms which prompted both Buddie and Hunter to remind him that they were unable to attend Wear meetings on his behalf, and early in January 1833 Buddie refused to be drawn into discussion: "I cannot say more on the subject of Regulation - your lordship will please to exercise your own discretion. I feel that I have done my duty by offering
advice, which I conscientiously believed to be for the best." On the following day, however, Buddie received a letter from Londonderry accusing him of wishing to sacrifice Londonderry's personal interests to the general trade. A week later Londonderry told him to give authority to Hunter to attend to the Trade while Buddie was in London, whereupon Buddie again reminded Londonderry "that I am not yet myself duly authorised to attend, and cannot do so until your lordship gives me an unqualified written authority to do so." Within a month or so, Londonderry was apparently ready to sue for peace, but by May his attitude was as intransigent as ever, insisting again on a specific quantity for Seaham (rather than submitting it to reference) - "I have made up my mind to beggary and ruin rather than be bullied by the Hetton Co., Lambton, Brandling and co." In the same letter, Buddie reminded him, "you exonerate me from all responsibility and take the management entirely into your own hands." The result was that "I feel myself so cramped and tight laced that I hardly dare exercise any discretionary power whatever." Four weeks after relieving Buddie of responsibility for Coal Trade affairs, however, Londonderry was again taking for granted that Buddie would try to "discover if we can take any and what judicious line to bring matters to some understanding." Buddie's reply was forthright:

"If the trade were satisfied that your lordship gave me your confidence, and would bona fide ratify my acts... I have little doubt but this object might be accomplished." This letter apparently resulted in Londonderry at last giving clear instructions to Buddie to resume negotiations on his behalf, for measures were soon taken towards establishing a Regulation. Despite Buddie's urging the fairness of the measure, Londonderry still refused to contribute to compensation for the pitmen's strike of 1832 but by the end of the year, Londonderry's financial position was such that he was forced to take more positive steps to encourage a Regulation and the position was rapidly resolved by direct communication between Londonderry, Durham and Mowbray, with a Regulation coming into effect on 1st March 1834.

Thus, throughout 1832 and 1833, relations between Londonderry and Buddie fluctuated from day to day. Buddie felt that his credibility as Londonderry's agent was ended in May 1831; when Buddie returned to the north-east in May 1832 he acted strictly on instructions, and in October 1832 Londonderry specifically stated
that Buddie and Hunter were not authorised to represent him. Londonderry, however, continued to direct affairs only by letter, and early in 1833 he appeared to be ignoring what he had said in the previous October. Nevertheless, Buddie stood firmly on the fact that he was not authorised to represent Londonderry. In May 1833 Londonderry reverted in unmistakable terms to himself directly conducting relations with the Trade, only to hint four weeks later that Buddie should try to break the deadlock in the Trade. At this stage, Buddie was apparently given the explicit authority to act, without which he had refused to move on Londonderry's behalf for the past year, but when Regulation was eventually restored it was by direct negotiations between the principals. It was a muddled situation. Buddie, having learned from his experience in 1828 and severely shaken by the divergence between his and Londonderry's attitude to the pitmen's strike in April 1831, categorically refused to exercise any discretion. The fluctuations in Londonderry's attitude, on the other hand, suggest that his letters were often more blunt than his intentions and probably written in the heat of the moment. Buddie appeared to take them more literally than Londonderry intended, but then Buddie had learned the dangers of placing himself between Londonderry and the Trade.

Nevertheless, although Buddie's and Londonderry's personalities and policy disagreements contributed to the situation, they were not the only factors involved. In fact, a colliery owner temporarily withdrawing discretionary responsibility from his Coal Trade agent was a well-recognised ploy. In January 1829, for example, Lord Durham's agents had no power to speak for him without further reference to him, or to modify his communications to the Trade, or even to state his views on the basic point at issue; as in the case of Londonderry in December 1832, despite the restrictions on his agents, Durham communicated with the Trade only by letter, and the result was a year of un-regulated trade. In June of that year, when attempts were made to restore Regulation, Lambton again failed to authorise his agents to act for him, much to the annoyance of the Coal Trade committees. Nor were Londonderry and Buddie the only people to be divided by their opinions on Regulation: the Hetton Company was frequently strongly split between "war" and "peace" factions with the result that negotiations for Regulation were delayed or protracted.
Relations between Buddle and Londonderry were permanently marked by the events of 1831-33; Londonderry's attitude to the pitmen's strike raised the points of honour and basic co-operation with the rest of the Trade, striking more deeply at Buddle's personal principles than did the normal course of Trade disputes, and the ensuing period of open trade, in Buddle's view so unnecessary, was disastrous for the colliery finances. Nevertheless, after the re-establishment of Regulation in 1834, the Regulation ran a fairly steady course, enforced by growing competition and with Buddle looking increasingly to partial regulation of the first-class collieries. After Buddle's death in 1843, Hindhaugh ventured to comment to Londonderry that he believed "your lordship is almost tired of the manner in which matters have been conducted." Nevertheless, Londonderry's instructions to Hindhaugh on the negotiations for Regulation in 1844 relied explicitly on the fact that "the late Mr. Buddle advised and my present colliery viewer is of opinion that I never should submit to the new principles introduced for revision of basis," and stated equally explicitly that he would consent to a Regulation for the first-class collieries, as Buddle had proposed. The final collapse of the Regulation in 1844-45 was possibly hastened by the fact that Buddle's negotiating and mediating ability was no longer available; Sir George Elliot, who had once been a pitman in Londonderry's collieries, explained to a Select Committee in 1873 that a scheme for a general countrywide Regulation in 1845 had collapsed because Londonderry - "a great giant in the county at that time, in the coal trade especially" - held aloof. But to suggest that Londonderry reacted to freedom from Buddle's influence by dissolving the Regulation, ignores, firstly that Buddle's attitude to full Regulation had been considerably modified during the late 1830s - "I am not now a Regulationist" - and, secondly, that despite the strain on their relationship of years such as 1831-33, Londonderry still referred to Buddle's advice on the Coal Trade even after the latter's death.
Chapter XIII

"A Black Cloud that o'er Spreads Me"

Buddie, as the manager of Londonderry's most valuable assets, became intimately involved in his general financial affairs, as did land agents on many large estates where agriculture was the prime concern. It was not a sphere of activity that Buddie enjoyed:

"I often think that nature never designed me for a financier, for of all other things it worries me the most - in short I find all other sorts of worries mere child's play to it."

Londonderry did not employ an auditor, like Lambton's Stephenson, or a central agent with an equivalent rôle, like the Duke of Northumberland's Commissioner, Hugh Taylor. Buddie was brought into the conduct of Londonderry's general finances from about October 1821, and after January 1822, when he became sole colliery manager, he was closely involved in them. Henceforth, until Londonderry's affairs were placed under a Trust in 1834, it was Londonderry and Buddie alone who provided central direction to the management of finances, and the day-to-day financial business was handled alongside other work:

"The money transactions alone would give full occupation to one of the most active, and accurate, banker's clerks, in London, and would require his undivided attention. As matters are conducted, your Lordship will be aware, that every one of your Lordship's agents is acting in the double capacity of agent, viewer and cashier, so that none can give their undivided attention to that important branch of your Lordship's business."

The question of auditing the colliery accounts was not, however, completely ignored. At the end of 1823, Colonel (later Sir) Henry Browne, an old friend of Londonderry's from his military and diplomatic career, undertook the task. Buddie felt, some years later, that at least an annual audit, even if Browne did not continue his work, was "essential to the comfort and satisfaction of us all," but he was not an admirer of Stephenson, the Lambton auditor. He suspected him of encouraging Lambton's break-up of the Regulation
in 1829 "with the view of keeping him longer in his grasp...He finds the sweets of a Receivership from one peer of the realm, and why may he not have his eyes on another victim?" Nor was a permanent salaried auditor an idea that appealed to Londonderry. When McDonnell suggested that there should be one under the new Trust in 1834, Londonderry's comment was, "Here is Stephenson & Co. with a vengeance. This surely will not do." Richard Groom, solicitor to the marriage settlement trustees, agreed with McDonnell and suggested an auditor at a salary of £500 p.a., "whose constant attention should be devoted to the general concerns, and particularly to the management of the collieries...a gentleman of rank, whose understanding is of the first order, and whose experience in business is very considerable." In fact, under the Trust of 1834, a Newcastle man, Nathaniel Hindhaugh (who was a fitter on the Tyne) was brought in to audit the accounts on the basis of one day a week, on a salary of £160 p.a.; Buddle's deputy viewer, George Hunter, became officially the sole cashier and receiver; and McDonnell, the chief (later the sole) trustee, acted more or less effectively in a co-ordinating role and as an intermediary between the agents and Londonderry. Buddle, for his part, mentioned in later years that since his long illness in the second half of 1831, he had not "either paid or received any money either on your Lordship's private account or for the collieries," and that between 1831 and the beginning of the Trust in 1834, Hunter had already "under your Lordship's immediate orders, carried on the financial business of the concerns, both collieries and private." Nevertheless, even after 1831, Buddle continued to act in negotiations with the bankers and to give advice to Londonderry on his finances; he was one of the key figures in the establishment of the Trust; and under the Trust he forcefully expressed his opinions on finance to McDonnell, and Gregson the solicitor.

When Sir Henry Browne undertook the auditing of the colliery accounts in 1823 he expected, so he told Buddle, "from the system I have never failed to observe in all your arrangements, both great and small," that it would be "as little troublesome as it is possible for accounts to be." In 1828 Buddle was confident that the accounts were kept in a way which "on the strictest scrutiny, would prove satisfactory." Nevertheless, Groom's chief reason for urging the need for an auditor in 1834 was lack of method in keeping accounts:

"the first measure should be to employ the auditor to
make enquiry into, and report upon all transactions in which the estates and Lord Londonderry are involved, with the view of reducing into order the facts which should be known to the Trustees. I have always considered that the want of a methodized General Statement of Accounts was a ruinous defect in the management of Lord Londonderry's affairs." \(^{10}\)

Edmund McDonnell expressed similar retrospective views over the next few years, although his concern to impress Londonderry with his own efficiency perhaps made his a biased judgement:

"the mode formerly adopted of keeping your accounts at Pensher (if keeping accounts it could be called) together with falacious estimates, must have led you or any other man in the world astray as to your real income and means."

A later letter from McDonnell in February 1839 indicates in greater detail the situation that had existed in the late 1820s and early 1830s. A deficiency of £70k remained in the Penshaw cash accounts that were wound-up on the establishment of the Trust in 1834; there were some indications that Dent, who had been in charge of the colliery office in the early 1820s, had received much of it, but not of how he applied it. Hunter accepted responsibility, McDonnell reported,

"altho' he solemnly declares he can no way account for the loss and that it was undoubtedly owing to the then state of affairs, and his necessary and constant absence riding all over the country to renew bills and avoid the importunity of creditors. This latter is in some measure true as I myself witness'd it in my early visits to Pensher." \(^{11}\)

Similar disorder had prevailed in the Seaham Harbour accounts in the early 1830s. Even some months after the establishment of the Trust in 1834, however, Hunter told McDonnell (or so he wrote to Londonderry) "that with so many Masters and requests that it is hardly possible for me to be so regular as people might expect." \(^{12}\)

In the early years, Londonderry showed the sort of detailed interest in colliery finances that Buddle welcomed, for example, scrutinising the monthly abstract of pay-bills, and keeping a close eye on market prices. \(^{13}\) After about 1821-22, however, Buddle's letters to Londonderry were invariably responses to insistent pressure to gain ever greater concessions from the northern bankers, attempts to persuade Londonderry to economise in building and electioneering and to introduce method into the payment of regular charges, and attempts to demonstrate that in a fluctuating trade, colliery profits
could not be anticipated endlessly without running the risk of laying the collieries open to creditors — the truth of which was finally demonstrated when Londonderry was forced to accede to the establishment of a Trust in 1834 to protect the collieries. Towards the end of his life, Buddle referred to the collieries as "a great mercantile concern" over which Londonderry's control should be strictly limited. Normally, however, Buddle's management of the collieries — at least until 1834 — was based on his principle of full consultation with and obedience to the owner. Despite his often fraught letters on finance, it was thus only at the end of his life that he approached the idea of the collieries as a separate financial entity. Londonderry himself considered them as a resource to be drawn on in the same way as any source of wealth — understandably enough, for even in their indebted and ill-managed state in 1819, the collieries were the largest part of Frances-Anne's wealth, and Lord Stewart became one of the few owners of such resources to take on the risks — and expect the rewards — of exploiting them himself.

Problems arose not from this attitude per se, but from the fact that colliery proceeds rather than profits were drawn on or anticipated for purposes other than colliery expenses. As early as September 1819, Buddle reminded his co-agent, Iveson, that "sundries paid by the collieries" amounted to nearly £16,250 and he hinted "hope you will now be canny with us and not run the old horse out of wind." It is clear also from Buddle's letters to Hawkes, the estate agent at Wynyard, in the early 1820s, that there was considerable inter-action between colliery and estate finances, and that by 1823 Buddle was having to take a firm line on the inability of the collieries to meet Hawkes' needs. Backhouse, the banker, had been quick to recognise this situation and granted extensions of the bank balance (without security) and a loan (on the security of Pittington colliery lease) only on condition that they were considered strictly colliery transactions.

This situation continued throughout the 1820s and early 1830s. In June 1827, for example, when Sir Henry Browne queried why Londonderry had received nothing from the collieries that year except £5,000 in promissory notes, Buddle pointed out that about £4,800 had been paid by the collieries to the estate agents, or in quarrying stone or providing coals for Wynyard and for estate tradesmen:

"one could not imagine that money could be frittered
away so rapidly in this sort of way, unless one saw it done, and had an account kept." In June 1832, Buddie brought to Londonderry's attention the large amount included in the pay-bills under the blanket heading, 'Estates,' "that your Lordship may see how the colliery profits are absorbed by the payment of innumerable items, foreign to the colliery affairs" - a total of £3,696,511d in twenty-eight days. As Buddie commented,

"nothing but a large vend and good prices can stand this - and it is terrifick to think that the movement of this great machine is wholly dependant [sic] on the caprice of a body of refractory pitmen or sailors. The idea makes me nervous."

Londonderry in reply evidently still queried the amount of the pay-bill, prompting Buddie to emphasise again that,

"if it was strictly confined to colliery objects its amount would be comparatively moderate. Our pay-bills may rather be considered as a schedule of your Lordship's general concerns than as colliery pay-bills."

By the end of the year, the collieries, according to Buddie, had contributed over £50,000 to objects other than their own purposes and now had no means, other than the day-to-day vend, to survive under the profitless prices, let alone to meet the load of acceptances and debt."

The result was that periodically, Buddie had urgently to ask for relief from Ireland, or to persuade the bankers still to meet the pays despite their rapidly growing balance, or even on one occasion to make the pay from his own pocket; but as he emphasised to both Lord and Lady Londonderry, when in 1837 they were apparently blaming the collieries for part of the debt,

"if the colliery proceeds had been appropriated to the payment of their legitimate debts only, and the clear profits alone abstracted, the collieries would not most assuredly have been in debt, as they have unquestionably been the money-making and not the money-losing part of the property."

Londonderry's attitude to the colliery revenues was, however, only one of the problems directly attributable to him. A thoroughly disillusioned Buddie described the situation in its worst light, towards the end of his life:

"If Lord Londonderry will insist on having the colliery finances under his own control, I am satisfied that no agent or manager will be able to stand up against his constitutional and habitual irregularities so as to keep matters right. I do not say this disparagingly, but
my decided opinion is that his Lordship's mind and
habits are so constituted that he cannot help committing
irregularities in money transactions, and that he feels
no compunction about running into debt. " Twenty years
experience has amply proved Lord Londonderry's utter incompetency to conduct a great mercantile concern, where its
finances come under his control."

To judge from Buddie's correspondence, Londonderry's invariable
reaction to financial difficulties was to extend what Buddie described
as "the horrible system of deferred payments, acceptances and renewed
bills," As early as 1825 Buddie begged Londonderry not to give his
bills (or promissory notes) to creditors, partly because Buddie could
not accept them, as the fitters' receipts (in other words the colliery
income) had to go direct to the bank, but also because he had "the
utmost horror" of such a system of accommodation paper: "it would
so distract and distress me that I should be rendered utterly
incapable of conducting your Lordship's affairs - indeed it is a
branch of business which I am not at all equal to."

Nevertheless, Buddie survived under the system, for by 1831 it had reached such
an extent, costing 12% in stamps, discounts and other expenses,
that he considered it the chief reason for there now being little
hope of reducing debts from income. He repeated this view at the
end of 1833: it was "a monster which contains the elements of self-
destruction in its very essence," and he felt that it was the extent of
"our paper system of renewing bills" that was alarming the bankers,
for "no trade however good can support it."

On several occasions Londonderry made solemn promises to
reform. In October 1829 (during a period of illness and depression)
in one of the few letters from him to Buddie that are known to have
survived, he wrote that he had followed Buddie's advice "in stopping
everything here as far as decency and some regard to the gratitude
I owe to the chief persons about this place will admit."
No calls
were to be made on the collieries, and expenditure was limited to
£50 a week: "you will for a year find me most firm in this, and
then you will perhaps have some confidence in me - which as to firm-
ness may have been often shaken. I work, I assure you, as hard as I
can here, and never neglect or defer anything you point out."

Buddie declared himself filled with "sentiments of the deepest respect
and regard" and with "fresh courage and vigour" on receipt of London-
derry's letter, which had "augmented the ardent desire which I have
long felt to exert my best energies" to relieve Londonderry's finances,
"and to place your Lordship's House at the head of the county in
point of wealth and consequence." This mood lasted for some months; in March 1830 Buddle told Richard Groom that Londonderry had "placed his Colliery Funds for the current year entirely at my disposal, to be applied as they accrue, to the meeting of his pecuniary engagements exclusively." Groom evidently responded with a "saucy letter," to which Buddle replied that Londonderry had adopted,

"an entire new system in the management of his affairs. You will not again hear of his Lordship's bills or acceptances being given to tradesmen etc. In short matters are put upon the most satisfactory footing [sic]."

Within a matter of weeks, however, affairs were apparently back to normal, with talk of continuing work on Wynyard, election expenses and non-payment of tradesmen's debts. Backhouse, the banker, who several years earlier had told Buddle that "he never experienced such unsteadiness and oscillation with any party as with us," had never been impressed by Londonderry's avowed reform: "he thinks we don't seem to understand the meaning of the word punctuality in money transactions at all." Londonderry's conduct of financial affairs was becoming notorious; Buddle's friend, Armorier Donkin, writing after Buddle's recovery from his illness in 1832, was worried to find,

"that you are still 'bothering' yourself with certain pecuniary concerns. Much as I respect the feelings which prompt your exertions, I am satisfied that this description of business is more likely to be injurious to your health than any other, and I am also convinced that all your exertions will be useless to the party they are intended to serve, who is evidently incorrigible, and will in the end, have to come to a standstill. I hope and trust you will at all events keep yourself free from personal entanglement."

Donkin reported a story concerning an arrangement between Londonderry and a corn merchant, Berkeley, for an exchange of accommodation paper; the arrangement did not go through, but Donkin, who believed the story to be true, said it was universally believed and, if unfounded, ought to be contradicted, "as it is anything but reputable to the Marquis." He added that there would be no difficulty in obtaining a loan or mortgage of £4,000 "for any person who would be likely to pay the interest," but that it was widely considered that Londonderry "would never pay...a shilling of interest except by compulsion." Moreover, in 1833, during negotiations for the transfer of Londonderry's account to the Joint Stock Bank in
Newcastle, Buddie discovered that the Directors had been told "frightful stories" of Londonderry's debts and mortgages, that his mortgage payments were largely in arrears and that he was living largely beyond his income; they were "positively afraid of being drawn out of their depths by engaging with us." 29

Buddie himself was more aware than anyone of the reasons for Londonderry's reputation in financial affairs and he was remarkably frank about it in his letters to Londonderry. 20 At about the same period as the Joint Stock Bank was experiencing qualms, when Buddie had suggested that the only choice was between a trust, and selling the town house and living abroad, Londonderry replied that he was himself virtually a trustee for his property and family; Buddie replied, "Can your Lordship depend upon your own firmness and perseverance in such a course?" As in the case of Londonderry's promises in 1829, Buddie was either willing to give Londonderry the benefit of the doubt or knew where to draw the line in expressing his opinion, for when Londonderry repeated his resolve to be his own trustee, Buddie wrote that "the solemn and frank straightforward manner in which your Lordship pledges yourself to future circumspection in the management of your affairs is positively new life to me and I could actually weep for joy on the occasion. 31 It was, however, too late for such resolutions, even had they been kept, to have any effect. As McDonnell told Londonderry a year later, "the system of postponement and bad faith in money transactions which perhaps from necessity has marked your dealings for a long time has worn out all confidence and increased the debt enormously. nothing but your own talent, and I may add ingenuity, could have carried your affairs on so long, even with your great income." 32

Income

Figures for Londonderry's income are difficult to trace over a period, as are those for his outgoings and debts. In October 1829, Buddie summarised the income as:

- Irish estates......£12,000
- English estates......10,000
- Collieries........ 30,000

£52,000

In another calculation in May 1830, including £1,000 military pay and a higher rate of profit from the collieries (£35,000) he made the total £57,000. 33 As he noted in that estimate, the colliery income
could fluctuate from £25,000 to £50,000 although he expected it to be around £40,000 when Seaham Harbour came into operation. Buddle was the first to emphasise that colliery income was not the most predictable or reliable source of wealth and its variability undoubtedly contributed to Londonderry's problems. Londonderry had early warning of it; in 1821 Buddle pointed out that the previous year had been one of the best ever known in the Trade, while the present year was so far (to August) one of the worst, due merely to lack of demand. Profit from the collieries consisted of the surplus of the receipts from the fitters over the colliery pays, and even from month to month there could be widely differing receipts: over £14,179 for 12,247 ch. in October 1822 but only £4,197 in the following January, due to bad weather. At their worst, the receipts were only barely sufficient to meet the pays, a situation that occurred particularly in periods of open trade: in July 1829, for example, when the "magnificent" vend of 18,373 ch. raised only £13,500 (instead of the £20,000 that could have been expected under Regulation); and again in January and December 1833.

Colliery outgoings in the form of pay-bills were also subject to variation, but to a lesser degree. In 1820 Buddle was apologising for pay-bills of over £4,000 but felt that, with the expectation of receipts regularly over £11,000 the pay-bills ought not to be much less than £8,000 (less in proportion than under the old regime) in order not to run up arrears of debts. Londonderry and Iveson, however, continued to urge lower pay-bills. The conclusion must be that already colliery proceeds were being diverted so that there were, firstly, insufficient reserves in the colliery account to tide the collieries over during the inevitable spells of low vend and poor receipts, and, secondly, a gradual build-up of postponed bills. On one occasion twelve years later, when explaining a pay-bill of over £9,100, Buddle pointed out that there had been little increase on ordinary working charges; the pay-bill had been swollen by payments that had been withheld and bills to tradesmen that had been renewed to keep down the last pay in the previous month. This situation left no room for legitimate increases in colliery outgoings such as the Seaham wayleaves, the extra payments to the Dean and Chapter for overs worked (a result of open trade), the Seaton coal rents (total nearly £4,500), and also more than £2,000 increase in wages resulting from Londonderry's concessions.
to the pitmen in the strike of the previous year. 

The Debts

Like many large landlords, Londonderry inherited considerable debts and commitments. The collieries in 1819 were encumbered by large debts, particularly to Lady Antrim (widow of Sir Henry Vane-Tempest) and Coutts the bankers (probably for their advance in November 1813 to prevent the collieries being stopped)—the total debts were £44,664. The marriage settlement also subjected Lord Londonderry's life interest in the settled estates to an accumulating trust fund of £4,000 p.a. for eight years, which was paid by the collieries, and there were the usual annuities and jointures; payments to Lady Londonderry, Lady Antrim, Lord Castlereagh and Mrs. Taylor totalled £6,000 p.a. In the absence of a regular series of financial papers, it is difficult to trace the history of these commitments. A letter from William Whitton, Sir Henry Vane-Tempest's former solicitor, to Lord Stewart in June 1819, suggests that Stewart found himself in difficulties almost immediately, for Whitton, having incurred Stewart's displeasure by a suggestion he made about Coutts' security, commented that, "if the arrangements you have adopted create difficulties & embarrassments in your concerns, your Lordship cannot justly place them at my door." He also implied that Lord Stewart had applied "upwards of £30,000 in working the collieries for your Lordship's individual benefit" which had been "expressly charged with the discharge of the incumbrances on the colliery at the time of the marriage." Sir John Beckett's Trust Funds still featured as one of Londonderry's largest yearly payments in 1829-32 (at £2,920 p.a. in 1829-30; and £3,300 in 1832). The trustees' solicitors, the Grooms, were a great source of worry to Buddle as they kept a close eye on Londonderry's finances and on the amounts owing to the trustees; and the marriage settlement, even fifteen years after the marriage, was a most potent force in Londonderry's affairs.

By 1822, as Buddle pointed out, the debt had altered in character as it was now the result of purchasing large extra property, not of mere arrears as in 1819-20. Buddle fully approved of these new commitments for, as he told Groom, the trustees' solicitor, "purchases which were essential to the welfare of the family...have required great exertions to be made in a short time, which have certainly produced a serious degree of financial embarrassment." Buddle's wish was to concentrate all resources on
liquidating the mortgages on these new properties, if not out of income, then by selling detached and unproductive estates: "our grand object at present is by sales etc. to get rid of the nuisance of interest paying." The impression is that the proceeds of any such sales were diverted before they could be applied to such a purpose; the Biddick and West Herrington mortgages (£20,490 and £22,000 in 1829) disappeared only in the 1830s; the Seaham mortgage of £35,000 remained, and new mortgages were added, including Holderness House to Sir E. Banks for £28,000. The debt to Coutts (presumably, at least in part, that inherited in 1819) appears as a mortgage of about £20,000.

By 1829 these mortgages with other debts (bond or simple contract debts, bank loan and tradesmen's arrears) amounted to £162,990, which at 5% interest imposed an annual charge of £8,149.10.0d. Less than a year later, in May 1830, in fresh calculations, Buddle reached a similar figure (£7,380 for £164,000 at 4½%) for mortgages alone, and added interest at 5% on personal debts of £32,600 (£1,630 p.a.) and on Backhouse's balance of £22,000 (£1,100). Adding the yearly payments to Lady Londonderry and others (£6,000) and to the trustees (£2,920), the total charge was £19,030 – that is, one-third of Londonderry's income, on a generous estimation of the latter. (There was in addition a sum of £15,000, not bearing interest, owing to tradesmen whose bills were not provided for by acceptances). Deducted from income, which on this occasion Buddle had estimated at £57,000, there should have been a "surplus for living, and liquidation of debts" of £38,470 – but Buddle added that the current year's surplus was already anticipated by acceptances given to tradesmen.

In August 1832, Buddle calculated annual payments at over £18,500, but this apparently included only mortgages, annuities and Trust Fund (not the personal debts and bank balance which had been included in his calculations in May 1830). The Biddick and West Herrington mortgages had apparently been cleared, but interest and redemption charges on the new Pittington purchase were more than double that saving. Moreover, the recent Exchequer Bill Loan would bring the total up to over £21,500. Buddle pointed what he saw as the crucial problem inherent in such an accumulation of borrowing: he was "really staggered" at the sum of £21,500 for annual charges, "an awful load" on an income that was largely dependent on a fluctuating and precarious trade, "and it involves still the more serious consideration..."
that...£4,500 only of it..is applied in redemption of debt - all the rest being permanent, so that there is no chance whatever of paying off any part of the mortgages, except out of the surplus of profit exceeding the above amount of out-going..."⁶⁷

Mortgages and bonds and simple contract debts formed by far the largest proportion of Londonderry's total debt. Large - and increasing - borrowing was, however, also secured through a bankers' "balance" (or overdraft) to an extent that was probably quite exceptional among English country banks.⁶⁸ Richard Groom, writing to the Joint Stock Bank's solicitor in 1834, made the interesting query, whether the long-standing current balance against the colliery account was "common practice with banks connected with the collieries?" Although such a state of affairs obviously did not appeal to him he went on to say that he had heard that if the balance were reduced to below £45,000 "any bankers in the North would willingly undertake the account for the profit of it."⁶⁹ This was a sphere in which Buddle was most closely involved, constantly acting as Londonderry's negotiator with his north-east bankers, and it was frequently a most time-consuming and wearing responsibility. At least from October 1821 until late 1831, those bankers were Backhouses, the Quaker bankers, and in particular Edward Backhouse of Sunderland. An agreement was reached in 1821-22 for a balance of £12,000; Backhouse furnished the money for the pay every two weeks in return for receiving the fitters' receipts on the monthly receipt day, and remittances to Coutts and other creditors were made through him. Within ten months the balance had risen to £18,000 or £20,000; in October 1822 Buddle succeeded in re-negotiating a balance of £20,000 as a strictly colliery debt. Londonderry continued to press for a further extension, but Backhouse was adamant, declaring the balance already "far beyond the mark" for a country banker. Nevertheless, by July 1824 it was up to £30,000. It is not clear whether Backhouse had any formal security for this balance; he could, of course, threaten not to advance the pay money, particularly when Londonderry hinted at keeping back the fitters' bills. In 1828, however, he also made a loan of £10,000 on the security of the North Pittington lease, again, much to Londonderry's displeasure, attaching it strictly to the colliery account.⁷⁰

Even in the early 1820s, each interview with Backhouse could mean for Buddle a total of four hours travelling (Wallsend to
Sunderland) and three or four hours at the bank, during which Backhouse inflicted on him "inquisitorial nibbling." Backhouse, despite his strictures, evidently found the account worth the risk, but in 1830 Buddie said he "dare not assume anything like a dictatorial tone with him [Backhouse]. I am on the contrary obliged to coax and pet him to keep him in humour and to carry him along with us, and it requires all my address and exertions to effect this." The accommodation of the bankers must have been largely obtained by Buddie's negotiating abilities (although on occasion Londonderry's personal intervention was effective, for the "plain friend", the Quaker Backhouse, was "by no means insensible to a little attention from superior rank"), but in 1827 Buddle told Sir Henry Browne that he believed he had lost all influence with Backhouse, and in 1834, when Londonderry suggested that Buddle and Hunter could be his trustees, Buddle said that the Joint Stock Bank "never would see us in any other light than your lordship's agents, and in that character, I am sorry to say, they have lost all confidence in us." Buddle's personal financial standing and credit were probably well-known to the local banks, but in view of his attitude towards debt, the treatment he had to endure on Londonderry's behalf from his country bankers probably did nothing to soften his long-term attitude to Londonderry's conduct of finances.51

By January 1832 Londonderry's banking business had been transferred to Chaytor's, a connection which lasted only a year, perhaps because, as Buddle foresaw, the bank was too weak to make the necessary advances. In January 1833 Buddle negotiated with the Joint Stock Bank in Newcastle. The balance was stipulated at £35,000 but by June it had already risen to £42,000, a month later to £60,000 and by March 1834 to over £90,000.52 It was the pressure by the Joint Stock Bank that finally forced Londonderry to agree in 1834 to the Trust urged by his advisers.

This bank overdraft was on the colliery account: on one of the many occasions when Londonderry complained of the restrictions imposed by Backhouses, Buddle pointed out that the collieries "have hitherto been carrying on without sufficient capital, to the extent of the balance advanced by the bank." But the balance was amassed as a result of the calls on the collieries' proceeds - or at least on their credit - for purposes not connected with the collieries. This was clearly stated in a document (not in Buddle's hand) describing
payments made at the Penshaw office in 1833. Cash payments according to the colliery books were £53,000; in addition, payments ordered by Buddle (chiefly to Londonderry, appearing in the bank account but not in the colliery books), another £3,000 for Seaham Harbour, and coals supplied to tradesmen, brought the total to £68,000. Against this was set the fitters' loan and tenants' rents, but another £6,000 appeared in the bank account for discount, interest and commission. The final amount disbursed "for payments not connected with the collieries..for Lord Londonderry's estates, private purposes etc." was therefore £61,850. The bank balance had increased by £55,300, leaving £6,500 "which must have been out of colliery profits."53

Although the most remarkable feature of Londonderry's banking in the north-east was the ever-increasing size of his overdraft, a variety of other factors often influenced his relationship with his bankers. Edward Backhouse was often seriously concerned by rumours or news from London about Londonderry's difficulties, as was the Joint Stock Bank in later years; Buddle gathered that "bankers had certain confidential communications for their mutual information and protection,"54 Movements in the banking world also had an inevitable effect: on 16th December 1825, Buddle found Backhouse looking like a ghost and his wife in tears as the bank was hit by the national banking crisis; he found that it was likely that the bank would be able to furnish only the bare pays for some time to come, with the added problem that the scarcity of money in London was damaging the coal market.55 Both Backhouse and the Joint Stock Bank were influenced also by their own interests in the coal trade. Rumours of a break-up of the Regulation invariably made Backhouse more difficult to deal with: "he says, as bankers, they have a deep collateral interest in the continuance of the regulation." Buddle also suspected on occasion that Backhouse's "prodigious itching to cut a figure in the Coal Trade," to match the Quaker interests in collieries such as Silksworth and Ludworth, encouraged his attempts to get "his finger into our pie,"56 This aspect was even more marked in relations with the Joint Stock Bank: Buddle's negotiations with the directors for the transfer of Londonderry's business there coincided with Londonderry's resistance to Regulation at the beginning of 1833, and Buddle commented that "I don't think we could very well have fallen into worse hands," as it was in the interest of at least four of the directors that Regulation should take place: John Carr, owner
of four inferior Tyne collieries and "exceedingly angry with your Lordship for the course you have pursued with respect to the Trade since May 1831;" Benjamin Thompson, the Seaham railway contractor; Thomas Brown of Jarrow colliery, also a ship builder; and George Walker, a fitter of inferior coals in Newcastle. They too, like Backhouse, had their minds "poisoned to the highest degree with all sorts of stories as to the desperate state of your Lordship's affairs," and later in the year the bank's caution was reinforced by reported government proposals for Joint Stock Companies to pay up a quarter or more of nominal subscriptions. As the balance rose throughout the year, Batson and Grace, the managing directors, were in serious trouble with the "coal owner directors" for allowing the increase "as it was merely supporting your Lordship against the rest of the Trade," and this pressure on them clearly increased their pressure for the Trust.

A further type of overdraft, one that had perhaps played the part of a bank balance for members of the nobility in earlier times, and was still used by Londonderry as an additional source of borrowing, was composed of tradesmen's debts. These, too, began to build up immediately, for even in 1820 Buddie was urging the need to make the pay-bills larger than Lord Stewart and Iveson wanted, on the grounds that "we had better keep out of debt and convince our friends and well-wishers that we do pay somebody;" on another occasion he was obliged to increase the pay-bills "for the honor and credit of the concern." By the end of 1822, Buddie was advising that the clamour of the tradesmen should be quietened without delay; in July 1823 he again warned Londonderry that the Wynyard tradesmen ought to be paid, "or I don't think your Lordship can with comfort come to the North in the Autumn." By 1835, arrears to colliery tradesmen were estimated by Buddie at £28,745, to Stockton tradesmen (for Wynyard) £2,790, and to London tradesmen about £30,000, making a total of £61,445 - more than the bank's balance at that time.

Buddie himself, and other agents, also provided what were virtually overdraft and loan facilities. In the early years, Londonderry's debt to Buddie largely consisted of arrears of salary. By the end of 1822 over £2,500 was owing to him; ten years later it still stood at £2,600-£2,800. By the latter date, however, Londonderry also owed Buddie over £3,400 for an engine and timber
for Seaham Harbour and "money at sundry times including Drummond's life policy and Amory's Pittington interest." Buddie was one of the creditors mentioned in the Trust of 1835 (as was John Gregson, the Durham solicitor) - in February of that year, the debt due to Buddie was £4,600 (£10,400 to Gregson). This may have included the £2,600 which Buddie had lent in the previous month to make the colliery pay, although this sum might have been counted as a loan to the Trustees; McDonnell reminded Londonderry (during the latter's rift with Buddie in 1841) that "the debt you owe him was incurred by an advance from his own funds to save the collieries from bankruptcy, for at that time not a farthing was to be got to make the pays and had not Buddie's money accomplished it the concerns must have stopped." By 1837, Londonderry owed Buddie £5,015 (including interest) and the Trustees apparently were also in debt to him.

Londonderry also obtained a loan of £4,000 from his fitters; it was because of "£800 of their bills for their loan to Lord L. being dishonoured and lying in their hands overdue" that they refused in January 1835 to pay for their December coals, so that, as the bank refused to help, Buddie himself had to provide the money to make the pay. In the following month Buddie suggested an arrangement whereby one fitting firm, Scurfield Tanner & Co., agreed to fit the coals on a salary, take on the whole of the fitters' debt, and have an abatement on the price per chaldron, in liquidation of their debt. By this date the same fitters also had given a mortgage on Rosebank, Londonderry's second London house. Shortly after Buddie's death Londonderry raised another loan from them.

Expenditure

The expenditure that caused such a load of debt falls into four categories: purchases of investment land, purchase and building of houses, electioneering, and personal overspending. Purchases of land, as has been seen, were considerable in the early years, and were fully approved and often initiated by Buddie - belying his dry comment in March 1823 that the colliery stock was "the only property belonging to your lordship with which I am supposed to be acquainted." His mistake was to suppose that Londonderry would be willing or able to concentrate his aims and his resources on liquidating the mortgages. As late as 1829 Buddie still calculated that the surplus income, after payment of annual charges and a deduction of about
£13,000 for living expenses, could discharge the mortgages and other debts in fewer than eight years, but by now it must have been a forlorn hope."

The building and purchase of houses caused a financial burden which Buddie found much more unacceptable. Early in 1822 his suggestion that plans for rebuilding Wynyard be postponed, was based on the hope that this would enable the new mortgages to be paid off first, but he soon considered such postponement essential in order to re-establish finances. He expected Wynyard to cost £1,500 per month - £27,000 by June 1824; Londonderry persisted and Buddie declared himself in the "greatest perplexity" over the divergence between Londonderry's wishes and the means of accomplishing them." Work on Wynyard, however, continued at least spasmodically, and therefore remained one of the first items to which Buddie looked for possible economies - as in November 1825 (in preference to Londonderry's suggestion of selling Pittington) and in March 1830 (by which date monthly expenditure on it was down to £100). Three weeks after the latter suggestion, he heard that the agent at Wynyard was proposing fresh impetus for the Wynyard works:

"an electric shock could not have proved a stronger sensation...it made me so feverish that I scarcely slept all night...really, my dear Lord, disheartened me to a degree that I cannot describe."

He considered the current year crucial - "pray, pray, therefore, my dear Lord, do not expend a single sovereign that is not requisite to personal comfort." 70

It was inevitable that Buddie should advise postponing the purchase of Holdernesse House, in London, in 1824, again on the grounds that priority should be given to relieving the concerns of interest payments; and that one of the first measures Buddie suggested early in 1833, when convinced of the need for drastic measures to retrieve the family finances, was the sale of Holdernesse House and the other London house, Rosebank. 71

Another normal sphere of expenditure which Buddie had to accept, but viewed with little sympathy, was that of elections. Londonderry claimed to have spent over £60,000 in the Conservative cause, a figure that could well be correct. 72 After eighteen years as Londonderry's agent, Buddie had no doubts that "the dreadful sacrifices which have been made by the family in those electioneering contests" had "contributed so largely to form the embarrassments under which we are now all suffering so severely." 73 The
Durham city elections of 1830 came at a particularly difficult time, costing, according to Buddle's estimate, over £8,500. He had emphasised that no help could be expected from Backhouses, and when it became clear that McDonnell would not be standing for the City, Buddle came up with a plan for a truce with Sir William Chaytor, the banker and a Whig candidate, which clearly illustrates the extent to which Buddle would have subordinated electioneering to financial considerations:

"enlist Taty to serve in our ranks for a limited time - say during the next session, certain. To lend us £5,000 at 5% interest for 5 years, as a bonus for withdrawing our opposition and letting him in free of expense... the idea of having to throw away £5,000 or £7,000 on the City election is just about as agreeable to me as the idea of having 5 or 6 of my front teeth pulled out."

He felt that such an alliance with "this pomme de terre" might also serve to arouse a spirit of rivalry in Backhouse and make him more amenable.76 (He suggested a similar scheme two years later when Chaytor had taken on Londonderry's country banking business.)

Within the next day or two, however, arrangements were in full swing for the reception of Londonderry's candidate, Sir Roger Gresley, and the transport of voters from Dundee and London at a cost of £25 each. Sir Roger's eventual victory (which was in any case successfully petitioned against) was small comfort - "the thoughts of such a waste of money at such a time, with other worry, has inflicted a bilious attack upon me... and to crown it all, the money from Londonderry to pay the voters did not arrive promptly:

"I assure you my dear Lord it was most distressing, and I trust I shall never again be placed in such a trying situation."76 In 1831, elections cost Londonderry £25,000; at the same time the pitmen's strike caused a loss in receipts of £20,000, making a total of £45,000 in nine months - "this at once accounts for and explains the cause of our present difficulties. No stretch of economy, no contrivance or management can bear up against such overwhelming shocks as these." Londonderry, however, was impervious to Buddle's attitude: in April 1831 he had pleaded with Buddle for a loan of £2,000 to £3,000 for election expenses - "For God's sake, do not desert me in this extremity...Could you not at such a moment, by some contrivance lend it me yourself - I would really [sic] never forget it."77 Gregson, although (unlike Buddle) a staunch Tory, was more sensitive to Buddle's attitude on finance, for in the following
year, when an advance of £200 was necessary for the Durham City elections, he suggested that "it would not be either agreeable or prudent to mention the matter to either Buddie or Hunter." Londonderry's personal cost of living was an item on which Buddie had less to say, although it was notorious: Lord Ravensworth assured Londonderry that he entered fully into his feelings on the state of his affairs early in 1834; but could not resist reminding him that "for fourteen years Lady Londonderry has been at the top of everything, her house, her jewels, her fêtes have been proverbial for more than royal magnificence;" Ravensworth himself had already reconciled himself to living "well and comfortably without any profits from collieries." The frank manner in which Buddie spoke of the houses and electioneering suggests that he would not have scrupled to mention personal expenditure in the same manner, had he not viewed it in a more tolerant and even generous light. Sir Henry Browne and Buddie both welcomed Londonderry's avowed determination to adopt "a temporary system of retrenchment" in October 1829, but Buddie felt that Sir Henry's hope of achieving their objects in four years would "limit your Lordship's living expenses to a lower scale than would be fairly consistent with what is due to your Lordship's rank and station. Let us be economical but not parsimonious."  

Another expense that Buddie strongly resented was the inevitable corollary of outstanding mortgages and a high bank balance: the legal and banking charges. Already in 1823 banking charges at Backhouses stood at over 10% and legal charges at £5,000 p.a. - "the idea is quite distressing - it smells of the old game under my lady's minority." To be free of the expense and the worrying of lawyers such as Groom and Gregson "seems worth sacrificing every other object for, ay, house, harbour and railways and all for a few years - but I am waxing warm and beg your Lordship's pardon." Apart from the expense, Buddie objected to "the pain and sacrifice of feeling to be endured from their insolence." The relationship with Backhouses was already such that Buddie regularly went to the bank, "hanging my ears...more like a culprit with clandestine intentions, than as your Lordship's agent going...as I should always wish to do on every occasion - in such a manner as becomes your Lordship's dignity."

Londonderry's investment in industry is difficult to
place in the context of his expenditure. Seaham Harbour is a clear-cut case of aristocratic investment in an industrial enterprise, financed partly from Londonderry's own resources and partly from two Exchequer Bill loans. These loans fall into a different category from Londonderry's other borrowing as they were obtained for a specific purpose and, thanks to Buddle, were strictly applied to it and not allowed to be syphoned off by Londonderry. Within a few years the savings made by the operation of the Harbour were sufficient to offset the loan repayments as well as the colliery proceeds spent on the Harbour during the period of the Trust. There is little clear evidence on the sources of the money provided by Londonderry himself; it averaged £2,200 per month between starting work on the Harbour in September 1828 and applying for the first loan in July 1832, and apart from an initial effort to remit Irish rents and sums furnished by the agreement with Braddyll, the majority must have come from the collieries.

Investment in the collieries is more difficult to examine. The problem is one of interpreting Londonderry's priorities, and the amount of evidence is limited. Was it, as Dr. Sturgess has claimed, a case of Londonderry putting personal expenditure first but leaving ample resources for judicious investment; "tying up half his income in industrial assets and yet still being led into debt by Buddle's over-enthusiastic expenditure?" This seems an unlikely attitude: Londonderry owed much of his wealth and prestige to the collieries that he acquired by marriage, drawing at least 60% of his income from them, rather than tying it up in them; he was in any case bound by the terms of the marriage settlement to maintain the collieries. The overall impression is that improvements at the collieries were allowed for before any calculation was made of net proceeds, let alone of any net surplus available for Londonderry's personal spending. Such an interpretation accords with Londonderry's evident determination not to skimp on his industrial enterprises, whether the collieries or Seaham Harbour. His and Buddle's problems only arose when those net proceeds were then anticipated for a variety of non-productive spending, leaving insufficient funds for contingencies (particularly fluctuations in the coal trade) or for remittance as a net surplus to Londonderry.

Purchase of land in connection with the collieries, and the renewal of the Dean and Chapter leases certainly caused London-
derry to incur debt (although a proportion of it was borne by the marriage settlement trustees) but it is likely that the collieries themselves called for positive investment decisions. Londonderry suggested that if he owned a share in Hetton, he could think of no better security for his investment than management by Buddie; he had unbounded confidence in Buddie's management ability. He was clearly in complete accord with Buddie's colliery improvements - which, after all, were the reason for employing the leading technical expert of his day. As has been seen in an earlier chapter, Buddie's measures caused considerable expenditure on stock - say, an average of £8,000 p.a. in the first four years; or at Rainton, an average of £3,480 p.a. over the period between Buddie's appointment in 1819 and the establishment of the Trust in 1834. The greatest increases were on dead stock which could be used as security for loans, as it was in the case of Coutts. Such figures take no account of the expense of sinkings but the latter appear to have been at the lower end of the scale that Buddie gave to the House of Lords in 1829. Profits held an average of about £28,000 to £29,000, far more than before 1819. The impression given is that Buddie was quite justified in stating that the collieries were not responsible for any part of Londonderry's debt. The colliery income was charged with a long list of regular remittances and the servicing of Londonderry's debts, and for fifteen years was additionally called upon to finance Wynyard, Seaham Harbour and electioneering. Had it not been for the disastrous year of open trade in 1829 and the pitmen's strikes of 1831-2, the collieries might well have continued capable of doing so without a crisis appearing in Londonderry's affairs; the purpose of the 1834 Trust was thus not to control the collieries' spending but to re-direct the application of their profits. The inability of the collieries to provide an income to cover all Londonderry's needs and desires, indicates the size of his other expenditure rather than over-enthusiastic or insufficiently rewarding investment in the collieries.

Remedies

The impression is that Buddie's ideal approach to Londonderry's finances would have been retrenchment on all sides - outlying estates, houses, electioneering and living expenses, too, so far as they caused vast arrears of tradesmen's bills - in order to allow
the colliery proceeds to be applied to the discharge of mortgages, and only the net profits to be withdrawn. Failing this, he tried to establish the principle that extraneous charges should be provided for by separate accounts, quite distinct from the colliery pays.

In 1823 he suggested an independent fund for the Wynyard building work. Two years later he commented, "I am really greatly grieved to find payments press hard upon your Lordship...as you ought always to have a sum in reserve to meet any exigency that may occur;" Londonderry apparently wrote "a very impressive" reply and Buddie's response demonstrates the difficult code he set himself to follow:

"The wish to attain all our most important objects... may occasionally lead me to the expression of my feelings on financial matters in somewhat stronger terms than is quite becoming; but in so doing I trust I never shall use the language of censure for the misapplication of means, as that would be departing from the line of propriety towards your Lordship from which I trust I shall never swerve."

In 1830 he emphasised that Backhouse would certainly not allow any electioneering charges to be included in the pay-bills - "nothing but a distinct fund provided specially for that purpose will do."

Two months later, urging on Londonderry the need to pay tradesmen's debts regularly, he suggested setting aside £10,000 p.a. to meet them once the back-log were cleared. His calculations in 1832, which demonstrated the "awful load" of £21,500 in annual payments, caused Buddie again to urge "the expediency of charging say £712 in every fortnights pay bill, which sum to be placed in the bank, under the head Estate Account. By going on steadily, in this way, we should always be prepared to meet these periodical payments without difficulty."

By 1834, however, the debt had increased to such an extent that the only remedy was to place the unsettled property under a Trust to prevent its being seized by creditors. The idea of a trust was remarkably long-standing. When Backhouse told Buddie in 1824 that "he was apprehensive matters would get to such extremities that the affairs would have to be put under the care of the Trustees," Buddie had already heard the idea "blabbed in another quarter", probably a reference to the Grooms' threat, four months earlier, that "if Lord Londonderry does not immediately abstain from all expenditure, and curtail his expenses so as to live far within his income, the Trustees must take his estates under their own management,"
Chapter XIII 248

and we must appoint our own Receivers." In the following year Buddle himself suggested that the English collieries and estates, or perhaps only Penshaw, should be placed in the hands of trustees, and their income applied to the payment of interest and the liquidation of debts, while Londonderry lived on the proceeds of the Irish property. By 1832 Buddle was at a loss to devise a course of action — there was little scope in the property, due to settlement and mortgages, but on the other hand, "palliation and expedients, out of income" could not even meet the pressing payments. Urging the need "to face our difficulties fairly," he again suggested placing the English estates and collieries under a Trust. Early in 1833 Buddle's ideas had crystallised to such an extent that he saw the only choice as being between a trust, or a sale of the London houses and living abroad. John Gregson, the solicitor, had already told Londonderry that "Buddle seems to have arrived at the conclusion that nothing will anlitr the purpose but the execution of a Trust Deed...he seems in a state of great trepidation as to the present posture of affairs." The rest of the year, however, passed under preoccupation with the Coal Trade, until in December, the Joint Stock Bank directors declared that unless their account were immediately reduced, they would seize the collieries:

"I really know not what to say, do or advise in this emergency, as it is an issue I have long dreaded but know not alas! how to avert it." The immediate move was to attempt to sell pictures and let Holderness House, and Buddle went to London early in January 1834 to help with the arrangements. After so many years of deferred payments, and colliery pays made only with difficulty, this was now recognised to be a crisis in Londonderry's affairs. Sir Henry Browne, on hearing from Buddle and Londonderry the "result we have long anticipated," told Buddle that he had written to Londonderry,

"A very long, and kind and comforting letter...beseeching him to put entire and unreserved confidence in you, and in all things to confide in you, as in himself — this is absolutely necessary. I will do everything on earth to assist you, and to support you to Lord L. in whatever steps you may think necessary for the future preservation of his Position and Property."

Browne clearly thought, now that Londonderry had "seriously resolved to make the sacrifices that are absolutely necessary," that "throwing useless ballast overboard, such as Pictures and Villas" would be
sufficient to save the ship from a lee shore. But by 7th January 1834, no progress having been made with regard to houses and pictures (although two Corregios, which Londonderry had tried unsuccessfully to sell to Peel, were later sold to the National Gallery), Buddie, on the other hand, was convinced that a Trust was the only course left. For the next two weeks he and McDonnell attempted in forthright terms to persuade Londonderry, who maintained a "decided aversion" to the idea; finally Buddie told him that "no more time is to be lost in scheming and temporizing," and rather than disguise his views on this, he would ask permission to retire, despite his attachment to Londonderry and the family, as it would kill him to stand by and see ruin over-running the family. Londonderry remained irreconciled to the proposal, but at the beginning of March, the Bank threatened to take immediate possession of Pittington colliery and proceed against all the personal property for the whole of their balance, unless Londonderry signed an agreement "for the trust deed as originally arranged. unconditionally and without further tampering." The Trust Deed was at last signed on 21st March 1834. All Londonderry's English estates, collieries and personalty, except Holdernessse House and Seaham Hall, were conveyed to the trustees (McDonnell, Batson of the Joint Stock Bank, and Sourfield, a fitter) upon trust to reduce the bank balance to £45,000 (from over £93,000); Lord Londonderry to have the rights to occupy Wynyard and to determine the Trust when the trustees had raised, and paid, £200,000 in part discharge of his debts (excluding mortgages) as well as reducing the bank balance.

Londonderry remained obdurate; he suggested that there was a conspiracy between the bankers and his agents, and McDonnell had to give him a strong hint to control his "besoin d'ecrire" - "particularly where you may have to speak of your own feelings," as men such as Batson, the bank director, could hardly be expected to sympathise with him. Londonderry always found it difficult to view the matter, as McDonnell urged, as "a dry and a mere matter of business" - a trait that was to cause many difficulties in the future of the Trust. In September, six months after the establishment of the Trust, three meetings by the trustees, Groom (solicitor to the marriage trustees), Buddle and Hunter proposed the sale of Pittington colliery to Sir John Beckett, the marriage settlement trustee, and the implementation of his powers (under the marriage settlement) to take possession of the other collieries "in case any interruption
of their due management by Lord Londonderry," and to raise £30,000 from the income of the life tenant (Lord Londonderry) "in order to preserve the efficiency and credit of the collieries." The minutes of these meetings were forthright: they emphasised the importance of the collieries as the family's principle source of income, their "very large annual profit" for many years (except 1833), the danger of Pittington's position as the Joint Stock Bank's security, and the fact that "the benefits proposed by the relief of Lord Londonderry from debt cannot be considered as his personal concern only. The elevation of the family of Lady Londonderry has mainly resulted from the collieries, the source of its wealth, and the family can only be maintained in its present position by the same means." Above all, the meeting resolved, "That the existing circumstances of Lord Londonderry's affairs amount to a state of things only short of a positive breach of his engagements under the settlement to carry on the collieries; engagements which Sir John Beckett's powers were meant to enforce." There could have been no clearer vindication of the years of anxious pleading and warning by Buddie.

A fourth meeting, on the following day, decided that Sir John Beckett's intervention, beyond the purchase of Pittington colliery, should not be called for, unless the extension of the March 1834 Trust, to include all creditors (and not merely the Joint Stock Bank) should appear to provide a safeguard against those creditors interrupting the collieries. Apparently this was soon felt to be the case, for matters were still by no means resolved. Londonderry continued to raise objections to the Trust - presumably the proposed extensions to it. Groom felt that "the Wynyard game is to eat and have the cake. It cannot succeed notwithstanding the skill and genius of the actors," and, as weeks went by, he apparently contemplated the possibility of bringing Londonderry "within the bankrupt laws as a trader." Buddie felt the Trust was necessary as otherwise the acting bank directors (Batson and Grace) would still be compelled by their Board to take possession of Pittington, and Lady Londonderry "concurs in the propriety of the whole arrangement - but of course does not press her opinion herself upon Lord L." Matters were finally brought to a head early in January 1835 when Buddie received an urgent summons from Londonderry to go to London, where the Sheriff of Middlesex had taken possession of Holderness House for the creditors. Sir John Beckett's purchase of Pittington
from Londonderry went ahead, and a new loan was apparently raised on it, but its "utter inadequacy" to meet the demands of the creditors was already clear to Buddie. By May 1835 Londonderry had executed a new Trust deed conveying all his English property (except Wynyard, Seaham Hall and Holdernesse House) to McDonnell and Batson upon trusts, firstly for the payment of interest and then for the payment of creditors to the amount of £150,000.  

Matters improved only slowly under the Trust. The result of the accounts for 1834 Buddie considered to be "exceedingly discouraging and places the trustees in a very serious position." Early in 1836, Buddie was roused at midnight by a message from Wynyard that one of Londonderry's tradesmen creditors (Losh Wilson and Bell) had obtained a writ against Wynyard; Buddie had to bail the writ and McDonnell hurriedly obtained a deed of assignment putting him in possession of Londonderry's personal property at Wynyard and Seaham as soon as the court officer left. The Trust accounts for 1836 (prepared in March 1837) showed that at the end of that year the remaining debt was £523,908, and the annual charge of interest, annuities and other fixed payments stood at £42,164.

By now, Batson having resigned at the end of 1835, McDonnell was sole trustee and there was a marked difference between his and Buddie's interpretation of the accounts. The balance sheet (prepared "as usual" by Buddie and Hindhaugh) was, according to McDonnell, "very satisfactory as far as profits etc. go." Buddie, on the other hand, although conceding that the gross profits of over £48,300 "considered in the abstract is no doubt very satisfactory," emphasised that "the Trustee, notwithstanding this profit which has been applied mainly to the liquidation of personal debt, has actually increased his own personal liabilities" from nearly £38,000 to over £41,200:

"it shews that powerful as our means are, they are inadequate to meet all the standing charges, and to resist the destructive torrent of interest and discounts, which is continually setting so powerfully against the prosperity of the concerns, and which leaves comparatively so small a surplus to grapple with the mass of debt."

McDonnell told Londonderry: "it is now my conviction that every nerve has been strained for the last three years and that the most beneficial results have followed," and he looked forward to the end of the Trust by the time Lord Seaham came of age (1842); Buddie, on the other hand, took the view that "when it is taken into consideration
that nearly three years have now been spent in merely getting the property saved from ruin and placing it in a situation to stem the overwhelming torrent of adversity...the prospect of speedy redemption is by no means cheering." McDonnell knew that Buddie did not share his sanguine view, but he anticipated that by the end of 1837, the state of finances would be such that they would "be prepared for any check the next year may produce in the Coal Trade." Buddie's qualms, however, were much more serious; the prospect that the collieries must make over £27,000 clear profit at least for the next three years, merely to meet fixed payments and interest on debts, was to him, "an appalling consideration, and causes any prospect of a change for the worse in the affairs of the Coal Trade to excite feelings of anxiety and discomfort."

McDonnell was clearly anxious to impress Londonderry with his work as Trustee; reduced expenditure at the collieries (for which Buddie was responsible) "proves that my pains and exertions have not been in vain," and having mentioned that Buddie "could place the future prospects of the whole concern in a clearer manner before you than perhaps I could" he hastily added, "I find however that none of them knows half so much about the concerns as myself, or so thoroughly the whole detail." Londonderry's response to the 1836 accounts, and what McDonnell called "the brilliant and successful result of the exertions made in your affairs in so short a time," thus annoyed McDonnell far more than Buddie. The latter was more used to dealing with Londonderry in business matters, but it may also be that Londonderry tempered his comments to Buddie. He did ask Buddie, "Why not proceed in every possible way, to redeem me from the galling situation of a dependant?" but to McDonnell he apparently threw out phrases such as "Temptations of Management" "Speculative projects though done before the eyes" and accusations of neglecting the objects of the Trust and of acting "as if the present managers etc. were the natural possessors for their natural lives." The immediate point at issue was the recent purchase of North Hetton colliery, to prevent it falling into the hands of a new joint stock company, and, perhaps in the heat of the moment, McDonnell offered to purchase Londonderry's share himself. Discussions between Londonderry, Buddie and McDonnell on the matter early in June 1837 became heated, with McDonnell twice deciding to have nothing more to do with it, "under the existing circumstances of his Trust" — that is, the debts due to him on the
henceforth, the history of the trust and londonderry's financial affairs was a catalogue of friction between londonderry and his trustees and agents. in the middle of 1838 a dispute flared up between londonderry and mcdonnell over the latter's assignment on the wynyard furniture, and culminated in mcdonnell's refusing to communicate with lord londonderry personally on the matter. later in the year londonderry strongly objected to the proposed renewal of rainton colliery lease; he seized on the question of the seaham harbour accounts to criticise the management of the trust; and shortly afterwards relations between londonderry and mcdonnell and buddle were again seriously strained by the former's allegations of favouritism shown to the agents' ships at seaham harbour. as buddle commented on this occasion:

"it is but too clear that there never will be a moment's satisfaction in these concerns, while lord londonderry imagines himself to be in fetters, and is constantly warring against those who are sacrificing almost all the comforts of life, in their endeavours to relieve him from a position which seems to be so irksome to him." 108

as the months went by, buddle and mcdonnell were not the only ones to suffer from such an attitude. hunter's health and nerves, according to buddle in 1839, were suffering severely as a result of a "bullying" and "other teazings and worryings" from londonderry, who was continually "harrassing his mind and body in running after his bill-trade...i am sure that he must give up his situation or submit to be killed." 109 hunter's relationship with londonderry was, however, an interesting one. shortly after the establishment of the trust in 1834, he had secretly sent £100 to londonderry, contrary to his positive orders to pay all monies into the bank, and, at least in the later years of the trust, he was not only cashier but also londonderry's sole "factotum" in his private financial matters from which londonderry attempted to exclude buddle and mcdonnell. 110 this state of affairs clearly put hunter under great pressure (unlike buddle who relied on his instructions from mcdonnell to keep the colliery finances entirely separate from londonderry's private affairs) and probably contributed to his alcoholism in 1843; but on the other
hand Londonderry then repaid him by revoking his decision to dismiss him. Even the solicitor, Gregson, was not immune to Londonderry's attitude, for in mid-1840 he refused to continue to act as solicitor to the Trust unless his communications with Londonderry could henceforth be conducted through another solicitor."

Meanwhile, the Trust was making only slow headway against the debts, owing largely to falling colliery profits caused by falling wages. As Buddle had feared, those for 1836 of over £45,600 were the peak; they fell to £43,300 in 1837; just over £31,000 in 1838 and 1839; £24,000 in 1840 and £22,200 in 1841. McDonnell told Londonderry at the end of 1840, when he heard from Buddle about that year's vend account, that "a more uncomfortable and dispiriting letter I have never received from him in his blackest and most desponding moods." Buddle had told Lady Londonderry at the end of 1837 that if colliery profits were to continue at over £40,000, the remainder of the £150,000 of debt for which the Trust was responsible could be paid off in three to four years, but that this depends "entirely and absolutely on the prosperity of the Coal Trade." By the end of 1840, taking into account the £35,000 due to the Trustee, only £88,165 had been redeemed."

As Londonderry's resentment of the Trust management increased, so Buddle's attitude also hardened. By now his influence was perhaps as great as ever despite the presence of a trustee, for in January 1841 McDonnell wrote to him, "as I know you are full of resource and more capable of guiding our vessel in safely than any other person, I can only put myself under your command. I promise to give you the utmost support I am capable of." Accustomed to the fact that "Lord L. never under any circumstances loses sight of the main chance," Buddle was by mid-1840 complaining to Gregson that he was vexed beyond endurance at McDonnell's tendency to give way to Londonderry. Ushered in by the disappointing Trust Account for 1840, the year 1841 saw a marked increase in friction. In February, Wynyard was burnt down and Londonderry's determination to rebuild caused heated discussions between Buddle and Londonderry, "in which his lordship repeated his detestation of the Trust." Buddle promptly urged on McDonnell the need for written instructions for Buddle as colliery manager, to protect him from a collision with Londonderry over help from the collieries for rebuilding Wynyard. At the same
Londonderry was refusing to sign the Trust Account for 1840; by the end of May 1841 McDonnell was refusing to see or to communicate with Londonderry until he did so, and it was left to Buddie and Gregson to pursue the matter with Londonderry at a meeting at Holdernesse House. Such arguments were no more significant in themselves than those which had frequently occurred during the previous five years of the Trust, but they proved to be almost the final straw, as Buddie succinctly recorded in his Place Book:

"His lordship went into a long story of complaints and grievances, to which he attributed his being kept so long in Trust, and laid great stress on the general mismanagement of his affairs which tended to keep him the longer in trust. All this was intended to impugn Mr. McDonnell's, but more particularly my own."

Londonderry declared that he would have an enquiry held into the management under the Trust before he would sign the accounts for 1840:

"Lord L. then went into a long rigmarole about the colliery agents not assisting him with anything from the collieries and accused them of not caring anything for him so long as they got their own high salaries paid.

I told his lordship that this attack on my management rendered it necessary that an investigation of the past up to the present time should take place, but that it was for me to consider whether I would in future submit to continue in a situation of such annoyance, as I owed it to my own character not to do so. In reference to my large salary I said it had not been paid in full neither principle nor interest – he got monte upon this and said the observation was impertinent. Warm words ensued and he said for his part he would consent to release me from the management under the Trust – to which I replied that if others would do the same I should be but too glad so we parted on very bad terms...I made up my mind not to hold any further correspondence with Lord L."

More by chance than by knowledge, Londonderry perhaps had some slight justification for part of his accusations. Newby, a colliery farmer, was mentioned by Londonderry during this row as "getting rich which it was impossible he could do honestly." Londonderry quite frequently expressed suspicions about his agents' income and interests, and the real reason for his dislike of Newby was more probably "his impertinence in not sending horses, lime etc. to Wynyard." Nevertheless, six months later Buddie found that Newby had in fact been guilty of fraud in the sale of wheat, and dismissed him. McDonnell, too, was found after his death to have misappropriated certain Trust Funds. The fortune that Buddie left, reputed to be £150,000, gave rise to at least one outside suggestion that it had been
"accumulated in the exclusive employment of the Marquess of London-
derry,.if not by dishonourable means, at least by excessive remune-
ration," but no evidence appeared then or since to suggest that
such an implication had any foundation in fact, and Buddle's charac-
ter and reputation made it extremely unlikely."

It was in the context of this row that Buddle wrote his
most blighting comments on Londonderry. Londonderry evidently
persisted in his threats of an inquiry into the management and by
6th June there was even mention of a "legal tribunal": "It is clear
that Ld.L. means nothing but open war with the Trust." Buddle's
reaction indicated the depth of his alienation: he referred to
Londonderry as the "enemy" and suggested that the help of Gregson,
the lawyer, should be sought in preparing answers to Londonderry's
charges. The deepest hurt was clearly not the aspersions cast by
Londonderry on Buddle's management of the collieries and Seaham
Harbour - for Buddle was confident that expert opinion would vindicate him, and he and McDonnell both welcomed the possibility of a
professional accountant examining the accounts - but rather London-
derry's "mean and unworthy conduct towards those who are his best
friends." Things have been so managed under the Trust that he has
never sustained the least personal inconvenience - he therefore
erroneously imagines that the Trustee has been equally at ease as
himself."*

Meanwhile, the Trust Accounts for 1840 had still not been
signed by Londonderry. Early in July therefore, Gregson, Buddle
and McDonnell prepared a bill to have them passed by the Court of
Chancery and threatened to file it at the end of the month if
Londonderry still refused to sign. Despite Londonderry's view of
the threat - "low vulgar and contemptible" - it was effective. The
accounts having been signed, Londonderry apparently felt that the
air was cleared, for at the beginning of August Buddle wrote to
Gregson that Londonderry had recently visited Seaham Harbour "in
a most amiable humour - no fault found with anything - all couleur
de rose!!" and that he had written to Hunter,

"to say that he now hoped all would go on in an amicable
way and that the spirit rather than the letter of the
Trust deed would be considered and that we would give
him every possible assistance from the collieries in the
reconstruction of Wynyard House."

Buddle, however, was still not in direct contact with Londonderry,
"as I consider his late unworthy treatment and behaviour towards me has exonerated me from all business communications with him."

Londonderry, too, continued to find it difficult to forgive Buddie, suggesting to McDonnell that Buddie spent too little time at Penshaw and that he had "pocketed thousands." McDonnell defended Buddie at length in several letters in August, September and October, declaring that Buddie had "discharged his duty to you with the greatest zeal and devotion," and emphasising that Buddie's "high character and integrity" were such that he could not brook "harsh usage": "he may have been wrong in what he said to you, but did you not excite him beyond all forbearance." It was not until the middle of November that Buddie could tell McDonnell that his mediation had "induced Lord Londonderry to address a conciliatory note to me, which has removed all difficulty on my part in communicating freely with his Lordship." Buddie's letters to McDonnell and Gregson, and McDonnell's letters to Londonderry, make it clear that Buddie conceded nothing to achieve this outcome. Sir Henry Browne complimented him on "the undeviating line of rectitude which has brought it about" and rejoiced in knowing that Londonderry "is likely to retain your valuable services and thus save himself and his family from certain ruin."

In the meantime, however, Buddie saw with growing alarm that "we are relapsing into the old jog-trot way of spunging [sic] upon ourselves." He had already expressed to Gregson his fears that McDonnell was again relaxing his control, and early in September 1841 McDonnell agreed to allow to be appropriated to the reconstruction of Wynyard monies which Buddie felt should have gone to the liquidation of the Trust's bank balance: "it is utterly incomprehensible to me how Lord and Lady Londonderry can persist in thus expending all available means, in the face of declining profits from the collieries, and the almost certain prospect of the breaking up of the Regulation at the end of the year." When Londonderry left for Ireland at the end of September, Buddie bitterly resented the fact that the collieries were to provide forage for the hunting stud and to send stone to Wynyard, and that Hunter had instructions to advance £450 per month for the building work, but he decided it was "not worth keeping oneself in warm water about."

He was soon far more alarmed by indications that Londonderry was now seriously considering getting quit of the Trust when Lord Seaham came of age in 1842:
"My decided opinion is that Lord Londonderry's position as well as the property will be infinitely safer in Trust than they can be under his lordship's uncontrolled management."

If Londonderry could pay off the Trust liabilities, Buddie felt that "the system of management for the future ought to be most seriously considered by Lady L. as well as his lordship and their confidential friends and advisers." He suggested a board of management of three or five friends - "that is to say that he must not have anything to do with the financial affairs of the concern, more than receiving the profit" - otherwise within twelve months the collieries would be "stuck fast in the hands of the bankers, or other creditors." In February 1842 Londonderry's aims received a boost, for as Buddie wrote to Gregson,

"We have become a mountain and a huge one too - since last Wednesday when we received a letter offering us the Lord Lieutenancy of the county!! And our magnificent ideas on the occasion know no bounds..."

Sir Henry Browne sympathised with Buddie - "I can picture to myself precisely the plans we are now full of - what a pass of projects." Buddie was ordered to estimate the value of various royalties, and felt that Londonderry planned to sell them "to enable us to resume our lawful and just position and to enable us to enjoy ourselves, during the now short residue of our lives." 122

Londonderry apparently gave some consideration to the kind of arrangement Buddie had suggested, but by May 1842 it was clear that he did not intend "to be placed under any kind of control whatever." Buddie therefore considered that "the salvation of the Family" depended on Lady Londonderry: "if she does not have a controlling power, tantamount to a Receiver appointed, all will be lost." He also told McDonnell that if Londonderry took control of the property, "I should despair of being able to continue manager." 123 Nevertheless, negotiations went ahead for the termination of the Trust on 30th August 1842, and immediately old problems reappeared. The debts that Hunter traced at Stockton, Seaham and Sunderland were found to amount to £9,000 (in addition to £5,000 owing to London tradesmen) and Buddie heard that Londonderry proposed to deal with most of them by giving acceptance or bills over three or four years:

"I have no idea that he will be able to effect this shuffling plan to any great extent, as his practice in this way is too well known. But he still might be able to effect it to a sufficient extent to do an immensity of mischief."
Londonderry's "precipitancy" in announcing his intention of ending the Trust caused speculation and excitement among his creditors, and Buddle was afraid that, without the Trust, the collieries would once more be continually exposed to the danger of stoppage, as creditors would not discriminate between private and colliery debts. He had already had indications that Lord Durham and the Hetton Company were "afraid of having any transactions with Lord Londonderry" and rumours that Londonderry would get quit of the Trust had made Morton immediately reconsider a joint wayleave agreement. By the end of July Buddle was having to work under what he called an interregnum, with Londonderry "at the old game - using the colliery property, and ordering this, that and t'other as if there were no restraints whatever and as if objects and the collieries were identical, the craving maw of Wynyard will soon swallow up the collieries stump and rump?" Buddle envisaged that this would involve him in a "personal collision" with Londonderry, "and in all probability a separation," so he requested written orders from McDonnell, Gregson and Londonderry. In addition, plans were under way for "an immense flare-up" on 24th August to celebrate Lord Seaham's coming-of-age "and to waste as much money as we can possibly contrive to do, without ever thinking where it is to be found": "I wish the wages of the poor starving labourers of Wynyard were first paid," Despite his strictures, Buddle personally attended at Penshaw to plan out the tables and estimate the quantities of beef, ale and bread for 1630 people, and spent another day in Newcastle ordering cutlery, pastries, jellies and meat; he escorted the Duke of Cambridge and the Wynyard party round the collieries, was toasted by Londonderry at lunch "in the most complementary and flattering manner," and addressed the workmen at Seaham Harbour on his behalf.

During September and October 1842 it gradually became clear that Londonderry was not in a position to end the Trust, although a new settlement was made in connection with Lord Seaham's coming-of-age. In Buddle's view, "one cannot help seeing that his Lordship has made a complete blundered business of it from first to last. The notion of getting out of Trust at this time was ill-conceived and premature." By the end of November Buddle was urging McDonnell the need for greater stringency in the Trust and possibly even the re-possession of Wynyard, and this at a time when relations between Londonderry and Buddle were otherwise reasonably cordial (Londonderry had recently
obtained Buddie's appointment as a magistrate, and during October Buddie had visited Wynyard and Seaham Hall for overnight or lunch parties to meet the Duke of Cambridge and the Archduke Ferdinand Frederick of Austria.) In financial affairs at least, Buddie never found cause to relax the opinions that had been developing for years, for in March 1843 he was still abiding strictly by his orders not to supply goods from the collieries, and reminding Londonderry "of the possibility of the Trust affairs being placed in the Court of Chancery." Londonderry jotted on the letter that he considered it "most insolent and impertinent" (though to Buddie he apparently wrote only "indelicate and unkind") "for a few loads of hay to borrow and coals as last year which I am ready to pay for." Londonderry perhaps retaliated, for McDonnell told Lady Londonderry shortly afterwards,

"Pray do not believe one word about Buddie receiving a percentage on the payments to tradesmen. I would pledge my life he never received a farthing in any such way. I believe Buddie to be a perfectly honorable and just man." 

There is nothing in Buddie's letters to indicate that Londonderry ventured to voice such suspicions to him directly.

There were other brushes between Buddie and Londonderry in 1843; Buddie began to talk of the need for new blood in the management of the concerns, and McDonnell and Lady Londonderry perceived that, if it were not for the burden of responsibility that he felt in the present state of affairs, he would be glad to retire. Within three months he was dead, and the Trust was ended in the following year.

Conclusion

It has been said that Londonderry's industrial career demonstrates "what could be achieved by that belittled legal persona - the life tenant." Certainly in the early months after his marriage, Londonderry spoke of his "anxious desires during my life to secure as far as depends upon me Lady Stewart's fortunes." In fact, however, it is remarkable that Buddie was far more conscious of the duties of a tenant for life than was Londonderry. Buddie was as strongly motivated as any nobleman by the desire to enhance the family's wealth and prestige, but he would do it through the collieries - "we are essentially a coal family," he told Londonderry, with a significant choice of pronoun - and not through
houses and elections. It was Buddie, too, who was particularly anxious to reduce debt as well as increase income. This may have been a result of his personal abhorrence (and lack of need) for debt. It perhaps indicates, also, that, as he acknowledged, he was not born a financier: mortgages and loans could be a sensible source of finance rather than merely a resort of the impecunious, while economical living and limited sales of land (such as Buddie envisaged) were rarely effective in substantially reducing debt. On the other hand, he had nothing against the Exchequer Bill Loans for Seaham Harbour – loans which had to be strictly applied to a productive coal trade project, which would in turn repay them.

Londonderry, in contrast, especially after 1834, clearly felt that there was little point in the tenant for life restricting his style and perhaps reducing the more tangible tokens of his status, in an attempt to reduce his successors' debts. Buddie noted in 1838 that "he seems to view his personal interest in the affairs, as tenant for life, separate from and in opposition to the interest of his family, instead of considering them as being mutual and reciprocal." McDonnell, too, recognised this tendency and reproached Londonderry directly for it. By 1841, Buddie (during his rift with Londonderry) felt that the tenant for life was "like an incubus on the property," careless of future family benefits.

Although Londonderry relied (until 1834, at least) on Buddie's willingness and ability to give financial advice and to conduct relations with bankers and creditors, he never gave Buddie the authority to implement the administrative measures which Buddie considered necessary, such as separate accounts for non-colliery expenditure, nor did he accept Buddie's tactical recommendations, such as prompt payment of tradesmen. Consequently, although the mere passage of years and the accumulation of problems must have contributed to the gradual but radical change of tone in Buddie's dealings with Londonderry on his financial affairs, behind it there lay the fact that Buddie was responsible for the sources of a great part of the family's income, without being able to control its expenditure, neither as to objects nor as to extent. This situation would have been far less trying for Buddie had it not been for his personal identification with "the sacred duty" of guarding the future interests of "the nearest and dearest dependants, even in preference to supplying our own immediate wants," and his conviction
that the wealth and status of the family depended on the collieries, the chief danger to which had more to do with financial insecurity than with mining."
Buddle as Colliery Owner

Prominent features of Buddle’s career label him as an entrepreneur. He was on occasion responsible for innovation; each new pit required decisions on objectives and the handling of uncertainty. Moreover, his continuous adaptation of existing concerns to changes in their circumstances was the hallmark of entrepreneurial skill in the north-east coal trade of the early nineteenth century, as an old-established industry tackled exhaustion of its resources at the same time as increasing its production and its efficiency.

On the other hand, Buddle was normally strongly averse to risk-taking and adventurousness – features which might be considered equally typical of an entrepreneur. His strongest claim to such qualities – the building of Seaham Harbour – was a product of his entrepreneurial skills in the service of Lord Londonderry, who bore the attendant risk.

Indeed, the significance of Buddle’s career is not so much as an example of an individual entrepreneur but as an illustration of the importance of partnerships in the entrepreneurial history of the first half of the nineteenth century. Almost invariably, both in the Londonderry concerns (in which owner and manager formed an entrepreneurial unit) and also in the small colliery partnerships in which Buddle owned a share, Buddle provided the expertise. His partners supplied the capital – without the fringe benefits which insulated Buddle’s investment from the same degree of risk – and occasionally performed some other entrepreneurial function such as conduct of relations with the market. In some of these partnerships Buddle was clearly in the valued position – before the days of limited liability – of being able to superintend the business in which he had invested. In one or two others, he appears rather as a manager for whom a partnership was provided as a means of binding his fortunes to those who had provided the
capital and bore the risk — an idea with which even Londonderry toyed. 2

Buddle's own attitude to the role confirms the view that entrepreneurs during the 'Industrial Revolution' performed a wide range of what later be deemed managerial functions. He considered organisation of production, selection of the site, application of technology, purchase of raw materials, marketing of the end product and development and maintenance of an organisational structure, as nothing more than part of his managerial or technical responsibility, which he would perform whether or not he had a stake in the ownership or even in the major policy decisions of the concern:

"I am not a colliery purchaser, nor a speculator on any way whatever — beyond the interest which I have for several years held, in certain collieries, in some as a lessor and in others as a lessee. My plan is to follow my legitimate occupation of a colliery viewer and mineral surveyor, and not to distract my attention or harass my mind by embarking in speculations, however seductive they may appear." 3

Inevitably much of Buddle's entrepreneurial skill appears in his work for Londonderry. This chapter examines his interests as a colliery entrepreneur on his own account, and even Matthias Dunn, although commenting that Buddle "was insatiable both in regard to money and fame," had to admit that "he was far from ambitious in owning collieries." 4

Benwell

Buddle's earliest share in a colliery was in Benwell, one of the oldest Tyne collieries. It was situated near Newcastle, above bridge; the coals were shipped by keel. The colliery had lain dormant for much of the eighteenth century, until a new winning was made to the Beaumont and lower seams in 1789. By 1802 the principal lessee was William Surtees, who had held in trust, four shares each for himself and Aubone and John Surtees, and one share for John Greene, viewer, who died before 1803. Either Buddle or his father already had some connection with the company, having apparently requested information on it in 1791 and been responsible for negotiations about the Newcastle Glebe coal in 1797. In 1803, five of Surtees' shares were redistributed and Buddle bought one of the shares belonging to Aubone Surtees, a Newcastle banker. 5

Buddle bought the one-twelfth share in the concern "on condition of having the sole direction of the colliery, with a salary of £100 p.a." He was allowed two years for payment of
the money and the evidence suggests that the purchase had been 
arranged but not completed in 1801; the net purchase price (taking 
interest and dividends between 1801 and 1803 into account) was 
£2,707.8.9d.6

Despite the understanding on which Buddle bought the share, 
his rôle as viewer at Benwell was limited in its early years; 
Buddle explained to William Surtees that the resident viewer, 
Jopling "as a pitman is a very competent man," but had "very little 
of the spirit of accommodation in his nature." Consequently, 
"being fully aware of the impolicy of having a resident viewer acting 
in disgust, or in other words, in the sulks." Buddle had ceased to 
consider himself as principle viewer, declining any salary and 
merely meeting the other partners at the colliery office to discuss 
general arrangements.7

Declining profits after about 1804, however, prompted an 
investigation and a reorganisation of management in 1808. Crosier, 
who also owned one thirteenth share, suggested to Buddle that the 
colliery should be let "by the ten;" Buddle at first objected to 
the idea but then felt that letting the colliery to undertakers - 
perhaps only for a year in the first place - would be "the only 
way to make an effectual reform." This plan was not pursued, as 
the decline in profits evidently provided an opportunity to persuade 
Jopling to resign. In October 1808 he was replaced by an under-
viewer who was to take his directions concerning the "underground 
department" directly from Buddle. Henceforth, Buddle's view book 
shows him actively concerned in underground inspections and in 
giving directions.8

The decline in profits arose from a combination of circum-
stances. Buddle gave the following figures for Benwell's coal, 
known as Adair's Main;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sold</th>
<th>Working Price</th>
<th>Selling Price</th>
<th>Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1804</td>
<td>30,734.4 ch.</td>
<td>12/10 per ch.</td>
<td>17/5</td>
<td>£6,619-odd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>27,091.20</td>
<td>14/5</td>
<td>18/2½</td>
<td>5,413-odd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>21,151.4</td>
<td>15/6</td>
<td>17/11/2</td>
<td>3,000-odd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>23,717.8</td>
<td>14/9½</td>
<td>17/-</td>
<td>2,648-odd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As he pointed out, the declining profits were caused by a decrease 
in vend (worsened by a growing proportion of small coal, selling 
for less than half the price of oversea or glass-house coal),
decrease in price, and increased cost of working due to the great rise in the price of materials - for which "no system of economy or management whatever" could compensate. He saw the only hope of relief in the restoration of continental trade."

Nevertheless, when the new viewing arrangements were settled, Buddle felt it worthwhile to investigate the state of the colliery, "with a view to prevent future disappointments arising from the anticipation of large profits which cannot be realized." His report demonstrates the type of problems besetting the old collieries in the Tyne basin in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, particularly the need to work deeper seams as the capacity of the shallow shafts, each working only a small area, was exhausted. At Benwell, the Engine, Aubone and Beaumont Pits had lain dormant for some years. Charlotte Pit had been working for nearly thirteen years and raising maximum quantity because it was in the best part of the mine, with the result that it was now exhausted, capable of being worked only for another two years. A new pit would have to be sunk immediately, but would barely be ready in time to replace the Charlotte. Delaval Pit, Buddle found, was in a deplorable state, probably working at a loss due to numerous dykes and troubles, and should be laid off as soon as the New Pit was ready. The latter had another thirty fathoms to sink; continuing day and night, it would probably be ready in eight months. A coal-drawing machine and a new branch of waggonway would have to be provided within the same period. The cost would be £3,000 so Buddle warned that little if any profit could be expected for the ensuing year. To ease the situation, Buddle suggested letting out the drawing of the coals to relieve the Company of an expenditure of £1,000.

The need for the new pit to be brought rapidly into production was emphasised at the beginning of the following year, 1809, when Benwell was allocated a basis of 25,000 under the Regulation but Buddle feared that the colliery would fall short of her quantity on this basis. In fact, although vend and price picked up in 1808-10, profits continued to fall as working costs rose:"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vend</th>
<th>Working Price</th>
<th>Selling Price</th>
<th>Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>24,483 ch.</td>
<td>£16/13</td>
<td>£17/42</td>
<td>£1,471.19.9d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1809</td>
<td>25,321 &quot;</td>
<td>£18/11</td>
<td>£18/32</td>
<td>860.3.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>27,959 &quot;</td>
<td>no details given</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Buddle clearly made attempts around this time to increase the efficiency of the workings. William Chapman's famous coal
drops were first built at Benwell Staith in 1808. Buddle's assistant, Dunn, mentioned in 1812 that the Edward Pit (probably the new pit sunk in 1808-9 or the replacement for Charlotte Pit) was one of the situations where Buddle was introducing his system of "dividing the coal into districts," and at some time Buddle also installed the tub and cage system for drawing coals, for in 1836 Benwell was one of his show-pieces for this system for the Peiles from Lord Lonsdale's Cumberland collieries. Unfortunately no evidence has been traced as to the cost of improvements, the savings expected from them or Buddle's and his partners' relative roles in initiating them, but it is interesting that capital continued to be spent in this way, as the colliery apparently made little profit throughout Buddle's life.

William Surtees junior asked Buddle's opinion on the colliery in 1827; the present annual return was only £1,017.11.0d and Surtees feared it would never be profitable. Probably in response to Surtees' request, Buddle drafted a valuation of the lessees' interest in 1827 and concluded that "under the present circumstances of the coal trade," the profit, if any, could not be assumed at more than £1,000 p.a.

The disruption in the Regulation of the early 1830s clearly did nothing to help the situation despite Buddle's having told Londonderry in March 1833 that "if I had no other interests to consult in the Trade but my own, I should at once declare that I would not, on any terms whatever, regulate this year, come what may." A year later the colliery account showed a loss of over £2,533. Nevertheless, the Company persisted. At the end of the same year, 1834, Buddle opened a negotiation on its behalf for part of the Dunston Haugh coal, to be worked by outstroke under the Tyne. Nicholas Wood, viewer to the Partnership (Lord Ravensworth and Partners) said they had hitherto declined subletting any of the coal; they might change their minds in the case of Benwell but would prefer to let a large tract of seven hundred acres as a distinct colliery. Buddle told him that the Benwell Company would be willing to consider this, but there is no indication whether an agreement was concluded. It is significant, however, that the Company was not only prepared to continue but was even looking round for new tracts of coal.

It is probably indicative of the future of the colliery
that in 1841 Buddle told the London factor, Sir James Duke, that all was ready for a trial of the Benwell soft coal as a gas and coking coal. At some time before 1860, however — perhaps after Buddle's death — the colliery was abandoned as unprofitable. 15

Buddle's interest in Benwell colliery was not entirely — nor even mostly — one of investment. By 1828, some of the original partners had disappeared: Crosier's share was sold in 1827; the George Surtees family still held 8/13 shares but George Dunn and Thomas Dunn now had four, and Buddle's remained at one. One of the Dunns offered his shares to William Surtees in 1833, and George Dunn wanted to sell his to Buddle in 1840. 16 Apart from this possible indication that the Dunns were not happy with their investment, there is little evidence regarding the attitudes of the partners towards the colliery. Buddle, for his part, had probably the best of the bargain. His share in the colliery was small but he continued as viewer at a salary of £100 p.a. Furthermore, even when the colliery was working at a loss, Buddle received farm rent, tentale rent on wayleaves and rent for colliery houses, presumably on the estate at Benwell that he had bought from Crosier (probably the former Benwell colliery partner) between 1810 and 1820. In 1833-34, for example, at about the time that the colliery made an exceptionally bad loss of £2,530, Buddle received £428 farm rent, over £151 tentale rent and £243 house rent. In 1838 the colliery made a loss of nearly £355 but Buddle received over £960 for rents and salary. In the following year a small profit of £1,327 was made, but again, Buddle's share of that would have been minimal compared with the £850 he received that year for rents and salary. 17

Buddle's connection with Benwell colliery was clearly, therefore, only incidentally entrepreneurial. Rather, it was professional, as a viewer, and (although the colliery itself was unprofitable) financial, as a lessor — although he owned none of the coal. Nevertheless, the range of considerations with which he dealt in his reports as a professional viewer — organisation of management, outline of future policy in response to changed circumstances, application of new technology, and marketing — reveal his entrepreneurial talents.

Heaton

In 1805, Buddle bought shares in two more Tyne collieries,
Heaton and Sheriff Hill. There is less information about these than about Benwell, but again, Buddie also acted as their viewer.

Heaton colliery was situated about three miles from the Tyne, below Newcastle, loading into ships rather than keels. In 1805 it was leased by seven men, each owning between six and forty-six of the ninety-six shares. It is possible that five of the owners were viewers or undertakers at other collieries, including George Johnson, who had made his fortune by winning Heaton, and John Watson who is known to have been a partner in Heaton as well as its viewer. Another shareholder, Fenwick, was referred to as "of Lambton" and it seems possible, therefore, that he was the Lambton undertaker, and that, of his other partners in Heaton, Featherstonehaugh was his predecessor in the Lambton undertaking and Croudace was the Lambton viewer.

In 1805, Lisle's executors' nine shares were sold to "John Buddle & Co." for £3,744,18.6½d. Buddie's colleagues in the purchase were a John Carr, Buddie's brother-in-law Whitfield Burnet, and a colleague at Wallsend colliery, Edward Nelson. A deed of partnership was apparently drawn up between them, and Buddie, Burnet and Nelson partly financed their share by a loan from Carr, paying for it in instalments.

Buddle remained the ostensible owner of the 9/96 shares, for in 1807 he received the profits on them, being £1,529.12.9d out of total profits of £16,316.3.1½d. Apart from this there is little indication as to the profitability of the concern. Certainly shareholders of the size of Buddie and his three partners in the 9/96 shares could not expect very large returns.

From April 1807, however, Buddie also acted as viewer to the concern at an annual salary of £200. In 1813 he was responsible for introducing William and Edward Chapman's steam locomotive on the Heaton waggtonway, apparently without any long-term success.

Buddle sold his shares and those of his widowed sister, Mary Burnet, in 1821 to one of the other partners, James Potts, who was also the fitter and colliery agent, and his view-books for the colliery also end at that time. His connection with the colliery had not been a happy one for some years. In 1815 seventy-five men had been killed when the water in the old waste broke through the workings. Then in June 1819, possibly as a result of Buddie's recent appointment as agent to the Vane-Tempest collieries,
"Mr. Pearson informed me that at a meeting of the Company last Thursday, it had occurred to them, that it would be beneficial to the concern to appoint a resident viewer, and that they thought of nominating Mr. George Johnson if I approved of it."

Buddle's curt response could have left little doubt of his attitude to the appointment of a member of a rival school of viewers:

"I replied that if the Company were of opinion that such an arrangement would be beneficial, I could not object to it."

Buddle had continued to attend the colliery as a supervisory or consultant viewer until he sold his shares. It was perhaps this colliery to which he referred when he told Lord Stewart in 1822, as the Tyne collieries resorted to ruinous freighting in unregulated trade, that, "I feel great consolation in having been able to narrow my own little personal concerns on that river, while the storm was gathering."

**Sheriff Hill**

In 1805 Buddle also acquired 1/16 share from William Surtees in Sheriff Hill, a Durham colliery lying under Gateshead Fell, leading its coals two and a half miles to the south bank of the Tyne for loading into ships. Surtees was probably the same who had introduced Buddle into Benwell colliery. He had owned 5/16 shares in Sheriff Hill but sold out in 1805 to one of the other partners, George Waldie (who already owned 5/16 shares) while apparently reserving one share for Buddle. Again, Buddle paid for his share in instalments over at least two years.

Little is known about the other partners. George Waldie wanted to sell his shares in Sheriff Hill in 1823, and it appears that he sold some of them to one, Clark, whose son, a Dr. Clark of Cambridge, wondered in 1832 why he was receiving no returns. In 1824, the four partners, Waldie, Pearson, Hutchinson and Buddle, decided to try to sell the colliery by auction but obviously failed, for two years later the lease was renewed. Waldie's son, John (who was also involved in the Northumberland Glass Company) tried to persuade Buddle in 1843 to buy all his colliery shares, in Sheriff Hill, Backworth and Percy Main, so that Waldie could instead invest in land, but Buddle had already sold his own share in Sheriff Hill in 1827, to Hutchinson.

At least between 1804 and 1810, Buddle was employed as
viewer to Sheriff Hill, receiving the very small salary of £31.10.0d. p.a., and still appears in 1816-18 clearly in charge of technical problems at the colliery.  

Backworth

Backworth royalty belonged to the Duke of Northumberland; the colliery lay about four and a half miles from the Tyne in the south-east corner of Northumberland. In 1805 the coal was let to the Percy Main Colliery owners, with five years allowed to make the winning. Buddie, who had been viewer at Percy Main since 1802, was immediately involved at Backworth, for his notebook contained details of borings made between 1806 and 1812. The winning was not begun, however, until 1813; Buddie was then fully involved in all the preparations, and in May 1814 the partnership agreement was signed, the owners of the 117 shares being George Waldie, Humble Lamb, Jacob Maude, John Walker (21½ shares each), Edward Hetherington (13 shares), Thomas Taylor and Buddie (9 shares each.) They were all, except Thomas Taylor and Buddie, the owners of Percy Main. George Waldie was a co-partner of Buddie's in Sheriff Hill colliery; Jacob Maude was uncle of Humble Lamb who was a close friend of Buddie's and his partner in Elswick; Thomas Taylor was Hugh Taylor's brother (and uncle of the famous Thomas John Taylor). It would be interesting to know what prompted Matthias Dunn to comment in later years that "when Backworth was taken, Buddie was forced into a share against his will."  

The colliery provides a good example of the problems that could beset a new winning. Plans were finalised in February 1813 for the site of the winning which was to consist in the first instance of one ten-foot pit. The erection of buildings (smith's and wright's shops, saw-pit, store-house and office) and the laying of the waggonway proceeded rapidly; regular sinking began in the middle of April 1814. In August 1815, however, work was stopped by a court case, Gray v. the Duke of Northumberland, which found "that the lord could not break the soil without the licence of the copyhold tenant, nor the tenant work any of the mines without the consent of the lord." It was seventeen months before agreement was reached with Gray for the working of the colliery, and the pumping engine was re-started in January 1817. It immediately became clear, however, that the original aim of drawing the water
rather than "stopping" it during sinking was impracticable, and
tubbing had to be resorted to. Buddie estimated that the sinking
would take sixty weeks, at a wage cost of £2,090 and in fact the
seam was reached in May 1818. It was found to be firm and strong,
and coal work started in July 1818.

In June 1820 a new pit was sunk, in accordance, presumably,
with the original intention to sink a separate coal pit when the
original coal and engine pit was in operation. The vend appears
to have grown satisfactorily - estimated at 26,398 chaldrons for
1821, 31,469 for 1824. The excess of sales over pays for three
months in 1821 was estimated at £6,577.6.10d; in 1827 the year's
profit was £11,500. By the latter date, however, the colliery was
experiencing some difficulty, for from March 1826 the original pit
had been laid off and only the second pit worked, to save expense.

Backworth was essentially a second-class colliery - as
Thomas Taylor commented in 1823, "quality has lately got a greater
ascendancy than usual and we cannot boast much of that at Backworth,"
Nevertheless, although Buddie admitted in 1826 that the colliery
was not in a commanding situation in either sales or profits, owing
to numerous competitors with coals of similar quality, he was
reasonably happy with the concern:

"none of our rivals can afford to undersell us and
altho' our profits may not be very great, yet the
mine is so thoroughly opened out and its establish-
ment so complete that it certainly will not require
any further investment of capital, I therefore look
forward with confidence to its going on cannily at
any rate, altho' not so as to fill our pockets rapidly."
The low working costs were indeed an important point. As one of
Buddie's partners, Humble Lamb, commented at about the same time,
"if we are oppressed and driven to desperation, we can still sell
here at 16/- a chaldron without being undone and destroyed."
Another partner, Thomas Taylor, firmly maintained that Backworth
should have the same quantity under a Regulation as Coxlodge and
Fawdon, despite the latter collieries' higher selling price: "I
say that the difference in the working charge more than compensates
for the difference of the selling price." The situation at Back-
worth was thus a striking contrast to that at Benwell. Low working
costs at the former enabled it to survive comfortably without
Regulation and to push for a relatively high quantity under
Regulation. At the latter colliery, high working costs had dogged
its fortunes and in 1826-27, as Backworth looked forward with quiet confidence, Benwell was reaching a low ebb. It is all the more remarkable that it was Benwell rather than Backworth that retained Buddle's interest and enthusiasm.

Backworth was one of a tightly-knit group of small collieries on the south-east coast of Northumberland, and on several occasions there was co-operation between them. In 1821, for example, Hugh Taylor - the Duke of Northumberland's agent - with a partner, William Clark, took Earsdon colliery from the Duke, and the Backworth owners agreed to their request that an additional engine should be erected at Backworth engine pit, to draw the Earsdon coal by outstroke from Backworth. This added connection with the lessor's agent was not necessarily beneficial for in future years one of the Backworth partners, Humble Lamb, felt that the "oppressive" terms of a new lease (probably for Percy Main colliery, another of the Duke's collieries in which Lamb was a partner) were due to "letting H.T. have so easy an outstroke from Backworth, he never knew the difficulty that those are exposed to in winning a colliery." At the same time, Backworth proposed winning Holywell colliery by outstroke on condition that the Duke renewed the Backworth lease. This latter proposition was still under consideration in 1826, when an alternative suggestion was made that "perhaps the better way would be for the Backworth Company to become undertaker [of the Holywell coal] and have a certain price per chaldron for putting the coals on board of ship," Thomas Taylor considered this "not a bad idea." In 1828 there was further cooperation, this time over leading the coals to the Tyne. The owners of Cramlington colliery decided to lay their own waggon-way instead of using the Backworth line. The Holywell Company had also been sharing the line, and Buddle and Thomas Taylor - this time in their capacity as the Holywell lessees - took proposals from both Cramlington and Backworth for the future leading of the Holywell coals, and subsequently reached agreement with the Backworth Company.

Apparently, however, Buddle's interest in Backworth was declining. In January 1831 he arranged to send his nephew, Robert Atkinson, to view the workings once a week and his view-book ended in March 1831. Preoccupation with the pitmen's imminent strike may well have marked his withdrawal from viewing the concern; perhaps, as Matthias Dunn hinted, his heart had just never been
in it. There is no evidence, however, that he sold his share.

**West Cramlington and Holywell**

Buddle's interest in Backworth may well have declined at about the same time as he became involved in two new collieries in the same area. East Holywell colliery came into being in time to be included in the Regulation formed in January 1828. Buddle was a partner from the start with Thomas Taylor, Joseph Lamb (brother of Humble), William Clark (probably Hugh Taylor's partner in Earsdon) and William Plummer; the colliery was leased from the Duke of Northumberland. Eleven years later West Cramlington colliery was sunk, again under lease from the Duke (and quite distinct from the older Cramlington colliery) with Buddle among the partners. Little is known about Buddle's connection with these two collieries; West Cramlington was a small one-pit colliery but evidently quite prosperous, disappearing only when Cramlington New Town was built over a hundred years later.

**Elswick**

Elswick colliery lay between Benwell and Newcastle on the banks of the Tyne; being above Newcastle bridge, its coals were loaded into keels. Buddle's connection with the colliery began solely as a viewer in 1804-5 when both he and his father were consulted on a new winning. Early developments were unpromising, for in February 1807 Buddle and the owners, Lord Loraine and Sir William Cunyngham, decided to "sell, let or lay in the colliery on the 25th March next." Buddle told Thomas Ismay, who may have had some interest in the concern, at about this time, that the unprofitability was due solely to the wetness of the seam, which the owners had decided to win before Buddle was consulted. Towards the end of March, however, no purchaser or lessee having been found but trade prospects having slightly improved, it was decided to continue working the colliery. During April Buddle sent the first cargo of Wortley-Main from the newly-won colliery to a coal factor in London, telling him that it was not a first-rate housekeeper's coal but that the brewers and maltsters in the north-east found it unequalled.

By December 1809, the colliery had been completely won but had not yet been able to obtain an adequate vend for the
capital investment and the working costs. It was capable of producing 18,000 to 20,000 chaldrons of ship coals yearly, but there was no prospect of vending this amount, at least for many years. The capital employed in the concern amounted to nearly £25,000 plus another £4,577 owing to tradesmen. Deducting the sale value of the stock, the capital sunk was £17,582.10.6d.

In view of the state of the vend, Buddie felt he could not value the colliery as a current going concern; instead, he estimated "the profit which Elswick colliery should make yearly, to remunerate the proprietors for the capital sunk in the concern." Over the remaining period of the lease - 37 ½ years - to give an annual return of 15%, the income would have to be £2,551, which would require a vend of 14,000 chaldrons of round coal and 3,000 to 4,000 chaldrons of small, at the present prices of 18/- and 7/- respectively. To give a return of 10%, the yearly profit would have to be £1,810, which would be obtained from a vend of 10,000 chaldrons best coal and 3,000 chaldrons small.

Earlier in the year Buddie had named the owners as Lord Loraine, the Hon.Wortley McKenzie and William Ord, but it may well be that this valuation was made when they were again considering the sale of the colliery. At this time Buddie had "the direction of the mining department" at Elswick. The history of the colliery is then unclear, however. At some time during the next twenty years, Buddie and Humble and Joseph Lamb - already well-tried as an entrepreneurial partnership - leased it from its owners. The earliest indication of the change was in 1819 when Humble Lamb wrote to Buddie to recommend a Trevethick engine for the colliery - "I fear there is no chance without one." With the benefit of hindsight, Humble Lamb attributed his involvement in the concern to Buddie, for during a period of financial difficulty at the colliery in 1827, he commented that:

"Elswick has really been a sad affair and if I could have foreseen the event I never would have entered therein; altho' my own private opinion (from what I saw under poor old Ismay) was that it was an unprofitable, nay, even a destructive concern, but your opinion and judgement converted me from my own conviction, when you said she could be worked so cheap etc., but mind I do not mean to cast the slightest blame on you in any way." Humble Lamb was an entrepreneur of a different kind from Buddie. He had apparently no technical or professional connection with the coal industry as had Buddie; when he died in 1844 he left
estates in Dumfries and Cumberland as well as at Crawcrook and Ryton in north-east Durham, and shares in collieries at Backworth, Percy Main, Haswell, West Cramlington, East Holywell, Elswick and Fenham, and Crawcrook - in all of which except for Percy Main and Haswell, Buddle had also been a partner. Lamb appears to have taken a keen interest in his collieries, particularly Elswick. Unlike Benwell and Backworth, little is known about the working of Elswick colliery, although the difficulties experienced in 1827 were apparently overcome, for by 1840 Buddle was reportedly hoping for a return of £1,000 on his share alone. The problems which so depressed Humble Lamb appear to have been connected with the Coal Trade and with financial organisation in the colliery office.

Elswick's position in the Coal Trade furnishes a comparison with both Benwell and Backworth, particularly in 1826-27, when disputes and problems within the Trade were nearly as great as in the better-known crisis of 1828-29. The Regulation that had been established at the end of July 1825 was in a shaky state by the beginning of 1826 due largely to low demand, adverse winds and the scarcity of money in London. By April 1826 it was clear that very short issues on the basis were needed in order to raise the market price, but many owners would be unable to afford sufficiently small vends, while the owners of the more opulent collieries in any case wanted freedom. Consequently there were numerous infringements of the Regulation. Elswick was apparently one of the foremost offenders on the Tyne, for early in 1826 Joseph Lamb wrote to Buddle,

"The delegate of Elswick has the eyes of the trade upon him... I wish you to shew fight nobly on the occasion. Some of the trade are in tears at their prospect and they blame Elswick... Now my argument is that our new winning at Elswick... should be left out of the regulation or a good allowance made for such new winning."

Prompted by the reduction of prices by Percy Main and Wallsend and by Hebburn's over-vend, Elswick and Joseph Lamb's other colliery, Walbottle, had both exceeded their quotas and in Joseph Lamb's view, "liberty will suit Elswick, Sheriff and Walbottle." Humble Lamb, too, was of the belief that Elswick would be one of those collieries that would be better off without Regulation:

"I think it quite impossible for Elswick to be under limit. We cannot or will not advance our price just now, regulation or no regulation. I am indifferent which - at all events it will check speculation and
we shall have the pleasure of seeing what the powerful lads of the Wear can do in the free trade, and that is always something. We have I think proved that Elswick can do nothing with a small quantity - let us see what she can do when left to herself."

Five days later the Regulation at last collapsed on the Tyne.⁴²

By June it was clear to Buddie that the resultant oversupply was causing low prices; at the end of July he told Londonderry that the Tyne vend for the past six months had been the largest ever, but at the smallest profit; only the inferior collieries benefitted. By the end of August the Tyne was ready to consider Regulation again, but despite the increasing urgency felt on the Tyne, it was the end of January 1827 before a new Regulation was settled.⁴³ Humble Lamb's ideas on Elswick's position had evidently changed in the same way as had the general opinion which Buddie reported, for by the turn of the year (providing that Elswick were given a basis of about 24,000 ch.) Lamb was in favour of strict regulation. Although listed as a first-class colliery, Elswick - which, as has been seen, did not produce good house coals - was particularly sensitive to competition from the inferior collieries and Humble Lamb feared that,

"by allowing many inferior collieries unlimited monthly vends, we will not experience the benefit of the regulation at Elswick that we ought to do; for it is only when no more good coals are to be had that we can expect people to come and buy of us."

When the Regulation was at last completed, Lamb urged on Buddie more than once his opinion that the committee should strictly enforce the monthly quantities and the provisions against freighting.⁴⁴

Apart from the problems of vend - keeping up an economical vend in competition with better-class coals and also with cheaper inferior coals - the other problem at Elswick which particularly troubled Humble Lamb was largely managerial. In April 1826 he noticed the beginning of problems at the fitting office:

"I find the clerks in our office are all in third share paid by Durham Main, Wabottle and Elswick. I wish we had our establishment distinct for it now becomes a very serious matter to us all, and Cramlington are coming into this place also, so we shall have scarcely room to stand amongst them."

Within a few months it was clear that the fitter or clerk, in Humble Lamb's opinion, was directly at fault. At the beginning of 1827 Lamb complained that the fitter was driving the concern to
"great distress and perplexity" by his heavy account, and that it was dangerous to allow a clerk - "especially a clerk who is in business for himself" - to draw bills and cheques in the owners' names: "I feel quite uncomfortable about it and regret that I was ever induced to enter the concern." He reiterated his complaints some weeks later; the clerk showed a tendency to "push the freighting system" rather than sell the coals at a price, and, in addition, Lamb feared that he was not keeping the colliery concerns distinct from his private transactions. In May 1827 Lamb was still complaining of the colliery's financial affairs and the undue power of the clerk.5

Clearly, however, no drastic changes were made, for the evidence, scanty though it is, suggests that the offender was none other than Nathaniel Hindhaugh. Lamb referred in 1827 specifically to "Nathaniel, the clerk"; a Newcastle Directory of 1834 lists him as "agent to Joseph Lamb and Co., owners of Walbottle, Elswick and Cramlington"; and as late as 1840 Hindhaugh was writing to Buddle about Elswick. It was this same Nathaniel Hindhaugh who, in the early 1830s, was appointed auditor to Lord Londonderry's trustees.6

Crawcrook and the Stella Coal Company

Crawcrook and the various collieries eventually owned by the Stella Coal Company were in quite a different area from Buddle's other colliery interests; on the south side of the Tyne in the north-west of Durham county.

The royalties which formed the Crawcrook colliery were bordered on the north by the Tyne but otherwise surrounded by the vast Grand Lease royalty, which was eventually to form the foundation of the Stella Coal Company. At the end of the eighteenth century the Grand Lease royalty was worked by Whitfield or Whitefield colliery owned by the Silvertop family; in 1803 the latter let it to George Dunn and Sons of Newcastle (3/4 shares) and Matthias Dunn of Stella Hall (1/4 share). To the east of the Grand Lease lay the Stella Freehold royalty, around the village of Stella on the Tyne, owned by E.T.Standish.7

Crawcrook

The majority of the coal under Crawcrook village and to the south of it was owned at the turn of the century by the
Reverend Robert Croft, and was let to David Crawford; in 1802 Crawford assigned his leases to a Mr. Wade who made a new winning there but apparently gave up in about 1809. To the north of the village lay the Town Fields, six or seven hundred acres in extent, which had been enclosed by Act of Parliament in 1794. Attempts to win the coal under the Town Fields were hindered by the Enclosure Award's reservation of the coal to those persons entitled to it before the division of the open fields, so that, as John Taylor noted when valuing the coal as late as 1878,

"the property is very complicated, the royalty owners of whom there are a great number, possessing ridges of coal situated sometimes near each other and in other cases at some distance."

To the south and east of the village lay the rector's Glebe royalty.

Like the Stella Coal Company, Crawcrook colliery is particularly well documented, and illustrates in detail the range of considerations demanded of a group of small colliery entrepreneurs. In fact, however, from the first projection in March 1818 of a colliery to win the Town Fields coal as well as Croft's, it lasted exactly four years, due not to management or engineering failure but to the complications of the ownership of the coal. It was not until nearly sixty years later that the Stella Coal Company was able to overcome these difficulties and mine the coal.

Buddle brought considerable local knowledge to the Crawcrook project for he had inherited his father's connections with George Silvertop of Minsteracres who owned Bushblades colliery (where Buddie senior had started his career) as well as part of the Grand Lease royalty; and also his father's connections with Standish, the owner of Stella Freehold royalty. As early as 1809, when Wade had told Buddie that he was going to give up his lease of Crawcrook, Buddie suggested that George Silvertop should seriously consider taking it, "as many advantages might ultimately result to the owners of the Grand Lease colliery from being possessed of Crawcrook colliery." The original impetus to win a colliery at Crawcrook probably came, however, nine years later, from Humble Lamb who had acquired a considerable amount of property there; Buddie later wrote that he had "been induced to join my friends the Messrs. Lamb" in the enterprise. Such a partnership had already been well tried at Backworth and Elswick on the north banks of the Tyne. In the Crawcrook concern Humble Lamb held 5/15
shares; Buddle, Joseph Lamb and William Scott had $\frac{3}{15}$ each, and James Hall had the remaining $\frac{1}{15}$.

Humble Lamb had bought John Wharton's lands in the Crawcrook Town Fields and the title of lord of the manor. During the first half of 1817 he opened negotiations with the Reverend Robert Croft for the latter's coal. His motives for doing so became clearer during the following year when George and Matthias Dunn's lease of the Grand Lease or Whitfield colliery became due for renewal. Humble Lamb's signature to the new lease was required, but he refused, ostensibly because of new outstroke provisions. There was clearly personal antagonism between Lamb and George Dunn, but the letter that Lamb sent to Buddle for forwarding to Dunn suggests also that Lamb's position as a local land-owner encouraged him in the colliery enterprise as a principal rather than a mere lessor - an interesting side-light on the entrepreneurial motives of minor country gentry:

"Altho' my share [in the Grand Lease royalty] is small, yet I am not ignorant of the powers it invests me with. I am lord of two-thirds of the manor and possess the most valuable and extensive portion of the soil [of Crawcrook]. I should indeed feel extremely mortified were any persons to work under my soil, when I am thus situated. This indeed would bring to issue a nice and critical point of law and I should think the decision less equivocal than in Mr. Gray's case at Backworth. If you can point out to me any decisive reason why Mr. Dunn should monopolize all the coal in this quarter, deprive me of working my just portion of Grand Lease, and afterwards work under my freehold at Crawcrook, where I am lord of two-thirds of the manor, and exclude me completely in this position, I shall subdue my pretensions."

He stated that only his local position induced him to enter into further colliery enterprises, a point he later repeated to Croft:

"Nothing should have induced me to extend myself further in the Coal Trade except the situation of my lands at Crawcrook and residing contiguous to it and the trouble and vexation I would experience by any other person disturbing the surface of my ground and the dread of being forced into litigation by such circumstances which I am so desirous to avoid."

The negotiations for Croft's coal were greatly protracted by uncertainty as to the extent of Croft's and Lamb's respective mineral rights, but in March 1818, anticipating success, Buddle drew up a "project for the winning of Crawcrook colliery." He envisaged a single pit in either Croft's or Lamb's ground which
would command about 400 acres of the Town Fields coal including that of other owners, for Croft's coal alone was not sufficient to form a colliery. During the latter months of 1820 and the beginning of 1821, approaches were also made to other owners of the Town Fields coal but the situation remained confused. One of the then partners, Warren Maude Lamb, reached agreement with the Smart family for their portion of the coal but the conveyance was not completed owing to Warren becoming bankrupt. Robert Simpson of the Stella Coal Company was taken by surprise in 1860-61 to find that the Crawcrook owners had never bought the Smarts' coal and he reopened negotiations for it, which were again delayed because of uncertainty over Smart's title to it.

Meanwhile, negotiations for Croft's coal by Humble Lamb and Buddie continued until agreement was reached early in 1821. Later documents suggest that the conveyance was never properly completed but work on sinking the colliery now went ahead.

Buddie's project in March 1818 had envisaged a single pit, divided by a brattice, to serve as both engine and coal shaft, and to be sunk in the first instance only to the Towneley-main seam at about sixty fathoms. Buddie calculated twenty-five years' supply of ship coals at an annual vend of 16,000 chaldrons. This amount, plus small, glass-house and oversea coals, could be reckoned to give sales of £26,525 per annum and a profit of £6,838 p.a.

In May 1821 Buddie proceeded to detailed calculations concerning the pumping and winding engines and arrangements for leading the coals. By July 1821 he had results from thirteen borings and was able to fix a site for sinking, in Lamb's ground. Contrary to his earlier ideas, he decided on two separate pits, with the pumping engine between them. The ground was broken on 18th July 1821. The remainder of that year was occupied with clearing the flooded Main Coal seam waste of Wade's old workings so that the pits could be sunk below the Main Coal, and in negotiations with the various local landowners for wayleave through their properties to the Tyne.

The new colliery apparently promised well; even before sinking started, James Hall, who was working for Buddie at Crawcrook as well as for the Dunns at their neighbouring Grand Lease colliery, told Buddie, "I doubt I will not be able to hold both situations; they seem much alarmed at Crawcrook going on." Entries in Buddie's note book end abruptly, however, early in April 1822,
for at the end of March, Miss Ann Simpson of Bradley Hall had served a notice on Buddie and the Lambs, informing them that she owned 2/8 shares in the coal under Crawcrook and requiring them to desist from sinking into that coal. Although there were moves in the 1830s to settle the claims to the Town Fields coal by arbitration, this injunction effectively put a stop to Crawcrook colliery until the late 1870s.55

Stella Coal Company

The Grand Lease royalty was held on a lease for three lives from the Bishop of Durham; by the 1830s the lease was held in the following shares:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shareholder</th>
<th>1833</th>
<th>1836</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silvertop and Towneley</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthias W. Dunn</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss Simpson</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddie</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamb</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>480</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The coal was sub-let from about 1803 to the Messrs. Dunn with whom Humble Lamb felt such rivalry over the Crawcrook coal in 1818. It appears that, despite Lamb's objections, the sub-lease had been renewed at that time, but it finally expired on 31st December 1833, and the Dunns, having fallen out among themselves, apparently did not again seek its renewal.56

In June 1833, Buddie was evidently instructed by George Silvertop, as one of the principal owners, to investigate the present situation of the colliery.57 Buddie found that the best seam, the Towneley-main, had been overworked, which meant that any new lessee would need about £37,500 to buy Silvertop's and Towneley's shares and then extend the workings, "which is rather a serious sum for the leasehold concern, shackled with the surface difficulties of ancient copyholds, and subject to the contingency of renewals, and the annoyance of obstinate and refractory shareholders." Nevertheless, Buddie considered it "a splendid tract of mine" and suggested that if an individual purchaser were not forthcoming, "I think there would not be much difficulty in forming a Company to purchase and work the colliery." Thus was conceived the Stella Coal Company, a brain-child of Buddie's which dominated mining in
north-west Durham until Nationalisation.

Buddle's scheme envisaged thirty shares, no individual holding more than six, or less than one, and a co-partnership deed. He suggested as possible partners, Silvertop and Towneley, "as having property in the neighbourhood;" "our friend Humble Lamb" - and "with such a party I think I would be induced to take some shares;" also "Hedgefield Matt" (Matthias Dunn of Hedgefield) and one or two others to have the offer of shares to the extent of their interest in the royalty.

Silvertop, an old friend of Buddle's, had recently retired to the south of England and Buddle too had declared his intention of avoiding further entrepreneurial involvement in collieries, so that he felt obliged now to explain his motives:

"a matter of feeling and a wish to commit myself with, and an earnest desire to serve friends, whom through life I have highly esteemed."

He was awaiting Humble Lamb's reaction as,

"next to yourself[Silvertop] he is the person on whose judgement and feelings my final decision will mainly hinge, as...I have no appetite whatever for embarking with new men; connecting myself with old friends as principals in the concern is my sole inducement for thinking of the subject at all."

Humble Lamb's response to Buddle's scheme was that in the present state of the coal trade, he had no great desire to embark money in an "up-the-water" colliery burdened with heavy keel dues. As there was £5,000 investment lying dormant at Crawcrook, however, he considered it might be worthwhile to take the western division of the Grand Lease, retain two or three hundred acres to be worked by Crawcrook, and sub-let the rest to, say, Blackett, a neighbouring colliery owner. In fact, however, events took a different course.

Early in 1834 several meetings were held of the lessors of the Grand Lease royalty, and it was agreed to advertise the colliery to let, with Matthias William Dunn insisting that it should not be let to his former partner and current antagonist, George Dunn, unless he himself were also to have a quarter share. In April a proposal was received from M.W.Dunn's cousin, Matthias, which was too slight for the lessors even to consider although M.W.Dunn declared himself happy with it. In the following month
Addison Potter made an offer, which Towneley and Silvertop accepted on Buddie's recommendation. Dunn did not attend the meeting at which the legal agreement was prepared, and replied, on receiving his copy of the draft, that he had been on the point of submitting an offer in partnership with Humble and Joseph Lamb - the only time that the Lambs appear in the affair. The other lessors felt that they must abide by the proposed arrangement with Potter; Dunn demanded either equal partnership with Potter, which the latter rejected, or a large rent, with the result that by May 1835 the other lessors were considering filing a Bill in Chancery to enforce a division of the property. 59

A draft lease made in June 1835, but not signed, shows that the proposed lease to Potter was in fact to a partnership consisting of Potter as fitter and cashier, T.Y.Hall as salaried viewer, and Buddie. The partnership clearly dated from 1835, for Robert Atkinson later noted that Potter and Buddie had paid for Hall's share, at 5% interest, and in return for three years' service by Hall as viewer, without remuneration, up to 1838. 60

While M.W.Dunn's attitude continued to delay the letting of the Grand Lease royalty, Buddie and his partners carefully consolidated their position. In July 1835 Buddie, Hall and Potter agreed to take the Rectory or Glebe coal at Ryton, subsequently known as West Towneley colliery, in equal shares - "I entered into this concern for the protection of the Grand Lease." Working operations at the Comb Hill pit there started immediately and coals were ready for shipping in February 1836. Even after the vast Grand Lease royalty was eventually acquired, and the Company therefore widened and re-named, the partnership was often still known as the West Towneley colliery company. At some time within the following year or two Buddie and Potter also took a lease of the Stella Freehold coal, setting out the site for a winning there in June 1837, although its progress over the next few years was disappointing. 61

In May 1838, M.W.Dunn and Potter at last reached an agreement on a partnership to take a sub-lease of the Grand Lease royalty, and Dunn was also offered a partnership in the Ryton Glebe and the Stella Freehold collieries, in order to make them a joint concern with the Grand Lease. After a succession of meetings to settle the details, agreement was at last reached in January 1839, as Buddie noted:
"the Company to be called the Stella Coal Company, Messrs. Potter, Hall and myself to receive all profits up to the 31st December 1838, from which day the new partnership is to commence. The tract of coal to be worked by this Company will be divided into two collieries, the one comprising the Glebe and the north-western division of the Stella Grand Lease, the other comprising the Stella Freehold and the south-eastern division of the Stella Grand Lease. The north-eastern division of the Stella Grand Lease, lying on the north or dip side of the Holborn dyke, is reserved by the lessors."

The shareholdings in the Company were in the proportions:

- Potter ............... 8
- Buddle ............... 6
- T.Hall ............... 5
- M.W.Dunn ............ 3
- R.Atkinson ........... 2 (given to him by Buddle)

The West Towneley Colliery Company, now known as the Stella Coal Company, went from strength to strength. In 1840-41 Humble Lamb and Buddle considered letting Crawcrook to the Company and the Company proposed offering for the eastern division of the Grand Lease. The first dividend of the new Company was made in May 1842 and totalled £2,000. In August 1843 a further £1,200 was divided. The shareholdings listed by Buddle on the latter occasion show that those of Potter, Buddle and T.Y.Hall had been slightly adjusted to give 6/360 shares to Humble Lamb. Buddle, of course, as the largest lessor, also received just over a quarter of the total rents paid by the Company of which he was a member; the rent received in March 1841, for example, was slightly larger than the dividend he received in May 1842.

In June 1840, Robert Simpson was appointed resident viewer, at a salary of £120. He eventually became the chief managing partner in the Company, succeeded in the 1870s by his son, John Bell Simpson. Buddle's heir, Frank Buddle Atkinson, and the Simpson family were still the primary shareholders when the partnership became a private company early in the twentieth century.

Conclusions

On the whole, Buddle's activity as a partner in colliery undertakings bears out his avowed attitude to such partnerships, as described to Lord Londonderry:

"My business on the Tyne is almost exclusively professional as a Viewer or adviser in the mining and
engineering departments. With the exception of Wallsend and old Tanfield-moor I have not anything to do with the general management of any colliery on the Tyne - not even excepting those in which I have an interest. It would be quite impossible for me to interfere in the general policy and management of those collieries the mining concerns of which I direct, as they are possessed by various individuals and companies whose interests are the most conflicting."

He went on to give a clear definition of his role as a technical expert in such partnerships:

"In short I no more enter into the management of these concerns, as to vend etc., than a physician enters into the private affairs of the several families whom he attends." 45

On the other hand, it is clear that the scope and the skill that he brought to his work as a viewer inevitably gave him rather more influence than he would admit to Lord Londonderry. This appears to have been particularly so where the other partners were fairly passive. Buddle seems to have been the leading influence in Benwell colliery, for example, despite owning only a very small share. At Backworth and Elswick, his partners included such men as Thomas Taylor and Humble and Joseph Lamb, who also took an active interest in the concerns, but even so, it is clear that non-technical discussions included Buddle.

The financial results of Buddle's involvement in colliery partnerships do not contradict his own emphasis on his role as viewer. As he emphasised repeatedly to Londonderry, those collieries in which he was a partner in the early 1830s were small or inferior collieries. Except for the Stella Coal Company, in which he owned one-quarter of the shares, his shares were invariably small - 1/13 in Benwell, 3/96 in Heaton, 1/16 in Sheriff Hill, 9/117 in Backworth - and none of the collieries appears at any time during his involvement, to have made large or even steady profits, again with the possible exception of the Stella Coal Company at the end of his life. In September 1832, when the coal trade was at a low ebb, Buddle told Londonderry that,

"Colliery profits are trifling, if any, as I think I lose as much by one colliery as I gain by another." 47

In some ways, such collieries were at least a safe investment, for they were capable of surviving periods of trade much better than were large concerns, and Buddle was by character a
cautious and moderate man. His personal interest in such
collieries was perhaps also an expression of his views on entre-
preneurship. Certainly by the 1830s he was quite out of sympathy
with the new breed of entrepreneurs, and he maintained to London-
derry that he would welcome a period of open trade to teach mod-
eration to those involved in the Trade, "for after all, it is
hardly fair" to expect profits of 20% to 60%, when other trades,
and even the Bank of England, were making only 5% to 12%. The new
developments of the 1830s did not accord with his old entrepren-
eurial ideas:

"this splendid trade is ruined and will not be worth
any gentleman's while pursuing in future as a gentle-
manlike business, as heretofore."
Chapter XV

Labour Relations

Some years after the pitmen's strike of 1831, Buddie recounted a conversation between himself and a hewer during the strike. They were at the coal-face, Buddie on the hewer's cracket or stool, and the hewer "on his hunkers," and the pitman wondered that Buddie dared to drive in his gig by Lambton Park wall at night. Buddie replied in the pitmen's broad dialect, "A-a parfickly flee" by the park, but received the answer, "Eigh, Mr. Buddie, hinny! but they can shut fleein'." The story, reported by a viewer who, when an apprentice, had heard it from Buddie himself, exemplifies Buddie's relationship with the pitmen and its apparent contradictions. In day-to-day work Buddie knew many of the ordinary pitmen individually; they respected him, but were able to talk with him. When they combined in a union against the employers, however, Buddie's attitude was inflexible and they rightly identified him as their chief opponent.

To some extent, relations with the work force depended directly on the coal owners, not only in exceptional circumstances such as Londonderry's decision to concede to his pitmen during the 1831 strike, but also in the provision of housing, education and medical care. Buddie impressed the Dean and Chapter of Durham in 1820 with his argument of the value, "particularly in these turbulent times," of a lessee such as Londonderry who was prepared to invest in an undertaking "in which 1,500 individuals of the most riotous part of the community were to be managed." In practice, of course, this management was in Buddie's hands, as was that of several hundred more at Wallsend and Tanfield Moor; he was also involved by virtue of his personal and professional reputation, in relations with the pitmen at those Tyne collieries where he was only viewer rather than manager. It was Buddie and his fellow viewers who were responsible, for example, for settling the terms of the annual bond, and Buddie's evidence to the House of Lords
Chapter XV

Select Committee in 1829, that the private charity of coal owners such as Londonderry and Durham, in providing for cripples and widows, was "to a much greater extent than they are even themselves aware of," hints at considerable discretionary powers, even in this sphere, in the hands of viewers or managers. Eleven years after the great strike of 1831, on the handling of which Londonderry and Buddle had completely disagreed, Londonderry had no reservations about Buddle's importance in managing pitmen: during twenty years' experience of the "pit population," Londonderry said he,

"never saw the period or the occasion when the pitmen were not more influenced and more obedient in the end to their agents (and especially to Mr. Buddle for his very singular power over them) than to any other authorities." 5

The employment of good viewers was in itself a contribution to good labour relations. On the eve of Buddle's appointment to the Vane-Tempest collieries in 1819, a deponent in the Chancery case then being resolved, declared that his knowledge of the "feelings, habits and prejudices" of pitmen led him to believe that they will be more anxious to serve when the manager visits the pits and the workings, than they would or can reasonably be expected to be with a man who never enters a pit." 6 Their safety depended on the viewers: Buddle himself pointed out that good ventilation, due to the skill of the viewers, and the use of Davy lamps meant that at the Londonderry collieries (although there were inevitable fractures and dislocations) "there is not twelve square inches of human skin burnt off in twelve months on the average." Serious accidents inevitably occurred, such as the explosion in Londonderry's Plane Pit in 1823 which killed fifty men, but twenty years later Buddle was emphatic that "the long period in which your collieries have fortunately gone on, without any serious catastrophe whatever" was due to Londonderry's viewers. 7

The most coherent and expressive body of evidence on Buddle's own relations with the work-force, in his correspondence, relates to labour unrest and strikes. There are, however, indications of other elements in the relationship - apparently less remarkable and probably therefore more normal than confrontation. Mining disasters tended to be reported in a matter-of-fact way, with concern for the disruption of production as much as for the loss of life or injury, but on the day after the flooding of Heaton
Chapter XV

...colliery in 1815 in which seventy-five men were killed, Buddle arranged for the surviving shift to be employed at Wallsend. After Londonderry's Plane Pit explosion in 1823, Buddle himself worked out the allowances for the victims' families, which resulted in Londonderry paying out over £2,000 in the next four years. Indeed, it may have been Buddle who prompted Londonderry's declared policy that coal owners should meet their own responsibilities in this manner in preference to launching general appeals: a week or so after the Plane Pit explosion Londonderry raised the question of a general fund for the families of those killed in colliery disasters, and Buddle described a "grand effort" that had been made in 1817 to establish a fund by a levy on the owners' rents and the men's wages. It was probably this scheme which the Northumberland biographer, Welford, attributed to Buddle, but Buddle told Londonderry that it had fallen prey to "some sudden caprice" by the workmen and that he doubted whether it could be revived; within a few days (presumably on Londonderry's instructions) he was working out the allowances to be paid by Londonderry alone to the victims' dependants.

It was not only the large coal owners such as Londonderry who, having provided housing for their pitmen, felt justified in evicting them when they struck or refused to bind. In 1826, when the men at Hebburn, on the Tyne, had refused for over a month to agree to the bond, Buddle accompanied one of the owners to turn out four or six families. Even in these circumstances, however, Buddle noted in his diary, he took care that one family with a young baby was moved, "by their own consent... into the Ranters' meeting house, which was dry and comfortable, a fire being constantly kept in it." When the men did not proceed to confrontation, Buddle was willing to investigate their grievances. In February 1837, for example, the Benwell pitmen were wanting an advance of price on various articles of work and Buddle responded by having a long discussion with them and formulating proposals. (The pitmen at this same colliery, when Buddle's sister died, formed her funeral procession and attended the interment.) In the following year, the Rainton men delayed binding in pursuit of what Buddle thought were "extravagant terms"; he asked the advice of the Coal Trade committee who suggested that he call a meeting of neighbouring viewers "to take their opinion as to whether the prices paid at Rainton and Broomside..."
were sufficient and to judge whether the men had any just cause for complaint." Buddie did so, found that Rainton was on a lower scale than its neighbours and so advanced wages by 3d. per score. 12

According to a writer in a Newcastle paper in the years immediately after Buddie's death, Buddie's contacts with the pitmen were not confined to work, for he "made himself at home in their cottages" and knew their wives and families. 13 If this were so, it would explain (with his low opinion of the established Church) his scathing comments in 1843 on the parochial clergy's failure to visit the pitmen's homes and interest themselves in the pitmen's way of life. 14 A keen musician, he encouraged the colliery bands and a hint of such hidden activities is given when Buddie wrote to Londonderry, at the band's request, to suggest that if Londonderry would allow them to have crimson trousers, they would buy themselves "duck pantaloons to save them." 15 He was also said to have supported colliery schools and to have encouraged others to follow his example; he and other Londonderry viewers and overmen subscribed to a reading club established in 1832 (although ten years later he said the pitmen failed to use it) and he was one of the leading patrons of the library of the Newcastle Mechanics' Institute. 16

From a more general point of view, Buddie's attitude to the work-force as a whole - "our murky crew" - sometimes echoed Londonderry's paternalism. In 1821 he reported with heavy humour that "your lordship's little black family...never were so well provided for, in all their lives...The only fear is that their present luxurious mode of living may spoil them if it continues for any length of time." 17 Twenty years later, after the visit of a party of nobility to the collieries, Buddie addressed the men to thank them for their "orderly and becoming conduct." Londonderry's 1530 men had been regaled with 1½lbs. of beef, a 3d. loaf and three pints of ale each - one of several occasions on which Londonderry gave his employees a feast in what was becoming a rather old-fashioned aspect of labour relations. On this occasion, as on others, Londonderry's employees, along with such sights as the colliery engines and the coal drops, formed part of the display which Londonderry and Buddie provided for visiting nobility, and Buddie drew the moral,

"that if the high aristocracy of the country were more frequently to find occasion to bring themselves into personal intercourse with the working classes, and show
them a little countenance and kindness, Chartism and all other absurd causes of political excitement would evaporate like the white mist in September before the sun-beams. In this respect your lordship has shown a brilliant and laudable example."

Buddle's attitude was not, however, confined to paternalism; for the importance that he always attached to skilled "pitmanship" and to overmen and viewers being recruited from the ranks of experienced pitmen, indicates a strong bond of mutual respect and good communications between pitmen and management. The value of such a relationship is demonstrated by the requests for pitmen that Buddie received from Cumberland, Wales and Scotland, where local labour was often described as ignorant and inexperienced. It also explains Buddie's and other viewers' opposition to Lord Ashley's attempt in 1842 to set a minimum age limit of thirteen (or even higher) on boys entering pits. Buddie made the sensible point that, unless compulsory education were provided, the boys would have nothing to do and their families' incomes would be reduced; but he attached most importance to a long practical upbringing in pit life: "it is like bringing lads up to the sea - only the pit lad's life is incomparably better and more comfortable than the sailor's." He spoke with authority in his comparison for he understood something of a boy's life at sea, as was shown when, during a visit to two of his ships at Seaham, he gave each of the nine apprentices "a watch coat to keep them comfortable during the winter."

Buddle's rôle in the discussions, before the introduction of the Bill, between the coal owners, the northern M.Ps and Lord Ashley has been discussed in detail. The sub-commissioner who investigated north Durham and Northumberland, J.R. Leifchild, told Buddie that his district "does not disclose those painful instances so common in others," and it was therefore hardly surprising that Buddie should resent interference by "our meddling morbid humanity mongers." He rather regretted his more vociferous comments to Londonderry, however: "your lordship will please to bear in mind that my observations were written before I had seen Lord Ashley's Bill." Lord Ashley was convinced by Buddie's argument that the age limit should be ten, not thirteen, and agreed to alter it providing the hours of work were limited; he thanked Buddie for his "readiness to forward any scheme that might be adapted to
promote the comfort and improve the state of the collier pop-
ulation.

Buddie made it clear to Lord Ashley at this private meet-
ing on 18th June that he was not authorised to commit the Coal
Trade to any compromise, and asked that the hours of work should
be left over for the meeting at the House of Commons on 20th June.25
Buddie wrote to Londonderry that this second meeting had resulted
in modifications being made to the Bill which would render it
"perfectly innoxious" and that "it was therefore agreed not to
offer any opposition to it in the House of Commons."26 One can
only speculate what Buddie had expected of this meeting; faced
with Ashley's proposition on the 18th, and lacking the time to
refer it back to the Coal Trade, but perhaps unwilling to jeop-
dardise the concessions he had gained from Ashley, Buddie probably
felt that he could safely leave the issue to the northern M.Ps,
Hedworth Lambton and Matthew Bell, who were to be present on the
20th and were aware of the coal owners' sentiments. Bell had been
sent early in June a duplicate of the petition sent to Londonderry
by the Coal Trade and moreover, according to Buddie, Bell and
Lambton had informed the Executive Committee of the Coal Trade
that Lord Ashley did not mean to press for a decision that session;
in order to allow time for due consideration.27 Buddie should per-
haps have emphasised again, at the risk of labouring the point,
that he was not authorised to bind the Trade to the decision of
the meeting, but Lambton should hardly have been so indignant
when Buddie, on his return north, found that the coal-owners
were "desirous that more time should be allowed for deliberation,
and that the Bill should not be hurried through Parliament this
Session."28

On 21st June, Londonderry waited as long as he could to
see Buddie before the latter left London and then, asking him to
write before he left, commented that "whatever may be your agree-
ment as to the Bill...a temperate exposition...of some of the facts
and details...will be of publick utility and cool down this humanity
mania" - a letter which does not suggest an intention blatantly to
ignore an agreement for the sake of opposing the Bill.29 Two or
three days later, however, not having received any request to the
contrary from the Coal Trade, Londonderry presented in the Lords
the petition which the Coal Trade had sent to him before they
deputed Buddie to meet Ashley. When he found the promoters of the Bill asserting that the coal owners had instructed Buddie to withdraw their opposition in return for concessions from Ashley, he wrote angrily to Buddie "distinctly to inform me if such in any manner has been the case" - "how is it possible after such an appeal as they called on me to present to the House of Lords, that they should have given any [such] instructions, without my knowledge or their having informed me of it." Clearly his anger was not that such an agreement might have been made, but that it might have been done so without his being told, thus placing him in an invidious position. Reassured by Buddie's reply (which was in exactly the same terms as Buddie's explanation to Ashley and Lambton) and furnished with details of the coal owners' continuing dissatisfaction with the Bill, he naturally proceeded with his campaign against it.

Buddie was not guilty, therefore, of failure to communicate nor of being "induced" by Londonderry to deny that the meeting on 20th June had reached an agreement binding on the Trade. It may well be, however, that he had some sympathy with Lord Ashley's aims, and that he was therefore taken unawares when "an returning to the north, I found the above compromise not at all satisfactory to the Committee or the Body of Coal-owners generally."

What evidence there is of Buddie's day-to-day relationship with the pitmen, and his normal attitude towards them, is borne out by the remarkable reputation he acquired in this respect. He was renowned early in his career - with justification - for his readiness to share dangers with the men. He was remembered for his willingness to talk with individual pitmen, slipping into their vernacular, for his charity to those in need and his position as their "chosen referee" in disputes.

Against such a background, Buddie's behaviour during the pitmen's strike of 1831 demands a more convincing explanation than Dr. Sturgess's description of it as "unrewarding do or die dogmatism." Buddie was convinced that the pitmen's demands must be resisted, not only because they would cost Londonderry £10,000 p.a. in increased wages when he could least afford it, but also in order to preserve the social order: "the coal-owners must stand firm, or their property and profits will be at the disposal of the pitmen in future." Lord Durham's agent, Morton, held the same view,
as did Lord Durham himself, and the Durham Chronicle roundly con-
demned Londonderry's concessions to the pitmen - "the weakness and
tergiversation of one distinguished individual" - as having created
"a belief, in the minds of the pitmen, that they were powerful
beyond control." Buddle complained vehemently of the supineness
and pusillanimity of the local magistrates in their reluctance to
authorise military protection for the collieries able to work; when
he heard rumours of a projected attack on his house at Wallsend,
he took matters into his own hands by mustering seventy special
constables and retired soldiers and sailors, together with colliery
agents and overmen, and armed them with muskets and two ship's
guns which were dug out of a ballast heap on the river bank.

If the typical framework for management of labour in the
industrial revolution was dominance and fear, it must also be
remembered that the union's weapons were those of riots, violence
and destruction of property. Buddle's demands for military force
must be seen in the light of the fact that he and his fellow man-
agers and owners were responsible for the security of their own
property. Not only was there no effective police force, but Buddle
had also long been concerned at the state of the magistracy; when
the pitmen's union was active in 1825 he had told Londonderry that
"the parson magistrates are really only fit for attending to the
fillating of b - d children and other parish business, but quite
unfit for carrying the law into effect in times of commotion amongst
turbulent bodies of colliers." On even relatively minor occasions,
Buddle found himself doubling up as a military officer, such as in
1819 when for at least three consecutive nights he was on duty in
command of a hundred special constables and a detachment of mili-
tary, to protect the spouts near Wallsend against the striking
keelmen. Again, Henry Morton held the same attitude. He, too,
organised his own force and called for troops to be stationed at
the collieries in 1831, and he and Buddle, early in 1832, co-operated
stead in drafting a "memoir" on the need for stipendiary magistrates,
as demonstrated by the strike; Morton was most anxious that Buddle
should discuss it with Lord Durham while they were both in London.

In 1831, Londonderry conceded to his pitmen early in May.
Buddle had been preoccupied with events on the Tyne and received
only imperfect and second-hand accounts, through Hunter, of London-
derry's meetings with his pitmen. Buddle dreaded its effects on
those collieries still resisting the union: "I never shall again be able to raise my head, after such a disgraceful defeat. It will be the death of me." He reported in the following days that Londonderry's action had indeed revived the flagging confidence of the strikers; he himself, however, would "quit the Trade and emigrate to America rather than couch to them." He had already been "tried, condemned and hanged in effigy" by the Rainton men, and his own position now became worse:

"I am beset, hooted and hissed and my life threatened wherever I go...under the impression...that they never would have gotten an advance if your lordship had not deprived me of my influence in your works."

The situation lasted for some weeks. Londonderry left the north immediately after yielding to the men, but for the following three weeks Buddle did not have a complete night in bed, as the pitmen on the Tyne burnt and shot effigies of their opponents, broke their windows and destroyed their gardens and attempted to stop those collieries that were working. Buddle frankly told Londonderry that,

"I...am the victim of my integrity...I may or I may not survive this storm, but...I certainly will be very cautious, how I again commit myself, in supporting the cause of those who have not the moral courage to support it themselves."

It was well known that the pitmen's strike was a major cause of Buddle's illness or breakdown early in August 1831. Within a few years of Buddle's death, however, it was said that,

"one of the rewards that he received for his care and kindness was that he was relieved from all harm when strikes arose. His neighbours had to send for the military to repress disturbances, but he was the friend and counsellor of his men, and they knew better than to rebel against his authority, or to interfere with his personal safety."

Buddle was apparently passing into folk-lore as the friend of the pitmen in much the same way as Londonderry, who had conceded their demands in 1831, was to be traditionally viewed as an 'ogre.' Perhaps there was no greater foundation for Buddle's reputation than for Londonderry's, but even during the strike itself there are indications that it was not entirely misleading. It is clear, for example, that Buddle had little difficulty in finding pitmen willing to tell him about the union's plans both before and during
the strike; and a week after the binding should have taken place he spent a whole day "in meeting different bodies of pitmen, and in talking and reasoning with them." A year later, when the men struck again, Buddie was again able to obtain inside information; one day he "fell in" with pitmen who confided to him their fears that the union leader, Hepburn, and their delegates were cheating them; and he was even on sufficiently good terms with Hepburn's coadjutor to challenge him to a wager on which side would win the day. The most striking evidence, however, was the attitude of the pitmen when the strike ended in 1831. Buddie reached agreement with the Wallsend men on 18th June, six weeks after Londonderry had settled with his men; he gave them 7/- per chaldron less than they had demanded, having "beaten them out of their arbitrary and absurd demands," but within two or three days their attitude to him, if he is to be believed, had completely changed:

"I have been denounced and hunted like a wild beast, by the infuriated body of pitmen, while they were in a state of excitement. But now that they are returning to something like a state of tranquility, they are doing me justice by every sort of apology, and acknowledgement of the injustice they have done my character during their phrensy. I am pawed and like to be pulled in pieces through kindness. I am complimented for having fought them fairly, like a man. I was chaired by force last Friday evening at Wallsend and was obliged to abscond on the Saturday morning to avoid the honor of being drawn in grand procession from Wallsend to Newcastle. So much for popular odium, or popular favor. I am now in favor again, without stepping out of my way to seek it." 

Buddie's attitude to union activities throughout his life, expressed most forcibly during the 1831 strike, is entirely what might be expected from the manager of a large and notoriously turbulent body of workers, at a period when there was little theory of management and no experience of trade union bargaining - particularly when that manager had an obstinate sense of what he considered right and necessary to preserve the status quo. From the evidence - and above all, his reputation - for Buddie's relationship with the pitmen in normal circumstances, it appears that his role as a most resolute opponent of labour combinations was of less significance than his personality and his treatment of the pitmen in their day-to-day work, in circumstances which demanded skill, courage, trust and respect from pitmen and manager alike.
Early in October 1843 Buddie met Londonderry at Penshaw and, as Londonderry recalled, "we had rode all over our collieries together." It was to be the last of such occasions, so typical of their relationship in earlier, happier years. Buddie was affected by the bad weather and died a few days later, on 10th October. McDonnell told Hindhaugh that few things had ever grieved him more: "I had unbounded confidence and regard for Mr. Buddie and mourn his loss more than I can describe." It is perhaps unfair to compare this with Londonderry's rather bald letter to Hindhaugh - "I can not express how deeply I was shocked and how much I feel on the occurrence" - but Matthias Dunn, some years later, commented that when Buddie died, "his employers considered that instead of suffering a grievous loss, they were relieved from a species of thraldom." There was perhaps a grain of truth in his guess at Londonderry's reaction, for three months after Buddie's death, when ordering Hindhaugh to implement changes in the colliery staff, Londonderry said with feeling, "the fact is like the system of viewers and the Coal Trade in general, there is a Despotism which will admit of no controul, and it is high time that some one should dare to speak out, and act." Whether or not Matthias Dunn's judgement was right, it was Buddie's dedication to the Vane-Tempest-Stewart family which had held him in its service until his death. On several occasions in the past five years Buddie had told McDonnell that he would be happy "to be relieved from this perpetual state of irritation, and to make my bow and retire," as soon as he could feel he had fulfilled his duty to the Trust. The year before his death, when Londonderry attempted to get free of the Trust, Buddie had felt that a separation between himself and Londonderry would be inevitable. The Trust had to continue, but in the summer of 1843 Lady Londonderry apparently perceived that Buddie wished to retire. McDonnell agreed
with her but recognised the duty that Buddie still felt to the persona of the family: "if a gentleman could be found of competent ability for such a concern, I belive you are right - my own impression is that Buddie would be very glad to retire - but that could not be in the present crisis of the Trade." A week or so later Buddie told Londonderry that he had mentioned to McDonnell some time ago the need for young blood in the concerns; Buddie felt himself in the best possible health, but "time is rolling on." Ten weeks later he was dead.

It was not unusual for agents of great landed families to adopt the aspirations of their employers. More unusual, however, was the extent to which Buddie did so. It is difficult to imagine Buddie acting for, say, a joint stock company as he did for Londonderry; the opportunity to use his skills in the service of a great family, present and future, struck a chord in him and remained the fundamental motive for his exertions. Land agents, it has been suggested, tended to identify with their employers' interests because of the social conservatism inherent in a new profession. Colliery viewers, however, were already a well-established and self-confident profession; Buddie's attitude to his employers must have been largely a personal response. Equally unusual were the persistency and frankness with which Buddie attempted to convince Londonderry of his family's best interests. James Loch was perhaps remarkable for the way he alternately supervised his employer's spending, warned him against extravagance and complimented him when he showed a better attitude, but Loch's employer, Lord Francis Egerton, escaped lightly compared to Londonderry. It was one thing to be complimented on one's behaviour; quite another to be told respectfully but clearly of one's weaknesses of character. Even Loch, it has been said, should have done far more to persuade his master to give priority to the industrial sources of his wealth - a criticism that could not be levelled at Buddie.

Londonderry was perhaps as unusual an employer as Buddie was agent. Not only was he prepared to invest in such risky business as coal mining but also to involve himself closely in its details, in co-operation, not with a traditional lawyer/agent but with a colliery viewer, and whom, moreover, he encouraged to give completely frank advice. Londonderry's was not a compliant character, nor did he agree with some of Buddie's most important views; his partnership
with Buddie was therefore the more remarkable.

There can have been few agents who, thus encouraged by their employer, found their advice so ignored as was Buddie's in the conduct of Londonderry's finances. Although the marriage settlement trustees and the new trustees appointed in 1834, vindicated Buddie's attitude, this aspect of his career serves as a reminder of the limitations of the agent's power. It also sheds some light on the neglected area of aristocratic finance for industry, particularly perhaps, the rôle of their country banks. In all other spheres, the long connection between Buddie and Londonderry worked well: a strong professional staff was established which, despite relatively low salaries and considerable over-work, remained loyal to the Londonderry concerns; radical technical improvements were effective in raising profits; colliery land was increased, with a lively regard for Londonderry's position in relation to his competitors and lessors as well as to actual coal production; and Seaham Harbour and railway were built. In relations with the Coal Trade Buddie was not always able to control Londonderry's actions but the impression is that, without Buddie's unflagging belief in the benefits of co-operation and negotiation, the coal trade of the 1820s and 1830s would have been an even less secure business than it already was.

Buddie's career epitomises those attributes of his fellow agents which have been described in recent studies: a growing professionalism; versatility and flexibility; command of detail as well as appreciation of fundamental issues; an amazing appetite for work; and indefatigability. He must be added to the select list of agents who added culture and social distinction to professional competence; he entered learned and socially elevated circles some twenty or thirty years before Thomas Sopwith, and although he could not claim Loch's political connections, he had shown that a colliery viewer could command the same prestige as a barrister/auditor.

Overshadowed by the great entrepreneurs and inventors in manufacturing industries, the coal viewers have attracted comparatively little attention. Buddie personifies their past traditions - which had already established their professional identity and their national and international reputation - and their future development. The lessons to be learned from Buddie's rôle as an entrepreneur on
his own account are perhaps rather more surprising. Risk-taking was inherent in any direct involvement in coal mining; therefore, although he owned more shares in collieries than many of his fellow coal-owners, Buddie limited the financial risk by earning salaries and rents as well as dividends from those collieries; he lessened the technical risks by contributing his own expertise, and he controlled the managerial risks by acting with tried and tested partners. Buddie also has a contribution to make to present knowledge of investment in coastal shipping, railways and banks, and to understanding the reasoning behind a small capitalist's decision whether or not to invest.

On a wider perspective, Buddie's experience probably embraced every shift in prosperity from one part of the coal-field to another; every type of coal in production; every transport situation; every technical problem and achievement both above and below ground. His career illustrates, to a remarkable extent, the general course of development of the north-east coal-field.
References

Secondary works are referred to by a short title after initial citation.

PP indicates Parliamentary Papers
DNB Dictionary Of National Biography

The following abbreviations for archive repositories have been used:

DRO Durham Record Office
NRO Northumberland Record Office
NEIMME North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers

For the sake of brevity, the initials of the repository and the title of the collections have not been given in references to two sources at the Durham Record Office which were particularly frequently used:

D/Lo indicates the Londonderry Papers
NCBI/JB/ indicates the National Coal Board, 1st deposit, John Buddle Papers.

The Londonderry Papers include Buddle's letters to the third Marquess of Londonderry, reference D/Lo/C 142. Writer and recipient have not been stated in each reference to this large correspondence, except in the few cases of a writer other than Buddle or a recipient other than Londonderry (or, before 1823, Lord Stewart as he then was; he has been referred to as Londonderry throughout the References.)

Material at the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers is listed and numbered, but identification depends on location. References therefore include the shelf number, or 'safe' if the document is kept in the safe, in the basement strongroom.

The following abbreviations are used to describe documents:

VB View Book
LB Letter Book
PB Place Book (Buddle numbered his place books but no.11 is missing. After no.10, therefore, the original and the modern numbers are not the same.)
CB Cash Book
Chapter I : Introduction


6. D/Lo/C 153(122)J.J.Wright to Londonderry, 3 November 1843.

7. DRO,D/X 410,Buddle's will, 9 October 1843.

8. NCB1/JB/2662, Account of actions by Buddie's executors, 10 to 28 Oct.1843.


10. D/Lo/C 142, 19 April 1829, referring to Thomas Smith of Lambton. Buddie's letters to Londonderry contradict the statement by R.J.Collyer,*The Land Agent in 19th Century Wales', Welsh History Review viii(December 1977)423, that correspondence between agent and landlord rarely provides any indication of the agents' attitudes towards their employers and their jobs.


12. DRO,EP/La 4, Lanchester Parish Records, baptism register; Chester-le-Street Parish Registers, vol.5,p.51,14 August 1743; vol.6,p.170, 29 October 1806; vol.7, 248,6 April 1827 [at the church].

13. W.Fordyce, The History and Antiquities of the County Palatine of Durham (Newcastle,1855) I,180; Welford, Men of Mark I,425; University of Durham,Department of Paleography,schoolmasters' licences.


15. NEIMME, shelf 46, vol.15, Bushblades Colliery Memoranda; vol.27,Notes upon Boring and Sinking, with inscription "Mr.Jno.Buddle,1765".
References: Chapter I/II


22. Morning Post, 25 June 1842 (quoting letter from Buddie to Londonderry, 14 June 1842); NCBI/JB/2556, Minutes of Evidence taken before the House of Commons Committee on the S. Durham Railway Bill, p. 25, 6 June, 1836.


27. NEIMME, safe, vol. 15 (LB) p. 154 Buddie to Silvertop, 26 October 1806.

28. See below, pp. 11-14

Chapter II: "The Craft call'd Viewers"

1. D/Lo/GLU2, 'A True Conservative' to Londonderry, 11 October 1843.

2. NEIMME, Matthias Dunn, History of the Viewers [ms.] based on conversations in 1811-12 with Samuel Haggerstone; cited only as Dunn throughout this chapter. The instances quoted here are from p. 26A (William Morriss) and p. 30 (George Joplin).

3. Welford, Men of Mark I, 430.


5. Dunn, p. 22.


8. Dunn, p. 18.

References : Chapter II

10. D/Lo/C 142,24 April 1824,13 November 1825.
11. Dunn, pp.38-45, appendix pp.13-17; see also, on Barnes, Galloway, Annals I,316-7.
12. Dunn, p.43.
14. Dunn, p.43.
15. See below, pp.59-60, 269.
17. NCBI/JB/9(Cash Book)2 March 1804; Dunn, p.43; DRO,D/Br 26 [temporary no.] (Branesepeth Papers, Wallsend Colliery Ledger)1807-8 passim.
18. NCBI/JB/10(Cash Book)31 December 1811; Dunn, p.43; NEIMME, shelf 17, Matthias Dunn, Journal of the Coal Trade [ms.] p.3 et seq., 1812.
19. NCBI/JB/1(Day Book)August 1815; JB/10(Cash Book)31 August 1816; NRO, Coal Trade Minutes, vol.IV, p.11, 7 March 1818.
20. NCBI/JB/282, Buddie to John Channon [copy] 26 September 1825. Buddie had charged da Costa a fee of £200 which was never paid.
21. D/Lo/C 142,24 April 1824.
22. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol.22(LB) no.44, Buddie to John Gregson [copy] 8 December 1839.
24. Morning Post, 25 June 1842, on speech by Londonderry, quoting letter from Buddie, 14 June 1842, Buddie's letter is only baldly described in Hansard, 3rd ser., lxiv(1842)540.
25. Morning Post, loc. cit.
27. Dunn, pp.24-26a, appendix pp.3-6.
28. For example, John Smurthwaite sen. and jun.; a Smurthwaite daughter married Thomas Croudace of Lambton and two of their sons were brought up as viewers; the Legg family at Rainton; Sober Watkin, sen. and jun.; the Easton family (Dunn, pp.24-26a, appendix pp.3-6,10,16). Such families were often linked by marriage.
29. Dunn, pp.26a,27; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol.15(PB no.16) 30 September 1843.
32. Fordyce, History of Durham II,682-4. T.Y. Hall's papers are in the Durham RO (NCBI/TH) and in NEIMME.
34. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol.11(PB no.12)5 June 1840. Simpson's salary was £120.


37. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 6 (PB) 10 and 23 May 1837; vol. 12 (PB no. 13) 12 May and 22 June 1841; shelf 14, vol. 3 (Bell Collection) p. 355, news-cutting of letter from Chevallier, 2 March 1841.


39. See below, pp. 44-5.

40. NCBI/JB/1086, T. Phillips to Buddie, 16 April 1842; JB/1339, Thomas Sopwith to Buddie, 19 April 1842.

41. NCBI/JB/1210, 1211, Stephen Reed to Buddie (enclosing testimonials) 15 October 1842.

42. Dunn, p. 45, appendix pp. 3, 10, 16.

43. NCBI/JB/1407, H. Taylor to Buddie, 12 June 1815.

44. Dunn, p. 44.

45. Dunn, p. 35.

46. Dunn, p. 43.

47. NCBI/JB/2556, Evidence on S. Durham Railway Bill, op. cit., p. 27, 6 June 1836.

48. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 11 (PB no. 12) 27 February 1840.

49. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 9 (PB) 1 September 1838.

50. D/Lo/C 142, 27 June 1832, 27 August 1825, 27 March 1843.


52. D/Lo/C 142, 16 May 1842.

53. Ibid., 5 November 1823.


55. D/Lo/C 142, 22 November 1824. The overman and master wasteman were "the principal agents of the resident viewer" (Fardyce, Coal and Iron, 35).

56. NCBI/JB/1063, J. Peile to Buddie, 18 October 1823.

57. D/Lo/C 142, 16 November 1825.

58. Ibid., 28 March and 26 October 1823, 4 January 1824, 10 November 1832. A few weeks after the Croudace incident, Buddie commented on it, "it is evident that he romances a little" (21 November 1823). On the approaches to Buddie and Hunter, see below, pp. 105-6, 145.

59. Ibid., 27 March 1843.


62. For example, Smurthwaite in Wales, John Watson in Sweden and Sober Watkin in Cumberland (Dunn, pp. 6, 8, 25, 44).

63. NCBI/JB/1051-54, 1063, J. Peile to Buddle, 20 to 30 June 1815, 18 Oct. 1823.

64. NCBI/JB/875, John Gray to Buddle, 27 June 1825.

65. See below, pp. 91-2.


70. See, pp. 29, 30.

71. NCBI/JB/1006, H. Morton to Buddle, 25 March 1832; -JB/1188, J. Reay to Buddle, 2 April 1832; D/Lo/C 142, 6 November 1832.

72. M. Forster to Buddle, 17 November 1832.

73. NCBI/JB/669(8), W. Fairley to T. Y. Hall, 1866.


75. See, pp. 29, 33.

76. Dunn, pp. 29, 36, 37. "By the ten": as subcontractors, receiving a set price per ton (approx. 50 tons).


78. Janieson, *Durham loc. cit.* 119. On this typical third-generation education of successful industrialists' descendants, see D. O. Coleman, *'Gentlemen and Players'* ,Econ.Hist.Rev. 26 (1973) 92-116; there is, however, perhaps nothing more significant in it than the factor of time, rather than of attitudes.

79. D/Lo/C 142, 'A True Conservative' to Londonderry, 11 October 1843.

Chapter III: "The 'Mighty Chiefs' of Oppression"

1. D/Lo/C 142, 30 March 1825.

2. D/Lo/L 15(3) 'Observations as to...manager and receiver', n.d., unsigned to Lord Stewart, April/May 1819]

4. 'An Earnest Address and Urgent Appeal to the People of England, in behalf of the Oppressed and Suffering Pitmen...' by W. Scott (Newcastle, 1831), op. cit.


7. D/Lo/L 15(13), Observations, op. cit.

8. D/Lo/C 142, 16 November 1823.


11. D/Lo/C 142, 9 June, 16 and 25 June, 2, 15, and 16 July 1825.


13. On Lambton, see below, p. 86; on Russell, D/Lo/C 142, 30 March 1825.

14. D/Lo/C 142, 30 May 1822.

15. NR0, Coal Trade Minutes, vol. IX, pp. 68-81, 20 March, 27 March, 10 April 1824.

16. Ibid., p. 109, 10 July 1824; D/Lo/C 142, 11 July 1824.

17. D/Lo/C 142, 4 and 13 June 1827.

18. D/Lo/C 142, 1-31 January 1828; NCBI/JB/896, T. H. Liddell (Lord Ravensworth) to Buddle, 12 and 31 January 1827 [sic].

19. D/Lo/C 142, 10 and 13 June, 15, 26 and 29 August 1829; NR0 Coal Trade Minutes (unnumbered vol., 'Committee Meetings 1827-32') pp. 199-202, 8 and 10 August 1829. Cf. P. M. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition in the English Coal Trade (Harvard, 1938) 95. Lacking the evidence in Buddle's letters to Londonderry, Sweezy was unaware of the nature of the "persuasion or pressure" by which Atkinson "must have been brought round". Sweezy wrongly describes Atkinson as "owner of Towneley Main"; he was agent to Burdon, lessee of Team colliery.

20. D/Lo/C 142, 13 and 14 June 1829, 22 December 1832.

21. Thomas Fenwick told the House of Commons Committee on the Durham South West Junction Railway Bill (NCBI/JB/2558, pp. 23-28, Fenwick's evidence, 14 May 1836) that he had been a viewer for 54 years, and "valuer" to the Bishop for 28 and to the Dean and Chapter for 20 years.


23. See p. 97.


27. D/Lo/C 142, 13 March 1823.

28. Ibid., 13 January 1824.

29. Ibid., 30 March 1825.
1. NCBI/JB/2418, View of Collieries, 1828. This list was probably made in preparation for Buddle's evidence to the Select Committees on the Coal Trade in 1829-30.

2. See p. 79.

3. NCBI/JB/2456, Tyne Coals Classified according to Prices, 1830.

4. This was, of course, the situation in that particular year; in 1840 Charles Blackett leased Prudhoe Main colliery, adjoining his own at Wylam; NEIMME, safe, vol. 39, Report, February 1840.


6. This evidence bears out D. Spring, 'Earls of Durham', op. cit.

7. In 1828 Londonderry was working Penshaw, N. Pittington and Rainton.

8. See p. 275, 283.

9. Select Committee on the Coal Trade, op. cit., 298.


11. See pp. 282-3, Cf. Taylor, 'Sub-Contract System', op. cit., 367; average commitment in mid-19th century Black Country collieries was less than £3,000 with a work-force of sixty to seventy.

12. NRO, Coal Trade Minutes (1805-15), p. 263, General Return of the Number of People Employed (etc.) 12 September 1815, Cf. Taylor, 'The Wigan Coalfield in 1851', Hist. Soc. of Lancs. & Cheshire 106 (1954) 117-26, on small number of workmen in each pit compared to the N.W.


15. D/Lo/C 142, 26 May and 2 June 1833.


17. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 12 (PB no. 13) 7 December 1839, 19 December 1840; shelf 47a, vol. 12 (LB) no. 44, Buddle to Gregson [copy], 8 December 1839; D/Lo/C 142, 8 January 1833.


19. NCBI/JB/231, George Burnett to Buddle, 31 December 1826.


22. D/Lo/C 142, 16 November 1823.

23. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 23 (LB) no. 23, Buddle to McDonnell [copy], 17 July 1840.

24. D/Lo/C 142, 27 August 1833, On the advent of joint-stock coal companies, see Galloway, Annals, II, 11. Buddle's and his colleagues' dislike of such companies was not unusual; it was shared by James Loch (Mather, After the Canal Duke, 104) and by Peile (J. T. Ward, Some West Cumberland Landowners and Industry', Indus. Arch. 9 (1972) 359).

25. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 5 (PB) 21 May 1836; D/Lo/6 500, Buddle to Londonderry, 18 January 1837.

26. D/Lo/C 142, 3 November 1840.
Chapter V: "Know the Man"

1. The quotation in the title is from D/Lo/C 142, 16 November 1823.
2. D/Lo/C 142, 8 July 1833; Buddle to Browne, 14 June 1826.
3. NCBI/JB/181, Browne to Buddle, 27 May 1833; NCBI/JB/838, Lamb to Buddle, 10 April 1827.
7. D/Lo/C 142, 30 May 1824, Buddle had already mentioned Lambton's "proverbial" punctuality in paying tradesmen (17 January 1823).
8. Ibid., 10 November 1828.
9. See Chapter XIII.
10. D/Lo/C 142, 18 March 1826.
11. Ibid., 22 September, 5 October, 19 December 1832.
12. Ibid., 3 July 1831.
13. Ibid., 6 January 1823, 3 August 1825.
14. See p. 117.
15. D/Lo/C 142, 2 March 1823; 13 January, 19 October 1828.
16. Ibid., 2 and 6 August, 16 October 1831.
17. Dunn, Viewers, p. 21.
18. D/Lo/C 151 (167) McDonnell to Londonderry, 2 September 1841.
19. D/Lo/C 142, 27 June 1832.
A. J. Taylor, 'The Third Marquess of Londonderry and the North-Eastern Coal Trade', Durham Univ. Journal 48 (1955-6) 26, quotes these letters but, although mentioning that Buddle and Londonderry were not on speaking terms at the time, implies that Buddle was expressing a considered and habitual opinion.
23. Dunn, Viewers, p. 43.
25. See p. 10.
27. D/Lo/C 142, 27 March 1843, and Londonderry's annotations.
28. Ibid., 29 March, 1 April, 29 July 1843.
29. D/Lo/C 148 (150), Hindhaugh to Londonderry, 27 November 1843.
Chapter V

31. NCBI/JB/974,975, R. May to Buddie, 15 August, 16 September 1823. It appears that May was reinstated, for his and his wife’s wages are mentioned in NCBI/JB/55, Atkinson to Buddie, 17 April 1825. He had probably been with Buddie for some years, as a payment of £1 was made to R. May for viewing work in 1818 (NCBI/JB/10, Cash Book). Buddie was perhaps more lenient with his own long-standing employees than with those of his employers.

32. W. Richardson, History of the Parish of Wallsend (Newcastle, 1923) p. 108. The house was destroyed by fire in 1890.

33. Greenwell in Colliery Guardian 1900, Buddie also owned a house in Lisle Street, Newcastle, and he had an office in the Royal Arcade (as well as at the Coal Trade Office as secretary): Pigot and Co’s National Commercial Directory, 1834, p. 606.


35. NCBI/JB/53, Atkinson to Buddie, - January 1825.

36. NCBI/JB/10, Cash Book: sums paid to Pybus’s school, 1819-21; NCBI/JB/922-24, Mackreth to Buddie, 12 March, 5 and 23 April 1823.

37. Welford, Men of Mark, III, 497-501; T. J. Taylor (1811-61), grandson, son and nephew of colliery agents, was like Atkinson intended to become a viewer and sent to Edinburgh to study mathematics, chemistry, geology, mechanics and mineralogy; he became a distinguished colliery engineer. Buddie’s correspondence includes mention of another aspiring colliery manager (William Gafton junr.), who, after leaving Newcastle, had been under the tuition of “Mr. Bald” [probably Robert Bald] at Edinburgh and while there attended the college for one year. (DR0, NCBI/JB/545, W. Gafton to Buddie, 5 October 1827.) Cf. D. Spring, The English Landed Estate (Baltimore, 1963) p. 101, on lack of university education among land agents.

38. NCBI/JB/51-54, Atkinson to Buddie, 24 December 1824 to 7 March 1825.

39. D/Lo/C 142, 27 August 1825, 10 August 1826.

40. NEMME, shelf 47a, vol. 12 (PB no. 14), 9 July 1842; vol. 14 (PB no. 15), 17 September 1842.

41. NEMME, shelf 47a, vol. 8 (PB) 24 March 1838.

42. NEMME, shelf 47a, vol. 10 (PB) 28 January 1839. Plaque in Benwell St. James Church, Newcastle: died 9 March 1845; University of Durham, Department of Palaeography, probate will, 16 July 1845.


44. NEMME, shelf 47a, vol. 15 (PB) 15 July 1843.

45. NCBI/JB/938, L. M. Macwhirter to Buddie, 28 December 1828.

46. Richardson, History of Wallsend, op. cit., p. 96.

47. NEMME, shelf 47a, vol. 8 (PB) 10 April 1838.

48. Welford, Men of Mark, I, 430; D/Lo/C 142, 21 April 1831. In 1807 Buddie received a year’s pay of £218.6d. from the Corps (NCBI/JB/9, 14 Mar. 1807).


50. Welford, Men of Mark, I, 430; NEMME, shelf 47a, vol. 12 (PB), 6 November 1840, 15 April 1841.

51. NCBI/JB/319-21, G. Corsby to Buddie, 9 April, 11 May and 12 July 1827, re. supplying a Gallini ‘cello, violin and guitars; NCBI/JB/2659, notes on the viol da gamba and other viols, 15 September 1827.

52. NEMME, shelf 47a, vol. 13 (PB) 9 April 1842.

53. NEMME, shelf 47a, vol. 13 (PB no. 14), 30 July 1842; vol. 15 (PB no. 16), 27 September 1843. Robert Lindley (1776-1855), "the greatest violoncellist of his time": principal violoncellist at the Opera, professor of the Royal Academy of Music. (2NS).

54. NCBI/JB/524, 525, George Fox to Buddie, 5 and 16 April 1842; see p. 291.
References : Chapter V

55. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.13(PB no.14)30 May 1842.
56. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.1-15(PBS)passim.; vol.5, 4 November 1836;
   vol.10,10 November 1836.
57. Ibid.,vols.7,8,9(PB)18 August,25 November 1837,20 August 1838.
58. Ibid.,vol.7(PB)25 August,26 October,10November 1837; vol.13(PB no.14)
   14 July 1842; Fordyce,Durham I,181; NCBI/JB/447,J.Edgecombe to Buddie,
   18 July 1832; JB/625,N.W.Hardcastle to Buddie,16 February 1832.
59. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.6(PB)13 January 1837; vol.8(PB)29 December 1837;
   vol.12(PB no.13)30 October,23 November,12 December 1840; vol.14
   (PB no.15)6 February 1843; R.S.Watson,History of the Literary and
   Philosophical Society of Newcastle upon Tyne(1793-1896)(London,1897)
   230,236-8.
60. 'John Buddie'Archaeologia Aeliana,3rd ser.X(1913)119-21; J.Buddie,
   'On Making the Society a Place of Deposit for the Mining Records of
62. NCBI/JB/721,722,Hodgson to Buddie,26 March 1834,15 August 1821;
   JB/1319-46,Sopwith to Buddie,1833-42. Buddie and Sopwith apparently
   met through Dean Forest business (see p.91),much to Sopwith's
   gratification (JB/1326,15 May 1833). Colonel Mills was land-agent
   to the Russells. On Sir Henry Browne,see p.116; on Lamb,ch.XIV,passim.
63. NCBI/JB/1008,Morton to Buddie,30 November 1833; NEIMME,shelf 47a,
   vol.5(PB)16 September 1836. Harriet Martinseau's mother came from
   a Newcastle family(Rankin) who, like Buddie,were Unitarians; Buddie
   had friends called Rankin in Bristol who were probably Harriet's
   uncle's family, with whom he stayed. NCBI/JB/1173-7,R.& T.
   Rankin to Buddie,1832.
64. Fordyce,Durham I,181.
65. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.3(PB)23 August 1835; vol.12(PB no.13)
   28 February,21 March 1841; vol.13 (PB no.14)29 March 1842; vol.14
   (PB no.15)4 August 1842; NCBI/JB/621,Hamel to Buddie,10 April 1815;
   JB/389,Dixon to Buddie,28 December 1816; JB/84,Bald to Buddie,
   12 September 1815; JB/204,Buddie to Elgin [copy]30 March 1818.
   For Dixon (1753-1824) and Bald (1776-1861) see Duckham,Scottish Coal
   Industry I,136-8,181-4;also 'Emergence of Professional Manager',
   op.cit.
66. Thompson,English Landed Society,163.
67. D/Lo/C 142,Buddie to Londonderry,10 May 1822; NCBI/JB/1243,Russell
   to Buddie,9 December 1813; NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.11(PB,no.12)
   26-29 January,7 April 1841.
68. NCBI/JB/1450,Charles Tennyson(brother-in-law of Matthew Russell)
   to Buddie,12 October 1827; NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.22(1B)no.32,
   Buddie to McDonnell copy 25 October 1839. It is possible that
   Buddie,like the Duke of Sussex,was a Mason, but no evidence has been
   found to suggest that this was so.
69. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.11(PB no.12)6 January 1840; D/Lo/C 142,
   6 November 1833.
70. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.7(PB)26 October,12 November 1837. Penwick had
   been the bishop's viewer for 29 years; see p.28,note 21.
71. Lambton Archives at Lambton Estate Office,Morton Box 12(1)Buddie
   to Morton,12 November 1837.
72. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.8(PB)13 December 1837; vol.12(PB no.13)
   11 November 1840,1 January 1841; vol.13(PB no.14)19 March 1842.
73. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.11(PB no.12)20 August 1840; vol.13(P.B.no.14)
   28 December 1841.
74. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.18(PB no.15)17 January 1842; Elgin,10 October
   1842.
75. NEIMME, shelf 47a.,vol.18(PB no.15)24 August,4 October,10 October 1842.
76. NCBI/JB,passim.,letters to Buddie.
77. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.12(PB no.13)18 January 1841.
78. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.6(PB)12-14 June 1837; vol.12(PB no.13)16 May 1841. Sir James Duke had been Secretary and Treasurer of the Society of Coal Factors; he became an MP and was knighted in 1837, and was later Lord Mayor of London; R. Smith, Sea Coal for London: History of the Coal Factors in the London Market (London, 1961) 160.
79. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.13(PB no.14)24 February 1842. On Dean Forest, see p.91.
80. For example, the Dean and Chapter were "a pack of old women in breeches" (D/Lo/C 142, 17 November 1824); William Chaytor, the Durham banker who opposed Londonderry's candidate in the 1830 election, was "Taty"-"this poume de terre," "this greasy beast" (D/Lo/C 142, 1 and 2 July 1830). Lawyers were a continual thorn in Buddie's flesh - see p.116.
81. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.7(PB)17, 19 and 22 November 1837.
82. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vols.12,13(PB nos.13 & 14)21, 23 September 1841. The labourers carrying coal from ship to carts in bags, were paid £1 per ton and carried 20 tons per day.
83. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.13(PB no.14)19 March 1842.
84. Spring, The English Landed Estate, 105, emphasises the amount of travel and hard work by land agents.
85. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.24(PB no.18)Buddie to McDonnell 22 Sept. 1840.
86. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.7(PB)28 August, 2 and 4 October, 14 to 22 Nov. 1837; vol.13(PB no.14)17-31 October 1841.
87. Ibid., 20-25 November 1841.
88. Ibid., 7 April 1842.
89. D/Lo/C 142, 18 October 1828; NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.12(PB no.13)15 Dec. 1840.
90. D/Lo/C 142, 18 December 1822. Cf. Spring, The English Landed Estate, p.105: "Few things are more conspicuous than the incessant industry of the leading land agents in the nineteenth century."
91. Dunn, Viewers, p.20.
92. T. E. Forster, 'Historical Notes on Wallsend Colliery', Trans, NEIMME XV (1897-8): J. B. Simpson's contribution to discussion p.92. There are numerous view-books of Buddie's at NEIMME and a few at DRO.
93. D/Lo/C 142, Donkin to Londonderry, 20 November 1832.
94. D/Lo/C 149(41), Hunter to Londonderry, 6 December 1832.
95. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vols.20-25: Copy out-letter books, 1826-43, Buddie experimented with "Wedgwood's patent manifold writer", a type of carbon paper (vol.20 no.4); Safe, vol.15: Copy out-letters, 1802-8; Safe, vol.22, Copy out-letters, 1822-36. C/ f. S. Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management, (London, 1966) 230: It was normal practice for "all correspondence, no matter how voluminous, was conducted as a matter of course in the senior partners' own hand."
98. D/Lo/C 142, 2 April, 28 July 1824.
100. See ch. XIV for Buddie's investment in collieries, ch. for salaries.
101. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.13(PB no.14)25 October 1841.
102. NEIMME, shelf 47a., no.29, Law Bill, 1824; shelf 15, vol.20, p.309, news-cutting from Courant, 20 October 1843; D/Lo/C 142, 12 December 1822.
Buddie's tombstone can still be seen in the church-yard, and there are a bust and plaque to his memory in the church.
103. MB/LJ/396,C. Dodds to Buddie, 6 January 1825; D/Lo/C 142, 23 Feb. 1829; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol.8(PB)5 May 1838. C/ f. Ward, 'Landowners and Mining' op. cit., 100-1, on successful industrialists buying land as a social investment; Spring, 'English Landowners', op. cit., 18-25, on landowners benefitting from railways.

105. D/Lo/C 142, 11 November 1832, 25 September 1833; D/Lo/C 151(51), McDonnell to Londonderry, 31 July 1835.

106. D/Lo/C 142, 27 August 1833.

107. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.5 & 6 (PB) 24 September, 4 October, 16 Dec, 1836; NCBI/JB/793, 794, B. Johnson to Buddie, 8 January, 13 June 1842. He mentioned payment for his services, so was apparently retained by Buddie to act on farm business.


109. D/Lo/C 142, 27 June, 23 September 1832.

110. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.21 (LB) no. 39, Buddie to Amory [copy] 27 August 1839.

111. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.22 (LB) no.16, Buddie to A. Donkin [copy] 30 Sep. 1839; vol.23 (LB) no. 21, Buddie to Waldie [copy] 17 July 1840. The idea of Buddie's buying Waldie's share had first been mooted in 1832, when Waldie's capital in the concern amounted to over £18,000, usually paying, so he said, 10% to 12%. (NCBI/JB/158, Waldie to Buddie, 9 April 1832). In 1839 Buddie invested rather less than this amount in the Newcastle & Carlisle Railway, as he told Waldie he had decided to do; see p. 60.


113. Buddie may well be a typical example of the early-19th century shipowner, owning two or three ships and limited capital (Rowe, 'Economy of the North-East [op.cit.].

114. D/Lo/C 142, 23 September 1832.

115. Ibid., 27 June 1832.

116. Ibid., 7 May 1842. Fluctuating profits of course affected the market value of the ship; Buddie considered that when it had been making good profits, its value was £2,700 but that after the lack of profits in 1840-42, it would now sell for not more than £1,300.


118. D/Lo/C 500 (4) Buddie to Londonderry, 7 April 1837.

119. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.6 (PB) 15 March, 25 May 1837.

120. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.7, 10, (PB) 8 November 1837, 4 February 1839. For the dispute with Londonderry over the Seaham ships, see p. 178.

121. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.23 (LB) no. 50, vol.24 (LB) no. 17, Buddie to S. Hetton Coal Co. [copies] 26 August, 20 September 1840; D/Lo/C 336 (8), Buddie to McDonnell, 21 November 1838.

122. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.6 (PB) 2 February 1837. The tenant, Robinson, wanted Buddie to raise his house another storey, at a cost of £300, and was willing to pay interest in additional rent: "this may be an inducement to me to lay out the money."


125. NCBI/JB/9 (CB) entries for 18 February, 4 November 1804.


127. NEIMME, shelf 47a., vol.6 (PB) 17 December 1836; vol.21 (LB) no. 9, Buddie to J. Adamson [copy] 7 August 1839; vol.11 (PB no. 12) 30 November 1839; NCBI/JB/2662, Contents of Buddie's safe, listed by executors, 17 Oct, 1843.
References : Chapter V/VI  


129. NCB/JB/2662, op.cit.

130. D/Lo/C 142, 22 and 27 August, 23 September 1832.

131. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol.10(PB)16 February 1839; vol.13(PB no.14) 21 May 1842. Since this was in typescript, I have found that Buddle owned 850 shares in the District Bank in 1841 (NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol.12(PB no.13) 11 September 1841.


133. Welford, Men of Mark 1, 430.

134. D/LO/C 133 (6) Burdon to Londonderry, 26 October 1842.

135. In 1823 Buddle reported that "Mr. Lambton has got W.Loraine dubbed a magistrate for the county of Durham" (D/Lo/C 142, 18 January 1823).


139. D/Lo/C 116 (15), (17) G. B. Wharton, Clerk of the Peace, to Londonderry, 17, 29 September 1825; NCB/JB/1270, W. Scobron, Deputy Clerk of the Peace, to Buddle, 15 October 1842; D/Lo/C 133 (6) op.cit.

140. NCB/JB/1000, 1007, Morton to Buddle, 4 February, 2 March 1832.

141. D/Lo/C 142, 6 November 1842.

142. D/Lo/C 116 (15), (17) G. B. Wharton, Clerk of the Peace, to Londonderry, 17, 29 September 1842; NCB/JB/1270, W. Scobron, Deputy Clerk of the Peace, to Buddle, 15 October 1842; D/Lo/C 133 (6) op.cit.

143. D/Lo/C 142, Londonderry to Burdon (enclosed in letter from Londonderry to Buddle) 1 November 1842.

144. NCB/JB/1448, C. Elliott to Buddle, 22 August 1842.

145. D/Lo/C 142, Londonderry to Burdon (enclosed in letter from Londonderry to Buddle) 1 November 1842.

Chapter VI : Wallsend and Tanfield Moor

1. D/Lo/C 142, 16 November 1823.

2. Ibid., 10 May 1822; DRO, D/Br/C 45 (Brancepeth Papers) Buddle to C. Pennyson, 31 May 1822.

3. NCB/JB/144,9, Tennyson to Buddle, 9 October 1827; D/Lo/C 142, 28 July, 9, 10 August 1824.

4. D/Lo/C 142, 30 March 1825.

5. Forster, 'Historical Notes on Wallsend', op.cit.; J. B. Simpson's contribution to discussion, p.92.

6. The following two paragraphs are based on Forster, op.cit.; Galloway, Annals 1, 307 et seq.; J. Bykes, An Account of the Dreadful Explosion in Wallsend Colliery on 18 June 1835 (Newcastle, 1835) 12. See also pp.92-4.

7. Russell is described as a fitter in NEIMME, safe, vol.12, p.1, New Washington Colliery Lease, 21 December 1775.

8. Buddle, 'On Making the Society a Place of Deposit...op.cit., includes historical notes on Wallsend colliery, p.309 et seq.


References: Chapter VI

17. Forster, 'Historical Notes', op. cit., 82.
18. Miss Maureen Weinstock MA, and staff of Dorset County Record Office have given me useful information about Pitt. His Dorset concerns included a cannery, hotel, rope factory and clay works, and he was widely involved in philanthropic and local affairs. The fate of the bulk of his papers is not known, although his letters to Buddle indicate that he preserved and bound papers sent to him by Buddle.
21. Ibid., p. 36, 30 December 1822.
22. NCBY/1133, 1122, Pitt to Buddle, 6 March, 14 August 1828.
23. Galloway, Annals 1, 388.
25. Ibid., p. 217, 14 February 1827; p. 254, 10 October 1827.
26. Ibid., p. 263, 20 June 1830; p. 273, 30 January 1830 [sic; should read 1831].
27. Ibid., pp. 296, 301-3, Estimate of leading costs, 1831.
28. Ibid., p. 303, Buddle's notes, 28 May 1833.
29. Ibid., p. 319, 12 March 1834.
30. Ibid., p. 333, 5 June 1835.
31. Ibid., p. 336, 12 June 1835.
32. Ibid., p. 338, 12 June 1835.
33. Ibid., p. 190, 6 February 1825.
34. Ibid., p. 226, 20 June 1830; p. 268, 11 December 1830; p. 304, 18 May 1833.
35. Ibid., p. 269, 11 December 1830; p. 272, 30 January 1831; p. 289, 21 June, 1831; p. 295, 11 September 1832.
36. Ibid., p. 307, 26 October 1833; p. 319, 12 March 1834.
37. Ibid., p. 336, 12 June 1835.
38. Ibid., p. 344, 5 June 1835.
39. Ibid., p. 356, 12 June 1835.
40. Ibid., p. 362, 1 February 1836.
41. Ibid., p. 366, 12 June 1835.
42. Ibid., p. 368, 14 December 1832.
43. Ibid., p. 370, 26 October 1833.
44. Ibid., p. 372, 26 October 1833.
45. Ibid., p. 374, 26 October 1833.
46. Ibid., p. 376, 26 October 1833.
47. Ibid., p. 378, 26 October 1833.
48. Ibid., p. 380, 26 October 1833.
49. Ibid., p. 382, 26 October 1833.
50. Ibid., p. 384, 26 October 1833.
51. Ibid., p. 386, 26 October 1833.
52. Ibid., p. 388, 26 October 1833.
53. Ibid., p. 390, 26 October 1833.
54. Ibid., p. 392, 26 October 1833.
55. Ibid., p. 394, 26 October 1833.
56. Ibid., p. 396, 26 October 1833.
57. Ibid., p. 398, 26 October 1833.
Chapter VII: Consultant Viewer and Engineer; References: Chapter VII

1. D/LO/C 142, 16 November 1823.
2. Ibid.
4. Dunn, Viewers, appendix p. 6.
5. NCB/JB/1337, 1344, T. Sopwith to Buddie, 14 April, 24 July 1842.
6. NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. 12 (PB no. 13) 26 December 1840.
7. See p. 106.
8. See ch. XIV.
9. NCB/IB/7 (Personal Ledger) pp. 13, 66 and passim.
10. Ibid., p. 24 and passim; NEIMME, safe, vol. 40 (Hebburn VB) 5 February, 11 July 1810, 5 July 1813; vol. 41 (Hebburn VB) 31 January, 7 Feb. 1824, 7 October 1826. Safe, vol. 49 (VB 1808-9) is unlabeled but appears to relate to Hebburn.
11. NCB/IB/10 (CB) 11 August 1812; JB/166, T. Brown to Buddie, 10 April 1832;
NEIMME, safe, vol. 36 (5 vols.) (Jarrow VB, 1811-30).
12. NCB/IB/9 (CB) 5 August and 27 October 1802, 31 December 1806 et seq.;
NEIMME, safe, vol. 15 (John Buddie senior, Colliery Journal) 22 November 1800;
safe, vol. 5, Reports on Mines belonging to the Dean and Chapter, 1800-6;
on Fenwick, see ch. 3, note 21.
15. NCB/IB/7, op. cit., p. 36, 'Profit and Loss account, 1805'; JB/9 (CB) 25 March 1807, 23 July, 6 August 1808.
16. D/LO/C 142, 4 April 1830.
17. NCB/IB/2561, Marruco to Buddie, 23 November 1832; D/LO/C 142, 19 Nov. 1832.
18. NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. 7 (PB) 12 November 1837.
20. NCB/IB/10 (CB) 14 February 1811.
21. Dunn, Viewers, appendix p. 18; Journal, p. 3.
23. NEIMME, safe, vol. 14 (Account of Collieries... 1797, with additions 1802-4) p. 85; vol. 13 (Lambton Collieries) pp. 27, 61, 143, and passim, undertakers' accounts.
25. D/LO/C 155(17), Wright to Londonderry, with list of Sunderland magistrates, January 1842.
27. D/LO/B 33, Report on letting collieries to be worked by contract, 27 October 1811.
31. D/LO/L 16(54), Tempest v. Ord; Copy affidavit of Thomas Croudace, 16 Mar. 1817.
32. NEIMME, safe, vol. 34(i) op. cit., 20 April 1807, 19 April 1808, 6 Apr. 1809, et seq.; safe, vol. 3 (Reports and Valuations) pp. 133-207, Report on Lambton Collieries to Thomas Wilkinson, October 1810. Except where otherwise stated, all the following information on the situation before 1810 is from this report. Buddie agreed to write the report at his meeting with Wilkinson in April 1810; although the report is dated October 1810, Buddie delivered it to Wilkinson in April 1811.
33. Taylor, 'Sub-contract System', op. cit., suggests that individual entrepreneurs suffered severely from low prices, caused by increased competition, in 1783-93, and looked to the sub-contract system as a source of stability.
34. See p. 126.
References: Chapter VII

35. D/Lo/B 33, op.cit.
36. NCB/JB/2071, 2072, 2073, Comparison of prices at Lambton collieries, 1797-1800, and 1803; JB/2077, Increase of prices at the binding, 1804.
37. The undertakers' price for 1812 was 14/2d, consisting of 13/3d, for working charges, 6½d, for waggonways and wagons, and 4d, allowed the undertakers (NEIMME, safe, vol. 34(ii) 31 March 1813).
38. C.g. Taylor, 'Sub-contract System', op.cit., who suggests that the sub-contract system gave stability in costs.
39. D/Lo/B 33, op.cit.
40. NEIMME, safe, vol. 34(ii) op.cit., 8 July, 16 September, 23 December 1812.
41. Ibid., 16 March, 28 April 1813. On Scopeaux, see L. Cooper, Radical Jack (London, 1959) 44-45.
42. For example, NEIMME, safe, vol. 34(ii) op.cit., passim. Buddie (28 April 1813) refers to Board Minutes which (apart from one paper dated 28 April 1813, NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. I, item 34) have not been found.
44. NCB/JB/2079 (Lambton VB) 1814-19 (continues NEIMME, safe, vols. 34(i)(ii)).
45. D/Lo/C 142, 5 January 1823.
46. Ibid., - June 1827; 4 January, 20 June, 15, 19, 27 September, 5 October 1828.
47. Ibid., 2 July 1828, 19 April 1829.
49. D/Lo/C 142, 23 September 1832.
50. Ibid., 13 June 1825.
51. NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. 7(PB) 5 August 1837.
52. D/Lo/C 142, 2 November 1825, 25 July 1830, 7 July 1833; NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. 7(PB) 29 September 1837.
54. D/Lo/C 500(1) Buddie to Londonderry, 18 January 1837.
55. D/Lo/C 142, 20, 24 April 1824.
56. NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. 2(h) no. 30, Buddie to McDonnell [copy] 1 June 1841.
57. D/Lo/C 142, 1 and 25 June 1825.
60. NCB/JB/1060-1074, J. & W. Peile to Buddie, 1823-32; NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. 8(PB) 3 April 1838.
61. NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. 7(PB) 2 October 1837.
62. NCB/JB/1075-77, W. Peile to Buddie, 6, 11 December 1837.
63. NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. 7, op.cit., 4 October 1837.
64. Duckham, Scottish Coal Industry I, 145.
65. NCB/JB/200-217, Elgin to Buddie, 1814-33; NEIMME, shelf 45, vol. 3(Elgin Papers 1807-42) includes many letters from Elgin to Buddie; NCB/JB/541-543, Grafton to Buddie, 10, 12 May 1815, 12 May 1823.
66. NCB/JB/208, Elgin to Buddie, 24 January 1823, C.f. Duckham, Scottish Coal Industry, 159; the 7th Earl of Elgin's activities as a soldier, ambassador and collector "must have left him little time to devote to mineral matters, at least until pursued by financial trouble."
67. NCB/JB/672, 673, 674, 677, J. Henderson to Buddie, 1, 30 May, 28 October 1823, 4 March 1824.
68. NCB/JB/679, 682, J. Henderson to Buddie, 21 June 1825, 17 February 1826; D/Lo/C 142, 29 March 1829, 25 February 1830, 6 June 1835.
69. NEIMME, shelf, 47a, vol. 23(LB) no. 32, Buddie to Hon. James Bruce [copy] 26 June 1846.
References : Chapter VII 319


72. NCBl/JB/1/op.cit.,1817; Galloway,Annals I,503.

73. NEIMME,shelf 47a,vol.12(PB no.13)15 March,16-17 May 1841; vol.16 (Robert Atkinson's PB)17 February,8 March 1841,The Talacre Coal and Iron Co.was one of a number of collieries on the Dee estuary which faded out in the mid-19th century with geological and water problems.

74. NEIMME,shelf 47a,vol.14(PB no.15)20-21 October 1842; NCBl/JB/412-6, T.Donkin to Buddle,22 August-10 December 1842.

75. D/LO/C 142,18 October 1832; NCBl/JB/1,op.cit.,1832.

76. NEIMME,shelf 47a,vol.1(PB)1834 (account); vol.12(PB no.13)27 Feb. 16-17 May 1840;vol.13(PB no.14)26-28 October 1841, M.Bisas(ed.) Iron in the Making,Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860(Glamorgan Record Office,1960), Ward,'Landowners and Mining',op.cit.,67-8, mentions controversy between Bute and Guest in 1820s-1840s,as an example of complicated lease negotiations.

77. NCBl/JB/1648-9,J.K.Winterbottom to Buddle,3 January,3 June 1827; NEIMME,shelf 47a,vol.14(PB no.15)17,18 October 1841.

78. D/LO/C 142,10 August 1826.

79. NCBl/JB/986,A.Milne to Buddle,10 March 1832.


82. D/LO/C 500(4)Buddle to Londonderry,7 April 1837.


84. NEIMME, safe,vol.39,p.l,Report on Sydney Colliery in the Island of Cape Breton,1 July 1834. The coal-field had been opened up for the Association in the past seven years by Richard Smith,later mine agent in Staffordshire to the trustees of the first Earl Dudley: Mather,After the Canal Duke,98.


86. R.Young,Timothy Hackworth and the Locomotive(London,1923)289, 399-403:according to a paper by H.S.Pool,n.d.(appendix M)the 'Samson'was in use until 1884 and the boiler of the 'John Buddle' was still in use for a stationary engine.


88. See p.7.

89. See ch.XI.

90. NEIMME,shelf 47a,vol.7(PB)15 October,16 November 1837; vol.12 (PB no.13)19 August,18 September 1841.


93. NEIMME,shelf 47a,vol.6(PB)6 Mar,1837.

94. NEIMME,shelf 47a,vol.22(LB)nos.8,12,Buddle to Lord Talbot copies 14,19 Sept 1839; vol.13(PB no.14)1 Oct,1841; NCBl/JB/781,Lord Ingestre to Buddle,27 Dec,1839; JB/1402,Lord Talbot to Buddle,28 Jan,1840.

95. NCBl/JB/633,Hardinge to Buddle,11 May 1825; D/Lo/6142,18 Sep,1830.


97. NCBl/JB/2556,Minutes of Evidence,op.cit.,p.5,6 June,1836.

98. F.B.Hinsley,The Development of Mechanical Ventilation in Collieries in the 19th Century,University of Nottingham Mining Department (cont'd)
References : Chapter VII/VIII  

100. Galloway, Annals I, 422 et seq. (Davy Lamp), 422-5 (Curr's inventions) 482-4 (Hall's tub and slide); NCB/ JB/ 345-67, Curr to Buddle, 1800-3; NEIMME, safe, vol. 15 (LB), no. 6-9, 154-6, Buddle to Curr, 1802; NCB/ JB/ 1753, J. B. Foord to Buddle, 15 Oct. 1839.
101. Record of First Series of British Coal Dust Experiments, 1908 (Colliery Guardian Co. Ltd., 1910) preface.
102. W. Scott, 'An Earnest Address and Urgent Appeal', op. cit.
104. Raistrick, 'Development of the Tyne Coal Basin'. "Few fields have given such a rigorous testing to the engineer "but produced" a peculiarly high standard of mining practice."
105. Ward, 'Landowners and Mining', op. cit., rightly points out that consultants such as Buddle were often amazingly knowledgeable.
106. Jevons, Coal Trade, 63-4.

Chapter VIII : Londonderry Agent: The Situation in 1819

3. D/LO/F 1051, loc. cit.
7. D/LO/L 16 (23), op. cit.
10. D/LO/L 16 (162), T. v. O.; brief of an affidavit by Mowbray, 7 Jan. 1819.
11. Dunn, Viewers, appendix p. 3.
14. D/LO/L 16 (352), T. v. O.; copy State of Facts and Proposition of Mowbray as to his allowance, n.d. Mowbray variously claimed £1,000 or £2,000 pa. for 1813-15.
15. D/LO/L 16 (38), T. v. O.; draft affidavit of Mowbray, n.d.
16. D/LO/L 15 (27), T. v. O.; copy Order for Reference to the Master, 23 Nov. 1815 referring to Order, 1 Aug. 1815.
18. D/LO/L 15 (13), op. cit.
19. NEIMME, safe, vol. 6, p. 186, Request by Mowbray to Buddle to view at Rainton, 4 Feb. 1817; D/LO/L 15 (13), op. cit.
20. NCB/ JB/ 1 (DB) April 1818.
23. D/LO/C 117, Groom to Stewart, 9 Apr. 1819
24. D/LO/L 15 (7), Whitton to Stewart, 6 Apr. 1819.
25. D/LO/L 15 (13), op. cit.
References: Chapter VIII/IX 328

26. D/Lo/L 15(4) Whitton to Stewart, 16 Apr. 1819; D/Lo/E 16, same, 26 June 1819.
27. D/Lo/B 47, op. cit.; D/Lo/C 318(241) Vizard to Groom, 30 Apr. 1819; D/Lo/L 11, Statement by Iveson and Buddie, 31 May 1819.
28. D/Lo/C 11, 12, 18 December 1822.
29. D/Lo/L 15(15) Buddie to Whitton, 13 Apr. 1819.
30. NME, shelf 45, vol. 1, no. 44, op. cit.; D/Lo/C 267(1), (2) Stewart to Nowbray and Stewart to Buddie [copies] 9 June 1819.
31. Ibid., (3) Stewart to Buddie [copy] 10 June 1819.
32. On Nowbray and Wood, see p. 102.

Chapter IX: The Londonderry Hierarchy

1. D/Lo/C 150, Buddie to Iveson, 3 June-July 1819.
3. D/Lo/L 150, Buddie to Iveson, 6, 21 Aug., 20 Nov. 1819.
4. D/Lo/C 332, Stewart to Iveson, 3 Feb. 1820.
5. See p. 144.
6. Lambton Archives, Croudace to Lambton, 9 May 1822; See pp. 142 et seq.
7. D/Lo/D 346(58) Londonderry to Sir Cuthbert Sharp, 26 Nov. 1826; D/Lo/C 142, 28 Jan. 1839.
8. D/Lo/C 267(4) Stewart to Wood [copy] 10 June 1819; D/Lo/C 150, Buddie to Iveson, 31 July 1819; D/Lo/C 142, 15 Nov. 1824, 4 July 1829.
9. D/Lo/L 150, Buddie to Iveson, 31 July 6, 8, 13 Aug. 1819.
10. D/Lo/C 142, 16 Aug. 1827; D/Lo/F 1154(1) News cuttings, Lord Seaham's Coming of Age, 1842.
12. D/Lo/C 319(3), (8), Stewart to Groom, 7 Jan. 1820, 9 Feb. 1821; D/Lo/C 147, Groom to Stewart, 26 Dec. 1820, 5 Jan. 1821; D/Lo/C 317(2), Groom to Gregson, 23 Nov. 1820.
13. For example, D/Lo/C 333, Buddie to Iveson, 3, 21 February 1821.
14. D/Lo/C 142, 6 June 1828.
15. Ibid., 28 Sep. 1829.
16. Ibid., 27 June 1832.
18. Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business (Durham 1975) 102. On managerial salaries in general, see Pollard, op. cit., 143; many top managers were receiving £1,000 or more in the early 19th century.
19. D/Lo/C 267(2) Stewart to Buddie [copy] 9 June 1819; D/Lo/C 142, 18 Nov. 1826. Payment: by percentage had been common among late-18th-century land agents; Thompson, English Landed Society, 153. Nowbray attempted to claim 2½% on profits (D/Lo/L 16(152) loc. cit.).
20. D/Lo/B 306(6) Salaries and allowances paid to agents, 1839; D/Lo/C 148(151) Hindhaugh to Londonderry, 4 Dec. 1843.
22. Ibid., 18 Oct. 1828; D/Lo/B 306(6) loc. cit.
23. D/Lo/C 142, 16 Nov. 1825.
24. Ibid., 3 Dec. 1832.
25. Ibid., 6 Nov. 1832.
30. Ibid., and (151) 4 Dec. 1843.
31. D/Lo/C 142, 28 July 1826; NME, shelf 47a, vol. 15 (PB no. 16) 21 Sep. 1843; "The fitting office to be removed from Rutherford's-most likely because Rutherford has demanded payment of his bill for groceries furnished to the Hall."
References: Chapter IX

32. D/Lo/C 142, 19 Nov. 1824, 12 Feb. 1825, and passim.
33. Ibid., 12, 28 Jan. 1824.
34. D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 17 Dec. 1825.
36. D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 30 Jan. 1819.
38. D/Lo/C 142, Buddle to Iveson, 5 Apr. 1820.
39. D/Lo/C 142, 8 July 1824; Greenwell, Colliery Guardian, 1900, op. cit.
41. D/Lo/C 142, 27 Dec. 1825.
42. Ibid., 6 Mar., 4, 19 Apr. 1830.
43. D/Lo/C 730 (1) Londonderry to Gregson, 25 July 1837.
44. D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 10 Feb. 1820; D/Lo/C 142, 11 Feb. 1820.
45. NCBI/JB 1245, 1246, Russell to Buddle, 6, 8 Mar. 1801.
46. D/Lo/C 500 (4), Buddle to Londonderry, 7 Apr. 1837.
47. D/Lo/C 142, 28 Sept. 1821; NCBI/JB 629, Hardinge to Buddle, 10 Apr. 1823.
48. This evidence supports Nossiter, Opinion and Political Idioms, 31:
49. "there is no doubt that Londonderry's agents frequently engaged in
bribery."
50. D/Lo/C 142, 11 March 1823.
51. Ibid., 7 Jan. 1835; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 1 (PB) 6, 7 Jan. 1835. On
respect for the allegiance of other's tenants, see T. J. Nossiter,
52. D/Lo/C 142, 13, 20, 26 June 1830.
53. Ibid., 7 July 1831; 24, 25 Dec. 1832.
54. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 1 (PB) 6, 7 Jan. 1835.
55. "the Wynyard Edict” of 1837’ Durham County Local History Soc. Bulletin 21
(April 1978) 2-8, points out that Liddell had been complaining of
Gregson’s attitude since early June.
56. D/Lo/C 142, 2, 8 July 1830.
57. The remainder of this paragraph is all based on D/Lo/C 142, Buddle
to Lady Londonderry, 25 Dec. 1832.
58. D/Lo/C 142, Buddle to Lady Londonderry, 4 Jan. 1835.
59. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 7 (PB) 6, 7 Jan. 1835.
60. NCBI/JB 1557, Londonderry to Buddle, 17 July 1837.
61. D/Lo/C 504 (7), Gregson to Londonderry, 30 July 1837. A. J. Heesom, 'The
‘Wynyard Edict’ of 1837' Durham County Local History Soc. Bulletin 21
(April 1978) 2-8, points out that Liddell had been complaining of
Gregson’s attitude since early June.
62. D/Lo/C 730 (1) Londonderry to Gregson, 25 July 1837.
63. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 7 (PB) 25 July 1837. A week earlier Lord and Lady
Londonderry had issued a letter to their agents, employees and
tenants, in similar terms; Heesom, 'The 'Wynyard Edict' of 1837', op. cit.
64. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 7 (PB) 26, 27 July 1837.
65. D/Lo/C 142, 27 March 1843; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 14 (PB no. 15) 27 March 1843.
66. D/Lo/C 142, 27 March 1843; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 14 (PB no. 15) 27 March 1843.
67. D/Lo/C 142, 27 March 1843; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 14 (PB no. 15) 27 March 1843.
68. Thompson, Landed Society, 154.
69. NCBI/JB 57, R. Atkinson to Buddle, 27 April 1825.
70. D/Lo/C 142, 27 March 1843; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 14 (PB no. 15) 27 March 1843.
71. D/Lo/C 142, 27 March 1843; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 14 (PB no. 15) 27 March 1843.
72. Ibid., 3 March 1824; D/Lo/C 151 (42) McDonnell to Londonderry, 27 March 1824.
73. D/Lo/C 142, 31 October 1824.
74. See p. 255; D/Lo/C 151 (153) McDonnell to Londonderry, 10 August 1824.
References: Chapter IX 323

75. D/Lo/C 142, 5 Mar. 1843.
76. D/Lo/C 149(193), Hunter to Londonderry, 15 Nov. 1843; D/Lo/C 506(1), Hindhaugh to Londonderry, 24 Nov. 1843.
77. D/Lo/C 148(151(153)), Hindhaugh to Londonderry, 4, 27 Dec. 1843.

Cf. Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, 102, who considers of Buddle, Hindhaugh, Hunter and others that "their efforts were amply rewarded."

78. D/Lo/C 326(2), Londonderry to Hindhaugh, 5 Jan. 1844.
79. D/Lo/C 148(151), loc. cit.

80. See p. 17.
81. D/Lo/C 148(152), Hindhaugh to Londonderry, 11 Dec. 1843; D/Lo/C 149(197), Hunter to Londonderry, 21 Dec. 1843; Hindhaugh attended general meetings, Hunter continued on the Wear committee, Hindhaugh's background was that of a fitter, not a viewer as suggested by Newton (ed.). Londonderry Papers, op. cit. 109.

82. D/Lo/C 142, 2 Nov. 1830.
83. Ibid., 3 Nov. 1822.
84. Ibid., 6 Jan. 1823, 26 May, 1825, 19 May, 8 July, 1826; NCB/IB/193, Browne to Buddle, 3 Apr. 1842.
85. D/Lo/C 151(36), McDonnell to Londonderry, 25 Feb. 1834.
86. See p. 141-2, note 22.
89. Ibid., 18 Jan. 1828, 24 Sept. 1843.
90. Ibid., 8 Oct. 1829, 4 Feb. 1829.
91. D/Lo/B 303, Londonderry to Buddle, 7 Oct. 1829.
92. D/Lo/C 142, 22 May, 19 June, 26 Nov. 1825; 16 Nov. 1828; D/Lo/P 1154(1), Newscottings on the Opening of Seaham Harbour and the Duke of Wellington's visit to Penshaw.
93. D/Lo/C 142, 29 June, 3 July 1831.
94. ERA/D/X 366(143), Londonderry to Sharp, 19 Aug. 1831; D/Lo/C 142 - Oct. 1831.
95. D/Lo/C 142, 13 Jan., 17 Mar., 17 June, 1833.
96. Ibid., 10 Mar. 1834.
97. See pp. 50, 64.
98. D/Lo/C 142, Buddle to Londonderry, 10 Mar. 1834.

Chapter X: Strategy and Tactics at the Londonderry Collieries

1. D/Lo/C 142, 18 Dec. 1822.
2. D/Lo/B 36, Mowbray to Taylor, 2 Jan. 1815.
3. D/Lo/B 37, Estimate by Steel and Wood, 1815. This figure applied to Rafton; savings were smaller on the Penshaw coals.
6. D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iverson, 12 Nov. 1819; D/Lo/L 15(13), Observations, op. cit.; D/Lo/C 142, 28 Jan. 1820.
8. D/Lo/C 142, 15 April, 1820.
10. Ibid., 2 March, 26 Oct. 1823.
11. Ibid., 28 Aug., 2 Dec. 1833, 14 June, 1834; On Lambton's fittage experi-

(cont'd)
11. -ment, 15 Oct. 1825; D/Lo/C 148(151)mining to Londonderry, 4 Dec. 1825.


15. D/Lo/C 142, 25 Jne. 1824.


17. For drops, see "Staiths" in C. Greenwell, A Glossary of Terms used in the Coal Trade of Northumberland and Durham (London, 1888) 80-81. It is apparent from the plan, D/Lo/B 309(5) that there were already spouts at Penshaw.


20. D/Lo/C 142, 22 Feb., 11, 12 Apr., 1822. Buddle had developed an idea for a "floating engine" to transfer the tubs but found that Chapman had already invented one; D/Lo/C 142, 18 Feb. 1821.


22. D/Lo/C 142, 27 Aug. 1822.

23. D/Lo/B 309(4) Answers to queries by Lady Londonderry, 2 Nov. 1824.


25. D/Lo/B 309(3) loc. cit.; Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, 36; "the working of pillars at Rainton was to be discontinued". This is clearly incorrect, with the special exception of the Resolution pit (see p. 128). On pillar working, see Galloway, Annals I, 45-6.


27. D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 19 Feb. 1820.

28. See p. 18.

29. D/Lo/B 47, loc. cit.; D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson 1819. It is not clear from this letter that Buddle actually introduced Wallsends, but a Memorial of the Coal Fitters against the Changes Introduced by Lord Stewart, 13 Dec. 1819, D/Lo/B 309(6), specifically mentions their "introduction." Cf. Sturgess, op. cit., 56, note 1.

30. D/Lo/B 309(3) loc. cit.; NEIMME, shelf 45, vol. I, no. 44, loc. cit.; D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 21 Oct. 1819. Buddle's attitude to the system of supplying lamp oil suggests that he may have influenced Londonderry's resistance to truck; see Heesom, 'Entrepreneurial Paternalism', op. cit., 251.

31. D/Lo/L 11, Valuation of Stock on 3rd April, 31 May 1819.

32. D/Lo/C 318(241) Vizard to W. Groom, 30 Apr. 1819.

33. D/Lo/B 309(17) Valuation of Stock 1819-20; D/Lo/B 308(1-4) Profit and Loss Accounts, 1820-23. Shillings and pence have been omitted from the figures, for clarity. Percentage calculations are mine.

34. D/Lo/B 303, Expenditure at Rainton since 1820, 30 Jne. 1829; D/Lo/B 241, Buddle to R. Groom, 6 Aug. 1834.

35. Dunn, Viewers, p. 43; D/Lo/B 308(5) Londonderry to Buddle, 5 Dec. 1824.

36. D/Lo/L 13(13) T.V.O.: order for a manager of the collieries, 18 Aug., 1813; D/Lo/L 16(162) T.V.O., affidavit of A. Mowbray, 7 Jan., 1819; D/Lo/B 51, Vend and Prices, 1799-1819; D/Lo/B 41, Extract from Profit and Loss Accounts ending 1 August 1818.

37. D/Lo/C 267(1) Stewart to Mowbray [copy]; 9 Jne., 1819; D/Lo/C 318(241) loc. cit.

38. D/Lo/B 308(1-4) loc. cit.; D/Lo/B 303, Hunter to Buddle 22 Sep. 1829.

39. D/Lo/E 21, Trust General Account, 1834-41.

40. D/Lo/C 142, 10 Jne. 1832.

41. Thompson, English Landed Society, 151 et seq.; Maguire, Downshire Estates 183-216; Spring, English Landed Estate 98-102.
42. D/Lo/C 142,7 May 1842.
44. Spring, 'Earls of Durham', citing Report of Select Committee on Church Leases, PP. 1838 (ix).
45. D/Lo/B 310(10) op. cit.; D/Lo/C 310(241) op. cit.
46. NEIMME, safe, vol. 5, op. cit., pp. 54, 56; D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 24 July 1829.
47. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 9 (PB) 22 Sept. 1838.
48. D/Lo/C 142, 22 Jan. 1820. For "the baronets' coal", see p. 130.
49. D/Lo/C 332, Stewart to Iveson, 3 Feb. 1820; D/Lo/B 302, Reflections on the Dean and Chapter's demand... by Buddle, 16 Sept. 1819.
50. Ibid., 11 Aug. 1829; D/Lo/B 329, Londonderry to the Dean and Chapter copies 11, 25 July 1829.
51. D/Lo/B 303, Memoranda on renewal of Rainton Colliery Lease, 18 July 1831.
52. Ibid., 19 Aug. 1825.
53. D/Lo/C 150, 332, Stewart to Iveson, 26 Nov. 1819, 3 Feb. 1820.
54. Ibid., 123, 127.
55. D/Lo/C 142, 28 Mar. 1820, and passim.; D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 27 April 1820; D/Lo/D 893, Lease (for 21 years from 20 July) 26 Dec. 1820.
56. D/Lo/B 242(2) Memoranda re. renewals, n.d. post 1832; D/Lo/B 310(10) op. cit.
57. D/Lo/C 142, 24 May 1824; D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 27 April 1820.
58. D/Lo/B 310(30) op. cit.
59. D/Lo/B 303, Londonderry to Buddle, 11 July 1829, and Rainton Colliery memoranda, July 1829; D/Lo/B 329, Londonderry to the Dean and Chapter copies 11, 25 July 1829.
60. D/Lo/C 142, 15 Sept. 1830; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 9 (PB) 22 Sept. 1838.
61. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 24 (LB) no. 53, Buddle to Gregson (copy) 1 Aug. 1841; nos. 34, 36, Buddle to McDonnell (copies) 11 Aug., 2 Sept. 1841. Buddle's pointed reference to mismanagement was in allusion to Londonderry's accusations of mismanagement by his agents, which had caused the present rift between Buddle and Londonderry.
62. D/Lo/C 142, 22, 25 July 1830, 23 Jan. 1832. The negotiations were concluded during Buddle's absence through illness. D/Lo/C 310(10) op. cit.
63. D/Lo/C 142, 15 Sept. 1830; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 9 (PB) 22 Sept. 1838.
64. D/Lo/C 142, 26 Dec. 1833.
65. D/Lo/C 142, 7 Feb., 7 April 1821; D/Lo/D 769, Valuation of part of S. Biddick, 10 Aug. 1822.
References: Chapter X

79. D/Lo/C 142, 7, 18, 29 Apr, 1821; D/Lo/C 333, Buddle to Iveson, 8, 18 Apr, 1821.
80. D/Lo/C 142, 26 May, 1821; D/Lo/E 545(3) Agreement for sale, 4 May 1822; D/Lo/E 545(4) Mr. Stephenson's terms for S. Biddick, 22 July 1828; D/Lo/D 771, Sale agreement, 15 Feb, 1838.
81. D/Lo/B 47, Mowbray to Stewart, 30 Apr, 1819.
82. D/Lo/C 142, 16 Oct, 1821; Buddle had found among his father's papers a proposal from Sir Henry for leasing the coal; 5 Dec, 1821.
83. Ibid., 3, 11 Jan, 1822. In fact, the group who later in the year waited to take N. Pittington (see p. 137) also "plagued" Lambton over this estate (Beckwith's) at Herrington; Ibid., 30 Aug, 1822.
84. Ibid., 7 Dec, 1822 (referring to tentale rent).
85. Ibid., 8 Mar, 1822; D/Lo/E 545(3) apportionment of purchase money, 8 May 1823; D/Lo/D 771, op. cit.
86. D/Lo/C 142, 31 Dec, 1821; 7 Dec, 1822.
87. Ibid., 7 Oct, 1826; NEBME, shelf 47a, vol. 20(LB) no. 4, Buddle to Browne copy 10 Dec, 1826.
88. D/Lo/D 771, op. cit.
89. D/Lo/C 142, 22 Jan, 1820.
90. D/Lo/B 47, op. cit. (mentioning a report of 22 Apr, 1816).
91. D/Lo/C 142, 22 Jan, 1820.
92. Ibid., 11 Feb, 28 Mar, 1820; D/Lo/C 321(5) Buddle to Iveson, 1, 23 July, 1820.
93. D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 29 July, 1820.
94. D/Lo/B 309(13) Counsel's opinion on Lyon's Bill, 16 Aug, 1820; D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Iveson, 28 Oct, 1820.
95. Ibid., 10, 22, - December, 1820; D/Lo/C 333, same, 31 Mar, 1821.
96. D/Lo/C 333, same, 10 Feb, 5 Mar, 1821.
97. D/Lo/C 142, 12 Oct, 9, 23 Nov, 1822, 18 Jan, 1823.
98. Ibid., 13, 26, 30 Oct, 1823; D/X 346(16)(18), Londonderry to Sharp, 23 Oct, 18 Nov, 1823.
99. NCBI/JB/1892, Sharp to Londonderry, 1 Dec, 1823.
100. D/Lo/C 142, 4 Jan, 1824.
101. Ibid., 12 Oct, 2 Nov, 1823; D/Lo/X 346(16) loc. cit.
102. D/Lo/C 142, 5, 6 Nov, 1823; D/X 346(16) loc. cit.
103. D/Lo/C 142, 13 Jan, 5 Feb, 1824; D/X 346(17) Londonderry to Sharp, 3 Nov, 1823.
Croudace had recently told Buddle that he, too, had been offered a share in return for managing Hetton; see p. 17. Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, 25-6, wrongly states that Londonderry had secured "a minority interest" in the company; he was neither shareholder nor lessor.
104. D/Lo/C 142, Feb-Mar, 1824, passim, 9 June, 11 Dec, 1824; D/Lo/B 289, agreement, 15 Oct, 1826.
105. D/Lo/C 142, 17, 24, 29 Dec, 1824; 12, 13, 14 Feb, 4 Apr, 1825. Buddle said that the Hetton division and sale had almost prevented his attending to any other business for the past five months.
106. Ibid., 14 July, 1823.
107. Ibid., 22, 31 Jan, 1824.
108. Ibid., 11 Dec, 1824.
109. Ibid., 12, 19 June, 1824.
110. Ibid., 24, 25 June, 1825.
111. Ibid., 6 Apr, 15 June, 1825.
112. Ibid., 9 Oct, 1825.
113. Ibid., 8 Jan, 1833; 4 Dec, 1834.
114. NEBME, shelf 47a, vol. 4(PB) 15 May, 1836; vol. 5(PB) 21 May, 4 July, 16 Sept, 1836.
115. D/Lo/C 142, 18 Dec, 1822.
116. For a similar policy by another landowner, see R. A. C. Parker, Coke of Norfolk (Oxford, 1975) 93, on Thomas William Coke's purchases (1776-1816) which were determined "by the amount of land...that came up for sale...and not by causes directly affecting his own willingness or ability to buy."
117. D/Lo/C 142, 26 Oct, 1823.
118. Ibid., 1 Oct. 1825.
119. Ibid., 17 Apr. 1831.
120. Buddle's evidence indicates that Croudace and Morton, too, had a considerable degree of initiative in their employer's territorial policy. Cf. Parker, Coke of Norfolk, 178, who, on the untimely sale of the Cokes' Lancashire and London estates, appears to underestimate the role of careful territorial strategy by agents. Sturgess, Aris tocrat in Business, 22, overstates Londonderry's own role ("the Marquis involved himself in management to the extent of seeking out collieries for purchase"); indeed, he was in Vienna when Buddle proposed several of the earlier purchases.

Chapter XI: Seaham Harbour

1. D/Lo/C 142, 13 Oct. 1826
2. The only published account of Seaham Harbour is Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, which does not inspire confidence.
4. Buddle advised Londonderry (D/Lo/C 142, 5 May 1832) that there was no need for him to oppose the projected North dock at Sunderland as it would increase charges at Sunderland and so favour Seaham.
5. D/Lo/E 344 et seq., papers re. commercial enterprises, 1852-99.
6. D/Lo/C 142, 7, 13 Nov. 1826.
7. Ibid., to Lady Londonderry, 16 Nov. 1828.
8. NCBJ/1528, Londonderry to Buddle, 10 Oct. 1828; D/Lo/C 142, 15 Oct. 1828.
9. D/Lo/C 142, 16 Nov. 1821.
10. D/Lo/E 575(1) Sale agreement, 19 Nov. 1821; D/Lo/C 318(22,23) Londonderry to Groom, 22, 24 Nov. 1821.
12. D/Lo/C 142, 23 July, 1823.
13. Ibid., 18 Sept. 1828.
15. DRO/D/X 346(58) Londonderry to Sharp, 26 Nov. 1826; J. Sykes, Local Records or Historical Register (Newcastle, 1865-66) 232.
17. D/Lo/C 142, 18 Sept. 1828.
18. NCBJ/1503, Morton to Buddle, 18 Mar. 1832
19. D/Lo/C 142, 2 Jne. 1833.
22. See p. 177; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 10(FB) 8 Nov. 1838.
24. D/Lo/C 142, 24 May 1828.
25. D/Lo/C 142, 562, op. cit.
26. D/Lo/C 142, 7 Dec. 1822
27. Ibid., 21 Feb. 1827, 10 Dec. 1829.
29. D/Lo/E 596(4) Answers to queries by Lady Londonderry, 2 Nov. 1828
31. Ibid., 16 Nov. 1821.
32. Ibid., 3 Feb., 1 Apr. 1822.
33. Ibid., 18 Jan. 1823.
35. D/Lo/C 142, 5 Dec. 1821; D/Lo/E 593(1) op. cit.
36. D/Lo/C 142,3,12 Feb.; Memorandum of conversation, and Chapman's comments, 11,18 Feb, 1822. The completion of the outer piers was estimated at an additional £6,000.

37. Ibid., 10 Apr, 1822.

38. Ibid., 2 Feb., 11 Mar., 4 Jan, 1923.


40. D/Lo/F 106,5, Buddle to Londonderry, 7 Sept, 1823.

41. Ibid., 18, 26 Sept., 19, 23 Oct, 1823.

42. Ibid., 12, 13, 16 Nov, 1823.

43. Ibid., 26 Jul., 7 Aug., 9 Aug., 1822; D/Lo/E 594(H) Buddle to Telford [copy] 23 Jan, 1833; Telford to Buddle, 18 Jan, 1833.

44. D/Lo/F 1045, Buddle to Londonderry, 7 Sept, 1823.

45. Ibid., 18, 26 Sept., 19, 23 Oct, 1823.

46. Ibid., 18, 26 Oct, 1823.

47. NCBl/jB/l524, Londonderry to Buddle, 10 Nov, 1828; D/Lo/C 142, 12 Feb., 1823. Chapman had already designed several docks and harbours; Skempton, 'William Chapman' op.cit., 51, 60, 70.

48. Ibid., 10 Oct, 1828; D/Lo/C 142, 12 Feb., 1823. At this time Buddle referred to the proposed town as "Stewart's Town."

49. Ibid., 8 Dec, 1821, reporting conversation with George Baker of Elemore. I am grateful to A.J. Heesom for pointing out that Baker annotated his copy of the Seaham sale particulars, suggesting that he may have been interested in purchasing the estate; University of Durham, Dept. of Palaeography, Baker Baker MSS., 20/94.

50. NCBl/jB/l527, Londonderry to Buddle, 6 Oct, 1828.

51. Ibid., 24 Oct, 7 Nov, 1828.

52. Ibid., 24 Oct, 7 Nov, 1828.

53. Ibid., 24 Oct, 7 Nov, 1828.

54. Ibid., 24 Oct, 7 Nov, 1828.

55. Ibid., 24 Oct, 7 Nov, 1828.

56. Ibid., 24 Oct, 7 Nov, 1828.

57. NCBl/jB/l540, Londonderry to Buddle, 11 Nov, 1828.

58. NCBl/jB/l541, 1547, Londonderry to Buddle, 7, 20 Dec, 1828; D/Lo/C 142, 7, 20, 21, 28 December, 1828.


60. Ibid., 15 Oct, 1828.

61. D/Lo/C 151(132) McDonnel to Londonderry, 18 Jan, 1841.

62. D/Lo/C 142, 12 Feb., 28 Mar., 26 Apr, 1823. At this time Buddle referred to the proposed town as "Stewart's Town."

63. Ibid., 6, 7, 1823.

64. Ibid., 10 Nov, 1828.

65. Ibid., 30 Aug, 1823, 2 Oct, 1828.


68. NCBl/jB/l527, 1530, 1532, Londonderry to Buddle, 6, 15, 24, Oct, 1828; D/Lo/C 142, 11, 19 Oct, 1828.

69. D/Lo/C 142, 13 Oct, 1828.


72. D/Lo/C 142, 27, 28 Sept, 1828.

73. Ibid., 27, 28 Sept, 1828.

74. D/Lo/C 142, Memorandum etc., loc. cit., 12,16,26 Oct, 1823; 25 Nov., 8 Dec, 1821.

75. Ibid., 10 Apr., 4 Aug, 1822.

76. Ibid., 29 Aug., 3 Nov, 1822.

77. Ibid., Memorandum etc., loc. cit., 12,16,26 Oct, 1823; 2 Feb, 1823.

78. Ibid., 18 Dec, 1822; 6 Jan., 28 Mar, 1823.
References: Chapter XI

79. Ibid., 23 May 1823.
80. Ibid., Jly., 1823, passim.
81. Ibid., 27 Jly., 1823.
84. D/LC/C 142, 29 Jne., 1831.
86. D/Lo/C 142, 9 Jne., 1824.
87. D/LO/C 142, 5 Oct., 1826.
88. D/Lo/C 142, 19 Jne., 1827.
89. Ibid., 13 Oct., 1826; D/LO/E 595(11) Outline of agreement for
lease of Seaham Harbour and Railway, 28 Oct., 1827.
91. D/Lo/C 142, 3 May 1827.
92. Ibid., 3 May 1827.
94. D/LC/E 593(14) loc. cit.
96. D/LC/C 142, 10, 15 Sept., 1828.
97. Ibid., 15 Sept., 1828.
98. Ibid., 6 Feb., 1828.
100. NCBI/JB/1518, 1529, Londonderry to Buddle, 16 Sept., 14 Oct.; D/LC/C 142, 7 Nov., 1828.
102. See p. 162.
104. Ibid., 9, 10 Nov., 1828.
108. Ibid., 8, 9 Jly., 10 Dec., 1829.
109. Ibid., 9 Nov., 1828.
111. D/Lo/B 303, Londonderry to Buddle, 7 Oct., 1829.
112. D/LC/C 142, 19 Apr., 11, 24 Jne., 1830; 28 Apr., 29 Jne., 1831.
114. See p. 296.
115. D/LC/C 142, 13 Jly., 1831.
116. Ibid., 8 Jly., 1831.
117. Ibid., 1 Aug., 1831.
118. Ibid., 29 Dec., 1831.
119. Ibid., 22 Aug., 1832.
120. See p. 202, 222 et seq.
121. D/LC/C 142, 3 Feb., 1832.
122. Ibid., 21 Jne., 1832.
123. Ibid., 11 Sept., 1828.
128. Ibid.; Buddle to G. Lockwood, 19 Apr., 1833.
129. D/LC/142, 6 Aug., 1823 [re. Edward Backhouse, the Quaker banker.]
130. NCBI/JB/181, Browne to Buddle, 27 May, 1833.
131. D/LC/C 142, 8, 28 Jly., 1833.
132. D/Lo/E 604, Buddle's answers to queries, 28 Jan., 1836, Brickwood to Buddle, 7 Mar., 1836.
133. See p. 249.
134. D/Lo/E 605, D/Lo/B 327(5) Coals shipped, 1831-35 and 1835-7. Figures rounded up or down.
136. D/Lo/B 328(1,3,5,7), Buddle to Trinity House and Spence; Lee to Buddle, and memo., 6-29 Dec., 1836.
137. See p. 180.
138. D/Lo/E 328(7), Memorandum, 21 Dec., 1837.
139. D/Lo/C 151(91), McDonnell to Londonderry, 9 Feb., 1839.
140. D/Lo/C 327(1) McDonnell to Hindhaugh, 26 Dec., 1838; D/Lo/C 336(8), Buddle to McDonnell, 21 Nov., 1838; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 10(PB)4, Feb., 1839.
142. D/Lo/C 142, Londonderry to Buddle, 28 Jan., 1839.
143. D/Lo/C 336(4), Londonderry to McDonnell, 23 Jan., 1839; (6), Londonderry's opinion on Hindhaugh's report, 16 Feb., 1839.
144. D/Lo/C 142, 29 Jan., 1839.
145. D/Lo/C 336(6) loc. cit.
146. D/Lo/C 327(1) McDonnell to Hindhaugh, 26 Dec., 1838; D/Lo/C 151(89), McDonnell to Londonderry, 5 Feb., 1839.
147. D/Lo/C 327(8), Hindhaugh to McDonnell [copy], 5 Jan., 1839.
148. See p. 104.
149. D/Lo/C 142, Londonderry to Buddle, 28 Jan., 1839.
150. D/Lo/C 336(8) loc. cit.
151. D/Lo/C 336(4) loc. cit.; D/Lo/C 151(97), McDonnell to Londonderry, 24 Feb., 1839.
152. D/Lo/C 336(8) loc. cit.; D/Lo/C 151(90,92), McDonnell to Londonderry, 7, 11 Feb., 1839. McDonnell warned Londonderry to be careful how he spoke of Spence, and to clear his account immediately, as Spence was in a position to "do mischief to the interests of the Harbour." Londonderry had already recognised such a possibility - see p. 103.
153. D/Lo/C 257(6), Londonderry to Nicholson, n.d.
154. D/Lo/C 151(95), McDonnell to Londonderry, 16 Feb., 1839; D/Lo/B 306(6), List of agencies, Apr., 1839. The same tendency towards economy after Buddle's death was shown at the Harbour as at the collieries: Londonderry proposed a total expenditure of £690 on the Harbour agencies, and Hindhaugh thought two principal agents "totally unnecessary," and "should be got rid of," D/Lo/C 146(151), Hindhaugh to Londonderry, 4 Dec., 1839.
155. D/Lo/C 151(92,95), McDonnell to Londonderry, 11 Feb., 18 Jly, 1839.
156. Fordyce, Coal and Iron, 71.
158. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 23(LB)no. 5, Buddle to McDonnell, 2 Feb., 1840.
159. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 24(LB)no. 35, Buddle to Gregson, 27 Aug., 1841.
160. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 22(LB)no. 43, Buddle to McDonnell, 20 Nov., 1839; vol. 25(LB)nos. 1, 2, same, 26, 27 Sept., 1841.
162. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 25, nos. 26, 34, Buddle to Gregson, 13 Feb., 2 Jne., 1842.
163. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 12(PB no. 13)23 May, 1841.
164. The following information on the Seaham Harbour finances is taken from D/Lo/B 329(7) Buddle to McDonnell, 10 Jne., 1841; D/Lo/B 329(81), Outline of Harbour general account, 21 Mar., 1834 to 31 Dec., 1840; D/Lo/B 329(81), Expenditure on Seaham Harbour to 31 Dec., 1841.
165. After Buddle's death, Hindhaugh suggested that the general management of all the accounts and colliery concerns might be concentrated at Seaham (D/Lo/C 146(151) op. cit., and in fact the agent at Seaham eventually headed the Londonderry staff.)
166. In 1837, 80,000ch.p.a. were being shipped from Sunderland; in 1842, 78,873 ch. were shipped from Seaham (D/LoB 329(6)Project, 20 Dec. 1837; D/LoB 327(8)Coals shipped at Seaham, 1842).

167. Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, 219-20: *ex ante* calculations of cost and income of a new enterprise "represented the highest forms of accounting of which records have survived", but "the establishment of a reliable basis for total or overall calculations for the firm as a whole" remained an insurmountable difficulty at this period.

168. Such failings in accountancy were not unusual; fraud or error were particularly prevalent among the large concerns of the Industrial Revolution (though not amenable to cure by better accountancy alone): Pollard, *op.cit.*, 218, 229-32.

169. Pollard, *op.cit.*, 249, has reached similar conclusions on industry generally: "the success of a concern...would stand or fall with the 'quality' of its partners."

---

**Chapter XII : Buddle, Londonderry and the Coal Trade**


2. NRO, Coal Trade Minutes, (cited as CTM throughout this chapter) vol. 1, p. 260: Wear Vane in 1814.

3. Ibid.

4. D/Lo/C 142, 17 Jul. 1823


7. D/Lo/C 142, 8 Aug. 1833.


11. NRO, CTM, vol. I, p. 10; D/Lo/C 142, 5 Nov. 1833.

12. D/Lo/C 142, 3 June 1835.

13. Ibid., 25 Jan. 1829, 2 May 1824.


18. D/Lo/C 142, 20 June 1833.

19. Ibid., 27 Dec. 1830.

20. Ibid., 6 June 1835. Hindhaugh's opinion in 1844 of the unwieldy and unsatisfactory committee meetings (Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, 97) was thus not new.

21. D/Lo/C 142, 19 Nov. 1833.

22. Taylor, '3rd Marques of Londonderry' 27; 'Combination', 32. The Londonderry Papers had not been deposited in the Durham Record Office when these articles were written.


25. D/Lo/C 142, 3, 6 June 1835. See pp. 197-8

26. D/Lo/C 142, 5 June 1825, 5 Nov. 1833.

27. Ibid., 11 Feb. 1820, 9 May 1822.

28. D/Lo/L 16(141)Mowbray to Sir Henry Vane-Tempest, 3 May 1813.

29. D/Lo/C 142, 15 Feb. 1825.


31. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition, 62.

32. D/Lo/C 150(2)Buddle to Iveson, 4 Nov. 1820.
References: Chapter XII

33. D/Lo/C 142, 9 May, 3 June, 1822.
34. Ibid., 3 Nov., 1822.
35. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition, 60.
36. D/Lo/C 142, 23 April, 2, 4, 11, 29 May, 1826.
37. Ibid., 8 Jan., 1833.
38. Ibid., 18 June, 1 July, 1826.
39. Ibid., 9 Feb., 1829.
40. Ibid., 25 Feb., 1829.
41. Ibid., 3, 29 March, 1829.
42. Ibid., 1, 2, 3 April, 1829.
43. Ibid., 8, 25 June, 27 July, 25 September, 14 December, 1833.
44. Cf. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition, 79: "Once the prices in the north had been fixed...they were not changed for a full year."
45. D/Lo/C 142, 13 March, 1834, 25 September, 1833.
46. Ibid., 16 August, 4, 9 September, 1834.
47. Ibid., 18 May, 3, 11 June, 16 August, 11 September, 22 December, 1835.
48. NCB/NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 23(1B) no. 22, Buddle to McDonnell, 17 July, 1840.
49. D/Lo/C 142, 3 January, 1842.
50. Ibid., 6, 25, 28 June, 1842.
51. Ibid., 27 August, 1842.
52. Ibid., 24 June, 1825.
53. D/Lo/B 51, Minutes of Wear Coal-owners meeting, 28 June, 1819.
55. Ibid., 15 October, 1828, see p. 214.
56. Ibid., 2 March, 1843; D/Lo/C 326(1), Londonderry to Handhaugh, 18 January, 1844.
57. D/Lo/C 142, 16, 20 November, 1823, 7 January, 1825.
58. Ibid., 2 July, 1824, 6 April, 5, 9, 25 June, 2 Joly, 1825.
60. D/Lo/C 142, 8, 30 July, 1831, 10 May, 22 August, 8 September, 1832.
61. Ibid., 12 March, 1833.
62. Ibid., 9 September, 1833.
63. NCB/IB/186, Browne to Buddle, 29 October, 1833.
64. D/Lo/C 142, 11 March, 1829.
65. E.g., ibid., 17 June, 1825, 19 May, 1826.
66. Ibid., 26, 25 June, 1825.
67. For example, ibid., 16 November, 1823, 4 June, 1826.
68. Ibid., 15 October, 1828, 25 February, 1829, 29 November, 11 December, 1832.
69. Ibid., 4 February, 1829.
70. Ibid., 18 February, 5 March, 1829.
71. Ibid., 7 June, 1829.
72. Ibid., 29 October, 1830.
73. Ibid., 20 June, 1833 (quoting Londonderry to Buddle, 24 May, 1833).
74. Ibid., 2, 16 June, 1833.
75. Ibid., 25 July, 1833.
76. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition, 56–58. Sweezy accuses an earlier writer, H. Levy, Monopoly and Competition (1911) of passing off a description of the Tyne organisation as a description of the whole Regulation, and of neglecting the relationship between the Tyne and Wear; Sweezy, himself, however, has little to say about the Wear per se.
77. D/Lo/C 150, 333, Buddle to Iveson, 21 October, 1819, 28 October, 31 March, 1821.
78. D/Lo/C 142, 9 May, 5 June, 1822.
79. Ibid., 28 June, 1822.
80. Ibid., 15 July, 1823.
81. Ibid., 17 July, 1823.
82. Ibid., 15 February, 12 August, 1823.
83. Ibid., 19 October, 1823.
84. Ibid., 26 October, 2 November, 1823.
85. Ibid., 22, 31 January, 12, 24 February, 15 May, 1824.
References: Chapter XII

86. Ibid., 19, 24 Jne. 1825.
87. Ibid., 20 Jly. 1829.
88. Ibid., 13 Jne. 1827, 10 Jne. 1829.
89. D/Lo/C 142, Buddle to Londonderry, 5 Jan. 1834; NCBI/JB/140, 141, Branding to Buddle, 8 Dec. 1833. The reference to "Madam from Edinbro" is presumably to a mistress of Londonderry's.
90. D/Lo/C 142, 27 Jly. 1833.
91. Ibid., 16 Aug. 1835.
92. Ibid., 27 Aug., 11 Sept. 1835.
93. D/Lo/C 500 (3), Buddle to Londonderry, 24 Mar. 1837.
95. Ibid., 27 Dec. 1842.
96. Taylor, 'Combination', loc. cit., 33, rightly points out that Lord Durham and the Hetton Co. had misgivings about joining Londonderry in a partnership to work the Seaton coal, but this was because of his financial reputation, and does not imply that "the shadow of Londonderry lay over all hopes of closer understanding in the north-eastern coal trade."
98. See pp. 205-6.
99. D/Lo/C 142, 16, 17, 24, 29 Jne., 6 Jly. 1825.
100. Ibid., 10 Jne., 21, 25, 26 Dec., 1826, 9 Jan. 1827.
101. Ibid., 10 Apr. 1827 (referring to meeting on 8 Jan.).
102. Ibid., 17, 19 Apr. 1827.
103. Ibid., 4, 13 Jne., 10 Sept. 1827.
104. Ibid., 10 May, 2, 10, 14, 20 Jne. 1828.
105. Ibid., 27 Jne. 1828.
106. Ibid., 30 Aug., 1, 2 Sept. 1828.
107. Cf. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition, 89; Sweezy saw the situation as a dispute between the rivers.
111. NRO, CMT (Committee Meetings 1827-32) 5 Oct. 1829. The proportions were Tyne 826, Wear 533.
112. D/Lo/C 142, 1 Dec. 1832, 6 Jly. 1833.
113. D/Lo/C 142, 14 Jly. 1833.
114. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition, 58-9; Taylor, 'Combination', 32.
115. D/Lo/C 150, Buddle to Tveson, 24 Feb. 1820; D/Lo/C 142, 26 Mar., 15 Apr., 4, 30 May 1822.
116. D/Lo/C 142, 2 May 1822.
117. Ibid., 7, 28 May 1822.
118. Ibid., 9 May 1823.
119. Ibid., 13 Mar. 1823.
120. Ibid., 22 Jly. 1823.
121. Ibid., 30 Aug., 2, 21 Nov. 1823.
122. Ibid., 19, 26 Jne. 1824.
124. Taylor, 'Combination', 32.
125. D/Lo/C 142, 8, 15, 22 Apr. 1826.
126. Ibid., 12 Apr., 2, 3, 4, May 1826.
127. See p. 209.
128. NRO, CMT (Committee Meetings 1827-32) 23, 30 Aug., 2 Sept 1828; D/Lo/C 142, 2 Sept. 1828.
129. NRO, CTM (loc. cit.) 24 Jan. 1829; (General Meetings 1827-45) 3 Feb. 1829; D/Lo/C 142, 3 Feb. 1829.

130. NCB/JB/2451, Londonderry to Buddle [copy], 4 Feb. 1829; JB/2452, Minutes of the Wear Coal Owners meeting copy 6 Feb. 1829; D/Lo/C 142, 7 Feb. 1829. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition, 90, does not mention the events after 24 January 1829.


133. D/Lo/C 142, 3 Feb. 1827; Arthur' was Mowbray of the Hetton Company.

134. D/Lo/C 142, 12 Sept. 1828.

135. Ibid., 10, 17 June, 1825, 31 July, 1826.

136. Ibid., 23 Jan., 18 March, 1833.

137. Ibid., 17 June, 3 July, 1833.

138. Ibid., 18 May 1835.

139. Ibid., 6 Nov., 1842. Cf. Taylor, 'Combination' 32, who says the "general loyalty" of the inferior collieries to Regulation was never in question": "The greater their deficits the more tenaciously they clung to the principle of Regulation."


141. Lambton Archives, Croudace to Lambton, 29 May 1822, See p. 205.

142. D/Lo/C 142, Ravensworth to Londonderry, 12 Jan. 1829, with copy of letter from Wearcliff, 10 Jan. 1829.

143. D/Lo/C 142, Buddle to Londonderry, 24 June 1825.

144. Ibid., 25 December, 1826, 13 January 1833.

145. Ibid., 12, 22, 27 July, 9 August, 19 October, 2, 16 November 1823.

146. NCB/JB/2588, Waldie to Buddle, 11 October, 1823.

147. D/Lo/C 142, 21 November 1823.


149. E.g., D/Lo/C 142, 15 January, 12 August 1823, 20 July 1829.

150. See pp. 201, 209. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition, 85, describes 1827 as a "quiet" year.

151. D/Lo/C 142, 25 December 1826.

152. NCB/JB/836, Lamb to Buddle, 30 March 1827.

153. NCB/JB/2588, Lamb to Buddle, 10 April 1827.

154. D/Lo/C 142, Buddle to Browne, 21 April 1827, 11 January 1828.

155. D/Lo/C 142, 13 June 1827, 11, 17, 19 January 1828; Buddle to Browne, 11 January 1828.

156. D/Lo/C 142, 12, 20 June 1833.

157. Ibid., 8 August 1833.

158. Ibid., 8 July 1831.

159. D/Lo/C 149(45) Hunter to Londonderry, 17 December 1832.

160. D/Lo/C 142, 6 May 1832.

161. Ibid., 10, 24 June 1832.

162. Ibid., 8 September, 13 October, 18 November 1832.

163. D/Lo/C 149(45) Hunter to Londonderry, 17 December 1832.

164. D/Lo/C 142, 22 December 1832.

165. Ibid., 29 November, 1 December 1832.

166. Ibid., 1 December 1832.

167. Ibid., 29 November, 4, 7, 22 December 1832, 6 July 1833.

168. Ibid., 17 December 1832, 12, 13, 22 January 1833.

169. Ibid., 19 February, 26 May 1833.

170. Ibid., 20 June 1833.

171. Ibid., 9 September, 5 December 1833, 3 January 1834.

172. NRO, CTM (General Meetings 1827-45) pp. 29-33, 19 January, 16 June 1829; D/Lo/C 142, 13-14 June 1829.

173. E.g., D/Lo/C 142, 13, 14 July 1833.

174. D/Lo/C 148(154) Hindhaugh to Londonderry, 2 December 1843.

175. D/Lo/C 326(6)(7) Hindhaugh to Hindhaugh, 1 February 1844.
177. House of Commons Select Committee on the Dearness of Coal, 1873, PP 1873(313)X, 297.
178. D/Lo/C 142, 4 Dec. 1832.
179. Cf. Taylor, '3rd Marquess of Londonderry', 21–27; Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, 96–7: "He [Buddie] did not easily see that the circumstances which had previously made monopoly possible no longer existed."

Chapter XIII: "A Black Cloud that 'O'er Spreads Me"

2. D/Lo/C 142, 27 June, 1832. Such a situation was not unusual; cf. Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, op. cit., 230.
3. D/Lo/C 142, 21 Nov. 1823.
7. NEIMME, shelf 45, vol. 13 (Londoneriy Trust LB) Buddie to McDonnell copy 18 Dec. 1835; D/Lo/C 318 (107) Buddie to Groom, 27 Nov. 1834.
8. D/Lo/C 142, 14 Apr. 1841.
9. NCB1/JB/176, Browne to Buddie, 7 Nov. 1823; D/Lo/C 142, 6 June, 1828.
13. E.g., D/Lo/C 142, 3 Feb. 1822. The suggestion by Dr. R. Sturgess (Aristocrat in Business, p. 88) that Buddie's explanations of accounts show that Londonderry's knowledge of accountancy was meagre, and that Buddie's accounts misled him, is unfair to both men. Londonderry showed a mastery of detail from the start, and Buddie was being conscientious; it is normal practice by professional accountants to accompany accounts with fuller comments.
15. D/Lo/C 150, Buddie to Iveson, 3 Sept. 1819.
16. D/Lo/C 321, Buddie to Hawkes, 8 May 1823.
18. Ibid., Buddie to Browne, 7 June, 1827.
21. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 25 (LB) nos. 21, 28, Buddie to McDonnell, 14 Nov. 1841, 4 May 1842.
22. D/Lo/C 142, 28 July, 1833.
23. Ibid., 5 Aug. 1825.
24. Ibid., 29 June, 1831.
25. D/Lo/B 303, Londonderry to Buddie, 7 Oct. 1829; D/Lo/C 142, 8 Oct. 1829.
26. D/Lo/C 273 (LB) Buddie to Groom, 14 Mar. 2, 1830; D/Lo/C 142, 2 Apil. 1830.
27. D/Lo/C 142, 2 May 1824, 2 Sept. 1830, 8 Feb. 1832.
28. NGC/13/406, Donkin to Buddle, 15 Mar. 1832.
29. D/Lo/C 142, 20 Jan. 1833. See also p. 239 on Londonderry's financial reputation.
30. Londonderry encouraged Buddle to give frank opinion and advice: see p. 40118.
32. D/Lo/C 151(33) McDonnell to Londonderry, 24 Jan. 1834.
33. D/Lo/C 142, 19 Oct. 1829, 1 May 1830. Cf. Spring 'English Landowners' op. cit., 51, on the relatively small number of estates that derived half or more of their gross incomes from non-agricultural sources.
34. E.g. D/Lo/C 142, 11 Jan. 1825.
35. Ibid., 11 Aug. 1824.
36. Ibid., 3 Nov. 1822, 2 Mar. 1823.
37. Ibid., 1 Aug. 1829, 24 Jan. 1833.
38. D/Lo/C 142, 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
40. D/Lo/C 142, 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
41. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
42. D/Lo/C 142, 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
43. D/Lo/C 142, 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
44. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
45. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
46. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
47. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
48. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
49. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
50. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
51. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
52. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
53. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
54. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
55. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
56. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
57. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
58. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
59. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
60. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
61. Ibid., 26 May, 22 Jly. 1820, 23 Mar. 1821.
References: Chapter XIII

62. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vols 1, 2, (PB) 8 Jan., 19 Feb. 1835; D/Lo/C 500(4)
Buddle to Londonderry, 7 Apr. 1837; D/Lo/C 151(167) McDonnell to
Londonderry, 2 Sept. 1841.

64. D/Lo/C 142, 20 Feb. 1833; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 2 (PB) 2 Feb. 1835;
D/Lo/C 153(125) J.J. Wright to Londonderry, 9 Nov. 1843.

65. Cannadine, 'Aristocratic Indebtedness' xxv, 4, 638 et seq.: these
categories of spending were normal.

66. D/Lo/C 142, 28 Mar. 1823.

67. Ibid., 19 Oct. 1829.

68. Ibid., 10 Apr., 4 Aug. 1822.
69. Ibid., 18 Dec. 1822, 6 Jan. 1823.

70. Ibid., 27 Nov. 1825, 31 Mar., 19 Apr. 1830.

71. Ibid., 30 Jan., 1824, 7 Feb. 1833.


73. D/Lo/C 142.

74. Ibid., 26 Jne., 1 Jly., 29 Oct. 1830.

75. Ibid., 23 Jan. 1832.

76. Ibid., 26 Jne., 6, 15 Jly., 5, 11 Aug., 29 Oct. 1830; W.W. Bean, Parliamentary
Representation of the Six Northern Counties (Hull, 1890) 136-9.

77. Ibid., 29 Jne., 1831: D/Lo/C 272(15) Londonderry to Buddie, 27 Apr. 1831.

78. D/Lo/C 146(64) Gregson to Londonderry, 18 Nov. 1832.

79. D/Lo/C 87(11) Ravensworth to Londonderry, 14 Feb. 1834.

Buddie's attitude (e.g. 'puritanical attitude to private spending').


82. See chapter XI.

83. Sturgess, op. cit., 89, 102.

84. D/Lo/C 142, Buddie to Groom, 4 Jan. 1823.

improvements was the area of greatest contention."

86. See pp. 128-30; Select Committee on the Coal Trade, PP, 1829.

87. Sturgess, op. cit., 92.

88. D/Lo/C 142, 6 Jan. 1823, 10, 17, Jne., 26 Jne., 2 Sept. 1830, 8 Aug. 1832.

89. Ibid., 15 Mar., 2 Jly. 1824.

90. D/Lo/B 310(4) Plans for Liquidation of debts, 18 Nov. 1825.

91. D/Lo/C 142, 16 Sept. 1832, 15 Feb. 1833.


93. D/Lo/C 142, 14 Dec. 1833.

94. NCBI/187, Browne to Buddie, 29 Dec. 1833.

95. British Library, Add. Ms. 40403, f. 301-2, Londonderry to Peel, 27 Dec. 1833;
2nd Duke of Buckingham, Memoirs of the Courts and Cabinets of William
IV and Victoria (London, 1861) 11, 95; I am grateful to A.J. Heesom for
information on the Corregios. D/Lo/C 142, 7, 21 Jan. 1834; D/Lo/C 151

96. D/Lo/C 142, 8 Feb., 2, 9 Mar. 1834; D/Lo/E 51, Trust Deed, 21 Mar. 1834.
Sturgess, op. cit., 91-2, obscures the fact that this was a new trust,
rather than a mere intervention by the marriage trustees or "a
committee dominated by the trustees and principal creditors."

97. D/Lo/C 560(7), McDonnell to Lady Londonderry, 28 Mar. 1834; D/Lo/C 151(42)
to Londonderry, 27 Mar. 1834.

98. D/Lo/C 320, Minutes of resolutions... 10, 11, 12 Sept. 1834.

99. Ibid., 15 Sept. 1834.

100. D/Lo/C 318(107) McDonnell to R. Groom, 29 Nov. 1834; D/Lo/C 320(3)
R. Groom to Buddie [copy] 14 Oct. 1834; (20) Rastall to R. Groom, 6 Nov. 1834;
(4) Buddie to R. Groom [copy] 16 Oct. 1834. The comment on Lady Londonderry
is interesting in the light of her reputed role in the
family's business affairs: cf. Spring, English Landowners, 45. In 1842
on the other hand, Buddie did attach great importance to her role;
see p. 158 of this thesis.
References: Chapter XIII

101. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vols. 1, 2 (PB) 10 Jan., et seq., 26 Feb., 1835; D/Lo/C 318 (110) Gregson to Groom, 6 May, 1835.

102. D/Lo/C 142, - Dec., 1835; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 4 (PB) 6, 8, 10 Jan., 1836.

103. D/Lo/C 500 (3) Buddel to Londonderry, 24 Mar., 1837. These figures differ from those given by Buddle to Lady Londonderry, particularly the annual charge (£20,877) D/Lo/E 21, Buddle to Lady Londonderry, 10 Dec., 1837.

104. D/Lo/C 151 (59, 83) McDonnell to Londonderry, 9, 31 Mar., 1837; D/Lo/C 500 (3) op. cit.

105. D/Lo/C 151 op. cit., and (81) 9 Apr., 1837; D/Lo/C 500 (4) 7 Apr., 1837.

106. D/Lo/C 151 op. cit. (80) 2 Apr., 1837; NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 6 (PB) 2, 7-12 June, 1837.


108. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 20 (PB) 6, 8, 10 Jan., 1836.


110. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 13 (PB) 13 June, 1840.

111. D/Lo/E 21, Trust General Accounts, 1834-41, and Buddle to Lady Londonderry, 10 Dec., 1837; D/Lo/C 151 (127) McDonnell to Londonderry, 29 Dec., 1840.

112. D/Lo/B 369, McDonnell to Buddle, 1 Jan., 1841.

113. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 12 (PB) no. 13, Buddle to McDonnell, 27 Aug., 1839; vol. 23 (LB) no. 15, Buddle to Gregson, 28 May, 1840.

114. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 12 (PB) no. 13, Buddle to McDonnell, 27 Aug., 1839; vol. 23 (LB) no. 15, Buddle to Gregson, 28 May, 1840.

115. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 12 (PB) no. 13, Buddle to McDonnell, 27 Aug., 1839; vol. 23 (LB) no. 15, Buddle to Gregson, 28 May, 1840.

116. Ibid., vol. 12 (PB) no. 13, Buddle to McDonnell, 27 Aug., 1839; vol. 23 (LB) no. 15, Buddle to Gregson, 28 May, 1840.

117. Ibid., vol. 12 (LB) no. 33, Buddle to Gregson, 1 Aug., no. 34, to McDonnell, 11 Aug.; vol. 25, no. 21, to McDonnell, 14 Nov., 1841; D/Lo/C 151 (passim.) McDonnell to Londonderry, 29 Aug., - 1 Nov., 1841; NCBJ/JB/189, Browne to Buddle, 5 Jan., 1841, for 1842.

118. Ibid., vol. 12 (LB) no. 33, Buddle to Gregson, 1 Aug., no. 34, to McDonnell, 11 Aug.; vol. 25, no. 21, to McDonnell, 14 Nov., 1841; D/Lo/C 151 (passim.) McDonnell to Londonderry, 29 Aug., - 1 Nov., 1841; NCBJ/JB/189, Browne to Buddle, 5 Jan., 1841, for 1842.


120. Ibid., vol. 25, no. 4, Buddle to Gregson, 28 Sept., vol. 24, no. 36, to McDonnell, 2 Sept., 1841.

121. Ibid., vol. 25, no. 21, to McDonnell, 14 Nov., 1841.

122. Ibid., no. 26, to Gregson, 13 Feb., 1842; NCBJ/JB/192 Browne to Buddle, 2 Mar., 1842.

123. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 24 (LB) nos. 31, 32, Buddle to McDonnell, 6, 11 June, 1841.

124. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 12 (PB) no. 13, 8 July, 1841; D/Lo/C 146 (115) Gregson to William Cowburn (Londonderry's annotation) 9 July, 1841.

125. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 24 (PB) nos. 33, Buddle to Gregson, 1 Aug., no. 34, to McDonnell, 11 Aug.; vol. 25, no. 21, to McDonnell, 14 Nov., 1841; D/Lo/C 151 (passim.) McDonnell to Londonderry, 29 Aug., - 1 Nov., 1841; NCBJ/JB/189, Browne to Buddle, 5 Jan., 1841, for 1842.


127. Ibid., vol. 25, no. 21, to McDonnell, 14 Nov., 1841.

128. Ibid., vol. 25, no. 21, to McDonnell, 14 Nov., 1841.

129. Ibid., vol. 25, no. 21, to McDonnell, 14 Nov., 1841.

130. See pp. 298-9, D/Lo/E 51, Trust Deed 1834, with deed of indemnity and release, 1844. Cf. Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, 91; the settlement of 1842 did not, as Dr. Sturgess suggests, return control of the estates to Londonderry.

131. Sturgess, op. cit., 104. It is doubtful if, in the context of 19th century land law, it is correct to see the life tenant as a "belittled" legal persona; strict family settlement was normal and its renewal each generation was at the behest of the current life tenant; see, for example, A. D. Hargreaves, An Introduction to the Principles of Land Law, 4th ed., G. A. Grove and J. F. Garner (London, 1963) 64-65; Thompson, Landed Society, 64 et seq.
Chapter XIV: Buddle as Colliery Owner


2. See pp. 104-5. Lord Stewart suggested a percentage in 1819 "in order to give us both a reciprocal interest in the profits of this great concern"; D/Lo/C 267(2) Stewart to Buddle, 9 Jne. 1819.


4. Dunn, Viewers, appendix p. 20.


10. NEDME, safe, vol. 21, loc. cit. In 1705 "Benwell and Stumblewood colliery" had five working pits, two in process of sinking, and seven proposed.


15. NEDME, shelf 47a, vol. 25 (LB) no. 23, Buddle to Duke 21 Nov. 1841; Fordyce, Coal and Iron, 87.


18. NCB/1397, 2418, View of Collieries, 1828; NEDME, safe, vol. 14, op. cit., p. 82; see pp. 81, 83 on Lambton men.

19. NEDME, safe, vol. 32, op. cit., p. 45; according to this source, the purchase price was £5,000. NCB/1B/9 (CB) 9 Sept. 1805; NCB/1B/7 (Ledger) pp. 37, 40, 45, 61, 72.

20. NEDME, safe, vol. 32 (VB, 3 vols.) (i) p. 91, accounts for 1807.


23. NEDME, safe, vol. 32 (ii) p. 220, 3 May 1815; (iii) pp. 259-60, 19 Jne. 1819. (cont'd)
cont'd 23. This George Johnson was probably the son of the famous George Johnson who had won the colliery.


25. NCBI/JB/2418 loc.cit.; JB/7 p.29; JB/9 5 Sept.1807; NEIMME, safe, vol.14, op.cit., p.21: there were two other partners, holding 5/16 and 1/16 shares respectively.


27. NCBI/JB/7 p.28; JB/2261-2271, correspondence and other papers, 1816-18.


29. The information in the following two paragraphs is based on NEIMME, safe, vol.58 (VB) pp. 11-13.


32. NCBI/JB/1429, 1430, Taylor to Buddie, 9, 18 Oct. 1826.


34. NEIMME, safe, vol.46 (VB) pp. 49, 1 Jan. 1831 et seq.

35. NRO, CTM (Committee Meetings 1827-32) pp. 284-286, 20-22 Nov. 1830; NCBI/JB/2418, loc. cit.

36. NCBI/JB/2034 (VB) p.1, 23 Nov. 1806; p.126, J. Feb., 25 Mar. 1807; NEIMME, safe, vol.15 (LB) p.175; Buddie to T. Ismay, 4 Jan. 1807; p.210, Buddie to J. Devey, 19 Apr. 1807. The owners had considered letting the colliery in April 1803, but the viewer they consulted, Nicholas Wood, had reported that "no undertaker or lessee will give you a fair rent by the ten, for reason we consider the working of the colliery not to be hazardous and the situation of it eligible", and recommended sinking to the Low Main seam (NRO, Armstrong Mss., 725/F17, op.cit., p.140-2, 1 Jan. 1803).

37. This is presumably the decision that Buddie criticised.


39. NCBI/JB/713, Hindhaugh to Buddie, 10 Mar. 1840.

40. NCBI/JB/1427, 1428, 1429, Hindhaugh to Buddie, 12, 17 Apr. 1826.

41. NCBI/JB/824, 825, Lamb to Buddie, 17 Apr. 1826. See p.213.

42. D/Lo/C 142, 1424, J. Jan., 30-31 July, 26 Aug. 1826.


44. NCBI/JB/830, 834, 835, 842, Lamb to Buddie, 17 Apr. 1826, 19, 22 Jan., 14, 22 Feb., 18 May 1827. Cf. Buddie's comments in earlier years on the dangers of allowing too much power to fitting office clerks; see p.23.

45. NCBI/JB/694, 695, 696, 697, Lamb to Buddie, 17 Apr. 1826, 19, 22 Jan., 14, 22 Feb., 18 May 1827. Cf. Buddie's comments in earlier years on the dangers of allowing too much power to fitting office clerks; see p.23.


50. NCBI/JB/1981, Buddie to G. Silver top [copy] 20 Jan., 1821; NEIMME, safe,
References: Chapter XIV/XV

50. vol.48, list of shares [on list of debts] Aug. 1825.
54. NCBI/JB/1972, J. Hall to Buddie, 17 March 1821.
57. This and the following two paragraphs are based on ibid., nos. 4/1, 2, Buddie to G. Silvertop [copies] 8, 23 June 1833.
58. Ibid., no. 4/3, H. Lamb to Buddie, 31 July 1833.
59. Ibid., no. 4/4, Buddie to P. Towneley, Statement of Facts, 8 May 1833.
60. Ibid., no. 4/5, draft lease, 1835; SC/707, Minutes of meeting of persons interested in Crawcrook coal [copy] 15 September 1836; JB/1991, A. Donkin to Buddie, 23 April 1832.
61. NEIMME, shelf 50, no. V4, valuation of lessees’ interest, September 1833.
62. Ibid., vol. 9(PB) 7, 29 September 1838; vol. 10(PB) 30 October 10, 24 November 1838, 28 January 1, February 1839.
63. Ibid., vol. 11(PB) no. 12, 25 July, 22 August 1840; vol. 12(PB) no. 13, 15 April 1841; vol. 13(PB) no. 12, 24 March, 25 August 1843; vol. 14 (Atkinson’s PB) 23 March 1841.
64. Ibid., vol. 11(PB) no. 12, 5 June 1840; Companies Registry, file 76258: registered 1803.
65. D/LO/C 142, 16 November 1823.
66. Ibid., 4 February 1829, 29 November 1832, 13 January 20 March 25 September 1833.
67. Ibid., 23 September 1832.
68. Ibid., 20 March 27 August 1833.

Chapter XV: Labour Relations

3. D/LO/C 150, Buddie to Iveson, 27 April 1820.
4. P. E. H. Hair, The Binding of the Pitmen of the North-East 1800-9 Durham University Journal, new ser., xxviii(1965-6)1-13, on Buddie’s role in coordinating the binding; Select Committee on Coal Trade, Buddie’s evidence (6 May) PP, 1829, 33.
7. D/LO/C 142, 10 October 1821, 5 March 1843.
8. Heesom, op. cit., 265-7; NEIMME, shelf 33(iii) Wallsend VB, 258, 4 May 1816; D/LO/C 142, 21 November 1823.
9. Heesom, op. cit., 265-6; D/LO/C 142, 16 November 1823; Welford, Men of Mark I, 430.
10. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 4(PB) 25 July, 21 August, 25 December 1835; vol. 7(PB) 27 June, 1837; vol. 13(PB) no. 14, 14 October 1841.
11. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 6(PB) 24, 26 February 1837; vol. 12(PB) no. 13, 20 June, 1841.
12. NEIMME, shelf 47a, vol. 8(PB) 24, 26 March 1838.
15. NCBI/JB/524, 525, G. Fox to Buddie, 5, 16 April 1842; D/LO/C 142, 18 February 1842.

17. D/Lo/C 142, 14 Sept. 1821.

18. D/Lo/C 142, 27 Aug. 1822. Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, 182-3: "employers themselves, groping their way towards a new impersonal discipline, looked backwards sporadically to make use of feasts and holidays, typical of the old order, in cementing personal relationships and breaking the monotony of the working year."

19. D/L 15-16.


21. NBIMME, shelf 47a, 8(PB) 17 Jan. 1838.


23. NCBI/JB/1783, Leifchild to Buddie, 18 May 1842; D/Lo/C 142, 16 May, 19 June 1842.

24. NBIMME, shelf 47a, vol.13(PBno,14) 18 June 1842. Taylor, op. cit., wrongly states that Buddie's Place Book gives 17 June as the date of this meeting.


27. NBIMME, loc. cit., 6 June, 17 June. [meeting with Bell prior to seeing Ashley]; D/Lo/C 142, 6 June 1842.


29. NCBI/JB/1791, Londonderry to Buddie, 21 June 1842.

30. NCBI/JB/1800, Londonderry to Buddie, 8 July 1842.


32. NCBI/JB/1801, loc. cit. This interpretation of Buddie's role and attitude differs slightly from Heesom, op. cit., 241-2 and Taylor, op. cit., 21-27, and particularly from MacDonagh, op. cit., 62, who says "Londonderry denied, and induced Buddie to support him in denying, that the meeting on 20 June had reached a binding agreement."

33. Dunn, Viewers, p.43; Welford, Men of Mark I, 430; Colliery Guardian, 1900.

34. Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, 60.


36. D/Lo/C 142, 20, 21, 23 Apr. 1831.


38. D/Lo/C 142, 20 Nov. 1825; D/Lo/C 150, Buddie to Iveson, 15 Oct. 1819.


40. D/Lo/C 142, 8 May 1831.

41. Ibid., 16 Apr., 12, 15, 19 May 1831.

42. Ibid., 28 May, 4 June 1831; Dunn, Viewers, p.20-21; NCBI/JB/846, H. Lamb to Buddie, 5 Apr. 1832.

43. Welford, Men of Mark I, 430.

44. On Londonderry's reputation, see Heesom, op. cit., 238.

45. D/Lo/C 142, 6 Mar., 12, 21, Apr. 1831.

46. Ibid., 6, 21 May, 13 and 27 June 1832.

47. D/Lo/C 142, 18, 23 June 1831.

Chapter XVI: Conclusion

2. Ibid.; D/Lo/C 327(49) McDonnell to Hindhaugh, 17 Oct. 1843.
5. See p. 259.
7. D/Lo/C 142, 29 July, 1843.
8. Spring, English Landed Estate, 127
9. Ibid., 132.
10. Ibid., 95; Mather, After the Canal Duke, 117-8.
11. D. Cannadine's recent work on aristocratic finances ('Aristocratic Indebtedness', op. cit., and 'The Landowner as Millionaire', op. cit.) had to rely, for information on Londonderry, on the limited account given by Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, op. cit.
12. Spring, op. cit., 105-6, 134-5 (citing Sopwith in the late 1850s as an example of "a rare agent who achieved something of social distinction") and passim; Thompson, English Landed Society, 156 et seq.; Richards, Leviathan of Wealth, 119.
13. "The story of the great coal viewers has never, oddly enough, been written. This book is still the nearest we have to it": B. F. Duckham's Introduction to Galloway, Annals, op. cit., 7.
Note on Sources

The principal documentary sources are described in Chapter I. Attempts have been made to trace records of the Hetton Coal Company, without success: the National Coal Board (North East Area) has retained none, and there are only a few items at the Durham Record Office.

Bibliography


'John Buddie, F.G.S.', Archaeologia Aeliana, 3rd series, x(1913) 119-21.

'Books Printed in Newcastle, 1639-1800', Archaeologia Aeliana, 3rd series, iii (1907) 91-102.

Atkinson, F., The Great Northern Coalfield, (Durham, 1966)

Bean, W.W., Parliamentary Representation of the Six Northern Counties 1605-1886 (Hull, 1890)


Bowen, I., 'Country Banking, the note issues, and Banking controversies in 1825', Economic History, iii, no.13 (February 1938) 68-88

Boyd, R.N., Coal Pits and Pitmen, (London, 1892)


Buddie, J., 'On Making the Society a Place of Deposit for the Mining Records of the District', Transactions of the Natural History Society of N'land and Durham, ii (1838) 309-36


Carse, A., A Short History of the Newcastle upon Tyne Mechanics Institution, (Newcastle, 1862)


Coleman, D.C., 'Gentlemen and Players', Economic History Review, 26 (1973) 92-116

Colls, R., 'Oh Happy English Children!' Coal, Class and Education in the North-East', Past and Present, 73, (Nov. 1976) 75-91.

Collyer, R.J., 'The Land Agent in 19th Century Wales', Welsh History Review viii (December 1977) 401-25

Cooper, L., Radical Jack (London 1959)

Daniell, H.E.B., 'Memoir of the late Colonel Sir Frank Robert Simpson, Bart., Transactions of NELMME, cix (1949-50) 190-1


Dron, R.W., The Economics of Coal Mining (London, 1928)


Durham Advertiser

Edington, R., A Treatise on the Abuses of the Coal Trade (2nd ed., London, 1817)
Ernie, Lord, English Farming Past and Present (London, 1961)
Fordyce, W., A History of Coal, Coke, Coal Fields and Iron, (London, 1860)
Fordyce, W., The History and Antiquities of the County Palatine of Durham, 2 vols. (Newcastle, 1855)
Forster, T.E., 'Historical Notes on Wallsend Colliery', Transactions of NEDME XV(1897-8) 77-94
Greenwell, G.C., 'Mining Reminiscences - No.1: John Buddie', Colliery Guardian, 1900
Hair, P.E.H., 'The Binding of the Pitmen of the North-East, 1800-1809', Durham University Journal, new series, xxvii (1965-6) 1-13
Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series
Hart, C.E., The Industrial History of Dean (Newton Abbot, 1971)
Heesom, A.J., 'Entrepreneurial Paternalism: The 3rd Lord Londonderry (1778-1854) and the Coal Trade', Durham University Journal (June 1974) 238-56
Heesom, A.J., 'The "Wynyard Edict" of 1837', Durham County Local History Society Bulletin, 21 (April 1979) 2-8
Hinsley, F.B., 'The Development of Mechanical Ventilation in Collieries in the 19th Century', University of Nottingham Mining Department, Magazine, xxi (1969) 68-77
Jamieson, J., Durham at the Opening of the 20th Century (Brighton, 1906)
Large, D., 'The Election of John Bright as Member for Durham City in 1843', Durham University Journal, new series, xvi (1954-5) 17-23
Newcastle Weekly Chronicle


Parliamentary Papers: Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the State of the Coal Trade, VIII, 1830


Phillips, M., A History of Banks, Bankers and Banking in Northumberland, Durham and North Yorkshire (London, 1894)

Pigot and Co., National Commercial Directory (London, 1834)


Richardson, W., History of the Parish of Wallsend (Newcastle, 1923)

Rowe, D.J., 'The Economy of the North-East in the 19th Century, a Survey', Northern History VI (1971), 117-147


Spring, D., 'The Earls of Durham and the Great Northern Coalfield, 1830-80' Canadian Hist. Review, xxxiii, no. 3 (September 1952) 237-253

Spring, D., 'The English Landed Estate in the Age of Coal and Iron 1830-80' Tfi, no. 1 (1951) *Journal of Economic History

Spring, D., 'The English Landed Estate in the Nineteenth Century' (Baltimore, 1965)


Sturgess, R.W., Aristocracy in Business: The Third Marquess of Londonderry as Coalowner and Portbuilder (Durham, 1975)


Sykes, J., 'An Account of the dreadful explosion in Wallsend Colliery on 15 June 1835 (Newcastle, 1835)


Sykes, J., Local Records or Historical Register of Remarkable Events in Northumberland and Durham (Newcastle, 1865-66)
Thompson, B., The Inventions, Improvements and Practice of Benjamin Thompson, (Newcastle, 1847)
Thompson, F.W.L., English Landed Society in the 19th Century, (London, 1965)
Ward, J.T., 'Some West Cumberland Landowners and Industry', Industrial Archaeology, 9 (1972) 341-62
Watson, R.S., History of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Newcastle upon Tyne 1793-1896 (London, 1897)
Welford, R., Men of Mark 'twixt Tyne and Tweed, 3 vols, (London/ Newcastle, 1895)
Whellan, W., & Co., History, Topography and Directory of Northumberland (London, 1855)
Young, R., Timothy Hackworth and the Locomotive (London, 1923)