Peasant struggle and the agrarian reform: a case study from Cajamarca, Peru

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PEASANT STRUGGLE AND THE AGRARIAN REFORM

A CASE STUDY

FROM

CAJAMARCA, PERU

by

HELEN RAINBIRD

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Ph.d. Thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of Durham
ABSTRACT.
The main source of primary material on which this thesis is based is fieldwork carried out in Cajamarca, Peru, between February 1975 and September 1976. It concerns a former estate (hacienda), called Chala, in the province of Hualgayoc. This had been an agricultural and livestock estate which had drawn on the labour services of its peasant tenants in production. Before the Land Reform, introduced in 1969 by the modernizing military regime of General Juan Velasco, there had been a series of struggles organized by the peasants against the landlord. At the time the land reform law was passed, the peasants were already in de facto control of the land, and violently resisted attempts to introduce a cooperative.

The thesis includes a theoretical discussion of the highland estate system, and an analysis of the historical and regional context in which it operated. Regional variations in the agrarian structure are explained by reference to the demands created by the primary export sector (plantation agriculture and mining) for labour and foodstuffs. The uneveness of agricultural development within regions relates to the political and economic power of the landlords within the region and nationally.

The conclusions of my fieldwork are, that as far as the highland estates were concerned, the objectives of the Land Reform were political rather than economic. This is demonstrated by the utopian nature of cooperative plans for estates such as Chala, which were formulated without resources being provided for building infrastructure such as marketing systems, credit and technological inputs. However, the Land Reform has liberated the peasantry from the payment of the landlord's rent, and has thus made way for a fuller development of capitalist social relations in the countryside.
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PREFACE

This thesis is based on theoretical research and fieldwork carried out in Peru between February 1975 and September 1976. Primarily, it documents and analyses the development of capitalism in a sub-region of the Andean department of Cajamarca - Bambamarca - and how this had the effect of opening up the internal contradictions of the 'traditional' hacienda system. I have taken one hacienda, Chala, as my case study, demonstrating developments in the present century, culminating in a series of peasant struggles against the landlord, and subsequently against the implementation of the 1969 Land Reform.

I would be the last person to justify a field study in which the unit studied, in this case, the hacienda Chala was isolated from its regional and historical context. For this reason, I have spent considerable time in analysing the historical development of the agrarian structure of Cajamarca. Nonetheless, one aspect of the agrarian structure that cannot be ignored is the extreme unevenness of its development. Having spent nearly two years in the field, it was quite a shock to return to Durham to be greeted by my colleagues' apparent disbelief of my findings. How could an apparently 'feudal' estate exist in this part of Cajamarca when capitalist agriculture, out-migration and petty trading were so developed amongst the peasants of other valleys?

The explanation for this uneven development lies, I believe, in the relationship of different regions to the mining and export agricultural sectors of the Peruvian economy, and the demand that these respective industries create for labour and, in turn, create a market for agricultural produce. These demands have produced
the diversification of the haciendas into renting estates and capitalist farms and have also diversified the peasant small holding economy.

The reason that the agrarian reform is central to my thesis is partly that at the point in time that I carried out my field research, its implementation was a key factor affecting the development of the agrarian structure. It also formed a very important part of the overall economic and political policy of the modernizing, reformist military regime of General Juan Velasco. However, I believe that the agrarian reform has also been important for ironing out the uneveness of development of the Peruvian agrarian structure; it has brought about a homogenization of the process of agrarian capitalist development, weeding out economically inefficient estates, stimulating the commercial farms, both large and medium-sized, freeing the remaining tied peasantry from the land, and speeding up the overall process of proletarianization of the peasantry.

The structure of the thesis falls into four main parts -

The first section, Chapter 1, is a theoretical discussion of the place of the hacienda system in the development of the Peruvian agrarian structure, and concentrates in particular on the problem of the capitalist transformation of the estate system.

In the second section, Chapters 2 & 3, this theoretical discussion is followed through by an historical analysis of the agrarian structure and its relation to developments in other sectors of the economy. Chapter 2 analyses the agrarian structure as a whole and concludes with an examination of the 1969 Land Reform law and its economic and political consequences. Chapter 3, in
contrast, focusses on the regional agrarian structure of Cajamarca, and its distinctiveness from other regions.

The third section of this thesis, which includes Chapters 4, 5 and 6, is a discussion of how the hacienda system operated in Chala, landlord strategies towards the estate and the development of a series of peasant mobilizations. It analyses the development of the peasant struggle from the first tentative rebellions against the landlord, through the peasants' de facto control of the land, to their struggle against the implementation of a co-operative under the land reform programme.

The final section of the thesis is made up of Chapter 7 and the Conclusion. Chapter 7 is a discussion of ideology and peasant consciousness. Whilst it involves a general analysis of ideology, it concentrates on the ideology of paternalism under the hacienda system, but also in the relationships established between peasant leaders and their followings after the land reform. It demonstrates, I believe, contradictions in the aims and the implementation of the 1969 Land Reform Law, which it seems are now becoming clearer, as capitalist relations of production develop more fully, and the class struggle becomes more acute.

Helen Rainbird, Coventry 1960.
CHAPTER 1: Introduction.

General Perspectives.

In this Chapter I shall concentrate on one particular feature of the agrarian structure, the so-called "traditional" or "quasi-feudal" estate (hacienda). Over the present century this land holding and labour institution has been undergoing profound modifications. Some estates have simply disappeared through their division and sale to peasant tenants. Other landlords have successfully transformed their haciendas into modern capitalist enterprises. Still others attempted this transformation but were unable to carry through their plans in the face of peasant resistance to proletarianization. The Agrarian Reform Law passed in 1969, and implemented in the succeeding years, is in many ways the culmination of this process, and is paving the way for the further development of capitalism in the agricultural sector.

A major problem facing anyone attempting to draw general conclusions on agrarian processes is the uneven development of the agrarian structure in a dependent economy such as Peru's. This means that traditional systems of political domination, such as the hacienda system, have reached a crisis point in different regions at different periods of history, according to the nature of their integration into the capitalist economy. The response of agricultural enterprises, whether large-scale, medium-scale, or of the peasant type, to markets for goods, labour and services is largely a response to their insertion into a specific regional context. Thus in Peru, the critical factor affecting regional agrarian structures has been the demand for labour, agricultural produce and services created by
the region's relationship to the economic enclaves, namely the mines and the agricultural plantations (Samaniego and Sorj, 1975). The different labour requirements of these enterprises, their scale of operations, and the extension of the area from which they recruit labour have profound implications on the extent and form of capitalist development in the regions. This inevitably affects the stability of hacienda system, as both peasants and landlords respond to the market, exacerbating the conflict of interests between them. The Peruvian agrarian structure can therefore be characterized by its heterogeneity, and by the heterogeneity of class struggles in the rural sector.

In analysing my field data, which covers developments in one estate, the hacienda Chala, in Cajamarca between 1950 and 1976, I have given weight to general developments in the Peruvian socio-economic structure, and in particular to the regional context of Cajamarca. In this way the field data can be seen to document general processes occurring in the regional agrarian structure. It therefore throws light on general problems of the development of capitalism in agriculture in dependent economies, and in particular, on the processes of differentiation and proletarianization of the peasantry.

1. See Cardoso and Palleto (1969) and Wolf and Hansen (1972) for analyses of enclave economies. Roberts defines an enclave as "a system of production (which) has no linkages into the economy of the region or nation in which it is located." (1978:50) However, he argues that this is never found in its pure form. The point is that an enclave is characterized by primary export production, which does little to diversify the economy or contribute to capital formation within the country concerned.
The debate on the differentiation of the peasantry.

In recent years it has been recognized that economic dependency does not imply an international division of labour whereby the dependent economies simply export primary produce to the developed capitalist world. On the contrary, some under-developed countries (e.g. Argentina, Brazil) have developed a sizeable industrial sector. There is therefore no contradiction between dependency and industrialization as was previously thought (Cardoso, 1969). This industrial sector is, needless to say, dependent on foreign capital, expertise and technology, and is often partly or completely owned by foreign capital. Although the dependent economies are now going through a process of capitalist development similar to that which occurred in Western Europe, it differs in several important aspects. Firstly, this development is not autonomous, but is linked to foreign capital. Rather than representing the development of an independent national bourgeoisie, it in fact allows for the development of new forms of foreign control of the economy, this time involving foreign capital penetration in the sphere of production rather than simply in the sphere of circulation. Secondly, in order to be competitive in the world market, capital rather than labour intensive techniques are employed in production. Therefore, although industrialization is accompanied by proletarianization, it can not fully absorb all surplus labour. Thirdly, the development of industry is to a certain extent in conflict with the interests of classes linked to previous patterns of development based on primary exports.

2. For a detailed discussion of the change from financial to productive investment in dependent economies see Kay (1975).
Therefore class alliances and conflicts of class interests develop in a complex way between agricultural and industrial interests, sometimes making concessions or forging temporary alliances with the dominated classes, that is to day, the peasantry, the proletariat and other popular sectors.3

In Latin America, industrialization has largely taken the form of import substitution. In some countries (eg. Brazil, Chile and Argentina) import substitution industries were developed as a result of the crisis of the 1930's, when primary exports could no longer be sold on the international market and foreign earnings could no longer buy imported manufactured goods. Some industry developed prior to this related to the primary export sector (eg. refrigeration and food processing plants in Argentina, related to meat production). In Peru industry was mainly artisan-based or linked to the enclaves (see Sulmont, 1975).

The development of capitalist industry requires certain pre-requisites such as the transformation of labour into a commodity and the creation of the internal market. Both these processes take place by means of the extension of commodity production and are fundamental to our understanding of the agrarian structure.

3. See Cardoso and Falleto (1969) for a detailed discussion of dependency theory. They argue that the class alliances which develop in the course of industrialization vary from one country to another according to the productive base of each country. This also explains the historical sequence in which industrialization has occurred in Latin America.
The basic processes leading to the formation of the homemarket are, according to Lenin:

1. An increase in the social division of labour, whereby various forms of processing raw materials are separated off from agriculture and become independent branches of industry, which exchange their products for the products of agriculture. Agriculture itself becomes an industry and the same process of specialization takes place within it. In this way, generalized commodity exchange is established that is to say, products are no longer produced for consumption but for exchange, and exchange takes place through the medium of the market.

2. As a result of these developments, the industrial, non-agricultural population grows faster than the agricultural population. An increasing part of the population leaves agriculture for the manufacturing sector.

3. The direct producer is separated from the means of production; the peasant's land is expropriated and thus subsistence production is no longer possible. The creation of the home market occurs through the 'freeing' of the small producers from the land, thus converting the means of production into a commodity in the hands of the agricultural entrepreneur. The entrepreneur, in turn, produces agricultural goods as commodities for the market. At the same time, the small producer's means of subsistence has now become the wage expended by the employer when hiring labour. As the means of subsistence are converted into commodities (ie. the producers now have to buy their means of subsistence) so the home market for articles of consumption is created.
A central contention of Lenin's argument is that capitalism develops in agriculture in the same way as it develops in industry. He argued that it would develop rapidly, suppressing feudal vestiges such as the estates and communes. From this it follows that landholding relations do not constitute an obstacle to the development of capitalism, and that the peasantry should disintegrate rapidly through proletarianization and migration. Lenin maintained that the peasantry was differentiating into rich, capitalist farmers on the one hand and a poor peasantry - the rural proletariat, on the other. The independent peasantry, the middle peasants, were a feudal element which would eventually disappear.

In countries such as Peru, although differentiation and proletarianization as general processes are the predominant processes affecting the peasantry, the agricultural sector has not been transformed at the same rate as the industrial sector. The independent peasantry has not entirely disappeared and in fact shows considerable persistence, whilst large sectors of the rural proletariat cling tenaciously to the land. The reason why a qualitative difference does exist between the development of capitalism in agriculture and industry is due to the existence of a monopoly over the means of production in agriculture, the land, and the charging of rent which acts as a brake on agricultural development.

4. See the conclusions to Chapter 1, Collected Works, Vol.3, 'The development of capitalism in Russia' (1960:57-9)
The Debate on Land Rent.

The debate on rent is central to the theory of value, and thus is of crucial importance to Marxist theory as a whole. Rent can come from many different sources of property ownership; from the ownership of agricultural land, mining land and from urban property. It is key to analysing the form in which surplus-value is distributed amongst different classes. As such, it is also crucial to the analysis of class interests and potential class alliances. The different theoretical positions taken up in this debate thus also have different implications for the analysis of these class interests and potential alliances.

In this section, I am concerned with the question of rent in the agricultural sector. The debate on rent is not concerned with the material form in which rents are paid, for example, in cash, kind or labour services, but involves abstract concepts relating to the distribution of the surplus-value produced by workers in the agricultural sector. In the editorial comment of "La Renta de la Tierra", it is argued:

"The ownership of the land also implies the possession of something which is obtained through the sanction of the market; value, that is to say, the right to enjoy the social surplus produced by the system." (1979:4)

Therefore, the struggle for the land can also be seen as the struggle against the classes which possess it and benefit from it. However, in the course of this argument I shall demonstrate that it is not simply the peasants who struggle against the landlords' possession of the land.

If our concept of rent was restricted to rent in its material form of payments made to the landlord, then this might be the case. However, the abstract Marxist concept of rent, which sees rent as a deduction on the whole of the surplus value produced, enables us to see that other classes in a capitalist society also have an interest in the abolition of some of the components of rent.

Marx, in Capital Volume III, argues that there are two main kinds of rent; differential and absolute. I will discuss differential rent first, since this is the least contentious, and will then discuss the debate around absolute rent. Marx himself made contradictory statements about absolute rent, hence it is this aspect of rent theory which is most debated.

In order to establish the existence of rent, Marx draws the comparison between a factory using a natural force, such as a waterfall, and one using steam in the process of production. He argues:

"precisely because this surplus does not stem from his capital as such, but from the control of a limited natural resource distinct from his capital which can be monopolized, it is transformed into ground rent."

(Capital Vol. III:646).

This rent is differential rent because it arises from the difference between the individual price of production of a particular capital (the capital which has control over the monopolized natural form) and the average price of production of the total capital invested in that sphere of production (capital which is invested under average conditions of production). Therefore, control of the natural force makes capital invested in this sphere of production more productive than capital investments which are excluded from these exceptional natural conditions.
The natural force is not itself a source of surplus-profit, but it does increase the productivity of labour. Therefore, the private ownership of the waterfall (or of land) enables the landlord to transform surplus-profit into ground rent.

There are two main kinds of differential rent, which is a form of rent arising from especially favoured conditions of production.

Marx argues that in agriculture, it is the price of production on the worst soil (supposing that it yields no rent⁶) that determines the market price for products. The first form of differential rent is illustrated in the natural properties of the land which make the conditions of production more favourable on particular plots of land. For example, greater fertility of the soil in one location. However, proximity to markets and the existence of distribution systems, can also produce this form of differential rent. Marx writes that differential rent is:

"the result of varying productivity of equal amounts of capital invested in equal areas of land of different fertility, so that differential rent was determined by the difference between the yield from the capital invested in the worst, rentless soil and that from capital invested in superior soil." (Capital III:674)

The second form of differential rent is produced when capitals of different productivity are invested in agriculture. This is the surplus-profit which arises from successive investments of capital.

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⁶ He later contradicts this statement by arguing that even the worst soils produce absolute rent. However, this does not invalidate this premise for the existence of differential rent.
According to Marx, all agricultural land yields absolute rent, independent of the existence of differential rent. This is because the organic composition of capital in agriculture is inferior to the organic composition of the average social capital. It is argued that the landlords' monopoly of the land prevents the free movement of capital into agriculture, and, in doing so, prevents surplus-value produced in agriculture from participating in the formation of the average rate of profit.

The contentious points of this debate relate to the question of how capital is prevented from investing in agriculture, and, therefore, how absolute rent is constituted. This centres around the issue of whether it is the landlords' monopoly of the land which prevents capital investment in agriculture, or whether the conditions of production themselves prevent capital from being invested. Other writers, such as Rey (1973) and Gutelman (1978) resort to an explanation involving the continued existence of pre-capitalist modes of production, articulated with the capitalist mode of production, to account for the existence of absolute rent. It should be emphasized, in examining the main arguments in this debate, that it is a debate which has not yet been concluded. Furthermore, the political implications of this debate are significant in so far as they have a bearing on the presumed interests of different classes in relation to the agricultural sector and to land reform, and thus on potential alliances and conflicts of interest between classes.

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7. By conditions of production I mean factors such as the climate, seasons and the soil itself over which capital has relatively little control. Kautsky (1972), for example, noted how the extensive nature of agricultural production compared to industrial production meant that the speed of change, capital accumulation and the transformation of social relations advanced at a slower pace in agriculture than in industry.
Absolute rent and the articulation of pre-capitalist modes of production.

A number of writers have attempted to explain the existence of absolute rent in terms of the articulation of the capitalist mode of production with pre-capitalist modes of production. In this section I shall examine the contributions made to the debate on rent by P.P. Rey (1973) and Gutelman (1979). It is important to point out that though both writers base their arguments on material from specific social contexts, they have contributions to make to the theoretical debate on rent.

Rey takes rent to be, in material terms, what the peasants pay the landlord for their rights to access to land. On this basis, he argues that part of agricultural production takes place on the basis of non-capitalist relations of production. For Rey, the existence of absolute rent is a sign of the articulation of the capitalist mode of production with the feudal mode of production. He argues that the landlord will only invest in commercial agriculture if it allows him to obtain a rent at least as great as that obtained under the preceding mode of production.

Unfortunately, there are a number of problems with Rey's argument. Firstly, he does not explain how feudal rents are fixed, thus undermining his assertion that landlords will only invest in agriculture if they can obtain a greater rent than from feudal rents. Secondly, in arguing that capitalist land rent is a relation of distribution which is based on the feudal mode of production, he is led to contradict Marx's dictum that the relations of distribution in any given mode of production correspond to the mode of production and reproduction from which they spring.
It is the political implication of Rey's work which is most interesting, and perhaps also the least easy to substantiate. He argues that the opposition of class interests based on relations of distribution are secondary compared to those based on relations of production. He writes:

"the contradiction which opposes landlords and capitalists concerning the distribution of rent is thus secondary in relation to the fundamental convergence of their interests from the point of view of relations of production .... the ownership of the land allows the capitalists to obtain labour power - expelled peasants - and goods - products extracted by means of rent -, which would be consumed by the peasants if rent did not exist; in the same way, only capitalism allows rent to grow in important proportions". (1973:60)

It seems that this argument leads Rey onto very dangerous ground. Firstly, he uses rent in the sense of the material produce received in rent by the landlord and not in the Marxist categories of absolute and differential rent. He argues that the development of capitalism in agriculture allows the volume of rent to increase. However, the development of capitalism in agriculture does not just involve an increase in the volume of goods entering the market as the amount of products extracted from the peasants in rents increases, but also involves an increase in agricultural productivity, and thus the surplus-value produced in this sector.

As a result of Rey's failure to use the Marxist concept of rent, he sees the conflict of interests between landlords and capitalists solely in terms of the struggle over agricultural surpluses. This
raises the question of whether a conflict of interests exists between landlords as a class and capitalists. Kliminsky (1979) maintains that it is not possible to exclude an alliance between landlords and capitalists. In fact, due to the international division of labour, the productive bases of different Latin American countries vary widely, and so too do the potential alliances and conflicts of interests between landlords and capitalists.

Gutelman (1978) also argues that absolute rent derives from territorial property which is a pre-capitalist relation of production. He also maintains that producers on the most fertile land have an interest in seeing the producers on the least fertile lands growing the same crops as them, since their costs of production determine the price of the product in the market. Whilst Gutelman recognises that absolute rent prejudices the interests of capitalism in general, he explains it in terms of the increased price of agricultural products, which increase the cost of labour power. This leads him to argue that agricultural capitalists are opposed to industrial capitalists because they capture part of the surplus-value from industry.

However, if absolute rent is defined as deriving from the non-participation of surplus-value produced in agriculture in the equalization of the rate of profit because of the lower organic composition of capital in agriculture, then the extraordinary rate of profit in agriculture owes nothing to the transfer of surplus-value from industry to agriculture, but is constituted by the surplus-value produced in agriculture. Therefore, all the working class, including agricultural workers, are affected by the high price of agricultural products.
Gutelman also argues that absolute rent tends to disappear with the increasing organic composition of capital in agriculture. He argues this not on the basis of Marx's proposition that absolute rent will diminish relatively to differential rent, but on the basis that territorial property will cease to be a pre-capitalist relation of production but will become a capitalist relation of distribution. He does not explain how this transformation takes place, nor can he explain the fact that investment in agriculture cannot take place without the payment of rent to the landlord.

**Theoretical problems arising from the debate on Mexican agriculture.**

I shall now examine some of the problems which have arisen in the debate over absolute rent in relation to Mexican agriculture. I am mainly concerned with the work of Roger Bartra (1974) and Armando Bartra (1979). This is an important debate for two reasons; firstly, because it deals with the post-land reform situation, secondly, because it does not prove conclusively that land reform eliminates absolute rent, as some writers have argued that it should do so.

Armando Bartra (1979), rejects the concept of the articulation of modes of production to explain the existence of absolute rent, and tries to analyse rent in the context of the capitalist mode of production itself. He develops his argument to show that other social classes, such as the peasantry can subsist and reproduce themselves inside the capitalist mode of production.

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8. See Zaldívar, who writes: "But now, by putting an end to the monopoly over land possessed by the agrarian bourgeoisie, and by creating numerous small and medium owners, who will compete in the market, the government will eradicate the absolute rent of the land." (1974:63)
He addresses his analysis to Mexican agriculture, and to the fact that as a result of the Mexican revolution, a large part of the land is owned by peasants. He disagrees with Roger Bartra (1974), who argues that the whole of the peasantry performs the function of a landholding class, thus constituting an obstacle to the investment of capital in agriculture. A. Bartra points out that this statement is contradictory, since there is a relation of exploitation between the peasantry and the bourgeoisie, and this formulation is only acceptable if capitalist rent is considered to be any income received by virtue of being a proprietor. He argues that though individual peasants may present themselves as landlords to individual capitals, this is not the case for the peasantry as a whole. Though Mexican peasant agriculture may constitute a barrier to capital which wants to enter agriculture, this is a different problem altogether.

Peasant incomes generally do not guarantee subsistence living requirements, so many peasants also sell their labour power. A. Bartra writes:

"payment of rents to the peasantry is no more, in the global process, than an appearance, which is neutralized by the payment of labour power below its value." (1979:45)

He argues that the regulating price of the market will fluctuate around the costs of reproduction of the majority of the peasant units of subsistence. Therefore, lands of medium quality in the hands of peasant proprietors, which enable their owners to obtain a surplus above the cost of reproduction, can be transformed into capitalist enterprises, and thus achieve the average profit, or more.
The implications of this analysis for class relations are complex and interesting. The coexistence of peasant producers and capitalist farmers generate a multiplicity of conflicts at different levels; for example confrontations over the ownership of the land and the exploitation of the peasants through wage labour employment by capitalist farmers. Furthermore, the surplus produced by peasants is exploited by global capital, which means there is a conflict between the peasantry and the bourgeoisie, including the agrarian bourgeoisie. This is because superprofits are made by the most productive plots in agriculture, and it is the competition of the most favoured enterprises with peasant production of low output which influences the fixing of prices of agricultural products.

A. Bartra's argument concludes that capital finds a means of eliminating rent as a deduction from the general rate of profit, by preventing the full operation of capitalist relations of production in agriculture. Thus the role of peasant production in capitalism is to serve as an alternative to rent. However, I would argue that though it may be useful to capital at a specific stage of development to prevent the full operation of capitalist relations of production in agriculture, as A. Bartra suggests, this can only be a transitory phenomenon, since the overall objective of capital is to expand the total surplus-value produced.

Concluding remarks on the debate on rent.

The conclusions to A. Bartra's argument open up some interesting points for discussion. As a result of the Mexican land reform, small scale peasant production accounts for a large part of Mexican agricultural production. This is also occurring in Peru as a result of the land reform. The Mexican material indicates that this still
presents a barrier to the free investment of capital in the agricultural sector, though it can be overcome to a certain extent by government credits linked to extension programmes, for example.

What then is the purpose of land reform?

There is no doubt that land reform does increase the productivity of the land and of labour in the Latin American context. Whereas large scale property is often extensively farmed, peasant holdings are generally intensively cultivated. Thus the amount of surplus-value produced by the agricultural sector rises. However, the changes in legislation also alter the way in which this surplus-value is distributed between classes. Yet even with these changes, there are still barriers to the investment of capital in agriculture which do not appear to be the result of land ownership alone.

Murray (1977 and 1978) argues that there are three main ways in which capital tries to surpass the fetter of landed property; firstly, by extending geographically; secondly, by transforming the form of property ownership and, thirdly, by attacking the material basis of rent by increasing productivity and thus decreasing the significance of the land as an element in the labour process.

The move from land ownership to owner-occupation (the transformation of landowners into capitalists and capitalists into landowners) is nowhere more clearly evidenced than in land reform legislation. However, this does not finally remove the barriers to capitalist investment in agriculture, nor does it provide a final solution to class antagonisms in the agricultural sector, or in capitalist society as a whole. It is precisely this aspect of the debate on rent which has yet to be concluded.
The persistence of small-holding peasant agriculture.

We have established that the conditions for the development of capitalism in agriculture are not the same as they are in industry. Lenin also contended that the development of capitalist agriculture would lead to the concentration of property and the elimination of the small producer. Kautsky, for one, noted the resistance of small producers to the concentration of property. He argued that the concentration of property does not lead to the elimination of small agricultural enterprises, but that tendencies towards concentration and division coexist (Kautsky 1972:189). Furthermore, the existence of small property sustains large property in two important ways. Firstly, rural smallholdings provide subsistence for the peasant family, who, to all intents and purposes are wage earners, in that they sell their labour power to the large enterprises. Secondly, through the standardization of products, the concentration of markets in cities and the development of collection and marketing networks, the small scale producer is subordinated to large scale enterprise, and must sell his products in order to make a subsistence living.

In the same way, small producers can be effectively proletarianized by their subordination to merchant capital. Roseberry (1978), for example, documents how loans made to small producers are repaid with interest at harvest time in the form of commodity produced. Similar processes occur through the development of outwork systems of manufacture, whereby peasant families engage in production of an artisan nature, which is subordinated to capital. Peasant producers lose their independence and effectively become proletarians, whilst retaining their status as proprietors of the land. Capitalist development in agriculture is thus not characterized by an unlimited concentration of property, but rather by the vertical concentration
of capital. Thus capital intervenes not only in the process of production, taking advantages of economies of scale, proximity to markets and improved technology, but also in controlling the sale and distribution of production from peasant plots.

As argued above, in the case of peasants producing commodities for the market, the small peasant producers must align their prices with those of the most efficient capitalist enterprises. In order to compete, peasants must accept prices for their products which effectively deny them the payment of profit and rent elements of production. In order to do this, the peasants must exploit their own and their family's labour. If profit on production is not received, then the aim of production is merely the satisfaction of the family's basic subsistence needs. Hence the remuneration of the peasants' labour is below that of a proletarian.  

The continued existence of peasant small holding is consequently not precluded by the development of capitalism. To a large extent small peasant property conceals proletarianization, though, it must be emphasized that this is not its only effect. In Peru:

"in a certain way, the need to work in capitalist enterprises - at first only on a temporary basis - corresponded to the Indians' desire to 'affirm their condition as free peasants'. At the same time that conditions were created for their proletarianization, these Indians were resisting proletarianization."

(Sulmont, 1975:43).

9: Kautsky noted that the independence of the small peasants in Germany was not to their advantage. Not only was their production inefficient, but, he argued, they would be better off as wage labourers (Kautsky, 1972). The self-exploitation of the peasant has been noted by many writers, e.g. Chayanov (1966) and marks the distinctiveness of peasant as opposed to capitalist criteria of production.
In fact, as well as enabling peasants to retain their independence, the establishment of a semi-proletariat was not without advantages to capital. For example, in the mining and plantation enclaves of Peru, the establishment of a stable proletariat only started in the 1920's and was not generalized until after the Second World War. Until this point, these enterprises made use of largely seasonal and temporary labour. (Sulmont 1975). Therefore, the fact that labour power could be reproduced on the basis of small scale production on peasant plots of land meant a considerable saving on the social cost of producing and reproducing labour power.  

Studies on Africa on the "labour reserve economies", demonstrate that here too, despite different historical developments, there have been deliberate efforts to maintain small scale subsistence production. This has served seemingly contradictory ends: On the one hand it checks the development of commodity production amongst peasant small holders, thus eliminating productive alternatives to labour migration. On the other hand, the total destruction of the peasant small holding economy is prevented, thus allowing it to continue in the reproduction of labour power. (Cliffe, 1976). In fact, it has been explicitly recognized that the existence of a fully proletarianized labour force installed around the mines, would need higher salaries, better housing, schools and the establishment of a social security system for periods of sickness, unemployment, and, of course, old age.  

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10. Castro Pozo notes that in the 1920's a temporary mineworker recruited under the enganche system received wages that were 25 to 50% lower than those of a permanent mineworker (1947:120). For a more detailed discussion of labour recruitment, (enganche), see Chapter 3.

11. Meillassoux (1977) quotes Lord Hailey, "An African Survey": "The reserves are used as redemption policies in the sense that they satisfy the needs of the unemployed, the sick and the old, with no burden to the State." (1938:605). Meillassoux's analysis is actually based on the concept of the articulation of the capitalist mode of production with pre-capitalist modes of production. I have already dealt with the theoretical objections to this analysis in discussing the work of P.P. Rey in the section on the
The continued existence of peasant community structure is also, in a certain sense, functional to capital.

"With the development of an agro-mining capitalist economy, the comunidad indígena (the Peruvian community - H.R.) became a functionally convenient form of organizing the villages of the countryside. Because of its collective character, the comunidad indígena tended to slow down the process of social and economic differentiation that would eventually destroy the subsistence basis of a temporary wage labour force. At the same time, the comunidad encouraged the union of households for joint or communal action." (Samaniego 1978:59)

In fact, it was precisely on the basis of traditional communal forms of peasant cooperation that the peasant communities were brought into closer communication with the cities. Through the Ley de Conscripción Vial of 1920, all villages organized as communities were obliged to work on road construction. Their communal organization was thus exploited, in order to build the infrastructure which would stimulate crop, mining and livestock production. There is also no doubt that the existence of a community structure enabled individual migrants to leave their community land to be cultivated by kinfolk in their absence.

Thus Peruvian rural society is being shaped by contradictory processes; On the one hand, the usurpation of peasants' lands, their flight from the countryside and the establishment of capitalist agriculture. On the other hand, a degree of legal protection has been afforded to communal land rights (for example, the statutes

12. Hacienda tenants were also liable to this work. The Ley de Vacancia (1924) and obligatory military service also allowed the state to make use of the unpaid labour of peasants.
in the 1920 Law of communities allowing for the recognition of the indigenous communities) to prevent the formation of stable proletariat and to encourage small scale commodity production.

It is, therefore, not surprising to find capitalist agriculture has not been established to any great extent through the development of a class of rich farmers from the ranks of the peasantry. Independent farmers do, of course, exist, but the major means whereby capitalist agriculture has been established has been through the transformation of the large estates into commercial enterprises.

Amin (1975) argues that the concentration of landed property and the open proletarianization of the peasantry have not been the principal means whereby capitalist agriculture has developed. This is because it is the most costly means of developing commercial agriculture due to the payment of rent. On the contrary, he argues that superexploited but independent peasant production is more profitable to capital because the small producers will forego the rent element so long as they have sufficient income to meet their subsistence needs. Moreover, it has the advantage that the producers consider themselves to be independent producers, and not proletarians.

In Latin America, it has historically been the landlord-farmer path to capitalist development which has predominated not as an exceptional case, as Amin would argue, but because of favourable class alliances. C. Kay argues:

"It so happens that in most Latin American countries these class alliances have favoured the landlords and not the peasants, and this explains the predominance of the landlord-farmer path". (C.Kay 1977a:8).
However, Mariátegui did not believe that it was possible in Peru for modern farms to be established on the basis of what he considered to be pre-existing feudal property relations:

"large modern property does not come out of large feudal property ..... on the contrary, in order for large modern property to evolve, the division and dissolution of large feudal property is necessary." (Mariátegui, 1974:34).

Admittedly, landlord strategies in Peru were not as successful as they were in Chile and Argentina in transforming their estates into capitalist enterprises and proletarianizing their labour forces. Outside the coastal plantations, and the highland livestock ranches and dairy farms, most estates could be considered as "transitional" since they were unable to fully transform relations of production. Peasant resistance to proletarianization constituted the major barrier to the full introduction of wage labour relations. Therefore, the "peasant problem" has been a major factor determining landlord strategies and the degree to which they were successful.

The landholding system.

There can be no doubt concerning the importance of land tenure relationships in determining both the distribution of power and income in the rural areas. It is also true that land tenure is crucial to the study of economic development in general, and not just to the problem of the development of commercial agriculture. In this section, I want to look at factors such as the growing demand for agricultural products, stimulated by absolute population growth and the relative growth of the non-agricultural population
located in the towns, in order to see how the landholding system came to be perceived as an obstacle to the further economic growth of the Peruvian economy.

There are a great many excellent ethnographic accounts of the highland haciendas in Peru and their relationship to the small-holding peasantry, whether these are independent small-holders, tied hacienda tenants or community members. Most of these studies have not been concerned merely with a descriptive analysis of the many and varied tenancy arrangements which were to be found on these estates, but are also concerned with the changes affecting them, and tending to undermine the system of domination involved in the landlord-tenant relationship. Therefore, in analysing the hacienda system prior to the land reform, we are essentially concerned with an institution which was undergoing, or attempting to undergo, certain types of change.

Barraclough (1973) argues that in many Latin American countries the land tenure system upheld a system of social and economic relationships which perpetuated the circle of rural poverty and low productivity in agriculture. He maintains that where there is little technological development, land is the main source of wealth. Ownership of the land will also affect labour relations and power relations in the agricultural sector. Dorner (1972), also argues that the land tenure system reflects social class structure and relations.

Barraclough maintains that whilst it might be possible to expect the

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ownership of the land to become less important as a political issue as a society develops, in fact large landowners often feel threatened by innovations. He writes:

"As the economy becomes more advanced and complex, the relationship between the means of production and class status, power and ownership of wealth becomes much less straightforward. In this situation one might expect land tenure to become a less burning issue. But this occurrence requires that the social system, which was originally largely shaped by the power relationships with respect to land, adjust to fit the new conditions when the necessary adjustment in land tenure and institutions are not forthcoming rapidly enough and the social system continues to retain essential characteristics of earlier agricultural societies, social stresses develop that make land reform the explosive issue it is today in most of Latin America."

(1973:14).

Barraclough thus pinpoints the problem, that where the landholding structure is unable to evolve spontaneously into line with the requirements of capitalist development, then it is necessary for the state to intervene in the structure of land tenure.

The seigneurial land tenure system is held to impose various barriers to economic development. These arise from considerations of productivity and from the considerations of political stability that would result from a more equitable distribution of resources. (Dorner, 1972). Firstly, land use on the large estates is extensive
and is often kept idle, thus preventing increased productivity of the land. Secondly, peasant plots are often on the poorest soil, though they are intensively farmed. Thus rural labour is under-employed, or, in other words, it could be more productively employed. Thirdly, it is argued that the surpluses received by landlords in rents could be directed towards industry rather than towards consumption. Finally, the estate system has the effect of restricting the educational and health facilities, as well as the income, of the vast majority of the rural population.

The main failing of this kind of analysis is that it sees the agrarian problem only in terms of a conflict of interest between landlords and peasants over the control of agricultural surpluses. The fact that the surpluses extracted by the landlords could be invested in industry is not seen as a factor intrinsic to the way in which surpluses are produced in the agricultural sector, but rather as a factor related to the individual consumption aspirations of feudally-minded landlords. Furthermore, as I intend to demonstrate in the following sections, many landlords were entrepreneurs, and were trying to invest capital in their production. However, conditions of production, particularly on the more remote highland estates, impeded the transformation of relations of production. This, along with the internal social differentiation of the landlord class, explains the limited extent to which landlords were successfully able to introduce capitalist relations of production on their estates.

Land reform, therefore, attempts to solve some of the problems concerning the flow of capital into the agricultural sector and the raising of agricultural productivity. However, a restructuring of land tenure institutions also involves changes in the social,
political and economic positions of several groups in society. (Dorner, 1972:18). Therefore, though the main aim of land reform will be to raise the surplus-value produced by the agricultural sector, the way in which it is redistributed will depend on the class interests which formulate land reform policy.

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that regardless of the entrepreneurial strategies that landlords used on their estates, they have often been expropriated on the basis of reforms espousing an anti-feudal rhetoric. Though land reform does increase productivity, there are also political motives for land reform. Many land reforms have been conceived and implemented in the context of rising rural discontent, and struggles between peasants and landlords over the land.

Land reform is explicitly recognized as a means of incorporating peasants into the democratic process as a method of averting a revolutionary movement based on social discontent. This has often been one of the strategic aims of reformist regimes introducing land reforms, as well as of organizations such as E.C.L.A. (The Economic Commission for Latin America) and the F.A.O. (The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). Carroll writes:

"A thorough overhauling of the land system is regarded as a prerequisite to achieve a measure of social justice and to attain a better distribution of rights and opportunities in line with current aspirations." (1970:104).
Carroll is not alone in stressing this purpose of land reform. Numerous writers have expressed the revolutionary potential of land reform, in fact, the title of Carroll's article is "Land Reform as an Explosive Issue in Latin American Politics."

Bourricaud (1970), on the other hand, has argued that the tensions created when the oligarchic system is under stress from the demands of the newly mobilized masses do not necessarily lead to an "explosion". He writes that although the agrarian problem may be posed in terms of a possible "explosion" or breakdown of oligarchic control, this is not the inevitable outcome.

Consequently, though land reforms may resolve conflicts between peasants and landlords over rights to land and peasant surpluses, this does not in the long term resolve the struggle for the surplus-value produced in the agricultural sector. Though a land reform may seek to channel this surplus-value in particular directions, according to a specific programme of industrialization, it does not alter the fact that surplus-value is still produced by peasant agricultural labour, which is appropriated by other non-producing classes. Thus land reform, rather than resolving class struggle, shifts it onto a new basis.

The hacienda system: feudal or capitalist?
Many of the conceptual problems relating to the debate on the feudal or capitalist nature of Latin American social structures revolve around the definition of a mode of production and the tendency to equate the social relations of production with a distinct mode of production. The existence of servile labour
and other forms of coerced extraction of peasant surpluses, not to mention various forms of primitive exchange and reciprocal labour obligations, have led to some writers to argue that specific economic systems exist which are distinct from the capitalist mode of production. Against this, Sánchez argues:

"Anthropological studies have argued that the notions and practices of reciprocity amongst others constitute the regulating mechanism of Andean economic relationships. This belief has led those specialists to suggest the persistence of a qualitatively distinct system which interacts with the alien and dominant system, i.e. capitalism. ......... the persistence of some practices according to such a principle is not associated with the existence of a specific economy: rather it is the product of the determining effects of economic and political forces pertaining to the rules and development of the capitalist system."

(Sánchez, 1978:1)

Historically, there are many examples of social relations of production existing as anomalies, under general conditions of production and reproduction of a mode of production to which they do not correspond. This does not imply the existence of two modes of production, or their articulation.

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14. See Foster Carter (1978) for a full bibliography and discussion on 'the modes of production controversy'.

15. Banaji documents the example of large scale payments of wages on the estates of the Bishop of Winchester in the early thirteenth century in Britain which by no means represented the development of generalized commodity
Rather, we should look at the way in which, under the special conditions of production experienced in dependent economies, commodity production may occur without the full transition to capitalist relations of production. Hobsbawn argues:

"Though it may seem tempting to explain the peculiar neo-feudalism of La Convención by the historic facts of the Spanish conquest (the transfer of European medieval institutions, practices and values), by survivals of pre-Columbian forced labour, by the character of social relations between lords and dependent peasants, or in similar terms, there is no need for such explanations. It is perfectly possible to assume that (within a general framework of society) that development of this specific form of neo-feudal agriculture is a necessary consequence of the decision to undertake desmesne cultivation under conditions of labour shortage and inadequate communications. It demonstrates once again that the very growth of the capitalist world market at certain stages produces, or reproduces, archaic forms of class domination on the frontier of development."

(Hobsbawm, 1969:48-9)

In fact, Banaji maintains:

"It was precisely in the backward countries subjugated to world economy as colonies that the process of the mediation of capitalist (value-producing) relations of production by archaic (pre-capitalist) forms of labour assumed historically unprecedented dimensions, while feudal relations of production figured in their pure form of commodity feudalism."

(Banaji, 1977:11)
Banaji is therefore making a distinction between different types of enterprise which draw on archaic labour relations. These are on the one hand, capitalist firms producing goods for the world market, operating mainly through archaic forms of labour organisation at low and generally stagnant levels of techniques. These were found in Africa and large parts of Asia. On the other hand, feudal estates, integrated into the network of world commodity exchanges, that is to say, feudal relations of production in their pure form of commodity feudalism. He argues that these were the types of estates found in Latin America (Banaji, 1977).

In Peru, in the coastal plantations, where production was dominated by foreign capital and was geared to the world market, the former type of enterprise existed. All the pre-requisites for the production of surplus-value existed, apart from the last, which is characteristic of the development of capitalism; the transformation of labour power into a commodity. The use of slave labour until the abolition of slavery in 1854, followed by the use of semi-slave Chinese indentured labour until 1874 far from representing a slave mode of production, was indicative of labour-intensive production techniques operating under conditions of labour shortage. Moreover, the fact that no wages were paid made this an exceptionally cheap form of production, making it competitive in the world market, where distance was a disadvantage to Peruvian growers. Indeed, the conditions of enclave production, linked to foreign markets and foreign capital, meant that primitive accumulation of capital had not occurred internally in Peru.

16. Between 1849 & 1875, 90,000 coolies were imported of which 5,000 worked in the guano fields, 5,000 went into railway construction and 80,000 went to work in the haciendas. Unlike the slaves, the coolies had no families to maintain and so were an even cheaper source of labour. Their conditions were so appalling that individual and collective suicides were common. (Sulmont, 1975)
Sulmont remarks:

"The indigenous mass of the sierra still remained in a situation of immobility and isolation. In contrast to what occurred later, the volume of the population was approximately adjusted to the availability of the land." (Sulmont, 1975:29)

Traditional forms of domination combined with the Indians' engagement in wage labour as a means of resisting proletarianization (see above) meant that in order to tap the indigenous labour reserves of the highlands special forms of labour recruitment were necessary (enganche). These methods of recruitment were only suspended in the 1950's, when the disintegration of the former basis of the peasant economy was well advanced and by which time a stable proletariat, capable of reproducing itself, had been formed (Scott, 1976). This marked the formal domination of labour by capital in these enterprises.

In contrast to the plantations, estates in the highlands continued to extract rents in various forms from their peasant tenants. According to Banaji's argument this represented pure commodity feudalism. That is to say, that servile labour rather than being disintegrated by commodity production, was actually intensified by it.

7. Primitive accumulation precedes capitalist accumulation. It is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but is its point of departure. It is the process whereby one class accumulates wealth, so that the direct producers are separated from the means of production and are forced to sell their labour as a commodity. See Marx, Capital Vol.1, Part 8, 'So-called primitive accumulation'.
"The feudal regime of the haciendas tended to increase its servile exactions on the peasantry as the growing demands of the world market stimulated maximization of their surplus. Thus, far from the expansion of the external market acting as a disintegrating force on feudalism, its effect was rather to accentuate it and consolidate it." (Laclau, 1971:30)

Historically, I believe this was the case, that commodity production was based on the simple extraction of rent in the highland estates. Macera, for example, documents the massive profits of the colonial haciendas and argues that nothing confirms the image of the hacendados as having no sense of production for profit. (Macera, 1975:15). However, in the present century, the growth of urban markets in Peru, combined with foreign competition (for example, in the case of cattle rearing haciendas, competition from Central American and Argentinian beef) has meant that the managers of most highland haciendas have not been content to produce a simple surplus, but have attempted to increase production at competitive prices. They have done this both by capital investment (thus increasing differential rent) and by increasing peasant labour obligations and rents (absolute rent). Zaldivar remarks:

"Indeed it was this very mechanism (ie. price) that induced them to preserve traditional systems of labour, which made it possible to preserve their market position and increase their absolute rent." (Zaldivar, 1974:55)
However, I would argue that the expansion of production on highland estates has not taken place by increasing absolute rent alone. What has actually occurred, though in an extremely uneven way, have been attempts to transform relations of production from those based on servile labour and rents to those based on wage labour. This process has been uneven, not only because it has been successfully implemented in limited areas and under specific conditions of production (i.e. one commodity rather than another). It has also been uneven in the extent to which it has accommodated to and compromised with peasant producers both inside and outside the estate. I therefore propose to examine estate production by means of multi-enterprise analysis, which views the hacienda system as "a conflicting unity between two types of enterprise: the landlord and the peasant" (C Kay, 1977:2) I will also take account of the different conditions for the development of capitalist production - large and small scale - under different types of agricultural production. In this way I shall analyse changing forms of exploitation associated with the hacienda system and show how seemingly similar forms of archaic labour relations are very different in their practical implications for capital.

C Kay finds it useful to distinguish two forms of estate enterprise: on the one hand the Grundherrschaft system or hacienda de arrendamiento in which the landlord leases out most of the estate to the peasants who thus account for most of the estate's production. In this type of estate peasant enterprises predominate and little or no wage labour is employed. On the other hand, there is also the Gutswirtschaft system or hacienda de producción, in which the landlord directly cultivates most of the land, and leases out a small part of the estates to peasants so as to obtain
cheap labour for his own enterprise through the tenants’ labour rents. (C Kay, 1974 & 1977) He argues that the economic logic of each system of production affects in different ways the primitive accumulation of capital.

Whilst Kay does not argue for the existence of a feudal mode of production in Latin America, he finds it useful to draw comparisons with the effect of the development of trade and commodity production in Western and Eastern Europe, where the Grundherrschaft and Gutswirtschaft estate systems predominated respectively.

In Western Europe the Grundherrschaft system, because of the predominance of peasant enterprises, allowed the peasants to have control over agricultural technology, over their labour power and a partial control over the means of production. Furthermore, where rents are paid in cash they must also have interrelation with the market. The growth of urban and overseas markets allowed the peasants to control an increasing agricultural surplus. With the emergence of the bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the bourgeoisie found themselves in conflict with the old social order. Thus an alliance between the bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the emerging proletariat led to the overthrow of the feudal system. Wealthy peasants, the kulak farmers, were able to employ wage labour and extract surplus-value, thus establishing capitalism in agriculture.

In Eastern Europe, in contrast, the Grundherrschaft system existed until the fifteenth century due to conditions of labour scarcity. In the sixteenth century the peasants were enserfed as the landlords became traders as well. They also subjugated the bourgeoisie of the towns as well. Since no alliance between the peasants and the bourgeoisie developed no bourgeois revolution liber-
ating the peasants from the land occurred. The urban centres were not provided with a proletariat, and nor was a home market for industrial goods formed. In fact, Postan goes so far as to argue that the self same forces which brought about the disintegration of the feudal system in Western Europe maintained it in Eastern Europe. (Postan, 1977) In Germany, on the other hand, the development of capitalist agricultural production by the Junkers took place by the enforced internal proletarianization of the peasant tenants. This process has been called the path of feudal reaction. (Dobb, 1946).

C. Kay argues that in Latin America, as long as only a weak export market existed, the estates began to expand their cultivation with the labour services of their attached peasants. Thus the early stages of Chilean wheat production for the Peruvian market saw the development of peasant enterprises in Chile, whilst later, landlords attempted to gain greater control over the disposable surplus by doubling the number of tenancies. These were later substituted by labour rents with the expansion of grain markets in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the landlords taking over control of the production process.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine long-term historical trends in the development of the highland estate system. However, it is useful to pinpoint, by means of concrete examples, how on different estates, the land worked by the estate, the desmesne, and peasant enterprises responded to market opportunities for commodity production.

16. "Some of the great landlords, the Radziwills, the Potockis, the Czartoryskis, used their immense resources of money and labour to set up industrial establishments, including large textile manufactures. But the establishments were components of manorial latifundia. They were dependent on serf labour and exercised monopoly powers over their outlets, which were largely the areas confined to their owners estates. In this way foreign trade and manorial manufactories merely reinforced the self-sufficiency of the Polish
A primary consideration is the landholding structure itself, and two main tendencies can be identified in the present century with respect to the actual area of land held by the estates. These are the opposing tendencies towards the division of estates into small units and their expansion through the usurpation of peasant lands.

Chevalier, for example, documents the expansion of haciendas in Puno. In eight provinces in Puno there were 703 haciendas in 1876 and 3,219 in 1915 that is to say that 2,516 haciendas were created in the course of 40 years. In the province of Azángaro in the same department, the numbers of haciendas increased from 178 to 611 during the same period. This expansion was largely related to the development of wool production; prices and the volume of exports peaked between 1915 & 1918 (Chevalier, 1975:15).

It can be argued that this expansion in numbers was partly due to the division of old haciendas and the more intensive use of land (c.f. Martinez Alier, 1973). However, this does not explain a series of peasant uprisings in the region from 1895 onwards: in Azangaro in 1910 and 1913, the Huancané massacre of 1923, and further uprisings in Canas (Layo) in 1921, Espinar (Tocroyoc), Grau (Jacquira) and Aymarae in 1922, (Chevalier, 1975). It can only be assumed that the haciendas’ expansion occurred to the detriment of the economic viability of peasant enterprises, mainly in their direct access to the land.

Another form of expansion has taken place in cases where large companies such as the Cerro de Pasco Corporation have bought up other existing highland estates to extend their holdings in order
to engage in extensive livestock raising (see Laite, 1978). This more closely resembles the expansion, for example, of the coastal sugar plantations documented by Klarén (1973) than the strategies of other highland estates.

In the department of Cajamarca, however, the opposite tendency has been the case. Over the present century there has been a tendency towards the division and sale to peasant tenants of estate lands. These, it must be added, have generally been of the Grundherrschaft kind, with peasant production predominating, though it has also been one of the major strategies whereby landlords have accumulated capital to invest in commercial farming. In the latter instance, they generally sold off unproductive lands or estates to peasants, which enabled them to concentrate dairy production on the best valley lands. They were also able to shed a large part of their tenant labour force, and rather than meeting peasant resistance to their initiatives, succeeded in placating them to a certain extent by the sale of the land. This process has been in evidence since the early part of the century and speeded up during the 1960's with the landlord's fears of an agrarian reform, (Valderrama and Arce, 1974).

The Grundherrschaft haciendas in Cajamarca were generally those owned by institutions, such as schools, universities or the Church, which contracted them out to short-term renters. Because these renters were more concerned with making quick money from rents than in exploiting the lands efficiently, they drastically increased the numbers of peasant tenants, taking no account of long-term considerations of capital investment or the maintenance of a docile labour force.
On this type of estate the peasants managed to retain an increasing portion of the surplus for themselves and estate managements found it impossible to increase the absolute rate of exploitation. For example, on the hacienda Porcón, its owner - the Beneficencia Pública of Cajamarca was unable to raise peasant rents based on the size of landholding and head of cattle between 1905 through to the 1960's when it was divided up and sold to the peasants on an individual basis.

Having established that landlords had least control over production, their peasant tenants and the surplus product in the Grundherrschaft haciendas, it is necessary to qualify this statement by the fact that on very few estates did one type of landlord-peasant relationship exist to the exclusion of all others. One of the landlords' main trump cards vis-à-vis the peasants was a policy of 'divide and rule' based on having a complicated hierarchy of renting arrangements - with tenants, sub-tenants and even sub-sub-tenants, not to mention a sliding scale of labour obligations. Although in a long-term perspective the transition from rents to forced labour or forced labour to rents can be viewed as an historical sequence (c.f. C.Kay, 1977), in the short-term there is evidence that the different tenancy arrangements provided different factors of production to the estate. Therefore landlords would introduce new tenancy arrangements according to the development of particular strategies. Labour tenants, for example, merely provided labour power as a factor of production whilst renters, apart from providing cash rents, also provided beasts of burden for the estate due to their greater capacity

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\[1\] This is evident in most studies of haciendas. See, for example, Fioravanti (1974) and Hobabawm (1969b) on the valley of La Convención, Vásquez (1961) on Vicos in the Huaylas region. See also Cotler (1970), & Pearse (1975) on estates in Latin America.
to secure part of the disposable surplus for themselves. Moreover, share-cropping on a short term basis can be used as a means of opening up new lands for cultivation, thus expanding the area under cultivation.

There is, however, a qualitative difference between share-cropping in general and other types of renting arrangement, that further substantiates the view that many haciendas were transitional, rather than 'traditional'. Share-cropping is altogether a more sophisticated variant of the landlord-tenant relationship and can be considered as a transitional form between pure rent payment (in the form of labour, kind or cash rents) and wage labour itself. Both the peasant and the landlord, in this instance, supply part of the means of production; the landlord usually provides land and seed whilst the peasant provides labour and the instruments of production. However, when the crop is divided at harvest times, it is no longer a simple payment of rent but includes interest on the capital advanced by the landlord:

"On the one hand the share-cropper, whether he employs his own labour or another's labour, is to lay claim to a portion of the product not in his own capacity as labourer, but as possessor of part of the instruments of labour, as his own capitalist. On the other hand, the landlord claims his share not exclusively on the basis of his landownership, but also as a lender of capital."

(Marx, Capital, Vol.3:803)

The extent to which a share-cropper can be considered to be a capitalist will, however, depend on factors such as the size of holding, capital invested, and whether cash crops are grown.

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20. This is, in fact, what Kula concludes from his study of the Polish feudal system (Kula, 1977)
The main point which, I believe, emerges from this argument is that the mere existence of renting relationships is not in itself an indication of a lack of capitalist strategy on the part of the estate management. The assumption that production on the estates was static and geared to the prestige and consumption aspirations of the landlords fails to take account of the processes whereby income is generated on an estate system. Under specific conditions of production, renting arrangements may be the most rational form of land and labour exploitation. A case report quoted by Horton, on Monteseco, a coffee-growing estate in the Zaña valley, Lambayeque confirms that where economies of scale are unimportant, rent collection was more profitable than central administration:

"In order to solve our labour problem and to maximize the production of the hacienda we gave plots of marginal land to colonos. Since we also financed their production we could dictate the following conditions:

1) Seed the varieties that we specified.
2) Seed when we specify.
3) Irrigate when we specify and in the fashion we specify.
4) Sell us all the harvest.

We seeded one time each year on the best lands .... in that way we were assured ourselves one good crop per year - and the colonos seeded two times each year and worked for the hacienda when we needed their labour. With this system we managed to utilize the available irrigation water rationally, minimize the risks incurred by the hacienda, employ the residents of the hacienda year around and elimi-
ated the need to contract workers outside the hacienda. " (Horton, 1974:31)

Similarly, evidence from La Convención demonstrates that where desmesne production is based on labour services, with the payment of only a nominal wage and is complemented by the surplus from peasant production by the payment of rents in cash or kind, the landlord bears virtually no costs of production. Hobsbawm points out:

"This situation may explain the remarkable sluggishness of the landlords to undertake improvements. For anyone with enough money to buy an estate, let alone the good fortune to inherit one, a high rate of profit without risk, or indeed major current outlays, was almost certain. Even if the bottom temporarily fell out of a market, he risked no actual loss, but merely forewent his usual gain. Few gamblers have had such good fortune to toss two-headed coins so consistently." (Hobsbawm, 1969:43)

In fact it was the peasants who provided seed, work implements, animals and labour who bore the risk: Castro Pozo, for example, notes that when rice cultivation was introduced in Piura yanaconas were given land to cultivate because, despite the profits to be made from rice cultivation, the hacendados had insufficient capital to invest in the land. (Castro Pozo, 1949:24)

There are a number of crops such as coffee, rice and cotton where there are few advantages of scale and because of the labour-intensive nature of production, it can be as efficiently carried out on small and medium sized holdings. Since these are cash
rather than subsistence crops, the question of who controls their sale on the market is also a crucial element in the division of the surplus product between landlord and peasant. Castro Pozo noted that the forced sale of rice by yanaconas to the estates in Piura in the 1930's and 1940's took place at one third of its market price (Castro Pozo, 1949:25). As noted above, one of the conditions of the renting contract in Monteseco in the Zaña valley was the sale of the entire coffee crop to the estate.

In La Convención a major cause of conflict was the forced sale of peasant coffee crops to the landlords at below the market price. As Hobsbawm argues, as long as the haciendas retained their powers of extra-economic coercion, they were not obliged to make themselves more efficient:

"So long as the hacendado could force his peasants to sell their coffee to him at 7 soles per kilo, and prevent them by armed guard from crossing the river to sell it at 11 soles to the merchants, he made 4 soles a kilo profit without so much as lifting a finger."

(Hobsbawm, 1969:45-7)

If peasants engaging in market production had complete control of the surplus product, it meant that not only could they start to accumulate for themselves, but they could also make themselves independent of the landlords. Thus landlords frequently forbade the cultivation of certain market crops, eg. sugar cane production was forbidden to peasant producers and limited to desmesne production in La Convención, (Hobsbawm, 1969). The numbers of head of livestock pastured on estate land were frequently regulated too. (Rainbird and Taylor, 1977).

Thus, by their own criteria of production, these estates were highly profitable. Needless to say, this was not so much by
virtue of their productive investment in agriculture (though this did occur to some extent) but by the extraction of ground rent, interests on loans (through share-cropping arrangements) and through the control of the sale of peasant surpluses. Whilst the landlords did organize their estates to the end of achieving a profit, they only rarely intervened actively as capitalist entrepreneurs in organizing the process of production. However, to dismiss them as mere pre-capitalist rentiers is inaccurate; relations of production were fundamentally geared to commodity production, and thus rather than being pre-capitalist, they had developed largely in function of their relationship to capital:

"Today wanaconaje does not embody the same characteristics as it did in the colonial period or in the first decades of the Republic. Industrial capital has hypertrophied it or deformed it, according to the agricultural activities as a whole to which it is applied, and also the different forms of the socio-economic environment in which it operates."

(Castro Pozo, 1949:24)

The landlords of the haciendas therefore did not operate as simple rentiers, but as merchants and usurers as well. In some cases they also controlled equipment essential to the processing of their tenants' crops, such as mills in the rice-growing areas of the Jequetepeque, (Castañon and Martinez, 1975). Thus, in many ways their methods of operation were similar to those of capitalist entrepreneurs; by controlling the production, sale and distribution of the product. That is to say, by the vertical integration of their interests.
I shall now examine attempts by some estates to invest capital in the process of production and to introduce wage labour relations on their estates. I shall do this by examining estates where this was successful, and evaluate why it failed on others.

It is first necessary to consider the basis of tied labour since this explains to a large extent the landlords' difficulties in freeing themselves of their peasant tenants. The original operational context of the hacienda was one where capital was extremely scarce and where labour too was a scarce commodity. Now whilst the landlords required labour that was abundant and cheap, they could not maintain a full-time labour force whose only subsistence was the wages it obtained from the hacendado. The essence of serf tenancies was not to get labour gratis, but to get it at a fixed rate below that obtaining in the open market. Insofar as it was always difficult to obtain labour at below its market value, there was always a labour shortage. In order to obtain a permanent labour force on the estate under these conditions, the peasants had to be able to provide a good part of their own subsistence needs. The landlord, in order to accomplish this, had to provide land for the subsistence cultivation of his tenants. In order to ensure a stable supply of labour he had to use extra-economic coercion in order to make the peasants work for him or to render up a part of their surplus.

It was also in the landlord's interests, where servile labour existed, to prevent the differentiation of the peasantry as far as possible.
Lenin argues:

"Labour-service presupposes and requires the middle peasant, one who is not very affluent (otherwise he would not agree to the bondage of labour-service) but is also not a proletarian (to undertake labour-service one must have one's own implements, one must at least be in some measure a 'sound' peasant)."

(Lenin, Vol.3, 1972:186)

Consequently, the principle of organization of an estate system based on rents is diametrically opposed to that of a capitalist enterprise. Whilst the former is based on the direct producers having access to the land and producing their own subsistence needs, the latter requires their dispossession from the land and the necessity of their selling their labour power to meet their subsistence needs. The estate system, in preventing the differentiation of the peasantry, actually retards and prevents the development of the objective conditions for a system based on wage labour. For landlords wanting to end the enfeudamiento of an estate, the forcible dispossession of the peasant workforce was necessary, and yet certain to meet peasant resistance.

Horton writes of this predicament:

"Recent studies of highland agriculture...... indicate that economic decision-making is a much more important determinant of the internal organisation of the estates than are political or cultural factors and that highland estate owners were much more concerned with the rationalization of production methods than previously thought.......... In many highland estates, primarily the largest ones estate owners and managers have."

20. Lenin later contradicts himself by making a distinction between labour service with animals and a proletarian type in which labour only is supplied.
sought for years to eliminate peasant or colono production in favour of wage-labour production, but they have been universally opposed by the peasant residents of their estates." (Horton, 1974:v)

There are two main kinds of highland estate where capitalist relations of production have been introduced. These are the extensive livestock estates of the Central Sierra and the department of Puno, producing wool for the international market and the intensive dairy haciendas of Cajamarca and Arequipa, producing milk and milk products for local urban markets and for canning (evaporated milk). Generally speaking, agricultural estates in the highlands have not succeeded in introducing capitalist relations of production. In order to understand why it has been possible for livestock and cattle estates to succeed in transforming relations of production it is necessary to examine problems of capitalization and risk on these estates compared to those of the agricultural estates. The questions whether these innovations require the transformation of labour relations from above, of economies of scale and of the perishability of products with respect to the proximity of markets are all crucial to this discussion.

Leaving aside the problem of the landlords' initial process of capital accumulation - which may have taken place through the sale of unproductive lands (as mentioned above) or through the raising of peasant rents or through their interests in other sectors of the economy - I shall discuss problems of capitalization and risk in livestock and agricultural estates respectively.
In a crop estate there is far more risk involved in setting up capital outlay than there is in a livestock estate. This is partly due to climatic factors - for example a series of frosts or late rains may ruin a crop. Furthermore, undercapitalization may jeopardize the survival of the enterprise: for example if crops are not seeded on time. In the highlands in general, economies of scale are insignificant in agricultural production. This is because the terrain makes a higher technical level of production through the introduction of farm machinery difficult. Labour intensive methods of production make small and medium size property more efficient than large estates. The development of infrastructure; efficient delivery, marketing and processing systems are crucial to the expansion of crop production. Because of these conditions, investments tend not to yield large returns. This was the case in Udima, in the highlands of Cajamarca:

"The irregularity of the terrain and rainfall is the principal problem there ....... Irregularity ruins any normal calculations of yield and profitability... 'Normal conditions' practically do not exist in that zone, and therefore cattle grazing has always been the principal activity ....... We invested in that fundo, but never did we reap an adequate return. The most important branch of business has always been 'rental of pastures'. Therefore we never changed the system, but rather improved it - made it yield more." (Horton, 1974:31)
In this instance, though, some technical improvements were introduced into the estate, the prime means of increasing profitability was through increasing peasant surpluses through more efficient management. In the highlands in general on the agricultural estates, resident workers continued to live primarily from their own cattle and crops. Whilst some technical improvements were possible on the desmesne lands, this nearly always involved the employment of peasant labour, often unpaid, rather than the introduction of a specialized wage labour force. Alongside these labour practices, were the traditional attitudes and the poor treatment of the work force.

"With the patron the estate was well administered, you couldn't fault him on that; but the people were badly off....... he managed the people with kicks and beatings ....... The patron did not want us to go to school, and because of this people didn't have sufficient education to leave."

(Horton : Case study of Hacienda Sondorf, Cuzco, 1974:19.2)

The increase in peasant surpluses as a response to market pressures goes a long way to explain the essential instability of these estates. Though no direct dispossession of the land occurred which would have fully proletarianized the peasants, the haciendas' attempts to increase their profits increased the absolute exploitation of the peasants. In this way they not only ate into the peasants' surplus labour, but actually jeopardized the labour that was necessary for their own subsistence production and reproduction.

In livestock estates, in contrast, capitalization takes a different form altogether. Whereas lack of capital can produce a lowering of productivity, it does not jeopardize profitability
as seriously as it does in crop enterprises. Furthermore, re-capitalization occurs naturally through the normal reproduction of the livestock, without further heavy capital expenditure.

Again, in contrast to cropping in the highlands, significant economies of scale do exist in livestock operations. The introduction of improved stock, combined with centralized technical expertise increases productivity considerably.

In the sheep haciendas, the introduction of capitalist relations of production required very little re-organization of labour, since only one shepherd need be employed per 900 head of sheep. (Horton, 1974:243) In fact, in the sheep estates it has not generally been the introduction of a small, salaried labour force which has met the opposition of the peasants. For example, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation has employed capitalist relations of production from the early part of the twentieth century, using a small, salaried labour force. (Rainbird & Taylor, 1977:56). However, the estates did meet opposition when they tried to limit or abolish the practice of huacchileraje, whereby peasants by means of renting contracts, pastured their own flocks on the estate's lands. The estate's strategy was partly in response to the high degree of control required over throughbred animals to prevent them from breeding with the peasants' huaccha flocks. However, it was also a function of the fact that under extensive production conditions, productivity can only be increased by the physical expansion of pastures beyond a certain point. Thus, when estate managements complained about the huaccha flocks and claimed that they would dearly like to get rid of 'feudal' renting relationships, they were not actually proposing to convert the peasant herders into wage labourers (for they had no need of such large numbers of workers) but to expand the estate's effective
control over lands that had been customarily pastured by peasants. Therefore, when Martinez Alier argues that it was peasant resistance to wage labour which prevented the full introduction of capitalist relations of production on the Cerro de Pasco Corporation's estates he is wrong. (Martinez Alier, 1974) It was not wage labour as such that they were resisting but the estate's usurpation of their lands. 22

In the dairy haciendas, the situation was somewhat different due to the intensive nature of production. Because activities needed to be concentrated within an easy distance of the milking sheds, there was no purpose in having extensive pastures. Instead fodder crops were grown. Thus, on these estates the peasant labour forces could be shed by selling off unproductive grazing land on the periphery of the estate. Furthermore, because Arequipa and Cajamarca are both areas of extreme fragmentation of small-holdings (minifundismo) it was relatively easy to recruit wage labour.

Even in the most advanced capitalist estates of this type a 'peasant consciousness' was often actively fomented in the interests of social control. Thus permanent wage labourers received small garden plots and paternalist benefits such as mid-day food rations were maintained. The rationalization of production and the introduction of wage labour in Cajamarca met relatively little opposition from the peasantry. The reason, perhaps, lies in the fact that capitalist relations of production were only introduced into those haciendas which had undergone an intensive process of capitalization.

22. Martinez Alier does in fact modify his argument in a later publication, "Haciendas, Plantations and Collective Farms: Agrarian Class Societies — Cuba and Peru" (1977). In this book, he makes it clearer that it was the displacement of peasants which was the problem.
Since these were also the haciendas owned by the politically most powerful landlords, they were also most able to control and contain peasant mobilizations against these measures.23

It might perhaps be asked why if dairy farming was so profitable and could be carried out on relatively small units of production (compared to haciendas in general, and livestock estates in particular) and the introduction of wage labour could be carried out without the direct dispossession of the peasants from the land, more estates did not choose this investment option. The answer, of course, lies in the perishability of milk as a product and the need to have an efficient collection and distribution infrastructure. In the Cajamarca valley, the development of the dairy industry coincided with the attraction of Perulac (a subsidiary of the multi-national, Nestlé) to the region 24. This has not only provided the infrastructure for capitalist enterprises producing dairy products, but has also stimulated milk production on small holdings wherever the collection network extends. Since large parts of the sierra still suffer from poor communications, this has been an option for estates in only limited areas.

23. For a fuller discussion of the capitalization of haciendas in Cajamarca and the debate on peasant resistance to proletarianization, see Rainbird and Taylor (1977). Wilson has emphasized the need to look at family and affinal organization of resources in the process of capital accumulation (see Wilson, f/c).

24. Perulac is the Compañía Peruana de Alimentos Lácteos SA. In Arequipa it was the Leche Gloria company which set up a milk processing factory and milk collection network.
In the preceding paragraphs I have discussed the nature of the hacienda system in the highlands. A point I have emphasized is the transitional nature of their organization of production. Apart from the obvious case of the dairy and livestock estates, most estates found it difficult to raise productivity by means of large scale capital investment. They, therefore, relied primarily on the extraction of rents from peasant producers. They maintained low technical levels of production, and were only able to increase profitability by increasing the direct exploitation of the peasants. In a similar manner, in the extensive livestock haciendas, after a certain level of capital investment was attained, productivity and profitability could only be expanded at the expense of the peasant tenants. Since this usually required their dispossession from the land, this was a major cause of peasant opposition to their operations.

The 1969 Agrarian Reform: A New Model of Capitalist development in Agriculture. 25

Prior to the passing of the Agrarian Reform, there existed what could generally be considered as a crisis in the estate system in Peru. This was because whilst attempts had been made to increase productivity by capital investment, in the majority of cases profitability could only be improved by increasing the extraction of peasant surpluses.

25. A full discussion of the Agrarian Reform follows in Chapter 2. The purpose of this section is to pinpoint the main issues concerning the development of capitalism in agriculture, and how the agrarian reform in general has attempted to solve them.
Furthermore, the fear of the possible passing of an Agrarian Reform Law had led to the decapitalization of estates since the 1960's, thus decreasing the overall productivity of these estates. In many instances this led to an increase in the extraction of surpluses from the peasants. 25

This crisis was not limited to the agrarian sector, but fundamentally represented a conflict of interest between the emergent industrial bourgeoisie and the oligarchy whose interests were traditionally in the agro-export sector. Scott, (1972) argues that the distribution of land-ownership prior to the reform was a major determinant in the structure of national industry, the composition of the import bill and the nature and size of certain capital outflows. Therefore, in order to reorganize the structure of the economy as a whole, a reform of the landholding structure and an increase in overall productivity were essential. In fact, Zaldivar, (1974), goes so far as to argue that the series of attempts to introduce a land reform, starting during Leguía's second period of government, (1919-1930), have represented attempts by the bourgeoisie to do just this. Until the 1969 reform, these attempts were always blocked by oligarchic interests.

25. See Horton, (1974) for the impact of the 1963 Law on levels of capital investment. He quotes the business records of Udima (Cajamarca) for 1963; 'The Agrarian Reform will soon be approved, and will certainly affect Udima. Therefore, we should plan to dedicate all our attention in the years in which the firm can still do so to extracting the maximum possible surplus from the 'coloniaje' and from the hacienda's cattle ......" (Horton, 1974:44).
Previous attempts to introduce land reform were limited to the regulation of contracts between landlords and tenants (the 1947 Law of Yanaconaje), the modernizing of the existing system of agriculture and the siphoning off of excess rural population into new colonization zones (the 1963 proposals of the Commission for Agrarian Reform and Housing), and the expropriation of "feudal" estates in zones of intense social conflict (Belaúnde’s 1964 Reform, D.L. 15037). The 1969 Reform Law differed from these insofar as it included plans for the expropriation of modern capitalist farms as well as "feudal" haciendas, and actually allowed the State to intervene as an entrepreneur in the organizing of the agricultural sector, through the setting up of cooperative enterprises.

It was argued that the expropriation of the estates and the payment of the Agrarian Debt (the Deuda Agraria) were to have been the primary means whereby resources were transferred from agriculture to industry. This has not taken place by

26. This was the argument of many early analysts of the regime, e.g. Quijano, (1971) and Scott, (1972). Though this was evidently the intention of the Military Regime's policy, Caballero argues that in practice the transfer of capital through industrial bonds has been minimal. (Caballero, 1976). See Chapter 2 for more detailed coverage of these arguments. The Agrarian Debt was eventually cancelled in 1979, subject to various conditions on the part of the land reform beneficiaries, such as being up-to-date on repayments.
the simple expropriation of the estates - which merely put an
end to the monopoly over land possessed by the landlords - but
by the Government's taking control of the estates and trans­
forming them into production cooperatives and SAIS's.27

In the case of the capitalist enterprises in agriculture, it
is clear that the Agrarian Reform has enabled the state to take
control of production, and levels of investment are being main­
tained or increased. In the case of the renting haciendas,
the situation is somewhat different. Whilst attempts were
made to maintain large-scale units of production, attempts
to introduce cooperatives were met by little success:

"these cooperatives could be organized only
by investing foreign capital and the recruit­
ment of peasant labour on wage contracts. In
this way, despite Government rhetoric on the
'tranference of land and power to the peasantry',
the bulk of the peasantry were to be converted
into proletarians." (Sánchez, 1978:6).

In other words, the Government was intending to carry out a trans­
formation of relations of production, by transforming the peasantry
into wage labourers, where the landlords had failed. It goes with­

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27. There are two main types of production cooperative in Peru;
the conventional production cooperative, the Cooperativa
Agraria de Producción (Agrarian Production Cooperative) and
the Sociedad Agraria de Interés Social (Agrarian Society of
Social Interest), which is specially adapted to highland
conditions of production, and allows for a degree of
profit-sharing with neighbouring, member peasant communities.
cut saying that, where landlords had previously held considerable local power and great ideological and coercive control over their labour forces and had failed in this, it was unlikely that a national government with weak penetration in the regions would succeed. In fact, peasants took advantage of delays in the implementation of the reform and the organization of the co-operatives to expand their own family enterprises. Thus, when officials finally came to organize the co-operatives, they found the land already carved up and that where desmesne cultivation had been of a commercial nature (e.g., the extensive livestock estates) the expansion of the peasant enterprises was even threatening its continued viability (see Rainbird and Taylor, 1977). In fact, many of the modern SAIS's are facing exactly the same problems as the old haciendas:

"the problem faced by the administrative councils of SAIS, like the modernizing landlords before them, is not how to keep the peasants tied to the land, but how to separate them from it; in this case, how to induce conductores de parcelas and huacchilleros to work longer and harder on the co-operatively held land and not so much on their private plots. It might be argued that the agrarian reform should never have promised 'land to the tiller'...." (Harding, 1975:232)

Whilst there is a basis for expecting the richer and more modern haciendas to produce a higher differential rent as a result of the co-operative programme and government inputs, there is no such future for the former 'feudal' haciendas. Whilst the conditions have been created for the development of a capitalist market and for the formation of differential rent, there seems to be no
guarantee of capitalist development in agriculture as there is on the co-operatives and SAIS's. There is no capitalist accumulation taking place which would make investment and technical progress possible. Free market prices, originally combined with the payment of the agrarian debt, prevent the small farmer from accumulating (c.f. Zaldívar, 1974). For these peasants the prospects are for proletarianization with the undermining of the subsistence economy with few prospects for employment in the formal sector of the economy. Rather, they will continue as impoverished wage labourers, who have only the appearance of small proprietors. Their proletarianization occurs through the domination of their productive activities by circulation and usurer's capital, that is to say, through the appropriation of surpluses in the process of commodity exchange and through their employment in outwork systems and in the informal sector.

Conclusion:

In this Chapter I have pinpointed some of the main theoretical problems involved in studying the hacienda system and the transformation of the agrarian structure by the development of capitalism. I have argued that the developments in the haciendas depended on a number of different factors, such as the relationship to the enclaves and the type of agricultural production, and that these varied considerably from one region to another. It is evident from the analysis that the Land Reform of 1969 consolidated processes towards the development of large capitalist farms, on the one hand, and the fission of the renting estates into peasant smallholdings, on the other. Whilst it is clear that the land reform was part of the military regime's policy for creating conditions favourable to the development of manufacturing industry, it is evident that it also had the effect of homogenizing the development of the agrarian structure, thus mitigating the
uneven development that had previously characterized it.

The Land Reform Law, as will be argued in Chapter 2, was the product of a coalition of different class interests. In the same way, the persistence, weaknesses and contradictions in the hacienda system represented a balance between different class interests. My analysis will not be restricted to the external factors affecting the haciendas, such as booms and slumps in the Peruvian economy, but how these have been translated into changing power relationships between the dominant and the dominated classes, which are, in turn, manifested in their changing consciousness of their class interests.

In the following chapters I shall be analysing both the general theoretical problems raised by the study of the hacienda system in the highlands of Peru and the specific problems raised by the study of one hacienda, Chala. I hope to show that whilst developments in Chala are not typical for the whole of the highlands, because of the uneveness of agrarian capitalist development, they formed part of an historical process, in which the Land Reform has been an important turning point.
CHAPTER 2: The historical context of the Agrarian Reform, its results and implications

Introduction:
In this Chapter I shall discuss recent changes that have been taking place in the agrarian structure of Peru which made the introduction of an Agrarian Reform expedient in the later 1960's. These have been largely in response to changes in the structure of the economy as a whole, and their repercussions on the class structure. In this way, the dynamic of rural power relations can be understood by reference to the emergence of new class forces, and the conflict of interests between different classes or class fractions.

Changes within the Peruvian economy have come about largely in response to the changing structure of capitalism internationally. The weakness and vulnerability of economies dependent exclusively on primary exports was demonstrated during the crisis of the 1930's. In response to the crisis, many countries started to develop industry on the basis of producing goods which could no longer be acquired from the metropolitan countries due to the decreased value of foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, foreign capital itself moved from the sphere of circulation and finance operations and began to engage directly in productive operations as well. As mentioned previously, the attempt to re-organize the structure of the economy has frequently brought about a conflict of interests between already established sectors of the dominant class whose interests are based on old patterns of political domination and extraction of surpluses, and emergent sectors whose interests require a re-organization of the pattern of political domination in order to organize new methods of production and the
extraction and distribution of surpluses

These developments give rise to contradictions between different sectors of the dominant classes and may lead them to seek the support of sections of the peasantry, the proletariat or the urban masses. It may also produce contradictions between the group that controls political power, and the group which is dominant economically.

In the 1960's new sectors of the dominant class, whose interests lay in the Peruvian urban-industrial sector, attempted to gain the political power which would enable the rapid development of the industrial sector. This required certain modifications in the existing structure of domination, most notably, a greater degree of state investment in economic infrastructure and the abolition of absolute rent extracted in the agricultural sector by virtue of the landlords' monopoly control of the land. This latter objective was seen as essential to the securing of a new distribution of differential rent (see Chapter 1). The Belaúnde régime (1963-68) attempted unsuccessfully to reorganize the structure of economic development, whilst the increasing political mobilization of the peasantry and the rural proletariat made a solution to the 'agrarian problem' expedient. The military régime which took power in 1968 represents a more successful attempt to resolve this crisis of power in favour of industrial interests, and was the first régime to successfully implement an Agrarian Reform of national

1. See Chapter 1 and reference to Cardoso and Falleto (1969). For recent analyses of the changes brought about by the military régime see Fitzgerald (1979) and Thorp and Bertram (1978).
rather than piecemeal application.\textsuperscript{2}

The Land Reform will be analysed in detail, not only from the point of view of its inception but also from the point of view of its implementation. This gives us an understanding of the political objectives of the reform, and the effect it had on the balance of class forces in the rural sector, as well as its practical implications for the economic development of agriculture.

The background to the Agrarian Reform:

Peru, in the early twentieth century maintained an economy which was still largely dependent on primary exports. The main centres of capitalist investment and economic development were the enclaves: the plantations of the northern coast and the mines of Central Peru. Because the enclaves were controlled mainly by foreign capital, accumulation was directed towards the exterior and due to the economic self-sufficiency of the enterprises, there were relatively few linkages into the surrounding economy.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{2} I am indebted to Antony Ferner for information on the crisis that existed in the Peruvian political structure prior to the military coup of 1960. See Ferner (1977) and also Quijano (1971) for a detailed exposition of conditions which led to the coup.

\textsuperscript{3} Klarén, for example, documents that Casagrande, owned by the Gildemeisters, purchased a number of estates in the nearby highlands to meet the plantations demands for foodstuffs inexpensively. The company also secured the lease of the port of Malabrigo in 1915 in order to import large quantities of merchandise for the company store. This, combined with the effect of the elimination of small producers, and the conversion of whole areas from staple crop to sugar production, were responsible for the strangulation of commercial activities in a number of small towns of the Chicama valley and led to their eventual decline (Klarén, 1973: 56-7). See  Beckford (1972) for a general discussion of the repercussions of plantation economies on their surrounding region or country.
The control by foreign monopolies of the enclaves meant that national capital tended to be invested in industries which were linked to agriculture, of which cotton and woollen textiles were the most important, followed by oil, soap and cocaine refining.

Because of the uneven development of the Peruvian economy, in the early twentieth century Peru was still largely an agricultural country despite the increasing importance of the mining sector. The class structure reflected this uneven development. The dominant class, for example, was composed on the one hand of the oligarchy whose interests were linked to the agro-export sector and constituted a parasitical class insofar as their wealth was based on the extraction of rents from peasant producers and the gains to be made from financial speculation. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie whose interests lay in manufacturing, was only emergent. Its own operations were limited by the oligarchy and in particular the oligarchy's interest in maintaining non-capitalist relations of production in the countryside.

Of the dominated classes, the proletariat, too was emergent. It was small compared to other sectors of the popular classes - the peasants, the artisans and the small traders - and its character was non-industrial and non-urban due to the fact that it was confined to the mines and the plantations. Furthermore, because the formation of a stable proletariat, capable of reproducing itself in the capitalist sector of the economy came relatively late, for a long time the proletariat retained its links to the land (see Chapter 1). According to the Extracto Estadístico del Perú, in 1926 there were 28,592 workers in mining, a similar modest number in manufacturing, whilst there was a total of 22,540 workers
in the sugar industry including 1,173 women. In the cotton haciendas there were an estimated 40,557 workers in the agricultural year 1922-23 and 11,332 workers in the rice plantations for the agricultural year 1924-25. This constituted only 2.65% from a total population of five million, of whom the vast majority were peasants.

The most important period in Peruvian economic development came after the Second World War when the renewed dynamism of the world economy led to the opening up of new fields of investment in Peru. United States investment leaped from $14.5 million in 1950 to $692 million in 1968. (Portocarrero 1976). From the 1950's there was a broadening of the export base of the economy due to mineral exports during the Korean War and the development of the fishmeal industry. Mining continued to be the most dynamic sector of the economy, and it was not until the 1960's that it was replaced by manufacturing. (Portocarrero, 1974)

The combination of the expansion of the capitalist sector of the economy, combined with the effect of increased market demand on the non-capitalist agricultural sector, led to qualitative changes in the social structure. On the one hand the expansion of industrial activities led to the rapid growth of the urban population and industries associated with construction, distribution, transport, energy and services of all kinds. These developments saw the quantitative expansion of the urban-industrial proletariat and the growth of the urban middle sectors (technicians, teachers, lawyers, engineers etc.)

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1. Figures quoted in Mariátegui (1974:29). See also Bonilla (1974) and Laite (1971) for figures of mineworkers in the Central Sierra, and Sulmont (1975) and Yepes (1972) for the working class in general.
At the same time the expansion and diversification of the capitalist base of the economy heightened the contradictions existing in the agrarian structure between production for the market and non-capitalist relations of production. Landlords and peasants alike tried to increase their part of the disposable surplus and this led to the development of a huge wave of rural struggles, mainly around access to land, but also to some extent around wages, child labour and the provision of schooling. Partly in response to fears of an imminent land reform and partly in response to the internal problems on the estates, landlords began to divide up their properties and to sell small plots of land to their peasant tenants. The freeing of the peasants from the payment of rents produced a massive liberation of labour power from the land which came to form a vast reserve army of labour for the urban centres and the capitalist agricultural plantations. Because of the high level of technical development of the capitalist sector, it was unable to absorb all this surplus labour. Thus the mushrooming of the shanty towns in the 1960's was in great part a response to the creation of a huge proletariat dependent on the informal sector of the economy (that is to say, petty services, petty trading and petty commodity production). At the same time, there was a limited development of capitalist relations of production in the 'traditional' areas of the highlands, which gave rise to a new type of rural proletariat (Quijano, 1973).

Whilst the bourgeoisie did not change its dependency on foreign capital (it continued either to be a junior partner in the multi-nationals, or to control small and medium enterprises) it diversified its interests:
"The bourgeoisie .... diversified its interests and, at the same time, the power base of the agrarian bourgeoisie as well as the bases of the senorial landlords were being reduced and deteriorating. This came precisely at the moment that the bases of imperialist capital had begun to combine the semi-colonial model of accumulation with urban-industrial forms of accumulation." (Quijano, 1973:40)

These developments in the economic base of the country and in the class structure found expression at the ideological level, with the emergence of new political organizations of the bourgeoisie and the proletarist. Amongst the small and medium bourgeoisie, new reformist tendencies emerged in the form of Belaúndism and Christian Democracy. Sections of the working class, particularly the mineworkers and the industrial working class began to show discontent with APRA as it became increasingly pro-imperialist and held increasingly contradictory reformist positions. This was combined with the success of the Cuban revolution, which emphasized the immediacy of further revolutions in Latin America.

5. Belaúnde's Acción Popular party represented the emerging 'middle sector' of Peru, composed of professional and technical workers. Christian Democracy, on the other hand, represented the interests of the emerging national bourgeoisie.

6. APRA, the Alianza Peruana para la Revolución Americana, was founded by Víctor Raúl Haya de La Torre in 1930 with a five-point programme which included: (1) action against Yankee imperialism; (2) the political unity of Latin America; (3) the nationalisation of lands and industry; (4) the internationalisation of the Panama Canal, and (5) the solidarity of all oppressed peoples of the world. For many years its greatest political base lay in the middle sectors of Trujillo who represented the interests of the emerging national bourgeoisie.
and was influential in the formation of many new political groups.7

Until this period, political work amongst the peasants had been given relatively low priority by organized political parties. Whilst parties such as APRA were organizing unions amongst the sugar proletariat they also had electoral ambitions. Because few peasants could pass the literacy requirement which would have enabled them to vote, APRA paid relatively little attention to organizing amongst them. The heterogeneity of the agrarian structure meant that struggles tended to be localized and unco-ordinated in time and space. Samaniego argues:

"Historically peasants have always been involved in politics; although clearly the class of politics has not always been the same. In general, the peasant has been more involved in what we would call 'traditional' politics; recently, since the beginning of the twentieth century, peasants in Chupanca and other zones of Peru have entered into modern politics through formally organized political parties and defined ideologies." (Samaniego, 1973:45)

Thus whilst in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, peasant mobilizations tended to be largely spontaneous, from the 1920's onwards the peasantry began to be given serious consideration as a political force.

7. See Marks (No.21, 1976), Valderrama (1976) and Bejar (1970) on the Peruvian Left.
In the 1920's the indígenismo (indigenous) movement emerged with the granting of rights to peasant communities under the Constitution of 1920, the creation of the Department of Indian Affairs in 1921, and the setting up of the Patronato de la Raza Indígena (the Board for the Indigenous Race) in 1922. In Piura, the Socialist Party under Hildebrando Castro Pozo (the first head of the Department of Indian Affairs) organized the yanaconas of the rice and cotton plantations into unions and also started organizing the colonos of the highland province of Ayabaca. In the 1930's and 1940's APRA began to organize unions on estates where wage labour was being introduced in the sierra, whilst unions were reported to be active in the sierra of La Libertad between 1945-48, and strikes occurred in the haciendas Campodén and Salagual in Cajamarca between 1946 and 1947 (Harding, 1975:228).

The political organization and activity of the peasantry inevitably begged the question of an agrarian reform. In the 1931, the Socialist Party proposed a law for regulating the contracts of yanaconaje, which was rejected. It was not until 1947 that a law was introduced regulating the contracts between yanaconas and the haciendas, which limited the payment of rent to 20% of the harvest and pro-

8. See Sulmont (1975 p. 54 and following) for details of the peasant movements in the period 1914-1924 and the growth of the Asociacion Pro-Indígena.

9. Yanaconas were the share-croppers on the coastal plantations that is, it was a renting relationship operating under conditions of capitalist production (see Chapter 1). Colonos were the renters, paying rents in cash or labour on the highland estates.
hibited unpaid labour practises. (Eguren, 1975:38-9)

Valderrama argues that until the 1950's the peasantry remained marginal to political struggle. (Valderrama, 1975) However, this is only true insofar as the fact that the organizations of the peasantry had little influence on national politics. Sulmont (1975) argues that the influence of APRA whose main base was in the sugar plantations extended well into the surrounding highlands due to the fact that most workers were temporary or seasonal migrants. Thus, returned migrants often took leadership positions in the struggles of their home communities, due to the experience they had obtained in organized politics in the plantations (See Alberti and Sánchez, 1974, and Handelman, 1975). The same was true of the mines, and Bonilla argues that this situation continued into the mobilizations of the 1960's.

"The analysis of the peasant mobilizations which occurred in the 1960's ..... (in the Central Sierra), as in the Southern Sierra of Peru, has revealed the role played by the mining areas in awakening the consciousness of the peasants as a social force. The 'invasions' of haciendas, for example, were led by peasants who had spend some time in the mines before returning to their communities. Until the last two decades, the mining centres and their unions were practically the only channels of political socialization for the peasants of the Centre ..... In effect, the permanent transitionality of the worker himself, has been converted into an extraordinary force of mobilization of groups of his own class as well as of the peasants." (Bonilla, 1974a:48)
By the time of the 1956 elections all political parties were promising land reform. However, attempts by the Prado régime to fulfil electoral promises were limited to setting up a commission to investigate the means of fostering small and medium private enterprise in agriculture. In the late 1950's there was a resurgence of peasant activities: on the coast there were struggles against redundancies and for union recognition (Valderrama, 1976; Eguren, 1975) and these were followed by a wave of reinvindicaciones de tierras, whereby lands usurped by haciendas were recuperated by invading peasant communities. These occurred particularly in the departments of Cerro de Pasco, Huánuco, Junín and Tarma in the Central Sierra. (see Kapschí, 1975; Handelman, 1975; Hobsbawm, 1974; and Smith, 1978) In the Southern Sierra – in Puno and Cuzco – a new federation of peasant unions was established which acted within the legal "rules of the game" as well as outside them. 10 The composition of these unions was heterogeneous, and they included workers, hacienda peasants and peasant community members, achieving a high level of political and para-military organization. All these mobilizations used the tactic of direct action, occupying lands in dispute or refusing to pay the landlord the rent for the lands they worked. In 1963 a general strike was called in Cuzco which paralysed the department.

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10. Hugo Blanco's "Land or Death: the Peasant Struggle in Peru" (1972) is the most important source on the ideology and strategy behind the political activities of La Convención. Blanco himself was the key organizer of the unions. See Fioravanti (1974), Hobsbawm (1969b) and Craig (1968) for analyses of events there.
In the latter half of the year, there was a wave of mobilizations and invasions in Puno, Ayacucho, La Concepción, Satipo and Tarma, (Valerrama, 1976). Harding notes that there were 114 haciendas occupied in Cuzco alone in 1964. (Harding, 1975).

In response to these mobilizations a series of attempts were made by the government to tackle the question of agrarian reform. Pedro Beltrán set up the Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization in 1959 with the aim of syphoning off part of the surplus rural population into colonization schemes and encouraging the division of estates by private initiative. However, the proposed law was not accepted. In 1962, the military junta which came to power proposed the expropriation of all uncultivated lands. This also failed to become law. There were various other attempts during this period, such as the laws D.L. 14238 and D.L. 14444, neither of which came to anything. The first Land Reform Law which was actually implemented (though to limited extent) was the D.L. 15037 passed by the Belaúnde régime in 1964. However, this was aimed primarily at expropriating haciendas in zones of exceptional rural unrest, or "feudal" haciendas and was not widely implemented.11

Needless to say, it should be pointed out that the introduction of an Agrarian Reform Law which was only partially implemented has a contradictory effect on struggles in the rural sector.

11. See Bourque and Scott Palmer (1975) for a discussion of the extent of implementation of the Belaúnde law. They argue that of the 100,000 families which Belaúnde claimed to have benefited by the reform, more than 70,000 received their land by virtue of de facto occupation of lands, which merely legitimized by the law.
Whilst it aimed to dampen peasant land hunger in conflictive zones, it actually had the effect of heightening conflicts in the zones where it was not applicable. Horton writes:

"A major conclusion of my fieldwork is that non-enforcement of the 1962 law had a detrimental affect on agricultural production and investment, and increased peasant pressures for land redistribution. Fearing expropriation, landlords 'mined' agriculture ....... (they) also attempted to expel their colonos in order to reduce the social burden on their estates, and to avoid future conflicts with peasants over rights to crop land and pastures and possible expropriation under the 1964 land reform law."

(Horton, 1974: vii-viii)

Moreover, the Left, drawing on the foco strategy of the Cuban revolution, initiated a series of guerrilla fronts in the highlands, to a large extent tailending the peasant struggle.12

It has been claimed that the armed forces also learnt lessons from the massive military campaign which was mounted to eliminate the guerrilla.

12. See Bejar (1970) and Valderrama (1976) for a discussion of the guerrilla fronts. Bejar writes: " Held back by its lack of audacity, the Left had voluntarily isolated itself from the popular upsurge and so was unable to use it to link the peasants' demands to the objectives of the revolution. Thus in 1962, it lost a revolutionary opportunity." (Bejar, 1970: 58-9) Debray, in "A Critique of Arms"(1977) makes a negative evaluation of the guerrilla "foco" strategy, criticising its efficacy when it is not linked to the struggles of the masses in general. Debray himself was responsible for the propagation of the "foco" strategy in his earlier writings.
This is supposed to have given rise to a distinctive school of thinking within the Centre of Advanced Military Studies, the CAEM, which emphasized internal economic development and reforms as an alternative to insurgency and counterinsurgency.\(^{13}\) (See Villaneuva, 1972)

The background to the military intervention of 1968 was thus the product of a crisis within the dominant classes; the bourgeoisie was the economically dominant class, but was unable to introduce a new structure of development which would enable it to organize its interests more effectively. However, political power, in the form of the control of the institutions of the state and powerful lobbies such as the National Agrarian Society (the SNA, which represented the landlords' interests) was held by the agro-export oligarchy.\(^{14}\) This prevented the emergent bourgeoisie from introducing a series of reforms to alter the traditional structure of domination. One of the most crucial areas for reform was the landholding structure, which was a major barrier to the development of industry and to commercial agriculture and at that time, a major cause of unrest in the rural areas. This was beginning to undermine the regime's ability to control the dominated classes. The Belaúnde régime: (1963–68) represented an unsuccessful attempt to solve these problems.\(^{15}\)

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13. This aspect has nearly always been overemphasized in analyses of the military regime which came to power in 1968. This argument has generally been based on the analysis of military journals during this period and it has not been proven that they have that much to bear on military strategy.

14. See Malpica (1964) for a breakdown of the oligarchy's interests.

15. See Ferner (1977) for a discussion of the crisis which pertained before the military coup. He also analyses in detail the class interests represented by the military régime.
"In the context of the political conditions which obtained before the coup, the various interests which were beginning to shape the Peruvian economy could express themselves only through compromises amongst the various bourgeois sectors, none of which was able to exercise hegemony, through necessary concessions to increasing pressures from dominated and intermediate groups." (Quijano, 1971:13)

In order to understand the nature of the agrarian reform, it is at first necessary to understand the reform as reflecting certain class interests which were represented in the régime. Robles Tarma argues:

"An agrarian reform is a conscious intervention by a class or sectors of a class, or even the result of the conciliation of the interests of different social classes, in order to reorganize social relations in the countryside with respect to the objectives defined by it or the groups which direct or implement it. As such, an agrarian reform is a political project..... The essence of the agrarian problem (and also its solution) thus lies neither in the shortage of land, the lack of inputs, credit or technology, nor in faulty distribution mechanisms. The essence of the agrarian problem should not be sought in the shortage or abundance of resources, but in the relations between men."

Whilst it is true that an agrarian reform is primarily a method for creating the conditions for the better development of capitalism, it also comes out of the dynamic created by the conflict between classes. In Peru, it was not the case that the land
reform represented an index of the revolutionary power of the peasantry; the peasant struggles were too heterogeneous and lacking in national organization and strategy for this to be the case. It has been argued that agrarian reforms are introduced when the national bourgeoisie considers that it has sufficient political power to break with the traditional land-owning classes. (Valderrama, 1975) In Peru, it was a weak rather than a strong bourgeoisie which implemented the reform, which explains to a large extent the contradictory aims that it held.

The military régime and the agrarian reform. 16

The agrarian reform law, passed on June 24th 1969, was one of a series of reforms introduced by the military regime which included the reorganization of industry and mining, the nationalization of the fishing industry and the partial nationalization of banking and commerce combined with a new nationalistic foreign policy. The three main components of the régime's policy was therefore the undermining of the oligarchy's traditional economic and political base, which enabled a modernizing of the economic structure, the expansion of the state's role in planning and organizing the economy, and an attempt to organize political relationships through corporate institutions such as the Industrial Community. Cotler argues that these measures enabled the state to take a central role as an entrepreneur in the economy, thus carrying out some of the tasks implemented by the bourgeoisie in other states, for example in Europe. (Cotler, 1975:53)

Whereas previous proposals for an agrarian reform in Peru had always been limited to the abolition of "feudal" landholding and practices, the reform introduced by the military had the distinct-
ion of being directed against the modernized agricultural sector as well. This meant that the foreign-controlled plantations on the northern and central coast – principally the sugar plantations and to a lesser extent, cotton and rice plantations – were some of the first to be expropriated by the régime. Shortly before the introduction of the reform, the strife-ridden livestock estates of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation had been expropriated under the stipulations of the reform law passed by the Belaúnde régime.

The scale of the changes introduced by the agrarian reform make it by far the most influential and irreversible of the changes introduced to Peruvian society by the régime. The Reform intended to expropriate 9 million hectares and to benefit 340,000 families. The largest part of this land area, 80.6%, was to be given over to Agrarian Production Cooperatives (the CAP's) and the Agrarian Societies of Social Interest (the SAIS's).

16. A number of recent works have evaluated the economic and political consequences of the 1969 Agrarian Reform. See for example Scott (1972), Zaldívar (1974), Harding (1974 & 1975), Valderrama (1976) and Cañadón (1976), for global analyses, though the authors emphasize different points in their analyses. For case studies see Montoya et al. (1974), Roberts and Samaniego (1976), Long and Winder (1975) on the Central Sierra; Valderrama and Arce (1974), Deere (1977), Rainbird and Taylor (1977) and Taylor 1979 on Cajamarca; Mejía and Díaz (1975), Eguren (1975) and Castañón and Martinez (1975) on its affect on the coastal plantations. Horton (1974) gives a comprehensive overview using case studies from all over Peru, whilst Bayer (1975) analyses the effect of the land reform on the zones of minifundismo.
Lands held by peasant communities were also to increase slightly. (See Table 1):

**Table 1: Adjudication objectives of the Agrarian reform programme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Adjudication (a)</th>
<th>Area Thousands</th>
<th>Beneficiaries Thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual production (b)</td>
<td>61,376</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operatives</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>3,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal co-operatives (c)</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIS</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3,475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Has.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual production (b)</td>
<td>61,376</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operatives</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>174.5</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal co-operatives (c)</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIS</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**: 62,634 | 9,000 | 100.0 | 340.0 | 100.0

**Source:**
Convenio Ministerio de Agricultura, Agencia Internacional para el Desarrollo, Fundación para el Desarrollo Nacional Estudio de Evaluación del Problema de Carnes en el Perú (Lima 1973) Vol.6

(a) By 'Adjudication' we mean the institutional form in which the expropriated land passed to the peasants.

(b) This assumes that the adjudications to 'grupos campesinos' have been included under this heading.

(c) This is concerned with lands which were adjudicated to peasant communities, which are supposed to be worked co-operatively, but which rarely are in practice. (taken from Caballero 1976:5)

The scale of the expropriations, combined with the Government's policy of social participation and the creation of co-operatives, has led some analysts (eg. Chaplin, 1976) to argue that the military was a corporatist régime attempting to conciliate class conflict. This view accepts, on face value, policy statements made by the régime about its policy of 'social participation'. Although institutions such as the Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS - the Government agency for social mobilization) and the Comunidad Industrial (the industrial community - essentially a profit-sharing device) were set up to implement this policy, they were actually
a means of imposing authoritarian control on the proletariat and the popular sectors. They were primarily manipulative and used the ideology of class conciliation in order to divide existing union structures and to mobilize sectors of the masses in support of the Government. Thus, although elements of corporativism were present at the institutional level, corporativism did not characterize the régime as a whole, (Esteves, 1978). It primarily represented the interests of the bourgeoisie and was not situated above the class struggle. However, due to the conditions in which the military came to power, concessions were made to the proletariat and the peasantry due to its lack of political support from the class whose interests it was supposed to be representing.

Needless to day, the régime's need to seek popular support had the effect of further alienating support from the dominant class. The strengthening of the state itself, combined with populist policies, made private investors insecure since the extent to which the private sector was to be nationalized was not clear. On the one hand the régime gave certain benefits to the popular sectors - the redistribution of the land, profit-sharing schemes in industry, the building of facilities in the barriadas (the shanty towns), which were designed as political measures to obtain their support. On the other hand, the economic policies of the régime were geared towards an expansion of the industrial sector, which brought, as a consequence, the greater incorporation of the dominated classes into industrial production and the growth of their political and trade union

17. The lack of confidence of the dominant class in the policies of the Velasco régime can be demonstrated by the reduction of investments in the private sector. Between 1968-75 public investment increased by an annual average of 22.1% compared to 5.1% in the private sector.
organizations. Thus the state, in pursuing populist policies, sought controlled support from the working class and the peasantry whilst constantly running the danger that in attempting to gain support in this way, its own limited objectives for social participation would be surpassed by the demands of mass mobilizations.

The contradictory nature of the régime's policies - nationalism and populism - combined with its lack of support from the industrial bourgeoisie, made an early characterization of the régime problematic. The fact that the strengthening of the state sector of the economy was accompanied by the opening of diplomatic and commercial relations with the socialist bloc, led Conservatives and even some Left-wing commentators to characterise Peru as socialist, or at least on the path to socialism, (see Hobsbawn, 1971b, for example). However, a closer examination of the reforms and expropriations reveals them to be a nationalist and anti-oligarchic.

The military themselves never professed a critique of capitalism, nor had the intention to break with capitalist forms of production.

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18. Perner (1977) notes that there was a rapid growth in unions in the early years of the régime, which is, in part, attributable to the régime's tactical alliance with the Peruvian Communist Party, which allowed for the strengthening of the Trade Union movement under PCP control. At the same time an increasingly class conscious, militant trade unionism was emerging which sought to break the collaborationist policies of the leadership of the Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos (the CGTP, the PCP-dominated trade union federation). This was particularly strong amongst the metal workers and the miners. There were an increasing number of strikes after the military came to power, in mining, in industry, in export agriculture and amongst public employees. In 1971 there were 377 strikes; in 1972 - 396 strikes and in 1973 - 788 strikes. The general strike of July 1977, followed by the general strike of January 1978 demonstrate that the general trend is towards increasing militancy.
They emphasized that they wanted "a pluralistic and humanistic society based on social democracy of full participation", that it was a revolution that was "neither communist nor capitalist, but Peruvian" (see Cotter, 1975). The modernizing ideology of the régime, on the other hand, is apparent in many speeches published by the régime:

"Our standpoint is absolutely clear: all we want is that abroad nobody thinks about us as a country that can be maintained in a semi-colonial stage or subjugated by means of threat or buying of wills; internally we want to let everyone know that we promote a peaceful revolution which, avoiding chaos and violence, makes real a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and improves the living standard of the majority of our people."


Therefore, reforms were aimed primarily at foreign and oligarchic control of the economic enclaves, which thus passed to state control, whilst industrial expansion was encouraged through state, foreign and national capital investment. Peru's dependency was no longer that of a primary export economy based on enclave production but had accommodated itself to a new relationship with the international economy and foreign capital which allowed for the development of manufacturing industry and the opening of the internal market.

Different phases in the implementation of the agrarian reform can be distinguished which are related to changes in the balance of forces within the military during this period (Valderrama, 1975).
The existence of divisions within the military explains some of the contradictions with the régime's strategy as a whole. It is worth considering these divisions briefly before examining agrarian reform in detail since they are enlightening with respect to the changing political orientation of the Government. This is true in particular of the changes which occurred with the introduction of the 'second phase' of the revolution after September 1975, after which many of the earlier anomalies were swept away with the consolidation of right-wing forces within the cabinet, which led to the increasing repression of the trade unions and the political parties, and the suspension of the right to strike.

Basically, three main groups can be distinguished amongst the group which came to power in 1968. Firstly, there was a group which was prepared to use fascist-like police repression with respect to the organized working class. This was particularly evident with the MLR (the Revolutionary Labour Movement) created on the Government's initiative and its infiltration of trade unions, attacks on trade union leaders etc. This group became increasingly influential after Velasco's illness in 1975, and more recently, in 1978 when there has been the creation of the Peruvian Anti-Communist Alliance (the AAP) which has led attacks on prominent trade unionists and popular leaders (Murphy, 1978:1026). Secondly, there was the technological-developmentalist line which sought the enlargement of state control of the economy, but which emphasized the need for private investment and the development of private industry alongside the state sector. Morales Bermúdez - the Minister of Economy under Velasco, represented this tendency within the military, which was consolidated when he assumed the presidency in September 1975. The third main tendency was represented by progressive elements such as Rodríguez Figueroa and Maldonado who favoured increased workers' participation
in industry. This group fought for re-distributive policies, and wanted to forge the peasants and workers into a powerful social sector which would allow for the introduction of so-called socialist relations of production in the countryside. Their ideology was reflected in the left-wing intelligentsia employed in the Ministeries and the state sector during this period: "a curious amalgam of anarchism, co-operativism and self-management". (Caballero, 1976:17)

Stages in the implementation of the agrarian reform

It has been indicated above that divisions within the military gave their political strategy an initial lack of coherence. These same divisions also gave rise to changes in tactics due to pressures brought on the régime by different social classes. The pattern the implementation of the agrarian reform took was thus a reflection of and a response to the balance of social forces in the countryside.

Valderrama (1976) has distinguished three main phases in the development of the régime's policy towards the agricultural sector:

1/ From June 1969 to the beginning of 1972 - the period in which the power base of the oligarchy was destroyed and attempts were made to strengthen the small and medium Commercial farmers.

2/ From the beginning of 1972 to the beginning of 1974, this period saw the emergence of a new model of state intervention in agriculture whereby attempts were made to organize the rural workers as a support base for the régime.

3/ From 1974 onwards, the period was referred to as 'la consolidación del proceso' in official literature, during which the economic crisis led the Government
to lay increasing emphasis on the technocratic and productive aspects of the reform. Valderrama argues that throughout the implementation of the reforms, the military retained the initiative in the countryside.

(Valderrama, 1976:24 - see also Aldúnate, 1976)

In the first phase of the agrarian reform, government policy clearly set out to break the power base of the oligarchy. The oligarchy was viewed by the government as a parasitic class which hindered rather than encouraged the economic development of the country.

"The oligarchy are not industrialists and entrepreneurs who contribute to the formation of the wealth of the country and understand that capital has a social responsibility. The oligarchy prevents the growth of true industrialization in Peru, and has always been on the side of the international consortii."

(Comercio, Lima 12th October 1969; quoted in Valderrama 1976:26)

As with other sectors of the economy, the military attempted to eliminate oligarchic and foreign control of the production of primary exports in the economic enclaves, but tended to strengthen the role of foreign and national capital in manufacturing and processing (Quijano, 1971). The fourteen major sugar complexes were expropriated by military operation the night of the publishing of the agrarian reform. The element of surprise was so great in the operation that the owners had no time to decapitalize their holdings. (Aldúnate, 1976:18). Cotton and rice estates were also expropriated on the Central and Northern coast, whilst the vast cattle-ranching estates of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the central sierra had already been intervened shortly before the passing of the reform under the provisions of Belaúnde's reform.
The military envisaged that the transfer of capital to the manufacturing sector would take place through the payment of compensation. Cash payments to former landlords were limited, though the law allowed for payment in bonds over a 20 years period for sums up to 5/270,000 (≈6,236:5/ .= 2.3$ 1971) Above these limits, bonds were to be exchanged for shares of stock in state enterprises. The landholders also had the right to cash bonds at the Banco Industrial at 100% face value on condition that a sum of equal value was invested in new industrial plant. (Quijano 1971:16).

Despite these provisions, the manner of payment of compensation did not favour the landlords. The sums paid were considerably less than the market price of the land, and payment in bonds under conditions of rapid inflation could only be prejudicial. Furthermore, though cattle estate owners were paid in cash for their livestock, this evaluation was based on technical and not market value. Therefore many landowners decapitalized their estates well before the procedure for expropriation was started (Horton, 1974; Caballero, 1976).

In fact facilities offered to landlords for transferring investment to other sectors of the economy were not favourable: investment by bonds was confined to the state-controlled sector, and due to the particular conditions of agricultural production which produce a higher than average profit it was hard for landlords to find such attractive investments outside agriculture. The mechanisms set up for re-investment in industry did not function effectively. By 1975 the number of projects financed by bonds was minimal, and less than 2% of the bonds issue had been invested. (Caballero 1976:40)

19. See footnote No.5 in Chapter 1
These attempts to transfer capital to the industrial sector from the agricultural sector were accompanied by attempts to strengthen commercial farming where it existed and to stimulate it with co-operative organizations where it did not already exist. (Harding 1974)

It aimed to eliminate traditional systems of excessively large and excessively small holdings, through the promotion of small and medium-sized commercially viable holdings. To this purpose, the régime set up production co-operatives where large scale units would suffer economies of scale from sub-division, and encouraged private land divisions where economies of scale would not suffer so (eg. in the cotton and rice growing areas). In practice, rather than eliminating excessively large and small holdings, the reform actually created a greater concentration of landholding than had pertained prior to the reform, and failed abysmally to re-organize the vast sector of minifundismo, as Table 2 demonstrates.

Table 2 : Distribution of Land Ownership by size before and after the Agrarian Reform

<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% units</td>
<td>% area</td>
<td>% units</td>
<td>% area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5 has.</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 100 has.</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - 500 has.</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 500 has.</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Caballero, 1976:19
Attempts to encourage the formation of a class of agricultural entrepreneurs based on medium size agricultural property were unsuccessful. This was partly because a large number of the divisions of the large estates were fictitious and represented no change in the status quo. However, pressure was also exerted by the large landowners through their agricultural association, the Sociedad Nacional Agraria (the National Agrarian Society), and through their kinship and affinal ties to the medium producers to prevent such a differentiation. 20 This provoked the Government to close the SNA in 1972.

If the Government failed to find support for its agricultural policies amongst the medium agrarian bourgeoisie, then it also found that the private parcelations were bitterly opposed by the workers on the estates, most of whom came off very badly from the divisions. They were often thrown off the land and turned into casual labourers, since the people the landlords sold the estates to or parts of the estates to were not peasants but the friends and relatives of the landowners. It has been estimated that in Cañete 2,000 permanent labourers (40% of the labour force) were deprived of their jobs due to the decreased labour requirements of the small landholding units. (Zaldívar, 1971:33). Moreover, the divisions, real or fictitious, of the estates were often used deliberately as a union-splitting device, since the minimum number of works necessary to form a union is 20, (Eguren, 1975:49). For example, in the Chancay Valley the haciendas Lauré, Jesús del Valle, San José, Caci, Boza and Cuyo were divided into between two to twelve lots, whilst Huando was sub-divided into 63 lots. (Majía and Díaz, 1975:103). This gave rise to

20. See Harding (1975) and Rainbird and Taylor (1977) on the mobilizations of the Committees for the defence of small property.
numerous mobilizations against the private divisions of the land, to the extent that the Government was forced to modify the conditions for private sub-division at the end of 1969 and to annul many private sub-divisions, (Harding 1974; Mejía and Díaz 1975; Valderrama 1976)

The speed and effectiveness of the implementation of the agrarian reform proceeded at markedly different rates in the coast and the sierra. Because agriculture on the coast was more commercialized and wage labour relations pertained, it was easier to implement co-operative policies. The commercial organization of the enterprises meant it was relatively easy for the estate to pass from private to co-operative ownership with no great disruption of production. Moreover, since the majority of the labour force was proletarianized there was no conflict of interests between the efficient running of the enterprise and individual aspirations for land ownership.

In the sierra, in contrast, the uneven development of capitalism, combined with the special conditions of exploitation in the highlands meant that co-operative organization was more problematic. Social relations of production under the estate system had included renting systems as well as wage labour. Some estates had employed solely wage labour, whilst others had combined it to varying degrees with renting systems and pre-capitalist forms of subjugation of the labour force. Therefore it was difficult to establish co-operatives under these conditions since in many instances there had been no organization of commercial production along capitalist lines prior to the reform. Moreover, the very fact that some estates had tried unsuccessfully to engage in commercial production had produced peasant mobilizations against increased labour obligations and rents and in defence of small plot production.
They had engaged in these struggles in order to throw off the yoke of estate domination and to retain a greater part of the surplus they created for themselves. Under these circumstances the acceptance of a co-operative organization of production was unlikely.

The CAP's (the Agrarian Production Co-operatives) were introduced mainly on the coast, though some were introduced on the commercial estates in the sierra. This involves the passing of the ownership of the estate to the members of the co-operative, whilst the estate remained under state control during the period of payment of the agrarian debt (20 years). In theory the General Assembly of the Co-operative members and its Committees of Administration and Supervision were the organs of decision-making on the co-operative, and a portion of the profits of the enterprise were distributed to the members each year.

In the sierra, the complicated way in which the estates drew on tied labour and the labour of independent smallholders and community members meant that co-operative working of the land and division of profits was much harder to organize. This was especially true where there was a commercial section of the estate employing a permanent wage labour force in addition to extracting surplus labour and surplus product from peasant tenants. The structure of the SAIS (Society for Agrarian Social Interest) was set up to cope with these special conditions, though with little palpable success. It has been extremely difficult to get peasant smallholders to work in the commercial sectors of the co-operatives and there have been many instances of co-operatives being invaded by neighbouring pea-

21. For example, the CAP La Colpa in Cajamarca. However, this was a rarity and a response to the fact that co-operative workers refused to share profits with the neighbouring minifundistas through a SAIS.
sant smallholders, to the extent that in Cajamarca the SAIS La Pauca, the SAIS Atahualpa the SAIS José Carlos Mariátegui are in danger of disintegration, (Rainbird and Taylor, 1977:62). It has been argued that the conception of the SAIS has been based on the false assumption of the existence of common interests amongst the community peasants of the sierra. Their long-standing involvement in the monetary economy and patterns of seasonal and temporary migration for wage labour employment mean that there is now no common interest in the agricultural economy. There is also considerable social differentiation within the communities:

"In a certain respect, given the way the SAIS is structured and the national economy of the countryside, the SAIS has been introduced too late to help the villages. The way in which the villages are articulated to the national economy, basically in order to take advantage of surplus labour power in the form of seasonal and temporary labour, means that the villages can not be integrated into the SAIS."

(Roberts and Samaniego 1976:87)

In other zones in the sierra where there had been no development of commercial agricultural production prior to the reforms, attempts to introduce co-operatives met the fierce resistance of the peasantry. Not only were the co-operative plans in contradiction with their aspirations for individual private property, but the co-operative plans were not on firm foundations where there had been no pre-existing commercial exploitation. Where landlord production had been at the same low technological level as the peasant plots, there was no advantage of scale to be made without large inputs of capital and technology. Moreover, attempts to set up communal work projects necessarily conflicted with the interests of individual small-
holding production. In many instances successive plans were drawn up for a CAP, a SAIS and rejected by the peasants. Ultimately, a compromise institution was created, the Grupo Campesino, which in the last analysis is no more than individual holdings held by joint legal title.

Caballero (1976) has noted the predominance of political criteria over economic considerations in the formulation of the programme for this agrarian reform. This lack of a clear relationship between the general objectives of the reform and the concrete measures contained in the law is nowhere more evident than in the sierra.

A further reason for resistance to the régime's co-operative policy was that despite the espoused ideology of egalitarianism, there was a strict hierarchization of control and inequality in decision-making between technical and administrative staff and the rest of the members. Attempts were made to undermine existing trade union structure by refusing to recognize them as negotiating bodies, and union leaders were prevented from becoming members of the Committees (Mejía and Díaz, 1975:124). This was accompanied by the Labour authorities rescinding on their responsibilities in labour disputes, and responsibility for industrial relations passing to SINAMOS (Valderrama 1976; Aldunate 1976)

In summary, the military régime's policy in the agricultural sector initially won it spontaneous support from the peasants and workers who benefitted from it. However, the limitations of the co-operative policy soon became apparent; there was a tight vertical control over the co-operative members, they had little effective power in decision-making, there were restrictions on trade union
activity, and the temporary workers, the *eventuales*, were excluded from the benefits. In fact in many instances technical and productivity considerations were allowed by technicians and co-operative members alike to over-rule social considerations of stability of employment and the right to work - thus there was a tendency to decrease the numbers of workers benefiting from the co-operative and the employment of new machinery rather than additional workers.

Mass mobilisations by the rural workers against loopholes in the law and repressive aspects of the co-operative policy forced a reformulation and a radicalization of the reform (Harding 1974, Esteves 1978). Strikes against the private parcelations such as Huando in October 1970, the general strike in Chancay in May 1973 and the bloody clashes which occurred in Ancash at the same time forced the Government to speed up plans to create integrated development projects (PID's) to give temporary workers the same rights as permanent workers and to make a more even regional distribution of benefits from the more to the least productive enterprises.

Furthermore, land occupations, for example, the 80 or so which occurred in Piura between September 1972 and mid-1973 forced the Government to legally recognize expropriations in the form of *faits accomplis*. Therefore the Government was not only forced to radicalize existing legislation by popular mobilizations, but was also led to extend the provisions of the reform to sectors which had been specifically excluded. Thus profit-sharing schemes were introduced in the non-reformed sector, farms were threatened with expropriation for non-compliance with labour legislation and farms which had been earlier exempted were expropriated, (Harding 1974; Valderrama 1976)

As a result of these developments, the second phase of implementation of the reform, from the beginning of 1972 to the beginning of
1974, demonstrates the Government's recognition of the bankruptcy of previous policy towards the entrepreneurial sector. Instead, greater emphasis was given to the co-operative sector and the widening of the state's role in planning.

This phase saw the expansion of the state bureaucracy in the countryside in order to co-ordinate regional development policies and to develop infrastructure to support changes in land tenure. Thus schemes for Integrated Development Projects were set up (PIAR's); there were 52 in existence in April 1973, and another 53 planned for the end of 1974, whilst it was estimated that 75% of productive land would be in the hands of various kinds of co-operative organizations by the end of 1975, (see Harding, 1974:14). Many of these projects existed only on paper, but even as a programme for re-organization they met considerable opposition: not just from the peasant smallholders in the sierra who wanted to hold on to their tilling and grazing rights, but also from co-operative members who did not want to see a dilution of their profits through re-distributive policies, (see Rainbird and Taylor, 1977:63). Furthermore, small and medium landowners, alarmed by the snowballing effect of the reforms, organized protest marches and Committees for the Defence of Small and Medium Property, often pulling in the less perspicacious elements of their peasant labour forces to support them. (Harding, 1974; Rainbird and Taylor, 1977)

A section of the state bureaucracy was also set up to intervene in the commercialization of agricultural inputs and products. The main institutions set up were the Empresa Peruana de Servicios Alimenticios (EPSA) for the sale and distribution of agricultural products bought at fixed prices, and the Empresa Nacional de Comercialización de Insumos (EMCI) for the sale and distribution of fertilizers, pesti-
icides and improved seeds etc. to the producers. Government prices paid for agricultural produce tended to be low and did not change with variations in the market price of the produce; thus in 1974 cotton producers were being paid well below the market price (Castañon and Martínez 1975), whilst differentials in buying and selling prices between the highlands and the coast were not made good to the peasant producers in the highlands. Needless to say, infrastructural facilities tended to benefit the large reformed enterprises rather than the small producers who are unable to make advantages of economies of scale or to invest large amounts of capital. The same was true of the Government's credit policy extended through the Banco de Fomento Agrario (the agricultural development bank); credit facilities tended to benefit the large reformed enterprises, namely the export agricultural sector on the coast. Eguren notes that between 1957 and 1974 the structure of credits issued by the BFA hardly varied; in 1957 81% of credit was directed to the coast, 12% to the sierra and 7% to the selva. In 1974 these figures were 67%; 14% and 19% respectively, (Eguren, 1976:26). Furthermore, irrigation projects established through foreign technical and financial aid, such as Olmos and Tinajones in the North and Majes in the South, were mainly to the benefit of the coast.

A further feature of the extension of the state bureaucracy into the countryside was the Government's policy of 'social participation'. This was aimed at legitimizing the re-organization of agriculture and to win popular support for the régime through the building of a vast organization of peasant and rural proletarian bases.

The law D.L 19400 passed to May 1972 laid down norms for the structure and functioning of agrarian organizations (see Winder, 1978). It established that existing base units such as the CAF's, the SAIS's,
the service co-operatives, the peasant communities and organisations which were still to be set up - the associations of small proprietors (the conductores directos) and the landless peasants - should form Ligas Agrarias (agrarian leagues or associations) in each valley or province. These ligas agrarias were to represent their members as part of a Departmental Federation. The Federations combined to form the National Agrarian Confederation, the CNA. This organizational structure was to constitute the only legitimately recognized channel for representing agricultural interests to the state. The state apparatus was articulated to these organizations through SINAMCS, which was charged with their promotion, recognition and control, and also initially, with the funds of the CNA, (Mejía and Díaz, 1975:126). By the first congress of the CNA in October 1974, it claimed to have set up 123 Ligas Agrarias in 18 Departmental Federations, and counted with the affiliation of 2 million rural inhabitants.

The primary aim of the establishment of the CNA and of parallel developments in industry and the state sector (the creation of the Confederación de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana in the industrial sector and the Sociedad de Educadores de la Revolución Peruana in education) was to neutralize the development of the class conscious trade union movement. In so far as the benefits of the reforms were limited, they succeeded in momentarily dampening political militancy of these sectors of the labour force and to reinforce existing divisions within it. For example, the agrarian reform enabled 2% of the economically active population - the workers on the sugar co-operatives - to receive a third of the resources available for re-distribution in the rural areas. Similarly, the Labour Communities.

22. See Esteves (1978) for an analysis of the Comunidad Industrial
in industry, fishing and mining affected only 250,000 workers, that is to say 12% of the economically active population, (Cotler, 1975:63). However, the organs which were set up to control the participation of the agricultural and industrial work force were vertical structures which allowed no real participation in decision-making. Therefore, the ideology of class conciliation was shattered whenever the government acted in a repressive way towards land invasions or mass mobilizations, and when the organizing bodies of the co-operatives refused legitimate demands for greater workers' control in management. The establishment of a co-optive institutional structure thus produced its own antithesis - the strengthening and growth of the independent trade union movement. For example, in industry, as Ferner argues:

"..... the comunidad industrial went well beyond the logic of a primarily co-optive institution and became an element seriously compromising the capitalist's control of the firm and its operational efficiency. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, it created a dynamic of its own from which it was difficult to retreat. Instead of integrating the workforce into the firm, it served in many cases as an arm of the class struggle, interacting in unforeseen ways with the trade union organization. " (Ferner, 1977:35)

In the agricultural sector the Peasant Federation of Peru, the COP, was reconstructed at the same time as the formation of the CNA. Although it is considerably smaller than the CNA, it has some 173,000 members and has demonstrated its ability to channel the demands of its membership independently of government control.

Finally, it should be added that the conclusion of the agrarian reform process in June 1976 left many of the peasant base of the CNA
disillusioned. Despite government tutelage and bureaucratic control, the different memberships of the CNA were increasingly converging in their political positions with the CCP and were rejecting positions of support and collaboration with the government, (Pásara, 1976:21). The same process occurred in the CTRP, which supported the General Strike of July 1977, (Peru Bulletin, 1977).

The third and final stage of the implementation of the reform from early 1974 onwards represented a turn to a concern for technocratic aspects of production. This was in response to the economic crisis and the low level of foodstuff production. As a result, the role of SINAMOS was minimized in the countryside, especially its anti-landlord agitation and propaganda concerning peasant participation. Whereas previously land invasions by the rural proletariat (e.g., in Piura) had been legally recognized as de facto expropriations, the struggles of the poor peasantry in Andahuaylas to recover their lands were repressed (Harding 1974, 1975). Consequently, it was in this period that the structural limitations of the agrarian reform became more apparent; it had obviously not really intended to make a massive re-distribution of wealth, it had not benefitted the poor and landless peasants; rather it was concerned with increasing production and productivity, and thus required greater state control over the reformed enterprises. As Valierrama notes:

"The agrarian reform discriminates in its policy with respect to different sectors and systems of production, consolidating a pattern of uneven development in the countryside. The activities of the agrarian reform and the public sector in general (credit, technical assistance, state investment etc.) tend to be concentrated in particular zones or units, where
the process of capitalist development is most advanced, or where conditions for its advance are best. " (Valderrama, 1976:33)

In stimulating the capitalist sector of agriculture and largely neglecting the smallholder sector, the agrarian reform rather than detaining the process of social differentiation and pauperization of the peasantry, has actually enhanced it. Relatively little weight has been attached to the need to reform the smallholder and peasant community sector, and little attempt has been made to support changes in landholding by technical and financial aid. The reform affecting community membership has not substantially changed the distribution of resources within the communities, and if anything has served to polarize the interests of the poor peasants who benefit marginally from the reform, and the wealthier, independent and more commercially-orientated farmers who are disqualified. Long and Winder argue:

"Implementation of the new community reforms in smallholder districts would, therefore, have the double effect of polarizing economic classes at the local level, with possible political ramifications, and of severing links with urban-based groups that have, in the past, played a major role in promoting village improvement schemes." (1975:88)

In fact, evidence suggests that in setting out to promote the medium farmers and the co-operatives, the agrarian reform has actually caused a decapitalization of the smallholder sector. This occurs through

23. For a fuller account of the peasant land occupations in Anda­huaylas, see Sánchez (1977)
mechanisms such as the payment of the agrarian debt, taxes on agricultural property and the sale of agricultural products, government price controls and provisions made by the Dirección General de Reforma Agraria obliging peasants to produce crops of basic foodstuffs for the market without guaranteeing prices, (Bayer, 1975). Furthermore, delays between the expropriation of the estates and legal handing over of the land to the peasants allowed landlords to decapitalize before the peasants either as individuals (nominally as a grupo campesino) or as a SAIS or a CAP took control of production.

Conclusions:

The agrarian reform set out with a series of clearly defined political objectives. It aimed to remove the extremes of large and smallholding from the land tenure structure; it followed a policy which set out to eliminate the large landholders whilst encouraging the development of the small and medium agrarian bourgeoisie (ie. the commercial farmers and traders). The payment of compensation on the expropriated estates was to finance a flow of capital into industry, whilst the removal of absolute rent was to stimulate the expansion of the internal market. The elimination of landlord absenteeism and the more efficient use of lands (often left idle on the estates) were aimed at increasing production and making it more sensitive to market demand. As a spin-off of this rationalization of land resources, an increase in agricultural employment was anticipated, thereby hoping to stem the flow of migrants to the towns. (Caballero, 1976).

In the course of implementation of the reforms, however, a series of problems were encountered which were partly the product of the piece-meal way in which the law was conceptualized and implemented. More
importantly, the reform itself created new contradictions, and the way in which policy developed was largely a reflection of the responses of different class interests in the countryside. These problems arose both at a national level and within individual reformed enterprises.

In general the reform succeeded in creating better conditions for the development of capitalism in agriculture and a back-up for the growth of the manufacturing sector. The mere removal of the parasitical class of landowners was sufficient to do that. However, the political orientation of policy affected each sector of agriculture and each class differently. The major beneficiaries of the reform were those sectors where commercial agriculture was already developed - namely medium-sized enterprises and the co-operative sector of export agriculture. Therefore the overall effect of the reform was to reinforce, though on new terms, the dependent structure of agriculture.

Only restricted sectors of the peasantry and the rural proletariat benefitted from the reforms, (see Cotler, 1975:63). The numbers of minifundistas who were unaffected or whose situation was actually worsened by the consequences of the reform on the market for temporary and seasonal labour far outweighed the numbers of beneficiaries. Even those that benefitted from the reform were lumbered with the payment of the agrarian debt, which paradoxically impeded the very objective of the reform - the stimulation of the development of capitalism in agriculture. Hence Zaldívar argues:

"The bourgeois reform thus creates, again, its own contradiction: the form of payment impedes the development of capitalism in the countryside. Para-
The purpose of capitalist development in the countryside is best served by non-payment for the land, but this is precisely what cannot be done in the context of a capitalist reform. (Zaldívar, 1974:67)

Policy towards the rural sector was part and parcel of the military régime's overall strategy to replace the primary export economy by one based on the strengthening of the manufacturing sector. The special conditions under which the military came to power meant that the state itself had to take on the role of entrepreneur and organizer of the economy. The régime had both political and economic objectives:

"The model of rapid capitalist accumulation required a context of relative social peace, and not one of unrest. This was assured, in the first place, by mechanisms for organizing the subordinate classes along 'corporatist' lines, with the state directly controlling the institutions which represented them." (Ferner, 1976:29)

In the agricultural sector, the constant effect of both the reforms and the expansion of the state administrative apparatus was to reduce the intensity of peasant and rural proletarian struggles. (Zaldívar, 1974). The purpose of the Ligas Agrarias was to channel struggles into bureaucratic structures which did not threaten the régime. Amongst the more highly politicized workers of the coastal plantations, the impact of these manoeuvres has been negligible, since the previous management has been replaced by technicians and state bureaucrats in the reformed enterprises. Co-operative structures, by virtue of their own internal limitations, have opened up new contradictions between capital and labour. The militancy of the...
small peasants has been affected by their receiving land, though there is evidence to suggest that the euphoria is already wearing off, as struggles are increasingly articulated against the state itself.

It is more than evident that one of the major results produced by the implementation of the agrarian reform and the régime's search for political support for its policies has been the strengthening and consolidation of the state apparatus itself. The agrarian reform, then, as Cotler (1975) has remarked, has made way for a new mode of political domination in Peru.
CHAPTER 3: The Hacienda system in its regional context

Introduction:

In this chapter I shall outline the main features of the regional agrarian structure of Cajamarca which are essential for understanding the local operation of the hacienda system. The unevenness of development within the region explains the contrasts to be found between the highly commercialized dairy farms and the more 'traditional' estates. The hacienda Chala in the province of Hualgayoc, where fieldwork was carried out, represents the latter end of the spectrum, and operated in an area where in general commodity production was least developed.

The distinctiveness of Cajamarca compared to other regions of Peru can be related to various factors. The relatively low level of the land (2,000 metres to 4,000 metres) has meant that a system of intensive settled agriculture has evolved, with a high density of population, compared to the predominantly extensive herding economies of other parts of the highlands. Moreover, the fact that the structure of the indigenous peasant community is weak here compared to other regions has meant that haciendas have expanded onto peasant lands, meeting relatively little community-based opposition. The fact that haciendas have often employed large resident labour forces has made difficult any challenges to the haciendas' control of the land.

Settled agriculture, combined with a weak community structure, have meant that landlords have been able to exert high levels of political control over the rural population. This has been in part due to the immense power invested in local landlords by virtue of a relatively weak centralized state. It has also been the case that until the
present century there was a relatively low level of monetization of the rural economy. Urban markets were distant, hence it was difficult for peasants to accumulate capital through commodity exchange which would enable them to make themselves independent of landlord authority. Finally, unlike, for example, the Central Sierra, there has been no significant competition for labour from a vigorous capitalist mining sector. The mines of Cajamarca are small workings which create a very small demand for labour. It has only been with the rise of the sugar and rice plantations on the coast since the turn of the century that a significant demand for wage labour has been created.

The coastal plantations have had a dual effect on the economy of Cajamarca. One the one hand they have created a demand for wage labour which has meant that temporary and seasonal patterns of labour migration have been established amongst the free peasants of Cajamarca. On the other hand they have also created a demand for foodstuffs, with the conversion of their lands to monocultures and with the concentration of population. This has been a major stimulus towards the development of commercial agriculture within Cajamarca itself. This latter development has, in turn, led to the enlargement of the minifundio sector, as landlords have enlarged their productive lands and have shed their tied labour forces by selling off unproductive land to peasant smallholders. The main features of the regional agrarian economy have therefore been the division of the estates and the proletarianization of the peasant smallholders, accompanied by the development of commercial agriculture, particularly dairying.

However, it should be made clear that proletarianization by means of wage labour employment is not the only means whereby peasant households complement their domestic production. Small scale commodity
production has been essential to the livelihood of the small producers insofar as it enables them to acquire means of subsistence which can not be produced on their own plots of land. This small scale commodity production takes the form of the sale of agricultural surpluses on the market and the sale of artisan products.

The first and major part of the chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the agrarian structure of Cajamarca as a whole. The second part will focus specifically on the area around Bambamarca in the province of Hualgayoc, which is an essential background to the analysis of the hacienda in Chapter 4.

The Agrarian structure of Cajamarca

The agrarian structure of Cajamarca has always been characterized by livestock and agricultural production. Until the present century, techniques remained rudimentary, there was relatively little specialization of labour, and landlords extracted surpluses in the form of the servile labour of peasant producers and the extraction of rents in various forms rather than through the wage labour relation. A low level of technical development remained until about the 1920's when the long-standing isolation of the region and poor communications were broken down.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the rural economy of Cajamarca was beginning to recover from the depression of the 1880's and to respond to the demand for foodstuffs and labour created by

1. For reasons of space it is not possible to make a really comprehensive analysis of developments in the agrarian structure in the twentieth century here. However, the most important features and trends will be discussed. The reader is referred to Taylor (1979) for a comprehensive analysis of developments in the agrarian structure of Cajamarca between 1850 and the present day.
the expansion of sugar and rice production on the northern coastal plantations. Whilst the War of the Pacific (1879) had had a devastating affect on the economy as a whole, the highlands of Cajamarca suffered in particular by the invasion of the Chilean army in 1882. During this period many provincial towns of this part of the sierra were sacked and heavy ransoms exacted from the local authorities. Chota, for example, was razed to the ground, San Luis, San Pablo and Cajamarca were sacked, whilst ransoms were exacted from Bambamarca, Hualgayoc, Ichocán and San Marcos, which were paid over the subsequent years by increased rents from the peasantry. Thus the economy was predominantly agricultural, dominated by landholding interests, and emerging from a period of economic depression.

Until this period, the main products exported from the region were grains and livestock. There was little market for produce within the region due to the predominance of a peasant population which gained its subsistence largely from the land. Santolalla Bernal remarked:

"Because industry and commerce are seriously restricted in the department of Cajamarca, the majority of the population work in agricultural tasks as proprietors or as colonos. Their lands produce everything they need from food to clothing. Because of this, the major part of production and harvests are consumed by the producer himself and a small part of the surplus goes for sale in the market."

(Santolalla Bernal, 1918:41)

The landlords found their own production had to be limited due to the lack of local markets. Not only did they have problems, for example, in building up their own herds for the lack of commodities
entering the market (Santolalla Bernal complains of the short supply of sheep and the need to buy livestock outside the region), but, like the peasants, were forced to sell their products at ruinous prices to local merchants who marketed the goods outside the region. Thus, in the absence of good communications with the coast, there was little incentive to increase production.

"To conclude, the landlords find themselves obliged to restrict their production, with the threat of seeing their harvest stored up for prolonged periods, and suffering the risks and losses that this may cause them to run into. In order to produce on a larger scale, the only recourse is to export produce to the populations of the coast and Lima."

(Santolalla Bernal, 1913:43)

Therefore, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the foremost consideration for large scale producers was the problem of the marketing of their products. Whilst there were considerable gains to be made in the price differentials between the highlands and the coast, the transport of products was costly. Santolalla noted that whilst butter sold at between 70 and 90 centavos a pound in Cajamarca, this rose to between 90 centavos and S/0.20 on the coast and in Lima. Similar differences existed between the highland price for cheese, which in Cajamarca went at between 30 and 37 centavos a pound, and on the coast between 45 & 55 centavos. Since the nearest modern transportation system began at the railhead in Chilote, 58 kilometres away from the town of Cajamarca, transportation from the point of production to the railhead was by pack animal. This task was usually part of the labour services performed by the tenants on the estates, who used either their own or the estate's animals to carry the cargos. The fleteros or cargueros (muleteers) were usually paid a nominal wage for this service. In the late 1910's the cost
of transporting a quintal of wheat to Lima was calculated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Per Quintal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carriage to Cajamarca</td>
<td>S/ 0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire of warehouse in Cajamarca</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriage to Chilette and toll</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containers</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency in Chilette, mule to train, carriage to Pacasmayo, guard etc.</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency in Pacasmayo, embarkation costs, guard, police, loading and unloading of carriage, stamps, overtime and official papers</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriage in Callao and minor expenses</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks, robbery etc. 3% of value</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>S/ 2.83</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sentolalla Bernal (1918). (If it is considered that the value of a quintal of wheat was S/0.00 in Lima, it can be seen that a considerable proportion of the costs was actually spent on transportation).

The growth of plantation agriculture on the northern coast of Peru was the main stimulus to the expansion of commercial agriculture within Cajamarca. This demand for foodstuffs arose because the expansion of plantation monoculture and the concentration of under the control of property/large monopolies displaced many small foodstuffs producers on the coast. Moreover, the concentration of a large wage labour force on the plantations meant that the demand for foodstuffs had to

2. The quintal is a traditional measure which is calculated by volume and not by weight. Different products, because they have different bulks, therefore, have a different weight. An almud of what represents 22 lbs., an almud of barley 18 lbs. and an almud of potatoes 20 lbs. A quintal is made up of four almudes. From what I can gather, the arroba is roughly similar to the almud in weight, whilst the carga (literally the amount carried by a beast of burden) was twelve almudes. These measures are still used in the region, as are alforjas (saddle-bags) and latas (cans) in preference to metric weights.
be met by the neighbouring highlands (see Hilare, 1973). This meant that landlords in Cajamarca attempted to expand production, initially by the more efficient use of labour, though by the 1930's they were using the strategy of expanding the area under desmesne production. At the same time, some of the plantations, realizing the advantages of the vertical integration of their investments, bought up estates in the highlands to supply their seasonal demand for labour and their company stores with foodstuffs. The De La Piedra family, for example, who owned various estates on the coast, including Poma lca, bought Udima in the sierra of Cajamarca (Malpica, 1974:109). Moreover, the Guldemeisters, the owners of the Empresa Agrícola Chicama Limitada and one of the largest landowners in the country, also owned Sunchabamba and Huacraruco in the province of Cajamarca and Taulis in the province of Hualgayoc. This constituted a total of 120,000 hectares in the department of Cajamarca alone, (Malpica, 1974:103). The plantation of Cayaltí considered buying Chala to this purpose in 1942 but the contract was never made (Huertes Valdejos, 1974:148)

An indication of the extent of changes in coastal agriculture can be gained by a brief review of sugar, rice and cotton production in the coastal valleys of northern Peru at the opening of the twentieth century. Between 1894 and 1913 the sugar production of the departments of Lambayeque and La Libertad rose from 32,321 to 105,176 metric tonnes and by 1913 these two departments produced over 50% of Peru's sugar output, (Albert, 1976:36a). Cotton and rice production also underwent a phase of expansion in the northern departments. In fact, between 1914 and 1921 rice production doubled in Peru, and most of this increase was accounted for by the department of Lambayeque and the Jequetepeque valley, both of which are adjacent to Cajamarca, (Taylor, 1979 )

3. See Appendix 2 for this document
Until this period, landlords had gained their incomes mainly from peasant rents in various forms. These renting arrangements usually involved variants of cash payment or payment in labour for the usu-fruct of a small plot of land. Both on-farm and off-farm peasants rented land from the landlords, thus despite the large size of the population living off the land, there was considerable differentiation within the peasantry. Servile labour obligations usually extended to all members of the peasant family, including women and children, and if wages were paid for the labour performed, they were notional and paid in kind, rather than taking the form of a monetary wage. Labour relations were usually accompanied by a high level of paternalist authoritarianism, with obligations on the part of the landlord to provide mid-day food rations and loans and protection to the peasant family. The hacienda system was strongest where the Galtung system of production was employed, (see Chapter 1) with the hacienda administration cultivating desmesne lands with peasant labour. Because there was a direct interest in the organization of production on these estates, high level of labour discipline were maintained. On the Grundherrschaft estates, in contrast, the management had no direct role in the process of production and merely collected rents at the end of the year. These estates tended to be owned by institutions such as the Church, Schools and Universities, and contracts were made out to tenants who administered rent collection etc. Because these renters were more concerned with making quick money from rents and labour services than in exploiting the lands efficiently, they increased the numbers of peasant tenants drastically, taking no account of long-term considerations for investment or labour discipline, (see Rainbird & Taylor, 1977)

Consequently, even at the beginning of the twentieth century the landlord class of Cajamarca was beginning to differentiate itself
into those who gained a living from simple rents, and those that sought more active participation in the process of production and in producing for the market. Santolalla Bernal criticizes, for example, the tenant of the hacienda Llaucañ, the province of Huálgayoc:

"The hacendado, instead of dedicating himself to the exploitation of the land is more correctly described as a landlord, charging high prices for his renting contracts and without giving many facilities to the colonos."

(Santolalla Bernal, 1916:23)

Taylor (1979) also notes that in the early years of the century the payment of wages in cash to labour service tenants was being introduced into a few haciendas, replacing payment in kind. In the early 1900's the daily rate paid in Cajamarca was between ten and fifteen centavos, and by 1920 it stood at 33 centavos in the hacienda San Felipe de Combayo and 25 centavos in La Colpa. Despite official legislation (the Right of Remuneration Bill, passed in 1916) the minimum wage of twenty centavos was often not paid, in some estates up until the eve of the agrarian reform. Moreover, as the century progressed, livestock production became increasingly important in the development of commercial agriculture. Cacho Galvez, the owner of the estate Polloc, began to import pedigree Brown Swiss

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4. Núñez del Prado notes: "Directives concerning the salaries and minimum wage for the Indians have been on the books for nearly forty years. The first article of the law no.2285 says that 'the personal work of the Indians shall be remunerated in cash, and it is absolutely prohibited to require them to live in agricultural, industrial or ranching centres against their will ....' Despite these clear directives, not one municipal council in the entire history of Peru has deliberated on the minimum wage for the Indian. The reason is obvious: to establish a minimum wage would mean to have to pay it."

(Núñez del Prado, 1973:53)
dairy cattle from the Argentine in 1916-17, (Taylor, 1979). Landowners in Cajamarca, Cutervo, Bambamarca, Teabamba and Chugur later followed suit.

The methods used by landlords to accumulate capital were various. A common strategy was to sell off an estate or part of an estate either to another landlord or in small lots to the peasant tenants. Rents were also increased, and sometimes exacted in the form of payment in livestock, eg. La Pauca (see Rainbird and Taylor, 1977).

In the area around the mines in Hualgayoc, it was common for landlords to own mine workings as well as agricultural lands, eg. the Sousas, the Mirandas and the Santolallas all had investments in Hualgayoc at the turn of the century. (Pélega Santolallas, 1904)

Estates were also sometimes used as securities on loans, hence a landowner's least productive estates could be mortgaged to finance investments on more intensive units of production. A further, and less easily verifiable form of accumulation was through cocaine processing, which is common throughout the region, since coca leaves are brought overland by pack animal from the semi-tropical lands by the headwaters of the Marañon.

The affect of these strategies on peasant producers were nearly always to their disadvantage. Many smallholders' lands were usurped by landlords, for example, the estate Polloc usurped lands owned by the community of La Encanada in 1907 and La Pauca expropriated the lands of the community of Lic-Lic at more or less the same time (see Taylor, 1979). At the same time, the sale of hacienda lands to the peasant tenants often left them with insufficient land to make a subsistence living since they were usually sold the poorest lands.
Chambeu et al (1975) argue that the predations of the landlords were most effectively resisted by peasant smallholders organised in communities. However, the community structure in Cajamarca is weak compared to other regions of Peru, and most independent peasants live in Caseríos or hamlets. The weakness of the community structure within the region is demonstrated in Table 2:

Table 2: Recognition of Community status by Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>No. communities recognised</th>
<th>% of communities recognised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancash</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apurímac</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arequipa</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayacucho</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuzco</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancavelica</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huánuco</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ica</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junín</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loreto</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moquegua</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasco</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piura</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puno</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacna</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 1,662 100.0

Source
Dobyns, 'Comunidades Campesinas del Perú', (1970:120)

5. It does not necessarily imply that all the communities listed are functioning communities, but it does demonstrate instances where claims to community status have aided local political strategies. See Rainbird (1975), Samaniego (1974) and Smith (1978) for different instances in which this strategy has been used.
The weakness of the independent peasantry is perhaps explained by the fact that Pre-Incaic social organization was not based on the extended kin-group, the ayllu, as it was in other parts of Peru. In Cajamarca, it was the nuclear family that was the primary unit of production and through which usufruct rights to land were received (Espinosa, 1976). Cajamarca is also the department where native languages have had least resistance to the importation of Spanish, as Table 3 demonstrates. The combination of a weak community structure and the lack of persistence of native languages can perhaps be attributed to the short, but extremely destructive period of the Inca Empire in this region, followed rapidly by the Spanish conquest. However, since the present-day peasant community structure of Peru is not so much a survival of pre-capitalist social organization as a reflection of the colonial state's need to organize corvée labour (the mita) for the mines, public works and for the payment of tribute, one can only assume that this was organized differently in Cajamarca. The existence of local mineral workings in Hualgayoc and the colonial woollen textile industry (see Silva Santesteban, 1954) may have meant that Indian labour was required in the department to a greater extent than in other regions. This may underlie some of these organizational differences, whilst developments in the nineteenth and indeed the present century must also be taken into consideration.

The independent peasantry's lack of the traditional forms of organization meant that they were ill-equipped to resist incursions on their land. Thus, the proportion of land controlled by the estates

6. In the region of Cajamarca, the Incas were in power for only 70 years prior to the Spanish conquest in 1532. It was also the first part of the empire to be conquered by the Spaniards. (Espinosa, 1976)
In 2010, the Department of Camarines had the following population demographics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9 years</td>
<td>610,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 years</td>
<td>33,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years</td>
<td>64,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years</td>
<td>68,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years</td>
<td>69,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59 years</td>
<td>76,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69 years</td>
<td>76,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79 years</td>
<td>70,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-89 years</td>
<td>64,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 years and over</td>
<td>410,029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Language: Tagalog

Note: The data provided is from the 2010 Census of the Department of Camarines.
and the proportion of unfree peasants has been high until fairly recently. Deere (1976) refers to data from the 1839 ecclesiastical census which demonstrates that there were twice as many peasants living within the boundaries of the haciendas in Cajamarca, as there were independent smallholders. Valderrama demonstrates that even at the beginning of the twentieth century thirty-seven of the largest estates in Cajamarca held approximately one third of the cultivated land (Valderrama, 1974:2-3). This virtual monopoly of the land by the landlords has meant that they have held an extremely powerful political position within the region. Moreover, this was reinforced by the restricted possibilities for investments outside agriculture and the lack of competition for labour power within the region. The mines at Huálgayoc only employed between 220 and 230 miners at the turn of the century, most of whom were contracted through the enganche system, (Léjaga Santolalla, 1904). This should be compared with a total of 9,651 miners in the whole of Peru in 1905, and 13,361 in 1906, (Sulmont, 1975:252). Though labour recruitment by the coastal plantations began in the highlands in the 1880's, this did not seriously compete with the haciendas for labour until the 1930's.

The economic power of the landlords within the region was reinforced by a high level of political control. As Taylor notes, it was no longer by virtue of personal followings and caudillismo that they ruled, but by virtue of a new relationship with central government authority:

"Under this new political modus operandi, Cajamarca's landlords retained a large degree of autonomy within the Department, but this was no longer due to the near absence of central government control (as in the nineteenth century). Now regional power was exercised thanks to the explicit approval of central authority..."
reflecting a subtle change in the balance of social and political strength between the bourgeoisie and the landowners." (Taylor, 1979:110)

On the other hand, peasant vindications were not only disadvantaged by the peasants' lack of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the landlords and the weak development of peasant organizations, but all expression of political struggle had been seriously dampened by the experience of the Llaucán massacre in 1914. In this incident 150 peasants including men, women and children were brutally killed for protesting against increased rents on the hacienda Llaucán. Alegría refers to this as "the most horrendous hecatomb" (1973:385) and local peasant accounts recall the river Llaucano flowing with blood. 7

Whilst the old patterns of political domination in the region began to change because of the estates' increasing orientation towards commercial production, the independent peasantry began to find themselves less dependent on renting lands from the estates in order to make a livelihood. As the demand for labour on the coastal plantations grew, so migration for short periods of wage labour employment became an increasingly attractive option. This was not just because it meant that the peasants could remain independent of the servile exactions that hacienda renting contracts entailed, but because it enabled them to affirm their position as independent producers (Sulmont, 1975:43) in a period in which the expansion of the estates and population growth were making subsistence production on the basis of a peasant plot increasingly difficult (see Table 4). Because considerable wage differentials existed between the coast and the highlands, temporary migration to the coastal plantations became the

7. See Appendix 1 for documents relating to the Llaucán massacre.
Table 4: Population growth in the Department of Cajamarca, data from 1875, 1940 and 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1876²</th>
<th>1940b</th>
<th>1960c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>55,559</td>
<td>123,070</td>
<td>170,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajabamba</td>
<td>19,168</td>
<td>38,952</td>
<td>55,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celedín</td>
<td>13,502</td>
<td>39,925</td>
<td>57,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contumaza</td>
<td>13,377</td>
<td>27,868</td>
<td>37,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutervo</td>
<td>n.d</td>
<td>52,792</td>
<td>95,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chota</td>
<td>51,016</td>
<td>94,984</td>
<td>114,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hualgayoc</td>
<td>47,298</td>
<td>94,158</td>
<td>100,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaén</td>
<td>12,726</td>
<td>22,663</td>
<td>75,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40,789</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Data from 1876 Census taken from Kubler (1973:35)
b. Data from 1940 Census taken from Anuario Estadístico del Peru (1966)
c. Data from 1961 Census
d. The province of Santa Cruz was created in 1950, by an amalgamation of the districts of Santa Cruz (Hualgayoc) and the districts of Chancaybanaos, La Esperanza, Sexi and Uticyacu of the province of Chota.

most cost effective way of obtaining a cash income. In 1920, for example, the wage rates in the most modern estates in Cajamarca stood at between 25 and 33 centavos, whilst on the estates where servile labour pertained, the nominal wage paid in kind had remained at five centavos for child and female labour and ten centavos for male labour. On the coast the following rates were paid:

Table 5: Wage rates on the coastal plantations, 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male wages</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>S/ 1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaña</td>
<td>S/ 2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jequetepeque</td>
<td>S/ 2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicama</td>
<td>S/ 1.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female wages</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicama</td>
<td>S/ 1.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(This was the only valley where women were employed)

Source Albert (1975:168a, 170a)
The recruitment of Indian labour from the highlands was originally initiated as a response to the drying up of traditional labour sources for the coastal plantations. After the manumission of the negro slaves in 1854, Chinese indentured labour had been employed in the cane fields. 8

By 1876, due to an international scandal about the treatment of the coolies, the sugar plantations were once again faced with a labour shortage. Klaren writes:

"With the gradual recuperation and subsequent expansion of the sugar industry after the War of the Pacific, the labour problem became increasingly critical. Gerardo Elings, a prominent sugar planter in the early decades of the twentieth century, for example, wrote:

'Labour was........ at one time (after the War of the Pacific) the great problem of coastal agriculture. When the author was a boy, he heard this problem constantly discussed everywhere - in the university, parliament, the national press and wherever two hacendados or persons interested in national economic development came together'.

8. See Chapter 1, footnote 13, for figures of Chinese labourers imported to Peru, and their employment by sectors of the economy."
Denied access to traditional foreign labour sources, many planters increasingly began to turn to the sierra Indian to meet their rising labour needs. " (Klaren, 1973:25)

However, whilst a section of the indigenous labour force was free from the land in the sense of not being restricted from migrating by servile ties on the estate system, they were not formally free from the ownership of the means of production. That is to say, they were not fully proletarianized. Thus planters on the coast turned to the enganche system (literally 'the hook') as a method of contracting indigenous labour.

The enganchador or contratista (the labour contractor) was usually contracted by the planter to recruit a specific number of labourers, and was forwarded a substantial amount of money to be used as advance payments to the future workers. The enganchador or his agent then travelled to the sierra, visiting provincial towns and villages to recruit labour. They were usually careful to recruit during the dead season - between the end of the harvest in October and the beginning of the sowing season in April, when labour requirements on the peasant smallholding were lowest, and labour most readily available. The advance payment in cash was used as a lure, and contracts were usually for two or three months.9

9. See Klaren (1973), Albert (1976) and Scott (1976) for a more detailed discussion of the enganche system as it operated in the northern highlands in recruiting for the sugar plantations. Scott, in particular, analyses the nature of the labourmarket and the theoretical problems raised by enganche. Enganche has been used throughout Peru as a means of recruiting peasant labour for the mines and the plantations. See Bonilla (1974a) for an analysis of labour recruitment in the mines of Morrococha.
Though these practices were started in the 1880's, it was evident some time before a regular flow of labour was set up. Whilst Albert writes that Bambamarca, for example, was the main area supplying labour to the plantations Cayaltí from at least the 1880's (Albert, 1976), Klarén quotes a planter complaining in 1894 that the number of workers brought from Chota, Cabana and Sihuas was still very small (Klarén, 1973:25).

There has been some debate on the extent to which enganche operated in a free market for labour. Whilst it is clear that initially there was a problem in attracting labour to the coast, hence the need for inducements, it is evident that patterns of temporary migration were well established in the early twentieth century and competition between different enganchadores considerable (see Table 6).

Table 6: Haciendas with Contratistas in Bambamarca and amounts available for advances, November 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hacienda</th>
<th>Valley</th>
<th>Capital for socorros (soles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casa Grande</td>
<td>Chicama</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartavio</td>
<td>Chicama</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romalca</td>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumán</td>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ucupe</td>
<td>Zaña</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talsmbo</td>
<td>Jaquetepeque</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampagrande</td>
<td>Chicama</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayaltí</td>
<td>Zaña</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total                                      56,800

Source
Albert 1976:202a
There are two main elements in this debate; the extent to which coercion was used in recruiting labour and then in maintaining it on the coastal plantations and why it took so long for a permanent proletariat to form. Albert argues:

"While the method by which the surplus was appropriated and the character of the labour market indicate capitalist relations of production, it can be argued that the contracted labourers did not constitute a fully-fledged rural proletariat for many continued to have smallholdings in the sierra and were employed only temporarily on the sugar estates. For those who eventually remained on the coast and became permanent workers on the estates, enganche represented a transitional phase, but many contracted workers remained, in Chris Scott's words, '...... fundamentally migrant peasants seeking temporary off-farm employment to increase their cash incomes.' "

(Albert, 1976:101a)

If it was the case that migrants were only seeking target incomes, for example, in order to finance a fiesta or build a house, then there was a limit to which inducements such as higher wages would influence them to work for longer periods on the coast, and thus decrease the turnover of the labour force.

The question of whether coercion was used in recruiting labour is more problematic. Whilst the socorro (the advance payment made by the contratista) was no more than a forward payment of wages, the mechanisms whereby labourers were indebted to the company store, or were contracted to further periods of employment by advances to their families in the sierra involved some element of coercion (see Scott, 1975)
However, as mentioned above, the encomenderos were in competition and the word soon got around it one agent or another was involved in abusive practices. Certainly, by the 1950's a free market for labour existed. In 1952, Casagrande's agent in Cajamarca was able to write "the labour power of the peon (worker - HR) has become a commodity like any other, subject to the laws of supply and demand" (quoted in Scott, 1976:331).

Whilst this was generally the case, in the instances where the plantations bought or rented estates in the sierra, this was often to employ their tied labour force in the plantations. Yepes writes:

"the large capitalist enterprises resorted to the strategy of buying or renting lands - where non-capitalist relations of production were maintained - explicitly and expressly to oblige the colonos, pongos etc. to work in the large agro-extractive enterprises." (Yepes, 1972:208)

In this instance it is clear that extra-economic coercion did perform a function in labour recruitment, if only because labour was recruited by virtue of its being tied to the land.

Whilst there is no doubt that the independent peasants were free to migrate to the plantations, the hacienda tenants constitute a different category altogether. There has been considerable debate as to whether servile labour, and the concomitant lack of geographical mobility of labour has existed in the Anies.10 Martínez Alier, for example, maintains that in the estates owned by the Cerro de Pasco

Corporation in the Central Sierra, not only was labour free to migrate, but landlords were actually trying to get rid of their peasants, (Martínez Alier 1973). However, as I argued earlier (see Chapter 1) this was a highly capitalized ranching estate which was trying to expand the lands under its direct exploitation by restricting the numbers of peasant tenants. Whilst some landlords were keen to expel peasant labour forces in the sierra this was not the case on the renting haciendas, where the extraction of rents in cash and labour services required a high degree of control over the labour force. The fact that peasants were threatened with expulsion if they failed to fulfill their labour services, is in no way indicative of their having freedom of mobility. Whilst it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which tied labour forces on the highland estates were restricted in their freedom of mobility, it is possible to assess the extent to which renting rather than wage labour relations prevailed on the estates. Malpica presents the following data to demonstrate the numbers of the rural population in the departments of Amazonas, Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cajamarca and Huancavelica working under noncapitalist relations of production (see Table 7).

Table 7: Rural Population of selected departments working under non-capitalist relations of production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departments</th>
<th>No. of pre-capitalist contracts inc. renting</th>
<th>No. of proprietors</th>
<th>No. of feudatarios (CNRA)</th>
<th>Rural population no. of families (Population Census, 1961)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>3,655</td>
<td>10,501</td>
<td>6,531</td>
<td>14,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apurímac</td>
<td>8,761</td>
<td>31,469</td>
<td>7,465</td>
<td>46,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayacucho</td>
<td>12,656</td>
<td>48,929</td>
<td>8,505</td>
<td>61,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>38,266</td>
<td>66,998</td>
<td>19,943</td>
<td>127,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancavelica</td>
<td>9,272</td>
<td>38,076</td>
<td>7,635</td>
<td>49,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>72,610</td>
<td>195,973</td>
<td>50,079</td>
<td>298,297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Malpica (1970:361)

NB: This excludes the numbers of community members working under non-capitalist relations of production amongst themselves. Community members are covered by the category of proprietors.
It is evident that by the 1930's coastal plantations were in competition with the highland estates for labour. In Cajamarca, despite this competition, landlords succeeded in maintaining high levels of social control over their labour forces and were not seriously affected by labour shortages. On the modernizing estates, there had been an introduction of a division of labour and the specialization of agricultural tasks. Whilst the landlords were often attempting to shed labour (e.g., by selling off unproductive lands to tenants, or straightforward evictions) the offer of a wage plus a small parcel of land was sufficient incentive to most peasants, the majority of whom were minifundistas, holding extremely small plots of land.

However, on the estates which remained renting haciendas, there is evidence that high levels of control were maintained over the labour force, which included restrictions on the mobility of the tied labourers (the feudatarios). Moreover, there were often restrictions on marrying outside the estate (e.g., Chala) and peasants were prevented from educating their children (e.g., in the hacienda La Faica, when the Agrarian Reform was implemented in 1973, only twelve peasants out of 500 families had completed primary education). This is not to say that no peasants from these estates reached the coastal plantations to work; peasants holding cash tenancies because of their lower labour obligations, could quite easily migrate away on a temporary basis. However, for the tied labourers, who paid their rents primarily in labour, migration meant forfeiting their access to the land. Since servile labour obligations extended to their wives and children as well, it meant their entire family's labour mobility was restricted. Thus, when tied labourers migrated, it tended to be on a permanent basis.

In order not to undermine labour discipline on the highland estates, there had to be a degree of agreement between the encarnchadores and the hacendados with respect to the hacienda tenants. Klaren writes:
"It was not uncommon for local authorities to use the enganchador in rounding up prospective braceros, (labourers - MR) a service for which, of course, they were well paid. In some instances, the authorities themselves acted as enganchadores, delivering Indians in their jurisdictions to hacendados in need of braceros" (Haren, 1973:27)

Given the close ties between the local authorities and the landlord class, it is reasonable to assume that they would not deliberately undermine the most powerful local interests, by recruiting labour from their estates.

Two main developments affected the emergence of capitalist enterprises in Cajamarca: these were the opening up of road from Cajamarca to the coast in the 1940's which allowed the estates to supply an increasing quantity of foodstuffs to the towns of Trujillo and Chiclayo, and the establishment of a milk processing plant in the Cajamarca valley in 1947, Perulac, the Compañía Peruana de Alimentos Lácteos SA and a subsidiary of the multi-national corporation Nestlé, was attracted to Cajamarca by the landlords with dairying interests in order to provide a stable market for their products. The extension of its milk collection network allowed the numbers of milk producers and the volume of production to increase considerably, (see Table 3 )

Table 8 : Milk suppliers to Perulac in Cajamarca

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of suppliers</th>
<th>Volume of milk processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2.5 million litres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>10.6 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>17.7 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elaborated from Deere (1977:58)
By the 1970's milk production was no longer based on large units of production (by then the majority were transformed into cooperatives under the Agrarian Reform Law) but on smallholdings as well. Chambeu et al (1975) argue that the introduction of minifundistas into commodity production through the sale of milk to Perulac has accentuated the process of internal socio-economic differentiation within the caseríos and the communities. It is only the wealthiest minifundistas, possessing between ten and fifteen cows who can guarantee to sell a churn of milk (a norongo which holds 30 litres) a day to Perulac. Minifundistas with fewer animals must group together around one peasant who takes the responsibility to supply the milk to Perulac. This supplier is known as the cabezas de norongo (the head of the milk churn). Whilst dairying has been the main form of commercial development within the region, the estate La Fauca, owned by the Fuga family, raised thoroughbred fighting bulls.

Whilst the development of commercial dairy farming was occurring on the most favourably placed estates and amongst the wealthier minifundistas, the other main tendency in the agrarian structure has been towards the division and sale of the Grundherrschaft and less commercially developed Gutwirtschaft estates. This can be explained by the landlords' desire to transfer their investments to more profitable sectors of the economy, or in order to capitalize their more productive lands and estates.

The division and sale of estates in the highlands of Cajamarca began early in the twentieth century, partly through the division of lands by inheritance and partly as a deliberate policy of selling lands to the peasants. The estate, San Antonio, in the province of Hualgayoc was divided and sold in 1904, whilst the Colegio San Juan of Chota, repeatedly attempted to obtain the legal dispositions which would enable the school to sell off the lands of Llaucán. This process
was fairly gradual until the 1960's, when estates began to be divided on a massive scale. In some instances, sales were intended to prevent peasant invasions of desmesne lands. For example, the estate Huacraruco sold lands to tenants on its boundaries to discourage invasions by the neighbouring community of La Huaraclla, thus pitting peasant against peasant, (Harding, 1975:230). Moreover, the passing of Belaúnde's Land Reform Law in 1964 and the wave of rural unrest, in the Central and Southern sierra, if not in Cajamarca, posed the sale of lands as a more profitable alternative to expropriation either by the state or by invading peasants. The massive scale of the land divisions explains to some extent the relative absence of rural unrest in Cajamarca during this period.\footnote{Valderrama calculates that nearly half a million hectares were sold between 1962 and 1970, and that this represented nearly one third of the agricultural land in the department, (Valderrama, 1974). The Agrarian Reform of 1969 has continued rather than checked this process. (see Table 9 )}

11. See Rainbird and Taylor (1977) for an analysis of other factors which prevented the crystallization of peasant struggles during the pre-reform period.
Table 9: Principal estates divided by private initiative in the Department of Cajamarca, between January 1962 and July 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estate</th>
<th>Proprietor</th>
<th>Area divided up and sold (Has.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fallán</td>
<td>Madres Conceptionistas</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quispe</td>
<td>Manuel Cacho</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polloquito</td>
<td>Luis Cacho</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabacal</td>
<td>Orbegoso</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maraipampa</td>
<td>Orbegoso</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandor</td>
<td>Amorphin</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca</td>
<td>C. Bueno (Olga)</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combayo</td>
<td>Santoli-lia</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lívás</td>
<td>Luna-Cartland</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisi-Pisi</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuillapampa</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcón</td>
<td>Beneficencia Cajamarca</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chumbil</td>
<td>Souza</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huagal-Pauca</td>
<td>R. Puga (10,000 has. remain)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chequill</td>
<td>Bueno</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furuy</td>
<td>G. Fajares</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chala</td>
<td>L. Zárate (2,000 has. remain)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Araquenda</td>
<td>Orbegoso</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chingol</td>
<td>Orbegoso</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sta. Ursula</td>
<td>Madres Conceptionistas</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choten</td>
<td>Madres Conceptionistas</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calluan</td>
<td>Bueno</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huacraruco</td>
<td>Gildemeister</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montón</td>
<td>Negrón</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huacatez</td>
<td>G. Fajares</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yana-yacu</td>
<td>Madres Conceptionistas</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quilcate</td>
<td>Z.A. Rodríguez</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quilcate</td>
<td>Carlos Rodríguez</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirihual</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambería</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llaucán</td>
<td>G. U. E San Juan de Chota</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Clara</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chanta</td>
<td>Negociación Chanta</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schumba</td>
<td></td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llagaden</td>
<td>Falvio Castro</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
La Viña | R. Sattui | 500
Combayo | | 30,000

394,200

Source
Valderrama (1974, Table 1)

Private initiative in this table includes estates divided by private initiative by the landlords, and by peasant invasions or occupations pre and post reform. The Agrarian Reform officially did not encourage private divisions and attempted to maintain large units of production. As in other regions of Peru, this met the opposition of the peasantry.
These developments, combined with changes in the labour market in the 1950's have had important implications for the peasantry of Cajamarca. The establishment of a stable proletariat on the coast, the rapid growth of urban populations and the introduction of more intensive production techniques (e.g. mechanical cane cutters) led to a decline in labour recruitment through enganche. This has led to changes in the pattern of labour migration, and in the structure of employment within the region, as increased access to land has absorbed more peasant labour in domestic production (see Table 10)

Table 10: Structure of migration from a survey of 26 caserios in the Cajamarca valley

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>18.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caserio</td>
<td>11.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone</td>
<td>25.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trujillo</td>
<td>12.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimbote</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>24.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other places</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>18.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>14.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professinals</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural workers</td>
<td>12.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>15.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>24.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chambeu et al (1975: Table 6)
Chambeu et al argue that permanent migration has occurred mainly amongst the wealthier strata of the peasantry. Seasonal migration, whilst formerly to the coastal plantations, are now directed towards the towns of the northern coast such as Chépen, Pacasmayo, Guadalupe and the rice plantations of the selva in Jaén and Bagua. The migrants now work mainly as labourers and street sellers, because particularly since the land reform, the demand for temporary labour on the plantations has been reduced. The structure of employment has also changed quite noticeably within the region since the 1940's, as Table 11 demonstrates.

**Table 11:** Percentages of the actively employed population by sectors, 1940, 1961 & 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and allied occupations</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and craftwork</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; communications</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and banking</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration, domestic service, professions</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not classified</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NB Apart from a small milk processing factory and a few lemonade bottling factories, 'industry and craftwork' refers to artisans in peasant family units, eg. carpenters, weavers, tile makers etc.

**The District of Bambamarca**

The district of Bambamarca lies to the north of the province of Cajamarca in the province of Huálas (see Map 1). It is connected by road to the towns of Chota and Cajamarca. Although Bambamarca
is situated only 90 kms. by road away from Cajamarca, this is a nine hours journey by the daily bus service, and lorries carrying cattle to the coast from the Sunday market form the bulk of the traffic. Although the town of Chota is only 30 kms. away from Bambamarca, communications are less frequent than with Cajamarca. The bus service runs there only once a week, enabling merchants from Chota to buy and sell their wares at the Sunday market. Within the district, communications are by foot or by horse.

Bambamarca itself is a small town of 5,045 inhabitants. The majority of the population of the district, numbering 40,250 persons, live in widely dispersed small-holdings. There are a few small nuclei of settlement outside the town such as Maygeabantu, Romero and Talledaco, but these are insignificant both in size and as commercial centres. The town of Bambamarca is situated at 2,500 metres by the River Llaucano, which flows down from the high moorlands of Hualgayoc, carrying the effluents from its mines through the province of Chota to the headwaters of the Marañón. It is a fertile region, which because of variations in altitude, covers three different ecological levels ranging from high moorland, through to temperate and semi-tropical sub-climates.

The sub region of Bambamarca is shaped by the same general forces of development as the department of Cajamarca as a whole. This can be seen by a breakdown of the occupational structure in Table 12.

12. These figures are from the 1972 Census.

13. See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of these different ecological zones.
Table 12: Economically active population of six years and over: Departament of Cajamarca as whole and Districts of Hualgayoc and Bambamarca

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic classification</th>
<th>Cajamarca</th>
<th>Hualgayoc</th>
<th>Bambamarca</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economically active population</td>
<td>206,696</td>
<td>26,712</td>
<td>11,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Professional &amp; technical occupations</td>
<td>3,528</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Managers, officials and administrators</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Office workers</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Retailers</td>
<td>5,350</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Agricultural workers, fishermen, hunters etc.</td>
<td>160,024</td>
<td>20,681</td>
<td>8,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Miners</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Transporters</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Craftworkers; workers in occupations related to spinning, dressmaking, carpentry, construction etc.</td>
<td>20,510</td>
<td>3,420</td>
<td>2,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Other craftworkers</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Workers</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Service workers</td>
<td>5,947</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Other workers</td>
<td>3,943</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:

The majority of the population is involved in agricultural work or in craftwork, closely related to agriculture. In the case of Bambamarca, this craftwork is commonly the production of straw and palm sombreros, and clothes making done on an outwork basis for shopkeepers based in Bambamarca. Workers in offices, mines and industry form a very small proportion of the economically active population, whilst service workers tend to be young girls in domestic service. From this breakdown it is clear that very little wage labour employment is available locally, hence outmigration has been the major means by which cash income is obtained. In Table 13...
outmigration is shown for all the provinces of Cajamarca. The
districts of Bambamarca, Chugur and Hualgayoc combine to form the
province of Hualgayoc.

Table 13: Percentage of population migrating in the Department
of Cajamarca, by province.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>% age Migrated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>170,125</td>
<td>9,345</td>
<td>5.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajabamba</td>
<td>55,782</td>
<td>7,079</td>
<td>12.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celendín</td>
<td>57,142</td>
<td>4,156</td>
<td>7.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contumazá</td>
<td>57,102</td>
<td>4,915</td>
<td>13.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutervo</td>
<td>95,463</td>
<td>16,659</td>
<td>17.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chota</td>
<td>114,554</td>
<td>3,897</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hualgayoc</td>
<td>100,540</td>
<td>3,897</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaen</td>
<td>75,625</td>
<td>2,907</td>
<td>7.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz a</td>
<td>40,789</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL for Department of Cajamarca: 746,938

Source:

Combined with the phenomenon of outmigration is the problem of
population increase and the increasing fragmentation of the land.

Table 14 shows the increasing density of population between the 1940
and the 1951 census.

Table 14: Population, area and density of the Department of
Cajamarca, by provinces. National Censuses of 1940 & 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Population 2/7/51</th>
<th>Population 9/6/1940</th>
<th>Area km² (1961)</th>
<th>Density of inhabitants (per km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>170,125</td>
<td>123,070</td>
<td>4,898.65</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajabamba</td>
<td>55,782</td>
<td>38,952</td>
<td>2,025.15</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celendín</td>
<td>57,142</td>
<td>39,925</td>
<td>2,594.90</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contumazá</td>
<td>37,102</td>
<td>27,868</td>
<td>2,633.60</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutervo</td>
<td>95,463</td>
<td>52,792</td>
<td>3,729.81</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chota</td>
<td>114,554</td>
<td>94,984</td>
<td>3,968.75</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hualgayoc</td>
<td>100,540</td>
<td>94,158</td>
<td>3,181.05</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaen</td>
<td>75,625</td>
<td>22,663</td>
<td>10,745.40</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz a</td>
<td>40,789</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,640.51</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The province of Santa Cruz was created by D.L 11326, 1950 and includes the districts of Santa Cruz (province of Hualgayoc) and districts of Chancaybenos, La Esperanza, Sexi and Utica cu of the province of Chota.


The main features which make it distinctive within the regional agrarian structure are the existence of mines at Hualgayoc, and the fact that the milk collection network of Ferulac does not extend to this area. This has meant landlords have not had a stable market for dairy products, as in the Cajamarca valley, and dairy products have been marketed in the form of butter and cheese. Thus, most estates in this sub-region have been divided up and sold to their peasant tenants. The minifundio is the predominant form of landholding in the area and migration to the coastal plantations has been a long-standing phenomenon.

It is noticeable in Bambamarca that no capitalist farms existed prior to the agrarian reform. This can perhaps be explained by the diverse interests of the landlords, and the fact that land and mining interests were closely linked. Purser writes:

"There are an excessive number of small (mining) concessions, whose owners sit on them rather than work them, as both they and their miners can live comfortably off the good agricultural land ...."  
(Furser, 1971:164)

Thus, neither agriculture nor mining saw the development of large capitalist enterprises, because the rents provided by the one were complemented by the ready cash received from periodic mineral exploitation. Llaucan, by virtue of being owned by an institution,
was almost entirely given over to peasant production. On the other hand, underwent certain technological innovations on its demesne lands, and also expanded the area under hacienda control by opening up rough pasture land for cultivation. However, at no point was an attempt made to introduce wage labour, and peasant families which were dislodged in the course of a dispute (some eighty families) do not appear to have been expelled as part of a conscious strategy to shed tied peasant labour from the land. Rather, the investments on this estate tied in with the landlord's interests elsewhere - a highly capitalized but small dairy farm in the Cajamarca valley, and a mine in the adjacent province of Celendín, for which the unpaid labour of his peasant tenants saw to the transportation of the minerals to market.

At the turn of the century, a large part of the area was covered by three large haciendas: San Antonio, owned by Diego Villacorta; Llaucán, owned by the Colegio San Juan of Chota and Chala owned by the Miranda family. Other smaller haciendas also existed, such as San Antonio del Capulí and Llumecucho. Progressively through the present century these estates have been divided up and sold to the peasants: San Antonio in 1904; Llaucán in 1962-63 and Chala most recently under the agrarian reform. This process of land division has been largely a result of the lack of profitability of this kind of landholding, and has also reflected a decline in the landlords' power on estates based exclusively on renting relations, as other landlords have capitalized their estates and diversified their interests.

As a result of the land divisions, the major part of the land is now held by peasant small holders. These are fundamentally subsistence producers who do not produce crops for cash sales. A relatively

14. See Chapter 4 for details of inheritance in Chalo.
small proportion of their production goes to market, whilst cash incomes are acquired through temporary migrations or by the sale of artisan products. Thus, whilst peasant production is not organized along capitalist lines, the surpluses produced by family labour are sold in the market. Through the process of circulation the peasants are integrated into the market. The direct producers are impoverished but the relations of production are not transformed by capital. Masa writes:

"Not only does commercial capital prevent peasants from accumulating by appropriating all the surplus created by the sale of their products in overtly capitalist markets (the large cities); but it also decapitalizes and impoverishes the peasants, forcing them to reduce their consumption, and makes them buy articles of consumption which they do not produce themselves and have to buy in the market"

(Masa, 1975:48-9)

Thus, whilst the sub-region of Bambamarca has experienced the general tendencies of development in the agrarian structure of Cajamarca, it is distinguished by the lack of impact of the dairy industry on the region, not as a lack of dairy livestock, but as a lack of a stable capitalist market for milk as a product which only a milk collection network could establish. This has affected the development of the hacienda system in the sub-region, as well as the commercial opportunities open to small peasant producers.

Conclusion:

In this Chapter I have argued that the main tendencies in the agrarian structure of Cajamarca have been contradictory. With respect to the hacienda system these have been, on the one hand
the development of commercial dairy farming on a number of estates, and on the other hand the division and sale of hacienda lands to the peasantry. With respect to the peasantry there has been increasing outmigration and proletarianization due to increasing pressure on the land and the recruitment of labour from the coastal plantations. At the same time there has been an intensification of the use of family labour with increased access to land through the division of the estates. This has increased the peasants' subordination to commercial capital.

It is also important to make clear the unevenness of these developments within the region. Both landlord and peasant producers have been integrated into capitalist production through the development of the dairy industry. However, at the same time, many estates continued as renting estates primarily subordinated to commercial capital and speculative dealings. In these estates the possibilities for commercial investment were limited: landlords increased production by more efficient management but not by transforming relations of production.

Within Cajamarca there has been a diversification of both the landlord and the subordinate classes. The landlords have either become commercial farmers with interests in other sectors of the economy, or were attacked as feudal rentiers by the agrarian reform. The subordinate rural classes range from fully proletarianized wage labourers on the dairy farms, and minufunilistas who are forced to sell their labour power on a more or less permanent basis, to peasants who have received sufficient land through the agrarian reform to continue, for the time being, as independent producers. Where the milk collection network exists there are opportunities also for dairy production on small units of production and this has
been a major factor affecting the internal differentiation of the peasantry in these zones. Finally, it is essential to underline that the regional structure of Cajamarca is heterogeneous. This explains both the problems of landlord strategy on different estates, and the chronology and phases in political struggles in the rural sector.
Introduction:

In this Chapter I analyse the organization of production in the hacienda Chala. This was an estate where production was organized on a non-capitalist basis: the landlord's income came primarily from rents and from the surplus produced by a servile labour force on the desmesne lands. However, production practices were not static, but developed and changed over time. Hence the relationship between landlord and peasant enterprises was essentially a dynamic one. This included attempts by the landlord to expand desmesne production, and to increase the rents paid by the peasant tenants. There was also a degree of technological innovation and capitalist investment in desmesne production.

There has been considerable debate as to whether servile labour and restrictions on labour mobility existed on the Andean haciendas. Martínez Alier argues that the hacendados, far from trying to prevent their peasant tenants from leaving their estates, were actively trying to expel them. He argues that Andean haciendas were essentially capitalist enterprises, which were unable to fully transform their relations of production due to peasant resistance to proletarianization (Martínez Alier, 1973). However, it has been demonstrated in Chapter 1 that not all estates were trying to expel their tenants and to introduce capitalist relations of production. Considerable diversity existed in the Andes, and the relative success or failure in transforming relations of production based on rents to the wage labour relationship was determined largely by the type of cropping: livestock estates, arable estates or dairy farms. Thus, a large number of estates could be considered as transitional, rather than as feudal or capitalist. Thus, so long as renting continued to be profitable on at least part of the hacienda lands, then the incentive was to maintain the number of peasants.
Whilst the mere existence of renting contracts on a hacienda does not necessarily imply the existence of restrictions on the tenants' freedom of mobility, these restrictions were more likely to be in force where corvée labour was practised. Thus, whilst clearly there were not labour restrictions on all Andean haciendas, the uneven development of capitalism in the Peruvian agrarian structure made it possible for servile labour practices and restrictions on the freedom of mobility of peasant tenants to continue to exist in some of the estates.

In Chala, the hacienda did exercise considerable control over the labour force and there were restrictions on the tenants' freedom of mobility. It is therefore important to ascertain how this was achieved, and to analyse how it affected the class position and consciousness of the peasants. Lenin (1972) argues that servile labour can only be extracted from the middle peasantry, because they alone of all the rural classes are neither too rich to make themselves independent of the landlord, not too poor to be forced to seek wage labour. Thus, it must be assumed that we are concerned with formally self-sufficient peasants, and must examine the mechanisms, ideological and physical, which compel them to work or pay rent to a landlord. This has important implications on the development of commodity production and retards the process of the social differentiation of the peasantry. An analysis of relations of production under the hacienda system is thus essential to understand the crystallization of peasant struggle, and the form it takes. It is also essential to our understanding of the peasants' response to the Agrarian Reform. The peasant struggle and the Agrarian Reform will be analysed in Chapters 5 & 6.
Ihistic aspects of the estate:

The hacienda Chala is situated by the small market town of Lumbambarca and extends over an area of 16,377 hectares (see Map 1). Apart from an all-weather road leading up to the casa hacienda (the estate house), the rest of the property is connected only by horse tracks and footpaths. The estate covers several different ecological levels, by virtue of its variation in altitude. Thus, in the highlands of the jalca (lands over 3000 metres in altitude) tubers such as potatoes, ollucos and oca are grown as well as grain crops such as barley and oats. In the lower lands of the quichua (2,500 - 3,000 metres) maize, beans and potatoes are grown, whilst in the semi-tropical lands of the temple (2,000 - 2,500 metres) coffee, yuca, bananas, oranges and sugar cane were grown. Thus different sectors of the hacienda were dedicated to the production of different crops and the rearing of different animals. The sector of Adcuñac, was given over to the cultivation of semi-tropical produce, whilst the jalcas of Cabrancncha, Liclicpampa and Mayguesmarca were given over to sheep rearing and tuber cultivation. The quichua lands of Santa Barbara were dedicated to vegetable, maize and dairy production, whilst the quichua lands of Colpa served as rough grazing land until the end of the 1950's.

1. This figure reaches 18,377 hectares if the 2,000 hectares usurped from the neighbouring estate of Llaucan are included. For information about Llaucan, see Appendix 2. Details of the boundary dispute are to be found in Chapter 5.

2. The spread of the lands of peasant communities in the Andes over different ecological levels has been well-documented in Peru. Murra argues that this has occurred through a process of colonization, so that base communities could have access to resources produced in different ecological zones, (Murra, 1975). Much has been made of the principle of reciprocity involved in exchanges of products between peasants living in different ecological levels, (see, for example, the collection of essays in Alberti and Mayer, 1974). However, Scott has argued that trueque (barter exchange) across these different ecological levels is best analysed not according to an abstract concept of 'verticality' but in terms of the concept of comparative advantage, (Scott, 1974). Sanchez, on the other hand, demonstrates that the ideology of reciprocity often obscures exploitative relationships between peasants, and is a means by which wealthier peasants accumulate through so-called 'traditional' exchange relationships. (Sanchez, 1974).
It is difficult to gauge the distribution of the land between arable land, pastures, forests and barren lands, as well as the proportion occupied by desmesne production and peasant tenancies respectively. This is not only because records of land use prior to the agrarian reform are incomplete, but also because the area under desmesne production was expanded in the 1950's, both by a process of encroachment on peasant lands, and by the opening up of former rough grazing land. The distribution of different land types can be seen in Table 1. In the sectors of Liclipampa, Naygesmarca, Santa Bárbara-Colpa and Cabrancasha a large proportion of the land is arable, whilst in the largest sector, Adcunac, 57% of the land is either forest or unsuitable for agriculture. In the estate as a whole there are 4,750 hectares of arable land, and 3,275 hectares of pastures. It is difficult to assess the proportion of land exploited directly by the hacienda compared to the area occupied by peasant tenants. The supreme decree No. 121A of 21st September 1967 which authorized the expropriation of Chala calculated that the area under direct exploitation was 4,100.72 hectares, and the area occupied by the peasants 7,783.356 hectares. There is no indication of the proportions of arable to pasture land in these figures. It is interesting to note that the landlord, Zárate, was arguing in 1968 to retain 5,000 hectares of the estate for his own production, which would seem to suggest that the figure for direct exploitation is probably fairly accurate.

3. These Ministry of Agriculture figures conflict with those of the Agrarian Office of Bambamarca. Since it is impossible to assess which of the two are more accurate, I have used the Ministry of Agriculture figures, since they are more detailed and were drawn up in order to organize the co-operative in Chala.
Table 1: Land type and distribution in Chaco by sector.
The landlords:

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Chala was owned by José Catalino Miranda, a hacendado who also held mining interests in the region as well as an estate, La Cadena, near Chilote. He owned with Aurelio Sousa the mine of Santo Cristo in Hualgayoc and had allowed Eloy Santolalla, a local mining engineer, to construct a plant for leaching silver in Chala in 1891, (Málaga Santolalla, 1904:6)

When José Catalino Miranda died in 1902, Chala was divided up amongst his heirs as follows: to Carmen Zoraida Miranda de Cuadros - one fifth part; to César Miranda - two fifths; to Rogerio Miranda - one fifth and to Julio Miranda - one fifth. The wife of César Miranda, Susana Rodríguez, gradually brought up the remaining three fifths of the estate with money inherited from her own family before her marriage.

It is clear that whilst César Miranda was hacendado of Chala, the estate was run by an administrator, and the hacendados made only rare appearances in Bambamarca. This is confirmed by peasant accounts, which recall that work discipline was relatively slack, and that the visits of the Mirandas to the estate were the cause for celebration and gifts of sacks of produce to them. Since they had houses in Lima and Cajamarca and César Miranda was kept occupied by his political duties for Cajamarca (1913-18, 1939-45), he took little interest in the running of the estate. It is clear that for the Mirandas Chala served as a supplier of foodstuffs for their households, and brought them a regular income in rents. It was also used, on frequent occasions, as a security against loans and other

4. This data is taken from the Public Register of Property of Cajamarca.
the same period, a major transformation occurred in Santa Barbara and Capitola. During this time, some areas saw brown ocean water daily as a result of coastal erosion. New lands were opened up for coastal erosion protection and expansion of coastal recreation. This expansion of public and other areas of environmental management, for example, the Development Plan for a sewage treatment plant was adopted in 1996, the California Coastal Act was enacted in 1975, and a new major county park was established in 1977. It was to last for eight years. It carried in an annual rent of $7,500.

In 1994, a rent contract was entered into with the same renter, and the property was sold to the new owner. In 1999, the property was sold to a new owner for $275,000. The new owner continued to use the property as a rental. In 2009, the property was sold to a new owner for $380,000. The new owner continued to use the property as a rental. In 2019, the property was sold to a new owner for $450,000. The new owner continued to use the property as a rental. In 2029, the property was sold to a new owner for $500,000. The new owner continued to use the property as a rental. In 2039, the property was sold to a new owner for $550,000. The new owner continued to use the property as a rental.
of peasants from their lands. These lands were subsequently converted into pastures. In the early 1960's, a boundary dispute occurred with Llaucán in which Chala stood to lose 2,000 hectares of land in Chungos. Quick money was made and confusion sown amongst the peasants by selling off plots of land in this section on an individual basis before the dispute could be settled.

According to a former empleado of the hacienda, a number of small mines had always been worked on the property itself. Copper, zinc, silver and lead were extracted. Whilst Zárate was running the estate these operations were intensified, and a road built to the casa hacienda to facilitate the extraction of the ore. The peasants apparently rebelled against this work, and subsequently seven or eight wage labourers were employed from outside the hacienda. Zárate also owned a mine in Horoporc, in the adjacent province of Celendín, and although the Chalinos did not have to work in ore extraction, the transportation of the ore by horseback was a much disliked labour obligation.

The sindicato (peasant union) which was set up in 1963 also claimed that the hacendados were involved in the cultivation of opium. They cited the fact that Zárate's brother, Pepe Zárate, had been arrested in 1949 on a charge of drugs trafficking. Obviously, there is no evidence to prove this either way. Nevertheless, in the late 1940's the anapolis plant was being grown in the more isolated parts of the Bambamarca region (and reputedly on the haciendas Jerez and Pallán). Furthermore, illicit cocaine refining (pichicato) is common in the area, and the police periodically discover small laboratories in the

6. A leaflet issued by the Sindicato Unico de Yanaconas y Colonos de la hacienda Chala claims "It is well known that Zárate Bringas served time for drugs trafficking, as a hardened offender...." (June 1969)
Because Zárate was trying to expand and modernize production, the peasants naturally suffered as a result of attempts to accumulate capital at their expense. Cash rents were increased in the 1950's and the size of the peasants' subsistence plots reduced. The midday food rations, and periodic gifts of sacks of produce that had been common in the time of the Miranda's were also cut. This more "rational" management meant that the illusion of benevolence previously fostered by the paternalist system was finally broken. A series of mobilizations against the landlords were organized by the peasants, so that by the mid-1960's Zárate was forced to leave the estate and to assign the day to day running of it to an administrator. From this period onwards the peasants were in de facto control of the land, a situation which was legally ratified by the expropriation of the estate on the 5th December 1970. As a result of this, S/.435,720 was paid in cash in compensation, and a further S/.410,00 in class "C" bonds for investment in industry. Of all their previous agricultural properties, the hacendados retained only a small dairy farm, Tartar, in the Cajamarca valley.

Relations of production on Chala.

Within the hacienda relations of production were characterized by a low level of technology. Surpluses were extracted from the peasant producers in the concrete form of the days they worked for the hacienda and in rents in cash or kind. There was little capital investment in agriculture, though the hacienda herds were built up and maintained by the natural reproduction of herds and livestock. Agricultural production appears to have been geared mainly towards the internal consumption requirements of the estate; the payment of shepherds, and foremen, the provision of midday food rations and occasional gifts and payments to the peasants.
Table 2: Account books for Cabracancha 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>cargas</th>
<th>almudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maize production</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent to casa hacienda in Chala</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment to work gangs (días de la paz)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midday food rations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary of empleado of Cabracancha</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barley</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midday food rations</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fodder for pigs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment for muleteer and field foreman</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary of empleado</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In stock</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>131½</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wheat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midday food rations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoilt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In stock</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midday food rations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of work gangs (días de la paz)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In stock</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midday food rations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Milled maize (chochoca)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midday food rations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In stock</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Livestock and mineral production, on the other hand, were geared towards sale in the market, and were carried by mule to the railhead in Chileté for markets in Lima and Trujillo.

During the colonial period, there had been an important cottage weaving industry in Cajamarca. (See Silva Santesteban, 1964) Chala, like many other estates had had its own obraje or workshop. Although woollen production for the national market declined with the termination of colonial protection policies, the workshop continued to operate in Chala until 1917, though at a much reduced level of output. In this way cloth was provided in payment for the labour services of the tenants of the estate.

During the period in which César Miranda was hacendado of Chala (1902-1954) production on the estate was relatively stable. The hacienda employed the same rudimentary equipment on the desmesne lands that were used on the peasants’ plots, thus there were few advantages in economies of scale as far as production was concerned. However, there were advantages of scale in marketing, since the quantities of agricultural produce and livestock sold meant that sales could be delayed if prices were low, and the landlord could also ensure that his products were transported to lines of communication by means of peasant muleteers.

When Zarate took over the management of the estate, certain innovations were introduced; these included a small amount of capital investment, and the introduction of share-croppers in the sector of Colpa. However, these innovations did not transform relations of production. No attempt was made to introduce wage labour, and certainly there was no development of a specialized labour force. Eight families were evicted in retaliation for organizing a protest, but this seems to have been more of an opportunistic tactic.
rather than part of a conscious capitalist strategy of divesting
the land of its peasant occupants. The main change introduced was
that of more efficient management, and this represented an increase
in the absolute rent extracted from the peasants.

Rents were paid either in the form of an annual cash sum or in
working a number of days in payment on the estate. These servile
labour obligations extended to women and children as well as the
menfolk. Even the tenants with renting contracts were obliged to
work a number of days for the estate. As argued previously, extra-
economic coercion is required in order to force formally self-
sufficient peasants to work for a landlord. Peasants, unlike
proletarians, are not forced to sell their labour because they have
other access to the means of production themselves. Peasants there­
fore work for a landlord not because they are forced to by economic
necessity, but because they are coerced into it by ideological and
physical means.

In Chala, a high degree of control was maintained in particular over
the tied labourers, the peones, who had the heaviest labour
obligations. However, the arrendadores, the peasants who paid cash
rents, also had to work a certain number of days on the estate lands,
depending on the stipulations in their contracts. Thus it was
necessary to maintain a high degree of control over both sectors of
the workforce. There was an elaborate hierarchy of administrators,
overseers, field foremen and superintendents (empleados, regidores,
mayoreyes and comisarios) who were charged with supervising the
work gangs and counting the herds. In addition the womenfolk were
counted at compulsory church attendances every week: the wives of the
tied labourers were counted every Thursday at eight o'clock in the
morning, whilst their daughters were counted on Sunday mornings.
Table 1: Cases of Cases of 

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(See Table 3 for Rest of Table)
Table 4: Occurrence of maternal and paternal surnames (apellidos) amongst heads of household in the sector of Santa Barbara. (Post-reform figures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ex-Peones</th>
<th>Ex-Arrendadores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of surnames occurring</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of heads of household</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% frequency of six most common surnames</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These restrictions applied primarily to the peones. However, despite these restrictions, this does not imply that none of the peones ever left the hacienda nor migrated away. However, when this did occur it tended to be on a permanent basis, in contrast to the pattern found amongst the "free" peasants of the communities and zones of minifundismo of temporary and seasonal migrations.

There were also restrictions placed on the arrendadores by virtue of the fact that their renting contracts were renewed yearly. Hence failure to pay rent or to render the stipulated number of days labour could result in the forfeiting of the contract. The contract clearly stated the numbers of animals the arrendador could maintain on the property and prohibited the commercial sale of firewood from the hacienda. Not only was the contract precarious, but the arrendador had to sign a statement that he would "bind himself not to introduce any disruptive individuals into the estate who would alter the public order of the hacienda, or who have or might damage the property of the Señores Miranda." 7

Needless to say, control was not exercised by brute force alone, but by a "stick and carrot" policy. The paternalist relationship exercised considerable force over the peasantry, and masked to some extent the exploitative relationship. Since César Miranda was nearly always absent from the estate, most of the peasants' dealings with the estate administration were through the empleados. Thus peasant accounts tell how they always complained against the empleados, and Miranda is always remembered as a "good" patron.

When the hacendados did visit Chala, messengers would be sent ahead to bring news of the arrival, and the peasants would gather to greet them with gifts from their land. There was singing and dancing, and the hacendados would make gifts of food, kill sheep and give away soap and clothes to the adults as well as toys to the children. When Carnaval was being celebrated (carnival, at Shrovetide), they would order sacks of potatoes to be distributed to each family. This material benevolence was backed up with a concern for the spiritual welfare of the peasants. In one note, Miranda explicitly requested that "the people should not be allowed to die without confession. The priest must be informed how many people are ill, so that he can go to each house to confess them".

The paternalist relationship was accompanied by a relatively slack attitude to work discipline. Whilst the landlords were absent, defaulters were punished by a period in the dungeon. When he was present, he would prevent the empleados from punishing them, saying "leave my little children alone". It is interesting to note that it was not the changing work discipline that most angered the peasants when Zarate took over. Without exception, the first thing he was always criticised for was for halving the midday food rations.
Presumably many of the other paternalist perks were out as well, such as the right to ask for credit at the hacienda warehouse (almacen), and the right to glean the desmesne fields after the harvest (apalar). Several peasant women recall how they were beaten for refusing the greet Zárate at the casa hacienda, or for refusing to make gifts of food and animals to him.

The internal differentiation of the hacienda peasantry. As mentioned earlier, there were basically two kinds of peasant tenants in Chala: the peasants who paid cash rents, the arrendadores, and the tenants who paid rent in labour services, the peones. Sharecroppers, partidarios, were also employed, but only to a limited extent. Only two partidarios were recorded in the account books of Cabracancha for 1916, though when Zárate was expanding production in the late 1950's there were sixteen in Cabracancha and about thirty in Colpa.

Servile labour relations, unlike the wage labour relation, extended to the entire family and not just to the individual worker employed by the enterprise. Thus the peones' womenfolk and children from the age of seven were also employed by the hacienda. The arrendadores and their wives also had to fulfil a stipulated number of days labour for the hacienda, though their children were exempt. Because of the use of child labour, it was in the interests of the hacienda to encourage early marriage and the rapid reproduction of the family as the unit of labour power. 8
There is evidence of this in the relatively large size of families in Chala compared to small holder zones in other provinces of Cajamarca. In the sector of Santa Bárbara-Colpa of Chala, the average number of children per family on a plot of land under 3.5 hectares was 3.95, compared to an average of 3.6 in other provinces of Cajamarca. The average number of family members per household was 6.0, compared with 5.5 in the other provinces.

The peones were engaged in all the normal agricultural tasks of the hacienda; clearing the land for ploughing, sowing, weeding, harvesting, making butter, working in the orchards and in the saw mill, carrying produce to market in Cajamarca, to Chepén and to Chileté, where the railway started. In addition they had to guard the flocks as punteros (cattlehands) and mitayos (shepherds) but in this instance the tasks were rotational and lasted six months. For this they were paid in kind on a monthly basis. The cattle were counted on the first day of every month when they were given salt. If any animals were lost they had to be replaced by the peasant herdsman. Each of the pastures in the hacienda was devoted to the raising of different animals, such as sheep, cows, pigs, goats, horses and mules and in the semi-tropical lands turkeys were raised as well as the normal household animals and poultry.

8. Kula stresses the importance of women's labour for subsistence production on the family plot, due to the shortage of male labour during periods of heavy fieldwork. (1976:74) It appears that in Poland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, women's labour was not widely used in desmesne production except in craftwork or if there were small workshops. In contrast, throughout Cajamarca, women's labour has been used directly in the process of production, as well as in service activities e.g. as domestic servants in the casa hacienda, in preparing the midday food rations for the work gangs. See Deere (1977) for a detailed analysis of women's labour in the haciendas of Cajamarca.

9. See Appendix 3 for a detailed breakdown of landholding and family size in thirteen provinces of Cajamarca.
The womenfolk of the peones were called the "weeklies" (semaneras) because they worked one week for the hacienda and one week for themselves. Their single daughters worked one month on, one month off. They were engaged in the lighter agricultural tasks, in the preparation of the midday food rations for the work gangs (cuadrillas de peones) and as servants in the casa hacienda. Their agricultural tasks, though lighter than the men's were no less arduous and unpleasant. They would carry the manure to the fields, sow, weed, harvest, thresh and sort the grains. However, they never used any of the heavy agricultural implements such as the pico (pick), the lampa (heavy hoe) and the yunta (plough). They also had to collect wood to kindle the fire to prepare the midday food rations and to work in the dairy as dairy maids. They collected straw and mud for making bricks of adobe in the open air, and prepared tiles for firing in a kiln. In addition to the labour they performed they were from time to time subjected to the sexual attentions of the landlord or his empleados.

Children worked for the hacienda from the age of seven, usually in guarding the pigs and goats. They were called the "dailies" (diarios) because they worked every day. The hacendado expressly forbade the teaching of the children of peones on the hacienda, and did not allow them to go to school outside the hacienda either. A primary school functionned for twelve years in the sector of Cabracancha whilst Miranda was hacendado. This was because during the first presidency of Manuel Frade, a law was passed obliging all haciendas to provide schooling for their tenants. However, this was only for the children of the arrendadores, and it was closed down when Zárate took over the running of the estate. As a result the workforce was kept cowed and illiterate, and when the hacienda was expropriated in 1970 not a single peon had completed primary
education. A few of the younger peones had had up to three years schooling, but they were from the families who had been evicted from the hacienda in 1958 for sending their children to school in Bambamarca and attempting to set up a school on the estate themselves.

Since part of the rents paid by the arrendadores were paid in cash, their labour obligations to the estate were less than those of the peones. The labour duties they had to perform were mainly ploughing and muleteering, which they did with their own animals. Thus whilst the peones contributed labour power alone to the process of production, the arrendadores contributed work animals as well. Thus, at a very basic level, the differentiation of the peasantry into cash tenants and labour tenants, allowed the hacienda to obtain different factors of production in the labour process. The same was true of the sharecropping contracts. Since the estate provided part of the means of production and the seed, interest was earned on this advance. When the sharecroppers were employed in larger numbers in the late 1950's, it was specifically with the intention of opening up rough pasture land. This was to be cultivated for a number of years to improve the soil, after which Zarate intended to terminate the contracts, and to convert the land into improved pastures. It was rumoured that he planned to introduce fighting bulls from La Fauca into the sector of Colpa. However, he was thwarted by the share-croppers' refusal to leave the land. (See Chapter 5 for details)

Though nominal wages were paid for some of the tasks performed by the tenants on the desmesne lands, these were not the rates of pay for labour in the free market, and were usually paid in kind rather than cash.
Whilst the peones were not paid for the fifteen days a month they had to work compulsorily for the hacienda (except for the midday food rations) they were paid ten centavos a day if they worked an additional four days a month. These days were called los días de la paz (rest days). This was not paid in cash, but was redeemed in a cash equivalent at the end of the year at the hacienda store (almacen). In the same way a peon was paid an equivalent to 40 centavos for carrying produce on horse back to Cajamarca. An arrendador performing the same task with his own pack animals was paid 30 centavos in the same way. The children, the diarios, were paid five centavos a day, whilst there is no record of the women being paid at all for the work they did. Similar rates of pay were in force at the hacienda San Felipe de Combayo, (see Table 5).

Table 5 : Rates of pay on the hacienda San Felipe de Combayo, 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rate (centavos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrendadores</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peones</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journeys and tasks outside</td>
<td>40 - 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hacienda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>15 - 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All these rates were supplemented by a ration of food provided at midday.

Source: Malaga Santolalla (1919).

It is evident that these payments can not in any way be considered as evidence of the existence of wage labour. Firstly, the wages were not paid in cash but were redeemed in kind at the hacienda almacén. Secondly, the rates were considerably lower than the wage on the free market, which in the sugar plantations of the northern coast were between £ 1.48 and £ 2.00 for men and £ 1.19 for women.
in 1919. Thirdly, this was a tied and not a free labour force, and finally, the wage rates for the días de la paz and for the diarios remained the same from at least 1911 through to 1938, whereas the wages on the free market increased, (see Table 6).

Table 6 : Wages in the cotton, rice, sugar and mining sectors of the economy, 1920-1943.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>S/. 2.40</td>
<td>S/. 1.55</td>
<td>S/. 2.78</td>
<td>13.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>S/. 1.65</td>
<td>S/. 1.09</td>
<td>S/. 2.51</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>S/. 1.83</td>
<td>S/. 1.78</td>
<td>S/. 2.53</td>
<td>27.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>S/. 2.73(a)</td>
<td>S/. 3.38</td>
<td>S/. 3.33</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Figure for 1924, earlier figures are not available

Elaborated from Sulmont (1975, 253 & 255)

Whilst the wage rates in Chala remained stable throughout the period, the goods against which they could be redeemed in the almacen increased in 'price', as shown in Table 7.

Table 7 : Prices of products in the hacienda store of Cabracancha, 1921, 1933 & 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almud of maize</td>
<td>S/. 1.00</td>
<td>S/. 1.50</td>
<td>S/. 1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almud of eating potatoes</td>
<td>S/. 0.50</td>
<td>S/. 0.80</td>
<td>S/. -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almud of seed potatoes</td>
<td>S/. 0.30</td>
<td>S/. 0.50</td>
<td>S/. 0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11b. of meat</td>
<td>S/. 0.10</td>
<td>S/. 0.10</td>
<td>S/. -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Accountancy books for Cabracancha.

Over the years, the variety of products requested and distributed decreased. In 1921 for example, barley and lentils also figured amongst the items requested, but these had completely disappeared by 1941. The same is true of meat. As the prices in the hacienda

10. See Chapter 3, Table 4, for details of wage rates on the coastal sugar plantations.
store rose, the peones became increasingly indebted to the hacienda. In 1921, many peones had $ 4.80 — their entire earnings for the year from the días de la oaz — the their credit, whilst others had up to $ 12 owing to them from previous years. By the agricultural season of 1935-36 there were very few peones still holding credit, and there was an average debt to the almacén of $ 4.9.

Whilst it is clear that the internal differentiation of the peasants meant that the hacienda had access to different factors of production, it is also important to assess how far their different relationships to the hacienda signified class differences. The arrendadores obviously had a greater degree of independence and bargaining power vis-à-vis the hacienda than the peones they had to sell part of their surplus product on the market in order to meet the payment of rent in cash. Also, whilst some of the arrendadores were Chalinos by birth, others were born in the neighbouring estancias and probably retained family lands outside the hacienda, (see Table 2). Moreover, the fact that their labour obligations were less onerous than those of the peones, and did not extend to their children, meant that it was possible for some of them to migrate temporarily to the coastal plantations or to the rice plantations of Bagua and Jaén. Thus a higher level of market involvement and a greater level of internal differentiation is to be expected amongst the arrendadores than amongst the peones. Figures from Cabracancha from 1949 demonstrate, however, that there was no great internal differentiation even amongst the arrendadores, (see Table 8).
Table 8: Differentiation amongst 37 arrendadores of Cabrancano, 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land size</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 3.5 has.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 - 11 has.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11+ has.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0 - 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Renting contracts of Cabrancano, 1949

The most significant of these figures are those for cattle since oxen are used for ploughing and therefore constitute part of the working capital of the peasant enterprise. They were also loaned out to other peasants in return for a stipulated number of days labour, on the owner's land. They also serve as a store of value. Despite the fact that one of the arrendadores' tasks for the hacienda was transportation, the number of beasts of burden owned was small. The eight arrendadores who had plots of land over 3.5 hectares are also those with the greatest number of animals, and paid the highest rents.

Whilst the arrendadores were engaged in petty commodity production and thus could accumulate a small amount of capital, the hacienda placed limits on the numbers of animals they could pasture. In the renting contracts, the exact numbers of animals of each type were stipulated. Moreover, the contract stated that "improvements are not recognized. If improvements are made without the authorization of the hacienda administration, they go to the benefit of the estate." Thus, there was no incentive to improve lands or cultivation prac-
tiss. Thus, though technically the arrendadores had greater possibilities of independent accumulation than the peones, this was limited by the stipulations of the renting contract, and the fact that the contract had to be renewed yearly. 11

Whilst it is evident that the hacienda, as a primarily Gmina enterprise did limit the peasants' involvement in commodity production and the degree to which they could accumulate capital, this does not mean that the peasants engaged in a purely natural economy. Rather their relationship to the market was much more complex, as the analysis of the market and artisan production will demonstrate.

Household production:

I have already argued above that the highland estates of Peru were engaged in commodity production, but that they did this on the basis of the extraction of rents from peasant producers rather than by extracting surplus-value through a capitalist production process. In this section I argue that whilst the hacienda system did retard the process of the differentiation of the peasantry in Chala, it was not based on a system of natural economy. On the contrary, the peasant tenants were integrated into the market both as producers and as consumers.

Marx defined natural economy as:

"When no part of the agricultural product, or but a very insignificant proportion, enters the process of circulation, and then only a relatively small part of the product which represents the landlord's revenue ....... Domestic handicrafts and manufacturing labour, as secondary occupations of agriculture ....... are the prerequisites upon which domestic economy rests." (Marx, Capital Vol.III, 1974:785-7)
In Chela, rather than there being a natural economy, we find a diversification of agricultural production over the different ecological levels of the estate, as well as the integration of the peasant producers into a regional pattern of specialization of textile production. Whilst some of the exchanges took place outside the sphere of monetary exchange, others did not. Thus the peasants were subordinated to circulation capital, both as producers and consumers.

The practice of exchanging goods between partners living at different altitudes, and thus in different ecological zones, is common in the Andes. It is a means of acquiring different agricultural products, and proves more advantageous for both partners than buying the same goods on the market, or trying to grow them on unsuitable land. In Chala, it was rare for individual families to have access to land in more than one ecological level, though individual holdings often contained different microclimates. These exchanges were not simply of a non-monetary nature, and money often exchanged hands between partners. Moreover, goods were often exchanged not just for consumption but for resale in the market or at a fiesta. Exchanges were referred to as cambio, negocio or traspaso - barter, trade and sale respectively - and the exchanges which took place between long-established partners on a non-monetary basis were generally considered to be of higher status than those that were merely traded. For example, one household in the semi-tropical lands of the temple might have several trading partners arrive in time for the yuca (manioc) harvest, and to acquire sugar cane, oranges and bananas for the fiesta of Carnaval. A long-standing trading partner would be

11. It is also likely that there was control over the quantities and even the prices of products going out of the haciendas in certain periods. Until 1962 there was only one bridge connecting Chala to Bambamarca.
given more food and greater hospitality by the hosts, and charged nothing, save the labour required to harvest the quantity of produce he had requested. This was, of course, in anticipation of a return at the time of the maize or potato harvest on the receiver's land. Less established partners who came to buy the produce, would be treated with less deference, especially if it was known that they intended to re-sell the produce.

It was common practice for people living in the quichua lands near Bambamarca to make a short trip to the jalca or the temple to buy produce on a one-off basis if they were hard up for cash. They would then take the produce to market, and would make a small gain on the transaction. Others did this on a regular basis, and would hold a regular patch in the Sunday market. Partners living away from Bambamarca would often request manufactured goods rather than agricultural produce, such as kerosene, salt, sugar, pasta and rice. These exchanges were of advantage to both parties due to the price differentials of goods on the market and on the plot, and the low level of monetarization of the economy.

If a peasant required a large amount of cash - for example for house construction, to buy agricultural implements such as hoes or machetes, or to cover the expenses of a funeral, the sale of animals was the most efficient means of acquiring it. It was common practice to buy a young or injured animal and to look after it until its condition improved, and it could be re-sold for a higher price in the market. Thus livestock, apart from their usefulness as work animals or as suppliers of wool and milk, were an essential part of the peasants' capital, and increased of its own accord through natural reproduc-

12. Death was by far the most important life cycle ritual and required the largest expenditure. Christenings were also observed, though marriage was not celebrated. Recently converted Protestants were the only peasants who got married. For a discussion of Protestantism, see Chapter 7
Suction. Smaller animals such as chickens, guinea pigs (cues) and rabbits were sold when smaller amounts of cash were required, for example, for the payment of a christening. Agricultural produce was marketed consistently, though in small quantities. Where the peasant plot was close enough to the village, milk and eggs could be marketed daily, and were usually sold on a regular basis to a woman's comadre. Women living at a greater distance away from the village made their milk into cheese, which along with other products, were brought up regularly by itinerant middlemen for sale in Caja-marca or on the coast. Masa refers to this as the mercado de ramificacion — the ramifying market — to indicate the decentralized nature of this form of commodity exchange, (Masa 1975). Herbs for tea making and for seasoning, along with alfalfa and firewood, were also marketed for small amounts of cash.

It was possible to work for a wage locally, and most peones sought wage labour during the dead season (December to March) which is the slack season of the agricultural cycle. This work was in house construction or in labouring and usually involved a small payment in cash, a meal and a ration of coca. When the work involved an exchange labour relationship, minga, between two friends of family members, payment tended to be in kind rather than cash. Whilst in the zones of independent peasant small holdings wage labour was the

13. Comadre is a term which refers to the relationship between a parent and the god-parent of a child. It is a means of confirming or re-confirming a relationship between friends or family members. In this instance it was an asymmetrical relationship between the producer and a client in the village.

14. Coca is a green leaf which is grown in the ceja de selva (the brow of the jungle) and is the plant from which cocaine is refined. Peasants chew the dried leaves along with lime, which acts as a catalyst on the juices. It has a numbing effect, and is supposed to help withstand cold and hunger.
preferred form of relationship, even when it was a minga, in Chala and other less monetarized zones, the tendency was to pay in kind. The payment was either part of the harvest or a lata or alforja (can or saddlebag-full) of agricultural produce. This usually proved to be better remuneration than a small sum of cash, and thus benefitted both the employer and the labourer.\(^15\)

By far the most significant form of regular cash income for most peasants was the sale of craft goods. In the zone of Bambamarca, this primarily meant weaving, and clothes and sombrero making. Whilst wool was spun and woven into blankets and ponchos by women within the household unit, most other items of clothing had to be obtained through barter or through the market.

Within Chala there were a number of men weavers who specialized in the production of bayeta, a relatively fine woollen cloth which was used for shawls (pañolones), skirts (fondos), babies nappies (pañales) and short woollen trousers used by men (though these are dying out with the increasing availability of manufactured goods). Bayeta was woven on a heavy wooden loom, which required a considerable outlay of capital. In contrast, the loom that was used for weaving blankets and ponchos was a simple sling, which was slung around the back and attached to a tree or a rafter of a house. Whilst every household was able to obtain the means of production which would enable them to produce blankets and ponchos, the spun yarn had to be taken to the owner of a wooden loom in order to be woven into bayeta. Payment was usually in kind, though cash was occasionally accepted.

\(^{15}\) In 1976 the wage rate paid to a peon in Cabrancas would have been S/20 in cash, whilst the rate in kind stood at a lata of potatoes, worth roughly S/120 on the market. It therefore stands to reason that payment in kind was often preferred by the peon.
There was also a demand for lighter articles of clothing such as blouses, shirts, aprons and trousers. Many of these items could be obtained from shops in Bambamarca, though there was also an extensive outwork system, and goods could be obtained direct from the producers if the materials were provided. This kind of production, like loom weaving, required a heavy capital outlay for the purchase of the sewing machine. Whilst the peasant artisan usually owned the sewing machine, the middlemen would provide the raw materials, and would pay a piece rate for the finished article. Tailors and seamstresses were common in the small-holding zones outside Chala, and some families owned up to two or three machines. However, within Chala it was only the slightly better off families which owned sewing machines.

A type of artisan production which required little capital outlay on means of production was the weaving of straw and palm sombreros. All that sombrero-making requires is a small wooden mould to shape the cup of the hat, and the purchase of a bunch of straw or palm (manojo de paja, manojo de palma). It took roughly two weeks to complete a sombrero de paja, whilst the finer fibre of the palma meant that these sombreros took between four and six weeks to complete. Whilst some peasants were supplied with straw and palm by middlemen and sold their finished product at a predetermined price to them, others bought their own raw materials and sold their goods on the open market. There was one street in Bambamarca, off the main square, which every Sunday was given over to the buying and selling of sombreros and paja and palma. The fact that most artisan production was concentrated during the slack season when there were few agricultural tasks, meant that the market was flooded with
products in February and March, and prices subsequently fell. This was the period when middlemen bought up large quantities of sombreros, and treated them with brimstone (azufre) to make them shining white, before taking them to Cajamarca and the coast where prices were considerably higher.

Whilst Bambamarca specialized in the production of sombreros, the surrounding areas also had specialist forms of artisan production. The neighbouring province of Chota specialized in the production of cotton saddle-bags (alforjas) and brightly coloured swaddling clothes (pañales), and Tacabamba specialized in the production of indigo, tye-died, cotton carrying shawls (pañones), which every peasant woman in the area surrounding Bambamarca uses. These products were marketed regularly in the Sunday market in Bambamarca by salesmen from Chota, who often took a purchase of sombreros back with them to Chota. These salesmen were particularly in evidence on the days of the periodic big markets (mercados grandes) which were held immediately before any of the major Saints' Days fiestas in the region. These were the days when the peasants would come into town to buy new clothes for "Sunday best". There was no evidence that any of these artisan goods were exchanged directly on a non-monetary basis between different producers. Artisan production, particularly in Chota, was highly commercialized, and was marketed in tourist shops as far away as Lima.

Whilst artisan production is still thriving in the region, bayeta shawls and trousers are being replaced by manufactured goods from other parts of Peru.
Conclusion

In this Chapter I have argued that Chala was neither a feudal nor capitalist estate, but one of the various forms of transitional estate that could be found in Peru prior to the agrarian reform. Clearly an estate which employs a low level of technology and servile labour can not be considered as a capitalist farm, since relations of production are not capitalist and nor has labour been formally dominated by capital. Yet nor was Chala feudal, since production was geared to the market, and attempts were made to rationalize the labour process and to increase production, even though this did not result in a transformation of relations of production.

Martínez Alier argues that Andean haciendas were trying to divest their estates of peasant tenants and to transform them into capitalist enterprises. On this basis he argues that servile labour and restrictions on labour mobility did not exist. (Martínez Alier, 1973) However, clearly in a number of haciendas - the agricultural and livestock estates rather than the sheep ranches - servile labour practices did obtain. Since the problem of scarcity of capital combined with the intransigence of peasant tenants prevented them from transforming their relations of production, they could best compete in the market by increasing the absolute rent extracted from their tenants. This was the central contradiction of haciendas based on servile labour practises; a contradiction which came to a head in the 1950's and 1960's. Chala was not alone in experiencing this contradiction; hence the wave of peasant struggles against the haciendas throughout Peru in this period.
The argument that servile labour must be based on natural economy patently is not correct. Labour was tied to the land by institutional restraints, but this did not prevent peasant household production from being highly integrated into the market. However, servile labour does require a middle peasantry, one that is neither so poor that it is forced into wage labour, not so rich that it can make itself independent of the estate. Therefore the hacienda system in Chala did prevent the excessive fragmentation of peasant small holdings, and also, any great accumulation of capital in peasant hands. As such, it artificially maintained a peasantry, which was effectively tied to the land, but which did not obtain its entire income from the land.

The household economy of the peasant tenants of Chala was very similar to that of the independent peasant small holders living in adjacent zones. The main distinguishing feature was that the small holders were not tied by servile obligations to the land and were therefore free to migrate away from the region for periods of temporary wage labour employment. Thus, independent peasant small holders had the opportunity to accumulate capital, and were thus more internally differentiated than the peasant tenants of Chala. Since the middle peasantry is artificially maintained by the institutional system of the hacienda, then the removal of these restraints - by expropriation, invasion or private division - makes way for the fuller development of commodity production. Thus the struggle for the land in Chala represents the struggle of middle peasants against the payment of absolute rent under non-capitalist relations of production, relations of production which were dominated by circulation capital.
CHAPTER 5: The Struggle for the Land

Introduction:

In this chapter I analyse the struggle for the land from the perspective of the changes that were taking place in the hacienda system due to its relation to the market, and developments in the Peruvian class structure which led to a weakening of the landlords' control over their peasant tenants, and the growth of peasant struggles.

In this analysis, I reject the perspective of modernization theory, which holds that the traditional system is undermined by the impact of cultural changes emanating from urban centres. This is the perspective taken by Landsberger (1969); Huizer (1973); Craig (1968) and Lamond-Tullis (1970). This views the hacienda and the system of political domination employed by the hacienda as static phenomena, and attributes peasant protests to new ideas and information received by the peasants from outside the estate. Whilst there is no doubt that the majority of peasant struggles in recent years have been articulated with particular urban-based political parties and organizers, and that also the peasants' own temporary migrations to sources of wage labour employment have served to educate them in political organization, this is not the only factor contributing to the development of struggles. Wage labour migration represents a factor in the objective class position of the peasant, as well as allowing for changes in the peasants' subjective experience of organization and political strategy. Moreover, landlord strategy with respect to estate management does change over time and, as argued earlier, is nearly always to the detriment of the peasant tenants. The balance of class forces nationally also affects the timing of particular waves of peasant struggles. Thus in the 1960's in Peru the wave of peasant land invasions and struggles for union recognition were related, on the one hand, to landlords' attempts to
rationalize production on their estates, and on the other, the fact that the emergent industrial bourgeoisie perceived the continuing operation of the estates as a barrier to the development of commercial agriculture and to the growth of the internal market.

The analysis of peasant struggles has also been complicated by the question of whether these struggles are revolutionary or petty bourgeois by nature. Hobsbawm (1974) argues that in the case of land invasions, they can be objectively revolutionary regardless of the subjective aspirations of the peasants who are involved in them and who motivate them. For example, many land invasions which took place in the Central Sierra in the 1960's were justified by the peasant participants in extremely legalistic terms, in terms of re-claiming community lands long ago usurped by the estates. Direct action in the form of land invasions were usually only a last resort, or a strategy arrived at only through the negotiation of different interests. However, this is not the way in which the class nature of peasant struggles is to be ascertained. Thus the class interests and the level of consciousness achieved by the participants in any struggle are fundamental to understanding the long term development of political struggles.

The confusion between political tactics and political consciousness can be attributed to some extent to the debate around whether peasant movements are political or pre-political, (see Quijano, 1967). There has been a tendency to argue that because peasant movements have often been local and spontaneous they should be classified along with banditry and jacqueries as being pre-political, (see Hobsbawm, 1969a, 1971a). Where they have formed trade unions and have drawn on formal political ideologies and parties, then this is considered as political. However, whilst this classification relies on the concept of the existence of objective conditions for political struggle before a struggle can be political, it relies on a broad, rather than a
narrow definition of political consciousness. It is evident that for a large part of the twentieth century peasants have indeed used political strategies in the sense that they have struggled to gain local and temporary objectives. That is to say, they give evidence of the development of an economic or trade union consciousness. However, if we define political consciousness as one which entails the development of class conscious struggles, then struggles of this nature have been only a recent development in the Peruvian rural sector. Thus for Martínez Alier (1973) to argue that peasants and rural proletarians have the same political objectives and levels of consciousness because they engage in similar kinds of activities, is incorrect. Even a cursory glance at the literature on peasant struggles in Peru demonstrates the heterogeneity of the rural class structure and the class interests of different sectors of the peasantry. Thus the peasants of the community of Huasicancha who invaded the lands of the hacienda Tucle in the 1960's (see Smith, 1978) had very different interests and a different level of political consciousness from the poor peasants of Piura who led the land invasions of the estates in the early 1970's, (see Harding, 1975).

In this chapter, I shall emphasize the features of particular phases of development of the struggle against the landlord in Chala, and how these reflected changes in the peasant organization. These stages in the struggle will also be related to changes in the landlord's strategy. A point that needs to be emphasized is that the implementation of the land reform in Chala did not put an end to the struggle, but rather gave it a new focus and new objectives.

**Background to the struggle in Chala:**

The struggle for the land in Chala had its origins in the contradictions inherent in the hacienda system. The stability of the hacienda was undermined by developments in the economy and in the class struc-
ture. Generally speaking, the haciendas which had not been able to transform their relations of production and convert themselves into capitalist farms were in a situation of crisis by the late 1950's and the 1960's. The growth of urban populations meant that their production was affected by competition in the market from more capital-intensive enterprises, thus in order to compete they had to increase absolute rent. Landlords in the highlands who did attempt to introduce capitalist relations of production nearly always met peasant resistance to the usurpation of subsistence lands and proletarianization. Thus the only option open to landlords was to increase the surpluses extracted by the more efficient use of labour, cutting back on paternalist benefits, and by improving production techniques on the desmesne lands.

Whilst landlords were attempting to rationalize production in this way, they were inadvertently introducing capitalist criteria of production into a system which was based on the use of extra-economic coercion. It was precisely this strategy which clarified the exploitative nature of the landlord-peasant relationship, which had previously been masked by the paternalist relationship and the ideology of paternalism. In Chala, it was the loosening of the paternalist ties between the landlord and the peasant tenants combined with increased exploitation in a concrete form which produced the objective conditions for the peasant protests. Whilst no large scale attempts were made to evict peasants from the land as part of a conscious strategy on the part of the landlord to introduce capitalist relations of production, there is no doubt that piecemeal encroachments on the peasants' land, and the opportunistic eviction of peasants as revenge for organizing protests formed part of an overall strategy of increasing desmesne production at the expense of peasant subsistence.
The weakening of the internal structure of the hacienda system took place at the same time that the landlord class itself had been undergoing a process of internal differentiation. The landlords in Cajamarca who developed commercial dairy farms diversified their interests and maintained their political power in the Sociedad Nacional Agraria, in the Senate and in the political parties. It was on the commercial dairy estates in the Cajamarca valley that landlord power was least affected by the wave of peasant mobilizations in the 1960's. The smaller landlords with less diversified interests, whilst often managing their own estates directly, were increasingly viewed as parasitic rentiers by the more 'modern' fractions of their class.

The differentiation of the peasantry, by virtue of wage labour migration and the division and sale of haciendas, could not fail to make an impression on hacienda tenants still under landlord control. In the market, the peasants saw the increased affluence of peasants from neighbouring zones: they did not have to perform unpaid labour services for the landlord, they owned or were buying their own plots of land, they could send their children freely to school without the interference of the landlord, and they were buying highly valued manufactured goods in the market. This raised the demand for the land, albeit for legal distribution and sale, at the very time that landlords were trying to increase absolute rent.

A final factor undermining the hacienda system was the fact that the peasant tenants - the renters, even if not the tied labourers - were able to migrate to the coastal plantations to work for short periods. This meant that they were able to accumulate cash incomes in a way that was impossible in the context of the local economy. They also experienced industrial labour relations and learnt of the significance of trade union and political organizations. They thus
developed organizational skills and a higher level of political consciousness and often came to form the most articulate layers of peasant leaders in local struggles.

Early phases of the struggle:
The early phases of the struggle are the least well documented and most plagued by conflicting accounts of what happened. Dates and figures are often inaccurate, whilst accounts tend to reflect current relations between different factions, rather than the original relationship of forces.

There were two mobilizations in the early stage of the struggle, which were precipitated by changes in the organization of production on the hacienda. The first of these mobilizations occurred in the early 1950's and the second in 1956-7. The conditions which lead the peasants to start organizing were roughly similar in both instances, though the origin of the leaders and the extent of support of the mobilizations were different.

The first mobilization was, according to one account, a response to Zárate's taking over the renting of the hacienda. This was pressaged by an increase in rents and a decrease in the customary rations served to the work gangs at midday. A decision was taken by a group of arrendadores and peones to take a petition to the Labour Judge in Cajamarca, calling for an end to the rent increases and to the unpaid labour the peones had to perform for the hacienda. Some 150 signatures were collected for this petition, and the judge

1. However, if this was the case, it would date the mobilization after 1954, which was the year that Zárate signed the renting contract with the Mirandas. However, it is possible that he was acting as manager prior to this date, due to the fact that the Mirandas had paid for his studies in agronomy and that he was married to Zoila Rodríguez, the adopted daughter of the Mirandas.
ruled in favour of the peasants. In 1953 the labour obligations were increased and the rents doubled once again. The peasants sought legal restitution, but at this point three of the leaders were arrested, and others were evicted from their plots of land. The mobilization thus came to a temporary halt.

A second version of this episode of the struggle ascribes mainly to the arrendadores of Chungos and Cabrancancha, who were protesting against rent increases. It is also likely that an illegitimate son of Cesar Miranda was involved, who was trying to obtain the property for his own family, who were empleados. The peasants involved in this protest were brought off for a paltry sum of money, and forced to leave their plots of land.

The mobilization of 1956 was the first to extend to all sectors of the estate. It was organized in response to the halving of the midday food ration, the decreasing of the size of the plots of land that the peasants worked for their subsistence, and the raising of rents. However, the factors precipitating it was the demand for the schooling of the children of the peones, who until this plot had been working on the estate from the age of seven, and an incident relating to the construction of a road from the village of Bambamarca to the casa hacienda. Whilst work on the road was in progress, two peasants were injured by dynamite explosions, and were themselves ordered to pay the wages for two workers to replace them.

The initial organizers of the mobilization were several families of peones in the sector of Santa Bárbara, who were determined to send their children to school. The shame of the illiterate is frequently expressed in peasant language, for example in phrases such as "we used to be like animals in those days" and:
"I didn't know what an official was then. No, I didn't know what an official was, or if an official was the same as an investigator. Really, we didn't know anything; a judge and a lawyer were all the same to us."

Since there were no schools functioning on the hacienda for the children of the peones, they sent their children to school in Bambamarca. The hacendado took immediate action against this, because not only did he not want an educated work force, but it meant that the children were being prevented from tending the herds. He called the peasant leaders to the casa hacienda and ordered them to take their children out of school so that they could look after the pigs. He informed them that the law did not allow the children of Chala to go to school, and threatened to evict the families from the estate. The peasants sought advice from two 'quack' lawyers (tintarillos) and the local school inspector who was probably a member of the Aprista party. They suggested that a petition should be taken to the Ministry of Education in Lima, signed by all the heads of households in Chala.

The leaders of the peasants then proceeded to collect some 600 signatures and the names of 1,500 children who lacked schooling. From the outset, they did not waste time with the local authorities since they were advised that they were either in the pay of the hacendado or could be hounded out of town if showing sympathy to the peasant cause. They thus went straight to Lima to present their petitions to the Ministries of Education, Labour, Agriculture and Haciendas. However, messages were sent from the Cajamarca regional authorities claiming that they were already four state schools functioning in Chala. The peasants were turned back with the comment, "Do you expect us to believe that the ingeniero is lying?"
The peasants' next strategy was to set up a school of their own and to pay a school teacher to teach the children. All the children attended these classes, but they were stopped after a fortnight. The peasant leaders were arrested on the pretext that they had been damaging hacienda property, and that they had refused to work their fifteen days of labour for the hacienda for the past five years. Eighty-three families were evicted from the hacienda as a result of this.

One of the major shortcomings of this early protest was the lack of a permanent organizational structure amongst the peasants, and a reliance on legal channels of action rather than on the strength of mass mobilizations. Though there were leaders in each of the sections of Chals, this was on an ad hoc basis around this particular issue. Positions of leadership were confined to the ranks of the peasants, whilst outsiders acted only on a consultative and not an organizational basis. The leaders were courageous and extremely militant, but were inexperienced and lacked a development of class consciousness. Only in the later stages of the struggle were links

2. This has been a common strategy in peasant struggles, and represents a respect for legalistic and bureaucratic channels of resolution to struggles, not just on the part of the peasants, but also of their legal and political advisors. It derives from two main factors: firstly, the fact that provisions often existed in the letter of the law for the solution of peasant problems, but were not implemented in practice in the regions because of the considerable power landlords exercised in their local areas. Secondly, it was in Lima that sympathetic parliamentary deputies could be sought, and contact with unions, such as FIMCAP could be made.

3. 'Ingeniero' is the title used to address people with technical qualifications. In this instance, Zárate was an agronomist.

4. See Alberti and Sánchez (1973) for a similar case when the peasants of Yanamarca set up their own school. The Asociaciones de Padres de Familias (the Parents' Associations) have often been influential pressure groups in local politics.
made with trade union organizations on the sugar estates of Cayaltí and Casagrande, and the neighbouring hacienda of Pallán where the Apristas had organized a union.

The second phase of the struggle for the land:

The conditions analysed in the previous section which provoked the initial mobilizations against the hacienda made further protest feasible at any time. The failure of earlier protests can be ascribed to factors internal and external to the peasant organization itself. The significance of the second phase lies in the fact that politically and organizationally the mobilization was more developed, thus many of the former limitations - of isolation of the struggle, of reliance on legal channels of action and of the lack of a permanent organizational structure - were overcome. Moreover, the balance of forces had changed nationally, to the detriment of the land owning classes. The whole of the highlands was alive with the promise of agrarian reform, whilst the success of the peasant sindicatos in La Convención (near Cuzco), encouraged peasant struggles everywhere. This was the period of the massive land invasions in the Central and Southern Sierra, and the opening up of guerrilla fronts in several zones.

The major point of difference between the earlier and the later stage of struggle in Chala lay in the formation of a peasant sindicato organized by the Movimento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left.

5. For a peasant account of this phase of the struggle see Appendix 4.
This meant that the struggle attempted to transcend the limitations of a narrow, locally-based struggle, and allowed the peasant sindicato to relate to other political organizations and struggles in different parts of Peru.

In the earlier mobilizations only formal, legal channels of action had been used. This resulted in the peasants placing undue confidence in lawyers and in the Ministries in Lima. Though these channels of action were still used and the lobbying of sympathetic deputies in the Chamber of Deputies continued, this was a complement and not a substitute for mass mobilizations and action. Emphasis was continually laid on the peasants themselves taking control of the land, by subverting the effectiveness of the hacienda administration, in ways which led eventually to a situation in which the peasants were in de facto control of the hacienda.

From the outset of this phase of mobilization the key demand was for the land, and action was not concentrated on peripheral issues, such as rent increases and the lack of schools for children, as it had been in earlier protests. Emphasis on the land raises the key issue of the control of the means of production, which takes the directly political form of challenging the landlord's power. Though the struggle is economic, in the sense that it is geared to fulfilling the peasants' immediate demand for land, in the development

6. The Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria developed out of the Alza Rebelde (Rebel Apra) split of the Aprista party. It was formed during the late 1950's along with other groups of the Peruvian 'New Left', under the influence of the Cuban revolution, see Valderrama (1976); Bejar (1970) and Marks, (1976) for details of the Peruvian Left.
of the struggle and through the strategy of mass mobilizations it can transcend these confines and may bring about a confrontation between the power of the peasants on the one hand, and the power of the hacendado and the repressive apparatus of the state on the other. Under these conditions, the peasants may achieve the understanding that it is not simply the person of the hacendado that they are fighting, but the whole apparatus which supports his interests.

There are many problems in attempting to analyse a peasant mobilization. Much of the information used in this account is based on the formal documents that were drawn up in the course of the struggle. These tend to be the petitions drawn up by the peasants and sent to the Agrarian Reform bodies, the Ministries and the Chamber of Deputies, and the contrary evidence presented by the hacendado, to incriminate the peasants, weaken their struggle and to deny recognition of their claim. The evidence is therefore

7. In this chapter I have drawn mainly on the documents of the file of the Juzgado de Tierras (Land Judiciary) which were drawn up for the purpose of the expropriation of the hacienda. Though the material is presented in chronological order, several distinct features of the struggle can be discerned. These are:

(1) The hacendado's attempts to sell land on an individual basis in the confusion over the ownership of Chungos which arose through a boundary dispute with the neighbouring hacienda, Llaucán.

(2) Direct action in Aduña, Cabrancancho and later Santa Bárbara as well.

(3) Conflicts involving the share-croppers in Colpa.

(4) The hacendado's attempts to avert the agrarian reform and discredit the peasants struggle after Chala had been earmarked for expropriation by the Decreto Supremo 121A of September 1967.

(5) The repression and blocking of legal channels of action by corrupt local authorities.

(5) Evidence of relationships to other struggles, to the peasants expelled in previous mobilizations, and the organization of the welfare of the families of imprisoned or fugitive peasants.
contradictory and often difficult to verify. It also presents only the formal, legal aspect of the struggle, and thus probably overestimates the role of the Aprista party. The ideology of the dominant class comes over very strongly in many of the reports, and tends to exaggerate the violence and the numbers of peasants involved in particular incidents. It also tends to give the impression that the struggle was provoked by the interference of outsiders, who incited the otherwise placid peasants to violence. In rare occasions reports do refer to Sarate as having the mentality of a feudal seigneur; both peasants and the landlord use the anti-feudal ethic when it suits their case.

The formation of the sindicato:

In the early 1950's the decision was made by the peasants of Chala to form a sindicato. For several years they had been struggling unsuccessfully against increased exploitation under the hacienda system, but the overwhelming weight of land-owning interests in government and in positions of influence effectively blocked the resolution of the peasants' demands. They described their situation in the following terms, in a petition addressed to the President of the Military Junta in 1962:

"Since the times of our ancestors, whom we have succeeded from fathers to sons, we have cultivated the land and laboured in the said hacienda, suffering servitude and exploitation, expulsions from the land and other abuses, which never seem to end. For many years we have requested the intervention of the Ministry of Labour and Indigenous Affairs,
but until now, no measures of justice have been taken, and nor has the expropriation we have proposed been taken up."

(Petition from the peasants of Chala to the President of the Military Junta, 15th November 1962)

The above document continues by appealing to the Military Junta's proclaimed policy of "studying and resolving the situation of the peasants by means of an Agrarian Reform".

The specific situation which prompted this petition was the individual sale of land by the hacendado of Chala. The problem lay not so much in the fact that he was selling the land, a measure the peasants would have whole-heartedly welcomed, but the fact that he was selling the land to outsiders. This, they felt, prejudiced their own access to land. He was also using coercion to exact the inflated price he was charging, and in some instances was threatening to expel peasants who were unable to find the cash to pay for the plots of land which they normally rented.

In addition, this represented an opportunity for the landlord to intimidate peasants who were politically active, or who were opposed to this particular process of sale and division of the land. The following warning was sent to another peasant of Chungos:

"By the order of the Ingeniero Zárate I am requested to empty your house because it has been sold to F.H. Take your belongings as well as your door. Take them immediately or I will come and throw them out myself." Note sent by the empleado of Chala, Oscar Nestanza, to a tenant of Chungos, dated 5th October 1962.
"I am warning you to stop causing a disturbance to don F.Z., who has bought the plot of land next to yours. If you continue to annoy him, I shall be forced to take the matter to the police, to put an end to this kind of disturbance."

(Signed Luis Zarate - 2 November 1962)

The main zone affected by private sales was Chungos. The sale of land in this sector does not appear to have been part of a conscious strategy on the part of the hacendado to divest the desmesne lands of peasants, to accumulate capital or to avert agrarian reform as it was in many other estates in Cajamarca during this period. On the contrary, it appears to have been an opportunistic tactic to make some quick money. These lands were in dispute with the neighbouring hacienda of Llaucán which was being divided up and sold to its tenants by its owner, the Colegio San Juan of Chota (see Appendix 1).

From 1963, the lands of Llaucán were being sold to the peasant tenants of the hacienda. In the course of the legal investigation, it was discovered that 2,000 hectares of land belonging to Llaucán had been usurped by Chala in Chungos, and a further 6,948 hectares by the haciendas Jerez (3,440 hectares); Jadibamba (1,958 hectares) and Combayo (1,550 hectares). The Supreme Resolution which authorized the division and sale of these additional sections was not passed by the government until 15th December 1965. Luis Zarate knew what the outcome of the dispute would be, and tried to sell off as much land in Chungos before the resolution was passed.

No scruples were shown about the eviction of peasant tenants. The police were often brought in to threaten them with the burning of their crops and homes if they failed to meet the payment of either
the advance sum of money or later instalments of the payments that the landlord was demanding. Plots were sold at between S/35,000 and S/62,000 - considerable sums of money, if it is considered that the current wage was S/.10 a day in Bambamarca.

Until 1962 the peasants tried simply to persuade the government to set in motion the process of agrarian reform which existed in law. However, ambiguities in the legislation and the corruption of local officials made it possible for hacendados to sell their lands in a capricious way to the highest bidder. As the Institute of Land Reform and Colonization pointed out to the owners of Chala, the property could either be expropriated by the state and sold directly to the peasant occupants at prices determined by the productivity of the soil. Alternatively, it could be sold privately by the owners, without the intervention of the state or the Institute. A document dated 18th December 1962 makes it clear that not only was it politically easier to reach an agreement between the different parties by the latter course, but that it also relieved the economic burden placed on the state by the process of expropriation. A further petition to the Institute dated 22nd September 1963 indicates the lack of success the peasants achieved through this channel.

The sindicato was eventually formed in February 1964, when a committee of nine officers was elected. Present at this meeting was the Secretary General of the neighbouring hacienda of Pallán (province of Celendín) who spoke on the significance and aims of union organization and the protection afforded to unions by the state. A unanimous decision was taken to form the Sindicato Unico de Yanaconas y Colonos de La Hacienda Chala and its objectives were stated to be "to comply strictly with the laws of the country, and to seek at all times the collaboration of the hacienda administration, for the
best solution of agricultural and labour problems. The list of demands (the oliego de reclamos) of the sindicato included, amongst others:

1) The sale of the hacienda lands to the tenants of Chala and not to outsiders.

2) The abolition of the unpaid labour services.

3) The abolition of the task of carrying mineral from the mine of Foroporo (Celendín) to Bambamarca.

4) The issue of official renting contracts to all tenants on the hacienda.

5) The introduction of a minimum daily wage of S/ 1.10 with all social security benefits for all who worked on the hacienda.

6) The reinstatement of all tenants expelled in previous years.

7) An end to reprisals against politically active peasants.

From this moment on, the peasants began to rely on the strength of mass action to weaken the hacienda administration. Sabotage and direct action was taken by individuals with the backing of the sindicato. Direct action involved encroachment onto desmesne lands by the peasants, accompanied by the construction of peasant shacks which gave the appearance of lengthy occupation. They outwitted the hacienda administration and the police by producing receipts of old renting contracts, or by claiming to work as hired labourers for a third party.

The next tactic was for the peones of Cabrañancha to announce that from September 1964 they would no longer perform the unpaid labour obligations to the hacienda on the grounds that the Agrarian
Reform Law No. 15037 in article 237 expressly forbade the use of servile labour. In order to maintain their status as legal tenants they paid a nominal sum of S/100 a year rent into a bank account in Bambamarca. This arrangement, however, was not recognized by the hacienda administration. Similarly, the arrendadores refused to pay their full rents, and the part they did pay was also deposited into this account in Bambamarca. In the meantime they continued working their own plots of land and taking firewood from the hacienda, as they always had done.

Throughout the course of the struggle the peasants stressed their desire to work honourably for a "better and more prosperous Peru" in their official documents and propaganda. In accordance with this, they demanded a state-financed school in November 1954 and denounced Luis Zárate for tax evasion. For tax purposes, the estate had been declared a livestock farm with over 2,000 head of cattle and 2,000 head of sheep. It is not possible to verify these figures either way since the records available are incomplete. The sindicato produced photographs in evidence that the pastures were empty, and then proceeded to cut down the wire fences around the desmesne lands.

9. The only records available indicate the pasturing of the following livestock in Cabrapancha in 1966:

- Bulls and cows: 291
- Horses: 31
- Mules: 24
- Donkeys: 2

Plus 120 animals pastured for the villagers of Bambamarca.

Source: Accountancy books for Cabrapancha, 1956

If this figure is multiplied by four to take account of production in other sectors of the hacienda, it is possible that there may have been 2,000 head of livestock, including animals pastured from Bambamarquinos. However, this is a very rough estimate, since the five
sectors of the hacienda spanned different ecological niches, not all of which would have been suitable for livestock production. No mention is made of sheep in the ledgers, which the relatively high land of Cabracancha (+3000 metres) would have permitted. A testimony of one of the former empleados in 1970 stated that there had never been 2,000 head of cattle and that there had only been about 300 animals belonging to Zarate pastured on the estate.

in Cabracancha in order to pasturc their own sheep and cattle on them. When the police arrived to investigate, they encountered only children minding the herds.

The hacendado did not hesitate to denounce these incidents to the police and to bring in detachments of the Civil Guard to arrest individuals and to intimidate larger groups. He effectively prevented the sindicato from receiving formal recognition from the Ministry of Justice and Indigenous Affairs, by virtue of the fact that the law required the workers to be paid a wage in order to receive union recognition. However, the sindicato was affiliated to FEPCAP, the peasant federation. With regard to the sale of land and the threats of eviction, the sindicato had little recourse to justice locally due to the complicity of the authorities, namely the Juez Instructar and the Juez de Primera Instancia. They were also conscious of the insecurity of their access to land since for several years the hacienda had refused to issue renting contracts which would guarantee their right to the land if an Agrarian Reform was implemented.

In early 1965, the hacienda started a new assault against the peasants, this time against the share-croppers (partidarios). This

10. The Federación de Campesinos del Perú was linked in this period to APR, and found its support mainly in the sugar plantations. However, this federation also had considerable implantation in the Central Sierra and played an important role in peasant organizations in this zone. See for example Samaniego (1974), Smith (1978) and Handelman (1975)
group of peasants had been cultivating the land of Colpa since 1959 by virtue of a verbal contract. The hacienda had introduced them into this zone in order to open up rough grazing land to cultivation. The hacienda provided the seeds and the land whilst they worked the land and provided their own instruments of production. The harvest was divided between the two parties. This particular phase of the mobilization was motivated by the hacienda's refusal to provide the customary seeds, and attempts to dislodge the share-croppers by destroying their shacks. In Colpa twenty families of share-croppers were affected, excluding several families of 'blacklegs' (amarillos) who were protected by the administration. In Cabracancha there were only two share-croppers affected, due to the small number of share-croppers in this section of the hacienda.

The share-croppers had the law on their side: a clause in the Agrarian Reform Law No. 15037 states that "the political and administrative authorities will give guarantees to hacienda tenants that they will not be thrown off the lands they occupy, nor will they be prevented in any way from obtaining the means for their exploitation." Therefore, the only way in which the hacienda could abrogate their right to access to the land, which was guaranteed by law, was to claim that they were not legal tenants, but invaders. Thus, the hacienda administration had to forcibly dislodge the share-croppers from the land. Their livestock was confiscated, and it was claimed that the 'invaders' had built a bridge across the river Llaucano in order to facilitate the passage of their flocks. The hacendado's account of events demonstrates his fear of the growing confidence of the peasants:

"The situation is getting worse daily and chaos is increasing, as is the number of invaders. They are now employing a new system which will lead to the premature
exhaustion of the pasture, destined for my livestock (of the hacienda) so that it will die for lack of foodstuffs ...... I regret that the intellectual author of this malevolent plan is T ........ and I also denounce B........, who one Sunday in the month of February, came to Bambamarca and taking advantage of the large gathering of peasants here for the market, hired a loudspeaker .... and from the balcony of a house incited his large audience, by announcing that he was Secretary of the Land Reform and that his party (the Aprista party) was making the agrarian programme effective. "

(Letter written by Luis Zárate, Land Judiciary File, April 1965)

As a result of the escalation of conflict in Chala, a resolution was passed in the Chamber of Deputies condemning Zárate as an "insolent individual with the mentality of an encomendero" and recommending that the hacienda should be expropriated under the existing land reform, (Land Judiciary File, 19th October 1965). It also requested that guarantees should be given to the peasants, so that they no longer need fear reprisals for claiming their legal rights, particularly regarding the making of the sworn declarations (declaraciones juradas) which entitled them to land under the Agrarian Reform Law.

Regardless of resolutions enacted at the national level, Zárate still held considerable sway locally. The increasing level of peasant mobilization led to a fear of communist guerillas amongst the

12. An encomendero was the colonial official who was placed in charge of a land grant (the encomienda), with responsibilities for Indian corvée labour and for the payment of tribute.
villagers of Bambamarca, which was fuelled by the fact that there were active guerrilla fronts in the Centre and the South of the highlands. Zárate was quick to point out the dangers of this to the village of Bambamarca:

"I think it is interesting to note that the hacienda Chala is located close to a provincial capital, and that the casa hacienda is less than 880 metres from the village. If a subversive action was to take place in the hacienda Chala, which is more than 16,000 hectares in extension and densely populated, the damage this could cause and its national impact is difficult to predict."

(Letter to the Lieutenant of the Civil Guard, Bambamarca, October 1965)

The local authorities were naturally quick to put this entire process down to "political agitation".

"Thus it is the Aprista leaders of the village who are responsible for maintaining this state of tension amongst the peasants and who encourage them to violence, and they are helped by members of the M.I.R."

(Report of the Sub-Prefect of Hualgayoc, October 1965)

In summary, by the end of 1965, 300 peasants were in a position to benefit from the Supreme Resolution which recognized that Chungos belonged to Llaucán, and thus were eligible to benefit from the division and sale of the estate. The peones of Cabracancha had ceased performing their labour services to the hacienda, though they were paying a cash rent into an account in Bambamarca, which the hacienda administration refused to recognize. In Colpa, the share-croppers had been able to prove that they were not invaders and refused to move when the hacienda failed to renew their contracts.
Collectively and individually, sindicato members were harrassed, whether it was by cattle stampeding over their crops, or arbitrary arrest on trumped-up charges of cattle rustling or assaults on hacienda personnel. In October 1965 there was a grand total of 27 peasants under arrest, with five peasants enjoyed provisional liberty with caution.

From 1966 onwards there was a general escalation of violence as the conflict between the peasants and the hacienda became more acute. In April 1966 the first real land invasion took place, when the peasants set up boundary stones and trenches in Cabraca.cha. In June, 200 head of cattle were expropriated by the sharecroppers of Colpa. The administration's reprisals took the form of breaking down the fences protecting the peasants' crops, and threatening stampedes. As a result of one such stampede, one peasant was killed, another lost an eye and a third was gored by a bull. In addition thugs were hired to menace sindicato members. On one occasion four were surprised before they could inflict any harm, and dutifully frogmarched off to the offices of the Civil Guard. At the same time, a genuine concern arose amongst the villagers of Bambamarca and in certain circles of the Chamber of Deputies with respect to police brutality. Two peasants, neither from Chala but from the surrounding area, were so badly treated in the local P. I. P. station (the Policía de Investigación is the Peruvian equivalent to the Criminal Investigation Department) that one died and another was left in a coma. The normally apathetic villagers of Bambamarca were so incensed by this brutality that they invaded the P. I. P. station, and pubically destroyed all the furniture and records in the town square.
By the end of 1966, the Aprista parliamentary cell, with the support of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, approved the passing of a resolution for the expropriation of Chala. It was decided that the most rapid formula would be for the Oficina Nacional de Reforma Agraria (ONRA, The National Office for Agrarian Reform) to apply article 52 of Agrarian Reform Law 15037, which provided for the expropriation of conflictive haciendas which were not in zones formally declared to be liable to the reform process. Provisions were made by the Deputy Tantalean Vanini of Cajamarca to draw up a complementary bill in the event that peasants evicted from the hacienda in previous years were excluded. These plans were carried through and in January 1967 a team from the Institute of Agrarian Reform arrived in Chala to draw up the plans for the expropriation. However, the team clearly demonstrated its pro-landlord position; they indicated that only the lands declared in the sworn declarations were to be expropriated, and that no compensation was to be made for the predation on land and abuses suffered at the hands of the hacienda foremen. Peasants expelled from their lands in previous years were not to benefit. In addition to these problems, the team was put up at the casa hacienda and enjoyed the hospitality of the hacendados. The sindicato declared that support for the team was impossible.

13. "Nevertheless, I shall try to intervene in the process if it is not sufficiently broad and effective. If reparations are not made to the peasants who were dispossessed of their lands, I shall present a drastic and complementary bill on Chala which will be approved immediately in fullfilment with the agreement of the Aprista parliamentary cell." Letter from Víctor Tantalean Vanini to peasants of Chala, December, 1965.

14. "Team designated from Cajamarca Office is staying in the casa hacienda and has been given hospitality by the hacendados since its arrival in Bambamarca. Support of peasants impossible; they do not accept disposition regarding evicted peasants." Telegramme sent by the sindicato to the Institute of Agrarian Reform, January, 1967.
The immediate outcome of this sham attempt at reform was the announcement of a six day strike from the 27th January. At a mass meeting the removal of the empleado, Mestanza was called for. Further meetings took place, and the houses of three foremen and five backlegs were destroyed. The local Civil Guard received a communication to the effect that the peasants were in complete control of Cabracancha and Adcunac, and subsequently sent to Celendin and Chota for reinforcements.

During the course of the strike, it was decided that all peasants who had been dislodged from the hacienda in previous years should be reinstated in order to obtain entitlement to the land under the agrarian reform. A list of 83 heads of household was drawn up, 27 from Santa Bárbara, 53 from Cabracancha and two from Adcunac who had been expelled in previous years.

The growing power of the peasants is illustrated in the Sub-Prefect's report for February 1967. This not only demonstrates the fact that by this point in time the peasants were in de facto control of the land, but also pinpoints the repercussions of these events on the balance of power in Bambamarca itself.

"At 13.00 hours, a group of about three hundred peasants took up a position on the foot of the hill .... at a short distance from the casa hacienda, and holding a Peruvian flag in their hands, they began to carry out a series of provocative and menacing actions so that the Sub-Prefect, the parish priest, and the Lieutenant of the Civil Guard had to come to talk with the leaders ......... The peasants of Chala have always enjoyed ample guarantees to carry out their strikes with the presence
of delegates from the unions of the sugar estates of Cayaltí and Pomalca, but they have never made such violent attacks and outrages as they have during the latest strike which lasted six days. In these, the peasants have been spurred on by members of the M. I. R. to refuse to pay their rents, and the hacienda is now treated as though it were a community, with no respect for private property. The M. I. R. wanted to take this important town for its urban and rural population of 42,00 inhabitants, as a bridgehead for the elections of 1969. In this crusade they have received the collusion of APRA, to demand the annulation of the elections which the Alianza\(^1\) won by an overwhelming number of votes." (my emphasis: Sub-Prefect's Report, February, 1967)

In early March of 1967 a further act of violence was instigated by the hacienda administration in Cabraconcha. It involved a blackleg who had been contracted as a share-cropper and paid by the hacienda to act as an agent provocateur. The individual concerned was working for the hacienda and refused to stop work when approached by the sindicato members. On one occasion when a number of peasants approached him to join the sindicato and cautioned him against continuing work for the hacienda, he shot into the crowd with a gun, killing one peasant and seriously wounding another. It later transpired that he had been paid to aim at leaders of the sindicato by the hacienda administration.

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1. The Alianza was the electoral coalition between President Belaúnde's Acción Popular party and the Christian Democrats, which came to power in the 1963 elections. In these elections, APRA had formed an alliance with Odria's Union Nacional Cristia.
The Guardia Civil sent in a contingent of 35 men to extract the body and to free the family of the assailant. They were met by large numbers of peasants armed with sticks and stones. Eleven Civil Guard were left behind in Cabracancha to keep the peace once the body had been removed to Bambamarca.

This policy of mutual harassment continued, though at this stage the hacienda was increasingly on the defensive against peasant gains. Because the hacienda was designated for the agrarian reform process since 1967, and was certain to be expropriated in one form or another, the hacendado's strategy became that of undermining the claims to land of as many peasants as possible in order to retain the largest amount of desmesne lands for himself. This he did by denouncing large numbers of peasants as invaders and outsiders. The sindicato members were shrewd, and used the same weapon against the hacienda in denouncing groups of blacklegs as invaders to the police, thus creating a high degree of confusion regarding outsiders in the pay of the hacienda or buying land illegally, and peasants justly reclaiming land after years of expulsion from the hacienda.

One such incident occurred when a group of eight peasants were formally denounced to the police by the sindicato as outsiders and invaders. In fact they were share-croppers who had been working for the hacienda for several years in the section of Colpa, but had not joined the sindicato and had been harassing other peasants. The denunciation came in the form of an accusation that they were invading the land, when in fact sindicato members themselves were invading the land, in an attempt to oust them from the hacienda.

At the same time the harassment of individual leaders continued -
cattle were stampeded over their crops and blacklegs were paid to construct houses and to start sowing pastures so that the hacienda could accuse the sindicato of usurpation. This served as a pretext to order the arrest of peasants who were assumed to be important leaders. In addition illegal sales of land to outsiders continued in the zone of Chungos and more sporadically in Cabrancha, which also served to harrass individual peasants with prior claims to land.

In May 1967 a new ploy was devised by the hacienda administration which was to organize an alternative agrarian reform under the legal title of the Asociación Agropecuaria de Campesinos de la Hacienda Chala (the Agricultural Association of Peasants of the Hacienda Chala). This involved forcing the lieutenant governor of Tuco to make out contracts for the sale of land to individual peasants, spreading rumours at the same time that "the agrarian reform had no reason to interfere in Chala" and that the agrarian reform officials were "liars and communists".

Under the provisions of the law 14646 of 1964, agricultural associations could be set up and inscribed in the General Office for Indigenous Affairs of the Ministry of Labour and Communities. These associations could propose alternative forms of expropriation, which corresponded to a "tacit submission" on the part of the hacendado's to the peasants' right to the land. It involved the direct sale of land to the peasants by the hacienda, and the peasants would have a twenty year period in which to pay the compensation.

17. Complaint filed to the Institute of Agrarian Reform by the sindicato, May 1967.
Practically, such a solution meant that only a few peasants - those favoured by the administration - would receive land, and the hacendado would remain relatively unscathed by the expropriation, retaining large tracts of land for himself. Furthermore, in the short term, it was also a means of confusing and dividing the peasants, of which the *sindicato* was extremely wary.

"At the moment, the hacendado is trying, with the aid of the Notary of the Province, to disorganize the *sindicato*, which has solicited the expropriation of the hacienda in accordance with the article No. 52 of the Agrarian Reform Law. He is attempting to form a pseudo Peasant Agricultural Association, so that the sale can be made directly between the proprietors and the highest bidder. He also counts with the complicity of the lieutenant governors of the hacienda, who have been nominated recently, and who have been forcing the peasants against their will to put their thumbprints and signatures to the document .......... For this reason we direct ourselves to you, to inform you that all the peasants of Chela desire the expropriation of the estate by the Institute of Agrarian Reform and its organization, and not the backward and seemingly peasant institutions, which are trying to impede the functioning of the true spirit of the Agrarian Reform."

(Letter to the Institute of Agrarian Reform, July 1967)

The plan to introduce an alternative expropriation failed because Zárate himself was not particularly interested in it:
"I regret to inform you ...... that the procedure with respect to Chala has turned against us, because the Institute of Agrarian Reform will make the expropriation in spite of everything, and they will have nothing to do with the plan that we drew up and elaborated ...... as you can see, our plan has not come to fruition, and it is none's fault, apart from Zárate's, who has delayed too much and has not carried out his tasks with sufficient anticipation."

(Letter from one lawyer to another, July 1967)

Throughout 1967 a campaign had been built up to reinstate the peasants dislodged in earlier protests. This involved the sending of petitions to the Institute of Agrarian Reform as well as the issuing of warnings to the hacienda administration not to continue harassing the first groups of peasants who had already returned to their former plots. In August and September large scale invasions occurred by peasants recuperating the plots they had cultivated prior to 1958. Their immediate strategy was to build shacks and to start ploughing the land, to give the appearance of lengthy occupation. This was followed-up immediately by the filing of a claim for a state-financed school.

The hacendado now recognized his impotence against the peasant organization and that the expropriation had already occurred in practice, even if not in the law.

"Since I believe the approved expropriation will be made valid, or rather, it is already valid by virtue of the peasants' de facto occupation of the land, deliberately produced by the systematic
invasion of the lands of the hacienda Chela and encouraged by the Agrarian Reform Office of Cajamarca .... and tolerated by the forces of law and order."

(Letter from Zárate to Minister of Agriculture, November 1967)

Initially, he proposed that 5,000 hectares should be retained for his livestock business. The remaining 11,000 hectares he argued would be quite sufficient for the 222 'authentic' peasants who lived on the property. In addition, the hacienda provided the beasts of burden for carrying mineral from his mines in Rambrán, in the province of Celendín and loss of production would be incurred if rights of passage were lost across the hacienda. This strategy played on two main factors: firstly, the fact that the Agrarian Reform was 'anti-feudal' and was not concerned with expropriating viable commercial enterprises. By arguing that Chela was a profitable commercial farm, Zárate could best state the case for a partial expropriation in his favour.¹⁹

To support his case, Zárate produced documents stating that ledgers had been received by the Regional Labour Inspectorate, and letters

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¹⁹. Zárate argued that, "the state by its own actions, and with the collaboration of private industry, is obliged to relate the agrarian reform to the industrial development of the country. The development of the vast and rich copper deposit of Rambrán is linked to the fortunes of the hacienda Chela. The application of a total expropriation of the estate, without recognising the rights of the proprietors .....in unrestricted benefit of the invaders and pseudo-tenants of the estate would signify a heavy blow to the mining industry in this rich and promising region of Peru." Letter from Luis Zárate to the President of the National Agrarian Council (Consejo Nacional Agrario), April 1963.
from the Hochschild Mineral Company in Callao, stating quantities of ore received. This strategy was accompanied by the recognition of a very small number of the total number of peasants entitled to receive land under the agrarian reform. This meant that those designated as 'invaders' had no right to the land, thus reinforcing the landlord's case for a partial expropriation.

Meanwhile within Chala, violence between the hacienda administration and the sindicato members was on an ever-increasing scale. This period saw the emergence of an organized group of amarillos. One such incident occurred when a group of thirty families in Cabracancha, after suffering for four years from threats by the hacienda administration, retaliated against amarillo herdsmen who were driving cattle over their crops. They drove sixteen bulls and nineteen horses belonging to the hacienda eight miles from their pastures in Cabracancha to the casa hacienda. In the process two animals were killed and others seriously injured. A couple of weeks later, the administrator tried to return the animals to their pastures in Cabracancha, only to be greeted by forty men and women armed with sticks and stones. The animals had to be returned to the casa.

20. Hochschild's quote the following figures of ore received from the mine of 'Cantinflas' (Poroporo):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metal</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>98.972 tons</td>
<td>84.579 tons</td>
<td>122.392 tons</td>
<td>US $10,818.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>220.292 tons</td>
<td>322.479 tons</td>
<td>222.482 tons</td>
<td>US $32,797.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Cantinflas' was actually owned by the Sousa and Miranda families (see Halcin, 1971:121). 'Cantinflas' is so small that it is not even mentioned in 'Los Buenos del Peru'.

21. Zárate argued in the same letter to the President of the National Agrarian Council that "the law authorizes the expropriation of only the part of the estate to which the peasants have a right and not the entirety of it." (opp. cit.)
hacienda, where a further 150 peasants were waiting, complaining of damage to their crops and false denunciations made against them by amarillos to the Police.

As the expropriation of the hacienda began to become a reality, divisions within the peasants began to appear over the carving up of the land after the agrarian reform. Individual peasant leaders, acting in their own interests, started menacing and threatening others, and charging them for the right to access to the land and for filing petitions and claims which would entitle them to benefit from the land reform. In early 1968 the first complaint was filed by the sindicato against the group of former share-croppers who were now controlling the land in Colpa. They were trying to expel fifteen families from their lands in order to distribute them to members of their own families. The four ring leaders denounced the sindicato leaders for illegally selling the land and started to destroy the crops of the families they were trying to expel. This incident probably represents a conflict between peasants who objected to paying the leaders for the right of access to land, and the leaders and their supporters who were trying to charge them. It is probable that the practice of charging had become widespread by this time.

Many conflicts occurred over the division and allocation of land. These were not just conflicts between family members, but often large scale conflicts between unionized and non-unionized peasants. In Adcunac, for example, the empleado and the lieutenant governor were distributing land to their friends and families regardless of other peasants claims to the land. The empleado of Adcunac was also responsible for building a bridge across the river Llaucano to the district of Paccha, so that peasants under orders of arrest
could be more easily captured by the police. The sindicato decided that the best way to overcome the behaviour of the lieutenant governors was by nominating their own. In doing this they upset the normal procedure, which was for the Sub-Prefect of Bambamarca to nominate them in each district and estancia.

In May 1968 the legal process of expropriation was well under way. The topographers were expected to draw up the plans for the expropriation, but due to some bureaucratic delays, did not arrive when expected. During this period, Zárate began a new offensive: this was to denounce peasants leaders to the Police for criminal offences. The empleados and the amarillos also began to spread rumours that the agrarian reform would not be implemented. When the topographers finally arrived in May, they refused to measure many of the peasants plots on the grounds that they did not have the correct sworn declarations. Attacks on the sindicato members and damage to their property continued and there was also an assault on the sindicato premises. The National Agrarian Council was thus requested to speed up the second stage of the expropriation, and to order the evaluation of the hacienda for the purpose of the payment of compensation.

In 1969, the hacienda administration made last ditch attempts to thwart the expropriation by seeking to discredit the peasant organization. This involved accusing leaders of selling the land (which was partly true) and denouncing one leader in particular of drugs trafficking with the aim of buying arms for communist guerrillas.

In June, Zárate took advantage of the change of the head of the Policía de Investigaciones in Cajamarca. The new chief did not

22. Pamphlet, Sindicato Unico de Yanaconas y Colonos de la Hacienda Chala, June 1969
know that Chala had been earmarked for expropriation since 1967, and with the collusion of the Juez Instructor of Bambamarca, issued an order of arrest for the leader. Police entered Chala by night and tried to arrest the leader in the early hours of the morning. The peasants mobilized rapidly, and some fifty men and thirty women turned out to prevent the capture. They succeeded in routing the Police and forced them to run for cover in the mountainside.23

As a result of mobilization against the Police, distorted reports appeared in the newspapers, which justified further incursions into Chala. Thirty rangers were sent in to put down the peasants on the 24th June, ironically the 'Day of the Indian', and which coincided in 1969 with the passing of the Agrarian Reform Law No. 17716. This was reported in the newspapers with the headline, 'Picket of Civil Guard marches to rescue: peasants capture three officials of the PIP in Cajamarca', and recounted how a "furious mass of peasants brutally maltreated and kidnapped three policemen" If it had not been for the strange coincidence of the passing of the Agrarian Reform Law on this day, which sounded the death knell of any further attempts to frustrate the expropriation, there might have been a terrible massacre of the peasants. A telegram was sent from Lima, dated 24th June, from the President of the Republic, Juan Velasco Alvarado, congratulating the peasants of Chala on the passing of the Land Reform Law.

23. FEDECC (1975) gives an amusing account of this incident. See Appendix 5.

24. See 'Extra', 24th June 1969, for a full account.
Conclusions

Though the passing of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1969 marked the end of the struggle against the hacendado, it did not signify the end of the struggle for the land. In fact, it heralded the beginning of a series of problems over the implementation of the Agrarian Reform, and the setting-up of a co-operative. Compensation still had to be agreed upon, amnesty had to be sought for the peasants still under orders of arrest and the carve-up of the land was by no means settled. In addition, it had still not been decided whether the hacendado would retain some land on the property.

The passing of the Agrarian Reform Law did mark a significant break insofar as it prevented the further development of the struggle between the peasants and the state. The peasants were not armed, and at this particular juncture were ill-prepared for such a confrontation. Furthermore, it is not clear how long unity of the movement could be maintained since factionalism was already appearing amongst the most opportunist sectors of the leadership. It is clear that class consciousness had not developed to any great extent amongst the peasant base - if it had there would have been a basis for more sustained class orientation of the struggle as it continued after 1969.
CHAPTER 6: The Implementation of the Agrarian Reform in Chala

Introduction:

At the time at which the Agrarian Reform Law No. 17716 was passed on the 24th June 1969, the struggle against the landlord was still in full spate in Chala. Despite the peasants' de facto control of the land, and the fact that the estate had already been earmarked for expropriation under the Reform No. 15037 passed by the Belaúnde régime, Zárate, the landlord, had fought to retain as much of the land as possible for himself. This had involved discrediting the peasant cause, and provoking the attack by the rangers on the peasants.

With the passing of the second Agrarian Reform Law, the peasants' claims to the land were indisputable. However, whilst the peasants struggle against the landlords had come to an end, they continued to fight against collectivization. The landlords also embarked on a battle with the reform authorities over the payment of compensation.

There has been a tendency to analyse the relative failure or success of rural co-operatives with regard to the individualist or collectivist spirit of the peasants involved. There has thus been considerable debate on the extent to which traditional forms of co-operation between peasants can be geared towards modern co-operative arrangements in the production, distribution and service fields.¹

Some of this work does admit the existence of different class interests within peasant groups and demonstrates that traditional patterns of land and labour co-operation often serve to conceal

¹. See, for example, the collection of essays in Worsley's 'Two Blades of Grass' (1971).
wage labour employment and the accumulation of capital amongst certain strata of the peasantry. Thus the success or failure of co-operatives depends largely on the internal structure of the peasant group, and the extent to which new co-operatives and co-operative infrastructure conflict with already established commercial and agricultural interests.

Needless to say, anthropological studies do not always take into consideration the fact that reforms themselves have a class basis and have specific objectives towards the rural sector. Whilst the objectives of an agrarian reform, at a very basic level, are to create the conditions for the fuller development of agrarian capitalism, the specificities of each reform, ie. the form of expropriation, the types of co-operatives introduced, credit policy, clearly demonstrate the ruling coalition's class interests with respect to the development of the agricultural sector. I have discussed at length the class interests represented in the Velasco régime which came to power in October 1968 in Chapter 2. The implications of this on agricultural policy were discussed, and so too were the changes in policy towards the agricultural sector, which emerged as a result of rural class struggles.

The implementation of the agrarian reform in the ex-hacienda Chala must be analysed in its economic and political aspects. We are concerned with the struggle over the implementation of Government policy, the struggle over allocation of resources, and the emergence of different class interests amongst the peasantry. A general analysis of the struggle against the co-operative will be complemented by case study material. A more systematic analysis of pea-

2. See Long and Winder (1978) and Samaniego and Roberts (1978) for analyses of co-operative strategies amongst community peasants of the Peruvian highlands.
sant ideology and class consciousness follows in Chapter 7.

The legal battle over compensation:

After the passing of the Agrarian Reform, a technical evaluation of the value of Chala was made for the purpose of the payment of compensation. The evaluation was established at S/ 435,720 (about £4,350 at the then current exchange rates) after fines had been imposed on the proprietors for breaking the law - namely in utilizing anti-social systems of labour relations on the hacienda, and for committing a number of abuses against the peasants.

The hacendados contested the evaluation and took the case to the Land Judiciary (Juzgado de Tierras) where they submitted a technical report. They submitted a claim of compensation totaling S/4,403,226 (£144,032 at the then current rates of exchange).

The local Juzgado de Tierras in Chota rejected their claim and ruled in favour of the evaluation made by the Agrarian Reform Office. The matter was then taken twice to the Agrarian Tribunal in Lima, where on the 5th November 1973 the landlords' claims were ruled to be without substance. Subsequently, S/ 435,720 was paid in cash, and a further S/410,000 was issued in class 'C' bonds. The peasant beneficiaries were given a period of twenty years in which to pay off the agrarian debt in annual instalments.

3. As argued in Chapter 2, relatively few of the bonds issued in compensation to landowners were realized due to the stipulation that an equal sum of money had to be invested in the industrial sector by the recipient. Thus the issuing of bonds did not finance a large scale transfer of capital from agriculture to the manufacturing sector, as had been envisaged originally.
The struggle against the co-operative:

In Chela, the implementation of the agrarian reform necessarily had to take into account the fact that there had been an extremely powerful peasant mobilization against the landlord. The peasants had been in de facto control of the land for a number of years, which further complicated the situation. For whilst the agrarian reform had been set up to expropriate the land from the landlords and re-distribute it to the peasants, this was strictly within a co-operative framework. In Chela, the agrarian reform officials were confronted with peasants who had a reputation throughout the region for their ferocity (los chalinos guanos), and who had an extremely strong and united political base in the sindicato. It was precisely this unity which had to be broken down in order to impose the Government's co-operative policy.

The land reform agencies were faced by political problems in approaching the legalization of the expropriation (the adjudicación) in Chala. The law expressly forbade the division of large units of production, and the peasants were united in their opposition to any plans for a co-operative. Furthermore, it was important to set a precedent in Chala for the rest of the region, for the success of the co-operative here had important ramifications on other problem estates in Cajamarca, notably, La Fauca and Culquimarca, where the peasants were also rejecting co-operative plans. Thus, Chala became the test case - the caso problema - of Cajamarca, and officials were keen to impose co-operative plans, however unsuitable and dis-

4. A peasant account recalls: "We made the agrarian reform before the official agrarian reform. It wasn't quite so well organized, but we were almost entirely without education and guidance." (FEDECC, 1975)
The student suggested that the...
equipped to evaluate and organize in this new situation. Thus, when the sindicato dissolved, individualistic peasant consciousness was re-asserted. The personal ambitions of a few leaders, combined with their control over the division of the land, meant that old patterns of personalism and patron-client relations were also re-established.

After the passing of the Agrarian Reform Law, the immediate task of the sindicato was to obtain pardons for all the peasants under orders of arrest for crimes against the landlord. The corruption of local authorities, namely the local judges, was also denounced.

When the original plan for a cattle co-operative was drawn-up, the lands that had formerly been the desmesne lands of the estate were designated for co-operative use. Thus 200 hectares of land were put by for the capitalist nucleus of the enterprise. It was anticipated that the peasants would work their own lands, and work for a wage on the co-operative. The aim was to build up a herd of meat-producing cattle, by crossing native (criollo) animals with Brown Swiss. Milk production was viewed as a secondary activity to stock-raising, due to its perishability and the difficulty of marketing it. Thus fresh milk was to be sold locally in Bambamarca, whilst by-products - butter and cheese - were to be sold in more distant markets. Since the estate had been completely decapitalized by the hacendados, considerable capital outlay was required in order to get the enterprise on its feet, (see Table 1)

It was argued in the proposals that arable production should be given low priority due to the risk from disease and the possibility of frosts in the lands over 2,500 metres in altitude. The proposals specifically recommended that no credit should be given for
arable production, "because in the present conditions on the estate, we would be favouring the consolidation of mini-families with these loans, which contradicts the spirit of the agrarian reform law" (Technical report, October 1970)

Table 1: Investment Plan, Chala

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of 200 criollo cows at S/. 8,000 each</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of 6 Brown Swiss bulls at S/. 20,000 each</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of 4 horses at S/. 3,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 metres of fencing</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of 11,500 metres of irrigation channels</td>
<td>115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 tools</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 straight hoes</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 picks</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 mattocks</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 brooms</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 brushes</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 hammers</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ropes</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 saws</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 adzes</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 handsaws</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 veterinary dispensary</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 soldering iron</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryegrass seed for 20 hectares</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 2,377,004

Source:
Informe Técnico Fundo Chala, October 1970
Regardless of the plans that were being drawn-up, it was already apparent at this stage that the peasants wanted individual small holdings in preference to a co-operative enterprise.

"It can be affirmed that Chala is well on the way to becoming converted entirely into small holdings... At the present the only thing that the occupants want is, that having been qualified as beneficiaries of the reform, the legal papers are made over to them as soon as possible, and that they are not bothered any further." (Report, November 1970)

The proposals made it clear that no financial or technical assistance would be forthcoming to small-scale agriculture, yet the same technical report notes that in order to carry out the co-operative plans "it will be necessary to re-locate the peasant beneficiaries of Liclicpampa and Catuden" (pastures between Liclicpampa and Aduñaco).

Effectively, what had happened between the peasants taking control of the land and the formulation of these co-operative plans, was that the desmesne lands had been occupied by peasants expanding their small holdings. There is ample evidence that a number of peasant leaders had been charging for 'services' - namely the registration of legal papers for qualifying as a beneficiary of the agrarian reform - and this had become an effective means of charging for access to land. Since the majority of the peasants were illiterate and did not have the remotest idea as to how to acquire the papers for themselves, they had aligned themselves behind one leader or another - according to their kinship relations or the vicinity in which they lived - in order to obtain
access to the land. Whilst, obviously, the original tenants of Chula had expanded their holdings, many outsiders also took advantage of the situation. A memorandum of October 1970 had already noted that the hacienda had been completely occupied by peasants, apart from 140 hectares of useless land. Another report written in the same month calculated that there were about 400 peasants who had occupied land through sales by the sindicato leaders, in addition to the original 900 tenants.

Many of the complaints written to the agrarian reform agencies at this time specifically request that the land should be sold to them on an individual basis. They argued:

"We do not accept the co-operative, because we fought for individual plots of land. The reason is that we are accustomed to work personally on our own holdings."

(Petition, November 1970)

Other petitions claimed:

"We are now as oppressed as we were with the hacendados"

and

"We have been saved from one kind of slavery, and we don't want to fall into another."

The implementation of the cattle plan was obviously impossible without peasant support. But in Chula opposition to any kind of co-operative proposal was so great that officials from the ministries and from co-operative organizations such as CONDECOOF found it impossible to work there. Between the passing of the agrarian reform and late 1972 more than 72 functionaries were posted there and achieved little success. The high turnover of personnel, combined with their conflicting explanations of what
co-operative was, made the peasants extremely hostile to outsiders.

There is no doubt that the heavy-handedness of a number of these officials in dealing with what they considered to be 'anarchy' and 'disorder' in Chala contributed towards the violence and confusion surrounding the introduction of the co-operative. The peasants had good reason to be suspicious of collective land ownership and work since collective work projects had traditionally been under the supervision of the foremen and for the benefit of the hacienda. The co-operative plan therefore represented to them the re-imposition of labour obligations which they had fought so hard to throw off. The expansion of peasant enterprises through the encroachment of desmesne lands had also resulted in an increase in the labour requirements of the peasant family plot. Within the region, there was no pre-existing model of communal land ownership due to the absence of a strong peasant community structure, whilst their previous dealings with officials during the struggle for the land, had not elicited any great confidence in their intentions or their class sympathies.

There were also social and cultural problems involved; namely the officials' inability to convey to the peasants the benefits of co-operative organization and to understand their fears and reservations. The functioning of the co-operative was explained to them in terms of the state owning the land and the peasants working it for a wage payment. On the one hand, because of their lack of extensive involvement in commodity production prior to the reform, there was a genuine problem in that they did not understand the benefits of the collectivization of production. Moreover, because plans for a pro-

duction co-operative were not backed up by agricultural extension services, services and distribution co-operatives, there was no immediate or tangible benefit to peasant smallholdings. They had also had no previous experience of credit before, so there was naturally fear of the enormous debt that would be contracted in laying out so much capital for the cattle co-operative. A final point is that the reform officials were peculiarly insensitive to the fact that the land they were proposing for the co-operative was already occupied and that they were threatening the livelihood of a large number of families. There appears to have been a genuine lack of understanding on both sides, though it is clear that the peasants were prepared to play the role of 'stupid Indians' when it suited their purposes. A report on a visit to Chala by an agronomist in November 1970 clearly demonstrates some of the problems faced. The visit had the purpose of explaining the benefits of co-operativization to the peasants. Only thirty turned up to the meeting.

"Since it turned out this way, the ingeniero spoke to them about the benefits of the law, and the ideas behind co-operatives. Then he read out the special dispositions, emphasizing the eighth which refers to the offence of sabotage, making a commentary in each instance and noting whether the peasants were giving him their attention. Several of them asked for clarifications, for example, on what a co-operative signified. This simple fact made it very clear to us that the majority did not understand, and that they therefore want nothing to do with it."

(Report, November 1970)
There were also some more serious blunders made by officials who did not understand the social reality of the peasants. One official, in an attempt to win over a hostile crowd, tried to speak to them in Quechua. Since Quechua has all but died out in this part of the highlands, far from pacifying the crowd, this gesture further enraged them. The peasants subsequently attacked this official and the agronomist who had accompanied him, and overturned their car.

Since by the end of 1972 it was becoming obvious that a C.A.I. or S.A.I.S. was not immediately on the cards in Chala, a new model of co-operative organization had to be worked out, which would enable the peasants to continue working their smallholdings, but which would serve as "a transitional organization which would evolve towards one of the models defined in the agrarian reform no. 17716." (Ministry of Agriculture, Plan de Explotación de Chala, 1973). In the original cattle plan of October 1970, an afforestation project had been conceived as a possible secondary scheme alongside the main proposals. It was this project which was now elaborated, along with proposals for organizing small co-operative groups, recruited on a voluntary basis, for cultivating arable land. These groups were to be known as conjuntos (groups) and would be entitled to credit, whereas individuals were not.

A major feature behind this line of official thinking – apart from the obvious one that these groups and projects could be the embryo of a future co-operative – was the fact that the agrarian reform forbade the issue of individual titles to land. Thus, in order to receive title to land, an organized group had to exist in order to

9. See Chapter 2 for an explanation of these different types of co-operatives.
receive the collective title to land. Thus to some extent, the
groups which were organized at this stage, the grupos campesinos,
were a legal fiction. Yet since the peasants could not receive
title to property any other way, they were obliged to attend
monthly general meetings, to elect committees and to discuss the
question of the payment of the collective agrarian debt.

The Ministry of Agriculture officials now used more subtle tactics
in approaching the peasants of Chala. Leaders were identified in
each sector, and were explained in detail the situation with res­
pect to the setting up of the grupos campesinos and the necessity
of supporting the afforestation project. These leaders were not
particularly committed to the concept of co-operativism, but saw
this as an opportunity to legitimize their positions within the
ex-haciendas. They were thus rapidly transformed from the most
rabid rejectionists of the co-operative plan to its most vociferous
protagonists.

Factionalism and the opposition to the afforestation project:

It is clear from the documents of the Land Judiciary that the sale
of land by the sindicato leaders had begun in 1969, if not before,
and that this had become important in establishing their respective
power bases and followings. A number of individuals had been able
to accumulate considerable quantities of land and cash for them­
selves, as a result of their positions on the sindicato committee.
Because they held positions of authority on the sindicato, they
came to monopolize access to the land reform organizations, and
began to charge the other peasants for arranging the legal documents
which entitled them to the land. Thus a number of different fac­
tions began to emerge around these leaders: conflicting groups
from amongst the Chalinos who had been in the sindicato, an organ­
ized group of *gente rebelde* (rebels), not to mention the outsiders who had bought hacienla lands.

There were three main leaders who were vying for complete control of the ex-haciendas. They were trying to acquire more land for themselves, and to build up their individual followings by the sale of land. It is interesting to note how old patterns of paternalism were reproduced in this new situation. One of these leaders had had a school and the communal house (the *casa communal*) built on his own extensive lands, and sponsored the *yunsha* for the festivities of Carnaval. 10

The antagonisms between different followings were articulated in terms of personal antagonisms. Thus the rivalry between don Felix, the leader of *Pagayamarca*, and Juan de Dios, the leader of *Cabraconcha*, was articulated in terms of their personal enmity. The fact that don Felix was the son of an *empleado* and had been educated in Cajamarca, and the other was the son of a *peon* and was thrown out of the estate in 1957, was just one element in their personal rivalry. Both of them would periodically denounce the other for

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10. The *yunsha* or *unsha*, known as *cortemonte* in other parts of Peru, is a tree or a pole with branches tied to it, which forms a symbolic cross. In Cajamarca, Carnaval is celebrated for three or four days, during which people drench each other with buckets of water and throw bags of flour over each other. On each day, individuals sponsor *yunshas* in different estancias and in different quarters (barrios) of the villages. The sponsor provides the tree or pole and decks it out with handkerchiefs and fruit, and might also pay for a band or the hire of a record player. At the end of a day's dancing around the *yunsha*, it is felled and everyone rushes forward to grab the handkerchiefs and the fruit. Whoever succeeds in felling it is the next year's sponsor. In Chala, it had become the custom for the committees of each section to sponsor a *yunsha*, though private *yunshas* were also sponsored. Nearly all the *yunshas* in the neighbouring small-holding zone were private.
selling the land, whilst claiming that he had merely charged for his expenses and lawyers fees. The fact that don Felix paid peones to work his land, and the fact that Juan de Dios was rumoured to have another house in Cajamarca (in the sense of another family) from the time he worked as street seller (ambulante), both entered into the mud-slinging between them.

This conflict which was essentially between two individuals extended to the entire membership of their respective followings. In 1975 there was a minor dispute over the right to take firewood from the mountainside. In Cabracancha there was none, so the residents of Cabracancha had to take it from Naygesmarca. True to form, don Felix was charging for this, which the Cabracanchinos naturally objected to. At the same time there was also a dispute over the building of a bridge over the stream that divided the two sectors. It was a joint project, but the residents of Cabracancha refused to co-operate in it. The first time I visited this sector, some peasants of Naygesmarca were working on it. I was mistaken for a representative of the Sub-Prefect and the Lieutenant Governor of Naygesmarca fiercely denounced Juan de Dios's and the Cabracanchinos failure to co-operate to me.

In the sector of Colpa-Santa Barbara the situation was more complex due to the more heterogeneous composition of the inhabitants, who included ex-partidarios, ex-peones, ex-arrendadores and outsiders. The former sindicato leader, Inocente, who had been charging for the land in this section, was not actually a native of Chala but had been a partidario in the sector of Colpa. He had a strong following amongst the other ex-partidarios, a large number of whom were related to him through kinship and marriage. However, he made the mistake of trying to expel a number of native Chalino families
from the land they had acquired through the agrarian reform, with the aim of giving the land to his kinsfolk. In this sector, there was also a number of families who had been active in the 1956-7 protest, and had been evicted from the hacienda. They had therefore been absent from Chala during the period in which the sindicato had been organized, though they had remained in contact with the organization, and many had never left Bambamarca. Thus, when Inocente started to charge for the land, they were able to organize effective opposition because of their previous experience. They were thus not dependent on him for arranging the legal papers entitling them to the land, and had the authority to challenge Inocente's attempts to dislodge other peasants of this sector. One of this group, Asunción, lead eight ploughing teams on to the lands in dispute, thus asserting the native Chalinos' rights to the land.

The development of the relationship between the leaders of these factions and the agrarian reform authorities was crucial to the eventual elimination of the opposition to the afforestation project and the creation of the grupos campesinos.

It has been argued above that originally there was a united opposition to the project for a production co-operative. By the end of 1970 it was clear that a single co-operative, covering all of Chala, was unworkable, and that the division of the estate into smaller units was a more tenable proposition. Once the leaders of Chala had been won over to a position of supporting the plantation project, the question of winning the mass of the peasants over arose.

In most sectors, the fact that title to land could only be obtained through membership of the grupo campesino meant that a great many peasants were prepared to accept working on the plantation if as a
result they secured their legal papers to the land. There were individual cases of peasants who did not want to join one of the grupos campesinos (the 'desorganizados') and others who did not want to pay the agrarian debt (the 'morosos') in the sectors of Liclicpampa, Colpa-Santa Barbara and Kaygeamarca, but there was no organized opposition except in Cabracancha. Furthermore, for a long time there was no organized grupo campesino in Adcunac because whilst 95 of the residents were in favour of forming a group, a further 28 had insisted on individual property titles. In the meantime the leaders of the other four sectors of Chala had put out the story that this sector was 'desorganizado', in order to attempt to appropriate the most productive lands for the benefit of their own sectors.

The opposition in Cabracancha came from an organized group of rebels. Their leader spread rumours that the co-operative was 'communism' and would take the land away from the peasants. When a loan was taken out and work began on the planting if the eucalyptus seedlings a battle took place between the factions supporting the project, and the group of rebels opposing it. Don Felix's and Juan de Dios's factions were united for once against the common enemy. As a result of the fighting one old peasant woman was killed, and the entire group of rebels was expelled from the hacienda. This expulsion appears to have affected some 90 families and the lands passed to the grupo campesino for the benefit of the Conjuntos.

Whilst the majority of peasants accept their organization into grupos campesinos, there continued to be individual opposition to the plantations. There have been several attempts to sabotage the plantation, by pulling up the saplings. However, by far the most damage was inflicted in November 1975 when some 200 hectares of saplings were burnt down. Whilst it was commonly held that the
culprits were one of the 'morosos' and his two sons-in-law, it was occasionally argued that the leadership clique had started off the fire to cover up the fact that many of the saplings had been badly planted and had died as a result of water-logging. Since there was no evidence either way, no prosecution occurred.

Whilst it is clear that the opposition to the planting of the eucalyptus plantation did come from the rebels, there are also a large number of complaints by individuals that they had been sold land by the sindicato leaders, then only to have it taken away from them for the afforestation projects, or so that land could be cultivated by the conjuntos. Sometimes land was simply sold and re-sold to different families. Certainly, the success of the agrarian reform in Chala depended on these faction leaders' support for particular projects, and so there was a tendency for officials to turn a blind eye to the sale, and then disputes involving the sale and re-sale of hacienda lands. They also tended to ignore complaints that the elections of certain leaders to positions on the committees of the grandes campesinos had been rigged. There were a number of complaints, for example:

"We ask for the definitive change of the Administrator of Chala .... who was nominated by .... (official) without respecting the elections in which he obtained only five votes, against 95 votes that were received by another candidate... When this individual was Secretary of the sindicato de yanaconas y colonos de la hacienda Chala, he gave the unoccupied parts of the hacienda to people like ourselves who had nothing, for the sum of S/300. Now he informs us that we must move because of the co-operative, and he has denounced us as invaders, after he himself gave us the lands."

(Report, March 1971)

11. The disputes which arose from the sale and re-sale of the land will be analysed in detail with other case material in the case study on the 'tierras libres' (the 'free lands')
In fact by 1972 it was clear that there were a great many problems in all parts of the hacienda, which had been provoked by the leaders' sale and re-sale of lands. However, it was necessary to obtain the permission and protection of these leaders in order to work in Chala, for example to set up the conjuntos. Officials had to work through the faction leaders in order to carry out the Government's agrarian policy, but it was precisely this which consolidated their positions. Thus, whilst in theory, the agrarian reform claimed to give land to the tiller, and to do away with the hacendados, ('peasant, the patron will no longer eat your misery!' exclaimed one poster), in Chala it enabled a handful of leaders to accumulate land and cash for themselves, and to exercise considerable arbitrary powers over the distribution of land to the mass of the peasants.

The setting up of the conjuntos and the co-operativas de consumo.\(^\text{12}\)

Though Chala had been expropriated at the time of the passing of the agrarian reform in June 1969, it did not officially pass into the hands of the peasants until July 1970, when a provisional administrative committee was inaugurated (the toma de posesión). However, legal title to the land (the adjudicación) was not finally

\(^{12}\) The co-operativas de consumo were small stores run co-operatively, which were set up in Santa Bárbara and Cabracancha. In 1976 there were still none in any of the other sectors. Chala, unlike the surrounding peasant smallholding zones, was notable for the absence of peasant huts selling biscochos (sweet bread buns), sugar, rice, salt, gaseosas (fizzy drinks), aguardiente (cane alcohol), cigarettes, coca and other items that peasants might buy when not wanting to travel all the way to Hambamarca for the purchase. Thus there was a need in Chala for establishments selling basic commodities such as rice and sugar.
awarded until the grupos campesinos had been organized. The grupos campesinos of Santa Bárbara, Cabracancha and Haygesmarca received their collective titles to land in June 1973. Until this point there had still been considerable opposition to the formation of the grupos. However, once the significance of the ceremonies was realized, there was a flood of petitions requesting membership. Thus the grupo campesino of Liclicpampa was awarded its title to land shortly afterwards in December 1973. Adcanac, through a combination of opposition to forming a grupo and the unsuitability of the original plans drawn up for joint agricultural exploitation, only received its adjudication in June 1975.

The adjudicación involved the peasant group electing a committee of administration and a supervisory committee (comité de vigilancia), and committing itself to the payment of the agrarian debt and to the formation of small co-operative groups (conjuntos) for the collective cultivation of what remained of the former desmesne lands. These were the so-called 'free lands' (tierras libres). Plans were drawn up for each section of the estate, whereby in each successive year a larger quantity of land would be collectively cultivated. The plans were drawn up by members of the agrarian agency of Bambamarca in consultation with the peasant leaders of each sector. Thus, at the end of 1979, it was anticipated that some 250 hectares of land would be communally cultivated and that there would also be a herd of 75 head of cattle, built up over the five-year period and supported by communal funds and labour. The calculations of production costs and labour requirements for the sector of Liclicpampa for the agricultural campaigns of 1974/75 until 1978/79 can be seen in Tables 2 & 3. Exactly the same plans were drawn up for Santa Bárbara and Cabracancha, whilst the plan for Haygesmarca included the seeding of fields of Rye Grass, to
create improved pasturage for the initial herd of 26 head of cattle. Capital was to be loaned by the Trust Company (the Banco de Fideicomismo) and the Agricultural Development Bank (the Banco de Fomento Agropecuario), and supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Though it is impossible to know if these production objectives have been met, by 1975/76 there was already evidence that substantial modifications had been made to the original plans. No mention was ever made of the cattle plan, and the only communally owned cattle (three bulls) in the sector of Santa Barbara died through neglect, leaving the members of the conjunto to pay off the debt without having received any palpable benefit from the investment. Extensions of land were being cultivated by conjuntos though membership was on a voluntary basis and by no means included all the members of the grupo camuesino. Some of the conjuntos had taken out loans for seed and pesticides, whilst others contributed their own capital as a condition of membership. It is difficult to calculate the numbers of individuals involved in each sector since no records were kept. Moreover, there were a number of different conjuntos cultivating different crops in different fields, though their memberships overlapped to a large extent. By 1976, new conjuntos were being proposed in Santa Barbara by a group of protestants who wanted to work collectively, and in Noguarcma by a family which wanted to rear goats. There is no doubt that it tended to be the committees in each sector who were involved in these enterprises, since their prestige was reflected in the success or failure of the conjuntos. Many peasants claimed that they did not have the time or the money to get involved. Whilst it appears that the lands designated as tierras libres were being used for this kind of joint venture, there was also evidence that some of these lands were being rented out to individuals by the committee members,
### Table 2: Cultivation Plan for Liclicampa, 1974 - 1979

#### A. Area under cultivation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>5 has.</td>
<td>10 has.</td>
<td>15 has.</td>
<td>20 has.</td>
<td>25 has.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peas</td>
<td>1 ha.</td>
<td>2 has.</td>
<td>5 has.</td>
<td>8 has.</td>
<td>10 has.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>1 ha.</td>
<td>3 has.</td>
<td>5 has.</td>
<td>5 has.</td>
<td>5 has.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>7 has.</td>
<td>15 has.</td>
<td>25 has.</td>
<td>33 has.</td>
<td>40 has.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. Labour requirements (in days labour):

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>2296</td>
<td>2050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peas</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>464</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2632</td>
<td>2430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### C. Capital Investment:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>S/.64,000</td>
<td>S/.128,000</td>
<td>S/.192,000</td>
<td>S/.358,400</td>
<td>S/.320,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peas</td>
<td>S/.4,500</td>
<td>S/.9,000</td>
<td>S/.22,500</td>
<td>S/.36,000</td>
<td>S/.45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>S/.5,000</td>
<td>S/.15,000</td>
<td>S/.25,000</td>
<td>S/.25,000</td>
<td>S/.25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>S/.73,500</td>
<td>S/.152,000</td>
<td>S/.239,500</td>
<td>S/.419,400</td>
<td>S/.390,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Costs of potato cultivation are calculated at S/.12,800 per hectare. In the Ministry of Agriculture figures, wages do not appear to be included in this figure.
- Costs of pea cultivation are calculated at S/.4,500 per hectare. This does not include payment of wages.
- Costs of wheat cultivation are calculated at S/.5,000 per hectare. This does include payment of wages.

**Source:**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gross value of production</td>
<td>164,700</td>
<td>333,900</td>
<td>523,500</td>
<td>695,100</td>
<td>859,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Immediate outlay</td>
<td>99,500</td>
<td>204,000</td>
<td>317,500</td>
<td>412,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interest</td>
<td>3,980</td>
<td>8,160</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>16,980</td>
<td>20,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Repayments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Total cost (2+3+4)</td>
<td>103,480</td>
<td>212,160</td>
<td>330,200</td>
<td>428,430</td>
<td>540,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Net profit (1-5)</td>
<td>61,220</td>
<td>121,740</td>
<td>193,300</td>
<td>266,620</td>
<td>318,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Agrarian debt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Remaining total (6-7)</td>
<td>61,220</td>
<td>121,740</td>
<td>193,300</td>
<td>266,620</td>
<td>318,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Indivisible capital (45% of 8)</td>
<td>27,550</td>
<td>54,748</td>
<td>81,680</td>
<td>119,780</td>
<td>143,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Total profits (55% of 8)</td>
<td>33,570</td>
<td>66,960</td>
<td>111,620</td>
<td>146,840</td>
<td>174,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Divisible profits (75% of 10)</td>
<td>25,250</td>
<td>50,220</td>
<td>83,720</td>
<td>110,130</td>
<td>130,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Total paid in wages</td>
<td>18,560</td>
<td>38,400</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>79,040</td>
<td>97,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Total income (8 + 12)</td>
<td>79,780</td>
<td>160,140</td>
<td>253,300</td>
<td>375,660</td>
<td>415,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Total income in cash (11+12)</td>
<td>43,818</td>
<td>88,620</td>
<td>143,720</td>
<td>189,170</td>
<td>227,190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ostensibly to cover their administrative expenses.

In terms of creating a nucleus of capitalist production, the conjuntos are severely limited in what they can achieve. They were dedicated to staple crop production—potatoes and maize—rather than cash crops. After the members of the conjunto had taken their share of the harvest, either a proportion equivalent to the amount of capital and cash they had put in, or by paying a cash sum per sack of produce at a price determined by the loan that had to be re-paid, there was little remaining surplus to be sold in the market. After sales to members of the conjunto, a conjunto of Colpa which had been farming one hectare of land had only six and a half sacks of potatoes for sale in the market. This brought them a profit of only S/.3,400 after all the deductions had been made, to be divided between the twelve members. A great many of the problems faced by the conjuntos were directly the result of there being no infrastructure to support their co-operative production efforts. Thus pesticides, for example, had to be bought at extortionate prices from shopkeepers in Bambamarca, whilst more advantageous prices for the harvest could have been obtained by marketing in Cajamarca or on the coast.

The setting up of the co-operatives de consumo was dogged by many of the same problems faced by the conjuntos. There was a fundamental lack of capital to acquire stocks of goods in sufficient bulk. In Santa Bárbara, the co-operative was set up in the casa hacienda, and was run by an ex-embledo who was well-liked by the peasants and was efficient at his job. By 1976 there were more than sixty members of the co-operative, who all had shares in its profits according to the amount of cash they had contributed. The initial capital of the co-operative had been S/.26,000 and the profits for 1975/76 were S/.13,000. In October 1975, there were also
In an attempt to set up a co-operative in Cobrancascha due to a national rice shortage, the peasants either had to queue for hours in the market to buy rice at the official price of S/15 per kilo, or to buy it at S/20 on the open market. The co-operative of Santa Bárbara had already taken out the legal papers to obtain rice at the official price from the municipality, and the Cobrancaschas wanted to do the same. However, in Santa Bárbara the co-operative had already been going some time and had sufficient capital to buy up a large quantity of rice. Moreover, if it was ever short of capital, the members could chop down some of the trees from their mature eucalyptus plantation surrounding the casa arcénica and sell them in the market. In Cobrancascha, the co-operative had only been selling sugar up until that point, and there was a need for a considerable capital outlay in order to get it off the ground. Whilst it would have been realistic, given the low level of cash incomes, to have asked people to have contributed ten soles each as a membership fee, even if there were 300 members, this would only enable the co-operative to purchase seven sacks of rice from the municipality, which did not, by any means, cover the demand in the sector. Whilst the contributions required were nearer to S/100 per head, it was felt that this was an excessive sum of money and the possibility of a loan was looked into.

Both the attempts to set up the co-operativas de consumo and the conjuntos faced the same lack of initial capital. Moreover, without additional infrastructure they contributed little to the benefit of the peasant as a whole. As it was, it tended to be the leadership cliques and the slightly better off peasants who tended to be involved in both kinds of venture, because they were the only ones to have sufficient cash to participate. Thus, rather than creating employment and generating a source of cash income, the conjuntos became the means whereby peasants who had sufficient
capital could extend their access to resources, primarily the land. The fact that production has been geared to subsistence rather than cash crops has meant that the smallholding economy is being reinforced, rather than drawing peasants into commodity production and wage labour employment. The failure to establish a C.A.F. or a S.A.I.S in Chala, combined with partial attempts to set up co-operative organizations through the conjuntos and the co-operativas de consumo clearly demonstrates the initial incoherence of the military régime's agrarian policies. For estates such as Chala, a production co-operative was a utopian project without vast capital investment both in the process of production and in infrastructure. Moreover, as it was initially conceived, it would have involved the proletarianization of the peasant tenants, and this was precisely the opposite to what the agrarian reform had promised to the smallholding peasants of the highland estates. Therefore the project for the production co-operative failed to find support from the peasants themselves. Moreover, no account was taken of the fact that they were already integrated into the market through agricultural and artisan production, and subject to exploitation by commercial capital. Therefore, unless the conditions of their participation in the market were radically changed, the expropriation of the haciendas only offered a partial solution to problem of commercial agricultural development. The régime's policy was primarily anti-oligarchic, and though concessions were made to the dominated classes such as the peasantry, it did not represent the interests of the small producers. Though EPSA (the Empresa Peruana de Servicios Alimenticios) and ENACI (the Empresa Nacional de Comercialización de Insumos) were set up to facilitate the marketing of produce from the medium farms and the large commercial estates (by then transformed into C.A.F's), no such infrastructure was provided in the smallholding zones. The régime had no reason to undermine the interests of the small traders and merchants in the rural areas.
of the highlands.

From 1974 onwards, during the third stage of the implementation of the agrarian reform, greater emphasis was placed on technical improvements and increased production in the existing commercial agricultural sector. Thus, within Agrarian Zone 2, it was the coastal plantations and dairy haciendas which were given priority in the agrarian policy. They received large investments as well as considerable foreign and national technical aid. Estates such as Chala became the domain of organizations such as SINAINCS. In Chala, the attempt to organize a co-operative had had a primarily political aim, not just because of the conditions existing inside the estate, but the repercussions they might have on other 'problem' estates within the region. Therefore, over and above any economic criteria for the success of the production co-operative, the main purpose of agrarian policy towards Chala was primarily to defuse the organized strength of the peasant sindicato.

The activities of SINAINCS and the Liga Agraria:

The predominance of political criteria in the military régime's agrarian policy was nowhere more apparent than in the formation of SINAINCS (The National System of Support for Social Mobilization) and the creation of a network of peasant leagues - the Ligan Agrarias - which formed the basis of the National Agrarian Confederation.

13. See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the three phases in the implementation of the agrarian reform.

14. See the article 'Movilización o manipulación' in Marka, No. 21, 1975, and Esteves (1977), Sorj (1976) and Winder (1978). Similar structures were set up in other sectors of the economy, for example the Confederation of 'Workers of the Peruvian Revolution (the CTRP) in industry and the 'Young Towns' (the Pueblos Jovenes) in the shanty towns. See Chapter 2 for further details.
SINAMCS was set up by the military in order to mobilize popular support for its policies, and aimed at neutralizing pre-existing peasant and workers' organizations. It set up systems of representation based on the concept of 'participation' and conciliation through negotiation with individual representatives of the organizations, thus attempting to circumvent or defuse mass mobilizations.

In Bambamarca, SINAMCS did not have a very high profile due to an initial antagonism which had been created between this organization and the Institute of Rural Education (the I.E.R), an educational and extension programme sponsored by the Catholic Church. The I.E.R was already established in the region and it seems, originally offered to co-operate with SINAMCS in certain areas of its work. The promoters (promotores) of SINAMCS, however, were jealous of the Church's contact with the peasant populace, who had proved largely hostile to their own overtures, and began to act in an officious way. When the local parish bulletin criticized SINAMCS as "an immature group which has been given too much power", the promotores immediately attacked members of the Church as 'imperialist spies'.

It so happened that at the same time there was considerable opposition from the villagers of Bambamarca to reforms that were being introduced in the Church. The opposition came from a number of women, who accused the priests of throwing the statues out of the church and robbing the bells. These were SINAMCS's allies in a campaign that was mounted in May and June 1973, to raise the people against the priests. One Sunday, SINAMCS promotores set up loudspeakers in the centre of the village from which abuse was shouted.

15. This account is taken from El Encuentro Newsletter, No.6, 1973.
at the priests. The climax of this campaign came when the Prefect of Cajamarca was prevailed upon to order the seizure of the parish duplicating machine, and a raucous scene was staged by the townswomen and the SINANCS promotores, denouncing the priests, when the Minister of Housing came to present the titles to land, at the adjudicacion of the first three sectors of Chala. An investigation was subsequently ordered from Lima, which resulted in the return of the duplicating machine to the parish. As a consequence of the failure of this campaign, SINANCS was placed in abeyance, and avoided conflict with the Church as far as possible.

During 1975 and 1976 the SINANCS promotores were in evidence from time to time. They had established a Liga Agraria in the province, which included the grupos campesinos of Chala, and the representatives of a number of independent smallholding zones, as well as the service co-operative, El Salvador, run under the auspices of the parish. In November 1975, the second convention of the Liga Agraria of Hualgayoc was organized, which a number of representatives of Chala attended.

With respect to Chala, SINANCS promotores were little in evidence. They never attended the general assemblies of the grupos campesinos, though they did attend the very infrequent meetings of the co-operative de consumo in Santa Bárbara. Then they did attend these meetings, it was usually to denounce the imperialists (the priests) and the capitalists: denunciations which went over the top of the heads of most peasants.

As was to be expected, the promotores worked with the already established and self-designated leaders of Chala. These were naturally the most self-interested leaders, who had no objection to the way in which SINANCS worked. They would periodically go off
to courses in Chota and Cajamarca, and to all extents and purposes the mass of the peasants had little knowledge, and certainly no access to, decisions that were being made on their behalf. Sessions of the Liga Agraria consisted in denouncing corrupt local authorities and discussing the internal problems of each group. Paradoxically, the individuals in Chala who were causing most of the internal problems were precisely the leaders who were having discussions with SINAMOS. It was only to be expected, then, that the Liga Agraria performed an essentially bureaucratic function, through which the power of these leaders was legitimated and consolidated.

In 1975 and 1976, SINAMOS appeared to have set itself three main tasks: to build the National Agrarian Confederations through the Ligas Agrarias, to form cells of militants supporting the military regime (nucleos de militencia) and to set up local offices where disputes could be taken to peasants elected to positions in the Liga. It was proposed that each peasant group represented in the Liga Agraria should levy its members in order to support peasants working for it, and to pay the costs of any legal problems, which required the defence of the peasants' interests. Though in the sector of Santa Barbara this levy was proposed and accepted by one general assembly, in the following one it was rejected. There were also a number of criticisms of SINAMOS's work locally, for example, they had promised legal aid to peasants with problems with the law, but had failed to send the appropriate authorities when a peasant leader of Huilgayoc was arrested and imprisoned. They had talked a lot about helping in the formation of services cooperatives, but had not given any aid to the only existing cooperative, El Salvador. Moreover, when there had been a landslide in the zone of La Camaca and a number of peasants had lost their homes and land, they had made promises of supplying building materials and forming a
Pueblo Joven with no concrete results.

In 1975, there were proposals in the air to set up Nucleos de Militancia in Bambamarca and in the surrounding estancias. It must be remembered that this was now the so-called "second phase" of the Peruvian revolution, initiated by the assumption of the presidency of Morales Bermúdez. This marked a clarification of the class interests represented in the régime as well as the deepening of the economic crisis.16

The creation of nucleos de militancia was essentially a means of building bases of support for the régime, at a time when its policy of "participation" and cooption were already being undermined by the increasing level of class struggle both in the countryside and in the industrial sector. To my knowledge, these nucleos had little impact. One of the Chalinos who was most involved with the Liga gave an impassioned speech at one general assembly in Santa Bárbara, urging those present to support the project, which was called the Front for Defence of the Peruvian Revolution (the Frente de Defensa de la Revolución Peruana). One member of the committee yawned loudly, and there was little enthusiasm from the floor.

This same peasant, was also appointed to work in an office, solving disputes over land. He was to be found working at a type-writer all day long - a very incongruous position - and as a result his agricultural work was abandoned. At one point, the placard over the office was removed during the night, which annoyed him. It is interesting to note that this individual was not a Chalino by birth, but had been a share-cropper brought in from outside the

16. See Chapter 2, and Ferner (1977) for an analysis of the changes introduced by the "second phase" of the Peruvian revolution.
estate. He was also a known amarillo and had supported the hacendado to the end. Though he was an amenable character, he was distrusted. Strangely, he justified his involvement in the Liga Agraria for the same reasons that he justified his scabbing during the struggle; it was for "humanism and patriotism" (humanismo y patriotismo).

In Chala, there were certainly some confusion as to the role of SINAMCS, and, more concretely, as to what SINAMOS would do for Chala. The general assessment tended to be non-committal, since the promotores had not proved themselves in any direction. Though in Chala there has been no mass rejection of the politics of SINAMCS and the Liga Agraria, in 1975 and 1976 neither was there a situation of growing class conflict in the zone, in which the sympathies of SINAMCS could be put to the test.

The payment of the Agrarian Debt:

One of the major issues raised by the implementation of the agrarian reform was that of the payment of the agrarian debt. Where peasant organizations have been strong, its payment has frequently been rejected on the grounds that the hacienda lands were originally stolen from the peasants, and that the landlords had already received sufficient payment because of all the years the peasants had paid rents and worked on the desmesne lands.

In Chala, as indicated earlier, there was no organized opposition to the payment of compensation, though there were individual objectors, the morosos. In fact, in Chala, as in many other parts of Peru, there was an immense respect amongst the peasants for legal papers.
Given the climate of political insecurity in the immediate post-reform period, and constant rumours of the imminent return of the hacendados, the Cholines, like many other hacienda tenants, opted for getting their titles to land in order as soon as possible. In Chala, this was combined with the fact that the agrarian debt was extremely low, which meant that the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform were able to pay it off immediately, rather than in instalments over a twenty years period, for which the law provided.

As mentioned previously, the compensation awarded to the hacendados was extremely low. They were awarded S/ 435,720 (about £4,357 at the then current exchange rates) paid by cheque at the Banco de la Nación and a further S/ 410,000 (£4,100) in class 'C' bonds to be amortized over a twenty year period. Thus the peasants had a total debt of S/ 845,720 to pay off over a twenty year period, and the interest on this sum over the period as well. However, because the valuation of the hacienda included the casa hacienda, the eucalyptus plantation surrounding the casa hacienda, and various outhouses, the majority of the debt fell on the sector of Santa Bárbara, where most of these were situated. Thus Santa Bárbara had a debt of S/ 642,000 (£6,420) whilst the other four sectors of the estate only had to pay S/ 203,720 (£2,037.20) between them. This meant that these other sectors were able to pay off their debt very rapidly by charging a per capita quota. Because this meant that individuals actually paid very little for their plots of land (between £2 and £3), land in Chala was often referred to as 'tierra no pagada' (unpaid land).

In Santa Bárbara the situation was naturally more complex, due to the difficulties of raising such a large sum of money. Moreover, there was also the question of who was to benefit from the sale of
the eucalyptus plantation, and how the casa hacienda and its out-houses could best be used for the collective benefit. Eventually, it was decided that the best tactic would be to sell the wood from the plantation and to pay off the debt with the proceeds. This solution to the payment of the debt was by no means straightforward. The debt was communal, but some peasants had more land than others. This raised the question of whether quotas should not be paid as well. There were major problems concerning this sale, which was beset by bad advice and ridiculously low offers for the wood. There were 600 trees and it was considered that S/1,000 (£10) would be a reasonable price to ask per trunk, although it was realized that if they were sold in smaller lots over a longer period of time, they could obtain up to S/2,000 per trunk. Thus the sale of the 600 trunks would generate S/600,000 and the remainder of the debt could be paid by individual quotas. However, the offers which were made for the wood were ridiculously low - S/400,000 and S/410,000 respectively and did not comply with the peasants' other demands, that the labour of Chalinos should be used in felling the trees, and that guarantees would be given for the safety of peasant houses adjacent to the plantation.

This transaction was further beset by the peasants' lack of knowledge in dealing with large commercial transactions of this nature. Furthermore there was mutual distrust and suspicion amongst the members of the committee who were supposed to be arranging the transaction. There were some accusations that the wood was already being sold contraband. All this combined to produce a number of delays,

17. These were even more in evidence after September 1975, when Morales Bermúdez assumed the presidency.
and by mid-1976 (the time that fieldwork was completed) the agrarian debt of Santa Bárbara had still not been paid. The situation reached such a point, that members of the grupo campesino of Liclicpampa would interrupt general assemblies in Santa Bárbara, demanding that they paid the debt immediately. The rationale behind this was that it was only when the entire debt of Chala was paid off, would the peasants be free of the legal fiction of collective land ownership, and the land could revert to private property.

Case Study: Segundo and the 'tierras libres'.

The case of the tierras libres (the free lands) clearly demonstrates some of the contradictions which arose because of the attempt to transform a relatively uncapitalized hacienda into a production co-operative. The tierras libres were theoretically the former desmesne lands of the estate, though because of the expansion of peasant enterprises, they were actually considerably smaller than they had been under the landlord régime. Whilst they were earmarked by reform officials for the future development of the co-operative, and in some instances were actually being worked by the conjuntos, they were also being rented out to individuals, and it was in these cases that the contradiction between nominally communal land and individual private property became most apparent.

It should also be noted, that whilst in practise the land was divided into smallholdings as though it was individual private property, in the law there was no individual title to property in Chala. Title was held by each of the grupos campesinos. This meant that the terms of qualification to access to the land were through membership of one of the grupos campesinos, and this carried stipulations that land could not be held in two sectors of the hacienda, which
could imply members of two ‘grupos’. Thus, whilst it was possible theoretically to hold land inside and outside Chala, it was not possible to own land in two sectors of the estate.

As was to be expected, there were a number of attempts to usurp the free lands by individual peasants. There were also attempts by peasants working as share-croppers on lands owned by absentees, to assert their right to this land. In both instances, the Government slogan of ‘land to the tiller’ (la tierra es marrgaier, le trabaja) was appealed to.

I argued in Chapter 2 that this slogan was in fact in direct contradiction to the Government’s policy of proletarianizing the peasantry through the creation of production co-operatives. In Chala, it became a means of justifying the expansion of individual private property, either against collective claims (which were collective only in theory) and against other individuals’ claims to land. Though there were in fact a number of conflicts between share-croppers and absentee owners, and individual claims to sections of the tierras libres, I concentrate on one case in particular, because it raises the question of ownership of land between sectors, and demonstrates conflicts between individual peasants as well as with the leadership factions.

Segundo was a former arrendador of Chala, and lived with his wife and five children in the sector of Colpa. He had traditionally cultivated lands in the parts of the hacienda called Huiloc, which actually straddled the post-reform boundary between Caracancha and Santa Barbara-Colpa. Though he and his wife both originated from La Camaea and continued to own half a hectare of land there, they lived and worked in Chala. Through the agrarian reform they received access to four and a half hectares of land in Chala.
In 1975, Segundo started to rent some pastures in Muyoc, which were in fact tierras libres belonging to the grupo campesino of Santa Bárbara-Colpa. His neighbour, Juan, who was registered in Cabracancha, also started using the pasture and damaging Segundo’s crops in a nearby field. Juan was also a former empleado of the estate, who had been allowed to stay on after the agrarian reform because of his laughter. He was considered to be capricious, and was not considered to have been one of the 'good' empleados. He refused to pay the damages that he had caused, and during the course of the dispute, a number of references were made to the fact that the patron had now gone and he could no longer do as he pleased.

As the dispute unfolded, it transpired that the issue was not simply a question of Juan’s use of the pastures, and the damage that had been caused, but that Segundo resented paying rent for the tierras libres to the committee of the grupo campesino. He argued that the committee had been charging thousands of soles for the renting of the tierras libres and that the law said that they were for the benefit of everyone. Charging for rent was therefore unjust. It was interesting that he argued against the charging of rent on collective lands on the grounds that they belonged to the collective in order to substantiate his individual claim to them.

Shortly after the dispute with Juan, his lands in Muyoc were invaded by the conjunto of Cabracancha. Thus whilst in dispute with the committee of Santa Bárbara-Colpa over the payment of rent, he was now asking them to take up his case against the conjunto of Cabracancha, which was led by Juan de Dios. He started pleading his poverty, and claiming that he had eight hungry children to

18. See the section on 'Factionalism and the opposition to the afforestation project' earlier in this Chapter for details of Juan de Dios’s leadership of the faction of Cabracancha.
It later transpired that he was actually holding lands in Cabracancha, as well as in Colpa, and that he had the lands in Cabracancha by virtue of a personal agreement with Juan de Dios. The grupo campesino of Santa Bárbara-Colpa refused to take up his case because it was a personal agreement, and not a conflict between two sectors. He was thus unfortunate to have suffered at the hands of Juan de Dios, who had made a practice of selling lands to one individual and then throwing them off to enable the conjunto to cultivate land. Thus Segundo's individual interests were in conflict with the expansion of the so-called 'collective' interests of Cabracancha, that is to say, in conflict with the interests of the leadership faction.

In Santa Bárbara-Colpa, he was also opposing himself to the leadership faction. He criticized their renting of the land, and whilst he did not object to paying rent of S/.500, he felt that the S/.1000 they were charging was excessive. He threatened to insist on paying at a general assembly, so that all the members of the grupo could see that they were charging rents for the tierras libres. Thus whilst the entire dispute was articulated in terms of individual versus collective interests; that is to say, that each protagonist claimed to represent collective interests pitted against individual interests, it fundamentally represented the challenge of an individual's interests against those of the leadership faction. This struggle, however, was not generalized, and was carried out on an individual rather than collective basis.

Conclusion:

In this Chapter, I have indicated how the co-operative plan failed in Chala. This was due to a number of factors: lack of capital
investment, lack of infrastructure, lack of technical and extension services and lack of credit facilities. However, as Robles Tarna argues, the agrarian problem is not a question of the abundance or lack of resources, but the social relationships between people, (Robles Tarna, 1972:42). Thus an agrarian reform must be assessed in terms of the class interests it represented, and the extent to which it altered the social relations of production.

Many writers have noted the utopian nature of the military régime's agrarian policy (see Valderrama, 1975) and others have argued that it was guided by political rather than economic criteria (see Caballero, 1976). This certainly was the case in Chala. The prime aim of the agrarian reform in this case appears to have been to defuse the peasant mobilization and to weaken and undercut the structure of the sindicato. Because of the orientation of this policy, the agrarian reform had the effect of consolidating the positions of a number of self-interested leaders, which enabled them to acquire large amounts of land for themselves.

The economic policy towards Chala was over-ambitious and unrealistic, given the fact that most of the desmesne lands were already occupied. The eucalyptus plantation project was a curious choice for a collective venture, given the fact there was no short-term benefit for the peasants. The conjuntos were certainly more realistic, but it seems unlikely that they could form the basis of a future production co-operative. By 1976 the numbers of peasants participating in them was still restricted.

The future of developments in Chala will evidently not be through the growth of commercial agricultural production. This is impossible given the military régime's policy of only encouraging commercial agriculture where it already exists. Moreover, given the economic
crises, it is unlikely that resources will be diverted to the small-holding sector, for 'social' rather than economic ends. Thus it can be anticipated that the peasants of Chala will continued to undergo the processes of social differentiation and proletarianization, not in relation to the development of commercial agriculture, but by an intensification of their existing forms of involvement in the market. Thus their integration will be primarily in the form of petty commodity production (agricultural and artisan products) and through outwork systems.

A further effect that the agrarian reform has had on the regional labour market, has been to foreshorten the opportunities for temporary employment on the coastal plantations. Now organized as production co-operatives (C.A.F's) the tendency has been to limit the number of co-operative members who participate in the distribution of profits. This has inevitably affected the demand for temporary wage labour. Moreover, with the increasing emphasis of the agrarian reform on the technocratic aspects of production, that is to say, on investing in new technology and in increasing productivity, production has become increasingly capital-rather than labour-intensive. The structure of temporary wage labour employment is, therefore moving away from the patterns which were current in the 1950's and the 1960's. Thus it is moving away from the commercial agricultural sector of the economy, and into service industries and petty production in the urban areas.

As yet is is impossible to assess the extent to which the agrarian reform, in abolishing the rents paid to landlords, and in liberating peasants from their servile ties to the land, had created the conditions for the increased differentiation of the peasantry. In Chala, it is clear that it has allowed for the establishment of rich peasants amongst the leadership cliques. Their wealth, however, is based more on the charging of rents, and control over the land,
than on commercial agriculture. It has yet to be seen whether they will develop into commercial farmers. A key area of analysis is the way in which the strategies and alliances of these peasants are developed, and how they are validated with reference to different ideological reference points. This will be the subject of discussion in Chapter 7 which follows.
CHAPTER 7: The re-structuring of ideology - the emergence of factions and new patterns of patronage

In this Chapter, I shall analyse the changing basis of the ideology of paternalism: firstly how it operated under the hacienda system, and secondly, how it was re-worked as an ideology after the land reform as the peasant leaders built up their followings based on patronage relations. The material discussed in Chapters 3, 4 & 5 on the hacienda system, the peasant struggle and the land reform respectively, raises a number of interesting questions concerning the operation of ideology. One of these is the question of what the nature of ideology is when there is only passive resistance to a system of exploitation. Another is how the hold of an ideology which corresponds to a particular form of exploitation is broken. Finally, there is the question of how an ideology supporting new forms of exploitation can be imposed. This requires both a general theory of the nature of ideology, as well as an analysis of specific developments in Chela.

To my mind there has been relatively little discussion of ideology within the field of anthropology, particularly with respect to the relationship between ideology and social action. This has meant that ideology is perceived by the anthropologist as an immutable part of the superstructure of society, or as a given set of ideas which do not contain ambiguities and contradictions. There are a number of studies which have tried to come to grips with aspects of these problems, which I shall briefly review.

Geertz in 'Islam Observed' (1968) attempts to analyse idiosyncrasy in a comparison of the forms taken by Islam in Java and Morocco. In Morocco, Islam is associated with the worship of saints and ecstatic religion, whereas in Java it has absorbed many elements of
the syncretic hindu religion. However, Geertz's explanation concerns itself with an institutional analysis and a concern with the 'archetypal religious men'. He takes cultural differences as given, and makes no materialistic analysis of the different societies. As such, his work highlights the problems of the relationship of the countryside to the towns, the relation of the formal, written religion to its local interpretations, but tells us little of religion in practice and the influence of ideology on social action, which in its own turn affects ideology.

The relationship between belief and social action has been more successfully tackled in studies of situations of social change. Analyses have been developed in entrepreneurial studies (eg. Long 1968, Barth 1963, Bailey 1950) and in studies of millenarian movements in the context of rapid social change induced by colonial conquest (eg. Worely 1970, Burridge 1959, Lawrence 1961).

Entrepreneurial studies demonstrate how discrepancies in social systems undergoing change are open to manipulation and innovation. Under these circumstances, individuals may make reference to different normative and value systems in their strategies, thus making a 'bridge action' between two different ideological systems (Bailey 1960). Concretely, these studies deal with the way in which individuals lessen their obligations to the local community by emphasizing their identification with new sets of values. These may be the values of a new 'Protestant ethic' such as identification with the Jehovah's Witnesses in Long's 'Social Change and the Individual' (1958) or the more cosmopolitan values of the national society as Barth observed in his study of entrepreneurial activities.

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1. Larrain writes "The determination of consciousness by material reality includes the fact that consciousness is already in that material reality", Larrain (1976:3). For a good critique of institutional and actor-orientated approaches to the study of ideology, see Jones (1975 & 1975)
in northern Norway (1963). Though the importance of analyzing the role of individuals operating as brokers between the local and national levels of society cannot be over-emphasized, these studies fail to explain the basis of these monopoly positions in the rural structure. Thus, they omit to analyze how these entrepreneurs are perceived by the remainder of the social group that the entrepreneur is himself manipulating, and how his innovative behavior is accepted and justified, or rejected by them.

Studies of millenarian movements have been forced to examine the impact of colonial regimes on simple societies. However, analyses have more often than not been articulated at the level of a concern with fantastic cults and the birth of new religions than as a reflection of the social dislocations produced by the advent of force: labour camps and plantation economies. Farridge (1969) confines the development of cargo cults to the sphere of religious contemplation and a 'concern with the truth about power'. More pragmatic analyses have designated millenarian movements as primitive forms of protest and political organization (see for example Worsley 1970, Hobsbawm 1959, Quijano 1967). Because of the low level of control over the natural world that these economies allow and the dispersed nature of production, protest takes the form of a religious cult rather than the developed political form achieved with the full development of the productive forces, a complex division of labour in society and the socialization of labour.

These attempts to understand the nature of ideology are only partially successful insofar as the majority tend to regard the relationship between ideology and the social structure in extremely mechanistic terms. The recognition of the flexibility and manipulability of ideology is an important step towards understanding the dynamics of the relationship between ideology and social action and
Whilst it is correct to recognize the distinctiveness of ideology in societies where kinship relations form part of the economic base of the relations of production, it is a mystification to try to isolate distinct cultural systems under the guise of their being 'primitive' or 'peasant' societies. In earlier chapters I have endeavoured to demonstrate that peasant subsistence plot production is integrally related to the wider economy through the processes of extraction of surpluses and the distribution of commodities. Its most important role is in the sphere of the reproduction of the labour force for the capitalist sector of the economy. We are, therefore, not principally concerned with how ideology operates in a 'pre-capitalist mode of production' as such, but how it operates under peripheral capitalism. Here, relations of production based on kinship relations form the basis of subsistence production and the reproduction of the labour force. In this sense, although the forms of fetishism appropriate to the capitalist mode of production operate in certain spheres of social relations, there are other factors related to the organization of subsistence agricultural production which also have to be considered.

In this Chapter there will be a general discussion of ideology, emphasizing in particular the relationship between ideology and social action. This will allow a general conception of ideology to be developed which will be able to take change and contradiction in ideology into account. The discussion will then focus on the ideology of paternalism, taking into account the objective conditions of a society in which patronage relations are found. I will then examine two case studies of factions in Chala after the land reform to analyze how leaders established and then legitimised their new positions of power and wealth. This necessarily has to take into
account how the ideology of paternalism operated under the hacienda system. I shall attempt to show that the relative success or failure of these leaders' strategies was directly related to their control of resources, and the presence or absence of other factions competing for power. Therefore the re-establishment of patronage as an ideology was not simply a repetition of cultural patterns of behaviour. Ultimately, I believe, this leads us to an analysis of what the political objectives of the agrarian reform were, and what its concrete implications were in the case of Chula.

Marxist approaches to the study of ideology:

In Marx's writings there is no single theory of ideology, but rather two different positions representing the materialist and the idealist conceptions of ideology. In a certain sense these two positions are contradictory to each other, yet at the same time, they can be reconciled through Marx's conception of praxis. In certain respects, though this dualism exists in Marx's own writings, these two factors have been separated and opposed by their interpretation by subsequent writers.

A materialist conception of ideology perceives ideology as a question relating to how people perceive reality whilst an idealist conception of ideology considers it to be a problem of how reality can deceive consciousness. The former is the 'historicist' position of writers such as Lukacs, and ideology is defined as "consciousness which distorts reality otherwise transparent and empirically verifiable", (see Larrain 1976:1). This position clearly recognizes the class nature of ideology and the possibility of the members of a class holding a 'true' or 'false' consciousness of their position in society. The idealist position, in contrast, holds that reality has the property of deceiving consciousness. That is to
say, that the appearance of things does not reveal their true nature. This is most clearly exemplified in Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism, whereby commodity exchange appears as a relationship between things (for example goods exchanged in the market) rather than a social relationship between people who mutually exchange the products of their labour.

In the materialist analysis there is no question that ideology could be organized in anything other than the interests of the dominant class. As Marx and Engels argue in 'The German Ideology',

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of production are subject to it."

(1965:60)

However, the mechanisms whereby ideology represents the interests of the ruling class are complex. It should not be conceived of as a mechanistic relationship, whereby the dominant class deliberately plots to deceive the subordinate classes. Rather, ideology operates at different levels of consciousness. Lukács draws attention to the twofold nature of ideology:

"On the one hand it refers to the elementary Marxist axiom that every person in society has a definite class position, one aspect of which, of course, is the overall culture of his time, and that there can
be no item of consciousness which is not determined by the here and now of the existing situation. On the other hand this leads to certain definite deformations, and we have now come to understand ideology also in the sense of a certain deformed reaction to reality." (Finkus Ed., 1974:42)

Whilst it is true that the dominant class deliberately try to organize the whole of society along the lines of its own interests, the organization of this at the ideological level is more problematic:

" 'Ideology' for Marx and Engels, is precisely the attempt to 'universalise' and give 'ideal' form to what are no more than limited class-bound ideas and interests; it is in this sense that they use the word 'ideology' perjoratively, as meaning a false representation of reality .... along with deliberate deception (by the ideologues of the dominant class - F.R), there is also much and perhaps more of self-deception, insofar as the spokesmen of the dominant class, and those for whom they speak, do deeply believe the universal truth of the ideas and ideals which they uphold ...." (Wiliband 1977:32)

The extent to which the dominated classes consciously or unconsciously consent to their domination and exploitation by the ruling class is the subject of debate and carries political consequences. This is a topic which will be raised shortly in relation to Godelier's analysis of the 'internal armature of social relations', and is related to the structuralists emphasis on the contradiction between structures as being the central contradiction of society, and not
the contradiction between classes.

Here the idealist position on ideology has been taken up by the structuralists it has had the effect of de-emphasizing the class nature of ideology. If it is argued that ideology represents the property of reality to deceive consciousness, then this may be done at the expense of a consideration of the role of class forces and class interests in shaping ideology. The significance of this is that whilst the contradictions between classes can not have an internal solution and require conscious and practical intervention through political action, contradictions posited as between structures since they take no account of the human actors in the model make the resolution of contradictions seem dependent on a blind natural process in which there is no need for human intervention, (Larrain 1976).

In Marx's writings the contradiction between the materialist and the idealist position is overcome by reference to the concept of praxis, both of an everyday and revolutionary nature. Everyday praxis is the utilitarian praxis that people engage in by virtue of their position in class society and the division of labour. The ideology pertaining to this level of social activity is phenomenal, and unable to penetrate the appearances of reality. Revolutionary praxis, in contrast, grasps the essence of social reality not as something given, but as something to be created in the course of class struggle.

Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism is the starting point of any analysis of the illusory representations of reality. The analysis of commodities is central to the understanding of the capitalist mode of production. The touchstone of Marx's theory lies in his recognition of the labour embodied in commodities as
being the source of value and not their usefulness in consumption (their use value). In commodity exchange in the market, it appears as though one commodity is exchanged for another (e.g., wheat for cloth, or money for cloth). This appearance of things conceals the fact that it is actually different types of labour which are being exchanged (i.e., the labour required to cultivate x bushels of wheat compared to the labour involved in weaving y yards of cloth). Therefore, what is in reality a social relationship between different producers, appears through commodity exchange as a relationship between things.

This same process takes place during the course of capitalist production:

"In fact, for both capitalist and worker, in practice everything takes place as if the wage paid for all the labour provided by the worker ..... "Wages, therefore, make unpaid labour seem like paid labour and, correlativey, make profit seem inevitably the product of capital."

(Godelier 1977:162).

Through this process then, different forms of profit appear as if they are an intrinsic product of capital, and not as the surplus produced by the unpaid labour of the worker.

Under the capitalist mode of production, two main forms of fetishism occur: firstly, commodities appear to receive their value through exchange on the market, this conceals the fact that their value lies in the labour embodied in them which is merely realized through their sale. A relationship between people, therefore, appears as a relationship between different commodities. Secondly,
through the wage relationship it appears as though the worker is paid for all the work he performs, but his unpaid labour in fact produces surplus value, which is the source of the capitalist's profit.

Marx argues that it is only under the capitalist mode of production that the wage relationship conceals the unpaid labour of the worker. In all other modes of production this concealment of the extraction of surpluses does not occur. For example, the labour performed for a feudal lord, or for the State under the Asiatic mode of production, takes the form of labour which is separated in time and space from the labour performed on the peasant's plot. However, the transparency of this relationship is obscured by the complexity of social relations. For example, the fact that kinship relations form part of the relations of production means that relations that are solely economic do not exist. Godelier writes:

"Labour as an activity which is simply and solely economic...... does not exist in these ancient modes of production. Kinship relations assume political, ideological as well as educational functions (thus the transmission of traditions and values are associated with religion and ancestor worship) but they also function as elements of the relations of production and as elements of the infrastructure. Kinship relations are, therefore, plurifunctional, and it is their plurality which confers on them their dominant role in social life." (Godelier 1977:67)
This is one of the reasons why the class consciousness of the dominated classes such as the proletariat and the peasantry can not develop in pre-capitalist epochs. Relations of production never achieve the impersonal and alienated form found under capitalism. However, it is also true that the economic self-sufficiency of the parts of a society under pre-capitalist modes of production, also make the development of class consciousness unlikely. The atomization of the peasantry onto individual estates under feudalism, for example, meant that rebellions were undertaken on a local basis against a particular landlord, rather than by the entire peasantry against landlords as a class. Thus whilst the extraction of surplus labour is more easily perceivable where the structure of a society is simple, it is less easily understood by the actors.

Another feature of non-capitalist societies is that they have a relatively low development of the productive forces and therefore little control over nature. Thus all social relations are cloaked by a 'mystical veil'. Godelier himself defines ideology as "a more or less coherent domain of spontaneous phantasms and illusory beliefs referring to social reality" (1977:159) and draws the comparison with myths and beliefs in primitive societies which deceptively serve to explain and justify kinship relations, incest prohibitions, the origins of plants, animals, techniques and the division of labour (opp. cit).

If we examine, for example, the feudal mode of production, some of the questions raised concerning the operation of ideology in non-capitalist modes of production will be elucidated.

Under feudalism the extraction of the surplus production took a palpable concrete form. Rent was paid either in the form of surplus labour or in the form of rents paid in cash or kind. There
was in this instance no mystification surrounding the surplus product, since it either took the form of days of work which were devoted to the landlord as distinct from the days worked on the individual peasant plot for the benefit of the domestic group, or it took the form of a quantity of agricultural produce which was handed over directly to the landlord.

The key question concerning the feudal mode of production is how this relationship was justified, both in the eyes of the peasants and by the landlord. Since the mode of production required the peasants themselves to have access to the land for their subsistence and reproduction, there was an inevitable contradiction in the need to produce for themselves and the means by which they were made to render their surpluses to the landlord.

To date, Godelier's analysis of the Inca social formation is the only attempt which sets out to analyse the basis for the incorporation of communal forms of production into a pre-capitalist class society. However, it has serious failings due to his mechanical conception of the articulation of modes of production. For these reasons, it merits a detailed examination, which can point out the limitations of the structuralist conception of ideology.

A critique of Godelier's concept of the 'internaLarmature' of social relations:

In "On the definition of a social formation: the example of the Inca", Godelier attempts to examine how ideology relating to different modes of production is re-worked to suit the interests of the new dominant mode of production. He looks at the methods by which the extraction of surpluses is justified through ideology rather than by outright coercion.
The Inca empire represented a social formation in which communities whose production was based on mutual co-operation between the direct producers were incorporated into a wider social organization, characteristic of the asiatic mode of production. Godelier examines the ways in which the former mode of production was subjugated to the requirements of the new mode of production. He is concerned with two main areas of analysis concerning ideology: how a new ideology was imposed to legitimate the extraction of surpluses by a new ruling class, and how rituals relating to the former mode of production were imbued with new meaning, which enabled a certain masking of these exploitative relations.

In Godelier's analytical framework, two separate levels of ideology exist: there is ideology which is concerned with the surface level of social relations, which is related to the individual's class position in society. He gives the example of the formation of working class ideology in Britain, as the peasantry were driven from the countryside into the towns and factories. He also conceives of ideology as being part of the 'internal armature' of social relations. In this instance ideology functions "not only as the 'legitimation' of the relations of domination, but also as an internal and necessary component of the relations of production" (Levi-Strauss et al., 1976:46): that is to say the sets of ideas (values and norms) relating to production relations. Therefore, in the analysis of the Inca state it is not simply the State's physical capacity for violence and coercion which is at question, but also the extent to which the oppressed classes consented, consciously or unconsciously to this domination.

The central contradiction produced by the Inca conquest of other native peoples of the Andes was how to allow the subdued peoples to continue to produce their means of subsistence in accordance with
traditional practices whilst obliging them to work for the State. Consequently some of the superstructure (ritual and ideology) associated with the previous mode of production had to be maintained in order to ensure the reproduction of labour power. Other parts of the superstructure, rather than becoming redundant, were re-worked to suit the new mode of production. Godelier emphasizes in particular the ritual and festivities associated with communal work parties. The ritual pertaining to the previous mode of production was maintained whilst serving a different purpose: forced labour for the Inca State. Therefore, it was not simply the introduction of a new god and new creation myths which legitimized domination by the Inca at one level of ideology: this domination was also justified by the fact that rituals and labour practices, which were already accepted by the conquered peoples, were put to a new purpose, that of maintaining a new system of class relations. These features of the previous mode of production formed the 'operational bases' of the new mode of production. The features of the previous mode of production which remained intact were:

1) A primitive form of community production based on different forms of simple cooperation.

2) Land was owned by the community as a whole. There were no individual rights to land, usufruct rights to land were possessed on the basis of membership of the community.

3) Lots of land were periodically re-distributed.

4) The community appeared as a reality superior to the individual and as a practical condition of the individual's survival.
5) The function of representing the community and controlling the process of production was the responsibility of a particular family - the curaca - who personified the community.

6) The subsistence needs of widows, the old and the infirm were met through the cultivation of the curaca's lands.

Therefore, it was the elements of the previous mode of production which pertained to the sphere of maintenance of reproduction of the labour force which were retained, whilst the form of expropriation of the surplus changed. It was this surplus which supported the bureaucratic and religious apparatus of the State.

There are, nevertheless, serious problems with Godelier's analysis, the least of which is the fact that Inca expansion in the Andes was considerably more complex than he describes. The Incas conquered a series of kingdoms in different stages of their own expansion, and not populations which were organized in simple community structures. Thus to a greater or lesser extent, the ideological superstructure pre-existed amongst these peoples which justified the extraction of surpluses. The Incas merely expropriated the local nobility's rights to the surplus product.

Furthermore, Godelier wildly under-estimates the extent to which the Incas did use force and coercion in their subjugation of other kingdoms. Espinosa (1976), for example, reports that the discontent and opposition to Inca rule in Cajamarca was formidable, to the extent that 50% of the indigenous population was deported to other parts of the empire.
27 mitimaes settlements of Cajamarquinos were created in, amongst other places, Copacacabana (Lake Titicaca), Ayacucho, Lircay (Huancavelica), Polivar (Huanachucoco), and the south of Columbia. At the same time, mitimaes were brought from other rebellious provinces to Cajamarca to control the unruly population.

More importantly, it should be pointed out that the problem with Goieler's analysis lies not only in his selection of empirical material, but at the theoretical level as well. The former is largely a question of emphasis in the material he has drawn from. The latter is due to his inability to analyse contradictions within the different levels of ideology which he distinguishes, (see T owes, 1977). He assumes that the introduction of a new dominant ideology with the imposition of new relations of production automatically cancels out the power of previous images. This is simplistic. Though these images are now imbued with a new layer of meaning, it does not prevent them from continuing to evoke their old meanings. Turner (1967) in particular has stressed the ability of symbols to suppress or emphasize different layers of meaning in different contexts. He calls this the 'multi-vocality' of symbols. There is, therefore, no reason why the old rituals relating to the communal work parties should not still evoke the collective past experience of less exploitative relations. 3

2. The mitimaes were colonizer populations which were sent from one part of the Incas empire to another to control indigenous populations. Often it was used as a means of controlling a rebellious population. That is to say, the rebels were divided up and sent to unfamiliar environments.

3. This is illustrated by the following example of the persistence of two dominant images from previous modes of production in Chala. Although Peru has experienced 400 hundred years of colonial domination and Christianization there are still many undercurrents of pre-Christian imagery to be found in religious representations. In Chala, the patron saint who had the most important fiesta of the year is Santa Barbara who is also the saint of the lightning. It is no coincidence that she should have been selected in a region where the Rayo (the god of the lightning) was the main god of the pantheon in pre-Incasic times.
Furthermore, remnants of sun worship, deriving from the period of the Inca conquest era still in evidence. An old man was heard to say to a flabbergasted Church gathering in Chala: "The sun is the only thing which we are interested in worshiping because it alone gives rebirth to every plant, every tree and to every Christian, and this must make us think."

There is no denying the strength of the incorporation of these symbols into a new dominant ideology. However, as with the persistence of Quechua in many parts of the sierra of Peru, we should not consider this as a straightforward phenomenon serving only the interests of the ruling class. The survival of Quechua, I would argue, has been a major way of retaining cultural and class identity for the dominated classes, and as such constitutes an ideological weapon in the class struggle. Martínez Alier writes:

"It seems to me that the reason why indigenous culture has survived for so long is precisely the opposite: this culture has been used by them as a weapon in the class struggle."

(Martínez Alier, 1973:82)

Therefore, I would argue that whilst a degree of consensus must be necessary for the extraction of surpluses to take place, this does not explain how opposition is expressed or why conflict develops at particular points in time. In this sense, the idealist position, which structuralists such as Godelier have taken up, is over-deterministic. It can not explain how ideology can contain contradiction, nor can it analyse the dynamic of 'the battle for consciousness'.

"The opposing forces of tradition and actuality, on the one hand, and of change on the other, do constant battle for (the) consciousness (of the working class). From that battle neither of these forces emerge totally victorious, or totally secure in such victories as they may
achieve. Tradition can never be completely paralysing: but neither can it be rapidly overcome."

(Miliband, 1977:47)

The main criticism of Godelier's work is that in assuming consensus in the establishment of exploitative relations over the populations conquered by the Incas, he is also denying the role of active human intervention in social life. As such he sees social relations as static, and can not take account of conjunctural factors in his analysis. In making these assumptions, his conceptualization of ideology becomes incapable of understanding the periodic rebellions of the peasantry, not just against their Inca oppressors, but throughout history.

How, then, can we overcome the contradiction between ideology which serves the interests of the ruling class, but which at the same time contains elements which run entirely counter to it, and which embody the ideology of class struggle? Godelier's explanation of social control is only partial, because it leads us to conclude that ideology thrown up in rebellion is entirely innovative. Miliband argues:

"The dangers of this formulation (ie. the ideas of the class which controls the material means of production are the ruling ideas - HR) as of the notion of 'hegemony', is that it may lead to quite inadequate account being taken of the many-sided and permanent challenge which is directed at the ideological predominance of the ruling class."

(Miliband, 1977:53)
The problem is therefore to pose a theoretical analysis of ideology which can account for both periods of seemingly passive acceptance of ruling class/and active rejection and resistance to it. This can only be done by recognizing that whilst ideology does at a generalized level embody the ideology of the ruling class, it can not obliterate the day-to-day experience of class relations. Every class has its own ideology, which develops in the course of its formation. This, it should be added, does not happen in isolation from objective factors, such as the balance of class forces at a particular conjuncture. Thus, whilst accepting that there are means whereby oppression can be made acceptable to the dominated classes, it should also be recognized that class antagonisms can find expression without achieving full articulation or erupting in overt rebellion.

The analysis of the ideology of paternalism.

I now take the example of the ideology of paternalism embodied in the hacienda system in order to develop themes suggested in the first section of this Chapter. Paternalism is very clearly an ideology which serves the interests of the dominant class, yet it is accepted and even manipulated by the dominated peasantry. It contains the contradiction that although it is the landlord who appears as the benefactor and protector, in practice it is the peasants who are subjected to extreme exploitation and are expected, in addition, to make gifts to the landlord.

Analysis can be developed by examining the persistence of patterns of paternalist relations after the abolition of the hacienda system in Chile. The removal of the landlord through the expropriation of the estate has resulted in the establishment of new patronage relations between the peasant leaders and the peasant base. This
demonstrates the flexibility of ideology: its ability to remain a constant factor whilst continually changing in its practical implications. It shows, too, that ideology is not just related to the sphere of cultural patterns and traditional practices, but to the control of resources and access to political decision-making.

Li Causi (1975) argues that anthropologists have tended to analyse paternalism only at the level of surface appearances, without respect for the social context in which it is found. In this sense, the anthropologist is taken in the same way as the people involved in the patronage relationship by the ideology of reciprocity and mutual obligation. This can be seen, for example, in Wolf's characterisation of the patron as providing economic help and protection against the 'legal and illegal exactions of authority' and the present client as regaling in intangible assets such as esteem and loyalty (1965:15). Silverman also stresses the reciprocity of the relationship:

"Patronage as a cross-cultural pattern may be defined as an informal contractual relationship between persons of unequal status and power, which impose reciprocal relations of a different kind on each of the parties. As a minimum, what is owed is protection and favour on the one side, and loyalty on the other."

(1965:176)

Whilst these characterizations admit that the patronage relationship is a relationship between non-equals, they do not examine

4. "We can therefore define ideology as a changing, situationally transcendent set of ideas which attempts to persuade people to conduct their lives in certain ways."

(Bowes, 1975:44-45)
the basis of this inequality. Are we to suppose that a relationship between people who are socially unequal is bound to be unequal because of the intrinsic status differences between them, or does it have some other basis, in which lies the root of the inequality? \(^5\)

Li Causi maintains that the deficiencies in analyses of paternalism are due to their reference to 'gap' theory (1975:93). Crudely, this is the belief that peasants are culturally short-sighted, narrow-minded and in need of someone to help them with their economic, political and bureaucratic problems. The patron therefore links the gap between the kin-based community with which they are accustomed and the impersonal bureaucratic society which constitutes the wider system. \(^6\) Taking the perspective of class analysis, Li Causi demonstrates that the ruling class in fact uses a 'stick and carrot' policy as far as patronage relationships are concerned:

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5. The concept of *asymmetrical reciprocity* is a contradiction in terms and therefore meaningless. Either a relationship is asymmetrical or it is reciprocal. In the instance of patron-client relations this concept has been used to demonstrate how the patron gives more than he receives, when in fact the basis of the patron-client relation is the exact opposite.

6. This is, of course, related to 'modernization' theories of development whereby the failure to develop capitalism in a country is attributed to the traditional, backward sector of the economy. For a full discussion of modernization explanations of peasant movements, see Reinbird (1975:45-70).
"On the one side .... the landlord, through the mezzadria relationship (share-cropping - S.R.), gets a cheap labour force, and an increasingly powerful economic and political position. On the other side, he acts as if he were a "patron", granting small favours to the peasant and his family, by helping him cope with procedures imposed by the wider society (the State), or by patronizing and economically subsidizing "collective" institutions, such as the local music band. This "patronizing" behaviour did not, however, alter the substance of the relationship." (1975:98-99)

Thus, he argues, patronage can be conceived of as an ideological device which maintains the status quo.

Whilst Li Causi is correct to look at the social context in which patronage relationships occur, in rejecting what he calls "gap" theory, he is also rejecting an important part of the analysis of paternalism. In doing this, he suggests that paternalism is intrinsic to a particular set of social relationships at the local level, which he maintains disappeared with the Italian agrarian reform in 1950. However, this is obviously not the answer in the case of Chala, where patron-client type relations continued after the agrarian reform, when the social basis of the paternalism of the hacienda system had been abolished. The answer lies, I believe, in the nature of the relationship between the local power structure and the State, and not in a particularistic model of exploitative social relations. 7

7. See Heath (1970) on the persistence of the same patronage model in the Yungas region of Bolivia after the Land Reform.
Li Causi does in fact recognise that it is the absence of judicial and legal apparatuses which are the main pre-requisite for the appearance of patron-client type relationships. Nevertheless, he does not sufficiently develop the argument that the formal legal institutions of a country may be extremely favourable for the creation and maintenance of these sets of local relationships.

In fact, many analyses of the peasantry suggest the fragmentation of the peasantry into competing groups such as factions and the existence of middlemen who mediate relationships with the wider society. Shanin for example uses the concept of "vertical segmentation" to define social groupings, usually local, which cut across the major socio-economic stratification of society and which produces a division of the peasantry into qualitatively similar, highly self-sufficient, hierarchical segments with relatively little interaction between them (1972:177).

A similar concept, that of domination, has been applied to the Peruvian situation. Cotler (1969), for example, analyses the

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8 Many observers have noted the dispersed and hierarchical nature of political groupings amongst the peasantry. Alavi, for example, writes: "The pattern of political behaviour of the peasantry is based on factions which are vertically integrated segments of rural society dominated by landlords and rich peasants at the top and with poor and landless labourers who are economically dependent on them at the bottom." (Alavi 1965:273)
"traditional" hacienda system of the Peruvian sierra by reference to the following features: ⁹
a) a low level of urbanization
b) little socio-occupational diversification
c) a low level of technological development and low productivity
d) poor communications
e) a high level of illiteracy.

Cotler argues that whilst there is a very uneven distribution of resources throughout Peru, ¹⁰ in the "traditional" parts of the sierra there is only one source of wealth which is in agriculture.

9. "Whilst useful as a descriptive term the concept of "domination" contributes little analytically to the analysis of local level relationships, and tends to oversimplify the complexity of rural class structure. This is also true of its concept of the "triangle without a base" and the "closing of the base of the triangle" with the development of peasant organisations.

10. For the purpose of this article, he refers to the sierra departments of Puno, Cuzco, Apurímac, Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Ancash. He specifically excludes the Central Sierras from this on the grounds that, like the northern and central coast of Peru, it is more affected by the high productivity sector of the economy, which is controlled by foreign capital. He gives the following figures on the regional distribution of resources: In the "traditional" regions of the sierra 88% of the units of production control 6% of the cultivated land whilst 0.9% of the units control 69% of the cultivated land. In the rest of the county 79% of the units of production control 7% of the land, and 0.9% of the units control 73% (Cotler 1969:63). These are, of course, pre-reform figures.
Therefore, due to the lack of alternative sources of employment, control of the land becomes the key to the control of all aspects of social life. The landowning class is also the class which controls the sources of regional capital accumulation and investment, the distribution and marketing of produce, education and, in the southern sierra, knowledge of Spanish as well. They therefore occupy positions of political control which enable them to implement political repression, and are supported in these positions by national institutions. The monopoly of resources and power exercised by the landowning class results in the "margination" of the peasantry with respect to their participation in social resources and decision-making, and the accompanying cultural stereotypes of the peasants implied in ruling class ideology.

Cotler's model, whilst taking into account important features of the relationship between the landowning class and the peasantry fails to go beyond purely descriptive usefulness. It describes the surface expressions at the local level of the autonomy of the regions, but does not explain it. It also fails to examine the way in which the organization of production itself produces the atomization of the peasantry.
Paternalism in the hacienda system and after the implementation of the Agrarian Reform.

I have demonstrated in the previous section that paternalism is not specific to the hacienda system, but that patterns of patronage relations were built up after the Agrarian Reform. The implication of this is that this kind of relationship is characteristic where the physical conditions of production, and the relationship of the regions to central State authority are similar, without the landlord-peasant relationship. I also argue that the so-called "atomization" of the peasantry does not prevent them from organizing politically and taking independent action. Both Godelier, in his exposition on ideology, and Cotler, in his concept of domination are over-deterministic in their analyses, and underestimate the degree to which ideology can contain contradiction. Rather, I argue that periodic crises in the hacienda system, related to developments in the economy and the national class structure have the effect of clarifying the contradictions embodied in the ideology of paternalism.

If we examine certain dominant features of the ideology of paternalism found in the hacienda Chala, we discover a series of contradictions relating to the rights and obligations of the landlord owed to the peasants in return for their labour. The old hacendado, Miranda, was described by the peasants in the following terms:

e) "He was a good patron".

b) "He gave us midday food rations and made us gifts of sacks of potatoes."

c) "He didn't punish us; he would say the foremen, 'leave my little children alone'."

d) "When the landlord and his wife arrived at the hacienda it was the cause of great celebration and mutual gift-giving. The
 devotion of the peasants to them is demonstrated in the following song, which the peones sung in welcome when they arrived at the hacienda:

"My lord, give me leave, my lord, give me leave,
Sire, please excuse me, Sire, please excuse me,
I will sow a pineapple in your patio and carnations in your window,
I will place a lily of love on your breast, my patron."

However, when questioned further whether this landlord had in fact allowed the peasants to send their children to school (which was the issue which sparked off the 1956 mobilization) or whether they had to work hard for no pay, the reply was "we always complained against the administrators". The administrators it seems were divided into those that were "good" and treated the peasants reasonably and those that were "bad" and tyrannical and were involved in enforcing the work régime, punishing indiscipline and demanding unwarranted gifts of eggs and poultry. From this it is clear that whilst the peasants were aware of the exploitation of the hacienda system, they directed their class hatred not against the landlord, whom they rarely saw except on special occasions, but against the administrators, employees and work-gang leaders who formed the agents through which labour duties were exacted and labour discipline enforced.

The importance of the ideology of reciprocity in the paternalist relationship becomes apparent when the reasons for the mobilization against the later landlord, Zárate, are investigated. Without exception, the first comment about him was that he cut the midday food rations, that he punished those who failed to turn up for work, that he was "as fierce as a kangaroo" and that he hit the women when they refused to make gifts of fowl and guinea pigs. Moreover, the
fact that he managed the hacienda personally rather than leaving it in the hands of an administrator created, in the peasants' minds, a direct link between their deteriorating conditions of work, the loss of some of the material benefits of the paternalist régime and the personal involvement of the landlord in the running of the estate. The fact that it was the change in the outward expression of the relationship between the landlord and the peasants, as well as the encroachment on peasant plots and the increased labour load is demonstrated in the fact that the earliest mobilizations around rents and the lack of children's schooling concentrated on the effects and not the symptoms of the new régime. This is to say that the terms of the landlord-peasant relationship were brought into question, but not the landlord-peasant relationship itself.

The contradictions embodied in the ideology of paternalism in the hacienda system are not specific to landlord-peasant relations, but are also found in other aspects of social life in rural Peru, for example in relationships between peasants and shopkeepers and traders. The fact that the ideology of paternalism and patronage relations have been perpetuated even after the Land Reform in Chala, though now in new relationships, is more a reflection of the stagnant nature of the forces of production. This perpetuation of patronage relations reflects the failure of the peasants to obtain greater participation in decision-making and control of resources, than to any cultural characteristics of the peasantry themselves (cf. Foster 1965). Though the paternalist relationships which have emerged since the Agrarian Reform are of recent origin and do not rest on the same basis as the landlord-peasant relationship, these relationships still mediate relations of political domination and economic exploitation. Now, however, rather than being expressed through the terminology of patronage, these relations are expressed in a
new idiom. In Chala, they are expressed through the ideology of kinship relations, through *compadrazgo* or political allegiance during the common struggle against the landlord.

The explanation of the continuance of these patterns of relations after the Agrarian Reform, lies in the fact that the State, in attempting to expand its influence, found it easier to negotiate with individuals rather than the mass of the population. Moreover, due to the military régime’s lack of support from the dominant classes, it was forced to seek political support from the dominated classes, hence the development of its policy of 'social participation'. However, this participation was limited, and was specifically designed to prevent popular mobilization. In Chala, therefore, the State agencies found it easier to deal with those who styled themselves as peasant leaders rather than with the peasant base, due to the mass opposition to the introduction of the co-operative. The State not only supported the emergence of medium-size farmers and the small rural bourgeoisie, but was actually prepared to bolster up the political position of these individuals. In Chala, this meant turning a blind eye to illegal dealings in the land and the protection of peasant absentee landowners if it meant that it could negotiate its policies, and thus avoid a direct confrontation. Therefore, in one fell swoop a series of difficult manoeuvres were achieved. Firstly, the peasant mobilization was weakened, defused and demobilized. This was achieved by not allowing any one of the three peasant pretenders to leadership absolute supremacy within the ex-hacienda, but rather to play off rivalries and factionalism between them. This rivalry and factionalism was not created by the State, but already existed based on the followings of leaders from the different phases of the struggle. In making concessions to the self-interest of these leaders, the State
agencies were also able to implement the legal fiction of the successful co-operative in Chala.

The fact that the State agencies deliberately chose to deal through key-placed individuals in the social structure rather than through a more democratic and participatory process can be demonstrated in the aims behind the creation of an agency such as SINAMCS. The organizational structures set up by SINAMCS, such as the Ligua Agraria, were to mobilize support for the Government. The leaders selected to represent particular communities, factories or plantations, tended to be those with political influence within their communities or workplaces, but who were manipulable and prepared to make compromises when it came to dealing with the Government. Nevertheless, within Chala, at least, the degree to which individual leaders could maintain patterns of patronage and support depended on their ability to fulfill the needs of their followers and the extent to which their inevitable abuses of power were questioned and criticized.

In the following pages, two case studies will be analyzed. In these, the relative success or failure of two leaders in building up a following and in imposing a new system of patronage relations will be examined. We will see that success or failure was not necessarily determined by the strength of the individual's kin, affinal, or religious affiliations, but on the basis of his access to resources and ability to deliver the goods to his followers, compared to that of other competing factions within his section.
This concerns the situation in one of the sectors of the estate, Maygasmarca, one of the sectors of the estate furthest from Ima- smarca. Much of the analysis focuses on the relationship between the two leaders, whom I shall call Felix Tarrillo and Juan Rico Tarrillo, and in particular Felix's network of interpersonal relations. This network extended to peasants and non-peasants—primarily reform officials, lawyers, SIMACOS promoters, and was central to the maintenance of his position within his own sector. These relationships meant that he controlled access to the land, and on the basis of this, his following had been built up.

Whilst Felix Tarrillo's power within his own sector was based on his control of the land, he also committed many abuses. He had more than 50 hectares of land himself, he was protecting absentee, he paid wages to work on his own land, he sold land to one family and then re-sold it to another, and he was also charging people for the right to take firewood from the 'free lands'. This case study demonstrates how kinship, compadrazgo and other personal relationships mediate the perception of exploitative relationships between peasants. Moreover, because no-one else in this sector had the same access to legal channels for obtaining title to the land, his position went more or less unchallenged at least within his own sector.

Felix Tarrillo's family were not originally from Chela, but his father came to Chela from Chota in order to take up the position of explorado of Castrocincha. The family were, therefore, entitled to some 30 hectares of land and had enjoyed privileges that were not open to other peasants, eg. they had not paid rent, nor had they performed servile labour obligations. Felix Tarrillo himself had received primary education and had spent some years in Cajamarca at
school as well. It was here that he first joined the Aprista party and became active in local politics. Then he returned to Chala, it was in order to take up the position of school teacher in the school set up in Cabracancha for the children of the arrancadores. The family was expelled from this section of the hacienda in 1954, along with other families who had protested against increased rents and had lived in Bambamarca for a number of years. Tarrillo's father, the empleado, was also expelled and imprisoned for six months.

Felix Tarrillo was about 70 years old and had been married twice. His first wife was from Bambamarca and had the upbringing of a towns-person. She was literate and sophisticated by local standards. By her, he had four children - two sons and two daughters. The eldest son worked in Lima, the two daughters were training in Cajamarca, where he had another house and the youngest son was a policemen in Bambamarca and lived in a house owned by Tarrillo. Apart from a brother and some cousins who owned small shops in Bambamarca, Tarrillo was also related to the former hacendados, the Miranda's, through their illegitimate son by his sister. This son worked for the Ministry of Agriculture in Lima and was involved in trying to undermine Zarate's claim to the hacienda at one point.

Tarrillo's first wife died in the 1960's. His second wife was the opposite of the first. She was less than half his age and came from one of the peon families of Chala. She was illiterate, and on occasions he would denigrate her humble background. He had three small children by this woman. When in town, Tarrillo dressed and

11. See footnote 6, Chapter 2, for details of the Aprista party.
behaved as a townsman. In the countryside, he dressed and behaved as a peasant, living in a rude chona as other peasants did.

When the family was expelled from the hacienda in 1954, Don Felix sold his animals and bought a share in a lorry with a Bambamarquino. He travelled in Peru a great deal, particularly to Lima, but also to the jungle regions.

Whilst living in Bambamarca, Tarrillo had bought a house near the Corellana bridge - the bridge that all the Chalinos had to cross in order to get to the Sunday market. He sold kerosene, aguardiente, sugar and other items to them, giving them credit and generally keeping touch with events on the estate. However, he only became actively involved in Chala in the 1960's after the formation of the sindicato. Whilst he was clearly not one of the key leaders, because he was more articulate than most peasants and was a member of ATRA, he was identified as one of the leaders. Because of this, he tended to deal with relations with outside organizations, both before the passing of the Agrarian Reform and after its implementation. Thus, he obtained a position whereby he was the main person to negotiate with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Juez de Tierras, and the various cooperative agencies. When approached by townsfolk and peasants from outside Chala it must have been very easy for him to falsify their legal documents and nothing was said, either by those who benefitted from the transaction, nor by the State officials who may or may not have been entirely aware of what was going on. Bitter accusations and counter accusations concerning the illegal sale of the land only came into the open once the rivalry between Don Felix and the other peasant leaders vying for supremacy, Juan de Dios Peralta and Inocente Chavez came to a head. These accusations are naturally denied by the officials, since it is only through these leaders that they have been able to have any impact in Chala at all. The 'success' of theGrupo Campesino, the planta-
tion and the half-hearted attempts at setting up voluntary co-operative societies (the conjuntos) were entirely due to these leaders' co-operation.

As mentioned in Chapter 6, the sale of land started prior to the passing of the 1969 Land Reform and the legal award of the land to the peasants. The factionalism which emerged between the three main leaders was basically over who was to assume the position of supreme leader in Chala, since each of them already controlled one sector. Juan de Dios was in fact the overall leader of Chala until 1971 when the ex-hacienda was divided into five sectors for the purpose of giving the peasants legal entitlement to the land. Felix Tarrillo claimed that Juan de Dios wished to regain control of supreme leadership. Inocente, on the other hand, maintained it was he and not Juan de Dios who was supreme leader.

The factionalism between these three leaders is in part related to their different origins. Felix Tarrillo was, as mentioned earlier, the son of an empleado, and to all extents and purposes an arrendador. Juan de Dios was a peon by birth and Inocente was born outside the hacienda and had come in as a partidario in 1952, to open up the grazing land in Colpa. Felix had been thrown out of the hacienda in 1954 with the other arrendadores. Juan de Dios had been a key organizer of the 1956 protest and had been thrown out of the hacienda with the other families of peones who had joined the protest. Both Felix and Juan de Dios joined the final stage of the struggle in its later years, and Felix certainly resented Juan de Dios' joining the comité of the sindicato just at the time at which the struggle against the landlord was drawing to a close. Inocente, on the other

12. See the section on 'factionalism and the opposition to the afforestation project'. 
hand was involved continuously in the struggle of the 1960's, but
was considered an outsider. Although Felix had no qualms about
selling land to outsiders, he was keen that other outsiders from
Inocente's following should not assume positions of importance on
the comité del grupo campesino after the implementation of the
Agrarian Reform.

As mentioned earlier, the relationships between these leaders and
their support bases were founded on multiple ties of kinship, compad-
rrego, residence and common interest in access to the land. However,
there was a shifting pattern of alliances, which tended to change
when other individuals emerged who had access to the same resources
(i.e. the land) by virtue of their ability to organize legal papers
independently of the faction leaders, and their ability to challenge
the faction leader's authority by reference to their own support
base. Thus, in each sector of the estate, different patterns of
rivalry existed to the faction leader's power.

In the sector of Santa Bárbara-Colpa, for example, Inocente's fol-
lowing was rivalled more by the following of the leaders of the 1956
protest than by either of the others. Felix Tarrillo an Juan de
Dios appear to have been through periods of temporary alliances, for
example when they banded together over the planting of the eucalyptus
plantation, and the expulsion of the amarillos from Cabrancanha in
1973 and periods of intense antagonism. In 1975 there were two
minor conflicts: the first was over the building of a bridge over
the river dividing Cabrancanha from Maygesmarca in which the people
of Cabrancanha had refused to co-operate, and in the right to take
firewood from the mountainside. Because of the law of the land, there
was firewood only in Maygesmarca and there was considerable resent-
ment to the fact that Felix was charging the Cabrancanchinos to
collect it. On a personal level, these antagonisms were all too
clearly demonstrated whenever the peasant leaders had to come into
town for conventions or meetings with officialdom. On one occasion, the leaders and the committees of all the five sections of Chala were to be seen sitting on different benches around the Plaza de Armas of Bambamarca, studiously ignoring each other.

By mid-1976, because of the regulations regarding the constitution all three leaders had given up their positions as members of the grupo campesino, members of the comités de grupo campesino in their respective sectors. They were still, however, working with officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and SINARCIS. Felix Tarrillo had the local school and the communal house (used for meetings) built on his land, and had sponsored an unsha for carnavales in much the same spirit that the old hacendado had sponsored fiestas. He was also friends with the local lawyer and tax officer whom he entertained when they came to Chala to hunt venison.

Tarrillo also had a useful contact through his son, who worked at the local post of the Guardia Civil. Through him he was able to receive useful privileges eg. his family did not have to queue for rice sold at the official price in the market when there was a shortage but got it directly through his son. Also, this contact must have been invaluable when he was faced with problems from the people he was charging for the land, or share-croppers who were rebelling against absentee land owners.

It was very rare to hear actual criticisms of Felix Tarrillo, especially within his own sector of the hacendado. His larger quantity of land was not questioned, but accepted on the basis that his father had also had more land. This was because the struggle in Chala had been a reivindicación de tierras (recuperation of land) and had never aimed at an equal re-distribution. His superior position was also justified by reference to the fact that he had been a peasant leader, that he had struggled with them, and that
he had helped them a lot. These inequalities were therefore accepted because of Felix's ability to act as a patron. Within the village, those who opposed him had the weight of authority against them. This was true for the amarillos who opposed the planting of the eucalyptus plantation and who were eventually expelled, as it was for the morosos who had planted and seized over the eucalyptus seedlings and who were suspected of burning down the plantation in November 1976. Those who opposed him over his charging for the land or for his protection of absentee landowners, found themselves up against his superior pulling power with the Police, local lawyers, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Juez de Tierras and SINAMCS. In fact, Felix Tarrillo was supposed to take local problems to SINAMCS for solution, therefore his control of this channel of influence effectively prevented anyone from seeking justice through this channel and enabled him to continue his illegal and capricious practices without interference. That is to say, he was in an extremely effective brokerage position.13

Felix Tarrillo was also, through his greater articulateness, able to prevent others from doing precisely what he himself was doing. In all sections of Chala, there were disputes as to how the tierras libres (the lands formerly directly cultivated by the landlord) should be used. Members of the committees were not above using them to their own advantage, e.g. renting them out and claiming that the rent was to cover their official travel expenses to Cajamarca and Chota nor were they adverse to surreptitiously usurping them themselves. However, when other families laid claim to these lands, or refused to pay rent for them, they were quick to oppose private cultivation and ownership of these lands on the grounds that they belonged to the whole group and were therefore owned co-operatively.

13. See Boissevain (1974) and Bailey (1960) on brokerage relations and the manipulation of networks of social relationships by people in brokerage positions.
Criticisms of Felix Tarrillo came, as would be expected, from outside his own sector and were most clearly articulated by other leaders and their followings. These took the form of mutual slanging matches, whereby the one's lack of involvement in the illegal sale of the land was contrasted with the others shady dealings. In more critical moments, attention was in fact brought to the way he was concealing the conflicts he was himself creating to SINANCS.

Generally, people tended to refer to him in terms of their kinship relationship to him or with reference to their common struggle. These would be under or over-played according to the circumstances. For instance, one individual who was related to Tarrillo's wife would emphasize the kinship relationship and the fact that they had been 'as brothers' during the struggle to bolster up the very minor role he himself actually played. On other occasions, frustrated by SINANCS's lack of effect on strife-torn sectors of the hacienda he would perceive Tarrillo's part with greater lucidity.

When the situation in Maygesmarca is compared with that of Santa Bárbara-Colpa, striking differences are evident in the extent to which leaders were able to monopolize brokerage positions. In Santa Bárbara-Colpa, there were in fact three different factions competing for power, and the leaders had quite different relationships to their respective support bases.
In this case study the situation in Santa Bárbara-Colpa will be examined. This, in many ways, was the most heterogeneous sector of the ex-hacienda because there had been peones, arrendadores and partidarios in this sector prior to the land reform. Moreover, the partidarios originated from outside the hacienda from the neighbouring zone of San Juan, whilst many of the families of peones had been expelled as a result of their involvement in the struggles of the 1950's. Thus both these groups had experience of work outside the hacienda.

In this sector there had been bitter enmities created over the issue of support for the earlier struggles. One distinction which was always made in evaluating relationships between families in this sector was whether individuals had supported or scabbed during particular phases of the struggle. These antagonisms were constantly being re-asserted both formally and informally years after the event had actually taken place. Moreover, they were rarely cancelled out by kinship relations, or more recent relationships established by common religious denomination.

The main informal groups in this sector can be distinguished as those around Inocente — namely his group of kinsfolk who all entered Chala as partidarios in the 1950's, those around Luis Ramos, who was one of the leaders formally recognized by SINAMOS and the Land Reform Agencies, and the group of families around Asunción Tirado, who had been one of the leaders of an earlier protest, and had a large number of kinsfolk and peones and arrendadores who had been expelled at the same time in his support base. Though Luis Ramos was formally recognized as the leader of this section, in practice his position was relatively weak, and he actually had little support. Many of these
internal conflicts and contradictions came to head around a particular dispute over the land in 1975 and 1976, in which patterns of allegiances were made quite explicit.

Before starting this analysis, it is important to point out that in this sector, a protestant group, the Peregrinos, had established a base. They were propagating the protestant ethic of rejecting old customs and effectively strengthening the individualist ethic, and the nuclear family at the expense of the extended family.

To measure the impact of protestantism, attention should be drawn to several innovations. Saints Days, normally observed by music, dancing and drunkenness, were completely avoided by the protestants, who regarded them as sinful. In doing this, they were also attempting to re-define their kinship relationships. This they did by cutting back on customary reciprocal gifts, for example when a calf is born, it is normal for the family that owns the cow to give a sweet made from the cholestrol (that the cow produces before beginning to lactate) to their neighbours and kinsfolk. When an animal dies, it is also cooked and shared out amongst neighbours. Guinea pig (cuy) is cooked to celebrate the planting of the potato crop, and the completion of a house (this celebration is called the pararyko). Moreover, certain families were beginning to lessen their exchange labour relations with their kinsfolk (minga), because if they had spent money on herbicides and fertilizers, as the Ministry of Agriculture was encouraging them to do, they resented the obligation to repay with part of the harvest. This increasing emphasis on the nuclear family as the domestic unit of production was accompanied by the pressuring of Church members into legal marriage contracts, which the majority of peasants did not have, since normally no marriage ceremony was observed. All these new types of behaviour, though essentially of an economic nature, were expressed
in strongly moralistic terms.

The Peregrinos were a fairly tightly-knit group, who worshipped together and were beginning to work together and go on barter exchanges together. They were organizing their economic interests more formally in 1975, by the setting up of a Protestant conjunto, in order to jointly work part of the tierras libres.

There was not a great deal of antagonism between the protestants and the catholic majority though they caused some trouble for their fatalistic attitude to illness. They were criticized for their money-mindedness and lack of generosity to kinsfolk in the terms of "protestantism is no more than good business".

In this sector, Inocente, who had originally been one of the main contenders for the supreme leadership of Chala, had lost a lot of credibility. This was mainly due to an incident in the early 1970's, when he had tried to throw out some of the families, natives of Chala, who were legally entitled to the land. Part of the problem was that he had access to the local authorities which were issuing legal entitlement to the land, whilst the other aspect of the problem was that he had the physical force, in the form of his following, to evict the families concerned. Because Asunción Tirado and his supporters had previous experience of leading their own struggles, they could organize legal papers on their own initiative, and refused to pay Inocente for access to the land. Moreover, they had a considerable support base, due to their previous leadership in the struggle and because they formed an alternative source for obtaining legal entitlement to the land. Thus, when Asunción led a number of ploughing teams onto the land in dispute, the Chalino's right to the land was re-established. By 1975 and 1976 Inocente had lost a lot of his power base in this sector of the ex-hacienda, and
it was common to hear his rather large plot of land remarked upon, and also the fact that he had tried to set himself up as a hacendado, by charging the other peasants for the land.

The relationship between Asunción and Luis will be examined through the case study of the dispute over land mentioned earlier. Both leaders were protestants, and they were brothers-in-law too.

The dispute over land involved a woman, Concepción Sánchez, who was not a Chalina by birth, who had been living with a Chalino, Juan Ruiz, and had a son by him. Juan had then travelled to the coast to work in Cayaltí and Concepción had received title to the land through the Agrarian Reform in Juan's absence. Her father-in-law, Pedro Ruiz, had pressured for this title, thinking that it would entitle his own family to more land. After a while, however, Juan Ruiz took up with another woman in Cayaltí, abandoning Concepción. At this point, Pedro Ruiz tried to dispossess Concepción of the land, claiming it belonged to him through his son and that he had been working it. This was a bitter dispute, which was taken to a series of General Assemblies as well as to Committee meetings.

The decision over the dispute was brought to one General Assembly in which Luis Ramos declared himself in favour of Pedro Ruiz, giving the reason that he was from Chala and had produced (false) evidence that Concepción held land outside in her community of origin. To the majority present this constituted an unjust decision. Concepción was an orphan, had no land outside Chala and had lived there for many years. Pedro Ruiz, in contrast, was just trying to accu-

14. Women had no independent title to land under the reform unless they were spinsters or widows. Hence Pedro was able to claim that although the land was registered in Concepción's name, it was actually Juan's.
Emulate land: he already had his entitlement in Chala and had bought some eleven hectares in Chungos at the time of the parcelization of Llaucán. Morally, they could see no reason why Concepción should not have entitlement to the land.

Luis Ramos, who supported Pedro Ruiz, was immediately suspected of having received a bribe. (At the same time he was also under suspicion of selling contraband wood from the eucalyptus plantation around the casa hacienda and of mismanaging the funds of the grupo campesino.) Asunción, who had been having an affair with Concepción over a number of years, naturally supported her and made an impassioned speech in her favour.

Despite the affinal and religious relationship between the two men, however, this did not prevent the conflict around this particular case from coming out into the open. Part of the reason lay, perhaps, in the fact that Asunción took his religion seriously, and had totally rejected what he considered to be the old ways. He often remarked of Catholics that their religion required no self-discipline from its adherents. Luis, in contrast, had joined the Peregrinos, because he has been told that faith would cure his dying wife's illness. In fact, she had died in early 1975 and Luis had been slowly slipping back into the habit of drunken binges on a Sunday market day. Asunción made a number of quite public allegations about Luis's reversion to sinful ways, and was constantly checking up with people on whether he had been drunk or not on particular occasions. He was also constantly emphasizing to the supervisory committee (the comité de vigilancia) of the grupo campesino of the need to keep an eye on Luis.

In addition to Luis's lack of moral uprightness, Asunción also distrusted Luis politically. He believed him to be a liar (mentiroso).
and a ragamuffin (palomilla) and was often frustrated by his unreliability. All these opinions were voiced quite publicly. In fact, Asunción could even be heard to say that although Luis was a brother in religion, he often felt like belting him one. In this case, common religious affiliation merely served to dampen what was otherwise a quite hostile relationship. Though this had roots in the current conflict over land, it also went back to a long-standing lack of confidence in Luis’s political integrity. When Asunción’s extended family had been thrown out of the estate for organizing a protest, Luis had not supported them, through fear. He was thus constantly referred to by them as an amarillo (scab), and it was this assessment of him which was reinforced by his current abuses of power.

Analysis:

The analysis of these two case studies raises a number of interesting questions. Why, given the history of political mobilization in Chala were the peasant leaders able to accumulate land for themselves and to exploit their fellows? How was it that in some sectors it was easier for the leaders to monopolize the control of access to the land than in others? What were the mechanisms whereby the ideology of paternalism was re-established?

The answers to these questions lie in two crucial factors: the way in which control over resources was operated (namely how legal entitlement to the land could be obtained) and the operation of different systems of reference in social relationships which were emphasized or de-emphasized according to different situational contexts.

In case study No. 1, Felix Tarrillo’s abuses of power were examined. However, these were, to a large extent, tolerated so long as members
of his following continued to benefit through their relationship to him, and there were no other contenders for this position. Therefore, in these relationships, it was always the kinship element, neighbourhood or the fact of participating in the common struggle that were always emphasized. The reason that Tarrillo was able to get away with this behaviour lay largely in the fact that the peasants had developed a trade union or economic consciousness of their immediate demands, but not a political consciousness of their class interests, in the course of their struggles. Therefore, once their struggle was taken outside its original frame of reference, that is to say, away from the struggle against the landlord, they were not equipped to direct the struggle or to exercise control over those who abused their positions of power. This element is far more important in explaining events in Chala after the land reform than more simplistic explanations of the mass of the peasant's illiteracy and lack of expertise in dealing with bureaucracies and the law.

In case study No. 2, in contrast, there were three competing factions for power, and no one faction leader was able to monopolize access to the land. Criticism of leaders was more vocal in this sector, through this was mainly a reflection of the fact that there were alternative channels of access to resources. It is significant that the most critical section of peasants in this sector had, in fact, organized themselves against the landlord in an earlier stage of the struggle, and many had been forced to take waged jobs during their period of expulsion from the hacienda. Thus critical perception of relationships in terms of their kinship, affinal, patronage or religious content rather than their strictly political or economic content is not simply a cultural idiom of the peasantry as some anthropological writers would have us believe, (see Foster, 1965 for example). Rather, it is related to concrete sets of relationships at the local level, which are concerned with control of resources.
Conclusion:

As demonstrated above, patronage relationships were established after the expropriation of the hacienda in Chala and these were based on the faction leaders' control of access to the most important resource: the land. Thus, patronage relationships and their accompanying ideological manifestation, paternalism, were not specific to the hacienda system, but were re-worked to suit the conditions pertaining after the reform.

I have already argued in previous chapters that political criteria dominated economic criteria in the conception and implementation of the Land Reform Law. This clearly was the case in Chala, where the prime aim of the reform was to give land to the peasants and to demobilize the peasant struggle. Subsequently, much was done to defuse the organized strength of the peasant movement, by the way in which particular leaders were made to become intermediaries in the distribution of land.

It is also clear in this case that one of the main functions of the land reform was to strengthen the state itself in the regions, both by extending the state bureaucracy (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture, SINAMOS) into the regions, as well as through the whole process of gathering information and the registration of property. Furthermore, the political decline of the landlord class and their control over their peasant tenants also opened up space for the penetration of central state authority in the regions.

Factionalism was in fact tolerated by state agencies, and indeed was encouraged by the establishment of organizations such as the Ligan Agrarias (the peasant leagues set up by SINAMOS). Based on a concept of limited participation, these were precisely the organs...
which legitimated faction leaders' power, whilst limiting entirely the involvement of the mass of peasants in decision-making processes.

Finally, whilst expropriation meant that the peasants no longer had to pay the landlord's rent, the attempts to set up a co-operative made little practical impact on the social relations of production. As has been made clear in Chapter 2, the emphasis of the Land Reform after 1974 became increasingly on stimulating and developing commercial agriculture where it already existed, and not in developing it where it did not. Thus in Chala, the forces of production have remained stagnant, and the régime certainly has no interest in developing the consciousness of the mass of the peasants that would enable them to do anything else.
CHAPTER 8 : Conclusion

In this thesis I have studied the development of a struggle on one estate in Cajamarca between the 1950's and 1970's, demonstrating that it was not isolated from general developments in the Peruvian socio-economic structure. I have shown that the hacienda that my empirical work was based on was representative of a certain type of hacienda in the regional agrarian structure of Cajamarca (though the unevenness of the development of the regional agrarian structure can not be overstressed). I have also analysed events in Chala as part of an historical process taking place in Peru - namely the development of agrarian capitalism - which focused on the immediate pre-and post-reform period.

I have endeavoured to expose some of the common misconceptions of the 'traditional' hacienda system of the Andes - namely to argue that it was not feudal, and nor was it a static institution. I have shown that in the present century in Cajamarca, there have been two main processes affecting the haciendas. These have been the division and sale of hacienda lands to the peasant tenants, and attempts, which were successful to a greater or lesser extent, to introduce capitalist relations of production and to increase output for the market. My analysis, particularly in Chapter 1, showed how difficult this transformation has been, and that often landlords resorted to commercial production on their desmesne lands only, complemented by peasant rents, the control of marketing and the use of unpaid or cheap peasant labour.

Fundamental to my argument is the recognition that Peru is a capitalist country, albeit a peripheral capitalist country. Thus whilst all relations of production are dominated by capital, in many cases labour has still not been formally dominated by capital. Thus there has not been a complete transformation of relations of production.
There are a number of hypotheses that can be put forward to explain why landlords did not succeed in transforming their estates into capitalist farms. It could be argued that renting was profitable, and so there was no incentive to change (eg. Hobsbawm, 1969b) or that renting was not profitable, so the landlords sold their lands in order to invest in other sectors of the economy. Alternatively, it has been argued that landlords wanted to introduce capitalist relations of production but were prevented from doing so by peasant resistance to wage labour (eg. Martínez Alier, 1973). I contend that in haciendas like Chala, and in others, for example those cited by Horton (1974), the conditions were: lack of capital for investment, and attempts to increase differential and absolute rent had the effect of making the internal contradictions of the hacienda system more acute. Of course, none of these factors can be analysed in isolation from the regional agrarian structure, the political power of the landlord, and the type of agricultural production (ie. livestock or cultivation since this affects capital and labour requirements). Furthermore, booms and crises in the economy and the balance of class forces nationally also affected the landlords' success in implementing these transformations and the peasants' resistance to them.

In Chala, we can see all of these problems illustrated. For example, the networks and political influence of the landlords, César Miranda and Luis Zárate were quite different, as was their ability to manage their patronage relationships with the peasant tenants of their estate. By the 1950's, Zárate was unable to maintain the force of the ideology of paternalism, since it increasingly conflicted with his strategy of increasing differential and absolute rent. He had no explicit strategy of dispossessing peasant families from the land, though 80 families were thrown out in reprisal for organizing a protest. Needless to say, he did make encroachments on peasant
subsistence holdings, and introduced stiffer penalties for work indiscipline.

These landlord strategies in Chala produced a series of peasant mobilizations.

However, throughout the Andes there have been waves of peasant mobilizations as the conflict of interests between landlords and their peasant tenants, or between landlords and neighbouring peasant communities have been heightened by economic crises. The peasant mobilizations of the 1960's were largely in response to the crisis in the economy produced by the drop in the international price of copper, which meant large numbers of migrant workers returned to their communities of origin. This was further heightened by the conflict of interest between the oligarchy and the emergent bourgeoisie.

As argued earlier, the land reform was the product of a coalition of different class interests. In Chala, as in many other cases, it merely legitimated the peasants' de facto control of the land. In other instances, rather than dampening rural struggles, it actually opened up new struggles. Clearly the reform introduced a bureaucratic process into the expropriation of the estates, and it also strengthened the state itself through its control of the expropriations. At the same time, the land reform had contradictory aims; it set out to re-organize the structure of the economy in order to create the conditions which would enable the development of the manufacturing sector, yet made little attempt to develop commercial agriculture in the highlands. Projects for co-operatives (the CAP's and the SAIS's) were drawn up, as were regional development projects (the HIAA's and the PID's) yet these were largely utopian plans.
Thus the overall effect of the land reform was to strengthen commercial agriculture where it already existed, and resources were not made available for development of the highlands. It was in the highlands, even more so than on the coast, where the land reform was manifested as a political rather than an economic intervention.

In Chala, the failure of the co-operative, the peasant opposition to it, the manipulation of the leaders and the re-establishment of patronage relationships, can all be seen as part of a programme to extend the market for manufactured goods by liberating the peasants from the payment of the landlord's rent, but not part of a project for their full emancipation.

Finally, I believe we are led to ask what the long-term effects of the land reform and the struggles which led up to it and followed have been. I would argue that the struggles in the rural sector of the 1960's can be regarded as an historical phenomenon. Struggles led under the banner of slogans such as 'guerra a muerte al latifundio' (struggle to death against the estates) are no longer taking place because the vast majority of the large estates have been expropriated. Nevertheless, the peasants are still exploited through the market, through outwork systems and by wealthier peasants.

The land reform has led to a massive migration to the cities. In the cities some migrants find employment in factories, but the majority are employed in services and petty commodity production. This whole process has produced a massive socialization of production, and so the political struggles which are now emerging are qualitatively different from the rural struggles of the 1960's. As Petras and Havens write:

"What differentiates this from past mobilizations - mostly in backward rural areas - is that the objective conditions for the present..."
struggle are taking shape along with an advance of capitalist relations of production. Thus the arena of struggle is now located in the public and private industrial and modern agricultural centre. The large-scale, state-owned enterprises, mining and metallurgical enterprises and agro-industrial complexes, are the centres of class conflict and political rebellion." (1979:26)

The rural areas are also being politicized, though the struggles are no longer the old style reivindicaciones de tierras against the landlords. On the contrary, these are the struggles of the rural workers and the small-holding peasantry against rising prices and political repression exercised by the state itself. Thus, the processes documented in this thesis have made way for the greater development of agrarian capitalism in the highlands, and new forms of struggle are already emerging.
APPENDIX 1: Documents relating to Llaucan

The massacre of Llaucan - December 1914:
(From Ciro Alegría: 'El mundo es ancho y ajeno')

It was a year yesterday that the army, under Colonel Revilla, the then Prefect of Cajamarca, went to Llaucan, and turned it into the most horrendous hecatomb, which will go down in the national martyrology of the indigenous people of recent years. The bullets and sabres of criminal officialdom riddled the natives of Llaucan on 3rd December 1914. Not content with massacreing those who had come together pacifically and without arms to await the arrival of the first authority of the department, they went from one home to another, without respecting age, sex or condition, so that children, old people and even women about to give birth or who had just given birth, were killed in their own beds. (1973:385)

The massacre of Llaucan:
(From Jorge Basadre: Historia de la República del Perú, Volume 12, 1968 and re-printed in PEDECC, 1975)

In December 1914 there was a massacre of Indians on the hacienda Llaucan in the province of Chota. From its award to the College of San Juan of Chota, this hacienda had been administered directly by the establishment. Lately, with the aim of increasing the rents, the renting of the estate was auctioned off to the highest bidder. This system continued until 1915, when, as a result of having increasing the amount of the annual rent from 6,800 soles to 16,500 soles, a fact which was prejudicial to the peasant tenants, there was an uprising of these tenants who were of native origin, who were incited by people who were against these new arrangements.
As a result of this tragic event which has been called 'the massacre of Llaucán' where more than 150 natives, including women, children and old people were killed or wounded by the troops, which were led by the Prefect of Cajamarca, Colonel Belisario Ravines. The troops had come along in view of the fact that the community of the estate had refused to give possession calmly to the new tenant of the estate, Eledoro Benel. The sale was suspended immediately by a supreme resolution which ordered the administration of Llaucán to be undertaken by an employee nominated by the Government.

The renter of Llaucán:
Eledoro Benel Zuloeta
(Taken from E J Hobsbawm : Bandits, 1972:93-95)

"A good example of such a situation was that of the Department of Cajamarca in Peru in the early twentieth century which produced a number of 'opposition' bandits, notably Eledoro Benel Zuloeta, against whom some rather elaborate military campaigns were mounted in the middle of the 1920's. In 1914 Benel, a landowner, had leased the hacienda Llaucán making himself rather unpopular with the local Indian peasantry whose discontent was mobilized against him by the brothers Ramos, who already held the sublease of the estate. Benel appealed to the authorities, who massacred the Indians in the usual manner of the times, thus confirming those left in their hostility. The Ramos then felt in a position to finish off Benel, but only managed to kill his son. 'Unfortunately justice failed to act and the crime remained unpunished', as the historian tactfully puts it, adding that the assassins happened to enjoy the support of some other personal enemies of Benel, eg.
Alvarado of Santa Cruz. Thereupon Benel realized his assets to finance a formidable legion of his dependents (trabajadores), determined to give their lives in the service of their chief, and moved against Alvarado and the Ramos. This time justice did act, but Benel had fortified his own hacienda and defied it. This naturally helped him to win further sympathizers whom he supplied with all the necessities of life.

He was merely the most formidable of a large number of band-leaders who emerged with the virtual breakdown of Government authority, in a complex combination of political and personal rivalries, vengeance, political and economic ambition and social rebellion. As the military historian of the campaign put it:

The peasantry of these settlements was humble and sluggish, incapable of standing up against the little local tyrants. However, to feel alive is to feel rage against injustice. Hence persons of local power and authorities who lacked the intellectual preparation for their difficult duties, managed to unite a now emboldened and determined people against them.... The history of all peoples shows that in such situations armed bands are formed. In Chota, they went with Benel, in Cutervo with the Vásquez and others. These men exercised their kind of injustice, punishing those who usurped other men's land, formalizing marriages, pursuing criminals and imposing order on the local lords.
At the time of elections Congressional Deputies made use of these fighters, supplying them with arms and instructing them to take action against their political adversaries. The armed hosts grew stronger and banditry reached the point at which it caused panic amongst the peaceful citizenry.

Benel flourished until in 1923 he made the mistake of allying with some local potentates who planned to overthrow the formidable President Leguía, after which substantial forces were brought into the field and the Cajamarca situation was cleared up, not without considerable efforts. He was finally killed in 1927. The Rosos and Alvarado also disappeared from the scene, together with various other band-leaders."

The Colegio San Juan of Chota:

The college was founded by law in 1851, and shortly afterwards the public documents were accredited to the college as proprietor of Llaucán. During the war with Chile, the college closed and the rents of 1881-22 went to General Montero. Between 1883-86 free education was provided during the period in which Llaucán was administered by the Departmental Committee of Cajamarca. Between 1886-88 it was closed. In 1887 the deputies of Chota presented a petition soliciting the devolution of Llaucán to the college, which the Department's Treasury was then administering.

Between 1940-45, the CELSA (Compañía Explootadora Mina San Augustín) based in Hualgayoc, set up a small hydroelectric plant in Hualgayoc. Damages of S/30,000 and a gift of S/4,129
were paid in compensation.

In 1926 President Leguía drew up a project for the division and sale of the land of Lleucán to its peasant occupants. The college protested, so the operation was suspended. In 1946, this was proposed again but the people of Chota went to the Chamber of Deputies and the Plaza de Armas in Lima to protest. In 1952 a supreme decree was issued which would enable the land to be sold to the peasant tenants. The aim of this sale was to provide funds for the construction of new buildings for the college in Chota. It was finally sold in lots to the peasants between 1962-63.

Sources:
Gamarra Hernández (1919) and
GUE San Juan de Chota (1961).
The Directors should consider and study my proposal for the acquisition of an estate in the highlands which belongs to Mr. César Miranda, the present senator for Cajamarca. This estate has about a thousand colonos and tenants. Cayaltí would have sufficient people for its own contract, who would be controlled during their stays in the highlands, in the same way as if they were in Cayaltí. Moreover, it would be possible to buy cattle every Sunday in the Bambamarca market, in order to fatten them in Chala to send them to Cayaltí, which would be most beneficial to the slaughterhouse. Chala also has extensive lands where grains would be sown for the staples warehouse in Cayaltí. There are also extensions of woods, the exploitation of which would be an added advantage. I have not yet mentioned the minerals which can be had, starting with the known coal deposits, which would be a further advantage to a business of this nature in the highlands.

Letter from Ismael Aspillaga Anderson to Office in Lima, 1942

Source:
Huertas Vallejos, 1974: 148
### APTENDIX 3: 1976 Demographic Summary:

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**Total Provinces of Cajamarca and Cajabamba:**

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Source: Private communication C. D. Deere.
So we said, "What shall we do? What shall we do if we don't know how to go about it, if we don't have any education or guidance?"

So we were told about some fellows who acted as lawyers. They were sharp types, and they'd won several legal cases. So we told them, "This is what we want to do with the schools."

And they said, "Delighted" thinking there would be money in it for them. "But," they said, "there'll be problems, that can't just be swept away with a broomstick. There'll be a fight until the last hour of our lives against the landlords. And if you are prepared to suffer hunger and imprisonment, and even lose your lives, then we can make a deal."

So we made a deal.

So six of us went to each sector of Chala collecting signatures, knocking on all the doors for two days by night.

There were 1,500 school children; four, five or six in each house, and we put them all down for the school because none of them had had any education. And our "lawyers" said, "Bring us the signatures, but if Zárate catches you and beats you, just let him do it. You mustn't do anything to him, not even throw a stone, or he'll take us to court for assault. You let him hit you, and if he kills you, then it doesn't matter, because we're here to see justice done."

The next day at about 10 in the morning don Lucho (Zárate) came up to the street corner where I was sitting. He grabbed hold of me by the neck and kicked me in the nose. I was bathed in blood, but I let him hit me.

"'hat's this I hear that you've been collecting signatures in Chungos?" he said to me.
"Not just in Chungos, Ingeniero," I said, "all over the hacienda."
"And why are you doing this?"
"For the school," I said.
"You swine, you swine!" he shouted, "So you want a school?"

He punched me and kicked me, and that's all I remember. It lasted a fair time. As in a dream, I remember everyone gathering around to look. So don Lucho Zárate waited, and then grabbed my arm to take me away.

I said to him,
"You have no authority to take me to prison. What more do you want to do with me? You've already beaten me, What more do you want?"

I was completely covered in blood.

So he ran off to fetch a policeman to take me away. So I went into hiding, the petitions were ready to take to Lima.

Four of us went to Lima. We left at three in the morning. Don Lucho Zárate had gone to the Labour Judge in Cajamarca thinking that we were going to present our petition to the Labour Judge in Cajamarca. There used to be a Labour Judge in Cajamarca, but we had him thrown out by denouncing him in Lima.

So we went on to Lima and Zárate waited fifteen days for us in Cajamarca! We spent a month in Lima, and we presented the petitions to the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Education. We took 600 signatures to each Ministry.

We made all the people sign, eight signatures each. It was terrible - it took so long! I don't know how God .......... nevertheless, in the Bible it says God chooses the useless to contradict the wise men.
APPENDIX 5: Peasant Account of the Incursion of a Picket of the Civil Guard into Chala.

The police had come to take him (don Felix) away; but they were given a beating they'll never forget; their chief was very high up. The police came to look at the door of don Felix's house and it was locked. They tried to force it, and also they let off various shots which made holes in the door. He answered with several shots from the inside. So they forced the door, and levered it out, and then they started to take him away in his underpants.

First, about forty or fifty men got together, and then A., who was the women's leader, called together about thirty women. In the meantime the police and don Felix had passed the river, and were in a narrow pass below.

We said, "Carajo! We won't let them get away with him!" And there wasn't even anywhere to escape to.

So the women said, "Who are you, and where are you going with don Felix?"

And when they didn't reply, the women shouted, "Get them by their necks and beat them!"

Bam, bam, bam, sticks rained down on them and the chief's arms were injured. But where had the rest of them disappeared to? They'd escaped, and they'd run so fast you could hardly see them. And the people were looking for them everywhere; they pulled some of them out of the bushes down by the river, and one of these was their chief, whom we surrounded with cactuses. He couldn't get up, but he was still alive and kicking.

The handcuffs they'd put on don Felix were iron chains, so we got hold of a saw and cut them. So don Felix had a bracelet on each wrist.
Then we called all the people together and said that there were still three cops on the loose. So everyone ran back again with the women at the front, and brought one of them back with sticks. His head was covered in mud, so he must have fallen in the marsh-land. There had been five of them altogether, so there must have been one left. And this unfortunate fellow was up on the cliffs for two days. He was scared stiff because he knew that if he poked his nose out they'd make firewood of him."

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjudicación</td>
<td>The legal process of passing the land to the ownership of the peasants.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amarillo</td>
<td>A peasant who did not join the struggle against the landlord.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulante</td>
<td>A street-seller.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrendador</td>
<td>A peasant tenant paying rent primarily in cash.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casa comunal</td>
<td>The communal house.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casa hacienda</td>
<td>The hacienda (landlord's) house.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comadre</td>
<td>Co-godparent, a ritual relationship between two women, when one is the godparent of the other's child.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conjunto</td>
<td>Group.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperativa de consumo</td>
<td>Consumers' cooperative.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Curaca</td>
<td>The chief of the Inca village unit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Choza</td>
<td>Hut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaración jurada</td>
<td>Sworn declaration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desorganizado</td>
<td>A person who did not join one of the peasant groups organized after the land reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empleado</td>
<td>The manager of the hacienda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enfeudamiento</td>
<td>The method by which peasant tenants were given small plots of land on a large estate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estancia</td>
<td>Peasant smallholding zone, formerly a hacienda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiesta</td>
<td>A festival, often in honour of a patron saint.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gente rebelde</td>
<td>The peasants who opposed the formation of peasant groups after the land reform.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grupo campesino</td>
<td>The compromise organization set up amongst the peasants when plans for a cooperative failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacienda</td>
<td>A large estate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hacendado</td>
<td>The owner of a large estate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ingeniero</td>
<td>A title denoting someone who has technical qualifications, for example, in agronomy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jalca</td>
<td>High moorland above 3,000 metres in altitude.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liga agraria</td>
<td>Agrarian league, a cooperative organization into which the peasants were organized by government bodies after the land reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minga</td>
<td>A traditional exchange labour relationship between kinsfolk.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minifundio</td>
<td>A small rural property.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minifundista</td>
<td>The person who owns and works a small rural property.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mitayo</td>
<td>A shepherd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mitimaes</td>
<td>Settlements of colonizer populations sent by the Incas to subdue unruly provinces of their empire.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moroso</td>
<td>A defaulter on the agrarian debt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nucleo de militancia</td>
<td>A cell of militants, groups which were set up to support the policies of the military regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partidario</td>
<td>A share-cropper.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrón</td>
<td>The boss.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peon</td>
<td>A peasant paying rent in the form of labour services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pichicato</td>
<td>Illegal cocaine refining.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policía de Investigación</td>
<td>(P.I.P.) The Peruvian equivalent to the C.I.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotor</td>
<td>A government official involved in promoting the agrarian leagues and the cells of militants.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pueblo joven</td>
<td>A &quot;young town&quot;, a euphemism for a shanty town.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puntero</td>
<td>A cattlehand.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quichua</td>
<td>The temperate lands between 2,500 and 3,000 metres in altitude.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sindicato</td>
<td>The peasant union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temple</td>
<td>The semi-tropical lands between 2,000 and 2,500 metres in altitude.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tierras libres</td>
<td>The &quot;free&quot; lands, which had been the landlord's desmesne lands prior to the land reform.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tinterillo</td>
<td>A &quot;quack&quot; lawyer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toma de posesión</td>
<td>The ceremony at which the lands legally passed to the peasants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanacona</td>
<td>A share-cropper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunsha</td>
<td>A symbolic tree used in the festivities at Shrovetide.</td>
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