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**SALVATION IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT:  THE IMPACT OF HEGELIAN SOCIAL THEORY ON MODERN UNDERSTANDING OF SOTERIOLOGY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*.**

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Salvation in a Social Context: The Impact of Hegelian Social Theory on Modern Understanding of Soteriology, with particular reference to *The Phenomenology of Spirit.*

The study is an exercise in interdisciplinary practice. It concerns the relationship between theology and socio-philosophy and considers the type of dialogical theory that is required in order to articulate the meaning of salvation socially. The intention is mediate a theological understanding of salvation through issues raised by Hegel in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and which continue as matters of concern to his interpreters.

The study is divided into three main parts, Identity, Alienation and Community. Each part represents interrelated areas of human experience which bear upon Christian and non-Christian social theory. The Introduction and Part 1 outline difficulties on the side of faith in articulating an idea of God's salvation for the contemporary needs and goals of society. I paint in broad brush strokes the shape of the contention over how to speak about salvation in a social context, in particular, the dualism between talking of 'the social' either terms of the functions of collected individuals or as a single entity.

Part 2 introduces critical interpretations of Hegel and his treatment of various social forms of alienation. Relevant contributions from contemporary non-Christian social theorists, Jürgen Habermas, in particular, are summarized and discussed.

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In Part 3 I consider what is inadequate in Hegel's own superseding of the Christian understanding of community and ask: "What kind of thought is able to sublate Hegel's own inadequate notion of community?" Using analogical reasoning, I suggest that it is possible for theology both to learn from Hegel and his interpreters, and to criticize them. I look at some implications for Christian social theory today.

**Part 3:** *COMMUNITY*

Chapter 6: *HOPES FOR COMMUNITY*

Chapter 7: *COMMUNITY RENEWAL*

## Declaration

I confirm that no part of the material offered has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or in any other University.

Signed:     Esther D. Reed

Date:       2-3.92

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

# SALVATION IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT: THE IMPACT OF HEGELIAN SOCIAL THEORY ON MODERN UNDERSTANDING OF SOTERIOLOGY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*.

My theme is salvation in a *social context*, the context in which we locate our individual projects and have things in common; the context for the economy, polity, culture and societal community. My theme is *salvation* in a social context - that healing (L. *salvus*) wrought in Christ which has effect more widely than in the life of the individual. And my theme, finally, is salvation in a social context considered analogically through dialogue between Christian and non-Christian social theory. The basic form of questioning arises upon asking, can one say anything of what God's salvation is like in dialogue with non-Christian social theory, especially Hegel's science of consciousness but also Habermas's communicative action theory. In introducing this theme I acknowledge the influence on my work of the contemporary Latin American Liberation theologian Clodovis Boff. The name of Clodovis Boff is a by-word for the theology of liberation and it may seem curious to link him into a study of Hegel, of whom he is deeply critical. [1] Both struggle, however, towards a better understanding of community in the seemingly inevitable tension between the single 'I' and the universal 'We', and I draw on their work together.

The charge against much modern Christianity is that it has fostered the alienation of individual salvation from the social

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[1] C. Boff (1987) pp. 12; 39; 177; 203; 219.

context. It is not a new charge. Hegel came close to denying that Christianity has critical social importance when he said that it was a mutation of free self-consciousness; "agonizingly self-divided, the movement of an infinite yearning ...in antithesis to the Unchangeable" (217). [2] His charge, like that of 'post-Christians' today, is that the Christian faith has not and perhaps cannot attend to social matters because it is about the infinite yearning of the individual for release from the present order. This means that one of the most controversial issues of our time is how to deal theologically with sin and salvation not only with regard to the individual but in socio-political spheres. [3]

It is generally agreed amongst theologians of all persuasions that salvation takes effect in the life of the individual through faith in Christ. It is also commonly confessed that God's act in Christ constitutes a universal, cosmic event of renewal. Vernon White's 1991 essay *Atonement and Incarnation: Universality and Particularity* addresses precisely this claim of its universal scope. [4] There are difficulties, however, on the side of faith in articulating an idea of God's salvation for the contemporary needs & goals of society. E. Dussel, a Latin American theologian, writes, "historical, social sin is transmitted by institutions - by cultural, political, economic,

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[2] Quotations are from A.V. Miller's translation, 1977, Oxford University Press, Oxford, and section numbers are given in brackets after the quote.

[3] A. O. Dyson explains why salvation is a volatile concept in theology today. Liberation Theologians, he says, are accused of reducing discussion about salvation to politics. "Freedom in Christian and Contemporary Concepts of Freedom". *Studia Theologica*, vol. 39, no. 1., 1985.

[4] V. White (1991). See Ch. 8 for an ethical discussion of the imperialistic associations of Christianity's claim for universal significance.

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religious, and so on structures." [5]   Sin, says Dussel, is part of the texture of society.   But in what sense?   How do we identify the social character of sin?   We might well agree with Dussel about the social character of sin in the sense that one offence affects the lives of many.   But does this still tie us to a perspective from the individual and meet the challenge of attending to social matters?

What other available options do we have for thinking about salvation socially?   Some of the early 1970s Liberation theologians tried relocating the *ordo salutis* from the individual to 'society', thinking of 'society' as a thing or subject with a history.   They used Marx's idea of the collective subject.   In the *Grundrisse* (G. Groundplan) Marx writes; "It is always a certain social body, a social subject, which is active ... ". [6]   J. Miranda, for instance, uses his ideas of 'the collective labourer' and 'general social knowledge'. [7]   There are big questions here, but I suggest at the outset that we must be very careful about developing an idea of salvation in a social context which enables us to say that a particular group, class, nation, collectively experiences salvation or is guilty.   I need only recall the work of Horkheimer and Adorno on the logic of collective responsibility for sin to be reminded not only of the loss of a sense of common responsibility, but the identification of a people - the Jews - with sin, and its horrendous holocaust consequences. [8]

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[5] E. Dussel (1988) p. 22.

[6] K. Marx *Grundrisse*. Foundations of the Critique of Political economy. Vintage Books, N.Y. 1973, p. 8.

[7] J. Miranda (1978) pp. 42 f.

[8] M. Horkheimer & T. Adorno (1972) *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* Orig. Ed.

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This is to paint in broad strokes the shape of how I shall consider the contention over how to speak about salvation socially - namely, how we are caught in the dualism of talking about 'the social' either in terms of collected individuals or as a single, unified entity. Now I want to introduce how I use Clodovis Boff as a theological resource, and Hegel and Jürgen Habermas as resources from non-Christian socio-philosophy, to establish what is intended as a more adequate way of thinking about salvation in a social context. Concisely, what I propose is an approach to these theological questions through dialogue between Christian and non-Christian social theory in order to relearn what we understand by 'the social'. What I take from Boff are some of the analogical tools developed in his explication of salvation through a reading of Aquinas - the distinction between the content and meaning (L. *res significata* - thing signified) of salvation within Christian theology and different modes of expression (*modus significandi* - mode of signification). This distinction allows contemporary questions about salvation to be worked out through the medium of philosophy or, in my case, socio-philosophy, without identifying Christian faith with socio-philosophy. [9]

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1944.

[9] C. Boff does not clearly distinguish between Aquinas's conception of analogy given in *De Veritate* (q. 2 a. 11) which assumes the relation between God and the world only as an analogy of proportionality (*convenientia proportionalitatis*) and the analogy of attribution (*convenientia proportionis*) found in his later works especially *Summa contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theologica*, 1. (See T. McDermott's translation (1989) pp. 30 - 34). The question surrounds the distance fixed in the analogy. His repudiation of the analogy of proportion leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended and exceeding its signification. *S.T.* pt. 1, quest. 13, art.s 5 - 12.

The intention is to attain a better understanding of the order of God's salvation socially, the ongoing mystery or economy of salvation that is God's continuing work in the world. The manner of procedure involves a formal discussion of the relation between theology and socio-philosophy. The use of Aquinas' distinction is important because it allows me to relate two dimensions in the theological task that constantly intersect, doctrine and dialogue with other disciplines. [10] Clodovis Boff develops this distinction throughout *Theology and Praxis* in terms of what he calls 'first' & 'second' theology. 'First' theology corresponds to the confessional doctrines of God, creation, incarnation etc. 'Second' theology is an outworking of the content of these doctrines through socio-analytical mediation. The former is the heartland from which to derive theoretical understanding of salvation. The latter is the going through socio-analytical mediation to derive contemporary understanding of 'the social'. We must know both what God's salvation is ('first' theology) and know what it is like in terms of human liberation ('second' theology).

The study of this relation is the theme of the thesis. The general intention of the study is to open up a space for dialogue between the two realms of discourse. Most of our problems

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[10] C. Boff quotes *S.T.* 1, quest. 1, a. 2, ad 2 where Aquinas says two kinds of science comprise doctrine, the one being *sacra doctrina* established on principles revealed by God and the other being *pars philosophiae*. (1987) p. 270 n. 46. See also *S.T.* 1 a 4 ad 2: "Sacred Doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each, the same formal aspect (*ratio*)". Other 20th C. retrievals of philosophical analogy to the content of sacred doctrine include D. Burrell's (1973) linguistic and K. Rahner's transcendental work. (1975) pp. 71f.

about their relation stem, I argue, either from too close an identification between the two or too sharp a distinction. Either non-Christian social theory is assumed to be concerned with issues identical to those of Christianity in its identifying of social forms of alienation, with the result that priority is given to action for justice and peace; or else Christian social theory is regarded as concerned only with the Church, allowing little if any contact with non-Christian social theory. This produces an equal and opposite distortion, Christian social theory in which the questions of action for justice and peace are marginal or irrelevant. It leads very quickly to an introverted ecclesiology. I try to counter the dangers either of too close an identification or of an implied separation of the doctrine of salvation and socio-economic and political concerns by reconsidering this relation with reference to the notion of analogy.

It is no easy matter to engage critically with ideas of analogy because generations of theologians have subjected analogical discourse to careful attention. [11] What I hope to do is not to define rules or a strict framework for employing analogy as a device that guarantees a fruitful relation between Christianity and socio-philosophy. Rather, I hope to open up the different elements for debate and to disentangle the elements involved in interdisciplinary practice. I do not intend to put together a logic for analogy in the sense of providing a theory of the parallels operating in the different spheres of Christian and non-Christian social theory. My argument will more properly be understood as an inquiry into how to speak of both God and the world while

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[11] See D. Burrell (1973) for analogical forms of discourse as developed by Classical & Medieval proponents; Plato, Aristotle, John Duns Scotus and Aquinas.

engaging in interdisciplinary practice.

This involves consideration of the question of why salvation is properly an analogical term; how can it be used to speak of God's salvation to say what it is like in socio-economic and political terms? How is it to be distinguished from metaphorical use? [12] In addressing these questions I draw upon the framework for analogy from language that Aquinas offers where it proves helpful. I do not intend to make a study of Aquinas but I do employ the resources from philosophical grammar that he uses to attain a systemic grasp of the notion of analogy. He speaks of putting together different realms of discourse with the intention of perceiving something of God:

> In every true affirmative statement, although the subject and predicate signify
> what is in fact in some way the same thing, they do so from different points
> of view ... while the fact that they are put together affirmatively indicates
> that it is one thing that is being looked at. [13]

Making a statement about God cannot be vaccinated against mistake, he seems to imply, except that its intent to speak of God allows language to signify an affirmative statement by the subject about him. This is what David Burrell calls an "inner word", an interior or spiritual element which both permits and conveys information about God. [14]

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[12] I understand metaphor to mean a figure of speech or descriptive term that is transferred to some object to which it is not immediately applicable.

[13] T. Aquinas S. Th. 1.13.12.

[14] "When Aquinas speaks of the act of understanding as expressing an 'inner word' or 'species', the first analogy borrows from language, the second from vision". D. Burrell (1973) p. 152.

There are two issues here. First, there is the fundamental issue of what kind of logical space and relation between theology and socio-philosophy is to be conceived in this discussion. Second, once this issue has been considered, there are the detailed questions that arise in working towards an account of this logical space and relation with reference to Hegel and Habermas. The former is the background question of the type of relation envisaged and the main issue is between a closed and an open, a static and a dynamic perspective. If the perspective is closed or static, then from the beginning the type of relation is more or less decided. Each realm of discourse is self-contained and little or no point of contact is either necessary or desired. [15] The open or dynamic perspective, by contrast, is a moving, dialogical type of relation. No limits are placed in advance on what might be discovered through interdisciplinary dialogue.

In this study I stress what I have been calling the logical space between Christian and non-Christian social theory because I believe that anything less than a perspective which conceives of their more fundamental relation risks limiting the question of how we might understand God's salvation. So, what kind of space and what kind of relation? The bare outline of an answer might run as follows. The logical space between Christianity and socio-philosophy is not just incidental or occasional but belongs essentially and integrally to the Christian gospel of creation, redemption and ongoing recreation. These are the three primary characteristics of God's relation with the world. And the logical

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[15] Ch. 7 takes up these issues in more detail with reference to the Augustinian notion of the two Kingdoms.

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space that exists for dialogue between Christian and non-Christian social theory is, I suggest, integrally part of the relation between these different dispensations of God's work in the world as Creator, Redeemer and Sustainer.

This is the theological ground for considering the relation between Christian and non-Christian social theory. It may be summarized by saying that some connexion between God and the whole world is essential. This connexion affects our comprehension not only of God and the Church, but also more widely of humankind's social situation and possibilities. It presumes a certain concept of God and views of creation which cannot be considered here as fully as they ought. However, we can say that Christian and non-Christian social theory share a commonality on this basis of a shared relation to the Creator. And it is this relative commonality, implying a relationship of all things to God, which motivates analogical discourse. "Reasonable analogies" are found, Aquinas says, by virtue of the likeness that creation bears to its creator: "This is common to every creature". [16] This is not to say what type of analogy is to be employed. That is a more detailed question to which I shall refer shortly and for which Aquinas used various types of analogy. [17] The nub of the matter, however, is the ontological ground for analogy based on the intrinsic likeness of created effect to cause.

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[16] T. Aquinas x *Quodlibets*, viii. 1. Quotation from T. Gilby (1955) p. 112.

[17] On the types of analogy in St. Thomas see H. Lyttkens (1953) Ch.s IV-VI. This is a useful account of analogy based on attribution and proportion presented in relation to St. Thomas's conception of God and creation.

The idea of logical space between Christian and non-Christian social theory depends on this likeness of effect to cause. As some commentators on Aquinas note, his analogical theology presumes a "metaphysics" of likeness, that is, a theoretical support for the contingency and possibility of God's creation of the world to be ultimately like himself. [18] The basic causal analogy is used accordingly to explain the need and longing for community existence that is expressed, somewhat differently, in Christian and non-Christian social theory. The consequent need for better human relations can be expressed both positively and negatively. Positively it is due to the longing of humankind made in God's image to become like its maker. Negatively it is due to the imperfection and deficiency that increases the distance from the divine prototype. The logical space for dialogue between theology and socio-philosophy thus exists in the potential and the need for the human likeness to its creator to be realized.

The logical space between Christian and non-Christian social theory is therefore not a problematic gap between the different dispensations of the providence of God. Otherwise, the work of God the Redeemer is separated from that of God the Creator, Sustainer and Sanctifier. It is part of the gospel message from the beginning. This seems at first glance just what we should expect from a Christian soteriology, tackling the question of salvation in the modern world in terms of a trinitarian theology. And yet the surprising thing is that the implications of such an approach are so under developed. My perception of the current trend in theological thinking is that we could well be moving

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[18] H. Lyttkens (1953) p. 482.

into an Augustinian phase where the plea is for Christian social theory to be a 'counter-history', 'counter-ethics' and 'counter-ontology'. [19] John Milbank suggests in his recent publication *Theology and Social Theory* that we should adopt an ecclesially centred Christian social theory. Advocating the distinctiveness of Christian social theory he tends to separate, not merely distinguish, the theatre of God's Holy Spirit in the Church from secondary, proximate forms of social relation conducive to community: "What theology has forgotten", he writes, "is that it cannot either contest or learn from this understanding as such, but has either to accept or deny its object.". [20] It is important, he says, to reassert theology as a meta discourse because theology, alone, is a discourse for everyone, supposedly without the dialogue of mastery. [21]

Consider Milbank's statement: "The Church ... should seek to be an *asylum* ... a social space where a different, forgiving and restitutionary practice is pursued". [22] The heart of Christian social theory is ecclesially centred and should concentrate, he says, on its own practice of proper relations. The idea of a logical space between Christian and non-Christian social theory tends to be conceived by him more as a gulf between the redeemed and the unredeemed than as something that is at the heart of the gospel, the different dispensations in the providence of God. Contrast and difference there is indeed. But there can be a contrast only if each of the characteristics of God's relation

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[19] J. Milbank (1990) p. 381.

[20] J. Milbank (1990) p. 10.

[21] J. Milbank (1990) p. 6.

[22] J. Milbank (1990) p. 422.

with the world remain in existence after God's work of salvation in Christ. No talk of salvation is complete without bringing it together with the truth of creation and the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit. [23]

I mention Milbank's work because the overall aim of his project is to challenge the secular reason of Western philosophy, targeting Hegel in particular as offering an heretical and anti-theistic basis for Christian social theory. Hegel's ambitions, he says, "are intimately linked with 'heretical' and 'pagan' currents ... within secular social theory itself". [24] His significant and demanding book attempts to construct an Augustinian basis for Christian social theory *as ecclesiology*, breaking with all dialectical reason that would go through (*dia* Gr. 'through') non-Christian socio-analytic mediation. [25] His work is cited here partly as a justifiable warning against Hegel's quasi-soteriology which appeals to something more basic than the truth of the gospel. It alerts us to the question of the legitimacy of regarding dialogue with Hegel and the whole issue of the nature of Christian social theory and its mediation through socio-philosophy. More than this, it raises significant methodological questions about what is often presented as the narrow choice between a social theory which is ecclesio-centric and that known through principles of practical reasonableness. [26]

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[23] This is one of the central claims of C.E. Gunton's *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology* (1991); "because the theology of the Trinity has so much to teach about the nature of our world and life within it, it is or could be the centre of Christianity's appeal to the unbeliever, as the good news of a God who enters into free relations of creation and redemption with his world". p. 7.

[24] J. Milbank (1990) p. 147.

[25] J. Milbank (1990) pp. 380; 389.

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He makes plain that questions about the propriety and method of dialogue with non-Christian socio-philosophy are consequent upon various understandings of the fruits of God's salvation in Christ for the whole world, the ontological bonding of Christ and the Church with the world. The problem as I see it, is whether the realities of Christian social theory; faith, scripture, the sacraments and the rest, are regarded as within bounds defined by sin. Is Christian social theory to be regarded primarily as about an escape from the realm of sin, or as the realization of God's creative purposes and relation with him? The danger is that when the former is emphasized Christian social theory can easily forget its created oneness, its ontological bond with the world, and so neglect positive aspects within non-Christian socio-philosophy. [27] The question is not a new one. Compare K. Barth's conviction that there can be no philosophical substitute for theology's presenting of the word of God with H.J Paton's stressing in the 1950s that theological truths are inevitably expressed, in part at least, in the language of philosophy. [28] It is, however, an urgent one if we are to practice what P. Nellas calls a discernment of spirits in any dialogue with socio-philosophy from the perspective of trinitarian theology. [29]

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[26] O. O'Donovan described this with regard to ethics as the false polarity between the 'ethics of the kingdom' and 'ethics of creation', the gulf between those advocating a "faith" ethic and those urging a more autonomous rationality. (1986) p. 15.

[27] I take the phrase "ontological bond" from Panayiotis Nellas (1987) who offers an excellent consideration of the relationship between the Church and the World in Part One, 111, pp. 93-102.

[28] "Philosophy cannot go beyond ... the Word of God itself, if it is to be true to its own task, if it is not to become theology". K. Barth's *Ethics* p. 44. Cf. H.J. Paton (1955) pp. 373 f.

It is perhaps helpful to make clear at this early stage that I see some convincing reasons for the strong reaction against post-Enlightenment secular social theory expressed by Milbank. These will be discussed in due course, not least that Hegel makes speculative reason the answer to the alienation between human consciousness and the Christian God as absolute and self-sufficient: "The Good ... the Holy, Creator of Heaven and Earth" (759). Hegel's answer to this alienation is the speculative subsumption of the Christian faith within "Absolute Knowing". Hegel makes Christianity the same as the philosophy of "Absolute Knowing", affirming Christian revelation within speculative reason. W. Jaeschke describes how, at the beginning of his years in Jena, Hegel determined to recover the concept of God more satisfactorily than Kant's notion of the Absolute: "Remoteness in time and space" (764). [30] Hegel's own answers, I suggest, provide an unacceptable basis for Christian social theory, but it is necessary to face the challenges posed by him if theology is not justifiably to be accused of failing to give effective help to the modern world. This means asking: Should Christian social theory reverse Hegel's subsuming of theology within philosophy by reasserting itself as a "meta discourse"? How and when should theology affirm human capacity and responsibility within secular disciplines? [31] Is the only alternative to Hegel's certainty of reason's oneness with God (which Jaeschke calls the Easter of speculation), Milbank's

[29] P. Nellas (1987) p. 103.

[30] W. Jaeschke (1990) pp. 128 - 145.

[31] On the biblical tradition of wisdom as the solid foundation for human rationality in tension with Augustinian concern for the purity of wisdom see D.W. Hardy in G. Wainwright Ed. (1989) Ch. 12 "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology". On the wisdom tradition as the neglected side of biblical faith see W. Brueggemann (1972).

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mistrust of post-Enlightenment secular reason? [32]

It is all too easy to beat a retreat from human rationality *per se*, allowing little or no possibility for conceptualizing a critical framework of dialogue on the frontiers between Christian and non-Christian social theory. However, dialogue with non-Christian theorists is, I suggest, not necessarily to capitulate to methodological atheism and secular answers to the control and regulation of power. Hegel's enterprise is a rational reconstruction of the universal presuppositions of human consciousness and self-reflection. Dialogue with his phenomenological analysis of the experience of consciousness and self-reflection is not, however, to presuppose his unity of logic and history, his assumed Absolute *Spirit* or self-determining dialectic of the human *spirit*, in order to perceive Christian social theory as including God's extra-ecclesial operation. [33]

Instead of the attitude of a division between Christian and non-Christian social theory what I am suggesting is that we build on the premise that, being created, humankind already has some likeness to God. This is the fundamental, background for the type of relation envisaged. The logical space for dialogue between Christian and non-Christian social theory is not a gap

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[32] W. Jaeschke (1990) p. 131 emphasizes Hegel's faithfulness to eliminating this disharmony in the Berlin Lectures, e.g., *L.P.R.* 1 §§ 23 - 38 on the rift between a positivst theology the "so-called [pure] thinking of the Enlightenment". C. Taylor (1975) says Hegel's unifying vision is a "self authenticating dialectic". p. 216.

[33] "Hegel only distinguishes finite from infinite in a highly unchristian fashion, by placing a *certain level* of finite reality totally outside the reach of divine providence." J. Milbank (1990) pp. 159; 380 f.

between creation and redemption but is found in God's continuing work, presence and power in the world. And the type of relation possible between Christian and non-Christian social theory will be deeply influenced by this sense of the different stages in God's dealings with the world. I suggest that Aquinas's distinction between God's gracious activity in the world as operative and cooperative [L. *operans et cooperans*] might be considered in this. [34] In Aquinas's words, we are talking about how analogy as a real likeness between God and creation affects the possibility of obtaining knowledge of God's operation in the world; "the known is in the knower through the likeness". [35] For our purposes, this involves the different kinds of knowledge and relation possible between theology and socio-philosophy given the agendas and presuppositions in both.

The basic idea governing Aquinas's treatment of God's operative grace is that salvation is not human but divine and must relate the whole universe, not just the Church, dynamically to the sole author of created perfection: "Christ's passion is the cause of our salvation ... in that it reconciles us with God". [36] The initiative lies with God who is operative in the world according to the different dispensations of his work. We have here what might be called the basis for an operative relation between socio-philosophy and theology. God is operative in all creation to convey his divine presence and power, suggesting what might be called a first-order relation of human society to

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[34] T. Aquinas *S. Th.* 1-2, 1. 111, a. 2c. See B. Lonergan (1971) Ch. 6, "Actual Grace as Operans et Cooperans". He gives a particularly clear exposition of grace in terms of divine and human connaturality.

[35] T. Aquinas *S. Th.* 1a. lxxxv. 2, *ad* 1

[36] T. Aquinas *S. Th.* 3a. Xlviii. 6, *ad.* 3.

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divine social intent. [37]

In this reference to a first-order relation of human society to divine social intent I have taken a step forward toward the goal of specifying the type of relation possible between theology and socio-philosophy. In a sense, the above has been preparing the way for an answer to the question: How do we conceive the analogy between the creative sociality of God and that of humankind? It is an important question and an approach to an answer, I have said, is grounded in the certitude of God's providence. [38] This is the fundamental presumption of the likeness of the created to the Creator, cause to effect and gives the basis on which analogy is built. Divine presence and power is conveyed through aspects of the created order that evidence his likeness. God is immediately related to the created order, requiring no mediation of his presence. This I call the first-order relation of God in the world. It is the immediate relation of all human society to divine providence.

The first-order relation is easy to grasp because its basic affirmation is the unity of the different dispensations of God's activity in the world within the certainty of divine providence.

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[37] God's gracious relation with the world is cooperative also inasmuch as the human will is both passive and active and can work together with him: "God works in every nature and purpose; all the same, we can think of ourselves as acting by our own powers and abilities". T. Aquinas *S. Th.* 1a-2ae. lxviii, 2, *ad* 1. Every person endowed with the ability to live cooperatively with God becomes his worker or *"familiar"*. *Ibid.* 1a-2ae. lxiii. 3, 4.

[38] On Aquinas's notion of providence as enabling his use of Aristotelian philosophy whenever compatible with Christian doctrine, see See B. Longeran (1971) pp. 76-84.

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Any progress, however, toward more detailed understanding of the analogy between the Creator and the created would seem to require exposition of the implicit distinction between a first and a second-order relation. The latter involves the detailed questions that arise in working towards an account of the relation between Christian and non-Christian social theory, and which I hope to consider with reference to Hegel and Habermas. The matter is not easy. What is the manner of this relation? What types of analogy are to be employed?

Let us approach the problem by getting hold of a distinction that helps us to be aware of the role of analogy in theology generally. I refer to the general distinction between analogical discourse as either an art or a science. This distinction is vague, but it indicates the two basic ways that analogy is commonly employed to speak of the relation between God and the world. On the one hand, analogy is perceived as belonging to the realm of artistic discourse with its fields of simile and metaphor. [39] On the other hand, analogy can be conceived as a schematic type of order which specifies degrees of proportionality. The passages where Aquinas sets forth his ideas of analogy frequently use the word *proportio*, in the sense of a definite, specifiable relation between God and creation. [40]

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[39] On the history of this debate from Cajetan to C.S. Lewis see R. McInerny (1968) Ch. II. Note that Aquinas opposes metaphor to analogy because the former involves a reduction of what is signified to the sense of the word in question:

"The metaphorical sense is contained in the literal sense, for words bear imaginative suggestions as well as their plain and proximate sense".

*S. Th.* 1a. i. 10, *ad* 3.

[40] *De Veritate* 23. 7 *ad* 9; 23. 1. *ad* 1; *S. Th.* 1a 14. 1 *ad* 3. On this see H. Lyttkens (1953) pp. 436 f. Also D. Burrell (1973) Ch. 10.

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Theology should resort to all the sciences, since they are its familiars, and its precursors in time though its followers in dignity. [41]

Aquinas looks for some kind of logic by which to order theological discourse about God. He does not identify theology as a science because the former deals with matters of faith which are not seen. [42] Nevertheless, he attends to formal likenesses in respect of the properties appertaining to God and creation.

There is no need to illustrate this distinction between different types of analogy except to say that the temptation to divide analogical discourse into either an idiosyncratic affair or a technical discourse governed by a body of rules is not easy to resist. David Burrell is one writer who has sought to recognise and to resolve this difficulty through a linguistic mediation of the different types of analogy: "That capacity (for language to reach beyond logic) is shared by poets, scientists, some philosophers, and nearly all ordinary men". [43] He considers the context, grammar and 'similarity-in-dissimilarity' features of language to expose a range of analogical uses. [44] Reference to Burrell is a reminder that there simply cannot be a complete consensus on how analogical discourse should be. Hence the need to opt for a particular approach to analogical mediation of the supernatural character of Christian faith with knowledge in other fields. I opt for a socio-philosophic mediation of the

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[41] T. Aquinas, Exposition, de Trinitate, ii. 3, ad 7. Quotation from T. Gilby (1953) p. 29.

[42] Ibid. p. 28.

[43] D. Burrell (1973) p. 242.

[44] "My strategy has been to expose the attitudes and convictions embedded in our ordinary usage, including the uncanny sense for similarity-in-dissimilarity we display in our frequent recourse to metaphor". Ibid. p. 243.

imperceptible operations of God in human society and the following indicates how I intend to proceed.

As an exercise in 'second' theology this thesis aims to allow Hegel and Habermas to become dialogue partners in considering the themes of Identity, Alienation and Community. Each theme represents interrelated areas of human experience in its deepest dimensions and which pervade both Hegel and much contemporary social theory. As I show in reflections on several of Hegel's major interpreters, these have been central and foundational notions for him and modern day thought. The thesis broadly follows the journey in the *Phenomenology* from the earliest shapes of consciousness and self-consciousness to the self-manifestation of Absolute Knowing. Tracing Hegel's journey does not mean that I find in the *Phenomenology* the potential for expressing a Christian understanding of the themes, much less that I intend to reargue his position. It does mean that I find aspects of Hegel's description of the inner dynamics of consciousness and the search for community to be surprisingly pertinent to the contemporary struggle with the crucial problem of a better understanding of God's salvation in a social context.

This must be explained more precisely. The very word analogy suggests something beyond logic (*ano* Gr., beyond or higher). The immediate sense is that human logic is not enough to speak of God's salvation. Analogical theology is thus meant to allow the development of new ways of perceiving and conveying God's presence and power. It opens human discourse up to the metaphysical sphere, referring us beyond socio-philosophy.

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God's salvation mobilizes the process. This is why I have referred to Clodovis Boff's notion of 'first' theology as the heartland from which to derive theoretical understanding of salvation, and spoken of the first-order or immediate relation of human society to divine social intent. 'First' theology must, however, have a readily understandable human content if it is to do the work proposed for it. Hence, the object of this study to consider a socio-philosophic mediation of soteriology. This is the second-order discussion of the form of various theories of analogy, what Boff calls 'second' theology.

'Second' theology, or a second-order discussion of the forms of theories of analogy, must be practical and analytically critical on the level of a textual reading of Hegel and his interpreters. A first-order discussion of theological discourse about salvation is not sufficient for analogy. Specific dialogue with particular philosophers and theorists is the essential constitution of constructive analogy. It is to preserve its integrity. In this study I do not attempt a systematic account of the relationship between theology and socio-philosophy but I do attend to the attitudes and consider the 'moves' or actions that are involved in what is primarily a dialogical and an interpretative process. I do not intend to define rules or a strict framework for debate but to consider certain attitudes that might be called 'moves' or actions and which enable the dynamics of interdisciplinary discourse required.

Four moments or stages can be identified. The first is the attitude of openness or willingness to engage in dialogue. It

requires an act of commitment towards the dialogical partner together with the charitable supposition that there is something to be received from the debate. Given that an initial openness provides *prima facie* reasons for debate, [45] there follows a second stage which is the task of investigation. This is the work of identifying the crux issues, noting where problems arise and enabling a tracing of their history and causes. The issue which determines this study is that of why and how Christian theology must speak more adequately of salvation in a social context and I address it in the light of difficulties remaining since Hegel's representation of early nineteenth century idealist German philosophy.

Hegel functions in the study to represent a certain lineage of discussion. He is the progenitor of a particular kind of discussion who provides a backdrop for, and focuses discussion on, the themes of Identity, Alienation and Community. The fact that Hegel puts his finger on important post-Enlightenment questions about identity, alienation and community can readily be seen. Since 1970, several social theorists have taken Hegel as a major philosophical figure. [46] Gillian Rose's 1971 *Hegel Contra Sociology* reclaims Hegelian speculative philosophy, aiming to retrieve his 'eschatological' reading of the present as a critical, rational tool. [47] Charles Taylor's 1979 reconstruction

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[45]    D. W. Hardy in Geoffrey Wainwright, Ed. (1989), pp. 274f

[46] By Enlightenment understand the atmosphere of devotion to freedom and scientific knowledge predominant amongst philosophies after the early to mid 1700s. See P. Gay (1970b) Bk. 3, Ch. 1, §. 3 where Enlightenment is defined in terms of reason, humanitarianism and industry. On Hegel's failure to recognize these as elements comprising 'the Enlightenment' see R.C. Solomon (1983) pp. 552 - 559.

of the social design of Hegel's philosophy is a notable treatment of Hegel's development of modern notions of the individual by relating individual subjectivity to the individual's life as a social being. [48] His 1989 *Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity* indicates the continuing need for studies in the meaning of identity left to us from philosophical constructs in the post-Reformation period. [49] Allen W. Wood's 1991 *Hegel's Ethical Thought* is an indication of a revival in analytical Hegelian ethics. Wood strips Hegel's ethical writings of their speculative content to what they say of a universal, objective standard for assessing social relations. [50] Hegelian social theory is ignored to our loss and peril. His science of consciousness forms the backdrop for much contemporary debate about self-actualization, freedom and mutual recognition in a rational social order.

The first and second 'moves' or stages in the analogical task of theology developed in this study are thus an attitude of openness to debate and the task of investigation. In pursuing

[47] Gillian Rose (1971) pp. 3 - 6 and 136 f. for her reaction to Hegel's attributing speculative authority to reason.

[48] C. Taylor (1979) pp. 127-30 thinks Hegel to provide essential insight regarding the development of modern society by posing problems inherent in the individual's drive for freedom independent of community. On this see also R. Plant (1973) pp. 144 f.

[49] C. Taylor (1989) esp. pp. 495 - 502 traces the emergence of a modern sense of identity in the three loosely termed domains of theism, scientism and romanticism, including reference to the Hegelian notion of 'the spirit' of human intuition (p. 520)

[50] Allen W. Wood (1991) "Speculative logic is dead; but Hegel's thought is not" pp. 4 - 6. On the tendency in Hegel's vision to smother the individual see pp. 256 - 60.

this task I accept the perspectives that Hegel sets in these concerns. My concern is with the Hegel who is alive today not merely the residual Hegel in the texts alone. This leads to the third 'move' or stage in the analogical task of theology which is that of making specific points of contact between Christian and non-Christian social theory. The important point here is to recognise that the debate must become specific. If theology is to be a partner in the ongoing debates about Identity, Alienation and Community it must recognise the plurality that exists amongst the interpreters who bring the issues that Hegel raised to prominence, and respond to it with specific reference to particular figures. It seems to me that an honest recognition of this plurality is only possible within the confines of a single study by a concentration on selected figures from amongst Hegel's many interpreters. Hence Jürgen Habermas is taken as one, and possibly the best, example of a contemporary social theorist who perceives the need for a radical reconsideration of the aforesaid themes as they have been influenced by Hegel. Society is not, he believes, a pure Idea. It is not a static thing or object but is about living socially through better coordination of the activity of communication. Language is available to everyone, he says, proposing a predominantly linguistically mediated theory of communicative action.; "it is a universal", the theory of communicative action being a deliberate attack on the 'I' - 'We' framework of much Hegelian influenced socio-philosophy. [51]

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[51] J. Habermas (1987b) p. 397. For Habermas's summary of Hegel's cognitive and idealist philosophy of subjectivity in relation to his own project see pp. 374-403, "The Tasks of a Critical Theory".

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This question of the 'I - We' framework of Hegel's social theory refers to a dualism rooted in Hegel's subject - object framework of philosophy. It refers to the dualism which, I maintain, is the main hazard of the salvation in a social context debate, the dualism between talking of salvation either in terms of the individual response of faith to God's act in Christ or as an impersonal, interchange between God and society as a single, static entity. [52] Habermas's is a well-established voice within an explicitly Hegelian influenced tradition which analyzes and rejects Hegel's 'I - We' framework for debate. I hope to reflect on the valuable conclusions of his work and incorporate some into an analogical exercise in Christian theology. In so doing, I work with the idea of 'parable' as a bringing together of discourse about God and human society. From the Greek *parabole,* meaning to place beside or to make a comparison, my intention is to bring together theological discussion of the ramifications of Hegel's 'I - We' framework for debate with Habermas's treatment of the major issues of Identity, Alienation and Community.

But there is also a fourth stage in the analogical task of theology which is particularly important in grasping the conceptual relation between Christian and non-Christian social theory. This is the restoring of non-Christian social theory to its own agenda, as it were giving it back to its particular concerns as distinct from the motive force in any theological study. If theology is to be a partner in contemporary debate about Identity, Alienation and Community it must listen to and

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[52] I am reminded of Edna McDonagh's raising of these questions with a commendable clarity (1989) esp. Ch. 1 "The Gracing of Society".

be able to be heard by those otherwise involved in its substantive questions. It must do this, however, without losing its specifically Christian hope of salvation which finds true identity and community within a fully Trinitarian theology. The fourth moment in the analogical task of theology must therefore be a renewed distinguishing of the separate agendas which determine Christian and non-Christian social theory.

These four 'moves' or stages in the analogical task provide a working agenda for the opening up of logical space between the two realms of discourse and a pursuing their relation. By engaging in dialogue with Hegel and Habermas I am not suggesting that salvation has more to do with human relation and community than communion with God. That would suggest a horizontal notion of salvation purely in social terms. [53] I am suggesting that because sociality and relation are at the heart of the gospel, because God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit is communication and relation *par excellence*, because of the interrelation of the different dispensations of God's work in the world, and because of the human vocation to become like God, it is well for us to dialogue with those for whom the overcoming of alienation and community are pivotal for how we understand human experience.

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[53] An example of current emphasis on salvation and the social with broader theological focus than the so-called "Social Gospel" of 1920s is Paul Fiddes (1989).

> Salvation must be a healing of our will ...But, ... there is also something more corporate about sin. ... We must then try to understand the cross as having some effect upon the whole structure of human life and society. p. 152.

He draws on Abelard's primarily subjective understanding of the transforming energy of the cross, opening it out to include an objective focus. p. 141.

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Before commencing, some indication should be given of the German texts and English translations used in my reading of Hegel. A. V. Miller's translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, made from the fifth edition (F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1952) edited by J. Hoffmeister and corresponding to *Gesammelte Werke* 9 is the text usually cited by paragraph number. This translation is preferred to that of J. B. Baillie, the main reason being his preferred use of the term *Spirit* rather than *Mind* to translate *Geist*. An advantage of the translation *Mind* rather than *Spirit* is that it emphasizes point of contact with the exposition of consciousness in the *Berlin Phenomenology* developed from the Jena and pre-Jena writings. I adopt Miller's translation as *Spirit,* however, because it captures something of Hegel's employment of quasi-theological imagery whilst allowing an ambiguity to remain concerning its reference to the human 'spirit' as a basic reality. *Spirit,* says Hegel, is the experience of relation between individuals;

> the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in
> their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We'
> and 'We' that is 'I' (177).

It is this social character and concern of the *Phenomenology* that I wish to emphasize. [54]

I have also referred to Walter Kaufmann's translation of the Preface and H. P. Kainz's wording of occasional passages. [55]

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[54] For Hegel's *Geist* as vehicle for nothing greater than the human spirit see J.E. Grumley (1989) pp. 22 f. Also R. C. Solomon (1983) pp. 5 - 7; 579; 631-4. Like Solomon, I say that Hegel was a precursor of atheistic humanism (p. 582), a post-Christian, subsuming the ethical insight of Christianity into philosophy.

When the German text is quoted, reference is made to *G.W.F. Hegel. Werke in Zwanzig Bänden* 3, *Phänomenologie des Geistes.* Occasionally I have referred to *Sämmtliche Werke, Band V, Phänomenologie Des Geistes,* which is the translation made after the original edition by Johannes Hoffmeister. The most useful glossaries of German words used in the text and translated into ordinary English are found in R.C. Solomon's *In the Spirit of Hegel* and C. Taylor's 1975 publication, *Hegel.* [56]

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[55] W. Kaufmann (1965) Ch. VIII: The Preface to the *Phenomenology:* Translation with Commentary. H. P. Kainz (1976).

[56] R.C. Solomon (1983) pp. 273-286. C. Taylor (1975) pp. xi-xii.

## 1. A. *THE HUMAN NEED FOR IDENTITY*

Questions of individual identity are important to the way people live. A sense of identity arising from the unity and persistence of personality is a requirement for sharing, participation, togetherness etc. The human need for identity is seen in various ways. Pastorally, the individual's need for identity is a factor inherent in the care and support of those who are depressed or in rebellion against the demands of relationships in society. Ethically, the individual's search for appropriate practical expression of identity as a Christian requires its working out in the light of given experience and situations. Doctrinally, we need a better understanding of how the theological notion of humanity made in God's image and likeness contextualizes that of the human need for identity. [1] The subject becomes even more problematic when we attempt to articulate not only individual but social and general human concepts of identity.

A. L. McFadyen points out in his 1990 *The Call to Personhood*, that questions of individual and corporate identity cannot be taken for granted. "Who am I?" "Who are we?" are typically human queries in our Western individualistic and yet standardized society, suggesting that there is a deep human need for identity and for theological contribution to contemporary

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[1] V. Lossky argues that the idea of personality is a Christian contribution to identity philosophy: "The Theological Notion of the Human Person", V. Lossky (1974), Ch. 6. See also G. C. Berkouwer (1962) for questions of the image of God in humankind after the fall. Ch. 2.

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debate. [2] McFadyen tackles the typically modern Western version of the human quest: "What is individual identity, and where does it come from?" within the theological setting of creation in the image of God and the call of Christ, presenting positively Biblical ideas of God's image and personal identity as relational. This is all the more important because increasingly today the postmodern challenge (in so far as it can be defined as a broad intellectual movement rather than a style or method [3]) offers an extreme emphasis on the difference of all existing things and the need to talk of relation. Jürgen Habermas speaks of extreme fragmentation and a resulting 'unsurveyablility' (*Un-übersichtlichkeit*) in what he calls the 'postmodern' attitude of heterodoxy. [4]

Against this background, the timeliness of any theological contribution to a discussion of individual identity requires adaptability to the contemporary context. We must, however, "begin *wherever we are* ..." [5] 'Where we are' - the contemporary context for debate - is clearly still influenced by Hegel's formative status in modern ideas of identity. This can only be appreciated, however, by realizing the pervasive and

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[2] A. I. McFadyen (1990) p. 1.

[3] The idea of 'Postmodernity' resists close definition. R. Bernstein describes it as "anti-foundational philosophy." in Habermas (1986). Stanley Aronowitz links it to the deconstruction of the myths of modernity, notably the ideal of a qualitatively better life. (1988) p. 46. F. Jameson says its most decisive insight is: "the bourgeois individual subject is a thing of the past, it is also a myth: it never really existed in the first place" (1985) pp. 111-126.

[4] P. Feyerabend (1987) quotes Habermas's *Eine Neue Unübersichtlichkeit* p. 1.

[5] M.C. Taylor (1984) p. 3.

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profound influence that Hegel continues to exercise on much contemporary social theory. For this reason Habermas's interpretation of Hegel is important in our study. He identifies an increasingly decentred, fragmented picture of the human condition that is plausible particularly within the Hegelian tradition. [6] The fragmentation he describes takes different forms. For instance, he distinguishes the philosophical decentred subjectivity of the French *antimodernists*, associated with Bataille via Foucault to Derrida, from the administrative separation of culture and society associated with those he calls the Neoconservative *postmodernists*, notably, the early Wittgenstein. [7] I would call your attention in particular to one disturbing thrust of Habermas's comments about identity in society. Talk about society, he says, seems to be exhausted. Politically left-wing ideologies have failed, only to be replaced by a lack of social identification. [8] By appealing to critiques of so-called "modernism" in art, he speaks of a disillusionment with the failures of the Enlightenment project for the enrichment of social life. Hence, he finds it ever more difficult to speak of individual identity and societal integration: "If I am not mistaken", he says,the chances for this today are not very good". [9]

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[6] Habermas says this himself in *Hegel's Social and Political Thought* Ed. D.P. Verene (1980)p. 247.

[7] J. Habermas "Modernity versus Postmodernity" in *New German Critique* No. 22, Winter 1981, pp. 3 - 13.

[8] J. Habermas (1989) Ch. 1 "Neoconservative Cultural Criticism in the United States and West Germany" pp. 22 - 47.

[9] J. Habermas *ibid.* p. 11.

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The need for better understanding of the history and development of this sense of fragmentation alongside the increasingly intense human quest for identity is clear. And Hegel's place in this story is an important one. Habermas's comments upon the pathological deformations of collective and individual identity leave any discussion about salvation in a social context with unfavorable prospects of success. Yet, this is our context for our discussion in the so-called 'postmodern' situation and it must be faced realistically if interdisciplinary practice is to be possible. The intention in this Chapter is to show that questions raised by Hegel about conceptual issues in conceiving of individual identity link us firmly into contemporary debate about restrictively subjective conditions for identity, relation and our understanding of God.

## 1. B. *HEGEL'S NOTION OF IDENTITY*

For the purpose of 'scene setting' it should be observed that it was under the influence of René Descartes (1596-1650) that issues of identity became central to philosophy via questions of self-knowledge. An individualist in terms of the sources of knowledge being the intuition and deductive reasoning of the 'thinking I', Descartes built structures of knowledge on assumptions about the intuitive and inductive operations of the mind. [10] (By intuition he means the immediate self evidence

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[10] R. Descartes, in J. Cottingham, transl. (1986), Second Meditation, p. 18. "Discourse on Method" in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch, Transls. (1985), Vol. 1, pp.112-131. Also, "Principles of Philosophy", p.193f. Bertrand Russell (1947) writes: "Having secured a firm foundation (*cogito ergo sum*), Descartes sets to work to rebuild the edifice for knowledge".p. 587.

with which a truth forces itself upon us,.deduction then being the the analyzing of the axiomatic principles of knowledge, the certainty of which cannot be doubted. [11]) Hume (1711 - 1776) challenged the idea that we can attain justification of individual identity simply by taking 'I think' as a standard, albeit retaining some basic elements in Descartes' concept of the 'I'. [12] In the main, however, he attacked Descartes' inability to provide universal criteria for knowledge of the self by inference from the ideas present to the mind. [13]

It should also be born in mind that at the time of writing the *Phenomenology*, the term *Identität* was commonly invoked in the context of G.W. Leibniz' assertion that the identity of a thing is contained in its 'substantial' or existing unity. This theory, known as the identity of indiscernibles, allowed Leibniz (1647-1716) to argue the genuine, intrinsic identity of a thing as a subject of predication. Leibniz extended Thomist arguments about individual things being known by reference to their nature or essence, deducting and interpreting the predicable identity of a thing. [14] It is clear from his 1801 essay *The Difference*

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[11] R. Descartes , in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch, Transls. (1985), Vol. 1, p. 14-5; 33.

[12] Jonathan Bennet (1971) notes parallels between Hume and Descartes concerning knowledge of identity through both intuition and demonstration. p. 249. He drawn on Hume, *T. H. N.*, Vol. 1, Part 1, sect. 1, p.16; Vol. 1, Part 11, sect. VI, p. 71; *Ethics*, 12, I, 116, p.149.

[13] See *T.H.N.* "Of the Origin of our Ideas" C, part. 1, sect. 1; Vol. 1, Part 11, sect. VI, p. 71; Vol. I, Part III, sect. VI, p. 89; *Ethics*, 12, I, 116, p. 149. *A Treatise of Human Nature* deals particularly with identity and the contents of the mind as both impressions and ideas; "Of the Origin of our Ideas", C, part. 1, sect. 1.

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*between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy* that Hegel is critical of what remained of Leibniz' notion of identity as the logically discernible form and quality of a thing in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. [15] As I shall show, he joins Kant in condemning the difference between the identity of a thing and its intelligence as merely logical, dealing most plainly with the problem of the identity of "the Thing" in §§ 111 - 131 on Perception. [16]

This is but a brief introduction to the complex background of Hegel's charge against his contemporaries that they had a restricted notion of individual identity. The modern problem for Hegel was an excessive emphasis on identity as sameness. He warns against an inherently non-relational view of the self. At the beginning of the Preface he says that to become human is to actualize our social and rational nature, to become aware of the self not only as merely private and personal but as relational and 'objective'; to some extent mutually involved with others;

[14] See Leibniz' *Discourse on Metaphysics*, GP. IV. 436, p. 22 for summary of how two objects can be identitical in all respects and yet differ numerically. F. Copleston, S.J., Vol. IV, Ch. XVII "Simple Substances or Monads" pp. 295 - 301.

[15] G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel: The Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian System of Philosophy*, Transl. J.P. Surber, Ridgeview Publishing Co., California, 1978. Hereafter abbreviated as the *Difference* essay.

[16] I. Kant *C.P.R.* A 44 / B 62 f; B 292 - 294; A 263 / B 320 F. On Leibniz and Kant's notion of the unitary ego see R.C. Solomon (1983) pp. 67 - 79. Also B. Aune (1985) who links Leibniz' identity of a thing as substance to problems of personal identity in J. Locke and R. Descartes. pp. 82 - 99. On the tension between perception and reason; the passive receptivity of sensory impressions and their active, rational ordering, with reference to Descartes, Locke and Hume, see C.E. Gunton (1985) Pt. 1, Ch. 1.

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"mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole" (2). Later, he urges: "The single individual is incomplete Spirit ... the others being present only in blurred outline" (28). Identity awaits full awareness in conscious social relations, "a truth ripened to its properly matured form so as to be capable of being the property of all self-conscious Reason" (70). It is not in the sameness of the epistemologically centred 'I' that identity is found, but through relationship: "Only this self-*restoring* sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself - not an *original* or *immediate* unity as such - is the True" (18).

There is an intensity in Hegel's conviction that Kant, in particular, sets the wrong boundary conditions for speaking of individual identity. "Just to talk", Hegel says, "of the *unity* of subject and object ... is inept, since object and subject, etc. signify what they are *outside* of their unity" (39). Identity consists in more than the externally perceivable conditions for rational deduction. Kant and Fichte are caught, he suggests, in the divide between the empirically observable, substantial unity of the self and the concept of the transcendental 'I'. The merely external perception of identity can only ever be partial; a "lifeless Understanding and external cognition" (51). [17] This understanding of identity suffers from its impermanence and superficiality. Hence, Kant is said to have a restricted and "unsocial" notion of identity. [18]

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[17] See the *Difference* essay pp. 15 f. for obvious reference to the Kantian table of judgements and its restricting identity philosophy to a limited number of thought functions: reflection, speculation, transcendental intuition and absolute reason.

[18] The word 'unsocial' is used by J. Habermas with reference to Hegel's opening

The situation is rather more subtle than interpretation of Hegel easily allows. Insofar as the Preface and Introduction are set against the background of a post-Cartesian and post-Kantian context, the first sense of identity [*Identität*] for Hegel is the being able to distinguish one being from another by the control of one's perceptions. Identity is a momentary totality of thought determination under Kantian conditions:

> They speak of the existence of *external* objects, which can be more
> precisely defined as *actual,* absolutely *singular, wholly personal,*
> *individual* things, each of them absolutely unlike anything else; this existence,
> they say, has absolute certainty and truth" (110).

This momentary totality of thought is the certainty of individual identity over against all that is different from it. It has an apparent "absolute certainty and truth" (110). Hegel's general intention is toward a more comprehensive certainty in which the movement of logical thought presents a progression from identity through difference to relation and unity.

This is evidenced in his primary use of the concept of identity as a logical principle throughout the *Phenomenology* and can be illustrated statistically in the words used to convey different senses of the concept of *identity - Identität, Gleichheit* and *Persönlichkeit.* *Identität,* meaning that which can be identified by the conditions required in the activity of representing or naming the existence of a thing, occurs six times, twice in the

out of Kant's philosophy of identity to include a particular form of social relation:

> The *Phenomenology of Mind* attempts this reconstruction ... through the
> socialization process of the individual, through the universal history of

mankind" (1979) p. 19.

Preface and four times in "The Revealed Religion" (748-787). *Gleichheit*, meaning sameness or that which has identity with another thing in parity, occurs fifty eight times throughout the text. *Persönlichkeit*, meaning personality, occurs twenty-seven times, including five times in the sections on *Spirit* and legal status (477-483) and nine times in the sections on Culture and actuality (488-526). *Einzelheit* denotes individuality as one element in Hegel's triadically structured manifestation of individuality. and occurs two hundred and six times.

The *Phenomenology* is not a logic, at least in the systematized sense of the *Logic* of 1812 which, according to the Preface to the first edition, is a developed form or "expanded arrangement" of the content of logic there. [19] Nonetheless, I take logic as my point of departure in order to understand how a concept like *identity* functions in Hegel's science of consciousness *vis-á-vis* his Kantian context. Logic is always a *prius* in Hegelian theoretical inquiry and *identity* is first a logical category of pure thought. G.R.G. Mure writes: "It is a pure thought with no necessary reference to sense." [20] This is not to underplay the significance of Hegel's contact with the early Romantics e.g., F. Schlegel, Tieck and Novalis who also helped form his concept of identity. [21] The 1801 essay *The Difference*

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[19] *S.L.* "Preface to the First Edition" pp. 25-29. In support of this see, J.N. Findlay (1958) "The Logic may be said, ... to carry out in the medium of pure thought what the Phenomenology carried out in the medium of individual experience. (p.150). H.G. Gadamer (1976) "The Phenomenology of Spirit is a kind of anticipation of what was to come ..." (p. 75). Also, A. Sarlemijn (1975).

[20] G.R.G. Mure (1940) p. 112.

[21] Consider, for example, the early Schelling's attempt to supersede Fichte's duality between the identity of the empirical self (ego) and the non-ego in the

*between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy* also shares some of the idealist leaning of Schelling and the Romantics, like whom he sees philosophy as expanding the questions about identity into the infinite. [22] To the contrary, the metaphor of a circle and circular movement is commonly employed after some of the earlier Romantics with a Neo-Platonic influence, depicting identity in terms of a departure from a primal unity, subdivided and reconvergent. (§§ 32; 50; 802) [23] We should be aware, however, that the *Phenomenology* is Hegel's "exposition" [*Auslegung*] (10) of the developing character of pure thought *vis-à-vis* Kantian subjectivity. [24]

The significance of this in Hegelian terms is partly explained by the fact that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is largely a response to both the Cartesian principle of private consciousness and Hume's refusal to speak of the unity of personal identity. [25] Immediately prior to Kant, epistemological theory

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*Erster Entwurf eines System der Naturphilosophie* (1799) and *System des Tranzendentalen Idealismus* (1800).

[22] The *Difference* Essay p. 108.

[23] On Hegel's sharing idealist leanings of Schelling and the Romantics, M.H. Abrams (1971) "The Great Circle: Pagan and Christian Neo-Platonism" pp. 146-172.

[24] D.M. Schlitt (1990) finds logic to be the main content of absolute philosophy for Hegel because the latter defines *spirit* in terms of thought: "Thought was its own content, hence logic was absolute form" p. 136.

[25] See Kant, *C.P.R.*, B5 on Hume's "repeated association with .. custom" as inadequate for deriving notions of the self and that which comprises subjective necessity; B20 on Hume's claim to have shown *a priori* propositions impossible; B793 on Hume's not distinguishing pure understanding from pure reason; B794 on what Kant sees as his errors in failing to allow for a transcendental logic. Cf.

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was caught in the dilemma of self-knowledge resting either on logical inference drawn from the spontaneous act of thought or, as Hume contends, on the possibility of knowledge of the self deriving from observation deduced from sense experience and ideas. [26] To be fair to Kant, we must recognize his dilemma. He was faced, on the one hand, with Hume's emphasizing of the 'I' as a passive receiver of external events and, on the other, with remnants of Descartes' idea that the *ego* is more than a complex of ideas or successive mental states. It is important to recognize the deficiencies that he sees in Descartes and Hume's philosophy of self-understanding and personal identity. [27] Nevertheless, there is considerable force in Hegel's argument against Kant that fixed, transcendentally derived limits of consciousness are insufficient to attain knowledge of identity: "For what is lifeless, since it does not move of itself, does not get as far as the distinctions of essence ..." (45) [28] Hegel argues against Kant's transcendentally fixed limits of consciousness, affirming that the *experience* of conscious identity must learn to judge itself for what it is: a "*dialectical*

Hume, *Treatise*, Vol. 1, Part 1V, sect. VI, p.239.

[26] The dilemma was made acute by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), a disciple of Descartes, who claimed that empirical experience and that beyond the empirical could be solved within a complete and rational system of philosophy.

[27] See Kant, *C.P.R.*, A760/B788 - A769/ B797; A764/B792. Also, H.J. Paton (1936) pp. 138-140; 372-377. Also, D. R. Cousin, "Kant on the Self", *Kant Studien*, Band 49, 1957/1958, pp. 25-35.

[28] The phrase "the distinction of essence" [*Wesen*] has a history of interpretation that we cannot consider here. See E. Husserl (1983) pp. 55-7 for his Hegelian influenced notion of the of being in its physical, value and thought related manifestations. Also Heidegger (1969) pp. 61 - 73 for his sense of '*Wesen*' as that which is intuited in thought.

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movement ... called *experience* [*Erfahrung*]" (86). [29] He rejects Kant's 'fixed' notion of identity.

## 1. C. *THE QUESTION OF HEGEL'S INFLUENCE*

Reference to Kant's conception of the experience of 'I'-ness illustrates the difficulty in entering imaginatively into the background for Hegel's ideas of identity. A deep cultural abyss exists between ourselves and his historical and philosophical context which prohibits direct translation of what he understood by the word identity [*Identität*]. It is only reference to the background provided by the figures of Descartes, Hume and Kant which opens up the real issues of how individual identity is to be understood. Hegel accuses his predecessors of constraining individual identity within an undifferentiated notion of sameness: "Usually, the Subject is first made the basis, as the *objective*, fixed self" (60).

Needless to say, interpretations vary as to what Hegel means by opposing the simplicity and 'fixity' of consciousness with his demonstration of consciousness as a supposedly non-fixed, living and developing programme. Compare A. Kojève, for whom Hegelian consciousness was irreducibly personal with C. Taylor's discussion of what can be known supra-personally of the basic

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[29] For an accessible description of the task of the *Phenomenology* as a response to Kant's views on cognition, see Werner Marx (1975). Marx is convinced that the 'idea' and significance of the *Phenomenology* lies in its principle of self-consciousness (p.98). Ivan Soll's *An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics* (1969), also largely approaches Hegel in terms of his critique of Kantian epistemology.

data of experience. Kojève stresses distinctions of consciousness within the self, extending what is known by the human individual to what is universally and eternally known. [30] C. Taylor, by contrast, emphasizes that the 'I' is as much universal as particular, implying a distinction between Hegel's treatment of the identity of the individual 'I', and the 'I' understood as humanity generally as an indefinite number of 'I's. C. Taylor stresses that the science of consciousness for Hegel is not all personal or subjective because it always has practical, social implications; "there is no level of experience that can be thought of, even as an abstraction, as pure receptivity". Rather, the shared experience of engagement in relation gives unity to the universal: "It was the absence of this notion in Kant's conception of experience that made it inevitable that he present causality as necessary succession according to a rule". [31]

The very diversity of Hegel interpretation presents a problem but that is not the key issue here. Of itself, the tension between Kojève's emphasis on the irreducibly personal nature of Hegel's treatment of the moments of consciousness and C. Taylor's stressing the wider social implications is not a problem, but is part of the 'I-We' dualism that is a much larger issue than Hegel interpretation. The character of modern socio-philosophy is deeply shaped by it and I try to give due consideration to at least one

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[30] A. Kojève (1969) locates the question of identity in the individual who experiences it; "to give a correct and complete answer to the Cartesian question, "What am I". pp. 33 - 35; 261 f.. C. Taylor reads the *Phenomenology* as a transcendental argument about the universal characteristics of experience. In A. MacIntyre, ed. (1972) Ch. VI pp. 182 - 187.

[31] C. Taylor, *ibid.* p. 186.

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line of its development through Hegel interpretation in the Chapters that follow. The decision to raise the issue early in the thesis is a deliberate one, for I think that it has played an important role in modern discussion both of Hegel and, more widely, of socio-philosophy in general. I do not think that it is primarily a question about Hegel for the very reason that it entails questions that range more widely than his work, as the contemporary debate shows. But that is not to say that the interpretative question of Hegel is an empty one. It opens up a space between the socio-philosophy and the Christian faith. Putting a space between the two does not by any means reduce the Christian message of salvation. Both are allowed to stand on their own terms with their own proper authority. It is in the relation between the two that the need for analogical theology is found.

## 1. D. *HEGEL'S NOTION OF IDENTITY AND GOD*

So what is to be said? How is the analogical task to proceed? What does analogy require? On the basis of Aquinas's distinction between the semantic content; meaning (L. *res significata* - thing signified) of salvation within Christian theology and different modes of expression (*modus significandi* - mode of signification), we are dealing with two things. First, the meaning or content of the Christian message of salvation. Second, the mode of expression that is appropriate to the dialogical context, in our case, socio-philosophy. There is a logic operating in each of the two domains that is in some way related. It is the analogical task of theology to ask: How? The

perennial dilemma is that the logic of neither domain is fully clear. For this reason and in this context I have thought it right to engage in such excavative work as illumines the contemporary debate. Hegel and his interpreters are made a focus of study not only as a means of getting in touch with our roots, but to cast light on the issues as they are. It is more of the excavative work that must concern us now as we consider the relation between Hegel's notion of identity and his concept of God.

The *Phenomenology* delves deeply into issues of identity, alienation and community whilst condemning the Christianity he knew as a pallid and socially ineffective faith. Early in his career, the Tübingen essay of 1793, *Religion ist eine,* implied a disenchantment with the Christian faith in concluding that the religion, historical tradition and political constitution of a people constitute its *spirit.* [32] His remarks on love in 1799 on *The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate* were a condemnation of a perceived tendency to dehumanize at the expense of the concept called 'transcendence'. "In all the forms of the Christian religion ... which have been developed in the advancing fate of the ages, there lies this fundamental characteristic of opposition ..." [33] In the *Phenomenology* he warns against theoretical acceptance of God as little more than an idol; "essentially an *'other '* in relation to self-consciousness" (529). It is this sense of self-consciousness developing in relation to his notion of God that must be explored.

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[32] H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 481 - 507.

[33] *E.T.W.* p. 301.

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The relation between the logical conditions for individual identity and the Absolute touches on the association of the former with the idea of the Absolute *as God*. Hegel wrote at a time when the construction of individual identity as a logical category had an inevitable connection with Kant's transcendental concept 'God'. Kant's *fixed* notion of the self is inextricably linked with the Christian God as absolute and simple *in itself.* Hegel renders problematic both Kant's non-relational view of the self and the idea of a God set over against the self:

> If the understanding fixes these opposed determinations, the finite and the
>
> infinite it destroys itself, since the opposition of the finite and the infinite
>
> means that, insofar as one of them is posited, the other is sublated. [34]

His conviction in this passage is that an idea of individual identity framed logically over against a concept of the Absolute as God is unsustainable. An idea of the Absolute who cannot be thought to engage with historical social issues remains an illusion. "It may be expedient", he says, "to avoid the name 'God' since this word is not immediately a Notion, but rather the proper name ... of the underlying Subject" (66). God as the Absolute '*Other* ', he says, destroys the individual's search for identity in the recognition of its being set against something abstract and objective. [35]

There are points of contact between Kant's failure to show consciousness as relational and Hegel's assumptions about the identity of God. The first has to do with a critique of Kant's

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[34] The *Difference* Essay, p.16.

[35] L. Boff (1988) outlines some of the effects in associating God as an "a-trinitarian monotheism" with ideas of individual identity as fixed and singular. pp. 20 - 24.

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*formal* extracting of conclusions about identity from the content of experience. (By *formal,* understand Kant's presuming *a priori* the basic structures and categories of deductive knowledge. [36]) Though we need not enter into the detail of this argument, we should note that Hegel's argument is a demonstration against the attitude of formalism in philosophy which occupies itself with structures for knowledge from the external features of experience. [37] The second is the resulting asocial notion of Christianity and, determining it, a notion of God as 'other' and alien; "'the Divine', 'the Absolute', 'the Eternal'. etc. ... as something immediate" (20). There is a notable coincidence between Hegel's deliberate move against Kant's confining the activity of the 'I' *in itself* and his naming the Christian God as precluding any meaningful relation with the world.

His reaction against Kant's demonstration of the transcendental conditions of consciousness is important. Kant had linked the latter with postulation of the Absolute as a rationally derivable feature of the conditions of self-consciousness:

Now the transcendental concept of reason is directed always solely towards

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[36] For Kantian formal logic as considered defective by Hegel see J. Hyppolite (1974) pp. 13 - 15. Also Werner Marx (1975) who is convinced the 'idea' and significance of the *Phenomenology* lies in its principle of self-consciousness as response Kant's views on cognition. (p.98). Ivan Soll's *An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics* (1969) also approaches Hegel in terms of his critique of Kantian epistemology.

[37] D.M. Schlitt (1990) speaks of Hegel's *Phänomeno-theo-logik* as an indication of the relation between Identity and Religion in the three logical moments of the concept; Universality, where Hegel treats of the problem of beginning with the Absolute, particularity, where he examines forms of consciousness, and Individuality, where he considers their relation. Pt. 111, Ch. 5.

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absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and never terminates save

in what is absolutely, that is, in all relations, unconditioned (A 326).

The Absolute is an extension of this synthesis of the conditions of human reason; that which is really transcendent is the universality of the human will. [38] Not until Fichte was the Absolute conceived of as activity, implying that it should be identified with the infinite striving of the human ego. [39] Kant has, however, solved the problem of the derivation of individual identity by accepting a division between the sensible world and active reason directed towards the universal structure of the mind. Individual identity has been made into a property of the nature of active reason itself, what he calls; "absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions".

I do not want merely to represent this happening in process, however. The challenge is to address the implications of Hegel's critical interpretation of Kantian epistemology in relation to contemporary debate. This means asking how his condemnation of the idea of God as the Absolute *in itself* links into current issues about individual identity and alienation. In order to do this, it is necessary to understand that Hegel is one of many in

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[38] On this see C.E. Gunton (1985) pp. 57 f.

[39] S. Rosen argues that Hegel retains Fichte's doctrine of individual reflection which identifies the activity of the Absolute with that of the individual ego. S. Rosen (1974) Ch. 10. (This is influential in Rosen's reassimilating Hegel's logic into contemporary philosophy because of the need to distinguish philosophical truth from subjective opinion. p. 265). For a contrasting reading of Fichte's response to Kant which underplays Fichte's notion of the Absolute as *Das Ich* the first principle of philosophy and hence Absolute see, F. Copleston S.J. (1965) Vol. VII pp. 1 - 31.

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the post-Enlightenment era to suggest replacing a particular understanding of the Christian confession because of problems associated with the idea of the Absolute *in itself*. [40] The evidence in the text of the *Phenomenology* and amongst his early and more recent interpreters is that his notions of problems associated with individual identity derive, at least in part, from what is believed about God. Hegel's rejection of the idea of the Absolute *in itself* leads to his replacing the name 'God' and Christian revelation with a higher truth - namely philosophy, the study of which he says is, "life, Spirit, ... truth" (67). He raised profound and serious questions about the failings of Lutheran piety; "providing edification rather than insight" (7). As both R. Solomon and P.C. Hodgson point out, Hegel's criticism of the Christianity he knew pervades his entire corpus: "The telos of both logical idea and finite spirit is the reality of God as Absolute Spirit." [41]

Hodgson draws on E.L. Fackenheim's claim that a religious dimension is essential to understanding all Hegel's thought; "Hegel holds the actual existence of religious life to be an indispensable condition of his philosophy as a whole". [42] Religion, the Holy and the Eternal are, Hegel says, "the bait" required to arouse the desire for philosophy. Half a century later

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[40]For Kant's definition of the Enlightenment as "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity" - namely, the assuming of courage to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another, see, I. Kant, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment", in H. Reiss (1970). For the Enlightenment as linked to the idea of the autonomy of modern humanity since Kant see, Michael Welker (1975).

[41] P.C. Hodgson in Ed. N. Smart *et al.* (1985) Vol. 1, pp. 81 - 82.

[42] E.L. Fackenheim (1967) p. 9. See P.C. Hodgson *ibid.* p. 108.

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both Feuerbach and Schopenhauer had made explicit what for Hegel was implicit, a time "not far distant, when religion will depart from European humanity, like a nurse whose care the child has outgrown." [43] It is Hegel, however, who represents the early origins of a post-Christian humanism that grew out of the failure of Lutheran piety and its understanding of God as the Absolute *in itself* to engage with social questions. R.C. Solomon comments that Christianity for Hegel was not simply a "false" religion to be rejected altogether, but that he wanted to retrieve the human sense of community lost in meaningless dogmatism. [44] L. Dickey says that Hegel stands at the end of the tradition in the 1790s which tended to incorporate socio-economic ideas learned from the Scottish economists A. Smith, J. Steuart and A. Ferguson into the doctrines of Lutheran piety: "Hegel's problem was how to turn the arguments of the Scottish Enlightenment to the advantage of the religio-political ideal of Protestant civil piety". [45]

Hegel's philosophy is marked by intense engagement with the Christian tradition. And, as Dickey's study makes clear, this engagement can perhaps best be explained with reference to the debate amongst the *Aufklärer* who were philosophers, poets and

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[43] A. Schopenhauer, *Essays,* p. 121.

[44] R.C. Solomon (1980) p. 231.

[45] L. Dickey (1987) p. xi. Note how the concept of folk-religion [*Volksreligion*] functions in the "Tübingen Essay" of 1793 in an ethico-political sense: "How must folk-religion be constituted? .... It must be so constituted that all the needs of life - the public affairs of the State are tied in with it". In H.S. Harris (1972) p. 499.

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pastors between 1748 - 1774 delineating their opposition to orthodox Lutheranism. [46] Those amongst the *Aufklärer* were, for example, figures such as Leibniz, Wolff, Kant, Spalding and Klopstock.   Hegel's involvement with these people, Dickey suggests, sharpened his argument that the Christianity he knew must die as the precondition for a more *human* spirituality that left behind a notion of individual identity in relation to a God who is an Absolute *in itself.*

## 1. E. *THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE*

Some two hundred years ago then, Hegel was proclaiming the death of the rationally coherent 'I' as an epistemological construct and today we still struggle with restrictively subjective understanding of the 'I'.   Hegel wants to be free of Kant's location of discussion of individual identity within *a priori* principles which provide no "firm footing" (A 796/ B 824) for a structure of knowledge, only a partial extension of the activity of consciousness. [47]   He wrote in 1806/7;

> the general nature of the judgement or proposition, which involves the
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> distinction of Subject and Predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition,
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> and the proposition of identity which the former becomes contains the counter-

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[46] L. Dickey (1987) pp. 12 - 32. "[T]he *Aufklärer* could be said to have been searching for what their detractors called "a compromise theology,' ... voluntarist in a religious sense, activist in an ethical sense, civil in a human sense, and moderately synergist in a soteriological sense" (p. 26).

[47] "Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest".J. Habermas (1972) p. 310. For the persistence of this idea see Robert R. Sullivan "The Most Recent Thinking of Jürgen Habermas" *Interpretation. A Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14-15, 1986-7. Also "The Relevance of Reason" in T. Rockmore (1989) pp. 169-178.

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thrust against that subject-predicate relationship. (61)

The subject / predicate framework for thinking about individual identity allows only an external perception of identity. The issues here run deep, linking us firmly into the contemporary debate about restrictively subjective conditions for individual identity, relation and our understanding of God. *"In itself "*, Hegel says, Christianity's perception of the Absolute as God has little to do with the troubled ambiguities where faith must live: *"In itself,* that life is", he says "one of untroubled equality and unity with itself, for which otherness and alienation, and the overcoming of alienation, are not serious matters" (19).

This quotation may simply represent a thinly disguised idealist statement on behalf of a totalizing logic that organizes all questions of theology, history, nature and society within a philosophical whole. [48] If this were its only significance, the question need detain us no longer. It is not its only significance, however, because Hegel's challenge exists in his questioning the relation between our views about what it is be human in relation to what we believe about God. Hegel's is a critical voice and his impact on Christian and non-Christian social theory obliges a response. As D. Cupitt writes: "Hegel shows a realist idea of God becoming so fuzzy, metaphorical and indefinite that it eventually dissolves away altogether". [49] Cupitt's observation begs the

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[48]Jean-Francoise Lyotard (1984) designates modernity - Hegel included - as characterized by the idea of the *whole.* "Modern" is "any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse ... such as the dialectics of spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, of the creation of wealth".(p. xxiii).

[49] D. Cupitt (1984) p. 249.

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question as to what is understood by this *'realist'* God, and whether it adequately represents the Christian confession. His reference to Hegel's notion of a *'realist'* concept of God is somewhat vague. If his main point, however, is that Hegel's *Geist* is an atheistic destruction of Christian belief and a slipping away from classical theism, he makes special call upon us to demonstrate the distortions in his understanding of God and the consequently damaged notion of individual identity. [50]

We must be careful here. "Enlightenment bashing" is quite fashionable, as Lesslie Newbigin observes. [51] It is easier to condemn Hegel's collision course with theistic Christianity than to answer his charge of Christianity's tightly closed social vision. If, however, Hegel's reaction against the Cartesian and Kantian notions of identity is as closely intertwined with notions of the Absolute God as simple and *In itself* as I have suggested, we do well to face the challenges that Hegel and his interpreters pose. We do well to ask how theological literature might be enriched and contribute to the debate assessing and informing us of the tendency in the human condition towards social interaction.

With this in mind, three observations can be made about the central themes of the thesis. The intention is to indicate how constructive dialogue between Christian theology, the ambiguous legacy from modernity, and contemporary non-Christian

[50] D. Cupitt (1986) In the Hegelian system, "the individual, Christianity itself, were painlessly absorbed" p. 155.

[51] "The Gospel and Our Culture" Newsletter 1, Selly Oak College, Birmingham.

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alternatives regarding individual identity and community might proceed.

1. First of all, one is struck by the astonishing continuity of questions and the chief problematics between Hegel and the current 'post-modern' era. Much of what Hegel undercuts in the 'modern' post-Cartesian and post-Kantian view of identity is the same as what has been rejected by 'postmodern' thinkers. Remarkable is the fact that perceivable amongst both tendencies are clear resonances of issues similar to those determining Hegel's attack on Kant's notion of the self and individual identity. Take, for example, Kant's notion of identity which is defined, Hegel thinks, by a false association of identity and sameness: "A simple thing of this kind which *is* through negation, which is neither This nor That ... we call a *universal*. ... 'This' shows itself to be a *mediated simplicity*" (96; 97). [52] Note the echoes of Hegel in M.C. Taylor's assertion that identity is complex and temporal not simple and given. "The 'This" with which we started no longer seems simple. ... "This "is "compound and complex". [53] These words are Taylor's and they bear remarkable similarity to Hegel's observation.

Like Hegel, the critical problem for Taylor is how time and history alters and even destroys the simple identity of consciousness: "It is clear that the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing else but the simple history of its movement or of its experience" (109). Both urge upon us the individual's need for

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[52] Compare M.C. Taylor's demonstrates the loss of the modern idea of identity and selfhood. (1982) p. 89.

[53] M.C. Taylor (1984) p. 47.

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identity as a factor inherent in modern and postmodern experience. Both perceive that an *a priori* belief in a fixed unity of consciousness yields a rationally coherent, but static and relationally incompetent, notion of the 'I'.[54] M.C. Taylor hints that Hegel's critique of the pretensions of the thinking 'I' pre-empted 'postmodern' criticisms of the Enlightenment. This is obvious in Hegel's idea of identity as sameness or what he calls the fixity of the self; "the *fixity* of its self-positing, ... the fixity of the pure concrete, which the 'I' itself is, in contrast with its differentiated content". (33). For Hegel, it is reaction to this Kantian concept of identity which leads to his own speaking of "identity in diversity" or difference. Like Taylor, Hegel's notion of identity in difference causes the self to 'deconstruct' whenever time and relation is taken seriously by the thinking individual. The finite self as a single 'I' must admit its non-existence in deference to the infinite that negates it.

This remains a consistent theme within 'postmodern' condemnation of naïve assumptions about the inviolability of the setting of rational conditions for individual identity. Note J. Derrida's comment when speaking of his own understanding of epistemological "displacement" and the fallacy of speaking of the 'I' as simple, that Hegel "did not know the extent to which he was right". [55] What is significant is the degree of continuity

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[54] M.C. Taylor's (1984) essay the "Disappearance of the Self" compares Hegel's critique of Kant's philosophy of consciousness with his own ideas of the temporality of consciousness: "The now, as it is pointed out to us, is Now that *has been*" pp. 46 - 48. Cf. *Phen.* Sects. 90 - 110.

[55] J. Derrida (1978) p. 257. Quoted from G. Bataille in Ch. 9 "From Restricted to General Economy. A Hegelianism without Reseŕve".

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between Hegel and postmodern 'deconstruction' of simple, rationally contained identity. A typical summary of the 'classic' view of postmodernism suggests:

> Identity is suggested by the very structure of language itself, a language logically prior to the subject. ... The subject, in other words, is subjected, its pre-eminent position usurped; no longer sovereign but dethroned, constructed in and through discourse. [56]

These words are P. Currie's but F. Jameson and others also note that post-modernism's most radical insight is similar to Hegel's conviction that the modern human subject has disappeared; "this construct is merely a philosophical and cultural mystification, which sought to persuade people that they 'had' individual subjects and possessed this unique personal identity". [57] M.C. Taylor writes that 'postmodern' philosophy must break free of reason as the simple identity of the subjectivity of the self with its identity and relationality: "The sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else; individuality, personality". [58] There are remarkable points of continuity between Hegel's attempt to break out of the "infinite opposition" [59] of Kant's subject-object model of philosophy, and the 'post-modern' carrying of this critique forward to its logical conclusion. [60]

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[56] P. Currie "The eccentric self: anti characterization and the problem of the subject in American postmodernist fiction" in Malcolm Bradbury and Sigmund Ro, Ed.s (1987) p. 67.

[57] F. Jameson (1985) p. 115.

[58] M.C. Taylor (1984) p. 36 - 7.

[59] "[T]he opposition here has become fixed in infinity". *Difference* essay, p. 57.

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**2.** The continuity is reinforced not only through a 'deconstructive', but also through 'reconstructive' critique. I have already mentioned Habermas's emphasis on individual identity as constituted by relation with others amongst constantly changing social and historical needs. Despite the technicality of much of Habermas's language it is possible and, I argue, necessary to keep theological confession closely alongside a critique of related socio-philosophic issues if a more adequate understanding and expression of identity is to be attained. It is significant, for example, that Hegel's one explicit reference to human nature *per se* in the *Phenomenology* is to communication at a rational level:

> For it is in the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds ... and being able to communicate at that level. (69) [61]

Hegel, in similarity with both Habermas and Pippin, transfers Kant's absolute transcendental reference to the realm of social human interests. This is seen especially in his assertion that

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[60] The influence of Nietzsche in this debate should not be under emphasized as it was he , not Hegel, who expressed the irreversible condition of despair as regards the self that also characterizes deconstruction. Nietzsche was the prophet who foresaw "*irrevocable* loss and *incurable* fault", beginning, he says, with the 'death of God' and closes with the 'the death of ourselves'. M.C. Taylor (1984) p. 6 says it is under Nietzsche's influence as well as Hegel's that influences Derrida's denial of anything outside of the individual uniting him with the sameness shared with others. This is the risk that postmodernity takes: "To risk meaning nothing is to start to play, and to enter into the play of *Différance* ..." (1981) p 14.

[61] The 1832-1845 *Grundlage der Werke* speaks of 'nature' not human nature: "*Denn die Natur dieser ist ...*". It does so, however, in the context of humanity and its roots: "die Wurzel der *Humanität*"

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the truth of consciousness has nothing to do with an Absolute outside of consciousness; "the exposition of the untrue consciousness in its untruth is not merely a negative procedure" (79). Note the parallel with Habermas's conceiving of the transcendental conditions for knowledge as transcultural human needs: "The transcendental logic of an earlier period ... seeks a solution to the problem of the *a priori* conditions of possible knowledge. For both, the conditions for knowledge are no longer *a priori* in themselves, but found in the process of inquiry". [62]

Habermas's work is of interest because, as I have indicated, towards the end of the 1970s he started a turn that culminated in his *Theory of Communicative Action* which grounds an idea of the social in the function of communication. [63] His is not the only major reconsideration of Hegel's influence, however, Robert Pippin's study of Hegelian idealism also re-appropriates Hegel's analysis of the failure of Kantian idealism to show individual identity as both self-relating and in relation with others from the standpoint of absolute knowledge. [64] In some agreement with Habermas, we shall see that R. Pippin stresses Hegel's demonstration of Kant's failure in demonstrating

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[62] Habermas (1972) p. 194. Raised in Nazi Germany, having studied under Theodore Adorno, heir to the Frankfurt legacy of the criticism of ideology, Jürgen Habermas has been hailed as one of the most influential thinkers in Germany today. See *Bibliographical Dictionary of Neo-Marxism* (1985) Ed. R.A. Gorman, Mansell, London.

[63] For Habermas on Hegel's early projects in the concept of a reconciling reason as opposed to his later loss of criticism and supportive philosophy of the state, see J. Habermas (1987) Lecture 11.

[64] Robert B. Pippin (1989).

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consciousness and individual identity as "socially interactive" rather than private and inner. [65] Both Habermas and Pippin draw on Hegel's intention to demonstrate the social nature of selfhood. This makes it all the more important to consider the goals that Hegel set himself regarding the social design of individual identity.

Thus there is widespread recognition of Hegel's influence on individual identity as a socio-philosophic problem. What I have done is to take both 'deconstructive' and 'constructive' interpretations of Hegel's notion of identity in order to assess Hegel's continuing impact. In order to do this, I have made a broad distinction between two types of postmodernism; deconstruction and construction, of which Habermas represents the latter. [66] This distinction is hardly new and tends towards the over generalized, but it derives from widely perceived differences in the nature and function of language - namely, the tension between its indeterminacy and universality. In other words, the tension between language perceived as culture specific over against the universal fact of language *per se.*

There are problems in contextualizing the discussion of Hegel's influence in this manner. First, locating a description of major trends within 'postmodernism' in the nature and function

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[65] R. Pippin (1989) p. 36. See also pp. 102-3.

[66] J. B. Cobb describes two types of postmodernism: deconstruction and process. *Theology Today* Vol. 47 1990 - 91 pp. 149 - 158. Broadly, I agree drawing on the 'constructive' reaction against modern idealism not through process philosophy but Habermas's social reconstruction through the universality of language.

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of language is overly narrow if not shown to be founded on a deeper logic and to have socio-economic and political implication. Locating the study in this manner is also misleading if allowed to colour Hegel retrospectively as a 'language philosopher'. Kojève interprets the *Phenomenology*'s dialectical method in terms of language discourse: "By an act of freedom ... he (man *sic.*) *speaks* with his adversary, he engages in a *dialogue* with him: he uses a *dialectical method*". [67] Habermas also treats Hegel's concept of *spirit* as the underlying subjectivity of self-consciousness and relation with another; "the medium *within* which, as an absolute mediation, the two mutually form each other into subjects". [68] As Habermas is aware, however, Hegel offers no linguistic basis for the process of *spirit.* [69]

The advantage of locating Hegel's influence in deconstructive and constructive approaches to language is the access it gives to major contemporary interpretative methods for considering individual identity. Habermas represents a linguistically *constructive* approach to questions of individual identity left to us by Hegel. M. C. Taylor, by contrast, advocates a *deconstructing* of Hegel's absolute claims. He works under the

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[67] A. Kojève (1969) pp. 179 - 80.

[68] J. Habermas (1974) "Remarks on Hegel's Jena *Philosophy of Mind*", p. 145.

[69] J. Habermas suggests; "it is the dialectical interconnections between linguistic symbolization, labour and interconnection which determine the concept of spirit". (1974) p. 143. He refers back to the 1803 - 6 Jena lectures on the Philosophy of Nature and Mind, aware that Hegel did not proceed to a linguistic communicative path.

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influence of Derrida's conviction that the message is always in the medium. The medium of language, he says, is always relative: "Truth with a capital 'T' cannot be articulated reflectively according to a single grammar". [70] I should say at this point that the distinction between deconstruction and construction is not to be exaggerated. István Mészáros suggests reasons why the gap which seems to be unbridgeable is more imaginary than real. He mentions Habermas's allowing a *pluralist* perspective resembling that of some postmoderns. [71] Indeed, I have shown already that there are many shared interests regarding Hegel's influence in questions of individual identity. The distinction is purely functional, therefore, in analyzing both divergence and convergence in recent Hegel interpretation.

**3.** The challenge is whether Hegel's post-Christian perspective $^{is}$ better positioned to deal with questions of social relation than is the Christian faith, tied, as he says it is, to an unmediated alienation from a theistic God and a flight from the real world: "the alien content of its consciousness" (803)". The task of theology in this respect is to understand the social character of salvation. [72] Contemporary theology does well, I

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[70] M. C. Taylor (1982) p. 47.

[71] István Mészáros (1989) p. 38.

[72] Some work is being done in this area. John Zizioulas's *Being as Communion* (1985) has proved to be a major contribution, showing as it does how an understanding of ecclesiology can be revitalized if the full social consequences of the idea of identity in communion are accepted. Leonardo Boff's *Trinity and Society* (1988) is a dogmatic interpretation of the Trinity, important for its exposition of divine communality as a model for personhood and society. D.W.

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believe, when it explores critically its relationship to the ambiguous legacy of Hegel interpretation. This is necessary in order to go beyond his negative interpretation of the Christian faith and to affirm something positive. It is clear that the full development of such a task would go beyond the limitations of this study. In this first Chapter I have tried to follow something of the current theological discussion about this topic, opting for analogical forms of reasoning that open the logical space required for such discussion. My aim in the following Chapters is merely to reflect upon how this work might be accomplished, considering the type of interface required for dialogue between Christian and non-Christian social theory.

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Hardy's essays in *On Being the Church* (1989) and *The Weight of Glory* (1991) introduce the significant notion of 'sociality' into theological discourse about the form and practice of society, in C. E. Gunton & D.W. Hardy (1989) pp. 21 - 47; "God and the Form of Society" in D.W. Hardy & P. Sedgwick (1991) pp. 131 - 144. For other expositions of the communion of the Trinity as the basis for ecclesial relation see P. Avis *Christians in Communion* (1990), *Church as Communion*, A.R.C.I.C 11 (1991); "The Ecclesiology of Communion" in *The Church: Local and Universal* WCC.

<div align="center">THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE</div>

## 2. A.  IDENTITY AND HEGEL'S LOGIC OF RELATION

Time and again the *Phenomenology* touches on the great themes of human relation.  Its relevance rests in Hegel's ability to identify perennial needs of the human spirit.  And, as I pursue the theme of individual identity and relation it makes a better place than most to test a theological perspective.  Of particular interest now as I look at §§ 90 - 165 is the question: Does the perspective from the 'I' established by Hegel allow for a recovery of the self as social?  Already, I have shown that Hegel draws attention to the short sightedness in Kant's establishing the 'I' as a single activity of consciousness.  But how successful is he in forgoing Kant's non-relational setting of limits and boundaries to the notion of individual identity; "the immediacy of my *seeing, hearing,* and so on" (101)?

Hegel aims to offer a renewed vision for locating individual identity within a social context.  As R. Pippin says, he attempts "to reformulate the notion of subjectivity itself, attacking virtually all of the post-Cartesian assumptions, denying that consciousness is "private," "inner," or a "spectator," of itself and world, and asserting that it is, in a special sense of the term, "communal," "public," and even socially interactive." [1]  His call is for a re-examination of the 'modern' prioritizing of the individual as single and *in itself.*  It may be that the cultural abyss between Hegel's philosophical and historical context and our own prohibits a complete 'translation' of the issues here.  Nevertheless, the contemporary resonances in his intention are

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[1] Robert B. Pippin (1989), p.36.  See also pp.102-3.  .

convincing enough cause to ask the question: Does Hegel succeed in making individual identity thinkable in a new way?

On the positive side, conversation with Hegel in addressing this question makes us sensitive to certain asocial concepts of the self. §§ 90 - 165 on Consciousness, Sense-Certainty, Perception and Understanding are an attempt to show that some relational dimension of the individual is inherent in consciousness; "pure being at once splits up into ... 'This' as 'I', and the other 'This' as object" (91). Pure being entails, he says, the dimension of the self functioning relationally because relation is entailed in sense-certainty: "It is not just we who make this distinction between essence and instance, between immediacy and mediation; on the contrary, we find it within sense-certainty itself" (93). By studying the text in more detail, however, we find §§ 90 - 165 to assimilate many of the conditions for identity laid down by Kant's account of the apperceptive nature of experience. In R. B. Pippin's words:

> Hegel's procedure here already betrays an important Kantian assumption about the apperceptive nature of consciousness .. he is assuming that there must be such conditions explicit in a possible sense experience.[2]

As I shall show, Hegel does indeed draw on Kant's ontology of individuality in framing the debate about sense certainty and particularity. However, the results are denigratory consequences for individual identity as relational. [3]

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[2] Robert B. Pippin (1989) p.120.

[3] Interpreting Hegel neither on the basis of an Hellenic idealism (which he believes not to fulfil the necessary criteria for the realization of true social relations ), nor on the sole basis of immediate social needs and conditions, R. B. Pippin focuses on the principle of identity that, for Hegel, resides in thought itself. See (1981) "Hegel"s political Argument and the problem of *Verwirk-*

On the negative side, the nub of my argument is that Hegel fails to think of the 'I' in a new way, and that this is simultaneous with his ceasing to believe in God in any sense that can be called Christian. The two matters are not unconnected. For Hegel, the positing of an ontologically singular God is bound logically to his positing of the 'I' as a simple, unified subject engaging with the objective world. E. Jüngel's comment on this relation is that we cannot underestimate the significance of Hegel's questioning the nature of Divine Being as a consequence of making the divine *essence* a problem. [4] "The systematic *connection* ", he says, "of the death of God with the epistemological-metaphysical problematic of modern atheism could be Hegel's most significant achievement for theology". [5] Hegel, more than most philosophers of the nineteenth century, challenges Christian theology to make God *thinkable in a new way.* [6] This is reflected in E. Jüngel's particular theme of how to allow for Hegel's corrective emphasis on the story of the humanity of God in Christ. [7] The related question I pursue concentrates on the soteriological implications of connections between Kant's notion of the 'I' as singular and self-contained, and his understanding of the Absolute as unconditioned.

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*lichung*", p.513.

[4] E. Jüngel (1983) p. 100 f.

[5] E. Jüngel *ibid.* p. 97.

[6] E. Jüngel *ibid.* pp. 64 - 100; 101 - 122; esp. pp. 110 - 111. Jüngel's emphasis on God's activity in history finds links between Hegel's triadically structured philosophy and Trinitarian theology.

[7] E. Jüngel *ibid.* "That the God who is love must be able to suffer ... is an indispensable insight of the newer theology schooled by Luther's Christology and Hegel's philosophy" (1983) p. 373.

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I mentioned above the need to recognize that in Hegel's discourse about identity and relation, we are simultaneously involved in analogous talk about God. If one examines what is meant by the concept of a God who, for Hegel, is 'Being', 'the One' or 'the Singularity', a necessary relationship can be perceived between the self-determining of individual identity and the overall movement of absolute *Spirit,* in which Hegel subsumes the Christian faith. The main reason for this contact is that Kant ascribes to the function of language an implied analogy of being which defines the concept God in proportional relation to the concept 'I', "the proper name, the fixed point of rest of the underlying subject" (66). [8] As I indicated above, Kant's notion of the 'I' has been established as the premise for the Absolute raised to the status of an infinite principle: "For what necessarily forces us to transcend the limits of experience and of all appearances is the *unconditioned* " (*C.P.R.* Bxx). [9] Thus, we are dealing here with a connection framed by Kant according to which the ontic order between God and the 'I' are intimately related.

Hegel's complaint against Kant is centred on an analogy of being between God and the 'I' and the presumption of *a priori* structures and categories of deductive knowledge that

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[8] For Kant's ambiguity re: extending this discipline of pure reason to belief in a primordial being see *C.P.R.* A 792 / B 820 f. G.E. Michalson Jr. (1990) writes: "God enters Kant's scheme by riding on the coat-tails of the principle of proportionality ... to satisfy reason's demand for symmetry" p. 24.

[9] On the relation between Hegel's attack against the defences against scepticism which he finds built into the religious outlook of faith and Kant's *a priori* claims for philosophical method see M.N. Forster (1989) pp. 89 - 94; 110 - 116.

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determines each: "This pattern of giving reasons and stating conditions belongs ... to external conditions" (66). [10] We shall see that §§ 90 - 165 of the *Phenomenology* take apart Kant's restricted knowledge of consciousness whereby the 'I' is a simple, unified subject in receipt of intuitive representations, engaging with the objective world:

> Through inner *experience* I am conscious of *my existence* in time ... It
>
> is identical with the *empirical consciousness of my existence*, which is
>
> determinable only through relation to something which, while bound up with
>
> my existence, is outside me. (*C.P.R.*, BxIn.)

Consciousness of individuality is awareness through perceptions of the object before it: "knowledge by means of connected perceptions" [11] Initially the 'I' identifies itself in consciousness. Then, through a series of successive reflective moments it identifies itself as distinct from the external world. Hegel reviews the nature of Consciousness, Sense-Certainty, Perception and Understanding, intending to reformulate the Kantian notion of subjectivity as relational rather than private and inner. The question to be asked is how successful is he in this task?

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[10] For definition of Kant's so-called formalism in philosophy see Ch. 1 p. 27. Hegel defines Kant's formalism as his relying on truths taken for granted; "it just lays them down, and believes it is entitled to assert them" (67).

[11] Kant, *C.P.R.*, B 147; 161. Habermas explains this as follows:

> Hegel directs himself against the organon theory of knowledge. ... Knowledge
>
> appears mediated either by an instrument with whose help we form objects or
>
> as a medium through which the light of the world enters the subject".

J. Habermas (1972) Pt. 1, Ch. 1, p. 10. By "organon theory of knowledge" understand consciousness as an instrument of knowledge empirically available to itself. "Science must liberate itself from this semblance" says Hegel (76) and be replaced with a phenomenological self-reflection of consciousness. J. Habermas (*ibid.*) p. 7.

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## 2. B. *THE 'I' AND THE 'WE'*

In order to answer this question and to understand these early sections on Sense Certainty, Perception and Understanding, it is necessary to recognise that Kant represents for Hegel a culmination of long-term epistemological problems. [12] I have shown already that his idea of social reality is a response to Kant's ideas of individuality consisting in isolated units; "This particular 'I'" (90); *"wholly personal, individual* things ... *absolutely singular entities" [Wesen]* (110). [13] Howard P. Kainz indicates as much in recording Hegel's dissatisfaction with Kant's failure to reflect genuine experience: "The attitude of Formalism in philosophy, which occupies itself with applying the schemata of the mind in mere external fashion to things, without going out of itself to enter into the dynamism of the thought content .... must endeavour to take the "leap" to true systematic philosophical knowledge". [14] He condemns Kant's

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[12] In many respects Plato remains the starting point for Western studies of epistemology insofar as he discusses knowledge of the self by the self. Amongst the Minor Socratic Dialogues *Charmides* contains a dialogue about the distinction between knowing and the object known (166a-b). *Thaeｅtus* seizes on a similar problem, determining the conditions under which knowledge (Επιστημη) of the self is possible. See A.E. Taylor (1937) pp. 53-57.

[13] On Descartes' notion of the 'I' as singular based on the intuitive and inductive operations of the mind see Louis E. Loeb (1981), 1.3, "Epistemology in Descartes, Locke and Berkelely", p.41. See, R. Descartes , in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch, Transls. (1985) Vol. 1, p. 14-5; 33, where intuition is the immediate self evidence with which a truth forces itself upon us and deduction is the analyzing of the axiomatic principles of knowledge, the certainty of which cannot be doubted. .

[14] Howard P. Kainz (1976), p. 57. Kant's 'I' who thinks is a simple, unified subject engaging with the objective world: "I am immediately conscious only of that which is in me" (*C.P.R.* Bxl n.). For instance, the "numerical unity of this apperception" (A 106) refers to the unity of intuition and empirical identity

inability to move beyond this external designation of identity. The question is whether he escapes what he himself condemns as an asocial understanding of the self.

In asking this I am building on the hermeneutical thesis established in Chapter 1 that Hegel's idea of the process and experience of consciousness is intended to demonstrate the social nature of selfhood. Hegel's notion of "phenomenological experience" is, as J. Habermas says, about "the socialization process of the individual ... as it reflects upon itself in the forms of absolute mind". [15] Judith Shklar observes: "The turn to the social aspects of any shape of consciousness was, for Hegel, the decisive moment". [16] Yet my contention is that Hegel's notion of the social is inadequately based on assumptions about the particularity of the 'I'; "consciousness ... only as a pure 'I'; or ... a pure 'This'" [*Dieser*] (91), and the universal objective realm; "the object similarly only as a pure 'This'" [*Dieses*] (*ibid.*). Consequently, these early sections illustrate that individual identity, which for Hegel is not yet fulfilled in notions of consciousness as 'I'; "nothing more, a pure 'This'" (91), is as incomplete as the divine objectivity which stands over against the 'I'.

Clearly, Hegel wants to demonstrate a primitive and more encompassing understanding of pure being than Kant's notion of transcendental apperception can reach. It is all too obvious,

bound together in the experience of cognition or transcendental apperception.

[15] J. Habermas (1972) p. 19.

[16] J. Shklar (1976) p. 20.

**THE 'I' AND THE 'WE'**

however, that he is caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, he is faced with Kant's and, to some extent, Descartes' understanding of the self as the possibility of self-knowledge and conscious relation with others drawn from the spontaneous *act* of thought. On the other, is the argument which Hume contended, namely, that identity comprises the substance or *being* of sense experience, and ideas from which the possibility of such knowledge is derived. This is to put the matter rather baldly. However, the divide concerning the free *activity* of consciousness *vis-á-vis* physical *being* caused Hegel to seek a new overview of the experience of consciousness. Descartes built structures of knowledge and relation on the intuitive and inductive operations of the mind. [17] In his 'Second Meditation' the implication is that one can have knowledge of the self and relations by reflecting on the mind, its faculties and workings, given the appropriate intellectual discipline. [18] Similarly, the 'Sixth Meditation' is about recognizing the history of one's own mind by inferring the distinction between one's own volitions and judgements and the existence of corporeal things. [19] Against this, the thrust of Hume's attack against Descartes was to provide universal criteria for knowledge of the self and relations from something more 'substantial' than ideas present to the mind. [20] For both, everything in thought can be traced

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[17] By intuition Descartes means the immediate self evidence with which a truth forces itself upon us. Deduction is the analyzing of the axiomatic principles of knowledge, the certainty of which cannot be doubted. R. Descartes , in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch, Transls. (1985) Vol. 1, p. 14-5; 33.

[18] R. Descartes, in J. Cottingham, transl. (1986) Second Meditation, pp. 16-23.

[19] R. Descartes, in J. Cottingham, transl. (1986) Second Meditation, pp. 50-62.

[20] "It is therefore by *experience* only that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another". Hume, *Treatise* ,Vol. I, Part III, sect. VI, p. 89.

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back to some impression or idea given to the single subject. [21] Hume's main complaint, however, was the need to establish a more permanent basis for knowledge of the self and relation: "We are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, ... though we are not able fully to satisfy ourselves in that particular". [22]

Kant had attempted a response to this dilemma when he made the point that conceiving of the thinking 'I' involves a distinction between the empirical and transcendental self.  As I have shown already, the problem which Hegel sees here is that of *abstractly* derived functions of reason.  Even language itself, he says, remains external to the relational construct of consciousness. He talks about the need "to help out language" (110).  It is a universal, he says, in the sense of being logically available to everyone; "it is a universal.  I take it up then as it is in truth ..." (*ibid.*).  Even the function of language, however, does not go all the way down to the ontological principle of the self.  It might be observed that this polarity remains at the heart of contemporary questions about individual identity and relation. They arise again later with reference to Habermas.  For the moment, note Hegel's conceived need for a new expression of the relational construct of consciousness.  His solution stands or falls within the 'I' - 'We' framework.

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[21] "Ideas produce the images of themselves in new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed, either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impression.  ... This then, is the first principle I establish in the science of human nature". *Treatise*, Vol. 1, Part 1, sect. 1, p.16.

[22] Hume, *Treatise*, Vol. 1, Part. IV, sect. VI, pp. 238 - 249. Esp. p..241.

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So what kind of relational construct is it that Hegel suggests? Let us consider relation as spoken of in §§ 90 - 165 of the *Phenomenology.* Here, when Hegel speaks of a more significant relation with others he often does so in terms of community; "*Gemeinschaft mit anderen* " (117) and *essence* [*Wesen*]. The term *Wesen* occurs nine hundred and thirty three times in the *Phenomenology* although its meaning is not well developed. In the *Logic, Wesen* is spoken of as "the truth of *being* " or that which is affirmatively present in it [*ist an ihr seiend*]. [23] Note, for example, his use of the term *Wesen* in §110 quoted above. Its use is remarkable because in §§ 90 - 165 of the *Phenomenology* it most often occurs as a relativizing of the gap between immediate consciousness or sense-certainty and the objective realm that it perceives; "this *inner truth,* as the *absolute universal* ... in which the truth has its *essence*" (144). Here, however, the point seems to be that singular entities contain something implicitly of the *essence* that is universal. It is, he says, merely meant "not actually expressed".

This concept of *essence* is significant in Hegel's attempt to address the gap between the particular 'I', (based on the certainty of the experience of life as belonging to the 'this I'), and the universal 'We' (that which can be instantiated by any number of particulars:

> When we reflect on this difference, we find that neither one nor the other is only *immediately* present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time *mediated* (92).

The way in which Hegel deals with this gap imposes limitations, I suggest, for how the self can have a social reference. It

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[23] Hegel *L.* pp. 389 & 391 respectively.

<p align="right">THE 'I' AND THE 'WE'</p>

precludes any understanding of 'the social' except as the mediating or relativizing of all opposition in anticipation of potential unity: "a *mediated simplicity*, or a *universality* ... sense-certainty has demonstrated in its own self that the truth of its object is the universal" (98 & 99). He maintains the tension in consciousness between the 'I' and the universal 'We' through an idea of the self bound by ontological particularity.

Hegel's awareness in these sections of a problem in relating the particular 'I' and the universal 'We' is evident in § 110 when he argues that there is an *essence* prior to individuality that has been denied by Kant and other epistemological thinkers; "if they wanted to *say* it, then this is impossible, because the sensuous This that is meant *cannot be reached* by language" (110). He adopts what might be called an essentialist approach evidenced in the comment that language, as the primary function of relation, cannot obtain to the nature of the 'I' that is anterior to any active consciousness or reflection:

> They speak of the existence of *external* objects ... absolutely *singular, wholly personal, individual* things ... but what they mean is not what they say ...
>
> This that is meant *cannot be reached* by language ... which is inherently universal. (110).

By this I mean that there is something "beneath" socialization and prior to individuality in the sense that the 'I' is conscious of a history and the idea of *being-for-self*.

> What has emerged for it as a result is the Notion of the True - but only as the *implicit* being of the True ... which lacks the *being-for-self* of consciousness (133).

This 'essential' or foundationalist notion of human nature places

him at odds with Kant and functionalist thinkers who find the social to be no conscious activity on the part of the 'I'. Kant wrote: "The proposition, 'I think', in so far as it amounts to the assertion, "I exist thinking', is no mere logical function, but determines the subject (which is then at the same time object) in respect of existence". (*C.P.R.* B 429). For Kant, Hegel says, abstraction constitutes the relation between the act of consciousness that is the 'thinking I'. Or, as G. Deleuze comments, it is only in pure philosophy that Kant looks for the 'I' in its purity and genuineness. [24]

Beyond Kant's notion of the pure 'I', says Hegel, is a relational *essence* which is implicit in the 'I's *being-for-self* and confers on the self the meanings and prerogatives of the universal. *Essence* is the dynamic process by which the implicit relationality of immediate consciousness and the 'We' is realized:

> In essence the object is the same as the movement: the movement is the
>
> unfolding and differentiation of the two moments, and the object is the
>
> apprehended togetherness of the moments (111). [25]

In this passage it is the surpassing of immediacy and singularity in relation; the self is not existing of itself, *bei sich selbst* but exists in relation with others, it is *bei uns*. Individuality is not *in-itself* but for others, *für-ein-Anderes*. The verification of this fact is given, Hegel thinks, in the movement of thought.

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[24] "The first two critiques (suggest) a necessary submission of the object to the 'finite' subject: to us, the legislators, in our very finitude (even the moral law is a fact of moral reason". G. Deleuze (1984) p. 69.

[25] George Myro in Richard E. Grandy, Ed. (1986) "Identity and Time" considers if 'identity' is always relativized to a concept and does not exist *tout court*. Ch. 15.

THE 'I' AND THE 'WE'

This movement is being described non-temporally in terms of fleeting totalities; "the singular being ... becomes universality ... *My 'meaning'* has vanished, and perception takes the object as it is *in itself*, or as a universal as such" (130).  He wants to demonstrate that the social structure of the individual lies within the experience of consciousness in distinguishing itself from the universal and at the same time *relating* itself to it. Clearly, Hegel sees the need for reconciliation between the particular 'I', which he makes foundational for all subsequent discussion, in relation to universality and the 'We'. [26]  The question is whether he can attain to it.

## 2. C. *INDIVIDUALISM IN ONTOLOGY*

§§ 90 - 165 of the *Phenomenology* thus set out some of the premises for Hegel's understanding of the origins, evolution and socialization of particular consciousness.  These are the less glamorous sections of the *Phenomenology* being concerned with the most primitive forms and shapes of consciousness. Nevertheless, it is here that he makes the particular 'I' foundational for all subsequent discussion.  We have seen that Hegel makes particularly the truth of individuality prior to the social and this, we argue, has intolerable consequences for any sense of the self as social.  A brief word survey shows is that *beziehen* (*acc.* to connect with or refer to) is often used in connection with the verb to differentiate [*unterschieden*], meaning to recognize the being of self to be distinct from any other.  (113; 115; 121; 123 ....).  The question is again how the

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[26] On "Particulars as Bundles of Universals" see D.M. Armstrong (1989) Ch. 4. For a summary of traditional arguments for universals see B. Aune (1986) Ch. 3.

distinctness of the 'I' is played off against the plurality of the 'We'.

Inherent in all this is the issue of individualism in ontology. Hegel retains, *we* argue, the overwhelming modern Western mentality that shows being or substance to precede the function of relation, implying a priority for individuality in ontology. It is of course necessary that regulative principles for understanding the nature of individual subjectivity require the condition of distinctness. Like Kant, he accepts the given relation of the 'I' to objectivity, and goes on to ask about the possibility of relation. W.W. Floyd Jr. refers to Kantian criticism as the guardian of plurality; "**sociality**, understood first as the 'letting be' of the integrity of that which is alien to the subject, the dialectical affirmation of heterogeneous otherness".[27] Hegel's, however, is not only a 'letting be' of the self and the 'other' in a given relationship but rather, I suggest, the assumption that every individual exists as a non-relational singularity before engaging in the activity of relation. [28]

It is important to look closely at these early sections of the *Phenomenology* for the characteristic and disfiguring features of individualism that are embedded in much subsequent modern and contemporary thinking. Time and again the 'I' is conceived of as subject to a particular interpretation of the necessity of its

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[27] W.W. Floyd Jr. (1988) p. 111.

[28] Bonhoeffer's *Akt und Sein* (1956) is a study in the act / being divide in modern philosophy, believing its resolution to be found in Christ; "the unity of man, of human existence, is founded solely in the Word of God" p. 106. For a critique of Bonhoeffer's revelational resolution of the problem see E. Feil (1985) pp. 5 - 14.

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'substantial', immediate existence. In particular, in associating sense-certainty with pure being, Hegel restricts a notion of the 'I' that can only be particular and non-relational. Two things should be made plain. First, individualism is to be distinguished from individuality, the former being manifest in forms of isolation and social dissolution; the latter calling for full participation in various forms of community. [29] Secondly, *individualism* is not a system of general principles nor ethical code, but a way of thinking about the 'I' as the centre of existence. (It should, of course, be remembered that Hegel's is only one representation of the modern problem of individualism. D. Riesman's *Individualism Re-considered* made this point in 1954 as did Stephen Lukes' *Individualism* in the 1970's. [30])

This being said, of particular concern is how Hegel sets up discussion about 'the social' in terms of a gap between the particular 'I' and the universal 'We'. The danger is that there is a reduction of the subject and object to a sameness of opposites which needs a third term; a 'concept of thought', to bring about an identification. The presupposition operating here is the distance separating one individual from another. Isolation like a second nature surrounds the individual, concealing the absence of

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[29] M.C. Taylor (1980) says that Hegel makes this point as follows:
Hegel's recognition of the essential coimplication of opposites enable us to see that the individual is *never* only the individual. To the contrary, concrete individuality arises *only* through the internal relation of self and other.
p. 273

[30] D. Riesman (1954) defends the individualism that will not sacrifice the individual to the needs of the group. p. 38. Stephen Lukes (1974) argued that progressive conceptualization of the supreme worth of the individual has had harmful social implications in political, economic , religious and ethical spheres.

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true relation. Viewed in this way, the individual continues to have identity, to live, to move, to meet with others. But the quality of relation is coarsened, and instead of reflecting the spiritual sense of God's creation lapses into the struggle for survival that Hegel so vividly depicts. E. Levinas' distinctive ontology of the plurality of beings is critical of Hegel and the whole of Western Metaphysics for this reason. "Most often", he says, it is "an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by the interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures comprehension of being". [31] In other words, relation is a function that brings together isolated beings which are separate before they are social.

The peculiar perspective on Hegel's notion of relation offered by Levinas is considered more fully in Chapter 4. For the moment, the impression of relation to which I refer can be seen in the usage of the words for relation in §§ 90 - 165. The most general word for relation is the noun *Verhältnis,* which occurs over 150 times throughout the *Phenomenology* in singular and plural forms. It occurs 50 times in the infinitive and compound infinitive verb forms and 41 times in verb form with a singular subject. Its meaning can vary but in §§ 90 - 165 tends to be used either in the impersonal sense of approaching an idea or object (90; 123) to describe the connection between the act of knowing and its object; *"das Verhältnis, ... das Wissen und der Gegenstand* (100), or as an umbrella term for that feature or attribute of things which is involved when considering the particular individual in connection with another; *"nämlich das*

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[31] E. Levinas (1979) pp. 40 & 43 respectively.

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*Verhältnis zu Anderem".* ( 128 also 114; 125. ) In other words, Hegel's uses the idea of relation to indicate a particular type of connection between discrete entities.

This limited sense of relation is seen in the way various verb forms of the infinitive *beziehen* occur 11 times in §§ 111 - 165 including twice in the compound form *Sichaufbeziehen*, meaning to relate to oneself (113). In the main it is used of perception [*Wahrnehmung*] as the determination of thought in detaching itself from sense-certainty and being plunged into the contradiction of being pure and simple negativity: "The This is, therefore, established as *not* This, or as something superseded" (113). The 'I's comprehension of its own existence is one of distinction within itself of what it 'is' and the reflective distinguishing of itself from objective universality: "Our Nothing, as the Nothing of the This, preserves its immediacy ... but is a universal immediacy" (*ibid.*). What this means becomes clearer in §§ 111 - 131 on "Perception: or the Thing and Deception" regarding the relation between subject and object. The object or 'opposite' is spoken of in two ways; in the form of posited selfhood; "a relation of self to self" [*sich auf sich bezieht*] (114) and as objective otherness; "the universality ... *otherness* itself .. immediately present for him" (116). [32] In both senses it is present to the subject as an object of perception for understanding across the void of reflective consciousness.

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[32] J. Habermas (1987) condemns the *Phenomenology* as caught within an ego-centric principle of subjectivity; "the infinite processing of the relation-to-self that swallows up everything finite within itself". p. 36.

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Note how the verb *beziehen* is often used to effect the play on words between the noun for object [*Gegenstand*] and its adjectival, objective form [*gegenstandlich*], the noun for in opposition to [*Gegenteil*], and its additional adjectival form which also means opposite to, [*gegenteilig*]. For example, § 144 states: "The One is the *moment of negation*; it is quite simply a relation of self to self and it excludes an other ... As a One, ... the determinateness is set free from this unity with its opposite, and exists in and for itself". [33] We see this particularly in the relationship between the particular 'I' and universality where reflective action takes sense-certainty towards identification with universality as the truth of its particular 'I'-ness: "With this, the Understanding has indeed superseded its own untruth and the untruth of the object. What has emerged for it as a result is the Notion of the True ..." (133). It is the universal, he says, which is the true content of sense-certainty. "Through the fact, then, that we regard the characteristic of being a universal medium as *our* reflection, we preserve the self-identity and truth of the Thing, its being a One" (119).

This notion of the 'I' being "a One" leaves me wary because any notion of the social presupposes a separation of opposites. C. Taylor speaks of an original richness of consciousness being lost in difference; "sensible certainty as a conception ... is a prey to contradiction ... in principle unrealizable". [34] R. B. Pippin observes that contradiction is at the heart of Hegel's notion of

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[33] "*Das Eins ist das* Moment der Negation, *wie es selbst auf eine einfach Weise sich auf sich bezieht und Anderes ausschließt ...als* Eins *aber ist sie, wie sie von dieser Einheit mit dem Gegenteil befreit*". (114).

[34] C. Taylor (1975) p. 142.

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immediate identity as an "identity of identity and nonidentity." Contradiction, he says, is seen as a metaphysical doctrine for Hegel at the heart of all movement and vitality. [35] Hegel allows opposition to become entrenched at the very heart of human consciousness. §§ 132 - 165 on "Force and the Understanding" make this plain. His notion of 'force' is consciousness aware of itself as a comprehensible and distinct unity, wanting to maintain its original separateness: "Force, *splits*" into an antithesis which at first appears to be an independent difference, but which in fact proves *to be none*; for it is the *selfsame* which repels itself from itself" (156). If we accept Hegel's notion of particularity as original to the self, ontology is still not liberated from regressive reflection of the self upon itself. It is still, as he observes himself, "communing directly with itself, enjoying only itself; although it seems to be busy with something else" (163).

Thus I have shown that the easiest and, I argue, the necessary way into Hegel's understanding of *identity* [*Identität*] is at a level of logical abstraction. Far from being just a logical principle, Hegel shows the idea of *identity* to feed into concerns about the human will, the natural order, morality, culture, society etc. As a moment within the science of consciousness, Hegel's idea of *identity* is a pivotal point from which all his social theory develops. We saw this in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology* where the principle of identity was claimed to manifest itself in a process of thought from simple abstractness to something that is relational and

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[35] R. Pippin, "Hegel's Metaphysics and the Problem of Contradiction", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 16, pp. 301 - 312. See *SL* esp. pp.439 - 442.

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conditioned: "Self-identity ... is pure abstraction; but this is *thinking* ... Comprehended in this is the fact that Being is Thought". (54). Here in §§ 90 - 165 we have seen again that Hegel's basis for social theory makes 'being' individual logically prior to any notion of the social. Thus I have identified two levels, so far, at which the concept of *identity* operates for Hegel; at the level of logical principle and as a moment within the science of consciousness.

To recapitulate, in any contemporary consideration of identity and relation it is clear that we cannot shake off our past. M.C. Taylor's 1980 *Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard* is just one illustration of the lasting significance of Hegel's critique of Kant, especially regarding the unitary idea of the self as providing a contact point for the experience of the self in the modern and postmodern world. [36] Placing the idea of 'identity' squarely back at the centre of the contemporary philosophical agenda, he makes the point that we are all, to some extent, living off the 'intellectual capital' of the post-Reformation period in looking for contemporary criteria in interpreting the modern sense of identity. The question is whether we too are to adopt the distinction or opposition [*Gegenstand*] between the single 'I' and the universal 'We' as axiomatic for a notion of relation. Are there any other options for change? [37]

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[36] See also M. C. Taylor (1984) "Disappearance of the Self" which claims to show how both Kant and Hegel's idea of the self 'deconstructs' itself because of a fallacious reliance on the idea of "self-sameness." pp. 36 - 7.

[37] M.C. Taylor (1980) compares Hegel and Kierkegaard, the latter insisting, Taylor thinks, that to be individual is deliberately not to be identified in relation with others: "The individual is only the individual. [*Den Enkelte kun er den Enkelte*]. p. 272. Quoting from *Fear and Trembling*, Transl. W. Lowrie.

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## 2. D. *OPTIONS FOR CHANGE?*

I have suggested reasons why Hegel's starts from the wrong place in order to reach an adequate understanding of the social, simply playing off the 'I' over against the 'We'. As yet, Hegel has offered no adequate way of healing the isolation of the 'I' *vis-á-vis* the universal 'We'. Perhaps he has no intention of so doing. R. Rorty thinks that the *Phenomenology* is just a literary device designed for this purpose of engaging the one over against the other; "not an argumentative procedure or way of unifying subject and object, simply a literary skill ... constantly shifting vocabularies, thereby changing the subject". [38] As Rorty observes, Hegel merely makes smooth, rapid transitions from one moment or terminology to the other. [39]

It is not enough, however, to throw stones at Hegel if no alternatives can be energized. [40] Especially in the light of J. Milbank's recent suggestion that we "re-do" Hegel's critique of the Enlightenment, his critique of Christian practice, and encounter of the philosophical *logos* with the theological *logos* within a more explicitly Christian framework, we must ask what options for change there are available. [41] Contemporary theologians including some feminists feel strongly

(1970) Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 80; 3: 119.

[38] R. Rorty (1989) p. 78.

[39] R. Rorty (1989) p. 78.

[40] Karl Barth once said: "Theology had, and still has no occasion to throw stones at Hegel if it has not trodden the same path as he, only not in so firm or so logical a manner as he did". (1959b) p. 281.

[41] J. Milbank (1990) Ch. 6 pp. 147 f. "The best way to 'retrieve' Hegel would be to try to see this narrative of Christian *Bildung* as itself foundational" p. 173.

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about the need for new foundations for an understanding of relation. Daphne Hampson looks for a "different sense of self and different sense of relationality". Talking about relation in Hegelian terms has repercussions, she says, for the assumed opposition between women and men. [42] From a different context, Enrique Dussel, a contemporary Latin American Liberation theologian condemns Hegel as an example of modern European philosophy's "culture of the centre" which denigrates anything other than the thinking 'I' to the edges of consciousness. Consequences are drawn from European philosophy for subsequent colonial exclusion of 'third world' countries to "the periphery". [43] There is clearly a need for a new basis for social theory other than that offered by Hegel.

Having thus identified the need to resituate Hegel's starting point for consideration of the social from the particularity and asocial self to sociality we must look for new articulations of individuality and relation. Some work is being done across the range of non-Christian social theory. Michael Argyle's 1991 *Cooperation. The Basis of Sociability* is, for example, an experimentally based study in the human capacity to cooperate. Cooperation, he says, may well be inherent in human nature as opposed to being learnt through social functions: "All kinds of cooperation have a universal, possibly innate, part which is much the same in all cultures". [44] It is common for representatives of biological, [45] ecological, [46] geographical, [47] and political

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[42] Daphne Hampson (1990) p. 119.

[43] E. Dussel (1985) esp. pp. 4 - 15.

[44] M. Argyle (1991) p. 243.

[45] See K. Lorenz' (1963) biological study of e.g., "Social Organization without

disciplines to find that the social is an undervalued concept when thinking about the individual. Over against the claim by the so called 'new right' that "there is no such thing as society; there are only individuals and families". [48]  D. Marquand, J. Boswell and others represent significant attempts to mediate between the discrediting of the idea of society as an existing entity, and assuming the social somehow comes about through changes in environmental, political and economic values. [49]

Specifically in Chapter 3, I take Habermas's interpretation of Hegel as the most promising exploration of the communicative nature of the self as a test ground to look at whether the social signifies a function to link multiple particulars, a 'property' of the substance of the 'I', or is *constitutive*  of who the 'I' is. With Hegel and Habermas together I ask: Can sociality be accorded primacy in our social thinking?  The question raises general issues of the relation between theology and non-Christian socio-philosophy, especially regarding how to appraise

Love" (Ch. IX) in flock organizations. His plea is that human society is so characterized by aggression that biological sciences must be employed to appreciate human bonds of love and friendship (Ch. XIV, esp. p. 258).

[46] For study of the need for sound ecological / social practices as early as 1959 see R.F. Dasmann (1959) on *Environmental Conservation*.

[47] P. Dickens & P.E. Lloyd (1981) comment on the simultaneity of individualist and interdependent urban values, the "phenomenon of individuals rubbing together" (p. 15)

[48] For this as a quote from Mrs. Thatcher see R. Dahrendorf "Changing Social Values under Mrs. Thatcher" in R. Skidelsky (1988) p. 195.

[49] E.g., D. Marquand (1988), pp. 31 - 2; 81 - 2; 86. See F.A. Hayek, *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics* (1967).  J. Boswell (1990) "I suggest that the value of community is ... the summit of our thinking about social ideals ... even though it has fallen into disrepair" p. 10.

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the pre-existing divisions and conflicts of consciousness that Hegel perceives.   The position of a Christian theology of salvation *vis-á-vis*  non-Christian social theory, as proposed by this study, is at the same time both critical and affirmative.   I can safely say that I do not identify myself too closely with the options for change proposed by Habermas.   My aim is to draw from his work whatever liberating factors exist in his re-interpretation of Hegel.   The intention is to illuminate analogies of the healing effect wrought in Christ which may be utilized in giving content to what God's salvation is like in social economic and political terms.

## 3. A.  *DID HEGEL'S PARABLE GET IT RIGHT?*

Can sociality be accorded primacy in our thinking about the self?   In this Chapter I address the question in the light of Hegel's analysis of the self's existence *for itself,* as recounted in §§. 166 - 230 of the *Phenomenology*.   These sections bring together questions about the fears and uncertainties of human existence alongside issues surrounding the temporal nature and social existence of the self.   Hegel's general concern is with the certainty and satisfaction of self-conscious existence, and Chapter IV of the *Phenomenology*  starts with a critical reflection on what it is to be certain of individual selfhood; "a certainty which is identical with its truth" (§ 166).   §§. 166 - 230 include the (in)famous Lord / Bondsman parable in which the fear of losing identity takes concrete form in the so-called 'trial by death'.   Hegel's parable itself does not mediate an analogy of what God's salvation is like.   It points, however, to the need for parables through which it is possible and entirely correct to speak of salvation in a social context in an analogous sense.

No story from nineteenth century philosophy has had a greater impact upon modern social theory than the Lord / Bondsman parable.   The contemporary reader of Hegel cannot but be aware of the many interpreters who have gone before, and wonder whether there is anything worth saying that has not already been said. [1]   Nonetheless, the fact is that it has a classic quality,

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[1] See R. H. Roberts, "The Reception of Hegel's Parable of the 'Lord and Bondsman" in *New  Comparison. A Journal of Comparative and Literary Studies,*  Vol. 5, 1988, pp. 23-39.

addressing perennial assumptions that individual identity consists in struggles over conflicting interests, desires and needs. Much discussion about the parable has centred on whether it is an arbitrary paradigm of psychological and social behaviour or the expression of an inclusive, necessary method arising from the nature of consciousness. H. Adelman phrases it neatly in his article "Of Human Bondage", when he asks if the parable expresses contingent forms of fearful and conflict oriented consciousness or forms which are permanent in human experience. [2]

This question is central as I argue that human nature is not inherently or necessarily conflict oriented; identity and conflict are separable. With this question of the contingent or permanent nature of fear and conflict in the human experience in mind, I distinguish two different forms that fear takes in §§ 207 - 230; the fear of death and meaninglessness. The Preface has already spoken of death as the first and most universal type of fear: "Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful" (32). Fear, for Hegel, is an ambiguous experience. Though a force that destroys relation it is also the power that resists death and is present in the experience of nothingness; "this is the tremendous power of the negative" (*ibid.*). The fear of death is present in every self-consciousness. The fear of meaninglessness is also present in every self-consciousness and is expressed as the uncertainty experienced in the need for recognition: "A self-consciousness exists *for a self-consciousness*. Only so is it in fact self-

[2] H. Adelman "Of Human Bondage" in D. P. Verene Ed., (1980) *The Hegel Society of America 1976*, pp. 119 - 134.

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consciousness; ..." (177). For Hegel, the fear of death is not only physical (§§ 452f.). It is a *spiritual* element in human experience, formative of *finite* human identity in the sense of being integral to the higher, rational element in humankind: "In that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being ... the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness" (§ 194). [3]

A. Kojève makes death and the fear of death the major emphasis in his interpretation of the *Phenomenology*, insisting that the thinking of death is the only way that human consciousness discovers its potential for life: "It is death that engenders Man in Nature, and it is death that makes him progress to his final destiny". [4] Death is not 'nothing' or false for Hegel, says Kojève, but must be 'lived with' or 'lived through' in order that human consciousness be fully itself. "It is therefore, when all is said and done, this consciousness of death that humanizes Man and constitutes the ultimate basis of his humanity". [5] Consider the overall structure of §§ 166 - 230.

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[3] The only time Hegel uses the term 'finitude' [*Begrenzung*] is in §731 to talk of the independent existence of the gods of antiquity. *Begrenzung* is translated as 'limitation' by A.V. Miller in § 731.

[4] A. Kojève, "The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel" in "Interpretation. A Journal of Political Philosophy" Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 114 - 157. We do not follow Kojève in believing the celebrated struggle of lordship and bondage to represent the nub of Hegel's philosophy; "the key to an understanding of the Hegelian system in its totality and to the *Phenomenology* in particular" (p. 134). He does, however, usefully facilitate a reading of the *Phenomenology* in terms of the human consciousness rather than a mystical, quasi-divine idealism. This is useful in assessing the impact of of the desire of consciousness for recognition and objectification of itself through a struggle for identity.

[5] A. Kojève (1969) p. 153. The fear of death is the source of selfhood for Hegel; "the profound basis of Hegelian anthropology is formed by this idea that

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As the debate moves on from the Lord and Bondsman parable to new 'shapes' [*Gestalt*] of consciousness, the point is that neither the Stoic nor the sceptic has a real answer.  The Stoic, for example, suffers from self-delusion, unaware that its withdrawal from the struggle is correlate to the surrender of selfhood; "it has not there achieved its consummation as absolute negation" (§ 201).  Neither can the Sceptic ever be more than partially free, denying any permanent relation with the truth; "it owns to being a wholly contingent, single and separate consciousness - a consciousness which is *empirical,* which ... it knows has no truth for it" (§ 205).  Escape from the fear of death is no simple desire for the immediate satisfaction of the self's interests but a fundamental question of hope.

The subject is emotive.  There is no denying the *a priori* fact of natural death; the unavoidable radical negation in response to which life is either be enhanced or undermined.  But the fear of death aroused in the self for Hegel is not only a realization of the fact that humans must die.  It is a fundamental constituent of the truth of selfhood; "the essence of the negative movement in which consciousness turns against its particular individuality, but which, *qua relation,* is *in itself positive* ..." (§ 226).  Here is the crux issue: Is fear and the negative moment of death *in itself positive?*   Is it the passage to the social or does it strike at the root of sociality?  Fear, Hegel appears to say, makes a positive contribution to social meaning.  But this, I argue, is consequent upon a 'tragic' notion of selfhood.  Instead of

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Man is not a Being that *is* in an eternal identity to itself in Space, but a Nothingness that *nihilates* as Time in spatial Being, through the negation of this Being". p. 48.

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this, we require a paradigm shift to a communicative and cooperation based sociality. [6]

## 3. B.  *DOES FEAR DETERMINE SOCIALITY?*

The sense of human fear which gives this parable that accent of humanity is the stamp of Hegel's genius.  It can be read as any tragic drama in which events perpetuate the disastrous trauma. The reminder of "absolute negation" which the *Phenomenology* never tires of presenting, contains the basic ingredient of tragedy - inevitability.  But it is not only the death that kills outright that is the main cause of fear in §§ 166 - 198; "for this universal flux has its negative nature only in being the supersession of them" (169).  The realism of the scene in Hegel is potentially much more varied in its devices.  From the force that makes the self into a thing through fear there proceeds another force, and much more portentous, that which determines life while the self is still fearful - the fear of meaninglessness. Given that the 'I' is in search of "The Truth of Self-Certainty" - as Hegel says, "[S]elf-consciousness is Desire" (174), this undefinable influence of fear is exercised by those with enough self-certainty to exert themselves explicitly; "*in an objective manner*" (174). It is not exercised by those whom the satisfaction of desire could deprive them of life but only by those who take fear seriously enough to dare to express a desire: "A self-consciousness exists *for a self-consciousness*. Only so

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[6] J. Sensat captures the significance of this in political terms.  He argues that Habermas' critique of Marx rests on the latter's Hegelian influenced failure to recognize socialization not conflict in the process of social evolution. J. Sensat (1979) Ch. 4.

is it in fact self-consciousness ... the object of Desire" (177). At least some will have experience of desire and step out "into the spiritual daylight of the present" (*ibid.*). But the implication is that there are others, more miserable selves, who without the fear of meaningless and not attaining self-satisfaction have become things for the rest of their lives.

It is significant that the word 'meaning' [*Bedeutung*] (translated both as significance and meaning in A.V. Miller's edition), occurs thirteen times in §§ 166 - 230, as a noun. The past-participle 'recognized' [*anerkannt*] occurs four times and is interpreted by A.V. Miller as 'being acknowledged' and being recognized (§§ 178 & 185). Other verbal forms appear thirteen times. In the main, the fear of meaninglessness is expressed as the need for recognition and there are four different uses of the word 'meaning' [*Bedeutung*] in relation to the idea of recognition: meaning in relation to opposition [*entgegengesetzen Bedeutung*] (§ 178); meaning that is dual [*doppelte Bedeutung*] (§§ 178, 182); meaning that is required or demanded [*geforderte Bedeutung*] (§ 188); and positive meaning, [*positive Bedeutung*] (§ 196). Hegel seems to think that it is the need for meaning and recognition that gives opposition its basis in relational theory. We see this again in the connexion between the third and fourth uses of the word 'meaning' identifiable in §§ 166 - 230 - namely, required or demanded meaning [*geforderte Bedeutung*] (§ 188) and positive meaning [*positive Bedeutung*] (§ 196). "[N]egativity is not negativity *per se*, and therefore is formative activity" (*ibid.*). Death and the fear of meaninglessness have become existential values.

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But is Hegel only arguing against himself here? § 196 speaks of the formative and positive significance of the self's own negativity of fear; "the negative significance of fear", suggesting that death and negativity exist in a creative union with free self-consciousness. Only when we appreciate the dialogical character of Hegel's style do we realize that his thought is self-polemic. As G. Steiner writes: "Hegel, and this is rare, was able to *think against himself*". [7] Because the prospect of death casts a shadow of fear in these passages, perhaps it is only that Hegel values human relation and regrets the limits that fear imposes.

This dialogical character of his thought raises the important point that we must identify what, if anything, is of constructive value in Hegel's theory of fear. In what sense can fear be thought of as a formative activity in overcoming the threat of meaninglessness? Mary Daly's paradigmatic account of the "enspiriting process" or recreation of the female self is patterned on Hegelian imagery:

> To the degree that the Female Self has been possessed by the spirit of
>
> patriarchy, she has been slowly expiring ... lacking independent vigour
>
> and forcefulness. ... As she creates new her Self she creates new space ..." [8]

Daly uses Hegel's test of the control and use of fear not only of what fear does *to* people but what fear does *for* them, implying that women need to interiorize a mastery of fear in order to become oneself. José Miranda who was perhaps one of the most influential early liberation theologians wrote in 1971;

> dialectical thought does grasp the contradiction ...this is because dialectical

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[7] G. Steiner (1984) p. 20.

[8] M. Daly (1979) p. 340.

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thought believes in hope ...Man is an abstraction if he does not signify suffering, working struggling mankind. Such is the subject, but such too is the object of knowing". [9]

The message is that the oppressed need Hegelian and Marxist dialectics as a defence against those who would exploit them. Both Daly and Miranda are struggling to maintain a control of fear appropriate to a responsible agent.

Daly and Miranda would have us acknowledge - and I agree - that the control and use of fear is necessary if any individual is to be the maker of his or her own life. In this Hegel highlights a real and intrinsic connection between fear and the very heart of self-understanding and psychology. [10] Liberation theologians have spoken of "the awakening of consciousness", arguing that fear-mastery is integral to self-understanding and relation. [11] As Daly and Miranda are aware, the parable can be used to empower the fearful to improve their chances of survival by creating new expectations of life. On the other hand, what are the consequences of this parable of fear-mastery becoming a basis for an under_standing of selfhood which allows no possibility for relation other than that motivated by fear? Far from offering a release from the fear of death as the problem *par excellence* of selfhood, if the fear of death is natural as Hegel suggests, the necessity of fear-mastery and the ideals of responsibility and self-identity must be sustained. "Life

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[9] J. P. Miranda (1977) pp..271 & 273.

[10] Donald Evans (1980) makes a psychological study into how the conflicting tendencies of trust and fear lead one both to affirm and to deny life. He argues that struggle and fulfilment are the main constituents of selfhood.

[11] E.g., J. Míguez Bonino (1983) pp. 103 - 6.

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consists ... in the self-developing whole which dissolves its development and in this movement simply preserves itself" (171). If fear is taken as one's teacher it is possible to become its master, but the necessity of the lesson is terrible.

Hegel is not blind to this. He uses the idea of fear-mastery to show what cannot be attained by its values of self-realization as much as its value for inspiration: "What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses ... " (177). He knows that fear-mastery alone is insufficient to attain the higher, rational element in the self. Yet the real subject of §§ 166 - 230 is fear. Not only is death deeply embedded in authentic selfhood for Hegel, but the fear of death and meaninglessness is what makes human selfhood authentically real: "If it has not experienced absolute fear but only some lesser dread, the negative being has remained for it something external, its substance has not been affected by it through and through" (§ 198). Not only is the self subject to the fear of death but here the truth of selfhood is found.

Hegel uses an almost Homeric style in recounting the parable, showing the misfortune of human consciousness not as a goal for which to strive, but to be recalled and respected as a judgement. [12] S. Weil's essay "The 'Iliad', Poem of Might" recapitulates the vicious circle of war in Homer's epic in a way that shows Hegel's parable to shadow its dramatic unfolding: "The thought of death

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[12] Similar points are made by J. Shklar (1976) pp. 57 - 68. "The battle of heroic competition cannot be anything less than mortal combat. Hector and Achilles never consider anything else". p. 59.

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cannot be sustained ... death itself is their [warriors] future". [13] Like Hegel, she illustrates how sensations of fear, threat, reification and the undefinable influences of human presence on the self overlap.   George Steiner's *Real Presences* situates Hegel's dialectic of meaninglessness amidst poets and philosophers of the modern era for whom heroic but doomed action becomes almost obsessive: "The enigma of nothingness haunts the inception of cosmological and philosophical thought in the Western tradition" [14]   Steiner sees Hegel as expressing the kind of meaningless that arises when the self is driven by some ill-understood desire for self-assurance which dare not surrender to itself or the enemy.

So, we simply cannot negotiate the fragility of the 'I' or the compulsion to self-preservation which roots our fear.   He makes plain the formative function of fear in the development of the self: "In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness" (§ 189).   Similar to a tragic drama in which events move to a fatal, inevitable conclusion, Hegel's parable is an expression of human misfortune *par excellence*.   "The outcome is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal" (191). [15] Like tragic drama it has a purging effect

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[13] S. Weil, "The 'Iliad' or the Poem of Force", (1986)pp. 182-215.

[14] G. Steiner (1989) p. 133. Leibniz, Pascal, Heidegger, Sartre and Derrida are but a few whom Steiner mentions in connection with the Hegelian influenced idea of the 'death of God'. "The break with the postulate of the sacred is the break with any stable, potentially ascertainable meaning of meaning". p. 132.

[15] Sartre's comment is apt:
   What the gambler apprehends at this instant is again the permanent rupture in determinism; it is nothingness which separates him from himself. ... *I must rediscover the fear of financial ruin or of disappointing my family, etc.*,

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in which reading the parable prevents us from becoming overcharged with tragic emotion at the foregone conclusion almost without hope that both master and slave cry for deliverance. Every facet teaches the uncertainty of human nature. The progress of relation is no more than the play of fear and desire. [16]

Hegel's urge to characterize selfhood by the desire for self-satisfaction is linked with the fear of contingency. In §§ 166 - 230 the noun contingency [*Zufälligkeit*] occurs four times and the adjective [*zufällig*] twice, notably, all within § 205. The word is used consistently throughout the *Phenomenology*, adjectival forms occurring eighty-one times and the adverb [*zufälligerweise*] six times. The noun [*Zufälligkeit*] occurs forty-eight times in the whole text, the idea of contingency providing Hegel with different threats from those discussed previously. Broadly speaking, it takes two forms. The first is described most clearly in Ch. 5, part A, §§ 231 - 346 where he speaks about the cause and effect structure of the natural order where the confusions and caprice of immediate natural existence determine the limits of experience. [17] Organic nature has no

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I must re-create it as experienced fear.
J.P. Sartre (1958) p. 33. On the rapprochment between Hegel and Sartre see R.C. Solomon (1987) *From Hegel to Existentialism*. "Hegel and existentialism form a natural dialectic, whose vicissitudes have come to define not only continental philosophy but much of life in both Europe and America. (p. ix).

[16] Julia Kristeva speaks of negativity as the "death drive" in her reflections on desire; "he who loves a reflection without knowing that it is his own does not, in fact, know who he is". (1987) p. 107. This is a description ot Narcissus but the relation between fear and desire in that myth parallels many concerns of the parable.

[17] See §§ 245; 257; 275; 295. Also the Preface § 10 where the contingency of

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history, he says (§ 295), each part being ruled with the contingency of nature's uncertainty. There is no guiding principle in the natural order, immediate facts independent and unrelated; "the freedom of Nature ... irrationally playing up and down the scale of contingent magnitude" (§ 275).

The second is a distinguishable but related sense of the word 'contingency' used in the context of the argument against Stoicism and Scepticism. [18] The theme of fear is continued as a factor in discussing Stoic and Skeptic expressions of the freedom of selfhood in §§ 197 - 206 where Stoic apathy, he says, is not far removed from the strain of thought that teaches the utter contingency [*völligen Zufälligkeit*] of human selfhood; "in its own self infinite" (§ 202). Contingency, in this second sense, is the singleness and separation of individual self consciousness in the flux or "confused medley" (205) of innumerable other selves:

> This consciousness ... passes back and forth from from the one extreme of
>
> self-identical self-consciousness to the other extreme of the contingent
>
> consciousness that is both bewildered and bewildering (205).

His discussion of Stoicism and Scepticism is neither clear nor detailed but the general aim of the former is easing "universal fear and bondage" (§ 199), by conceiving the world order as basically harmonious. The latter is seen by Hegel as an extension of Stoic apathy: "*Scepticism* is the realization of that of which Stoicism was only the Notion" (§ 202). Its primary

the natural order is again likened to caprice.

[18] R. Solomon (1983) says Hegel refers to the late Stoicism of Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius not that from Zeno to Chrysippus, 3rd. C B.C. (pp. 457 - 461).

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characteristic is what he calls "self-conscious negation" (§ 204), the denial that self-consciousness contains any permanent truth. Selfhood rests in the self's being a single and separate self-consciousnesses for whom there is no ultimate truth.

The question of individual truth *vis-á-vis* ultimate truth is important here because it relates to what Erich Kahler calls the the 'splitting of consciousness' or the 'I' expressed in terms of the "'I' that is We". [19] This fear of contingency is not only negative for Hegel because it requires that the self be able to develop from an immediate, static or non-relational state to the maturity of what Hegel calls the "'I' that is We.". Michael Forster claims: "Hegel's critical interpretation of the skeptical tradition in philosophy proves, then, to be the key ... to unlock the whole of his epistemological enterprise". But compare Forster's account of Hegel's subsuming Stoic and Sceptic fear of contingency within dialectical method; "a proof of Philosophical Science for all nonscientific viewpoints", with David Lamb's presentation of Hegel's absolute as relative to both. [20] Forster names Hegel the anti-skeptic with a series of defenses against both ancient and modern schools. D. Lamb believes that Hegel's dialectical method embraced a total scepticism: "The method employed must be sceptical, and the critique must be used unsparingly against itself", [21] destroying any basis for foundational certainty by

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[19] Erich Kahler (1989, originally published 1957) describes psychological and social effects of the "second consciousness" or splitting of the ego drawing on psychological studies of pain. Ch. 4. The republication of his book reflects its curiously up-to-date diagnosis of the pervasive *malaise* of human consciousness.

[20] M.N. Forster (1989) p. 172.

[21] M.N. Forster (1989) p. 4. See Ch.s 7 & 8 on Hegel's defences against Skepticism. D. Lamb (1980) p. 24.

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accepting the ultimate partiality of truth. [22]

Forster and Lamb's differing perspectives on the quest for self-certainty *vis-á-vis* the contingency of selfhood illustrate the tension inherent in the text. On the one hand, the freedom of consciousness can be managed only, Hegel says, by those for whom self-certainty is an uncompromising demand or "required meaning" [*geforderte Bedeutung*] (§ 188). This demand of free self-consciousness is a simple truth of freedom: "The individual who has not risked his life ... has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self consciousness" (§ 187). On the other hand, if such independent self consciousness is of the stoic or sceptic kind, it is never wholly aware of the truth because of isolation and singularity.

> In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself.
>
> In Scepticism, this freedom becomes a reality, negates the other side
>
> of determinate existence, but really duplicates *itself*, and now knows itself
>
> to be a duality (§ 206).

He condemns the "simple freedom" of consciousness which develops centrifugally only to enjoy its own 'I'ness, recalling the statement in §184 that not only does the self develop centrifugally from its own centre in response to inbred desires but also centripetally in recognition of another: "They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* one another" (184). "*For itself* " he says, free self-consciousness remains pitiable, hinting that to cope with contingency is a social process that involves recognition of a 'universal will' (§ 230). [23]

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[22] D. Lamb (1980) pp. 34 - 39; "From Explanation to Description: Hegel".

[23] Hegel's idea of 'universal will' is very different from Rousseau's notion of the social contract in which each individual is alienated with all his/her rights to the

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So, did Hegel's parable get it right?  Yes, it would appear, at least insofar as these fears are part of the permanent and enduring existence of the self and human relation.  He offers, as Lamb suggests, a presuppositionless presentation of the shapes of consciousness. [24]  But is this the whole story?  Hegel's depiction of free self-consciousness lived out over an abyss of fear ignores the crucial question of whether contingency, fear and meaninglessness have been given an entirely unacceptable slant.  My main point lies in the implication of Hegel's words - not that these passages describe the uncertainties of consciousness, rather, they imply that because of possible results, fear and death are positive, not negative.  Fear is made the criterion of relation not relation the criterion of fear. [25] The crux for the contemporary reader must surely be whether Hegel shows *that* it is the case that death is inseparably joined with life or whether he describes what happens *when* free self-consciousness is desired above all else.

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universal will. On Hegel's reaction against Rousseau's idea of weakness making a person social see J. Hyppolite (1974) pp. 11 f.  On Hegel's unfairness to Rousseau in failing to recognize that he wanted a more integral, universal idea of reason than arbitrarily bringing individuals into agreement see C. Taylor (1979) pp. 406 - 414.  On Rousseau's lack of belief in progress as a major point of contrast with Hegel see Hilail Gildin "Revolution and the Formation of Political Society in the Social Contract" Interpretation Vol. 5, issue 3, pp. 247 - 265.

[24] D. Lamb (1980) p. 37.

[25] Cf. Hegel's treatment of death in "The Revealed Religion" where, by being raised to the level of "natural universality", the death of "the divine Man" is almost said not to be the enemy of life:

> The *death* of the divine Man, *as death*, is *abstract* negativity, ... This self-consciousness therefore does not actually *die*, ... but its particularity dies away in its universality, i.e., in its knowledge, which is essential Being. (784).

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## 3. C.  *A PARADIGM SHIFT?*

'Paradigm shift' is the phrase used by Habermas for the conversion from purposive activity to communicative action. [26] He speaks of individual subjectivity being liberated to give content to its social dimensions: "Subjectivity frees itself here from the conventions of daily perception and of purposive activity, from the imperatives of work and of what is merely useful". [27]  Significantly, he views the task of a critical social theory as getting beyond the limitations of egocentric modern philosophy: "The theory of communicative action is meant to provide an alternative to the philosophy of history on which earlier critical theory still relied, but which is no longer tenable". [28]  Of interest here is how this opens up discourse between Christian and non-Christian social theory.  R. Siebert suggests that Habermas allows new discussion of the disunion and reunion of the religious and the secular; he "is able to help political theology's search for a new co-incidence of the religious and the secular". [29]  Habermas is willing, Siebert argues, to break with the Hegelian conjunction between religion and subjection.  He quotes his invitation to political theologians to collaboration on the spiritual situation of our age. [30]

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[26] J. Habermas (1987b) Ch. V "The Paradigm Shift in Mead and Durkheim: From Purposive Activity to Communicative Action".

[27] J. Habermas (1987 b) p. 379.

[28] J. Habermas (1987 b) p. 397.

[29] R. Siebert (1985) see pp. 473 - 483.

[30] This refers to Habermas's editing *Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age"* (1984) to which D. Sölle, J.B. Metz and J. Moltmann contributed. This is not to forget the purely human content of Habermas's.work:"My experiences have transcendental necessity only under the factual condition of successes and

Like Hegel, Habermas projects an ideal of mutual understanding and intersubjectivity framed within an interest-determined interaction: "The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori". [31]   Unlike Hegel, he claims to address the fundamental problem of socio-philosophy - the relation between instrumental and communicative reason - not bound to the perspective of the subject. [32]   In particular, he reflects on what elements of contemporary socio-philosophy that are influenced by Hegel can be accepted or rejected by a communicative rationality.  As I have said, his rejection of Hegel's 'I' - 'We' framework of thought is most important.  His suggestion is that is is necessary to break this unhelpful mould by providing a new and primary context for debate.  This he terms the 'life-world' [Lebenswelt]. He means by it the totality of cultural, systemic, symbolic and material structures of society.  It is a conceptual notion that has a mediating function whereby the 'I' and the 'We' are related.  He says; "I introduced the system concept of society by way of a methodological objectification of the lifeworld ... in action-theoretic terms". [33]   Significantly, it is this concept of the lifeworld which gives expression to his idea of 'the social', the former having an analytic function obtained by abstraction through his theory of communicative value.

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failures of possible instrumental actions". J. Habermas (1972) p. 129.

[31] J. Habermas (1972) p. 314.  For an evolution of Habermas's thought between 1972 - 1989 see A. Honneth & H. Joas (1988) pp. 151 - 167.  Presupposed human interests remain of decisive importance.

[32] "Social actions can be distinguished according to whether the participants adopt either a success-oriented attitude or one oriented to reaching understanding" J. Habermas (1987 a) p. 286.

[33] J. Habermas (1987b) p. 374.

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The problem as I see it is whether it is possible to break out of Hegel's domestication of fear into mutual recognition. In R.C. Solomon's words: "The question is still personal identity and survival". [34] The question is whether it "ultimately involves a kind of weakening, homogenization, or flattening of any "vital" self". [35] Is the accommodation of self-determination; the ego "as self-deflating as self-inflating", [36] the only way to facilitate the social dependence and interdependence of individuals? In order to address these questions I compare Habermas's communicative and cooperation based sociality with R.B. Pippin's reappropriation of Hegelian subjective logic. Pippin challenges the need for and plausibility of Habermas's paradigm shift, and would have us make a fresh attempt to realize the Hegelian project; "the *PhG* and the *Logic* might provide us with a "logical framework", he suggests, "within which some domain of spirit might be investigated". [37] According to Pippin, it remains incumbent on postmodernity to realize Hegel's project regarding the social nature of self-consciousness: Hegel "provokes again the "groundless" search for reconciliation with other self-conscious agents". [38] Current postmodern problems in attaining a social understanding of consciousness rest in the failure, he says, adequately to account for the individual project of self-determination. Hence, the need to relearn from Hegel

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[34] R.C. Solomon (1980) p.239.

[35] R.B. Pippin (1991) p. 112.

[36] Pippin (1991) p. 165.

[37] R.B. Pippin (1989) p. 259. Ludwig Siep (*Inquiry*, 34. pp. 63 - 76) says Pippin 'transcendentalizes' Hegel's conceptual scheme, unjustifiably interpreting Hegel's notion of consciousness with reference to an extra-conceptual reality.

[38] Pippin (1991) p. 167. By "groundless" Pippin means without reference to Christian metaphysics or even Platonic themes. (pp. 22 f.)

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what he calls the German idea of self-determination or self-grounding. [39]  Anything else, he suggests, is a final co-opting of the autonomous subject.

Pippin describes the causes of fear recounted by Hegel in words similar to those of Habermas; "in Hegel's account of what he calls "negativity," the dissatisfactions responsible for historical change, ... stem from an original failure of self-consciousness". [40]  Yet he steers well clear of Habermas's rethinking sociality, contesting its hopes for a socially integrating appeal to reason in public life.  My unease relates to his retaining the idea of self-determination as central to Hegel and the whole modern project, assuming the Hegelian *ethos* of the 'I' in search of freedom from the fear of reification, death and bondage; "the unavoidable role of a spontaneous self-determination". [41]  Pippin refers in passing to ideas of the ideal speech situation and other forms of "practical wisdom" as possible reconstructions of Hegelian intent.  He wants the radical shift that Habermas thinks to be possible; "the progressive elimination of bases of recognition linked to the mere exercise of power". [42]  But Habermas's limitation, he says, is not being Hegelian enough to understand that the unavoidable role of self-determination can be countered only by a framework of reasoned constraints. [43]

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[39] Pippin (1991) pp. 14.; 110.

[40] Pippin (1991) p. 71.

[41] Pippin (1991) p. 165.

[42] Pippin (1991) pp. 147; 164.

[43] Pippin (1989), pp.6; 39; 103; 120.  Robert, B. Pippin (1989) pp.154; 170; 184.  "Habermas is not anything like "Hegelian" enough" he says, p.197.

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For Pippin, individual identity remains determined by the need to escape from fear and uncertainty through self-determination. This is clear in his interpretation of the relation between Hegel and Nietzsche where he thinks the dispute turns on whether he rejects or realizes an order of relation in which each can be "an individual self" with an identity gained in relation with others. The question is whether Pippin's critique is moulded by the illegitimate presuppositions of Hegel's treatment of the control and use of fear. If so, it will remain caught, for the reasons already shown, in the dualism between talking of 'the social' either in terms of the functions of collected individuals or as a single entity.

I have argued that the heart of Habermas's critical theory is the criticism of this 'I' versus 'We' dichotomy. R. Geuss makes the same point, distinguishing the Frankfurt School tradition of *Ideologiekritik* from Hegelian influenced scientific theory. He suggests three reasons as to why this is significant: 1. Its aim is emancipatory not instrumental knowledge. 2. It has no theory / object divide because it is always part of the object domain it describes. 3. It evaluates and anticipates social conditions beyond the provision of empirical evidence. [44] This is not to suggest that Habermas's own enterprise is not about the meeting of individual needs and interests. To the contrary, in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas's distinction between technical,

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This is argued in "Hegel, Habermas and Modernism", *Monist,* 1990. Cf. Hegel's singular individual seeking the "tranquil unity certain of its [own] truth" (§ 237) in relation to the plurality of others. J. B. Thompson (1990) also prefers a regulated pluralism to Habermas's public opinion formation because of the concentration of power in transnational media conglomerates.

[44] R. Geuss (1981) pp. 79 - 80.

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practical and emancipatory interests stressed that the type of critical theory necessary to bring about their contextualization within a mutual responsibility for society. [45] Similarly, it is not to deny any social possibilities contained within the *Phenomenology*. G. Steiner writes: "The self-realization of 'spirit' (*Geist*) in Hegel's *Phenomenology* is an Odyssey of consciousness ... made in and through speech". [46] This is significant given Habermas's linguistically oriented social theory, suggesting that Habermas might follow at least the intent of Hegel's "Odyssey of consciousness". It is to suggest that by reconceptualizing Hegel's individually instrumental framework for social theory with a communication based concept of action and reason, he makes the type of paradigm shift required when talking about critical and integrative social theory.

In view of Habermas's intentions to set social actions and intents within the cooperative interrelations of society's members, it would obviously be mistaken to represent *The Theory of Communicative Action* as anything more than a contribution to the on going debate about specific problems in social theory. However, in allowing his concerns to stand alongside and influence our concerns of how to speak of salvation in a social context, we are engaged in a particular type of dialogical practice that stresses the importance of learning and expressing theological truths, at least in part, through the language of socio-philosophy.

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[45] J. Habermas (1972) pp. 307 f.

[46] G. Steiner (1989) p. 91.

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This type of dialogical practice enables us, I suggest, to consider Habermas's paradigm shift as a type of parable for Christian social theory. The word parable (Gr. *para* = over + *ballein* = to throw) suggests the harnessing of independent, accepted truths from known fields of knowledge to illustrate truths of God's nature and action. Parabolic language is a second-order discourse that makes God's saving act in Christ the condition for positing analogies wherever possible with non-Christian social theory. It is not surprising perhaps that the theology of liberation has drawn frequently on the parables of Jesus which, says Christopher Rowland, "were an invitation to change things according to God's justice and goodness". [47] There is, of course, a quantum leap between what Habermas means by societal community and Christian talk of the Holy Spirit and community. No amount of analogical reasoning will bridge the gap which says that *all* human action is provisional before the coming again of Jesus Christ. But with properly derived analogical tools we have an interface for dialogue in which political and social values are more adequately assessed.

Three reasons can be suggested as to why a critical reading of Habermas can serve parabolically to illuminate and give content to the idea and practice of sociality. They are as follows: -

1. The first reason why Habermas's communicative action theory is like a parable is that the heart of what he is doing is about communication and relation. This accords with the nature of the human self created in the image of the God who is community and relation *par excellence*.

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[47] C. Rowland and M. Corner (1990) "Parables of Today" p. 9.

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**2**. The second reason is that he subordinates the logic of self-determination to that of communicative action. He subordinates the logic of self-determination to that of communicative action. This means that he addresses squarely problems inherent in the Hegelian heritage regarding the concept of rationality, critical theory and their embodiment in social interaction. By looking for concepts of rationality that are more comprehensive than Hegel's fear determined notion of *Verstand*, he replaces the central concept of self-reflection with the social dynamics of these processes. This gives some practical content to 1.

> Taking as our guideline the idea of a "linguistification" [*Versprachlichung*] of
> this ritually secured, basic normative agreement, ... This concept takes us
> beyond ... purposive activity and purposive rationality. [48]

Self-determining or strategic action is said to presuppose a primary mode of communicative action. Convinced of the need for a paradigm shift from the Kantian and Hegelian philosophy of consciousness, he has exposed the whole ambit of the modern turn to the subject to critical analysis:

> The paradigm of the knowledge of objects has to be replaced by the paradigm
> of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and action.[49]

The values of self-determinative purposive action are made logically to depend on conditions of linguistic interaction.

> Communicative action relies on a cooperative process of interpretation in
> which participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, the
> social and the subjective worlds. [50]

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[48] J. Habermas (1987 b) p. 2.

[49] J. Habermas (1987c) "Communicative versus Subject-centred Reason", Ch. XI, p. 295-6. For Habermas's summary of the links between Kant and Hegel's philosophy of consciousness in relation to his own theory of communicative action see "The Tasks of a Critical Theory" (1987 b) pp. 374-403; (1988) p. xiv.

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He wants to break with the primacy of epistemology and treat questions of communicative action and mutual understanding independently of Kantian and Hegelian presuppositions about the singular nature of the 'I'.

**3**. The third reason why Habermas's communicative action theory is like a parable for a more adequate notion of sociality is that he goes some way to overcoming the 'I' - 'We' divide that plagues Hegel's notion of free self-consciousness.  How?  Through the analyzing of the functions of communicative acts.  Consider the following illustrations (Fig.s 1 & 2) which represent his understanding of the relations of communicative acts.  They are centred around the act of communication.  In any act of communication there are individual actors and the act of communication.  Communication happens largely through language but many factors influence that depending on the "lifeworld" of which the actors are part.  By lifeworld he means all those assumed background norms of geography, history, moral standards, art heritage etc. that provide the general context for thinking about society; all those taken for granted things which individuals may or may not hold in common.

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50 J. Habermas (1987 b) p. 120. Habermas's (1979) *Communication and the Evolution of Society* introduces the shift to communicative action. For a critical account of Hegel's failure to replace models of instrumental reason with inter-subjective rationality, remaining within the framework of subject-object relations see G. Wagner & H. Zipprian *Inquiry*, 34, March 1991 pp. 49 - 62.

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## RELATIONS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS
### Fig. 1

LIFEWORLD

LANGUAGE

(A1)  ←———        ———→ (A2)

COMMUNICATION

CA1  ⇄  CA2

**A = ACTOR**

**CA = COMMUNICATIVE ACTION**

The following, (Fig. 2) is a fuller representation of the same illustration and is based on Habermas's own representation of the World-Relations of Communicative Acts in *The Theory of Communicative Action* Vol. 2. [51]

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[51] J. Habermas (1987b) p. 127.

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## RELATIONS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS
### Fig. 2

LIFEWORLD

LANGUAGE

(A1)                    (A2)

SUBJECTIVE                    SUBJECTIVE
WORLD                          WORLD

(A1)        COMMUNICATION        (A2)

CA1                    CA2

(A1 + A2)

OBJECTIVE                    SOCIAL
WORLD                          WORLD

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
The impact of Fig. 2 is that of action and movement and one can see that what is happening is a resolution of the aforesaid dualism in the activity of communication.    Note how the subjective worlds are here belonging to each individual; so we have the elements of individual responsibility.    Also the objective world, retaining a limited sense in which society can be studied as something which exists for reflection.    This is the work of the empirical sciences.    Also the social world of public structures; local & national government, the media, the judiciary and police.    The arrows represent the relations that communicating actors establish around the goal of critical communication.    It is a dramatic model in which society is understood in terms of the dynamics of human relation. Habermas owes much here to the writings of Talcott Parsons, acknowledging that the questions with which Parsons starts are influential to his own work; "how is society possible as an ordered complex of action". [52]    The intention is to develop the type of conceptual strategy that allows societal mechanisms to connect up with intersubjectivity and critical consciousness.

Here we have diagramatic illustrations of Habermas's conception of communicative integration that is possible and necessary in order to mediate the 'I - We' dichotomy that has plagued modern social theory.    Individually interest-guided action is subordinated to the transcendental condition of action coordination.    Habermas grounds his theory in the basic use of

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[52] J. Habermas (1987b) p. 201. On this see A. Giddens (1978) p. 11 f. Also "Habermas on the Alleged "Priority" of Communicative Action over Strategic Considerations of Power" in A. Smith, *Ethics and Politics in the Work of Jürgen Habermas, Interpretation*, 11, 1983, pp. 333-351.

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language and its orientation towards the communication of each person's narrative of events that take place in their lifeworld, and understanding. The 'subjective worlds' and the 'objective worlds' presuppose the original mode of communicative action.

> In the communicative practice of everyday life, persons do not only encounter
>
> one another in the attitude of participants; they also give narrative
>
> presentations of events that take place in the context of their lifeworld. [53]

He is replacing Hegel's philosophy of self-conscious reflection with a critique of mutual understanding, a subjective philosophy of individually instrumental reason with an intersubjective philosophy of communicatively functional reason.

Thus, to recall the four 'moves' or stages of analogical theology specified in the Introduction, I am now showing something of the relation between the second and third of those stages - namely, the relation between the investigative task of Hegel interpretation and the making of specific contacts between Christian and contemporary non-Christian social theory. This is an interpretative exercise in unpacking a Christian idea of human sociality through dialogue with a specific example of non-Christian social theory. In making points of contact here I am not suggesting that salvation has more to do with human communication than communion with God. That would suggest a horizontal notion of salvation purely in social terms. I am suggesting that because of the human vocation to become like God who is communication and relation *par excellence*, we might well dialogue with those for whom communication is made the norm for how we understand society.

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[53] J. Habermas *ibid.* p. 136.

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## 3. D.  *QUESTIONS THAT ARISE*

The task is not easy and becomes all the more difficult as we realize the extent to which Habermas's theory is problematic in its own spheres of reference. It must be recognized that Habermas's work is not unproblematic and I consider reasons for this shortly. Habermas does, however, use linguistic analysis in shaping a critical theory that, I argue, convincingly breaks free of the constraints of the philosophy of consciousness stemming from Kant and Hegel. I am using the debate between Hegel and Habermas, however, to relearn an understanding of the social in order better to comprehend and articulate the social dimensions of God's salvation. As C. Boff writes: "Theology can construct its socio-analytic mediation only from the findings of a discipline whose conclusions are susceptible of articulation by and in a properly theological discourse". [54]

Following C. Boff, I am using non-theological vocabulary and expertise hermeneutically in order to engage in a critical, interpretative exercise of one of the best contemporary representations available for social relation. The thesis proposed is that Habermas's grounding an idea of the social in the function of communication is a parable of divine salvation if it can be shown to articulate a new quality of relation. In theological terms, the quality issue in relation means asking where salvation (L. *salvere*= to heal) is to be found for selfhood under the control of fear. Salvation as God's healing can be identified only to the "eyes of faith". If, however, substantial content is to be given to an articulation between Christian and

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[54] C. Boff (1987) p. 54.

non-Christian social theory then this type of dialogue is needed in order to provide the contact required.

What we have here is the relation between 'first' and 'second' theology really being put to the test. [55] To recapitulate, 'first' theology corresponds to the confessional doctrines of God, creation, incarnation etc. 'Second' theology is an outworking of the content of these doctrines through socio-analytical mediation. In Boff's words, "Second theology does not work *upon* the concept of salvation ... but works *with* that concept ... Second theology has recourse to this concept to establish the relationship between its content and the reality of liberation".[56] The act of interpreting the impact of Habermas's relocating of Hegel's notion of free self-consciousness within contemporary analytical debate belongs supremely to our own time and concerns context specific issues. By this I mean that, for our purposes, what he says is said primarily of the particular hermeneutic process surrounding the ramifications of Hegelian discussion. But the advantage of considering analogical questions on the level of Habermas's socio-philosophic theory is the fact that his critical method is not caught in the 'I' - 'We' divide that plagues Hegel's notion of free self-consciousness. He aims at a resolution of the aforesaid dualism in the activity of communication.

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[55] Socio-analysis and hermeneutics are the two principles specified by C. Boff as epistemological foundations for a theology of liberation. (1987), pp. 221 - 232.

[56] C. Boff (1987) p. 81. Cf. K. Barth's Introduction to his *Ethics*: "The theme of dogmatics is simply the Word of God, but the theme of the Word of God is simply human existence, life or conduct". God's salvation understood apart from the relation to our experience is, he says, not God but a mere concept of God. p. 17.

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We must be aware that the usefulness of Habermas's paradigm shift to help us articulate what God's salvation is like in socio-philosophical terms is limited.   He has been criticized for neglecting important aspects of human experience.   Barbara Herrnstein Smith, for example, criticizes his ignoring the role of listeners. [57]   István Mészáros condemns his dissolving "real speakers"; passionate and demanding individuals, into "competent speakers" who conform to definitional assumptions. [58]  A further problem is his perhaps undue rejection of 'de-constructionist' writers, at least in his early essays.   Contrary to what Habermas indicates in the aforementioned article *Modernity versus Postmodernity*, [59] there is no blanket denial in 'postmodernity' of a social articulation of the individual need for identity. [60]   R. Rorty's emphasis on the public project of solidarity in *Contingency, irony and solidarity* is evidence of this.   "What can there be" he asks, "except human solidarity, our recognition of one another's common humanity?" [61]

Charles Taylor finds Habermas' conception of the social too narrow.   "The fact that the self is constituted through exchange in language ... doesn't in any way guarantee us against loss of meaning, fragmentation, the loss of substance in our human

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[57] B. Herrnstein Smith in J. Fekete Ed. (1987)  "Truth Without Truth Value" pp. 16 - 21.

[58] István Mészáros (1989) p. 33.  "Habermas's 'pure communicative action' is a pure fiction" (*ibid.*).

[59] See n.5.

[60] I use 'postmodern' as an umbrella term for a reaching beyond modernity's love of unifying meta-discourses, rational determination of knowledge and belief in the theoretical truth of scientific and technological progress.

[61] R. Rorty (1989) p. 189.

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environment and our affiliations". [62] In his search to explain the degree of moral consensus that is evident throughout modernity, Habermas's account of modern identity leaves Taylor unsatisfied with his functional emphases on language as a foundation for the social sciences. He has strong intuitions that the practice of communication and morality points to some other source supporting the norms to which Habermas appeals. [63]

For aesthetic reasons T. Eagleton warns against a demise of the idea of the social as something humanity might 'be'. Lamenting the loss of the aesthetic as a social force the implication in his work is that Habermas's purely functional critique is incomplete. "The idea of a human nature does not suggest that we should realize any capacity which is natural, but that the highest values we *can* realize spring from part of our nature ... " [64] It cannot, he says, take account of what it is to 'be' both individual and social: "What is it to 'be' a woman, a homosexual, a native of Ireland?" [65] Similarly, Richard Rorty distances himself from Habermas' locating of the social in the activity of communication for "poetic" reasons: "He (Habermas) thinks of his account of "communicative reason" as a way of updating rationalism. I do not want to update either universalism or rationalism but to dissolve both and replace them with something else". [66] Rhetoric, poetics and

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[62] C. Taylor (1989) pp. 509 - 510.

[63] "The intention of this work was ... to make these sources again empower, to bring the air back again into the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit". *Ibid.,* p. 520.

[64] T. Eagleton (1990) p. 412.

[65] T. Eagleton (1990) p. 414.

[66] R. Rorty (1989) p. 67.

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imagination are the primary elements of human society but none, he suggests, are accounted for by Habermas adequately.

Taylor, Eagleton and Rorty make the point that relation and communication are inherently suggestive of the *quality* of human sociality rather than its mere presence or absence. Such qualitative usage connects us immediately to Habermas's perceived need to break free of the Hegelian self-determination of consciousness through fear:

> Hegel's experience of reflection shrinks to the consciousness that we are
>
> delivered over to a process, itself irrational, in which the conditions of
>
> rationality change with time and place .... [67]

The criticisms of C. Taylor, Eagleton and Rorty are pertinent but do not invalidate our question of whether Habermas's paradigm shift can function as a symbol or metaphor of divine salvation. To the contrary, they sharpen the issue. Framing a critique of Hegel and Habermas in these terms requires asking how faith - to use C. Boff's word - *clarifies* [68] the *quality* issues of human relation.

Hence, it is clear that merely representing the content of Habermas's shift towards a paradigm of communicative action provides no analogy of salvation unless it signifies something additional. The energy of symbol or parable depends, as I shall explore more fully, on the nature of analogy possible. In C. Boff's words: "Its (theology's) discourse is therefore not representative but significative. That is, it is shot through with the energy of

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[67] J. Habermas (1988) p. 172.

[68] C. Boff (1987) p.130.

symbol, and must finally end in apophasis". [69]  In other words, we can speak of human categories of relation and *look through them* to what is signified there of salvation in a social context. The thesis being developed is that the nature of the controversy surrounding the salvation in a social context debate demands that we have methodological tools with which to address the task.  These tools, I suggest, might well take the form of analogical reasoning, helping us in dialogue with Habermas to articulate theologically what God's salvation *is like* in socio-philosophical terms.

### 3. E. *DEVELOPING THE IDEA OF 'PARABLE'*

Let me summarize my considerations thus far.  Hegel's is a brilliant portrayal of the psychology of fear.  However, not only does he describe its painful realities but he implies that through the control and use of fear the promise of the Notion of *Spirit* is good and desirable: "What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is ... 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'" (177).  The implication is that fear may be positive in a qualitative sense.  This, I suggest, invites the reader to use fear and envy as motives in attaining free self-consciousness and, as Habermas is aware, restricts the Notion of *Spirit* or, what Hegel calls the potential for perfect freedom in the unity of independent consciousnesses (*ibid.*), to a philosophy of individual consciousness not sociality.  In order to assess the possibility of giving primacy and content to sociality, criteria are required to assess its healing signification.

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[69] C. Boff (1987) p. 55.

I have shown that there is ambiguity in the text and in its interpretations between fear and Hegel's promise that the 'I' has universal significance. [70] Interpreting §§ 166 - 230 with these questions in mind does, however, offer a coherent reading of the *Phenomenology* as a whole, and is, as far as I can see, compatible with the logic of *Aufhebung* which says that something is sublated only insofar as it enters into unity with its succeeding moment. This reading is confirmed by C. Taylor who directly refutes Hegel's claim that only by finding itself through fear can the self subsist again in itself. C. Taylor shows how moments of fear and death in the *Phenomenology* not only represent certain characteristics of consciousness but have an additional, and perhaps illegitimate, purpose: "The initial task is to show that the object in question is to be understood in terms of the realization of a goal". [71] Hegel, he says, forces consciousness at crucial points to conform to an ontological vision: "It is this longing for total integrity which for Hegel underlies the striving of self-consciousness" [72]

Beyond this, I have been engaged in a critical, interpretative exercise concerning the best medium that modernity offers for giving content to sociality. In particular, I am asking about the critical sensibilities required to escape Hegel's language of separation and self-determination. [73] Theologically this is

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[70] As S. Smith writes; "lesser and more inadequate forms of life are both annulled and preserved in the higher ones". (1989)Ch. 6, "Hegel's Idea of a Critical Theory". p. 190. Cf. "*To sublate [aufheben]* has a twofold meaning in the language: ... it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to". *S.L.* p. 107.

[71] C. Taylor (1975) p. 218.

[72] C. Taylor (1975) pp. 148 f.

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important if Christian social theory is to be both analytic and hermeneutic; - both assessing Hegel's dangerous disruption or splitting of the self from within, and positing of the 'I' *vis-á-vis* the 'We', [74] and interpreting new socio-analytic mediations of sociality.  Hegel's idea of the "'I' that is We" marks, as we have seen, a susceptibility in thinking about the self that allows opposition and fear to characterize selfhood.  Fear makes a 'thing' of the self as the 'I' stands over against the 'We'. [75] The task is really to think clearly about the possibility of critical social theory as moving from an *objectifying*  to a *relative,* integrative critical theory.

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[73] Julia Kristeva shows the Hegelian language of separation and struggling towards identity as the primary opportunity for narcissim. (1980) pp. 254 f.

[74] Erich Kahler (1989) makes this point. pp. 90 f.  Also R.D. Laing (1965) re: the threat of engulfment of the 'I' by the 'We', and consequent fears of implosion, de-personalization and petrification.  pp. 45 f.

[75] J. Habermas (1987 b) says reification is a pathological principle of sociation where the 'We' systems of government, media etc. impose preconceived ideas and categories on historical events. pp. 343; 375.  G. Lukács elevated the concept of reification to a central category in Marxist theory through a transmuted Hegelian standpoint on the splitting apart of universal and particular, subject and object etc. See Lukács's famous essay "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" in his (1932) *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstein.*  Previous to this, in 1892 Karl Kautsky expressed the objectifying effect of the link between commodity and capital as the worker's "transformation into propertyless proletarians" (1971) p. 15.  For a recent argument that reification is still the structuring principle of the capitalist mode of production, leaving social life riven by antinomies,  see P. Brown (1990).

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## 4. A. *DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR DIALOGUE*

*Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know what it (knowledge of God's salvation) is; but it can know whether it exists or not.* [1]

These words of Aquinas express a desire for knowledge of God's salvation.   Reasoned discourse, he suggests, can say *how* salvation is but requires the eyes of faith for its theological content to be perceived.   Having sketched the controversy surrounding the salvation in a social context debate, this Chapter pursues the analogical discourse with philosophy, or in my case socio-philosophy.   I suggest methodological tools derived from Aquinas and C. Boff with which to address the task and two things become clear.   First, no principle of analogy offers a determinate pattern or condition for articulating God's salvation; it is not directly derivative of the truth of revelation. [2] Second, any attempt to speak of salvation in a social context relies on its being knowable and perceivable.   We can, Aquinas says, "know whether it exists or not".

But how can we know?   What is this knowledge of healing and liberation this signifies salvation?   The rationale pervading Chapter 3 was that the light of the knowledge of God illumines social forms of communicative action and the healing of the 'I -

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[1] T. Aquinas *S. Th.* 1, Q. 13, art. 12.

[2] D. Nicholls *Deity and Domination* (1989) surveys 19th & 20th century images of God implied analogically in political ideas of freedom, conflict and consent. He notes possible perversions in the principle of analogy, reminding us of National Socialist ideas of an earthly analogue to God rejected by some followers of Barth.   pp. 233 -4.

We' divide as signifying God's salvation. There must be criteria, however, in order to specify *what healing qualities* might be identified and sought. Critique, as distinct from description, requires the judging of correctness and the evaluating of purpose in any social theory - in this instance, Habermas's new conceptual apparatus for giving content to the idea of sociality. If, as Habermas implies, the *Phenomenology* contains no framework adequate for a contemporary theory of interpersonal relation, we might well affirm his paradigm shift to communicative action. That is *if*, like salvation, it has to do with the healing of relations. We should be naïve with respect to Habermas's theory of communicative action, however, should it simply be assumed as having unquestionable pedagogical value.

What is needed is a theoretical interface for dialogue which gives practical criteria for assessing social relations. In this Chapter I argue that Hegel allows us to develop some such practical criteria in his considerations of various forms of social alienation. Hegel wrote in *The Berne Plan of 1794* that theology's emphasis must be practical. It must "not merely concern itself with the knowledge of the existence and attributes of God, but deals with this problem in relation to men and to the needs of their reason". [3] A major complaint of his against the Protestantism of his time was that it failed to relate its faith to alienation in the social sphere; "building its temples and altars in the heart of the individual. In sighs and prayers he seeks for the God whom he denies to himself in intuition". [4]

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[3] *The Berne Plan of 1794* in H.S. Harris (1972) p. 508.

[4] Hegel, *F. & K.* p. 57.

DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR DIALOGUE

We have reached an integrated level of discourse, therefore, in which Habermas's reinterpretation and relocation of Hegel's concerns are to be tested against Hegel's own treatment of the social alienation.  In this Chapter we see that there are many reasons for speaking about alienation that are not only Christian. The word has diverse applications, referring with equal ease to religious, economic relations, political and language interaction, often functioning like an empty space that theorists fill with meaning appropriate to the time.  As I shall show, it is a pre-ethical term, not of itself denoting specific differentiated content.  Against this background, the work of analogy is that of combining the different, double meanings, articulating the relation between socio-philosophy and theological theory.  To this end I ask: In order for the critical truth of analogy to be established, what insights are to be gained with respect to Hegel's treatment of alienation and the 'other'?  Particularly, I am concerned with Hegel's notion of alienation and the language used in talking of "the other"; the *other* God and the *other,* neighboring human subject.

## 4. B. *THE SEVERAL MEANINGS OF ALIENATION*

The *Phenomenology* is, of course, not unaffected by historico-political circumstances and before proceeding, it is necessary to consider the several meanings of alienation both contained within the text itself and arising from the differing perspectives of its later interpreters.  The *Phenomenology* itself is the product of a unique situation when ideas of individual freedom and independence had been alive across

Europe for several decades as bearers of the demand for release from civil and political restraints. An anonymous poem in the *Berlinische Monatschrift* of 1793 yearned for a land "where sweet equality dwells". Quoted in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, the accompanying observation reminds us that the *Phenomenology* was written at a time of need for mediation between the individual subject and political power:

> We can sense a profound alienation from the society in which such men
>
> lived, an estrangement from its prevailing values, a repudiation or
>
> spiritual flight. [5]

This is important because some commentators emphasize how the existential implications of these sections derive from Hegel's socio-political convictions. S. Averini argued in 1972 that Hegel's idea of the individual's coming to himself (*sic.*) was an argument against his being made a mere instrument in the hands of superior forces. [6] Averini wants to show the *Phenomenology,* and especially Hegel's idea of the cunning of reason, to be an answer to the lack of mediation between the individual and political power.

We must be careful here because the etymological origins of the idea of alienation are difficult to trace. Nathan Rotenstreich finds the Latin word *alienatio* to have two meanings. First, a legal meaning concerned with the conveyance of property. N. Lash agrees, noting that this first meaning also reflects an

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[5] *The New Cambridge Modern History* Vol. VIII. *The American and French Revolutions 1763 - 93*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965, p. 442. For a brief statement of the German political structure see J.H. Shennan (1986) *Liberty and Order in Early Modern Europe. The Subject and the State. 1650 - 1800.* Also R. Zaller (1984) *Europe in Transition 1660 - 1815.*

[6] S. Averini (1972) pp. 230 f.

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economic fact. [7]  Second, Rotenstreich draws on the "ecstatic" sources of, for example, Augustine's idea of elevation from the senses to connote a going above oneself and reaching submersion in God. This positive and ecstatic achievement is changed by Hegel, he says, from union with an elevated sphere into the means to an end, or an "improper transcendence" which denies any transcendent or sublime object to absorb alienation. [8]

It is helpful perhaps to note that the term alienation, as derived from Hegel, has a further double meaning: Alienation as estrangement [*Entfremdung*] refers to the socio-psychological condition of self-consciousness and its contradiction, being the direct result of the dynamic character of the principle of identity. This sense is developed in response to Kant's philosophy of consciousness and concerns the movement of the self into otherness returning in a cycle of mediation. This first sense of alienation [*Entfremdung*] is the state of divided self-consciousness that is grasped in relation to the idea of the unity of consciousness: "The movement of a being that immediately is, consists partly in becoming an other than itself, and thus becoming its own immanent content" (53). It concerns the self-creation of consciousness by a growing through the experience of moving outside of the self in thought and is the possibility of all development.

The second sense of alienation, meaning externalization,

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[7] N. Rotenstreich, "On the Ecstatic Sources of the Concept of Alienation" in the *Review of Metaphysics* vol. 16, 1963, pp. 550-555. N. Lash (1981) p. 171.
[8] For arguments to show continuity not contrast with pre-modern etymological roots of the idea of alienation, see T. Schroyer (1973) pp. 44 f.

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[*Entäußerungerung*] is a related philosophical category, possibly with roots in Platonic criticism of Aristotle regarding the natural world as distinct from the sublime world of ideas. [9] It has social overtones relating to the individual when treated as an object which is both available to thought and manipulable. Hegel gives no explicit specification of social forms of *Entäusserung* but the *Phenomenology* as a whole can be read as a classification of types of social externalization in different historical contexts. In the course of its progress Hegel touches upon ancient, feudal, and capitalist societies. He looks at various forms of alienation amongst intellectuals, the religious, producers and consumers.

Thus the two senses of alienation [*Entfremdung* a n d *Entäusserung*] are philosophically distinct but related. The former, simple sense arises from the division of the self into conflicting parts, the latter sense also being used of this movement of a self, from itself, through itself but including more ambiguous uses of the term with applications in social and political philosophy. For example, §§ 48 & 66 of the Preface speak of the external [*äußerlich*] character of the Kantian mode of cognition, both the Lord and Bondsman want to rid themselves of their "self-externality" [*Außersichsein*] (187), a society's culture is said to be its "externalization" [*Entäußerung*] (489), and the incarnation is an "externalization" [*Entäußerung*] (759) of the divine essence.

The distinct but related senses of the two words for

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[9] S. Rosen (1974) makes this connection, pp. 76 f; 147.

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alienation have been the cause of much controversy in Hegel interpretation. The so-called Young Hegelians B. Bauer, D. F. Strauss, Moses Hess and others, who sketched the first pictures of humanistic communism, illustrate the sense of continuum in Hegel between the alienation in and of individual consciousness and social structures. J.F. Toews describes in detail tensions arising in early receptions of Hegel's writings in Hegel's own lifetime. He refers particularly to disagreements within the Hegelian school between 1830-41 over left and right wing appropriations of his treatment of the *idea* of alienation and its relation to *historical reality*. [10] As Toews makes plain, the usage of terms such as 'left' and 'right' is misleading when discussing the problematic of interpreting Hegel's own seamless integration of the speculative science of Absolute knowledge and alienation in social relations. On the other hand, he makes the point that some indication of the general divisions in interpretation of the *Phenomenology* clarifies major diverg-ences that do occur concerning the place of social factors underlying the relation of an ideal to historical experience. [11]

Broad brush strokes are inadequate to do justice to Toews' illumination of disputes since the 1820's over interpreting Hegel's notion of alienation in the light of the changing German social and cultural context. It is helpful, however, to note the thrust of his argument that whereas at the time of Hegel's writing the *Phenomenology* interpreters enthused over an idealist positing of community as the condition for overcoming individual alienation, within less than three decades the only

[10] J.E. Toews (1980).

[11] J.E. Toews (1980) pp. 8-9; p. 205.

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viable Hegel interpretation had reduced the science of Absolute knowledge to the science of human consciousness which saw the chief task of philosophy as specifying the conditions under which freedom might be achieved. We see in Toews' tracing of the dissolution of Absolute idealism into dialectical humanism through the figures of Strauss, Bauer, and Feuerbach, the reduction of Hegelian Absolute idealism to the functional relation of elements of the human consciousness. His point is well made that before the German Federation of 1815 interpretation of Hegel's science of the Absolute was tied to tensions within reformist and revolutionary tendencies in German politics, whereas after 1815, the community ideal becomes more implausible under the heavy handed rule of Austria and Prussia. For example under the influential Austrian Chancellor Metternich, [12] hopes of the speculative transforming of alienation into reconciliation rang hollow and absolute idealism passes into dialectical humanism. [13]

I mention Toews' work to illustrate that we could spend time tracing disagreement in the history of the interpretation of Hegel regarding the double meanings of alienation, the relation between the idealist science of knowledge and its purpose in relation to existing social and political reality. The history of the idea of alienation since Hegel brings the danger of reading

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[12] See A.J. Grant (1945) p. 185f..

[13] J.E. Toews (1980) ch. 10. We could illustrate the point by noting the extent to which Marx reads Hegel through Feuerbach. See K. Marx, "The Early Writings. 1837-1844", in D.M. McCellan (1977) p. 100, which refers to alienation as consciousness of the self in relation to the infinite in terminology heavily influenced by Feuerbach's reduction of the Absolute to the infinity of human self-consciousness.

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back into the *Phenomenology*  the overtones of his major interpreters.   Marx and Feuerbach, also Simmel, E. Durkheim, Weber and others could be the subjects of long investigation. [14] For example, after the discovery and publication in 1932 of those manuscripts where Marx devotes considerable attention to Hegel there was renewed interest in Marx's assimilation of Hegel's dialectical relationship of subject and object.   This often now makes it difficult to disentangle the Hegelian notions of alienation from subsequent evaluations.   G. Lukács' reading of the *Phenomenology,*  for instance, is determined by a definition of *Entäußerung*  as externalization, meaning the product of labour when exploited as an object independent of the worker. [15] Lukács, stands at the head of divergent streams of mid-twentieth century Marxist interpretation that was active in laying bare the Hegelian content of Marx' writings. [16]  He illustrates the need to be aware of how Hegel comes to us through secondary interpreters.

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[14] A useful overview of the alienation of consciousness as a formative idea for German sociology in the Weimar Republic is D. Frisby's (1983) *The Alienated Mind.*

[15] G. Lukács (1975) pp .537-568.  Cf. "Labour's realization is its objectification.  In the sphere of political economy this realization of labour appears as loss of realization for the workers; objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation (*Aneignung als Entfremdung, als Entäußerung*).  Marx, in Struik (1932) p. 108.   On varying lines of tradition within Marxism re: the idea of alienation and production see, J. Habermas (1987c) "Excursus on the Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm", pp. 75-82.

[16] For a critical re-appropriation of Hegel different in style from that of Lukács but drawing on the same tension between the interrelation of subject and object see H. Marcuse (1941) esp. ch. IV.   Also (1964) pp. 138 f where he writes of the *Phenomenology*, "The logic of thought remains the logic of domination."

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## 4. C. *RECENT INTERPRETATION*

In the 1950s and 1960s, the influence of Hegel in ideas of alienation still spanned the distinction between socio-psychological conditions and the socio-economic, political issues of work, education, income, authorities etc. [17] In 1955 Erich Fromm picked up the socio-psychological sense of Hegel's notion of alienation: "By alienation is meant a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one might say, estranged from himself." [18] He emphasizes the subjective sense of estrangement as that feeling of unease and separation from the group, when the self has a feeling of pointlessness because no goals exist. E. Kahler wrote in 1957: "The history of man could very well be written as a history of the alienation of man." [19] In 1958 Hannah Arendt emphasized the second sense of alienation [*Entäußerung*], looking at how the idea of the overcoming of alienation in the public spheres of work and politics gives meaning to social organizations. Since Hegel and Marx the overcoming of alienation meant, she suggests, becoming a participating member of society beyond the work-place: It "consisted in the elimination of the gap between the individual and social existence of man",

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[17] See G. Nettler "A Measure of Alienation", American Sociological Review, Vol. 22 (1957) pp. 670-77 for estrangement related to creativity, mental and social disorder, proclivity to suicide etc. M. Seeman "On the Meaning of Alienation" *ibid.* Vol. 24 (1959) pp. 783 f. on the behavioral consequences of social conditions that produce the alienation of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness and isolation. Also D. Dwight "The Meaning and Measure of Alienation" *ibid.* Vol. 26 (1961) pp. 753 f.

[18] E. Fromm (1955) p. 20.

[19] E. Kahler (1989) p. 43.

claiming that herein lies the contrast between ancient Greek and modern political philosophy. [20]

These examples illustrate differences which continued in Hegel scholarship in the 1970's concerning the extent to which his idea of alienation were to be understood either as a quasi-metaphysical idea of pure and eternal thought, or in terms of the human psyche, or to be cashed out in social and political issues. I could, for instance, compare the influential 'revisionary metaphysical' reading of Hegel by J.N. Findlay with the socially rooted approach of C. Taylor. Findlay believes that for Hegel alienation is found in the realms of nature, understanding and human relations and overcome in the unifying principle of thought, arguing that the crux of the matter lies in "the extent to which his (Hegel's) philosophy is Hellenic rather than Kantian", 'the Idea' being objective after the manner of Plato and Aristotle in the sense of a striving towards a rational end. [21] He believes that Hegel brings to completion the unifying principles governing the relation of things in the world and in the realm of thought in a manner suggested by the Platonic development of ideas and the Aristotelian notion of active intelligence.[22] For C. Taylor, in contrast, the alienation of which Hegel speaks mirrors historic and social reality as a philosophic appropriation of social reconciliation. Alienation arises for Hegel, he suggests, "when

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[20] H. Arendt (1958) pp. 89 n. 301, 311.

[21] J.N. Findlay (1958) p. 46.

[22] J.N. Findlay (1970) ch.s. VII; VIII; XV, esp. pp. 262 f. Hegel is understood as modifying Aristotle's categories of scientific and metaphysical knowledge in important ways that can be seen via his critique of the Kantian categories. He retains much from Plato's theory of forms. Notable is his retaining of what Plato calls *anamnesis* in the concept of *Erinnerung*.

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the goals, norms or ends which define the common practices or institutions begin to seem irrelevant or ... when the norms are redefined so that the practices appear a travesty of them." [23]

## 4. D. *ALIENATION AND THE WORK OF ANALOGY*

My proposal here is that we can specify a thematic relation between Hegel's assessment of these types of alienation and theology's treatment of *otherness*; the otherness of God, of one's neighbour, of the poor, of Christ.   The type of thematic relation possible, I suggest, looks for a correspondence between divine and human principles of relation co-ordinating everything in the highest way to knowledge of God's salvation.   This is to move the discussion to a deeper level of reflection; towards an interface of correspondence between Christian and non-Christian social theory which allows for an understanding of the disclosing presence and activity of God. [24]   It is to say that talk about salvation in a social context develops by the mingling of different models and discourses, through seeking to express the relationship between human relations and the divine prototype of sociality proper.   It requires my finding meanings that correspond between Christian and non-Christian social theory, referring simultaneously to Hegel's treatment of alienation, to contemporary socio-philosophy and to what Hegel calls Christian 'positivity', that is, the content of Christian doctrine. [25]

[23] C. Taylor (1975) p. 384.

[24] I.T. Ramsey writes of the order of disclosure that a new depth or dimension *comes alive* when one is suddenly aware of a new encounter; "disclosure reveals something of whose existence we are aware because we are aware of *being* confronted". I.T. Ramsey (1971) p. 212.

[25] See H. Marcuse's (1960) definition of positivism as dehumanizing

Given the relation in Hegel's work between the metaphysical idea of pure and eternal thought, the human psyche, and social and political issues, the *Phenomenology* lends itself easily to certain analogical forms of reasoning. As we have seen, 'alienation' is used both of God and self-conscious individuals univocally by Hegel, that is, in the exact same sense. His description of alienation and *'otherness'* is made common to both God and fellow subjects as the types of fear and limitation felt by the individual against both. 'Alienation' is used equivocally of God and self-conscious individuals - not in the exact same sense (univocal), but neither in a totally different or unrelated meaning. It has a twofold and related meaning;

> whereby what exists *in itself* exists equally *for an other*; it does pervert
>
> the Unchangeable, but it perverts it from the *nothingness of abstraction*
>
> *into the being of reality* (389).

The self exists *in itself*, experiencing itself over against itself and set in opposition to its *other* fellow subject. It knows itself to be existing in relation to the *Unchangeable* and experiences an alienation which, this passage implies, is a matter both of feeling *and* thought.

I have said already that Hegel did not think much of the Christianity learned in his Tübingen days because of its neglect of social questions. H. Küng describes the dangers held out for the orthodox doctrinal teaching of C.F. Schurrer, F.C. Rösler, C.G. Storr as "Theology at Odds with Itself" concerning the relation of ethical and politico-economic questions to doctrine. [26] The

"reification" which creates abstract, scientific domains for inquiry. p. 112.

[26] H. Küng (1987) pp. 31 - 40.

1802/3 *System of Ethical Life* attempted to establish *Sittlichkeit* as some sort of ethical community consciousness or vehicle for a new, objective Christian religion; "in the ethical life the individual exists in an eternal mode; ... all things are in God and there is nothing singular". [27] L. Dickey goes so far as to say that the *Phenomenology* and later political writings are assimilated within an economy of salvation argument or "soteriological process". [28] In consequence, consciousness is unhappy, he says, when it does not recognise that the idea of the Unchangeable which is really internal to consciousness has become an "alien Being" (§ 208).

Hegel wants to supersede forms of relation in which both the *other* God and the *other,* neighboring human subject are an "alien necessity". These passages represent a climactic condemnation of Christian theism, drawing on earlier complaints at the Christian faith for having reduced human self-consciousness to defilement (225) and guilt, confronting a divided humanity with an Unchangeable and absolutely '*Other* ' God whose power is mediated through the priests (228). Taking up the theme of the perversion or distortion caused to the individual, in its sense of separation from God, he speaks of consciousness' sense of wretchedness, 'one-sidedness' (211) weighted against this God, also its sense of passivity (221) and brokenness (222).

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[27] *System Essay* in H.S. Harris (1979) p. 143. L. Dickey (1987) takes this as evidence for the *Phenomenology's* being the pursuit of a redemptive *telos* in a pragmatically Pelagian sense: "Hegel conceived of a people, religiously characterized, as the carrier of Christian *gnosis* in the world". p. 289.

[10] L. Dickey (1987) p. 290.

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The work of analogy in this context is to give shape in dialogue with Hegel to social processes of liberation. Christian theology holds that it is in no way contrary to the individual's wholeness, dignity and full development as a person to acknowledge the *otherness* of God, and to find the highest reason for sociality in the human vocation to grow in the likeness of God. By this belief, the Christian believer knows that only the God s/he meets in Christ can heal the deepest alienation of the human heart and speak liberation more widely in society. The gospel, far from taking away the rightful autonomy of the individual, rather restores and guarantees his/her identity. In the remainder of this Chapter, I try to address these issues by holding on to the critical truth of analogy. The intention is neither to cease doing theology in favour of socio-philosophy, nor to allow the relation between doctrine and social theory to be so weak as to fail to relate the Christian order of salvation with non-Christian apparatus for relearning sociality. The intention, rather, is to use analogical reasoning to articulate theologically what God's salvation *is like* in social terms.

In pursuing its own end, salvation, theology not only communicates the revealed life of Christ in a direct fashion but in a less direct manner diffuses the light of that salvation through different forms of social theory. Theology does this most of all by restoring and enhancing human social identity, both criticizing and edifying social structures, and giving importance and deeper meaning to the individual's everyday social contacts. This means being glad to value highly what other non-Christian social theorists have done and are doing to

co-operate in the same task. Here I set out some general principles for promoting this co-operation and mutual help in spheres which Christian and non-Christian interpreters of Hegel have to some extent in common.

In order to do this, it must be said that Christian analogical reasoning is not primarily political, economic or social, but theological. From its theological content, insight, rules of love and energy derive which can help to establish an interface for dialogue. This means recognizing what is liberating and healing in present-day re-thinking of sociality, especially the development towards the giving of priority to sociality over against individualism. It also means discovering in the mind of Hegel the hidden cause of the denial of orthodox Christianity and its links to his major questions of human subjectivity and alienation. It is thus to some extent a self-critical task on the part of theology. The principle of analogy is not directly derivative of any particular understanding of salvation but is a matter of interpretation. As D. Nicholls writes in *Deity and Domination*: "It would ... be wrong to suggest that Trinitarianism *logically* implies commitment to a communitarian political ideal". [29] It would mean degrading the concept of divine *otherness* and the incarnation to suppose that it is in any way manipulable. The incarnation is not to be made into a philosophical principle abstracted from the historical instance. This is to be condemned comprehensively as an offence leaving God without relation to the world. [30]

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[29] D. Nicholls (1989) pp. 187; 237.shows that manipulation occurs in Hegel's understanding incarnation according to an analogical, literal content.

[30] Ferenc Lehel's notes in I. Tödt Hg. (1988) speak of Bonhoeffer's complaint

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In his treatment of alienation, we are reminded that the very least that Hegel required was the relation of ethical and politico-economic questions to doctrine. His concern was that Christianity is incomplete both as an objective religion (ritualized and institutionalized) and as a subjective religion (absorbed in moral education). [31] This does not mean that, like Hegel, I want to heal the 'alienation' and 'otherness' discussed through a belief in "The Certainty and Truth of Reason". It does mean that some general principles can be set out for promoting the healing of alienation and the overcoming of *otherness* in spheres which Hegel, his interpreters, and Christian theology have to some extent in common.

## 4. E. *SOME PROBLEMS OF ANALOGICAL DISCOURSE*

The analogical task then is to allow the logic of God's *otherness* and presence to inform relational categories of human knowledge. There are problems in attempting to meet this need practically through dialogue with Hegel and his interpreters. For example, the fact there there are analogical forms of reasoning already operating in the *Phenomenology* is both a disadvantage and an advantage. The main problem is that the type of analogical critique and reasoning developed by Hegel submerges the distinctiveness of Christian theology within his own particular philosophical construct. There is no escaping the fact that Hegel's is an illegitimate sameness or unity of being between the alienation and 'otherness' of Absolute *Spirit* and

against Hegel's notion of the incarnation as such: "*Gott als Beziehungs-losigkeit zur Welt*". p. 36.

[31] See the *Berne Plan* of 1794 in H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 508 - 510.

that of human self-consciousness. Quentin Lauer poses the question; "has Hegel not overreached himself when he claims that *what* we know in knowing God is *what* God knows in knowing himself?" [32] As Lauer points out, there is an obvious danger in Hegel's logic of analogy; - namely, the subsumption of theology to socio-philosophy. [33] The dangers are plain to see in § 234, for instance, where Hegel attempts speculatively to penetrate beyond the limits of analogy to an idea of totality: "Consciousness", he says, "will determine its relationship to otherness or its object in various ways, according to the precise stage it has reached in the development of the World-Spirit into self-consciousness".

This problem is caused by the fact that '*otherness* ' and 'alienation' as used by Hegel in the *Phenomenology* apply both to the human experience of itself and in relation to God, the Unchangeable [*der Unwandelbare*]. In this twofold usage of the terms we can distinguish two kinds of analogical or "proportional" uses of the word. First, there is the case of alienation being used both of God and human subjects because each of them has the same order or relation to "The Certainty and Truth of Reason". He uses the word 'alienation' univocally of the 'I' that rests in its own self-certainty or "*tranquil unity certain of its [own] truth*" ( 237), and of the Unchangeable because each of these has some relation to the activity of reason in the self. The former suffers from the antithesis of the certainty of its own truth over against the 'We' or universal;

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[32] Q. Lauer (1982) p. 278.

[33] R.B. Edwards (1979) usefully contrasts Aquinas' subordination of philosophy to theology with Hegel's subordination of theology to philosophy, pp. 72 - 86.

"*certainty*, qua '*I*' ... is not yet in truth reality" (239). The latter is another symptom of what Hegel calls the tension between particularity and totality, that is,"the element of universality, in the qualityless void of being" (405). His concern that consciousness move beyond the the emptiness caused by the *Other's* being regarded as separate from the human order; "something indifferent and extraneous" (238). Hegel's language used about God is derived from the human experience as he seeks comprehension of a more fundamental relation.

Second, there is the case of alienation being used equivocally of the two things because the nature of God as the Unchangeable is similar to, or causes, the alienation of self-conscious individuals. Recall from §§ 207 - 230 how Hegel says that Christianity renders the individual passive. The active independence of the individual is said to be largely denied; "the Unhappy Consciousness merely *finds* itself *desiring* and *working* " (§ 218). [34] The same is true of the 'I's relation to the 'We' or the totality of the universal which puts particularity at stake: "The *abstract necessity* therefore has the character of the merely negative, uncomprehended power of universality, on which individuality is smashed to pieces" (366). [35] In both cases, 'alienation' applied to self-consciousness is used

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[34] See the "Frankfurt Sketch" (1798) in which faith is a mode of union with the object of belief and religion a form of power set up to confine human activity. In H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 512 - 515. For Hegel's influence by G. C. Storr and other, according to him, "positivist" thinkers of the [old] Tübingen *Stift* see H.S. Harris (1983) pp. 5; 15, also W. Jaeschke (1990) 2.1; 3.4; 3.5.

[35] Compare the "bad infinity' of simple connection in *The Jena System* pp.32-8: "Bad reality stays at the concept of quality ... bad ideality stays at the concept of quantity ... bad infinity ... allows them both to subsist". p. 33.

primarily either of God or the 'We'. This is seen in the consequences for the status of the particular when ideas of quantity or number are the basis for relation: "As a *whole...* there thus enters a play of individualities with one another in which each and all find themselves both deceiving and deceived" (416). [36]

As illustration, take Hegel's polemic in §§ 231 - 437 against those whom he thinks hinder the overcoming of alienation. Criticizing forms of thought which have "thrown off all community (*Gemeinschaft*) with others into the sheer opposite ... *being-in-itself* " (§ 364), he sets in relief the relative values of the Hedonist, the Aesthetic and the 'Knight of Virtue' as examples of inadequate bases for human, and especially ethical relation. [37] He targets the classic arguments of the 'Hedonist' and the 'Aesthetic' and "Knight of Virtue" for criticism because of mutual indifference to the "other", that is, following "the way of the world" (384), and it is important to bear this in mind as examples of univocal predications based on the one non-univocal, analogous experience, that of the "other". For the Hedonist, the 'other' "does not yet possess [objective] being which confronts it

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[36] The *Jena System* is an important backdrop to §§ 231 - 437. This is because of the bonding in thought developed between the subject as singular and the totality of the universal: "What is more determinate in this totality of the universal is that it connects with the "this" ... and posits it as sublated, in that it posits others equal to it". In J.W. Burbidge and G. di Giovanni (1986) pp. 107-8.

[37] Neither the term hedonist nor aesthetic are found in §§ 231 - 437. but their use is justified on the grounds that 'hedonist' is widely used by commentators, e.g., R. Norman (1976) pp. 78 f., and R. C. Solomon (1983) pp. 498 f. The term 'Romantic' sometimes replaces 'aesthetic'. T. Eagleton (1990) argues against identifying the 'aesthetic' with Romanticism in the German philosophical tradition. pp. 116 f.

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as a reality other than its own" (§ 360). The Hedonist fails to raise himself above his/her own pleasure: "It plunges ... into life and indulges to the full the pure individuality in which it appears" (§ 361). The Aesthetic regards the other whom the self confronts either as its oppressor or object of suffering; "on the one hand a law by which the particular individuality is oppressed ... and, on the other hand, a humanity suffering under that ordering" (§ 369). Either way, the other is an "alien necessity" (*ibid.*).

In both of these cases, the word 'other' or 'alien' is transferred from the human to Absolute *Spirit*; it is used first of the individual and only then of the divine. There is a sense, however, in which the reverse is true in that Hegel also takes theological language from its primary meaning and applies it to his science of consciousness. W. Jaeschke's comment on Hegel's language about God in the *Phenomenology* seems to imply that these words are used primarily of God, and then of the human experience:

> More clearly than in the later lectures, the religiohistorical conception of
> the *Phenomenology* is that of an incarnation of God in human form. [38]

Language about the incarnation is used, he says, of the human experience because of some prior reference it has to the divine. It is the incarnation, Jaeschke says, which supplies the pattern of 'otherness' and alienation, the consequence being that we cannot explain what Hegel means by the alienation of the 'other' without mentioning its order of relation to the divine. [39]

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[38] W. Jaeschke (1990) p. 204.

[39] "[O]ne way of understanding Hegel's philosophy as a whole is to think of it as

Thus we see that not only does Hegel's treatment of social alienation operate, so to speak, 'from below' *vis-á-vis* the *'otherness '* of divine subjectivity.  He also maintains a logic of divine *'otherness '* in which the possibilities of divine presence inform his categories of human knowledge and relation. Interpretations vary as to Hegel's scathing attack against this logic of divine *'otherness '*; the "unhappy" representations of Christianity's alienated relation with the Unchangeable [*der Unwandelbare*] and Christian grounds for social theory.  E.L. Fackenheim claims that Hegel is reworking a religious dimension; "Hegel holds the actual existence of religious life to be an indispensable condition of his philosophy as a whole". [40] This contrasts with A. Kojève's denouncing of any religious element in the *Phenomenology* : "Hegel does not need a God who would reveal the truth to him. ...The truth which he incarnates is the final result of the real or active dialectic of universal History". [41]  Kojève avails himself of Hegel's quasi-theological language to exemplify the problem of knowing.  According to him, the analogy of 'otherness' was intended by Hegel primarily, if not only, as a dialectic of the social struggle in history.  The one point is clear, however, that there is a correspondence between Hegel's review of alienation as a central characteristic of humanity in its social state and its relation to God.

As I have shown, the concept of 'alienation' is used by Hegel of

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trying to replace the Christian religion with a system that utilizes its superficial forms but is in fact wholly secular" R. C. Solomon (1980) p. 230; 466. Also R. Norman (1976) who interprets §§ 207 - 230 as a remaking of Christianity, pp. 60 - 64.

[40] E.L. Fackenheim (1967) p. 9.

[41] A. Kojève. (1969) p. 186.

God and self-conscious subjects in an analogous way, that is, in accordance with a certain order between them. A close relationship is established between the processes of human consciousness, social relationship and divine subjectivity. It cannot be stressed too strongly that, unlike Hegel, my grounds for deriving the message of salvation and of hope for social questions do not lie in the unifying power of reason; the "development of World-Spirit" (234). God's economy of salvation in Christ is not of the same order as the effective presence of the 'other' conceived by non-Christian social theorists and I have no intention of allowing theology to be accommodated to the particular concerns of Hegelian socio-philosophy. The question, therefore, is how to start from proximate experiences of alienation and open human understanding out to God.

### 4. F. *ANALOGY AND SALVATION SIGNIFIED*

I am talking, therefore, about alienation and the 'other' not solely in terms of human relations, but in terms that *extend* discourse about human relation to soteriology proper. The intention is to show an equivalence between critique and meaning in both Christian and non-Christian social theory. Indeed, my reflections in Chapters 1-3 have shown an equivalence between Christian and non-Christian social theory *in criticism* of Hegel's drive for free self-consciousness. More than this, I have demonstrated a *correspondence* between Christian and certain non-Christian treatments of 'alienation' and 'otherness'. This is not the concept of correspondence employed in a formal truth theory; I am not asking: "In what does

the truth of a belief consist?" or "How can we test the claim of a belief to be true?" For example, there is no intention to show that truth consists in agreement between judgements or propositions and God's independently existing reality in the inclusive sense that Hegel maintains. [42] What I do intend is to affirm truths of relation seen in Christ through the medium of socio-analytic analysis.

A word of warning must be sounded here because, as Vernon White notes, no allusion to analogy can be allowed if it even hints at religious tyranny and imperialism. White's essay *Atonement and Incarnation* recounts certain attitude difficulties as regards attributing universal effect to the particularity of the Christian message, that is, the premise which underlies analogical reasoning: "Does not Christ's constitutive role", he asks, "imply Christian arrogance, opening up a Pandora's box of religious tyranny and imperialism?" [43] The question that arises is as follows: If the universal effect of Christ's salvation is made the context for dialogue with non-Christian social theory, might theology risk recourse to a non-dialogical professing of Christian truth that can only be normative and definitive for theology, and perhaps not even there?

This word of warning requires that we look more closely at

[42] " ... a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact" to one's subjective belief: Bertrand Russell (1919) p 202. From the wide range of literature on the correspondence theory of truth see A.D. Woozley (1964) Ch. VI; Susan Haack (1978) pp. 11 - 17; 91 - 4. W.V. Quine (1986) pp. 1 - 14; 35 - 46.

[43] V. White (1991) pp. 111 - 112.

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the required apologetic attitude. Suffice it to mention Aquinas's intention regarding the opening of the logic of human relations out to God when he wrote:

> Human philosophy examines creatures as elements of this world.
>
> Christian faith, however, does not stop short there; ... Even when they look
>
> at the same thing their point of view is different. The philosopher starts from
>
> proximate causes, the theologian from the first cause as divinely revealed".[44]

He speaks about the revealing of something declaring itself to us, the apologetic attitude always beginning with God's work of grace in Christ and also a feeling of deep esteem for the work of human philosophy. C. Boff explicates this passage as looking to interpret "the extent of the "incarnation" of divine salvation *in* human history". [45] It affirms a responsibility for the revealed truth and to act in full fidelity to it. But this same fidelity must be a constitutive quality of Christian theology in dialogue with non-Christian social theory in order to help them combine with each other in addressing social problems of alienation. [46]

## 4. G. *INTERPRETATIVE CRITERIA FOR SALVATION*

The need for interpretative criteria in this interpenetration of social and soteriological questions is pressing. Careful not to confuse the relative autonomy of theology and socio-philosophy,

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[44] T. Aquinas : 11 *Contra Gentes*, 4.

[45] C. Boff (1987) p. 228.

[46] Compare this to D. Nicholls (1990) who says that Hegel makes illegitimate claims to politicize his interpretation of incarnation, using political concepts to imply literal truths about God. Like Aristotle, Nicholls says, "Hegel realized that the kind of autarky which is appropriate for the state is possible only when a high degree of plurality and diversity is manifested". p. 183. See Hegel's *P.R.*, para. 288, pp. 189 f. on the state incorporating diversity amongst classes, estates, regional governments etc.

I use the traditional doctrine of analogy to describe the structures that allow parallels between Hegelian and theological treatments 'alienation' and 'otherness'. This is what Clodovis Boff calls "the leap of *transignification* "; the semantic operation of opening up an image to its theological dimension: "It means the extreme maximalization of its "evocative force"; identifying God's footprints in the world and opening human relation to the idea of God's presence. [47] The semantic content; meaning (L. *res significata* - thing signified) is different but if analogy can be seen to exist in critical modes of expression (*modus significandi*) space has been created for an articulation of faith. Now this articulation of faith must be made more specific, using analogical forms of reasoning to say what God's salvation is like in socio-philosophic terms.

Taking 'incarnation' as an interpretative criterion for salvation and healing, the analogical task is to look for correspondence between Christian and non-Christian theory regarding the status and presence of the '*other* '. How? The question is particularly pertinent in our reading of Hegel, especially §§ 394 - 437 on "Individuality Real in and For Itself', where he derives principles of free individuality from the incarnation event proper. The 'incarnation' for Hegel is not peculiar to the Christ event but is used in principle of other things. It becomes a principle of relation, not only the personal presence of Christ and the Holy Spirit in time. [48] How then is the critical truth of analogy to

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[47] C. Boff in L. & C. Boff (1984) pp. 80 - 1.

[48] This was one of the main complaints made by D. Bonhoeffer against Hegel in his Hegel Seminar of 1933 in I. Tödt Hg. (1988). Bonhoeffer consistently applies the concept of person to override Hegel's modalism. "*Um vor Modalismus zu*

be different from this? If the incarnation is not to be made into a philosophical principle abstracted from the historical reality, what is the relation between Hegelian socio-philosophy and 'incarnation' as an interpretative criterion for salvation?

In order to answer this question we must be clear about Hegel's understanding and use of the concept of incarnation. Interpretation of the incarnation is not explicit in these sections but questions about the theoretical foundations on which "The Ethical Order" (444 - 483) is based are uppermost. Hegel does not deal fully with the incarnation of God in Christ until "The Revealed Religion" (748 - 787). Throughout the *Phenomenology*, Hegel subsumes revelatory religion within the Absolute *Spirit*, supposing the divine nature to be the same as the human. W. Jaeschke writes: "Hegel accordingly links the unfolding of the content of the revelatory religion to the shape of the incarnate God". [49] It is the word 'shape' that is important here, Jaeschke contrasting Hegel's interpretation of the incarnation in this period with Christian interpretations in which "God became human in Jesus Christ in order to distinguish definitely between God and humanity for ever". [50] James Yerkes also claims that these later passages are an extension of the religious and Reformation language of Christ's death into the language of philosophy: "This ... is the truth of the trinitarian principle of incarnational reconciliation whereby God is shown to *be* reconciled with the world". [51] In other words, interpretation of

schützen, ist der Begriff der Person nötig". p. 19.

[49] W. Jaeschke (1990) pp. 204 - 5.

[50] W. Jaeschke (1990) contrasts Hegel's Christology of the Jena period with E. Jüngel's (1983) interpretation of the incarnation. pp. 94; 132.

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the 'incarnation' principle is made primarily of the Christ event, any approximation to human experience being derivative from there.

The idea of incarnation derives for Hegel from the Christ event. Yerkes stresses that Hegel's is a strongly *incarnational* view of God's relation to the world and that this pervades every form of relation that is instantiated in the development from "Observing Reason" to "Individuality Real In and For Itself". [52] This is borne out in § 401 where, in order to abolish the antithesis between individual consciousness, the universal 'We' and the Unchangeable the reader must, Hegel says, let in a 'spiritual' presence or colour; "the tinge [*Tinktur*] of Spirit" (401). [53] The "tinge" of *Spirit* idea is explained in terms that indicate an intrinsic connection between the incarnation proper and free 'individuality'; "action simply translates an initially implicit being into a being that is made explicit ... when the latter has made it into a reality". In other words, the principle here applies most fully to the incarnation proper. In §§ 231 - 437 it is used derivatively as a principle informing free individuality. The incarnation is a principle that has become an abstraction from the historical instance. [54] Later in the

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[51] James Yerkes (1983) p. 138.

[52] Yerkes claims; "Hegel's conception of the Absolute as Spirit is compatible with ... both a theistic and a Christian interpretation of the world". (1983) p. 196.

[53] It is likely that Kant's distinction between speculative natural philosophy and practical moral philosophy - natural intuition and appearance being subordinate to rationally discerned imperatives - is being repudiated here. See I. Kant, *C. Prac. R.* pp. 75 - 83 on the two pathways in life. Also *C.P.R.* A 805 / B 833 f.

[54] On Hegel's abolishing the distinction between the conceptuality and reality see L. Siep "Hegel's Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" in *Inquiry,* 34, pp. 63 - 76. It

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*Phenomenology* this again becomes obvious when the incarnation more than anything else is made the particular instance of free individuality; "the Son, is that which is simple and knows itself to be essential Being, while the other part (Spirit) is the ... externalized being-for-self" (§ 776).

For Hegel, the principle of incarnation can be used of many instances and especially of 'universal consciousness" (405). Whilst we shall search in vain for the name of Jesus Christ in §§ 231 - 437, as indeed in much of the *Phenomenology*, incarnation is shown to express a principle which, from the very outset, is used of God and human experience. The concept derived from the Christ event is implied of the experience of free self-consciousness: "Consciousness must act merely in order that what it is *in itself* may become explicit *for it* ; in other words, action is simply the coming-to-be of Spirit as *consciousness*" (401). [55] My question then, is how the incarnation can and should be taken as interpretative criterion for saying what God's salvation is like in social terms without its becoming little more than an abstract principle.

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reviews R.B. Pippin's *Hegel's Idealism* in terms of how the *Phenomenology* demonstrates permanent properties of consciousness and extra-conceptual reality.

[55] It is not immediately clear from §§ 231 - 437 but the moments of free self-consciousness; immediacy, negation and self-consciousness, denote later representation of "the revelatory religion". Cf. *L.P.R.*, Vol. 111, Ms. § 18 which defines God the Eternal Concept *Ansich* as tautologous. The *Triune* God as immediate is "non-mediated, indeed not even the living, far less the spiritual - is something dead, as though something could be without this mediation" i.e., the mediation of the incarnation. W. Jaeschke argues that the moments established here herald later articulation in *L.P.R.* (1990) pp. 204 - 7. Also D.M. Schlitt (1984) 95 -8.

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The critical question is how to overcome Hegel's 'I'-other structure of relation without the incarnation being reduced to such an abstraction. [56]  How is God's *otherness* and presence in the incarnation to be made a criterion for critique?  If the logic of God's *otherness* and presence is to inform our understanding of human *'otherness'* and alienation, how is the presence of God's *'otherness'* to be received and understood?  Hegel, we have seen, reduces the alterity of the *'other'*, whether this be the *otherness* of a fellow subject or that of God, to a modality of the self-consciousness of the 'I'.  It is the single 'I' which informs his understanding of both human and divine relation.  How then are we to respond analogically to Hegel's challenge about Christianity's inadequate answer to problems of social alienation, without the incarnation being made a principle of universal consciousness?

The question has, in part, been answered already but must be further explained.  I have affirmed that creation is given a creaturely likeness by God; *Inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari",* [57] and that this likeness

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[56] E. Lévinas has struck perhaps the greatest blow to Hegel's self-other structuring of relation.  Many themes in his work derive from the need to find alternative language for relation to that of Descartes, Kant and Hegel.  Edith Wyschogrod (1974) writes: "[A]t the heart of Levinas' thought is the question: does thematizing consciousness exhaust the data of all experiencing?" p. 51.

[57] This confession of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 is used by P. E. Przywara (1935) pp. 29 - 34 in discussion of the analogies of proportion and attribution.  Note similar principles in the Augsburg Confession 1530, Article XVIII *Of the Freedom of the Will:* "Man's will has some liberty for the attainment of civil righteousness, and for the choice of things subject to reason.  Nevertheless, it has no power, without the Holy Ghost, to work the righteousness of God, that is, spiritual righteousness".  In C.L. Manschrenck Ed. (1964) Vol. 2, p. 45.

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forms the basis of the relation between theology and other disciplines analogically. This critical and sharing relation is possible in virtue of the healing presence of the *Other* in Christ, in whom is the human vocation to salvation. The capacity of analogy is thus taken to imply an analytical meaning and, more than this, to subvert and extend it through a *transignification* from the literal sense to a spiritual reality.

The point is that the *correspondence* established between Christian and non-Christian social theory can become a *transignification*, showing God's salvation to be signified in the quality of human relation. The word *transignification* means the fact or property of perceiving and expressing one thing through another. It describes a theological attitude which, I believe, seems to fit the special needs of our times. It is critical, although never destructive, of non-Christian social theory, requiring an honest relationship with regard to the person of Christ as a condition for whole healing and liberation. It involves an attitude of respecting everything that leads to a better understanding of the most profound and important human problems of alienation. [58] It is what Míguez Bonino calls the

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[58] See E. Jüngel (1983) p. 281. For an assessment of Jüngel's protest against the emptiness of analogy when it is merely a human self-communication see W. Breuning, "Überlegungen zu Jüngel's interessantem Versuch der Weiterführung des Analogieverständnisses" in J. Brantschen, P. Selvatico, Ed.s (1980); "*wenn die Selbstmitteilung nicht eben doch einen ihr <eigenen> Inhalt hat*" p. 382. According to Breuning, Jüngel develops the dynamic features of analogical understanding in Pryzwara (p. 384) on the strength of God's communication of the image (*Ähnlichkeit*) of himself in Christ: "*Aber ihr eigentliches Wesen als Nähe gründet nicht in der <Ähnlichkeit>, sondern inn ihrer Kraft als Mitteilung ihrer selbst*". p. 385.

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"double location" of theology, that is, the difference between a confession of faith and making God's saving presence identifiable where it is not confessed. [59] This so-called 'double location' of theology arises from its purpose in yielding knowledge about God but not exclusively in an ecclesial context. It is possible because of the wider operation of God's saving work done in Christ: He is "the alpha and omega of all things, especially rational beings". [60]

The idea of transignification is broader in scope than simply observation of certain linguistic usage, nor does it operate within a framework of closed systems. Instead, the idea of transignification functions in the formulating of the logical space wherein to relate the necessity to speak of salvation and the language of socio-philosophy in which it must be articulated. It focuses theological issues about the way in which God and the created order relate to each other. I am at pains to stress that discourse about salvation must be authentically human. In the context of social theory, this means making non-Christian socio-philosophy part of theological discourse. It is what G. Steiner calls the naturalizing or bringing home of a mode of discourse within an interpretative process; a playing of ideas to ourselves within our own language. [61] The idea of transignification indicates an open form of analogy, demonstrating that it is the human context within which salvation is signified. Such discourse is only possible on the basis that the operation of the Holy Spirit is brought together with the work of Christ in

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[59] J. Míguez Bonino (1983) p. 42 - 44.

[60] T. Aquinas, *S.Th.* 1 a. ii & xliv.

[61] G. Steiner (1975) pp. 296-413.

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disclosing God's saving purpose.

Thus, there must be analysis and criticism of Hegel's reducing the relation between self and 'other' to knowledge of the 'other' by the self. As I have shown, alienation and '*otherness*' are evocative categories in the *Phenomenology* - the evocation, that is, of the one excluded outside the totality of the single 'I'. E. Lévinas, for example, gives a harsh warning that the *'other'* cannot be so reduced by the self to a neutral position or a position of service of the self. The *'other '* must be "let be", his essay *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* being a sustained denouncing of the idea of a subjectivity reducible to 'essence' or the mediated relation of self with self. [62] The *'other'*, he says, "figures as what is near in a proximity that counts as sociality, which "excites" by its pure and simple proximity". Here is a correspondence between Christian and non-Christian social theory which must be extended in order to allow God's salvation to be signified in the quality of human relation.

In some ways this type of study is radical - that is, in relating a Christian commitment to a theology of sin and salvation to non-Christian social theory. This is seen particularly in the fact that Hegel, nor his interpreters Habermas, Fackenheim, Kojève and others pose the question of alienation and the *'other '* in the same terms as a Christian social theorist. In other respects, the type of answer being given is less than radical, some form of analogical discourse in theology being characteristic of most words about God. [63]

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[62] E. Levinas (1981) p. 16.

[63] T Aquinas says:

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Sallie McFague captures this need for analogical discourse in her description of metaphor and analogy as the two spheres of thought that are most active in speaking about salvation. [64] Aquinas spoke of the "double truth about divine things ... on the side of our knowledge which variously responds to the truths of divinity". [65] Theology, he says, issues from the light of faith, yet is not opposed to the best findings of philosophy. [66]

Without making a study of Aquinas, it is this principle that allows the familiar distinction between the thing signified (L. *res significata* ) and the mode of its signification (*modus significandi* ) to be worked out through the medium of philosophy or, in our case, socio-philosophy. Even if Hegel's is an improper framing of divine *'Otherness'* as an abstract principle, the key element is the common search amongst his interpreters for criticality regarding Hegel's "Individuality In and For Itself" amongst Christian and non-Christian theory. The analogical task

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A meaning expressed by words, which is the literal or historical sense,

is discovered by getting the hang of the sentence. You find the spiritual sense,

by looking past the things signified by the literal sense to other realities

behind them.

*Sunday Sermons,* 20, quoted in *St. Thomas Aquinas  Theological Texts,* Transl. T. Gilby (1955) pp. 18-19.

[64] For definition of symbol and metaphor as "basically a new or unconventional interpretation of reality" see S. McFague *Metaphorical Theology* (1983) pp. 40 f.

[65] T. Aquinas 1, *Contra Gentes,* 9. "There is a double canon for the theological truths we profess.  Some surpass the ingenuity of the human reason, for instance the Trinity.  But others can be attained by the human reason" 1, *Contra Gentes,* 3.

[66] "From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, ... the stronger the intelligible light is in man". T. Aquinas, *ibid.*

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in interpreting Hegel is thus an apologetic one.   It lies in preparing the ground for the gospel; a function concerned with salvation.

## 5. A. *ALIENATION AND HUMAN SPIRITUALITY*

It may be helpful at this point to recall the criteria which have already been established in deriving a general interpretative framework for addressing the question of salvation in a social context.

**1**. The task of soteriology includes illuminating analogies of the healing effect wrought in Christ in dialogue with non-Christian social theory.

**2**. Soteriology is about the healing of what has been separated as a result of the Fall. This means the restoration of the *Imago Dei* in the self and humankind as inherently social.

**3**. From 1. & 2. it follows that we might well learn from Hegel's critique of Kant's idea of the self as fixed and singular. He warns against an inherently non-relational view of the self.

**4**. There is no idea of selfhood or relation in Hegel adequate for Christian understanding because he is tied to a logic of self-determination not relation and communication.

**5**. The need for recognition of the neighboring self or 'other' in its full historical identity.

These criteria have been established as part of the task of discerning a more satisfactory understanding of human relation through dialogue with Hegel. Chapters 1-4 have been about how to break out of his 'I' - *'other '* structure of relation which reduces the *'other '* to a neutral position or a position of service of the self. If, from what we have already seen regarding the social nature of selfhood, Hegel fails where he promised most, the question now is why develop further points

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of contact with his notion of human potential?  Why pursue the question of alienation and Hegelian *spirituality*?  In this Chapter I raise the subject for two reasons.  First, because it emerges as a matter of course as we proceed with the journey though the *Phenomenology.*  §§ 438 - 671 of the *Phenomenology,* which are entitled *Spirit,* begin with the words: "Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth".  The actualization of rational self-consciousness through its own activity takes on a *spiritual* character, the nature of which we shall discuss, in its relation to questions of the truth.  Second, because there is a sense in which Hegel's quasi-theological use of language still functions pertinently as a focal metaphor in the resolution of problems concerning the overcoming of alienation through reason. Hegelian *spirituality* may be dead in the sense of providing a metaphysical key to the comprehension of all reality.  His framing of the question of alienation and spirituality raises the issue of human relation and reasoning ability in an acute and relevant way.

What then is to be done in introducing this Chapter?  The first thing is to make clear again that it is in response to social problems of alienation that I have been arguing for an analogical model of theology that can say what God's salvation might *be like* in social terms.  The second thing is that I am using Hegel only insofar as he helps us to explore the question of human potential as an issue of *spirituality* and community relation. The third thing is to point out that it is a mistake to talk about '*the* problem of alienation and human spirituality' as if there is

a single issue with which the Christian church has traditionally been concerned. One thing that Hegel teaches is that alienation is not so simple as to result in a single meaning but emerges as a whole network of meanings which cannot be presented in a single, homogeneous picture. Nevertheless, the question remains as to how to address the fact of alienation not only in the individual but also the social realm. For this reason, Hegel's treatment of *spirituality* in terms of the human capacity for community requires a framework within which to criticize his work effectively and to discern congeniality wherever possible.

The whole corpus of Hegel's work bears upon human spirituality in the very limited sense of the conscious awareness of Reason. My special interest in this Chapter on human spirituality lies not in its being concerned, like Hegel, with the description of the stages of the Notion of Reason - the Ethical order, Culture, Morality and the rest - but, in the human capacity and potential for community given in reason. In Christian interpretation the very powerful paradox of human capacity and incapacity for community creates profound assessment problems regarding Hegel's description of spirituality. The question centers on the confidence in human reason, in particular, the ability of reason to represent the sum total of the social order and all human activity. It comes to a head in the *Phenomenology*'s argument for a type of spirituality *intrinsic to* the nature of reason [*was sie an sich ist*] (489). Karl Löwith interprets this passage in Christian overtones of the *Logos* as giving onto-"logical" definition to humankind. [1] There is, he suggests, something inherent in each individual, by

[1] K. Löwith (1965) pp. 307-330.

the very fact that s/he is human, toward the potential for community. [2] If so, this human potential, as expressed in Hegel's terms of "spiritual *essence* ", requires careful assessment as the commingling of the human and divine natures.

In Chapters 1-4 I have warned against Hegel's concept of God as a divine Being determined by the constraints of Kantian logic. In E. Jüngel's words: "It would be correct to say of a God so understood that all things human were alien to him". [3] Questions remain, however, regarding whether there is such a thing as natural human capacity for community *Imago Dei* - what Hegel calls "spiritual *essence* " (439). If Hegel expresses the tendency in humankind for communal relation, albeit in a distorted fashion, the theological question is whether there are valuable aspects in his representation of the relation between human alienation and *spirituality* which must be stressed.

## 5. B. *HUMAN CAPACITY AND INCAPACITY* [4]

Non-Christian assessment of how Hegel relates *spirituality* to his notions of individual identity and community has commonly been broken down in two extreme ways. Critics have argued that Hegel displays a notion of *spirituality* that

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[2] Aquinas talks about an *innate* bent in human nature towards reasonable living. *Disputations, de Caritate* 2, in T. Gilby (1955) p. 212 - 3. He quotes Aristotle's understanding of virtue as a disposition to the best. *Physics*, vii. 3, 246$^{b}$23.

[3] E. Jüngel (1986) p. 297.

[4] I am indebted for this phrase to J.D. Zizioulas "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood". *Scot.Journ. of .Theol.* Vol. 28, pp. 401-448.

elevates the ideals of 'the Enlightenment' above an ethical point of view. Alternatively, the argument has been put that the ideals of ethical community are so inseparably linked in Hegel with totalizing ambitions of reason that the relation between *spirituality* and totality renders any reading of the *Phenomenology* legitimate only if used to criticize all forms of totalitarian thought. W. Kaufmann might represent the first view with his suggestion that *spirituality* in Hegel is a manifestation of God's revelation to the extent that happenings succeed because they are good: "Hegel's approach is not amoral. Although he finds the aim of history in its "result". [5] C. Taylor exemplifies the second option, suggesting that Hegel absorbs the Enlightenment drive towards freedom in an implicit affirmation of the destructive potential of modern society. [6]

Theological assessment is a complex matter. Insofar as the question concerns salvation in a social context as a cooperative endeavour between humankind and God, the question is a very old one indeed. Its history reaches back to the debate between the Alexandrian Fathers and Pelagius regarding the human capacity of free will, the incapacity brought by sin, and human relation to God. I do not intend to enter into the historical development of the question, except to note that Hegel's own protestant cultural context reflected this tension in the debate between orthodox Lutherans and the *Aufklärer*. L. Dickey takes the dispute between Augustine and Pelagius as illustrative of debate amongst the *Aufklärer*. They were philosophers, poets and

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[5] Walter Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method" in A. MacIntyre, ed., (1972) p. 44.

[6] C. Taylor (1979) p. 130.

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pastors immediately preceding Hegel, between 1748 - 1774, e.g., Leibniz, Wolff, Kant, Spalding and Klopstock, who delineated their opposition to orthodox Lutheranism over this issue. [7] Hegel, Dickey says, stands at the end of this tradition, tending in the 1790's to emphasize human capacity not incapacity. Orthodox Lutherans, he maintains, fell back on the dogmas of Augustinianism to counter the *Aufklärer* who set out to rehabilitate Pelagius. [8] He, like Löwith, draws on recent commentators of Pelagius to illustrate Hegel's influences, the majority of whom conclude that Pelagius' theological views were partly contingent on grace but that to participate in salvation, humankind must bring itself into communication through thought with the divine *logos*. [9]

The above makes clear, and this is of vital and decisive importance to our theme, that in Hegel's designation of human *spirituality* as through the activity of reason we are to discern two aspects; human capacity and incapacity. On the one hand, we might talk with Aquinas about the building up of "human quality" through rational capacity. [10] On the other, human capacity having acquired sin as its content betrays the real depth of its alienation from God. With regard to human capacity, any propensity towards building up the community, Aquinas says, reflects the work of the Holy Spirit in implanting and sustaining

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[7] L. Dickey (1987) pp. 12 - 32. "[T]he *Aufklärer* could be said to have been searching for what their detractors called "a compromise theology,' ... voluntarist in a religious sense, activist in an ethical sense, civil in a human sense, and moderately synergist in a soteriological sense" (p. 26).

[8] L. Dickey (1987) pp. 19 - 34. See also W. Jaeschke (1990) 2.1; 3.4; 3.5.

[9] L. Dickey (1987) pp. 27 - 8 nn. 196 - 200.

[10] T. Aquinas *Summa Theologica*, 2a - 2ae. xxiii. 2.

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of a potential for community:

> God, who moves all things to their due ends, implants in them dispositions to
> follow the purposes he assigns: *wisdom disposes all things gracefully.* [11]

He suggests a certain affinity with Hegel's affirmation that steps towards community are to be made through the activity of reason. In other words, there is a basis here for a positive and critical relation between Christian and non-Christian social theory in the human vocation to community regarding the rational capacity given to enable its possibility.

With regard to the question of human incapacity, an inherent tendency against community requires that theology deals with another fundamental problem. For Christian theology, this is the problem of sin and its habitual charm for the human person. In drawing a connexion between alienation in Hegel and a Christian understanding of sin, I make no attempt to empty the cause and content of sin into philosophical theory. Warnings about 'determinate' readings of sin which identify alienation with a particular state of consciousness instead of historical circumstances have rightly been sounded by many theologians of liberation. J. Sobrino writes: "European theology approaches reality through the mediations of thought ... with a particular type of thinking". [12] Beware the historicist reductionism, he warns, which explains rather than changes the historical situation. The fact remains that for Christian theology there is something called sin which is like an obstacle interposed between individuals and between humankind and God. [13]

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[11] T. Aquinas, *ibid.*

[12] Jon Sobrino (1985) pp. 15-16.

[13] "When I speak in any college about estrangement everybody knows what I

This theological problem of knowing how to respond to Hegel's emphasis on human rational capacity can be illustrated by brief comparison. Compare D. Sölle's sympathetic reaction to Hegel's linkage between alienation and *spirituality* and the more cautious approach of W. Kasper. D. Sölle, a proponent of liberation theology in western Europe and well known for her appropriation of Hegelian Christology writes: "For a rising European theology of liberation this criticism of human alienation, prompted by Hegel and carried through by Karl Marx, is automatically central, because Marx, turning Hegel upside down, noted alienation in the conditions of production in industrialism." [14] Taking over Hegel's idea of alienation at the heart of modern experience, she draws on the liberal concept of sin as cutting oneself off from God and neighbour, identified in the social effects of a society's industry, bureaucracy and consumer relations. A certain normative status is claimed for Hegelian influenced analysis to emphasize sin's social and structural nature.

By contrast, Kasper's feeling is that Hegelian social analysis is too much an expression of the modern desire for freedom from the problem of sin to be made normative in Christian interpretation He links Hegel's idea of alienation to the modern 'autonomistic' interpretation of humanity: "It is true that the problem of human alienation has been much discussed ever since Rousseau; but generally speaking the solutions offered have been

mean, because they all feel estranged from their true being, from life, from themselves especially. But if I spoke of their all being sinners, they would not understand at all". P. Tillich (1965) p. 98.

[14] Dorothee Sölle (1990) p. 61.

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in purely immanent and autonomous terms". [15] Without a substantively Christian perspective grounded in God's liberating activity in Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit, he says, reading Hegel serves only as a humanist exercise in community ethics.

Sölle and Kasper illustrate the problem of divergent sympathies in reading Hegel theologically. On the one hand, is an emphasis on the human potential for liberating action (Sölle). On the other, Hegelian *spirituality* cannot be reconciled with the intention of theology to relate an understanding of God to human experience (Kasper). They witness to the fact that in actual human experience the two categories, spirituality (in the sense of an innate longing for community) and sinfulness, are inseparably linked. If this is right, and humankind has potential (in sinfulness) for community, we are questioning the idea of community as *intrinsic to* the nature of the created gift of reason. This is an ontological question which asks about a destiny for community with God and one's fellows as an essential part of the *Imago Dei*. To let such a question guide my interpretation of Hegel is to recognize the spirituality in sinfulness paradox. It is not to suggest, as D. Cupitt might, an Hegelian influenced anthropocentric and voluntarist interpretation of spirituality: "All meaning and truth and value are man-made", he says, "and could not be otherwise". [16] On the

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[15] W. Kasper (1989) p. 88.

[16] D. Cupitt (1984) p. 20. Note the similarity with J.A.T. Robinson's 1960 interpretation of Tillich: "a statement is 'theological' not because it relates to a particular Being called 'God', but because it asks *ultimate* questions about the meaning of existence". J. A. T. Robinson (1963) p. 51.

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contrary, it is to understand soteriology as having two distinct but related aspects. The one is negative; being saved from fallen sinfulness. The other is positive; fulfilment of humanity's full communion with God and the reaching out to human destiny in creation. [17]

### 5. C. *POSING THE PROBLEM OF SIN*

Given that defining a correspondence of meaning between Hegel's notion of alienation and a Christian interpretation of sin prepares us for a better understanding of salvation in a social context, how are we to understand and use the word 'sin'? I am reminded of Voltaire's despising of the Christian religion for making individuals aspire to escape their sinful condition: *Je ne suis pas Chrétien, mais c'est pour t'aimer mieux* ["I am not a Christian, but it is in the interest of being able to love better"] [18] More recently, I think of J. Kahl condemnation of the doctrine of sin and salvation the "misery" of Christianity. [19] Kahl quotes Karl Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*: "For Germany, the critique of religion is essentially over." [20] It was the problem of sin, he says, from which humanist philosophy broke free.

The question is not new with respect to Hegel scholarship. H.J. Paton commented in 1955 that saints and philosophers alike

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[17] See J.D. Zizioulas "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood". *Scot.Journ. of .Theol.* Vol. 28, p. 434.

[18] Voltaire, *Épitre à Uranie*, quoted in P. Gay (1970a) p. 387.

[19] See J. Kahl (1971). Also A. Pérez-Esclarín (1980).

[20] J.Kahl, *ibid.*

may be shocked at Hegel's undermining of Christian theism and its associated doctrines. [21] More recently, the question is a particularly pressing one in discussions about salvation in a *social context*. G. Gutiérrez wrote in 1973: "Sin appears as the fundamental alienation, the root of a situation of injustice and exploitation. It cannot be encountered in itself, but only in concrete instances, in particular alienations." [22] Enrique Dussel, the contemporary Latin American theologian observes that "historical, social sin is transmitted by institutions - by cultural, political, economic, religious, erotic, and so on structures." [23] Sin, says Dussel, is part of the texture of society. But in what sense? One might well agree with Dussel about the social character of sin in the sense that one offence affects the lives of many. But this still ties us to a perspective from the individual and does not, I suggest, meet the challenge of attending to social matters. The issue is how to pose the problem of sin in a social context in such a way as to enable more adequate options for thinking about salvation.

In particular, I suggest that we look at how Hegel denotes and demonstrates some of the deepest forms of alienation that a society can experience. Specifically in §§ 438 - 671 he is

[21] H.J. Paton (1955) p. 180. For links between Hegel's aim to reintegrate alienated consciousness back into humanity and L. Feuerbach's radicalizing of this humanization of religion see Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*: "The consciousness of the infinite is nothing but the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness. To put it differently: in the consciousness of the infinite, the conscious subject has the infinity of his own essence as his object". *Werke*, VI, 2 - 3: 1, 36 - 7.

[22] G. Gutiérrez (1974) p. 176.

[23] E. Dussel (1988) p. 22.

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concerned with the form of social alienation that can be diagnosed as the 'spirit of individualism' [*Geistes der Einzelheit*] (§ 475) or "germ of destruction" (§ 476). He directs our attention especially to the one major form of social alienation that he calls atomicity [*Punktualität*] (§ 482), that is, the non-existence of relation in either the individual self, family or nation state. From the outset of Ch. VI of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel attempts a uniting of the ideas of alienation and *spirituality* through human history's unfolding into supposedly yet more complete forms of unified consciousness. Alienation, especially that of atomicity, acts as an over-arching philosophical construct. It expresses a trans-cultural experience, being used in §§ 438 - 671 of a range of historical and social situations including the Greek, Roman, Medieval and Enlightenment cultures, family relations, law and government, and events subsequent to the French Revolution.

## 5. D. *ATOMICITY AND THE PROBLEM OF SIN*

Nowhere in the *Phenomenology* does Hegel mention sin [*Sünde*} or original sin [*Erbsünde*]. Significantly, however, alienation is understood as an ultimate dimension of human nature [24] Lukács writes: "it is in Hegel we first encounter alienation as the fundamental problem of the place of man in the world and *vis-à-vis* the world". [25] Lukács and A. Kojève both claim Hegel to demonstrate alienation as the basic tenor of human existence for Hegel, commenting on his philosophic

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[24] *L.P.R.* 3: 293 mentions a "fall" but only whilst stressing the return of the world as the 'other' into the unity of the concept. On "Hegel's Philosophy as Anti-Christian or Christian?" see W. Jaeschke (1990) pp. 381 - 387.

[25] G. Lukács (1932) pp. xxiii - xxiv.

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method as "purely "empirical" or "positivist" [26] In other words, Hegel demonstrates the fact of alienation not only as specific, partial relational failings which can be shown empirically, but also its deeper content and real tragedy in the human situation.

Lukács and Kojève remind us that for Hegel alienation is an objective social fact as well as being a subjective, personal trait. The noun form [*Entfremdung*] occurs twenty-nine times, the infinitive [*Entfremden*] three times, the present participle [*Entfremdende*] twice, and varying adjectival forms thirty times. The term alien [*Fremd* ] is a noun used as an adjective nearly forty times, often in association with the idea of externalization [*Entäusserung*] which occurs nineteen times in the noun form, once as an infinitive [*Entäussern*] and five times adjectivally. It would not be too much to say that, in general, §§ 438 - 671 are Hegel's plea for a recovery from the spiritual death or "loss of its essence" (§ 483) signified by what he calls atomicity and the 'spirit of individualism' [*Geistes der Einzelheit*] (475).

Chapter VI of the *Phenomenology* usefully illustrates this type of alienation. It opens with a picture of ancient Greek society largely sterile in its relations and undergoing breakdown;

> a world which has completely lost the meaning for the self of something alien
> to it, just as the self has completely lost the meaning of a being-for-self
> separated from the world (439).

Hegel's claim is that ancient Greece became a victim of

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[26] A. Kojève (1969) p. 176.

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'atomicity', implying the draining away of meaning with its failing social spirit. The 'spirit of individualism' is part of Hegel's language of alienation used to describe the passing of the Greek culture due to its failure, he would have us believe, to suppress increasing separatism: "the simple compactness of their individuality has been shattered into a multitude of separate atoms" (476). For example, the individual male youth who assumes an individualism in community affairs and war is said in §§ 471 - 474 to be atom-like, as is the warring state in isolation from its neighbors. (475 - 477).

The experience is typical, he says, of the passing from the ancient Greek to Roman culture. §§ 444 - 483 on "The Ethical Order" trace an escalating sense of seriousness that begins with the mere inference of another's existence; "the existence of the children remains an alien [*fremde*] reality, a reality all its own" (456). It extends to the fragmentation of a society and to the laying waste [*bloßes Verwüsten*] (482) of all social forms of organization. [27] This atomism or fragmentation is form of social alienation given in contrast to the "Spirit of community" (473). [28] The 'spirit of individualism' signifies a sickness in society, Hegel says, demonstrated by Antigone and the tensions she faces between social responsibilities and the new 'spirit' of "private end" (475) that would override them. Antigone, like all women in ancient Greece is distinguished by her presence and

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[27] The phrase *bloßes Verwüsten* will allow of stronger interpretation than A.V. Miller suggests - namely, naked devastation.

[28] Note the phrase "[*dem höchssten Geiste des Bewußteins, der Gemeine*] T.W.A. Vol. 3, p. 351 and rendered in A.V. Miller as "the Spirit's highest form of consciousness, the Spirit of the community" ( 473).

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role in the home; "her interest in centred on the universal and remains alien to the particularity of desire" (457). Traditionally, the brother or husband of the household is the one representing the alienation or split between family commitments and wider city-state concerns. In the male, "the self-contained life of the Family breaks up and goes beyond itself". (458) Creon in particular represents the new 'spirit of individualism' which alienates the family from the state and will extend the principle to inter-state relations: "He who wantonly attacked the Spirit's highest corm of consciousness, the Spirit of the community, must be stripped of his entire and finished being" (473).

Consider the heart of the tension in the Antigone story - namely, that there is no prospect for resolution from the conflict between her claims of 'otherness' and the progress of civic society except, that is, within an inclusive totality. Neither she nor Creon were wrong: Civic law and government are legitimate forms of reason but so are religion and tradition; "sticking steadfastly to what is right" (437). Hegel's diagnosis of the spiritual condition in this transition era suggests the 'spirit of individualism' to be one of the deepest losses of meaning a society can experience. Regardless of the fact that we no longer live with the same conflict of priorities as those facing Antigone in her choice between obedience to the old family-tribal laws and the new form of Greek civil society, Hegel identifies certain noncontemporaneous phenomena in social relations. I cannot but note in passing how this critique of Greek culture confirms a male dominated social hierarchy by interpreting the role of men as more 'spiritual' than that of

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women. He somewhat curiously makes woman represent the spirit of individuality and man, in general, represent relation. [29] Hegel's hindrances to an egalitarian anthropology is not, however, our main focus of attention. I must delimit discussion to what this *'spiritual'* sickness means as the dispersal of society into "a sheer multiplicity of personal atoms ... alien to them and soulless as well" (481).

The form this takes develops into a sickness or alienation. A most striking feature of §§ 477 - 483 is the near torrent of words to express alienation in the Roman state obsessed with individual civil rights, private citizenship and legal relations. In the space of a page we hear of what is abstract, *arbitrary*, *capricious* and *without reality*. He talks of *soullessness*, *rigidity, empty singleness, essencelessness, solitude*. H e speaks of being *cut off, unreal* and *impotent*, describing Roman relational content as a *chaos* that is *frenzied* and *destructive*, displaying *atomicity* and *waste*. There is almost a neurosis, he seems to say, about the drive to individuality in the Roman culture. It allows the individual to be thought of as 'Person', he says: "Personality ... is the independence of consciousness, an independence which has *actual* validity" (479). His use of the word 'person', however, hints at a confusion in the principle of independence and the significance of personality: "Personal independence in the sphere of legal right ... is self-consciousness as the sheer empty unit of

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[29] Genevieve Lloyd (1984) writes: "The pattern he (Hegel) introduces lends itself to the accommodation, containment and transcending of feminine consciousness, in relation to more mature 'male' consciousness" pp. 72 - 3. Also note R.C. Solomon (1983) "Hegel on Family and Feminism" pp. 538 - 546.

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the person" (*ibid.*).

Troubled by this problem of individualism which for Hegel is institutionalized in Roman society, Hegel examines its causes and suggests that the Roman Empire so idolized power that a legal system capable of stabilizing relations was required; "legal right [is] ... *mine* ... as something whose validity is *recognized* and *actual*" (480). Problems ensue, he says, when power is made the basis of legality and relations consist in contracts concluded between free persons, causing the idea of the person to be defined in terms of legal rights and obligations and "to describe an individual as a 'person' is an expression of contempt" (*ibid..*). His hypothesis is built on the conception that Roman emperor worship is not worship of a person but the worship of power. The emperor has become "the titanic self-consciousness that thinks of itself as being an actual living God" because lower in society a legitimation of power manifests itself in orders that protect the self as non-relational and atom-like (481). As J. Hyppolite writes: "The individual who (in vain) knows himself to be a person appears alone face to face with an alien domination which crushes him. ... The emperor's will ..." [30] No social framework conducive to the development of authentic personality can be based on a picture of society bound together by the law and the controlled deployment of power.

These sections can plausibly be rejected as absurd in their claim that historical eras embody distinct but related shapes of alienation. Note, for example, how alienation is not a problem

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[30] Jean Hyppolite (1974) p. 372.

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that appears to threaten the movement of 'Spirit' in §§ 438 - 671 through the breakdown of the Greek city-states (objective 'Spirit) the Christian feudal world to its culmination in the French Revolution (self-alienated 'Spirit') and the Napoleonic period. To the contrary "Spirit ... must advance to the consciousness of what it is immediately ... by passing through a series of shapes to attain to a knowledge of itself" (441). [31] This is what he calls "the determinateness of *alienation*" [*Bestimmtheit der Entfremdung*] (529). [32] We might well be condemnatory of Hegel's goals for community being limited by the metaphysical constraints of absolute idealism and an epistemologically oriented grasp of the modes of consciousness. Clearly he wants to think that an estimation of traditional "ethical" value is possible as an arbitrary moment within the whole; "it is right because it is what is right" (437).

In terms of the development of a critical framework of thought, very real dangers lie in his accepting that there is no viewpoint from which to see if anything is wrong with a society's internal conviction or to express a negative judgement on a total social system. This explains the relative unimportance of Antigone's criticizing the cultural and societal rationale on which her society is based; "as soon as I start to

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[31] See. Marx's general conclusion on Hegelian philosophy in "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* - Introduction" (1844), *C.W.* 111. "The immediate *task of philosophy,* which is at the service of history ... is to unmask self estrangement (*Selbst-entfremdung*) in its *unholy forms*". p. 176.

[32] H.S. Harris says Hegel's developing ideas of determination in *The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics* regarding the relation between totality & its parts preempts the *Phenomenology's* reconstruction of the Kantian position on judgement and syllogism. H.S. Harris in J.W. Burbidge and G. di Giovanni (1986) p. 98.

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test them I have already begun to tread an unethical life" (437). 33 "for what we are concerned with is not the point of view, but the object and content, which ought not to be self-contradictory" (437). The positive point to be made, however, concerns the transcultural experience of the capacity for community that he perceives within the problematic character of human existence.

## 5. E. *ON THE PROBLEM OF ASSESSMENT*

The reader is immediately wary at this point of Hegel's commitment to a metaphysics of totality. The concepts of alienation and totality cannot be separated as a brief word survey illustrates. The word totality [*Totalität*] occurs only ten times in the *Phenomenology* and the word [*Gesamtheit*], also meaning totality, only once. Another interchangeable word for totality [*Vollständigkeit*] occurs eleven times and the word for 'the whole' [*das Ganze*] is found ninety-six times. Adjectival forms are more common, those from the root [*gesamt*] occurring three times, from [*Vollständig*] eighteen times and from [*ganz*] over two hundred and twenty times. Hegel's *spirituality* is summarized, by Kojève as follows: "Only philosophic Discourse can achieve Truth, for it alone is related to the *concrete* Real - that is, to the *totality* of the reality of Being". 34

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33 For links between Hegel's acritical concept of ethical or communal life and the divinity of the state see J. Plamenatz (1963) Ch. 4, esp. pp. 234f. L.W. Dickey (1987) describes *Sittlichkeit* as an elastic term which collapses all realms of experience; natural, social, political into one principle of action. pp. 181-5.

34 A. Kojève (1969) p. 178 n. 2.

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The dangers are all too obvious. On the basis of the conclusion of Chapter 4 that the 'other' is a most important category for subverting the totality of Hegelian logic, we are deeply suspicious of Hegel's concept of totality and the trust he places in any determinate progress of reason. Totalizing reason is no longer enough because the 'other' comes to us from beyond its horizon. [35] As J. Derrida writes: "The "we" of the *Phenomenology of the Mind* ... encloses itself in the circle in order to *know sense*". [36] Derrida's condemnation is not far removed from Habermas's observations already noted as to Hegel's self-enclosed notion of *spiritual* totality. He decries Hegel's "infinite processing of the relation-to-self that swallows everything finite within itself". [37] Habermas does not cease to remind of the traceable descent from Hegel's philosophy of consciousness into Kautskyite reformism and Stalinist totalitarianism: "The totality of instrumental reason finds its expression in totalitarian society." [38] Thus we are reminded that postmodernity - insofar as it is a single

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[35] E. Dussel (1985) calls this the analectical moment, contrasting *ano-* (beyond) with *dia-*(through). pp. 158 - 160.

[36] J. Derrida (1978) p. 276. Ch. Six of Writing and Difference exemplifies Derrida's perceived need to subvert the idea of totality in Hegel through encountering distance and separation. In M.C. Taylor's words:

Something always remains that resists the powerful thrust of Aufhebung. This remain(s) is an exteriority that can never be completely interiorized;

it is ungraspable, inassimilable, indigestible. This exteriority is the OTHER exteriority, "without correspondence with the Hegelian concept of exteriority."

Such an exteriority ... the problem of the bastard." M.C. Taylor (1987) p. 270.

[37] J. Habermas (1987) p. 36.

[38] J. Habermas in R.J. Bernstein E d. (1986) p. 73. J. E. Grumley (1989) traces the "historicist stream" of totality thinking from Hegel to the present.

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movement - condemns the totalizing drive of modernity, and of Hegelian philosophy in particular. [39]

Without doubt, Hegel's idea of the determinateness of alienation moves us onto slippery ground with respect to knowing what sort of determination is meant. Determinate alienation for whom? From what? In which political, economic, cultural, psychological context is alienation determinate? [40] Analogy may be the meat as well as the spice of theological life but Hegel's concept of alienation and *spirituality*, no matter how much it is subjected to interpretative critique, may well be so fundamentally misleading that it impedes rather than enlivens soteriological understanding. There are important questions here, and thus I distinguish Hegel's denoting alienation as an inherent force in humanity from his interpretative commitment to a philosophical metaphysics of totality. [41] By Hegel's denotative treatment of alienation and *spirituality* I mean that which describes or demonstrates cogently. *Connotative* reasoning is taken to mean the seeking to persuade and the giving of insight in addition to that drawn from *denotative* arguments based on observation and probability. We need to distinguish

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[39] "Postmodernists distrust metanarratives; there is a deep suspicion of Hegel, Marx and any form of universal philosophy". M. Sarup (1989) p. 132. This is a generalization drawn from attacks by Lyotard and Foucault on Hegelian Marxism.

[40] For the breadth of definitions of 'alienation' derived from Hegel in Marx see J. Plamenatz (1975) pp. 139 - 42. Also N. Lash (1981) who looks at the four main aspects of alienation in Marx's Paris Manuscripts; alienation from nature, the individual as worker, his *species-being* or human essence and from fellow human beings. Ch. 14 , esp. pp. 170 - 191.

[41] G. R. G. Mure (1940) is a still useful summary of Hegel's notion of truth consisting in totality. pp. 165 - 175

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Hegel's denotative treatment of alienation from his quasi-theological portrayal of the notion of *spirituality*. This being the case, it is possible to incorporate lessons learned from Hegel of the general pointlessness, meaninglessness and irrationality of social atomicity.

## 5. F. *THE CONTENT OF SPIRITUALITY*

On the basis of this distinction, the next step in assessing Hegel's treatment of alienation and *spirituality* is to look at how he sets goals for community. The most penetrating description of *spirituality* offered by Hegel in Chapter VI of the *Phenomenology* is in its closing words:

> it is God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the
> form of pure knowledge (671).

*Spirituality* is not just about a religious yearning for God. It is about how knowledge of God is realized concretely - (in Hegel's sense of 'concrete' from L. *concrescere*; to grow together). [42] Two problems emerge when speaking about the content of *spirituality*.

1. The first concerns the atheistic implications of Hegel's very use of the words alienation and *spirituality*. The second is about Hegel's own failure to realize the *spirituality* of which he speaks concretely. With regard to the first problem, the obvious danger for a Christian interpretation is that Hegel's very use of the words alienation and *spirituality* risks their becoming arbitrary and in the end meaningless. H.S. Harris says that Hegel

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[42] On the meaning of 'concrete' in Hegel see E. Jüngel (1976) p. 32  For Hegel's own definition see his *Aesthetik* (new ed., Berlin, 1955) p. 108 f.

is influenced in this by the Platonic idea of the "truly beautiful bond" of reason between the one and the many, the divine and the human. [43] Hegel's general project, he thinks, is a reemployment of Greek ontology in the search for a unification of experimental and formal sciences, with religious and speculative reason. [44] J.N. Findlay contextualizes the concept of *spirituality* in Hegel within the goal of understanding its "final causation" after the manner of Plato and Aristotle. [45]

2. The second danger, as R. Engels observed, not long after Hegel wrote, is that Hegel's overall sense of alienation and *spirituality* fails to be mediated 'concretely'. It is treated, he says, merely as a principle of thought transcending and prior to society and politics. [46] This danger is seen particularly plainly in §§ 521 f. where the relation between noble, ignoble consciousness and the "actuality" of wealth is summarized by anticipating the resolution of these historical conflicts in the more 'real' history of thought:

> What we have here, then, is that all the moments execute a universal justice
> on one another, each just as much alienates its own self, as it forms itself

[43] H.S. Harris (1983) p. 109. He draws on Plato's *Timaeus*, 31c - 32a.

[44] H.S. Harris, Introduction to *The Jena System* in J.W. Burbidge and G. di Giovanni (1986) pp. xiii - xxiii. Since Parmenides the unity between being and thought was the ultimate concern for Greek classical thought. Cf. *The Sophist* 237 E f. where Plato wants to show that non-being has a relative reality of its own within a movement in which being and non-being qualify each other. In the text, the problem centres around the idiom ον with its derivatives το ον (that which is), το ἤν (that which is one), μη οντα (that which is not one), μη ον (that which has no being).

[45] J.N. Findlay (1958) p. 46.

[46] R. Engels, "The Revolution against Hegel" in L.S. Feuer Ed. (1969) pp. 237 - 256.

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into its opposite and in this way inverts it. True Spirit, however, is just this unity of the absolutely separate moments ..." (521).

"Spirit" may be mediated in the social world but, in this instance at least, alienation is not overcome there.

More recently, Raymond Plant is suspicious of Hegel's *spirituality* for the same reasons; it removes alienation from immediate social and political life. It becomes, he thinks, a philosophic appropriation of immediate conditions. [47] For example, some parts of §§ 488 - 537 on "Culture and its Realm of Actuality" attempt to deal with specific conditions of alienation in Medieval European society and with culture [*Bildung*] as essentially a social phenomenon. Hegel especially mentions state power, wealth, the position of the nobility, the common people or 'ignoble consciousness' and general pressures leading up to the French Revolution. Alienation occurs in the loss of individuality over against both state-power and wealth: "Dominion and wealth therefore confront the individual as objects" (§ 495). Hegel's main intention, however, is to show that state-power represents universal consciousness over against independent consciousness. He is imposing the philosophical construct of the stages of consciousness onto the very real issues of power and wealth:

> It [ignoble consciousness]... sees in the sovereign power a fetter and a suppression of its own *being-for-self*, and therefore hates the ruler ... and is always on the point of revolt. It sees, too, in wealth, by which it attains to the enjoyment of its own self-centred existence, only the disparity with its permanent *essence*; since through wealth it becomes conscious of itself merely as an isolated individual (501).

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[47] R. Plant (1973) pp. 25 f.

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Alienation in thought is merely reflected by alienation in the social world, embedded in social conditions. [48]

What possibility then is there, for the Christian theologian to reflect on whatever good exists among the fruits of Hegel's critique of social atomism? In this Chapter, I have been attempting to take a positive attitude towards Hegel wherever possible because he grasps the socially destructive effects of atomicity. If, however, Greek monism not Christian soteriology lies behind his notion of *spirit* as the expression of a natural potential, it seems that we are tied to an underlying non-Christian image of *spirit* as embodying a form of rational freedom. [49] Similarly, if Hegel's ambiguous use of the term *spirituality* fails *concretely* to express fundamental human reactions in the face of the fear of alienation, Christian soteriology loses little in not exploring what might be liberating in his human *spirituality*. [50]

I suggest two answers in response to these points. The first is by example, and the second by way of constructive argument.

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[48] R. Norman (1976) makes this point, p. 95.

[49] A yet worse scenario would be that interpretation of Hegel could not escape his establishing the sort of continuity claimed in his *Philosophy of History*: "The German world took up the Roman culture and religion in their completed form". *P.H.*, p. 342. On this vision of *spirit* and historical domination see T. Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination* (1973); E. Dussel (1985) Ch.s 1 & 2. .Also M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno (1956) Ch. XII "Ideology" for Mussolini's being influenced by Pareto's reading of Hegel (p. 196). In contrast, S. Averini argues against Hegel's being a nascent German nationalist (1972) esp. pp. 240 - 1.

[50] Note J. Derrida's comment on Hegel's treatment of the shared need to overcome alienation: "I have wanted to show that Hegel's reaction is the fundamental human behaviour". (1978) p. 258. Quoted from G. Bataille's *Hegel, la mort*.

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1. The first response is to refer to those Christian theologians who, reading Hegel, have attempted to reappropriate aspects of his thought. Earlier this century, E. Przywara, like Hegel, directed individual identity towards a teleological *spirituality* or "unity of completeness" to which the self is objectively related. He refers to a *transcendentality* or a striving outwards from the self having, like Hegel, identified the three main activities of human consciousness as *immanence* or immediacy, *transcendence* of consciousness and a unity in thought. [51] More recently, Hans Küng's *The Incarnation of God* is a prime example of someone using the fruits of Hegel's Christological thought to develop directions for Christian spirituality. Küng allows Hegel's vision of the incarnation to act as a corrective emphasis on the humanity of God. [52] D. M. Schlitt takes the triadic movement of Hegelian logic between the spheres of individuality, universality and particularity as a reformulation of Trinitarian theology. [53] Schlitt maintains a dichotomy between Hegelian *spirituality* and the Christian confession. [54] He recognizes, however, that there is value in Hegel's conviction that *spirituality* remains but an empty word if the human capacity for community is not grasped.

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[51] P. E. Przywara (1935) pp. 119 - 127.

[52] H. Küng (1987) Ch. 8. "Hegel ... appeals to the fact that this unity of God and man has been revealed in Christ. How can we then dispute the possibility of such a unity in the case of Hegel's philosophy, whilst at the same time presupposing it in that of our own Christology?" p. 431.

[53] D.M. Schlitt (1984) "The movement of Spirit ... is for Hegel the movement of the consciousness of God ... Trinity, absolute subjectivity" p. 228.

[54] D.M. Schlitt (1984) 'Hegel's intended immanent and consistent deductive argument always presupposes a movement from finite to infinite" p. 273.

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**2.** Merely to refer to what others have done is inadequate, however, if that which makes humanity *capax infiniti* or *capax Dei*, according to Hegel, is theologically inadequate.  Here we face the full consequences of Hegel's motif of totality or 'true' infinity; the subsuming of Enlightenment philosophy, religion, faith and social conditions within the idea of *spirituality* ideally present in every human consciousness: "Consciousness experiences both sides (particularity and totality) as equally essential moments" (418). [55]  As presented in the text, the character of *spirituality* in §§ 438 - 671 is decidedly post (or sub-Christian), offering an autonomous *spirituality* apart from the presence and person of the Holy Spirit.  Hence the need to distinguish between *denotative* and *connotative* argument when incorporating Hegel's insights into a Christian soteriology.

This, I have suggested, is not to use Hegel's *spirituality* as a model for theology in terms of a literal description of human potential in overcoming social forms of alienation.  Nor is it to say that what Hegel calls *spirituality* is an arbitrary use of a category which bears no significance whatever in terms of creation *Imago Dei*.  These are not the only two alternatives before us.  Rather, it is to propose reasons why analogical reasoning helps us to articulate theologically what God's salvation is like in social terms.  Hegel speaks of human reason as having a certain potential inherent in its nature.  This

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[55] For Hegel's distinction between faith and religion see the "Berne Plan" of 1794 which distinguishes religion and theology by suggesting that the latter maximize the rationality of the Idea of God.   H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 508 - 510.  Also, "The Frankfurt Sketch" (1798) in which faith is a mode of union with the object of belief and religion is a form of power set up to confine human activity.  *Ibid.* pp. 512 - 515.

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potential or capacity, I have suggested, reflects the created human orientation towards community which requires rational activity and its proper direction. Hence, it is possible to use Hegel's own goal setting exercise to identify trans-cultural forms of social alienation that reflect the loss of meaning associated with atomicity, and other forms of social deformation.

The passages we have considered have been disturbing ones, focussing again on the fragmentation of consciousness caused by the need to escape alienation in the real world. They are meant to disturb us, Judith Shklar believes, Hegel's intention being to expose the vanity of modern forms of ethical society life by showing how critical ethical theory can only be interior to totality or the "*essence* of self-consciousness" (437). [56] Hegel, better than most, expresses the fact that atomism and individualism is an obstacle to individuality and community in any age. Merely to posit community as a goal of human potential is not, however, to be able to overcome fear and domination historically. The goals that Hegel sets for community may yield only indecency and waste, it being a short step from his explanation of alienation within an overall vision of *spirituality* to the assumption that alienation can, and perhaps must, be controlled in order to facilitate that vision. [57]

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[56] J. Shklar (1976) p. 85.

[57] See Wyschogrod's (1985) *Spirit in Ashes* on links between alienation in Hegel and the man-made mass death of the twentieth century. "In making the fear of violent death ... the foundation of self-consciousness ... consciousness must experience the vicissitudes of concrete existence, as well as epistemological doubt, if Spirit is to mature". p. 120.

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Complete rejection of the Hegelian enterprise, however, including its attempt to reconstruct a non-alienating intersubjectivity, is to risk denying the rational capacity for community given to humankind as integral to selfhood. [58] A spirit of discernment must be practised in liberating whatever is of value in his work. Since humankind is made in God's image, each person has the ability to set and to assess the content of human relation and community. [59] To this end, my aim has been to incorporate ideas learned from Hegel and his interpreters of the human problem of sin and alienation, utilizing his insights to show how salvation is signified *concretely* in signs and acts of healing across the social spectrum.

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[58] Note the parallel with Habermas's warning against a complete rejection of cultural modernity, including that which points towards liberation in the Hegelian heritage. He does not want "to throw out the baby with the bathwater". J. Habermas"Neoconservative Cultural Criticism" in R.J. Bernstein (1985) p. 93.

[59] T. Aquinas *Summa Theologica*, 2a - 2ae. xxiii. 7. He quotes from Ps. lxxii. 28.

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## 6. A.  *HEGEL'S HOPES FOR COMMUNITY*

I move now to Chapters VII and VIII of the *Phenomenology*.  In Chapter VII, Hegel makes his first major exposition of the relation between theology and socio-philosophy on the basis of the speculative concept of religion.  (By speculative understand Hegel's total comprehension of all the various forms of consciousness).  Chapter VIII reaches a vantage point in the sections on "Absolute Knowing", bringing together the defining features of his idea of relation in "the reconciliation [*Versöhnung*] of consciousness" (794).  As ever, it is difficult to dig Hegel's meaning out from the obscure text.  However, from this vantage-point in the unfolding the drama of consciousness towards "the totality of its moments" (788) we can see the emergence of what he calls a new shape of *Spirit.*  In short, it is about the unity of universal self-consciousness and the ultimate object of respect; "it unites the objective form of Truth and of the knowing Self in an immediate unity" (805).  His concern is with the reconciling of alienated consciousness.

The central issue facing us has been well set by Habermas when he writes: "Hegel cannot obtain the aspect of reconciliation ... from self-consciousness or the reflective relationship of the knowing self".  [1]  Hegel's, he says, is a bad 'dialectic' of

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[1] J. Habermas (1987) p. 29.  Cf. S.B. Smith (1989) who also locates Hegel's project in problems of the divided self. He quotes Hegel: "The need for philosophy arises when the power of unification disappears from the life of man" p. 17. *Werke* 2: 22.  Unlike Habermas, Smith refuses to find in Hegel even limited inspiration for the communal spirit: "Hegel resisted the appeal of communtarianism as profoundly at odds with the deepest aspirations of modernity"

unresolved division between subject and object. It speculatively subsumes all community questions under the concept of the Absolute and the idea of totality. Speculative thinking describes Hegel's theoretical framework for pure philosophical activity, and there can be no balking at the fact that for Hegel knowledge of the Absolute involves some sense of the unity of all historical processes. Recall the Introduction to the *Phenomenology* which made this plain; "cognition ... excluded from the Absolute, is surely outside of the truth" (74).

Of interest here is relation between Hegel's speculative hopes for community and Habermas's substantive use of teleological reasoning. Habermas writes: "Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech". [2] This is the object of his paradigm shift from Hegelian self-determined to communicative reason. In the study so far, I have shown points of connaturality between *spirituality* in Hegel and Habermas's giving content to community through the idea of communicative intent. [3] Habermas makes language not reason *per se* the substance of sociality. It is still the reasoned speech act itself, however, which provides communicative effects when directed towards understanding. T. McCarthy writes: "Habermas wants ... to conceive of action theory as a reconstructive science concerned with the rational reconstruction of universal competences". [4] He is described by R.J. Berstein as a guardian of reason, standing against the mood of the times to eschew critical and

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pp. xi; 158 - 64;. 230.

[2] J. Habermas (1987 a) p. 287.

[3] See especially Ch. 3.

[4] T. McCarthy (1978) p. 335.

reconstructive reason. [5] In other words, there is some similarity between Habermas's setting community as a goal and Hegel's giving content to community through rational capacity.

The reason for my interest in this relation is the challenge to the Christian theologian from both Hegel and Habermas to speak more adequately of community. Hegel, for example, wants to provide for the historical realization of a rational unity in a post-Christian context; to "actualize this unity". The Christian religion, he says, must be superseded by the new speculative logic, his language of *spirituality* describing a higher unity for the individual with the infinity of objective relation or Absolute Knowing. [6] W. Jaeschke elaborates this theme by noting that Ch. VIII of the *Phenomenology*, entitled "Absolute Knowing", draws upon metaphysical aspects of Christianity. [7] He affirms the rational content of Christian dogma expounded by Hegel in "The Revealed Religion" as "the self-certainty of the community", pointing out how Ch. VIII builds upon the "relationship-of-consciousness" between the divine and human. [8]

The need to make a closer definition of possible hopes for community has already been illustrated. As I have shown, there is certainly no shortage of discussion on the subject. However, the striking feature of the study so far is the extent to which clear theological grounding is often lacking in this task.

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[5] R.J. Bernstein (1985) p. 25.

[6] See Hegel, *The Difference Essay,* p. 20 - 2. for an earlier treatment of speculation as raising individual identity to consciousness in a move to unity with otherness.

[7] W. Jaeschke (1990) pp. 186 - 207.

[8] W. Jaeschke (1990) p. 192.

Obviously this is a large question to try to address in a single study and to a large extent my arguments have been and continue to be rather skeletal. I hope, however, that they are not insubstantial and provide a reasonable indication of the type of analogical thought which, I believe, provides ways of attempting answers. The nub of the matter is threefold:

1. Why do Chapters VII and VIII of the *Phenomenology* move to a position beyond the idea of community known in "The Revealed Religion" (748 - 787)?  Should anything still be learned from his belief that Christianity provides merely a provisional answer to social needs?  "For it (consciousness) steps out of its actual world into pure consciousness, yet is itself generally still in the sphere of the actual world and its determinateness" (527).  The experience of faith, we have been reminded, is exposed by 'the Enlightenment' as an attempted escape from the objective world: "Pure consciousness, namely, is reflection out of the world of culture .... coming under the determinateness of *alienation*" [*Bestimmtheit der Entfremdung*] (§ 529).  The Christianity he experienced did not fully meet his basic insight that human experience in its inner life and public spheres is divided, frustrated and fearful.

2. What is inadequate in Hegel's own superseding of the Christian understanding of community?  His notion of the reconciling power of reason rests in the teleological hope of conscious knowledge of the pure 'idea'; "its fulfilment consists in perfectly *knowing* what *it is*, in knowing its substance" (808). [9]

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[9] Compare Kant's stipulation that conscious knowledge of the Absolute is

Speculative reason is the link between *'spiritual'* strength and social reformation; the power whereby humankind finds its own divinity: "superseded individuality ... through determination, to the universal" (789). Why have his hopes for reason permeating all reality been so discredited in recent years?

**3**. What kind of thought is able to sublate Hegel's own inadequate understanding of community? Not least is the question of how there can be universal hopes for community in a fragmented and atomistic society. [10] This is an especially acute question for theology when seeking to understand salvation in a social context since, in addressing this question, we are concerned with the communal life of the society in which we are placed. Each society is highly specific, with particular needs, characteristics and sense of history. How are the universal claims lying at the heart of a Christian soteriology to have bearing upon an infinite number of different social contexts without postulating Hegel's or another idea of totality? The following sections of this Chapter, that is, **6. B, 6. C** and **6. D** address the questions raised above in **1-3** respectively.

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impossible because, "All philosophy is either knowledge arising out of pure reason, or knowledge obtained by reason from empirical principles" (I. Kant, *C.P.R.* A 841 / B 869) and both pure and empirical philosophy reach an impasse before the concept of God.

[10] In Raymond Plant's words:

The intellectual problem for ... theology is how this general and universal vision lying at the heart of Christian faith and thought can be brought to bear upon societies with different histories, identities and sense of tradition.

In "Pluralism and Political Theology" in *Vision and Prophecy. The Tasks of Social Theology Today,* Centre for Theology and Public Issues, Occasional Paper No. 23, p. 6.

## 6. B. *HEGEL'S CHALLENGE TO THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY*

It is not an insignificant hazard when reading Hegel that he raises more questions than he answers. This is particularly true regarding his somewhat obscure references to the Christian community. In the *Phenomenology* the passages explicitly about community [*Gemeinschaft*] usually refer to the "Revealed Religion" (748-787) which is, says Hegel, an extended form of Christ-consciousness that intuitively unites the divine and the human. It does not, he says, grasp the significance of this unity rationally: "Its reconciliation ... is in its heart, but its consciousness is still divided against itself" (787). He wants his science of consciousness to mirror the more dynamic movement of the Absolute: "The implicitly available unity of consciousness and self-consciousness does not, therefore, yet exist for the community, although it is the community's concept to actualize this unity". [11]

The Christian community is explained as a sequel to natural and ancient Greek religions because of its conscious sense of the divine *Spirit* being present in humanity: "God is sensuously and directly beheld as a Self, as an actual individual man" (754). [12] Recall J. N. Findlay's rooting of Hegel's concept of the Absolute in a variant of Platonism which says that the highest thing to which human life can attain is knowledge of the unifying function of thought. [13] Findlay's 'revisionary metaphysical'

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[11] W. Jaeschke (1990) p. 206.

[12] See Q. Lauer (1976) pp. 244-255.

[13] J.N. Findlay (1970) chs. VII; VIII; XV, esp. pp.262f. Hegel is understood as modifying Aristotle's categories of scientific and metaphysical knowledge in

reading of Hegel, as we have seen, suggests that a classical rooting of Hegelian speculation is necessary in order to understand the unifying principle of thought that transcends and is prior to nature, knowledge and human relation. Complete or absolute hopes for community are integral to Hegel's idea of "the whole" [das Ganze] (801).

Not until the Berlin *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (1821 - 31) does Hegel more fully expound the 'spiritual' unity of philosophy and Christianity that he thinks is possible in the Christian community and beyond. [14] It becomes more obvious in the *Lectures* that his passionate desire is a wanting to heal the rift between the "so-called [pure] thinking of the Enlightenment" and what he deemed a doctrinal or positivist theology. [15]

> Here in the philosophy of religion it is more precisely God, or reason in
> principle, that is the object. God is essentially rational; is rationality that is
> alive, and as Spirit is in and for itself. [16]

Here, the community is supposedly less than essentially rational, less than self-conscious of its union with the Absolute;

> it has the character of a content produced from consciousness for which Spirit
> yearns ... it is not yet *in itself* its own content" (768).

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important ways that can be seen via his critique of the Kantian categories. He
retains much from Plato's theory of forms, notably his retaining of what Plato
calls *anamnesis* in the concept of *Erinnerung*.

[14] *L.P.R.*, Vol. 1, Intro 1824, § 38 f.

[15] *L.P.R.*, Vol. 1, Intro. 1824, § 38.

[16] *L.P.R.*, Vol. 1, Intro. 1824, § 53. See P. Gay (1970a) Ch. 3 on the
Enlighten ment thought of Galileo, Boyle and Newton as having changed intellectual
outlook more drastically than Reformed doctrine. For Hegel against the
'Enlightenment theology of reason' see *L.P.R., ibid.,* $W_1$, $W_2$ (Misc. P.), p. 122
n. 26.

As Gillian Rose observes, when understood speculatively, the Revealed Religion is opposed to what Hegel presents as orthodox Christianity: "The speculative reading of religious presentation explicates the contradiction between consciousness' definition of the absolute and its real existence. It is thus a phenomenology". [17] According to Hegel's interpretation of knowable reality, the Christian community must progress to a post-Christian state of Absolute Knowing.

This tells us why Hegel moves to a position beyond the idea of community known in "The Revealed Religion". It is because of its incorporation within the inclusive totality of Absolute Knowing. The further question was whether anything should still be learned from his criticism that Christianity provides merely a provisional answer to social needs. Over general questions lead to over exploited assertions about 'the social' as a locus of salvation. Hegel's challenge does come in the form of an over general question. Yet, something is to be gained from it, I believe, if it serves as a call to commitment and action. What do I mean by this?

i) First, it means that in answering the question: How are we to understand salvation in a social context? we must be prepared to **enlarge our vision** of what salvation is about. The orthodox, Protestant community known to Hegel's experience was reminded that the revelation of God's purpose was inadequately understood if restricted to their own private fellowships. For Hegel this

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[17] G. Rose (1971) p. 94. It is debatable whether the "Revealed Religion" in the *Phenomenology* is orthodox Christianity. See J. Yerkes (1983) who suggests the Hegel's notion of the "*ever-prese_nt*" redemptive possibility of Divine Spirit may be a viable theological position after the demise of Neo-Orthodoxy.

HEGEL'S CHALLENGE TO THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

meant incorporating socio-economic ideas learned from the Scottish economists A. Smith, J. Steuart and A. Ferguson into the doctrines of Lutheran piety. In the words of L. Dickey: "Hegel's problem was how to turn the arguments of the Scottish Enlightenment to the advantage of the religiopolitical ideal of Protestant civil piety". [18] In our own time, I suggest it means that it is not enough merely to say that the transforming energy of the cross has social implications. We must increasingly find forms of analogical thinking which stimulate reassessment of the soteriological content of the Christian faith. [19]

ii) Second, it means that in answering the question: How are we to understand salvation in a social context? we must be prepared to **enlarge our understanding** of what salvation is about. As we have seen, it is hard even to say what one is talking about when one speaks of the *social*. Salvation, I have emphasized, is the fulfilment and final perfection of what is proper to created being, in Christ, through the Holy Spirit. In K. Barth's words; "salvation is its *eschaton* .... being which has a *share* in the being of *God* ... an *eternal* being which is hidden in God". [20] The major question of this thesis has been about breaking with our philosophic heritage that is caught between the single 'I' and

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[18] L. Dickey (1987) p. xi. Note how the concept of folk-religion [*Volksreligion*] functions in the "Tübingen Essay" of 1793 in an ethico-political sense: "How must folk-religion be constituted? .... It must be so constituted that all the needs of life - the public affairs of the State are tied in with it". In H.S. Harris (1972) p. 499.

[19] Paul Fiddes' *Past Event and Present Salvation* draws on Abelard's primarily subjective locus for salvation and extends it to the social context. (1989) pp. 141f. "We must then try to understand the cross as having some effect upon the whole structure of human life and society". p. 152.

[20] K. Barth *C.D.* IV / 1 p. 8.

the universal 'We'. I have argued that Christian social theory need neither dissolve into a perspective from the 'I' nor accept some notion of society as a collective subject. [21] Neither alternative is acceptable because neither offers more adequate options that avoid both a restricted subjectivism and a notion of society as a single, static entity. Thus, enlarging our understanding of the fulness of salvation includes the question: "What will it mean for our understanding of the social?"

iii) Addressing this question involves **enlarging movement** between Christian and non-Christian social theory. Using Aquinas's idea of theology as a second order, reflective activity, I have argued that there is no abyss that separates the *analogia fidei* realm of 'first' theology and confessional doctrine from 'second' theology dialogue with non-Christian social theory. I have shown that it is neither good for 'first' theology to be without the theoretical logic of socio-philosophy nor to empty the content of salvation into human social relations. The one reaches out to the other. [22] This being so, the kind of agenda

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[21] Consider Marx's criticism of Feuerbach's failure to recognize groups within society, of not society itself, as processes with an active subject: "Feuerbach ... does not understand human activity itself as *objective* (*gegenständlich*) activity". In T.B. Bottomore and M. Rubel (ed.s) (1961, reprinted 1990), p. 82. On the idea of society as "A History with a Subject" see J. P. Miranda (1978). On "Consciousness and the Idea of Society" as a theme within Marxism see L. Kolakowski (1978) Vol. 1, Ch. V §§ 1 - 2; Vol. 2, Ch. 11, §§ 2 - 3.

[22] E. Dussel (1985) finds correspondence between the Christian content of incarnation and E. Levinas's talking about the revelation of the 'other' in terms of "Proximity" or an originative presence *prior to* the self-conscious initiation of relation. Levinas recasts Hegel's philosophy of social relations in ethical not soteriological terms, using the idea of God's presence in the stranger, the widow and the orphan to expose the violences of his totalizing reason. Dussel identifies

set for the study has been how engage in the type of dialogue required. This question is difficult, but the *analogical* task of theology has been developed as a reflective, second order exercise which looks for harmony between the meaning of salvation in Christ and liberative, edifying features in non-Christian socio-philosophy. I have used tools derived from Aquinas's classic texts about analogical reason as interpreted by contemporary liberation theologians. It is a *similarity-in-difference* way of thought, providing an interpretative framework through which to assess how salvation is signified socially. [23]

## 6. C. *RECONSIDERING COMMUNITY*

Practically speaking, this means understanding what is inadequate in Hegel's own superseding of the Christian understanding of community. Using analogical language, it is possible as E Jüngel suggests, for theology both to learn from Hegel and to criticize him. Jüngel uses Hegel as a support to theological reflection in rethinking his atheistic response to the "bad old God of the metaphysicians". This does not mean that he thinks God's *essence* [*Wesen*] should be expressed through the claims of reason; the exclusively Christological grounds of Jüngel's account are not compromised. [24] Rather, as he explains, it is important that we not only negate Hegel's

excluded 'otherness' with the peoples of Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia. E. Dussel (1985) p. 50; 244. Compare Levinas (1981) pp. 176 - 7.

[23] I am indebted for this phrase to D. Tracy (1981) pp. 408 f.

[24] J. B. Webster (1986) stresses how Jüngel understands the image of God like Barth from within the horizon of the history of Jesus. Ch. 9, pp. 104 - 5.

misguided hopes for community but transform them into new and more adequate articulations.

The problems of analogous talk about God are well documented by E. Jüngel. He mentions especially the appearance of always humanizing talk about God under the title analogy of the name (*analogia nominum*), whereby one thing - here the simplicity of the subject - is the hermeneutical reason for the same concept being applied to God. [25] We have seen already that Hegel wants to take Christian influences and understand them with a different philosophical content. In Chapters VII and VIII of the *Phenomenology*, illustration of this is given in the type of usage given to the word community in relation to his sense of universal absoluteness.

Some form of the root word *Gemein* occurs over eighty times in the *Phenomenology*. In noun form [*Gemeinschaft* ] it means those with a mutuality of interests (364), the moral society [*Gemeinde* ] (656), an international alliance [*Gemeinschaftlichkeit* ] (727), the Christian community (781-787), and a collective or unity of minds [*Gemeinsamkeit der Bewußtsein(e)* ] at the conclusion of the Preface (69). In adjectival form [*gemein, gemeinsam, gemeinsamkeit* ] means that which is held in common with another thing (543), with the form *gemeinschäftliche* sometimes having a peculiarly nationalist reference (727). There is a problem of definition in knowing how broad a sense in which to speak of society, compounded by the related use of *Gesamtheit* to mean a social form of the totality or whole (730), *das Gemeinwesen* an international community

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[25] E. Jüngel (1983) § 17 pp. 261 - 2.

or polity, although it is probably best translated by A.V. Miller as "commonwealth". This is in addition to the philosophical category *Allgemeinheiten* (729; 730; 745), which is used by Hegel to mean universality but can refer in common parlance to the general public.

It is important to note in this respect how the notion of the Christian community features in relation to words derivative from the verb, to speculate. The noun 'speculation' [*spekulation*] occurs only once in the *Phenomenology* as a derogatory term used of "abstract thought" (580). Here it means an aspect of 'the Enlightenment' that Hegel attacked because of its unreflective, 'in itself' [*an sich*] form of consciousness. It refers to Kant's principle of complete determination which says to know a thing we must know every possible predicate and must determine it thereby as a sum total in itself, or object that is only implicitly 'for us'. [26] Adjectival forms occur far more commonly; eighteen time in fact, for example, in "The Revealed Religion" (§§ 761f.) where speculative thinking tries to understand the Revealed Religion within an idea of totality or the whole. This notion of totality or the whole is the process of development through which, Hegel says, everything can be comprehended by reason: "Speculative knowledge knows God as Thought or pure Essence, and knows this Thought as simple Being and as Existence" (*ibid.*).

Hegel's intention is to establish "the object", that is, all that

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[26] I. Kant *C.P.R.* A 572 / B 600. For Hegel, a thing 'in itself' must be complemented by its being 'for us' i.e., transformed into a moment within conscious development.

can be objectified in thought, ultimately all human history, "as
an *implicitly* spiritual being" (788). In other words, to
establish the link between the '*spiritual* ' (in the sense of the
speculative harmonization of consciousness with itself) and
historical social processes. The point cannot be made too
strongly that Hegel's notion of this '*spiritual*', speculative
relation has a technical sense in his claim for unity between an
objective observation of reality and idealist associations with
Platonism. G. Lukács's *The Destruction of Reason* captures this
in the tension between Hegel's search for objectivity and his
idealist tendency by referring repeatedly to his 'objective
idealism' and the thin dividing line between rationality and
irrationality. [27]

In this, he is much inspired by Jakob Böhme and others of
German Romantic philosophy. His letters boasted at times of
having been a follower of Böhme from his youth. [28] Particularly
evident in these passages are reminiscences of Böhme's
conceiving of the world progressing towards unity with the self-
manifestation of the Divine being; "Spirit emptied out into
Time" (808). [29] Of particular interest here is how this unity is

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[27] G. Lukács (1980) Ch. V, "Neo-Hegelianism".

[28] On receiving the complete works of Böhme from P. G. van Ghert in 1811 Hegel
wrote to Ghert enthusing about his unsystematic attempts to to think abstractly
and to bring the elements of speculative conception under some control: "*Bei ...
seiner eigenen wenigen Bildung, abstrakt zu denken ist sein Bestreben der
härteste Kampf, das tiefe Spekulative, das er in seiner Anschauung hat, in die
Vorstellung zu bringen ...*" See Ernst Benz (1983) pp. 13; 108 - 110.

[29] "For God has not brought forth the creation, that he should be therby perfect,
but for his own manifestation ... for the great joy and glory." J. Böhme, "The
Signature of all Things" Ch. XVI in *Works*, C. J. Barber Ed. (1909) London.

manifest in community.  W. Jaeschke suggests:

> For it belongs to the concept of religion to be the self-consciousness of spirit
>
> in the form of consciousness [of an object]  ... in philosophy of religion
>
> self-conscious spirit itself - and not a representation - becomes the object
>
> of its consciousness".  [30]

Knowledge of the divine is woven into the texture of discourse about human consciousness and relation.  The threat, however, is that the Christian God either disappears into the distant realm of the unconditioned or loses his objective distinctiveness from human experience

Any hopes for community would, on this view, take place within a metanarrative or metaphysic of totality that reveals some kind of absolute truth of reason in a non contextual sense. The clearest picture of this in the *Philosophy of History*  which looks at society within the ancient Oriental and Greek worlds, the 'reflective' period of Roman history and the 'philosophical' history of the German world. [31]  Reason has been given some kind of metaphysical foundation.  However, this kind of foundation has been thoroughly criticized in recent years.  The accusations of Horkheimer and Adorno that Hegel "played a bloody role in the true history of the human race" have made us

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[30] W. Jaeschke (1990) p. 193.  An underlying question here is whether the *Phenomenology* is an integral unity including the last chapter on 'Absolute Knowing".  On the time lapse between the "Introduction", "Preface" and Ch. VIII see W. Marx (1975) who argues for an overall structural unity.  On the controversy between T. Haering and O. Pöggeler over the status of Ch. VIII see R. Pippin (1989) pp. 109 f.

[31] On this threefold structure as a modern myth see P. Springborg, 'Politics, Primordialism and Orientalism: Marx, Aristotle and the myth of the *Gemeinschaft*' in *American Political Science Review*,  Vol. 80, no. 1, March 1986, pp. 185f.

all too wary of the totalizing tendency of his speculative reason; the singularity of the 'I' taken up in the totality or "movement of the universal" (789) [32] In relation to this, Chapter 4 showed that Hegel's ontology of singleness suggests a perverted notion of totality that leaves the 'other' outside. [33]

Thus, there is no place for any speculative hope for community in which universal presuppositions are supposedly derived from Hegel's overall metaphysical framework and its pattern of self-consciousness; "self-consciousness gains the form of universality and what remains to it is ... the Notion that has attained its realization" (795). Bonhoeffer, in his 1933 Hegel-Seminar, referred to Hegel's admiration of the ancient Greek religion (treated in the *Phenomenology* as a discussion of aesthetics (699 - 748)) as the 'fairer' [*heitere*] religion because of its comprising reconciliation by nature. [34] He reminds us that the *Phenomenology* argues for a type of reconciliation inherent in the nature of reason that is reminiscent of the age-long tendency of philosophy towards the idea of Absolute unity. Instead, we must consider what kind of thought is able to sublate Hegel's own inadequate understanding of *spirituality* and community.

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[32] M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno (1972) p. 224.

[33] "The Hegelian *Aufhebung* ... is included *within* the circle of absolute knowledge, never exceeds its closure ... belongs to restricted economy", describing Hegelian *spirituality* as the circulation of prohibitions, unable to break out of the drive from negation to counter negation. J. Derrida (1978) p. 275.

[34] "[*E*]nhalt Versohntsein von Haus aus". Ilse Tödt (Hg.) (1988) p. 15.

## 6. D. *INCREASED COLLABORATION*

I have argued for the increasingly collaborative character of the theological task, pursuing Aquinas's analogical model for theology as a reflective word after faith. Hegel, we have seen, threatens to diminish the radical 'otherness' of Christ's divinity, penetrating beyond the plane of analogy to rise above God. [35] "Science contains within itself ... the passage of the Notion into *consciousness*" (806). In R. Pippin's words; "all human activity should be explained, accounted for and evaluated only in terms appropriate to rational, in his terms, spiritual or non-natural beings." [36] Does this mean, however, that we must retreat into a kind of isolationism in which non-Christian social theory is treated as an area of human autonomy; "a distorted and distant echo" of Christianity? [37]

The legitimacy of analogical thinking in theology is an issue over which many battles have been thought. Recall Karl Barth's now infamous judgement in the Introduction to *Church Dogmatics* which stated that *analogia entis* is the invention of the Antichrist. [38] For him there can be no philosophical

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[35] See E. Heintel's (1958) *Hegel und die Analogia Entis* which understands the relation between a legitmate logic of analogy and Hegel's speculative sense in terms of the ontic difference between knowledge of the Absolute and absolute knowledge.

[36] R. Pippin, "The Rose and the Owl: Some remarks on the Theory - Practice Problem in Hegel", *The Independent Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 111 (1979) pp. 7 - 8.

[37] J Milbank (1990) p. 390.

[38] "*[H]alte die analogia entis für die Erfindung des Antichrist und denke, daß man ihretwegen nicht katholisch werden kann*". *C.D.* 1/1, § VIII. E. Mechels traces the development of Barth's treatment of this question in his (1974) *Analogie bei Erich Przywara und Karl Barth*. He contrasts Barth with Przywara

substitute for theology's presenting of the Word of God, making the *analogia fidei* a primal meaning for interpreting all reality. The implied suggestion in this thesis is that we can move beyond the conflict about discussions of analogy (*analogia entis*) being said to be 'from below' *vis-á-vis* the analogy of faith (*analogia fidei* ) which is from above. The two are not alternatives. In order to understand their relation, I have been arguing consistently that theology must meet with non-Christian social theory. This is necessary if we are to distinguish practically between alienation and liberation, capacity and incapacity, creativeness and destructiveness in the world. As Aquinas writes: "Our intellect, which knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures". [39] The doctrine of salvation takes its metaphors / understanding concerning God out of the world of human beings. Simultaneously, the eyes of faith are required if the meaning of salvation is to be understood as coming 'from above'.

This leads us fairly naturally back to the work of Jürgen Habermas and his recovering the idea of community for

for whom the *analogia entis* entailed no postulate of natural theology but was about the structure of relation "*Wesensstruktur*" of the revealed God and humankind. See esp. pp. 122 - 124. Note Barth's comment on the independent nature of philosophy; "philosophy cannot go beyond ... the Word of God itself, if it is to be true to its own task, if it is not to become theology". *Ethics* p. 44.

[39] T. Aquinas *S. Th.* 1, Qu. 13, art. 4, p, 156. Also 1, Qu. 13, art. 1 p. 149. The analogy of proportion is to be distinguished from the analogy of attribution in which non-comparable relations of different things are held with the one thing they have in common; "according to the proportion of many things to one". *S Th.* 1, Qu. 13, art. 5, p. 159.

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philosophy. Habermas, since his doctoral dissertation in 1954 (Univ. of Bonn), *Das Absolute und die Geschichte. Vonder Zwiespältigkeit in Schelling's Denken*, has refused to postulate an objectifiable idea of society distinct from empirically, naturally and socially generated subjects, specifically in order to avoid any association with Hegel's idea of totality. [40] The crux issue is Habermas's search for a non-Absolute concept of reason that will provide a basis for the testing of truth and legitimacy in social relations. "Validity claims are *internally* connected", he says, "with reasons and grounds". [41] Making communicative rationality the basis for liberative social action, he tests the legitimacy of the criteria by which to evaluate any notion of community by its findings: "The universal pragmatic conditions of possibility of rationally justifying norms of action or evaluation have themselves a normative character". [42]

In turning to Habermas, I have attempted to give practical content to an understanding of the social in terms that find critical correspondence between Christian and non-Christian social theory. If salvation has a wider than ecclesial reference, God's revelation in Christ yields a sociality not only to be worked out in the Christian community, but collaboratively with

[40] Cf. R. Engels, "The Revolution against Hegel" in L.S. Feuer (Ed.), pp. 237 - 256. Also Lukács (1980) p. 547 on the progressive elements in Hegel's dialectic with which Marx could and could not associate himself when critically re-worked in a materialist dialectic.

[41] J. Habermas (1987 a) p. 301. On the logic of legitimation problems see J. Habermas (1973) Pt. 111, esp. Ch. 2 "The Relation of Practical Questions to Truth" for his discursive theory of truth.

[42] These words are T. McCarthy's (1978) p. 325 but quoted by Habermas as outlining the intent of his universalization thesis in J.B. Thompson & D. Held Ed.s (1982) p. 256.

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non-Christian social theory. [43] Hence the need to resituate Hegel's starting point for consideration of the self from particularity to sociality, and the need to call on examples of socio-philosophy for what they might disclose of the social form of God's salvation. Chapters VII and VIII of the *Phenomenology* thus remind us of both the totalitarian dangers of Hegelian-influenced speculative thinking but also lend urgency to consideration of alternative notions of communicative rationality as bases for testing liberative social action.

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[43] Note the points of contact here with theology after the manner of Bonhoeffer which, W.W. Floyd suggests; "must be able to articulate meaningfully its own ... ethics of difference". W.W. Floyd (1988) p. 11. See D. Bonhoeffer (1962) "In principle, the idea of a contingent revelation of God in Christ denies the possibility of the I's self-comprehension ... revelation must therefore yield an epistemology of its own". p. 15.

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## 7. A. RENEWAL FOR ACTION

The argument of this thesis has occurred in four 'moves' or stages. In a first move (the Introduction) the background of the problem was sketched. I outlined the need to avoid this dualism which is the hazard of the salvation in a social context debate. This corresponds to the attitude of openness to debate with non-Christian social theory which, I said, was imperative for analogical theology. [1] Chapters 1 and 2 outlined the 'I' - 'We' dilemma in relation to deconstructive and constructive interpretations of Hegel, noting parallels between Hegel's notion of the 'I' and his understanding of the concept God. This corresponds to the task of investigation which is the second 'move' or stage in the analogical task. In Chapter 3, the foreground stage of the argument was developed and the problem of Hegel's individualism was related to Habermas's communicative paradigm shift. By understanding theology as a fundamentally interpretative and critical exercise the issue of communicative not instrumental rationality was taken as a parable, enabling theological articulation of what God's salvation is like in socio-philosophic terms. This comprised the third 'move' or task of making specific points of contact between theology and socio-philosophy. There followed the need to develop the second and third of these 'moves' in an integrated fashion and Chapters 4 and 5 risked presenting liberation from alienation and human *spirituality* as themes shared by Hegel and Christian understanding. Chapter 6 considered §§ 672 - 808 of the *Phenomenology*, looking at Hegel's universal theses about the nature of community.

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[1] See Introduction, pp. 30 f.

Thus, between doctrinal confession of the gospel of salvation and the actions that have to be decided upon in particular situations, I have argued the need for a mediation through non-Christian social theory. The Christian theologian, seeing the context of surrounding social life damaged by different forms of alienation, becomes conscious of the trans-historical nature of this tragic state. S/he might ask, is the idea of salvation in a social context one of those articles of faith which, like the doctrine of the Trinity, all Christians are "supposed" to accept although, in Kant's words, it "provides nothing, absolutely nothing, of practical value"? [2] The Christian doctrine of salvation will indeed be of little practical value unless specific, provisional definitions of the type of action required of Christians can be given in a particular time and place. For this reason, over against any separatist claims for theology's heterogeneity and otherness, I have felt compelled to analogical inquiry.

The question with which I began was: How are we to understand salvation in a social context? I have tried throughout to emphasize as hard as I can the sceptical case about the possibility of speaking about 'the social'. I do not share this scepticism, and have argued that there are ways of answering the various charges laid against the possibility of renewed Christian social theory. The deep dilemma between talking of 'the social' either in terms of the functions of collected individuals or of 'society' as a single, static entity has been traced to some of its roots in eighteenth and nineteenth century German socio-philosophy. Having done this, the challenge was not just to attack the resulting individualism of

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[2] Shirley C. Guthrie takes this quote from Kant. See *Theology Today*, Vol. 46, 1989-90, p. 205.

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much modern socio-philosophy but to show that the aforesaid dilemma can, to some extent, be resolved in the activity of communication. In this, Habermas's communicative action theory acted like a *parable*, enabling theological articulation of the openness of the future to human liberation and community, and what that signifies of God's salvation. Now, in the final Chapter, I attend to the fourth 'move' or stage of the analogical task which is to refocus on the substantive theological issues, summarizing the findings of the study.

## 7. B. *ACTION IN THE WORLD*

The motive force in the study has been the idea that God's operation in Christ exemplifies a form of relation, instances of which can be adduced in dialogue with non-Christian social theory. With properly derived analogical tools, the task has been to talk about 'the social' and to assess social and political values. The task of social theology has been twofold, that of deriving doctrinal, theoretical understanding of salvation ('first' theology) and that of going through socio-analytic mediation ('second' theology). In the words of Gottlieb Söhngen, a one time influence on E. Jüngel; "the divine metaphor / parable (*Gleichnisrede*) camps in the middle of our earthly-human world of metaphors / parables (*Gleichniswelt*)". [3]

I refer to Söhngen because he illustrates the crux of the matter

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[3] G. Söhngen (1952) "*die göttliche Gleichnisrede zeltet metten in unserer irdisch-menschlichen Gleichniswelt*" p. 241. The *analogia entis,* he says, derives from the human world of being (*Seinswelt*) and the *analogia fidei* from the world of faith. pp. 236-7. For E. Jüngel's reference to Söhngen see (1983) pp. 262; 289.

which is that 'first' theology, or the *analogia fidei,* would not yield itself to analogy in any relevant sense without its humanly rooted yet God inspired power of picture and metaphor. Similarly, 'second' theology would not be theology without its reading the social nature of humanity 'from above', with a point of departure in God's revelation of himself in Christ through his offer of salvation. The two senses are in interaction, the one energizing a new and evocative meaning in the other. It is helpful, perhaps, to compare this position with the "two cities" approach of, for example, J. Milbank which draws substantially on Augustine's distinction between *civitas terrena* and *civitas Dei.* Milbank's *Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason* probes the concept of the 'secular' in relation to the Christian tradition. Reacting against the "let the world set the agenda" mood that was popular in the 1960's and 1970's, Milbank shakes off the confinements that theology suffers when adapting itself to secular notions of reason. He wants "to restore in postmodern terms, the possibility of theology as a meta discourse", [4] that is, to rediscover the Christological-ecclesial narrative of the Christian tradition as an exemplary form of human community independent of other disciplines.

For Milbank, the question when reading Hegel in particular is: Who sets the agenda? The question is a legitimate one and his answer is that Christian social theory must recover itself as a "metanarrative" or ultimate way of thinking: "It is theology itself that will have to provide its own account of the final causes at work in history". [5] His concern is that Christian social theory

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[4] J. Milbank (1990) pp. 1; 380-88.

does not become a province or reserve within secular reason. (For example, using the Hegelian language of *Sittlichkeit* in talking of the Christian community, he subsumes Hegel within the "metanarrative" or Christian account of history.) My concern in response is that this fails to come to terms with the human capacity / incapacity issue dealt with previously. [6] A "two cities" approach fails to recognise what is good and of value in human reason *per se*, and consequently is unable to establish a framework for dialogue. The alternative is to resign oneself instead to an Augustinian flight from the 'secular' because of its domination by power struggles. [7]

Little is to be hoped, Milbank feels, for Christian / non-Christian dialogue because force and the control of force is at the root of any secular social theory. This is clear even from the structure of the book which centers around four variants of secular reason selected to demonstrate 'secular' reason's domination by the issue of power. [8] Secular government is said to be "committed by its very nature only to the formal goals of *dominium* ". [9] The implication is that the social responsibility

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[5] J. Milbank (1990) p. 380.

[6] See Ch. 5 C.

[7] A useful overview of power struggle and the overcoming of alienation as formative ideas for German sociology, especially in the Weimar Republic is D. Frisby (1983) *The Alienated Mind.*

[8] Milbank (1990) pp. 9-23 on the different roots of the secular. Four variants of secular reason are identified as Liberalism (a fusion of scientific and theological discourse), Positivism (the presupposition of a social organism preceding virtue or politics), Dialectics (an explaining of human inter-action through the power of the negative), and Difference (a relativism suggesting randomness and particularity at the level of 'ultimate reality').

[9] Milbank (1990) p. 422.

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of the Christian community must lie elsewhere than in striving for a better 'secular' social theory; "What theology has forgotten", he writes, "is that it cannot contest or learn from this understanding as such, but has either to accept or deny its object". [10] No compromise can be allowed to dilute the distinctiveness of Christian social theory; "if Christianity seeks to 'find a place for' secular reason, it may be perversely compromising with what, on its own terms, is either deviancy or falsehood". [11] Note his brief dismissal of Karl-Otto Apel's attempt to postulate liberative content in the activity of communicative reason as naïve in assessing the assemblage of claims to rational justification for action. [12] The matter does not end here, however, if we are not to risk the church and the world becoming detached regions with different modes of knowledge and non-related interests. [13]

I should note that Milbank criticizes spatial designations of the Christian community as *Civitas Dei*. [14] There is no question but

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[10] Milbank (1990) p. 10.

[11] Milbank (1990) p. 23. Compare N. Pittenger (1982) who speaks of the man Jesus as 'imaging' the responsive love that reconciles the world to God an an analogy of human salvation. pp. 103-8.

[12] Milbank (1990) p. 272. See K.O. Apel (1973) pp. 252-267, also "The Problem of Philosophical Fundamental Grounding in light of a Transcendental Pragmatic of Language", in *Man and World*, 8; "I conclude that the life-element" of philosophical arguments is a *transcendental language game* in which ... the *transcendental-pragmatic rules or narms of ideal comunication* is presupposed". pp. 239-275. Note that S.K. White (1988), like Milbank, criticizes Habermas for not accounting adequately for human motivation. pp. 4 f.

[13] On distortions in applications of Augustine and Luther's "Two Kingdoms doctrine" see U. Duchrow, "The Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms as Resource for Our Time: Help or Hindrance" in *Luther et la Réforme allemande dans une perspective oecuménique*, Geneva (1983) pp. 249-262.

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that the Christian and secular meet on the same plane; "the inhabitants of the *altera civitas* ", he says, are "on pilgrimage through this temporary world". [15] However, little provision is made for Christian engagement in social theory alongside secular theorists because power cycles dominate the latter. *Civitas Dei* and the *altera civitas* tend to be separated due to the little perceived commonality in their procedures and interests. There are genuine difficulties that Milbank identifies. In particular, is his reminder that only God-centred humanity can be said by Christians to provide for the fulfilment of true society, emphasizing the need for radical negation of Hegel's recasting of Christian doctrine in terms of a self-determining rationality. This might be expressed in terms of what David Tracy calls "negative dialectics", meaning the judgement brought on analogical thought in Jesus Christ as Word-Event. [16]

Two things remain to be said in response to his approach, however. First, the Christian community is not free of the power cycles which, Milbank says, dominate 'secular' relations. [17] Second, the "two cities" approach risks making sin the primary point of reference rather than salvation and the mystery of the Holy Spirit's work in maintaining an openness in the human order to liberative human relations. [18] When the former is emphasized

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[14] Milbank (1990) pp. 422-3

[15] Milbank (1990) p. 380.

[16] D. Tracy (1981) pp. 415f.

[17] See R.H. Roberts, "Lord, Bondsman and Churchman" in C.E. Gunton and D.W. Hardy, Eds., (1989) for parallels between the Hegelian parable and relations between clergy and laity in contemporary church structures.

[18] On openness in the human order as a mark of the world's inseparability from the Holy Spirit see J. Zizioulas, "Preserving God's Creation" in *King's Theological*

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rather than the latter, the result, as I have suggested, is the familiar "two cities' dualism which risks undermining the mystery of God's abiding presence in creation.

## 7. C.  *TIME FOR ANALOGICAL THEOLOGY*

The argument which I have been proposing is that Christian discourse about salvation can, and perhaps must, be mediated through non-Christian social theory if we are to effect an adequate articulation of salvation socially.  Primarily I have been arguing for an attitude, a manner of doing theology, rather than a formal means of procedure although the 'moves' or stages specified are intended as an elucidation of the possibilities for analogical theology.  By way of summary, let me turn to the familiar model of analogical practice that Aquinas has helped us to consider.  I refer to the content in human relations that is common to Christian and non-Christian social theory [L. *ratio communis*] which, if taken to signify salvation socially, can be said to be analogous.  Aquinas wrote that analogy signifies a middle [L. *medius*] between two types of discourse, the univocal and the equivocal. [19]  The character of this "middle" has occupied our minds throughout this study and I have argued that the content of salvation will mediate, participate in and include something of the modes of both realms of discourse.

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*Journal*,  Spring 1990, pp. 1-5.

[19] T. Aquinas *S. Th.* 1a, q. 13, a. 5.  "A term may be predicated of various subjects in three ways, univocally, equivocally and analogically.  Univocally, if the same term and meaning is used in exactly the same sense, ... equivocally, if the term is the same but the meaning and definition different, ... analogically, if various objects, though diverse by meaning and definition, bear on some one common meaning".  Opusc. 11, *de Principiis Naturae ad fratrem Silvestrum.*  Quoted from T. Gilby (1953) p. 93.

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To conclude let me express this using Aquinas's distinction between univocal and equivocal discourse. [20] Aquinas says that univocal discourse is that when there is a commonness of meaning shared in a particular context of usage as, for instance; "when the generic nature is predicated of the species with exactly the same force and meaning". [21] If univocation is that use of a common name to signify the same notion in each realm of discourse, much of this study has been about social concerns shared between theological discourse and socio-philosophy. [22] The human need for identity, the fear of death and alienation, and the hope of liberative social action in community fall under a common intent where some affinity between Christian and non-Christian social theory can be ascertained. This is what Clodovis Boff calls a "correspondence of relationships" between doctrinal matters and social analysis. It does not, he says, imply a univocal predication of God and humankind; it does not "designate an equality between *terms* of the hermeneutic equation, but precisely between the respective *relationships* between pairs of terms". [23] The issue is our recognition of the relationship between theological discourse and its social context.

This relationship cannot properly be conceived, however, if we only extract its common notes. We need Aquinas's sense of things which are named equivocally, having a common name but signifying

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[20] D. Burrell (1973) warns against too marked a division into univocal and equivocal discourse on the basis of Wittgenstein's denial that we can ever construe an adequate formulation of the meanings or the kinds of contexts involved. pp. 218 f.

[21] T. Aquinas *S. Th.* 2a-2ae. cxx. 2, c.

[22] For further definition of Aquinas's sense of univocation see R. McInerny (1968) Ch. 1, pp. 1-12; D. Burrell (1973) pp. 70-1, 129, 144, 218.

[23] C. Boff (1987) p. 148.

diverse things.  For instance, when speaking of the relation between philosophical and theological discourse, Aquinas writes: "Merely rational inquiry can lead to the first, but the second lies beyond the unaided reason". [24]  Theology signifies different notions about the relation of God to the world from the intentions of philosophical discourse.  So, when the notions of liberation and healing are used of society from a theological perspective they exhibit an inner tension which gives rise to an extended meaning. To speak of liberation and healing theologically has an additional bearing on divine truth.  There is no complete equivocation between Christian and non-Christian social theory.

While pursuing this line of thought, I referred to what happens in such a use of language as a 'transignification', Clodovis Boff's word for the operation of opening up an image to its theological dimension. [25]  It is the use of a word to allow a sense that is more than syntactical and which takes us beyond human arrangements to convey the divine presence and power by which the individual and society can be transformed. [26]  I mention this idea of 'transignification' again because my perception of its meaning is a sense in which the raising of the aforesaid issues about salvation in a social context is a channel whereby the distinction yet affinity between Christian and non-Christian social theory conveys divine presence and power.  As Aquinas writes: "The

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[24] T. Aquinas 1 *Conta Gentes*, 9. Quoted from T. Gilby (1953) p. 5.

[25] See Ch. 4. G.

[26] For a brief summary of the use of the idea of 'signification' in Catholic eucharistic theology see W. Kasper (1989) pp. Ch. X "Aspects of the Eucharist in Their Unity and Variety".

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truths of philosophy are more restricted; they cannot be contrary to the truths of faith, but instead offer likenesses and anticipations of them". [27] Christian faith does not stop at discourse about human relation but looks to be renewed continually in its understanding of God as Trinity in order to reflect this in its discourse about salvation socially. Hence the central theological claim being made in this study that true individual identity, release from alienation and community are found in the human vocation to grow in the likeness of God. [28]

## 7. D. *THE RENEWAL OF VISION FOR SERVICE*

The intellectual problems in this study have thus been attached to the idea that God's salvation in Christ is confessed as having some a world-wide, universal effect, some sense of all human vocation being found in Christ the true likeness of God. I have addressed the question as to how a contemporary soteriology is to give content and quality to God's extra-ecclesial saving purposes in particular situations, without making the type of absolute explanations of social processes that Hegel propounds. Unlike the "two cities" approach to secular reason that makes little provision for Christian engagement in social theory alongside secular theorists, I have argued the theological responsibility of discerning with non-Christian social theory what, in social,

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[27] T. Aquinas, Exposition, *de Trinitate*, ii. 3. Quoted from T. Gilby (1953) p. 8.

[28] Aquinas writes: "No agent acts unless aimed at a goal". God is the ultimate goal of humankind. *S. Th.* 1a1. 3-7 in T. McDermott (1989) pp. 167f. Compare this with D. Cupitt's translating of Hegel's immanent critique of Christianity into a form of human spirituality that breaks free of supposedly tired beliefs in the transcendent. "To speak of God is to speak about the moral and spiritual goals we ought to be aiming at". (1984) p. 270.

economic, political terms etc. is derived either by a co-operative calculation. Let me finish by quoting from the Book of Proverbs: "Where there is no vision the people perish". [29] For too long we have had no vision for how to speak of salvation in social context. Fresh, contemporary interest in analogical thinking, I believe, helps renew our vision.

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[29] Prov. 29:18.

**THE RENEWAL OF VISION FOR SERVICE**

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