‘CROSSING BORDERS’:
CULTURAL-GEO-POLITICS OF
RAPPROCHEMENT TOURISM BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN

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‘CROSSING BORDERS’:
CULTURAL-GEO-POLITICS OF RAPPROCHEMENT TOURISM BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN

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THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan in the era of warming cross-strait relations. By moving away from state-centric approaches to the study of cross-strait tourism, it interrogates themes surrounding the concepts of ‘border’, ‘identity’ and ‘materiality’, in an attempt to offer a more nuanced understanding of the everyday micro-politics at play. More specifically, the thesis considers different taming strategies engaged by the authorities on both sides in dealing with sensitive histories and difficult heritages, and how their practices are materialised in the tourism landscape. In doing so, this study probes the often assumed processes of rapprochement that result from and animate the cross-border exchanges by providing powerful examples of how tourists respond to attempts to manipulate their opinions, how they interpret ideologically loaded materials on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but also of the genuine curiosity and good will that can result. This showcases the everyday experiences of tourists and the various bordering practices they enact and encounter during their travel. Discussions on tourists’ subjectivities show that far from being passive ‘numbers’ or ‘flows’ as often assumed by economic-centric studies, cross-strait tourists are actively shaping the rapprochement landscape. Furthermore, inquiries into the material cultures of memory and identity provide novel insights that go well beyond the state-led ‘peace through tourism’ initiatives to look at how commercial culture is shaping and responding to memories and cross-strait movements. Empirical findings are able to unpack how the border is experienced through a range of artefacts – from border controls to travel documents and cross-border purchases that extend
beyond the literal border. Additionally, this research also broadens the sensorium by looking beyond ‘sight’ seeing to incorporate the olfactory, tactile, auditory and gustatory senses in discussing knives made from artillery shells, music events in a defunct military tunnel, and foods offered by local entrepreneurs. Finally, in acknowledging that tourists are not the only subjects of tourism, the thesis examines the roles played by ghosts and deities in their participation of cross-strait rapprochement tourism. In doing this, it demonstrates that rapprochement tourism is more about ‘interactions along the side’ rather than state-level diplomatic exchanges. Forays into consumption practices, identity construction (both national and self), and border (un)making could prove to be significant in the advent of unprecedented tourist exchanges between China and Taiwan.

**Keywords:** rapprochement tourism, cultural-geo-politics, difficult heritage, border, identity, materiality, bordering practices, sensuous materialism, China, Taiwan
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Names of all locations mentioned in this thesis are romanised according to the Hanyu Pinyin system. However, I choose to use ‘Kinmen’ instead of its Hanyu Pinyin equivalent, ‘Jinmen’, as the former is the official name used in Taiwan. Where people’s names are concerned, I follow the respective system of Romanisation used in their place of origin (i.e. Pinyin Romanisation for the Chinese and the Wade-Giles Romanisation for the Taiwanese).
Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and effort and where other sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged. No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other learning institutes.
Statement of Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
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J.J. ZHANG, March 2013
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Prologue

It was 9 August 2009. I had arrived in Taipei for the Pacific Asia Student Seminar (PASS) organised by the National Taiwan University (NTU). The PASS was an eight-day international forum where undergraduates and postgraduate students came together to discuss the “history, development, present situation and the future progress and prosperity” of the Pacific Asian region (Pacific Asia Student Seminar, 2009). Upon arrival at the registration, I became aware that participants from China were requested to surrender their Taiwan Travel Permits to the organisers.¹ It was not long before I overheard some dissent amongst the Chinese students as apparently they were the only ones that had their personal documents detained by the organisers. Other delegates from countries like Singapore (where I am from), Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States, and even Hong Kong² were not required to do so. Being a holder of a Singapore passport whose access to and mobility within other countries are pretty much straightforward, I was rather

¹ As China and Taiwan refuse to recognise each other’s passports, visitors from either side need to apply for a travel visa. Taiwanese visitors to China are issued the Taiwan Compatriot Permit, while their counterparts are given the Taiwan Travel Permit. The apparent reason for detaining the Chinese students’ travel permits was to restrict the students’ movement in Taipei.
² Citizens of Hong Kong are not required to apply for the Taiwan Travel Permit to enter Taiwan.
bewildered by the hierarchy of passports/travel documents at play. A rather awkward start to the seminar it was.

A few days into the programme, we were brought on a fieldtrip to Kaohsiung, a port city in southern Taiwan. As our coach approached the outskirts of Greater Kaohsiung, we were met with flooded fields and damaged electrical poles on either side of the road. The city was still recovering from the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot that had caused hundreds of deaths just one week ago. As if to rub salt into the wound, Chinese tourists were reported to be boycotting visits to Kaohsiung, and thousands of hotel reservations were cancelled after the Chinese government claimed that the city was helping to promote Tibetan and Xinjiang independence movements. This boycott alone was estimated to cause six million Taiwan dollars in lost revenue (Agence France-Presse, 17 September 2009). Apparently, The Dalai Lama was invited by Kaohsiung’s mayor, Chen Chu, and other officials from the pro-independence Democratic Progression Party to offer comfort to the victims of Typhoon Morakot. Furthermore, the Kaohsiung Film Festival was also due to screen a film featuring exiled Uighur leader and activist Rebiya Kadeer, whom Chinese authorities had blamed for causing ethnic unrest in Xinjiang in July that year. Although the Dalai Lama had stressed that his visit was non-political, and the Film Festival organisers had made a statement that the controversial film was selected purely for artistic reasons, Beijing still deemed these activities as “creat[ing] trouble and hurt[ing] China’s core interests” (Taipei Times, 17 October 2009). Commenting on the Chinese tourists’ decision to cancel their tour packages to Kaohsiung, Fang Liqing, spokeswoman of the Taiwan Affairs Office, explained that the Dalai Lama and Rebiya
Kadeer incidents had “hurt the Chinese people’s feelings and it [was] only natural for them to show their dissatisfaction...” (ibid). Unconvinced that the boycott was self-imposed by the Chinese tourists, Taiwan’s Premier Wu Den-yih remarked during a legislature meeting that the Chinese authorities should respect the rights of its people to choose where they want to travel to, adding that it was “inappropriate for the [Chinese] government to interfere [with] tour group itineraries” (ibid). The aftermath of Typhoon Morakot, the supposedly ‘non-political’ visit by the Dalai Lama, and the controversial Uighur activist film filled every available time slot on the evening TV news and occupied every inch of front-page news in Taipei, and had become the topic of interest amongst the PASS participants throughout the duration of the seminar. With these topics still being ardently debated in the media, the Chinese participants at the PASS informed the organisers that they would not join the ‘Civil Society’ session³ where members of the Taiwan Friends of Tibet, a Taiwanese non-profit organisation, were scheduled to present their views on contemporary conflicts between China and Tibet. One of the Chinese students revealed to me that it was ‘inappropriate’ and ‘not convenient’ for them to attend talks that the Chinese government deem controversial. The students were not sure if anyone was ‘monitoring’ them and whether they would get themselves into ‘trouble’ if they stayed in the seminar room. Was this a performance of their national identity or an act in retaliation to the detainment of their personal travel documents? I wondered.

³ Other discussion sub-fields included history, politics, economics, human rights, and culture.
This short and fragmented recollection of my time at the PASS demonstrates the intermingling of macro-political events with micro-political practices. The inconsistent manner in which they weave my memories and appear in the narration goes to show the difficulty in separating the ‘macro’ from the ‘micro’ and vice versa. In retrospect, the (re)actions I encountered and observed during the PASS constituted borders-in-practice at the personal level in the everyday geo-politics of cross-strait relations. Studying this particular context is important because research on China-Taiwan relations has often focused on macro-political issues. Rather than state-level politics, this thesis places emphasis on micro-episodes where things like travel documents became a site of bordering and where political borders became personal boundaries. Yet, such personal practices of bordering are never totally detached from macro-political events, and the often assumed “distant considerations of statecraft and international diplomacy” (Newman, 2011: 37) are very much part of the everyday. For the Chinese tourists who boycotted Kaohsiung and the seminar participants who decided to be absent from the ‘Civil Society’ presentation, Kaohsiung became not just a site of politicking between Beijing and Taipei, but also a metaphoric arena for the Chinese citizens to express their national identity and patriotism (or perhaps also fear) towards the Chinese authority. Yet, contrary to the visual presence sought by many political actors, the performance of identity in both cases was enacted via the politics of absence. Several questions emerged when considering these bordering practices: How do authorities on both sides frame cross-strait tourists’ social identities? How do Chinese tourists perceive their roles when visiting Taiwan and how are these identities performed? In which ways are the Taiwanese tourists visiting China involved in the everyday politics of
cross-strait relations? This thesis will provide insights into what I call the cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. I will now discuss the key research objectives.

1.2 Key Research Objectives

In formulating the key research objectives of this thesis, I have three main concerns in mind: 1) Current research on post-conflict tourism often takes the ‘peace through tourism’ concept for granted. Tourism is treated as a panacea rather than a process needing critical analyses. 2) Scholars of cross-border tourism tend to focus on macro-political and/or economic perspectives, rather than elicit the more nuanced aspects of everyday cultural-geo-politics. 3) Writings on China-Taiwan tourism are primarily based on fieldwork carried out in only one side of the Strait. A more comprehensive view from both sides is lacking. By taking these concerns into consideration, this thesis aims to fulfil both conceptual and empirical objectives. Firstly, curiosity about Chinese tourists’ behaviour and the role they play in cross-strait relations led me to rethink the taken-for-granted concept of ‘peace through tourism’, often encountered in both tourism and border studies. Scholars have questioned this presumed relationship between tourism and peace and have instead offered a critical approach to the study of cross-border rapprochement between former enemies (see for example, Lisle, 2007; Hazbun, 2009) (section 2.1.3). Indeed, I have decided to refer to ‘rapprochement tourism’ rather than the more common ‘reconciliation tourism’ (see for example, Guo and Kim et al., 2006) precisely to avoid
the baggage of simplicity that the latter term tends to carry. ‘Rapprochement tourism’ hints at a more open-ended and nuanced scenario. It allows us to situate the cross-strait relations as something that is still evolving, and to problematise the rapprochement processes rather than seek a solution to a ‘cross-strait problem’ to achieve a ‘happy-ending’. Moving forwards therefore, I am interested in a more critical exploration of the various strategies engaged by both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments in dealing with sensitive histories and difficult heritages, and how these practices are being reflected on the tourism landscape. Research questions include: Which aspects of culture or history have been (de)emphasised by cultural institutions in both China and Taiwan in their management of the rapprochement tourism landscape? How are contesting narrations of common historical events or personnel that are deemed to be too “sensitive” managed in the midst of the post-war rapprochement discourse? In what ways are the ideologies of the state(s) transmitted? Is there a difference between intended messages for citizens and tourists from the “other side”?

In the current climate of ‘peace and co-prosperity’, China and Taiwan see tourism as spearheading a cordial relationship in the name of ‘economics before politics’. Tourist numbers are treated as a form of ‘peace-o-meter’ – it is assumed that with more tourists from ‘the other side’, more peaceful cross-strait relation will follow. Overwhelmed by tourist arrival statistics and trends, both governments fail to recognise the individual as an active participant in the rapprochement process. Moreover, studies on cross-strait relations have often been dominated by a macro-political perspective. In other words, scholars prefer to focus on State-level politics
rather than shed light on the less obvious but equally important everyday politics experienced by individuals. Therefore, there is a need to gain a more nuanced understanding of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan; a need to think beyond border as being a barrier to cooperation, and consider the cultural-geo-politics behind (de-)bordering practices at the personal level. Evidently, politics could never be eradicated from seemingly banal activities, and local realities challenge the global framework of ‘peace through tourism’. As is evident in my account of the PASS seminar, the border does not stop at the limits of the sovereign state; it overflows and extends beyond political boundaries to affect personal experiences as well (Paasi, 2005). Hence, as van Houtum (2011) argues, a border is a verb (see also van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002); we should study the border by attending to happenings on the ground, to ask the question of ‘who does the bordering?’ and to call for a study of borders from ‘the bottom up’, “with a focus on the individual border narratives and experiences” (Newman, 2006a: 143). This leads to my second objective: to investigate the everyday experiences of tourists and the various bordering practices they enact and encounter during their travel to/on the ‘other side’. What are the effects of the changing tourism landscapes on people’s attitudes, behaviour and perceptions of cross-strait ties? How do they negotiate their identities at border crossings and at the various attractions? I will investigate how their behaviour and actions are both affected by and in turn, affect the configurations of cross-strait relations.

Thirdly, to further explore the different forms of border and bordering practices in rapprochement tourism, I address how non-human things such as travel documents
can also form sites of bordering. This project will ask what roles such documents perform in the rapprochement process. Furthermore, in view of the close cultural proximity yet uneasy past between people on both sides, I will investigate how a common belief in the existence of ghosts and deities provides us with a new dimension in analysing cross-strait relations. It was not too long ago that a Wall Street Journal article reported on how anti-communists gods/deities in Taiwan are beginning to ‘express’ goodwill towards China in the midst of warming cross-strait ties and tourism exchanges (*The Wall Street Journal*, 21 April 2008) (see Chapter Six). It is by taking into consideration such non-human things and beings, which are so intimate to cross-strait tourists’ travelling experiences that new forays into exploring cross-border rapprochement tourism through non-state actors can be achieved.

The key research objectives of the thesis may therefore be summarised as follows:

1) To explore the different strategies engaged by the authorities on both sides in dealing with sensitive histories and difficult heritages, and how their practices are materialised in the tourism landscape.

2) To interrogate the everyday experiences of tourists and the various bordering practices they enact and encounter during their travel to/on the ‘other side’.

3) To examine the roles played by non-human things and beings in their participation of cross-strait rapprochement tourism.
In achieving these objectives, the thesis aims to provide an empirical contribution to research on tourism development as a means of post-war rapprochement. This genre of research has hitherto focused on the more ‘established wars’ like the Great War (Lloyd, 1998; Seaton, 2000), World War II (Gordon, 1998; Muzaini, 2004), Korean War (Timothy et al., 2004; Lee, 2006) and Vietnam War (Henderson, 2000; Agrusa et al., 2006). Tourism case studies related to ‘less significant wars’, like the China-Taiwan conflict, are seldom heard of if at all. In this study, both Chinese and Taiwanese tourism landscapes are situated in a contemporary geopolitical context and in relation to the enduring and unresolved conflict between China and Taiwan, suggesting the importance of analysing rapprochement and bordering practices. Furthermore, one of my main contributions to cross-border tourism research between China and Taiwan lies on my accessibility to both sides of the Taiwan Strait. My primary claim here is that contrary to what most titles suggest, writings on cross-border tourism more often than not focus on just one side of the border. For instance, a paper on ‘Cross-strait tourism between China and Taiwan’ may actually be discussing Chinese tourists’ experiences in Taiwan, but not the other way round. Taiwanese and Chinese researchers I spoke to lamented about the difficulty of conducting fieldwork on the ‘other side’. Their political identities often draw scepticisms from authorities across the Strait and as such, applying for a research permit is a challenging task to say the least. As a Singaporean, I was able to travel relatively easily between China and Taiwan during the course of my fieldwork. Furthermore, with relatives residing in both sides of the Strait, I had even more ‘excuses’ to be commuting frequently between the two states.4 This research is a

4 For a more detailed discussion of my positionality, see Chapter Three.
result of fieldwork conducted in China and Taiwan. Therefore, this thesis marks a new and important foray into discussing rapprochement tourism from both the Chinese and Taiwanese perspectives.

In short, by positioning itself in the wider literature of cross-border rapprochement tourism, my thesis focuses on the cultural-geo-politics of tourism exchanges between former enemies. It looks at how stories of the past are being (re)narrated by cultural institutions, and how new stories are created at the personal level across time and space. Furthermore, it seeks to go beyond State-level diplomatic exchanges and engage with a more grounded cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism that takes into account everyday happenings, experiences of tourists and locals, and also the roles played by non-human things and beings. Before I proceed further, it is helpful at this juncture to provide a brief background to China-Taiwan relations, and thus the context for present-day rapprochement tourism.

1.3 Setting the Stage: Rapprochement Tourism in Context

Taiwan was acquired by Japan from the Qing Empire in 1895. After the end of World War II, the island was returned to the Republic of China (ROC). In 1949, the ROC’s nationalist party (Kuomintang – KMT) lost the Chinese Civil War to the Chinese Communist Party and retreated to Taiwan. After the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese Communist Party took control of mainland China while the Kuomintang’s jurisdiction was restricted to Taiwan, Kinmen and several other outlying islands. Figure 1.1
shows the location of places mentioned in the thesis. Kinmen, being physically nearer to mainland China became a military stronghold for the KMT (see Chapter 7). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) that was formed on mainland China since 1949 has always regarded Taiwan as part of its territory. The ROC on Taiwan, however, sees itself as an independent country. This led to hostile relations between the two republics, with the PRC threatening to use military force if necessary.

Figure 1.1 Map showing China and Taiwan, and location of places mentioned in the thesis
There was to be no tourism development between the two states for almost 40
years. Although China has allowed Taiwanese residents to visit the mainland since
1978, the Taiwanese government only lifted the ban for its people to travel to
mainland China via a third country (usually Hong Kong) in 1987. Chinese tourists
were still not allowed to visit Taiwan then. However, cross-strait relations have
changed for the better in recent years as leaders from both sides endeavour to ‘put
politics aside’ and concentrate on economic collaborations. Increased tourism
exchange is a result of such an initiative.

4 July 2008 marks a historic moment in cross-strait relations between China and
Taiwan. For the first time in almost six decades, mainland Chinese tourists were
permitted to visit Taiwan as part of an organised tour via direct charter flights.5
Evidently, such a development goes in tandem with Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-
jeou’s doctrine of “Economic Cooperation Before Politics”. The landslide victory of
Taiwan’s KMT in the parliamentary election followed by Ma Ying-jeou winning the
presidential election earlier on in that year, paved the way for improvement of cross-
strait ties, which were dampened significantly by the anti-China stance adopted by
the previous administration under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Conversely, as President Hu Jintao subtly changed the Chinese take on the Taiwan
issue from the political rhetoric of ‘peaceful reunification’ to an economic rationality
of ‘peace and development’, China has begun to engage Taiwan beyond

5 Under the agreement signed by the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits based in
China, and the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation, there is now no need for tourists from
both sides to travel to a third country before landing. Previously, tourists from China and Taiwan have
to travel via a third territory, for example, Hong Kong, before touching down at Taiwan and China,
respectively.
conventional political platforms. In pursuing the ‘peace through tourism’ agenda, Head of China's Tourism Administration, Shao Qi Wei, lauded the normalisation of travel between the two politically divided territories, hailing the launch of regular commercial flights and the beginning of mass tourism from China as akin to building “a bridge of friendship” (*Morning Star Online*, 4 July 2008).

The opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists is indeed as much an economic decision as it is a political manoeuvre. Such a gesture of political goodwill was reciprocated and extended further when in September 2008, Wang Yi, director of Beijing’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, announced, amongst a slew of incentives to boost tourism exchanges, that on top of weekend direct flights, residents from thirteen provinces and cities in China will be allowed to travel daily to and from Taiwan via the Taiwan-held islands of Kinmen, Ma-tsu and Peng-hu (*Central News Agency*, 8 September 2008). These reciprocal rapprochement initiatives saw an influx of cross-strait tourists travelling across the Taiwan Strait, with the increase of mainland Chinese tourists especially significant. In 2010, 1.6 million Chinese tourists visited Taiwan, overtaking the Japanese as the largest tourists group in Taiwan (*BBC News*, 6 October 2011). Such an unprecedented increase in tourist traffic across the Taiwan Strait under the current rapprochement climate has brought about significant changes to the tourism landscapes in both China and Taiwan. It is in such a political context that my discussion on rapprochement tourism is situated.
1.4 Thesis Organisation and Synopsis

This thesis is organised into eight chapters. In this introductory chapter, I have provided a brief introduction of contemporary cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan, and placed rapprochement tourism in context. The main concerns with current research on post-conflict rapprochement in general and cross-strait tourism between China and Taiwan in particular were raised before key research objectives were outlined.

The first part of Chapter Two provides a literature review of studies on tourism across borders of conflict. Academic writings on tourism exchanges between China and Taiwan are also reviewed. In doing so, I access the trends and limitations of current research and propose a conceptual framework that focusses on a more critical cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism. Key concepts such as ‘border’, ‘identity’ and ‘materiality’, which form the cornerstones of a cultural-geo-political approach, are also introduced. This chapter thus serves to situate the thesis in the ‘sea’ of rapprochement tourism research while at the same time highlight the gaps in existing literature, and the contributions of the thesis. More specifically, the review reflects on the condition of existing research on post-conflict tourism exchanges. There exists a group of writers of rapprochement tourism that espouse the ‘peace through tourism’ agenda. I argue that these writings are over-optimistic as they take for granted that peace will eventually be achieved through tourism without putting emphasis on tourism as a cultural-geo-political process in itself. Furthermore, in many writings, tourists are reduced to passive numbers rather than active
participants in the tourism process. This thesis makes important contributions to the investigation on the form and nature of tourist encounters and how these are affected by and affecting cross-strait relations. Therefore, instead of a universal ‘tourist’ as often assumed by statisticians, we look at tourist subjectivities. The chapter goes on to provide an overview of literature pertaining to heritage taming, which forms a unique component of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. Other than showing that there are ideological imperatives behind the promotion of rapprochement tourism that go beyond the economic rationale, it also presents the argument that rather than a singular hegemonic representation of heritage, there are alternative and plural interpretations that are created by tourists. Discussion also shows that researchers of cross-strait tourism between China and Taiwan often choose to focus mainly on the economic, logistical or management aspects of tourism exchanges without acknowledging that tourism is a social-cultural phenomenon. Other than adopting an economic-centric perspective, these studies tend to emphasise state-level transactions. Even when everyday personal decisions are considered, they are analysed independently from macro-political happenings. Based on first-hand empirical research, carried out over the course of one year, this thesis will argue that macro- and micro politics are more intertwined, and it is beneficial to acknowledge a dialectical relationship between them.

Following the review on rapprochement tourism, the second part of Chapter Two goes on to introduce the cultural-geo-political approach. I turn to ‘border’, ‘identity’ and ‘materiality’ as conceptual tools. These concepts are in turn reviewed within contemporary scholarships before I look at how they fit into the cultural-geo-political
approach in analysing rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. Firstly, I
draw on recent attempts by border scholars to reconceptualise the concept of
‘border’. In short, instead of focusing on the ‘where’ and ‘what’ of borders, the thesis
emphasises on the ‘how’ – How are borders performed through tourism? Also, other
than seeing ‘border’ as a noun, I explore ways in which it can be treated as a verb in
order to go beyond the fixity and physicality that existing research on border still
very much assume. The review goes on to engage with the concepts of identity and
liminality. ‘Identity’ as taken up in this research, is contingent – it is not a fixed entity,
but something that is both fluid and mobile. My claim here is that during a liminal
time-space of cross-strait travel, tourists possess multiple identities and perform
these identities depending on where they are and who they are with.

Finally, discussion on materiality reveals that tourists are not the only subjects of
rapprochement tourism as other things come into the picture when we delve into
the world of material culture. Therefore, we need to analyse how touristic things
participate in tourism exchanges apart from looking at tourist flows and patterns.
Alongside this discussion, the chapter also brings in research on spectro-geography
to gain a better understanding of the immaterialities of rapprochement tourism.
Exploring the realms of the untamed other worldly unsettles the rationality assumed
by the ‘peace through tourism framework, and provides an avenue through which to
engage with non-visual-centric analyses.

I then go on to discuss methodological concerns in Chapter Three. I outline the
various research methods utilised, and also reflect on the limitations of the research
as well as my own positionality in relation to the fieldwork process. As one of my main contributions to research on rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan is the foray into eliciting tourists’ experiences on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as oppose to conventional one-sided accounts, this chapter serves to illustrate how I go about doing cross-border rapprochement tourism research. Additionally, I also put across the point that fieldwork is a social process and that being reflexive is part and parcel of research methodology.

Chapters Four to Seven present the empirical findings of this study with regard to the myriad facets of rapprochement tourism. These empirical chapters look at four different ways of interpreting rapprochement tourism that a cultural-geo-political approach can offer. Chapter Four discusses the various strategies and practices adopted by both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments in their efforts to manage and tame sensitive histories and heritages, and how tourism landscapes on both sides are being altered in the process. This discussion is important because both Chinese and Taiwanese tourists are brought up and educated under completely different political systems. The findings show that there is no one Heritage or History ‘out there’, but multiple heritages and histories. The Chinese government strives to emphasise cultural similarities between the Chinese and Taiwanese people and to create a ‘One China’ national identity. Conversely, the Taiwanese authority adopts a practical stance in adapting attractions to suit the Chinese tourists, while at the same time maintains a unique Taiwanese identity. But of course, as this thesis argues, tourists are not passive receivers of state messages, but are actively participating in the rapprochement process. To this end, I also discuss practices of rapprochement
performed by the tourists as they visit the various attractions. For instance, to MacCannell’s (2001) ‘second gaze’ and Bruner’s (2001) ‘questioning gaze’ (both recognise the agency of tourists in their interpretation of museum exhibits), I add the ‘diplomatic gaze’. This gaze refers specifically to cross-strait tourists who are on diplomatic trips, and while they may not agree with or have alternative interpretations of certain museum displays, they nevertheless choose to (re)act in a tactful manner. Examples of such ‘silent resistance’ to museum exhibits on the ‘other side’ provide important insights to the mentality of cross-strait tourists as they participate in rapprochement tourism. Through the various examples, we witness the ways in which borders are eradicated and sometimes re-drawn to conform to the rapprochement climate, and also the reactions and coping strategies of cross-strait tourists and local entrepreneurs as they encounter such rapprochement tourism spaces.

Based on travel narratives of both Chinese and Taiwanese tourists, Chapter Five continues the endeavour to elicit the cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan from a grounded approach. It seeks to examine cross-strait tourists’ ‘material moments’ on ‘the other side’ through the lens of ‘border’, ‘materiality’ and ‘identity’ in an attempt to move beyond the often state-centric analyses of cross-strait ties. Discussion shows that things that are close to the personal or those that are part and parcel of a touring experience are far from inert; they participate in the social and political lives of their owners, feature in bordering practices between the Chinese and the Taiwanese, and are often platforms through which identities are performed. These things include identification documents like
passports and travel permits, and popular cross-border purchases like counterfeit iPhones, tobacco and liquor. Importantly too, as the various travel narratives reveal, the ubiquitous border certainly does not exist only in its physical form, but are also enacted through travel documents and the bodily performances of tourists. Furthermore, imagined and perceived social borders are equally potent in (re)shaping cross-strait relations. A study that captures the often neglected field of comparative tourists’ travel experiences is timely in the advent of warming relationship between China and Taiwan and the unprecedented increase in tourism exchanges that ensues.

In line with the thesis’ aim to explore not just the material aspects but also the immaterialities of cross-strait relations, Chapter Six incorporates the ‘voices’ of the spectral in the enchanted world of rapprochement tourism. In this chapter on the other worldly, non-human beings – spirits, ghosts, and deities – are argued to be participating actively in the rapprochement process, rather than just a precipitate of memories. Their actions both haunt and are influenced by current practices in tourism exchanges between the two former enemies. A look at how the respective authorities deal with the subject matter shows that while the Chinese government has only just begun to incorporate traditional cult activities into its cross-strait strategies, the Taiwanese authority has a much more intimate affair with religious believes in ghosts and deities. Warming ties between China and Taiwan has seen local cult beliefs playing a significant part in rapprochement. The chapter looks at examples from China and Taiwan to gain insights on how spectral beings participate in the rapprochement process and how people from both sides interact with each
other through associated tourism activities. Discussion shows that from the once anti-communist deities and the spirits of dead soldiers in Taiwan to the Sea Goddess, Mazu, in Putian (China), an engagement with the spectral offers alternative communicative platforms for the people. As such, common belief in the Mazu cult has seen the creation of alternative communities based on religious identity. As this chapter shows, the Mazu pilgrimage tour is an embodied experience and a platform through which Chinese and Taiwanese devotees performed their identities. Studying the spectral is important because its existence is a shared belief amongst many ordinary people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and the activities instigated by this common cultural factor are producing many novel yet unexplored materials for the study of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. Moreover, because ghosts and deities exist in the realm of the unseen, they offer spaces of imagination for what cross-strait relations can be, rather than a fixed rationale adopted by ‘peace through tourism’ agendas.

The penultimate chapter utilises the former battlefield island of Kinmen, Taiwan as a platform to incorporate the various strands of discussion that runs through the preceding chapters. More specifically, this case study discusses the post-war material culture of Kinmen in the midst of rapprochement tourism and how the materiality of things of and from the battlefield past weave ruptured memories into present-day consciousness of locals and cross-strait tourists on the island. My main aim here is to destabilise the often perceived banality of the material world around us. Running parallel to this discussion is the endeavour to move beyond a visual-centric analysis of material culture and engage with other senses in order to garner a
more intimate reading of people’s relationship with things. As such, by experimenting with the concept of sensuous materialism, the chapter draws on souvenir knives made from artillery shells, a music performance staged in a former military tunnel, and food and beverages inspired by the Civil War to explore how through their materialities, these touristic things interact with the senses and shape people’s consciousness of cross-strait relations. The findings show that far from dead or non-living, these things are full of life and energy in their ability to engage in affective communication with cross-strait tourists, and animate the object-human relationship. Forays into the creation and consumption of touristic things and how their commemorative materialities interact with and shape people’s consciousness of past histories, present happenings and future dreams can help us gain a more nuanced understanding of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan.

I conclude with Chapter Eight by summing up the findings of the thesis. Instead of reiterating the conclusion of each chapter, I choose to tie the various debates together by looking individually at the key concepts of ‘border’, ‘identity’ and ‘materiality’ and see how each of them features throughout the empirical chapters. Next, I acknowledge that this thesis is not meant to be exhaustive about the cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism. Rather, it maps the contours of a number of novel research themes through which to study the subject matter. I then go on to identify some potential areas for future research, before making some concluding remarks by re-visiting the ‘peace through tourism’ agenda.
CHAPTER TWO

TOWARDS A ‘CULTURAL-GEO-POLITICS’ OF RAPPROCHEMENT TOURISM

2.1 Rapprochement Tourism: A Literature Review

The first part of this chapter provides a literature review on rapprochement tourism. It is not meant to be exhaustive. My rationale here is to look at what others have done, assess their contributions, highlight gaps in the literature, and establish the contours of my intervention in the field. The aim is also to come up with a ‘cultural-geo-politics’ approach that the rest of the thesis can draw upon when discussing the various nuances of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. The ensuing sub-section takes a closer look at the existing literature on tourism across (former) borders of conflict. This is followed by a brief discussion on ‘heritage taming’ as a quintessential component of rapprochement tourism management. I then draw attention to existing research on tourism between China and Taiwan. My main concerns with existing literature on rapprochement tourism are four-fold. First, studies on post-conflict tourism exchanges tend to see tourism as a solution for peace without problematising the practices of rapprochement that constitute the tourism process. In other words, more critical analyses need to be done to understand the processes through which the tourism landscapes on both sides are formed, and the various practices engaged by tourists and locals as they participate
in the rapprochement process. Secondly, scholars of rapprochement tourism often choose to focus on macro-political aspects, overlooking the nuances of micro-political events and their implications. Also, research on tourism exchanges between China and Taiwan is heavily biased towards economic and logistical analyses. Such writings assume the ‘universal tourist’ and are more interested in tourist numbers than unravelling the critical geo-politics of tourists’ subjectivities. Lastly, most accounts on cross-strait tourism are actually one-sided. There is an apparent lack of cross-cultural and comparative analysis that seeks to understand rapprochement tourism from *both* sides of the Taiwan Strait. In order to address these gaps, I turn to some recent studies pertaining to the critical geopolitics of rapprochement tourism to elicit some salient points. Ideas like ‘everyday geopolitics’, ‘management of post-conflict difficult heritage’, ‘heritage at the personal scale’, and ‘post-national community imaginaries’ are incorporated into the main themes of the thesis. Additionally, the second part of this chapter introduces the ‘cultural-geo-politics’ approach and discusses the key concepts of ‘border’, ‘identity’ and ‘materiality’. Other than accounting for the dearth of research pertaining to the specific areas I mentioned above, one important contribution of this thesis is the engagement with discussions that go beyond the tourist as the sole subject of tourism analysis. For instance, by exploring the material culture of rapprochement tourism, we begin to understand how touristic things participate in the socio-political lives of their owners by possessing identities themselves and by becoming sites of bordering. Also, the thesis presents a new foray into understanding the immaterialities of rapprochement tourism by interrogating the ghosts and deities that so actively participate in the tourism exchanges between the Chinese and Taiwanese people.
2.1.1 Tourism across borders of conflict

In this age of globalisation and ever increasing connectivity between countries, it is often claimed that political boundaries are losing their significance. Regional bodies such as the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) offer quintessential examples of how political borders are harnessed to foster greater inclusion rather than their traditional role in repelling external forces. However, some political entities remain separated, either internally or from other countries. Several reasons explain why borders of conflict are created. They include ethnic clashes (e.g. Greek and Turkish Cyprus), religious differences (e.g. India and Pakistan), and political rivalry (e.g. North and South Korea; China and Taiwan) (Butler and Mao, 1996: 25; Kim and Prideaux, 2003: 675). When it comes to a stage of rapprochement, tourism exchanges often become a stepping stone for re-establishing cordial relations.

The political uses of tourism in terms of international or public relations form a strand of scholarly inquiry into the politics of tourism (Richter, 1989, 1994; Mowlana and Smith, 1990; Hall, 1994; Craik, 1997; L’Etang et al., 2007). Citing examples from the opening up of China, Cuba, and Vietnam to western tourism, Richter (1989: 2) attests that “[t]ourist flows in general can be seen as crude but reliable barometer of international relations among tourist-generating and tourist-receiving countries”. Building on to the empirical evidence of such claims, Hall (1994) analyses international tourism policies of countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, China and the Philippines, shedding light on issues ranging from foreign diplomacy and trade, restrictions and restraints, to international recognition and
political stability. Furthermore, tourism’s potential role as a vehicle for peace has also been explored by many researchers (D’Amore, 1988; Jafari, 1989; Var and Brayley et al., 1989; Var and Schlüter et al., 1989; Matthews and Richter, 1991; Hobson and Ko, 1994; Richter, 1989, 1994; Lee, 1999; Gelbman, 2008). In terms of re-establishing ties between partitioned states, studies have demonstrated that tourism could well be the forerunner for peace making (Kim and Crompton, 1990; G. Zhang, 1993; Butler and Mao, 1995; 1996; Yu, 1997; Alipour and Kilic, 2005; Guo and Kim et al., 2006: 997). For instance, in the Asian context, Butler and Mao (1996) observe that the ‘amount and type of travel’ between partitioned states can reflect and influence the development of relationship between them. Also, Kim and Crompton (1990) explore the role of tourism in reducing tension and envision it contributing to the unifying of North and South Korea, while Guangrui Zhang (1993), in summing up a tourism seminar held between Chinese officials and academics and their Taiwanese counterparts, argues that tourism exchanges between China and Taiwan “help promote mutual understanding, clear up misunderstanding and strengthen unity among the people on both sides of the Straits, and may further be beneficial to peace in the Asian and Pacific region as well as worldwide” (p. 229). Furthermore, in recent years, there has been an emerging interest in research pertaining to battlefield tourism and its promotion of peace between enemies, both past and present. Studies by Timothy et al. (2004), Guo and Kim et al. (2006) and Cho (2007) explore the possibilities of reconciliation between belligerents like China and Taiwan, and North and South Korea. These authors corroborate the utility of battlefield tourism as a bridge to foster peace and stability between former enemies. I find these positions potentially to be over-optimistic as they treat tourism
as a panacea and assume in advance that tourism will eventually lead to peace without acknowledging that tourism is a cultural process needing critical analysis.

Conversely, Kim and Prideaux (2003) acknowledge that tourism may not necessary promote peace and could merely serve as a political tool of the government. They argue that “tourism...is a consequence of a political process, not the genesis of the process (Kim and Prideaux, 2003: 683). Empirical studies on a visit by Greek students to Turkey (Anastasopoulous, 1992), US students’ travel to the former Soviet Union (Pizam et al., 1991), and Israeli students to Egypt (Milman et al., 1990) dispute the validity of the ‘tourism for peace’ concept presumed by many tourism researchers (for details, see Kim and Prideaux, 2003: 676). In their example of tourism at Mt. Gumgang6 in North Korea, they report that South Korean tourists have practically no contact with the North Koreans as they are completely isolated by fences and armed guards. As such, Kim and Prideaux dispute Kim and Crompton’s (1990) theorisation that tourism is a good platform to foster ‘people-to-people’ diplomacy and an eventual reunification of North and South Korea. Rather, they argue that ‘high politics activity’ (i.e. inter-government arrangements on tourism and tourism facilities) may be more important than ‘low politics activity (i.e. person-to person interaction) in fostering peaceful relations between the two Koreas. In fact, the former pair is sceptical about the usage of tourism revenue by the North Koreans, fearing that in the event monetary gains are used by the North to acquire weapons that threaten South Korea’s national security, “tourism may be the vehicle for

6 Mt. Gumgang is a tourist resort in North Korea built and operated by the Hyundai Corporation of South Korea. This project was permitted by North Korea and has received substantial financial assistance from the South Korean Government (Kim and Prideaux, 2003).
destroying peace” (Kim and Prideaux, 2003: 684). Furthermore on the use of tourism as a political tool, Robinson and Smith (2006: 2) suggest that,

Each nation, no matter what their position in any notional global political league table, promotes tourism as an actual and potential source of external revenue, a marker of political status that draws upon cultural capital, and as a means to legitimise itself as a territorial entity.

As such, tourism is seen not only as an economically important industry, but also a politically useful tool in gaining publicity, relaying desired messages, and for participating countries to harness on the improved relations to attain desired recognition in the global arena. This all attests that tourism is inherently political. The overview of existing literature on rapprochement tourism offers us a rough picture of current developments in academic contributions on this complex issue. There are two observations that I want to make at this juncture. First, there seems to be an overly optimistic view of tourism as the way to bring about peace between former enemies. It is evident that researchers of rapprochement tourism adhere to the kind of ‘tourism for peace’ mentality not dissimilar to that adopted by the International Institute for Peace Through Tourism (I IPT). For the I IPT, tourism plays a major role in the promotion of peace. It envisions tourism to be “the world's first global peace industry”, and carries “the belief that every traveller is potentially an ‘Ambassador for Peace’” (International Institute for Peace Through Tourism, 2012). Although I do not dispute that tourism exchanges could contribute to the easing of tensions between former enemies, I caution against the taken for granted notion of ‘peace through tourism’ in the rapprochement process. To illustrate, preliminary observation shows that in promoting the ‘tourism for peace’ agenda, Chinese and
Taiwanese tourism planners adopt a strategy of historical amnesia. Inherent differences in identities are subjugated and buried in preference for a *tabula rasa* approach to tourism, as each side takes for granted a singular/universal history based on its own perspective. Authorities from both sides claim that they should put economics before politics and often boast about the numbers of tourists travelling across the border. As such, tourists are reduced to percentages; they become pawns of politicians and are portrayed as passive ‘flows’ representing ‘peaceful relations’ rather than active agents participating in the rapprochement process. I argue that such an approach is problematic as sites of ‘difficult heritage’ and sensitive history are increasingly forming attractions for tourists on both sides, and that in itself is interesting. The encounters with and subsequent interpretations of such sensitive heritage cannot be analysed under a ‘tabula rasa’ framework. Also, it is apparent that an increase in the number of tourists travelling across the Taiwan Strait does not necessarily equate to an improvement in relationship or understanding between the Chinese and Taiwanese people. Rather, then, the form and nature of these tourist encounters must be investigated.

Furthermore, there is a need to qualify what we mean by ‘the Chinese tourists’ or ‘the Taiwanese tourists’. They are of course not homogeneous groups of people with uniform identities, but are characterised by rich cultural entanglements in, between and across these two political entities. Such ‘tourists’ have relatives residing across the border; they also include business partners, academic colleagues, religious connections, lovers and many more. These various relationships add layers of complexities to the notion of ‘the tourist’ and ‘tourism’. Instead of a ‘peace theory’,
we need a more ‘grounded’ approach to rapprochement tourism that moves beyond the “universal tourist subject and experience” to recognise “tourist subjectivities and performances” (Franklin, 2007: 132). A better understanding of everyday cultural-geo-politics in such cross-border tourism is believed to be necessary for this endeavour. Instead of seeing tourists as numbers in an arithmetic formula of peace, it is more useful to think of them as active participants in the rapprochement process – each having her/his own character as she/he interacts with ‘the Other’ from across the border; each as being able to perform identities and engage in practices of signification (Crang, 2006). Together they interact and react to form a unique landscape of rapprochement that is far beyond what a simplistic ‘tourism for peace’ concept can capture. Yet, they are not the sole subjects of rapprochement tourism, but form part of a network of people, infrastructure, technology and things (Franklin, 2007). To do this, we need to adopt a more critical approach to understand rapprochement tourism both as involving a dialectical relationship between macro and micro politics and as an on-going process in a state of becoming.

The general critique on the dominance of economic discourse in tourism studies (Franklin and Crang, 2001; Crang, 2004; Picken, 2006) can also be applied to the current state of research on rapprochement tourism. Researchers tend to focus solely on the economic benefits brought about by the normalisation of travel between political units, forgetting that tourism is in itself a social-cultural phenomenon. For instance, in their synopsis of ‘tourism between partitioned states’, Butler and Mao’s (1996) endeavour to discuss the conceptual and theoretical implications of this genre of tourism seems to fall short of being able to engage with
critical cultural-geo-politics. Their discussion revolves mainly around economic implications; choosing to describe patterns of tourists flows, motivations, accessibility between partitioned states, cost of travel and tourists expenditure. Moreover, the authors also assume a narrative of linear progress, which oversimplifies the often complicated process of rapprochement. It is indeed necessary not to see tourism as just “a logical extension of the general principle of industrial capitalism to the realm of leisure” (Borocz in Koshar, 1998, cited in Crang, 2004: 74), but “as a modern culture in and of itself” (Crang, 2004: 74).

But of course, this is not to belittle Butler and Mao’s (1996) contribution, or any other researchers who concentrate on the economics of rapprochement tourism. My intention here is to highlight the importance of not just describing the ‘why’ of tourism, but also the ‘how’. For example, how are sensitive heritages managed in the midst of rapprochement tourism? How does tourism affect people from both sides and how is it in turn transformed by them? How are tourist destinations not only consumed by tourists but also constantly created by them (Crang, 2004)? In other words, instead of merely describing the happenings of tourism, we should interrogate tourism happenings. While the former describes unilateral macro-political decisions shaping tourism policies, the latter investigates how policies transform tourism landscapes on the ground, and how tourist spaces shape and are shaped by tourists’ performances and practices. The following sub-section takes on a quintessential component of rapprochement tourism management – heritage taming.
2.1.2 Taming heritage: an ideological framing of the past?

The potent but unstable mix of politics, ideologies and economic principles become even fuzzier when culture and heritage are thrown into the pot as frequently happens with the development of tourism.

(Selwyn, 1996, cited in Burns and Novelli, 2007: 1)

The argument that there are political imperatives and ideological underpinnings in the promotion of tourism, other than economic rationales, becomes even more compelling when the variables of ‘difficult heritage’ and ‘sensitive history’ are factored in. An increase in interest on heritage as a tourism commodity has contributed to a burgeoning literature on the spatialities of heritage politics (Johnson, 1999; Dwyer, 2000; Agyei-Mensah, 2006; Kelly, 2006; Winter, 2007: Yan and Bramwell, 2008; Su and Teo, 2008; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008; Logan and Reeves, 2008). As reiterated by Johnson (1999: 187) heritage tourism is not merely “a set of commercial transactions, but the ideological framing of history and identity”. Similarly, in their attempt to define the realm of cultural politics, Jordan and Weedon (1995: 4) ask: “What cultures shall be regarded as worthy of display and which shall be hidden? Whose history shall be remembered and whose forgotten? What image of social life shall be projected and which shall be marginalised? What voices shall be heard and which silenced? Who is representing whom, and on what basis?” This set of considerations became even more potent when we look at rapprochement tourism between former enemies. Disputed heritages and controversial histories are tamed as each side attempts to cater to tourists from the other side. The strategies and practices of ‘taming’ have profound
political implications (see Chapter 4). However, discussion on the cultural politics of heritage tourism does not stop at the level of hegemonic representation.

Another aspect of heritage management politics lies in competing representations of history by various stakeholders. Studies on this recognise the plurality in the interpretations of history by different sectors of the society, and thus highlight the politics behind multiple representations at heritage attractions. For instance, Dwyer (2000: 660) gives an overview of the “current memorial practices and representations of the Civil Rights movement [of the 1950s and 1960s]” at various memorial landscapes of the US South. Critical analysis of various monuments and museums dedicated to the movement reveals that the role of women in organising and leading the movement is obscured from the heritage tourism sites. Furthermore, Dwyer observes two contesting historiographical perspectives – one that celebrates the supremacy of the white elites, as opposed to one that reflects everyday African-American grassroots struggle for civil rights.

A similar case of multiple representations can be found in India. Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008) interpret the advent of heritage tourism as an avenue for “renegotiation and dissemination of identities” (p.790). Their study reveals the ways India’s heritage is portrayed by three groups of stakeholders, namely the Indian government, the domestic tourism trade media, and the popular tourism media. They suggest that the private sector’s representation of India as “an ethnically diverse nation in which Hinduism preceded and prevailed over all other ethnicities/religions” (p.790) is consistent with the state’s narrative. However, while the former stresses the
“nostalgic experiences of a sanitized colonial history”, the latter emphasises “accounts of resistance against colonial powers” (p.790) – clearly in an attempt to legitimise its own authority. This goes to show that there are multiple histories and heritages at play, not just a singular History or Heritage per se. Yet, I concur with Crang’s (1994) argument that “it is insufficient to appeal to an ‘authentic’ history against an ‘ideological’ one. Rather, there are always multiple constructions of the past. The organisation of such histories into heritage has political implications” (p.341). Therefore, it will be interesting to see how seemingly harmonious portrayal of ‘tamed heritage’ interacts with inherently contentious interpretations. I shall now reflect further on research carried out specifically on the topic of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan.

2.1.3 Academic literature on China-Taiwan tourism

In empirical terms, research on tourism development as a means of post-war reconciliation has focused on the more ‘established wars’ like the Great War (Lloyd, 1998; Seaton, 2000), World War II (Gordon, 1998; Muzaini, 2004), Korean War (Timothy et al., 2004; Lee, 2006) and Vietnam War (Henderson, 2000; Agrusa et al., 2006). In contrast, the China-Taiwan conflict has often been treated at best as a background for post-Cold War commentaries or Sino-American politics. However, due to recent developments in rapprochement between China and Taiwan, and the rise of China as a ‘super power’ in general, scholars have begun to shed light on post-Civil War tourism exchanges between the two former belligerents (see for example, G. Zhang, 1993; Hall, 1994; Butler and Mao, 1996; Yu, 1997; Guo and Kim et al., 2006;
Chen, 2010). Both Hall (1994) and Butler and Mao (1996) have used the China-Taiwan story as a case in point amongst several other examples in their writings, but do not offer an in-depth analysis. For those who do, they focus primarily on the patterns of tourist flow and economics impacts and thus face the similar critiques offered earlier. To illustrate, G. Zhang (1993) urges a full lifting of the ban on travel across the Taiwan Strait so as to reap the economic benefits tourism has to offer. Furthermore, Guo and Kim et al. (2006) analyse tourist flow patterns, political events, type and profile of tourists, policy issues pertaining to tourism cooperation, and logistical obstacles in terms of tourist transportation, before offering their solutions to these ‘problems’, often alluding to the need for an eventual unification. Building on Butler and Mao’s (1996) analysis, Yu (1997) sees tourism as a low-politics activity that promotes people-to-people interaction and reduces tension between the two peoples. However, instead of a more critical interrogation of how tourist identities are performed through such interaction, he focuses his attention on describing the different stages of tourism development and events that affect tourist flows.

It is worthwhile noting that the above studies all took place pre-2008. As was mentioned in Chapter One, rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan reached a milestone moment in 2008, after the inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou as the Taiwanese President, and the subsequent direct flight arrangements for cross-strait tourists. It is therefore timely to re-visit the ever evolving tourism landscape between the two former enemies post-2008. A look at post-2008 tourism literature on the subject matter revealed the same trend explicated above. Researchers are mainly interested in the logistical issues brought about by the unprecedented
increase in tourist flow, choosing to analyse areas in management and marketing. Discussions of airline service quality, customer satisfaction (Lu and Ling, 2008), and economic implications of direct flights across the Taiwan Strait (Chang and Hsu et al., 2011; Lau and Lei et al., 2012) seem to be the most sought after. Furthermore, terms like ‘emerging trends’, ‘new markets’ and ‘outbound tourism’ dominate the narratives of cross-strait tourism studies (see for example, Chang and Wang et. al., 2007). And as this chapter was being written, a research workshop on Chinese outbound tourism organised by the Emerging Markets Special Interest Group (EMSIG) at the University of Canberra in Australia took place in May 2012. It is apparent that due to China’s phenomenal rise in the last decade, and the increasing ability of its people to travel further abroad, the ‘Western market’ has felt it necessary to monitor emerging trends and opportunities. Such research is often pioneered by academics who in turn secure their research funding from private companies. As such, research generated in this context remains largely biased towards the commercial aspects of tourism. The fact that the workshop presentations are being arranged into ‘Demand-side’ and ‘Supply-side’ considerations (EMSIG website) was telling of the organiser’s focus on economics. Indeed, “in order to understand ‘what tourism is’, the researcher became (and often still becomes) a tourist” (Picken, 2006: 162). Therefore logistical issues of demand and supply still remain the focal point of discussion for these researchers. I suggest that research on rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan should go beyond the pillars of tourism management, tourist expectations/satisfaction and issues of demand and supply. In this era of unprecedented tourist flows across the Taiwan Strait, there is an urgent need to analyse tourism happenings ‘on the ground’, to elicit the nuances of tourists’
interactions with people on the ‘other’ side, and to unravel the critical geopolitics of their encounters with various touristic things.

Additionally, when explicating tourism development across the Taiwan Strait, researchers tend to make a clear-cut distinction between macro political events/decisions from micro political happenings. From Yu’s (1997) and Chen’s (2010) framing of ‘high and low politics activity’\(^7\) to Cai’s (2010) analysis of the impact of cross-strait relations and crisis events on Taiwanese tourist arrivals in China, macro and micro politics are taken to be separate entities, with the former affecting the latter. I argue that such unilateral/top-down approach to tourism studies fails to capture the complexities of the cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. Macro and micro politics are more inter-related and enmeshed in contemporary cross-strait relations, and research on rapprochement tourism may benefit more from recognising a dialectical relationship between them. Furthermore, as elucidated earlier, there needs to be an awareness that tourism is a part of material culture and material culture involves not just people, but things as well. Therefore, there is a need to interrogate how touristic things participate in the process of rapprochement, rather than focus only on tourist flows, government policies, and the impact of political events on tourist arrivals etc. This is a timely study as the rapprochement tourism landscapes in China and Taiwan are just recently being shaped by and shaping the still unresolved sovereignty disputes across the Taiwan Strait. This suggests that issues of identity performance and consumption practices become even more important to analyse.

\(^7\) See also Kim and Crompton’s (1990) discussion on ‘track one’ vs ‘track two’ diplomacy.
Another point that I want to discuss is that of positionality. It is observed that although claiming to be studies on cross-border tourism/tourism between China and Taiwan, researchers often base their analyses on one side of the border only (e.g. Chen, 2010). Simply put, due to political sensitivity a Chinese researcher will find it difficult to conduct fieldwork on Taiwanese soil and vice versa.⁸ One Chinese academic I spoke to revealed that because of the difficulty in being granted a Taiwan research visa, she would often cross the Strait as a ‘business delegate’ in order to conduct fieldwork in Taiwan. Such methodological impediments may explain why the majority of research is based on government policies, tourist numbers and economic trends, which are more easily available. That means, there remains a dearth of interventions on the cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism as experienced by people on both sides of the border. This is where my thesis makes its specific intervention: to provide a platform for understanding the dialectical relationship between macro political management and micro-political practices on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, in order for us to gain a better understanding of rapprochement tourism, we need to probe beyond the perspective of government policies to know how ordinary people think and react to such cultural interactions. It is to bring research to the ground, to the everyday, that we will be better positioned to comment on ‘rapprochement’ and what it means to people.

Positionality in terms of institutional environment is also of paramount importance. As Tribe (2005) reminds us, researchers are producers of knowledge. Indeed,

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⁸ For a discussion of my own positionality in conducting this research, see Chapter Three.
researchers have a pivotal role in knowledge construction, and this in turn is affected by institutional environment. It is therefore apt to consider how one’s institutional environment affects one’s research and thus construction of knowledge. To illustrate the style of discussion in G. Zhang (1993) and Guo and Kim et al. (2006) clearly indicate a kind of ‘reunification logic’ purported by the Chinese government. Conversely Yu (1997) seems to be less ‘obliged’ to reiterate the ‘need for reunification’. This is not surprising considering the fact that Guangrui Zhang is affiliated to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Yingzhi Guo is from Fudan University in China, while Larry Yu is based in the George Washington University in the United States. The two former researchers might have felt compelled to highlight the ideal of ‘reunification’ in order for their research to be recognised by their own institution. However, academic pieces like these are in danger of being another voice for the government. Steering away from such normative commitments, there is an emergent trend of research that argues for a more nuanced understanding of rapprochement tourism.

2.1.4 Critical geopolitics of tourism across borders of conflict

I now turn to studies that provide a more critical approach towards the analysis of tourism in sites of (former) conflict. Some notable research on tourism exchanges between former/existing foes that have gone beyond the realm of economics include Webster and Timothy’s (2006) piece on Greek Cypriots’ perceptions of crossing the Green Line between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus, Lisle’s (2007) comparison of cultural institutions’ political
narratives in the two Cypruses under the current pressure for peaceful reconciliation, and Hazbun’s (2009) explorations of ‘new geopolitical and geocultural imaginaries’ enabled by cross-cultural tourism between Israel and Jordan. Instead of reiterating each of their fascinating accounts, my intention here is to sift out common denominators when they engage with the critical geopolitics of rapprochement tourism and to see in what ways these inform my own project. More specifically, I draw on themes such as ‘everyday geopolitics’, ‘heritage at the personal scale’, ‘post-national community imaginaries’, and ‘management of post conflict difficult heritage’ to develop pathways through which to better understand rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan.

First, the everyday geopolitics of tourism is discussed by Webster and Timothy (2006) and Hazbun (2009). Webster and Timothy (2006) reveal that although the border between North and South Cyprus has been opened to residents and tourists, nearly half of the Greek population has not visited the Turkish part. They are morally obliged not to do so as crossing to the other side “would demonstrate tacit recognition of the existence of the other political entity on the island and spending money there would be wrong, fuelling the economy of what is considered an illegal occupation regime. ...[For] ‘day-tourists’, [they] bring their own food and drinks... and avoid paying entrance fees and purchasing souvenirs” (Webster and Timothy, 2006: 176). Such a “protocol”, while considered to be unproblematic from the perspective of one group of people, may be accused of being the ‘wrong tourist behaviour’ by tourism operators on the other side. Indeed, Hazbun (2009) highlighted a similar situation. Israeli tourists’ low-spending propensity is often
denigrated by Jordanians, who claim that they are not demonstrating the ‘right tourist behaviour’ and are “crowding out higher spending tourists from Europe” (Hazbun, 2009: 18). Another example of everyday geopolitics of tourism at play is demonstrated by the Chinese tourists’ boycott of Taiwan’s Kaohsiung as mentioned in Chapter One (see also Chapter Five). Therefore, rapprochement tourism does not involve only state-to-state macro politics, but can also involve a very personal choice.

Rapprochement tourism is not only for those seeking leisure, but also for people seeking relatives and territorial re-attachments of places they were once forced to leave. In this respect, Webster and Timothy (2006) discuss what they call ‘personal heritage tourism’ while Hazbun (2009) talks about ‘return tourism’. Since the Cyprus border reopened in 2003, thousands of Cypriots from the south have travelled across the “political divide to experience the lands of their ancestors” (Webster and Timothy, 2006: 177). Similarly, Hazbun observes that of the Jordanians travelling to Israel, 90% were of Palestinian origin and most cross over to meet relatives. According to Butler and Mao (1996), more than two million Chinese crossed over to Taiwan after the civil war. Most of them were military personnel who left their families behind, which is one of the reasons why many Taiwanese still have relatives on the other side. Today, Taiwanese tourists visit China to re-discover their ancestral and religious roots (see Chapter Six). China welcomes such ‘return tourism’ by their Taiwanese ‘compatriots’ as it fits into the discourse that the two sides are ‘one family’, and that Taiwan would eventually ‘return’ to the ‘brotherly love’ of China. Forays into the notion of ‘personal heritage’ in rapprochement tourism analysis are refreshing as heritage can now be discussed not just at the scale of the national, but
also the personal. The body becomes the centre of focus as it transcends geopolitical fault lines and engages in the performance and negotiation of one’s identity.

Third, there are attempts by scholars negotiating the geopolitics of post-conflict tourism to offer alternative routes for rapprochement. One of which is to promote forms of ‘political tourism’ that encourage people from both sides to recognise their difficult/painful pasts. Both Lisle (2007) and Hazbun (2009) have explored the concept of ‘political tourism’. For Lisle (2007), political tourism for Cyprus in the era of rapprochement is important “because it forces divided societies to confront the difficult issue of where and how to represent their dissonant heritage in a way that satisfies both local communities and international visitors” (emphasis in original, p.109). ‘Political tourism’ for Hazbun offers a platform to develop ‘new geopolitical and geocultural imaginaries’ that allow for more pluralistic notions of overlapping territorial attachments, and “alternative relationships between territory and identity, such as transnational and diasporic identities” (Hazbun, 2009: 33-34). In the case of tourism across the Taiwan Strait, religious pilgrimages participated by devotees on both sides are seen as potential analytical platforms for such post-national community imaginaries (see Chapter Six). Post-national concepts proposed by Hazbun and the politics of representing dissonant heritage in the context of political tourism (see Chapter Four) might offer some analytical tools to understand rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan.

Fourth, historical amnesia as a strategy for managing ‘difficult heritage’ is interrogated by both Lisle (2007) and Hazbun (2009). Hazbun (2009) criticises that
most ‘peace through tourism’ initiatives avoid or erase past conflict between politically divided communities. Instead of ‘forgetting’ the difficult past, he advocates an active engagement with the conflict, by “promoting itineraries that lead travellers and host communities to excavate the often contentious, overlapping territorial connections between peoples” (Hazbun, 2009: 5). Conversely, instead of rebuilding the Cyprus Dead Zone for commercial purposes, Lisle (2007) argues that part of it should be preserved so that tourism stakeholders can begin to contemplate how to “represent the toll of thirty years of ethnic conflict.” Furthermore, “future generations of Cypriots, as well as curious tourists, will be able to encounter the legacy of partition and be forced to think about its consequences” (Lisle, 2007: 113).

The critical geopolitical interventions of these writings are precisely what studies discussed in the preceding sub-sessions are lacking. This sets up the tone for us to proceed to the next section, where I introduce the ‘cultural-geo-politics’ approach to provide a platform for researchers to engage in critical analyses of rapprochement tourism.

### 2.2 A Cultural-geo-politics Approach

In the previous section, I provided a brief overview of existing literature pertaining to rapprochement tourism. Various strands of research and gaps in the literature were discussed. I also highlighted an emergent genre of studies that attempts to engage with critical geopolitics of rapprochement tourism. Themes like everyday geopolitics, heritage at the personal scale, post-national community imaginaries, and
management of post conflict difficult heritage were recognised as potential areas to be interrogated in this thesis. I have also suggested a ‘cultural-geo-politics’ approach in which we can better engage with such issues. I shall elaborate further in this section.

What do I mean by a ‘cultural-geo-politics’ approach? As the term suggests, ‘cultural-geo-politics’ refers to issues relating to both the cultural politics and geopolitics of rapprochement tourism. In explicating the cultural political aspect, this thesis adopts Crang’s (2004) perspective of examining tourism “not simply as consuming places but also as a dynamic force creating them...” (p. 74). In his writing on the cultural geographies of tourism, Crang (2004) reports that tourism has often been treated as a ‘problem’ by cultural geographers. Local cultures are seen as being eroded or homogenised by the globalising force of tourism. This is especially evident in Wang’s (2000, cited in Jamal and Kim, 2005) critique on tourism and modernity where culture is lamented to have been commodified and exoticised to serve the needs of tourists. Both destinations and tourists are being depicted as passive in such studies and portrayed as victims of market capitalism. As Jane Desmond reminds us, “tourism is not just an aggregate of merely commercial activities; it is also an ideological framing of history, nature and tradition; a framing that has the power to reshape culture and nature to its own needs” (1999, cited in Crang, 2004: 76). Rather than assume that tourists are passive receivers of state messages, a cultural-geo-politics approach recognises the agency of the tourists in interpreting heritage and constructing their own knowledge of history. In fact, they play their roles as tourists and perform their identities through signifying practices. As such, tourist
destinations are not merely visited, but are “fluid and created through performance” (Crang and Coleman 2002: 1).

Rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan is in itself a geopolitical activity. Tourists from both sides constantly need to negotiate their identities and their ability to travel across the border is only made possible by the temporary suspension of contentious debates over territory and sovereignty. Also, as explicated in Chapter One, cross-strait tourists participate in the everyday geopolitics of rapprochement. The cultural-geo-politics approach thus seeks to go beyond the analysis of the state to include non-state actors. Cynthia Enloe’s (1990) reference to ‘international political relationship’ is an inspiring entry point. From a feminist perspective, she argues that “relations between governments depend not only on capital and weaponry, but also on the control of women as symbols, consumers, workers and emotional comforters” (ibid: xi). We can borrow this ‘international political relationship’ lens to rethink cross-strait relations, in order to reconsider supposedly benign activities like heritage tourism, and how tourists are managed by the respective governments to serve political causes. Not only that, we will also discover how ordinary people, through their everyday actions/decisions, are actually actively participating in/contributing to international politics. This would open up exciting opportunities to better understand the geopolitical nuances in the context of cross-strait tourism exchanges between China and Taiwan. However, by ‘non-state’, I do not mean that these people’s perceptions of cross-straits relations are not at all related to the state. In fact, their experiences are inter-textual in nature, and are constituted by, and at the same time, constitutive of the state. The reading of
international geopolitics through the micro-level offers a promising avenue in the endeavor to go beyond state-centric notions of international relations that many researchers on rapprochement tourism adhere to.

Furthermore, as Franklin (2007: 131) notes, “Substantial progress has been made in addressing the essentially visual and symbolic registers of tourism research and part of what Tribe has called a new turn of ‘new tourism research’ has concentrated on exploring a more dynamic, ‘entangled’ tourist. There is now a healthier balance of sensual and embodied tourism work...” Other than challenging the visual-centric tradition, this thesis also aims to shed light on the (im)materiality of cross-border tourism. This strikes a chord with contemporary efforts to re-materialise the study of cultural geography (Whatmore, 2006). Potential grounds for discussion include the contact zones (both real and imagined) where rapprochement tourism takes place, locally-produced goods, and tourist souvenirs with strong place identity (see section 2.5). Interpreting rapprochement tourism through the cultural-geo-political lens thus allows one to go beyond the representational bias of landscape analysis to experiment with non-representational ideas such as sensuous materialism, and embodied practices and performances “that recursively produce destinations and visitors” (Crang, 2004: 83). Such cultural geography endeavours seek to unravel the micro-political aspects of the human condition.

I have provided a brief definition of ‘cultural-geo-politics’ by discussing the cultural- and geo-political perspectives of rapprochement tourism that this thesis will take. I brought the discussion further by incorporating recent debates in the cultural
geography of tourism to go beyond visual-centric and representational approaches to engage with the more sensuous and embodied aspects of travel experiences. However, a cultural-geo-politics approach also involves attending to the notions of border, identity and material culture. I will now look in more detail at each of these.

2.2.1 Re-conceptualising the ‘border’

The notion of the border has often been taken for granted in discussions on cross-border rapprochement tourism. Researchers seem to be overwhelmed by economic impacts and whether tourism will eventually lead to peace. However, they have failed to recognise rapprochement tourism as a cultural-geo-political process in itself. One way to gain a better understanding of this process is to turn to ‘border’ as a conceptual tool. In the realm of border studies, Anssi Paasi (2011a: 28) reminds us that “[i]nstead of a fixed, all-encompassing [border] theory, it is perhaps the idea of theorizing or conceptualization that could provide more tools for border scholars.” Indeed, this section is not about coming up with a definitive notion of border, but an exploration of the different possibilities that ‘border’ entails through a re-conceptualisation of the term.

In reviewing Julian Minghi’s (1963) and Victor Prescott’s (1965) overviews of boundary and border studies, van Houtum (2005) reports that scholars of the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century focus their enquiry on the ‘where’: “Where is the border located, how did it came about, evolve, change over time, became the topic of (military) disputes and what are the political
consequences of its (changes in) location” (van Houtum, 2005: 674). However, he further elaborates: “The insight that the making of borders is the product of our own social practices and habitus has led to the study of borders beyond merely states or nations” (ibid). In this respect, Newman (2006a: 143) calls for a study of borders from ‘the bottom up’, “with a focus on the individual border narratives and experiences.” Indeed, the proliferation of borders does not stop at the limits of the sovereign state; it overflows and extends beyond political boundaries to affect personal experiences as well (Paasi, 2005).

Therefore, this thesis endeavours to probe further on the ‘how’ – How borders and tourism have a more mutual relationship? It is perhaps useful to think of ‘border’ as both a noun and a verb. The former has been extensively covered by border tourism research or border studies in general. ‘To border’ or ‘bordering’ thus opens up new interfaces for the discussion of tourism practices and their implications on cross-strait relations. As Rumford (2006: 155) suggests, “...theorizing borders and the dynamics of bordering and rebounding have become key components of understanding contemporary social and political change.” The question then, is ‘Who borders?’ ‘Border practices’ as understood by existing effort to re-spatialise ‘border’ seems to assume a state-centric perspective. In contrast, I wish to show in this thesis that not only are borders erected by the state, ordinary non-state actors are also actively (de)constructing borders, and (re)producing new forms of borders, which may or may not be in line with the intentions of the state. As such, instead of state-led ‘border practices’, I see border as a social practice performed by ordinary people.
Seeing border as a social practice thus unleashes the potential of this concept to exist in various forms. As alluded to in the literature review on rapprochement tourism, there has been an understanding of borders as static, unmoving, and fixed – something that tourism has to work around rather than something that is produced by tourism. I argue that far from being fixed, borders are fluid and exist at multiple sites; they can be reiterated and reproduced through the mobile bodies of tourists. Interactions/bordering practices between the tourists and locals, and encounters between Chinese tourists and Taiwanese attractions and vice-versa, and how they negotiate their identities to interpret and make sense of what they see, are potential empirical sites to study. Newman’s (2006b) idea of the cultural border thus allows us to study the everyday geopolitics of bordering practices. As such, borders are both real and imagined – not just non-visible. For a border to be an imaginary, it has to be imagined by someone. The ‘imagined border’ suggests a certain level of agency, which the notion of non-visibility lacks. As Newman (2006b: 177) argues,

The ‘here–there’ and ‘us–them’ cut-off points are not always played out through the construction of physical and visible walls and fences. They may be as invisible as they are tangible and, equally, as perceived as they are real. I define you as belonging to a different social, ethnic, economic or religious group and, as such, I have created a border separating the self from the other. The extent to which I am prepared to overcome my feelings of exclusivity will determine the extent to which I am prepared to permit you to cross the border and to interact with me.

Forays into such an epistemology of ‘border’ can serve to overcome its fixity and physicality that existing theorisation still very much assume.
If borders are not fixed, neither are identities. Identities are contingent and can be negotiated by the tourists. The mobility and leisure pursuit of the tourist might evoke a certain kind of cosmopolitan identity, and this will have implications on how they interact with people they meet and things they see/buy at the tourist destination. As Rumford (2006: 163) observes,

The cosmopolitanization of national societies, which Beck conceives of as globalization from within, works to blur distinctions between the national and international and to superimpose previously distinct spaces, thereby creating a new kind of place. We are increasingly mobile between different cultures (through marriage, diasporic kinship networks, etc.)... [and] possess a cosmopolitan imagination through which we are able to include ‘the otherness of the other in our self-definition’ (Beck, 2004: 148)

He further elaborates:

The ideas of cosmopolitan societies and global spaces have important implications for the way we think about borders. Cosmopolitanism...draws attention to the difficulty in sustaining dichotomies of inside/outside, us/them, national/international which were staple concepts for a territorial world of nation-states.

(Rumford, 2006: 163)

It would be interesting to juxtapose this notion of cosmopolitan identity with the Chinese definition of modernity. According to Nyíri (2009), the Chinese state embraces tourism as a project of modernity and thus encourages its people to engage in both domestic and international tourism. How then, does this embodiment of modernity affect the identity of the Chinese tourist? How are the Chinese tourists managed/educated by the state with regards to forms of modernity and ‘proper’ behaviour before they travel? Is this form of governance ever complete?
Therefore, b/ordering (van Houtum and Kramsch et al., 2005) identities is not about petty politics of boundary-making amongst people who dislike each other, but about a consciousness of how the construction of identities is informed by and informing macro-political relations in and between China and Taiwan. The next section further elaborates this approach to thinking identity.

2.2.2 Identity, difference and liminality

It seems to me that in considering the various themes for rapprochement tourism research, the concept of ‘identity’ appears to be a recurring denominator of concern – Identity at the national level as constituted by the state, as well as everyday identities of the people that are intertextual in nature (national, historical, cultural, personal etc.). However, in promoting cross-strait peace and rapprochement through tourism, both the Chinese and Taiwanese states adopt a strategy of historical amnesia. Differences in their interpretation of historical events are treated as too sensitive to be discussed openly. Thus, inherent differences in identities, discourses, and perceptions are subjugated and buried in preference for a tabula rasa for tourism to take place. Tourism then becomes a vehicle for achieving the agenda of ‘economics before politics’. Such a strategy of de-politicising rapprochement tourism is dangerous and not sustainable in the long run. According to Jamal and Kim (2005: 65), “travel and tourism are powerful productive forces of personal, ethnic and national identity.” As museums and sites of historical significance increasingly become places of interest to tourists from both sides, differences in the portrayal of similar historical events or stories narrated about
common heroic figures will be encountered, contested and challenged. Therefore, there needs to be an understanding of identity that goes beyond singularity and universality.

A useful starting point is to acknowledge that there is no one History out there, but *multiple histories* – each (re)created, (re)invented and (re)inscribed into the lives of the people. These become the building blocks of specific national identities – identities are built on *difference* (Connolly, 1991). These histories need to be problematised, and the resultant identities need to be scrutinised through tourism exchanges and not be erased by the very act of crossing the border. Moreover, as Connolly (1991: 46) reminds us, “no identity is the true identity because every identity is particular, constructed, and relational.”

It is perhaps useful to think of identity as not a fixed entity, but something that is fluid (flows in and out of the body) and mobile (when the body is on the move). In fact, as Crang (2004: 82) argues, “…tourists do not have pre-given identities; rather, there are identities formed through processes of identification and self-creation.” Both fluidity and mobility of identity enable the tourist to embody multiple identities in relation to where they are and who they are with. For instance, a Chinese tourist in a war museum in Taiwan may negotiate her/his national identity and become more accommodating with the Taiwanese’s narration of historical events, although she/he may not agree with it. Chinese national identity then takes a backseat to the tourist’s identity as a body on travel; as someone who is representing her/his country in an effort to express tolerance over the ‘Taiwanese compatriots’. The
liminal space of a tourist destination allows the tourist to temporarily step out of her/his political domain/identity, and adopt other less dogmatic identities. This could be promising as Connolly (1991: x) suggests that “one significant way to support human dignity is to cultivate agonistic respect between interlocking and contending constituencies.” However, the example of the Chinese tourists’ mass-boycott on Kaohsiung mentioned earlier demonstrates how national identities can be evoked by on-going political happenings. Therefore, it is necessary to de-stabilise the often-assumed rigid and fixed notions of identity so as to better capture the elusive cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism.

Another dimension of identity worth pursuing is its relation to material culture. As mentioned earlier under the endeavour to incorporate non-state actors in the analysis of international politics, non-human subjects also contribute significantly to the identity dynamics of cross-strait relations. ‘Things’ to be considered may include kitsch souvenirs, food, and even identification documents like the ‘Taiwan Compatriot Permit’ used by Taiwanese tourists to enter China. More importantly, what is at stake here is how identity is embodied in such cultural artefacts? How does the materiality of touristic things operationalise in the realm of cross-strait politics and identities? Can identities be negotiated between human and non-human subjects? I suspect that identities flow in and through such items and they in turn interact with the identities of the tourists, question their notion of intrinsic truth, contest their universalism or compromise on the basis of particularities. Indeed, there are countless possibilities waiting to be explored.
I am also interested in how tourists behave during their tours, especially at border-crossings and border areas (e.g. immigration checkpoints, ferry terminals, etc.) I suggest that the concept of ‘liminality’, famously developed by Arnold van Gennep and later by Victor Turner (1969), could be useful in this respect. According to Turner (1979: 465), ‘liminality’ literally means ‘being-on-a-threshold’ – “a state or process which is betwixt-and-between the normal, day-to-day cultural and social states and processes of getting and spending, preserving law and order, and registering structural status.” These in-between places constitute a liminal space within which normativities of the tourists’ everyday lives are temporarily kept in suspension, allowing them to encounter the ‘Other’ in a different social structure. Utilisation of ‘liminality’ in tourist/tourism studies is not new. A quick reference to existing literature shows the concept being applied to society’s/individuals’ behaviour, activities (e.g. sex tourism; pilgrimage, etc.), and specific site/place (e.g. hotel). For instance, Wagner (1977) adapts Turner’s notion of ‘communitas’ and argues that tourists form ‘spontaneous communitas’ and interact with each other based on ‘the spirit of the holiday’ rather than ‘the home life social hierarchical system’. Gottlieb (1982) on the other hand, discusses the inversion of the everyday identities of holiday-seekers: the upper-class tourists temporarily becoming a ‘pseudo-proletariat’, while the middle-class ones seek an aristocratic change when on tour. Building on this genre of ‘inversionary behaviour’, Lett (1983) incorporates the concept of ‘play’ as developed by Huizinga (1950, cited in Currie, 1997) and Norbeck (1971, cited in Currie, 1997) to explicate yacht tourists’ sexual behaviour. Tourism, for Lett, is a form of play, “a stepping out of ‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all its own” (Huizinga cited in Lett 1983: 41). Such
temporality of social behaviours and spaces is also captured in Rob Shields’ (1991) ‘places on the margin’ when he discusses sex tourism in Brighton (see also Ryan and Martin, 2001; Ryan and Hall, 2000). Pritchard and Morgan (2006) bring this discussion into the hotels, seeing them as ‘liminal sites of transition and transgression’. As is evident, the concept of liminality has been well adapted in studies on the social-cultural aspects of tourism especially in the realm of sexual activities. The geo-political potential of it seems to be under-theorised. While scholars like Salter (2003) and Wang (2004) allude to the ‘rites of passage’ of passport checks and the humiliating experiences of travellers as they undergo rigorous scrutiny by the immigration officers, I will explore the existential inner-workings of the travellers during such a liminal period (see Chapter Five).

Rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan offers a fertile test bed to unleash the geo-political potential of the concept of liminality. The ‘political’ may refer to both the macro-politics of cross-strait relations and micro-political practices of the tourists, while the ‘geo’ represents the places, the in-between, the marginal or the transitional, where encounters amongst people and things happen. Having a better appreciation of the ‘material moments’ (Burrell, 2008) during this liminal period will have significant implications for developing a deeper understanding of rapprochement tourism between politically divided entities. As such, rather than seeing a *communitas* (Turner, 1969), which refers to a collective (consciousness) of people in a liminal space, I should like to borrow Callon and Law’s (1995, cited in van der Duim, 2007: 151) idea of a ‘collectif’, which is “an emergent effect created by the interaction of the heterogeneous parts that make it up”, to allude to a hybrid
collective of tourists, locals and things. Relationship amongst these components may be better understood through the lens of material culture and materiality, which the final session will turn to.

### 2.2.3 Material Culture and (Im)materiality

A cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism cannot ignore the fact that material culture plays a major role in the tourism process. According to the *Dictionary of Archaeology*, ‘material culture’ refers to the artefacts or other concrete things left behind by past cultures. It is by studying these things that archaeologists come to understand past societies. However, material culture as a field of study is engaged by researchers from a wide array of disciplines that include archaeology, anthropology, geography, history, sociology, and cultural studies. It is not limited to the analysis of things of the past, but also looks at their continuities in various forms in the present.⁹ Although diverse in terms of the various philosophical traditions adopted, the commonality lies with the “desire to give greater attention and respect to materiality and material culture” (Miller, 2010: 76). Chris Tilley *et al.* (2006: 3, emphasis in original) provide the following definitions of materiality:

> According to various dictionary definitions materiality can mean *substance*, something comprised of elements or constituents, of variously composed matter: the tangible, the existing or concrete, the substantial, the worldly and real as opposed to the imaginary, ideal and value-laden aspects of human existence. Materiality can also be taken to refer to individual *things*, or collections of things, rather than to persons or societies.

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⁹ See Miller (2010) for a brief overview of the different approaches to the study of material culture.
For this study, ‘material culture’ refers to the things from and of a tumultuous past. It seeks to adhere to a broader definition of material culture by examining how things from and of a past generation continue to be significant to contemporary consumption practices, how they enact and connect memories and how their materiality interact with locals/tourists on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Instead of being ‘cast in stone’, meanings of such artefacts are always in a state of becoming rather than being as they are bought, given or circulated. Yet, in works that respond to calls to ‘rematerialise’ research in cultural geography, there seems to be an uncritical substitution between the physicality and materiality of an object (see Ramsay, 2009 for a similar critique). Furthermore, although it is crucial to understand the interaction between human and things little has been suggested in tourist and border studies on how exactly such interactions take place. I therefore argue that ‘materiality’ is a medium through which interactions between people and things take place, and it is taken to refer to the tangibility and material composition of things that evokes the various senses of vision, hearing, smell, taste and touch. More importantly, such a non-representational conceptualisation denounces subject-object dualisms and at the same time gives agency to the object. Therefore, objects are seen here as being able to do something, “has sufficient coherence to perform actions, produce effects, and alter situations” (Bennett, 2004: 355). As such, I attempt to tease out some of the vital materialism (Bennett, 2010) in which the materiality of the thing of interest, or to use Rom Harré’s (2002) term, ‘social object’, is seen as engaging in lively conversations with humans across time and space.
Closely related to the concept of materiality is the immateriality of rapprochement tourism. I posit that the presence of the absence or haunting from the past is as powerful as the material presence of things in understanding the interaction of locals and tourists with the rapprochement tourism landscape. One strand of research that interrogates a ‘more than human world’ lies in spectro-geography (Pile, 2005; McEwan, 2008; Cameron, 2008). As Maddern and Adey (2008: 291) argues, “a careful attunement to the ghostly, spectral and the absent, can be a particularly powerful and emancipatory way of dealing with a number of problematics central to contemporary geographical thought.” I argue that an engagement with this field of study opens up opportunities to go beyond the physicality of the matter in materiality. It seems to me that ghost spirits are as much entangled by political happenings in the human world as humans are enchanted by the spiritual. As Gelder and Jacobs (1998, cited in McEwan, 2008: 37) argue:

Ghosts simply could not function in a climate of sameness, in a country which fantasises about itself as ‘one nation’ or which imagines a utopian future of ‘reconciliation’ in which ... all the ghosts have been laid to rest. But neither can they function in a climate of nothing but difference, where the one can never resemble the other, as in a ‘divided’ nation

It is perhaps only under the discourse of peace and post-war rapprochement, in a situation where sameness and difference remains an indeterminate, in the advent of unprecedented tourism exchanges between China and Taiwan, that such ghost stories flourish. But how do ghosts and spirits manifest themselves? Are they real or merely fabricated? Perhaps more importantly, how does a belief in their existence affect and constitute the tourist’s experience and her/his perception of cross-strait ties?
By interrogating the enchanted world, the cultural-geo-politics approach aims to reveal the roles played by non-human entities that are less manageable but nevertheless create affect amongst tourists on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This may either manifest in the form of memories evoked by ghosts and spirits from the war past, and how people from both sides deal with them, or through a new geo-cultural identity fostered amongst tourist-pilgrims by participating in a shared religious event. Such events bind devotees with different political allegiance and personal agendas together to fit into the overall discourse of rapprochement. Therefore, these spectral interventions challenge the rationality that is presumed under the ‘peace through tourism’ framework, and open up new possibilities to analyse rapprochement tourism. In other words, non-human beings operate in the arena of rational unbecoming. By following this line of inquiry, we find ourselves not merely discussing the effects but also the affects; not just the reason but also the emotion of rapprochement tourism. Indeed, in interrogating the materiality of cross-strait tourism between China and Taiwan, it is insufficient to focus solely on the physical border or traditional notions of real/solid matter. An analytical space needs to be reserved for the spirits, the ghosts, the deities, in order to capture a more complete picture of the cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism (see Chapter Six).
2.3 Towards a ‘Cultural-geo-politics’ of Rapprochement Tourism

I started this chapter discussing how researchers think about rapprochement tourism in terms of inter-state relations and ended it contemplating the roles ghosts and deities play in cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. Indeed, as Franklin’s (2007: 140) observes “…tourism is both open ended, always becoming something else, and under-determined, in that there is a heterogeneous field of objects, practices and projects with none of them (and certainly not only the humans among them) being decisive, the only mover or the sole agent.” A cultural-geo-politics framework is thus an eclectic platform for the discussion and analysis of such a complex issue as rapprochement tourism.

This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of literature pertaining to rapprochement tourism, tease out some gaps in existing research and suggest the potential contribution of this thesis. I have shown how many writings on the subject matter tend to adopt an uncritical ‘peace through tourism’ approach, while others are merely interested in commercial aspects of tourism such as destination management and marketing. Furthermore, there is also an inherent assumption that the rapprochement process is undertaken by the governments involved, rather than negotiated and performed by locals and tourists. Such state-centric approaches often reduce tourists to passive ‘numbers’ and ‘flows’ across borders of conflict. In the case of China and Taiwan, researchers on cross-strait tourism face methodological impediments in terms of their national identity and positionality within academic departments. While the former is the main reason why works on
cross-strait tourism are often one-sided, the latter explains the normative tone adopted by these academics. The lack of critical analysis and the focus on state-centric discussions are criticised by a burgeoning genre of research that engages with critical geopolitics of tourism across (former) borders of conflict. It is this strand of research that the thesis contributes to. I then introduced the ‘cultural-geo-politics’ approach before explicating the main concepts of ‘border’, ‘identity’ and ‘materiality’, which are pertinent to discussions in the empirical chapters. All in all, through a cultural-geo-politics approach, this thesis endeavours to shed light on not just the macro-political exchanges between states, but also the everyday geopolitics of non-state participants; to give voice to not only humans, but also the things and spectres that enchant the rapprochement tourism landscape. The next chapter will turn to questions of methodology.
3.1 Fieldwork as a Social Process

Research methods form an integral part of any academic project. They are not only tools available to the fieldworker, but are also means by which the researcher engages the researched community in a social process. It is by doing fieldwork that one gets to appreciate a place, its people and things, and above all, their geographies.

A month-long preliminary fieldwork was carried out from March to April 2010. This pilot study was executed to test out the feasibility of my project. The main objectives were to visit and get a sense of the various sites of difficult heritages and sensitive histories and to establish contacts with gatekeepers in order to expand my existing network of interviewees.\(^\text{10}\)

Subsequently ‘proper’ fieldwork was undertaken from January to June 2011. The preliminary fieldwork was useful in helping me ‘map out’ the research terrain and offered me some food for thought in terms of challenges/practicalities before I carried out the full-scale study. This chapter thus aims to elucidate the methodological routes I embarked on during my fieldwork in China and Taiwan. The first section discusses the various qualitative methods that

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\(^{10}\) I have and maintain a network of interviewees in Taiwan established while researching for my Honours and Master dissertations.
were utilised while the second section goes through the array of challenges and ethical/practical issues that I encountered during the research process. They were mitigated with varying degrees of success, but some lived on as limitations of this research. The final section interrogates my positionality and ends this chapter on a reflective note.

3.1.1 Semi-structured in-depth interviews & informal conversations

Potential interviewees for this research were organised into three groups: 1) Tourism officials, museum/event curators; 2) Tourists (both Chinese and Taiwanese); 3) Locals and other stakeholders (e.g. pilgrimage organisers, musicians, entrepreneurs). This is simply for the purpose of clarity and there is no intent to allude to any hierarchical/top-down structure. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with Chinese and Taiwanese tourists, tourism planners and people involved in the post-war creative industries. A total of 96 interviews were conducted, out of which 42 were Chinese tourists and 35 were Taiwanese tourists. Interviews with government officials were not so well-balanced. While I managed to talk to eight Taiwanese tourism officials, only two Chinese officials agreed to be interviewed. 11 I also interviewed two Chinese and seven Taiwanese locals who were either local entrepreneurs or artists contributing to post-war material culture. As far as possible, face-to-face interviews were arranged. In the few cases where my respondents were not able to meet up with me, the interview was carried out over

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11 Officials in China are almost impossible to contact. For instance, I was told by an informant that the Palace Museum in Beijing does not entertain enquiries from research students. Moreover, a museum director in China may well hold the position of a cabinet minister. This makes it all the more difficult to establish contact. Conversely, governing bodies in Taiwan are relatively more approachable.
the phone or via Email. In gaining access to people’s experiences of cross-strait tourism, snowballing contacts proved effective. However, I was careful to use ‘multiple initial contact points’ to prevent having a limited circle of like-minded contacts (Valentine, 2005a: 111). Although I could have aimed for a ‘representative sample’ in terms of gender and/or age group of cross-strait tourists, it is far more meaningful to capture a wide variety of travel experiences rather than spending precious time worrying whether a certain ‘quota’ has been reached for each category. Such purposive sampling eventually led me to explore the different types of tourists crossing the border, and a general pattern soon emerged. I observed that different generations deal with cross-border tourism encounters differently. For instance, those in their 80s-90s would reminisce about their past attachments with family members and places on the other side, while post-war baby boomers now in their 40s-60s shared more about memories of the war and their interpretations of it. Yet, the younger generations engaged themselves with popular culture or cultural differences between China and Taiwan. To illustrate, a popular variety show in Taiwan invited local undergraduates and their Chinese counterparts who were on exchange programmes to share their observations on each other’s culture in a fun and light-hearted environment. As such, rather than seeking for an abstract number or percentage to fulfil a certain ‘statistical representation’, I am more interested in how these individuals’ travel narratives contribute to a more nuanced understanding of rapprochement tourism.

All interviews were conducted in Mandarin and/or Hokkien (South Min dialect), at a time and place suited to the respondents’ convenience, and lasted about 45-60
minutes each. Although prepared in English, a Chinese version of the interview questions was provided to interviewees before the start of the interview so as not to put her/him at any disadvantage. A semi-structured format with questions serving as aide-memoire allowed the interview to proceed in a conversational mode. This facilitated effective interaction and better rapport as the phrasing of the questions may change according to the interviewee and mood of the particular session. In relating to the government officials, it was important to ‘gild the lily’ or to offer something in return (Clark et al., 1998). For instance, I was often asked to provide feedback on how to improve museums and to share research findings with my interviewees. These encounters gave me the opportunity to re-visit respondents and recount my preliminary findings and suggestions. It was often during these sessions that I was able to garner more opinions as they became more willing to share their knowledge. All interviews, at the interviewees’ consent, were digitally recorded. In conducting in-depth interviews, I often found myself assuming dual roles. For example, I was both a keen listener of the various stories my interviewee had to share and a ‘third person’ ‘observing’ the interview process, making in-situ critical analyses of what was said and determining how best to continue the conversation. It was this ‘jumping out and in’ of roles that maintained the integrity and quality of the interviews. Transcription was done as soon as possible after the interviews as it will be easier to elicit main themes when the conversations are still fresh in the mind (Longhurst, 2003). There was a need to be flexible when interviewing officials. They either had very limited time, or they were kind enough to invite me to their offices for the interview, but simultaneously had to attend to calls or even leave the rooms for meetings before returning to continue the interview. Some preferred to talk
through meals, and spent more time talking about the food than answering my questions.

The degree of formality of an interview needed to be adjusted so as to adapt to the various conditions and to yield maximum results. For instance, informal interviews were useful when interacting with local residents. Apart from the practicality of this method, the informal setting made it easier for me to “understand how individual people experience and make sense of their own lives” (Valentine, 2005a: 111). From the experience of my previous fieldwork encounters, informal conversations were particularly useful in gaining tourists’ perspectives at the various scenic spots. This was particularly true for Chinese tourists. First of all, since they travelled in tour groups with extremely tight schedules, they were always in a ‘rush-to-wait and wait-to rush’ mode. This made formal interviews extremely difficult, almost impossible. Furthermore, most Chinese tourists I encountered in Taiwan did not seem comfortable being approached by someone with a clipboard and pen. They were extremely sceptical about the motives of this Chinese/Taiwanese look-alike man asking them to describe their tour experience. However, they seemed more at ease if I was hanging around, helping them take some photographs, and then having a chat with them about their holiday.

3.1.2 Participation observation

For a research that aims to unravel the attitude and behaviour of locals and tourists towards rapprochement tourism, and their interactions with touristic things,
participant observation was essential. It was carried out during fieldtrips to various attractions such as museums, memorials and souvenir shops. The degree of participation as an observer (Hay, 2000) differs across time. Whenever I encountered a new tourist site, I participated as a tourist more than I observed the visitors. After repeated visits, I began to observe the behaviour of others more than I participated in the tour experience. This allowed me to relate better to tourists’ and locals’ experiences when I eventually interviewed them. Furthermore, elderly respondents would often prefer to be interviewed at their homes mostly due to their restricted mobility. Trips to homes proved to be fruitful as I was often treated with a wide array of photographs, souvenirs and other artefacts as my respondents related their travel narratives to me. In such cases, I adopted the ‘non-representational theory’ stance to “become an observant participant rather than a participant observer” (Thrift, 2001: 556) so as to “understand the meanings of place and the contexts of everyday life” (Kearns, 2000: 108). Also, by adopting a more observational role, the emotions evoked by these things and their interaction with my interviewees, were more vividly captured; something that a questionnaire would not be able to show. It was through such subtle manoeuvring between participation and observation that more meaningful readings of the ‘memoryscape’ could be achieved.

As this study espouses the relevance of a ‘grounded’ research, fieldtrips to the respective tourist sites were pertinent to unravel the production processes and consumption practices of the tourism landscapes. Apart from short and multiple visits to specific tourist attractions in both China and Taiwan, extended stays at certain sites were necessary to facilitate ethnographic methods like participant
observation and listening to cultural narratives of individuals. For instance, in order to appreciate the local residents’ perception and attitude towards cross-border tourists and rapprochement tourism, I spent two months on the island of Kinmen. The informal settings on the island provided me with valuable opportunities to engage with the locals’ ‘flow of everyday life’ (Hay, 2000) and to appreciate political nuances within a society. It was important for me to blend into their living environment (i.e. in terms of dressing appropriately and speaking the local dialect). I concur with Bunge’s (1971, cited in Cloke et al., 1991: 41) assertion that “[i]t is impossible to understand a neighbourhood without becoming a neighbour”. Apart from gathering information for this thesis, an ethnographic fieldwork gave me the opportunity to have a better understanding of local people and their culture. My stay in Kinmen allowed me to participate in the locals’ activities ranging from basketball games at the community sports hall to attending religious festivities. It was through such mundane and ingenuous encounters with locals in the ‘field’ that makes my fieldwork experience an extraordinary one. As Chang (2000a) expresses succinctly, “it is through the subtle power relations between people that we can best appreciate landscape evolution” (p. 346).

3.1.3 Secondary data

A variety of secondary sources was also tapped. My affiliation to the Centre for Chinese Studies during my fieldwork in Taiwan gave me access to the National Taiwan Library. I also had access to the reference library of the Mainland Affairs Council in Taipei. These opened up the methodological route to review theses and
publications by Taiwanese and Chinese academics on cross-strait tourism. Books on oral histories proved to be crucial in eliciting local people’s experiences during and after the war, while local newspapers revealed contemporary tourism happenings across the strait. Furthermore, official reports on diplomatic visits by Chinese civil servants were also referred to. The cultural-geo-political dimensions of cross-strait tourism available from the popular media (e.g. The Internet; TV news) also provided me with a better understanding of local situation and people’s views and sentiments. Internet activities such as blogging and web page posts serve as fertile grounds for interrogating everyday experiences and exchanges between the tourists and locals in both China and Taiwan. Such virtual ethnography provides windows through which the researcher could better capture the more nuanced and candid aspects of cross-strait sentiments in a grounded and personal manner. In a sense, fieldwork was not just something I did ‘out there’. The field site is both ‘out there’ and ‘in here’. So, it might be useful to think of fieldwork as a process that overflows spatial and temporal boundaries.

3.2 Fieldwork Impediments & Limitations

My fieldwork in China and Taiwan was not always smooth-sailing. In this section, I shall share some of the difficulties, constraints and challenges I encountered in the course of my journey. One of those difficulties occurred during the early stages of my fieldwork. As I was interested in exploring the identity politics of souvenir buying and giving I was hoping to gain access to my interviewees’ homes. I presumed that it
would be more convenient for my respondent to reach out to a certain souvenir displayed on her/his cabinet and start recollecting its biography, and also share some photos while talking about travel experiences. I soon realised, however, that although I managed to get myself invited to the homes of a few close contacts of mine, first-time interviewees were not that keen on having the interviews at their homes. This was mainly due to inconvenience because of the presence of other family members. Initially, I thought this was a compromise of my original plan. However, this method turned out to be very effective in getting people to select the objects that they thought were significant, and very often, the process of choosing and narrating the biographies of these things away from the familiar surroundings of their own homes seemed to trigger a more critical reflection of identity politics. The sharing of photos was also facilitated by technology. Some younger respondents brought along their lap tops or iPads to show me their travel photos. And with Wi-fi connection easily available at interview venues such as cafeterias, social media like Facebook where photos were shared and comments received was just a click away. As such, my respondents were able to relate to me their thoughts in a relaxed environment, away from the ‘watchful eyes’ of other members at home.

Gaining access to government officials was not easy. I found that it was almost impossible to interview government officials in mainland China, especially those in Beijing due to red tapes and bureaucracy. For example, I had wanted to talk to a representative of the Palace Museum in Beijing to learn about how the museum was engaging with cross-strait relations. My request was turned down because the museum claimed that it has stopped ‘entertaining’ research students. However, as
This thesis is not solely based on officials’ perspectives, I managed to overcome this challenge by using alternative methods like textual analysis of official tourism websites or indirect interviews with reporters who had covered related stories. Conversely, contacts in Kinmen and mainland Taiwan were more accessible. This was largely due to my previous presence ‘in the field’ while researching for my Honours and Masters dissertations. As such, I was trusted as “part of an already known community rather than a completely unknown and difficult-to-place stranger” (Crang and Cook, 2007: 19). For example, I was able to interview a museum curator in Kinmen and met up with an informant from Taiwan's Tourism Bureau through gatekeepers who were already familiar with me. I also had access to the reference library of the Mainland Affairs Council in Taipei. Snowballing personal contacts in both Taipei and Beijing is a critical tool. Various ‘gatekeepers’ needed to be identified before access to desired interviewees was possible. The cultural context of China and Taiwan – societies that prefer personal connections and relationships to formal encounters – allows the effectiveness of snowballing to be realised, as trust is more easily gained. Reporters, or anyone working in the media were extremely resourceful gatekeepers, and I was fortunate to be able to tap into their network when trying to gain access to the government. My contacts included a columnist working for the Chinese Communist Party official newspaper, a reporter at Xinhua News Agency (China), and a couple of television programme producers in Taiwan. In China, reporters are treated with caution as politicians are worried that they might be featured in negative press should they ‘offend’ them. Reporters themselves need the politicians to support their projects or provide insider’s stories. It is this delicate power relation that makes reporters excellent gatekeepers.
Other than limitations of research methods and difficulties with gaining access to certain respondents, I also encountered an ethical issue with interviewing Chinese undergraduates who had been on exchange programmes in Taiwan. As the gatekeepers were mostly their seniors or someone of higher authority, I was concerned whether the recruitment method involved unbalanced power dynamics. For instance, through my personal contact in China, I was able to interview five Peking University undergraduates who had visited Taiwan. Although the person who helped me arrange the meetings is a friend of my contact, she is a staff member of the University’s overseas exchange programme selection committee. In an intensely hierarchical society like China, the students might have felt obliged to participate in my research. And as I was about the same age as the University staff, most of my interviewees addressed me as ‘senior’ throughout the interviews. Although I appreciate the efficiency of such an arrangement, I was equally concerned about the potentially unbalanced power relation between myself and my respondents. I found myself having to assure them that participation was non-obligatory and that my research is independent of their University’s administration. Furthermore, I ensured that I conducted my interview in a conversational mode, sharing my thoughts with them as appropriate, without relying too much on a question and answer style, which might aggravate the very much entrenched senior-junior power dynamics.

As much as I wanted to assimilate to my research community, I was often challenged with ethical decisions as to how far I should go to be ‘like one of them’. As the saying goes, “When in Rome, do what the Romans do”, and in this spirit, I would drink a pint or two with my interviewees if necessary. However, I am not a smoker, and this
might have affected my rapport with some of my potential informants, especially in China. During my fieldtrip to one of the Chinese cities, I was invited to lunch with some female government officials, a local male historian, a local reporter and his camera man – a strange combination of government, academia and media. On the rotatable top at the centre of the table sat a barrel of cigarettes. When we were half-way through the meal, the men at the table started to circulate the barrel; offering and lighting up each other’s cigarette. I was offered one too. Attempting to avoid being tagged as a ‘non-smoker’ and therefore not ‘man enough’ or not ‘one of them’, I explained that I was having a sore-throat and would rather give it a miss. And then the question came, “But are you a smoker at all?” Although they were polite towards me, the cigarettes and smoke that engulfed the room seemed to bind them more closely together. I was undoubtedly inhaling the second-hand smoke, but unquestionably out of place and outside their ‘circle of trust’. I made the decision not to smoke but at times risked access to certain groups of people and their insights. This inevitably lived on as a limitation of my research.

Nevertheless, in other occasions, I was ‘adopted’ by my research community as one of them. For instance in Kinmen, because of my lineage, people on the island see me as part of their community (see section 3.3 for a discussion on my positionality). It was often in such a situation that I found myself doing research amongst familiar faces, interviewing people I have known for years and have become close friends with. However, because of my familiarity with them, I found it quite a challenge to ask people ‘the obvious questions’ (see the challenges DeLyser outlines on ‘insider research’ (2001)). Therefore, it was easier to engage them in discussion about cross-
strait tourism rather than asking them questions that might seem to fetch an ‘obvious answer’.

3.3 Reflexive Methodology

It is appropriate to end this chapter on a reflective note. Being reflexive certainly accounts for part of the methodology as research is never a ‘unilinear’ process (see, for example, Dowling’s (2000) piece on ‘critical reflexivity’). I needed to constantly stop, take a step back, reflect upon my positionality and fine-tune research methods in the course of my fieldwork in order to proceed.

According to Star (1991, cited in Thrift, 1997: 135), “people inhabit many different domains at once…and the negotiation of identities, within and across groups, is an extraordinarily complex and delicate task…; we are all marginal in some regard, as members of more than one community…” (see also, Narayan, 1993; DeLyser, 2001). As much as I am interested in the concept of ‘border’ in this thesis, I was very much involved in the process of ‘crossing borders’ myself during the fieldwork as I adopted different identities at different places and time, with different people. My positionality as a Singaporean student researcher is substantiated by my identity as an ‘Overseas Chinese’ ‘returning’ to research for his thesis. Existing contacts with relatives in both China and Taiwan further ‘legitimised’ my work. Being simultaneously an insider and an outsider proved to be effective in eliciting more sensitive insights from local respondents. On one hand, they were more forthcoming
during discussions as I have a lineage relationship with them. Conversely, because I am a Singaporean, they felt relatively at ease to disclose more sensitive sentiments as they knew that I would not be entangled in their much complicated socio-politics. My experience was thus different from DeLyser’s (2001) definition of insider and outsider. For her, those who are ‘adopted’ by their communities and who ‘go native’ “begin as outsiders, whereas those [like her] who study [their] own communities start as insiders and are ‘natives’ before the research begins” (ibid: 442). For me, it is something that is ‘in-between’. Due to my Overseas Chinese identity, I am neither a complete insider nor a total outsider. Therefore, careful threading in and between my positionalities to maintain a kind of ‘identity equilibrium’ during the fieldwork process, contributed significantly to a fruitful learning journey. Furthermore, my positionality is a critical asset when differentiating the contribution of my research from that of others. Most research done on China-Taiwan tourism seems to focus on just one side of the border. I suggest that this is largely due to methodological impediments faced by the researcher. In other words, he or she is bounded by methodological limitations (e.g. positionality; access to resources; time factor etc.) to carry out research on the ‘other side’, preventing useful and important comparative analyses to be achieved. For instance, tourism researchers in China and Taiwan are more often than not burdened by their own positionalities. The researcher’s national identity hinders her/his accessibility to resources on the ‘other side’. This is the main reason why there is an apparent lack of comparative studies looking at tourism landscapes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In this respect, my
positionality as a Singaporean, with lineage connections to both China and Taiwan, is an advantage.

However, there were times when I thought I had blended in quite well with a community, but would be reminded of my ‘outsider’ status by members of that community. For example, during a presentation of research methodology at the Centre for Chinese Studies in Taipei, I was trying to bring across my argument that Western researchers doing fieldwork in China and Taiwan often have an advantage over their Asian counterparts due to the higher social status accorded to them by the locals. I was reminded of Rose’s (1997) point that “[f]acets of the self – institutional privilege, for example, as well as aspects of social identity – are articulated as ‘positions’ in a multidimensional geography of power relations” (Rose, 1997: 308). To illustrate, I shared my views on the ‘chong yang’ (崇洋 – worship/admiration of anything/anyone Western) phenomenon in both China and Taiwan. I lamented that ‘Western’ researchers often receive better treatment from the locals than local researchers in China and Taiwan. A senior lecturer once told me, “In the world of Asian scholarship, there is a hierarchy of researchers. The Chinese and Taiwanese, for instance, are always going to listen to the Western scholars first, then consider writings by their own people, and then if they have time, others.” My hypothesis was that given the same research topic, locals in China and Taiwan are more willing to share their thoughts and interact with a Westerner than a fellow Asian. While being seen to be mingling with a Westerner elevates one’s social status/ego and could possibly be a highly fulfilling experience in itself, there are not much ‘perks’ to be seen with a ‘nosey’ Asian asking frustratingly ‘obvious’ questions. When I was
relating this point, I saw some nods of agreement from the audience, which made me feel that I was a part of their community. However, during the question and answer session, a local academic was quick to point out that she felt that as a Singaporean, I was in fact enjoying the same type of privilege that a Westerner would have experienced. Therefore, positionality is a two-way affair; although positioning oneself or ‘situating' is a crucial goal for all critical geographies” (Rose, 1997: 306), it is also about how people in my research community place me in their network.

In terms of language, proficiency in the Chinese language and the Hokkien (South Min) dialect gave me an added advantage in establishing commonality and rapport with my respondents, and gaining their views and concerns. Indeed, “[g]iven that the goal of ethnographic and related qualitative research is to understand something meaningful about the lives of other people, the language(s) within and between which this understanding develops requires some detailed thought” (Crang and Cook, 2007: 23). I have always believed that being able to communicate with one’s informants in their own language is a prerequisite for a more ‘grounded’ research as one would be able to appreciate the more nuanced expressions. At times, however, my command of the pu tong hua (普通话 – Standard Mandarin) was insufficient. When researching on the Sea Goddess (Mazu) cult in the Chinese town of Putian, I had to rely on my friend, who grew up there, to communicate with the locals in the Putian dialect. It was only when it came to interviewing a Taiwanese devotee, that I was better able to strike a rapport with the interviewee as I was more fluent in Taiwanese Mandarin than my Chinese friend.
Apart from being reflexive on the practicalities of doing my fieldwork, I constantly reflect upon the moral obligation to undertake an ethical research. As Blomley (1994) and Castree (1999) have suggested, there is a rich history of social activism in human geography that espouses the need to make a difference or improve the social condition of the researched (Cloke, 2002; Valentine, 2005b). Yet, increasingly, geographers are being criticised for being more concerned over intellectual aspects rather than the political relevance of research (Mitchell, 1995; Philo, 2000; Cloke, 2002). Similarly, many researchers are doubted for their commitment towards the researched community vis-à-vis that of fulfilling publications and funding requirements (Cloke, 2002). Therefore, there is a constant call for academics to revive the discipline’s commitment to social activism, “to get off their wall of self-importance and take down the walls of impenetrable language” (Fox, 1979, cited in Kearns, 2001: 301).

I argue that such commitment to the communities in which we conduct our research can be reflected in many ways that are not restricted to the direct contributions of research. In other words, our relationship with the community stretches beyond the boundaries of the research process. Herman and Mattingley (1999) stress the importance for reciprocity between the researcher and the researched. In this respect, such reciprocities can benefit the researched community in humble but practical ways – what I term ‘ethics beyond research’. For example, during my stay in Kinmen, I volunteered my service in translating and correcting the explanatory texts at the Civil Defence Tunnel and the Chiang Ching-Kuo Memorial Hall. Although this was not directly related to my fieldwork agenda, I felt it was nevertheless a humble
way to return a favour to the community that hosted me, especially in a time when its tourism industry is aiming to attract international tourists. A decent English translation effort is definitely essential to reach out to foreign tourists. In China, I was invited to join a group of historians in their effort to submit a UNESCO Heritage Site proposal for the Island of Gulangyu off the coast of Xiamen. I am not a historian, but nevertheless, I helped to source out historic maps of the island back in the UK. These simple examples serve to illustrate that an ethical research need not necessarily realise abstract notions of social justice or activism. Such small acts of care and concern to the researched community reflects Kearns’ (2001) definition of a compassionate geography that possesses the spirit of solidarity and empathy, and involves “being down to earth so as to reconnect with the roots of both our humanity and our discipline” (p. 301).

In retrospect, the contribution of my research on rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan to the betterment of both societies, if any, might not be realised in the short run. However, the continuity of my relationship with the local community brings about beneficial “externalities” that actually contribute to its development in a humble but practical way. Furthermore, helping the host communities gave me an opportunity to reciprocate their kindness and support. Thus, the vocabulary of ‘social justice’ should be expanded to go beyond abstract understandings that are often held hostage in the ‘ivory towers’ of knowledge. ‘Down-to-earth’ ethical behaviours help to create a climate of trust between the researcher and the researched community (Korgensen, 1971; Mitchell and Draper, 1982; Walsh, 1992, cited in Israel and Hay, 2006) so that people may be more willing to participate in the
research we undertake. Indeed, developing a sense for the other (Augé, 1998) serves as a basis for “living ethically and acting politically” (Cloke, 2002: 587).

3.4 Summary

This chapter has attempted to lay out the methodological roots and routes of this thesis. This was done by interrogating the various research tools I utilised during my fieldwork. Challenges met and mitigations meted out were discussed – some of which were negotiated more successfully than others, while other impediments lived on as limitations of this research. I find Rose’s (1997: 319) advice apt:

We cannot know everything, nor can we survey power as if we can fully understand, control or redistribute it. What we may be able to do is something rather more modest but, perhaps, rather more radical: to inscribe into our research practices some absences and fallibilities while recognizing that the significance of this does not rest entirely in our own hands.

Fieldwork is something that researchers seek to manage, but at the same time, there is a need to acknowledge that it cannot be completely under one’s control. It is like an organism; it has a life of its own and is always in the process of becoming. It is thus important to embrace this idea when doing fieldwork so as not to be outdone by occasional hiccups along the way. In terms of ‘writing up’ for this thesis, the points that constitute the various discussions were garnered from a personal log book. Effort was made to record and reflect on the findings and development on a daily basis; both to draw a closure to each day’s fieldwork and in preparation for this thesis. Thus, as Cloke et al. (2004) have intimated, this was not a matter of ‘writing up’ at the end, but ‘writing through’. As the authors put it succinctly, “even the most
preliminary notes and observations made in the field are already casting a particular interpretive light on the eventual ‘findings’ of the research” (p.360). Indeed, this thesis is the result of three years of continuous writing.

The final section of this chapter was dedicated to reflections on my positionality as a researcher and my thoughts on conducting an ‘ethical research’. As Doreen Mattingly and Karen Falconer-Al-Hindi (1995, cited in Rose, 1997: 308) remind us, it is necessary “to make one’s position vis-à-vis research known rather than invisible, and to limit one’s conclusions rather than making grand claims about their universal applicability.” Indeed, the data collected and the interpretations made in this thesis were context-based and the result of ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway, 1991, cited in Nightingale, 2003). Therefore, they are by no means representative of the entire spectrum of views. Also, the methods employed and perspectives adopted were but some of the many angles from which the research objectives may be fulfilled. It is with this in mind that I now turn to the empirical findings.
CHAPTER FOUR

TAMING & CONSUMING SENSITIVE HISTORIES & DIFFICULT HERITAGES

4.1 Introduction

‘Common heritage’ and ‘cultural proximity’ between China and Taiwan are often played up by politicians on both sides of the Strait when fostering tourism exchanges between their people. But what if this ‘heritage’ or ‘shared history’ is haunted by ghosts of the past – a past that was marred by chaos and bloodshed; a civil war history that saw a country torn apart by differences in political ideologies? As much as both governments strive to put economics before politics or seemingly adopt a ‘historical amnesia’ approach towards rapprochement tourism, there is evidently a great deal of political work that goes into writing different accounts of the past. In this chapter, I set out to discuss the different ways in which sensitive histories and difficult heritages are managed and consumed on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. ‘Difficult heritage’, according to Macdonald (2009: 1), is “a past that is recognised as meaningful in the present but that is also contested and awkward for public reconciliation with a positive, self-affirming contemporary identity (Macdonald, 2009: 1). In the case of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan, I borrow this term to refer to the uneasy historical baggage brought about by decades of
separation that people from both sides now encounter. I seek to interrogate how these sites are re-organised to cater to tourists from ‘the other side’, and how new ones are being created in the midst of the rapprochement ‘climate’. By expressing ‘history’ and ‘heritage’ in their plural form, it is suggested that there is no one History or Heritage ‘out there’ – “the past is not an immutable or independent object. Rather, it is endlessly revised from our present positions (Crang, 1994: 341). As such, people are exposed to and indeed possess different versions of histories and heritages. Furthermore, as this chapter will show, practices of rapprochement are constantly (re)producing heritage.

In the next section, I present a brief overview of literature pertaining to post-conflict heritage management. I will then discuss, using empirical examples, how these play out in various tourist attractions in China (section 4.3) and Taiwan (section 4.4). I will show that in its organisation of sensitive histories and difficult heritages, China seeks to establish a ‘Taiwan inclusive’ national identity, and to reduce historical differences to the realm of the same. Conversely, Taiwan adopts a pragmatic approach in offering ‘gestures of rapprochement’ to cater to Chinese tourists while at the same time seeking to create a unique Taiwanese identity. From these examples, we shall see the depoliticisation of difficult heritages, and the domestication, commercialization and cartoonisation of sensitive historical figures. These are all part and parcel of attempts to make an ‘inconvenient’ past more ‘palatable’ for cross-strait tourists’ consumption. But of course, the tourism landscape is also shaped by locals and tourists themselves. We are reminded by Crang (1994) that “there are multiple ways of experiencing heritage” and “it is performance that
creates heritage” (p. 341; see also Franklin, 2003a). Such performances are enacted not merely by the government but also ordinary people (both tourists and locals) inhabiting these so called heritage sites. More specifically, I will show how these tourists and locals interpret exhibits in museums and how they view tourism products created under the rapprochement theme. Also, I explore how cross-strait tourists’ identities are performed through their encounters with the locals. Analysing these aspects is important as it is in line with the aim of the thesis to unravel the micro-political nuances of rapprochement tourism. As such, this chapter will also consider people’s lives and livelihood and how these are interwoven into the politics of cross-strait relations. The discussion provides some theoretical pathways through which to engage with debates on the ideological ‘taming’ of ‘difficult’ heritages and ‘sensitive’ histories, and the identity politics associated with tourists’ and local’s consumption of the rapprochement tourism landscape.

4.2 Post-conflict Heritage Management

I have discussed at the outset that this thesis aims to unravel the micro-political aspects of rapprochement tourism rather than adopt a state-centric approach. However, I am also interested in how inter-state tourism policies aim at taming difficult heritages and sensitive histories materialise on the ground and how the resultant landscape affects and is in turn reproduced by people’s feelings about cross-strait relations. Such ideological taming to cater to tourists from a former enemy state has profound political implications. Therefore, “[r]ather than closing our eyes to such [state] practices and downplaying their importance, we still need to
scrutinize how and in what practices and discourses such border-producing identity narratives are produced and reproduced” (Paasi, 2011a: 21).

Heritage, as has been discussed in studies on heritage tourism, is commonly assumed to encompass, in Logan and Reeves’ (2008: 1) terms, “the great and beautiful creations of the past, [and] reflections of the creative genius of humanity”. However, historical pasts that were unpleasant, but nevertheless play a significant role in social memory and identity politics, are beginning to be emphasised in the context of ‘heritage conservation’ (Winter, 2007; Logan and Reeves, 2008; Macdonald, 2009; Burström and Gelderblom, 2011). For example, Logan and Reeves’ collection of case studies on ‘difficult heritage’ focus on the painful and/or shameful episodes of a nation’s or community’s history and “the ways that government agencies, heritage professionals and the communities themselves seek to remember, commemorate and conserve these cases – or, conversely, choose to forget them” (ibid: 1). While Logan and Reeves’ study is a cross-cultural collation of heritage sites from different continents, Winter (2007) focuses on the World Heritage Site of Angkor, Cambodia. His case study reflects on post-conflict developmental issues surrounding stakeholders’ competing claims to the heritage space and identity. Conversely, Macdonald (2009) and Burström and Gelderblom (2011) provide a case of coping with the Nazi past – a heritage that some locals would rather not recognise, but nevertheless bears significant testimony to the past. The former looks at the Nazi Party Rally Grounds in Nuremberg while the latter discusses the Third Reich Harvest Festival at Bückeberg. Both studies capture vividly the politics and dilemma of recognising the historical significance of such sites on the one hand, and the risk that
the ‘heritage effect’ might promote these sites into “becoming pilgrimage destinations for perpetrator admirers” (Macdonald, 2009: 3) on the other.

In the Asian context, Tim Winter (2009) discusses how intra-regional tourism puts the management of sensitive histories and the politics of their interpretation in the limelight. He reports that some countries need to alter their historical narratives in order to cater to tourists from the region. For instance, in order to maintain cordial relations with China, and to attract Chinese tourists, Vietnam has to reconceptualise the way it represents its hostile encounters with China. Vietnamese government officials “have instructed local tour guides to skim over histories of invasion and inter-state conflict” (ibid: 113). In China, the Nanjing Massacre memorial site, which is visited by many domestic tourists, “seems to engender simultaneous feelings of hatred and peaceful reconciliation toward Japan” (Ross, 2006, cited in Winter, 2009: 113).

Recently, some commentators have adopted a phenomenological perspective that argues that heritage tourism “cannot exist independently of the tourists who perform it” (Franklin, 2003a: 205, emphasis in original). For instance, Instead of seeing heritage as dead and immutable, Crang (1994) suggests that “we study its process of creation” (p. 346). Tourists at heritage sites are not passive viewers but are actively interacting with what is presented to them, drawing upon their own life experiences and other sources of knowledge. It is through such engagement and embodied performance that new meanings of heritage are created. In a time where nations and communities are beginning to acknowledge and reconcile with their
‘problematic’ past, an engagement with this emerging genre of research proves crucial. The following sections address places of interest in China and Taiwan that come into being under processes of rapprochement. Some are newly built, some revamped and some are accidental. It is of course not my intention to be exhaustive, but rather my rationale is to highlight some salient points with regards to the taming and organisation of sensitive histories and difficult heritages.

4.3 Exploring China’s Rapprochement Strategies

4.3.1 Reducing historical differences to the realm of the same

If there is one place that exudes the sense of a cultural-geo-political taming of sensitive histories, then the China Museum for Fujian-Taiwan Kinship (also known as Min Tai Yuan Museum) is the example par excellence (Figure 4.1).
Located in the city of Quanzhou in the south-eastern province of Fujian, the museum covers a considerable area of 23,332 m² and is 43m tall. The idea of having a museum to showcase the ‘natural and historical bond’ between China and Taiwan was first proposed in 2004 by Li Changchun (Director of the Central Spiritual Civilisation Steering Committee of the Politburo Standing Committee). The fact that it is given ‘national level’ status goes to show the high priorities accorded to it by the central government. Perhaps it was due to the pro-independence leadership by the Democratic Progression Party (DPP) in Taiwan¹² that this project was deemed necessary. The DPP was then attempting to disassociate Taiwan with its Chinese heritage while actively promoting a Taiwanese identity. As such, the construction of a museum that reminds Taiwanese visitors of their kinship ties with mainland China

¹² Taiwan was still under the leadership of Chen Shui-bien in 2004. It was only four years later in 2008, that the pro-status quo Kuomintang regained control of the parliament.
became an important component of the Chinese central government’s ‘Taiwan-related work’ (对台工作). I will show that the museum seeks not just to depoliticise a sensitive past but to showcase and celebrate Taiwan’s connection with mainland China. This is a celebration of sameness, a fostering of togetherness between the Chinese and their Taiwanese counterparts, which reduces historical differences to the realm of the same.

In just 18 months construction of the museum was completed, and in May 2006, it was open to the public. Within the first year of opening, it hosted 1,030,000 visitors, out of which 110,000 were from Taiwan. As such “it is a base from which the central government showcase its policies towards Taiwan… [and] an important platform to promote more exchanges with the Taiwanese for collaboration and development of an important window through which to introduce Fujian” (Museum Introduction). Other than being a propaganda platform for the Taiwanese, the museum is also a base for both ‘National Youth Education’ (全国青少年教育基地) and ‘National Patriotism Education’ (全国爱国主义教育示范基地).

Visitors to the museum are greeted by its grand façade. Its architectural design is full of symbolisms, the meanings of which are usually relayed to the Taiwanese by their Chinese tour guides. For instance, a huge rectangular pond measuring 74m long and 18m wide lies in front of the entrance. The flowing water “signifies the continuity and long history of kinship between China and Taiwan” (Museum Introduction). Also, two 2.19m tall ‘nine-dragons’ pillars flank the museum, symbolising “the fact that people from both sides of the Strait are all descendants of the Dragon” (ibid). These
designs showcase the Chinese government’s desire for reunification. The theme of kinship and familial ties continues inside the museum – an 18m tall and 9m wide ‘gunpowder painting’ of a giant Banyan Tree with massive roots took centre stage in the reception hall (Figure 4.2).

![Figure 4.2 Cai Guoqiang’s ‘Gunpowder Painting’](image)

It is an inauguration exhibition by the renowned artist Cai Guoqiang, who had used his favourite material – gunpowder – and some precision pyrotechnics to create this piece of contemporary art. The controversial material and explosive technique involved in creating this piece were used to symbolise a transition from conflict to rapprochement. This was not any political rapprochement, but one between ‘family members’, between ‘brothers’. According to Cai, "Banyan trees are easily found in
Fujian and Taiwan, and viewers from across the Straits can connect with the image comfortably based on its human and historical connotations," (China Daily, 20 May 2006). Evidently, the Banyan tree and its extensive root system clearly symbolise a big and extended family, alluding again to the familial themes that the Chinese are keen to sell to their Taiwanese counterparts. As if to reinforce the ‘one family’ discourse, it was reported that Cai had enrolled the assistance of his family members from his hometown village nearby to complete this painting.

![Museum’s floor plan](source: Pan, 2011)

The main exhibition hall is divided into five zones based on geography, ancestry, legal, commercial, and cultural ties. These zones are connected by carefully designed corridors and pathways to direct tourists’ gaze and guide their flow and direction (Figure 4.3). Although separated into five different zones, the museum is essentially about a celebration of sameness/similarities. The exhibition starts by using a
temporal theme: beginning from the Quaternary Ice Age of the Pleistocene, through the early migration of people from Fujian to Taiwan. These displays “spatialise time into a series of...discrete narrative episodes” (Crang, 1994: 345). The narration then seeks to naturalise Taiwan’s relationship with China. For instance, a case was made about how Taiwan and mainland China used to be connected by a land bridge. Findings from archaeological excavations are also displayed to justify that the two places were geographically connected to each other. During one of my visits to the museum, a Taiwanese visitor burst out in laughter and commented to his group, “Wow... can’t believe that they go to such extent to convince that we belong to China! Really take my hat off them!” Moving on to the early migration of people from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, there is a section suggesting that the aboriginal people in Taiwan could be descendants of the Minyue Clan from China. It is interesting to note here that Taiwan has always used its indigenous culture to celebrate its unique Taiwanese identity and therefore difference with China. The Taiwanese believe that their ‘original inhabitants’ (原住民)\textsuperscript{13} have Austronesian roots and are closely related to their Southeast Asian neighbours (Hitchcock and Stanley, 2006). One of my Taiwanese respondents, Chen Shu-yi who had visited the museum shared her thoughts:

> What have our aboriginal people got to do with theirs? Hahah! Even those dead man’s bones, they need to claim that they originated from China. People over here often refer to the Chinese as kong-gu-li (in the Hokkien dialect). It's actually ‘concrete’ in English...meaning that their brains are filled with cement.... Can’t move and can’t think...very hard... it's an adjective to describe a person who is very stubborn.

(Personal interview, 2011)

\textsuperscript{13} There are currently 14 recognised aboriginal groups in Taiwan: Ami, Atayal, Bunun, Kavalan, Paiwan, Puyuma, Rukai, Saisiyat, Tao, Thao, Tsou, Truku, Sakizaya, and Sediq.
It is not my intention here to prove whose version is ‘true’. The origin of Austronesians is in itself contested, not to mention the politics of appropriation by both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments. However, the museum’s storyline and its attempt to create a collective past, and how Taiwanese visitors reacted to the displays bring to mind Franklin’s (2003a: 194) argument that “Heritage...is literally genealogy, a chance to showcase local culture, to create social identity, and to have some say and control over how others, especially tourists, understand local people” and, I would add, understand themselves. As such, the reaction to the displays is a dialogue between the objects of display and the visitors. In striking a conversation with these things, the visitors are in fact performing their identities vis-à-vis that, which was narrated to them. Indeed, “Heritage is not an object seen as existing independently of how it is experienced” (Crang, 1994: 342).

Instead of addressing ‘difficult heritage’ (i.e. the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang), this ‘episode’ in history was intentionally suppressed when the chronological order of display is suddenly disrupted by a cultural theme that highlights the various aspects of ancestral worshipping, religions (Buddhism and Taoism), folk beliefs (e.g. the Mazu Sea Goddess cult) and schooling system that people from both sides share in common. Other than portraying a shared cultural identity, the museum also attempts to foster a ‘Taiwan-inclusive’ nationalism’. For example, the curators chose to enact the idea of a common enemy. The section, named ‘Joint Resistance Against Western Colonialists’, illustrates how Taiwan and China were brothers in arm in chasing away the Dutch from Taiwan, in fighting against the British during the Opium War, the French Army during the Sino-
French War, and the Japanese. Special attention was placed on the resistance against the Japanese as photos and historical records were utilised to show how people from both sides joined efforts to oppress the cessation of Taiwan to Japan, and how they resisted the Japanese rule. This narrative style is not unique to the museum and can be observed in other sites like the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing and the Museum for the War of Chinese People Resistance Against Japan in Chongqing. Yet, it was not surprising that most Taiwanese visitors did not seem impressed by this rendition and adopted a fleeting attitude when encountering this section. For one, the Taiwanese, especially the younger generation, do not possess any historical connection with the Opium War, and certainly bear no grudges against the ‘Western Colonialists’. In fact, Taiwanese governance of its colonial past, be it under the Dutch or Japanese, is set in a tone of ‘nostalgic remembrance of local history’ (Chan, 2011: 374) rather than hatred. In other words, the strategy adopted by the museum to ‘deal’ with ‘difficult heritage’ in terms of forgetting sensitive histories and demonizing historical remembrance of an imagined common enemy does not seem to reap its intended effects.

Other than engaging in critical dialogues with the exhibits, the Taiwanese visitors that I observed did not follow the intended route. Instead of a passive, ‘conveyor belt’ encounter, as assumed by many commentators, visitors were more spontaneous and often had something in mind that they wanted to see. It is this sifting and sorting, and varying span of attention that made the museum a
performative space in itself. One of my Taiwanese interviewees, Zhou Miao-chen, put it this way:

I think there is nothing special in the museum. We were on a group tour and I had no idea how we ended up there. If you haven’t mentioned, I would have forgotten that we’ve been there. We were doing research on Taiwanese businessmen’s children studying in Kinmen at that time. We were also writing something on religion and the spread of Christianity in Kinmen, so we wanted to see if there is anything special. We went to the religion section, but nothing on Christianity. And there was also one section on wedding custom, and I went to take a look... so I only went through it selectively. I realized that it did not mention too much about politics.

(Personal interview, 2011)

There is a kind of spontaneity in Zhou’s approach to the museum exhibits, suggesting a time-space interaction that was not intended or anticipated by the curator of the museum. MacCannell (2001) introduces the term ‘the second gaze’ to “denote the way many tourists wilfully ignore the proffered direction. He uses this to underline the independence or agency or tourists in the face of attempts to order and manage the ‘gaze’ (Franklin, 2003a: 206). As such, tourists’ interactions with such heritage museums are less passive than active. They subvert the ordering of space and take on a journey of their own in their exploration of the museum, concentrating on some parts, skimming through others, and skipping other parts completely. According to Crang (1994: 346),

Their motions and their experiences are the performance—what I term the utterance—of these places. They transform them, open them to use and subversion. But no product is left, no traces remain. This is an appropriation of the given order that occupies but does not possess it. These utterances, then, are overlooked in many accounts—by commentators and designers.
I cannot agree more with this observation, and the lack of such commentary is still very apparent almost two decades on.

4.3.2 Between memory and money: cashing in on Chiang Kai-shek

Dealing with a difficult past involves coming to terms with sensitive political figures too. This section discusses the ‘domestication’ of Chiang Kai-shek at his ancestral hometown in Xikou, China, which recently became a popular tourist attraction amongst both Chinese and Taiwanese tourists. Local entrepreneurs’ attempts to commercialise heritage and Taiwanese tourists’ reactions will also be discussed. But first, let us take a look at the changing attitude towards this sensitive political figure. Chiang Kai-shek could not be a more controversial figure in the history of China. He was the villain in the eyes of many when his party executed thousands of communist during the White Terror of 1927. Furthermore, Chiang was denounced of his policy of cornering the communists rather than concentrating on resisting the Japanese during the Second World War. ‘Heritage sites’ were preserved and opened to the public to educate them on the ‘horrid past’ under the ‘Kuomintang dictatorship’. For example, the Zhazidong Prison in Chongqing, where Kuomintang imprisoned and later massacred its political prisoners, was designated as ‘Important Preservation of Historical Relics’ (重点保护文物) by the Sichuan Province local government in 1956, and as ‘National Preservation of Historical Relics’ (全国重点保护文物) by the State Council in 1988. The site, which showcases the living conditions of prisoners and the numerous methods of torture used by the Kuomintang was and still is popular.
amongst domestic mass tourists. A dusty portrait of Chiang Kai-shek in his military uniform hung on the wall of what seems to be a command centre. A mother was seen pointing out the ‘torture room’ to her son and explained, “This is where those *bad eggs* [villains] beat up and killed your grandfather.” This vignette exemplifies that “[m]emorialising events is not done by developers or professionals, but in the practices of visitors” (Crang, 1994: 350).

Yet, in the midst of rapprochement with Taiwan, portrayal of the infamous Generalissimo has somehow taken a new twist. According to my Chinese respondents, Chiang and his party are now treated more neutrally. Qi Yu, a Chinese postgraduate, recalled:

> There is an obvious change in the way the government portray Chiang Kai-shek and KMT. When I was a school boy, KMT was always portrayed as the bad guys in our history text books, but not anymore now. Especially if you were to go to the museums in Beijing... the way they narrate about the resistance against the Japanese... it was more of a united front rather than putting the blame on the KMT...

(Personal interview, 2011).

A reporter in Fenghua shared the same sentiments:

If you realise, there are now more soap operas showing cooperation between the KMT and the CCP in fighting against the Japanese. Such TV shows are very hot [i.e. popular] nowadays. The whole family will have dinner and watch these episodes together. In the past, only the People’s Liberation Army were portrayed as fighting against the Japanese alone.

(Mr Wu, personal communication, 2011)
As is evident ‘difficult heritage’ and ‘sensitive histories’ are not just dealt with (or avoided) in museums, but are literally performed through popular media and interwoven into the everyday life of people. Song Yu, a historian based in Fenghua, China, reflected, “In retrospect, to be fair to Chiang Kai-shek, it is easier for Mao Zedong to sabotage Chiang than for Chiang to protect his empire at that time” (Personal interview, 2011). Indeed, under the rapprochement climate, many Chinese have come to sympathise with and acknowledge Chiang as an extraordinary individual and an influential leader. Chiang’s ancestral home in Fenghua, Zhejiang bears testimony to the change in attitude towards this sensitive political figure.

Chiang Kai-shek was born in the small village of Xikou in Fenghua to a middle class family of salt vendors. The Xikou area was first named as a ‘National Scenic Spot’ (国家重点风景名胜区) since 1994 due to the picturesque sceneries afforded by its surrounding mountains. From 1996-2006, Chiang Kai-shek’s residences in Xikou gradually became preserved by the ‘National Key Cultural Relics Protection Unit’ (全国重点文物保护单位) of the State Council – the highest level of protection accorded to a ‘cultural heritage’. Since then, Xikou became a popular attraction amongst domestic and Taiwanese tourists alike, all wanting to catch a glimpse of how life was like at Chiang’s hometown. A Shanghai-based journalist commented, “Filial Taiwan compatriots flock in during the grave-sweeping festival of Qingming, but they’re vastly outnumbered by their Mainland counterparts the rest of the time” (Movius, 1999). However, important to note is the transformation of Xikou from a low profile village-cum-hometown of a de-throne leader to a popular tourist attraction celebrating its connection with this controversial character. A personal
contact, Zhang Xuxiao, who is born in Hangzhou in Zhejiang Province shared her memories of visiting Xikou as a child in the 1980s and contrasted it with its current development:

As a child, I used to go to Xikou. It has always been known to me as Chiang’s hometown. But it was not very popular. It might be due to the sensitive political associations that people there generally keep a low profile about this place. Now, it is so popular. People come from all over China and Taiwan. Out of a sudden, the locals in Xikou become proud that this place gave birth to such an important person in history.

(Personal interview, 2011)

The museum spaces scattered around Chiang Kai-shek’s properties in the village offer an official portrayal of him and his family members. To illustrate, one of Chiang’s residences, the Wencang Pavilion, showcases the living quarters of Chiang and his second wife, Song Meiling. Tour guides will be seen shepherding droves of tourists into the ‘living room’, the ‘study room’ the ‘bed room’ etc., each jostling their way through the crowd and talking into blasting microphones to explain to tourists how the Chiang couple led their lives, the fengshui (geomancy) principles behind their six-legged bed, that their son, Chiang Ching-guo, was educated in the Soviet Union, Song Meiling’s hobbies and so on (Figure 4.4).
They seem to be following a prescribed script as the same narration is repeated by different tour guides over the course of the day. Black and white photographs of Chiang and his wife were hung on the walls of common corridors, each depicting the everyday life of the couple. Below is a selection of captions that follow each picture:

- Mr Chiang Kai-shek and his wife admired the beauty of plum blossom in Le Pavilion
- Mr Chiang Kai-shek and his wife went on a pleasure trip of their hometown
- Mr Chiang Kai-shek and his wife cooked in Fahua Nunnery
- Mr Chiang Kai-shek enjoyed the sight of Ms. Song Meiling’s painting
- Mr Chiang Kai-shek played chess with his wife
- Mr Chiang Kai-shek and his wife were going for a stroll

By concentrating on the domestic spaces and the ordinary life of Chiang Kai-shek, the exhibition seeks to ‘domesticate’ a high-profile military figure. Obviously, such a portrayal does not impress some Taiwanese visitors. A Taiwanese museum curator who had been to Xikou commented:
If we go to a museum of an important person, we would expect to see a documentation of what he has done or contributed. But there was nothing in the museum except for Chiang playing chess or chatting with his wife, Chiang looking at his wife paint or goes for a stroll...haha...don’t you find it very strange? If I have no background knowledge of Chiang, I would have thought that he only knew how to do these things.

Even the tour guides, they merely talk about the design of the bed, this mirror here and that mirror there. There is no focal point at all. They won’t talk about the fact that Chiang came over to Taiwan. Perhaps they took for granted that people already know about this. Maybe they are not allowed to mention too much. Or maybe they don’t even know about this.

But because it was a diplomatic visit, I thought it was not polite to criticise. So, I merely followed the museum guide, looked around, and smiled...

(Wang, personal interview, 2011)

Apparently, the visitor was not convinced by the museum’s narration. I find Bruner’s (2001: 899) notion of ‘the questioning gaze’ especially apt in this respect, “to describe the tourists’ doubts about the credibility, authenticity and accuracy of what is presented to them in the tourist production”. As such, tourists are “active selves that do not merely accept but interpret, and frequently question the producers’ messages.” However, there was also, what I term, a ‘diplomatic gaze’ involved in the museum curator’s experience. The ‘looking around’ and the ‘smiling’ was all part of a diplomatic performance – a gaze to conceal the visitor’s disagreements with the exhibits in a tactful manner.

Crang (1994: 345) reminds us that “[t]he poetics of presentation enable some forms of knowledge and impede others, creat[ing] varying subject positions. These positions have been made up in different ways and provide different relations of known and knowing subjects” (emphasis in original). This case study of Xikou
showcases an effort by the Chinese State to de-politicise a sensitive historical figure by “manipulating heritage toward [its] ideological biases” (Winter, 2009: 113). As Chang (2000b) has shown, tourism planners may simplify or ‘tame’ the associations of specific places. Indeed, “by prescribing themes to places, planners inadvertently freeze their identities and stultify their potential to evolve organically, effacing their myriad histories on the one hand while confining their future to a pre-ordained narrative on the other” (p.35). A representative from Fenghua’s Taiwan Affairs Office subtly claimed, “The promotion of familial relationship [between China and Taiwan] is an art. There is no need to say something directly. By using a variety of different methods, we let people feel the bond for themselves” (Deng Jun, personal interview, 2011; emphasis added). In the nostalgic atmosphere of Xikou, Chiang was no longer a Generalissimo, but trapped in a “static space from which temporality has been drained” (Crang, 1994: 342). By ‘framing’ him into the mundane and benign everyday, he was forgotten as once a leader of the Republic of China, and being ‘subdued’ to be merely a son, a husband and a father.

Economic reform in China since 1978 has brought about rapid “commodification of cultural specialties and revival of heritage places” (Chan, 2011: 388). This, coupled with the neutralisation of the Chinese State’s take on Chiang Kai-shek, have certainly attracted local entrepreneurs to jump on the ‘rapprochement bandwagon’ and ‘cash in’ on the ‘Chiang Kai-shek’ brand. For instance, the single street that runs through the village is lined with countless stalls selling the ‘Thousand-layered biscuit’ (千层饼) (Figure 4.5).
Story has it that this was Chiang’s favourite snack when he was a child, and that he would use mischievous methods to jump the queue while buying them. It is claimed that he missed the snack when he was in Taiwan – a nostalgic account of an ‘ordinary boy’ who would grow up to be a man of great historic importance. The majority of these shops have attractive sign boards, pronouncing, “Chiang Family/Clan Thousand-layered Biscuit”, each claiming to be close relatives to the Chiang family and being a ‘hundred-year shop’ (百年老店) selling the ‘authentic’ version (Figure 4.6). Photos showing visits by Chiang Kai-shek’s descendants and other politicians from Taiwan hung on the walls of these shops, as if to authenticate the owners’ relationship with the Chiang family. One of the shop owners I spoke to explained, “Chiang Kai-shek belongs to the 28th generation of the Chiang clan; my wife belongs to the 30th generation” (Fang Boyun, personal interview, 2011). Another local entrepreneur down
the street exclaimed enthusiastically, “Chiang Kai-shek was my idol! He continued, “I am part of the Chiang family... I would have to call Chiang Kai-shek ‘granduncle’. I have the same generation name ‘Hsiao’ (孝) as Chiang’s grandchildren. We are considered brothers” (Mr Jiang, personal interview, 2011).

Interestingly, my fieldtrip to Xikou coincided with a community twinning ceremony (社区结对仪式) between Fenghua and Da-shu (Kaohsiung, Taiwan). This ceremony was attended by Chinese officials from the Taiwan Affairs Office of Fenghua People’s

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14 ‘Jiang’ is the pinyin spelling of ‘Chiang’.
Government. Their Taiwanese counterparts included representatives from the various villages in Da-shu and a member of parliament. Town-twinning has become popular in the current climate of rapprochement, and Fenghua, with its association with Chiang Kai-shek, is a common twinning partner. One representative from the Taiwan Affairs Office revealed that they have to “attend to two or three groups per month” for such twinning ceremonies (Dai Wang, personal communication, 2011). After the ceremony, the delegates from Taiwan were taken on a tour in Xikou and brought to a particular Thousand-layered Biscuit shop for a tasting session. They were then presented with bags of the biscuits as a token of friendship by their Chinese hosts. I found out later on that the shop belonged to the relative of one of the officials from the Fenghua Taiwan Affairs Office. With so many similar Thousand-layered Biscuit shops lining the main thoroughfare of Xikou, it is crucial then, for the owners to establish the ‘right connections’ to bring in ‘politically important’ customers to support and sustain the myth surrounding their product. As much as the local government is relying on the creativity and entrepreneurial spirit of the Xikou locals to create an atmosphere of nostalgia, the businesses are also dependent on such official patronages to boost their survival. It is therefore apparent that in rekindling the memories of Chiang Kai-shek, national agenda and private interests are in fact highly intertwined. Other than the Thousand-layered Biscuit, the next most popular product that is associated with Chiang Kai-shek is the ‘Chiang Clan’s Cuisine’. One of the many restaurants serving the Chiang cuisine has a portrait of Chiang Kai-shek in his military uniform on its sign board and boasted of its ‘presidential standard’ private kitchen cuisine; while a more modest one at the corner of the street invites customers to ‘enjoy the Chiang Family local dishes’ and
‘listen to its family stories’. If biscuits and cuisines are not enough to fill the appetite of tourists, there are also gift shops selling ‘Cross-strait Tourism Essentials’ and a studio offering photo-taking services with a Chiang Kai-shek impersonation (Figure 4.7).

Figure 4.7 Photo-taking with Chiang Kai-shek impersonation

In line with the central government’s endeavour for a collective attainment of economic development, modernity and a civilized society through tourism (see Nyíri, 2006; 2010), such a tourism landscape has become very common in China. Moreover, the decentralisation of economic governance has given rise to an increase in individually-driven entrepreneurship. In Chan’s (2011) comparison of cultural governance in China and Taiwan, she observes that local residents in China “exercise more individual initiative… by reinventing themselves as entrepreneurs who sell local
specialities” (p.375). In the case of Xikou, it was not until the change in cross-strait relations that local residents embraced the Chiang Kai-shek connection. However, this was met with a ‘critical gaze’ by Huang Tzu-chuan, Chief of the Interpretation & Education Section at Kinmen National Park, as she lamented:

Everyone is earning money off Chiang Kai-shek, but no one is talking about what he has done. They only talk about his family life. No one seems to know the history of this person in the first place. Moreover, we have never heard of the ‘Thousand-layered biscuit’ as Chiang’s favourite snack! Haha... But in Taiwan, people cash in on Chiang Kai-shek too. There are documentaries made and books written about him. At least there are critical commentaries on Chiang’s political contribution. Some good...some bad...but nothing like what’s happening at Xikou.

(Personal interview, 2011).

From this interview extract, it is clear that in portraying sensitive historical figures, there is not just one life to talk about, but many lives. As Jamal and Kim (2005: 63) propose “...heritage becomes an important resource for (re)constructing national and local identity, and tourism’s political role in this is often disguised by its economic one.” Vendors at Xikou are not entirely ignorant of the sensitivities of Chiang, but have in fact made a political choice to stick with their nostalgic story line and benign focus on Chiang’s lineage. They need to tread carefully between their celebration of the village’s local identity as Chiang’s ancestral hometown and their own national identity under the Communist leadership. Taiwanese visitors are not passive or ‘faceless ciphers’ (Hooper-Greenhill, 1988, cited in Crang, 1994) either; they are very much involved in the making of this heritage site as they question and
interact with what is presented to them. It is through such utterances (Crang, 1994) that heritage is experienced and performed.

4.4 Taiwan's Practices of Rapprochement

4.4.1 Heritage in the making: the National Palace Museum

The National Palace Museum of Taiwan, located at Shuangxi outside Taipei is a good ‘site’ to start our exploration of the myriad practices of rapprochement reciprocated by the Taiwanese government in its effort to improve cross-strait relations. After their retreat from mainland China in 1949, the Nationalist government was extremely keen in fostering a Chinese nationalism. Chiang Kai-shek, who pledged to bring his 600,000 troops and civilians back to the Chinese mainland to regain political power, “required the Ministry of Education to use museums as social education bases for promotion of the best aspects of traditional Chinese culture” (Chen, 2008: 126). It was under such a political climate that the National Palace Museum, amongst others, was built. Since its opening to the public in 1965, the museum has remained as “a symbol of the political identity of the Republic of China” (ibid). Although famous in the world arena for its impressive collection of Chinese art and historical relics from past dynasties, the National Palace Museum was often caught in the political limelight whenever cross-strait tensions occur. A Taiwanese informant shared his observation:
Whenever the two sides quarrel [sic], they will always bring up the topic of Palace Museum. The Chinese side would accuse Chiang Kai-shek of looting their national treasures and that our National Museum should return the exhibits to Beijing’s Palace Museum. We always joked that we’ve got the real stuff and that Beijing’s Palace Museum is but an empty shell. But of course, things are different now. I think both sides have avoided talking about such sensitive issues and moreover, our Palace Museum is attracting lots of Chinese tourists these days.

(Chen Yi-xiu, personal interview, 2011)

When the KMT retreated to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the military to take with it a substantial amount of cultural artefacts originally housed at museums such as the Palace Museum in Beijing, the Central Museum in Nanjing, and Henan’s provincial museum (Chen, 2008). A visitor to Beijing’s Palace Museum will often be amazed by its grand façade and architectural excellence, but dismayed by the lack of quality cultural artefacts. Conversely, the National Palace Museum in Taipei might not be the ‘authentic’ imperial palace, but nevertheless houses an impressive collection of cultural artefacts that attract visitors from all over the world. Therefore, the authenticity of the Palace Museums is always a significant issue of contention attracting public attention.

However, in recent years, such ‘skirmishes’ about the ‘looted’ treasures or the authenticity of the museum seem to have disappeared as the mood for rapprochement has set in. Since the KMT reclaimed governance of Taiwan from the pro-independence DPP in 2008, the National Palace Museum has started offering gestures of rapprochement. For example, the sensitivities associated with the cultural artefacts are being neutralised by the cartoonisation of these objects into
cute souvenirs for the Chinese tourists (Figure 4.8). Souvenir replicas of the ‘Jadeite Cabbage’ and the ‘Meat-shaped Stone’ – two of the most sought after ‘treasures of the museum’ – were so popular amongst the Chinese tourists that it caught media attention several times.

Figure 4.8 Examples of museum souvenirs
A representative from the museum’s Department of Cultural Creativity and Marketing revealed:

Yes, the ‘Jadeite Cabbage’ is one of the most popular souvenirs amongst the Chinese tourists. They find such cute things very special. I think these are all part of the Chinese culture…it is not sensitive…they can accept it. We always need to fulfil what’s needed in the market and reflect what’s going on in the society with creativity. This is what we call ‘cultural creativity’.

(Mr Hong, personal interview, 2011)

The materiality of the kitsch souvenirs acts to diffuse the problematics associated with the ‘real’ ownership of the cultural artefacts. In a sense, the Chinese can now own and bring home ‘a piece of history’, and indeed, a share of Chinese cultural heritage. As such, to the argument that there are multiple ‘heritages’ or ‘histories’ I would add that heritage is always in the process of being (re)produced by practices of rapprochement. Rather than a fixed object or closed system immune to change, it is an organism always in the state of evolving and open to different appropriation and interpretation. The range of souvenirs has not just attracted the attention of Chinese tourists, but also museum curators from China. Here is Mr Hong again:

Also, in comparison…in terms of the quality of material, the technique of production, the visual appeal, and cultural creativity, we are actually very much ahead of the Chinese. In recent years, since cross-strait relations have improved, personnel from museums in Nanjing and Shanghai have been coming over to ask us about our production of souvenirs. They are interested to learn from us…our ideas…our way of thinking…to understand…
These souvenirs have allowed the National Palace Museum to appropriate a sensitive past in a more benign and ‘palatable’ way. Instead of making claims to the rightful ownership of the cultural artefacts, attention has shifted to the invention of ‘copies of heritage’ in the name of cultural creativity. Instead of ‘seeking the authentic’ (MacCannell, 1976), tourists are drawn in by the aesthetics of these miniature replicas. Furthermore, in contrast to the Chinese strategy of reducing differences to the realm of the same, the practices of rapprochement adopted by the Taiwanese seem to strive to go beyond a ‘dead’ heritage to create something different, in order to attract Chinese tourists whilst selling a unique Taiwanese identity at the same time.

Chinese tourists at the museum are not only buying the souvenirs, but are also very much involved in the performance of laying claims to the exhibits. For instance, one Chinese tourist was heard joking to the Taiwanese tour guide of his group while being led to view the various exhibits.¹⁵

Your Chiang Kai-shek was really a smart man! He had actually managed to get all these treasures over to Taiwan... really a great man. But that’s fine; these are all part of our heritage. No matter whether they are here or in the mainland [China]...Taiwan has taken care of them very well.

One of his tour group mates agreed and added, “Better than being kept in some lao wai museums...hahaha.” These few sentences, although shared in a light-hearted manner, were in fact loaded with political meanings. For one, this tourist was

¹⁵ Due to their tight schedules, Chinese tourists in the museum travelled in groups led by their tour guides. In a sense, their gazes were directed. Only at the museum shop were they allowed to move around freely while waiting for their coaches to arrive.
performing his national identity as he alluded to the ‘fact’ that these cultural artefacts originally belong to China. At the same time, he was also relaying his country’s ‘One China’ policy and magnanimity to let Taiwan ‘keep’ these treasures. Finally, he reiterated China’s strategy of creating a common enemy by drawing in the ‘lao wai’ – a derogatory term to refer to the ‘Westerners’. Clearly, he was referring to the large number of cultural artefacts that had been looted by western colonial powers from Beijing’s Old Summer Palace or Yuanmingyuan during the second Opium War in 1860, some of which are kept in museums like the Army Museum in Paris and the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, while others are in the hands of private collectors. For Ji Xiaolan, one of the Chinese tourists whom I interviewed, it was the more recent memory of the Cultural Revolution that was cited:

We are all Chinese People. It doesn’t matter which side these treasures are kept... It’s not a problem. More critical is that they are all on our own earth and they are being well preserved. Just think of our Cultural Revolution, so many treasures were destroyed. It was such a pity.

(Personal interview, 2011)

Such are some of the many practices of identity performed by Chinese tourists in heritage spaces in Taiwan. These practices animate heritage (Crang, 1994) and reflect the intertextualities in tourists’ interactions with museum exhibits. As Crang (1994: 346) suggests:

To each exhibit, people bring a host of metonymic others—personal resonances that are set off, memories and connections triggered by the display (Jordanova, 1989; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1991, page 389). This empowers visitors—who are so routinely abstracted as ‘faceless ciphers’ (Hooper-
Greenhill, 1988). Their imaginations are a part of the experience as much as anything else.

As such, tourist practices at heritage sites are constitutive of and at the same time constitute the multiple meanings of the cultural artefacts in the museum.

Other than re-appropriating cultural artefacts as kitsch souvenirs, the National Palace Museum has also begun to host joint exhibitions with its Chinese counterparts. One of the most significant of late was the ‘Landscape Reunited’ exhibition held in June 2011. In short, this exhibition brought together two sections of a much celebrated Chinese painting – ‘Dwelling in the Fuchun Mountains’ – by the renowned artist, Huang Gongwang (1269–1354) from the Yuan Dynasty. The National Palace Museum owns the larger section (636.9cm) while the Zhejiang Provincial Museum houses the smaller section (51.4cm). The introductory guide wrote:

For more than 360 years, these two sections of the original scroll have never been displayed together. For this special exhibition, the Zhejiang Provincial Museum agreed to lend “The Remaining Mountain” to Taiwan so that these two treasures could be brought together for display. Through this recreation of the original appearance of ‘Dwelling in the Fuchun Mountains,’ audiences can reach a fuller understanding of this important masterpiece in Chinese art.

Although the aim of the exhibition seems to be simple, one needs to not only appreciate the painting but the political undercurrents of such an event. As Crang (1994: 345) reminds us, “Heritage phenomena call for different practices. There is less of a focus on ‘dead exhibits’ extracted according to scientific categories. Instead the focus is on the human use of exhibits” (emphasis added). Without doubt, the title and contents of the exhibition symbolise a gesture towards rapprochement by
the National Palace Museum. A museum representative shared the political intricacies behind holding such an exhibition:

To be honest, such joint exhibition would not have been possible under the previous museum director because of the DPP connection. Chinese delegates were not really welcome before 2008. Then, after the KMT took over, and the new museum director came, things started to change. We are entertaining more Chinese officials now, and have plans for more of such joint exhibitions. But at the moment, it’s only the Chinese bringing cultural artefacts over to Taiwan. They have invited us to bring ours over to China, but we dare not, as they can’t guarantee that their government won’t try to retain them afterwards!

(Kiat, personal interview, 2011)

As is evident, rapprochement is a complex process involving not just government to government interactions, but also various heritage practices and the mobility politics of cultural artefacts.

Furthermore, tourists do not simply interact with museum exhibits; they encounter other tourists too. Tim Winter (2009: 105) offers an anthropological take on such encounters:

If a trip to a heritage visitor center involves encountering visitors or tour groups from other countries it is hard to resist leaping to conclusions about the behavior – sometimes perceived as rude – of those Germans, Italians, Americans or Koreans across the room. All too often those conclusions rest on clichés. But to dismiss such observations out of hand would be to close down a fascinating and potentially fruitful line of enquiry. Clearly, it would be foolish to suggest that our spectrum of cultural differences are somehow erased or transcended as we take on the role of ‘the tourist’.
Tourists in the museum do not travel alone. They might be accompanied by family and friends or others from the same tour group. They encounter people from different nationalities as well. As such, they are not only ‘consuming’ the exhibits, but are also constantly ‘sizing up’/observing others. Similar to Winter’s (2009) observation, such encounters often involve stereotypical conclusions about the behaviour of the Other. This does not necessarily need to be just a silent thought, but can be performed there and then. For instance, a tour group from China was being led by their tour guide to some of the most popular exhibits. A museum staff, conscious of the noise level, waved a little sign board at the tourists that says ‘Please Keep Quiet’ (Figure 4.9). A Taiwanese visitor tried her best to steer away from the group as they breezed past her. At this moment, the gaze of the Taiwanese visitor and the museum staff met. They looked at each other, smiled and shook their heads. Complaints by the Taiwanese about ‘boisterous’ Chinese tourists have become an everyday affair on social media or TV news. The former Taiwan representative to the US claimed:

The National Palace Museum is one of the biggest attractions of Taiwan. International tourists coming over to Taiwan would like to visit the museum but the museum is crowded with Chinese tourists - now it is so noisy and crowded over there, for other people to go and enjoy the treasures is virtually impossible and that has downgraded the standard of the management of the international museum and we don’t like it.

(BBC News, 6 October 2011)

16 Common lamentations about Chinese tourists include jumping the queue, speaking loudly in restaurants, vandalising plants in parks etc. Some hotels even have separate dining rooms for Japanese and Chinese guests. “...some Chinese will speak very loudly when they're dining but the Japanese do not,” says a hotel manager (BBC News, 6 October 2011).
It might have taken 360 years for the two sections of the same painting to come together, but ‘reuniting’ people from China and Taiwan might be an even more daunting task.

4.4.2 Re-casting Chiang Kai-shek: Cartoonisation of sensitive historical figures

Since the inauguration of the ex-president Lee Teng-hui in 1988, Taiwan’s cultural policy has shifted from that of re-sinicisation to one that focused more on local history and Taiwanese identity. Rather than promoting traditional Chinese culture, the celebration of unique aboriginal cultures, and nostalgic remembrance of the
Japanese colonial past (Chan, 2011) were encouraged to support the pro-independence movement. The aim was to emphasise difference – a difference that may form a basis for Taiwan’s independence. This movement reached its peak in 2007 when Taiwan was under the presidency of Chen Shui-bien. Instead of merely promoting a ‘Taiwanese heritage’, there were attempts by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to ‘de-Sinicise’ Taiwan (*The Straits Times*, 30 January 2007; 9 February 2007). Examples include the editing of high school history textbooks to downplay historical ties with China, replacing “China” with “Taiwan” on the stamps, renaming the ‘Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall’ to the ‘National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall’, and a proposal to keep away statues/busts of Chiang Kai-shek in public space. The disposing of Chiang Kai-shek’s statues/busts, which have occupied for instance the assembly area of schools, round-about of major roads or other public parks, were responded with fervour from those in the Pan-Green (pro-independence) Camp. The Ci-hu Mausoleum in Taoyuan, which comprises the mausoleums of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-guo, and their villas, began ‘adopting’ these statues and busts. Before long, an accidental tourist attraction was born.

Today, the Ci-hu Memorial Sculpture Park in the Mausoleum houses more than 150 bronze busts and statues of Chiang Kai-shek. This collection of the nationalistic icon, initially ‘made possible’ by a process of forgetting, has ironically evolved into an attraction popular amongst the Chinese tourists. Every day, bus-loads of Chinese tourists arrive to witness this unique landscape and “take photos with Chiang Kai-shek”. Away from their original locations in the wider schema of landscapes of
power, the materiality of these bronze structures, which once exuded nationalistic vigour, seems to soften into the greenery of the park (Figure 4.10).

In a bid to further neutralise any nationalistic sentiments associated with Chiang Kai-shek, the Taoyuan County Government collaborated with local artists to organise the ‘Open Chiang’ event in April 2010 to coincide with Ci-hu’s Tourism Season. With a stroke of creativity, the serious-looking bronze statues of Chiang Kai-shek were given a make-over in the cross-dressing activities, giving rise to ‘alternative Chiang Kai-
sheks’ as one Taiwanese blogger puts it. For once, Chiang was no longer a sensitive political figure, but Superman, a fruit farmer, or even a chef (Figure 4.11).

Lee Fu-hua, a representative from the Taoyuan County Government Tourism Bureau explained:

Through the ‘Open Chiang’ event, we wish to portray a political figure of the past in a more creative manner. We want to bring the bronze statues closer to people’s hearts. We want the society to be more open-minded when it comes to history and hopefully, these interesting displays can stimulate their imaginations and attract more visitors.

(Personal interview, 2011)

Clearly, the ‘Open Chiang’ event has sought to de-politicise Chiang Kai-shek and encourage visitors, especially the younger generation in Taiwan and tourists from China, to form alternative interpretations of Chiang. Rather than the political leader who fought against the communist party, Chiang was “re-casted” as a comic hero, or an everyday character.

This practice of taming is also evident in the range of ‘Chiang’ souvenirs that the Mausoleum carries (Figure 4.12). The cartoonisation of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, into figurines, key chains, and other kitsch souvenirs resonates with the taming strategy adopted by the National Palace Museum mentioned earlier. Below is an extract from the Mausoleum’s ‘Design Concept of the Souvenirs’ (emphasis added):
Figure 4.11 Chiang Kai-shek statues in different costumes
Figure 4.12 ‘Cartoonised’ political figures & range of souvenirs at the Mausoleum  
(Top left: Chiang Kai-shek (left) and his son, Chiang Ching-guo;  
Top right: Chiang Kai-shek (left) and Mao Zedong)
Quality souvenirs were viewed as having important effects on shaping the unique characteristics of the location and tourism marketing. Hence [the Taoyuan County Government] took the lead by collaborating with non-government entities in introducing souvenirs with distinguishing features of the Chiangs as well as integrating the local cultural resources and industries with unique characteristics. By mixing abstract cultural meanings into the design and originality of merchandise, it has created a new trend for the cultural creative industry...... All of these designs give the merchandise a sense of historical commemoration entwine in modern fashions......

Due to the business opportunities of tourism from China, the effect the unique characteristic of the Chiangs have on tourism is becoming an important local resource...... Apart from creating more income from tourism for the locals, it is also the future trend for development of the cultural creative industry.

It is evident from this extract that the Mausoleum is quite explicit in its strategy to attract more Chinese tourists to the county and has an eye on the Chinese market when sourcing for suitable souvenirs. These souvenirs are proving to be a success in attracting the Chinese tourists. A Chinese respondent, who became a collector of the cartoonised figurines such as that of Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping, confessed:

They are so cute! I bought the Sun Yat-sen one during my first trip to Taiwan, and when I came back to the mainland [China], there was an urge for me to collect the rest as well. So in the end, I had to ask my friend in Taiwan to help me buy the Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong pair. I am very tempted to collect the entire set...Maybe next time when I visit Taiwan again... The Taiwanese are very creative people. You can’t find such things in China.

(Zhang Yi, personal interview, 2011)

In promoting what was referred to as ‘cultural creativity’ by both the National Palace Museum and the Mausoleum, these institutions are in fact embracing practices of rapprochement towards the Chinese tourists; they are attempting to transform
political complexity to cartoon simplicity as such ‘cartoonisation’ makes sensitive political figures more ‘palatable’ for tourist consumption. In other words, the concept of ‘cultural creativity’ is abstract enough to be able to provide a platform to foster a unique Taiwanese identity based on a creative class, while at the same time produce souvenirs that are more appealing to the Chinese market. These non-human subjects give difficult heritages and sensitive histories new meanings, and contribute significantly to the identity dynamics of cross-strait relations. More importantly, what is at stake here is that identities are embodied in the materiality of such invented cultural artefacts. They flow in and through such touristic things and in turn interact with the identities of the tourists. In these kitsch souvenirs, we gain a better understanding of the cultural technologies of government in Taiwan’s management of cross-strait rapprochement tourism.

4.5 Digesting the Past, Consuming a More Palatable Future

This chapter has provided an analytical lens through which we can study rapprochement tourism. By looking at how tourism landscapes are represented and (re)constructed for cross-strait tourist consumption, and how tourist sites are in turn created through tourists’ ‘utterances’ (Crang, 1994), we have derived at a more culturally complex rendering of tourism’s ‘consumption’ of places (Oakes, 1999). More specifically, I have attempted to explore the various strategies and practices of taming difficult heritages and sensitive histories adopted by both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments to cater to tourists from across the Taiwan Strait. Practices
of depoliticisation, domestication, commercialisation, and cartoonisation were discussed. Through the various empirical examples, I have shown how China seeks to establish a ‘Taiwan inclusive’ identity, and to reduce historical differences to the realm of the same. Evidently, Chinese museum curators often employ themes of familial ties and camaraderie in museums specially built for Taiwanese tourists, and utilise ‘linear time’ as a depoliticising strategy when presenting the exhibits. Conversely, Taiwan adopts a pragmatic approach towards their Chinese counterparts, yet does not forgo its aim in creating a unique Taiwanese identity.

One common practice between China and Taiwan is the neutralising of political sensitivities via material culture. The commercialisation of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘favourite childhood snack’ in Xikou, the cartoonisation of Chiang and Mao Zedong into kitsch tourist souvenirs, and the merchandising of miniature replicas of museum treasures in Taipei serve to depoliticise controversial politicians, and the disputed ownership of cultural artefacts, and give rise to new forms of heritage. While the nostalgic Thousand-layered Biscuit provides a platform for Chinese local entrepreneurs to cash in on the ‘Chiang Kai-shek’ brand, the aesthetics of the kitsch souvenirs provides an outlet for Taiwanese designers to showcase their creativity while at the same time cater to the unprecedented increase in Chinese tourist arrivals. The materiality of such non-human subjects give difficult heritages and sensitive histories new meanings, and contribute significantly to the identity dynamics of cross-strait relations.
However, as I have also shown, tourists are not passive receivers of ideological messages; they react and challenge the narratives in various ways; often not overtly, but nevertheless very telling of their attitude towards cross-strait relations. I have also discussed a variety of gazes, namely the ‘second gaze’ (MacCannell, 2001), ‘questioning gaze’ (Bruner, 2001) and my own idea of the ‘diplomatic gaze’, by which tourists engage with what they encounter at the Fujian-Taiwan Kinship Museum. Such gazes reveal the agency of tourists and their critical ‘conversations’ with both the exhibits and the rationale behind their narration. Additionally, museums might be places where tourists and locals encounter each other. As demonstrated by the example of Taiwan’s National Museum, practices of bordering/exclusion towards the Chinese tourists could be performed by subtle exchanges of gazes and smiles between the Taiwanese locals. Such behaviour towards the Chinese visitors and the generally negative portrayal of them in the TV news and social media speak volumes of the cultural clashes generated by the unprecedented influx of Chinese tourists. This reveals the disjunction between what is expected of cross-strait tourism exchanges and the stark realities on the ground.

The authorities’ attempt to manage the difficult past and sensitive historical personnel goes to show that there is no one History of Heritage out there, but multiple histories and heritages. To this, I would add that heritage is always in the process of being (re)produced by practices of rapprochement. Rather than a fixed object or closed system immune of change, it is an organism always in the state of becoming and is thus open to different appropriations and interpretations. How might rapprochement tourism be studied outside the confines of discussions around
the taming of heritage? The next chapter looks at another way of studying rapprochement tourism that the cultural-geo-political approach can offer by examining cross-strait tourists’ travel experiences on ‘the other side’.
CHAPTER FIVE

BORDERS ON THE MOVE: CROSS-STRAIT TOURISTS’ MATERIAL MOMENTS ON ‘THE OTHER SIDE’

5.1 Introduction: Re-visiting the ‘Border’

The previous chapter deals with the management and consumption of difficult heritages and sensitive histories. Discussions show that it is crucial to note that tourism places and spaces are not (re)created solely by tourism authorities, but are also actively engaged and experienced by tourists. As Crouch (2004: 85) remind us, “Understanding places of tourism as more than the product of an industry and its marketing unsettles the view of the industry and its cultural mediators as main players in tourism, and in tourism space-making.” Indeed, tourists play important roles in shaping tourism spaces too. I have attempted to address this through tourists’ consumption of the various attractions and museum spaces in the previous chapter. This chapter goes further to explore more broadly, tourists’ travel experiences ‘on the other side’.

The idea of a ‘borderless’ world (Ohmae, 1990) gained much popularity throughout the end of the 20th Century (See Paasi, 2005 and Bauder, 2011 for an overview of the

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17 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 2012 Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting in the ‘Border Matters!’ session. I would like to thank the discussant, Professor Anssi Paasi, for his warm and insightful comments.
changing discourses on the border). Yet it has also come under heavy challenge. Mobility studies remind us that passport and visa regimes continue to be limiting and discriminate against certain groups of people, rendering them immobile in an otherwise ‘interconnected’ world. For example, Wang (2004) reports on the immobility of Taiwanese people across certain international borders as a result of the perceived invalidity of the Taiwan passport. He discusses the humiliation and embarrassment experienced by Taiwanese travellers whenever their visas or passports are scrutinised by immigration authorities, and the inconvenience of being mistaken as mainland Chinese. Similarly, Jansen (2009) argues that the formation of the European Union does not lead to a borderless region or seamless travel. Rather, it further excludes the ‘immediate outside’ as the mobility of citizens from non-member countries is heavily restricted. He describes the ‘humiliating entrapment’ experienced by people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia as they attempt to enter EU countries. Such constraints on one’s mobility and unequal treatment to holders of different passports by the authorities have led Wang (2004) to question the post-national genre of border research, suggesting that the old ‘nation-state’ model of citizenship is “being entrenched perhaps more deeply than before” (p.371). Far from diminishing, borders seem omnipresent in a variety of forms and practices.

Whether borders are here to stay or about to wither away, what we find in the literature on borders is the predominance of statist and static approaches to this subject, meaning that it becomes difficult to capture the intricate dynamics of societal transformations. For example, narratives of the border are plagued by a managerial/top-down approach, assumed by the privileged observer “that makes
the rest of the world an object of observation” (Mignolo and Tlostanova, 2006: 206). In contrast, this chapter seeks to study the border by attending to happenings on the ground, to ask the question of ‘who does the bordering?’ and to call for a study of borders from ‘the bottom up’, “with a focus on the individual border narratives and experiences” (Newman, 2006a: 143). Indeed, the proliferation of borders does not stop at the limits of the sovereign state; it overflows and extends beyond political boundaries to affect personal experiences as well (Paasi, 2005).

Contributing to these debates, this chapter concerns itself with re-visiting the ‘border’ in the context of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. The main aim here is to elucidate the experiences of ordinary people at border-crossings, and the materiality of their travel to/on ‘the other side’. The concepts of materiality, identity and liminality will be utilised to explore the enactment of bordering practices at and across political boundaries in a variety of different ways through travel documents like the Taiwan Compatriot Permit (for Taiwanese visitors), and the Taiwan Travel Permit (for Chinese visitors). Furthermore, I will show that other than the more serious aspects of self-identity and identification by others, there is also an element of play involved in tourists’ negotiation of identity. This will be illustrated by the tactical usage of the Taiwanese Identification Card and tour guide license. Discussions show that far from merely pieces of paper, these identification documents are sites of bordering and participate in the social and political lives of their owners. Importantly, the affective material moments captured by the various examples reveal important information of cross-strait tourists’ and locals’ sentiments towards each other and the rapprochement process in general.
The emphasis on human experiences does not mean ignoring or side-lining the potency of the physical border, which can be conveniently dismissed by discussions that focus on the ‘invisible’ or ‘personal’ border. Far from being ‘non-places’ (Auge, 1995, cited in Burrell, 2008), spaces at border crossings and areas are ‘furnished’ with emotions, identity negotiation and performances. Burrell (2008) for example, explores how Polish migrants perform the ‘experience of mobility’ through the materiality of things like passports and laptops at international borders. She shows that far from empty ‘in-between’ spaces, “the physical practice of journeying and border crossing... is a highly materialised and emotional undertaking, and a real, tangible space in its own right” (p.353). Similarly, I will show how border spaces are filled with emotions and identity performances by highlighting Taiwanese tourists’ behaviour at the Chinese immigration checkpoint, and the cross-border buying and selling between Taiwanese tourists and Chinese locals at the waiting lounge of a ferry terminal in Xiamen, China. Perhaps, it is interesting to note here that the Chinese equivalent of ‘border’ (bian-jie: 边界), connotes a dual meaning of ‘edge’ and ‘world’. The spatiality of the term and the infinite ways in which this space can be theorised calls for a more critical interrogation. Indeed, as Shields (2006: 233) argues, “...borders and boundaries have complex ontologies and spatio-temporal form as interfaces. They are not just edges.” This chapter will shed some light on the world of possibilities in border and mobility studies.
5.2 Setting the Stage, Materialising the Border

The China-Taiwan conundrum remains one of the unresolved conflicts of the Cold War era. Although it can be said that both political entities are relatively at peace with each other, no peace treaty has ever been signed, and China remains ardent that it will use military action against Taiwan should the latter proclaim independence. However, the phenomenal rise of China over the last decade saw the two republics engaging each other in a totally different political game. Taiwan has increasingly come to terms with the fact that ‘independence’ is not a realistic option. Pushing for independence could only upset China and strain both cross-strait and international (US) relations. China, on the other hand, is beginning to abandon the futile efforts in engaging Taiwan in non-constructive verbal disputes over the latter’s sovereignty, in preference of the potential economic benefits to be reaped from a Greater China sphere of co-prosperity. Such sentiments for peaceful and mutual economic development are neatly captured in existing tourism developments in and between the two republics.

Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou, who was re-elected in January 2012 to serve his second term as President believes that “a surge in two-way trade, investment and tourism across the Taiwan Strait [has] helped Taiwan’s export-dependent economy... [and] will raise Taiwan’s competitiveness” (Businessweek, 14 January 2012). His victory had offered him a mandate to forge ahead with plans of expanding cross-strait economic exchanges. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter One, China has changed its attitude towards Taiwan from a political rhetoric of ‘peaceful reunification’ to an economic
rationale of ‘peace and development’. Although the normalisation of travel between the two former enemies is a welcome development, politics can never be eradicated from seemingly banal activities, and local realities challenge the global framework of ‘peace through tourism’. Rather than seeing it as ‘economics before politics’, cross-strait engagement has metamorphosed into something that not only concentrates on macro-political issues, but micro-political nuances as well. As such, tourism activities that infiltrate into the lives of both populations become even more important to analyse.

This chapter looks at one facet of cross-strait tourism – the materiality of border crossings. I suggest that we can grasp a more nuanced understanding of people’s negotiation with and performance of their identities by interrogating things that are part and parcel of their travel experiences. These include identification documents like passports, visas and entry permits, and popular cross-border purchases like counterfeit iPhones, tobacco and liquor. More than that, ‘things’ here also extend to ‘significant others’, ‘practices’ and ‘political causes’ (Sayer, 2011). Furthermore, things matter to people, but they do not merely serve as an ‘extension of self’ (Belk, 1988), that is, ‘what one is’; things also contribute to ‘how one is’ (Sayer, 2011). In other words, tourists are suspended amongst other things during their travels and these things are capable of affecting their feelings, emotions and values. As such, I hope to garner a more intimate understanding of Chinese and Taiwanese tourists’ travel experiences through things that are close to the personal and the everyday. In other words, rather than seeing cross-strait exchanges as political rhetoric, I see them as being experienced by ordinary people.
Furthermore, the concept of ‘liminality’ is integral to the analysis of ‘borders on the move’. As I have discussed in Chapter Two, ‘liminality’ offers an avenue through which we can gain a better understanding of tourist behaviour. However, as I have argued, although the concept has been extensively utilised in studies on the social aspects of tourism, its geo-political potential is less noticed. Here, based on empirical findings, I will show how being at a liminal space such as the immigration checkpoint or ferry terminal, tourists adopt identities that are different from those they possess while under their home political and social structures. The ‘geo’ in ‘cultural-geo-politics’ can then be used to represent these in-between places where encounters between people and things occur. Therefore, the liminal space in a rapprochement tourism landscape is not made up of a ‘communitas’ (Turner, 1969), of like-minded people, but a ‘collectif’ (Callon and Law’s (1995, cited in van der Duim, 2007: 151) of tourists, locals and things. Also, I look at the existential inner workings of the tourists during ‘material moments’ (Burrell, 2008) on ‘the other side’ to gain a more intimate understanding of their behaviour towards the rapprochement process during the liminal period. The rest of the chapter looks at how such interaction presents itself in a series of travel narratives by both Chinese and Taiwanese tourists. These stories and encounters might be subjective and personal, “yet they are not just free-floating ‘values’ or expressions projected onto the world but feelings about various events and circumstances that aren’t merely subjective” (Sayer, 2011: 1, emphasis original).
5.3 Crossing the Border: Checkpoints, Travel Documents and the Performance of Identity

One of the recurring themes in my conversations with Taiwanese and Chinese tourists on their travel experiences is that of their interactions with personal documents like passports and entry permits. Such travel documents, the application for them, the possession of them, and their usage often evoked affective moments at border crossings. I suggest that by listening to their travel narratives and plotting the moments when their travel documents remind them (and others) of their identities and in the process facilitate or impair their mobility we can gain a better understanding of cross-strait relations at a more intimate level. I will draw upon materials garnered through a series of semi-structured in-depth interviews with both Taiwanese and Chinese tourists to explicate.

For Taiwanese tourists travelling overseas, the Taiwan (Republic of China – ROC) passport can prove to be a hindrance. Although it can be said that Taiwan has de facto independence, it is not recognised as a sovereign state by the United Nations. Moreover, most countries adopt a ‘one China policy’, recognising the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the official China. The validity of the Taiwan passport is thus questioned at immigration checkpoints and has impeded mobility rather than facilitated flow. Wang (2004) writes about the Taiwan ‘passport problem’ in terms of a misrecognition of Taiwanese tourists as Chinese by immigration authorities, and the difficulties in obtaining visas from other countries. Whilst he focuses on the experience of Taiwan passport holders as they travel to and across Europe, I choose to bring discussions to the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, Wang seems to lend his ears to
the more economically privileged (i.e. those who can afford to travel to Europe); and by referring to publications and travel notes by popular writers, he tends to focus on the literate or those who can/want to be heard. However, by adopting a cross-strait tourism perspective in this chapter, I focus on the ordinary – ordinary people who can afford ordinary trips to mainland China/Taiwan as opposed to the more expensive and infrequent tours to Europe.

5.3.1 The Taiwan Compatriot Permit

Both China and Taiwan of course claim to be the ‘true China’. The China-Taiwan conflict has never been resolved but a compromise was reached under the somewhat ambiguous 1992 Consensus, where both China and Taiwan confirm that there is only ‘one China’ albeit each having a different notion of what that ‘China’ is. Therefore, even in the context of rapprochement tourism, both sides are cautious not to grant each other de jure sovereignty.

Needless to say, the Taiwan passport is not recognised by the Chinese authorities. Instead of stamping directly on the passport, tourists from either side are issued travel permits to be shown to immigration authorities upon arrival. The Mainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents, commonly referred to as the Taiwan Compatriot Permit (TCP) (Figure 5.1), is issued to a Taiwanese tourist while the Chinese counterpart will be issued the Exit and Entry Permit for the Taiwan Area of
the Republic of China. The TCP is created by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security\(^\text{18}\) and has been in existence since 1987 when the then Taiwan President, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted the travel ban across the Taiwan Strait. A typical Taiwanese crossing the border to mainland China would use the Taiwan passport at the Taiwanese checkpoint, and present the TCP to the Chinese authorities upon arrival in mainland China. Stamping on such a document thus allows both sides to temporarily avoid the sensitive issue of state sovereignty, on paper at least. In practice, this is not the case. A TCP holder is identified as someone who resides in Taiwan, but who is essentially a fellow countryman hence ‘compatriot’. I am interested in how the possession of the TCP affectively interacts with the Taiwanese tourist at the checkpoint and how the checkpoint itself creates a liminal environment between home and away.

\(^{18}\) Although China claims Taiwan to be part of its territory, Taiwanese visitors are not classified as domestic tourists, but like Chinese residents of Macau and Hong Kong, are referred to as ‘compatriots’ (State Statistical Bureau of PRC, 1990) (Butler and Mao, 1996).
One of my interviewees, Ben Huang, who has recently been to Shanghai, offered his ‘border experience’. The following is an extract of our conversation:

B: When my friend and I reached the border control at Shanghai airport, I actually wanted to queue at the ‘International arrival line’... hahaha...I asked him, ‘Why should we queue at the ‘Domestic arrival line’? Hahaha

J: So your friend naturally went to the Domestic queue?

B: No, that’s because he had travelled to Shanghai many times, he said we had to go to the Domestic line. Then I asked, “Shouldn’t we go to the International one?” He answered, “No, we have to go to the Domestic line.”

B: As for the TCP...I got hold of this thing as I need to go to Shanghai...And when I got it, I didn’t think that there is anything wrong with this thing as it has been in existence for a long period of time. And I only treated it as a document.

J: Just like a visa?

B: Yes... and I have nothing against it. But I would think more during the immigration part...when entering/when crossing the border...about where to queue. This reminds me of one of my friends who was being called back to the ‘Domestic line’ at Beijing. I would think as my friend did: ‘We should be going to the International line...if Hong Kong and Macau people are already queuing at the ‘international’ line. Because our thinking is...Hong Kong and Macau, logically, they are China, not us.

B: But in the end, I still went to the Domestic line so as not to get into trouble. It’s different in China. In Taiwan, you can scold the government, but in China, you need to be more reserved.

As Bachelard argues, we have “only retained the memory of events that have created us at the decisive instants of our pasts” (2000, cited in Crouch, 2004: 91).

Ben’s recollection of his border experience is infused with politics and with questions about struggles of identity and mobility. As Ben’s narration clearly explicates, the material significance of his TCP and the identity it represents do not correspond to his self-identification. As is evident, the affective moments between Ben’s TCP and
himself did not happen before the traveller reached the Chinese checkpoint. Ben did not have any ‘problems’ with it until the “immigration part...when entering/when crossing the border...about where to queue.” The problematisation of where to queue shows that he was well aware of the identity politics of cross-strait tourists, and reflects the defining moments of identity struggle he had to engage with. To be queuing in the domestic line, was to admit that Taiwan is part of China. Choosing the international line, however, was a performance of his national identity as Taiwanese. However, this struggle was short-lived as he was reminded of his friend’s ‘fate’ in Beijing. Moreover, his travel companion, who had more experience in crossing the border, advised him against it. Overwhelmed by the stringent mobility regime and fear of “get[ting] into trouble” in a place that was neither here nor there, he made a calculative decision to follow the ‘rules’ and joined the domestic arrival line. The word ‘Compatriot’ in the TCP may not be enough to infer the ‘belonging’ of Taiwan to China. The Chinese authority’s strict enforcement at the checkpoint ensures that the reclamation of this final frontier is also observed in practice, no matter how superficial it is.

The political overtone in something that is as personal as a passport or a travel permit should be interrogated further. In contrast to the feelings of humiliation reported by Wang (2004) of Taiwanese travellers when their passports were deemed invalid at international checkpoints, my informants do not seem to allude to any form of mortification when using the TCP. Indeed, it was “only a document”. I suggest that at liminal spaces like immigration checkpoints tourists tend to keep their values or beliefs in suspension; the ‘tourist identity’ allows them to be in a state
of political numbness, to compromise to the institutional requirements, even to the extent of using a travel document that recognises indirectly that Taiwan is part of China. In fact, the Taiwanese tourists seem to avert the political implications of using the TCP in a playful manner. I became aware of this after my presentation at the Centre for Chinese Studies in Taipei in which I had a stimulating discussion on passport and identity with the participants. One of them came up to me and asked, “Do you know what we [Taiwanese] call the TCP?” I did not. “Dai bao zheng,” the lady replied (‘Permit for idiots’), before bursting into laughter. The interesting play with words and pronunciation (from ‘tai bao zheng’ to ‘dai bao zheng’ – a near-homophone to ‘tai bao zheng’) represents a self-humiliation but at the same time is a way to avoid politically sensitive sovereignty issues. As idiots, they do not need to fuss over issues of national identity; their objective is simply crossing the border to the other side. This resonates with Jansen’s (2009: 820) recollection of his conversation with a Serbian woman who lamented that the visa for Serbians to enter Hungary is widely referred to as ‘Porez za budale’ – ‘Tax for idiots’. However, the sentiment of such a referral is rather different. In Jansen’s case, it is born out of a lamentation of a helpless entrapment and humiliating treatment by the mobility regime. In the case of Taiwan, it seems to me that people have come to terms with their country’s ambiguous identity and instead of being offended by the visa regime as suggested by Wang (2004), there was a denouncement/deprecation of the self in a playful yet politically informed manner. Such playfulness does not connote a foolish or naïve gesture, but I suspect a kind of soft yet powerful resistance to the institution. Indeed, in retrospect, if ‘dai bao zheng’ literally means ‘idiot compatriots permit’, does it not mean that those who issue them are idiots themselves?
5.3.2 The Chinese checkpoint as threshold

Vacationscapes are ‘produced by movement, both of the mind and the body’ and the role of movement is not so much to a different geographical space as to a different social space of ‘elsewhereness’.


Let us return to the Chinese checkpoint. I now want to ask further what goes on in the Taiwanese tourist’s mind even after coming to terms about having to queue at the domestic arrival line. In other words, what are the impressions of the tourist during such a liminal period at the checkpoint? One of my interviewees, Cheng, who has made several trips to China via Kinmen19 for holiday and work, gave an interesting account of her psychological and ‘bodily’ ‘transformations’ when queuing up and crossing the Chinese immigration checkpoint:

C: At the immigration point, you are already on the mainland [China], but you are not really in the country yet...not really allowed entry yet. I feel that...whenever I reached the place, it seems like I am changing to another person. Because I will always think that I was about to enter into what I imagined as a uncivilised place...hahaha... a place where people spit freely everywhere...haha...This is what we imagine Chinese people to be. And their low level of civilisation... how they always jump the queue, and push their way around... I was about to enter such a place...So whenever I was there, I would start to think of myself as becoming another person.

J: To be like them?

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19 Kinmen Island became a bastion and war frontier for the Kuomintang after the party and its followers retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Since the abolition of martial law in 1992, the island has experienced gradual de-militarisation. Abandoned or defunct military installations have become important tourism resources (see Chapter Seven). Improvement in cross-strait ties has also seen the island developed into a port of call for Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan proper or for Taiwanese tourists travelling to mainland China.
C: No! Haha... Just that I have to pretend to be detached/unconnected/indifferent. You'll start to feel that you ought to equip yourself with arms and armour.

J: Oh I see... to protect yourself.

C: Yes...

J: Because you felt uneasy?

C: Hmm... no. Just act nonchalant...Moreover, Taiwanese are always being cheated in the mainland [China], I felt that we are like idiots. My friends and I were cheated several times and the feeling wasn’t good. For example, the porters will ask for a certain fee and later charged higher. So once you reach the immigration point, you have to start to be a little different...you’ll have that feeling.

The Chinese checkpoint is indeed a threshold for Cheng. She felt that she was neither here nor there; not in Taiwan, but not quite yet in China. This liminal space created a kind of anxiousness in her while she prepared to encounter the other side. It was a transitional period during which her social imaginations of China and its people materialised in her ‘transformation’ to become “another person”. Cheng’s narration of how she had to transform herself before officially entering into China was akin to changing into a ‘tourist mode’ (Currie, 1997). This was not any ordinary mode, but one in which she became detached/unconnected/indifferent and equipped with “arms and armour”. Cheng’s border crossing experience reminds one of the ‘rites of passage’ that act as both “indicators and vehicles of transition from one sociocultural state and status to another” (Turner, 1979: 466). To illustrate, Van Gennep introduced the three phases of “(1) separation (from ordinary social life); (2) margin or limen (meaning threshold), when the subjects of ritual fall into a limbo between their past and present modes of daily existence; and (3) re-aggregation, when they are ritually returned to secular or mundane life – either at a higher status.
level or in an altered state of consciousness or social being” (Turner, 1979: 466-467). Juxtaposed onto the border crossing process, Cheng left her ordinary life and everyday social structure when she embarked on her travel to China. She then enters the liminal period at the immigration checkpoint where she felt that she was becoming another person. Finally, when she was granted entry and crossed the checkpoint, she would have been in a different sociocultural state as she began her journey under a new social structure. The fact that Cheng goes through this ritualistic process “whenever” she is at the Chinese immigration checkpoint confirms her border crossing experience as not dissimilar to Gennep’s ‘rites of passage’.

From the narration above, it is evident that the inner-workings of the tourist’s mind do not cease even after coming to terms with having to queue at the domestic arrival line. Notions of identity performance and behaviour, and preparations for the encounter with the ‘other’, continue to be worked through while waiting for or going through passport/travel permit inspection. These inner-workings constitute a kind of identity performance, albeit not expressively executed. Such emotions and mode-changing contribute to the “‘furnishing’ of journey and border times and spaces” (Burrell, 2008: 353).

5.4 Political Border as Personal Boundary: Cross-strait Tourists’ Experiences

The Taiwanese tourists are not the only ones to encounter mobility restrictions. For the Chinese people, the ability to go abroad for a holiday is not something taken for
granted. Government officials and military personnel must have their passports detained by their employers, and only under special circumstances are they granted permission to travel. One of my informants travelled for the first time to Taiwan only after he retired from his job as an official in the Chinese Communist Party. He said, “It was not convenient for us to go overseas for holiday. I have been to most Chinese scenic spots, but never overseas. So the very moment I retired, I brought my wife to Taiwan” (Mr Chen, personal interview, 2011). Such ‘inconvenience’ is experienced by another interviewee, who currently works for a national bank. She lamented that she has to surrender her passport to her company and needs to seek permission before she can travel abroad (Zhang Yi, personal communication, 2011). Such control and close surveillance of one’s movement even to the extent of detaining the passport, which is supposed to facilitate one’s mobility, might seem absurd in other parts of the world, but is an everyday reality that people in China live with.

Even for the majority who are not involved in military or government jobs, applying for a visa to travel overseas might not be easy or even possible. Take the recent opening of Taiwan to tourists from China as an example. Although tourism exchanges between the two sides are often hailed as a way of forging a ‘bridge of friendship’, this bridge is unfortunately not extended to everyone in China. In other words, the opportunity to participate in rapprochement tourism is not equally shared, to say the least. To illustrate, in 2008, only residents from thirteen provinces and cities in China\footnote{The 13 administrative districts are Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan and Shanxi provinces and the cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing (Central News Agency, 7 September 2008).} were allowed to travel (on group tours) daily to and from Taiwan.
Three years later in June 2011, Taiwan began to allow entry of independent Chinese tourists, but only 500 are given permission to enter each day and only residents of Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen are eligible to apply for such a travel permit (BBC News, 28 June 2011). My conversations with tourists or would-be tourists in China on their travel documents thus very much evolved around the themes of mobility restrictions caused by the absence of a readily available passport or not having the ‘right province of residence’ on their passports. This reflects the ‘unequal degrees of mobility’ experienced by people from the same country. Indeed, the “‘mobile subjects’, as conceptualized by theorists such as Scott Lash and John Urry (1994), may not be as ‘mobile’ as they imagine” (Wang, 2004: 370). Respondents in China explained that people from Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen are deemed more cosmopolitan and of a higher social status and integrity, and thus seen as more suitable/reliable to be admitted as ‘independent tourists’. A traveller with a passport that shows the ‘right province of residence’ is thus deemed to possess a more desirable character than one who does not. This causes the production of ‘collective hierarchies’ as travel documents are “experienced as becoming part of persons by classifying them into collectives” (Jansen, 2009: 821). It is evident that bordering practices in terms of tourist profiling by the Taiwanese authorities are already taking place even before the tourists step into Taiwan. Such an invisible border and how it is being experienced through the materiality of a personal identification document is a quaint example of how the effects of macro-political circumstances have come to be borne by individuals.
5.4.1 The Taiwan Travel Permit as a site of bordering

For a thing to be political, it must give rise to a meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic that is never set up in advance.

(Rancière, 1999, cited in Dikeç, 2005: 184)

Collective hierarchies continue to be at play even after the Chinese tourists have crossed the border into Taiwan. I recollect an observation when I attended the inaugural Pacific Asia Student Seminar (PASS) organised by the National Taiwan University (NTU) in August 2009. The PASS was an international forum where undergraduates and postgraduate students came together to discuss the “history, development, present situation and the future progress and prosperity” of the Pacific Asian region (Pacific Asia Student Seminar, 2009). Students from leading Chinese institutions like Peking, Qinghua and Renmin Universities were invited to participate in this seminar. Such academic visits appear to be the dominant ‘method’ of entering Taiwan for the younger generation. Chinese respondents often revealed that they do not wish to participate in group tours as they claimed that those are for their parents’ generation and are generally boring and restrictive.\(^\text{21}\) Therefore the best way to travel Taiwan is to go for an academic conference or student exchange programme. They often have ample time to travel around Taiwan during their stay there, which may last for a few days to a few months. A student identity card, thus, supersedes the validity of the Chinese passport when applying for a Taiwan travel permit and is deemed to be ‘more useful’ \textit{per se}. For this example, I shall refer to these forum participants as student tourists as indeed, they did engage with touristic

\(^{21}\) Tour groups need to follow a fixed itinerary and tourists are not allowed to travel alone.
activities other than the conference itself. Upon arrival at the seminar venue, I became aware that the Chinese student tourists were asked to surrender their Taiwan travel permits to the organisers (Figure 5.2). It was not long before I overheard some dissent amongst the Chinese as apparently they were the only ones that had their personal documents detained by the organisers. It was explained that this was an administrative protocol from ‘above’ and there was nothing the organisers could do. I could understand the discontent about the unequal treatment and perhaps the absurdity of the organisers’ actions, but wanted to gain a more nuanced insight into the affective interactions between the travel permit and the student tourist under such circumstances. So, during my fieldwork in China in 2011, I visited one of the fellow participants, Shen Jian, to interview him on his Taiwan travel experiences. When asked on his views of having to surrender his Taiwan travel permit, he said:

I thought it was very strange for them to do that. It is an identification document. How could you detain an identification document? No matter whether it is a passport or anything else, this is a thing of my personal identity. Such things have never happened to us in mainland [China]. They had detained something that is personal. It does not belong to them; it is none of their business. But of course, I am not trying to sound ‘revolutionary’, but in the mainland, for such an academic activity, no one will detain your personal document. But they were students, and maybe by doing that, it was easier for them to organise and manage. I can understand that, but I still think that this method was very strange.

(Personal interview, 2011)
Figure 5.2 The permit for mainland China residents travelling to Taiwan (issued by the Chinese authority) and the Taiwan Travel Permit (issued by the Taiwanese authority)

A ‘strange’ way of management and control indeed, but the unequal treatment received by the conference delegates just goes to show that “relations between different passports are hierarchical and that they are experienced as such” (Jansen, 2009: 817). Although “identification is not reducible to identity” (Butler et al., 2000, cited in Amoore, 2006: 344), identity is still essentially not just about self-recognition, but also recognition by others (Beger and Luckman, 1967; Calhoun, 1994, cited in Wang, 2004). Apparently, the trustworthiness of a person is determined by the type of passport/permit s/he is issued with. I could sense Shen’s feeling of injustice during the interview, but he had kept his response in a rather ‘politically correct’ manner by describing the entire saga as merely ‘strange’. However, we shouldn’t trivialise his affective material moments with the Taiwan travel permit when he questioned the authority of the organisers to detain such a “thing of ... personal identity” and
‘material object of mobility’ (Burrell, 2008). This echoes Navaro-Yashin’s (2007) call for an analysis of “interactions between documents and persons”, that is, “the way documents are perceived or experienced as affectively charged phenomena when produced and transacted in specific contexts of social relation” (cited in Jansen, 2009: 816). In this case, the effects of an ‘administrative protocol’ from ‘up there’ have trickled down through the materiality of the Taiwan travel permit to affect the student tourist personally. Shen’s ‘imagined mobility’ was clearly not in sync with his ‘corporeal mobility’ (Burrell, 2008), which was restricted by the mobility regime. This is quintessential of how borders are not just found at the immigration checkpoints, but are erected, practiced and experienced at the personal level as well.

5.4.2 Taiwanese identification cards and playful identities

The individual not only thinks but also does, moves and engages the body practically and thereby imaginatively, and in relation to material objects, spaces, and other people.

(Crouch, 2004: 87)

The discussion so far has focused on the more, for want of a better word, serious aspects of self-identification or identification by others. Here, I suggest that in the context of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan, there lies an element of ‘play’ involved in the performance of tourist identities. I will draw on the use of identification documents other than passport or travel permits by Taiwanese tourists in China, and the circumstances under which they experimented with, and straddle identity boundaries. For the Taiwanese tourists, material moments with their
identification documents do not occur only at the immigration checkpoint. The interaction continues throughout their travel on the mainland. These are not necessarily travel documents per se, but are documents that travel with the tourist and at times enable her/him to negotiate macro-political structures to her/his own advantage. One of my Taiwanese respondents told me about her friend’s routine performance of identity to the Chinese locals through his Taiwanese Identity Card:

My friend is very funny. Whenever he goes to the mainland [China], he would show off his Republic of China [Taiwan] ID card to people there and quipped, “We belong to the same country right? In that case, I should be able to use this here!” Haha... He just felt that with his effort, he could influence the Chinese people to think that Taiwan is a sovereign country. He’s always like that and ended up in long and funny debates with shop owners. We’ll just leave him alone to enjoy himself.

(Chen Shu-yi, personal interview, 2011)

As Turner (1979: 466) reminds us, “Liminality is full of potency and potentiality. It may also be full of experiment and play. There may be a play of ideas, a play of words, a play of symbols, a play of metaphors. In it, play’s the thing.” Such playfulness can be extended to this tourist’s performance of identity through his Taiwanese Identity Card. Although a Taiwanese tourist in China is not required to bring along the Taiwanese Identity Card, but is instead required to use the Taiwan Compatriot Permit (TCP) for identification purposes, Chen’s friend chose to do otherwise. In the liminal state of touring, he put forward his views on Taiwanese sovereignty in a playful and light-hearted manner that might not be possible under the host country’s normal social structure. He would not go so far as to mock the Chinese state, but still found liberties in the way he expressed himself and interacted
with the locals. Conversely, in the spirit of tourism, the locals were happy to engage him in friendly debates on cross-strait relations. As Crouch (2004: 89) shares, “The work on performance, and in particular so-called performativities, points in particular toward the negotiative work the individual may do in opening up new possibilities in their life. Practice and performance colour the character of consumption.” Such playful performance of one’s identity has indeed created refreshing avenues for people on both sides to engage with cross-strait issues.

Furthermore, the Taiwanese tourists I spoke with sometimes boasted of their triumphs over the ‘system’ when their Taiwanese identification documents were accepted by tourism authorities. This is an extract from an interview with Ling, a Taiwanese tour guide:

L: Oh yes, another interesting thing about documents is our tour guide license. Whenever I go to the mainland, I’ll bring it along. Because in the mainland, you need to pay to enter most tourist attractions. But tour guides enter for free or are at least given huge discounts when you show your tour guide license.

J: They recognised the Taiwanese tour guide license?
L: Not really. Some attractions do acknowledge, but others don’t. Haha...

L: There was once we went to a scenic spot at Nanjing. The entry fee itself was already CNY$120 (£12). So I thought fortunately I’ve got my tour guide license with me. I depend on it to help me save lots of money when travelling in the mainland.

J: So what were you thinking when using the Taiwanese license on Chinese soil?
L: Mine was very simple: to save money! Hahaha. I don’t care about national identity. It’s all about saving money.

J: So when you were using the pass, what did you actually want the person at the ticketing counter to think?
L: Hahaha…very interesting! Of course I want the person to think that “ok you can use this, you are a tour guide”. And I will presume that the person was thinking, “good, you feel that Taiwan belongs to us”… hahaha….this is actually very scary isn’t it? If they don’t accept, it means that they don’t recognise that Taiwan belongs to them. It will be interesting if I were to probe further in such a situation, but normally if they don’t accept my Taiwanese document, I’ll just take it back, because I’m in a foreign place.

J: So it’s a win-win situation no matter what. If they accept the pass, they are happy, because they will feel that you think Taiwan belongs to China. On the other hand, you’ll be happy as you have saved some money.

L: Haha… but you’ll feel that you’ve done something wrong…hahaha…

J: If they don’t, it means that they do not recognise that Taiwan is part of China. In that case, you’ll be happy too!

L: Haha…Taiwan is not part of them at all…just that we wanted to take advantage! If they don’t accept, we can say “hmm…I think there’s some problem with your notion of national identity”…hahaha…this method is great…I’ll have to use it next time!

Figure 5.3 A Taiwanese tour guide license
The producing of Taiwanese documents at ticketing counters of Chinese scenic spots is another quintessential example of ‘play’ in a liminal period of travelling (Figure 5.3). Ling claimed that it has got nothing to do with national identity as she was very clear of her political allegiance, but this does not prevent her from wittingly taking advantage of the ambiguity of the macro-political notion of ‘belonging to China’. Indeed, such ‘conversation’ of who and what belongs was unspoken but amazingly took place via the materiality of the tourist pass. The use of the Taiwanese document was interpreted as a submission of the holder to the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, documents “take the shape of or transform into affect and become part of their handlers in that way’ (Navaro-Yashin, 2007, cited in Jansen, 2009: 816). Furthermore, this interview extract is interesting as it does not only reveal the tourist’s material moments with her tour guide pass in China, but also hints at her enthusiasm in experimenting with new ‘techniques’ to take advantage of the current political climate in cross-strait relations. It shows that such performance of identity is not just talked about in the aftermath of travel, but is constantly in the making, and constantly being scripted in the tourist’s mind. This performance would be rehearsed and staged in future encounters with the hosts in China. Butler (1993, cited in Sofaer, 2007: 3-4) reminds us that “people can hold multiple or plural identities which may spring to the fore in different circumstances, times, and places.” Although I do agree on the plurality of identities and their temporal and spatial properties, the multiple identities at play in this example exist on rather abstract planes of reality. In other words, the allegiance of Ling to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was derived based on a double assumption. Ling assumed that by producing her Taiwanese tour guide pass, the authority at the ticket counter would
assume that she was recognising and submitting herself to the PRC’s sovereignty, and would then grant her a discount. As such, her clear allegiance to the Republic of China (Taiwan) co-exists with her willingness to be assumed as having a sense of belonging to PRC. However, as is evident from the conversation, Ling might be haunted morally when she returned to her home social structure as she felt that she has ‘done something wrong’ in terms of betraying her own national identity. Yet, in the spirit of tourism, at the liminal stage at which she ‘plays’ with her identity and the other’s identification of her, the ultimate aim was not about making macro-political statements, but a personal triumph of being able to save some money. This economic rationale in the political life of things might seem trivial but nevertheless plays an important part in Taiwanese tourists’ tour experience. The final section of this chapter seeks to extend this economic raison d’être to the analysis of tourists’ buying and selling of things at the border.

5.5 Street Economies: Buying and Selling at a Ferry Terminal

Up to this point, I have argued that there is a convenient dismissal of the ‘in-between place’ as a site of analysis in border studies. The final section of this chapter devotes some space to explore how a place of transit for cross-border tourists is not just an empty place, but one that is furnished with material objects and feelings of identity. I will use the Dong Du Ferry Terminal in Xiamen, China as an example in developing this point (Figure 5.4).
During my fieldwork in China and Taiwan, I was quite often based in the Taiwan-held island of Kinmen. Although not the political centre of Taiwan, this island, which is situated in between the two ‘Chinas’, is very much at the heart of cross-strait politics. Even before the commencement of direct flights between China and Taiwan, Kinmen has been used as a test bed for re-establishing links between people from both sides since the early 1990s. What was called the ‘mini-three links’ saw daily ferry services ply between Kinmen and the coastal city of Xiamen in mainland China. I often took advantage of the ferry service to travel between China and Taiwan as it only takes an hour and cost substantially less than a flight from Taipei. It did not take me long to realise that once the Taiwanese tourists reached the Xiamen ferry terminal, they would be approached by locals asking if they have any duty-free cigarettes or liquor to sell. These locals are often attendants from souvenir shops in the ferry terminal.

22 The three links refer to direct postal, transportation of people and trade.
Taiwanese tourists would usually spend about fifteen minutes at the arrival hall of the ferry terminal waiting for their coaches and would often participate in such street economies with the locals. The tourists I spoke to revealed that the profit gained from the selling of duty-free items (Figure 5.5), which they have bought at the

![Figure 5.5 Examples of duty-free items](image-url)
Kinmen ferry terminal, would be used as ‘pocket money’ for their tour in China or spent at the very shop they sold their ‘goods’ to. The interesting thing about these shops is that they are not merely souvenir shops, but sell an amazing range of counterfeit mobile phones, including the ever popular iPhones. I was curious about such street economies and interested in how tourists and locals interact, bargain and trade during this space-time at the terminal. I was fortunate to able to follow a friend, Ren, from Kinmen, who had decided to spend the weekend in Xiamen and had plans to earn some pocket money by selling duty-free items at the Xiamen terminal.

Before the trip, I had a conversation with Ren:

R: There is an economy out there at the ferry terminal. Normally, we will bring 2 boxes of cigarettes...like Mild Seven.... We can each bring a bottle of alcohol as well. The first choice is western liquor like Martell blue. If that’s sold out, we usually go for the Kinmen Kaoliang Liquor, which will earn us less profit, but better than nothing. So Mild Seven and Martell would probably earn you a profit of CNY$240 (£24). A Mild Seven and Kaoliang combination will fetch about CNY$110 (£11). CNY$240... that’s already covered three quarters of my return ferry ticket!

J: Is this legal?

R: I’m not sure, but I don’t think the authorities can say anything. These’re just small and private transactions between people. But there is some sort of regulation that you can’t bring more than one bottle of Martell across the border per month. Sometimes the Chinese customs stops and checks you.

J: Other than selling these duty-free goods, do you buy things from the local shops at the ferry terminal?

R: Yes, of course... especially mobile phones. I’ve bought a couple from them in the past and they work well.
At the Xiamen ferry terminal, everything went according to plan. As he had earlier decided to buy a counterfeit iPhone from one of the shops at the Xiamen terminal, he brought the duty free Mild Seven cigarettes and Martell liquor directly to the ‘phone’ shop, hoping to strike a deal with the shop owner. The negotiation for the price of the duty-free goods went well and he earned a handsome profit of CNY$240 (£24). However, it was the exchange of words between Ren and the shop owner when they were bargaining for a better price for the counterfeit iPhone that the notions of identity and personal boundaries started to unfold:

O: CNY$900 (£90) is the best price. You guys are from Taiwan... I have relatives there too, that’s why I’m giving you the best price!

R: Come on... CNY$800 (£80). We are compatriots right? Compatriots should be nice to each other...

O: CNY$890 (£89) is the lowest I can go. You are not Taiwanese! Taiwanese people are more generous and fun to do business with!

R: Well, we are not Taiwanese you see. We are Kinmenese!

By associating with his Taiwanese relatives, the shop owner was attempting to dismantle the personal border, based on nationality, between him and his Taiwanese customer. He was also trying his best to speak Mandarin in a Taiwanese accent so as to break any possible language barrier. Conversely, pushing for a good deal for the counterfeit iPhone, Ren took ‘tactical advantage of the current system’ (Wang, 2004) and rapprochement climate by highlighting his ‘compatriot’ status. In such an economic interaction at the ferry terminal, personal boundaries were withdrawn as buyer and dealer negotiate their identities in order to seal a good deal. But as soon as the shop owner realised that his tactics were not working as intended, he
immediately withdrew and put up a ‘wall’, claiming that his customer was not ‘Taiwanese’/generous enough and not fun to do business with. The buying and selling of things at the ferry terminal show how places of transition “are intensely material and used spaces and times” (Burrell, 2008: 357). One might ask if such business dealings are legal and whether people are being asked to move on. These activities are neither legal nor illegal, but something that is in-between – something that is informally regulated but not sanctioned by border authorities. Moreover, and importantly, the lounge at the ferry terminal constitutes a space-time where tourists are expected to be waiting for either their tour coaches or ferries. Therefore, the flow of tourists in such an in-between space is not a priority (compared to, for example, the immigration checkpoint) and this creates opportunities for interactions between the Taiwanese tourists and Chinese traders. This example also illustrates how such places can be furnished by a ‘collectif’ (Callon and Law’s (1995, cited in van der Duim, 2007) of tourists, locals and things rather than just a ‘communitas’ (Turner, 1969) of tourists. The liminal space of the ferry terminal provides a platform for such economic transactions to take place. Instead of an empty “in-between space, suspended between two realities” (Burrell, 2008: 369), the ferry terminal is brought to life by the material culture of cross-border buying and selling.

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23 This question was raised by one of the graduate students in a guest lecture I gave at Sunderland University. I thank her for her query, which led me to analyse further the space-time dynamics of the waiting lounge.
5.6 From Borderless World to Borders on the Move

By bringing ‘materiality’ to the study of ‘border’ and vice versa, this chapter has aimed to provide a more grounded approach to the understanding of cross-strait tourism between China and Taiwan. Rather than focusing on state-level politics, a more nuanced cultural-geo-politics was highlighted through the various material moments in cross-strait tourists’ travel experiences. Also, the narrating of individual travel experiences “is as important as actual events where ‘the journey becomes a spatial and temporal frame to be filled with identity narratives’ (Elsrud, 2001, cited in Crang, 2004: 80). As such, from the various tourist travel narratives and my own participant observations, I have attempted to locate and highlight the confluence of the political and personal at both the real and imagined borders. Therefore, instead of a ‘borderless world’ we witness a world of rapprochement tourism that is filled with physical borders and bordering practices. As is explicated throughout the chapter, the ubiquitous border certainly does not exist only in its physical form; imagined and perceived borders are equally potent in (re)shaping cross-strait relations. Furthermore, it is evident from the discussion that things that are close to the personal or those that are part and parcel of a touring experience are far from inert; they participate in the social and political lives of their owners, and are often platforms that connect “macro structures (the state) and micro actors (individuals) to each other” (Wang, 2004: 355). More than that, things like travel permits also engage in affective material moments with their holders at border crossings, influencing how they see themselves and how they feel about how others are treating them. Other than travel permits, personal documents like the Taiwanese
tour guide license and identity card were also explored. Through these examples, I argued that there is an element of ‘play’ in tourists’ negotiation and performance of Taiwanese tourists’ identities during the liminal period of travel. Instead of a feeling of ‘humiliating entrapment’, I suggest that there was a voluntary engagement with the ‘border’. Moreover, just like in the animal kingdom, play is an excellent way to learn how to deal with the world. In addition, contrary to traditional analysis, the identity of a tourist during this liminal period is not merely inverted. Rather, I suggest that a kind of diversion is at play as s/he chooses to perform different identities in different social settings. Indeed, liminality provides a fertile conceptual ground to explore and explain the behaviour of cross-strait tourists, and opens up potential trajectories of how cross-strait relations may develop. This concept will be further employed in Chapter Six, when we look at the identity performances of pilgrim tourists. As such, rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan is not merely a political rhetoric, but is something that is experienced at the personal level. However, I suggest that in engaging with ephemeral or ubiquitous imaginations of the border, there is a risk for researchers to take the physical border for granted. In other words discussions on border crossings in their own right might be seen as passé and thus not academically rigorous. With that in mind, I brought on my participant observation at Xiamen’s Dong Du ferry terminal to illustrate how in-between places are not empty, but charged with vitality and emotions as tourists, locals, cigarettes, liquor and counterfeit mobile phones interact with each other to form a ‘collectif’. Cross-strait tourism thus becomes de-centred in relations with other people, places and things. Additionally, as the economic activities have shown, cross-strait tourists
communicate with the locals in simple economic terms based on self-interests rather than nationalistic or patriotic sentiments.

We now see entirely new but ever evolving cross-strait relations that span a wide spectrum of people’s everyday lives and lived environments that include but are not limited to cultural activities, popular culture, tourism, and so on. In other words, cross-strait engagement has metamorphosed into one that not only concentrates on macro-political issues, but micro-political nuances as well. We need to ask ourselves, “How can a re-conceptualised ‘border’ escape from the cannons of ‘national security’, ‘war on terror’, ‘control/surveillance’ etc., and concern itself with something that is as banal, as mundane, as innocuous as tourism?” “How can this process of re-conceptualising inspire further epistemological and ontological re-theorising of the ‘border’?” This chapter has sought to provide some potential lines of inquiry. As such, tourism activities that infiltrate into the lives of both populations become even more important to analyse. In departing from the mainstream academic writings that focus primarily on the macro (international) politics of the China-Taiwan conflict, such analysis has the potential to garner a more nuanced understanding of cross-strait ties through everyday cultural-geo-political processes that are constituted by and at the same time constitutive of wider political issues. Tourists and touristic things are, however, not the only subjects of tourism. The next chapter brings our discussion into the enchanted world of ghosts and deities to explore the immaterialities of rapprochement tourism.
CHAPTER SIX

THE ENCHANTED WORLD OF RAPPROCHEMENT TOURISM

6.1 Introduction: The Enchanted World

Chapters Four and Five have in one way or another dealt with the materiality of cross-strait relations such as how sensitive histories and difficult heritages are managed and consumed, or tamed using kitsch souvenirs, and how identities are performed/negotiated via identity documents and cross-border purchases. This penultimate empirical chapter goes further to explore the immaterialities of rapprochement tourism. It aims to reveal the agency possessed by non-human things and energies that are less manageable but nevertheless important actors in cross-strait relations. In one way, what follows is a response to calls for the study of materiality to go beyond the physicality of the object in question (Anderson and Tolia-Kelly, 2004). Jane Bennett’s (2004) attempt to capture the “recalcitrance possessed by nonhuman entities and forces” (p.347) for instance serves to contribute to this burgeoning inquiry into a ‘more than human world’ (Whatmore, 2006). Also, another different but closely related strand of research concerns itself with the supernatural or the otherworldly – what Maddern and Adey (2008: 292) call ‘spectro-geographies’, or “concern for the just perceptible, the barely there, the nagging presence of an absence in a variety of spaces” (see also, Pile, 2005; McEwan,
In order to gain a better understanding of post-war relations between former enemies, an analytical space needs to be reserved for the spectral, the supernatural, and the irrational, as it is occasionally through them that memories of the past are recalled and hatred possibly reconciled. The spectral in rapprochement tourism, so to speak, will be interrogated in two parts. The first part touches on the ghosts, spirits, deities and gods that were born out of the Chinese Civil War but continue to haunt and actively participate in the rapprochement process. The second part focuses on the ‘more than human’, and in particular, the goddess Mazu – a shared cult between the people of coastal China and the Taiwanese – in binding devotees with different political alliances and personal agendas together to fit into the overall discourse of rapprochement. I will show how an analysis of the Mazu Pilgrimage helps to unravel the roles played by non-human subjects in the rapprochement process. Gaining a better understanding of the spectral is important because its presence is a common belief amongst many people in China and Taiwan. As such, we are moving away from the rationality assumed by the ‘peace through tourism’ agenda, and coming to terms with the irrationality of rapprochement tourism. Religious activities organised around a popular folk deity like Mazu, and participated by devotees from both sides of the Taiwan Strait are generating many novel case studies for research on rapprochement tourism. However, these materials remain largely unexplored. Moreover, because the spectre operates in the realm of the invisible, it provides more room for imagining what cross-strait relations can be. The chapter ends by accessing the possibilities of a post-national identity, and acknowledging that the immaterialities of rapprochement tourism are very much a part of the material world they operate in.
6.2 Spirits Matter in Contemporary China and Taiwan

Before we enter the enchanted world of rapprochement tourism, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the respective takes on the subject matter by both the Chinese and Taiwanese public in general. Until recently, traditional cults\(^{22}\) and religious practices\(^{23}\) in China have been deemed as superstitions by the Chinese Communist Party. However, due to their popularity amongst overseas Chinese and Taiwanese, and their potential in establishing a unique identity to bind Chinese around the world together, local government and intellectuals now see such cults “as part of a national heritage worthy of preservation” (Laliberté, 2011: 3). In October 2007, for the first time in history, the Chinese government mentioned ‘religion’ in an amended statute, acknowledging that religion is an important part of citizen’s life. Such a change in attitude corresponds to the Chinese government’s effort to utilise ‘soft power’ in diplomatic ties, not dissimilar to the rationale behind the proliferation of ‘Confucius Institutes’ all over the world (see Paradise, 2009, cited in Laliberté, 2011). Not surprisingly then, the changing take on religious practices is most prominent in Southern China where historical and social ties with overseas Chinese and Taiwanese are the strongest. Moreover, due to the distance from the political centre of Beijing, local religions and cults in this area were able to survive Mao Zedong’s censure during the Cultural Revolution. Today, we witness the promotion and sponsorship of the Mazu Pilgrimage by officials in Fujian Province.

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\(^{22}\) Similar to Dean (2003), the term ‘cult’ in this thesis carries no derogatory meaning. The worship of local gods like Mazu and the Yellow Emperor is akin to the “cults of the saints in medieval Europe or in parts of Catholic Europe today” (p.340).

\(^{23}\) Religious practices include geomancy (风水, fengshui), divination (已经, yijing), ancestor worship (拜祖, baizu or 敬祖, jingzu), along with beliefs in spirits and deities (神, shen) and in ghosts (鬼, gui) (Laliberté, 2011).
Their counterparts in the North China province of Shanxi, have also taken advantage of this socio-political climate. In 2009, their worship to the Yellow Emperor (*Huangdi*) saw them invite Lien Chan, Taiwan’s Kuomintang Honorary Chairman, to join in a public ritual to pay respect to the God, recognised in Chinese mythology to be the ancestor of Chinese people (Laliberté, 2011). However, the support given to religious practices does not allude to the political leaders becoming devotees themselves; it simply reflects their pragmatism towards religion as a potential political tool to unite Chinese people around the world, particularly the Taiwanese. Moreover, the Chinese State is still officially atheist, and anyone with a religion is deemed ‘inadequate’ to join the communist party.

Conversely, in Taiwan, we see a rather different picture. Religious practices have always been part and parcel of social and political lives. In contrast to a path towards secularisation that one normally expects of a modern society, religion in Taiwan “is thriving and even expanding” (Katz, 2003: 395). Instead of distancing itself, the government embraces religion overtly. Political leaders are not afraid of showing their devotion to certain deities. In fact, visits to temples and propitiation to the gods are often made public and reported in the media. For example, Katz (2003) provides a vivid account of how electoral candidates in Taiwan exploited the ‘divine powers’ of cult deities to influence election results. Religious spaces such as temples become rallying spots for politicians. More often than not, supporters of a certain candidate cite spectral happenings at cult temples, such as the flaring up of incense burners, to indicate a ‘divine wish’ for that particular patron to be elected. Representatives from another camp will then quickly denounce the efficacy of the deity in question, while
claiming that a ‘celestial choice’ has been made by another (more powerful) deity in favour of their candidate. The notion of power as it operates in the private and public spheres is of interest here. In the case of China, power clearly lies with the political leaders as they can be seen as appropriating private religious practices to meet certain public agenda. In a sense, the private is made public, but still very much a separate entity from the public, as it is clearly a political tool. In the case of Taiwan, the power relation between deities, temple leaders and politicians is more subtle. Although still a political instrument or technology, the gods are seen as possessing the power to alter political outcomes. As such, the public here operates through the private, indeed, the boundaries between them are blurred as religion is made political and politics religious.

In this chapter, my main aim is not to discuss the existence or non-existence of ghosts and gods, or whether they are inventions or social constructs (see for example, Bell, 1997: McEwan, 2008). Instead I propose an open-ended and non-reductionist approach to how we encounter the enchanted world. This means, rather than investigating what ghosts and gods are, I am more interested in how they participate in rapprochement tourism and in so doing, enchant cross-strait relations. "We become enchanted ... when we are confronted by circumstances or occurrences so peculiar and so beyond our present understanding as to leave us convinced that, were they to be understood, our image of how the world operates would be radically transformed" (Schneider, 1993, emphasis in original, cited in McEwan, 2008: 30). However, “...to ask what ghosts are might be a misplaced question in that ghosts, spirits, apparitions, or spectres are neither some-thing nor
no-thing” (Holloway, 2006: 185). This suggests that we need to pay attention to how spectres operate. Ghosts and spirits might not be physically real, but they affect, possess and haunt people. I will show that rapprochement tourism understood through the lens of the spectral is more about affect and feeling than reason and meaning. At least for the devotees, the belief itself is more real and true than anything else. Perhaps we can never define what ghosts and gods really are: questions of faith and religion require living with a ‘duration of uncertainty’ (Jackson, 1981, cited in Holloway, 2006: 185). This requires us to “attend to the haunting power of spirits by leaving analyses open and unfinalized” (ibid: 186). It is such a suspended state between the real and imagined, between the mortal world and the realm of the immortal that I invite readers to adopt as we delve into the enchanted world of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. The next section looks at the behaviour of spirits and ghosts that originate from the Civil War past, and how they continue to participate in the political lives of people in the midst of the rapprochement climate.
6.3 Encountering the ‘Untamed’

6.3.1 The Wang Yulan cult

Whilst commentators proudly proclaimed the end of history at the close of the twentieth century where all moments in time are neatly ordered and ‘in their rightful place’ (Fukuyama, 1992), the twenty-first century has so far transpired as a century of haunting; of irregular, unexpected and (un)anticipated events that appear to be ‘beyond the real’ (Kitchin and Kneale, 2005). These events continue to reverberate in and around places long after they have occurred so that time is rendered ‘out of joint’ (Derrida, 1994)

(Maddern and Adey, 2008: 291)

The first story tells of how a formerly anti-communist deity on the island of Kinmen has become an ambassador of goodwill under the rapprochement climate. We begin our encounter with a female spirit whose body was washed ashore on Kinmen Island in the summer of 1954. Coast guards of the Kuomintang (KMT) Army and local people helped to recover the body. Taking pity on her plight, they decided to give her a proper burial. The very night of her recovery from the beach, the female spirit appeared in one of the soldiers’ dream to thank him and the villagers for their kindness and confided her fateful encounter. A spirit medium from a village temple was also reported to have been possessed by her. Through the medium, she shared her misfortune. Her name was Wang Yulan, aged 17 and from the city of Xiamen in mainland China. In the morning of that fateful day, she was out on the beach, picking up oysters to earn a living. She was confronted by a group of communist soldiers attempting to take advantage of her. In an attempt to resist their infringement on her chastity, she put up a fight, but was eventually stripped of her clothing by the
enraged soldiers and thrown into the sea. Impressed by Wang’s heroics, the KMT army erected the Chaste Maiden Temple in praise of her determination in upholding her principles even in the face of death and identified her as a martyr (Figure 6.1).
The Wang Yulan Cult soon took form as the spirit was reputed to possess divine power and was able to answer the prayers of her devotees. The conclusion of an inscription outside the temple, composed by the then Division Commander, read:

It is truly painful. Between Jinmen and Xiamen, fierce sea creatures come and go. How was she able to float to this place, and tell her story of injustice? While alive she was able to resist; when dead she threw herself towards freedom. The brutal and immoral regime of the red bandits [communist soldiers] moves both Heaven and man to indignation. How divine and remarkable [is Wang’s spirit]? Today the whole world’s anger against communism is at its high tide, and the revolutionary resistance to brutality rises like the wind. Autocracy must be defeated, and brutal governance must be destroyed. The facts are so. In order to comfort her virtuous spirit which has died prematurely, I have lovingly composed this record, in order to commemorate her purity and chastity.


The interpretation of the local cult to suit nationalist ideologies and the deification and ‘martyrisation’ of the female spirit attest to the attempt of the state to shape ritual practice within the wider geopolitical context. By intertwining politics with popular religion, messages from the state were effectively transmitted.

After the end of martial law in Kinmen in 1992, the island heralded in a new phase of tourism development. According to Szonyi (2005: 94), the temple is represented in guidebooks and itineraries “as a space for tourist consumption. Visiting it is an exercise in authenticity, a necessary component of experiencing [Kinmen]”. Tourists worshipping at the temple add a new layer of complexity. Other than assimilating into the locals’ practice of worshipping, mainland Taiwanese tourists introduced the offering of cosmetics into the “ritual performance”. Szonyi explains that the tourists draw on their experiences in Taiwan, “where shrines to the ghosts of unmarried
women are very common” (ibid). Furthermore, he analyses that “[b]y offering cosmetics to Wang Yulan, the tourists are in effect resexualising her, reinterpreting her in terms closer to that of a living being than the nationalist symbol of the military or the protective deity of the villagers” (ibid). The re-feminisation of the deity reflects the active role performed by the tourists in reshaping the symbolic meaning of the temple.

When Chinese tour groups were allowed to visit the Island in 2001 via the ‘mini three links’\(^\text{24}\) agreement, this temple, though popular amongst the locals and tourists from mainland Taiwan, was eliminated from tour itineraries by the Chinese authorities due to its anti-communist connotations. However, when I returned to the island in 2011 for my fieldwork, I noticed a new granite tablet erected near to the temple’s entrance (Figure 6.2).

\(^{24}\) These refer to direct trade, postal and shipping links between Kinmen and Matsu of Taiwan, and Xiamen and Fuzhou of China.
Although the storyline remains the same, it is now the ‘local hooligans’ that were responsible for Wang Yulan’s death, not the ‘red bandits’ or the ‘communist soldiers’.\(^\text{25}\) The change in attitude of the temple’s management resonates with a Wall Street Journal article on how anti-communist gods in Kinmen are ‘embracing’ China in the current geopolitical climate across the Taiwan Strait (Wall Street Journal, 21 April 2008). In that article, Su Ai-chih, a spirit medium, shared that during a séance Wang has requested to ‘return’ to her ancestral hometown on mainland China in search of her family. According to Su, the deity seems to hold less of a grudge against her murderers now (ibid). Together with a Taoist priest, Su even built a paper boat so that Wang can ‘sail’ back to the mainland. When asked about the anti-communist deities\(^\text{26}\) involvement in current cross-strait relations, locals running a market next to the temple shared with me that they welcome this ‘change of

\(^{25}\) This replacement of sensitive terms with more neutral vocabulary also took place in various war museums on the island.

\(^{26}\) In Kinmen and the neighbouring Little Kinmen, there are some 44 anti-communist temples (Wall Street Journal, 21 April 2008).
hearts’ of the deities. They felt that the earlier inscription outside the Chaste Maiden Temple was too political. Now that the introductory plaque has been changed, Chinese tourists felt much comfortable to drop by and also patronise their stalls. With tourism being the obvious economic lifeline since the gradual de-militarisation of the island, and the mainland Chinese tourists just 2km away (compared to 350km for mainland Taiwanese tourists), it is no wonder that anti-communist deities are also re-aligning their take on political matters. Indeed, it is pertinent for a critical assessment to “recognise that the strategies which shape consumption and identity are multiple and are dependent on political, economic and cultural processes” (Crewe and Lowe, 1995: 1893). As such, the battlefield tourism landscape takes on multiple layers of meanings and their dominance is constantly being negotiated by the various stakeholders, including the untamed.

6.3.2 Return of the dead soldiers

Anti-communist deities are not the only ones having a change of hearts. Since cross-strait tensions thawed and travel was permitted from Kinmen to mainland China in 1992, spirits of the KMT soldiers, who died during the Kuningtou Battle in 1949, had made requests through local mediums to return to their hometowns in mainland China. The following discussion will show how the desire of the soldier spirits to return to their homeland is in fact generated by and contributing to the

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27 The popularity of Taoist temples is often gauged by the amount of incense and money donation offered by devotees. A typical visitor usually buys joss sticks and incense paper (paper money) from the temple keeper. The joss sticks will then be lighted and handled with both hands, before the devotee kneels down in front of the deity to say some prayers, usually to wish for good health and protection for the entire family. The joss sticks are then inserted into an incense burner (Figure 6.1). Following that, the paper money will then be burnt so that the deity can receive it in the other world. The ritual normally ends by putting some money into the temple’s donation box.
rapprochement climate. Most of these spirits were housed in temples across the islands (although locals believe that many still roam freely). One of such temples is the Lee Kuang-Chien Temple. Lee was a colonel in the nationalist army and died on the Kuningtou battlefield when leading a charge against the communist soldiers, who had landed on Kinmen in the hope of capturing and using it as a launch pad to attack the KMT on mainland Taiwan. Being the highest-ranked soldier to have sacrificed, Colonel Lee was commemorated for his valour and deified at a temple dedicated to him (Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 An idol of Colonel Lee Kuang-Chien (Photo by Chi Chang-hui)

He was also made ‘leader’ of the spirits of his compatriots. Temple keeper, Chang Tse-I reveals, “Mr Lee now wants to return to his homeland in peace” (Wall Street Journal, 21 April 2008). In fact, according to a Kinmenese blogger in response to a posting on the eeriness of certain war relics on the island, such requests by ghosts of the KMT army to return to their ancestral villages are not new. Apparently, before
mass tourism started, Taiwanese people were allowed to visit relatives on the other side since 1987. It was then when the ‘voices’ of these ghosts re-surfed ever since their souls were believed to have been put to rest in temples after the 1949 battle. Indeed, in an attempt to define what a ghost is, John Wylie cites Derrida: “A spectre is always a revenant...because it begins by coming back” (Derrida, 1994, cited in Wylie, 2007: 171). He goes on to say that, “The spectral ushers in an endless process of returning, without ever arriving. In neither coming from somewhere nor going anywhere, the spectral constitutes an incessance that belies origins or ends: a haunting” (ibid). On the former battlefield island of Kinmen, such haunting becomes rampant whenever there is a change in political climate. Moreover, discussions of such haunting of the past amongst the Kinmen netizens bear testimony to the fact that the past very much still lives on in the present. Perhaps it is “in the spaces of entangled times, of transformation and uncertainty, that ghosts and spectres appear...” (McEwan, 2008: 33). Also, the changing times and attitude of the spirits may have instigated a change in temple management. For example, similar to the plaque outside the Chaste Maiden Temple, the one dedicated to Colonel Lee was also replaced. Although the Kuningtou Battle is still mentioned, anti-communist sentiments and nationalist fervour in retaking mainland China are being substituted by a list of battles he fought against the Japanese during the Second World War – something that mainland Chinese tourists can recognise. Such a gesture highlighting the existence of a common enemy reminds us of China’s rapprochement strategies mentioned in Chapter 4.28

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28 The sentiments towards the Japanese are very different though. In China, we see a certain grievance and injustice portrayed in the various museums. Kinmen is however more neutral and sees the Japanese occupation as a chapter in its history. It also sees such neutrality as the best option to
Calls from the deities, spirits and ghosts to visit or return to mainland China have been scattered and random at times, with local mediums and temple management fulfilling the various ‘requests’. However, the consciousness of the coming back or returning of the untamed seems to have been produced by and producing the rapprochement sentiment across the Taiwan Strait. In a highly publicised gesture of goodwill, Wu Youhua, a Xiamen based businessman sponsored a religious ceremony in Kinmen to comfort and ‘fetch’ the souls of the communist soldiers who were killed during the Kuningtou Battle back to the Buddhist Nan Putuo Temple in Xiamen (Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4 Fetching the souls of dead Communist soldiers back to Xiamen, China
(Source: Kinmen Daily News, 16 September 2012)
Conversely, rites were also performed in the same event to gather the ghosts of KMT soldiers and house them in the Hai-Yin Temple on Kinmen’s Tai-Wu Mountain (Kinmen Daily News, 16 September 2012). It is evident that there is an effort by both governments to institutionalise such ‘spectral forces’ and perhaps tap on these energies to attain political aims. Institutionalisation, however, is not all-encompassing. It remains to be seen how the ghosts concerned will react to this effort to order and tame them. Only the spirits themselves or at best the mediums will have a clue on whether they are really put to rest, or not.

Perhaps, the ‘repatriation’ of these ghosts and spirits might not go down well with certain stakeholders. Our final encounter with the ‘untamed’ brings us to paranormal adventures sought by young Taiwanese tourists in Kinmen. Analysing such activities is important as we can gain alternative understandings of people’s appropriation of the spectres at a rapprochement tourism site that might be different from conventional practices as explicated earlier. These tourists usually come in groups to explore the island, either on bicycles or one-stroke scooters. Beyond the meta-narration that former battlefield sites are reminder of the sufferings of war and importance of peace – something that Kinmen is very keen to portray to Chinese tourists – youngsters choose to experience the battlefield landscape in a more spectral manner. Poka, a university student in her early 20s, claimed enthusiastically:

If you haven’t tour the island on bicycle at night, you haven’t experienced the real Kinmen. Cycling with friends in the middle of the night to the various battlefield sites and abandoned military fortresses was one of the most
thrilling activities. The guys in our group kept making funny noises and shared ghost stories of Kinmen. It’s very scary, but it’s really fun and exciting.

(Personal interview, 2011)

The abandoned military sites that are otherwise tourist attractions in the day are re-interpreted by these night cyclists as “haunted”, as sites that evoke emotions, not of nationalism, patriotism or the importance of peace, but those of the eerie, ghostly and supernatural. As Maddern and Adey (2008: 292) remind us, “spectro-geographies are relations that may speak through texts, things, objects and practices, and more than metanarratives and overarching ideologies.” Instead of buying into the prescribed meanings of the battlefield landscape, these young tourists set out for an encounter with the otherworldly and construct a collective identity for themselves as ‘real tourists’ through consuming the spectral. Furthermore, the defunct bunkers that ghosts occupy, the deserted battlegrounds that spirits roamed, go to show that the “possession of a place by ghosts...is not a non-material phenomenon” (Bell, 1997: 832). The immaterialities of the otherworldly are still very much a part of rather than apart from the material world that they operate in.

This section has attempted to illustrate the enchanted world of rapprochement tourism through the behaviour of the various deities, spirits and ghosts, and people’s appropriation of them. It is evident that these untamed are ‘irreducible’ (Derrida, 1994) precipitates of a tumultuous past, and they are very much active participants of present-day cross-strait politics. We now move on from an engagement with the spectral that is more random and refuses categorisation to one that is more organised and institutionalised, yet still enchanting– the Mazu Pilgrimage.
6.4 Paying Homage to the ‘Heavenly Mother’ – Mazu Pilgrimage Tours

As the Empress of Heaven, she appears seated upon waves or clouds, or often on a throne, clad in a long robe with an official girdle, wearing an imperial headdress. She holds an official tablet or a sceptre, as symbols of her imperial status. In rank, she is equal to all male emperors and subordinate only to the supreme (male) god. She usually has two accompanying personages: Ear of a Thousand Li and Eye of a Thousand Li, by which her observant and attentive powers are symbolized. She sees and hears all those in distress who petition her for assistance and protection.

(Irwin, 1990: 63-64)

The cultural proximity of people from Fujian province in China and those in Taiwan (due to diasporic linkages) means that religion is a common social denominator for most. Their common belief in Mazu or Tien-shang Sheng-mu (the Heavenly Mother) is a case in point. Since the establishment of informal contacts in 1987, Taiwanese pilgrims travelling to discover their religious roots in China became the “largest and most visible groups of travellers” (Katz, 2003: 407). When the mini-three links agreement started in 2001, pilgrims were able to take advantage of the direct shipping links between Kinmen and Xiamen. On 2 October 2002, the 426-member delegation, made up of devotees from ten Mazu temples on mainland Taiwan, became the largest pilgrimage group to visit China (ibid). This section aims to look at the Mazu pilgrimage as a platform to further our understanding of how religion plays a part in the rapprochement process between China and Taiwan. In particular, I will discuss the cultural-geo-politics of the Mazu Pilgrimage from a variety of different scales, ranging from the state, to temple organisations and the personal. In doing so, I will show that as a form of rapprochement tourism, the pilgrimage tour is both a
social activity and a socialising one. As such, the Mazu cult is seen as a potential force in creating new forms of post-national communities between the Chinese and Taiwanese devotees.

For most Mazu devotees, a pilgrimage is often also a leisure activity in itself. A trip to the ancestral temple is never complete without stopovers at scenic and shopping spots. It is no wonder that studies on the Mazu cult and tourism between China and Taiwan tend to treat such religious pilgrimage as a tourist product, focusing their analyses mainly on economic aspects of supply and demand (see for example, Guo and Kim et al. 2006). Also, more generally, works on popular religions often focus on the state-cult relationship (see for example, Katz, 2003), on religion as an empowering tool for (female) mediums to fulfil personal agendas (Endres, 2008), or on how the hierarchy of deities is a reflection of social order (Irwin, 1990). Although these approaches are insightful in their own right, I seek to adopt a perspective that understands pilgrimage as an embodied experience and as a performance (Holloway, 2006; Laliberté 2011) of a plurality of identities. Doing so will facilitate our understanding of pilgrims’ behaviour and subjectivities and unfold many personal stories that will contribute to a more intimate understanding of the Mazu Pilgrimage. I am also interested in how people’s participation in such a shared religious event influences their perceptions of cross-strait relations and their counterparts across the Strait. As Holloway (2006: 182) argues, the geography of religion has hitherto focused mainly on the “construction and effects of religious-spiritual space” rather than on the production of such spaces (although see Kong 1992; Martin and Kryst 1998; Game 2001). In other words, it is very often assumed that spiritual spaces
were there *before* the pilgrimage rather than spiritual spaces being *performed* through the pilgrimage. As such, I understand the Mazu pilgrimage tour not as a tourism product, but as something that produces platforms for people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait to interact with each other. More specifically, I am interested in how such deities-oriented tours help to interrogate the roles of non-state or even non-human actors/subjects in the rapprochement process. The questions I ask include: How are identities performed by the devotee-tourists on such tours? What forms of ‘bordering’ take place when people from both sides interact within the context of such cultural events? How does one’s national identity stand alongside cultural/religious identity when participating in such tours? How does ‘accompanying’ the Mazu Goddess on a tour serve to erect and/or eradicate borders? Before exploring these questions further, it is useful to have an idea of how the Mazu cult started and why the various Mazu centres in Taiwan feel obliged to organise pilgrimages to the ancestral temple on Meizhou Island.29

### 6.4.1 From seafarers’ guardian to Cross-strait Goddess of Peace

As the legend30 goes, Mazu was born into the Lin Family on Meizhou Island, off the coast of Putian in Fujian Province in 960 A.D. Just before the arrival of the baby, a spectrum of red light was cast from the sky into the family’s bedroom, followed by a lingering fragrance in the air, and thunder-like rumbles. When she was born, she did

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29 For an excellent anthropological study on Mazu cult centres in Taiwan and their politics with each other and the state, see Sangren (2000). This chapter chooses to focus on the cross-border and rapprochement aspects of the Mazu pilgrimage.

30 It is perhaps more appropriate to say this is just one of the many different versions of Mazu’s biography. See Boltz (1986: 219-220) for a detailed discussion of the variations. However, it suffices to say that although details differ, all accounts attempt to show that Mazu possessed divine powers from a very young age.
not utter a single cry, thus her name – Mo-niang (silent lady). Such “signs and wonders” (Rubinstein, 2003: 183) led her family and villagers to believe that she was not an ordinary child. One day when Lin Mo-niang was 15, her father and brother had gone out to work at sea. She fell into a trance at home and could not control her hands and legs. Her mother was terrified and tried to wake her up. Upon her returning to consciousness, she cried and demanded to know why she was not given enough time to rescue her brother. Moments later, news arrived that a boat had capsized at sea and while Mo-niang’s father survived, her brother drowned. Her father told his family of a spectral being saving his life during the ordeal. It became apparent that it was indeed Mo-niang who ‘went’ in aid of her father and brother, but because she was revived too early by her mother, she could not get a good grip of her brother, and thus he drowned. That was when Mo-niang’s divine power was realised and she continued to lend her hand to seafarers in distress. She did not die a natural death. At the age of 28, she ascended to heaven from Meizhou Island. Since her ascension, she continued to be the guardian for fishermen and merchants who ply the treacherous waters of the Taiwan Strait. People soon erected a temple for her on Meizhou Island and the local folk deity soon gained popularity in the coastal areas of mainland China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. According to Maspéro (1963, cited in Irwin, 1990: 63) by 1228, Mazu temples could already be found in “all the maritime provinces of coastal China.” As Boltz (1986: 211) professes, Mazu is attributed with “a vast range of divine power, but overall her reputation rests on her ability to rescue those who suffer hazards at sea. As the special guardian of seafaring populations, she remains unsurpassed.”

31 So widespread is the cult today that Mazu temples can also be found in Australia and the US.
Mazu’s efficacy and power was not only recognised by ordinary people, her divinity and meritorious deeds were also acknowledged by the ruling elites. As such, we see the numerous official titles conferred to Mazu by emperors of the different dynasties (from Song to Qing)\(^{32}\) ranging from *Sheng-fei* (Holy Queen), *Tain-fei* (Celestial Consort), *Tian-hou* (Empress of Heaven) to *Tian-shang Sheng-mu* (the Heavenly Mother). These titles were often bestowed on her for her ‘services to mankind’. For instance, she was accredited when she guided the boat of the ambassador to Korea to safety during a storm in the Sung Dynasty. Some scholars interpret this as a way for rulers to institutionalise the Mazu cult and legitimise their own authority (Irwin, 1990), while at the same time gain the support of her devotees indirectly. However, such legitimisation is a two-way process. In China, deities also needed sanction by the authority so as not to be deemed as secret sects and therefore illegal. “[G]ods are perceived as powerful only insofar as people worship them” Sangren (2000: 72). As such, “…state recognition and promotion of local deities… in effect allows each to tap the other in a process of mutual legitimization” (*ibid*: 77).

Today, in lieu of the warming ties across the Taiwan Strait, Mazu is hailed by the Chinese as the *hai-shang he-ping nu-shen* (Sea Goddess of Peace) or *hai-xia liang-an he-ping nu-shen* (Cross-strait Goddess of Peace). A Mazu devotee in Putian expressed:

> As I am from Mazu’s hometown, I feel very proud that a woman from Putian can become a common deity for the Chinese in the world… I feel that by using deities and religious belief, we are better able to go beyond politics to

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\(^{32}\) For a list of official titles bestowed to Mazu, see Irwin (1990); for a more detailed discussion, see Boltz (1986).
construct a kind of common identity and communication platform. This is what I feel as a local.

(Zheng Li, personal interview, 2011)

Other than a symbol of cross-strait peace, Mazu also represents familial ties between China and Taiwan. In that respect, the annual pilgrimage has often been promoted as *Ma-zu hui niang-jia* (Mazu returns to her natal home). The ‘Mazu homecoming’ discourse is related to the concept of *ling* in Taoism. As Sangren (2000: 56) explains:

...*ling* is one of the key concepts uniting Chinese culture and religion. In brief, *ling* is a kind of magical efficacy attributed to supernatural entities of all sorts – gods, ghosts, ancestors, and so forth. Moreover, it is a relative quality: some gods and ghosts are more *ling* than are others.

Being housed in the ancestral temple, the Mazu on Meizhou Island is regarded as the most *ling* amongst all the other Mazu idols at other cult centres. That is the reason why on the 23rd day of the third lunar month (Mazu’s birthday), pilgrims will travel to Meizhou Island to pay homage to the goddess. Some will even bring along their own Mazu idols and pass them over the ancestral temple’s incense burner. They will then leave them overnight in the temple so that the various Mazu idols “can take a rest and chat amongst themselves” (Chinese temple staff in Meizhou, personal communication, 2011) (Figure 6.5). Devotees believe that by doing so, the *ling* of their Mazu idols will be recharged. It is therefore not difficult to understand the Chinese government’s keenness to harness the popularity of Mazu for its reunification aims. With the basic knowledge of the cult established, the following
sections will explicate the cultural-geo-politics of the Mazu pilgrimage and how this event creates spaces of the political within which the identities of Taiwanese pilgrims and that of their Chinese counterparts are being constructed and performed.

Figure 6.5 Mazu idols from different temples being assembled with the main idol in the Meizhou ancestral temple

6.4.2 When movement takes on meanings

The mobility aspect of a pilgrimage takes on a myriad of cultural-geo-political meanings at a variety of different scales. In the following, I look at what the movement of Taiwanese pilgrims across the Taiwan Strait mean to the nationalist and communist governments, the cult centres in Taiwan, and the pilgrims themselves. Before the relaxation of travel prohibition of Taiwanese to mainland China by the nationalist government in 1987, Mazu pilgrimage was deemed to be illegal. Since 1987, Taiwanese pilgrims travelling across the Taiwan Strait have
increased considerably. However, they were not allowed to travel directly to mainland China and had to take a detour through a third country such as Hong Kong. When the leadership of Taichung’s Zhenlan Gong (temple) (one of the main Mazu cult centres in Taiwan) proposed a direct pilgrimage to mainland China in 2000, the proposal was heavily politicised and further polarised the two main political parties – the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). Katz (2003) reports that the temple leader, Yen Ching-piao, and representatives from the KMT party even gathered at Zhenlan Gong to throw divination blocks in order for Mazu to ‘decide’ on the date of departure. After the date was selected and the impending direct pilgrimage just one and a half month away, it created a political mayhem between the KMT supporters and the then newly formed Chen Shui-bian’s government. The pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which Chen led, was clearly not in favour of such direct pilgrimages to mainland China as that would imply an acknowledgement of Chinese roots. Chen attempted to convince the Taiwanese people that participation would only be complying with China’s propaganda efforts (Katz, 2003). I would argue, however, that the support for a direct pilgrimage to mainland China by the KMT members was more of an act of opposing everything and anything that the DPP stands for, rather than representing an ideological reunification with mainland China. At the same time, the Chinese government, especially local officials from Fujian Province, who had considered the financial gains and ideological meanings of such direct pilgrimages, were more than willing to welcome the pilgrims (ibid). According to Sangren (2000: 64), the Chinese officials even began to promote “its own interpretation of Mazu cult history and meaning.”
The movement and flow of pilgrims are meaningful to cult centres in Taiwan too. Before pilgrimage to mainland China was legalised, Taiwanese pilgrims go to major Mazu temples within mainland Taiwan.\textsuperscript{33} These temples thus serve as pilgrimage centres while other less significant temples are subordinated by them. Many scholars interested in the Mazu cult in Taiwan have written on inter-temple rivalry. It is of course, beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into the often exciting and colourful politics between powerful Mazu cult centres. However, it suffices to reiterate the belief that deities are only powerful insofar as people pray to them. The more devotees a Mazu temple can attract, the more magical efficacy (\textit{lingqi}) is gained by its Mazu idol. As such, each temple attempts to justify its direct lineage to the ancestral temple on Meizhou Island mainly via historical documents. The ability to organise pilgrimages to mainland China thus provided another avenue through which temples can assert their authorities. For instance, the widely publicised pilgrimage from the \textit{Zhenlan Gong} in Dajia to Meizhou in 1988 was interpreted as an assertion of the temple’s “legitimacy and authority as one of Taiwan’s leading Mazu temples” (Katz, 2003: 407), and an “idiom by means of which [it] rejected the subordinate status of its Mazu relative to Beigang’s”\textsuperscript{34} (Sangren, 2000: 64). Considering the prestige of being a Mazu cult centre in Taiwan and the economies associated with pilgrimages, it is no wonder that the movement of pilgrims within and across the Taiwan Strait carries so much meaning.

\textsuperscript{33} Sangren (2000) estimates the number of Taiwanese pilgrims making pilgrimages to Taiwan Mazu cult centres to be 4-5 million. See Sangren (2000: 46) for the list and location of these cult centres. 

\textsuperscript{34} The Chaotian Gong at Beigang is one of the most important Mazu centres in Taiwan.
So, how meaningful is the Mazu pilgrimage to an individual? Here, I observe that there is a disjuncture in the appropriation of Mazu between the state and the individual. For example, the Taiwanese state prefers to recognise Mazu as a national heroine for her assistance to Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) in his expulsion of the Dutch colonisers from Taiwan, while Chinese officials are keen to stress the peace-keeping attribute of Mazu (thus the title ‘Sea Goddess of Peace’ – *haishang heping nüshen*). For the individual, however, it is Mazu’s magical efficacy in dealing with everyday problems that is most cherished. After numerous conversations with Taiwanese pilgrims during my fieldwork, I gained a sense that although they are conscious about the Chinese promotion of Mazu as Sea Goddess of Peace, the discourse of Mazu as cross-strait peace-maker is at most ‘politically correct’ and not quite relevant to their personal motivations for participating in a pilgrimage. Mdm Hong, a Taiwanese pilgrim in her 50s, shared of how it was a personal pact with Mazu to join the yearly event:

I had an agreement with Mazu last year when I went to Meizhou. If she keeps my knees strong, I will return again the next year to thank her and make offerings to her. True enough, my knees did not give me any problems throughout the last year and I saved a lot of money that would have otherwise gone to the doctor! So I mainly went back to thank her for her grace and mercy.

(Personal interview, 2011)

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35 At times, the Chinese state also celebrates Mazu’s role in helping Admiral Shi Lang recapture Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty. It is also interesting to note that there is a subtle disjuncture between the Chinese and Taiwanese portrayal of Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) as ‘national hero’. The Chinese state hails Zheng for his success in his quest to expel ‘foreign invaders’, whereas the Ming Dynasty general was revered by the Taiwanese state for establishing a separate political entity on Taiwan from the Qing rulers on mainland China. This fundamental difference can easily be noticed when comparing children’s books on Zheng Chenggong in China and Taiwan.
Indeed, many of the pilgrims went on the pilgrimage to thank the goddess for answering their prayers (*huanyuan*). Yet, there were others who claimed that they were being ‘instructed’ by Mazu to join the procession, and hoped that by following her instructions, their wishes would be granted. It is the thanking for miracles that had already taken place and the hope for more divine help in the future that contribute to the ‘collective production of divine power’ (Sangren, 2000: 90).

For many pilgrims, the procession/movement itself takes on meanings. In a typical pilgrimage from Kinmen to Meizhou for example, the Mazu idols will first be ‘invited’ from the temples in which they reside, and will be literally taken on board coaches and ferries to reach the destination. Once on the island after a ten-minute ferry ride from the mainland, the respective Mazu of the various participating temples will be seated on sedan chairs, ready for the 500m procession towards the ancestral temple, situated on high grounds (Figure 6.6).
The ‘islandness’ of such a cult centre and the idea of negotiating the ‘mountain’ (although only at a height of about 30m) to reach the ancestral temple contribute significantly to the overall sacredness of the pilgrimage. Amidst the blasting of firecrackers, Chinese trumpets, drums, gongs and cymbals, the ritual procession starts in earnest. At some point during the procession, sedan chairs can be seen swinging violently from side to side as handlers, both women and men, try to regain control of them; the tempo of the drums, gongs and cymbals keeping up with their movement. Handlers of Mazu’s sedan chair have often shared their experiences of feeling the force of the goddess running through the chair itself, thus the rocking movement as they paraded towards the ancestral temple (Figure 6.7).
Such ‘divine power’ also manifests itself in corporeal ways. One of my informants, Mdm Lee, related to me about how she had suffered from rheumatism of her shoulder joints and that Mazu appeared in her dream one night to instruct her to help out in the local temple’s pilgrimage to Meizhou. She complied and performed the role as one of Mazu’s servants in waiting during the procession. Half way through the journey from the pier to the ancestral temple, she could feel a certain energy running through her body, as if helping her along the way, and her shoulders felt less tense after the procession. This testament and the experience of the sedan chair handlers bring to mind Sangren’s (2000: 111) description of a pilgrimage as ‘scared time’ as devotees believe that there is a very high possibility that Mazu will ‘manifest her power’ (xianling) during a pilgrimage. For the sedan chair experience, the divine power is materialised through the swinging and rocking of the chair. For Lee, her encounter with divinity was more of an embodied experience. Importantly then,
“these were bodies, both material and immaterial, in contact, relation, movement, and rhythm” (McCormack, 2002, cited in Holloway, 2006: 184).

6.4.3 Pilgrimage as a social(ising) activity

I have argued that personal agenda takes precedence when going on a Mazu pilgrimage. Devotees either pray for the protection of family members or their own health and wealth prospects. However, the movement of the entourage of devotees during the ritual procession, the performance of roles like soldiers or servants in waiting are all part and parcel of a collective experience. Also, if a pilgrimage represents ‘scared time’ (Sangren, 2000), time spent in coaches and ferries before and after the procession can be described as ‘testimonial time’. Such pockets of space-time interspersed between ritual processions are meaningful as devotees, some familiar to each other some not, share their encounters with the spectral. One’s testimonial will be acknowledged by nods of agreement before others chip in with their own experiences. This observation corresponds to what Chen (1984, cited in Sangren, 2000: 91) comments, “…participating in the pilgrimage is essentially an engagement in a legend-telling session. The incense guests [pilgrims] like to exchange their own memorates [testimonies] to invite friendly conversation.” As such, a pilgrimage is as much a social activity as it is a socialising one. The testament is indeed a performance of a pilgrim’s religiosity and the act of relating spectral encounters with Mazu to fellow pilgrims is a validation of one’s self-identity/faith vis-à-vis those of other devotees, thus rendering these instances of space-time as meaningful as the actual procession or temple rituals. Indeed, religious space
overflows the fixities of the temple and the fluidities of the procession; it manifests itself in these in-between places where the ‘faith-as-personal’ boundary is redrawn to incorporate a more communal sense of the Mazu cult. Furthermore, such cross-strait pilgrimages also encourage the production of liminal spaces where differences in people’s identities and/or political allegiance seem to be transcended in favour of a pilgrim ‘communitas’ (Sangren, 1987; Turner and Turner, 1978). These spaces allow “sensuous impulses [to] flourish and... normative codifications of identity and practice [to] be suspended (Holloway, 2006: 183). It is clear therefore, that such in-between places are not ‘non-places’, but platforms for socialising and binding pilgrims into a collective during a pilgrimage. More importantly, these places are not stagnant; they are constantly in motion either approaching or moving away from the ancestral temple in Meizhou.

It has to be noted that the social collective made possible by the Mazu pilgrimage is multidimensional. In his observation of Mazu pilgrimages within Taiwan, Sangren (2000) notes that the annual pilgrimages have the sociological effect of “unit[ing] Taiwanese into a single ritual community” (p. 76). There is continuity with this sense of Taiwaneseness in the context of a cross-strait Mazu pilgrimage especially when the entourage of Taiwanese pilgrims parade their Mazu idols through the Chinese streets, passing homes and shop houses (Figure 6.8).
Due to its more elaborated style, and the sheer number of its participants, a Taiwanese procession is often greeted by local devotees who will line both sides of the streets and look in awe at the spectacle. Some even set up tables of food offerings outside their homes/shops in anticipation of the passing procession and burn incense to welcome the numerous ‘Taiwanese Mazu’ idols (Figure 6.9). Taiwanese pilgrims I communicated with expressed their pride as they processed pass the local people, and highlighted that they managed to preserve the traditions of the Mazu cult better than their Chinese counterparts.
Yet, my participation observations revealed that there were also differences within this supposed unity of the pilgrims. The richer and thus more influential of the temple groups had more elaborated dresses and accessories for their goddesses, bigger sedan chairs and marched at the front of the procession. The identity of each group was very clearly represented by the cloth banner, embroidered with the name of its Mazu temple, behind which its followers marched (Figure 6.10). Pilgrims from the same temple association also shared the same coaches and sat at the same table during meal times. Therefore, as much as the pilgrimage is deemed to have created a united religious community, it has also helped to erect borders of differences at a variety of different scales. As such “identities are not so much temporarily discarded
as they are foregrounded in such pilgrimage performances” (Sangren, 2000: 99). However, these pilgrims still reside in liminal spaces, away from their local social structure. Although they carry with them their local identities and are embodiments of those identities, the liminal state itself, renders an arena for them to be more liberal in their performance of those identities, and ultimately influences their perceptions of the ‘other’ and thus interactions with them. This sets the tone for interrogating Taiwanese pilgrims’ encounter with their Chinese counterparts in the enchanted world of the Mazu cult, which the rest of the section now turns to.

Figure 6.10 Cloth banner as identity marker of pilgrims’ association with their Mazu temple

‘Taiwaneseness’ is not the only collective identity generated by a pilgrimage. This social collective takes on a different form in the context of cross-strait Mazu pilgrimages. Instead of a national identity at stake, the cultural identity of being fellow Mazu devotees or children of Mazu takes precedence when Taiwanese
pilgrims interact with their Chinese counterparts. As ‘Heavenly Mother’, Mazu is the putative parent of all her devotees. This discourse of sameness is dominant in Taiwanese pilgrims’ responses when asked about their views on the Chinese people. However, I caution against a naïve take on such blanket-covering identity based on the sameness between Taiwanese and Chinese devotees. The enchantment of divine power does not work on the basis of the same, nor does it function through complete difference. This became apparent when I chanced upon a Taiwanese Mazu medium in a Mazu Temple at Gangli, Putian.  

She shared with me (at length) her religious autobiography of how she came to become a devotee and later a Mazu medium, and how Mazu has instructed her to carry out voluntary/humanitarian work in mainland China. Below are snippets of her ‘life-saving’ and temple-transformation efforts in Putian:

You are interviewing the Mazu medium who has saved millions of people

Mazu has instructed me to come over to the mainland, to attain a higher level [shenzao], to learn more “kung fu” [“martial arts”/skills]...to learn... So sometimes I have to come here two to three times a year...

Mazu just comes to me...possesses me...and I will be able to feel it. So every year, she will possess me, and will go to various places to pray, to do volunteer work or to save people with terminal illnesses.

For example, over a three-year period, I rescued three daughters of someone who volunteers at the Mazu temple in Putian. Each time, they were in critical condition, even the doctor couldn’t do anything... because they were suffering from ‘formless illness’ [wuxing bing]

12 years ago, I came on a pilgrimage with Dajia Mazu. The temple was very unhygienic then...people spit on the ground...very dirty... That’s why I was determined to help.

36 Some scholars argued that Gangli is the real birth place of Mazu, although it is a common belief that Mazu ascended to heaven from Meizhou Island. There is a certain temple rivalry over authenticity and which should be recognised as the real ancestral temple.
I treated it just like my own house... I cleaned the toilets, kitchen, sinks... everywhere... everything...

When I first came, the bed was extremely dirty... they were being bitten by mice... just like those you see at a rubbish dump... the bathroom, toilet, sink and so on. I changed them... all of them.

This journey is very tiring... needs a lot of money too... it is not just about volunteering. I donated too... all these years... I’ve donated quite a lot of money... could be around a few million RMB... Whenever I go, if I can afford, I will donate...

My younger brother suggested that since I come so often, I could buy a house here and rent it out to people and earn some rental. But Mazu came and told me not to and instead donate the money to the temple.

Mazu will not differentiate... people from both sides are all her children... As long as you are sincere, no matter what you do or where you are, I believe Mazu will always protect you...

(Mdm Liu, personal interview, 2011)

As can be seen from these extracts, Mdm Liu is obviously proud of her achievements as a Mazu medium. She perceives herself as an embodiment of Mazu’s divine power in her intervention into the everyday lives of Chinese devotees, who like her, are ‘all Mazu’s children’. In highlighting the existence of ‘formless illnesses’ – something that even modern science or a secularised society cannot address, she has established a rationale for the divine healing power that she possesses through Mazu. The possession of Mazu thus constitutes a space that allows “for the recognition that wider cultural-political discursive practices were (re)produced and sometimes challenged in the construction of this space” (Holloway, 2006: 182). Additionally, Liu also demonstrates that she is fulfilling Mazu’s calls and deems such cross-strait missions as ‘training sessions’ and a path to attaining greater divine power. Her efforts in renovating the temple, donating money and even in overcoming a moral
dilemma to profit from the housing market were used to valorise her commitment to Mazu. As such, the volunteering aspect of Liu’s ‘religious duty’ is as much a humanitarian effort contributing to the betterment of her patron’s society as it is a means towards her own personal ends. Furthermore, as can be seen from Liu’s testimony, although both Taiwanese and Chinese devotees are similarly children of Mazu, they are not equal, be it financially or spiritually. It is the difference in the perceived standard of living and religious know-how that nourishes a productive site for Liu’s enchanting encounters to flourish.

The fleeting transcendence between sameness and difference in the socialising process can also be observed in interactions between the Mazu organisations from both sides. Although a similar religious conviction has seen such cultural entities at the forefront of the rapprochement process, their inherent differences is one of the key reasons that draw them to each other. After the Cultural Revolution and the re-establishment of ties with Taiwan, there was a huge incentive to utilise common religions as a socialising platform for both Chinese and Taiwanese people. Unfortunately, many customs and rituals pertaining to the Mazu cult in China were lost. These need to be re-introduced by the Taiwanese devotees during pilgrimages. Temple organisations from Taiwan usually play the ‘big brother’ role in re-introducing traditions to the devotees and religious organisations in mainland China. As a representative from one of the Mazu cult centres in Taiwan enthused:

They have lost those traditions...propitiation to the goddess (bai bai)... recital of religious scriptures (song jing)... So we brought these over to them. For example the recital team (song jing tuan) in the Meizhou ancestral temple was trained by us. They had no idea of food offerings too. When I brought apples
there, they even touch them and ask whether they were real or not! Haha They had not seen such offerings before. Joss sticks and incense paper were also introduced by us...they don’t have such things in the beginning!

So slowly, every trip, we brought over something. Now on Meizhou Island, there are proper festivals and rituals for the birthday of Mazu, and the day she ascended to heaven. At her birthplace at Xianliang gang, there is even a sea prayer event. It’s basically helping them bring back those rituals performed by our ancestors.

(Dong Zheng-xiong, personal interview, 2011)

This is in effect a reversal of roles in China-Taiwan relations. China has always poised itself as the ‘big brother’ who is the legitimate player in international politics. In terms of rapprochement, it sees itself as the magnanimous elder sibling, always forgiving, and always welcoming the homecoming of his other half with open arms. However, in the enchanted world of rapprochement tourism, it is the Taiwanese game that the Chinese is trying to get a foothold on. A Taiwanese informant revealed:

To be honest, we jolly well know that the mainland is trying to use Mazu as a tool for unification (*tongzhan*), but what they do not understand is that Taiwan’s Mazu culture is so well established and deeply embedded in our lives; our devotees are even more religious than theirs. There is no way that they can pull us over! Haha... But they thought since we are so devoted to Mazu, they will use Mazu as a bridge for both sides to communicate. This is not a bad thing though. So before we talk about politics, we use Mazu culture as a topic of exchange....

It is clear that the Chinese intentions are very much in the consciousness of Taiwanese Mazu devotees. Taiwanese temple organisations, with their separate sets of agenda, are obviously taking advantage of the political climate to further their interests in the revival of the Mazu cult in China. As such, the Taiwanese Mazu
organisations felt obliged to re-educate their counterparts on how propitiation of Mazu should proceed.

Nevertheless, politicking apart, there is a hint towards the end of my interview with Dong that Mazu could indeed be a formidable force in generating curiosity and actually promoting cultural exchange and integration of social collectives. As Mr Dong put it:

There was one official from the promotional department of Putian who came to our temple and participated in the entire 9-day Mazu procession. He went back to China and held an exhibition on Taiwan’s Mazu culture – showing people there the popularity of Mazu in Taiwan.

I have also written a couple of books on Mazu... the most recent one is on ancient couplets (duilian) carved on the pillars of Taiwanese Mazu temples that made reference to Meizhou Island. I want to show people that although they might not know their counterparts in Meizhou, the couplets that were carved a few hundred years ago were testament that they share the same roots...Such cross-strait culture still needs everyone’s effort to be patient and communicate more and understand more...

We also learn from them too. For example, through historical records in China we learned about the Mazu Feast (Mazu yan) – an ancient way of making offerings to Mazu that was even more elaborated than what we have in Taiwan. We also brought the Taiwan style to China and showed it to them. This is one way for knowledge to be exchanged.

And in 2000, we performed a full scale Taiwanese style Mazu procession in the mainland. We brought over all our traditional equipments and props. The event was even telecast live in China and Taiwan.

Our temple has made pilgrimages to Meizhou Island for the past 24 years... Through these years, cross-strait cultural exchanges have matured... In the future, we still need to depend on Mazu to act as a bridge for both sides to communicate, because both sides can’t agree with each other’s political stand... So by using local cultural events as a platform for communication... politics and confrontations can be avoided. Historically Taiwan has been part of the mainland; it is politics that separated them. I think the greatest credit must be given to Mazu for connecting both sides, for acting as a bridge for both sides, a nest for cross-strait communication to flourish.
Dong’s experiences with Mazu as a bridge for cultural exchanges between China and Taiwan give us an idea of how a common religious identity between post-conflict societies can be used to harness a ‘post-national community imaginary’ (Hazbun, 2009). Such a sense of community is not based on national identity, but one that is imagined along religious affinity. Heritage in this case, is not something that is managed by the state, but one that is personal, and one which appeals to ordinary people in search of ancestral roots. The exhibiting of Mazu culture in China, the writing of books on historical religious connections between the people, the teaching and learning between devotees through various Mazu events, are all elements for creating ‘new geopolitical and geocultural imaginaries’ (ibid) that go beyond partisan politics between the Communists and the Nationalists. In an interview with Adrian Franklin (2003b: 215), Bauman reminds us that:

We are ‘transcending beings’ which constantly look forward beyond the border they have drawn, beyond the limits they set, and we need this propensity of transcending today because we are facing a truly life and death challenge. Either we all teach each other and learn from each other, or we will live unhappily ever after, if we stay alive, that is.

Bauman has been most sceptical about the adequacy of tourism in promoting peace; he claims that our “curiosity of the other and impulse to transcend our reciprocal otherness” (Franklin, 2003b: 215) are “being used up, diverted, channelled away, squandered by the commercialized pseudo-multiculturalism... in lieu of genuine conversation or a real attempt to get an insight into the other’s life and thought” (ibid). However, it seems that the multiple cultural exchanges that the Mazu cult affords are a testament of Bauman’s ‘transcendence of borders’ and sincere
attempts in gaining a better understanding of each other. Another Chinese devotee I interviewed shared, “I think she acts as an important communicative medium for two people who are under different political systems. She is a very important force...a medium... When surrounding Mazu, we can shed away a lot of our political baggage” (Huang Zhiling, personal interview, 2011). Outside the confines of politicking and beyond the boundaries of pilgrimage tours, Mazu’s role in socialising and integrating some people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait seems to be a promising reality.

6.5 From State-level Diplomatic Exchanges to ‘Interactions along the Side'

This chapter has attempted to account for the immaterialities of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. In particular, I have investigated the roles played by ghosts, spirits and deities in the rapprochement process. These non-human beings were born out of the Chinese Civil War but continue to haunt and actively participate in the everyday geopolitics of cross-strait relations. Additionally, belief in the efficacy of the goddess Mazu by devotees from either side of the Taiwan Strait, and the political implications of such a belief were also addressed. I started the chapter by comparing the different attitude towards the spiritual adopted by the Chinese and Taiwanese societies. Through the various examples shared, it is evident that while religion and politics are very much intertwined in Taiwan, the Chinese State’s take on the subject matter stamps more from pragmatism. What is common, however, is the attempt by both governments to tame and co-opt the spectre into
their political agendas. It was indeed a challenge to write about the spectre. I have deliberately sought to avoid debating the existence/non-existence of ghosts/gods, or whether they are inventions or social constructs and instead adopt an ‘open approach’ to focus on the cultural-geo-political implications of a belief in the presence of the otherworldly shared by ordinary people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It is the power of such a common cultural belief between two politically separated societies that is generating interesting stories about the immaterialities of rapprochement tourism.

Our encounter with the untamed started with the anti-communist deities and their participation in the everyday politics of cross-strait relations. The ‘change of hearts’ of deities like the Chaste Maiden and General Lee towards China, and the desire for them to return to their ancestral hometowns, constitute a kind of re-bordering. Instead of a bastion against communism, these deities have become ambassadors of goodwill. This boundary-remaking was further extended to temple managements when texts that were deemed politically sensitive were removed from introductory plaques of temples to cater to the Chinese tourists. The consciousness of the coming back or returning of the untamed seems to have been produced by and producing the rapprochement sentiment across the Taiwan Strait.

The second part of this chapter went on to discuss the cultural-geo-politics of pilgrimage-tours at a variety of different scales – from that of the state, to temple associations and the personal. I have also elucidated the different ways in which a pilgrimage is as much a social activity as it is a socialising one. The pockets of space-
time when and where fellow devotees share stories of their spiritual encounters, and the interactions of Taiwanese pilgrims with their Chinese counterparts are all creating senses of community among like-minded people beyond that of the nation. In terms of encounters with fellow pilgrims from the other side, I have explicated that it is often the complexities between sameness and difference that initiate and sustain interactions. As Gelder and Jacobs (1998, cited in McEwan, 2008: 37) argues, “sameness and difference collide in complex ways, creating a structure in which ‘sameness and difference embrace and refuse each other simultaneously.’” Moreover, through the in-depth interviews conducted with pilgrim tourists, it is evident that there is a plurality of identities at play during pilgrimage-tours. The complex interplay of the multiple identities a pilgrim possesses calls for a rethinking of the concept of ‘liminal tourist’. Rather than just a simple replacement of one identity with another, the pilgrim-tourist experiences a plethora of identity-defining and identity-making moments such that it is unclear when one identity starts and the other ends. Indeed, identity is always in the making, but never made. It is on this basis that religious spaces are constantly being performed and inscribed with personal meanings.

The possibilities for post-national identities were also assessed towards the end of this chapter. People from both China and Taiwan are cognizant of the potentials of the Mazu cult and its associated events in binding people together. There is evidence that such cultural activities are beginning to move beyond state sanctioned definitions and are in fact defining new frontiers of ‘geopolitical and geocultural imaginaries’ (Hazbun, 2009). As Paasi (2011a: 20), citing Nagel (2004), notes,
“identities and political activities are now multilocal and loyalties are no longer seen to correspond to the nation-state, that is, territory and politics are not in a one-to-one relation.” There is definitely potential for such post-national identity to take root via religion-led activities, but whether this will flourish into some kind of ‘shared humanity’ (Bauman in Franklin, 2003b) remains to be seen.

Rapprochement tourism as interpreted by this chapter, has got more to do with ‘interactions along the side’ rather than state-level diplomatic exchanges. Moreover, we begin to engage with the language of affect as understood in an enchanted world, rather than the logic of meaning in a secular one. Instead of adopting a rationality of peace through tourism (e.g. the belief that people will gain a better understanding and be less fearful of each other through increased tourism exchanges etc.), we are coming to terms with the non-rationality of rapprochement tourism – experiences like riding around the battlefield island of Kinmen in paranormal adventures; possession of the medium’s body by Mazu; spiritual communication between devotee and deity while participating in a Mazu procession; and the feeling of Mazu’s presence by carriers of the deity’s sedan chair. These are experiences that seem absurd in the first instance, but the shared belief in the existence of the otherworldly gives credibility to the power of the enchanted world. Rather than a different realm altogether, the immaterialities of rapprochement tourism are very much a part of the material world they operate in. Furthermore, we need to acknowledge that rapprochement tourism is more about affect than effect; emotion than reason; feeling than meaning. It is on such a basis that we can remain open to many possibilities when analysing cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan.
If rapprochement tourism is indeed more than what meets the eye, what other senses might we employ to understand such practices? The final empirical chapter of this thesis will explore these other senses in a discussion on post-war material culture in the former battlefield island of Kinmen, Taiwan.
CHAPTER SEVEN

RE-VISITING BATTLEFIELD MEMORIES, EXPLORING THE SENSES: POST-WAR MATERIAL CULTURE OF KINMEN IN THE MIDST OF RAPPROCHEMENT TOURISM37

7.1 Introduction: Re-visiting Kinmen

This final empirical chapter seeks to bring the discussion of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan to the island of Kinmen, which often found itself in the centre of cross-strait relations. The aim of this chapter is two-pronged. First, Kinmen as a post-conflict tourism site serves to provide a platform to ‘ground’ discussions on rapprochement practices. It is by placing these discussions at a place where battlefield memories form a significant part of the recent past, and where people are still exploring ways to deal with the island’s battlefield identity that we can best sift out the everyday experiences of cross-strait tourism. Indeed, “[i]t is particularly in the borderlands that the memorial landscape can be seen as an arena ‘for social actors and groups to debate and negotiate the right to decide what is commemorated and what version of the past will be made visible to the public’” (Dwyer and Alderman, 2008, cited in Zhurzhenko, 2011: 74). Secondly, 

37 An earlier version of this chapter was awarded the Terry G. Jordan-Bychkov Student Paper Award (Best paper in the PhD category) by the Cultural Geography Specialty Group at the 2012 Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments.
picking up from where we left in the previous chapter – that rapprochement tourism is more than meets the eye – I seek to continue the endeavour to go beyond visual-centric analyses by interrogating the various ways in which the commemorative materialities of touristic things on the island stimulate the other senses, thereby gaining a more intimate understanding of cross-strait sentiments.

Politically belonging to Taiwan, Kinmen is located 350km southwest of Taipei, Taiwan, but a mere 10km from the city of Xiamen in the People’s Republic of China (Figure 7.1).

The island became a military stronghold of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Nationalist Army after its forces retreated from mainland China during the Civil War with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1949. It was the scene of battles to stop the PLA from capturing Taiwan and became a frontline in the global
Cold War. Since the abolition of the martial law in 1992, Kinmen has experienced gradual de-militarisation. Abandoned or defunct military installations have become important tourism resources. More recently in 2008, improvement in cross-strait ties saw the opening of Taiwan to direct charter flights from mainland China. Nevertheless, Kinmen is often the first port of call for Chinese tourists who are en-route to taking cheaper domestic flights to mainland Taiwan. Owing to its strategic location, Kinmen once again finds itself at the centre of cross-strait relations, but this time, rapprochement tourism takes centre-stage.

Apart from the preservation and adaptive re-use of military infrastructures, the thriving battlefield tourism industry also brought about many innovative products invented by local entrepreneurs, artists and musicians. It is therefore in the interest of this chapter to tell stories about the post-war material culture of a former military outpost. More specifically, it considers things from and of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape and how their materialities weave the island’s ruptured past into the everyday consciousness of people in the post-war era. These stories seek not to add on to existing historical narratives of the Chinese Civil War, but to offer alternative manifestations of a post-conflict society through materialities of the recent past (González-Ruibal, 2008). Furthermore, they attempt to contribute to discussions on the after-life and possibly, reincarnation of defunct military stuff (Saunders, 2000; 2002a; 2002b; 2003a; 2003b; 2004) in the wider context of ‘difficult heritage’. As such, the chapter endeavours to respond to calls for new experimentations with potentialities of materiality (Anderson and Tolia-Kelly, 2004). Furthermore, in articulating the argument that theories of tourism tend to be object poor, Franklin
(2003, cited in van der Duim, 2007: 150) posits that “tourism is no doubt a social activity, but it cannot be reduced to the social because it is relationally linked to a wide variety of objects, machines, texts, systems, non-humans, spaces and so on, without which it would not happen and could not have become what it is.” As such, I endeavour to discuss the liveliness of these touristic things as they interact with local people and tourists – through the visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory and gustatory senses – to elicit the nuances of what I call a critical sensuous materialism.

7.2 Material Culture and Materiality: Some Philosophical Underpinnings

In this chapter, ‘post-war material culture’ refers to the artefacts from and of Kinmen’s battlefield past. In particular, I will examine how the commemorative materialities of these conflict-related things affect contemporary consumption practices, and how meanings of such artefacts are constantly changing and being changed by the rapprochement climate. Also, as mentioned in the previous section, the aim here is also to go beyond visual-centric analyses and engage with the other senses of hearing, smell, taste and touch, and in so doing demonstrates how materiality acts as a platform through which people and ‘social objects’ (Harré, 2002) engage in lively conversations across time and space. Furthermore, in line with Hetherington’s (2004) exploration with the persistence of objects even in destruction and “the ways in which people manage absence within social relations” (p.157), I posit that the presence of the absence or haunting from the past is as
powerful as the material presence of things in understanding the interaction of locals and tourists with Kinmen’s battlefield landscape.

To facilitate such a discussion, a philosophical/ontological underpinning is necessary to set the stage for a horizontal distribution of power between people and things, which lays the foundation for interrogating the possible exchanges of properties between them. Deleuze (1988: 18) suggested that the thesis of parallelism “does not consist merely in denying any real causality between the mind and the body, it disallows any primacy of the one over the other.” Merleau-Ponty’s Reversibility Thesis could also come in useful in explicating the mutual and dialectical relationship between humans and objects. Tilley (2004: 17) utilises this thesis in his exploration with the materiality of stone:

In the process of touching an object, the same thesis of the reversibility of sensation/perception can be posited to be at work. I touch the stone and the stone touches me...Touching the stone is possible because both my body and the stone are part of the same world. There is in this sense a relation of identity and continuity between the two.

Such theorisation of the haptic is also evident in Hetherington’s (2002) discussion on the visually-impaired and their interaction with museum exhibits. In conceptualising a scopic that is proximal rather than one that is distal (governed by the sense of sight), he shows how touch is a ‘source of visualisation’: “Touch introduces the body’s surface reflexivity into knowing; through touch we are made aware of ourselves as more than just an eye/...We become extensions into the world of things through our own bodies and their haptic capabilities” (ibid: 202; see also Hetherington, 2003).
The sense of touch is but one of the multiple sensate and sensorial aspects of making material memories. More importantly, these non-representational conceptualisations denounce subject-object dualisms and at the same time give agency to the object. Therefore, objects are seen here as being able to do something, “has sufficient coherence to perform actions, produce effects, and alter situations” (Bennett, 2004: 355). This leads to Bennett’s (2010: viii) definition of ‘vitality’ in her concept of ‘vital materialism’:

By “vitality” I mean the capacity of things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own.

In fact, the recognition of agency in things is not new. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) introduces us to the communicative ability of objects in the domestic environment. Their concept of ‘psychic transactions’ very much captures the affective energy of communication between things and humans. In the context of Kinmen, things associated with its battlefield past are thus not merely commodities of the tourism industry. Rather, they are animated with spirits of the past and vitality of the present, and are constantly in conversations with their makers, local people and tourists, creating affective experiences and structuring the consciousness of other actors and actants of the battlefield tourism landscape. The next section frames the debate surrounding post-war commemorative materialities that this chapter chooses to engage with.
7.3 Material Memories: Trench Art and Commemorative Materialities of Post-war Landscapes

War objects may be small, e.g. a bullet; intermediate, e.g. a tank; or large, e.g. a whole battlefield landscape. All share the defining characteristic of being the product of human action rather than natural processes. Thus, the Western Front of the First World War is as much an artefact as a portable war souvenir, a Second World War V2 rocket, the symbolic terrain of war memorials, or the ‘Cross’ formed by remaining structural elements in the ruins of the World Trade Centre.

(Saunders, 2002a: 176)

Some of the first examples that come to mind when we think of post-war commemoration may be battlefield relics, monuments or memorials. Although the contents, politics and organisation of such commemorative structures have been well-researched, there seems to be a dearth of exploration into the commemorative materialities of artefacts that are moveable. This mobility constitutes not only to circulations in post-war material culture in terms of memorabilia making/buying/giving, but also the instability of their values and meanings through time and space. To illustrate, Nicholas Saunders’ analysis of Trench Art (Saunders, 2000; 2003a; 2003b) offers an inspiring attempt to re-evaluate “the role of material culture as multi-vocal representational embodiments of war” (Saunders, 2002a: 175). According to him, Trench Art refers to “any item made by soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians, from war matériel directly, or any other material, as long as it and they are associated temporally and/or spatially with armed conflict or its consequences” (Saunders, 2000: 45). Furthermore, souvenirs by/of combatants are also ones where values move. Harrison (2008) for instance, explores the changing meanings to war veterans of mementos taken from the enemy dead as war trophies, and traces the
return of such artefacts to the original owners’ surviving kin. Such ‘footloose’ commemorative materialities and their associations with memory (un)making are what this chapter attempts to explicate. Before I proceed further, I should like to highlight some inherent limitations with Saunder’s ‘Trench Art’ approach.

First, although Saunders (2000) reminds us of the importance to recognize the physicality of conflict, and thus highlights the need to understand the material culture of war, there is little attempt to go beyond the physical objects themselves and consider how, through their materialities, they interact with humans. I have elsewhere adopted a landscape analysis approach in an attempt to capture the power and representations of Kinmen’s arsenal of battlefield heritage, eliciting the multiple ideological messages possessed by military slogans, war memorials and the like (Zhang, 2009). Here, I would go beyond representational analysis to uncover how materialities of the battlefield past are not dead and cold, but are in fact lively and restless in their interaction with humans of the present. In other words, instead of presuming that meanings are already inscribed onto things, I see such things as being able to create meanings themselves. Also, there is a need to discover “what is being created in the manufacturing process apart from physical objects” (Christensen 1995, cited in Chilton, 1999: 2).

Secondly, there seems to be an over-emphasis on the visual in such an analysis. What about the other senses in which people interact with things (see Howes, 1991) and what are the implications of having a better understanding of the sensate and affective communication aspects (see Beckstead and Twose et al., 2011)? In the case
of human-object interaction, Saunders has in fact provided a glimpse of the possibilities of other senses at play. Hear Saunders again:

Paintings and memorials represented war from a distance, spatially and temporally. They connected through impressions, possessing little or no sensuous or tactile immediacy. By contrast, metal Trench Art was made from the waste of war, its varied forms incorporating the agents of death and mutilation directly. Anonymously responsible for untold suffering and bereavement, expended shells, bullets and shrapnel were worked into a variety of forms, engaging visual, olfactory, tactile, and sometimes auditory senses, as well as memory.

(Saunders, 2000: 46)

Unfortunately, such narrations were often restricted to the soldiers-as-Trench Art producers “especially when the dominance of the visual was destroyed in trenches and dugouts” (Saunders, 2000: 55). Furthermore, there is a lack of elaboration of how such sensuous materialism takes place empirically. I suggest that it is possible to bring such sensuous materialism out of the events of war and show that it overflows to modern times and spaces. True enough, “Rich in symbolism and irony, metal Trench Art is a complex kind of material culture, whose physicality and nature make it a unique mediator between men and women, soldier and civilian, individual and industrialized society, the nations which fought the war, and, perhaps most of all, between the living and the dead” (Saunders, 2000: 46). But how and where does this mediation take place? Is there a possibility to animate such mediation? Walter Ong’s (1991) concept of the ‘sensorium’ might offer us a clue. Ong defines the sensorium as “the entire sensory apparatus... an operational complex... the organization of which is in part determined by culture while at the same time it makes culture” (ibid:
28, see also Howes’ (1991) idea of ‘sensorial anthropology’). He focuses on the workings of and shifting priorities given to the various senses in the life-world of people from different culture across time and space. I posit that the idea of the sensorium is aptly suited to confront the problematic of an overly visual interpretation of material culture. It is equally important to understand how things, through their materiality, stimulate the other senses of humans. As such, ‘sensuous materialism’ attempts to see the different senses as channels through which the materiality of an object interacts with people and creates effects.

Third, Saunders (2002b) classifies Trench Art into three periods of manufacture: 1914-1919; 1920-1939; 1939-2001. In his discussion, there is almost a lamentation about post-war production of Trench Art, hinting that they are mass produced by institutions and thus pretty much devoid of the original feelings of Trench Art of the earlier era:

Burgeoning number of battlefield visitors (Walter 1993: 63; Lloyd 1994: 289) saw an increase in the popularity of all kinds of Great War memorabilia and the ever popular decorated shell cases became a mainstay of the militaria trade. Most have had their original meanings displaced by a market whose fluctuating prices reflect the classificatory confusion which surrounds them. Regarded variously as antiques, militaria, souvenirs, bric-a-brac and curios, the qualities of completeness, distinctiveness and shiny appearance have replaced earlier emotional values.

(Saunders, 2002b: 36)

I do take his point that mass-produced “war souvenirs” for the tourist market can never be compared in terms of emotional values and authenticity of meanings imbued by soldiers-as-makers. However, by privileging and authenticating metal Trench Art produced by people who are closer to the war in a temporal sense, he
overlooks the creativity and vitality of contemporary producers. I argue that post-war commemorative materialities can be equally powerful in their ability to interact with people, and to engage in conversations with former enemies across political boundaries, especially during times of rapprochement. Indeed, “Recognizing the multiple temporalities of the material culture of war and the contingent relation of military material culture to conflict is an important step for the development of the field” (Gregson and Crang et al., 2011: 303). I now turn to a particular form of metal Trench Art in Kinmen before venturing out to explore other commemorative materialities that might not necessarily be born out of war materiel, but nevertheless play a vital role in people’s consciousness about Kinmen’s battlefield past and contemporary cross-strait ties.

7.4 Memories and Materiel: From Artillery Shells to Household Knives

First World War landscapes are a complex layering of commemorative materialities and spirituality, in which the past is recycled and memory perpetuated in the present.”

Saunders (2003b: 7)

While themes surrounding war commemoration, materiality and memory have been extensively discussed in works related to famous conflicts like the First World War (e.g. Morris, 1997; Iles, 2006) and the Second World War (e.g. Moshenska, 2008; Muzaini, 2009), little has been done on this aspect with regards to conflicts during the Cold War years (although see van der Hoorn, 2003; Beckstead and Twose et al.,
2011), not to mention the civil war between China and Taiwan. In the case of Kinmen, I suggest that the recycling of the past and perpetuation of memory can be materialised through the Kinmen Knife (Figure 7.2).

Figure 7.2 The Kinmen Knife
Manufactured using artillery shell cases and fragments (Figure 7.3) left behind after a series of artillery battles with the communist forces starting from the August 23rd Bombardment in 1958, the Kinmen Knife is the pride of Kinmen, and is often featured in media reports and documentaries. Major television networks like CNN from the United States, NHK from Japan and TVBS from Taiwan, and international magazines like TIME, all have had special reports on the knife-making industry. Wu Tseng-Dong, Director of Chin Ho Li (one of the leading knife manufacturers) recalled:

I survived the war years as a child. We were so helpless when the artillery shells came. But when we got used to the bombing, we could estimate where the shells landed and decide whether to take cover in the tunnel or not. When things got quiet, some of us would go in search for the shell fragments to be used as raw materials for our knives. ...The kitchen knife is used in every

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38 The artillery battle lasted for 44 days and an estimated total of 474,910 artillery shells fell on Kinmen and its surrounding islets. Intermittent shelling persisted for the next ten years.
household...both in China and Taiwan. I want to remind people of the great sufferings caused by the war. At the same time, this common household item would also remind the users of the kinship and culture that both sides share. We are ultimately one family.

(Personal interview, 2008)

Several points could be made here. By recycling the artillery shell cases and fragments, there is an attempt of reclaiming power and reinstating a sense of control over a weapon of mass destruction that ruptured the lives of so many. Concurrently, this can also be seen as a way to seek closure to the persisting unrest and conflict between the two sides that have impeded mobility of their people across the border, many of whom have relatives on the other side. There is a yearning for peaceful reconciliation that came out of the manufacturing process. Indeed, “the meanings people give to things are part and parcel of the same meanings that they give to their lives” (Tilley, 2004: 218). Nevertheless, in his domestication of a weapon of mass destruction into an everyday household item, Wu is not quite ready to completely silence its materiality. A half-knife half-artillery shell stood stoutly on a display cabinet in his shop (Figure 7.4). It seems to suggest the reincarnation of the dead and corroded shell case into a knife of hope that breathes new life into cross-strait ties. The Kinmen Knife, considering the very material that it is made from, is inextricably linked to the “sufferings caused by the war”. Yet, such commemorative materiality seeks not to remember, but to forget. Unlike the various war memorials constructed by the Ministry of Defence to remember the war so as to highlight nationalist ideologies (Zhang, 2009), the artillery shell case, stripped of its ability to cause mass destruction, seeks to forget about past atrocities in its reincarnation as
an everyday household item. The knife takes on a new role, however, to “remind the users of the kinship and culture that both sides share”.

Figure 7.4 Half-knife half-artillery shell display

When asked about Wu’s clientele, an element of souvenir buying and giving emerged. Wu’s main customers were the garrison during the martial law years, Soldiers serving on the island would buy a knife or two back to mainland Taiwan when they completed their tour of duty. Subsequently, through word of mouth, the popularity of the Kinmen Knife soared. Wu quipped, “Today, when people think of Kinmen, they will think of the Kinmen Knife.” However, due to the gradual demilitarisation of Kinmen, there is a shift of the composition of his customers. Now,
tourists from mainland Taiwan and China have replaced service men as the main clientele. I suggest that the notion of the Kinmen Knife-as-souvenir remains the same, albeit invested with different meanings by its buyer, throughout the various phases experienced by the business. Following Susan Stewart, souvenirs work to remember “events whose materiality has escaped us” (1993: 135). For the returning soldier, the Kinmen Knife when brought home, served as both a closure and continuity of his military experience. It was a piece of the war, a fragment from a weapon of mass destruction that might have killed him. Possessing or giving the Kinmen Knife, thus, was an extension of himself (Belk, 1988); it was a performance of victory over the enemies. For the mainland Taiwanese tourists, the island of Kinmen has been a mystery throughout the martial law years – long heard of but never been to. It was only until the opening of the island in 1992 when the first tours began. To them, the Knife serves as a memorial token “of a spatially and temporally distanced landscape” (Tolia-Kelly, 2004a; 2004b). Such cultural materialism has also been extended to the Chinese tourists since the inauguration of rapprochement tourism between the two sides. One Chinese tourist I met at the Chin Ho Li store shared,

I’ve heard of the Kinmen Knife even before I reached Kinmen. It’s so popular in Xiamen. It is so surreal to touch these knives and to know that they are actually made from artillery shells that were fired from our side. But it’s not sensitive now... we are already at peace and we are buying the knife as a souvenir.

(Personal communication)

For the mainland Chinese visitors, they are curious about the island’s ability to withstand the showers of artillery bombardment during the war years. An estimated
474,910 artillery shells were fired at Kinmen compared to a response of 74,889 (Aug23 Artillery Battle Museum). It was almost a mystery that the Communist Party’s People’s Liberation Army failed to capture this small isolated island. The purchasing and handling of a knife, made not from any other material, but from artillery shells fired from Mainland China would have authenticated their battlefield borderland/frontier experience. Referring to his Chinese customers, Wu commented:

The artillery shell fragment represents war and cruelty, but now we use it to make something that is heart-warming...a household item. It represents a transition from war to peace. You see, it was originally a war item. Now there are Chinese tourists. They come and would find this knife interesting...it can be a souvenir or used at home. The knife is made from artillery shells fired by them. And now, in times of peace, they are bringing these back. It is quite symbolic in a sense.

The ‘bringing back’ and ‘returning’ of the artillery shells reflect a kind of conversation that is ongoing amongst the Knife, its maker and its user. The material and texture of the Knife speaks of its life story – a biography that very much centres on the intractable conflict across the strait. The materiality of the Knife thus acts as a platform to remind the Chinese tourists of the atrocities caused by the civil war. Depending on who the owner is, the Knife relates to the different dimensions of personal/distant/opposed relations to the island, and is a ‘precipitate of re-memory’ (Tolia-Kelly, 2004a) as memories of the war are evoked through the sight, touch and density of everyday encounters. As such “objects may not merely be used to refer to a given social group, but may themselves be constitutive of a certain social relation” (Miller, 1987, cited in Geismar and Horst, 2004: 6). At last, the artillery shell has redeemed itself, having reincarnated from a weapon of mass destruction that had
caused immeasurable sufferings to a “heart-warming” souvenir returning not just to the ‘other side’ where it came from, but also to the very centre of the Chinese tourists’ everyday life.

Discussion hitherto has focused on the interactions between human and object. The Kinmen Knife, its maker and users are involved in what Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) will call ‘psychic activities or transactions’. According to them,

Objects are not static entities whose meaning is projected on to them from cognitive functions of the brain or from abstract conceptual systems of culture. They themselves are signs, objectified forms of psychic energy. Whether through action or contemplation, objects in the domestic environment are meaningful only as part of a communicative sign process and are active ingredients of that process.

(Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981: 173)

This hints on the attempt to give more agency to things rather than seeing meanings as being ascribed to them. The idea of ‘psychic activities’ and ‘psychic energy’ within the transactions between persons and things thus recognise the liveliness of things. The question now is, if the Kinmen Knife is alive and so energetic, does its conversation with the maker remains the same ever since its reincarnation? The following abstract from Wu offers some clues:

In the past, we did not think too much about the symbolism of the knife. During the war years, people went around to collect shell fragments to sell for money. It was a matter of surviving and earning some cash. We bought over the fragments and turn them into knives and sell them. It was for the money
too. We basically needed to make a living during those difficult times...But in recent years, cross-strait relations have become more amicable. And there has been a more economic focus to cross-strait ties over the past ten years. So gradually, we started to associate our knife with the promotion of peace across the strait.

The collecting of artillery shell fragments during the war years resonates with Moshenska’s (2008) article on the “accumulation, exchange and disposal” of children’s shrapnel collection (p. 107). For these children, the fragments’ symbolic value fell the moment they got old and cold and lost their lustre. In Kinmen however, the value changes quite differently. In retrospect, although the economic value of shell fragments has always been prioritised, the psychic transactions between the Kinmen Knife and its maker have apparently changed over time under the evolving political economy. The language has metamorphosed from one of ‘survival’ and ‘making a living’, to one of ‘promoting peaceful cross-strait ties’. Contrasting with Saunders’ (2002b) attempt to classify memorial tokens into three manufacturing periods, each dominated by a certain group of makers and genre of artefact, the materiality of the Kinmen Knife overflows temporal and spatial boundaries. Through engaging its maker and users in different psychic interactions, the Knife effectively adapts to the unstable cultural-geopolitical climate, renews its identity, embodies changing ideologies, and shapes the identities of its users so as to survive through the years and even ‘travel’ beyond the border. As such, it is important to appreciate the trajectories of things, and to interrogate and capture materiality in action, and how meanings are always in a state/flux of emergence rather than inscribed or read into by social scientists.
The recycling of the shell cases and fragments into household knives materialises war time memories. Waste produced by such a lethal entity that caused the lives of so many became reincarnated into an ambassador of goodwill between China and Taiwan. By handling and touching the Kinmen Knife, one is able to visualise both the tumultuous past and a relatively cordial present across the Taiwan Strait. This reminds us of the importance of going beyond the functions of an object to interrogate its biography (Kopytoff, 1986) and to “explore its ‘social life’ by assessing the changing values and attitudes attached to it by different people over time (Appadurai 1986, cited in Saunders, 2002a: 176), and, I would add, space. Yet, such a biography is a messy one as the Kinmen Knife refuses to be bounded by frames of time, and its existence is juxtaposed by landscapes that are both present and absent at once. Perhaps the half-knife half-artillery shell that resides in Wu’s shop says it all: There is no clear demarcation of where the shell ends and where the knife starts; The Kinmen Knife is as much possessed by the spirits of the past as it is an embodiment of a promising peaceful future.

7.5 Infrastructure Becomes Memorial: The Kinmen Tunnel Music Festival

After the artillery battle in 1958, the military constructed underground tunnels so as to preserve their combat capability during artillery bombardments. This ‘tunnelisation’ process gave rise to ‘underground Kinmen’, which in recent years has become a valuable tourism resource. Built in 1961 and completed in 1966, the Zhaishan Tunnel and its water passage (Figure 7.5) leads directly from the inner land
to the ocean. In the tunnel, tourists get to see a series of rooms where the soldiers once lived. Tour guides ritualistically emphasise the “almost impossible task of excavating through the bedrock of granite gneiss” and the “sufferings that soldiers experienced during the round-the-clock construction”. Tourists are encouraged to “touch the granite structure, breathe in the dense air and imagine how life was like for the soldiers during the war.” Transforming military facilities and infrastructure into tourist sites and presenting them in their original state not only provides a unique experience for the tourists, but also “raise their emotional quotient by [allowing them to] empathis[e] with the events” (Muzaini, 2004: 53). Indeed, “much of the symbolic importance of these places stems from their emotional associations, the feelings they inspire of awe, dread, worry, [or] loss” (Davidson et al., 2005: 3). After the martial law period and the gradual demilitarisation of the island, the tunnel
gained an ideological function of relaying nationalist ideologies to the younger generations of Taiwanese as it was transformed into a site for national education.

Later, the tunnel, together with other defunct military infrastructures manifested the rich battlefield heritage of Kinmen in tourism brochures. In recent years, due to the improvement of cross-strait ties, the tunnel sees itself hosting the Kinmen Tunnel Music Festival, aiming to foster rapprochement between China and Taiwan. Organised by the Kinmen National Park and conceptualised by Taiwanese cellist and artistic director Chang Cheng-Jieh, the Music Festival has been an instant hit since its inception in 2009 to coincide with the 60th Anniversary of the Kuningtou Battle. The music performance features renowned Taiwanese musicians playing (mainly) classical pieces on a floating platform that ploughs through the tunnel’s water passage (Figure 7.6). Audiences are gathered along the originally elevated granite corridor, which overlooks the passage.

39 The Kuningtou Battle in 1949 is the only battle where the communist soldiers landed on Kinmen and engaged in face-to-face combat with the nationalist soldiers. The nationalist eventually won this battle – their first victory in many months of retreat from the mainland. This victory has since been recognised as the most crucial for preventing a communist take-over.
Chang shared his views on how music has instilled life into Zhaishan Tunnel:

I have always thought if it is merely Zhaishan Tunnel, it is only something that is left behind by the war...by history. The feeling is unique when you enter, but it does not possess a new life. But with music inside, when the music flows and notes start to dance... Music, I think is an excellent language. It comes up as a little more special than the Chinese language or any other languages. Today, when you enter the Tunnel and the guide talks about what happened 50 or 60 years ago, how this was built because of the war...etc... This sounds very direct, very hard...merely a gesture. But if today you enter the Tunnel, and the music comes on... The musical notes could almost bring you to a kind of... to another world. But that world differs from each and every person. Moreover, I think that music is the best bridge of communication between different generations. It is in fact, a language between our world and the other world... The force to move you is even stronger. So, I am happy that through music, the Zhaishan Tunnel can have a new life, but I hope that this new life can thrive on and be sustainable.

(Personal interview, 2011)
Music is not only more powerful than words; it is also full of energy and breathes new life into the tunnel. I have attempted to highlight the functions performed by things. In other words, instead of treating things as being used by humans to carry out certain tasks, and therefore passive, these things perform such functions through their materiality or in the spirit of Gibson’s ‘mutualism’ (1979, cited in Graves-Brown, 2000), afford the performances to take place. The materiality of the tunnel provides perfect acoustics and thus affords the music to be transmitted at the highest auditory standards. Conversely, the music, which itself is produced by the instrument, acts as the tunnel’s voice and softens its concreteness while affording the audiences the space for imaginations. One audience wrote on the feedback form, “Grateful, thankful, touched” (感恩、感谢、感动), while another expressed, “Bravo! Really touching, fantastic sound effect!” (太棒了！太令人感動了，音響效果非常好!) 40 It is apparent that music does arouse one’s emotional quotient. However, this is not to say that the audiences are directed to a particular ‘ending’, but, as what Chang suggested the ‘other world’ to which the music brings is different for everyone. The following paragraph from Chris Tilley (2004) beautifully captures the essence of what has been discussed here and is worth quoting in full:

In the case of vision, the act of seeing entails a body capable of being seen just as touching requires a body capable of being touched. Merleau-Ponty, in his famous essay ‘Eye and Mind’, writes of a reversal of roles between the painter and the painted. He cites the painter as saying: ‘In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at the forest. Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 167). There comes a point, Merleau-Ponty comments, in which who sees and what is being seen, who paints and what is being painted, is thoroughly ambiguous. And this is because painting is not just an act of pure vision; it establishes bodily contact between

40 I would like to thank the Kinmen National Park for generously sharing this information.
the painter, who paints with his or her body, and the painted. Painting is a bodily process linking the two. The painter sees the trees and the trees see the painter, not because the trees have eyes, but because the trees affect, move the painter, become part of the painting that would be impossible without their presence. In this sense the trees have agency and are not merely passive objects.

(Tilley, 2004: 17-18)

Similarly, in the case of the Kinmen Tunnel Music Festival, who plays and what is being played becomes ambiguous. The tunnel acts as a ‘sensorium’ (Ong, 1991) where the various actors and actants come together. The music is able to create a sensorial experience to connect the bodies of the musicians and spectators with that of the aural of the tunnel. Unlike conventional war memorials where the sense of sight takes precedence, the affective effects of the music in the tunnel-sensorium offer a proximal alternative to the visualisation of past woes and present hopes. It also provides an avenue through which the sound of peace could be relayed to the other side for a promising future. Indeed, the music travels in and between different ‘worlds’, be it now and then, here and there, us and them, dead and alive.

When asked about the music festival’s theme of ‘Kinmen Harmony’ and its role in cross-strait relations, Chang expressed its promises and limitations:

I hope that we can gradually attract our friends from across the strait to attend this music festival. What we hope for is peace. Gradually, when the conflict gets even more neutralised, I hope that their [Chinese] musicians can participate in the performance as well. This site was where both sides engaged each other in warfare in the past, but today, people from both sides come together and perform in a music festival. In fact, I have tried inviting the Chinese musicians over for the 60th Anniversary of the Kuningtou Battle. They refused to come! They felt that they had lost that battle! Hahaha... but I think
this can be overcome slowly... The role that I wish the music festival could play is... through the music... I believe the Kinmen people, I believe the Xiamen people, I believe the Taiwanese, I believe the Chinese...I believe the Kinmenese overseas diaspora, I believe people from all over the world do not want a war. I wish that this music festival can tell people that this is the last tunnel... this is the last war... that we wish we could have peace forever. This is what I wish to express most. We would also like to tell... through music... those politicians with a vital stake in the society that we do not want war we want peace.

It is evident that the materiality of the Zhaishan Tunnel reinvents itself over the years and is active in (re)creating social relations. Music in a battlefield tunnel might not be merely something to remind people of the battlefield past, but also seeks to transcend political boundaries in its attempt to re-create entirely new collective memories in the name of peace and harmony for participants of different political allegiance. As Freedgood argues, “The knowledge stockpiled in things bears on the grisly specifics of conflicts and conquests that a culture can neither regularly acknowledge nor permanently destroy if it is going to be able to count on its own history to know itself and realize a future” (Freedgood, 2006, cited in Pettitt, 2008: 5). As such, “[m]emory is constantly refiugured in practice and performance through what individuals do. As things are done, other “events” are remembered and replaced into the present. Memory is temporalized and can reinvigorate what one is doing ‘now’; it is also reinvigorated and can be rerouted in the ‘now’, but not in an exact rerun of the past” (Crang, 2001, cited in Crouch, 2004: 91). Indeed, it is at the intersections of remembering, forgetting and creating memories that both the music and tunnel live. As much as the tunnel still exudes the patriotism and fervour of a past era for some, it has also lent its own material conditions to transmitting the music of peace. Yet, the music festival seeks not to erase memories of the war but to
remake memories – collective memories that are shared by the performers and audiences from China and Taiwan within the acoustical setting of the Tunnel.

The Zhaishan Tunnel Music Festival could not have been possible without the physicality of the military tunnel. Conversely, the music and tunnel would not have fulfilled their roles in the promotion of cross-strait ties without the ‘import’ of other places. It is through the constant reference to ‘the other side’, to the Chinese tourists and to historical events that the narrative power of the music festival is sustained. This testifies to Crang’s observation that “places are made but they are not bounded, fixed entities but are relationally linked to other places. In other words...the paradox of experiencing a place is that it depends on other absent places” (Crang, 2006: 53). In this case the music festival can be thought to take place not just within the bounded interior of the tunnel, but is made possible through the co-existence of Kinmen’s relationship with mainland China. The presence of an absent landscape is as much significant as the physical environment itself.

In short, this case study can be positioned at the cross-road of ‘acoustical and cultural analysis’ (Feld, 1991) as it “involves both an account of the physical or material conditions of sound production and the social and historical conditions of its invocation and interpretation” (Feld, 1991: 79). Materiality, as Sofaer (2007) argues, “provides the means by which social relations are visualized... Without material expression social expressions have little substantive reality, as there is nothing through which these relations can be mediated (Sofaer, 2007: 1). However, the music festival demonstrates a possibility to go beyond visual-centric analyses
and engage in sensuous materialism to gain a more nuanced understanding of the complex interactions between objects and people. Music, though intangible, is equally powerful in conveying feelings and is actively generating affective alliances and re-creating collective memories in the military tunnel. Yet, it does not act alone. It appears as part of the materiality of the tunnel for it is the acoustics of the granite structure that allows the music to be what it is. Forays into such performances elicit the intangibilities of material culture and allow one to think not just about the materialities, but also the *immaterialities* of culture. Through the lens of sensuous and affective materialism, the immaterialities of identity negotiation and practices of signification (Crang, 2006), are seen as not apart from, but *a part of* the material.

### 7.6 Food for Thought: Ingesting Memory

So far, we have discussed about things *from* Kinmen’s battlefield past, here I shift my focus to things *of* the past to shed light on the creative vigour of present day entrepreneurs. In this section, I draw on food and beverages. Unlike the Kinmen Knife and the Zhaishan Tunnel, the gastronomic is highly perishable and cannot physically connect us to the past. And yet its material capacities and its visual, olfactory and gustatory consumption create powerful affective resonances that can be just as powerful, if not more intimate in its ability to shape people’s consciousness.

Let us begin with some Kinmen Kaoliang Liquor. The consumption culture of kaoliang liquor started in North China. When the KMT forces retreated from mainland China
to Kinmen, the military brought with them their kaoliang liquor drinking culture, and introduced the growing of sorghum (a family of wheat from which kaoliang liquor is made) to residents. An exchange economy between the garrison and civilians soon started as sorghum was grown by the locals in return for rice from the military. The liquor has since become Kinmen’s most important export commodity and is inextricably linked to the island’s identity. With the rise of tourism, local entrepreneurs came up with ‘commemorative kaoliang liquor’ featuring the major battles for tourist consumption. Some liquor bottles are made in the shape of tanks, helmets, army boots and artillery shells, marrying the consumption of kaoliang liquor with war commemoration. More than the vessels, the kaoliang-battlefield factor can be incorporated by the actual product. To illustrate, one young and innovative local entrepreneur, Li Min-de, introduced the ‘Kinmen Battlefield Cocktail Series’ (Figure 7.7).

Figure 7.7 The 'Kuningtou Battle' kaoliang cocktail
Popular amongst the younger locals and tourists, this series encompasses a total of six cocktails made from a mixture of kaoliang liquor and fruit juice, each exuding a different colour and character. According to Li, each of them is an embodiment of a major battle, a historical event, or a certain ideology. A local homestay operator confirmed the cocktail’s popularity:

I bring my guests here almost every week. Many tourists have read about the Battlefield Cocktail Series from travel blogs and would like to try them. I think the kaoliang series is a novel idea to let people from outside Kinmen know about us and our history and even better, attract them to visit Kinmen.

(Lai Jie, personal interview, 2011).

When asked about where the idea of the cocktail series came from and the stories each drink tells, Li enthused at length, linking the aroma and taste of the ingredients to the emotional states and memories they were meant to evoke, while reflecting on Kinmen’s history from the war years through to the more amicable situation across the Taiwan Strait today:

The ‘Kuningtou Battle’ is a mixture of Kaoliang liquor, orange juice and guava juice. This gives the cocktail a tinge of red to signify bloodshed during the Kuningtou Battle.

The 823 Bombardment is an aerial battle...That’s why this cocktail is blue in colour. There is salt at the rim of the glass to enhance the taste and to signify that they [the communist soldiers] were rubbing salt into our wounds.

To echo the tunnelisation, we created ‘Tunnel’ with a dark/dull purple colour, to mimic the ambience inside a tunnel.

As for ‘Night Attack’, both sides used to deploy divers, known as “water ghosts”, during the night, either to collect intelligence or to cut off the heads of
enemy divers. That’s why it is made from lemon and guava juice, to give it a red tone to signify such atrocities.

In the 70s, there was no more war. Both sides were more or less at peace. Kaoliang (sorghum) can once again be grown on the fields, creating large areas of greenery – A kind of “Kaoliang awakening”... A green Kinmen indeed...That’s why this cocktail is green in colour and has a refreshing fragrance.

Lastly, everyone is talking about peace now...That’s why this cocktail, ‘Peace’, has a honey base. We want to savour the sweetness of peace.

(Personal interview, 2008; italics added)

The governmental rationalities in developing Kinmen into a battlefield tourism destination play themselves out in the form of the rationale behind the creation of the Kinmen Battlefield Cocktail Series. Li’s personal narration and interpretation of Kinmen’s past and present are clearly influenced by the meta-narration in terms of its selective focus on certain battles and flow of events. The stories behind the ‘823 Artillery Battle’ and ‘Night Attack’ cocktails reflect the hostile binary of “us and them”, which is very much prominent in the narrative thread found in various war museums on the island. Yet, while the governance of his own business decisions might be influenced by the authorities’ tourism initiatives, Li never forgets to add a pinch of innovation to “spice up” the stories and exert his Kinmenese identity. The cocktail series is thus as much a (re)presentation of Kinmen’s battlefield heritage as it is a performance of the entrepreneur’s own sentiments about the historical events and his interpretation of current happenings in Kinmen. As such, “rather than being imagined (Anderson, 1991) identity is ‘constituted’ through the process of making ‘things’ real both to ourselves and to others” (Garner, 2004, cited in Geismar and Horst, 2004: 9).
The agency of the Kinmen Battlefield Cocktail is not to be drowned out by the voices of its creator and the state. I would argue that the kaoliang liquor actively seeks to transform itself to suit the changing drinking culture of younger generations. Moreover, through its aesthetics, taste and fragrance in various guises in the cocktail series, it materialises a distant past and remembers history in pretty much its own terms, and in so doing, “creates or challenges the values attached to human relations” (Sofaer, 2007: 2). Unlike the previous examples of knife and tunnel music festival, which are things from the past, the kaoliang cocktail has only recently been born out of the creativity of a local entrepreneur. Yet, through its narrative power and sensuous materialism, it presents itself as both a precipitate of the battlefield past and an extension to present day cross-strait ties. The materiality of the kaoliang cocktail interacts with its consumer and stimulates the visual, gustatory and olfactory senses. Indeed, it is through the aroma and appearance that the cocktail is tasted. With its colour, taste and aroma, it animates Kinmen’s battlefield history and challenges it’s drinker to reflect on the conflicts experienced by people from both sides of the Strait.

If these drinks seem outlandish then they are part of a range of products available such as the ‘bullet’ crackers (biscuits made to the shape of bullets) (Zhang, 2010). The success of which has triggered an ‘arms race’ among other local entrepreneurs. Chen Li-lin, Manager of Yi Lai Shuen, for example, came up with the idea of “Battlefield Mine Cake” (Figure 7.8).
Individually packed in sachets with camouflage design to accentuate the battlefield theme, these chocolate-coated cakes have fillings that come in a variety of different flavours ranging from kaoliang to strawberry and peanut. The sprouting of locally produced products that are associated with Kinmen’s battlefield heritage is telling of the generative effects of tourism landscape governance. However following Taipei’s friendly stance towards Beijing and the increased economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, local entrepreneurs with battlefield-related products to offer are beginning to set their sights not just on the Chinese tourists visiting Kinmen, but at the larger Chinese market on mainland China. As such, the increased sensitivity
towards Chinese tourists has evolved into greater awareness of the Chinese market as a whole. As Chen revealed:

I have originally thought of coming up with a comic strip to instil a certain storyline behind this product...for instance someone stepping on a mine and how he was rescued – a common experience for people in Kinmen. However, as I intend to promote this cake in mainland China, it is wise not to deal with the battlefield history too much, if not it might be censored by the Chinese authorities.

(Personal interview, 2008)

As is evident, as much as Chen wishes to instil life into her product, there is a limit to the intended liveliness of the mine cake. The cake’s role is to accentuate the battlefield identity of Kinmen, but it has to abstain from evoking sensitive issues between China and Taiwan. With a smooth face, savoury chocolate coating and soft texture, this ‘mine’ seeks not to cause harm, but to submit itself to the taste buds of the consumer. Memories of the war as materialised by the body of the cake are thus fragmented and selective. More than that, in order to ‘sanitise’ the image of the land mine as a weapon of mass-destruction, which has taken the lives of so many, the war is remembered not for the sufferings caused, but for the peace that people yearn for. The back of the mine cake wrapper reads: “Hidden beneath the white sandy beaches were countless land mines. In today’s peacetime, the mine ‘Q’ cake will break out from the line of defence to explode your taste buds.” ‘Q’ here could mean either a ‘chewy texture’ or ‘cute’. In order to make the ‘mine’ more palatable, the entrepreneur seeks to cartoonise a weapon of mass destruction and uses a play of words to soften the apparently hard-to-swallow memories of the land mines.
7.7 ‘Making Sense’ of Rapprochement Tourism

To understand what people are and what they might become, one must understand what goes on between people and things.

(Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981: 1)

This chapter has sought to destabilise the often perceived banality of Kinmen’s post-war landscape by highlighting the social life of touristic things and their interactions with locals and tourists. By engaging with the concept of sensuous materialism, the chapter attempts to go beyond visual-centric analyses and re-orientate studies on post-war material culture from a constructivist approach to one that recognises the interactivity of objects and humans via the visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory and gustatory senses. By way of conclusion, I make four reflections on the materiality, memory, identity and mobility of things.

First, by situating this discussion in the wider literature on commemorative materialities, I see materiality as the platform where things and people communicate. Nicholas Saunders’ notion of Trench Art serves as a useful entry point from which to tell the stories of the various things including those that do not originate from war materiel per se. I have also attempted to go beyond visual-centric engagement with materiality by capturing the sensate and sensorial aspects of human-thing interactions. Hetherington’s (2002) discussion on touch as a source of visualisation that is ‘proximal’ rather than ‘distal’ could also, as this chapter has shown, be applied to the other senses. As such, by engaging with critical sensuous materialism, we are able to sift out the sentiments evoked by the touch of the Kinmen Knife, the melody
of the Zhaishan Tunnel music, and the aroma and taste of the Kaoliang Cocktail and the Battlefield Mine Cake. This allows us to gain a more intimate understanding of the multiple ways in which Kinmen’s post-war material culture participate in the rapprochement process. Furthermore, the sensorium (Ong, 1991), an arena within which the sensory apparatus of an individual or a culture operates, is a useful place to situate and advance discussions on materiality and material culture. However, the sensorium does not exist in an abstract conversational vacuum between people and things, but operates in the wider system of life-worlds.

Second, I am primarily interested in how things act as objects of memory, not in memory per se, and how memories might be enacted in things. As Chris Tilley (2004: 219) suggests, “It is memory that serves to connect knowledges of one place to another, without which experience remains shallow and non-contextual.” In the case of Kinmen, the various touristic things discussed in the paper serve to remind locals and tourists of the past as much as they embody glimpses of the future. Yet, not all artefacts seek to remember. At times, these things attempted to forget the conflict, but were still very much haunted by spirits of the past. The Kinmen Knife presents a vivid example of such active forgetting but involuntary remembering. Conversely, as the Tunnel Music Festival shows, there are instances where things welcome a reflection of the past through their materialities while at the same time attempt to re-create collective memories for former enemies. Indeed, things are capable of transmitting/communicating affects. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton’s (1981) notion of psychic energies inherent in things proved to be useful in arguing for the potential of things to evoke memories of the past and remake collective memories.
In the case of the Kinmen Tunnel Music Festival, “while memory may be drawn upon to signify, it is made anew, drawn through performance, and thus flows in time with the other components of performance. It is less that memory is performed than it is “in performance.” (Crouch, 2004: 92). By gaining a better appreciation of such affective communication of things, we may be a step closer to understanding the mentalities of people in Kinmen’s post-war society and how cross-strait ties might develop.

Thirdly, touristic things are for sure extensions of their makers’ identities but they also possess identities and are involved in active conversations with its buyer/owner/giver. I have shown how through the process of making material memories, local entrepreneurs exert their own identities. The various inventions by local entrepreneurs are in fact their interventions on contemporary cross-strait ties. Far from being passive followers of governmental rationalities, they make their voices heard through their products. The Kaoliang Cocktail and Mine Cake examples demonstrate the negotiation between the government’s rationale for preserving Kinmen’s battlefield heritage and local entrepreneurs’ own interpretation of cross-strait ties and aspirations. Indeed, as their products show, the entrepreneurs possess agency and do not act according to prescribed trajectory of actions, but neither are they in direct opposition to the state. Conversely, touristic things are always in constant negotiation with the consciousness of the tourists who buy them as souvenirs or as part of a collection; connecting them to the places and people where these things were bought, and when in the domestic sphere, these things continue to draw perceptions out form their buyer or keeper and are constantly inviting
her/him to reflect on her/his own identity. Therefore, it is worthwhile to interrogate and capture materiality in action, and to appreciate how meanings are always in a state/flux of emergence rather than inscribed or read into by social scientists. Indeed, As Tilley (2004: 222) posits, “Things and places are active agents of identity rather than pale reflections of pre-existing ideas and socio-political relations. Having real material and ideological effects on persons and social relations, things and places can then be regarded as much subjects as objects of identity.”

The fourth and final point concerns the attempt to recognise multiple spatialities/temporalities by moving away from notions of authenticity tied to location/origin or producer or time period that works on military souvenirs/tourist souvenirs currently does. For instance, I have argued that by privileging and authenticating metal Trench Art produced by soldiers and civilians during and in the immediate aftermath of war, Saunders overlooks the creativity and vitality of more contemporary producers. More specifically, through the artillery shell Kinmen Knife and Zhaishan Tunnel examples, I have shown that things from the military past often re-invent their materialities over time to adapt to changing political circumstances. Just as the Knife transforms itself from a local product to an ambassador of peaceful cross-strait ties, the Tunnel’s defensive materiality softens in the face of music to echo rhythms of harmony across the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, things move. The mobility and circulation of material culture has been highlighted. For one, rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan does not merely consist of travelling bodies; touristic things travel across political boundaries too. Reflecting on the buying of the Kinmen Knife by Chinese tourists, the maker saw it as a way of
‘returning’ the artillery shells to the place where they were fired from. However, such mobility of the reincarnated shell does not bring about dissent, but instead facilitates the delivery of a heart-warming message of peace and rapprochement.

To close, it is hoped that forays into the making and consuming of touristic things and how their materialities interact with and shape people’s consciousness of past histories and present happenings can help us gain a more nuanced understanding of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. As Buchli and Lucas (2001: 80) argue, “the relation between remembrance and forgetfulness is not a linear process but a struggle, a tension” (see also van der Hoorn, 2003). Sensuous materialism offers an avenue for us to gain a sense of the past and a ‘sense-able’ present. Moreover, as they always say, in material culture, the past often lives on in the present.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8.1 Rapprochement Tourism between China & Taiwan: A Summary

"We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time." -- T.S. Eliot

Indeed, there is no end to any exploration. As I began writing the conclusion of this thesis, I realised that there is no closure; this research only marks the beginning of the myriad ways we can understand rapprochement tourism. What this thesis has done, is to open up theoretical pathways through which we can analyse post-conflict tourism exchanges – pathways that endeavour to go beyond the state and commercial aspects of rapprochement and tourism that have dominated academic interventions in the past decades. As such, the thesis has presented ways in which we can garner a more nuanced understanding of the everyday geopolitics of non-state participants, and means through which to give voice to not just the humans, but also the things and the spectre that enchant the rapprochement tourism landscape. In this concluding chapter I seek to reiterate the main findings of the thesis before I contemplate on some potential areas for further research. Instead of recapping the conclusion of each chapter, I shall sift out some salient points
pertaining to the key concepts of ‘border’, ‘identity’ and ‘materiality’ as they appeared in different forms throughout the empirical chapters. I would then offer my concluding remarks by re-visiting the ‘tourism for peace’ agenda – thereby arriving at where we started, but knowing it for the very first time.

The concept of ‘border’ proves to be useful in gaining a more critical understanding of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. I have argued that the border is not necessarily confined to immigration checkpoints but manifest itself in different forms, and at a variety of different places. The taming of sensitive histories and difficult heritages as discussed in Chapter Four demonstrates how imagined borders can be demolished or re-worked at the various attractions that were either newly built, transformed or purely accidental, to appeal to tourists from ‘the other side’. These taming practices are also seen as having ‘bordering’ effects as boundaries are re-drawn and new frontiers envisioned through the various ways heritages are packaged and histories told. However, these bordering practices are not only performed by the states; cross-strait tourists and locals are actively engaging with such bordering processes as they challenge museum narratives and perform their identities in the process of interpreting museum exhibits and encountering the ‘Other’. In Chapter Five, I focus on cross-strait tourists’ travel experiences while crossing to and on ‘the other side’. Travel narratives of both Chinese and Taiwanese tourists were examined to reveal their encounters with practices of bordering during their time on tour. Contrary to the idea of a ‘borderless world’, the border in this chapter is argued to be omnipresent – it appears at immigration checkpoints, manifests itself through passports and visas, and comes into play during interactions
between tourists and locals. Borders on the move, that is. I have also shown that in the pursuit to understand the social or invisible border, ‘in-between’ spaces such as the waiting lounge at a ferry terminal are often overlooked. Discussions on cross-border buying and selling between the Taiwanese tourists and the Chinese locals at the Dong Du Ferry Terminal in Xiamen reveal that such border areas are not ‘non-places’, but filled with identity politics and performances. Chapters Six and Seven show that border-negotiation is not something taken on only by humans. As both chapters have shown, non-human beings from spirits, ghost and deities to touristic things of and from a battlefield past were equally active in participating in bordering practices. The requests made by anti-communist deities and ghosts of dead soldiers to return to their home villages in mainland China constitute a kind of nostalgic re-bordering – from one that excludes to one that embraces the Chinese state and its people. Discussion shows that the concept of ‘returning’ is both produced by and reinforces the rapprochement climate. However, there is also an economic rationale behind the change of hearts of the once anti-communist deities. By re-defining their boundaries and becoming ambassadors of goodwill rather than bastions against communism, they certainly stand to benefit from the patronage of Chinese tourists. Such re-drawing of boundaries is being extended to touristic things in Chapter Seven as I explored the post-war material culture of Kinmen, which finds itself at the cross-roads of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan. I observed that cross-strait tourism does not merely consist of travelling bodies; touristic things travel across political boundaries too. The buying of the Kinmen Knife by Chinese tourists, for example, was seen by its maker as a way of ‘returning’ the artillery shells to their
place of origin, and such border crossing carries with it messages for peace and rapprochement.

‘Identity’ is a recurring concept throughout much of the discussion. As I have shown in the first empirical chapter, the taming of sensitive histories and difficult heritages is in one way an identity-making exercise. While the Chinese state remains keen on forging a ‘One China’ identity and identifies Taiwan as a ‘long-lost brother’, its Taiwanese counterpart on the other hand, plays the rapprochement game much to its interest in selling a unique Taiwanese identity. Tourists’ identities were also performed through their encounters with museum exhibits. From the attitude of the Chinese tourists towards the notion of ‘stolen national treasures’ at Taipei’s Palace Museum, to the ‘diplomatic gaze’ cast by Taiwanese delegates on the ‘domesticised’ portrayal of Chiang Kai-shek at Xikou, it is clear that museum exhibits do indeed draw responses from and converse with tourists. It is often through such encounters that we can see how identity politics is being played out vis-à-vis the current rapprochement climate. Following this line of inquiry, tourists’ identities as discussed in Chapter Five were negotiated through the possession and usage of identification/travel documents during their tour across the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, for some Taiwanese tourists, the border at the Chinese immigration checkpoint is akin to a threshold, beyond which they adopt completely different identities. Being on tour thus constitutes an entry into a liminal state that allows the tourist to leave the home social structure behind and to adopt a variety of different identities. As was discussed, these identities also included playful ones as some Taiwanese tourists experimented with new configurations of identity politics.
through the usage of their Taiwanese identification cards when travelling in China. In particular, the usage of the Taiwanese tour guide license to gain free/discounted entries into attractions, and the willingness of the Taiwanese holder to be assumed to have a sense of belonging to China reveal that identity is contingent on where and with whom one is. Indeed, during the liminal state, “[i]ndividuals can overflow the boundaries of the rational and the objective and be playful, imaginative, and go beyond what is evidently “there” in an outward, rational sense (Crouch, 2004: 88). However, as elucidated in the following chapter on the enchanted world of rapprochement tourism, the pilgrim-tourist could never be completely detached from her/his home social structure, nor is the commencement of a liminal state a simple replacement of one identity with another. Rather, the liminal represents a more complex interplay of different identities. These identities are being negotiated when pilgrim-tourists from both China and Taiwan interact with each other. Furthermore, discussion shows that the Mazu Pilgrimage is indeed a socialising activity and it is at the frontier of creating new forms of post-national communities. Analysis of this common religious identity shared by many Chinese and Taiwanese in the context of the pilgrimage-tour provides refreshing insights to the study of rapprochement tourism. Identity as understood in the final empirical chapter is possessed by things as well. Through their identities, touristic things in this chapter were involved in active conversations with its maker/buyer/owner/giver. They were always in constant negotiation with the consciousness of the people who bought them as souvenirs or as part of a collection; connecting the buyers to the places and people where these things were bought, and when in the domestic sphere, these
things continued to draw perceptions out from their buyer or collector and constantly invited her/him to reflect on her/his own identity.

Last but not least, ‘materiality’ has been featured extensively in the four empirical chapters. Materiality is seen as a platform where people and things communicate. The materialities of the Thousand-layered Biscuits, the miniature replicas of national treasures, and the cartoonised figurines of sensitive political personnel like Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong give difficult heritages and sensitive histories new meanings, and contribute significantly to the identity dynamics of cross-strait relations. As was discussed, the kitsch souvenir was not merely an object, but a subject that actively injected political meanings, de-stabilised fixed notions of identities, and via its materiality, performed as a medium through which state ideologies and/or personal meanings are relayed. Furthermore, the materialities of travel and other identification documents were also interrogated. It is apparent from the various travel narratives that things that are close to the personal or those that are part and parcel of a touring experience are far from inert; they participate in the social and political lives of their owners, and are often platforms that connect “macro structures (the state) and micro actors (individuals) to each other” (Wang, 2004: 355). More than that, things like travel permits also engage in affective material moments with their holders, influencing how they identify themselves and how they think of others’ perceptions of them. ‘Materiality’ in Chapter Seven is discussed in the form of commemorative materialities. More specifically, it looks at how memories are being materialised through the various artefacts related to Kinmen’s battlefield past. Additionally, I have also experimented with the concept of
‘sensuous materialism’ so as to go beyond visual-centric analyses and re-orientate studies on post-war material culture from a constructivist approach to one that recognises the interactivity of objects and humans via the visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory and gustatory senses. Such interactions animate the object-human relationship and shape people’s consciousness of cross-strait relations. Other than ‘materiality’, the thesis also gives analytical space to the immateriality of rapprochement tourism. This takes the form of ghosts, spirits and deities and their active participation in cross-strait politics in Chapter Six. Discussion of such immaterialities allows one to move beyond the rationality assumed by ‘peace through tourism’ to engage with more irrational aspects of cross-strait tourism. The affective encounters between the tourists and the spectres, and the embodied experiences of pilgrim-tourists set the stage for us to acknowledge that rapprochement tourism is more about emotion than reason; feeling than meaning. Along this line of inquiry, Chapter Seven discusses the ability of music to convey feelings, arouse emotions and create collective memories in the Kinmen military tunnel. Through the lens of sensuous and affective materialism, the immaterialities of identity negotiation and practices of signification (Crang, 2006), are seen as not apart from, but a part of the material.

This thesis has demonstrated that a cultural-geo-political approach to the study of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan does indeed offer a more critical lens than the ‘peace through tourism’ perspective. It shows us the different theoretical pathways through which to understand the more everyday aspects of cross-strait relations – something that state- and economic-centric approaches fail
to capture. Through these micro-political episodes, we gain a more intimate sense of the rapprochement sentiment between people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Importantly too, in a field where research is still very limited or biased towards either China or Taiwan, the thesis has made a significant contribution by providing empirical findings from both political entities. The discussion above has served to tease out some significant cultural-geo-political ‘moments’ captured by the concepts of ‘border’, ‘identity’ and ‘materiality’ throughout the thesis. It is evident that it is difficult to separate one concept from the other in discussing the cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism. These concepts reinforce each other and it is the synergy they create that enables more rapprochement phenomena to be explored. It is in this spirit of further exploration that the next section now turns to.

8.2 Potentials for Future Research

So, what lies ahead for the cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism? As I have suggested at the beginning of this chapter, this thesis only marks a beginning to the myriad ways in which we can study rapprochement tourism. The cultural-geo-politics approach has proven to be promising in unravelling the nuances of tourism exchanges between China and Taiwan and still has much to offer in that respect. Before making my concluding remarks, I offer three potential areas for future research.

First, further research could focus on how divided societies confront sensitive remembrances of their past. In terms of ‘difficult heritage’ management, I have
focused my discussion on how both China and Taiwan have generally adopted strategies of ‘avoidance’, rather than encouraging people from both sides of the Strait to recognise their difficult/painful past. I recall a conversation with a tour guide in Kinmen in which she relayed the dismay of a reporter from Beijing that historical wall inscriptions on the battlefield island that propagated anti-communist nationalist ideologies were increasingly being removed in view that they were too sensitive for the liking of Chinese tourists. The reporter had visited Kinmen in the hope of capturing these once antagonistic artefacts to share with the general public in China, but left in disappointment. However, there are now counter-arguments proposed by islanders and academics that these war relics are unique to Kinmen and serve as important educational resources for people from either side to remember a tumultuous past. More research needs to be carried out on how such politics of heritage management play out amongst the various stakeholders of rapprochement tourism in both China and Taiwan. A cultural-geo-politics approach that deals with themes regarding bordering practices, identity and materiality of war relics is well-suited for this genre of research.

Upon return from my fieldwork in June 2011, I was met with news that travel restrictions on Chinese tourists were further relaxed. Individual travellers from Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen are now allowed to visit Taiwan without being part of a tour group, but only 500 visitors who can prove that they earn an annual income of around £11,000 or have at least £4,285 in savings are given permission to enter each day (BBC News, 6 October 2011). I have already alluded in Chapter Five about the ‘unequal degrees of mobility’ experienced by people from the same country. Apart
from analysing this in terms of discrimination along the line of where one stays and
how much one earns, further research needs to be carried out on the dynamics of
individual travelling experiences of Chinese tourists. For one, it has already been
reported in the Taiwanese media that local people were concerned as these
individual tourists are free to ‘wander’ around Taiwan and might actually be
communist spies and thus pose a threat to Taiwan’s national security. Conversely,
some of the Chinese tourists who were privileged to experience such ‘freedom’
lauded the new policies, stating that it was very convenient for them to move
around as there were ‘no cultural or language barriers’ (BBC News, 6 October 2011).
Whether the Taiwanese public differentiates between group tourists and individual
travellers in terms of their attitude towards them remains to be studied. The
cultural-geo-politics approach is well-poised to unravel the challenges of potential
cultural clashes and security issues resulting from the shift from controlled group
tours to un-monitored individual travels.

Thirdly, kinship-induced travels might open up new grounds for rapprochement
tourism research. Through the various empirical chapters, I have covered the
travelling experiences of cross-strait tourists, student tourists and pilgrim-tourists.
However, rapprochement tourism is not only for those seeking leisure or divine
power, but also for people to seek relatives and territorial attachments of whom/of
which one was forced to leave. As such, a potential future research lies in the field of
‘return tourism’. I envisage that the discussions on affective and sensuous
materialism could prove to be useful in explicating the emotions involved when
people travel across divided societies to reunite with relatives and loved ones. What
do they reminisce about when they meet each other? What do they bring along on such trips? What places do they visit? These enquiries open up new grounds for investigation. Moreover, such research will further the agenda to explore heritage at a personal scale as opposed to grand narratives on tourism and peace.

8.3 Concluding Remarks: Re-visiting ‘Peace through Tourism’

In my little book about community (Bauman, 2001) I discuss the dangerous phenomenon of fraudulent substitutes for the absent real thing (substitutes that in fact make the real thing yet more absent) a bit more widely... Substitutes are instant cures. They do not treat, but exacerbate the disease and make it more difficult to cure, as the energy which could be channelled into therapy is diverted. Tourism is such a substitute, a substitute satisfaction of a genuine need –that could otherwise prove creative and deeply ethical: The need to top up the proximity of otherness with recognition of shared humanity and enrichment of its contents

(Bauman in Franklin, 2003b: 214)

In re-visiting the idea of ‘peace through tourism’, I wish to reflect a little on Bauman’s thoughts. The ‘real thing’ that Bauman was referring to in the above interview is what he calls ‘shared humanity’. He was sceptical about tourism, seeing it as a substitute and waste of energy, which could have been harvested for attaining a sense of shared humanity. Indeed, we should not see tourism as a substitute nor should we use it as ‘instant cures’. This is exactly what is happening between China and Taiwan. Officials from both sides are using tourism as a ‘quick-fix’ for ‘promoting’ cross-strait peace and development, but as the thesis has shown, what is happening on the ground is often in stark contrast with what is envisioned by policy makers. The sudden influx of Chinese tour groups into Taiwan, the tight itineraries they
follow, the ‘touch-and-go’ style of tours they participate, are unfortunately not going to generate meaningful tourist-local interactions or foster the kind of ‘shared humanity’ that Bauman was referring to. In fact, ‘anti-social’ behaviours of Chinese tourists in Taiwan are constantly being reported on the news and shared across social media. Rather than promoting goodwill between people from post-conflict societies, it seems that such kind of tourism is encouraging the opposite.

Nevertheless, in the context of the unresolved conflict between China and Taiwan, rapprochement tourism still possesses the best potential for people from both sides to engage in meaningful interactions. The fundamental disjuncture in each state’s view on sovereignty makes a win-win political settlement between the two Chinas a far-fetched ideal. Furthermore, with Taiwan’s pro *status quo* Kuomintang in power for at least another four years, and China’s Politburo Standing Committee being led by yet another politically conservative leadership in Xi Jinping, it is unlikely that cross-strait relations will change dramatically in the next ten years. Therefore, rapprochement tourism will remain largely ‘in the making’. ‘Rapprochement’ implies a resumption of cordial relationship and hints at a more open-ended, and nuanced, scenario. It allows us to situate the cross-strait relations as something that is still evolving, and includes practices of both inclusion and exclusion. As such, instead of writing off tourism, there is a need to contemplate on the type of tourism and the style of touring. As I have shown in my discussion on cultural exchanges between Chinese and Taiwanese pilgrim-tourists of the Mazu cult, there remain potentials for people to ‘rub each other’s elbows’ (Bauman in Franklin, 2003b), and be involved in

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41 Xi Jinping will officially take over Hu Jintao as China’s President in March 2013.
meaningful conversations. Through such pilgrimage tours, new geocultural imaginaries based on an identity that is beyond the ‘national’ facilitate the forming of a community that is outside the confines of discourses on territoriality and sovereignty. Conversations within such a community would evolve around “common concerns of daily life practices in the fields of commerce, education and recreational pursuits” (Newman, 2011: 37) rather than the macro-politics of cross-strait relations. Also, as suggested by Lisle (2007) and Hazbun (2009), in their study on Cyprus and Israel, respectively, instead of avoiding or erasing the painful past, it might be useful to promote itineraries that encourage people on both sides to confront it. The battlefield landscape of Kinmen offers a platform for both the Chinese and Taiwanese to contemplate on the legacies of the Chinese Civil War and ponder upon the best ways forward. Although tour groups might not be keen on such itineraries, the commencement of individual travels in Taiwan by Chinese tourists presents a good starting point for such therapeutic travels to flourish. So, can a sense of shared humanity be attained via tourism? I would say yes, but it depends on the type of tourism.

Culture brings people together but also separates them; history binds people together, but there are many histories. To close, it is hoped that this thesis has in one way or another demonstrated that we should not take the idea of ‘peace through tourism’ for granted. The cultural-geo-politics of rapprochement tourism between China and Taiwan is essentially about the many nuances of everyday cross-strait relations that are experienced and produced by ordinary people, but which are seldom addressed by academics. Far from a simple panacea, rapprochement tourism
is in fact a much more complicated process involving a slew of stakeholders – humans, non-humans and things, and the stories that bind them together.
APPENDIX A
Complete List of Interviewees (Chinese Tourists; p. 1 of 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chen Jie*</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>01-Mar-11</td>
<td>Tourist at Taipei's Palace Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chen Xin</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>25-Mar-11</td>
<td>Undergraduate, Qinghua University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cheng Guo</td>
<td>21-30</td>
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<td>29-Mar-11</td>
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</tr>
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<td>21-30</td>
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<td>25-Mar-11</td>
<td>Undergraduate, Qinghua University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fen Min</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>02-Mar-11</td>
<td>Tourist at Taipei's Palace Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>He Xin</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>02-Mar-11</td>
<td>Tourist at Taipei's Palace Museum</td>
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<td>Huang Chenyin</td>
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<td>20-Apr-11</td>
<td>Undergraduate, Xiamen University</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Huang Dingru</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>25-Mar-11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>23-Mar-11</td>
<td>Undergraduate, Peking University</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
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<td>31-40</td>
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<td>25-Apr-11</td>
<td>Mazu devotee</td>
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<td>Ji Xiaolan</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>02-Mar-11</td>
<td>Tourist at Taipei's Palace Museum</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Li Jun*</td>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>02-Mar-11</td>
<td>Tourist at Taipei's Palace Museum</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Liang Yong</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>01-Apr-11</td>
<td>Associate Professor, Xinan Zhengfa University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Liu Han</td>
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<td>&gt;70</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>Yu Fu-shen's Chinese auntsies</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mdm Yu 2</td>
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<td>Yu Fu-shen's Chinese auntsies</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mr Chen</td>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23-Apr-11</td>
<td>Retired teacher; member of Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Mr Lian</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23-Apr-11</td>
<td>Principal, Chang Tai Communist Party School</td>
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## Complete List of Interviewees (Chinese Tourists; p. 2 of 3)

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<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
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<td>51-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23-Apr-11</td>
<td>Principal, Chang Tai Yi Zhong (High School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mr Liu</td>
<td>&gt;70</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>01-Mar-11</td>
<td>Tourist at Taipei's Palace Museum</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mr Wu*</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>16-Apr-11</td>
<td>Reporter in Fenghua</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Mr Xie</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23-Apr-11</td>
<td>Chang Tai county Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Mr Xu</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>Mazu devotee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Mr Yang</td>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23-Apr-11</td>
<td>Retired principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Mr Yao</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23-Apr-11</td>
<td>Retired teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Mr Zhang</td>
<td>41-50</td>
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<td>23-Apr-11</td>
<td>Chang Tai county Ministry of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mr Zhang Kun</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23-Apr-11</td>
<td>Lecturer, Chang Tai Communist Party School</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Mr Zheng</td>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>25-Apr-11</td>
<td>Zheng Li's father; Mazu devotee</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Qi Yu</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>29-Mar-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Shen Jian</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>Participant at the Pacific Asia Student Seminar</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Song Yu*</td>
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<td>Local historian at Fenghua, Xikou</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Wang Bo*</td>
<td>&gt;70</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>01-Mar-11</td>
<td>Tourist at Taipei's Palace Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Wang Xuan*</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>01-Mar-11</td>
<td>Tourist at Taipei's Palace Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Yang Yi</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26-Mar-11</td>
<td>Joined exchange programme in Taiwan</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Yu Jing</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26-Mar-11</td>
<td>Beijing local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Yu Xiang</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26-Mar-11</td>
<td>Yu Fu-shen's cousin</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Zhang Dantong</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>23-Mar-11</td>
<td>Undergraduate, Peking University</td>
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## Complete List of Interviewees (Chinese Tourists; p. 3 of 3)

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<td>M</td>
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<td>Lecturer, Department of History, Xiamen University</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Zhang Xuxiao</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>Visited Chiang Kai-Shek's hometown as a child</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Zhang Yi</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>23-Mar-11</td>
<td>Employee at a national bank</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Zheng Li</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>27-Apr-11</td>
<td>Lecturer, Department of History, Xiamen University</td>
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* Pseudonym
## APPENDIX B

Complete List of Interviewees (Taiwanese Tourists; p. 1 of 2)

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<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Annie Chang</td>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>Second generation Chinese in Taiwan</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Carol Liu</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>14-Feb-11</td>
<td>Taipei local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chang Chun-yi</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>14-Feb-11</td>
<td>Visited Xiamen with friends; grad trip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chang Rong-fa</td>
<td>&gt;70</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10-Apr-11</td>
<td>Mazu pilgrim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chang Zhi-qiang</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>14-Feb-11</td>
<td>Visited Xiamen with friends; grad trip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chen Chien-ming</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>18-Feb-11</td>
<td>Email interview</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Chen Li-ling</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>14-Feb-11</td>
<td>Visited Shanghai; business trip</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chen Shu-yi</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>22-Jan-11</td>
<td>Employee of Kinmen National Park</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chen Yi-xiu</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>25-Mar-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese MA Law student at Renmin University, China</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chen Yu-lin</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>14-Feb-11</td>
<td>Visited Beijing; family tour</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Cheng*</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>23-Jan-11</td>
<td>Kinmen local; Chinese checkpoint experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cindy Lee</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>27-Jan-11</td>
<td>Participant at Pacific Asia Student Seminar</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Cui Ping</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>06-Mar-11</td>
<td>Visited various cities in China</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Edwin Yang</td>
<td>31-40</td>
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<td>04-Mar-11</td>
<td>Associate Professor, National Taiwan Normal University</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Fang Chen-xuan</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26-Mar-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese studying in China; daughter of businessman</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Guan Ming-shen</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23-Feb-11</td>
<td>Telephone interview; served military service in Kinmen</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>21-Feb-11</td>
<td>Retired lecturer; served military service in Kinmen</td>
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### Complete List of Interviewees (Taiwanese Tourists; p. 2 of 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Li Meng-juan</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>14-Feb-11</td>
<td>Visited Xiamen with friends; grad trip</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Lin Mei-yin</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>24-Jan-11</td>
<td>Lecturer at National Quemoy University</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Ling*</td>
<td>21-30</td>
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<td>24-Jan-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese tour guide</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>51-60</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>13-Apr-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese Mazu pilgrim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Mdm Lee</td>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>13-Apr-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese Mazu pilgrim</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
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<td>51-60</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>24-Apr-11</td>
<td>Mazu devotee cum medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Mr Chang</td>
<td>51-60</td>
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<td>Chang Chunyi's father; email interview</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Yu Fu-shen's uncle</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>61-70</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21-Feb-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
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<td>51-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>11-Apr-11</td>
<td>Museum curator</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Yang Qi</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Yang Yong-xiang</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>24-Feb-11</td>
<td>Email interview; served military service in Kinmen</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>15-Mar-11</td>
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* Pseudonym
APPENDIX C
Complete List of Interviewees (Government Officials)

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<th>Gender</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>03-May-11</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Dai Mang*</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>16-Apr-11</td>
<td>Chinese; Representative, Taiwan Affairs Office of Fenghua People's Government; Informal interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Deng Jun*</td>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>16-Apr-11</td>
<td>Chinese; Representative, Taiwan Affairs Office of Fenghua People's Government; Informal interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dong Zheng-xiong</td>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>18-Feb-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Representative, Da Jia Zhenlan Gong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fang Tian-jyi</td>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>03-May-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Chief, Bureau of Social Affairs, Kinmen County Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Huang Tzu-chuan</td>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>22-Jan-11; 11-Apr-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Chief, Interpretation &amp; Education Section, Kinmen National Park</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kiat*</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26-Jan-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Representative, National Palace Museum, Taiwan</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Lee Fu-hua</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23-Feb-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Representative, Tourism Bureau, Taoyuan County Government; Telephone interview</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Li Wo-shih</td>
<td>51-61</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>09-Apr-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Magistrate of Kinmen</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mr Hong</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>01-Mar-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Representative, Department of Cultural Creativity and Marketing, National Palace Museum</td>
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* Pseudonym
**APPENDIX D**

**Complete List of Interviewees (Creative Industry)**

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ben Huang</td>
<td>31-40</td>
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<td>17-Feb-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Owner, MIIN Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chang Cheng-Jieh</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>15-Mar-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Artistic Director, Kinmen Tunnel Music Festival</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chen Li-lin</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20-Dec-08</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Manager, Yi Lai Shuen</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Fang Boyun</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>16-Apr-11</td>
<td>Chinese; owner of 'Jiao Guan Zan' Thousand-layered biscuit shop</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lai Jie</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>13-May-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Owner, Kinmen Homestay</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Li Min-de</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>03-Jun-08</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Manager, Bar Sa Restaurant</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Monica Wu</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>11-Feb-11</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Brand Manager, Chiang's Talk</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mr Jiang</td>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>16-Apr-11</td>
<td>Chinese; owner of 'Long-men' Thousand-layered biscuit shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Wu Tseng-Dong</td>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30-May-08</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Director, Chin Ho Li Knife, Kinmen</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E

AIDÉ-MÉMOIRE for Interviews

Sample Aide Memoire for Interview with Chinese/Taiwanese Tourists

1) When did you go to Taiwan/China? Was it your first time there?
2) Where did you visit in Taiwan/China?
3) Do you have any relatives there?
4) What kinds of travel documents do you need to prepare? Tell me about the process of applying for these documents.
5) Could you show me some photos that you have taken in Taiwan/China? Tell me about them.
6) What aspects of Taiwan/China do you enjoy most?
7) Could you tell me about the souvenirs/gifts you bought from Taiwan/China?
8) Could you share with me some stories of your encounters with the Taiwanese/Chinese during your holiday? What were some of the most memorable things? What were the most striking differences or similarities between Taiwan and China?
9) Has your trip changed or confirmed your understanding of Taiwan/China? How did your trip change/confirm your understandings?
Sample *Aide Memoire for Interview with Taiwanese Ma Zu Devotees*

1) Which part of Taiwan do you come from?

2) Could you tell me more about your participation/involvement in this Ma Zu tour?

3) What are your views of Taiwanese visiting Pu Tian to pray to Ma Zu?

4) What are some of the offerings you brought from Taiwan? What do you bring back as a souvenir/token of blessing?

5) Could you share with me some of your interesting encounters with the Chinese devotees?

6) How have religious tours like this affected your ideas about the relationship between China and Taiwan?

7) Do you intend to travel to other parts of China after this trip? If so, where to?
Sample *Aide Memoire for Interview with Local Ma Zu Devotees in Pu Tian, China*

1) What are your views of Taiwanese devotees visiting Pu Tian to pray to Ma Zu?

2) Could you share with me some of your interesting encounters with the Taiwanese devotees?

3) What are some of the differences between the Chinese and those from Taiwan in terms on how they pray to Ma Zu (e.g. differences in the things they offer or bring home)?

4) Have you visited any Ma Zu temple in Taiwan? If so, where and under what circumstances did you do this (e.g. group tour?). Did you go specifically for religious purposes or were other places of interest included as well? Tell me about your experience.

5) How have religious tours like this affected your ideas about the relationship between China and Taiwan?
Sample *Aide Memoire* for Interview with Local Entrepreneurs in Kinmen

1) How has the branding of Kinmen as a battlefield tourism destination affected your promotional strategies/ the way you run your business?

2) What is your main motivation behind the development/ invention/ introduction of the particular product that is associated with Kinmen’s battlefield image? (E.g. Kinmen knife made from artillery shells; mine cake, etc.)

3) How are the “stories” behind your products tailored in tandem with the battlefield image?

4) What is the message that behind your product?

5) Who is your clientele? How effective is the battlefield image of your products in attracting your clients?

6) Considering the fact that Kinmen is undergoing de-militarisation, do you think that battlefield tourism is important for the island’s economy and therefore here to stay?
Sample *Aide Memoire* for Interview with Local Entrepreneurs in Xikou

1) How has the transformation of Xikou into a tourism destination affected your promotional strategies/ the way you run your business?

2) What is your main motivation behind the development/ invention/ introduction of the particular product that is associated with Chiang Kai-shek?

3) What is the message behind your product?

4) Who is your clientele? How effective is the Chiang Kai-shek image in attracting your clients?

5) Considering the fact that China and Taiwan are undergoing rapprochement, do you think that the Chiang Kai-shek associations are important for Xikou’s economy and therefore here to stay?
Sample *Aide Memoire* for Interview with Representative of Taoyuan County Government Tourism Bureau

1) Could you tell me more about the Bronze Statue Park in Ci-hu?

2) What was the motivation behind organising the ‘2010 Open Chiang’ event?

3) How did so many bronze statues of Chiang Kai-shek end up in the park?

4) Who were involved in the design of the costumes?

5) What was the appeal of this event amongst the Chinese tourists?

6) What do you think of such a light-hearted caricature of Chiang Kai-shek?

7) How did people respond to such an initiative by the Tourism Bureau?

8) Could you share with me any future plans for the statue park? Is the Open Chiang going to be annual event?
Sample *Aide Memoire for Interview with Representative of Kinmen National Park*

1) Could you tell me more about the Zhaishan Tunnel Music Festival?

2) What was the rationale behind staging such an event?

3) Could you tell me something about the curator, Chang Cheng-jie and his ideas?

4) One of the main agenda of the festival was to use music as a platform for communicating peace across the strait. How was this made possible? (Note: Both in terms of how the festival came to be and whether it is achieving its aims.)

5) How was the response of people who attended the musical performance? Could you share with me some of their feedbacks?

6) The music festival has been held for two years running (2009 and 2010). Is the National Park treating this as an annual event? If not, why? If yes, could you share with me some of the future plans for this music event?
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